

ORGANISATIONAL ASPECT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA

**A STUDY OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS
IN
JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND PUNJAB
WITH REFERENCE TO
HARKAT-UL-ANSAR AND BABBAR KHALSA**

*Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

Submitted By

TANU PATNI

**CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067
INDIA
2000**



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI - 110 067

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled ORGANISATIONAL ASPECT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA; A Study of Terrorist Organisations in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab with reference to Harkat-ul-Ansar and Babbar Khalsa submitted by TANU PATNI is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this university. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other university and is her own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Rakesh Gupta

Prof. Dr. Rakesh Gupta
Supervisor

Kuldeep Mathur

Prof. Dr. Kuldeep Mathur
Chairperson

CHAIRPERSON
Centre for Political Studies
School of Social Science-II
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

CONTENTS

PREFACE

CHAPTER I	<i>CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM</i>
CHAPTER II	<i>COMPOSITE CULTURE I - KASHMIRIYAT</i>
CHAPTER III	<i>COMPOSITE CULTURE II - PUNJABIYAT</i>
CHAPTER IV	<i>TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS : KASHMIR</i> <i>Harkat-ul-Ansar</i>
CHAPTER V	<i>TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS : PUNJAB</i> <i>Babbar Khalsa</i>
CHAPTER VI	<i>CONCLUSION</i>
	<i>BIBLIOGRAPHY</i>
	<i>APPENDICES</i>

PREFACE

Terrorism is assumed as a phenomena that can be analysed in terms of the methods and effects of violence employed for political aims. The connotations of terrorism have been changing .If it began in modern times as Robespierre's reign of terror, today there is cyber terrorism. This is a new form of terrorism which is now becoming prevalent . There are definitional , typological and ideological problems in understanding terrorism . The theories of social change are inadequate to understand it. Terrorism is understood in the terms of means and effect to achieve political goals. This can be used both by the opposition groups and by the state. Those who find definitions inadequate opt for typologies. Typologies are found wanting too. They suffer from ideological biases and prejudices. Some episodes defy any classification.

Steering clear of definitional, typological and ideological dimensions of terrorism, an attempt has been made to look at terrorism as a strategy to achieve certain goals. This approach does not claim any advantage from general theories of revolt or violence. It looks at individual and organisation behaviour in the context of structural factors.

Many theories have been enunciated to deal with its causes in terms of alienation, social and economic factors and ideological linkages, This dissertation attempts to look at the individual and organisational aspect of terrorism. This dissertation assumes that the individual and the organisation are intrinsically connected. In this it looks at the social, economic and historical conditions as preconditions and events as precipitants in the process of terrorism . We forego any gains from a historico socio analysis . We only focus on the individual and organisational aspects of terrorism.

Our assumption is that terrorists are not depraved or cold blooded calculators. They make rational choices. More significantly, they may also have a sensibility which may allow them to leave the earlier path and adopt a new one. Having seen the unintended results of their choice in terms of cost benefit analysis, they may want to give up that option and return to their

real family. But the organisations of which they become members become their political families. Interorganisational conflict may exist there. The organisations have their processes and ideologies which may hinder the individuals to come out of them once they realize their mistakes, or strengthen their resolve and carry on.

With this in mind, this thesis attempts to study terrorist organisations with special reference to the Babbar Khalsa in Punjab and the Harkat-ul-Ansar in Kashmir, and this would attempt to conceptualise it with a comparative perspective of religion and history. For both the states have boasted of Punjabiya and Kashmiriya meaning compositeness and comingling- values that are now on a discount.

The choice of these two organisations was made not only because they had been very actively involved in increasing militancy in the states but also because they have a lot of support from other countries; Harkat-ul-Ansar has been declared a terrorist organisation by the United States and has the blessings of Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden.

The Babbar Khalsa trace their origin to the Babbar Akali movement of 1920 which was an offshoot of the Gurudwara reform movement. One of the first militant groups to come into prominence, Babbar Khalsa is an offshoot of Akhand Kirtani Jatha, and came into existence in 1978 to act as its armed wing.

This group operated independently and was reported to be financially very well off having a lot of foreign aid and patronage. Their targets were mainly very important persons. They were the first group to make liberal use of explosives in Punjab. They had a branch in Canada and in U. K. also.

This dissertation comprises of six chapters. The first chapter deals with conceptual framework of terrorism. Terrorism has been defined in a number of ways by different scholars, In this chapter we briefly describe the history of terrorism, causes and typologies

are used to explain the meaning and different perceptions of terrorism.

The historical background & cultural understanding are imperative for analysing the rise of militancy in these two states . Terrorists are made. No one is a born terrorist as also noone is a warmonger by birth. Punjab and Kashmir have always boasted of a rich culture. Since terrorist movements engage in cultural reinterpretation of identity groups and communities ,we focus on Punjabiya and Kashmiriya as composite identities as against their communal identity interpretations. Chapter two and three deal with this aspect.

It has been observed that terrorism in the above states has not been the activity of a single individual. There has always been a group - the size and structure of which might vary- which has been behind the terrorist act. Terrorism is a group activity. . The group does not work in isolation. It always has some connection outside itself. It can not work alone. Among other things, it needs money, arms and other material support to function. Very often, these groups have the support of other countries. Chapter four and five analyse these different groups. As the number of terrorist groups is too large in these two states, first there is a brief mention, about some well known organisations in these states. Then these two organisations are discussed in detail. An attempt has been made to describe the command structure, the recruitment process, the financial aspect, the age-group, the education level , the ideological strength, the inter and intra group dependence and conflict and the relations across the border.

In the concluding part, an attempt has been made to compare the two organisations structures. Number of interviews of police ,army officers and of some terrorists were also conducted. These interviews were conducted in an infomal and unstructured manner. The findings of these interviews have been included in the conclusion, though wherever necessary , annonymity has been mantained.

This dissertation is based on governments reports, interview with police and army officers and terrorists, intelligence reports and also secondary sources .

In the appendices, the profiles of certain significant terrorist leaders is drawn to show the difficulty which they face as individuals when they attempt to leave the organisations. This is based on secondary as well as primary sources.

I take this opportunity to thank Dr. Rakesh Gupta , who is the guiding spirit behind this work. A truly dedicated guide, friend and philosopher, he painstakingly and tirelessly went through the entire work several times. His drive and quest for excellence remain unparalleled.

The endearing support of my family and friends too has been a great help in accomplishing my task.

I would also like to thank the staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, New Delhi, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Library, New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, Library of Police Headquarters, Jaipur, J. P. Library, Meerut, Library of D. A. V. College, Ajmer, National Police Academy Library, Hyderabad and the Library of Lal Bahdur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Mussorie. I am thankful to all those interviewees who consented to talk to me.

Last, but not the least, I am grateful to Mr. Rahul Aggarwal for painstakingly word processing my work . His help in finishing my work was tremendous.

However , no one is responsible for the inadequacies which this work may have. I am alone responsible for them.

JULY 2000.

TANU PATNI

CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM

Terms like "terrorism" and "reign of terror" have changed meaning several times. Originally, in the "popular phase" of the French revolution the terms stood for organised intimidation by the ruling factions and not by the revolutionary sections of the masses. Two centuries of uprisings, revolutions, rebellions, and world wars later, terrorism has become the weapon of the weak. Those who seek to change their world, but cannot muster the power to do so. At the dawn of the 21st century, terrorist violence does not have to be actual; even threats can create fear.

Today's terrorists are empowered disproportionately by the transport and telecommunication revolution, and the tools of globalisations such as electronic banking and internet. Smuggling, drug or gun-running and money laundering are replacing robberies as fund raising options. Ideologically divergent outfits in different parts of the globe are even joining hands.

The modern state, in its strategic responses, has also become much more effective and focussed. Many policy makers in democratic systems are tempted to use repression, but it has been proved conclusively that this creates the vicious circle of terror and counter-terror. Nations faced with terrorism evolve their own strategic culture as an outcome of the state's repetitive (planned and coincidental) responses to incidents of violence. They try to make tight securities a part of their national ethos and constantly research and develop methods of combating terrorism. Security forces try to learn lessons from the bitter experiences.

Terror has been with man since Adam and Eve were driven out of Eden. Man has fears, phobias, apprehensions and alarms in varying degrees and these have been utilized by prophets and saints, tyrants and the champions of proletariat to elicit desired responses- trying to make him God fearing or a subordinate creature. Terrorism derived from terror (intense fear) and -ism (practise

of or theory or principles thereof) is a word about which, no two people seem to agree, either to what it means or the appropriate response.

According to Martha Crenshaw¹, both the phenomenon of terrorism and our conception of it depend on historical context -political, social and economic - and on how the groups and individuals, who participate in or respond to the actions we call terrorism, relate to the world in which they act.

The term terrorism and terrorist are of relatively recent date. The meaning of terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the dictionnaire of the academic franchise as "systeme de la terror". According to a French dictionary published in 1796, the Jacobians had on occasions used the term when speaking about themselves in a positive sense². Only later did it become a term of abuse with criminal implications.

It did not take long for the term to reach England. Edmund Burke in 1795 wrote about "thousands of those hell hounds called terrorists, who were let loose on the people." Terrorism during the French revolution was more or less a synonym for a reign of terror. A terrorist was anyone who attempted to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation. During Burke's time attack on property caused terror. Today in the context of hijacking of IC-814, attack on life causes terror. Obviously, the meaning of the word has undergone changes since the times of Thomas Hobbes who created a 'Leviathan' to prevent fear from gripping man desirous of commodious living.

No definition of terrorism can possibly cover all varieties of terrorism that have appeared over history. In the nineteenth century, People's Will Group practised the tactic against the Czar in defence of democracy. Peasant wars,

labour disputes and brigandage have been accompanied by systematic and sporadic terror, and the same is true of general wars, civil wars, revolutionary wars and resistance movements against foreign occupants. They need to be distinguished from terror politics. Terrorist activities have been and are contextual in time and space. However in most cases terrorism was one of the strategies to achieve ends, or, some movements developed a fringe that was labelled terroristic.

One of the earliest known examples of a terrorist movement is the Sicari- a highly organized religious sect consisting of men of lower orders active in zealot struggle in Palestine in A.D.66-73. A similar mixture of messianic hope and political terrorism was the feature of another group-the Assassins.They were an offshoot of the Ismailis who appeared in Persia in the 11th century and were suppressed by the Mongols only in the 13th century. Their style is akin to contemporary terrorism.

Secret societies of a different kind existed for centuries in India and the Far East. Anglo-Indian authorities denied the existence of thuggis until Captain William Sleeman studied and finally destroyed them. Thuggis did not have a political intent. The ideology of Indian terrorism was a curious mix of Indian tradition and western influences.

Secret societies in China existed among river pirates and the outlaws both in the hills and among city dwellers. There is hardly any society -ancient or modern -that does not show the signs of terrorist activities-sporadic or more organised, non-political or political, social protest or criminal . Thus the origin of terrorism is of an ancient vintage and so cannot belong to the terrain of either National Liberation Theology or Marxism, as has been made out traditionally.

Terrorism has been defined in various ways by different scholars. Bell argues that terrorism is the weapon of the weak but it is a very powerful weapon. Bell's description treats terrorism as a conflictual behaviour by those for whom full scale military conflict is impractical. Fromkin takes a similar approach in arguing that military action is aimed at physical destruction while terrorism aims at psychological consequences. Terrorism, he argues is violence for the purpose of creating fear. Jenkins views terrorism as a low cost type of warfare between major powers.³

From a conservative point of view, Walter Lacquer's work is good. His and Brian Jenkins view is typical of US State department's point of view. According to Walter Lacquer of Georgetown University, violence or threatened violence intended to produce change is terrorism⁴ This sentence shows that both think that terrorism is (1) illegitimate force (2) applied on innocent people (3) for illegitimate ends. The official definition of terrorism accepted by both Germany and US is "criminal violence violating legal codes and punishable by the state is terrorism. This definition which looks at terrorism as a crime metaphor was provided by the US Senate and so it just takes the state view of terrorism. But terrorism has other roots and causes as well which the definition does not talk of. Rubenstein⁵ takes the position that terrorists are communicators who have lost faith not in the message but the ability to move the audience using non-violent language. Hamilton⁶ defines terrorism as violence with four distinguishing characteristics. It is planned, has a political purpose, is directed against the state or other established power and is conducted by a small group. Kirk describes terrorism as "political extortion".

Raymond Aron⁷ describes terrorists act of violence as one whose

aim is to have a psychological effect out of proportion to its purely physical result.

Ronald Crelinstein⁸ defines it as a particular strategy of political communication. It utilizes a combination of violence and the threat of violence.

Ted Gurr⁹ calls terrorism a state of mind of political actors who are paralyzed by the threat of unpredictable attack. Yonah Alexander defines terrorism as - "The use or threat of use of violence against random or civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create generalised pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals".

TYPOLGY

As definitions are not inclusive of all the aspects of terrorism, other analysts have come out with typologies to overcome this problem. Some of the main typologies are:-

Typology made by Paul Wilkinson.

Three types of terror emerge from his analysis (1) Criminal (2) Political (3) State sponsored.

He also makes a distinction between internal and external terrorism.

J Bower Bell¹¹ describes six basic types of terrorism and their corresponding purpose:

Type	Purpose
a Psychotic	Psychological gratification
b Criminal	Profit

c Vigilante	Retaliation
d Endemic	Internal struggle
e Authorized	State repression
f Revolutionary	Behavioural change through fear.

These are further subdivided into :

- (a) Organisational - To maintain discipline.
- (b) Allegiance - To win public support.
- (c) Functional - To accomplish goals and functions of groups.
- (d) Provocative - Aim is to incite governments to repression.
- (e) Manipulative - Aim is to strike at targets for psychological impact.
- (f) Symbolic - Aim is to strike at targets for psychological impact.

British expert Crozier does group classification which also is six fold.

- (1) These are minority nationalistic groups composed of ethnic factions who wish to replace the powers that be.
- (2) Marxist revolutionary groups.
- (3) Anarchist groups composed of revolutionaries who seek to destroy the social order.
- (4) Pathological groups or individuals similar to the anarchist.
- (5) Neo Fascist groups or individuals of the right wing.
- (6) Ideological mercenaries like the Japanese red army.

These typologies provide an approach to the tactics of terrorists, thus suggesting five tactical forms of terrorism

- (1) Criminal
- (2) Ideological
- (3) Nationalistic
- (4) State sponsored
- (5) Guerilla

There are six tactics of terrorism as mentioned by Brian Jenkins.¹²
These are :

- (1) Bombing
- (2) Kidnapping
- (3) Arson
- (4) Hijacking
- (5) Ambush
- (6) Hostage Taking.

STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM

State terrorism which is sponsored by the state and state sponsored terrorism - terrorism which is sponsored by another country are two very prevalent forms of terrorism.

Gupta¹³ in his article writes that in the conditions of nuclear weapons and its potential of human annihilation, potential of causing ecological disasters

and the unwinnability of nuclear war under modern conditions, unconventional, unpositional war is increasingly been resorted to. The aim is to create conditions of political instability, violence and insecurity at the internal level of the target state so as to serve the strategic interests of the sponsoring nations. Usually in the Third World countries the issues of poverty alleviation, technological advancement have combined with the limited percolation effects of the developmental strategies, and acquisitive politics. Combined with these are the old, often passive cleavages on ethnic grounds. The states for their strategic interests fan the old and the new cleavages into violent expressions of insurgency, counter insurgency and terrorism that is related to small group violence. The significant variable is outside help. On its own the internal factors do not lead to terrorism, or, terrorism for that matter. This kind of violence is designated as Low Intensity Conflict. LIC is the fiery medium of racial, tribal, religious and regional struggles manifesting in wars short of their declaration i.e. undeclared confrontation. Afsir Karim¹⁴ describes Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as such an unconventional war. In the context of Pakistan sponsoring terrorism in India, we may agree with Gupta¹⁵ who writes" we may therefore conclude here that terrorism is a method against liberal democracy and that it is an unconventional warfare against power and dominant value system. In this, it is not to be equated with either a National Liberation Movement or with Revolutionary Warfare."

Martha Crenshaw¹⁶ talks about the difference between precipitants and preconditions. Preconditions are factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. A further classification divides preconditions into enabling or permissive factors,

which provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns. Precipitants are similar to the direct causes of terrorism. Furthermore, no factor is neatly compartmentalized in a single nation-state; each has a transnational dimension that complicates the analysis.

First, modernization produces an interrelated set of factors that is a significant permissive cause of terrorism, as increased complexity on all levels of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities. Sophisticated networks of transportation and communication offer mobility and the means of publicity for terrorists.

Urbanization is part of the modern trend towards aggregation and complexity, which increases the accessibility of targets and methods.

Social "facilitation", which Gurr found to be extremely powerful in bringing about civil strife in general, is also an important permissive factor. This concept refers to social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government making it morally and politically justifiable and even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism. Social myths, traditions and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom. Moreover, broad attitudes and beliefs that condone terrorism are communicated transnationally. Revolutionary ideologies have always crossed borders with ease, as did the ideology of French Revolution.

IDENTITY ISSUE: RELIGION, CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM

Martha Crenshaw is of the opinion that the first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. A social movement develops in order to redress these grievances and to gain either equal rights or a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this broader

movement. On Punjab and the Sikhs, Paul Wallace writes, "What is more important to the Punjab problem ... is the religious identity of the Sikhs and their ethnic identities as Punjabis." There is a whole body of literature that takes the view that there is no terrorism in Kashmir and the North-East. It is regarded purely as a struggle for self determination through armed politics in the name of the people and by the people.

ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE

Indian writings and writings on India focus on two dimensions of causality of terrorism viz external and internal. In the internal they refer to mainly two factors viz., problem of governance and the role of religion.

Within the broad streams of interpretation in India, perceptions of these conflicts refer to a range of super-structural factors, including demography (Northeast), ideology and politics (J&K, Punjab and the Northeast). The terrorist challenge is to the so-far-dominant secular and political nationalism, as well as to the original amiability of religious persuasions. A sampling of some of the various patterns of commentary is given below :

- . "Terrorism elevates politics to the level of quasi - religious movements".²⁰
- . "The growth of Muslim fundamentalism in Kashmir has unfortunately been more by default".²¹
- . "The contemporary Kashmir Problem dating from 1988-89 contains a volatile mix of self determination (including national Self determination) and Islamic fundamentalism".²²
- . "The very essence of the Pandit is a challenge to attempt a total Islamisation of the valley and reversal of its cultural traditions that are fundamentally Hindu in essence".²³

- "Launched in the early 1980s by a group of bigots who discovered their justification in a perversion of the Sikh religious identity, and supported by a gaggle of political opportunists both within the country and abroad, this movement had consumed 21, 469 lives before it was comprehensively defeated in 1993.."24
- "The fear that the immigrant population- the outsiders- would one day dominate them is keeping most of secessionist movements alive in the Northeast."25
- "Religious and ethnic cleavages created by the activities of various political groups have further aggravated the internal stability situation"26

Common to all these writings is a nuanced appraisal of the external linkages of this politics and its roots in bad governance. Invariably all accounts of the political process, especially the politics of vote banks. The view that terrorism is high voltage party politics has found its expression in comments on the activities of the RSS - the cultural wing of BJP, the Akali Party, the Congress, the National Conference, the Naxalites and regional parties. Over the decades, the party system in India has shifted from one dominant party to coalition party governments at the Centre, and to a multi-party system from a two-party system in the States. Terrorism in India took roots after 1967, but especially after 1971. These two dates are related to the emergence of the coalition governments in the States and the crisis of the Congress government at the Center, and to India's victory against Pakistan, respectively. The continuous erosion of the Centrist political system, accompanied by the gradual escalation of terrorism, is in conformity with Leonard Weinberg's thesis that the proliferation of parties leads to the phenomenon of terrorist politics. The role of political parties and existing power elites in these circumstances has been observed in virtually every theatre of terrorist strife in India27.

In Punjab, according to K.P.S Gill, "The Sikh religious leadership - and prominently among them the Alkalis... picked up the fundamentalist card; moreover, it was this leadership

that either participated in, encouraged, or failed to oppose or, dissociate itself, from the campaign of terror for Khalistan"²⁸.

In Kashmir, "Barring a solitary exception of the 1977 Assembly elections, rigging punctuated every election in the State, particularly the Valley. However, in 1987, fundamentalists got an opportunity on a platter to whip up anti-India fellings. Had the 1987 elections been fair, the secessionists would have invented another reason to advance their nefarious designs. But the people surmised that Rajiv Gandhi and Dr. Farooq deliberately took away their right to vote and betrayed them by massive rigging. The MUF came in for favourable mention in every home, in every office and in every lane and by-lane of Kashmir. People began to perceive bad administration, rigged elections, etc., as a consequence of Kashmir's accession to India"²⁹.

Briefly, the logic is that the political process and the formulation and implementation of policy added to the crisis in qualitative terms. Most of these analyses treat the administrative dimension of the problem in a manner that blames the government of the day, even as they blame them for treating the problem of terrorism purely as a law and order problem or a problem related to development. Marwah expresses this position succinctly in the context of the Punjab militancy, "The government treated terrorism merely as a law and order problem. The solution to terrorism, as the policy makers in New Delhi wrongly believed, did not lie in taking over the administration directly by New Delhi.... This mistake was repeated by the V.P. Singh's government in 1990 when it left Farooq Abdullah with no option but to resign by appointing Jagmohan as the governor of Jammu and Kashmir"³⁰. Marwah's criticism, however, extends well beyond the political executive, and is directed equally at various 'security experts' who endorse a reductionist approach to the terrorism. "It is not the political leaders alone who fail to grasp this essential fact and the complex nature of the problem"³¹.

The most salient political factor in the category of permissive cause is a government's inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism. The absence of adequate prevention by

police and intelligence services permits the spread of conspiracy. However, since terrorist organizations are small and clandestine, the majority of states can be placed in the permissive category. Gupta³² writes that it is the soft state argument as propounded by Gunnar Myrdal as also its strong arm tactics that are regarded to be the cause of terrorism. The soft state argument accounts for both the internal and the external dimensions. It is argued that India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 shook the faith of the common man in the North, East, in the capacity of India to secure them. When examined a little more closely, it amounts to what Atul Kohli says that India is in a bad shape. This theory is opposed by Paul Wallace³³ who calls it a "rising power".

Crenshaw believes that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority is not a necessary or sufficient cause of terrorism, nor does terrorism always reflect objective social or economic deprivation. It is the perceived injustice underlying the deprivation that give rise to anger or frustration. The intervening variables lie in the terrorist's perceptions. Moreover, it seems likely that for terrorism to occur the government must be singled out to blame for popular suffering. In his article Gupta³⁴ quotes John Bary who says that in India and Indonesia "religious fervor and economic deprivation...made a highly combustible mixture which is certain to produce more explosions". Gupta goes on to say that for Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, the thesis of internal colonialism cannot be applied. It may perhaps be useful to look at the reverse thesis, i.e., Punjab perceives its prosperity as the basis for looking for more. In Jammu and Kashmir, it has been conceded that while the state received privileged treatment it is the intervening political element which caused alienation. Arjun Ray agrees that militancy in Kashmir is a problem of scarcity and coercion though not religion. The psychoanalysis of 400 captured militants concludes that they took the gun because of the following compulsions: Coercion - 45%, Economic Deprivation and deep sense of hurt (alienation) - 45.5%,

Religion - 10%³⁵. How does one analyse a feeling of hurt? It is difficult to quantify. Psychologists do not have definitive answers.

Another condition that creates motivation for terrorism is the lack of opportunity for political participation. Regimes that deny access to power and persecute dissenters create dissatisfaction. In this case grievances are primarily political, without social or economic overtones. Discrimination is not directed against any ethnic, religious, or racial subgroup of the population. The terrorist organisation is not necessarily part of a broader social movement; indeed, the population may be largely apathetic. In situations where paths to the legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime's repression is inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely, as permissive and direct causes coincide. It is here that the liberal democracies have their Achilles' heels.

Leonard Weinberg³⁶ views terrorism as high intensity party politics. According to him, there are variety of ways in which political parties and political terrorism intersect. The most clear cut situation is one in which the party as an organization pursues its goals through terrorist violence. And, as with other types of party-related violence, the party involved may use terrorism on a continuing basis or intermittently as the perceived need for it arises. Secondly, just as parties may use terrorism, so too terrorist groups can make use of party politics. That is, violent political organisations may find it advantageous to form 'political wings' to pursue their goals, at least in part, through the electoral process. Weinberg says that political parties are susceptible to factionalism. In many instances, if factional conflict within the party becomes severe enough, dissidents will exit the organization in order to form another party. While this is a common pattern, there is another and not altogether unusual path. Dissidents may come to regard the electoral arena as hopeless, for one reason or another, and decide to form not a new

party but a terrorist organisation as the means to achieve their objectives.

Weinberg believes that independent parties created out of dissident factions of previously existing and larger parties may continue to try to influence the latter's behaviour, to move it in a direction the dissidents find desirable. The same applies where the dissidents have formed not a new party but a terrorist group.

But Martha Crenshaw believes that terrorism is essentially the result of elite dissatisfaction; it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the terrorists' aims or methods. Many terrorists today are young, well educated, and middle class in background. Such students or young professionals, with prior political experience, are disillusioned with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access to the system despite their privileged status.

Crenshaw is of the view that terrorism is most likely to occur where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to provoke the majority of the populace to action against the regime, yet a small minority, without access to the base of power would permit overthrow of the government through coup d'etat or subversion, seeks radical change. Terrorism may thus be a sign of stable society rather than a symptom of fragility and collapse.

Although it is generally thought that precipitants are the most unpredictable of causes, there does seem to be a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism. Crenshaw continues by saying that Government's use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protest or reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation. The development of such an action-reaction syndrome then establishes the structure of the conflict between the regime and its challengers. So, according to Crenshaw,


we must look at terrorist organization's perception and interpretation of the situation. Terrorists view the context as permissive making terrorism a viable option . In a material sense, the means are placed at their disposal by the environment. Circumstances also provide the terrorists with compelling reasons for seeking political change .Finally, an event occurs that snaps the terrorists' patience with the regime .Government action is now seen as intolerably unjust and terrorism becomes not only a possible decision but a morally acceptable one. The regime has forfeited its status as the standard of legitimacy. For the terrorist, the end may now excuse the means.

Gupta³⁷ is of the view that it is not merely political alienation and distortions of the electoral process that are the causes of terrorism, if at all. Frustrations with the working of the political system may lead to insurgency as in the North - East. Further, in Kashmir, apart from a strong sentiment for autonomy, it is the failure of opposition parties to grow that may have led to the growth of frustration with the system - a system that was being continuously manipulated by the local administrative elite leading to corruption and the incapacity of the system to give accurate information to the all - India leadership, who had their own interests which clouded the rational focus on National Security concerns. The step from being a party agitator to a terrorist is a small but significant one.

According to Oots³⁸ another type of good, motivating the terrorist could be 'select incentives'. These may be either economic or solidary. Selective incentives are goods which are available only to members of the organized group which seek a public good, i.e., the terrorist organisations members. Group solidarity and financial gains from terrorist acts are examples of selective incentives for terrorists. Some of the motives as listed by Oots are - Terrorism may be committed for publicity. It may be committed in order to undermine authority. It may be the result of a need to express frustration. It may

be committed in order to free jailed colleagues . It may be motivated by a need for financial resources to fund terrorist operations. Terrorism may be a therapeutic act for the terrorist. It may be motivated by a desire to provoke repression. Punishment of enemies is another reason for terrorism. Terrorism may be used to create disorder in the society. Terrorism may be a substitute for full- scale warfare. Financial gain may motivate terrorism. It may result from a lack of other means for addressing grievances. Terrorism may be a rational choice activity under the given conditions. Collective or personal guilt can motivate the terrorist. It may be used to demonstrate the group's ability to act. Terrorism may be used to recruit new members for the group.

TH8382
Arjun Ray³⁹ talks about the psychological causes. He says that in informal but structured discussions captured militants exhibit well known traits of insecurity buttressed by high levels of pathological anxiety. The potential militant is trapped in a mental crossfire- the fear of two guns - one in the hand of security forces and the other held by active militants. The psychological dilemma intensifies till it becomes intolerable to live in the present. A low self esteem ,a weak ego and low frustration tolerance make matters worse. Sooner or later the die is cast ; the devil wins. To the new convert , the elder militants are now his kindred , his religion, his hopes. When everything is lost, hope still lives on , and therefore the choice is quite clear. He makes up his mind. He crosses the Rubicon. Arjun Ray goes on to say that on account of the terrorist's pronounced psychosocial wound(some real, some imaginary), militants have a strong tendency to externalise - to blame society and 'others' for their inadequacies, for their plight in imprisonment. Those who are ideologues like Ahsan Dar, Inqalabi, and Harkat leaders like Abu Jindal of Charar -e- Sharif fame, suffer from acute symptoms of "exaggerated self- absorption" approaching Narcissism. Megalomaniac syndrome and misplaced sense of history is also evident. These ideologues still fantasise themselves as cast in the mould of Mao Tse -

DISS
363.3250954
P2742 Or

TH8382



tung and Che Guevara, striding larger than life across the stage of Kashmiri history.

Thus there have been a number of motives that have been postulated for terrorism. The terrorist views terrorism as the best way to achieve these goals and motives. That is, in the words of Oots, they seek to maximize utility which results from the attainment of any goal, insofar as it is possible under the given conditions.

ORGANISATIONAL ASPECT :-

Three factors are very important in discussing the organisational aspect.

- (a) Alienation from social movement
- (b) Existence of a feeling of betrayal, frustration and the felt need to do something in a society that is transiting from tradition to modernity with capitalism as the vehicle. The latter lets loose old societies and moral bonds. The individual becomes atomistic struggling to cling to the old change in accordance with the new.

In this situation sociologists have talked of a need of Organisations. Weber's rational legal authority introduces rationality to anarchy of society. Durkheim's solidarity groups create religious and other solidarities Pluralists talk of associations as pressure groups that lead to consensual politics. Rousseau's General Will is formed through collective organisation rejecting partial wills. In the present also the minorities which may be cultural, religious, regional or linguistic develop a feeling of alienation. Thus this leads to the formation of organisations. Anarchy in all processes leads the organisations to fight it. In the end, the alienated individuals organise themselves and become a terrorist organisation. New social movements try to remove the perceived injustices but terrorists do not agree. They need an organisation to fight terrorism. As in the present society so in India, one discovers that certain alienated individuals who are unable to come to power through the political process use terrorists route. They have specific socio - economic background. This suggests that the leadership is heterogeneous. Some come

from absolutely deprived backgrounds while some are a bit better off. It is therefore essential to look at leadership patterns. Political scientists created in twentieth century, the argument for group identity. According to Oots⁴¹ group size may affect policy in several ways. At the operational level, group size is likely to influence the course of bargaining in negotiated terrorist acts. Intuitively, it is apparent that the larger the terrorist group, the more likely there is to be a variety of opinion within the group. Policymakers also must account for overall organizational size when attempting to understand specific groups operating within a given jurisdiction. Terrorist organizations that are capable of fielding a large acting group have a larger choice of tactics than those who can gather only a small acting group. Moreover knowing a group's characteristic acting force size may give clues as to its likely choice of tactics.

NOTES

1. CRENSHAW, MARTHA, "The Causes of Terrorism", *Comparative Politics* 13 no 4. 1981 (July) Pg1.
2. OOTS, KENT. LAYNE, *A Political Organisational approach to Transnational terrorism*. Greenwood Press. N.Y. 1986. pg.224
3. Ibid, Pg. 5
4. RUBENSTEIN, RICHARD. E, *Alchemist of Revolution : Terrorism in the modern world*, London I.B. Tauris and company. 1987. pg10-11.
5. LACQUER WALTER, *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston, Little Brown and Company 1987, Pg10-11.
6. HAMILTON, LAWRENCE, *The Ecology of Terrorism : A Historical and Statistical study*, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Colorado. 1978 Pg 23.
7. ARON, RAYMOND, *Peace and War*, New york, Weidenfeld and Nicolson Press,

1966, Pg170.

8. CRELINSTEIN, RONALD, "Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and the Threat of Violence" in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 1 No. n.4. April 1989. Pg 2081-94.
9. GURR, TED, R., "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960's " in *Stohl Michael - The Politics of Terrorism: A reader in theory and practice*, New York, Marcel Dekker, 1979, Page 23 -50.
10. YONAH, ALEXANDER, "International Terrorism : National, Regional and Global Perspectives", *Journal of International affairs*, New York, Praeger Publisher, 1976, Pg XIV.
11. BELL, J, BOWYER, *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Governments/Societies respond to Revolutionary Violence*, New York, Basic books 1978, Page 22-25.
12. F. No. 2. Pg 30-35
13. GUPTA, RAKESH, "Terrorism as a Warfare Metaphor." *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XVI, No.9, New Delhi, December 1993, Pg13.
14. HANLE, DONALD, *Terrorism : Newest Face of Warfare*, NY : Pergamon-brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1989, Pg 103-130
15. KARIM, AFSIR, *Counter Terrorism, The Pakistan Factor*, Lancer Paper II, New Delhi, 1991, Pg. 1-2.
16. F. No.13, Pg 13-14
17. F. No. 1, Pg 17.
18. F. No1, Pg 17-18
19. WALLACE, PAUL, "Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity",

in *Crenshaw*, F. no. 1 Pg 1-12

20. MARWAH, VED, *Uncivil Wars : Pathology of Terrorism in India*, New Delhi, Harper Collins, 1995, Pg. 6 in GUPTA, RAKESH, "India : Towards a Political Economy of Inter State Conflicts", *Faultlines : Writings on Conflict and Resolution, Vol 5*, ICM - Bulwark Books, New Delhi, 2000, Pg. 112 - 114.
21. NAYAR, Lt. GEN (Retd) V. K., PVSM, SM, *Threat from Within : India's Internal Security Environment*, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers 1992, Pg 70 in Ibid.
22. NARAYANAN, M. K., *National security : The Internal Dimension*, RGIS, New Delhi, 1994 Pg. 5 in F. No. 20.
23. MAHESHWARI, ANIL, *Crescent over Kashmir : Politics of Mullaism*, New Delhi, 1993 in F. No. 20.
24. GILL, K.P.S., "Endgame in Punjab:1988-93", *Faultlines : Writings On Conflict and Resolution, Volume 1*, ICM - Bulwark Books, New Delhi, 1999, Pg 80.
25. F. No. 20. Pg 227.
26. KARIM, AFSIR, *Transnational Terror*, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 1993, Pg. VII.
27. GUPTA, RAKESH., "India towards a Political Economy of Inter State Conflicts", *Faultlines : Writings on Conflict and Resolution Volume 5*, ICM - BulwarkBooks, New Delhi ,2000, Pg 112-114.
28. GILL, K.P.S, *Knights of Falsehood*, Har Anand, Delhi, 1997, Pg 22.
29. F.No. 23, Pg 70
30. F. No. 20, Pg 168- 169.

31. Ibid, Pg169
32. GUPTA, RAKESH., "A Comparative Perspective on the Causes of Terrorism " in *The Journal of International Studies*, 35, A Sage Publications, New Delhi 1998 Pg. 23-45
33. F. No.19 Pg. 353.
34. F. No. 32. Pg. 39
35. Ray, Arjun, Major General, VSM, *Kashmir Diary, Psychology of Militancy*, Manas Publications, 1997, Pg 8-12.
36. Weinberg, Leonard, *Political Parties & Terrorists Groups*, London, Frank Cass, 1992, Pg. 125 - 139.
37. F. No 32. Pg 44.
38. F. No 3. Pg 18 -19.
39. F. No.35 Pg 12.

CHAPTER II

COMPOSITE CULTURE 1 - Kashmiriyat

In Kashmir, there has always been a coexistence of Hinduism (Vaish and Shaivism) ,Buddhism and Islam (Sufism).This composite culture became a model of Indian secularism. Co-existence and co- operation between different sects , different religions has been there for a long time now. Under Avantivarnam, Hinduism flourished. Buddhism and Islam entered the valley peacefully. Thus Kashmiri culture has always stood for a peaceful co-existence among different religions.This chapter briefly describes the history of Kashmir to emphasise the point that there has always been an intermingling of different cultures ,of different religions in Kashmir. Thus making the people tolerant and respectful towards other religions.This is the crux of Kashmiriyat.

Kashmir known as kasmira¹ to the local people was once a vast span of water according to certain geological and mythological beliefs. In one of the legends of Nilmata purana, the valleys name was 'satidesa.' The most reliable and the main source of ancient Kashmir's history is 'Kalhanas' epic historical poem Rajtarangini². Gonanda I the first known king of Kashmir was also a relative and a friend of Jarasandha who was the king of Magadha and the father in law of Krishna. He was killed when he went to help Jarasandha .Damodara who was Jarasandha's son become the king but he too was killed when he tried to fight Krishna. His widow who was pregnant ascended the throne. Her son was named Gonanda II and was crowned as the king. After him at least 43 weak and insignificant kings ruled Kashmir. It was in 273-232 B.C that Ashoka extended his rule over the valley and spread Buddhism. Thus Mauryan Empire began to decay after his death. His son Jalauka destroyed a few Buddhist Viharas and build two new Siva temples. Three centuries later, Kashmir passed under the control of the Kushans. Amongst the known Kushan

rulers were Kanishka, Huska and Juska. The fourth buddhist council was held by Kanishka in Kashmir. Buddhism became the state religion. A close cultural affinity developed between Kashmir and North India which was visible by the fact that numerous local leaders who succeeded the Kushans like Abhimanyu, Vibhisana I, Ravana, Vibhisana II were familiar names in North India. During their reign, Saivism prospered and Buddhism suffered. The Huns rule started with Mihira - Kula who was a very cruel king but the local leaders soon regained power and the second Gonanda dynasty came into being, When Hieun Tsang came to India, the Karkota dynasty was ruling over Kashmir and its founder Durlabhawardhana was the king. He had influence over places as far as Taxila, Hazara, Poonch and Rajourie but he was not totally independent. The economy of Kashmir was in good shape. Emperor Harshvardhana whose capital was Kannaunj, exercised a weak form of suzerainty over Kashmir. The most outstanding king of the Karkota dynasty was Lalitaditya who ruled for 37 years. Due to the misrule of his successors, the dynasty collapsed by the middle of the ninth century. In the next one and a half century the history of Kashmir was influenced by the looks and disposition of two women one Jayadevi who gave a new dynasty Uptala under whose King Avantivaram, Kashmir prospered and Hinduism flourished and the other Didda who set in motion forces which ultimately led to the decline of Hindu rule in Kashmir. It was in an atmosphere of moral decay, economic decline and social and political disruption that foreign adventurers started arriving in the valley. Two such foreigners were Shah Mir and Rinchana. The invasion by Dulacha, a Mongol warrior who hailed from Turkistan in 1320, struck a fatal blow to Kashmir. Dulacha swept everything before him. In the words of Jonaraja, Kashmir became almost like a region

before creation, Rinchana who hailed from Ladakh, took advantage of the disorderly conditions and plundered the area around the Lar valley. He got Ram Chandra the chief minister who had declared himself as the king after the flight of Suhadeva in the wake of Dulacha's invasion murdered by deceitful means and seized the throne. The kingdom of Kashmir thus came to be ruled by a Ladak Buddhist Rinchana married Kota Rani-the daughter of Ram Chandra. He restored order and set up an efficient administration under the charge of Shah Mir. His proposal of becoming a Hindu was turned down by the Kashmir Brahmins and so he then embraced Islam. He assumed the name of Sultan Sadar-ud-Din. Thus Kashmir got its first muslim ruler which was shortlived as Rinchana died in 1332, leaving behind a minor son Haider. The courtiers invited Udyanadeva brother of late king Suhadeva to accept the throne which he did. He married Rinchana's widow Kota Rani to strengthen his position. After his death, Shah Mir became ruler. He adopted a humane, enlightened and just approach towards Hindus and Muslims alike. The most important Sultan was Shihab-ud-Din the grandson of Shah Mir. His rule was the most glorious epoch in the history of Muslim Sultanate in Kashmir. Islam thus made its way into Kashmir by gradual conversion and it was the influx of foreign adventurers from both the South and Central Asia which prepared the ground for this. Thus the fact that Islam came to Kashmir initially by peaceful rather than forced conversions is significant in its further history also.

Shihab-ud-din's younger brother, Hindal succeeded him. It was during his time that Sayyed Ali Hamdani came to Kashmir and Islamic practices began to be adopted rather strictly. Under the next ruler Sultan Sikander, the

Islamic zeal attained fanatical proportions. He came to be known as 'But Shikan' destroyer of idols. A relentless campaign for conversion to Islam was launched under the chief minister 'Saif-ud-Din'. His son continued his policies but the next sultan Zain-ul- Abidin turned out to be the most tolerant and benevolent ruler that Kashmir has known. All restrictions against the Hindus were removed and he earned the reputation of being the greatest sultan of Kashmir who reined for half a century. His sons proved unworthy and the fortunes of the Sultan in Kashmir began to decline rapidly. The next 120 years saw only intrigues and conspiracies. It was in those unsetteled conditions that Mirza Haider Dughlat, a Mughal General who was in the service of Humayun entered the valley. In the name of Humayun, he ruled the valley for eleven years. His administration provided a welcome respite to the Kashmiris. After his death, there was scramble for power among the local factions in which the Chaks emerged victorious. From the near anarchic condition which the Chaks had put it in, Kashmir was rescued by the Mughals who established their full control over it in 1589 when emperor Akbar himself came there. Even before Akbar, the Mughals had been treating Kashmir as part of the their empire, but in 1589, Kashmir became a province of the Mughal empire. It was ruled through a governor known as Subedar. Peace prevailed. Notable social reforms were carried by the Mughals. Akbar, Jehangir, Shah Jahan were all fascinated by Kashmir and visited it a number of times. During Aurangzeb's long rule of 49 years, Kashmir saw 14 governors most of whom ruled well except for Iftikar Khan who persecuted the Brahmins. After Aurangzeb's death as the Mughal empire started to crumble, the central authority over Kashmir was lost and the valley once again became a hotbed of intrigues, violence and bloodshed.

Akbar had been approached by some nobles and was requested to annex Kashmir. It was a good judgement as it brought peace and justice for about 120 years. Those who invited the Afghan ruler - Ahmad Shah Abdali did not realise that they were really calling a barbarous horde to their garden of nature. Sixty seven years of brutal Afghan rule caused untold miseries. It was the worst rule that Kashmiris had been subjected to. Birbal Dhar a Kashmiri nobleman approached Maharaja Ranjit Singh for help and provided him with valuable information about the strength and deployment of Jabbar Khan's forces. With the successful conquest by Ranjit Singh, 67 years of Kashmir's nightmare came to an end. "The Sikhs" as observed by Young Husband a British political resident "were not so barbarically cruel like the Afghans but they were hard and rough taskmasters." Their main objective was to collect the maximum amount of money, no matter what the long term consequences would be. Except for the brief period of Kirpa Ram's governorship, the Sikh rule in Kashmir which lasted for 27 years was far from being benign or just. While the Hindus were treated slightly better, the Muslims were maltreated and subjected to a number of disabilities.

In the various military campaigns undertaken by Ranjit Singh, Gulab Singh exhibited his unmatched skill, courage, loyalty and organisational ability. In recognition of Gulab Singh's services and as part of his overall strategy to create a subordinate military power between the Sikh and the Afghan domain, Ranjit Singh granted a number of estates including Jammu, to Gulab Singh. The title of Raja was conferred upon him and he was given the permission to raise his own force. The Dogras thus acquired an important position in the

Jammu region and also at Maharaja Ranjit Singh's court. As the British started strengthening their hold, Gulab Singh cleverly turned the situation to his advantage. He remained in secret touch, with the British while professing loyalty and friendliness to the Lahore durbar. In the power struggle which ensued for seven years after Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, Gulab Singh realistically accepted the position of subordinate alliance to the British and in the process secured a vast princely state free from the vagaries of the Lahore Durbar. After the defeat of the Sikhs, two separate treaties were signed. One was the treaty of Lahore between the Sikhs and the British government and the other was the treaty of Amritsar - between Raja Gulab Singh and the British government, on March 16, 1846 which handed Kashmir and its adjoining areas over to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a mere sum of seventy five lakh rupees. The Dogra dynasty lasted for a little over a hundred years. This period saw four Maharajas - Gulab Singh, Ranbir Singh, Pratap Singh and Hari Singh. But the dynasty was always at the mercy of the British Government. With the Dogra dynasty started a new era of exploitation. The kingdom of Kashmir was now the largest princely state. Though the Dogra rulers sided with the British during the 1857 revolt still the British control over the state affairs was increased with the appointment of a Resident. It was the Dogra - British rule which finally set the Hindus and Muslims on a confrontationist path³.

An encouraging aspect of Kashmiriyat is that its compositeness and unity was the result of different castes and communities. Kashmiriyat instead of being a product of one religion is the result of composite convergence of sects and cults of Nagas, Shaivites, Vaishnavas, Buddhists, Sufis, Rishis. In spite of all the bigotry of some rulers, the spread of Islam too helped positively in

the evolution of this culture. The tradition followed by Kashmiri Muslims, the indigenous method of practising their faith following the customs, to the extent of modifying the rules of Islamic jurisprudence making them distinct from their co-religionists elsewhere. Similarly the Hindus of Kashmir developed their over indigenous philosophies, devised their own symbols and created their own traditions, which distinguishes them from the preponderant majority of their coreligionists in the Sub Continent⁴. G.M.D. Sufi, observes, "the cult of Buddha, the mysticism of Islam have one after the other found a congenial home in Kashmir on account of its cultural homogeneity and geographical compactness. All who emigrated to Kashmir merged their individual identities into one⁵".

On the eve of the country's independence , a number of forces were operating in the political paramount of the state because of which Kashmir soon found itself in the whirlpool of national and international controversy and conflict. Maharaja Hari Singh wanted Kashmir to be independent of both India and Pakistan, but a full scale tribal invasion backed by the Pakistan regulars launched on the October 22, 1947, forced the Maharaja to approach the Indian Government for help. The Maharaja thus unconditionally signed the Letter of Accession which was accepted by the Indian government which immediately despatched its army for Kashmir which forced the invaders to retreat. In the past ,the Kashmiri pandits, a minuscule minority lived in harmony under the Muslim predominance without facing any threat to their survival as a community. Both Hindus and Muslims have been bereft of riches To find jobs, the Hindus learnt the language of the rulers-Pathans, Sikhs, Dogras and English while the Muslims continued depending on agriculture and trade for survival.

Except for the times when Persian and Arabic was the language of

the rulers the Muslims were kept away from the benefit of the Government services. Thus, it was the Kashmiri Hindus who were made Munshi, Patwari or Girdwar in the government hierarchy. It were Hindus who became the instruments of implementing the government policies when the rulers came down with a heavy hand on the masses. This earned the envy and wrath of Muslims. Another reason for the increasing disaffection was the widening gulf between the rich and the poor. The deprived sections let loose a reign of terror in valley.

Power was in the hands of the Muslims after accession. There was no Kashmiri Pandit in the executive committee of the National Conference in 1990. P. L. Handoo, a Kashmiri pandit was only special invitee to the meeting. Though Kashmiri Muslims lag behind in their education qualification, their representation in state services is proportionate to their population.

Table 1

Percentage of each community employed in the government department as on 1-7-1987.

Category of service	Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs	Others
Gazetted	1.18	41.71	5.82	1.59
Non gazetted	37.89	56.23	4.23	1.64
Inferior	29.42	65.52	2.06	3.00

Source : Ministry of Home affairs, government of India annual report of 1991

Table 2

Percentage of employment and the percentage of each community

Name of the community	No of employees in the Government Service	% in Employment	%in Population
Hindus	70382	36.59	32.24
Muslims	110931	57.67	64.16
Sikhs	7282	3.79	2.23
Others	3764	1.95	1.34
Total	192359	100.00	100.00

Source: Ministry of home affairs, Government of India Annual report 1991.

Most thinkers argue that despite differences, there is no question of Hindu or Muslim communalism. Nor was there any serious conflict or confrontation. As there was no political, social or psychological difference between them a bond was developed. The only difference which existed was that of faith. Even the language spoken was common. Kashmiriyat was thus a spirit, a culture of synthesis, understanding and humanism. For S. Abdullah too, Kashmiriyat symbolised a spirit of independence and secularism joined by free will to a larger community. It meant a rejection of slavery, hegemony and mutual regenerative creativity⁶.

What is unfortunate today is that what began as a melting pot of different cultures Buddhism, Hinduisim, Naga worship and Advaitism and Islamic influences has disappeared. Customs and cultures which were age old were wiped

out in an instant at the instigation of Pakistan.

The differences which began to arise with the Dogra rule were restricted to the upper echelons. It did not really percolate to the masses even though the Muslim conference now known as the National Conference did attempt to channelize their discontent. Muslims voiced their demands, for the first time when the Governor General Lord Reading visited Kashmir. Basically their wrath was directed against Maharaja Hari Singh.

The clergy also had a very important role to play as it was through them that petitions, were submitted and so either through ignorance or through conservatism, they disallowed the inculcation of a new vision in the minds of the Muslims. They did not realise that it was their backwardness in education which deprived them of jobs and demanded reforms on grounds of discrimination. It was not the Dogra rulers but the Britishers who in the pursuance of their policy of divide and rule sowed the seeds of distrust in Kashmir, This was further nurtured by Pakistan subsequently for its own strategic interest.

The Jamaat-e-Islami became the most vocal instrument of the Muslim clergy. Jamaat preaches reactionary obscurantist ideology. It presents Islam as a political ideology and not as a religious pedagogy. Adbul Ala Maududi, its founder explicitly claimed that Islam was a political ideology comparable to communism and fascism. It also preaches militancy. It calls upon Muslims to reorganize themselves into a revolutionary party with the aim of capturing total power. Under Maududi, Jamaat preached that the aim of Islam was to establish the sovereignty of God on earth or an Islamic state and not the spiritual salvation of mankind.

Jamaat in Kashmir has definitely come a long way since its inception in 1942 in Shopian. In Kashmir, it had a two pronged strategy. It had to follow the strategy of Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind) as well as adjust itself to the native muslim population of the state. Secondly it had contended with the Indian union and aimed to establish a theocratic state instead of a secular one within it. Jamaat in Kashmir severed its relation with Jamaat (Hind) in 1953 as the Kashmiri unit did not recognise the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India .Thus started an era when it subtly started creeping into the politics of the state

The secular Sheikh Abdullah was popular among the Muslims and was not only resented but was also an impediment to the growth of Jamaat . According to political expediency, successive rulers either supported it or banned it. It was in the 1970's that it succeeded in making inroads among the students when it launched its Islami- Jamait-e-Toiba which opposed the 1975 accord. In the 1977 elections it won one Assembly seat from Sopore based on a limited alliance with the Janata Party, it could secure only 26 lakh voters. In the 1983 elections, it drew a blank, but its share of voters increased. In 1987, after an alliance with Muslim United Front, it cornered 4 seats amidst widespread allegations of rigging. This disillusioned a large section and led to the adoption of the cult of the gun.

The International Conference which was convened at Srinagar, was attended by the Imam of Kaaba was another factor which brought more people in its fold to make a further dent in the Muslim population. It established Shariat based Islamic courts, spread of Islamic education. Thus with Jamaats

success the institution of Muslim clergy became important. Till accession, the Mulla, Qazi, Mufti and Khalifa were insignificant.

Post Accession constitution too augmented this process. They saw their fate sealed in secular India and thus were on the lookout for a merger with an external force which would assure them supreme status. The natural and ever willing force was Pakistan. As the environment became conducive they began putting up ideas like the mosque being a weapon and the most relevant in politics. In the beginning, this trend was liberal and non-fundamentalist. But it soon changed. It is this segment which constitutes the bedrock of secessionism and militancy in the Valley today. In pursuance with their aim of making Kashmir a theocratic state, they have launched a series of regressive social reforms e.g use of veil and prohibition.

Though the Muslim Conference now known as the National Conference did come up in 1932 due to the efforts of a dozen Muslim graduates including S. Abdullah, the growth of the Muslim intelligentsia was belated and stunted. Slowly, there grew a rich and powerful bureaucracy and elite of Kashmiri Muslim intelligentsia in collaboration with the big trading classes (khwaja) and began to dominate the political, administrative and commercial life of the valley. This created two problems. One was to keep the large majority of Muslim masses from reacting to their ill - gotten wealth. Second the anxiety to perpetuate their dominant position. Thus the demand for a free state, clamour to join Pakistan and rise of fundamentalism suited them. It helped to direct the masses from the glaring contrasts of their wealth. To counter this anti- India tirade, the central government devised ways of supporting the ruling group, in

the process, hastening the further degeneration of Kashmiri politics and administration. Most Kashmiri bureaucrats catapulted to power not on the basis of merit but by virtue of being members of long oppressed majority community.⁸ They established links with rich Kashmiri Muslims who had illegally acquired their wealth. They then began a process whereby the Jamaat-e-Islami grew its strength and instrument of religion was freely used to shield themselves⁹.

Pakistan found a good opportunity in the entire situation. The masses bent under rampant corruption, all safety valves sealed and the total breakdown of administrative machinery all pointed to a situation Pakistan was waiting to exploit.¹⁰

The question of identity became important but it was not regional or cultural identity which the Muslim intelligentsia was looking for but a Muslim identity. The composite culture which had become associated with Kashmiri culture started being seen as cultural aggression by the Hindus.

Today, Kashmiri culture has come to symbolise Pakistani culture. The nature of Pakistan state is clergy, landlord, military and bureaucracy based. The Kashmiri Muslim intelligentsia aligned itself to Pakistan, in the hope that if Kashmir secedes to Pakistan, then they i.e. the intelligentsia will be in a commanding position. The intelligentsia plays a significant role keeping in mind a weak democracy, low political consciousness of the masses and firm roots of theocracy. The common Kashmiri even today is moulded in the tradition of rishis, of liberal mystic trend. The idea of fundamentalism has been thrust upon it by careful propaganda of Pakistan.

Kashmiriyat today is no longer a consolidating or a cementing force.

Now it is a negative, secessionist concept, fraught with communal and separatist overtones. It is increasingly being associated with theocracy and Islamic life style. It is a weapon in the hands of militants representing only sectarian and parochial interests. The Kashmiri identity, ethos, heritage extending over the millenia has degenerated to a very low level. The credit for which goes to misled youth armed and trained in Pakistan. At the other end, it is appropriated as a Hindu, pre Muslim legacy of co-mingling between Shaivism and Vaishnavism¹¹.

NOTES :

1. BHATTACHARJEA. AJIT, *Kashmir, The Wounded Valley*, UBSD, 1998, Pg 19.
2. JAGMOHAN, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*, Allied Publishers, 1991, Pg 39.
3. CHAUDHARY, MRIGANKA SINGH, *Terrorism as a warfare metaphor, An analysis of Jammu and Kashmir*, M. Phil. diss. J. N. U., 1995, Pg. 100.
4. PUNJABI, RIYAZ., "Kashmir, the bruised identity" in Thomas, Raju G.C. *Perspectives on Kashmir*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, Pg 136.
5. SUFI, GMD, *Kashmir Vol. II*, Light and life publishers, 1974, Pg. 136.
6. HARIOM, *Debacle in Kashmir*, Jay Kay Book House, Jammu, 1993, Pg 2.
7. PEER, GIYAS-UD-DIN, *Understanding Kashmiri Insurgency*, Jay Kay Bookhouse, Jammu, 1992, Pg 69.

8. PRADAN, DR. KAILAS. N, "Kashmir Society - New Contours", *KashmirTimes*, 13 November 1990.
9. Ibid, 14 November 1990, 15 November 1990.
10. KUMAR, SHARAT, "Challenges and opportunities for Indian Policy". *Mainstream*, Vol. 28 (32) 2nd June 1990, Delhi.
- 11: MAHESHWARI, ANIL, *Crescent over Kashmir*, Delhi, Rupa, 1993, Pg. 50-58

CHAPTER III

COMPOSITE CULTURE 2 - Punjabyat

The word Sikhs (derived from the prakrit '*Sikkha*' which in sanskrit became '*sishya*' meaning disciple) means disciples and their religion was evolved by a succession of ten Gurus (teachers). The first of whom Guru Nanak, was born on April 15 1469, in the village of Rai Bhoi, now named Nankana Sahib, about 60 k.m from Lahore now in Pakistan. But it was Guru Gobind Singh who sowed the seed for a separate Sikh identity when he summoned his followers to assemble at Anandpur Sahib on April 13, 1699¹. He proclaimed the founding of a new order - the Khalsa or Pure. He laid down five symbols to be carried by members of Khalsa - the so called 5ks. They were to wear their hair and beards un-cut (Kesh) they were to carry a comb (Kangha) with which to look after their hair and beards, they were to wear shorts (Kachcha), characteristic of the soldiers of their time and permitting more vigorous movements, they were to carry a sword (Kirpan) and they were to keep a steel bangle (Kara) on their wrist². Members of Khalsa were forbidden to smoke, to chew tobacco (beloved of Muslims) or consume alcohol, eat meat killed in the Muslim way or have sexual intercourse with muslim women. The objective behind creation of 'Khalsa' was to build a force with the spirit of nationalism free from the social and religious evils of the time³. Just before his death in 1708, Guru Gobind Singh put an end to the succession of Guru and bestowed the Guruship on the community (Panth) and on the holy book - the Guru Granth Sahib. In creating the Khalsa, Guru Gobind Singh not only institutionalised the Sikh culture but also made Khalsa Sikh walking testimonies of their faith.

HISTORICAL : PRE AND POST INDEPENDENCE

In 1739 Nadir Shah, the Persian, emerged through Punjab to sack

Delhi and between 1745 and 1767, according to one estimate there were nine Afghan invasions. Thus the invasions and violence were regular features of Punjab during those days. Out of these conditions grew a distinctive Sikh response - the 'Misl' - It resembled territorial militia. In times of strife local leaders gathered bands of able bodied Sikh and followed their leaders to their Misl to attack Afghan baggage trains, Mughals or ultimately fight with each other. In times of peace, the band dispersed to their villages. In theory, there were 12 Misls, each covering a different region of Punjab. The present day factionalism in Punjab politics, some agree, are the modern equivalents to the Misls and still explains Sikh political and social expectations today.

It was Ranjit Singh who built a Sikh empire in Punjab in 1801 thus ending the struggle between the misls. Before his 18th birthday, he had captured Lahore. When he died in 1839, his empire extended as far as Peshawar (now in Pakistan) in the North-West to Ladakh in the North-East to Montegemery in the South and Delhi in the East⁴. The Sikh empire did two things. First it made a reality of Guru Gobind Singh's cry, Raj Karega Khalsa - Khalsa shall rule. Though Ranjit Singh was careful not to offend the Muslim and Hindu subjects and though the Sikhs did not constitute majority of the population, the idea of a state ruled by Sikhs branded itself into the minds of Sikhs .Another important thing which the Sikh rule did was to encourage Sikhism. Because Sikhs ruled, it made sense to be a Sikh and to wear the symbols of the Khalsa.

After Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, it took East India Company ten years, two bloody wars and the work of some of its ablest officers to annex

the Punjab Kingdom. Dissentions and treachery at the Punjab court turned a sound Sikh victory in a bitter defeat in the main battle fought between Sikhs and the British on 21 and 22 December 1845. Treacherous miscalculations and manipulation by two Sikh Generals, Lal Singh and Tej Singh ensured complete rout of Sikh army. The fierce battle on 21 December, however surprised the English. The Sikh fought heroically and put up stiff resistance before withdrawing across Sutlej river on 22 Decmber 1845. As a result of hard fighting of Punjabi soldiers on the battle fields, an understandable respect grew up among the British. Thus began what is called by some as the imperial romance between the British and Sikhs. During the revolt of 1857, the Sikhs sided with the British and were invaluable in defeating the mutineers.

It was speculated that within 50 years, the sect of the Sikh would disappear. Since Sikhs lived among the Hindus and were drawn from Hindu caste, there was constant temptations to forsake both Guru Nanak's teaching about the single God and evils of caste and Guru Gobind Singh's injunctions to keep one's hair uncut. British patronage after 1857 helped to maintain the outward symbols of Sikhism. Practical encouragement was provided by the British - British Army made it a rule that Sikhs who join the Army should not be permitted to drop the practice of keeping long hair and beard. The British Indian Army rules clearly spelled out that "The outward conventional characterstics of Sikhs should not be permitted, after entering the British Army to drop them". The bonds between the British and Sikhs grew to such an extent that even the Ghadar Party movement during the First Wold War and after did not receive even a modicum of support from the Sikhs. After the Jallianwala Massacre,

in which many innocent people including a few Sikhs were killed, General Dyer was hailed as a hero, by the priests of Akal Takht (The seat of Spiritual authority of the Sikhs) and the Golden Temple. They presented General Dyer with a robe of honour and initiated him into the Khalsa.

By the end of the First World War, the sharpened sense of identity among Sikhs who kept beard and turban led to the growing demands that the gurudwaras should be controlled by genuine Sikhs, not by 'shaven Hindus'. In November 1920 an estimated 10,000 Sikhs met in Amritsar. The gathering of the Sikhs established a committee to draft new rules for the management of the Golden Temple. This became the Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). The SGPC was made responsible for the management of all Gurudwaras in the country by a proclamation made by the Akal Takht on November 15, 1920. Within a few months the Akali Dal - army of the faithful or immortal - was formed as a central organisation to co-ordinate local jathas, or bands that were attempting to wrest control of the Gurudwaras from the Mahants. The Gurudwara finally passed into the hands of SGPC. This change was not smooth. It involved many encounters between Mahants and Akali demonstrators including the 'Nankana Holocaust' when more than a hundred Akali demonstrators were slaughtered.

It was the British who institutionalised the SGPC and made it in effect the Religious Parliament of the Sikhs. The funds available to the SGPC as well as its influence over religious life made it a magnet for ambitious Sikh politicians. In the Sikh dominated Punjab formed in 1966, the SGPC became an organisation which could create or destroy governments.

In August 1944, various Sikh representatives met under the Akali leader Master Tara Singh in Amritsar and established a committee to evolve a scheme for the establishment of an independent Sikh state in case India was to be divided. The demand for an independent Sikh state was raised frequently over the next three years, but little effort was made to work out what it might entail. Neither was it used effectively as a bargaining counter with the British, the Congress or the Muslim League. The Sikh leaders were divided and confused about what they meant as a homeland. Their demand was seen as nothing more than an attempt to prevent the creation of Pakistan. By May 3, 1947 even Master Tara Singh of the Akali Dal, rejecting suggestions from the Muslim league that Sikhs would be better off in a united Punjab inside a big Pakistan, was resigned to partition; division of Punjab was the only way to a peaceful settlement. Along with the partition of India, the Sikhs were also divided. About 40 percent remained in West Punjab that is on the Pakistan side of the border and 60 percent on the Indian side. Sikhs in Pakistan along with their Hindu brethren had to leave their homeland. Partition of Pakistan did not merely affect the political psyche of the Sikh community, the economy too was badly affected⁵. But in spite of partition and consequent transmigration, the Sikhs worked hard made rapid recovery and prospered in independent India.

Since 1948, Master Tara Singh had been a bitter critic of India's national government which, he said was scheming to enforce the will of the Hindu majority and absorb Sikhs into Hinduism. In February 1949, he became the first high ranking non communist politician to be arrested by the Government of Independent India. By 1952, he had made a speech that virtually

called for the assassination of Nehru and was demanding a 'Punjabi Suba' a new state in which the interest of the Punjabi language and of Sikhs would be properly safeguarded. His statements were ambiguous or simply vague - about whether such a state was intended to have a Sikh majority or whether its main consideration was Punjabi, a language spoken by virtually everyone who lived in Punjab, regardless of the religion. By 1960, Master Tara Singh had succeeded in dragging most Akali sympathisers out of the Congress party and had begun a campaign of civil disobedience for the creation of Punjabi Suba in which Punjabi Language would be supreme. He wanted a state in which people read and write in Gurmukhi.

Militant Hindu organisations responded to such demands by organising a campaign to induce all Hindus in Punjab to record Hindi and not Punjabi as their mother tongue in the census of 1951. Throughout 1950s Punjabi Hindus increasingly educated their children in Hindi and affirmed that Hindi was their mother tongue. Thus the demand for a Pujabi Suba became the demand for a Sikh majority state.

By November 1960, the protest seemed to be petering out as peasants returned to their land to plant next season's crop. Master Tara Singh was still in prison. At this point, his recently recruited Lieutenant, Sant Fateh Singh, wrote to Nehru announcing that he would go on a fast unto death unless Punjabi Suba was granted.

The Central government made no promises, but it released Master Tara Singh who claimed he had won concessions and advised his follower to give up his fast in January 1961. The agitation however, had shown few results

and the third general elections was only a year away.

In August 1961, Master Tara Singh himself went on a fast unto death which failed and he was persuaded to end his fast in October 1961. Even though he was re-elected as the president of SGPC there began a decline of his authority and that of urban, non-jat sikhs in Akali politics.

The Punjabi language state was finally achieved in 1966. Under the terms of settlement, Hindi speaking belt became the new state of Haryana with its border running up to Delhi. The foothills of the Himalayas became the new state of Himachal Pradesh and the rest remained Punjab. Punjabi had a narrow Sikh majority of 56 percent but language not religion was the basis for division. The Akalis discovered that although they had been instrumental in getting the Suba, when it came to wielding power, it was the Congress party that won the polls. The only way they could form a government was in alliance with other political parties especially the Hindu Jan Sangh party. This was tried in 1967 and 1969 but the coalition proved hopelessly unstable. In order to maintain their support while out of office, they had to revive a sense of grievance among the Sikhs by returning to agitational politics. In spite of their victory over the Punjabi Suba, the Akalis had always kept this option open. Within months of the Punjabi settlement, Sant Fateh Singh came out with yet another demand and started a fast unto death to force Mrs Gandhi to concede to the demand that the city of Chandigarh be given to Punjab.

To protect their position as also to outwit the Congress party, the Akali Dal adopted a new plan of action. They decided to draw up a list of grievances which they hoped would convince Sikhs. The Akali Dal Working

Committee at a meeting held at Anandpur Sahib on October 16th and 17th, 1973 accepted the proposal of the eminent Sikhs who had redrawn the aims and objectives of the Sikh Panth to give a more vigorous lead for their achievement because of the anti Sikh policies of the Congress government. The committee's report was subsequently known as Anandpur Sahib Resolution and became the basis for the agitational activities of the Akali Dal that were to follow⁶.

ONTOLOGICAL

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the history of the Sikhs at least for nearly four to five hundred years of the existence of their faith has been a history of egalitarianism, peace as well as of warfare. But the origin and inspiration of the Faith was a doctrine of peace, and of the brotherhood of all mankind under the unbounded beneficence of the One God.

According to Guru Nanak, "If I declare to be a Hindu, I may be assassinated. But a Mussalman, I am not; I am composed of elements and Nanak is my name"⁷

The first date associated with the emergence of the Sikh Faith is the year 1499, when, at the age of 30, Guru Nanak Dev announced his mission with his declaration rejecting religious fundamentalism and affirming the universal brotherhood of man. "There is no Hindu, there is no Mussalman."

Even today, such an idea contains within it, the potential to agitate the orthodox; in the age when it was expressed by Guru Nanak, it was nothing short of revolutionary, and could well invite the pain of death. A contemporary history, the *Tarikh-i-Daoodi* records the case of a Brahmin sage, Budhan, from the village of Kaner near what is now Lucknow, who was put to death by Emperor Ibrahim Lodhi on a fatwa given by two Kazis; his crime was

that he had proclaimed, in the hearing of some Muslims that "the religion of both Hindus and Muslims, if practised with sincerity, was equally acceptable to God"⁸. It is a tribute to the sheer spiritual force of Guru Nanak's personality, and the purity of his divine inspiration, that he could preach his doctrine of revolutionary humanism and of absolute and unmediated devotion to the One God, across the length and breadth of the Indian subcontinent and, according to tradition, well beyond, in the very heartland of Islam at Mecca, in the icy wastelands of Tibet and across the sea in Sri Lanka.

This uncompromising fidelity is an essential element of the Sikh Faith; a deviation or a denial, for profit, for expediency or even out of fear for one's own life is simply and unconditionally inadmissible⁹. Ram Rai, the eldest son, and till then the designated heir of the Seventh Guru, Guru Har Rai, is said to have diluted the contents of a verse of the Guru Granth Sahib which he believed would offend the Emperor Aurangzeb, who had asked him to explain the passage. The verse, intended to emphasise that differences in the last rites between Hindus and Muslims were of no importance, and that the fate of all flesh was the same in death. Originally stated: "The dust of the Mussalman's body finds its way into the potter's clay; out of it, he fashions pots and bricks and fires them, and when they burn, they cry out"¹⁰. Fearing the Emperor's wrath, Ram Rai substituted the word '*beimaan*' [faithless or dishonest] for '*mussalman*'. For this transgression alone, he was disinherited by his father who declared, "The Guruship is like a tigress's milk which can only be contained in a golden cup. Only he who is ready to devote his life there to is worthy of it. Let Ram Rai not look at my face again"¹¹. And so it was, never was the Guru to see his eldest son, and it was younger, Hari Krishan, who was to be the next Guru.

The Sikh's commitment to his Faith, however, can never be reduced to mere fanaticisms or to a communal arrogance that denies others their right to choose their own path

of salvation, their own way of life. Indeed, some of the noblest chapters of Sikh history have been written, not on the Sikh's battles to defend their own faith or their own survival, but on their sacrifices for the protection of others. The circumstances of the martyrdom of Guru Tegh Bahadur are known to every Sikh.

A faith such as this does stand against any other religion, indeed, it stands above divisions of creed, of sect, or of denomination, protecting all against the absolutism or the tyranny of any one. It was for such protection that the Sikhs armed themselves, it was for such protection that the Tenth Guru - the son of the martyred Guru Tegh Bahadur - created the *Khalsa*.

When the Gurus led their Sikhs into battle, not only were they certain of the justice of their cause, but irrespective of the conduct of the enemy, their own actions were defined by a strict code of honour. "Let no one kill a fleeing soldier nor the one who has surrendered. And no woman's honour should be molested, nor women or civilians captured in reprisals or booty... We are fighting for a righteous cause - our right to live with honour and in peace - and not for the sake of self-glory, or rule over others¹²".

All this was soaked into the culture that was Punjab, into its language, into the collective consciousness of the Sikhs. It was what gave them the power to create a kingdom for themselves; and the strength to bear its loss. It gave them the courage to fight every enemy; and the large heartedness to be just even with those who gave them no justice. Themselves the victims of the worst kind of tyranny, the Sikh misls [or independencies within the Panth] that established their power after they had stemmed the Afghan tide, and the Sikh Kingdom of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, gave all faiths complete freedom and made no distinction among their subjects on grounds of religion or of caste. In times of distress they helped all without discrimination. In 1783, when a severe famine hit Punjab, the Sikh chiefs enlarged

their langars so that all the poor and the needy could be provided for. A report quoted in the Gazetteer of the Montgomery district says of the Sikh Sardar of the area: "The famines of 1783 occurred in Budh Singh's time. He is said to have sold all his property, and to have fed the people with grain from the proceeds."¹³

Such generosity, such empathy with the suffering of others, was possible because Sikhism, despite the unbalanced attention its turbulent history of conflict has received, was not, and was never meant to be, a creed of war, of violence. The Khalsa certainly took up arms; but it did so, not because these were in any way connected to the core of his religious beliefs, but to protect that core.

It would be inappropriate to attempt to define what constitutes that core, or in any way to circumscribe the message of the Gurus within what would be no more than a partial and imprecise interpretation. There are certain features of the essential teachings of Sikhism. Some of these are: The Sikh Gurus offered a conception of God as Truth, without form or aspects - nirguna - and beyond human comprehension. Yet He is given to man as a presence, revealed through creation and through His infinite grace. Whatever we do, our awareness of this presence must be constant; and this awareness must inform and be reflected in all our actions. Religion is not a turning away from the world, not a denial or a renunciation, but a life in God's presence - realised through absolute and constant devotion, and through the repetition of the many names of the One God. The Sikh Gurus recognised the potential of other living faiths, though they resolutely rejected their failing; this noble quality of wisdom and understanding, of the acceptance of the truth and of whatever was valuable in other religions is consecrated in the Adi Granth; side by side with the word of the Gurus, one finds the wisdom of Hindu and of Muslim saints. In this, the Guru Granth Sahib is unique in all the scriptures of the world. And its message is for all men without distinction or prejudice, for all men are in the protection of the One God. There is no space in this conception for distinctions between man and man, for

prejudices of caste, colour or creed; nor any space for superstition, for bigotry or for ritual.

"All men belong to You.

You are the support,

You stretch your protective hand"¹⁴.

And the essence of religious conduct is defined in terms, again, of the equality of man, and of the realisation of God within the normal duties and activities of the world.

Sikhism is a vigorous, earthy, dynamic faith; a faith that gives man concrete guidance by which he may live in the real world; its truths are tangible, its methods eminently practicable. An energetic and deeply religious people have translated its essence into the spirit of laughter that permeates the culture, the music, the dances, and the way of life of the Punjabi, the colours and flamboyance of the clothes they wear, their indefatigability, their unyielding courage¹⁵."

Sikhism is a large hearted religion; it is a religion, equally, for the large hearted. Those who seek to mangle it in order to fit it into their own constricted vision, their own withered, hate filled hearts, speak, not for Sikhism, but for an unnamed and malevolent creed to which Sikhism has always been and shall always be, an unrelenting enemy. The camaraderie between Hindus and Sikhs is well known. The Roti-Beti tradition exists. The visiting of each others religious places is a common practice in predominant form in Malwa and Doaba region of Punjab, though a little less in Majha (From where 50% of total Punjab terrorists came.) The two communities were together in politics of Unionist Party of Punjab under Sir Sikander Hayat and Chhotu Ram. The communal amity of the Punjabis broke with the Muslim League's Pakistan resolution. During the partition the two communities were together.

Notes :-

1. SHARMA, D. P., *The Punjab story, Decade of Turmoil*. APH Publishing Corporation, 1996, Pg 73.
2. SINGH, KHUSHWANT, *My bleeding Punjab*, U B S P D, 1992 Page 29.
3. SINGH, TEJA and SINGH GANDA, *A Short History of the Sikhs, 1469 - 1765*, Vol 1, Bombay; Orient Longman, 1950 , Pg.72.
4. SINGH, SATINDER, *Khalistan; An Academic Analysis*, New Delhi, Amar Publications, 1982, Pg. 82.
5. WALLACE, PAUL at el., *Political Dynamic of Punjab*, Amritsar, Guru Nanak Deo University, 1981, Pg.120
- 6 F. No.1. Pg 13-20
- 7 SINGH, DARSHAN. ed. DANG, SATYAPAL, *Terrorism in Punjab, selected articles and speeches*, Patriot Publishers , 1987, Pg27
- 8 TARIKH-I-DOODI, Trans. SIR HENRY ELLIOT, Vol. 4, Pg 464-65, cited in Dr. Gopal Singh, *History of the Sikh People*, World Book Centre, 1970, Pg 45.
- 9 GILL, K.P.S., *Knights of Falsehood*, Har-Anand Publications, 1997, Pg 11.
- 10 *GURU GRANTH SAHIB*, Asa Di War, M1, Pg466
- 11 MACAULIFFE, MAX AUTHUR, *The Sikh Religion :Its Gurus, Sacred writings and Authors*, Vol. 4, Pg. 10.
- 12 ZAFARNAMA cited in GREWAL at el., *GURU GOBIND SINGH: A BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY*, Department of History, Punjab University 1967, Pg226.
- 13 SINGH, HARBANS, *The Heritage of the Sikhs*, Asia Publishing House, 1964, Pg 67
- 14 *GURU GRANTH SAHIB*, ASA, 49, M5, Pg 383
- 15 F.No.9. Pg 127

CHAPTER IV
ORGANISATIONS IN KASHMIR
Harkat-ul-Ansar

Terrorism is a group activity involving intimate relationships among a small number of people. Interactions among members of the group may be more important in determining behaviour than the psychological predispositions of individual members.¹

Very few studies have focussed on the way terrorist groups are organized. Merari² classifies groups into four types according to whether their target is foreign or domestic and whether their base of operations is foreign or domestic.

- (1) Domestically based xenofighters. These groups have a domestic base and foreign target.
- (2) Domestically based homofighters. A domestic base and a domestic target mark this category of terrorist groups.
- (3) Foreign-based xenofighters. This class of terrorist groups attacks foreign targets and is based outside its homeland. The immediate target and the primary target of their attacks may be different entities.
- (4) Foreign-based homofighters. This type of group attacks its own countrymen but operates from a base outside its homeland.

Jenkins³ argues that little is known about how terrorist organizations make decisions and the behavioral pattern of terrorists. He lists several factors which could affect the tactics used by a terrorist group.

1. Background of the membership, e.g., previous military training.
2. Size of the acting group.
3. Cultural background.
4. Ideology.

5. Idiosyncracies of key actors.
6. Circumstances of the act, e.g., geographic location.
7. Universal "rules of the game".

Earlier studies suggest that many factors, some of which have yet to be investigated, may affect the operations of terrorist groups. They also suggest that terrorism is imitative. There is very little originality, and in spite of the availability of weapons, mass destruction is not generally a tactic of terrorism.

Grabosky⁴ states that most terrorist groups are organized in urban areas where the group can be assembled and disbanded quickly. The basic organization is cellular, i.e., the group is divided into many smaller units for security purposes. The normal cell has only three to five members. The acting group, the group actually involved in the terrorist act, is small, averaging only 4.4 members. This is partly because there is an increased security risk among large groups. The more people that know about the plans, members, and resources, the higher the risk.

Wolf⁵ outlines the organization of the urban terrorist group. A group must have goals which form the basis for the organization. The cell is the basic unit of organization for purposes of assigning specific tasks to specific units. Thus, there is a division of labour as different cells perform different duties. A cell generally consists of three to ten members. Cells are then grouped into columns. Each column has specific functions and contains 50 to 300 members. A command council provides the overall direction for the group. The maintenance of this structure requires financial resources, which is why many terrorist acts are committed for monetary gain rather than for the political goals of the group directly.

Further work has shed additional light on the subject of terrorist organizations. One member acts as cell leader and contact person with the higher organizational command.

Cell members are given as little information about the organization as is necessary for them to function. They may not even know who the group's members are outside their own cell. Thus, if they are captured they have little information which can be divulged to the authorities.

According to Wilkinson⁶, the overall organization normally consists of 1, 500 to 2, 000 members.

Gurr⁷ puts the figure somewhat lower. His figures indicate that 86 percent of the terrorist groups have fewer than 50 members. Another 8 percent have between 50 and 500 and only 6 percent have more than 500.

There are likely to be psychological or background differences between leaders and cadres.⁸ For example, a survey of contemporary terrorist movements found that leaders are usually older, than their followers, which is not historically unusual. In general, data are scant on individual terrorist leaders, their exercise of authority, the basis for it, and their interactions with their followers. Furthermore, if there is a predisposition to terrorism, the terrorism-prone individual who obtains psychic gratification from the experience is likely to be a follower, not a leader who commands but does not perform the act.

Terrorists live and make decisions under conditions of extreme stress. As a clandestine minority, the members of a terrorist group are isolated from society, even if they live in what Menachem Begin called the "open underground".

Terrorists can confide in and trust only each other. The nature of their commitment cuts them off from society; they inhabit a closed community that is forsaken only at great cost. Isolation and the perception of a hostile environment intensify shared belief and commitment and make faith in the cause imperative. A pattern of mutual reassurance, solidarity, and comradeship develops, in which the members of the group reinforce each other's self-righteousness, image of a hostile world, and sense of mission. Because of the real danger

terrorists confront, the strain they live under, and the moral conflicts they undergo, they value solidarity highly. Terrorists are not necessarily people who seek "belonging" or personal integration through ideological commitment, but once embarked on the path of terrorism, they desperately need the group and the cause. Isolation and internal consensus explain how the beliefs and values of a terrorist group can be so drastically at odds with those of society at large.

In their intense commitment, separation from the outside world, and intolerance of internal dissent, terrorist groups resemble religious sects or cults.

The terrorists' willingness to accept high risks may also be related to the belief that one's death will be avenged. The prospect of retribution gives the act of terrorism and the death of the terrorist meaning and continuity, even fame and immortality. Vengeance may be not only a function of anger but of a desire for transcendence.

Shared guilt is surely a strong force in binding members of the terrorist group together. Almost all terrorists seem compelled to justify their behavior, and this anxiety cannot be explained solely by reference to their desire to create a public image of virtuous sincerity. Justifications usually focus on past suffering, on the glorious future to be created, and on the regime's illegitimacy and violence, to which terrorism is the only available response. Shared guilt and anxiety increase the group's interdependence and mutual commitment and may also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the common ideology as sources of moral authority.

TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IN KASHMIR

Militant groups are known as Mujahide - Tanjeems in Kashmir. They are an interesting study in formation and dissipation. Emerging like meteors, they suddenly vanish into oblivion. Others like the JKLF, try to shed their past and attempt to reinvent them in a new mould. Till date, no one has been able to give an exact count of the number of terrorist

organisations in Kashmir.⁹

While Jagmohan claims 44 outfits in January 1990, JKLF Chairman Amanullah Khan claims 60-70 groups were active in 1991.¹⁰ Media reports commonly speak of about two dozen underground organisations operating. Most of these are splinter groups based in particular localities and habitually moving in and out of loose alliances and merger with other groups. In some cases, their independence from one another appears nominal than real. There is loose coordination of militant group activities, but no central command for formal integration of military operation.

On the basis of their relation with Pakistan a four fold classification of the terrorist organisations operational in Kashmir has been done here.

a. THE LIBERAL GROUP: Their demand is Azadi outside Pakistan. The important organisations which come in this category are the JKLF and the Muslim United Front. They favour total self determination.

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force (JKLF)

The most important group is the JKLF. By virtue of its espousal of Kashmir's independence, and a moderate brand of Islam, it is a popular group. Amanullah Khan is its chief and its headquarters are at Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Founded in 1968 as Kashmir National Liberation Front, it has come a long way. There are claims that it was initially a group called Plebiscite Front (not Mirza Afzal Beg's) but an organization created out of fragments of Operation Gibraltar¹¹, of resistance movements on the Indian side of the cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir which it had then been the aim of Pakistan to encourage. Perhaps the name Plebiscite Front was exploited in an attempt to radicalize supporters of that organization of the same name which had been founded by Mirza A. Beg and was far removed from advocating violent action. Initially it operated in total independence from any official body in

Pakistan. They began using covert resistance against Indian government, responsible to nobody but their own leadership, and controlled by no government. The leaders genuinely believed that they were acting in the interest of Kashmiri nationalism. But it was only in 1988-89, that Amanullah Khan and his associates really began to affect the course of political life in Jammu and Kashmir. They represented by no means the only organization involved in the deterioration in the security situation. Resistance factions too had proliferated under a bewildering array of names - Hizub-Ullah, Tigers of Allah, Al Omar Mujahideen. However, members of JKLF were singled out as the main culprits to explain the internal disorder in Kashmir. Now the traditional demonstrations and marches were replaced by the armed processions. From the second half of 1989, they became vociferously aggressive. They were responsible for the murder of T.L. Taploo on 15th September 1989, kidnapping of Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed, brutal murder of General Manager of Hindustan Machine Tools H.L. Khera, Vice Chancellor of Kashmir University Prof. Mushir Ul-Haq, his Secretary Abdul Ghani in April 1990 etc.

Initially the vanguard of secular militancy, today it is increasingly losing out to what can be seen as hard core elements.

JKLF's bases can be found in Karachi, Islamabad in Pakistan. Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In Jammu and Kashmir in Anantnag and Srinagar, as Urban and Rural Cells. In Europe and West Asia too they have regional Cells.

Their main leaders are Aman-Ullah Khan, Ashraf Abdul Hamid Deenani, Dr. Farooq Haider, Raza Musharaf, Md. Ashraf Gani, Yasin Malik, Hamid Sheikh and Hashim Quereshi who engineered the successful hijacking of Ganga, an Indian Airlines Plane to Pakistan in 1971.

Post 1989 Maqbool Butt's Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) spear-headed the militancy. It killed four air force officers at Rawalpura (Srinagar) on January 25

,1990 . Indian Oil executive director K Doraiswamy was then abducted , and released in exchange for Javed Ahmed Shalla. The consequent terror led to the exodus of nearly 3.5 lakh Hindus from the valley.¹²

Muslim United Front (MUF)

Today, it is a splintered and dormant organization. It demands autonomy and self-determination. Its leadership included Qazi Nissar, Abdul Gani Lone, Hafiz Makhdooml, Maulvi Abbas Ansari, Ghulam Shah, Abdul Waz Bilal.

B. THE RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISTS - They demand Islamisation and merger with Pakistan . Among others, it includes Hizbul Mujahideen and the Harkat -ul- Ansar ,the two dreaded terrorist organisations in Kashmir. The Harkat -ul-Ansar is mentioned later in the chapter.

Hizbul Mujahideen

The other most powerful group is Hizbul Mujahideen. It is fully patronized and funded by Pakistan. Hence better trained, hardcore and greatly feared. Its leader is S. S. Geelani, Supreme commander is Mohd Yusuf Shah Salahuddin, Operation commander is Junaid, Strength 1050, area of influence is J&K : Formed in 1982 to fight the jihad in Afghanistan, this militant organisation has maximum cadre strength.. Its Kashmir wing was created in 1989. It supports J&K merger with Pak. Basically, it is the armed wing of Pak's Jamaat-e-Islami . Of late though many have moved away. About 40-50% of its militants are foreigners (known as guest militants in Kashmir) . The ISI gave it full support till it began to resemble a state army.

ISI employed the Hizbuls to assassinate Maulvi Farooq , Mirwaiz of Kashmir on May 21, 1990 and Qazi Nisar , Mirwaiz of south Kashmir , in 1994 . This killed moderate opinion .

During its heyday, a Pakistani Jamaat fanatic, Mast Gul, occupied the shrine of

Sufi saint Noorudin Noorani at Charar-e-Sharif in May 1995. The shrine was gutted in exchange of fire with the army. Mast Gul escaped to Pakistan .

Hizbul's decline started when Pakistani state patronage shifted from the Jamaat -e-Islami to Jamaat-e-Ulema Islami. The group split, with Al Badr joining the new dispensation , which backed the Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Toiba. The elimination of Hizbul Mujahideen's top commander, Ali Mohammed Dar and his key aides, threw the group into further disarray. Most surrendered militants are from Hizbul.

Lashkar - e- Toiba

It's chief is Ata-ul-Rahman. Deputy commander - in - chief is Qazi-al-Dakhi. Strength - around 500. Area of influence - whole of Jammu & Kashmir except South Kashmir.

Formed with the help of Lahore based organisation Markat-e-Dawat-ul-Irshad (MDI). It is pro Pakistan. About 70-80% of its cadres are foreign militants, mostly Pakistani and Afghan nationals. The group is said to organise training camps in Pakistan. Regarded as one with the deadliest weaponry, it also has a modern communication system.

Al-Badr

Leader - Lukmaan, strength about 300, area of influence - Srinagar district. A breakaway group made up of mostly foreign mercenaries in the Hijbul-Mujahideen a couple of years back.

Al Barq

Patron A. G. Lone, strength about 150, area of influence Kupwara, Baramula & Bandipur districts . This pro Pakistan, Gujar dominated outfit was earlier favoured by the ISI. Now it has two factions. One faction is headed by Tajmul Islam, the other by Farooq Qureshi. It's headquarters is in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan.

Al-Jehad

Chairman - S. Hamid, Commander-in-Chief in Jammu and Kashmir - Khaled Sheikh, strength - about 40-50, area of influence - Pulwana, Baramula, Srinagar and Anantnag districts. This pro Pakistan group with pistol wielding cadres was formed back in 1974. It was the armed wing of Peoples League and was formed following the merger of Muslim Jaanbaz force and Kashmir Jihad Force.

Tehrik-e-Zehad

Raised by the ISI in POK during March 1997, comprises militants from all outfits. There are reports of POK personnels also having joined it. It is meant to carry out subversive operations near LOC. About 60-70% of its 250 add cadres are foreign militants.

Dukhtaran-e-Milat

An all women pro Pakistan group formed in 1990, which supports militants. Leader Aisha Andrabi & M/s Tabassum Aziz Bashi wants women to follow Islamic laws but her diktats have not received much support. This organisation has been accused of throwing acid in the faces of unveiled women, as also delivering a parcel bomb to a foreign journalist.

Ansar-ul-Islam

The other Jamaat-e-Islami and affiliated groups operating are Ansar-ul-Islam, also called the Muslim Liberation Front. It's aim is plebiscite and finally merger with Pakistan. It's leaders are Abdul Hamid. Their method is armed struggle.

Islamic Students League : Their aim is merger with Pakistan and total Islamization of the State. Javed, Mir Nalka, Ashfaq Wani are some of its important leaders.

People's League

Founded in October 1988, uses propaganda, agitation and armed struggle as its methods. Its

leaders were Wazir Ahmed Wani, Shahbir Shah, Aziz Sheikh, Farooq Rehmani. They too want merger with Pakistan and Islamization of the Valley.

Allah Tiger

They also demand merger with Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism. Its methods are armed struggle and terror. Self-Styled Air Marshal Noor Khan is its leader.

The other groups which demand Islamisation and merger with Pakistan are *Hizbe-Islami, Al Omar Mujahideen, Ikhwan Jul Musalmaan, Al Fatah.*

Hurriyet-E-Kashmir

There have been a number of efforts since the uprising began to forge a common pro separatist movement from the valley's political, religious, student, intellectual, professional and social organizations. The first of these was the Tehreek Hurriyet-e-Kashmir. It was an Islamist leaning umbrella organization. It excluded groups allied to the JKLF. But barely functioned. In April, 1993, it was replaced by a larger alliance that combined a dozen or more groups. This was called the All Party Hurriyet Conference. It included the JKLF and on the surface at least appeared to bridge the ideological divide. Led nominally by Maulvi Omar Farooq, a pir and joining together most of the valley's best known separatist politicians. The Hurriyet shot into prominence during the month long crisis in October-November 1993, over the militants seizure of the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar. They believe a hair from Prophet Mohammed's beard is preserved in Hazratbal. The relic was brought from Lahore to Srinagar in 1700. Some 40 odd second rung militants had held the government to ransom for 15 days, in internationalizing the issue. On 15th October Kashmir IGP A.K. Suri was informed by the Muslim Auqaf Trust member G.M. Chisti that militants inside the shrine had tampered with the locks leading to the room in which the relic was kept. Lt Gen. M.A. Zaki - Security advisor to the Governor ordered two BSF companies to surround the mosque and block all

entry and exit points before rushing to the Governor. The local police, civil administration, BSF, army intelligence were all aware that the militants had been using the shrine as a hideout for the past eight months. Al Umar Militants held arms displays within the mosque. The Hurriyet leader Professor Abdul Ghani, S.A.S. Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone got a new platform to cover ground activities. They tried to negotiate with the militants for a compromise solution. They organised strikes, boycotts, mass public demonstrations to protest against the governments seige tactics. Their influence in the valley seemed to rival that of militant organisations.

They seemed to have a greater role as elections were proposed to be held on the 18th of July, 1995, after the expiry of President's rule in Kashmir. They got a better platform during the SAARC Conference where their leaders met the Pakistani President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari in New Delhi.

But it was the newly formed Harkat-ul-Ansar, an Afghan based mercenary group who torched the Charar-e-Sharief Shrine on 11th May, 1995. Hurriyet leaders who came to the forefront were Abdul Ghani Lone, Shabir Shah, Yasin Malik. They tried marching towards the shrine but were detained by the police¹⁴. The All Party Hurriyet Conference has emerged as a strong force. It is an umbrella organization of 36 parties, with highly divergent views. There are certain moderate elements who have opposed the gun culture and favour a political dialogue.

c. THE FENCE SITTERS - Those Organisations which vacillate between self determination and merger with Pakistan. There is a large chunk of them. Some of them are *Kashmir Liberation Army, Kashmir Liberation Organization, Falah-e-Am Trust, Muslim Janbaz Force*. There are also a couple of groups which are Shia groups with unclear aims like *Karbalai, Al Khomeini*.

These small groups under zonal or Area Commands know very little about the overall strategy or even the true identity of their leaders. Their capture or surrender has very little impact on the terrorist capacity to attack. These young men, mostly below 25 years of age, who generally belong to Srinagar, Sopore, Anantnag, Kupwara, are unlikely to make hardened fighters. Out of every 10,000 men who are reported to be under training, some could prove good material for continuing the armed struggle. These small groups have, however, acquired a zonal identity which motivates them. Such group loyalties are known to have a dynamic influence on group members who after some "de individualization" care very little about personal safety. Besides these, the magic effect of words like 'Jehad', based on Islamic lore, 'Azadi', and 'anti-authoritarian', keeps them going. The group and ideology serves as a psychological trap from where exit is not easy. The basic structure of these outfits is standard and their ideology well set. There is also very little ambiguity in their aims.

Other than this, there is a plethora of support groups. They are the main sources of information and intelligence to these outfits. They identify targets, observe movements of security personnel, locate those chosen for assassination, and act as couriers. A second category gives logistical support during an operation. Yet other group provides a safe haven for weapons and ammunition. Every trained terrorist requires a minimum of five supporters.

Agitational terrorism has been successfully adopted in Jammu and Kashmir. In this there is a special group of mass contact motivators involved. There are yet those who carry on propaganda by word of mouth, cassettes and leaflets. Another group concerns itself with financial assistance.

d. NON CATEGORISED GROUPS : These groups do not provide categorised services. They perform a number of functions together. Hence cannot be compartmentalized. Some of these are *Zia Tigers, Islamic Jamait Tulba (Students Wing), Operational Balakote,*

Kashmir Freedom Army Guerrilla Commando, Students Liberation Front, Kashmir Freedom Movement, Al Mehrmoodi Mujahadin Inquillabi Council, Victory Commando Force, Islami Jamurie Kashmir, J&K Inquilabi Front, Tehrik Jihad, Hizb-Ullah Islamic Jammohuria, J.K. Free Army, Hiz-ul-Zaheed, Al Hamizah, Jinnah Liberation Tiger.

Other small groups include *Al Umar Mujahideen, Tehrik ul Mujahiden, Muslim ul Mujahidden, Hizbollah and Taliban-e-Kashmir*, number of total militants is about 250. North of Pir Panjal mountains. (Kupwara, Baramulla, Srinagar, Badgam, Anantnag, Pulwama Districts), the strength is around 1550, South of Pir Panjal (Poonch, Rajouri, Udhampur, Doda districts) it is about 950. The numbers do not include militants on the other side of the border, either awaiting infiltration or undergoing training.

HARKAT-UL-ANSAR (HUA)

The Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) is a group founded in 1982 along Pakistan's western borders, with its parent organisation called the Harkat Ul-Mujahideen (HUM). From this organisation, the HUA not only inherited its leader, Fazl Rahman Khalil, but also its underlying spirit and a considerable quantity of arms and personnel.

The HUA was formally founded in Muzaffarabad in the autumn of 1993 by a group of Pakistani political activists. In contrast to few groups, notably the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the HUA always advocated rule from Islamabad. Until the abduction of the six western tourists in Kashmir in 1995, few people knew of the Harkat ul Ansar, accredited from the onset as the real force behind Al-Faran, the militant group that claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of foreign tourists in Kashmir. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen emerged in 1985 as a splinter group of the Pakistan Islamia militant outfit Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (HEJI). It is learnt that a senior leader of HEJI, Maulana Fazlul Rahman

Khalil was succeeded by Maulana Irshad Ahmed as HEJI Amir but died fighting in Afghanistan in 1991. The Pan Islamic HEJI was launched in 1980 with its headquarters in Pakistan and Afghanistan & its focus on the Afghan war. Aligned to the Deobandi School of Thought, HEJI emerged as the armed wing of Jaamat-e-Ulemai Pakistan an organisation of Islamic clergy fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Security agencies in the valley believe that it was involved in the Kashmir insurgency as early as 1989. However, its role was then limited to training Kashmiri youths belonging to the JKLF (Farooq Haider group) were trained in camps run by the outfit in Afghanistan and POK. Sources said that Maulana Shahadatullah took over as HEJI Amir after the killing of Maulana Irshad in 1991. It is said that Shahadatullah wanted to reunite the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen with HEJI so that by combining the sources of finance weapons and cadre the outfit can operate effectively and make its presence felt. Irshad sought the help of the clergy and following the efforts of Maulana Qaleemullah, chancellor of Darul-uloom Jamia Farooqi, Karachi, Mufti Rasheed Ahmed, Chancellor, Darul- Ifta- Wal- Irshad, Karachi and and Maulana Rafi Usmani finally agreed to merge as Harkat ul Ansar. The unification process took a few years. According to police sources in Srinagar, Maulana Masood Azhar, General Secretary of the unified outfit was specially sent to implement the merger on the ground in Kashmir. A fact to be noted here is that the HUA owes its considerable arsenal in large measure to the generosity of the Pakistani government or more specifically its intelligence service, the Inter - Service Intelligence (ISI). "We know without any doubt that Harkat ul Ansar is very heavily backed by ISI", said one intelligence source in Islamabad recently, adding that its other sources of income are the wealthy individual donors in the Gulf countries and Pakistan, some of them exiled Kashmiris.

ACTIVITIES

Regarding their terrorist activities, the HUA, armed with considerable quantity of light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars and rockets, has played a significant role

against the Indian security forces in Kashmir throughout its four-year history.

It is possible that the worldwide publicity they created, highlighting both the Kashmir question in general and the HUA in particular, has enabled the organisation and elements within it to capture more westerners. Paul Wells (23), Keith Mangan (33) both British, Dirk Hasert (26) German, Donald Hutchings (42), American, Hans Christian Ostro, Norwegian were all abducted in July 1995 by an hitherto unknown group, Al Faran.

Harkat had the audacity to kill CIA officers in Pakistan, and was banned by the US government. It is dominated by recruits from Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and even has 16 Afro-Americans.

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen - Commander in chief Nayeem Khan alias Saifullah, strength- about 500, area of influence entire Jammu and Kashmir: In 1996, U. S. banned the Harkat-ul-Ansar, labeling it as a terrorist outfit. As a strategic move, the group which was formed following the merger of two pro Pakistan outfits, Harkat ul Mujahideen and Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami decided to revert back to its original names. The hijacking of IC 814 on December 24, 1999 was in all probability masterminded by this outfit. It is believed that the merger was the handiwork of Maulana Masood Azhar who tops the hijackers release list. The group follows a strict Islamic code. It also went public calling for donations for a jihad in Kashmir.

They call themselves the army of Allah and fight and die in the name of the prophet. Eclipsed in recent times by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the pan-Islamic Harkat-ul-Mujahideen is back in the limelight thanks to the hijack drama. Now the Harkat suicide attack and the 24 hr siege on the Headquarters of the Jammu -Kashmir police elite counter insurgency wing- the special operation group (SOG) at Srinagar is being seen as an attempt to consolidate its position. Ten policemen including an officer were killed while 3 Harkat militants who had

stormed the complex died in the attack. The Harkat first came into limelight in Kashmir when it banned the Amarnath Yatra in 1993 in retaliation to the demolition of Babri Masjid. It wanted the reconstruction of the mosque and wanted other closed mosques to be reopened.

The group again made news when it kidnapped two Britons David Mackie and Kim Housego from Aroo, Pahalgam on June 6, 1994 & was also suspected to be involved in the abduction of five western tourists in July 1995 allegedly by masquerading as Al Faran. The two Britons were released unhurt after the intervention of Mirwaiz of south Kashmir, the late Qazi Nisar. However the Harkat denied any role in the abduction of these western tourists. One escaped Norwegian national was beheaded while the police announced that DNA tests had confirmed that a body exhumed in South Kashmir in 1997 was of Paul Wells also among the tourists abducted. The fate of the other two remains unknown. The link between such groups became clear when the captors signalled their willingness to free the hostages on the condition that 15 political prisoners, held by the Indian authorities, were also released. Three of those named Sajad Ahmad, Masud Azhar and Khan Mohammad were HUA leaders.¹⁵ The police claim that Azhar sneaked into India on a Portuguese passport identifying himself as Issa Wali Adam. Azhar had flown from London to New Delhi via Bangladesh and entered Kashmir on February 9, 1994. But he was arrested along with senior Harkat commander Sajjad Afghani at Khanabal on April 13 1994 by the army, though the arrest was later shown as July 16, 1994. The duo were booked under TADA (FIR1/9) in the police station (counter intelligence) Kashmir. But police sources believe that two months before his arrest, Azhar had reorganised the two factions as Harkat-ul-Ansar to boost recruitment of local youth said a senior security forces officer who had been one of Azhar's interrogators. Sources in the security agencies claim that these Harkat recruits were imparted arms training in Yawar camp in Khost province in Afghanistan. This camp was said to be run by the Afghan Mujahideen group Hizbe-Islami (Yunis/ Khalid) faction. Before the Yawar camp the outfit has already set

up another training camp in Allaq-e-Gare (Fiza) area, sources said. According to a police officer, who has been questioning the arrested Harkat militants for years now, this fundamentalist pan islamic outfit is extremely selective in choosing recruits, who are generally taken from theological schools worldwide to ensure a high level of motivation for jehad. Harkats strategy has three cardinal components - Tableeg (religions discourse), Publicity & Jihad (Holy war) to achieve its pan Islamic ambitions. The officer admits that being cadre based, the foreign militants dominated Harkat and Lashkar have more conviction than other groups. The group has a well knit structure with Salahuddin alias Salar of Gujarat as its chief while Tasleem of Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh and Jamiel of Assam as its no 2 and 3 respectively. Harkat according to sources is being run by a 5 member 'Markaz' or by a command council in J&K which included Nayeem Khalid alias Nayeem Lohar alias Sonaulah of Karachi as chief, Abu Gazi alias Peer Baba (deputy chief) Azam Kashmiri alias Imtiaz, Amir Kashmiri alias Zahoor Ahmad Dar, of Nawakadal, Srinagar, Parvez Baba of Nayi Basti, Anantnag, and Jehangir of Mirjanpora, Srinagar. Nayeem & Abu Gazi are believed to have been killed while Baba who is an electrical engieneer is in jail.

Post Kargil, Lashkar and Harkat have changed the tactics from hit-and-run to openly attacking military camps. Though Islam forbids suicide, these '*fidayen*' missions are virtually suicide attacks. In fact, lost in the blaze of hijack publicity, was the Harkat audacious occupation of the Srinagar headquarters of Jammu and Kashmir police special operations group. Some 150 police men were trapped, a deputy superintendent and seven other ranks were killed, and the desperados were overpowered only after a 24-hour gunfight.

The Chain of command is

Maulana Fazlul Rehman Khalil of Dera Ismail Khan (Pakistan) - Amir-e-Aala

Maulana Abdula Jabbar Wasmi of Dera Gazi Khan (Sahiwal, Pakistan) Naib Amir

Farooq Kashmiri of Rawlakote (POK) Commander in Chief

Mufti Asghar of Bagh (POK) Launching chief

Salahudin alias Salar of Gujarat chief in India

Tasleem of Muzaffanagar -U.P. Deputy chief in India

Nayeem Khalid alias Sonallah of Karachi- J&K chief (reportedly dead)

Azam Kashmiri alias Zahoor Ahmad Dar ,Nawakadal, Srinagar- J.K No 2

Jehangir of Mirjanpur, Srinagar -District commander, city.

Masood Azhar - Born in an affluent family of Bhawalpur in Pakistan on July 10, 1968, his father is a retired school teacher. Azhar had been editing Sada-e-Mujahadeed, a magazine committed to spread of Islamic teachings. He had joined Harkat to raise funds for the group and also to enrol people for Jihad. He was rated as a strong motivator and orator. He arrived in Srinagar on Feb. 9, 1994 and got in touch with his long time associate Sajjad Afghani who at the time was heading Harkat -ul-Ansar group in in Kashmir¹⁸.

According to the interviewed intelligence officers, he came to India on a Portugese passport in January 1994 and checked into hotel Ashoka and then into a hotel at Janpath in New Delhi. He had visa for India, Pakistan & Bangladesh. He visited Deoband in U.P. on Januray 29 accompanied by Ashraf Dar & Abu Mehmood. He then returned to his hotel in Delhi & left for Nadwa, on Feburary 9 & caught the flight to Srinagar along with Dar to begin his assignment. His description is meduim height, shallow complexion, strong built, round face, protuding belly, eyebrows joined, thick lips, keeps a maulvi beard.

After passing the eighth standard examination in 1989, he completed the Almia examination from the Jamia Islamia. Later he joined the university as a teacher and worked there till 1992. He was influenced by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HKUM) activities.

At the Islamia, he was motivated by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman-Khalil to join jihad. Soon afterwards he attended a week long arms training camp at Yawar, Afghanistan, but decided against wielding the gun himself. Around 1989 he was persuaded by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman to merge his role of a teacher & a maulvi & become the editor of HKUM magazine Sade-e-Mujahid published from Karachi. He then procured his passport and began his travels. He has visited Lusaka, Chipata in Zambia, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, U.K, Mongolia and Nairobi. He has not been involved in any violent incidents but masterminded a few daring jail breaks.

Indian Express of January 8, 2000, reported an inflammatory speech made by him at an Islamic Seminary right after his release by the Indian Government in exchange of the hostages of I. C. 814 in December 1999, where he stated that the struggle to rid Kashmir of Indian authority would continue. "Tell Indians and those who have suppressed the Muslims that Mujahideens (Holy Warriors) are a force of Allah and will hoist the flag of Islam in this world soon. I have only come here because I need colleagues, I need Mujahideens who can fight for the liberation of Kashmir. I will not be at peace till the Muslims are liberated. So marry for Jihad, give birth for Jihad and earn for Jihad till the cruelty of India and America ends, but India first."

The following figure shows the chain of command of Harkat - ul - Mujahideen. This chain extends to include its leadership in Pakistan.

CHAIN OF COMMAND OF HARKAT - UL - MUJAHEDDEEN

AMIR - E- AALA

(Maulana Fazlool Rehman Khalil Of Dera Ismael Khan Pak)

NAIB AMIR

(Maulana Abdul Jabbar Wasmii Of Dera Gazi Khan, Sahiwal, Pak)

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

(Farooq Kashmiri Of Rawalakote-Pok)

LAUNCHING CHIEF

(Mufti Asghar Of Bagh-Pok)

CHIEF IN INDIA

(Salahudin Alias Salar Of Gujrat)

DEPUTY CHIEF IN INDIA

(Tasleem Of Muzzafarnagar)

JAMMU AND KASHMIR CHIEF

(Nayeem Khalid Alias Sonallah Of Karachi, Reportedly Dead)

JAMMU AND KASHMIR CHIEF-2

(Azam Kashmiri alias Zahoor Ahmed Dar Nawakdal, Srinagar)

DISTRICT COMMANDER CITY

(Jehangir Of Mirjapur)

Mickolus points out that joint terrorist operations are rare. He argues that there are several reasons for this. Since the goals of two groups may differ, cooperation must be negotiated and concessions made. Agreement on operations and goals is difficult to obtain. Personality and ideological differences may also hinder the development of coalitions. Moreover, bringing a second group into an operation increases the number of people who know the resources, plans, and people involved in the act. This presents an increased security risk. Thus, single group, single nationality events are prevalent

While joint attacks are rare they do occur but other types of cooperation between terrorist groups are more common.

Alexander and Kilmarx detail several types of cooperation which may occur between groups and between groups and supportive regimes. Among the types of cooperation are :

- (1) *Financial*
- (2) *Training*
- (3) *Weapons*
- (4) *Organizational*
- (5) *Operational*

Links exist between many governments and transnational terrorist organizations.

In Kashmir also, co-operation and conflict has been observed within terrorist groups. Harkat-ul-Ansar was formed by merging Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami, Al-Faran was a branch of Harkat-ul-Ansar about which nothing more was heard after the kidnapping of the foreign tourists. Many terrorists of one organization are also members of another terrorist groups. A terrorist organisation may have many groups and sub-groups.

That is the reason why, according to police officers, it is very difficult to form a clear cut listing of terrorists according to their group. The most fundamental division is those who favour accession to Pakistan and others which favour complete independence of Kashmir or pro-azadi elements. Initially JKLF was supported by Pakistan but when they realised that they were talking too much about independence, Zia floated in Hizbul Mujahideen. In Kashmir even today a lot of rivalry exists among groups. During the Amarnath Yatra of 1994 the Hizbul Mujahideen, Allah Tigers, APHC, Jamaat-e-Islami and JKLF all lifted the ban and appealed to the Harkat-ul-Ansar to do the same. These appeals refused to evoke a positive response. The attack failed and the Ansars suffered heavy casualties. The ban could not be successful as other militant organisations opposed the ban.

Kanti Bajpai feels that the hijacking was part of some inter group competitiveness. By doing this, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen wanted more publicity. They wanted to draw attention to their group. Publicity matters because that would persuade elements in Pakistan that this is the group to fund. They would want to project themselves as the most effective group in the struggle. It would cause militants working in other organisations to switch over to them. Publicity for the Kashmiri cause, publicity against the Indian government. Publicity of themselves - hijackers were probably aiming for these things. The Pakistanis have probably realised that to carry forward the Kashmir movement they need one dominant group which carries out massive insurgency systematically. The question is which group. Perhaps, this incident is part of that strategy.²²

ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE BORDER

Ghulam, 25, was recruited by a member of Harkat-ul-Ansar and Islamic guerilla group fighting Indian security forces. The group is founded by Bin Laden & Ghulam is one of the hundreds of Kashmiris recruited to bring Jihad to India Controlled Kashmir, the flash point of subcontinent. Taken to an Al Badr training camp in Khost, Afghanistan. Ghulam underwent

a 90 days course before being introduced to a 10 men unit which he had to guide back to India. He received a payment of 50,000 rupees in Afghanistan. Each militant had to sign a two years contract to fight in India. They were paid 400, 000 rupees. Bin Laden had sent fundamentalist, highly armed & trained suicide squads who want to take on India & the West said a Lt. Col. from a unit charged with routing militancy out. Out of every group of militants we are now encountering, many have been trained in Bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan and at least 72 are from Afghanistan itself. The Indian army has rescued 50 teenagers, the youngest aged 14, taken from their homes by militants using threat and inducements to persuade them to cross the Pir Panjal range.

Bashir Mohammed, a 14 years old boy from Southern Kashmir said, "They told us that they would harm our families if we didn't go, there would be guns, money and even girls waiting for us on the other side." On arrival in the valley, Ghulam's units and others like it are instructed to keep Kashmir on boils by selecting soft targets such as civilians and the foreign tourist who visits Kashmir. Indian intelligence sources said bonus payments have been promised to those who generate international headlines with an abduction or by killing a senior Indian army officer. "Bin Laden is financing a sophisticated fighting force. This is not a Riff-Raff operation", said Lt. Col. Rahul Samuel whose unit recently recovered Solar powered rockets and explosive devices fitted with detonators that can be programmed upto 194 days in advance²³.

Indian Express of November 3, 1998 reported that the security forces killed 4 foreign nationals, who according to army officials, were Pak national and owned allegiance to the Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin. These were carrying photographs of Bin Laden. Thus leading to the suspicion that they must be having some links to him²⁴."

Was the Taliban really all that neutral in resolving the hijack of IC-814? Consider

this. The Taliban's chief patron in Pakistan is Maulana Fazlul Rehaman's Jamaat-e-Ulema-Islami (JUI). Now the group behind the hijacking is Harkat-ul-Ansar which was created by JUI to counter Hizb -ul-Mujaheeden the armed wing of JUI's rival Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) .

That is, the Taliban and Harkat have the same mentor²⁵.

The two Jamaats and the Marqaz Dawat-ul-Irshad (MDI) have played a key role in the valley. Headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, it was used by General Zia in his Islamisation drive and Afghan campaign. The Benazir regime favoured JUI. The over five lakhs people in its 9,90,000 madrasas in Pakistan are JUI's raw material. MDI was founded in 1987 by Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed and Zafar Iqbal to wage jihad against non muslims. It is an umbrella body for Islamic militants ranging from Chechnya to Palestine.

One of the main reason for starting the ISI was to start a continuous war against India. General Hamid Gul was assigned the task to establish this agency. It's headquarters is at Islamabad . Today ISI has 25, 000 agents who work in six departments which are :-

Joint Intelligence X, Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau, Joint Intelligence North, Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous and Joint Signal Intelligence. It's yearly expenditure is 160 crores which is collected through smuggling of narcotics . To finance terrorist operations in India, advertisements are printed in Pakistani newspapers and donations are demanded from the people in the name of Jihad. The donations are deposited in "Faizal Bank Ltd. - 43 Kaide Azme Road, Lahore" in account No 201186001. Besides these , the Islamic Development Bank and Habib Bank bear the expenditure of terrorist bases running in India in the guise of Islamic Madersaa. Even after all this if more money is needed then the banned Pakistani bank - Bank of Commerce and Credit International prints fake Indian and American currency. Thus the ISI is completely autonomous in running and it's operations does not affect the finances of Pakistan.

Munirul Ahsan, the main accused of the bomb blast in Bangladesh which aimed at killing Indian Artists, and souring India - Bangladesh relations said that these blasts had the hand of Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Bangladesh and of Lashkar-e-Toiba.

In the past few years there has been enormous rise in the number of madersaa's on the Indo-Nepal border. In this area a total number of 121 new madersaa and 146 new mosque have been made. Most of these have been made between 1997 and 1999.

According to the intelligence reports, prominent training camps in Pakistan were Markaz-e-Abdul in Muzaffarabad, capital of POK, Markaz-e-ul-Kulas in Chilabandi, Muzaffarabad, Markaz-e-Aska in Kothi Muzaffarabad & Garhi Habbullah in Balakot. The camps were frequently visited by international terrorist and also by Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden who is in Islam ruled Afghanistan for special indoctrination session²⁶. The aim of ISI was not that militancy should succeed in liberating Kashmir but that violence should continue. This was part of its 'Bleed India a thousand cuts' policy wherein it hoped that India would be forced to withdraw from Kashmir leaving it for a Pakistani takeover²⁷.

Intelligence sources indicates that the bomb blast on December 2, 1996 at Ambala, where 11 persons were killed and 31 injured, two blasts at Sonapat on December 2, 1996 where seven persons were injured, two blasts in a vehicle near Sonapat where one person was killed and 12 injured, two blasts at Rohtak on January 22 where 18 persons were injured, one blast at Jalandhar on March 14 where six persons were killed and 14 injured, one blast at Pathankot on April 5, where three persons were killed and 16 injured, one blast in the Bhatinda-Ambala passenger train at Lehra Khanna on July 8 where 38 passengers were killed and two injured, one blast near temple at Bagapurana where three persons were killed and 67 injured and so on show that militant activities from across the border are increasing. The incident of firing by Pakistani troops in the Kargil and Sama sector of Jammu and Kashmir and also con-

tinuous militant activities in Punjab, Haryana and the North Eastern region are the handiwork of long term game plan of ISI for disruption of peace in India in general and drawing attention of the International Community in particular²⁸.

TRAINING AND EQUIPMENTS


Developments since 1987 suggest changing patterns of the training programme. Initially, there was an elementary training for a duration of seven to ten days. This included introduction to AK-series rifles, small arms, rocket launchers, light machine guns, explosives and guerrilla tactics with minimum practical exposure. Gradually the training pattern has been redefined to cover specialized training from two to twelve weeks duration incorporating handling of heavier weapons, anti-aircraft guns, radio controlled devices, anti tank and anti-personnel mines, sophisticated explosive devices. Finer aspects of Commando tactics and wireless telephone training is also imparted to selected Kashmiri Muslim subversives. Preference was extended to educated youth with a technical or science background. They were thoroughly affiliated to Pro-Pakistani militant outfits for specialized and prolonged training schedules.

The camps can be demarcated as JKLF Camps, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen camps, Peoples League, Tehreek-e-Jehad-e-Islami Camps which operate together as one Muslim Janbaaz Camps, Kashmir Jihad Force, Al Inquilab, etc. and so on.

JKLF camps are primarily located around Rawalpindi, Muzaffarabad. Their coordinators are Rashid Hasrat, Sheikh Rashid, Dr. Farooq Haider, Raj Muzaffar, Saifruddin, Yasin Chowdhary, Shah Hussain, Rauf Kashmiri, Mian Parvez, Yusuf Gujjar. They are approximately eighteen to twenty in number. Housed in school buildings and isolated houses, one is at Agriculture College Building at Muzaffarabad.

Similarly the Hizbul Mujahideen camps had names like Ayubia Camp, Magri Camp, Farooq Camp, Gazi Camp, Musa Camp, Jala Camp. They had their bases in Muzaffarabad,

TRAINING CAMPS FOR KASHMIRI MILITANTS IN P.O.K./PAKISTAN



○ EXTREMISTS' TRG. CAMPS	
PAKISTAN	
88.	RAWALPINDI
87.	RAWALPINDI
90.	KOHAT PAK JUN 90
91.	RAWALPINDI
92.	THANDIANI PAK MAY 90
P.O.K.	
93.	MUZAFFARABAD
94.	MUZAFFARABAD
95.	KARACHAI PAK APR 90
96.	MUZAFFARABAD
ACTIVE CAMPS	

NOT SHOWN IN MAP	
PAKISTAN	
97.	MUZAFFARABAD
P.O.K.	
98.	DILAWAR CAMP POK AUG - SEP 91
99.	SULTANI POK SEP 90
100.	MIRAL DHANI CAMP
AFGHANISTAN	
(NEAR KHOST)	
101.	MUZAFFARABAD
102.	MUZAFFARABAD
103.	MUZAFFARABAD
104.	MUZAFFARABAD
105.	MUZAFFARABAD

BOUNDRIES & LAC ALIGNMENT APPROXIMATE


cont'd

TRAINING CAMPS FOR KASHMIRI MILITANTS IN P.O.K./PAKISTAN

A F G H A N I S T A N CHINA

EXTREMISTS TRG. CAMPE

PAKISTAN		
1	ABBOTABAD	PAK AUG - SEP 88
2	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR 88 - APR 91
3	ABBOTABAD CAMP NEAR	PAK MAR - MAY 90
4	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAR - MAY 90
5	CHAKRAL	PAK AUG - SEP 89
6	SHARON & CHOWK, RAHALLPINDI	PAK AUG - SEP 89
7	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK FEB - MAR 90
8	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK MAR - MAY 90
9	GUJRANWALA	PAK JUL - AUG 88
10	GUJRAN	PAK JAN - FEB 90
11	COLLEGE NEAR LAHORE	PAK JUL 88
12	HOSPITAL CAMP, JHARI	PAK MAY 88
13	LAHORE CAMP NEAR	PAK JAN 90
14	LAHORE CAMP NEAR	PAK JAN - MAR 90
15	JHARI	PAK MAY - JUN 89
16	SHARON CAMP NEAR	PAK MAY - JUN 88
17	ISLAMABAD	PAK JUL - AUG 89
18	ISLAMABAD	PAK MAR - MAY 90
19	ISLAMABAD	PAK MAR - MAY 90
20	SOTLI	PAK JUL - AUG 89
21	LAHORE	PAK MAY - JUN 89
22	LAHORE, P.O. ONE ST HOUSE	PAK JAN - MAY 90
23	MUREE	PAK AUG - SEP 88
24	ISLAMABAD CAMP	PAK MAY - JUN 89
25	ISLAMABAD	PAK JUN 88, JUL 90
26	ISLAMABAD CAMP NEAR	PAK JAN - MAY 90
27	RAHALLPINDI	PAK AUG - SEP 88
28	SHARON	PAK MAY - JUN 88
29	SHARON	PAK MAY - JUN 88
30	NEW FALTO, GUJRAN	PAK JAN - MAY 90
P.O.K.		
31	ALFABAD	PAK JUL - AUG 88
32	ABBOTABAD	PAK JAN - JUL 89
33	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAR - APR 90
34	ABBOTABAD	PAK FEB - MAR 89
35	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK APR - MAY 88
36	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
37	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
38	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK APR - MAY 88
39	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK APR - MAY 88
40	CHAKRAL	PAK JUL - JUL 88
41	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK MAR - APR 89
42	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
43	ABBOTABAD NEAR	PAK JAN - MAY 90
44	GILGIT	PAK AUG - SEP 88
45	GUJRA FORT	PAK JAN - JAN 89
46	MIRPUR	PAK JUN - JUL 89
47	MIRPUR CAMP NEAR	PAK MAY 88
48	SARI BANS	PAK MAY - JUN 89
49	SHARON	PAK AUG - SEP 88
50	KEL	PAK JUN - JUL 88
51	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - APR 89
52	ABBOTABAD	PAK FEB - MAR 89
53	ABBOTABAD	PAK JUL - AUG 89
54	ABBOTABAD	PAK JUL - JUL 88
55	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
NOT SHOWN IN MAP		
56	ABBOTABAD CAMP NEAR	PAK JAN - MAY 90
57	ABBOTABAD	PAK AUG - SEP 88
58	HANG BAZI	PAK MAY - JUN 89
59	ABBOTABAD CAMP	PAK JUL - AUG 89
60	ABBOTABAD CAMP	PAK MAY - JUN 89
61	ABBOTABAD CAMP	PAK JAN - MAY 90
62	ABBOTABAD CAMP	PAK MAY - JUN 89
63	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
64	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
65	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
66	ABBOTABAD	PAK JAN - FEB 89
67	ABBOTABAD	PAK AUG - SEP 88
68	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAR - APR 89
69	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
70	ABBOTABAD	PAK JAN - FEB 89
71	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
72	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
73	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
74	ABBOTABAD	PAK JUL - AUG 89
75	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAR - APR 90
76	ABBOTABAD	PAK JAN 90
77	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
78	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
79	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
80	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
81	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
82	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
83	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
84	ABBOTABAD	PAK APR - MAY 89
85	ABBOTABAD	PAK MAY - JUN 89
86	ABBOTABAD	PAK JAN - FEB 89
87	ABBOTABAD	PAK JUL - AUG 89



BOUNDRIES & L.A.C. ALIGNMENT APPROXIMATE

Abbottabad, Karachi, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Garhi and Bagh in POK. Their Camp coordinators being Maqbool Allai, G.M. Slofi, ISI Officials, Ashraf Dar, Pakistani army officials and Afghan War Veterans.

The training schedule hitherto controlled by Pakistani authorities through several militant outfits are now being handled by the ISI and the Pakistani army. Multiple training programmes entailing basic arms training with longer duration specialized schedules are being organized by Pakistan army officials in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The tasks assigned to Kashmiri militants include smuggling of arms, elimination of pro-accession political activities, minorities, security forces, sabotaging government property and vital installations.

The direct control of arms training for Kashmiri secessionists by ISI was primarily to insulate the Kashmiri exfiltrants against those militant outfits that were not pro-Pakistan and to control the secessionist movement. The floating of new specialized militant outfits like K-2, Akbar Tigers consisting of Kashmiri saboteurs of all groups trained by Pakistan army personnel in uniform are efforts in this direction. Simultaneously, there is more active connivance of ISI/Pakistani army through coordination of transborder movements of Kashmiri secessionists.

Curriculum is according to aptitudes of the militants. Sophisticated techniques are imparted to the educated. Training in sabotage subversion, guerrilla tactics, communication equipment and indoctrination for armed struggle is imparted. While illiterate trainees are imparted basic training in handling of assault rifles and explosives. Emphasis is now being laid on building up tough physical standards and development of leadership qualities.

Reports also indicate that Pakistan security officials have infiltrated to the valley to survey security forces deployment and discuss joint operation with local militants in case of stepped up Indo-Pak hostilities. Afghan Mujahideens, who have links with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizbe Islami had infiltrated into the valley during early 1991. Pakistan ISI has been trying desperately to

extend militancy to muslim dominated areas of Jammu, including Doda, Poonch, Rajouri, through militant outfits.²⁹

EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

These militants have been equipped with the latest state of art weaponry. Pakistan has further intensified induction of trained Kashmiri militants with armament and sophisticated communication equipment to fight its proxy war in Kashmir. According to Mriganka Chaudhary, the mix of weapons has undergone a significant change since mid 1990 with each militant infiltrating group being issued 70% AK-47, 56 rifles, 20% light machine guns, Kalashnikov model GPMG, rocket launchers, 10% pistols as against the earlier practice of 80% pistols and 15% AK series rifles. Of late, Pakistan has inducted SVD Dragunov Sniper Rifles with telescopic sights, with a few armed groups. It is estimated that around 18,000 Kashmiri Youth had exfiltrated till July 1992 to Pakistan or POK for arms and training. Of them, 14,500 have infiltrated into the valley and 3,500 are awaiting infiltration. Around 3682 have been arrested who admit training at various centres.

Security Forces, intercepted 160 gangs of Pakistan trained militants, killed 692 infiltrators and arrested 721 till July 1992. Besides 850 militants, including 687 Pak trained of various outfits have surrendered to authorities with weapons.

Specifically the following have been recovered

Category	1988-March '93
M.M.G.	13
LMG/GPMG/UMG	484
SVD Dragunov	20
Kalashnikov rifles/carbines	8255
Detonators	16880
Radio Controlled devices	20

Source : Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India.

The cumulative recoveries of arms and explosives, communication equipment and assorted ammunition include.

Category	1988-90	1991	1992	1993	15 th March	Total
Rocket Launcher	141	140	174	97	5	557
Machine Guns	124	176	174	142	18	634
A.K. Series Rifles	1474	2602	3775	2209	402	10462
Sniper Rifles	1	3	13	54	7	78
Pistols/Revolvers	858	946	808	921	161	3694
Ammunition (Thousand)	242	318	343	293	57.6	1253.6
Grenades	2994	2236	2818	4363	315	12726
Rockets	370	329	267	135	29	1130
Rocket Boosters	156	203	144	61	3	467
Mines	1101	217	307	614	107	2346
Guns	30	79	81	63	15	268
Explosives (K.G.)	1966	588	436	2950	96	6036
Bombs	708	72	228	212	42	1262
Wireless Sets	22	36	68	132	31	288

Source : Indian Defence Review Vol. 9(3), July, 1994, p. 35.

Under official benefaction, the leaders of different militant groups operating in the valley are provided facilities to freely to meet exfiltrating Kashmiri youth on Pakistani soil and provided arms and training. Pakistani ground forces are constantly upgrading logistic and other kinds of support. ISI has established two launching camps on the Indo Pak border during 1991, one between Muzaffarabad and Athmugam and another between Chinari and Garhi Dupatta.

Pakistan has also set up a sophisticated wireless communication network both for use within the valley and also to have a direct link with militants in Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan. Suitable talent among militants has been given specialized and prolonged training in it. Till March 1994, 84 Wireless Transmission Sets have been recovered including portable US made High Frequency (HF) Harris sets with Alpha numeric displays and automatic coding and decoding facilities, with a range of 400-500 KM. Most of the recovered W/T sets are of Japanese make KT-22 of VHF bands, capable of being utilized as a telephone exchange with a range of 8-9 KMs³⁰.

The weapons are freely available from the open arms market of Peshawar and its suburbs, NWFP and some places in Baluchistan. They are well suited for ambushes and attacks on security forces and installations. Bombs with sophisticated timing devices have also been used in bazars and government buildings. Most of the weapons are easy to carry out and conceal.

NOTES :-

1. CRENSAW, MARTHA, " The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparitive politics* 13, no.4 (July) 1981, Pg 393.
2. MERARI, ARIEL, "A Classification of Terrorist Groups", *Terrorism : An International Journal* 1, No.3/4 1978 Page 333.

3. JENKINS, BRIAN. MICHAEL, "International Terrorism : A balance sheet " in *Contemporary Terrorism : Selected Readings*, edited by John. D. Elliot and Leslie. K. Gibson. 235-245. Gaithesburg, Maryland International Association of Chiefs of Police. 1978 Page 4-6.
4. GRABOSKY, P.N., "The Urban Context of Political Terrorism", in the *Politics of Terrorism*, edited by Michael Stohl. New York : Marcel Dekker 1979 Pg 51-76 .
5. WOLF, JOHN B. "Organisation and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups." *Terrorism : An International Journal* 1. No. 2,1978 Pg 170-174.
6. WILKINSON, PAUL, " Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence ", in *Terrorism : Theory and Practice*, edited by Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press 1979. Pg 112-113.
7. GURR, TED. ROBERT, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press 1970. Pg 35.
8. F. No. 1. pg392-395
9. *The Telegraph* - January 2, 2000
10. KHAN, AMANUALLAH' S interview in *Jung*, Karachi, August 18, 1991.
11. LAMB .ALISTAIR, *Kashmir - A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1992, page 292.
12. *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, Sunday January 2 , 2000.
13. *The Telegraph*, Calcutta - January 2 ,2000.
14. BAWEJA ,HARINDU., "Operation Blunder", *India Today*, New Delhi , 15 November, 1993 . Pg 30-46

15. RAJESWARI, P. R., "U.S. Policy on Terrorism, Part 1 Case of Harkat-ul-Ansar" downloaded from Internet site *www.terrorism.com*.
16. Reported after interviewing Government Officials names of whom cannot be disclosed.
17. *The Hindustan Times* - New Delhi , January 4, 2000.
18. *Indian Express*, New Delhi , January 8, 2000.
19. *The Hindustan Times* - New Delhi , Sunday January 2 , 2000.
20. MICKOLUS , EDWARD. F., *Combatting International Terrorism : A Quantitative Analysis*. Ph. D. diss Yale University. 1981 Pg 69-70.
21. YONAH ALEXANDER at el., *Terrorism : Theory and Practise.*, Boulder, Colorado : Westerview Press. 1979.
22. *The Indian Express* . January 10 ,2000 .
23. *The Times* , London . October 4 , 1998 .
24. *The Indian Express* . November 3 , 1998 .
25. *The Times Of India*, New Delhi , January 10 , 2000.
26. F. No 16.
27. SINHA, ADITYA, *Death of a Dream, A Terrorist's Tale*, Harper Collins, 2000, Pg. 77
28. F. No 16.
29. CHAUDHARY, MRIGANKA. SINGH, *Terrorism as a Warfare Metaphor : An Analysis of Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir*, M. Phil. diss., cps, J.N.U., 1995, Pg 237-243.
30. KUMAR, D.P., *Kashmir, Pakistan's Proxy War*, New Delhi, Har Anand Publications, 1992 . Pg 225-226.

CHAPTER V

ORGANISATIONS IN PUNJAB :

Babbar Khalsa

GENESIS : EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ORGANISATIONAL LINKS

The rise of militancy in Punjab is attributed to the ideals of late Giani Bakshish Singh a pro-Naxalite Sikh leader of Birmingham, who was the General Secretary of the pro-Khalistan faction of the Shiromani Akali Dal, U.K. After visiting Pakistan in November 1971 he came to Punjab ostensibly for the purpose of conveying condolences to the Akali Dal, Amritsar on the death of sant Fateh Singh. During his stay, he had secret meetings with selected Sikh individuals, including some activists of the All India Sikh Student Federation, and advised them to organise their movement on the following lines:-

- (a) To enlist paid workers who can work as member of suicide squads when the time for action came.
- (b) To organise secret cells in the Police and in the Sikh units of the armed forces.
- (c) To collect arms and explosives for use at the proper time, and
- (d) To create hatred between Hindus and Sikhs and cause communal disturbance in Punjab.

The cult of terrorism which had surfaced during the 1970s assumed monstrous proportion with the sectarian feud developing between the fundamentalist Sikhs and the Nirankaris. The Nirankari movement was started as a revivalist group in the last century. Their founder, Baba Dayal Das, preached against the growing tendency of the Sikhs to revert to the Hindu practices.

The Baba stressed on the Sikh doctrine that God could not be described because he is formless. 'Nirankar' means formless. A large group of Nirankaris started to serve their founder and his successors as Gurus. In this respect they violated Guru Gobind Singh's pronouncement that he was the last Guru.

The most offensive of all to the orthodox Sikhs were scriptures which the Nirankaris

added to the Sikh canon. A climax reached when Nirankaris were allowed to hold a convention in the holy city of Amritsar on April 13, 1978. This was retaliated by the fundamentalist Sikhs who were enraged over the Government's decision. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who happened to be staying at Guru Ram Dass Saria in the Golden Temple Complex for annual ritualistic ablution, addressed a mammoth gathering at the Manji Sahib and exhorted the audience to undo the wrong. As soon as he finished his fiery speech, an Agriculturalist Inspector of Punjab Government, Fauja Singh marched out of the Golden Temple at the head of a large procession shouting slogans against the Nirankaris. Sant Bhinderanwale stayed behind feigning stomach trouble. Along the two mile route to the Nihangan Bunga or the Nihangs Shelter, one of the agitated Sikh cut the arm of a Hindu sweetshop owner. Police made no attempt to stop the procession. When the Sikhs reached the convention enclosure, Fauja Singh drew his sword and swiped at the neck of the Nirankari Guru Baba Gurcharan Singh¹. One of the Guru's guard shot Fauja Singh dead and a battle broke out in which twelve Sikhs and three Nirankaris were killed.

This was the starting point of the tragic events in Punjab. A number of Sikhs were killed at the hands of the Nirankaris in the clashes of April 1978. The incidents of April 13, 1978 created a feeling amongst a section of Sikh youth that the Central Government dominated by the Hindus was deliberately encouraging sects like Nirankaris which deviated from the basic tenets of the Sikh religion. A general feeling was developed amongst the Sikhs that the Government was intentionally helping the Nirankaris in order to divide and weaken the Sikh "Qaum" and that the Sikhs would not be able to maintain the purity of their religion unless they free themselves from the dominance of the "Hindu Government".

Sikhs from all walks of life blamed the Akalis for perpetrating the tragedy by their indefensible decision to allow the Nirankaris to hold their 'Samagam' at Amritsar and that too on the Baisakhi day.

Baba Gurcharan Singh, the spiritual head of the Nirankaris, was assassinated on April 24, 1980 by one Ranjit Singh. Not long after Lala Jagat Narain, a well known Arya Samaj journalist was murdered on September 9, 1981 by elements suspected to be the supporters of Sant Bhindranwale.

Whereas the responsibility of killing the Nirankari Baba was owned by the Babbar Khalsa. Both the Babbar Khalsa and the Dal Khalsa claimed credit for eliminating the Lala. In an interview given to the Des Pardes of London on May 25, 1983 the Babbar Khalsa activist of Vancouver (Canada), Talwinder Singh Parmar stated that the Babbar Khalsa was responsible for the murder of Lala Jagat Narain.

Sant Bhinderanwale was arrested on September 20, 1981 in connection with the murder of Lala Jagat Narain. The Congress Chief Minister of Haryana, at the request of a Union Home Minister, sent an official car to Bhindranwale to enable him to escape arrest. He drove in the car straight to the Headquarters of his Seminary, Dam Dami Taksal at Chowk Mehta near Amritsar². As a result, there was large scale violence in which police personnel were attacked with deadly weapons near Chowk Mehta. The Police resorted to firing which was later justified after judicial enquiry. Coinciding with the arrest of Sant Bhinderanwale four persons were killed in Jalandhar and several other were injured by a gang of motor cycle riders. Thus started an era of random killings by motor cycle born militants which was to plague Punjab for the next three years.

The increasing number of incidents of violence, acts of sabotage and random killings by the motor-cycle born militants formed the backdrop for the start of Bhinderanwale's cult and the emergence of various other militant groups in Punjab, in 1980-81.

BHINDRANWALE'S CULT

During the Bhog ceremony of Sant Kartar Singh, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhinderanwale

was installed as the next religious leader of the sect and the head of Damdami Taksal. The goal of the sect was to preach strict adherence to the Sikh tenets. The sect had been a one man show and Sant Bhinderanwale led the followers in all matters. The sect had quite a large following of about 30,000 out of which about 25,000 were in Punjab. Over the next six years, until his death in June 1984, Bhindranwale propagated and practised a creed of unadulterated hate³. He well understood that hate was a stronger passion than love. His list of hates was even more clearly and boldly spelt out⁴. In an interview he said, "I ask them (his followers) to join the fight for our independence as a separate nation."⁵

The members consisting of fanatics hardcore and participating in violence, number about 500 of whom about 200 were taking shelter in the Golden Temple Complex before the Army action in June 1984.

Late Sanjay Gandhi who was keen to teach the Akalis a lesson for their all-out and continuous opposition to his mother's Emergency regime, thought of exploiting the growing popularity of Sant Bhinderanwale to his advantage, Giani Zail Singh was deputed to establish contacts with Sant Bhinderanwale and to egg him on to push the Akalis to a corner. By playing the Sikh religious cards, the Giani not only won the confidence of the Sant Bhinderanwale but persuaded him to field his men to contest the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) elections against the Akalis in 1979. Although most of Sant Bhinderanwale's nominees were defeated, the Congress(I)'s main objective was achieved. Sant Bhinderanwale who had earlier been condemning the Nirankaris also turned viciously against the Akalis.

If Giani Zail Singh cultivated Sant Bhinderanwale, it was Congress (I) Chief Minister, Darbara Singh, political rival of Zail Singh who acted disastrously in ordering the arrest of Sant Bhinderanwale in connection with Lala Jagat Narain's murder.

Not only was the Sant allowed to dictate the terms and time of his arrest, he was

also given special treatment in the jail. This confirmed the growing belief among the Sikh masses that Sant was a man 'extraordinaire'. Support for him came from Gurdial Singh Ajnoha, the Jathedar of the Akal Takht, and from Tohra, the President of the SGPC⁶.

When Sant Bhinderanwale came out of the forced confinement he was an embittered man. He had been let down by those very persons, whom he had gone out of his way to help. For instance, he had openly supported the candidature of the three Congress (I) nominees. Smt. Indira Gandhi, thus became Sant's third arch enemy, other being the Nirankaris and the Akalis⁷. Among his first public statements was an enthusiastic approval of the murders of the Nirankari Chief and of Lala Jagat Narain. "Whosoever performed these feats", he declared, "deserves to be honoured by the Akal Takht. If these killers came to me, I would have weighed them in gold."⁸

Akhand Kirtani Jatha

The origin of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha, a fanatic religious group, can be traced to the establishment of the Khalsa Diwan in 1904 by Bhai Randhir Singh of district Ludhiana. Bhai Randhir Singh, who started his career as a Naib Tehsildar resigned from service in 1904 and started devoting himself to the preaching of the Sikh religion through the Khalsa Diwan. He renamed the organisation as the Panth Khalsa in 1909 and organised a protest movement against the demolition of a wall of the Gurudwara Rakabganj at New Delhi by the British in 1914, for which he was imprisoned. Shortly after his release, he was again arrested by the British for attempting to instigate some Sikh soliders stationed at Ferozepur to revolt against the government and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. During his imprisonment he wrote two books called **Jail Chittian (letters from the jail)** and "**Rangele Sajan**" which provided religious and socio-political inspirations to the Babbar Khalsa and similar groups. In 1948, he again renamed his organisation as Shaheedi Dal and started a movement for asserting

the right of the Sikhs to freely cross over into Pakistan for worshipping at their religious shrines there. In the early 1950s, the name of the organisation again underwent a change and it came to be called the Akhand Kirtani Jatha.

After the death of Bhai Randhir Singh in 1961, Babu Mai Singh of Tarn Taran was nominated as the Jathedar of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha. He died in 1979 and was succeeded as Jathedar by Sqn. Ldr. (Rtd) Ram Singh, a resident of Amritsar. Other activists of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha were Harsharan Kaur and Amarjit Kaur, widow of Fauja Singh, who was amongst those killed during the Sikh-Nirankari clash of Amritsar on April 13, 1978.

Till the Army action in June 1984 when she surrendered before the Security Forces, Bibi Amarjit Kaur had been the main architect of Akhand Kirtani Jatha. She was detained in June 1984 and was later released from detention on October 1, 1985.

Dal Khalsa

The Dal Khalsa, also sometime known as the Khalistan Liberation Organisation came into existence on 13th April 1978 as an extremist and militant Sikh Youth Organisation. It aimed at the establishment of 'A completely autonomous Khalsa State' based on Khalsa principles. Its constitution envisaged a Khalsa State which would live in mutual cooperation with the nations of the world struggling to attain freedom and stipulated that Khalsa State would maintain direct links with the States and countries outside Punjab. It described the Hindu government at Delhi as a supporter of Nirankaris and hence an enemy of the Khalsa State and affirmed its commitment for a sustained struggle for the creation of Khalistan. The Dal activists preferred "Kesri Nishan Sahib" (Sikh Flag) to the tri-colour.

As the Dal Khalsa looked upon the Hindus as one of the principal enemies of the Sikhs, it regarded the Muslims and Pakistan as the objective allies of the Sikh Qaum. It, therefore, advocated cooperation with Muslim minorities of India and made no secret of its

contacts with Pakistan. Senior police officer, A. S. Atwal who was murdered outside the Golden Temple premises was a marked man by Dal Khalsa⁹.

Harsimran Singh was the Mukh Panch of Dal Khalsa. Other important activists included Gajiner Singh, Jaswant Singh Thekedar and Manmohan Singh. After the enforcement of the ban on the Dal Khalsa on May 1, 1982, its members went underground. While Jaswant Singh Thekedar and Man Mohan Singh escaped from India, Harsimran Singh was arrested on January 2, 1982.

All India Sikh Students Federation

The seed of the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) was sown in the premises of Sikh National College, Lahore in 1944. The Sikh Students were inspired from the functioning of the Muslim Students League and established the AISSF to meet the students demands and to preach and propagate Sikh religious teachings.

In 1955 when Master Tara Singh started Punjabi Suba agitation a large number of the Akali Dal workers were arrested. To add more teeth to the agitation Master Tara Singh felt the need for mobilising students. He appointed Satbir Singh as its President. He was given the task to establish cells in every college of Punjab, particularly in Khalsa Colleges. Satbir, however, could not achieve much success.

In 1961-62 a definite shape was given to the AISSF and Bharpur Singh (who later on became the Registrar of Punjab University) was made its President. Bharpur Singh operated from the Khalsa College, Amritsar and started forming cells in other Colleges. The sphere of activities of the AISSF, however, remained confined to Punjab and limited to the demands of students.

The AISSF was resurrected in 1978 after the merger of several rival factions. The

reorganised All India Sikh Students Federation came into existence on July 2, 1978 with the objectives of :-

- * Enlightening the Sikh students on the preachings of the Sikh Gurus and safe guarding their rights.
- * Making the Sikh students aware of the entity 'Qaum'.
- * Organising Gurmat camps to preach Sikh history and Sikh tenets.
- * Reviving the interests of students in religious, political, cultural and economic fields, and
- * Working for spreading Punjabi language and for the establishment of Sikh University.

Before Baba Kartar Singh, head of Dam Dami Taksal, died in late 1970s he made it clear that he wanted Sant Jarnail Singh Bhinderanwale and not his son Amrik Singh, who was at that time studying at the University, to succeed to the leadership of the Taksal, Bhai Amrik Singh later became Sant Bhinderanwale's right hand man and was elected President of the AISSF. As President of the AISSF, he was responsible for many murders, robberies and attacks on government property, which were almost daily happening in Punjab during Sant Bhinderanwale's time. Bhai Amrik Singh was killed in the Army action in the Golden Temple Complex in June 1984.

Harminder Singh Sandhu was the Secretary of the AISSF during Sant Bhinderanwale's time. The AISSF had a claimed strength of about 15,000 in Punjab before the army action. Its main areas of operation were Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Ferozepur, Faridkot, Ludhiana, Jalandhar, Kapurthala and Patiala. The Federation had a strength of about 200 militants, of whom about 100 were taking shelter in the Golden Temple Complex at the time of Army action in June, 1984. The AISSF had been organised on district basis where it had a District President, who looked after the interests of the AISSF in the District. These district

convenors during their annual Samagams (meetings) elected the President and the General Secretary. The President so elected then nominated 5-7 member presidium to look after various functions of the organisation.

Before the ban in March 1984, the AISSF held various conventions and passed resolutions expressing faith in Sant Bhinderanwale and supporting the controversial Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The AISSF also organised Gurmat training camps for Sikh Youths. Sporadic acts of violence by the AISSF workers apart, the organisation focused on spreading propaganda aimed at fomenting resentment against the government and the Security Forces. It had issued threatening letters to the VIPs and other political leaders. Its members raised secessionist slogans and circulated separatist literature, whenever they found an opportunity.

National Council of Khalistan

The demand for a Sikh homeland was first raised in 1946 by a small group of Akalis led by the late Master Tara Singh. Though the demand did not get much support, it was kept alive by a handful of dissidents led by Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan. In June 1971, Dr. Jagjit Singh went abroad and during his stay in U.K. Canada and U.S.A. campaigned for a Sikh homeland. He called it as "A Sovereign Sikh State of Khalistan." Khalistan or Khalsa Country, a term for an independent Sikh homeland, was coined in 1947 by Kapur Singh a professor of Comparative Religions at Oxford University, England, and an adviser to the then Maharaja of Patiala. Chauhan left India in 1971, and spent time in Britain and the USA. In October 1971 as the tension mounted between India and Pakistan over the guerrilla war in East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Chauhan engineered a half-page, 1500- word advertisement in the New York times under the heading, "The Sikh demand an independent State in India.... the only guarantee for peace on the sub-continent." The Sikhs it was proclaimed, lived in constant fear of genocide persecuted by a brute, unfeeling, racist Hindu majority. The advertisement, which

called for demonstration (which did not seem to have occurred) in front of the United Nations the following day, commanded little attention at the time. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, he declared his manifesto, proclaiming an Independent Khalistan¹⁰.

In March 1980, Dr. Chauhan hoisted the "National Flag of Khalistan" in the presence of a handful of his supporters at Anandpur Sahib. The Sikhs, in general did not show any enthusiasm towards the gimmick of Dr. Chauhan.

The National Council of Khalistan, had only a handful of following in Punjab and after it was declared unlawful association on May 1, 1982 nothing much was heard about this organisation, in India.

Dr. Chauhan¹¹ came to public life through the student wing of the Communist Party of India. He has been away from India since then. He took to gimmicks such as, issue of Khalistani passport, postage stamp and currency notes. His intention was to exploit the sentiments of Sikh residents of Canada and West Germany who were facing difficulties with immigration authorities there.

Dr. Chauhan also kept close links with Ganga Singh Dhillon, an American citizen of Indian origin and president of the Nankana Sahib Foundation of Washington. In late 1983, Dr. Chauhan along with the members of Dal Khalsa and others established contacts with the leaders of the J&K Liberation front in U.K. According to a statement issued on behalf of the President of Azad J&K Muslim Conference, Dr. Chauhan supported the aims of this organisation in return for their support to Dr. Chauhan's objectives. In fact as far back as in 1981 Dr. Chauhan claimed that his movement enjoyed the support of Jamait-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Sakhira Group

After the Babbar Khalsa, the first group which came into prominence was led by

Sukhdev Singh Sakhira. Hailing from vilage Sakhira, Tarn Taran District, Amritsar, Sakhira was the leader of a 12 member gang which included dreaded terrorists Pipal Singh, Kuldip Singh and Ranjit Singh Rana (Rana carrying a reward of Rs. one lakh later hit the headlines when operating independently he killed four women).

Before joining the band wagon of the militants, Sakhira was a simple agriculturist and a part-time Granthi doing Akhand Path around his village area. He took Amrit (Baptised) from late Sant Bhinderanwale and became his follower. After Army action he went underground and came to lime light for the first time when, at an Amavas Diwan at Tarn Taran, on May 21 1985 he threatened to kill SSP Amritsar for latters role in alleged fake encounters in the district. Sakhira occupied the top floor room of Guru Nanak Niwas from where he played key role in the Golden Temple politics. At the instance of Major Singh Uboke, Punjab Revenue Minister, Sakhira played an important role in pressurising Bhai Mokham Singh of Damdami Taksal to arrive at an agreement with the SGPC on the issue of Kar Seva prior to January 1986.

Sakhira's criminal activities spread over to murders, robberies, bank heists, shoot-outs and threatening people considered to be the traitors of the Sikh 'Qaum'. For his criminal activities Sakhira had reportedly formed a killer squad by the name of Gurmukh Sakhira with the blessings of the acting Jatheder of Akal Takht, Gurdev Singh Kaonke. Aim of the Sakhira gang, interalia, was to liquidate the Panthic traitors who in collusion with the Central Government were trying to wipe out the Sikh culture. The police officers who had committed atrocities on the Amritdharis and their families were to be liquidated first.

During Sant Bhinderanwale's time, Sakhira was an active member of Sant's entourage. He was one of the members of the team which had made an attempt on the life on Niranjan Singh, the Nirankari IAS officer of the Punjab Government Secretariat, at Chandigarh in December 1980.

Sakhira had developed good political connections with State Ministers. He was close to Balwant Singh and Major Singh Uboke, Ministers in the Barnala Government. Sakhira had links with the Police officials who used to hold him in awe and fear. A former Dy. Superintendent of Police, Tarn Taran reportedly used to pay Rs. 5000/- per month to Sakhira through one Kashmir Singh, Sarpanch Tarn, to buy peace. Similarly one station House Officer (SHO) of Police Station 'B' Division, Amritsar had to approach Sakhira, through one of his constable who was in league with Sakhira for mercy petition because Sakhira had threatened to kill the SHO for latter's alleged involvement in raids on the houses of Sikh youth and for torturing them.

Khalistan Commando Force (KCF)

Encouraged by the blessings give by the Damdami Taksal and the support rendered by the AISSF (Kahlon faction) Manbir Singh Chaheru of village Chaheru formed a gang of militants. Dhanna Singh, Gurbachan Singh Manochahal and Wasson Singh who were all part of Sant Bhinderanwale's Jatha' before Operation Blue Star, joined hands to form the KCF. Manbir Singh was bestowed with the title of General Hari Singh. The group had .455 and .38 revolvers, 9 mm Stenguns and .303 Rifles. Except .303 rifles which were obtained locally, other weapons were procured from Pakistan with the funds looted from Banks or obtained from sympathisers abroad. According to Manbir Singh Chaheru who confessed during his interrogation held in August and September 1986, the KCF was also in possession of bullet-proof jackets, HE-36 Hand Grenades and one Light Machine Gun (LMG)¹².


Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA)

While still a polytechnic student Tarsem Singh Kohar was sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder committed by him to settle a personal score. On a appeal to the High Court of Punjab, he was acquitted in 1982. In September 1983 he joined the group of

Sant Bhinderanwale, Just before the Army action he escaped from the Golden Temple and went underground, During July 1984 Kohar managed to receive a consignment of 4/5 stenguns, 4-5 Revolvers and about 700 rounds of 9 mm ammunition and 200 rounds of ammunition of revolvers through one Amrik Singh, an activist of the Akali Federation, who had fled to Pakistan. Soon after the receipt of arms and ammunition, Tarsem Singh Kohar formed a group which he named Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA). First major act of violence committed by the KLA was the China massacre which resulted in the killing of eight Hindus on September 12, 1984.

Jarnail Singh- Babla Gang

Jarnail Singh Halwara of village Halwara, District Ludhiana, along with Gursevak Singh Babla organised a gang of about 13 members in late 1984. Jarnail Singh reportedly master-minded the murder of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal in 1985 for which he had deputed his associates. In a daring operation on August 20, 1985 Sant Harchand Singh Longowal was shot dead while he was about to conclude his speech to 3500 odd people at the Gurudwara in Sherpur village in the interior of his home district Sangrur. Time was 5.30 P.M. when shots rang out from the first row, the bullets aimed at the seated Sant on the stage but wide off the mark, fired from a .455 revolver by a 22 years old youth, Gian Singh, the bullets injured others seated on the dias. Sant was immediately surrounded by his supporters. Gian Singh was overpowered. After a while when protectors of the Sant moved aside, Halwinder Singh (24 years) seated a few feet from the Sant pounced forward and fired a single shot at point blank range. Before the assailant could fire again he was overpowered. Sant was rushed to Sangrur hospital but within an hour of being admitted Sant Longowal was dead. Others, apart from Jarnail Singh and the two firers, who conspired to kill Sant Longowal were identified as Nirmal Singh, Darshan Singh and Charanjit Singh of the Halwara gang. Jarnail Singh had amassed huge wealth by Committing Bank robberies and dacoities. Considered to be a womanizer Jarnail Singh used to live in style and believed in enjoying 5-star luxuries.



Source - SHARMA D.P. - The Punjab Story, APPI Publishers, 1996, Pg 189

Mathura Singh Gang

This gang also known as a gang of clean shaven Sikhs was involved in various crimes committed outside Punjab including the murder of General Vaidya in Pune. Apart from Mathura Singh other members of the gang included Sukhminder Singh, alias, Sukhi, Rajinder Singh Gill, alias, Kuki, Harjinder Singh, alias, Jinda, Bakshish Singh and Sukvinder Singh, alias, K.C. Sharma, alias, Pal Singh, alias, Chiddu.

Harjinder Singh Jinda was believed to be the third ranking member of the group but was glorified by the media as the most wanted militant, who was involved in several bank heists and killings. A smuggler by Profession, Jinda joined the ranks of militants following a crack down on smugglers across the Indo-Pak border. The 22 years (as on 21.8.1985) old Jinda, hailing from village Gaddali in Amritsar district, joined the gang of smugglers of Upkar Singh and was involved in the smuggling of Gold, Charas and other narcotics across the Indo Pak border from 1983 onwards for want of money.

During his interrogation, Jinda confessed having committed a number of bank robberies including the Punjab National Bank robbery in which Rs. three lakhs were looted on March 14, 1985. The Delhi police after preliminary enquiries handed him over to the Gujrat police for bank robbery cases in that State. On April 4, 1986 Jinda was taken to the nearby Narol Court from Sabarmati Jail in Ahmedabad. He was escorted by a police party headed only by a Head Constable. On their way back when the party members halted for lunch at a road-side joint. Jinda gave the slip to the escort party and escaped. Later on he was arrested and killed.

Roshan Lal Bairagi Gang

Son of a "Halwai" (Sweetmeat seller) Jagir Das, alias, Jagir Lal of village Verowal Kalan, District Amritsar, Roshan Lal, alias, Bairagi embraced Sikhism when he was still young.

He started off with petty crimes, became a notorious criminal and ended up a dreaded terrorist carrying a reward of Rs. one lakh. He became leader of a five member gang and was involved in 26 heinous crimes including murders, attempted murders and bank robberies.

Khalistan Armed Police (KAP)

This group was headed by Manjit Singh Khajala. Other important members of this group were Manjit Singh Bhandi and Resham Singh. Aroor Singh, who later became member of the Panthic Committee, provided patronage to this group.

Apart from the above major militant groups there were a number of splinter groups which came to notice during 1985. These included *Khalistan Armed Force; United Sikh Army; Liberation Front of Khalistan; Tat Khalsa Armed Forces; The Khalistan Khalas Fauj*; elected as the President of the US Chapter. Earlier the Executive Vice President of the WSO Gurmit Singh Aulakh had left (WSO claimed he was dismissed) after levelling serious allegation against Bhullar. Because of internal quarrels between its leaders, the WSO in USA could not make any impact amongst the Sikhs in the country. It however, organised demonstration against visiting Indian dignitaries including one against Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in June 1985. Another activity of the WSO was in trying to defend the four Sikhs arrested for the plot against Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chief Minister of Hayana (detected in May 1985). Another notable achievement of the WSO was capture of prestigious Richmond Hill Gurudwara at New York by employing storm troopers of Sikh Students Association of America. WSO also managed to create a lobby amongst US Senators and Congressman with the result that they managed to have the Sikh question aired in the meeting organised by the US Senators. Dhillon also managed to highlight the Sikh issue by being invited to speak at a National Press Luncheon in Washington, a few days before the Prime Minister of India addressed the Press Conference at the same venue. Also a letter was sent to the Indian Ambassador in

Washington by eighteen congressmen about the alleged atrocities on the Sikhs¹³.

WSO Canada Chapter

In Canada the WSO was formed on December 8, 1984 when its constitution was adopted at a meeting at Ottawa. A 31-member national executive was also announced with Gina Singh Sandhu as its President. The WSO in Canada functioned mainly from the British Columbai (Vancouver) region because Gian Singh Sandhu belonged to Vancouver. Otherwise, the WSO had two regional headquarters in Canada at Vancouver and Toronto. The WSO in Canada unlike in the US worked more effectively and was able to capture the imagination of anti-Government of Indian Sikhs and its claim of having about 16,000 active members was not considered an exaggeration. The WSO had offices (by courtesy ISYF) in virtually all the Gurudwaras captured by the ISYF. While the WSO's claim of having won the recognition of the Canadian Government as the only representative body of the Sikhs could have been an exaggeration, there were indications to suggest that on every conceivable issue affecting the Sikh minority, the local authorities in British Columbai and Ontario province did seem to take into consideration the WSO's view point. Otherwise the centre stage in Sikh politics in Canada was taken over by the newly formed International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) Nevertheless the WSO took a leading role in issues like (a) lifting of the moratorium on repatriation of asylum seekers, and (b) arrest of Lakhbir Singh and others in connection with the bomb found outside the office of Indo-Canadian Times in Surrey B.C.

WSO U.K. Chapter

The WSO in UK was not allowed to establish itself on a firm footing because of the presence of Dr. Chauhan. The Conference held by the WSO in April, 1985 at Southall was more a shadow of the ISYF rather than that of the WSO.

It was observed that for basic violent activities or for strong arm actions, the

WSO in Canada and UK was totally dependent on ISYF. It was ISYF which was providing the real muscle to the WSO and, in fact, in Canada virtually the members of one organisation were members of others.

International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)

The most significant development in the Sikh extremist activities abroad during the post-operation Blue Star period was the emergence of International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) as the foremost organisation spreading the 'Khalistan' movement. It relegated to the background organisation like the Khalistan National Organisation led by Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan and the World Sikh Organisation as also the International Sikh Organisation (ISO) of Dr. Gurmit Singh Aulakh.

ISYF UK Chapter

The ISYF was formed in UK by Bhai Jaibir Singh Rode, nephew of late Sant Bhinderanwale on September 23, 1984 by the merger of youth organisation like the UK branch of the All India Sikh Students Federation, Sikh Youth Movement, Youth Akali Dal, etc. The ISYF constituted 31 branches in UK, divided into three zones- London, Midlands and North. It claimed to have a membership of around 16,000 in the UK. The simmering differences within the ISYF rank and file surfaced after the deportation of Bhai Jasbir Singh Rode from UK in late 1984 and his subsequent deportation to India from Manila. Soon two factions in the ISYF emerged-one led by Dr. Pargat Singh and another led by Bhai Gurmail Singh. Despite factional differences an Executive Committee was elected on consensus at the ISYF anniversary held in Derby on September 22, 1985 with Dr. Pargat Singh, Dr. Sadhu Singh and Ajaib Singh Gill as President, General Secretary and Joint Secretary respectively.

The ISYF directed its activities towards taking over the management of various Gurudwaras in the UK. As a result, most prominent Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara, Southall,

was taken over in April 1985 followed by Guru Arjun Dev Gurudwara, Derby. The ISYF also indulged in engineering attacks on moderate amongst the Sikhs. This was followed by a murderous attack on Sangtar Singh Sandhu (Akali Dal Longowal) who received grievous injuries. Lack of adequate protection and failure of British Police to apprehend the culprits in these two cases emboldened the ISYF led extremists to shoot to death Tarsem Singh Toor, General Secretary of the India Workers Association, UK, on January 23, 1986. An arson case in the office of Sandesh earlier resulted in the death of Kartar Singh Tar in 1984. Dr. Pargat Singh President, ISYF, UK, was himself attacked with knives on November 5, 1985 outside Hitchin Station by four clean shaven youth.

ISYF Canada Chapter

The Canadian chapter of ISYF came into being in April-May 1985 incorporating the old Sikh Student Federation. The ISYF Canada maintained close links with other ISYF chapters in the UK and West Germany. The intention was to achieve a centralised control or atleast coordination of all Sikh extremist activities and thus really internationalise the Punjab problem which was essentially an internal problem of India. While funds and brains were drawn from various countries, Canada became one of the major areas of concentration of the storm-troopers. A number of activists of the AISSF (India), the nominal parent body of the ISYF, gravitated to Canada. Prominent among them were Bhai Lakhbir Singh (Nephew of Sant Bhinderanwale), Harpal Singh Ghumman, alias, Harjinder Pal Singh Nagra and Kulwant Singh Sidhu.

The ISYF in USA and West-Germany could not make much headway and remained only paper organisations. While there was no open rift between the WSO and the ISYF on the issue of formation of the ISYF in USA, top WSO leaders worked behind the scene to dissuade the ISYF leadership from forming its US Chapter. In a meeting held a

Frankfurt on June 2, 1985 an eleven- member Committee of the ISYF, West Germany headed by Joginder Singh Malhi as President was formed.

Mai Bhago Regiment

This group was formed after a secret meeting held somewhere in the Amritsar district on October 24, 1986. According to Bibi Bhag Kaur, the self-styled General of the Organisation, they were itching to have arms training and join hands with their fighting Sikh brothers. Beside Bhag Kaur, Harcharan Kaur was given the rank of Lt. General, Mai Bhago Regt had shown allegiance to the Khalistan Liberation Force of Aroor Singh.

Mata Sahib Kaur Commando Force

It was led by Gen. Harsharan Kaur, who broke away from Mai Bhago Regiment on the issue of supporting KLF. Harsharan Kaur was assisted by Col. Jindi Kaur, Alias, Jindi. The Force claimed responsibility for snapping telephone wires at Jalandhar on the night of December 30, 1986 during Punjab Bandh.

Matahari Brigade

The most alarming aspect of the reportedly changing situation in Punjab was the formation of yet another force called Matahari Brigade an auxiliary of young women to carry arms and messages. Sometime in January 1987 when a dozen young girls met at a secret place in Amritsar and discussed the role of women in the changed scenario in Punjab. The meeting was convened and presided over by one Bhupinder Kaur, a member of the AISSF (M) and already a known militant with recognised leadership potential. The Police was waiting to catch hold of her but she managed to give them a slip. She had left as many as seven addresses in Amritsar alone, but was never found at any of them. But strangely, messages left at any of these places reached her.

It was doubtful whether such group of women militants existed in reality or not. But it is was certain that the militants were making use of women volunteers as carriers of arms and ammunition and for carrying messages from one member to another. These women were mostly related to the militants in one way or the other like wife, sister and even as lover. These women accomplices provided shelter to the militants and acted as their safe house keepers.

Babbar Khalsa

GENESIS:

The Babbar Khalsa trace their origin to the Babbar Akali movement of 1920 which was an off-shoot of the Gurudwara Reform Movement. Kishan Singh Gargaj, a former Hawaldar of Sikh Regiment organised this movement in the districts of Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana and Kapurthala. With no written constitution to support, the Babbar Khalsa was constituted primarily to annihilate the Nirankaris, punishing those who desecrate Sikh scriptures of Gurudwaras and eliminate the imposters who encourage self-styled Gurudom of individual by introducing the practice of obeisance .

GROWTH:

An off-shoot of Akhand Kirtani Jatha, the Babbar Khalsa came into existence in 1978 to act as the armed wing of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha of Bibi Amarjit Kaur. Ever since the clash between the Nirankaris and the Sikhs at Amritsar on April 13, 1978, a section of fanatic Sikhs vowed to take revenge from the Nirankaris and their supporters. After the killing of the Nirankari Baba in April 1980, criminal activities against selected Nirankari targets increased. A killer gang of several fanatic Sikhs spearheaded the attacks on the Nirankaris and the others. Among them was Talwinder Singh Parmar, who was generally regarded to be their leader. Talwinder Singh and some other members of the Killer gang, including Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal and Anokh Singh started using Babbar as suffix with their names. This group

later came to be known as the Babbar Khalsa. Talwinder Singh Parmar escaped from India in May 1982 leaving the reign of the Babbar Khalsa in the hands of Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal (Babbar). Other founder member of the Babbar Khalsa were Anokh Singh, Kulwant Singh Jagodhri, Mehnga Singh, Raghbir Singh, Man Mohan Singh, Jugraj Singh, Surinder Singh Gill, Sher Singh alias Bihari and Balwinder Singh Khojkipur.

The Babbar Khalsa had about 24-30 activists, all of whom were operating from the Golden Temple Complex. During the army action at Amritsar in June 1984, Balwinder Singh Khojkipur was arrested by the Army and others went underground, a few of them reemerged in 1985-86.

IDEOLOGY:

The Babbar Khalsa drew its inspiration in the religious field from Akhand Kirtani Jatha, in the political field from the theories advocated by one Kapur Singh, retired ICS officer, and in the ideological and tactical fields from the ideas propogated by the late Giani Bakshish Singh. Babbar Khalsa claimed that if the Sikhs had followed the advice of Kapur Singh they would have achieved independence a long time ago. It also talked of the Jewish Struggle for the creation of Israel and the national liberation struggle of the Kurds as its models for organising its activities. Unlike the Dal Khalsa, it preferred an amorphous, unstructured set-up. The establishment of a Khalsa Raj had been their avowed aim.

THE PAKISTANI FACTOR

The Babbar Khalsa always regarded Pakistan as the natural and cultural neighbour of the Sikhs with which they would have to maintain friendly ties and claimed that the Government of Pakistan promised to give the Sikhs assistance in their fight against "Hindu Imperialism" and that once Khalsa Raj was established, Pakistan would accord to the Nankana Sahib a status similar to that of the Vatican.

While the Operation Blue Star was still in progress the Babbar Singh slipped from the Golden Temple Complex and exfiltrated to Pakistan in the first week of July 1984. Immediately after entering Pakistan the members of the group reported at a Pakistan Ranger's picket from where they were taken blind folded in a truck and were lodged in a building on the outskirts of a city. The group remained in the building for about eleven months and was imparted training in the use of fire arms, etc. According to the disclosures made by Anokh Singh who was arrested in January 1987, one Gurmej Singh came to Pakistan from the U.K. and met and provided funds to Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal for purchase of arms. The arms and ammunition so purchased in Pakistan were then smuggled into India by the Babbar Khalsa activists for distribution among the members of the Babbar Khalsa group.

FINANCES :

It was also revealed by Anokh Singh that financial support to the Babbar Khalsa was provided mainly by Talwinder Singh Parmar of Vancouver, Canada and Gurmej Singh of U.K. Funds were sent directly to Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal operating from Pakistan. Arms and ammunition purchased in and supplied by Pakistan used to be smuggled into India through known smugglers under the direct supervision of Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal.

While Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal, subsequently rechristened Sukhdev Singh Babbar remained in Pakistan, Anokh Singh with few members of the Babbar Khalsa returned to India in May 1985 and established themselves in the Golden Temple Complex. Anokh Singh during his interrogation revealed that he was going in and coming out of the Golden Temple Complex because his photograph circulated to the Police and other Security Forces was not his, but somebody else's. The target of the Babbar Khalsa were mainly very important persons. The group was also the first to make liberal use of explosives in Punjab. Very secretive in Operations the Babbar Khalsa, unlike others, had no tug either with the Damdami Taksal or the AISSF.

This group operated independently and is reportedly financially very well off having lot of foreign aid and patronage," said one of the captured militant. Considered to be highly dedicated and motivated the Babbar Khalsa group did not believe in numbers but in strength of about 8-10 members only which included Sukhdev Singh Babbar, Anokh Singh, Sulakhan Singh, Surinder Singh and Manmohan Singh. The group had 8-10 stenguns, 10 pistols/revolvers, a few rifles and lot of ammunition. The Babbar Khalsa group was also imparted training in the use of explosives in Pakistan.

The Canadian branch of the Babbar Khalsa led by Talwinder Singh Parmar was considered to be one of the most active and violent militant organisations abroad. Operating from its base in Vancouver, the organisation was in the forefront of all major Sikh militant activities in the US-Canada axis till the rise in influence and power of the ISYF. Even with the rise in hold of the ISYF the hardcore following of Parmar remained intact. Serious allegations of misappropriation of funds, however, diminished Parmar's popularity till his arrest along with Inderjit Singh Riyot for suspicion of his being connected with the Air India bombing case. After arrest of Parmar, the Babbar Khalsa started associating with the ISYF. Along with the ISYF, the Babbar Khalsa demanded that the conduct of violent activities (both planning and execution) should be left with the youth of Babbar Khalsa and the ISYF with WSO confining itself to lobbying and constituency contacts only.

Babbar Khalsa in UK was a one man show of Gurmej Singh Gill. This group had very little following in UK. Still the group managed to hold a meeting of the Babbar Khalsa International in UK on October 20, 1985. A supreme council of Babbar Khalsa International (UK) was nominated with Gurmej Singh Gill as Jathedar.

ALIGNMENT OF BABBAR KHALSA :

The Babbar Khalsa maintained its independent identity. The group was neither


aligned to the Panthic Committee nor to any factions of the AISSF. It however, respected the sanctity of the Damdami Taksal without, of course, accepting the authority of the Taksal. Chief of the Babbar Khalsa, Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal mostly operated from Pakistan and handled procurement of arms and ammunition in Pakistan from the funds made available by Babbar Khalsa USA and the U.K. He supplied those arms to Anokh Singh who was controlling activities of the Babbar Khalsa in Punjab. Babbar Khalsa group was a small band of dedicated militants who operated in clandestine fashion without attaching much publicity to their acts of violence. Maximum strength of the Babbar Khalsa, at a given point of time during 1987, was estimated to be 65. Compared to this strength the Babbars had only 15 stenguns and 10 revolvers. The group, however, had huge quantity of explosive devices which was extensively used by them. The Babbar Khalsa received a major set-back when its top leader Anokh Singh was arrested by the Police on January 12, 1987. He, however, got freed within a month on February 12, 1987 from the premises of the District Courts, Ludhiana. While Anokh Singh escaped unscathed one of the trusted Lieutenants of the Babbar Khalsa, Sulakkhan Singh was killed. Anokh Singh was subsequently killed in an encounter with the police on August 31, 1987. After the death of Anokh Singh, Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal shifted his headquarters to Punjab.

Table 1
Strength of Militants in November 1989

<i>Group</i>	<i>Hardcore</i>	<i>Non-Hardcore</i>	<i>Total</i>
KEF	72	568	640
BTFK	34	306	340
KLF	17	163	180
Babbar Khalsa	39	341	280
Others	8	542	550
<i>Total</i>	<i>170</i>	<i>1820</i>	<i>1990</i>

Source : Sharma, D. P., "The Punjab Story, Decade of Turmoil", APH Publishers. 1996. Pg 231

ALIGNMENT OF MILITANT GROUPS



Source : Sharma, D. P., "The Punjab Story, Decade of Turmoil", APH Publishers. 1996. Pg 170

RECRUITMENT CENTRES :

For replenishing the casualties no fixed recruitment centres for any of the Militant organisation were in operation. Gurudwaras were the places where the Sikh youth were indoctrinated and initiated. The youth were given Amrits and asked to take a vow to defend the Sikh Panth unmindful of sacrifices. During the era of Sant Bhinderanwale several youth were given Amrit by the leaders himself and they were exorted to lay down their lives for the cause of Sikh Panth. The Sikh youth in the age group of 18-25 years were generally tapped by the Militant during their visit to Gurudwaras. Heroic deeds of Sikh leaders were narrated to them and they were inspired to emulate the examples of Sikh heroes. Though there was no discrimination in the selection process, mostly the Jat Sikhs were attracted. Smugglers and antisocial elements were also accepted by the Militant organisation without any accommodation

of reservations. All India Sikh Students Federation and the Damdami Taksal were another source of inducting youth into the organisations.

BACKGROUND OF THE MILITANTS :

Average age of the militants was reckoned as 25 years; some as young as 12 years, like Ranjit Singh, brother of one time dreaded militant Surjit Singh Penta who committed suicide by taking cyanide pill after surrendering to the Security forces during operation Black Thunder-II. Another noteworthy feature was that the life span of the militants was only 4-5 years. Specific studies of the militants revealed that nearly 82 per cent of them came from rural areas and belonged to poor or middle class families. Only 23 per cent were married. Majority (63 per cent) of the militants were school drop-outs having read only up to class six or seven. While 17 per cent were Matric pass 15 per cent were graduate and they were mostly the members of the A. I. S. S. F. Manbir Singh Chaheru (KCF) who was only 28 years when arrested, read upto class nine. He belonged to a low middle class family. Dhanna Singh (member Panthic Committee) who read upto class nine belonged to a farmer family. Aroor Singh (member Panthic Committee) was High School pass but was doing farming before he was drawn into militant activities. Sukhdev Singh, alias, Sukha Sipahi (KCF), a matriculate, was a police constable in Punjab Police.

However, not all the Militants were school drop outs or belonged to poor families. There were a number of Militants who belonged to affluent families and were educated. Quite a few like Harwinder Singh Sandhu (AISF), Harinder Singh Kahlon (AISSF), Satwinder Singh, alias Bhola, and a host of others were highly educated.

Almost all the militants of Sant Bhinderanwale era joined the movement because of deep sense of religious feelings. For them religion was above all other considerations. During his interrogation Avtar Singh, alias, Pahalwan, a Babbar Khalsa activist, revealed that he along

with one of his associates while on a mission to kill Inspector Gurmail Singh Bai of Punjab police, did not do so because when he (Pahalwan) reached the house of Gurmail Singh to execute the plan he was found reading Japji Sahib. Such was the influence of religion over the militants during 1983 and 1984.

Attitude and approach took a dramatic turn from 1986 onwards. By taking Amrit to achieve the goal set by Sant Bhinderanwale, militants with criminal records gained acceptability with the leaders of the militant organisation and respectability among the Sikh masses. Innocents were inducted and at times compelled to take Amrit and become pure Khalsa. In the name of religion young boys were asked to kill persons who were branded traitors and government touts.

Jails as Nurseries - Jails had also acted as nurseries of terrorism. Once jailed for little time, a petty criminal got hardened and well versed in militancy. Interrogations of several hardcore militants revealed that the moment a person was sent to jail his training as a militant began.

Lack of conviction by the judiciary also encouraged the criminals to go back to crime. Dharam Singh, alias, Dhanna, a Babbar Khalsa activist was one such case.

Police Harassment - There were wide range allegations of police atrocities in Punjab. There were innumerable cases where young people, in order to avoid harassment at the hands of police, joined militancy.

Money and Good Life - Lots of evidences were available to suggest that unemployment and poverty forced the youth to join militancy. A study of the back grounds of arrested Militants revealed that about 50 per cent of the Militants in 1987 were driven by sheer poverty to become outlaws. In majority cases Militants belonged to large families which had smaller holdings. Having not gone beyond High School and coming from large families, living

below the poverty line and desire for better life forced many a youth to join the rank of militants.

In the case of death of a militant a Gurudwara was built in his name in the village and bhog ceremony was held. The dead militant became a hero over night. Poor young men not only thought but many actually joined the militancy, considering it a very lucrative and attractive proposition. Kill a person and get paid Rs. 50,000 was the promise.

Sukhdev Singh Babbar, chief of Babbar Khalsa who was killed in an encounter in August 1992 was the owner of a bungalow worth Rs. 30 lakh in Patiala. He had also purchased another house for Rs. 14 lakh in Model Town, Patiala. Both the houses were in the name of the wife of Sukhdev Singh Babbar.

Anti-Social Elements - A number of militants did not have clean record of service and in order to give some credibility to their anti-social activities joined militancy. Gurusewak Singh, alias, Babla, an A category militant was an opium smuggler operating from Ludhiana. He became a Militant and co-founder of Jarnial Singh Babla gang in order to take revenge from his rivals in the field of opium smuggling, as also to obtain a religious cover to pursue his smuggling and criminal activities.

Trends :

The Khalistani terrorists were divided in terms of trend into three distinct categories even when they were united. If before operation Blue Star, they had a common umbrella of Bhindranwale's Damdami Taksal and also the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), that cover just did not exist any more.

The first trend was represented by those who became victims of fundamentalism, revivalism and religious rigidity and thus turned into religious fanatics.

The second trend comprised the unemployed and the disillusioned youth who thought that the Khalistani terrorism would provide salvation to them from the rigours of present inequalities under the existing socio-economic set-up.

The third and the major trend consisted of the anti-social and criminal elements who found it lucrative to join the Khalistani movement as it had already given a big boost to increased anarchy, breakdown of law and order and consequently massive smuggling, looting and other paying propositions.

After Bhindrawala's death, all these three trends came to the fore in a mutually conflicting position in the absence of a unifying force¹⁴.

Contradiction and tension within the groups became so widespread that inter-group murders and clashes began. This split along with the attitude of Pakistani authorities towards Khalistani terrorists in Pakistani prisons and their isolation from the people led to desperation and disillusionment of many terrorist.

After the return of Akali Dal in the power and the attractive slogans of rehabilitation and other benefits given by the government, some youngmen who had turned terrorist due to rigours of unemployment and other problems began to have second thoughts. So much so that young men being trained in Pakistan ran away and came over to India. However many trained terrorist fully committed to terrorism also crossed over to India.

The disillusioned young men returned to their village. The after effect of operation blue star was also wearing thin. The terrorist's hold had began to wane.

The hardcore terrorist saw the danger and they began to kill the youngmen who returned to their homes. They were labelled as police informers. The anti-social elements having become predominant amongst the Khalistani terrorists, personal enmity and murders

over looted booty and sex-related crimes increased.

Paramjit Singh Judge and two of his other teaching colleagues at the Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar have profiled 300 terrorists (dead or alive) from 20 villages from the worst-affected areas of Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Batala and Majitha. Paramjit and his two partners, Harish Puri and Jagrup Singh discovered that 250 of the 300 terrorists were Jat Sikhs. This has confirmed old suspicions that Punjab's terrorism had been Jat Sikh led. More than 210 of them (or 70 percent) were between 15 to 19 years of age, and some were touching 20. Twenty percent of the remaining were between 21-30 and only ten percent between ages 30 and 50. Only one extremist, Guru Singh, from Sursingh village in Tarn Taran district - the villiage that has produced the largest number of terrorists in Punjab - nearly over 50.

As for education 65 percent of the terrorists were illiterate, not having gone beyond primary school, 35 percent were school drop-outs and the bulk of the rest had just about managed to reach upto Matric. "The most qualified of the terrorists, Dharamvir, was a law graduate and Gurbachan Singh Manochal was a student leader.", says Paramjit, "So let us not talk about the educated unemployed coming into terrorism."

A study of landholdings was revealing, "As a caste group, Jat Sikhs are expected to have land." Paramjit continues, "And if it is a green revolution land, the stakes double." The majority of terrorists were found to own no more than five acres. This was also the case with married terrorists whose family holdings were taken together and it showed in the study that half the terrorist would inherit less than an acre of land.

Such a miserable instance could have driven many to terrorism. But Paramjit has found other reasons. "At least 180 of the 300 terrorist we sampled joined out of fun," he says. The phrase that was often used was 'Shokia taur se'. They were happy if they had a motorcycle and an AK47 and if they got to eat Almonds." Almonds? Paramjit believes is a

very important thing. "We checked out that whenever terrorist took refuge in a rich man's house, the first thing that they asked to be served were milk and almonds because it makes them feel cool as it showed the raw power they held over people's lives."

Women were another big draw. They kept off women of well to do families (many of them sent away the daughters to hostels or to colleges outside Punjab) and showed a disinterest in dalit woman. ("In caste situation obtained in Punjab before the Bahujan Samaj Party gained a strong hold, they had access to them anyway.") But they forced themselves on women from the marginal jat sikh families.¹⁵

ORGANISATION

Organisational structure of the militants was very loose. It was a porous unit with no systematic command and control structure. The organisations did not have written code of discipline, rules of membership, enrolment procedure and hierarchical pyramid except that the militants knew who was the chief of which particular militant organisation. The KCF, KLF and the BTFK had adopted military ranks to their leaders. The chief was known as General and Area Commanders were styled as Lt. Generals. The KCF alone had some local level officers who were given the rank of Brigadiers. No rank below the rank of Brigadier was in vogue. The Babbar Khalsa did not use military ranks. The chief was known as Mukh Panch. Others were referred to as leader. The respect one commanded depended on his standing in the organisation and skills to handle explosives.

Each militant outfit had number of gangs operating in different areas under Lt. Generals. There were as many Lt. Generals as there were gangs, Since command and control exercised by the leaders was loose, the Lt. Generals in most cases took actions independently without taking the Chief to the organisation in general and to the movement in particular.

Unlike a well organised structural frame, the militants in Punjab did not have cell

systems in their organisations. No cut-outs were used while communicating with members within the gang or between different gangs. No systematic intelligence gathering machinery was functional. There was a composite group which was performing all the tasks like collection of intelligence, propaganda, assigning the targets, fixing of modus-operandi and communication. Once a target was decided, only the tactical information required, in the execution of the task, was collected. There were no front organisations of the militants. Damdami Taksal did function as the mouth piece of the militants but it had no political base. Same was the case with different factions of the AISSF. Everybody was taken. Except in the case of the Babbar Khalsa which was very selective while taking new entrants, other militant outfits were not choosy and enrolled a large number of persons without verifying their antecedents. As a result, a large number of unwanted persons gained entry into the organisations. There were far too many militants and far too many gangs operating in Punjab. This proved counter productive as the number of militants became unmanagable and went beyond the exercisable control of the leader. Then undersirable elements also could find a place in the organisation. It was speculated that even the highly trained Punjab police personnel were able to enter into the militant organisations by enrolling themselves as militants.

Each militant outfit had a number of gangs or sub-gangs which were assigned different areas for operation. Mostly the demarcation was with reference to the districts. Some degree of over lapping was permissible. The Chief had his own gang for striking terror. At the beginning of 1986 there were about 40 gangs operating in Punjab. Out of these 40 gangs, 17 gangs were well organised with its members having certain amount of motivation. Others were bunch of vagabonds. Strength of the gang ranged from 6 to 13 members which was managable. As a result of efforts made by the Panthic Committee members, a number of militant gangs were roped together and major militant outfits emerged in 1987. Apart from a few independent gangs the four major groups were- the KCF, KLF, Babbar Khalsa and BTFK.

The following table gives the relative position of the gangs operating at different point of time in Punjab. No authentic information could be collected from 1989 onwards as from then on the movement became unwieldy¹⁶.

Relative Postion of Gangs

<u>Name of outfit</u>	<u>Number of Gangs</u>			
	<u>9/87</u>	<u>4/88</u>	<u>7/88</u>	<u>9/88</u>
KCF	10	13	20	22
KLF	6	10	13	13
BTFK	1	5	8	11
Babbars	6	5	5	6
Others	11	4	3	5
<u>Total</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>57</u>

Above figures reveal that the Militants had been improving their strength consistently. There had, however been decline in the number of independent gangs, from late 1977, these gangs started merging with main militant organisations. Operating of so many gangs obviously posed leadership porblem.

LEADERSHIP

It was deduced from the interrogation of the militants apprehended from time to time, that leaders did not have strict control over the members. Because of loose organisational structure, meeting between the leaders and the members were not regular to promote loyalties.

No classes were conducted to indoctrinate the members and motivate them to prepare for sacrifices and arduous lifestyle. Even meeting between the Chief and deputies were not held regularly to plan strategies. Leaders of different organisations did not see eye to eye with each other. Movement was faction ridden. The apex bodies, like the different Panthic Committees, failed to bring the leaders of various militant organisations to come to terms.

Top leaders like Baba Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, BTFK; Wassan Singh (KCF Barwal); Avtar Singh Brahma (KLF); Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal (Babbar Khalsa) and host of others were Semi-literate functionaries from rural stock. They did not have any interaction with intellectuals and the learned. It was strongly believed that they had advisers from among the disgruntled Akalis, ambitious Sikh politicians abroad and the mischievous Pakistan authorities. They lacked, both individually and collectively, qualities of leadership to lead the militants by bringing them under one umbrella. There was no militant leader of eminence who was acceptable to all the Sikh militants. That the Pakistani authorities were maintaining contacts with leaders of all the militant organisations and had not made any discernible efforts to bring them together, was indicative of the policy of keeping the movement in disarray instead of throwing up a leader who could negotiate settlement on behalf of all the militant outfits.

Spilling of more blood was the guiding principle while selecting a leader of a particular gang. In such a scenario it was difficult to envisage that leaders could act as challengers and champions. Obviously they could not act as a fatherly figure and failed to instill confidence among the militants.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION

At the advent of the movement the militants had limited number of arms. There was no regular supply of arms and ammunition from Pakistani militants had, therefore, to supplement their armoury by snatching the arms from the license holders and in a number of

cases from the police and the para-military forces. The rifles snatched from the police were cut on both sides so that weapons could be taken in a suitcase. Arms were also purchased at exorbitant prices from Pakistan through smugglers. The cost varied from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 45,000 depending upon the type of weapon. In one case Malkiat Singh Ajnala paid Rs. 2.70 lakhs to an arms Rifles and 500 rounds of ammunition. It may be recalled that there was gradual upgradation of weapons acquired from across the border by the militants both in terms of numbers and sophistication after the Rs. 5.7 crores Ludhiana Bank dacoity of February 1987.

The situation was further changed from January 1988, while small arms were acquired on payment, the Pakistani authorities started supplying missiles, rocket launchers and other heavy weapons free of cost. Surplus arms meant for Afghan Mujahideen also started finding their way into Punjab. Chiefs of the various militant organisations and members of the Panthic Committee were in constant touch with Pakistani authorities and placed indent for supply of arms and made arrangements for smuggling them into Punjab with the help of Pakistani rangers.

To start with looting of banks, Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB) power bill collecting centres, petrol pumps, liquor shops, etc., were the main source of fund for sustaining militant activities. Contributions of overseas Sikhs and offerings of Gurudwaras were the other sources. Extremist organisations functioning abroad collected huge amounts in the name of supporting militant movement in Punjab and sent the same to Punjab by means of Benami. Later funds started pouring-in through Pakistan. Funds were sent not only from USA, UK, Germany etc. but from countries like Norway, Denmark and Malaya.

From 1988 extortion of money from well-to-do Sikhs and Hindus became an easy source of money. Kidnapping for ransom was yet another source of raising of funds.

The militants never faced any resource crunch. They also resorted to drug trafficking to augment their funds. In the face of repeated attacks on teachers and traders in Gurdaspur in early 1988, a proposal was sent by the teachers and the traders suggesting that the militants could take 10 percent of their monthly earning and spare their lives. This arrangement, in fact was implemented to the satisfaction of both the sides.

HIDE OUTS

Gurudwaras and farm houses were commonly used by the militants to meet, conspire and plan actions. Weapons were also kept in either Gurudwaras or farm houses of sympathisers.

TRAINING

Contrary to the general impression, the militants were not put through to any training in the handling of weapons. The youths who joined the movement were simply told how to pull the trigger by the leader. They were given small arms at the time of carrying out the action and were told to pull the trigger from close range, aiming the revolver/pistol or the stengun at the target. Chanchal Singh a KCF activist who surrendered before the security forces after operation Black Thunder-II admitted that some training in handling and maintenance of weapons was, however, given to the militants staying in the Golden Temple Complex by Karaj Singh Thande (BTFK), an ex-armyman. They also had target practice in the basement of Bungas.

However those of the militants who crossed to Pakistan subsequent to operation Blue Star were given training by Pakistani instructors for a period ranging from two to six weeks in the handling of arms and explosives. According to intelligence sources, an expert on explosives from the U. K. trained a selected band of Babbar in the preparation of IEDs and charged a fee of Rs. 4 lakhs. The interrogation of a militant arrested in early 1992, revealed

that apart from the ISI some groups of Afghan Mujahideen also imparted training to the Punjab militants near the Afghan border, in the North-West Frontier Province. This was the first time that a militant confessed about the involvement of Afghan Mujahideen in the training programme of Punjab militants.

TRAINING CAMPS

Different accounts were given, by apprehended militants, on the number of training camps, their location, number of trainees, training curriculum and its duration. While some disclaimed any knowledge of such camps and of being formally trained, others spoke of cursory training in handling fire, arms at safe place. A sizeable number spoke about regular training in sophisticated weapons, chemicals and improvised and high explosives. It was however, observed that apart from the leaders only the very trusted and motivated activists of various groups were imparted such training. Before selecting persons for training, their bonafides and antecedents were carefully verified, screened, tested and checked and rechecked and their calibre and ability was assessed. Dedicated youth, specially those known to the militant leaders were segregated and housed separately. Persons not found suitable were pushed back into India. Even such discarded persons were throughly brainwashed against Hindus and were told to foment communal disturbances.

To start with, existence of five training camps in Pakistan came to notice-each militant group having its own training centre. Those camps were located at Lahore, Sialkot, Kasur and Faisalabad. Sialkot facing Gurdasopur sector in Punjab and Jammun in Jammu and Kashmir and Lahore opposite Amritsar were the main training grounds. Small safe houses in Sialkot and Lahore Area were being used as venues of training as also the indoctrination centres for different group of persons crossing over to Pakistan. As more and more persons crossed over to Pakistan, the number of training camps were also increased and by May 1988

as many as eleven training centres were in operation in Pakistan.

The training curriculum ranged from indoctrination against Hindus (on which great emphasis was laid) to handling of fire arms like .455 and .38 bore revolvers and pistols, stenguns, Self Loading Rifles, .303 Rifles, etc. Training also included the use of chemicals and low and high explosives. Preparations of improvised explosives and fabrications of time bombs were also taught to the trainees. Motivational talks were given by Sikh leaders based in Pakistan. A few selected ones were even imparted guerilla training and training in the use of improvised explosive devices including remote control devices. Duration of training ranged from 2 days to 3 months. There were reasons to believe that keeping Sikh youth in jails for periods ranging 9 months to 18 months was in fact a part of cover story given to the militants as a garb for their specialised and intensive training. It was, therefore difficult to conceive that Harjinder Singh alias Jinda (monster of Muktasar) out of his stay of six months in Pakistan was not imparted a single day training. Similarly Tejinder Singh and Gurvinder Singh the two apprehended militants remained in Pakistan for one and a half years and ten months respectively and were trained for one month and 15 days respectively.

One Sarabjit Singh during his interrogation gave a very clear picture of the training schedule and its curriculum that was being followed during 1985 to impart basic training to new entrants. According to him a six day training programme included the teaching of following subjects.

First and Second Day : Operation and handling of weapons from different positions. Lectures were followed by practical demonstrations which lasted about two hours each day.

Third and Fourth Day: Handling and operation of Stengun (then considered the weapon of the terrorist) from different positions. Lectures were followed by practical demonstrations. (No firing practice was given)

Fifth and Sixth Day : Use of chemicals and high explosives. Three lectures of one hour duration each (in morning session) for use of chemicals and one lecture of two hours duration (in evening session for use of High Explosive were held. Trainees were also lectured about some of the targets against which Plastic Explosives could be effectively used. Such elaborations included destruction of railway tracks, transformers, houses/building, bridges and Army convoys and vehicles.

After the training schedule minor tasks were assigned by the Pakistani mentors to unverified, unsponsored, untested and lesser motivated activists while major ones were reserved for those enjoying full trust and confidence of the leaders based in Pakistan. The tasks assigned mainly included fomenting Hindu-Sikh riots, killing Hindu leaders, destroying Hindu temples and places of pilgrimage, liquidating Sikh collaborators and traitors of the Panth, subverting the Army by infiltrating the sons of won over exservicemen into the Army ranks, luring serving Sikh Army personnel to report on the deployment and movement of Indian Army Units in Jammu and Kashmir and arranging safe houses for lodging militants and storing fire arms in J & K and Punjab. Sabotaging railway tracks, transformers, bridges, Atomic Research Centre, Creation of guerilla and political cells and winning over of ideologues for propogating cause of Khalistan, were some other tasks assigned jointly by the Pakistan Field Intelligence Units (FIU) and the militant leaders in Pakistan.¹⁷

Anokh Singh, Babbar Khalsa leader in India, who was arrested in January 1987 pointed out that he along with Sukhdev Singh Dassuwal (Head of Babbar Khalsa) went to Pakistan in July 1984. They were received at Pakistan Range Post, opposite Ferozepur sector and kept in a building for about an year. Apart from motivating them to strive for Khalistan, the Pakistan Intelligence Officers imparted training in preparation of explosive devices to Anokh Singh and a few others, which the former fully utilised in preparing transistor bombs which were planted extensively in Delhi in 1985. Anokh Singh also revealed that arms and ammunitions

were regularly supplied to the Babbar Khalsa elements in India by Pakistan.

The interrogation of the militants who were arrested in mid 1992, revealed that apart from the ISI some groups of Afghan Mujahideen has also been imparting training to the Punjab militants. A militant who surrendered before the Punjab police in Amritsar in July 1992 confessed that Afghan Mujahideen were associated with their training programme and training for 22 days was imparted by the Mujahiddeen near Afghan border. The training included handling of General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG) and automatic weapons like AK-47, AK-56 and AK-74 Rifles. Lobbing of hand grenades and laying of mines also formed part of the training programme. During their stay in training camps the Punjab militants were not allowed to mix with the teachers and were kept separately.

NOTES :

1. GILL, K. P. S., *Knights of Falsehood*, Har-Anand Publications, 1997, Pg. 78
2. RAMNARAYAN KUMAR, at el., *The Sikh Struggle*, 1991, Pg. 256-257 in TALREJA KANAYALAL M., *Secessionism in India*, Rashtriya Chetna Prakashan, Mumbai, 1996, Pg. 444.
3. F. No. 1, Pg. 78.
4. SINGH, KHUSHWANT, *A History of the Sikhs, Vol. 2, 1839-1988*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991, Pg. 330-331.
5. *Daily Mail*, April 12, 1984
6. DHILLON, GURDARSHAN SINGH, *Truth About Punjab : SGPC White Paper*, SGPC, Amritsar, 1996, Pg. 155.
7. SHARMA, D. P., *The Punjab Story, Decade of Turmoil*, A. P. H. Publishers, 1996

Pg 21-27.

8. *White Paper on the Punjab Agitation*, Government of India, 1984, Pg. 164.
9. SINGH, KHUSHWANT, *My Bleeding Punjab*, U. B. S. P. B., 1992, Pg. 51
10. TALREJA, KANAYA LAL. M., "Secessionism In India", Rashtriya Chetna Prakashan, 1996, Pg 446-447.
11. Ibid, Pg. 447 - 448.
12. F. No. 7, Pg. 96 - 101.
13. NAIR, V. K., *Threat from Within, India's Internal Security Enviornment*, Lancer Publisher, 1992, Pg. 44.
14. SINGH, DARSHAN. ed. DANG, SATYAPAL, *Terrorism in Punjab, Selected Articles and Essays*, Patriot Publishers, 1987, Pg 60.
15. *SUNDAY*, February 22, 1997, Pg. 10-14
16. F. No. 7, Pg. 308
17. F. No. 7 Pg. 270-272.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is the work of an organisation. It is a group activity. The size of the group binding varies in accordance to the organisation. Once an individual becomes part of the group, it does not allow him to leave it. The group could be very close knit with definite aims, ideology and a well defined role for every individual, or it could be a loose knit group with horizontal bindings and not very clear aims. What is common to all terrorist groups is that they all attempt to committ acts which cause 'terror'. They suffer from inter-group and intra-group clashes. When this happens, it is a weakness of terrorist's politics.

As has been seen in the earlier chapters, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Babbar Khalsa are two such terrorist groups which have a well knit organisational structure, well defined ideologies, system of recruitment and also links with foreign countries. Both these states have a rich culture. In chapter two and three, we have seen how the culture, value system and institutions in Punjab and Kashmir are being eroded. What is under stress are the emotional ties binding Kashmir and Punjab to the rest of the country. In the process, weakening the basis of a secular, plural and democratic politics.

Though formed as independent organisations, both these groups have a history which can be traced back. The HUA was formed after the unification of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (a splinter group of Harkat-e-Jehadi-Islami) and the HEJI. Similarly, the Babbar Khalsa is an offshoot of the Akhand Kirthani Jatha and traces its origin to Babbar Akali movement which was an offshoot of Gurdwara Reform movement of 1920.

Unlike other terrorist groups, both these groups have set ideologies. While HUA follows the Deobandi school of thought, Babbar Khalsa which came into existence to act as the armed wing of Akhand Kirthan Jatha was constituted primarily to annihilate the Nirankaris, punishing those who desecrate the Sikh scriptures of the Gurudwaras and eliminate the imposters who encourage self styled Gurudom of individuals by introducing the practice of

obeisance. Both these groups are highly fundamentalist and intolerant towards other religions. Both these groups have interpreted Islam and Sikhism in pragmatist terms.

As has been described in the earlier chapters, both Harkat-ul-Ansar and Babbar Khalsa are hierarchical at the top but the lower levels are more horizontal. There is a lot of conflict at the lower levels. The organisational structure of the HUA is classified in more stringent terms at the hierarchical level. HUA is a huge web like organisation which is international in character involving individuals of different nationalities.

Membership of both the organisations is restricted. Emphasis is on the strength of members and not their numbers. Thus the members of these organisations are more dedicated, organised and deadly. No member of either group enjoys sovereign power. The powers are shared among its various units that operate under a single banner. The powers are delegated from one unit to another for transaction or subversion through various units spread all over the world. The HUA and the Babbar Khalsa have operated in diffused structure, for instance, they have roots in Kashmir and Punjab respectively but their units are also set up in great Britain and the U.S. Police Officers in both Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, talk of the difference that exists between the leader and the cadres. The leaders it has been observed are more educated, from a better socio-economic background and are more ideologically committed. It has been seen that usually, the cadres are from a rural background. Their level of education is not very high and they fall within the age group of 20-30 years.

We looked at Merari's four fold classification in chapter four. Our groups i.e., Harkat-ul-Ansar and Babbar Khalsa seemed to be coming closer to domestically born homofighters very partially. These categories do not fit into the Indian case because of State sponsored terrorism. These groups have their funding, training and weapons from the foreign state sponsoring terrorism. Secondly, the leadership of these organisations is heterogenous.

Where there is a creamy, criminal and a middle layer as in Punjab. The creamy layer partially lives abroad for purposes of international propaganda and providing material support. In this context, our study suggests that one cannot accept this classification. One has to go in for the understanding that terrorism is a process in which decision making within the organisation, organisational strength, background and size of the group and ideology have a role to play. In that sense, Jenkins approach to terrorist organisations becomes significant. In trying to understand the dynamics of the terrorist organisations in Punjab and Kashmir, Oots's hypothesis about the capacity of terrorist organisations in accordance with their group size is useful. He suggests that average group size is largest for difficult acts. Difficult acts are more likely than other acts to be committed by a larger group. There is some variance in group size from group to group: Although most organisations use a relatively small group. We find that Harkat-ul-Ansar and Babbar Khalsa are big organisations with intermediate group size. This allows them to perform tasks like attacking strong hold of Indian Security Forces, kidnapping and bomb blasts. Like Oots's finding that intermediate group gets injured in the acts of terror, we find that in the two organisations the individuals did get injured.

What is not covered in Oots's understanding is the fact that certain terrorist organisations are created to counter other terrorist organisations. This was done in case of both Harkat-ul-Ansar and Babbar Khalsa. This leads us to a significant dimension of inter-organisational conflict among the terrorist groups. The logic of this conflict suggests that the movement is on the wane.

Inter and Intra organisational conflict exists leading to splits and new alignments. Every terrorist organisation wants to gain the maximum publicity. The hijacking of IC-814 can be seen in this context.

One of the reasons for the formation of HUA was to reduce the influence of

Hijbul Mujahideen. In Punjab too, the number of terrorist organisations was very large. Each group was trying to get more publicity. Thus spilling more blood.

The characteristic of training of both groups is transnational. Among the terrorist organisations in Punjab, Babbar Khalsa used the maximum explosives. The scientific and technological advancement in the art of making weapons demanded skilled manpower resources and proper training in the use of arms, Unless the group has undergone proper training, it is not possible for a potential individual to carry out the action plan aimed to subvert an established political system. This training, along with weapons was provided by Pakistan and by Afghan Mujahideens to both the groups.

Thus, we establish that both are part of state sponsored terrorism. The sufficient end sought here by the sponsoring state is not necessarily the total destruction of the targeted entity, but rather simply to destabilize or weaken the target. The Kargil invasion, operation TOPAC have all been part of this strategy of Pakistan. This clearly represents the use of lethal force on the moral plane to dissolve a targeted entity.

Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated on October 31, 1984 by aspirants of Khalistan and the spate of violence and terrorism that followed her death clearly indicated that the nation was under seige. The foreign policy design of Pakistan was exposed, which precipitated the Government of India for certain quick counter action programmes. Enactment of TADA and numerous acts that came into enforcement in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir during this period is the manifestation of the then prevailing law and order situation.

An important tactic of Pakistan is to link the Sikhs with the Kashmiri militants. The ISI is trying to bring the two to an agreement for joint action in India. They aim at co-ordination between the two subversions of the state. The relevance of this could be analysed

by the fact that Jammu and Kashmir has sizeable population of Sikhs, and Pakistani leaders are frequently in touch with Sikh leaders abroad. By creating a nexus between the two, Pakistan's tactic is to divert the attention of the Indian army from either of the state so that total collapse of government machinery is ensured and civil war prevails.

There may or indeed has been unprincipled politics, rampant corruption, sluggish socio-economic development, but this is not a sufficient reason to arouse secessionist overtures. It is a revolt that has been organized "yet" at times spontaneous on emotional issues like the disappearance of the religious relic from Hazratbal in 1963 and operation Bluestar in Punjab. Pakistan has not only encouraged it but provided state of the art weaponry, training and guidance. Infiltration across a porous border became easier than it had been when there was not the same level of dissatisfaction. Official and semi official, tacit and open support from Pakistan has left Kashmir and Punjab in a state of disarray.

The international media has publicized the after effects of militancy as the causes for it - breakdown of civil authority, repression, violation of Human Rights, alienation. This satisfies the militants and whets the hope of international intervention. A disinformation campaign has been resorted to, to influence international opinion against India. Impartial observations regarding innocent killings, disruption of life are few. Censorship and official control of information has tended to give gust to bitterness and to complaints that Indian authorities are concealing a policy of brutal suppression.

After the nuclear tests, the danger of open conventional warfare between India and Pakistan is now negligible, but support to and provocation of low intensity warfare will remain part of Pakistan's strategic objective for a long time to come. Even today, the ISI runs a number of training camps for Sikh militants. The surviving scraps of most of the major terrorist groups of Punjab including the Babbar Khalsa have found sanctuary in these camps.

The flow of recruits to these camps from India has now completely dried up. But there is evidence that the ISI is presently focusing on a recruitment drive of 'Khalistan' sympathisers in Canada, the U.S., England and Germany for training at these camps.

The war against terror in Punjab has been comprehensively won. But no society, no nation, is ever safe against the intentions and the amoral inventiveness of the criminally ambitious. Democracies are, in this, peculiarly vulnerable. Political instability, wide cultural differences and economic disparities - such as those that characterise the entire Indian sub-continent heighten such susceptibilities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Census of India, Punjab, Vol. 6, Shimla, Government of India Press, 1941.

-----, *Jammu and Kashmir, Part XII*, Series-8, (Srinagar, Directorate of Census Operation, 1981)

Crime in India, New Delhi, National Crime Record Bureau, 1980 to 1990.

India Year Book, New Delhi, Publication Division, Government of India, 1981.

Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report 1990-91*, New Delhi, Government of India, 1991.

Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report, 1989-90*, New Delhi, Government of India, 1990.

Office of the Director-General of Police, Intelligence, *Monthly Terrorism Review on Punjab*, Copy No. 22, Secret, Chandigarh, May, 1993.

Terrorist Activities Disruptive Act (TADA), New Delhi, Government of India, 1985.

White Paper on Punjab Agitation, New Delhi, Government of India, 10th July, 1984.

SECONDARY SOURCES

ABDULLAH, FAROOQ, *My Dismissal*, Delhi, Vikas, 1985.

ABDULLAH, SHEIKH MOHAMMED, *Flames of Chinar*, (translated by Khushwant Singh), New Delhi, Viking, 1991.

AKBAR, M.J., *India: The Seige Within*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985.

....., *Kashmir: Behind the Veil*, Delhi, Penguin Books, 1991.

AL MASHAT, MONEM ABDUL, *National Security in the Third World*, London, West View, 1985.

ALEXANDER, YONAH at el., *Terrorism as State Sponsored Covert Warfare*, Virginia Fair Fax, Hero Books, 1986.

ALEXANDER , YONAH at el., *Terrorism : Theory and Practice* .Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.

AMIN, TAHIR, *Kashmir Report*, Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies, 1990.

ASGHAR KHAN, M., *The First Round Indo-Pakistan War 1965*, New Delhi, Vikas, 1979.

AYOOB, M., & SUBRAHMANYAM, K., *The Liberation War*, New Delhi, 1972.

BAMAZAI, P.K., *A History of Kashmir: Political Social, Culture from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, Delhi, Metropolitan Book Company, 1962.

BANERJEE, S., T. BOSE, D. MOHAN, G. NAVLAKA. *India's Kashmir War*, New Delhi, 1990.

BASU, D.D., *Commentary on the Constitution of India*, Calcutta, S.C. Sarkar and Sons, 1972.

BAZAZ, P.N., *The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, Cultural and Political, from the Earliest Times to Present Day*, New Delhi, Pamposh publications, 1954.

-----, *Democracy Through Intimidation and Terror*, New Delhi, 1978.

BELL, J. BOWYER, *A Time of Terror*, New York, Basic Books, 1978.

BHARGAV, G.S., *Success or Surrender? The Simla Agreement*, New Delhi, Sterling publications, 1972.

BHATTACHARJEA, AJIT, *Kashmir - The Wounded Valley*, New Delhi, UBSPD, 1994.

BHARGAVA, G.S., *Crush India*, Delhi, ISSD Publications, 1972.

- BUTT, S., *Kashmir in Flames*, Srinagar, 1981.
- CHAND, ATTAR., *Pakistan terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir*, Delhi, Amar Prakashan, 1991.
- CHAUDHARY, MRIGANKA.S INGH, *Terrorism as a Warfare Metaphor, An Analysis of Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir*, M.Phil. diss. cps.J.N.U, New Delhi, 1995.
- CHOPRA, V.D. at el., *Agony of Punjab*, New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1984.
- CLUTTERBUCK, RICHARD, *Guerrillas and Terrorists*, London, Faber and Faber, 1977.
- CRANSTON, MAURICE. W., *The New Left*, New York, The Library Press, 1971.
- CRENSHAW, MARTHA, *The Causes of Terrorism*, Comparative Politics 13, no.4, July 1981.
- , *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power - The Consequences of Political Violence*, Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1983.
-, "Introduction: Reflections of the effects of Terrorism" in *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power : The Consequences of Political Violence*. Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1983.
- CRELINSTEIN, RONALD, "Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and the threat of violence" in *Terrorism and Political Violence. Volume 1* No. 4, April 1989.
- DANG, SATYAPAL, *Genesis of Terrorism : An Analytical Study Of Punjab Terrorists*, New Delhi : Patriot Publishers, 1988.
- DEORA, M.S. & GROVER, R., *Documents on the Kashmir problem (15 Vol)*, New Delhi, Discovery Publishing House, 1991.
- ENGINEER, ASHGAR ALI (ed.), *Secular Crown on Fire*, Delhi, Ajanta Publication, 1991.

- FANON, FRANTZ., *Wretched of the Earth*, New York, Millwood, 1980.
- FAZILI, MANZOOR, *Kashmir Government and politics*, Srinagar, Gulshan Publications, 1982.
- FROMKIN , DAVID 1978 . "The Strategy Of Terrorism" , In *Contemporary Terrorism : Selected Readings* , edited by John D. Elliot et al., Gaithers burg, Maryland, International Association Of Chiefs Of Police.
- GAJENDRA GADKAR, P. B., *Kashmir Retrospective and Prospect*, Bombay, University of Bombay, 1967.
- GANAI, A.J., *Kashmir and National Conference Politics (1975-80)*, Srinagar, Jay kay books, 1984.
- GRABOSKY, P.N. 1979. "The Urban Context Of Political Terrorism ," In *The Politics Of Terrorism* , edited by Michael Stohl. New York : Marcel Dekker.
- GUPTA, RAKESH, (ED.), (I) *India's Security problem in the Nineties*, New Delhi, Patriot, 1989.
- GREEN, LESLIE. C., *Nature and Control of International Terrorism*, Alberta: University of Alberta, 1974.
- GREGORY, FRANK and PALMER, JOSEPH, *Ten Years of Terrorism*, New York, Crane Russak Co. 1979.
- GRIBBLE, LEONARD, *Hands of Terror*, London, Frederick Muller Ltd . 1960.
- HAMILTON , LAWRENCE C . 1978 *The Ecology Terrorism : A Historical and Statistical Study*," Ph. D . diss University Of Colorado.
- HANLE, DONALD J., *Terrorism The Newest Face of War*, Pergamon Brasseyo, International

Defence Publishers, 1989.

HARIOM, *Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir 1857-1925*, New Delhi, Pamposh 1986.

-----, *Debacle in Kashmir*, Delhi, Seema Publications, 1992.

-----, *Special Status in Indian Federalism*, Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi Seema Publications, 1983.

HOFFMAN, P., *Peace can be Won*. New York, Doubleday , 1951.

HUSSAIN, SYED T., *Reflections on Kashmir Politics*, Delhi, Rima Publishing House, 1987.

HUNTINGTON , SAMUEL P., *Transnational Organisations in World Politics*, World Politics 25, 1973.

JAFFER, S.M. (ed.), *Kashmir Sold and Resold*, New Delhi, Bookland India, 1993.

JAGMOHAN, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*, New Delhi, Allied Publications, 1991.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR SAHAYATIYA SAMITI *Genocides Of Hindus in Kashmir*, Suruchi Prakashan, 1991.

JENKINS , BRIAN MICHAEL, " International Terrorism : A Balance Sheet ," In *Contemporary Terrorism: Selected Readings* ed. John D. Elliot and Lesley K. Gibson, Gaithesburg, Maryland International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978.

JENKINS, BRIAN. M., *International Terrorism : New mode of conflict* , Los Angels: Crescent Press 1977.

JOSHI , CHAND, *Bhindranwale : Myth and Reality*, New Delhi , Vikas Publishing House, 1984.

JOSHI, D. K. , *A New Deal for Kashmir*, New Delhi, Ankur Publishing House, 1978.

- KAK, B.L., *Kashmir, Problems and Politics*, Delhi, 1981.
- KAPUR, M.L., *Studies in the History and Culture of Kashmir*, Jammu, Trikuta Publishers, 1976.
- KARIM, AFSIR, *Counter Terrorism - The Pakistan Factor*, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1991.
- KAUL, PYARELAL, *Crisis in Kashmir*, Srinagar, Suman Publications, 1990.
- KAUL, R.M., *Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah: A Political Phoenix*, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1985.
- KAUL, Lt.Gen. B. M ., *The Untold Story*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1967.
- KHAN, ABDUL QAYYUM, *Kashmir Problem Options for Settlement: A Geo-Political Analysis*, Muzaffarbad, 1989.
- KHAN, AKBAR, *Raiders in Kashmir*, Delhi, Army Publishers, 1993.
- KHURSHID, SALMAN, *Beyond Terrorism - New Hope for Kashmir*, New Delhi, UBSPD, 1994.
- KIRK , RICHARD M, *Political Terrorism and the Size Of Government : A Positive Institutional Analysis Of Violent Political Strategy*, Public Choice 40, 1983.
- KUMAR, D.P., *Kashmir, Pakistani's Proxy War*, Delhi, Har Anand Publication, 1991.
- KHURSHID, SALMAN, *Beyond Terrorism - New Hope For Kashmir* , New Delhi , UBSPD , 1994.
- KOUMIDI, *Kashmir :its cultural Heritage*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1952.
- KRISHNARAO, K.V., *Prepare or Perish*, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1991.

LAMB, ALASTAIR, *Crisis in Kashmir 1947-1966*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

----- *Kashmir - A Disputed Legacy*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1992.

LAQUEUR, WALTER, *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1977.

----- (ed.) *Terrorism Reader, A Historical Anthology*, Philadelphia, Little Brown and Company, 1978.

LIVINGSTONE, NELL C. (ed.) *The War Against Terrorism*, New York, Lexington Press, 1982.

MAHESHWARI, ANIL, *Crescent Over Kashmir*, Delhi, Rupa, 1993.

MARWAH, VED, *Uncivil Wars : Pathology of Terrorism in India*, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1995.

MYRDAL, GUNNAR, *Asian Drama - An Injury into Poverty of Nations*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1968.

MICKOLUS, EDWARD F., *Combatting International Terrorism : A Quatitative Analysis*, Ph.D. diss ., Yale University, 1981.

NANDA, K.K., *Conquering Kashmir - A Pakistani Obsession*, New Delhi, Lancers, 1994.

NANDA, RAVI, *National Security Perspective, Policy and Planning*, New Delhi, Lancers, 1991.

NARAYANAN, MK., *National security: The Internal Dimension*, RGIS, New Delhi, 1994

NAYAR, Lt. GEN. (Retd) V.K., PVSM, SM, *Threat from Within : India's Internal*

Security Environment, New Delhi , Lancer Publishers 1992.

NOORANI, A.G., *The Kashmir Question*, Bombay, Manaktalas, 1969.

-----, *Kashmir Question Revisited*, New Delhi, Centre for Policy Research, 1991.

PEER, GIYASUDDIN, *Understanding the Kashmir Insurgency*, Jammu, Jay Kay Book House, 1992.

PRADAN, DR. KAILAS. N., "Kashmir Society - New Contours", *Kashmir Times*, 13 November 1990.

RAINA, A.N., *Geography of Jammu and Kashmir*, 3rd Edition, New Delhi, 1981.

RAINA. DINA NATH, *Kashmir - Distortions and Reality*, New Delhi, Reliance Publishing House, 1994.

RAINA, D.N., *Unhappy Kashmir The Hidden Story*, New Delhi, Reliance Publishing House, 1990.

Ray, Arjun, Major General, VSM , *Kashmir Diary, Psychology of Militancy*, Manas Publications, 1997.

RUBENSTEIN, RICHARD E., *Alchemist of Revolution, Terrorism in the Modern World*, London, IB Tauris and Company 1987.

SAXENA, H.L., *The Tragedy of Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1975.

SCHMID , A.P., JONGMAN , A.J. at el., *Political Terrorism : A New Guide To Actors , Authors , Concept , Data Bases and Literatures* , New York , North Holland , 1988.

SEN , L.P., *Slender was the Thread, The Kashmir Confrontation , 1947-1948* , New

Delhi, Orient Longman, 1969.

SHARMA , B.L., *Kashmir Awakes*, New Delhi , Vihas Publishers , 1977.

SHARMA , DHIRENDRA (ed.), *India's commitment to Kashmir* , New Delhi, Philosophy and social action, 1994.

SHARMA, D. P., *The Punjab Story, Decade of Turmoil*. APH Publishing Corporation, 1996.

SHULTZ , RICHARD H ., at el., *Responding to the terrorist Threat : Security and Crisis Management* . New York : Pergamon Press, 1980.

SINGH, DARSHAN. ed. DANG, SATYAPAL., *Terrorism in Punjab, selected articles and speeches* Patriot Publishers , 1987, Pg27

SINGH, KHUSHWANT, *A History Of Sikhs*, Delhi, Oxford University Press , 1977.

-----, *My Bleeding Punjab*, U B S P D, 1992.

SINGH, HARBANS, *The Heritage of the Sikhs*, Asia Publishing House, 1964.

SINGH, SATINDER, *Khalistan, An Academic Analysis*, New Delhi, Amar Publications, 1982.

SINGH, TEJA and SINGH GANDA, *A Short History of the Sikhs, 1469 - 1765*, Vol 1, Bombay, Orient Longman, 1950 .

SINHA, ADITYA, *Death of a Dream, A Terrorist's Tale*, Harper Collins, 2000.

SINHA, S. K., *Operation Rescue Military Operations in J & K 1947-49*, New Delhi, Vision Books, 1977.

STEIN, M.A., (TRANSLATION)) (2 Vol) *Kalhan's Rajtarangini*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1961.

- STERLING, CLARE, *The Terror Network. The Secret War of International Terrorism*, New York, Reinhart and Winston, 1981.
- STOHL, MICHAEL (ed), *The Politics of Terrorism*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1977.
- SUFI, G.M.D., *Kashmir (2 Vol)*, New Delhi, Light and Life Publishers, 1974.
- TENG, M.K., *Kashmir Art. 370*, New Delhi, Anmol Publishers, 1990.
- THOMAS, RAJU G. C., *Perspectives on Kashmir The Roots of Conflict in South Asia*, Oxford, Westview Press, 1992.
- *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security*, Toronto, Lexington Books, 1983.
- *The Defence of India*, Delhi Macmillan Company, 1978.
- *Indian Security Policy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986.
- TRIVEDI, VIJAYA. R., *Facts about Kashmir*, New Delhi, Anmol Publications, 1990.
- THAPAR, ROMILA, *A History of India*, Delhi, Penguin Books, 1966.
- TIKOO, P. N., *Story of Kashmir*, New Delhi, Sterling, 1970.
- VAS, E.A., *Without Baggage, A Personal Account of the JK Operation October 1947- January 1949*, Dehradun, Natraj Publishers, 1978.
- WAKHLUK KHEMLATA and WAKHLU, O.M., *Kashmir Behing the White Curtain*, Delhi, Konark Publishing House, 1992.
- WANI, G.M., *Kashmir Problems and Prospects*, New Delhi, Ashish Publications, 1993.
- WARIKOO, K., *Central Asia and Kashmir : A Study in the Context of Anglo Russian Rivalry*, New Delhi, Light and life Publishers, 1989.

- Weinberg, Leonard., *Political Parties & Terrorists Groups*, London : Frank Cass, 1992.
- WILKINSON, PAUL, " Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence" in *Terrorism : Theory and Practice*, edited by Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press 1979.
- WILLIAMS, RUSHBROOK L. F., *The State of Pakistan*, London, Macmillan Company, 1962.
- WIRSING, ROBERT G., *India Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*, London, Macmillan Company, 1994.
- YASIN, MOHAMMED, et. al., *History of the Freedom Struggle in Jammu and Kashmir*, New Delhi, Light and Life Publications, 1980.
- YOUNGHUSBAND, FRANCIS, *Kashmir*, London, Adam and Charles Black, 1909.
- *Northern Frontier of Kashmir*, Delhi, Orient Publisher, 1973.

ARTICLES

- ARIF, MOHAMMED, "The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan India Relations 1972-1992", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Jan 1994.
- BAMAZAI, SANDEEP, "Was Sheikh Abdullah a Secessionist", *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, 17-23, August 1991.
- BAWEJA, HARINDER, "Kashmir Valley - The Challenge of the Vial", *India Today*, 1st September 1991.
- BHAGAT, ADITYA, "Islamic Radicalism in the Kashmir Valley", *Pioneer*, 19th May 1995.
- CHOPRA, PRAN, "A Process of Peace: Kashmir i & ii", *The Hindustan Times*, 15th August 1991.
- CHOPRA, SURENDRA, "Terrorism - The Apex of Violence - A Prolegomenon to its Causes", *India Quarterly*, Vol. 47 (4), Oct, - Dec. 1991.
- CLARE, MICHAEL T., "Subterranean Alliances - America's Proxy Network", *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 34, Summer Fall, 1989.
- DHAR, O.N., "Insurgency in Kashmir - The Pakistan Connection," *Himalaya Today*, Vol. 2 (4-5), March- August 1991.
- GANGULY, SUMIT, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69(5), Winter 1990-91.
- GIL, K. P. S., "Endgame in Punjab : 1988 - 93", *Faultlines : Writings on Conflict and Resolutions*, Vol - I, ICM - Bulwark Books, New Delhi, 1999.
- GUPTA, RAKESH, "Terrorism as a Warfare Metaphor", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XVI, No. 9, Dec. 1993.

----- "A Comparative Perspective on the Causes of Terrorism", *Journal of International Studies*, 35, A Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1998.

----- "India Towards a Political Economy of Inter-State Conflicts", *Faultlines : Writings on Conflict and Resolution*, Vol. 5, ICM - Bulwarks, New Delhi, 2000.

HUSAIN, ALTAF, "Ire in the Valley," *The Times of India*, 2nd February 1992.

JENKINS, BRIAN M., "The Other World War," *International Terrorism*, Nov. 1985.

JHA, PREM SHANKAR, "A Chance for Peace in Kashmir," *The Hindu*, 28th January 1995.

KALA, ARVIND, "The Battle Against Secession", *The Tribune*, 9th July 1991.

KASHMIR DOCUMENTS, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 43 (2), April 1990.

A SERIES OF ARTICLES, "Kashmir Today", *Seminar*, No. 392, April 1992.

KAUR, AMAR J., "More on Kashmir Dispute," *The Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 27 (3), 18th January 1992.

KHANDURI, CHANDRA B., "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem and an Approach to Solution", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 13 (6), September 1990.

KUMAR, SHARAT, "Kashmir - Challenges and Opportunity for Indian Polity," *Mainstream*, Vol. 28 (32), 2nd June 1990.

MALIK, GAURI B., "Erosion of Indian Nationalism and Democracy" in *Kashmir*, *The Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 26 (9), 7AP 1991.

MASANI, MINOO, "Kashmir - The Case for Self Determinism", *Radical Humanist*, Vol. 54(3), June 1990.

MERARI, ARIEL, "A Classification of Terrorist Groups", *Terrorism and International*

Journal, I, No. 3/4, 1978

MURALIDHARAN, SUKUMAR, "Thawing Trouble - New Questions in the Valley", *Frontline*, 24th March 1995.

NANDY, ASHISH, "Terrorism - Indian Style", *Seminar*, Annual, No. 401, Jan. 1993.

NOORANI, A.G., "Resolving the Kashmir Question", *Mainstream*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 19, 1st Ap. 1995.

SHERWANI, L.A., "Kashmir Accession to India Re-examined," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 43(2), April 1990.

SINGH, AMRIK, "Kashmir: Search for Identity," *Free Press Journal*, 7th August 1990.

VARSHNEY, ASHUTOSH, "India Pakistan and Kashmir: Autonomies of Nationalism," *Asian Survey*, Vol 31(II), November 1991.

VINAYAK, RAMESH, "A Shocking Setback", *India Today*, 31st May 1995.

VOHRA, SAHDEV, "Pakistan 1994," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, May 1995.

YONAH, ALEXANDER, "International Terrorism : National, Regional and Global Perspectives", *Journal of International affairs*, New York , Praeger Publisher, 1976.

NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS

Times of India

Pioneer

Hindustan Times

The Tribune

Kashmir Times

Asian Age

Telegraph

The Times

Indian Express

The Statesman

India Today

Frontline

Mainstream

Economic and Political Weekly

Terrorism : An International Journal

Journal of International Affairs

Seminar

Pak Horizon

Asian Survey

Illustrated Weekly

International Studies, SIS, New Delhi

Comparative Strategy, London

India Quarterly

Strategic Analysis

Man and Development, Chandigarh

Faultlines, New Delhi

Aakrosh, Noida

APPENDIX

GURMEJ SINGH

Gurmej had sympathy for the Khalistani terrorists. Terrorist leader Avtar Singh took away land forcibly from other peasants and gave that to Gurmej. In the course of his frequent visits to Gurmej's house, Avtar used the two daughter of Gurmej to satiate the sex-lust of his and his gang members.

When Gurmej protested, the enraged Avtar decided to finish his family completely. After forcing open the door, the terrorists, led by Avtar one time friend of Gurmej - coolly shot Gurmej four times. His wife was apparently trying to hide below the cot when the burst of bullets caught her. The bodies of the two daughters were slumped against the wall, their hands folded in supplication. Obviously they were begging for mercy. The two sons were shot while lying on a cot. The guest was killed in another room.

Lady teacher, Mahinder Kaur was killed along with her two daughters and another woman. Her son-in-law was with terrorists led by Ranjit Singh. Rana was a regular visitor to Kaur's house. In the process, he became friendly to her daughter. The girl's maternal uncle Jasbir, an army captain based in Chandigarh and a Punjab short story writer, persuaded the girl to sever connection with his gang. Jasbir took his niece to the comparative safety of Chandigarh cantonment. In revenge, Rana first killed the son-in-law and then wiped out Mahinder Kaur's family except that girl. Rana was now gunning for the girl.

DIDAR SINGH

Didar Singh, a terrorist trained in Pakistan, had surrendered to the police in Gurdaspur District. He had been trying to get out of the web of the Khalistani terrorists. He had returned from Pakistan after a two-year stay there. He had gone there after operation Bluestar. He was gunned down on January 31 by other terrorist.

Jinda is a smart young man of twenty. He graduated from government college, and after operation BlueStar became a militant. He was recognised in the very first crime committed by him. Since then he absconded. In March 1986, with the help of his family members and through the Sarpanch of his village, Sardar Darbhajan Singh, he made arrangements to surrender before the Dhariwal police officers, and even the day had been fixed. But somehow Tarseem Singh Kohad came to know of it. He went to his house and threatened to assassinate the whole of his family if he dared to surrender. He gave a similar threat to the Sarpanch in case he helped anybody else to surrender. Hence the idea of surrender was given up.

According to Jinda, after the operation Blue Star, Pakistan used to provide arms to terrorists in good quantity and would promise them all type of help. According to him all this fuss has been created by Pakistan. Though Jinda himself has never been to Pakistan but he was told by young men returning from Pakistan that all this mischief had been created by Pakistan.

He said that a few days back, some forty Sikh youngmen were able to enter Punjab from Pakistan. All of them belong to the Babbar Khalsa faction.

According to Jinda as he has disclosed everything to the police, he will be put to death by his companions. The government might forgive him but the extremists would never.

Talking about Khalistan, he conceded, "Khalistan may give the Sikh some solace from the religious point of view, but so far as economic gains are concerned, there will be none. I am personally against Khalistan but I favour more powers to the Sikhs and non interference by the government in their religious affairs. The Jodhpur detainees should be released and the army deserters should be rehabilitated. Those guilty of November 1984 riots should be punished according to the law of the land. Then and only then peace can be sorted in Punjab. The Sikh youth are annoyed mainly because the guilty of the riots are not

deliberately being punished".

Towards the end, he said, "An extremist is a teetotaler and a vegetarian".

Source : DANG, SATYAPAL., "Genesis Of Terrorism, An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists.", Patriot Publishers, 1988, Pg. 61-104.

MILITANT GROUPS IN J&K

As of 15 August 1999



Graphic by VINEY

Name of the group	Operating in J&K	Awaiting Infiltration	Under Training	Total
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	1630	1175	660	3465
HARKAT-UL-ANSAR*	1170	655	900	2725
HARKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN	595	385	245	1225
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA**	649	355	2090	3294
AL-BADR	200	250	190	648
AL-JEHAD	63	10		73
TEHRIK-UL-JEHADI ISLAM	66	45	205	316
TEHRIK-UL-MUJAHIDEEN	71	100	150	321
JKLF	36	nil	nil	36

Total number of groups : 22

* Harkat-ul-Ansar exists under its own name as well as under the name Harkat-ul-Jehad-i-Islami

**The largest numbers of foreign militants are under the banner of the Lashkar-e-Taiba

led to the exodus of nearly 3.5 waiz of Kashmir, on May 21,

MAP OF KHALISTAN



REIGN OF THE ARMS

PAKISTAN

NEPAL

KHALISTAN

CHANGED NAMES

DELHI = DASMESH NAGAR

CHANDIGARH = SATWANT NAGAR

PALAM AIRPORT = BAINI AIRPORT

SULTANPUR = NANAK NAGARI

ISSUING AUTHORITY =

PANTHIC COMMITTEE


COMMANDO FORCE PORT

LIKHCHOHAN FORCE PORT

GIANI JAGIR SINGH

KHALISTAN

SEA



Source - Sharma D.P., "The Punjab Story". APH Publications, 1996 Pg. 191