THE GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHNONATIONALISM : A CASE STUDY OF SRI LANKA

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Award of the degree of

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It is certified that the Dissertation entitled a *The Geographical Analysis Of Ethnonationalism : A Case Study Of Sri Lanka* submitted by Bhaskar Katamneni in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. This is his own work and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation

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DEDICATED TO ALL MY TEACHERS WHO HAVE SHAPED ME INTO WHAT I AM TODAY.

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Preface

It is frequently asserted that terms like "ethno nationalism" or "religious-ethnic conflict, regionalism," however much in vogue, are quite misleading. They are so, it is said, because they mistakenly suggest something inseparable and essential about the connection between religion, ethnicity territory and nationalism, as though ethnicity was the source of these things. But far from being the source, ethnicity is in actuality usually a "tool" or "veil" for prior and ulterior territorial or nationalist interests. According to Walker Connor, national and religious identity ought not be confused; in fact, in regard to what makes for intense and enduring social loyalty, "the well-springs of national identity are more profound than are those associated with religion...."

It is true the role of ethnicity can be overstated and misunderstood. Ethnicity and nationalism are highly complicated and variable phenomena that resist simple diagnoses of any kind, including those involving region. Sensitivity to such complexity is urgently required in studying the subject.

However we must be careful in drawing conclusions about it, because there is something interesting and worthwhile in examining the recurring correlation of ethnicity and nationalism. If region is all that incidental a factor, why does ethnic conflict and the struggle over national identity in so many places-in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tibet and China, Israel, India, Nigeria, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, etc.-have such a conspicuous and enduring territorial component? Even if territory is used or manipulated for ulterior

purposes, why, exactly, is it religion that repeatedly gets used for ethnic and nationalist purposes?

To put it another way, why does the assertion of ethnic and national identity so frequently involve, as it obviously does, creation of the idea of home lands in order to justify their national aims. In short, what, precisely, is the connection between territory, ethnicity, and nationalism

This is the point from which one should start the journey into the world of ethnonationalism. How geography plays an important role in the creation and sustenance of these identities and how these identity politics are structured around territory would be the questions for which we should seek answers.

Sri Lanka was chosen because it represents all those elements of the ethno nationalist debate wrapped around the idea of separate homelands. Another motivating factor was the involvement of India in this issue.

I sincerely hope that i would be able to unravel the intricacies of this phenomenon with respect to this island country.

All the errors are mine.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ethnic nationalism - it seems to be the scourge of the Twentieth Century. It played a major role in motivating countless warriors in the past hundred years, often throwing a people's desire to achieve independence and self-rule into conflict with some larger state of which they were part. One can see this situation being played out from the Balkans to the Punjab and from Tibet to Nigeria. Ethnicity seems to be a nearly universal motivation for a group to take up arms and fight a common enemy, within their borders or abroad.

The Indian sub-continent has not been free of this type of ethnically motivated conflict. In the past fifty years alone, independent India has dealt with ethnic separatist movements in Kashmir, the Punjab and Assam. Similarly, Pakistan has faced portions of its population who are willing to take up arms for separatism in its Sindh[1] province. In recent years, though, the ethnic conflict of South Asia that has dominated the headlines is that of Sri Lanka, where the minority Sri Lankan Tamils are pitted against the majority Sinhalese in the former's drive for a separate state of Eelam. For a few years in the conflict, Sri Lanka's huge neighbor, India, ostensibly played the role of mediator between the two parties.

The increasing awareness of group identities and how they perceive themselves in the national collective have challenged many countries to redefine themselves in terms of

their national identities. For instance, the perception of President Chandrika Kumaratunga[2] is that all citizens of Sri Lanka are part of a single national collective: hence the recent statement, "We are Sri Lanka - One country One People" On the other hand, the perception of the Sri Lankan Tamil community is that they are a separate and distinct nation, implying that Sri Lanka is a country with at least two nations, thereby challenging the concept of a single nation.

Similar conflicting views were expressed at the recent convention of the Conservative Party in U.K. Lord Tebbit's[3] view was that "Multi-culturalism is a divisive force. One cannot uphold two sets of ethics or be loyal to two nations, any more than a man can have two masters. It perpetuates ethnic divisions. By contrast, the Chairman of the Conservative Party, William Hague projected the Conservative Party as an all-inclusive party with a "Multi-cultural" image that would be representative of current English society.

America too is addressing thc issue of its national identity. Samuel Huntington's view is that "The ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity ... deny the existence of a common culture...and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other sub national[4] cultural identities and groupings". Continuing he states that "The original Founding Fathers saw diversity as a reality and a problem: hence the national motto, e pluribus Unum"). Quoting the warning of Theodore Roosevelt, Huntington states[5], "The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities... Bill

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[1] For a detailed discussion on this issue refer to Asif Zakaria," The Mohazir Quami Movement in Pakistan", London: routledge, 1992.
[2] The Daily news ,September 4, 1999.
[3] Quoted from the Independent, October8 ,2000.
[4] The foreign affairs, September/October 1997.

Clinton[6], in contrast, was almost certainly the first president to promote the diversity rather than the unity of the country he leads... As a result, ethnic identities are becoming more meaningful and appear to be increasing in relevance compared with national identity" .

These contrasting perceptions of groups are eroding national identities and leading to divisiveness and instability in many countries. Does it then mean that an essential precondition for stability is a monolithic or homogeneous society where ethnic or other group identities are congruent with political boundaries? But such societies are the exception. Most political units are made up of communities divided by race, ethnicity, culture, and religion, to mention a few. An added component can be that some groups see themselves as nations. Unlike other distinctions, the concept of one or more nations within a state has political implications. Therefore, despite the ambiguity and vagueness of terms such as "nation", it is critical that an attempt be made to understand these contrasting perceptions of nationhood because they could very well be the underlying source for instability in countries such as Sri Lanka.

1.1 NATIONALISM: THEORETICAL VIEW POINTS:

So just what is nationalism anyway? Is it a recent phenomenon or does it go back much further? Well, that's something that is the focus of much heated debate; many have attempted to define concepts such as nation nationalism people ethnicity and other group

[5] Quoted from Neville Laduwahetty," What Is A Nation", Ethno politics, August 2000.p165
[6] Quoted from Smith et al, "collected debates of congress", Washington, US Library of Congress, 1997.

identities in precise terms. The very nature of these terms eludes definition.[7] It would be difficult to name four words more essential to global geopolitics than state nation, nation-state, and nationalism.[8] Not withstanding the ambiguity of these terms there exists a broad acceptance that the concept of a nation has significance greater than other group identities because it has a political dimension that does not exist in other identities.

Before considering the relation between the structure and function of a nation, a brief introduction to the range of theories of nationalism would be extremely useful in furthering this study. Any comprehensive review of theories of nationalism can however be of a book length[9].but an attempt has been made to give a birds eye view of the same.

At least nine academic disciplines[10]develop theories of nationalism and nation states:

- Political geography
- International studies
- Political science
- Cultural anthropology
- Social psychology
- Political philosophy

[7] For instance, the UN charter interchanges the words people, nation and the state.
[8] Walker Connor," Ethno nationalism", London, Blackwell, 1994.
[9] For instance Smith, "The Oxford Reader On Nationalism", Hutchinson , 1994
[10] Though there are other disciplines studying the issue, only those disciplines producing a substantial amount of research have been considered.

- International law
- Sociology
- History

When researchers in social sciences comes to defining the terms "nation" and "nationalism" in recent years, they have tended to fall into two general, yet distinct camps: what Anthony D. Smith calls the primordialists[11] and the modernists. Modernists, represented by sociologists such as Benedict Anderson, have pronounced the nation an essentially modern creation, with few roots in pre-modern times.

Smith himself is probably the leading and most prolific primordialist -- a believer in the historical longevity of nationalism and ethnicity. Even though modern "nationalism" itself (the idea of popular self rule) is only 200 years, he argues that ethnic identity has existed for thousands of years, and nationalism can only be understood as its modern articulation. Primordialists tend to see nations as being essential, basic units of social cohesion, a universal attribute of humanity.

Walker Connor also belongs to the primordialists. Connor challenges modernist/structural theorists who see ethnicity only as a by-product of modernization. Instead, he argues, myths of kinship and common origin are crucial to the genesis of nationalism. In fact, Connor's work also suggests a strong aesthetic/semiotic bent, revolving around the concepts of land, youth, blood, and sacrifice. Primordialists[12] also

[11] A D Smith in "nationalism," 1992, pp. 12

[12] Primordialist approach has been displaced from the center of this debate in the recent past it should however be appreciated for the enormous amount of literature generated in the past.

argue that every so-called 'nation' has constructed for itself a sense of national identity, built up partly on its observations and stereotypes of both its own people and of other nations. Though subject to alteration and development, it is these stereotypes that form the web of collective myths and memories that are the stuff of national identity, built up over centuries and as old as human society itself. Modernists might agree with much of that, but place the concept and process of nationhood in the specific context of modern society (particularly in Europe)[13]. Human beings might have sustained distinctive ethnic and cultural patterns in earlier eras, but that was not nationalism as we understand it today.

Modernists are sometimes divided between structuralists and deconstructionsists, reflecting the wider split in cultural studies between structuralism and poststructuralism. (Another sub-group sometimes identified by commentators are the "Instrumentalists," who posit that nationalism is often used as tool by elites to pursue economic or political goals: John Breuilly's *Nationalism and the States,* for example, holds that elites used nationalism as a tool to build coalitions to undermine the multinational empires of central Europe.)

Structuralists, while approaching the problem from various angles, all tend to see nationalism as an epiphenomenon of deeper social mechanisms -- such as modern communications (Karl Wolfgang Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication*), modern industry (Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*), and capitalism at a particular stage of its development[14] .Gellner's work, one of the standard sociological introductions to the field, argues that the need of modern industrial economies for a mobile and

[13] Most of the works on nationalism take a western centric approach, its only recently that some authors have come up with a third world view of the problem

[14]Quoted from Hobsbawm ," Nations and Nationalism Since 1780".

interchangeable workforce requires complex new skills and social formations beyond the resources of family and kinship ties. Such skills "can only be provided by a public education system that requires vast resources and standardization." integrated by (preferably) a single language and within a centralized political, economic, and educational system.

For deconstructionists such as Benedict Anderson, ethnicity and nationalism are essentially artificial constructs, "capricious imagined communities that float out of the new forms of media that have spread with economic modernization." Anderson's description of a nation as an "imagined political community" has been widely quoted. It is imagined, he posits, "Because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community." It is a community; he goes on, because it is "conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship"[15]. This is a useful definition, although its modernist presumptions make it problematic. Anderson makes some useful contributions to the study of nationalism, noting the different stages of its (supposedly) modern development, from the Americas through Europe until "the final stage" of nation building in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union. However, his stress on the artificiality of the state is too simplistic, and is over dependent on his favored case study, Indonesia[16], a rather exceptional (and faulty) example of the nation-state. What's more, as Peter Rutland notes in a review of the field, the title of his seminal work, Imagined Communities, is somewhat misleading. "Although the 'communities' may in a sense be imagined, the states around which they

[15] From "Anderson, "Imagined communities", 1991 p.6
[16] Many such examples can be given to refute the author's position but the one used in the text was deemed to be most valid. Same is the case with sri lanka

coalesce are all too real" (and Indonesia is the prime example of this). "Thus submerged in Anderson's text is a very different theory from that of deconstructionism: an account of nationalism as the product of the breakup of colonial empires" -- perhaps more in common with Breuilly's "instrumentalist" vision on *Nationalism and the States*.

Perhaps the simplest (or most over simplistic) working appraisal of nationalism comes from historian Eric Hobsbawm, who, for the purposes of his work, "assumes no a priori definition of what constitutes a nation. As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation,' will be treated as such" (Hobsbawm 1990, 6). For Marxists such as Hobsbawm, the power of nationalism is something they have had great trouble reconciling with their core beliefs of the primacy of class conflict in and economic exploitation in society. Hobsbawm seeks to explain nationalism as a deliberate ploy by the capitalist class to sow 'false consciousness' in order to divert the proletariat from the class struggle.

1.2 THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHERS

Geographers have also not lagged behind in espousing the cause of the nationalist ideologies(Agnew, 1984 Blaut,1986 Knight, 1982 Mclaughin,1986 Williams, 1982 etc.)Agnew opined that the way nationalism has been treated in social sciences speaks of inadequate geographical analysis. Williams [17]has however listed out five broad areas where geographical analysis could be very useful. They are:

1. National construction of social space,

[17] Williams, "National and Notional space" London, Sage, 1985, pp 250-265 .

2. Uneven development and nationalism.

3. The secular intelligentsia

4. Structural preconditions and triggering factors.

5. Ecological analysis.

Throughout the history of the nation states from that of European type to the recent post colonial nationalism have always brought into focus the delimitation of boundary and the appropriation of territory. Geography has always been at loggerheads with history in the staking of different claims to nationhood. Controlling the nation's past is a means by which other national, often deemed subordinate pasts can be eliminated. It is a means by which consciousness is structured and experiences are colonized (wright, 1985,p.142) .

Though the importance of territory and territoriality has been indicated time and again by many writers in nation building its significance has been given its due role only by the geographers. "Territory[18] is a bounded space ,that is a very substantial, material, measurable, and concrete entity although it is also the product and indeed the expression of the psychological features of human groups".(Gottman,1973,p.15)

Nationalists who want to match their distinctive group identity with their claimed or held territory would accept that "territory is space to which identity is attached by a distinctive group who hold or covet that territory and who desire to have full control over it for the groups benefit"(knight, 1982,p.526). This attachment and desire can be called as an expression of territoriality. Sack has presented the concept of territoriality beautifully as

[18]Similar definitions have also been given by Waterman (1985), Buchanan(1978)and Breuilly(1993).

"the attempt by an individual or groups (x)to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. He has indicated ten tendencies why territoriality is a means of exercising control. One of the important reasons is that it reifies power identifying it with a place than a social relationship,i.e:territory can be used ideologically[19] as an icon to promote certain interests which require social control by associating them with a place within which that control is exercised there by legitimizing the control by obscuring its real nature.In the original state nationalisms the boundaries are laid well before the sense of nationalism is identified among the population.such a kind of nationalisms involve not only the development of economic ideological military resources of the population binding them in a tight network of communication and complementarity based on mass participation.(deutsch 1953,p.54)but this is not always true sometimes national identities do not form that easily or smoothly without effort on the part of the institutions of the state. The same explanation holds good for states created by European states where vast frontier regions have only been incorporated recently into the world economy .the frontier is thus both a symbolic space of production as well as reproduction of national identities.

A large number of states have been created with artificial boundaries which encompass different ethnic groups with different religious and linguistic associations. most states contain potential secessionist nationalisms[20] .it is not only the intra state cleavages but also powerful hold of supra nationalism that they have to contend with. Internal unity based on the accepted nationhood and territorial demarcation has constituted an important aspect of the practical politics and strategies of nationalist movements. The nationalist

[19]Ed: Johnston et al ,"Nationalism, Self Determination and Political Geography" ,croomhelm,1988.p312

movement should draw from a complex set of factors to link the diverse people who live in various parts of the territory at physical socially and mentally so that they identify themselves with the territory.

Nationalism thus uses a variety of symbols to inculcate a sense of national unity and draws selectively from history to build and legitimize its own interpretation of the nation[21]. For national unity to be protected it keeps the other (enemy) outside the society. Thus nationalisms based on primordial features have to be strengthened with some other unifying factor that can be expressed territorially.

Though there are a variety of nationalisms and a plethora of economic political and social factors that produce it in the contemporary world map nationalism can only be situated along with state. State has sovereignty and self determination has no practical meaning without the force of the state to enforce it. Thus the claims for autonomy and territorial reorganization put forth by sub national nationalisms are dependent upon the existing state that it is challenging. Any analysis of nationalism would not consider this factor only at its peril.

In the previous paragraphs we have identified the significance of territory how it is delimited and controlled appropriated for nationalistic and state goals. Great debates have been done regarding the relationship of nationalism[22] to processes such as capitalism global integration and also fragmentation.(Ehrenreich,1983.. Stokes ,1986)modernization and the creation of bureaucracy(Gellner 1983)and the rise of rationalistic scientific thought(A.D.

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[20] From Nielsen ,"Ethnicity" Crogman, London, 1985,pp.31-32

[21] Though the discussion edges towards the sociological aspects , it is useful in understanding the issues from a behaviorist perspective which is assuming greater significance in geographical studies.

[22] Also refer to Smith," Federalism: The Multi Ethnic Challenge", 1987.Chapter 1.

Smith, 1971).All these debates have territorial dimension but with little explicit appraisal of its role in the construction of nationalism. Theories of uneven development internal colonialism and ethnic resurgence are understood through the use of core periphery relationships. Even Wallerstein only explains the difference in scale at which the economy and the polity operate without going into the details. Gellners work also hardly mentions territory. Local and regional societies according to him would lose their territorial attachments as they are integrated into the world economy. However we should understand that separatist nationalisms are found in these peripheral regions mostly.

A closer look at these theoretical view points suggests that any comprehensive theory of nationalism should provide us with the following answers.

- An account of the genesis and evolution of the idea of the nation state and its diffusion world wide.
- A spatio-temporal explanation of the varying structures ideologies and movements of nationalism in the modern period.
- An understanding of the collective feelings or sentiments of national identity along with the corresponding elements of consciousness.

Among the different theories surveyed most serve the area of evolution of the idea of nation state the second objective is but partially met in other theories and the third objective is yet to be explored. In the general sense, most studies of nationalism are more or less superficial historical or ethnographic descriptions of concrete cases, comparisons are

scarce. Neither classical nor contemporary social science considered nationalism as a central phenomenon of modern states, but rather as a passing ideology. However in the recent past some authors have realized its endemic existence. But on the whole, the amount of research on these lines is scarce. Another major lacuna is the exclusion of the idea of space as an overriding factor in the expression of such collective identities. The author would like to carry such a tradition which has been lately emerging further. Thus the second chapter of the dissertation would focus on the issue of space as a major factor in shaping the identities of the various groups in Sri Lanka.

On the issue of the origin of the phenomenon in eastern world vis a vis the western counterparts, there are some issues that need to be addressed .For instance Anthony D smith in his book titled" national identity (1991)states that there was no nation in ancient Greece only a collection of city states. We can speak of Greek culture and other ethnic community but not of an ancient Greek nation. This suggests that whatever else it may be what we mean by national identity involves some sense of political community however tenuous political community in turn implies at least common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all the members of the community it also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they belong.

1.3 THE MODEL AS APPLIED TO SRI LANKA

According to this concept of a nation, Sri Lanka functioned as one country and one nation governed by centralized institutions and a single legal code at least from 1832[23] and it continues to do today. Because Sri Lanka functioned and continues to do so as a single political unit, only one nation can exist with in the territory of Sri Lanka. For more than one nation to exist with in an existing political unit each nation would have to define itself territorially and operate under its own institutions and legal codes, in which event, each would become a separate a nation state. In short only one nation can exist with in a single political community. This issue would be considered in the second chapter of this dissertation where I would examine the idea of two nations in a single state with reference to the Sri Lankan position.

Once such identities are firmed up they create political problems to the constituent elements. If we introduce the idea of space here as an external element again we are talking in terms of geopolitical implications of the existence of such group identities this wield form the core of the fourth chapter of this dissertation.

Once we deconstruct any structure we need to provide a plausible solution. This would be the focus of the fifth chapter that is how the problem can be solved and how a spatial framework is needed in identifying any solution to this problem.

As a student of geography I may be blamed for being partial to the dimension of space sometimes underplaying other forces like time etc. but after going through the

[23] This is longer duration than most western nation states.

dissertation I think any discernable reader should appreciate the role of space vis a vis any other force that operates in the creation of modern states today.

1.4 HYPOTHESES:

In this research study the following hypotheses are sought to be tested:

1) Identifying with Space is a major driving force in creating group identities.

2) Sri Lanka represents a case of two nations in one state

3) Sri Lanka's ethnic problem can be best solved without any outside involvement.

4) The solution to the problem can only be non-territorial in nature

5) Sinhalese are seen as superior to other ethnic groups, because they were the original inhabitants of the island and because they were 'Aryan' migrants from Bengal.

6) Sri Lanka is seen as an island detached from the mainland, i.e. the Sinhalese feel that they are a minority in the region with no other country except Sri Lanka. The minority groups have ethnic links with other countries (e.g. Tamil Nadu in India).

7) The Sinhalese see themselves as the protectors of Buddhism. Appeals to save Buddhism from non-Buddhists and calls for a 'dharma yudhaya' (holy war) to protect Buddhist monuments and religion have often been made.

8) Foreign or minority-owned businesses are said to have retarded the development of Sinhalese businesses.

9Non-Sinhalese have an unfair share of government jobs and university places.

10) The Tamil Consciousness has evolved as a mirror-image to the Sinhalese consciousness.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW:

This is a list of all the essential books one has to consult for studying nationalism. The sources related to the problem region i.e.: Sri Lanka has been provided separately:

1.5.1 Nationalism

The origins and development of nationalism as a political idea are discussed in detail in E.J. Hobsbawm, *nations and nationalism since 1780,* 2nd ed. (1992); Elie Kedourie, *nationalism,* 4th, expanded ed. (1993); Louis l. Snyder, *encyclopedia of nationalism* (1990); Ernest Gellner, *nations and nationalism* (1983); and Hans Kohn, *the idea of nationalism* (1944, reissued 1967). Other discussions of the development of nationalism, including various interpretations in modern times, are Benedict Anderson, *imagined communities,* rev. And extended ed. (1991); Liah Greenfeld, *nationalism* (1992); John Lukacs, *the end of the twentieth century and the end of the modern age* (1993); and Louis l. Snyder, *varieties of nationalism* (1976). A sociological treatment of the subject is Anthony D. Smith, *theories of nationalism,* 2nd ed. (1983). Hugh Seton-Watson, *nations and states* (1977), is a detailed, worldwide study. A new approach to the problem of nationalism was introduced by Karl w. Deutsch, *nationalism and social communication,* 2nd ed. (1965), and *tides among nations* (1979), an overview of the development of his thinking. Nationalism outside western Europe is discussed in Gregory Maddox (ed.), *african nationalism and*

revolution (1993); David rock, *authoritarian Argentina: the nationalist movement, its history, and its impact* (1993); Jill a. Irvine, *the Croat question: partisan politics in the formation of the Yugoslav socialist state* (1993); Rupert Emerson, *from empire to nation: the rise to self-assertion of Asian and African peoples* (1960, reissued 1970); Elie kedourie (ed.), *nationalism in Asia and Africa* (1970); and selig s. Harrison, *the widening gulf* (1978). There are two valuable though dated bibliographies: Koppel s. Pinson, *a bibliographical introduction to nationalism* (1935); and Karl w. Deutsch, *interdisciplinary bibliography on nationalism* (1956).

1.5.2 Sri lanka: General works

Coverage of the geographic, economic, demographic, social, cultural, and historical aspects of the country is found in K M. De Silva (ed.), *sri lanka: a survey* (1977), a collection of studies; *the national atlas of sri lanka* (1988), containing 59 maps accompanied by authoritative texts covering the same range of subjects; and Russell r. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada (eds.), *sri lanka, a country study,* 2nd ed. (1990). H.A.I. Goonetileke, *a bibliography of Ceylon,* 5 vol. (1970-83), is a comprehensive annotated bibliography of writings on Sri Lanka in the western languages from the 16th century onward.

1.5.2.1 Physical and Human Geography.

As a basic geographic text on the country, Elsie Kathleen cook, *Ceylon: its geography, its resources, and its people,* 2nd ed., rev. By k. Kularatnam (1951), remains unsurpassed in detail and depth. B.H. Farmer, "Ceylon," chapter 26 in O H K. Spate, A T A. Learmonth, and A.M. Learmonth, *India and Pakistan,* 3rd ed. Rev. (1967); and B.L C. Johnson and

M.L. Scrivenor, *Sri Lanka: land, people, and economy* (1981), are other outstanding works of this genre. An elegant interpretation of the evolution of Sri Lanka's modern economy is presented in Donald r. Snodgrass, *Ceylon: an export economy in transition* (1966). A. Jeyaratnam wilson, *politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979*, 2nd ed. (1979), provides a useful introduction to the subject. Further insights into the ethnic dimensions of the country's politics can be gained from K M. De Silva, *managing ethnic tensions in multi-ethnic societies: sri lanka, 1880-1985* (1986); and S.J. Tambiah, *sri lanka: ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of democracy* (1986).

1.5.2.2 History.

Surveys of historical development include Sydney d. Bailey, *Ceylon* (1952), stronger on the period of western impact than on early history; s. Arasaratnam, *Ceylon* (1964); S.A. Pakeman, *Ceylon* (1964); E F C. ludowyk, *the story of Ceylon,* 2nd ed. (1967); and K M. De Silva, *a history of sri lanka* (1981), a comprehensive survey.

Early history to 1500 is explored in G.C. Mendis, *the early history of Ceylon and its relations with India and other foreign countries* (1932, reprinted 1985), the first critical treatment of the pre-European period; C W Nicholas and S. Paranavitana, *a concise history of Ceylon* (1961); Wilhelm Geiger, *culture of Ceylon in mediaeval times,* ed. By Heinz Bechert (1960), a social history of the Sinhalese from the 5th century bc to the 15th century ad; Amaradasa liyanagamage, *the decline of polonnaruwa and the rise of dambadeniya, circa 1180-1270 A.D.* (1968), an authoritative study of a hitherto neglected period; and R A L H. Gunawardana, *robe and plough: monasticism and economic interest in early medieval*

sri lanka (1979), an intensely analytical study of the development of Buddhist institutions in their economic context.

Histories of the periods of western impact, bringing the developments into the 20th century, include Tikiri Abeyasinghe, *Portuguese rule in ceylon, 1594-1612* (1966); Chandra r. Desilva, *the Portuguese in ceylon, 1617-1638* (1972), a detailed study; Sinnappah Arasaratnam, *Dutch power in ceylon, 1658-1687* (1958, reprinted 1988), a study of political, economic, and social effects; Ralph Pieris, *Sinhalese social organization: the kandyan period* (1956), covering kandyan society from the 16th to the 18th centuries; Lorna s. Dewaraja, *a study of the political, administrative, and social structure of the kandyan kingdom of ceylon, 1707-1760* (1972), a pioneer study of the last independent sinhalese kingdom; Kitsiri Malalgoda, *Buddhism in Sinhalese society, 1750-1900* (1976), a study of religious revival and change under the impact of colonialism; Lennox a. Mills, *ceylon under British rule, 1795-1932* (1933, reissued 1965); E.F.C. Ludowyk, *the modern history of ceylon* (1966), on the 19th and 20th centuries; and Michael Roberts, *caste conflict and elite formation* (1982), a study of the rise of sri Lankan elites and inter caste relationships in the context of modernization, 1500-1931.

The contemporary period is studied in w. Howard Wriggins, *ceylon: dilemmas of a new nation* (1960, reissued 1980), an analysis of developments after independence; Robert n. Kearney, *communalism and language in the politics of ceylon* (1967); Calvin a. Woodward, *the growth of a party system in ceylon* (1969); James Jupp, *sri lanka: third world democracy* (1978); Satchi Ponnambalam, *sri lanka: national conflict and the Tamil liberation struggle* (1983), an explanation of the rise of Tamil militancy from a stridently Tamil point of view; "sri lanka: racism and the authoritarian state," special issue no. 1 of

race & class, vol. 26 (summer 1984); James manor (ed.), *sri lanka in change and crisis* (1984), a collection of essays on the 1983 communal riots, their causes and consequences; Chelvadurai Manogaran, *ethnic conflict and reconciliation in sri lanka* (1987), a study of the conflict's geographic and economic roots; and a. Jeyaratnam wilson, *the break-up of sri lanka: the Sinhalese Tamil conflict* (1988), a political and constitutional discussion.

CHAPTER 2

SRI LANKA- CREATION OF TWO NATIONS WITHIN ONE STATE

2.1 THE IDEOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT

The current conflict in Sri Lanka is legitimized by some on the grounds that the Sri Lankan Tamils who constitute 12.6% of the population of the country are a "nation", that they have a claim to "territory" and therefore, have a right to "self-determination". Others find these notions "archaic and redundant". Instead, they legitimize the conflict on the grounds of "systematic discrimination". This chapter deals with the relevance and validity of these conflicting and divergent ideologies that legitimize the conflict. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the nature, character, and substance of these perceived concepts have changed so very significantly over the past fifty years, the conflict continues to the drum beat of a refrain that has lost its relevance.

For instance, in regard to language, Sinhala[1] was made the sole official language in the country in 1956 and the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act was introduced in 1958. In 1987 Tamil was given the status of an Official Language and in 1988 Tamil was made the language of administration in the provinces of the North and the East. Not satisfied with these arrangements, the Draft proposals before the Select Committee seek to declare certain regions with 25% minority representation, bilingual.

The original claims to territory were based on documents such as the "Cleghorn minute", the facts of which have been questioned by several scholars, some of whom were Tamil. Later claims were based on the Swiss model of cantons and "not to be constituted as a continuous Tamil territory" which was later revised because "he

[1] Today Sinhala, Tamil, English are recognized as official languages

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Figure no 1: srilanka ethnic groups 1991



(Chelvanayakam) and his party had now moved from "cantonal" to "regional" federalism[2] The regional concept required the "forging of the unity of the Tamil-speaking people" of Jaffna and Batticaloa. The original concept of Tamil-speaking people did not include the Muslim community. The inclusion of the Muslim component later, as comprising part of the "Tamil-speaking people", added numerical strength to justify their claim, despite the insistence of the Muslims to be considered a separate entity. The evidence reveals the pursuit of a single minded objective, namely, to secure a separate and exclusive region for the Tamil community, while having access to the rest of Sri Lanka.

In dealing with issues that are claimed to have affected the Tamil community, the chapter presented here draw on the experiences and practices that exist in other countries and the opinions of the international community. Events and circumstances have changed in Sri Lanka and the world around us. What may have been appropriate fifty years ago is irrelevant today. New circumstances call for new strategies. In the meantime the country will have to learn to endure the continuing trauma of violence, a strategy chosen and nurtured by the Tamil community, for which the Tamil community as a whole must take full responsibility. Judging from the continued support with which they nurture and maintain violence, the Tamil community appears to be indifferent to the consequences, and willing to victimize a whole generation of Tamil youth in the name of redressing "grievances" and fulfilling "aspirations", the specificity of which have eluded them. It is with this understanding that we attempt to understand the forces that have shaped sri lanka into what it is today an anarchic state with violence written all over its face.

[2] From A.J.Wilson ," S.J.V. Chelvanayakam - A Political Biography", London,199..p124

figure no 2: srilankan relegion 1991



2.2 SRILANKA AND PRIMORDIALISM

Among the few universalist theories of nationalism one should mention the primordialist and the sociobiological perspectives. Primordialism assumes that group identity is a given. That there exist in all societies certain primordial, irrational attachments based on blood, race, language, religion, region, etc. They are, in the words of Clifford Geertz[3] (1973), ineffable and yet coercive ties, which are the result of a long process of crystalisation. Modern states, particularly, but not exclusively, in the Third World, are superimposed on the primordial realities which are the ethnic groups or communities. Primordialists[4] believe that ethnic identity is deeply rooted in the historical experience of human beings to the point of being practically a given. In this chapter we will try to deconstruct this myth that in srilanka the two identities were given and not evolved. This will be done in two parts in the first part we will examine the historical origin of the identities . in the second part the so called perceived economic differences between the groups will be examined .

Some people assume, that the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is only an extension of a long-standing and bitter feud between the Tamils and Sinhalese, stretching back thousands of years. However, if we examine the evidence more closely, it becomes apparent that the conflict in Sri Lanka is not the manifestation of age-old rivalries and hatred. Rather, these events were borne of each actor's manipulation of perceived ethnic differences to serve their own political or security interests in the newly democratized government that was established in after independence from Britain.

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[3] Geertz,"Ethnicity: a Reader",cromagnon,1993,p.234

[4] Primordialism is often used to mean the socio biological perspective which was the dominant mode of thinking in social sciences in the last century.

2.3 Overview

Before examining this hypothesis, it is necessary to give a very basic overview of events in Sri Lanka in the last half-century. After achieving independence in 1948, the government of Ceylon, as it was then called, first denied the vote to Tamils of recent Indian origin and then progressively attacked the rights and privileges of Sri Lankan Tamils as well. By the 1970's, many Tamils perceived their position as so dire that various militant groups, the foremost of which was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), emerged and demanded a separate state of Eelam for the Tamils in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. After sporadic fighting and riots in the 1970's, a full-scale war erupted in 1983 while Jayewardene was President of the country, which was by then renamed Sri Lanka. At first through covert aid to the LTTE and other militants, and later through direct military engagement, the Indian government under Indira Gandhi and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, interjected itself into the conflict. In July 1987, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed, outlining India's role in maintaining peace on the island through the introduction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). This venture quickly went sour as the IPKF became bogged down in direct conflict with the LTTE. By 1990, the IPKF had fully withdrawn from Sri Lanka.

Since 1990, hostilities have continued. Neither side has shown the innovation and drive necessary to bring a quick end to the conflict. Most recently, LTTE forces launched a major offensive on the Jaffna peninsula that placed government forces on the defensive. As the situation deteriorated in early 2000, some analysts predicted that India would intervene again in the affairs of its southern neighbor, but so far only Norway has got itself involved directly in the conflict.

2.4 PRE COLONIAL SITUATION

In pre-colonial Sri Lanka, communities were not segregated by ethnicity as they are today. In fact, "Ethnic, religious, and linguistic difference[5] were not used as the bases for inclusion or exclusion from the polity" The evidence of the lack of importance played by these classifications is seen in the fact that "At various times, groups would speak alternative languages, adhere to alternative religions, and claim alternative identities" while staying comfortably within the same state structure[6] Further, the pre-modern Sri Lanka ethnic boundaries "were typically porous and indistinct." For instance, Tamil-speakers served as personal guards to the Sinhalese kings, Tamil architectural styles merged with the Sinhalese tradition and, most importantly, "archeological evidence reveals the ancient intermixture of culture, religion, and language in those very areas that are today considered the strongholds of unadulterated Sinhala or Tamil life". Emphasizing this similarity of cultures, some scholars even suggest that the "Tamils and Sinhalese are in fact closely related ethnically" and that the roots of the Sinhalese population "in major part lead back to South India," the Tamils' homeland as well] Therefore, one can clearly see that in ancient times the link between state and nation was weak, making it dangerous to assign the distinctly modern term of "nationalism" to the actions of these pre-colonial peoples.

2.5COLONIAL SITUATION

Just as ethnicity played no major role in pre-colonial times, so did it factor into creating antagonism in the British colony of Sri Lanka. Despite the fact that political tensions increased as the British began to devolve power to native leaders in the 1920s,

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[5] Stokke, Kristian." Sinhalese and Tamil Nationalism",.Political Geography,1998:p87

[6] Stokke, Kristian.,1998:p131

it is clear that "ethnic differences did not permeate all aspects of elite policies in the years before Independence"[7]Of far greater importance for Sri Lanka up until independence were "the trans ethnic cosmopolitan norms of equal treatment, freedom of conscience, and constitutional democracy, introduced by the British". In fact, this spirit of accommodation complimented similar tendencies among the indigenous population, which were derived from "the precolonial, premodern pattern in Sri Lanka of cultural and religious intermingling and harmony".[8]This spirit is further exemplified in the fact that, "The political project favored by the Tamil dominant class at independence entailed a political cooperation with the Sinhalese".[9]Therefore, even as Sri, Lanka entered the world as a sovereign state, ethnic conflict and antagonism was far from dominant in its politics. It was not that the British suppressed ethnic nationalism, but that their colonial governance provided no outlet for it.

Apart from demonstrating the absence of a long-standing conflict between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese it is equally important to note the lack of strong historical bonds between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamils of South India, in what is today the state of Tamil Nadu. Beginning in the Nineteenth Century with the Hindu revivalism led by Aramuga Navalar, the Sri Lankan Tamil community was characterized by a distinct desire to remove "the domineering style of Brahmin culture in India"[10]Beyond this attempt to establish a separate religious identity, "the Tamils of the north and east of the island had showed little inclination to identify themselves with

[7] Rogers, John D. Social Mobility, Popular Ideology and Collective Violence in Modern Sri Lanka" The Journal of Asian Studies,1987:p593
[8] Little, David. Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity. Washington, :United States Institute of Peace Press.1994:p12
[9] Stokke, 1998:p87
[10]Little ,1994:p41

the Tamils of Tamilnadu."[11] In fact, any external impulses for creating a distinctive Dravidian (the major ethnic group that Tamils belong to) Hindu identity or even an entirely separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka came not so much from Tamil Nadu, but from the vocal Tamil expatriate community. However, even this stimulus was still only a small factor in igniting the Tamil separatist movement, which was "fashioned in response to local events and local traditions."[14] Therefore, while the Sri Lankans have historically followed their own traditions, any external influences that did exist arose less from their cousins across the sea than from Tamils settled outside the region.

2.6 INDEPENDENT SRILANKA

In early 1948 Sri Lanka gained independence from the British after the most peaceful and subdued independence movement on the sub-continent. Although the transition was made without any large-scale violence, the new country was soon immersed in its own conflict between the two major ethnic groups. At independence, Sinhala Buddhists accounted for roughly seventy percent of the population, Hindu Tamils made up about twenty three percent, and Christians of all ethnicities and Muslim Moors accounted for the balance. The Tamil group itself was originally split equally between Sri Lankan Tamils whose families had resided on the island for many generations and Indian Tamils who had been brought by the British to labor on the tea plantations.[12] These Indian Tamils, however, played only a marginal role in the ethnic conflict of the last fifty years as many of them felt a stronger tie to South India and were, in fact, repatriated over the years. Therefore, the main ethnic divide lay between the Sinhala Buddhists and the Hindu Tamils.

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[11] Desilva K.M, "Decentralisation And Regionalism in The Management of Sri Lankas Ethnic Conflict"., International Journal of Group Tensions1989:p336

[12] Sabaratnam Lakshmanan,"The Boundaries of State and the State of Ethnic Boundaries",Ethnic and Racial studies,1987:pp292-293.

2.7VOTE BANK POLITICS

The immediate post-independence period was marked by the existence of "a huge untapped vote bank, and the temptation to run up a communal flag proved too much for the restraints of party politics".[13]In order for politicians to compete in the new world of multiparty politics, ethnic ideologies "[were] aroused and appropriated by a Westernised leadership which now sought more popular sources of legitimacy"[14]. Apart from their personal attempts to garner votes, certain politicians mobilized the concept of a distinct "Sinhala ethnicity as a means of establishing an equivalence between the state and the nation.[15]" This mobilization was seen as necessary on an island that harbored various ethnic groups and which had never before been united under one indigenous ruler. However, "For the first time in the history of these societies, ethnic distinctions began to be perceived in terms of political antagonism." Political entrepreneurs stoked the fires of communalism and thereby created opportunities where "lineage, clan and ethnicity [became] instrumental arguments at the service of [these] political actors.". Proving this, "Sinhalese politicians found the surest path to election was through reviving old myths, that could foster new prejudices."[16] Competition and the drive to achieve political power therefore led to an atmosphere of enhanced ethnic divisions for the purpose of winning votes.

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[13] Austin Dennis." Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka", Newyork: Council on Foreign Relations Press,.1995:p6

[14] Sabaratnam,1987, p307.

[15] Sheth D L ,"Nation Building in Multi Ethnic Societies; The Experience of South Asia",alternatives,1989:p384

[16] Spaeth Anthony,.Inventing an Ethnic Rivalry ,Harpers, November 1991:p68

Initially, the most convenient way for politicians to create a political niche and attract voters was through the manipulation of Ceylon's large religious differences. For the Sinhalese, their quasi-historical Mahavamsa chronicle provided a religion-based account of their history on the island. Alan Bullion characterizes this manipulation of history when he says:

Much historical and pseudo-historical scholarship has been rewritten in order to justify recent political policies. For example, the rewriting and usage of the alleged victory of the Sinhalese Prince Dutugamunu over the Tamil King Elara, in the sacred Mahavamsa, is utilized to symbolize the 'timeless' historical struggle between the Tamils and Sinhalese.[17]

Not only was this religious history rewritten to fit the realities of contemporary politics, it was also consciously used to inflame the spirit of ethnic divisiveness. In fact, with the adaptation of myths such as the Mahavamsa, "pre-existing differences were reinterpreted in a new fashion that emphasised antagonism and hostility, instead of tolerance".

2.8 RELEGION AS POLITICAL VOTE BANKS

A prime catalyst for the remodeling of religious texts was the Buddhist revivalism which accompanied the 1956 Buddha Jayanti, the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of Buddha's achievement of nirvana. This event quickly took on political undertones and "The desire to revive what was thought of as the ancient ethnic tradition... became, in the messianic atmosphere of the Buddha Jayanti, the prime determinant of a process of change aimed at extending Sinhala Buddhist political predominance.".Politicians, acting in conjunction with the politically active bhikkus, or

[17] Bullion, Alan. J ,"India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976-1994", London,1995:14

Buddhist monks, worked to cultivate the belief in the purity of "the unified island [of Sri Lanka] as the dhamma dipa; the homeland of Therevada Buddhism[18]."Thus, many Sinhalese felt that anti-Tamil aggression would be just another battle in a long holy war, a feeling which is apparent in "the readiness of most Sinhalese to join a modern Dutthagamini in combating Tamil claims when roused to do so." Besides the ordinary populace, it is apparent that the Buddhist monks were "readily mobilizable in a public cause [which] illustrates the profoundly political character of Sinhala Buddhism." Even in the last twenty years, ancient myths have been dug up to aid politicians as President Jayewardene styled himself as a modern-day Dutthagamini and justified his irrigation policies by likening them to those of the ancient Sinhalese Buddhist rulers.These examples show that a long line of Sinhala politicians made use of divisive ancient myths for their own political advantage.

It was not only the Sinhalese who helped feed the island's ethnic conflict through the reinterpretation of history. The Tamils employed the same methods in justifying plans for self-determination within certain "traditional homelands," an idea first introduced in the early 1950s. This concept "has been built on a foundation of pseudohistorical data... based on a hazy 'historical' memory." The promotion of these "'traditional homelands' of the Tamils has generated hostility from the Sinhalese," proving that both parties were responsible for creating an atmosphere of increased hostility.[19] Again, much like those Sinhalese who are willing to engage in a holy war against the Tamils, the minority Tamil militants who die fighting the Sinhalese become martyrs ensconced popular Tamil mythology.

[18] This is one of the many sects of Buddhism popular in Sri Lanka.
[19] DE Silva K M," Regional Powers and Small State Security", Washington.,Woodrow Wilson press, 1995: p6

Religion, therefore, helped to create a strong ethnic identity, which was then manipulated by the Ceylonese politicians to achieve certain political goals. The foremost of these, for the Sinhalese, were the adoption of Sinhala as the sole official language and a restructuring of the economic and bureaucratic order to favor the Sinhalese. At the same time, and resulting partly from these Sinhalese actions, Tamil politicians took up a defensive stance and pursued separatism. Both parties sought support for their policies by mobilizing strong ethnic and national feelings.

2.9 DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF TAMILS

In the year immediately following independence, the first Ceylonese Prime Minister, a liberal-minded statesman named Don Stephen Senanayake, disenfranchised the Indian Tamils who had immigrated to Ceylon just a few generations before. With this action, "Senanayake had given a huge political advantage to the Sinhala community," betraying the communalist spirit which was soon to enter the island's politics in even greater force.[20] Throughout the 1950s, Ceylon's politics were dominated by "the Sinhalese elite's use of linguistic, religious and ethnic identities to mobilize a mass following," especially as the 1956 national elections neared.[21] That year marked a turning point for the island as S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his newly formed Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) burst onto the island's political scene. Creating communal discord to gain votes, Bandaranaike turned any latent ethnic animosity "to his own advantage and in the process helped to determine the basic direction of Sri Lankan political life for some time to come." In fact, "Communalism

[20] Liitle,1994:p56

[21] Stokke,1998 :p97

represented precisely what Bandaranaike had been waiting for: the opportunity to break loose ... and build his own distinctive political organization loyal primarily to him.[22]".

Long before the campaigning began, Bandaranaike decided that his coalition would run on the platform of "Sinhala only" in order to gain the sympathies of any voters alienated towards the Tamils. This strategy worked extremely well, forcing the rival United National Party (UNP) to adopt "a similar posture on Sinhala supremacy for the sake of political expediency."[23] Bandaranaike ended up winning the election and quickly followed through on his chauvinistic promises by making Sinhala the official language of Ceylon. From the 1956 election onwards, "ethnic tension was transformed from a matter of manners - a private matter between individuals - to a political issue." Reflecting this reality, the evenhanded Marxist parties decided to adopt a "Sinhala only" policy in the early 1960s, a shift seen by many as characteristic of the blatant opportunism present in Ceylonese politics Regardless, it is still clear that the Sinhalese politicians had no qualms about fomenting communal discord in order to secure votes.

2.9 THE LANGUAGE ISSUE

Apart from the use of language to incite communal animosity, Sinhalese politicians helped inflame discord by manufacturing the perception of an economic inequality which corresponded to the general public's view of Tamil economic dominance. Contrary to contemporary belief, the post-independence Tamils were no more economically well off than the Sinhalese -- "there was little difference in the overall wealth of most Sinhala and Ceylon Tamils." Still, "Sinhala propagandists pointed to the fact that the smaller ethnic group accounted for a disproportionate share of jobs in the professions." Although this disparity can be explained by the Tamils'

[22] Bullion,1995:18

relative willingness to learn English as British subjects, here was "an issue ready-made for exploitation by politicians seeking electoral advantage, but ... they soon lost control of the emotions they helped generate.

While modernization of the economy progressed, demands for equality, if not complete Sinhala dominance, became louder. Soon after the 1956 elections, many actions favoring the majority Sinhalese were taken, including the expansion of the public sector to create "employment opportunities primarily for the Sinhalese working class" and the inauguration of extensive welfare systems which "were especially critical for the marginalized Sinhalese[24] peasantry and working class." Further, the government mandated certain "fiscal restrictions combined with direct support for small-scale industries [which] provided a favorable business environment for Sinhalese entrepreneurs" as well as a controversial plan of "colonization" aimed at putting Sinhala peasants into the eastern, Tamil-dominated states of Ceylon.[25] The policy that most affected the Tamil youth, and led to their eventual militancy, was the "standardization" of university entrance exam requirements which aimed at reducing the Tamil presence in post-secondary education. The Sinhala-dominated government weighted these entrance exams to favor the majority community. This process was begun only in the 1970s, though, after significant "Sinhala pressure to produce even further gains for the Sinhalese." Examining this long list of actions taken by Sinhala politicians, it is apparent that "ethnic claims became rooted in secular economic interest," prompting the intensely vote-conscious politicians to pursue ethnically chauvinistic and inflammatory policies.

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[23] Spaeth :1991,p70
[24] Desilva K M, History of Sri Lanka, 1981, pp187-203
[25] Stokke,1998,:p98

2.10 TAMIL REACTION

Largely in reaction to the Sinhala policies outlined above, Tamil politics experienced a similar increase in its focus on ethnicity. To stay politically competitive, Tamil politicians were forced to emphasize Tamil ethnicity in their election campaign speeches. Even in the relatively placid days of the late 1940s, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the Tamils' first major post-independence leader, followed a campaign strategy where his "principal means for electoral mobilization was a defensive Tamil nationalist ideology." During the 1950s the pattern was set whereby "Among the Tamil parties, there was a competition to assert adversarial courage toward the Sinhalese. The slogan of authenticity thus became the saw of communalism." In other words, to claim legitimate representative power and thus gain votes, Tamil politicians were forced to emphasize communal divisions. By the 1970s, the "standardization" policies of the Sinhalese elites had begun to seriously affect the Tamil youth, leaving them without avenues for social and economic advancement. At that time, serious calls for militant action to achieve an independent state of Tamil Eelam were made. In order to harness the power of these intense feelings, "The response from the Tamil political elite to this challenge from below was to radicalize their demands to the government. Therefore, it is clear that both the Sinhalese and Tamil politicians promoted and captured the ballot-box benefits of a heightened ethnic conflict.

Since the introduction of serious political rivalry between the Sinhalese and Tamils in the 1950s, radicalization and violence between the two groups have increased relentlessly. Generally the increased violence has emerged as the product of ethnically-based electioneering and politics. As a result of the wholesale introduction of communalism into Ceylon's politics with the 1956 election, "The political rivalry seems

to have ... reduced empathy and fellow-feeling between members of different communities.[26] In other words, the emphasis on ethnic differences, which propelled men and women into office in the 1950s, was ultimately transformed into popular communal discord. For example, when Bandaranaike attempted during his tenure as Prime Minister to make conciliatory gestures towards the Tamils he was forced to back down as the nationalist factions of his own party vetoed his action. This singular "act of acquiescence ... worsened ethnic relations and provoked the worst episode of communal violence in modern Ceylon's history to that time. This series of events worked to establish a pattern whereby any attempts to reduce ethnic tensions were immediately blocked by fiercely nationalist factions and then followed by a backlash of communal violence.

The 1970s witnessed a major escalation of conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils as riots and other acts of violence became more common. Partly to blame for this, Sinhala politicians unable to effectively deal with the decade's dismal economy had "diverted the grievances of the urban and semiurban poor back to cultural nationalism by portraying the Ceylon Tamils as responsible for the political, economic, and cultural problems of the Sinhalese."[27].The numerous anti-Tamil riots between 1977 and 1983 "were rooted in [the] unexpected social impacts of economic liberalization, where ... the dissatisfied sections of the urban poor constituted a volatile social base, capable of being mobilised for their own narrow ends by the ideologists of Sinhala dominance."[28] Still, the communal violence, especially that of the 1977 election year,

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[26] Kearney, Robert N "Ethnic Conflict and Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka ",Asian Survey, 1985: p903

[27]Rogers, 1987 p598.

[28] Kearney, Robert N, 1987: p907

cannot be blamed solely on the Sinhalese as the were in reaction to "anti-Sinhala statements made by Tamil politicians during the election campaign, and acts of violence by the [LTTE]."

Besides the actions of the general populace, the political parties also joined in the violence as "disgruntled supporters of the defeated SLFP tried to embarrass the new UNP government by instigating attacks on Tamils." Again, in 1983, riots erupted which many believe "were premeditated actions that were carried out by thugs operating under the patronage of centrally placed Sinhalese nationalist politicians. The violence of 1983, which ultimately plunged the island into civil war, was therefore sparked, as before, by the machinations of nationalistic politicians. As if ethnic tensions were not already acute enough, President Jayewardene epitomized the Sinhala politicians' prevailing attitude towards the Tamils when he remarked in July 1983: "Now we can't think about the [the Tamils]. Not about their lives or their opinion of us. Later in 1983, an increasingly authoritarian Jayewardene heightened tensions even further when his government enacted the Sixth Constitutional Amendment, imposing a ban on all political parties that advocated separatism, no matter how peacefully. This act eliminated the last legitimate means of Tamil opposition in Parliament, the Tamil United Liberation Front, and "handed over the Tamil political movement to the Tamil militants.[29] Yet again, it is evident that Sri Lankan politics witnessed a radicalization along ethnic lines as a result of certain politicians' desires to accumulate power.

Although the Tamils themselves were also responsible for the outbursts of communal violence, the Tamil militant movements in favor of a separate state of Eelam

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[29] Randhawa,, "Ethnic Conflict in Post Cold War Era: Some Reflections", Allied press Delhi, 1996: p146

really only gained currency after "more than two decades of frustration of Tamil efforts to secure concessions from a series of governments brought to power principally by Sinhala votes. By the early 1980s the main Tamil group fighting for separatism Tamils rights , were the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Founded by Vellupillai Prabhakaran[30] in 1971, the Tigers perpetrated anti-Sinhala violence and used assassinations, bombings and outright combat with the Sri Lankan army to press their demands. For the Tigers, both their ideological indoctrination through the utilization of the vast "LTTE pantheon of Tamil military heroes and victories," as well as their individual commitment to utilize the cyanide capsule worn around their neck if captured, testify to the intense radicalization of ethnic relations among all parties in Sri Lanka.

One argument against the theory that the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic violence is a modern phenomenon is the evidence of pre-modern wars between the Sri Lankan Sinhala kings and Tamil invaders from the north. While these wars did occur, they were not part of some ethnic conflict, but rather a simple contest for land. As shown above, the ethnic boundaries in pre-modern times were porous and indistinct, allowing the two peoples to freely flow over territorial boundaries. Thus, there is little doubt that the explosion of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka is rooted in recent history.

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[30] He was one of the founders and continues to be the undisputed leader of the organization till date

2.11 INDIAS ROLE

It is into the context of this ethnic turmoil that Sri Lanka's giant northern neighbor, India, enters the picture. Since the Sri Lankan conflict is itself essentially ethnic, many people assume that the Indian central government's intervention throughout the 1980s was ethnically motivated as well. While it may have received substantial pressure from the ethnically Tamil state of Tamil Nadu, India's intervention was, in fact, far from being motivated by ethnicity. Instead, as was seen in Sri Lanka, its actions were a result of politicians attempting to gain some kind of advantage, be it in the domestic political or the regional security arena.

In many ways throughout its involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict, India betrayed the fact that it was obviously not acting as a supporter of the Tamils along ethnic lines. First, the Indian government was not afraid to take punitive actions against the Tamil militants when their policies diverged. After the failure of the Indian-mediated peace talks in Thimpu, Bhutan in 1985, Indian willingness to chastise the LTTE was seen with the "punitive action against the recalcitrant Tamil militants" and deportation of some of their top leaders from India. The next year, the "Police seized a large quantity of arms and long-range radio sets from the LTTE and other militant organizations."[31] These actions would never have been undertaken if the Indian government were truly involved as a supporter of the Tamils. The most important example of India's failure to act along ethnic lines in supporting the Tamil separatist movement is seen in the wholesale warfare which ensued between the IPKF and the LTTE after1987.

[31]Bullion,1995,: p96

On the domestic level, "India's guarded response to the gradually swelling popular sympathies in Tamil Nadu for the Sri Lankan Tamils" further proves the point the Indian government was not following ethnic sympathies within its own borders. Also, the belief that popular support for a brethren ethnic group played a large role in India's intervention "is belied by a minority government's (V.P. Singh's) decision to deinduct the IPKF" in 1990, as well as the fact that even in Tamil Nadu there was a "virtual absence of the Sri Lankan question in the 1988 State Assembly elections." Since ethnicity clearly played a limited role in determining India's actions, it becomes necessary to look elsewhere to explain its intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict.

While the ethnic component of the Sri Lankan conflict was of little importance to the Indian government, it did become extremely important to Tamil Nadu state politics in the early 1980s. Both the ruling All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) party and the opposition Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party "tried to outdo one other in vying for patronage of particular groups and individuals" of Tamil separatists. This competition testified to the fact that the Sri Lankan Tamil question was "becoming increasingly integral to the political dynamics of Tamil Nadu." Beyond direct monetary support, the two political parties lobbied U.S. lawmakers and world organizations such as the UN to gain their support for the cause of a Tamil Eelam. Domestically, "leading Tamil Nadu politicians [32]... actively supported the Tamil militants in their struggle and lobbied [Prime Minister] Rajiv Gandhi" for his continued commitment to a solution of the problem of their ethnic brethren across the sea. Reflecting the high political capital inherent in supporting the

[32] Rajesh ,"Sri Lankan Quagmire", frontline, august 14, 1996

Tamil militants, Tamil Nadu opposition parties consistently took a "hawkish and militant posture" in their publicity and rhetoric.

Although relatively unimportant on the national scene, the politicization of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in Tamil Nadu was one of the factors which prompted India's direct involvement on the island. As in Sri Lanka, Indian politicians were willing to exploit ethnic feelings in order to gain backing, as Prime Minister "Indira Gandhi['s] government saw political advantage in providing support" to the Tamil separatists in the early 1980s. When Mrs. Gandhi sent her Special Envoy to Sri Lanka to mediate between the warring parties in 1983, it was not so much to find a solution as to "alleviate India's immediate concerns, which were ... the forthcoming general elections in 1984, in which [Mrs. Gandhi's] Congress (I) would probably be dependent upon support from AIADMK MP's from Tamil Nadu." After the assassination of his mother in late 1984 and his ascension to power, Rajiv Gandhi's actions towards the Sri Lankan Tamils were also motivated by personal political concerns as he desperately needed southern political support and "had come to rely on [AIADMK leader] M.G. Ramachandran as his only southern Congress ally." Therefore, when Tamil Nadu put intense pressure on Gandhi to aid the Tamils he was obliged to act in order to shore up support for his own party. In July 1987 Rajiv sent twenty-five ships loaded with humanitarian supplies to relieve the Tamils of northern Sri Lanka, which were blocked by a Sri Lankan coastal patrol[33]. these ships returned to India without delivering their supplies, Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayewardene signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, which began India's involvement in Sri Lankan peace keeping. Many analysts saw the accord's objective "as political rather than military" since, for Rajiv

[33] Kadian Rajesh. "Indias Sri Lankan Fiasco", New Delhi, Vision Books,1990:p81

Gandhi, "the perceived political benefits" and "Electoral calculations were ... important."[34] Two weeks after the Accord was signed, Rajiv Gandhi visited Madras, the capital of Tamil Nadu and proclaimed in grandiloquent tones the importance of the settlement that had just been reached. Gandhi's speech worked to display his real intentions to "the people of Tamil Nadu, who, he hoped and believed, would be grateful to him" for his actions on behalf of their brethren. This high degree of personal political calculation continued even when the IPKF's actions degraded into direct combat. For instance, even though opportunities existed in 1989, it was "politically inadvisable to liquidate the Tiger leader, Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran" and thus remove a major obstacle to the completion of the IPKF's job in Sri Lankan. As oneauthor says, "India utilized Sri Lankan ethnic strife, particularly after 1983, as a 'Trojan Horse' with which to satisfy domestic political demands. It is apparent therefore, that throughout India's involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict, the personal political goals of the Indian leaders helped determine the government's actions.

Besides the domestic political advantages inherent in intervening in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, "the dynamics of Indian federalism ... became an important factor in India's neighborhood policy." In other words, there was a fear of an ethnic separatist movement in an adjoining country leaping the border and sparking an internal struggle in multi-ethnic India. This prompted the Indian politicians to take action to solve the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. Owing to the disdain which many Indian politicians held for ethnic separatist movements, initial support for the Accord was high as it was "seen to give a firm commitment by India that it would not tolerate separatism." Domestically, this message was "intended to be registered in Tamil Nadu,

[34] Kadian,1990,p137 and Bullion,p110.

Assam, Kashmir and other states of ethnic unrest."Therefore, it is clear that one of the key reasons for many Indian politicians to support Indian intervention was not ethnic amity, but rather a desire to dampen the ethnic spirit of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Apart from personal political advantage and the desire to maintain India's federal unity, India's intervention in Sri Lanka was most likely motivated by its desires to maintain its own security while acting as the South Asian regional hegemon. According to Barry Buzan's concept of security complexes, India is in an unspoken regional security arrangement where the primary security concerns of each of its neighboring states link together "sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another[35]." Begun with Indira Gandhi and cemented under her son, the "Rajiv Doctrine" which guided India's relations within South Asia for much of the 1980s was "a confirmation both of India's desire and of its ability to adopt an increasingly assertive and hegemonic regional role." One can see the application of this policy in India's insistence that the 1985 attempt at mediation be held within the region (Thimpu, Bhutan) and the fact that the case of the Tamils was never taken to the International Court of Justice or the UN by the Indian government for outside adjudication.

Further illustrating the point that the security of India's small neighbors is linked to its own, K.M. de Silva says that when Sri Lanka shifts its interests and alignments, "it can pose a threat to the security (or at least, to the security perceptions) of a regional power" such as India.[36] It is exactly such a shift in Sri Lanka's relations with extra-regional powers in the early 1980s which precipitated India's subsequent involvement.

[35] Buzan Barry, "People States and Fear, Boulder,1991:p190

Rather than looking to India for help in solving its ethnic problems, Sri Lanka turned to Israel, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Even more alarming for the Indian strategists was the fact that Sri Lanka was negotiating with the U.S. to give the Americans port facilities in Trincomalee and to expand the Voice of America radio transmitter on the island. As a result, "India became increasingly involved in the domestic politics of Sri Lanka ... which it regarded as a threat to its regional security." The result of this involvement was the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord which "served both as a framework for maintaining Indian regional hegemony and as a means of enforcing the parameters of that framework.

For India, the peace Accord(appendix C) solved the imperative questions posed by Sri Lanka's overtures to extra-regional powers and worked to: "prevent Pakistan and other foreign powers from moving into Lanka [and] to protect India's maritime interest including oil fields, Exclusive Economic Zone, etc." Specifically, the Accord allowed India sole foreign access to the Trincomalee port and placed an interdiction on the construction of new radio transmitters, which could be used for spying. The advantages given to India in the Accord were acknowledged by all quarters as even Prabhakaran declared that the Accord "is primarily concerned with Indo-Sri Lankan relations. It also contains within itself the principles, the requirements for making Sri Lanka accede to India's strategic sphere of influence." Thus, it can be seen that India's actions were clearly motivated by a desire to improve its own regional security position.

One argument against the hypothesis that India was not acting along ethnic lines when it intervened in Sri Lanka is the fact that pressure from Tamil Nadu played a large

[36]Quoted from De Silva, Regional Powers,1992,p332

role in determining how India reacted to the island's ethnic conflict. However, as was shown, the high level of pressure placed upon the central government by the Tamil parties was partly a result of an intra-ethnic rivalry of the local level Tamil parties to gain more votes. Also, even if these Tamil demands were ethnically motivated, the Indian government and politicians clearly acted with their own political purposes in mind. In fact, most analysts place the importance of ethnicity as one of the least important factors in motivating India's actions in Sri Lanka.

Therefore, looking at the acts of and reactions to ethnic discord over the past fifty years, it becomes clear that both the Sri Lankan and the Indian politicians manipulated and exploited the existence of ethnic differences for their own ends. In both cases, the politicians were mainly interested in gaining the favor of a particular ethnic group by their actions, while the Indians were also motivated by regional security concerns. Regardless of their motivations, it is apparent that ethnicity plays a large role in determining the domestic and international politics of South Asia and will likely continue to do so in the future.

CHAPTER 3

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TAMILS IN SRI LANKA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In 1983 Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka commenced a terrorist war to carve out for themselves out of the sovereign territory of Sri Lanka an apartheid-style state to be called Eelam . In the twenty years since this war has claimed over 60,000[1] lives comprising people of all communities living in Sri Lanka. It has touched almost every part of the country even though most of the fighting has been confined to the North and East. Terrorist bombs have exploded in southern Sri Lanka several of them claiming more victims that the notorious terrorist bomb in Okalahoma City in April 1995 which resulted in widespread condemnation of the terrorists responsible. Systematic ethnic cleansing has been instituted in the North and the East, the main victims of which have been Sinhalese and Muslims long resident in these areas. Even Tamils in the North have been killed by the separatist terrorists for not co-operating fully with the terrorist leadership. The military campaign has also resulted in the death of a number of non-combatants, as has occurred in almost every war. Since the US war against Iraq this kind of casualty has been called "collateral damage"[2], but it has of course been characteristic of all wars. The Sri Lankan conflict has been no exception. In addition to the direct victims several thousand more had been made refugees, many of the Tamils fleeing to foreign countries,

[1] Abeyasekhara and Gunasinghe ,"The War for Eelam",1999:p23
[2] The total count of deaths in all the wars in the last two decades is a staggering 4 million according to UNHCR Report, 1998

even though only a very small fraction of those given asylum in the west as genuine refugees.

3.2 THE PROPAGANDA OF TAMILS

Simultaneously with the military action of the terrorists in Sri Lanka their support groups overseas commenced a propaganda campaign to mislead foreign governments, the media, voluntary groups concerned with human rights, religious bodies and the international community in general. The perpetrators of this misinformation ranged from private individuals to a multitude of well-funded organisations, which collectively have been referred to as the International Tamil Separatist Lobby (ITSL). The constant theme of ITSL propaganda was that the Tamils of Sri Lanka had been subjected to "discrimination" and other disabilities, and that political separation from Sri Lanka was the only available option. To anyone really conversant with the situation in Sri Lanka this claim was laughable. Perhaps it was because of this that this propaganda was not adequately refuted in its incipient stages by those interested in the unity of Sri Lanka. Perhaps they underestimated the military threat posed by the separatists. Gradually when it dawned that the terrorist war in Sri Lanka was a carefully orchestrated international campaign to break-up Sri Lanka the charges of the separatists came to be refuted by the correct facts about the Sri Lankan situation[3]. Unfortunately these remedial measures were not adequate and many of the persons who were converted by the separatist propaganda continue to entertain the views propagated by the ITSL[4].The stock-in-trade of the ITSL propaganda was not to cite facts, because there are none of any consequence to support

[3] The Data was made available by various sources both within and outside of government control
[4] Here the propaganda by the ITSL is taken as representative of Tamil opinion.

Figure no 3 HOUSE HOLD INCOME 1991



source: ministry of finance, srilanka

them, but to rely on personal anecdotes of persons allegedly the victims of a plot by the majority Sinhalese community. Most of these personal anecdotes were fabrications, but the listeners could never establish their veracity but believed them going on the general presumption that a minority must be discriminated because they are a minority. They forgot that whatever truth this maxim may hold it is not true of Sri Lanka where the Tamils have since colonial times been a privileged minority. Thus the ITSL propagandists were generally very successful with unthinking elements in the Press, and also with certain politicians who neither had the time nor the inclination to ascertain the full facts of the situation.

What is attempted here is not to rely on hearsay or unsubstantiated anecdote, but to state the facts. Fortunately Sri Lanka was one of the few developing countries with a wealth of statistical information on a variety of social and economic indicators. Census survey in Sri Lanka have been on par with those of the West for a very long time, and a wealth of statistics on other matters are available from official and private sources. This information can be combed to easily refute the claims of tamils. In this situation we shall look at the statistical picture relating to a number of indicators as it was before 1983[5]. This year is crucial to this question. After the terrorist war commenced the whole fabric of civil society was disrupted and with large areas of the country under the control of the terrorists normal activity could not continue. In fact there has not been a census since 1981, and it is very unlikely that once could be carried out in the whole of the country until the war is ended.

[5] Most of the data available pertains to 1981; the last time the census was conducted throughout the country, In 1991 and 2001 Tamil areas were left out of the census operation due to security reasons.

Figure no 4 economically active population



source: registrar of census

3.3 THE SRI LANKAN TAMIL CLAIMS

This is not the place to give a history of the Tamils of Sri Lanka[6], another subject on which ITSL propaganda has woven many myths. Historical records show that the ancient Sinhalese kingdom of Sri Lanka had been subjected to waves of invasion by Tamils from the South of India and that for long periods of time the Northern part of the country had been ruled by Tamil invaders from South India. It was during these periods of colonisation that a Tamil presence was established in Northern Sri Lanka, particularly the Jaffna peninsula. Prior to this even this region was inhabited by sinhalese as shown by historical records as well as archeological ruins[7].The rest of the country was relatively free of Tamil occupation, even the Eastern part of Sri Lanka which is now claimed as part of a mythical Tamil homeland. In fact when Robert Knox, the most famous of European captives in Sri Lanka, landed in Trincomalee he was apprehended by representatives of the Sinhalese King who ruled this part of the country. But during colonial times the Tamils spread to other parts of the country, including the East, mainly under the patronage of the colonial ruler.

[6] The history and the origin of the ethnic claims have been dealt separately and exhaustively in chapter no 2
[7] From DE SILVA," The History of Sri Lanka", London 1981.pp167-183

TABLE 1. Ethnic Composition of the Population

(source : registrar of census , srilanka)

Ethnic group	percent
Sinhalese	74
Sri Lankan Tamils	12.6
Moors	7.1
Indian Tamils	5.6
Other	1.3
TOTAL	100

TABLE 2. Important positions held by Tamils in Sri Lanka

(Source : Press release by the High commission of Sri Lanka dated 12 April 1998 at London)

Ministers of State
The Chief Justice of Sri Lanka
The Inspector General of Police
The Commander of the Armed Forces
Chairman of the Central Bank
Chairman of the State TV
Heads of Government Department
University Professors and Vice-Chancellors
Ambassadors and High Commissioners

Table 1 gives the ethnic composition of Sri Lanka as revealed by the 1981 Census which is the last Census we have. It shows that the Sri Lankan Tamils, who are the main party involved in the separatist movement comprised only 12.6(roughly one-eighth) of the population. The Indian Tamils, who were brought to Sri Lanka to work the tea plantations by the British inhabit a different part of the country and are not a party[8] to the plan to create a Tamil "homeland" called Eelam. When we refer to "Tamils" in this chapter we shall mean only the Sri Lankan Tamils. It must not be thought that all Tamils live in the area that is claimed as their "homeland". In 1971 29.2%0f all Tamils lived in areas that are generally called "Sinhalese areas". By 1981 the figure has risen to 32.8As mentioned before no census has been taken since 1981, but if a count be now taken it would exceed the 1981 figure. The reverse has taken place in the Northern Province. In 1971 4.50%of the population was Sinhalese; by 1981 this had fallen to 3 .0%[9]even this small number has not been tolerated and has now sunk to zero, with many actually killed by the Tamils. A similar process is now taking place in the Eastern province through ethnic cleansing.

The proportion of Tamils in the population is a significant statistic when we seek to establish whether the charge of discrimination against Tamils is a valid one. If the Tamils are indeed discriminated then the proportion of Tamils in the area in which discrimination is claimed must differ from the one-eight share which a non-discriminatory policy may be assumed to yield. In what follows we shall devise a statistical measure, which we shall call an Index of Advantage which is obtained by dividing the proportion going to the ethnic community by the proportion of that ethnic

[8] From Booth, Ken, "The Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka", Cambridge Univ Press,1998:p34
[9] Quoted from the UNHCR report on Sri Lanka, 1996.

community in the total population. If this index is unity there is neither advantage nor disadvantage to the community concerned; if it exceeds unity that group will have a positive advantage, while if it is less than unity that group will have a negative advantage, i.e. be discriminated against. If the ITSL claim about the existence of discrimination against Tamils is true then the Index of Advantage will be less than unity in all the relevant areas (such as employment education health or economic development.

The principal claims of the Tamil propagandists are:

- Tamils have been discriminated with respect to employment, education, and in several other areas.
- The language policy in force in Sri Lanka amounts to discrimination.
- The ethnic riots in Sri Lanka are a severe form of discrimination.

The next three sections examine the evidence on discrimination, and in the following two sections there after we will consider the alleged discrimination in employment, the language policy and the riots.

3.4 ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

Discrimination in employment has generally been the most important forms of discrimination where a group has been subjected to discrimination. In many Western countries blacks and coloured people have been confined to low-paying jobs and generally the highly paid professional jobs have been confined to the privileged group. Many people who listen to the claims of the ITSL propagandists would believe that this is the case with the Tamils as well.

Figure no 5 :infant mortality rate 1996



source: registrar of census srilanka

In fact the opposite is the case. In Sri Lanka the Tamils have been a favoured group with respect to employment. This is seen in the proportion of Tamils holding key positions, their representation in professions available to them generally.

Table 2 lists some key positions held by Tamils both before and after the present emergency. Of course at any given moment of time Tamils may not have held all of them, but many of these positions are usually held by Tamils at any given time. It is not necessary to mention the names of prominent Tamils who have held these positions as this information is readily available. In positions like Cabinet Ministers and Heads of Departments the number of Tamils occupying these positions usually exceed the proportion of Tamils in the population. Only after the commencement of the current emergency. with the terrorists taking reprisals against Tamils they see as collaborating with the Government has there been some reluctance on the part of Tamils to hold some of these positions.Table 3 gives the percentage composition of six key occupational groups in the Public Service in 1982. It will be seen that in every case the Tamils enjoy and advantage and it is the Sinhalese who are disadvantaged. If the proportion of professionals in the private sector is included the disadvantage is more pronounced.

TABLE 3 Professionals by Ethnic Group(in %) and Advantage Index for Public Service in 1982 (source: The Registrar of Census Sri Lanka)

PROFESSION	SINHALESE	TAMIL
ENGINEERS	0.98	2.24
SURVEYORS	0.85	2.54
DRAUGHTSMEN	0.82	2.72
DOCTORS	0.97	1.96
DENTISTS	0.78	3.2
VETS	0.92	2.78
ACCOUNTANTS	0.77	3.29
LIFE SCIENTISTS	0.95	2.25
PHARMACISTS	0.95	2.25

TABLE 4. Male Unemployment Rate by Ethnic group, 1981(source: ministry of labour,srilanka)

Group	Unemployment rate
Sinhalese	14.7
Sri lankan Tamils	8.8
Indian Tamils	5.0
Moors	11.8

TABLE 5 Male Unemployment by district and race. 1981(source: ministry of labour, srilanka) *Tamil districts are printed in bold for contrast*

District	Sinhalese	Tamil
Colombo	17.6	10.9
Kandy	14.7	9.3
Galle	20.7	6.7
K"gala	10.4	6.5
Matara	22.3	2.5
Jaffna	**2.7**	**10.1**
Vavuniya	**6.9**	**4.6**
Mannar	**3.2**	**2.4**
batticaloa	**2.8**	**7.2**

Statistics in this area are not readily available and in any case the charge is that it is the Government that is discriminating. Thus there is no foundation for the claim that Tamils are discriminated against in top-level employment. The fact is that there have never been a racial requirement for holding any position in the Public Service and Tamils can aspire to any position in the public service and have reached the top positions. Nor can it be claimed that Tamils are left out on the unemployment heap. The unemployment rate is generally much higher amongst the Sinhalese than amongst the Tamils. Table 4 gives some statistics which shows that not only is the typical Sinhalese twice as likely to be unemployment, but also has the highest unemployment rate of all ethnic groups. A more detailed analysis of the unemployment statistics by district and race also gives the same picture. In Table 5 five districts where Tamils constitute a majority of the population is shown in the second column and 5 typical Sinhalese-majority districts are given in the first column. For these 10 districts unemployed males are shown as a proportion of the relevant ethnic group. It will be seen that in all cases the unemployment rate amongst the Tamils is less than that amongst the Sinhalese.

Thus in terms of this most universally regarded indicator of discrimination there is absolutely no truth.

3.5 DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION

It is often claimed that Tamils have always held education in high regard and discrimination in this area has been most galling to them. Once again the facts tell a different story Incidentally the Tamils had been favoured with regard to Education in colonial times. The British for a long time left education to religious bodies, and because

Figure no 6:srilanka - literacy rate 1991



source: registrar of census

a larger proportion of Tamils converted to Christianity the missionaries established more schools there than elsewhere. Besides the Tamils were regarded by the British as a group that could be counted to give them support and therefore looked to that community to provide it with many of its functionaries. The privileged position of the Tamils continued under independence, but the Government sought to provide educational facilities to those who had been deprived of it hitherto whether they be Sinhalese, Muslims or even Tamils.

Table 6 shows that as far as the higher levels of education are concerned the Tamils once again occupy a favoured position. In all the faculties listed (which are generally considered the more prestigious areas of tertiary education) it is the Sinhalese who continue to be discriminated against. Incidentally the preponderance of Tamils have been in large part been due to the system of admissions. All students sit for the qualifying examinations in their mother tongue, and it is a well established fact that Tamil examiners consistently mark up the Tamils as against other examiners who stick to normal academic standards. It is to prevent this kind of abuse that for a short period admissions were to be limited to the population of each district. This scheme did not disadvantage the Tamils, but merely established a level playing field. However the system was abandoned when Universities were established in regional areas, including one in the North.

TABLE 6 University Enrolments by race and Faculty in sri lanka, 1981.

Faculty	Sinhalese	Tamil	Tamil%	A.I
Medicine	291	101	25.3	2
Dentistry	36	24	40	3.1
Vet Science	23	7	23.3	1.8
Agriculture	132	49	27.1	2.1
Bio Science	257	105	28.9	2.2
Engineering	321	142	30.5	2.4
Architecture	28	9	23.9	1.9
Phy. Science	354	219	38	3
Commerce	227	118	34.2	2.7

(Source: Ministry of Higher Education, Sri Lanka)

TABLE 7 Some School Statistics ,Selected Districts 1983 (source: census registrar)

District	Total students-000	Total schools	% of Tamil schools	Total expenditure in Rs Mn
Colombo	231	251	18.7	179
Kandy	273	749	24.6	213
Galle	200	509	3.4	148
Matara	164	417	4.6	116
K gala	143	386	8	126
Jaffna	207	568	99.5	137
Mannar	247	106	96.2	13
Mullaitivu	16	87	98.9	5

When it comes to the provision of general education the picture is no different. Table 7 gives some selected school statistics for the year 1983, selecting five districts where Tamils predominate and five where Sinhalese predominate. The statistics for the entirety of Sri Lanka is also included. It will be seen that once again, in terms of the provision of schooling no systematic bias cannot be identified. However direct comparison between the ethnic groups is not possible and several schools in Colombo and the other large centres of population have bilingual schools, and school facilities are available to students of both communities. This accounts for the larger expenditure on per student in Colombo than other provinces including Jaffna. One significant figure is that 27% all schools in the country are classified as Tamil- medium schools [10]which gives the Tamils a favourable Index of Advantage [11]at least on the basis of this index alone.

Another statistic that could be used to illustrate the favourable situation of Tamils in education is the enrolment of science students in pre-University (Advanced Level) classes. In 1982 the average for Sri Lanka was 36.7 students per 1000 in the population. But in the Northern and Eastern provinces (the areas were the bulk of the Tamils live) the figure was 51.7 per thousand. Science education is considered a key indicator in Sri Lanka. On this score too the Tamils do better than the rest of the country. It must be remembered that Sri Lanka is one of the few countries in the world where Tamils can study from the Kindergarten to the University in the Tamil Language. This is not possible in many parts of India, which is the place of origin of Tamils, let alone in other countries

[10] The board of Secondary Education ,Sri Lanka,1998.p122

[11] The advantage index has been calculated as follows.

A. I =proportion of a group having/utilizing a facility as a proportion of the group in the population multiplied by 100.For indicators such as infant mortality the indicator value is subtracted from 100 .

TABLE 8. Public Health Indicators

district	1	2	3	4
Colombo	5130	108	395	15.5
Kalutara	11486	5.6	421	5.8
kandy	10632	7.6	315	16
Matale	25833	11.9	382	10
Galle	6849	7.2	444	9.5
Matara	24837	7.7	495	11.1
Jaffna	77420	7.5	314	6.9
Vavuniya	9367	9	384	8.2
Batticaloa	13333	11.8	513	10.4
Kurunegala	12768	5.5	417	11.4
Puttalam	17000	8.0	443	7.9
A'pura	15364	10.8	398	4.9

(Source:Supdt. of Health Services Area, 1981)

Index

(1) No. of Persons per Doctor

(2) No. of Persons per Public Health Midwife

(3) No. of Persons per Hospital Bed

(4) No. of Persons per Health Centre

where they have migrated to. This is true in case of Singapore Malaysia Indonesia Canada UK and other countries to which the Tamils have migrated.

3.6 OTHER AREAS OF ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION

Employment and education are the main grievances on which Tamils have claimed discrimination. We have shown that on these grounds there is no basis for a claim of discrimination. But discrimination may be claimed in other areas as well.

We may, for instance, take the provision of health services. Table 8 gives some indicators of the provision of health case in Sri Lanka according to the main health divisions in the country. These show that while some diversity can be expected due to the location of the principal hospitals there is no systematic difference between the districts in which the Tamils predominate and the other areas. However as in the case of educational provision many Tamils live in "Sihalese areas" and would be entitled to the use of health facilities in these areas along with the other communities inhabiting these districts. For understanding Discrimination in economic development let us take several indicators. If we consider the provision of roads in 1980 there was on average 1.89 km of roadway for every 1000 in the population. Yet the figure in the 5 Tamil districts exceeded this: Jaffna (1.99), Mullaitivu (8.45), Vavuniya (6.03), Mannar (4.88), Batticaloa (2.45). In 1981 the expenditure per head of rural population on irrigation was Rs. 47.6. Yet the corresponding figure for the Northern and Eastern Province was Rs. 93.2. This is over twice the national average. At the time of the outbreak of the insurgency the Government had a scheme for the allocation of investment funds for the various District Councils. Under this scheme the per capital investment for the whole country was Rs 28.28. Yet the

per capita investment for most of the Tamil districts exceeded this: Jaffna (33.09), Mullitivu (32.46), Batticaloa (32.21) and Vavuniya (26.31). Only mannar was lower .Several other indicators of the "quality of life" exist in Sri Lanka Another claim of separatist propagands is that in the Land settlement policy of the Government there has been discrimination. This again is not correct as in all settlement of regions land has been set aside for Tamil occupiers to an extent that is not less than their percentage of the population. The claim that because the land development schemes have been in areas claimed for Eelam they should only be settled by Tamils is unteneable. Tamils have a right to buy land in any part of Sri Lanka and have been doing so in recent times. On the contrary it is the Sinhalese who are prevented from buying land in the North, a policy started under colonial rule.

3.7 THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

Next to the charge of discrimination against Tamils levelled against Sri Lanka the most commonly heard complaint is the allegedly unsatisfactory place given to the Tamil Language in the affairs of the country. A brief comment on the development of the Language question is appropriate here. During the colonial times English [12]was the dominant language of administration, politics, education, business, etc. Both Sinhalese (spoken by over 800f the population) and Tamil (understood by perhaps 200f the population), the two indigenous languages of Sri Lanka, were relegated to a distant second place. With the end of colonialism the question arose as to the national language of the land. The first attempt to address this question was in the Official Language Act of 1956. The newly elected SLFP Government introduced this Act, together with a

complementary Reasonable Use of Tamil Act. They were designed to address the Language question. The first made Sinhala the "official language"; this came to be dubbed the "Sinhala Only Act"[13]. The second defined the status of Tamil and guaranteed its use as the medium of education and instruction up to the highest levels, and ensured that it could be used in the courts, parliament, etc. and as a medium for entry into employment, and for all economic and cultural purposes. These Acts have been widely misrepresented as involving unfair treatment of the Tamil language.

The Tamils demanded "Parity of Status" between Sinhala and Tamil, and in many ways this was the trigger to what came to be called the "ethnic question", which in course of time became the separatist conflict which we are now witnessing. matters like this Sri Lankan practice has to be judged against the framework of international practice. In almost every nation there are more than one language spoken. Yet almost all countries have used the language spoken by the majority as the official language. Exceptions to this rule are extremely rare, e.g. Switzerland where three languages are recognized, Belgium and Canada where two languages are recognised. These handful of countries are the exception to the rule that the majority language is the official language of the country. Thus the policy enshrined in the 1956 legislation merely conformed to international practice and cannot be taken as an act of discrimination against Tamils. If it is indeed discrimination then almost all countries in the world, including Australia, the United States, France, Russia, etc. are also guilty of the same offence. In fact many Tamils have migrated to such countries as refugees, but they have not demanded "parity of status" for

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[12] DE SILVA "History of Sri Lanka 1981.p.146
[13] Chandraprema, C "The JVP insurrection 1987-89", Lake House, Colombo :p115

the Tamil language in these countries. In multicultural countries like India it would be absurd to give parity of status to all the languages would be absurd.

The charge of discrimination with respect to minority languages lies not in the absence of a "parity of status" in all regards, but in denying the minority concerned of reasonable language rights. This is exactly what the Reasonable Use of Tamil legislation in Sri Lanka was designed to achieve. Changes subsequent to 1956 have further strengthened the status of Tamil. In the 1971 Constitution Tamil was declared a national language. Indeed Sri Lanka is the only sovereign state to have conceded to Tamil the status of a national language even though only a small proportion of the world's Tamils live in Sri Lanka.

Thus Tamil figures in the National Insignia, the currency, postage stamps, in all official documents and forms, etc. English is also declared a national language to assuage other minorities than Tamils. In practice today Tamil is given virtual parity of status with Sinhalese and English in the public life of the nation. This is seen in the educational, political and legal systems, as well as in all other important areas of public life. It must be remembered that there are few countries which have given to a language spoken by less than a fifth of the population the place that has been accorded to Tamil in Sri Lanka. If judgement is to be based on international rights and practices the claim of discrimination against Tamils on language grounds in Sri Lanka cannot be sustained. The language policy of Sri Lanka may be contrasted with that in India which is the closest neighbour to Sri Lanka, and also contains what can be termed the original motherland of the Tamils. The Indian constitution states: "The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the

Devanagari Script"[14]. It is precise this that was established by the Official Language Act of 1956 in Sri Lanka when Sinhala was declared the official language. The significant difference is that less than half of the Indian population use Hindi in the Devanagari script, which over 80% 0f the population is conversant with Sinhala. The Indian constitution's language provisions have remained unaltered for nearly 50 years even though their implementation has been slow. This is also the case in Sri Lanka where the 1956 Act has not been implemented in full.

While language agitation has continued in India there has never been a case made for separatism on the basis of the constitutional requirement that Hindi be the "only" official language. In Sri Lanka however this has been made the basis for the demand for the creation of an apartheid Tamil state, with no language rights whatsoever to the non-Tamil people, should they be allowed to live in eelam when it comes into existence.When we move from India to other areas where Tamils have migrated we do not find anything like the position accorded to Tamil in Sri Lanka. There are substantial Tamil minorities in Malaysia, Singapore, Fiji, parts of Africa and even the West Indies. In most cases they have been taken by colonial rulers. Of these countries it is only Singapore that has given a limited place to Tamil in official notifications. But even in Singapore there is nothing like the widespread use of Tamil in Sri Lanka. Of course Tamils have move to Western countries particularly after the troubles in Sri Lanka, but they have not articulated a demand for the use of Tamil in these countries, and of course, Tamil is not accorded any special place in these countries.

[14] article 343(1)of the Indian constitution.

In countries like the United States and Australia English is the de facto offical and national language. It was felt that there is no need ot enshrine its usage in law as this is what will occur in practice. Indeed this has been the case. But it is interesting to note that there are moves in the United States to enshrine the position of English as the sole official language in law. If this is so it will be a parallel to the 1956 Sri Lankan law[15]. Yet the U.S. is often regarded as role model for democratic practice, and is certainly the most articulate spokesperson for democracy.

3.8 THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES

It is a sad fact of history that the Sri Lanka has seen a series of communal disturbances and riots between 1959 and today. In this Sri Lankan experience has been paralleled in many developing countries, particularly in South Asia. Further by the standards of many Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia the communal riots of Sri Lanka have been less violent. Despite this these riots have occupied an undue share of public attention in the West and the misrepresentation of the nature of these has been a major objective of the propaganda of Tamil lobby.

According to the Tamil lobby the riots are an attempt by the Government to exterminate the Tamils living in the South by instigating Sinhalese mobs to attack them. This is an interpretation given to these unfortunate riots which are not supported by any evidence. Of course many Tamils have lost their lives in these riots,[16] and much property owned by Tamils have been destroyed. This is particularly true in Colombo and certain

[15] The Sri Lankan official language act 1956 can be referred for further understanding.

other parts of Sri Lanka. While some Sinhalese criminal groups may have participated in these attacks they cannot be ascribed to the Sinhalese in general, let alone the srilankan government.Just as some Sinhalese may have participated in these riots many more Sinhalese have been involved in providing protection to Tamils. The Government, of course, moved in quite early by deploying the security forces, and providing shelter to the refugees until more permanent arrangements could be made[17]. There may have been some confusion and administrative failures especially in the early hours of a communal riot, but once its dimensions and purport have become clear all governments of whatever complexion (UNP or SLFP) have arisen out of their responsibilities.

Another fact relating to these riots is that it was not the Tamils who were the only victims. In fact in many instances it was the Tamils who first moved against Sinhalese groups in Tamil dominated areas. The first riot, that of 1959, was the reaction to acts against Sinhalese perpetrated by Tamils in the North and the East. Thus if the Sinhalese mobs were guilty in the Southern parts (and undoubtedly they were) so were the Tamils in the North. In fact almost all the Sinhalese who were resident in the North were quickly liquidated by these riots, and the remainder simply fled. In fact the Sinhalese victims in the North did not find any support from the ordinary Tamil population unlike the Tamil victims in the South. Ever since the language legislation of 1956 a number of language-oriented agitations had been carried by the Tamil political parties with inflammatory speeches made. It was these which triggered first the riots in the North and the East and they the reprisals in the south.

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[16] Dixit, J N, "Assignment Colombo", 1998,Vijitha Yapa Publications, Colombo :p176
[17] Dubey, R K ",Indo- Sri Lankan Relations, Deep Publications,Delhi,1994 :p189

The most publicised of the riots were those of 1983. This was a spontaneous, if unfortunate, response to the first military action of the LTTE in the separatist war when an army convoy was ambushed and all the soldiers killed. When the bodies were brought for burial there was local rioting which soon got generalised[18]. The causes for the riots was the general atmosphere of racism generated by the Tamil demand for a racist homeland. Even though later propaganda adduced these riots as the reason for the demand for a separate homeland they were in fact the cause of this racist demand which antedated the 1983 riots. In the case of these riots, which were televised for all the world to see, the Government came into the scene quite rapidly even though with hindsight it was not rapid enough. Once the situation was brought under control the Tamils victims were sheltered, and in many cases compensated for the loss of property. Unfortunately loss of life cannot be compensated.

But it is a measure of the extent to which racial relations have been repaired since the events of 1983 that the Tamil population in Colombo and the South generally has increased, not diminished. In the North however no Singhalese has been allowed to live, so great has been the pogrom against them. Not only has the number of Tamils in the South increased, but the South has become an area of refuge for Tamils fleeing the LTTE terror. Even the authors of Tamil communalism like the TULF leadership had to seek asylum in Colombo, but even there they were not free of LTTE terrorists. The increase in the number of Tamils living in the South is the greatest testimony to the non-communal nature of the bulk of the Sinhalese. Despite the grave provocation as the LTTE terrorist war progressed there has not been any occurrence of communal disturbances.

[18] The UNHCR report for the year 1984.

As against this the real racial bigotry has been seen in the ethnic cleansing activities of the LTTE. These acts of deliberate communal massacre cannot be compared to unorganised civil rioting. While the incidents of ethnic rioting in SL cannot be something that any country can justify to distort it and to use these unfortunate riots to instigate a system of deliberate ethnic murder, as has been done by the separatist terrorists, is to replace something that is bad with something that is worse. Once again it is the Sinhalese who have been painted as the villains by the apologists to those who have committed the real crimes.The facts given in the present chapter aim at understanding the claims of tamil lobby that the Tamils are discriminated against are not new facts and have been on the public record for well over a decade

Why have these reasons not become generally known? One factor is the incompetence of the information services and the diplomatic and consular representation of Sri Lanka. The fact was the existence of groups in the press and other lobby groups in foreign countries who are receptive to the propaganda. A clear example of the kind of misapprehension about discrimination against Tamils is revealed by the following statement made by Senator Gareth Evans[19] the Foreign Minister of Australia to the Australian Senate on 1 June 1995:

> "...if you go back historically most of the wrongs in this whole affair have been perpetrated against the Tamils. There has been a long tradition of discrimination and prejudice and various forms of misbehaviour directed

[19] Parliament of Australia," Collected Speeches in International Affairs",1996,Canberra:South Asia Chapter P.12

towards the Tamil by the Sinhalese. They have been a traditionally discriminated against minority." [Senate Hansard, 1 June 1995]

Such views can also be quoted from leading politicians in almost any Western countries. They are not only a testimony to the success of the Tamil lobby but also to the obtuseness and ignorance of the politicians concerned. Whether they have the grace the admit their own ignorance when the true facts are revealed to them is something that has still to be seen.

In the current situation when the racist terrorists of Sri Lanka have plumbed the depths of human misbehavior such ignorance cannot be permitted to prevail. The terrorists are now no longer only a threat to Sri Lanka but also to the whole region. This no doubt explains the changed attitude of India to the LTTE which had initially set the LTTE in business but was not able to control its functioning. The tragedy of Sri Lanka is that the myth of discrimination is so widely believed. In fact so successful has the Tamil propaganda been that even the highest levels of the present government of Sri Lanka seems to believe them. It is perhaps because of this misapprehension that they embarked upon the policy of unconditional negotiations with the LTTE which has become an unqualified disaster to Sri Lanka.

CHAPTER 4

THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AND IDENTITY IN SRI LANKA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade and a half, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the study of ethno nationalism and ethnic conflict has become a recognised sub-field within political science, international relations, and a variety of other social science disciplines. The attention of political geographers to this subject promised to bring about a more thorough consideration of the significance of territory and place in the context of ethnic identity, conflict group formation, and the development, management, and settlement of ethnic conflicts. While political science and international relations normally treat territory, if at all, from the perspective of its strategic value for states and in terms of the latter's territorial integrity and sovereignty, political geography adds a different but equally valuable perspective to this discourse, namely the role of territory, place, and the attachment of individuals and groups to them in the context of ethnicity and ethnic conflict.

In the explorations in this chapter we can aim at exactly this nexus, attempting to show how 'group identities also derive from place and territory'[1] and how and why the

[1] White," The Right To Self Determination: The Sri Lankan Tamil National Question", London, 1995


MAP NO 1. Colombo's centrality to world.(from boxer,portuguese empire)
Outward V
Return Voy
Other
Prime Meridian
Azores
Oporto
Lisbon
Madeira
Cape Verde Is
Brasil
Salvador
Bahia
Rio de Janeiro
Saint
Helena
Antwerp
Hormuz
Muscat
Diu
Goa
Cochin
Colombo
Galle
Malacca
Maldive Is
Mozambique
Macao
Miles

protectiveness of place, i.e., 'territoriality', manifests itself in groups and 'in virulent and often violent expressions'[2] (White, p. 4.), and seeking to analyse 'how national identity relates to territory and how it coexists and competes with other identities at different geographic scales' (Herb & Kaplan, p. 5). Clearly, these are important issues whose proper examination could make an important contribution to the discourse on ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic conflict.

We can begin by outlining a theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis of the particular case of sri lanka . We can Distinguish between core, semi-core, and periphery in case of sri lanka through its history. There are three degrees of significance of territory for a nation's identity. The assigning of a particular place or region into one of these categories can be done by looking at 'three major indicators: (1) the sites identified by the locations of important institutions and of historical events; (2) the landscapes described in nationally renowned literature, poetry, art, and music; and (3) the historical willingness to use force to hold onto a particular territory – the 'tenacity factor. The 'analysis of the core, semi-core, and periphery(map 1) helps us to gain a broader understanding of a nation's identity and helps us understand an important element of conflict as well as the potential for future conflict in particular places' However, to overemphasise the importance of emotional attachment ignores two crucial features of this dynamic, namely the relationship between interest and opportunity structures, (or, put more crudely, the importance of a rational cost-benefit analysis), and the personal agendas pursued by political leaders who manipulate real or perceived emotional

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[2] Herb and Kaplan ,"The Civic Tongue"New york:Longman,1983.

attachments to territories and places for their personal gains. Any proper historical or contemporary study of the sri lanka would have no difficulty in revealing this and placing territory in its proper place and context.

Answer to questions like 'the role of territory in a nation's perception of itself; the extent to which territorial aspects of national identity[3] might bolster, compete with, or supersede more ethnic aspects of identity; and whether an aspatial ethnic identity is possible' These, and other, questions are crucial in understanding territorial aspects of identities at various geographic levels.

The contributions territory makes to national identity, or the role that it plays in shaping it, has been defined as follows by Kaplan[4] . 'Territory clarifies national identity by sharpening more ambiguous cultural and ethnic markers' (p. 17). It 'creates a collective consciousness by reinventing itself as a homeland' (p. 17), 'it situates the nation, giving it roots and boundaries' (p. 17), and it 'makes the unique character of the nation tangible (p. 18). In turn, 'the continued existence of the nation can only be ensured via a clearly bounded territory' (p. 19). Kaplan complements these elaborations by relating national identities and territory to scale. His basic propositions are that 'national identities are situated among a cascade of geographically based identities' (p. 31) and that in order to 'understand national identity, it is crucial to comprehend its place within the

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[3] Viroli , Maurizo" For Love of Country: An Essay On Patriotism and Nationalism ", Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995.p183

[4] Kaplan "Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries ",Amsterdam:1994.pp17-46



FIGURE 2. The center and its reach: The three-tiered territorial organization
Sources: Seneviratne, 3.

overall scheme of identities, especially its relationship to the identity of states' (p. 32). Kaplan recognises the importance of territory for individual and collective identities, but he is less certain than White[5] that the nation will remain the focal point of territorial identities. Rather, he suggests 'that our monogamous relationship to nation will splinter into a more polygamous affair, with identities sited among a multiplicity of geographical scales' (p. 46). The following distinction of case studies at the levels of a macro, meso, and micro-scale, i.e., at supra-state, state, sub-state levels, is clearly tailored towards supporting this argument.

The competition that exists between different dominating national identities and sub-state national identities, between such sub-state national identities, and even within them, is the focus of the book written by white[6]. In his chapter on sri lanka . White uses much of the same arguments that can be found in his book on Nationalism and Territory referred to above, yet the clearer focus on sri lanka within the analytical framework of this edited volume allows him to place territory in a broader context, and his conclusions as to the territorial dimensions of Transylvanian identity are more convincing. For the future, he expects that 'northern Sri Lanka will not simply become a territory where [various ethnic groups] ... coincidentally live. Sri Lanka will be a territory where these peoples interact and create ... something Sri Lankan ' (p. 286). Quite obviously, this needs to be qualified inasmuch as the creation of such an overarching regional identity will only work if all the ethnic groups become more tolerant towards one another and if

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[5] White "Nationalism and Territory",London,Verso,1995 pp286-288

[6] Murphy "Identity Politics in The Cold War Era,Dublin,Newman,1992.pp183-185

there is no interference from either the Indian or western states or nations to thwart this project. Only in this case will Sri Lanka become an example of a region with a territorial identity that can be equally shared by different ethnic groups. Thus, similar to the point made by Murphy in relation to European identity, Sri Lanka could be a case where local and regional attachments complement rather than conflict with national and state identities.

What is implicit in the various studies in all individual case studies on Sri Lanka is that democracy is both the source of and a potential remedy for separatism. It should be nevertheless clear that the author is strongly in favour of democracy (and democratisation), even though they have little actual evidence that democratic/democratising states are in fact able to contain and appease separatist movements in an effective and democratic way.

over the years, many serious and thorough scholarly inquiries into the socio-political life of Sri Lanka have brought about a number of incredible insights. They have greatly enriched our understanding of the island nation, which has been challenged from within ever since its independence. Incidentally, every discourse on Sri Lanka's nation-building, political development or independence centres on or relates itself somehow to the larger theme of ethnic relations in historical and contemporaneous perspectives. All theses studies employ interrelated themes for the study of socio-political and economic development in the country.

To understand this theme ,in this chapter we need to incorporate into our methodological framework a number of disciplines like History, Culture, Politics and

Economics as analytical tools and present a well-integrated perspective on the relationship between society and space in colonial and postcolonial Sri Lanka. This multidisciplinary approach is justified on the ground that "space operates at multiple but related scales and is defined by, and defines, complex social spheres." It means that space is central to understanding most social issues and political, economic and cultural trends in a society, and therefore, a single disciplinary tool is insufficient for explaining the society-space linkage. In the context of Sri Lanka, we need to explore the historical construction of contemporary organization of space in relation to its territories, cities, landscapes, built forms, and their interconnections as part of changing politico-economic and cultural systems. The focus is on the spatial "construction of Ceylon, as part of British colonisation, its incorporation into the capitalist world-economy, and the institutionalization of an European, and principally British cultural hegemony". It should examine how Sri Lankan society reacted to and is contested by, for instance, the construction of certain identities and the restructuring of cultural institutions.

2.2 ECOLOGICAL SPACE IN SRI LANKA

The pattern of life in Sri Lanka depends directly on the availability of rainwater. The mountains and the southwestern part of the country, known as the "wet zone," receive ample rainfall (an annual average of 250 centimeters). Most of the southeast, east, and northern parts of the country comprise the "dry zone, which receives between 120 and 190 centimeters of rain annually. Much of the rain in these areas falls from October to January; during the rest of the year there is very little precipitation[7], and all living

[7] This portion of the narrative draws heavily from "O H K Spate ,A T A Learmonth And A M Learmonth

creatures must conserve precious moisture. The arid northwest and southeast coasts receive the least amount of rain--60 to 120 centimeters per year-- concentrated within the short period of the winter monsoon The natural vegetation of the dry zone is adapted to the annual change from flood to drought. The typical ground cover is scrub forest, interspersed with tough bushes and cactuses in the driest areas. Plants grow very fast from November to February when rainfall is heavy, but stop growing during the hot season from March to August. Various adaptations to the dry conditions have developed. To conserve water, trees have thick bark; most have tiny leaves, and some drop their leaves during this season. Also, the topmost branches of the tallest trees often interlace, forming a canopy against the hot sun and a barrier to the dry wind. When water is absent, the plains of the dry zone are dominated by browns and grays. When water becomes available, either during the wet season or through proximity to rivers and lakes, the vegetation explodes into shades of green with a wide variety of beautiful flowers. Varieties of flowering acacias are well adapted to the arid conditions and flourish on the Jaffna Peninsula. Among the trees of the dry-land forests are some valuable species, such as satinwood, ebony, ironwood, and mahogany.

In the wet zone, the dominant vegetation of the lowlands is a tropical evergreen forest, with tall trees, broad foliage, and a dense undergrowth of vines and creepers. Subtropical evergreen forests resembling those of temperate climates flourish in the higher altitudes. Montane vegetation at the highest altitudes tends to be stunted and windswept.

Forests at one time covered nearly the entire island, but by the late twentieth

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" India and Pakistan,1967,chapter 26

century lands classified as forests and forest reserves covered only one-fifth of the land. The southwestern interior contains the only large remnants of the original forests of the wet zone. The government has attempted to preserve sanctuaries for natural vegetation and animal life, however. Ruhunu National Park in the southeast protects herds of elephant, deer, and peacocks, and Wilpattu National Park in the northwest preserves the habitats of many water birds, such as storks, pelicans, ibis, and spoonbills. During the Mahaweli Garga Program of the 1970s and 1980s in northern Sri Lanka, the government set aside four areas of land totalling 190,000 hectares as national parks.

2.3 URBAN AND RURAL SPACE IN SRI LANKA

The dominant pattern of human settlement during the last 2,500 years has consisted of village farming communities. Even in the 1980s, the majority of people lived in small villages and worked at agricultural pursuits. Traditional farming techniques and life-styles revolve around two types of farming--"wet" and "dry"--depending upon the availability of water .

The typical settlement pattern in the rice-growing areas is a compact group of houses or neighborhood surrounding one or several religious[8] centers that serve as the

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[8] De Silva K M " A History of Sri Lanka" Hurst and co, London,1981pp24-142

FIGURE NO 8
SRI LANKA
NET INTERNAL MIGRATION
1991



focus for communal activities. Sometimes the houses may be situated along a major road and include a few shops, or the village may include several outlying hamlets . The life-sustaining rice fields begin where the houses end and stretch into the distance. Some irrigated fields may include other cash crops, such as sugarcane, or groves of coconut trees. Palmyra trees grow on the borders of fields or along roads and paths. Individual houses also may have vegetable gardens in their compounds. During the rainy seasons and thereafter, when the fields are covered by growing crops, the village environment is intensely verdant.

The nature of agricultural pursuits in Sri Lanka has changed over the centuries and has usually depended upon the availability of arable land and water resources. In earlier times, when villagers had access to plentiful forests[9] that separated settlements from each other, slash-and-burn agriculture was a standard technique. As expanding population and commercial pressures reduced the amount of available forestland, however, slash-and-burn cultivation steadily declined in favor of permanent cultivation by private owners. Until the thirteenth century, the village farming communities were mainly on the northern plains around Anuradhapura and then Polonnaruwa, but they later shifted to the southwest. In the 1980s, wide expanses of the northern and eastern plains were sparsely populated, with scattered villages each huddled around an artificial lake. The Jaffna Peninsula, although a dry area, is densely populated and intensively cultivated.

The southwest contains most of the people, and villages are densely clustered with little unused land. In the Central Highlands around Kandy, villagers faced with

[9] Diamond Larry "Dry Zone Agriculture in Sri Lanka " Oxford,West View Press ,1994. pp183-217

limited flat land have developed intricately terraced hillsides where they grow rice. In the 1970s and 1980s, the wet cultivation area was expanding rapidly, as the government implemented large-scale irrigation projects to restore the dry zone to agricultural productivity. In the 1980s, the area drained by the Mahaweli Ganga changed from a sparsely inhabited region to a wet rice area similar to the southwest. Through such projects, the government of Sri Lanka has planned to recreate in the dry zone the lush, irrigated landscape associated with the ancient Sinhalese civilization.

Beginning in the sixteenth century and culminating during the British rule of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the plantation economy came to dominate large sections of the highlands. Plantation farming resulted in a drastic reduction in the natural forest cover and the substitution of domesticated crops, such as rubber, tea, or cinnamon. It also brought about a changed life-style, as the last hunting-and-gathering societies retreated into smaller areas and laborers moved into the highlands to work on plantations. Through the late twentieth century, workers on large plantations lived in villages of small houses or in "line rooms" containing ten to twelve units. The numerous plantations of small landholders frequently included attached hamlets of workers in addition to the independent houses of the plantation owners.

The coastal belt surrounding the island contains a different settlement pattern that has evolved from older fishing villages. Separate fishing settlements expanded laterally along the coast, linked by a coastal highway and a railway. The mobility of the coastal population during colonial times and after independence led to an increase in the size and number of villages, as well as to the development of growing urban centers with outside contacts. In the 1980s, it was possible to drive for many kilometers along the southwest

coast without finding a break in the string of villages and bazaar centers merging into each other and into towns.

2.4 COLONIAL SPACE IN SRI LANKA

The Portuguese were pioneers in bringing about a spatial revolution by way of constructing a new 'Indian Ocean space' of which Colombo formed an integral part. The use of force to monopolise trade in the island created a profitable trading system, and the spatial order constructed enabled them to become a maritime power with a long distance trade network.Colombo emerged as the principal port (map 1)of the island, by the process of institutional and infrastructural development, The British went a step further to radically transform the spatial character of Sri Lanka . If territorial unification of the island led to destruction of regional identities, it paved the way for establishment of a new communication system, infrastructures, centralised bureaucracy and urban systems.

British colonialism had the visible effect of transforming the island's cultural landscape by erecting British statues in public squares and giving British names to streets and places. Going beyond the political appropriation of territories and built environments, British continued their colonial project into the realms of economy and culture.(map 2) The introduction of the coffee plantation system and the restructuring of Ceylonese society led to the country's incorporation into the capitalist world economic structure. There was greater movement of people and plant species across the world, and architecture and architectural knowledge were exported from other metropolises. All this had a definite effect on the Ceylonese landscape, urban forms and architecture. In short, European construction of space on a variety of scales—world spaces, regional spaces,


Kandyan territories allocated to former Ceylonese provinces
19th century connections between district capitals
New provinces of 1833
District capitals
MAP NO 3 COLONIAL SPACE IN SRILANKA(FROM DESILVA,)
Jaffna
Northern Province
Mannar
Vavuniya
Trincomalee
Anuradhapura
Puttalam
Polonnaruwa
Eastern Province
Batticaloa
Kurunegala
Western Province
Matale
Kandy
Amparai
Kegalle
Central Province
Badulla
Nuwara Eliya
Colombo
Monaragala
Ratnapura
Kalutara
Miles
0 10 20
Southern Province
Hambantota
Galle
Matara

territorial spaces, urban systems, landscapes, and interiors can all be analysed taking into account the sri lankan position. It shows that "European colonialism is not merely a political, social, and economic process, but also a spatial and cultural enterprise."

This fact of colonial life is not often underscored in any discourse on colonialism. The responses of the Sri Lankans, followed different patterns.[10] First, during the early part of colonial rule, they emulated the imperial spatial system in order to advance their political, economic and cultural positions within colonial society.(map 3) Thus, their adaptation to colonial institutions and spaces reflected the tight control that the colonial government exercised over the society. The trend changed gradually since the 1930s. There grew challenges to the British colonial space and the fundamental demand for creating 'national space' of post-independence Ceylon.

Both the socialists and nationalists were in the forefront of the movement, which continued even during the post-colonial period. Colonial society and space did not undergo qualitative changes immediately after independence. It took decades for the nationalist-socialist governments to severe the vestiges of colonialism and initiate the post-colonial nation-building process which even now is incomplete.

The Sri Lankan Tamils are a formidable challenge to the nation-building task(map 5); so is the Sinhalese majoritarian ideology which forms a hindrance to evolving a truly multi-cultural policy. A series of steps since the 1983 ethnic violence have transformed the political space of the island. Sri Lanka has acquired a new national identity[11], which

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[10] Nihal Perera "Decolonizing Sri Lanka "Oxford Univ Press, 1998,pp181-186

[11] Saska Sassen "The Global City "New York, Princeton 1999:p132



MAP NO 4. MODERN ECONOMIC SPACE IN SRILANKA(FROM THE ECONOMIC ATLAS OF SRILANKA

has pushed the society beyond the postcolonial period. This can be used to demonstrate how history can be used and interpreted in multiple ways to learn about social and political processes; how politics and culture play a role in the construction of society and space.

2.5 POLITICAL SPACE IN SRI LANKA

nation-building is a difficult process and its failure results in external intervention to create heightening insecurities of the State. Ethnicity is both a danger to and an opportunity for the making and remaking of the nation". The Sri Lankan State has been under siege from militant Tamil nationalism since 1983 whose demand for a separate state has led to a long-drawn-out process of militarization of society and polity. The State has mobilised all its military strength to overcome these challenges but its success has so far been minimal.(map 5) The behaviour of the State as a national security apparatus[12] and its failure in protecting human rights of minorities created a suitable condition for external intervention in the conflict .India was the most powerful interventionist force in Sri Lanka for about eight years—whose objectives, compulsions and strategies are lucidly analysed in chapter no 5.

Four distinct and contending narratives need to be examined to understand the ethnic problem in Srilanka.pan-Indian nationalism, Sinhala nationalism and Tamil nationalism in both Tamil Nadu (India) and Sri Lanka. While examining the notion of India in its historical, cultural and geopolitical perspectives, we can make a critical review of its emergence as a 'developmental state' as background to its hegemonic

[12] Guna Singhe, N "Politics of Ethnicity and Relegion"Colombo,SSA,1996 pp114-115.


Areas of JVP insurgent activity (1971)
The core area claimed by the separatists
Towns
MAP NO 5 POLTICAL SPACE IN MODERN SRILANKA AREAS OF MILITANCY(FROM ALLES)
Point Pedro
Kankesanturai
Jaffna
Elephant Pass
Mullaitivu
Mannar
Vavuniya
Trincomalee
Anuradhapura
Puttalam
Kekirawa
Habarana
Polonnaruwa
Kalkudah
Dambulla
Maho
Batticaloa
Kurunegala
Matale
Kalmunai
Kandy
Amparai
Kegalla
Badulla
Colombo
Nuwara Eliya
Bandarawela
Pottuvil
Moratuwa
Ratnapura
Kalutara
Rakwana
Kataragama
Kosgoda
Tissamaharama
Elpitiya
Deniyaya
Ambalangoda
Kirinda
Hambantota
Galle
Matara
Miles
0 10 20

foreign policy orientations in the regional context.

India's role in creating Bangladesh can be chosen as a case in hand to drive home the point and also to reveal the existing gap between its policy and practice in dealing with national questions in its neighbourhood.We can move on to narrate the construction of Sri Lanka on a majoritarian ethos through a textual analysis of the writings of President J.R. Jayewardene[13] .It reveals the mind-set of the Sinhalese who justify successive governments' decision to promote and protect their interests at the cost of the minorities. This exercise serves as a good background to the conflict created in the process of consolidating the Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism as an ethnic ideology for governance in multiethnic Sri Lanka.

An interesting and important narrative can be the comparison and connection between Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism and Dravidian nationalism of Tamil Nadu. There is an urgent need to break the myth about the two nationalisms and make a powerful argument for their disjunction: "The case of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka illustrates how Sinhala majoritarianism produced a violent movement for secession, whereas the case of Tamil Nadu in India illustrates how a potentially secessionist Dravidian movement reconciled itself to a role as unit within a larger polity when the majoritarian embrace was not quite so overbearing

It is true that the "political lessons to be drawn from these two contrasting examples are critical in any discussions of postcolonial nationalism", but, unfortunately, many in India and Sri Lanka make a putative link between the two nationalisms. The

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[13] Jayawardene J R "Ethnic Conflict In Sri Lanka "Centre fir Social Analysis,Colombo,1994.pp118-119

regimes in both countries conveniently do this too; in the case of Sri Lanka, to "justify the Sinhalese annihilatory response to the issue of Tamil nationalism"; in the case of India, it was "used as the perfect alibi to adopt an interventionist posture" in the conflict. Of course, one cannot underplay certain security implications of the ethnic violence for india's decision to get involved in the island nation. The evolution of India's Sri Lanka policy in the mid-1980s was a quick response to the unfolding violent events; two leaders who designed it were Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi. At one point of time, Sri Lanka assumed importance in India's regional policy making and the foreign policy establishment invested so much time and energy in evolving strategies to deal with the conflict.

The outcome was primarily a two-track policy: while offering its mediation to resolve the conflict, India extended military support clandestinely to some of the militant groups who were locked in a war in the northeast of the island.The main architect of this policy was Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi merely continued it with frequent modifications and suspension. The outcome of the policy was the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987, which is appended. The Agreement and the unenviable military role India had to play to implement it is constructed in a way to link its foreign policy orientations towards the South Asian region. In other words, India's inherent desire to play a hegemonic role in South Asia is somewhat attributed to the kind of policy response it formulated vis à vis the ethnic conflict[14]. While it is true that India's sense of importance in the region had influenced its decision-making on Sri Lanka, one cannot ignore the fact that it was a country affected by the conflict, directly or indirectly.

[14] Guna Sekhara S L , "Tigers, Moderates and Pandoras Package"Ceylon,MPP 1996,p47

Its two-track policy was confused and contradictory, but it was the best given the complexity of the conflict. The intentions of the leaders and objectives of their policy were good—that is, by embarking on the strategy of arming the militants, the Indian government sought to empower them so that they would negotiate with the Sri Lankan government from a position of strength. It is true that the policy backfired on India because of the lack of coordination on the part of various agencies and personalities involved in conducting and executing its Sri Lanka policy and miscalculations on their part to understand the interests and goals of the militants in getting militarily empowered by India. Any external involvement in ethnic conflict tends to be more complex than what the intervenor normally anticipates.

2.7 ETHNIC SPACE IN SRI LANKA

The different ethnic groups are not evenly spread throughout the island, but live in concentrated areas, depending upon where they settled historically. The Indian Tamils are heavily concentrated in the highland districts, especially in Nuwara Eliya, where they constitute almost half the population. This settlement pattern reflects their strong relationship with the plantation economy for which they provided much of the unskilled labor. The Sri Lankan Tamils, on the other hand, make up more than 95 percent of the population in the Jaffna Peninsula, more than 70 percent of the population in Batticaloa District, and substantial minorities in other northern and eastern districts. This pattern reflects the historical dominance of Tamil kingdoms[15] in the northern half of the island.

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[15] James Paul" Tamil Nationalism "London, Sage,1996,pp124-127

Figure no 9; srilanka location of ethnic groups

source : registrar of census srilanka

The Muslims are not in the majority anywhere, although they make up large minorities in Mannar District on the northwest coast and in the east coast districts; their strongest presence is in Amparai District, where they comprise 42 percent of the population[16]. The Sinhalese exist in substantial numbers everywhere except in the Jaffna and Batticaloa districts, and in some southern districts they comprise almost the entire population. Colombo District approaches the closest to an ethnic melting pot, with a Sinhalese majority and substantial Tamil and Muslim minorities. Colombo is also home to most of the Burghers (72 percent) and Malays (65 percent).

In many cases, the different ethnic communities live in separate villages or sections of villages, and in towns or cities they inhabit different neighborhoods. The fact that primary education is in either Tamil or Sinhala effectively segregates the children of the different communities at an early age. Business establishments run by, or catering to a specific ethnic group, tend to broadcast their ethnicity by signs either in Sinhala or Tamil, each of which possesses its own distinctiye script. Sports teams tend to include members of only one community, while Buddhist and Hindu religious services are automatically limited to one ethnic group. Relatively few persons are fluent in both Tamil and Sinhala, and accents betray which native community a person belongs to very quickly. Countering the intense pressures favoring segregation,

However, are official government policies that treat all citizens equally and numerous personal networks within neighborhoods and among individuals that link members of different ethnic groups and foster friendships. Ethnic segregation is reinforced by fears that ethnic majorities will try to dominate positions of influence and

[16] A detailed discussion on this issue is done in chapter 3 of this study

repress the religious, linguistic, or cultural systems of minorities. The Sinhalese are the overwhelming majority of residents within Sri Lanka, but they feel intimidated by the large Tamil population in nearby India; the combined Tamil populations of India and Sri Lanka outnumber the Sinhalese at least four to one. The recent memories of Tamil prominence in colonial and postcolonial administration, combined with a modern renaissance in Tamil consciousness in south India, are constant reminders of the potential power of the Tamil community. The Sinhalese feel quite isolated as the only group in the world speaking their language and professing their variant of Theravada Buddhism. The Tamils, on the other hand, are a minority within Sri Lanka. They cannot be sure of Indian support, and they experience increasing restrictions on social mobility as the Sinhalese majority increases its hold on the government. AntiTamil riots and military actions in the 1980s alienated a large sector of the Tamil community. In the middle are the Muslims, who speak Tamil but whose religious and cultural systems are alien to both other ethnic groups. Muslim leaders increasingly seek to safeguard the cultural heritage of their own community by adopting a public stance of ethnic confrontation.

CHAPTER NO 5

GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The pogrom against Tamils in July 1983 and the resulting clashes had two very important demographic consequences. One was the exodus of over 100,000 refugees from the northern regions of the island to Tamilnadu in South India; these were primarily civilians who had become victims of the government's drive against Tamil militants. It is well established that Sri Lankan security forces often turned against Tamil civilians in their attempt to flush out the militants. The second consequence was an exodus of Tamils living in southern parts of the island amidst the Sinhalese, to their 'traditional homes' in the north and east. Paradoxically as it may seem, the violence of July 1983 convinced many Tamils that they could be safe and secure only in their own areas, this despite the presence and operations of the army[1]. These moves immediately strengthened, on the one hand, the notion of a Tamil homeland in which Tamils would have their own state, and on the other, it established a close link between the Tamils of Sri Lanka and the Tamils of India, resulting in the Sri Lanka Tamil issue becoming the major issue in Tamilnadu politics.

The presence of Sri Lankan Tamil political and militants leaders and a large number of refugees in Tamilnadu[2] necessarily had an impact on the politics of that state. Tamilnadu was extremely conscious of its cultural heritage and its role vis-a-vis Tamil

[1]Bastian , "Devolution and Development in Sri Lanka", ICES, Colombo,1994. pp131.
[2] The total number of such refuges in Tamil Nadu is half a million.

communities in the other parts of the world. It had also been the scene of separatist demands for an independent state in the 1960s. Although these demands died down, the embers of Tamil nationalism were kept alive by the "Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam"(DMK) which was in power between 1967 and 1977.[3] .After July 1983, the DMK, which was by then in opposition, wholeheartedly took up the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils. It described the actions of Sri Lanka as genocide against the Tamils and called on the Indian government to send its armed forces to Sri Lanka in order tosave the tamils.

By 1983 the ruling party in Tamilnadu was the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kashagam(AIADMK), a split from the DMK, and its leader, M. G. Ramachandran also spoke out on the behalf of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. It accorded a measure of state patronage to the TULF and militant leaders as well as Sri Lankan refugees. It also mobilized public opinion by first organizing a state-wide stoppage of work, protesting against the oppression of Tamils by the Sri Lankan government; a resolution was passed in October 1983 in the Tamilnadu State Assembly [4]condemning the violence of Sri Lanka and urging the United Nations to intervene in the pursuit of a peaceful solution. Even though the AIADMK's support for the Sri Lanka Tamil cause stopped short of support for a separate state, the Sri Lankan Tamil Issue became a focal point in the internal politics of tamilnadu itself .It has sometimes been said that it was the pressure emanating from Tamilnadu that forced the Indian central government to intervene in the matter. The Tamilnadu government was no doubt concerned to see the divisive issue was settled, but it is now apparent that the central government of India was also motivated by reasons of national security as much as pressure from Tamilnadu

[3] Kodikara," Nationalism",Blackwell, 1983.p23.
[4] Ramesh , "Tamil Politics – A New Turn" Frontline, October 14, 1983.

Mediation by the central government began very shortly after July 1983. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi offered India's good offices in order to facilitate a political solution and this was accepted by Sri Lanka. G. Parthasarathy, a well known Indian diplomat and advisor to Indira Gandhi, visited Sri Lanka[5], discussed issues with leaders of the government, political parties, including the TULF, and by December 1983, had developed a set of proposals to resolve the conflict These were presented to an All Party Conference in January 1984 which, however, ended inconclusively in December 1984. This ended India's first mediation effort. It was activated on the premise that a conscious on the ethnic issue among the major political groups was desirable. Hereafter Indian mediation efforts were primarily to concern the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil parties and groups. During 1984 and 1985, while negotiations towards a peaceful solution were proceeding rather desultorily, the military conflict intensified, claiming ever more civilian casualities on both sides.

The Sri Lankan President and the Indian Prime Minister met in early June 1985 in New Delhi and this produced a quickening of efforts at mediation. Peace talks followed between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil political and militant organizations in Thimpu in Bhutan but these failed too. From August 1986 and in the subsequent months, officials of the two governments held talks in Delhi and arrived at what were described as 'draft terms of Accord and understanding'[6]. These terms envisaged a system of devolution at three levels, divisional, district, and provincial. Powers at the provincial level were defined allowing broadly for devolution with respect to law and order, agriculture, land settlement and other functions. This framework was the object of discussions between the

[5] Bose S, "States Nations Sovereignty" ,Sage Publications New Delhi,1994.p157.
[6] Draft terms of Accord and Understanding , Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.,1986

Figure no 7





source: UN statistical year book 1996

two governments as well as the government of India and the Tamil groups in Madras and produced an expansion of some powers devolved at the provincial level. Many attempts in 1986 to solve the conflict proved abortive but the next stage in this process of resolution moved with amazing rapidity. A car bomb exploded at a busy bus station in Colombo at the end of April 1987, killing 113 people.

The government, faced with popular outrage, launched what it called an ' all-out offensive' on the Jaffna peninsula and by the end of May captured a large part of it at great cost in terms of life, property and the massive dislocation of inhabitants in these areas. It was at this stage that the Indian Government intervened directly [7]and decisively. Arguing that army offensive had rendered the people of Jaffna totally destitute, it decided to send in 'humanitarian relief'. When a flotilla of boats carrying relief supplies were turned back by the Sri Lankan navy, India dropped relief supplies by air and then negotiating with the Sri Lankan government for the further supplies.

The idea of resolving the ethnic conflict through an understanding between the two governments had been in the air for a few months. Moreover, Sri Lanka found itself under great pressure from donor countries[8] to solve the conflict -- especially in view of economic devastation the war has caused and increased military expenditure. The Indian government thus found itself in a position it could enforce willingness both from Sri Lankan government and from the main military group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE). The Agreement which signed in July 1987 was the result. India had

[7] Chandra Prema, C,"JVP Insurrection in Sri Lanka" ,lake house,Colombo,1991:p126

[8] These include the UK, USA USSR as well as multilateral agencies.

moved from the position of mediator to that of direct participant, a participant with separate and specific interests of its own.

The agreement had three components -- first, the 'modalities' of settling the ethnic conflicts through devolution of power to a Tamil region combining the northern and eastern provinces; second, the guarantees and obligations of the government of India with regard to the implementation of the accord; third, (in letters exchanged alonged with the Agreement), the undertakings given by the government of Sri Lanka to India which are not related to the ethnic conflict but concern India's security interest's in the region.

5.2 FOREIGN POLICY OF SRILANKA

Before examining the specific security interests India sought to assure in the Agreement, it is necessary to turn back and look at some of the changes in Sri Lanka's economic and foreign policy which had a bearing on the Agreement. From 1956 to 1977, Sri Lanka had followed an economic policy that was characterized by state regulation of both local and foreign investment, emphasis on the public sector as the favoured means of growth, import-substitution in industry , fiscal policies directed towards an egalitarian distribution of wealth, welfare policies that sought to ensure to all citizens basic needs of food, health and education.

The foreign policy was one of non-alignment, with a tilt to the 'socialist' bloc in terms of assistance for public sector industry. Sri Lanka was a strong member of the non-aligned, anti imperialist Third World. During this period, Sri Lanka's foreign policy was totally congruent with that of India. There seemed to be hardly any divergency between India's and Sri Lanka's interests, and the last areas of disagreement (the question of an

island, Katchativu in the Palk Straits[9], and the citizenship of plantation workers) had been solved. However, these economic and social and social policies were accompanied by very slow economic growth rates. Unemployment soared and scarcities began to appear as foreign exchange became difficult to obtain. Dissatisfaction mounted and in 1977, the people defeated Sirima Bandaranaike and voted in the government of J.R.Jayawardene which was committed to a different set of policies. The changes in the economic sphere were drastic. Most regulations were scrapped; foreign investment was encouraged, and Free Trade Zones established. Most subsides were removed and the market place became the determining factor in investment. In contrast to earlier policies, private investment and entrepreneurship were encouraged and some parts of the public sector were privatized. Moreover power, irrigation, transport and communication facilities serving the interests of private capital were strengthened. Although the earlier welfare measures were retained, the new emphasis was on growth, not distribution. This economic policy had important foreign relation implications .foreign investment had to be sought from abroad and massive infrastructure needs of the public sector had to be obtained as grants and loans - mainly from the western countries. This whole process also required close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank[10]. In short, the Sri Lankan economy became firmly bonded with the capitalist world market. This swing away from an inward-looking regulated economy to an open, export-oriented economy had a determining influence on the country's foreign policy.

Sri Lanka chaired the Non-aligned Movement from 1976 to 1978 when J.R.Jayawardene handed over to Fidel Castro of Cuba. Professedly, Sri Lanka continued

[9] India and Sri Lanka have come to an agreement in the later years based on Gujral doctrine on this issue.
[10]ECOSAC "Economic outlook for the Asia pacific",1977

to follow a policy of non-alignment, but the imperatives of the economic strategies she had adopted pushed her in the direction of the Western camp. The principal aid donors became the industrialized countries of the West and Japan and their foreign policy needs came to the fore. To give an example, Sri Lanka was one of the very few Third World countries to vote with the UK on the Falklands issue[11], influenced no doubt by the fact that Britain is a major donor to the government's irrigation and hydro-power programme.

The government in 1980 permitted a significant facility used by the Voice of America and also approved the establishment of a broadcasting facility for West German Radio near Trincomalee. These links were seen as a further erosion of Sri Lanka's non-aligned status and a push in the direction of the US and the West. There was also some speculation that the US was interested in obtaining facilities at Trincomalee harbour, including the use of its oil storage tanks. The US denied such an interest but the uncertainities surrounding the lease of facilities in the Philippines proved a fresh impetus to such speculation These tendencies away from a non-aligned stance were strengthened after 1983 by the course of the ethnic conflict. The Tamil militants were based in India; their presence was tolerated by the state and central governments. Though officially denied, it was obvious that the training and staging grounds of the militants were in India. During the latter days of the conflict, the patronage given by the Tamilnadu government to the militants was demonstrated by open financial gifts.

Given this situation, the government looked to non-Indian sources for weapons, equipment and training. Thus links grew with Pakistan,[12] which became the main centre for the training of the security forces. Weapons and ammunition were obtained from

[11] Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs,New Delhi,1992
[12] Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs,New Delhi,1996

Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and various commercial organizations. The services of Israel were obtained for improving and expanding the government's intelligence apparatus and Israel was allowed to open Special Interests section in the US Embassy in Colombo. The government also procured the services of various mercenary organizations, primarily the KMS (Keeny Meeny Services) of the UK for training its Special Task Force of troops. Thus the Sri Lanka Government began to build up links with many governments and organizations seen as hostile to India, links that many suspect have matured into strategic relationships.

5.3 SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

It is in this context that one can examine those provisions[13] of the July 1987 Agreement concerned with India's security interests. Sri Lanka, it was said, "agreed to meet some of the security interests of india which are itemized as follows:

- ... an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Srilanka relations
- Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests;
- The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee [14]Oil Tank Farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
- Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used

[13] For greater details refer to the documents pertaining to the above agreement appended to this study
[14] This was however not done later due to certain problems encountered by the parties.

solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purpose.

In concrete terms, the Agreement ensures that Pakistani, Israeli and other influences on the armed forces of Sri Lanka seen as inimical to India are removed, that Trincomalee would not be used in a way injurious to India's interests, that the Tank Farm would be under India's partial control and that the US and West German broadcasting[15] facilities would not be used against India.

Moreover, what the Agreement guarantees is not only the removal of hostile influences on Sri Lanka's security forces; India actually substitutes herself, undertaking as a reciprocal gesture, to 'provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces'. By means of the Agreement, India removed perceived risks to her security in Sri Lanka and assured herself that such a situation would not occur again by reinforcing her influence over Sri Lanka. In undertaking to ensure the due implementation of all terms of the Agreement, India was also able to station her troops in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka as a peace-Keeping force.

India's intervention in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka began as a genuinely mediatory [16]role. The conflict had become significant factor in the politics of Tamilnadu and it was necessary that its influence on the inflammatory Tamil separatist tendencies be minimized. It was not in the India's interest, nor that of Tamilnadu state, to allow Sri Lanka to crush Tamil opposition and assert Sinhala hegemony over them. Such a situation would have been unacceptable to Tamils of India. Indian tolerance of Tamil militant groups has to be seen in that light -- an effort to prevent a military victory by the

[15] The voice of America, The Radio Free Asia, The Voice of Germany still relay signals from Sri Lanka till date.

[16] Chatterjee, Partha,."The nation and its fragments,"princeton,1993.p167

Sri Lankan government. However, a victory by the Tamil militants and the establishment of a separate state would not be in India's interest either. The Indian state itself is plagued with a number of separatist and secessionist struggles and in this context, the emergence of a small state in Northern Sri Lanka would not have been a desirable precedent. It could also exert an influence on the volatile sentiments of Tamilnadu; an independent Tamil state might have become an attractive magnet for separative sentiments.

Thus India would have wished neither for a Sri Lankan military victory nor military success for the Tamil militants. Its best interests would be served by a resolution of the conflict which recognized Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity, but which also allowed for democratic, political and economic rights of the Tamil people as a collectivity.

This conclusion would also assume that Sri Lanka's movement away from a non-aligned policy in its foreign relations would have been no more than an irritant in the eyes of India. It was unwelcome, but posed no immediate threat to India's security interests. That India looked on this problem, as one of human right is also evident from the fact that the only international forum at which she raised it was the US Commission for Human Rights.

However, the course of developments during the escalation of the conflict was instrumental in pushing Indian security concerns to the fore. These were the growing military relationship between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, Israel and certain Western countries, the growing influence of such countries on Sri Lankan security forces, the linkages seen to be developing between Sri Lanka, Pakistan and China. Taken together these indicated s security threat on India's southern flank, an area which had previously

appeared secure. Thus the resolution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka became bound up with the safeguarding of India's security interests.

It is the contention of many that India's security interests played a larger role in the accord than the actual resolution of the ethnic conflict. V. Prabhakaran, the leader of the most powerful Tamil militant group, the LTTE, has openly declared that he has no alternative but to acquiesce in the Agreement[17], even though it sacrifices Tamil aspirations and hopes to India's security concerns; he expressed dissatisfaction with the temporary nature of the merger between the northern and eastern provinces and said that LTTE would continue to work towards a separate state. There have been equally vehement attacks on the Agreement from the Sinhala side. The Jayawardena government has been accused of accommodating Indian security concerns to the extent of seriously compromising Sri Lanka's sovereignity and independence. This view rests on an analysis of the Agreement that places greater emphasis on the security issues; it argues that India was prepared to dismantle Tamil militant camps in India only when Sri Lanka agreed to give in on the security issues.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement also has many implications for the security of South Asian region. It is a known fact that all of India's neighbours have problems which involve India in some way. Nepal is faced with internal unrest led by movements which evoke some sympathy in India; while expecting Indian support in meeting these threats, Nepal is at the same time attempting to modify some of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship entered into with India in 1950, particularly those with regard to security affairs. Bangladesh has problems with its Chakma ethnic group in the Chittagong hill areas and has been following a foreign policy favorable to the US. The problems

[17] De Silva N ,Tamil Racism in Sri Lanka, colombo,1997.p194

between Pakistan and India are so familiar that it is not necessary to summarize them. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement can be read by all these countries as a signal that their internal and foraging policies must be so adjusted as to not to affect significantly India's security concerns. In this connection it is interesting to note that, while most countries were not happy[18] with India's violation of Sri Lankan air space in dropping food supplies, most countries have expressed their support for the Peace Agreement. The two countries to have voiced reservations have been Pakistan and China.

In effect, in signing the Peace Agreement, Sri Lanka has recognized the necessity of formulating its foreign relations so as not to affect its big and powerful neighbour, India. It is an acceptance of India's role as the regional power. The Agreement has been welcome by both USA and USSR. This also signifies the acceptance by all of India's role in the South Asian region and of the general desire to remove a focus of instability in the region.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement has implication for Regional Co-operation as well. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) excludes from consideration purely bilateral issues. Sri Lanka, however, has on many occasions attempted to override this and bring up the ethnic issue for discussion. These efforts have generally been supported by other members like Pakistan, who have also argued that the SAARC forum should be open to the consideration of bilateral issues. India has always opposed this view, maintaining that issues between any two countries of the region could best be settled on a bilateral basis and not be allowed to cloud issues of regional co-operation.

[18] Gunaratna R "International Implications of Tamil Insurgency", London,1997.p135

Another area of concern on which the Agreement may have some impact is the project to keep the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This idea was first advanced by Sirimavo Bandaranaike at the Non-aligned summits at Nairobi and Cairo, and later at the United Nations in 1971 where it was generally received with favour. India too supported the project, seeing it in a way of keeping the Indian Ocean free from naval deployments by both superpowers. The US has established a naval base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Although most countries still back the proposal in principle, it has been found difficult to get to the next stage of the project -- namely a meeting in Colombo to work out the details. India has shown herself deeply suspicious of Sri Lanka's stand and refused to attend meetings in Colombo of technical groups concerned with research into aspects of Indian Ocean activities. India still appears keen to pursue this project and Sri Lanka's re-structured relationship with India will possibly be of help.

5.4 SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL POWER IN SRI LANKA FOR SOUTH ASIA

The political structure of Sri Lanka is based on the concept of the center sharing power with the regions. This article explores the security implications of regional power due to the geopolitics of the Delhi/Tamil Nadu nexus, and also the relevance of regional power vis-a-vis the divided leadership within the Tamil community. To the LTTE, regional power is irrelevant because of their dedication to the creation of a separate state. If this is not an immediate possibility, regional power today would be of meaning only if it holds the promise of a separate state tomorrow. As far as the Tamil leadership in

Colombo is concerned, the concept of regional power is irrelevant because this leadership does not represent a region to which power can be assigned.

As a concept, regional power cannot be considered in isolation. It has to be considered within the geopolitics of the region. For instance, the powers to be assigned to the regions have a direct bearing on the security of Sri Lanka because of the cross border linkages that exist between the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Tamils in Tamil Nadu. Many have commented that these linkages are not a constraint, and that they arise from a "minority complex" among the Sinhala People despite their numerical majority in Sri Lanka. A recent assurance was "... fear that the demand for an "Eelam" or next best alternative is a step in the direction of "Enosis" with Tamilnadu is misplaced" [19]Whether there will be an "Enosis" with Tamil Nadu or not, the fact that Tamil Nadu has brought considerable pressure on the Indian Central government in Delhi regarding issues that relate to Sri Lanka is well documented. Therefore, a separate state "or next best alternative" would strengthen the linkages with Tamil Nadu, which in turn would threaten the security and hamper the freedoms of the rest of the Sri Lankan nation. "As the people of Tamil Nadu have an ethnic linkage with their brethren across the Palk Straits, Tamil Nadu has become a determining factor in shaping India's relations with Sri lanka in recent years" [20]The symbiotic relationship that exists between the Tamils in Sri Lanka and those in Tamil Nadu is well known. This relationship has been exploited by both, to

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[19] Ranita Hensman, , "Tamil Homeland Concept."The Island April 10,1998

[20] Sivarajah, "Politics of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka", Meridien,1996.p187.

the advantage of each and also by Delhi to its own advantage. In "Dynamics of Tamil Nadu Politics in Sri Lanka", Palanithurai & Mohanasundaram (1993) state: "Meanwhile, the D.M.K. in Tamil Nadu linked its autonomy demand with the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamils and such attempt indicated the trend that how the domestic problem of one country had its effect on its neighbour". The bargaining position of Tamil Nadu in the formulation of central government coalitions have enabled them to influence India's Foreign Policy towards Sri Lanka. It was primarily pressure from Tamil Nadu that caused India to violate the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

Asif Karim [21]in his book titled "Transnational Terrorism" - The dangers in the South (1993) state: "It is evident that we have been sitting atop a volcano, without realizing the danger that it is starting to show itself. Our intelligence agencies, as usual, have remained inert. Till the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, they were actually helping the LTTE's subversive activities obviously under the impression that the LTTE has no ambition in India, and that their activities remain confined to Sri Lanka only. This was a costly delusion.... Srikanth's interrogation revealed that the long term strategy of the LTTE was to create a "Pan-Dravida-Nadu" joining Tamil Nadu with the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka".

These linkages with Tamil Nadu are compounded by the North South posturing relating to language and majority/minority rule within India and Sri Lanka. Palanithurai & Mohanasundaram further states: "While the D.M.K. was fighting against the imposition of Hindi as well as the northern dominance, Sri Lankan Tamils fought against the Sinhala language and the dominance of the Sinhalese in the governance of the island".

[21] Asif Karim,"Transnational Terrorism", New Delhi,1993.

Further along, they quote from Spratt's book titled (D.M.K. in Power"): "...the D.M.K.party would lead a secession from India and the Federal Party would lead a secession from Ceylon and the two would join to form a united nation and state". These statements endorse the extent of the cross-border linkages between the Tamils in Sri Lanka and those in Tamil Nadu.

Developments in Canada should be a lesson for Sri Lanka. During the recent campaign "a separatist hard-liner" told a group of students that "the Quebecois strategy was really to use the threat of separation to milk the rest of Canada for all the concessions it could get, and then to go ahead with separation"[22]. Most analysts believe that the separation of Quebec would cause the dissolution of the Canadian federation. The territorial integrity of Sri Lanka is equally vulnerable. The cross border linkages with Tamil Nadu make even Provincial Councils a threat to the security of Sri Lanka. In this context any form of division of the country would make the security of Sri Lanka fragile and independence, meaningless.

These security threats are being overlooked because of a mistaken reliance on the power of Constitutions. This misconception is based on the belief that Constitutions by themselves can guarantee stability without the backing of security capabilities to enforce the provisions of Constitutions. This is in sharp contrast to the emphasis given to security considerations during the pre-colonial traditions of the Sinhala Kings where security was the responsibility of the heir apparent. These traditions were in keeping with the emphasis given to security in modern stable democracies.

[22]The New York Times, December 1, 1998

Stable democracies are fully aware that constitutions can endure only as long as there is a security establishment to enforce the provisions in Constitutions. In commenting on the "Conditions for Domestic Peace", Hans Morgenthau states "Peace among social groups within the nation reposes upon a dual foundation: the disinclination of the members of society to break the peace and their inability to break the peace if they should be so inclined. Individuals will be unable to break the peace if overwhelming power makes an attempt to break it a hopeless undertaking" [23]Sri Lanka did not recognize the need for "overwhelming power" to maintain domestic peace. Consequently, the insurgencies in the South and the North occurred because the insurgents believed that they could advance their beliefs through violence without too great a risk. However, even with "overwhelming power", Sri Lanka would be constrained in dealing with a Tamil insurgency because of the geopolitical influence of Tamil Nadu.

It was while attempting to subdue a Tamil insurgency that Sri Lanka was forced to accept Provincial Councils through the intervention of the Delhi/Tamil Nadu nexus. This nexus had the power to alter the very Constitutional character of Sri Lanka to be in keeping with that of India. Advantages in regional powers in one country would encourage their "brethren" in the neighboring country to seek similar advantages. By creating a parallel regional structure in Sri Lanka the opportunity for the nexus to influence the developments in Sri Lanka and visa-versa is greatly increased. The

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[23] Hans Morganthau,"Politics Among Nations", 1995.pp123-134

approach instead should be to structure the political arrangements in a manner to minimize the influence of this nexus.

The concept of regional power should also be viewed in the background of the split in the Tamil leadership between the English educated Colombo-based Tamils and the Tamil youth in the North. The Tamil Voice (USA), in its Summer 1995 issue stated: "Many are slow to realize that power within the Tamil society has now effectively shifted from an English-educated Colombo-based elite to a local group of men and women". Under these circumstances regional power would be enjoyed by a "local group of (Tamil) men and women".

The LTTE are the self proclaimed leaders of these "local men and women". The goal of the LTTE is to ultimately create a separate state. It is only a separate state that would give them legitimacy and also the opportunity to foster their vision for a Utopian state as outlined in the Vaddukoddai resolution. Their hope is either to exhaust the Sri Lankan nation and win a separate state militarily, or negotiate the next best, perhaps, with third party intervention, and use the powers negotiated to further the creation of a separate state. The Colombo-based Tamil leadership would not have any influence in these developments nor would they have any place in the new society.

Regional power was the hope of the Tamil community. However, in view of the divisions within the community, the leadership that could represent regional power is either the LTTE or the Colombo-based Tamils. Both leaderships cannot coexist at the same time in the same region, and since there is only one region, there can be only one leadership that can exercise the powers assigned to the region. These developments make

the concept of regional power to the Tamil community meaningless. To expect the larger Sri Lankan nation to sacrifice their security so that 5 to 6 percent of the population could have the opportunity to engage in social engineering for the purpose of creating their version of a Utopian state as outlined in the Vaddukoddai Resolution is unacceptable.

It is doubtful that the Colombo-based Tamil leadership bargained for these developments. There is no doubt that their strategy has gone awry. Their plan for regional power was in the hope that they would be the leaders of a separate region/state. The "youth" have usurped their place in history and in doing so the Colombo-based leaders have become irrelevant. Negotiating regional powers with them has no meaning because they do not represent a region to which powers can be assigned as long as the "youth" are around. Since the LTTE is only interested in negotiating terms that would eventually pave the way to a separate state, negotiating with them is equally of no value.

The security concerns of the larger Sri Lankan nation run counter to the political interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The greater the degree of regional power for the Sri Lankan Tamils, the greater the insecurity for the Sri Lankan nation. Since these threats are not perceived threats any more, but real, the concept of regional power should be abandoned if Sri Lanka is to avoid the Canadian experience.

Aside from threats of separatist insurrections, the Canadian Government has challenged Quebec's right to unilaterally secede. In August 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada " ... declared[24] that neither the Quebec government nor legislature have a legal right under Canadian constitutional law or under international law to unilaterally secede

[24] New York Times, August 7, 1998.

from Canada". The question that preoccupies Canadians is: what if Quebec does unilaterally secede? Will the rest of Canada resort to force and compel Quebec to remain within the federation or allow the process of dissolution of the federation to start with Quebec. Sri Lanka too will have to find answers to similar questions unless the concept of regional power is abandoned.

Such are the perils of regional power. By pursuing this concept Sri Lanka is inviting an unstable future. In economic terms, this instability would mean that resources that would be used for economic development would be diverted towards maintaining a security establishment in readiness. It is imperative that a radically new approach is sought. The only political structure that would address the security concerns of the Sri Lankan nation and have the potential to address the political interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils as well is a centralized government within which power is shared.

It is only a centralized government that can guarantee the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and through it render security to the larger Sri Lankan nation. The need of the hour is for the larger Sri Lankan nation to demand that their security should be the primary consideration in the formulation of any political arrangements.

CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION.

It is ironic that the capitulation to the forces of terrorism has come about precisely at a time when the international climate has become the least favourable to the LTTE and to the Tamil separatists. Ever since 1983 the Tamil terrorists have enjoyed great favour with international bodies allegedly concerned with human rights, with the foreign media, and even with foreign governments. This support came to them partly through default on the part of those upholding the unity of Sri Lanka who failed to counter the Tamil propaganda, and partly through the activity of interest religious and other groups who abhorred the prospect of a Buddhist country like Sri Lanka succeeding internationally. It must be remembered that Christian groups have played a strong part in supporting the LTTE both in Sri Lanka and abroad.

The main reason for the reversal of international opinion towards the LTTE is not the diplomatic activity of the Sri Lankan government, but the growing activity of expatriate Sri Lankan bodies which emerged in all Western countries, and the growing realisation that the LTTE was an international terrorist force. After the September 11 attacks it was quite logical that LTTE would not be welcome in most democratic nations of the world

With the increasing refutation of the superficial lies spread by the separatists such as the Discrimination Myth and the Homeland Myth the bottom was knocked out of the separatist arguments. However some of the media and the support in the unofficial bodies

which the Tamil separatists were able to secure in the early phases of the problem still continue to be of service to them.

The change on the part of the main Western governments has been due to a number of circumstances. The first is the recognition that terrorism has become the greatest threat to them in the post-Cold War world. In the United States in particular terrorism has reared it head as seen in the World Trade Centre bombings. Also Middle East terrorists have been increasingly using the method of suicide attacks which have imposed heave casualties on Westerners. Suicide bombing is a new threat. It is of course well known that the LTTE is the master in the use of suicide bombers. Since the West is increasingly perceiving terrorism, and suicide terrorism in particular, as a significant threat it is natural that they should condemn the LTTE.

Another factor inducing Western Governments to condemn the international arm of the LTTE is its association with narcotics smuggling and the smuggling of illegal immigrants to the West in the guise of refugees. Initially the West accepted these "refugees" with open arms. In many countries these so-called refugees were given assistance on a large scale. But when the exodus became a flood there was a reaction against the Tamil refugees. In many Western countries these "refugees" became adept at extorting money and in engaging in a number of criminal activities.

Amongst countries which have shown some reaction against Tamil separatist activity are the United States, Canada and some European countries. In Australia the action has not been so pronounced, but recently the Foreign Minister declared that he would not entertain any delegation from Tamil separatists unless they denounce the

terrorism of the LTTE. Unfortunately some Western countries like the U.K. and New Zealand have still not taken any action.

Some politicians in Sri Lanka seem to link the turn in international opinion with their offer of devolution, the downgrading of the military option, and talk of negotiations with terrorists. This is a misreading of the situation. The change in Western opinion has been largely prompted by their own interests, especially the harm which Tamil separatist elements are doing to Western interests. Sri Lankan politicians have misread the situation if they think that their own capitulation is the cause of this change and persist in the wrong course of action they have taken in this issue.

It must be realised that the partition of Sri Lanka will be welcomed by many in the Western camp. This given them an opportunity to continue the colonial policy of "divide and rule" by pitting Eelam against the rump of Sri Lanka that will be left. In everything from the disbursement of aid to the allocation of trade quotes, what was previously given to Sri Lanka will after the partition be divided between Sri Lanka and Eelam. In this connection it is significant that the proposed devolution will give enough external powers to the Eelam region to negotiate directly with other countries.

The position of India is worth special mention. It was India that originally armed the LTTE and set it up in business, as part of the Indira Gandhi plan to make Sri Lanka a satellite of India. This plan when horribly wrong because India's plans for the LTTE were not the same as those entertained by the latter. The LTTE plan was first to create an independent Eelam on Sri Lankan soil, and they foster the separation of Tamilnadu from India. If they were to succeed in this then Eelam and Tamil Nadu would be joined to form

a kind of Tamil mini superpower in the region. It is therefore inevitable that the axis between India and the LTTE would be broken. This occurred in spectacular fashion when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. This turned the Congress Party against the LTTE.

In India the Congress has lost its sole monopoly of power, and in Tamilnadu the anti-LTTE government of Jayalalitha has taken a more softer opinion towards LTTE. Thus the anti-LTTE forces have weakened in India, and it is possible that India may again support the LTTE. However this has already happened, but the readiness of the Sri Lankan Government to rely heavily on India for the "solution" to this problem may well be misplaced.

THE REAL POLICY OPTION

In international terms Sri Lanka is a tiny country and political fragmentation will further reduce its economic and political potential. Even the large European countries are now proceeding towards greater integration. China has integrated Hong Kong and has not relented in its move to incorporate Taiwan, while not relinquishing its ever tightening grip on Tibetan (even though Tibet has been a separate cultural and political entity with a very long history). As against these moves at centralisation, the examples of decentralisation like the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have brought these countries unmitigated disaster. Despite these lessons Sri Lanka seems to have a suicidal urge to follow the Bosnian example.

Centralisation in Sri Lanka must require the abolition of the Provinces as administrative units. These provinces were constituted by the British for no rhyme or reason, and none of the entities have any historical, geographical, economic or other

justification. They must be totally abolished. Some form of local government could be implemented to deal with local matters, but the unit of local responsibility should not exceed the size of the existing Districts.

All inhabitants of Sri Lanka can have equal rights and responsibilities regardless of ethnicity, language, religion and other characteristics. They should be free to move freely about the country, be subject to the same laws, and be able to live, work and own property in any part of the nation. This will make Sri Lanka single common market in economic terms, even though by international terms it will still be too small.

A code of Basic Civil Rights should be enshrined in the Constitution, and an independent judiciary should be established to oversee the enforcement of these Rights. As the charge of "discrimination" is the most common of the charges made under the old system (even though these charges have never been validated) there should be established an Anti-discrimination Law under which aggrieved person could obtain redress. Australia, and several other countries, have such anti-discrimination laws, so there is plenty of examples to learn from.

The country can adopt a policy of multi-culturalism within a unified nation. This means that cultural differences could be fostered where they have beneficial effects, but such differentiation should not entail territorial separation. The cultural diversity of Sri Lanka should be regarded as an asset, not as a liability which is the way that the devolutionists see it.

The most divisive issue of the past, viz the language problem, seems to have now been solved with the virtual adoption of parity of status between Sinhala, Tamil and

English. The continuation of such a policy will not pose a problem in multi-racial Sri Lanka will not pose a problem. But if the country is fractured into different racial enclaves the language problem will persist. Thus the Eelam Region will certainly adopt Tamil Only as their language policy, perhaps forcing other Regions to retaliate. This will reignite the language problem which has wrought so much havoc in Sri Lanka in the past.

The country's democratic institutions can be fostered. The greatest danger to democracy has been the rampant corruption in the past. This has been the main motivation for the proliferation of politicians, especially under the Provincial Councils system. With the Provincial Councils dissolved as a consequence of the abolition of the Provinces there will be a reduction in the number of corrupt politicians in the country. Of course even in the Central Government there will be an unacceptable degree of corruption unless active measures are taken against it, with still penalties to those who resort to corrupt means.

It is true that this kind of policy will not be accepted in the foreseeable future, especially as there does not appear to be any political grouping advocating it. We can only hope that in future this kind of political thinking will emerge. But if as seems likely the neo-Sinhala ideology prevails, and racially based territorial separation takes place, then only Sri Lanka's epitaph has to be written.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A	POLITICAL PARTIES IN SRI LANKA
APPENDIX B	ELECTION RESULTS IN SRILANKA
APPENDIX C	INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD
APPENDIX D	DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS
APPENDIX E	DRAFT CONSTITUTION CHAPTER XXVIII

Appendix A

Political Parties and Groups -- Sri Lanka

All Ceylon Tamil Congress
: also known as the Tamil Congress. Founded in 1944 to champion the cause of the Tamils against Sinhalese Buddhist domination. A faction broke away in 1949 to form the more aggressive Tamil Federal Party.

Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party--LSSP)
: Trotskyite-oriented party founded in 1935. Though touted as the world's only successful Trotskyite party, in recent years the LSSP has been considered politically spent.

Ceylon Indian Congress
: founded in 1939. Political group representing Indian Tamils that sought to revive Buddhism.

Ceylon Workers' Congress
: a minority-oriented party which enjoyed the support of the Indian Tamils and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress in the late 1980s.

Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL)
: began as a Stalinist faction of the LSSP, but was later expelled and founded as a separate party in 1943, remaining faithful to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV)
: Patriotic Liberation Organization--emerged in 1987 as a splinter group of the JVP.

Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF)
: a united front organization formed in March 1985 by the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, and EROS, which became largely inoperative by mid-1986 when LTTE quit, although the other groups sought to form a front without LTTE participation.

Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
: a guerrilla group that emerged in the early 1980s, part of the ENLF.

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS)
: militant Tamil guerrilla group that emerged in the early 1980s, part of the ENLF.

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP--People's Liberation Front)
: insurgent extremist political group founded in the late 1960s by Rohana Wijeweera. A Maoist and primarily rural Sinhalese youth movement based in southern Sri Lanka, it initially sympathized with the "oppressed" of both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities, but by the early 1980s, became increasingly a Sinhalese nationalist organization opposing any compromise with the Tamil insurgency.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
: strongest of Tamil separatist groups, founded in 1972 when Tamil youth espousing a Marxist ideology and an independent Tamil state established a group called the Tamil New Tigers; name changed in 1976. Competitors include People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, Tamil Eelam Liberation Army, and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization. Membership generally drawn from

the Karava or fisherman caste. By late 1986 LTTE had eliminated TELO and established itself as the dominant spokesman of the Tamil insurgency.

New Equal Society Party (Nava Sama Samaja Party--NSSP)
a breakaway faction of the LSSP.

People's Democratic Party (PDP--Mahajana Prajathanthra)
Sinhalese, founded in 1977 by six members of the SLFP.

People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE, also PLOT)
insurgent political group with large percentage of members belonging to elite Vellala caste; a rival of the LTTE, from whom it broke away in 1981 claiming a purer form of Marxist orthodoxy.

People's United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna--MEP)
political party founded by Dinesh P.R. Gunawardene in 1955 that has attracted Sinhalese support with its appeals to militant Buddhist and Sinhala chauvinist sentiments. Originally opposed to the UNP, it is basically an SLFP-Marxist coalition.

Sinhala Maha Sabha
Great Council of the Sinhalese. It was founded in 1937 to represent the interest of Sinhala-language speakers in the Ceylon National Congress and to mobilize popular support for the liberation of the country from foreign rule.

Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)
first major non-Marxist left-of- center political party to oppose the UNP; founded in July 1951 when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's left-of-center bloc split with D.S. Senanayake and seceded to form the SLFP.

Sri Lanka People's Party (Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya--SLPP)
political party formed in 1984 by a daughter of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Chandrika Kumaratunge, and her husband Vijay Kumaratunge, who claimed that the original SLFP, under the leadership of Bandaranaike's son, Anura, was excessively right wing and had become an instrument of the Jayewardene government.

Tamil Eelam Army (TEA)
insurgent group.

Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA)
insurgent group.

Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
guerrilla group decimated in 1986 by repeated LTTE attacks.

Tamil Federal Party
also known as the Federal Party. Formally established in December 1949. Competitor of the more conciliatory Tamil Congress, also known as the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, the party desired a federal system of government and the right to political autonomy--an independent Tamil state. Renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1971.

Tamil New Tigers
guerrilla group, formed in 1972, that abandoned the political process and geared itself for violence. The New Tigers espoused Marxist ideology and claimed to represent the oppressed of all ethnic groups despite its obvious ethnic affiliation; see also LTTE.

Tamil Tigers

Tamil separatist underground of rival and sometimes violently hostile groups based in the Northern and Eastern provinces and known collectively as Tamil Tigers.

Tamil United Front

founded in May 1972 as a reaction against the 1972 constitution, a coalition of Tamil interest groups and legal parties including the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party; united by the goal of Tamil autonomy and espousing nonviolent means, called the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)--political party spawned by the Tamil United Front.

Three Stars

insurgent Tamil coalition.

United Front (Samagi Peramuna)

three-party political coalition (LSSP, CPSL, and SLFP), formed in 1968 by Sirimavo Bandaranaike to prepare for the 1970 general election and to oppose the UNP.

United National Party

conservative, umbrella party founded by Don Stephen Senanayake in 1946 as a partnership of many disparate groups--including the Ceylon National Congress, the Sinhala Maha Sabha, and the Muslim League. Political party in power in Sri Lanka for ten years beginning in February 1948 when the new constitution went into effect, and again from 1977 to 1988; nickname is "uncle-nephew party" because of kinship ties among the party's top leadership.

Appendix B

Party Performance in General Elections, 1947-77

(showing percentage of popular vote and number of seats won)

	1947		1952		1956		March 1960		July 1960		1965		1970		1977	
Party	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats	Votes Won	No. of Seats
UNP1	39.9	42	44.0	54	27.9	8	29.6	50	37.6	30	39.3	66	37.9	17	50.9	140
SLFP2	--	--	15.5	9	40.0	51	20.9	46	33.6	75	30.2	41	36.9	91	29.7	8
LSSP3	16.84	154	13.1	9	10.5	14	10.5	10	7.4	12	7.5	10	8.7	19	3.6	0
CPSL5	3.7	3	5.8	4	4.6	3	4.8	3	3.0	4	2.7	4	3.4	6	2.0	0
MEP6	--	--	--	--	--	--	10.6	10	3.4	3	2.7	1	0.9	0	0.4	0
TC7	4.4	7	2.8	4	0.3	1	1.2	1	1.5	1	2.4	3	2.3	3	--	--
FP8	--	--	1.9	2	5.4	10	5.7	15	7.2	16	5.4	14	4.9	13	--	--
CIC9	3.8	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Other	2.3	1	2.9	1	0.3	0	7.6	9	5.3	7	6.7	7	1.3	0	1.810	1
TULF11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6.4	18
Ind.12	29.1	21	14.0	12	11.0	8	9.1	7	4.4	6	5.8	6	4.6	2	5.6	1
TOTAL	100.0	95	100.0	95	100.0	95	100.0	151	100.0	151	100.0	151	100.0	151	100.0	1- 68

-- Means did not particpate.
1UNP - United National Party.
2SLFP - Sri Lanka Freedom Party.
3LSSP - Lanka Sama Samaja Party.
4Includes both factions of LSSP, which ran separately in 1947.
5CP - Communist Party of Sri Lanka.
6MEP - Mahajana Eksath Peramuna.
7TC - Tamil Congress. With FP, formed the TULF to contest the 1977 election.
8FP - Federal Party. With TC, formed the TULF to contest the 1977 election.
9CIC - Ceylon Indian Congress.
10The Ceylon Workers' Congress.
11TULF - Tamil United Liberation Front.
12Ind. - Independents.

Source: Based on information from Craig Baxter, et al. *Government and Politics in South Asia,* Boulder, 1987, 330; and Robert N. Kearney, "The Political Party System in Sri Lanka," in *Political Science Quarterly,* 98, No. 1, Spring 1983, 19.

APPENDIX C

THE INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD

Sri Lanka Agreement

To establish peace and normalcy in Sri LankaThe president of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, hisexcellency Mr. J.R. Jayawardene, and the Prime Minister of The Republicof India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.

Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of Sri Lanka and India, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities of Sri Lanka.Have this day entered into the following agreement to fulfil this objective

1. In this context,

1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:

1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a ``multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society'' consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burgers:

1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured:

1.4 Also recognising that the nothern and the eastern provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples,who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups:

1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society in which all citizens can live in eqality,safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfill their aspirations:

2. Resolve that:

2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining pro-vinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the nothern and eastern provinces as outlined below:

2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e.from the date of the elections to the provincial council,as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3), the nothern and eastern provinces as now constituted, will form one adminis-trative unit, having one elected provincial council. Such a unit will have one governor, one chief minister and one board of ministers.

2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31st december,1988 to enable the people of the eastern province to decide whether:

a) The eastern province should remain linked with the nothern province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the nothern province as specified in para 2.2 or:

b) The eastern province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct provincial council with a separate governer,chief minister and board of ministers.The president may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.

2.5 The referendum, when held,will be monitered by a committee headed by the chief Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the government of Sri Lanka,

and a member appointed by the president, nomin-ated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the eastern province.

2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.

2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum.

2.8 Elections to provincial councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the provincial council of the north and east.

2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the eastern and nothern provinces by Aug. 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48 hours of signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the government of Sri Lanka.Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.

2.10 The government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the nothern and eastern provinces same organisations and mechanisms of government as are used in the rest of the country.

2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under The Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the process.

2.12 The government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.

2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.

2.14 The government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.

2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not finalized during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operatingdirectly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,

a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territoryis not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka

b) the Indian navy/coast guard will cooperate with the Sri Lankan navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.

c) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will co-operate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.

d) the Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.

e) The Governments of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the nothern and eastern provinces.

2.17 The government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the nothern and eastern provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this agreement. The government of India will extend full co-operation to the government of Sri Lanka in this regard.

2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

3. This agreement and the annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.

In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto.Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty-ninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

Ju[redacted]us Richard Jayawardene — Rajiv Gandhi

President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka — Prime Minister of the Republic of India

ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT

1. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the agreement will be observed by a representative of the election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.

2. Similarly, both heads of Government agree that the elections to the provincial council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the agreement will be observed and all para-military personnel will be withdrawn from the eastern and northern provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the council.

3. The President, in his discretion shall absorb such para-military forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.

4. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.

5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.

6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister od India also agree that in the terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the agreement, an Indian peace keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

1. From Rajiv Gandhi to J.R. Jayawardene on July 29, 1987:

Excellency,

1. Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millenia and more, and recognising the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussion, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:-

i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo Sri Lanka relations.

ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

iii) The work of restoring and operating the Tricomalee oil tank will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

iv) Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

3. In the same spirit, India will:

i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consulative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely,
Rajiv Gandhi

2. From J.R. Jayawardene to Rajiv Gandhi on July 29, 1987:

President of Sri Lanka
29 July 1987

Excellency,

Please refer to your letter dated the 29th of July 1987, which reads as follows:

Excellency,

1. Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millenia and more, and recognising the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussion, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:-

i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo Sri Lanka relations.

ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

iii) The work of restoring and operating the Tricomalee oil tank will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

iv) Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

3. In the same spirit, India will:

i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consulative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours Sincerely,
(Rajiv Gandhi)

His Excellency

Mr. J. R. Jayawardene

(President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Colombo)

This is to affirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

J.R. Jayawardene

President

Appendix D

PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLUTION OF POWER IN SRI LANKA

August 3rd 1995 (Draft Version)

TEXT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO THE REGION

Preamble:

These proposals seek to redefine the constitutional foundation of a plural society within a united and sovereign Republic of Sri Lanka based on the following principles.

a) promoting a vision of Sri Lanka where all communities can live in safety an security and their human dignity is valued and equality of treatment is an accepted norm of public life;

b) ensuring that all communities be given the space to express their distinct identity and promote that identity including the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, and nurture and promote their own language including the right to transact business with the State in the national language of their choice;

c) ensuring that all persons may fully and effectively exercise all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any distinctions and in full equality before the law.

d) giving recognition to Sinhala and Tamil as official languages and recognizing English as a link language;

e) providing an effective constitutional framework for the sharing of power with the regions based on an internationally consistent and coherent value system. There would be clarity and consistency in the distribution of power between the center and the regions and the scheme would be one which is capable of

effective implementation and include structures for the just and equitable resolution of center region disputes;

f) ensuring that all communities participate fully in the life of the nation whether it be at the national, regional or local level, thereby encouraging the regions and the communities which inhabit them to become constructive partners in a stable and pluralistic democracy.

I. STRUCTURE OF DEVOLUTION

1.1 Unit of Devolution

A regional council will be established for every province identified by a new schedule to the Constitution. One of the regions would be constituted by redemarcating the existing boundaries of the present North-East Province in full consultation with a view to reconciling Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim interests.

1.2 Regional Councils

A Regional Council will consist of such number of members as may be determined by law. A Regional Council unless sooner dissolved,continue for a period of five years. There will be a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker for each Council.

1.2.1 Legislative power in the region will be vested in the Regional Council. Every region may make laws applicable to the region with respect to any subject set out in the regional list. The Regional Council will have no jurisdiction over t he Reserved List.

1.3 Governor

There will be a Governor for each region for which a Regional Council has been established, appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Chief Minister of the Region.

1.3.1 The Governor will vacate his office upon:

(a) resignation;

(b) a 2/3 majority of the Regional Council passing a vote of no confidence.

(c) removal by the President.

1.3.2 The Governor may summon, dissolve and prorogue the Regional Council on the advice of the Chief Minister.

1.4 Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers

The Governor will call upon the person who commands the confidence of the majority in the Regional Council to form the Regional administration.

1.4.1 The Chief Minister cannot be removed from office so long as he enjoys the confidence of the regional council.

1.4.2 Executive power in the Region will be vested in the Board of Ministers who will be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Board of Ministers and the Chief Minister will be collectively responsible to the Regional Council.

1.5 Capital Territory

The territory comprising the cities of Colombo and Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte will be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Regional Council constituted for the Western Region and will be administered directly by the center, in such manner as the center may think fit.

II. FINANCE

2.1 There will be a National Finance Commission entrusted with allocating grants to the region, keeping in mind the objectives of balanced regional development.

2.2 Regional Councils will have the powers of taxation in certain specified areas, and the Constitution will require other revenue sharing arrangements.

2.3 Regional Councils will have the power to borrow as well as to set up their own financial institutions. International borrowing above a prescribed limit will require the concurrence of the center.

2.4 Regional Councils may regulate and promote foreign direct investment, international grants, and development assistance, subject to such conditions as may be specified by the center.

III. LAW AND ORDER

3.1 There will be a regional police service headed by a Regional Police Commissioner appointed by the Chief Minister, in consultation with the Governor of the Region. The Regional Police Commissioner will be responsible to, and function under the control of, the relevant Chief Minister. The Regional police service will investigate all offenses against persons and property.

3.2 There will be a national police service responsible for investigating offences against the States, threats to national security, offences related to elections, inter-province crimes and international crimes. The national police service will be headed by the National Police Commissioner and will be responsible for the Central Government.

3.3 The recruitment, transfers within the region, dismissal and disciplinary control of members of the regional police service will be the responsibility of the Regional Police Commission.

3.4 There will be a National Police Commission, the functions of which will include the transfer of Police Officers from one region to another in consultation with the Regional Police Commission.

3.5 The National Police Commission and the Regional Police Commission will both be appointed by the Constitutional Council. In the case of appointment of the

Regional Police Commission, the constitutional Council will act in consultation with the Chief Minister of the Region in question.

IV. LAND AND LAND SETTLEMENT

4.1 Land will be a devolved subject and State land within a region will be vested in the Regional Councils. State land within a region required for the purposes of the center in respect of a reserved subject may be utilized by the center in consultation with the relevant Regional Council in accordance with such procedures as may be established by law.

4.2 Priority in future land settlement schemes will be given to persons first of the district and then of the Region.

V. EDUCATION

5.1 Education and Higher Education will be devolved subjects included in the regional list.

5.2 Certain specified schools and universities may be declared "National" institutions administered by the center.

5.3 The recruitment, transfer and disciplinary control of teachers other than those in National Schools will be the responsibility of the Regional Council.

5.4 Training of teachers will be the responsibility of both the center and Regional Councils depending on w whether such teachers are to be recruited to the National or Regional Councils.

5.5 Curriculum development in regional schools will be the responsibility of the Regional Councils. Minimum standards will be set by the center.

5.6 There will be a National Education Commission composed of representatives of the center and the regions entrusted with the following functions:

a. identifying "national" schools and universities in consultation with regional Chief Ministers and stipulating criteria for admission into these national schools and universities.

b. setting minimum standards with regard to training, examination, curriculum, and employment of teachers

VI. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

6.1 There will be a High Court in every region. The High Court will exercise criminal, appellate and writ jurisdiction within the region.

6.2 The Regional Judicial Service Commission, which will be appointed by the Constitutional Council in consultation with the Chief Minister of the region will consist of the Chief Judge of the High Court and the two High Court Judges next in seniority.

6.3 Regional Judicial Service Commission will be responsible for the appointment of Regional High Court Judges and minor judiciary within the region. The Regional Judicial Service Commission will consult with the National Judicial Service Commission with regard to the transfer of judges.

6.4 The Governor will appoint a Regional Attorney-General who will advise the Governor on the Constitutionality of laws passed by the Regional Council. If a law is seen to be unconstitutional, the Regional Attorney-General after consultation with the Governor will institute action before the Supreme Court or any other tribunal specially set up to resolve disputes between the center and the region.

VII. PUBLIC SERVICE

7.1 There will be a Regional Public Service Commission (appointed by the Constitutional Council in consultation with the relevant Chief Minister) responsible for the recruitment, disciplinary control and dismissal of all persons employed by or seconded to, the Regional Councils.

7.2 The Regional Public Service Commission will consult with the National Public Service Commission, (also appointed by theConstitutional Council) in effecting the transfer of all such persons outside the Region.

VIII. COMMISSION ON DEVOLUTION

8.1 There will be a Permanent Commission on Devolution appointed by the Constitutional Council to resolve disputes between the center and a region or disputes among the regions. The Commission will have powers of mediation as well as adjudication.

IX. FRAME WORK RELATING TO DEVOLUTION

9.1 The Constitution will provide:

a. that the Republic of Sri Lanka shall be united and sovereign.It shall be a union of Regions.

b. that the territory of Republic will consist of regions, the names of which are set out in the first schedule. and its territorial waters,

c. that the legislative power of the People will be exercised by the Parliament, Regional Councils, and the People at a Referendum to the extent hereinafter provided: and

d. that the executive power of the people will be exercised by the President of the Republic acting on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers and the Governors acting on the advice of the respective Chief Ministers and Regional Boards of the Ministers to the extent hereinafter provided.

9.2 Article 76 of the existing Constitution will be deleted.

X. SUBSTANCE OF DEVOLUTION

10.1 Regional Councils will exercise exclusive legislative and executive competence within the devolved sphere. The subjects and functions will

be distributed between the center and the regions as set out in the following lists

LISTS

A. THE REGIONAL LIST

1. Health and indigenous medicine
2. Education and Educational Services, excluding national schools and national universities and the setting of minimum standards for training, examination, curriculum and teacher qualifications
3. Agriculture and agrarian services,
4. Irrigation within a region
5. Animal husbandry
6. Fisheries
7. Forestry and protection of the environment within a Region
8. Industries and industrial development
9. Energy
10. Transport
11. Minor ports and harbours
12. Roads and waterways
13. Housing and construction
14. Urban planning
15. Rural development
16. Local Government
17. Co-operatives
18. Supply and distribution of food within the Region
19. Promotion of tourism
20. The regulation of cultural activity within a region, including public performances
21. Broadcasting and media, including television

22. Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction
23. Social security
24. State land and its alienation or disposal (state land within a Region required for the purposes of the Centre in respect of a reserved subject may be utilized by the Centre in consultation with the relevant regional Council and in accordancewith such procedures as may be established by law).
25. Regional police and law and order
26. Administration of Borstal and reformatory institutions
27. Regional public service
28. Sports
29. Regulation of unincorporated associations and societies within the Region.
30. Regiònal debt
31. Domestic and international borrowing (international borrowings above a specified limit would require the concurrence of the centre).
32. The regulation and promotion of foreign(gn direct investment,international grants and developmental assistance to the Region.
33. Regional financial and credit institutions
34. Excise duties to be specified
35. Turnover taxes on wholesale or retail sales to the extent to be specified.
36. Betting taxes, taxes on prize competitions and lotteries other than National Lotteries
37. Motor vehicle license fees
38. Stamp duties on transfer of properties, such as land and motor cars
39. Fines imposed by courts
40. Court fees, including stamp fees on documents produced in courts.
41Land revenue, including the assessment and collection of revenues, and aintenance of land records for revenue purposes.
42. Taxes on mineral rights
43. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in the list
44. Taxes on mineral rights
45. Fines in respect of the matters in the Regional List

46. Planning at the regional level.

B. RESERVED LIST (CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LIST)

1. Defence, national security, national police, and the security forces
2. Immigration, Emigration and Citizenship
3. Foreign Affairs
4. National Census and Statistics
5. National Planning
6. Currency and Foreign Exchange, international economic relations and monetary olicy
7. Public Debt of the Government of Sri Lanka
8. Foreign loans of the Government of Sri Lanka
9. Regulation of banking and other financial institutions
10. Insurance
11. Stock Exchange and futures markets
12. Audit of the Government of Sri Lanka
13. Taxes on income capital and wealth of individuals companies and orporations
14. Custom duties including import and export duties, and excise duties (excluding such excise duties as may be devolved on the regions)
15. Turnover taxes and stamp duties , goods and services taxes (excluding those taxes and duties devolved on the regions)
16. Pensions payable by the Government of Sri Lanka or out of consolidated fund.
17. Atomic Energy
18. Maintenance and management of the National Grid
19. Minerals and mines (regulation and development of oil fields and mineral resources, petroleum and petroleum products)

20. National Rivers
21. Airports, harbours and ports with international transportation
22. Inter-regional transport and railways
23. Civil aviation
24. Inter-regional highways
25. Shipping and navigation; Maritime Zones including historical waters and territorial waters (Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf)
26. Elections (excluding elections to Local Authorities)
27. Posts and telecommunications
28. National Public Service and the National Public Service Commission
29. National Health Administration (inclusive of existing special purpose hospitals and teaching hospitals affiliated to national Universities; Training, education and research relating to Health; development of National Health standards; administration of all special programmes)
30. Drugs, poisons and narcotics
31. Administration of justice
32. National Universities
33. National standards with regard to professions, occupation and training
34. National standards relating to research, development and training in the area of agriculture.
35. Inter-regional irrigation schemes
36. Fishing beyond the territorial waters
37. Management of central policy and research institutions in the field of education eg. National Institute of Education;Management and supervision of national schools, conduct of national public certification examinations; imposition of minimum standards for training, curriculum and teacher qualifications
38. Adoption of children
39. National Industrial Research & Training
40. Regulation of activities for the enhancement of quality standards
41. Foreign trade, inter-regional trade and commerce
42. Patents, inventions, designs, copyright, trademarks and merchandise marks

43. Monopolies and mergers
44. Inter-regional food distribution
45. National media including Central Government Broadcasting and Television
46. National Archives and Museums, and archaeological sites declared by law to be of national importance
47. National Environment and National Policy on Tourism
48. Specialized National Housing Programmes
49. Specialised National Poverty Alleviation Programmes
50. Youth and Women's Affairs
51. Buddhism
52. Development of National sports administration and infrastructure
53. Intervention in instances of National (natural and environmental) disaster and epidemics
54. Labour regulation and standards
55. Surveys for the purpose of any matters enumerated in the Reserved List
56. Offences against Laws with respect to any of the matters in the list
57. Fees in respect of any of the matters in the list but not including fees taken in any Court
58. Public utility infrastructure development

APPENDIX E
DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF SRI LANKA
CHAPTER XXVIII
INTERIM COUNCIL FOR THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN REGIONS

Interim Council

243. (I) There shall be an Interim Council for the Northern and Eastern Regions set out in Part C of the First Schedule, with effect from the commencement of the Constitution, and shall continue for a period of five years from that date and such Interim Council shall be deemed to have been dissolved at the end of that period

(2) The Interim Council shall consist of such number of members as is equal to the total number of members entitled to be returned, in accordance with the determination made by the Commissioner of Elections under section 3 (3) of the Provincial Councils Elections Act No.1, of 1988, from the several administrative districts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces to the North-Eastern Provincial Council established under the 1978 Constitution.

(3) The President shall appoint the members of the Interim Council, so however, that the President shall appoint such members for each administrative district of the Northern and Eastern Regions, the number of members appointed for each such administrative district being equal to the number of members that each such administrative district was entitled to return to the North-Eastern Provincial Council in accordance with the determination referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article .

(4) (a) Recognized political parties and independent groups shall nominate, from among persons ordinarily resident in the Northern and Eastern Regions, persons for appointment as members of the Interim Council, for each administrative district of the Northern and Eastern Regions.

(b) The President shall appoint members of the Interim Council from among the persons nominated under sub paragraph (a) of this paragraph for each administrative district of the Northern and Eastern Regions, having regard to the ethnic composition of the Northern and Eastern Regions as well as to the ethnic composition of such administrative district.

(5) The members appointed by the President to the several administrative districts of the Northern and Eastern Regions shall together constitute the Interim Council for the Northern and Eastern Regions.

(6) (a) A member of the Interim Council may, resign from the Council by writing addressed to the President and such resignation shall take effect from the date on which the President accepts such resignation in writing.

(b) The President shall remove a member of the Interim Council from office on the recommendation of the recognized political party or independent group nominating such member for appointment to the Council.

(7) Whenever a member of the Interim Council dies, resigns or is removed from office, the President shall appoint in place of such member, a person nominated by the recognized political party or independent group which had nominated the member who has died, resigned or was removed from office.

(8) An act or proceeding of the Interim Council shall not be, or be deemed not to be, invalid by reason only of any vacancy in the Council or any defect in the appointment of a member of the Council.

Board of Ministers.

244. (1) There shall be a Board of Ministers for the Northern and Eastern Regions consisting of Chief Minister, two Deputy Chief Ministers and six other Ministers.

(2) The Governor shall appoint as Chief Minister of the two Regions the member of the Interim Council who is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the Council.

(3) Where the Chief Minister is from one of the three major communities in the two Regions, the two Deputy Chief Ministers shall be from the other two major communities in the two Regions.

(4) (a) The Governor shall appoint as Deputy Chief Ministers, the members respectively, of the Interim Council who are best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the Interim Council belonging to the respective communities of which they are members.

(b) Every Deputy Chief Minister shall be entitled to participate in meetings of the Chief Ministers Conference but shall not be entitled to vote at such meetings.

(5) Of the six other Ministers, at least one shall be from second major community in the two Regions and where there is only one other Minister from such community, such Minister shall be from a recognized political party or independent group other than the recognized political party or independent group of which the Deputy Chief Minister from that community is a member.

(6) (a) The Governor, shall assign the following subjects and functions to the Chief Minister and the two Deputy Chief Ministers —

(i) the Chief Minister - Regional Planning, Finance, Law and Order, Public Investment and Local Government;

(ii)the Deputy Chief Minister from the second major community- Health, Social Services, Rehabilitation and Islamic Culture;

(iii) the Deputy Chief Minister from the third major community- Archaeology and Museums, Buddhist Culture, Transpon and Highways, Housing and Urban Development.

(b) The Governor shall assign subjects and functions, other than the subjects and functions assigned under sub- paragraph (a) of this paragraph to the to the Chief Minister, Deputy Chief Ministers and the other Ministers of the Board of Ministers, on the advice of the Chief Minister.

Powers of Interim Council and Board of Ministers.

245 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, the Governor of the Northern and Eastern Regions, the Interim Council and the Board of Ministers appointed under this Chapter shall exercise and perform, the powers and duties conferred and imposed respectively on, and discharge the functions assigned respectively to, the Governor of a Region, a Regional Council and the Board of Ministers of a Region, by this Constitution, and all the provisions of this Constitution relating to the Governor of a Region, Regional Councils and the Board of Ministers of a Region shall, save as expressly provided in this Chapter, apply respectively, to the Governor of the Northern and Eastern Regions and to the Interim Council and Board of Ministers appointed under this Chapter.

(2) The Governor, Interim Council and the Board of Ministers shall exercise their respective powers with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the two Regions, recognizing the diversity of their identities and traditions, and such exercise shall be founded on the principles of full respect for the equality of the civil, political, social, religious and cultural rights of those people and of the freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and on parity of esteem and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of all communities in the two Regions.

Legislative powers of the Interim Council.

246. (1) The following shall require the votes of a majority of the members of the Interim Council, present and voting, as well as the votes of a majority of the members of the Interim Council belonging to the second and third major communities in the two Regions, preent and voting.

(a) any decision relating to

(i) the election of a Speaker;

(ii) the adoption of standing orders of the Council; and

(b) the passing of a draft Statute declared by the Speaker as having a vital bearing on -

(i)the manifestation of any religion in worship, observance, practice and teaching;

(ii) the security of the two Regions and its inhabitants; or

(iii) economic opportunities in the two Regions, upon a motion to that effect being presented to the Speaker signed by not less than thirty per centum of the total number of members of the Interim Council and the Speaker being satisfied that such draft Statute has such a vital bearing.

(2) A declaration made by the Speaker under sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) of this Article shall be conclusive for all purposes.

(3) (a) Every Statute passed by the Interim Council shall come into force upon the Statute receiving assent as hereinafter provided.

(b) Every Statute passed by the Interim Council shall be presented to the Governor for assent forthwith on the making thereof, and the Governor shall either assent to the Statute or may as soon as possible after the Statute is presented to the Governor for assent, return the Statute to the Interim Council together with a message requesting the Council to reconsider the Statute or any provision thereof and in particular, requesting the Council to consider the desirability of introducing such amendments as may be recommended in the message.

(c) Where a Statute is returned to the Interim Council under subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the Council shall reconsider the Statute having regard to the Governor's message and may pass such Statute with or without amendments and present the Statute to the Governor for assent.

(d) Upon presentation of a Statute to the Governor under subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, the Governor may assent to the Statute or reserve the Statute for reference by the President to the Supreme Court within one month of the passing of the Statute for the second time, for a determination that the Statute is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution.

(e) Where, upon such reference, the Supreme Court determines that the Statute is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Governor shall, on receipt of the Court's determination, assent to the Statute, but where the Supreme Court determines that the Statute is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Governor shall withhold assent to the Statute.

(4) There shall be an Executive Committee for each Ministry in charge of a Minister of the Board of Ministers and the provisions of this Constitution relating to Executive Committees of Ministries in charge of Ministers of the Board of Ministers of a Region shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to such Executive Committees.

Public Service.

247. (1) There shall be a Public Service Commission and a Public Service for the Northern and Eastern Regions.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, the provisions of this Constitution relating to a Regional Public Service Commission and a Regional Public Service shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to such Commission and such Service.

(3) The Public Service Commission of the two Regions shall make appointments to posts in the Public Service of the Regions in accordance with criteria relating, inter alia, to eligibility and merit prescribed by the National Public Service Commission, but shall ensure, as far as practicable, that appointments to all categories of posts in such Service at the regional level reflect the ethnic composition of the Regions, and that appointments to posts in such Service at district level, reflect the ethnic composition of the district.

Police.

248 (1) There shall be a Police Commission and a Police Service for the Northern and Eastern Regions.

(2) The provisions of this Constitution relating to a Regional Police Commission and to a Regional Police Service shall, subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, apply to such Commission and such Service.

(3) The National Police Commission shall, during the period of office of the Interim Council, recruit officers to all posts in the Police Service of the two Regions.

(4) The Board of Ministers of the two Regions shall assist the Central Government in the decommissioning of weapons unlawfully possessed by armed groups.

Finance

249. (1) The Interim Council shall expend the funds granted annually by the Central Government for the use of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, in accordance with guidelines issued by the Finance Commission.

(2) The guidelines issued under paragraph (1) of this Article shall include, inter alia, guidelines for the expenditure of funds in local authority areas with a view to eliminating or reducing disparities in development prevailing in such local authority areas.

(3) Where funds are allocated by the Interim Council for the development of a local authority area, the Interim Council shall ensure that such funds are not applied in such manner as would discriminate against minority communities living in concentrations in such local authority area.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement.

250. The Interim Council and the Board of Ministers shall take such measures as may be necessary -

(a) to rehabilitate and resettle, persons who have been displaced in the Northern and Eastern Regions, after January 1, 1983;

(b) to enable such persons to recover possession of property lost by such persons; and

(c) where such recovery is not possible, to ensure that such persons received adequate compensation for the loss of such property.

Cultural Committees.

251. (1) (a) There shall be a Cultural Committee for each of the three major communities in the Northern and Eastern Regions.

(b) Every Cultural Committee set up for a community shall consist of the members of the Interim Council belonging to such community.

(c) The members of each Cultural Committee shall elect a Chairperson of the Committee from amongst the members.

(d) The Chairpersons of local authorities established for local authority areas within the Regions may attend meetings of a Cultural Committee but shall not be entitled to vote at such meetings.

(2) A Cultural Committee may exercise and perform such powers and duties as may be conferred and imposed on such Committee by Statute and may make recommendations to the Interim Council on measures for the promotion of the culture of the community in respect of which the Committee has been set up.

(3) The Interim Council shall allocate adequate funds annually to every Cultural Committee set up under this Article and it shall be the duty of such Committee to apply such funds for the promotion of the culture of the community in respect of which the Committee has been set up.

Equality Commission.

252. (1) There shall be an Equality Commission consisting of three members appointed by the President from the three major communities in the Northern and Eastern Regions.

(2) It shall be the function of the Equality Commission to monitor measures taken by the Interim Council and the Board of Ministers of the Regions—

(a) to promote equality of opportunity for all communities in the two Regions in matters such as employment and access to public services; and

(b) to promote parity of esteem amongst all communities in such Regions, and may, for the purpose of discharging of such function, inquire into complaints relating to such matters made against public bodies functioning in such Regions.

(3) The Equality Commission shall report to the President as often as may be necessary.

Interim Regional Council.

253. (1) There shall be an Interim Regional Council for the Northern and Eastern *Regions* set out in Part C of the First Schedule for the period commencing on the date of dissolution of the Interim Council established under the provisions of Article 243, and ending on the last of the dates fixed for the referendum referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 127.

(2) The Interim Regional Council shall consist of such number of members as is equal to the total number of members appointed to the Interim Council increased by two.

(3) The election of members to the Interim Regional Council shall be from the several administrative districts of the Northern and Eastern Regions and the provisions of the Provincial Councils Elections Act, No.2 of 1988 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to such election.

(4) The provisions of Articles 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251 and 252, other than the provisions of paragraph (3) of Article 248, shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the Interim Regional Council established under this Article.

(5) (a) If for some unforeseen reason the Referendum referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 127 cannot be held prior to the expiration of a period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution, two Interim Regional Councils shall be deemed to have been established respectively for the Northern and Eastern Regions set out in Part C of the First Schedule, for the period commencing on the date of expiration of the ten year period and ending on the last of the dates on which such Referendum is subsequently held, and the provisions of the Constitution relating to Regional Councils shall, mutatis mutandis, and unless the context otherwise requires, apply to each such Council.

(b) Upon the holding of the Referendum referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, the relevant provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 127 shall apply.