

**PRESIDENT SADAT'S POLICY TOWARDS
ISRAEL
'FROM WAR TO PEACE'**

*Dissertation Submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, "*President Sadat's Policy Towards Israel 'From War To Peace'*" submitted by Fazzur Rahman Siddiqe in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University and this is his own work.

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Dedicated to:

My Parents

Who have been my first and last ideals

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Introduction

Egypt enjoys a dominant position in the Arab world and though being a part of African continent, it has always occupied an important place in the Arab politics and its relation with Arab world goes back to ancient period. Because of its strategic location, it has developed extensive contact with the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe. Egypt has gone through process of Africanisation, Islamisation and Arabisation. Islam is religion of majority of people, which fully integrates Egypt with other Arab countries. Egypt's dominance in the Arab world was first realized during Fatimid Caliphate in the period to 909-1171 AD during which Cairo had become the Capital and its supremacy was re-enforced during Mamluk dynasty from 13th century to 16th century after which it came under Ottoman occupation in 1517 AD.

Egypt had shown active and leading participation in the Arab affairs even when it was under British control since 1882. The period of British rule in Egypt coincided with the rise of nationalist aspiration among the Arab speaking region of Ottoman Empire and this period saw the deep interaction between Egypt and various other Arabic speaking regions. In these movements Egypt played greater political and intellectual role which reached its zenith in the post-World War-II period when it started a kind of movement for political cooperation among the newly independent Arab states, an effort that culminated in the formation of Arab League. Historically Egypt's interaction with the Arab world had tended it to assume a political and strategic role in the

Arab world and even today it holds a key position in the Arab world.

Despite being under alien rule for a long period, it never abandoned a leadership role and most of the time it sought the unity and integration of Arab world. Since the beginning of the twentieth century Egypt has become the center of several pan-Arab societies and movements.

The Palestine question occupies a principal position in Egyptian foreign policy and often has been a crucial indicator of its Arab policy. The emergence of political Zionism and the immigration of Jews into Palestine caused concerns and anxieties among the Arabs, especially to the leaders of Egypt. In response to Zionism, Egypt was instrumental in the formation of the Arab Company to Save Palestinian Land and a higher committee for the relief of Palestinian victims was formed in 1936, which included prominent Egyptians like Hassan Al- Banna, Dr. M.H. Haykel. Palestine issue became a domestic issue in Egypt, and witnessed the formation of several Palestinian student unions. At the external level in 1937, the Egyptian Prime Minister emphasized in the League of Nations that because of neighborhood, history, language, civilization and culture, Egypt is concerned about the Palestine cause”¹ Furthermore, in 1938, Cairo hosted an Arab conference of parliamentarians to discuss the Palestine question. Similarly, various conferences were held under the leadership of Egypt including one in London in 1939 with the active participation of Egypt. The events of

1. Taufiq Y. Hasau, *The Struggle for the Arab World*, (London, 1985), p.3

1936-1939 in Palestine had a profound impact upon Egyptian domestic policy. Various political organizations working for Palestinian cause were active on Egyptian soil.

During the run up to the partition of Palestine, Egypt led the Arab countries in presenting the cause of the Palestinian Arabs at the United Nations and then before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Having failed to prevent the passage of the partition resolution at the UN in November 1947, and after the establishment of the State of Israel in May, Egypt led the Arab world in first Arab-Israel war in 1948. Egypt's contribution to the cause of Palestine has been greater than other Arab countries and it had captured the Gaza Strip during the war. Unlike the then Transjordan, however, Egypt considered itself a temporary custodian of the Palestinian territories and kept the Gaza Strip under its military control. Moreover, it also facilitated the formation of the short-lived All Palestine Government under the leadership of Hajj Amin Al-Hussein with headquarter at Gaza.

The July Revolution of 1952 became a watershed in the history of modern Egypt when member of army officer carried out a coup against the existing regime in Egypt. The Free Officers abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the advent of Egyptian Republic. Those Free Officer were nominally led by General Mohammed Neguib but real power rested with an eleven-man committee of junior officers known as Revolutionary Command Council whose acknowledged leader was Col. Gamal Abdal Nasser. The Egyptian leaders mainly saw themselves as

Egyptian nationalist and committed to expel the imperialist forces from the Egyptian soil. In February 1953 Egypt and Britain reached agreement, which signaled an end of British rule. After this, the leadership of the Egypt went in hand of Nasser who was first Egyptian to be ruler of Egypt.

The emergence of the charismatic authority of Nasser in the mid fifties had a profound impact on Egyptian foreign policy and he pursued an active policy towards Arab world. His charisma, personality and belief were cited as the reasons for his unparalleled popularity in Arab world in general and in Egypt in particular. By 1954 he consolidated his power and had established himself as the central figure in the Egyptian decision making process especially in the external relation affair.² Nasser spoke loudly against foreign oppressor and his charismatic appeal was so strong that mass support for his foreign policy was always forthcoming.

The key elements in Nasser's foreign policy were non-alignment, shift towards a close relation with Russia, Arab unity, struggle with Israel and search for economic aid. All these aims were inter-related and sprang from his analysis of Egyptian interests and a desire for personal empire. His policy towards Arab world had the broader vision of geo-politics. He grasped the bargaining power of the Arab world, which could exert through geo-political position and oil resources provided they were united at least in their policies if not in their political institution. He had noted the special position of Egypt as the

² Narayan, no. 9, p. 72.

largest Arab state and as a center of Islam. Nasser's analysis was also derived from his experiences in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

He elaborates in his book, "*Philosophy of Revolution*" at length with the component of foreign policy of Egypt towards Arab world where he identifies three circles which condition Egyptian role, namely Arab, Islamic and African circles. Nasser was of the view that Egypt's place could not be limited by political boundaries. National security was one of the important element of Nasser's foreign policy and the doctrine of Egypt national security consisted of three interwoven elements, namely, direct security, vital security and strategic security.

The consolidation of Arab affiliation with Egypt was most important part of Nasser's Arab policy from 1956 to 1967.

The famous formulation of three circles where Egypt laid in the center was the indicator of what Nasser thought of Egypt among the Arab world. The Arab circle was most important and single entity. The homogeneity history, strategic location and oil of Arab world seem to be the main reasons for Nasser's emphasis on Arab circle. He supported all Arab liberation movements, opposed the creation of Israel , Baghdad pact and achieved nationalization of Suez Canal. Nasser's quest for autonomy abroad led to Egypt's drive for hegemony in the Arab world.

He captured the imagination of Arab nationalist, preached against foreign presence and called for Arab unity. He sought Arab support to undo the creation of Israel and avenge the injustice done to Palestinians. Nasser took pan-Arabism to maximize the role of Egypt in

the Arab world and he was prompted by pan-Arabism due to Israeli presence and called for Arab system to counter the imperialist power-backed Middle East system. Nasser's policy of pan-Arabism reached its climax in 1958 when confederation of Syria and Egypt into existence.

For Nasser, Palestine issue was a major theme for pursuing his pan Arab policy, Nasser even used the body of Arab League to propagate the issue of Palestine being most influential member of Arab League.

In 1964 Egypt took major part in establishment of PLO through Arab league to consolidate its standing in Arab and international arena. Egypt gave special patronage to this proposal of formation of PLO. Egypt contribution was greater than any other Arab state and it was mainly on the behest of Egypt that PLO came into existence. The achievement of PLO would have been inconceivable without Egypt's initiative and full support.

To counter the emergence of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt launched a media campaign against Iraq and became fully engaged in strengthening and securing the diplomatic position in the Arab world. Further, he formed alliance with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and this alliance was the first practical beginning of policy of integration of Arab world under the philosophy of pan-Arabism. This alliance was not to stop here but later Egypt signed a defense pact and this pact was joined by Saudi Arabia and Yemen. All these moves were the manifestation of Nasser's anti-imperialist policy and his slogan of united Arab against western colonial forces. This pan-Arab policy got

further legitimacy in Bandung conference of 1955 where he was proclaimed as an Arab leader. His independent policy was not confined to Arab states but he adopted this policy at global level when he signed arm deal with Czechoslovakia, which proved his independence from western world.

The issue of Israel was one of the major components of Egypt's foreign policy and this issue was the main source of legitimacy for various Arab regimes. For Nasser Palestine was integral part of the Arab world and for Nasser to fight in Palestine was not a fight on foreign soil. He once remarked: "As long as region is one, condition is same, problem is same and even the enemy are same, why should we dissipate our effort".³

The creation of Israel was seen a barrier between one Arab country and other and Nasser opposed the western power game plan to disrupt and upset equation in the west Asia. Seeing a close connection between western powers and Israel, he regarded the question of Israel of central importance to the Arabs and to Egypt in particular. He was of the view that only a united and liberated Arab world would be in a position to deal with Israel. Nasser's relation with Israel was associated by his desire of Arab leadership and he called for greater Arab unity for expulsion and defeat of Israel.

The policy of pan-Arabism and independent Arab policy was put to test in 1956 when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal following the refusal of the western powers to finance the Aswan dam, the main source of water for Upper Egypt. Nasser's decision led to a tripartite

³ . Glacono Luclani, *The Arab States*, London, 1990, P.301.

attack on Egypt. The basic motive was to weaken the position of Nasser in the Arab world and to prove the weakness of Arab unity. This tripartite attack began on 29 October 1956 when Israel attacked Egypt and was followed by Britain and France as these two powers were the main architects and financiers of the Suez Canal and always favoured the international control of the Canal.

Although, the Egypt had lost part of its army and air force and was deprived of revenue from the canal and the oil of Sinai.

Under intense US pressure ceasefire came into force on 6 November 1956. The total outcome of this war was substantial political victory for Nasser and the tripartite aggression strengthened his position in the eyes of Arab masses and Nasser emerged more powerful and popular. This added more credibility to his theory of pan-Arabism. Even Iraq, a member of the western-backed military alliance, was forced by public opinion to condemn the aggression. At the end of crisis, Nasser emerged as prime manipulator of the Arab policies.

The year 1957 was the high tide in Nasser's Arab policy when in January 1957 Treaty of Arab solidarity was concluded among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan for a period of ten years. Even the coup of 1952 was now being explained in terms of Arab nationalism. In an article in *Al-Ahram*, March 1957, Anwar al-Sadat declared. "There was nothing behind our coup other than Arab nationalism--which

awakened new historical development--we must nurture this link between the people of Arab nation.⁴

But later half of the 1957 saw a major challenge to Nasser's Arab policy when Saudi Arabia changed its attitude towards Nasser. It felt threatened by the rising popularity of Nasser and pan-Arabism was seen a danger to monarchy. In Jordan, pro-Nasser government of Nabulsi was dismissed by King Hussein who saw close alliance between two as a potential to infiltrate and subsequently to dominate Jordan. Jordan and Saudi joined the western camp and Jordan received major American economic assistance. Furthermore, it sought Iraqi and Saudi Arabian military assistance to crush the civil riot that was incited by the Nasserites after removal of Nabulsi. By late 1957, Nasser was left with only one ally in form of Syria.

Further he saw disintegration of Arab alliance system and gradually he started realizing the erosion of pan-Arabism but still he was the most influential Arab leader. Now Syria started serious campaign for unity with Egypt that in February 1958 culminated in the formation of United Arab Republic, a federation of Egypt and Syria under the leadership of Nasser. This union provided new breath to the Nasser policy of pan-Arabism and the policy of Arab nationalism had got a new life and achieved new strength. The formation of UAR did not go well with other powers who felt threatened by Nasser. The eventual break-up of the UAR in September 1961 following the secession of Syria

⁴. A. I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World The Element of Foreign Policy*, London, 1976, p.16.

dealt the most serious blow to Nasser's Arab unity campaign. It was major reverse in his three circle's policy. In reaction to this break up of UAR, Nasser said, "I want Arab unity of purpose before I talk about unity of Arab rank"⁵

After the secession, Nasser launched radical social change, externally he broke off diplomatic relation with Jordan accusing it of being involved in secession. He terminated the loose confederation between the UAR and Yemen. He denounced the King Saud and vowed not to recognize the new Syrian government. He argued that for Arab unity to be achieved, Arab reactionary must go. Heikal attributed the failure of UAR to the Egyptian's non-readiness for Arab unity, geographical division between the two countries and inability to overcome the regional chauvinism and there was no solid economic and social foundation on which the experiment could be based and firmly depended⁶. The post break-up period saw renewed orientation of Nasser's policy toward Arab world. The national Charter of 1962 concluded that Arabism was main character of Egyptian foreign policy and re-affirmed that there was no conflict between Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism. Nasser's involvement in the Yemeni civil following a military coup on 26 September 1962, proved to be a political disaster as it alienated powerful countries such as Saudi Arabia. Nasser himself has subsequently admitted that Yemeni venture was a miscalculation.⁷

⁵ . Hasou, n.1.p.116.

⁶ Robert Stephen, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (New York, 1970), p. 210.

⁷ Ibid, p. 171.

Nasser's policy towards Arab world saw various ups and down for one decade and his philosophy of pan-Arabism idea of Arab nationalism and following of active and aggressive Arab policy suffered various jolt and reached its zenith and nadir within one decade.

But the final and severest blow to Nasser's his pan-Arab policy came in 1967, with the crushing defeat of Egypt at the hands of Israel in June. It is well known fact that Israel issue constituted one of most important component of Nasser's pan-Arabism policy and he had derived his legitimacy by propagating anti-Israel policy.

The June defeat was most spectacular military defeat in modern history and the Egyptian army, perceived and presented as the guardian of the Arab nation had been dealt a humiliating blow by the mobile, superbly equipped and brilliantly led Israel forces. Egyptian arm forces had lost 10,000 men and 1500 officers in addition to 5000 men and 500 officers taken prisoner by Israel.⁸ The West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the entire Sinai Peninsula came under Israeli control with its soldiers reaching the eastern banks of the Suez Canal. The immediate aftermath of war found Egypt in almost hopeless position.

The Egypt's defeat in the 1967 was due to Nasser's obsession with pan-Arabism. Nasser was shaken by the defeat. This defeat proved to be a turning point in Egypt's Arab policy. Following the war, Nasser immediately abandoned his active Arab policy, withdrew his forces from

⁸ Anthony Mcdermott, *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution* (New York, 1988), p. 127.

Yemen and succumbed to Saudi Arabia pressure in allurements of financial aid and in exchange Saudi Arabia became a dominant power in the region posing an irreversible challenge to Nasser's role as a pan-Arabist.

Egypt faced an identity crisis in the wake of this defeat and proponent of pan-Arabism lost faith in this concept and appeal of Arab nationalism was no more an ideology and gave rise to Egyptian nationalism. The Palestine question was no more an issue for Nasser, which had attained national character as a movement, and it was no more a tool in the hand of Nasser to propagate the pan-Arab policy and Palestine issue lost its credibility as uniting force. Egypt's pre-dominance position was no more unchallenged and whole ideology of pan-Arabism was in question. The decision of Nasser to accept UN Security Resolution 242, which recognised the existence of Israel, was very much obvious indicator of Nasser's desire to accept the reality of Israel. Later Nasser's acceptance of Roger's plan showed his preference of own territories over Palestinian issue and this acceptance by Nasser was demise and collapse of theory of pan-Arabism, which Nasser carried for one and half decade as a most, important political strategy to pursue his political ambitions.

On 28 September 1970, after eighteen years of leading Egypt's vigorous regional activities, Nasser suffered a fatal heart attack and died at the age of fifty-two. For Nasser, pan-Arabism was a political mechanism to serve his political interest, dominate the whole Arab World and to keep reactionary force at periphery. The pursuit of these

goals, forced Nasser for collusion with conservative state. The 1967 war gave a blow to Nasser's pan-Arab policy and stimulated Egyptian nationalism and it was against this background that Sadat came to power.

Sadat was born on 25 December 1918 in Mitabul-al-Kam in district of Minnitiya.⁹ He was from a farmer background which had a profound impact on his political ideology and social understanding. His relations with peasant class made him to respect for private property and he developed a feeling of anti-feudalism. As a product of the 1952 Revolution, he developed an intense nationalism and unseen hatred for British rule. Exposed to rampant social injustice heaped on Egypt, which had changed his political thinking. During political formation of his personality, main concern for Sadat was British occupation, Egyptian subservience and to national sovereignty¹⁰. At early age, he was politically conscious but ideologically not sharpened and had developed very sharp understanding of every political group and their orientation. His political consciousness and his concern for domestic politics can be judged from the fact that he organised a march from his village to Cairo on the line of Hitler march from Munich to Berlin after World War I¹¹. In 1933, Sadat got enrolled in military academy and since then was obsessed with the military career.

During World War II Sadat's desire was to fight against British and support German in exchange for freedom and earned him two-year prison term for his anti-British Campaign. These years played great role

⁹ Krik J. Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat years* (New York, 200), p. 36.

¹⁰ Co. B. K. Narayan, *Anwar el-Sadat Man with a Mission* (New Delhi, 1977), p. 21.

¹¹ Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New Delhi, 1981), p. 45.

in Sadat's political life, political character and in forming the political vision of Sadat and developing his own orientation and analysis. After being released from jail in 1944 and after end of Martial Law, he involved himself in various clandestine activities and various operations including in an attempt to murder Wafadist leader Mustafa-al-Nahhas¹². Sadat again arrested and incarcerated for eighteen months and after that he worked as a journalist in *At-Hilal*. In 1949 he left this position and again joined army and became very active in free officer group and later became member of this group in 1951¹³.

Sadat's real political struggle and ambition began after the 1952 Free Officer revolt and the post 1952 era saw the political exposure of Sadat. Gradually, Sadat started distancing himself from Nasser group and a kind of suspicion developed against Nasser and for some years Sadat withdrew to periphery of ruling class. Being from peasant class, Sadat had always a kind of different feeling towards bourgeoisie group to which Nasser belonged, and felt isolated from the Nasserites group. Though Nasser had made him a member of RCC because of his role in Free Officer movement, most of the time Nasser gave him insignificant positions, far from the real center of power.

Initially he edited *Al-Jamahiriya*, the government newspaper and in 1955, he was appointed Secretary-General of the Islamic Congress and Nasser's advisor on Gulf and Peninsula affair. Later he was elected deputy speaker of National Assembly in 1957 and became the Secretary

¹² Beattie, n. 8, p. 60.

¹³ Sadat, n.10, p. 70.

General of party organization named as National Union. Sadat in 1960 became speaker of National Assembly and in his capacity as speaker, he traveled and visited many countries and led Egyptian delegations to various international conferences, which gave him opportunity to interact with Soviet and American leaders.¹⁴ In 1969 Sadat was appointed vice-President and after Nasser's death, Sadat emerged as natural choice for becoming president in 1970.

Many of his colleagues felt that Sadat would be an interim choice but in later stage of his political career, he had become politically very much ambitious. His reversal of several of policies of Nasser was motivated by his personal resentment against Nasser and desire to do away the injustice heaped upon him during the Nasser and to assert and prove his credibility as an independent ruler. He never bothered about lesser man and wanted to prove himself to be man of action and decisiveness. He always stressed the objectivity and realism of his policies. Keynote in his career was loyalty to his vision and to himself and always refused to be controlled by the forces outside his control. In his own world "he was the first and foremost a peasant and his peasant not use always affected him."¹⁵

By nature he was religious person, unlike Nasser who boasted of being an atheist.¹⁶ He defined politics as an art of building with society where the will of God is enacted.¹⁷ His imprisonment years influenced

¹⁴ Beattie, n. 8, p. 92.

¹⁵ Hirst and Beason, *Sadat* (London, 1981), R. 104.

¹⁶ Mohad Abdul Farid, *Nasser: The Final Years* (London, 1994), p. 160.

¹⁷ Felipe Fernandez Arnesto, *Sadat and His Statecraft*, (Britain, 1982), p. 94.

his political thought as well as religious one. He was of the view that dogma of Islam must be inculcated in every branch of life but wanted to maintain distinctive merit of Free Officer conviction. He never allowed the state to be enslaved by religious institution. He loved wealthy style and was much influenced by western life style, fond of worldly fame and enjoyed the company of greater people.¹⁸ He was man of pragmatic and rational nature and always tried to be different. As far as his political thought was concerned, in early stage of his political career, was in favour of dictatorship. For him it was the most efficient system which could lead Egypt into a new era but later he shifted to multi-party system under certain political compulsions.¹⁹

He was not an ideologue like Nasser and he never believed in grand theories. He had no bent for any ideologies and was impressed by highest authoritarian pattern of government but he retrained a sense of appreciation for the rule of law. Egypt's socio-economic condition had impact on his evolution of scientific socialism. He was first and last an Egyptian and loathed foreign domination. He always wanted Egypt to take an independent line and for him sovereignty meant political as well as economic sovereignty, which would lead towards prosperity. He favoured a powerful state which had a greater economic and political role. Sadat lacked the popularity and charisma of Nasser and he could never associate himself with the masses like Nasser who was the mass leader whose popularity was not confined to Egypt only but he was an Arab leader.

Nasser was a serious politician and it was tough for him to adjust to new group while Sadat was a man of light content nature. He knew

¹⁸ Beattie, n. 8, p. 116.

¹⁹ Ibid., 118.

only one ideology and that was ideology of nationalism. Sadat was less activist and interventionists while Nasser was hardworking, dynamic. Nasser was a source of energy for others and had close watch over functioning of the administration. Sadat was a personal decision maker and his self-importance, which led him to ignore the opinion of others and never heeded to suggestion of other while taking any important decision. He had novel conception of authority and he had a patriarchal style of functioning. For Sadat, Egypt was an authoritarian patriarchal family and he considered himself to be father of that family²⁰. Unlike Nasser who always associated himself with the general masses and acted in a way that proved that he was from the masses and always addressed them as 'brothers', Sadat always addressed them as "my children"

Sadat had patrimonial quality in his rule. He always spoke in term of himself as if Egyptian political system and establishment were his own. Most of the time he was fond of saying 'My constitution', 'My political parties', and 'My opposition.'²¹ Unlike Nasser who always showed the simplicity in dress and interaction, Sadat always showed kind of sense of royalty in dressing and he was every conscious of personal image.

Sadat's political style was characterized by initiative, surprise moves unexpectedness and shock treatment. His political skill included talent for strong will, readiness to take risk and he had much

²⁰ Arnesto, n. 17, p. 61.

²¹ Ibid., p. 89.

confidence in himself and a sense of destiny. He never hesitated in taking risk and was naturally an optimistic person and did not take much time in playing political gamble. One he said, "no problem should ever be regarded as insuperable. There are always solution to every thing"²²

One major ideological differences that Sadat had with Nasser was its foreign policy. The foreign policy of Sadat was not only at different line but it was complete reversal of policy of Nasser. Sadat's foreign policy ran against the tenets of Nasserite ideology and in the Arab sphere the policy of President Sadat indicated basic shift in the underlying elements of Nasser's foreign policy. Sadat's policy of de-Nasserization was far greater externally than at the domestic level.

As far as his policy towards two super powers was concerned he never favoured the complete surrender to Soviet Union, as was the case during Nasser period. Even during his evolution of political career, he never fully supported socialism but was inclined towards private property and had supported capitalism and consumerism. He gradually dismantled the foreign policy model of Nasser that was in practice for nearly two decades. He never supported the pro-active Arab policy and never favoured the role of leadership of Arab world rather he talked of unity and solidarity among the Arab world. Unlike Nasser who sought a leading role for Egypt in Arab world and strived hard to carry the Arab world under flag of Egypt in the name of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, Sadat abandoned the policy of Nasser and adopted a

²². A.K. Pasha, *Egypt's Quest for peace Determinant and Implication* (Delhi, 1994), p.29.

pragmatic approach. Foreign policy at the regional level, for him was trade off between economic and political objectives.

Sadat undid the whole concept of pan-Arabism of Nasser by changing everything ranging from country's name to flag to national anthem. He moved away from policy of Arab nationalism to Egypt first and go-it-alone policy.

Sadat preferred economic need over leadership of Arab world. He forged good relations with conservative and monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Iran, which were never at good term with Nasser's Egypt. For Sadat, foreign policy was a source of resource mobilisation and security perception was most important for him. Sadat championed the purely Egyptian nationalism and his foreign policy orientation motivated by domestic economic problems. For Sadat, anti-imperialism, Afro-Arab solidarity, Nasser's slogans to propagate his agenda of pan-Arabism, became out of date and no more useful for Egypt. Sadat foreign policy had close economic and strategic link. Sadat's view of superpowers reinforced by his desire to cement his relationship with oil rich conservative which he prescribed as vital source of economic aid. Contrary to Nasser who saw Arab as Egypt's natural sphere of influence, Sadat saw Egypt's leadership position as structural property. Sadat was of the view that economy was the biggest constrain for following the pro-active Arab policy of his predecessor. He rather emphasized on co-operation and solidarity and according to Sadat, "there are differences among the Arab world which must be recognised

and there are no total permanent convergences of interest between them"²³

Sadat was quite aware that he lacked the popularity, charisma of Nasser and he could not excite the masses of the Arab World, so he confined his policy to Egypt only and he had no desire to lead the Arab world but he adopted a policy, which served the economic interest of the Egyptian people. In fact Sadat was realistic in this regard and concentrated on Egypt which he calculated that he could win more acclaim and admiration to which Nasser had not paid enough attention in his quest for active pan-Arab policy.

When Sadat had taken over as the President of Egypt in 1970 the regional scenario was quite changed and it was no more the Egypt of Nasser nor it was the region which was living under the rhetoric of pan-Arabism. The defeat of 1967 had modified the stand of Arab governments. The emphasis from liberation of Palestine shifted to liberation of their own countries. Palestine issue was relegated to the background and was no more a source of legitimacy for any Arab government. Egypt was no more a regional power and slogan of pan-Arabism had lost its furore. Instead of Egypt, Saudi Arabia had emerged as regional power and involvement of other Arab Gulf countries increased in the issue of Palestine. Now the Palestine national movement was free from the Arab governments and this in turn challenged the pre-immense of Egypt in Arab affairs.

²³ Luciani, N.3, p. 117.

Regional balance of power had shifted in "favour of conservative and moderate forces. King Faisal emerged as an important leader of the region. There was no political space left for Egypt to pursue its erstwhile pro-active Arab policy. Israel had emerged a great military power in the region and particularly for countries of periphery. Palestine issue had lost its sympathy in various countries for its guerrilla war against Israel and for creating problem in region by its secret design, which had pushed it to background. All the countries which had borne the burnt of defeat of 1967 were dependent on Saudi Arabian financial help and Saudi Arabia was better placed to finance to appease trouble makers like Egypt and Syria in the hope that they will behave properly.

In such a changed and different regional scenario, Sadat had to adopt a very different foreign policy towards Arab world and he could not have adopted a pro-active Arab policy like his predecessor. Sadat gradually started re-establishing a good tie with the region and particularly with the oil producer for revival of economy that had suffered following the 1967 defeat.

The major thrust of Sadat had now become the liberation of own territories which was under Israeli occupation. It was under these domestic and regional circumstances that Sadat was making a strategy of war, as a means of regaining Sinai.

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Sadat's War Strategy

You have to change the *status quo*, the situation that you are in, but I am not inviting Sadat militarily. If he tries that, Israel will win another time by even greater measure than she was in June 1967.

-Henry Kissinger's warning to Sadat as recounted by Hafez Ismail.¹

The memories of 1967 were still fresh in Sadat's mind and were constantly hunting him since he had assumed the Presidency. The defeat of 1967 was a great blow to the reputation and prestige of Egypt as a major force in West Asia and since coming to power, Sadat had made clear that his first and foremost agenda would be the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories. All the three preceding Arab-Israel wars were fought under the leadership of Egypt but in 1967, Egypt suffered great territorial loss followed by Jordan and Syria. It was widely believed that only miracle could dislodge the Israeli from the heavily fortified sand bank emplacement along the Suez Canal. Many Egyptians had become inebriated listening to Nasser's promise of brighter, richer and stronger Egypt. However, their dreams were shattered by the 1967 War and whole Arab world had lost faith in the Nasser's slogan of pan-Arabism and scientific socialism.

The 1967 War was devastating both economically and politically. Destruction of two Suez refineries in cross Canal fighting was a severe blow casting anything up to \$ 200 million investment and hampering local supplies. Income from them between 1962 and 1966 was

¹ Kirk J. Beattie, *Egypt During the Sadat Years* (New York, 2000), p. 134.

sufficient to cover half of Egyptian trade deficit. The closure of Suez Canal caused a loss of £ 9 million in hard currency.² Following the war, Egypt suffered loss of nearly \$ 60 to 100 million every year, a great source of hard currency.³ The economy had tottered on brink of chaos with an external debt of around \$ 4 billion, facing chronic balance of payment deficit and shortage of foreign exchange. Hundreds state-owned plants were closed down because of lack of foreign exchange to import raw materials.⁴

The defeat was no less devastating on military front and vast areas were left virtually defenseless. The armed forces had lost 100,000 soldiers including 1500 officers and 40 pilots with many thousand more wounded.⁵ Five thousand Egyptian soldiers, eleven Generals and Brigades were taken prisoners. Out of seven divisions in Sinai, four were completely shattered. Military hardware to the tune of \$1-1.5 billion were destroyed or captured.⁶ By end of war, Egypt had only 160 out of 500 aircraft and 400 out of 1200 tanks and the manpower was reduced to 160,000 from 300,000 with 80 percent of military equipment destroyed.

The shock of defeat was greater because of high pre-war expectations. A media cartoon, for example, depicted a tiny Israeli

² M. Abdul Farid, *Nasser: The Final Years* (London, 1994), p. 99.

³ Donava, J. Robert, *Six Days in June: Israel's Fight for Survival* (Bombay, 1967), p. 154.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁵ Kimche David & Dawn Bawly, *The Sand Storm, Arab-Israel War of 1967: Prelude and Aftermath* (London, 1968), p. 237.

⁶ Anthony Mcdermot, *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A flawed Revolution* (New York, 1988), p.127.

cowering before the mighty Arab.⁷ They described Israel as nest of Zionist gang, weak and cowardly depended on US and had no match for united Arab armies. This defeat had brought a great humiliation and embittered the Arab world in general and Egypt in particular. The slogan of pan-Arabism had lost its miracle and become a political liability for Nasser. After this defeat, Nasser has started to distinguish Egypt from the Arab world and lamented:

“Those who talk, do not fight, raise their voices, but not weapon, speak of front but keep away from it”⁸

Egypt was no more the master of the Arab World and was deprived of its leadership role as this defeat ushered in new power structure and equations in West Asia. The balance of power totally swung in favor of Israel and Egypt ceased to be a challenge for Israel.

The victory for Israel or defeat of Egypt also had repercussions on international political environment. As a result of the Israeli victory, the global balance of power tilted in favour of US.

“The crisis arising out of defeat and pressure continued with military occupation had forced Egypt to seek the help of West capitalist and dominant bourgeoisie could no longer ally itself with socialist progressive countries. It was no longer Arab force fighting against imperialism and allying itself with the Arab forces.”⁹

The war produced a psychological shock to the Arab World and the emotional stress and strain felt by all responsible Arab elites were enormous. Sadat's behaviour both during the war and afterwards differed little from that of his fellow elites. The shock was so great that

⁷ Kimche and Bewly, n. 5, p. 239.

⁸ Hirst and Beason, *Sadat* (London, 1981), p. 46.

⁹ Roges Own and Charles Tripp, (ed.), *Egypt under Mubarak* (London, 1989), p. 58.

he went home and remained there roughly for days, dazed and heart broken.¹⁰

The war also generated a kind of optimism for a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. A major shift started taking place in Nasser attitude towards Israel when Egyptian Foreign minister Mahmood Raid met US ambassador to the UN Goldberg in New York in October 1967.¹¹ In this meeting Egypt agreed to allow Israeli shipping in Gulf of Aqaba and the transit of good destined for Israel through Suez Canal. Considering the background of Arab-Israel relationship, this proposal was a remarkable shift.

Nasser saw little hope in the Jarring mission of UN, when both parties were stubborn in their respective positions. Israel did not agree to withdrawal as a pre-condition for negotiations as demanded by Egypt and Jordan.¹² The contradictory view on whether negotiations should precede or follow the Israeli withdrawal stemmed from the desire of the both parties to negotiate from strength. But later Egyptian position underwent a change when it agreed to indirect talks even before withdrawal if Israel declared its readiness to implement UN Resolution 242.¹³ At diplomatic, level efforts were being made by various international missions like Jarring Mission of 1967, seven-point proposal of Dean Rusk in November 1968, Soviet proposal of 1968 and finally Rogers's plan of December 1969. All these efforts were

¹⁰ Biattie, n. 1, p. 31.

¹¹ David and Bawly, n.5, p. 271.

¹² Sadia Tauval, *The Peace Broker: Mediator in the Arab-Israel Crisis* (New Jersey, 1982), p. 143.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

combined with personal effort of Egyptian leadership for just and lasting peace in West Asia.

At his stage a tremendous change was marked in attitude of Nasser when he with the help of Hussein tried to reach to Western powers when for first time he expressed his willingness for some kind of settlement with Israel if the latter were to withdraw to pre-June 1967 position. This was a great departure from his previous policy when he and the Arab World were denying the very existence of Israel which was the main theme of Khartoum conference. Nasser was convinced that regaining Sinai would be very difficult without a kind of political settlement with Israel.¹⁴ According to Heikel "Nasser was of the view that Jarring is not going to solve the problems."¹⁵ Out of frustration with Jarring Mission and superpowers, Nasser launched the war of attrition in spring of 1969.

In 1970, a major effort was made to stop the War of Attrition by Rogers's initiative which eventually brought about a ceasefire. By accepting the cease-fire, Nasser took a leap towards reorientation of his policy towards Arab in general and Israel in particular.¹⁶ Disillusioned with the Soviet position during the war, he strove towards reconciliation with US. Shortly before his death, rejecting President Brezhnev's protest over Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers

¹⁴ David and Bawly, n.5, p. 271.

¹⁵ Tauval, n.12., p. 153.

¹⁶ Kimche and Bawly, n.5, p. 271.

plan, Nasser retorted: "I would accept solution from devil himself....."¹⁷

The statement was in great contrast to his earlier statement when he had told "What had been taken from force will be taken by force only."¹⁸

Sadat's Succession and troublesome legacy of Nasser

On September 1970, Nasser had a cardiac arrest that proved fatal causing great shock and grief to whole Arab world. Michal Sterner, who had seen Sadat during this period, described him as shattered by Nasser's death with his face ashen.¹⁹ Immediately after Nasser's death, member of Arab Socialist Union's Supreme Executive Committee (SEC), held a series of meetings to appoint the successor. Sadat emerged a consensus choice since he was the Vice President and a former member of RCC and an important member of Free Officer's revolution. Moreover, he was next to Nasser and considered an appropriate choice to symbolize the continuity of previous regime. Sadat occupation of vice presidency had given him a slight advantage over other contenders.

Sadat had inherited a very grim socio-economic condition. During Nasser's rule, Egypt had undergone major socio-economic

¹⁷ Felipe Fernandez-Arnesto, *Sadat and his Statecraft* (Great Britain, 1982), p. 122.

¹⁸ Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (New York, 1970), p. 110.

¹⁹ Beattie, n.1, p. 38.

transformations. The population had grown from over 21 million to slightly more than 33 million a 55 percent increase.²⁰

By 1970 illiteracy had declined by five percent but remained high at 70.2 percent nationwide.²¹ Job prospect for country's educated and uneducated were growing increasingly bleak. Cairo, a city setup to accommodate the need of three million had become home to nearly three time that number and this increase was felt more rapidly after the 1967 war and war of attrition in 1969 when it witnessed a large scale exodus from Sinai and Suez Canal zone. The decline in agriculture in rural areas also pushed the major chunk of population towards urban areas which led to swallowing of urban cities. Most basic services were strained literally to breaking point.

When he assumed the power, a series of problems of more recent origin exacerbated the long term difficulties. There was tightening strain of wars on Egypt's already existing scarcity of resources—not only to cataclysm of 1967 but also the slow relentless bleeding of Yemen war, an expensive peace of romantic pan-Arabism by Nasser. Military expenditure was absorbing nearly one third of nation income and it had lost revenue in the form of loss of Sinai and Suez Canal. American aid had been withdrawn and Egypt national debt was at alarming proportion. Over \$ 8,000 million it owed to external debtors including over \$ 4000 million to Soviet Union.²² The Aswan High dam had not yielded expected results. Per capita food production had fallen and Egypt was forced into dependence on foreign wheat market. Egypt

²⁰ Ibid, p. 12.

²¹ Ibid., p.12.

²² Arnesto, n. 17, p. 102.

could not get benefit of rise in oil price because of closure of Suez Canal.

The political elites were divided and there was factionalism within the upper echelons that surfaced even during Nasser's final years. This political factional group were divided in to mainly three groups –Leftist, Rightist and Centrist led by Ali Sabri, Vice President, Sharwai Guma, Minister of interior and Sami Sharif, Minister of Presidential affairs respectively.

Sadat inclination was towards centrist group and no leading centrist possessed Sadat's generally positive public image. Key centrist were apprehensive about Sadat's commitments to Nasser's ideology. His life style, aspiration, ambition and his well known appreciation for Western style and his standard of living and his friendship with wealthy Arab were very much indicative of his rightist orientation.²³

Hence, Sadat was invested with limited authority and had to confront not only political and economic problems but also had to steer political agenda that was to be moulded at formally in Nasser's image.

Consolidation of power and year of Decision

Sadat's name was approved for presidency following his acceptance of the idea of collective leadership and accordingly the SEC voted unanimously for Sadat to become President. On 15 October 1970, Sadat was officially elected President receiving more than 90.4 percent of the vote in a nationwide plebiscite that was marked by low

²³ Beattie, n. 1, p. 41.

voter turnout.²⁴ From September 1970 until January 1971, Sadat respected the collective leadership principle but later he began to deviate from this demonstrating an autocratic attitude. When Nasser in early stage of the revolution had called for debate over democracy versus dictatorship, Sadat joined others in touting the efficacy of one man rule.²⁵ And unsurprisingly within month after assuming the presidency, he began expecting the same unconditional acceptance of his autocratic rule that he had so readily granted to Nasser. He was no longer admirer of Sabri, Guma and others and saw them more as opportunist,²⁶ who had usurped the RCC core member rightful place at pinnacle of power.

Sadat had ample reasons to see himself as one of Nasser's equal. It was he who had languished for years in prison due to his revolutionary activities in 1940.s Gradually Sadat started concentrating power in his hand and making his individual base for his power and support. First important thing Sadat did was to create the support among army establishment – a major coercive apparatus. To secure support from the military, he focused his attention mainly on Lt. Gen. Mohammad Sadiq.²⁷ Sadiq was already chief of staff and in military there was also a sign of frustration since the army was held solely responsible for the 1967 defeat. The large scale presence of Soviet trainer was seen a great burden and source of humiliation.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 44.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 46.

Sadiq did not like presence of Soviet advisers and Sadat understood the ire and anger of army but he was bound by his mission of liberating Sinai that was difficult without Russian military assistance and training.

Sadat was equally in need of support of police forces and his efforts to shore up his base extended beyond the coercive apparatus and benefited from personality split and power rivalry among the centrist faction. By January 1971 Sadat had publicly demonstrated a proclivity for autonomous decision making thereby transgressing the collective leadership principle. The sudden death of Nasser in September 1970 had left Sadat with no options but to agree on ninety day extension of existing ceasefire. But later in December 1970 and January 1971 Sadat decided against the renewal of the ceasefire and toyed with the idea of a military option.

To prepare for war national defence council was set up in December 1970, under the chairmanship of Sadat. There was a consensus among the centrists that Egyptian military re-construction had been completed and a resumption of hostilities with Israel was first order of business. Special emissaries were sent abroad during this period to mobilize international support.²⁸

Sadat calculated that United States alone had held the key to conflict resolution because United States in his estimation was the only true power. Perhaps this was the beginning of Sadat's shift in

²⁸ Ibid, p. 50.

foreign policy. From here Sadat started making a gradual shift and was well convinced of the close link between US and Israel.

By now Sadat was free of legacy of mistrust between his predecessor and America. Political death and private diplomacy provided backdrop to Sadat's personal effort to improve relation with US and he recounted that how he had told Eliot Richardson, who had headed the US delegation to attend Nasser's funeral that "all I want is peace I am prepared to go to any length to achieve it."²⁹ Abd-al-Amin, former free officer advised Sadat to rethink Nasser's anti-American position and in exchange Sadat sent Amin to put out feelers with the American interest section personal regarding the American view of Sadat and Amin received word from Nixon that he was happy to engage in "side contact" with Sadat.³⁰

Meanwhile, in December 1970, Israel's Defence Minister Moshe Dayan floated the idea of partial (30-40 km) withdrawal of Israeli forces in Sinai Peninsula in exchange of clearing and re-opening of Suez Canal to international navigation.³¹ Though Sadat rejected idea in public, he had seriously contemplated on this proposal. The relation between Egypt and US was more strengthened when Nixon sent a letter of thanks to Sadat on December 24 1970, for sending a delegation to attend Eisenhower's funeral.³² According to Berger's cable, Sadat said in an unofficial meeting:

²⁹ Ibid., p. 52.

³⁰ Ibid., 53.

³¹ Ibid.,p. 54.

³² Ibid., 54.

“he wanted to open his heart to me in the hope that I would pass innermost feeling that on President Nixon”³³

Reviewing history of Soviet-Egyptian relationship, Sadat asserted that Soviet’s presence was necessitated by conflict with Israel and the pro-Israel position held by US, but the Egypt took no orders from Soviet and had no stake in cold war.

In attempt to impress the US the sincerity of his overtures, on 4 February 1971, couple of days before the expiry of the Roger ceasefire plan, he told the National Assembly of his desire to extend the ceasefire. Now he was ready to clear the Suez Canal provided Israel began withdrawal, Dayan’s formula that he had rejected earlier.

His decision to extend ceasefire by one more month did not go well within the National Defence Council where a majority was inclined towards war.³⁴ As he told Heikel, the decision to extend ceasefire was Sadat’s³⁵ and he had thrown his lot in favour of America as far as the settlement with Israel was concerned. When on 8 February Jarring asked both Israel and Egypt for their consent on peace and withdrawal, Egypt agreed but Israel refused to do so.³⁶ It clearly implied that Sadat was ready to coexist with Israel and his main objective was just and peaceful settlement. Earlier Sadat has stressed that battle with Israel has to be the first, second and final priority but now much of Government energy was taken up with peace making effort and to resolve the conflict with Israels.³⁷ According to Heikel, Egypt’s could not defeat Israel without first altering the US-Israeli relationship and in his view, “the aim of Egyptian foreign policy must

³³ Ibid. 55.

³⁴ Ibid., 57

³⁵ Mohamed. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (Dehradun, 1981), p.116.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 117.

³⁷ Mcdermot, n.6, p.132.

be to reduce the scope of military and political support to Israel and major support of this source is United States.”³⁸

As the February initiative elicited no strong positive response from either Israel or the US, on 6 March Sadat decided against extending the cease-fire further and quietly founded the committee to prepare for war headed by Vice-President Shaf’ei.³⁹ According to Fauzi, Egypt was just a stroke of Sadat’s pen on battle order away from war.⁴⁰ On April 17, 1971 Sadat took another major decision by announcing the Union of Arab Republic consisting of Egypt, Libya and Syria. This announcement was more intended to distract the public mood from the war as Guma said “We were not against unity but we did not want to postpone the battle.”⁴¹ Despite the cool reception by American and Israel to his February offer, Sadat had not abandoned peace and secret contact with America continued. On 22 April Sterner and Berger met Sadat and discussed about the interim peace arrangement.⁴² Sterner observed: “We could see that he wanted to negotiate peace. He was serious and this was important stuff. But what we did not know was whether he was going to be dumped.”⁴³

He was not satisfied with Soviet Union also regarding the delivery of weapons and he had tried assuage Soviet fear during May events - when he had expelled Ali Sabri. He always tried not to let

³⁸ Beatti, n.1, p.58.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.59.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 60.

⁴² Ibid., p.61.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 65.

Soviet feel that it was an anti-Soviet move. On May 27 1971, Soviet President Podgorny paid a quick visit to Egypt and persuaded Sadat to sign Treaty of Friendship and both countries signed.⁴⁴ Sadat had his own interest in signing the treaty because he did not want to be deprived of the essential arm supply.

After pushing aside his political opponent at home and receiving no sign of change in attitude of superpowers to “no war no peace” situation, Sadat declared on June 5, anniversary of 1967 war, the Year 1971 to be Year of Decision. He pledged that battle will end in one way or other way in 1971⁴⁵, On 22 July again he said that he would not allow year to pass “without decision, whether throughout peace or war even it mean sacrificing one million people.”⁴⁶ Sadat spoke of decisive period and hinted that existing situation will not be permanent. Even after the signing of 27 May Treaty of Friendship, Sadat had the same trouble with Soviet Union regarding the delivery of weapons and Soviet Union again began to dreg their feet. From the day Sadat declared the year 1971 to be Year of Decision, Soviet Union was against it and felt that 1971 should have been the year of taking of decision and not implementing it.⁴⁷ When the Soviets asked for clarifications, Sadat said that 1971 would put an end to Israeli occupation.⁴⁸ He told that only force can be used to liquidate aggression during his visit to Moscow on 11 October 197, and Egyptian people were facing more severe

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.86.

⁴⁵ Beason, n.8., p. 122.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.123.

⁴⁷ Heikal, no.35., p. 55.

⁴⁸ Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society: 1945-81*, (London, 1982)

challenges.⁴⁹ Sadat returned from Moscow without securing any assurance from Moscow.⁵⁰

Apart from Soviet apprehensions of Sadat about his secret mission with America, there were many other factors which caused postponement or delay of arms supplies and they include:

- (1) Soviet entanglement with Vietnam
- (2) Soviet commitment to India in its war with Pakistan in 1971
- (3) Soviet were reluctant to provide offensive weapons in light of 1967 experiment
- (4) Soviet Union could not keep itself engaged in so many places
- (5) Above all there were movement towards US-Soviet *detente*

Because of the some domestic reason in general and external reason, 1971 went without any achievement and Sadat blamed Soviet Union for the failure and claimed that political fog caused by war between India and Pakistan had forced him to delay the decision to go to war.⁵¹ December of 1971 came and went, Sadat explained that another battle front had frustrated his plan and the joke in Cairo was that by decree, Sadat was going to extend 1971 by several months.⁵² Sadat faced a lot of criticism from media and various organisations ranging from student to workers and all of them were frustrated and

⁴⁹ Beason, n.8, p.123.

⁵⁰ Beattie, n. 1, p. 123.

⁵¹ Mcdermott, n. 6, p. 45.

⁵² Hopwood, n. 48, p. 107.

many were unconvinced of his logic that the Soviet arms shipment intended for Egypt was re-routed to India.

Relation with superpowers and the October War

It can be well understood that year of decision was a major political challenge at home as well as abroad since it was first political challenge to distinguish himself from his predecessor and to establish his authority. But when this year passed like any other years, he had to face various criticism and it was a political defeat for Sadat against his rival at home and it became a source of great frustration for Sadat. He had to give a fresh look to his political agenda in general and in foreign policy in particular and started reframing his foreign policy towards both the superpowers. Since taking over, his foreign policy objective was restoration of territory preferably by negotiation, termination of war as economic cost had become increasingly unbearable and improvement of relations with US.

As a part of reorientation, he had given another extension to Rogers's cease-fire but it yielded no result. Even the renewal of ties with the Soviets and the signing of friendship treaty did not improve the situation. The Soviets were well convinced that through their control of arm and material supplies, they could make life difficult to for Sadat. During the second half of 1971 when Sadat was trying to open a channel of communication with US also, Soviet began to ignore the issue of arm supplies to Egypt. Their indifferences persisted despite an agreement to boost supplies made during Sadat's October visit to Moscow. When Soviet military supply shipment were suddenly

sent to India passing through Egypt to their ways, Sadat was infuriated. Soviet told Sadat that India seemed more prepared for war than Egypt so the equipment had been sent there. Soviet's relations with Egypt on military front were strained because there was always hesitation on part of quality because Soviet Union was mainly concerned with quantity and not the quality. Russian always argued that Egyptian were receiving arm on equal footing with Israel⁵³, and it was a great cause of concern for Sadat. His policy towards super powers was associated with his policy towards Israel and it was always a kind of triangular relation. If first phase of Israel withdrawal were completed, he could promise that he would get Russian out⁵⁴. About the presence of Soviet experts he felt: "Do you think that I want to keep them, we need them to give us protection but they are burden on us because we have to pay them in hard currency."⁵⁵

The year 1972 started on a bad note as far as relation with USSR was concerned. Sadat visited Moscow on 2 February 1972 and discussed the delayed shipments and told Brezhnev: "In October you promise me equipment that has not arrived, more was promise by Podgorny in July but not arrived, more was promise by Ponemora in July that has not arrived either why the delay."⁵⁶ Sadat came back from this meeting very disappointed as the Soviets offered nothing in the way of offensive weapons.

⁵³ Heikal, n. 35, p. 156.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 167.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 158.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 158.

The super power *detente* consecrated in the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting of 29 May 1972 strained the Egypt-Soviet relations and Egypt's military officers preparing for war of liberation were angered by delay in arm supply of Soviet Union. Along with *detente*, the superpowers had called for military relaxation in West-Asia.⁵⁷ Following the summit the value of friendship was questioned as the Soviets wanted solution in West Asia but were not in favour of war.⁵⁸ Sadat understood well that two superpowers were heading towards *detente* and he knew that American administration was not sympathetic towards Egypt. He made efforts to engaged Soviet Union in the Arab Israel crisis, but relation between Egypt and Soviet Union was a mixture of hope and despair. Sadat accused Soviet Union of not supporting their friends as American had been in support of Israel. This time Sadat mentioned of Jews migration from Soviet Union to Israel.⁵⁹

In May 1972, a fresh crisis erupted. After 1967 defeat, Nasser had permitted a lot of Soviet military advisors to stay in Egypt and to train army personnel and by 1971 this number had gone up to 15000. It was reported that these military advisors carried with them as much as several kg of gold and Gen. Sadiq accused Soviet personal of systematically depleting Egyptian gold reserve and issued an ultimatum to rectify the situation.⁶⁰ The presence of such a great

⁵⁷ Beattie, n.1, p. p. 124.

⁵⁸ Heikal, n. 35, p. 64.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 166.

⁶⁰ Beattie., n. 1., P. 89.

number of military advisors and trainers in the military establishment irked many and there was popular anger. Even public opinion was against their presence and they opined that Egypt was being used by these experts as an ideal weather training ground for their young pilots. In between 1971-1972, 68 planes with Egyptian and Russian pilots were lost for which Egypt had to pay.⁶¹ There were differences relating to the take over from Russian by trained Egyptian crews, the non-delivery of MiG-23 and controversy over payment.⁶²

On 6 July, less than a month after Gen. Mohammad Sadiq's visit to Moscow, Sadat shocked the world and asked Soviet advisors to leave Egypt by July 17. This announcement may be the culmination of the incident when Sadiq had asked Gerhard Martin of West Germany Merex Corporation to contact American official to see if they could help if Soviet were expelled.⁶³ Soviet's reaction to Sadat's decision was very cool when the Soviet ambassador told that they had full confidence in Egyptian leadership and admitted that problem of delivery of arm was because of transportation. Sadat's personal doubt about long-term values of Egyptian relationship with Soviet Union was sealed by superpowers *detente*. For Sadat the joint Soviet-US communique calling for military relaxation was a critical point. Reacting to Sadat decision, his daughter observed: "My father was a very patient man but when he came to the end of his patience, He would close the door and that was it. The expulsion was an example of this and he was not

⁶¹ Heikal, n. 35, p. 180.

⁶² Ibid., p. 162.

⁶³ Beattie, n. 1, p. 125.

a bargaining man at all.”⁶⁴ Gen. Gammasi asserted that Sadat had confided that “it is necessary to get the Soviet out before we go to war because if we win they will take the credit. If we loose they will blame the Egyptian officer. Sadat also wanted to send the message that he was not the Soviet’s man in the region.”⁶⁵

In the month that followed the eviction, Sadat repeatedly spoke of Soviet Union in the public in very friendly terms and Soviet-Egyptian relationship after expulsion quickly evolved towards a tense yet productive status. In October, Prime Minister Aziz Siddique visited Moscow and this visit represented it turning point in an effort to patch up Egypt-Soviet relation.⁶⁶ At this stage both needed one another; Sadat could not disown Soviet completely as long US did not changed its attitude and equally Soviet could not risk to loose its close ally in the region and was in no position to simply burn all the bridges. The dismissal of Gen. Sadiq by Sadat, who was accused of not following Sadat order to prepare for both, contributed in improving the relation between the two because he was suspected in Moscow and was blamed for creating mistrust between the two countries.

In February 1973, Gen. Ismail who had replaced Sadiq met Soviet officials in Moscow.⁶⁷ The Soviet approved Egyptian requests for upgrading Egypt’s military capabilities (T-62 tanks, mobile SAM missiles, scuds, anti-aircraft artillery, TU-123 light bombers etc.) and

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 125.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 125.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 126.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 127.

finally delivery soon ensued.⁶⁸ Sadat accurately labeled this as the largest arm deal ever concluded between two countries and Gen. Kamal Hassan noted that more arms came pouring into Egypt after Sadat dumped the Soviet than at any time before.⁶⁹

There was no progress in the Egypt-US relations as well. In February 1972, in a public address, he attacked United States and Secretary of State Rogers in the harshest of terms. Sadat told *News Week* that proximity talk over interim agreement were a “dead horse.” “I did the politically unthinkable a year ago, where did it get me? No where.”⁷⁰ The lack of progress, combined with fresh military supply to Israel, caused Sadat to toughen his position in early 1972. He would only enter in proximity talks if Israel gave to America a prior commitment that they would withdraw to pre-June war Egyptian border in final peace settlement. The decision of Sadat to expel Soviet advisors was not rewarded by significant modification in US policy the way Sadat had expected, especially when in May 1971, Rogers himself had announced that it would be difficult to alter the *status-quo* if the Soviet troops remained in place.⁷¹ When Sadat did not get any concession in exchange of the expulsion of Soviet advisors, he was disappointed and frustrated. In US the expulsion did not inspire a more generous position and was seen as part of Sadat’s domestic agenda to establish his position.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 127.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 127.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 128.

A meeting between US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger and Hafez Ismail took place from 23 February to 26 1973 did not make any headway. Following this meeting, Ismaile concluded that Egypt would have to go to war to alter the *status quo*. In his public address, on 1 May Sadat delivered a tough message and said “partial and interim solutions were to be rejected” and proclaimed: “What has been taken by force can be regained by force only.” Another meeting between Kissinger and Ismail on 2 May 1973 also ended fruitless. On 23 July 1973, on anniversary of the revolution address Sadat went on to describe the US a “big gangster”⁷² and announced that there would be no further postponement of a battle. According to Ismail, only difference between Egypt and US is total American political and military backing for Israel.⁷³ Ismail had gone to the extent of saying that one day Israel might challenge even US position in West Asia. America adhered to the idea that it could not force Israel but only bring moral pressure.

Finally the eruption of Watergate scandal in summer of 1973 brought ill fortune to Egypt in its diplomatic effort when this issue began to distract top American official form West Asia. Sadat’s decision to go into war only caused by lukewarm and indifferent response from two super powers to his exhaustive effort to persuade them to pressurise for territorial settlement. There were various other factors which were no less contributed to the aggravating situation in West Asia which eventually culminated into October war. Since Sadat had taken over as President of Egypt, he was persuading his diplomatic

⁷² Ibid., p. 130.

⁷³ Heikal, n. 35, p. 202.

policy with two superpowers separately. The indifferent attitude and the reluctance on the part of both superpowers were result of policy of *detente* and main content and theme of this *detente* was to prevent the direct confrontation between the two superpowers on behalf of other countries. Its most important element was the recognition by both the superpowers that nuclear war would be suicidal and this risk everywhere must be reduced.

The policy of *detente* was initiated by Nixon and called for peace, general and complete disarmament, security, relaxation of tension and peaceful co-existence. Detente was a typical ideology of foreign policy pursued by US with a dual aim: (1) to resist Soviet expansion; and (2) to prevent Global confrontation as well. This policy was very much visible in the West Asian conflict and both parties were adhered to it to prevent the direct confrontation.

Sadat had grasped that *detente* was harmful for Egypt and was a great barrier in the breaking the stalemate. Sadat's reading was that both the superpowers under detente had reached a kind of agreement to maintain the status quo in West Asia and hence was nothing but an alliance and agreement between the two. The meeting of May 1972 between Nixon and Brezhnev was victim of this *detente* from which Sadat had expected a lot but at the end West Asia was given marginal importance in this meeting.

In *detente*, Sadat saw no difference between two superpowers as far as their policy towards West Asia was concerned. This policy was perhaps also one of the reasons which pushed Sadat towards war.

Cairo was of the opinion that the Soviets preferred detente over Egyptian interest and because of détente they were not prepared to upgrade the military capability of Egypt. It attributed slackening in arms supplies and reluctance to meet Egyptian demands for sophisticated weapons to détente.⁷⁴

Sadat's road to peace effort was not blocked only by détente but also by other factors such as the Nixon doctrine. Unlike detente, the Nixon doctrine was not understanding or alliance between two superpowers but was a purely American policy initiated to further American interest during the Cold War. Nixon came out with certain framework of American foreign policy in a speech in Vietnam on 3 November 1969 and in foreign policy report of 18 February 1970. This policy later came to be known as Nixon doctrine contained certain major foreign policy elements which stated that

- (1) US will keep its all treaty commitments.
- (2) We shall provide a shield if nuclear power threatens the freedom of nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider important for our security and the security of the region as a whole.
- (3) In case involving other type of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistants if requested and as appropriate.

For Sadat, certain clause in Nixon doctrine was more than convincing that America can never oppose Israel and the US was an

⁷⁴ Mohad Sad Ahmed, *After the Gun s fall Silent. Peace or Armageddon in the Middle East* (London, 1976), p. 43.

open ally of Israel as it was very important country for America in West Asia to safe guard its interest against Soviet Union.

Egypt policy during 1972 were geared towards mobilising the political, economic and military capabilities for a showdown with Israel and applying pressure on US. Sadat's succession had improved Egypt's relations with Syria and it was essential step in the preparation of October war. Sadat had also improved relation with Faisal who could be of great help in form of oil as a political weapon. Faisal visited Egypt in May 1973 and Sadat visited Riyadh in August 1973. Military co-ordination efforts were made to bring Jordan in the rank of Arab confederation of war.

Sadat had made up his mind to go for war and on 15 May 1973, he decided to become Prime Minister replacing Ismail.⁷⁵ This was clear indication Sadat was going to take some major decisions. New military commander Ahmad Ismail had asked for six months time to allow for the arrival and assimilation of military equipment promise by Soviet Union in February 1973. Actual plans for the war was drawn by Gamassi, director of military operation and it was shown only to Syrian President Hafez-al-Assad when he visited Egypt secretly.⁷⁶ In their April meeting they agreed on October 1973 for war.

The expulsion of the Soviets led Israel and America to believe that likelihood of war had decreased whereas Sadat saw the expulsion as a necessary pre-condition for war as he did not want Soviet intervention

⁷⁵ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London, 1979), p.224.

⁷⁶ Beattie, n.1, p. 131.

in war and wanted a freehand in decision so that any achievement would be seen as an Egyptian accomplishment. Through diplomatic effort, an excellent rapport was established between the Egypt and major confrontation state – Syrian and Jordan as well as major Arab financial power like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were convinced to support the war. The release Muslim Brotherhood prisoners from jail, eviction of Soviet, move away from Arab application of scientific socialism—all these development had won the approval from Saudi Arabia and Libya enhancing Egypt's strategic depth prior to the battle. Alongside these preparations, considerable attention was given to prepare for use of oil weapons and Mustafa Khalid who conceived the oil weapon idea⁷⁷ was entrusted with duty of drafting a plan of action that could be agreed upon major Arab oil exporters.

In an interview to *News Week*, Sadat noted the negotiation had failed “Every thing in this country is now being mobilised is earnest for the resumption of battle which is now inevitable.”⁷⁸ The domestic political situation was very ripe with potential for great in stability. Throughout 1972-1973, both student and workers demonstrated with increasing frequency, expressing their unwillingness to tolerate any further postponement of the battle. Pressure was strong enough that the regime could not easily ignore it. At a National Security Council meeting held on September 30, 1973, Sadat told its members that the economy had fallen below Zero⁷⁹. “We have commitment (to the banks

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 132.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 133.

and so on) which we should be able to meet by the end of the year I can not ask for the single dollar more".⁸⁰ By 1973, the Egyptian economy had reached to the point of intolerable strain and in six year following the 1967 war, Egypt had spent \$ 9000 million on war effort.⁸¹ For Egypt it had been decade of sacrifice and President Sadat once said: "Army men are eating sands."⁸² Since 1967 Egypt had become the languishing stock of Arab World and "Every word spoken about me is a knife point at me personally and at my self respect."

The war

On the after noon of 6 October 1973 fourth Arab-Israel war broke out and shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility. The operation named as Operation Badr lasted for fifteen days and can be divided into three phase. The first five days were dominated by complete Arab victory, the next five days were lull and at the end of which Israel took initiative and the last five days of fighting swung in favour of Israel. The Egypt's principal and formal ally of this war was Syria; like Egypt, Syria also suffered defeat in 1967 and from a military point of view, its location north of Israel was an additional incentive.

At 1405 hours, 400 guns rocket launchers, mortars opened up on Egyptian front and later on Syrian front. Eight thousands troops crossed Suez Canal in 1000 rubber board and first fortress of Bar Lev Line was captured on first day,⁸³ and sand port were broken at the

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 163.

⁸¹ Heikal, n. 3, p. 204.

⁸² Ibid., p. 204.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 207.

east side of Canal. Nearly 80,000 men had penetrated three to four kilometres deep into Sinai. On the Syrian front the initial success was no less surprising. Many strong points of Israel had fallen within first hour of battle and observation post at Jabel el-sheikh was captured.⁸⁴ At this juncture, both superpowers called for ceasefire but Sadat was only occupied with military solution and again he found this ceasefire idea a policy of *détente*. For sadat the peace that Egypt sought “cannot contemplated before the last soldier of Israel leaves Sinai”⁸⁵ and added that he could had given a hearing if could have come only from Washington

The scale of Israeli air loss was intolerable and initially the Egypt had the opportunity to wipe out the stigma of defeat and humiliation which Egyptian army had suffered for six years.⁸⁶ In first phase Israel concentrated only at north to knockout Syria out of battle and then turning its full force against Egyptian position in Sinai. Sadat was against any kind of cease-fire because he was convinced that any ceasefire this time would leave Israel stronger.⁸⁷ In the next phase, scene started changing when Soviet pressurised Syria for ceasefire and tried to mislead Egypt by telling that Syria got ready for ceasefire which Syria refused.⁸⁸

The next few days were a period of lull and this period was termed as Operation Pause. This phase led to difference with chief of

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 208.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 208

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 209

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 211

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 212.

Operation, Shazley who was relieved of his post and this further led to difference in army. Syria wanted Operation to be continued unless Syria reached Jordan River but Egypt from very beginning was adhered to the idea of a limited war. Apart from various other reasons for expulsion of Gen. Sadiq, his opposition to Sadat's idea of limited war was the strongest one.⁸⁹ In this phase Sadat was in no mood for any kind of political solution and his only concern was to gain territories. Soviet tried to convince Sadat for ceasefire but Sadat reacted in his words "stop telling me what Arab said"⁹⁰ and became suspicious of Soviet role in Damascus. He told that America were doing all what they had promised to Israel and what were they (Russian) doing,⁹¹ In a letter he wrote to Soviet ambassador that the victory of Arab will enhance the image of Russia in Middle East.⁹² But Russian told that it would be very difficulty to carry on the Russian airlift if one Arab country was wanting ceasefire and other was opposing it.⁹³

As the war was progressing, other Arab countries started showing full favours to Egypt. King Hussein of Jordan expressed his willingness to join the war when he was fully sure that Israel had become so weak that it would be no more harmful. Even Arafat offered his fedayin units and Ghaddafi who was against the war also followed the suit by offering anti-aircrafts missile and all the other Arab countries started pouring military and economic aids Shakh Zahid of

⁸⁹ Beattie, n.1, p. 125.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 216.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 216.

⁹² Ibid., p. 217.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 219.

Abu Dhabi gave \$ 10 million to Egypt.⁹⁴ In beginning the US did not react as they were well impressed that Egypt would be defeated.⁹⁵ But by second week the first phase of astonishing victory came to an end and Syrian front had become vulnerable and now it was turn of Egypt to face the Israeli counter-offensive. By then, the American military assistance to Israel was in full swing in the form of airlift, tank, artillery and other equipments were flowing into battle field.

The last phase of the war went totally against the Arab world forcing Sadat to look for a political solution. Sadat addressed the assembly on 16 October, and told that he would agree to a ceasefire on conditions of implementation of 242 and give navigation rights in the Gulf of Tiran guaranteed by US presence in Sheram el-sheikh for specific period, a peace conference under UN auspices to be attended by all parties including Palestine and all members of Security Council and following withdrawal from the area, UN force will be there and give an opportunity for self-determination.⁹⁶ at the same time, the Israeli forces were fighting East and West of Suez Canal. The open offer of ceasefire by Sadat put Assad of Syria in trouble who complained that he had not been consulted before Sadat's announcement. On 17 October eleven day after the war had begun Arab oil producers announced a programme of reprisal against the western countries supporting Israel. There was to be five percent cut in oil outputs

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 134.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 134.

⁹⁶ Heikal, n. 35, p. 224.

followed by further reduction in every month until Israel had withdrawn from all occupied territories.⁹⁷

The very next day Nixon asked Congress for \$ 2.2 billion for military airlift to Israel leading Faisal to increase the cut to ten percent and a call for a *jihad*. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco and Algeria expressed their displeasure over airlift.⁹⁸ The US administration agreed with all the points of Sadat as conditions for ceasefire but on the issue of Palestine when Nixon had told that Palestine meant destruction of Jordan and Israel.⁹⁹ Now Sadat was ready to accept the ceasefire as he told Assad: "We had fought Israel for four days alone so we had been able to expose the enemy but for last ten days we had been fighting US as well and I can not fight against US and I accept responsibility before history for defeat so I am ready for ceasefire and I have informed of my decision to Soviet."¹⁰⁰

The ceasefire was agreed upon 22 October and came into practice immediately and Israel was first country to accept it followed by Syria which accepted it on October 24.¹⁰¹ The main strategy of Sadat in this war was to seek a political solution through military strategy. His main thrust was to break the stalemate that existed since 1967 year and the motive aim of this war was to open political possibility and to get political dividend by limited war policy. Sadat argued strongly in favour of limited war making his favourite point if

⁹⁷ Beason, n.8, p. 131.

⁹⁸ Heikal, n.35, p. 232.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 239.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 240.

he could win ten mm of grand east bank of Suez Canal, this would immediately strengthen his position in subsequent political and diplomatic negotiation.¹⁰² Sadat wanted to adopt military tool for political game and this war was more dominated by political strategy. By this war Sadat was looking at the next phase which he wanted to be of political and diplomatic nature and political solution was his first concerns. This war was launched in circumstances of days to allow peace negotiation to materialise.

By breaking the Bar Lev Line, the Egyptian forces broke through a wall of Illusion behind which peace was confined. As Sadat has told in people's council on 10 December "we had fought for peace."¹⁰³ Sadat wanted to achieve only psychological victory. The principal beneficiary of this war could be non-other than Sadat. He had become now hero of crossing and his popularity soared to all time high creating to political situation comparable to enjoyed by Nasser after 1956 Suez Canal victory. Public confidence in Sadat was so strong that as to enable him to chart to national destiny according to his own political and economic vision. The October war established Sadat's legitimacy as an Egyptian leader and he had taken the Israel on and forced concession from them. Now it was possible to have direct negotiation with Israel and new beginning of negotiation had come and this war also opened the way for negotiation with US and first Israeli-Egyptian agreement was signed after a quarter of century under the supervision of US in kilometre 101 and author of this agreement was Henry Kissinger.

After 1973 war, Egypt was put back again on international map after several lean years. Ahmad Hussein wrote in *Al-Ahram* on 24 October 1973.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 181.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 136.

“The military victory of Egypt will figure in most glorious pages in the annals of war and in the history of Egyptian people. October war was divine intervention. A remarkable performance by humble servant of Gaured, Anwer el-Sadat.”¹⁰⁴

It was unique event in the history of Arab world and national pride was restored and now Egypt was in position of bargain with Israel. The crossing of Suez Canal was taken as crossing from defeat to victory¹⁰⁵, and the myth of Israeli might was shattered even though Egypt’s material and human loss was far greater. Egypt lost around 9000 persons while 10000 left wounded and around 450 planes and 1900 tanks lost by Egypt.¹⁰⁶ But Sadat was successful in his mission and that was to break the *status quo*. According to Tawfiq el Hakim “It was a spiritual crossing to a new stage of history.”¹⁰⁷

This war gave Sadat new and fresh base from where he could negotiate and activate the superpowers to reach a kind of workable solution in West Asia. By oil embargo, Arab World proved its economic supremacy and raised the prospects of modifying pro-Israeli tendencies in American policy. Mustafa Amin wrote: “Crossing have taken as crossing from defeat to victory, division to unity, shame to dignity, and terror to security.”¹⁰⁸ This war brought Egypt a sufficient measures of military victory to receive political objective for which Sadat had entered in to war and thereby provided a great strength for Egypt at negotiation table.

¹⁰⁴ Sid Ahmed, n. 74, p. 15.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ Hopewood, no. 48, p. 108.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁰⁸ Sid Ahmed, no. 74, p. 16.

Major shifts in Sadat's foreign policy

The arrival of Sadat was marked by momentous changes in Egypt's foreign policy. These changes were not limited to regional level but went beyond that. From leading the Arab world in its confrontation with Israel, Sadat adopted Egypt first or Egypt-centric policy that culminated into peace treaty with Israel. A major shift took place in Egypt's policy vis-à-vis the superpowers as he steered Egypt from its close ally Soviet Union into the US camp. This was a total break from his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser who throughout his presidency fought against western imperialism, Zionist and maintained very cordial relation with Moscow at every level.

From being the most influential Arab country under Nasser, Egypt became isolated under Sadat and these far reaching changes took place in a matter of few years and were the result of variety of factors. From its erstwhile policy of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, the policy shifted to Egypt nationalism and Egypt-first or go-alone policy.

The sudden death of Nasser on 28 September 1997 brought to an end of the era of intensive political activities in the Arab world, especially those centered on Egypt. Nasser was succeeded by Vice-President Anwar el Sadat who though claiming to continue Nasser's revolution, gradually began to pull Egypt in the other direction. 'Egypt first' became the main content in agenda of foreign policy and a related theme was the sacrifices Egypt had made for pan-Arabism

and Palestinian cause. Various Arab regimes and movements were attacked whose own sacrifices for these causes were meagre. Egypt's Arab involvement reflected a change in its attitude towards Arab nationalism. The Arab world witnessed a major debate between the aspirations of those who adhered to Arab nationalism espoused by Nasser and the pragmatists who opted for Egypt-centric nationalism and called for domestic consolidation. This situation has been described by Heikal in following terms:

History is a struggle between reality and paradise. Man fights his reality and aspires to an ideal about which he dreams. This is the story of humankind's history from beginning to end. The problem is that some some people accept reality and forget paradise while others go to paradise and forget reality. The relation between two is of struggle....¹

Sadat gradually changed Egypt's position regarding the Arab world and made increasing emphasis on Egyptian affairs. Taking an inward approach Sadat subordinated pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism and Arab unity to Egyptian nationalism and patriotism.

In a speech in July 1972 Sadat declared that in the forthcoming battle with Israel

"Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism will, if necessary, be alone in the field"²

Initially Sadat worked towards a unified Arab approach to the issues and together with Syria and assured of full support of the Arab world and went to war against Israel in 1973. But soon he abandoned

1. J.P. Sharma, *The Arab Mind* (N. Delhi, 1990), p.109.

2. *Ibid.*, p.109.

his Arab allies and agreed on separate peace with Israel. Though pledging for Arab unity and respect for Arab nationalism, in the final analysis, he opted for go-ahead-alone policy.

Peace initiative with Israel and Break-up of Arab unity

Since coming to power, his main thrust was the liberation of Egyptian territory, termination of war and good relation with America. He could secure them if he managed to secure some concession from Israel. Once Sadat said:

"If Israel wants peace, we also want peace but how it is possible if one party is occupying one third of our land"³

On 4 February 1971 while extending the cease-fire he had proposed a partial Israeli withdrawal as the first step towards total withdrawal that would enable Egypt to re-open the Suez Canal. He was even ready to sign peace agreement.

This proposal of Sadat was in itself a great departure from the policy of his predecessor, Nasser and was a major blow to Arab unity. The idea of negotiation and peace with Israel severely damaged the spirit of Khartoom conference which talked of three Nos. This policy on the Palestine question was a great reversal of Nasser's who was father-figure for most of the Palestinians and who had always provided political shield to them. Sadat's offer for peace with Israel

³. J.P. Sharma, *Peace Policy of Nations* (New Delhi, 1995) p.85.

was the beginning of abandonment of the Arab nationalism and Arab unity ceased to be a main component of Egyptian foreign policy.

While announcing his peace offer, Sadat was well aware of the negative response he would face but in wake of the Israeli refusal to withdraw to the 1967 borders, Arab response was very mute. Disappointed by the negative response, he signed a friendship treaty with USSR in May 1971, and declared the year as year of decision. But superpowers *détente* came in the way leading to the denial of arm supplies by Moscow. In retaliation Sadat opted to expel the Soviet advisers in July 1972. This was the time when Sadat decided in favour of a limited war with Israel with Arab co-operation and he succeeded in retaining friendship with all Arab leaders.

Sadat also worked hard to co-ordinate with new Syrian leader Assad and in this way, a great unity was achieved by Sadat during October war between Cairo, Damascus and Riyadh According to one observer:

It is doubtful whether Nasser could have achieved this apparent degree of cohesion. Sadat's low political profile was of great acceptance and so was his quiet rejection of Nasser's plan for Egyptian leadership of Arab world and virtual dominance over- the Arab world this was the price Sadat was required to pay and it was gamble of great albeit hidden, dimension⁴

During the war, for the first time in history, oil was used as a political weapon. The Arab unity that was apparently achieved before war did not last and mistrust and suspicion began to surface among the coalition. In this post-war period, Sadat launched his Egypt first,

⁴ . A. K. Pasha, *Egypt's Quest for Peace Determinant and implication* (New Delhi, 1994), p. 142.

Egypt centric or go-ahead-alone policy, a policy based on Egyptian national interest. This period saw the realization of Sadat's initial policy of Egyptian nationalism and the abandonment of Arab nationalism espoused by his predecessor.

The post-war policy of peace with Israel, involvement of US in the peace process and exclusion of USSR from the peace making with Israel were clear indications that Sadat had abandoned earlier concerns for Arab unity and his policy sought to promote narrow Egyptian national interests. Further as Sadat proceeded towards peace with Israel without the involvement of any key Arab leaders, the deeper contradiction grew between Egypt nationalist and Arab nationalist. This contradiction went hand in hand with Egypt's separation from Soviet Union.

After the war Sadat sent Ismail Fahmi, his new foreign minister, to Washington to work peace plan and Fahmi found a change in American attitude towards Egypt, largely due to the oil embargo. Fahmi visit was reciprocated by the Kissinger's visit to Cairo that achieved two things: diplomatic ties with Egypt and Sadat's endorsement of step-by-step diplomacy. Sadat's main intention of going to war was to break the stalemate and reactivate the Arab-Israel issue. Indeed, Sadat had no time to grasp and evaluate the enormous impact the October war had in the form of oil embargo, world support, damage to *détente* and various other issues since as he was preoccupied with a nightmare of disaster over the encirclement of Egyptian army.

Because of his past experience with the Soviet and his belief that only the US had power to exert pressure on Israel, Sadat in his first meeting with Kissinger on 4 November, 1973 talked about common strategy against Moscow. He was very much convinced that if appeared flexible, the US would help him get back the occupied territory which was his ultimate foreign policy goal at regional level.

Sadat's acceptance of the step-by-step diplomacy of Kissinger combined with the gradual Egyptian isolation from the Arab world pushed Egypt's more and more ahead for a separate deal with Israel. After the war, Sadat totally subordinated the cause of Arab unity and pan-Arabism to peace with Israel and instead of asking for a comprehensive solution, he accepted without questioning, Kissinger's step-by-step approach and gave away all the trumps cards and levers of pressure.

When Sadat signed Sinai-I in January 1974 without giving due consideration to Arab world unity and went ahead alone in his mission of forging peace policy with Israel. This policy of Sadat faced various criticisms from all over Arab world. In response Sadat said:

"I am making disengagement with America and not with Israel"⁵

After the signing of Disengagement Treaty in January 1974, Sadat openly started criticizing the Palestinians and went to the extent of saying

5. J. Krik Beattie, *Egypt during the sadat years* (N. York,2000), p.174.

"let those who wish to fight come to Sinai and bring their arms, their men with them and Egypt will welcome them"⁶

Egyptian press and leadership started condemning the Palestinian people and started claiming and criticizing that it were not Egyptian "who had sold their lands to Zionism"⁷ After the Sinai-I agreement, Egypt's total isolation from Soviet Union caused Sadat to adopt a pro-America policy which in turn asked Egypt to go for peace with Israel. The change in Sadat's foreign policy at regional level was not merely regional development but it had a global link also. According to David Hirst, although it was Sadat who had brilliantly succeeded in inciting the Arab for war, he alone decided to sacrifice and destroy that unity after the war and he opted for exclusive reliance on to US. Sadat vowed to end the state of 'no wars no peace' and to achieve this he threw away the assets of Arab unity and started isolating one Arab country after another in order to receive Sinai. He embarked on a go-it-alone- policy that made impossible for Syria, Jordan and Palestinian to recover their territories.

After signing first Disengagement Treaty Sadat wanted that this should be followed by Syria since at the initial stage he was not in a position to abandon completely the Arab cause. Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy and Sadat's gradual policy of Egypt first were working together. Kissinger was successful in convincing Sadat that the conflict was old, difficult and intractable and could be tackled only in step-by-step piecemeal manner.

⁶. Hirst Beeson *Sadat* (London, 1981) , P. 196.

⁷. *Ibid.*, p.197.

At the Arab Summit meeting convened on 26 November 1973, differences between Egypt and Syria came out into open and this difference was so widened that on 17 December Syria announced its refusal to attend the Geneva Peace conference. Nothing came out of the Geneva conference attended by Egypt, Jordan, Israel and two superpowers and was followed by Sinai-I concluded on 17 January, 1974. One Syrian official denounced Sinai-I as a "unique picture in history of treachery against the people and the army in Syria and Arab nation"⁸ The Sinai-I was followed by lifting oil embargo on March 18 1974 and despite his denunciation of Sinai-I, Assad also concluded an agreement on 31 March 1974. Egypt welcomed this decision, which gave Sadat strength as well as excuse to steer his agenda.

Sadat's most strategic move to marginalise the Palestinian issue in Egyptian foreign policy came in October 1974 when he succeeded in making the PLO the sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people and so as to end to the Arab tutelage over the Palestine. This move of Sadat put the Jordan on opposite front, which had its own claim from very beginning to be sole representative of Palestinian people, and was only country to attend Geneva peace conference in 1973. So, Sadat got rid of the cause of Palestine and now other Arab states were equally responsible for Palestinian cause. The Arab world was well convinced that his isolationist policy might go further and result in a partial agreement with Israel. This anticipation and suspicion became clear when Sadat observed:

⁸ . Pasha, n.4, p.146

"I am not about to impose any decision on any one and reluctant to see any one else decision imposed on me"⁹

After PLO got recognition as a sole representative, which was not welcomed by US and Israel, US started persuading diplomatic effort for Sinai-II. Kissinger started concentrating on another Disengagement and another partial agreement between Egypt and Israel and Israel was having no problem signing another agreement with Egypt as it will further widen rift between Egypt and Syria", a major goal of Israel policy towards Arab countries. Egypt signed the Sinai-II in September 1975 that marked the beginning of a new equation in the Arab world. Now Egypt started seeking relations with Israel based on Egyptian economic, military and strategic interests. After the signing of Sinai-II, all the Arab leaders joined the chorus in condemning Anwar el-Sadat and Syria which after Sinai-I had not condemned Egypt in public started openly criticizing Egypt.

It was seen in the Arab world as case of history repeating itself. In 1948, Egypt was the first country to sign armistice and that was followed by the other three. Earlier it was self-interest that caused Egypt to embrace pan-Arabism but later it was compulsion to leave it and adopt purely nationalist policy. In the words of Sadat:

"The effort to unify the Arab world under Egypt had brought nothing but misfortune, trouble, problems, jealousy and intrigue."¹⁰

⁹ . Ibid, , P.148.

¹⁰ . Hirst & Beeson, n.7 p.170.

Sadat made Egyptians feel that it was Egyptian blood that had made the Arabs oil rich. Taufiq al-Hakim, doyen of Egyptian leaders urged that people to proclaim it frankly and firmly:

"any conflagration in our country will cause those who sit on well of gold to sit on well of fire and any conflagration in Egypt will expose the whole world to grave damage."¹¹

He further asked that Arab should finance two-thirds of Egyptian military budget if they want to keep the explosion away from own oil field.

Sadat was seen as a destroyer of Arab unity after he signed Disengagement II. The left wing weekly, *Rose-el-yaussef* asked:

"Who would have imagined that after more than a quarter century of Egypt leadership of Arab nationalist movement, when Egyptian people will return to bewildering question. 'Are they an Arab people or an Egyptian? And if our people are Egyptian only, why do they accept their responsibility as an Arab people.'" ¹²

Sadat denied that he had made any kind of separate agreement and again he reiterated his commitment to the Arab cause. In reality, the Sinai-II had left no doubt in mind of Arab leadership that he had made up his mind to deal separately with Israel and they were sure that separate deals would not stop at Sinai-II and would go further. According to Sadat,

"we must live according to facts of era"¹³

¹¹ . Ibid., p.252

¹² . Ibid., p.254

¹³ . Pasha, n.4, p.150.

By signing Sinai-II, Sadat got oil fields which he had dreamt of at the time of succession but this led to Egypt isolation in the Arab world and it became obvious that this agreement would lead to Egypt's eventual withdrawal from the conflict.

The first victim of Sadat's Egypt first policy was Palestine issue, which was no more a concern for Egypt and was given low profile and never formed decisive part of Egyptian foreign policy. He became so confined in his foreign policy orientation at regional level that he completely sacrificed the cause of Palestine when he ordered the closure of Palestine radio station in September 1975. Most of the pro-Palestinian activities were reduced to the minimum. According to Monssa Sabri, editor of Al-Akhbar

"condemnation of Sinai- II was an Arab pronouncement but ink with which it was written was Soviet."¹⁴

Thus, policy of Sadat was a reversal what his predecessor had followed. Instead of taking Egypt forward, he made a volta-face and Egypt was reduced to the level of an outcast even among the non-aligned movement. Sadat was not the first one to initiate the peace policy or Egypt first policy as far as the foreign policy was concerned. The beginning of shift in foreign policy was witnessed during last years of Nasser's Presidency and willingness to peace was realized after the defeat of 1967 war only. Nasser was the first one to leave Syria, a close ally in war of 1967, and he further improved his relation with Jordan to reach to American for peaceful settlement. Nasser also

¹⁴ . Ibid., p.150.

had developed the opinion that real leverage for a solution lied with US and he started approaching US though indirectly. Nasser started deviating from Khartoum conference resolution which strictly prohibited any kind of negotiations, recognition and peace with Israel.

In Heikal's words there were four major reasons which made Egypt to look for peace after war of 1967:

- (1) to set West Asian crisis in motion politically alongside the military action
- (2) to test the US attention
- (3) to implement 242
- (4) to maintain the Arab unity and to see no plan would work against Arab aspiration.¹⁵

The hectic effort for peace began on 17 June but all these efforts thwarted by US to counter the Soviet influence in this process. The real issue of difference was recognition of Israel's right to existence and withdrawal from occupied territories. The Arabs found this concession much too far reaching and rejected the resolution. However, during last months of 1967 Nasser too seemed to have had second thought about the wisdom of purely negative stand and soon most of the Arab states conceded to some kind of accommodation as. Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad explained in a meeting that Egypt was willing to make number of concessions and would let Israeli ship pass through Gulf of Aqaba, permit Israeli goods to pass through

¹⁵ . A.I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab world The element of foreign policy* (London, 1976) p. 58.

Suez and would accept declaration of non-belligerence¹⁶. This was a clear indication of beginning of shift in foreign policy at regional level as well at global level. America wanted Egypt to negotiate directly with Israel, which Nasser found unacceptable.

Resolution 242 passed on 22 November 1967 and accepted by Nasser⁰ while Syria rejected it which called for withdrawal of Israeli forces, solution to refugee problems, permanent and safe boundaries for all countries. Dr. Gunnor Jarring was appointed as UN representative. Nasser had no problem in accepting Resolution 242, despite its rejection by its ally Syria. After the failure of Jarring mission, the Soviet Union had submitted a six-point peace plan which was accepted by Egypt but again no progress was made because of Israeli refusal. The next stage in negotiation for peace was reached with the publication of Rogers's plan in December 1969 when the US Secretary of State suggested a peace treaty between Israel, Jordan and Egypt and called for an almost complete Israel withdrawal leaving open the question of Gaza strip and Sharm el Sheikh. Initially this proposal was rejected by Egypt but in the wake of escalation of conflict a certain shift could be detected in Nasser's attitude.

Nasser told Jarring that Egypt would agree to package deal covering all provision of Security Council resolution which would be signed before withdrawal began. The main conditions were as follows.

1. No direct negotiation with Israel

¹⁶ M. Abdul Farid, *Nasser: the final years* (London, 1994), p. 109.

2. No formal peace treaty or diplomatic recognition of Israel but simply an end of belligerence. Israel would have to give up all territories
4. With regard to Jerusalem, Nasser did not specify his demands and was willing to leave this to King Hussein
5. A settlement of refugee problem.¹⁷

Israel also no longer insisted for direct negotiation with Egypt and Nasser promised that Egypt would recognize Israel if the latter would withdrawal. Nasser accepted the Rogers cease-fire plan on 22 July 22 and it seemed that Egypt was in greater hurry for peace than Israel as Israel accepted cease-fire plan only on 6 August.

Nasser thus took some historic decisions which were a reversal of policy and a break from the previous policy of Arab unity, pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. It was none other than Nasser who violated the Khartoum resolution and accepted UN resolution number 242 without considering the concern of Syria, another close ally. He first talked of US involvement in resolving the West Asian crisis and later accepted Soviet plan. Not only this, Nasser went to extent of discussing the border issue with Israel and ultimately showed his willingness to recognise Israel, if it got ready to withdraw from the occupied territories. In short, Nasser himself was responsible for leaving the slogan of Arab unity and he was the first to provide new orientation to the foreign policy of Egypt. Sadat intensified and

¹⁷ Ibid., p.113.

accelerated the process initiated by his predecessor Gamal Abdul Nasser.

Shift from USSR to US.

The arrival of Sadat as the President of Egypt did not only signal a shift in Egyptian policy towards the Arab world but also a major shift in foreign policy at global level and particularly vis-à-vis the two superpowers. There was a close connection between the two. Even during his tenure as Vice-President, Sadat had shown a kind of inclination towards Western bloc and after coming to power he gradually but completely steered the Egypt into the US camp. This major change in foreign policy orientation at global level was not ordinary but was shaped by various constraints and compulsions.

One of those important factors was policy of *détente*----- a policy evolved by both superpowers to prevention confrontation and nuclear war between them. The basic concept of policy of *détente* had been described very aptly by Kissinger in following terms

"Do grown up people have to be on bad terms because their children are quarrelling"¹⁸

The main aim of *détente* was to relax tension between two superpowers and was a expression of common belief that in the nuclear age there was no alternative but to conduct their mutual relation on the basis of peaceful co-existence. By this policy of *détente*, both superpowers wished to base their relationship on the

¹⁸ . Water Laqueur, *Confrontation* (Abacus, 1974), p. 25.

principle of sovereignty, equality, non interference in the internal affairs and mutual advantage and that they would always exercise restraint in their mutual relation.

The *detente* evolved out of relationship established between Nixon and Kissinger on the one hand and Brezhnev and his team on other hand. Both groups expressed a willingness to co-operate in establishing a structure of peace, an international system in which the participants would operate with a consciousness of stability and permanence. *Détente* was taken as means to normalize relation between two.

Egypt had been a close ally of USSR since the 1955 deal when both vowed to oppose imperialism and oppose the Zionist design in West Asian region. Moscow became a close ally of Egypt for its role in opposing the Western imperialist forces in general and America in particular and the main motive of Soviet Union in region was to remove the influence of western power in economic, military and political sphere and promote the growth of the Soviet position in their place. Soviet leadership strengthened its position by massive shipment of military equipment and also in economic aids in form of financing the Aswan dam.

In early stage of relation between two countries, Soviet Union was not concerned with Arab-Israel conflict and this was of secondary importance but later became as main source of friction between two. This indeed pushed Egypt into the American camp during the last

years of Presidency of Nasser and Sadat fully steered Egypt into the Western political camp. There were basically three globally connected factors, which continued to influence the relation between Egypt and Soviet Union, and ultimately it caused the break in relation between them:

- (1) Delay in arm deliveries
- (2) Moscow's opposition to the war to break the stalemate
- (3) and deepening of superpowers *détente*.

The death of Nasser in 1970 caused anxiety in Moscow, especially when he was succeeded by Sadat who from very beginning was in favour of peaceful solution to West Asian crisis. Meanwhile on 4 February, 1971, Sadat's astonishing announcement of peace initiative was not welcomed by Soviet Union, which according to them would involve US, reduce the influence of Soviet Union and it discredit the Soviet effort for peace in the region.

Sadat's visit to Moscow on 1 March did not yield any particular result as far as delivery of Soviet arms was concerned. On the basis of this visit and arm delivery, he had expected from Soviet Union, he declared the year of 1971 as a 'year of Decision' and it was first major political challenge for Sadat to prove himself. In absence of Soviet arm delivery, the year of decision went without any achievement and Sadat attributed it to the failure of Moscow in delivering the arms. Soviet turned down the request for arms fearing that that yet another war with Israel would escalate to global proportion and that the Arab world would be defeated again.

At home, political developments also affected the Sadat's relation with Moscow. When he dismissed pro-Soviet Ali-Sabri group on 2 May 1971, Soviet leadership saw it as an anti-Soviet act and became very suspicious of Sadat. Despite his decision to expel Ali-Sabri, Sadat signed a treaty of friendship on 25 May with the hope that it would procure more and more arms. An abortive left wing coup on 19 July 1970 to overthrow President of Sudan was crushed with active support of Sadat. This strengthened Moscow's suspicions regarding Sadat's anti-communist proclivities as Sadat himself admitted that his "attitude to Sudan coup caused the gap between me and Soviet leadership."¹⁹

In the second half of 1971, when Sadat was trying to open channel of negotiation with US, Soviet leadership began to ignore the issue of arm supplies, despite an agreement during Sadat's visit in October. The shipment to India during 1971 Indo-Pakistan war caused infuriation to Sadat and it made military relation more and more strained and Sadat felt that that Egyptian dependence on Soviet Union was of no use whereas the US was providing Israel with everything it asked for. Once he said: "I would not only bring Russia but he could bring devil himself if it could saved me".²⁰ Sadat was disappointed and increasingly impatient over Soviet delays.

Meanwhile in Egypt, there was mounting criticism of government for so much dependence on Moscow and public opinion was in favour of a kind of balanced relationship with both the superpowers. Sadat visited Moscow on 2 February 1972 and he complained that arms promised repeatedly were yet to arrive and he

¹⁹ Pasha, n.4,p.209.

²⁰ Mohammad Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (Dehradun,1981)p.120.

was concerned with this delay. Another crisis erupted in July 1972 when Sadat informed to Soviet ambassador that service of Soviet experts and military advisers, who had been in Egypt since 1967 in large numbers, had been terminated. This decision was a great blow and the relation reached its lowest and was as a result of accumulated Egyptian grievances against Moscow.

The Nixon-Brezhnev summit took place in Moscow on 22 May 1972. West Asia was one of the subjects discussed but joint communiqué gave a very low priority to Arab-Israel issue. Sadat was upset by the outcome and this meeting confirmed his misgivings regarding Soviet concerns with West Asian crisis. He concluded that the superpowers had made a deal to freeze the status quo which was not in favour of Egypt and thought that policy of *détente* was proving harmful. For him *détente* was no more than a kind of alliance and agreement between two superpowers on the issues that did not directly affect them. Sadat saw no difference between two superpowers in relation to West Asia and was of the view that Soviet Union preferred *détente* over West Asia and the only because of *détente*, it was not ready to upgrade the military assistance to Egypt. He held the opinion that this policy was a kind of embrace between two superpowers for military relaxation.

Another major reason for difference between Cairo and Moscow was the Soviet opposition to war while Sadat saw war as the only solution to alter the existing stalemate. The period proceeding the

1973 war had been one in which Moscow had sought to deter Egypt from its war plan by delaying the delivery in arms.

This effort of Soviet Union had caused a great damage to Egypt-Soviet relations. Soviet was trying to preserve *détente*, which would be damaged if war broke out in West Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union wanted to avoid the risk of military confrontation with US and was of the opinion that a military crisis in the West Asia where both the Superpowers were heavily and directly committed could easily escalate to global proportion. This would not only destroy *détente* but it would lead to superpowers conflagration. Soviet Union never wanted its arms to be used for war but was in favour of it being used as bargaining chips.

This dual policy of Soviet Union forced Sadat to change his foreign policy. First Soviet Union was very keen in maintaining good military and political relation with Egypt. At the same time, it was not interested in war and always preached the avoiding of war and military confrontation. This contradictory policy combined with dualism led Sadat to look forward for other alternative.

Sadat could not have perused a serious policy towards Israel without receiving assurances from one of the superpowers. Since assuming office, he had opened the channels of communication with US because he was convinced that relation with USSR would not last longer as Soviet also did not have very good opinion about Sadat's Egypt. The relation between two was more of suspicious than trust.

From very beginning, support and commitment to Israel and prevention of Soviet domination in the region constituted main component of American foreign policy in West Asia.

The period of Sadat saw a shift of Egyptian policy from dependence on Soviet Union to a policy of friendship and co-operation with the US. The latter had always supported the peaceful settlement of West Asian crisis on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 242. The beginning of Egyptian shift towards US had started with the acceptance of Rogers's plan in August 1970. The plan was a part of Jarring Mission, established after 1967 war to mobilize the opinion for implementation of UN resolution. The failure of Jarring mission and success of Rogers's plan was an indication that the solution now lied with America. Post-Nasser period saw a rapid change in Sadat's attitude towards America and he became a firm believer in the philosophy that most of the cards were in the hands of the US.

The main American concern was to weaken the influence of Soviet Union in the region and any positive involvement on its part would eliminate the influence of Soviet Union. The Sadat period saw role of US as the principal intermediary and after coming to power, he extended the cease-fire till 5 February 1971. In the meanwhile on February 4, Sadat astonished the world by his first ever peace initiative. The first thing Sadat did, with the purpose of pursuing his peace policy, was he announced the establishment of diplomatic ties with US that was broken since the war of 1967. Now Sadat was in better position to deal with West Asian crisis as he had found a good

mediator in US, which was interested in reduction of crisis as to keep Soviet out of region. Sadat wanted US to assume more even handed posture in the conflict. These concerns were echoed by Heikal in the pages of *Al-Ahram* where he advocated the neutralization of US in the Arab-Israel conflict. In addition, Sadat wanted to exploit this situation, to secure greater Soviet cooperation concerning arms supplies.

Sadat's overtures towards the US did not secure any immediate gains. It was under these circumstances that Rogers arrived in Cairo on 4 May 1971. Rogers was the first secretary of state to pay visit in the area since 1953. During Cairo talks, US sought reassurance that its mediation would be rewarded by substantive gain for American interest while Egypt tried to judge American influence to exert pressure on Israeli withdrawal. According to Sadat, Rogers was at first to raise the question of Soviet presence and it was in this meeting that relation between Israeli withdrawal, the Soviet presence and Egyptian-American relation were explicitly discussed. Both agreed to open a negotiation on the rescheduling of payment on the \$ 140 million Egyptian debt to US.²¹

The main concern of this meeting was to ask America to pressure Israel for withdrawal from occupied territories. Egypt suggested that only effective form of pressure on Israel would be an American embargo on arms. Sadat said in May Day speech: "The country which gives Israel every thing from a leaf of bread to phantom

²¹ Sadia Touval *The Peace Broken* (New Jersey;1982),p.185

bombers claims that it can not pressure Israel. Is it not ridiculous?"²²

The stalemate in negotiation, the Egyptian profession of disillusionment and the news that Sadat was planning to pay another visit to Moscow stimulated the State Department to renew its effort to reach an interim agreement. Rogers announced on 4 October six points that could serve as basis for settlement. Egypt accepted it but wanted the US to take an active part in the negotiation and expected US to obtain concession from Israel. However, fresh delivery of arms to Israel during this period brought dual change in Sadat attitude and Egyptian acceptance of America as an intermediary was withdrawn. However, dialogue between Egypt and America continued and the idea of interim agreement was very much alive in the months that followed.

By involving itself, America attained some objectives and Egypt had been successful to open full-fledged negotiation covering various aspects of the West Asian crisis. Despite Sadat's disappointment with US, the mediation did contribute to the process of improving Egypt-US relation and to estrangement between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

If Egypt had hoped that its acceptance of American mediation would help the Soviet Union to grant Egypt all the aid that it had requested, Egypt's hope was not fulfilled. Instead of responding to Sadat's offer of peace, America renewed arm deal with Israel. Thus Sadat's policy of appeasement of US proved futile and he was left with

²² Pasha, n.4,p.222.

no option but to take his own independent decision for waging the war.

From War to Peace

The reason of October 1973 war could be traced back to Sadat's frustration with US on the diplomatic front. He had made diplomatic efforts to exert pressure on US to ask Israel to withdraw but was never assured by US for comprehensive settlement with Israel. With his failure at every diplomatic front, Sadat moved towards war since he believed that the war would put US on the spot due to its total support to Israel and would compel the Superpowers to intervene and bring about Israeli withdrawal. The war finally broke out on 6 October 1973 in which Syria and Egypt in a co-ordinated way attacked Israel. Both Israel and US were surprised and this war resulted in a kind of psychological victory for Egypt.

Sadat had launched the attack with great apprehension and Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, stormed the Barlev Line and pushed the Israeli towards passes. Fearing the "devastating counter attack" from Israel, Sadat was in direct and continuous touch with the State Department. The war turned in favor of Israel when America helped Israel in form of airlift. On 16 October, Sadat proposed a cease-fire if Israel withdrew to 1967 position. On this very day Israeli crossed the canal and established a foot hold on West Bank of Suez Canal and disrupted Sadat's calculation. This reversal in war led him to conclude that further continuation of war would be against

Egyptian interest. So he accepted cease-fire on 19 October which came into effect on 22 October.

The post-war international scene was such that Sadat could think only of diplomatic option to Arab-Israeli crisis and post-war environment brought the real change in Egypt attitude towards Israel and America. In this phase of peace negotiation Egyptian pro-American policy became visible. The post-war situation strengthened the American position and enabled the US to appropriate the mediator's role for itself alone. After the war, Sadat's first concern was to relieve trapped third army on East Bank

Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy led to the conclusion of five agreements within 23 months and those were Geneva Peace conference, Sinai-I, disengagement with Syria and Sinai-II in 1975. Kissinger adopted step-by-step approach and played a very decisive role in the negotiations. After the war America showed interest in solution of West Asian crisis unlike in 1971-72 when it had taken passive attitude to effort of peace by Sadat. Oil embargo in wake of war had also some impact on the American policy and it tried to gain out of Egypt's worsening relation with USSR.

Kissinger's visit to Moscow took place on 22 October and both leaderships announced that cease-fire negotiation would be followed by peace-conference under the auspice of US and USSR as co-chairman. The Egyptian interest in the US playing a role in the negotiation was re-confirmed on 22 October when Sadat invited

Kissinger to visit Egypt and was met with a prompt and favorable American response.

The most urgent concern for Israeli was release of POW and direct political settlement with Egypt. Israel succumbed to American pressure and on 27 October granted permission for a single Egyptian convey of supplies to be sent to the besieged force. At this stage Sadat's inclination to accept mediation was not only preserved but strengthened. On 28 October, a meeting took place between Israeli and Egyptian representative at Kilometre 101 on Cairo-Suez road.

A lengthy discussion ranging from POW to withdrawal took place and in this meeting, which was followed, by another meeting in Washington on 7 November. Kissinger portrayed this as

“one of the dramatic breakthrough of his diplomacy”²³.

It brought about a major turn in foreign policy of Egypt. Sadat accepted the Kissinger's gradualist approach and ceased to insist on a prior explicit statement by US or by Israel. In exchange of release of Israeli POWs, Sadat received permission for regular supply to Third Army.

This cease-fire was followed by efforts towards holding the Geneva peace conference. Egypt and Syria had implicitly accepted the resolution when they accepted resolution number 338. Arab states and Israel were divided on the issue of timing of conference, role of

²³ Tauvel, n.21, p.235.

UN, the issue of Palestine participation. Egypt and Syria both wanted an agreement on disengagement to be concluded before conference, as it would give justification for this conference. While Israel was in favor of minimum UN role, Arab states wanted the role of UN to be important. Israel rejected the participation of Palestinian as it considered it as terrorist organization. This conference lasted for two days from 21 to 22 December, 1973 and its importance was just symbolic and it did not set stage for substantive negotiation. In the wake of failure of Geneva Peace Conference, another round of shuttle diplomacy was launched by Kissinger.

The disengagement was not new in its formula and had been discussed even after end of October war in Washington and at Kilometre 101. Both Egypt and Israel had interest in disengagement as both were under pressure to resolve the issue. Israel was under severe economic and psychological pressure while Egypt was concerned with encircled Third Army. Disengagement was to be discussed at Geneva but after its failure, Kissinger took individual initiative. Through this initiative he wanted to demonstrate that a US role was essential for sustained diplomatic progress. The US interest and involvement in disengagement contributed in the lifting of Arab oil embargo.

On 4 January, 1974 Moshe Dayan visited Washington for talks with Kissinger and outlined Israel's disengagement proposal and invited Kissinger to West Asia to give the final shape. Kissinger was invited by Sadat also to help complete the agreement and this was

how the shuttle diplomacy of Kissinger was launched. On 18 January 1974 at Kilometre 101, chiefs of staff of the two armies signed the agreement in the presence of Commander of the UN emergency force. Throughout the negotiation, both parties make rapid concession and US further contributed to the successful outcome of this talk by helping the parties to reduce the risk. Satisfied with the progress, Sadat called Kissinger,

“You are not only my friend but my brother.”²⁴

After Sinai-I, the relation between Egypt and US developed rapidly. Sadat was successful in lifting the Arab oil embargo on 18 March 1974 and removing major irritants in their relations. The disengagement with Israel was followed by another disengagement treaty between Israel and Syria that was signed on 31 May, 1974. This treaty was much more difficult to sign. It involved month long shuttle between Israel and Syria. After the disengagement agreement, other two negotiating attempts ended in failure; one between Jordan and Israel and another between Israel and Egypt in mid-1975. The failure of effort between Jordan and Israel for disengagement was due to the Palestinian issue which Jordan claimed to be sole spokesperson. But after the Palestine Liberation Organization was given the real authority after Rabat summit, Jordan lost all interests in disengagement.

²⁴ Pasha, n.4, p230.

Sadat was also interested in another agreement, which would entail another Israeli withdrawal, and additional visible gains would defuse Arab criticisms of his co-operation with US. It was necessary for Sadat to justify his policy by demonstrating that it continued to pay dividends. Sadat's honeymoon with the US severed a jolt when Nixon resigned on 9 August, 1974 but Sadat continued to believe that only US could help secure Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

Meanwhile, Kissinger continued to work under the new President Ford and adhered to his step-by-step diplomacy and started working for Sinai-II. Sadat not only needed a quick withdrawal of Israeli forces but also needed to demonstrate that his turning to US had been a wise move and he publicly endorsed his effort adding that the US now had virtually all the trump cards for a peace settlement.

During March 1975, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy collapsed due to Israeli condition on the issue of withdrawal when it conditioned the issue of withdrawal to non-belligerency pact from Egypt. It was in the backdrop of Israeli position, that President Ford ordered a reassessment of US policy towards West Asia. The reassessment hardly made any impact on Israel as US had pumped huge quantity of arms during and after the October war.

Israel was prepared to withdraw at distance of twenty and thirty miles but insisted on retaining the passes and oil fields. Israel wanted political agreement of long duration while Egypt wanted temporary and military agreement. By mid August, the main points of new

agreement had won the consent of all parties and on 1 September, Egyptian and Israeli officials initiated the new agreement. The agreement was modeled on the previous one and both sides resolved conflict by peaceful means. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement was supplemented by an annex and by separate American-Israeli and American-Egyptian agreements. Furthermore, Egypt promised to relax some of the economic boycott measures and to tone down its propaganda against Israel. Kissinger finally concluded the Sinai-II between Egypt and on 4 September, 1975.

Sadat received Sinai-II as a victory for Egypt even though the success was not due to any change in position of US or Israel but due to massive concessions made by Sadat. On 26 October, Sadat visited USA thereby becoming the first Egyptian President to pay an official visit to the US. After conclusion of Sinai-II it became obvious that Sadat had fully implemented the agenda that he had launched when he had come to power. He had abandoned the ideas of Nasser and he sacrificed the mission of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. Egypt of Nasser stood for anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, non-alignment and for Arab unity but since Sadat had come to power he gradually started to reverse the Egyptian foreign policy one by one. First he showed his inclination to shape the foreign policy in a pro-west orientation, and later he broke up Arab unity following the Egypt-first policy and propagating the purely Egyptian nationalist policy. He did not stop there but gradually led Egypt towards an accommodative approach vis-à-vis Israel that culminated in a separate peace with the

Jewish state. His agenda of peace came to be fully implemented when he concluded the Sinai-II separately without any concerns for Arab unity.

Peace Initiative

Sadat's foreign policies in second half of seventies culminated in a remarkable revolution in Egypt's international alignment, which scarified its place in the Arab world for a separate peace with Israel and exchanged non-alignment for an overt US clientele. The outcome was very much obvious when he had signed the separate Sinai-II Israel but remained committed to Egypt's traditional foreign policy for nearly two years. He held to the common Arab position of a comprehensive settlement with Israel and sought an all-party Geneva settlement conference.

But one decisive factor in Sadat's foreign policy was the deteriorating economic condition. The Arab aid on which he was counting to redeem his promise of prosperity was declining as Egypt withdrew from the conflict after signing Disengagement agreement with Israel. The Arabs seemed prepared to give Egypt less than a fifth of the \$ 12 billion Sadat considered essential and his acceptance of partial withdrawal had jeopardized the access to the new Arab wealth.

Sadat's new economic policy introduced in 1974 was not yielding the desired results. Which was based on assumptions of increased foreign investment, foreign aid which could not be achieved in absence of peace. Sadat' peace initiative, therefore, was very much pushed by economic needs of the time. Between 1974 and 1977 Sadat was very much disappointed when he saw that Arab states were delaying a political settlement with Israel when he needed peace to pursue new

economic policy based on foreign investment and particularly from West. In reaction to lukewarm response from the Arab world to his peace effort, Sadat once said:

“They have to understand that instability in Egypt or an end to myself will mean an end to their regime and they are not helping enough so they can not be trusted”¹

Sadat had linked the vision of economic development in Egypt with the necessity of peace. In an address to US Congress in 1975 he had made it very clear that he saw no point in rebuilding his country as long as the threat of war was there which might jeopardize the entire effort of reconstruction. Sinai-I was perhaps the watershed in transformation of Egypt’s foreign policy and it was the stage when Sadat’s search for peace and economic prosperity went hand in hand. This was the period when Sadat introduced Open Door policy which was fully supported by the US. Since it had become the main actor in political settlement, the US could not have ignored the pro-western economic reforms. Sadat had by now totally rejected the involvement of Soviet Union in West Asian affairs and his relation with the Arab World was on the way of deterioration. These cleavages deepened more and more as he got closer to US camp, both for improving the economy of Egypt and for peace in West Asia.

US did not involve itself in West Asian crisis politically but showed great interest in improving the economy of Egypt. The economic aid from western countries and dependency on foreign aids

¹ . Beattle J. Kirk, *Egypt during the Sadat years* (New York 2000); p.215.

had direct bearing on foreign policy of Egypt and this aid could not be expected without diplomatic and economic opening to west, which in turn led to peace with Israel. By the mid 1975, the obstacles to comprehensive settlement seemed to have convinced Sadat that Sinai-II was the only viable road to this end. He was faced with the choice of holding out and to increase pressure on Israel to move towards general settlement or to take easier path towards separate peace. In Sinai-II, he took a decisive step and forged a separate deal and this nearly put an end to Egyptian war option and came close to taking Egypt out of Arab-Israel power balance.

By relying exclusively on the US and agreeing to a separate second disengagement, Sadat decisively undermined the prospect of general Arab-Israeli conflict. It was first step in Egypt's withdrawal from Arab world and led to decrease of Arab financial support. When Egypt was deprived of greater economic assistance from its Arab allies after Sinai, US and western countries economic aid started pouring into Egypt. Kissinger had already approved raising assistance to Egypt to \$ 500 million of total \$ 300 million was to be for communities which later reached to \$ 750. This amount was apart from \$85 million to clear the Suez canal². The paradox of Arab aid decrease and western aid increase pushed Sadat for peace. Egypt's grave economic need was matched by need of the western countries to safeguard their interest in West Asia. This was combined with Egypt's westward diplomatic opening which made Egypt eligible for western capital. The US policy in West Asia was

² Marvin G. Weinbaum "Egypt's Infetah and the politics of U.S. economic assistance" Middle Eastern Studies, (Washington DC) (1985) 207-222

that peace settlement and economic reform in Egypt should go together and policy of *Infetah* for Sadat was not inseparable from his policy of peace. He believed that the kind of US commitment needed to achieve peace was contingent on Egypt' re-integration into world capitalist system.

The evidence came quickly coinciding with January 1974 separation of forces accord between Egypt and Israel. The US announced the commitment of \$85 million for an initial program to help clear Suez Canal of war debris and to begin the reconstruction of canal cities. On 1 March 1974, the Nixon administration asked the Congress for a total of \$ 250 million for financial year 1975 and additional \$50 million to Egypt as it prepared the 1976 budget.³

Egypt' extraordinary role in regional affairs was matched by the depth of US- Egypt new economic relation that was emerging after signing the Sinai-I. Business and trade had flourished and while the direct investment remained low, US business had substantial impact on Egyptian economy. US economic assistance program centred on stability in region and this economic assistance was not an economic assistance but a kind of tool of political bargain. Unlike the pre-war situation where both superpowers could have played a balancing role, in post-open door policy situation, Egypt had lost both economic as well as political interest in Soviet Union.

After signing of Sinai-II in 1975, it had become quit clear that Sadat had totally adopted the policy of go-it-alone and his full fledged peace initiative was not just a hostage to the economic need or

³ . Marvin G. Weinbaum "Egypt's *Infetah* and the politics of U.S. economic assistance" *Middle Eastern Studies* (1985) 207-222.

economic mess that Egypt was undergoing but one had to see the peace initiative taken by Sadat in the international context and global environment of the post Sinai-II period.

The Soviet Union launched a strong attack on the second stage settlement as soon as it was completed. The USSR not only opposed it because it removed USSR from this initiative but also sowed the seed of division among the Arab World and because the agreement called for stationing of American troop rather than UN troops. Soviet Union complained about its exclusion from this settlement and charged that US was going back on 21 October 1973 understanding about joint auspice and arguing that all parties should be at Geneva negotiating a comprehensive settlement. Russia had boycotted the signing ceremony in Geneva. Sadat launched a blistering attack on the Soviet Union for flagrant incitement and an attempt at splitting the rank of Arab nation. Soviet response to the Egypt signing of peace was two fold. One was Sadat's increasing ties with America and Israel without considering the unity of Arab world and second was the large scale US aid to Israel.

The disengagement phase of West Asian peace making was at the end and circumstance was not appropriate for moving into negotiation for a comprehensive peace settlement. The spirit of *détente* was declining and joint US-Soviet participation had become nearly impossible after Sinai-II, and US had gone through constitutional crisis as an unelected President was in office. The Arab summit conference at Rabat had endorsed the PLO as legal and only representative of Palestinian people undercutting Hussein's claim for that role.

The Soviet – Egyptian relation resumed downward spiral. In the face of US open involvement in West Asian affairs and after the policy of *détente* was no more a global principal, Soviet Union had restricted the arm supplies and treaty of friendship signed in 1971 was abrogated. By 1976, Soviet weapon primarily went to Algeria, Syria and Libya and Moscow had made billion dollar arms commitment to Iraq in exchange of use of navel base in the Persian Gulf.

In contrast to that, US diplomatic leadership was accepted by all principle west Asian parties. Egypt had developed close economic relations with the US. The Soviet Union had no major country as its close ally in west Asia and it had lost its political base and military base as well.

At regional level, the scene was very much favorable for Sadat's peace effort. Syria was openly criticizing the Sinai-II and after Sadat had left Soviet camp, it was replaced by Syria and the had become one of the major receivers of arm supplies from Soviet Union. Soviet Union was trying very hard to forge the anti-Sadat group behind it to fight American move in West Asia. Gaddhafi of Libya was openly the attacking Sadat's policy of peace and the PLO also was tool in hand of anti-Sadat group to thwart every attempt of Sadat to move for peace. The PLO had won prestige in the UN but it was becoming more and more dependent on Syria. Civil war had broken out in Lebanon and various other PLO groups found them facing dominant Christian forces of Lebanon.

At regional level, the only friend Sadat had was in the form of Saudi Arabia. It was compulsion of Saudi Arabia to have relation with Egypt since it was the major victim of Nasser's opposition to conservative and monarchies. Moreover, Saudi Arabia was a close ally of America. After the PLO had become the sole representative of Palestinians, King Hussein did not show much enthusiasm in west Asian affairs. At home, Sadat was fighting a very hard battle of his political survival and was faced with many social and economic crises. He was facing harsh criticism from Nasserites, Marxists and Muslim fundamentalist for his failure of economic policy, Corruption was at rampant, middle men were ripping the fruit of economic liberalization and main benefited class were bureaucrat, middle class people and political agents. Unemployment was rising, a large scale migration was taking place thereby disrupting the life in urban areas. Above all, prices of essential commodities were rising high in wake of subsidies cut as demanded by the World Bank, IMF and various other international agencies.

The overall crisis that was faced by poor masses ultimately culminated into a great food riot in January 1977 which soon spread to major parts of Egypt. People came out on to the streets and shouting slogan for bread and first time since the October war people were shouting the name of their previous hero Nasser "where are you Nasser?" After the 1952 revolution, first time army assistance was sought to control the unruly mob and the food riot left more than hundred people killed and thousands were jailed.

But this food riot had major impact on Sadat over all policy and it was the food riot after which, Sadat set his second and last bid for peace after Sinai phase. This phase of peace initiative was nothing less than a shock for whole world and this phase, he started after concluding that "he can go anywhere in this earth for peace."⁴

Road to Jerusalem

The year 1977 was a different and was full of political activism to resolve the west Asian crisis. Jimmy Carter was already in office was not supportive of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy and was in favour of comprehensive peace in West Asia involving all concerned parties.

In Israel, new government was in power and after thirty years in opposition, the Likud party was in government and Menachem Begin was new Prime Minister who was well known for his staunch support for Zionist ideology and had always supported the philosophy of Greater Israel. Moshe Dayan had become the foreign minister.

At regional levels, Syria had come back at scene after remaining isolated after Sinai-II and this patch-up was because of the civil war in Lebanon and the realization that President Sadat was fully committed to peace and as he said:

"I prefer action over reaction"⁵

At this stage, Sadat relation with US was based on three component. (1) to get military and economic aid (2) to outbid Israel and secure US support in peace negotiation; and (3) to re-assure pro-west

⁴ . Kirk, n.1, p. 227

⁵ . Samuel F. Wells Jr. and Mark Bruzensky, ed., *Security in the Middle East Regional challenges and Great power strategy*" (London 1987), p.73.

Arab countries that their opposition to his relation with Israel would lead nowhere as Egypt had become the central figure in US strategy.

Sadat had totally abandoned the Soviet concern and perhaps this was the reason, why he delayed the resumption of Geneva conference where Soviet Union was to be a party. As far as Geneva Peace conference was concerned, only US was interested since it was of the view that Soviet involvement was necessary to keep radical Arab satisfied with the outcome of this conference. While Israel and Egypt were fighting a diplomatic battle to influence US administration, the US had become the partner rather than being only mediator. Apart from Israel and US , Sadat was involved by Romanian President Nikolai in May 1977, who urged Sadat to go for peace. Influenced by the idea of Romanian President, Sadat called his finance minister Fahmi and asked about going to Israel. Reacting to the question of Sadat, Fahmi said:

“Can you imagine, man got hashish idea and it appears he is talking seriously.”⁶

Fahmi tried to divert his attention by talking of UN Security Council as an attractive option.

During these developments Sadat had received letter from Carter asking him to publicly endorse a call for Geneva conference but Sadat had another idea which Carter had called the year 1977

“the brightest hope for peace that I can re-call.”⁷

⁶ . Kirk, n.1, p.227

⁷ . Hirst and Beesan, *Sadat* (London 1981), p.257.

Sadat's activism was combined with Israeli's serious assessment and analysis of Sadat motive. Begin's government was framing its own plan when Moshe Dayan was on tour to four countries, India, Iran England and Morocco in August 1977 to see the mood regarding west Asian issue and to put the Israel view on possible arrangement to be discussed at projected Geneva conference.

Iran fully supported the idea of Israel that repeatedly said no to Palestinian state. In England he met King Hussein who had lost all his interest in the West Asian issue after Rabat summit which had made the PLO only representative of West Bank. But he very frankly told Moshe Dayan that he would endorse the stand of the Arab world. In Morocco secret meeting was arranged between Egyptian Deputy Premier Hassan Tuhami and Moshe Dayan with the help of King Hassan. Sadat was very serious regarding this meeting and wanted every conflicting issue to be resolved with the Geneva Conference acting only as the venue for the signing ceremony.

In this meeting all difference surfaced and every thing was discussed and this meeting became a semi-Geneva conference. Israel had problem with Syria and repeatedly claimed that radical nature of Assad could not be changed for peace and did not want to see Israeli flag on Israeli embassy in Damascus.

Regarding the comprehensive peace, the problem for Moshe Dayan was as he told to Hassan of Morocco, since no country could sign peace without other country and problem was so complicated that

it was impossible to achieve a simultaneous solution with all Arab states.

On the issue of Palestine, all three major parties took different positions. Egypt was adhered to the idea of full Palestinian state while Israel out rightly had rejected the call for idea of Palestinian state but was ready to give autonomy to people in the region but not over the region itself. Though US was not a party to it, but it favored the idea of a national homeland of Palestine and supported the Palestinian entity. There was always danger that this meeting could break down so it was initiated by deputy level delegates. Another issue of difference was withdrawal from occupied territories captured in June 1967. Sadat was adhered to idea that he had full sovereignty over his land was not a subject for discussion. Other major issue of differences were of territorial nature like settlement at Golan Height, Western Wall and Jewish quarter of Old city, Mount of Olives and population center in south of Sinai.

For Israel, most difficult thing was issue of comprehensive peace as Moshe Dayan said: "There has never been a case in history in which a collective peace agreement had been signed"⁸ Israel was always interested in separate dealings with Egypt because it was well aware that other Arab countries were in no position to harm Israeli interest and main thrust of Israel's foreign policy in West Asia was to bring Egypt out of the Arab fold.

⁸ . Moshe Dayan, *Break Through* (N. Delhi, 1981), p.51.

Morocco secret meeting saw no headway and there were differences nearly over all issues. Now, all participants were eyeing the Geneva conference that was to be coincided with routine UN General Assembly annual conference. Before UN assembly meeting, a preparatory meeting for Geneva conference took place between Begin's representative, Moshe Dayan and Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State in third week of September 1977 and in this meeting Israel made efforts to convince US administration of its Israeli concerns.

Israel wanted to resume full diplomatic relation following the conclusion of peace treaty with Egypt but major differences arose regarding the continued settlement in West Bank, representation of the PLO at Geneva conference while the Begin government adhered to the idea that only Jordan government could talk of the West Bank issue. There were also differences over united Arab delegation. On the issue of Jerusalem, Israel was not ready to discuss division of the city or map of the city but agreed to discuss only relation between Jewish and Arab sectors.

On 29 September, US released two documents. One was in the form of working paper for Geneva conference and another was joint declaration to be issued by US and Soviet Union over West Asian policy. Israel rejected working paper because it did not contain some of the points put forward by Dayan in preparatory talks and at the same time did not like the ideas and content of joint declaration. Main objectionable point for Israel was representation of Arab countries at Geneva as a united delegation. Egypt was the exception among Arab

states which did not like the idea of united Arab delegation which would delay peace. This clearly indicated Sadat's search for separate peace. His support to Israel's view of keeping Soviet Union away from the talks strengthened this logic. On the issue of the PLO participation where Carter referred to Begin's statement that the PLO could participate if delegates were not well known, Moshe Dayan said:

"If these unknown attended Geneva, they would quickly become very well known indeed."⁹

Under the pressure from Israel government the working paper was modified and renamed "suggestion for the resumption of the Geneva peace conference' in which few points were agreed as:

- (1) negotiation will be on the pattern of Egypt -Israel; Jordan-Israel; Syria-Israel; Lebanon- Israel;
- (2) Arab parties will be represented by Arab delegation which will include Palestinian Arabs in opening session but later on it will split into the different working group
- (3) West Bank to be discussed among Jordan Israel Egypt, and Palestinian Arab
- (4) Resolution number 242, 338 will be agreed on the basis Geneva peace conference
- (5) Refugees problems to be discussed on terms to be agreed upon.

When Israel and the US were engaged in preparatory talks for Geneva conference, Sadat was giving final shape to his long due

⁹ . Ibid., p.70

individual peace strategy. This strategy culminated into his shocking announcement in National Assembly on 9 November 1977 when he said that Israel would be surprised to know that he was ready to go to her Parliament –the Knesset itself – to parley with them and to see peace come to West Asia. In the words of Abdal Rauf al-Reidi,

“Sadat was an impatient man and his policy was of peace. He did not want to wait for fifteen years for peace like Assad. It was Sadat’s deep feeling that October 1973 war should be the last war”¹⁰

This decision of Sadat was caused by various things. First he was well aware of the complications of Geneva conference where Soviet Union was also a part which would divide the Arab world. He was frustrated with Arab division on the resolution of West Asian peace and Syria’s reluctance to attend Geneva peace conference. Sadat’s multi-party involvement at Geneva would complicate the issue rather than solving it. At the same time increasing economic hardship at home pushed him for this surprise announcement that apart from giving shock to the whole Arab world, it resulted into complete Go it alone policy which had it beginning during Sinai agreement.

By this announcement, Sadat wanted to show that extermination complex of Israel was out of date and Jewish state can no longer exploit the Arab rejection of it existence to annex territories in the name of secure frontier. Sadat told Parliament that he was ready “To go to end of this earth if it will prevent our soldiers, officer and Army men from

¹⁰ . Ibid., p.2 26

being wounded. Israel will be astonished to hear me now before you that I am ready to go to their house.”¹¹

This decision of Sadat shows that how professional diplomat he was and how quickly he changed his strategy for his political maneuvering. The Israeli Prime Minister, Begin reciprocated the announcement and called Egyptian people to take a silent vow for no more bloodshed and no more war. The following week Sadat received official invitation from Israel and Sadat made history when he landed on Israel soil on 19 November 1977 and addressed the Knesset.

This visit of Sadat ushered into a new history for West Asia and this was culmination of the go-it-alone policy of Sadat. This visit broke the psychological barrier that had existed for the last thirty years and Sadat called this journey a sacred mission. Sadat addressed Knesset and talked of common monotheistic heritage of Muslim and Jews. In words of Taufuk al-Hakim:

“A common and national basis of cooperation exists between Israel and Egypt.”¹²

After this visit of Sadat whole question of Geneva peace conference was relegated to background and the whole issue of peace narrowed down to two major parties and US role was left with only of mediator. Regarding role of Soviet Union, Sadat said

¹¹ Hirst & Beeson, n.7, p.255.

¹² . Felipe Fernandez. Arnesto, *Sadat and His Statecraft* (Great Britain, 1982), p.141.

“My story with Soviet is that they went to play the role of guardianship but I told them that this guardianship was finished.”¹³

This visit of Sadat had fulfilled the goal of Israel for direct negotiation with Egypt and now both parties were well placed to talk directly without any alien pressure at the discussion table. He was so stubborn for his individual peace effort that he told US delegation:

“we are ready to go even if we have to spend two or three consecutive days in the Knesset.”¹⁴

Sadat’s whole point of peace plan was return to June 1967 position and wanted territory in exchange for peace. Sadat told the Knesset

“we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on Justice.”¹⁵

The entire Arab world was shocked over the visit that broke the Arab unity and it was full departure from path of Arab nationalism. Assad called this visit a fragmentation of its national solidarity and Saudi Arabia stated that any Arab initiative in regard to securing peace in West Asia must stem from united Arab stand and the PLO reacted very sharply and emphasized that no Arab nation would forgive Egyptian regime.¹⁶ The Arab world was divided over the reaction and there was an internal split which had convinced Sadat that Arab world could do no harm to his strategy of peace. Morocco and Sudan gave official support to Sadat’s visit and Sadat had full support of Oman. Saudi Arabia and Jordan called for wisdom and patience and stand

¹³ . Ibid., p.126.

¹⁴ . Kirk, h.1. p.259.

¹⁵ . Hirst’s Beesan, n.7., 269.

¹⁶ Ibid, p.228.

taken by countries were natural as they were closest allies of US in the region. Diplomatic relation was frozen by Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and the PLO. The strongest reaction came from Iraq, Syria, Algeria, the PLO and Libya. Syria went into day mourning on the day of Sadat's visit and one Beirut newspaper said:

“Sadat had entered a new history and his name will be added with Herzl, Balfour, Weizman, Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan—one of the founding member.”¹⁷

Particularly, for the Palestinians it was most shocking since it was the most powerful Arab state, upon whom the majority depended, Sadat was paying homage in *Yad Vashem*, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem and a great admirer of Hitler succumbed to Jews.¹⁸ It was very obvious from the context of Begin's speech in Knesset that nothing would come out of the historic visit. As Begin had not mentioned the issue of Palestinian state, told very frankly that he had not taken foreign land that Egypt claimed in the form of West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Height. Sadat returned empty handed from Israel and without any assurance for further concession.

He dropped another bombshell when he called for another Cairo conference in which he called Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the UN, the US, Soviet and Israel. Sadat's visit had already sabotaged the Geneva peace conference and Sadat was having full support of his member in Parliament. Once his foreign minister told him:

¹⁷ . Ibid, p.250

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 250.

“If you do not get Arab support for peace, come to Parliament, we are ready to give you mandate to conclude separate peace”¹⁹

Sadat’s call for Cairo conference was rejected by all parties except Israel which was adhered to its principle of not permitting the PLO participation in any of peace conference and here again Sadat succumbed to Israel pressure. Cairo conference also resulted into failure and from here on the whole diplomacy of peace was revolving around three countries of the US, Israel and Egypt.

Camp David

Sadat could not leave his peace effort because he had fought the war itself with slogan of ‘war for peace’ and this peace effort was proving tougher than war. Begin was in Egypt on 25 the December and presented a Palestine autonomy plan which was rejected by Sadat who termed it as anti-Arab. Even at this stage Sadat was optimistic of convincing Israel and US for concessions and to save Arab unity. A newspaper cartoon depicted Begin’s proposal in the following manner:

“Begin flying over pyramid away from Islamia while an official looking down and saying that would be a good spot for building Jewish settlement”²⁰

There was total impasse in the West Asian peace process from Cairo conference September 1978. This period of impasse was full of efforts on both sides to exert much pressure on US administration to extract concessions. Both sides engaged in diplomatic and counter diplomatic visits to US for putting their agenda. Sadat was confronted with so many dilemmas during this period of impasse. In exchange of

¹⁹ . Ibid., p.2 89.

²⁰ . Ibid., p.259.

recognition to Israel, he wanted assurance of a Palestinian state whereby he could tell his people about his achievement and claim that his recognition of Israel was not without its rewards. As Sadat told Begin in December:

“I must have something in hand other wise they will stone me to death”²¹

Sadat had often asserted that the subject of Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian state were not subjects of negotiation but the subject of implementation. Perhaps Sadat intended to use this logic for concluding separate agreement with Israel and he was anticipating that separate agreement route would be far easier to negotiate and the expected yields for Egypt were likely to outweigh the anticipated cost. The Tripoli conference convened by rejectionist state and Syria following the initiative had done little damage and their limited power did not enable them to take on meaningful acts against Egypt. Sadat still wanted one or more countries to join this peace process as a shield against criticism and issue of Palestinian state which he apparently adhered to was part of the strategy. The separate Sinai-II had given Israel virtual veto power to deal separately with the PLO. Sadat was well aware of reaction of the Arab world and never wanted to be branded as traitor to the Arab cause and wanted to safeguard his capabilities in the moderate camp of the Arab world. Sadat’s decision to break off the negotiation with Israel was clearly result of Begin’s refusal to make deep concession that Sadat needed for his comprehensive solution. Sadat’s regular feature was to invoke US support for his agenda while

²¹ . Hirst and Beesan, n.7, P.294

Egyptian-Israel deadlock showed no sign of easing, the role of US took on greater and greater importance and both sides recognized this and spared no effort in wooing public opinion and the Congress. Sadat's Camp David visit in February, 1978 and counter visit by Begin in March were part of this exercise.

Sadat always proclaimed that he had given Israel every thing by having gone to Jerusalem and he could not give any more and so burden of concession was placed on Israel. Begin again visited Washington in April 1978 and he was adamant of three nos: no to 242, no to Sinai withdrawal and no to self-determination in West Bank and Gaza. The visit of Begin was termed by Cyrus Vance as diplomatic disaster and the relation between Israel and US had reached to lowest point after 1956.

In May 1978 Sadat came out with another proposal that called for the return of West Bank and Gaza to Jordan and Egypt respectively if Begin were ready to accept Resolution no. 242. This offer was quickly rejected by Begin. The terms of Sinai-II were to expire in October 1978 and Sadat had threatened to go for war if progress is not made regarding withdrawal. Begin called this a total violation of his Knesset speech in which Sadat promised of no more war. For his part, Sadat wished to keep both option open to conclude separate peace or to go for comprehensive peace.

US Secretary of State was in West Asia carrying the letter from Carter to Begin and Sadat inviting them at Camp David on 5

September, 1978. Now Egypt, Israel and US had accepted that an Egyptian -Israeli peace treaty would have to be accompanied by some agreement on Palestine issue and on the future of West Bank and Gaza. Before leaving for Camp David, Sadat told Egyptians that it would determine the fate of the region. This invitation of Carter was a step towards removing deadlocks that existed after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. US had seen such a prospect with an alarm because suspension of negotiation would be set-back for Sadat and for the entire peace process.

After two meetings between Begin and Sadat at Camp David, the conference had produced tension and increased disagreement. Procedures were arranged so as to avoid further confrontations. Carter's security adviser and Cyrus Vance met separately with Begin and Sadat. It was at this separate meeting between US and each party that most important negotiations took place and the most significant concessions were made. On 17 September 1978, President Carter announced the conclusion of an agreement that consisted of two documents, namely, "The framework for peace in the Middle East" and "The framework for the conclusion of peace treaty between Egypt and Israel."

The former was an elaboration of autonomy plans of Begin presented in December 1977 under which, a self-governing authority was to be established in five transitional years. By third year, negotiations for the status of West Bank and Gaza and peace treaty between Jordan & Israel, migration issue, settlement will begin. No

Palestinian state was mentioned in Camp David agreement. Carter sent Vance to Riyadh and Amman to quell their opposition and to convince them of relevance of this treaty.

The Camp David Accord was to be signed on in 17 December, 1978 and it was agreed at that no more settlement would be build for five years in the West Bank and Gaza. But Israeli settlement activities continued even before agreement was signed and differences between the parties resurfaced and produced some unexpected difficulties.

To further negotiation process that was to lead for signing the Camp David, talk began at Blair House in Washington on 11 October 1978 in which Egypt was represented by acting foreign minister, Boutros Ghali who succeeded Kamel who had resigned in September during Camp David negotiations. But the formulated draft failed to receive the approval of both parties in their Parliament and these differences stemmed from the domestic pressures.

Jordan did not attend the negotiation as was called in the document. Saudi criticism was becoming louder and there was some grumbling within Egyptian own cabinet. Sadat was under heavy pressure to show that his policy was yielding real gain not only for Egypt but for Palestine also. Israeli government was also under heavy attack for concession that it had made in Camp David.

The month of December, the month to sign Camp David agreement came and went and no progress was made and effort to overcome these obstacle was conducted through US. US attitude was

much influenced by anxiety of Sadat political standing and to prevent his political isolation in the Arab world. US was caught between the risk of loosing face if the negotiation failed and the concerns that if they succeeded, they would not win goodwill for the US in the Arab world unless the agreements went much further in satisfying demands.

Much effort was invested by US in persuading Arab opinion that the Camp David accord was a framework within which additional Arab parties could expect to advance their own interest. The suspicion between Begin and Carter reached a point that Begin refused invitation of Carter in February 1979 to avoid being placed under extreme pressure for more concessions. Reacting to this attitude of Begin, Sadat said:

“Begin is trying to escape from cage of peace.”²²

Carter was under heavy pressure from pro-Israeli lobby inside Congress against asking further concessions from Begin.

Carter set out for West Asian tour and the final breakthrough occurred as result of dramatic and forceful intervention by President Carter. His talks with Begin in March yielded important Israeli concession and thereafter Carter obtained further concession from Egypt when he visited Egypt on 8 March, 1979. Sadat established diplomatic relation with Israel and pledged special access to Sinai oil. US promised Israel of oil export for fifteen years in case Egypt did not

²² . Armesto ,n. 12, p. 143.

keep its commitments. On 26 March 1979, Begin and Sadat met at White House and signed historic agreement at an impressive treaty.

For Arab world, this was a historic calamity. Egypt opted out of Arab order and allied itself with the US and sought peace with Israel. All the Arab countries rejected the Camp David agreement and even Morocco which was very much instrumental in holding secret talks between Egypt and Israel did not approve of Camp David agreement. A rejectionist body formed consisting of Iraq, Syria, Algeria, the PLO and Libya which totally boycotted the Camp David agreement. The country like Tunisia which was first to create the idea of direct negotiation with Israel ejected the Camp David. The Arab summit in Baghdad in March 1979 brought about final diplomatic break with Egypt and Islamic conference at Fez in Morocco voted to expel the Egypt from Arab league and Arab league head quarter was shifted to Tunisia.

The Arab leaders tried to buy back Sadat by offering \$ 100 million loan if he ditched the Camp David Accords but it was of no avail. Sadat reacted to this offer by claiming that he had signed Camp David for peace, not for money.²³ As Sadat had preferred Sinai over Arab fund, all Arab aid was stopped after this agreement. Sadat claimed that rejectionist nations were Soviet clients.

Reaction within Egypt was a mixture of support and rejection. Within political establishment, there was strong opposition but in general people on the street supported it because for them it was relief

²³ Armesto, n.12, p. 71.

from war as they had already made too much sacrifices. There were many differences in reaction to Crossing of Suez Canal in 1973 October war and Camp David agreement. After camp David, there was not that enthusiasm witnessed that was seen in October war. This time Sadat was not called hero of peace as was the case after war. People had very relaxed approach to this agreement since the dignity of Arab world was not an obsession in Egypt. After the October war Egyptians were free of morbid obsession with dignity and honour. People were of the view that this peace would bring economic prosperity, a life free of terror and fear and an easy life. During last one decade, Egyptian attitude had changed towards Arab cause and they had become first and last Egyptian people. Egypt's first sentiment aspired people for good future so they were in general not opposed to Camp David agreement.

Within Islamic group, strongest opposition came from Brotherhood which called this agreement un-Islamic and surrender to imperialist and Zionist forces and Sadat was accused of selling the Arab national and Islamic interest. Islamic group were of the view that this agreement would increase the influence of US in the West Asia and would legitimize the Zionist forces in the region. In contrast to reaction of Muslim Brotherhood, the response of Al-Azhar University, Cairo's most ancient Islamic institution was very surprising.

“The scholars of Al-Azhar think that the Egyptian Israel's agreement is founded on Islamic rules because it arises from a position of (Islamic) strength, after the holy war and victory Egypt achieved an 10th Ramadan 1393. The peace of al-Hudaybiya also arose from the position of strength of Muhammad army. There is blessing in this (Egyptian-Israel's) treaty because it returns to the Muslims Muslim lands part of

them earlier according to the arrangement and part later according to certain condition.”²⁴

This statement of Al-Azhar was very much indicative of the difference among the general section of Egyptian society regarding reaction to Camp David agreement.

Despite knowing the reaction of the Arab world, Sadat could not deter himself from going for peace agreement. He was well convinced that Arab had no choice but to follow Egypt's course since without Egypt they were military and diplomatically incapable of pursuing war or different kind of peace. At the first Baghdad conference after Camp David, virtually the whole Arab world including Sadat's close allies closed ranks in a working that Egypt could not have both separate peace with Israel and normal relation with Arab. All Arab opposition to his policy only aggravated Egyptian alienation from the Arab world.

Sadat asserted that Arab world needed Egypt more than Egypt needed them. In the eyes of Sadat, Egypt was the leader of Arab civilization, culture, heritage and Arab people and because of its internal weakness and split, the Arab world would have to come to terms with Egypt. Sadat had no problem in creating small and tiny enemies to have strong economic and military power on his side in the shape of US and to keep an old rival away in form of Israel. He accused the Arab world of doing little for Palestine cause and keeping Egypt starving and driving them to pain. Sadat was assisted by global political

²⁴ . Ronald Nettler “Muslim scholar on peace with Israel” *Midstream* (Tel Aviv) vol.26

environment helpful towards Egypt. Because of the fact that the Arab world would react very sharply to the Camp David, Sadat had already opened its economic and diplomatic door to various African and western European Countries.

Sadat was frustrated with division among the Arab world over peace issue with Israel. He made full effort to create a common consensus among Arab world and was adhered till the last to the idea of Palestinian state. When time was running against his peace initiative, he abandoned the cause of Arab world but hoped that the US administration would do something to save his face. Sadat wanted the participation of parties in the peace initiative and for this purpose, he had called for Cairo conference but none of the Arab partner accepted his invitation. Only then he analysed the internal split of Arab world and greater Arab disarray that pushed Sadat from the Arab fold. The Arab suspension of various aid and joint project was compensated by huge US aid which Sadat was expecting after Camp David agreement. It was his economic need that forced Sadat to accept partial agreement.

The level of US non-military aid remained unchanged from 1976 for seven years which totaled around \$ 7.6 billion which made Egypt together with Israel the recipient of about half of all America economic assistance. The aid had started only in 1974 after Sinai-I when the US had give \$ 85 million for an initial program and in 1975 additional \$ 50 million was given to restructure the budget. After Sinai-II this amount was raised to \$ 500 million. In 1979, the US already acted to shift \$

190 million in already committed capital development funds. Later as a reward for reaching peace accord with Israel at Camp David, the US Congress agreed to supplement the aid to Egypt by \$ 300 million over a three years period.²⁵ The Camp David agreement brought internal prosperity but at regional level it broke the Arab solidarity and cracks among the Arab was very much visible and the whole slogans of Arab world, Arab nationalism, Arab people was proved to be a hollow.

Assassination:-

Sadat's mind was modified by varying response to his peace initiative. He believed that only his view was correct and attitude set in of

“I am the best leader- no one has the right to oppose me.”²⁶

By early 1979, there evolved an informal group known as “Group of 100” that began speaking out against Camp David and calling for democracy. The stability of Egypt which he had constructed showed increasing sign of strain and was convinced of forthcoming crisis so he became Prime Minister in a cabinet reshuffle of May 1980. The most intractable problem Sadat faced was the erosion of his programme of peace as policies of peace were threatened by loss of momentum of Camp David. Nothing was achieved after two years of negotiation with Israel. Talks on Palestinian autonomy and status of Jerusalem remained deadlocked.

²⁵ Marvin G. Weinbaum “Egypt's Infetah and the politics of U.S. economic assistance” Middle Eastern Studies (1985) 207-222.

²⁶ . Kirk, n.1. p.235.

The Camp David accord had set April 1982 as the target date for final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and it was assumed that this agreement on other issue would also be achieved by him. Begin was quite unsympathetic to the issue of Palestinian autonomy and Jerusalem and was in no mood to change his stand over these complicated issues. The slow collapse of Camp David had begun in May 1980 itself when deadline for Palestinian autonomy talk passed without progress.

In November, he renewed an already rejected offer to Israel to exchange a million cubic meters of water a day for settlement of the Jerusalem question. Sadat traveled to various European countries to revive momentum and urge new initiative that might supplement the work of Camp David. Egypt had no peace at home when main opposition party, the socialist labour party, announced the withdrawal of its support in February 1981 for camp David because of Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and continuing policy of settlement activities in West Bank. Egypt's national consensus for Sadat's peace policy had broken down.

Sadat was also facing opposition over the failure of Infetah, government corruption and constraint on political liberalization. The economic grievances of the majority added to political danger and Sadat responded with large scale crackdown against all political parties. Arrests were being made, political freedom was controlled, opposition voice was crushed and various opposition leaders were thrown in jail. Another major threat for Sadat was from new activities of Brotherhood,

which got new strength after Iranian revolution. This development was major threat for Sadat after signing of Camp David. Brotherhood had attacked every attempt of Sadat to solve the problem peacefully as they considered it as a religious confrontation between Islam and Judaism. For Brotherhood, Palestine was an Islamic question and no government had any right to offer any concession. After camp David. Brotherhood intensified its attack especially with regard to normalization of relations with Israel. By early 1980, it had gained very large popularity and enjoyed great sympathy and support among the masses.

By 1981, Sadat had reneged on many of his earlier promises regarding political dissent and opposition of press, on Parliament as well as other forms of political organizations. In fact the wide spectrum arrests made in September of 1981 showed how seriously Sadat had eroded mass support for his political legitimacy. Over 1,500 individuals including almost all key opposition figures were thrown behind the bars. These arrests set the stage for the assassination of Sadat. The specific plan to kill Sadat had come from a young military officer who was the part of a unit that had participated in October 6 parades. It was the anniversary of the Suez Crossing of 1973 that the parade was intended to commemorate and First Lt. Khalid al-Islam Boli's team took part in the military parade. When Sadat rose from his seat to receive the parade, he was assassinated by Khalid who later in a trial boasted "I killed the Pharaoh."

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Conclusion

Sadat's policy for one decade as President may be described as reversal of Nasser's policy that Egypt had followed for fifteen years. His journey as the President from war to peace with Israel was the reflection and manifestation of domestic, regional and global circumstances in which he survived.

His foreign policy towards Israel for one decade was very much motivated and forced by changing domestic, regional and global scenario at economic and political level.

He never had any defined principle of his policy towards Israel but it was full of dramatic changes and his every next move was different from the last one.

One major theme of his foreign policy towards Israel was pro-active policy unlike his policy towards other Arab countries where he adopted a total reverse policy from his predecessor.

Basic thrust of Sadat by October war was to seek a political solution through military strategy and he noted to break the stalemate that was existing for last so many years. He initiated this war as a tool to open the political possibilities and to get political dividends by this war. His policy of limited was in itself was very much indicative of his strategy that he had in his mind.

Sadat's decision to go into war was politically motivated and his move was full of political strategies and his decision to go for peace with Israel was result of his gradual abandonment of pro-active Arab policy

of his predecessor and his assessment of internal split and internal rivalry and weakness among the different Arab nations. In his political assessment, he was quite optimistic that because of the internal weakness and mistrust among various Arab countries, no unanimous decision could be reached, so he went for peace. Not only this , but deteriorating economic conditions, strategic partnership between US and Israel and his open economic policy also forced him for forging separate peace.

He took very dramatic step in reversing the old and conventional policy of Egypt towards Arab world. He took no time in abandoning the cause of pan-Arabism and asserted that pro-active Arab policy was no more useful for Egypt in light of deteriorating economic situation, changing global political scenario and the regional political equation. Sadat violated the concept of united stand on Palestine question that dominated the regional policies since the establishment of the Jewish state. His policy regarding Arab-Israel conflict was a disaster's for Arab world but relatively beneficial for Egypt. Contrary to his predecessor, Sadat advocated and practiced a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other Arab countries and talked of Arab solidarity and was not interested in leading the Arab world.

Sadat was the man of vision, ahead of his time and it was his realistic policy that made him convinced that since Israel had the US support its existence cannot be wished away. Since Israel had become a reality, its existence must be recognized.

He broke the twenty years alliance with Soviet Union and entered the western capitalist block and here it was again his rational and pragmatic attitude that made him to take this stand. His turn towards West and particularly towards America was motivated by his desire for peace and to reform the economic mess which Egypt had been trapped after the June 1967 war. This economic factor played great role in shaping the orientation of Sadat's foreign policy towards Israel and poor economy led him to adopt inward looking policy and follow purely Egyptian policy that would serve the national interest of Egypt.

When he opened the economy in 1974, he recognized that foreign investment and foreign aid could be achieved only when good relations were forged with the western capitalist countries. It was his economic and domestic political constrain that forced to abandon the tradition Egyptian ally, the Soviet Union. Sadat's ideological and political consideration overshadowed by his own pragmatic approach and he preferred to go with one strong capitalist and political power in form of America after creating so many enemies among the Arab world. His anticipation that the turmoil would be very much temporary that later proved correct.

Sadat was a reactionary person and he gradually rejected all policies of Nasser and ushered in an era of de-Nasserization. He lacked the charisma of Nasser and could never gain that popularity and fame of his predecessor. He never emerged as a mass leader since his personality was located in cult of bourgeoisie section and he could never associate himself with the masses.

As far as peace was concerned, his total surrender and throwing lot with US did not prove that useful as it proved in his economic reform. At this front, Sadat failed because no progress could be achieved on autonomy issue while he was adhered to idea that progress in peace and autonomy in Palestine should be reciprocal. Israel was inflexible as far as the Palestinian autonomy was concerned and here the real gain was for Israel which brought Egypt out of Arab fold and left it in no position where it could neither re-claim the Arab leadership nor do much on Palestinian issue. This agreement gave security to Israel against further war, and left other Arab countries leaderless which could lead them against Israel.

Other Arab countries were victim of his in-ward looking policy. Syria was biggest victim and Jordan also suffered its dignity in the Arab world. Iraq emerged as the new frontier state replacing Egypt which itself later replaced by Saudi Arabia after the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war.

Sometime Sadat showed his weakness and was very compromising and this was proved by the conclusion of Camp David agreements. At the time of crisis he became more and more autocrat which made him to proscribe opponents of the Camp David accords.

Sadat risked the national identity as well as the Arab identity of Egypt by leaving the cause of Arab unity and its solidarity. He totally gave up the Palestinian cause and was not obsessed with leading the Arab world. Nasser's slogans of pan-Arabism became useless for Sadat as he could not continue that pro-active Arab policy. He proved himself

to be Egyptian nationalist and narrowed down Egyptian boundary which would serve the political interest through his foreign policy devoted to peace with Israel and domestic economic prosperity. It was a great irony that after doing much for Egyptian people, his death was mourned more in Western countries than Egypt and it was taken as disaster in Israel but not in Egypt.

He was not isolated in his life time only but even his funeral could not unite the Arab leader behind him. As Israeli Prime Minister Begin was attending the funeral, all the Arab leaders boycotted the occasion. He was taken to the funeral ground not as an Arab leader but as an Egyptian leader. In words of Heikel

"Sadat was killed because he scarified the cause of Arab for his relation with America and Israel" ¹

In the words of another scholar

"This assassination was an execution of system that undermined the Arab identity"²

To sum up, Sadat was a man of constant action and his political and diplomatic strategy had been the creation of circumstances and it evolved out of existing scenario. It was his policy of adaptation that transformed him from hero of crossing to peace maker and he was the man who was acclaimed for initiating the war and after few years he was criticized for making peace with Israel.

¹ Kirk, J. Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat Years* (New York, 2000), p 189.

² Hirst and Beason, *Sadat* (London, 1981), p. 13.

It can be summed up that his decision to go into war and again going for peace was result of domestic, regional and global circumstances as he was master of adaptation and survival, ready to change strategy quickly in course of his political maneuver. Sadat personality represented a diplomat, professional politician and a fox whose political skills enabled him to manipulate the condition for his own objectives.

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