

**'DACOITS OF CHAMBAL VALLEY : A STUDY IN THE SOCIO-
LOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR'**

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Preface

This study is perhaps the first attempt at a sociological analysis of the deviant behaviour of the dacoits of Chambal Valley. The problem has acquired considerable significance because of the magnitude of the problem in an ecologically well defined area, its historicity since the twelfth century, the various attempts by the formal agencies of social control to contain this phenomenon without appreciable results, and the unique and recurrent phenomenon of voluntary surrender (samarpan) in a newly-created environment where the charismatic and the formal authorities came together in a creative dimension.

The problem, in this work, has been studied within a theoretical framework which attempts to relate social deviance with social structure and change. After examining the various theoretical approaches to the sociology and social-psychology of deviance it was realized that none of these models adequately help in the examination of this unique phenomenon. It was, therefore, decided not to follow or evolve any specific typology from the previous models, but rather to examine material relevant to this phenomenon within the broad

context of social structure and change. Our attempt has been to evolve a theoretical framework which would enable, firstly, a better appreciation of the data already examined, and secondly, to enable a more efficient and comprehensive penetration into the empirical reality in the next phase of research. This fortunately has been one of the fruitful outcomes of this study.

The thesis examines the historical evolution of the baghi-subculture in the Chambal region since the twelfth century, from the time Raja Anang Pal Tomar was driven out of Delhi by Prithvi Raj Chauhan and had to take refuge in this region. Here, the baghi, in his role as the rebel and the outlaw, whose criminal offences were tied organically with a political content, is clearly revealed. This is of utmost importance for an understanding of the baghi-subculture and its erosion. The word dacoit is a misnomer in so far as the baghi is concerned. They are not equivalent concepts, precisely because of the historicity of the baghi. In the content of baghi role the rebel component outweighs the criminal component. This explains why the baghis often acquire legendary status. However, there are gangs operating in

the same region in which the content of criminality outweighs that of the rebel. The change that is taking place is an erosion of the former (rebel) and not so much of the latter (criminality). This has been analysed in the thesis.

The chapter on "The Structure And the Goals of Deviant Gangs" has been prepared on the basis of interviews with nearly twentyfive gang leaders. In view of the shortage of ~~the~~ space it has been decided to present a consolidated view of all the interviews in one place. In the next phase of research, it is proposed that these, as well as, additional gangs would be examined and a more elaborate and analytical discussion presented. For the present this chapter is descriptive in style but at the same time takes care not to omit the major structural consistencies of all the groups and the important variations that came to light. In chapters five and six the process of reintegration of the 'baghis' has been examined, first, in the perspective of their voluntary surrenders, and second, in their process of rehabilitation. In the analysis of voluntary surrender, attempt has been made to bring out clearly the pre-eminent role of charismatic authorities. Also we have tried to show the element of routinization of charisma that has taken place in the

last two surrenders. The over-arching role of the moral authority of charisma comes out in bold relief. For such moral authority makes possible flexibilities in the political and bureaucratic structures, as well as lends social legitimacy to the conversion from the 'baghi' status to the status of a lawful citizen.

The dynamics of rehabilitation reveals some of the inner contradictions of reintegration. It reveals how the social structure of baghi gangs tends to be transferred by inertia even into the open prisons. Another important thing to note is the maintenance and persistence of social institutional structures like caste within gangs as deviants, and even when they have sought reintegration with the legitimate order.

Since this study confines itself within the broad boundaries of what is expected to be not more than an extended term-paper, it has not been possible to enter into social structural realities of the agrarian social system, the contribution of the existing political and administrative structures of the panchayat, block and police etc., to the persistence of, or resistance to, the baghi problem. This will be taken up at the level of more intensive field work for which the theoretical framework has already been worked out in the conclusion.

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Chapter I

I N T R O D U C T I O N

"An area of 8,000 square miles the Chambal valley stretches across the three Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. The river Chambal rises in Malwa on the northern slopes of the Vindhya near Mhow and through the boundaries of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh it flows as far as Etawah border, finally converging into the Jamuna" (Garg 1965: 7). "The two districts of Bhind and Morena are known for their rugged terrain and the highly inflammable nature of the people. These districts are situated along the southern bank of the Chambal covering a length of about 250 miles. Adjoining these districts are the thick forest districts of Gwalior, Datis, Shivpuri and Guna. For several miles on each side of the river Chambal are the ravines cut out by rain water. The Kurwari river, which curves through Morena and Bhind districts, has also added to the mass of ravines. In addition, the eroding action of the comparatively smaller rivers Sank, Besli, and Parwati is also no less important as these meander through large tracts of cultivable land. (Bhaduri, 1972: 7).

It is clear that the ecology of Chambal valley with its ravines has provided a formidable sanctuary for the dacoits. The intractable ravines provided an ideal setting for refuge from law. The forces of law and order

Table No. 1 Ravine land and extent of dacoit infestation in Madhya Bharat (Pradesh) Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan.

State:	Ravine land (in lakhs acres)		Dacoit infested ravine land (in lakhs acres)		Percentage infestation	
	1956	1956	1972	1956	1972	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Madhya Bharat (Madhya Pradesh)	6.83	6.30	6.83	92.2	100.0	
Uttar Pradesh	12.30	6.84	10.11	55.6	82.2	
Rajasthan	4.52	2.44	4.02	54.0	88.9	
Chambal valley	23.63	15.58	20.96	65.9	88.6	

Source : Ravine Reclamation Programme. Report of the Working Group of Ravine Reclamation for dacoit infested areas of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, October 1972 , p.6

in an unfamiliar, or at least a less familiar terrain, are less than a match for the dacoits who move with facility and ease in such a sanctuary.

The steady increase in the area of infestation of the Chambal ravines by the dacoits is a clear indication of an enlargement of dacoit activity, and this inspite of the increased might of the law and order mechanisms devised

to contain them. Thus, this is additional evidence that as the police force acquired more strength, the dacoits were spreading themselves out in the ravines. The dacoits were responding to a situation in which the encounters with the police were increasing and more and more dacoits were facing death and arrests.

The figures in the above table suggest a progressive saturation of the ravines with dacoits. This is largely true although the percentage figures may be slightly exaggerated. For, the area under ravines has not remained constant as suggested.

Organised dacoity in the form of a permanent, though deviant, institution has been existent in the Chambal valley since centuries. "The Chambal region lies to the south of Delhi. Being very near to Delhi and Agra, both of which were seats of imperial power, the region naturally became a refuge for defeated kings, chieftains, disgruntled elements and claimants to the throne of Delhi or Agra for over nine centuries. Until the first quarter of the eleventh century, various Hindu clans inhabited the region of central India. In 1019 A.D. Mahmud of Ganni invaded India and after a time he conquered Gwalior in the course of his expeditions. When he died in 1030, a Hindu clan known as Tomar Rajputs who hailed from the lower basin of the Chambal river came to rule Delhi" (Nargolkar, 1974:9).

In the later part of the twelfth century Raja Anang Pal Tomar was driven out of Delhi by Prithviraj Chauhan. Anang Pal followed by three of his clans took refuge in this region. It is since then that the defiance of the Chambal region against imperial powers of Delhi Sultans, in later times of Mughals and Marathas, has been recorded. However, during 1486-1523, the Tomar rule in the Gwalior was at its best under Raja Han Singh. Tomar rule came to an end with the defeat of its last representative in the hands of Ibrahim Lodi in the battle of Panipat in 1526. The Tomars, in course of time, were reduced to the level of petty land-holders. They continued harassing the Delhi regime by attacking and looting the marching armies and trade caravans. This form of expression of political rebellion in the region developed into the phenomenon now understood by the term dacoity. Later the decline of the Mughals and the rise of the Marathas with a policy of dispossessing many Rajputs of their lands further added to the complications, thus providing renewed vigour to the practice of banditry in this region (Government of Madhya Pradesh, 1965: 338).

Since the existence of this 'lawlessness' in the Gwalior region, efforts have been made by a succession of rulers — Mughals, Britishers, Marathas and the successive

state governments of Madhya Bharat now Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh to check this problem. All these efforts were based on a policy of suppression by use of force and violence. Even military action was taken, villages were razed to the ground by fire power, yet dacoity flourished unabated.

An idea of the dimensions of the problem of dacoity in this region can be comprehended from the fact that 5,599 cases of crime have been recorded within a period of 15 years between 1958 to 1972 with an average of 373 crimes per annum over the period. These crimes include dacoity, murder and kidnapping. (Table-II)

Table No. II : Crimes Committed by Dacoits

1st Jan. 1958 to 31st December, 1972
(Gwalior Division)

Crime	1958-60	61-63	64-66	67-69	70-72	Total
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dacoity	595	588	378	266	315	2,142
Murder	398	266	172	203	155	1,194
Kidnapping	215	511	431	428	678	2,263
	1,208	1,365	981	897	1,148	5,599

Crime per annum 373, Dacoity per annum 143
Murder per annum 80, Kidnapping per annum 151

Source : C.I.D. Office,
Gwalior.

In the earlier period the persons who took to banditry found an inclination towards such activities mainly due to certain socio-political causes. Gang dacoity which had established itself continued into the British period. Lord William Bentinck took special measures to suppress crime with an iron hand. One measure taken by him was the enactment of Thugi Act XXX under which as many as 3,216 thugs were brought to book. This was followed up by other enactments like the Dacoity Act XXIV of 1843 and later by special provisions in the Indian Penal Code to deal with thugs as such (under section 311 IPC) on the one hand, and dacoities on the other, (sections-395 to 400 and 402 IPC) (Mathur, 1961: 1-5).

By the year 1945 the 2nd World War had ended. The armed armies of the Princely States had returned to their respective headquarters. The fourth battalion of the Gwalior state had been to the Middle East. It comprised of soldiers mainly from Bhind and Morena. In 1947, the merger of the Gwalior state army with the Indian army was under active consideration. Meanwhile, the Gwalior State army was sent to Hyderabad to fight the 'Rasakars'. On return, soldiers brought with them huge quantities of captured arms and ammunition. Subsequently, not all in the princely army who fought in Hyderabad were absorbed into the Indian Army. Thus a large number of soldiers found themselves

suddenly unemployed but rich in the possession of fire arms. Many of these unemployed and battle trained soldiers hailed from the districts of Bhind and Morena (Trivedi, 1972: 8).

Up to the dawn of independence, full patronage was provided to the dacoit gangs by the feudal classes. The problem of dacoity continued mainly because of the vested interests of the power structure itself.

The origin and the nature of the dacoity problem in Chambal valley, from a historical point of view can be better understood as some kind of social banditry. "The point about social bandits is that they are peasant outlaws whom the Lord and State regard as criminals but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported". (Hobsbawm, 1972: 17).

However, not until we realise the level of mobilisation by the state can ^{we} fully appreciate the gravity of the problem. During later Mughal period, the Chambal phenomenon was identified with the problem of quelling internal revolt. From an early policy of non-interference, the British in 1817 under Lord Hastings, adopted a policy of strong repression in alliance with native chiefs, but the problem was far from getting eradicated.

In the Princely States of Gwalior and Datis, the indigenous system of police was at work. Zamindars and Jagirdars were charged with the duty of apprehending the criminals. Under them a number of subordinate tenure holders were also responsible for the maintenance of law and order assisted by the village watchman and with the co-operation of the villagers. The Gwalior State police as it was then constituted, was hardly strong enough to face the challenge by the outlaws, and the only course adopted by the Gwalior Darbar was to use the Army. Thus in 1875, 2 villages were razed to the ground, for the alleged defiance of law and order by their inhabitants. These exemplary punishments were primarily meant to instil fear in the minds of the people and stop them from harbouring dacoits. (Government of Madhya Pradesh 1965: p.339)

For effective suppression of crime in addition to these measures, the police force was armed with modern weapons during the year 1927-28. Special efforts were also directed to enlist the sympathies of Zamindars and members of village defence force. (The Administrative Report of Gwalior State: 1927-28).

Further on May 13, 1929 the Inspector General of Police of Gwalior State called a meeting of the district officers of Tonwargarh and Bhind and officers of the special Dacoity Police, Agra. Though a whole lot of prominent gangs

of dacoits were liquidated the causes which gave rise to dacoity were given little attention (Katare, 1972: 172-173). In the post independence era, with the merger of the 23 Princely States and the formation of the new state of Madhya Bharat in the year 1948, the dacoit gangs again posed a very serious threat. In 1952 the Madhya Bharat government appointed 'Behind Morena Crime Situation Enquiry Committee' to review the dacoity problem and to suggest measures to deal with it. One of its recommendations was to set up a unified police command to conduct anti-dacoity operations in collaboration with the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan. Special anti-dacoity operations were started in the month of March, 1953 — directed against eight well-organised dacoit gangs. Most of the important Gujar dacoit gangs were liquidated by the end of 1955 but there was no appreciable improvement in the general law and order situation. Further, in the beginning of 1957 there were thirteen well-organised dacoit gangs in the area. On 25th March 1957 a meeting of the police officers was held and after prolonged discussions a scheme for tackling the problem was drawn up, which was put into operation on 21st May, 1957 .

The dacoity affected area of Madhya Pradesh was divided into 12 sections :

- | | | | | |
|----|---------|---|-------------|--------------|
| 1. | Bhind | : | (a) Gorni | (b) Pawai |
| | | | (c) Endori | (d) Mau |
| | | | (e) Gohad | (f) Mahgaon |
| 2. | Morena | | (a) Sihonia | (b) Rithora |
| | | | (c) Dixni | (d) Noorabad |
| 3. | Gwalior | | (a) Behat | (b) Bijoli |

Another sector at Ambha in Morena was established soon after beginning of the operation. Each sector was put under the charge of gazetted police officer with a reserve force of a company of Special Armed Force (SAF). Additional transport was provided to each sector with a wireless station. 'By the end of 1957 the force of law and order had gone a long way in shattering the morale of the dacoit gangs. By the commencement of year 1960 only five listed gangs plus some local gangs were active in the area'. (Government of Madhya Pradesh 1965: 367-68).

The momentum gained all these years, however, received a serious setback when in January 1961, the forces had to be withdrawn from anti-dacoity area to be employed elsewhere, for the visit of the queen of England to Delhi, to quell communal disturbances at Bastar, to control trouble at Bilai and at other places, and finally, one battalion of State S.A.F. had to be sent to Nagaland.

The result was that the anti-dacoity area was left with only 18-20 companies as against 32 companies of S.A.F. in the past, resulting in the re-emergence of new dacoit gangs and violence on a large scale. (Singh: 1963).

By November, 1962 S.A.F. in other parts of the state was once again available for duties in the anti-dacoity area. By 15th January, 1963 there were 31 companies. On 17th December, 1963 the Chief Minister and Deputy Minister (Home Affairs) held a conference of all Superintendents of Police, Collectors of the area, the Chief Secretary, Divisional Commissioner and Inspector General of Police to deal with the growing menace of dacoity. Further, on 20th July 1964 the Chief Minister presided over a one-day conference of the members of the State Vidhan Sabha from the dacoity-infested districts of the state of Madhya Pradesh where-in he announced the decision of the government to deploy a minimum strength of 35-40 companies of the Special Armed Force in the area and the setting up of several police stations and police out-posts with a priority to equip the force with necessary vehicles and wireless sets.

The Collectors were to be invested with additional powers to enable them to co-ordinate anti-dacoity work. The Chief Minister also announced some long term measures

for the socio-economic uplift of the area. Despite these anti-dacoity operations and strengthening of the police, the crime position as is clear from table-II (p.5), did not improve and the problem as such was no-where near solution. This, ^{with} despite the deployment of 42 companies of S.A.F. each comprising of 120 officers and men of the S.A.F. in the Gwalior Range with an estimated expenditure of Rs. 5 crores per year plus an additional expenditure of 120,380,000 during the years 1969-70 (Singh: 1970).

A review of the crime committed by the dacoit gangs during this period (i.e. late 60s and early 70's) leads one to conclude that the 'gains' were disproportionately small in comparison to the massive expenditure incurred.

It is clear that the frequency of encounters between the police and the dacoit had increased since after 1960 and had further increased during the period 1970-72. During the latter period the number of dacoits arrested and killed had also increased. The surrender of dacoits during the same period registered a high figure. But this includes the mass surrender in the presence of Jayaprakash Narayan. It is therefore argued by some that the increase in the quantum of force and suppression was the main reason why such a large-scale surrender of dacoits took place before Jayaprakash in 1972.

Table III

**Encounters, Deaths, Arrests and Surrenders in
the Districts of Bhind, Morena, Gwalior, Shivpuri,
Datia, Guna 1958-1972**

Year	Encounters	Dacoits shot dead	Dacoits arrested	Dacoits surrendered	Ratio of col. 2 : 3	Ratio of col. 2 : 5	Ratio of col. 3 : 4	Ratio of col. 3 : 5	Ratio of col. 4 : 5
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1958-60	152	132	456	118	1.15	1.29	0.29	1.12	3.86
1961-63	243	233	947	99	1.09	2.45	0.25	2.35	9.57
1964-66	240	229	1056	87	1.08	2.76	0.21	2.56	12.14
1967-69	214	170	1213	47	1.26	4.55	0.14	3.62	25.81
1970-72	266	314	1562	515	0.91	0.56	0.21	0.61	3.03

Note : 390 of 515 dacoits surrendered in 1972 in the 'Samarpan' ceremony.

Source : CID Office, Gwalior: 322 Dacoits surrendered from 14-4-72 to 6-6-72 and 68 dacoits surrendered from 7-6-72 to July, 1972.

However, the efforts of the police force despite its statistical achievements were of very limited significance in the terms of maintenance of law and order and in getting rid of the dacoity problem.

Almost similar, if not more discouraging was the fate of Gram Raksha Samities, an organised force of villagers. From 1966 to 1973 March 31, in Gwalior division¹ there were 4,274 Gram Raksha Samities (Village Defence Committees) with a membership of 88,305 persons. They had 626 encounters with the dacoits, gave active help to the police in killing 103 dacoits, were instrumental in the arrest of another 1,081 and in the release of 92 persons kidnapped by dacoits (C.I.D. Office Gwalior). In a way this organisation also failed in combating^t the crime situation mainly because of its (GRS) weak and ineffective resistance power against the well armed dacoit gangs.

Prior to the surrender of dacoits in Madhya Pradesh in 1972 according to the police records, there were 41 dacoit gangs in Gwalior division alone. These gangs were responsible for 842 murders, 664 dacoities and 1,415 kidnappings for ransom, and even after 902 encounters, with the police continued to terrorize the Chambal valley with their activities. The gangs were given code numbers by the police (as E.1, E.2, etc. i.e., Enemy No.1, 2, etc.) according to the incidence and severity of the crimes. It is in this context of the persistence of the deviant structures in the face of mounting challenges from the formal agencies of social control, that the sociological problem becomes sharpened^{2a}.

However experiment with the policy of persuasive non-violence was started as early as 1920 by Madhav Rao

1. ~~xxx~~

Gwalior Division in this study implies districts of Bhind, Morena, Gwalior, Shivpuri, Guna and Datia. At present a separate 'Chambal Division' comprising of districts of Bhind and Morena has been made out of the erstwhile Gwalior division.

1a. For a detailed account of the crimes^m committed by these gangs. see Appendix No. I

Seindia, but not continued long enough². With Vinoba in 1960, Jayaprakash Narayan in 1972 and S.N. Subbarao in 1976 being able to persuade large number of dacoits to surrender voluntarily, the problem had been taken up at a new level. It has been by and large, recognised that the phenomenon has its roots in the social structure constraints of the wider social environment.

Table IV

Voluntary Surrender of Dacoits of Chambal Valley
(1920-1976)

Year	Number of Dacoits surrendered	State
1920-1925	400	Madhya Pradesh
1960	20	Madhya Pradesh
1972	390	Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior division)
1976 June to 1976 August	90*	Uttar Pradesh
1976 August	21*	Rajasthan
Total :	921	

* Figures are inclusive of criminals other than dacoits who surrendered.

Source : 1. Bhatt, 1962: 31
2. Office of the Chambal Ghati
Seva Sansthan

2. see Chapter V

The surrender of dacoits of Chambal valley from time to time makes explicit that a manifestly deviant structure attempts an inte-gration into the structural milieu from which it sprang and to which it had been violent.

However, the pervasive nature of the phenomenon requires that we attempt to understand the problem in terms of the history, geography, social structure and the psychological motivations of the deviants in Chambal valley. Therefore, the relationship between the wider social system and the ways in which the articulation and conflict between the two was maintained needs to be examined.

Chapter IISOURCE MATERIAL AND FIELD WORK

The work attempted in this dissertation, as compared to the dimensions and scope of the problem at hand, is a limited one. The study is largely an attempt to review the existing theoretical and empirical literature for a more comprehensive and efficient formulation of the problem with a view to extend the study into more meaningful empirical dimensions. Therefore, empirical material has been obtained from the following sources :

- (1) Government Reports; Census Records
 - (a) Ravine Reclamations Report, District Gazetteers
 - (b) Crime situation enquiry reports etc..
- (2) Indian Police Journals
- (3) Madhya Pradesh Police Journals
- (4) Police Records from the volumes of Crime in India (Divisional Commissioner's Office)
 - (a) Gwalior (Divisional Head Quarter)
 - (b) Bhopal (Police Head Quarter)
- (5) Other Literature on the problem of dacoity :
 - (a) Project reports, Ph.D. publications

(b) Various News Papers:

(c) Literature by Sarvodaya - on the nature of the problem and mainly on surrender of 1960 and 1972

However, the availability of secondary source material was a problem, as not all relevant literature and data collected by various authorities and organisations could be found in Delhi. Hence this meant going to the data generating points. There was the additional problem of the available secondary source material falling short of the dimensions of enquiry. Since the secondary source had to be chased to the generating points, some data could also be collected at the primary level. The data-generating agencies thus also served as sources of primary data. Thus interviews with organisers of the 'Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan', the Sarvodaya organisation which is playing the vanguard role in the re-integration and rehabilitation of the dacoits, and with senior police officials, provided some invaluable insights on the nature of surrender and the implications of a nonviolent approach towards such crimes.

Table No. 5

**Details of Field Work : 20th December 1975
to 7th February, 1976.**

Place	Period of field(days)	Nature of Research Work	Nature of Data collected
MORENA	9	1. Collection of secondary source material - police records 2. Interviewed Superintendent of Police 3. Functionaries of C.G.S.S.*	Nature, rate of crime Dacoit problem Implication of Nonviolent approach to crime
MORENA Distt. Jail	1	1. Interviewed surrendered dacoits	Problem of dacoity, gang organisation, motivation for surrender
Gwalior	15	1. Data from University Library, police records, Commissioner's Office	Problem of dacoity, rehabilitation
MUNGAZI OPEN JAIL (Nav Jivan Shivir)	5	Interviewed prominent gang leaders	Case history, gang organisation motivation for surrender, rehabilitation, Problem of dacoity.
BHOPAL	10	Secondary source data	Problem of dacoity
Gwalior	7	Police and Commissioner's Office for Secondary data	Surrender and Rehabilitation of dacoits
Total :	47 days		

* Chambal Ghati Seva San-sthan

Interviews with the surrendered dacoits in the Morena district jail and Ma^ungali open jail (Nav^Jivan Shivir) were immensely rewarding. Data relating to gang organisation, their motivations for surrender, and the programme of rehabilitation which would cover their immediate future were collected. A similar opportunity was fully exploited while working at the 'Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan' in Gwalior. Here interviews with Tehsildar Singh, son of legendary Man Singh, and the famous Lokman, (the latter had surrendered in 1960) who were presently busy in accelerating the process of reintegration through surrender and rehabilitation, proved especially rewarding.

The Divisional Commissioner acceded to the request for granting me interviews with the dacoits who had surrendered in 1972 and were lodged in Ma^ungali open jail³ in district Guna. Five days of intensive interaction as a co-resident guest of the open jail enabled the establishment of excellent rapport with the surrendered dacoits. This further enriched the existing insights by the addition of several more concrete cases of dacoit behaviour. The first phase of field work took 47 days, from 20th December 1975 to 7th February 1976.

3. Renamed as Nav Jivan Shivir

The second visit to the field between May 25, to 5th June 1976 enabled me to witness the surrender of dacoits in Bateshwar, Uttar Pradesh. Data on 63 dacoits who surrendered on 3rd June 1976 in the presence of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, was collected. Here, some of the dacoits who had surrendered in 1960 and 1972, were also present. During the twelve day span it was possible to observe and record the phenomenon of surrender .

The third spell of field work helped complete the entire cycle of the process. From August 12 to September 2, 1976, the negotiations carried on between the Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan and the dacoits for their surrender was observed and recorded. For this several trips had to be made into dense forests through forbidding terrain to meet the dacoits. The process of negotiation brought me into contact with the families of the dacoits. It also enabled a more realistic appraisal of the attitude of the local people, the police and the workers of the Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan. The surrender of the dacoits took place at Talab Shah-i sub division, Dholpur on August 29, 1976. The phenomenon of surrender could, at last, be observed almost in its totality.

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It should be noted that a problem such as the present one has certain constraints. Since the events themselves can be observed and recorded to get an idea of the process of reintegration, one has to chase the events as and when they occur. To let the events take place, and get the details of it at a later time from the actors themselves, is not the same as seeing the events take place and recording them as a participant or non-participant witness. Therefore, to a large extent, the research design and plan of research had to be flexible, adjusting to the constraints of the events occurring in the field of study. Necessarily in the context of the present modest effort, some data will spill over as being more relevant to a more comprehensive formulation of the problem and, therefore, will have to be kept in store for future analysis along with other relevant data to be collected in future.

Chapter IIITHE PROBLEM AND THE THEORETIC FRAMEWORK

A number of serious efforts towards the formulation of theoretical approaches for the explanation and understanding of crime have been made in the past few decades. Though the advancements fall short of the requirements and expectations of the problem, some good theoretical contributions to the understanding of crime is now available. An analysis and interpretation of deviant behaviour being too complex inevitably leads one to the use of interdisciplinary approaches.

The sociologically oriented approaches to crime assume that the criminal is not an isolated individual; he is the product of his society. Instead of looking for the causes of crime within the individual himself, as hypothesised by the biological and psychological theorists, the sociologist takes the criminal as a member of his social group, viewing him as a phenomenon whose criminal conduct originates in the abnormalities of his social existence or in the behaviour of the society towards him. The main argument being that any solution to the problem of crime can be found in an analysis of the criminal's relationship to his social environment (Schafer 1969: 234).

There is an attempt by Schafer to classify theories relating to criminal behaviour into 'offensive and defensive', categories. Theories of the offensive category are those which 'attack the criminal' whose 'free will' reacts to social injustice and provokes him to direct his aggression towards the society in the form of crime. Theories falling within the purview of the defensive category view crime as a product of a disorganised society or as an outcome of social pressures. Here the emphasis is on social defence rather than on criminality, as criminal conduct is a product of the social context. It is further argued by Schafer that the main assumption in the 'offensive' approach is that it is the individual who decides of his own whether or not to engage in crime. The criminal comes to realise that his aspirations cannot be satisfactorily met because his society is either unnecessarily constraining or is partially or wholly unjust. Unable to attain his aspirations, through available institutionalised means he attacks society by deviant means for the attainment of material ends denied by the normative channels of legitimate means, on the other hand, the basic theoretical element in the 'defensive' approaches to crime is the interaction between the criminal and his environment, while at the same time the personal responsibility of the criminal is also acknowledged (Schafer, 1969: 236-242).

However, this categorisation of various theories on crime into 'defensive' and 'offensive' categories by Schafer, does not bring out any major differences between the two. The role of imperfect socialisation and social structural disorganisation is made very clear and given consideration simultaneously in both these orientations. This in turn leads one to ask what are the points of departure between the two approaches, to which Schafer's explanations are inadequate.

In the sociological theoretical approaches to the problem of crime, one view, holds that culture with its conflicting values and norms is responsible for leading man against the criminal law. In "a society which is characterised by dynamic quality, complexity, material insistence upon the importance of status, restricted group loyalties, survival of frontier traditions, tolerance of political corruption, acceptance of a quasi-criminal exploitation there will be many conflicts often taking the form of crime" (Taft, and England 1964: 275-279). Such type of ~~many~~ theories contend that there are inconsistencies in the social structure and an uneven distribution of values, means, goals and rewards. Durkheim's position in this context is that anomie, a situation characterised

by lack of rules, absence of norms, lawlessness or weakened norms, may lead to deviant behaviour. Such a situation obtains in societies which cannot or do not provide clear norms for guiding aspirations of individuals and groups. Thus when the balance between cultural aspirations and social opportunities is lost, anti-social or deviant behaviour is likely to develop.

Merton relates deviance and social structure basically using Durkheim's idea of anomie. He differentiates man's cultural aspirations from the institutional means available for their satisfaction. An effective equilibrium is maintained as long as satisfaction accrues to individuals who conform to both the constraints - the satisfaction from achieving goals and the satisfaction with the institutionally set modes of striving towards these ends. Aberrant conduct, therefore may be viewed as a symptom of disassociation between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means. The Mertonian argument is "that a society places great emphasis on individual success, while at the same time it excludes part of the society from achieving this success. Deviant behaviour is not generated simply by the lack of opportunities rather a comparatively rigidified class structure, a feudalistic or caste order, may limit such opportunities". (Schafer, 1969: 246).

Albert K. Cohen considers Merton's 'anomie' lacking in explanation for certain kinds of deviant behaviour. The explanation for non-utilitarian and destructive nature of much deviant behaviour, is not given its due share in this approach. The fact that even under such circumstances as explained by the theory a majority of the persons do not behave in a deviant manner, while others do, also remains ignored in this theory.

Marvin E. Wolfgang and F. Ferracutti in their theory of the 'Subculture of Violence' try to provide an explanation for criminal behaviour. Their theory draws from : (a) sociological theory of culture, social and personality systems, culture conflict, differential association and value systems; (b) psychological theory of learning, conditioning, developmental socialization and differential identification, (c) criminological research on criminal homicide and other assaultive crimes.

It is argued, that, the crimes of violence are most common among a relatively homogenous subcultural group, in any large urban community and also in some rural areas. From the psychological point of view it is hypothesized that the greater the degree of integration of the individual into the subculture of violence the higher the probability that his behaviour will be violent in a variety of situations. Sociologically, there should be a direct relationship between rates of homicide and the extent to

which the subculture of violence represents a cluster of values around the theme of violence. The overt use of force or violence either in inter-personal relationships or in group interactions is generally to be viewed as a reflection of basic values that stand apart from the dominant, the central or parental culture. The following corollary propositions are offered in this approach for its support :

- i. No subculture can be totally different from or totally in conflict with the society of which it is a part.
- ii. To establish the existence of a subculture of violence does not require that the actors sharing in these basic value elements should express violence in all situations.
- iii. The potential of willingness to resort to violence in a variety of situations emphasises the penetrating and diffusive character of this culture theme.
- iv. The subcultural ethos of violence may be shared irrespective of age in a sub-society, but it is most prominent in a limited age group, ranging from late adolescence to middle age.
- v. The counter norm is non-violence.
- vi. The development of favourable attitudes towards, and the use of violence, in a subculture usually involve learned behaviour and a process of differential learning association or identification.
- vii. The use of violence in a sub-culture is not necessarily viewed as illicit conduct and the users therefore do not have to deal with feelings

of guilt about their aggression.
 (Wolf-gang, Savitz and Johnston, 1970: 380-87)

Gibbens and Ahrenfeldt takes the definition given by Gordon (Gordon, 1947: 40-42), of subculture, ".....a subdivision of a national culture composed of combination of factorable situations such as class, status, ethnic background, regional and rural or urban residence and religious affiliation, but forming in their combination a functioning unity which has an integrated impact on the participating individual." (Gibbens and Ahrenfeldt, 1971: 52). It is contended by Gibbens that, "There have existed throughout history, in very different countries and cultures, rigidly and elaborately organised groups for whom serious form of crime, including violence and murder, has constituted a way of life or a substantial element of their social and cultural pattern of behaviour". Some of the socio-economic components of the social pattern, may be there, as influencing and controlling factors, in these groups, there may enter economic, political, religious and other components, and not infrequently several of these are inextricably interwoven in the social pattern" (Gibbens and Ahrenfeldt, 1971: 60-61).

However, the sub-culture of violence and the other sub-culture approaches, though being a blend of a number of socio-psychological approaches for explaining the phenomena of crime causation, are not without their shortcomings.

The theorists themselves, in the first place, are not clear about how a subculture whether that of violence or constituting of any other criminal activity, originates. The basis of the integration of the subculture also lacks explanation. What follows from these constructs is that the act of murder is taken as one of the main indicators of violence. But the act of murder is not so simple if we see it in terms of the motivations of the murderer. Even taking the act of murder as an indicator of violence, one has to simultaneously ask; what kind of gain it is leading to? Individual, collective or ideological gain?

Further cannot one also argue that murders (on a large scale but as separate incidents) are possible because there are societal mechanisms by which one can escape or stand a good chance of escaping legal punishment and retain the profits of the crime? It raises the doubt that more or less such behaviour is a function of social stratification and its relationship with the mechanisms of social control. In this situation, can it not be the case that the subculture of violence is being maintained in the interest of the 'subculture' of orderly behaviour? In such an approach, the precise content of supposed sub-cultural differences, require a clear specification. "It is possible for example that rather than a subculture of

violence, something like a subculture of muscularity exists with violence being only one of many possible outlets and not necessarily the preferred one".

(Erlanger, Dec.1974: 280) Due consideration therefore, also needs to be given to the origin, continuation and the relationship of a subculture to the social structure.

The main contention of Cortes and Gatti is that there is a lack of consideration of psychological variables in the sociological approaches and vice-versa. After organising various orientations of empirical knowledge Cortes and Gatti arrive at the theoretical formulation that, "Criminal and delinquent behaviour are the result of a negative imbalance within the individual in the interaction between (a) the expressive forces of his psychological and biological characteristics and (b) the normative forces of familial, religious and socio-cultural factors". (Cortes and Gatti,1972: 189)

In order to provide a theoretical formulation for the explanation of dacoity in Chambal valley, accounting for its origin, continuation and a sort of social acceptance of it in the society it is very clear that all these theoretical formulations given above are quite inadequate. Even the 'biopsychosocial approach' along with its other shortcomings, can be criticized partly, as another traditional theory. This approach

appears to be 'non-structural' and 'a historical' in terms of its modes of analysis.

By limiting the analysis to factors which are manipulable within existing structural arrangements, the impact of political economy, has not been given any consideration. "From this point of view deviance is 'in' but not 'of' our contemporary social order. Theories that locate the source of deviance in factors as diverse as personality structure, family systems, cultural transmissions, social disorganisation and differential opportunity - share a common flaw: - they attempt to understand deviance apart from historically specific forms of political and economic organisation". (Spitzer, June 1975: 638-640). The lack of a sense of historical development views deviance as an episodic and transitory phenomenon rather than as an outgrowth of a long term structural change. In the efforts towards the formulation of a theory an attempt should also be made towards the establishment of a relationship between deviance, social structure and social change.

Sarvodaya Strategy and Philosophy.

The sarvodaya understanding of the deviant 'baghi' behaviour, implicitly or explicitly, takes account of three major aspects of the problem. Firstly, it gives importance to the historicity of the problem and recognises the persistence of a deviant subculture. Therefore, it is at the

level of preferred values that change has to be directed. Culture, that is, has to be tackled at the value-plane. Secondly, violence as an operating principle is devalued and the superiority of non-violence and cooperation is emphasized. Thirdly, it recognises that the structural source of the deviant subculture lies in the exploitative social system.

Consistent with its stand on nonviolent means for the attainment of social, economic and cultural objectives, an enduring solution of this problem of deviance, it is generally understood, lies in a nonviolent solution of the problem. However, the sarvodaya solution does not envisage lifting of the police operation except during short periods permitted for voluntary surrender. Therefore, the sarvodaya strategy is to reduce if not eliminate, the continuous turnover of 'baghi' recruits. This is attempted in two ways. Firstly, by rehabilitating the dacoit families which have voluntarily surrendered so that the incidence of recidivism is low. Secondly, by encouraging the emergence of new structures at the grass root village level which would engage in efficient problem resolution and democratic conflict articulation⁴.

Thus the sarvodaya approach approximates to the theoretical schools which recognise the primacy of sociological factors in the explanation of much of deviant

4. On the basis of interviews with the Sarvodaya workers, working in the Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan, in various capacities.

behaviour. It therefore tries to manipulate the social structure both to bring back deviants into the legitimate fold, and to prevent the reinforcement of the deviant structures by reducing its recruitment. In the process it is expected that the emergent structure would pave the way for social changes at the grassroots.

There is another important dimension which cannot be ignored in an appraisal of the Sarvodaya intervention to counter the 'baghi' problem. This is the concept of 'man' in sarvodaya philosophy. Sarvodaya thought rules out the assumption of 'the wicked man' or the 'selfish man', as far as human nature is concerned. Rather 'man' is good at the core. The view that human nature is a mere social construct is discarded in its totality. No person is completely wicked. Though human nature might get 'rusted' on the surface on account of various factors but there is an innate nobility even in an apparently ignoble man (Doctor, 1967: 7). The only difference between the good and the bad man is that in the latter the good is dormant^o. In man there are two conflicting forces: self-love and self-sacrifice. Sarvodaya seeks to rescue the principle of self-sacrifice (Doctor, 1967: 7-8). Based on the innate goodness and capacity for improvement of human nature, mutual conflict is discarded as the dominant or governing principle of human life. If there comes to

^o See Appendix No.2, also.

exist a mutual conflict, ^{by GAN} reasons given by Sarvodaya are : defective education or the emergence of false sense of values.

Having accepted that human nature is malleable, that it can change for the better, Sarvodaya proposes that it is possible by rational appeals and through a nonviolent approach, persons can be trained in the virtues of truth, nonviolence, self-sacrifice, self-control and could be won over and transformed (Doctor, 1967: 9). Since a 'divine light' resides in the heart of every human being the possibility of reform is always there in case of the hardest of criminals.

And finally, "Sarvodaya incorporates within it the positive and benevolent aspects of Gandhian ahimsa. It is intensely practical but based on the foundations of truth and non-violence" (Kottaren, 1973: 211). And as a principle, "Non-violence' may, according to content, mean mere abstinence from the use of physical force; but, in its highest form, it is used to indicate not only the absence of anger and ill will but the presence of active good will towards persons guilty of the most heinous crimes" (Santharam, 1960: 8). In Sarvodaya, the main stress is on the use of non-violent means, ^{and} ethically, ~~the~~ violent means must be ruled out because these seek to solve the problem by annihilating one party or suppressing its freedom. While on the practical level, the use of violence is undesirable for it can never

achieve a lasting result (Doctor, 1967: 12-13).

The phenomenon of deviance in the Chambal valley is unique in as much as it has a historicity in political rebellion which is one important reason why the image of the 'baghi' (rebel) is not precisely that of a dacoit in the ordinary sense of the term. The 'baghi-subculture' articulates with the wider social and cultural milieu within a framework of historically evolved norms of expected behaviour. Thus there has come into existence certain historically conditioned, institutionalised norms of behaviour which regulate the conduct of the 'baghi'. However, the extent to which such norms of behaviour have been facing erosion is an indicator of the social changes occurring in the wider environment, the deviant 'baghi' still possesses a positive content in his image-configuration. Thus depending upon the role-performance of the 'baghi' they are hierarchised by the wider society in terms of the quantum of positive content that individual 'baghis' acquire in their interaction with the wider society. A 'baghi' like Man Singh was lionised, venerated, and given a legendary status.

The 'baghi-sub-culture' is also related to the feudal structure of the economy. Endemic factionalism as the basis of power for competing elites, the patron-client

alliances for mutual substance and mobility of its constituents, the land based economy with a tradition of paying tributes to the immediate overlords, all help to sustain the 'baghi subculture' by providing it with its material and non-material resource base.

The Chambal Valley phenomenon is unique in another important sense. No parallel instance can be cited of a deviant structure attempting a reintegration into the wider socio-cultural environment with which it was at variance. Nor do we find a society responding to such possibilities of reintegration in the manner in which such efforts have been made by our top political elite. Consequently, theories of deviance draw a complete blank on the problem of reintegration of the deviant sub-culture with the prevalent legitimate culture. One question that naturally arises is: does the voluntary surrender of dacoits indicate social changes in the wider environment, or is the phenomenon more complex than what appears to the eye?

It is the attempt to answer such questions that provide the theoretical - methodological orientation of the present study.

Chapter IVTHE STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF DEVIANT GANGSStructure of Gangs:

In order to understand the structure of deviance we have to examine : (a) the structure of the dacoit gangs in terms of its normative patterns regulating interactions between individuals within such groups (b) the process of recruitment, socialization and expulsion of its member; (c) goals of the dacoit gangs; (d) and finally the relationship between such gangs.

This will enable us to project how such groups maintained their solidarity through a mechanism of rewards and punishments, as well as the manner in which they derived their persistence by articulating with the structures external to it.

Leadership :

The role of leadership in the dacoit gangs of Chambal valley happens to be an important aspect of the institution of dacoity. In the first place, meeting the requirements of the gang in terms of supply of arms and ammunition , food, clothing, shelter and the arrangements

This chapter is based on interviews with the surrendered dacoits, during my three visits to the field.

for conducting various operations - dacoities, kidnappings for ransom, and murder etc., happens to be the main responsibility of the leader of the gang. So it is but natural that he has to be a person with wide networks in the wider society. A dacoit gang 'functions' only by dint of its helpers, harbourers and agents. It is again the leader of the gang who establishes a network of 'agents' outside the gang. He is also the sole authority in matters of recruitment, solving the disputes among the members, expulsion of any member from the gang and the distribution of the loot. In a dacoit gang there can be no 'law' other than the word of the leader. The disobedience of the leader, in any form, on the part of any of the gang members results in serious repercussions for that member.

However, the powers a leader assumes is a function of the requirements and welfare of the gang members. And the members, in turn, knowing full well that they have to depend for their requirements on a network of informers, helpers harbourers etc. accept the imperative dependence on their leader for their requirements and even for their existence. In order to gain in organisational and operational efficiency for the sake of maximising pay-offs, the gangs are sub-divided into smaller groups under command of 'lieutenants' appointed by the leader. There are at least four determinants of hierarchy in a

gang namely, that of (a) age, (b) caste, (c) the number of years a person has been a dacoit and (d) the relationship (kinship ties, familial ties, friendship ties) with the leader of the gang. Generally, the members who happen to have kinship or familial ties with the leader of the gang are respected by other members. The leader also tends to treat such members as his 'lieutenants'. As far as age is concerned the respect shown to an aged member is comparable with the norms of the wider society. This has nothing to do with the other strategic plans and policies of the gang, respect to elders did not mean power to them. The role of caste conforms to the norms of hierarchical stratification in the wider society. In assigning the routines of the ganglife, caste is taken very much into consideration by the leader. A member is generally not made to do any kind of work which his caste forbids him to do. Though there is a domination of the caste in the gang, to which the leader belongs, yet he is anxious to have members from a large number of castes, which in a way facilitates the routine functioning of the group particularly when the it is located at a place for a long stretch of time. Like age, caste has also no significant role to play in decision-making or plans and policies of the gang.

As for, the number of years, a person has been a dacoit and particular skills, if any, (marksmanship, knowledge of the networks etc.) that he may have come to acquire are given

due recognition and he is often consulted by the leader. The privileges accorded to him are in the form of better dress and better weapons in comparison to the less privileged.

Recruitment Socialisation and Expulsion.

Persons willing to join a gang usually have one or more of the following attributes : (a) persons seeking revenge through an intended murder, (b) a person already with one or more murder to his record, (c) helpers and harbourers of a gang whose activities have been disclosed to the police, and (d) persons who are seeking refuge from law for some serious crime, real or alleged. The decision to recruit a new member is taken by the leader with extreme caution for fear he might turn out a police informer with disastrous results for the gang. Even in case of a murderer the rules are not relaxed. Thorough inquiry is made about his statements regarding the persons whom he states to have murdered, the time, place, and the conditions under which the murder took place and so on. The gang also enquires how many persons know of the murder committed by him, especially the police. Only when this screening is over does he gain admission to the gang. Again no matter whether a person is on the run for petty crimes or for having been an informer or harbourer, or one who is intending murder and is on the run to save his life from his opponents, he is

scrupulously scrutinized and the rigour of scrutiny remains the same irrespective of the background of the new 'applicant'.

In case of a new recruit, if the leader finds the person of some use to the gang after having satisfied himself on his antecedents (i.e., after making sure ^{that} the entrant is not a police informer) he is admitted to the gang subject to the condition that some land-lord or well-known person stands security for the person concerned. Only after having made the new entrant a party to a major crime his loyalty is assured in a gang⁵. Sometimes a dacoit intends to migrate from one gang to another. In such a case enquiries are made by the gang leader from the gang to which he belonged and now wishes to migrate. His conduct in the other gang is verified as to whether or not he was instrumental in any way in reaching harm to the gang by taking away weapons from the gang, by quarrelling with the leader or any other member, by being dishonest and so on, or whether the desire to shift is a case primarily of preference. These enquiries are also made from the person directly. When fully satisfied the leader grants him entry into his gang otherwise his request is turned down. Even after all these precautions, the entrant's weapon,

5. I came across some dacoits who had not committed a murder, but accompanied the gang at all times.

if he possesses any, is seized by the leader for the time being. For at least two months he is not put on watch duties during night or day. Some trusted members of the gang are deputed by the leader to keep a strict vigilance over the new entrant's activities, behaviour etc. for a considerable period of time. In some big gangs, the new comer is made to do odd jobs for the gang members, during this period of probation. With the passage of time ^{only} when the leader as well as other members become fully convinced of the faithfulness of the newcomer is he treated as a co-member, and at that stage, if he had a weapon in the beginning which was seized by the leader, he is allowed to regain possession of it. If, however, he had come empty handed, he is provided with one.

The entrants to the gang, except the migrants from other gangs, mostly are used to the daily routine of the village life. The life in a gang as compared to the routines of village life is vastly dissimilar. It is but natural that the new entrant has to be socialized into the culture and structure of gang organisation and its functioning with its various operations of dacoity, murders, kidnappings for ransom, encounters with police, opposition from villagers and so on. Besides, he has to get used to running from place to place, learn to procure arms, ammunition and other

articles of daily use. Above all, one has to keep himself and other members 'safe'.

In the first place, an entrant is imparted the training and knowledge of the use, maintenance and minor repair of fire-arms. He is given training relating to the major operations like dacoities, kidnappings, murders and how to confront encounters with police and resistance by villagers. He is also duly trained in the code signals used by the gang and some of the routes for moving about. Only after the gang has come to acknowledge the sincerity of the entrant, is he given the names and address of a few agents of the gang in case he gets separated from the gang and has to secure shelter before rejoining the gang.

The entrant is made fully aware of the severity of the punishment by the gang in case he violates the rules. e.g., disobedience to the leader, quarrelling with co-members, caught sleeping while on watch, dishonesty with the gang in matters of money (of the loot) and finally any other harm to the gang like running away with the weapon of the leader and passing on any of the information of the gang to outsiders (specially to the police). The punishments range from a simple imposition of fine to expulsion from the gang (with the seizure of the weapon possessed) and to even murder of the defaulter by the gang.

It is obvious that certain common experiences of the gang members provide the basis of their socialization. Thus the refuge one seeks from fugitive status is provided by the gang. The feeling of fraternity is based on the commonality of their experience prior to entry in the gang. The rigours of gang life is the price one pays to avoid the deterrent consequences of law which appear inescapable more so with the multiplication of crime tallies. The greater the record of crime the more certain the verdict of law, the greater the magnitude of punishment, hence greater the logic for maintaining the deviant structure. This is the vicious circle.

As in the case of recruitment, the leader of the gang is the authority who decides the expulsion of a member from his gang. If a member is very quarrelsome and in any one of his quarrels, (though the quarrels among the members of the gang are very rare), picks up the gun on another member then the punishment may range between an imposition of a fine to expulsion. This fine is often in the shape of contribution of a certain amount of money for some religious cause. But in the case when a member has serious difference with the leader and happens to exhibit his disapproval of any of the orders of the leader, his weapon is forfeited by the leader and he is expelled from the gang.

The murder of a member by the leader (or on his order) takes place only in case of serious discord between the two, or in the event of a serious default, which might be harmful to the whole gang. Events of this type are very rare. Man Singh, the legendary bandit, had laid down a strict code of conduct for the members of his gang. There are a few instances of transgressions of the code of the gang by the members of his gang as a result of which they were shot dead by the gang itself. Similarly, Lakhan Singh who also believed in practising dacoity 'nobly', when he found his own nephew Hazuri Singh guilty of rape, reportedly killed all his associates and even fired at him, but somehow he managed to escape death. Amritlal said to be one of the most cunning dacoits shot dead some of his gang members whom he suspected of being in collusion with the police.

Functioning of Gangs.

The main aim of a dacoit gang is the maintenance of its own existence 'as a gang'. For this it requires financial resources. There are several courses open to dacoits for obtaining money:

- (i) through dacoity, (ii) by kidnapping for ransom ,
- (iii) by collecting 'chanda', a sort of tax imposed upon the

inhabitants of a village, (iv) by accepting 'tika' a sort of 'fee' paid by lesser criminals or by some rich men buying their own safety, from the gangs.

Money itself is not enough for the survival of the gang. It needs to establish an 'efficient' network of helpers and contact-men who alert the gang members in the wake of danger. Also, the elimination of the erstwhile opponents of the gang leader and/or of the members is given its due share of consideration. While on the otherhand, the elimination of police informers, ~~against~~ is considered necessary for the very survival of the gang. It is significant to observe here in passing, that the criminality of the dacoits do not turn them into agnostics. On the contrary, their religious concern is all the more acute and there are numerous manifestations of superstitions. There are several religious practices and considerations, to which due attention is paid by the dacoits before they set ^{out} on any excursion.

During the field study, it was found that this religious complex still had considerable hold on the dacoits. All the dacoits who were interviewed stated that they took into consideration a lot of signs and symbols and various omens before they started on any excursion. However, they denied that they worshipped regularly or performed religious rites before setting on any excursion. Many of the gangs until 1970's used to keep one per cent

of their loot for religious practices. Some of the dacoit leaders have constructed temples, contributed 'bells' to the temples, one even tried to run a school. Many, it is stated, provided financial help for the marriage of poor men's daughters. When asked how they could explain the coexistence of criminality on the one hand, and their religious and charitable practices on the other, they remarked that they (dacoits) were not innately criminals, that they were forced by circumstances to adopt the practice of murder, loot etc., that when confronted with serious encounters with the police and death stared them in the face, only God helped them to remain alive. These contributions and donations, particularly in temples, schools etc., have a two-fold motivation. One, to earn 'virtues' (punya) in the eyes of God, and the other, to perpetuate their own memories. It is interesting to note how certain superstitions, practices and beliefs are taken into consideration before launching on an excursion, whether of dacoity, kidnapping, murder or moving from one place to another :

(a) On Tuesdays and Wednesdays movement towards north is not considered good. On Mondays and Saturdays movement towards east is not considered good. On Fridays and Sundays movement towards west is not considered good.

(b) On Wednesday, 'Chauth' i.e., on the fourth day of the new moon, and on 'Padva', they do not shave, wash clothes or use soap.

(c) If any of the gang members happen to have a police encounter in a dream and that too in the early hours of the day, it is considered bad⁶.

(d) Certain animals and other omens are considered bad signs e.g., if a snake, or donkey, or a one-eyed person, or a widow with a water container on her head, if any of these crosses the way, it is a bad omen.

(e) The sub-groups sent by the leader on some errand consist of 'odd' number of members as 'even' numbers are considered unlucky.

(f) If a fox happens to cross the way, if a deer crosses from the right side, the sight of a cow with its calf or that of a Neelkanth (a type of bird), all these are considered as good omens.

However, the most overarching importance is that of a process of finding meaning out of a random sample of words from Ramayana by the equal interval method. If the interpretation of such a random assortment of words conflicts with a bad omen, the former prevails over the latter.

Dacoity: Successful execution of this sort of crime, like other crimes, depends much upon the advance gathering of information on the following points; the

6. Some of the dacoits denied faith in dreams.

exact location of the place of crime, the routes of approach and retreat, the presence of police, distance of the nearest police post and the time it would take the police to reach the place of crime, the amount of wealth available for loot, the number of persons in the house to be looted, the presence of fire arms in that particular house or houses and in the whole village, and the probability of resistance by the inmates, villagers as a whole and the 'Gram Raksha Samiti' etc.

The gang leader, after ascertaining the above logistics and any new developments that may have taken place, plans the action to be taken. He arrives at the final decision of the operation - time, date, routes etc. , only in consultation with his trusted lieutenants. The plan is unfolded to all gang members, just before the operation has to begin. Each member is assigned his role.

Accordingly, the dacoit gang then approaches its target secretly. After taking over the routes of entry and exit to that place, shots are fired in the air to announce the arrival of the gang. Then the house which is to be looted is fired at constantly. An announcement is made to all the other persons with a threat of murder if they interfere with the operation of the gang. The dacoits take over the house either by force by breaking

open the doors, or by scaling over the walls or by forcing the inhabitants to open the doors. At this time, one or two dacoits take positions on a high place to keep a better watch.

However, different dacoit gangs or the same gang on different occasions may adopt somewhat different strategies for taking over the possession of the target of the loot. Sometimes, after establishing full control over the surroundings secretly, one of the dacoits, calls out the owner of the house posing himself as one of his distant relative. As soon as the doors are opened, the dacoits enter the house and declare their real identity. Sometimes the gang comes up in the disguise of a police party and after entering the house discloses the identity of the gang.

After having controlled the situation the dacoits try their best through threats, beating and in some cases, murder of any of the inmate(s), (in case of resistance) to get maximum amount of booty or at least the speculated amount. However while committing a dacoity, dacoits try to avoid committing a murder. But if they face any resistance they have no hesitation in killing anyone.

Finally, after the successful execution of the whole operation, the members of the gang announce the name

of gang leader. After this, the gang retreats to its appointed place secretly.

Kidnapping requires more careful planning than the commission of dacoity, although the entire operation is more time-consuming yet, since the years prior to surrender it has become a more favoured deviant activity with the dacoits of the valley. The dacoit gang is more sure of its returns through kidnapping than through dacoity. Like dacoity, prior information and planning is a prerequisite for planning a strategy for kidnapping. Generally, two methods have been identified by which a gang is able to get hold of a kidnapee. The gang can commission its own agents and organise a kidnapping. Alternatively some times a smaller gang may kidnap somebody and 'sell' it to the bigger gang at a 'price' lower than expected from the party who would seek his release from captive status.

In the first instance, the role of the agents of the gang is very important, as they are the persons who have to take all the responsibilities for the successful execution of the plan. Usually, such agents develop a sort of 'friendship' with the target who is to be kidnapped. After winning over his confidence, on some pretext or the other he is taken to a pre-arranged place where some of

the gang members or the whole of the gang lie in wait for them. The agent has to perform a very crucial role as he has to keep in touch with the gang as well as with the target who is to be kidnapped, concurrently. The agents of some of the gangs have been so clever that on at least two instances the Chambal dacoit were successful in kidnapping persons from Delhi.

In the second case, the role of the agents is limited merely to supplying information to 'buyers' and 'sellers' of kidnapped persons. They act as some kind of brokers who help effecting the 'transaction'. Sometimes, a person is kidnapped only to be eliminated. These are generally persons suspected as the agents of police and staunch enemies of dacoits.

The major goal of a dacoit gang in case of a kidnapping is to extract a reasonable amount of ransom. Generally in the event of nonpayment of ransom by the family of the kidnappee the dacoits wait for a period of time⁷, after which another person from the same family may be kidnapped. When the gang is certain beyond doubt that it is not going to get any ransom the kidnappee is either murdered, or in some rare cases set free.

7. Some gang leaders stated that they had kept the kidnapped persons with them for two^{to} three years.

From the time of planning until the release of a kidnappee from the gang, it is a very long period of time during which an 'outsider' comes to stay with the gang for a sufficient period of time. Keeping in view the very conditions under which the dacoit gang has to operate and the presence of an outsider as a sort of prisoner, the gang has to devise a strategy specific to the situation. As soon as the dacoit gang takes charge of a kidnappee it at once starts moving, generally covering a distance of 15-20 miles. Then the leader starts questioning the kidnappee about the economic status of his family and the amount of money which can be extracted as ransom for his release. During such type of questioning, the kidnapped person is subjected to various degrees of physical torture (or threat of it) in order to get at a correct assessment of the financial position of the family. When the leader is convinced that the kidnappee's statements are true by comparing them with that of the agent of the gang, a decision about the ransom-demand is arrived at. If during this period of interrogation the kidnappee receives any serious injury he is provided with adequate treatment. After this he is generally not treated badly, except in the presence of his family members or relatives who come to secure his release. He is beaten up in their

presence to create an impression of what lies in ^{store} wait for him, in case the ransom demanded is not forthcoming. The kidnapped person is under strict vigilance by the gang all the 24 hours of the day and is carefully kept out of the secrets of the gang. Whenever the agents of the gang, or some local villagers pay a visit, the kidnappees are taken away at some distance where they cannot see or hear anything.

The kidnappee is not left unemployed. He is made to do various jobs for the gang, but mostly according to his caste status. Whenever, the gang is on move, he is made to carry loads or help in some other way. However, the gang sees to it, that the person is not harrassed unnecessarily and in case of a rich kidnappee, who is expected to pay a heavy amount of ransom, some special concessions are granted to him in terms of food, clothes and duties assigned to him.

Negotiations for the release of the kidnappee generally, do not start immediately with the act of kidnapping. The gang after 15 days or ^{even} a month sends information to the family concerned that such and such gang has kidnapped such and such person and the amount of ransom demanded is also conveyed to the family. In its first communication the gang does not indicate the place, nor fixes one, where the family members or some relatives could

contact the gang to secure the release. Rather the other party is supposed to act on its own and find a person who might act as a go-between. If the gang comes to know that the other party is either in-active or unable to find a go-between, then again information is sent to them and a person is indicated by the gang whom the other party could contact. The threat to life of the kidnapped person and grave consequences for the members of the family as a whole is always emphasised by the gang. When the other party comes in contact with the person either indicated by the dacoits or of its own the agent of the dacoits only after being assured that the party has no evil designs (like informing the police etc.) then he accompanies the person, and takes him to the gang, but not before informing the gang. When the family member of the kidnappee or some of his relatives happens to come to the gang, he finds the kidnapped person being beaten up by the gang (in most of the cases he is also rebuked and threatened with grave consequences). The gang leader then decides when, where and how much ransom has to be paid. If a person having some influence with the gang happens to intervene on behalf of the kidnapped person and asks for his immediate release with or without ransom, ~~then~~ the outcome solely depends on the amount of influence such a person commands over the dacoits. Though some gang leaders may agree to oblige in one or two such

in instances, in general this practice is disapproved and discouraged. Sometimes when a leader is pestered with entreaties and requests from all kinds of people including influentials, he threatens to double the ransom in order to ward off such attempts at release.

After receiving the ransom, the kidnappee is allowed to go to home with strict instructions that if he discloses any of the secrets (though full efforts are made to hide all the secrets) of the gang to the police or to some one else, he along with his family would be murdered. The person is instructed not to go to the police. He is also given some amount of money so that he faces no difficulty in reaching home (in case the gang is far away from the residence of the kidnappee). As soon as the person leaves the gang and sets for ~~their~~ home, the gang also leaves that place.

Finally, when a person is released after getting the ransom, there is a sort of agreement among all the dacoit gangs that a person who has been kidnapped once is not to be kidnapped again, either by the same gang or any other.

The police, on the other hand, tries to get information about dacoits from a released person. And in case the person concerned is instrumental in reaching any harm to the gang through the police, the dacoits spare no efforts to kill that person.

Another source of finance we have already observed, is the 'chanda'. It is a sort of levy or forced subscription imposed upon the whole of the village by a particular gang. This sort of extraction of money does not require much planning or hazards for the gang. Only terror and carefulness while accepting money is required on their part. A warning is sent to a particular village that a certain amount of money is required by the gang at a particular time. If the villagers fail to handover the required amount of money or inform the police, the village would be set on fire and the inhabitants murdered. In case the village as a whole decides to pay the money and without any evil design, the agents of the gang take five or six persons of the village to the gang and the amount is paid to the leader. Sometimes the gang visits the village and collects it. However no two gangs would impose 'chanda' on the same village, nor is a demand made by any other gang if a certain village is paying 'chanda' to some other gang already, to avoid conflict among themselves. The inhabitants of the village are assured by the gang that they will not be harrassed by any other gang or by this gang if they continue to pay 'chanda' without default.

'Tika' is a form of tribute paid by lesser criminals like smugglers etc. to ^{an} established gang leader. It is

a voluntary contribution to the leader and not to the gang as a whole. The gang does not have to make any efforts to retrieve such money. Also those who earn through forest products pay such tribute to ensure their safety. This sort of tribute to the gang leaders is also singular in character, after winning over the confidence of any one of the gangs, the person concerned need not fear about his well being from any other dacoit gang. One important aspect of 'Tika' is that no gang leader accepts it from any person lower than his own caste.

After having 'earned' from dacoity, kidnapping and ransom, there is a distribution of 'income' amongst the members of the gang. One general principle followed by the dacoit gangs (with an exception of a gang or two) has been that of dividing the loot on the basis of weapons possessed by the members of gang. 50 per cent of it is taken by the leader of the gang as his share and for expenses of the gang like food, weapons, ammunition, and other items of daily use. 5-10 per cent as commission of the agents who had been instrumental in arranging the operation successfully and 1 per cent (by most of the gangs) for the religious practices as 'Dan-Fun'. The remaining amount of money is divided among the members as

in the following table :

Table No. VI

Weapon-wise Distribution of Loot in a Dacoit Gang.

Sl.No.	Weapon	Share
(a)	Unarmed or without fire arm	1 share
(b)	12 Bore gun	2 shares
(c)	303 Rifle	3 shares
(d)	Automatic weapon	4 shares
(e)	Self loaded Rifle and other sophisticated arms	6 shares

Source : Personal Interview

In addition, to this share of the members, the leader of the gang charges 50 per cent of the share of a member to whom he has given his own weapon, as rent for the weapon. This includes charges for cartridges. If a member happens to possess his own weapon, then the leader charges from him the price of cartridges. However, for all the other items like food, clothing etc. nothing is charged from the members and they are also not required to pay anything to the agents of the gang.

We have discussed earlier the motivations behind killing a member. But target of murder outside the gang has several determinants. Thus there have been instances in which particular dacoit gangs indulged in murders in order to create awe and terror in the minds of the villagers, so that at the village level no one dares to act as a police informer or think of resisting the activities of the gang. After the attainment of such 'motive' the gang tries to avoid murder as far as possible. In case of a person who turns a police informer and becomes a grave threat to the existence of the gang no efforts are spared for killing him. Even when a gang is wiped out totally by the police through an informer, some other dacoit gang takes upon itself the responsibility of murdering that informer. Some small gangs in order to win the favour of bigger gangs murder a person who is supposedly a police informer working against a bigger gang.

Another determinant of murder is the avenging of past scores of the leader or the members with somebody with whom they have personal enmity. In some instances it is also done to oblige some powerful sections of the society. Such services to interested and powerful parties are of use to the gang leaders when it comes to danger from law and order. If villagers attempt to resist the dacoits during their operations, then also the dacoits kill unhesitatingly.

There are a plurality of gangs operating in any single area. These gangs are autonomous with respect to its own functioning. Yet there exists a code of conduct which shows that they are inter dependent, and interacting. We have already observed that an informer of the police is common enemy of all the gangs, that 'territories' are not poached upon by other gangs, that there are well accepted norms about, kidnapping and other activities to which the gangs operating in a particular area, by and large, conform. The mutuality between different gangs can be understood in terms of the long history of dacoity in the area, the inherent nature of the acts, the tactics of operations as dacoits, and the knowledge thus gained from the experiences of the past has led to the formulation of a number of 'rules and regulations', which in turn have facilitated the operations of dacoity, kidnapping and murders etc. and the very maintenance of the gangs.

In the first place, no dacoit gang tries to make an effort of committing any crime on the relatives, close friends, family and the agents of another dacoit gang. Default of this rule leads inevitably to gang warfare and retaliation by the gang whose agents, family, relatives or friends have been harassed on the 'aggressor' gang. No gang informs the police the whereabouts of any other gang nor discloses their agents. Further no person

from any other gang is admitted if he has done some serious wrong in the previous gang. No gang tries to distract members of another gang, howsoever useful that might be to them. There is no interference by a gang in matters of internal policies of any other gang regarding plans, activities, number of members and control exercised over them, the distribution of the loot, the number of kidnappees and behaviour with them, the amount of ransom demanded or extraction of 'chanda' or accepting voluntary contribution and the system of networks etc...etc... However, in case of a warfare between the gangs (there have been a few instances) all these rules are thrown over-board, and the contesting gangs try to wipe each other out, harass families, helpers etc. provide vital clues to the police against the enemy gang.

Therefore, it will be clear that here is a unique situation where the historicity of the rebel phenomenon has acquired the character of a 'baghi subculture'. The 'baghi subculture' itself is an outcome of the interaction between the historical phenomenon and its contemporary constraints, it is a peculiar mix of the rebel and the criminal. The plurality of gangs exist within a system with well laid out norms of reciprocity. If these norms did not exist it would spell disaster for all the gangs. The internal autonomy and the authoritarian structure of gangs is the sine qua non of their existence. Like any secret society or organisation, the structure of authority is highly centralised and personalised.

However, there is evidence of the gangs operating to oblige, high ups and influentials and at the same time extract 'chanda' from poor and defenceless villagers. This indicates their major alignments with the upper class interests. Their religious outlook and charity to the poor is a rationalisation of their conduct before the spiritual, and their invocation of caste suggests the retention of 'feudal' structure.

Chapter VTHE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION - I : VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

The deviant subculture of the 'baghi' in the Chambal valley, as we have seen has a historicity which to an extent dramatizes the image of him as a rebel against the oppression of a superior political authority before which he refuses to capitulate. However, with the changing political environment, the role of the political rebel has become increasingly less relevant but the image of the rebel still continues to carry some of the stereotype. It is in this context of the changes in the society and polity that the role of the 'baghi' has to be understood for a proper appreciation of the process of reintegration of 'baghis' with the society. The role context of the 'baghi' has an inherent contradiction between the role of the rebel and that of the dacoit. The 'baghi' as a rebel has a positive role content whilst the 'baghi' as a dacoit carries with it the stigmatized image of the criminal. Both tend to get combined into a single status of the 'baghi'. The combination of these two antithetical aspects of 'baghi' role creates tensions within the 'baghi' and paves the way for a re-integration with the larger society and culture by a redefinition of one's role.

Historical evidence suggests that armed action against the Chambal valley deviants has generally been met by armed resistance and the success gained by such action has at best been ephemeral and short-lived. The British compelled the Scindia of Gwalior to find a military solution of the problem. This led to military action in the valley in 1869 and 1875. This was followed up by meting out exemplary punishments to the arrested, distributing jagirs to influential Rajputs on the condition that they would maintain law and order, the re-organisation of the police by the British, and the conditional pardon of some dacoit leaders (Kasare;1972: 170-171).

Madhav Rao Scindia (1920):

For the first time Madhav Rao Scindia sought a non-military solution which he believed would result in a permanent solution of the problem. He held various conferences to ensure co-operation of the local people. On 30th January, 1920 he called a conference of Zamindars at Karera, near Shiv Puri, to devise measures to eradicate the dacoity menace. No police or army was allowed in this conference. The conference was also attended by some 400 dacoits. A sort of panchayat was constituted in this gathering and a list of the crimes committed by the dacoits was prepared and the kind of punishments that should go with such crimes

were worked out. The punishments were greatly minimised and the following decisions were taken:

- (i) that the state government would arrange for the maintenance of the families of the surrendered dacoits as long as they would be in jail,
- (ii) that after the release of surrendered dacoits the state government would help generously in their rehabilitation, and
- (iii) that the police won't go to fetch the dacoits to jail but they should surrender themselves of their own accord at the gates of the jail,

(Bhat, 1962: 30-31)

This led to the willing surrender of many dacoits.

A follow-up conference was held on 2nd March, 1920. It was attended by 500 persons and proved to be a success in meeting the objective for which it was convened. A committee of 59 persons was formed to help and suggest to the government various measures to check the re-appearance of the problem.

In addition to these provisions meant to attract the dacoits who would surrender voluntarily, the Scindia warned Zamindars and Jagirdars who failed to produce the dacoits with whom they had alliances with confiscation of their Zamindaris and Jagirs. The Inspector General of Police was

empowered to confiscate the property of the absconding dacoits, out of which a Dacoity Relief Fund could be raised to help the victims of the dacoits.

By dint of such novel policies adopted by him, Madhav Rao Scindhia was able to bring peace to the area and 'succeeded in reclaiming 80 per cent of the criminals'. Unfortunately, this approach which yielded very satisfactory results was not continued for long. However, this experiment did testify^{to} the efficacy of non-violence. (Bhatt, 1962: 32).

The non-violence and persuasive methods of dealing with the problem of Chambal valley dacoits met its first setback immediately after independence. Some prominent Congressmen (K.D. Paliwal, Vidyawati Rathor, H.K.J. Bhoota) had worked out a proposal for the surrender of Man Singh and his gang. The proposal had to be dropped when another section in the party charged^{them} for being in collusion with the gang (Singh, 1966: 9). Tehsildar Singh, son of Man Singh, has testified to this abortive attempt and has tried to suggest that although they enjoyed many of the material satisfactions of life, they were not lured into criminality for money. Circumstances also acted compulsively in forcing such a choice on them and more than once they have wanted to settle down to a peaceful life if it was possible⁸. However, it is the report of

8. Personal Interview.

the Bhind Morana Crime Situation Inquiry Committee of 1952 that summarises succinctly the attitude of the new establishment. The Chairman, R.K. Dixit observed that the balance of opinion seemed to be that a general amnesty was a summa counsel of despair and should not be adopted except in the last resort. The Committee on their part saw "no reason why with determined effort the administration could not wipe out the gangs" and they therefore could only "recommend that determined measures should be taken toward the end". A promise of amnesty, at least, they felt could be extended to those against whom there were no evidences. Such amnesty would help the desertion of gangs by many of their followers and also help bring back the absconders.

Vinoba Bhave: 1960.

The shift towards a policy of suppression from that of voluntary submission, however, did not mean that the advocates of the latter became indifferent to the non-violent approach. By July 1955 'Vikram' a monthly journal published from Ujjain came out with an editorial note that the governments of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan had been unable to solve the problem of Chambal ravines (dacoity) through violent methods. They had not grasped the reality of the problem. The editorial advised that Vinoba Bhave be requested to make an experiment in

non-violence in the dacoit-infested Chambal ravines. Vinoba should be granted facilities so that he may easily contact the 'notorious' dacoits (Guru Sharan, 1974: 7-8).

This demand on Vinoba came on the heels of his experiment in Telengana which gave birth to the Bhodan Movement in the midst of a bloody strife for land. In 1957 Mahavir Singh a Sarvodaya worker of Etawah is said to have proposed to Baba Raghava Das a non-violent solution to the problem of dacoity in Chambal valley. May be on account of the death of the latter nothing came out of this proposal at that time.

In 1957, H.S. Kohli, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Madhya Pradesh is said to have suggested to the Government that, though the police have been successful in liquidating 13 out of 16 dacoit gangs yet the problem remained as it was before. Violence had failed in eradicating the menace of dacoity in the region. It can be solved on a permanent basis only through non-violent methods and for this Acharya Vinoba Bhave should be requested to come here (Chambal region) and make an experiment in non-violence (Bhatt, 1962: 33).

In 1959 the late Major General Yadunath Singh of Etawah who was deeply concerned with this problem visited Bhind along with Dr. Sushila Nayar, Member of Parliament and Mrs. Indira Gandhi the then Congress President.

The local Congress Committee of Bhind requested these people to handle this problem seriously and try to find some non-violent solution, as violence had failed in solving it. The same year in July a desperate effort was made by Har Sevak Mishra, former Congress President of Bhind district, who accompanied by Prem Narayan Sharma, a worker of Gandhi Memorial Fund, went to Kachnar to meet Vinoba personally to appeal to him to pay a visit to the dacoit-infested areas (Singh, 1966: 9). At the same time Tehsildar Singh, son of Man Singh wrote a letter to Vinoba expressing his desire to meet him or any of emissary sent by him⁹. Major General Yadunath Singh was sent by Vinoba to meet Tehsildar Singh. Through him he (Tehsildar Singh) requested Vinoba to visit Chambal ravines and try his experiment of non-violence on the dacoits. Vinoba responded to their invitation and decided to give a month's time to Chambal valley. It was arranged that he would reach Agra on May 5, 1960 (Bhatt, 1962: 33-34).

Vinoba, according to his schedule, reached Agra on 5th May, 1960 and from 8th May, he started touring the area. He camped in 26 villages all of which were associated with 'notorious' dacoits of the valley and ended his tour on 8th June 1960, exactly after a month. During this period the authorities of the States of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya

9. Tehsildar Singh at that time was awaiting death in Jail. Death sentence was passed on him.

Pradesh did whatever they could to help Vinoba in making his 'peace mission' a success. Anti-dacoity operations were halted for the time being. The dacoits who surrendered to Vinoba were allowed to remain with him for some days, freely. In the meantime the workers of the 'Samiti' under Major General Yadunath Singh tried their best to spread the message of Vinoba to procure the surrender of as many dacoits as possible.

The efforts of the mission of Vinoba resulted in the voluntary surrender of twenty-one dacoits; four from Morena, nine from Bhind, six from Agra, one from Bharatpur and one who had no warrant against him.

The efforts however, were not limited only to the surrender of dacoits, a voluntary organisation, the Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti with ten members was formed at the direction of Vinoba. Swami Krishan Swaroop of Agra was made its President and Hem Dev Sharma of Gwalior, its Secretary. The main tasks of the Samiti were to look after the legal aspects of the surrendered dacoits, to take care of problems of their families and to generate an environment of peace in the area¹⁰.

10. For rehabilitation see Appendix No.4

Accordingly this 'Samiti' provided legal aid in 62 court cases in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan (Bhind, Morena, Datta, Gwalior in M.P. and Agra, Etawah, Hindon in U.P.) Many of these cases went up to the High Court at Allahabad, Jodhpur and Gwalior. Some cases even went upto the Supreme Court in Delhi. In all 31 lawyers most of

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Vinoba's non-violent intervention which was facilitated by the governments of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, started suffering from the unhelpful attitude into which these states relapsed. As a consequence Vinoba practically abandoned the institutional efforts aimed at solving the problem. The police once again started suffering from the feeling that an erosion was taking place in the credibility of the law and order institutions. The police chief K.F. Rustomji, on 2nd June, 1968 bemoaned the unfortunate role of the 'Mission'. He observed "It is a matter of regret that the 'Mission' should have deliberately given a set-back to the task of maintaining law and order in the area in order to please the dacoits. Apart from operational time lost, and statements made against the police the Mission has delivered a blow to the morale of the force, it took three years for the police and the people of these districts to turn the battle in their ^{favor} and when we are nearing the end, we are told that the courage and sacrifice of all was in vain, that the police officers who had shed their blood for

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whom offered their services without any fee provided this legal aid. By 1963, 13/20 were free either by court verdict or they had served their sentences and started living a settled life with their families. While four others Lokman, Tej Singh, Dary Lal and Bhagwan Singh got life imprisonment (Singh, 1966). By 1966, three more were released and on 18th April 1968 Lokman, Tej Singh and Bhagwan Singh were set free, by giving them the benefit of good conduct while in jail. The last man Dary Lal was released in 1970.

defending others, had used a rifle and had thereby created dacoits, and the dacoits sincerely feel that they have been oppressed by the police". Rustanji further observed that if such a mission is sent again to deal with crime in an area there should be special legislation which would enable it to act, and could remove the confusion and doubt in the minds of those who are charged with the duty of law enforcement. "Clearly there is a conflict between what the law required and what the mission wants, and it is wrong to ask police to do what the Mission wants". (Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, 1965: 368-69).

However, Vinoba's efforts in the Chambal valley led to two significant developments. Firstly, for the first time the problem of dacoity in the region and its solution was viewed in the context of sarvodaya philosophy. This enabled the understanding of the problem in a larger sociological frame which debunked the narrow social pathological dimensions of criminological behaviour. The values that were evoked for the solution of the problem were universalistic in appeal and extolled the basic virtues and innate goodness of man. It's appeal to the dacoits therefore asked them to give up their deviant way of life without shirking responsibility for their deeds. In effect, they were being asked to accept their share of punishment voluntarily, cleanse themselves of the stigma of the dacoit role and get integrated with the mainstream of national and social life.

The second important development that was the outcome of Vinoba's mission was the creation of a legitimate passage of re-entry of the deviant into the mainstream which on the one hand implied the voluntary acceptance of penal punishment but which at the same time offered him a new social status free from any social stigma.

Afterwards, a controversy and a sort of hostile attitude developed in some quarters of the State. So it became very difficult for the peace Mission to carry on its activities openly and with enthusiasm. Virtually Vinoba had to ask the Mission to stop its activities. The scene again turned to one of violence and terror. A sort of vicious circle of violence prevailed over the area. The inhabitants had to suffer from the atrocities of both - the police as well as the dacoits.

We have already observed how the cessation of the activities of the Mission became imperative in the face of a critical attitude of the police. The 'conversion' role practically came to an end. The Mission, therefore, started working on prevention of the malady rather than its cure.

The perception of the dacoits had also undergone change. The bullet or the gallows were the only two alternatives to which they could surrender in view of a basic distrust of the police. The third alternative of 'Sanaxpan'

became viable when the deviant sub-culture witnessed the voluntary surrender of 20 dacoits before Vinoba in May 1960, the commutation of Lehsilder Singh's death sentence on 3rd June, 1960, the release of all those convicted by 1970, and finally their rehabilitation and metamorphosis to peaceful citizenship and acceptance by the society. The legitimacy of voluntary surrender had come to stay.

Jayaprakash Narayan: 1972.

Not unlike 1960, this time again the initiative for surrender came from the dacoits. Madho Singh was the man who initiated the voluntary surrenders. His efforts date as far back as 1966¹¹. In this connection he had written letters to a number of persons, whom he thought would be in a position to take up the problem. "For the last six years, I wanted to evolve a solution which might put an end to all this. For it I tried a lot. To Gulzarilal Nanda the ^{then} Home Minister, I sent many persons. To different governments in Madhya Pradesh I have been sending emissaries and letters. Other than this at the time of S.V.D. Govt. in Madhya Pradesh I wrote letters to almost all the MLA's and Ministers out of which one was for Shri Jayaprakash Narayan

11. Kameshwar Prasad in 'Chambal-Yamuna Ghati ki Bagl Samasya' observes that a 'Text of the resolution' for the solution of the dacoity problem was passed by 200 dacoits of U.P., M.P. and Rajasthan comprising of 9 gangs, in one day 'Conference' under the Chairmanship of Madho Singh on 16th Aug. 1966, in the forest of Shivpuri district.

I had written letters to Vinoba, Prime Minister and President but all these efforts bore no fruit". Madho Singh is confirmed by an advocate Sh. Vidya Ram Gupta of Morena, who observed that "the outlaw chief wrote a letter in 1969 to the Convener of 'Anti-Dacoit Police Collaboration Committee' expressing a desire to surrender" (Mainstream: Apr.29, 1972).

In the same year i.e., 1969 on 20th October one Jagrup Singh, a forest contractor met Vinoba. He was sent by Madho Singh as a representative of the dacoits to make ^{Vinoba} agree to visit Chambal valley and accept surrenders. In 1971, on 25th June he himself went to meet Vinoba at his 'ashram' in Wardha in disguise but with no success. Then on 1st October, 1971 Madho Singh disguised as Ram Singh, a forest contractor, met Jayaprakash Narayan at Patna and requested him to take the responsibility of surrender. It was in his third meeting with Jayaprakash Narayan that Madho Singh disclosed his real identity. Jayaprakash Narayan assured him that if the attitude of the Government was favourable he would take the responsibility. Jayaprakash Narayan accordingly wrote letters to the Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan and contacted the Central Government also. From the very beginning he made it very clear that the dacoits could be

pursued^{at} to surrender only if they could be assured that the law and order would take its own course but amnesty of life would be granted to them and humane treatment would be meted out to them after their surrender (Joshi, Mishra and Garg, 1972: 36-41). The fact that the dacoits who surrendered to Vinoba in 1960 were leading a normal life and there was no case of relapse to any criminal activity on their part encouraged the government to go into the experiment once again.

After getting a favourable replies from the concerned Chief Ministers, Jayaprakash Narayan constituted the Chambal Ghati Shanti Mission in the month of October 1971. The immediate task of contacting the gangs and persuading them to surrender was made the responsibility of Mahavir Singh and Hemdev Sharma. A contingent of selfless workers of the Mission Mahavir Singh, Hemdev Sharma, Charan Singh, S.N. Subbarao, Lokman, Tej Singh and Daryelal along with some others started contacting the dacoit gangs from November 1971 onwards. For the whole month of November no link between the dacoits and these workers could be established. Then Madhe Singh, who after returning from Patna had also started convincing the dacoits regarding the possibilities of surrender, was approached by some of these workers and ~~was~~ was told about their failure in contacting the dacoit gangs.

Madho Singh advised them to contact first the family members, relatives and influential persons of the area and convince them so that they, in turn, could ask their relatives and family members who were operating as dacoits to surrender. This method worked and the workers of the Mission most of the time accompanied by the family members of the dacoits were able to contact them. Some of the dacoits were doubtful about the assurance of the grant of amnesty for life. Some dacoits including a few gang leaders expressed a desire only to surrender before Vinoba, and a few proposed to surrender only before the Prime Minister (Devash and Aggarwal: 1972: 9-12). Such proposals came from those who were ignorant of who Jayaprakash was and felt insecure unless they surrendered before the highest authority or before one who had already demonstrated that surrender before him was safe enough. On 13th December 1971 Jayaprakash Narayan issued a secret appeal to the dacoits of the valley, urging them to lay down arms and to co-operate in the programme of the country. He also made it clear that the attitude of the government was favourable. They should stop their criminal activities and prepare themselves for voluntary surrender. In February 1972, Tehsildar Singh, son of Man Singh was released from the prison by the efforts of Jayaprakash Narayan. He also joined Lokman and other workers of the Mission¹².

12. At present he is the Vice-Chairman of the "Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan".

In February 1972, P.C. Sethi replaced S.C. Shukla as Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. It is acknowledged almost universally that the new Chief Minister showed considerable dynamism in tackling the problem of surrender and rehabilitation of dacoits. By 1st and 2nd of March, 1972, Mahavir Singh, Hemdev Sharma and Tehsildar Singh met Jayaprakash Narayan at Delhi and Madho Singh informed Shri Narayan that he had been successful in persuading about 100 dacoits to surrender. On Jayaprakash Narayan's request to the Madhya Pradesh government, Phargarh area was declared a peace-zone and the dacoit gangs in that area could be contacted with comparative ease. One jeep was provided to the Mission by 'Himalaya Seva Sangh' which added to the efficiency of the 'Mission' in establishing contacts with dacoits and persuading them to surrender. In the 2nd week of March 1972, after discussions with the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh met Jayaprakash Narayan and assured him of his full co-operation in facilitating the surrenders and also indicated his acceptance of a 20 point scheme worked out by the Sarvodaya and government authorities¹³. By this time the gangs of Kalyan Singh, Mahan Singh, Harvilas, Jangjit Singh, Mohar Singh, Sarup Singh, Tilak Singh, Pancham Singh and Kalicharan

13. A 20 point scheme was agreed upon by the Government. The same scheme found its continuation in 1976 in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan for the surrender dacoits. See ch.VI

along with their gang members had been contacted and persuaded to surrender.

Some more jeeps were provided to the Mission by the police department. The workers of the Mission combed the whole area and contacted as many dacoits as possible. The Central Home Ministry convened a meeting of Inspector Generals of Police of the three states: Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan to work out plans and procedures for the 'surrender of dacoits'. It was followed by a meeting of the Chief Ministers of the three concerned States at Delhi on 2nd April, 1972. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh was not present at this meeting but was represented by an emissary, it was decided that :

- (i) the Mission be provided with vehicles of the Police department for quicker and easier contacts with the dacoits,
- (ii) the Police force should suspend its operations against the dacoits until such times the dacoits could make up their minds about voluntary surrender,
- (iii) that one of first steps which would be considered as an earnest of their desire to surrender would be the release forth-with of the persons whom the dacoits had kidnapped for ransom without any preconditions.

(National Herald, 3rd Apr. 1972).

By 8th April in response to the above precondition 'most of the estimated 80 persons kidnapped by the dacoits of Chambal valley had been released and two or three such released persons had reached their homes also (Hindustan Standard: April, 9 1972). The gang of Madhe Singh had also released 12 kidnapped persons without taking any ransom. Finally on 10th April, 1972 Jayaprakash Narayan met Prime Minister along with the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, After getting her consent on the entire plans and proceedings, Jayaprakash Narayan reached Gwalior on 11th of April, 1972. As a result of his efforts and that of the Mission, the police of Madhya Pradesh, the state Governments of the three states and the dacoits, from 14th April to 6th June, 1972, 322 dacoits surrendered along with 191 weapons.

Table No. VII

Surrender of Dacoits in Gwalior Division from 14th Apr. to 6th June, 1972 and weapons surrendered.

Date	Place	No. of Dacoits	No. of Weapons
14-4-1972	Jaura (Morena)	82	48
16-4-1972	Jaura (Morena)	81	62
17-4-1972	Gwalior	1	0
23-4-1972	Dabra (Gwalior)	25	15
1-5-1972	Gwalior	81	36
14-5-1972	Morena	13	8
15-5-1972	Gwalior	2	0
16-5-1972	Gwalior	7	6
25-5-1972	Gwalior	6	4
26-5-1972	Gwalior	1	0
1-6-1972	Gwalior	18	9
3-6-1972	Gwalior	4	3
6-6-1972	Gwalior	1	0
Total		322	191

Later upto July 1972, 68 more dacoits surrendered.
Source: CID Office, Gwalior.

S.N. Subbarao : 1976

The most recent voluntary surrenders of dacoits organised by the Sarvodaya organisation are significant in as much as these have not been presided over by ^{the} charismas of Vinoba or Jayaprakash. It is also significant that the absence of such charismatic personalities indicates a certain institutionalization of the methods and procedures initiated by them. The co-ordination of the efforts of the voluntary organisation with that of the formal structures of power of the State and the country had been effected by the intervention of the charismatic personalities. The acceptance in principle of the 20 points arrived at jointly by the Sarvodaya authorities under the leadership of Jayaprakash and the highest authorities of the state provided the main guidelines of the institutional framework legitimising the novel co-operation between a voluntary organization and the state apparatus. This provides perhaps an important aspect of what is usually understood as routinization of charisma.

It is in this context that the attempts at securing the voluntary surrender of dacoits twice in 1976 has to be grasped in order to be appreciated.

The major efforts at securing voluntary surrender of dacoits came in quick succession. The first was initiated

by the government of Uttar Pradesh in January 1976 and the other in Rajasthan in the month of August 1976.

The fact of surrender of 501 dacoits in Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior - 390 and Sagar division - 111) in 1972 and the success of it in terms of (a) very low incidence of crime by dacoits in the post-surrender years as compared to pre-surrender years¹⁴, (b) disappearance of the phenomenon of new gang formations¹⁵, (c) negligible number of surrendered dacoits who escaped from the jail¹⁶, (d) conduct of surrendered dacoits: (i) in jail, (ii) while on parole and (iii) after release from jail, served as a basis, for the Uttar Pradesh government to try this method in its State (Chambal valley region, Agra division). At the time when talks for arranging the surrender of dacoits in Uttar Pradesh started, in Agra division there were seven well organised dacoit gangs with a membership of 114 dacoits, possessing 50 fire arms, according to Police records.

14. see Appendix No.3

15. At present there is only one dacoit gang in Bhind district (Madhya Pradesh) (Northern parts)

16. Upto 31-12-75 twenty surrendered dacoits escaped from Prisons.

17. 'When over 200 of them were left on parole to go wherever they wanted, many of them naturally went to see their families and near ones. Some made time to go to Saint Vinoba. When they went to Villages, they touched the feet of those whom they had hurt and begged their pardon'. (Subaroo: 1974)

In January, 1976 a meeting of high ranking police officers of these states concerned was held at Gwalior to curb the menace of dacoity. Tehsildar Singh (Vice-Chairman of Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan) and other office bearers of the 'Sansthan' were invited to this meeting. The predominant view in that meeting was in favour of trying to obtain a voluntary surrender of the operating dacoits of Agra division in a manner similar to that of 1972 experiment. The efforts towards obtaining the voluntary surrender of dacoits of Agra Division began in right earnest when in the last week of February 1976, Minister of State for Home Affairs (Uttar Pradesh) announced in a press conference that about 100 dacoits of Agra division on behalf of Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan were ready to surrender. The 'Sansthan' was to submit a list of such dacoits to the government by 5th March, 1976 (New Bharat Times, 24 Feb. 1976)

The efforts of the 'Sansthan' for contacting the dacoits and persuading them to surrender started on a 'war footing' from the month of April. In all, the efforts were directed towards contacting 11 gangs, operating in the Chambal valley. A scheme was drawn for contacting and persuading the following gangs by Sansthan workers including some ex-dacoits:

**CGSS and a few ex-dacoits
to contact :**

Dacoit Gangs :

1. Madho Singh
2. Jangjit Singh
3. Tej Singh
4. Padam Singh

1. Ram Sanshi
2. Bulaki
3. Mohar Singh

1. Madho Singh
2. Jangjit Singh
3. Tej Singh
4. Kanhai

1. Ganga Singh
2. Tehsildar Singh

1. Pooran Singh
2. Sobran Singh
3. Lokman Dixit

1. Raghunath Singh
2. Rampal Singh
3. Raghunath Singh
4. Piya Ram Singh

1. Mohar Singh
2. Piyaram Singh
3. Tehsildar Singh
4. Bhagwat Dada

1. Jagat Singh
2. Tehsildar Singh

1. - - - -

1. Jagat Singh
2. Tehsildar Singh

1. Tehsildar Singh
2. Tej Singh

1. Tehsildar Singh
2. Tej Singh
3. Jagat Singh

1. Harvilas - Nathi Gang

2. Attar Singh Gujar Gang

3. Ram Lakhan Gang

4. Bhogi-Puttan Gang

5. Deshraj Gang

6. Hari Singh Gang
(Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh)

7. Janak Singh Gang

8. Kanta Singh Gang

9. Satar Gang (local)

10. Shrikishan Gang

11. Raghunandan Gang
(Rajasthan)

12. Lal Singh Gang
-

By mid-May the gangs of Lal Singh, Bhogi-Putten and Deshraj had been contacted. In order to contact and persuade other gangs Subbarao asked the Uttar Pradesh Government to approach the Madhya Pradesh Government for the release of Madho Singh, Mohar Singh and a few others. So that the 'influence' and services of these ex-dacoits could be used in securing the surrender of as many dacoits as possible. However, by 19th May the gangs of Janak Singh, Kanta Singh and Sattar were also contacted.

From 15th May onwards the 'Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan' decided to organise a Youth Peace Camp (Tarun Shanti Kendra). This was mainly to provide an opportunity to the intellectuals, students and creative youth to have a deeper insight of the problem of dacoity in the Chambal region. The other major objective being to socialise the surrendering dacoits for leading a peaceful and useful life after their surrender. By 20th May the office of 'Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan' was shifted from village Jaitpur to Bateshwar, Tehsil Bah. The 'Youth Peace Camp' was also converted into 'Samarpan Shivir'. Dacoit leader Lal Singh was the first surrendering dacoit who came to stay at the 'Samarpan Shivir' on 20th May, till the date of surrender ceremony (3rd June, 1976).

By 21st May, 75 dacoits were stated to have entered the 'Peace Zone' of Manipuri district. By 25th May, dacoits started visiting the 'Samarpan Shivir' at Bateshwar. The gangs of Janak Singh, Bhogi-Puttan and Attar Singh camped at Shoripur in a temple near Bateshwar. On 26th May Madho Singh reached Agra on parole to contact and persuade the remaining dacoits. Mohar Singh also reached Bateshwar on 29th May, 1976 for the same. A 'Gayatri Yagna' was started in the 'Samarpan Shivir' from 28th May to be continued upto 3rd June 1976. This was organised to provide a religious atmosphere to the surrendering dacoits for their 'spiritual purification' as they were supposed to enter a new life (a kind of rebirth) after their voluntary surrender.

On 29th May a meeting was held in New Delhi attended by Subbarao, Central Minister P.C. Sethi (who was the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh during the surrender of dacoits in Madhya Pradesh in 1972), Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and Union Minister for Home Affairs. The decision to accept the surrender of dacoits in Uttar Pradesh on the guide lines of 1972 surrender had the 'unofficial' sanction of the Government of Uttar Pradesh from the very beginning. Finally, on 30th May, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh got the consent of the Prime Minister for accepting the proposed surrender of dacoits.

From the very beginning the Government of Uttar Pradesh took the initiative to solve the problem of dacoity in Agra division on a non-violent basis. The first step taken in this direction by the Uttar Pradesh Government began with a meeting of the top police officers with their counterparts in Madhya Pradesh and with the workers of the Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan in January 1976 at Gwalior. From then onwards, the governmental machinery had been fully co-operating with the 'Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan' in terms of : (a) facilitating its workers in contacting the dacoit gangs, (b) facilitating it to use the services of some ex-dacoits, serving their prison terms, in Madhya Pradesh at that time, (c) providing funds for its functioning, (d) providing vehicles and wireless sets etc. and finally (e) by making provisions (like the Madhya Pradesh Government) for the rehabilitation of the surrendered dacoits along with the victims of dacoits.

The efforts and the keen interest taken by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Anti-Dacoity Operation), Agra Range, regarding the securing of surrender of dacoits, was of great help to the 'Sansthan' for the work at hand. On the request of the 'Sansthan' in order to facilitate easy contact with the dacoits, in the month of May two 'Peace Zones' were declared by the Government one at Bateshwar of Tehsil Bahad and the other in the Police Station area of

Oravar (12 villages) in district Mainpuri. It implied no operation against dacoits, in that area¹⁸. The Provincial Armed Constabulary and other armed forces were removed from these 'Peace Zones'. The Senior Superintendent of Police (Agra), in order to cope with the effects of the 'Sansthan' in the last week of May (the time at which the efforts of the 'Sansthan' were at its peak), gave special instructions to all his subordinate officers and the concerned Police Officers. The Inspector General of Police (Uttar Pradesh) issued orders to the police on 27th May not to harass in any form the dacoits and their families who were to surrender. Later, on 2nd June, he visited the 'Samarpan Shivir' at Bateshwar.

Besides this cooperation with the Chambal Ghati Sava Sansthan for a non-violent solution of the problem of dacoity, there was also the warning by Additional Inspector General of Police (Uttar Pradesh) to the dacoits, of stern police action against those who would not surrender. In order to satisfy the anxieties of the surrendering dacoits, the Minister of State for Home Affairs (Uttar Pradesh), himself met them on 27th May at Bateshwar. He assured them to give due recognition to their complaints and the terms and conditions of surrender and later rehabilitation etc.

18. A pre-condition to it was that - the dacoits also had to abide by the maxim of a 'Peace Zone'.

The Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan also played a co-operative role in the efforts of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan for securing surrender of as many dacoits as possible. Without any hitch, the Madhya Pradesh Government released Madho Singh, Mohar Singh, Kalyan Singh, Jangjit Singh, Ramphal and Raganath Singh - on parole to facilitate the work of surrender for the Uttar Pradesh Government. Keeping in view, the intention of some of the gangs not to surrender, the Madhya Pradesh Police on 1st June, kept a strict watch on its borders along with Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The government of Rajasthan, declared Raja Khera area (district Bharatpur, sub-division Inolpur) as 'Peace Zone', to facilitate the workers of the 'Sansthan' in contacting dacoits. The Rajasthan dacoits who were willing to surrender, could also cross over to Uttar Pradesh from there.

However, unlike the environment in which the previous surrenders had taken place, the surrender at Bateshwar did have some disappointments. Nearly 40 per cent of the estimated surrenders did not take place. This was unfortunate particularly because all of them had been to the 'Peace Zone' but only 60 per cent ~~were~~ decided finally on voluntary submission, while the others opted for the continuation of deviant behaviour.

Of the prominent gang leaders who had arrived in the Peace Zones were Harvilas and Nathi, Bhogi Ram and Puttu Singh, Kanta Singh, Shri Kishan, Deshraj, Lal Singh and Attar Singh. It is interesting to note that these several gangs tended to get organised around two factional leaders - Janak Singh and Shri Kishan - Kanta Singh. However, whilst the two enemies submitted to the authorities, Deshraj, Shri Kishan, Harvilas and Natthi walked out ^{at} the last moment¹⁹. Also, the atmosphere of Peace Zones was marred by threats of violence. The total number of voluntary surrender consisted of dacoits (63) as well as those who were not dacoits but nevertheless were harassed by the police for alleged alliance with dacoits or for petty crimes. The latter found voluntary surrender as a dacoit as one way out of the harassment by the police.

The pattern was different in Rajasthan the following month August. Although the number of voluntary surrender were less (21), than in Bateeshwar. The norms of the peace zone were not violated and none who had come in the ^{peace} zone walked out. Harvilas who walked out in Bateeshwar walked in at Dholpur but without his gang. However, the violation of the peace zone did not take place. It was, however, not possible to avoid some deviations from strict adherence of

19. Out of these gang leaders, only Shrikishan was absconding upto August 1976, while the others surrendered either in Uttar Pradesh or in Rajasthan.

some of the guidelines in the 20 points, e.g., whereas it was required that everybody holding kidnapes for ransom should release them before his surrender could be accepted, surrenders were accepted in cases where the kidnapes was released and ransom money extorted. Also, in some cases arms were not surrendered on one plea or the other.

Voluntary Surrender, Escape and Repeat Surrender :

Although most of the dacoits who have voluntarily surrendered undergo the terms of punishment as per prior understanding, their problems inside jails and outside sometimes either scampel or encourage some dacoits to escape. Interviews with dacoits and gang leaders reveal certain features of the new situation in which these dacoits find themselves. There is a tendency for the hierarchy which is existent within dacoit gangs to be carried into the prisons and open jails even after surrender. Thus the authority of the gang leader vis-a-vis the members of the gang which has been transferred from the ravines to the jails tends to continue. While this continuity is irksome to the gang members in this new situation the tolerance limits by and large are maintained. However, problems arise when the leader of one gang expects the member of another gang to bend to his authority. This is one situation from which a dacoit tries to seek escape, which again is possible if he escapes from the prison itself.

Then there is the other problem of the hierarchy of dacoits in the new situation, where some dacoits are more important than others in the eyes of the 'Mission' as well as the authorities of the state. Therefore, there is a feeling amongst dacoits lower down in the hierarchy of importance that the 'Mission' and the authorities pursue the terms and conditions of their surrender more vigorously for those who are more important than they^{are}. Consequently the families of the more important dacoit leaders receive better security and attention and economic benefits than the others^{to}. Thus, the families of less important dacoit leaders or gang members are more prone to harassment by their erstwhile enemies than the others. This has compelled some dacoit members to escape²⁰.

It is interesting to note that all the 18 of the 20 dacoits who escaped or tried to escape, were gang members and only two gang leaders of low rank. Of the 20 escapees 12 were shot dead, 2 were rearrested and four re-surrendered, while one was absconding and one not known (CID Office Gwalior). There is atleast one dacoit leader who in all has surrendered three times.

The problem of surrender, escape and resurrender has another aspect. Since the Chambal valley falls under the jurisdiction of three adjacent States, dacoits belonging to

20. Another cause for escape was termed as harassment by the police either of the dacoit in jail or of his family in the village.

one State having surrendered in another find that they are at a disadvantage. The state to which one surrenders claims that since he does not belong to the State he can not be a beneficiary of some of the rehabilitation measures. In such cases a dacoit prefers to escape from the alien state to which he has surrendered. This problem of jurisdiction of the State, nativity of the dacoit and the measure of rehabilitation, however, have been later sorted out and the contradictions removed. Illustratively the problem of a Sikh dacoit (Bishamber Singh) was typical. He was denied rehabilitation provisions because he was a Punjabi and Madhya Pradesh refused to take his responsibility²¹. It was with great effort that the 'Sansthan' could make the authorities accept the fact that in spite of being a Punjabi he belongs to Madhya Pradesh and for all practical purposes belongs to the State. Raghunandan Singh is an example of an escapee from Madhya Pradesh who chose to resurrender in Rajasthan in 1976. Harvilek Mallah is yet another case, although he belongs to Uttar Pradesh, he shifted his family to Rajasthan before surrendering and chose to surrender in Rajasthan.

We have therefore been witnessing alternative methodologies of action directed towards the solution of

21. In terms of land allotment etc..

deviancy problem. On the one hand the time honoured methods of coercion and social control by the established institutions of law and order have been used, perhaps with greater vigour with the advent of British administration. On the otherhand the alternate method of social change through persuasion and voluntary surrender initiated experimentally by Madhav Rao Scindia, and continued through the voluntary efforts of Sarvodaya organisations has become the second method of solving the problem of this deviance. Conflicts and co-operation between the adherents of these methodologies of action has been one of the significant outcomes of the social process of change.

Chapter VITHE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION - II : REHABILITATION

The entire phenomenon of the solution of the dacoity problem can be understood in terms of its three major aspects. First the initiation of the process by which the deviant can find re-entry into the society from which he had become alienated or against which he was directing his energies. Secondly, the deviant having decided to re-enter had to be provided a smooth passage by which he could become co-participant in the 'normal activities' of the society without carrying the stigma of his earlier role. And finally it is equally important that an entry into the deviant subculture is checked and contained so that there is a prevention of this deviance. It is in this context that rehabilitation and prevention of deviance has to be understood and the means and mechanisms analysed.

The process of initiation of re-entry began with the establishment of the 'Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti' in 1960, which found its inspiration from Vinoba. It was through this organisation that the first voluntary surrenders found expression in Vinoba's presence. Thereafter the activities of the 'Samiti' were directed towards encouraging larger number of surrenders even after Vinoba had left.

However, as has already been noted this voluntary organisation came under heavy fire by the police authorities who complained that it was denigrating the role of the police and this created an antagonistic relationship between the 'Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti' and the police. Since the state practically withdrew ^{from} the co-operation ^{of} this voluntary organisation ^{it} was compelled to give up its main objective and diverted its attention to the prevention of the process of entry into deviant sub-culture. Since 1960, from the time this voluntary organisation was established, till 1972 it had been instrumental in solving nearly 250 land disputes by peaceful dialogues. It produced before the police 40 such persons who being afraid of police after indulging in minor crimes had gone under-ground and were on the verge of taking ^{to} a life of crime by joining some gang or the other. Further, it directed its efforts towards the rehabilitation of the 20 dacoits (members of Man Singh gang) who surrendered to Vinoba.

The lost function of this organisation was again revived during the next surrender programme under the leadership of Jaya Prakash Narayan. However, it was renamed as 'Chambal Ghati Shanti Mission'. This time the surrender and rehabilitation aspects of the problem were given careful consideration and a 20 point guide-line was legitimized

by its acceptance by both the state at the highest level of Prime Minister and by Jayaprakash Narayan and the Sarvodaya organisation. The following were the stipulations of the guidelines :

1. The time limit for surrender of dacoits should be adhered to unless in the light of success in securing surrenders and the needs of the situation any further small extension is accepted by the Chief Minister.
2. All persons kidnapped who are at present in the custody of dacoits will be immediately released by them without ransom and without waiting for the date of final surrender.
3. Dacoit gangs who intend to surrender will cease forthwith to commit robberies, dacoities and murder etc.
4. Surrender of dacoits means surrender of entire gang with all arms and ammunition.
5. Dacoits will ensure that there is no intimidation of witnesses either by their accomplices or any one else acting on their behalf.
6. It may be ensured that surrendering dacoits do not transfer their arms and ammunition to others and that all weapons, fire arms and ammunition is brought at the time of surrender.
7. Surrender will be arranged in the comparatively unobtrusive rural area so that the local, national, as well as the international press is kept out and no publicity is given.

8. Photographers will not be allowed to be present or to take photographs at the time of surrender. This is a legal necessity as other-wise identification will get isolated.
9. The level of officer or Minister to be present at the time of surrender will be decided by Chief Minister.
10. Dacoits who surrender will not be garlanded and will not be taken out in processions and there will be no other ceremony to give semblance of respectability. They will be turned over to Jail custody after surrender before a Magistrate and the Police.
11. Cognisance of change of heart of these dacoits will be such as not to demoralise forces of law and order or the general administration or give an impression that these persons have been lionised.
12. There will be no undertaking about the concurrent running of sentences of imprisonment when passed.
13. Surrendering dacoits will not be hand-cuffed. This is however subject to conduct of accused remaining satisfactory and there being no infringement of discipline in jail or outside.
14. Trial of surrendering dacoits may be conducted either in some premises of the jail or close to it so that hand-cuffing of accused may not be required.

15. Investigation of criminal cases against dacoits will be completed within 6 months.
16. Trial will be completed within about 3 years. Special courts may be set up.
17. Trial will take place as far as possible at one place for individual gangs.
18. Cost of defence of dacoits will not be borne by State or Centre. There is no objection to private agencies doing this. Fewer cases may be accepted as such.
19. Efforts will be made to see that there is no scope for complaints and facilities will be provided within reasonable and permissible limits.
20. Police action will continue against those who do not surrender.

(Source : Office of the Chambal Ghati Seva Sanathan).

It will be clear from the above stipulations that a legal normative framework was given a sanction of formal authority by the state which permitted enough encouragement and inducement for the dacoits to submit voluntarily, and at the same time they make clear the role of law and order agencies of social control unambiguously. Thus the surrendering dacoit was not to be exhibited in a manner which would lionise the image of the deviant and devalue the role of the formal agencies of social control.

It can not be said that all the guide-lines could be strictly followed but the indulgence to such violations were accepted in a permissive spirit by the parties in agreement. While the operative part of the conditions of surrender found more or less a strict adherence, the other part was permitted considerable leeway. Thus the peace - zones, the submission of gangs with fire arms, the voluntary acceptance of penal prohibitions by the surrendering dacoits and other related matters were observed upto the best possible extent. But the points dealing with propaganda and ceremony could not be kept under control. All the media of mass communication described in vivid detail the entire proceedings of surrender. Huge crowds thronged the arena where this unusual drama was unfolding itself and no less a person than the Chief Minister himself added to the ceremony presided over by Jayaprakash Narayan.

With the surrender of 501 dacoits including leaders and gang members certain sequential steps were taken in the spirit of the guide lines²². The dacoits of Gwalior division were lodged in Gwalior Central Jail, special courts were instituted in the jail itself to deal specifically and exclusively with their cases, the facilities which go with an

22. This number of surrendered dacoits is inclusive of Bundelkhand (Sagar division) region dacoits.

open jail were immediately made available to them and several other concessions were provided. The Mission's appeal for contributions from the public for their legal defence and rehabilitation found response in several ways. There were contributions in cash, voluntary gift of legal counsel and advice by persons in the legal profession and such others²³.

The Government took steps to meet the immediate and long term needs of rehabilitation of the dacoit families and their victims. The immediate relief provided Rs.400/- to the dacoit and Rs.500/- to the affected families and set about to make provisions for education of children, occupational rehabilitation by considering favourably the suitability of existing employment opportunities, by providing

23. From all sources, the money thus collected amounted to Rs.1.90 lakh. No other State except Mysore made a contribution, Ravi Shankar Maharaj, Sarvodaya leader of Gujrat contributed Rs.1,00,000 out of which a major portion was distributed by 1973 among the families of dacoits from U.P. and Rajasthan (73 dacoits). Those states provided no aid (upto ~~1972~~ that time) to the families of the dacoits originating from U.P. and Rajasthan who had surrendered in 1972 in Madhya Pradesh (Hindustan Times, Feb.27, 1973). For legal defence of the surrendered dacoits financial assistance to the tune of Rs.15,000/- was provided by Ravi Shankar Maharaj and Rs.26,126/- were provided for the above said purpose by the Chambal Ghati Shanti Mission'.

them with facilities for loans, distribution of land and so on. The state evolved a five point programme for the rehabilitation of the surrendered dacoits as well as the victims of dacoits.

Under the short-term phase a cash amount of Rs.400/- per family was distributed among the families of 307 dacoits²⁴ and among the families of the victims this amount was Rs.500/- per family²⁵. Under the Long-term phase the provisions were made for - (a) distribution of land, (b) Scholarships to the children for education and (c) preference in taking their wards in governmental jobs.

Occupational Rehabilitation:

3,985.35 acres of land upto 1975 were distributed among 310 dacoits, at the rate of 15 acres per dacoit, but since October, 1974 the limit has been lowered to 5 acres per dacoit. A number of them submitted applications for re-allotment. This was because either the earlier allotted land was not fit for agriculture or was situated at a place where they still had enemies.

24. A sum of Rs.1,22,800/- was distributed^{by} the concerned Police Supdts. of the areas.

25. A sum of Rs. 4,01,00/- was distributed by the Police Supdts. of the areas.

For agricultural operations 190 families of dacoits were given the grant of Rs. 3,52,905 upto 1973-74²⁶.

Table VIII

**Scholarships for the Education of Surrendered Dacoit²⁷
Children : 1972-1975**

Year	Number of scholar- ships	Amount in Rupees
1972-73	169	52,939.00
1973-74	228	87,922.00
1974-75	205	66,135.00

Note : The information for Guna district on this point is not there in these figures.

Source : Divisional Commissioner's Office (Gwalior).

Three persons out of the families of dacoits were taken in government services. Thus the above schemes were floated to help integrate the deviants in the mainstream of society²⁷. A hostel was also established at Gwalior for children of surrendered dacoits. Earlier there were sufficient number of children but in 1975 only 10 were there. The

26. For lack of receiving allotment for the last two years, this work could not be finished.

27. There were 14 cases where these facilities were withdrawn because of violation of parole rules.

wives of the dacoits were also encouraged to visit 'Mahila State Home' to learn and engage in useful economic activities²⁸.

Rehabilitation of Victims :

7,028.93 acres of land was distributed among 700 families of the victims of dacoits at the rate of 15 acres per family by 1975*. Agricultural grant of Rs.83,520 had been distributed among 62 families.

Table No. IX

Scholarship for the Education of Children of the victims of Dacoits

Year	Number of Children	Amount in Rupees
1972-73	1,299	4,58,388
1973-74	2,143	9,36,536
1974-75	2,031	6,73,959

Note : The figures for these years do not include the information on the items for Guna district.

Source : Divisional Commissioner's Office (Gwalior).

147 members of such families were taken into government services.

28. The Mahila State Home is a government institution for the training of arts and craft to women to help them increase their earning capacity.

* Since October 1974, it was lowered to 5 acres per family.

Bank Loans to Surrendered Dacoits :

To the ex-dacoits who are still serving their sentence at 'Nav Jivan Shivir' Mungaoli, one ex-dacoit chief had received two loans of Rs. 20,000 each for starting a dairy. And a loan of Rs. 66,000 was made available to the wife of another for the purchase of a tractor²⁹. During the year 1974, State Bank of India loaned Rs. 20,000 to some dacoits for the purchase of buffaloes etc. out of which 10 buffaloes were purchased. Further upto August 1975, 10 dacoits got a loan of Rs.3,000 each.

On 14th November, 1973 near about 100-125 of the surrendered dacoits were transferred to specially prepared open jail at Maongaoli in district Guna, where they could live with their families³⁰. The open jail now termed as 'Navjivan Shivir' permitted the Sarvodaya voluntary organisation to apply its theory of speedy rehabilitation. The 'Mission'³¹ as well as the state initiated a system of self-government in some of their communal aspects of life

29. Nav Bharat Times: 7-9-1975

30. The surrendered dacoits who were awarded seven years' or more imprisonment were the ones who were transferred to the open jail. The rest having to serve less than seven years were kept in other district and central jails at various places but the jail terms were the same as those in the open jail.

31. Surrendered dacoits generally mention the Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan as 'Mission'.

and living at Navjivan Shivir. A 'Panchayat' came into existence and started operating as an important decision-making body which dealt with disputes amongst its own members inside the Navjivan Shivir and also interact with the 'Mission' and the 'Jail' authorities to communicate the needs of the inmates.

Several economic activities were started within the 'open jail' as a part of the programme of rehabilitation. Land belonging to the 'Jail' could be cultivated by the inmates, a flour mill was opened, a furniture manufacturing unit started functioning and a milk dairy was also started. Those inmates who showed interest in such gainful employment were rewarded by other kinds of relaxations. Their period of parole was extended and the profits of their productive labour went to them, and they were encouraged to produce more.

The activities related to the surrender and rehabilitation of dacoits were being conducted by the Chambal valley Peace Mission established by Vinoba in 1960 and reshaped by Jayaprakash Narayan in 1972. However, with the expansion in the activities of the Mission, internal differences on management of the problems of rehabilitation led to the formation of Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan in 1975. The main role of rehabilitation and the two surrender programmes in 1976 shifted to the 'Chambal Ghati Seva Sansthan' under

the leadership of S.N. Subbarao. Presently, it is the 'Sansthan' which is carrying on the implementation of the guidelines and looking to the rehabilitation of surrendered dacoits' families and their victims' families in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan.

On the eve of surrender of dacoits on 3rd June 1976 various plans were formulated by the Government for socio-economic development of the dacoit infested areas of Agra division. For Tehsil Bah (district Agra) a development scheme costing Rupees 32 crores was drawn up. The main items being :

- (a) an increase in the area under Kharif from 18,000 hectares to 40,000 hectares; under Rabi crop and for other crops from 500 hectares to 8500 hectares.
- (b) the establishment of 292 small scale and cottage industries, and
- (c) the construction of roads and bridges rupees four crores seventy lakh scheme (Nav Bharat Times: 4th June, 1976).

Another development plan for this region was announced by the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh on 6th June. A Rupee: 50 crore proposal for the Chambal-Betwa region to be developed in two phases was worked out for consideration. Under the first phase - roads, bridges and minor irrigation were to be

taken up. The second phase was to cover major irrigation projects (Hindustan Times: 7th June, 1976). The opinion of the Central Zonal Council was in favour of assistance by the Centre to the States of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan in implementing their socio-economic developmental scheme to check the menace of dacoity. A proposal for carrying out a study of the problem of dacoity by the Bureau of Police Research was also put forward. A meeting with Planning Commission was also emphasised for the economic development of the region (Hindustan Times: 12th June, 1976).

The Harijan and Social Welfare Department (Uttar Pradesh) one week prior to the surrender ceremony, proposed to provide loans for surrendering Harijan Dacoits (if any). These loans were to be provided as a measure of rehabilitation (Amar Ujala : 27th May). On 3rd June, the Agriculture Development Branch of State Bank of India (Shamsabad) put forward a proposal for providing financial aid to the families of surrendered dacoits for agricultural purposes, under its jurisdiction. In sum, the development and rehabilitation agencies of government responded efficiently to the demands of the new situation and promoted the voluntary role of the 'Sansthan' in surrender, rehabilitation and development.

Chapter VIIC O N C L U S I O N

The substantive problem of the 'baghis' is of sociological significance only when we are able to relate this problem with the social structure, social process and social change. The existence, continuity and persistence of this problem is a manifestation of the character of the social structure. It follows that the phenomenon of reintegration through voluntary surrender and voluntary acceptance of penal punishment is yet another manifestation of the structure which has presumably undergone change. The phenomenon of voluntary surrender, therefore, must be analysed and interpreted as a complex indicator of societal change and the flexibility of the societal structures to respond to the demands of change. Thus, if changes are taking place in certain major institutions of the society, inhibitions regarding permissibility of changes in other institutions may create problems for the overall social development. This is true because social change is not coterminous with social development, social change can have consequences both intended and unintended, both functional and dysfunctional in terms of the larger value base of the society. The major goal of social development is to attempt to divert and direct, as far as possible, the intended and unintended consequences of social change towards the preferred goals of social development. Sociology

of the deviant subculture of the 'baghis' of the Chambal Valley is illustrative of how the process of reintegration of deviance into the normative framework of the legitimate wider social environment is an unintended consequence of change which has been interpreted as an objective of social development in terms of our value frame.

A comprehensive study of social change and social development, with the phenomenon of the process of reintegration and deviance in the Chambal valley as an indicator, would have to include firstly a systematic mapping of structure and change of the social milieu of which this deviance is a product. Secondly, the phenomenon of reintegration and the attendant activation of various existing institutional structures and the emergence of new organisations and institutions and their impact on the social milieu would also provide the content and substance of changes that have and are taking place. The present effort falls far short of this comprehensive canvas and confines itself to a more modest understanding of this problem.

The immediate implications in the understanding of social change can be in terms of - structures which are undergoing alteration by elimination, and structures which are undergoing transformation with the emergence of new structures. The phenomenon of change in Chambal Valley, therefore, can be understood in terms of the erosion of deviant

structure of the 'baghi' subculture, and in terms of the emergence of voluntary associations, new formal rules and regulations and the advent of new problem-solving and decision-making groups with a view to prevent the recurrence of conflicts which give impetus to the contending parties to enter the 'baghi' subculture. The 'Shanti Sena' or peace brigades have been encouraged to grow at the village level since April 1976.

The analysis of secondary source material gives sufficient clues to the persistence of this phenomenon (of dacoity), specially until the 1960s. The historicity of the problem, as we have noted had endowed the 'baghi' with the image of a rebel. Thus right from the beginning the 'baghi' deviance had a political connotation and content. It is not, therefore, surprising that the conflicts, rooted in the contradictions of the system of the agrarian structure, and therefore of the political system of the rural society should become one of the sources of a steady inflow into the deviant subculture. It is further not surprising that the wider political system involving the power structure upto the level of the state and beyond should also have been related to the perpetuation of this subculture. The pattern of extracting taxes from "territories" under control of the 'baghis' in the form of 'Chanda' is again reminiscent of the rebel 'baghis' who had to contend with

the imperial powers in Delhi or with their lieutenants. One however does-n't know whether it was from poor villagers only that they extracted their levy at the village level.

However, while the rebel image of many important gangs continued in the minds of those under their domains, there has been a steady increase in the content of criminality and the objective of material gains. This is clearly indicated in the change that has been taking place in the crime pattern. We clearly observe that whereas there is no clear trend of a change in the ratio of dacoity to murder, we do find a very clear pattern of a decrease in dacoity and murder.

Table No. X

Distribution of Dacoity, Murder and Kidnapping as proportions of each other (Gwalior, Bhind, Morena, Shivpuri, Guna and Datia (Madhya Pradesh)

Years	Ratio of <u>Dacoity:</u> Murder	Ratio of <u>Dacoity :</u> Kidnapping	Ratio of <u>Murder :</u> Kidnapping
1958-60	1.49	2.77	1.85
1961-63	2.21	1.15	0.52
1964-66	2.20	0.88	0.40
1967-69	1.31	0.62	0.47
1970-72	2.03	0.46	0.23

Source : CID Office Gwalior

with an increase in the incidence of kidnapping for ransom, An increasing incidence of kidnapping is indicative of the fact that there is an increased motivation for crime for material benefits rather than for the squaring up of entities arising out of a conflict in the agrarian setting or in the rural power structure. So even if dacoity and murder have decreased, the ratio between them remains more or less unaffected. This would indicate a substantive reduction of the political content of the 'baghi' subculture and an enhancement of the criminal propensities for material accumulation of wealth.

The above pattern by deduction would suggest, firstly, that for some reasons or complex of reasons the 'baghi' way of settling disputes is becoming progressively less relevant, and therefore some changes must have taken place within the last 30 years or more by the new political and economic forces released in the society. Secondly it would be consistent with the 'baghi-rebel' configuration if the 'baghi' finding his political targets in the village becoming less relevant, or perhaps getting a forced relevance, consequently shifts his targets to some other object in which his 'baghi-rebel' configuration finds some kind of a fit. It is, therefore, interesting to note that there has been an increase in the incidence of kidnappings. The impression that one gets out of the inadequate data is that a number of targets of kidnapp-

ing are those who have been identified by the 'baghis' as having amassed wealth by improper means. Can it be that consciously or subconsciously the 'baghi-rebel' target has been the black sheep of the society who have amassed black money? Has he consciously or sub-consciously tried to give a continuity to this 'baghi-rebel' role? However, this needs proper empirical validation and should be the hypothetical basis for further researches.

It is in the context of the historicity of the 'baghi-rebel' role, the social changes that have taken place, and the problem of a fit between the former and the latter, that interpretations of the voluntary surrenders of 'baghis' of Chambal Valley have to be interpreted. For certainly there is enough evidence to suggest that the increase in the strength of the law and order apparatus of the State has not led to any significant decline in the incidence of such deviant behaviour and whenever there has been a reduction in the strength of the State apparatus there has been a spurt in deviant activities. Therefore, the obvious explanation that the dacoits had no option but to surrender with the increase in the might of the police force is too superficial for academic consumption. Further, this erroneously assumes that the police force is outside the society and milieu in which the subculture operates. Therefore once again by inference the proposition that the nature of social changes that have

taken place has provided alternative means of conflict articulation and has increasingly proved redundant or less effectual the 'baghi-rebel' means for such solutions, gains in credibility. Increasingly therefore, the 'baghi' has presumably been feeling the unnecessary costs for what presumably are meagre political gains of scoring over a factional enemy. Drawn into deviance by the in-ertia of the 'baghi-rebel' subculture he now finds that the structure has undergone such transformations that the costs of achieving the goals are too heavy. It is this lag between the changes in the structure and the culture that provides one of the principle foci for our interpretation. The attitudes of the most important 'baghis' interviewed - Tehsildar Singh^{*}, Lokman, Madho Singh, Mehar Singh, Makhan Singh, Kamta Singh, Janak Singh and others confirm that they wanted to live normal lives and found it tiresome and sometimes agonizing to be always on the run, that there has always been a genuine desire among them to live peacefully, that they were not criminals who took to the life of crime only for material benefits, that they were the persons who in a way were forced to lead their lives outside the pale of the society on account of the social injustices meted out to them, that this was why they had surrendered when provided with an opportunity; all these indicate that the proposition has some validity.

An important point that should not confound the problem is that the universe of the 'baghi' subculture is not coterminous

* See foot note 32, on page 118

with the universe of criminality as is generally understood. Therefore an end of the 'baghi' subculture need not imply the end of criminality or the existence of criminal gangs. To the extent that criminal gangs exist in other parts of the country even in the absence of any kind of subculture like that of the 'baghis' , it is not unlikely that criminality should continue even assuming that the 'baghi' subculture has come to an end. It is interesting to note that there is a diminishing rate of surrenders with each successive programme of surrender. Secondly, it is also obvious that the criminal element of the later 'baghis' is higher than their rebel content. They are consequently lesser personalities than the earlier 'baghis' in the eyes of the people. This indicates that the universe of the subculture of the 'baghi-rebel' has already shrunk and what remains has more of the criminal than the rebel.

The remnant criminal gangs are, therefore, not bound so strictly by the norms and values of a subculture--norms relating to the rules of the game. The phenomenon of the voluntary surrender displays yet another important fact of Indian society. For a problem which is essentially

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32. Tehsildar Singh was arrested by the Police after an encounter. He confirms that prior to his arrest Man Singh gang had tried to settle down peacefully a number of times, given the opportunity to do so, (Personal interviews)

confined to a small region, it is interesting to note that charismatic personalities of the status of Vinoba, Jayaprakash Narayan and Indira Gandhi were able to wield together the voluntary and formal institutions of the state for the specific task of eliminating a social problem. This gives evidence of the enormous capacity of our political elite and institutions to accommodate the conflicting and contradictory nature of these institutions. It would appear that an effort to erase a subculture for which the initiative came from the subculture itself needed above all a macro-societal legitimacy. A grant of reprieve of the sentence of imprisonment, if made by formal authorities in power, would carry less legitimacy before the eyes of the people than if a stamp of legitimacy came from the acknowledged leaders of the masses, whose image did not vest in any kind of formal authority but is essentially based on an overarching moral authority. Thus the termination of an age-long subculture could only be effected by the moral authority of the national leaders. This explains the role of charisma and voluntary organisations in the context of such persisting socio-cultural phenomenon.

In conclusion, it would be desirable to evolve a theoretical model with the help of which the phenomenon of the 'baghi-rebel' subculture can be analysed. In a situation such

as Chambal Valley we are confronted with an interaction between a legitimate order and a deviant subculture. Both the legitimate order and the deviant subculture have contradictions within them. The legitimate order has a manifestly legitimate dimension. It also has, embedded in it, latent deviance. Thus there are those who are enacting roles by occupying legitimate status positions in the existing institutions of the order, but there are status incumbents who are not necessarily playing the roles as per the institutionally defined normative standards. Such status incumbents also play a deviant role in pursuit of specific objectives, which generally relate to personal acquisition of material possessions. Illustratively a person may be a politician or a member of legislature or a police man, these are statuses in the legitimate order. However, such persons may decide to play their roles in terms of the manifest norms, and they may also choose to indulge in corrupt practices by utilizing their manifest position and amass wealth for some other kind of benefits. The deviant subculture too has a manifest and latent dimension. At the manifest level he is an outlaw, he is a criminal, he can choose to murder or kidnap or indulge in rape - all these would not be inconsistent with the manifest deviance of his role.

		Deviant subculture ('Baghi' role)	
<u>Legitimate Order</u>	<u>Manifestly legitimate</u>	<u>Manifestly deviant</u> Conflict	<u>Latently legitimate</u> Conflict but not unequivocal and unambiguous Baghi role - prototype Robinhood
	<u>Latently deviant</u>	Co-operation	Co-operative and conflict. Indifference.

However, the 'baghi' subculture also has a latent legitimacy. It is this latent legitimacy that reinforces his image of a rebel against oppression, makes him keep up his role as benefactor of the poor and the poor in turn try to ensure his safety. It is within this framework that we can examine the levels of interaction between the deviant subculture and the legitimate order. Further it would also help to explore and explain in greater details the factors responsible for the persistence of the deviant subculture. Clearly there are four broad arenas of interaction. Firstly, the interaction between the legitimate order at its manifest level with the deviant subculture at its manifest level.

Clearly the interaction here is that of conflict. The manifest legitimate order cannot accept the existence of the manifestly deviant subculture. Thus the various institutions of the State would try to control and contain the manifestly deviant activities of the 'baghis'. However, this ideal typical situation of the two contradictory structures in conflict faces problems when the manifestly deviant baghis can cooperate with the latent deviant structures of the legitimate order. The reasons for such co-operation may be many ranging from material gains to kinship to sympathy etc. Again, even those of the manifest legitimate order have to reckon with the latently legitimate role of the baghi, the proto-type of which is the image of Robin-hood. Again it would be interesting to note how the latently legitimate role of the baghi interacts with the latently deviant structure of the legitimate order. This model is at best a broad methodological framework, which doubtless would have to undergo further refinements as the variations within each broad cells multiply.

APPENDIX No. I

Crimes Committed by Individual Dacoit Gangs (41) and
the ~~Number~~ Number of Encounters with Police.

Code No. of the Dacoit Gang.	Crime by Gang			Total	Encounters with Police.
	Murder	Dacoity	Kidnapp- ing		
E. 1	115	61	133	309	80
E. 2	71	62	112	245	81
E. 3	77	63	73	213	63
E. 4	40	54	102	196	69
E. 5	26	49	59	134	45
E. 6	65	44	83	192	36
E. 7	53	33	73	159	51
E. 8	35	32	46	113	51
E. 9	27	30	32	89	22
E. 10	41	22	83	146	26
E. 11	19	0	18	37	20
E. 12	33	26	81	140	49
E. 13	3	0	22	25	10
E. 14	1	2	11	14	21
E. 15	14	19	28	61	34
E. 16	9	9	22	40	13
E. 17	1	1	03	5	1
E. 18	6	6	16	28	3
E. 19	3	3	5	11	2
E. 20	52	23	30	105	18
E. 21	8	0	25	33	8
E. 22	9	2	41	52	14
E. 23	3	0	0	3	4
E. 24	2	0	21	23	5
E. 25	6	5	30	41	7
E. 26	22	63	72	157	65
E. 27	3	0	1	4	1
E. 28	4	1	19	24	18
E. 29	5	0	29	34	10
E. 30	1	1	12	14	1
E. 31	2	1	20	23	18
E. 32	67	45	80	192	30
E. 33	3	1	9	13	2
E. 34	10	0	5	15	6
E. 35	0	0	2	2	2
E. 36	3	3	8	14	10
E. 37	0	0	1	1	12
E. 38	0	0	3	3	1
E. 39	0	0	2	2	2
E. 40	3	1	1	5	1
E. 41	0	2	2	4	0
Total	842	664	1,415	2,911	901

Source : CID Office, Gwalior

By the year 1972, the number of dacoit gangs in Chambal valley (in Madhya Pradesh, Northern range alone, leaving aside the number of local gangs and those of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan) had gone upto fortyone. According to the police records above is the account of crimes committed and number of encounters with police of these dacoit gangs, since the inception of these gangs upto early 1972.

In total these fortyone dacoit gangs had been responsible for 842 murders, 664 dacoities, 1,415 kidnappings for ransom and had survived even after 942 encounters with the police. It was almost at this juncture that Sarvodaya leader Jayaprakash Narayan, on the personal request of dacoit chief Madho Singh, started efforts for a nonviolent solution of the age old problem of dacoity, to which the state as well as Central governments responded favourably. The outcome being the mass surrender of dacoits of Chambal valley as well as of Sagar division. For the first time the government of Madhya Pradesh adopted various socio-economic rehabilitative and reintegrative measures on a wide scale in its efforts for doing away with the problem of dacoity from the region.

हम सुधरें, जग को सुधारें

प्रिय बागी भाइयों,

हम सभी बागी भाइयों का आप को राम-राम ।

सोच-विचार कर हम लोगों ने निश्चय किया है कि हम लोग राष्ट्रपिता महात्मा गांधी के चरणों में आत्मसमर्पण कर लें ।

सोचने से यह पता चला कि समर्पण करने में ही असली बहादुरी है । उसमें हमारा ही हित है । हमारे परिवार का हित है, हमारे गाँव का हित है, हमारे देश 'भारत' का हित है ।

अबकी बार उत्तर प्रदेश सरकार अनेक सुविधाएँ दे रही है, उसका लाभ उठाएँ । आगे ऐसा स्वर्ण अवसर नहीं आएगा । आप सब जल्दी से जल्दी बटेश्वर, शौरापुर या उरावर आ जायें ।

आखिरी तारीख गुरुवार ३ जून १९७६ है ।

समर्पण उसी दिन प्रातःकाल बटेश्वर में होगा । मुख्य मन्त्री तथा अन्य प्रतिष्ठित व्यक्ति आयेंगे ।

हम सब एक साथ समर्पण करें ।

हम सब आप के भाई

- १ - श्री जनकसिंह क्यारी
- २ - श्री पुत्तनसिंह
- ३ - श्री भोगोराम पांडे
- ४ - श्री लाखन सिंह
- ५ - श्री अतर सिंह
- ६ - श्री गोपी राम
- ७ - श्री रिपुदमन सिंह
- ८ - श्री नत्थी सिंह
- ९ - श्री अतरसिंह बसई
- १० - श्री लालसिंह
- ११ - श्री नत्थीसिंह ककरेली
- १२ - श्री पूजाराम सिंह शर्मा
- १३ - श्री महावीरसिंह चांदीकरार
- १४ - श्री हरालाल बटेश्वर
- १५ - श्री रामप्रकाश नोगवाँ
- १६ - श्री रामस्वरूप चतुरभुजकापुरा
- १७ - श्री कुतका बेरिया

- १८ - श्री जयवीर बटेश्वर
- १९ - श्री शेर खाँ ग्वालियर
- २० - श्री प्रकाश (१० वर्ष)

इन तीन समर्पणकारियों के नाम श्री नत्थूसिंह गूजर ग्राम बडागाँव के द्वारा अनुशासन के आधार पर—

- २१ - श्री कामता सिंह मड़वा
- २२ - श्री तुलसी राम यादव चौरगा-
बेहड़
- २३ - श्री राम प्रकाश यादव उरावर
- २४ - श्री जालिमसिंह
- २५ - श्री मोजमसिंह विक्रमपुर
- २६ - श्री अनारसिंह रमा० म० प्र०

बागी भाईयों से,

“ मेरे दोस्तों ! अपने बुरे कामों का साफ
इजहार करो और उसका दण्ड स्वीकार

कर, कर डालो इसी जन्म में

अपने पापों का प्रायश्चित्त ।

एक राह तो खुली है। हम

चाहते हैं कि जो भी भूले-भटके

भाई हैं, वे हमारे पास आ

जायें । हम उनका स्वागत करते हैं । उन्हें

न्याय दिलाने की कोशिश करेंगे । ”

—बाबा विनोबा

चम्बल घाटी सेवा संस्थान

(राजस्थान)

समर्पण शिविर धौलपुर : राजस्थान :

इस लीगों ने संघर्षा यह बातें माननी है कि सम्पूर्ण
करते समय अपने हितधारियों की भी सम्पूर्ण करने और
अपनी पकड़ को भी छोड़े देते। अनेक मामलों में अनेक

नाई न ही, ऐसी सहायता भी मिलनी।
विषय बताने हेतु और उनके परभावों की आर्थिक कति-
उदारता बरती है। सम्पूर्ण करनेवालों के साथ न्याय-
यह आखिरी सीका है। इस बार ही सरकार ने बहुत
सम्पूर्ण की सीका बार-बार नहीं आती। इस बार

इलाके को शामिल मिलनी।
किता। अब आप ली भी बाहर से वे आवाज ही इस
बड़े-बड़े सम्पूर्ण से अब तक वे आवाजों ने सम्पूर्ण

हमारे साथ है।
आपका सम्पूर्ण ही और वे इस काम में मदद देने के लिए
आदि धर्म में लग रहे हैं। ये लोग भी पूरी बाहरे हैं कि
अपने बालबच्चों के साथ सुखशांति से रहने लगे हैं, खेती
समय में बाहर आ जायेंगे। छोटे छोटे से सब लोग अपने-
उनमें से भी अनेक लोग बाहर आये हैं। और लोग भी कुछ
सन १९७२ में कई बड़े गिरावों ने सम्पूर्ण किता और आज
सम्पूर्ण किता और आज वे सब लोग जेल से छूटे हैं। फिर
सन १९६० में मानसिक - गिराव के बड़े सदस्यों ने

बदली-से-बदली ली जाए।
आप अपने हित में सोचते हुए आत्मसम्पूर्ण का निर्णय

पुस्तकालय संरक्षणाधीन पुस्तिका

पुस्तक संख्या : २२२२
पुस्तक नाम : [...]
पुस्तकालय : [...]
पुस्तकालय संरक्षणाधीन पुस्तिका

पुस्तक संख्या : २२२२

पुस्तक संख्या : २२२२
पुस्तक नाम : [...]
पुस्तकालय : [...]
पुस्तकालय संरक्षणाधीन पुस्तिका

समर्पण कारी

का अपना व्रत

१. ईश्वर की अनुकम्पा है कि उसने मुझे समर्पण करने की प्रेरणा दी।
२. नए जीवन में प्रवेश करते समय मेरे विचार भी नए होने लगे हैं।
३. प्रभु ने हमको मनुष्य जन्म दिया है। मनुष्य जन्म जीवों में सबसे ऊँचा है। मनुष्य धर्म प्रेम करने का है, द्वेष का नहीं।
४. शासन व शान्ति कार्यकर्ता, हमारी व हमारे परिवार की देख-रेख करेंगे। हमारा भी धर्म है कि हम वर भावको भूलेंगे, पुराने दुश्मनों को भी अपनाएँगे। कोई पकड़ अपने पास नहीं रखेंगे।
५. मेरे सबसे बड़े दुश्मन तो मेरे अन्दर हैं—काम क्रोध ईर्ष्या द्वेष आदि। उनको जीतना अवश्यक है। मैं अपने ऊपर काबू पाऊँ यह सबसे बड़ी जीत है।

६. बहादुरी—

- दूसरों का जीवन देने में है जान लेने में नहीं।
७. हम केवल ईश्वर से डरें। हम किसी से नहीं डरे— हमसे किसी को भी डर न हो।
८. वर को मिटाने का एक ही तरीका है— सैत्री, दोस्ती, प्यार।
९. सरकार और जनता के हम आभारी हैं कि हमें नई जिंदगी मिल रही है। हम उसके योग्य बनेंगे।
१०. किसी जनता को हमने तकलीफ हुई हो तो हमको उसको अफसोस है। हम अपने शेष जीवन को जनता की सेवा में लगाएंगे।

समर्पण शिविर

कोलपुर

२०२३ ३४२-००१

शिविर आचार्य (३००३०)

APPENDIX No. IIIRehabilitation of Dacoits who Surrendered to
Vinoba in 1960 :Legal Aid :

In total the Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti spent Rs. 15900 for the court cases of the surrendered dacoits. This amount was made available to Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti by (a) Gwalior Chamber of Commerce, (b) Sewa Seva Sangh, (c) Gandhi Smarak Nidhi (Madhya Pradesh) and (d) Gandhi Smarak Nidhi (Uttar Pradesh).

Economic Aid :

Seven out of these twenty dacoits were rehabilitated on the land (twenty 'bighas' per family) allotted by Madhya Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Board. For rehabilitation most of these twenty surrendered dacoits were given financial help by Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti. A hostel at Bhind was started by the 'Samiti' for the education of the children of dacoits and the children of victims of these dacoits. The International Mission -- 'War on Want' and certain social Welfare Agency of Germany also made financial contributions in line with Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti towards the rehabilitation and reintegration of these dacoits.

On behalf of the Chambal Ghati Shanti Samiti and other social welfare agencies, the following are the attainments by March 1962 towards the socio-economic reintegration of the

fourteen out of twenty dacoits who submitted voluntarily to Vinoba in 1960:-

- i) Lokman - his land was under plough in village Bigwa. Family lived in its own house in Bhind city. His son was sent for education at the expenses of 'Samiti' at Visarjan Ashram, Indore. Half of his land was under dispute at village Ditawli.
- ii) Ram Sanchi - his land at village Niwari had been under agricultural operations. His family possessed a house of its own and also possessed some land at village Jaluapura.
- iii) Bhagwan Singh - his land at village Ruan which had been confiscated by the government earlier, and given to others was restored to his family. His land was under agricultural operations. His family had shifted to village Goth, where the villagers collectively constructed a house for the family. Younger brother of Bhagwan Singh was also sent to Indore for education but was back on account of bad health. There was no en-mity with the family on the part of others.
- iv) Bhoop Singh - his land was under agricultural operations at village Achhin. Some rivalry was therein the village.
- v) Kanhai - his brother got established at village Khara Rathore and the whole of his land was under the plough.

- vi) Kharehera - his land at village Sikta was under agricultural operations, while the family lived at Bhind.
- vii) Badan Singh and Ramdgal - their lands at village Guman Singh-ka-pura had been brought under the plough. 'Samiti' purchased bullocks for them. Earlier the atmosphere in the village was of violence, their houses were uprooted by the opponents and last year (1961) only due to the opponents, their lands could not be tilled. The 'Samiti' spent Rs.2,100 for these two families constituting 36 members.
- viii) Probhudyal - only two bighas of land under the plough. Family at village Khadot in its own home. One of his sons was helped by 'German Shayta Kosh'.
- ix) Lacchi - family at village Khadit, people of the village have constructed a house for the family.
- x) Vidya Ram - family at village Pratap-pur, land was under the plough, no opposition in the village.
- xi) Jangjit - a financial help of Rs.70 was provided to him by the 'Samiti'.
- xii) Tej Singh - family migrated to village Pihora to stay with his elder brother, while his land was under the plough at village Moghna.

xiii) Durjan - family stayed at its own village.

xiv) Moharman - economically unsound position, financial help to the family was provided by German Shyta Kesh.

(Bhoomi Kranti: Year 4, Vol.24,
1962 , p.4-5)

APPENDIX No. IVCRIME COMMITTED BY DACOITS 1973-75 :Table No. 1.2

(Gwalior Division)

Dist- riots	Year 1973			Year 1974			Year 1975		
	Dac- oity	Mur- der	Kidnap- ping	Dac- oity	Mur- der	Kidnap- ping	Dac- oity	Mur- der	Kidna- pping
Bhind	16	1	1	11	0	2	7	4	3
Morena	19	5	5	7	3	3	16	5	1
Gwalior	21	1	3	6	5	4	17	5	4
Shivpuri	12	2	0	7	3	0	10	3	2
Datia	9	1	0	2	2	0	3	2	1
Guna	15	0	1	3	0	0	10	0	0
Total :	92	10	10	36	13	9	63	19	11

Source : CID Office Gwalior

Table No. 1.3

Encounters, Deaths, Arrests and Surrenders in the Districts
of Bhind, Morena, Gwalior, Shivpuri, Guna and Datia (1973-75)

Dist- riots	Year 1973				Year 1974				Year 1975			
	En- coun- ters	Dac- oits shot dead	Dac- oits Arre- sted	Dac- oits surre- nder- ed	En- coun- ters	Dac- oits shot dead	Dac- oi- ts arr- est- ed	Da- coi- ts sur- ren- der- ed	En- cou- nt- ers	Da- coi- ts shot dead	Da- coi- ts arr- est- ed	Da- coi- ts sur- ren- der- ed
Bhind	0	0	26	8	0	0	89	0	2	1	65	0
Morena	10	12	42	10	4	5	117	0	12	9	72	8
Gwalior	5	8	27	11	0	0	2	0	2	2	38	2
Shivpuri	2	1	7	0	3	1	44	0	4	2	35	0
Datia	0	0	24	0	3	6	19	0	3	1	51	1
Guna	2	3	40	0	3	2	33	0	1	0	38	1
Total :	19	24	166	29	13	14	304	0	24	15	299	12

Source : CID Office Gwalior

From table 1.2 we get—

Crime per annum 89. Dacoity per annum 64,
Murder per annum 14, Kidnapping per annum 10.

In the post-surrender period in Madhya Pradesh (1973-75) Crime per annum was 89, Dacoity per annum 64, Murder per annum 14 and Kidnapping per annum 10, as compared to pre-surrender period. This ratio happens to be very low. In the pre-surrender period Crime per annum was 373, Dacoity per annum 143, Murder per annum 80 and Kidnapping per annum 151. This low incidence of crime in post-surrender period was one of the major influential points which induced the Uttar Pradesh government to try the nonviolent method of accepting the surrender of dacoits (Chambal valley, Agra Range) in the pattern of Madhya Pradesh. Almost, similar to the low incidence of crime, have been the low number of encounters, deaths, arrests and surrenders of dacoits in the period 1973-75 as compared to the pre-surrender era.

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