

**United Nations' Response to Natural Disasters: A Comparative  
Study of Tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
for award of the degree of*

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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
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*Economic damage*  
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**List of Abbreviations**

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| ALES     | Aceh Local Elections Support                          |
| ASEAN    | Association of Southeast Asian Nations                |
| ATDTF    | Asian Tsunami Disaster Task Force                     |
| BAPPENAS | Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional                |
| BBB      | Build Back Better                                     |
| BRR      | Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi                   |
| BCPR     | Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery             |
| BCPR     | Bureau of emergency Prevention and Recovery           |
| CA       | Consolidated Appeal                                   |
| CADREP   | Capacity Development for Recovery Programme           |
| CADRI    | Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative            |
| CAP      | Consolidated Appeals Process                          |
| CBDRM    | Capacity Development and Recovery Programme           |
| CBO      | Community based organisations                         |
| CCA      | Common Country Assessment                             |
| CCC      | Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies          |
| CERF     | Central Emergency Response Fund                       |
| CFS      | Child-Friendly Schools                                |
| CfW      | Cash for Work   |
| CHEs     | Complex Humanitarian Emergencies                      |
| CFS      | Children Friendly School                              |
| CMCoord  | Civil-Military Coordination                           |
| CNO      | Centre for National Operations                        |
| CLTS     | Community Led Total Sanitation                        |
| CRPD     | Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities |
| DAD      | Development Assistance Database                       |
| DAD      | Donor Assistance Database                             |
| DPCCS    | Department of Probation and Child Care Services       |
| DHA      | Department of Humanitarian Affairs                    |
| DMC      | Disaster Management Centre                            |
| DMT      | Disaster Management Team                              |

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| DPPCS   | Department of Probation and Child Care Services     |
| DRR     | Disaster Risk Reduction                             |
| DRU     | Disaster Reduction Unit                             |
| ECD     | Early Childhood Development                         |
| ECHA    | Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs         |
| EEZ     | Exclusive Economic Zone                             |
| EMOPS   | Office of Emergency Programmes                      |
| EPF     | Emergency Programme Fund                            |
| ERC     | Emergency Relief Coordinator                        |
| ERD     | Emergency Response Division                         |
| ERTP    | Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery        |
| ERTR    | Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery        |
| EWSS    | Early warning system in Sri Lanka                   |
| FAO     | Food and Agriculture Organisation                   |
| GAM     | Gerakan Aceh Merdeka                                |
| GDP     | gross domestic product                              |
| GIST    | Geographic Information Support Teams                |
| GIS     | Geographic Information System                       |
| GIST    | Geographic Information Support Teams                |
| GoI     | Government of Indonesia                             |
| GoSL    | Government of Sri Lanka                             |
| GOI     | Government of Indonesia                             |
| GDP     | Gross Domestic Product                              |
| HC      | Humanitarian Coordinator                            |
| HFA     | Hyogo Framework for Action                          |
| HIC     | Humanitarian Information Center                     |
| UNIMS   | United Nations Information Management System        |
| IASC    | Inter-Agency Standing Committee                     |
| IATF/DR | Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction       |
| ICVA    | International Council of Voluntary Agencies         |
| ICRC    | International Committee of the Red Cross            |
| IDNDR   | International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction |
| IDPs    | Internally Displaced Persons                        |

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| IFIs      | International Financial Institutions                            |
| IFRC      | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent          |
| IGOs      | Intergovernmental organisations                                 |
| ILO       | International Labour Organisation                               |
| INGOs     | International non-governmental organisation                     |
| INSARAG   | International Search and Rescue Advisory Group                  |
| ICCPR     | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights            |
| ICESCR    | International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights |
| IFIs      | International Financial Institutions                            |
| INTERFAIS | International Food Aid Information System                       |
| ISDR      | International Strategy for Disaster Reduction                   |
| IOM       | International Organisation for Migration                        |
| IPCC      | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change                       |
| IRU       | International Relief Union                                      |
| ISDR      | International Strategy for Disaster Reduction                   |
| KIP       | Independent Committee for Elections                             |
| LDCs      | Low Developing Countries  |
| LRWG      | Livelihood Recovery Working Group                               |
| LTTE      | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam                                 |
| MDF       | Multi Donor Fund  |
| MDGs      | Millennium Development Goals                                    |
| MENR      | Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources                   |
| MoE       | Ministry of Education   |
| MOH       | Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition                            |
| MOH       | Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition                            |
| MSF       | Médecins Sans Frontières  |
| NAD       | Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam  |
| NCPA      | National Child Protection Authority                             |
| NDMC      | National Disaster Management Centre                             |
| NFI       | Non-Food Items  |
| NGOs      | Non-Governmental Organisations                                  |
| OCHA      | Office of Coordination of Humanitarian affairs                  |

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| OECD     | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development                       |
| ORS      | Oral Rehydration Solution   |
| OSE      | Office of the Special Envoy   |
| OSOCC    | On-site Operations Coordination Centre                                      |
| PAEDF    | Preparatory assistance for Establishing Disaster Management Framework       |
| PAHO     | Pan-American Health Organisation  |
| PDES     | Policy Development and Evaluation Service                                   |
| PWDs     | Person with disabilities  |
| PLA      | People's Liberation Army  |
| POE      | Provincial Office of Education  |
| P-TOMS   | Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure                                 |
| QIPs     | Quick Impact Projects   |
| RADA     | Reconstruction and Development Agency                                       |
| RALS     | Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces   |
| RAN      | Recovery Aceh Nias  |
| RCB      | Response Coordination Branch  |
| TCER     | Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit                               |
| RSG      | Representative of the UN Secretary-General                                  |
| SCCs     | Social Care Centres   |
| SCiSL    | Save the Children in Sri Lanka  |
| SDF      | Self-Defense Forces   |
| SRSG     | Secretary-General's Special Representative                                  |
| SWM      | Solid waste management  |
| TAFOR    | Task Force for Relief   |
| TAFREN   | Task Force to Rebuild the Nation  |
| TAP      | Transitional Accommodation Project  |
| TSP      | Transitional Shelter Project  |
| TEC LRRD | Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development |

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| TEC           | Tsunami Evaluation Coalition                          |
| TCP           | Technical Cooperation Programme                       |
| CRPD          | Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities |
| TLCs          | Temporary Living centres                              |
| TNI           | Indonesia National Army                               |
| TRO           | Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation                     |
| TRWMP         | Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Programme           |
| UN            | United Nations  |
| UNCT          | United Nations Country Team                           |
| UNDAC         | United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination   |
| UNDAF         | United Nations Development Assistance Framework       |
| UNDMT         | United Nations Disaster Management Team               |
| UNDP          | United Nations Development Programme                  |
| UNDRO         | Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator          |
| UNEP          | United Nations Environmental Programme                |
| UNESCO        | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural   |
| UNFPA         | United Nations Fund for Population Activities         |
| UNGA          | United Nations General Assembly                       |
| UNHCR         | United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees     |
| UNICEF        | United Nations Children's Fund                        |
| UNFCCC        | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate        |
| UDHR          | Universal Declaration of Human Rights                 |
| UNOCHA        | Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs       |
| UNOPS         | United Nations Office for Project Services            |
| UNORC         | United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator     |
| UNRC          | United Nations Resident Coordinator                   |
| UNVs          | United Nations Volunteers                             |
| USAR          | Urban Search and Rescue                               |
| Virtual OSOCC | Virtual On Site Operations Coordination Centre        |
| WASH          | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene                         |
| WCDRR         | World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction           |
| WES           | Water and Environmental Sanitation                    |

|     |                                   |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| WFP | World Food Programme              |
| WHO | World Health Organisation         |
| WMO | World Meteorological Organisation |

## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

### Background

This study examines the United Nations' response to natural disasters by discussing the development of the United Nations (UN) guidelines and working of the institutionalised mechanisms. The comparative study of how the UN responded to tsunami of 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka adds an empirical element to the study.

Security is the key vital pillar of the Westphalian sovereign states in the international politics. Comprehending the concept from the diverse theoretical underpinnings has been a matter of contestations. A major contestations swirl around the traditional view and other non-traditional view of security. The tradition view concentrates to focus on the security of the state as threat arising from the other states and response to these threats as prominent concern of the state. The realist theorists have concentrated on this view. The two World Wars and Cold War decades defined security chiefly explained around such notion of the security. Thus, the discourse of security largely hovered around the hard security with focus on military capability. This view of security has been challenged by the liberal, feminist, constructivists as well as the Post-colonial conceptualisation of security.

A study of the Human Security Report Project of Simon Fraser University in Canada noted the rise of new trend since 1945. There has been steady decline in major inter-state conflict and a lack of conflict of high intensity war. Thus, the hard security notion has been contested from another set of understanding of security (Rajgopalan 2012:137). This alternative conceptualisation of security is termed as "Human Security". This concept got into prominence with conceptualisation by Mahbubul Haq that encompasses seven diverse components: "economic security (assured basic income), food security (physical and economic access to food), health security (relative freedom from disease and infection), environmental security (access to sanitary water supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system), personal security (security from physical violence and threats), community security (security of cultural identity) and political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms)"(UNDP 1994:24).

The link between the natural disaster and human security has been under debates in the academic discourses. Vulnerability, being an important component of human security,

encompasses the victims of internal conflict and war , those surviving at or below the subsistence level and those effected by natural disaster (Acharya 2001:447). The viewpoint that relate natural disaster with human security has been contested by Sverre Lodgaard, who takes narrow definition of human security and caution us to connect development to the frequency of natural disaster, human plight and environmental contamination. Rather, he relates human security to exposure to physical violence in the process of a conflict (Acharya 2001:447). Recent discourses on the natural disaster take the notion of security nearer to human security. The UN General Assembly in a resolution states that the member countries agrees “that human security is an approach to assist Member States identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (UNGA 2012). Additionally, the 2014 Human Development Report states that natural disasters may cause human being to fall from the ladder of human development (UNDP 2014). These UN documents indicate that natural disaster and vulnerabilities emanating from it could be located under the broader rubric of the alternate security conceptualisation and broader definition of human security.

Recent decades have seen persistent upsurge in incidents of natural disasters as pointed by Katoch. These disasters have claimed lives of about “249,896 people worldwide in 2004 in 360 reported disasters compared to 84,570 killed in 1995 in 239 reported disasters” (Katoch 2006: 153). It implies that “the frequency and effects of disasters” have been escalating at an alarming rate. On an average “each year nearly 100,000 lives are lost due to natural disasters throughout the world” (Seck 2007: 3). From a cumulative calculation, since 1960s economic loss from these disasters has shot up from “US\$ 75.5 billion to approximately US\$ 660 billion in 1990s” (Seck 2007: 3). An estimate of 2016 entails that natural disasters have displaced approximately 24 million people from their homes. In these incidents, women have been the most vulnerable sections besides children. Both of them have 14 times more possibility of meeting with death than men (Cazabat 2017). Yet another estimate put natural disasters taking toll of more than sixty-two million people worldwide since 1900. This number is almost equal to the total number of people who were killed in the two World Wars. Despite these alarming situations, scant thought have been engaged in discipline of political science and economics on this issue.

The concerns arising out of natural disasters are intimately related to climate change. The climate change aggravates the existing risk of the natural disaster. Thus, this has caused the



increase in frequency as well as intensity of the tropical storms, cold waves, heat waves, floods, droughts, tornadoes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “*Special Report on Emission Scenarios*” put the global average surface air temperature to surge “from 1.4 to 5.8 °C by 2100, relative to 1990 levels”. Simultaneously, the average sea levels over the globe are projected to increase by 0.09–0.88 m by 2100. The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 2007 indicates the altering nature of the natural hazards compounded by climate change that would lead to intensification of heat waves and heavy precipitation in future. Besides, as per the estimates of the World Disaster Report 2001, “over 3 billion people across the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Africa will suffer an increase in water stresses by 2080” (Wilson 2001: 6). It would have cascading repercussions dwindling agricultural production and aggravate hunger in Africa and cause increased frequency of droughts and floods. Thus, a large number of people would be affected by “enhanced number of hydro-meteorological disasters including floods, wind storms and droughts” (Wilson 2001: 6).

The constant upsurge in the frequency of such disasters and their linkage with the issues of climate change, sustainable development, human security and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have slowly become a matter of discourse of the national and international and attempts have also been made to tackle and mitigate natural disasters’ outfall. Clearly, “future development policy must incorporate an increase in adaptive capacity of which an important component is the ability to devise development policy that takes into account global climate change and its adverse impacts on developing countries” (Dore and Etkin 2000: 46-51).

Coming to the global institution, under the umbrella of the UN natural disaster caught attention in the late 1970s and 1980s, with focus on emergency disaster relief measures and coordination. There were simultaneous concerns over the suffering of the victims of natural disasters and need for effective collective efforts to provide humanitarian assistance at the global forums. Subsequently, the UN had conferred upon itself “a central and unique role in providing leadership and coordinating the efforts of the international community to support disaster-affected countries” (UNGA 1991:3). However, decades of 1990s saw a major shift to disaster prevention and disaster preparedness.

The global disaster discourses were complemented through the process of institutionalisation within the UN to respond to natural disasters. This led to formation of an Office

of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) “to mobilise, direct and coordinate relief”. The reform initiatives of Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997 resulted in the establishment of a new office called the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (UNOCHA). Besides it, several UN operative agencies are part of the institutional response mechanism. Under the UN reform process in 1990s, the responsibility of disaster mitigation and reduction was assigned to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) maintains a Global Emergency Programme Fund to help out victims of natural disasters. Other UN agencies like the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Food Programs (WFP) have their specific operational mechanisms to tackle natural disasters. Besides, these institutional evolutions, efforts of the UN has also established and created a number of principles, norms and guidelines to be considered while responding to disaster. The institutionalisation and policy guidelines developed by the UN system in regard to emergency relief and humanitarian assistance are for both the natural as well as other disasters.

This study focuses on examining the UN’s reply to tsunami, a natural disaster of 2004. “A tsunami is a series of great sea waves caused by an underwater earthquake, landslide or volcanic eruption. More rarely, a tsunami can be generated by a giant meteor impact with the ocean” (National Geographic 2007). Tsunamis strongly strike the coastlines, thus, destroying property and loss of lives.

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered a series of tsunamis in the Indian Ocean. It caused death of more than 227,000 people. Out of the several disasters that occurred in the past, the Indian Ocean tsunami happened to be the largest in terms of human toll, destructions and affliction at global level. In the “immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs facilitated the preparation and launch of an inter-agency flash appeal covering the urgent needs of some 5 million people for six months” (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006h: 5). Approximately \$14 billion had been pledged for early relief as well as rehabilitation phase and substantial amount came from international sources. This disaster was also the “most generous and immediately funded international humanitarian response” (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006h: 5).

This study examines the working of the various the UN institutional mechanisms in dealing with the natural disasters as well as formulation of several principles, norms and guidelines to

address natural disaster. The comparative case study of the UN's response to the tsunami of 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka is undertaken as these two countries were worst hit countries by this natural disaster.

## **Literature Review**

The relevant literature on the topic of this study is reviewed under the following themes: the Natural Disaster Discourse, the UN System Response, the UN System's Response to the tsunami of 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

### *The Natural Disaster Discourse*

Disaster has been scribbled in variant literature with a polemical understanding of the term having embellished "with particular political, ideological, cultural and other biases", and this results in a lack of agreement on what constitutes a disaster. In the antiquity, the understanding of the natural disaster such as earthquake and volcanic eruption was explained as an act of divine will or as a myth that evolved in the Mesopotamian Civilisation, Greece society and Bible (Grandjean et al. 2008: 188).

In contrast to traditional understanding, the modern understanding of the natural disaster regard it as an outcome of trigger role of geo-tectonic, climatic as well as biological factors. The term "natural disaster" refers to the societal impact of natural hazards such as cyclones, earthquakes and floods. Initially, it was attributed that "violent force of nature" or "nature on rampage" being factor that causes the natural disaster.

On the other hand, the decades of 1970s and 1980s saw the introduction of the vulnerability approach to natural disaster and dismissal of the predominant theory that disasters being quite normal in nature as it being outfall of the external natural events. The researches leading to this approach point out that the natural disaster underlies the operation of social system and creating vulnerabilities among the people that get afflicted by the disaster. This approach was complementary to the earlier notion of 'marginality' that was taking roots in the academic research.

Scholars like Anderson and Woodrow (1989: 4-5) identify natural hazards as an outcome of the vulnerability. They point out coastlines, places of active volcanoes and region prone to flood and drought as "zones of the seismic activity." Therefore, natural disaster could be averted by avoiding living or working in these areas. They regard that the actual magnitude of disasters could

be also predictable and its casualty could be restrained with the deployment of the technology. Wisner (2004) argues natural disaster as an outcome of natural hazards, such as flood, tornado, volcano eruption, earthquake causing financial and environmental damage and loss to human lives. The loss depends upon the ability of people to combat the calamity and also their 'resilience'. This comprehension is based in the understanding: "disasters occur when natural hazards affect vulnerable people" (Wisner 2004: 46). Wisner (2004:7) opines that the separation of natural disaster from its social environment and putting over-emphasis on natural hazard runs with risk of neglecting one of the significant elements of surrounding social environment. "The natural" and "the social" cannot be seen in isolation to each other. Doing so results in incomplete understanding of the issue and would not help in preventing or mitigating the burden caused by disasters.

A natural calamity will not cause catastrophe in "areas without vulnerability", e.g. strong earthquakes in unpopulated places. Hence, the term natural is argued as an incident is not hazardous without involvement of human population (Alexander 2002: 41-90). The literature attributes human being for the creation of vulnerability. These are manifestations of socio-economic and political marginalisation, a scarcity of options and a scarcity of resources.

Another set of argument emanate contrary to the predictably of natural disaster and reduction of ramification of natural disasters. Such arguments illustrate that despite several scientific development people continue to be devastated because the prediction tools as well as technological availability to ensure it remains costly as well as lack of will of those in power makes situation worse. This is further magnified because of the dilemmas before the state whether to invest to erratic nature of the natural disaster or other significant priorities.

Literatures also debate around natural and manmade disasters. The former is understood as one that is induced by natural events like earthquake, flood, volcano and so on. The differential factor between them seems to be the primary forces that unleash them. On the other hand, later is an outcome of processes rooted in the structure and dynamics of the societies. The natural disaster may act as a catalyst to it. For instance, Bangladesh's cyclone and civil war in 1970-71, the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 and civil strife in countries like Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Sudan. In turn, a natural disaster is always caused by extreme natural event together with kind of social setting. But prevailing social vulnerability is by and large an endogenous process like drought induced famines (Albala 1993: 8-9). Even there remain contestations over categorisation of natural disasters. Albala

(1993: 8-10) classifies disasters into categories like sudden disaster and slowly developing disaster. The former includes earthquake, hurricanes, and floods and later includes disaster for instance, droughts, epidemics and desertification. The sudden disaster is characterised by an instant occurrence and short term effects and severity of such disasters. In turn, in a slowly developing disaster has long direct and indirect effects causing mass breaking point like famines and mass epidemics. The prevailing social conditions and endogenous processes come to be developing in slow pace compared to sudden disasters. The socio-political and economic inequalities come forth faster in sudden disasters. Albala also categorises natural force that generates them, for instance, biological events i.e. floral and faunal infestations, migration, forest fires, red tides, fungal diseases, geophysical events (geothermal and meteorological i.e. earthquakes, volcanoes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, storm surges, erosion, desertification, landslides, mud flows, droughts, tornadoes, astronomical events, e.g. fireballs, meteorites fall. Such categorisation is insufficient to analyse disaster within the economic and social framework. Another categorisation was done by the Joint Inspection Unit Report 1980 on the UNDRO that broadly clubbed disasters in four diverse categories. First, "sudden natural" for instance, floods, earthquakes, second "creeping" or "long-term natural" for instances, droughts and epidemics; third "deliberate man-made" including international or civil wars and disturbances; lastly, "accidental" (Joint Inspection Unit 1980:1).

Arjun Katoch (2006:154) explains the difference between the natural disaster and complex emergencies. The former is considered with uncertainty for instance earthquakes, cyclones, on the other hand, later is attributed to man-made structural problems manifested in civil wars or droughts. The early phase remains critical in advent of natural disaster for the humanitarian actor as there exists inclination to save lives under huge pressure. On the other hand, the complex emergencies focus on redressal of structural concern that takes years to get mitigated. National governments are traditionally attributed to coordinate the disaster relief. On the other hand, there may or may not be a national government to enable cooperation in the event of a complex emergency.


Other set of scholars assert that man-made disasters are not similar to natural ones, nor manmade disasters including war, economic recession are similar in their nature. Each natural disaster itself represent distinct feature and are *sui generis*. Therefore, at times there is overlap in a particular disaster as neither being purely natural or man-made. Subsequently, the newer international instruments have intended to define it in broader manner. The disaster discourse

begins with a broader definition that is inclusive of both conflict related as well as natural disaster in its rubric. The literatures undertake several connotation of the disaster reflected in myriad of actors.

The UNDRO, as a disaster coordinating mechanism in the early 1970s under the rubrics of the UN lacked agreement and precise definition of disaster, regard it as severe phenomenon having huge infliction on the vulnerable section of society by death as well as damage.

The Tampere Convention (1998), under Article I definition includes: “Disaster means a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing suddenly or as the result of complex long-term processes” (ITU 2021). This is the comprehensive explanation of the disaster. The other definition comes from the Pan American Health Organization and WHO (2004) which says: “Disaster... A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses, which exceed the ability of, affected society to cope using only its own resources. Disasters are often classified according to their cause (natural or man-made)” (United Nations 2004:17). The Red Crescent Movement, the International Red Cross and the Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) that work towards disaster relief define the term disaster as “a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering and distress, and large-scale material damage” (Sphere Project 2004: 316).

**Figure 1.1: Disaster Cycle**



Source: Mohammed H.I., Dore and David Etkin (2003), “Natural disaster, Adaptive capacity and development in twenty- first Century” in Mark Pelling (2001 ed.) *Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World*, London: Routledge: pg76.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Operational Guidelines of Natural Disasters outline a “natural disaster” to be something “caused by a sudden onset natural hazard,” that leads to “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources” (IASC 2011: 55-58).

Several literature mentions about the environment and sustainable development, they assert propensity of developing countries to be afflicted and succumb to vulnerability in the advent of the natural disasters more than the developed countries. Outcome of these disasters would affect the poorest and marginalised section the worst. El-Masri et al. (2002) considers the impact of natural disasters on human habitation as an outcome of the failure of human use system both in

pre- disaster and post- disaster phase. Numerous factors in pre-disaster phase, for instance, construction methods, high levels of inequality, urbanisation, absence of planning for mitigation, early warning system and status of vulnerability reduction decide the level of ramifications of the natural disaster. The post-disaster phase, is dependent upon the relief operations and subsequent, resources available to deal with losses. Thus, the effect of natural disaster is correlated to the growth and advancement of a society. Wisner points out indebtedness of the Low Developing Countries (LDCs) make the “reconstruction and the transition from rehabilitation to development” difficult for these countries. The rapid rate of urbanisation increases the number of people under risk. Notable examples of the same includes the earthquake in the state of Gujrat (India) in 2001 and the mudslides in Caracas, Venezuela (1999) (Wisner 2004: 5).

Dahiya also states that two-third of the total people that wore the brunt of natural disaster emanates from the developing countries with highly developed countries accounting just two per cent. In the developing world, those having limited resources are adversely affected in case of advent of the natural disaster (Dahiya 2015: 148). Twigg and Steiner (2002) points out that each year between 1971 and 1995, human lives were lost were 128,000, affecting 136 million population around the globe with majority being from south. In such cases, the governmental capacity remains crucial for stability of political regime (Twigg and Steiner 2002: 473-479). Katoch (2006:156) makes similar sense with developing countries facing harsh brunt of the natural disasters affecting them disproportionately.

Mark Pelling brings element of conflict and its connection with natural disaster. He argues that the underdeveloped region having internal or external conflicts have probability of worse scenario if hit by the natural disaster (Pelling 2003:50). Similar to one noted in the context of every major natural disaster, where people hope to receive some diplomatic gains emerging from the tragedy; the tsunami has not been an exception.

The joint inspection Unit Report 1980 makes identical argument with empirical evidence about the developing countries and impact of disasters. As an outcome of the disaster, 75 per cent the developed countries largely affected by the monetary losses, it is the developing countries that have 95 per cent death because of the disaster and losses to the extent of the economic growth. The IDNDR (1994) mentions that it is the developing countries population especially poor and socially disadvantaged groups least equipped to cope with disasters. Bringing politics and disasters together, Cohen and Werker account the effect of the natural disaster on the political process,



economy, environment and subsequent development. The political dimension equally remains crucial for reduction and response measures to a disaster. The evidence to such claims comes from the response to federal disaster and electoral factors influence the issuance of disaster declaration by the president in U.S. The poorly run countries has tendency to create the severe condition for poor in these countries (Cohen and Werker 2008: 8-46). Enia points that the earlier works on natural disasters and politics manifested in corruption and other barriers (Enia 2008: 10). Enia rejected disaster as political. The recent studies account a link between politics and disaster with a lot still left to research. Studies tend to focus on disaster causing critical changes in society and subsequently major policy shifts. It highlights the effect of disasters on the ensuing conflict leading the either way of positive or negative (Enia 2008: 10). In the positive sense, studies by Blockeret, Evin, Kelman and Koukis, Quarantelli and Dynes (1976) indicate natural disasters promote cooperation between conflicting groups. On the other side, a set of work including of Cuny regards disaster is marked with economic losses, human suffering, and socially abnormal behaviour (Cuny 1983:48-49).

#### *The UN System Response*

Literature concerning the UN system response remains largely concentrated in the form of primary sources such as documents, reports and resolutions of the UN and its agencies. Fidler (2005) traces evolution of international disaster response with League of Nations establishment of the IRU, adoption of bilateral treaties on disaster relief in post-World War II coupled with IGOs and NGOs engagements in disaster relief. This also brings the discourses of decades of 1970s and 1980s underlining multilateral treaty on disaster relief and several reforms under the UN in the direction of disaster coordination and other related dimensions. An account of recent decades marked with global presence of IGOs and NGOs along with innovations in the field of transportation and communications technologies to respond to natural disasters could find mention in this work. Several works of IFRC, for instance, “*Law and legal issues in international disaster response: a desk study*” (2007) captures the dynamics of global disaster response. Smith (1985) also analyses the working and challenges to the International Relief Union (IRU) and put forth several concerns downsizing the IRU including financial constraints, withdrawal of members and other concerns.

Assessing the institutionalisation in reference to the UN, the issue of the disasters was erratic in the UN and there was no effort to invent an International Relief Organisation (IFRC

2007: 52). With the passage of time, the political leaderships started seeing the necessity of prolonged and improved efforts towards the international disaster response. The persistent demand for assistance by the nations impacted with the disaster, along with a major shift in the thinking came with the prolific increases of the international actors to provide the humanitarian assistance including the WFP, the WHO and the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). Mc Entire (1997) argues that awareness of the multitude of actors and governments' concern to properly manage them for relief delivery led to the creation of the UNDRO. The work by Kent (1983) seeks to explore the dynamics of the 1970s that caused the UNDRO establishment. It portrays 1970s decades marked with intense pressure by the interest groups and media to tackle the disasters, looking for the UN system to set their house in order. This work highlights in detail the politics of the period as well as its involvement of the UNDRO in cases of disaster unlike other literature.

Another important work to understand the overall comprehension of the UNDRO is Joint Inspection Unit Report (1980), that goes into analyse mandate, machinery and analytical gaps i.e. vagueness of mandate and its uncertainty over dealing with natural disasters or other disaster situations often creating conflict with other actors including voluntary agencies, several UN agencies. The coordination as well as funding dimension finds mention in the work with recommendations to bring out changes. Other literature illustrates multiple glitches in the UNDRO for instance, lack of clear mandate, considerable competition from other agencies and non-cooperative attitude from the UN agency field staffs, lack of staff, fund, confused internal line of authority, infamous UN personnel system, politics and internal quota system limited the ability of the coordinator to assemble qualified staffs (Green 1977: 32).

Changes undergoing under the rubric of the UN to respond to natural disasters have also found few mention in literatures. The institutional structure under the UN saw certain adaptation as the UNDRO was integrated into the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 1991 with establishment of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator. Later in 1998, the DHA morphed into the UNOCHA. "UNOCHA has been the lead agency working with actors on the ground, coordinating with the military and enlisting donor support" (CRS 2005: 2). Kent (2004) depicts the dynamics of the post-Cold War period, including the collapse of regimes in the Horn of Africa and the collapse of a weak state structure in Yugoslavia, that

resulted in an increase in new involvement in humanitarian concerns (Kent 2004: 217). Katoch brings forth the challenges before the UNOCHA. He points out figure on deterioration of the available expertise to tackle natural disasters and also underlines humanitarian community obsessions for the conflicts and complex emergencies and marginal focus on natural disasters (Katoch 2006: 160). Coppola (2006) work offers comprehensive and descriptive details of several institutionalisations under the heading of the UN and its agencies to tackle disaster. With reference to the UNOCHA, he discusses institutional mechanism. Under critical part he brings out the erratic nature of fund responders and reflects upon class bias, gender bias, cultural bias, issue of sovereignty among several challenges before the existing International disaster management system. Katoch (2006) also brings out ongoing nature of international disaster management with focus upon coordination mechanism of the UNOCHA and related tools: United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), the Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) and On-site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC).

Discussing the UNOCHA as coordinating mechanism, Reindorp and Wiles (2001) discusses at length the issue of coordination as well as brings out critical challenges being faced by the OCHA in terms of resistance faced from UN agencies as well as funding. Nishimoto (2014) regards UNOCHA as a representative of the broad current humanitarian system at the international level and part of the multilateral disaster response institutionalisation. He puts forward a shift that has taken place over the years. The IRU was largely established to cater to those affected by immediate advent of natural disasters. On the other hand, the current UN mechanism to disaster relief is based on UNGA Resolution 46/182 has shifted its focus from those affected by episodic event to the sufferings of the victims (UNGA 1991).

Mc Entire (1997) illustrates problematic dimensions of coordination. He regards that coordination is reliant upon the nature of disaster, level of centralisation and unity in the International humanitarian community. In addition to it, the involvement myriad of actors, little contact with each other, struggle among the relief organisation to acquire funds, divergent aims and values to provide relief efforts contribute to coordination problems. Pointing at the coordination, Katoch (2006) brings forth the new emerging constraints or challenges before international disaster management i.e. increased actors in the field, diverse nature of guidelines as well as diversification in terms of the donors differing from the trends in the past. He also

highlights the increased role of the corporate sector in the domain of disaster management. Such development is largely an outcome of the newly emerging corporate social responsibility ethics. Besides, corporate sectors' engagement is also seen as an endeavour to improvise its image in the public domain. The literature takes stock of the prevailing challenges in the present mechanism of the UN. He specifically points out "lack of adequate experience in disaster response, combined with insufficient local knowledge has adversely affected the ability of international organisations and NGOs to effectively respond to disasters" (Katoch: 2006: 160).

McEntire (1997) accounts that since late 1970s and early 1980s the reliance on mere relief measures in the advent of disasters as solution came under attack. Therefore, in 1990s a new approach began to gain currency (McEntire 1997: 51). Seck (2007) argues that internationally, such agenda of disaster reduction has evolved out of "economic and human costs of disasters" and "their association with inappropriate development". The importance of disaster risk reduction as a strategy is beginning to emerge in development thought, owing to the increased attention on climate change. During the United Nations' International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) from 1990 to 1999, policy frameworks were established in response to the rising number of human casualties and property loss. Lechat (1990) on the other hand, reemphasises the utmost priority to disaster relief usefulness.

In recent times, there has been growing interest of multilateral and bilateral organisations in disaster mitigation and preparedness, so is the relation between catastrophes and development concerns (Christoplos et al. 2001: 187). This is manifested in the broader mandate of MGDs where achievements of MDGs are precursor to disaster risk reduction. The Millennium declaration envisages that the issue, plans, structure of disaster reduction is knotted somewhere in the plans, structure of poverty alleviation (Wisner 2005: 284). What contributed further in debates was the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. One of the preparatory documents of this summit "*Disaster Risk and Sustainable Development: Understanding the Links between Development, Environment and Natural Hazards Leading to Disasters*" was a rare instance of integrated teamwork by various UN agencies. The UN General Assembly cited an insufficient institutional setup as a major weakness in dealing with the earthquakes that struck Gujarat, India, and El Salvador in 2001. Thus, the traditional approach to deal with disaster had been provision of massive relief rather the preventive measures. This approach had largely dominated the discourse of international disaster management until the second half of the 20th

century. Such understanding regarded disaster as a short time, onetime event to be responded by the government and other relief agencies. But the ongoing discourse with focus on disaster reduction runs contrary to the traditional approach and discourses connected to it. In attaining disaster reduction, literature takes account the UNDP initiatives to focus on “culture of prevention” as well as vulnerability reduction being recognised as an element of developmental process by the UNDP (UNDP1999).The literature also points out to the creation of the Disaster Reduction Unit (DRU) in the Bureau of crisis Prevention and Recovery to support technically and financially formulation and implementation of disaster reduction policies and capacity building initiatives and facilitate transition from the disaster immediate disaster response to long-term recovery (Coppola 2006: 571).Therefore “UNDP is in a prime position to facilitate the transition from the disaster response efforts to long-term recovery” (Coppola 2006: 571).

Conclusively, Costea and Felicio (2005) emphasise that the traditional approach to international disaster management has been largely focussed to provision of massive relief rather the preventive measures until the second half of the 20th century. Such understanding regarded disaster as short time phenomena, onetime event to be responded by the government and other relief agencies, marginalising social and economic milieu as factor to disaster. They bring out how the recent decades have seen a shift towards an integrated disaster risk reduction and culture of prevention under the rubric of sustainable development.

Another theme to be analysed under the rubric of the UN in the process of disaster management include evolving norms, principles and guidelines that underline the rights of the affected communities in the natural disasters. Such guidelines as well as principles complement institutional mechanism. Literatures on the norms and principles emerge mostly from the primary documents and sources and lack criticality as well as analysis. The IASC adopted Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters addressed to inter-governmental and non-governmental humanitarian actors. IASC (2011) captures the detailed illustration of guidelines and norms pertaining to diverse concern emerging in the process of early relief assistance and recovery process. These include: “Protection of life, security and physical integrity and family ties. Protection of rights related to the provision of food, health, shelter and education. Protection of rights related to housing, land and property, livelihoods, secondary and higher education. Protection of rights related to documentation, movement, re-establishment of family ties,

expression and opinion and elections” (IASC 2011). ITU (2021) illustrates the guidelines on “*Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations*” and special mention of “Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations”. The UNOCHA principles of neutrality, sovereignty and non-discrimination are also considered in the multiple literatures. But, these literatures largely lack the critical and analytical dimension of these norms, principles as well as guidelines.

### *The UN System’s Response to the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

The UN response could be understood at two levels, i.e. at emergency relief phase and recovery and rehabilitation phase. Indonesia as well as Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) formally called for international assistance after tsunami wreaked havoc in these countries in the year 2004.

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006e) discusses in detail the impact and intensity of tsunami as well as the capacity of both the countries. Athukorala and Resosudarmo (2005) work undertakes the economic impact in both the countries. Shaw (2015b) an edited volume reflects upon diverse dimension of both the early impact of the tsunami as well as the long term recovery phase. It evaluates the environmental impact specifically on the Mangrove vegetation and educational institutions. The assessment of the repercussions of tsunami had been supplemented by the primary documents of UN operative agencies. These include their annual assessment of the agency such as the UNICEF annual report reveals the domain of impact on children, their education, women, health as well as sanitation among the other dimensions and several policy initiatives undertaken by the agency. So is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report entails the impact on shelter situation in both the countries and programmes undertaken to mitigate the impact of tsunami.

The literature on the UN response takes into account several programme and policies undertaken by the UN and its agencies in both the early assistance phase as well as recovery and rehabilitation phase. The primary documents of the several UN agencies concentrate on factual as well as descriptive part of the programme as well as policies undertaken by these agencies. Generally, these work lack in the critical as well as analytic dimension of the UN work. The literatures in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka dwell on assessment undertaken by several agencies. OCHA (2005) documents the UNDAC efforts in undertaking one of the earliest formal assessments in Banda Aceh, Indonesia as well as in Sri Lanka. This also takes stock of the differences of the UNDAC work and troubles faced by it in both the countries. Besides, other

works undertake comparative study between Indonesia and Sri Lanka. An insightful work has been compiled by Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006e) reveals that the early presence of the UN agencies in Sri Lanka prior to the tsunami present an enlightening contrast with Aceh, Indonesia with far-reaching repercussions for relief efforts. UNHCR and PDES (2007) work analyses the UNHCR's role in early assistance and recovery as well as rehabilitation phase in both Indonesia as well as Sri Lanka. It also brings forth the differences of involvement of the agency in both countries. Comparing the role of the UNHCR, in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, in the former UNHCR involvement was in the emergency and transitional shelter provision and not in the permanent shelter, whereas in Indonesia the UNHCR involvement was in the early shelter as well as permanent shelter programme. It did not participate in transitional shelter rather it was undertaken by the Indonesian government. Besides, the UNDP reports captures UNDP's Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTR) targeted at improving the government's and civil society's capacity for long term recovery and risk reduction. The report also takes stock of the UNDP's other initiatives, for instance, Cash for Work (CfW) programmes, port rehabilitation projects; digitisation of land registration records (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 35-36 ; UNDP 2005a: 3; UNDP 2005b ;UNDP Sri Lanka 2005).

The coordination mechanism in the early assistance under the rubric of the UN has been captured by annual report of OCHA. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006e) highlights the lack of the “distinction between coordination at the operational level (who does what and where) and strategic coordination at policy level (such as for joint advocacy)”. It also brings forth that the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs meant for coordination process in the field situation has been ignored by many organisations as these organisations are too engrossed in their own work. Several challenges and mounting tasks have also emerged out of the response to Indonesia and Sri Lanka that has been captured by diverse works. Telford (2007) in his work highlights shortcomings especially of staffing in both the countries.

Another significant part of the UN assistance in the early and later recovery phase is to reflect upon operationalisation of norms, principles and guidelines for Natural Disasters in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Specific works by Fletcher et al. (2005) captures violation of norms under the banner of the IASC pertaining to women in Indonesian case. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006c) gauges the inability of the state to provide assistance and complexity arising out in such circumstances with multiplicity of the actors on the ground to deliver the early assistance process.

McCulloch (2005) highlights militarisation of the aid in Indonesia. The non-participatory nature of the recovery as well as rehabilitation is also highlighted (Cohen et al. 2005: 35). Kleinfeld work questions the principles of neutrality and equity and politicisation of aid in Sri Lanka. He recounts, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and the GoSL insisted on managing the distribution of relief in places and among populations claimed to be under their authority...both parties insisted on their right to govern areas requiring humanitarian assistance. Equally, both political actors sought to undermine their adversary’s ability to do so, deepening the political rift” (Kleinfeld 2006). In Sri Lankan case, Cohen et al. (2005) discusses the operationalisation of norms connected to women and children, military intervention. Entwisle (2013) reflects upon flout of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and discrimination between the IDPs displaced as consequence of the natural disaster and others victims of prolonged conflict in Sri Lanka. Reflection on violation the IDPs principles, Weinstein (2005) work brings out the dearth of community participation in the process of “relocation sites, timing of moves, aid priorities and the planning of housing” in Sri Lankan Case.

The recovery phase in Sri Lanka had also exhibited adherence as well as violation of norms, principles and guidelines. Summing ramifications of rebuilding and relocation process in the long term was riddled with dearth of proper hazard assessments and therefore leading to their exposure to new hazards flooding (Mannakkara and Wilkinson 2013). Such concerns have been reiterated in other works (Oyhus 2017:19). Telford (2006) uses gender lenses to analyse the long term recovery and observed that the “women were less satisfied than their male counterparts with the tsunami response” especially in camps. Even livelihoods opportunities were primarily available to male and women were at disadvantageous position in Sri Lanka (Amnesty International 2006). FAO (2006) brings forth the instances of misplaced priorities in fishing sector and reveals messy fishing boats distribution to the fishing communities unsuitable for them.

In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, conflict along with tsunami was a common factor. In Indonesian case, Nazara and Resosudarmo (2007) brings the description of the armed struggle led by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) as well as the repressive measures by the Indonesian government leading to death and displacement of local population. This work reveals the plight in Aceh region of Indonesia before the advent of tsunami.



Williams (2016) discusses overview of the multiple participants involved in the process of relief assistance in the 2004 tsunami crisis including the state government as well as “their militaries, civil society organisations, foreign militaries, private enterprise and international NGOs”. It raises some of the significant challenges of coordination, civil military engagements and provide suggestions to improve the relief assistance in case of engagement of multiple actors. Hangzo (2011) captures broader non-traditional challenges in the Indonesia and also illustrates in this ASEAN involvement as regional grouping in relief assistance.

Enia (2008) develops a theoretical framework to comprehend the relationship between disaster and conflict and apply this framework in travaged Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Hyndman (2008) discusses the Indonesian Aceh region and eastern Sri Lankan region, both under the decades old conflict in midst of tsunami. These cases present two diverse cases midst of tsunami. In Sri Lanka, tension between GoSL and the LTTE derailed the process of negotiation between the two and caused ultimate rout of the LTTE. In contrast, in Aceh, Indonesia agreement between the GAM as well as Government of Indonesia (GoI) led to the peace process creating greater autonomy for the region affecting disaster assistance.

From the above literature review, it is obvious that there are studies relating to response to natural disaster but there is dearth of a comprehensive study of UN system wide response to natural disaster. It is an area which is understudied when compared to complex emergencies of manmade disasters. The natural disasters like the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 have brought this lacuna glaringly. It is interesting to look into different facets of disaster response mechanism of the UN system and various challenges encountered where several actors work simultaneously. This study attempts to fill up this gap.

### **Definition, Rationale and the Scope of the Study**

In this study, disaster would mean “.....a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing suddenly or as the result of complex long-term processes” (ISDR 2018). Due to the drastic climate change, the world has witnessed increasing number of natural disasters. Compared to voluminous study on complex emergencies relating to war and peace matters, the UN system response to the natural disaster is understudied. The UN is an important universal organisation to deal with common issues with collective effort. The UN has devised various norms and guidelines to deal with natural disasters

and the UN and its agencies are involved in the areas of disasters not only deal with the humanitarian crises created by the disasters but also rehabilitation and recovery and prevention activities. Therefore, comprehensive study of the UN system-wide response to natural disaster is significant. This study takes tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka as two empirical cases and compares the UN system's response in these two countries. Indonesia and Sri Lanka seem to be appropriate cases not only because they were the two most affected countries by the tsunami in 2004 but both were undergoing internal problems of demand for separate states by the LTTE in Sri Lanka and by the GAM in Indonesia.

The scope of study restricts to study of the UNOCHA and the UN operative agencies such as the UNICEF, the WFP, the UNDP and the UNHCR in emergency relief as well as recovery phase in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. These were prime agencies involved in both the countries in delivering relief and recovery measures. The study has special focus on the Aceh region in Indonesia and southern, northern and northeast coastal regions of Sri Lanka.

### **Research Questions**

1. What is the existing and evolving nature of international disaster response at the global level?
2. What are the different norms, principles, guidelines and institutional mechanism under the rubrics of the UN to respond to natural disasters?
3. Has there been any shift in the UN approach to respond to natural disaster?
4. What were the major points of similarity and dissimilarity of effects of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka?
5. How does onset of disaster and longstanding conflict in Indonesia and Sri Lanka affect the immediate relief measures in both the countries?
6. How did the UN agencies respond to tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in reconstruction and rehabilitation phase?
7. What lesson does each of the two victim countries offer for the future UN responses to natural disasters?

## **Hypotheses**

1. The UN's policy shift from immediate disaster relief measures to disaster prevention in response to natural disasters led to the institutional adaptation and change in the policy orientation of various the UN agencies.
2. The internal conflicts within Indonesia and Sri Lanka led to the derailment of the immediate relief phase and funding assistance in both the countries.
3. The presence of the UN agencies in Sri Lanka much before the tsunami and better coordination among them led to more successful response to the crisis in Sri Lanka than in Indonesia.

## **Research Methods**

The present study has used comparative method to study the UN system response in the case of tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. It is descriptive as well as analytical study and therefore relay on qualitative method.

The study has used primary sources such as resolutions, reports of the joint inspection unit of the UN, reports of Secretary-General, of the UN agencies and others. The secondary sources include the report of NGOs, research Institutions, a books and academic journals. Newspaper clippings and the Internet sources have been also used judiciously.

The study is comprised of six chapters. **Chapter I** highlights and takes stock of the literature review that encompasses conceptual understanding of the term and various discourses on natural disasters, discourses related to the UN response mechanism as well as the UN system response to tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. It also lays out the research design such as rationale and scope, the aim of the study and research questions and hypothesis of the study.

**Chapter II** discusses about the UN's norms and mechanisms for natural disasters. It highlights the shift taken place in disaster response policy that traditionally revolved around the emergency relief and coordination to a new trajectory to disaster preparedness as well as disaster reduction. Diverse set of principles, norms as well as guidelines to deal with the natural disaster has been also under discussion of this chapter. It then discusses the institutional mechanisms developed by the UN system. It also discusses how the UN operative agencies of the UNICEF, the UNDP, the FAO, the WFP and the UNHCR tackle natural disaster.

**Chapter III** discusses the scope of damages by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and actors engaged in the response to the disaster. The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 had a massive impact on Indian Ocean countries as well as the East African coast. In comparison to countries in the Pacific, countries bordering the Indian Ocean had little experience with tsunami and lacked regional and national early warning and evacuation systems. This chapter examines the tsunami's effects in the afflicted countries, particularly in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, in terms of human, economic, and environmental damage. Aside from the tsunami disaster, both countries had been embroiled in battle for decades, with the free Aceh Movement led by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Indonesia and the LTTE in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka, and both were most struck by the tsunami. The chapter brings out the dimensions of conflict and the rebel groups' responses on the advent of tsunami. This chapter also takes snapshot of response of multitude of actors to tsunami including national actors as well international agencies reflecting various options available to both countries in terms of national capacities and international assistance to respond to the disasters. In comprehending the outfall of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the chapter attempts to show the commonality as well as the contrast between two highly devastated countries of Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

**Chapter IV** discusses the UN system's emergency relief responses in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in the aftermath of tsunami. It takes stock of situation and response by Indonesia and Sri Lanka as well as illustration of international response in both countries. Among the UN system, the UNOCHA, the UNICEF, the UNDP and the UNHCR were intensely involved in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka to carry out emergency relief response to the tsunami. Therefore, the chapter illustrates with special focus on activities of the UNOCHA, the UNICEF, the UNHCR and the UNDP. It analyses various policies and programmes taken up by these agencies and also discusses the challenges faced by these agencies. Simultaneously, it undertakes comparative study of the UN system involvement early phase in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Another substantive dimension of the chapter is the discussion on the operationalisation of principles, norms and guidelines developed under the aegis of the UN to deal with natural disaster in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and compare the operationalisation in both the countries.

**Chapter V** compares recovery, rehabilitation and disaster reduction measures in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. It takes into account major destructions and requirement of recovery, rehabilitation

and disaster reduction measures in both the countries. The prominent role of the office of Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery is also discussed in this chapter. The special focus of discussion is activities of the United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC), the UNDP, the UNICEF and the UNHCR. This has been done comparatively as well as critically in recovery and reduction measures in both the countries. It also analyses various policies and programmes taken up by these agencies. Another substantive dimension of the chapter is the discussion on operationalisation of principles, norms and guidelines developed under the aegis of the UN and operationalisation of them in both the countries in this phase. It also compares their operationalisation in these two countries.

**Chapter VI** is concluding chapter that contains the summarisation of the major findings of the main chapters. It points out how and which chapters answer the research questions. This chapter also discusses whether the hypotheses of the thesis is substantiated or rejected and in which chapters. This chapter ends with overall perspective on the subject matter of this study and opinion of what future research required to be undertaken on this subject matter.

## CHAPTER II: UN NORMS AND MECHANISMS FOR NATURAL DISASTERS

### Introduction

The global response to natural disasters was marked by skewed growth in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a part of codification of international humanitarian law, with effort to conceive treaties to regulate telecommunications as well as endeavours to combat cross-border spread of diseases (IFRC 2007: 25). Such responses to natural disasters were characterised in the early twentieth century with the limited institutionalisation manifested in establishment of the International relief Union (IRU) under rubrics of the League of Nations that limped later. In decades of 1960s and 1970s under the United Nations (UN) saw emergence of Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), as prime coordination mechanism of disaster response later replaced by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in the decades of 1990s. The UNOCHA cater to the needs of conflict emergencies as well as natural disasters.

Simultaneously, there are various principles, guidelines and norms created for the management of the natural disasters. Importantly, among these, norm and principle of impartiality and neutrality are significant. Further, in the advent of natural disaster, operational guidelines evolved by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) characterised by right based approach is major development. It seeks to provide vulnerable sections, women, children and Person with Disabilities (PWDs) with multiple set of human rights available amidst of natural disasters. These encompass “protection of life, security and physical integrity of the person and family ties; protection of rights related to the provision of food, health shelter, and education; protection of rights related to housing, land and property, livelihoods and secondary and higher education and protection of rights related to documentation; movement, re-establishment of family ties, expression and opinion and elections”. Though, most of these norms as well as guidelines are general and non-binding in nature but carries insurmountable moral authority.

This chapter unveils the broader facets of the international disaster management and specifically deliberates around perspectives of the UN and its agencies in responding natural disaster. It begins to trace the broader trends of international disaster responses: commencement of IRU under League of Nations, regional and sectoral attempts in post Second World War phase and evolution of disaster discourses under the UN from its inception. The Subsequent section

elaborates varieties of norms, principles and guidelines designed and evolved under the aegis of the UN requiring adherence in occurrence of natural disaster. Adherence, supervision as well as implementation of the norms and guidelines are done through the UN institutional mechanisms would be the second section of the chapter. This section discusses the working of the UNDRO which was a major institutional effort in 1970s. The end of Cold War and reform process in the UN led to establishment of the UNOCHA. The working of the UNOCHA would be discussed in this section as well. The last section of this chapter discusses how the UN Specialised Agencies involve in response to natural disaster. UN operative agencies- the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would be assessed reflecting how disaster reduction and mitigation to natural disaster are being evolved under these institutions.

### **Evolution of International Response to Natural Disaster**

Traditionally, the disaster management had been integral part of the national domain with rigid bureaucratic mechanism. Underlying such rationale of understanding was that these natural disasters had been short term phenomena with insignificant ramifications on the interstate relations unlike the war, trade or other technological development (Fidler 2005:2). Simultaneously, the relationship between international law and natural disasters like tsunamis, typhoons, hurricanes, volcanoes and droughts had remained on slow pace compared to an extensive body of development in the domain of international humanitarian law concerning the armed Conflicts. Over the years, evolution of response to natural disaster has been marked with more dynamic and flexible network model based on collaboration with diverse actors on the ground.

The efforts to create an international mechanism for disaster governance took shape in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Fidler 2005: 2). There was push for international policy and legal mechanism with early endeavours of the International Red Cross Conferences' assertion on capacity building of the Red Cross as well as replicating the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864) for the natural disasters victims. This was further accentuated in 1921 under Giovanni Ciraiolo, the President of Italian Red Cross. They demanded formation of an international organisation aimed to provide relief to the natural disaster. This led to adoption of the Convention and Statute Establishing the IRU in July 1927 under the rubric of

the League of Nations. This was the first multilateral mechanism to tackle various facets of disasters (Guttry 2012).

The International Relief Union (IRU) was mandated to deliver aid and coordinate; study preventive measures against disasters with principle of non-discrimination and one-time payment for an initial fund on states parties to provide disaster assistance. Its working mechanism comprised of a Council of Member States and the Executive Committee that served as an executive body, with two representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross Societies. Assessment of its operationalisation reveals its involvements in two disasters of 1934 and 1935. The IRU evolution continued with developments till the Second World War. The scarcity of financial resources, its failure to develop international disaster related international law, especially relating to prevention and mitigation of disaster and its failure to deliver itself as international organisation to address natural disaster were major obstructions for IRU. The withdrawal clause of the treaty was used by the member parties and abandon the IRU. However, it continued its existence as non-performer till 1968 (Fidler 2005: 4).

The facets of international disaster response in the post-Second World War saw adoption of bilateral treaties and regional agreement on disaster assistance. The dearth of international mechanism in the post-Second World War gave leverage to the emergence of Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to respond to the disaster relief to evolve itself. Since 1968, there was growing concern to establish a more permanent focal point for dealing with disaster relief (Kent 1983: 694). Further, Chilean earthquake 1971 took toll of eighty-five people and making a sizeable populace 2,348,522 homeless; 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan left 300,000 deaths with disruption of 3,648,000 lives (Kent1983:693). These incidents caught attention of the western press to dearth of intergovernmental organisation to tackle with disasters or disaster preparedness.

An estimation of disasters between 1965-75 put disaster rate approximately once a week taking toll to 3.5 million people affecting more than 400 million populations. In economic terms, the damage aggregated at \$5.3 billion within the affected countries and received \$1.6 billion of humanitarian assistance (Joint Inspection Unit 1980: ii). Debates swirled around response to disasters and the UN was stranded with dilemma where on the one hand there was wide recognition that the existing response system was inadequately prepared i.e. coordination was minimal,



information transfer insufficient and shared knowledge spotty, on the other hand, many nations were unwilling to allow the outside actors to assist the disaster response fearing compromise with their sovereignty (Hannigan 2012: 51). The UN General Assembly created the UNDRO in December 1971 “to mobilize, direct and co-ordinate the relief activities of the various organisations of the UN system in response to a request for disaster assistance from a stricken State” (UNGA 1971:86). Thereafter, the decades of 1970s and 1980s debated on the need to establish a multilateral treaty on disaster relief, having universal application. However, there was dearth of substantial outcome. Instead, one witnessed adoption of multiple sectoral and regional treaties pertaining to disaster during this period.

Besides issue of coordination and relief measures of disaster, the concern for disaster reduction and mitigation got priority in the discourses of the UN with the launch on 1 January 1990 of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) through the General Assembly. The member states and relevant institutions were directed “to reduce, through concerted international action, especially in developing countries, loss of life, poverty and property damage as well as the social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters. It also harped upon expansion of their capacity to deal with major natural disasters and to increase the resilience and mitigation capacity of the local population” (United Nation 2019: 5). Thus, the IDNDR proved to be an important starting point for significant activities, both at UN level launching of the UN International Strategy for Risk Reduction (ISDR) and at regional level. The ISDR acted as a global framework for the promotion of action to reduce social vulnerability and risks of natural hazards and technological and environmental disaster (United Nation 2019: 5).

From 1990 to 1994 several rounds of International disaster response related meetings were held but there were few effective activities implemented on the ground. Subsequently, the UN organised a conference at Yokohama in 1994 as the mid-term review of the IDNDR. The outcome called as the “Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World” was levelled as “Hyogo Framework for Action” (HFA) was embraced by 168 states (LESTARI 2008: 1). The beginning of the implementation of the HFA (2005–2015) had started to execute risk reduction in a comprehensive way. It laid stress on the early warnings for efficacious disaster prevention and preparedness. The role of education and training, sharing of technology, environmental protection and the fight against poverty were identified as vital to vulnerability mitigation. To execute these

targets, the stress was on national measures, multi-level approach and role of global community (Costea and Felicio 2005: 6). The Yokohama conference helped to increase global acceptance of the link between catastrophe risk reduction, sustainable development and poverty reduction. Further, it generated awareness among states and led to the adoption of integrated approaches to disaster risk management. In a number of countries, initiatives were taken towards the development of knowledge, skills and technical abilities to reduce the effects of hazards and to reduce people's vulnerability to disaster risks (Costea and Felicio 2005: 6).

The discourse of disaster mitigation was reinforced with the second World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDRR) held in Kobe, Japan from 18 to 22 January 2005, marking 10 years of Great Hanshin earthquake in Kobe that had killed 6000 persons and made more than 45,000 people homeless as well as the tsunami 2004, took lives of 227,000 people and more than 1.7 million people remained homeless that affected 15 countries encompassing two continents.

The third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) held in 2015 in Sendai that adopted "Sendai Declaration and Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)" with the goal of creating a framework that was brief, focused, forward-thinking, and action-oriented (Chatterjee et al. 2015: 177). It upgraded the earlier landmark agreement that was reached a decade ago in Hyogo and now aimed to create a comprehensive framework with achievable targets, a legally-based instrument for disaster risk reduction. It set out four specific priorities for action:

- i. Understanding disaster risk;
- ii. Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk;
- iii. Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience;
- iv. Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction (UNISDR 2019:14).

It also evolved certain assessment mechanism to foresee global progress toward the Sendai Framework's objective and aim as well as seven global targets to be met in coming years. These include: "the reduction of global disaster mortality; reduction of the number of affected people; reduction of direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product; reduction of disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, such as the health and educational facilities; and increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk

reduction strategies by 2020” (United Nation 2019:1) among other goals. Thus, the Sendai framework seeks to focus on the disaster reduction measures to be mainly undertaken by the state in collaboration with other actors including local government as well as the private sector. This framework is limited by its voluntary and non-binding nature (United Nation 2019:1).

These three international conferences, held in Yokohama in 1994, Hyogo in 2005 and Sendai in 2015 were pivotal in moving disaster management from a reactive to a proactive strategy. Under the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World and the Hyogo Framework, the focus was on risk reduction and developing resilience. The Sendai Framework was a step forward in the same direction reinforcing the shift to disaster risk reduction taking into account factors such as biological and technological hazards, governance and a broader view of sectoral action including health. Besides, Sendai Framework, the disaster reduction goals are also embedded in the other the UN related entities for instance, the Rio conventions prominently characterised as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nation 2019:5-7). These developments at UN has simultaneously seen upsurge in proposal of negotiation for universal treaty devoted to disaster management. The above mentioned accords are limited to regulating specific issues, as contrast to the IRU's endeavour to control all aspects of emergency situations in a comprehensive manner. Other international agreements related to various aspects of disasters are: “The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident(1986), the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency(1986), the Convention on the Trans-boundary Effects of Industrial Incidents (1992), the Kyoto protocol (1997), the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations(1998), the Food Aid Convention (1999), the Framework Convention in Civil Defence Assistance (2000), the Revision of the International Health Regulations (2005), as well as the Optional Protocol to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (2005)”.

Thus, the domain of the disaster management at international level has been discernible with multiplicity of options ranging from creation of institutions, norms creation and policy development, creation of universal institutions like the IRU and the UNOCHA as well as attempt to provide regional and sectoral agreements to respond to multiplicity of disaster.

## **Norms, Principles and Guidelines of Natural Disasters**

A norm is an accepted behaviour and set of standards for activities. The norms creation can be comprehended at both “Global” and “local” level aimed to order to what might be chaotic in the absence of standards. The norms at the international level can take several forms and the most concrete form comes in the form of treaty. The treaties contain the most concrete, understandable and probably the most important international standards. The UN is a vital forum for norms creation as well as advocate in the domain of the humanitarian assistance. Historically, the UN has played an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights, climate change, protection against torture, safeguard of women and child rights. In the sphere of natural disaster, with the demise of the IRU, one could witness a volley of development in an effort to create norms and guidelines or code of conduct with reference to the natural disaster. Diverse form of “soft law” instruments in form of resolutions, declarations, codes, models, and guidelines have been established over the years in the domain of natural disaster (IFRC 2007: 116).

### *Norm and Principle of Impartiality and Neutrality*

The principles pertaining to emergency assistance begins with onset of the disaster. Impartiality, neutrality as well as humanity are crucial guiding principles in these endeavours. These are guiding principles of OCHA (MacGoldrick 2003: 23-24). In perusal of these guidelines, state’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity must to be respected in the wake of occurrence of natural disaster. Humanitarian assistance provided to country follows on the basis of appeal by nations for such assistance. The affected state is also expected to initiate, organise, coordinate and implement the humanitarian assistance within a state with the advent of a natural disaster (MacGoldrick 2003: 24). Impartiality principle lays down the path for humanitarian assistance without any kind of discrimination. As a result, the principle of non-discrimination is at the heart of humanitarian assistance (MacGoldrick 2003: 24). This demands that victims of natural disasters receive essential commodities and services. These comprises of provision of food, water and other requirements on an equitable basis. This also aims to provide requirements of marginalised sections of society including needs of women and children. The inclusivity nature of this principle encompasses old aged person, persons with disabilities and persons within its ambit. The ethnic as well as religious minorities and indigenous persons have also to be provided with their requirements under this

principle. The prime motto of principle of non-discrimination is to ensure availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of humanitarian assistance.

The principles of impartiality as well as neutrality under the OCHA guidelines remain consistent with the principle humanitarian laws of the ICRC. These principles urge shunning any sort of differentiation on the basis of varied identities that is there would be no distinction on the basis of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. Simultaneously, the principle of neutrality restrains the state from acting in favour of anybody in case of hostilities. Simultaneously, it restrains to intervene in any set of controversies whether of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. It urges humanitarian actors especially state to maintain its autonomous status vis- a- vis its donors. Thus, neutrality remains significant part of humanitarian principles. Besides, these OCHA principles, the discourse of the norms, principles pertaining to natural disaster have been also created by the ICRC. These have increasingly got mention in World Disaster Report 2000 reflecting the necessity of evolving multiple norms swirling natural disaster (Hilhorst et al. 2014:175-76).

#### *Norms and Guidelines of Protection of Human Rights*

Natural disasters have traditionally been viewed as challenges and concerns of humanitarian character. Therefore, protection as well as promotion of human rights are increasingly being recognised in the advent of natural disaster. In the aftermath of natural disasters, human rights violations such as unequal access to assistance, discrimination in aid delivery, forced relocation, sexual and gender based violence, loss of documentation, recruitment of children into fighting forces, unsafe or involuntary return or resettlement, and property restitution are common (Reliefweb 2008:1). The displacement further cause risk of human rights violations.

The IASC, an inter-agency coordination committee in charge of emergency assistance and disaster reduction has created a set of 25 policies, principles, and guidelines for humanitarian assistance. These IASC guidelines highlight the significance of intervention required by global community in delivering humanitarian assistance in case of state's failure to provide assistance. Such assistance need to be provided with effective coordination of humanitarian actors as well as national government. The IASC has adopted Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters to provide guidance to protect the rights of people affected by natural disasters. The

guidelines focus on what humanitarian actors should do to implement a human rights-based approach in case of natural disasters (Reliefweb 2008).

The IASC operational guidelines on human rights protection in the aftermath of natural disasters derive itself from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) entails varieties obligations for range of civil and political rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) entail varieties obligations for state ranging from the economic, social, and cultural rights. They also hold equality as well as non-discrimination as a major pillar of ensuring human rights. It urges that irrespective of distinctiveness on the varied basis race, colour, language and other variables the state would not discriminate individuals and similar laws would be employed to administer justice. Simultaneously, the vulnerable groups' rights would be adequately placed for protection including those of women, older people, Person with disabilities (PWDs) and others.

#### *Women, Child, and PWDs*

The IASC guidelines calls for due consideration to the needs and interests of women, children and PWDs. Their psycho-social assistance as well as health requirements remain utmost priority. For women suitable clothing, hygienic materials and reproductive health care needs should be given attention. For children, appropriate measures need to be taken to protect children against inhuman practices. These include protection against trafficking, any form of forced labour as well as any practices amounting to slavery such as forced prostitution and sexual mistreatment (IASC 2011: 30). One of the vulnerable groups identified in the IASC guidelines is the PWDs. The guidelines states that "... safe and non-discriminatory access to available humanitarian assistance should be secured for all persons in need. In particular, measures should be taken to grant priority access to vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities" (Chaudhry2015: 5). The planning approach should take special needs of PWDs and for that inputs from the organisations of disabled persons should be been given adequate space. Such standards run parallel with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) that direct States Parties to secure the protection and safety of PWDs in dangerous situations, such as natural disasters (United Nations 2006e: 10). In the post disaster phase, PWDs should be meted out augmented safeguard and accessibility to humanitarian assistance. They should be aided in the process of evacuation, ensure measures to

prevent their separation from their family and be provided emergency housing. Inclusivity as well as accessibility in policy for PWDs remains at a high priority (United Nations 2006e: 10).

*Protection of Life; Security and Physical integrity of the Person; and Family Ties*

IASC guidelines highlights need to be informed among the affected people about the risk arising, precautions and other details like safe escape, emergency shelter etc. in their understandable language. It also emphasised the need for community based disaster planning, integration of disaster awareness in educational curriculum, training in the first aid as well as operationalisation of disaster readiness and mitigation steps like riverbed upkeep in flood-prone regions. The evacuation process should respect the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected without discrimination as well as separation from the family remains minimal, evacuation of children to be along with their parent/grandparent or guardian (IASC 2011: 15-26).

The IASC guidelines also highlights the need to take preventive measures including surplus deployment of law enforcement personnel to protect from gender related violence, thefts, plundering or a general violation of law and order; exploitation, trafficking, etc. These guidelines emphasises need to take the opinion of the affected population and point out need for protection against hostility of host communities. Not only safeguard against violence within victimised people need to be ensured in camps. But also emphasise need for protection of women and girls from gender related violence as well as providing proper support to survivors. Human trafficking, child labour and modern forms of slavery such as forced marriage, forced prostitution, sexual exploitation and other forms of exploitation must all be addressed. If a natural disaster occurs in an area where there is armed conflict, appropriate preventive measures should be implemented immediately or existing measures should be strengthened to protect children affected by the disaster from recruitment and use by armed forces or armed groups, including local defence forces in accordance with international standards and procedures (IASC 2011: 15-26). When internally displaced people live with host families, there should be effective monitoring and ombudsman mechanisms in place. Armed forces should give over camps or communal centres to civilian authorities or organisations after the immediate emergency phase has passed. The role of the police and security services should be limited to ensuring security. To avoid despoliation or mutilation of the mortal remains of the dead should be collected and recognised and the remains should be returned to the next of kin of the deceased person as soon as possible (IASC 2011: 15-26).

### *Protection of rights related to the Provision of Food; Health; Shelter; and Education*

According to the IASC principles, necessary goods and services must be provided regardless of race, colour, sex, language, handicap, religion, or other status. Thus, the principle of non-discrimination would prevail in terms of access to relief materials and services. Simultaneously, these guidelines also take care of the differential needs and requirements of the internally displaced person. The right to water aims to ensure that everyone has access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and inexpensive water for personal and home use. The recommendations also call for enough supplies of drinkable water to prevent dehydration, cooking, and personal and hygienic needs. In the aftermath of the natural disaster, displacement is one of the major concerns. Therefore, emergency shelter becomes important. Thus, right to shelter needs to be protected as with accommodation be characterised with peace, dignity as well as security (IASC 2011: 34). Generally, public arenas such as halls, hospitals or schools are used as emergency shelters. However, using educational institution is not recommended for emergency shelter in most cases because it may disrupt regular schooling. Tents are utilised instead when buildings are not accessible or are unsafe for displaced people to stay.

The Brookings Bern Project on Internal Displacement put restrictions on keeping the affected population in the temporary shelter. Evacuees should not be kept in emergency shelter for longer than three weeks. Temporary shelters are a sort of interim accommodation for persons who have been relocated due to a disaster and are unable to find permanent home (Reliefweb 2008). Finally, it is suggested that temporary shelters be constructed in collaboration with displaced communities to ensure that their individual needs are satisfied (Reliefweb 2008). Lastly, it is recommended that temporary shelters be built in conjunction with dislocated communities in order to guarantee that their specific requirements be met. The right to health necessitates adequate protection, including timely, accessible, and gender-sensitive health care. Other health-related factors, such as access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation, sufficient quantity of healthy food, nutrition and shelter, safe occupational and environmental circumstances, health-related education and information including on sexual and reproductive health remain crucial. As a result, health interventions should be planned with these factors in mind. The right to education need to be adequately protected and attention need to be paid to receive it without discrimination and be inclusive. The guideline also asserts significance of compulsory and free education at the primary level (IASC 2011: 29-32).



*Protection of Rights related to housing; land and property; livelihoods and secondary and higher education*

The right to property includes the right to possess individual house, land and other property and assets free from encroachment and discrimination. Formal titles, customary entitlements are to be protected and respected. It envisages protecting the property as well as possession of those who have faced the brunt of disaster and displaced in the process. The looting, destruction as well as illegal occupation are required to be checked. The right to reclaim the property should be enforced whose land deeds have been destroyed or loss of property document. Special claims of land title and its ownership by the indigenous groups and minority groups need to be respected in such a situation. Transitional shelter or housing needs to be accessible, affordable and habitable. Simultaneously, these shelters should ensure security of tenure, cultural preferences of the habitant and accessibility of minimal health and educational services. The guidelines also stress the need for ample measures to shift from emergency shelter to transitional shelter and then to a permanent shelter is the goal. The consultation of all stakeholders remains significant in the planning and implementation of transitional shelter and permanent housing programmes. The availability of employment opportunities disrupted by the natural disaster need to be restored without any discrimination. Such measures need to be started in the emergency phase period followed by the safe and healthy condition of working conditions (IASC 2011: 39-44).

*Protection of Rights Related to Documentation; Movement; Re-establishment of Family Ties; Expression and Opinion; and elections*

The IASC guidelines highlight the rights of individual personal documentation. The disaster is marked with damage of personal documents, for instance, certificates of identity connecting to birth, marriage, divorce, death and others creating trouble for individual accessing benefits of the aid, property, health and education along with other benefits. This becomes troublesome for disaster victims and restrains individual liberty. The IASC guidelines point out the importance of individual personal documentation in the natural disaster to facilitate people's return to homes and access to employment opportunities and other things. The outfall of the 2004 tsunami caused loss as well as damage of birth, marriage, property papers along with other vital certificates of individual as well as families. Therefore, an important task before government was to reissue such documents. The right to freedom of movement of victim to be respected, including the right to decide to leave the endangered zone, except protection of the safety of the persons concerned. Ensure family unity

in the process of relief operation need to be taken into considerations, including the families that are internally displaced that wishes to stay united be permitted to remain together. Such considerations is to be taken into account in all phases of the disaster response. The political rights in form of right to vote as well as get elected be ensured to the victims of disaster (IASC 2011: 45-53).

Several guidelines are formulated in relation to shelter. People displaced by the disaster should be entitled to freely enter and exit the camps. Unless it is urgency for the camp's safety, security or health of occupants or the surrounding community, such movement should not be restricted or prevented. Adequate measures should be taken to prevent the presence of uncontrolled armed forces in camps and settlements at all times in order to ensure that these places keep their civilian character. Armed forces or security forces should only be present when absolutely necessary to provide security. Camps set up by armed forces or groups in the aftermath of an emergency should be handled by civilian authorities or organisations. The role of police and security forces should be limited to providing security. The police and security forces' responsibility should be restricted to ensuring security. Appropriate steps should be adopted as soon as possible, without discrimination to enable a rapid transition from temporary to transitional shelter and then permanent accommodation. This is necessitated to accomplish international human rights law's standards (Harper 2009:198-99). Thus, these IASC rights based guidelines pertaining to natural disasters are significant contribution to the domain of norms creation as they are the only mechanism that specifically links human rights and natural disasters. These have developed deriving its substance from major human rights corpus: the UDHR; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). But these instruments are still in its infant phase (Hilhorst et al. 2014: 185) as well as not binding as they are not treaty based laws. Effective operationalisation of these rights require elimination of discrimination and stop economic, social and cultural rights' violations.

Besides, human rights are the outcome of a lack of resources and capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters. What is required at this stage for effective implementation of these norms, guidelines and principle is to embrace these norms and create human rights viewpoint as well as mindset. There is necessity to comprehend these global and national available guidelines but simultaneously exhibit commitment to ensure that they are implemented on the ground (Ferris

2010:9). The evaluations by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General (RSG) on the human rights of IDPs demonstrate that national authorities are frequently uninformed of the importance of human rights rules in the context of natural catastrophes. Even though many of the laws and codes of conduct applicable in natural disaster circumstances provide such assurances, international agencies and NGOs are unaware as to how to incorporate a human rights based strategy into emergency relief and response. (Reliefweb 2008:2).

#### *Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations*

The Indian Ocean tsunami tragedy highlighted that there were no clear and consistent regulatory agreements covering many aspects of trans-boundary disaster management and humanitarian assistance. OCHA, in the past faced the resistance from governments pertaining to importation of wireless telecommunication equipment (Rahrig 2010: 278). To do away such resistance on the part of the government the “Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations” came into force on 10 January 2005 proved to be an important change in direction to resolve these concerns (United Nations 2006a:9). Removal of traditional as well as regulatory barriers in trans-border use of telecommunication equipment by humanitarian agencies in the advent of emergency with consent of the local authorities is substantive part of the convention. The signatories are to provide local facilities, equipment as well as personnel for effective administration of telecommunication services. This treaty eases the use of life-saving telecommunication equipment, sets aside varied regulatory barriers to use of telecommunication resources including licensing requirements to use allocated frequencies, restrictions on the import of telecommunication equipment as well as limitations on the movement of humanitarian teams (UNTS 1998). It incorporates in detail procedures for request in the provision of telecommunication assistance. Simultaneously, it recognises the right of a state to direct, control, and coordinate assistance within its territory (ITU 2021).

The larger challenges to such convention emanates from its non-ratification by many self-sufficient countries, who have already developed their network of telecommunication, for instance, United States, Russia and Germany, as they are better placed to tackle disaster. Many of these self-sufficient countries hardly need assistance in the advent of natural disaster nor are they interested to share their network to the poorer region. Thus, the provisions of the convention seem useful for vulnerable countries (Rahrig 2010: 285-86).

Thus, these set of guidelines and norms create a volley of standards that remain essential to respond to natural disaster. These guidelines and principles intimately connected to institutional mechanism under UN and its operative agencies.

### **The UN Institutional Mechanisms for Natural Disasters**

Apart from peace and security, human rights and development, the UN has been mandated to deal with humanitarian concerns, which also includes humanitarian crisis caused by natural disaster. The UN regularly involves itself in mitigation, early preparation, response and recovery from disasters across the world given its amicable ties with countries and most importantly developing countries that are most vulnerable in case of disaster. Its numerous offices, organisations and programmes assist countries in reducing hazard vulnerability by strengthening both institutional and citizen capability. It is also upfront in mobilisation of resources in case of occurrence of disaster and continues to aid afflicted countries during the recovery period (Coppola 2011: 553).

It responds immediately on occurrence of disaster by extending “relief aid such as food, water, shelter, medical assistance and logistical support” (Coppola 2011: 553). In close cooperation with governments, organisations, and citizens, the UN is involved itself in capacity building as well as disaster risk reduction measures long before the actual onset of the disaster and redesigning development models. Assistance in risk mapping throughout the world and assisting government in creation of the institutional frameworks depleting chances of disaster risk remains part of its mission. It also encourages states to build early warning systems. Besides, it monitors and forecasts disaster risk that remains vital part of its role (Coppola 2011: 553). Several units in UN secretariat and specialised agency bodies have been involved with mandate to respond to disaster including natural disaster. These include the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA), the WFP, the FAO, the UNICEF, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UNDP, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the UNHCR. There are also a number of non-UN IGOs with relevant official mandates at the global level, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Civil Defence etc. (IFRC 2007: 33).

#### *The Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO)*

The UN as a successor to the League of Nations, to begin with had limited and sporadic focus on disasters and lacked endeavour to create a relief organisation at global level. The decades of late

1960s and beginning of 1970s were marred by the devastating natural disasters: including Yugoslavian earthquake, Southern hemispherical hurricane, Caribbean food shortage and other incidents. The ECOSOC asked for a report in the matters of disaster relief from the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG). Simultaneously, the General Assembly adopted multiple resolutions focusing on persuading donor countries to boost the amount and speed of emergency assistance (IFRC 2007: 52).

Several operative agencies of the UN have been involved in dealing with both natural as well as manmade disasters. Over the years there has been also increased presence of NGOs and their involvement in humanitarian assistance. These developments raised concern for coordination of these actors for humanitarian relief (Nishimoto 2014: 299). The major step to create a coordination mechanism was formalised with the UN General Assembly Resolution of 14 December 1971 that established the UNDRO “to mobilise, direct and co-ordinate the relief activities of the various organisations of the UN system in response to a request for disaster assistance from a stricken State and to coordinate the assistance given by IGOs and NGOs such as the International Red Cross” (UNGA 1971). The mandate of the UNDRO included: relief co-ordination, mobilisation of aid for disaster-stricken countries as well as prevention, pre-disaster planning and preparedness reducing the impact of natural phenomena or eliminate the threat altogether through preventive measures (Joint Inspection Unit 1980: 5). Initially, it responded to the sudden natural disasters like volcano or typhoon, later it evolved to account the emergency manmade disasters. It was established as central platform that maintained a clearinghouse in Geneva and facilitated information exchange and enabled the donors to match the requirements of supplies of goods and services for disaster preparedness.

The UNDRO creation was mired in controversy from its inception. Kent (1987) says that “two years of arduous discussing” occurred prior to the decision to move ahead with the creation of a relief coordination office within the UN system. A number of key stakeholders such as the UN agencies, voluntary organisations (like the League of Red Cross Societies), and various governments (including the Soviet Union and France) were deeply divided over role attributed to this organisation. Few argued that the UNDRO would direct relief activities in a disaster stricken country, rather than just mobilising and coordinating (Kent 1983: 700). This endeavour to direct and co-ordinate function through an office in the UN secretariat was resented by agencies like the UNICEF and other specialised agencies that feared to lose to their autonomy and their decision

making capability or transfer of resources in favour of the United Nations. The initiative of the UNDRO could have also alienated the pioneering role played by the Red Cross Organisations that did not expect its reliance on any other governments and IGOs. Mc Entire (1997) argues lack of the capacity of the multitude of actors and government to properly manage relief delivery led to the creation of the UNDRO.

The UNDRO made an attempt to Draft Convention on Expediting Delivery of Emergency Assistance aimed to expedite the emergency assistance in 1984 but was not adopted by the member countries. It reeled under financial crunch since its inception and consequently, this agency chronically starved for funds with even to pay for salaries and paperclips. Stephens (1979:188) accounts the “financial sword of Damocles” hung over the UNDRO with inability to fulfill its mandate and “gain the attention and respect of the international relief community.” To cater to the urgency of the UNDRO, in the early 1975, a special voluntary trust fund was established by a few contributing member states. The General Assembly decided to cover the UNDRO’s administrative and staffing expenses from the regular UN budget. Besides limiting what the agency could realistically do, especially in terms of field operations, its heavy and frequently adhoc financial reliance on contributing governments meant that the coordinator’s office was “particularly susceptible to those same government’s wishes and pressures for changing or modifying the UNDRO’s structure and activities” (Green1977: 189).

Besides, overstaffing was another challenge before the UNDRO. The estimates show that by 1980, the UNDRO staff had grown from six to 50, and the annual budget from US\$330,000 to US\$3.6 million (Richter 1995: 291), but this failed to turn things around. The UNDRO’s first decade failed to understand the links between disasters and development (Kent1983: 699). Scholars have also disputed the UNDRO as not being an organisation. In turn, it is opined as an office in the UN Secretariat based in the UN office in Geneva, with a coordinator of the rank of Under-Secretary General and its staff. The hazy mandate, considerable intra-agencies competition and non-cooperative attitude from the UN agency field staff, lack of staff, fund, confused internal line of authority, infamous UN personnel system, its politics and internal quota system severely limited the ability of the coordinator to assemble qualified staff (Green 1977:32).

The working of the UNDRO exhibits its close collaboration between the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its liaison on all disaster related matters. They exchanged

information in occurrences of disaster emergencies to avoid duplication in their respective request for international assistance. The League's assistance was also sought in the UN supported government projects in pre-disaster planning (Beigbeder 1991: 47). However, the available expertise to tackle natural disasters got insignificant attention as humanitarian community showed obsession for the conflicts and complex emergencies (Katoch 2006: 160).

Cuny (1983) especially objected to the protocol whereby the UNDRO coordinated the receipt and dispersal of funds from foreign donors. It made more sense, when he argued to designate a local group to coordinate the emergency response, as outsiders were unfamiliar with local conditions and politics. Furthermore, the UNDRO's mandate was restricted to coordinating an emergency response, thus ruling out undertaking any longer-term measures that intertwined disasters and development. Voluntary agencies and NGOs, particularly the League of the Red Cross, were generally more willing to assist the UNDRO than its sister UN bodies. The standing relief agencies within the UN system, even though they were not overly helpful, still did not attempt to hinder the UNDRO's activities. Rather, "the major source of resistance to the UNDRO came from the UN Headquarters in New York, not from the relief community" (Stephens 1979: 132). The UNDRO limped along until 1992 and was disbanded as part of a reform package undertaken by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and absorbed within the newly created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), an office that was given a wider, more political brief covering complex emergencies such as famines as well as natural disasters (Walker and Maxwell 2009: 42).

#### *The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)*

The 1989 Armenian earthquake followed by the humanitarian crisis in 1990s during the Gulf war Balkan war, civil war in Rwanda and Great Lake Region in 1994 created a need for coordination of humanitarian assistance, both for natural as well as manmade disasters. The UNDRO failed to respond to such situation to avert death toll and problems of IDPs. Such development put the humanitarian assistance on the political agenda of G7 summit (1991) held at London. This summit called for setting up high official under the rubric of the UN Secretary-General to "strengthen the coordination, and to accelerate the effective delivery, of all the UN relief for major disasters" (OCHA 2012: 1-2). Simultaneously, the UN budgets hard pressed to meet new and larger responsibilities aimed to build a more streamlined, less redundant and better articulated latest

system of achieving humanitarian objectives. For more than a decade, the UN system struggled to co-ordinate its response to International emergency and disasters. The UN took the first steps towards promoting more centralised coordination of humanity assistance agencies with the establishment of DHA in 1991. Before establishment of the DHA, the UNDRRO performed coordination functions. The existence of DHA was comparatively for shorter period between April 1992 till 1997 and performed to coordinate the UN specialised agencies as well as engaged itself in humanitarian assistance systems and protection. Under the leadership of Kofi Annan, as a part of reform effort, the DHA was redesigned to the UNOCHA.

The core functions of the OCHA encompassed coordination of emergency response, policy development, and humanitarian advocacy (MacGoldrick 2003: 25). It facilitates the coordination of operative the UN agencies for instance, the UNDP, the UNHCR, the UNICEF with Geneva based Response Coordination Branch (RCB) issuing situation report to attract the attention of International community. To coordinate the emergency phase at the country or on-site level, it assists country specific the UN Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) as well as assist national and local level government in carrying out the relief assistance and others and help in mobilisation of assistance for the affected countries asking for international assistance. It is not an implementing agency rather a coordinating agency. The UNOCHA include multiple response tools and structure - the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), the International Urban Search and Rescue Standards (INSARAG), the Geographic Information Support Teams (GIST).

The working of the OCHA exhibits its obsession to man-made complex emergencies, overlooking natural and technological disasters (Katoch 2006:160). The OCHA devotes less time and resources to establish the necessary tools and strategies for natural disaster response and coordination. Its coordination mandate is also jeopardised by a lack of authority, opposition by the UN agency and sporadic funding (Macrae 2002). The structural constraints in the delivery of coordination function is marked with dearth of authority and clout to guarantee that all agencies engaged in the process of humanitarian assistance in relief or recovery process are on the same page (Coppola 2006:527). Besides, the confrontation from the UN agencies as well as erratic nature of funding has subsequently impacted the overall outcome of the OCHA's performance. The presence of highly professional personnel had been behind the success of the organisation. But what has come as a challenge is slow deployment of staff compounded by the erratic nature



of contract or no contract and poor briefing to staffs. There is need to evolve larger coordination assistance at the decentralised level i.e. regional, country and sectoral levels (Reindorp and Wiles 2001: iii).

The Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 revealed the faultlines in the existing humanitarian coordination mechanism under the aegis of the UNOCHA. This is further complicated by the OCHA's lack of command authority over operational agencies of the Emergency Relief Coordinator and his country level representative mandated to coordinate the humanitarian assistance (IFRC 2005: 151). The coordination is also marred by unwillingness on the part of the agencies involved in the coordination to release the efficient people in the process of coordination. The Coordinators are seen to possess institutional biases causing conflict of interest derailing the coordination role of UNOCHA. For instance, the UN system agencies focus primarily on their agencies rather than to the UN family as a whole and also tend to neglect or marginalise most significant humanitarian actors in the field, like NGOs and the Red Cross Movement (Reindorp and Wiles 2001:iii, 10). Several of NGOs regard that benefits from the UN-led coordination processes is scant. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), international consortium of NGO recounts "The UN is unable to offer services and attitudes commensurate with the partnership demanded by NGOs" (Reindorp and Wiles 2001: iii, 11). There is need to reform the OCHA so that donors are readily updated as well as other humanitarian agencies are also updated with information unfurling on the ground in advent of disaster. This would prove quintessential in ensuring international assistance to the affected area.

#### *The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)*

The UNOCHA was empowered through the UN Resolution 46/182 December 1991 mandated enhancement of the UN's capability and capacity to counter disasters of various nature, inclusive of complex humanitarian emergencies as well as other humanitarian operations in the field. It replaced the previous highest official, the Disaster Relief Coordinator, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who is responsible for coordinating and facilitating the UN humanitarian assistance and serving as a primary point of contact for governments and NGOs. Thus, the ERC heads OCHA and acts as principal advisor, coordinator and advocate of the whole structure of coordination under the humanitarian assistance under the rubric of the UN (United Nations 2008: 222-267).The IASC, the Consolidated Appeals Process and the Central Emergency

Revolving Fund act as key coordination mechanisms and tools of the ERC. It works with assistance of 860 staffs in working coordination with staffs in New York, Geneva and several of them on the ground (Bullock et al. 2017: 262). Prior to 1991, natural disasters were controlled by the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator, and complex humanitarian emergencies were overseen by special representatives of the UNSG. The role of the two different office was merged to establish the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) (Coppola 2011: 555). The ERC works with Secretary-General and aids the IASC in directing, coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2019). The Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator acts as an advisor to the UNSG on disaster-related issues also chairs the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and leads the IASC. He reports to the UNSG as well as even called before the Security Council in cases of humanitarian emergencies (IASC 2019).

*The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)*

The UNDAC was an important part of the coordination created in 1993. It comprises of specialists in the field of disaster management picked up from the OCHA, the UNDP and the UN agencies such as the WFP, the UNICEF and the WHO. They take up the responsibility of damage assessment. These assessments support to states and to the UN Resident Coordinator in operationalisation of international assistance. It also involves itself in preparation of the UN Interagency Appeals intended to raise fund for emergency relief for the operational agencies of the UN including the UNDP, the UNHCR, the UNICEF and others that assist provisions of basic requirements at the early stage of the disaster. They remain in permanent standby mode for rapid deployment with consent and move to field between two to four weeks. Their deployment remains in several cases for instance, sudden onset disasters and prolonged crises and so on.

The global deployment of the UNDAC ensures efficient collaboration among several stakeholders involved in the disaster management process (OCHA 2018: Vii). Its Disaster Response Preparedness Mission had in the past assisted disaster afflicted countries to devise their disaster response plan. It has assisted multiple countries in the disaster reduction process and upgradation of disaster preparedness plans for several countries. Afghanistan, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic are few of them (Katoch 2007:1).

Currently, the UNDAC team comes from 79 countries and has more than 225 team members. The team also got under critical scrutiny in Bhuj earthquake, Gujarat on 26<sup>th</sup> January 2001. In this case, the team arrival was too late approximately one week after the earthquake.

Aside from that, the team was too small and underequipped to deliver fully effective coordination and assessment services (UNOCHA 2001: 1-2). There requires need for restructuring of the UNDAC. A key element of the Hyogo Framework emphasises the importance of linking disaster response and disaster reduction initiatives to assist communities become more resilient in the face of disasters and make the transition easier. As a result, a lot of Asian natural disaster experts believe that immediate disaster relief should be linked to recovery and risk control. Even adding scientists from relevant disciplines, such as seismologists, for rapid scientific disaster evaluations that promote recovery and long-term development has been also suggested to be added in the UNDAC team. (United Nation 2006f: 14).

#### *The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)*

It was in 1992 that the IASC was brought into effect by the UN Resolution 46/182. It brings together all of the UN's major agencies, both inside and outside the organisation under a single platform chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) (United Nations 2008:268). It supports in formulation of policy as well as addresses the issue of coordination with regard to humanitarian assistance. “The ERC works to deploy appropriate personnel from throughout the UN to assist UN resident coordinators and lead agencies to increase on-site coordination” (Bullock 2017: 283). One of the functions of the IASC is to arrive at decision through inter-agency coordination in advent and to respond to complex emergencies. It is heavily involved in needs assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination arrangements and the formulation of humanitarian policy (OCHA 2005).

Reform to address gaps in the coordination led the IASC to establish “sectoral clusters” with lead organisations in charge for global coordination (IFRC 2005: 151). The major sectors and their head include: “Agriculture (FAO); Camp coordination and management (UNHCR for conflict induced displacement; IOM for natural disaster migrations); Early recovery (UNDP); Education (UNICEF and Save the Children Alliance); Emergency shelter (UNHCR for conflict-generated internal displacements, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for disaster situations); Emergency telecommunications (OCHA, with telecommunications services provided by UNICEF and WFP); Health (WHO); Logistics (WFP); Nutrition (UNICEF); Protection (UNHCR); Water sanitation and hygiene (UNICEF)” (United Nations 2008:268). These clusters are intended to boost accountability while also improving collaboration, capacity, and overall effectiveness (IFRC 2005: 152). The cluster strategy has now

been effectively used in a number of emergencies, with the ability to address both international and local coordination.

What emerges problematic for the IASC is its association with non-UN organisations in the coordination process that creates a sort of characterisation of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders in the humanitarian assistance. For instance, at many times the meeting of a ‘core group of the IASC members’ encompasses only the UNOCHA and three prominent UN agencies i.e. the UNICEF, the UNHCR and the WFP. Such meetings are organised earlier or after the normal IASC meetings. For many actors such attempt by IASC weakens the chances of the humanitarian community and coordination mechanism as a whole (Dalton 2003: 22).

#### *The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)*

It was established in 1991 to kick off the interagency appeal process and to collaborate with the IASC Country Team on the ground and the ERC at headquarters. The IASC, donor, host government are major actors of the CAP to design and prepare a Consolidated Appeal (CA) for fundraising. The Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) normally prepare the Consolidated Appeals (CA), which are launched globally by the UNSG at the Donor's Conference each November. The CA is valid for as long as it is required for financial purposes, which is normally one year or longer. It becomes important especially when the situation requires long term recovery measures to be addressed on the ground beyond period of six month (UNOCHA 2019). These funds seek to cover varied sets of arena such as coordination and support services, economic recovery and so on. The advent of the disasters follows issuing of situation report and followed by a Flash Appeal. This flash Appeal is generally brought and launched within a period of two to six months. It is after this that Consolidated Appeal is issued (Coppola 2006: 486).

This mechanism has accumulated over \$US 17 billion in the first decades of its existence and proved itself significant for resource mobilisation in the case of crisis. The proportionate share of the CAP to total global humanitarian assistance has dwindled from an average 40% to an average of 30% between 1991-2001. The political or strategic interest as well as high profile case largely influences the funding (Porter 2002: 1-2). This is a major shortcomings to the CAP, despite that it remains the best and quick tool available with UN agencies to mobilise as well as imitate joint planning in the process of relief, transition period as well as recovery phase.

### *The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)*

The CERF was established in March 2006 as a critical finance vehicle to respond quickly to humanitarian crises. It upgraded erstwhile Central Emergency Revolving Fund and give another name CERF in 2005 under resolution 60/124, is administered on behalf of the UNSG by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (UNGA 2006). This was brought in post-tsunami 2004, the South Asian earthquake, and other natural disasters and act as important source of funding for covering several activities. Initially it was designed to serve the requirements of the Complex humanitarian emergencies but it was in 2001 that General Assembly expanded its mandate to cover all sets of disasters (OCHA 2012:3, Coppola 2006:483). Funding is received from the donor government as well as private sector to assist countries affected by the natural disaster as well as conflict situation. In the process of delivery of fund, it has evolved two diverse window of funding rapid response and an underfunded emergencies window. The major source of fund comes from the government donors. With later providing assistance based on need assessment, the interaction with humanitarian actors, as wells proportion of need already met on the ground (CERF 2011:3-4).

Prior to the CERF, the UN humanitarian assistance faced with unpredictability to fund humanitarian assistance. The establishment of the CERF has increased the funding predictability (OCHA 2011: 3-4). It assisted US\$ 0.6 billion to underfunded crisis between the period of 2006 and 2010. Additionally, the CERF has enhanced the domain of the humanitarian services by funding the less funded common services like transportation as well as communications (OCHA 2011: 3-4). The CERF secretariat improved its process, procedure as well as information management and is widely recognised in responses of stakeholders. UN agencies interviewee expressed their satisfaction with CERF processing of funds and its readiness of response. The CERF has also exhibited readiness to respond, accessibility to staff, flexibility of consultative process as well as openness to constructive criticism of the CERF (OCHA 2011:4). The monitoring of the CERF funded projects and its outcomes continue to be an important challenges for CERF.

### *The Virtual On Site Operations Coordination Centre (Virtual OSOCC)*

The development in the information technology has assisted the humanitarian relief and exchange of the disaster information. The Virtual OSOCC is an OCHA managed central repository of information that allows information sharing among disaster responders (Coppola 2006: 560). They are intimated with situational awareness in the early phase and support decision making and

coordination on the ground. Users can comment on current data and debate issues with other stakeholders in an interactive Web-based database where the data is kept.

### **The UN Specialised Agencies involvement in Natural Disaster**

Apart from the above UN instruments, some of the UN specialised agencies are actively involved in dealing with natural disaster.

#### *The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)*

In the domain of disaster management, principally the UNDP focuses on development of national capacities. It has over the years evolved to focus on mitigation and preparedness, risk reduction to the domain of emergency assistance. In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly charged the UNDP with operational responsibility for natural catastrophe mitigation, prevention, and preparedness. In this direction, it employs DRR practitioners to cover all regions, with a focus on the countries with the most risk. (UNISDR 2013:48). The UNDP programmes have envisioned to enhance national preparedness for natural catastrophes, both prevention and response. The recovery assistance facilitated by the UNDP enables restoration of normalcy after the advent of crises for an effective transition to development. The UNDP also strengthens governance structures and policies for better disaster risk management and response (UNDP 2010: vi). The disaster reduction has been integrated in the planning framework with a focus on disaster risk management in order to reduce poverty and achieve long term human development (UNDP 2010). Building of national capacity for prevention and management of catastrophic events has been integrated in the UNDP work. It aids the government to enhance their ability to oversee recuperation and to review attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and decreasing burden to future calamities (UNDP 2010). The UNDP also focuses on strengthening governmental institutions and improvise upon institutions' existing capacities in case of occurrence of a disaster specifically for the developing world.

With the reform process in the UN, the OCHA Emergency Relief Coordinator functions related to disaster mitigation have been brought to the UNDP. Under the UNDP, the Disaster reduction Unit (DRU) assists the UNDP Country Offices technically and financially in designing and implementing disaster reduction strategies and capacity-building programs. Developing countries are especially assisted through “capacity building, integration of disaster risk reduction into development projects and investment” (Coppola 2011). Infrastructural loss, displacement, refugees remains a major hurdle in the way of the UNDP. To work efficiently, the UNDP requires

a permanent country office, amicable relationship with government and political bias, coordination of UN agencies and dealing with donors. An Emergency Response Division (ERD) was established under the umbrella of the UNDP in 1995 to reinforce its role with regard to disaster management. The ERD was tasked to evolve a collaborative arrangement consisting of several actors. These comprises of countries, the UN agencies, contributors and NGOs to respond instantly in case of disaster, facilitate transport and communicate to management staff and help out in distribution of relief. UNDP has also set aside approximately 5% of its budget to avoid bureaucratic derailment and respond to special condition. In case of major disaster, “special extra-budgetary contributions to provide the state with technical and material assistance, in coordination with OCHA and other agencies involved in the UN Disaster Management Team (DMT) has been envisaged” (Coppola 2011). Another significant initiative under the aegis of the UNDP has been Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI). This initiative pools together expertise from diverse organisations: FAO, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the UNICEF, the WFP and the WHO that are actively involved itself in reinforcing disaster risk reduction in several countries. It supports countries in the preparation of national strategies, frameworks as well as incorporation of disaster risk reduction into the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (United Nation 2019: 32-33).

#### *The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)*

Under the structure of the UNICEF, an Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) exists with responsibility to manage UNICEF’s emergency activities. It maintains UNICEF’s Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) and coordinates with other organisations in the field. Water and sanitation, child safety and education are prime domain of this agency’s operations. The concerns pertaining to women and children are addressed from time to time by the agency.

In the domain of the disaster risk reduction, it has engaged actively to execute priorities of Hyogo Framework of Action with its engagement in national level development processes, UN country planning Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). It ensures that the DRR is incorporated in the policies of the governments. It seeks to demand the representation of children in DRR initiatives. This UN agency has also established its own organisational “early warning early action” system. Especially in the domain of education, it lays emphasis upon incorporation of disaster risk reduction in school programme as schools designed to resist against any set of disaster. The UNICEF also supports preparedness

activities by co-leading the IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness, supporting CADRI and leading or co-leading clusters in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Nutrition and Education (UNISDR 2013:89).

#### *The World Food Programme (WFP)*

WFP became member of the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on Disaster Reduction in 2000. It prioritises mitigation of consequences of natural hazards on poor with regard to food security. A disaster mitigation steering group has been established to assist its offices incorporate these efforts into their development initiatives. The agency also works on a number of projects to guarantee food security. These relate to water harvesting in Sudan to fight against drought. In Tanzania, the agency has undertaken measures for food storage. Besides these activities WFP also involves in early warning and vulnerability mapping around the world (Coppola 2011: 575). Regular monitoring of the world's food security situation is also done by its the International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) that monitors the flow of food supplies around the world and provides the humanitarian community with an accurate inventory and assessment of emergency food supply quantities and locations. This database also incorporates emergency related statistics, such as estimated supply timetables, plight and international port capacities. When natural catastrophes strike, the WFP is a key actor in meeting the victims' immediate nutritional needs. Food is brought to a storage and distribution takes place from centre to the affected location. Such allocation is based on the OCHA and the UNDP's pre-determined needs assessments (WFP 2005).

The WFP engages with NGOs with extensive experience and technical expertise to distribute, transport, store food. Further, it collaborates closely with UN agencies to plan a comprehensive and effective response to disaster victims (Coppola 2011: 575). The funding of the WFP comes from governmental as well as voluntary contributions to collect cash, food and other services. Majority of its funds comes from the state as logistic team bridges the gap between contributors and those in need. In 2004, the agency delivered 5.1 million tons of food (WFP 2005). The WFP has been also involved in complex situations (such as the conflicts in Syria and Yemen), natural catastrophes (such as earthquakes in Nepal and Ecuador) and epidemics and pandemics (such as the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa) in recent years (WFP 2019).

#### *The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)*

The FAO is a member of the International Assessment Task Force on Disaster Reduction. The United Nations World Food Summit mandated it in 1996 to help UN member countries build national food



security, vulnerability information, and specialised mapping systems to tackle the problem of malnutrition. The strategy's goal is to improve communities' and local organisations' ability to prepare for natural disasters and deal with food shortages (Coppola 2011: 579). The organisation aims at disaster preparedness, reduction of adverse impacts of disaster and accentuates food security and rural production. The FAO also predicts, informs plight of agricultural sector and undertakes the possible relief and reconstruction activities (Coppola 2017: 579).

Within the FAO, Emergency Coordination Group takes up the concern of the emergencies and disaster reduction in tandem with other member countries and partners as well as redressing issues around the disasters (Coppola 2011). The foremost task taken by the FAO is to evaluate the position of supply of food and cereals to the disaster hit areas is done by contacting farmers, herders, fisheries and local government in such areas. Accordingly, relief and rehabilitation programmes are framed and necessary funds are arranged towards the same (Coppola 2011: 579).

Finally, the last component of the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division is the Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit. In the context of preparedness, emergency relief rehabilitation, the Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit (TCER) gives recommendations to the FAO. The FAO looks after the gaps and the developmental activities. The works of the FAO is financially supported by its Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), the government agencies and NGOs (Coppola 2011: 579).

#### *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)*

Traditionally, the UNHCR did not involve in natural disaster response as it largely focused the issue of refugees. The advent of Indian Ocean Tsunami as well as South Asian earthquake (2005) caused this agency to come forward and engage in assistance. It provided family tents, blankets, plastic sheets, jerry cans, kitchen sets, stoves, and lanterns through planes stocked with supplies from its global and regional stocks during the emergency assistance phase (UNHCR 2005a). Thus, the UNHCR's contributions of "tents, non-food items, and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) assisted build UNHCR's credibility as an operational partner in the wake of disaster" (Entwisle 2013: 49). The UNHCR has the practical experience to assist national governments to implement protection actions in the arena of forced displacement, legal aid, documentation, identification of vulnerable groups, ensuring aid accessibility and participatory assessment. For instance, in the wake of the

tsunami 2004 in Sri Lanka it got engaged in legal aid clinics as well as addressed land and property concerns and created awareness over discrimination in aid delivery.

At the country level, the agency serves as the protection cluster lead. It works to reduce protection risks at the strategic planning and policy level and engages with varied actors comprised of government, military, Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, ISDR to evolve a framework of protection risks in a disaster. Its expertise in cluster leadership and internal displacement has aided national authorities' operational protection response substantially. But, there is need to strengthen the UNHCR's capacity to assist national governments (Entwisle 2013: 50). The UNHCR involves in training process in the realm of disaster management. Its Asia e-centre trains on the protection subjects to imbibe these within disaster contingency planning processes. It has also deployed protection experts in national contingency planning processes. These experts provide suggestions on protection concerns pertaining to natural disasters (Entwisle 2013: 46-47).

The UNHCR faces challenge as a protection actor as the larger concern in the advent of disaster largely focusses on saving lives and other protection issues are regarded as non-essential. It is presently the only UN humanitarian actor not formally engaged in catastrophe risk reduction efforts. Though it has made efforts to include DRR into its operations, such as during flooding in places like Kakuma, Kenya. Its Regional Centre for Emergency Preparedness (UNHCR e Centre) has come to assist in the Asia-Pacific area to prepare and respond to disasters. (UNISDR2013: 85). But challenges also crop up before the agency as their staff members do not constitute part of the UNDAC training programme or deployed as part of the UNDAC teams. Therefore, disaster risk reduction initiatives remain still a challenge for the UNHCR in the process of disaster management.

But, despite its UNHCR evolving engagement in disaster management domain, it has huge potential in trajectory of the humanitarian assistance. Its participatory approach seeks to include people of different age, gender and diversity that can further assist the operational humanitarian actors to address protection risks, delivery of assistance, mitigation of existing vulnerabilities as well as recovery and rehabilitation phase. In the case of a natural disaster, the UNHCR's expertise in IDP profiling and registration, as well as its community based approach to assist is a vital asset in tackling the issue of IDPs (Entwisle 2013: 48).

## Conclusion

The global response to natural disaster marked its limited presence in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Further, the establishment of the League of Nations coupled with an urge by the International Red Cross Conferences for creation of a body of law for natural disaster led to establishment of the IRU under League's umbrella. It was designed for relief assistance in wake of the natural disaster. Over the years, it produced plentiful scientific publications, though failed in endeavour to coordinate and deliver disaster assistance. Furthermore, its functioning was hampered by the dearth of fund and its fear of interference in sovereign space of the state. Another trajectory of advancement reflected in the post Second World War phase, where IGOs and NGOs became major actors along with increased attention to natural disasters in regional and bilateral treaties. At the global level, the cavalades of natural disasters in the decade of 1960s and 1970s and coordination challenges in midst of natural disasters headed to establishment of the UNDR0 under the aegis of the UN.

In the decades of 1990s, there was a significant shift in disaster management discourse at the global as well as the UN level with an augmented focus around mitigation as well as resilience. The disaster reduction was also spirit behind the Yokohama conference (1994) and subsequent conferences. The Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDRR) in Kobe (2005) designed Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015) aimed at disaster risk reduction and an early warning system. Simultaneously, the UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) (2015) in Sendai, Japan developed a framework for disaster risk reduction. Thus, the trajectory of the global disaster discourse has moved towards increased focus to disaster reduction as well as preparedness from initial focus on early relief and its coordination.

Simultaneous with international disaster discourses, disaster response has been carried forward through evolution as well as design of principles, norms, guidelines and conventions pertaining to natural disasters. The principles of sovereignty, neutrality, non-discrimination remain important pillar echoed in the OCHA in the course of the natural disaster. Human rights approach to natural disaster has led to adoption of the IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights. This encompasses broader set of right meant for protection of the affected population out of natural disasters. These rights are- “protection of life, security and physical integrity and family ties; protection of rights related to the provision of food, health, shelter and education; Protection of rights related to housing, land and property, livelihoods, secondary and higher education and

protection of rights related to documentation, movement, re-establishment of family ties, expression and opinion and elections". Analysis of these guidelines projects that these are infant in nature and require change in attitude of multiple humanitarian actors involved in the wake of natural disaster. They are limited and non-binding in nature, multiplicity and ignorance of humanitarian actors. Another significant part of the norm creation has been the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations that captures smooth transfer of telecommunication in the advent of transboundary disaster. But, such convention faces a major challenge as the well technologically networked countries do not ratify this convention especially USA, Russia, Germany because they are self-sufficient in the field. Despite, multiple limitations of the norms, guidelines and principles vitality of these norms and guidelines remain because of their moral authority.

Besides, these principles, norms, guidelines under the rubrics of the UN, the UN has established multiple institutional mechanisms. Before the establishment of the UN, the IRU was devised under the League of Nations, but it failed to deliver and largely confined to produce scientific academic publications. The incidents of natural disasters in the decades of 1960s and early 1970s for instance, Yugoslavian earthquake, southern hemispherical hurricane, Caribbean food shortage pressurised the UN to establish the UNDRO on 14 December 1971. Its design was contested as it was perceived as an endeavour of USA in liaison with influential countries to put a managerial approach in the disaster coordination for other countries. The erstwhile Soviet Union and France were deeply divided over role attributed to the UNDRO. The UNDRO's mandate restricted to coordination during emergency response and lacked longer term measures limped along until 1992.

Subsequently, the UNOCHA was established under reform undertaken by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), Kofi Annan. Emergency response coordination, policy formulation, humanitarian advocacy and facilitation of operational UN agency coordination are all significant roles of the organisation. The supportive tools including ERC provides leadership; IASC assists in coordination with multiple actors in the coordination process; the CAP and the CERF are major platform to make appeal in the advent of disaster as well as fund assistance programme; the Virtual OSOCC acts as a central repository of information shared with partners in the field as well as the UNDAC are specialists in the assessment of needs or requirements of the victim countries. These tools had been riddled with challenges. The OCHA still remains inclined

to the conflict emergencies and therefore, natural disasters are overlooked. The funding to the CERF has been erratic. Furthermore, the UNDAC deployment faces issues of delayed deployment in advent of natural disasters and lacks personnel from relevant discipline, such as seismologists for immediate scientific disaster assessments.

Simultaneous institutionalisation to respond to natural disasters is mirrored in UN operative agencies. Institutional adaptations, adoption of policy directives as well as shift focus to disaster reduction remain the nature of changing discourses in the UN since 1990s. The UNDP assumed role to mitigate, prevent and prepare to minimise the impact of natural disaster. These institutional responsibility is implemented by the DRU in the Bureau of emergency Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and CADRI. In the UNICEF, the UNICEF an Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) to assists emergency activities and an Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) had been established to tackle emergency circumstances in the arena of water and sanitation, child protection and education. The UNICEF policy remains consistent with Hyogo Framework of Action to ensure disaster risk reduction incorporation in policies of the governments. The FAO, its Emergency Coordination Group performs overall coordination of emergency and disaster reduction. The WFP being part of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction in 2000 seeks to tackle disaster concerns. The UNHCR has come to take up field of disaster management. In this process it provides assistance to the states' authorities to respond to natural disaster; acts as the head of the global protection cluster and assist in training to local, national and international actors.

Thus, the international response to natural disaster undertaken by the UN has evolved over the years with current coordination role mandated to the UNOCHA. There is necessity to reform tools of the UNOCHA, including the UNDAC, the CERF and the IASC to respond to increased cases of natural disaster and carry out disaster reduction. The UN agencies operationalise assistance in both relief as well as long term recovery. There is necessity to nurture collaboration among these UN operative agencies that often assume and exhibit itself as a separate entity constraining coordination process. Simultaneously, the norms, principles and guidelines specific to natural disaster remain infant in its attribute, require efficient implementation and political will. Furthermore, new norms and agreements are necessitated to respond to natural disaster and preparedness for future disaster.

## CHAPTER III

### SCOPE OF DAMAGES BY INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI AND ACTORS IN RESPONSE

#### Introduction

The Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 was caused by a high powered earthquake with magnitude 9.0 on Richter scale, whose epicentre was located on the western coast of Sumatran Island of Indonesia. The tsunami took toll of approximately 200,000 people and 1 million people's homes were destroyed by the devastation. Besides, lives of several millions of people were impacted directly or indirectly by tsunami. It affected the population of more than 12 countries. As its epicentre was in proximity of Aceh, it had impact on the neighbouring countries. Therefore, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives were the hardest hit countries and with scant impact on countries of Bay of Bengal region and in the east African countries (Shaw 2015a:3). The countries in proximity of the Indian Ocean affected by tsunami had scarce prior experience of the tsunami compared to the Pacific countries. They had dearth of “either regional or national early warning and evacuation systems”. This caused huge losses. Unlike other disasters of the past, the devastation of tsunami was covered by global electronic media followed by unprecedented humanitarian outpouring of the aid.

Among the countries reeling under the tsunami, Indonesia was the hardest hit nation where tsunami took huge toll in Aceh, with 130,400 dead, 36,800 missing and 504,500 displaced. In both urban and rural areas of the country huge disruption of economic activities had impact on multiple sector of economy-commerce, agriculture and fishing. Environmental repercussions of the disaster manifested in destruction of coral reefs, mangrove swamps, loss of land and physiographic alterations in the coastal region (Karan 2011:13).

For Sri Lanka, the island nation, tsunami was worst calamity that country had ever seen in the modern times. The eastern as well as southern coastal belts were the most devastated within an hour of tsunami. Approximately 70% of country's coastlines were affected due to tsunami taking toll of 35,000 people and approximately 800,000 were rendered homeless. Five of the nine provinces of the country were affected by this disaster. In terms of damage to property and infrastructure, the loss was estimated to be USD 1 billion (ADB 2005: 65).


This chapter illustrates the damages unleashed by the tsunami in various realms ranging from human, economic to environmental domain in the tsunami ravaged Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Besides, outfall of tsunami devastation, both countries had been reeling under several decades of conflict. In Aceh region of Indonesia, there was decade long ongoing confrontation between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and Indonesian government whereas in Sri Lanka, rebel in northern and eastern part of country led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were demanding for their separate territorial existence. This chapter brings out the dimensions of conflict in both countries. This chapter also discusses multitude of actors, both national and international agencies responding to tsunami with specific focus on individual countries' assistance. The chapter also attempts to show the commonality as well as the contrast between Indonesia and Sri Lanka in the last section of the chapter.

### **Indian Ocean Tsunami: Spread and Effect**

The unprecedented Indian Ocean Tsunami on the 26 December 2004 was caused by a massive earthquake which unleashed a stored energy equivalent to over 23,000 times the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in the Second World War. Striking the west coast of northern Sumatra of Indonesia coupled with severe aftershocks of tsunami, "water through the Indian Ocean at speeds of more than 500 km/h" (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006a: 33). The Indian Ocean tsunami, which was the world's fourth strongest disaster since 1900, displaced 10 meters of the seabed. It also triggered a massive tsunami, which affected the western coasts of northern Sumatra, Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, east coast of India and the low-lying Maldives Island, before reaching the African coast (ISDR 2007: 357).

The tsunami that struck India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Thailand, and Somalia in December 2004 left a devastating trail of death, injury and destroyed property in six countries: India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Thailand, and Somalia (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 33). Within ten minutes of the earthquake, tsunami waves impacted the Nicobar and Andaman Islands and Banda Aceh was hit within another ten minutes. Both Thailand and Sri Lanka were struck within two hours of the earthquake. Shortly later, the east coast of India was struck. Tsunami hit Maldives three hours after the earthquake struck, while the Somali coast was hit more than seven hours later (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b). The degree of human, physical, socio-economic and environmental impacts of the tsunami were different in different sub regions, countries and geographical regions within countries.

Map1: Depicts countries most affected by Tsunami 2004



Source: World Atlas.com, “Tsunami December 2006,” URL: <https://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/tsunami.gif>.

The ramifications in terms of the death toll were huge, with an “approximately 240,000 people across 12 countries were killed in the disaster” (OCHA 2005:165) including a substantial proportion of children (WHO 2013). Approximately 50,000 persons were “missing and feared dead and more than one million persons were displaced” (Couldrey and Morris 2005:6). According to the available data, the tsunami affected Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand were the worst affected countries in terms of lives lost and people missing. However, towards the close of January 2005, reports also highlighted that tsunami affected the citizen of more than 40 countries were



under the impact of tsunami (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006a: 33). Several facets of impacts have been provided in the following tables (Table 3.1, Table 3.2).

**Table 3.1 Demographic Impact of the Tsunami**

|   | <b>Indonesia</b> | <b>Sri Lanka</b> | <b>India</b> | <b>Maldives</b> | <b>Thailand</b> |
|---|------------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <b>Population (million)</b>                                     | 214.7            | 19.2             | 1,064.40     | 0.293           | 62              |
| <b>Population loss (incl. missing)</b>                          | 167,540          | 35,322           | 16,269       | 108             | 8,212           |
| <b>Population loss (incl. missing) as % of total population</b> | 0.077%           | 0.184%           | 0.002%       | 0.037%          | 0.013%          |
| <b>Population loss in the most affected province</b>            | 2.3%             | 2.7%             | n/a          | n/a             | 1.5%            |

Source: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006a), *Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami Synthesis Report* by John Telford and John Cosgrave: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) London: 37.

*Table 3.2 Economic Impact of the tsunami*

|   | <b>Indonesia</b> | <b>Sri Lanka</b> | <b>India</b> | <b>Maldives</b> | <b>Thailand</b> |
|---|------------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <b>GDP per capita, US\$</b>                 | 970              | 950              | 564          | 2,440           | 2,306           |
| <b>Calculated GDP US\$ billion</b>          | 208.3            | 18.2             | 600.3        | 0.7             | 143.0           |
| <b>Total D&amp;L from tsunami, US\$ m</b>   | 4,451            | 1,454            | 1,224        | 603             | 2,198           |
| <b>Total D&amp;L from tsunami, % of GDP</b> | 2.0%             | 7.6%             | 0.2%         | 83.6%           | 1.4%            |

Source: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006a), *Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami Synthesis Report* by John Telford and John Cosgrave: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) London: 37.

| <i>Table 3.2 Economic Impact of the tsunami contd.</i> |                  |                  |              |                 |                 |
|--|------------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|  | <b>Indonesia</b> | <b>Sri Lanka</b> | <b>India</b> | <b>Maldives</b> | <b>Thailand</b> |
| <b>Pre-disaster GDP growth rate 2005</b>               | 5.4%             | 6.0%             | 7.2%         | 7.5%            | 6.0%            |
| <b>Revised GDP growth rate 2005</b>                    | 5.2%             | 5.4%             | 7.2%         | -1.7%           | 5.7%            |
| <b>Damage and losses</b>                               |                  |                  |              |                 |                 |
|  | <b>Indonesia</b> | <b>Sri Lanka</b> | <b>India</b> | <b>Maldives</b> | <b>Thailand</b> |
| <b>Damage, US\$ m</b>                                  | 2,920            | 1,144            | 575          | 450             | 508             |
| <b>Damage, % of total D &amp; L</b>                    | 65.6%            | 78.7%            | 47.0%        | 74.6            | 23.1%           |
| <b>Losses, US\$ m</b>                                  | 1,531            | 310              | 649          | 153             | 1,690           |
| <b>Losses, % of total D&amp;L</b>                      | 34.4%            | 21.3%            | 53.0%        | 25.4%           | 76.9%           |
| <b>Losses, % of total GDP</b>                          | 0.7%             | 1.5%             | 0.1%         | 21.3%           | 1.0%            |

Source: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006a), *Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami Synthesis Report* by John Telford and John Cosgrave: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) London: 37.

The afflicted areas were mostly along the shore, with a substantial proportion of the people engaged in fishing. According to statistics, women had been among the worst victims of this natural disaster, indicating the distribution of the tsunami death toll was influenced by gendered vulnerabilities (Oxfam 2005, Akerkar 2007: 357). The tsunami's impact on thousands of tourists from Europe and Australia was a unique feature of the disaster in which nearly 2,448 international visitors from 37 different countries were killed in Thailand.

**Table: 3.3: Countries afflicted by Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 accounts number of dead, displaced and Losses**

| <b>Country</b> | <b>Dead or missing</b> | <b>Displaced</b> | <b>Losses US (\$mn)</b> |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| Indonesia      | 166,344                | 566,898          | 4,451                   |
| Sri Lanka      | 35262                  | 519,063          | 1,454                   |
| India          | 16,389                 | 647,599          | 1,224                   |
| Thailand       | 8240                   |                  | 1,198                   |
| Somalia        | 150                    | 5000             |                         |
| Maldives       | 108                    | 21,663           | 603                     |
| Malaysia       | 74                     | 8000             |                         |
| Myanmar        | 59                     |                  |                         |
| Tanzania       | 10                     |                  |                         |
| Seychelles     | 3                      | 200              | 30                      |
| Bangladesh     | 2                      |                  |                         |
| South Africa   | 2                      |                  |                         |
| Yemen          | 2                      |                  | 2                       |
| Kenya          | 1                      |                  |                         |

Source: OCHA (2005), Situation Report South Asia Earthquake and Tsunami, 18, January 14 2005 [online web] accessed 5 May 2006.  
 URL: [http://www.fao.org/ag/tsunami/resources/img/rw\\_tsu\\_sitre18\\_170105.pd](http://www.fao.org/ag/tsunami/resources/img/rw_tsu_sitre18_170105.pd)

## Scope of Damages in Indonesia

In comparison to other countries, Indonesia was impacted the hardest by the tsunami, which was generated by a high-intensity earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale, with its epicentre near the western coast of north Sumatra. Secondly, compared to Pacific region, the Indian Ocean Region had dearth of the early warning system that had clear repercussion on the huge destruction made to Indonesia and neighbouring countries.

**Table 3.4: Overview of tsunami damage in Indonesia**

| <b>Impact of tsunami</b>                          | <b>Indonesia</b>         |
|---|--------------------------|
| Population loss (% of national population)        | 166,364(0.1percent)      |
| Displaced population (% of national population)   | 566,898(0.3 percent)     |
| Total cost of damage (US\$ Million)               | 4,451m(2 percent of GDP) |
| Private/public (%)                                | 71.2/28.8                |
| Housing damage (% of total)                       | 31.4 percent             |
| Physical infrastructure (% of total)              | 14.3 percent             |
| Social sectors (% of total)                       | 6.2 percent              |
| Productive sectors (% of total)                   | 7.9%                     |
| Impact on worst-affected province (cost as % GDP) | 97.0%                    |

Source: Scheper, Elisabeth, Arjuna Parakrama Smruti Patel (2006)

*Impact of the Tsunami response on local and national capacity* London:

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
### *Destruction*

Indonesia is a group of five major island viz. “Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya and Kalimantan”. Aceh, the epicentre of earthquake that triggered tsunami is located in the north-west

of Sumatra. Aceh is marked by its poverty and most dense populated region. The densest is Banda Aceh with 2,916 people/km. Despite this island being rich in natural resources, oil and gas, the pre-tsunami poverty levels were 29.8% on an average among its 4 million people. Government’s anti-poor policies and lack of any commitments to poverty eradication had threatened livelihoods. The majority of the population depended on agriculture, fishing and fish farming for survival. It was also characterised with large disparities in wealth and high level of corruption.

Indonesia’s “Aceh Province was damaged by the initial force of the earthquake and then immediately engulfed by the tsunami” (ISDR 2007: 357). Though, the earthquake and tsunami were most acute in the region but its impacts could also be seen in Nias Island, located in north Sumatran province. In Indonesia, the tsunami killed 0.07 percent of the country's 216 million people. However, it killed about 4% of the inhabitants of Aceh province (WHO 2012: 102).

**MAP 2. Depicts percentage of damage district wise in Aceh Province of Indonesia**



Source: ReliefWeb (2005a), “Aceh Province: Percentage of damage by district (12 January 2005)” [Online: web] Accessed 15 December 2019 URL:<https://reliefweb.int/map/indonesia/aceh-province-internally-displaced-persons-12-january-2005>.

### *Human Impact*

In Indonesia, on the Sumatra Island, primarily it was the northwest and northeast region that was worst affected along with the coastal area of Banda Aceh. Aceh province in Indonesia, the closest to the epicentre of the earthquake was particularly heavily damaged (Rofi 2006). According to the Indonesian government's disaster coordination agency, BAKORNAS, by the end of March 2005, 128,645 people had died in Aceh, 37,063 had gone missing and 532,898 had been displaced (USAID 2005). The city of Banda Aceh, followed by the districts of Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat, suffered the most deaths and disappearances. Aceh Barat district was the hardest hit in terms of percentage of population, followed by Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Besar. These were the four districts where the tsunami's effects could be noticed the most (Athukorala and Resosudarmo 2018: 11). In Aceh, estimation put affliction of tsunami that took lives of 60 prominent leaders of civil society. This was further compounded by death 5,200 local staffs and a sizeable number of civil servants dead and missing (BAPENAS 2005). The UN personnel puts the situation “tens of thousands of corpses littering the streets, a third of the city’s inhabitants perished, and administrative and medical personnel decimated” (IFRC 2005:82).

The fluidity of displaced population remained an issue of concern in Aceh, survivors continued to move from one place to another in public or community spaces, host families, tent camps and other temporary shelters. This population lacked in shelter, water and sanitation because of magnitude of the problem as well as due to lack of skilled staff. Delay in the deployment of essential services made matter worse for these people (Hedman 2005:5). Another region afflicted by tsunami in Indonesia included the least developed region of the Nias Island. The Island is backward due to the historical neglect and geographical isolation along with political and economic marginalisation of the predominantly Christian majority population.

The UN and its several agencies were vital in the early assessment of the damage. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assessment states that the northern part of Indonesia consisting of the autonomous province of Aceh and North Sumatra were most severely affected areas. It reports death of approximately 127,000 people, 37,000 missing and displacement of 534,000 people. The subsequent strong earthquake further caused death and destruction in Aceh (UNDP 2005a: 3-4). The Government of Indonesia (GoI) along with the World Bank and the UN undertook an early assessment of damage. The assessment calculated the monetary value of the devastation unleashed by the natural disaster to social, economic as well as environmental realm.

These assessments took into consideration the direct loss or devastations as well as indirect effects of the disaster pertaining to diverse domain. Direct loss encompassed “impact on assets, stock, property, valued at agreed replacement unit prices”, whereas indirect impact comprised of “flows that will be affected, such as revenue, public and private expenditure etc. over the time period until the assets are recovered” (UNDP 2005a: 10).

### *Economic damage*

The loss was earmarked at US\$ 4.5 billion that rough accounted for “97 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) of Aceh”. It was the poor coastal communities that were hard hit. It shattered the infrastructure, administrative apparatus affecting basic services. It also hit vital sources of livelihoods. The situation got further deteriorated due to continuous seismic activity followed by aftershock in Nias Island of Indonesia in March 2005. This added to further death and damage thus, derailing recovery measures. It also had immense psychological effects on the population (ISDR 2007: 357-358).

**Table 3.5: Damage and Loss Assessment in Indonesia Figure in (US\$) Billion**

| <b>Social Sectors</b> | <b>US\$ Billion<br/>1,741</b> | <b>Productive Sectors</b> | <b>US\$ Billion<br/>1182</b> | <b>Infrastructure</b> | <b>(US\$) Billion<br/>877</b> | <b>Cross-Sectoral</b> | <b>(US\$) Billion<br/>652</b> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Housing               | 1,437                         | Agriculture               | 225                          | Transport             | 536                           | Environment           | 549                           |
| Education             | 128                           | Fisheries                 | 511                          | Communications        | 22                            | Governance & Admin.   | 89                            |
| Health                | 92                            | Industry & Trade          | 447                          | Energy                | 68                            | Bank & Finance        | 14                            |
| Religions & culture   | 83                            | -                         | -                            | Water & Sanitation    | 30                            | -                     | -                             |
|                       |                               |                           |                              | Flood control         | 221                           |                       |                               |

Source: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS) (2006), *Indonesia: Preliminary damage loss assessment*, Yogyakarta and Central Java Natural Disaster: Jakarta



The overall economic impact of the tsunami as well as the resulting losses were estimated to be \$9.9 billion in the affected areas. The most affected country Indonesia's loss accounted for nearly half of the total global loss because of tsunami. The pre-existing situation in the country characterised by low socio-economic indicators and other realities further caused deeper impact in the country. The consequences of the tsunami were compounded given high level of poverty, depilated environmental condition, scant respect for human rights and protracted armed clashes in the Aceh region. Additionally, dearth of knowledge about tsunami, lack of communication alert and absence of disaster resistant technology proved disastrous for the loss meted out in the country.

Nearly 17.3 percent of those who died were 65 years old or older, constituting 3.1 per cent of the population. In some places the victims largely constituted the children below 15 years and elderly of over 50 years of age. Furthermore, greater number of women than men lost their lives. The survey conducted in the villages by Oxfam suggested that the number of male survivors were three times higher than the females (Oxfam 2005). Moreover, the mortality rate was even higher among adult females than their male counterparts. Its reasons are attributed to the comparative differences in strength, stamina and ability to swim and climb. Various field visits in the initial weeks after the disaster exhibits that tsunami heavily affected the vulnerable populations, hence constituting approximately two-third of the affected population of Aceh by the women, children and the old people. Meanwhile, the prime occupations for livelihood commerce, agriculture and fishing were hardly hit and stood standstill (Karan 2011:14).

### *Environmental Damage*

In Indonesia, coastal areas and their ecosystem had been disturbed due to distinct human affairs like construction, tourism, wrongful fishing in the past. The damage was lesser in the western and eastern parts of Aceh, where the coastal ecosystem was comparatively better (Athukorala and Resosudarmo 2005: 15). The tsunami brought enormous amount of waste and debris at different places including human settlements, roads and affected the sea. The Solid waste management was at worse. It had repercussions for the sanitation systems. For example, the sewage treatment facility in the Aceh peninsula as well as its connecting road and sludge trucks were damaged by the tsunami causing hygiene concern in Indonesia (UNEP/OCHA 2005: 5).

In Indonesia, environmental damage was caused due to massive destruction to the pesticide and retail oil depots. Damage from the chemical units was very limited as there was absence of

big industries using or producing heavy amount of harmful chemicals (UNDP/UNDAC2005: 5). The medium and long-term impact of tsunami on the environment was damages to the “coral reefs, loss of fertile soil, loss and degradation of vegetation (including e.g. mangroves and sea grass), and salt intrusion into soil and inland water” (Joint UNEP/OCHA 2005: 6). This environmental loss lasted for a longer period. Additionally, the relocation of the effected population was also thought to be impacting the environment adversely (Joint UNEP/ 2005:6). The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) played a significant role in this rapid environmental assessment, but it was neither all inclusive nor provided in-depth analysis.

### *Separatism and disaster*

The Indonesian region of Aceh of Sumatran province had protracted conflict between the GAM and the GoI. Since 1976 till 2004 it had taken a toll of more than 15,000 people. Tsunami became a context for both the parties to end their hostilities and look for a peaceful resolution of their conflict.

Since 1970s, many rebel leaders were staying in exile in Sweden and mountains in the proximity of the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. The Free Aceh movement had its origin in the high handedness on the part of central government with denial of benefits of the rich oil and gas resources of the region given to the foreign companies without consultation of the Acehnese population. Simultaneously, most of the incomes from these mineral resources were appropriated by the national government rather than the local populace.

In the 1980s, the GAM guerrilla movement became more intense with connivance of the overseas groups. Suppressive measures by the Indonesian government caused death and displacement of local population. Officially in 1996, the military operation ended but was not reciprocated with reduction of military in the region neither with stepping down of Suharto in 1998. The situation and control of the Indonesian government remained same during the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration in the early 2000s (Nazara and Resosudarmo 2007: 4-5). There was a normalisation in their relationship in 2002 with a truce, but that did not last long as the truce broke on the disagreement over the terms of the final agreement. In the past, the imposition of martial law had made condition worse in Aceh. In Aceh a state of emergency was declared by the government by May 2003 that stopped entry of any outsiders that included diplomats, news reporters and humanitarian actors. This terminated all forms of communication between the GoI and GAM. The tsunami took toll of approximately 300,000 people with Aceh having 130,000

people killed and several rendered homeless. In the post tsunami phase, the GAM rebels offered resource supplies to local people, medical supplies and provided shelters to the extent possible. They followed burial of the dead and established first aid stations (Nakashima 2005). The Indonesian military, however, asserted that aid supply was being disrupted and diverted for their own use by the rebel.

During his election campaign President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in September 2004, offered GAM economic concessions. GAM had been demanding for independence in the past wished now to be recognised as a political party and dropped the demand for a separate state. The government agreed to their demand. Just before the tsunami, the government showed willingness to negotiate with exiled rebels, offered them amnesty and greater autonomy. These positive posturing by both the GAM and the GoI led to an end of emergency in Aceh. The removal of emergency allowed influx of aid and humanitarian actors in the region. The GAM reciprocated by the unilateral ceasefire in the wake of tsunami. However, the Indonesian government ensured that aid does not fall in the hands of this rebel faction (Enia 2008: 13).

The demilitarisation process was to follow under 200 European and 100 ASEAN observers to oversee the process and the amnesty to rebels laying down arms. According to the agreement, seventy percent revenue from oil-rich province of Aceh would be attributed to the province. This also paved the way for the establishment of a Human Rights Court and Truth and Reconciliation commission to resolve all issues on the basis of just and fair standards in the region. A peace agreement between the GoI and the GAM rebels was signed officially on August 15, 2005 in Helsinki. This was followed by the GAM rebels turn in their weapons, which led to continued decline in the incidents of conflict (BRR NAD–NIAS 2005:53). Thus, in case of Indonesia, the tsunami offered an opportunity for both sides to signal a rapprochement (Huxley 2005).

#### *Responses of the Actors*

Aceh region due to its relative geographical inaccessibility and prolonged civil strife had seen the existence of very few international agencies before the advent of the tsunami. The proclamation of martial law in 2003 created additional surveillance over the international agencies to operate in the region. The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that were operative on the ground worked in the domain of advocacy and human rights were sandwiched between security forces and GAM (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 21).

A volley of 300 International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) flooded Aceh in the first two months for early disaster assistance. Several of these INGOs left the country soon and by October 2005 only 178 remained in the country. Many left considering the early relief phase being over or due to their incapacity. Work of many local agencies was undermined because of 'poaching' of their staff by international agencies. It was with innumerable support of NGOs, civil society along with the corporates aided by individuals, relief operation were undertaken in the country (UNIMS 2005: 20). As far as Community based organisations (CBO) networks were concerned, they had in the past, assisted communities in difficult period of civil conflict but were marginalised in responding to the impacts of tsunami.

As far as the national government response in Indonesia was concerned the National Disaster Management Coordinating Board was not mandated to tackle disasters like tsunami. The National Development Planning Agency played important role to devise master plan for reconstruction. The newly created Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency, Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) had major responsibility to play in response and reconstruction under the direct supervision of the president of the country. It also coordinated with the provincial level. However, a tension arose between BRR and other central ministries and between central and provincial and district administration as power concentrated more in the hands of central government (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b:26). In Aceh, the Indonesian military called Indonesia National Army (TNI) played important role in early relief phase with approximately 12,000 military personnel deployed for burying the dead people, clear debris and other works. These were search and rescue and catering to immediate requirements of food, shelter and medical aid.

The contribution of civil society organisations, including NGOs, church groups, and other community organisations, notably, the national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies was extraordinary. Before the arrival of international agencies in Indonesia, relief material was distributed by the Armed Forces or organisations like the national Red Cross Society (Satish 2016). Few of the agencies were working in the domain outside their competence. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), prominently known for its emergency medical assistance intervened in the recovery of fisheries in Aceh (Indonesia Relief 2005). In the context of tsunami, the ASEAN, the regional forum in the South East Asia organised a Special Leaders' Meeting on January 6, 2005 in Jakarta, Indonesia. It asked the international community and regional governments to work

together to provide emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as to prevent and alleviate human suffering. Individual countries made huge assistance in the wake of tsunami in Indonesia. The military contingents of countries including Australia, United States, Japan, among others played important role in the relief and rehabilitation efforts. They were mostly involved in airlift, maritime transport, medical services, and road and bridge rehabilitation. For example, the US had committed a total of 15,000 troops, including those from the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and was operated the USNS Mercy hospital ship off the coast of Aceh. The Bush administration offered a significant amount of humanitarian relief in January 2005. President Yudhoyono was approached by Australian Prime Minister John Howard, who offered aid. Australia said in January 2005 that it would provide Indonesia with AU\$500 million in grants-in-aid (later boosted to AU\$1 billion by offering AU\$500 million in non-interest loans) and sent naval vessels, transport aircrafts and helicopters to the country. Japan dispatched three naval vessels and a total of about 1,000 troops and large sums of grants-aid. It also dispatched its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) contingents to carry out relief activities that represented the largest overseas relief operation. Supply of relief items, medical services and epidemic illness management were among the major help efforts carried out by SDF units. The Indonesian government and disaster victims praised them in particular. China made an announcement of \$60 million humanitarian cash in addition to medical supplies, rescue operations and DNA identification teams. It did not send its People's Liberation Army (PLA) units to the devastated area unlike other countries. China, on the other hand, prioritised the development of a regional tsunami early warning system, the interchange of tsunami related information and other critical natural catastrophe concerns (Kondo 2006: 45-50).

India began “operation Gambhir” and deployed its military, especially the Indian Navy in the assistance process. It provided 40 tonnes of relief materials as well as medical supplies (MEA 2005). Rations, medicines, tents and field hospitals were among India's contributions. The Indian Consulate in Medan, Indonesia aided 5,000 people of Indian origin and 500 non-resident Indians (NRIs) (MEA 2005). India sent \$1 million worth of emergency meals, medications, tents and first-aid kits. In Aceh, it also created two field hospitals. Extension of “concessional lines of credit” as well as “reconstruction of roads, buildings and harbours” in Aceh province was also part of the India’s assistance plan (Panwar 2020). These assistances by different countries mirrored the dynamics of relationship or changing nature of the relationship in the region especially concerning major powers.

## **Scope of Damages in Sri Lanka**

The tsunami of 2004 wreaked havoc on Sri Lanka, the second most severely hit country. Prior to the 26th of December 2004, its representative at the United Nations (UN) stated that the island nation had no need to be concerned about tsunami because no such event had occurred in living memory. Despite this, the killer wave struck the country's northern, eastern, southern and south-western coastal districts in 2004.

### *Destruction*


The tsunami hit Sri Lanka's eastern coast and at its southern tip affecting 14 of the country's 25 districts and affecting multiple geographical regions, sectors and populations. The most damaged districts were nine demanding further assistance. Out of these nine at least six reeled under the protracted ethnic conflict. The northern and eastern parts under the control of the LTTE faced hurdles in disaster relief and witnessed unequal distribution of resources among those displaced by tsunami and the people displaced due to pre-existing conflict (UNICEF 2009: i).

**Table 3.6: Human Loss and damage in Sri Lanka as of 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2005**

| <b>Provinces</b>     | <b>District</b> | <b>Death</b>  | <b>Missing people</b> | <b>Partially damaged House</b> | <b>Completely damaged House</b> |
|----------------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Northern             | Jaffna          | 2,640         | 540                   | 6,084                          | 1,114                           |
|                      | Killinochchi    | 560           | 1                     | 1,250                          | 4,250                           |
|                      | Mullativu       | 3000          | 552                   | 3400                           | 600                             |
| <b>Eastern</b>       | Trincomalee     | 1078          | 337                   | 5974                           | 10,394                          |
|                      | Batticaloa      | 2840          | 1033                  | 15,939                         | 5665                            |
|                      | Ampara          | 10,436        | 876                   | 29,077                         | -                               |
| <b>Southern</b>      | Hambantota      | 4,500         | 963                   | 2,303                          | 1,744                           |
|                      | Matara          | 1,342         | 613                   | 2,362                          | 5,659                           |
|                      | Galle           | 4,216         | 554                   | 5,525                          | 5,966                           |
| <b>Western</b>       | Kalutara        | 256           | 148                   | 2,572                          | 2,930                           |
|                      | colombo         | 79            | 12                    | 3,989                          | 2,210                           |
|                      | Gampaha         | 6             | 5                     | 292                            | 307                             |
| <b>North Western</b> | Puttalam        | 4             | 3                     | 23                             | 72                              |
| <b>Total</b>         |                 | <b>30,957</b> | <b>5637</b>           | <b>78,199</b>                  | <b>40,911</b>                   |

Source: Yamazaki, Kenji and Tomoko Yamazaki (2011), "Tsunami Disasters in Seenigama Village, Sri Lanka, and Taro Town, Japan" in Pradyumna P. Karan and Shanmugam P. Subbiah (ed.) *Indian Ocean Tsunami: The Global Response to a Natural Disaster*, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, pg136.

**MAP 3. Depicts the affected region and death in Sri Lanka in case of Indian Ocean Tsunami2004**



Source: UNHCR (2005d), “Death caused by Tsunamis by district”  
URL: <https://reliefweb.int/map/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-deaths-caused-tsunamis-districts>



Before the advent of tsunami, flood had already affected, the northern and eastern parts of the country causing displacement and infrastructure damage (ReliefWeb 2004). The Indian Ocean tsunami that occurred on 24 December 2004 hit approximately half of Sri Lanka's shore. Its height tended to be around 8 m, causing deposits of nearly 20 cm in thickness.

The tsunami's aftermath resulted in physical, social and environmental devastation, with the east and south bearing the brunt of the damage. Because of its small local economy, the north bore the brunt of the economic impact. The worst affected areas in the south and east accounted for 26% of the island's total population (UNIMS 2005: 8). This tsunami disproportionately affected the poorer sectors of the population, such as poor fishermen's families or illegal squatters along the railway line.

The eastern region was conflict ridden; marking a long entangled civil war between the LTTE and Sri Lankan forces. A large affected population during tsunami included people that lived in the camps meant for internally displaced due to civil war (UNIMS 2005: 8). According to the estimates of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR), the number of displaced before the tsunami was approximately 390,000. These were also economically and socially vulnerable population (UNIMS 2005: 8). The tsunami enhanced the grief of orphans, widows, elderly and disabled persons. There also existed the dangers from anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordinances from the civil war. It was apprehended that they could have spread in course of the tsunami which would have proven dangerous for the inhabitants of the affected areas. However, these problems did not arise as expected providing a great relief (UNIMS 2005: 8).

In the worst afflicted southern province of the country, the UNDP team reported that government offices - sub-offices of the *Pradeshiya Sabhas* and local government units i.e. "Pradeshiya Sabhas and Urban/Municipal Councils" had been completely destroyed in the tsunami. But largely, the local government offices were in working condition. Higher tiers of local government got also affected by the tsunami. To note, in Sri Lanka, four district headquarters were affected by tsunami. Because the majority of responsibilities were shifted to the district level, it had an influence on service delivery capacity. There had a considerable indirect impact on the operation of local governments at a higher level in some circumstances (UNDP 2006a: 6).

**Table 3.7: Overview of tsunami damage in Sri Lanka**

| <b>Effects of tsunami</b>                         | <b>Sri Lanka</b>    |
|---|---------------------|
| Population loss (% of national population)        | 35,262(0.2%)        |
| Displaced people (% of national population)       | 519,063(2.7%)       |
| Total cost of damage (US\$ Million)               | 1,454m(7.6% of GDP) |
| Private/public (%)                                | 72.9/27.1           |
| Housing damage (% of total)                       | 28.3%               |
| Physical infrastructure (% of total)              | 18.8%               |
| Social sectors (% of total)                       | 5.7%                |
| Productive sectors (% of total)                   | 25.0%               |
| Impact on worst-affected province (cost as % GDP) | 90.0%               |

Source: Elisabeth Scheper, Arjuna Parakrama, Smruti Patel, *Impact of the Tsunami response on local and national capacities*, Tony Vaux Joint Evaluation 2006, Pg 24.

### *Human Impact*

Over 30,000 people died in Sri Lanka as a result of the tsunami, and over 860,000 people were displaced (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d). Sri Lanka was the second most affected country among the countries hardest hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami on December 26, 2004 (Nishikiori et al. 2006). The tragedy resulted in massive losses for Sri Lanka's coastal population. Simultaneously, it had an impact on all social groups in Sri Lanka, including Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. Those living in the Amparai and Mullaitivu districts, which had a significant

concentration of Tamils and Muslims, made up the largest percentage of the population (Frerks and Klem 2005a:7). The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) observed that nearly one-third of the people who lost their lives in the tsunami in Sri Lanka were children. Tsunami added to the misery of the people who were already suffering due to the long history of conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government mostly in its north and the eastern parts. The tsunami affected at least two-third of its coastline population. Additionally, Island underwent infrastructural loss and damages to its natural ecosystem (UNICEF 2009).

Due to the tsunami, about 100,000 dwellings were completely destroyed another 45,000 were slightly damaged that accounted for roughly 13% of coastal housing. The majority of coastal towns were fishing villages made up mostly of shoddy timber-frame dwellings, except in regions where significant human disturbance of the coast had occurred. Several sections of the coastline were populated by sturdy brick-and-stucco buildings and hotels that were less damaged by tsunami flooding. In general, poorly constructed structures near or on the coast were completely demolished (Frerks and Klem 2005a).

#### *Economic damage*

The diverse areas in Sri Lanka were affected by the tsunami marked by distinct nature of needs related to their poverty, losses, vulnerability and risk. According to UN estimation, Sri Lanka incurred approximate loss of US\$ 1 billion calculated to be around 4.5 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ISDR 2007: 2003-2005: 357).

The country has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering 517,000 square kilometres of ocean, about six times its land area. The area occupies a strategically vital spot in international shipping channels due to its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The fishing and tourism industries were the two major industries that were severely impacted by the tsunami. Historically, the fishing industry's contribution to GDP has been less than three percent. It is the oldest industry in Sri Lanka with noteworthy contribution to country's progress. The fishing industry had incurred a loss of US\$97 million due to tsunami. According to an estimation the country lost two third of its fishing industry with loss to fleet, harbours severely damaged thus causing unemployment to approximately 100,000 of the population (Frerks and Klem 2005b:9). The tsunami adversely impacted the fisheries sector and its contribution to the GDP fell sharply to one per cent after (De Silva and Yamao 2007: 386-87). In the tsunami, nearly 27,000 fishermen and their family members lost their lives and 90,000 families were displaced. In terms of infrastructure, 65 percent of the

fleet, including outboard motors, fishing gears and nets and also the harbours were damaged (UNIMS 2005: 9-10).

Similar to the other sectors, the tourism sector incurred a loss of US\$ 250 million. Nearly 27,000 people lost their jobs in tourism and the related services (UNIMS 2005: 9-10). Furthermore, the tsunami rendered 200,000 people jobless out of that approximately 100,000 people were affected in fisheries, tourism and its connected occupation and informal sectors (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 31).

In the agricultural sector, the loss was largely restricted to standing crops and estimated to be nearly US\$ 3 million. The flooding of seawater in the agricultural fields increased soil salinity made it unfit for agricultural production for some upcoming years. The loss to the livestock included the poultry and goats, although the number was less (UNIMS 2005: 9-10).

The tsunami caused destruction of 100,000 houses and partial damage of 46,000 house most of them built near shoreline that displaced 235,000 families. The criterion for creation of a buffer zone, where no construction would be allowed became a matter of contention, these yardsticks were set at two different levels for Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006f: 48).

The Sri Lankan economy was estimated to grow at 6 percent in the year 2004 but it only grew at 5 percent. The production of fish estimated to dwindle from 300,000 tons to 200,000 tons. Tourism was set to hit with drop to 175,000 from expected 425,000 in 2005. The imports were estimated to accelerate having an impact on the deficits on the current account and over all the balance of trade. Thus, there was urgency of global aid as well as a moratorium on debt relief was highly necessitated in emergent situation (Frerks and Klem 2005b:9).

### *Environmental Damage*

The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR), Sri Lanka sought support from UNEP for the environmental damage assessment. The UNEP also established the Asian Tsunami Disaster Task Force (ATDTF) to examine the environmental situation in all impacted nations and develop a response strategy.

The sea water increased the salinity and upset the balance of the Sri Lankan lagoons. Several observers opined that it would recover ecologically. The east and south-west of the country

has been marked with severe beach erosion (NARA et al. 2005). Beaches in the east saw massive erosion and sand migration, with some losing up to 50% of their width and up to a metre in height (IUCN 2005). This is attributed to tsunami backwash. The eastern coastline vegetation was badly destroyed and the tsunami water had carried a thick sludge with it (UNEP& Sri Lanka 2005: 10-30). The damage to Coral reef was patchy with some region totally destroyed, with others had no impact of tsunami. In Akkraipattu and Batticaloa; Sallithievu and Vaharai for example, mangrove plantations were crucial in preventing tsunami waves and saving agricultural lands such as rice (paddy) fields, roads, human settlements and structures (MENR 2005:36). The tsunami hit Sri Lanka's southern and eastern shores, which had a history of coral rock mining, blast fishing, and other destructive practises. The ecosystem had become vulnerable as a result of these factors, and the tsunami exacerbated the devastation by breaking off significant portions of the reef and dropping sand and silt on them, as well as large amounts of garbage, dirt and organic debris. Offshore, the presence or absence of coral and rock reefs is extremely important. The tsunami waters were black in colour and carried a thick filthy sludge down the east coast. People in the south-west complained of itching after coming into contact with tsunami waters. The contamination by arsenic could also be seen in the tsunami affected areas (Rajasuriya 2005:48).

Issue of drinking water became a matter of grave concern. Around 62,000 groundwater wells were contaminated by seawater, sewage as a result of the tsunami. The tsunami destroyed 15,000 wells and left 500 million kilo grams of rubble in its wake. Thus, potable water became an important concern for people. The increased soil salinity made the agricultural fields unsuitable for farming in the medium and long term. Sand dunes, mangrove forests and coral reefs acted as natural barriers to lessen the impact of tsunami waves in Sri Lanka, according to a study done by the Stockholm Environment Institute.

### *Separatism and Disaster*

Sri Lanka had seen a prolonged conflict between GoSL and militant sections of Tamil minority; concentrated in northeast part of the country spearheaded by LTTE with demand of separate land. Nearly 60,000 people have died as a result of suicide bombings, attacks on Sinhalese leaders, attacks on civilians and moderate Tamils, and government counter-attacks over the years. In 2002, with initiative of Norway a short term ceasefire was brokered, but by May 2003, talks between the government and LTTE failed and increased tension between the two parties in the wake of the advent of tsunami. The tsunami killed 31,000 citizens in Sri Lanka and 700,000 were rendered

homeless. To the LTTE infested region in the north and east approximately 9,000 people lost their lives (Enia 2006). Independent reports enumerated these regions to be the most affected and had half of the fatalities. The military capability of both the government and LTTE had been affected with much damage to the LTTE. The infrastructure that was already in bad shape because of the protracted civil war further made the situation worse (Raman 2005).

The LTTE steadfastly organised relief, began disposing of the dead bodies and attempted to bring normalcy in the region. On the other side, the GoSL and their agencies were slow to react to the Tamil region as they were active in the Sinhalese majority region. Allegations were levelled against the Sri Lankan government for discriminating in the provision of aid and relief (Steele 2005). The LTTE emphatically demanded the regions it controlled to be treated as an autonomous region and funds coming for it should be provided to them. In a way forward, it was only later in June 2005, the governmental initiative allowed the LTTE for a greater say in distribution of aid, but several parliamentarians opposed this move and regarded it as an attempt to legitimise LTTE. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court regarded it illegitimate as LTTE was a terrorist organisation with no legal sanctity. Subsequently, the nationalist party broke out the coalition government led by the president Kumaratunga (Sengupta 2005).

The national elections that followed in November 2005 got Mahinda Rajapakse elected as the president. He had harsh stance against the LTTE and regarded negotiators in the past to be soft on the LTTE. Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader called for war in case their demands were not met. He had asked Tamil voters to boycott the elections and leave government offices and education institutions. This caused increased tension between the two parties and increased violence. The Sri Lankan government moved for the military solution of the conflict. By July 2008 the government had retaken control over regions which were controlled earlier by the LTTE.

#### *Responses of the Actors*

Prior to the advent of the tsunami, several international agencies had marked its presence in conflict ridden zone. There was also coordination mechanism within government, within the UN, among NGOs but Sri Lanka lacked a comprehensive disaster management plan at the national level. Following the tsunami in Sri Lanka, a slew of foreign actors flocked to the island to help. Nearly 133 countries came to assist in one way or another (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 4).

The government led by president Kumaratunga on December 27, 2004 had announced to release US \$ 0.46 million from the government treasury to provide early assistance. A Centre for

National Operations (CNO) was established to complement and liaison with multiple partners on the ground including relevant ministries, NGOs, private sectors. Three different task forces were established under president secretariat: the Task Force for Rescue and Relief, the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) and the Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order. The government appointed disaster management bodies to oversee and organise relief efforts at the district level.

Later, the government reconstituted TAFREN as Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) in November 2005 aimed to respond to the disaster and took up coordination with several stakeholders and began working in the realm of reconstruction in the affected areas. This proved to be centralised unit in disaster management and lacked devolution on the ground (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 27). The LTTE had also taken an active role in District Task Forces and conducted its own evaluation of the north east. The Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation was engaged in food distribution in collaboration with local government officials at both the provincial and district levels. A disaster relief fund was established under the President's Secretariat to collect funds centrally to be used during recovery process. The relief assistance in the LTTE dominant region of Sri Lanka's north and east region was led by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). Besides, during the relief assistance military forces played a significant role in rescue operations (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 25).

Countries that assisted Sri Lanka included USA, India and others. The USA deputy secretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz paid a visit to Sri Lanka but its military assistance distanced from Tamil areas in an effort to avoid the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The U.S. assisted in provision of "food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, protection and anti-trafficking, logistics and coordination, and clean up and rehabilitation activities" worth \$62 million in Sri Lanka. To revive its economy USA had assisted micro-finance programs reachable to 30,000 families involved in tourism, textile, fishing, and handicraft industries in tsunami affected areas (CRS 2005: 25-26).

With its 1,000 aid workers, India stepped in to help. It dispatched five naval ships with medical personnel and relief supplies to Trincomalee, Galle, and Colombo. The Indian Air Force and naval helicopters aided in the transportation of food, medicines, and drinking water to the afflicted areas of the country. The Indian government declared a contribution of Rs. 100

crores (\$25 million) for tsunami relief and restoration. It's worth noting that Indian assistance arrived in the country far earlier than other countries' came for help (Panwar 2020).

Several community groups and NGOs assisted through provision of food, health supplies and services, water, and other basic requirements. One of the largest national NGOs, Sarvodaya, was one of the first to deliver help to tsunami victims in several parts of the country.

In the early relief assistance, many of the specialists from outside the country came to assist in the process. These included media houses, documentation specialists and technology experts. The agencies argued the importance of understanding local system. Huge flow of funds diverted the attention more on spending and showing quick results rather than taking care of relevant problems. The NGOs provided immense relief assistance in the recovery effort. Some of them included "SEWA Lanka and the Red Cross Society of Sri Lanka". The presence of numerous NGOs and CBOs caused oversupply of aid, unhealthy competition among INGOs as well as decline of professionalism (Frerks and Klem 2005b:20).

The corporate sector assisted restoration of communication infrastructure, provision of medicines, food and money. In the recovery process significant role of the private firms for instance, Dow Chemical, Nestle Corporation, Microsoft, Vodafone, Coca Cola and others were crucial to assist Sri Lanka. The assistance was also substantiated through domestic private firms that contributed financial assets as well as managed relief centres that provided food to displaced people. Local insurance companies helped clients to process their claims. The assistance from the multiple humanitarian actors including liaison with the private sector in longer term recovery program was necessitated given the enormous destruction in Sri Lanka (Jayasuriya 2005 etal. 2005: 5-7).

### **Comparison of Damages in Indonesia and Sri Lanka**

Prior to tsunami 2004, Indonesia and Sri Lanka were already struggling with the internal conflict, chronic poverty and poor considerations for human rights. The tsunami severely impacted these two countries and further worsened the situation. Comparing the two countries, the destruction of the tsunami was more intense in case of Aceh, Indonesia than in Sri Lanka. In Aceh 129,271 people were killed with displacement of roughly 566,8982 people and 750,000 losing their source of income. In Sri Lanka over 30,000 fatalities were caused due to tsunami and over 860,000 persons were displaced (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d). Sri Lanka was the second most affected



country by tsunami (Nishikiori et al. 2006). Here, the north and eastern regions largely inhabited by Tamils were the most affected region. At the economic parameter both the countries saw huge loss. Indonesian economic loss was calculated at US\$ 4.5 billion; roughly comprising 97 per cent of Aceh gross domestic product (GDP). On the other hand, Sri Lanka had lost approximately about \$1 billion, or 4.5% of its GDP of the country (Inderfurth et al. 2005: 15). Both these countries faced a larger concern of already existing internally displaced population because of long protracted conflicts.

Despite several set of assessments of impact in both countries, it was argued that these assessments were not ideal to guide for humanitarian actors and beneficiary in many cases, “Too often, situation reports and assessments served the interest or mandate of the assessing agency more than those of the potential beneficiaries” (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006g: 12). These assessments lacked participation of the afflicted population in collection or verification of data.

Comparing the Pre-tsunami plight in both, Aceh region in Indonesia was marked by inaccessibility and a prolonged civil strife that had led to the existence of very few international agencies in the region. Further, the situation was complicated in 2003 due to the proclamation of martial law in Aceh. The NGOs working on the ground in Aceh pertained to advocacy and human rights, some of them were under constant threat from security forces or from the GAM (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 21). In both cases, specifically in case of Aceh, the government had stringent control over the presence of INGOs as well as over the UN agencies and their operations. Likewise, Sri Lankan case was no different as the government exercised its control over INGOs during and after the tsunami period (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 25). In the case of Sri Lanka, pre-Tsunami period was marked with operationalisation of several international agencies providing disaster relief and development assistance in the conflict ridden zone of the country. For instance, the UNDP, the Office of the UNHCR and World Food Programme (WFP), they were working in the region. The government had a coordination mechanism with the UN and with other NGOs operating in the LTTE dominated regions. However, the most notable similarity among these two countries were combination of situation of natural disaster with conflict in both countries of Indonesia as well as Sri Lanka. In both cases of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, conflict was a major factor. In the most affected region of Aceh, the Indonesian government’s presence and its authority continued to be exercised in larger extent compared to Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, in the north the

LTTE wielded the real authority. In the east, all three: the government, the LTTE and a breakaway faction of the LTTE were trying to have their influence in the region. Furthermore, in Aceh, the prolonged conflict between the GAM and GoI did not become an impediment in the tsunami response. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, ceasefire that was existed between GoSL and the LTTE since February 2002 could not survive. The situation deteriorated further because of absence of any formal arrangement between the GoSL and the LTTE during tsunami. This caused scant attention as well as assistance to people of region under LTTE control.

Comparing the functioning of the rebels in midst of tsunami, in Sri Lanka, the LTTE were in an autonomous position to provide aid and relief in the wake of tsunami. They also became part of the aid sharing by the government that was kept on hold by Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. With change in presidency from Kumaratunga to Mahinda Rajapakse in November 2005, situation became tensed between the government and the rebels because of the tough stance by the existing government. Subsequently, Sri Lanka did not see strengthening the peace process in the wake of Tsunami (Telford 2007: 18). Marking a departure from Sri Lanka, in Indonesia, an agreement was arrived at between the rebel group and GoI. In both the cases, conflict had made engagement difficult for the local communities. Compared to Sri Lanka, in Indonesia, intersection between conflict stricken and tsunami victimised population was less. In case of Sri Lanka, conflict had hindered the decision making at multiple levels. According to the Sri Lanka claim holder survey people residing in conflict zones predominantly ethnic minorities could not raise their dissatisfaction against the response of tsunami. This reflected the dearth of tools to fight against such injustice meted out to them (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006b: 38).

## **Conclusion**

The Indian Ocean tsunami caused unprecedented havoc to human civilisation. It was one of the largest disasters in the present century that human civilisation has encountered with largely affecting habitations of the coastal areas. Indonesia and Sri Lanka being the most affected countries with former's Aceh region being the worst affected region and northeast and southern part Sri Lanka were most affected region. The major economic sectors affected during the Tsunami were fishing and tourism with additional overall loss to other sectors of the economy. Indonesian economy sustained a loss of 4.5 billion with a substantial part of Aceh's gross domestic product (GDP) impacted by tsunami. Sri Lankan economy depleted by 1 billion due to Tsunami. The

environmental degradation included impact on “coral reefs, loss of fertile soil as well as loss and degradation of vegetation” in both the countries.

Besides, the decade long conflicts in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, these countries faced simultaneously the challenges of catastrophic tsunami. The GoI and the GAM underwent negotiation process under Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was positively responded by the GAM rebels. The GAM rebels also realised of existing realities that they could provide only limited assistance to the local people unlike the LTTE in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, relief assistances were undertaken by the LTTE in their region. Even in Sri Lanka situation deteriorated to worse due to reluctance of both the parties to coordinate. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) principally led relief assistance in the northern Sri Lanka. They complained about discrimination by Sri Lankan government in the distribution of aid and relief work. The demand by the LTTE for independence followed by election of new president Mahinda Rajapakse with tough stance against the LTTE made any rapprochement or agreement a far dream. Thus, two cases manifest diversity of dynamics in case of advent of tsunami and Conflicts. Besides, multiplicity of actors on the ground including INGOs, international agencies and individual state reflect competitiveness to perform on the ground with huge funding as well as power dynamics of great and regional powers. Thus, tsunami devastated countries created a situation for huge response with multiplicity of actors.

**CHAPTER IV**  
**UN EMERGENCY RELIEF RESPONSES IN INDONESIA AND**  
**SRI LANKA**

**Introduction**

The provision of relief assistance in case of natural disaster is function of multiple variables ranging from the humanitarian concern to strategic factors. The predominant paradigm to understand disaster assistance is interest politics. It has been perceived that “real or potential donor nations habitually put their perceived national interests over humanitarian concerns” (Kent 1987: 119). Similarly, Nelson (2010) concludes that “disaster aid is a political price and is not the neutral and apolitical refuge that supporters and critics sometimes assume.” Margesson (2007:17) in reference to USA highlights the importance of political considerations in decision whom to support. He is of the view that it is interest of marking its presence felt that propels country to assist in a region.

The liberal tradition emphasises the role of the institutions for creating and facilitating peace and addressing the common issues. As expression of this liberal idea, role of the international institution like the United Nations (UN) becomes pertinent in the advent of natural disaster like tsunami 2004. However, actual operationalisation of the UN institutional mechanism is coupled with interest politics of the UN agencies. In both countries of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the role of “the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) for assessment and Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) for the coordination mechanism became vital. Simultaneously, the operative UN agencies including the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR)” assisted predominantly in the diverse domain of the child and women. Several of these humanitarian works well went beyond their traditional nature of assistance.

This chapter seeks to unfurl the UN institutional response in early phase of tsunami, in both, Indonesia, the most affected country by tsunami with protracted conflict led by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Aceh region as well Sri Lanka, with huge human toll having a long

drawn conflict led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). Assessment of the UN institutional mechanisms' performance on the onset of the tsunami 2004 in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka have been undertaken comparatively. Descriptively and analytically, this chapter analyses the UNOCHA's work as a major coordination mechanism and reflects upon interventions of its supporting tools like UNDAC. For both the countries, the study also makes assessment of similarities and contrasts of relief activities, policies programmes or assistance provided by the UNDP, the UNICEF and the UNHCR. This chapter also undertakes evaluation of implementation of norms, principles as well as guidelines devised by Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the UNOCHA and others pertaining to natural disasters. The chapter seeks to bring forth a comparative analysis of the emergency relief assistance from the UN institutional perspective and adherence of the normative framework in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

### **Situation and Response by Indonesia and Sri Lanka**

Indonesia was unprepared as well as lacked the early warning system to respond to tsunami. Aceh, Indonesian Province on the Sumatran Island, was among the most affected region. There was huge damage of life in addition to infrastructure. The devastation, disruption of the communication plus infrastructure furthered the delay in provision of initial relief in Aceh. Calang in Aceh Jaya was shattered with destruction of local government offices and was characterised by presence of handful of UN staff in Aceh region.

Indonesia, struck by the tsunami, described it as a national calamity and, unlike Sri Lanka, did not request rapid international assistance. (IFRC 2005: 81). The National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management (Bakornas PBP), which was in place at the time, dispatched resources required in Aceh region. Responding to the immediate requirements of the tsunami afflicted population, in the mid-January 2005, Government of Indonesia (GoI) came out with a plan consisting of three phased approach. The first phase focused on immediate relief that concentrated itself to catering to food, medical assistance and temporary shelters provision and was to be in operation for initial six months. The rehabilitation phase was to begin from February 2005 to until February 2007 and the reconstruction phase from February 2005 to 2009. In order to further the recovery phase, Indonesian government established the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) NAD-Nias, or Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias. International agencies, 133 individual countries and 500 agencies, brought in inflow of funds in

the Indonesia and in province of Aceh in particular. A major challenge on the ground was related to its operationalisation of humanitarian actors efficaciously eschewing duplicity (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008:17).

On the other hand, Sri Lanka had severe devastation to its account. The prolonged conflict in the nation had led to engagement of several international agencies engrossed in resolving issues with the LTTE. The advantageous position for the country compared to Indonesia was the prolonged presence of the UN agencies (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006c:18). Sri Lanka founded the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) in 1996 to counter disasters. However, it lacked legal powers and could not tackle the intensity of the disaster caused by tsunami. Later, the Centre for National Operations (CNO) was formed in order to tackle to disaster like tsunami but it got replaced with Task Force for Relief (TAFOR). Problem with existing institutions were marred by its hierarchical and top-bottom approach with lack of consultation between the district level and central level (ALNAP 2005: 13). Despite these difficulties, the national government efforts were supplemented by several other international agencies. The UN and its agencies were crucial in providing the bedrock to the immediate relief measures. An added advantage for Sri Lanka was the pre-existing dialogue and cooperation between UN agencies and NDMC that was expected to play important role in the early relief phase (Government of Sri Lanka and United Nations 2005). Thus, the major agencies had presence in Sri Lanka well before the advent of tsunami. With the onset of the tsunami, the UNICEF, the UNOCHA and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) complemented each other through coordination of sectorial divisions of labour.

In both countries of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, emergency relief assistance was marked by centralised structure of governance compounded by discontent and violence among the people (Telford 2007: 25). Before the advent of tsunami, Aceh was characterised with government's stringent check and control over the INGOs as well as the UN agencies. The case was no different in Sri Lanka as the activities of INGOs were also under huge surveillance. As both Sri Lanka and Indonesia had been suffering from decades of civil war, questions were raised about the impact of ongoing conflict on the tsunami relief aid. The presence of secessionist group in both countries in relief phase presents two contrasting case. There existed a clear mark of the impediments put forth by the LTTE in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, despite existence of the ceasefire since February 2002, there was no consensus or formal treaty about how the relief assistance would be carried forward

in region where LTTE was dominant. To add, there were instances of delayed delivery of the aid in the LTTE zone. This region of the north and east part faced neglect and a sizeable aid came to the southern part of the country (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 24). In the beginning of relief assistance, the demand for funding remained separate with for GoSL and the LTTE. The LTTE began to garner the fund through directly making a request for help from the Tamil Diaspora and the international community (Arumugam 2005). The relief measures in early phase of relief assistance in the north and eastern region of the Sri Lanka was undertaken by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO). This humanitarian entity was close to the LTTE that carried out the relief assistance on the ground. Both the GoSL and the LTTE charged each other for playing politics around assistance. Tamilnet, a pro-LTTE website, said that Sinhalese mobs were obstructing assistance deliveries to the north. It was reported that “Both sides are acutely aware that the way the relief efforts are being handled can affect their political status” (Arumugam 2005).

In contrast, predicament in Indonesian case of Aceh seemed different. The Indonesian case had an advantageous position as in August 2005, the Aceh separatist faction and the Government of Indonesia struck a peace accord. This provided an impetus to the relief efforts as well as recovery and rehabilitation process. On the other side, in Sri Lanka, post-tsunami response was a daunting task adding as the displacement crisis was vacillated through long drawn civil war between LTTE and government (Boano 2009). The LTTE had record of performing disaster relief assistance effectively. This gave credit to the LTTE and its claim of forming a separate government. This resulted in a hard bargaining by the LTTE, failure in finding a solution caused further civil strife (Enia 2008: 9-10).

In the wake of tsunami, it was necessary to conduct need assessment in both the countries to have an estimate of the requirement to respond to the emergent crisis. This function was carried out by international agencies on the ground in both countries. In Sri Lanka, presence of many actors before the advent of tsunami helped to conduct district-level assessments later compiled into a single report. On the other hand, there was lack of such compilation of need assessment in Indonesia (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006g: 24).

## **The UN System in Emergency Relief Responses in Indonesia and Sri Lanka**

The tsunami 2004 proved to be a global disaster and response to it came from the multiple actors, marked with unprecedented response from the civil society, inter-governmental organisations as well as governments. The UN and its global reach profoundly contributed in providing assistance with its huge baggage of knowledge, experience and a pull of resources to help victim countries. The UN specialised agencies, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provided substantial early assistance.

The UN Secretary-General emphasised the need to intensify, coordinate the different agencies of UN system, NGO and several donors. This followed with appointment of the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator for tsunami affected population with prime aim to facilitate leadership and assistance to the UN country teams so that they can deliver relief by consulting the affected states. In addition to it, to keep tsunami as matter of global attention and effectively implement the recovery process, former United States President, William Jefferson Clinton was designated as the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (United Nations 2006a: 9).

The emergency relief measures involved multi stakeholders including “Sixteen UN Agencies, 18 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), more than 160 International non-governmental organisation(INGOs), private companies and civil society groups that were deployed to the affected areas. They provided emergency food, water and medical services to more than five million people. The UN emergency relief efforts consisted of five UNDAC teams that had 44 disaster-response experts from 18 countries” (OCHA 2005:165).

The total aid contribution for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 amounted to \$6.25 billion donated to central UN relief fund assisting 14 countries. The aid agencies as well as Tsunami Evaluation Committee regarded huge outpour in terms of funding as most generous as well as immediately funded humanitarian assistance in the history (Okai 2014). Indonesia was most funded country amounted to more than \$1 billion and further \$3 billion allocated to the region for early warning system as well as to tackle future tsunami kind disasters. Sri Lanka followed Indonesia as the second largest recipient of aid. It was allocated more than £651m (Okai 2014). Under the rubric of UNOCHA, donors were encouraged to contribute directly in the account of



the appealing agencies, but it received resources for government as well as private agencies in the initial phase covering initial six months extended for six more months produced. The UNOCHA Flash Appeal for the tsunami devastated countries included “Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles Somalia and Sri Lanka”. It raised approximately US\$ 1.2 billion almost 90% of the target (Okai 2014).The large portion of these contributions went in provision of the food requirements \$229 million and \$ 187 million went to the shelter provision as well as emergency supplies(Ram Kumar 2006).

The UN also contributed by establishment of a database to track the receipt and expenditure of relief donations in order to improve UN financial transparency. The UN's expenditure tracking database under UNOCHA, has been hailed as a new chapter in the organisation's ongoing attempts to demonstrate its commitment to better governance. It served as a "real-time" database that gave international funders confidence that relief money was being used effectively during the operationalisation phase (Ramkumar 2006). Importantly, the tracking mechanism remained useful in monitoring flow of the funds as well as making advocacy for the underfunded projects as well as organisation (OCHA 2005:166).

**Table 4.1: Depicts Agency Expenditure Rates by Program Sector as a Portion of Total Funds Received for Each Program Sector**

| Agency expenditure | Total program expenditures >90% of funds received             | Total program expenditures between 89%-75% of funds received | Total program expenditures between 74%-50% of funds received | Total program expenditures <49% of funds received |
|--------------------|---|--|--|---|
| <b>UNDP</b>        |   | Coordination<br>Shelter & Non-food                           | Economic Recovery &<br>Infrastructure<br>Agriculture         |   |
| <b>UNICEF</b>      | Health, Shelter<br>Non Food, Multi-sector, Water & Sanitation | Economic Recovery & Infrastructure<br>Coordination           | Protection   | Education   |
| <b>UNHCR</b>       |   | Shelter & Non-food   | Multi-sector   |   |
| <b>UNOCHA</b>      |   | Coordination   |  |   |

Source: Ramkumar, Vivek (2006) “Analyzing the UN Tsunami Relief Fund Expenditure Tracking Database: Can the UN be more transparent?” [Online: web] Accessed 5 oct. 2019 URL: <http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Analyzing-the-UN-Tsunami-Relief-Fund-Expenditure-Tracking-Database-Can-the-UN-be-More-Transparent.pdf>

Among all the UN system, the UNOCHA, the UNICEF, the UNDP and the UNHCR were intensely involved in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka to carry out emergency relief response to the tsunami. Detail of each of these agencies involvement is discussed below.

*The UNOCHA in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

The UNOCHA under the rubrics of the UN came forth to assist in tsunami outfall. It participated in field and regional coordination as well as information dissemination by holding meetings of its offices in New York, Geneva, UN Agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the UNOCHA field offices. This culminated in establishment of a Tsunami Task Force. It produced inputs from the ground in its situation reports and copious documents on the disaster to disseminate information at global level. To update donors, the UNOCHA organised information meetings in order to exchange information, set priority needs and track daily contributions by the donors.

At regional level, to assist the tsunami victims, a UNOCHA Regional Office in Bangkok was established, providing a back-up to the UN tsunami operation through information sharing meetings. To supervise the civil military coordination, it deployed UN Civil-Military Coordination Officers. They were involved in developing coordination with the militaries and governmental bodies of approximately 35 countries. The military assets were used to support the relief effort in accordance with the humanitarian community's requirements. This resulted in the establishment of a structured Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) network at three levels: headquarters (Geneva), regional (Bangkok) and field (Jakarta, Banda Aceh, Meulaboh, Medan, and Colombo) for coordination. (United Nation 2005e: 3).

In Indonesia, UNOCHA aimed to assist short term requirements of the tsunami afflicted population by the first half of 2005. Ensuring coordination with the government and civil society in provision of humanitarian needs of tsunami affected populations was another important part of the UNOCHA activities (OCHA 2005:168). A UNDAC team in liaison with the UNOCHA got engaged in the process of damage loss assessments on the 31 December 2004 at Banda Aceh. The Disaster Mitigation Unit (DMU) of UNDP, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) assisted in damage and loss evaluation using technical expertise. Critically, these assessments evaded large deployment of assessor because of the security as well as the logistic problem on the ground (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006g: 24). Furthermore, the assessment done by the UNDAC was bypassed by some of the major donors and therefore they deployed their own

assessments because they were apprehensive and lacked confidence in UN assessments (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006e: 20-12; Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006g: 57). This led to establishment of multiplicity of actors in the assessment process and caused duplication of the work. In the initial days of relief measures, the UN agencies had dearth of contingency as well as disaster preparedness plans that hindered the early relief efforts (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006e: 25).

The outfall of tsunami necessitated the need to revamp the UNDAC that must be deployed as soon as possible in the affected area at the earliest within 24 hours of the tsunami. Simultaneously, there remains urgency to integrate skills in logistics, civil-military interaction and administration (UNOCHA 2005:17). Besides, under the UNOCHA in Indonesia, a Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) was also established for compilation of information in Aceh that provided help to aid agencies with regard to donation and need requirements. It was an important forum for information management amidst influx of volley of humanitarian assistance.

The UNOCHA maintained its offices in Indonesia at Jakarta and Aceh that was assigned to coordinate in Aceh with the local government, the military and the humanitarian actors. Its initial role was to appeal various donors to contribute directly in the account of the appealing agencies. It was funded by several governments, private sectors, individual donors for its coordination requirements. Under the UNOCHA in Indonesia, the UN Flash Appeal for the tsunami was calculated for its initial requirement to be approximately US\$ 373 million that included the basic needs ranging from food, medical supplies and clean water (UNOCHA 2005: 167). Temporary shelters and immediate income generation programmes were also initiated under it. The relief assistance phase saw expenditure of more than US\$500 million (BRR 2007). A Tsunami Trust Fund was established to keep separate the funds contributed for tsunami operations. This Fund amounted to \$74.6 million to be utilised by the affected countries on the demands of the Humanitarian coordinator (United Nation 2005d: 3). The UNOCHA utilised these fund to assist victims in the rebuilding their livelihood after the disaster. The international appeal as well as extensive global media coverage of the disaster generated copious fund for immediate responses. Thus, the UNOCHA emerged as a central unit at the earliest stage with the onset of the tsunami. The UNOCHA Indonesia also involved itself to avail coordination of the UN Inter-agency coordination contingency plans. They (UNOCHA Bakornas combine) centred on

emergency operations ensuring the fulfilment of all basic needs such as “food, medical supplies, clean water, temporary shelters, and immediate income generation activities such as the cash-for-work programme”. During the relief phase, it is estimated that more than \$500 million in aid was distributed with the UN agencies and INGOs taking the lead. (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 4).

The UNOCHA’s coordination in Aceh was complicated with the multiple NGOs and their refusal to coordinate and share information, duplication of works and neglect of the prominent environment and security concerns (Rowbottom 2007). It was primarily involvement of the UN agencies and international NGOs that were in the leadership position and took approximately six months to cover the immediate relief phase for those affected by tsunami.

The UNOCHA was still unclear about its mandate as embedded in the in General Assembly resolution 46/182 that regarded its jurisdiction confined to the emergency phase. Any expansion of this role in the recovery and reconstruction phase required clarification. There was also need for regular meeting with the NGOs and donor communities for smooth coordination by the UNOCHA in Jakarta that was lacking in general (United Nations 2006a:15). The coordination in general was marked by lack in the strategic planning. It deterred many leaders as it required amalgamation of both experienced and inexperienced agencies working under pressure to perform (TGLL Project 2009:21-22). The abundance of funds also caused disincentive for coordination in the humanitarian assistance. There was also oversupply by the relief assistance in Banda Aceh compared to other affected regions in Indonesia. Supply of relief was largely dependent upon the availability of relief material rather than actual requirements on the ground (OCHA 2005:168).

Another set of challenge that grabbed the UNOCHA was coordination of information, being one of the important functions of the UNOCHA. The OCHA situation reports in Indonesia aimed to provide the information about daily updates on the ground had not been regularly released. These reports were discontinued in April 2005 in Banda Aceh and May 2005 in Jakarta primarily because of the absence of reporting officers in the offices and insufficient staff in post emergency phase. Under UNOCHA, in Indonesia, Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) aided coordination process, collating planning information and shared it with humanitarian actors. Ensuring quality and accurateness of the data was formidable challenge. The presence of cavalcades of actors and pressure to deliver remained a challenge to information sharing (OCHA 2005: 169). The UNDAC team's report in Sri Lanka was one of the country’s first formal

assessments. The UNOCHA aimed at smooth coordination of the humanitarian actors and transition from relief to long term recovery process. It was also involved in information management, advocacy for humanitarian need and supported disaster preparedness planning as well as coordinated UN contributions to GoSL.

The UNDAC team was immediately deployed in Sri Lanka for assessment and provided technical assistance for disaster response management and coordination. It highlighted the short-term financial, material and human resources needed to assist the Sri Lankan government and people efficiently. It also produced Rapid Environmental Assessments (REA) that supported enhanced assistance from national and international actors to tsunami affected people. The UNDAC team faced resistance to begin the assessment in Sri Lanka as each state in the country did not want its relief process be out of their hand. Therefore, there was delayed clearance for the UNDAC team (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006g: 24).

In Sri Lanka, the UNOCHA aided the work of former US President Bill Clinton's Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. Their personnel were stationed in Colombo as well as had field offices in Kilinochchi, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara and Galle and two temporary sub-offices in Matara and Hambantota to help with district coordination. The UNOCHA became involved immediately and played an important role in the drafting of the transitional strategy.

The UNOCHA flash Appeal was the prime funding request vehicle as well as the coordination structure. It convened meetings with all partners that chalked out humanitarian assistance and addressed concerned issues. It also got involved in the transitional strategy that resulted in the formation of Tsunami working Group Initiative, a platform created to look into the actual operationalisation of tsunami assistance and gaps in the operationalisation of programmes. It assisted in the “identification of overall cost for the tsunami response, conducted public information activities through the deployment of staff and securing temporary housing and shelter for some 500,000 people providing food, water, sanitation, clothing and medical attention. It aimed to ensure return of the population to bring about normalcy as soon as possible” (OCHA 2005: 172). The presence of the HIC was pivotal in coordination, communications and information exchange that further led to creation of the Donor Assistance Database (DAD) in 2005. It was principal database of financial and other information for the Sri Lankan government pertaining to tsunami relief and recovery. In the coordination process, different stakeholders were shared with these

information connected to needs and responsibilities of communities in the country. Regular mapping and monitoring activities facilitated more coordinated approach to information. HIC and DAD confirmed that all “humanitarian actors worked towards strengthening communication capacities at the district and local levels. The aim was that the tsunami affected communities, especially displaced communities remain abreast with development plans and play and could play an integral role in decision-making” (OCHA 2005: 165-169).

The UNOCHA assisted at the district and divisional level in Sri Lanka, but this came under criticism as a result of the deployment of junior personnel without back up team and lack of equipment on their part (OCHA 2005:159-169). They also lacked effectiveness in the district because of the dearth of commitment by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) to deploy coordination officers to the districts. Therefore, the employment of experienced people to coordinate at the decentralised district level had been suggested for future efficient coordination management. The UNOCHA needs to exhibit its strength in the emergency phase and upgrade themselves to the challenges of disaster like these. Otherwise it would be redundant or ignored and even superseded by more capable NGOs or bilateral agencies (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006e).

Overall, in both the countries endeavours for formal assessment were undertaken by the UNDAC that undertook the earliest form of damage loss assessments. It was largely concerned by the security as well as the logistic problem. Several of these assessments were bypassed by the major donors that deployed their own assessments. In Sri Lanka, the UNDAC Team provided technical assistance in disaster management and coordination. Comparatively, departing from Indonesian case, the entry of the UNDAC team in Sri Lanka was resisted for assessment as the states did not want its relief process be out of its hand and therefore clearance to this agency was long delayed.

In both countries, the UNOCHA significantly contributed in preparation as well as issuance of flash appeals seeking aid from donors. In Indonesia, the UNOCHA Bakornas combine focused on the emergency operations catering to basic needs that included “food, medical supplies, clean water, temporary shelters, and income generation activities, for instance cash-for-work program”. The coordination in Aceh was complicated with multiplicity of NGOs and their refusal to coordinate and share information, duplication of works and security concerns under UNOCHA.

The UNOCHA situation report providing the daily updates were not released regularly. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, TAFOR was primarily responsible for immediate relief coordination. This was characterised by its hierarchical nature that raised concern over lack of consultation between the district level and central level. Thus, UNOCHA remained focused primarily in the loss assessment.

### *The UNICEF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

Broadly, the tsunami 2004 devastated approximately 200000 lives out of these, one third children bore the brunt of this menace, either they were killed or had gone missing (UNICEF 2005b:12). Children's deaths accounted for roughly a third of all deaths in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. (UNICEF 2009: 1).

Before the advent of tsunami, the UNICEF had scarce existence in Aceh. The restricted movement of humanitarian actors during the protracted conflict made the UNICEF's access difficult in the region in the initial days of tsunami. Its full scale operationalisation began to take off three weeks later after the advent of the tsunami 2004. In three months, the number of the UNICEF personnel in Aceh increased from two to 69, while the UNICEF Indonesia headquarters quadrupled in size by May 2005 (UNICEF 2006a:15).

Responding to tsunami disasters, the UNICEF in Indonesia considered primarily the children's immediate and long-term needs and requirements. Broadly, it engaged in three layered concern, first, provision of life saving supplies to surviving population; second, provision of basic services, reopening schools that included potable water, sanitation and third, the implicit domain of planning and consensus-building. The UN agency had a comparative advantage in Aceh because of its ability to function as a liaison between the government and non-government response. It possessed a national database on education, schooling and details of the vaccination coverage for children.

The UNICEF requested \$144 million for funding under UN Flash Appeal to meet immediate needs that was announced in January 2005. The demand for fund was further enhanced to \$326.2 million in May 2005 to cover its overall operations under emergency assistance for the whole year. It was funded profusely with major contribution from the UNICEF National Committees, 22.3% from the governments and the rest from the UN, field office, private sector fund and INGOs (United Nations 2006b:31). The UNICEF was instrumental in various

assessments done to assess the condition of women and children in Indonesia. It conducted 14 assessments from January to September 2005 that included critical nutrition surveys, education survey as well as the rapid assessment of learning Spaces (RALS). Several of these assessments were of high value, specifically its nutrition surveys. These proved worth noting but at times failed in terms of responding to the urgency that emerged out of these assessments. The nutrition survey identified “acute malnutrition among women and children but it did not elicit sufficient response” (UNICEF 2006a: ii).

In the domain of health, the UNICEF’s medical assistance in Indonesia comprised of provision of medicines, immunisation against measles and distribution of vitamin A supplements. The vaccination against the Measles could reach to more than 0.1 million children as well as spearheaded a campaign against polio. In the country, it tackled Malaria cases with distribution of mosquito nets and potable water (UNICEF2006a: ii). Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) was another priority domain of the UNICEF in Indonesia that encompassed provision of potable water to temporary settlements. Following that, temporary water treatment plants were set up to provide enough drinkable water (WHO 2013: 3).

Furthering its Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCC), the UNICEF played important role. Despite the huge devastation, within a month of the earthquake and tsunami, schools reopened (UNICEF 2010). The agency also partnered with the Aceh Provincial Office of Education (POE) to launch its first “back-to-school campaign” in the aftermath of tsunami. Around 800,000 youngsters were able to return to school as a result of such initiative (UNICEF 2009). Information materials, food, stationery kits, textbook sets, school tents, school in a Box kits and recreation kits were distributed to the children. In collaboration with other partners, 2,000 separated and unaccompanied children registration could be accomplished. Furthermore, cleaning up of schools and distribution of school supplies was important endeavour that enabled children to attend school, handle trauma and resume learning Further, the children’s centres were established along with coordination of psychosocial activities (UNICEF2006a: ii). Special centres as well as counselling activities were created in Indonesia for special children. Police officers were also adequately trained to instil trust in children in order to protect them from abuse and violence. (UNICEF 2005b:13).



Besides children, women got priority under the rubric of the UNICEF in Indonesia. Women undergoing pregnancy were given iron tablets. Malaria nets with insecticide-treatment were distributed to check the spread of the disease. In Aceh, ambulances along with midwives were deployed for safe delivery. Thus, in case of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, one of the significant contributions that emerged out of the UNICEF work was prevention of spread of any major disease as well as provision of essential material to school going children (UNICEF 2006c). As the UNICEF in Indonesia was confronted with several challenges, it had to rely upon several other actors for execution, given the size of the devastation in Indonesia. The destruction of the provincial government, civil strife and reluctance on the part of NGOs to work in the conflict-ridden region made the agency's activity difficult in the Aceh region. The agency felt shortage of funds in the region and executing partners. Even, the UNICEF office's emergency preparedness as well as response plan lacked an explicit human resource mobilisation plan and the list of essential supplies. During the first weeks following the tsunami response, the Indonesia country office concentrated primarily on meeting immediate needs and its programme planning did not begin until March 2005 (UNICEF 2006a: ii). Other pitfalls in the work of the UNICEF was its urban tilt. An assessment survey conducted in Indonesia reflected that a level of cynicism, fatigue, detachment, depression and bitterness among the children. There was lack of optimism about future prospect among them and acceptance that their plight was worse than that of prevailing just before the tsunami.

The education sector in Indonesia suffered because of a lack of communication among multiple actors and government officials. It also faced a shortage of permanent schools as well as issue of overlapping school sites (UNICEF 2010). The UNICEF assessment after a year of the tsunami revealed persistent requirements of emergency assistance material like housing, food, clothing and education among affected community (UNICEF 2005a: 43). Thus, it was pitted with multiple challenges in several programmes.

The UNICEF in Sri Lanka had a major advantage to deal with tsunami disaster as it had field offices in the Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Trincomalee district. In the LTTE region, it was primarily the initiative taken up by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation that spearheaded the early relief efforts. The LTTE met with representatives of the UN Agencies and Foreign Missions in Killinochchi regarding their plans and concerns as well as issues in the process of the

relief efforts. The UNICEF was part of the interaction to ensure its interventions in the LTTE region. In a major effort to provide immediate relief, the UNICEF Colombo Office coordinated with the Zonal office of the affected region with focus to cater to the needs of the children in the emergency phase.

The UNICEF interventions in Sri Lanka were in the domain of “water, sanitation and hygiene maternal, child health and nutrition, early child development, basic education and child protection”. The agency's primary focus in the country was on “water, sanitation and hygiene; basic education; child protection; and child and maternal health and nutrition”. They were amounted for 83 percent of overall UNICEF's response in the advent of tsunami (UNICEF 2006a: 85-86).

To begin with, the UNICEF in Sri Lanka conducted several assessments and a rapid assessment comprised both situation and needs assessment to determine the type of relief for immediate response in Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee, Hambantota, Matara, Galle and Ampara were shared with GoSL. In LTTE region, the UNICEF engaged in rapid assessment of the tsunami on the landmine in Batticaloa, Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee districts. These assessments facilitated medical teams to disaster devastated spots, provision of essential drugs to the inflicted region and reconstruction of the affected hospitals and health facilities. In order to assess malnutrition, the agency also piloted a “rapid nutrition survey” in IDP camps. Importantly, this survey aided in the development of nutrition-related interventions as well as the development of a “national recovery and reconstruction plan” in collaboration with district officials (UNICEF 2009: vii).

Further, the UNICEF developed its own in-house data collection tools in Sri Lanka that included variables like maternal as well as child health and other variables. These data proved vital for the assessment of the plight of the children. But largely these assessments exhibited dearth of a standardised format or tool for rapid assessment in the UNICEF (ALNAP 2005: 4). There was also directed deployment of UNICEF staff within agencies of the GoSL to provide technical assistance to protect children in camps, displaced children, protect from child abuse and assist children separated from family. The UNICEF teamed up with the Department of Probation and Child Care Services (DPCCS) and other humanitarian actors to coordinate the process to identify, document, trace and reunify disjointed and lone children. The UNICEF assistance enabled

rehabilitation of approximately “17 percent of all separated and unaccompanied children, prevention their of sexual exploitation and child trafficking” (UNICEF 2009: V). In the health sector in Sri Lanka, UNICEF was part of health coordination to assist Ministry of Health and Nutrition (MOH). It agreed with the MOH to take a lead role to re-establish maternal and child health services along with promoting breast feeding and nutrition surveillance, restoration of cold chain facilities and so on. UNICEF continued “to help ferry the wounded and dead to area hospitals while providing bed sheets, towels, drinking water bottles, cooking utensils sets and mats to assist the displaced and stranded” (UNICEF 2006a). Besides these, insecticides, mosquito nets, Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS), anti-biotic and anti-septic were part of the immediate distribution. The immunisation as well as restoration of the cold chain facilities initiated by government was complemented by the UNICEF.

The agency made important intervention in the domain of education in Sri Lanka. Like, the Indonesian case, its clarion call and technical support led to opening of schools at the early stage. In the initial first to six weeks of the advent of the UNICEF aimed to focus was on establishing the temporary learning spaces. It ensured water and sanitation facilities for children, provided students with school-in-a-box kit in the worst hit district of the Sri Lanka and other region. Like, India and Maldives, in Sri Lanka, the education related advocacy coupled with the governmental material and financial support that led schools to be reopened at faster pace. In comparison to Indonesia, in Sri Lanka the reconstruction move was at a much slower pace as more than 200 schools were occupied for temporary shelter of the affected families (UNICEF 2009:v).

The UNICEF faced the challenge of lack of staffing and technical capacity to tackle the disaster in Sri Lanka (UNICEF 2009:11). There was dearth of the nutrition staff in the UNICEF country office and local technical staff. In combination to it, the competition between the UNICEF and other agencies to provide assistance caused competition for human resources among agencies in relief assistance process (ALNAP 2005:30). Thus, the register of pool of local expertise could have been a major asset that lacked both in Sri Lanka. The agency failed to take into account the taste and preference for Children. Children in Sri Lanka did not like the taste of unfamiliar packed food provided in the camps. The management of the emergency relief and coordination activities being two different responsibilities were under the hand of same person that affected efficient functioning of the work. The UNICEF work also lacked the participatory attitude for beneficiary including children and youth. There was dearth of harmonious relation to work among the

UNICEF and other sister organisation such as the WHO, the UNFPA, the UNDP and other UN agencies (ALNAP 2005:19). Despite these all hurdles, major outcome of the UNICEF work resulted in early reopening of schools to restore normalcy to children’s lives (UNICEF 2009). Children were permitted to appear for classes without uniforms and birth certificates. The attendance at the few schools was low as many children were dead or injured during the tsunami and therefore parents were afraid to send their children back to school owing to safety concerns (Kuntoro 2015).

*Table 4.2: UNICEF assistance to Indonesia and Sri Lanka (May 2006)*

| <b>Aceh, Indonesia</b>  | <b>Sri Lanka</b>   |
|---|--|
| Coordinated measles vaccination for 1.1 million children.   | Distributed 66,000 family kits.  |
| Distributed 300,000 bed-nets, 490,000 vitamin A tablets, 2.7m iron tablets, 9 ambulances, 15 emergency health kits sufficient for 150,000 people, 224,325 Hygiene kits. | Set up 97 temporary schools (and cleaned and repaired 170), distributed 48,000 desks, 52,000 chairs, material for 227,000 School uniforms. |
| Distributed 6,953 ‘schools in a box’3, 1,000 tents for temporary classrooms, and school supplies for 830,000 children.  | Ran 30 water tankers, 20 gully suckers, constructed over 2,900 latrines and restored 6,200 water points.                                   |
| Set up 21 children’s centres.   | Distributed 1.6m vitamin A tablets, health kits, cold chain equipment (196 vaccine carriers)   |
| Rehabilitated or constructed 256 permanent water points and 13 water treatment units or systems and ran 9 water tankers.  | Substantial child protection and Psychosocial work.  |

Source: UNICEF (2006), “The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster: Evaluation of UNICEF’s Response (Emergency and Initial Recovery Phase), Synthesis Report”, *Evaluation Office UNICEF*, Evaluation Report, May 2006, URL: [https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/UNICEF\\_Tsunami\\_Synthesis\\_Report\\_2006.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/UNICEF_Tsunami_Synthesis_Report_2006.pdf).

The UNICEF assistance in Indonesia and Sri Lanka can be reflected in Table 4.2. Comparing the emergency assistance phase in both the countries, the overall death of the children comprised nearly one third of the total death in these country (UNICEF 2009: 1) and the agency was highly funded agency in both countries. However, reflecting upon the fund expenditure, Indonesia appeared to be making less expenditure in terms of the total fund allocated when compared to Sri Lanka. (United Nations 2006b: 32).

The UNICEF lacked standard assessment tools and instructions in Indonesia, making it difficult to build a consistent rapid assessment process with comprehensive coverage and high quality data. Only the Sri Lankan country office, on the other hand, had developed standard evaluation templates to assure data comparability. Unfortunately, they were not employed consistently in the field (United Nations 2006e: 34). Thus, the major feat of the agency in Sri Lanka was that it completed the assessment pertaining to the impact of tsunami within the first 72 hours of advent of tsunami. In comparison to Indonesia, in Sri Lanka, the reconstruction move was at a much slower pace as more than 200 schools were occupied for temporary shelter of the affected families (UNICEF 2009:v).

The Indian Ocean Tsunami coupled with South Asian earthquake and several armed conflicts pushed the UNICEF to enhance its capacity building in planning, deployment and administration of staff. The commonality that marked the role of the UNICEF in these two countries of Indonesia and Sri Lanka was its readiness in education sector with steadfast effort to open school at the earliest possible.

#### *UNDP in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

The domain of the early relief assistance was traditionally in the hands of the UNOCHA, the UNICEF and the WFP and others. The UNDP traditionally worked in the conflict related long term recovery programme. But, the Indian Ocean Tsunami marked a major move towards relief role for the UNDP. It actively involved in disaster relief work that was unprecedented (UNDP Indonesia 2005: 9). It also developed the close relation with the other UN agencies to facilitate coordination in the process of resource distribution. It used its Regional BCPR for Asia and Pacific. The funds generated by the UNDP were derived both from the UN Flash Appeal as well as non-Flash Appeal (United Nations 2006b:42). The UNDP programme was the largest in Indonesia to deal with disaster of tsunami. BCPR aided the UNDP office in Indonesia on the advent of tsunami

2004 and was present in both Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. It created a logistic centre in Medan for itself and other agencies to help with procurement, transportation and other tasks. The DMU of UNDP BCPR assisted in technical help to “Flash Appeal and the damage and loss assessment. It also enabled the enlistment of United Nations Volunteers” (UNVs). In response efforts, UNDP initiated the damage and loss assessment in collaboration with the World Bank. The agency used the ECLAC technique in Indonesia, which had previously been used in Belize and the Dominican Republic in 1998, Venezuela in 1999 and El Salvador in 2001. These assessment aggregated the assessment of damages in the domain of governance, livelihood, and risk management. Such assessment enumerated the monetary value of the “socio-economic and environmental impact of natural disaster” as well as its direct impact i.e. impact on assets, stock, property and indirect bearing of the disaster on diverse (UNDP Indonesia 2005:8). Thus, this estimation put total loss and damage to approximately “USD 4.5 billion that was equivalent to the GDP of the Aceh province” (UNDP Indonesia 2005:11). Such methodology of assessment lacked the information on several of governance indicators like the number of affected civil servants. Difficulty also was how to monetise and calculate the replacement cost of the records of these civil servants in the process of assessment (UNDP Indonesia 2005:13).

*Table 4.3: UNDP Emergency relief in Indonesia: An overview*

| <b>Time frame</b>         | <b>Key objective</b> | <b>Focus areas</b>  | <b>Support</b>   |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---|--|
| <b>Dec 2004- Mid 2005</b> |                      |   |  |
| 6 months                  | Humanitarian relief  | Burying the bodies<br>clearing Rubble<br>Livelihood Recovery planning<br>Livelihood | Overall UN coordination<br>Flash Appeal/Emergency Relief<br>• Support to the Damage and Losses assessment<br>Support to the development of recovery blue print<br>Private sector partnership |

Source: BAPPENAS (2005), “Indonesia: Notes on reconstruction, the December 26, 2004 natural disaster”, January 19-20, 2005 [online web] Accessed 5 May 2019, URL: <https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/2165>.; UNDP Indonesia (2005a), *UNDP’s Initial Response to the Tsunami in Indonesia (End of Mission Report: January – March 2005)*, UNDP Transition Recovery Unit, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery with UNDP Indonesia: Geneva.

The UNDP's evolved role in the domain of relief assistance was a major innovation for the agency. The evaluation of the UNDP works reflect that even in the relief phase of the early assistance, the organisation activities primarily focused on the recovery component. The attempt was to bridge the gap between the relief assistance as well as long term recovery (UNDP Indonesia 2005:10). The activities that formed the part of the initial response by the UNDP in Banda Aceh included: clearing tsunami debris and provision of heavy equipment inputs in collaboration with local authorities. Heavy equipment were deployed to clear debris Banda Aceh, the most affected region of Indonesia.

It played a vital role in UN's knowledge base on the tsunami disaster in Aceh and became principal source of data for the planning of relief efforts. In liaison with HIC, the provincial authorities ensured smooth information flows and standardisation of data. It facilitated tabulation of data into the Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping system developed by the HIC. With GIS, the HIC facilitated various sources of information into maps. This could effectively portray tsunami's impact and the response by the international agencies. This proved a reference point for government, non-government and the UN agencies and an important source of guidance for the relief efforts (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006a).

The Immediate Employment was a first step for UNDP's Livelihoods Recovery Component, allowing access to remote communities so that early activities could begin. In assessing the impact of the UNDP supported immediate employment activities, a sample of 520 workers from 13 villages in six districts reported that 81 percent of respondents said the money received from this programme provided enough funds to meet their daily needs, 24 percent said they were able to save money from the programme and 17 percent said they were able to use their savings from the programme to begin a new business and 83% of respondents indicated that their participation in the programme aided to relieve stress and trauma resulting from the tsunami and earthquake disasters. By September 2015, the initiative had reached over 250 villages, 36 sub-districts, and seven districts in Aceh with over 34,000 people benefiting from daily income to meet their basic requirements. (UNDP 2006a). Its Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTR) helped over 40,000 families in Aceh find work and rebuild their lives (UNDP 2006a). In the process of relief assistance, there were instances of changing dynamics between UNDP and NGOs. Traditionally, NGOs were employed by the UNDP as "sub-contractor of UNDP" in execution of multiple projects. But amidst the tsunami, these NGOs had huge amount

of resources at their disposal and at several instances these international NGOs approached UNDP if it could do the work of NGOs (UNDP Indonesia 2005:19). Traditionally, the UNDP had been working in the domain of conflict prevention and recovery. Its entry to a new field of relief assistance in advent of tsunami 2004 required a tenable approach to continue in a field that had not been its domain in the past. Another challenge pertained to the UNDP's ECLAC model of assessment was lack of capacity of this model to undertake a comprehensive assessment to damage done to the governance sectors. Therefore, questions erupted what to include under the broader understanding of governance and how to calculate the economic damage done to personnel and public records (UNDP Indonesia 2005:12). This agency also faced difficulty to cope with massive offers coming from the private sectors and lack of strategy to channelise these funds.

Thus, in Indonesia, the UNDP's timely engagement in relief phase among affected population was widely appreciated but multiple challenges were faced by the UNDP in the process. It actively participated unlike in the past in the Flash Appeal process that generated a large amount of fund for the UNDP. Additionally, unlike in the past, it participated in emergency relief that was primarily confined to the OCHA, the UNICEF, the UNHCR and the WFP and others (UNDP Indonesia 2005: 9). Its activities exhibited overlapping between the two phases of early relief as well as long term rehabilitation. Thus, it initiated recovery even in the relief phase. For instance, several of its operations, such as "cash for work, waste management and local government assistance" were started in the early stage of relief assistance.

In Sri Lanka, the UNDP assisted the government in coordination of relief assistance both at central and local levels. In emergency phase, it worked closely with the UNDP Country Office that assisted in deployment of the UN volunteers (UNVs) steadfastly within 24 hours in the southern districts as well as other devastated region of Sri Lanka of Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara and Matara. These UNVs collaborated with the District Secretaries to enable the coordination of information at the local level. It convened the meetings of the major actors in the field including the UN, NGOs, INGOs, multilateral organisation donors and others. They assisted people in provision of needs and requirements in the tsunami devastated region. Gathering information of the injured, victims as well as infrastructural damage and communicating it back to the CNO in Colombo was importantly undertaken by the UNDP (UNDP 2005c:8). The Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative in coordination with the senior officials ensured to



bring the donors as well as the multitude of the UN agencies and the NGOs (UNDP 2004). The UNDP facilitated information coordination support at the local level and assisted the international donors and shared the information concerning the requirements in devastated region. It also collated the upgraded information with regard to donor assistance. The UNDP supported the UNRC in preparing regular updates of the situation and organising daily coordination and information sharing meetings of all the national and international humanitarian actors present in Colombo.

The UNDP in Sri Lanka aided the GoSL to develop the nationally owed tracking mechanism that resulted in establishment of DAD to ensure transparency in donor's contribution as well as their utilisation for the stipulated programme. DAD in the country was vital to track the needs unmet, identification of duplications and bottlenecks in the implementation of the assistance programmes (UNDP 2005c: 6). Sri Lanka created a Disaster Management Centre with UNDP help less than a month after the 2004 tsunami (DMC) that acted as a centralised information platform for the rest of the world. It managed upgradation of statistics pertaining to the disaster (Ching 2011). It proved to be “instrumental in warning of the need to evacuate coastal regions in the face of an impending tsunami” (Williams 2016:405). This availability to information significantly increased global awareness of the crisis and was a critical and crucial part of the overall relief effort. But, over the process of operationalisation the DMC engaged in design and implementation of various activities for instance, early warnings systems and preparedness plans, and therefore, “little attempt has been made to maintain those activities” (UNDP 2011: 6).

The UNDP in Sri Lanka initiated the humanitarian assistance with prime focus to mobilise both financial and human resources to assist the tsunami affected areas of Sri Lanka. Thus, the UNDP operationalisation was beyond its traditional mandate of conflict related long term recovery. Making its departure from antiquity, it engaged in the early relief assistance and assessment of damage and loss in the domain of governance, livelihood, and risk management in both the countries. The UNDP operationalisation also reflected changing dynamics between the UNDP and NGOs. Traditionally, NGOs acted under the supervision of the UNDP in execution of multiple projects. But amidst the tsunami, these NGOs were in possession of huge resources at their disposal and at several instances these international NGOs approached UNDP do their work.

### *The UNHCR in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

Since 1979, the UNHCR had a working presence in Indonesia with its regional office situated the country. Traditionally this UN agency confined itself to keep watch on the arrival and protection of refugees from other countries. The UNHCR lacked the mandate to act in case of natural disaster. The agency never involved in Aceh, Sumatra region and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). However, given the intensity and gravity of the situation caused by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and request by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), it got prompted to involve in Aceh region.

The UN Country team requested the UNHCR to initiate the provision of shelter. Expanding its wings, the agency began its operationalisation in Calang district, the capital of Aceh Jaya Regency. The agency's additional resources were utilised to provide the technical assistance and aided the relief of a large number of individuals in the emergency phase almost 300,000 and the recovery of several hundred thousand (UNHCR& PDES 2007:9). The UNHCR collaborated with the Ministry of Public Works to administer its emergency housing programme with a target to assist 100,000 people at 20 different sites in the proximity of west coast of Aceh to provide shelter. It also conducted coordination with various agencies involved in providing emergency shelter to displaced people (UNHCR& PDES 2007:8). The other essential goods including tents, blankets and shelter material were also catered by the agency. The emergency shelter programme sustained people for several week and months after the advent of the tsunami. Technical assessment of the shelter programme revealed that the UNHCR's lightweight tent successfully provided shelter to people compared to other tents that could not continue to protect people for several months.

There were also challenges that emanated in the early phase assistance for the UNHCR in Indonesia. The sensitive relationship between the GoI and the UNHCR became an issue of concern between the two countries. For the GoI, presence of offices of the UNHCR in sensitive Aceh region became of matter of concern. Some of the GAM rebels outflowed to Malaysia to seek the UNHCR protection against GoI. Therefore, apprehension of such engagement of the UNHCR with the rebels was distasteful for the Indonesian government and it wanted a limited role for the UNHCR in Aceh area. Therefore, the UNHCR was asked to pull back its activity in March 2005 from the district in the midst of emergency phase. The GoI argued that Aceh did not have refugee issue and therefore no necessities of the UNHCR in that area (UNHCR& PDES 2007:1). This resulted in

derailment of the UNHCR activities. The UN Resident Coordinator made failed attempts to persuade the Indonesian government to modify its stance on the UNHCR.

The UNHCR had a well-established coordinated cooperation with the Government of Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and NGOs to address IDP protection problems emerging from the conflict. This presence and experience enabled the UNHCR to initiate protection related to the natural disaster. Like Indonesia, in Sri Lanka also traditionally, the UNHCR did not engage in natural disasters' response. However, huge destruction caused by tsunami as well as request by the UNSG led to its operational presence in Sri Lanka in tsunami operation. Such a move of the UNHCR was hailed by the GoSL. The GoSL requested the agency to take up the shelter programme for a year that assisted more than 100,000 people. Its interagency Logistics Operations Centre and transitional shelter coordination efforts served over 275,000 people and it directly provided transitional shelter to over 20,000 people. It also concentrated on the distribution of non-food items (NFI) in the east and north, as well as in a few southern areas (UNHCR & PDES 2007:1).

The tsunami led the loss of essential documents that included identity cards, birth, marriage, death certificates and so on. In the cases of lost documents, it was the UNHCR that came to assist those with lost documentation. The agency played significant role in either replacement or recovery of the documents of approximately 120,000 people (UNHCR 2005a: 350). Legal Clinics were opened in all the aggrieved districts of the country. It provided legal aid (UNHCR & PDES 2007:1). The UNHCR works in Sri Lanka were troubled by dearth of coordination among several agencies compounded by sluggish pace of the work in designing shelter, indecisiveness of the officials at the UNHCR in the country. Its shelter programme was also marred by plethora of organisations in the field, each being competitive to show their mark on the ground (Stirrat2006:13). Besides, the UNHCR agreed to take leadership in coordination of transitional shelter programme, but there was lack of staff on the ground to carry forward coordination activities. Additionally, by the time they had adequacy of the staff, there was derailment of the transitional shelter programme due to discordant relationship between the UNHCR and donors (United Nations 2006a: 17). Overall, the UNHCR's long-standing relationship with the Sri Lankan government enabled UNHCR to carry out its protection duties following the tsunami disaster.

Thus, the UNHCR in both countries went beyond their traditional role of refugee protection by providing assistance in shelter programme in both early assistance and recovery and

rehabilitation phase. In Sri Lanka, the UNHCR provided assistance in emergency and transitional shelter provision and left permanent shelter programme to other actors including the state (Pagonis 2005). On the other hand, the UNHCR in Indonesia involved itself in the early assistance and did not involve much in transitional shelter and therefore, the tasks related to transitional shelter was undertaken by the Indonesian government including construction of the temporary wooden barracks throughout Aceh. Indonesian government's realisation for the transitional shelter emerged much later as early emergency shelter faced debilitation. Even in transitional shelter in Indonesia, the UNHCR provided technical advice and layout design of the shelter. Comparatively, in both countries the UNHCR lacked institutional capacity as well as dearth of shelter expertise therefore, they were reliant upon the external expertise.

Table 4.4: UNHCR's Assistance to Indonesian and Sri Lanka

| Nature of assistance  | Units         | Nos.        |
|---|---------------|-------------|
| <b>INDONESIA</b>  |               |             |
| Emergency NFI   | Beneficiaries | 145,000     |
| Shelter Coordination  | Beneficiaries | Unspecified |
| Permanent Shelter   | Beneficiaries | 2,900       |
| Nias Shelter materials:   | Beneficiaries | 10,000      |
| Nias Timber Supply  | Cubic metres  | 8,000       |
| Nias roofing Sheets   | Square metres | Unspecified |
| Shelter coordination technical Advice and Support                         |               | Unspecified |
| <b>SRI LANKA</b>  |               |             |
| Emergency NFI   | Beneficiaries | 100,000     |
| Shelter Coordination  | Beneficiaries | 275,000     |
| Shelter Provision   | Beneficiaries | 22,500      |
| Provision of transitional Protection, survey, legal support Beneficiaries | Beneficiaries | 1,20000     |
| Logistics Operations Centre<br>Publication of equity papers               |               |             |

Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees Policy Development And Evaluation Service (UNHCR& PDES 2007), *UNHCR's response to the Tsunami emergency in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, December 2004 - November 2006*, PDES: Geneva, pg11.

## **Operationalisation of Norms, Principles and Guidelines for Natural Disasters in Indonesia and Sri Lanka**

The following section discusses how the norms, principles and guidelines for natural disasters, discussed in chapter II, had been applied in dealing with tsunami crisis during the early relief phase in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

In Indonesia, the advent of tsunami was marked with slower response by the local as well as national government. This was primarily due to death of the large scale officials at local level and national level in Aceh estimated to be 10,475 staffs. Further damage to Indonesian military as well as navy and infrastructure derailed rescue of the affected population by the state. Such situation propelled the local population to depend on their own resources initially. Under such circumstance, the IASC guidelines earmark the significant role for international community to deliver humanitarian assistance especially in amidst of state failure to deliver assistance. Thus, in Indonesia multitude of international agencies came to provide assistance in the early phase of relief assistance. This remains consistent with the IASC guidelines (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006c: 10).

Months following tsunami, the “IASC operational guidelines on natural disasters pertaining to protection of life, security and physical integrity” were kept at abeyance in Aceh Province of Indonesia during rescue operations leading to dearth and delay in the immediate care for sick and injured victims. As a result, there was a significant death rate among tsunami victims. Bambang Antariksa, the Aceh regional executive said “there was no (rapid) rescue operation, and that in itself is a human rights violation. In the first and second day, there were survivors who were buried under the debris. But (they died) because there was no rescue operation” (Cohen 2005: 32).

Women had marginal say in camp management. The UNHCR reported increase cases of domestic violence as well as alcohol use in the camp (Fletcher and Weinstein 2005: 67). In the tsunami afflicted region especially in Aceh, the people stayed in the barrack-like structures that were extremely overcrowded unfit both for families with children (Action Aid International 2006:26). In Indonesia, tsunami had impacted the fishing communities destroying approximately 70 per cent small fishing feet in Aceh province (IFRC 2013:15). In the early relief assistance the temporary resettlement sites were constructed far away from places of livelihoods for the fishing community.

All these developments in course of relief assistance flouted the IASC's right to life and livelihood (Action Aid International 2006:26).

The realm of assistance and delivery distribution was complex and problematic and violated the UNOCHA principle of non-discrimination and neutrality. In Simeulu region, Indonesian people encountered faults in relief assistance. An assessment done in early two months exhibited neglect to remote villages by the local and central government. This was worsened by people stay in makeshift shelters with insufficient clothes and food and medicine (McCulloch 2005:26). In the country military controlled aid distribution and for International aid organisations it was impossible to travel outside of Banda Aceh without a military escort. The deployment of excessive security forces flouted several guidelines established by the IASC. Instances of theft of the aid and allegation as well as counter allegations continued between the GAM pointing figures at the military and vice versa about such theft of aid. This hubbub existed as military wanted to control over the aid that further delayed the relief distribution (McCulloch2005:27). In the emergency phase, in accordance to the IASC guidelines, camps that were set by military should have been under control of civilian institutions or officials. Besides, the police and security forces should have been employed to ensure security. But on the ground the situation was different. The right to be evacuated is an inalienable part of the right to safety and physical integrity. Despite such principles under the IASC guidelines, the Indonesian National Police and military (TNI) and their families were on the priority list of evacuation. Such priority for evacuation might not been available for others. It was also reported that the military forces instructed the "civilian survivors to remove the bodies from the streets" (Cohen et al. 2005: 33). Such instances were in clear violations of UNOCHA's principles of neutrality and equity.

The violations of the varied provisions of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were also reported in Indonesia. For example, in the Aceh region, military control of aid was used to reinforce the military's position. In Pidie, Aceh, aid was withheld by military to prevent its accessibility to the GAM personnel in the region. Even the residents were under repression with withholding of aid distribution (Cohen et al. 2005: 36).

In Indonesia, the diverse vulnerable sections included women and children. Several plausible explanations were attributed to their plight as they were not trained to climb tree or swim

and most of them remained at home. In the post tsunami phase, their health and education requirements suffered in the country (Cohen et al. 2005: 31).

In Sri Lanka, the protection of life, security and physical integrity adopted by the IASC guidelines were violated in the LTTE covered region with incidents of child abductions by the LTTE from shelters and camps in the north-eastern Province as well as sexual violence. Cases of child abductions were reported by UNHCR and the local NGO Sarvodaya. (Weinstein 2005: 66). These abducted children were recruited as child soldiers by the LTTE. Children were also to be conscripted into the military forces as a result of family separation and post-disaster situations. It was the gross violation of the right to protection against separation of families that is innate part of the IASC guidelines connected to the broader set of “rights related to protection of life, security and physical integrity”. The IASC guidelines of right to livelihood was under threat in the country as a large sections of the fishing and small farming coastal communities were largely affected with the advent of tsunami. In Sri Lanka, over 66% of fishing fleet had been destroyed impacting their livelihood (IFRC 2013: 15).

In Sri Lanka, the IASC operational guidelines pertaining to right to education had got priority as several schools opened within few weeks after the advent of the tsunami. Supports were provided for the orphaned children’s accessibility to school. In the country, right to documentation was a major challenge and commendable job were seen regarding documentation of the child survivors and keeping children within their home communities. Check on prevention of illegal adoptions, provision of psychological and emotional needs were adequately addressed. Accessibility of documents enabled children to get enrolled in the school and get uniforms and school related supplies.

But, on the other side, there was differential treatment between the IDPs displaced as a consequence of the natural disaster and those victims of the prolonged fight in the Sri Lanka. Thus, the tsunami impacted IDPs were in better condition compared to the other set of IDPs. In the Tamil area, for example, IDPs affected by the tsunami in Sri Lanka had more leverage in receiving relief packages and support than other IDPs with similar needs. In another instance, all tsunami IDPs had transitional shelter and were availing basic needs requirements. The conflict linked IDPs were in second-rate welfare centres that were their home for last ten years. Such differential treatment meted out to IDPs cause conflicts in Batticaloa District (Entwisle 2013: 20). This violated the UNOCHA’s principle of non-discrimination. Community participation is an inherent aspect of



IDPs principles. However it was rarely applied in Sri Lanka, with no choice offered to IDPs about relocation sites, relief priorities or housing development (Fletcher and Weinstein 2005: 61). Families were frequently forced to move from shelters to relatives' homes to transitional lodging. Some IDPs had moved two or three times in few months making it impossible to arrange for their assistance (Entwisle 2013: 14). There were incidents of maltreatment by the local authorities as well as lack of medical facilities and childhood immunisations. Thus, it put clear challenge to the right to health that was needed to be provided at the appropriate time without discrimination on the basis of culture or gender and was supposed to be readily accessible as well as available to all affected population. Accessibility of full information to IDPs and their inclusion in the planning and management of their return, resettlement and reintegration is part of the IDPs guiding principle. These norms saw violation in Sri Lanka as transitional housing were established in the zone of flooding without community consultation further, the affected community had to move in the incomplete infrastructure.

In Sri Lanka, the OCHA's principles of equity as well as non-discrimination were under question in case of funding. Despite initial cooperation, GoSL as well as the LTTE were unable to arrive at rapprochement on tsunami assistance distribution, making it impossible for humanitarian agencies to reach the LTTE affected region (Entwisle 2013:17). Meanwhile, the east and northeast part of the country had very limited support and they raised voices about politics at play. These were LTTE dominated regions with little assistance provided to conflict affected populations. The Sri Lanka Country Study makes note of the criticism of rations received in terms of quantity as well as the lack of cultural preferences in considerations of supply of the ration (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 32).

There existed power struggle between the LTTE and the GoSL. Kleinfeld narrates, "The LTTE and the GoSL insisted on managing the distribution of relief in places and among populations claimed to be under their authority...both parties insisted on their right to govern areas requiring humanitarian assistance. Equally, both political actors sought to undermine their adversary's ability to do so, deepening the political rift" (Kleinfeld 2006). It was also argued that the GoSL stopped Kofi Annan, UNSG to visit the LLTE region and his visit covered a larger region of Sinhalese inhabited south. Annan was led through the hard hit town of Hambantota in the Sinhalese dominated south and Trincomalee in the east and he was not allowed to visit the LTTE held Mullaithivu District (Kleinfeld 2006). The Sri Lankan government was concerned that

allowing Annan to visit LTTE controlled areas would signal that the LTTE was a genuine force. Before leaving Sri Lanka, Annan briefed a press conference expressed his thoughts on the visit and expressed his wish to return. Margareta Wahlstrom, the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs reiterated “the UN’s commitment to the equitable distribution of aid, given the conflict environment and the desire by global donors to verify that their assistance was reaching everyone in need” (United Nation 2005f). Not only there were rumours about the south being treated better than the northeast, but there were also stories about differing treatment inside these regions.

Besides, the discrimination exhibited in the process of resettlement, according to Amnesty International, more Sinhalese compared to Tamils were resettled in the early stages. There were accusations of Tamils grabbing land in regions designated as a relocation site for Muslim communities following tsunami (Entwisle 2013:30). The government run camps were overcrowded flouting the IASC Guideline of Protection of rights related to the Shelter. This was further accentuated with dearth of water, and sanitation, unavailability of toilet facilities for women and inequitable aid distribution among different camps. In Sri Lanka, the “protection of life, security and physical integrity” were violated in the LTTE covered region with incidents of child abductions by the LTTE. The principles of equity as well as non-discrimination adopted by UNOCHA were under question in case of aid or funding aid distribution in both countries. Instances of maldistribution as well as maltreatment were seen in both countries. In case of Indonesia, the military of the country as well as the officials at ground level either preserved best assistance for their own use or delivered no assistance at all. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the LTTE controlled region in the north and east got disproportionately less assistance than southern areas. Therefore, the operationalisation of norms, principles guidelines were marked with violations as well as adherence to them. The principle of equity, non-discrimination conceptualised under the UNOCHA were under scanner. The flouting of aid distribution norms, its maldistribution as well as maltreatment meted to affected population in both countries were against the principles. Similarly, there were hitches for aid providers to receive aid in the LTTE habitat zones in the north and east. There were also allegations about the partiality with non-visit of the UNSG, Kofi Annan in the LLTE dominant region. The rights related to the Shelter were flouted as camps were overcrowded. Simultaneously, IASC guidelines of the protection of life, security and physical

integrity were under threat as cases of child abductions existed in the LTTE region. Indonesia was no different case as in Aceh Province, protection of life, security and physical integrity were kept at abeyance in rescue operations with increased cases of domestic violence as well as alcohol use in the camp (Weinstein 2005: 67). Thus, in Indonesian Aceh Province, “IASC operational guidelines on natural disasters pertaining to protection of life, security and physical integrity” were kept at abeyance in rescue operations. The IASC guidelines of the right to livelihood was under threat in both countries, as temporary resettlement sites were located at a distant place from the livelihoods of the fishing community becoming barrier in attainment of right to livelihood (Action Aid International 2006:26).

## **Conclusion**

The tsunami in 2004 wreaked havoc on Indonesia and Sri Lanka bearing the brunt of the worst damage. Both these countries were already reeling under conflict even before the advent of tsunami, i.e. in Indonesia, it was the GAM in Aceh region whereas Sri Lanka had protracted conflict between the LTTE and GoSL. As a response to tsunami, Indonesia utilised its existing mechanism, “National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management” (Bakornas PBP) that deployed resources in Aceh region and GoI initiated three phased strategy- “immediate relief, rehabilitation phase and reconstruction phase”. In Sri Lanka, the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) engaged in disaster management proved to be hierarchical and followed top-bottom approach. A comparative study of the situation in both the countries suggests that Indonesia had called for immediate international relief assistance whereas Sri Lanka delayed in making the call for international aid.

Besides the governmental agencies, the early relief assistance in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were complemented by multiple international agencies marked by unprecedented response from the civil society and the intergovernmental organisations. In both the countries, prior to the advent of tsunami, governments maintained stringent check and control over the international NGOs as well as UN agencies operating in the conflict areas. The institutional response mechanism under the rubrics of the UN in the early assistance phase began with coordination role undertaken by the UNOCHA and complemented by operative UN agencies. Comparing presence of the UN operative agencies, Sri Lanka’s most affected region in the North eastern region had presence of the UN

agencies including UNICEF, UNOCHA among others before the Tsunami. Such presence, for instance of the UNICEF in Sri Lanka, especially in the conflict zone enabled “provision of safe water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, access to child protection and health services and other services” during the initial emergency and relief phase. In contrast, the Indonesia had scarce presence of these international agencies in the Aceh region. For example, the UNICEF had small presence in Aceh compounded by restrictions on movement of humanitarian actors during the protracted conflict. Consequently, the UNICEF’s full operationalisation of early relief assistance in Aceh was delayed by three weeks from the date of inception of tsunami. In the midst of tsunami of 2004, Indonesia made a successful liaison with the GAM and concluded an agreement in few months of the advent of tsunami, whereas Sri Lanka failed to come in agreement with the LTTE that affected the relief assistance phase in Sri Lanka. There were difficulties for relief actors to provide assistance in the LTTE controlled zones in the north and east and even UNSG, Kofi Annan failed to pay visit to the LTTE covered region.

Under the rubrics of the UN, coordination led by the UNOCHA in Indonesia coupled with preparation and launching of flash appeals to plead donors for aid were initiated in both countries. In Indonesia, the UNOCHA Bakornas combine focussed on the emergency operations as well as catering to basic needs. The operationalisation of the UNOCHA was riddled with challenges. Several NGOs remained reluctant to share information with the UN and as they sought to assert their independent existence on the ground. The operationalisation of its coordination in Aceh was complicated with multiplicity of NGOs and their refusal to coordinate and share information with the UNOCHA. The duplication of works and neglect of the prominent environment and security concerns were felt by the UNOCHA. The UNOCHA situation report providing the daily updates were also not released regularly. Under the UNOCHA, first formal assessment of loss and damages in tsunami devastated regions were undertaken by the UNDAC in both countries. But several of these assessments were bypassed by the major donors instead deployed their own assessment mechanisms. There were contrasts in the case of both the countries as far as the entry of the UNDAC team in the country was concerned. On the one hand, Indonesia allowed the UNDAC team in its territory whereas on the other hand, Sri Lanka was hesitant about assessment of loss and damages as each of the states wished to have control over its relief assessments and assistance. Resultantly, the entry of the UNDAC in Sri Lanka was delayed. However, similar problem was not faced by the UNDAC in Indonesia. Additionally, in Sri Lanka, TAFOR was primarily

responsible for immediate relief coordination. This was characterised by its hierarchical nature that raised concern over lack of consultation between the district level and central level. Furthermore, in Sri Lanka the UNOCHA focused more on the loss assessment.

With strike of tsunami in both countries, the UN agencies played a decisive role. Among all, the UNICEF played a significant part in both the countries. In both countries, the overall death of the children comprised nearly one third of the total death in the countries and the UNICEF was highly funded agency. In both, the UNICEF conducted loss and damage assessments, nutrition surveys, education survey and the rapid assessment of learning spaces (RALS). Though, the tsunami was responded by huge aid but data suggest dissimilarity in fund expenditure of the UNICEF. In Indonesia, UNICEF had less expenditure in terms of the total fund allocated compared to Sri Lanka. With regards to tools, the UNICEF in Indonesia had dearth of standard assessment tools to develop a viable rapid assessments. On the other hand, it was only Sri Lanka country office that devised standard assessment templates for data comparability. But they were not operationalised on the ground. The Indian Ocean Tsunami and armed conflicts pushed the UNICEF to enhance its capacity building in planning, deployment and administration of staff in both countries. The UNICEF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka also exhibited their readiness in education sector with steadfast effort to open school at the earliest possible.

The UNDP in Indonesia and Sri Lanka engaged in early relief assistance much beyond its traditional domain of operationalisation on the advent of tsunami. Simultaneously, in both countries, the UNDP exhibited overlapping between the early assistance and long term recovery phases as it began some of the recovery program well in advance in the early phase of assistance. Besides, the damage and loss assessment conducted by the UNDP in both countries assessed damage in the governance, livelihood and risk management related field unlike other agencies. The UNDP operationalisation also saw a novel development where NGOs that were in the past “sub-contractor of UNDP” in execution of multiple projects. But amidst the tsunami, these NGOs had huge amount of resources at their disposal and at several instances these international NGOs approached the UNDP if it could do the work of NGOs.

The UNHCR operationalisation in both the countries exhibited the agency’s departure from its traditional role of protection of refugees to its engrossment in shelter provision in early as well as long term recovery programme of the natural disaster. The UNHCR role reflected

commonality as well as contrasts in both cases. The UNHCR assisted Indonesia in emergency and permanent shelter programmes and not in transitional shelter programme. Its transitional shelter programme was largely under the control and supervision of Indonesian government. On the other side, in Sri Lanka case, the UNHCR engagement was in emergency and transitional shelter provision and not permanent shelter. Another dimension of the UNHCR in Indonesia as in contrast to Sri Lanka, was that its early assistance in the Indonesia derailed due to sensitive relationship between the GoI and the UNHCR. The presence of the UNHCR office in Aceh as well as the GAM rebels outflow to Malaysia to seek UNHCR protection against GoI caused limited role for the UNHCR in Aceh area in the early assistance phase. Later, the agency was also asked to withdraw from the region in the midst of this phase, thus causing derailment of the UNHCR's work. Such was not the case of UNHCR in Sri Lanka. Comparatively, in both countries the UNHCR lacked institutional capacity and had dearth of shelter expertise therefore, they were reliant upon the external expertise.

The operationalisation of the norms, principles and guidelines framework was a mix set of experiences in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The equity as well as non-discrimination principles enunciated under the OCHA were under threat in the aid distributions in both the countries with instances of maldistribution as well as maltreatment. In Indonesia, government of the country kept best assistance caused marginalisation of aid for the GAM. Similarly, donors found it difficult to access LTTE region. This was further compounded by non-visit of the UNSG, Kofi Annan to the LTTE covered region though he paid his visit to other parts in Sri Lanka. This reflected the discriminatory approach of the GoSL and the UN. Similar was the case in Sri Lanka, where the IASC guidelines were flouted in the LTTE region with replete incidents of child abductions. The IASC guidelines of the right to livelihood was under criticism as in both the countries temporary resettlement sites were constructed far away from the source of livelihood (Action Aid International 2006:26).

To conclude, experiences of both Indonesia and Sri Lanka suggest that the UNOCHA needs to undertake better coordination with its UN operative agencies. The UNDAC needs to revamp itself and incorporate experts from relevant discipline, such as seismologists, who would assist in the immediate disaster assessments. The urgency to revamp the UN operative agencies is also necessitated as some of them are venturing into the new domain of the early disaster relief, which traditionally had not been their domain of operationalisation. Though, presence of norms,

principles as well as guidelines present a normative framework for natural disaster response, their non-binding character make them ineffective in the operational field.

## CHAPTER V

### COMPARISON OF RECOVERY, REHABILITATION AND DISASTER REDUCTION MEASURES IN INDONESIA AND SRI LANKA

#### Introduction

The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Secretariat marks a difference between relief and recovery. The relief is centred on intervention with the onset of the disaster catering to preserve lives as well as provision of the basic requirements to the victims of the disaster. On the other hand, recovery (comprises of rehabilitation and reconstruction) focuses upon policy initiatives as well as decisions “to restore or improve the pre-disaster living conditions” and encourage and facilitate requisite adjustment to minimise risk arising out of disaster. Therefore, the actions and aspirations of the victims emerging out of the immediate relief phase remains important component of the recovery. In the process, the early phase of immediate relief gets juxtaposed with longer term concerns including permanent housing, schooling and restoration of livelihoods. Developing linkage between the immediate relief assistance and long sustainable development as an important approach emerged in 1980s in response to the African food crises calling for prevention as well as integration of relief and larger development discourse (Wijkman and Timberlake 1988). The outcome of such approach is expected to lessen the scope of the immediate relief assistance and “move towards development and better rehabilitation that would ease the transition between the two phases from relief phase to rehabilitation phase” (Smith and Maxwell: 1994).

Therefore, recovery remains an important component of the disaster management with rationale to protect lives, shun suffering as well attain dignity of human being in the advent both natural as well as man made disasters. The larger philosophy is to create a culture of preparedness that does not cause further disaster with an aim “to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises” (Telford 2007: 15).

Attached to the recovery process, the disaster reduction and response is linked to early warning and meeting the needs of vulnerable populations. on the global level, disaster discourse entails the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) that stresses upon disaster risk reduction (DRR)



as well as “emphasises the systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment and improved preparedness for adverse events” (ISDR 2005).

Following the tsunami of 2004, as the focus shifted from immediate relief to medium and long-term rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk reduction activities in tandem with engagement of stakeholders and humanitarian agencies and organisations. The focus was on integration of the all phases of humanitarian assistance. This saw emergence of a new conceptualisation prominently called “Build Back Better (BBB),” that underlines long term recovery of the disaster management and encompasses rebuilding homes, livelihoods and infrastructure as well as rebuilding local communities and governments.

Given this background, this chapter compares recovery, rehabilitation and disaster reduction measures in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. It takes into account major destructions and requirement of recovery, rehabilitation and disaster reduction measures in both the countries as well as response by Indonesia and Sri Lanka in recovery, rehabilitation and disaster reduction phase. Under the rubrics of the United Nations (UN), chapter brings out and analyses the prominent role of the office of Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery. The subsequent sections of the chapter focuses on policies, programmes and activities on recovery and rehabilitation of “the United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)”. It analyses comparatively as well as critically recovery and risk reduction measures of these UN agencies in both the countries. Another substantive dimension of the chapter is the discussion on operationalisation of principles, norms and guidelines relating to recovery and rehabilitation developed under the aegis of the UN in both the countries.

### **Situation and Response by Indonesia and Sri Lanka in Recovery, Rehabilitation and Disaster Reduction Measures**

The Indian Ocean Tsunami had huge repercussions for the Indonesia with huge toll accounting for an excess of 115,000 people dead and rendering about 20 percent Acehnese population homeless. An estimation to damage repair was aggregated to \$5.8 billion. The demand for Shelter was utmost.

An assessment put approximately 500,000 displaced Aceh and nearly 115,000 were accommodated in tents or barracks with several residing with their relatives or friends (UNIMS 2005). There were requirements of 120,000 new permanent houses as well as 85,000 houses required for repair. The housing sector was the most important challenge for the country (United Nations 2006g: 4). Therefore, the focus on the reconstruction of houses got prominence in the reconstruction phase.

In revival of the infrastructure, sea ports upgradation was high on the list in Aceh Barat, Banda Aceh, Bireuen, Sabang as well as rehabilitation of arterial bridges and road reconstruction caught attention in this phase. The education sector in pre-tsunami was already reeling under the devastation in Aceh of more than 30 years of armed conflict and tsunami further deteriorated the plight of education sector. Tsunami severely destroyed 2,135 schools in Indonesia and 15,000 students had no school to go because of destruction (Shaw et al. 2012). Approximately 50% of all schools were destroyed amounting to around 2000 schools in Aceh alone and required reconstruction of schools in Aceh and Nias (United Nations 2006g: 4). Particularly, in Aceh, the 41,000 students were dead or were rendered missing along with 2,500 teachers. This was further compounded by deterioration of overall strength and capacity of the education system. Besides, breakdown of the roads and broken telephone had disturbed the communication at different governmental level (UNICEF 2009).

Disruption of the existing health infrastructure was another challenge in the process of rehabilitation. The physical infrastructure and equipment were devastated with onset of tsunami. An estimate puts approximately 122 significant health care service centre including hospitals, health care centres and sub primary health care centres were devastated and challenge was to set them in order. Livelihoods and economic activities were shattered by tsunami. The fisheries and agricultural activities were hard hit sectors. In the country, tsunami and subsequent earthquake affected the livelihood of at least 500,000 people (United Nations 2006g:3). Tsunami had affected Acehnese agriculture and an over 64,000 hectares of agricultural land as well as brackish ponds around approximately 15,000 hectares in total were damaged in the process (UNIMS 2005: 5). There was also loss of the provincial lands registry as well as loss of land ownership records (Mangkusubroto 2015: 155).

The national government under the leadership of President Yudhonoyo in Indonesia declared the end of the early relief phase by March 2005 to focus on the long-term measures and formally

inaugurated the recovery and reconstruction phase. The Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency of Aceh and Nias (BRR) was established in April 2005. It aimed at community centric restoration of livelihoods and infrastructure and had responsibility to design the policies their implementation as well as coordination and collaboration with local and international level to rebuild Aceh and Nias. It owed the responsibility to pull together agencies and evolve its own mechanisms for coordination. Aceh and Nias' rehabilitation and reconstruction plans were to be coordinated by BAPPENAS, the National Development Planning Agency. The Master Plan was developed in collaboration with a number of institutions and international organisations. The BAPPENAS drafted a report outlining the specifics of the restoration process, which began in mid-2005 and aimed “to restore public services, economic facilities, land rights, and law and order. This reconstruction phase was designed to address all aspects of development in order to improve the situation for the people and government of the affected region” (UNDP 2005b: 6).

For Sri Lanka, the tsunami 2004 was the most devastating disaster to impact the country in the living memory of the people. Approximately, 114,069 houses needed to be rebuilt or repaired (United Nations 2006g: 7). Because of various disputed problems about land rights, design and priorities for infrastructure redevelopment, water and sanitation and construction standards, the transitional shelters remained a difficult task (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 32). Overall three per cent of the working population, estimated to be 200,000 people had to lose their job due to this tsunami. The fishing industries as well as the tourism industries were heavily ravaged by tsunami, former sector loss estimated at US\$97 million in as well as US\$250 million in later sector were lost (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 32). The agriculture sector was marred by the increased salinity of the agricultural fields and damage to livestock in the country. This caused unemployment for more than 30,000 in this sector (Jayasuriya et al. 2005: 20). The health sector faced major halt due to damage or destruction of health facilities in the country and health personnel were killed by the tsunami (United Nations 2006g: 7). The anticipated cost of repairing the health care industry, including medical equipment and vehicles, was calculated at \$84 million (Jayasuriya et al. 2005: 18). The education sector had seen the devastations of educational institutions and infrastructures. Nearly 182 schools, rendering 5 percent of total schools were damaged or destroyed causing displacement amounting “80,000 students and 3,000 teachers” (UNICEF 2009). The schools at primary as well as secondary levels were majorly affected due to advent of tsunami. Therefore, the prime focus was to ensure students accessibility to school and

inception of their academic programme. Efforts were also to clear those schools that were running as relief camps.

Under the recovery phase, on March 2, 2005, the GoSL unveiled a three-year rehabilitation plan. It was also to note that by the end of 2005 a new government under the leadership of Mahinda Rajapakse took over the country. The original coordinating body, the Centre for National Operations (CNO), was merged with all other tsunami related agencies to form the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA), established in November 2005 as a single government agency to focus on reconstruction and development issues across all sectors and stakeholders. Its mission was to Build Back Better (BBR) the victims of tsunami, with the goal of “accelerating and coordinating the reconstruction, long-term recovery of properties, livelihoods, industries and infrastructure in order to reduce the impact of future disasters, optimise resource use, protect vulnerable groups, adhere to core principles and accelerate long term reconstruction and development” (Tsunami Information Center 2006).

In the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) affected regions, funding agreement was reached through MoU between the GoSL and the LTTE in June 2005. This was called the Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS), but this was challenged by the majority Sinhalese communities. The government that signed the agreement lost majority and a new president under Mahinda Rajapake put aside the P-TOMS.

There were differences in the situation in Aceh of Indonesia and that of Sri Lanka. The 30 year struggle between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement came to an end with the signing of a peace deal between the two parties. The reconstruction process got boost because of Helsinki Peace treaty between the GoI and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) along with the establishment of Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR), the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency to oversee the reconstruction effort and coordinate the reconstruction process. Other actors on the ground according to an estimation put the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) undertook 80 percent projects whereas the donors and the government implemented small proportion of projects (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008:8).

## **The UN System Recovery, Rehabilitation and Disaster Reduction Measures in Indonesia and Sri Lanka**

In most post-disaster situations, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the UN are considered to be efficient in the infrastructural development and in providing funds for social and community rebuilding. These bodies also assisted in rebuilding public services, state institutions and in the development of the private sector. One of the significant contributions of international efforts was creation of an early warning system in the Asia and Pacific region in 2006 with endeavour of the secretariat of the ISDR of the UN and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The IFIs and the UN encountered difficulties in mobilising funds for rehabilitation. There were gaps between relief and development, hesitation among the agencies to provide human resources towards the process of rehabilitation and development. But, importantly the tsunami 2004 marked a departure from the antiquity as many of the agencies had continued to stay in the rehabilitation phase and funds were abundant (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006: 22). The major UN operative agencies that engaged in the long term recovery, rehabilitation and disaster reductions comprised of mainly the UNICEF, the UNDP and the UNHCR among several others on the ground.

### *Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery*

In the complex emergencies, the UN has designated Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG) but such mechanism lacked in case of the advent of the natural disaster. There was lack of such position that engages in the longer term recovery. In the case of tsunami, to support the process of recovery and serving out countries in implementation of national recovery plans, a position of UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery was established and Bill Clinton, former President of the United States was appointed to this position. This post was accredited to ensure efficient used of the funds, keep world's attention on the affected areas and championing "the idea that we have a moral obligation to build these areas back better than they were before the crisis began" (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 30). The special Envoy also chaired the Global Consortium (that included Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) members, victim state, IFIs and representatives from corporate sector), the significant coordinating body for the tsunami recovery. Importantly, it was the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery that conceptualised BBB to undertaken the process of recovery and rehabilitation in long term. Former US President Clinton's 2006 report titled "Key Propositions for Building Back

Better” contained major elements of this new conceptualisation. These included focus on prevention of pre-disaster vulnerabilities and multi-stakeholder participation. Diverse propositions under BBB highlight the significance of communities' participation undertake their own recovery. The principles of fairness and equity remain another component of recovery as well as preparedness plan. It also highlighted the need for a decentralised recovery structure with local level institutional participation and vitality of information for recovery. Simultaneously, reflecting on the stakeholders, it emphasises jurisdictional clarity of the global institution like UN, World Bank and others. Besides, governmental responsibility and global institutions, it attributes growing space for NGOs and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement in the recovery process. There is increased emphasis to shun unwarranted rivalry and unhealthy competition and lastly focus is on reduction of risk and creation of resilience. These all components of BBB are intimately connected to recovery (Clinton 2006).The BBB framework has been used as a tool to assess and determine post-disaster recovery best practices.

There remains standing of the Special Envoy as its office enjoyed the goodwill of many world leaders, allowing it to communicate politically sensitive issues that others may find difficult to convey. The Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery proved to be significant in sustenance of global political attention to the recovery endeavours. The Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) also promoted the basic principles of “BBB” to ensure accountability to affected peoples, encouraging added private sector participation in the rebuilding process, improved “regional early-warning and disaster-reduction practises and systems”, and an enhanced interaction and cooperation among INGOs. The presence of this office helped to collect a substantial contribution from various international sources for recovery process. It also raised serious concerns on Sri Lanka’s buffer zone policy and made focussed efforts to address the tsunami affected country’s project financing and to fill budgetary gaps.

Despite the existence of Special Envoy's office, the UN and international community faced structural challenges in its operational and coordinating systems. There were difficulties in replication of coordination mechanism similar to relief phase and lead transition to recovery. The OSE had also undertaken responsibility to compile lessons learnt from this transition. The OSE was unique experiment of its kind and difficult to duplicate in other disasters, but it was employed in the Pakistan earthquake of 2005. Thus, there continued the legacy of OSE to institutionalise

some learnings from it and ensure that future emergencies advantage from the lessons learnt (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 22).

*The United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC)*

Due to involvement of various actors and agencies in the recovery, reconstruction and disaster reduction activities, the issue of coordination gained salience. In the Indonesian case, several coordination mechanisms operated on the ground working with various groups of development partners. These included the Global Consortium for Tsunami Recovery, “the Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (BRR) of the Indonesian government, Multi Donor Fund (MDF) to coordinate bilateral and multilateral donors. The UN also formed the UNORC in September 2005, with the mission of coordinating UN agencies and providing a single point of contact for BRR to the UN system” (Kuntoro 2015: 163).

In November 2005, the UNORC and the BRR concluded a Memorandum of Understanding to formalise the UN's engagement in “maintaining the capacity to respond to emergencies and to reach out effectively to the communities on behalf of the Government as the reconstruction and recovery phase progressed” (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 28). The UNORC aimed to improve coordination among UN agencies, NGOs, bilateral donors as well as provide assistance to the government's reconstruction and recovery activities. It acted as a hub for communication between the UN system and BRR. It intended to create a system approach among the UN organisations and put in place institutions for coordination at all levels. It also aimed to close gaps in the response and provide cross-sectoral connections and strategic strategy (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 28). The BRR was more engaged in the execution of the programme but less in the coordination process therefore it got increasingly reliant on the UNORC to support INGOs coordination. The UNORC had developed a number of sector coordination structures, notably the IASC, a centre for coordination of 23 UN agencies working in Aceh and Nias. It had dialogue, shared information and diminished chance of duplication of projects.

The central point of coordination was located in Banda Aceh complemented by six field offices that maintained a significant field presence across Aceh and Nias (BRR NAD–NIAS 2009:35). The UNORC highlighted one UN approach that aimed to harmonise UN assistance in order to maximise their impact in aiding the government and communities in their recovery, reconstruction and reintegration efforts.

On a variety of recovery-related policies, regulations and programmatic concerns, UNORC served as a significant counsellor to the head of BRR, the executing Agency, and the governors of Aceh and North Sumatra including assuring international partners to coordinate their efforts with the government. In addition, the agency supplied a variety of independent analytical, statistical, and strategic data to aid the government and international recovery community in planning and monitoring humanitarian, recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration initiatives. The UNORC was in charge of a website that provided a variety of services to all stakeholders as well as easily available resources to the general public. It was updated with information on development progress and UN contributions on a regular basis (BRR NAD–NIAS 2009:35). The outcome of these meetings though varied but ultimately it facilitated well-knit networking amongst agencies and resulted in avoidance of duplication of efforts. Although the purpose of these meetings was to debate strategy and improve coordination, they resulted to be a mere information sharing platform. The agency officials were too preoccupied with their own initiatives to attend primarily informational meetings. As a result, following sessions were delegated to more junior personnel, confirming the content's informative rather than strategic nature (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008:28). Coordination continued to suffer because of diverse groups having different perceptions and aims, simultaneously power politics were frequent with urgency to accommodate the divergent cultures sensitively (TGLL Project 2009:21-22).

In the Sri Lankan case, the coordination was necessitated in broadly three sets of domain: among governmental agencies, among several agencies and NGOs and third, coordination with the LTTE that controlled the hardest hit region of the tsunami (TGLL Project 2009: 30). “TAFOR (Task Force for Relief) and TAFREN (Task Force to Rebuild the Nation) were the two special task forces in charge of coordination. Following the election of a new President in November 2005, the decision was made to merge TAFREN, TAFOR and TAFLOL to form the RADA, which was established by an Act of Parliament in early December 2005” (Jayasuriya et al. 2005:15-16). The Sri Lankan government resisted LTTE to assert itself as a power in regions under their control. On the other side, the LTTE was also reluctant to consent for any condition that marginalised their powers. Several round of negotiations between the GoSL and the LTTE resulted in a MOU that provided an aid sharing arrangement called the Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS) arrived at in June 2005. This arrangement was intended to provide aid in the LTTE region in the northern and eastern Sri Lankan region. This agreement sought to set up a regional



fund under that donors could directly donate to the corpus in the LTTE controlled region. A multilateral agency was to be appointed as the custodian of this arrangement. But, such agreement soon ran into trouble as it was opposed mostly by the majority Sinhalese community. Such an arrangement was challenged in the courts and the Supreme Court in July 2005 put on hold to it (Jayasuriya et al. 2005: 17).

Coordination during the recovery phase under UN in Sri Lanka was in contrast to Indonesia. In Indonesia existed a full-fledged UNORC to coordinate UN activities and coordinate with BRR. In Sri Lanka under the UN rubrics, UN agencies became centre for coordination. For instance, “UNHCR accepted to be the lead agency for coordinating the transitional shelter programme” (TGLL Project 2009:30). The governmental mechanism for coordination RADA in Sri Lanka ceased to operate by June 2007. There was an apprehension that it would stall the remaining tsunami recovery and cause inappropriate coordination. Subsequently, end of 30 years of armed conflict in Sri Lanka further increased the demand for recovery needs larger than those for the tsunami.

Comparatively, in both cases of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, coordination mechanism in the long term recovery and rehabilitation phase under the rubric of the UN was marked with major differences. Each created its own ad hoc mechanism to undertake the long term recovery process. This was contrast to the early relief assistance where the UNOCHA played significant role. In case of Indonesia, as the relief phase came to an end as the UNOCHA was replaced by the UNORC in recovery phase as announced by the government. The UNORC was established to regulate as well as coordinate the recovery measures undertaken by the UN agencies and it acted in collaboration with BRR in Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, the UNOCHA created for the early relief phase for coordination was replaced with specific UN agencies taking up their own coordination mechanism. An overarching coordination mechanism under the UN umbrella for the UN agencies seems to be missing in case of Sri Lanka. Rather it was specific the UN agencies that coordinated its work.

#### *The UNDP in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

The UNDP was actively involved in recovery and disaster reduction measures in the aftermath of 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia. It led the largest the UNDP programme in the country as it was the most hit country of tsunami. Initially, the UNDP did not have presence in the Aceh region, but subsequently it engaged meticulously combining of the disaster relief with long term

reconstruction as well as rehabilitation assistance (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006a:47). The UNDP initiated Recovery Aceh Nias (RAN) database to collate online data connected to all ongoing projects in Indonesia funded by the World Bank, the UNDP and the ADB. The stakeholders in Aceh- Nias recovery updated their daily progress to avoid duplications of the project in the country (BRR NAD–NIAS 2009: 35). As a result, it aided in the monitoring, coordination, and identification of recovery gaps (UNDP 2008:56). The UNDP cooperated with the Indonesian BRR to provide “technical and operational assistance to monitor the reconstruction of tsunami affected areas in order to improve development coordination” (UNDP 2005c: 6).

The UNDP collaborated closely with the GoI, particularly the BRR and local governments. In Indonesia, the UNDP's “Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTP)” implemented a number of initiatives , including policy intervention for urgent rehabilitation, livelihoods, shelter and housing rehabilitation and capacity building (UNDP Indonesia 2005: 8). The agency contributed through its several projects in the arena of waste management; port infrastructures rehabilitation and governance in Indonesia.

*Table 5.1: Recovery Strategy under the UNDP in Indonesia*

| <b>Rehabilitation</b><br>6-12 months   | <b>Reconstruction Recovery Programme overall management and implementation</b><br>1-3/5 years  |
|--|--|
| <i>Restoring the situation to the minimum level</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic facilities</li> <li>• Banking and financial institutions</li> <li>• Land rights</li> <li>• Law and order</li> <li>• Temporary shelter Public services</li> </ul> | Economy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transportation system</li> <li>• Telecommunication system</li> <li>• Social and cultural system</li> <li>• Institutional capacity</li> <li>• Housing</li> </ul> |

Source: BAPPENAS (2006), *Indonesia: Preliminary damage loss assessment, Yogyakarta and Central Java*, Jakarta; UNDP Indonesia (2007a), *Annual Report 2007*; UNDP Indonesia: Jakarta.

Under the rehabilitation process, the UNDP initiated employability efforts in Indonesia, for instance, cash for work (CfW) programme in January 2005 in collaboration with local NGOs and INGOS. As part of CfW, small-scale fishing activities, paddy field rehabilitation, livelihood revitalisation for disaster affected women and children in Aceh and other productive activities were done (UNDP 2005b). CfW programme were sponsored by multiple donors as well as NGOs. An estimate enumerates that UNDP independently employed over 14,000 and injected US\$10million into the local economy (World Bank 2005:111). This project aided in the repair of roughly 60% of damaged boats in Bireun, Aceh as well as the cleaning of 90% of village areas and 70% of important canals that feed water to fish ponds (Reliefweb 2005b). According to the UNDP study, such initiative assisted dislocated communities scattered in tents, barracks as well as brought hopes to several hopeless people. Importantly, it became a source of income for IDPs and affected families to meet basic household needs. This further aided them in reopening the businesses, injecting immediate cash into communities. Thus, CfW became vital to community revival and provided financial inputs toward restarting livelihoods. Therefore, it proved to be significant for transition to recovery process in the country. The CfW was undertaken in collaboration of the UNDP and the USAID and those who cleaned their own home as well as village were also compensated for their work. But such initiative came under criticism as it largely meant that all work be compensated. Such move remained significant in the wake of occurrence of tsunami and people had difficulty to get work (TDMRC and IRP 2012:82).

The Cash for Work (CfW) programme was also coordinated by the UNDP as well as local government through creation of a separate Livelihood Recovery Working Group (LRWG) that assisted vulnerable section including poor, handicapped and displaced person. This created a plethora of livelihood programmes. According to the Humanitarian Information Centre (UNIMS) database, by mid-June 2005, there existed 62 organisations working on 190 livelihood-related projects across Aceh and Nias (World Bank 2005: 112).

The UNDP continued to support infrastructural initiative as well as the reconstruction of the port. Simultaneously, cleaning and dredging of ponds to reconstruct breakwaters and revetments were also rolled out in Indonesia. Pushing in the infrastructural recovery, it collaborated with AusAID and provided support for the reconstruction of Ulee Lheue port in July 2005 (TDMRC and IRP 2012:6). In March 2005, the UNDP launched the Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Programme (TRWMP) to respond to the debris as well as municipal waste as

part of the UNDP led initiative, ERTRP. The prime motto of this initiative was to reinforce local government that had limited capacity with regard to waste management. Initially, the debris clearance was a short term measures and was extended in the long term recovery programme as environmental hazards continued to damage public health. Rolled out in liaison with the provincial and municipal department *DinasKebersihan* (Sanitation Departments) in Banda Aceh sought to cover demolition of public building damaged beyond repair and develop a long-term sustainable municipal garbage collection. Such initiative enabled capacity building of government officials especially municipal sanitation staff engaged in the process of waste reduction and recycling. The outcome of these programmes included rehabilitation or reconstruction of regional and district landfills in Banda Aceh city/Aceh Besar; in Pidie and Bireuen districts (UNDP 2013). This was further complemented by the UNDP led Solid waste management (SWM) programs, recycling of solid waste and local collection points and planning for collection and disposal (ACEH – NIAS and BRR 2005: 86).

The UNDP in collaboration with International Labour Organisation (ILO) had also undertaken capacity building in the tsunami hit region of Aceh. These activities primarily comprised of training the workers of construction industry along with vocational and technical training. The UNDP collaborated with Austcare, a refugee charity, to install simple brick machines to enhance brick producers' productivity and improve the quality of building materials (UNDP 2006b:13).

In the governance field, the UNDP had been traditionally playing significant role in the conduct of election. In the recovery phase, under Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery (ERTR) programme, the Aceh Local Elections Support (ALES) in association with the civil society organisations initiated voters' education and provided assistance in Aceh's first-ever provincial, district and municipal heads election in December 2006. The UNDP technical assistance was given to Komite Independen Pemilihan (KIP), an independent committee for elections throughout the electoral process i.e. "elections, dispute resolution, donor coordination, financial management, polling, counting and monitoring and voter education" (UNDP 2007:49-50). In the election process, the UNDP also assisted the rapid tele count that enabled vote counting by the local electoral commission. These efforts on the part of the UNDP led to highest voter turnout (85 percent) and election was declared transparent, "free and fair by both the national and international observers" (UNDP 2007:49-50). Indonesia lacked the early warning system in pre

tsunami period but the UNDP had been supporting North Sumatra's disaster management requirements in the past. The UNDP also initiated DRR programme in provincial and local government level. There were disaster risk reduction (DRR) legislation in Indonesia. Such enactments established a "new disaster management authority at ministerial level" to oversee all disaster related activities. At the provincial level, attempts were also initiated by the UNDP's DRR team to incorporate disaster reduction measures in their policies. To mark an accomplishment, Aceh became the first province in Indonesia to undertake and incorporate directives and guidelines of disaster management enactment in its policies and programmes. Furthermore, the UNDP came up with a handbook "*Good Building Design and Construction*" (2006) for construction of several households in Nias. These measures had importantly contributed to disaster reduction. The UNDP DRR team also "prepared a Concept Note on DRR for Aceh that comprised of several provincial DRR policies and an action plan to incorporate these principles in all provincial and local activities. This facilitated community based disaster risk reduction plans and initiatives" (UNDP 2007:52-53).

For GoSL, the Indian Ocean Tsunami was a decisive incident. The UNDP collaborated with the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to establish a coordination system to oversee the recovery and to help design a national disaster risk management policy. Besides, the UNDP took steps in Sri Lanka "to guarantee strong governance, capacity building, disaster management, early warning systems, environmental protection and disaster management mainstreaming" (UNDP 2011: 5). The UNDP also came up with Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy that encompassed measures to reduce disaster risk. These actions comprised a variety of measures including early warning systems, the DMC capacity development, preparedness plans and training.

The UNDP established a tracking system for tsunami aid called Development Assistance Database (DAD) for regular upgradation through online platform assistance. Compared with the "OCHA system that tracks funds under the Flash Appeal, the DAD was intended to serve as a development planning tool throughout the course of reconstruction and future development" (Grewal 2006 :25-29). In the aftermath of tsunami early assistance phase, there were multiple actors engaged in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction but most of them were primarily confined to development of infrastructure but there was no sole agency involved in coordination of disaster matters, it was the UNDP endeavour that led establishment of Disaster Management

Centre (DMC). The UNDP was the one that supplied the initial funding for the DMC's establishment and accompanying institutional procedures. It also contributed to disaster management legislation and policies, culminating in the enactment of Sri Lanka's Disaster Management Act 2005 that established an effective disaster management institutional structure to proactively engage in disaster reduction activities consistent with the "Hyogo Framework for Action for disaster resilience for vulnerable communities". Under the legislation, the DMC managed to incorporate disaster management into the national budget (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006f: 57). In December 2005, the DMC produced a full report in partnership with the UNDP called "Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: Road Map for Disaster Risk Management". The report argues "Communities bear the primary impact of disasters, yet the first and continued response to disasters comes from community members. Well prepared and protected communities are the first line of defence against disasters and a key to reducing vulnerability and increasing disaster resilience" (DMC/UNDP 2005: 47).

In Sri Lanka, the UNDP initiated two specific projects to undertake the creation and execution of a disaster risk reduction road map. These included: "Capacity Development and Recovery Programme (CADREP) and Preparatory assistance for Establishing Disaster Management Framework (PAEDF)". The former initiative, CADREP undertaken by the UNDP with support from others actors aimed "to develop the capacity of government and civil society in the planning, disaster and information coordination, management and delivery of recovery and reconstruction services on a sustainable basis." The latter the UNDP initiative in partnership with local partner, CADREP took an active role in the recovery process, acting as a link between civil society and government agencies. It was successful in developing national policies for authorities, but it fell short of local preparedness plans and effective grassroots risk reduction emphasis (Brusset 2009:102).

There were other projects that were significant in the country undertaken with the UNDP assistance. The Preparatory Assistance for Establishing Disaster Management Framework (PAEDF) initiative provided technical and administrative support in the areas of training, education and disaster preparedness planning and with other sets of initiatives complemented by human resources and financial assistance (UNDP 2011: 35). Another important project included Early Warning System in Sri Lanka (EWSS) targeted to lessen the vulnerability to tsunamis and

related hazards. The UNDP also provided policy assistance to the GoSL to devise early warning systems for natural disaster, strengthening the ability of organisations engaged in early warning systems and tsunami early warnings, mapping out sensitive areas and awareness programmes. This project aided erection of multi hazard early warning towers, megaphones to selected coastal police stations to circulate early warning messages.

In the governance domain, the UNDP focussed on capacity enhancement of “public administration, local government, civil society and the private sector”. The UNDP announced a new effort to help local governments strengthen infrastructure and services for recovery and reconstruction with funding from the German and Norwegian governments. The programme coordinators and government employees were given specialised training to advance skills in recovery and reconstruction planning, management and delivery (UNDP 2006b:13).

Besides, the UNDP also launched the cash for work (CfW) programme in Sri Lanka for rapid recovery of tsunami affected populations that were vulnerable and disadvantaged. It assisted in clearance of the coastline debris in seven districts assisted approximately 3,000 fishermen devastated after the tsunami (Reliefweb: 2005b). From a gender perspective, a UNDP led initiative was brought called the People’s Commission on Post-Tsunami Recovery, this proved to a significant platform for women to raise their concerns pertaining to tsunami and its outfall (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006f:43). Resultantly, the decision making in camp and village committees shifted to the hands of women, which was traditionally under the male domination. The UNDP also “supported the Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit of the National Human Rights Commission in the process of People’s Consultations in collaboration with local universities with an aim to increase participation in the recovery process”(UNDP 2006a: 14).

In course of execution of recovery and rehabilitation and disaster reduction measures the UNDP encountered several challenges in projects initiated them for disaster risk reduction in Sri Lanka. There existed an ambiguity around legal status of the DMC, there were dearth of skilled staff at the district level and inaccuracy of early warning predictions became major hurdle in ensuring reliability of the DMC. The UNDP report states that the agency supported the DMC in the process of designing as well as implementation of several initiatives like early warnings systems. However, “little attempt has been made to maintain those activities” (UNDP 2011: 6). There emanated criticism from gender perspective as disaster reduction had male bias. These

UNDP projects filled a void of the disaster reduction strategy in Sri Lanka. Prior to 2005, the country lacked a unified and comprehensive disaster management guiding document. Thus, such initiative filled this void. Initiative like DMC proved efficacious in managing the floods of 2007 and 2008 and cyclone in 2009. In the short period of inception of DMC, it was able to handle a number of emergency circumstances without the assistance of the world community. In addition to it, the UNDP released an important document “Road Map towards Safer Sri Lanka” it proved to be a guiding framework for the country's overall disaster management programme. Sri Lanka's capacity for early warning forecasting and dissemination was strengthened because of EWSS project, which led to the formulation of a multi-hazard national early warning strategy. The UNDP collaboration with government helped in creation of a catalogue that recorded past 30 years disasters of the country. This partnership with the UNDP raised capacity of disaster management mechanism in the country. For instance, in the domain of education, school syllabus came to embed itself with disaster reduction measures.

Analysis of the UNDP works in Indonesia and Sri Lanka reveal that in Indonesian, the UNDP programme was the largest compared to other tsunami devastated countries including Sri Lanka. In both countries, the UNDP projects related to recovery programmes were well in advance embedded in relief assistance programme. In both cases, the UNDP actively involved in facilitating generation of income programmes like cash for work as well as infrastructural development. Its engagement in governance domain led to successful as well as transparent election in Aceh region of Indonesia where municipal election was being held after several decades of conflict between the GAM and GoI. Governance dynamics in Sri Lanka aimed to strengthen the public sector, grass root governance structure, civil society and the corporate sector. Disaster risk reduction was significant domain in both countries, where the UNDP had significant role to play, in both countries it provided its experts inputs and recommendations to design and enact disaster risk reduction legislation.

#### *The UNICEF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

The UNICEF had played a critical role in providing emergency assistance in collaboration with its partner agencies in Indonesia and later invested in the long term recovery phase. Its association continued with government agencies at both in Indonesia in general and in Aceh and north Sumatra regions in particular. The agency brought up a three-year recovery plan to ensure safe drinking



water and sanitation, administer emergency measles vaccinations and re-establish basic health care access. It also provided temporary learning facilities to guarantee that youngsters affected by the tsunami may continue their education.

In a major work in the domain of education in Indonesia, the construction of child-centric schools besides repair or construction of children's social care centres was a commendable initiative of the UNICEF. These schools were characterised by adequate teaching faculty, adequate space, and provision of potable water as well as separate toilets for both the sexes. More than 9,000 teachers were recruited as well as trained to address staff scarcities (UNICEF 2009). Schools were having seismic resistance features as well as easy-to-reach (UNICEF 2006c:8). An estimate puts 291 schools benefiting 58,677 children established by the agency (UNICEF 2008:6). These programmes initiated added to positive outcomes in direction to enhanced school enrolment.

The UNICEF Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres were also established in 2009 that benefitted preschool children with safe and congenial environment. Additionally, the UNICEF engaged in the process of capacity building of the governmental institutions. The agency compiled the education database of 3700 schools in Aceh that could be effectively used in correction policies and practices (UNICEF 2008: 8).

Pertaining to judicial trial of children, Indonesia marked an innovation. The UNICEF established children centric court to guard the rights of the children. This marked a departure of the erstwhile policy where children's trial happened along with the criminal proceedings. The UNICEF ensured the capacity building of judges, prosecutors and police officers through training as well as by compilation of a fresh legal code in treatment of vulnerable children. Furthermore, "separate women's and children's desks were established in Aceh police stations with the goal of identifying and responding to cases of abuse, exploitation and trafficking" (Harper 2009:34).

Water and sanitation infrastructure was another domain of the UNICEF. In the early assistance phase, the agency mainly concentrated in prevention of water borne as well as sanitation related disease. Whereas in the recovery phase, the agency assumed long term focus on "water security, basic sanitation and improved hygiene". The consequences of such programmes aided 182,000 people with 1,643 new or rebuilt water points till 2009. Upgradation of the sludge treatment plants as well as Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) emphasised to improve sanitation facilities with 2,400 schools.

UNICEF's efforts in Indonesia also addressed the health as well as health related infrastructure with a motto to have disease free children. Both mosquito nets as well as malaria control initiative assisted approximately 3 million children and women by the end of 2008. This was further complemented by malaria reporting and surveillance activities. Immunisation against polio benefitted over 1 million children under the age of five years since 2005 till October 2009 (UNICEF 2008: 4-5). More than "7,362 midwives and volunteers were trained about nutritional care and enabled to establish community based therapeutic care for severely malnourished children. Thus, the UNICEF developed access to quality healthcare services by quickening the construction of new facilities and building the capacity of health care staff" (UNICEF 2008: 4-5).

The UNICEF initiative also involved counselling sessions to adults, addressed human trafficking and provided consultations to women. The psychosocial programmes benefitted 73,000 children in Aceh and Nias. The UNICEF's also proved itself efficacious in technical assistance designing a legal child protection framework for Aceh through participatory feedback mechanism with children's participation.

Analysis of the UNICEF Indonesia revealed that in the domain of the education, there were dearth of qualified and effective teachers was a major hurdle for the country. The surveys also suggested teachers' in Aceh at primary level lacked their qualification to teach (UNICEF 2009; Shaw 2015a: 55).The UNICEF work on the ground was further complicated by death of government employees "a lack of clear directions from authorities of various government bodies, which caused confusion among several actors. There was also overlapping of school sites due to lack of communication among different actors and education authorities" (UNICEF 2010).

In Sri Lanka, UNICEF came forward and funded tsunami interventions in early relief phase in four major sectors. These included "water, sanitation and hygiene; basic education; child protection; and child and maternal health and nutrition". In the recovery process, the long term developments in these sectors were major focus of the UNICEF. The UNICEF emphasised to bring back the tsunami afflicted displaced children to school and improvise the teaching and learning process. Therefore, an Education Recovery Plan led to the establishment of schools and new permanent schools, pioneered the concept of the Children Friendly School (CFS) for participatory school management, teaching and learning.

The water, sanitation and hygiene promotion activities were coordinated by the UNICEF in Sri Lanka and simultaneously this UN agency provided technical assistance to government and

other actors the in domain of sanitation as well as solid waste management. Under the UNICEF recovery programme, the sustainable accessibility of water and sanitation, water trucking and distribution programme marked a shift from “household-managed wells to institutionally managed piped water”. Through construction of 8,409 water points, the agency provided 129,000 people with potable water. Rainwater harvesting system and establishment of water treatment plant during 2008 and 2009 in Tangalle, Thirikkovil and Kantale were initiatives in the direction of water security. In order to relieve the internally displaced population, it initiated a four year water distribution programme to lessen water fetching times that resulted in prevention of major outbreaks of waterborne and sanitation related diseases. (UNICEF 2009: iii). Children being the prime focus of the UNICEF, the schools were enabled with child friendly water and sanitation facilities. Internal strife in the Sri Lanka combined with tsunami had huge ramifications of causing displacement of people. The UNICEF provided potable water and sanitation facilities to “2,000 displaced persons in five camps in Trincomalee” (UNICEF 2008:12).

In health and nutrition domain, the UNICEF supported proper management of vaccine stocks, vaccine stores as well as cold rooms for vaccine storage facilities. Additionally, health facilities having potential to serve 360,000 people were also established with the UNICEF assistance. The UNICEF's capacity building initiative trained “3,500 health professionals on health and nutrition issues, as well as infant and young child feeding practices. Nutritional surveillance was operationalised to estimate malnutrition with establishment of weighing centres and distribution of micronutrient supplements” (UNICEF 2008:10-11). The UNICEF promoted infant and young child feeding practices along with adolescent nutrition.

The psychological assistance to students and teachers were initiated by the UNICEF with trained teachers as well as INGOs and NGOs in tsunami affected communities and camps. This UNICEF initiative benefitted 3500 teachers on interactive learning and that offered coaching and remedial classes for children. These psychosocial mediations were also initiated to ensure that affected children's lives return to normalcy and continue to promote resilience and recovery. Besides, the UNICEF assisted Sri Lanka's Ministry of Education (MoE) in execution of the national action plan on psychosocial interventions (UNICEF 2008: 12-13).

The UNICEF contributed to build health and nutrition sector in Sri Lanka. It emphasised the restoration of regular health and nutrition capacity as well as health related infrastructure. These included “modernisation of health facilities, strengthening the cold chain system; equipping

mobile health clinics to ensure accessibility to health services” (UNICEF 2009: Vii). The UNICEF effort led to construction and renovation of health facilities as well as nutrition surveillance of nearly 278,000 children. Such UNICEF effort led to drop in percentage suffering from wasting among children (UNICEF 2009: Vii). Analysis of the UNICEF works in Sri Lanka were successful in child protection programme with focus on immediate needs of vulnerable groups of children, advancement of their wellbeing and legal systems for all children (UNICEF 2009: V). The UNICEF activities were also under critical scanner as the construction of schools undertaken by the UNICEF came under question because of its dearth of sustainability, especially with regard to maintenance of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities in schools (UNICEF 2009: iii). Dilemmas also prevailed in securing community agreement on location of schools that caused delays and further cancellations of reconstruction contracts. Cases where IDPs centres were created in school buildings caused indiscriminate harassment of students, teachers and schools (UNICEF 2009: iv).

It was also unfortunate that shelter, water and sanitation sectors had not been planned well together. Its WASH initiative was affected due to inflated costs (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006e: 28-29). Further, the recovery initiatives of the UNICEF were delayed as there were difficulties in gaining accessibility in conflict-zone, thus lower completion rates in these regions. As in Sri Lanka, the fight between the GoSL and the LTTE intensified in 2008, the UNICEF humanitarian response in the country marked a shift in focus from a tsunami recovery efforts to addressing the conflict-related concerns. This, further delayed and hampered tsunami related recovery (UNICEF 2009: 7).

Thus, assessment of the UNICEF work in Indonesia and Sri Lanka revealed that as in both countries children constituted a substantial part of the tsunami affected population. Therefore, it was inevitable that the UNICEF would have substantial role to play. The agency contributed significantly in sphere of children education, health sanitation and development of related infrastructure with capacity building of the health as well educational professional being significant part of the long term agenda of the UNICEF. In both countries, recovery initiatives undertaken were continuum of early relief assistance. Distinctiveness of the UNICEF in Indonesia compared to Sri Lanka was establishment of children centric court to protect the rights of the children. This was an innovation as well as departure from the previous judicial procedure of

treating children as well as adult with same set of laws. Thus, a fresh legal code had been established to treat of vulnerable children. Such innovation was lacking in the UNICEF programmes in Sri Lanka. Besides, there were largely congruence of the UNICEF's initiative in both countries that encompassed establishment of children centric schools, psychological support to teachers as well as children, creation of health infrastructures and WASH facilities.

Comparison of challenges exhibited that the UNICEF in Indonesia faced dearth of competent teachers in the realm of education. The UNICEF work also derailed because of death of government employees that caused ambiguous directives from government that furthered confusion. On the other side, the UNICEF in Sri Lanka lacked close planning of shelter, water as well as sanitation sectors. Its WASH related recovery initiative reeled under inflated costs, therefore faced difficulties in implementation. The recovery process were derailed also because of inaccessibility of the agency in conflict-zone and shift in the UNICEF efforts to conflict-related concerns and because fighting intensified in 2008 between the government forces and the LTTE, thus derailed the tsunami related recovery (UNICEF 2009:7).

#### *The UNHCR Indonesia and Sri Lanka*

The UNHCR in Indonesia was primarily engaged in the shelter programme in the recovery and reconstruction phase. The Tsunami had left 1,27000 houses damaged further aggravated by Nias earthquake that destroyed 15000 and damaged approximately 19000 houses. The UNHCR's reconstruction process focused on development of Aceh's west coast. These reconstructions initiated under the UNHCR involved community participation in collaboration with BRR and the public works department. The UNHCR engagement in Indonesia comprised of emergency shelter as well as the execution of a permanent shelter programme (UNHCR and PDES 2007:13). The UNHCR's was not present in construction of transitional shelter. Rather, it was the GoI that got involved in this phase and made arrangement of wooden barracks for the temporary period of time in Aceh. It was largely government that had to shoulder this responsibility, the UNHCR assisted in the technical domain to design of the temporary living space. It is also interesting that the UNHCR had no presence in Aceh before the advent of tsunami. It decided to operate in one of the most inaccessible area in this long term phase of the disaster. The profusion of the donors and media attention on the one hand and dearth of experience in the field of shelter provided the agency both opportunities and challenges in the operationalisation. The permanent shelter project

undertaken by Indonesia was implemented through the local contractors with intension to build local economy. The outcome of the efforts of the UNCHR resulted in delivery of 1,100 houses in Aceh and 230 in Nias Island by November 2006. The UNHCR was also engaged in Krueng Sabee, where a pilot project was initiated for permanent housing (Ang 2005).

The attempt of the UNHCR in Indonesia to rebuild community as well as permanent shelter met with limited success. This initiative undertaken by the UNHCR encountered several barriers such as enhanced construction cost, logistic difficulties, upsurge in the fuel price and design modification request by the community before the agency to deliver permanent houses. In addition, the delivery of the permanent shelter was far lower than the target. By November 2007, an estimated “20,000 families were living in tents and another 25,000 to 30,000 in barracks, according to an estimate. Further, reduction in the number of people living in tent was at slow pace” (UNICEF 2009: 6). Another concern that erupted even after free and fair election in December 2006 in Aceh as some newly elected ex-GAM officials in the region started levying taxes on construction companies, posing unexpected hurdles for project implementers and various sub-contracted agents (UNICEF 2009:6). However, the good thing that emerged was the community participation that largely propelled the success of permanent shelter construction.

The UNHCR played a key part in Sri Lanka's shelter strategy, but made it plain that it would not participate in permanent shelter programme. The UNHCR assisted in the government's Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) in supervising its shelter programme construction. The TAP project aimed to facilitate the implementation of transitional shelter. The transitional shelter proved to be “a habitable covered living space and a secure, healthy living environment, with privacy and dignity, to those within it, during the period between a conflict or a natural disaster and the achievement of a durable shelter solution” (UNHCR 2005b: 6). The UNHCR was also requested to develop a country wide programme to coordinate shelter sector as well as provide guidance to the shelter agencies engaged in the country (UNHCR 2005b, UNHCR 2005c).

The agency collaborated with the Norwegian Refugee Council's Shelter Coordination Cell to meet the needs of the housing and move tsunami displaced populations out of tents by November 2005. Thus, approximately 58000 transitional shelters were constructed by NGOs under the leadership of the UNHCR. This UN agency also focussed on supervising quality of transitional shelter programme. It also initiated shelter upgradation programme renovating the substandard

shelters. In collaboration with Sri Lankan government, the UNHCR conducted survey to account for the displaced, missing, injured or probable dead and established legal clinics in collaboration with other agencies in district affected by Tsunami. These legal clinics helped in replacement of the lost document for nearly 120,000 people. Campaign against sexual and gender based violence was also undertaken by this agency. The agency was also involved in the construction of 4,500 high quality transitional shelters. By and large it participated in transitional phase response in both sphere of coordination level and direct provision of shelter (UNHCR 2005a:252). The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (TEC LRRD) Study reported the poor quality of some of the transitional houses in Sri Lanka thus, some other agencies had to come in to correct the faults (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006d: 45). The UNHCR in Sri Lanka had developed cordial relation not only with the government but also several important actors such as Tamil Tigers (LTTE). However, its public profile was under disrepute because of its protection provided to the IDPs, particularly in the LTTE affected north and east region.

Overall, the transitional shelter building efforts in Sri Lanka was largely successful but the permanent housing was derailed in the country. Even the effort to build transitional shelters started slow. The challenge in the permanent housing efforts were problematised because of dilemmas over the place and way to establish housing as well as shortage of staff to approve building projects. There also arose problem in permanent housing allocation in northern as well as eastern province that were largely the LTTE controlled region (Boano 2006).

In the long-term development in Sri Lanka, the UNHCR did not involve in execution of the permanent Shelter but actively engaged with those actors working in this field. The permanent shelter programme in the country was under trouble on the issue of its location majorly for those living near coastal region before the tsunami. The GoSL coastal buffer zone policy earmarked distance beyond which permanent construction could be constructed in the country. The buffer zone policy required relocation of families causing inhabitant's apprehension about long distance that they would have to travel for their work. Additionally, the permanent construction policy was further delayed as alternative site for the reconstruction were under consideration (UNHCR 2005a).

Comparing the UNHCR work in Indonesia and Sri Lank exhibited contrasting strategy in shelter provision. In the Indonesian case, the UNHCR engrossment was confined distinctively in

immediate shelter provision leaving transitional phase largely to the GoI. Later, the UNHCR assisted GOI in permanent housing. On the other hand, the UNHCR's engagement in Sri Lanka exhibited its substantial role in emergency as well as transitional shelter provision. In the transitional phase, the UNHCR assisted in the government's Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) in supervising its shelter programme construction. The final stage of permanent housing unlike Indonesia was left to government in Sri Lanka. In both countries, the UNHCR shelter programme had its own set of concerns. In Indonesia, enhanced construction cost and community demand for design modification were major challenges in the process of execution of permanent housing programme. On the other side, in Sri Lanka, permanent shelter faced challenges from new buffer zone policy and shortage of staff to approve building projects.

### **Operationalisation of Norms, Principles and Guidelines Related to Recovery and Reconstruction**

Normative framework advanced by the IASC and the OCHA were also available for test in the long term recovery and rehabilitation phase. Providing adequate shelter for the displaced persons remained one of the most difficult challenges in the recovery effort in Indonesia. The IASC guidelines on right to housing were flouted as the design of the barracks was unsuitable for the liveability of the survivors. For instance, the quarters in the barracks were built to accommodate six people was small in size and even lacked partition. The six-person-per-quarter quota criterion was implemented on the ground without maintaining family unity. Besides it, in Indonesian case, the permanent housing reconstruction had been marred by its slow pace because of lack of coordination as well as shortage of material. This caused several displaced to accommodate themselves in temporary accommodation with friends or relatives, in tent camps and shelters (Inderfurth 2005). In Indonesia, (BAPPENAS), the National Development Planning Agency as well as BRR engaged in development of master plan for Aceh reconstruction. There was lack of community participation and coordination with other national level bodies in planning process and decision making in the reconstruction process. There was lack of the public participation in policy making and local involvement in reconstruction blueprint (Cohen et al. 2005: 35). In gross violation of the guidelines on internal displacement and principle of equality, the IDPs residing outside the government sponsored IDPs or barracks were left out of the government aid in Indonesia setting a precedent of discrimination. Arguments were also made that these aid could be possibly be misused by the GAM. But, such move ran contrary to the principle of equality in the



reconstruction phase compounded by the reports of IDPs being dependent on NGOs rather on the governmental agencies. Thus, the discrimination was at play in garb of the political beliefs of the IDPs. Like the relief phase, the intrusion by the military was a common feature in the reconstruction phase that saw continued presence of military. The residents being detained on petty issues like lack of identification card. They were even victimised if they did not provide support to the military. Further, international organisations were under pressure to report their activities to military. For example, field workers of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Meulaboh in Aceh region were arrested in June 2005, later released on the condition that every agency must report its activity to the military. The military also controlled residents under the garb of maintaining security and acted as managers of aid, forcing people to stay in barracks and also determined when a survivor can return home (Cohen et al. 2005: 38).

The IASC guideline on right to documentation was under grave threat because of rampant corruption in Aceh. For instance, to obtain national identity card residents were required to pay 12,000 Indonesian Rupiah each person. In Meulaboh, bribes were also paid for measurement of land and grant of land certificate. Both were supposed to be freely available. Such corruption cases flouted IASC rights to documentation. According to rights to documentation, any personal document for identity and other purposes lost or damaged in a natural catastrophe, such as birth, marriage and death certificates and others to be reinstated at the earliest possible (IASC 2011:45). The instances of corruption clearly put a hurdle in the way to successfully achieve such aims embedded in the IASC guidelines.

The Aceh region experienced violation of political rights including freedom of speech and assembly as well as curtailment of economic and social rights. The government failed “to provide adequate standard of living, accessibility of aid as well as means to earn a livelihood in the barracks. Lack of clear and consistent system for obtaining identity cards and land certificates threatened the property rights. For instance, Lamno area actually disappeared become a part of the sea. The villagers of this area had been unable to get clear information about compensation and resettlement” (Cohen et al. 2005:33).

Sri Lanka violated the IASC guidelines that emphasise appropriate measures to be undertaken for smooth shift from emergency shelter to transitional shelter following principle of non-discrimination. This equally applies to transition from transitional shelter or to permanent

housing. There remained qualitative regional difference in transitional shelters in the country and the permanent housing lacked a standardised model. For instance, transitional shelter for two sets of IDPs i.e. conflict stricken as well as tsunami hit in Batticaloa District were different (Entwisle2013: 23).

There were also allegations that many decisions made by TAFREN were not reflection of the affected communities but represented big business interests (Brusset et al. 2009). This was clear derailment from the IASC guidelines that emphasise consultation and participation of persons and groups directly affected by disaster in the planning, decision making process and execution of transitional shelter and permanent housing programmes. The IASC guidelines call for consideration and requirements of the social as well as cultural contents in the housing. The socio-economic state and cultural arrangements of the people were not taken into account in the Sri Lankan case (Jayasuriya et al. 2005). In addition to it, it neglected “traditional settlement patterns, housing types and layouts and cultural and ethnic issues due to non-participatory reconstruction practices. This, furthered conflicts and resentment among locals” (Boano 2009; Mulligan and Shaw 2007; Silva 2009).

In the permanent shelter building, land scarcity had been a major issue for housing in Sri Lanka's more in densely populated coastal districts in the south and east. Sri Lanka's buffer zone policy exacerbated the problem. Later, this extent of buffer zone was relaxed by the government bringing it to about 50m. Introduction of Coastal buffer zones was part of risk reduction in the post-tsunami reconstruction had caused inherent trouble. Kennedy (2008) and Ingram et al. (2006) expressed concern on rebuilding and relocation of these people to buffer zone would expose them to risk in the relocated region. Flout of the norms could be seen with establishment of residential areas in the non-suitable areas (Oyhus 2017:19). Under the reconstruction process, several organisation “avoided an environmental impact analysis as well as long term urban or rural planning in their settlements projects, thus making vulnerabilities inevitable in the future” (Kennedy et al. 2008).

IASC guidelines prescribe for the utmost engagement of affected communities, particularly women in the process of recovery as well as rehabilitation. In Sri Lanka, there was gender discrimination as the women complained about the lack of accessibility to recovery programmes. There were instances of women faced difficulty in gaining recovery grants, as these grant were

granted in favour of men. There were complaints about “a lack of information and the possibility of losing land or property rights. In the eastern Sri Lanka, Women were apprehensive about losing their customary laws that gave them equal rights to land and inheritance, may be lost in a new legal regime” (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006e: 29). This runs contrary to the IASC guidelines that stress equal treatment to both sexes in issuing of document. There were vulnerabilities for women and girls in absence of livelihood. They resorted to exchanging sex for food (Entwisle2013:16). The Tsunami Evaluation coalition (TEC) survey in Sri Lanka reports that in all phases of the tsunami response, “women were less satisfied than their male counterparts, believing that international agencies did not do enough to safeguard women, particularly in camps” (Telford 2006: 70).

The reconstruction phase also saw violation of norms and guidelines related to child labour and the disruption of education (Entwisle 2013:24). At one end, positive reports were there with 85 percent of Sri Lankan children went back to school, many of those who were enrolled were dropped out after a year to work because schools were located too far away from their homes (Amnesty International 2006: 37). This clearly ran against the right to education as embedded in the IASC guidelines.

The norms and guidelines connecting to livelihood were also under scanner in Sri Lanka. The fishing communities were moved distant from the shorelines in process of the relocation of communities during the creation of buffer zones. This affected their livelihood. The Amnesty International revealed that livelihoods opportunities in the country were largely bias in favour of male rather than those for women (Amnesty International 2006). Besides, livelihood initiatives were at uneven pace. Notably boats distribution were uneven and also differential in quality of boats in Sri Lanka. The OCHA principle stresses on the non-discrimination as well as equity. Thus the livelihood concern were in contrast to what was demarcated by the OCHA guidelines. The reflection of misplaced priorities was also demonstrated in cases where fishing equipment were supplied to those with no history of fishing and had no harbours in their proximity and they could take light boats to shore. But in contrast, some of the donated boats were either too heavy or poorly built to be towed ashore. For instance in Sri Lanka, “nearly 19 percent of the new boats were not even seaworthy” (FAO 2006).

The reconstruction process in Sri Lanka reported aid related corruption as well as discrimination in the north east region of Sri Lanka. There were allegations that the reconstruction

in southern part was consistent compared to the north-eastern region in Sri Lanka. It was argued that as the representation of large number of Member of Parliament hailed from the region southern including the Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa. Therefore, the reconstruction had south bias. Transparency International Sri Lanka reported that “out of the USD 1.7 billion of international aid actually disbursed to the implementing agencies, USD 500 million could not be accounted for, and was perhaps used by the government for other purposes. There also remained distrust between the government and the civil organisations” (TISL 2007).

Comparison of the operationalisation of norms, principles guidelines pertaining to the OCHA and the IASC Operational Guidelines exhibit adherence as well as derailment in both countries. Many a time, these guidelines were flouted as both local and international agencies. They competed with each other and were under pressure to exhibit their outcome and presence leading to uncoordinated as well as disjointed recovery measures (Boano 2009; Khasalamwa 2009). Further, in both cases, these guidelines were complicated by lack of awareness by local community of these principles, norms and guidelines (Mannakkara and Wilkinson 2013). Common in both cases, community consultation in post-tsunami recovery activities were avoided that caused dissatisfaction among people with their new homes and locations. This also flouted the IASC guideline that emphasised that affected individuals and communities “to give feedback and file complaints or grievances about the disaster relief and recovery response” (Mannakkara and Wilkinson 2013). The IASC’s guideline of right to housing suffered especially because of lack of consultation with stakeholders and the centralised level of governance. There were instances of discrimination in aid and violation of the IASC principles concerning the women as well as children.

## **Conclusion**

The recovery, rehabilitation and the disaster reduction in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka were mounting challenges to be overcome. In Indonesia, momentous damage to permanent housing required it to keep it as utmost priority in the recovery process. Infrastructural requirements pertaining to upgradation of sea ports, roads as well as disruption of health infrastructure required utmost attention. The plight of education had deteriorated further with tsunami apart from the armed conflict. Tsunami had shattered the livelihood as well as economic activities, especially agriculture, in Indonesia. For Sri Lanka, tsunami was hardest hit in its living memory by tsunami.

Challenges to be undertaken included shelter construction and the infrastructural development. In the domain of economic activities, in Indonesia agriculture required major attention whereas fishing and tourism heavily ravaged in tsunami hit Sri Lanka and were the major points of attention. On similar note in both countries, health and education sector related infrastructure was to be rehabilitated as part of long term recovery process.

Response in long term rehabilitation and recovery process in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka began at the end of the early relief assistance formally set off in March 2005. In Indonesian case, BRR was established in April 2005 and carried out restoration of livelihoods and infrastructure in liaison with other humanitarian agencies. In the case of Sri Lanka, a single government agency, Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) created in November 2005 engaged itself in reconstruction and development of all sectors and stakeholders.

Response under the rubric of the UN to undertake recovery and provide assistance in implementation of national recovery plans, Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery was proved to be useful as he could keep world attention to tsunami afflicted region and could produce global political goodwill for the recovery effort. The Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) contributed the principles of BBB that became bedrock of the recovery process in Tsunami affected countries. Prevention of pre-disaster vulnerabilities, engagement of multi-stakeholder, self-recovery of communities, focus on principle of fairness and equity in recovery as well as preparedness plan, decentralisation of recovery structure to facilitate local level institutional participation remain some of the significant component of BBB. These principles became milestone to be immortalized in future recovery phases. The endeavours of Secretary-General's Special Envoy Bill Clinton raised substantial contribution from various international sources and supervised expenditure tracking system. Despite these successes, there remained limitation to replicate the office Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery in post-tsunami emergencies.

A significant dynamics of response was coordination, therefore several coordination mechanisms were at play in recovery process in both the countries. Under the rubric of the UN, unlike the early assistance phase that had the UNOCHA as the coordinating mechanism, the recovery process in Indonesia was replaced by the UNORC that coordinated UN agencies with other humanitarian actors on the ground. At macro level, the UNORC had established sector specific coordination points that had meetings on regular basis to share information and avoid

duplication of work. The UNORC demonstrated to be an important advisor to BRR in matters of recovery related policies to Indonesian government. Despite these works of the UNORC, rather than becoming a coordination entity it became a forum for information sharing. Further, coordination was marred by difference of aim and perception of the multiple humanitarian actors, power play and different culture of these actors in the field.

In Sri Lanka, the RADA was a major coordination mechanism under the government. To coordinate the GoSL and the LTTE, the Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS) was formalised but such mechanism was stayed by Sri Lankan Supreme Court. Under the rubrics of the UN, in contrast to Indonesia, Sri Lankan coordination was undertaken by specific UN agencies taking up their own coordination mechanism. An overarching coordination mechanism under UN umbrella for the UN agencies seems to be missing in case of Sri Lanka. Rather, specific UN agencies coordinated its work. For Instance, the UNHCR agreed to be the lead agency for coordinating the transitional shelter programme.

The UN operational agencies effectively led the process of recovery and reconstruction process in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In Indonesia, the UNDP programme was the largest when compared to Sri Lanka. Marking similarities in both countries, the UNDP recovery process was closely intertwined with relief programme and thus, recovery process was initiated by the UNDP well in advance during relief phase in both the countries. In both these countries, the UNDP actively facilitated generation of income programmes such as CfW as well as infrastructural development. For instance, In Indonesia, the UNDP in liaison with BRR and local government initiated ERTR that embraced CfW programme, waste management, Recovery and others. On the other side, in Sri Lanka, it initiated CBDRM. In the governance domain, the UNDP in Indonesia led to successful as well as transparent election in Aceh region of Indonesia, where municipal election was being held after several decades of conflict between the GAM and GoI. On the otherside, the UNDP governance domain in Sri Lanka emphasised the capacity enhancement of administration, civil society and the corporate sector's capacity. Disaster risk reduction was noteworthy element of the UNDP in both the countries, where it provided expert's inputs and recommendations to design as well as enact disaster related legislation. In Indonesia, the UNDPs aided in disaster risk reduction legislation. Similarly, the agency also assisted Sri Lankan

government in shaping the Disaster Management Act 2005 that was consistent with the Hyogo Framework.

In both countries children were approximately one third of the affected population due to the Tsunami. The recovery process in both the countries was characterised by similar set of programmes in the domain of children's education, health, sanitation and related infrastructure. The capacity building in terms of the health, education and professional growth remained important to long term agenda of the UNICEF. In both countries, these recovery initiatives were largely an extension of the early relief assistance. The UNICEF activities in Indonesia were marked with innovations. The UNICEF in Indonesia brought the concept of children centric court and laws, unlike the criminal laws. Such distinctive innovation lacked in the UNICEF programmes in Sri Lanka. Broader analysis of the UNICEF recovery programme exhibited congruence in both countries including establishment of children centric schools, psychological support to teachers and children, creation of health infrastructure and WASH facilities.

Comparison of challenges exhibited that the UNICEF Indonesia was troubled in the realm of education with dearth of qualified teachers. Its works were also derailed because of death of government employees compounded further with dearth of clear directions from government bodies. Compared to Indonesia, in Sri Lanka, the reconstruction move was at a much slower pace as more than 200 schools were occupied for temporary shelter of the affected families. The UNICEF in Sri Lanka also exhibited lack of simultaneous planning of shelter, water as well as sanitation sectors. Its WASH initiatives reeled under inflated costs, therefore faced difficulty in implementation. The recovery process in the country derailed also because of inaccessibility of the agency in conflict-zone and shift of the UNICEF efforts to conflict related concerns as fighting intensified in 2008 between the government forces and the LTTE, hampering the tsunami related recovery. Thus, broader analysis of the UNICEF recovery programme exhibited congruence as well as divergence in both countries.

In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the UNHCR's response extended beyond its usual responsibilities of refugee safeguard to undertook measures in shelter provision in the long term. In both countries, the UNHCR adopted distinct strategy in the process of shelter provision. In the Indonesia, the UNHCR primarily engaged in permanent housing and provided technical assistance in the transitional shelter provision. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, the UNHCR assisted in

transitional shelter provision and did not get engaged in permanent shelter that was left to others. In its transitional phase, the UNHCR supported the GoSL in execution of Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) as well as supervision of its shelter programme construction.

In both the countries, the UNHCR shelter programme were riddled with glitches, for instance, in Indonesia the UNHCR faced enhanced construction cost and community demand for the design modification before the agency delivered permanent houses. On the other side, in Sri Lanka, slow pace of the transitional housing as well as the new buffer zoning policy delayed permanent shelter. Most importantly, in both these countries the UNHCR had to put its shelter programmes to different contractors as they were short of expertise in this field.

The operationalisation of the normative framework comprised of the IASC guidelines and principles laid by the OCHA in recovery and rehabilitation phase had mixed outcomes in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In both the countries, the IASC guidelines on right to housing and shelter were flouted because of dearth of consultation with stakeholders especially women. Besides, the centralised governance was inconsistent with the IASC guidelines that stresses upon the community participation in decision making. In Indonesia, lack of community participation and coordination with other national level bodies in planning process affected the shelter and permanent housing. On the other side, Sri Lanka's housing and shelter initiatives sidelined "traditional settlement patterns, housing types and layouts, cultural and ethnic dimensions". Another point of concern, especially in Sri Lanka, was breach of the OCHA "principle of equality and non-discrimination". There were instances of discrimination in aid as well as in project implementation with greater focus to the southern region marginalising northern and eastern region in Sri Lanka. It was argued that as large number of Member of Parliament belonged to southern region, including the Prime Minister that gave the reconstruction a south bias. To a large extent, in both the countries, like relief phase, women as well as children were not in priority considering their livelihood concerns violating the IASC principle.

Thus, the recovery responses in both countries were marked with commonality as well as contrasts. The challenges put forth by the tsunami in the long term rehabilitation and recovery phase had reinvigorated the UN to create a new office of Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery that enunciated build back better principles for recovery process in tsunami devastated countries. This office became an innovative and a replicable model to be emulated in



future recovery programmes. But, UN still struggles under adhoc coordination mechanism for long term recovery process. A rethinking and reform needs to be undertaken to establish a consistent coordination mechanism in recovery phase like the OCHA, available in the early relief phase. An overhaul is necessitated in the UN operative agencies as they have come to undertake responsibility beyond their traditional mandate, thus to sustain such new attributed role, these agencies need to be reformed to undertake new assignments. Simultaneously, the norms, principles and guidelines for recovery process need to be disseminated through increased awareness among humanitarian actors involved in the process of response. There is also need for political will of the state as well as the UN.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

There is persistent escalation in the natural disaster incidents in recent decades unleashing huge devastations. An estimate in 2016 puts natural disasters caused eviction of 24 million people away from their homes, large section constituted of women. The United Nations (UN) system response to natural disasters is understudied compared to voluminous study on conflict zones. This study attempts to capture institutional and policy level developments and changes across the UN System to respond to natural disasters. This study has made attempts to trace the evolving dynamics of institutional mechanisms as well as the norms and guidelines under the rubrics of the UN to deal with natural calamities. To understand the operationalisation of these institutional mechanisms and norms of the UN system, the study has undertaken comparative cases of the UN System interventions and engagements to deal with disaster of tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in both early relief phase and rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. This comparative study shows how the UN system's mechanisms and policies functioned at ground level and challenges encountered.

The historicity of the international trajectory of disaster governance can be traced in the 19<sup>th</sup> century marked with scant endeavours. Reflections of further evolution began with assertion on capacity building of the Red Cross as well as replicating “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864)” for the natural disasters victims. In 20<sup>th</sup> century, disaster response discourse was reinforced in 1921 under Giovanni Ciraolo, the President of Italian Red Cross, who stressed upon the creation of an international organisation to provide relief to the victims of natural disaster. It was under auspices of the League of Nations, the International Relief Union (IRU) was established as a mechanism to respond to natural disasters. The operationalisation of the IRU suffered because of its erratic financial structure and failure to develop international law on disaster. However, it produced a copious scientific academic work. Discourses that shaped post- IRU phase went on to establish a permanent focal point to respond to international disasters.

The United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) was formed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1971 “to mobilise, direct, and coordinate the relief efforts of the

various UN agencies”. Further, the decades of 1970s and 1980s debated the need to establish a multilateral treaty on disaster relief having universal application. Several sector related and region related treaties on disaster response were also undertaken during this period. There was a major shift in the UN disaster discourse in decades of 1990s as besides coordination and relief measures, disaster reduction and mitigation assumed priority. The decade of 1990s was designated as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) with prescription to the states and relevant institutions to reduce impact of the natural disasters. The assessment of the IDNDR at Yokohama conference focussed on early warnings, prevention and preparedness as well as adoption of integrated approaches to disaster management. As successor to IDNDR, “the UN International Strategy for Risk Reduction (ISDR)” was established in 2000 with focus to reduce social vulnerability and risks of natural hazards and environmental disaster at global as well as regional level. In post tsunami 2004, Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDRR) in Kobe inclined to disaster risk reduction as well as early warning system. A major initiative on the same trajectory was UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR), Sendai, Japan in 2015, which designed a framework for disaster risk reduction. Thus, an apparent shift in trajectory of the global disaster discourse that moved towards a disaster reduction as well as preparedness from its original emphasis on relief assistance and coordination.

The larger dynamics of the international disaster response under the rubric of the UN have also led to evolution of principles, norms and guidelines to deal with natural disasters. The principles evolved under tutelage of the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) include- sovereignty, neutrality and non-discrimination in the advent of disaster. Another set of the Operational Guidelines on Human Rights initiated under the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) encompasses “protection of life, security and physical integrity and family ties; protection of rights related to the provision of food, health, shelter and education; Protection of rights related to housing, land, property, livelihoods, secondary and higher education and protection of rights related to documentation, movement, re-establishment of family ties, expression and opinion and elections”. These sets of operational guidelines are at infant stage and non-binding in nature. Multiplicity of guidelines and lack of awareness among humanitarian actors make operationalisation of these guidelines difficult. However, these guidelines acquire importance as moral authority. Furthermore, most of these norms and guidelines pertain to natural disaster within boundary of the state and there is dearth of norms to tackle transboundary disasters.

A major success in direction of creation of the binding norms has been the “Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations” that cover transboundary disaster management specifically to target removal of traditional as well as regulatory barriers in transborder use of telecommunication equipment by humanitarian agencies. The well networked countries like USA, Russia, and Germany remain reluctant to ratify such a convention as they are self-sufficient in case of the advent of the natural disaster, leaving poorer countries at risk. This remains a major limitation to such a convention.

The development of principles, norms, and guidelines under the rubrics of the UN runs parallel to development of institutional mechanisms to respond natural disaster. Before the establishment of the UN, the IRU was devised under the League of Nations but it failed to deliver and largely remained limited to the production of scientific academic publications. Under the umbrella of the UN, disaster discourse started to establish a permanent focal point to tackle several incidents of natural disasters in the decade of the 1960s and 1970s. Incidents and its repercussions, for instance, Chilean earthquake left 2,348,522 homeless; 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan took toll of 300,000 and caused disruption in the life of 3,648,000 individuals. In addition, the data between 1965 and 1975 reveals that the rate of disaster occurrence approximately once a week takes a toll of 3.5 million people and affects more than 400 million people. Such havoc contributed to establishment of UNDRO in 1971. The process of establishment of the UNDRO was marred by dilemmas over its role. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the League of Red Cross Societies, Soviet Union and France were deeply divided over UNDRO’s role. Few of them clamoured for the UNDRO to assist in relief activities in a disaster stricken country, others wanted the UNDRO to play its role in mobilisation of funds and coordination of relief assistance.

Initially the UNDRO responded to natural disasters like volcano or typhoon and emergency manmade disasters. It also acted as a centre for information and enabled the donors to fund for the requirements of emergency assistance. An unsuccessful endeavour to draft a convention on Expediting Delivery of Emergency Assistance to accentuate the early relief assistance was also made by it. It also worked in partnership with the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies on all disaster related matters, including exchange of information in case of disaster as well as in government projects in pre-disaster planning. What boggled the UNDRO were financial crunch, overstaffing, hazy mandate, intra-agencies competition and non-cooperative attitude from the UN

agency field staff leading to decline of the organisation. The UNDRO mandate also was limited to coordination during emergency period neglecting long term measures. The UN attempted to reform coordination dimension of the humanitarian assistance, both for natural as well as manmade disasters. This urge was largely in response to the 1989 Armenian earthquake and subsequent humanitarian crises in 1990s during the Gulf war, Balkan war, civil war in Rwanda and Great Lake Region in 1994, accentuated a rethinking of the existing mechanism like the UNDRO. The UNDRO had failed to respond to such situation to avert death toll and problems of Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Further, humanitarian assistance got on the table of G7 summit (1991) that called for setting up a high official under the rubric of the UN Secretary-General to reinforce coordination and effectuate UN relief for major disasters.

Besides, the UN budget was also hard-pressed to meet new and larger responsibilities aimed to build a more streamlined, less redundant and better articulated latest system of achieving humanitarian objectives. Therefore, the UN established Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 1991 that worked till 1997 involved in coordination of UN specialised agencies as well as engaged itself in humanitarian assistance system and protection. The reform process redesigned DHA to the Office for the UNOCHA in 1997. Thus, the UNOCHA was assigned to perform coordination of emergency response; policy development and humanitarian advocacy, facilitate coordination of UN operational agencies and works with assistance of several tools. These supportive tools include- “Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)” that provides leadership to UNOCHA; the “IASC” assists in coordination with multiple actors in the coordination process; “Consolidated Appeals Process and Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)”, acts as a major platform to make appeal at the advent of disaster as well as fund assistance programme; “Virtual On Site Operations Coordination Centre (Virtual OSOCC)” acts as a central repository of information to be shared with other partners in the field operations and “United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)” comprises of the specialists in the field of disaster management involved in the assessment of needs or requirements of the victim country. These tools were riddled with challenges. UNOCHA still continues to incline towards the conflict emergencies and marginalises natural disasters. The funding to CERF has been erratic. The UNDAC has been marked with delayed deployment of personnel and lacks personnel from relevant discipline, such as seismologists, etc. Therefore, it requires immediate scientific disaster assessments experts. Besides, the UN agencies have been involved in dealing with natural disasters

and have adapted themselves to new discourses of disaster. Institutional adaptations; adoption of policy directives as well as shift focus on disaster reduction remains major themes of the changing discourses in the UN since 1990s and these are slowly embedded in the UN agencies. To illustrate it further, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has assumed duty for “natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness”. Such responsibility is performed by the Disaster Reduction Unit (DRU) in the Bureau of emergency Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) of the UNDP. Under the UNICEF, the Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) assists emergency activities and UNICEF’s Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) has been established to tackle emergency situations in domain of water and sanitation, child protection and education. The UNICEF has also initiated policy consistent with Hyogo Framework of Action to ensure disaster risk reduction measures are incorporated in policies of the governments. The United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR) as an actor in disaster management provides assistance to the states’ authorities in responding to natural disasters; acts as the head of the global protection cluster and acts as an enabler through its training to local, national and international actors.

Thus, mapping evolution of the international response to natural disasters reveal that the UN has evolved itself over the years with current coordination role mandated to the UNOCHA. Several tools of the UNOCHA, including the UNDAC, the CERF and the IASC are needed to be reformed to respond to increased cases of natural disaster as well as embed disaster reduction in its mandate. The UN agencies operationalised assistance in both relief as well as long term recovery. Thus, there is necessity to nurture collaboration among these operative agencies that often assume itself as a separate entity constraining the UN coordination process. Besides, the norms, principles and guidelines specific to natural disaster remain infant and evolutionary in nature necessitate efficient implementation. New norms and agreements need to be evolved to respond to natural disaster beyond the state’s territory. The Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 was a global disaster having huge ramifications. The tsunami created unprecedented havoc to human civilisation having death toll at 300,000 people across 12 countries. It was the habitation lying in the coastal areas as well as women were worst victims of the tsunami. In terms of death toll and number of people missing it was Indonesia and Sri Lanka that were the hardest hit countries.

Comparatively, the scope of damages in both in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were marked by commonality as well as contrasts. Compared to Sri Lanka, Indonesia was the worst affected nation. In Aceh, Indonesia roughly 129,271 people were killed, with displacement of 566,8982 population. Aceh, Indonesia's north western tip of Sumatra, was the most severely impacted region. On the other hand, Sri Lanka had lesser number of fatalities with over 30,000 and over 860,000 displaced due to tsunami. The country had never encountered tsunami like disaster affecting 14 of the 25 districts of the country. It was these 9 districts in the eastern region (Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara), north-eastern (Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu) and south-eastern (Mambantota, Matara and Galle) that were hard hit following the tsunami and six of these districts were suffering from long protracted conflict between Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Comparative economic data revealed that US\$9.9 billion were lost throughout the affected regions, Indonesia accounted for nearly 50 percent of the overall loss whereas Sri Lankan economy was depleted by 1 billion by the tsunami 2004 accounting for approximately 4.5% of its GDP. In both the countries, fishing and tourism were major sectors of economy that bore the brunt of tsunami. Environmental impact of tsunami disaster affected equally in both countries. In Indonesia, environmental impact could be felt much more on the coastal areas and their ecosystem, brought enormous amounts of waste and debris at different places including human settlement, road and affected the sea. There were damages to the coral reefs and Mangroves. In Sri Lankan case, sea water increased salinity and disturbed balance of the lagoons and estuaries. The east and south-west of the country were marked with severe beach erosion. Potable water was deeply affected by contamination by seawater, sewage and the wastewater. Studies also highlighted the importance of the natural barriers like mangrove forests that mitigated the tsunami effects in Sri Lanka. In similar ways, in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, tsunami occurred amid decade long conflicts. Apart from natural disaster, Indonesia was also characterised by the prolonged conflict between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) calling for free Aceh and GoI. Over a stretch of 1976 till 2004, approximately 15,000 lives had been lost in the conflict. Tsunami became a ground for both the parties to end their hostilities and look for a peaceful resolution of their conflict. The GoI showed willingness to negotiate with exiled rebels, offering them amnesty and greater autonomy. This was also reiterated during election campaign of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in September 2004. He offered economic concessions to GAM that fell short of their demand for independence.

GAM wished to be recognised as a political party and it dropped the demand for a separate state. The government agreed to their demands. Thus, a better relationship evolved between the GoI and GAM rebels.

Similarly, Sri Lanka was under protracted conflict between government and the LTTE with demand of separate autonomous land. According to an estimate, in the LTTE occupied region in the north and east approximately 9,000 people lost their lives. Different independent reports enumerate this region to be most affected and accounted for about half of the overall fatalities in the country. The relationship between LTTE and Sri Lanka government deteriorated to worse due to reluctance of both the parties to coordinate. The demand by the LTTE for independence, later election of new president Mahinda Rajapakse and his tough stance against LTTE made any kind of deal a far dream and relief assistance difficult.

The study focus on both these countries, as on similar note both the countries were the most affected countries afflicted by the devastation caused by the tsunami 2004. Simultaneously, both countries were reeling under conflict before the advent of tsunami, Indonesia by the GAM in Aceh region and Sri Lanka had protracted conflict Sri Lankan government and LTTE. In midst of tsunami 2004, Indonesia made a successful liaison with GAM and concluded an agreement in few months of the advent of tsunami, whereas Sri Lanka failed to reach agreement with LTTE affecting relief as well as recovery and rehabilitation phase. This reflects the contrasts of the two cases. In addition to it, Sri Lanka was marked by the early presence of the UN agencies before the advent of tsunami whereas in case of Indonesia there were absence of the UN agencies and they were deployed after the advent of tsunami. Therefore, the case studies of these two countries become interesting to investigate the response of the UN system.

In response to tsunami, Indonesian Government rolled out three phased approach in the mid-January 2005, where the first phase concentrated on immediate relief catered to food, medical assistance and temporary shelters. This was operational for initial six months with the advent of tsunami. The rehabilitation and reconstruction phase was scheduled from February 2005 to 2009. In Indonesia, immediate relief phase was carried out by National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management that deployed resources in Aceh region. In Sri Lanka, the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) engaged in disaster management. Comparing the states' response, Indonesia had called for immediate international relief assistance whereas Sri Lanka delayed in making the call for



international aid. In both countries, the emergency relief was marked by centralisation of governance. Besides, before the advent of tsunami, government had stringent check and control over the International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) as well as the UN agencies in Aceh and case was no different in case of Sri Lanka as the activities of INGOs were under huge surveillance.

The Actors' response in both cases exhibit that the tsunami created global response. In Indonesia, more than 300 International INGOs flooded Aceh in the first two months for early disaster assistance but several of these left the country by the end of October 2005 after relief phase, mainly because of due to their incapacity. Besides, instances of "poaching" of the local agencies' staff by international agencies proved disincentive for these Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to work. In Sri Lanka, response to tsunami came from multiple actors comprised of individual countries, INGOs and IGOs. It was the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) that primarily conducted relief assistance in the northern Sri Lanka and was therefore blamed of discrimination by Sri Lankan government in distribution of aid.

The Country specific assistance poured in Indonesia as well as in Sri Lanka. In Indonesia, Australia, United States, Japan and India were important player in the relief and rehabilitation efforts. USA assisted by deployment of military assistance as well as engaged in airlifting. It also provided medical assistance as well as helped in reconstruction of means of communication like roads. Australia provided grants-in-aid. It also deployed its naval vessels, aircraft to Indonesia. Japan assisted by support of three naval vessels, about 1,000 troops and large sums of grants in-aid. Its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) involved in supply of aid goods, medical services to epidemic disease. The Chinese involvement was limited to supply of \$ 60 million relief fund. Compared with other assisting countries, China's military forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA) was not deployed as part of its assistance in the region. India initiated "Operation Gambhir" in Indonesia and deployed its military, especially the Indian Navy in the assistance in Aceh. Its emergency assistance included supply of rations, medicines, tents and field hospitals. It also established two field hospitals in Aceh. Extension of "concessional lines of credit" as well as "reconstruction of roads, buildings and harbours" in Aceh province was also part of the assistance plan.

In Sri Lanka, USA and India were among the main countries that came to assist the country. Paul Wolfowitz, the USA deputy secretary of defence visited Sri Lanka. USA aided both in

immediate relief and later recovery and rehabilitation phase. It provided food, shelter, health, water and sanitation. It also supported recovery process through its assistance by provision of counselling to people, undertaking anti-trafficking initiatives and other rehabilitation programmes. It introduced micro-finance programs that benefitted more than 30,000 people. But, it refrained from military assistance in Tamil areas. Neighbouring country India initiated “operation rainbow” to provide assistance in Sri Lanka. Indian military forces were among the first foreign rescue forces on the ground. They deployed 1,000 relief personnel, five naval ships that carried medical and relief assistance.

Specific UN response to tsunami disaster could be broadly divided in two phases- the immediate relief phase and recovery and rehabilitation phase. Among all actors, the UN response to tsunami was significant as it had huge baggage of knowledge, experience and a pull of resources to help victim countries. The UN specialised agencies, such as the UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP), and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provided substantial early assistance. The UNOCHA emergency operations catered to basic needs, such as food, medicine and other essential items. Compared with Indonesia, the entry of the UNDAC team in Sri Lanka was resisted for assessment as each state aspired to keep its relief assistance under its own control. There were contrasts in both countries with regard to presence and operationalisation of the UN operative agencies in the early relief assistance phase. Sri Lanka’s most affected north eastern region had presence of the UN agencies like the UNICEF, the UNOCHA long before the advent of tsunami. In contrast, there was dearth of these UN agencies in the Aceh region of Indonesia. In Indonesia, the UNOCHA Bakornas combine focused on the emergency operations, catering to basic needs. The operationalisation of its coordination in Aceh was complicated with multiplicity of NGOs and their refusal to coordinate and share information, duplication of works and neglect of the prominent environment and security concerns under the UNOCHA. The UNOCHA situation report providing the daily updates were not released regularly. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, TAFOR was primarily responsible for immediate relief coordination. This was hierarchical in nature that raised concern over lack of consultation between the district level and central level. Thus, the UNOCHA focused more on the loss assessment in case of Sri Lanka. In both countries, in the early disaster relief support, the UNOCHA was the prime unit involved in coordination. Besides, it engaged in preparation as well as issuance of flash appeals pleading for aid from donors. Such coordination was replete with challenges. NGOs operating on the ground were reluctant to

share information with the UN and several of UN operative agencies sought to assert their own independent existence. In both the countries, formal assessments were undertaken by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) but these assessments were bypassed by the major donors that deployed their own assessments.

The UN operative agencies were significant actor on the ground in relief assistance. Compare to Sri Lanka, the UNICEF had scarce presence in Aceh, Indonesia. The UNICEF in Sri Lanka had a major advantage to respond to tsunami as before the tsunami, it had field offices in the Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Trincomalee districts. In Indonesia, major domain of UNICEF intervention included provision of life saving supplies, provision of basic services, reopening schools. The majority of the funds went to “water, sanitation, and hygiene; basic education; child protection; and child and maternal health and nutrition”. The UNICEF undertook multiple loss assessment nutrition surveys, education survey as well as the rapid assessment of learning spaces (RALS) in both countries. But, in the process of loss assessment in Indonesia, the UNICEF lacked standard assessment tools for consistent rapid assessments, comprehensive coverage and qualitative assessment of data. Only the country office in Sri Lanka had developed standard evaluation templates to assure data comparability. Unfortunately, they were not employed consistently in the field. In both countries, the UNICEF was highly funded, but the UNICEF fund expenditure revealed that Indonesia appeared to be making less expenditure in terms of the total fund allocated when compared to Sri Lanka.

The UNICEF in these two countries exhibited its readiness in education sector with steadfast effort to open school at the earliest possible. The Indian Ocean Tsunami coupled with armed conflicts pushed the UNICEF to enhance its capacity building in planning, deployment and administration of staff in both countries. The UNDP operationalisation in both the countries went beyond its traditional mandate related to long term recovery. Marking its departure from antiquity, the agency was involved in the early relief assistance and assessment of damage and loss in the domain of governance, livelihood, and risk management in both the countries. It is also to be noted that early phase of relief assistance included recovery component. Simultaneously, in both countries, the UNDP exhibited overlapping between the early assistance as well as long term recovery phases as it began some of the recovery program well in advance in the early phase of assistance. Besides, the damage and loss assessment conducted by the UNDP in both countries, unlike other UN agencies, assessed damage in the governance, livelihood, and risk management

domain. The UNDP operationalisation also reflected changing dynamics between UNDP and NGOs. Traditionally, NGOs, had been “sub-contractor” of the UNDP in execution of multiple projects. But amidst the tsunami, these NGOs had huge amount of resources at their disposal and at several instances these international NGOs approached the UNDP if it could do the work of NGOs.

Like the UNDP, the UNHCR in both the countries kept aside its traditional obligation of refugee protection and engaged in the early assistance through provision of emergency shelter. However, there was difference of the UNHCR’s engrossment in the two countries. In Sri Lanka, it assisted in the emergency and transitional shelter provision and not in provision of permanent shelter whereas in Indonesia, it provided assistance in emergency as well as permanent shelter programmes and not in transitional shelter. Besides, the UNHCR’s early relief assistance in Indonesia became a sensitive issue for GoI because of presence of offices of the UNHCR in this sensitive Aceh region and outflow of the GAM rebels to Malaysia to seek UNHCR protection against GoI. This was distasteful for the Indonesian government and it limited role for UNHCR in Aceh area. Subsequently, the UNHCR was asked to pull back its activity in March 2005 in the midst of emergency phase. In other case of Sri Lanka, the UNHCR had presence in the country much before the advent of tsunami, but, unlike Indonesia it was not asked to cease its operations in Sri Lanka in the early relief phase. Finally, in both countries, the UNHCR had dearth of institutional capacity, shelter experts and they were reliant on external expertise for their emergency shelter project.

In the early disaster relief assistance phase, operationalisation of the prominent normative framework i.e. norms and principles of the UNOCHA as well as the IASC Operational Guidelines revealed mixed experiences of obedience and violation in both countries. The UNOCHA principle of equity and non-discrimination were violated during aid distribution in both countries marked with instances of misdistribution as well as maltreatment. In Indonesia, the best assistances were kept for themselves neglecting the Aceh region, the most affected region in Indonesia. Similarly, aid actors in Sri Lanka had difficulty getting aid into LTTE controlled region, further compounded by non-visit of UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan in the these LTTE controlled region.

Analysis of the implementation of the IASC guidelines in both countries exhibit that the IASC Guideline on Protection of rights related to the Shelter were flouted as the government run

camps were overcrowded beyond required under the IASC guidelines. In Sri Lanka, the IASC directives pertaining to “protection of life, security and physical integrity” were violated in the LTTE covered region with several incidents of child abductions. Similarly, in Indonesian Aceh Province, “the IASC operational guidelines on natural disasters pertaining to protection of life, security and physical integrity” were kept at abeyance in rescue operations with the UNHCR reported increased cases of domestic violence as well as alcohol use in the camp. Similarly, the IASC guideline of the right to livelihood was under criticism in both countries as temporary resettlement sites were constructed far away from the livelihoods of the fishing community.

Thus, during the early assistance phase, in both countries, under the rubric of the UN, the UNOCHA played as prime coordination mechanism as well the UNDAC as damage assessment mechanism. The multiplicity of the actors involved in assessment caused duplication of work. In the domain of coordination, the UNOCHA served as the principal point of contact for the UN agencies operating in Aceh. Working with these entities had been difficult because each agency had its own flag and processes. Even NGOs resisted to work under the rubrics of the UN agencies and rather competed with them because of huge flow of fund in these two affected countries. Even the coordination proved to be weak. What was revealing in the operationalisation was the operative UN agencies went beyond the traditional mandate to assist in the early phase. UNDP as well as the UNHCR played role much beyond their conventional mandate to help out the victims. The early presence of several of the UN agencies in Sri Lanka could not provide advantage in relief assistance because of conflictual relation between GoSL and the LTTE. Simultaneously, norms, principles as well as guidelines and its non-binding nature require fresh consensus of countries to strengthen these for disaster management under the rubrics of the UN. However, their mere existence and evolution create a normative yardstick in advent of natural disaster response.

The other significant part of the UN response included the long term recovery, rehabilitation as well as disaster reduction measures. Both in Indonesia and Sri Lanka these measures began at the end of the early relief assistance with a new conceptualisation of “Build Back Better” (BBB) to characterise tsunami recovery and rehabilitation phase. The recovery phase in both the countries began to set off in March 2005 with deployment of multitude of actors. Under the rubric of the UN, a position of Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery was established and he was expected to work for reconstruction of the affected regions and provide

assistance to implement national recovery plans. This office garnered support and collected a substantial contribution from various international sources for recovery process. It also raised serious concerns on Sri Lanka's buffer zone policy and focussed efforts to address project financing and budget gaps in the tsunami affected country.

In the long term recovery process, coordination remained vital though several coordination mechanisms were at play on the ground. Under the umbrella of the UN, the UNORC was created to coordinate UN agencies with other humanitarian actors in Indonesia. For the GoI, the UNORC proved to be an important advisor of Badan Rehabilitasidan Rekonstruksi (BRR) on recovery related policy matters. However, such coordination mechanism became a mere forum for information sharing. The Reconstruction and Development Authority (RADA) was a major coordination mechanism under the Sri Lankan government. The GoSL and the LTTE coordinated through the Post Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS) but such mechanism was kept on hold by Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. Under the aegis of the UN, in contrast to Indonesia, Sri Lankan recovery coordination was undertaken by specific UN agencies taking up their own coordination mechanism. In Sri Lanka, an overarching coordination mechanism under the UN umbrella for the UN agencies seems to be missing. Rather, specific UN agencies coordinated their own work. For Instance, the UNHCR agreed to be the lead organisation in organising the transitional shelter programme.

Reflecting upon the responses and operationalisation of the UN agencies in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, they exhibited their immense contribution to overall recovery as well as rehabilitation process. Comparatively, the UNDP programme in Indonesia was the largest compared to any other tsunami affected countries including Sri Lanka. In both countries, the UNDP recovery process and relief programme was closely intertwined. Therefore, the recovery related policies and programmes were undertaken well in advance even in relief phase. In both countries, UNDP actively carried out income generation programmes, such as CfW as well as infrastructural development. For instance, in Indonesia, the UNDP in collaboration with BRR and local government implemented Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTRP) launched CfW programme, waste management, recovery and others. The UNDP largely contributed to field of governance, its endeavour led to successful as well as transparent municipal election in Aceh region of Indonesia. This election was held in backdrop of decade old conflict

between the GAM and GoI. In Sri Lanka, the UNDP initiated capacity building and recovery programme (CBDRM). In the field of governance in Sri Lanka, the UNDP concentrated on capacity enhancement of administration, local government as well as the private sector. Disaster risk reduction remained priority for the UNDP in both the countries, where it provided expert's inputs and recommendations to design as well as to enact disaster related legislation. In Indonesia, UNDP assisted in disaster risk reduction legislation. Similarly, the agency also assisted Sri Lankan government in designing the Disaster Management Act 2005, consistent with the guidelines of the Hyogo Framework.

During the recovery process, in both countries, recovery programmes were extension of the emergency relief phase with focus on similar set of programmes in the domain of children's education, health, sanitation and related infrastructure accounting long term needs and requirements. Health, education and professional growth remained significant to long term agenda of the UNICEF. In Indonesia, construction of child centric schools, capacity building of the governmental institutions, creation of educational database for framing corrective policies were vital contributions made by the agency. Besides, establishment of water and sanitation as well as health infrastructure, psychological support were significant assistance provided by the UNICEF. Such programmes were simultaneously brought in Indonesia. In contrast to Sri Lanka, the UNICEF activities in Indonesia were marked with innovations. The UNICEF in Indonesia brought the concept of children centric court and laws, unlike the criminal laws. Such distinctive innovation lacked in the UNICEF programmes in Sri Lanka.

Comparison of challenges exhibited that the UNICEF Indonesia was troubled in the realm of education with dearth of qualified teachers. Its works were also derailed because of death of government employees. There was dearth of lucid directions government causing confusion. Compared to Indonesia, in Sri Lanka, the reconstruction move was at a much slower pace as more than 200 schools were occupied for temporary shelter of the affected families. The UNICEF in Sri Lanka exhibited lack of simultaneous planning of shelter, water as well as sanitation sectors. Its WASH initiatives reeled under inflated costs, therefore faced difficulty in implementation. The recovery process in the country derailed also because of inaccessibility of the agency in conflict-zone and shift of the UNICEF efforts to conflict related concerns as fighting intensified in 2008 between the government forces and the LTTE, hampering the tsunami related recovery. Thus,

broader analysis of the UNICEF recovery programme exhibited congruence as well as divergence in both countries.

The UNHCR response in Indonesia and Sri Lanka went beyond its traditional role of refugee protection into shelter provision in the long term. In both countries, there were distinct strategies in shelter provision. In the Indonesia, the UNHCR primarily engaged in permanent housing and provided technical assistance in the transitional shelter provision. On the other hand, in Sri Lankan case, the UNHCR assisted in transitional shelter provision and did not get engaged in permanent shelter that was left to others. In its transitional phase, the agency supported the GoSL in execution of Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) as well as supervision of its shelter programme construction. The UNHCR shelter programme in both countries were riddled with problems. In Indonesia, the UNHCR faced high construction cost and also demand for community intervention in design modification in permanent houses. On the other side, in Sri Lanka, slow pace of the transitional housing as well as the new buffer zoning policy delayed permanent shelter. Most importantly, in both these countries the UNHCR had to put its shelter programmes to different contractors as they lacked expertise in this field.

The adherence to the normative framework relating to recovery and reconstruction in the natural disaster in both the countries were marked by mixed outcome. The IASC guidelines pertaining to right to housing, shelter were accompanied by concerns in both the countries. There was dearth of participation and consultation with stakeholders including women or other sections in design and place of such housing. Such decisions were largely decided by the centralised governmental agencies, thus were inconsistent with the IASC guidelines that stresses upon the community participation in decision making. In Indonesia, community participation and coordination with other national level bodies in planning process affected the shelter and permanent housing. On the other side, Sri Lanka's housing and shelter initiatives were marginalised as "traditional settlement patterns, housing types and layouts, and cultural and ethnic dimensions" were not taken into consideration. Instances of gender discrimination were also reported as the women complained about the lack of accessibility to recovery programmes. Further, recovery and rehabilitation process in Indonesia was marred by instances of bribes in documentation, military intrusion in the working of the international organisation as well as restriction on political, social and economic rights violating the IASC guidelines in long term recovery process. To a large extent, in both the countries the IASC principles pertaining to right



to livelihood were violated where the women livelihood needs were not kept in priority. On the other case of Sri Lanka, there were instances of discrimination in project implementation. In the country greater focus in project implementation was given to the southern region, marginalising northern and eastern region that had equally bore burnt of tsunami 2004.

Thus, the recovery and rehabilitation phase saw a new innovation under the UN umbrella with creation of a new office of Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery as well as a new principles of Build Back Better (BBB) that became bedrock for this phase. This became a replicable model for future recovery programmes. Under the rubrics of the UN, coordination in recovery phase in Indonesia was undertaken by UNORC, on the other hand, Sri Lanka, lacked an overarching mechanism like the UNORC rather specific UN agencies were taking the lead in the coordination process. Thus, there is urgency to reform to establish a coordination mechanism in recovery phase like the UNOCHA. A rethinking is also necessitated around UN operative agencies that had come to undertake new responsibility beyond their traditional mandate, thus to sustain such new attributed role, these agencies need to be reformed to undertake new assignments. Simultaneously, the norms, principles and guidelines for recovery process need to be further developed and reinforced.

There are seven research questions of this study. The first research question is “What is the existing and evolving nature of international disaster response at the global level?” This research question has been addressed in chapter II of the thesis. First it traces the evolution of global disaster discourse since 19<sup>th</sup> century till recent years. Then, response at the international level in general, entailing the global as well as regional framework of disaster response has been discussed in the chapter. The second research question is “What are the different norms, principles and guidelines and institutional mechanism under the rubrics of UN to respond to natural disasters?” This research question is also addressed in chapter II of the thesis. It deals with in depth discussion on the UN norms, strategies and mechanisms to tackle with natural disasters.

Third research question is “Has there been any shift in the UN approach to respond to natural disaster?” This research question has been also accounted in the chapter II of the thesis. Traditionally, the UN response to natural disasters concentrated on the immediate relief and coordination role. In course of evolution, there has been gradual shift to long term disaster reduction measures as well as disaster preparedness. These developments have been captured in

deliberations and outcome documents of “world conferences in Yokohama 1994, Hyogo 2005 and Sendai 2015”. Such shift to disaster reduction has also been importantly reflected in the institutional mechanism of the UN and its agencies discussed in chapter II.

Fourth research question is “What were the major points of similarity and dissimilarity of effects of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka?” The answer to this research questions is dealt in chapter III of the thesis. Both the countries were struggling with the internal conflict, chronic poverty and poor human rights record. In terms of the human toll, the damage of the Tsunami was more intense in case of Aceh, Indonesia than in Sri Lanka, making it second worst tsunami hit nation. In Sri Lanka, the north and eastern region largely inhabited by Tamils were the most affected region. Economically, the loss was huge for both the countries, Indonesia loss is calculated at US\$ 4.5 billion comparatively Sri Lanka had lesser loss amounting to approximately about \$1 billion, or 4.5% of its GDP. Both these countries faced a larger concern of already existing internally displaced population because of long protracted conflicts.

Fifth research question is “How did onset of disaster and longstanding conflict in Indonesia and Sri Lanka affect the immediate relief measures in both the countries?” is elaborated in Chapter IV of the thesis. Both countries affected by the tsunami response combined with conflict. The Aceh region, Indonesia had prolonged conflict between the GAM and GoI but they came to an agreement in the process of tsunami response giving some leverage in relief assistance. But, despite the agreement, the government had stringent control over the presence of international NGOs including even the UN agencies. On the otherside, in Sri Lanka, government as well as the LTTE were in conflict amidst of tsunami and there was no explicit agreement between them to help individuals in the LTTE controlled tsunami affected areas. Rather in Sri Lanka, LTTE was autonomous to provide aid and relief in the wake of tsunami. They also became part of the aid sharing by the government later kept on hold by Sri Lankan Supreme Court. In Sri Lanka, with change in president from Kumaratunga to Mahinda Rajapakse in November 2005 tough stance were taken by the later that made situation tensed between the government and the rebels. Thus, in Sri Lanka, tsunami had no substantial role in strengthening the peace process. This hampered the decision making on immediate relief measures at all levels including the districts affected both by conflict and Tsunami. Thus, in Sri Lanka civil strife created problems in distribution of aid in the LTTE region during the tsunami period.

Sixth research question is “How UN agencies responded to tsunami 2004 in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in tsunami affected reconstruction and rehabilitation?” This question has been responded in Chapter V. The UNDP, UNICEF and UNCHR were actively involved in both long term rehabilitation and recovery phase. What is significant to mention that the agencies like UNDP as well as UNHCR have moved beyond their mandate amidst tsunami. Traditionally, the UNDP had been engaged itself in the long term recovery as well as development mostly in conflict zone, but tsunami saw its involvement in case of natural disaster. Comparatively, the UNDP programme in Indonesia was the largest compared to any other tsunami affected countries including Sri Lanka. In both countries, the UNDP actively carried out income generation programmes, such as cash for work (CfW) as well as infrastructural development. The UNDP largely contributed to field of governance, its endeavour led to successful as well as transparent municipal election in Aceh region of Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, the UNDP initiated capacity building and recovery programme (CBDRM). In the field of governance the UNDP focussed capacity enhancement of government, local government and civil society. In the domain of disaster risk reduction it aided through expert’s inputs and recommendations to design and enact disaster related legislation. In Indonesia, UNDP assisted in disaster risk reduction law and similarly, the agency also aided Sri Lankan government in design of the Disaster Management Act 2005.

During the recovery process, in both countries, recovery programmes were extension of the emergency relief phase with focus on similar set of programmes in the domain of children’s education, health, sanitation and related infrastructure accounting long term needs and requirements. Health, education and professional growth remained significant to long term agenda of the UNICEF. In Indonesia, construction of child centric schools, capacity building of the governmental institutions, creation of educational database for framing corrective policies were vital contributions made by the agency.

The UNHCR response in Indonesia and Sri Lanka went beyond its traditional role of refugee protection into shelter provision in the long term. In both countries, there were distinct strategies in shelter provision. In the Indonesia, the UNHCR primarily engaged in permanent housing and provided technical assistance in the transitional shelter provision. On the other hand, in Sri Lankan case, the UNHCR assisted in transitional shelter provision and did not get engaged in permanent shelter that was left to others. In its transitional phase, the UNHCR supported the

GoSL in execution of Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) as well as supervision of its shelter programme construction. The UNHCR shelter programme in both countries were riddled with problems. In Indonesia, the UNHCR faced high construction cost and also demand for community intervention in design modification in permanent houses. On the other side, in Sri Lanka, slow pace of the transitional housing as well as the new buffer zoning policy delayed permanent shelter. Most importantly, in both these countries the UNHCR had to put its shelter programmes to different contractors as they lacked expertise in this field.

Seventh research question is “What lesson does each of the two victim countries offer for the future UN responses to natural disasters?” The penultimate research question about the lessons that both victim countries offer for the future UN responses to natural disasters is offered in chapter II, III, IV as well as V of the thesis. It proposes to revamp the UNDAC, undertake reform in the UN agencies to take on the natural disaster mechanism and incorporate disaster reduction priorities in its policy as well as institutionalisation. Under the UNDAC, need for attaching varied experts to UNDAC for instance seismologist is need of the hour. The UN agencies like the UNICEF as well as the UNHCR need to recalibrate themselves to adjust themselves to new responsibility of responding to different phases of natural disaster. The augmented funding from the private sector and their assistance to the UN agencies need to undertake adjustments and preparedness in these UN agencies. The UN agency like UNHCR has to incorporate shelter experts as they have come to undertake the responsibility of shelter provision. Besides, shortage of staff, lack of local officials put enough competition to the UN from NGOs. These were some of the significant learning for the UN agencies to respond to natural disaster.

The first hypothesis “the UN’s policy shift from immediate disaster relief measures to disaster prevention in response to natural disasters led to the institutional adaptation and change in the policy orientation of various UN agencies” remains validated. The chapter II of the thesis deals with this hypothesis. The institutional mechanism under the rubric of the UN to respond to natural disasters initially began with establishment of the UNDRO with a motto to coordinate and distribute relief measures. It got replaced by the UNOCHA and coupled with restructuring and reorientation of the UN operative agencies that reflects the concern to disaster reduction. UN agencies had come to incorporate disaster reduction as priority in the policy and institutionalisation. Additionally, the UN policy shift to disaster risk reduction was also reflected

in institutionalisation of the UN agencies too. The various conferences in 2005 made disaster risk reduction as important component. To elucidate, the UNDP was mandated to undertake responsibility pertaining to operationalisation of natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness by the UN General Assembly. Subsequently, it employed disaster risk reduction practitioners in its operationalisation and had undertaken Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) initiative that pools together expertise from the UN as well as outside to reduce disaster as well as climate risk. The UNICEF has also established the UNICEF Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS) to assist emergency activities. UNICEF's Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) had been established to tackle emergency situations in the field of "water and sanitation, child protection and education". The UNICEF policy also remains consistent with "Hyogo Framework of Action" to ensure disaster risk reduction incorporation in policies of the governments.

The second hypothesis is "the internal conflicts within Indonesia and Sri Lanka led to the derailment of the immediate relief phase and funding assistance in both the countries" is validated. This hypothesis has been addressed in chapter IV of the thesis. Though there was huge outpour of funding in the region afflicted by the internal conflict but it was derailed in the early relief assistance. In Sri Lanka, despite existence of the ceasefire, since February 2002, there lacked consensus or formal treaty about how the relief assistance would be carried forward in region where the LTTE was dominant. To add, there were instances of delayed delivery of the aid in the LTTE controlled area. This region of the north and east part faced neglect and a sizeable aid came to the southern part of the country. The early relief assistance in the LTTE region came primarily from the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), the humanitarian entity close to the LTTE that carried out the relief assistance on the ground. Both the GoSL and LTTE charged each other for politicising assistance. Similarly, it was thought that agreement between the GAM as well as Indonesian government could provide better advantage for Indonesia. But, in Indonesia, military controlled aid distribution and International aid organisations could not move out of Banda Aceh without a military escort. The deployment of excessive security forces caused flouting several guidelines established by the IASC. Instances of theft of the aid and allegation and counter allegations between GoI and the GAM pointing fingers at the military and vice versa about such theft of aid. Thus, Indonesian military wanted to control over the aid that further delayed the relief distribution. Therefore, the relief assistance was derailed in both countries in immediate relief

phase. Besides, operative UN agencies like the UNICEF marked small presence in Aceh due to protracted conflict that made UNICEF's access difficult to Aceh in the early days of disaster. Its full scale operationalisation began to take off three weeks later after the advent of the tsunami 2004. In terms of staff, the UNICEF staff increased accompanied by expansion of the UNICEF Indonesia office. Thus, internal conflict in both countries derailed the early relief assistance. Such validation of hypothesis is mentioned in chapter IV of the thesis.

The hypothesis "the presence of the UN agencies in Sri Lanka much before the tsunami and better co-ordination among them led to more successful response to the crisis in Sri Lanka than in Indonesia". Such invalidation of hypothesis is mentioned in chapter IV and V of the thesis. This hypothesis is rejected as both the countries faced coordination difficulties even though the UN agencies were present in Sri Lanka before advent of tsunami. For instance, the UNICEF in Sri Lanka had a major advantage to deal with tsunami disaster as it had field offices in the Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Trincomalee district, but the coordination mechanism under the UNOCHA lack capability to have control over the UN agencies. Further, the UN agencies operational in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka were interested more in asserting their own existence. The multiple NGOs' refused to coordinate and share information and at many instances refused to work under the umbrella of the UN. Thus, early presence of the UN agencies did not give additional advantage to Sri Lanka.

This study demonstrates both strength and weakness of the UN to respond to tsunami 2004. The Indian Ocean Tsunami saw new sets of responsibility undertaken by the UN operative agencies different from their traditional role. Digressing from the past, they actively involved in both early relief assistance as well as long term recovery and rehabilitation phase. A new partnership with the private sector came to these UN agencies in course of providing assistance. Such emerging developments necessitate further strengthening of these UN operative agencies as well as research in these specific domains. This study also highlights the requirement of various reforms to make UN operative agencies more effective dealing with natural disaster. To undertake long term recovery and reconstruction, the UN has only adhoc coordination mechanisms that need to be revamped and need further research. The UNOCHA, the prime coordination mechanism under UN in relief phase and its related tools like the UNDAC, the ERC, the IASC and the virtual

OSOCC require thorough study of their performance and reform to make them effective. This opens up scope for further exploration of the UN system's response to natural disaster.

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