

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**

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CERTIFICATE

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PROF. RAJENDRA K. JAIN
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*Dedicated
To
My Parents*

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

Preface

i-iv

List of Abbreviations

v-vi

Chapter I Changing Dynamics of European
Security in the Post- Cold War Era 1-39

Chapter II European Security and Defence Identity:
Issues at Stake 40-66

Chapter III EU, NATO and European Security
Cooperation: St-Malo Declaration to the
Helsinki Summit 67-87

Chapter IV Conclusion: Future Prospects of a European
Security and Defence Identity 88-114

Bibliography 115-127

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Sapanti Baroowa .
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Preface

The end of the Cold War has presented European security structures with a host of new challenges, including ethnic conflicts in out-of-area regions, economic and democratic reform programmes in Central and Eastern Europe, refugees and migration flows, environmental hazards, religious fundamentalism, organised crime, terrorism and drugs. These changing dynamics of European security and the accompanying challenges and dilemmas called for not only a redefinition of Europe's security concerns and objectives, but also, a realignment of the existing security institutions. That the Europeans need to assume greater responsibility for their security is a view that is increasingly being expressed on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in the wake of the Kosovo crisis of 1999 which laid bare the glaring insufficiencies of Europe's contribution towards resolution of conflicts in its own backyard. In recent times, however, significant developments are taking place in Europe as far as Europe's quest for a independent security and defence identity is concerned. For long the Europeans were divided on the question of assuming a greater security and defence role. The opinions were quite polarised with France and the United Kingdom being the two powers on opposite extremes. The breakthrough occurred

in December 1998 at St-Malo where Britain under Tony Blair lifted its decades-long veto against a larger European role. Britain had all along opposed moves towards assuming greater autonomy as it was viewed to be detrimental to the special relationship with the United States. The St-Malo declaration laid the ground for the subsequent Helsinki Summit of December 1999 in which the 15 members of the EU took on board the need to improve defence capabilities in general and force projection in particular, while moving forward with setting up intergovernmental EU machinery to deal with defence issues. These developments not only hold the promise of Europe's new-found resolve to take on a greater responsibility for its own defence but is also suggestive of its assertion of a security and defence identity which is solely of its own.

The purpose of the present study is to critically analyse both the prospects and problems of the existing momentum towards a European Security and Defence Identity in the light of the prevailing realities.

Chapter I not only presents a broad overview of the new challenges and threats facing Europe but also looks at the various institutional responses to the changing circumstances. It tries to investigate as to what extent the existing security institutions succeeded in adapting to the changed situation. Although the main institutions

especially NATO, WEU and the OSCE undertook significant self reform programmes by evolving new structures and mechanisms, the net result was often an over-lap of roles and functions.

In Chapter II an attempt is made to critically analyse the issues and problems that impinged on the European quest for a separate security and defence identity especially in the 1990s. The chapter examines how the search for a European Security and Defence Identity evolved and gathered momentum during the period. It also identifies the various factors as well as issues which were , and perhaps still are, at stake and which determined the course such a quest would take, especially in the light of differing national perspectives within Europe. A detailed treatment is also given to the NATO/WEU security interface which was the central focus of debates regarding European security in the 1990s. Attention is also drawn to the various exercises in reform and restructuring that NATO undertook in an effort to accommodate European demands better. The implications of NATO's restructuring combined with its Eastward Enlargement on the future development of a European Security and Defence Identity is also examined.

Chapter III takes up the St-Malo Declaration as the starting point of a renewed and a more serious European attempt at assuming a larger

profile in defence and security terms. It analyses the background to, and the possible reasons behind Tony Blair's change of mind which marked a significant departure from Britain's earlier position regarding a European identity in terms of defence and security. The Chapter analyses the various events that the developments at St-Malo set in motion including the Cologne European Council leading to the Helsinki Summit which saw the adoption of the EU's 'headline goal'.

Finally Chapter IV carries forth the analyses of the new developments with a view to examining their long-term implications. It attempts a realistic appraisal of the current developments in the light of the various issues that need to be addressed on a more pragmatic basis especially the capabilities gap between the EU and the United States. The Chapter also highlights the United States' reactions to Europe's new moves to take up a bigger defence role. The American reservations are loud and clear but the present study concludes with a optimistic note in that the significant first steps have been achieved. It is now upon the Europeans to seize upon the moment and take on the responsibilities which are perhaps long overdue.

List of Abbreviations

CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMFA	Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSCM	Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean
CW	chemical weapons
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
EMC	European Military Committee
EMU	European Monetary Union
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to the WEU
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HGTF	Headline Goal Task Force
HR-CFSP	High Representative for CFSP
MC	Military Committee
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace Programme
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSC	Political and Security Committee
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
WEAG	Western European Armament Group
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter I

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Introduction: New Security Challenges in a New Europe

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of superpower rivalry has not led to an era of assured peace in Europe, but has in fact brought to the fore a host of new challenges and threats, which have in turn led, particularly in the field of security, to a great deal of rethinking. It may, however, be argued that the end of the Cold War effectively removed the immediate risk of a direct, large scale, military attack on Western Europe, and that there was also a corresponding decline in the risk of a massive nuclear exchange on the continent.¹ Viewed from this perspective and in comparison to the earlier East-West conflict, the new security scenario, can even be termed positive, at least from the Western point of view. The West was able to decrease its military readiness, decrease the numbers of its troops and arms and, at least to an extent, reduce the accompanying financial burdens.² Yet even as the hard military threats of

¹ Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (London), vol.22, no.1, March 1999, p.2.

² Dieter Mahncke, "Parameters of European Security", *Chaillot Paper 10* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), September 1993, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai10e.html>

bipolar rivalry diminished, there was a recognition that Europe still faced a plethora of security concerns. Some of these had been overshadowed by the Cold War and others were created by the very end of the conflict. Specialists in geopolitics agree that anything could happen in the given situation - for the best or for the worst.³ Actual and potential instability in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the neighbouring countries of the Mediterranean and West Asia is one cause for concern. Similarly, the dangers presented by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism must be taken into account. Massive, uncontrolled migration, transnational environmental issues and the risks of economic destabilization could also threaten security. In general, these new challenges to European security can be divided into a number of broad categories: the re-emergence of nationalism and ethnic strife; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the new transnational risks of organized crime, international terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering; the potential danger from spillover effects of instability in out-of-area regions; and, the soft security issues of human rights and migration.

³ Jacques Delors, "European Unification and European Security", *Adelphi Papers*, no.284, January 1994, p.4.

Nationalism and Ethnic Strife

The post-Cold War emergence of nationalism in the East is of particular concern to the West since few of the emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe have homogenous populations or settled borders, and nationalism has been increasingly defined along religious or ethnic lines, which often cross national borders. The result of such ethno-religious nationalism has been wide scale minority problems associated with self-determination movements.⁴ For example, by 1991 all of the states of the former Eastern bloc, including those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had pressing minority problems that ranged from armed strife in the former Yugoslavia to questions of citizenship and status as in the Baltic states.⁵ Indeed, after the demise of the Soviet Union, self-determination has become one of the potentially most dangerous agents shaping the European security landscape. The international community was challenged by the dilemma to recognise or not to recognise newly independent states. Recognition has proved right in the case of the Baltic republics. In former Yugoslavia, it has spurred an atrocious war that posed the most imminent threat to European security as it may spill over into other parts of the disintegrated federal state and involve neighbouring

⁴ Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (New York, 1994), p.57.

⁵ Stephen Iwan Griffiths, "Nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe" in Colin McInnes (ed.) *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, (New York, 1992), pp.64-5.

countries. Self-determination is most frequently claimed on ethnic or nationalist grounds. Both phenomena, ethnic tensions and nationalism, occur in an environment of political and economic instability in which the existing state structure does not fulfil the population's expectations raised by democratisation. The resurgence of nationalism in the post-Communist era is closely linked to the demise of ideology, to democratization and to the material hardships entailed by economic reform. For more than seven decades, civic identification in the former Soviet Union was rooted in ideology. When the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 new states, old identities had to be revived or new ones created.⁶ The end of the Cold War also revealed that the overall problem of national minorities had just been frozen under Communism. Old issues revived overnight and new ones emerged with the change of borders in the wake of the dissolution of multiethnic communist federations like the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. At present, national minority issues are sources of potential tensions and instability in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the territory of the former USSR; the most important cases are related to "divided nations", Russian minorities and minorities with no kin state.⁷ The fact that the majority of these minority questions remains unsettled and the geographic proximity of several conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe

⁶ Victor-Yves Ghebali and Brigitte Sauerwein, *European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives*, (New York, 1995), p.48.

⁷ *ibid.*, p.63.

means the West must develop a mechanism to deal with future Bosnias or Chechnyas.

On a higher level, Western Europe must also be prepared for the possibility of a re-emergence of Russian nationalism - to the point that Moscow would attempt to reassert itself as a potential power on the European continent. For, even after the break - up of the Soviet Union, Russia remains by geographical location a European power, and its existing military capability as well as future potential make it the foremost European military power. In addition, the West must also be prepared for any spillover which might emerge from internal instability within the Russian Federation. There is much uncertainty about how Russia will develop in future, and even less agreement on how much insurance the West needs to prepare for these uncertainties. Moreover, the sheer size of Russian nuclear and conventional forces demands healthy respect from the West Europeans. This is, however, not to contend that the West should risk alienating the Russians by condemning them to be a perpetual enemy, but it is clear that the presence of Russia on the European continent requires an equal military counterweight as the best guarantee for future stability, and that at the very least, Russia needs to be included on a consultative basis in the evolution of Europe's security architecture.⁸

⁸ Lansford, n.1, p.3.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The militarisation of West Asia and North Africa point to a second major security concern of Western Europe - the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For Europe, proliferation threats revolve around three main areas: the control and maintenance of the nuclear stockpile and infrastructure of the former Soviet Union; the development of indigenous means of production of WMD by rogue or pariah states; and the sale of WMD delivery systems capable of hitting Western Europe.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, concerns about the control and accountability of its nuclear arsenal have been paramount for European security. Despite some progress in the dismantling of its existing nuclear stockpile and the collection of warheads from other former Soviet republics, the Russian Federation retains the world's second largest nuclear arsenal.⁹ The deteriorating morale and low pay of the state's strategic rocket forces raised serious questions about the Kremlin's ability to adequately control its inventory. To further complicate matters, the loss of employment and prestige for the estimated 3,000 - 7,000 scientists and engineers who worked on the design and production of Soviet nuclear

⁹ *ibid.*, p.4.

weapons may tempt many to sell their services to those states in the process of developing their own nuclear weapons.¹⁰

The possible transfer of nuclear technology and secrets is especially troubling for Europe since several states in North Africa and the Persian Gulf region have ongoing programmes to develop WMD. The nuclear programmes of Iraq and Libya seem to have halted for the time being, but both nations still possess considerable capabilities in producing chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, in 1991, Algeria was discovered to have a secret nuclear research facility near Oussera and was accused by the CIA of attempting to develop a nuclear bomb with the aid of China and Iraq.¹¹

Proliferation concerns are exacerbated by the transfer or sale of delivery systems. Algeria and Iran now possess 'Kilo' -class submarines. In addition, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria have FROG-7 missiles, and Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have Scud-B/C missiles.¹² The continued proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems has created in Europe an impetus for collaborative defence planning and intelligence exchanges to counter such risks. The nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway in March 1995 has demonstrated the potential of terrorists using chemical weapons, and

¹⁰ Duke, n.4, p.52.

¹¹ Mark Stenhouse, "The Maghreb: The Rediscovered Region", *International Defense Review: Defense '95*, Feb. 1995, p.86, quoted in Lansford, n.1, p.4.

¹² Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), "Parliamentary Cooperation in the Mediterranean", *WEU Document 1485*, 6 November, 1995, quoted in Lansford, n. 1, p.4.

the ongoing movements of separatist groups in Europe, raise the possibility of their using WMD or the threat of WMD to accomplish politico-military goals.

The New Transnational Risks: Organised Crime, International Terrorism, drug trafficking, and money laundering

Among the new factors that transcend boundaries and erode national cohesion, the most perilous are the so-called 'new risks': illegal drug trafficking, international organised crime and terrorism. Contrary to other global challenges (like environmental concerns etc.), they call directly into question the very authority of the state, and are potentially, if not openly, subversive. Five aspects of transnational organised crime and drug trafficking are strategically relevant: the close interconnection between these two risks, nuclear smuggling, drugs geo-strategy and political disorder, drugs and insurgent movements, and cyber crime and money laundering.¹³ Transnational organised crime, drug trafficking and international terrorism are therefore the three new risks that must be fully included in the strategic picture of European security. The conjunction of transnational organised crime and illegal drug trafficking is a serious threat for the government, society and economy of European countries, because it

¹³ Alessandro Politi, "European Security: The New Transnational Risks", *Chaillot Paper 29*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), October 1997, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai29e.html>

can result in the marshalling of significant resources to impose a *pax mafiosa* on whole regions, or indeed to corrupt a government and destabilise an economy creating 'grey zones'¹⁴ The most visible demonstration of these phenomena is given by the cases of former Yugoslavia and Albania. Each time the international community refuses or fails to restore peace and order comprehensively, the area becomes prey to organised crime and becomes a hub for trafficking, notably arms and drugs, directly endangering European security. International terrorism has acquired a different dimension, following the general development of the world economy, through its deregulation and delocalisation. Consequences of these changes are the renewed interpenetration between terrorist and criminal groups, and the spread of terrorist methods among criminal organisations. A comprehensive evaluation of these risks must also take into account the new and revolutionary nonphysical dimension: cyber crime and associated money laundering. Cyber crime has the potential to attack vital government and private electronic networks, while money laundering has the capability to destabilise local economies. European security, therefore, has now to be considered in a wider context than before, and Europe's essential interests, influence and prestige will depend in part on how these issues and risks are tackled, both in the short-term, as well as in the long run.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

Instability in Out of-Area Regions

In and of themselves potential conflicts in out-of-area regions do not pose an automatic threat to West European security. Such conflicts entail no direct threat as long as they can be isolated.¹⁵ But there is no assurance that a conflict can indeed be kept isolated. A conflict may spread, either by an extension of the accompanying problems (nationalism, ethnic conflict, refugees) to neighbouring countries, thus involving them or by involving other European countries with conflicting interests, be they historic or current. Such an extension would not necessarily pose an immediate threat to European security overall, but clearly the difficulties of isolating the conflict would increase significantly and there would indeed be potential for an extension of the conflict.¹⁶

Geographically speaking, the main challenges to European security are, actually or potentially, concentrated in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and Eurasia. References to some of the risks emanating from these regions have already been made in the sections on weapons proliferation and on nationalism and ethnic strife. The Balkans however warrants further treatment given the complex nature of the region's geopolitical reality and given its record of turbulent flare-ups in recent history. The Balkan region,

¹⁵ Mahnke, 42.

¹⁶ *ibid.*

or Southeastern Europe, has traditionally been the object of a long and active rivalry between external powers and, thus, a source of instability and war in Europe. Because of the continuous conflicting interests among its nation-states, it has been argued that it is less a region than an amalgam of bilateral interests. Several long-standing territorial disputes still hang over the region: Transylvania (Romania/Hungary), Bessarabia (Romania/Russia/ Ukraine), Kosovo (Albania /Serbia) and Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania).¹⁷

Apart from being at the crossroads between Christianity and Islam, the Balkans have an obvious geostrategic importance given, in particular, their contiguity to Russia, West Asia and North Africa as well as their encompassing of the Turkish straits. Since the end of the Cold War, the region is increasingly becoming the "powder keg" it has traditionally been in European history - a trend due to the Yugoslav conflict as well as the awakening of issues related to national minorities. The collapse of Communism has had at least two main effects. First, the geostrategic importance of the Balkans has lost most of its relevance from the point of view of outside political actors, beginning with the USA and Russia. Second, the absence of a stabilizing influence from external powers have unleashed uncontrolled and virtually unmanageable ultra-nationalist forces

¹⁷ Gheballi and Sauerwein, n.6, p.133.

and fuelled ethnic conflicts. The Yugoslav crisis, for manifold reasons, presents an extreme degree of gravity. It swept away most of the hopes generated by the end of the Cold War for a "peaceful, democratic and united Europe", and also trampled underfoot the basic principles in which the new "whole and free Europe" was supposed to be embedded.¹⁸

The Soft Security Issues: Migration and Human Rights

In Western Europe, national security has come to be defined less by concerns over the sanctity of borders and more by issues surrounding the personal safety and well-being of individual citizens. Direct or 'hard' or military threats to the continent have mostly been replaced by indirect or 'soft' threats to security and stability. The most significant and immediate of these soft security threats include migration and human rights. With chronic high levels of unemployment throughout much of Europe, immigration has become an increasingly contentious political matter. This is especially true in France where the government is eyeing Algeria warily in case an escalation of the conflict there unleashes a new flood of refugees.¹⁹ Some security experts have also predicted that the Maghreb "will become for Europe the functional equivalent of what Mexico is for the United States" and the prospect of Maghrebi boat people is not

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 133-4.

¹⁹ Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War an Itself", *Foreign Policy*, no.99, Summer (1995), pp.138-40

altogether far-fetched".²⁰ The fear of large-scale migratory flows from what is perceived as Europe's soft underbelly was one of the major reasons behind the proposal for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). For Western Europe, migration therefore represent a multifaceted problem whose importance is likely to grow in the future - given, first, the magnitude of the migratory potential of the countries of the former USSR and those of Central and Eastern Europe, especially Romania and, second, the possibly growing flow of refugees and displaced persons generated by conflicts in both the former Yugoslavia and the territory of the former USSR. What is therefore increasingly being felt in Europe is to devise a kind of strategy which would combine some tightening of controls with development measures that address the root causes of the outflow. The issue of migration flows will continue to rank high on the European political agenda because disordered or large scale migrations confront national societies with multifaceted challenges not only of an economic, political and social nature, but also with demographic, cultural and religious implications.

With the end of the Cold War, human rights issues have also become increasingly relevant to European security as the rise in ethnic conflict has led to larger numbers of refugees. In response to the number of

²⁰ Francois Heisbourg, "Population Movements in Post-Cold War Europe", *Survival*, vol. 33, no.1, January/February 1991, p.35.

conflicts and rise in refugees, European security institutions have been called upon to conduct an ever expanding number of humanitarian operations. These also called into question the right of the international community to interfere on humanitarian grounds in violation of a state's sovereignty. Upto that time the traditional approach has been on the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention. Humanitarian aid could only be delivered to the people of that state with the consent of its government. Any form of military intervention by individual states on the territory of other states was ruled out. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the right to take enforcement action if the situation in a state poses a threat to international peace and security. The operation "Restore Hope" in Somalia set a precedent as the UN intervention was not motivated by a threat to international peace, but by extreme humanitarian need. In the preamble to Resolution 794 which authorized the United States to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment of humanitarian relief operations in Somalia the 'magnitude of the human tragedy' was invoked. As the turmoil in post-Communist Europe is bound to be accompanied by abuses or even flagrant violations of human rights, such a shift in the acceptability of humanitarian interventions is quite significant. It reflects the new awareness of a

collective responsibility which had been stifled by the hegemonial "big brother" approach of the Cold War era.²¹

Institutional Responses

The changing dynamics of European security at the end of the Cold War, and the accompanying challenges and dilemmas called for not only a redefinition of Europe's security concerns and objectives, but also, a realignment of the existing security institutions and their adaptation to the new realities. Security had to be now redefined in more comprehensive terms and therefore all concerned institutions indulged in a dual process of self-reform and competition. In fact, institutions and their post-Cold War responsibilities have been the central focus of debates about European security since days after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The goal, first set in the then US Secretary of State James Baker's Berlin speech in December 1989, was to establish a new security architecture, one that preserved what had been achieved in the West but encouraged adaptation to the new political and military context.²²

The existing security institutions undertook significant self-reforms whose global effect was an overlap of roles and functions. Thus, the CSCE

²¹ Ghebali and Sauerwein, n.6, p.47.

²² Catherine Mc Ardle Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An interim assessment* (Washington D.C., 1995), p.22.

(now OSCE) was institutionalised in order to perform new functions adapted to the demands of a "whole and free" Europe. NATO revised its strategy and established, through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the Partnership for Peace Programme, an organic link with its former Warsaw pact adversaries. The European Community took the decision to achieve its evolution towards an "European Union" endowed, among others, with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to use for one of those purposes, the WEU. Besides the WEU has been politically reactivated and provided with growing operational capacities. The Council of Europe granted membership to a large number of former Eastern bloc countries and opened its activities to virtually all other candidates. Finally, the UN itself was freed from its European taboo and was authorised to deploy a large-scale peace-keeping operation on the continent - namely in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).²³ These developments were termed positive in so far as they indicated that European security was no longer tackled on a sector-by-sector basis, but approached comprehensively. But on the flip side, they also led to conflicting institutional claims and competencies - CSCE/NATO/WEU in the security field and CSCE/Council of Europe in the human dimension - apart from the overwhelming presence of the UN as a universal actor.

²³ Ghebali and Sauerwein, n.6, p.141.

Institutionalisation of the CSCE process

In an effort to contain the growing number of ethnic and sub-state conflicts in post-Cold War Europe, in 1990 several European states, including Russia, attempted to turn the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (renamed 'Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe' in December 1994) into a regional collective security organisation that would be able to intervene in such conflicts. Through collective actions such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement, it would manage and contain such conflicts from spreading.²⁴ One of the driving forces behind the CSCE was the notion that the organisation, because of its broad membership, would be able to overcome the East-West divide in Security by replacing both NATO and Warsaw Pact.²⁵ Thus Russia would have been guaranteed inclusion into the security architecture of Europe, supplementing the loss of influence in Eastern Europe on a far grander scale.

The Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed on 21 November 1990, took stock of the end of the Cold War and outlined the blueprint of a new institutionalised CSCE. The Paris Charter transformed what was only an ongoing process of negotiations with no predetermined periodicity and

²⁴ Ingo Peters, "CSCE" in Christoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds.), *The Future of European Security*, (Dartmouth, 1995), p.68.

²⁵ Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions", *Survival*, vol.38, no.1, Spring 1996, p.11.

with rotating intergovernmental secretariat into a permanent institution. The CSCE was provided with a Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (CMFA); a committee of Senior Officials to convene with no predetermined frequency, a purely administrative and intergovernmental small-sized Secretariat in Prague; a Vienna-based Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) with no real mandate in the field of conflict prevention; an Office for free elections in Warsaw with the simple mandate of facilitating contacts and exchange of information on elections within participating states, but not to monitor such elections. The deliberate mild institutionalisation was motivated by the concern of many states not to create a cumbersome structure and bureaucracy which would undermine the CSCE's flexibility and effectiveness. In sum, therefore, the Paris Charter established a somewhat fuzzy institution lacking centralised structures, legal foundation and operational mechanisms. By mid-1991, the participating states realised that the CSCE could not become credible or effective without more administrative co-ordination and some operational capacities. One measure to address the lack of co-ordination has been the creation of the Post of Secretary General of the CSCE. But at any rate, co-ordination of CSCE activities increasingly proved to be more difficult than foreseen. The initial structure provided for by the Paris Charter has been complemented by additional elements such as a Forum for Security Co-

operation, a High Commissioner for National Minorities, a Sanctions Coordinator, and a Conciliation and Arbitration Court.

The post-Cold War landscape also introduced several new themes in the CSCE work programme, including migrations, refugees, arms transfer and non proliferation, and defence conversion. However, under the Paris Charter the CSCE was not vested with any operational capacity. In view of filling that gap, the participating states gradually decided to soften the consensus rule, to establish a brand new instrument for conflict prevention in the High Commissioner on National Minorities, to pave the way for CSCE peace-keeping operations and to adopt a package of measures in the field of peaceful settlement of disputes. Although the intellectual and political origins of CSCE peacekeeping may be found in the Paris Charter, it was the CSCE Summit meeting at Helsinki in July 1992 which first asserted that 'peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to complete the political process of dispute resolution'.²⁶ The Helsinki decisions contained a detailed description of what CSCE operation might look like and provided a general mandate for peacekeeping activities. They included some preconditions such as exclusion of enforcement action, consent of all parties concerned, and

²⁶ Jerzy M. Nowak "The OSCE" in Trevor Findlay, (ed.), *Challenge for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Project no. 12, (Oxford, 1996), p.129.

existence of a durable ceasefire. The CSCE was authorised to request the EC, NATO, WEU and the CIS to make their resources available in support of peacekeeping activities.²⁷ Subsequent summit conferences endorsed the Organisation's role as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation in the region, and also focussed on measures to improve the operational capabilities of the CSCE in these spheres. Accordingly, Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation (REACT) teams were to be established to assist participating states.²⁸

Despite lacking real enforcement capacities, the CSCE had been trying to handle several conflicts or potentially conflictual situations in the respective areas of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. In doing so it has been called to perform, on a purely pragmatic basis, a gamut of functions ranging from "indirect peace-keeping" (monitoring of Russian peace-keeping troops in Moldova and Georgia) to peace-building (building civic society in Georgia and Tadjikistan by means of human dimension instruments), peace-making (in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) and preventive diplomacy (in FYROM, Estonia and Latvia).²⁹

²⁷ *ibid.*, pp.129-30.

²⁸ *The Europa World Year Book 2000*, 41st Edition, Volume 1 (London, 2000), p.239.

²⁹ Ghebali and Sauerwein, n.6, p.154-5.

Evidently, while considerable preparations for peacekeeping have been made within the CSCE structures and institutions, peacekeeping operations in the traditional sense of the term have not yet been initiated.³⁰ At present what are commonly called OSCE peacekeeping operations are long term missions established to maintain favourable conditions for preventing conflicts or facilitating negotiations. The OSCE's lack of mandate to undertake enforcement action has been an inhibiting factor. Other weaknesses have come to light such as inadequate cooperation with NATO, WEU, CIS etc., and the lack of appropriate operational infrastructure.

In the final analysis, it became apparent that the wide membership of the CSCE made it too bulky and cumbersome to deal effectively with many of the new conflicts which were breaking out across Eastern Europe. Specially, the CSCE, with its emphasis on diplomatic measures and negotiations, found itself unable to deter or counter 'committed aggressors'³¹ A 1994 Russian initiative to streamline the institution by establishing a ten member security council was rejected³² Despite its promising beginnings, it became quickly apparent that the West European states and the United States did not have the political will to implement the

³⁰ Jerzy M. Nowak, "The OSCE" in Findlay, (ed.), n.26, p.130.

³¹ Peters, n.24, p.77.

³² Zelikow, n.25, p.11.

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views and or enforce the decisions of the organisation. The failure of the CSCE to maintain peace in either Bosnia or Chechnya confirmed its inability to coerce warring parties to the peace table since, in the end, the organisation could only seek voluntary compliance. The CSCE (now OSCE) has established a niche for itself in the diplomatic realm and has proven productive in negotiating between warring parties on more than one occasion. It is making a substantial contribution as a forum of preventive diplomacy, early warning, and human rights monitoring, all of which are much needed in the European sphere. It continues to perform the important tasks of providing a forum to the East European states, and of offering Russia an active part in European security matters, thereby ensuring that Russia is not isolated. It has also been recognised as an important complementary organisation for the existing security structures in Europe. Nonetheless, it has failed to develop into a pan-European collective security organisation able to eclipse existing institutions and ensure stability on the continent, while adequately addressing the new security threats facing Europe.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): Efforts at Adaptation

The end of the Cold War represented for NATO the achievement of its founding principles and objectives; which in turn meant that the alliance now lacked a single compelling *raison d'etre*. Confronted by a

"irrelevance dilemma", NATO responded in three ways: by reforming its military strategy, redefining its mission in post-Communist Europe and institutionalising its relations with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP).³³

(a) A New Strategic Concept

NATO began a review of its military strategy, resulting in NATO's "new Strategic Concept" published at its November 1991 summit meeting in Rome. The concept affirmed that the core purpose of the alliance remained collective defence but declared that since the threat of a monolithic, massive military attack no longer existed, "the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess". Security problems now arise "from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe".³⁴ In other words, instability and uncertainty were to be considered as new threats since they could involve outside powers or spill over into the territory of NATO states. The concept also

³³ Ghebali and Sauerwein, n.6, p.155.

³⁴ "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", *NATO Document*, Rome, November , 1991, Para 10.

considered that even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, could not be overlooked. Indeed, even after the collapse of the USSR, an unpredictable Russia would remain, in terms of manpower and weapons, the largest military power on the Continent and also a superpower possessing the ability to destroy the US.³⁵ The new Strategic Concept also stressed the necessity to maintain a military capability sufficient to prevent war, to provide for effective defence and to meet any potential risks. This implied that the fundamental objective of NATO - safeguarding the freedom, the security and territorial integrity of its members, as well as establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military defensive means - remained unchanged. In terms of substance, the new Strategic Concept announced the shift from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence and the modification of the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In brief, NATO decided to maintain its integrated military structure and to rely on a appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces - substantially reduced, but with increased flexibility and mobility. The alliance's new Strategic Concept

³⁵ Edward Mortimer, "European Security after the Cold War", *Adephi Papers*, no.271, 1992, p.8.

was unwieldy, the product of what was unquestionably an ambitious undertaking in a turbulent political context.³⁶

On crucial points there had often been only general agreement, and clarity was often sacrificed to the continuing imperatives for last-minute compromises.³⁷ The revision of NATO's strategic concept was a necessary but not a sufficient step. In order to be fully relevant, an alliance with no defined enemy needed to spell out more specifically concrete functions - namely out-of-area crisis management, peace-keeping and projection of stability into Central and Eastern Europe.³⁸

(b) NATO Goes Out-of-Area

Following the change in concept, therefore, came several institutional innovations. One attempt was to go out-of-area. But the idea of extending NATO activities outside the area explicitly defined by the Washington Treaty was not approved by all member states. Particularly welcomed by the United States, it was adamantly opposed by France. For the French, it meant a reinforcement of American leadership, as well as the lessening of the chances for the development of an independent European defence identity through the WEU. It was only after endless

³⁶ Catherine Mc Ardle Kelleher, n.22, p.64.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ Ghebali and Sauerwein, n.6, p.156.

squabbles that NATO members reached a compromise affirming their readiness to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peace-keeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available NATO resources and expertise. This decision was elaborated further by the CSCE Helsinki Document of 1992 which stipulated that the CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organisations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peace-keeping activities. It also added that decisions by the CSCE to seek the support of any such organization will be made on a case-by-case basis, and after having allowed for prior consultations with the participating states which belong to the organisation concerned. The clarification of the relations with the CSCE and with the WEU allowed NATO to go one step further by expressing its willingness to support equally peace-keeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council. The Yugoslav conflict gave NATO the opportunity of contributing, for the first time in its history, to UN peace-keeping and sanctions enforcement operations. In July 1992 NATO undertook a maritime operation in the Adriatic Sea to monitor compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions against former Yugoslav republics.³⁹ This was followed by NATO's

³⁹ UN Doc. S/RES/757, 30 May 1992.

provision of staff, finance and equipment to the military headquarters of the UN Peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). From April 1993 NATO aircraft began patrolling airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina to enforce a UN mandated 'no-fly zone'⁴⁰ In addition, NATO aircraft provided protective cover for UNPROFOR troops operating in the 'safe areas' established by the Security Council.⁴¹ In February 1994 NATO conducted the first of several aerial strikes against artillery positions that were violating heavy-weapons exclusion zones. Throughout the conflict, the Alliance also provided transport, communications and logistics to support UN humanitarian assistance in the region. All these and subsequent NATO out-of-area operations till recent times suggested the fact that peace-keeping, which forms an integral part of crisis management, became a new regular task for NATO.

(c) Establishment of the North -Atlantic Co-operation Council

The launching of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at the ministerial level took place in December 1991, at the time that the USSR was collapsing. Opened initially to all members of NATO and of the former Warsaw Pact, the new body subsequently welcomed all Republics of the former USSR, plus Albania. The NACC was established as a forum

⁴⁰ UN Doc. S/RES/816, 31 March 1993.

⁴¹ UN Doc. S/RES/.836, 4 June, 1993.

for the former Warsaw Pact states and NATO members to discuss security concerns, and for NATO members to pass on experience and expertise in matters such as civil-military relations and defence conversion. In signing the NACC protocols, participants acknowledged that instability was a primary concern to Europe's future, and that NATO should play a decisive role in addressing and ameliorating that instability.⁴²

The NACC called on members to meet at regular intervals to discuss a broad array of issues-ranging from traditional human rights concerns to economic transitions. As to military ties and cooperation, the NACC declared that the focus of the consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-military coordination and air traffic management and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes⁴³ The NACC is another attempt as part of NATO's efforts to broaden its role from a defensive alliance into a loosely constructed collective security organisation which would give greater flexibility in responding to the national interests of its member states. But when considered from the perspective of "co-operation partners" of the CSCE or of NATO itself, NACC seems an ambiguous

⁴² Richard Rupp, "NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense toward Collective Security", in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, (London, 2001), p.162.

⁴³ *ibid.*

experiment - if not "an anomaly".⁴⁴ As a body of a purely consultative nature, it is a disappointment for all those states seeking concrete security guarantees; it prevents them from obtaining what they precisely want to get.⁴⁵ Moreover, and although it affirmed that it was a contribution to strengthening the role of the CSCE and the achievement of its objectives without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms, it was found to duplicate some CSCE functions and mechanisms.⁴⁶

(d) NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme(PfP)

By 1993, there was widespread disillusionment with the NACC. It provided a forum for discussion of security concerns, but lacked ability. Furthermore, the NACC did not provide the former Warsaw Pact states with any substantial security guarantees.⁴⁷ The PfP proposal was designed to increase direct military contacts between the East and West, thus making the Central and East European states feel more secure, without alienating Russia by direct NATO expansion. PfP was in fact touted as a precursor to NATO membership in January 1994 at the Brussels Summit and offered the states of the East tangible security benefits. For instance, PfP states were allowed to participate in NATO peacekeeping exercises and UN or

⁴⁴ Mortimer, n.35, p.32.

⁴⁵ Gheballi and Sauerwein, n.6, p.161.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ McInnes, n.5, p.93.

OSCE-sponsored humanitarian operations. In addition, PfP states were given offices at NATO HQ and allowed to take part in the new planning and coordination cell of NATO's European Command. Finally, PfP states were allowed regular consultations with NATO over military planning and procurement, free-restructuring and civil-military relations.

The requirements to join PfP were left deliberately vague, but states were required to work towards interoperability with NATO forces, and to share the cost of any peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Most significantly, PfP did not come with any firm security guarantees. But although the PfP protocols did not afford Article 5 protections or identify any state or states that might threaten members of the alliance, some critics argued that the growing interaction of permanent members with 'associate' members would lead to the emergence of *de facto* security guarantees.⁴⁸ Many officials also argue that the only difference between NATO members and partners is the commitment by members to collective defence.⁴⁹ Although Article 5 is an important political difference between members and partners, it has little effect on NATO's daily military activities. Virtually the entire structure of NATO except Article 5 has been incorporated into the Partnership for Peace structure.⁵⁰ In the final analysis

⁴⁸ Rupp in Carpenter (ed). N.42, p.164.

⁴⁹ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War", *International Organisation*, vol.54, no.4, Autumn 2000, p.729.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p.729-30.

PfP nonetheless accomplishes two major goals. It provides a means for all of the OSCE states, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the traditional neutrals, such as Austria or Finland, to be involved in NATO. PfP also provides functional programs to meet specific needs, instead of simply providing a forum for consultation.⁵¹

The European Community: Steps towards a European Identity

In response to the challenge posed by the end of the Cold War, the European Community ('European Union' since 1 November 1993) developed two parallel approaches. The first approach was to support economic and political reforms in the former Eastern bloc. The EC concluded special economic agreements with the countries of the initial Visegrad Triangle - namely Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia - and launched two ambitious aid programmes called PHARE and TACIS. The former was aimed at the countries of Central Europe and the latter was meant for the Republics of the former USSR. The second approach was to put the issue of political union, including foreign policy and security, on the EC's agenda along with the issue of economic and monetary union; the Maastricht Treaty constituted its well-publicised end result. However, without awaiting the entry into force of its provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EC off-

⁵¹ Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?", *Survival*, vol.38, no.1, Spring 1996, p.102.

handedly by passed the CSCE and engaged itself in managing the Yugoslav conflict.⁵² It adopted both measures of peace-keeping as well as peace-making. The former was undertaken with a cease-fire monitoring mission, and the latter by means of the "Carrington" peace conference supplemented by the "Badinter" Arbitration Commission.⁵³ In both cases it failed. The EC also substituted its unproductive peace conference on Yugoslavia by a joint venture with the UN called the Geneva International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. The European community after becoming the European Union, with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993, undertook one its major common foreign and security policy initiatives by sponsoring the "Pact on Stability in Europe" initiative.

(a) The European Stability Pact

Also known as the "Balladur Project" the idea behind the European Stability Pact stemmed largely from the new right-wing government's intention to exercise some influence over French foreign policy and not leave it exclusively to the Socialist President.⁵⁴ The proposal also had to do with the Yugoslav experience and concerns about potential ethnic and territorial disputes between Central and East European countries which

⁵² Ghebali and Sauerwein, n.6, p.165.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.165.

⁵⁴ Mathias Jopp, "The Strategic Implications of European Integration", *Adelphi Papers*, no.290 (1994), p.52.

have close ties with the EU and wish to join it. Mentioned for the first time in April 1993, on the occasion of the inaugural address of the Prime Minister to the National Assembly, the 'Pact on Stability and Security in Europe' was initially suggested as a pure EC endeavour, excluding North American and most of the CSCE participating states. Under external pressure from several sides, France revamped the project mainly by deleting the reference to 'security'. At the Copenhagen European Council meeting of June 1993, the EC members endorsed the revised project and later decided to convene in Paris, in 1994, a preparatory conference for the purpose of launching a negotiation process. Under the brand of the European Union, the project was assigned the declared purposes of accelerating the admission to the EU of those Central and Eastern European countries ready to solve first their outstanding bilateral border and national minorities problems. This would be done under multilateral aegis and would provide the EU with a major opportunity of implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, while contributing to the stability of the whole of Europe by means of a full-fledged exercise of preventive diplomacy.

However, all target states, except Hungary, reacted negatively. They criticised the geopolitical scope of a project restricted to six target states - Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia and open to third states only on the basis of the dual criteria of neighbourhood

and non-involvement in a current armed conflict. More importantly, they disapproved of the main thrust of a project asserting the necessity of bilaterally consolidating borders and settling national minority problems. Indeed, the Pact's explanatory memorandum did not rule out the possibility of some rectification of borders. For their own part, the USA and Russia raised another major objection; the goals of the Pact were standard CSCE goals which could more effectively be realised within the CSCE framework. Under the circumstances, the EU readjusted the project. It opened the diplomatic exercise to some 40 states and added the three Baltic states to the priority list of target states. It also decided to involve the CSCE to the process of elaboration and implementation of the Pact. Last but not the least, it accepted a radical transformation of the Pact's basic approach by focusing the latter on the concept of "good neighbourhood". In other words, stability was no longer conceived as the outcome of the consolidation of borders and the settlement of national minority issues in Europe, but essentially as the development of good neighbourhood relations as well as of transborder and regional economic, cultural and environmental co-operation.

The Pact was nevertheless EU's attempt to take more seriously the security problems in Central and Eastern Europe. It was also a signal to the countries concerned, and the outside world, that from a strategic political angle, Central and Eastern Europe was no longer seen as a grey area, but

one on which Western Europe has claims in terms of security and stability.⁵⁵

(b) The Political Revival of the Western European Union

In 1984, meeting in Rome, the WEU's Council adopted a declaration stressing the need for a better use of the Organisation in view of the enhancement of the common defence of NATO countries and defining some institutional guidelines in view of adopting the WEU to new tasks. The main result of the Rome Declaration was the reactivation of the WEU's Council which, beginning in 1985, regularly met at the level of Foreign Affairs and/or Defence Ministers. Later, the 1987 Hague Platform on European interests in security matters sketched an outline for future WEU work based on the dual objective of strengthening the military dimension of European integration and Atlantic solidarity.

The WEU's institutional grounding were made more firm by the Maastricht Treaty which established the Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of the pillars of the European Union. Infact the provisions concerning the formal institution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the 'eventual planning of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence' was, inspite of its hypothetical phrasing, one of the treaty's most far-reaching elements.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.53-54.

As far as the WEU was concerned, the Maastricht Treaty introduced two dramatic new elements. First, it considers the WEU as an integral part of the development of the European Union and expressly requests it 'to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implication'. The Treaty specifies that the modalities of the WEU's employment shall be worked out by the Council of the European Union in agreement with the competent bodies of the WEU- which apparently meant participation in decision-making on an equal footing. It also provides for the establishment of close working relations between the two institutions. For the WEU, all these did not mean absorption within the EU, but rather an organic linkage.

Second, the Treaty specifies the relations between the WEU and NATO. The development of the WEU, it says, does not represent an end in itself, but a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This implied a more important role, in the form of responsibilities and contributions, for the WEU member states in NATO. At any rate, in order to ensure complementarity and transparency between the future European Security and Defence Identity and the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU was unambiguously enjoined to act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Alliance, and to establish close inter-secretariat co-ordination with NATO.

Conclusions

The armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia brought home to the international community the respective strengths and weaknesses of the roles which the main multilateral security organisations, the UN, NATO, the EU, the WEU and the OSCE, can play in the new European security environment.⁵⁶ At an early stage of the conflict, it was thought that the essential role in its solution could be played by the OSCE as the largest, most democratic and, in fact, universal regional security arrangement of all European states and the US, Canada and the new Central Asian states. The emergency situation mechanisms established by the Berlin CSCE Council of Ministers, in June 1991, were used immediately after the war broke out, but they failed to contain it. As early as the summer of 1991, hopes were pinned mainly on the EU, whose institutions were expected to bring about an end to the armed conflict through joint diplomatic efforts, and set in motion peace settlement procedures. But all the European security institutions failed, each in its own way, to meet the challenge.⁵⁷ In the spring of 1992, after Bosnia and Herzegovina had become engulfed in hostilities as a result of the weakness and inefficacy of the European

⁵⁶ Mathias Jopp, "The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations", *Chaillot Paper 17* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1994) <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai17e.html>

⁵⁷ Zdzislaw Lachowski and Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Inter-Institutional Security co-operation in Europe: Past Present and Perspectives", in Wilfred Van Bredow, Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel (eds.) *European Security* (London: 1997). P.122.

security institutions, the initiative to seek a settlement to the conflict was taken over by the UN.⁵⁸

Overlapping competencies of the existing institutions and the competition among them can be termed as one of the major factors behind the institutional inertia and the failure to address more effectively the security challenges in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the institutions had outlived the conditions and circumstances that prevailed when they were set up, and hence, with accelerated change in the security environment, the ability to readjust operational bodies to new requirements had proved limited. The institutions have responded to events as they have arisen, trying to adapt to the changing conditions but putting off the adoption of basic decisions to a later date. Such were the motives of calling into being the NACC in late 1991, and the PfP in early 1994.

The Yugoslav crisis also demonstrated that the EU still did not represent a power able to cope successfully with conflicts and crises which have a military dimension. What was lacking was the common political will and the necessary military capacities to give it the stature and credibility of a serious security actor. To have the EU or WEU efficiently respond to conflicts, it must have at its disposal necessary military assets

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

such as long-range transport aircraft, air refueling capabilities and satellite intelligence. It was felt that as long as Europe as such does not have enough military muscle, its contribution to the management of acute crisis will remain very limited or at least confined to coordinating diplomatic efforts. The EU was therefore called upon to identify in clear terms its vital interests so that it could avoid any further marginalisation in the realms of security in the future. Finally, it was increasingly being realized throughout EU's political spectrum that a united Europe would be incomplete without a security and defence component solely of its own. And it is the EU's search for such a common security and defence identity that the subsequent chapters will trace, as well as try to analyse the problems and prospects of such a quest.

Chapter II

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY: ISSUES AT STAKE

Introduction: European Security and Defence Identity as a Historical Necessity

The post-Cold War era has been a period of swift and dramatic historical change, a period when international relations in Europe, released from the grip of the Cold War, have increasingly been characterised by instability, uncertainty, and volatility. Writing in the late 1960s, Pierre Hassner tried to assess the possibilities for Europe beyond the Cold War and concluded that European security integration would be an essential anchor for the continent in the absence of direct superpower hegemony.¹ 'Some multilateral framework', he argued, 'some collective arrangement committing stronger states to the protection and restraint of smaller ones must be an essential part of any European system'.² It can be argued that the original concept of the European community was strongly influenced by security considerations given the fact that coal and steel were chosen as the first subject of integration because of their importance in sustaining a

¹ Ian Gambles, European Security Integration in the 1990s, *Chaillot Paper3* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU) November 1991, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai03e.html>

² Pierre Hassner 'Change and Security in Europe Part II: In Search of a System', *Adephi Papers*, no.49, 1968, p.21, as quoted in *ibid.*

national war effort. In his essay “European Security Integration in the 1990’s”, Dr. Ian Gambles, suggests three goals of European security integration.³ Firstly, according to Gambles, the most widely-shared objective of European security integration is the preservation and extension of the European security-community – a community in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes. Secondly, it is a goal of European security integration to protect and promote the vital national interests of European nations more effectively and efficiently in international relations. Gambles argues that no European country now has the independence in security policy necessary to back up a national foreign policy in the way that the United States can. Consequently the protection and promotion of Europe's overseas political and economic interests, including the enforcement of principles of international conduct and the consolidation of geopolitical order, is a foreign policy goal for which European security integration is essential. As the EU’s experience in the Gulf War and the recent Kosovo crisis showed, world respect for Europe as a power in its own right was fatally undermined by its inability to muster either the will to determine a common security policy or the capability to carry out a common military effort. Thirdly, and most controversially, according to Gambles, it is a goal of European security integration to advance the construction of a federal Europe. In this sense,

³ Gambles, n.1.

European security integration is an end in itself, a vital element of a project of European Unity which has for some become the unshakeable political commitment by which all political programmes and decisions must be guided.⁴ These are the kind of values that have come to guide the new debate on European security integration, with its focus on Europeanisation rather than on transatlantic balance. For many, the overall, long-term direction of European integration is towards supranational union. A supranational union must have the full range of attributes associated with a state, and a commitment to the European idea therefore must include a commitment to an integrated security policy and an integrated military arm, even if no progress whatsoever is possible in the short term.⁵

Although the concept of a European Security and Defence Identity as a viable entity was first debated in the 1990's, it nevertheless has evolved out of a long tradition of advocacy of European cooperation and self-reliance in security matters, including a spectrum of general ideas and specific proposals for a European defence entity, European security identity, European Pillar, European Defence Community, or European Security Organization. As early as the last years of the Second World War, planners in both London and Paris devised schemes for the creation, in a post war world, of a security community involving the main countries of

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ *ibid.*

Western Europe.⁶ These schemes for what became known as the 'Western Union' underpinned the defensive treaties of 1947 (Dunkirk) and 1948 (Brussels), both of which were predicted on the assumption that European security could and should essentially be underwritten by the European powers themselves. However, even before the ink was dry on the Brussels Treaty, the European security context had been radically transformed by the onset of the Cold War and the emergence of the Soviet Union as the main threat to Western Europe. This shift had two main consequences. First, it rapidly became apparent that the European powers were in no position at all to guarantee their own security. France was already becoming bogged down in an unwinnable colonial war in Indonesia. Britain was economically exhausted and massively overstretched, with unsustainable imperial pretensions. Germany was in ruins, and Italy was little better. The Europeans may have had plans of pooling their steel and coal, but they were incapable in defending themselves. Second, it was equally obvious that European security could only effectively be underwritten by the United States, which was urgently enjoined by France and Britain to enter into an 'entangling alliance', binding the destinies of the

⁶ John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe* (Leicester, 1984), pp.5-14, quoted in Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge, *Chaillot Paper 43*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU) November 2000 <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai43e.html>

two continents in an Atlantic security community.⁷ Even so, it was not the intention of those who framed the Washington Treaty in 1949 that the United States should emerge as the undisputed leader within the Alliance, the one which was considerably more equal than all the others. Infact, NATO, at its outset, seemed predicted on the development of two roughly equal military pillars, whose combined articulation was perceived as creating a clear positive - sum relationship. The equal pillars concept simply never happened.⁸

Attitudes of the Major Players Towards a European Security and Defence Identity in the 1990s

When first debated as a viable entity in 1990, the European Security and Defence Identity had three main proponents, albeit for different reasons, and one chief opponent. The favourably disposed were France, Germany and the United States, while Britain was generally opposed. Underlying the differences were issues of national interests, mutual trust, threat perception, leadership, EU political integration, cooperation with Russia and defence expenditures.⁹ Throughout the 1990s, the same issues

⁷ Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?" , Chaillot Paper 43, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), November 2000, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai43e.html>

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Emil J Kirchner, "Second Pillar and Eastern Enlargement: The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity in James Sperling (ed.), *Europe in Change: Two Tiers or Two Speeds*, (Manchester, 1999), p.46.

continued to impede the establishment of a genuine European Security and Defence Identity, despite significant declarations by NATO in 1994 and 1996 for the establishment and working of such an identity. However given the successes of NATO with regard to the Gulf Conflict and the Implementation Forces (IFOR) and Stabilisation Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the decision to add Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO, it even seemed that an effective European Security and Defence Identity was less likely. However, the gradual integration of the EU, especially with the introduction of a single currency and European Monetary Union (EMU), and the steady enlargement of the EU, brought security and defence increasingly into the orbit of EU activities. Moreover, this coincided with the changing nature of security policy, in which non-military aspects were growing in stature and in which the EU, through its 'civilian power' image, felt it had a natural advantage.

In the late 1990s, the view that a European Security and Defence Identity is an essential component of the European security order was not confined to France, Germany and the US, but was also shared by Britain. But the problem was that different aims were envisaged and these differences surfaced over the future role of the Western European Union (WEU), which was seen as the most likely conduit for such an identity. For the US, the WEU and a European Security and Defence Identity was to be subservient to NATO, encouraging the European partners of NATO into

greater burden sharing, providing an additional base for US global policing and avoiding becoming a 'European caucus' which would challenge American leadership.¹⁰ Britain, maintaining its consistent position in the 'special relationship' with the US, agreed with the US that NATO's primacy should not be challenged by the WEU. However, in its attempt to secure that preferred outcome, as well as ensure continued American commitment to European defence as a countervailing power against a potential strident Germany or a potential revanchist Russia, Britain was prepared to be more calcitrant than the US in blocking any closer integration between the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the WEU. Britain viewed the NATO arrangements in place as a bridge between the Americans and the Europeans, a position that would be lost with a robust European Security and Defence Identity at the periphery of NATO. Throughout the first half of the 1990s Britain had called for a European Security and Defence Identity closely tied to NATO. Using economic arguments against duplicating force structures, logistics, space satellites and intelligence resources, Britain struggled to make sure that a European Security and Defence Identity depend on NATO for the successful implementation of peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management missions that require force deployments.¹¹ France, in contrast, sought

¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp.46-47.

¹¹ Gale A. Mattox and Daniel Whiteneck, "The ESDI, NATO and the new European Security Environment" in James Sperling (ed.), *Europe in Changing : Two Tiers or Two Speeds* (Manchester, 1999), p.125.

substantial autonomy for the WEU, a lessening of the American role in Europe through a strengthened WEU/EU and a greater binding-in of Germany in EU integration, and therefore proposed an organic link between the WEU and EU. For France, a European Security and Defence Identity meant a tool for implementing EU decisions which have defence implications, rather than being a 'working group' within NATO and under US direction. French governments, both Conservative and Socialist, therefore viewed the European Security and Defence Identity as building European cohesion and leading to European independence.¹² The German position exhibited a desire to do a bit of everything, for example, Europeanise NATO through a strengthened WEU, attempt a more equal partnership between the Europeans and the US in NATO and foster EU political integration through an upgraded WEU, which would be formally linked to the EU. Such a position reflected the specific difficulty of German policy which have had a penchant for straddling the gap between French positions on the one hand and British or American positions on the other.¹³ The Dutch have steered a middle course. The Netherlands preferred a European Security and Defence Identity to the extent that it play a role in conflict resolution and crisis management, but remain within NATO and under US leadership to carry on robust peace enforcement and

¹² *ibid.*, pp.124-5.

¹³ Dieter Mahncke, "Parameters of European Security", *Chaillot Paper 10*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU) September 1993, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai10e.html>

power projection missions. In the final analysis, these diverging standpoints and conflicting interests and fears of the European powers acted as a major roadblock to the creation of a meaningful and effective European Security and Defence Identity in the 1990s.

The NATO -WEU Debate

Although the view that the Europeans needed to assume greater responsibility for their security was increasingly being expressed on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the 1990s, a specific dilemma that the Europeans were unable to deal with was as to which Western multilateral institution would best be able to cope with the security challenges facing Europe. As is evident from the national positions discussed in the earlier section, the debate primarily revolved around NATO and the WEU. The Atlanticist vision of the WEU essentially subordinated the organization to a NATO-dominated framework. It sought to establish the WEU through an evolutionary process involving successive phases as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.¹⁴ Thus, a very limited mandate was sought for the WEU, one that will not conflict with, but only reinforce the alliance. NATO was, in the Atlanticist view, the necessary organisational

¹⁴ Catherine Mc Ardle Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An interim assessment* (Washington D.C., 1995), pp. 56-57.

framework so long as the US was willing to remain committed and involved; any change must come within that framework. An eventual European defence organisation might oversee capabilities for missions outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty, the so-called out-of-area missions, but NATO would remain primarily responsible for defence in Europe. In the longer term the Atlanticists were also generally against any further transfer of national sovereignty to the European Commission, especially in areas as sensitive as foreign policy, let alone in security arrangements or plans for operational defence.¹⁵

Advocates of NATO also argued that although the alliance now lacked a single compelling *raison d'etre*, it nevertheless was vital to neutralise the residual threat posed by Russian military power and to address the conflicts arising within and in the vicinity of Europe¹⁶ They also saw NATO and its 'Partnership for Peace' programme as providing institutional mechanisms to integrate all the nations of Europe into a pan-European security system. The Atlanticists also regarded the close relationship with the United States as essential to meet many of Europe's needs in terms of defence and military infrastructure. Therefore members of NATO were determined to avoid renationalization of defence policy to keep the United States in Europe and to enable the European countries to

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.57.

¹⁶ John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.104, (1994-95) pp.767-8.

avoid having to build expensive independent national military forces.¹⁷ On the military side, NATO's incremental Bosnia operations made clear to its members by 1995 that because of its integrated military command structure NATO was adaptable to the Post-Cold War European security environment. For some forty years, the alliance had created an infrastructure, a set of practices and procedures, and a culture of professionalism in a military command based at SHAPE in Belgium.¹⁸ Therefore NATO was advocated on the virtue of it being a tried and tested security organisation. Nevertheless, NATO initially suffered three major impediments.¹⁹ The first was the lack of a mechanism to address out-of-area issues. Since most of the new security threats that affected Europe originated outside of the borders of the Alliance members, NATO needed a means to allow its member states to deploy NATO resources there. The second was the issue of expansion. Since NATO was perceived primarily as an anti-Soviet alliance, any expansion would be viewed with hostility by Russia. In addition, if NATO was to become the primary institution for European security, it needed to incorporate the traditional neutral states of Austria and Sweden. NATO expansion may lead to an organisation that, like the OSCE, was too unwieldy to be militarily effective. Finally, there

¹⁷ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War", *International Organisation*, vol.54 (2000), p.723.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol.22, no.1, March 1999, p.7.

was the question of establishing the criteria for new members. This was especially important in order to address concerns about degree of democratisation, civil military relations, military interoperability, and the possibility of bringing ongoing ethnic or border disputes into the alliance. This led to considerable debate as to whether NATO should even enlarge.²⁰ But despite these questions, support for NATO remained very strong in certain nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

Opponents of NATO, however, had during the 1990s proposed its replacement by the WEU as the primary guarantor of European security. The WEU member states had, they argued, many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly divergent US and European perspectives that had already caused serious disarray in NATO. A robust WEU, it was argued, would have a number of advantages over NATO. Unlike NATO, the WEU by virtue of it not being solely a military alliance but a defence identity of the EU, would not require an external adversary to justify itself. A strong WEU would not only be as effective as NATO in preventing the renationalization of European defences, but would also give Western Europe the ability to protect its vital interests without reliance on the United States. Moreover, Russia is likely to view the WEU as less provocative than a US dominated NATO, especially an enlarged version that extends to Russia's borders.

²⁰ *ibid.*

The WEU however was criticised on the ground that it lacked a permanent command and control structure, and was dependent on assembling its forces and creating such structures as the crisis management mission or peacekeeping mission proceeds. But the EU did manage to address out-of-area issues, even before NATO could evolve mechanisms to do the same. In 1987, the WEU launched operation 'Cleansweep' to clean shipping lanes in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War. During this operation WEU's contribution in facilitating coordination in the theatre and among defence ministries enhanced Europe's collective profile in the US and West Asia. The WEU was also successful in winning legitimacy and public support for a mission by the use of a European label.²¹ During the Gulf war, the WEU coordinated the naval blockade against Iraq. After the war, the WEU initiated Operation "Safe Haven" to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds. All these actions showed that the WEU can continue to fulfill, and perhaps work at improving, its role as coordinator of European military efforts in crises outside the NATO area. These actions also added impetus for NATO to develop its own structures to deal with out-of-area operations.²² It should however be noted that in each of these operations, WEU actions took place only after lengthy and often tortuous consultations

²¹ Gambles, n. 1

²² Lansford, n. 19 p. 9.

since the WEU had no standing forces and had to make arrangements on an *ad hoc* basis.²³

The Europeanists' preference for the WEU was also reflected in the so-called Franco-German proposal of October 14, 1991. It envisioned a much broader mandate for the organisation, than that for NATO, incorporating increased cooperation on arms with a view to establishing a European Arms agency and the formation of military units under the authority of WEU.²⁴ The WEU was seen as a component of a developing CFSP, and the WEU was set up as a coequal partner to NATO by calling for closer military co-operation in compliment to the Alliance and by allowing for the WEU to coordinate common European Security positions before discussion in NATO. Finally, the proposal incorporated the Eurocorps initiative, announced in 1991 as an expansion of the Franco-German brigade of 1988 to participation by other interested European states, as the backbone of an eventual common European army. The end result which was envisioned was that of a Europe that would take responsibility for the security and, therefore, the defence of its constituent elements whatever NATO's situation and wherever threats might arise.

²³ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "French Strategic Options in the 1990s", *Adelphi Papers*, no.260, Summer 1991, p47.

²⁴ Kelleher, n. 14, p.57.

The reaction of the United States to the Europeanist initiatives was swift and harsh, with a full campaign of aggressive diplomacy and back-channel pressure. Washington on several occasions shrilly warned the Europeans about precipitous, unconsidered action on organisational expansion that put NATO's achievements and guarantees at risk. Perhaps the most telling evidence of American anxieties about a European undermining of NATO came at the November 1991 Rome NATO Summit, staged to highlight NATO's new post-Cold War strategy and force structure. President Bush directly challenged the allies: 'If your ultimate aim is to provide for your own defence, then the time to tell us is today'. He then went on to argue forcefully that the US did not see 'how there can be a substitute for the Alliance as the provider of our [US] defence and Europe's security'.²⁵

The announcement of the Franco-German Eurocorps initiative in October 1991 and its inclusion into the overall Franco-German proposal, was a particularly unpleasant surprise for the Atlanticists. The design of a joint Franco-German military unit, freestanding and eventually to be supplemented by force contributions from other European states, proved especially galling to the NATO stalwarts not only in Washington but also elsewhere. Political and military figures alike protested the creation of a Eurocrops outside NATO, especially one involving German troops already

²⁵ As quoted in *ibid.*, p.58.

pledged to NATO. They demanded operational coordination with and linkage to the NATO integrated command. The Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 marked the striking of a relatively fragile security bargain among the Europeanists and the Atlanticists: in the short term recognising NATO's primacy but clearly defining the path for future independent Europeanist evolution. The WEU would look forward to the eventual framing of a 'common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence', as part of a broader CFSP. Moreover, the WEU would be simultaneously both 'an integral part' of the staged evolution of the EU and a means toward a strengthened European pillar of NATO. The sections of the Treaty dealing with the WEU owe more to the Atlanticist view of the WEU as 'bridge' between NATO and EU, than to the concept of the WEU as the embodiment of a European Security and Defence Identity. Hence, while the Treaty called for the development of CFSP, the Treaty's view of WEU owed more to the British view point than to the French.²⁶ In a separate declaration, the nine WEU members tried to give a more substantive profile to their efforts to establish a genuine European defence identity and to assume greater responsibility for European defence. The WEU would strengthen its linkages to both the EU and NATO through a move to Brussels and the development of an operational role through joint planning in a Brussels - based planning organisation and logistical and

²⁶ Lansford, n.19, p.11.

other support cooperation complementary to the alliance. States that were members of the EC or NATO but not members of the WEU could participate in WEU activities as members or associates as they chose. The WEU ministerial Council's Petersberg Declarations of June 1992 more clearly defined the WEU's role as both a European defence organisation and pillar of the Atlantic alliance. In Petersberg the signatories agreed to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with their own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council.²⁷ According to the declaration, the WEU may become engaged in peacekeeping, search and rescue missions, humanitarian aid, and military combat. Shortly after the Maastricht summit, the WEU was confronted with escalating violence in the former Yugoslavia. Following an extraordinary Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki in July 1992, the WEU took action against Serbia in conjunction with UN resolutions 713 and 757 by providing air and naval equipment to strengthen enforcement of the economic embargo against Serbia. WEU monitoring missions were strengthened and expanded again with 'Operation Sharp Guard', which began monitoring UN sanctions in the Adriatic on June 15, 1993 as a combined WEU-NATO effort.

²⁷ Luisa Vierucci, "WEU - Regional Partner of the United Nations?" *Chaillort Paper 12* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), December 1993, p.23
<http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai12e.html>

Institutionally, the WEU also enjoyed some moderate success. The Maastricht Final Act and the Petersberg Declarations provided for substantial expansion of the WEU planning cell and secretariat, while taking care not to explicitly challenge NATO. Also the WEU's administrative organs were moved from London and Paris to Brussels, which increased efficiency and proximity to other European institutions as well as to NATO. The WEU also developed a 'two-hatting' formula to share ministers with NATO, increasing the level of experience in the WEU while providing a cooperative link to NATO. Though the WEU still lacked an integrated command structure, these steps made it more capable of coordinating action within its mandate. In the final analysis, however, it became clear that NATO and WEU were engaged in overlapping, often repetitive functions. Both organisations had offered their military capabilities to the UN and the CSCE for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Both were also engaged in a dialogue with the Central and East European states, through the NACC and the associate partner status for the WEU. As a consequence, although the NATO-WEU debate continued, what followed was a series of measures that NATO undertook in an effort to not only adapt itself better to the changed circumstances, but also with a view to bridge the gap with the WEU and address better the Europeanists' demands and concerns.

NATO's New Initiatives: Efforts at Europeanisation or a Further Strengthening of the Transatlantic Bond?

In an effort at eliminating competition between NATO and the WEU and to avoid duplication in planning and administration while undertaking peacekeeping missions, NATO in its January 1994 Brussels summit decided on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The goals were also to keep NATO relevant in the changing environment while meeting European concerns about greater autonomy in security matters. Already a broad consensus had emerged in Europe for the reform of NATO's structure so as to make it more European and thereby enable the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their security. The NATO agreement of January 1994, which established the CJTF therefore recognised the need for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the sharing by the US of military assets, such as infrastructure, logistics and communications for operations, with the European allies, under the joint control of NATO and the WEU. This arrangement assumed the American formula of CJTFs being 'separable but not separate' from NATO'.²⁸ The CJTF concept also provides a mechanism for 'coalitions of the willing', giving those NATO states which do not want to be involved in a specific out-of-area operation, the ability to opt out. The CJTF contributes to European Security and Defence Identity by endowing

²⁸ Kirchner, n.9, p.50.

the WEU with assets and capabilities, but ensures American involvement through the NAC which approves each CJTF. This raised concerns over potential US vetoes. Further concerns were raised about the influence of the US, since American staff officers would have to be involved in CJTF exercises at various levels to oversee the use of US assets. France was particularly disturbed over the possibility that the Americans would thus be able to exert significant influence over the direction of operations, with minimal involvement.²⁹ Ideally, France sees the CJTF as a mechanism that allows Europeans to act militarily outside American control and would enable France to play a leadership role in European defence and security. It therefore campaigned for a separate command structure for the CJTF.³⁰ Britain, on the other hand, viewed the CJTF as a device for sustaining the relevance of NATO's integrated military structure to new tasks in a complex world, while avoiding the creation of wasteful rival structures.³¹ However, in the meantime, gradual French re-integration into NATO moved forward as France returned to some of the alliance structures it left in 1966. In 1995, France announced that it would return to the North Atlantic Military Committee and begin attending meetings of the Defence Planning Committee. The rewards of re-integration were apparent in June 1996, at the Berlin Summit, where France was able to gain concessions

²⁹ Lansford, n.19, p.14.

³⁰ Kirchner, n.9,p.51.

³¹ *ibid.*,

from the United States which allowed European states to have political control and strategic direction of CJTF missions.³²

Notwithstanding the new found cooperation between NATO and the WEU facilitated by the CJTF arrangement, the Europeanists continued to work along two tracks towards the goal of a European Security and Defence Identity by the establishment of increased capabilities through the Forces Answerable to the WEU(FAWEU); and the development of an integrated defence market through the Western European Armament Group (WEAG). With the CJTF, it was widely recognised that the WEU needed to develop force structures that went beyond the three existing bodies - the Eurocorps, the Multinational Division (made up of Belgian, British, Dutch and German troops) and the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Group - in order to allow the WEU to effectively control and staff future operations. At the Lisbon WEU ministerial meeting of May 1995, ministers approved the creation of a Situation Centre and an Intelligence Section in the WEU's Planning Cell. More significantly, the WEU approved the creation of additional force structure for the WEU. France, Italy and Spain agreed to create ground (EUROFOR) and naval reaction (EUROMARFOR) units in order to respond to security concerns in the Mediterranean. Soon afterwards, Portugal also agreed to participate in both forces. WEU

³² Bruce Clark, "Europe Secures Greater Role in NATO Operations", *Financial Times*, 4 June 1996, p.1, quoted in Lansford n. 19, p.15.

capabilities were further expanded by the creation of the Franco-British Euro Air Group (FBEAG). FBEAG was created to enhance the capabilities of the two air forces to undertake humanitarian and peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. With the creation of these new units and agreements that commit national units to the WEU, the organisation acquired significant operational capabilities.

CJTF operations offer the opportunity to satisfy both the Atlanticist and the Europeanist stance on European security. Ideally, the CJTF satisfies Atlanticists because technically and in budget terms the WEU's military might and European defence overall will virtually overlap with that of NATO. For those in favour of a more autonomous European defence, however, the CJTF may allow the Europeans the choice to act decisively with military force without the United States. Not only may such an arrangement increase the likelihood of consensus and action on issues viewed as European, but military operations without the United States may carry a lighter political load, both outside NATO and within, especially but not only in France.³³

In an era of declining defence expenditures, the CJTF appeared attractive to the Europeans because by allowing access to American assets, it lessened the need for WEU states to develop autonomous capabilities

³³ Kelleher, n.14. p.69.

that would replicate those of the US. At the same time the CJTF established a mechanism to allow the Americans to provide assets and support, but not necessarily troops, for out of area operations where Washington wishes to avoid involvement. Through the double-hatting system, the CJTF concept allowed forces to be answerable to both NATO and the WEU. This increased the number of units committed to the WEU. As a result, states obtained a greater range of options to address national concerns. For example, the Southern European NATO states of Portugal, Spain, France and Italy were able to establish EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to address potential instability in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the CJTF also has a number of potential disadvantages. Although it appears to allow greater military flexibility for both NATO and the WEU, the CJTF in fact demands a greater degree of consensus among a large number of countries than does any previous arrangement. Moreover, if NATO forces were allocated to a WEU mission, NATO might then be unable to meet other central military requirements. Article 5 cases would seem to call for the immediate return of forces to NATO command.³⁴

In the final analysis however, the CJTF concept enabled NATO to adopt a compromise position which, for the Atlanticist states, served to maintain the centrality of the American commitment to European security while for the more Eurocentric states, provided the opportunity of a greater

³⁴ *ibid.*, p.71.

degree of European influence and direction over potential operations, and in doing so, helped in promoting the development of a European Security and Defence Identity but within the framework of the existing transatlantic relationship.

Implications of NATO Enlargement On ESDI

In the late 1990s, the issue of NATO enlargement was also seen by many commentators, as having far reaching implications for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. Reimund Siedelmann points out that NATO enlargement represents 'the continuation of political and military dependency on the US; a military perception and military solution of Europe's basic security problems; and a lost opportunity to streamline a competitive, duplicating and counter productive European security architecture.'³⁵

According to Emil J. Kirchner, NATO enlargement implies that, 'the EU will miss an historic opportunity to complement its well-developed economic profile with a political and security dimension. The EU might thus for a considerable time remain a half-way house with enticing prospects for solving regional problems and establishing a European order, but in the meantime severely weakened by perceptions in Central and

³⁵ Quoted in Kirchner, n9, p.57.

Eastern Europe of military inadequacy, by internal differences over a military upgrading of the WEU, and by continued American leadership and control'.³⁶ Moreover, a less confrontational approach with Russia could have been ensured by the expansion of the EU and the integration of NATO's new members in the WEU and a strictly European ESDI outside of NATO. The preference of Central and East Europe states for inclusion in NATO than in an independent ESDI loosely linked to NATO posed as a undermining factor for the successful development of an independent and effective ESDI outside of NATO. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary recognised that the security commitment of NATO and the United States was more important than a similar commitment from a still developing ESDI. NATO membership was also seen as giving the new members a voice in the WEU and ESDI that was greater than that which they had as PfP members. From the viewpoint of NATO advocates, who see the ESDI as providing a 'European' pillar to the Alliance, the inclusion of the new members made the 'ESDI within NATO' stronger by making it more representative of the interests of the democratic states of Europe.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.57.

Conclusions

The United States throughout the second half of the 1990s consistently backed an ESDI within NATO as a component part of the restricted NATO. The United States had sought to shape the ESDI in such a way that it is at once a part of the new NATO which can act without the participation of US combat forces, and at the same time remain tied to NATO through the political process of the NAC and the military structure of CJTFs, logistics, intelligence and space resources. For the United States, an ESDI within NATO is not only possible but highly desirable because NATO's internal restructuring should lead to redirection of responsibilities and missions to reflect the European desire of a greater role in NATO. To reflect these changes, NATO reduced its major commands from three to two and its subordinate commands from four to three. Within this new command structure, a greater role for European officers was created, making the Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) a permanent European post, designating the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as the commander of ESDI forces in the case WEU operations without US participation, and, to signify the importance of information sharing between both ends of the transatlantic Alliance, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence position was designated a European post. Moreover the CJTF concept has created

positions for European leadership of multinational forces that are part of NATO's regular available force structure.

Notwithstanding these efforts on the part of NATO and the United States to construct the ESDI within NATO into the 'European Pillar' of the alliance, the Europeanists did not lessen the pace of their attempts towards the achievement of an ESDI outside and independent of NATO. The creation of an effective and independent ESDI however requires political cohesion, an independent staff organisation, designated forces and leadership. Although NATO approved of and insisted on an ESDI only within the Alliance, its recognition, of the concept nonetheless served as a 'green light' which unleashed a political process that began to address the fundamental issues related to the evolvement of an independent and effective ESDI. This eventually led to the St-Malo Summit and on to Cologne, Helsinki and the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), all of which would be the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter III

EU, NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION: ST-MALO DECLARATION TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

The Breakthrough at St-Malo

In 1998, the fifty year old inconclusive debate on European defence took a major step forward when the British government decided that to improve European defence capabilities, it would be necessary to use the EU as a framework. Francois Heisbourg calls this a change of Copernican proportions since after all, one of the reasons for the failure of attempts to establish a European Defence Community in the early 1950s, was the British refusal to be part of it'.¹ This so-called 'sea change' in Britain's attitude towards EU defence and its lifting of its decades-long objections to the EU acquiring an 'autonomous' military capability, occurred at the Franco-British summit in St-Malo, on 3 and 4 December, 1998. St-Malo is widely considered as the start of the European defence project. The new opportunity presented by St-Malo was very rapidly followed by a multitude of far-reaching declarations and proposals.

The St-Malo Declaration was the first official document laying down the new British orientation towards EU defence. However, first

¹ Francois Heisbourg, "European Defence Takes a Leap Forward", *NATO Review*, vol.48, no.1, Spring/Summer 2000, p.8.

allusions to this change had previously been made by British Prime Minister Tony Blair when he reopened the debate on European defence by presenting new ideas in a speech delivered at the informal EU meeting of Heads of State and Government in Pörschach, Austria, on 24 and 25 October 1998, and the press conference that followed. The British message was that the EU ought 'to have a more united and influential voice, articulated with greater speed and coherence through the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, and backed up when the need arises with effective and prompt military action'.² Blair was supported by Defence Secretary Robertson at the informal conference of EU defence ministers in Vienna in November 1998 and by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook at the WEU ministerial meetings in Rome the same month.³ The summary of the British position was that the EU should be given 'the ability both to decide and to act quickly and effectively, in order to achieve common goals'.⁴

The St-Malo process 'owes its origins to the intense frustration felt by Tony Blair throughout 1998 as he struggled to formulate a policy on

² 'The future of European defence, Speech by British Defence Secretary George Robertson to the WEU Assembly, Paris, 1 December 1998', Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, *Arms Control Reporter* (IDDS: Brookline, Mass.), Sheet 402, D. 141, Dec. 1998, quoted in Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Europe: The Institutionalised Security Process", *SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford, 1999), p.251.

³ *ibid.*, p.251.

⁴ *ibid.*

the Balkans⁵ The crises in Albania (Spring 1997) and in Kosovo (1998-9), in both of which the United States, increasingly responsive to domestic constraints exhibited a marked penchant for unilateralism, persuaded Tony Blair of the need for greater European pro-activism and military capacity on the security front.⁶ The inadequacy of the EU and the reluctance of the US to deal robustly with the crisis in Kosovo led Blair to revise a long-standing policy of reserve regarding a European defence project. Indeed, Britain became convinced at this time that, far from it being the case that a serious European military capacity constituted a threat to the survival of the alliance, it had actually become a condition of the alliance's continued good health. Philip H. Gordon specifically suggests two main factors behind Blair's new thinking.⁷ These are in keeping with the factors already outlined, but nonetheless would do well with further elaboration. The first, left unstated was that Blair and his Labour government genuinely supported European Union and wanted Britain to be part of it. Since public opposition to monetary integration prevented them from joining this most important of European projects, they had to find another way to signal their support. Defence cooperation was a logical choice in view of Britain's strength in this area. The second factor, stated publicly and often, was the

⁵ Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, Summer 2000, p.33.

⁶ Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Mark Webber, "NATO's triple challenge", *International Affairs*, vol. 76 (2000), p.495.

⁷ Philip H. Gordon, "Their Own Army? : Making European Defence Work", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.79, no.4, July/August 2000, p.14.

realisation that the Europeans were not pulling their weight in a NATO alliance dominated by the United States. As a result, Europe was paying for this with a loss of political influence and military effectiveness. According to senior British officials, Blair was 'appalled when briefed during the spring of 1998 at how little the Europeans could bring to the table should a NATO campaign in Kosovo even be required'.⁸ Therefore at St-Malo, Blair lifted the fifty-year-old British veto on the Europeanisation of defence policy.

The central goal of the St-Malo Declaration is to determine the role of the EU concerning European defence, taking into account EU-NATO relations. It is significant that the declaration made only a brief mention of the WEU. The essence of the declaration is to impart practical significance to Article V of the Amsterdam Treaty. To this end, Blair and the French President Jacques Chirac agree that, 'The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'. They committed themselves to this task 'acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO... contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the

⁸ *ibid.*, p.14.

collective defence of its members'.⁹ Although Blair and Chirac emphasised a continued commitment to NATO, the Saint-Malo declaration also left open the possibility of European military action outside the framework of the Alliance. From the European perspective it is important to retain the option of a 'purely' autonomous European military capability, as a means of pressuring Washington to cooperate in the development of ESDI within NATO. Moreover, there are likely to continue to be cases where it is more appropriate for the EU to act outside the NATO framework, no matter what course NATO developments take.¹⁰ This was very much in line with the language of a Franco-German Declaration adopted a few days earlier, at the 1 December 1998 summit in Potsdam between Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin¹¹ According to the declaration, the European states will operate within the institutional framework of the EU. Three bodies were mentioned. They are the European Council, the General Affairs Council and meetings of defence ministers. For the purposes of European defence, the EU must be given appropriate structures and capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning. It will also need to have 'recourse to suitable military means'. In order to fulfil its new

⁹ Franco-British Summit, Joint Declaration on European Defence, 4 december 1998, Saint-Malo, Para. 2, <http://www.ambafrance.org.uk>

¹⁰ Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defence Capability", *Survival*, vol.41, no.1, Spring 1999, p.24.

¹¹ *ibid.*

tasks, the EU needs to have strengthened armed forces ‘that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology’.¹² The construction of defence as an EU ‘fourth pillar’ by incorporating the WEU into the EU, would strengthen Europe militarily and thus make it a more attractive partner for the United States without weakening NATO.¹³ The advocates of this solution claim that ‘Europe’s current inability and unwillingness to assert its security interests is more damaging to the transatlantic relationship than a broad-shouldered Europe demanding to be considered in American calculations’.¹⁴

Four reasons may be cited as to why the St-Malo process can be regarded as a qualitative step towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)¹⁵ First, it reflects a major shift in British security policy. The British government was convinced that the US will no longer automatically underwrite European security in the same way as during the Cold War. Enhanced European capability is perceived by Britain as the most effective means of silencing the voices of isolationism or, more importantly, the advocates of ‘burden-sharing’ in Washington. Second, the St-Malo process is a major expression of political will in an area where

¹² Joint Declaration on European Defence, n.9, para. 4.

¹³ Rotfeld, n.2, p.253.

¹⁴ Schake and others., n.10, p.21.

¹⁵ Howorth, n.5, p.34-35.

firm policy initiatives and robust executive actions are less dependent on building a constituency of public support than may be the case in other areas of policy. The fact that the British government appears to be genuinely open-minded about the implications of CESDP is an important act of faith. By unlocking the capacity of the European Council – rather than simply the WEU - to act on the security front, a real possibility has emerged of making progress towards CESDP. The third reason why St-Malo constitutes a qualitative breakthrough is that it should eventually permit a dynamic security dialogue between Brussels and Washington. Previously transatlantic defence discussions between the two sides of the Atlantic have been bilateral, a procedure which merely perpetuated the fragmented state of European security opinion, or conducted via the WEU, which highlighted the imbalance in the relationship. In theory, straight talk between the two sides could now result in positive-sum games. The fourth reason is that, from the military perspective, the open-endedness of the St-Malo agenda allows for a bottom-up approach whose largely technical dimension is particularly appealing to soldiers. This involves the collective quest for operational requirements of a CFSP-led CESDP: intelligence, planning and analysis, force projection, inter-operability, logistics and sustainability. Although this is certain to be frustrated to some extent by the different requirements of budget-holders and finance ministers, the very fact of engaging in the exercise brings service personnel together.

To sum up, the St-Malo process, while clearly constituting a revolution in terms of the potential for European security integration, however has cleared away much of the debris from the past rather than laying down clear precepts for the future.¹⁶ It determined the direction of the debate on future European defence policy and prompted the USA to cooperate in developing ESDI. Tony Blair made possible an unprecedented level of consensus among Europeans on a thus-far elusive and divisive goal. Within a very short time, ‘EU partners were able to reach a detailed agreement on the framework (the EU and, within it, a specific security and defence-related machinery), the objective (for the Europeans to be able to undertake corps-size military operations) and the general relationship with NATO (balancing European aspirations for more autonomy with a clear recognition of the continuing importance of the Atlantic Alliance).¹⁷ The process was, by EU standards, remarkably fast and non-contentious.

NATO’s 50th Anniversary Washington Summit Declaration and its New Strategic Concept

The Washington Declaration, signed by heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the NAC to mark the 50th anniversary of NATO and to set forth a vision of an alliance for the 21st century stated: ‘NATO embodies the vital partnership between Europe and

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p.49.

¹⁷ Gilles Andreani, “Why Institutions Matter”, *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, Summer 2000, p.81.

North America. We welcome the further impetus that has been given to the strengthening of European defence capabilities to enable the European Allies to act more effectively together, thus reinforcing the transatlantic partnership'.¹⁸ Defining the approach to security in the 21st century, NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted at Washington recognised the security of Europe and that of North America as 'indivisible' and their commitment to 'the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area'.¹⁹ This meant that any move towards an ESDI needed USA's approval. For many years the United States strongly endorsed the 'ESDI within the alliance' position. But after the Franco-British Declaration at St-Malo, US officials began to demonstrate a more cautious approach. At the NAC meeting of 8 December 1998 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned the European allies against de-linking ESDI from NATO, against duplicating existing efforts and against discriminating against non-EU members.²⁰ US fears mounted after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999 and the launching by the EU of the work of giving the CFSP an

¹⁸ The Washington Summit Communique, "An Alliance for the 21st Century", 24 April, 1999, *NATO Review*, Summer 1999, Documentation, p.D1.

¹⁹ 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23 and 24 April 1999, *NATO Review*, Summer 1999, Documentation, para 27, p.D9.

²⁰ Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Europe: The new Transatlantic Agenda", *SIPRI Year book 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford, 2000), p.186.

operational NATO dimension. The WEU was considered as a bridge between NATO and the EU states. The NAC meeting in Berlin in June 1996 proposed the use of 'separable but not separate' military assets in WEU-led operations. The Washington NAC meeting reaffirmed thus: 'On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union'.²¹ In fact, the signatories of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept wished both to secure the existing central role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security structure and to acknowledge the developments and changes that have taken place in the security sphere since the 1991 Strategic Concept was adopted.²² But the crucial point is that the Berlin decisions of 1996 addressed to the WEU referred to missions and roles for the WEU as defined by the Petersberg Declaration of 1992 - conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian and rescue work. The military role, therefore, that NATO envisaged for the WEU was limited to humanitarian assistance in peacetime and did not include a defence and security role as such. The debate initiated by the St-Malo Declaration however, centres around the new role which the EU can and

²¹ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, n.19, para 30, p.D9.

²² Rotfeld, n.20, p.187.

should play in matters of security and defence. The 1999 Washington Communiqué reflected to some degree the new situation signalled by the St-Malo Declaration. But in practice it meant NATO acceptance that the EU can have the capacity for autonomous action, take decisions and approve military action where the alliance as a whole is not engaged, and that cooperation between NATO and the EU will be based on the mechanisms that exist between NATO and the WEU. NATO's support for an autonomous EU force and military capability was qualified. It was not support for an independent European defence but for the European allies taking steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, to be addressed to new missions and avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO.²³ NATO also declared its readiness 'to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance'.²⁴ In other words, the alliance recommended that the EU should tackle the problems which NATO does not wish to or cannot handle. This also implied that the EU's role in defence matters or broader military issues is seen by NATO as marginal. Infact it is interesting to note that, on the issue of a distinct European security role, the new Strategic Concept exhibits a delicate balancing act.

²³ The Washington Summit Communiqué, n.18, p.D4.

²⁴ *ibid.*

The key paragraph is replete with language that sought to satisfy both the NATO advocates and their opponents.²⁵ The paragraph begins by emphasising that the alliance is ‘the foundation of collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued whenever possible...’ Yet it was also ‘committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership’.²⁶ The paragraph praised the European allies for having made decisions ‘to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field’, but stressed that the European Security and Defence Identity would be developed ‘within NATO’.

Finally, there was a convoluted passage that sought to balance every conceivable objective of both camps.²⁷ ESDI would ‘reinforce the transatlantic partnership’; yet it would also enable the European allies ‘to act by themselves...’ But they could act by themselves only ‘as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily...’²⁸ In other words, the European members of NATO were given approval to take greater responsibility for dealing with security problems in their region through the

²⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blue Print or Conceptual Muddle?” in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed), *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, (London, 2001), p.15.

²⁶ The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, n.19, para. 30, p.D9

²⁷ Carpenter, n.25, p.15.

²⁸ The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, n.19, para 30, p.D9.

WEU, or a new security mechanism under the auspices of the EU, as long as their military initiatives remained clearly subordinate to NATO's control. The implication was that NATO would have a 'first right of refusal' to intervene in a conflict, and only if the alliance considered the problem beneath its notice would the ESDI be given the authorisation to take action. Although the language offered cover to both factions, in terms of the substantive implications, it represented a victory for the NATO-centric camp.²⁹

The Cologne European Council

In 1999, the decisions taken at the meetings of the European Council in Cologne and Helsinki were the first real attempt to hammer general declarations on European security integration into an operational act. This was made possible by the profound change that has taken place in the premises of European states' security.³⁰ First, none of the EU member states is any longer in a zone of immediate threat. During the Cold War transatlantic relations were dominated by the overriding priority for collective defence. This warranted not only the involvement but also the dominant role of the United States in European security. Second, the policies of the EU members have changed. The British Government of

²⁹ Carpenter, n.25, p.16.

³⁰ Rotfeld, n.20, p.195-6.

Prime Minister Tony Blair has proved to be much more pro-European than previous governments; France has become less anti-US; United Germany led by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer is demonstrating commitment to NATO, and the ability to take independent decisions; and the non-aligned members – Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden – are less oriented to their traditional interpretation of neutrality. Third, the Cologne European Council took place in the closing days of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo. The experience of Allied decision making during the campaign accelerated the process towards a European identity in matters of security and defence. For all the US official representatives' repeated calls on the European allies to take on a share of the military burden that is commensurate with the USA's, the United States was not eager to translate the transatlantic partnership into sharing its leadership with Europe. The Kosovo crisis therefore 'highlighted the need to shift the balance in favour of Europe for the future of Euro-Atlantic security by creating a credible common foreign and security policy to give the Union a political language of its own, backed up when necessary by force.'³¹

The Cologne meeting of the European Council on 3-4 June 1999 therefore concluded with the adoption of several major decisions on a

³¹ Lamberto Dini, 'Taking Responsibility for Balkan Security', *NATO Review*, vol.47, no.3, Autumn 1999, p.6.

common foreign policy and security. As already remarked, a broad consensus had emerged in Europe by that time as regards EU's need to acquire significant political and military capacity, both to take decisions and to implement them. Neither capacity had hitherto been possible, decision-taking for want of any institutional framework, implementation for lack of serious military muscle. Cologne therefore agreed, echoing the words of St-Malo, that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO'.³² A commitment was adopted at Cologne to develop more effective European military capabilities on the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities. Here the Cologne documents referred to the NATO Washington decisions of April 1999, 'The EU will take over the functions of the WEU by the end of 2000 and the WEU will cease to exist. The relevant NATO and EU documents are in agreement that the CFSP should be compatible with the 'common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty'.³³

³² Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 3-4 June 1999, Annex III, para 1. http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june1999/june_99_en.htm

³³ Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions 3-4 June 1999, Annex III, Presidency report on strengthening the Common European policy on security and defence' sect. 1 http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june1999/june_99en.htm

The process initiated by the St-Malo Declaration and continued in Cologne is intended to achieve 'more complementarity, cooperation and synergy' between NATO and the EU.³⁴ If a common European policy on security and defence is to be taken seriously it will require the building up of credible military capabilities and the establishment within the EU of appropriate decision-making bodies. The debate initiated and recommendations adopted at Cologne set in motion a process which is to lead not to the EU replacing NATO in Europe but to the development of effective 'consultation, cooperation and transparency' between the EU and NATO. Although all the EU states except Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden belong to NATO, still no institutional arrangements or formal contacts exist between the two security structures. Here the decisions adopted by NATO and the EU at Cologne can be seen as qualitatively new. The Cologne European Council also focussed on creating a new security and defence decision-making structure within the EU, including such elements as a revamped General Affairs Council where EU foreign affairs and defence ministers would sit together, an EU military committee and staff to prepare their decisions, along with a high-level politico-military body (Political and Security Committee or PSC – also known by its French acronym, COPS) to steer the progress and channel advice to ministers.³⁵ Finally, the decision to designate former NATO Secretary General Javier

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ *ibid.*, sect. 3.

Solana for the new post of Secretary General of the European Council and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy testified to the fact that the CFSP was gradually being given an operational form.

The Helsinki Summit

The Helsinki European Council meeting of 10-11 December 1999 carried forward the resolutions and commitments arrived at in Cologne several steps further by attempting to give them a more concrete and operational shape. The Finnish Presidency (July-December 1999) therefore responded to the mandate given it by Cologne to strengthen the common European policy on security and defence. In fact it was widely felt that the decisions taken at Helsinki laid down the real foundations of a new European identity in terms of security and defence. The main decisions of The Helsinki Summit in this respect may be summarised as follows.³⁶ First, the Helsinki European Council announced 'its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army'. Second, the EU 'must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year

³⁶ Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, paras 25-28 http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/doc99_en.htm

military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks'. Third, 'new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework'. Fourth, 'modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States. Fifth, 'appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non – EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management'. And finally, 'a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States'.

Apart from defining the goals of military capability, the Helsinki Summit also reaffirmed the institutional framework committed at Cologne by deciding to give concrete shape to a number of new permanent decision-making structures. The Helsinki Council declared that the 'following new permanent political and military bodies will be established within the Council'.³⁷ First, a 'standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in

³⁷ Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, Annex I to IV, 'Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European policy on Security and Defence' sect. 3, http://europa.eu.int/conclu/dec999/doc99_en.htm

Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation'. Second, a 'Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken. Third, the 'Military Staff (MS) within the Council structures will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

The Helsinki 'headline goal' and the evolving institutional mechanisms were by any measure, a remarkable progress as far as a common European policy in terms of defence and security is concerned, given that till a year before there was no consensus as to the EU's potential involvement in defence affairs, nor was there any general agreement on the

need to give pride of place to force-projection capabilities. Differing defence commitments and policies make it all the more remarkable that a common European policy on defence and security has been able to proceed not only speedily but also as an enterprise of all 15 EU members, in contrast to other European initiatives in areas lying close to the heart of state sovereignty. Neither the Euro nor the Schengen process for removing internal border controls have enjoyed as broad a consensus.³⁸ The Helsinki initiative seems more serious than many of its predecessors due to three reasons.³⁹ First, Britain whose forces are necessary to any credible European military capability, is engaged wholeheartedly for the first time. Second, the Kosovo conflict brought home to the Europeans just how militarily dependent on Washington they are and will remain unless big changes are made. And third, the Helsinki declaration is not a call to revive the WEU but a plan to transfer responsibility for defence and security to the EU, an organisation backed by real political will and momentum.

With its Helsinki decisions, the EU not only goes beyond previous statements on European security and defence, it also moves significantly beyond the model of transatlantic partnership agreed at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin. The purpose of the Berlin decisions was to

³⁸ Francois Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, Summer 2000 ,p.5.

³⁹ Gordon, n.7, p.12.

develop a 'separable but not separate' ESDI within NATO. The WEU was to serve as a bridge between the EU and NATO, keeping these two institutions at arms length of each other. With the absorption of the WEU, as per the Helsinki decisions, this arrangement will be nullified, as the EU itself takes on the WEU's functions. Many observers may welcome these developments as a logical step - a long overdue 'tidying' up' of Europe's complicated institutional landscape, but they raise a number of questions of both an institutional and a more fundamental nature.⁴⁰ But such issues and problems are a natural challenge of all political processes and movements of change. The unanswered questions and issues in the wake of Helsinki no doubt need resolution and also deserve a more comprehensive and separate treatment, and which therefore will be attempted in the concluding chapter. In the final analysis, however, the Helsinki decisions retain their significance in giving a major impetus to the process of European security integration. The decisions taken at Helsinki indicate not only the EU's new-found willingness to take more responsibility for its own defence and project power independently but also its determination to become a serious security actor in its own right.

⁴⁰ Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: 'Separable but not Separate'", *NATO Review*, vol.48, no.1, Spring/Summer 2000, p.12,

Chapter -IV

CONCLUSION : FUTURE PROSPECTS OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY

Progress on the Road from Helsinki

The developments in the field of EU defence and security starting with the St-Malo process and leading via the Cologne EU Council to the Helsinki summit, changed the very character of the Union. What was previously unthinkable 'at Fifteen' became an objective agreed by all member states: the inclusion in the Union's legitimate competencies of a common security and defence policy, in other words its acquisition of strategic responsibility in post-Cold War crisis management. The decisions taken at Helsinki were carried forward and reaffirmed by subsequent European Council meetings and other EU exercises. Where permanent structures were not possible in the immediate term, interim bodies were set up. The message conveyed was that the EU was serious this time and was determined to see the 'headline goal' and the institutional mechanisms agreed upon at Helsinki come to fruition. The institutional framework, set out at Cologne and launched at Helsinki, involved a number of key institutional innovations which were put in place in the six months between

October 1999 and March 2000.¹ They include, first, the designation of former NATO Secretary - General Javier Solana as the first High Representative for CFSP (HR-CFSP), a position which had originally been decided on at the EU Amsterdam Council in June 1997. The High Representative also combines the functions of Secretary-General of the European Council and, as of October 1999, Secretary-General of WEU. This accumulation of responsibilities underscores the political will of the EU to create, within the intergovernmental framework of the European Council, a single centre for politico-military planning, analysis and policy advice. However, the HR-CFSP's staff is miniscule. In addition to the normal support of a cabinet, the HR can rely on around twenty advisers drawn from all fifteen member states, who constitute the newly established Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) - usually referred to simply as the Policy Unit. Second, the creation of a Political and Security Committee (PSC) comprising senior officials (ambassadorial level) of each EU member state, meeting twice a week in Brussels. The PSC's functions as underlined by the Helsinki resolutions has already been mentioned in the previous chapter. Pending definitive arrangements for the composition and remit of the PSC, an interim committee (iPSC) was established on 1 March 2000. The definitive PSC is anticipated to be chaired by the HR-CFSP, but

¹ Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?", *Chaillot Paper 43*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), November 2000
<http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai43e.html>

the interim committee was chaired by the representative of the country holding the EU Presidency. Third, the creation of a European Military Committee (EMC), the highest EU military body, formally composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the fifteen member states meeting at least biannually, but normally represented by their military delegates who, in most cases, are double-hatted with each nation's NATO representative. In the interim period, this body was known as the interim Military Body (iMB). And finally, the creation of a European Military Staff (EMS) to provide military expertise and capacity to support the EU's CFSP/CESDP. These arrangements however needed time to bed down and also to bring out the full implications for the existing institutional structures of the CFSP/CESDP. In addition to the launching of these new institutions or CESDP, by the middle of 2000, no fewer than four separate organisms were assessing European requirements for various force structure scenarios in keeping with the 'headline goal' proposed and agreed to at Helsinki.² These include, first, the WEU Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations which was established in November 1998 and which reported in November 1999. Although this report pre-dated the Helsinki decisions on the 'headline goal', its recommendations in many ways anticipated some of the central issues involved in the elaboration of the 'headline goal'. Second, the NATO

² *ibid.*

Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was launched at the April 1999 Washington Summit, sought to identify existing overall NATO capacity, to detect needs and gaps mainly on the European side and to arrange for these to be met and filled. It examined 58 separate areas of military capacity with a focus on US-European and intra-European interoperability. This work was also tied to the 'NATO Force Goals 2000' project. The teams working in NATO in DCI sought to co-ordinate this work with the intra-EU work on the Helsinki 'headline goal'. Third, the iMB's Headline Goal Task Force (HGTF) pursued the methodology set out in the joint Franco-British paper of February 2000 entitled 'Elaboration of the Headline Goal: Food for Thought'. This involved a six -stage process, moving from the overall strategic context, via planning assumptions and scenarios to identification of the full range of 'headline goal' requirements. And finally, the EU-NATO Ad hoc working group on collective capabilities, which began work on 28 July 2000, was intended to co-ordinate the work of the DCI with that of the iMB - HGTF, and in the process provide a focus for the necessary discussions between NATO and EU on a range of issues.

The progress thus achieved were carried forth by the subsequent European Council meetings including the ones at Lisbon, Santa Maria da Feira and Nice, all of which not only reaffirmed the Helsinki decisions but also attempted to further strengthen the ongoing momentum towards a

credible EU policy in terms of security and defence. The Lisbon European Council of 23-24 March 2000 welcomed 'the fact that the interim bodies foreseen at Helsinki have now been established and are starting to function effectively and that the Council has identified a process for elaborating the headline goal and identifying national contributions so as to meet the military capability target set at Helsinki'.³ The Feira European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2000, 'identified principles and modalities', which would 'allow non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession candidates to contribute to EU military crisis management. Principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations have also been identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements'.⁴ The Nice European Council of 7,8, and 9 December 2000 also reaffirmed the various goals established at Helsinki and reiterated that 'the aim of the efforts made since the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils is to give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises

³ European Council Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000, Presidency Conclusions, para, 43, in Maartje Rutten (compiled), "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents" *Chaillot Paper 47*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), May 2001, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai47e.html>

⁴ European Council Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, Presidency Conclusions, para 9, in Maartje Rutten (compiled), "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents", *Chaillot Paper 47*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), May 2001, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai47e.html>

by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field'.⁵ Despite the continued commitment to the realisation of the Helsinki goals, the progress towards that end is also not without its accompanying problems and difficulties. A number of outstanding issues remain to be addressed before a full realisation of the potential of the Helsinki goals could be achieved.

Issues and Problems on the Way Ahead

The first major issue and problem area is related to the question of generating the resources and narrowing the capabilities gap between the EU and the United States. Opinions are polarised on this issue, some analysts insisting that, unless the EU generates substantial sums of new money, there is no prospect of the EU ever playing a defence role commensurate with its economic strength and political ambitions. If the EU wishes to be able to run effective military operations, its members need to enhance their capabilities.⁶ Americans will tire of discussing Europe's security architecture if the Europeans appear to want recognition without being prepared to share the burden of both common and distinctive security

⁵ European Council Nice, 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, Presidency Conclusions, Annex VI, 'Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy' in Maartie Rutten (compiled) "From St- Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents", *Chaillot Paper 47*, (Paris : Institute for Security Studies of WEU), May 2001, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai47e.html>

⁶ Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch Laine and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defence Capability", *Survival*, vol.41, no.1, Spring 1999, p.25.

interests.⁷ Improving capabilities also means some members spending more on defence and, more importantly, most members spending their defence budgets on different things.⁸ Some commentators are also of the opinion that the USA's European allies are not capable of carrying out operations independently.⁹ There were widespread critical comments in the USA to the effect that its European allies, with over 2 million persons under arms, had difficulty in fielding 40,000 soldiers for peacekeeping duty in the Balkans. Most of the European allies have defence budget structures, which are out of sync with the requirements of the post-Cold War era.¹⁰ Collectively, NATO's European members field standing forces of 2.4 million - fully one million more than the United States with its global operations. But spending on equipment and firepower is at US \$ 11, 000 per soldier in Europe versus US \$ 36,000 per soldier in the United States.¹¹ Analysis at the other end of the spectrum, however, point to the fact that the EU member states already spend 60 per cent of the US total (US \$165 billion as against US \$ 285 billion), yet aspire to play only a regional security role, whereas the United States has global aspirations.¹² In this

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ *ibid.*, p.26.

⁹ Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Europe: The New Transatlantic Agenda", *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford, 2000), p.198.

¹⁰ Francois Heisbourg, "European Defence Takes a Leap Forward", *NATO Review*, vol. 48, no.1, Spring /Summer 2000, p.9.

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² Howorth, n.1.

more optimistic view, synergies, nationalisation, restructuring and economies of scale should be sufficient to give the EU the forces it will require without having to increase defence budgets. Francois Heisbourg is of the opinion that, in 'the post-Cold War context, 60 per cent should be more than enough to deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe'.¹³ But conversely, 'the Europeans do not get anything like 60 percent of the USA's capabilities from their in defence spending', as starkly highlighted by the Kosovo conflict.¹⁴

However, it seems unlikely that the EU will be able to achieve what it has set out to achieve if defence budgets continue to decrease. The capabilities gap between the EU and the United States also need to be addressed and narrowed to the extent possible. In some areas, there are technology gaps, and in most areas there are investment and procurement gaps. These gaps add up to US superiority, quantitative to be sure and sometimes qualitative, in many areas of military capability.¹⁵ These include strategic mobility assets such as aerial refuelling and air transport; surface ships and submarines; precision-strike munitions; electronic warfare; power projection in the sense of long-range air and missile strikes; and what the US military calls C⁴ ISR - command, control, communications,

¹³ Heisbourg, n.10, p.9.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union", *Survival*, vol.42, no.4, Winter 2000-01, p.98.

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance¹⁶ In order to discourage any unilateralist tendencies of the United States stemming from these advantages, the Europeans need to spend more money on military equipment, particularly communication and information - gathering systems such as airborne surveillance and satellites.¹⁷ In the US, 30 percent of the defence budget is assigned to equipment and R&D. In Europe only Britain and France approach that level.¹⁸ Many European countries must spend appreciably more than is currently being spent on equipment. Or else, 'European forces risk becoming dependent on purchases of US weapons, being incapable of sustaining inter-operability with US forces, falling behind the capabilities of potential aggressions, or suffering higher casualties than the US in coalition operations.'¹⁹

Heisbourg suggests several measures to enhance EU defence capabilities.²⁰ He asserts that there are enough reasons which make it necessary to consider introducing input commitments, sometimes called 'ex ante' criteria or more robustly 'convergence criteria', into ESDP. For instance, the EU has been rather successful in pursuing this kind of approach in areas such as trade policy or monetary union. Although this

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ Schake and others, n.6, p.27.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Francois Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, Summer 2000, pp.10-14.

does not mean that the same would also work for defence, but it would be prudent to play to an institution's known strengths. The first step in devising input indicators is to harmonise the data, most importantly the budget criteria. The nature of input commitments could be set half-way between the legally binding convergence criteria used in the framework of monetary union and a purely symbolic display of statistical indicators. Although the Europeans now seem to understand better than before how great the capabilities gap is, the European public does not seem prepared to make the financial sacrifices necessary to procure such capabilities any time soon.²¹ Therefore if 'the EU is ever going to acquire the military capacity implicit in its current ambitions, it is probably going to have to persuade the European voter to increase defence spending.'²² The resources issue is therefore likely to become the critical variable which will test the seriousness of purpose of the EU member states where military capacity is concerned'.²³ The EU nonetheless is attempting to tackle the challenge of improving the military capabilities of its member states in a number of ways. France has proposed that the EU examine scenarios of the Petersburg tasks, from the simplest level to the level of an army corps as this would

²¹ Philip H. Gordon, "Their Own Army? Making European Defence Work", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 4, July/August 2000, p. 16.

²² Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Mark Webber, "NATO's Triple Challenge" *International Affairs*, vol. 76 (2000), p. 508.

²³ Howorth, n. 1.

make it possible for EU military leaders to estimate requirements.²⁴ In the presidency of the WEU and EU during the latter half of 2000, France convened a meeting of EU defence ministers in September 2000 to examine the requirements flowing from EU's crisis-scenario analysis and to consider potential force contributions by member states. This was followed by a capabilities-commitment conference in November 2000, with the commitments endorsed at the highest level at the EU summit in Nice in December 2000.

The EU's recent drive in the wake of Helsinki to create new institutional structures, working parties, ad hoc groups and force targets suggests the positive steps forward in the direction of EU's independent security and defence identity. However, critics of certain aspects of CESDP-mainly in the United States-voice concern that, irrespective of the functionality and effectiveness of the new institutions, the main emphasis in this new energy is on institution-building, which is conflated and equated by these critics with 'European integration', the latter acquiring, in this context, pejorative overtones.²⁵ Meanwhile the real task of organising serious European military capacity is in this view, simply marking time. The Europeans' response to this argument is to insist that institutions do matter since it is from within them that an all-important European security

²⁴ Yost, n. 15, p. 117-18.

²⁵ Howorth, n. 1.

culture will arise. And that security culture, generated by the daily contact of security actors and deciders from the fifteen member states working together in the same location, is a vital ingredient not only in the decision-making process itself, but also in ensuring that practical implementation will happen as foreseen. The focus on institutions is therefore necessary, because far from being a distinction, the institutional discussion has always been and remains a key to any attempt at developing an EU security and defence policy. This is inevitable for three reasons.²⁶ First, the European defence institution previous to the Cologne and Helsinki mechanisms are unworkable. Modest as the programme agreed in St- Malo may seem, there was no chance that the institutions in place upto that time could have carried the process forward. Second, only the EU can provide a suitable framework for the process started at St-Malo. Beyond its overall change of heart with respect to European defence, the British government contributed to what has been, in effect, one of the most innovative aspects of the current debate: that is, the choice, by the Europeans of the EU as the institutional framework through which to channel their aspiration for a more autonomous role in defence, as part of a process that involves all its 15 members on an equal footing. And third, this has always been the way European integration has moved forward. Institutions matter for the EU in

²⁶ Gilles Andreani, "Why Institutions Matter", *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 82-83.

a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norm-setting and institution-building. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging. Therefore, for those many commentators and actors, in Europe and elsewhere, who believe that a credible CESDP does require the institutional capacity to make decisions, the post St-Malo developments are an encouraging testimony to what is possible among fifteen sovereign states if the stakes are regarded as high enough and if the political will to succeed is present. But behind the surface activity and energy, a number of significant questions remain unanswered. While there is a real dynamic 'at 15', there are also quite different points of view on a number of major issues, particularly where the relationship between the EU and NATO/ the United States is concerned. This calls for a further elaboration and an assessment of how the fifteen member states line up on one side or another of the various arguments.

Critics are of the view that there are two parallel sets of dichotomies in the development of a single EU-wide defence and security policy.²⁷ The first is the difference in emphasis between the EU NATO members and the remaining Neutrals. The second is the degree of divergence which still persists between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists among the eleven

²⁷ Croft and others, n. 22, p. 506.

EU NATO members. The former dichotomy has lost some of its edge as neutral states struggle to define the specificity and relativity of their 'non-alignment', but nevertheless they bring to the EU's discussions on a common security and defence policy a different cultural approach both to diplomacy and to peacekeeping, while representing a permanent degree of scepticism about the role and function of NATO.²⁸ The contribution of these neutral EU member states towards the implementation of CESDP is likely to be less focussed on any residual Atlanticist/ Europeanist dichotomy than on the overall balance within the EU's foreign and security policy between military and non-military instruments.²⁹ The Feira EU Council meeting finally gave the go-ahead to development of the civilian aspects of crisis management as well as to policing.³⁰ One of the greatest distinctions between US and NATO approaches to collective security and the approaches likely to be used by the EU will be the role of civilian and other non-military instruments in humanitarian action, rescue operations, refugee and displaced persons assistance, peace operations, peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, monitoring and a whole range of other tasks.³¹ These are precisely the sorts of activities which many of the EU's smaller

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Howorth, n. 1

³⁰ EU Council Meeting at Santa Maria da Feira, *Presidency Conclusions*, Appendix 3: 'Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management'; Appendix 4: 'Concrete Targets for Police', in Maartje Rutten (compiled), 'From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents', *Chaillot Paper 47*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), May 2001, <http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai47e.html>

³¹ Howorth, n. 1.

or neutral states are ideally configured to carry out. The non-aligned members, in their distinctive ways, have therefore created a new collective thrust to the overall EU debate on the specificity of security policy, a civilian thrust which will find support in sympathetic quarters across the 15 members states.³²

A more serious dichotomy is that which pits those states for whom NATO in its traditional form remains the fundamental security reference, and those who, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and commitment, wish to see the EU acquiring greater autonomy. Despite their joint sponsorship of the St-Malo process, Britain and France continued to promote and to epitomise the two contrasting positions on Atlanticism/Europeanism which had traditionally informed their security relationship, even though by 1999-2000 France had moved much closer to NATO and the UK had moved closer to Europe, thus narrowing the gap without eliminating it.³³ Most other countries situated themselves somewhere along the Spectrum between these two poles. For the Europeanists, the starting point is that the CESDP is above all a European project which involves, under certain circumstances, making use of an Atlanticist instrument: NATO. For the Atlanticists, on the other hand, the starting point is a reflection on the best means of safeguarding the Atlantic alliance, which involves making use of

³² *ibid.*

³³ *ibid.*

a European instrument: CESDP.³⁴ In general, considerations geared to ensuring the best interests of NATO, which were assumed to be congruent with the best interests of European security as a whole, took precedence in Atlanticist thinking over considerations about European defence integration *per se*. However, it cannot be denied that the UK, under Tony Blair's leadership began, at the turn of the century, to participate more enthusiastically in the strictly European dimensions of defence and security than some of the 'smaller' Atlanticist countries, which had always been reluctant to trade in American leadership for French, German or British leadership.

The main bone of contention, however, is not the desirability or inevitability of some form of European defence capacity. Virtually no state still questions the rationale of the EU defence project. The debate is over how far to take CESDP, and particularly over the nature of its relations with the United States and NATO. There is therefore still a significant difference of opinion between France and the UK over the extent to which the alliance can or should be re-balanced in favour of Europe. While both countries were happy to co-sponsor the Helsinki 'headline goal' proposals, they do not see eye to eye on the more ambitious plans for European intelligence, command and control, strategic lift and above all strategic

³⁴ Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000.

planning capacity which France has been energetically promoting. The basic difference in starting point resulted in serious problems emerging in early 2000 over the implementation of the institutional proposals emerging from Helsinki. Disputes arose over both the underlying principles and the timetable for NATO-EU negotiations; over the priority to be accorded to the involvement of non-EU NATO members or of non-NATO candidates for EU accession; over the types of missions which the EU should see as a priority for planning purposes; and indeed over the modalities for strategic planning itself. But the political will existing in both Paris and London to make CESDP work finally prevailed over the difference underlying the strategic assumptions of both countries and a breakthrough took place at the Political Committee meeting on 19 April when a Franco-British paper offered the prospect of resolution on most outstanding issues.³⁵

That solutions can after all be arrived at in the end, is not only suggestive of the continued good health of the European security and defence project but also of it being well on track towards the possible fulfillment of the Helsinki 'headline goal'.

³⁵ Croft and others, n. 22, p. 507-8.

Attitude of the United States towards the European Quest for a Security and Defence Identity

The attitude of the United States towards the prospect of a serious, substantive European defence initiative has been one of ambivalence and negative rhetoric. In official documents, however, Washington has for several years supported the concept of an ESDI.³⁶ In December 1998 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described one of the seven chief tasks of the alliance as 'to develop a European Security and Defence Identity or ESDI, within the Alliance, which the United States has strongly endorsed'.³⁷ It is, however, a qualified support, with some reservations. Albright drew attention to this in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in December 1998: 'Any initiative must avoid preempting Alliance decision-making by delinking ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members'.³⁸ This caveat was further developed by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. In response to the Franco-British St-Malo initiative presented in December 1998 and developed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Defence Secretary George Robertson at the March 1999 London conference 'NATO at Fifty', Talbott warned that ESDI carries with it both risks and costs: 'If

³⁶ Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Europe: The Institutionalized Security Process", *SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford, 1999), p.240.

³⁷ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Statement to the North Atlantic Council, 8 Dec. 1998 <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/981208.html>

³⁸ *ibid.*

ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood or mishandled, it could create the impression - which could eventually lead to the reality - that a new, European-only alliance is being born out of the old, transatlantic one. If that were to happen, it would weaken, perhaps even break, those ties that I spoke of before - the ones that bind our security to yours'.³⁹ In his view; it is essential that ESDI does not take a form that discriminates against the USA or other NATO Allies which are not members of the EU.

Many US commentators feared that the June 1999 Cologne proposals amounted to a European intention to take military action outside of NATO whenever possible, rather than seeing NATO itself as a first resort. In addressing German military commanders on 1 December 1999, US Defence Secretary William Cohen, insisting that there 'can be no separation' between the EU and the United States, went on: 'I prefer to say that NATO should have what I call a first option on any action that would be taken in the way of a military operation'.⁴⁰ European leaders were baffled by the United States' lukewarm response to the 'headline goal', set at Helsinki. They noted Madeleine Albright's explicit caveats which have by now come to be known as the three 'D's - duplication, decoupling and discrimination. Repeated statements on the three 'D's' has led to a

³⁹ Text: Talbott 10 March, 1999 remarks on "A new NATO for a new era", quoted in Rotfeld, n. 36, pp.240-41.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?", in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, (London, 2001), p.20.

damaging rhetoric which could also be interpreted as a fundamental questioning of the very enterprise of ESDI as such. In fact, a European Defence Policy cannot materialise without it, and the EU has set up certain structures that duplicate NATO, such as political and military committees or the Europcorps command.⁴¹ The concept of 'non-discrimination' also raises similar questions, since an ESDI inevitably must distinguish between insiders and outsiders, between those who assume obligations and privileges and between those who do not.⁴² Creating a long list of all European countries that are not part of the EU and asking for their interest to be taken into account as if they were members of the EU could, if taken to its logical conclusion, dilute the identity of a European approach. Finally, 'decoupling', is an inevitably ambiguous concept. In fact, Europeans want the United states to remain committed to European security and maintain a military presence on the continent.⁴³ In this sense no EU member state wants a 'decoupling', but it is after all the United States that defines 'decoupling', and could, if it wishes, turn the whole process into a self-fulfilling prophesy.

At the level of official discourse, the former Clinton Administration had formally supported ESDI. But the support had varied considerably in

⁴¹ Francois Heisbourg, "European defence: making it work", *Chaillot Paper 42*, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU), September 2000
<http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai42e.html>

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ *ibid.*

both tone and conviction. This is evident from the three speeches by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.⁴⁴ In October 1999, at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, he made the remark which is now regularly quoted as an indication of Washington's concern about the drift of European defence policy: 'We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO'. In his 15 December 1999 address to the NAC, Talbott strove to counter the negative connotations of his earlier remarks by making an unambiguous statement of support: 'There should be no confusion about America's position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against it, we are not ambivalent, we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe, that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own - period, end of debate'. But that was not the end of the debate as Talbott returned to the theme barely six weeks later when addressing the DGAP in Bonn. This time, the concerns had become explicit: ' We're in favour of ESDI. But while our support for the concept is sincere, it is not unqualified.... to work, it must reconcile the goal of European identity and integration on the one hand with the imperative of transatlantic solidarity on the other; it must reinforce, not duplicate or dilute the role of the

⁴⁴ Howorth, n. l.

Alliance as a whole; and it certainly must not attenuate the bonds between our defense and your own'. Similarly, in a statement published on 20 June 2000, President Clinton, in welcoming the decisions taken at the EU Council in Feira, reiterated the US belief that CESDP would strengthen both Europe and the Alliance, but added that it was essential to make further progress both on the integration of the non-EU NATO allies and on a broader discussion between the EU and NATO.⁴⁵ But American policy makers are disingenuous when they contend that they want to see a strong ESDI develop.⁴⁶ Ted Galen Carpenter is of the view that even 'if European leaders did not seek to make a robust ESDI a competitor to NATO, the dynamics of international politics would ultimately lead to that result.'⁴⁷ That is especially true if NATO did not have the option to preempt ESDI and take control of a military mission. As Carpenter further says, an 'explicit or implicit division of labour in which a European security organisation would be responsible for dealing with future Bosnia or Kosovo-type contingencies while NATO remained responsible for responding to a major security threat would gradually but inexorably marginalise the alliance'. Such a scenario implies that a substantive ESDI would become the organisation called upon to deal with Europe's real security concerns. NATO would become little more than a standby 'insurance policy' against a

⁴⁵ ibid

⁴⁶ Carpenter, n.40, p.21.

⁴⁷ ibid., p.22.

highly improbable threat. Such a development would mean the inevitable dilution of US influence in the transatlantic security relationship, since the relationship itself would be increasingly irrelevant. At some level, US policymakers perceive that outcome, and that is one reason why they regard even the possibility of a successful ESDI as unsettling.⁴⁸ In the final analysis, however, what is important is that both Europeans and Americans should support the endeavour of institutional and military reform arising out of Helsinki, and the European leaders should ensure public support for the project. The new American administration would do well by replacing the policy of the earlier administration with a more proactive policy of support for EU empowerment and a new thinking on a more mature and balanced strategic partnership between the EU and the United States.⁴⁹

The Road Ahead

In the two years between St-Malo and Nice, ESDI has come a long way. But as the discussion on the outstanding issues and problems would suggest, ESDI still has some more ground to cover before it fulfills the expectations of its initiators. Problems will remain for some time to come and the road ahead will be long, complicated and sometimes even tortuous. But the European track record of collective endeavours does not inspire

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective", *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, Summer 2000, pp.28-29.

specticism.⁵⁰ European processes has always been drawn out and often painful, and in this context it is worth remembering that the countries participating in the European integration process have always succeeded in their large-scale existential undertakings, moving from coal and steel to customs union, to trade policy and the single market, and from there to monetary union, without prejudice to subsequent endeavours. There is no reason as to why the same would not apply in the field of defence and security. After all, the EU has a potentially powerful legitimising role which post-Cold War NATO has not been proven to possess.⁵¹ Put into perspective, the development of a common EU security and defence policy between December 1998 and December 2000 was almost revolutionary compared with the slow progress made during the preceding half century, at least in terms of political commitments and policy guidelines. Much as Europeans still have room for improvement, especially in terms of equipment and budgets, the progress made so far would have been unthinkable as recently as two and a half years ago.

Jolyon Howorth points to three factors which suggest that, however daunting the current and future problems, the chances are that, unlike in the past, this time some viable form of ESDI will emerge.⁵² First, the degree of

⁵⁰ Heisbourg, n.20, p.15.

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Howorth, n.1.

political will which has been generated in Europe behind ESDI, ever since the St-Malo summit in December 1998 is considerable. The considerable momentum which has kicked in since St-Malo shows no signs of slackening. It has acquired an inner dynamic, rather in the manner of the single currency or the Euro project, which will prove increasingly difficult to reverse - the more so as Europe's credibility as an international actor becomes associated with ESDI itself. The EU has everything to gain from making a success of ESDI and everything to lose from failure. Infact failure would have profound ramifications across the entire range of political projects currently being undertaken by the Union - including enlargement and EMU. The Cold War is over and US commitment to Europe cannot remain the same as it was from 1947 to 1989. The American tax payer cannot be expected to continue to bear the brunt of the burden which the EU itself is quite capable of assuming. To a large extent, the survival of the Alliance itself is now dependent on the generation of a significant European military capacity. At the same time, the creation of that capacity is intimately tied up with the EU's ability to maintain a defence industrial base and stay abreast of technological developments in the field of sophisticated weaponry. And the third factor is the British commitment to Europe. All the signs suggest that Britain has thrown itself fully into the project. Whether or not the United Kingdom will eventually become a fully-fledged member of the EU's other main integrated projects,

such as the Euro, it seems beyond question that, barring a political upset, London is now seriously committed to the cause of CESDP. The road ahead may be dim-lit and uncharted, but there is little doubt that it is leading to a new balance in the respective responsibilities of the EU and the United States for the security of the continent. Although no clear blueprint for the relationship between Europe's two major international organisations will emerge in the short term, such a balance in the long-term could emerge from practice. That would require a continued EU-NATO relationship but one in which European capabilities are significantly developing. It would also require a more relaxed American attitude towards sharing leadership in Europe.

Other problems still to be resolved are many. Institutions will need constant adjustment; defence and security cultures will need time to adapt to one another; a strategic project needs to be developed; an efficient executive structure to emerge and above all a credible military capacity has to be delivered. But no one can perhaps doubt that the military dimension will de facto change the nature of the EU and its ability to exercise influence outside the Union. A page has been turned, and the Europeans cannot now return to what for forty years was a position of very comfortable irresponsibility. But this qualitative leap in the exercise of power and influence will also call for many, possibly painful, adjustments of inherited cultures, mechanisms and habits. But already there are

abundant signs that all fifteen members of the union are beginning to view CFSP and CESDP as aspects of a seamless web of policy transactions which will sooner or later affect each country equally significantly.⁵³ Collective security in one part of Europe inevitably has implications for all other parts. Nonetheless, the cooperation aspired to in terms of defence and security will continue to be difficult at times in political terms as many national compromises and occasional sacrifices would be needed. But then, the essential distinctiveness and the true moral force of the European Union has been a tendency to combine consensus with efficiency, and diversity with unity. And after all, in the final analysis it is upon the Europeans to make the choice between a Europe of an ineffective and impotent collection of states or a strong and stable union capable of defending itself and providing for its own security. The events in the wake of Helsinki en route to Nice suggests that the choice has been made. For, an enlarging and more integrated EU will increasingly have to confront political and security issues or problems to which it can only respond effectively with a greater security and defence capability of its own. The implementation of a coherent security and defence policy leading to a European Security and Defence Identity in the truest sense of the term, therefore will remain the ultimate challenge for the European Union in the years to come.

⁵³ *ibid.*

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