

**“BORDER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AMERICA :  
A CASE STUDY OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE”**

**DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

for the award of the Degree of

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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**2001**




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
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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to a number of people who have directly or indirectly helped me in completion of my work.. I am very grateful to my supervisor Dr. S.S. Deora for his support and guidance. I am deeply indebted to my friends for their support. The assistance of the staff of IDSA library and the ICWA is gratefully acknowledged. Particular thanks are due to Mr. Ricardo Leon of the Embassy of the Republic of Chile.

*Krishnendra*

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**CHAPTER I**

**INTRODUCTION**

Human societies have a strong attachment to territory, seeking to exercise absolute control over tracts of land regard as vital living space. Throughout the long process of the evolution of the Homo sapiens, hunting and nomadic groups have recognized territories, but definition becomes really important for sedentary agriculturists, so land division was recorded as early as the Sumerian times. The Romans carefully demarcated their imperial territories, private estates, and even parcels of land. The growth of a monetary of a monetary economy in the middle ages made legal definition of land parcels and titles increasingly important as land ownership became an ever more attractive form of individual wealth and a lucrative taxable asset. This encouraged states themselves to define more carefully the country over which they claimed sovereignty, so vaguely defined marches were replaced by exactly demarcated frontier boundary lines. In modern times the whole land surface have been shaped into legally defined territories and the process has begun to be extended over the marine space also.

Apart from its value as living space, society sentimentally treasures territory as one of its most sacrosanct possessions. The national territory usually has a prominent place in the nation's iconography, with the homeland personified as the 'fatherland' or 'motherland' and attachment to expressed in the cultural activities of the population, with the surrender of any of it regarded as unacceptable. Nevertheless feudalism, built of a hierarchy regarded territory less importantly than the modern nation-state, so monarchs laid less value on compact territories than was later the case. The absolutist monarchical state became more

dependent on territory as a source of wealth, and consequently more interested in a careful definition of the of its lands it held, while the shift to the state idea centered around the nation intensified the meaning of territory. Nations have usually clearly perceived ideas of the extent to what they regard as rightly their homeland. Unfortunately not infrequently, the territory regarded by one group as rightly its own overlaps a similar perception by another group, creating conflicting claims to that particular tract of country.

Boundaries being the lines being the lines of demarcation of areas of different sovereignty define territorial limits of the state over which it exercises sovereignty are the contact They assume a significant role as they. Boundaries as they have evolved from frontiers, which were zones of transition between areas of different authority, became lines as the concept of sovereignty and the idea of demarcation of a state's territory took root with the passage of time. This process of evolution was marked by struggles for acquisition of territory through force. These conflicts were fought to settle the overlapping claims of the contestants. The motive of these conflicts was to settle the territorial claims according to the contesting nations' perception of their territorial sovereignty. Almost all of the boundary disputes have their origin in historical evolution of the term from 'frontier ' to 'boundary'.

The modern concept of state lays stress on precise demarcation of territorial limits on one hand and on the other the integrative processes tend to make the border limits more susceptible to infiltration. Advancements in the modes of communication, and presence of homogenous people on both sides of the border lead to interaction of different forms among the neighboring states. The insistence of governments on the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty causes the adoption of stringent measures along the border limits. The integrative processes cause movement of people and goods across the limits. The illegal passage of commodities and people has a direct effect on the sovereignty of a nation. The governments deploy their military forces to maintain a constant surveillance on the borders. The complications assume more significance when combined with the illegal traffic of arms, ammunition and narcotics.

The physiography of the boundaries also might prove to be hindrance in the sharing of resources. The physical and relief features influence the definition of boundaries owing to their morphology. Mountains, swamps and marshes due to their inherent structure are difficult relief and topographic features to demarcate boundary lines upon them. The rivers are also conspicuous features as they change their course, and cause problems in demarcation. These areas become points of constant tension if the demarcation is not so precise. The bordering nations try to acquire points which have the capacity to accord geo-strategic advantages to one



nations upon another. The contesting nations keep such areas under their possession and take measures to keep their sovereignty intact.

The resource sharing along the borders and the tendency of the states to retrieve their lost territories provides geopolitical importance to boundary limits.

South America being a region of relative isolation in the global arena has its own geopolitical interaction among the states. This relative isolation of the continent has allowed local geopolitical ambitions to operate which have their root in the European geopolitical thought. The geopolitics combined with the problems of clear demarcation of the boundary lines present a complex scenario to be scrutinized. The problematic delineation due to reliance on physiographical features as boundary lines has led to problems in resource sharing which play a significant role in geopolitical aspirations of the states in the continent.

The geographical proximity of the US with South America makes it susceptible and more vulnerable to be affected by the drug production. American interests in the continent assume more significance as the revolutionary guerilla organizations present a threat to the functioning of democracies, which in turn affect the stability in the region. Despite repeated negotiative gestures, the U.S. has been unsuccessful in checking the production of narcotic crops (marijuana, poppies and coca) grown extensively in most of the Latin American countries. The drug crops

are given precedence over other crops because they are commercially viable for the poor farmers and fetch immensely high prices in the world market where the trade is carried on illegally.

The three major players in the Southern cone are Brazil, Argentina and Chile With their geopolitical schools of thought. The origin of these schools of thought can be traced back to 1960s when military establishments in the Southern cone assumed power. The geopolitics of these major states is deeply related to each other. Brazil being the major player in the continent stands out as the dominant state in the affairs of the continent. The second tier states of Argentina and Chile have projected Their contrasting viewpoints regarding the sharing of resources and demarcation of boundary lines. The geopolitical opinions of these states came to the fore during the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, which was in line with their respective ideas of presence in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific. The beagle Channel dispute though arrived at a solution by the contesting parties accords advantageous position to Argentina. The solution came through Papal mediation in 1978 when the two nations came very close to a war.

Another instance was the Falklands/Malvinas dispute of 1982 when Argentina fought a war with Britain over these islands and was decisively defeated. The Chileans abstained from voting in the OAS meeting, which supported Argentina. Brazil though supported Argentina was not very forthcoming in it's statements as

it called them 'Argentine cousins'. The geopolitical interests of Argentina in the islands were that they were aiming to establish 'choke points' in the passage to Pacific and Chile and Brazil had other ideas. Chile having the same intentions in the Atlantic and Brazil resented the geostrategic advantages that the acquisition of islands would accord to Argentina.

The 'ice continent' or the Antarctica with its complications in the sectoral demarcation of the area and the real or perceived presence of resources is another point for geopolitical scrutiny. The Antarctic Treaty System of 1959 demarcated the territory from 20 W longitude to 90 W longitude among the three nations of Argentina, Chile and Britain where the territorial claims of these states overlap with each other. The claims of other nations in the resource sharing of this 'common heritage of mankind are not to be underestimated.

The South Atlantic is another region where the nations of Southern cone interlock their interests because it holds a geostrategic location. The presence of Britain in Falklands, South Orkneys and South Sandwich and the passage of ocean routes make it an area of geopolitical significance.

Argentina and Chile share a border along the Andes Mountains and in the southern islands at the Cape Horn. The length of these borders is 5300 kms. The enormity

of the borders combined with rugged terrain poses many problems in the management of borders.

**CHAPTER II**

**FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES**

### **Borders as a Historical Process**

Frontiers and boundaries are respectively the zones and lines with separate areas of different political authority.<sup>1</sup> International boundaries are global geo-political phenomena, which affect the lives of millions of people, and they are among the top preoccupations of governments and the military. Boundaries also create social and cultural landscapes and fundamentally affect communications, settlement patterns and access to resources. In states with long and insecure boundaries substantial sums are spent on their protection and management.

There are two aspects of boundary and frontier studies. First, the position and character of any boundary or frontier is the outcome of the interaction of many factors viz. social, cultural, economic and geographical. Second, once any boundary and frontier has been established it is capable of influencing the landscape of which it is a part and the development and policies of separated states.

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<sup>1</sup> See an article by J. R. V. Prescott, "Political Geography" in the field of Geography edited by W. B. Morgan and J. C. Pugh, Methuen, London 1972.

### **The Origin and Evolution of Terms**

The word "frontier" implies what it suggests etymologically, that is, that which is "in front". The frontier was not abstract term or line; on the contrary a designated area which was part of a whole, specifically that part which was ahead of the hinterland.<sup>2</sup> Hence, it was often called the foreland, or borderland or march. In its historical origin the frontier was not a politico-legal concept. It was rather a manifestation of the spontaneous tendency for the growth of the acumen. Since, the beginning of civilization, the frontier was on the margin of the inhabited world, but each particular ecumene, for instance, that of the agricultural society had its frontiers. The lines of the Roman Empire were those of the ecumene of Western Civilization. With the development of patterns of civilization above the level of mere subsistence strictly adapted to particular environmental conditions, the frontiers between the ecumene became meeting places not merely of different

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<sup>2</sup> See an article by L. K. D. Kristoff, "The nature of frontiers and boundaries", *Annals of the association of American Geographers*, Vol.49, September 1959.

ways of physical survival, but also different concepts of good life, and hence increasingly political in character. But even at this the "frontier" meant quite literally the front, since it indicated the direction for future territorial expansion of the state. The etymology of the word "boundary" immediately points to the primary function of the boundary. The boundary indicates certain well-established limits (the bounds) of the given political unit, and all that which is within the boundary is bound together that is fastened by an internal bond.<sup>3</sup>

"Boundary" is a term appropriate to the present day concept of the state, that is, the state as sovereign spatial unit. The essentials of statehood both from the functional and legal point of view are: territory, people and a government in effective control internally, independent externally, and willing and able to assume obligation in international law. Sovereignty is territorial; hence it must have a certain known extent: a territory under exclusive jurisdiction limited by state boundaries. The modern state is bound within and confined to its legal limits. The boundaries bind together an area and a people which live under one sovereign government and law are at least presumably integrated not only administratively and economically but also by means of state idea.<sup>4</sup> AT the same time the state is marked of from its neighbors by a political boundaries. In an age of acceptance of

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<sup>3</sup> R.D Dikshit, "Political Geography- the discipline and its dimensions, Tata McGraw Hill, New Delhi 1997.

<sup>4</sup> See and article by Stephen B. Jones, "Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time", Annals of the association of American geographers. Vol. 49 September 1949.



coexistence of many states it is an important to have the spheres of the centripetal, integrating forces legally delimited. The historical process of transition from intermediate frontier region to boundary lines was a logical corollary of the changeover from tribal law to territorial law. The tribal political organization was marked by cooperation and competition between the laws of kinship and territory. The territorial principle is never absent, even where kinship appears to be of overwhelming importance. The territorial principle has tended to dominate as political development has progressed; though relics of kinship appear. Sovereignty in the modern state is essentially territorial, whereas blood relationship and not territory was the basis of the tribal state.

The presence of fixed boundary lines is evident only at the end of the Middle Ages. The state jurisdiction was limited by vague border zones, but there were no boundary lines. The frontier was merely a place where the state put halt to its authority; it had no recognition in public law. The need for fixed boundaries arose only after the modern states of Europe developed to take the place of the Holy Roman Empire. This development brought the population of the neighboring pairs of states in closed proximity to each other, so that it became imperative that they should know the precise limit of their territorial jurisdiction.

Another factor, which hindered the rise of defined linear boundaries, was the hierarchical character of feudal authority.<sup>5</sup> Feudalism began as a personal bond between two individuals, a lord offering protection and favor, a vassal offering loyalty and service-the system had ended up with complex sets of overlapping, divided and often conflicting loyalties.

The first foundations toward the emergence of the modern territorial state were laid by the end of 16<sup>th</sup> century, Edict of Nantes (1598), marking the end of the religious wars and grant of religious matter should be treated as internal affair of the state. This, on the one hand, strengthened the hand of the sovereign in enforcing loyalty and certain homogeneity of outlook among all the inhabitant of the realm, and on the other, was a milestone toward the establishment of the principle of impenetrability of the state's territory which is the cornerstone of concept of sovereignty and of the modern international system. And once this principle impenetrability was recognized, it became possible for each state to develop its national law, the law of the land.<sup>6</sup> In this sense boundaries are political legal phenomenon.

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<sup>5</sup> R.D Dikshit, " Political Geography- the discipline and its dimensions, Tata McGraw Hill, New Delhi 1997.

<sup>6</sup> J.R. V Prescott, " Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries", Hutchinson University Library, Croom Helm, London 1978.

In the process of boundary evolution, three stages of international boundary formation have been differentiated. The first stage of allocation concerns a simple political division of territory and gives the first general shape to the states involved. Straight lines connecting known geographical features such as the mountains and sources of rivers and waterfalls, coordinates of latitude and longitude are common characteristics of such boundaries. These lines would usually be refined during the stage of delimitation. This involves the selection of specific boundary site which would require detail geographical knowledge not available when the allocation was made. The final stage of boundary development is called demarcation; this requires that the boundary should be marked on the ground by any appropriate means including pillars, cleared vistas and fences. As the international boundary passes through the stages of allocation, delimitation and demarcation, its definition may become increasingly precise and the location of boundary may alter. Since dispute will find their source in faulty definitions or objections to particular locations, the location must be known in assessing the influence, which it may have on national or individual behavior. Characteristics of the behavior of the states to each other are also revealed by boundary disputes. Such disputes can be divided into four classes. Firstly, there are those disputes where a state lays claim to land or territorial waters belonging to another state, and these are called territorial disputes. Secondly, there are disputes over discrepancies between the definition of the boundary and the boundary demarcation, and these are called positional disputes. The state initiating

territorial or positional disputes is seeking an alteration in the position of the boundary, either to acquire certain areas or to make the demarcated line coincide with the define line. The third kind of dispute relates to the functions applied at the boundary by states. The recurring complaints by the Bonn government against the restrictions on travel to West Berlin raised by the government of East Germany provided the best example of such functional disputes. Fourthly, an increasing number of disputes concern the use of some resource, which spans the boundary, such as a river, oyster bed or oilfield. These are called resource dispute. Any state, which initiates a boundary dispute of any kind, is seeking to gain some advantage. In some cases the advantage sought is permanent and tangible. For example Israel raised the thorny problem of an agreement concerning the use of Jordan waters so that the agriculture economy of the state could be strengthen, so that more settlers could be accommodated in Israel, an so that certain lightly populated could be more intensively settled.

### **Boundary Concepts and Nationality**

Ideas about boundaries are inescapably related to the geographical and historical milieu of the political communities, as they are a product of felt human needs to demarcate of precise limits of their political jurisdiction on the ground. Ideas about boundaries therefore vary in space as well as time and reflect differences in national goals and objectives. Thus, the French (who possessed a somewhat geographically well defined territory) pleaded for consultation of the law of nature for guidance to fix their national territories, but the Germans, when faced with the task of creating a unified German state, pleaded in favor of the concept of

boundaries based on folklore nationality. German philosophers, like Fichte, did not discard the concept of natural law, but they insisted that common language and culture constituted a natural law, higher than that of rivers and mountains.

The German doctrine of national boundaries (based on language and a shared way of life), with its inherent concept of “the Divine Right of People” for national self determination, became the basis for redrawing the political map of Europe following the defeat of Germany in the First World War.<sup>7</sup> Then on, nationality became increasingly identified with language. The principle of self-determination on the basis of linguistic nationality, established at Paris in 1919, became the guiding principle for fixing boundaries worldwide.

### **The Dynamics of Border Interaction:**

Recent tendencies in various parts of the world towards increased interdependence and integration among nations have greatly enhanced interaction among borderlands populations. Trans-boundary trade, tourism, migration and the prevailing social and cultural relationships have linked regions of adjoining countries ever closer to one another.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

Conditions in borderlands worldwide vary considerably because of profound differences in size of nation-states, their political relationships, their levels of development, and their ethnic, cultural and linguistic configurations.<sup>8</sup> Despite this heterogeneity, however, it is possible to generalize about features common to all and to posit a classification scheme based on cross border contact. AS the world has evolved geopolitically, more and more border lands have tended toward convergence rather than divergence, but unfavorable conditions in many areas still keep neighboring borderlanders in a state of limited interaction. Thus in categorizing in borderlands it essential to assess cross-border movement and the forces that produce it. With such considerations, four paradigms of borderlands interactions are proposed; alienated borderlands, coexistent borderlands, interdependent, an integrated borderlands.

This refers to borderlands where day to day, routine boundary interchange is practically nonexistent owing to extremely unfavorable conditions.<sup>9</sup> Warfare, political disputes, intense nationalism, ideological animosity, religious enmity, cultural dissimilarity and ethnic rivalry constitute major causes of such alienation. International strife leads to militarisation and the establishment of rigid control over cross border traffic.

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<sup>8</sup> See an article I. D. Amaral, "New Reflections on Theme of International Boundaries", in *Global Boundaries* edited by Clive H. Schofield, Routledge, London 1994

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

Such a tension filled climate seriously interferes with the efforts of local population to lead normal lives. International trade and substantive people to people contact are very difficult if not impossible. The ever present possibility of large-scale violence keeps these unstable areas sparsely populated and underdeveloped. Currently, alienated border plants are found in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.

Coexistence arises between adjoining borderlands when their respective nation-states reduces extant international border related conflicts to manageable level or, in cases where unfavorable internal conditions in one or both countries preclude by national cooperation, when such problems are resolved to the degree that minimal border stability can prevail.

A scenario that reflects evolution from a state of alienation to one of coexistence is when a serious dispute is resolved by two nation-states to extent that international relations are possible, but not to the point of allowing for significant cross-border interaction. In effect, economic and social development that normally would take place in the region under more favorable circumstances is put on "hold". Coexistence characterizes the Ecuador-Peru, Israel-Jordan and USSR-China borderlands to cite some example.

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The condition of borderlands interdependence exists when a border region in one nation is symbiotically related linked with the border region of an adjoining country. Such interdependence is made possible by relatively stable international relations and by the existence of a favorable economic climate that permits borderlanders on both sides of the line stimulate growth and development that have tide to foreign capital, markets and labor. The greater the flow of economic and human resources across the border, the more the two economies will be structurally bonded to each other. The end result will be creation of a mutually economic system.

The degree of inter-dependence in the borderlands is contingent upon policies pertaining to the national interest of the two neighbours.<sup>10</sup> Concerns over emigration, trade competition, smuggling, and ethnic nationalism compel the central governments carefully to monitor the border, keeping it open only to the extent that it serves the agenda of the nation-state. Conditions in the USA-Mexico borderlands constitute a good example strong asymmetrical interdependence. Better balanced interdependence may be found in parts of Western Europe, where economic in equality among neighboring nations is less of a problem than in the western hemisphere or other continents.

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<sup>10</sup> Oscar J. Martinez, "New Approaches to Border Analysis," Routledge, 1994



During the stage of integrated borderlands the neighboring nations eliminate all major political differences between them and existing barriers to trade and human movement across their mutual boundary. Borderlanders merge economically, with capital, products and labor flowing from one side to the other without serious restrictions. Nationalism gives way to a new internationalist ideology that emphasizes peaceful relations and improvements in quality of life of people in both nations through trade and diffusion of technology. Each nation willingly relinquishes its sovereignty to significant degree for the shake of achieving mutual progress.


Integration between two closely allied nations is most conducive when both are politically stable, militarily secure, and economically strong. Ideally the level of development is a relatively equal one. Population pressures are non-existent in either nation, and neither side feels threatened by heavy immigration across their open border. Lack of data makes it difficult to cite examples of integrated borderlands, but if any region in the world reflects such condition among select adjoining nations it would surely be Western Europe.

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People in border regions are frequently closely associated with foreigners, particularly in cases of intense cross-boundary interaction. Powerful international forces tend to pull many borderlanders into the orbit of adjoining countries, with a resulting array of transnational relationship and their way of living.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, some sectors of the population managed to remain shielded from transnational activities, and their lives are minimally affected by proximity to borders.

In accordance with these opposing patterns borderlanders can be categorized into national borderlanders and transnational borderlanders. National borderlanders are people who are subject to foreign economic and cultural influences, have low level or superficial contact with the opposite side of border owing to their indifference to their adjacent neighbors or their unwillingness or inability to function in any substantive way in any other society. Transnational borderlanders, by contrast, are individuals who maintain significant ties with the neighboring nation; they seek to overcome obstacle that impede such contact and they take advantage of every opportunity to visit or live intermittently on the 'other side'. National and transnational borderlanders may be further subdivided into subgroups depending on local circumstances such as ethnic configuration and degree of transborder contact.

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<sup>11</sup> Stanley Waterman, "Boundaries and the Changing Political World Order", Routledge London, 1993.

As the world has evolved from isolation toward integration, borderlands have become increasingly important for nation-states with significant cross-border interlinks. This is particularly true in Western Europe and North America, where a number of binational borderlands thrive from pronounced trade, migration, cultural interchange, and social interaction.

Regardless of location, borderlands around the world are alike in a number of ways. As peripheries of nation-states they are subject to frontier forces and international influences. Most borderlanders are exposed to processes that have the potential for generating conflict, including border related disputes, oppressive tariffs, restrictive migration, policies, constraint to free cross-border movement, ethnic friction and stereotyping by outsiders. On the other hand to be a borderlander is to have opportunities unavailable to people from heartland areas. Borderlanders live in a binational milieu and are exposed to different ideas and cultures; they also have access to foreign economy, which increases employment possibilities and consumer choices.

**CHAPTER-III**

**SOUTH AMERICAN GEOPOLITICS: AN OVERVIEW**

In terms of international politics, the region of South America beyond the Circum-caribbean includes the actions of states located in the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia), constantly involves Brazil as a key factor, and sometimes draws in Ecuador. Thus the northern tier states of Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Surinam are excluded; they overlap with some of the concerns, but the thrust of their international relations are essentially part of Circum-Caribbean sub-system. South America thus define while a part of the larger Latin American region, forms a separate sub-system with a number of characteristics which distinguish it from Mexico and Circum-Caribbean.

A principal characteristic of the South American sub-system is its relative isolation from the mainstream of international politics.<sup>12</sup> The region has been relatively shielded from the global mainstream of great power politics and, during the 20<sup>th</sup> century largely beyond their spheres of influence. It has a unique political-geographic situation that fundamentally affects both relations with external states and its own intra-regional relations. The region's isolated

geographic position at great distances from Europe and United States has combined with other factors, specially the relative strength of the key local states, to exclude the area for the most part from global balance of power rivalries<sup>13</sup>. This is in dramatic distinctions from the northern portions of Latin America. Consequently, the Southern Cone states and Brazil have developed a distinct set of relationship with external actors, as well as intra-regional structures and processes, largely out side the context of global power politics.

The South American international sub-system may be specifically defined on several levels that involve different kinds of relationships. At the local state level, the leading South American states are, in a relative sense internally institutionalized and independent in international politics, especially in comparison with most Caribbean countries. They have critical domestic problems, often related to the their international environment, but the political systems and decisional outcomes of most of them rely less on personal relationship and more on institutional than do the 'crisis countries' of much of the Northern Latin America. Brazil is the leading nation in Latin America and in South American sub-system. It stands apart in several aspects, to the extent that it could be considered a distinct sub-system in its own right. By several measures of size-

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<sup>12</sup> G.Pope Atkins, "South America into the 1990s: Evolving Relationship in a New Era" Westview Press Boulder 1990. P.12-24

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

territory, population, economy, and others-Brazil ranks in the upper strata of the world's nation-states.

South American relations with extra-hemispheric states have been particularly important. Unlike the presence of Mexico and most Caribbean countries in bilateral US economic network, the Southern Cone states and Brazil formed a multilateralized trading and investing area. They also have long-standing cultural and military with Europe; the region's recent trade with Europe has included arms transfers. Brazil especially has diversified its economy and developed a broad network of bilateral relationships. Its multilateralized trade structures includes ties in Europe, the Middle East and Africa and Japan, in addition to those with United States. Argentina trades heavily with Russia. Peru has purchased a large volume of armaments from Russia and France. South American west coast states see themselves as part of a Pacific Basin trading system; Japan has become has become an important economic force in the region, notably with Peru, Bolivia and especially Brazil.

Southern Cone states and Brazil have important interactions with United States and other Latin American states due to their geographical proximity, and have belonged to inter-American system since 1889<sup>14</sup>. The United States, by and large

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<sup>14</sup> Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, "Latin American Nations in World Politics, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984.

has been one of the several competitors in South America, only briefly (after World War II) approaching a position of primacy as in the Circum-Caribbean or Mexico. While the US presence in the sub-system remains important and should not be underestimated, the United States in its Latin American relationships has had the least interest and influence in Southern Cone (with temporary exceptions), and its leverage with Brazil has declined dramatically over the past two decades. Further more as noted above these states have important linkages outside the hemisphere that balance the US influence.

The regional states have important sets international issues and patterns of interactions among themselves.<sup>15</sup> The South American region has long been an area of local conflicts, with roots in the colonial period. The legacy includes a long list of territorial disputes, national power struggle that have led to warfare and threats of war, and claims of sovereignty and competition for resources. They have been defined and shaped by regional conflicts with minimal reference to outside great power influence. Relative isolation in global politics has allowed important local rivalries and ambitions to operate. Indeed those processes have largely been the consequence of the fact that outsiders have rarely played the role of local policemen. Isolation of the small states from extra-regional influences, however, has increased their dependency on local great powers. The three weak

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<sup>15</sup> G. Pope Atkins, "Latin America in the International Political System" Westview Press, Boulder 1989.



states- Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia- have been caught-up in rivalries between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru; (buffer status) has been accorded to them in the sub-regional game of power politics.

Sub-regional international politics have resulted in strategic components to several local states' foreign politics, and they have developed geo-political and balance of power thinking toward their own region.<sup>16</sup> The espousal of geo-political strategic perspectives further distinguishes the South American sub-system from the rest of South America. Particularly ominous is the introduction of nuclear question into intra-regional international relations, with advance capabilities on the part of Argentina and Brazil. On the positive side, Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement since 1979, and successful Argentine- Chilean effort to settle territorial disputes, have established a cooperative mood in intra-regional politics. Several of the sub-regional states extend their international concerns beyond the South American continent to the South Atlantic Ocean and to the Antarctic. From their perspectives, the issues in their own sub-regional inter-state rivalry are linked to competition for resources in the sea and seabed and territorial claims in South Atlantic and Antarctica. The South Atlantic zone includes the special case of Anglo-Argentine conflicts over Falkland/Malvinas islands and other insular territories. The Antarctic involves a broad array of states around the globe; it has

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<sup>16</sup> G.Pope Atkins, "South America into the 1990s: Evolving Relationship in a New Era" Westview Press Boulder 1990. P.12-24

been regulated by the Antarctic Treaty regime since 1961.<sup>17</sup> The South American states often interact in South Atlantic and Antarctica from geopolitical perspectives; many geo-politicians defined the Southern Cone to extend to these contiguous zones.

Geopolitical thinking has been a common feature of several authoritarian military dictatorships in South America in the period from the 1960s to the early 1980s.<sup>18</sup> It formed the intellectual base for the “National Security State” and influenced a series of internal and inter-state policies and development in this period. Geopolitical thinking is closely tied to deep currents of nationalism and patriotism, and thus it has a tendency to endure regardless of the type of regime.

In addition, there are close ties between South American Geopolitical thinking a certain potential or existing conflict situations. These situations in turn stimulate geopolitical modes of analysis and insure that there is a popular and policy-making audience for arguments that base national irredentist claims on geopolitical rationales. Thus, in Argentina one of the common explanations for the deeply felt need to recover the Malvinas islands is that it is geopolitically vital for Argentine interest in the South Atlantic and beyond. In a similar view the Antarctic programs of several South American nations (among them Argentina, Brazil,

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<sup>17</sup> Jack Child, “Geopolitics and Conflict in South America,” Praeger New York 1985.

<sup>18</sup> See an article by Howard J. Wiarda, “South American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy” in G. Pope Atkins, “South America into the 1990s, West View Press, Boulder 1990

Chile and Peru) are frequently explained and justified in geopolitical terms. Several long standing inter-state strains in the subcontinent (such as Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, Bolivia's quest to regain an outlet to the sea, and Peruvian-Ecuadorian tensions) also can be explained, at least partially, in terms of geopolitical thinking in these countries.

At the same time, one must take note of the fact that there is a current in the South American geopolitical thinking that sets aside these nationalistic quarrels and stresses the need for South American integration and the common bonds of Latin American roots of these nations. Recent bilateral agreements between the two key countries of Argentina and Brazil also have geopolitical roots. The increasing associations of these more positive aspects of geopolitical thinking with redemocratizing currents in South America suggests that democracy may be strengthened in the region if the more enlightened forms of geopolitical thinking over the more aggressive and chauvinistic ones.

### **South American Geopolitical Thinking: A historical overview (1960-1990)**

The ideas of the 19<sup>th</sup> century European Geopolitical schools made their impact on the South American military establishments, especially those such as Chile and Argentina that professionalized their doctrine and organization under Russian

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tutelage beginning in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>19</sup> This explains why geopolitical ideas were not rejected by Southern military establishments after World War II when they were in the United States and Europe because of their association with Nazi Germany. Although geopoliticians in South America did not necessarily accept the Hitlerian concept of geopolitics, they did not reject geo thinking.

For about two decades after World War II, South American geopolitical ideas were circulated among a narrow circle of intellectuals. Contributing to this their overwhelming US predominance in hemisphere strategic matters, and the patronizing attitude on the part of United States toward any idea emerging in Southern Hemisphere. The inter-American military system was dominated by the United States in these years after WW II, and there was a little for ideas emanating from other nations of hemisphere.

The situation began to change in the mid-1960s, when the larger and more sophisticated military establishments of the Southern Cone began to become more independent of US strategic tutelage.<sup>20</sup> The militaries in several of these nations strongly perceived a threat from guerilla warfare, and did not feel that the old inter-American military system under US control had the ability who respond to

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<sup>19</sup> See an article by Jack Child, "The status of South American geopolitical thinking" in G. Pope Atkins "South America into the 1990s, West View Press, Boulder 1990

<sup>20</sup> See an article by Howard J. Wiarda, "South American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy" in G. Pope Atkins, "South America into the 1990s, West View Press, Boulder 1990

the new threat. A series of military regimes took power in the Southern Cone in these years, and some of them created National Security States in response to the perceived guerilla threat. In particular, the Brazilian military revolution (1964), the Peruvian military revolution (1968), the Chilean military regime from 1973, and a series of military regimes in Argentina and Uruguay (1976 on) to power at least partly as a response to the threat to subversion. Military leaders felt that they had in geo thinking and National Security states an answer to threat. Their strategic independence from Washington increased as they intensified their anti-guerilla struggles and as the United States, especially under the Carter administration, responded with strong emphasis on punishing the violators of human rights.<sup>21</sup> With parallel decline of US strategic influence and growing independence of South American military establishments, the previously ignored geo ideas began to acquire a larger audience.

The revitalization of geopolitical had two dimensions. The first argued that the organic state was being attacked from within by the 'cancerous cells' of subversion that had to be "extirpated" by surgical means, violently if necessary. The second dimension of geo thinking dealt with external affairs. It rested on the need for the organic state to project its influence outward and obtain excess resources and "living space" (lebensraum). Geo thinking consequently exacerbated a series of old border and territorial disputes, such as the War of the

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Pacific (Chile-Peru-Bolivia), the Beagle channel controversy (Argentina-Chile), the historic Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, the Malvinas/ Falklands disputes and the control of Antarctica and the South Atlantic.

### **Argentine and Chilean geopolitical Schools of Thought**

The Argentine geopolitics acquires almost the same significance as does Brazil, the most prolific nation state in the region. It also shows certain limitations and idiosyncrasies that reflect some basic differences. Argentina geopoliticians seem less confident of their ideas than their Brazilian counterparts, and they waste creative energy in internecine squabbles and disputes between fragmented groups and different sub-schools. There is a sense of frustration among Argentine geopoliticians, a feeling that Argentine "greatness" has been denied to the nation by some conspiracy of enemies must be found and dealt with. They see the nation as victim of numerous past geo aggressions, and suggest that Argentina is geopolitically unsatisfied nation that can not rest until past wrongs are righted. Further energies are expended on the usually futile search for a great unifying "Argentine National Project" that will bind together all patriotic Argentine in a grand scheme of development and movement toward the country's rightful destiny.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Another debilitating feature of Argentine geopolitical thinking is its reactive nature, especially toward the ideas and writings of Brazilian (and to a lesser extent Chilean) Geopoliticians. Historically, the theme of Portuguese-Brazilian expansion at the expense of Spanish-speaking world as a fundamental one. The Brazilian geopolitical path to greatness is seen as a distinct threat by most Argentine geopoliticians. This perception, which was quite strong up to the late 1960s, diminished somewhat with the weakening of the US-Brazilian ties.

Chile also absorbs much of the Argentine geopoliticians' energy. Historical rivalries are paramount, based on territorial disputes and problems establishing boundaries between the two nations. In the 1960s and 1970s these had a specific focus in Beagle channel and issue of sovereignty of three key islands at the eastern mouth of the channel ( Lennox, Picton and Nueva), which almost led to a war in 1978. The larger geopolitical issue however had to do with Argentine perception of Chilean penetration of Patagonia and South Atlantic and of Argentina's Antarctic claim.

The Argentine geopolitical parallel to Brazil's theme of feeling of Amazonic heartland is manifest in its desire to recover the islands of the South Atlantic (Malvinas/ Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich and South Orkneys) and consolidate its sovereignty in the region. Two related themes are to keep both Chile and Brazil out of the "Argentine" South Atlantic as well as to make good

Argentina's Antarctic claim.<sup>22</sup> In a larger sense this Argentine geopolitical thrust southward is continuation of 19<sup>th</sup> century drive to bring first the Pampas and then Patagonia under effective control of Buenos Aires. However, unlike Brazil's push inward, the Argentine thrust to the south is maritime and not continental-heartland in nature. This gives a strong naval tone to much of Argentine geopolitical writing. A unifying theme is that of "Argentine Sea", which ties together the three basic parts of "Tri-continental Argentina": Mainland Argentina, Antarctic Argentina, and Insular Argentina (that are the South Atlantic islands).<sup>23</sup> Thus, the effective control of "Argentine Sea" means expelling the historic usurper (Great Britain), keeping out the old rivals (Brazil and Chile), and making sure that new potential adversaries do not consolidate their position in Argentine Antarctica.

Argentine geopoliticians are not as deeply concern with resource geopolitics as their Brazilian counterparts, since Argentina is basically concern with oil reserves in the Malvinas Basin, as well as in Antarctic oil, for the time when Argentina's current reserves run out. Argentina's privilege status as major exporter of foodstuffs (mainly grains and meat) has had a geopolitical impact in terms of the political implications of these exports in a hungry world.

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<sup>22</sup> See an article by Jack Child, "The status of South American geopolitical thinking" in G. Pope Catkins "South America into the 1990s, West View Press, Boulder 1990

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



The most significant aspect of geopolitical thinking in Chile in the 1970s is that the military regime of General-President Augusto Pinochet created the first true Chilean geopolitical school at the same time it set up the Chilean National Security State based on geopolitical principles and the theory of organic state. Before 1973 that is when Pinochet assumed power in the coup against Salvador Allende, a loosely connected group of Chilean geopolitical writers existed but with no coherent doctrine or set of geopolitical project as in Argentina and especially Brazil. The geopolitical thinking that existed at that time was largely confined to military circles. Pinochet's own Senior War College Thesis dealt with geopolitics, but it was not generally known outside of the officer corps. The Pinochet regime in 1970s set about giving structure and support to his geopolitical thinking by increasing the role of geopolitical ideas in government, the media and the educational system. It is significant that shortly after Pinochet came to power his old War College thesis was published.

Chile's manifest destiny toward greatness rested on the belief that they are among the very last defenders of Christian western values against a decisive onslaught by Marxist-Leninists and the internal corruption of the West.<sup>24</sup> But there is also arcane geopolitical theory that holds that the core of human civilization has been

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<sup>24</sup> See an article by Howard J. Wiarda, "South American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy" in G. Pope Atkins, "South America into the 1990s, West View Press, Boulder 1990

historically shifting westward, following the sun. Thus, the cradle of human culture began in the Middle East, shifted to the Mediterranean, then to Northern Europe and to the United States and now is about to move again to the Pacific. Chilean geopolitical thinkers see their country as one of the key Pacific Basin nation that will share in this new center of human civilization and power. Chile's unique geography imposes severe restraints on geopolitical projects to increase its lebensraum and influence. The common metaphor is that Chile is like a tube that can only expand out the ends to the west. The expansion north was achieved in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), and Chile need be concern only with preserving the gains made in that conflict at the expense of Peru and Bolivia. The major forms of geopolitician's attention is therefore south, to the control of the inter-oceanic passages ( Beagle Channel, Strait of Magellan, and the Drake Passage), and the protection of Chile's Antarctic interests.

A Chilean parallel exists to Argentine geopoliticians' ideas regarding a "Tri-continental Argentina" welded together by an "Argentine Sea". " Tri-continental Chile" consists of mainland Chile, Chilean Antarctica, and insular Chile, which includes the Pacific Ocean Islands (Easter and Robinson Crusoe), the Magellanic and Beagle Channel islands, the Cape Horn group, and the Diego Ramirez group that lies between South America and Antarctica. The geopolitical concept of a "Chilean Sea" has roots going back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the victorious

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Chilean fleet during the war of the Pacific made a "Chilean lake" of the waters west of Chile.

Despite the clear nationalistic and aggressive tone of much of Chilean geopolitics, there is also a current of cooperation with Argentina, especially in keeping newcomers out of the Antarctic sectors where Argentina and Chile have overlapping claims. This raises the intriguing possibility of combined Argentine-Chilean activities in what could be called their "Antarctic Condominium".

Latin America is emerging from a thirty years of intense, violent, and deadly conflict. The "national security" governments in South America, with their massive and systematic human rights violations, have all been replaced by elected governments with a commitment to respecting human rights. Indigenous communities are becoming peacefully incorporated as independent political actors throughout the region. Sendero Luminoso, the "Shining Path," has been defeated in Peru. The wars between El Salvador and Honduras, Argentina and Great Britain, and Peru and Ecuador have been resolved. And the near-wars between Peru and Chile and Argentina and Chile, as well as Guatemala's threat to the existence of Belize, have been settled, sometimes more amicably than others. In addition, the nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina has ended without proliferation, arms industries have been dismantled, military budgets have declined dramatically, and military conscription is slowly being eliminated. Yet

the legacy of this violent period has a strong impact on Latin American citizens, policymakers, and military officers: few believe that this past has been clearly exiled to the dustbin of history, never to threaten the peace and prosperity of the region again. For example, guerrilla movements persist in Colombia and Peru, a border war erupted between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 and has only recently been resolved, and vigilante groups threaten to undermine many of the compromises that ended the Central American civil wars. Hence, a lively and fundamentally important discussion flourishes in the region concerning the causes, prevention, and resolution of deadly conflict.

### **The Problem of Deadly Conflict**

Latin American analysts disagree about a number of issues concerning deadly conflict, but there is a major consensus concerning the roots of such violence. Social and economic marginalization produces poverty and a sense of powerlessness. Some critics believe that this marginalization is reproduced and reaffirmed through political structures which defend the status quo and thereby lead to political alienation from the political system. There is also a great deal of concern that the emphasis on allowing the market to work furthers this alienation by rapidly destroying communal and societal safety nets. This situation may continue to simmer, explode suddenly and/or develop into sustained violent conflict, depending upon precipitant events or the success of political

entrepreneurs. Such poverty and marginalization occasionally produce sporadic and spontaneous but extremely violent uprisings. These uprisings are provoked by a sudden event, such as raising prices on previously subsidized goods and services, or national governments taking over resources that had been controlled locally. The phenomenon of an "urban revolt" is a short, spontaneous uprising with a minimum of organization and coordination, distinguished from "civil disobedience" by violence. For example, between 300 and 2,000 people were killed and another 1,000 were wounded during the "Caracazo" of 1989, two days of rioting throughout the principal cities of Venezuela.

But it is more dangerous when poverty and alienation provide fertile ground for political entrepreneurs to organize sustained violence against the political system. While we are all familiar with such movements against authoritarian political systems, we are less aware that they also occur against democratic systems that fail to provide opportunities for social, economic, and political participation. This was the battle cry of many left-wing activists in the 1960s and 1970s against "bourgeois democracy," but many committed democrats in the 1990s continue to worry about it.

The issue of political entrepreneurs raises the question of the motives of these leaders of violence. Ideological beliefs have historically been the main impetus for organizing violent movements. However, ideologically based violence has

waned as the right has been discredited by massive violations of human rights; the end of the Cold War has discredited anti-democratic alternatives even among the left; and Sendero Luminoso in Peru has met defeat.

According to Latin American analysts, the second most prevalent motive of these political entrepreneurs is the struggle for political and economic power. (The U.S. government, partly because of a historical skepticism regarding the importance of ideology, tended to emphasize power over reform-oriented ideologies in its analyses of these movements.) These political leaders seek to empower the marginalized sectors of society so that the disenfranchised may gain control over their everyday lives, be secure, and climb out of poverty. In the past, the closed nature of the social, economic, and political structures of Latin American countries convinced these leaders that revolution was the only path to improvement. With re-democratization, there is a new opportunity for the peaceful empowerment of these groups. Latin Americans worry nonetheless that the new political and economic structures may not deliver sufficient opportunities to the large number of citizens mired in poverty and thereby contribute to a new round of violent challenges to the system.

Personal and illicit economic gain is an increasingly important motive among individuals seeking to organize the socially marginalized into potentially large-scale and deadly confrontations. Though contraband has long been a way of life

for many groups in Latin America because of governmentally sponsored private monopolies, it has not previously resulted in large-scale violence. Today, the drug barons of the region have organized poverty-stricken peasant producers and the desperate urban poor into bands of traffickers. Their hold over these individuals comes not only from the distribution of economic benefits but also from terror. Drug lords have organized enforcement gangs and generated large-scale violence in efforts to terrorize those who would interfere with their ability to continue to get rich. A particularly violent combination of guerrilla movements with drug production and trafficking developed in Peru.

Politicization of indigenous communities may be leading them to become increasingly assertive in demanding not only economic benefits but the right to participate in the national political life without assimilating into mainstream society. War and mass violence from the Conquest to the first half of the 20th century demobilized, silenced, and isolated many of the surviving indigenous peoples of Latin America. But the Central American wars and the increased penetration of the market in the 1980s in many ways destroyed their isolation and led many indigenous people and sympathetic activists to defend their cultural heritage actively once again. When traditional political systems did not respond appropriately, some of these groups turned to violence.

There is also increasing concern in parts of Latin America over the organized violence perpetrated by gangs of young urban marginals and the official security forces ostensibly given the charge of upholding the law. In Central America, such gangs are reproducing their experiences in urban gangs in the United States, where they were refugees from the civil wars. Gangs in the rural areas often include ex-combatants who have demobilized but cannot find gainful employment, because of the economic crisis currently afflicting the region. Given the lesser opportunities for legally gainful activities in the shantytowns of Latin America and the low professional state of the police and judiciary, gang violence produces a much greater perception of insecurity in Mexico City, Guatemala City, San Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro than in the United States. The result is a proliferation of private police forces, poorly trained but armed, and a militarization of urban police forces. The combination of these factors produces a dramatic increase in the level of deadly urban violence.

The migration of economic refugees has in the past produced extremely violent conflict in Latin America. In 1937, for example, Dominican troops massacred up to 12,000 Haitians looking for work in the Dominican Republic. The 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras was precipitated by Honduran decisions to expel thousands of Salvadorans working illegally in Honduras. Many Venezuelans and Costa Ricans now believe that crime and unemployment are the result of the thousands of Colombians and Nicaraguans, respectively, illegally crossing the



border. Vigilantism has not yet produced large-scale deadly conflict, but the potential remains, as, for example, on the Honduran-Salvadoran border. The 1992 World Court resolution of the border demarcation resulted in official and extra-official armed groups harassing hundreds of people caught on the "wrong" side of the border. Salvadoran Defense Minister Gen. Jaime Guzmán Morales expected that "these kinds of conflicts will continue until a definitive solution is reached regarding citizenship and property rights in the border communities."

Territorially focused nationalism has been a source of constant tension in the region because most borders contain disputed sections. Bolivia refuses to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Chile because it cannot resolve the question of sovereign access to the Pacific (lost to Chile in the 19th-century War of the Pacific); Ecuador and Peru have only recently (1998) resolved the question of their border. Nicaragua and Colombia, and even Venezuela and Colombia (both long-standing democracies), have experienced threatening moments on their borders. Progress has been slow over the last century. Among the most promising recent experiences are the resolution of the last points of contention between Argentina and Chile; Guatemala's recognition of the legal existence of Belize; and the acceptance by Honduras and El Salvador of the arbitration resolving their border demarcation. Yet even in some of these cases the potential for deadly conflict remains. Guatemala is only now, six years after recognizing Belize, beginning to discuss where the precise borders lie, and El Salvador and Honduras are

encountering increased tensions along the border as they seek to resolve citizenship and property questions.

Deadly conflict in Latin America has taken different forms, depending upon whether the issues involved were "traditional" or what are now seen as "new" post-Cold War security issues. The patterns of conflict that matter are not only the ones that directly produce deaths, but also those designed to wreak havoc on the economy and sow a climate of insecurity among the population and subsequently produce deadly conflict. The goal of both these types of conflict is to weaken and de-legitimize the ability of the state to provide for the common good; it thus feeds directly into the governability problems perceived by many Latin American analysts to be the major issue of the contemporary period. The traditional pattern of hostilities consists of armed skirmishes between organized tactical units directed from the capital. These traditional patterns of conflict develop in Latin America over borders, natural resources, and power projection. In only one of these confrontations has a "new" issue on the international agenda been a major factor in the violence: the drug trade in the U.S. invasion of Panama. That intervention and subsequent U.S. pressure on Colombia led some observers of Latin America to fear a new wave of U.S. military invasions in the Caribbean Basin. The Latin American security literature on confidence-building measures, arms control, and the military balance of power focuses on this pattern of violent conflict.

Even before the end of the Cold War and the focus on "new" sources of conflict, the traditional pattern of interstate violence did not fundamentally concern Latin American analysts. In 20th-century Latin America, internal conflict has been significantly more deadly than interstate conflict, especially during the last thirty years (compare tables 1-4). Four patterns of violent conflict can be discerned: civil war between armed groups operating under central commands; locally autonomous and officially tolerated "death squads"; non-official violence perpetrated by anti-system forces, either political insurgents or criminals; and terrorist attacks designed to undermine the state's ability to provide peace and prosperity.

**Table 1****Violent Interstate Conflict in Latin America, 1969-1989**

<b><u>Year</u></b>	<b><u>Conflict</u></b>	<b><u>Deaths</u></b>
1969	El Salvador-Honduras War	2,000-5,000
1981	Ecuador-Peru	250
1982	Argentina-Great Britain	1000
1989	U.S. invasion of Panama	352
1995	Ecuador -Peru	1,000-1,500*

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Clarence Davidow claimed, in a presentation at the University of California on March 3, 1997, that "hundreds" died. Another pattern of deadly conflict is found in civil wars, in which armed

groups operating under central commands and controlling significant amounts of national territory fight for control of the government. The civil wars of Central America were ended by negotiations that re-democratized the region, while in Peru the end came with the military defeat of insurgents. (While Sendero and the MRTA [Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement] are still active, they have been effectively reduced to guerrilla and terrorist actions).

In Colombia, however, civil war continues in many regions where the government has no control. Death squads can take many forms, consisting of soldiers, police, and even private entrepreneurs seeking to make money. They tend to be locally autonomous and officially tolerated, if not directly encouraged, and essentially given carte blanche to act as they see fit in "saving" the country. Government officials are rarely held accountable for their actions, yet, at the very least, their inaction is fundamental to continued death-squad activities. These violent activists are defenders of the status quo, whether against political insurgents or criminals, including gangs of street children in Rio de Janeiro. One of the problematic issues in newly democratic societies of Latin America is attempting to discover who was responsible for directing these actions, and determining whether to punish them or move toward reconciliation based on discovering the truth. Terrorist violence is distinguished by its desire to provoke a reaction that produces more violence. By increasing the level of violence in a society, terrorists seek to destroy the system. Three types of terrorism have been distinguished: subversive terrorism, state

terrorism, and transnational terrorism. One of the interesting aspects of subversive terrorism in Latin America, which differentiates it from that in the Middle East or Northern Ireland, is that it is not linked to demands for national sovereignty of a particular group. Instead, it is stimulated by perceived domestic injustices. Government forces and their allies use state terrorism to destroy the links between guerrillas and society. Transnational terrorism is committed in neutral or third-party states but is targeted at the home country of the terrorists. Costa Rica and Honduras suffered from many of these acts in the 1980s.

A final pattern of deadly conflict is indirect but still contributes to a climate of conflict that produces significant numbers of deaths. These are terrorist attacks designed to undermine the ability of the state to provide an acceptable level of individual security and prosperity. These attacks focus on economic targets such as power stations or policemen and judges as symbols of the state's ability to provide individual security. Many Latin American analysts see this challenge as directly linked to the question of governability.

Latin America's interstate wars in the 20th century, unlike those of the 19th, have been bilateral affairs. There has also been surprisingly little spillover of internal conflict across borders, although outsiders often become involved in their neighbors internal problems. In the 1980s, we had active military involvement by the U.S., Argentina, and Cuba in Nicaragua and El Salvador, as well as by

Nicaragua's Sandinista government in El Salvador, and Cuban support for the guerrilla movement against the military dictatorship in Chile. Because Latin American countries all faced many of the structural problems that could lead to violent conflict, there was great concern that violent conflict in one country, if not contained, could envelop the region. Speaking of the Central American conflicts during the 1980s, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that "if a war developed in this region, its effects would spread to the entire Latin American continent. From Mexico to Tierra del Fuego, our societies would be in turmoil, polarized, and radicalized." Both the defenders of the status quo and those seeking to overthrow it shared this expectation. Regionalization of conflict occurs not only via interstate war, but also by international linkages created by subversive and criminal elements. The fear that neighboring forces in conflict will develop contacts with Colombia's guerrillas propelled Colombia's presidents to mediate conflict in Central America and Panama. The international links of revolutionary forces not only increased their ability to do violence, but also stimulated the Colombian government and its international allies to use military force to defend the country against external aggression, thereby increasing the level of deadly conflict. Many Peruvian analysts worried that Sendero's successes were creating contingency plans among Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the U.S. to invade the country. All political sectors in the region saw that Latin America was being pulled apart by the Cold War. In response to the internationalization of Latin American conflicts, the right sought more intervention by the allied superpower,

the United States. As Minister Caputo noted, ".polarized and radicalized societies are particularly apt for superpower conflict and competition ... we would see ourselves once again involved in a foreign conflict, raising banners which are not ours and shedding our blood for symbols that do not represent in any case either a national or regional interest. " The center, as well as some sectors of the left, perceived that easing both superpowers out of Latin American conflicts would facilitate their management. Efforts were undertaken to create a Zone of Peace in the region as a whole, or in subsections that could be more easily isolated from U.S. strategic concerns, such as southern South America. Augusto Varas of FLACSO-Chile was an early exponent of this idea; and the Comisión Sudamericana de Paz was established in Buenos Aires in 1987 with the explicit task of stimulating the conversion of South America into a Zone of Peace. Before this third path or isolationist security scenario could play itself out, however, the Cold War ended, helping to produce a dramatically altered security environment for Latin America, along with re-democratization and economic liberalization. In the post-Cold War era Latin America has once again emphasized the regional dimensions of security by stressing the collective nature of security and thus the responsibility and interest of the inter-American community to aid in disciplining those who threaten the region's peace. By this definition, all movements against democratic systems as well as interstate violence should become internationalized because the community will become involved in protecting peace and security. The expectation is that such intervention will be limited to diplomatic and



economic boycotts. But Argentina was quite supportive of the U.S. decision to utilize military force in Haiti.

Early reaction to signs of trouble. Latin Americans have been searching for early warning signs in order to head off many of the violent conflicts. They perceive that success in this area is a twofold process, requiring a willingness to undertake concerted action as well as the ability to discern the likelihood of conflict. Both have been problematic, but perhaps the commitment to act has been most difficult to develop. This is because historically most Latin American countries saw the defense of national sovereignty as their best protection against the willingness of European great powers and the U.S. to intervene, even with force, in their domestic affairs. This view began to change in the late 1980s, largely as a result of the ongoing experience with violent conflict. The Contadora peace process, sponsored by Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico attempted to resolve the Central American crisis with a minimum of attention to domestic issues and more emphasis on traditional concerns about foreign interventions against internationally recognized governments and local military balances. The Contadora effort stagnated since the United States emphasized the internal political aspects and the Sandinistas were reluctant to diminish their military capacity (they saw the United States, not Honduras or Costa Rica, as their chief adversary). The 1986 and 1987 Esquipulas meetings triggered a major conceptual shift, which produced the Arias Plan. President Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica

perceived that the roots of Central American interstate mistrust lay in domestic politics. He thus pushed for national reconciliation, questioned the Sandinista government not because it was illegitimate but because it was not democratic, and argued that a lasting peace required the democratization of the political systems. In addition, a timetable for the implementation of the distinct phases of the peace plan was developed. And an International Commission of Verification and Vigilance (CIVS), consisting of the foreign ministers of the G7, the five Central American countries, and the General Secretaries of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN was created. Because Latin Americans, not North Americans, took this initiative, the domestic sources of interstate conflict now became legitimate targets for action by Latin Americans.

The most convenient shorthand for Latin American concerns with potentially violent situations is the survival of democratic systems. Latin Americans like to criticize the American definition of democracy, which focuses on the formal institutions and elections, and emphasize instead the need to incorporate the "democratization of social and economic conditions." The truth is that their governments use the formal definition of democracy when it is convenient for their political or policy goals. Latin American governments agree that all of the hemisphere is governed by democratic political systems, with the exception of Cuba. The overthrow of a democratic system thus was first informally recognized,

and subsequently codified in the OAS, as a threat to the peace and security of the region.

Comprehensive balanced approach to alleviating pressures. Although Latin American analysts, policymakers, and activists may disagree about what needs to be done, virtually everyone agrees that stable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive and balanced efforts. The Central American Treaty for Democratic Peace of 1995 identifies four guiding principles: the rule of law (*estado de derecho*), the strengthening and perfecting of democratic institutions, the subordination of the armed forces to constitutionally mandated civilian authorities, and the maintenance of an active, flexible, and mutually collaborative dialogue. One analyst argues that democracies -- best response to terrorism combines civil means -- economic, political, legal, and diplomatic -- with military force. Another scholar and ambassador argues that cooperative security in South America requires development of a common understanding of security compatible with democratic forms of government in the region, equal deterrence capabilities among states in the region, and coordination of foreign policies.

The team in Nicaragua, under the auspices of the International Commission of Support and Verification and the OAS, has made a number of recommendations for the construction of peace in societies previously at war. These four

recommendations illustrate the idea that constructing peace requires a comprehensive approach.

### **1. Nationalization and Sustainability of the Peace Process**

The conditions that led to the establishment of the international peace mission should not be permanent. Responsibilities for support services must be gradually transferred to national entities, both governmental and non-governmental. State institutions include the judiciary, police, the human rights prosecutor, and electoral organs. In civil society, local organizations will need to be strengthened. This process of nationalization requires strengthening these entities and their capacities to support the peace process, principally the national efforts of mediation, conflict resolution, human rights protection, and violence-deterrence. If this process is not successfully carried out, an institutional vacuum will develop after the international mission leaves and the peace will not survive.

### **2. Popular Participation in the Peace Process**

The population participates in the peace process via the peace commissions. This eliminates the paternalistic practices into which international organizations are often prone to fall and which atrophy national capacities and generate passive attitudes. The most effective dissuasion from the use of violence is one that comes

from an organized population with a positive and active attitude toward its future. The peace process is not constructed exclusively by the state and international organizations but also by organized popular constituencies. The three actors need to coordinate so as to make their actions complementary. In short, it is a participatory conflict resolution process.

### **3. Local Decentralization of the Peace Process**

The goal is decentralized conflict resolution. Involving local authorities will allow the pacification process to respond to the specific needs of the people in the most efficient, practical, and realistic manner. By this means, the local peasant communities become participants in the peace process, not just objects. For this to be effective, local capacities must also be strengthened.

### **4. Development of Peasant Civil Society**

These post-war communities have historically been repressed. The construction of peace ought to stimulate their organization and the development of forms of self-representation, which will allow them to become effective actors in society. There has been a fundamental change in Latin Americans' understanding of their margin for action. Many analysts have historically argued that Latin America's problems were not locally caused and that therefore solutions to national problems require

changes in the behavior of external factors. Some of these perceptions have changed. For example, Tokatlian and Pardo argue that Colombia's consistent and long-standing tradition of violence is the root cause and thus external factors build on it, but the solutions to it have to be found in Colombia. Latin America has also historically been a state-oriented society; that is, the government was perceived as the key actor, for good or bad, in structuring the political, economic, and social environment in which people interacted. The terror of the national security states largely destroyed this view, although it does still persist in some countries that escaped the horrors of state terrorism. Civil Society. The strengthening of civil society is virtually a battle cry in contemporary Latin America. Analysts recognize that society has the power to make a difference, but that it has been too unconcerned and demobilized to act. There is a new effort to inculcate democratic values rather than simply using democracy as a tool to be discarded if it doesn't work out.

Freedom of the press has long been understood to be necessary for a free society in Latin America, but now, with the dismantling of many government monopolies over paper distribution and television channels (and the penetration of satellite TV), there is a proliferation of alternative sources of information. This is a mixed blessing, since hate groups can also peddle their wares. But since schoolchildren are now being taught about human rights, perhaps the new free societies in Latin America can tolerate such excesses. Civil society is also being strengthened by the

proliferation of "think tanks," organized by locals and supported in part by international foundations.

Latin America is a region of strong presidentialism. The president is often a kind of democratically sanctioned authoritarian for the period in office, a period usually constitutionally limited to one term. Thus, in the past, to speak of "state action" meant to focus on presidential interests. Things have changed in the past five years, however, as presidential excesses threatened to bring down democratic systems in Venezuela, Brazil, Guatemala, and Ecuador, as they did, temporarily, in Peru. Attempts to transform the system into a parliamentary one seem to be developing into a trade-off — increased legislative power in return for the possibility of immediate re-election for the president.

The result should be governmental policies that are more in tune with the desires of the electorate. This should facilitate some of the changes analysts argue are necessary to ensure peace and prosperity. Besides the president, the other major state actor in Latin America has been the military. An important debate exists concerning the role of the military in providing socioeconomic infrastructure or the policing necessary for the personal security, which, in turn, provides citizens the opportunity for development. The history of military violation of human rights and its role in violently suppressing what were initially peaceful efforts to change an unequal and discriminatory status quo makes some people nervous about

involving the military in the new "civic actions" of the 1990s. Yet in the context of states and societies with limited resources, some analysts feel that it would be a waste of talent and capability to exclude the military from performing these tasks. The experience of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is often cited. The prerequisite, however, is civilian control of the military. In the absence of civil control, it is argued, we may have a repeat of the 1960s experiences of Brazil and Peru, in which militaries "learned" from their experiences with social infrastructure development programs that politicians and democracies could not alleviate the root causes of conflict. In addition, some analysts argue that military influence in foreign affairs makes a nation's foreign policy less attuned to human needs and more focused on military factors.

The new missions of the Nicaraguan military are constitutionally very extensive. These include helping to patrol the border; providing security in rural areas; respecting and promoting human rights; combating drug-related activities and the illegal traffic of people and goods across the border; defending the environment; and searching for a new order in international relations and civil defense. The Colombian constitution of 1991 increases civilian control over the military by increasing legislative oversight of its operations and creating a civilian-dominated National Security Council. In addition, President César Gaviria named the first civilian defense minister in forty years. The new constitution still allows



constitutional authorities to utilize the military for maintaining internal order, however.

Reform of the judiciary and the police is an enormous task, even in established political systems like the Colombian and Mexican ones, not to mention the evolving ones of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The problem is not just the impunity with which certain social groups act against the marginalized populations. It is also that the police are themselves often at the service of the exploiters. So overzealous in their efforts to maintain "order" that they dramatically abuse the very citizens whom they are supposed to protect.

Finally, a growing number of peace analysts and activists are becoming more interested in the economic agencies of the state. These advocates want more effort paid to the social safety net, which they feel has inadequate resources compared to those dedicated to the structural adjustment of the economy and downsizing of the state. This is not an argument for keeping the state large and omnipotent. Rather, it requires a smaller and more responsive state with strengthened state regulatory and development agencies to perform necessary tasks to facilitate peace and prosperity for those whom the market would exploit in the short- to medium term.

The Role of Advanced Industrialized Countries. During the Cold War, many Latin American governments and citizens feared the "North" would exploit them.

Today, they fear Latin America may be ignored at a time when it needs the expertise, resources, and even goodwill of the North if it is to succeed in building peace and prosperity. Analysts are not just referring to economic relations, important as they are in the context of globalization. For the issue of deadly conflict, they see a need for Northern participation in conflict resolution processes like those in Central America. In conflict prevention efforts the participation of the North is perhaps even more important, since many of the weapons come from the North and the sanctions threatened by Northern markets could have a large impact in deterring violent action, especially against democratic institutions.

The challenge of coordination among the tasks and actors, and the importance of leadership. The recognition that coordination and leadership is necessary stimulates Latin American nations to seek greater cooperation amongst themselves. It is commonplace to encounter rejection of any mention that the U.S. should lead, especially when security is equated with an inter-American military focus, as was the case under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). An interesting suggestion was made by one analyst that the U.S. should avoid four errors in the current context: it should not 1) quickly throw together a "Grand Design" for the hemisphere, ideologically based and underfunded; 2) promote a hemispheric scheme more oriented towards events outside the region than within it; 3) unilaterally intervene, particularly with Rapid Deployment Forces; and 4) push innovations (such as demands for compulsory arbitration on

border disagreements) that threaten to upset the progress already made by parties in negotiations.

The Latin American leaders who have demonstrated an ability to focus regional attention have been ex-President of Costa Rica and Nobel Prize winner Arias and whoever happens to be President of the big three, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Among organizations, the Comisión Sudamericana para la Paz played an important role at one time, and now the Peace and Security in the Americas group is stimulating much work, although it is hard to know how much influence it has on policymakers at this time.

Chilean leaders agreed to a Pact of Governability when the clash between defenders and reformers of the constitution (written by the military government in 1980 and revised just before that government returned to the people in 1989) threatened to escalate. For most Latin Americans, strengthening democratic governments also means consolidating civilian control over the military. Civil control in a democratic context should produce fewer domestic and international conflicts. But Monica Hirst has raised the interesting question of whether different degrees of civilian control have important implications for peace, even in consolidated democracies. She is leaning toward an affirmative answer, but it is still too early for the evidence to be convincing either way. Another way to strengthen democracy is to increase its reputation and standing in the region by

committing the inter-American community to its defense. The OAS recently adopted the view that a threat to democracy in any Western Hemisphere nation automatically constituted a threat to the security of all American nations. The Miami Summit of American Nations seconded this view and the first hemispheric meeting of ministers of defense followed suit. As a result, diplomatic and economic sanctions were imposed on coup leaders in Haiti in 1991, Peru in 1992, and Guatemala in 1993, and the threat of sanctions recently helped avoid a coup in Paraguay. The Group of Eight suspended Panama's membership after its fraudulent elections in 1988. Subsequently, when democratic processes were upset in Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, Latin American states imposed or threatened economic and diplomatic sanctions. Mexico and Cuba, however, demonstrate the limits to Latin American (as well as American, in the case of Mexico) willingness to act: Mexico was not sanctioned in 1988 despite widely documented fraudulent elections, and Latin Americans do not see the continuation of Fidel Castro's government in power as a threat to hemispheric security.

Latin America's willingness to use international sanctions to promote and defend democracy does not extend to use of military force. Latin America largely opposed utilizing violence to combat violence in Haiti. Among the major Latin American states, only Argentina supported the idea of using military force to remove Haitian usurpers. The proposals for a hemispheric cooperative security regime pushed by the Paz y Seguridad group is very conservative on this point.

After warning against the UN Agenda for Peace emphasis on the diminution of sovereignty in the contemporary world, the group goes on to warn that once the principle of multilateral interventions is accepted, it can easily be applied to a variety of issues.

Champion the rule of law as the basis for regulating social interaction at all levels. The buzzword in Latin America for this issue is *estado de derecho*. Both the right and the left use it against each other because the laws themselves privilege some outcomes over others (i.e., by what is defined as legal and illegal). But the basic point upon which all sides agree is that the rule of law provides credibility among competing actors. It is therefore fundamentally important when bringing together social groups who have just been involved in deadly conflict. The most interesting conceptualization of the *estado de derecho* is that of the Executive Secretary of the *Comisión Sudamericana para la Paz*: it derives from popular sovereignty and the reign of justice.

In Latin America, one of the key social divides is ethnicity. The region had avoided widespread ethnic conflict for the past half-century, mainly by continued demobilization and isolation of indigenous communities. Now that these communities are newly empowered and seeking to defend their rights, tensions could escalate if not handled well. It is particularly surprising to see how unaware mestizo society was of the large-scale and efficient organization among

indigenous peoples until the large-scale uprisings in Ecuador in 1990 and Mexico in 1994. For many mestizo analysts, achieving a stable multiethnic society would be greatly facilitated by promoting local NGOs. Because they are not tied into the reigning distribution of social and economic power, they can serve as honest brokers among the groups. But the indigenous communities have made extensive efforts on their own to avoid needless antagonisms. Thus, in Ecuador, leaflets explain the demands of indigenous peoples and specifically state that they are not seeking independence nor do they see their demands as anti-mestizo.

It is particularly important for development aid to promote education and alternative crops for peasants growing illegal ones. The "Alliance for the Sustained Development of Central America" agreement reached at the presidential summit of 1994 calls for the respect of cultural and ethnic diversity in the development process. This requires not just promoting economic development, but also socio-economic reforms that distribute resources more broadly. In Ecuador, the newly mobilized Amazonian peoples argue that delimiting the physical frontiers among ethnic groups will lead to a more rational and optimal use of the nation's resources.

Refine institutions and processes for nonviolent dispute resolution and promote conflict resolution strategies based on mutual accommodation. Getting the military out of the business of ensuring domestic order is a fundamental first step for many

analysts in refining institutions and conflict resolution processes. But in the Latin American context, it also raises the controversial question of justice for violators of human rights in a country's authoritarian past. Arias stands at one end of the spectrum when he declares that "it is still necessary for the Latin American family to attain reconciliation, but not at the expense of pardoning all of the crimes of those who committed them." At the other extreme stands the Uruguayan president, Julio María Sanguinetti: "we pardoned terrorists, who had some responsibility for the violations of human rights, so it is natural to have amnestied the military as well." The 1989 plebiscite in Uruguay supported Sanguinetti's position with 55.4% of the vote. Even Argentina finally passed a law limiting prosecution to those who gave orders, rather than those lower down who actually tortured and "disappeared" people. President Menem wound up pardoning leadership and instituting a controversial amnesty law covering past human rights abuses.

The framing of an issue plays an important role in negotiations between adversaries. President Belisario Betancur (1982-86) changed the country's strategy from a focus on "internal violence as a product of international violence" (links to Cuba and Nicaragua), to "national peace is linked to international peace." The new definition opened up new opportunities; symbols and signs in the negotiations indicated that the military option was being discarded or downplayed. None of the recommendations by Latin Americans for preventing or resolving deadly conflict

region. In an interesting twist to what we commonly hear in the U.S., on this matter Latin America wants the U.S. to control its borders!

Another difference between how the U.S. looks at Latin America and how it looks at itself lies in the area of deterrence. Many Latin American civilian and military analysts perceive the need to deter aggression or adventures by neighbors militarily. The United States doesn't see why Latin American nations would fight each other, and hence chalk this talk up to militarists. But some very respected Latin American advocates of democracy and civilian control over the military see an uncertain world and believe that prudence in the defense of a nation's interest requires that it have a minimal deterrent force. For these analysts, the success of confidence-building measures depends upon partners' perceiving that risks of betrayal are low because the military balance is stable. This perspective informs their suggestions for international cooperation in order to modernize, rebuild, and professionalize the armies of the region.



has been particularly unique to Latin America. But there are three areas in which Latin American analysts address issues which relate more specifically to their own reality.

More efforts to control/reduce demand for drugs in Advanced Industrialized Countries (AIC). Drug trafficking has wreaked havoc on many local communities and even entire countries in Latin America. There are few calls for legalizing the production and export of drugs in Latin America, although the violence of the last 15 years is beginning to push some analysts to discuss it not as a solution, but as an aid in the effort to combat consumption. There is, however, a sense that Latin America is paying the bulk of the costs of the war on drugs, even as the consumption driving the market occurs largely in the advanced industrialized nations, with the U.S. as the dominant consumer. Analysts are interested in developing a means to transfer more costs of fighting the problem to consuming countries. This strategy requires cooperation among producing countries so as to negotiate a better deal with consumers, including the U.S. Small arms registration and control. While most analysts in the U.S. think of controlling conventional weapons in the military sphere, the issue looks very different from Latin America. The export of small arms from the U.S. to Latin America dramatically aggravates the problem of deadly conflict. There is, thus, an increasingly vocal demand in Latin America that the U.S. cooperate on regulating the flow of small arms to the

**CHAPTER IV**

**GEO-STRATEGIC CONCERNS OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE**

## Geo-strategic Concerns of Argentina and Chile

Historically, European settlement patterns were such that South America was settled on the run, leaving the less attractive center empty. As can be quickly grasped from a glance at the map of South America, most of the major cities in the subcontinent are on the coast or somewhere near it. The coastal core areas that developed tended to become the central nuclei of the emerging nations. Thus, few borders cut through core areas and there was no particular sense of concern over the need to determine borders accurately during the colonial period or in the early years of national existence.<sup>25</sup> This lack of space mastery and well-defined borders is a source of much unease in the subcontinent. A further unfortunate legacy was a sense of rivalry between the Spanish speaking nations of South America and the lone Portuguese speaking nation Brazil. In Argentina, there is this perception, nay, obsession of Brazil, with its natural ally Chile as expansionary powers. According to one statement, the Brazilians will not be willing to end this expansionary process until Portuguese-speaking feet can wash in the Pacific Ocean. The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry took a variety of forms ranging from the war over the 'Bando Oriental' of Uruguay in 1825, the attempt to bring down the Argentine dictator, Rosas in the 1850s, competition in Paraguay after the 1865 war of the Triple Alliance and a series of less dramatic confrontation over borders and

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<sup>25</sup> See an article by R. Janani, "Geese are Swans And Swans are Geese" Argentina: Some Indian Perspectives, Embassy of Argentina, New Delhi. 1997

territories. During World War II, Argentina and Brazil found them on opposite sides with Brazil a close relationship with United States of America (USA) and Argentina observing studiously aloof neutrality that in fact leaned towards the Axis.

The rivalry has important influences in the domestic and international politics of the three buffer states of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.<sup>26</sup> This can be explained by Argentina's discernment as the natural geopolitical leader of the Parana-Plata River and Estuary system. It is expressed as a manifestation of the 'law of orange' by which is meant that any floating object dropped in the entire area of the River Plate Basin would sooner or later drift by the port city of Buenos Aires and thus would symbolically come under Argentine geopolitical influence. Argentina wants to have her presence felt in the entire region, and so does Brazil. The influences also have to do with several categories of Argentine Brazilian competition, a competition that is usually low-key and even cordial, but is nevertheless a present and constant factor. One important aspect of the rivalry is competition for the arms market in the buffers and the influence that accrues from the sales continues. The rivalry has also come to include competition for resources such as Paraguayan hydro-electrical energy, and to a lesser extent, Bolivian oil, gas and iron-ore.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

Brazil's awakening interest in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic makes these regions new theatres for the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry.

The Malvinas (Falklands) conflict-1982 had an impact on the Argentine-Brazilian relations and the nuclear dimension, which is an important factor in the regional politics. Polls taken during the conflict indicated Brazilian public opinion tended to favor the British, and many Brazilians referred to the islands by their English name, Falklands. However, after some fence-sitting, the Brazilian government decided that moderate support for Argentina was probably the best course of action in view of the way the Argentines were able to line up fairly strong Latin American support. Brazil voted in favor of Argentina's positions in the Organization of American States (OAS) and even supplied Argentina with two reconnaissance aircrafts. However, Brazilian support was never enthusiastic. The Brazilian statement that 'we are supporting our Argentine cousins' was in marked contrast with those of other countries that were supporting their <sup>27</sup>Argentine brothers' The Brazilian position in the conflict was shaped by strong ties to Britain, fundamental coolness towards Argentina, and a concern that Brazil's own interest in the South Atlantic and Antarctica might not be served by an aggressive and victorious Argentina in control of the Malvinas Islands. But Brazil recognized the

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
<sup>27</sup> Sachdeva, Manpreet, "Argentina's Foreign Policy: Catching up with Times" Embassy of Argentina, New Delhi 1997.

wisdom of not siding with Britain and the USA against most of Latin America and thus Brazil gave their grudging support to Argentina.

As regards the nuclear aspect, Argentina's nuclear program is the oldest and most sophisticated in Latin America. Brazil's program too is making swift progress. Both countries have adequate aircraft delivery system. Neither country is effectively bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Argentine strategic doctrine has always stressed the merits of Argentine 'quality' (higher cultural level, literacy rates, racial 'whiteness', arms sophistication and military training) over Brazilian 'quantity' (sheer physical size, population and Gross national Product). But still, its perception that it is steadily falling behind Brazil on various accounts remains a great incentive for detonation a nuclear device. For Brazil, pride, nationalism, and the possibility of Argentina going nuclear first are the incentives. Though not a conflict in the military sense, the Argentina-Brazil rivalry is fundamental to an understanding of the international relations of Argentina in particular and of the South American continent as a whole.

### **The Beagle Channel Issue**

If influence and leadership in the Southern Cone are the causes for the contention with the northern neighbors, it is mainly the status of the 'keeper of the doorway'



ARGENTINE and CHILEAN CLAIMS IN PATAGONIA


from the Atlantic to the Pacific that can be attributed to its dissension with the Western neighbor, that is, Chile.<sup>28</sup> The South Pacific and its entry points through the Beagle Channel and the Southern Passages are seen by the Chile as a region subject to the geopolitical 'law of valuable areas', which holds that if a nation does not fill, develop and defend its valuable areas, another nation will. The bioceanic principle is an important element in Chilean thought as well as Argentine. Even though Chile accepts the concept of 'Argentina in the Atlantic and Chile' in the Pacific', there is also a historical memory that Patagonia was under the control of Chile. Therefore, the stress upon drawing the line between Atlantic and the Pacific to favor Chile in terms of the Beagle Channel islands. The Argentines too feel that they have cause to be upset because they believe that Chile is engaged in a 'silent invasion' of the semi-empty Patagonia through migration. This, they feel, is being done to avenge the loss of the region.

The bone of contention between Argentina and Chile, the Beagle islands, primarily being an outcome of this deep-rooted tension, and the bioceanic principle of both countries, is also linked to the Malvinas conflict and the competing Antarctic claims.

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<sup>28</sup> Hirst, Monica, "Security Policies, Democratization and Regional integration in Southern Cone", Serie de documentos e Informes de investigacion, FLASCO Prgram, Buenos Aires, August 1995





THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

In 1881, a general agreement was reached between the two countries under which the boundary would be the 'highest peaks' of the Andes. However, differences remained for many years over just what these highest peaks were. The same treaty also clarified the status of Patagonia, giving it to Argentina, and divided the Tierra del Fuego between the two countries. The British crown was given arbitration power over details under a 1902 treaty and through the years has further refined the sovereignty issues in the Southern islands. But unfortunately the limits of the Beagle channel were never clearly defined, and as a result, there were always doubts about the ownership of the Beagle Channel islands and the easternmost point of Chilean sovereignty. The British role as arbiter between Argentina and Chile has always been sore point for Argentina. This was reflected during the Peron era (1945-55) when Argentina became increasingly aggressive over the issue of the Malvinas islands. Argentina overtly stated that it doubted the neutrality of Britain in light of the Malvinas islands controversy and suspected that there were secret understanding between Britain and Chile. As a result, in 1971 Argentina insisted that the arbitration arrangement be changed so that the actual judgement would be made by an impartial panel of the five members of the international Court of Justice. The arbiters, an American, a Nigerian, a Frenchman, a Swede and an Englishman spent a six-year period studying the treaties, logs, maps and documents and position papers submitted by Argentine & Chile. The findings were released in early 1977 and came down heavily on the side of Chile. The dividing line was drawn north of the islands, thus awarding

Nueva, Picton and Lennox (the NPL islands) to Chile. The net result was to reject the Argentine contention that the bioceanic principle should take priority over evidence that the Beagle Channel ran north of the NPL islands as contended by Chile. Argentina then took the most unusual step of rejecting the arbitration on the grounds that the award went beyond the strictly defined issues that had been laid before the arbitral board. This in turn provoked strong reactions from Chile, which argued that an arbitration award is binding and cannot be rejected unilaterally.

Argentina's formal rejection of the arbitral award in January 1978 was followed by attempts to negotiate the issue bilaterally, but little progress was made, and both nations prepared for war during the year. The war hysteria reached a fever pitch in December 1978 when troop movements signaled that mobilization was underway in both countries. A report that Peruvian forces were also moving along their southern border with Chile raised the specter that the conflict might extend beyond the two countries. As an Argentine admiral was to recall later. "we all know the gravity of the consequences of a war, and we realize that even when one is victorious all objectives aren't accomplished. No one wants it, but, perhaps, in the absence of other possibilities. And we also know how close we were to that alternative towards the end of 1978".<sup>29</sup> As Christmas approached and tension

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<sup>29</sup> See an article by R. Janani, "Geese are Swans And Swans are Geese" Argentina: Some Indian Perspectives, Embassy of Argentina, New Delhi. 1997

continued to rise, Chile called for a Meeting of Consultation under the OAS Rio Treaty. Argentina in turn proposed that the matter be negotiated by Pope John Paul II. Chile accepted it, the Pope named Cardinal Antonio Samore as his personal representative. A war was just averted.

But the conflict not being fully solved, the military geography of the area tends to favor Argentina as it has more military bases closer to the Beagle Channel area than Chile. Should hostilities invoke attacks on each nation's heartland, Argentina again has a very significant advantage that Chile's Central Valley heartland lies quite close to Argentine bases in the west, mainly in Mendoza, while the Argentine heartland of Buenos Aires is far from Chilean bases. Both countries would be hardpressed to manage a confrontation with each other if they were already engaged in another conflict. Chile, in particular, would have classic worst-case situation if it were required to mobilize against a Peru-Bolivian coalition in the north, face Argentina in the Patagonia-Beagle Channel area and at the same time defend its Santiago-Valparaiso-Concepcion heartland. Argentina's corresponding worst case scenario would invoke a Chilean attack while it was involved with Britain over the Malvinas islands or Antarctica. This possibility weighed very heavily on Argentina during the 1982 conflict.

Chile was one of only two Latin American nations to abstain in key OAS votes that supported Argentina, and Argentina strongly suspected that Chilean public

opinion and the Pinochet government supported Britain. This suspicion was based in part on history but also on the idea that if Argentina were weakened by a defeat against Britain, it would have a diminished capacity to pressure or go to war with Chile. Chile showed its concern that the Argentine 'recovery' of the Malvinas Islands was but the beginning of a long process of Argentine aggressive actions in the south. Another current of opinion held that the Galtieri regime would really have preferred to go to war with Chile to take the Beagle Channel islands, but that the Vatican's role prevented them from doing so, thus they had to settle for the Malvinas conflict instead<sup>30</sup>. There seemed to be a great deal of pessimism in Chile during the Malvinas conflict, along with a tendency to expect the worse. If Argentina won, it would be emboldened to try and take the Beagle Channel islands, if Argentina lost, it might move to take them in order to salvage its hurt pride. And it was perhaps because of this view that, wanting to improve its relations with Argentina, it tried to assure Argentina that it did not have to worry about its back since Chile was guarding it.

The overall advantage to Argentina led some analysis to suggest that it would be to Chile's strategic advantage to launch a quick preemptive strike, especially at a time when Argentina was distracted elsewhere. In Latin American military circles, this is known as the 'Israeli tactic' of making a rapid advantage and then holding terrain while an International Organization attempts to find a political

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<sup>30</sup> Howard T Pittman, "The impact of Democratization on Geopolitics and Conflict in Southern Cone", Latin American Studies Association, Boston, 1986

solution<sup>31</sup>. There was sustained speculation in Argentina on the existence of a broad secret understanding between the two nations that would be counter to Argentina's interests in the Malvinas, as well as in the Antarctica and Drake Passage. In the face of decisive military defeat on the islands, Argentina turned its attention to replacing the equipment lost in the conflict. This rearmament program concerned Chile. Since there seemed a little prospect of any Argentine action against the reinforced British garrison on the islands, many Chileans wondered if these weapons might be used against them. But tension eased with the transition to an elected civilian President in Argentina, and a hopeful situation prevails.

### **The Falkands/ Malvinas Issue**

The conflicts in the sub-continent are all interrelated, and one particular conflict whose impact can be felt in all other conflicts is that of the Malvinas islands. The islands have now acquired a symbolic, emotional and political significance that far outweighs the inherent importance of the islands themselves.<sup>32</sup> The islands have a historic geopolitical thinking significance in that they were one of the many original outposts of the British empire selected because of their proximity to

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<sup>31</sup> James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in Southern Cone" *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol 27, No 3, 1985.

<sup>32</sup> Child Jack, "Present Trends in the Inter-American Security System and Rio Treaty", *Anuario Juridico*, 1983, Organization American States, Washington DC in 1994.

maritime 'choke points' (sites where land tends to compress the seaway and makes it easier to control it since it is so restricted) which permitted the Royal Navy to project its power at key sites with maximum effectiveness. The islands were the site of important engagements in the two World Wars. Their contemporary significance lies in their relationship to the South Atlantic and Antarctica, since whoever possesses the islands is in a strong position to project power into these areas and strengthen any of sovereignty and influence in the region.

The early history of the islands is complicated making it difficult to establish any clear priority to the British or Argentina claims. The complication began with two different sixteenth century discovery dates, 1520 by a Spanish member of Magellan's expedition, according to Argentina, and 1592 by an English navigator, according to Britain. Exploration and settlement in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were sporadic. Spain, France and Britain, all established settlements of one kind or another in this early period. In 1810 when Argentina gained independence from Spain, the Spanish abandoned the islands. This early Argentine settlement was destroyed by a US Naval vessel in 1832 after a series of incidents between the settlers and the US Sealers. A year later the British expelled the remaining Argentinians and began their long period of effective control. In that period of almost a century and a half, there were few notable events in the islands' history. Argentina made periodic protests over British action but these protests were largely ignored and the dispute was considered dormant. The highly

nationalistic regime of Juan Peron in Argentina (1945-55) seized on the Malvinas issue as a patriotic rallying point and linked it to Argentine claims in Antarctica and to a geopolitical vision of a 'greater Argentina'. Argentina put forward its appeal to the decolonization of settlements that occurred in the third world after World War II, and it was successful in obtaining UN Resolution that led to Anglo-Argentine talks over the eventual resolution of the issue. The talks seemed to offer the promise of slow but steady progress toward an eventual transfer of sovereignty. In the mid 1970s this optimistic development received a setback when both countries began to perceive an economic benefit in terms of possible major oil deposits as well as other resources. In 1976 there was a shooting incident involving a British Oceanographic vessel and an Argentine Navy destroyer, which strained relations between the two countries and led to a withdrawal of ambassadors and a basic reevaluation of options on the part of the Argentines. This reevaluation apparently included contingency planning for the eventual recovery of the islands by force if negotiations with Britain did not yield favorable results. The government hardened its attitude, as monthly meetings produced no results. These events eventually led to war for sovereignty of islands in April 1982 between Argentina and Britain. Argentina faced a overwhelming and decisive military defeat in the in that short but destructive war on the islands. During the post war period, Argentina focussed its efforts on the political and diplomatic fronts in an attempt to continue to pressure Britain and in replacing its lost military equipment. Argentina was able to gain considerable support in the



OAS and diplomatic fronts in an attempt to continue to pressure Britain and in replacing its lost military equipment. Argentina was able to gain considerable support in the OAS and the General Assembly of the UN in this process. The UN vote in Nov 1982 favored Argentina and was not so rewarding to the Thatcher government, since the US and several NATO allies supported Argentina's call for new negotiations.

The neutral stance of Chile in the Falklands conflict was a source of resentment for Argentina during and after the conflict.<sup>33</sup> It was believed that Britain was seeking to establish the presence of Chile in the South Atlantic by projecting her into the Southern islands in order to weaken Argentina's position in the region, and was also trying to place Chile on the Southern flanks of the Malvinas.

Immediately after the conflict, there were speculation and reports about possible Chilean purchases of aircraft and ships from Britain, including some that fought in Malvinas conflict, which would deliver a symbolic message to Argentina.

Despite attractive offers from the erstwhile Soviet Union, the Argentine military opted for its traditional supplies, West Germany, France and Israel as well as Brazil. Although Brazil and Chile were apprehensive about Argentina's

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<sup>33</sup> Child, Jack, "Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among neighbours, Praeger New York 1985.

rearmament, this did not go beyond replacement of lost material, and could not become a source for any arms race in Southern Cone.

The conflict affected US relations with Latin America and undermined the credibility of the OAS and its instrument for peacekeeping and, the 1947 Rio Treaty. The US made a number of reconciliatory gestures towards Argentina in an attempt to repair some of the damage caused by its strong support to Britain. For a brief period, the recovery of the islands provided a powerful unifying cause for Argentina. The defeat caused a sense of bitterness and illusion, which in turn led to the overthrow of the nation's military rulers and was an important factor in restoration of democracy in 1983 with Raul Alfonsin as the President.

### **The geostrategic situation in the South Atlantic**

This conflict may be complicated but it is nothing compared to the trouble in the area where there is a juxtaposition of the unknown of the Antarctica, the infantleness of Africa, and the adolescence of South America. The South Atlantic includes both influence and resource issues. The influence elements involve the projection of power into this large region, which does not fall under any treaty or security arrangement. For the super powers this is a remote area of little intrinsic importance other than the oil sealanes in the eastern portion and the access routes

to the Antarctic and between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.<sup>34</sup> To the regional states, especially Argentina and Brazil, the influence issue has an obviously much higher priority, and Argentina in particular considers it a 'vital' national interest since Argentina defines its own nationality terms of sovereignty in the South Atlantic, the islands and Antarctica.

The resource elements of the South Atlantic conflict are not so well defined. For the US and Western Europe, the 'resource' of greatest interest is the sealane that carries Persian Gulf Oil around the Cape of Good Hope and up the western coast of Africa. The area could become a region of confrontation over sealanes or Antarctic access. For the sub-regional littoral powers it is an important area in which to emphasize their claims and make their presence felt in an attempt to secure expanded exclusive economic zones and improve their Antarctic claims.

Argentina's concern with the South Atlantic is, of course, related to their idea of sovereign claim on the Malvinas and its conviction that it has sovereignty in the Antarctic sector.<sup>35</sup> The ocean integrates mainland, insular and Antarctic Argentina. The region is a primary theatre in which the current of Argentine Brazilian competition and cooperation are being played out. Chile too has South Atlantic pretensions. These would extend beyond the Beagle Channel islands to

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<sup>34</sup> See an article by Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and Southern Cone subsystem", in G. Pope Atkins (ed) *South America into the 1990s*. Westview Press, Boulder 1990.

<sup>35</sup> Child, Jack, "Antarctic and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum, New York Praeger, 1988

the 'Arc of the Southern Antilles'. This would greatly strengthen Chile's position in Antarctic and surrounding waters while practically demolishing Argentine's claims in the same area. The overlapping Argentine and Chilean Antarctic claims further stimulate the sense of competition between the two countries.

### **Geopolitics of resource in Antarctica**

The conflict over control of Antarctic and its resources is the most complex, involves a large number of actors and has the potential to snowball into a major conflict in the region. The situation can be attributed to various reasons. First, the legal status of Antarctica is in considerable doubt. Some nations have staked out sovereignty claims, others have reserved the right to do so. Still others argue that the continent should be managed on a condominium basis among the nations that have been active in the exploration. A large group of nations with little activity in the Antarctic have pressed the argument that any benefit from the continent should be for the good of all nations. Secondly, traditional international law is 'ambiguous: and not particularly helpful in putting forth any single solution acceptable to majority of the nations involved. Thirdly, the real or perceived presence of economically viable mineral and biological assets has drawn the attention of nations of the Antarctic. Fourthly, the Malvinas war has casted serious apprehensions about the ability of interested parties to settle their Antarctic disputes by peaceful means.

The overlapping territorial claims in the Antarctica are consequent to the Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty 1959, which came into force in 1961. This article stipulates the continuation of the 'status quo' regarding the claims of situation so that it will not obstruct cooperation within the Treaty's framework, especially with other states who do not recognize the legitimacy of those claims. This provision guarantees non-renunciation of prior claims, or rights to claims, and simultaneously prohibits any new claims or assertions of national activities during the Treaty's duration as a basis for substantiating past or future claims.<sup>36</sup>

The overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile and United Kingdom provide an interesting ground for scrutiny under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Argentina claims a wedge shaped sector between 25° W and 74° W longitudes south of 60° S latitude, extending up to the South Pole at 90° S latitude. The area as claimed by Chile extends from 53° W to 90° W longitudes, the latitudinal extent being the same. The United Kingdom claims the territory from 20° W to 80° W longitudes in the same latitudinal extent during the inception of the Antarctic Treaty.

This sector assumes more significance as the "tri-continental" ideology of both Argentina and Chile extends into the Antarctic. Further, the British presence in the sector with Falklands dispute in the background provides another angle to it

geopolitical significance. Argentina's invasion of the islands in 1982 was suspected to be an action to strengthen its Antarctic claim, and that one of the reasons for Britain's strong response was to protect its own claim.


Moreover, the presence of US bases for scientific purposes in the sector has its different implications to be covered upon. The Antarctic being declared as "the common heritage of mankind" in 1959, added another dimension to the problem. The number of member states in the original ATCP was twelve, which included Argentina, Australia, Chile, Belgium, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The membership was further increased by including fifteen more members in the ATCP.

The second major instrument of the Antarctic Treaty system, the Antarctic Seals Convention was promulgated in 1972 and entered into force in the same year. It limits the vulnerability of six species of Antarctic seals to commercial exploitation.

The Convention on Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the third principle component of the Antarctic Treaty System, was negotiated in 1980 and entered into force in 1982. CCAMLR aims to encourage the preservation of all Antarctic

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<sup>36</sup> See an article by Joyner, Christopher C., "Antarctica and the Indian Ocean States: The interplay of law, Interests and Geopolitics" in *Ocean Development of International Law*, Vol. 21, No 1, 1990.



RIVER PILCOMAYO DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY

marine living resources, inclusive of fish, crustaceans (i.e. krill), creatures on the continental shelf, and bird life.

The geopolitical situation in the Southern Cone becomes more intricate when combined with the border disputes, which exist in the northern portion of the Cone. Various disputes including the two major (Chile and Argentina) and minor actors (Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru) have interlocking territorial claims. Argentina and Paraguay have differences over the demarcation over the boundary along the Pilcomayo river. The sharing of waters of the river waters led to difficulties in the demarcation of the territorial limits. The Argentine view is that because of the very special geological formation of the area and the sediment carried by the river, the shared portion of the river changes its course at three different points including Puerto Irigoyen and Sombrero Negro. The Argentine and Paraguayan governments have studied the problem and agreement to dam the river at these points have been reached so that the river water can be released with control. The dispute also involves Bolivia as the river forms a boundary between Argentina and Bolivia before it makes a boundary between Argentina and Paraguay.<sup>37</sup>

The dispute over the use of Lauca river waters which has its source in Chile in flows on to Andean Plateau of Bolivia still stands unresolved. The installation of

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<sup>37</sup> Phillip, Kelly, "Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America, University of Texas Press, Austin 1997.





a hydroelectric project by Chile and the use of waters unilaterally for irrigation purposes is deeply resented by Bolivia. This dispute reached a critical point in 1962 when Bolivia had warned Chile in that year that the diversion of water from the river by Chile would be regarded as an act of aggression. The dispute further relates to the Bolivian desire to acquire a corridor to the Pacific Ocean. In 1976, Chile made a proposal to Bolivia to grant a corridor to the sea in lieu of full use of Lauca river waters. Bolivia had broken diplomatic relations with Chile in 1979 because no progress was made in negotiations concerning Bolivia's access to the sea. At present Bolivia has been granted all the facilities of port in Antofagasta on the Chilean coast.

Another border dispute which has its roots in nineteenth century is the one which involves Bolivia, Chile and Peru. Bolivia has been landlocked since losing its coastal territory in the Pacific war of 1879-84, when Chile seized the then Bolivian port of Antofagasta and surrounding coastline. Peru, which joined the war in support of Bolivia, lost its own southern provinces of Tacna and Arequipa to Chile but retrieved Tacna in 1929 under the Treaty of Ancon. Bolivia's efforts to regain an outlet to the Pacific Ocean have since been hampered by a provision in the Treaty of Ancon to the effect that no Chilean territory formerly belonging Peru could be surrendered to a third country without the consent of Peru. Bolivia also failed to win proper access to the Atlantic ocean via the Paraguay river in the Chaco war of early 1930s.

**CHAPTER V**

**CONCLUSION**

Boundaries, in their process of evolution from the frontiers have undergone a transition in various stages to acquire their present form. Boundaries, the lines of precise demarcation of territory, define the territorial characteristic of the state to accord a definite and exact territory upon which the state exercises its sovereignty.

The term 'frontier' implies what lies in front and indicates towards the outlying territory, evident in which is the expansionary idea for the state. These frontiers being the zones of transition between states gradually gave shape to the transitional societies that were a product of their situation. The situation of these people exposed them to multiple cultural influences and struggles for the expansion by the states lying on both sides of the frontier. These influences of situation, culture, and conflict and movement of the frontiersmen, which is natural to them, have been responsible for their transitional existence. The frontiers, if allowed to evolve gradually over time, take shape of the boundaries that are coterminous with the notion of the nation-state. These boundaries create a situation of peaceful co-existence for the neighboring states.

The frontiers, if tempered with, during the process of evolution or boundaries imposed upon it forcefully lead to the formation of identities that are not coterminous with either of the states between which it is a transitional zone and refuse to accept the sovereignty of either of the states. These identities of dissension

become a source of conflict at the border zones and attract attention of the sovereign governments.

Boundaries, of which the primary function is 'to bound' demarcate the precise limits of the state, are inherently confining in nature. Boundaries, in order to achieve precision pass through the stages of allocation, delimitation and demarcation. The existence of overlapping territorial claims in combination with the problems of delimitation and demarcation can become constant source of tension

The physical delineation of borders poses problems when the topography and relief features make them difficult to be demarcated precisely. The resource sharing along the borders coupled with problematic delineation renders the concepts renders the borders vulnerable to be breached by the people in either side of the border.

The porosity of the borders, which is influenced by the factors mentioned above, is a major concern of the states. Although in the face of globalisation, the sovereignty of the states is constantly eroding, the territorial aspect of the state remains immune to these forces. Porous borders with illegal movement of commodities, people, arms and ammunitions affect the territorial sovereignty of the state. The states take measures to check the breach of their borders and the

management problem becomes intense if coupled with physiological difficulties.

South America's relative isolation from the rest of the world and the geographical proximity to U.S. presents a complex set of issues in the region. The region was traditionally administered through the Monroe doctrine states the idea that South America lying in the same hemisphere as US is sole domain of the US and the affairs of the region are of a special concern for the US. It became all the more rigid during the Cold war. This was clearly demonstrated during the Cuban missile crisis of 1961.

The region evokes particular concern of the US on the drug issue, which directly affected the US policies in the region during the Cold War period. The production of narcotic crops and the corresponding existence of the drug economies, which facilitated the revolutionary communist organizations, were perceived as the threat to the US dominance in the region.

The use of drugs which is related to social problems, crime and violence in the region as a whole and US in particular has been a concern for US. The nemesis of drug trafficking and the issues connected to it such as terrorism and fundamentalism plagued the region as various revolutionary organizations thrive. The drug problem has a global dimension to it because the major producing

nations (Colombia and Venezuela) all form an integral part world drug market and can not be dispensed with.

The formation of the regional organizations like the OAS and MERCOSUR (common market for Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) and increasing dialogue among the states in the region for security purposes have created an environment for stability in the region. The MOMEPA (military observer's mission in Ecuador and Peru) is an example of this which derives its legitimacy from the Rio de Janeiro protocol.

A major step based on democratic nations shared interests were taken in the second summit of the Americas, held in April 1998 in Santiago. In this summit heads of states and governments, Commission on Hemispheric Security was asked to identify ways and means to revitalize and strengthen the inter-American system's security related institutions in the hemisphere.

The Southern Cone comprising Brazil, Argentina and Chile has its own geopolitical interactions among the states. The geopolitical ambitions have surfaced in the Falklands/ Malvinas dispute in the past, which had their impact on the region as a whole. The Beagle Channel, which has been arrived at an amicable solution between the contesting parties (Argentina and Chile), still remains an issue of concern. First, the deployment of forces accords strategic and

advantageous position to Argentina. Secondly, it is affected by the dominance of Argentina as a major economic power in the region and its proximity to the first world in terms of development.

The South Atlantic issue, which is based on the 'bi-oceanic' principle of Chile and Argentina, is inextricably linked to the geopolitics in the region. Chile having the control of Cape Horn islands has access to both Pacific and Atlantic oceans and commands an advantageous position. The passage of inter-oceanic merchant vessels and the route through Cape of Good Hope lends the South Atlantic a geostrategic dimension to be worked upon.

The Antarctic continent constitutes the tri-continental ideology of both the nations (Argentina and Chile) which promotes the presence of both the nations in the mainland, the seas and the Antarctic continent. The continent assumes a global dimension as it has been declared 'common heritage of mankind'. The perceived resources are directly proportional to the advancement of technology, higher the level of technology of the nation, higher the opportunities for exploitation of resources in the climatically and topographically harsh terrain of Antarctica. Argentina being the more economically and technologically advanced nation in the continent would probably benefit more than Chile.



The geostrategic concerns further extend to the delineation of precise boundaries between Argentina and Chile. The *Laguna del Desierto* and *Campos de La Hielo Sur* issues on which negotiations are being carried upon by both the parties is an indication which reflect the tone of integration in the region. The problematic delineation coupled with the issue of illegal migration through the Andes to the Argentine Patagonia are being worked upon in the purview of peace and harmony in the region.

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