PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled **Pattern of International Terrorism in the Post Cold War Period** submitted by **Daniel Joseph Kuba** is in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. This is a bonafide work to the best of our knowledge

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Dedicated to the memory of my late Father A. M. Daniel

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"When I consider Your heavens,
The work of your fingers,
The moon and the stars, which
You have ordained,
What is man that you are mindful of him..."
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CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE POST COLD WAR AGENDA

The international focus is shifting to include international terrorism as a major item on the global agenda. The inability of nation states to counter terrorist activities, the rising lethality of terrorism with increasing recourse to 'spectacular acts', and the proliferation of networking between various terrorist groups and terrorists and transnational organised crime syndicates have contributed to the concern, particularly in the post Cold War period. All through the Cold War years, terrorism had been considered another manifestation of power politics, and states thought of it as a domestic problem. Today, however, they are rethinking some of their basic assumptions and beliefs on motives, goals and the scope of international terrorism.

In recent years, the West has been facing major terrorist attacks both on its territory and its interests abroad. In the United States, right-wing extremists, like the Christian Patriots have been active since the early 1990s. Significant, however, have been the increasing attacks on US facilities and personnel abroad, by certain Islamic fundamentalist groups who blame the United States of heading a "global conspiracy against Islam" and economic and material exploitation. In the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany, too, groups that are foreign or local groups that have foreign support have carried out terrorist activities. Terrorism was rare in Russia and Japan. A lot

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has changed in the 1990s. Both those countries must now cope with acts of terrorism that can strike such things as public transportation, apartment buildings and other public assets and facilities.

China is facing an Islamic uprising in its Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Islamic fundamentalist influence and support, emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, has been responsible to a large extent for the new development. There has also been increasing evidence of involvement and support by Islamic fundamentalist groups in ethno-nationalist movements in Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, South East, South and Central Asia and Russia. In the last decade, six areas have been especially affected by terrorist-fundamentalist violence; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Kosovo enclave in Serbia and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The inability of many postcolonial states to create institutional mechanisms to assimilate multi-ethnic and cultural aspirations resulted in conflicts in these states. Terrorists and extremists have exploited the vulnerabilities of these states to their advantage. Islamic fundamentalist terrorism has found fertile ground in the instabilities of many of these states. Operating from these states, Islamic fundamentalism is a violent force and is today considered a phenomenon directed against the West, against states with Muslim populations that have secular governments, and states that have Muslim minorities fighting for independence or autonomy.

Terrorism in the past focussed on goals of immediate concern to the terrorists and against a well defined set of enemies. After the 1960s, from

which period terrorism is supposed to have acquired 'international'

characteristics, at least till the 1980s, the pattern indicated that the political

and ideological content of terrorist activities were comprehensible and target;

were chosen according to what was amenable to their cause. However, in

the last two decades, terrorists have been more indiscriminate in their use of

violence which, as many analysts point out, indicate the changing goals and

objectives of terrorists. Brian Jenkins notes that "the notion that analysts

offered once about the constraints on terrorist behaviour are eroding as they

move away from a political agenda into new realms that entail large scale an

indiscriminate violence."[1] The justification that terrorist groups give now of

their violent activities have increasingly moved away from their initial political

economic, social and even religious rationale.

During the Cold War, the bulk of the terrorist movement was related in

some way to the rivalry between the eastern and the western blocs. Terrorisr

became a useful instrument of state policy, conditioned by such factors as

clash of ideologies, alliance building and other specific state interests.

Terrorism subsequently became a highly political term and it became

impossible for states to agree on building up a strategy against it. There was

optimism that the end of the Cold War would reduce international terrorism tc

manageable proportions and increase international cooperation. However,

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[1] Brian Jenkins, Opening address, *Conference on Terrorism and Beyond*, Oklahoma City National
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, April 17, 2000. Available at
http://www.mipt.org/jenkins-ctb.html (17 February 2001).

terrorism has become a much more difficult subject to deal with, as new justifications and motivations are added to the old ones.

Many argue that international terrorism "reflects broader trends in irregular warfare."[2] The Naval War College in the United States, for example, has announced that its curriculum and war-gaming exercises are going to include urban warfare and terrorism as important parts of training.[3] This has emerged out of increasing evidence that terrorism is becoming a well-coordinated strategy in armed conflict. In many states the magnitude and viciousness of this phenomenon has resulted in full-scale counter terrorist operations by regular armed forces. The most recently asked questions are if terrorism in the future would become a "continuation of politics by other means." There is also a fear among analysts and policy makers that, if states continue to support terrorists, 'catastrophic terrorism' through the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) will become part of terrorist strategy. Material, moral, technical and political constraints among terrorist groups, especially of the religious variety, are eroding and if the present trend of international non-cooperation continues, terrorists in the near future will go in for large-scale attacks using WMDs.

The fact that a problem like terrorism is rooted in the social, political and economic conditions of society cannot be discounted. Society with all its institutional constraints features a certain amount of discontent. The inability,

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[2] See for example, Ian O.Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, *Countering the New Terrorism,* RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 42.

[3] Noam Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy,* Verso: London, New York, 1991, p. 30.

however, of many states to cater to the socio-economic welfare of their population has contributed to further grievances. These have translated into violence of all sorts. States, instead of formulating policies to resolve the areas of conflict, on the other hand, brought in the military and police to solve the problem which only curtailed democratic participation and civil liberties. The state's intransigence further fuelled rebellion. This has resulted in a vicious cycle of violence, a phenomenon that has become virtually endemic to the international system today.

The aim of this dissertation is to identify the new trends in terrorism. It attempts in particular to answer two questions:[4] First, has the change in the pattern of international terrorism in the post Cold War period arisen out of unexpected political turning points, exposing government vulnerabilities that suited terrorists? Secondly, are we seeing an accepted new form of warfare, which involves organisational, doctrinal, strategic, tactical and technological innovations for offence and defence? The following two sections will attempt to understand the concept. The first is a historical overview of the evolution of terrorism as a strategy in armed conflict. The second will focus on various aspects and issues that makes terrorism a difficult subject to study, particularly, the inability of the world community to arrive at a definitional consensus on terrorism.

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[4] These questions have already been raised. See David C.Rapoport, "Terrorism," *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict,* Vol.3, Academic Press, 1999, p. 501, and Ian O.Lesser, et al., *Countering the New Terrorism,* p. 47.

TERRORISM: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Terrorism has been perhaps as old as history. Many of the characteristics present in contemporary terrorism have been there since ancient times. What has changed today is the increasing belief in violence and killing as the final arbiter of even minor grievances and revenge. The instruments of terror have also become highly sophisticated and destructive.

Religious motives have driven terrorism all through history. *Sicarii*, a Jewish religious sect, went about murdering during the first century AD. It was part of the zealot struggle in Palestine with the objective of creating mass struggle against Greeks and Romans.[5] During the 11th and 12th century AD, an Arab religious teacher, Hassan Ibn Sabah, formed a "Society of the Assassins." The group was called *Fedayeen* who believed that killing bad people on the command of their leader was a sacred duty, which ensured their personal salvation besides getting rid of a corrupt order in this world.[6] Yet another group was the *Thugs*, active in India till the late 19th century. They killed to provide sacrificial offerings to the Goddess Kali.[7] Religious disharmony has also resulted in various types of conflict between different groups of people. Religion has been used for social and political purposes apart from its moral functions. This critical linkage has survived over the years and even in contemporary times, it is seen that most major conflicts around the world have a strong religious content.

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[5] Louis Rene Beres, *Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat,* Westview Press, Bolder Colorado, 1979, p. 8.

[6] N.S. Saxena, Terrorism: History and Facets in the World and in India, Abhinav Publication, 1995, p. 39.

[7] Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists,* Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 16.

The most compelling scenario of the last one and half centuries has been the use of violence as a reaction to oppression, with the aim of putting power in the hands of the aggrieved people. Violence in these cases was employed to effect an escape from bondage and hence to correct a wrong. The French "Reign of Terror", 1793-94, sent 40,000 to the guillotine and 300,000 to jail.[8] One very important characteristic of modern day terrorism was brought out during this period, i.e. the ability of a small group of people to wield such enormous power. Robespierre and his inner cabal of twenty-two men, which made up the Committee of General Security, was able to manipulate fear by creating "an aura of uncertainty."[9] It was this revolutionary zeal of the group that became a precursor to revolutionary terrorism in modern times. Edmund Burke popularised the term in English.[10] In the present age, terrorists have manipulated the media to create fear and uncertainty among the target group. They have done so by staging 'spectacular' events, which have been transmitted to millions of people across the globe through modern means of communication.

In the late 19th and early 20th century, a spate of killings of kings, queens, aristocrats and the ruling elite by anarchists and social revolutionaries presented another breed of terrorism, which indicated careful and calculated use of violence for specific purposes. Terrorism had

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[8] See Beres, op.cit., p. 8.
[9] Ibid., p. 8.
[10] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 7.

revolutionary connotations of a different kind.[11] The 'peoples will' became an important motivation behind these killings. During this period, Tsar Alexander II in 1881, President Carnot of France was assassinated in 1894 and the King of Italy in 1900.[12] Terrorism was used during this period to create fear among the elite.

During this period, the modern histories of France and Russia were influencing people's desire for freedom from oppression, which was seen as being perpetrated by the elite in society. Many began to imbibe revolutionary ideas and carried their ideas to the point of political assassination. For example, the nationalist movement in India began to adopt terror tactics in the form of bomb attacks and shooting of administrative and police officials. Bal Gangadhar Tilak began a revolutionary movement for *swaraj*, which was aimed against the exploitation meted out to the Indians. He urged his followers to look to the examples of Ireland, Japan and Russia. In 1908, a Russian gave the Indian revolutionaries a manual for the manufacture of bombs.[13] A pamphlet entitled *Bande Mataram* issued from London in 1909, made the following exhortation, "Terrorise the officials, English and Indian, and the collapse of the whole machinery of oppression is not very far off."[14] Attempts were made to assassinate the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. Many prominent Englishmen and Indians who supported the English were

[11] Hoffman calls this as a type of revolutionary terrorism that was particularly aimed at the elite in the society.
[12] See Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, p. 16.
[13] Amera Saeed, "Terrorism: The South Asian Experience," *Regional Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Autumn, 1999, p. 50.
[14] B.B.Majumdar, *Militant Nationalism in India*, Calcutta, 1966, p. 93.

murdered. An attempt on the life of Lord Hardinge, the Governor General of India, was made in January 1913. It has been estimated that in Bengal alone, in the period from 1905 to 1931, 360 terrorist outrages were committed and in these 112 persons were killed, many of whom were prominent officials of the British government in India.[15]

Totalitarian state repression or what many analysts call "state terrorism" also became widely practiced during this period. This was seen as being carried out to counter the increasing threat to the state and its interests from the revolutionary influences. State terrorism became a part of the elite strategy to quell rebellious people who became a threat to the regime. The Nazis, Fascists and Stalinists used terror against their own people and even against people in other states.[16] States continue to use state repression in modern times. But they do so covertly to escape attention from an increasingly watchful international media and universal human rights concerns.

Revolutionary terrorism made a comeback after World War II. The period has seen a variety of revolutionary movements all employing terrorist tactics. Anarchists, separatists, anti-colonial nationalists, and New Left and Right-wing reactionaries have spawned the period's landscape of violence. Terrorism during this period was aimed at the state, particularly in Third World countries where anti-colonial sentiments were running high. Many nation states came into being during this period as a result of movements that

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[15] ibid., p.177.
[16] For more details see Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 23-25.

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helped overthrow colonial masters. Leaders of these movements such as

Lenin, Trotsky, Sorel, Carlos Marighella, Mao Tse Tung, Frantz Fannon,

Marcuse, Che Guevera and others became heroes. The post Cold War period

is once again seeing the re-emergence of such movements, particularly in the

newly formed states in Central Asia and the Balkans, after the break-up of the

Soviet Union.

The use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy has been a post

World War II phenomenon. The earliest use of this type of terrorism has,

However, been found in the writings of Kautilya, as early as 303 BC.

According to him, *tusnim yuddha* or 'silent war', which involves methods such

as assassination, murder and poisoning, should be used in a quiet manner to

spread confusion in the ranks of the enemies.[17] Terrorism in the form of

covert state-sponsored support for terrorists and other states, particularly in

the Third World countries, became a common feature during the Cold War

period. Noam Chomsky critically views the United States' foreign policy during

this period. He argues that "terrorism and other crimes of the US and its

clients were not only far greater in scale (than it is now) but also incomparably

significant on any moral plane."[18] For example, according to Chomsky the US

ran by far the most extensive international terror in Cuba in the 1960s. It also

sought to assassinate Lumumba and backed dictators like Truzillo, Somoza,

Marcos, Suharto and others. He argues that involvement of the United States

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[17] Maj.Gen.S.Mohindra, *Terrorist Games Nations Play,* Lancer Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1993, pp. 1-15.
[18] Chomsky, op.cit., p. 14.

in the affairs of the Middle East was aimed to ensure its dominance over energy resources.[19]

All through the Cold War period, the US and the former Soviet Union have either taken part in assassination attempts of leaders in Third World countries or have supported one regime against another or have been factors in the rise or fall of certain leaders of their choice. The former Soviet Union has also been accused of supporting left terrorist groups or leaders with left ideologies all over the world with money and materials to topple democratic regimes and replace them with communist ones. The Soviet Union has been accused of the assassination of Hafizullah Amin, the ruler of Afghanistan.[20] It also gave arms to Middle Eastern and South Asian countries and pledged to support wars of liberation in non-Western countries.[21] In the last quarter of the 20th century, smaller states like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Pakistan have also started sponsoring terrorist groups for various reasons.

Contemporary terrorism retains most of the characteristics of the past but has become a far more serious threat than in the past. Terrorism as a coercive tactic is getting internationalised as terrorists come to appreciate the success of terrorist operations in other countries. What has become particularly dangerous has been the support and even direct involvement in the form of planning and execution of terrorist acts by certain states for purposes inimical to the state and the international system. The vigorous way

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[19] See Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, pp. 14-16.
[20] Asaf Hussain, *Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East*, Mansell Publishing Limited, London and New York, p. 59.
[21] For more details see Hussain, *Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East*, pp. 55-72.

in which terrorism is spilling across boundaries and with the recent increase in the networking between groups, many analysts see it as the most dangerous threat to national and international security in the coming years.

THE DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA

Every work on terrorism begins with an attempt to define it. Consequently there are hundreds of definitions on the subject, but, despite this, there is as yet no consensus on a universal meaning of terrorism. Brian Jenkins argues that it is the emphasis given to different elements by analysts in their definitions that has caused confusion in defining terrorism and that this factor has been a barrier to international cooperation.[22] Pointing out the subjective nature of the problem, Alex P. Schmid argues that "the question of a definition of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency."[23] Existing definitions have tended to project in major ways an analyst's cultural, professional or political biases. Any definition of terrorism is 'necessarily' an arbitrary one, the primary purpose of which is to establish a point of reference or departure for further discussion.[24]

Some scholars, to do away with the confusion in definition, have instead tried to develop typologies of terrorism. Here too, the subjective element has seeped in among them. They have divided terrorism into types

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[22] See Brian Jenkins, "Terrorism: A Contemporary Problem with Age-old Dilemmas," in Lawrence Howard Ed., *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses,* New York: Praeger, 1992, pp. 14-15.

[23] Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature,* p. 6., quoted in Donald J.Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare,* p. 104.

[24] Donald J.Hanle, *The Newest Face of Warfare,* p. 104.

such as repressive, revolutionary, pure, religious, state, state-sponsored, millennialist, issue-based and others. The problem, as Hamilton suggests, is that "almost as many typologies seemed to materialise, as there were analysts."[25]

Many other reasons exist for this problem in definition. Many states do not see it as a common international concern. They prefer to handle terrorism and its consequences within the domestic realm for two reasons. First, states know that the root cause of terrorism lies within their own boundaries and treating this as an international subject could bring international criticism and subsequent interference. Secondly, terrorism is seen by a majority of the world community as a powerful weapon against political and material exploitation by the powerful states. Internationalising it would mean surrendering this weapon to the powerful states. It is, hence, a highly politically and emotionally charged term. Terrorism is also a closely monitored subject because it involves sovereignty, security, legitimacy and other issues. In many states, even the study of terrorism has become a political decision.

What this has resulted in is the problem of creating an institutional mechanism for collecting worldwide data on international terrorism and its nature in various parts of the world, for the purpose of understanding broad trends in terrorism. Often the data that is released of terrorist acts is manipulated. This also means that there is a wide gap existing between academics and actual policy makers as far as the study of terrorism is

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[25] James T.Hamilton (ed.), *Television Violence and Public Policy*, The University of Michigan Press, 1998, p. 24.

concerned. This does not allow good researches to translate into governmental policies and decisions. All these have made it difficult for states to come up with a generally agreed upon understanding of the problem.

The changing nature, goals and motives of terrorism have also contributed to the difficulty in reaching a definitional consensus. David C.Rapoport argues that the most compelling reason perhaps is because the meaning of the term has changed frequently over the past two hundred years.[26] Bruce Hoffman also writes, "[n]ot surprisingly, as the meaning and usage of the word have changed over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, terrorism has proved increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition."[27] Both Rapoport and Hoffman study terrorism in phases, which had its own special character, dominating purposes and peculiar tactics. They see terrorism as shifting meaning, from one with revolutionary connotations to state repression, to anti-colonial sentiments, to nationalism and separatism outside the colonial framework, to extremist religious fundamentalist activities and to state-sponsored activities in other countries. The latest understanding of terrorism is that it has become an accepted form of warfare, covert in character but posing as a major threat to many states.[28]

In an anarchic international system, terrorism becomes an instrument of the strong, hostile and weak in the furtherance of their national interests.

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[26] See David C.Rapoport, "Terrorism," in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan Eds., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics,* Vol.2, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 497-510.
[27] Hoffman, op.cit., p. 28.
[28] Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., pp. 42-45.

And as long as it is useful for them, they will continue to use it. Strong states have used it to establish friendly regimes or bring down unfriendly ones in other countries. For example, in the early 1970s, the United States through its agents was involved in clandestine efforts to remove Salvador Allende, including the assassination of Rene Schneider, who did not approve of US plans.[29] Weak states have used terrorism as a substitute for conventional inferiority while engaging a hostile state. India's charge that Pakistan is fuelling terrorism in Kashmir is generally accepted today. Despite Pakistan's decade of denials that it is only providing moral support to Kashmiri aspirations, there is significant evidence to prove that the Pakistani military is deeply involved in the smuggling of anti-Indian terrorists across the Line of Control.[30] Many politically unstable states have also used terrorism as an instrument to consolidate their positions domestically and internationally. Iran is a classic example in this case. The Iran sponsored assassinations of the Shah's family, Shahpur Bakhtiar and his Secretary, Kurdish leaders opposed to the regime in Cyprus, Paris, Karachi and Berlin in the early 1990s, indicate domestic reasons for the resort to terrorism by Iran.[31] Iran also attempted to play a major role in Middle East politics by trying to unite conservative Muslim sentiments by particularly assisting Yasser Arafat's Fatah and Hizbollah in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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[29] See Cindy Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1997, pp. 85-86.
[30] See Ghulam Hasnain, "Inside Jihad," *Time,* February 5, 2001, pp. 22-25.
[31] See Edgar O. Ballance, *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection,* Macmillan Press Ltd., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1997, pp. 145-162.

In the last few decades, the media has also been accused of contributing to the confusion in the usage of the term, by, for example, using militants, terrorists, insurgents and freedom fighters interchangeably in various media reports.[32] What this has resulted in is the difficulty in really identifying who a terrorist, an insurgent or a militant. Three aspects of this definitional imbroglio are worth noting. First, there is the perennial definitional problem that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. Secondly, and as a corollary to this, the escalation of terrorist violence that has resulted in mass killings has increasingly isolated people's sympathy for the cause of the terrorists. There are some, who, while sympathetic to the terrorist's cause, do not see them as freedom fighters because they violate all rules of war (*jus ad bellum and jus in bello*). All social norms "are absent when we speak of terrorism ... [N]o rule of combat is respected if the rule violation serves the terrorist's purpose."[33] It has become difficult to differentiate between militants, terrorists, insurgents, freedom fighters and criminals. Rapoport argues that the recourse to terror has become very cheap. Initially, only the idea of a perfect society was powerful enough to justify extra-normal violence. Now virtually any aggrieved group turns to violence.[34]

Thirdly, the international community at the United Nations has been unable to come to a generally agreed upon understanding of terrorism. For

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[32] Hoffman points out how various media reports use these terms even while describing members of the same terrorist outfit. See Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 14.

[33] Alex P.Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*, p. 6., cited in Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*, p. 106.

[34] Rapoport also argues how even single issue activists like anti-abortionists, environmentalists and animal rights activists have in recent years taken recourse to increasing violence to put their points across. See David C.Rapoport, "Terrorism," *Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Violence and Peace*, p. 500.

the powerful countries terrorism carries strong security connotations. In

debates in the United Nations, they focus on the violence aspect of the act.

On the other hand, the Third World states argue that the root cause of

terrorism lies in the ills and struggles of a 'colonial' past. They point out that

people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and

exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including

force.[35] They caution the UN against a Western-oriented understanding of

terrorism as that would deprive the oppressed people of the only weapon they

have to fight for their rights. The Third World states emphasise not the

violence in defining terrorism but rather the underlying misery, frustration,

grievance and despair that leads people to the path of violence.[36]

Thomas Badey places existing definitions under two broad

categories.[37] The academic type and the political type. Definitions like those

of Alex P. Schmid fall under the academic type. According to Schmid,

"[t]errorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,

employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for

idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to

assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The

immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets

of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target

population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based

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[35] See Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 31-32.
[36] Ibid., p. 31.
[37] Thomas J. Badey, "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.10, No.1, (Spring 1998), p. 90.

communication processes between terrorists (organisation), (imperiled)

victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target

(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target

of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or

propaganda is primarily sought."[38] Badey points out that academic type

definitions, like the above, tend to be all-inclusive and thus in most cases

have "diminishing utility" as far as policy outcomes are concerned. Wardlaw

also notes that academic definitions do not have much of a prescriptive value

because many students of terrorism seem to find little difficulty in labeling an

event as 'terrorist'.[39]

On the other hand, the political type of definition revolves around

counter terrorist motivations. Badey argues that this category allows politically

convenient interpretations of events. According to him, the US State

Department's definition contained in Title 22 of the United State's Code,

Section 2656(d), clearly defines terrorists as either "sub-national groups or

clandestine foreign state agents." The problem with this category is, as many

argue, the free hand given to certain states in monopolising violence both in

the domestic and the international context.

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[38] Alex P.Schmid has evolved a definition by synthesizing 109 different definitions, by taking the aid of over fifty scholars and by including identifiable elements appearing in them depending on the frequency with which it appears. See Alex P.Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem," in Alex P.Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, *Western Response to Terrorism,* (London, Frank Cass, 1993), p. 8, cited in Thomas J. Badey, "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach," *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol.10, No.1 (Spring 1998), p. 91.

[39] Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-measures,* Cambridge University Press, Massachusetts, p. 4.

For Jessica Stern, academic type definitions have tended to follow two diverging normative views on the use of violence to achieve political goals.[40] First, the deontological ethicists for whom the value of an act is intrinsic. The point here is that the goodness or evilness of the act must be understood in and of itself, whatever the motivations. Targeting the innocent is evil, regardless of its ultimate consequences. Secondly, there are the consequentialists for whom the

right act in any situation is the one that will produce the right overall outcome. This implies that terrorism may be permissible under certain circumstances. Scholars following the above two views stress the morality factor, though approaching it from two different directions. Bruce Hoffman admits that the core issue in the two diverging views may ultimately help us in evolving a consensus to at least distinguish it from other types of violence, even if we cannot define terrorism.[41]

Political type definitions have involved two compulsions. First, they facilitate jurisdictional responses to acts directed against vital interests of the state from domestic sub-national actors. For example, the Law Commission of India's Working Paper on Legislation to Combat Terrorism has argued for the re-enactment of a comprehensive anti-terrorism law to fill up various loopholes in existing legislation (in this case the Terrorists and Disruptive

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[40] See Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, p. 19.
[41] See Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, op.cit., pp. 40-44.

Activities Prevention Act, 1987, which has since lapsed).[42] Secondly,

political definitions tend to counter subversive activities by foreign agents

against a country on its soil or its facilities, personnel and interests abroad.

The US Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 1996, the Prevention

of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1996, of the United Kingdom, and

so on, all contain provisions to effectively deal with terrorism against the state

from foreign groups or agents. There are some political strategists who say

that terrorism should be defined by a country according to what it thinks is

best, based on the circumstances, provided they don't overstep the legal

framework that affects the fundamental rights of their people. In this sense,

the state should define it according to "threat perceptions and the

psychological climate."[43] Governmental priorities and interests have, in almost

all cases, ultimately translated into actual policy decisions in the fight against

terrorism.

Terrorism as War?

Terrorism is seen by many as a warfare metaphor particularly for two

reasons: first, its covert and calculated use by certain states to promote "their

strategic and ideological interests"; secondly, because of the emerging

doctrinal, tactical, operational, networking and other innovations of

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[42] Law Commission Of India, *Working Paper on Legislation to Combat Terrorism*, 2000. The paper discusses at length the need of a comprehensive legal instrument that will provide counter-terrorist agencies, the ability to combat terrorism in view of the declining security situation of the country.
[43] See Andre Guelke, *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism*, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London & New York, 1995, pp. 7 45.

confrontation against established state structures domestically and internationally.[44] A RAND Conference, in 1982, termed terrorism a "low-level conflict." [45] According to K.J.Holsti, wars in the post 1945 period have been mostly low-level and intrastate in nature. He calls these types of war as "wars of a third kind."[46] The United States and other Western democracies acknowledge that a state of war exists between them and certain states that sponsor terrorism against them.

A RAND study identifies three doctrinal paradigms since the 1960s under which terrorists have operated and have posed threats to the state and the international system.[47] According to the study, from the 1960s to the 1980s, terrorism was used as a coercive diplomacy tool to achieve specific concessions. During this period some sort of proportional relationship existed between the force level employed and goals sought. The failure of coercive terrorism gave way to what they call the "war paradigm". A war paradigm implies taking a strategic, campaign-oriented view of violence that makes no specific call for concessions from, or other demands upon, the opponent.[48] The strategies of terrorists, according to the study, during this period have been to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, as part of what they view is "ongoing war". The third doctrinal change is what they call "the new world

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[44] K.R.Singh, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," *International Studies,* Vol.32, No.2, 1995, p. 119.

[45] Miller Reuben, "Acts of International Terrorism: Government Responses and Policies", *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol.19, No.3, October 1986, p. 385, quoted in, K.R.Singh, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy", *International Studies,* Vol. 32, No.2, 1995, p. 119.

[46] See K.J.Holsti, *The State, War and the State of War,* Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 19-40.

[47] For more details see Ian O.Lesser, et al.,op.cit., pp. 68-72.

[48] Ibid., p. 69.

paradigm."[49] Religious justifications of violence to usher in a new world have been the chief motivation of terrorists in this context.

Donald J. Hanle also argues that terrorism meets the criteria that govern the general understanding of war. The most important aspect he points out is that "... terrorism represents a clash of wills between two contending parties. If both parties employ force to resolve this clash of wills, and if both parties seek a political end through this conflict, then a state of war exists, and terrorism used by either belligerent constitutes a form of war."[50] Terrorism has also been considered as war because there has been increasing evidence of states sponsoring terrorism in various garbs. It has come to be associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare, whereby weaker states can confront larger, more powerful rivals without the fear of retribution.[51]

There are, however, some who argue that terrorists are not warriors. Cindy Combs studies the profile of the contemporary terrorist and concludes, "modern terrorists are, for the most part, fanatics, whose sense of reality is distorted."[52] She further argues that terrorism is distinguished from guerilla warfare by deliberate attacks upon innocent civilians. The difference between a terrorist act and war activity is that terrorist acts are perpetrated deliberately upon innocent third parties, in an effort to coerce the opposing party or

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[49] Ibid., p. 71.
[50]Hanle,*Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*, p. 118.
[51] Hoffman, op.cit.,, p. 27.
[52] Combs, op.cit., p. 66.

persons into some desired political course of action.[53] Terrorism, according to

Friedlander, involves the deliberate disruption of norms, the violation of

generally accepted standards of decency, including the laws of war as they

apply to the innocent and helpless.[54] Rohan Gunaratna also points out that

modern terrorists are very difficult to distinguish from ordinary criminals.[55] And

criminals cannot be treated at par with warriors, who are characterised by

certain attributes of character, rules of conduct and principles.

Terrorism as a strategy used in an armed conflict traces its roots to

theories of revolutionary warfare, particularly the anti-colonial movements in

this century. Guerilla movements across the world understood the need of a

violent phase in their movement because they believed that colonialism was

in itself repressive and that only violence could counter it. Mao Tse Tung,

hailed as the first theorist of post-war revolutionary warfare, writes, "it is

necessary to create terror for a while in rural areas, otherwise it would be

impossible to suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the

countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry."[56] Others like General

Giap of the Vietcong and Che Guevera have also argued this in their writings.

However, these leaders and theorists have accorded a very limited role to

terrorist tactics. One of the chief reasons has been the danger of losing the

people's support, which was the chief priority of these revolutionary

[53] Ibid., pp. 9-10.
[54] Friedlander, *Terrorism: Documents of National and International Control*, Vol.1, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1979, p. 286, quoted in Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 13.
[55] Rohan Gunaratna, "Emerging Trends in South Asian Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare", at a Seminar, *India International Centre*, New Delhi, 7 December 2000.
[56] Mao Tse Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung*, Vol.1, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 29, quoted in Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures*, op.cit., p. 47.

movements. Both Carlos Marighella and Che Guevera, for example, warn that terrorism could lead to the destruction of ordinary peoples' lives, which is vital for the movement to sustain itself.[57] Most revolutionary warfare theorists have argued that terrorism has a limited and secondary role and that it must be employed selectively and cautiously lest the tactic backfire.[58] Terrorism, then, used during the anti-colonial movements, was a part of the war paradigm only as a tactical maneuver and not as an end in itself. It is important to understand this part of the evolution and development of terrorism to evaluate the nature of contemporary terrorism.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism, as pointed out, becomes a very arbitrary term depending on one's professional, circumstantial, cultural and motivational positions. The fact that terrorism has become a highly political term in contemporary times makes it difficult for a generally acceptable definition to evolve. Use of the term implies a moral judgement, and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.[59] In an increasingly fragmented world, based on ethnic, territorial, religious and other lines, terrorism assumes dimensions other than the use of illegal force for political goals.

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[57] See Wardlaw, op.cit., pp. 47-48.

[58] Ibid., p. 48.

[59] Brian M.Jenkins, *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems,* (RAND Corporation, P-6563, December 1980), p. 10, quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* p. 31.

Does this mean, however, that we should continue to tolerate terrorism, leave it to individual states to worry about their own security or believe in terrorism as a normal course of human affairs? What seems to be lacking in the study on terrorism is an objective understanding of the problem. Lack of a generally agreed upon definition entails that we will have to confine our discussion to empirical cases and judge them on merit. A parliamentary working group of NATO in its report argued that the defining characteristic of terrorism is the act of violence. No amount of justifications is going to be able to explain an act which kills people who have no part at all in the conflict. There has to be a criteria for an acceptable act of violence that will have to seriously consider moral questions, of whether the victim is responsible for a crime that deserves death. The human psychological and moral revulsion to violence beyond a certain point should be the underlying emphasis. This also means that the distinction made while studying terrorist activities by different groups, which includes terrorism carried out by states, become a matter of procedure and not substance. An act of unacceptable violence becomes punishable regardless of the perpetrators. This will also make it easier for a legal framework to fall in place.

Despite the perennial definitional problem, since the early 1970s acts such as attacks on airlines, diplomats and piracy on the high seas have come to be accepted as international terrorist crimes. Regimes have been built to collectively fight against such terrorist acts. The criteria that brought about cooperation in these cases should serve as the base on which to build a new

set of norms and practices. The ultimate objective should be to develop a holistic concept of terrorism, which can serve as a framework for those wishing to apply the concept of terrorism in particular cases.

Jessica Stern presents a wide sweeping definition – "as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with an object of exacting revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience."[60] According to her, this definition "allows for a range of possible actors, states or their surrogates, international groups, or a single individual, for all putative purposes, political, religious or economic and for murder for its own sake."[61] For her, two aspects of terrorism are prominent and need focus; first, that it is aimed at non-combatants; and secondly, the deliberate manipulation of fear by a few.[62] It is for these reasons that terrorism cannot be treated as war.

David C. Rapoport argues that each surge of terrorism in the last century has been associated with unexpected political events, exposing governmental vulnerabilities and making it possible to define new issues or give older ones greater salience.[63] For newly formed states, their failure to evolve institutions to assimilate or respect multi-ethnic and cultural diversity has led to conflict. In many instances, because of the state's inability to fulfill their political, economic, religious and other social aspirations, groups have challenged regimes and declared wars upon incumbent governments. In

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[60] Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists,* op.cit., p. 11.
[61] Ibid., p. 11.
[62] Ibid., pp. 11-12.
[63] See David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism," *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict,* Vol.3, 1999, pp. 501-503.

these circumstances, terrorism as a strategy did acquire some legitimacy because many saw it as part of war against despots and tyranny, a national liberation movement or civil war.

In the post Cold War period, however, the trend indicates that terrorism is less of an armed struggle for a justifiable objective and more of a criminal, fanatical and barbaric activity. What terrorists are doing is taking advantage of vulnerabilities in their states to get themselves fully entrenched in the political and economic system, thus gaining legitimacy to carry out their agendas within and outside their respective countries. Often, it has been the rulers who have facilitated the entries of these elements. For example, it has been reported that the *mafia* controls nearly half of Russia's consumer markets, real estate and banking sectors.[64] This factor has also allowed them to spread their tentacles to other areas of interest, domestically and internationally. Jessica Stern and Satish Kumar both point out that the nemesis of Pakistan has been the inefficient, corrupt and despotic nature of its leaders. A problem like terrorism cannot be understood properly without a full appreciation of their sources, effects and dynamics at the level of domestic politics. Terrorism as seen today is a nuisance and more so because those supporting it are often those who are supposed to be controlling it. International terrorism is a bigger nuisance because it goes beyond the borders of a state.

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[64] Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, p. 104.

CHAPTER II

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

There has been a pattern of marked changes in international terrorism in the post Cold War period, particularly in the motivations and goals of terrorists. The trend of indiscriminate targeting reflects this change. Religious motivations with cultural connotations and visions of a post-apocalyptic future, ethnic hatred, mass violence for political and criminal goals and fanatical or irrational explanations for resort to terrorism are the distinguishing features of the new breed of terrorists from their more traditional counterparts.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first makes a statistical assessment of international terrorist incidents in the period from January 1990 to September 2000, with the objective of drawing quantitative generalisations of international terrorist activities. The second section will attempt to understand the motives behind and justifications offered for resort to terrorism in the post Cold War period. This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first will deal with the ideological orientations of today's terrorists. The second will focus on the resurgence of ethno-nationalist movements and factors that have made it an important source of terrorism in the 1990s. The third will attempt to study Islamic fundamentalist terrorism: the actors, supporters and goals, and see in what way religion is being used for political ends. The final section will focus on Iran and Pakistan to understand the nature of the objectives behind their continued support for terrorists. Internal

political dynamics that make up a prominent aspect of contemporary terrorism in most states is manifested in tolerance of terrorism by these two states.

A major change in the nature of international terrorism has been the rise in the number of terrorist incidents that go unclaimed. This questions our conventional understanding that terrorists undertake violent activities to advertise their cause. The rise of terrorism may be attributed to the increase in the number of individuals or groups who do not want themselves known for various reasons and in many cases because the intentions were criminal. In this sense, terrorism becomes like any other profession.[1] This has also been because certain groups realise that they can achieve the same psychological effect without having to advertise their causes through the use of spectacular media events. More concerted counter terrorist strategies adopted by most states have made it difficult for terrorists to be open about their exploits for fear of retribution.

There has been an increasing lethality of terrorist attacks, almost at an average rate of 4 deaths and 26 injuries per attack in the 1990s, although the number of incidents have come down compared to the 1980s.[2] The new trend seems to indicate that violence has, for many terrorists, become an end in itself. The post Cold War period has witnessed the actual use of unconventional weapons by a terrorist group, thus breaking a long held taboo

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[1] Peter Chalk calls this new phenomenon 'ad hoc terrorism'. See Peter Chalk, "Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism in the 90s", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, p. 157. And Bruce Hoffman calls this 'amateur terrorism'. See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 185.

[2] This average has been taken from the figures released by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, for the period 1991-2000. Available at _http://www.ict.org.il._

that human beings are averse to using weapons that indiscriminately kill large numbers of people.

ASSESSING STATISTICS

The definitional inconsistency among researchers and policy makers makes the assessment of statistics of international terrorism a practical and theoretical problem. Walter Lacquer notes, "figures are almost meaningless because of the incidents that are not included and included."[3] Major differences in totals and classifications of terrorist events by various researchers and institutions raise questions of larger theoretical interest. Questions such as why certain significant terrorist incidents have been left out by a researcher and why some terrorist organisations are not classified remain.[4] The focus here will be to try and understand the general trend which the statistics seem to offer. A careful look for significant events that give the particular period under review its unique character will also be undertaken.

In a detailed study of terrorist incidents in the 1980s by Edward Mikolus, Todd Sandler and Jean Murdock, some of the conclusions reached were: terrorist incidents have gone up in the 1980s, with incidents mostly occurring in the Middle East and Western Europe (61 % of the total

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[3] Walter Laqueur, "Post-Modern Terrorism." Available at *http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel /laqueur.htm,* (February 17, 2001).

[4] For example, the US State Dept.'s Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) list do not include the Real Irish Republican Army (PIRA) even after the group carried out the Omagh car bombing in Northern Ireland in 1998 killing 29 people and injuring more than 200. Similarly, the Harkat ul Mujahideen fighting in Kashmir is not in the list although the group is actually the Harkat ul Ansar (designated FTO) with its name changed.

incidents).[5] During this period, according to their study, explosives have accounted for 42.6 percent of all terrorist acts. Assassinations comprised 12 percent, threats 10 percent, armed attacks 9.5 percent, hostage taking 1.5 percent and skyjackings 1.6 percent of total incidents. Further, suicide terrorism accounted for 0.25 percent of total international terrorist incidents. In USSR and Eastern Europe, only 0.72 percent of all incidents took place. When these statistics are compared to that of the post Cold War period, a prominent change that has taken place has been the lethality (in terms of victims) of individual terrorist acts, which have become much higher now.

A comparison of reports and chronologies of the Terrorism Research Center (TRC), the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and the US State Department annual survey of international terrorism (*Pattern of Global Terrorism*) indicates variations in number counts and modes of classification. Yet they depict marked similarities in trends. For the purpose of this section, the chronologies of the three sources given above of the period from 1991 to 2000 have been used. The objective will be to draw out broad generalisations of the pattern of international terrorism during the period. Another purpose of the statistical assessment done below will be to highlight new developments in international terrorism. For example, no incident of skyjacking, took place in the 1990s. International terrorist incidents in Russia, the anonymity factor in international terrorism and the

[5] See Edward F. Mikolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events*, Vol. II, Iowa State University Press/Ames, 1989, pp. xvii-xviii. The statistics given below have also been taken from their numbers.

popularisation of suicide terrorism are also new developments. All the statistics given in the section below are averages calculated from the chronologies of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzliya, and the US State Department annual survey of international terrorism (*Pattern of Global Terrorism*).

There were casualties in 71.2 percent of the incidents. Most of the incidents with no casualties involved kidnapping incidents, where the victims were let off after ransom or concessions. Bombings were the major attack type. Forty two percent of all total attacks have involved explosives of one kind or the other. These have resulted in mass casualties usually of innocent people who happened to be "at the wrong place at the wrong time." There has been an upswing of suicide bombings in the past decade particularly by the Hamas and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This is indicative of an additional stage in the escalation of terrorist activity with the clear intention of causing a maximum number of casualties and damage. In the survey, suicide bombings constituted 4.5 percent of the total incidents but have caused 12.6 percent of total deaths. Every suicide bombing has resulted in mass casualties.

There has been a major shift from turmoil in the Middle East (especially in the 1980s) to South Asia, the Central Asian Republics, and Russia in the 1990s. Forty-six major terrorist incidents have occurred in Russia and the Central Asian Republics in the last few years, accounting for 451 (15%) of total deaths and 874 casualties. More and more of the activity in

the region has been linked to the war in Chechnya and the new wave of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from

Afghanistan. In Kashmir and Sri Lanka, too, there has been an escalation of bombings and massacres. The Russian, Central Asian and South Asian region as a whole has accounted for 40.6 percent of total deaths and 26.7 percent of total casualties.

High profile terrorist incidents have been a novelty of the 1990s decade. This indicates the new terrorist strategies of maximum damage and mass killing of civilians. The World Trade Center bombing, the Kurdistan Workers Party's (PKK) operation in six European countries on the same day on 4 November 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway, the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the bombings of apartments in Moscow have resulted in deaths of hundreds of civilians. In the 1990s, 75.5 percent of terrorist incidents have targeted civilians and only 19 percent of targets have been government or military or diplomatic personnel or buildings.

In 52.5 percent of the incidents in the period, the identities of the perpetrators remain unknown. Terrorists do not come forward to claim responsibility for their acts. Though certain groups are held responsible, there has been no evidence of a particular group's involvement. This raises questions of whether our conventional understanding of terrorists is eroding and if we are looking at a new genre of terrorists who cannot be in significant ways distinguished from ordinary criminals. In this sense, terrorists are no

more interested in advertising their causes to garner popular support, which in earlier years was the *raison d'être* for terrorist acts.

CHANGING GOALS AND MOTIVES

Terrorists groups are usually interested in specific goals. In earlier years, ideology and revolutionary zeal in the various movements were very prominent. The movements carried out activities that would enhance their local and international appeal. They offered moral justifications for most of the activities they undertook. They usually acted within a framework of self-imposed restraints. It was political violence for political objectives and hence calculated violence. In September 1972, Black September, an offshoot of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which was a Marxian Palestinian movement against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, kidnapped the Israeli delegation at the Munich Olympics and subsequently murdered them. The aims of the act were very specific. First, the event was used by the group to advertise their cause to millions of homes around the world through the global media coverage that had converged in Munich to cover the Olympic games. Secondly, the group wanted to make it known that they had international reach and would stop at nothing till their final objective was achieved.[6]

Tactics and strategies have also been in consonance with the objectives of the terrorists. In the past, both strategies and tactics of extreme

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[6] John Bowyer Bell, "Collaboration Between Terrorists", *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, pp. 252-253.

left organisations and ethno-nationalist groups indicated some sort of pattern. They issued communiqués, took responsibility and explained their actions and, however disagreeable or distasteful their aims and motivations were, their ideology and intentions were understandable.[7] Particularly, among left wing terrorists, the portrayal of themselves as the "revolutionary vanguard" made most of their acts only a 'symbolic' event. They were careful also not to undertake actions that might alienate potential supporters or their perceived constituency.[8] Some even strongly felt that the deliberate involvement of innocent civilians were not only counterproductive but also wrong.[9] Tactics or strategies were worked out to get many people watching their cause especially from the international community and from fellow organisations with similar grievances or following the same ideology. The strategies were also worked out to the last detail. For example, a hostage of the OPEC Ministers kidnapping in Vienna in December 1975, describing the situation, said, "there is no doubt that Carlos the Jackal and his group had made very careful plans. We could tell at once that they knew every detail about the building, exactly where to go and each member of the gang knew precisely what to do."[10]

In the post Cold War, however, the ideological and revolutionary aspects seem to be less prominent. Today they do not issue communiqués,

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[7] Bruce Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism." Available at http://www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.htm, (17 February 2001).
[8] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 159.
[9] ibid., p. 158.
[10] Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex: A Study in Terror, Facts on File Inc., New York, 1982, quoted in Cindy C.Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, p. 128.

do not offer justifications and groups do not want to take credit for their actions. Many analysts say this has been due to new justifications shaped around religious and cultural objectives. Terrorists are getting involved in legal and illegal business, in shops, restaurants, real estate, shipping lines and other investments. They are also engaged in organised crimes. For example, it is believed that terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) spend 50 percent of their time engaged in crime, ranging from thefts, narcotics and small arms smuggling, to credit card fraud.[11]

In earlier years, terrorists were educated and understood to a certain extent the reasons for their activities.[12] However, many of the terrorists today are uneducated, thus making them follow orders blindly. Cindy Combs notes that terrorists now "commit terrorism for reasons that are often unclear both to themselves and to those witnessing the acts."[13] Religious justifications have also become one of the chief motivations driving terrorism in the post Cold War period. These do not entail specific objectives. They see terrorism as a tool for the realisation of an idealistic 'New World'. It has become very difficult now to generalise about a typical terrorist, his other motives, goals, strategies, affiliations and weapons.

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[11] Rohan Gunaratna, "Emerging Trends in South Asian Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare", at a Seminar, *India International Centre,* New Delhi, 7 December, 2000.

[12] Combs notes that until the mid-1970s, individuals involved in terrorism were quite well educated and economically well off. Terrorism for them was "a way of rejecting the comfortable, middle-class values of their parents" and a fight for a higher value. See Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* pp. 70-71.

[13] Combs, op.cit., p. 56.

Decline of Left Ideological Motivations for Resort to Terrorism

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the breaking up of the Berlin Wall has in significant ways heralded the decline of extreme left terrorism.[14] The rounding up and subsequent arrest of alleged members of the RAF, earlier sheltered by East Germany's communist government, has been generally acknowledged as the breaking up of left terrorism as a viable strand of terrorist threat.[15] These two events also robbed the ideological legitimacy of numerous left wing groups, resulting in an increased sense of strategic confusion and organisational isolation.[16] Most left wing organisations came to realise that they can no more count on sponsorships, safe havens, and training camps from countries who had earlier supported them. Countries such as Cuba, North Korea, Libya, East Germany and others that formerly engaged in supplying terrorists with training, weapons or funds reportedly renounced their roles.[17] This is one positive development because many groups exposing this ideology tended to be extremely violent in their revolutionary zeal. These groups have now been reduced to manageable proportions.

There has, however, been an increase in terrorism by groups with extreme right orientations during the period. In the late 1980s and the early

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[14] See Peter Chalk, "Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism in the 90s," p. 151.
[15] See The *New York Times*, June 16th and 17th, 1990.
[16] Peter Chalk, op.cit., p. 151.
[17] For more details see Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists,* Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, p. 6.

1990s the majority of terrorist activities and political violence have tended to be by groups with particularistic ideologies, extreme right belief systems and religious fundamentalist organisations.[18] The trend is expressing itself through increasing electoral support for xenophobic and radical right parties, through the growth of militant neo-Nazi organisations and networks and xenophobic youth cultures and through increased violence against asylum seekers and other minorities and a parallel trend in increased religious and millenarian militancy.[19]

Resurgence of Ethno-Nationalist Motivations

One of the more pertinent features of post Cold War politics in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the particularly violent civil wars that have accompanied the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation and the Soviet Union.[20] Old feuds have been re-ignited and there is growing demand for legitimate governments. Besides these states, violent nationalist and separatist movements are seen in South Asia particularly Kashmir and Sri Lanka, Indonesia, China, Burundi and Rwanda. Some of these movements have been enmeshed with religious fundamentalism, especially those emanating from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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[18] See for more details, Tore Bjorgo Ed., *Terror from the Extreme Right,* Frank Cass, London, pp. 1-43.
[19] See for example, the Annual Report of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1993,* Bundesministerium des Innern, 1994, quoted in Tore Bjorgo, *Terror from the Extreme Right,* p. 2.
[20] Peter Chalk, op.cit., p. 153.

In the early years of the 1990s, the resurgence of ethno-separatist and revolutionary movements particularly in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe has been fueled by Muslim support around the world. Islamic fundamentalist groups particularly in Afghanistan and terrorist groups were easily dragged into the conflict. What was apparently a political problem eventually began to acquire religious and cultural connotations. Islamic fundamentalists and ideologues have been able to turn religion into a strong rallying point for Muslim sentiments all over the world. This task has been made easier by economic and political instability in many of these states. Theological and cultural justifications are being offered, making the task of understanding the goals and behaviour of terrorists in this region more problematic.

The movements in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Abhakzia, the disputed enclave of Nagorno Karabakh are believed to be supported by Muslim fundamentalist groups and terrorists from across the border who justify their involvement to liberate the ethnic Muslim population from Russian colonial pressures and create Islamic states in the region. Even in the Balkans, the Iranian-backed Hizbollah reportedly trains Croat and Bosnian Muslim paramilitary groups.[21] This new phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict has become one of the chief sources of international terrorism. There are some who argue that the support given by Muslim fundamentalists to these movements is part of a wider objective of building up a force to counter

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[21] Ibid., p. 153.

the West.[22] Shankar Sharan, for example, notes that the August 1999

invasion of Dagestan by armed squads led by Shamil Basayev and Hattab,

terrorist commanders from Chechnya, was not to seek Chechnya's

independence from Russia but a pursuit of a terrorist and expansionist

agenda.[23] The popular call for nationalism in the Cold War days have come

up again with renewed intensity. With money, training, men and weaponry

from across borders, the area of conflict has expanded engulfing vulnerable

states and threatening to entrench and embitter groups along more polarised

ethnic and religious divisions.

The New Ideology of Islamic Confrontation

The RAND St. Andrew's database of international terrorism reveals a

significant increase in the number of religious terrorist groups in the 1990s.

From 2 in 1990, the number increased to 11 by 1992 and to 26 in 1995.[24] It

has been estimated that religious groups committed 25 percent of all

international terrorist acts in 1995 and were responsible for 58 percent of total

deaths.[25] The increase in lethality of international terrorism in the 1990s has

been attributed to religious motives and imperatives because religious groups

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[22] Chalk argues that in many ways this correlates with the argument made by Huntington in his 'clash of civilisations' thesis, where he suggests that the fundamental sources of future conflict will 'not be primarily ideological or economic in nature, but rather, the result of faultlines between civilisations'. See Chalk, "Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism in the 90s," pp. 152-153.

[23] Shankar Sharan, "Islamic Terrorism Threatens Russia," World Focus, Vol.20, No.1, p. 9.

[24] Ian O.Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 17.

[25] See Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 8.

have been less constrained in the use of violence by fear of angering the public.

Bruce Hoffman points out that the religious imperative for terrorism is the most defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.[26] As has become obvious, major religions, as well as some smaller sects and cults are involved in one way or the other in conflicts in many parts of the world. But Islamic fundamentalist terrorism from the Middle East and Afghanistan presently causes the most serious concern. There are three aspects of Islamic fundamentalism that needs serious analysis. The first is what many call the 'theological glorification of violence'. Although this is a controversial issue, the fact remains that some tenets of Islam treat violence as a sacramental act or divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative.[27] This can be manipulated for selfish interests. The Muslim *Jehadi* concept promises a heavenly afterlife for all those who sacrifice their lives for the 'holy' cause. This justification is not answerable to the masses or to the court of Law. Many young children, particularly in the Madrassas, are

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[26] See Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* pp. 87-94.

[27] The Jihadic dimension of Islam which is a revolutionary concept approves of violence which is essential because "life is a lesson and struggle...death is better than a life of humiliation. There is no other way out but continuation of the war by every means...to achieve honour and glory." This quote is taken from J.S.Ismael, "Social Change in Islamic Society: The Political Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," *Social Problems* (27) 5, 1980, p. 614, in Asaf Hussain, *Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East,* Mansell Publishing Limited, London & New York, 1988, p. 91. For more details see pp. 75-100.

educated with *Jehadi* ideals.[28] This aspect has to some extent shaped both

the aims and tactics of Islamic terrorists in the post Cold War period.[29]

Secondly, there is the enmeshment of religion and politics in many

states, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia. Islam is seen as the

most political religion.[30] Islam as a religion, apart from being a way of life, has

been invoked and manipulated by certain leaders for two purposes. First, it

has been use by the elite to derive legitimacy for staying and continuing to

stay in power.[31] It is a rallying platform for electoral gains and helps gain

public opinion in favour of the regime. The fact that regimes in many of these

states are unstable makes religion a very important aspect in the political

power game. Secondly, Islam has also entered the foreign policy realm, both

as an instrument of national interest and as a fallout of domestic instability.[32]

The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann also assigns two functions to

religion, "to define the undefined, especially in the crisis of identity and as a

cushion for domestic disappointments."[33]

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[28] Ghulam Hanain, a Pakistani journalist gives a first hand account of how recruitment and training is done in Madrassas and training Camps in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir of potential *Jehadis* in the *Outlook, Weekly News Magazine*, 25 September, 2000.

[29] David C.Rapoport, "Terrorism", *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, Vol.3, Academic Press, 1999, p. 503.

[30] Traditional Muslims claim that in Islam religion and politics are inseparable, and that Western attempts to privatise Islam are an attack on it. See for more details, William Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*, pp. 92-96. Also see Asaf Hussain, *Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East*, p. 90. Hussain argues that Islam is a political religion.

[31] See Satish Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan," *Aakrosh (Asian Journal of Terrorism and International Conflicts)*, Vol.3, No.6, January 2000, pp. 17-35.

[32] Inability of a regime to handle political oppositions within a government's central leadership in the form of internal divisions, competing personalities, institutions, factions and political parties can force a government to turn to public support using religious agenda. This can spill over to the foreign policy realm as domestic politics have broad impact on actual foreign policy decisions. See Joe D.Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in Neach et.al., *Foreign Policy Analysis: The Second Generation.*

[33] Niklas Luhmann, "Funktion der Religion", *Frankfurt am Main,* p. 115, cited in Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam*, Pluto Press with TNI, 1995, p. 110.

Finally, Islam has been used as a cultural and religious call to Muslims all over the world to resist and destroy the "sons of Satan". After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has been seen by many Muslims as the ultimate victory of the Islamic forces against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Muslims, especially the more radical ones see the United States as the force that remains as part of a "global conspiracy against Islam" and as the head of foreign culture and modernisation that threatens the Islamic world.[34] For example, the Hizbollah (Party of God) in a 1985 communiqué declared, "we... consider ourselves a part of the world Islamic community, attacked at once by the tyrants and the arrogance of the West and the East ...our way is one of radical combat against depravity and America is the original root of depravity."[35] This factor has contributed to the overt support by radical Muslim groups for Muslim causes elsewhere in the form of money, men, and material.

Reuven Paz, Academic Director, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel, argues that the 1990s resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism has been to a large extent the outcome of the "Arab-Afghan" phenomenon and the consolidation of *Wahhabi-Takfiri Jihadi* ideology and rhetoric.[36] According to Paz, this ideology believes in the existence of an inexorable clash between Islam and Western culture and that the only way

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[34] Reuven Paz, "Is There an Islamic Internationale?" Available at *http://www.ict.org.il* (17 February 2001).

[35] "Open letter from the Hizbollah on the occasion of the first anniversary of Ragheb Harb, symbol of the Islamic Resistance and Exemplary Martyr", issued by Hizbollah, Beirut, Lebanon, 16 February, 1985, quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 97.

[36] See Reuven Paz, "Is There an Islamic Internationale?" Available at *http://www.ict.org.il* (17 February 2001).

out of this is *jehad.* The development of this ideology, according to him,

began after volunteers from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Algeria,

who participated in the Afghan war together, went back to their own countries

after the war as leaders of radical Islamic organisations.

The support by Middle East nations particularly Iran, Pakistan and

Sudan has continued to fuel extreme Muslim groups around the world.[37] It

has been reported that an Iranian "Fund for the Fallen Soldiers" gives

financial and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians and other terrorist

organisations to the tune of several millions of dollars.[38] Pakistan also

supports extreme Islamic groups and terrorists both within the country and in

its fight against India. The continued violence in the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli

dispute even after a hard earned peace process has been due to rejectionist

violence from Islamic extremists who regard the agreement as "little more

than a *de facto* capitulation to the dictates of Tel Aviv and a wholesale

betrayal of Islamic interests."[39]

Two developments with regards to this phenomenon have taken place

in the 1990s.[40] First, there has been a shift in the struggle, mainly through

terrorism from the Arab world to Central and South East Asia, Russia, and

against American interests in the region. The break up of the Soviet Union,

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[37] It has been estimated that in about 11 military camps in Iran, about 5000 volunteers pass through these camps to receive extensive training in a wide range of terrorist skills. See Peter Chalk, "Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism in the 90s", p. 155.

[38] Author unknown, "Iranian Support for Terrorism," Available at *http://www.ict.org.il* (17 February 2001).

[39] Peter Chalk, op.cit., pp. 156-157.

[40] Reuven Paz, "Is There an Islamic Internationale?" Available at *http://www.ict.org.il.* (17 February 2001)

which brought about religious-national awakening in the newly independent states was eagerly used by the Afghan Mujahideen as an outlet of their resentment, against what they perceived was oppression. In the Nagorno Karabakh region and Chechnya, the Taliban has been sending money, weapons and men to fight against the state.

Islamic fundamentalist groups have particularly targeted the United States accusing it of attempting to subdue the Islamic world, particularly the overt support to Israel. Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlalah, the spiritual leader of the Hizbollah, pointed out that Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the embodiment of the West's hostility to revolutionary Islam.[41] Many others feel that the 1986 attack on Libya and later the Gulf bombing and the bombing of Afghanistan were attacks by the United States on Islam. Radical Islamic groups have carried out significant terrorist acts against the United States, which they call a 'defensive strategy' against the continued assault on Islam. Some of the terrorist acts include the 1993 bombing of New York City's World Trade Center, the June 1996 truck bombing of a US Air Force barrack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and a host of other smaller incidents. In March 1997 in a television interview to CNN, Osama Bin Laden criticised the US as 'unjust, criminal and tyrannical'. [42] He also mentioned that US civilians are not exonerated from responsibility because they chose the government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its crimes in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. He

[41] Hoffman, op.cit., p. 97.
[42] Cited in *The Hindu,* "US Government is Criminal, Says Osama," Friday, February 23, 2001, p. 12.

said it was necessary to wage a holy war to drive out the Americans from all Muslim countries.

Secondly, better cooperation between various Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups and organisations have come about.[43] In the Middle East, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and to some extent the Hizbollah are cooperating, and internationally, Egyptian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, Algerian, Jordanian, Yemeni, Sunni Lebanese and Afghan groups are also cooperating.[44] The motivation behind better cooperation has been rhetoric built around the need to thwart what they see as cultural intrusion into Islam. Most *Jehadis* see themselves as defenders of Islam in what they perceive as a global war to obliterate their basic beliefs and lifestyles.

The Afghan Mujahideen victory against the Soviet Union has made Afghanistan the centre of the new Islamic resurgence. The ability of certain leaders, like Osama bin Laden, to market this notion and rally Muslim sentiments worldwide also explains the geographical shift of the post Cold War Islamic resurgence. And subsequently this state has become the centre for the export of Islamic ideals around the world and particularly to neighbouring states. The Afghan terrorists see themselves as the representative of Islam's relentless struggle against secular regimes and

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[43] See Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shai, "The Afghan Alumni Terrorism:Islamic Militants Against the Rest of the World." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il* (17 February 2001).
[44] Reuven Paz, "Is There an Islamist Internationale." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il* (17 February, 2001).

heretical cultures.[45] Radical conservative Muslims strongly believe in the

illegitimacy of all secular governments. The only legitimate government is one

that adopts Islamic law or the *Shariat* as the basis of governance. Islamic

fundamentalist and radical terrorist organisations centred in Afghanistan

today operate in four capacities: first, as leaders of radical Islamic

organisations in their respective countries; secondly, as creators of new

terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaida (the Vanguard); thirdly, as

architects of 'independent' terrorist cells, which while lacking a specific

organisational affiliation cooperate with other institutionalised terrorist

organisations; and finally, as participants in the struggle of Islamic populations

in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Tadjikistan and Kashmir.[46]

The aims of the 1990s Islamic extremism have been as follows:

1. The overthrow of secular regimes and their replacement by theocratic

   ones.

2. Support for nationalist movements of Muslim minorities in other nations.

3. Neutralisation of foreign influence in Islamic culture.

4. The elite, particularly in states that are politically unstable, has used Islam

   as a powerful tool, in the political power game, when deriving legitimacy

   becomes difficult through normal democratic and representational

   procedures. [47]

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[45] Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shai, "The 'Afghan Alumni' Terrorism." Available at
http://www.ict.org.il (17 February 2001).
[46] See Yoram Schweitzer, et.al., "The Afghan Alumni' Terrorism." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il*
(17 February 2001).
[47] Ibid.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

While attempting to study changing motivations in international terrorism it is pertinent to take into account the domestic dimension of the problem. The interplay of social agendas, internal political dynamics and religion is important in considering the subject. The following section is an attempt to see what seem to be the goals of the continued support by Pakistan and Iran to terrorists. Tolerance and support for terrorists by these two states brings to light two very important aspects of contemporary terrorism: first, the political-religious nexus, and secondly, the use of terrorism as a state policy of engaging an enemy. The focus here will be to see what role politics within these states have translated into violence.

Pakistan and Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism

In the last couple of years attention has shifted to Pakistan for two reasons.[48] First, the successful hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814C from Nepal to Afghanistan is widely believed to have been monitored and executed by the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) of Pakistan. Secondly, the hijacking involved four countries - Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Moreover, the demands of the hijackers were met, which indicated the comeback of hijacking as a successful terrorist strategy.

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[48] See Maj.Gen.(Rtd). Afshir Karim, "Terrorism in South Asia", *Aakrosh*, Vol.3, No.6, January 2000, pp. 7-10.

Pakistan, despite its denials, has been supporting Islamic fundamentalism by maintaining strong links with the Mujahideen. There is enough evidence to suggest that Pakistan draws *Jehadis* from the Afghan Mujahideen for the struggle in Kashmir. It also provides training facilities, weapons and other material support to various terrorist groups.[49] It was in Pakistan that Maulana Masood Azhar, a HUM ideologue, and freed from an Indian jail in return for the hostages of Flight 814C, announced after his release in front of thousands of his supporters: "we are going to organise a 500,000 Mujahideen force to fight the Indians."[50] Pakistan also takes charge of coordinating among various terrorist groups into acting simultaneously through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Field Intelligence Unit (FIU), both government agencies, in the Kashmir valley. What is disturbing also is the public announcement by the government leadership that Pakistan would provide moral and diplomatic support to the freedom struggle in Kashmir. There are training camps in Karachi, Muzaffarabad, Ugi and the North West Frontier Province. Though numbers differ, there are believed to be about 10,000 Madrassas where children are imparted religious training.[51] It is also widely believed that Pakistan has been trying to spearhead pan-Islamism by attempting to equip itself with what they prefer to call the "Islamic Bomb."[52]

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[49] See Ghulam Hasnain, "Inside Jihad," *Time,* February 5, 2001, pp. 22-25.
[50] Amitab Mattoo, "Terrorism in Kashmir," *World Focus,* Vol.20, No.1, p. 14.
[51] Ghulam Hasnain, a Pakistani journalist puts the number at around 2000. Jessica Stern estimates a much higher number of about 40,000 to 50,000 Madrassas in Pakistan.
[52] D.R.Gopal, "Islamic Terrorism," *World Focus,* Vol.20, No.1, p. 8.

The biggest irony of Pakistan's history has been that Islam, which was supposedly the *raison d'être* of Pakistan, not only failed to hold the country together, but also became the biggest source of its identity crisis.[53] Gen. Zia-ul-Haq attempted to consolidate his position by playing the Islamic card. He was able to equip himself with extra-constitutional powers. What happened then was that democracy was throttled. Opposition political parties agitating for democracy found themselves battling a holy warrior instead of a military dictator.[54] Gen. Zia also promoted *Madrassas* as a way to garner the support of religious parties for his rule and to recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.[55]

Islamicisation policies by successive rulers also brought about sectarian violence in Pakistan. The theological difference between the Sunni and the Shia religious sects was transformed into a full-fledged political conflict with broad ramifications for law and order, social cohesion and government authority.[56] All these resulted in making especially the youth highly vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalist movements. Jessica Stern argues that the continued neglect of socio-economic and educational welfare underestimates Pakistan's susceptibility to the culture of violence. She notes that the "financial interests of certain people will sustain the Jihadi movement in Pakistan, unless Pakistan makes its own changes and stamps out

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[53] Satish Kumar explains at length how the process of Islamicisation of the Pakistani state only made it more vulnerable to Islamic terrorism and domestic instability. See Satish Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan," *Aakrosh,* Vol.3, No.6, January 2000, p. 17.
[54] Ibid., p. 22.
[55] Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 2000, pp. 118-119.
[56] Ibid., p. 125.

corruption, strengthens democratic institutions and makes education a high priority."[57]

Pakistan has two reasons to continue supporting the Mujahideen fighting in Kashmir.[58] First, the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 is still seen by Pakistan as an attempt by India to dismember it and Pakistan is determined to pay India back in some measure. Secondly, Pakistan regards the Kashmir insurgency as a cheap way to keep India tied down both domestically and internationally. India is seen as a 'soft state' and this has given a boost to the fundamentalist groups to continually step up assault on Kashmir. Post-Kargil Kashmir is witnessing a much more aggressive phase of militancy.[59] One of the reasons for the aggressiveness could be the support given by the present Pakistani leadership, which wants it to be known that being a nuclear state, it is taking a more hard-line approach on Kashmir. The goal of Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir, as Kalim Bahadur argues, has never been the welfare of the people of Kashmir but rather part of a wider political agenda fueled by its socio-economic ills, particularly the inadequate access of youth to proper education.

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[57] Ibid., p. 126.

[58] Stern also makes this point. See Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," pp. 115-116.

[59] Kanti Bajpai makes this point. See Kanti Bajpai, "Bombs, Wars, Coups, and Hijacks: Making South Asia Into a Flashpoint," in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, Amitabh Mattoo, Eds., *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy*, pp. 25-26.

Iranian Support

Iran figures prominently among radical Muslims because many of them derive the legitimacy of their revolutionary ideology from the successful Islamic revolution in Iran. Iran's brand of radical revolutionary Islam has been a legacy of the Ayatollah Khomeini's successful mobilisation ofMuslims on the basis of the *tawhidi* tradition.[60] This tradition accepted the complete authority of God in all aspects of governance. Khomeini's interpretation of the tradition brought him into conflict with the superpowers, who, he claimed, were interested only in controlling humanity, exploiting others and preserving their own interests. He also believed that the United States' support to Israel was a political conspiracy to bring about 'separation' among the Muslims. His support to Hamas and other pro-Palestine groups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict explains the revolutionary dimension of his beliefs. The Shia dominant Hizbollah, Iran's brainchild, was formed in the Bekaa Valley of Southern Lebanon to actively participate in the Palestinian struggle.[61] In later years, Iran supported the Afghan Mujahideen struggle against Soviet forces. In the 1990s, despite the radicals being ousted from power, Iran does not deny its adherence to Khomeini's 'Islamic Revolutionary ideology', though it stresses that the support entails only moral, cultural and humanitarian aspects. There

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[60] The *tawhidi* tradition believes that society can be brought under divine unity. It is basically an integrationist approach. The belief is that a world based on monotheism will generate harmony. See Asaf Hussain, *Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East*, pp. 88-90.

[61] See Edgar O'Balance, *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1975-95: The Iranian Connection*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1997, pp. 15-45.

is increasing evidence, however, to suggest that Iran supports international terrorism.[62]

Iran has continued support for Palestinian terror organisations in terms of finance, weapons and training facilities. The Hizbollah continues to get all types of support for its activities. Iran has been active in attempting to disrupt the peace process in the Middle East on grounds that it threatens to increase Iran's political isolation in the region and to limit its influence and harm its interests in Lebanon.[63] Iran, in the 1990s, carried out assassinations of opposition activists outside Iran, by specially selected squads of Hizbollah members or other Iranian intelligence operatives. This was done to consolidate the political position of the present Iranian Islamic regime. The *fatwa* against author Salman Rushdie may be also mentioned within the framework of Iranian terror. Iran has also been trying to create a 'terrorist internationale'. It has been constantly keeping in touch with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). For example, Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein president, paid a visit to Teheran in December 1987.[64] It has also been reported that Iran called for a meeting of terrorist leaders in November at the Feirouzi Palace, Teheran, where members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Hizbollah, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Abu Nidal Group attended.[65]

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[62] Author unknown, "Iranian Support for Terrorism." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il,* (17 February 2001).
[63] Ibid.
[64] Edgar O'Ballance, op.cit., p. 162.
[65] Ibid.,p. 163.

With the ousting of Iranian radicals from power, there was optimism that this would mark a key turning point in Iran's sponsorship of international terrorism. However, it has been pointed out that "in all probability both the Iranian spiritual leader Khatemi and President Rafsanjani were involved in ordering the execution of terrorist acts."[66] The radical revolutionary interpretation of Islam seems to have got deeply entrenched into the domestic political structure of Iran and having become the centre of ideological legitimacy for many radical Islamic groups, it finds it difficult to renounce this role.

CONCLUSION

In the 1990s, both secular and religious terrorist groups have tended to focus on individual acts, to kill as many for maximum effect. While for secular groups, this may be because they have come to realise the need of escalation in the level of violence given the people's indifference to low level violence, for religious groups it has been because they see themselves as harbingers of fundamental changes in the society. Secular groups have taken to 'spectacular' terrorism because this also serves the same purpose of creating psychological fear as the traditional, slow, long-drawn effort of systematic engagement in the form of kidnapping, hostage taking and calculated acts aimed at the government and the military. For religious groups the death of the enemy becomes an end in itself. They are not constrained in

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[66] Author unknown, "Iranian Support for Terrorism." Available at _http://www.ict.org.il._ (17 February 2001).

killing the enemy because only that would bring about the 'new' system they foresee. For both these objectives, the strategy has been random civilian violence, particularly in places where there is a lot of movement of civilians, like bus stops, passenger buses, market places and subways.

International terrorism in the 1990s may be misunderstood if the analysis is not rooted in the domestic instabilities of many of the states that are facing the problem. There is abundant data to support the view that the overwhelming majority of conflicts in the international system since World War II have been "a ubiquitous corollary of the birth, formation and fracturing of Third World states."[67] Terrorism has arisen out of both state inability to cater to and intransigence to their needs and welfare. The superpowers by exporting superpower rivalry to the Third World during the Cold War, especially in the form of proxy wars, as well as the transfer of weapons greatly increased insecurities and instabilities. The end of the Cold War has only furthered the threat due to the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which brought about polarisation on ethnic and religious grounds. Democracies in Third World states are still very immature and political organisation is still very fragile. It is important to understand that the fundamental causes of terrorism, "lie in the bitter ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts and hatreds which spawn such brutal violence and the power struggles and rivalries of states."[68]

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[67] Luc Van De Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, Paul Scirone, *Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States,* St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1996, p. 68.
[68] See also Paul Wilkinson, Ed., *Technology and Terrorism*, Frank Cass, London, 1993, p. 3.

Islamic fundamentalism is a phenomenon closely tied with many aspects of 'human security'. The inability of the state structure in many states to deliver the goods and the systematic manipulation of religion by selfish individuals or groups, particularly through indoctrination in religious schools and establishment of laws and codes of conduct, may have made Islamic fundamentalism what it is today. Stern points out that in Pakistan the *jihadi* mindset has been the outcome of weak governmental policies ever since it got independence.[69] Spending about 5 percent of its $61 billion GDP on defence, Pakistan has insufficient funds for socio-economic and educational welfare. She also points out that supporting terrorists against India has cost Pakistan enormously, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the interests of Pakistan and those of the terrorists are not fully aligned and therefore there is internal upheaval. Internationally, the atrocities carried out by the militants have damaged Pakistan's image with others. Kalim Bahadur argues that Afghanistan has become an important centre for terrorist activities because of the availability of money through drug smuggling.[70] In 1998, Afghanistan was the second largest producer of opium poppy. The Taliban has not been able to provide a government to rebuild the war-torn nation. On the other hand, they have progressively throttled the democratic space of the people by enforcing religious laws and policies.

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[69] See Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," pp. 115-126.
[70] Kalim Bahadur, "Islamic Fundamentalism and International Terrorism," *Aakrosh*, Vol. 3, No.7, April 2000, p. 36.

The rise of issue based terrorism, like the radical environmental groups, the anti-abortionists and animal rights activists, is also a recent phenomenon. These groups are a result of the increasing activism of civil society in the daily affairs of the state, due to the state's indifference to these issues. Terrorism has been able to attack and entrench itself in vulnerable state institutions of many weak states causing the gradual demise of states affected by it and also posing as significant challenge to other states in the international system.

CHAPTER III

TECHNOLOGY AND THE MODERN TERRORISTS

The post Cold War period has indicated that qualitative change in the means of terrorism and the proliferation of these and operational innovations should be one of the central foci of analysis. The terrorists have been able to exploit many developments in modern technology to suit their needs. The biggest push that terrorism has got in the last decade has been to do with the development of communications and information technology, for which there is no infrastructural control possible. Communications technology has particularly played the role of increasing networking among various groups of people. The popularisation of this technological infrastructure has provided a ready tool for the terrorist, a global area and a way to leverage limited resources. Technology has also enabled modern terrorists to carry out acts in small numbers, relying more on the firepower of their weapon systems than on their strengths in terms of numbers. In other words, one of the consequences of technological innovations is that "the small bands of extremists and irreconcilables that have always existed may become an increasingly potent force".[1]

This chapter will focus on the changing nature of contemporary terrorism with particular reference to new developments in weapon,

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[1] B.M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in D.Carlton and C.Schaerf Eds., *International Terrorism and World Security,* Croom Helm, 1975, p. 28, quoted in Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter Measures,* Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 26.

communications and information technologies. This chapter is divided into four major sections. The first section will deal with how technology is impacting on terrorist mindsets, the choice of their targets and tactics. The second section will deal with weapons. Developments in weapons technology have given terrorists a wide range of weapons to choose from and a variety of ways to use them. A small sub-section has been added here to discuss suicide terrorism as a new weapon in the hands of terrorists. Contrary to popular opinion that suicide terrorism shows an increase in the level of confrontation, the increased resort to this method may be an indication that terrorists are actually losing out to counter terrorist agencies in terms of innovative tactics and technologies. The third section will focus on organisational and operational structuring of terrorists in the post Cold War period. To particularly study the impact of technological developments in this area, a small sub-section has been added here to discuss support networks of terrorist organisations. The final section will focus on the changing relationship between the media and terrorism.

Technology shapes human behaviour. It has shaped the way an average man works, plays and thinks. With the opportunities offered by technology, new philosophies have been shaped to accommodate them.[2] Wilkinson notes that in prehistoric times, violence, which is an indispensable part of human nature, was most probably effected by threatening to kill with boulders or sharp edged rocks. In medieval ages, the threat or the act was

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[2] Ibid., p. 31.

carried out by daggers and swords. In modern times, the same is effected through guns and bombs, precision guided missiles, rockets and other weapons.

Technology has particularly helped the terrorists in three ways. First, it has given the terrorists low-cost, low-risk and high-yield methods of engaging the enemy. The range of easily available weapon systems has boosted the capability of terrorists to inflict maximum damage at a relatively low cost to them in terms of their cadres. The possibility for terrorists to place a highly potent bomb timed to go off hours after they have left the scene has meant a "radical change in many aspects of the small tactical area."[3]

Secondly, it has given them a range of targets to choose and the confidence of destroying the target. They also have a wide variety of tactics from which to choose and sufficient training and support systems to make the most of tactics within their groups.[4] There are two aspects of terrorist-targets that need to be noted. First, technology has contributed to the "transition from personal to impersonal terrorism, wherein the target has changed from a specific tyrant to a randomly selected, symbolic individual remotely related to the target of terror."[5] The range of available weapons has allowed this to happen. It may turn out that sometimes an act may turn out to be contrary to what the terrorists had actually planned, but for them the act is justified

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[3] Ibid., p. 31.
[4] Cindy Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1997, p. 145.
[5] The quoted part of the points made above has been made by Donald H.Bell. See Bell, "Comment: The Origins of Modern Terrorism," *Terrorism An International Journal*, Vol.9, No.3, (1987), p. 310, quoted in Donald J.Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of War*, p. 185.

because it has been aimed at a well-defined enemy. Secondly, modern developments in science and technology have resulted in high rise buildings, shopping malls, nuclear and other installations, gas pipelines, industrial areas, railway stations, airports and other such key-areas, which become "vulnerable key-points" in contemporary industrialised societies that make important targets for terrorists.[6]

Thirdly, technology has enabled networking among various groups and peoples. Anonymous payphones, cellular phones that allow one to roam, facsimile machines and alphanumeric pagers allow terrorists to always keep in constant touch with each other. Computers and its applications are used for propaganda purposes, which can be distributed via electronic mail, mailing lists, anonymous remailers and newsgroups. Through the use of these machines all parties can be kept informed of all evolution in tactics, techniques and technology. The Internet system is getting revolutionised day by day and this technology is being given away free to anyone who wants it. In contemporary times, when groups resort to terrorism, they are taking into account not only their limited capabilities but also the successful examples of other groups in other parts of the world. [7]

Terrorists realise that they are economically and militarily weak compared to the counter terrorist forces and, therefore, the success or failure

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[6] See Paul Wilkinson, *Technology and Terrorism,* Frank Cass, London, 1993, p. 3.

[7] Redlick argues that the Quebec Liberation Front in most of its activities was extensively influenced by the examples of the Palestinian, Algerian and Cuban movements and the Tupamaros. He attributes this influence to the transnational flow of information that helped the Quebec movement materially and tactically and also as an inspirational source for resort to terrorism. See A.S.Redlick, "The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism," in Y.Alexander, D.Carlton, and P.Wilkinson Eds., *Terrorism: Theory and Practice,* pp. 73-95.

of achieving their goals is going to depend in a major way on their ability to manipulate the available weapons and tactics to their advantage. Cunning and innovation are key factors for terrorists, who find themselves far more inferior to the enemy forces. They will have to always remain tactically one step ahead of the enemy to be effective. The lethality aspect in contemporary terrorism is undoubtedly connected with technological developments and has much to do with technological inputs into the weapon systems.

WEAPONS

Easy availability and diversity of weapons have made terrorism a particularly attractive strategy for many people. The development of light man-portable automatic weapons with a high rate of fire, portable 'fire and forget' missiles and malleable, highly destructive plastic explosives, like semtex, have provided the terrorists with some powerful firepower, greatly increasing their capability of inflicting serious threats to life and property against a well armed and sophisticated opponent.[8] Guns and bombs of all shapes and sizes have remained the most important part of the terrorist arsenal. In modern times, proliferation of these weapons for reasons such as ideological, religious, smuggling and pure profit motives have both increased terrorists' acts and their lethality.

The essential requirements of weaponry have been availability, simplicity and efficiency but other requirements have been added over the

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[8] Wilkinson, *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, p. 3.

years.[9] Miniaturisation, the use of remote control devices to trigger explosives and increased recourse to unconventional explosives which are usually used for commercial purposes have evolved as technological additions to the arsenal of terrorists. In the 1990s, nearly half of all incidents have been carried out with explosives of one kind or another. Bomb-making instructions are readily available in the print and electronic medium, particularly the Internet, making it very easy for anyone interested in making bombs.

Explosives have been moulded into many types of bombs; letter bombs, landmines, culvert bombs, parcel bombs, car and time bombs and barometric and pipe bombs. The ingenuity of terrorists to modify explosives into various types is one of the chief sources of their weaponry. They have been triggered by various firing devices, detonators, radio-controlled fuses, watches and clocks, booby traps, springs and electric charges and remote detonators. Initially, most of the explosives used by the terrorists were military explosives, which were acquired through theft, purchase or given by sponsoring agents especially states.[10] Present-day terrorists, while continuing to use conventional explosives, have increasingly switched over to non-military type explosives for various reasons, particularly for its difficulty in detection by counter-terrorist agencies. For example, it has been reported that Picatinny Liquid Explosive (PLX), a slightly yellow liquid which contains 95 percent nitromethane and 5 percent ethylenediamine, in a whisky bottle

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[9] Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics*, Facts on File Inc., New York, 1982, p. 104.
[10] Jimmie C.Oxley, "Non-Traditional Explosives: Potential Detection Problems", in Wilkinson, *Technology and Terrorism*, p. 30.

with 350g of Composition C4 in a radio were used in the downing of Korean Air Flight 858 in November 1987.[11] The usual machines to detect explosives failed to detect this bomb while it was being smuggled onto the plane.

Explosives become the obvious choice of weapons for terrorists because of the firepower it gives. Constrained as they are in terms of numbers, the terrorists turn to explosives to obtain maximum results while risking the lives of only a few. Oxley notes that there are two aspects of explosives that give it its dangerous character.[12] First, there is not only the ready availability of traditional explosives like TNT, picric acid, lead picrate, PETN and RDX, but also the possibility of home-synthesis. And secondly, the availability of hundreds of energetic compounds like, nitromethane, ammonium nitrate, mercury fulminate and urea nitrate which can be made into explosives of all types. There are also many liquid-based oxidisers and fuels like nitrobenzene, petroleum-based products that can function as explosives. For example, "Black Powder", used by many terrorists, is a mixture of a readily available compound, potassium nitrate and sulphur mixed with charcoal. Oxley points out that the range of explosives and packaging possibilities is staggering. "A bomb no longer is a recognisable sphere or pipe, nor does it necessarily need a blasting cap. Every bottle, can of hair spray or shaving cream, every vacuum bottle of coffee is a possible device."[13]

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[11] Ibid., p. 36.
[12] Ibid., p. 34.
[13] Ibid., p. 46.

Technology has also helped terrorists to constantly stay a little ahead of counter terrorist security measures, by unconventional adaptations and modifications to conventional weapon systems.[14] The available technological know-how allows for terrorists to be innovative. Often big weapons are beyond the economic means for most terrorists and too big to steal. Much has depended on their own ingenuity and the 'element of surprise' in their tactics.

Suicide Terrorism: The New Weapon

This period has seen an increased recourse to tactics involving suicide bombings. It is the latest in the changed mindset of terrorists. A suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator.[15] This type of attack includes the bomb and the man. The ability of contemporary terrorists to blow themselves up to achieve maximum effect not only indicates an additional escalation in terrorist activity but also a change in motives from what is commonly understood about terrorists. Terrorists face the risk of being killed in an act. But suicide attacks, where the terrorist knows full well that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process, has not been part of terrorist strategy in earlier decades.

The 1990s have witnessed suicide bombings as a well-coordinated strategy by terrorists. The consequence of such a method is the increasing

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[14] This point is discussed in detail by Hoffman. See Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities," in Wilkinson, *Technology and Terrorism*, pp. 19-22.

[15] Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Terrorism: An Overview." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il.* (17 February 2001).

belief that acts of terrorism cannot be resolved through diplomacy and other

normal channels of conflict resolution. Girls and boys as young as 16 years of

age have been seen going to their deaths smiling, after having blessed by the

Mullah and saying goodbye to their families and friends.[16] This factor explains

in major ways the trend towards increased lethality in the post Cold War

period.

Suicide terrorism has been carried out in two ways, car or truck bombs,

where the terrorist drives an explosive-laden vehicle into the target, and by

attaching bombs to the body. Though constituting only 4.5 percent of total

incidents they have caused nearly 13 percent of total deaths.[17] Not one

incident by this method has resulted in zero deaths or injuries. This form of

terrorism has become a very serious threat because of the feeling of

helplessness by security personnel and the population in the ability to prevent

or take precautions. Extreme Islamic groups like Hamas and the Hizbollah

and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have particularly used this

type of method. Indoctrination and economic rewards have played a role in

motivating many of the terrorists to carry out suicide missions.[18] Many other

suicide terrorists carry out the act due to extreme loyalty to their leaders.

Suicide missions are highly effective. Terrorists suffer fewer casualties

and inflict high casualties to the enemies. In recent years, many suicide

[16] Edgar O'Ballance, *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1975-95: The Iranian Connection,* Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1997, p. 71.

[17] This average has been calculated from the chronology of international terrorist incidents prepared by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya. Downloaded from *http://www.ict.org.il.* (October 2000).

[18] See Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Terrorism: An Overview." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il.* (17 February 2001).

terrorists have been able to carry out assassinations of world leaders. The sophisticated security cordons around many of these leaders make it difficult for even a well planned strategy of harm to succeed. Suicide terrorism in these cases has been the most effective. A suicide bomber, who had an explosive device hidden on her body, carried out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991. She was able to bypass the entire security cordon and on the pretext of garlanding the ex-Indian Prime Minister, triggered the blast that killed him and many others in the crowd. There is a general perception, as pointed out, that suicide terrorism is an escalation in the level of threat posed by terrorists, particularly because fundamentalist terrorists and motivated cadres of well known groups have resorted to this form of attack. In the last decade, suicide terrorism has been used when all innovative strategies have failed to penetrate the security cordon around a particular target. The popularisation of this method in recent years, however, raises the question of whether contemporary terrorist are gaining on counter terrorist agencies in terms of innovative tactics, technologies and the 'element of surprise', which have been the backbone of terrorist operations in earlier days?

ORGANISATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL INNOVATIONS

In the 1960s and 1970s, most terrorists groups worked under a central command in a usually hierarchically structured system, although the number of the members of the groups were small. Hoffman estimates that most left

wing organisations like the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Red Army Faction

(RAF), or even the Red Brigades had hardcore members of fewer than 50 to

75 dedicated terrorists and even nationalist groups like the Provisional Irish

Republican Army (PIRA), the Basque separatist, Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna

(ETA), or the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) numbered less than 500

followers.[19] All the groups gave a lot of importance to well-coordinated

strategies, which were often worked out down to the last detail.

There is strong evidence to suggest that terrorist organisations have

proliferated in the 1990s. There has also been an exponential rise in the

numbers of loosely connected and indirectly linked terrorist groups.[20] Most

reflective of this fact is that, splinter groups, either breakaways due to

organisational problems or charismatic appeals, are on the upswing.[21] For

example, the "Afghan Alumni" operate as architects of independent terrorist

cells which, while lacking a specific organisational affiliation, cooperate with

other institutionalised terrorist organisations.[22] Palestinian security sources

indicate that there are ten or more Hamas splinter groups and factions with no

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[19] Bruce Hoffman, "Continuity and Change in Terrorism." Available at http://www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.htm_ (17 February 2001).

[20] Hoffman calls these groups "amorphous terrorist groups." They often operated in very small cells usually of four or five members. And they functioned on a linear rather than a hierarchical basis.

[21] There are for example 44 different groups operating in Kashmir. Although officially only five are known, whenever any terrorist act occurs, those that claim responsibility for the event give names which some say are fictional, while others say they are real. Some of the names include Al Faran, Al Umar, Allah Tigers, Al Jung, Zia Tigers, Mahaza-e-Azadi, Dukhtran-e-Millat, Pasdaran-I-Inquilaabi Islam, Jamat-e-Islami, Al Umar Mujahideen, etc. See Ved Marwah, *Uncivil Wars: The Pathology of Terrorism in India,* HarperCollins Publishers, India, 1995, pp. 33-150.

[22] Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shai, "The Afghan Alumni." Available at http://www.ict.org.il_ (17 February, 2001).

centralised operational leadership.[23] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is believed to be a group of loosely affiliated factions. The Iranian backed Hizbollah also acts as an umbrella organisation of radical Shiite groups. It is in addition widely believed that there are organisations like the Al Qaida (The Vanguard) or certain states that actually coordinate the activities of smaller cells. Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, coordinates the activities of various terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.

Many analysts point out that "the Afghan war was a seminal event in promoting the networked form, in that it showed that fluidly organised groups, driven in this case by religious imperatives, could defeat an experienced hierarchically structured army."[24] With the successful entry of the Mujahideen into Kabul in 1992, thousands of volunteer guerilla fighters who were as anti-West as they were anti-Soviet literally became 'rebels without a cause'.[25] They could be easily absorbed into conflicts in various neighbouring states. They literally became hired soldiers for anyone who could pay them. It was this that resulted in the formation many small groups.

Small terrorist cells, the absence of a central command structure or actual functioning headquarters may allow its members greater freedom and independence in tactical decisions and remove previous inhibitions on the

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[23] "Gaza Strip, West Bank: Dahlan on Relations with Israel, Terrorism," *Tel Aviv Yedi'ot Aharonot,* FBIS-TOT-97-022-1, February 28, 1997, p. 18, quoted in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michael Zanini, *Countering the New Terrorism,* RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 61.

[24] Michael Whine, "Cyberspace: A New Medium for Communication, Command, and Control by Extremists", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* RAND. Available at *http://www.ict.org.il.* (17th February 2001).

[25] Peter Chalk, "Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism in the 90s", *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* Vol.53, No.2, 1999, p. 156.

terrorist's desire to inflict widespread indiscriminate casualties.[26]

Organisational structuring of terrorist groups into smaller cells has enhanced

the attack capability of the terrorists. Small cell operation allow terrorists to

converge on a target from different directions before they can be identified

and allows perpetrators to quietly melt into the crowd after carrying out attack

and the problem of tracking them down is increased for counter terrorist

agencies. This makes predicting future attacks highly problematic. Cell

autonomy limits police and intelligence penetration into the organisation.[27] It

has been this that has led to the proliferation of terrorist groups in its network

forms. It is easier to find havens in other countries and there is less chance of

getting arrested. The rise of network forms of organisation is a key

consequence of the ongoing information revolution.[28] Islamic fundamentalist

organisations like Hamas and the Bin Laden network consist of groups

loosely interconnected, semi-independent cells that have no single

commanding hierarchy.[29] Today, many consider the most notorious element

of the network to be "Osama bin Laden, who uses his wealth and

organisational skills to support and direct a multinational alliance of Islamic

extremists."[30]

Moreover, the anonymity in today's terrorism could mean that the

groups lack a discernible organisational structure. This could be for the

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[26] See Bruce Hoffman, "Continuity and Change in Terrorism." Available at http://www.mipt.org/ hoffman-ctb.htm, (17 February 2001).
[27] David C.Rapoport, "Terrorism," Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, Vol.3, Academic Press, 1999, p. 504
[28] Ian O.Lesser, et al., op.cit., p. 39.
[29] Ibid., p. 56.
[30] Ibid., p. 62.

above-cited reasons and particularly to avoid retaliation by the victim state's military forces. This organisational trend is going to pose as a serious challenge to counter terrorist agencies in the future. Networking among various groups will exacerbate the threat. It becomes easy for a terrorist group to acquire support for its activities in various places.

Support Networks

In the post Cold War period, technological dynamics, increased mobility and the sophistication achieved in communication technology, particularly the Internet, have dramatically increased the dangerous trend of network support for terrorists from across boundaries. Networks are being formed not only among those who believe in the same cause but also among those who have similar grievances, cutting across ethnic groups, geographical boundaries and nationalities. According to Rohan Gunaratna this has resulted in "boosting military and non-military capability of terrorist groups at the strategic level. And at the tactical level, they have performed diplomatic, political, military and economic functions both domestically and internationally."[31] In addition, they work as lobbies to governments and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Support groups in foreign countries most of whom are made up of diaspora and migrant communities have raised funds for terrorist groups.

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[31] See Rohan Gunaratna, "Transnational Terrorism: Support Networks and Trends," *Faultlines*, Vol.7, November 2000, pp. 1-2.

The effectiveness of networking "overtime may depend on the presence of shared principles, interests, goals – at best, an overarching doctrine or ideology – that spans all groups and to which the members wholeheartedly subscribe."[32] Such set of principles, shaped through mutual consultations and consensus building can enable them to be "all of one mind" even though they are dispersed and devoted to different tasks.[33] Network groups have particularly helped groups in terms of money. An Algerian immigrant to Canada who was writing a doctoral thesis on Islamic groups claimed that Canada has served as the transit point for much of the $137 million raised worldwide for the Islamic movements in Algeria.[34] Much of the financing, according to him, has been carried out by support groups in the name of cultural, social and other humanitarian projects. It has been reported that Islamic terrorist groups have massive network supports in the US, Europe and recently, in Arab countries in the Middle East.[35]

During the Cold War, many terrorist groups enjoyed the support of one or the other bloc. For instance, almost all Palestinian groups were supported by the former USSR or its satellite states, who channeled support directly or through humanitarian and other independent looking organisations.[36] These

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[32]Ian O.Lesser, et al., op.cit., p. 51.

[33] ibid., p. 51.

[34] Reuvan Paz, "Targeting Terrorist Financing in the Middle East." Paper presented at the International Conference on *Countering Terrorism through Enhanced International Cooperation*, Courmayeur, Mont Blanc, Italy, 22-24 September, 2000. Available at *http://www.ict.org.il.*

[35] See for more details, Reuvan Paz, "Targeting Terrorist Financing in the Middle East." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il.*

[36] Rohan Gunaratna, op.cit., p. 5.

have come down in the post Cold War period. Even if certain states support them, they are less open and prefer to deny such involvement.

MEDIA AND TERRORISM

The media has played the role both of facilitator and obstructer for terrorist goals and objectives. Research has shown that when violence is portrayed as morally proper or somehow beneficial, it lowers a viewer's inhibitions against aggression and the prototypical 'justified' scenario is the hero who employs violence to protect society against villainous characters.[37] On the one hand, the terrorists use the media for their purposes of advertising their cause, create fear and thus achieve a certain amount of success. On the other hand, the media can also thwart the purpose of the terrorists by picturing him as a murderer and thus lose him public sympathy. Terrorists use violence as an essential means of achieving psychological impact and not as an end in itself.[38] And hence, the media becomes a very important part of the terrorists' strategy. Terrorists have "manipulated and exploited it in ways amenable to their cause."[39] Terrorism and the media also share a symbiotic relationship, one needing the other to achieve certain objectives. The media gets its share of 'high drama' events that brings in a lot of money through a wide coverage of terrorist acts.

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[37] James T.Hamilton Ed., *Television Violence and Public Policy,* The University of Michigan Press, 1998, p. 38.
[38] Gabriel Weimann & Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism,* Longman, New York and London, 1994, p. 56.
[39] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 135

A US CRS Report for Congress has identified some aspects that terrorists want from the media.[40] First, publicity for its cause. Hoffman writes that the bigger the chance of getting wide coverage, the greater is the terrorist interest. For example, during the TWA Flight 847 crisis, the hijackers paid no attention to "non-American and non-television journalists."[41] Secondly, the media can spread a favourable understanding of their cause, in public opinion. Sometimes terrorists also tend to court sympathetic press personnel. Thirdly, they use the media to lend legitimacy to their cause. Terrorists know that a favourable media agency can go a long way in giving their cause legitimacy in the face of repression. Fourthly, the media acts to give maximum public exposure during individual acts. Finally, media coverage causes damage to the enemy, amplifies panic, spreads fear, scares people away from tourist spots and investments, makes people lose their faith in the government and triggers the government to unpopular over-reaction.

The post Cold War period however seems to suggest that the emerging trends of international terrorism is impacting on the traditional relationship between the two. The anonymity factor in today's terrorist acts seems to underscore how terrorists no longer seek credit or want to advertise their cause unlike earlier decades, when terrorists almost immediately claimed responsibility for a particular act. Two reasons may explain this new phenomenon. For one thing, terrorists want to avoid retaliation from

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[40] CRS Report for Congress, "Terrorism, The Media, and The Government: Perspectives, Trends and Options for Policy Makers," 1997, pp. 2-3.
[41] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 136.

increasingly skilled counter terrorist agencies and, for another, they have also

discovered that they can sow as much confusion, fear and discord by

remaining anonymous, if not more.[42] Simona Sharoni, an American

University Professor of Peace and Conflict Resolution, noting this new

development says, "it's a new phenomenon, nothing like what's been done

before, and it forces people to ask questions about why this happened."[43]

Single-issue terrorism is on the rise. These groups are more interested

in problems in their own backyards even though they are in many cases

international in character. They are not interested in the media as much as

the traditional terrorists. These groups are coming together across

geographical areas, uniting under single issues or acting according to

religious motivations facilitated by the post-print age.[44]

Another aspect has been the increased attacks on media personnel,

especially those who are outspoken on issues of concern to the terrorists.

One private group, the Committee to Protect Journalists, estimates that forty-

five journalist were killed in 1995 alone as a consequence of their work.[45] This

seems to indicate that the traditional relationship between the media and

terrorism is significantly changing in modern times. In many ways, the Internet

is today playing the role that the media has been playing for many years and

terrorists are finding it less necessary to use the media for various purposes.

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[42] Peter Grier and James N.Thurman, "Age of Anonymous Terrorism." Available at _http://www csmonitor.com/1998/08/12 /fplsl-csm.htm._ (17 February 2001).

[43] For this quote see _http://www.CPJ.org/_

[44] Neal A.Pollard, "The Future of Terrorism." Available at _http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism /future.shtml_ (17 February 2001).

[45] For details of journalists killed in terrorist violence, see _http://www.CPJ.org/_ (17 February 2001).

CONCLUSION

Qualitative changes in weaponry, as an explanation of the increased lethality of terrorist acts in the post Cold War period cannot be discounted. Some analysts point out that in this period most of the victims have been "people who were in the wrong place at the wrong time." It is the weapons, their availability, sophistication and diversity that need serious analysis.

What many analysts seem to have left out when they discuss weapons as a cause of terrorism, however, has been to do with the increased supply and proliferation of weapons, particularly small arms, in zones of conflict all over the world for various purposes such as ideological, political, religious or economic. There is a direct relationship between conflict and the availability of weapons used in conflicts. Chris Smith, for example, notes that although Sind in Pakistan has always been a violent province, the dramatic increase in violence and polarisation dates from 1985-86 and coincides with the time when weapons from the Afghan pipeline began to find their way into commercial channels.[46] The supply of weapons into many regions in the Third World by weapon producing countries has also accounted for the increased insecurity in the region. Many of these regions which are already facing political, communal or other types of crisis easily become violent because of easy accessibility to weapons. The politics behind the buying and selling of small arms and the increasing scale of local production have had its share of

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[46] Chris Smith, "The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: A Case Study of South Asia," *SIPRI Yearbook 1995,* SIPRI, Stockholm, p. 590.

impact on the increasing scale of resort to terrorism in the post Cold War

period. Many weapon-exporting countries will have to rethink their policies of

arms business, particular to states that are not democratic in their functioning.

South Asia is seen today as one of the most violent regions in the

world. One reason for this has been that it is a region where there is a

growing availability of small arms of every make. The Afghan war raked in

light weapons from many countries who were against the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan. The United States, Israel, Turkey, Egypt and China supplied the

Afghan Mujahideen with all kinds of small weapons, which after the war

ended, landed in the hands of terrorists. Terrorists today use weapons that

were used during the Afghan war and which can be acquired from the arms

bazaars in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other places in South Asia.[47] What has

become more threatening in recent years has been the parallel criminal

business like narcotics and drugs smuggling that is conducted along with the

arms trade. This is a deadly combination with far reaching repercussions for

society.

Many Third World states import a lot of armaments. And there is a

massive supply of weapons to many Third World states from the West and

other regions for reasons which are more political than security-oriented. For

example, Pakistan in 1998 spent about 5 percent of its Gross Domestic

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[47] For more details of the arms bazaars see Ajay Darshan Behera, "The Supporting Structures for Pakistan's Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XXV, No.3, June 2001, pp. 396-400.

Product (GDP) on defence alone.[48] Much of Pakistan's acquisition of weapons came from the United States, for whom Pakistan was an important part of its overall interests in South Asia. Pakistan's focus on defence arises out of its domestic insecurities and perceptions of its enemies. But this has led to a situation where "there is more reliance on the military for a greater degree of surveillance and social control. And the military as a reservoir of political power can be captured by groups within states that have no interest in creating a broader consensus for representative rule."[49] It is no secret that Pakistan supports the Jehadi movements in Jammu and Kashmir by giving them arms and ammunitions from its armoury.

Technological inputs into the strategy and weaponry of terrorists is becoming a much more serious problem than in the past because of new justifications that are being offered by terrorists. Combs notes that "modern terrorists are, for the most part, fanatics, whose sense of reality is distorted...and that they operate under the assumption that they alone know the truth and are therefore the sole arbiters of what is right and what is wrong."[50] She further points out that 'group dynamics' operating in a terrorist group, with its own set of what is moral and legal, also to a large extent determines the perception of reality of individual terrorists. She argues that it is difficult to convince a religious terrorist who has been indoctrinated into

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[48] Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.79, No.6, November/December 2000, p. 115.

[49] See also Keith Krause, "Armaments and Conflict," in Luc Van De Goor, Kumar Rupasinghe and Paul Sciarone Eds., *Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States*, St. Martin's Press Inc., New York, 1996, p. 185.

[50] Combs, op.cit., p. 66.

believing that his actions are acceptable in view of a "higher morality" and who believes that his sacrifice will give him a heavenly afterlife. It is in this context that the fear of terrorists manipulating technology to result in catastrophic consequences has exacerbated.

The defining characteristics of a successful terrorist, according to Edgar O'Balance, are dedication, personal bravery, performing a task without the human emotions of pity or remorse, a fairly high standard of intelligence, fairly high degree of sophistication and a reasonable possession of general knowledge.[51] These characteristics, Combs points out, are eroding in terrorists today. Most of the newly recruited terrorists in terms of age, educational standards and economic status indicate that these new terrorists are less rational, more emotional, have less understanding of what they are fighting for, are taken up more by the adventure of using guns and violence and blindly follow orders of the elders and leaders.[52] In such a situation, many experts on terrorism present a pessimistic view of the future. The utilisation of the incredible technological innovations by the terrorists, according to them, is going to result in an even more bloody and destructive future.

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[51] Edgar O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence,* cited in Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* p. 59.
[52] See Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* pp. 59-61.

CHAPTER IV

FUTURE THREATS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT

International terrorism seems to be headed in a "disquieting trajectory". New manifestations are evolving while the old ones are being operated under new justifications. This section will deal with the various manifestations of international terrorism in the post Cold War period and see at what level they pose as threats to the international system. It will particularly focus on new threats that are emerging. The first section deals with state sponsored terrorism. Even though this is not a new type of terrorism it continues to remain a serious threat. The issue of state involvement is important because it is assuming increasing importance on foreign policy agendas to the extent of dominating them.[1] The second section will focus on terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Material, technological and moral constraints are eroding to make this threat more real than ever. This section will take into account the lessons that can be learned from the Aum Shinrikyo, sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway, where a chemical weapon was used with the intention of mass kill. The third section will deal with the millenarian threat. Millenarian movements come into existence in a context of frustration and can be extremely violent. And the final section will deal with computer terrorism, a

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[1] Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures,* Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 175.

small component of the discourse on international terrorism now, but increasingly becoming potent.

STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM

State involvement in international terrorism has been, as already noted, of two types. The first type is when states use terrorism usually to repress the people, making them "apolitical or politically malleable and weaken the population's willingness to support revolutionary or other anti-government movements."[2] The systematic elimination of opposition to a certain regime and suppression of dissent by covert and terror tactics also come within the ambit of this type of terrorism. As is obvious, this type of terrorism has generally been employed by those states that do not enjoy widespread legitimacy among the populace.[3] This type of terrorism is not practiced openly as in earlier times, given the increased international attention to domestic, human rights and other humanitarian issues. Even if some states use a certain amount of state terrorism, they never justify their acts and it is a highly secretive affair.

The second type is the use of terrorism as an instrument for specific foreign policy objectives, which became popular in the Cold War period. This type of state's involvement also includes support such as funds, weapons, training facilities, logistics, intelligence and diplomatic facilities. This type of

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[2] Donald J.Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*, p. 164.
[3] Alexander Dallin and George Breslaner, Political Terror in Communist Systems, (*Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970*),p. 2., quoted in Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*, p. 167.

involvement can be less covert because often "the benefits outweigh the relatively minor disadvantages of keeping a nation's support secret."[4] And it is this type of state sponsorship of terrorism that has serious implications for global security in the future. The sponsorship by states has moulded terrorists' strategies, doctrines and targets in the post Cold War period. It has enhanced their financial, logistics, material and other capabilities, enabling them to play a major role in contemporary affairs.

State sponsorship of terrorism entails three real dangers.[5] First, the danger of terrorist activities may escalate into full-scale war between two nations and which may eventually drag in other actors particularly major powers. This is what Lacquer calls the 'Sarajevo Complex'. Secondly, there is the danger of over-reaction by major powers, who might take unilateral military action against certain states who support terrorism, particularly, if the major power feels that its interests are being threatened. This type of unilateral over-reaction has grave implications for international relations in the long run. Thirdly, there is the danger of the gradual obliteration of democratic norms and functioning in the victim-state paving the way for internal turmoil and more violence.

State-sponsored terrorism becomes more deadly because terrorist capabilities are enhanced. Terrorists with state support do not depend on the

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[4] Philip B.Heymann, *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society,* Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998, p. 67.
[5] Wardlaw makes these points. For a detailed discussion of the dangers of state sponsored terrorism see Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures,* Cambridge University Press, London, 1989, pp. 175-186.

local population for support and hence they need not be concerned about alienating popular opinion or provoking a public backlash.[6] State-sponsorship also puts more resources at the disposal of the terrorists, intelligence, money, sophisticated munitions and technical expertise, thus reducing the constraints on the terrorists.[7] With the help of states especially during the 'escape-stage' terrorists can become much bolder. They also are less fearful about planning future attacks. To carry out attacks in foreign countries, terrorists need passport, visa and other diplomatic support. States by making these arrangements for them enhances their international reach.

States have sponsored national and international revolutionary groups and political terrorist groups in the past. In most instances, the purpose for such support was to bring down certain rulers and establish friendly regimes. Since the objective had a significant political content, support to established and well-known groups entailed a certain amount of success. In the post Cold War period, the trends seem to indicate that states look for groups that are less revolutionary and less conspicuous and more inclined towards personal gains.[8] This has been because the sponsoring state is more interested in subversion, wherein the political aspect of a terrorist group is less valuable. Moreover, there is also less chance that a state's sponsoring exploits will be publicised if the group they are supporting is not a well-known terrorist group. As already pointed out, states support terrorists because it is the safest and

[6]Ian O.Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, *Countering the New Terrorism,* RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 15.

[7] Brian M.Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear," *ORBIS,* Vol.29, No.3, Fall 1985, p. 510.

[8] Lacquer, Hoffman, Wardlaw and others make this point.

the cheapest way to engage the enemy without the fear of retribution. In many cases, states can escape identification, retaliation and sanctions.[9] From a purely military perspective, too, terrorism has greater utility.[10] There are very few men and material involved in this type of engagement and it is therefore far more attractive than even a very low-scale conventional war.

Perhaps it is state sponsorship of terrorism that has increasingly allowed it to be viewed as war by many analysts. They attribute the emergence of highly destructive and well-planned strategies of international terrorism in the post Cold War period to state sponsorship. This phenomenon has been termed a new 'war paradigm' in international relations for the following reasons.[11] First, it employs lethal force for political objectives. Secondly, it targets an entity whether it is an alliance system or a nation-state. And thirdly, it engages an enemy. The study argues that it is a fight between two entities one trying to subdue the 'will' of the other. They argue that when states use certain terrorist groups, the revolutionary objective of a terrorist group is overridden by the sponsoring state's national policy objectives. Hence a state's involvement amounts to an indirect form of war.

There are two problems while analysing state sponsorship of terrorism. First, it is difficult to identify a state's involvement in clear terms and with hard evidence. It is also difficult to find out what the objectives of the sponsorship are. Secondly, the designation of certain states as terrorist states is often

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[9] Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., p. 15.
[10] Donald J.Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*, p. 188.
[11] Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., p. 69.

seen as a highly politically motivated decision. For example, the United States

has designated seven states as sponsors of terrorist activities. They are Iran,

Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Cuba and North Korea. These countries are often

referred to in policy literature as synonymous with the term 'rogue states'.

There is however no agreed definition of what constitutes a rogue state. Many

accuse the list of political, ethnic and other biases.[12] In the future, the

difficulties associated with identifying a state sponsor are going to impact on

attempts at building a common strategy to fight the menace of terrorism.

In the analysis of state sponsorship of international terrorism, what

seems to have been overlooked has been to do with a nation's inability to

control the activities of certain, often powerful groups, within their own

countries. In many states, particularly where democracy is very weak, the

elite runs the entire governmental process often with the help of certain

powerful groups. These groups which are in most cases established terrorist

groups are given a lot of free hand in the government. Lebanon, for example,

could not deny operational freedom to well-armed Hizbollah forces.[13] The

same is the case with Pakistan. Most of the terrorist groups in Pakistan are

associated with or are the armed wing of legitimate political parties. For

example, Hizb-ul-Muzahideen is the armed wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the

Lashkar-e-Toiba is affiliated with the Ahle Hadith political groups and the

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[12] The non-inclusion of Pakistan in the list is pointed out by many Indians as an indication that 'national interest' considerations have gone in while the list was made.
[13] Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., p. 67.

Hizb-e-Wahadat is associated with Shia political parties.[14] In Afghanistan, the

Taliban acts more like a terrorist group than a political party. It is the elite and

the political parties that legitimises their operations and allows their gradual

integration into the state structure. And selfish motives of certain individuals

can manipulate these groups to involve in subversive activities inside and

outside their countries. Stern points out that it is difficult to promote *Jihad* in

Kashmir and Taliban in Afghanistan without inadvertently promoting

sectarianism in Pakistan, particularly between the opposing Tehrik-e-Jafariya-

e-Pakistan (TJP), a Shia party, and the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, a Sunni

party, which was formed to offset the TJP.[15] What seems to be the case,

then, is that states and their institutions are actually not in control but

terrorists that have managed to control the government.

A RAND study has proposed a new war counter paradigm, particularly

the role of the Air Force, to counter such use of terror, much like the US

bombing of Afghanistan supposedly against Osama bin Laden's hideout in

Afghanistan.[16] Military response to state sponsored terrorism in the future is

gaining wide support. But the roots of this type of terrorism is seen in the

political and social conditions of states. What military responses will result in

terms of death and destruction remains to be seen.

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[14] See Satisk Kumar, "Militant Islam: The Nemesis of Pakistan," *Aakrosh,* Vol.3, No.6, January 2000, pp. 34-36.
[15] Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol.79, No.6, November/December 2000, pp. 124-125.
[16] See Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., p. 70.

TERRORISTS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

In the post Cold War period a lot of speculation has taken place with regards to the possible use of WMDs by terrorists, be they international cults, groups or individuals. Writings on catastrophic terrorism in the period have focussed on defence and preparedness indicating that most see this latest form of terrorism waiting to happen on a large scale. Analysts are also beginning to see the implications of the convergence of terrorism and transnational organised crime syndicates (TOCs) as the threshold of the reality of terrorists going in for WMDs. Brian Jenkins once wrote, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." He however writes in 2000, "large scale, indiscriminate violence is the reality of today's terrorism."[17]

The serious concern of WMDs being used by terrorists has emerged out of incidents where states as well as groups have broken the taboo against the use of such weapons in the last decade. Furthermore, the religious imperatives that seem to be driving terrorism, for whom death and destruction of this world is a sacred duty and also necessary for a higher morality and a new world has further increased the fear.

UN inspectors uncovered Iraq's secret programme that had produced a hoard of germs for biological warfare. The team also uncovered a secretive Iraqi group known as the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division, which was part of the Organisation of Military Industrialisation which appeared

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[17] Brian M.Jenkins, Opening Address, *Conference on Terrorism and Beyond,* Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, April 17, 2000. Available at *http://www.mipt.org /jenkins-ctb.html,* (17 February, 2001).

to focus on germs warfare.[18] It was also confirmed that the microbial research facility at Salman Pak had done development work on botulinum toxin as a potential warfare agent.[19] Iraq has been particularly targeted because of the reported use of chemical and biological agents during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and the Gulf war in the 1990s. The current concern of the Iraqi biological weapons programme is two fold.[20] First, the total Iraqi import of 40 tons of growth media to produce biological agents, only about 23 tons are accounted for, which means that 17 tons are missing and the UN can account for only 25 of the over 150 germ bombs and cannot account for the 25 germ warheads which the Iraqis had acknowledged that they had produced.[21] Secondly, Saddam Hussein's call for *jihad* against the West particularly the US, may translate into attacks of Western facilities and personnel outside their countries through unconventional ways and means.

The Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995, and an earlier attempt by the same group in Matsumoto on June 27, 1994 have also intensified the fear regarding this particular strand of terrorist strategy. The question is, will millennial cults like these or even nihilist individuals like the Unabomber, go in for WMDs if they are capable of? There have also been other instances when biological and nuclear materials have

[18] Brian Solomon, *Chemical and Biological Warfare*, Reference Shelf, The H.W.Wilson Company, New York, Dublin, 1999, p. 34.
[19] Leonard A.Cole, *The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare*, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 1997, p. 84.
[20] For a detailed discussion on Iraq's biological programme, See William J.Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," in Brian Solomon, *Chemical and Biological Warfare*, p. 28-40.
[21] ibid., p. 29-31.

been recovered from individuals. For example, Larry Wayne Harris, a biologist was arrested in Ohio and pleaded guilty to fraudulently obtaining bubonic plague cultures for reasons many suspected of racial prejudice against the Jews in New York.[22]

Easy accessibility, easy production, low cost and high potency of chemical and biological weapons make these highly attractive to whoever wants to use them. Many argue that countries or groups that are unable to achieve their goals by conventional means might go in for these weapons driven by frustration. Further, elaborate international networks have developed among terrorist, organised criminals, drug traffickers and arm dealers creating an infrastructure for catastrophic terrorism.[23]

How Real is the Threat?

Most analysts argue that the fear of the use of WMDs by non-state entities are being blown out of proportion by government agencies and some analysts because of the actual technical problem involved in the manufacture, storage and delivery of these weapons. Hoffman is convinced that the Aum Shinrikyo experience indicates that even though contemporary terrorists are not morally or psychologically averse to the use of WMDs, they are unable to do so because of immense technological difficulties. He argues that Aum Shinrikyo with all its resources (which are reported to be in excess of $1

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[22] James Ridgeway, "Harris Arrest Reflects Hatred of City on Rascist Right: Germ Warfare in 'Jew York'?" cited in Brian Solomon, *Chemical and Biological Warfare*, p. 91.

[23] Ashton Carter, John Deutsch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.77, No.6, November/December 1998, p. 81.

billion), manpower and years of R&D activities could not stage a single

successful chemical or biological attack even though its intention was

'overkill'.[24] Walter Lacquer also argues that terrorists are probably less likely

to use nuclear devices than chemical weapons and least likely to attempt to

use biological weapons given the technical difficulties.[25] Both however agree

that these difficulties could be overcome because of further advances in

technology and other material factors and if certain states sponsor the

production of such weapons. Despair and frustration, if their objectives are

not achieved, could also lead some groups or individuals to use

unconventional weapons. Contemporary trends in international terrorism,

where terrorism is seemingly becoming an end in itself further strengthens

this argument. The debate that is going on of whether terrorists may go in for

strategies involving the use of weapons of mass destruction in the future will

need to seriously consider a variety of features such as procurement, storage,

manufacture, delivery, cost effectiveness and detection. A table is given

below for the purpose of analysing the threat posed by nuclear, biological and

chemical material, which may be fashioned into a weapon by terrorists.

[24] See Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism." Available at _http://www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.htm_ (17 February 2001).
[25] See Walter Lacquer, "Post-Modern Terrorism." Available at _http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intre l/laqueur.htm_ (17 February 2001).

TABLE 1

	NUCLEAR	BIOLOGICAL	CHEMICAL
Procurement	Hard	Relatively easy	Relatively easy
Manufacture	Hard	Relatively easy	Relatively easy
Storage	Difficult	Difficult	Difficult
Delivery	Hard	Hard and hazardous	Hard and hazardous
Lethality	High	High	High
Target control	Fair	Low	Low
Cost effectiveness	50-50 to good	Very good	Very good
Detection	High	Low	Low

Source: Martin Shubik, "Terrorism, Technology and the Socio-Economics of Death,"
Comparative Strategy, No. 16, 1997, pp. 399-414.

Quite contrary to conventional wisdom that terrorists will not engage in

mass killings through the use of WMDs, for moral, psychological or

ideological or other reasons, the use of these weapons have been

constrained mainly due to technical reasons, especially for small terrorist

groups with limited resources and capabilities, who may have the will to carry

out such acts. Traditional terrorists never needed WMDs to drive their point

home, given their clear goals and motives. This cannot be said about religious

terrorists, some nihilist, psychopathic individuals and cults for whom killing is

justified by some irrational and illogical idealism.[26] For the Unabomber, it

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[26] This point of view is also agreed upon by Brian Jenkins, Bruce Hoffman, Cindy Combs and David
Rapoport.

would not have made much of a difference if he was killed by a conventional, nuclear or a biological weapon.

States will find it difficult to support the nuclear or other WMD aspirations of terrorist groups or carry out such exercises themselves because they are answerable to the international system. The political repercussions for states would be massive and difficult to handle. It was the reported production by Iraq of WMDs that sent in the United Nations inspection team, UNSCOM, to conduct a search. Its use may not become a trend for all terrorist groups but certain groups that might possess the will and capability in future will have no aversion in carrying out an attack with such weapons. As long as biological, chemical, nuclear materials are accessible to the public, the danger is always there.

THE MILLENARIAN THREAT

Millennialism is a term "given to religious groups that live in imminent anticipation that the world as we know will end. They believe that justice will be administered which will lead to the destruction of the wicked and will give the righteous an earthly paradise. Millenarian groups often turn to terrorism, partly because terror is part of the end-time vision."[27] Millenarian movements have increasingly attracted attention because its various manifestations (for example, religious cults, environmentalist groups and anti-abortionists) are becoming violent. Unlike terrorist groups these movements are often legal

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[27] David C.Rapoport, "Terrorism," *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, Academic Press, 1999, Vol.3, p. 498.

organisations, with legal resources and often made up of groups of concerned citizens, which make it difficult to predict their behaviour.

The last part of the last century saw a heightened millenarian mood. Many, especially religious groups and cults saw the period as a "critical point between two millennia". For example the Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese millenarian group, believed that the time had come for a new purified world which would emerge out of the destruction of the present world. For the purpose, they used a chemical agent (sarin gas) in a public place killing twelve and injuring about 5000 in March 1995. The last decade also witnessed many charismatic men who have huge followers. A leader's interpretation or mis-interpretation of what he believes is a revelation of God can incite his followers, who may with zeal carry out the leader's interpretation. Shelley Shannon, an anti-abortionist defending the killing of Dr. David Gunn in 1993, interprets the Holy Bible to say that God approves of some killings provided it is not the shedding of innocent blood.[28] For her, protecting babies and stopping the murder of innocents is right and just, even if it takes the use of violence to do so.[29]

Millenarian movements arise in the "context of despair" and in the last three decades or so there has been an increase in the growth of extreme socio-spiritual and environmentalist groups that have resorted to violence. The environmentalist groups prefer to call themselves 'Eco-Warriors' and

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[28] See for example, *The Holy Bible*, Numbers 25:1-8.
[29] Jeffrey Kaplan, "Absolute Rescue: Absolutism, Defensive Action and the Resort to Force," in Michael Barkun Ed., *Millenialism and Violence*, Frank Cass, London, 1996, p. 156.

these groups have been waging a war against moderate governmental policies and mainstream environmentalists for their slow and deliberate action for the protection of the environment. Guided by a kind of spiritualism that came to be called "Deep Ecology", these groups are highly prone to become violent.[30] Groups like the eco-warriors and anti-abortionists are usually anti-government but find it difficult to carry out terror tactics on a large scale for the following reasons. First, these groups, as they become gradually large and recognised, tend to strike a balance between their activities and legal government procedures.[31] Secondly, these groups are usually small with very limited resources and concentrate on problems in their own backyards.

After the Aum Shinrikyo incident and the World Trade Center bombing, governments have become more wary of millenarian groups and whether such groups with a proclivity to violence is on the increase, is becoming an important topic for researchers. Many argue that millenarian movements especially of the religious variety may contemplate the use of WMDs. Terrorism motivated by religious imperatives, where violence is regarded by its practitioners as a divine duty or sacramental act, is seen as embracing markedly different means of legitimisation and justification, which offers no moral constraints to the terrorists.[32]

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[30] Rik Scarce, *Eco-Warriors: Understanding the Eco-Radical Movement,* The Noble Press, Inc., Chicago, 1990, pp. 1-4. 'Deep Ecology' exposits that human life and nature are intrinsically linked and that human beings are not the measure of all things. It urges the individual to look beyond the self and be a part of the eco-system.

[31] For example, Green Peace which came into existence as a radical group, today acts within the parameters of well defined set of rules and regulations that do not go against the governmental policies.

[32] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* p. 88.

CYBOTAGE[33]

Computer terrorism is the latest addition to threats to national and international security. The dependence on computers in the present age to a whole variety of tasks is enormous. It has become part of everyday life and one cannot think of life without computers. Computers perform innumerable functions ranging from simple calculations to communication, entertainment and connectivity. It has opened up a whole new world of opportunities in information and communication. And terrorists of all types have benefited from computers and the ongoing revolution in information and communications technology (ICT). Many also recognise that the proliferation of terrorist groups is related to the growing role of networks by ICTs – of networked organisational designs and related doctrines, strategies and technologies – among the practitioners of terrorism.[34]

The threats that the revolution in ICTs poses to the world are two fold. First, it has become a handy tool for terrorists and subversive elements to get in touch with others who believe in the same set of values and have similar grievances. It also makes it easier for them to get in touch with their members anywhere, almost instantly and thus inform them of strategies, tactics, plans, codes and technical details on how to make weapons. Secondly, terrorists can use this new tool to disrupt the functioning of their enemies by, for

[33] This term has been borrowed from Ian O.Lesser, et.al., *Countering the New Terrorism*. They have used it to mean computer terrorism, particularly, hacking into information stores or websites and disrupting communications.

[34] Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., p. 45.

example, targeting their information stores, communications and other processes, particularly hacking into the data stores and websites.

ICTs provide a range of other benefits. They are cheap. With a modem and a computer a terrorist can become a global player. One does not need to be an expert computer operator or learn complex programming. To hack into someone's information store, what is needed is only to download from a hacker's website computer atomated hacking scripts.[35] It also enables extremists to reach their target audience when other outlets and media are denied them. There is also no control possible on the use of ICTs. It is also difficult for the law and order agencies to track down the culprits. The Internet for example, protects the secrecy of its users. Code language can be used while sending messages. The Internet can be accessed from anywhere and this facility has become the source of many wild and well-planned "conspiracy theories" in the present age.

A RAND Corporation study has termed this new phenomenon as 'Netwar'. It has been defined as "the emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organisation and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age".[36] Netwar here focuses on the networking innovations that the new age revolution in ICTs

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[35] quoted in Michael Whine, "Cyberspace – A New Medium for Communications and Control by Extremists." Available at *http://www.ict.org.il* (17 February 2001).

[36] Ian O.Lesser, et.al., op.cit., p. 47.

have brought about. It is the coming together of groups and individuals

believing the same ideals or suffering the same grievances or even people

who are just bored and want some adventure with the help of modern ICTs.

The study contends that a war doctrine (a sort of a war ideology) emerges as

groups of various types take advantage of evolving network designs. Netwar,

according to the study, also includes cyberwar, which is an information-

oriented engagement. Here acts such as "cybotaging" or hacking into

information stores or websites and disrupting communications of others are

included.

The danger that this new phenomenon poses is real and waiting to

happen. In the United States, the President's Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection was established in 1996, to enquire into the dangers

arising out of the use of ICTs by terrorists and others. It reported in 1998 that

the national infrastructure was vulnerable and would become increasingly

prey to attack by hostile forces.[37] Michael Whine points out the following

immediate dangers as a result of use of ICTs by terrorists and the possibility

that the future may see these threats on a much larger scale.[38] First, there is

interconnectivity between two totally different ideologies sharing a perceived

grievance. Mention may be made here of the growing communication

between small environmental and other issue-oriented groups that have

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[37] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "The Advent of Netwar," RAND, for the Office of the Secretary of Defence, CA, USA, 1996, quoted in Michael Whine, "Cyberspace – A New Medium for Communication, Command and Control by Extremists." Available at http://www.ict.org.il. (17 February 2001).
[38] See Michael Whine, "Cyberspace – A New Medium for Communication, Command and Control by Terrorists." Available at http://www.ict.org.il. (17 February 2001).

sprung up around the world. Secondly, there is the fear that national

infrastructures which are increasingly getting computerised, may be the target

of information warfare or cyber terrorism in the future.

CONCLUSION

The future for terrorists look bright as weapons become deadlier,

mindsets change with new justifications, states remain intransigent, new

issues come up and international non-cooperation persist. State-sponsored

terrorism in various guises continues to aggravate insecurity in many states.

In South Asia a nuclear dimension has been added to the hostility between

India and Pakistan. A recently fought war between the two states was the

result of Pakistani-sponsored infiltration of armed terrorists and infiltrators into

the Kashmir Valley. As long as the benefits outweigh the attention and

criticism that state sponsorship brings about, states will continue to use this

as an instrument of state policy. The benefits accruing from such an

engagement may see a future use of this strategy on a much wider scale.

Catastrophic terrorism as a strategy of terrorists cannot be discounted

given the advancement in material and scientific development. It will, as Brian

Jenkins point out, represent a quantum jump for terrorists, one that is not

impossible, though may not be imminent or inevitable.[39]

International non-cooperation is what has brought terrorism to this

dangerous level of threat. Terrorists are gradually networking with

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[39] Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" *ORBIS*, Vol.29, No.3, Fall 1985, p. 515.

transnational organised criminal organisations and drug smugglers, on the one hand, and legitimate business and governmental institutions, on the other, and merging into every sphere of activity. Fighting such a powerful force will require the will and courage of statesmen and leaders.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of international terrorism in the post Cold War period brings to the fore a dynamic linkage between a sponsoring or 'harbouring' state's domestic political structures and functioning and international terrorism. The change in motivations and goals of terrorists reflects this linkage. International terrorism is, in significant ways, a manifestation of a weak government's failure to sustain its democratic structures and functioning. More specifically, it becomes a cushion for domestic frustrations and apprehensions. Afghanistan today finds itself on the wrong side of the international ethos for openly supporting international terrorism, particularly for harbouring Osama bin Laden. The Taliban, which controls nearly 90-95 percent of Afghanistan, is not a political party. It is a radical Islamist outfit whose emphasis, in recent times, on religious orthodoxy in reforming society has proved to be obscurantism and politically inapplicable. It is an ethnic militia group that has emerged the winner of the ethnically motivated power struggle in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a multicultural state with Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Shia groups making up a sizable minority in the state. There are two other centers of power struggle in the already devastated state. One is Uzbek controlled and the other is the Northern Alliance, which is Tajik dominated and includes the Hazara and other Shia communities. The Taliban, though in power, has not been able to see to the socio-economic and political welfare of its citizens. The condition of the people in Afghanistan is deplorable. The Taliban legitimises its rule by positioning itself as the

defender of Islam and the harbinger of fundamental changes in Afghanistan and the Muslim world. By exporting these ideas to other countries, Afghanistan has become the chief source of international terrorism.

The breakup of the Soviet Union created a host of weak, democratising states in the region. The immediate attempt by these states was the conduct of free and fair polls. Elections, however, have been far from democratic. In the recently held elections in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in late 1999 and early 2000, all the incumbent presidents, who happen to be former leaders of the communist party of the former Soviet Union, won the elections polling over 90 percent of the total votes, indicating the absence of opposition candidates.[1] President Niyazov of Turkmenistan even made some constitutional changes that made him president for life. While trying to strengthen their own positions they have discarded all democratic norms and neglected socio-economic and political priorities in their states. Central Asia and the Caucasus is a very strategic region because of natural gas and oil deposits. The geo-strategic significance of the region coupled with the inefficiency of the new governments has made these states highly vulnerable to outside interference. In the 1990s, with a lot of propaganda for the creation of a pan-Islamic identity to counter the cultural attack by Western nations, Islamic fundamentalist forces, especially those from Afghanistan, have been able to get a foothold in the conflict in this

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[1] For an overview of the election result and Western response to the democratisation process in Central Asia see Jim Nichol, "Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, IB93108, The National Council for Science and the Environment, Washington D.C. Available at *http://www.cnie.org.*

region, made easier by the presence of Muslim minorities who are either fighting for independence or autonomy. The Taliban has been sending men, money and equipment to the Muslims in their fight against their secular regimes.

International terrorism affects the stability and democratic functioning of both the sponsoring or harbouring states and victim states in various ways. The most dangerous threat is that fundamental freedom and civil liberties of the people are undermined in the victim state. In many cases, a state is forced to curtail the activities of the terrorists by making certain laws, which gradually shifts the democratic functioning of the state and other institutional mechanisms to more stringent control by the government. There is more reliance on the police and military in the daily affairs of the state. In such a scenario, the common people are caught between the terrorists on the one hand and the state on the other. The subsequent fear from both gradually isolates the people from the government. In most states, where terrorism has caused death and destruction, there is a general notion among the citizens that the death and destruction has come about because of the failure of the government to protect them from the terrorists. The government's reaction to terrorist attacks in ways such as counter operations, arrests of suspects, curfews, physical frisking, home searches and interrogations are often unpopular among the common masses because they are the victims and not the terrorists. Alienating the common man from the government has been one

of the objectives of the terrorists. Careless handling of these operations has often served the terrorist's purpose.

International terrorism is sustained in many ways through smuggling of drugs and narcotics, small arms and other illegal material. This has drastic consequences for society. In many countries, generations of youth have been caught in the vicious web of drugs and violence. Drugs and narcotics have been the cause of many broken families and crimes in society. The youth become easy prey to violence. The easy availability and diversity of weapons in various forms have made it much easier for them to take up violence as a way of life. For example, *jihad* becomes a very attractive outlet for a Muslim youth caught in the dilemma of youthful aspirations and dreams and the inability of the state to fulfil them, due to the opportunities present in such a life. These have broader implications for society.

International terrorism also affects the perpetrator state or the state that gives operational freedom to terrorists in two ways. First, terrorists gradually get absorbed into the political structure of the state. To obtain legitimacy, often, these terrorists, through the collaboration of those in power, become legitimate members of a state's political party. They are given a lot of operational freedom within the state and in their activities, get money, weapon, logistics and diplomatic support. They even involve themselves in legal business and other humanitarian, social and political organisations. What this entails is a gradual decline of political values and morals, which is replaced by the power of money and guns. In such a situation, it is the

common people who are the most severely affected. Polarisation on the basis of particular political leanings, ethnic and religious considerations take place, breaking institutions apart. The judiciary and the legislature are usually affected most. Dissent is suppressed by the state for reasons such as maintenance of law and order. In the long run, there is possibility of a complete breakdown of the state machinery.

Secondly, a perpetrator state or a state harbouring state may invite political and economic isolation from the international community. Particular acts may invite severe sanctions. What is still more dangerous is that some states may even physically attack states sponsoring or harbouring terrorists, which might escalate into a real war. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to collectively fight terrorism are on the upswing in the last decade. These efforts came about due to the general perception that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is on the rise and is a conscious policy of certain states to destabilise the international system. With the decline of ideologically motivated terrorists like the Japanese Red Army and Red Brigade and other left terrorist groups, Islamic terrorism has come to the forefront as the chief source of international terrorism, since the early 1990s. If these attempts translate into real policies, states that openly or indirectly support terrorism are going to face the ire of the international community.

Till the mid-1990s, the level of threat posed by international terrorism made many think that international terrorism does not present a significant challenge to the fundamental stability and the functioning of democratic

states.[2] The emerging pattern of new motivations, opportunities and manifestations, on the other hand, tell a different story. A deeper appreciation of the problem at its roots is necessary. Certain aspects of a state's political structure and functioning that have unintended consequences, leading to violence and the export of this violence in the form of international terrorism should become the focus of further study on the subject.

COUNTERING THE THREAT

As pointed out in the very beginning, international terrorism has in the past been delimited to and countered in the domestic realm. The most successful counter-terrorist strategies have been in the domain of individual states and have been carried out by their special forces in their own countries or even abroad.[3] There has been collaboration among elite anti-terrorist squads of various countries, although their roles have not been prominently displayed or acknowledged. States have countered terrorism in two ways. First, by enacting special legislations. The British government for example, recently passed the U.K. Terrorist Act, 2000, which came into force in February 2001.[4] The scope of the Act covers a wide area that will make it

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[2] David A. Charters in a study on the effect of international terrorism on democratic societies in six countries in 1994 concluded that international terrorism does not pose as a threat to the fundamental security and functioning of democratic states. See David A. Charters, Ed., *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries,* Greenwood Press, Connecticut, p. 212.

[3] For example Israel's specialised counter-terrorist squad, Sarayat Matkal is "one of the best trained and equipped special forces unit in operation today, with an impressive record of successful missions" which includes, among many others, the Entebbe rescue operation in 1972. For more details look up Cindy Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,* Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1997, pp. 171-182.

[4] For a good overview of the Act see Hasan Suroor, "The Empire Strikes," *The Hindu,* New Delhi, January 14, 2001.

difficult for terrorist groups to use the U.K. for various activities, particularly, the collection of funds.

Secondly, the other method that states have used to counter terrorism has been police or military retaliation. The US and Israel have very stringent counter terrorist policies, which among other strategies, includes the use of armed forces to destroy the base of international terrorists. A RAND study even recommended the use of the Air Force to counter the new terrorists.[5] A Time Series investigation to "investigate the current threat posed by transnational terrorist incidents" had three policy recommendations for the government of the United States[6]: first, a proactive anti-terrorist campaign to infiltrate terrorist groups or destroy their resource base, especially terrorists of the religious and amorphous variety and annihilate them. Secondly, the use of intelligence for deep infiltration into the terrorist bases; and thirdly more protection for civilian targets as terrorists are most likely to go in for 'soft' targets in the future. States have used both the above approaches in their fight against international terrorism.

At the international level cooperation has been particularly lacking for various reasons cited in chapter one. In the United Nations, despite the scores of resolutions (eighteen so far), passed both in the General Assembly and the Security Council, a regime has been unable to see the light of day. There have been sixteen international conventions on various aspects of

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[5] See Ian O.Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, *Countering the New Terrorism,* Project Air Force, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999.
[6] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol.44, No.3, June 2000, pp.307-332.

international terrorism. Four of these have translated into treaties. The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation of September 23 1971, the Convention for the Suppression for Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of March 10 1988, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of December 14 1973 and the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages of December 18 1979, have become international treaties to fight the problems of air hijacking, sea piracy, attack on diplomats and internationally recognised persons and the illegal taking of hostages. However, other aspects of international terrorism have evaded a consensus among nations in finding ways to fight them together.

It is interesting to note that most countries, while condemning terrorism in all its forms, continue to support it in one way or the other. The Arab Interior Ministers Meet in Tunis in January 1994, condemned Israeli terrorism while it supported Arab peoples' right for struggle to liberate their territory in compliance with international law.[7] The United States supports Israeli terrorism against Arabs while it decries the support to terrorist groups given by Afghanistan, Libya, North Korea and Iraq. It does not comment in clear terms on Pakistani sponsored terrorism. India, while accusing Pakistan, arms Sri Lankan terrorist groups.[8] In a situation where there seems to be no real

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[7] For an interesting account of this see K.R.Singh, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy," *International Studies,* Vol. 32(2), 1995, pp. 127-130.
[8] See Afsir Karim, "International Terrorism: The Indian Response," in Lalit Mansingh & others, Ed., *Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st Century, Vol.1,* Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi, p. 293.

desire, there can be no meeting ground for the members of the international community to cooperate.

It has been in the bilateral sphere that, perhaps, the most successful effort has been achieved. The cooperation between India and the U.K. to fight terrorism, institutionalised in the Indo-British Extradition Treaty of 1992 and the companion agreement to seize assets of terrorists and drug runners is the best example. Almost all extradition treaties have been plagued by what is known as the "political offence exception" clause. This clause says that "extraction shall not be guaranteed when the offence is regarded by the requested party as one of a political character or if the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with a view to trying or punishing him for an offence of a political character."[9] The problem encountered here is that a political offence, if not specifically pointed out, may mean anything to anybody. V.S. Mani points out that in the Indo-British Treaty, the sting of the political offence clause has been taken out by clarifying a number of specific offences which "shall not be regarded as offences of a political character."[10]

In recent years there has been an upsurge in bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism. The United States and Russia have a Joint Working Group (JWG) on containing terrorism. It was the recommendation by this group that brought about stringent sanctions (arms and military assistance) by the

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[9] V.S.Mani, "Bilateral Cooperation for Containing Terrorism: Extradition Arrangements." Paper presented in a Seminar on *International Terrorism and State Policy,* National Security Programme, JNU, Series No.5, March 29-30, 1994.
[10] Ibid.

United Nations Security Council on Afghanistan. Russia and three other former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have approved a joint force of 1700 men to be deployed in these countries to counter the rising threat of Islamic terrorism in the region.[11] The rapid reaction force is slated to become operational from August 2001. India has JWGs with Britain, United States and Russia to combat terrorism. China has also been forthcoming on terrorism emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Li Peng, in his recent visit to India in January 2001 showed willingness to join India in the fight against terrorists. These attempts indicate that the international community is now realising the need to come together and fight the menace collectively.

In the final comment, international terrorism seems to be yet another unintended consequence of a world caught in the mad craze for 'power and prestige'. Fighting this menace will not only require regimes and legislations but also a change in the mindsets of the leadership in all countries. The democratic principles of accommodation and transparency will go a long way in instilling confidence among the citizens and in the long run could be the answer to many ills that afflict society.

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[11] See Vladimir Radyuhin, "CIS Forms Units to Fight Terrorism," *The Hindu,* December 1, 2000.

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