US MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF EAST AFRICA AND SUDAN

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation, "US MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF EAST AFRICA AND SUDAN", Submitted by **me**, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the Degree of **Master of Philosophy**, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University. This is my own work.

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We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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PROF. B. VIVEKANANDAN
(Chairperson)

Dedicated to my brother, CHINTU

..........my best pal

CONTENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism continues to cause grave concern and disruption in scores
of countries. Combating this menace remains a very high priority
for the United States and many other nations. No one definition of
terrorism has gained universal acceptance, however, the definition
of terrorism is contained in title 22 of the United States code,
section 2656f (d), the statute contains the following definitions:

- The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated
  violence perpetrated against non-combatant[1] targets by sub-
  national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to
  influence an audience.

- The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving
  citizens or the territory of more than one country.

- The term 'terrorist group' means any group practicing, or that
  has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

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[1] For the purpose of this definition, the term non combatant is interpreted to include, in addition to
civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.

The U.S. government has employed the definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purpose since 1983.[2]

The damage to society from terrorism is very high. It is not just in terms of the dead and wounded, it is aimed at wider audience than its immediate victims. Publicity is an integral part of terrorism, and the news industry is a primary conduit connecting terrorist, the public and governments. Terrorist must have publicity in some form if they are to gain attention, inspire fear and respect and secure favorable understanding of their cause, if not their act. Governments need public understanding, co-operation, restraint, and loyalty in efforts to limit terrorist harm to society and in effort to punish or apprehend those responsible for terrorist acts. Journalists and the media in general pursue the freedom to cover events and issues without restraint, especially governmental restraint.

The media and the government have common interests in seeing that the media are not manipulated into promoting the cause of terrorism or its methods. But policy makers do not want to see terrorism, or anti-terrorism eroding freedom of the press -- one of the pillars of democratic societies. This appears to be a dilemma

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[2] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*: 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999 report/

that cannot be completely reconciled -- one with which societies will continually have to struggle. The challenge for policy makers is to explore mechanisms enhancing media / government cooperation to accommodate the citizens and media need for honest coverage while limiting the gains uninhibited coverage may provide terrorists or their cause. Communication between the government and the media here is an important element in any strategy to prevent terrorist causes and strategies from prevailing and to preserve democracy.

The media are also known to be powerful forces in confrontations between terrorists and governments. Media influence on public opinion may impact not only the actions of governments but also on those of groups engaged in terrorist acts. From the terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or campaign. And in hostage type incidents, where the media may provide the only independent means a terrorist has of knowing the chain of events set in motion, coverage can complicate rescue efforts. Government can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion against the country or group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and the media can also be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments to take, or reject, actions against terrorism.

Margaret Thatcher's metaphor that 'publicity is the oxygen of terrorism' underlines the point that public perception is a major terrorist target and the media are central in shaping and moving it. For terrorism the role of media is critical.

We shall, therefore, examine the competing perspectives on the desired role for the media when covering terrorist incidents, and also; what the terrorist wants, what the government wants, and what the media wants when covering a terrorist event and some new trends impacting on terrorism and the media.

Competing Perspectives on the Role of the Media when covering Terrorist Events

Terrorists, governments, and the media see the function, roles and responsibilities of the media, when covering terrorist events, from differing and often opposing perspectives. Such perceptions drive respective behaviors during terrorist incidents -- often resulting in tactical and strategic gains, or losses, to the terrorist operations and the overall terrorist cause. The challenge to the governmental and press community is to understand the dynamics of terrorist

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enterprise and to develop policy options to serve government, media and societal interests.

What Terrorists Want From Media

Terrorists need publicity, usually free publicity that a group could normally not afford or buy. Any publicity surrounding a terrorists act alerts the world that a problem exists that cannot be ignored must be addressed. From a terrorist perspective, an unedited interview with a major figure is a treasured prize, such as the May 1997 *CNN* interview with Saudi dissident, terrorist recruiter and financier Osama bin Laden. For news networks, access to a terrorist is a hot story and is usually treated as such.

- They seek a **favorable understanding of their cause**, if not their act. One may not agree with their act but this does not preclude being sympathetic to their plight and their cause. Terrorists believe the public "need help" in understanding that their cause is just and terrorist violence is the only course of action available to them against the superior evil forces of state and establishment. Good relationships with the press are important here and they are often cultivated and nurtured over a period of years.

- Terrorist organizations may also seek to court, or place, sympathetic personnel **in press positions** -- particularly in wire services -- and in some instances may seek to control smaller news organizations through funding.

- Legitimacy. Terrorist causes want the press to give **legitimacy to what is often portrayed as ideological or personality feuds or divisions between armed groups and political wings.** For the military tactician, war is the continuation of politics by other means; for the sophisticated terrorist, politics is the continuation of terror by other means. IRA (Ireland) and Hamas (Israel) are examples of groups having "political" and "military" components. Musa Abu Marzuq, for example, who was in charge of the political wing of Hamas is believed to have approved specific bombings and assassinations.[3] Likewise, the "dual hat" relationship of Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein -- the purported political wing of the IRA – to other IRA activities is subject to speculation. Distinctions are often designed to help people join the ranks, or financially contribute to the terrorist organization.

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[3] Steven Emerson, 'Islamic Terrorism from Midwest to Mideast', *Christzan Science Monitor*, August 28, 1996.

- They also want the press to notice and give **legitimacy to the findings and viewpoints of specially created non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and study centers** that may serve as covers for terrorist fund raising, recruitment, and travel by terrorists into the target country. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad -- funded and controlled World and Islamic Studies Enterprise is but one known example. The Hamas -- funded Islamic Association for Palestine (LAP) in Richardson, Texas, is another of many.[4]

- In **hostage situations -- terrorists need to have details on identity**, number and value of hostages, as well as details about pending **rescue attempts**, and details on the public exposure of their operation particularly where state sponsors are involved, they want details about any plans for military retaliation.

- Terrorist organizations seek media coverage that **causes damage to their enemy.** This is particularly noticeable when the perpetrators of the act and the rationale for their

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[4] Terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process: the Origins and Activities of Hamas in the United States, testimony by international terrorism consultant, Steven Emerson, before the Senate Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, March 19, 1996, P. 11

act remain unclear. They want the media to amplify panic, to spread fear, to facilitate economic loss (like scaring away investment and tourism), to make populations loose faith in their governments' ability to protect them, and to trigger government and popular overreaction to specific incidents and the overall threat of terrorism.

What Government Leaders Want From the Media

Government seek understanding, cooperation, restraint, and loyalty from the media in efforts to limit terrorist harm to society and in efforts to punish or apprehend those responsible for terrorist acts, specifically:[5]

- They want coverage **to advance their agenda and not that of the terrorist**. From their perspective, the media should support government courses of action when operations are under way and disseminate government provided information when requested. This includes understanding of

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[5] Note that in April 1994, The House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearing on the impact of television on U.S. foreign policy. Scholarly and media viewpoints were presented on what, if anything, the media might do to avoid inadvertently "Skewing" U.S. foreign policy on way or another and setting media foreign policy agendas. Although government/media cooperation in terrorism coverage was not the focus of these particular hearings they offered insights and suggested areas for examination of media/terrorism coverage issue. "Impact of Television on U.S. foreign policy", April 26, 1994, GPO, Washington, 1994, U.S. Congress, 103, Session 2, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Congress, p.53

policy objectives, or at least a balanced presentation, e.g., why governments may seek to mediate, yet not give in to terrorist demands.

- An important goal is to **separate the terrorist from the media** -- to deny the terrorist a platform unless to do so is likely to contribute to his imminent defeat.[6]

- Another goal is to **have the media present terrorists as criminals** and avoid glamorizing them; to foster the viewpoint that kidnapping a prominent person, blowing up a building, or hijacking an airplane is a criminal act regardless of the terrorists' cause.

- In hostage situations, governments often prefer to exclude the media and others from the immediate area, but they want the news organizations to **provide information to authorities** when reporters have access to the hostage site.

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[6] In the case of the anonymous " Unabomber", it was publication of a manifesto in the *New York Tines* and *Washington Post* that triggered the leads and actions by the suspect's family, which resulted in an arrest.

- They seek publicity to help **diffuse the tension of a situation**, not contribute to it. Keeping the public reasonably calm is an important policy objective.

- It is generally advantageous if the media, especially television, **avoids " weeping mother" emotional stories on relatives of victims**, as such coverage builds public pressure on governments to make concessions.

- During incidents, they wish **to control terrorist access to outside data** -- to restrict information on hostages that may result in their selection for harm; government strongly desires the media **not to reveal planned or current anti - terrorist actions** or provide the terrorists with data that helps them.

- After incidents, they want the media not to reveal government secrets or details techniques on how successful operations were performed -- and not to publicize successful or thwarted terrorist technological achievements and operational methods so that copycat terrorists do not emulate or adapt them.

- They want the media **to be careful about misinformation** from terrorist allies, sympathizers, or others who gain from

its broadcast and publication. Many groups have many motives for disseminating inaccurate or false data, including for example, speculation as to how a plane may have been blown up, or who may be responsible.

- They want the media **to boost the image of government agencies**. Agencies may carefully control leaks to the press giving scoops to newsmen who depict the agency favorably and avoid criticism of its actions.

- They would like **journalist to inform them** when presented with well grounded reasons to believe a terrorist act may be in the making or that particular individuals may be involved in terrorist activity.

- In extreme cases, where circumstances permit, vital national security interests may be at stake, and chances of success high, they may seek **cooperation of the media in disseminating a ruse** that would contribute to neutralizing the immediate threat posed by terrorists. In common criminal investigations involving heinous crimes, such media cooperation is not uncommon -- when media members may hold back on publication of evidence found at a crime scene

or assist law enforcement officials by publishing misleading information or a non-promising lead to assist authorities in apprehending a suspect by, for example, lulling him or her into a false scene of security.

What Media Want When Covering Terrorist Incidents Or Issues.

Journalists generally want the freedom to cover an issue without external restraint -- whether it comes media owners, advertisers, editors, or from the government.

- Media want **to be the first with the story.** The scoop is golden "old news is no news". Pressure to transmit real time news instantly in today's competitive hi-tech communication environment is at an all - time high.

- The media want **to make the story as timely and dramatic as possible,** often with interviews, if possible. During the June 1985 TWA Flight 847 hijack crisis, *ABC* aired extensive interviews with both hijackers and hostages.

- Most media members want **to be professional and accurate** and not to give credence to disinformation, however newsworthy it may seem. This may not be easily done at time, especially when systematic efforts to mislead them are undertaken by interested parties.

- They want to protect their ability **to operate as securely and freely as possible** in the society. In many instances, this concern goes beyond protecting their legal right to publish relatively unrestrained; it includes personal physical security. They want protection from threat, harassment, or violent assault during operations, and protection from subsequent murder by terrorists in retaliation providing unfavorable coverage (the latter occurring more often abroad than in the United States).

- They want **to protect society's right to know**, and construe this liberally to include popular and dramatic coverage, e.g., airing emotional reactions of victims, family members, witnesses, and "people on the street," as well as information withheld by law enforcement, security, and other organs of government.

- Media members often have no objection **to playing a constructive role in solving specific terrorist situations** if this can be done without excessive cost in terms of story less or compromise of values.

New Trends Impacting On Terrorism And The Media.

A series of recent terrorist acts indicates the emergence of trends that impact on the relationship between the media, the terrorist, and government. These include:

(1)   a trend towards anonymity in terrorism;

(2)   a trend towards more violent terrorist incidents; and

(3)   a trend towards attacks on media personnel and institutions.

Anonymous Terrorism

Today we see instances of anonymous terrorism when no one claims responsibility and no demands are made. The World Trade Center bombing is but one example. This allows the media a larger role in speculation, and generally removes most basis for charges that they are amplifying a terrorists demands or agenda. Reportage is

inevitable; especially if it includes unbridled speculation, false

threats or hoaxes, coverage can advance terrorists' agendas, such as

spreading panic, hurting tourism, and provoking strong government

reactions leading to unpopular measures, including reactions on

individual liberties.

More Violent Terrorism

In the context of advanced information and technology, a trend

suggesting more violent terrorism cannot be ignored. The

Department of State's *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996* notes

that while worldwide instances of terrorist acts name dropped

sharply in the last decade, the death toll from acts is rising and the

trend continues "toward more ruthless attack on mass civilian

targets and the use of more powerful bombs. The threat of terrorist

use of materials of mass destruction is an issue of growing

concern...."[7] If, and as terrorism becomes more violent, perceptions

that the press is to some degree responsible for facilitating

terrorism or amplifying its effects could well grow. Increasingly

threatened societies may be prone to take fewer risks in light of

mass casualty consequences and may trust the media less and less

to police itself.

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[7] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*; 1996, April 1997, P.3

Attacks on Media Personnel and Institutions

Attacks on journalists who are outspoken of issues of concern to the terrorists seem to be on the rise. Recent attacks occurred in Algeria, Mexico, Russia, Chechnya, and London, but there have been cases as well in Washington, D.C. at the National Press Building and at the United Nations in New York. One private watchdog group estimates that forty-five journalists were killed in 1995 as a consequence of their work.[8]

The sensationalism that surrounds terrorism and the news media coverage it receives is well manipulated by terrorists. Bombing, skyjacking, and kidnappings contain all the necessary elements to attract media attention, horror, excitement and violence. The media and their audience seem to have an appetite for 'new' news and sensational news. George F. Will, a newspaper columnist and television commentator, criticizes the news industry for rewarding terrorists with more coverage as their attacks become more violent and outrageous, Will has called television "an electronic

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[8] According to the New York based Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ) more than 300 journalists have been murdered since 1986 as a consequence of their work and in 1995 alone 45 were killed. See website address http: //www.cpj.org/

megaphone" for terrorists. By allowing themselves to become a conduit between terrorists hands.

The focus of this study would be on international terrorism that has attracted a lot of media and global attention and has created varied public opinion during Clinton administration is the series of incidents happening at the behest of Sudan. This study is also an attempt to examine the role of media in publicizing international terrorism and its effects on American public, generating anti - terrorism global public opinion and influencing American government decision makers in formulating policies for countering international terrorism and military action. This would be carried out with the help of a case study of East Africa and Sudan. This study has been divided into five chapters.

The first chapter provides an overview of relations between media, government, terrorists and public. It is an attempt to analyze the role of media while covering terrorism events and what does terrorist want from media. Also what government leaders want from the media and what media wants when covering terrorism incidents or issues. This has been undertaken so that it provides a clear picture of how all four *i.e.* media, government, terrorist and public, are co-related and influence each other.

The second chapter has endeavored to analyze the definition and evolution of terrorism and international terrorism. It is also an attempt to analyze the U.S. counter terrorism policy and how USA encounters global terrorism.

The third chapter is the case study and is an attempt to analyze the role of media in reporting the bombing of U.S Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 8,1998. An attempt has been made to analyze the importance of media and how it leaves an impact on the minds of public thereby formulating public opinion and also analyze intrinsic dependency of terrorism and mass media on each other.

The subsequent chapter is an attempt to analyze if the U.S. was 'justified' in carrying out the military action against Sudan and Afghanistan in retaliation to the August bombing. Also it has been attempted to examine the role of media during the whole 'state of affairs' and how did media react to the whole situation and what kind of public opinion emerged from the whole incident.

In the concluding chapter an overall assessment of the issue has been made keeping in mind the case study.

CHAPTER II

U.S. ENCOUNTERS GLOBAL TERRORISM

Terrorism is a term that is frequently appearing in the media today and has become a topic of global concern. Terrorism is cancer of the modern world. No state is immune to it[1]. Its growth has accelerated over the years. It is said that globalization of violence has ushered in a new 'Age of Terrorism.'[2]

The world periodically experiences fresh and well-publicized, spasms of terrorism. For all the million of words, the hundreds of hours of television time, the legions of experts, there is surprisingly little clarity about what is terrorism in the first place. The term terrorism is unsatisfactory. It is emotive, highly loaded politically and lacking a universally or even generally, accepted definition. As Walter Laqueur has said, the term has been used as a synonym for 'rebellion; street battles, civil strife, insurrection, rural guerilla war, *coup d 'etat* and a 'dozen other things'.[3] The result is that it has "become almost meaningless, covering almost

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[1] Paul Johnson, The Cancer of Terrorism, in Netnyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West can Win (New York, 1986), p.31

[2] Prof. R.P. Dhokalia, Terrorism and International Law: National and International Dimensions, 27 I.J.I.L., (1987), P.157

[3] Laqueur, Terrorism- A Balance Sheet, Harper's Magazine (March and November, 1976), reprinted in Laqueur ed., The Terrorism Reader, 262, (1979)

any, and not necessarily political, act of violence."[4] Even amongst

scholars in the field many definitions have been promulgated; in a

1983 study Alex Schmid compiled 109 definitions of terrorism.

Although there seems to be general agreement that terrorism

involves the threat or use of violence, that it seeks to create a

climate of fear and that it often relies on publicity, differences in

definition range from the semantic to the conceptual.[5]

Brian M. Jenkins asserts:

Terrorism is often described as mindless violence, senseless

violence, or irrational violence. If we put aside the actions of

a few authentic lunatics, terrorism is seldom mindless or

irrational. There is a theory of terrorism, and it often works.

To understand the theory, it must be understood first that

terrorism is means to an end not an end in itself.[6]

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[4] Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism. (1987). As Laqueur suggests, one of the many areas of disagreement regarding the concept of terrorism is whether it should be limited to political violence or whether it should also include violence by those not politically motivated.

[5] Schmid, Political Terrorism A Research Guide to Concepts Theories, Data Base and Literature, (1983), p. 119-152. Schmid examines the various definitions of terrorism and the relationship between terrorism and such other phenomenon as guerilla warfare, political assassination, anarchism and 'terror'. p.p. 20-71. For definition formulated by Schmid see p.p. 17-18.

[6] International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (Los Angeles: Recent publications, 1975), p.3

While terrorist activity may appear random, close examination reveals that terrorism has objectives. Attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract media attention. Terrorist acts like the holding of hostages serves to increase the drama, especially if the killing of the hostages is a possibility. Terrorism is aimed at people watching and, in that sense, "terrorism is theater."[7]

A serious attempt to define terrorism came in 1937 when the League of Nations formulated the convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The Convention which was signed by Twenty- Four states, was ratified by one and never actually came into force. It was a direct response to the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the President of the Council of the French Republic in 1934 by persons who could be described as Yugoslav freedom fighters or terrorist, depending upon one's political stance. 'Act of Terrorism', as set forth in Article I, are "criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or the general public."[8]

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[7] Brian M.Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New kind of Warfare, Report p-5216 (Santa Monica, C.A.: Rand Corporation, June 1974), p.3-4.

[8] John Dugard, 'International Terrorism: Problems of Definition', *International Affairs* (London), vol.50, no.1, January 1974, pp.67-69

The Leagues successor, the United Nations, also has been unable to agree on a definition of the term and has become diverted by an "in conclusive" discussion of the causes and motives of terrorists.[9]

The difficulty in defining terrorism has led to the cliche that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."[10] The phrase implies that there can be no objective definition of terrorism, that there are no universal standards of conduct in conflict.

Terrorism, therefore, is a very broad concept, which has evolved through ages. The main object of terrorists is to create a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence. Campaigns of terrorist violence can be used to publicize the terrorist's cause, as well as to coerce the wider target group to accede to the terrorist's aims. Mass Media at this point helps the terrorist gain access to the public at large and decision-makers in the target society.

Evolution of Terrorism

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[9] Louis Hoffacher, 'The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism,' *Vital Speeches of the Day*, February 15, 1975, 41:266
[10] Methodological Options for International Legal Control of Terrorism, in Bassiouni, ed., International Terrorism and Political Crimes (1975), p.490-91

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The term terrorism originated

from its Latin counterpart, 'terrere' which means 'to frighten'. The

English words, terror and terrible have the same origin. This term

has been used throughout history to maintain power and enforce

policies by arousing fear in the public.[11]

Terrorism has its political origin in the French Revolution-- in the

sense of terror carried out by the state. Gradually the idea of

popular sovereignty was born: it was in its name and in its defense

that the revolution justified state terror.

Political terrorism was later used in the second half of the

nineteenth century, notably by the Russian populists who were

influenced by Romantic tradition. The distant origin of terrorism is

to be found in 'tyrannicide'. The assassination of a tyrant was

traditionally committed in the name of justice but it was in the

name of ideological purity that the most powerful terrorist

organization ever created that of the Assassins,[12] operated in the

eleventh and twelfth centuries.

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[11] Robi Chakravorti, Terrorism: Past, Present and Future, 29 E.P.W. (Sept. 3, 1994), p. 2340

[12] Gerard Chahand, Terrorism : From popular struggle to media spectacle, (Worcester, 1987), p. 77-78.

Modern terrorism can be dated back to the Russian populists the Narodniks, who were active between 1878 and 1881.[13] The terrorism of the populists was never the less the expression of the general crisis in Russian society. It should be noted that the populists published a statement condemning the use of terrorism in the democratic countries when the American President James Garfield was assassinated in 1881.

In today's world, after the ideas introduced by the French revolution, Romanticism, Socialism the doctrine of just rebellion has become a wide spread phenomenon.

It is deeply voted in democracies especially in the liberal democracies of the west and can now be classified into different types.

Classification of Terrorism

Many terrorist movements are provincial in outlook and conceive of their activities exclusively as response to internal circumstances. Hence it is necessary to distinguish between other types of

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[13] Ibid

terrorism from international terrorism.[14] For example; one expert

writing in 1970's felt it useful to differentiate four types of

terrorism:

International-- U.S. State department, defines terrorism as

international when it involves "citizens or territory of more than

one country."

Transnational-- terrorism practiced by autonomous non-state

actors, but not necessary with the support of sympathetic state.

Domestic-- involves the citizens and territory of one state and is

directed against (or by) that state.

State terrorism-- terrorist tactics practiced by a state within its

own borders, such as genocide performed by Nazi Germany.[15]

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[14] For instance Edward Micklous based his classification of international terrorism as state terrorism, domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. See Edward Micklous, Trends in International Terrorism, in Mauris H. Livingstone et al (eds.), International Terrorism in the Contemporary World. (1978), p.45

[15] Edward Mickolus, Trends in International Terrorism, in Marius H.Livingston, with Lee Bruce Kress, and Marie G. Wanek, eds., International Terrorism in Contempoarary World, (Westport Conn: Green Wood Press, 1978) p.45.

Among the categorization, therefore, is necessary to define 'international terrorism' in some detail, which is the focus of this study.

International Terrorism

International Terrorism is conducted by people controlled by a foreign state.[16] It is any act of terroristic violence containing an international jurisdictional element. Its perpetrator may be from one state while the victim belongs to another state, or the terrorist may occur in a jurisdiction foreign to both.[17]

Since the 1960's, acts of international terrorism have recurred with sufficient frequency for terrorism to rise steadily on the global agenda. Therefore, received increasing attention of governments, scholars, politicians, commentators and the general public. For example, the seizure of U.S. hostages in Iran in November 1979, the shooting of the Israeli Ambassador to London in June 1982, the attacks on Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985.

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[16] David C.Rapopost, Religion and Terror: Thugs, Assasins and Zealots, in Charless W. Kegley, Jr. ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes and Controls (1990), pp.5

[17] L. R. Penna, State responsibility and Terrorism, 27 I.J.I.L. (1987) p.265

U.S. Department of State, Office of Counter Terrorism, arrives at the conclusion that international terrorist activity has increased dramatically between 1968, when it identified 125 individual international terrorist incidents, and 1988, when 855 incidents were identified.[18]

It would be difficult to define International Terrorism in precise terms, distinguishing it from other types of violence.[19] A book on this subject listed over hundred definitions of the term.[20]

The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as international when it involves "citizens or territory of more than one country."[21] Laqueur observes that the term 'international terrorism' can refer to state sponsored terrorism against foreign countries, to cooperation between terrorists groups and to attacks against foreign nationals or property in the terrorists' own country or elsewhere.[22] Wilkinson suggests that terrorism is international when it is "directed against foreigners or foreign targets", when it is "concerted by the governments or factions of more than one state,"

[18] Charles W.Kegley, Jr., International Terrorism : Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (New York, 1990) {Fig : 1 International terrorist incidents 1968-1988}, see appendix (i)
[19] Chakravorti, n.11, p.2340
[20] Schmid, n.5
[21] U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1988, p.v. (1989)
[22] Laqueur, n.4, p.266

or when it is "aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government."[23]

Therefore, we can say that whenever the citizens, territory or entity of a second state are involved in a terrorist act, that act can be considered international terrorism. This definition of international terrorism reflects the particular concern of United States and the handful of other governments frequently targeted by terrorists abroad. Therefore, United States took certain measures to counter-terrorism. The next half of the chapter deals with measures United States adopted to counter global terrorism.

U.S. Encounters Global Terrorism

Rapid increase in acts of terrorism initially took the democracies by surprise no one could have predicted that there would be such an increase in scale of terrorism. For the states concerned, terrorism poses costly problems of security, protecting political leaders, embassies, leading figures, buildings and airports that might serves as targets. The government of United States has devoted a

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[23] Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 182 (second ed. 1986), The International Law Association states that terrorism is international, despite its having been committed "within the jurisdiction of one country," when it is committed "against any foreign government or international organization, or any representative there of ," or " against any national of a foreign country," or "by a person who crosses an international frontier into another country from which is extradition is requested," see ILA, Report of the Sixty-First Conference (1984) p. 6-7

considerable amount of energy to the issue of international terrorism, adopting various measures to counter terrorism.

With the stunning massacre at Lod Airport and the brutal slayings during the Olympics at Munich in 1972, terrorism, with all its ramifications, became more apparent throughout the world and US policy against terrorist first took shape.

On September 22, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State, William Rogers, establishing the Cabinet Committee to combat terrorism. The committee was to be chaired by Secretary of State,[24] Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies were "to cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its functions under this directives and they shall comply with the policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the Cabinet Committee."[25]

The first meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on October 2, 1972. The committee agreed that the initiatives already taken to address the problem of terrorism were realistic ways to respond to

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[24] *U.S. Department of State, Bulletin*, V.LXVII, No. 1739 October 1972, p. 475
[25] Ibid

the widespread threat.[26] In addition it was also decided that new initiatives should be made to the International Civil Aviation Organization; increased efforts to share intelligence among nations should be fostered; the U.N. Ambassador should push for the adoption of a draft convention to hinder terrorist activity; and lastly the working group was to begin immediately to develop contingency plans in anticipation of terrorist acts. Armin H. Meyer, the former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, was nominated and approved as states' Special Assistant and coordinator to combat terrorism.[27]

Due to inactivity of The Cabinet Committee the Carter administration decided to formulate a more responsive policy to the threat of terrorism. The original committee was abolished in 1977. Pursuant to Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) No. 30, the federal government's response to domestic and international terrorism was reorganized under the aegis of the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council.[28]

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[26] Ibid

[27] See, n. 24, p. 477. The Committee did not meet again. "In the five years of existence the committee accomplished little towards fulfilling its mandate." See U.S. Congress, House Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism. Staff Report, Sub-committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 95th Congress session, December 1978, p.6

[28] Executive Committee on Terrorism, The United States Government Anti-Terrorist Program, (Washington : National Security Council ; June 1979), p.7

President Carter revised the way National Security Council handled terrorism, and also the way the National Security Council itself functioned. He established two major policy organs, the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee.

These developments demonstrate the continuity of concern about international terrorism on the part of United States. Hostage crisis in Tehran in 1979 did untold physical damage to America's morale and international credibility.[29] Reaction to perceived American inadequacies in coping with the Iranian crisis markedly assisted the election of Reagan to the Presidency in 1981.[30] The new administration began its work by declaring that combating international terrorism was one of its major priorities. Public awareness and concern increased. In mid 1982, circumstances began to change with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This was followed later in the year by American military involvement in the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and then as part of the multinational force.[31] After bomb explosion in the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1982 terrorism moved on to center stage in terms of attention from the U.S. government. It marked a watershed

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[29] The hostage crisis became a milestone around President Carter's rule.
[30] G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism, (First edn. 1990), p.234.

[31] U.S. Secratory of State, Shultz view the deployment as a means of obtaining an Israeli withdrawal and restoration of stability in Lebanon.

is the US policy in response to terrorism. Increased emphasis was placed on the governmental counter - terrorism infrastructure.[32]

During first year of President Reagan's Administration an organizational structure for crisis management was established with a group chaired by Vice- President and supporters by inter agency working groups.[33]

In April 1982, the President refined specific Lead Agency responsibilities for coordination of the Federal response to terrorist incidents:

• Department of State-incidents that take place within U.S. territory.

• Department of Justice, essentially The Federal Bureau of Investigation that take place within US territory.

• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-- incidents aboard aircraft that take place within the special jurisdiction of the United States.

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[32] Ibid.
[33] Neil C. Livingston, Jerel E. Arnold ed., Fighting back: Winning the War Against Terrorism, (Lexington, M.A. : D.C. Herth and Co., 1986), p. 252.

In addition to the Lead Agency responsibilities, a number of interagency groups to facilitate coordination were established, including the inter – departmental group on terrorism, to develop and coordinate overall U.S. policy on terrorism chaired by the Department of State. The group was expected to meet frequently to deal with issues such as international cooperation, research and development, legislation, public diplomacy, training programms and anti-terrorist exercises.[34]

Terrorist activities; more specifically, anti-U.S. terrorist activities showed a major spurt from the early 1980s the trend continued during the Presidency of George H. Bush.

The Bush presidency stressed the key role played by U.S. government in providing "vigorous international" response to modern terrorism. Arguing that the problems of terrorism are global in its ramification, the administration pointed out the various elements in developing a counter terrorism strategy. The basic elements of which were, namely, firmness towards terrorist, make state sponsors of terrorism pay, program of action to bring terrorists to justice and the State Department sponsored Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance Program for law enforcement officials of the world.

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[34] Report of The Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, February 1986, p.8.

The main emphasis was on executive responsibility towards solving the problem of terrorism. The emphasis was amplified by some policy decision. For instance the "War on Drugs" policy of the Bush administration had wider implications of containment of terrorism.

Terrorist activities which were showing a decline in 1980s ascended sharply by 1993. Terrorism made the headlines throughout 1993--the World Trade Center bombing in February, the failed Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait in April and numerous coordinated attack by the Kurdistan workers party throughout Western Europe on two separate dates in June and November.

The Clinton administration essentially focussed on the centrality of terrorism as a global issue. Outlining the focus of U.S. "counter-terrorism policy" for more than a decade, the administration argued that terrorism was both "deadly" and "persistent" and was "an issue that will remain with us for quite some time."[35]

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[35] U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1993 (Washington, D.C. : USG PO, April 1994), p.1.

The United States under the Clinton administration stressed that implementing a strict counter terrorism policy was the best way to reduce the global terrorist threat. Addressing the United Nation General Assembly, Clinton urged the world nations to meet the challenge posed by terrorism with "serious, deliberate, disciplined concern and effective cooperation."[36] Clinton also said that the possibility that terrorists would threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction could not be met with complacency. "Nor can it be met with panic."[37]

The Clinton administration has sought to increase the use of extradition as a counter terrorism tool. It is engaged in an active programme of negotiating new policies and updating extradition treaties with nations around the world. At the end of the year 1996, five new extradition treaties were pending before the U.S. Senate for advice and consent of ramification and nearly twenty others were at various stages of negotiation.[38]

In response to the November 1995 bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Secretary Perry established the Anti Terrorism Task Force. The Task Force was directed to develop a plan of action to

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[36] *Times of India* (New Delhi) September 22,1999.
[37] Ibid.
[38] See n. 35

eliminate complacency and significantly enhance the security of

Department of Defense and its associated facilities and personnel

world wide. The Task Force forwarded twenty-two major initiatives

and recommendations to Secretary Perry, who approved an

implementation plan on July 15, 1996. The more recent Dowing

Report, which examined the June 1996 bombing of Khoban Towers,

produced a second set of recommendation. These have

fundamentally changed the way Department of Defense does

business with regard to anti-terrorism.[39]

In recognition of the changing nature of the terrorist threat

Department of Defense on August 27, 1996, established the Anti-

Terrorism Coordinating Committee.[40] The committee meets monthly

or as needed. Its purpose is to identify issues that affect force

protection, exchange ideas and information and develop policy

recommendations. It also serves a valuable function by providing a

synergism that enhances the effectiveness of Department of

Defense anti- terrorism planning.

President Bill Clinton appointed a national coordinator for security

infrastructure protection and counter terrorism in May 1998 to

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[39] 'Responding to Terrorism', Chapter 9 of the *U.S. Department of Defense 1997 Annual Defense Report.*
[40] Ibid

"bring the full force of all our resources to bear swiftly and effectively."[41]

A variety of counter terrorist programms have been tried over the years by United States with mixed success. Although the number of incidents has not declined, the progress of United States has been substantial in encountering global terrorism. The counter terrorist policy of United States, therefore, can be summarized into three general rules:

- First, make no deals with terrorists and do not submit to blackmail.

- Second, treat Terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law.

- Third, apply maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions, and by urging other states to do likewise.[42]

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[41] Ashton Carter, 'Catastrophic Terrorism : Tackling the New Danger,' *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 1998

[42] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*,1996

CHAPTER III

MEDIA REPORTING ON TERRORISM IN EAST

AFRICA

The Media is an indispensable communications link of the modern society, through its various forms media serves economic, social and political interests in the collection and dissemination of information[1]. In the nineteenth century anarchists hoped to use press coverage of bombings and assassinations to stir up public support and make governments appear incompetent. They taught a very important lesson to their successors, that news can be an unintentional friend to terrorism. Publicity served many purposes: to attract new recruits for the cause; to persuade the public that the government could not protect them; to frighten the leadership, perhaps into using unpopular anti-terrorism measures, and ultimately, to provoke disorder and revolution. Modern terrorists exploit the news industry that now includes not only print but also electronic media. The electronic media can reach a vast audience

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[1] M. Cherif Bassiouni, Problems in media coverage of non-state sponsored terror violence incidents in Lawrence Zelic Freedman and Yonah Alexander ed., Perspectives on Terrorism. (Delhi : Hindustan Publishing Corporation 1995), p. 177.

almost instantaneously, and satellites make live coverage possible

almost anywhere in the world.[2]

The media has come to serve willingly or unwillingly the purpose

of those who engage in terror plus violence. This fact was

described by the National Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism,

in the following manner:

> Acts of terrorism have gained immediacy and diffusion
>
> through television, which conveys the terrorist message
>
> to millions worldwide. The modern terrorist has been
>
> quick to exploit the medium in a way that shows
>
> government as a poor rival. Formerly in countries where
>
> free speech and communication were jealously guarded
>
> rights, it would have been unthinkable for violent
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> subversives to have seized control of the organs of mass
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> communications. Today it is the commonplace
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> consequences of terrorist action. In many ways, the
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> modern terrorist is a very creation of the mass media. He

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2   Donna M. Schlagheck, _International Terrorism : An introduction to concepts and Actors._
    (Lexington Book Library of Congress cataloging in public data) 1988.
[3] National Advisory Committee on criminal justice standards and goals, reports of the Task Force on
    Disorders and Terrorism 9(1976) (hereafter cited as Disorders and Terrorism)

has been magnified, enlarged beyond his own powers by others.[3]

Television news today has the ability to broadcast live virtually any major development in the world, and the tendency to then discuss the situation to death. It would thus be easy to forget that there was once a time in the early history of the medium when it was actually criticized for not covering and discussing enough news. The satellite technology has brought round the clock coverage of revolutions, hijacking, bombings and other fast-breaking events. Television has come full circle from its infancy - "The golden age of television"[4] as the 1950s are now remembered when there was a plethora of live dramatic and comedy shows but scarcity of news programms and interviews. One of the last remnants of "Live" television programming today is the news which adds to its importance for the viewers. Live news coverage of events gives the viewers a sense of being there, with the added interest of not quite knowing the ultimate outcome. Television news today also provides for global look-ups of the "talking heads", the so called commentators and experts who can be

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[4] Jeffrey D. Simon, The terrorist trap: America's experience with terrorism, (Indianapolis: University Press, 1994), p. 261

routinely rounded up to offer instant analysis on whatever issue

may arise.⁵

[It is not just television news that provides extensive coverage of

events and continual commentary about terrorists. Journalists have

skillfully used the technological breakthroughs that have brought

into existence personal laptop computers, portable telephones and

fax machines to file a report from virtually anywhere and get it

printed in the next newspaper edition. Radio including the short

wave stations that can transmit programs from one country to

several other throughout the world, and the numerous current event

magazines and newsletters are additional aspects of this global

news village. While most forms of mass media have the capability

to follow a terrorist episode from beginning to end, capturing the

public's interest, it is television in particular that allows for a

vicarious experience. Viewers can watch the dramatic moments of a

hijacking or hostage episode without ever having to leave their

living rooms. Infact as one commentator pointed out, when

television stations used the title "America held hostage" to present

their reports on the 1979-81 Iran hostage crisis, they could just

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⁵ Ibid: p. 262. See also, A. Odasuo Alte and Kenoye Kelvin Eke, (eds.), <u>Media Coverage of Terrorism</u>
<u>Methods of Diffusion</u>, (New Bury Park: Sage publications. 1991)

have been referring to millions of Americans who were riveted to their television sets as the crisis unfolded.[6]

/The first disruptive terrorist event shown on live television was the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. It was believed that the Black September (the terrorist group that carried out the massacre) timed their attack to coincide with the world wide media coverage guaranteed for the Olympics.[7] Had that hostage seizure and killing occurred anywhere else in the world, it is doubtful that the media would have been able to provide the coverage that it did. Terrorism was ahead of television technology at this time. In those days the news teams could not be put in place, like today, to cover a hot spot virtually anywhere, like a rapid deployment military force. But during the Olympics everything for a complete media perspective was already in place. The latest television equipments and the cameras were already on the scene, as were the hundreds of reporters from all over the world. The global sporting event was instantaneously transformed into a global terrorist event -- Terrorism and the media would never be the same again.[8]

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[6] Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media, (New York: Columbia university press. 1994), pp. 28-29.

[7] Michael Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism, (Chicago: The university of Chicago press. 1993), p.46

[8] Jeffery D. Simon, refer no. 4, p. 264

Publicizing terrorist attacks, especially hostage-taking incidents in which the captors hold press conferences, give terrorists a platform to address a wide audience. From that platform terrorists can promote their cause, air their grievances, curry sympathy, publicize their demands and recruit new followers. The propaganda war and the impact of the media could be gauged when Islamic fundamentalist seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, and held America hostage for more then 444 days. The chant of 'Death to America' was a made to order situation for a match between terrorism and the media technology. The nightly flash of camera bulbs, beaming images live into people's homes and militants holding anti-US demonstrations for the benefit of the camera hit home the message of importance of the media.[9]

Getting the attention of mass media, apart from the public and the decision-makers has been the *raison d' etre* behind modern terrorism increasingly shocking violence. Some observers argue that by resorting to ever more spectacular, brutal deeds and thereby, heightening the threshold of violence, terrorists are assured a substantial press coverage and public attention. Further

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[9] A.P. Schmid., Terrorism and the Media: The ethics of Publicity, Terrorism and Political violence, (London), volume 1, no. 4, October 1989, p. 564
[10] Donna M. Schlagheck, refer no. 2, p 67

more, it is felt that through the mass media, international terrorists gain access to the public at large and to decision-makers in their target society. Because the 'so called' free press is the "primary conduit connecting terrorists, the public and governments."[10]

Violent incidents may well advance the terrorist's goals only if these kinds of incidents are widely reported. For this reason the press is frequently accused of providing terrorists their 'lifeblood' or 'oxygen' in the form of publicity.[11] Some observers argue that if the media were to deny such coverage 'terrorism would case to exist'[12].

According to some critics, for news networks, access to a terrorist is a hot story and is usually treated as such.[13] It has also been suggested that the press and especially television unwittingly bestows respectability and perhaps even a hint of legitimacy upon terrorists simply by interviewing them, since 'the process of interviewing some one, whether he is a terrorist or a government official or foreign diplomat, is essentially the same process.' The mere fact that the terrorist is interviewed by respected media

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[11] Former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in *New York Times*, June 16, 1986
[12] John O' Sullivan, Media publicity causes Terrorism, in Bonnie Szunsk. ed., Terrorism: opposing viewpoints (St. Paul: Green Haeven Press, 1986), p. 70

representatives and treated 'as someone whose contribution to the public debate is worthy of attention elevates the person virtually to the level of a legitimate politician.'[14] It has also been pointed out that from a terrorist perspective, an unedited interview with a major figure is a treasured prize, for instance, the may 1997 *CNN* interview with Saudi dissident, terrorist recruiter and financier Osama bin Laden, in which he openly ' threatened Washington, saying that he would strike until U.S. forces are withdrawn from Islam's holiest shrines. He told the reporters, the U.S. should "leave Saudi Arabia or die."[15] On September 26, 1990, for example, during Persian Gulf conflict, Dr George Habash of the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was reportedly interviewed by Ted Koppel on *American Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC)* 'Night Line' programme. Habash used the opportunity to repeat and expand on his previously reported threats of violence against Americans in case of military actions by the United States. The same applied to the many press conferences and interviews that Nabih Berri granted during the TWA hijacking crisis. In his message to the U.S. administration, the Israeli

[13] Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, trends, and options for policymakers. (Washington, D.C. Congressional research service, October 22,1997) p.2

[14] John O' Sullivan, refer no. 12, p.73

[15] *News week*, Agust 24, 1998. Bin Laden has long been suspected by American sources of involvement in terrorist attacks on American targets, including car bomb in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; in 1995 that killed five Americans, and the bombing of the Khobar Housing Complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996 in which 19 U.S. Service personnel died. He is also accused to be the mastermind behind U.S. Embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998.

government, and the public Berri insisted that the demands of the hijackers, for whom he negotiated, had to be met. This incident was placed on media center stage and Nabih Berri achieved instant stardom.[16]

*Terrorists target the citizens and calculate that these immediate victims are sure means to get the attention of the mass media, the public and policy makers in their target country. Contemporary terrorists are sophisticated enough to understand that decision-makers in liberal democracies cannot and do not ignore press coverage and public opinion. It is for this reason that they try to exercise influence over targeted officials or nations through intimidation. By bombing an installation, or by taking hostages for several days, terrorists achieve what is for them invaluable status and media helps them attain that status.[17]

Apart from general publicity for their cause, terrorist organizations often have specific requirements when using the mass media. First, they are anxious to ensure that maximum number of people find out about their actions. This has the desirable effect, from the

[16] Jeffrey D. Simon , refer no. 4

[17] Paul Wilkinson, The Media and International Terrorism, in Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (ed.), Encyclopedia of World Terrorism Vol. 3 (Armank N.Y. ME. Sharpe Inc. 1997), p. 675.

terrorist's point of view, of creating fear among their target audience.

Second, they want to mobilize wider support for their cause among the general population, at home and abroad, by emphasizing the righteousness of their cause.

Third, terrorists aim to disrupt the security forces publicity for a successful terrorist attack helps prove in aptitude of the security forces.

Finally, terrorists use publicity to boost their actual and potential supporters, to increase recruitment, to raise more funds, and to inspire further terrorist initiatives.[18]

But we cannot totally discredit media for these reasons. They do what comes naturally, covering the unusual, the dramatic and the terrorists exploit this to get their message out. In some cases media becomes an unintentional and unwilling amplifier of the terrorist's publicity campaign because the media wants to protect society's right to know, and construes this liberally to include popular and dramatic coverage, e.g., airing emotional reactions of victims, family members, witnesses, and 'people on the street', as well as

information withheld by law enforcement; security, and other

organs of the government. There is a crucial and legitimate role for

the media to play in the national security sphere, the challenge

remains for it to maintain public pressure on the government to

devise the most effective strategy against terrorism. Since the Iran

hostage crisis, the media have constructively carried out this role

while checking the CIA's and the executive branch's abuse of their

authority.[19],

The early 1980s were filled with major terrorist episodes that made

instant headlines and top television news stories, including

bombings of the U.S. Embassy annex buildings and the Marine

barracks in Beirut. The media provided extensive coverage. A

pattern to news coverage of terrorism began to emerge. When the

hijacking hostage episode involving Americans occurred in June

1985, (hijacking of TWA Boeing 727 Flight 847) from Athens to

Beirut, the media demonstrated how far they had come since the

day of the popular front or the Liberation of Palestine hijacking in

Jordan in September 1970.[20] Compared to that multiplan seizure

and blowing up of aircraft on the ground, the hijacking of TWA

Flight 847 was far less dramatic. However, now television

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[18] Ibid; p. 675.

[19] John P. Wallach, Leaders, Terrorists, Policymakers, and the Press, in Simon Serfety (ed.), The Media and Foreign Policy (New York; St Martins Press, 1990) p. 92.

[20] New York Times, 15 June, 1985.

technology was ahead of the terrorists and able to take a rather ordinary hijacking and transform it into one of the major media spectacles of the decade.[21]

The TWA hostage crisis in the summer of 1985 received massive media attention for two weeks, the three major television networks devoted 65 percent of their news coverage to the incident and the most prestigious newspaper, e.g., *Los Angeles Times, The New York Times* and *Washington Post*, 30 percent of their main sections.[22] A study concluded that while the terrorists received considerable attention and had their causes and grievances reported, 'they had only limited success in gaining coverage that might have helped their efforts to gain respectability and legitimacy.'[23] The intense competition for a story, however, produces unedited coverage (e.g., The Beirut Airport press conference held by the skyjackers of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985) and headlines coverage giving terrorists the spotlight they desire. The hijackers apparently understood the value of American news sources. For the American media and for their own purpose they frequently made the hostages available for television interviews or provided information about their captives. *ABC*'s coverage of the event drew a lot of criticism. The seventeen

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[21] David L. Paletz, Alex P. Schmid (ed.), Terrorism and the Media, (New Burg Park, California : Sage Publications Inc, 1992), p. 17.
[22] Nacos Fan and Young, Terrorism and the Print Media, quoted in Josebern Zuluika, William A. Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism.

days of the ordeal reports about the TWA situation were the lead story on the *Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)* Evening News sixteen times.[24]

On October 7, 1985, four Palestinian terrorists sized control of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro while on sea near Alexandria, Egypt, threatening to kill passengers, the terrorists forced the crew to sail towards Syria. On the second day of the hijacking, Leon Klinghoffer, a 69 year old wheelchair bound New Yorker and Jew, was shot in the head and thrown into the sea.[25] The terrorist aboard the ship certainly understood how to secure attention. The fifty largest circulation American Newspapers became intensely preoccupied with the event. As many as 43 newspapers editorialized on the issue, only five did not comment editorially, the remaining two dailies were on strike.[26]

A number of U.S news organizations including *United Press International* (UPI), the *Chicago Sun Times*, and the *Columbia Broadcasting System* (CBS), independently drafted guidelines for the coverage of terrorist incidents and hostage taking. These agencies developed policies to the effect that they would avoid

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[23] David L. Paletz, Alex P. Schmid (ed.), refer no. 21, p. 19.

[24] Brigitte L. Nacos, refer no. 6, p. 31.
[25] *New York Times*, 8 October 1985. See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 144-145.
[26] Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, The Media and International Terrorism, (New York, Longman Publishing Group, 1994), p. 64.

providing an excessive platform for terrorists that they would not provide live coverage of terrorism, and that coverage would not sensationalize a story beyond the fact of its being sensational.[27]

Washington drafted out its own techniques for dealing with the terrorist publicity problems. Rather than using censorship or news blackouts, the Carter and Reagan administrations employed misdirection and misinformation techniques to ease the burden of publicity and public pressure during the terrorist crisis. For example, two major hostage-terrorism problems, the 1979-81 occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the multiple kidnapping of Americans in Beirut (following the Israeli incursion in 1982). The Carter administration repeatedly stated its commitment to negotiate the hostages' release and the President's rejection of any violent measures that might endanger the safety of the fifty-four Americans being held in Tehran. While the demands took place and the administration negotiated with Iran, a rescue mission was planned and carried out (unsuccessfully). Similarly, the Reagan administration was publicly committed to a policy of 'no deals with terrorists,' while it secretly shipped weapons and

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[27] Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter (ed.), Terrorism and the Media, (Washington D.C., Brassey's U.S. Inc. 1990), p. 43-44.

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spare parts to Iran in exchange for the release of Americans held by pro-Iranian Shi'ite groups in Beirut.[28]

The misdirection of public media attention per se was not denounced, but the Reagan administration's disinformation campaign did provoke a hostile reaction from the news media.

Presidency of Bill Clinton did not remain untouched by the prevailing terrorism scare. Clinton had barely settled into his presidency when the World Trade Center explosion in 1993, shocked the nation. President assured the nation that the government was doing everything in its power to keep Americans safe at home. But inspite, of his and other officials seemingly calm demeanor, the White House was reportedly 'jittery' and 'far more shaken than it had publicly let on.'[29]

A few years later, The Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, hit headlines, both in the national and local media coverage owing to its devastating effects. The *New York Times* had its front page dedicated to this incident the very next day and almost all Television and Radio stations in and around the city covered this issue. Media coverage of this incident marked by non stop

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[28] Donna M. Schlagheck, refer no. 2.

reporting about the disaster and its victims, the dramatic rescue efforts, and other aspects reveals the high degree of media sensitivity to this subject.[30]

The sensationalism that surrounds terrorism and the news media coverage it receives is also a device manipulated by terrorists. Terrorists acts like bombing are one of the necessary elements to attract media attention. This correlation illustrates the symbiotic relationship between 'terrorism' and the media: the 'terrorists' rely on media to further their terror-inspiring goals, and the media utilize the terrorists' acts as necessary or rewarding news items.[31] It is not only media and terrorism but also the media and their audience who seen to have an appetite for 'new' news and sensational news. For example, another act of terrorism directed against U.S. that immediately attracted a lot of media and global attention and created varied public opinion is the bombing of U.S. Embassies in East Africa-Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998.

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[29] Russell Watson et. al., 'The Hunt Begins', *Newsweek*, March 8, 1993, pp. 22-26; Bill Jurque et. al., 'A Break in the Blast'; *Newsweek*, March 15, 1993, pp. 28-31.

[30] *New York Times*, 20 April, 1995, pp 1 and 23

[31] M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Prolegomenon to Terror Violence,' *Creighton Law Review* 12:745, 760. Dr. Frederic Hacker, a California Psychiatrist with experience as a terrorism negotiator and a contributor to this volume, has remarked: "If the mass media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent them. In turn, the mass media hanker after terroristic acts because they fit into their programming needs; namely sudden acts of great excitement that are susceptible, presumably, of quick solution. So there is a mutual dependency." Hickey, "Terrorism and Television," T.V. Guide, 31 July 1976, Walter Laqueur has called the media the "terrorist's best friend." Ibid.

The local news media as well as the international media covered the story initially in almost similar manner. Most news coverage carried the story that a small pick up truck packed with explosives drove up to the delivery entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, where vehicle occupants kill several guards with a grenade, then trigger the bomb act 10:35 am (3:35 am EDT). The blast collapsed the adjacent Ufundi Cooperative Building and destroyed the left and the rear side of Embassy. Minutes later bomb hidden in a vehicle that pulls up to the main gate of the U.S. Embassy in Dares Salaam, Tanzania explodes, tearing off the east wing of the concrete block building and raining debris on the streets and houses for nearly a mile in every direction. The two attacks killed 224 people (most of those in Nairobi) and injured about 5,000. No immediate claim of responsibility was made, but suspicion initially focuses on the Egyptian-al-Jihad (also known as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), which had made threats against American installations before the bombings.

Washington Post reported the very next day of the bombing that 'powerful terrorist car bombs exploded just minutes apart outside U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania yesterday, killing at least 81 people including eight Americans and injuring more than 1,600. The authorities said they fear the death toll could rise much

higher'.[32] U.S. disaster relief units and anti-terrorism specialists were rushed to the two East African capitals. It was also reported that President Clinton interrupted a bill signing ceremony in the White House Rose Garden to condemn what he called "The cowardly attacks."[33] In his released statement the President said that "these acts of terrorists violence are abhorrent; they are in human."[34] The President uttered a grim, public warning to the terrorists "we will use all the means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how long its takes."[35]

Pictures of the disaster were also sprawled all over the local and international newspapers and television the next day. Some of the articles carried the news in a melodramatic way. For example, *Time* reported "when terror strikes, it always tears through the comforting screen of normality. One moment, mid-morning shoppers and workers bustle along Nairobi's Haile Selassie Avenue at the downtown corner where a bronze eagle and a fluttering flag mark the five-story U.S. Embassy. The next, the earth trembles as a thunderclap unleashes a mighty shock wave. Seconds later, black smoke plumes into the sky as the tarmac ignites, flashing fire to .

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[32] *Washington Post*, August 8, 1998; p. A01; http://www.washingtonpost.com
[33] Ibid.
[34] Remarks by the President, Rose Garden; The White House Office of the Press Secretary, August 7, 1998.
[35] Terror in Africa, *Time*, August 17, 1998.
[36] *Time*, August 17, 1998, pp. 32

parked cars and passing buses, the blast shatters every window within a 400 meter radius into lethal silvers, blows the bombproof doors off the embassy, sucks out ceiling and furniture and people, pancakes a seven-story building next door into a mountain of rubble. Thousands of innocent people are injured, and more than hundred die, including eleven Americans."[36]

According to *BBC* reports, the blast in Kenya occurred shortly after U.S. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell met with Kenyan Trade Minister Joseph Kamotho at the nearby Cooperative Bank. The cooperative building located between the trade center and the Embassy was completely leveled.[37]

CNN reported that in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the explosion left a large crater outside of the American Embassy. An eyewitness at the scene said in an interview with *CNN* that he thought that the bomb had been placed near the Southwest corner of the building. "The people at the front of the building didn't stand a chance," he said.[38]

There were no immediate reports of evidence linking the attacks to any particular group but gradually the attack was linked to different groups by different media sources. For example, a claim

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[37] *BBC*, August 7, 1998 also see *Times of India*, New Delhi August 8, 1998.

[38] *CNN,*, August 7, 1998.

of responsibility was reported to have been made through telephone to the Arabic-Language newspaper *Al-Hayat* in London, cited a previously unknown group the Liberation Army of the Islamic Sanctuaries. But it did not say where the group was based, describe its nature or give the nationalities of its members.[39]

Constance Freeman, an expert on African Affairs, interviewed on the *BBC*, said "It is not clear what sort of local situation could have led to (the attack)-- The latest speculation leads to the fact that it has something to do with Iraq, or some other Middle Eastern group."[40]

Radio Monte Carlo mentioned that the "Islamic Jihad" had also threatened to attack U.S. interests.[41]

The Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* reported that a man in contact with Israeli intelligence warned the United States that its Embassy in Kenya might be the target of a bombing shortly before the attack occurred. However, Israeli intelligence told the Americans not to put too much faith in the man's report and it should be taken with 'a grain of salt.'[42]

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[39] *Washington Post*, refer no. 32, also see, Newsweek, August 17, 1998; pp. 26.
[40] *BBC News*; 7 August 1998.
[41] *Radio Monte Carlo*; Israel Radio, August 7, 1998.

It was also argued that perhaps the attacks were an act of revenge by a Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, *Washington Post* reported in support of the argument. 'In June 1998 a raid was conducted by security personnel from the United States and Albania in Tirana against an alleged cell of an Islamic terrorist organization. The Albanians arrested two suspected employees of Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, and the Americans took custody of a van load of documents and computer gear. A possible connection between this event and bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania has provoked American officials to begin investigation whether the attack might have been an act of revenge by Bin Laden's organization for the CIA's role in the arrest of four of its alleged members in Albania.[43]

Al-Hayat, a newspaper owned by Saudies and widely read throughout the Middle East, also reported in support of the argument that Islamic Jihad had vowed to strike against America interests.

But other possibilities were not ruled out, as reported in *Time*, the U.S. counter terrorism officials were not ruling any one out. 'The

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[42] *Ha'aretz*, August 12, 1998.

bombers could be Kenyans or Tanzanians with a grudge against the U.S., outside terrorists from around the globe, or a combination of two. The bombing could be the work of an enemy state, an organized fringe group or fanatic individuals.'[44]

Morris Busby, former Director of the State Department's counter-terrorism office and other Intelligence experts believed the operation had to be 'professionally' planned to get two powerful car bombs into both cities and parked near the Embassies, and to explode them almost in tandem.[45]

News about claiming the responsibility of the attack came in soon. *Washington Post*, for instance, reported that "Three Islamic Extremist Organizations have so far taken responsibility for the two bombings on Friday. August 7, 1998 in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. All these are previously unknown names in the Islamic Extremist arena. These names may well cover names whose purpose is to mislead investigations, alternately; they may be aliases used as a consequence of rivalry between various groups. The three names are 'Al-Aqsa Group' (Jama at al-Aqsa), The Meccan Group (Jama 'at Makkah), and, 'the Liberation Army of Islamic Sanctuaries (Jaysh

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[43] *Washington Post*, August 12, 1998.
[44] *Time*, August 17, 1998; pp. 35.

[45] Ibid.

Tahriral-Muqaddar-al-Islamiyyah). All these claims of responsibility were made via anonymous phone calls."[46]

Although various groups were linked with the attack but highest on the U.S. list is Saudi renegade millionaire Osama bin Laden. Over the past years he has issued a number of decrees, calling on all Muslim groups to attack U.S. facilities. Bin Laden is thought to be a major financier of terror groups and is the prime suspect in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. service men.[47] While his declared goal is the overthrow of Saudi monarch, Bin Laden's bitterness towards the U.S. is just as strong. "All Muslims," he said in May 1997, "must declare jihad against them (Americans)."[48]

In an interview with *ABC* news earlier in 1998 from his camp in Afghanistan Bin Laden spewed hatred for Americans. He said, " We believe that the biggest thieves in the world are the Americans. The only way for us to defend these assaults is to use similar means." He had also issued a handful of fatwas, or religious instructions urging attacks against U.S. interests not just in Muslim areas but

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[46] *Washington Post*, August 9, 1998.

[47] *Newsweek*, August 17, 1998.
[48] *Time*, August 17, 1998.

also, anywhere in the world.[49] But these threats were not taken seriously because, such general threats do not help U.S. intelligence officials sort through the 30,000 they receive each year, to pick out the real warnings.[50]

In another interview to *ABC* news after the bombing incidents, Osama bin Laden denied that he was the mastermind behind the embassy bombings. "I heard about the bombings the same way everyone else heard about them, from the television or radio. I did not order them but was glad for what happened to the Americans there, (the bombings) were Islamic revenge on American spies in East Africa."[51]

According to *Time* reports on being asked if he was responsible for the bombings Osama said that "Our job is to instigate and by the grace of God, we did that and certain people responded to this instigation."[52]

United States government, on the other hand, maintain that it has proof that Osama bin Laden was behind the Embassy bombings.

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[49] *Newsweek*, August 17, 1998, pp. 28.

[50] *Washington Post*, refer no. 32.When asked about the reported threats, Pickering said the State Department gets about 30,000 threats a year and treats them 'all as extremely important.'
[51] *Newsweek*, January 11, 1999. Bin Laden on December 22, 1998 spoke for more than two hours with Ismail a Palestinian journalist, who provided Newsweek with the transcript.
[52] *Time*,January 11, 1999, pp. 16.

Newsday reported, that a relatively low-level associate of Bin Laden may have been identified by an embassy guard as having been in the truck carrying the bomb in Nairobi.[53]

A massive investigation by the CIA, FBI and other agencies, was carried out; investigators formally accused Osama bin Laden and his followers of planning and executing the blasts.[54]

A terrorist is a criminal who seeks publicity. It is their lifeblood. If the media were not to report terrorist acts and to explain their political and social significance, terrorism as such would cease to exist. Media finds terrorism a sensational news story and are therefore inclined at first to over report it, to write admiringly of the terrorists' 'daring', even while morally condemning them and to exaggerate their significance. The media exploit terrorism as a good story as is apparent from the example of Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

Osama bin Laden's interviews prove that media unwittingly assisted terrorists spread an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in society; it

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[53] *Time,* August 24, 1998, pp. 36.
[54] Tim Ito, 'Twenty years of Anti American Terror'; *Washington Post Staff Writer*, April 30, 1999. http://www.washingtonpost.com

provided him an opportunity to argue his case to the wider public;

and they bestow an undeserved legitimacy on him.

CHAPTER IV

MEDIA AND U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN SUDAN

In the previous chapter we discussed the bombing of U.S Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 and the media coverage of the incident. In this chapter a discussion on U.S. missile attack on Sudan and Afghanistan has been attempted which it said was in retaliation to the Embassy bombings. A detail account of the role of media played in covering the attacks and its impact on the public is also recorded. Media have the ability to set the public agenda and to influence the relative importance of any issue in the public mind. Public opinion largely depends upon how media defines important issues around which the individual can formulate an opinion. Mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about.[1] We will also discuss with the help of extensive media coverage and global reaction if U.S. was "justified" in retaliating in the manner it did and also is use of force "justified" in dealing with acts of terrorism. We will mainly look at the editorials of leading newspapers and television interviews and coverage.

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[1] Maxwell Mc Combs and Donald Shaw, The emergence of American political issues. The Agenda-setting Function of the Press, (West, St. Paul, 1977), p.5

In responding to the need to maintain security for its people, the

U.S. government has attempted to come to grips with the problem

of terrorism. There are several aspects of the phenomenon that

make this task difficult. Terrorism is not a constant; it waxes and

wanes, often the characteristics of a terrorist act are idiosyncratic,

taking on the peculiarities of a particular group, geographic area or

manner of execution. The people of a nation deserve protection and

demand it when it is found lacking. Yet, an action by the

government that is effective in countering hijacking may have no

effect on reducing the incidents of bombing or kidnapping. The

government must respond to the many aspects of a problem

contained under the label -- 'terrorism'.[2]

The options for combating and suppressing terrorism can be

visualized as a continuum of response moving from stoicism, static

defensive measures, and diplomatic initiatives at one pole to the

use of force options at the opposite end of the spectrum. Hugh

Tovar, has argued that force should be used "whenever we judge

that it is justified and feasible" and not simply as the last resort.

Although United States should be free to consider armed strikes

against terrorists at any time, never the less every feasible and

effective option short of force should be explored before crossing

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[2] Farrell William Regis, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of a Effective Strategy, (West View Press Inc. 982), p. 69.

the force threshold. The operative term here is 'effective'. If the only effective response is force, then the liberal democracies of the west should not shrink from using force to protect their interests, citizens and property.[3] But the questions remain whether use of force is 'justified' in such situations, for example, were the cruise missile attacks by U.S. justified against Afghanistan and Sudan on August 20, 1998 in retaliation to August 7, 1998 bombings of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. And, would such measures do any good in the war on terrorism?

Force is deterrent to terrorism. The resort to force by a democratic society is a difficult and usually reluctantly reached decision because democratic societies (U.S. being one of them) want to solve international problems by diplomacy and recourse to other legal devices rather than by force "However, the threat posed by international terrorism and its patrons is so serious that there is a need by the liberal democracies of the west to protect their moral order and values with the judicious use of force."[4] In this connection proactive responses to terrorism can be classified into three categories: Reprisal Preemption and Retribution. These there

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[3] Neil C. Livingstone, Proactive Response to Terrorism : Reprisals, Preemption and Retribution, in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., (ed.), International Terrorism : Characteristics, Causes, Controls (1990), p. 219.
[4] Ibid.

forms of responses have a legal justification under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.[5] If we can define terrorism as a form of aggression especially when promoted by foreign government, we may adopt and employ proactive measures.

Preemption: It can be defined as striking advance of hostile action to prevent its occurrence and to avoid suffering injury.[6] It amounts to a response without a prior illegal action. It is applied to protect, designed to prevent a terrorist attach from being carried out and thus to avoid related deaths, injuries and destruction.[7]

Retribution: Retribution campaign hold out the promise of more vigorous repressive measures that may yield long-term results. These campaigns involve a shadow war against the political infrastructure of an opponent. A force should be created capable of taking the offensive against international terrorism.[8]

Reprisals: Reprisals are defined as coercive measures directed by a state against another state in response to illegal acts of the latter for the purpose of obtaining, either directly or indirectly,

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[5] Article 51 of the Charter provides for individual or collective self-defense.

[6] Neil C. Livingstone, Proactive Response to Terrorism : Reprisals, Preemption and Retributions, in Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell C. Arnold (eds.), Fighting Back : Winning the War Against Terrorism (1986).

[7] President Roosevelt once observed: 'When we see a rattle snake poised to strike, we do not wait until he has struck before we crush him."

[8] Neil C. Livingstone no. 6, p. 127

reparation or satisfaction of the illegal act.[9] In another words, it is a counter terrorism measure adopted by the victim state against the terrorism sponsored state in retaliation to the act of terrorism against it. Under international law, reprisals must conform to certain carefully defined conditions and limitations. Reprisal must be precipitated by a prior illegal act, preceded by an unsatisfied demand for peaceful redress of the injury and be in proportion to the initial action. Also it should prohibit injuries to third parties.

In earlier times, it was provided that all peaceful remedies be exhausted before carrying out any form of retaliation. But this would result in waste of time and was unlikely to produce tangible results. Therefore, to be effective reprisals should be swift and discriminating. It should be directed at those specifically responsible for the actual terrorists incident. The main instrumental purpose is to persuade those engaged in terrorism to cease and desist.[10]

When considering military reprisals, practical, legal, moral and public relations issues may have to be given due weight. It should be carried out immediately after the terrorist attacks so that public

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[9] Ibid. p. 120.

[10] Neil C. Livingstone no. 3, p. 220.

may not lose sight of the original incident which provided the retaliation. There should be a provable link between the target of the reprisal and the terrorist incident .For this, the retaliating power must have accurate intelligence.[11]

The law of proportionality should always be borne in mind. It should take care that civilians are not incidental victims of their attack. It should be overt if it is to have cathartic effect on the victimized nation or serve as a deterrent to future attacks. Reprisals must be publicly acknowledged to have maximum impact. This is where media plays a major role. A firm attitude by the state against terrorism should go hand in hand with self-restraint on the part of the media and a campaign to educate public opinion. Ample media coverage is vital to generate awareness of the magnitude of terrorist threat. It would lead to public perception that terrorism is not likely to be a lasting problem. Therefore, little needs to be done on a regular basis to combat it. Only the extensive media coverage will generate the necessary attention needed to secure the sources[12] for an effective anti-terrorism programme.

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[11] Striking at terrorist training camp where members of the group have been given training may be a good target that the public would be able to understand. For example, USA on August 20, 1998 carried out military action against Afghanistan in retaliation of August 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 'suspecting' that it was a training camp for terrorists. But this raises another question that is 'suspicion' enough for retaliating?

[12] Resources include funds, training the forces, implementing security measures, etc.

The primary terrorist threat to the United State emanate from two regions, South Asia and the Middle East, supported by state sponsors, terrorist live in and operate out of areas in these regions with impunity. They find refuge and support in countries that are sympathetic to their use of violence for political gain, derive mutual benefit from harboring terrorists, or simply are weakly governed. The United States use the designations of state sponsors and foreign terrorist organizations, political and economic pressure and other means as necessary to compel those states that allow terrorist to live, move and operate with impurity and those who provide financial and political patronage for terrorist, to end their direct or indirect support for terrorism.[13]

Major terrorist threat to United States comes from Afghanistan which continues to be a primary 'safe haven'[14] for terrorists, while not directly hostile to United States, the Taliban, which controls the majority of Afghan territory, continues to harbor Osama bin Laden and a host of other terrorists loosely linked with Bin Laden, who directly threatened the United States and others in the international community.[15]

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[13] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*: 1999.
[14] Wendy S. Ross, Terrorism Long-term Problem, Clinton, US Officials say, United States Information Agency, August 23, 1998. http://www.usia.org
[15] Refer no. 13

The Middle East is also a 'hot bed' of state - sponsored terrorism. Five of the seven state that have been branded by the U.S. government as sponsors of international terrorism - Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria are located in the region.[16]

Sudan's terrorist connection is not new and the country has been on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism since August 1993.[17] Sudan is the largest country in Africa, as large as the eastern portion of United States. It borders Egypt and Libya to the North, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya Uganda and Zaire to the South and Central African Republic and Ched to the west. Strategically, Sudan controls the shipping routes leading from the Red Sea, to the Gulf of Eilat and the Suez canal.[18] It has an area of approximately 2.5 million Sq. kms and a population of 27 million, two-thirds of which are Muslims and the remaining are Christians and Animists who dwell mostly in south.[19] The numerous ethnic and religious

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[16] Cuba and North Korea are the other two on the State Department's list of states that sponsored terrorism. Moreover, 22 of the 41 major international terrorist groups described in the State Department's annual report of global terrorism are based in Middle East. Also see U.S., Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* : 1993, April 1994.

[17] Sudan and Terrorism, U.S. News Wire – Anti Defamation League, 26 August, 1998 (New York 1999). http://www.adl.org

[18] Survey of Sudan's Involvement in Terrorism Associated Press, June 15, 1998. http://www.associatedpress.com

[19] Kenneth R. Mc Kune, "US Counter Terrorism Policy towards Sudan," Statement before the subcommittee on Africa. US Department of State, Washington, May 15, 1997

groups, many of which fit together uneasily, and there is a constant civil strife going on between them. Since independence in 1956, only the period between 1972 and 1983 saw the country at peace with itself.

The Sudanese government became officially Islamic when a 1989 military *coup d'etat* brought Lieutenant General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir to power. While General Bashir was the head of the state, he was dominated by the Iranian - backed extremist National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. The NIF took control of many government institutions.[20] It implemented a wide range of policies which have alienated Sudan from its citizens and earned it the opprobrium of the international community. The NIF regime supported international terrorism primarily by providing 'safe-haven' to terrorist elements.[21]

Sudan is said to harbor a number of terrorist groups. They include an 'old line' secular group, the Abu Nidal organization, but most of them are military Islamic extremist organizations. Among them are HAMAS, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihed (PIJ), and Egypt's Al-Gama'al al-Islamiyya. The Sudanese government also supports Islamic and non-Islamic opposition

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[20] Refer no. 17
[21] Refer no. 19.

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groups in Algeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Sudan is also believed to provide military training and financial support and office space in Khartoum to officials of international terrorist radical Islamic groups.[22]

The assistance which Sudan gives to the various terrorist organizations, as well as its possible involvement in the attempted attacks in the U.S. in 1993, have caused the U.S. to include Sudan in the list of countries supporting terrorism and as a result has imposed commercial and economic sanctions on it. This U.S. decision encouraged a Sudanese effort to improve its international image and at the same time, to bridge its impaired relations and to deny all involvement in terrorist activity.[23]

In August 1993, The Clinton administration placed Sudan on the list of State sponsors of terrorism and applied unilateral sanctions with that designation. In 1996 again diplomatic sanctions were imposed on Sudan and also United States evacuated its Khartoum Embassy and expelled a Sudanese diplomat suspected for supplying

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[22] Sudan was designated under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act and related Foreign Assistance and Arms Control Legislation because it provided – and continues to provide – 'Safe Haven' to terrorist groups, training facilities and a transit point of or these groups. Also see no.17

[23] The State Department report said that Sudan has been reported harboring several of the most violent international terrorist and radical Islamic groups and also supports regional and non-Islamic opposition and insurgent groups in the African nations of Ethiopia. Eritrea, Uganda and Tunisia. US Department of State, Annual report on Global Terrorism, 1998. Also see no.18

inside information about the United States to the group of terrorists convicted of plotting the 1993 bombing of the U.N. and other New York landmarks. In November 1997 the U.S. announced new comprehensive economic sanctions against Sudan.[24]

In the face of mounting international pressure, created by extensive media coverage Sudan had to take some steps to respond to concerns about its involvement in international terrorism. Its most significant action was expulsion of exiled Saudi terrorist financier Osama bin Laden and members of its terrorist groups.[25] He is also reported to own numerous business there, including share of drug plant which opened in 1996, a joint venture between a Sudanese businessman and a Saudi Shipping Company.[26]

Bin Laden has undergone slow but steady change in his character and aspirations. During his Afghan period in the 1980's he was mainly an organizer, an entrepreneur and at times a fighter. After his exile to Sudan at the beginning of the 1990's he became sponsor and financier of numerous terrorist groups present at that time in Sudanese training camps, in co-operation with the Iranians. The expulsion from Sudan to Afghanistan transformed him into the

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[24] Refer no. 17

[25] Refer no. 19.

strategist of the Sunni terrorist groups, as can be seen from the publication of the 'Declaration of War'.[27] Stefan Leader, a terrorism specialist with Eagle Research Group Inc. Arlington wrote:

'Osama bin Laden has declared war on USA. Beginning in August 1996 and as recently as February 1999 he has issued Fatwas (religious decrees) declaring jihad against USA must be evicted from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. He is the prime suspect for the August 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa and has threatened more terrorist attacks.'[28]

On August 7, 1998. U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were bombed. Clinton administration linked the attacks to groups led by Osama bin Laden. The official reports say that the explosion at the U.S. embassies killed 250 people in Kenya and 10 in Tanzania and total 12 U.S. citizens. More than 5,500

[26] *The Economist*, August 29, 1998, p. 45.
[27] A fatwa was publicly presented in May 1998 to the Islamic journalists, CNN and ABC News. The primary reason for declaration of jihad against Americans was that for over past seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim people. Also see Ely Karmon, 'Bin Laden Out to Get America!' October 29, 1998 ICT. http://www.ict.org
[28] Leader Stefan, 'Osama Bin Laden's Ouest for Weapons of Mass Destruction,' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1999; p. 34.

people were injured mostly Kenyans.[29] With evidence mounting

against Bin Laden, U.S. authorities retaliated on August 20 with

surprise cruise missile strikes against sites purportedly linked to

Bin Laden's paramilitary training camps in Afghanistan and a

pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that was suspected of making

chemical weapons. The strike killed dozens and destroyed the plant,

but missed the exiled Saudi, believed to be at one of the camps in

Afghanistan.[30] The Zhawar Kili camp in Afghanistan described by

one senior intelligence official as a 'terrorist university' was known

to be a training ground for the followers of Bin Laden. The Zhawar

Kili training camp is in a remote region of Afghanistan about 90

miles south of the capital of Kabul. The EL Shifa pharmaceutical

plant in Khartoum, Sudan was a late addition to the US target list.

The U.S. officials said there was no record of it having produced

any pharmaceuticals. It was selected as a target because Bin Laden

had dealt with plant officials in the past and was known to be

seeking to purchase chemical weapons for the use in further attacks

on U.S. citizens and facilities.[31] It was reported to be making an

ingredient for the deadly VX nerve agent used for making chemical

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[29] Pentagon : Strikes Sought to Protect U.S. citizen overseas, as reported by CNN, August 20, 1998.
http://www.cnn/us/9808/20/pentagon.02/

[30] *Washington Post*, August 21, 1998.
[31] U.S. Strikes at Osama bin Laden Terrorist Network, ERRI Watch Center, August 22, 1998.
http://www.erri/watchcenter/98

weapons.[32] U.S. official sources also claim that intelligence agents have collected a soil sample from the factory site that show traces of precursor chemicals used in making nerve gas. But the foreign diplomats, journalists and others insited by Sudanese to inspect the rubble, have found nothing to back these allegations.[33]

The raids took place at about 13.30 EDT, about 1930 hours local time in Sudan and 2200 hours local time in Afghanistan. U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen said in his interview that 'the attacks were timed to reduce the number of innocent civilians, who might have been killed or wounded in the attacks'. He also said that he could not release many details about the attacks. He would not say for example, whether the raids were air strikes, ground attacks, or a combination of both. He said secrecy was necessary because U.S. forces may launch additional attacks against Bin Laden's terrorist network in the near future.[34] The timing was intended to reduce unintended harm to civilians in Sudan, where the EL Shifa pharmaceutical factory had closed for the day and to catch as many terrorists as possible in their beds in the Afghan camps where they

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[32] *Newsweek*, August 31, 1998, p. 24.

[33] Refer no. 26, p. 45.
[34] Cohen's remarks were supported by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in her interview. Also see Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen : Remarks at Press stake-out on Capitol Hill. Washington, D.C.; August 21, 1998 as released by the office of the spokesman, U.S. Department of State. http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/

were trained. But it was later reported that missiles launched against Sudan came from U.S. Navy vessels in the Red Sea and the missiles launched on Afghanistan came from ships in Persian Gulf. Some reports stated that upto 60 Tomahawk missiles were fired at the targets in Afghanistan and 20 Cruise missiles from 2 warships were fired on Sudan factory.[35] The U.S. reports carried a different version which, claimed that 7 Tomahawk missiles were fired and 6 of them hit the plant.[36]

Echoing the words that accompanied similar U.S. military strikes a dozen years ago, President Clinton announced attacks against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan by declaring, "we have struck back".[37] He also declared on television, "our target was terror".[38] President Reagan justified similar action against Libya by saying, "we have done what we had to do".[39] August 20, 1998 strikes in many ways were parallel to the April 14, 1986 bombing of the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. American forces were successful in finding their primary target, the home and head quarters of Libyan Leader Moammar Gadhafi, but he was not hurt. This raid came in response to anti-American attacks, including the bombing, a week earlier of a West Berlin nightclub that killed an

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[35] Refer no. 32

[36] Alistain Lyon, 'Sudanese demonstrate their anger', *Reuters News Service* 1998.
http://www.reuters.com/98

[37] Text of Clinton's Statement in Massachusetts, Associated Press, *Nando Media*,August 21, 1998.

American soldier. Reagan administration officials tied that attack to Gadhafi, and said the raid's purpose was to strike down terrorism.[40] Clinton officials echoed similar sentiments in discussing the attacks. President Clinton gave four reasons for justifying his actions:

First, because we have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in the Embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania.

Second, because these groups have executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past.

Third, because we have compelling information that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable collateral casualties we saw so tragically in Africa.

And fourth, because they are seeking to acquire chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.[41]

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[38] Refer no. 32

[39] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (1998)

[40] Ibid.Experts repeatedly cited Reagan's Libya bombing as evidence that air strikes reduced terrorism. On ABC's Good Morning America, ubiquitous T.V. guest Sen. Mac Cain remarked, "There are examples, such as our raid on Libya, where we bombed Tripoli back in 1986, which made Gadhafi rather quite, and he's remained so ever since." August 21, 1998.

[41] Refer no. 37

The President also made clear that the fight is "not directed at any particular nation or any particular faith" but at the network of Osama bin Laden, the exiled Saudi millionaire whose "callous, criminal organization" and its "policies of violence violates the teaching of every religion."[42]

The U.S. air strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan made headlines around the world. The extensive mainstream media coverage resulted in varied public opinion which went for and against the air strike. Opening lines of *New York Times* lead editorial said in support of the attack, "The United States has every right to attack suspected terrorists if there is credible evidence showing that they were involved in attacks against American citizens or were planning such attacks."[43]

Washington Post editorial reported, "The United States was correct to send its military forces into action against terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan yesterday."[44]

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[42] Wendy S. Ross, White House correspondent, United States Information Agency, August 23, 1998. http://www.usia.org

[43] *New York Times*, August 21, 1998. "International law recognizes a country's right to strike another only when defending itself against an attack that is 'imminent and overwhelming', leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation."
[44] *Washington Post*, August 21, 1998

Headlines of *Los Angeles Times* also were in favour of air strikes, "U.S. Air Raid Necessary." *USA Today* editorial reported, "USA strikes on Terrorism a Good Beginning."[45] Clark Staten, Executive Director, Emergency Response and Research Institute in Chicago issued statements in support of the air raids.[46] The Congress was divided on the issue but more than 25 senators have been reported to be in favour of air strikes.[47] But some did remain skeptical and a few were against it.[48] Initial public opinion was strongly in favour of the U.S. attacks. Two-thirds of Americans approved the military strike, while 19 percent were opposed, according to a *CNN-USA Today*-Gallup Poll of 628 adults. The poll had a margin of error plus or minus 4-percentage points.[49]

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[45] *Los Angeles Times*, August 21, 1998. Also see *USA Today*, August 21, 1998

[46] *ERRI Daily Intelligence Report, Risk Assessment Services*, August 23, 1998 vol. –4, p. 235. "We applaud the actions of President Clinton and the Department of Defense in their recent strike against terrorism in Afghanistan and Sudan. In our opinion, this may be the first of what could be several necessary strikes against these zealots and murders. Who would maim and kill innocent people while in pursuit of their 'religious' and geo-political ambitions. It should be remembered that what Mr. Bin Laden and his accomplices' advocates and the actions that they have taken are not the spirit of Koran, nor do they reflect the tenets of the Moslem religion. We must be careful that other believes of the Islamic faith aren't blamed for the actions of these radical 'religious leaders'." Staten concluded.

[47] "The attack was justified at the plant and the terrorist camp," said Sen. Bob Smith, R – NH. Gingrich, R-Ga., said the United States " did exactly the right thing today." Helms, R-NC., Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, "sooner or later, terrorists will realize that America's differences end at the Water's edge." "It was important to respond to the recent terrorist attacks upon American interests." – House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, D-MO.

[48] A few Republican Senators were skeptical. "I am going to begin with the presumption that terrorism is a terrible threat. But I want to know more than I know at the moment, especially the reason for doing it now." - - Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa. "I am not saying that force is not appropriate", said Sen. Dan Cots, R-Ind. "I'm questioning the timing." "I'm more satisfied with the rationale behind the Afghanistan site than I am with the pharmaceutical plant." Said Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah.

[49] John Dimond, 'U.S. says battle against terrorism only beginning', *Associated Press*, 1998.

On the international front the extensive media coverage around the world unleashed a flood of public opinion and analysts began to ponder upon the U.S. action. In preliminary reaction from media overseas, only a few opinion makers defended the attacks as the reasonable response of a country and a President determined to protect U.S. citizens. These writers filing from Europe and not surprisingly from Israel, saw the "resolute action" of the U.S. as the appropriate response to terrorism. London's Centrist *Independent*, for example, pointed out that "Osama bin Laden, had, after all declared war on America, we can hardly complain if they reply in kind."[50] British Prime Minister, Tony Blair issued statements in support of the U.S. raid. "I strongly support this American action against international terrorists. Terrorists all over the world know that the democratic governments will act decisively to prevent their evil crimes."

The Conservative *Ottawa Citizen* maintained, "US counter attacks against a terrorist base in Afghanistan and a chemical works in Sudan are not only morally defensible, they are morally laudable."[51] Media reports in Denmark, Greece and Poland were in U.S. support.[52]

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[50] *Centrist Independent* (London) August 21, 1998
[51] *Ottawa Citizen* (Canada) August 21, 1998
[52] Centrist *Rzeczpospolita* (Poland) published this editorial on August 21, 1998 by Piotr Aleksandrowiez, "Cruel terrorism requires a tough resolute response. If there was compelling evidence

Even those generally supportive of the U.S. "retaliation" however, echoed a more broadly felt sense of 'unease' with the 'unilateral' and 'extra-territorial' nature of the mission.[53] The majority worried that the U.S. 'use of force' would not put an end to the problem of global terrorism and could infact, set in motion a 'bloody spiral' of reprisals. Bornn's Centrist *General-Anzeiger* predicted: "unfortunately ... the danger of terrorist attacks has not been stopped. On the contrary, we must count on acts of revenge and on further bloodshed."[54]

In discussing the anti-terrorist strikes, a preponderance of editorials and television discussions dwelled on President Clinton's "intense political difficulties" as a result of Starr investigation and the President's admission that he had had an "inappropriate relationship" with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Even though few observers personally subscribed to the theory that the President had "organized" the military strikes as a "distraction"

that terrorists trained in Afghanistan were connected with the Embassy bombing, the death of innocent people, and if there was evidence that production of chemical weapons is going to start in Sudan, then air strikes were necessary."

[53] Former Italian Ambassador to NATO and Moscow Sergio Romano wrote in centrist, top circulation *Corriere della sere* , August 20, 1999 ".... But the ... punitive actions against Afghanistan and Sudan once again prove that American foreign policy is becoming unscrupulously extraterritorial: Washington does not know frontiers, national sovereignty nor international rules when it wants to strike an enemy or vindicate an offense...."

[54] General – *Anzeiger* (Germany) August 21, 1998

from his personal problems, most indicated that Clinton's

credibility had been "dramatically devalued."[55] In more than one

reference to the film, "Wag the Dog,"[56] these journalists

maintained that it would be difficult for the President to dispel the

impression that he had not "organized" the military strikes to

deflect the American public's and world's attention from the Starr

investigation.[57] Dailies in Spain and Britain offered this antidote to

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[55] "It is worth mentioning that following Clinton's domestic defeat in his recent court case, some international news agencies and publications raised the probability of a foreign military move by America aimed at covering up and over shadowing his problem" – *Iranian Radio*.
France -- Right-of-Center *Le Figaro*'s Washington Correspondent, Jean-Jacques Mevel, observed (August 21, 1998): "Now that weapons have been used, Bill Clinton remains exposed to criticism. He will no longer be criticized for being weak, but for having organized a distraction from his personal problems. He was not yet been questioned about it, but his Defense Secretary, William Cohen, has already been forced to.... say that 'these attacks are a part of a continuing effort to defend U.S. citizens and interests abroad'."
Lebanon – A front-page article in Arab nationalist *As-Safir* commented (August 21, 1998): "Clinton succeeded in diverting the public's eye from his own problems by launching a military attack against some targets in Afghanistan and Sudan under the pretext of prohibiting new terrorist acts against Americans."
Pakistan – (August 21, 1998) *The Independent Nation* held: "The U.S. forces' air strikes on the site of Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Sudan are aimed at diverting attention of its masses from the Clinton – Monika scandal which brought the American President to his knees, plunging his popularity considerably..."
[56] France : In left-of-center *Liberation*, Jacques Amalric commented (August 21, 1998): "As in the film 'Wag the Dog', in which the U.S. President was shown building up a war against Albania to make people forget about a romantic relationship ... How many people, all over the world, will remain convinced that the strikes ordered by Clinton were not meant simply to avenge the victims of the massacres?..."
[57] Cyprus – Greek-Language, right wing, usually anti-American *Simerini* judged (August 21, 1998): "The Americans bombed Sudan and Afghanistan in an effort by Clinton to distract the public. The bombing occurred at the time Lewinsky was testifying."
Romania-Sensationalist Daily *Ziua* claimed (August 21, 1998): "Yesterday, the U.S. started military reprisals against supposed bases of terrorists involved in the bombings in Africa. Clinton bombed Sudan and Afghanistan. The U.S. President has interrupted his vacation and ordered the raids at exactly the time Monica Lewinsky was having one more hearing on the sexgate scandal." One popular Turkish newspaper *Daily Hurriyet* was particularly blunt in assessing Clinton's motivation for ordering the strikes. The headlines read, "The Monica Missiles."
"I have no doubt that this aggression is to divert the attention from the cases from which the American President is suffering." – Sudanese Information Minister Ghazi Salrhuddin.
According to *Newsweek, ABC/Washington Post and CBS/New York Times* polls released on August 22, 1998, forty percent of these surveyed by *Newsweek*, or two out of five people, felt the action was a diversionary tactic. In the both, the ABC/Post poll and CBS/NYT poll twenty seven percent of those surveyed said they felt it was a diversionary tactic.

any cynical interpretations of the President's 'use of force'. Madrid's liberal *EL Pais* recommended that evidence "supporting the attacks ... be made public, in order to remove any suspicion that Washington's action have been prompted..... by domestic opportunism."[58]

Predictably, response from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Arab world was sharply critical of the U.S. missile strikes. Kabul's voice of *Radio Shari'ah* denounced the strikes as "a clear violation of international norms" and "an act of aggression against Islamic World." Lahore's independent *Nation* decried the U.S. attack on "two poor sovereign nations fighting for their survival" and charged that the U.S. had not "seriously pursued the Taliban offer to punish Osama bin Laden on Afghan territory if proof was provided against him."[59]

The popular reaction to the American strikes was reported to be mixed. By and large U.S. population supported it[60] but it was unanimously condemned as well. Media and public on the streets accused Clinton of ordering the attacks to draw the spotlight off his

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[58] *Financial Times* (Britain) August 21, 1998. *EL Pais* (Spain) August 21, 1998.

[59] Kathlen J. Brahney, US air strikes against Afghanistan Sudan: Mined Views on Washington's action.August 21,1998. http://usinfo.state. gov/admn/005/www/n8821:html .

[60] Refer no. 49.

affair with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky.[61] People in USA and Arab world gathered on the streets to protest against the air raids. More than 100 people representing several groups marched in front of the Federal Courthouse in Minneapolis.

About a dozen people reportedly stood silently in front of the New Hampshire State house on August 21, 1998 holding signs that read: "Bombing is Terrorism Too," "Only Terrorist Fight Terrorist with Terror," and "Vengeance Begets Violence."

Therefore, from the above case study it is evident that media plays a very important role in projecting any incident and equally significant role in formulating a public opinion that may or may not go in favour of the government's action.

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[61] Nancy Alach 42, of Cambridge was reported to comment in reference to the movie 'Wag the Dog' in which the President invents a military conflict to distract the country from a sex scandal. "It's so clear to me that this is his way of dealing with the whole Monika thing. There is no part of me that can rationalize how you can think terrorism will end by dropping some bombs."Reading a newspaper in a Mc Donald's branch in Bahrain, 25-year-old Saudi citizen Mohammed al-Turki called the American missile strikes " a plot to divert public attention from Clinton's wrong doings."

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is more than the bomb and the gun. It is a struggle that ultimately is fought in the political arena and, as such, is also a war of ideas and ideologies. Combating terrorism requires patience, courage, imagination and restraint. Perspective is essential. Overreaction and bombast play into terrorist hands good intelligence, a professional security force, and a measured response are necessary. Most important for any democracy in its struggle against terrorism is a public that is informed and engaged, and understands the nature of the threat, its potential cost, and why the fight against terrorism is its fight too. Publicity is an integral part of terrorism, and the media is a primary conduit connecting terrorists, the public, and governments. From the presentation in preceding chapters we understand that terrorism and the media have a symbiotic relationship. Without media, terrorists would receive no exposure, their cause would go ignored and no climate of fear would be generated. Terrorism is futile without publicity, and the media generates much of this publicity.

Publicity serves many purposes for the terrorists: to attract new recruits for the cause; to persuade the public that the government

cannot protect them; to frighten the leadership, perhaps into using unpopular antiterrorism measures; ultimately to provoke disorder and revolution. It can, therefore, be an unintentional friend to terrorism. But we also understand that the most appropriate way to fight terrorism is to direct public attention to it, because to understand a problem and make careful policy choices, the public must be informed. If the public gives up its right to know, it gives up the right to self-government. The media are, therefore, within their prerogative of informing the public as long as they are passive observers of events. When they become active participants in a terrorist situation or knowingly become a vehicle of biased propaganda, then that particular member of the media is abusing the power protected by U.S. Bill of Rights' First Amendment.

One of the important question as mentioned in the preceding chapters is: what was the media reaction to the terrorist act of US Embassy bombings. Media coverage of this incident marked by non-stop reporting about the disaster and its victims, the dramatic rescue efforts, and other aspects reveals the high degree media sensitivity to the issue. The US news media and the international media covered the story in almost similar manner and took a very critical stand of terrorist attack. The US media reports projected the terrorist in a negative light.

For any act of terrorism, that is always a political, social, ethnic or religious creed that can be used to justify it by someone to "justify" an act, one must compare it with a legal or ideological system as a basis of justification. If one considers an act 'justifiable', one probably wouldn't call it terrorism. Then we come to another crucial question as discussed in fourth chapter is: should military action be taken against terrorist countries as proclaimed by United States against Sudan and Afghanistan. We can, therefore, conclude that on a case-by-case basis, that so long there exists no global consensus or agreement on counter-terrorism, victims of terrorist activities, especially states with similar influence and military power like US, would adopt military action. Such actions generally follow the following pattern. Firstly, some international terrorist incidents demand a response for which law enforcement has neither the training, resource, nor the personnel. In these cases, military forces appeared to the countries like US, which has global reach to be the only adequate response. Furthermore, some countries support terrorist campaigns as actual instruments of their foreign policy. Strangely the cases studied were viewed by the US as state sponsored terrorism that affected or harmed American citizens or interests. As no other international agencies existed to protect the interest and concern of the US, the US foreign policy-

makers in the existing global power politics, being the lone supreme power, take the unilateral action. Such acts affected the sovereignty of the states like Sudan and Afghanistan. Yet the international community had no alternative to offer as far as the US is concerned and the US dictate prevailed. Therefore it is incumbent on the international community and community of nations to prevent any future erosion of sovereignty of states by formulating structures to deal with such acts of terrorism.

The US media played critical and important role in projecting the terrorist incident and facilitating the US government to take suitable actions of retaliations, even unilateral military retaliations. As discussed in the previous chapters, the media reports generated ambiance and environment for the US government to take military action against Sudan and Afghanistan. The US media cited grievance stories of the Embassy bombing victims and stirred up public sympathy and support enticing the government to retaliate, the way it did. The US media extensively supported the US government's cruise missile attacks on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant and Afghan paramilitary camps. To quote Bill Press, the 'left' on *CNN's Crossfire*, (August 20,1998), seeks Pat Buchanan's approval; "you know Pat, I think this Wag the Dog talk is nonsense. I think the President did the right thing and I know

you agree. I mean it was positively Reaganesque, what he did today. I just hope, since Osama bin Laden is still alive, that we have a few cruise missiles left and use them." Some other National Television Prime time Programms, for example, *CNBC's Hardball*, *MSNBC's The Big Show, CNN's Larry King Live, CNBC's Rivera Live* and *Fox News Channel's Crier Report*, supported the cruise missile attacks.

The popular US newspapers like *New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times* and *USA Today* also graphically endorsed the cruise missile attacks. To quote, *New York Times* lead editorial: "The United States has every right to attack suspected terrorists if there is credible evidence showing that they were involved in attacks against American citizens or were planning such attacks." Therefore, we can infer that there seem to have existed surprisingly high level of harmony and coordination between the media and US policymakers. Such a harmony ensued public support and congressional endorsement.

The US media also drew attention to one of the crucial problems now facing not only United States but also the world. It pointed out how the Islamic fundamentalist groups are a global threat especially to United States. In the past few years, the Islamic

Extremist Groups have come up as a threat to the United States. They were headed by different individuals but their target remained the same *i.e.*, United States. They have been reported responsible for most of the terrorist activities against the United States, be it the 1998 US Embassy bombings or 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Therefore, the present case study has revealed that among the policy goals of the US, counter-terrorism has emerged as one of the major objective of the US. It has also led the US policymakers to include the rise of Islamic fundamentalism a priority threat perception, which the US cannot ignore.

Terrorist, governments and the media see the function, roles and responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist events from differing and often competing perspectives. Such perspective drives behavior during terrorist incidents -- often resulting in both tactical and strategic gains to the terrorist operation and the overall terrorist cause. The challenge to both the governmental and press communities is to understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to develop policy options designed to serve the interests of government, the media and the society.

The media and the government have common interests in seeing that the media are not manipulated into promoting the cause of

terrorism or its methods. In functioning democracy policymakers do not want to see terrorism, or anti-terrorism, eroding freedom of the press -- one of the pillars of democratic societies. This appears to be a dilemma that cannot be completely reconciled -- one with which societies will continually have to struggle. The challenge for policymakers is to explore mechanisms enhancing media/government cooperation to accommodate the citizen and media need for honest coverage while limiting the gains uninhibited coverage may provide terrorists or their cause. Communication between the government and the media here is an important element in any strategy to prevent terrorist causes and strategies from prevailing and to preserve democracy.

The successful completion of retaliation in Sudan and Afghanistan in countering the terrorist attacks on American Embassies would be a counter force in action in American foreign policy. However, the policymakers, congressmen and journalist have begun to debate and evolve policy options to consider future such attacks on American interests. There are indications that a number of options are being considered by congress, government and media. Some options that are in favour of congress, government and media include:

(1) financing joint media / government training exercises;

(2) establishing a government terrorism information response center;

(3) promoting use of media pools for hostage - centered terrorist events;

(4) establishing and promoting voluntary press coverage guidelines.

Financing Joint Government / Media Training Exercise:

An effective public relations usually precedes a story -- rather than reacts to it. The mood of the media, policymakers and congressmen is to empower the nation to beneficially employ broad public affairs strategies to combat terrorist - driven initiatives, and the media playing an important role within the framework of such a strategy. This is a realization among congressmen, media personnel and policymakers that there should be training exercise among media and concerned government agencies. Training exercises are vital; exercises such as those conducted by George Washington University and the Technology Institute in Holon, Israel, which could be useful to gather US government response and US media coverage of mock terrorist incidents. Promoting and funding of similar programs on a broad scale internationally would be useful in developing effective counter-terrorist programs.

Establishing A Government Terrorist Information Response Center.

One option that US Congress might consider would be to establish a standing government terrorist information response center (TIRC). Such a center, by agreement with the media, could have on call (though communication links) a rapid reaction terrorism reporting pool composed of senior network, wire-service, and print media representatives. Network coverage of incidents would then be coordinated by the network representative in the center. It is felt that such centers would end the experience of confusion when terrorist incident occur in the United States exposing a vacuum of news other than the incident itself, and by the time the government agencies agree on and fine tune what can be said and what positions are to be taken, the government information initiative is lost.

Promoting use of Media Pools

Another option, which has been seriously considered by the congress and the media, would be promoting the use of media pools. This action would call for a media pool where all agree on the news for release at the same time especially in hostage type

events. A model would need to be established. However, the major American news media agreement would not be easily secured.

Promoting Voluntary Press Coverage Guidelines

The American Congressional Research Staff (CRS) has also suggested that to meet the terrorist problem there should be promotion of voluntary press coverage guidelines. The CRS has suggested that US Congress could urge the President to call a special media summit, national or perhaps international in scope under the anti-terrorism committed G-8 industrialized nations summit rubric, for senior network and print media executives to develop voluntary guidelines on terrorism reporting.

Areas of discussion might be drawn from the practices of some important media members and include guidelines on:

- Limiting information on hostages, which could harm them: e.g. number, nationality, official positions, how wealthy they may be, or important relatives they have.

- Limiting information on military, or police, movements during rescue operations;

- Limiting or agreeing not to air live unedited interviews with terrorists;

- Checking sources of information carefully when the pressure is high to report information that may not be accurate -- as well as limiting unfounded speculation;

Toning down information that may cause widespread panic or amplify events, which aid the terrorist by stirring emotions sufficiently to exert irrational pressure on decision-makers.

Even if specific guidelines were not adopted, such a summit would increase understanding in the public policy communities of the needs of their respective institutions.

The media and the government have common interests is seeing that the media one not manipulated into promoting the cause of terrorism or its methods. On the other hand, neither the media or policy makers want to see terrorism, or counter terrorism, eroding constitutional freedoms including that of the press -- one of the

pillars of democratic societies. This appears to be a dilemma that

cannot be completely reconciled -- one with which U.S. society will

continually have to struggle.

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
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
Figure 1. International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-1988.

Source: Office of Counter-Terrorism of the U.S. Department of State

Sudden Impacts: The Unlikely Targets

Around 10:30 a.m. on Friday, a bomb exploded outside the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Almost simultaneously, 400 miles to the south, another bomb ripped apart the front of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. What unfolded:

Nairobi

Moi Ave.

Ufundi
Cooperative
House
(destroyed)

U.S. Embassy

Steel
security
fence

Cooperative
Bank

Garage
entrance

Ufundi
House
rubble

Guardpost

Checkpoint

Truck

1 Bank guards allow a pickup to pull into the parking lane off Haile Selassie Avenue

Concrete-and-steel posts

Haile Selassie Ave.

2 The truck parks at the guardpost near the U.S. Embassy's underground parking garage

3 The blast topples Ufundi House, shatters the bank's windows and rips through the rear of the embassy

Dar es Salaam

2-foot-thick concrete-and-iron wall

U.S. Embassy

Nigerian
Embassy
(heavily
damaged)

Guardpost

Guardpost

Laibon St.

1 A tanker that is owned by the embassy tries to enter the grounds

Tanker

2 A bomb, stuck underneath the truck, detonates and wrecks the embassy's front

SUDAN   0   400 MI
ETHIOPIA
UGANDA
RWANDA   KENYA
                   Nairobi
            TANZANIA
BURUNDI   Dar es
               Salaam

ZAMBIA   MOZAMBIQUE

AFRICA

In the Cross Hairs

Last Thursday U.S. warships fired about 80 Tomahawk cruise missiles at facilities linked to Osama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind behind the Aug. 7 embassy bombings in East Africa. The retaliation was aimed at a paramilitary camp in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant near Khartoum, Sudan.

THE TOMAHAWK III MISSILE

The Tomahawk is a U.S. Navy favorite when it comes to land attacks. Why? Fired from a submarine or surface ship, it can avoid radar detection and thus hide the location from which the missile was launched.

Engine
Fuel tank
Guidance system
Booster
Warhead
Forward fuel tank

Length: 20 ft. 6 in.
Diameter: 1 ft. 8.4 in.
Wingspan: 8 ft. 9 in.
Range: 1,000 miles
Cruise alt.: 50–100 ft.
Speed: 381–671 mph
Guidance system: Satellite-based GPS
Cost: $1 million (approx.)

THE SUDAN ATTACK

Khartoum North
Shifa complex
KHARTOUM
Nile River
Downtown Khartoum
Khartoum International Airport

Aerial photo of the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in north Khartoum. A nearby candy factory was damaged, too.

THE AFGHANISTAN ATTACK

Base camp includes administration, storing, housing and training facilities. A support camp was damaged as well.

Khwlah
AFGHANISTAN
Khowst
Training camps
Base camp
PAKISTAN
Urgun Shah

Four training camps used to practice terrorist tactics, weapons and explosive devices. The site includes firing ranges.

10 p.m. (local time): The Zhawar Kili Al-Badr camp is hit by missiles from four Navy ships and a submarine in the Arabian Sea

Arabian Sea

Indian Ocean

U.S. NAVAL POWER

The military hasn't detailed the ships used in the attacks, but seven warships—cruisers, destroyers and a submarine—were in striking distance. Like the Milius, they may have fired missiles.

USS Milius guided-missile destroyer
Vertical-launch missile system

Destroyers: USS Milius, USS Elliot, USS Briscoe, USS Hayler
Cruisers: USS Shiloh, USS Cowpens, USS Valley Forge*
Sub: USS Columbia
Carrier: USS Abraham Lincoln*
*NO CRUISE MISSILES

Caspian Sea
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TURKEY
Kabul
AFGHANISTAN
LIBYA
EGYPT
Persian Gulf
U.A.E.
SAUDI ARABIA
OMAN
YEMEN
Red Sea
INDIA
ETHIOPIA
UGANDA
SOMALIA
CONGO
KENYA
Dar es Salaam
TANZANIA