

**PARTITION OF THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT :
A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL LEGACIES.**

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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "PARTITION OF INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT : A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL LEGACIES", submitted by **OM PRAKASH** in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. This is his original work. We recommend that the dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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***TO
MY PARENTS
&
ALMIGHTY DIVINE BELOVED***

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Finally I bow to the omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient almighty and divine preceptor for his blessings.

New Delhi

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PREFACE

Today, when India and Pakistan, two prominent nations of South Asia, have already marched through the 50th year of its independence, the legacies which we are carrying today since partition of the sub-continent is a matter of special interest in the wake of a nuclear South Asia and throwing cold water on the hopes of peace loving people of the two countries by the civil-bureaucratic-military system of Pakistan by sending intruders in Kargil.

The main **objective** of the present study are:

- To **examine** how partition affected the geo-politics of the sub-continent.
- To **find out** the socio-political fall out of the partition.
- To **investigate** the refugee problem.

This study is also intended to test the following **hypothesis**:

- ❖ The **breaking** of a bigger state changes the strategic situation of the region as a whole.
- ❖ The **Indian** national Congress with a vision of a democratic, civil libertarian and secular India, based on a self-reliant egalitarian social order and an independent foreign policy helped India to emerge as a dynamic mature and largest democracy in the world.
- ❖ The **inheritance** of backward regions, lack of vision and a big army stood in the way of emergence of Pakistan as a civil-democratic state.
- ❖ Partition of a geographically or historically developed country creates unnatural boundaries, which lead to unending bilateral problems between the new states.

The present study is divided into five **chapters**.

Chapter—I provides the prelude to partition and the chain reaction which leads to the great divide. Chapter—II deals with the geo—political legacies i.e. all the outstanding contentious issues between India and Pakistan.

Chapter—III discusses the refugee problem exclusively.

Chapter—IV analyses the party system as well as the military and bureaucratic system of the two country.

Chapter—V links the whole issue with the current happenings.

The **data** for the study is drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include government publications and reports, autobiographies and military gazette etc. the secondary sources include books research articles, newspapers and seminar and conference papers.

CHAPTER ----1

BACKGROUND

India ,from centuries is the living example of having a composite culture. Even during the Mughal rule there was hardly any animosity between the Hindu and the Muslim populace . They lived in perpetual symphony and such vibrant tradition gave way to cultural synthesis. Thus came out a tradition which was neither 'Hindu' nor 'Muslim' but in its essence 'Hindustani'.

The British Sinister Design – The imperial British rulers were the great architect in the sense that they engineered a slow and tepid process of vertical division in the Indian society based on religion, which finally culminated in the form of unfortunate balkanization of a nation which had presumptuously faced numerous onslaught of foreign invasions from the thousands of years. Such skillful social engineering by the colonial masters gave a death warrant to united India and blew up the pathways of composite culture, leaving behind burning dusts and ashes.

The British rulers were neither the true friends of the Muslims nor the foes of Hindus; they were the true friends of British Imperialism and acted on the tested and tried maxim of 'Divide et Impera'. John Eliphinston , governor of Bombay (1853-1860) , wrote in a minute, "Divide et Impera was the old Roman motto and it should be ours". The early British economic and educational policies benefited the Hindus more than the Muslims. The British looked upon the Muslims as the chief conspirators in the revolt of 1857. The Wahabi movement confirmed their suspicion . The British government deliberately adopted the policy of suppressing the Muslims . However a change in British policy is perceptible towards the 1870's. The Hindus politically more advanced than the Muslims , demanded more share for Indians in higher services, agitated for grant of political rights, introduction of representative government , etc. The Hindu posed a serious menace to the stability of British rule in India than the politically , economically and educationally backward Muslim. This marked the beginning of a

change in British policy towards the two communities, which was worked by the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy.

A great alteration could be witnessed in the character of Syed Ahmed Khan , the propounder of Aligarh Movement . In the beginning he was the great advocate of Hindu—Muslim unity and described the Hindus and the Muslims as “ two eyes of a beautiful bride ,i.e. India”. In 1884 addressing a Punjabi Hindu audience he said , “ Every inhabitant of Hindustan is a Hindu and I am therefore sorry that you do not regard me as a Hindu.”

In contrast with his earlier views Sir Syed in a speech at Meerut on 16 March 1888 maintained that the Hindu and Muslims were not only two nations but as two warring nations¹ who could never lead a common political life , should ever the British quit India. Such change in attitude was in order to exhort Muslims to shun the Indian National Congress predominated by Hindus and to impress upon the British the need to view their importance in political rather than numerical terms. With the extension of the elective principle under Rippon’s reforms of 1882—83, the British granted separate electorates to Muslims in local government bodies . The Aligarh movement worked to instill into the minds of the Muslims a spirit of loyalty towards the British crown and worked consciously and deliberately to keep them away from the mainstream of Indian political life.

Separate electorate were incorporated in the 1909 Morley—Minto reforms and extended in the constitutional reforms of 1919. If playing Muslim communitarianism against Indian nationalism had its potential to misfire , playing the region against the center could secure British imperial interests . The main purpose of the reform was to confine Indian politics to the provinces, so that the unitary center could be kept under the exclusive purview of the British . Politics in provincial and local arenas meshed awkwardly with communally compartmentalized electorates . This structural contradiction was to haunt Muslim politics for the remainder of the colonial period . Not needing to compete with other Indians, Muslim politicians seeking election in religiously demarcated constituencies could focus wholly on their own co-religionists.

¹ M.A.H. Isphani in C.H. Philips(ed.) Partition of India, pp333.

The Muslim Backwardness—The socio-political and educational awareness came late to the Muslims which left them back in the race of gaining jobs and other favors in compare to a growing Hindu intelligentsia . But there were other reason also viz. British suppression on Muslims at post mutiny period and keeping them out of the army due to mistrust ; reduction of the importance of Arabic and Persian due to English education ; resentment against English education lead to the cultural backwardness and their exclusion from the administrative posts, and also the legal medical and other professions ; awakening of new English educated Hindu class.

Anil Seal , the doyen of Cambridge School opined that the Muslim community formed a block of peoples whose conditions were generally equal and whose solidarity was generally firm . Unevenness of socio-economic development produced disparities between Muslims in different provinces and between Muslims in the same provinces, just as it was doing between Hindus. In so shapeless, so jumbled a bundle of societies , there were not two nations , there was not one nation, there was no nation at all ,what was India ?---- a graveyard of nationalities and the mother of new nationalism struggling to be born .

TABLE---1: HINDU, MUSLIM REPRESENTATION IN U.P. PUBLIC SERVICES

| SERVICES | HINDUS | | MUSLIMS | |
|-----------------------------|--------|------------|---------|------------|
| | NUMBER | PERCENTAGE | NUMBER | PERCENTAGE |
| CIVIL | | | | |
| Executive service | 175 | 52.5 | 132 | 39.6 |
| Tahsildars | 106 | 54.99 | 84 | 43.6 |
| Naib Tahsildars | 117 | 55.9 | 87 | 44.1 |
| AGRICULTURAL | | | | |
| Class I | 9 | 64.2 | 3 | 24.4 |
| Class II | 32 | 76 | 5 | 12 |
| Subordinate | 401 | 73.4 | 137 | 25 |
| POLICE(DSP) | 28 | 56 | 14 | 28 |
| Inspectors | 105 | 46.4 | 68 | 30 |
| Sub-Inspectors | 1029 | 54.2 | 832 | 43.8 |
| Head constables | 898 | 35.2 | 1638 | 64.4 |
| EDUCATION | | | | |
| Class I | 11 | 73.3 | 4 | 26.7 |
| Class II | 78 | 73.6 | 14 | 13.2 |
| Judicial services | 159 | 72 | 55 | 25 |
| Civil surgeon | 25 | 83.3 | 4 | 13.3 |
| Medical officers | 78 | 75 | 21 | 20.1 |
| SERVICE OF ENGINEERS | | | | |
| Class I | 3 | 60 | 1 | 20 |
| Class II | 21 | 72.4 | 3 | 10.4 |
| Income Tax (Class I & II) | 24 | 61.5 | 12 | 30.7 |
| Forest service | 12 | 57 | 4 | 18.5 |

Source: Address by G.B. Pant to members of the UP Press Consultative Committee, 11 Jan. 1939.2\p & J\ 8\ 686, India Office Library Records.

From the above table we have to reckon with the fact that the Muslim grievances existed.

Chain Reaction : A series of chain reaction ² since 1917 further accentuated the crises. Jinnah's relegation from the center of nationalist politics consequent upon the simultaneous rise of the Pan-Islamists and emergence of Gandhi in Indian politics since 1919-20; the aggravation of communalist tendencies in politics both by the introduction of representative institutions under the 1919 reforms and the bitterness, frustration and confusion resulting from the collapse of non-cooperation --- Khilafat movement as well as abolition of Khilafat (1994). The steep and significant rise in the position and influence of the provincial Muslim political bosses in the Muslim majority areas in the north western and eastern region in the inter- war period ; the reluctance or inability of the Indian National Congress to strengthen the hands of the left faction of the Muslim League under Jinnah in the course of negotiations among the Indian political parties in the year 1926-28; the unilateral declaration by the congress of its political goal of Poorna Swaraj—all find in varying degrees of importance which played a latent but major role in shaping the future events.

It needs to be reiterated that 'communalism' or 'separatism', both in their latent and overt forms , did not always embrace large segments of society , they only touched limited groups in certain areas . Their impact was transient as groups embroiled in inter-religious feuds at a given moment could be seen living harmoniously at other times.

CONGRESS VERSUS JINNAH : The 1937 election in which out of 11 provinces the Indian National Congress emerged with a clear majority in six. The performance of Muslim League was worst. The revelation of the utter weakness of the League and Jinnah , positively diminished their importance to the Congress. For Jinnah the political reality of he post -1937 British India , that while Hindus would dominate in all the Hindu majority provinces , Muslim seemed unable to dominate even , the two largest Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal looked menacing . He now clearly saw the lack of any political choice other than turning the League into the third focus of

² S.R.Mehrotra in C.H. Philips (ed.) "Partition of India" , pp190.

power in India and the 'sole spokesman' for Muslims.³ Such orthodox perception led to a complete transformation of the mores of Jinnah's personality, ideology and policy and gave birth to his 'two-nation theory'.⁴ The religious slogans helped the Muslim League in reaching the Muslim masses over the head of the provincial leaders. Jinnah's task was further facilitated by the political exigencies arising from the second world war. The Congress intransigence drew the government closer to the League and made them realize the obvious importance of promoting Jinnah as the spokesman for the Indian Muslims. By 1940 Jinnah's emphasis on partition lowered the final curtain on any prospect of a single united independent India.⁵

The Congress claim to be the sole mouthpiece of the Indian opinion and the sole party to negotiate with the Raj, and an anxiety to secure their own position before their bargaining capacity with Pax Britannica deteriorated further. The result was seen in the consolidation of the Muslim League, the crystallization of the Muslim demands and the pitching of these demands on a very higher level. The demands were--- further constitutional arrangement should be made not on the basis of population but on the basis of communities, that the Muslims be treated on complete equality with the Hindus, and that no constitutional change be made without the consent and approval of the two communities. In basing demands on communities rather than parties, the Muslim League hoped to take advantage of the fact that the Hindu Mahasabha contested the Congress claims, while the scheduled caste still demanded to be treated separately. This was the first tangible step towards delineating the contours of the Pakistan demand. It was very much the outcome of the Congress ministries.

THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN : In December 1930 Muhammad Iqbal⁶, the renowned poet and philosopher, had asked the All-India Muslim League's council to endorse the call for the creation of a Muslim state in the north-west of India, including Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan. His ideas were ignored by most Muslim politicians but gained some momentum in the informal politics through the medium of

³ Ayesha Jalal, "Sole Spokesman", pp.39.

⁴ R. Coupland, "The Story of the British Raj" pp. 78-79.

⁵ Anita Inder Singh, "The origins of the Partition of India", 1936-47, (New Delhi, 1987) P. 239.

⁶ Shamloo, 'Speeches and statements of Iqbal' (Lahore, 1948), P.9.

the popular press. In 1933 they inspired Chaudhary Rahmat Ali⁷, a student at Cambridge, to invent the word 'Pakistan' meaning, the 'land of the pure'. Unlike Iqbal's scheme, which was strictly placed within the control of India, Rahmat Ali envisaged a confederations of Muslim states in the sub --
-continent linked to the original Pakistan, including all the Muslim countries in west and central Asia. By the late 1930s Iqbal and Rahmat Ali's ideas has been supplemented by a plethora of Muslim schemes, each looking in its own ingenious way to a solution of a minority community's political dilemma.

GAINING MOMENTUM OF PAKISTAN'S DEMAND : In March 1940, without specifying the exact geographical boundaries, the All India Muslim League at its annual session in Lahore formally demanded independent Muslim state in the north-west and the north-east of India on the grounds that Indian Muslims were a nation. As Jinnah noted in his address, the term nationalist has become a 'play of conjurers' in politics. The time has come for Muslims to reject the derogatory label of communalism, once and for all, and advance a vision of nationalism which was no less valid than that Congress. Rising from the ashes of the 1937 electoral debacle, this was Jinnah and the League's attempt to formally register their claim to speak for all Indian Muslims. The League drew strength from the rising tide of Muslim antipathy to the prospect of Congress rule at the all-India center.

Although there was no mention of either partition or Pakistan, the League's resolution maintained that all future constitutional arrangements be reconsidered since Indian Muslims were a nation and not a minority, as had been presumed in the past. After 1940, Jinnah argued that as there were at least two nations in India, a transfer of power would have to involve dissolution of the unitary center which was an artifact of British colonialism.

Due to League's claim to speak for all Indian Muslims, and political geography ensured that the Muslim nation would have citizens straddling the frontiers. Jinnah always maintained that the two main Muslim-majority provinces, Punjab and Bengal, would keep their existing boundaries with the large non-Muslim population. The

⁷ B.L. Grover, "A New look at Modern Indian History" (New Delhi, 1983) pp597.

calculation was that a Muslim state built around these provinces would remain part of a larger all-India whole in which minority Muslims outside the Muslim territory would be protected by the similar position that non-Muslim would have inside it. Jinnah's demand for Pakistan aimed at negotiating a new constitutional arrangement in which Muslims would have an equitable share of power at a center reconstituted on the basis of a partnership between two essentially sovereign states, Pakistan (representing the Muslims-majority provinces) and Hindustan (representing the Hindu-majority provinces).

Jinnah's resort to religion was the most practical way of mobilizing a community divided by politics. By keeping the League's demand for a 'Pakistan' vague and undefined, Jinnah could try and muster up as much Muslim support as possible to block Congress ambitions at the centre.⁸

Despite sharing popularity of Pakistan among Muslims, whether in the majority or minority provinces the league failed to effect control over Muslim-majority-province politicians, inside and outside the provincial legislature, as well as over the masses at the base. While this demand of Pakistan attracted many Muslims, it soured relations between the communities in Punjab and Bengal. Without the tacit agreement of non-Muslims in these two provinces, Jinnah could not palpably claim their undivided territories for Pakistan.

Pakistan was anathema for most non-Muslims in Muslim-majority provinces. There were repeated warnings from the governors of Punjab and Bengal, and also Assam. But neither Delhi nor London cared to expose the flaw in Jinnah and League's strategy, namely that Pakistan could entail partitioning Punjab and Bengal. This allowed Jinnah to concentrate upon building the League's strength in the Muslim-majority-provincial legislatures.

The re-constitution of the Governor-Generals's Executive council was proposed to be done by nominating all of them except the commander-in-chief from amongst leaders of Indian political life. The executive council was to have a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportion of Muslim and caste Hindus. Lord Wavell called a conference at Simla in June-July 1945 to sort out an

⁸ Bipin Chandra, "India's struggle for Independence (1857-1947)", 1988, pp431.

agreement between the Congress and the League . The Congress proposed to include two Congress Muslims out of its quota. But Jinnah insisted that all Muslim members of the council must be nominated by the League. Lord Wavell announced the breakdown of the conference giving the general impression that Mr. Jinnah had been given the veto to torpedo all constitutional advance in India.

In 1945-46 elections Jinnah and the League won all the Muslim seats to the central assembly , and polled seventy-five percent of the total Muslim vote cast in the provincial assembly election. In compare to 1937 elections it was a remarkable recovery . Electrified by the slogan for Pakistan , Muslim had not voted for a specific agenda because no agenda had been detailed. No one had a clear idea about the exact meaning of 'Pakistan' . The elections had been won by local leaders with whom the provincial League had struck alliances . These could crumble under the pressure of events over which Jinnah and the League had no control .

The Congress party formed government in all the Hindu majority provinces and the N.W.F.P. , while the League came in power in Bengal and Sind. In the Punjab a Unionist ministry was formed although the League was the single largest party.

The cabinet Mission comprising Lord Pethick Lawrence (secretary of state), Sir Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade) and Mr. A. V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty) reached India in March 1946. Meanwhile Prime Minister Atlee announced in the House of Commons that a minority could not be allowed to put a veto on the advance of the majority⁹.

The Cabinet Mission plan rejected the demand for Pakistan and suggested instead a central government in charge of Foreign Affairs , Defense and communication . It however conceded the Muslim League's demand half -way by grouping provinces of Madras , Bombay , Central Provinces, U.P. , Bihar, and Orissa to form Group A; Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab , N.W.F.P. and Sind to form group B; and Bengal and Assam to from Group C. The full autonomy to the provinces and the provision for Grouping gave to the Muslim League the substance of Pakistan.

Further, the Cabinet Mission plan laid down procedure for the election of a constitution-making body. In the election of the Constituent Assembly , the Congress

⁹ S.R. Mehrotra in C.H. Philips (ed) Partition of India . pp219.

won 199 of the 210 General seats , the League bagged 73 of the 78 Muslim seats. Mr. Jinnah maintained that Congress having support of 211 members out of 296 of the Constituent Assembly would place the Muslims at their mercy. He, therefore demanded two constitution-making bodies, one for the people of India and one for Pakistan.

Jinnah soon realized that a Pakistan with its own sovereign center would alone be capable of controlling the Muslim provinces. But a sovereign Pakistan had to include undivided Punjab and Bengal if it was to receive a larger share of the center's assets. Without some such bargaining weight Jinnah could not hope to negotiate the broader all-India arrangements. By withdrawing from the Cabinet Mission plan , the Muslim League in a desperate bid to achieve Pakistan observed 16 August , 1946 as ' Direct Action Day'¹⁰. The great Calcutta killing' which began that day and continued until 20 August left a few thousand Hindus and Muslims dead. In early September the Congress joined an interim government at center , while the Muslim League stayed out. After the League joined the interim government in October , the two sets of ministers remained at odds with one another. Meanwhile relations between religious communities deteriorated sharply in various regions of India. The British authorities were worried that they had lost control over the 'Frankenstein monster' they had helped to create but felt , it was too late to tame it . They were frightened into appeasing the League by Jinnah's ability to unleash civil war. Jinnah joined the interim government because it realized that it was fatal to leave the administration in Congress hands and had sought a foothold in the government to fight for Pakistan.

THE DIVIDED HOME: By early 1947 London's main priority was to get out of India as quickly as possible before anti-colonial politics became more radicalized than they already were, and before communal violence reached even more dangerous levels. Throughout the country there were reports of peasant , labour and youth unrest. On 20 February 1947 the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee ¹¹, announced that the British would depart from India by 30 June 1948. The Hindu Mahasabha immediately demanded the partition of Punjab

¹⁰ C. Khaliqzaman, Path Ways to Pakistan, 1961, p153

¹¹ B.R.Nanda in C.H.Philips (ed) Partition of India pp 171.

and Bengal . The Congress also echoed the similar demand and suggested that the principal of partition might have to be extended to Bengal as well. Such was the situation in which Lord Mountbatten came to India as Viceroy. He was the last Viceroy and charged with the task of winding up the Raj by 30th June 1948. Mount batten has a clear cut directive from His Majesty's Government to explore the option of unity and division till October 1947.

Mountbatten soon discovered that he had little real choice. Jinnah was obdurate that the Muslims would settle for nothing less than a sovereign state. Mountbatten found himself unable to move Jinnah from this stand. He gave the impression that he was not listening . He was impossible to argue with.¹²

The British could keep India united only if they gave up their role as mediators trying to effect a solution Indians had agreed upon. Unity needed positive intervention in its favour, including putting down communal elements with a firm hand. This they choose not to do. They in fact took the easy way out. A serious attempt at retaining unity would involve identifying with the forces that wanted a unified India and countering those who opposed it. Rather than doing that , they preferred to woo both sides into friendly collaboration with Britain on strategic and defense issues.

Mountbatten's formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity. The country would be partitioned but so would Punjab and Bengal , so that the limited Pakistan that emerged would meet both the Congress and League's positions to some extent. The League's position on Pakistan was conceded to the extent that it would be created , but the Congress position unity would be taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible. Since Congress were asked to concede their main point i.e. a unified India , all their other point would be met . Whether it was ruling out independence for the princes or unity for Bengal or Hyderabad's joining up with Pakistan instead of India , Mountbatten firmly supported Congress on these issues. He got His Majesty's Government to agree to his argument that Congress goodwill was vital if India was to remain in the commonwealth.

The Mountbatten plan , as the 3rd June 1947 Plan came to be known , sought to effect an early transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status to two successor

¹² M.N.Das , "Partition and Independence of India : Inside Story of Mountbatten Days" , 1982 , p62.

states, India and Pakistan. Congress was willing to accept Dominion Status for a while because it felt , it must assume full power immediately and meet boldly the explosive situation in the country. For Britain , Dominion Status offered a chance of keeping India in the Commonwealth.¹³

The rationale for the early date for transfer of power , 15th August 1947, was securing Congress agreement to Dominion Status. The additional benefit was that the British could escape responsibility for the rapidly deteriorating communal situation¹⁴. As Patel said to the Viceroy , the situation was one where ‘ you won’t govern yourself , and you won’t let us govern’. Mountbatten was to defend his advancing the date to 15th August , 1947 on the ground that things would have blown up under their feet had they not got out when they did .

Although the abdication of responsibility was callous , but the speed with which it was done made it worse. The seventy-two day timetable , 3rd June to 15th August 1947 , for both transfer of power and division of the country was to prove disastrous. The partition council had to divide assets , down to typewriters and printing presses , in a few weeks.¹⁵

THE MACABRE DANCE: The Punjab massacres that accompanied partition were the final indictment of Mountbatten. His loyal aide, Ismay , wrote to his wife on 16th September 1947 : ‘our mission was so very nearly a success : it is sad that it has ended up such a grim and total failure’.¹⁶The early date , 15th August 1947 , and the delay in announcing the Boundary Commission Award , both compounded the tragedy . A senior Army official , Brigadier Bristow , posted in Punjab in 1947 , was of the view that the Punjab tragedy would not have occurred had partition been deferred for a year or so. The Boundary Commission Award was ready by 12th August 1947, but Mountbatten decided to make it public after Independence day , so that the responsibility would not fall on the British. Independence Day in Punjab saw strange scenes. Flags of both India and Pakistan were flown in villages between Lahore and

¹³ V.P.Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* , 1957 , p226.

¹⁴ Bipin Chandra , “ *India’s struggle for Independence (1857-1947)*” , 1988, pp499

¹⁵ Bipin Chandra , “ *India’s struggle for Independence (1857-1947)*” , 1988, pp498.

¹⁶ Percival Griffiths , *Modern India (1957)* , p85.

Amritsar as people of both communities believed that they were on the right side of the border. The morrow after freedom was to find them aliens in their own homes.

THE INEVITABLE: Why the Congress , wedded to a belief in one Indian nation, accepted the division of the country, remains a question difficult to answer . Why did Nehru and Patel advocate acceptance of the 3rd June Plan and the Congress working committee and the A.I.C.C. pass a resolution in favor of it? Most surprising of all , why did Gandhi acquiesce? Nehru and Patel's acceptance of Partition has been popularly interpreted as stemming from their lust for quick and easy power.

The reality is that Nehru , Patel and Gandhi in 1947 were only accepting what had become inevitable because of the long-term failure of the Congress to draw in the Muslim masses into the national movement and stem the surging waves of Muslim communalism , which since 1937 , had been beating with increasing fury. The most unreal belief , that partition would be peaceful. No riots were anticipated , no transfer of population planned , as it was assumed that once Pakistan was conceded , what was there to fight over? The hope was that madness would be exorcised by a clear surgical cut . But the body was so diseased , the instrument used infected and the operation proved to be terribly botchy.

The root of Gandhiji's helplessness was neither Jinnah's intransigence nor his disciples alleged lust for power , but the communalisation of his own people. At his prayer meeting¹⁷ on 4th June 1947 he explained that Congress accepted partition because the people wanted it . It was the 'Hindus' and 'Sikhs' desire for partition that rendered him ineffective. The Muslims already considered him their enemy. Gandhiji saw the inevitability of partition walked bravely into the AICC meeting on 14 June , 1947 and asked Congressmen to accept partition as an unavoidable necessity in the given circumstances , but to fight it in the long run by not accepting in their hearts. He did not accept it in his heart and kept alive his faith in his people. He choose to plough a lonely furrow walking barefoot through the villages of Noakhali.¹⁸

¹⁷ Gandhi , Autobiography (1957) , p441.

¹⁸ The Times of India , August 20 , 1947.

THOSE WHO OPPOSED PARTITION: There is no doubt that several group opposed the partition plan . The socialists , the Congress Muslims , the ulema in the Jamait-al-ulema , the Ahrars, the Shias , the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Momins repudiated the two nation theory and doggerdly adhered to their vision of a united India. The all India Ahrar conference held in 1943 and 1945 and the Momin conference held in 1945 denounced Jinnah's plan to divide the country.¹⁹

The British rulers had won the war against Hitler , but lost the one in India. Their withdrawal from India was not destined towards any philanthropic or good humoured proclivity. In fact domestic and international circumstances obliged them to leave. Hitherto un-politicized areas had apolitical groups had fallen in line with the rest of the country in the agitation over the INA trials. Men in the armed forces and bureaucracy openly attended meetings , contributed money , voted for the Congress and let it be known that they were doing so. The nationalist sentiment was subdued deeply and the nationalist movement eroded imperialist hegemony, gnawed at the pillars of the colonial structure and reduced British political strategy to a mess of contradictions. When the loyalists began to jump overboard, when prestige was rocked , when the district officer and secretariat official left the helm , it became clear that the ship was sinking. The policy of Indianization ended British domination of the ICS and by 1939 British members had achieved parity and so manpower shortage was one of the main reason of their withdrawal. The British had realized over the years on a twin policy of conciliation and repression to contain the growing national movement. But after the 1942 Cripps offer , there was little left to be offered except full freedom. On the international front the USA and USSR put pressure on British to provide full freedom to the Indians. Being tired and weekend by the second world war Britain thus , finally sought to a graceful withdrawal from India.

Infact, the Independence- -partition duality reflects the success –failure dichotomy of the anti- imperialist movement led by the Congress. However several social , cultural, mental and moral shackles were yet to be broken. A bunch of domestic as well as external problems were waiting to be solved due to the partition and burden of these legacies were to be fell on the shoulders of the coming generation.

¹⁹ H.V.Hodson , The Great Divide ,pp356.

CHAPTER TWO

GEO—POLITICAL LEGACIES

Fredrich Ratzel, considered to be the father of geopolitics maintained in a paper titled “The laws for the Spatial Growth of a Nation State,” that a nation state is a living entity, a living organism and its core areas and boundaries or peripheral areas are organically linked together. He emphasized that the borders and the boundary are the peripheral organs of a nation state and are also the bearer of its growth as well as its fortification and play an important role in the transformation of the state.

In order to understand the Geo-political alterations produced by the partition of the Indian sub-continent, it will be imperative to define such terms viz. boundary, border, frontier etc. **Boundary** is a line of demarcation, based on political agreement or geographical features that determine the limits of legal and administrative jurisdiction of a sovereign independent state. It is legally defined and accepted by international community.¹ **Border** is the area that extends inwards from the boundary or the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The depth of the border may vary upon the terrain and the geopolitical location of the area concerned. **Frontier** is generally treated as a troubled area along the boundary where the writ of the government has softened to be enforced by force of arms. To sum up, boundary is to be defended in times of war. Border has to be patrolled in times of peace to prevent illegal immigration and to control smuggling, drug trafficking etc. Frontier needs to be consolidated by evolving appropriate socio-economic and political policies.

In Indian sub-continent the boundaries are the product of Partition, colonial legacies and agreements. But unlike the antecedent boundaries of third world countries, the boundaries of the Indian sub-continent belong to the category of superimposed boundary, that is, these boundaries are fixed on already socio-economically developed areas, and

¹ R.C.Sharma in D.K.Arya (ed) “Management Issues and Operational Planning for India’s borders”, PP.39

tend to be artificial in nature and connotation. The case of the boundary between East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) and West Bengal is important in this respect where a well unified cultural and linguistic area of the sub-continent is unnecessarily divided . The very character of superimposed boundaries is such that they posed border issues in different forms at various points of time.

Water is a significant geo-political element in the politics of the sub-continent . The water disputes which are also linked with the partition legacies must be seen within the border framework of border disputes.

Among the various geo-political problems inherited from the partition, one is the problem of security. Except external aggression various kinds of threats are challenging our national security and integrity viz.-

- 1) external support to various secessionist and insurgent movement ;
- 2) intervention in the internal affairs of a nation including manipulation of its economic policies and economic exploitation ;
- 3) transgression in territorial waters and the extended economic zone ;
- 4) denial and withholding of various resources such as food , oil ,technology, various raw materials. These are non-military to the security and well being of nations , and
- 5) manipulation of neighbors and their policies against the interest of a particular nation.

BORDER DISPUTES :

The partition of India has added a new dimension to our border issue, both strategically and geographically. The colonial legacies have frequently caused situation of conflict in the sub-continent. Several boundary disputes have resulted in actual wars.

The territorial boundary disputes in the sub-continent exists in relation to the nature of boundaries as well as the process of boundary making .In 1947 India acquired boundaries which has no exact coincidence with those of any pre-colonial state in the sub-continent. It had problem of consolidation not only in its areas but also on its periphery , and in recent times it has to face serious questions of assimilation leading to situations of revolt.

SIR CREEK ISSUE :

The Indo-Pakistan boundary represents the political division of a single geographical , ecological and economic region with all the resultant incongruities , anomalies and irrationalities. The Indian Independence Act of 1947, allocated Sindh to Pakistan and south of Sindh principalities like Kutch , Sulgam , Tharad and Santalpur acceded to India and thus the boundary between Sindh and Kutch became an international boundary between India and Pakistan. Soon India and Pakistan had a different view about the location of the boundary through the Rann of Kutch . The unprovoked attack by Pakistan on Sardar post in April 1965 caused considerable consternation. Soon due to an understanding between the two sides the boundary extended from mouth of Sir-Creek in the west to east terminal at the tri-junction of Gujrat , Rajasthan and Hyderabad.

Sir-Creek is a 60 mile long estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch , separating Gujrat from the Pakistani province of Sindh . According to Pakistan , the entire Sir-Creek with its eastern bank defined by a “green line” and represented on a 1914 map , belongs to it. India disputes this . According to New Delhi, the “green line” on the 1914 map is an “indicative ribbon line” . On the contrary , the boundary is defined by the “mid-channel” of the Creek as shown on a 1925 map. Boundary pillars have been created in the middle of the creek , indicating the frontier line.

The dispute hinges on the demarcation of the boundary from the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek and from the top of Sir Creek eastwards to a point on land designated as ‘Western Terminus’ . The boundary thereafter has been fixed.

In recently² held talk on Sir Creek issue India rejected Pakistan’s bid to internationalize the Sir Creek issue , reiterating that all differences between New Delhi and Islamabad after the Simla accord have to be resolved bilaterally .Both agreed to continue discussions. The demarcation of the frontier in this area has major consequences. Most importantly , this border , once defined , can be the basis of determining maritime boundaries which are usually drawn as extensions on sea from reference points on land. Maritime boundaries help in defining the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelves. The EEZs which extend to 200 nautical miles can then be subjected to commercial exploitation.

² The Hindu, Nov.9,1998.

The demarcation of the maritime boundaries has acquired fresh urgency on account of the likely presence of oil and gas along the sea bed in this zone.

Given the commercial importance of the area , Pakistan is insisting on defining the extremity of its land frontier in the Sir Creek area in the manner which will give it control over a larger EEZ. The Pakistani EEZ will be enlarged by around 250 square miles in case India accepts the green line showing Sir Creek's eastern bank as the land boundary for drawing maritime frontiers. Islamabad has rejected the mid-channel principle as proposed by India , pointing out that this principle applies only to "navigable channels". Sir Creek according to it is not a navigable channel.

Keen to arrive at an early resolution of maritime boundaries , India has proposed a new formulation which de-links the charting of maritime frontiers from fixing the land boundary in Sir Creek. India proposed that the two sides should delimit the maritime boundaries from the "seaward" side. The two sides can proceed towards the land from the extremity of the EEZ limit to a "mutual acceptable limit". This limit can be governed by the internationally recognized Technical Aspect of Law of Sea (TALOS).

Pakistan , however, has rejected this approach insisting instead that the determination of the land boundary in the Sir Creek area and fixing its maritime borders are inseparable. Pakistani sources said foreign oil companies will not move into the area unless the disputes over maritime boundaries with India was fully resolved.

Pakistan while emphasizing the 1914 map , was overlooking the basis on which several such maps had been made. Sources pointed out that a ruling in 1913 of the Government of Bombay which resolved the dispute on Sir Creek between the then MahaRaja of Kutch and the ruler of Sindh was the basis for making several sequential maps. The ruling was subsequently endorsed as a resolution by the Government of India in 1914.

The mid-channel principle on Sir Creek was endorsed by "Para 9 and Para 10" of the 1914 resolution. This was represented in the final map of 1925 by the "proper boundary symbols".

Rejecting the Pakistani claim that the creek was non-navigable and therefore not conducive for commercial use , India asserted that the channel could be used for navigation during the entire year, especially during high tide. Pakistani official

acknowledged that unlike India , Islamabad was yet to complete the hydrographic survey between Gujrat and Sindh.

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO :

Pakistan's most serious problem of frontier policy is with regard to Kashmir. Kashmir issue remains exactly as it was when Lord Mountbatten left India , despite three wars between the two countries. The Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir , has given the region a rather complex political structure. Ladakh and the bulk of Jammu , Poonch and the Kashmir valley are in Indian hands. Pakistan holds small portions of Jammu , Poonch and Kashmir sectors. Mirpur , Poonch and Muzaffarabad now form Azad Kashmir which is not formally a part of Pakistan, though very closely related to the Pakistan Government. Gilgit and Baltistan and political agencies which are not formally Pakistan's territory, though administered by Pakistan . Kashmir concerns not only India and Pakistan but also China, which attaches great geo-political significance to Aksai chin . The present de facto frontier between India and Pakistan across the west of the state is identical with the cease fire line fixed in 1949. A direct cause of open war between India and Pakistan in 1965, the subject of repeated abortive references to the UN security council , the task of a succession of failed international mediators , the confrontation over Jammu and Kashmir has remained a fatal obstacle to lasting friendly relations between two countries.

The Indo-Pak boundary including the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is accepted by all except in the area around the Siachen Glacier , where the armed forces of both sides are trying to establish a de facto line of actual control even after 50 years of the first Kashmir war. The Simla agreement ³ Clause-IV section – II says in Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 1971 shall be represented by both sides. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally , irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretation .

On Kashmir , the main elements of the problem lies in the insistence of Pakistan on the two-nation theory and India's rejection of it, the insistence of Pakistan on self

³ K.K.Mojumdar in R.C.Sharma (ed) India's Borders, PP.119

determination for their co-religionists in Kashmir , and India's rejection of the principal in the form in which Pakistan asks for it. Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite conducted by an impartial authority under the auspices of United Nations and India's denial of this demand as constituting a serious infringement of her sovereignty; Pakistan's adherence to the west sponsored military pacts and her reliance on a UN settlement of the problem and India's policy of non-alignment and the basic distrust of the U.N. Security Council. For India Kashmir is not a problem in the sense that its possession can be discussed with any state. It is part of India legally and politically. For Pakistan the integration of Kashmir with India is legally invalid.

India has not accepted plebiscite in Kashmir , for that would lead to revival of communal sentiment and the two-nation theory . India feels that there has been a change of conditions , which have completely ruled out a plebiscite. The changed conditions were caused by the acceptance of the U.S. military aid by Pakistan ,its adherence to the military pacts like SEATO and the CENTO , which threatens India's security, the overthrow of democracy in Pakistan , the Chinese aggression in Laddakh , the consolidation of its aggression by Pakistan and the vast strides of progress made by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.⁴Even a scheme of partition-cum-plebiscite were ruled out , accordingly the state of Jammu and Kashmir save the valley , was to be partitioned between India and Pakistan and there was to be a plebiscite in the Kashmir valley. This suggestion had come from Sir Owen Dixon , but was not mutually acceptable to India and Pakistan . The main difficulty arose over the conduct and the organization of plebiscite. Pandit Nehru's suggestion to Lord Birdwood⁵that the people should elect an intelligent representative group , which could then take the decision on their behalf , was not acceptable to Pakistan. It was suggested that a sort of condominium of India and Pakistan over Kashmir be established, accompanied by a guaranteed neutrality of the world powers in the affairs of the state. But due to a proxy, war situation between the two countries such possibilities are not practicable.

⁴ Asian Recorder, 1958, Vol. IV, No. 37, pp. 2226-2227

⁵ Birdwood , 'Two Nations and Kashmir', p. 201

The Kashmir , question has been the outcome of the original sin i.e. agreement on a cease-fire in Kashmir by India without getting the whole of Kashmir. Once we were in war, we were entitled to the fruits of victory. But once we committed the mistake, we must accept its natural logic. The present situation ⁶ is such that India cannot hope to occupy the Pakistan occupied Kashmir, nor can the Indian administered Kashmir be occupied by Pakistan without a major showdown between the two countries which will be disastrous to both India and Pakistan in the wake when both have acquired nuclear weapons and probability of its use could not be denied, and if it happens the annihilation of millions of millions of lives in both the country will be an ultra-tragic episode.

Siachen the highest and most expensive battlefield of the world lies in the most inhospitable Karakoram high terrain. It is spread over a length of about 74 kilometer and the width varies between 2 to 8 kilometer.

Recurrence of clashes between India and Pakistani forces signifies its geo-strategic importance. Its location near the meeting place of international boundaries of India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan is enough to impart unparalleled significance to it. The greatest enemy here is weather. Scarcity of oxygen, near -43 degree Fahrenheit temperature, blinding blizzards that can last days are the greatest killer. Indian army dominates most of the heights along the Saltoro ridge with an avowed aim to maintain the natural boundary to serve as an extension of the line that divides most of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The 1949 Karachi agreement drew the ceasefire upto the map coordinate NJ 9842 at the southern foot of the Saltoro range. The line ends here. Pakistan says that it has all along controlled the area from NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. In 1963 Pakistan ceded 1544 sq. miles of Siachen area to China. This was vehemently condemned by India. A strong Indian base at the foot of the Siachen glacier has given vantage point to India over this vast icy territory. There is a need of fresh discussion for a new line of demarcation which must begin at NJ 9842.⁷ Before doing so the army must pull back from the region of conflict. India has proposed a cease

⁶ Times of India (New Delhi) 8 October 1998.

⁷ Arya & Sharma (ed.) "Management Issues and Operational planning for India's Borders", p. 149

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fire to be followed by a thinning out of forces in the Saltero area as a prelude to final demarcation beyond NJ 9842 but Pakistan has rejected the proposal.

It is high time to think over the issue seriously. Innumerable loss of men and material by both side and high expenditure to carry on things e.g. one liter of kerosene oil costs 400 rupees to carry on at this height , and per day Indian expenditure of Rs. 3 crore obliges us to come on the table to sort out the differences.

The need to solve these contentious issues is imperative by being realistic. The present cease fire line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir should be frozen. Both India and Pakistan will have to renounce their claim on whole of the Jammu and Kashmir. In such solution no one will be a loser or can claim victory in the real sense.

PARTION OF PUNJAB :

The demand of partition of Punjab came in the forefront after the issue of the Draft Declaration by Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942. The Draft greatly alarmed the Sikhs in Punjab because it meant that Punjab being Muslim majority province in which the Sikhs , the Hindus were to be under perpetual Muslim domination. So Master Tara Singh met Cripps in 1942 talked about the possible division.

In the Punjab elections of 1946 proved to be a turning point. The Muslim league secured 73 seats of the Punjab Legislative Assembly out of 85 seats contested. Unionist Party won 19, Congress 51, Akalis 21 and Independents 11.⁸ Despite Muslim League's victory Sir Khizar Hyat Khan formed a coalition ministry with the support of Akali and the Congress.⁹ This had an adverse effect on the Muslims of the Punjab. They insisted on inclusion of Punjab as one of the province of Pakistan. This further emboldened the Sikh demand for division of Punjab.

Lord Mountbatten also was convinced that any attempt to impose mainly one community's government on the Sikh's would produce immediate armed retaliation which might end in civil war. The Sikh struggled hard to extend the western boundary of Punjab. They had already demanded river Chenab to be the boundary line which was argued by their representative before the Punjab Boundary Commission. Justice Teja

⁸ Singh , Kartar Giani , 'A case for a Sikh Hindu Province in the Punjab' Delhi, 1946, p.9

⁹ The Times of India , September 12 , 1946

Singh who was member of the Punjab Boundary Commission suggested the following boundary line: "I would draw the north-western boundary of the eastern Punjab along the river Chenab from where it enters the Punjab going right upto Kharki and from their turn to the right bank of the lower Chenab canal upto Naiwara, there follow the bank of the Rakh branch upto the Lyallpur district , go along the present boundaries between the Lyallpur and Montgomery districts, turn to Channu then following first the present western boundary of the Montgomery district and then upto the banks of the river Sutlej and the present southern boundary of the Montgomery district come to Sulemanki where the districts of Ferozepur and Montgomery and the Bahawalpur state join.

So finally the Radcliffe Award, gave to East Punjab the whole of Jullandhur and Ambala divisions, and the Amritsar district of the Lahore division together with a few tehsils of the Gurdaspur and Lahore districts. East Punjab obtained control over three of the five rivers of the united Punjab; the Beas , Sutlej and the upper waters of the Ravi. About 38% of the area and 45% of the population were assigned to East Punjab.

West Punjab obtained 62% of the area and 55% of the population, together with a major share of the sources of income of the United Province. The loss of Lahore as well as the canal colonies of Shiekhpora, Lyallpur and Montgomery, caused immense grief to the Sikhs. The muslims were deeply hurt by not getting the entire Lahore Division.

PROBLEM OF SECURITY:

The problem of national security, for a country like India, which has experienced a series of catastrophes from within and constant threat from without, has to be formulated in terms of the larger goals and aspirations. Briefly there are three such objectives: national stability and integrity; social political and economic progress and peace and stability in our relations with other states. The problem of national security must be seen in terms of these larger goals. This may be called the cultural dimension of the problem.

India having a boundary line of 15200 kilometer, covering seventy districts with total area of 6,58,500 square kilometer including 37,555 square kilometer area in Ladakh under illegal occupation of China. The situation has got many a time aggravated on account of external influence resulting in subversion, terrorism, smuggling and drug-trafficking posing serious problems.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA'S SECURITY:

There are fundamental differences in the make up of India and Pakistan. India's perception of threat from Pakistan can be considered under the following headings:

(A) Ideological threat: Pakistan's ideological threat to India is not so much because Pakistan is a theocratic state and has declared itself as an Islamic Republic, but because of Pakistan's claim to be the symbol of the aspirations of the Muslim community in the sub-continent. Pakistan continues to believe and propagate that the Muslim population in India suffers from "Hindu domination",¹⁰ despite the exploding myth of two nation theory and the creation of Bangladesh in Pakistan in 1971.

(B) Conventional Nuclear Military Threat: The Pakistani armed forces have gone a four-stage equipment and modernization program. The first phase was between the early 50's and early 60's when, as a result of the agreement with the United States and also by virtue of its membership of CENTO and SEATO, Pakistan armed forces began receiving equipment, supplies and training from the United States and Britain.

The second phase during the early 70's, witnessed a massive supply of Chinese military equipment such as tanks and aircraft. China also assisted Pakistan, in establishing certain defense production facilities.

The third phase during 80's was the period when Pakistan acquired arms from west European markets, with financial assistance extended by some of the oil rich Arab states. This was also the period, when Pakistan raised new divisions.

Presently the Pakistan army is in *the fourth stage* when a US sponsored rearmament of Pakistan armed forces is on. Not only this but China is also assisting Pakistan in supplying arms.

With the current nuclear explosions by both India and Pakistan at Pokhran and Chagai Hills respectively, both the countries have achieved parity in nuclear weapon system and the security problem has become more and more sensitive and acute. Any mistaken step by any of the country could trigger a nuclear war in the region which could result in the complete destruction of the millions of lives and property. Although some

¹⁰ U.S. Bajpai (ed.) "India's security", pp.73

experts opined that since both the country's have achieved nuclear deterrence, so any possibility of a future war has been minimised. But none can deny that the kind of conventional superiority that India enjoyed has been neutralised.

(C) Interventionary Threat: Pakistan fell prey to the cold war logic of military alliances and became a part of the global power struggle. The invocation of American power and support helped Pakistan to build up a military machine disproportionate to its own need and resources: that considered necessary to attain an artificial parity with India.

In the sixties, as the Pakistani base became increasingly irrelevant for the United States, Pakistan invoked China as a countervailing factor to India. Not only did China help Pakistan a great deal militarily and diplomatically, but it also established a permanent strategic link with the sub-continent by commissioning of the Karakoram highway.¹¹ Pakistan established expensive military linkages with many countries in the middle-east. These linkages paid rich dividends for Pakistan in the past conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971. Libya, Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia had passed on American military equipment to Pakistan sometimes even at official U.S. instance.

Currently again China is assisting Pakistan in developing missile system. The Haft-1 and Haft-2 missile is considered the Chinese version of the M-11 missile. Besides it Ghauri, Ghaznavi, Abdali; all the missiles were developed by Pakistan due to clandestine support for technology and equipment by China. The assistance for nuclear enriched uranium by China to Pakistan, finally made Pakistan a nuclear power.

(D) Threat of diplomatic containment: Pakistan's attempt to contain India diplomatically has been manifested by overtly and covertly encouraging other sub-continental nations to keep up a level of confrontation with India. This naturally vitiates the evolution of a state of good neighbourly relations. Pakistan has done its bit to tarnish India's image both in the western and the Arab world. Its Islamic connections and its pro-western orientations have been useful in the pursuit of this diplomatic objective of checkmating India.

¹¹ P.S.Jaya Ramu, "India's National Security and Foreign Policy", 1987 p.172

(E) Threats arising out of internal instability: Today there is a chorus of public opinion, specially on a post Chagai Pakistan and the imposing economic sanctions by U.S. and other powers. Pakistan whose economy runs mostly on foreign aid is passing under a critical situation. The probability of internal instability due to economic strife could be detrimental not only for Pakistan but for India as well. The growing internal dissension could trigger an ethnic conflict in Pakistan. The economic unrest, unemployment, uneven development in Pakistan all could act as a catalyst to inflame the situation and India could not be unaffected by it. Pakistan, as it did in the past , might in order to divert the public attention could trigger a war. Thus a stable Pakistan is always preferable for the regional peace and security.

Pakistan's quest for parity with India is a legacy of pre-partition days when the Muslim league was seeking parity with the Indian National Congress¹². The identity crises¹³, the small power psyche and the threat it perceived to its security from India were some of the major considerations in Pakistan's quest for parity with India. Not able to match India in size, population and resources, Pakistan launched itself on a foreign policy strategy of forging politico-military linkages with external powers to attain artificial parity with India. Z.A.Bhutto wrote clearly that Pakistan will always need a plus factor for coping with India¹⁴.

In keeping with its belief that security does not consist only in defense preparedness, India also oriented it's diplomacy with a positive thrust. The current move for strengthening of bilateral relation with Iran , efforts to improve relations with China, the bus diplomacy of Atal Behari Vajpayee, several secretary level talks with Pakistan are the diplomatic move to minimize, the seriousness of Pakistan's challenge to India's security.

Bangladesh and India's Security:

East Pakistan from her inception was summoned on all sides by Indian territory, and posed no security problem for India. However, small strips of territory in the Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal is significant to isolate Assam , Sikkim , and the Darjeeling

¹² Keith Callard, "Pakistan: A Political Study" (London,1957) p.304

¹³ Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pakistan relations," International Studies, vol. 5, nos. 1-2 july -october, 1963,pp.174-179.

district from the rest of India, in the event of simultaneous thrust by the Chinese towards this area from the Chumbi valley. The then East Pakistan could also carry out disruptive activities on the borders of Assam and West Bengal, as she had in fact been doing. There was also a chronic problem of infiltration and smuggling along the border. The emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971, therefore turned out to be a major threat to India.

India and Bangladesh also concluded in March 1972, a *treaty of peace and friendship*¹⁵ and there existed a broad understanding and rapport between the two on their respective world views so long as Awami League led by Mujib remained in power in Dacca.

Following the overthrow of the Mujib regime in August 1975, the fate of India's security concerns in Bangladesh went into jeopardy.

Another important feature about the international boundary between India and Bangladesh has been the geographical framework, both in physical and cultural terms, which has posed many inherent problems for proper administration. Increasing influx of migrants across the border caused tremendous stress on our delicate environmental assets¹⁶.

Bangladesh has a low income, meager resources and an overwhelming population. Steady deterioration of economic condition and the growing number of Bangladeshi nationals living below poverty line and persecution of religious minorities by General Ershad's government followed by Begum Khaleda Zia's government. Mass migration of people from Bangladesh into India continued since 1980's and thus posed a great security problem for India and a burden on Indian economy.

TABLE -2 RELIGION-WISE ILLEGAL ENTRIES

| Year | Hindu | Muslim | Others | Total |
|------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| 1984 | 2971 | 6388 | 93 | 9452 |
| 1985 | 5117 | 8689 | 95 | 13001 |
| 1986 | 7160 | 15379 | 26 | 17565 |
| 1987 | 7077 | 17959 | 83 | 25119 |

¹⁴ Z.A.Bhutto, "The Political Situation in Pakistan", 1968, p.23

¹⁵ The Statesman, March 21, 1972.

¹⁶ Kanti.B.Pakrasi, "The Uprooted, A Sociological study of Bengal refugees", p. 90

| | | | | |
|------|------|-------|----|-------|
| 1988 | 5453 | 14102 | 79 | 19634 |
|------|------|-------|----|-------|

Source : Border security force , 1990.

The above figure would show that Muslim migrants far out stripped Hindu migrants.

The Assam Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia said¹⁷ in the assembly in April 1992 that about three million Bangladeshis infiltrated into Assam during the last five years while 4.5 million had entered West Bengal. After Mujib, General Ershad's regime unleashed terror and mass victimization of Hindu population in the countryside. 39,055

Bangladeshis intercepted in the first six months of 1991 , some 28000 were Muslim¹⁸.

The Chakma problem is the legacy of India's partition in 1947. The people of the Chittagong hill tracts(CHT) had expressed their desire to be with India since they felt that a secular India would provide greater guarantees for the preservation of their tribal identity than the theocratic State of the then East Pakistan. Contrary to their expectations and desires the Radcliffe boundary commission made the CHT a part of Pakistan without assigning any reasons for doing so. Following the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the leadership of Manabendra Narayan Lama tried to achieve autonomy for the region. But instead the large suppression and mass killing by General Ershad and Khalida Zia regime forced the Chakma's to flee towards North-East and West Bengal region of India.

In recent years although the Bangladesh and Indian government has been able to sort out the problem and Bangladesh has agreed to call Chakma refugees but still the problem of their rehabilitation and employment is much acute and would be a big challenge for the Bangladesh government .

The Water Dispute:

The river Indus originates from north of Kailash mountain and travels 200 miles in Tibet and enters India in Ladakh and flows down to Pakistan before joining the Arabian sea.

¹⁷ The Statesman, April 26, 1992

¹⁸ Sunday 22-28 March 1992-Politics of Infiltration.

The main tributaries of the river are Kabul, Swat and Khurram joining from the west and Jhelum, Chenab , Ravi , Beas , Sutlej from the east.

The Indus Water Treaty:

The Indus basin, became a disputed issue between India and Pakistan after partition. Due to the division of Punjab , Pakistan got 18 million acres of irrigated land for a population of 22million in the area around Indus where as India received 5 million acres of irrigated land for a population of 20 million. The eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi carried a meager flow of water which was 1\5 Th. of the total . Both the countries entered into an agreement on Dec. 20 , 1947 to maintain status quo on the then existing water sharing arrangements on the upper Bari Doab Canal and at Ferozpur. It was agreed upon to negotiate on the Indus water before March 31, 1948 when the standstill agreement ended. In the absence of any negotiation India discontinued the flow of water from Upper Bari Doab canal to the central Bari Doab canal on April 1, 1948 which resulted in drying up of irrigation channels near Lahore. Pakistan took advantage of the situation to criticize India and gain popular support at home , India had insisted to settle the issue through bilateral negotiations . Pakistan insisted on third party mediation and tried to internationalize the issue and discuss it on UN security Council on DEC. 16, 1952 . The world Bank ventured to mediate and solve the water sharing issue which was accepted by the two conflicting countries. On Sept. 19, 1960 The Indus Water Treaty¹⁹ was signed by J.L.Nehru and Ayub Khan according to which a permanent Indus Commission was set up to serve as regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the treaty . Following were the main provisions of the treaty -----

- Article II (I) of the treaty provided that all the waters of the eastern rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India. Except for the domestic use , Pakistan will not interfere in the flow of Ravi and Sutlej or any tributary which joins these two rivers before they cross into Pakistan .

¹⁹ The Times Of India , September 20, 1960.

- Article III (1) states that Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use of all those waters of the western rivers which India is under obligation to let flow without any interference except when used for domestic use, non consumption use, agricultural use, and generation of hydro-electric power.
- Article III (2) sanctioned that for a transition period from 1 April, 1960 till March 31, 1970 India shall limit its withdrawal for agricultural use, limit abstractions for storages and make deliveries to Pakistan from eastern rivers.
- According to Article II (5) till such time Pakistan will construct and bring into operation, that part of a system of works which will accomplish the replacement, from the western rivers and other sources of water supplies for irrigation canal in Pakistan which on 15 August 1947 were dependent on water supplies from the western rivers. The agreement solved the water problem between the two countries.

Tulbul Barrage Dispute:

Fresh tension mounted over India's construction of Tulbul Navigation Project in Wular Lake located on the Jhelum river in 1984. India contends that Wular Barrage would be beneficial for transportation of 0.5mn ton of apple and other fruits from Baramula to Srinagar and is in accordance with the Indus Water Treaty which allows the use of western rivers for domestic use, agricultural use for irrigation and non consumptive use (Article III).

Pakistan complained that India is constructing the barrage for storage facilities which is against the Indus Water Treaty, which does not allow the storage work on the river to exceed 10,000 acre-feet of water whereas the barrage to be constructed is of 300,000 acre-feet storage capacity. This would reduce the flow of water in the Jhelum and affect the production of electricity at Mangla, will affect agriculture in Punjab Pakistan also complained that Jhelum being an important tributary of the Indus and with reduced flow of water, the level of the Indus would also be affected which would damage the agricultural production in Sindh. Pakistan fears that India can use the barrage to her advantage and defame Pakistan among the people of Pakistan occupied Kashmir that the later creates hurdle in the implementation of welfare activities for Kashmiris.

Discussion on the subject took place on May 1986 , dec. 1987 and March 1989. During the discussion India agreed to forgo its treaty rights over three million acre-feet general storage from the tributaries of the Jhelum. Pakistan is said to have accepted the proposal . From August 6-9 , 1992 a meeting between the representatives of both the countries was held in which legal and technical aspects of the barrage was discussed.²⁰

The matter on Wular barrage is still undecided . It however, has not heightened the passion between the two countries. Firstly , both the countries haven't externalized the issue to their advantage. It had not been utilized to gain political mileage at home by describing it as anti- India or vice- versa . Secondly, the barrage hasn't been completed and there is no obstruction in the flow of water to Pakistan. Both the countries have remained within the confines of the Indus Water Treaty.

GANGA WATER DISPUTE :

In 1951 diversion of water from the Ganges into the Hoogly was planned in order to flush sediments out of Calcutta port and improve conditions for navigation. Pakistan objected but India persisted . The construction of the barrage began in 1961 and was completed in 1975.

Bangladesh a successor state maintained the old objections and was apprehensive that the withdrawal of water from Ganges , 11 miles before it enters Bangladesh would reduce water volume in the Ganges delta to level where navigation , fishing and irrigation will be adversely affected . The issue which had remained deadlocked since the 1977 agreement on water-sharing lapsed in 1982 . It was renewed on an ad-hoc basis upto 1988 ; it lapsed again from early 1989.

In 1987 a historic water agreement for sharing of Ganga water was signed by Indian Prime Minister H.D. Devegowda and his Bangladesh counterpart Ms. Sheikh Hasina . The treaty sought for the optimum utilization of the water resources of their region in the fields of flood management , irrigation , river basin development and generation of hydro-power for the mutual benefit of the people of the two countries. Following were the main provisions of the treaty :

²⁰ Third World Impact, September 1992.

- Article I: The quantum of water agreed to be released by India to Bangladesh will be at Farakka.
- Article II: The sharing of waters at Farakka by ten-day periods from January 1 to May 31 every year. If flow at Farakka falls below 5000 cusecs in any ten day period , the two governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emergency basis.
- Article IV: A joint committee shall be set up on suitable terms at Farakka and Hardinge bridge to observe and record at Farakka the daily flows below Farakka barrage, in the feeder canal , and at the navigation lock .
- Article VI: The joint committee shall submit to the governments all data collected by it and shall also submit a yearly report to both the governments .
- Article VII: The joint committee shall be responsible for implementing the agreements contained in this treaty and any difficulty or dispute not resolved by the joint committee , shall be referred to the Indo-Bangladesh joint river commissions. If the differences still remain un-resolved , it shall be referred to the two governments to resolve the issue.
- Article X: Sharing arrangement to be reviewed by the two governments at five year interval or earlier as required. It would be open to either party to seek the first review after two years to assess the impact and working of the arrangements.
- Article XII: This treaty shall remain in force for thirty years and it shall be renewable on the basis of mutual consent.

To sum up, all the contentious problems which India is facing currently viz. Kashmir problem, boundary disputes, security problem and disputes regarding utilization of natural resources are the products of the partition. These geo-political legacies often rose as the major impediment in the way of peace and security in South Asia. The effort should be made to tackle the disputes bilaterally , prudently and step by step in order to gain a lasting peace in the region.

CHAPTER---III

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

The trauma of partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 created refugee streams across the newly drawn boundaries in the East and in the West. While several Muslims living in India from generations had to abandon their homes and hearth and flee to Pakistan in the wake of Hindu Muslim riots. Vast stream of Hindus and Sikhs from West and East Pakistan came to India creating unprecedented political and economic problems to the fledgling national government.

The entire Hindu and Sikh population of West Pakistan estimated about 5 million during the period 1947-48 and 3.5 million from East Pakistan reached India in the period 1950-51. According to 1951 census, the total number of displaced persons in India in 1951 was 74, 79, 278. As the railway trains were attacked most of the migration was in the form of bullock-cart caravans or in foot convoys. All the roads leading from Pakistan to India were choked with men women and children as well as bullock-carts and cattle. On all the roads a seething mass of humanity stretched over many miles all moving towards India urged onwards by a restless destiny. It was an awe inspiring spectacle the kind of which had not been seen for centuries in human history. When they reached India they were given shelter in the colonies of tents, the refugee camps.

The Gargantuan Exodus and Rampant Violence:

It began almost a year before actual partition. The roots lay in the frenzy generated by the demand for separation and the opposition to it. The call for "Direct Action" August 16, 1946 and the great Calcutta carnage spread the flames eastward to Noakhali and Tripura in East Bengal. Direct Action meant murder rape and loot, directed against Muslim minorities of the region. So fierce was the onslaught that it could not but provoke retaliation against Muslim minorities in other parts of India. Slowly at first, and then with increasing rapidity, the trouble spread westward ---- Bihar, Garhmukteshwar, and on to the Punjab and the north-west frontier provinces. About 5000 people were killed.

Refugee Inflow From West-Pakistan:

In early 1947 violence broke out in Lahore. Each side tried to force the other out of the city in order to claim the state capital as part of its portion of the soon to be divided Punjab¹. In three and a half months, 3200 people were killed and over 100,000 non-Muslims fled eastward. Passions were aroused in the rest of the country by these first refugees and a rash of tit-for-tat killing and massacre ensued.

The refugees coming from the north western frontier province and Sindh were attacked by a blood thirsty mob of pathans on a refugee terrain at Gujarat railway station on the night of January 11-12, 1948. The Indian army escort was quickly overpowered out of the 2400 passengers only 700 could reach India; most of the others had been massacred brutally, and the women kidnapped. The loss of property was estimated at nearly rupees 30 lakhs. "No help at all was forth coming either from the police or the Pakistani army. Subsequent complaints and protests were treated with callous indifferences. The attack was obviously premeditated and carried out with the connivance of the authorities"²

The second incident was the ferocious assault launched by tribesman on the refugee camp at Parashinar in NWFP on January 22, 1948³. Evacuation from this camp had been delayed by the Pakistan government in spite of strong representations from New Delhi since October 1947. In this insensate attack 130 persons were killed and 50 wounded and also 50 women were abducted. It was only after this incident that the survivors were allowed to be escorted to safety. The evacuation of the NWFP was carried out uneventfully thereafter and completed by March 1948. The process of inflaming Sindhi Muslim opinion against the minority community was slower than elsewhere, but it was pursued with relentless tenacity. Muslim refugees from East Punjab propagated communal hatred by spreading exaggerated reports of Hindu atrocities. Soon panic spread in the mind of the minority community Hindus. The high commission for India in Karachi was soon inundated with appeals for evacuation facilities. By October 1947, plans had to be drawn up for transporting 3000 people a month from the port town of Karachi. Also arrangements had to be made to run special trains from Hyderabad and Mirpur Khas

¹ Stephen.L.Killer, "Uprooting and Social Change", p.37.

² U.Bhaskar Rao, "The Story of Rehabilitation", p.21.

³ The Frontier Post January 24, 1948.

to Marwar junction. It was estimated that by the end of 1947, roughly 4,85,000 non-muslims had left Sind.

On January 14, 1948, a directorate of evacuation was set up. The first major job it was confronted with was the transfer of 54,000 destitutes from Karachi. Every available ship was pressed into service. The vessels took on their human cargo at Karachi, disembarked passengers at Kathiawar port and steamed back to Karachi for another bursting load.

The Indian government was confronted with a major difficulty. The northern and eastern regions of this country were already bursting with refugees. Bombay which had already given shelter to a considerable population of the migrants protested that it could take no more. Arrangement had therefore to be made to divert the new refugee to Central India and elsewhere further South.

The Exodus from the East Wing:

Although a thin migration already began by the dark days of Noakhali-Tipperah disaster but the approaching partition and the horrible news of Punjab riots added to the already serious fear of Hindus in East Bengal. Radcliffe's Award offered a sensational fillip and in the first half of August, 1947, itself the movement was believed to have reached the peak period. East Pakistan officials added more explosive materials in their day to day administration to bring the progressive discordance in the cordial relations existing for long between the common Hindus and Muslims of East Bengal.

Two major differences⁴ in the two migrations are, **first**, that the exodus from East Pakistan continued during 1950's, 1960's and till the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

Secondly, the influx from East Pakistan to India had not been balanced by a corresponding efflux from India into Pakistan. The displaced persons from West Pakistan were absorbed much more rapidly, because to some extent, a vacuum had been created by the departure of Muslims. In the eastern region the government had been faced with a monumental task of fitting these displaced persons into an area which was almost saturated, both from the point of view of population and employment.

The partition had left 12 million non-Muslim population of undivided Bengal in East-Pakistan over the next two decades, a sizeable part of this minority was displaced and

⁴ Kanti .B. Pakrasi, "The uprooted, A sociological study of the refugees of West Bengal" ,p.23.

forced to seek refuge in eastern India. Their displacement proved to be long-drawn affair, making refugee rehabilitation in West Bengal highly complex and problematic. In 1981 the government of West Bengal's refugee rehabilitation committee estimated that no less than 80 lakhs i.e. about one-sixth of this state consists of displaced persons from East Bengal, now called Bangladesh⁵.

Among the first to leave East Bengal were the Hindu upper middle classes, as most had contacts in Calcutta and could look forward to picking up professions and trade in new surroundings. They left due to fear of violent riots and a general sense of persecution and insecurity. Although the policy of the Indians government in Bengal aimed not at evacuating the minorities from East Pakistan as has been done effectively in Punjab, but in negotiating with Pakistani authorities for creating conditions of security so that mass exodus could be prevented. But these measures and **Nehru-Liaquat pact** all proved to be futile and by 1950 an estimated 1, 575,000 people left East Bengal for India⁶.

Relief and Rehabilitation Measures:

In order to provide relief and rehabilitation to the waves of refugee on a war scale, the government of India set up a Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation in early September 1947. Isolated pockets of refugees were organized into camps and given rations and military protection against harassment. Gradually Indian troops took over the responsibility of looking after camps in West Punjab, and Pakistan took corresponding duties at East Punjab camps. These people were then sent to evacuation points by motor transport.

Towards the end of March 1948, refugees in camps numbered 8,29,733 in provinces, as follows:

⁵ Government of West Bengal, "Refugee Rehabilitation Committees Report", Calcutta, 1981.

⁶ O.H.K Spate, "India and Pakistan, A general and regional geography", London, 1956 p.120.

TABLE-III DISTRIBUTION OF PUNJAB REFUGEES BY 1948.

| PROVINCE | POPULATION IN CAMPS |
|------------------|----------------------------|
| East Punjab | 6,66,375 |
| United Province | 44,215 |
| Delhi | 44,893 |
| Ajmer-Marwar | 7,463 |
| Bombay | 4,425 |
| Central Province | 9,561 |
| Bihar | 7,099 |
| Madras | 3,318 |
| West Bengal | 2,594 |
| Total | 8,29,733 |

Source: Department of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation, Government of India, 1967.

The first necessity, **shelter** was the toughest problem. In East Punjab educational institutions were closed down for several months and their buildings placed at the disposal of the incoming refugees. The army was allowed military camps, barracks and tents to be pressed into service. The refugees were also accommodated in the houses vacated by the Muslims.

Food, clothing, medical aid and education were provided free in camps. The free daily rations included wheat flour, rice, pulses, vegetable oil, salt, condiments, sugar and milk for children were provided. Fruits, milk, vitamin tablets and other medicinal preparations were distributed liberally when doctors recommended them. Inoculation against cholera and small-pox vaccination were carried out by teams of doctors.

Free primary and middle schools were set up for boys and girls, the teachers being recruited from among the displaced persons themselves. Educational effort was supplemented by the provision of facilities for technical and vocational training.

For the **rural land settlement** each Punjabi refugee family was settled on a plot it was adjudged capable of handling to its advantage. The average individual holding ranged

from six acres to eight. An effort was made to group people together. This naturally conducted to co-operative farming where the refugees pooled their salvaged resources in the interests of better production. Most of them had to be content with much less than they had possessed. As against 67.30 lakhs acres of land costs about 500 crore they had abandoned in West Pakistan, only about 47.55 lakh acres of land costs about 100 crore had been left behind⁷. These East Punjab land were not as productive as the land they had abandoned.

Under the **Quasi-Permanent Land Settlement Scheme** verification were made regarding the individual claim of land in West Pakistan and accordingly the effort were made to allot land . Village allotment committees were constituted for the purpose for allocating houses. Side by side , a **garden colony scheme** was also introduced. Units ranging from 10 to 20 acres were allocated to educated persons with gardening experience. The government provided all the necessary irrigational and horticultural facilities.

The **rural loans** were provided for maintenance until the first crop had been harvested , for the purpose of livestock , fodder , seeds and agricultural implements and for the repair and construction of houses, wells etc. By the end of 1950-51 , taccari loans totalling Rs. 2.94 crores had been advance to these displaced persons.

For the **urban rehabilitation** , each state was allocated fixed quotas of refugees. The state formulated elaborate schemes. Colonies were developed on the outskirts of existing towns. Plans were also laid for separate self-contained townships, each with its own civic center , hospital , markets and shops , educational institutions , and residential accommodation. The states put the emphasis on affording the refugees opportunities of gainful employment.

Regarding rehabilitation measures in West Bengal, until 1950 , the government aimed at providing the incoming refugees relief on a piecemeal basis rather than creating conditions for their long term rehabilitation. Its main response consisted of setting up relief camps in key areas where shelter and other basic amenities essential for survival were provided⁸. Most pre-1950 refugees came from the middle classes and relied on their

⁷ Land settlement manual, Government of Punjab, 1952.

⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru selected works, vol.5,p.161-163.

own resources to begin life afresh. Less than 10% depended on government assistance and sought accommodation in government run refugee camps. However, after 1950 the problem of refugee rehabilitation acquired a somewhat different character. Most of those now crossing the border belonged to the agricultural classes. They come with few possessions, capital or skills and naturally craved for land upon which they could resettle. The peak of the refugee inflow occurred in 1956 when Pakistan adopted an **Islamic constitution**⁹.

Unlike the displaced persons of West Pakistan, the refugees coming from East Pakistan were reluctant to move to other states except West Bengal, Tripura and Assam. The rehabilitation scheme were broadly divided into two sections, rural and urban.

For the agriculturist, the **first** item was of allotment of agricultural land or financial help for the purchase of such. **Second**, the allotment of a household plot or a loan for the purchase of such plot. Then came a loan for building a house followed by monetary aid for buying farming implements such as bullock and other equipment. A **maintenance grant** for nine months upto the harvest was sanctioned. Non-agriculturists were given a loan to start in business or purchasing homestead plot, house-building along with a grant for three months.

TABLE—4 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE REFUGEES FROM EAST PAKISTAN OVER DIFFERENT DISTRICTS OF WEST BENGAL BETWEEN 1946 AND 1950.

| WEST BENGAL | Hindu migrants from East Pakistan by year of arrival | | | | | |
|------------------|--|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| | 1946 | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | Total |
| Districts | | | | | | |
| Darjeeling | 1.0 | 22.4 | 28.0 | 14.3 | 34.3 | 100(15400) |
| Jalpaiguri | 1.1 | 14.1 | 19.2 | 16.1 | 48.9 | 100(96078) |
| WestDinajpu r | 0.3 | 6.5 | 13.2 | 11.8 | 68.2 | 100(110791) |
| Malda | 0.4 | 7.3 | 8.8 | 10.5 | 73.0 | 100(59046) |

⁹ Annual Reports, 1948-58, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India, New Delhi, 1949-50.

| | | | | | | |
|---------------|-----|------|------|------|------|------------------|
| | | | | | |) |
| Murshidabad | 0.2 | 12.1 | 16.3 | 9.6 | 61.8 | 100(94148) |
| Nadia | 1.4 | 11.3 | 17.8 | 15.6 | 53.9 | 100(41816 3) |
| 24-Parganas | 1.9 | 19.8 | 21.9 | 13.3 | 43.1 | 100(51489 0) |
| Howrah | 2.8 | 25.4 | 18.8 | 13.7 | 39.3 | 100(59800) |
| Hoogly | 2.0 | 21.4 | 23.7 | 14.3 | 38.6 | 100(50526) |
| Midnapur | 1.8 | 37.7 | 35.4 | 10.0 | 15.1 | 100(32926) |
| Bankura | 0.8 | 21.9 | 11.0 | 5.9 | 60.4 | 100(9232) |
| Burdwan | 2.1 | 23.9 | 25.6 | 14.9 | 33.5 | 100(93187) |
| Birbhum | 3.8 | 26.8 | 19.9 | 10.2 | 39.3 | 100(11010) |
| All Districts | 1.4 | 16.3 | 19.6 | 13.7 | 49.0 | 100(15651 97) |

Source : West Bengal District Hand Books : 1951 Census.

The above Table, shows that although the process of migration begin in 1946 but it was a meagre one. Following the partition in 1947 the migration stepped up. In 1948 we find a decline in incoming refugees, but again in 1950 the migration increased sharply due to increasing riots and growing fear psychosis among among the non-Muslims.

Some of the camps in West Bengal were converted into townships ,so that the transition from relief to rehabilitation was accomplished with little disturbance to the

lives of the refugees. In 1956 more than four lakhs families still lived in camp, while a very large number awaited rehabilitation outside camps¹⁰.

Dandakaranya scheme was formulated as a long term solution for the resettlement of the East Bengal refugees¹¹. Located in the tribal area comprises the districts of Bastar in M.P. and Kalahandi and Korapat in Orissa, the Dandakaranya area is rich in mineral resources but poor for settled cultivation¹².

By 1965 over 2.7 lakh acres of forest had been cleared for refugee settlement, over 12000 families were moved into the region and were settled in 184 villages that were built by that year. But soon a backlash began due to the sense of alienation, unfamiliar tribal population, fear of wild animals and no hope for paddy cultivation without irrigation. By 1978 a large number of refugees sold off their property, land and belonging to return to West Bengal. They moved to the Sunderbans delta, parts of Tripura and the Assam valley where without any government aid or planning they cleared forests, colonised agricultural tracts and created their own settlement¹³.

In 1981 the government of West Bengal acknowledged that out of the official figure of eight million registered displaced persons, over 70% or 5.6 million still lived below the poverty line¹⁴.

Divided Family:

The partition and resultant population transfer witnessed the mass scale killings and abduction of women and girls. Either of these women were married and obliged to absorb in the Muslim society or in the wake of their refusal to marry they were raped and killed. So mother parted with her son, brother with sister and husband with wife. And thus an everlasting wound remained on the psyche of the refugees. Still today Hindus and Sikhs from India occasionally visited their Muslim relatives in Pakistan and vice-versa. Sometimes a family with 10 or 12 members, were left only one or two. Their agony and mental psychological parameters are very complex to define.

¹⁰ Relief and Rehabilitation of Displaced persons in West Bengal, December 11, 1957.

¹¹ The Statesman, 15, August, 1957.

¹² Ben Farmer, "Agricultural Colonization in India", 1972, p.37-42.

¹³ Myron Weiner, "Sons of the Soil, Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India", 1978

¹⁴ Government of West Bengal, Refugee Rehabilitation Committee's Report, p.50.

The persons who were driven out of Pakistan and were forced to give up all social, cultural and economic relationships with their regular homes and were often compelled to live at a lower social and financial level in the receiving states of India¹⁵. In India where the families rarely leave their land and homes unless they are forced from it, we can well understand the magnitude and severity of the problems linked with incessant movements of hundreds and thousands of non-Muslim minorities from Pakistan. The displaced persons said good-bye not just to a plot of land but to their entire tradition, home life, language group and the shrines of their fore fathers.

In spite of all expensive measures of rehabilitation the unavoidable problems of healthy assimilation of the refugees into the country's socio-economic structures and again, the vital problems of adjustment with new socio-political climate persist even today in India. In their new habitats in India almost everything was at variance with their previous experience and activities. The effect of a catastrophe diffused heavily through their family organisations, professional structures, mental make up and above all the very ethos of life.

In the case of Bengali refugees, though they were evicted from homeland and turned overnight into refugees, the behaviour of displaced members had certainly not undergone any basic transformation as human being to snap the links of those customs and aspirations which prescribe the standards of family behaviour and family living in the Hindu society. The displaced persons could maintain family integrity in as high as 92% of the cases. The displaced families with regard to differential treatment, opportunity and understanding they did not show both strong and weak points in making themselves assimilated in the social milieu of the receiving state.

Occupation and Family Structure:

Families which were dependent on agriculture before migration from East Pakistan, had conspicuously concentrated in village areas (37%) of West Bengal. But when a sizeable portion of the migrant population belonging to the same occupation class of agriculture preferred to stick to the city environs (32%), the social situation does become greatly infested with many pressing problems.

¹⁵ Kanti B. Pakrasi, 'The Uprooted', P.125

The displaced family and single member units which were linked with trade and commerce before migration came largely to reside in city areas of West Bengal. 72% of the families of this class concentrated in towns and cities of the state. Migrant families and single member units depending on bureaucratic, clerical and other type of services in East Bengal were found to have concentrated in maximum strength in towns (29%). Their least concentration being noticed in rural areas. Migrants dependent on occupations other than those associated with agriculture, trade and commerce or services were present to the extent of (19%) in villages and (5%) in the city of West Bengal.

FIGURE—I: MAGNITUDE OF MIGRATION WITHIN WEST BENGAL (1947-48) BY THE REFUGEES BELONGING TO DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES.



FIGURE -1, IS ON THE NEXT PAGE.

Source: Kanti.B.Pakrasi "The Uprooted, A Sociological Study of the Refugees of West Bengal".p.23.


Series 1: Village

Series 2: Town

Series 3: City

Thus during 1946-47 in the early stages of communal disturbances, the non-Muslims who were associated with agriculture and allied activities were prompted to part permanently with their homes and hearths. With the very start of the social calamity the non-Muslims

45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%



Series 1
Series 2
Series 3

Agriculture

Trade & comm...

service

Other

who depended on trade, business and allied commercial activities or on bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic professions reacted more quickly and vividly in taking decision to migrate.

Notwithstanding their varying occupational experiences before migration, the displaced population maintained joint families, immediately after migration. They could maintain kinship integrity in such high magnitude even after migrating to a completely new socio-cultural and economic setting of West Bengal. This was most probably due to tradition bound, institutionalized mode of kinship orientation and functioning prevalent in the Hindu society of Bengal as a whole from long past.

This unique phenomenon of **family cohesion** may be explained additionally by the fact that **social and moral order based upon occupational association and interest** must have persisted in crisis hour amongst the displaced families constituting each social class, especially through caste-values and norms.

To sum up, the Punjab refugees were quick to adapt themselves and succeeded in agriculture, trade commerce and industries and they were able to bring **Green Revolution** and high economic development in the Punjab-Haryana region. They were also ready to spread themselves out over the whole country and affected the economy and polity of the region. So the case of Punjabee refugees was a case of successful adaptation in which they became self-reliant either individually or collectively and also loose their identity as refugees. They could not only merge themselves in the mainstream of Indian society but have also attained upward mobility. They have shown inclination towards geographical mobility and have spread them selves all over the world, demonstrating their keenness to look for opportunities and utilise them to their own advantage. The Bengali refugees took much time and their process of assimilation in the Indian mainstream was long and a complete adaptation is yet to achieve.

CHAPTER --IV

THE CIVIL- DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE

A modern state is rooted in the concept of national unity. But some state may be such conglomerations of diffused and unwieldy nationalities that they may find it impossible to develop an identity of their own, and if there is a great deal of exploitation of one section of the people by another, or of one part of the country by another, their legitimacy might be getting continuously eroded. There may also be such a lack of people's participation in the country as to lead to a break-down of communications between the rulers and the ruled, and the forces of disintegration may ultimately get the upper hand. In a situation in which there has been neither modernization nor nation-building nor political leadership of a high order, the army , the civil services and the religious groups, normally assigned a subordinate role in a modern state, may, separately or in alliance with each other come to occupy the supreme position. A political system of this kind is bound to break down sooner or later¹.

Despite emerging from the same social, political and cultural entity, Pakistan and India instead of developing parallel and similar civil democratic political system, developed different systems. Unlike India, Pakistan could not develop a vibrant democratic set up but fell in the lap of totalitarianism. The problem could be traced in the legacies of partition and process of nation-building and state formation activities. It is also imperative to focus on the nature of, party system, military and bureaucracy and how this triumvirate moulded contrasting political set up in India and Pakistan.

The Party Structure:

The Indian national movement under the leadership of Indian National Congress (INC) had a vision² of a civil libertarian, democratic, secular and socially combined with anti-colonial ideology and a pro-poor radical socio-economic orientation. It enabled the national movement to base itself on the politically awakened and active movement. Thus

¹ S.P.Varma and Virendra Narain (ed.), 'Pakistan, Political System in Crisis', Rajasthan University Press, 1972, p.72.

² Bipin Chandra, "India's Struggle for Independence", Penguin, New Delhi, 1988, p. 528.

India's political establishment after the partition was the visual manifestation of the ideological dimension of the national movement.

Unlike the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League failed to transform itself from a national movement to a national party to lead the nation on to the road to democracy, stability and prosperity. The reason is Muslim League never became a mass based party until 1939-40. The INC began its career in 1885 and the long struggle for independence and Gandhi's role made it a mass party in 1920's. It provided umbrella for diverse interests and opinions, ranging from those who believed in non-violence to the communists and socialists. The struggle for independence enabled them to evolve patterns to resolve internal conflicts and aggregate diverse interests. The Muslim League lacked the procedures of internal discussion and collective leadership. Its claim as the spokesman of the Muslim League was challenged by a number of other organisations, which were working for independence but did not favour the idea of a separate state for the Muslims.

The Muslim League stood for the creation of Pakistan and directed all its efforts to achieve this objective. It did not indicate the outlines of the political and economic action to be followed after independence. Its leaders merely claimed that, "the Muslims of the sub-continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and tradition of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today."³ How to build their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam were not formulated. Thus when the main objective of the party was achieved and the Quaid- I- Azam died, the Muslim League lost the momentum and vigour which characterized its movement before 1947. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, there was none to keep the Muslim League together.

The role of opposition is very important for the successful working of liberal democratic institutions. Its constructive criticism can promote democratic values in society. However the party in power in Pakistan deliberately discouraged the growth of opposition parties and any opposition to the Muslim League was regarded as tantamount to opposition to Pakistan. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said, "the formation of new

³ Liaquat Ali Khan, 'Pakistan : Heart of Asia' (Cambridge Press), 1950 , pp. 2

political parties in opposition to the Muslim League is against the best interest of Pakistan. If the Muslim League is not made strong and powerful and the mushroom growth of parties is not checked immediately, I assure you that Pakistan will not survive.”⁴Such internalized faction made Muslim League hollow from inside and failed to present an inspiring programme to the people, with the disappearance of strong leadership, various factions started breaking away and formed new political parties which was not the result of ideological conflicts but personality clashes, jealousies and the desire to gain power. No party could claim to have a mass base in both the wing of Pakistan. The party in power in Pakistan adopted various methods to retain the support of its members, and discourage growth of healthy opposition. Repressive measures were adopted to crush opposition. Political opponents were arrested and put behind bars. Public meetings and processions were banned. The hated **PRODA**⁵ (Public and Representative Offices Act, 1949) provided for the debarring from public life for a specified period of time persons found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity.

The opposition parties also lacked organisational cohesion. In 1957 the United Front succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Muslim League in the elections of East Pakistan Provincial Assembly but could not maintain its unity after winning the elections. The political parties constituting the United Front quarreled with each other on the question of the distribution of ministerial offices.

The loyalties to a particular party was not based on principles but on political and ministerial gains. “Politics in Pakistan was made up of a large number of leading persons, who with the political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Consequently rigid adherence to a policy is likely to make a politician less available for office⁶.

The display of uncontrolled ambition to gain political objectives, lack of decorum and sense of sobriety, frequent crossing of the floor by the members of the National Assembly, accusations and counter-accusations and scuffles in the house and ban on processions around the assembly chambers, very brief session of the National Assembly

⁴ The Statesman, 28 October, 1950.

⁵ The Times of India, November 7, 1997.

⁶ Keith Callard, “Pakistan, A Political Study”, London, 1957, p.67.

and the desire of the members to be always on the winning side tarnished the image of the National Assembly as a representative body. The national Assembly failed to exercise real control over the cabinet. Traditionally the Prime Minister and the cabinet are responsible to legislature in the parliamentary form of government and the cabinet can remain in office as long as it commands the support of the majority of the members of the legislature. But in Pakistan the National Assembly played no significant part in the making and unmaking of cabinets. No government was removed by a vote of no-confidence on the floor of the National Assembly. The decision to form a new ministry was taken behind closed doors.

The weak political leadership and ceaseless struggle for power shifted real political power from the National Assembly to the Head of the State (Governor General and President since 1956). A strong tradition of violating the norms of parliamentary democracy was established⁷. The politicians were divided in so many camps that they could not adopt united stand to restrict the greater concentration of powers in the hands of the head of the state. The President could always find some politicians willing to support him. This enabled him to play the politicians against each other and compel the cabinet not to work against his wishes. There are numerous examples in the political history of Pakistan to show that the Head of the State was not a titular head but an active participant in the political drama of Pakistan, viz. dismissal of Khwaza Nazimuddin's ministry in April 1954 by Governor General Ghulam Mohammed; dismissal of Mohammed on June 20 by General Zia; the dissolution of Benazir Bhutto's first Government by presidential decree on 6 August 1990 with allegations of inefficiency, corruption and disorderliness still unsubstantiated; sacking of Nawaz Sharif's government in April 1993 following personal bickering by Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1996. Hamza Alvi has found Pakistan's dilemma symptomatic of many post-colonial countries where the usual process of maturing into a nation before becoming a country has been reversed⁸. The 1954 arrangements when the Governor General ruled the country in a semi-dictatorial manner,

⁷ P. Bhogal, "Problems and Prospects of democratization in Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, October, 1996.

⁸ Hamza Alvi, "Nationhood and Nationalities in Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly, 8 July 1989.

undermining the democratic institutions reminds of the viceroy's executive council before partition⁹.

Under these circumstances even genuine believers in democracy and the rule of law found it difficult to defend a system which was rapidly impairing the moral fibre of the nation. It made a mockery of the parliamentary system. The constitution commission rightly attributed the failure of the parliamentary system of Pakistan to the following three causes:¹⁰

- Lack of proper elections and defects in the late constitution.
- Undue interference by the heads of the State with ministers and political parties, and by the central government with the functioning of the government in the provinces.
- Lack of leadership resulting in the lack of well organised and disciplined parties, the general lack of character in the politicians.

Thus the political system of Pakistan was functioning contrary to its professed principles. Political intrigues and opportunism; lack of discipline in the political parties led the country from crisis to crisis. The politics pursued in these years was "thoroughly inimical to social change and national consolidation"¹¹.

TABLE—5 PARTY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL ELECTION BY PROVINCES 1993

| Party | Punjab | Sindh | Baluchistan | Islamabad | Total |
|------------|--------|-------|-------------|-----------|-------|
| PPP | 47 | 33 | 5 | 1 | 86 |
| ML(Nawaz) | 52 | 10 | 10 | -- | 73 |
| ML(Junejo) | 6 | -- | -- | -- | 6 |
| PIF | -- | 1 | 2 | -- | 3 |
| MQM | 1 | -- | 1 | -- | 2 |
| ANP | -- | -- | 3 | -- | 3 |
| India | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 |
| Others | 1 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 14 |
| Total | 202 | --- | --- | --- | --- |

⁹ The Times, 29 October, 1954

¹⁰ Report of the Constitutional Commission, Pakistan, 1961, p. 6.

Source : Adapted from 'People's Verdict', Newline, October, 1993.

TABLE—6 PARTY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1993.

| PARTY | % OF VOTE OBTAINED | SEATS WON |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------|
| PPP | 38.1 | 86 |
| ML(N) | 39.7 | 73 |
| MQM | 1.1 | 2 |
| ANP | 1.7 | 3 |
| PIF | 3.1 | 3 |
| Independence | 7.4 | 15 |
| Others | 8.8 | 20 |
| Total | --- | 202 |

Source : Adapted from 'people's verdict', Newline, October, 1993.

The tables show that the PPP won an overall majority in the center and in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. While maintaining its core support of 38.1%, the PPP lost in crucial urban constituencies like Lahore and Rawalpindi where the ML made visible gains as well as noticeable inroads in Sindh. Benazir Bhutto with the support of various groups and independents, formed the government at the center in Sindh and Punjab.

In India, the Indian National Congress, being in the vanguard of the national movement, was a mass party and included many elements viz. moderates, liberals, radicals and several others. With independence in 1947, the congress constituted itself as a federal political power structure. From a triumphant national movement it became a dominant ruling party.

The party system in India plays the role of a political instrument of socio-economic change. It mobilises people not only for electoral politics, but more importantly for

¹¹ Gunnar Myrdal, "Asian Drama", vol.1, Penguin, 1969, p.315.

building awareness and enthusing people for nation-building, state-building, citizen-building and democratic identity-building.

Three factors are important regarding Indian party system:

- A major legacy of the national movement was the building of national consensus on the three significant dimensions of national interest, namely national unity and political migration, national socio-economic development and national defence and security. The pre-independence congress as the vehicle of the national movement, acquired pre-eminence in public consciousness precisely as a party protecting and promoting national consensus. It facilitated its emergence as the dominant party of the Indian political system after independence.
- The coexistence of different ideology in the national movement gave it a broad base and provided it an all India legitimacy and laid down a tradition of toleration and accommodation of different points of view. That's why Indian polity has never been ideologically polarised. This aspect provided the framework for the growth of the multi-party situation in India.
- The continental size of the country, comprising well-defined and distinct socio-cultural regions, with their own languages and dialects, specific patterns of caste, community and tribal formations, provided the objective conditions for the rise of regional parties and groups and their specific regional demands.

Indian party system after independence in five decades of its functioning has witnessed seven stages¹² of growth:

- 1952-64—the epoch of national consensus—the Nehru era.
- 1964-69—the uneasy transition marked by the emergence of multi-party.
- 1969-75—the period of new consensus and of increasing inter-party conflict.
- 1975-77—the emergency authoritarian period.
- 1977-80—the Janata phase of tussle between the Congress and opposition in the center and the Congress and regional party in the states.
- Since 1989—the transition from multi-party situation to a coalition government at the center.

¹² Rasheeduddin Khan, "Democracy in India", NCERT publication, 1995, p.69.

In recent years Bharatiya Janata Party has emerged as the largest party and pushed the Congress at second place. But the formation of government by BJP after 1998 election with the help of regional parties shows the emergence of right-wing politics in the Indian political system. However the BJP was obliged to drop its communal agenda in order to secure a consensus within the coalition¹³. Now increasing say of regional parties in our political system shows that we are definitely moving towards a more mature democratic setup.

Military System

As due to inner contradictions the early moves to establish a democratic setup failed in Pakistan, the army, which was by far the most disciplined and trained structure, was called to help the civil government in the maintenance of law and order and thus military became an important factor in the decision making process of Pakistan. The role of military in the internal affairs of the country contributed towards the feeling amongst the armed forces, that they could do what the civilian government was not capable of doing. There were several factors for the growing participation of the military in the political system:

First from the day of its inception Pakistan led a precarious existence. In addition to the normal problem of setting up a new government it confronted the horrors of communal riots, undefined border, strained relations with India, war in Kashmir and the maintenance of law and order in the early years. "Political organisation cannot exist in social chaos and something very near to social chaos marked the advent of the new state"¹⁴. To prevent total breakdown the central government depended upon the military. **Second**, the weak social base due to lack of a big middle class and intelligentsia like India prevented the masses from political education. The disarray of political leadership and political parties and the lack of organised political support resulted in the weakening of the political institutions.

¹³ The Hindustan Times, 6 April 1998.

¹⁴ R.D.Campbell, "Pakistan: Emerging Democracy", Princeton, 1963, p.33.

Third the military inherited the high standard of British training and rich experiences of the two world wars. The military and the bureaucracy was disciplined and cohesive and perhaps the most organised institution in Pakistan.

Fourth, the military having a pool of skilled man power having knowledge of modern technology and managerial experience can be of great use in civilian sector where there was much confusion and a political vacuum due to death of above qualities.

Fifth, the public image of the military was high. The people as well as the political leaders regarded the military as patriotic, dedicated to the nation's cause and firm and fair. It was perceived by the military as its legitimacy by the masses and encouraged it to intervene in politics.

The army got the first chance to run the civil administration directly in 1953 due to outbreak of the anti-Ahmadi riots ¹⁵ in Punjab. The army successfully brought the situation back to normal within a few days. It created an impression in the mind of the public that the army could restore peace and effective government when all other devices had failed.

During 1947-58 the politicians were busy in solving their own problems and they hardly had the time to tighten their grip over the military. During this period Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers but only one commander-in-chief of the army General Ayub Khan. This continued stay in office and lack of political control gave him a chance to consolidate his position in army.

Pakistan's continuum of martial laws or military led regimes (1958-71 and 1977-88) and its unchallenging position were the result of realignment of businessmen-industrialists and feudal landlords of Pakistan¹⁶. The specific feature of this ruling elite is that it is getting more and more inter-twined with each other. This development took place during Zia's regime in which a conscious policy of patronage to military personnel and their relatives was implemented. Military personnel and their relatives were appointed to positions in the civil bureaucracy and the numerous state corporations pushing out civilian employers. There are sufficient indications that an exodus from the army for more attractive jobs in bureaucracy and industry has begun.

¹⁵ The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 29 June, 1954.

¹⁶ Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, "The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan", Oxford University press, New Delhi, 1995, p.7.

The army and bureaucracy decision for a military takeover in October 1958 has various reasons. The first ever general election was about to take place in 1959 which increased the restlessness of the masses and the leaders of the opposition party made number of promises of radical reform. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact following the liberation of Iraq had increased anti-American and anti-British feeling. Any elected Government of Pakistan would have had to make concession to this manifestation of public opinion and a new government would have been forced to withdraw from the military alliances. An elected government would also have had more confidence to combat the influence of the bureaucracy, and to establish civilian control over the army. By the coup the army and the bureaucracy duo were fulfilling their traditional role in capitalist and feudal societies in order to protect the hollowed institution of private property.¹⁷

MILITARISATION OF PAKISTAN

The British rule created the myth of 'martial races' by putting Pathans, Baluchis, Jats, Sikhs, and Muslims of Punjab and Gurkhas of Nepal in this category. The combatant troops were mostly recruited from these groups. In 1929, 54% of the total combatant troops in the Indian Army was supplied by Punjab. Such a regional concentration continued even after 1947, with the predominance of Punjab and the N.W.F.P. The landowning class from Punjab dominate the ranks of the officers of the armed forces, along with their adherence to feudalism and professionalism.

Although Liaquat had a pro-US orientations, he nevertheless followed a non-aligned policy. But Pakistan defense needs as advocated by the defense establishment, helped by the cold war and Nehru's dismissal of the USA.¹⁸ Four factors seem to have compelled Pakistan to abandon the option of non-alignment: the fear of India, the domestic political and economic problems, the ruling elite and the dictates of the international climate.¹⁹ Not only did the agreement change the entire training patterns of armed forces and introduced the American pattern of training but gradually it made

¹⁷ Tariq Ali, 'Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power' (Vikash Publication, New Delhi, 1970).

¹⁸ Iftikhar H. Malik, 'State and Civil Society in Pakistan', Macmillan, London, 1947, p.75

¹⁹ P.I. Cheema, 'Pakistan's Defense Policy, 1947-58', London, 1990, p.164

Pakistan heavily dependent upon American weaponry. Consequently when the American decided to impose an arms embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was Pakistan that was seriously hurt.²⁰

PATTERNS OF MILITARY IN INDIA :

The Indian National Congress proved a more stable ruling party than the Muslim League of Pakistan. The towering personality of Pandit. Nehru enabled the political system to consolidate itself and institutionalize its practices. This civilian control over the military during the first decade after independence was firmly established. The army was deliberately downgraded. The title of commander-in-chief was abolished in favour of chief of the Army staff. The policies pursued by Krishna Menon then Defense Minister weakened the military establishment in the period prior to the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. The term of the three military chief reduced from four to three years in 1966. No chief of Army Staff was given extension. After the coup in Pakistan in 1958, the Indian Government tightened its vigilance of the army.

Replying a question put by a correspondent about the engagement of army to step up food production Krishna Menon said, "I fundamentally differ from such proposals because it will encourage dictatorship to be established in this country."²¹

The recent sacking of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, the naval chief, by the Defense Minister George Fernandes although raised a lot of controversy and media hypes but it made one thing clear that unlike Pakistan, Indian civilian control over the military is complete. Regarding crossing Line of Control in order to cut supply line of the intruders during recent Kargil crisis, Army Chief V.P. Malik made it clear that it is cabinet to decide regarding crossing the LOC.

These efforts of the political leadership undermined the status of the military, especially the Army in India. It therefore couldn't play as much important role in the decision making process of India as did its counterpart in Pakistan. The recent intrusion in Kargil by Pakistan is considered an individual decision of Army, undermining the

²⁰ Ibid, p.160

²¹ The Hindu, March 8, 1959.

authority of Nawaj Sharif government. Thus the military establishment of the two country seems on the opposite poles.

BUREAUCRATIC ESTABLISHMENT :

Bureaucracy an essentially non-political institution with British tradition of non-commitment could assume a political role in Pakistan due to weak social base as well as the “disarray of political parties and the isolation of politicians from organized political support which reflect underlying weaknesses in the social base.”²² After Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, “the political leadership ceased to have any real standing amongst the people and their isolation made them vulnerable before the onslaught of the bureaucracy.”²³ While the League had been gradually sliding down towards the abyss of its extinction it gave way to the emergence of the new power groups and the civil service was the immediate power group to achieve authority in the Pakistan politics.

Under Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan , the civil servants effectively controlled the entire administration in the provinces and the politicians were put in a subordinate position under them .²⁴ Neither Jinnah nor Liaquat Khan seemed concerned with the setting up of democratic institutions and allowed bureaucracy to actively interfere in political processes. No general election were held during the uninterrupted four years tenure of Liaquat Ali Khan.

Bureaucracy direct participation in politics began with Ghulam Muhammad becoming the Governor General after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan.²⁵ Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin and his cabinet although he still enjoyed the support of the majority of members in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly . Dawn’s comment that “ on the night of April 17 , 1953, a government headed by the President of the Muslim League was flicked off like ash from a cigar tip”²⁶ , was a dramatic

²² Hamza Alvi, “ The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan”, International Social Journal (Rome), Vol. 3 ,No. 14 , March – April 1960 p.152

²³ Ibid , p. 157

²⁴ Khalid Bin Sayeed , “ The Political Role of Pakistan’s Civil Services” , Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXI , No. 2 , June 1958 , p. 131

²⁵ Sisir Gupta , “ Military , Bureaucratic Oligarchy of Pakistan” , Indian Left Review , Vol. 1 , No. 3, May-June 1971, p.23

²⁶ The Dawn , October 27 , 1954 .

confirmation of the bureaucracy's ascendancy to political power. This action proved that the bureaucracy had scant regard for institution of Parliamentary democracy.

The dismissal of united front ministry in 1954 in east Pakistan was like throwing cold water on the people's aspiration . In fact "the United Front had emerged as the most menacing challenge to the continued domination of the Punjabi led ruling coterie. They had the fear that the United Front might succeed in obtaining far-reaching provincial autonomy and thus stamp out the political-economic exploitation by the Punjabis."²⁷The imposition of section 92-A in East Bengal was a serious blow to democracy and represented an attempt to undo the popular victory in the elections. It was at this juncture that the threat to the democratic aspirations of the people assumed menacing proportions.

In order to eliminate East Bengal threat to the West Pakistan-based bureaucratic authority , Ghulam Muhammad integrated the three provinces and a number of other political units in the western wing into a united west Pakistan province called **one unit**. The real motive of this bureaucratic feudal ruling clique was to "capture power both in the center and in the one unit government"²⁸ so that they could assert unitedly against East Bengal. The appointment of Iskander Mirja as the Governor in the East Pakistan and his administration there was "like the administration of one of the bigger colonies-----"²⁹.Mr. Mirja believed that Pakistan was not yet ready for democracy. He told a foreign correspondent that, "the masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are bound to act foolishly , as they did in East Pakistan. It was thus necessary , that there should be somebody to rectify their blunders."³⁰His method of rectifying blunder was to kill the democracy and he did it.

The bureaucracy ,in close consort with the Army, dominated politics in Pakistan throughout but with a mask provided by chosen politicians till 1958 when the army, instead of remaining a backseat driver, chose itself to manouver the steering wheel. The bureaucratic clique in Pakistan with the help of political stooges brought a constitution in 1956, which gave enormous power to the president. But the ruling clique , through its policy of interference in and disruption of political parties, managed to create a climate of

²⁷ J.K. Ray , " Democracy and Nationalism on Trial : A Case Study of East Pakistan" , Simla, 1968, p.108

²⁸ The Dawn , October 1, 1955.

²⁹ The Times , December 2, 1954.

political instability and chaos of such a magnitude that the president came to the conclusion that this constitution was not workable and proclaimed its abrogation in October 1958. Clearly the attempt was to show that the survival and unity of Pakistan could be maintained only under a set up from which political parties and the democratic right of political dissent were totally eliminated. And this the bureaucratic-army combine succeeded in achieving by 1958.

Political ambitions of Pakistan's bureaucracy were so overwhelming that whenever political process, viz. elections, were allowed to take place at provincial levels, they were systematically subverted and reduced to a farce. Such a gross interference was detrimental to the healthy growth of democratic politics in Pakistan.

TABLE—7. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PAKISTAN'S BUREAUCRACY (1973—83)

| REGION | STRENGTH (IN %) |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| Punjab | 55.8 |
| NWFP | 11.6 |
| Urban Sindh | 20.2 |
| Rural Sindh | 5.1 |
| Baluchistan | 3.1 |
| FATA & N. Areas | 3.4 |
| Azad Kashmir | 0.9 |

Source: Government of Pakistan, Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report, January 1983, Islamabad, MPCPP, 1984.

The above table clearly shows the dominance of Punjab in bureaucracy followed by Sindh and N.W.F.P. Such Punjabi feudal dominance and neglect of other areas has intensified the unrest and centrifugal tendencies in backward regions.

The **Basic Democracy** of Ayub Khan was a tool to build a stable support structure at lower level by distributing favours among the rural elite. The bureaucracy was asked to

³⁰ The Dawn, October 31, 1954.

play a dominant and important role in it. The bureaucracy, because of its socio-economic background,³¹ had close relationship with the growing class of industrialists. It acted as the agent of big industrialist in the government.

The absence of strong and organised pressure groups failed to generate significant power to counter the power of the civil service. The industrial working class was not at all an effective, sizeable and organised political force.³² The centralized nature of the bureaucracy enabled it to counter the challenge posed by the democratic political process. Though the bureaucrats often declared that their actions were mainly motivated by the interest of Pakistan and democracy, but in real they hardly had any respect for democratic institutions. Whenever there was a threat to their interests or to the interest of their patrons—the feudal lords and capitalists, they did not hesitate to throw to the winds whatever pretensions about democracy they had.

Pattern of Indian Bureaucracy

The imperial powers established a bureaucratic system in their colonies and safeguarding and protecting their vital interests by giving it a highly centralized and hegemonic position in administration. Its two outstanding features were elitism and loyalty to the masters.

In the post independence period the generalist, elitist civil service of India is the legacy of the British days. Due to alteration from limited government to big government and from autocracy to democracy the nature of post-independence bureaucratic setup also underwent remarkable change.

Bureaucracy now is guided and controlled by the people's representatives. The bureaucrats blame the ministers and the political leadership for all the ills of Indian administration. The politicians also publicly condemn the inefficiency of the civil service. This mutual distrust is a serious problem of the present day situation in India.

Frequent leadership change further aggravate the problem of leadership between the bureaucracy and the political leadership. A mutual bureaucracy is not always possible. A

³¹ S.P.Verma & Viredra Narain, "Socio-economic Background of Pakistan's bureaucracy", South Asian Studies, Vol.6, No. 1 January, 1971, p. 59-70.

mutual value-free bureaucracy is possible only in a society where consensus existed on values; but in transitional societies where situations of dissent and conflict existed, it was too much to expect anyone to be neutral. To end the anti-bureaucratic attitude of the people and to bring the citizen and the administration closer to each other, the government established the Panchayati Raj institutions and Community Development Programme³³.

In India due to increasing politicization of administration the political leaders tend to excessively control the administration and interfere with its executive processes.

Although it restrains administrative excesses and corruption and makes the administrators responsible to the elected representatives of the people. But excessive political control makes the administration frustrated and powerless and reduces its independence and effectiveness. So a better coordination and cooperation between the two is imperative for nation- building and system maintaining activities.

³² Hamza Alvi, "The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan", International socialist journal, Rome, vol.3, no.14, March-April 1960, p. 156.

³³ "Public Authority in a Developing Political Community : The Case of India", Archives Europeans de Sociologie, IV, 1963, number1, p.61-63.

CHAPTER ---V

CONCLUSION

The Indian sub-continent which came out from the ordeal of partition in 1947 left behind burning wound and shattered passion. Still after 50th year of its independence, India and Pakistan both are carrying the burdened legacies, which is not only plaguing the interest of the two states but has been successful in creating an unseen psychological wall between the people of the two countries. Despite belonging to same race and same culture we are looking each other not only as aliens but even enemies. The problem seems to lie somewhere.

The current Kargil crisis is one of the repercussions of these legacies. A truncated Pakistan with lack of resources and underdeveloped region along with a big army and feudal bureaucratic setup was unable to establish itself as a welfare, democratic state due to inherent contradictions. The increasing centrifugal tendencies among its states especially NWFP and ethnic clashes in Sindh and other parts due to lack of homogeneity and problem in nation building , it became imperative for the army and national leadership to divert public attention from core domestic issues and thus Kashmir issue became a favorite tool.

In the wake of a nuclear South Asia, the main objectives of Pakistan is to internationalize the Kashmir issue and to observe the reaction of nuclear India. Because India showed restraint regarding crossing the Line Of Control Pakistan's objective of attracting third party mediation has failed and it became isolated diplomatically. The aggression in Kargil was being projected as a legitimate exercise to avenge India's support for the breaking away of Bangladesh from Pakistan. A Pakistan defence ministry spokesman said that, "Pakistan visualizes the present 'warlike situation' to develop in three phases. Phase-I will involve dispersal of planes, equipment, ammunition, personnel, and communication networks to dislodge the enemy. Phase-II will involve being prepared for a full-scale battle in all the theatres. Phase-III means an actual involvement in war, in

which ground-air and sea forces would go into an operational mode¹. Parallel to this, Nawaz Sharif's letters to G-8 countries and United States in which he emphasised that, "Kargil cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger issue of Kashmir"². Despite the three wars and finally its dismemberment in 1971 Pakistan has failed to learn lessons from the past and in the international arena it is emerging as a failed and rogue state. The army of Pakistan never want the Kashmir issue to be resolved. Any step towards closer relationship between the two country were seen with raised eyebrows. Because the army knows its very supremacy will exist only if the present hostility continues. That's why the success of the *Bus Diplomacy* and *Lahore Declaration* were jeopardised due to aggression in Kargil by the Pakistan army. Infact instead of one, there is three autonomous power center in Pakistan i.e. the civilian government, the army, the ISI. None has control over the other, although sometimes they work in tandem against India.

In India opposition political parties are considered as political rivals by the government and their constructive criticism of the government policies helps to undo the ills and thus puts the democracy on a more mature setup. But unlike India, the opposition in Pakistan are considered as enemy. The military take over by Ayub Khan occurred in 1958 due to selfish motives and immature politics failed to provide a working political structure. The ruling political parties effort to eliminate the rival camp is still existing. The treatment meted out to Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), and self-exile by its leader Altaf Hussein and widespread repression on its supporters proves the fact. The recent move to eliminate Benazir Bhutto from the political scene on the pretext of corruption by the Nawaz Sharif government, is an attempt to maintain the old tradition. Nawaz Sharif himself is neck deep in various corruption charges and once if in future the PPP government comes to power then the same treatment could be meted out to him. About one decade old democratic system in Pakistan is still in infancy and reeling under crisis after crisis. The Indian democratic setup has been progressing definitely towards a more mature system. The dominance of a single party, Indian National Congress has broken and it gave way to the rise of BJP and various regional parties. The era of

¹ The Hindustan Times, July 7, 1999.

² Ibid.

coalition politics makes the government more and more responsible with increasing say of the regional parties.

About human dimension, the refugees, who came into East Punjab and West Punjab after partition faced counterpart experience borne out of the common predicament of displacement. The refugees who came into the East Punjab gained considerable success. Success meant to increased wealth and thus a more tolerant attitude towards competition called a synergistic outlook. Then wealth is used not only for material things and investment but also for education for one's children. This education, in the next generation, can help to develop modern attitudes and the sense of efficacy that can be transmitted to future generations in place of the refugees sense of invulnerability.

In order to secure a decent level of living the farmers are adapting such means as saving of money , investment of savings in economic pursuits and enterprises such as agriculture and agro-industries, risk taking, acceptance of innovation, the ability to wait for returns on investments, selling one's labour, hiring the labour on the basis of one's ability rather than for considerations of caste and kin and some of the changes which are taking place in the attitudes and behaviour of the rural people.

The process of land settlement in the country side of Punjab involved large-scale land transfers which led to the earliest and most comprehensive land reforms that take place in independent India. The reconstruction of the agricultural economy, the creation of irrigation infrastructure and the enterprise and energy shown by the refugee farmers laid the foundations of intensive agriculture in East Punjab and in less than two decades the region stood at the threshold of the unprecedented rural prosperity ushered in by the **Green Revolution.**

In sharp contrast, problems of unsatisfactory integration of the uprooted families from East Pakistan still loom large in the absorbing society of West Bengal. Cultural upbringing and the social traits of the uprooted population, especially of the educated Hindus, require, indeed a careful evaluation in understanding their mental make-up and familial expectations in the absorbing society at large of the country. They had and still have certain definite motives and aspirations in the various spheres of social and economic activities which are of-course, oriented towards realisable achievement. The refugee problem still persist in general and eastern India may be a sharp indicator of

greater initial and expanding incompatibility between the displaced persons needs, aspirations and urges for a decent life and living and the receiving country's social , economic resources and demands.

Cultural incompatibility between the Bengali speaking Hindu refugees from East Pakistan and the Bengali speaking inhabitants of West Bengal is definitely not so great as to reduce them into two alien groups within the same cultural milieu. Infact, they are fast integrating into one cultural group. The bulk of the refugees from East Bengal could never be rehabilitated on land, except in small pockets like the Andamans. When their large-scale agrarian settlement was belatedly attempted in **Dandakaranya** , it ,in turn, threatened the displacement of the tribals. At the same time it failed in its objective of meaningfully rehabilitating those it was meant to benefit. The long drawn out influx of refugees into West Bengal merely led to a situation in which a very large number of people who had been engaged in agricultural occupations before their displacement were found to seek survival in semi-urban and urban contexts as the under-class. They contributed to the process of immiserisation that has come to characterize the economy of the Eastern Indian region.

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