

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPE

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This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPE", being submitted by Ram Briksha Kumar, in partial fulfilment of requirement for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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P R E F A C E

Many young persons of my age-group, like me, should feel proud and favoured to be in an active state of mind and body at this point of time when the entire planet seems to be in a state of flux. Ethnic, demographic, economical, political, enviournmental and similar changes in the realm of different persuasions - all these are in a state of conflict and perpetual activity. The European continent which has remained the birth place of epoch-making events, ideologies and doctrines is no exception. The modalities and structures formulated at the end of World War II began crumbling due to the failure of the ideological and economic siphons and because of the urge of people to live and embrace in love rather than in enmity. The old changes as the new order ushers in. The military alliances, viz. the NATO and the Warsaw Pact - conceived and commanded in the backdrop of that old order of the late 1940s and 1950s, could not remain immune to the dreams of the people, be they in plain clothes or in uniforms.

Hence, this study is an attempt to examine the fate of these two military alliances, viz. the NATO and the Warsaw Pact after the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. By the time this work was being given finishing touches, one of the alliances of post World War II era namely the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. There has been great concern about the existence and relevance

of the other military alliance, (the NATO), as well.

Chapter I is introductory in nature covering the developments in Europe and in the USSR beginning from the mid - 1980s. Chapter II examines the fate of the military alliances amidst the developments that have taken place in Europe in recent years as well as their relevance in the changed circumstances. Chapter III is a brief summary of the arms - control and confidence - building - measures ever since the first meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in 1985. Chapter IV is an attempt to work out the future models of European peace in the backdrop of the unification of Germany, the dis-integration of the Soviet Empire in the East Europe and greater economic integration of the European countries. Chapter V is an overview as well as an assessment of the historic changes taking place in Europe.

It was my privilege to work under the supervision of Prof. T.T. Poullose.

I shared all the carelessness and waywardness of a new research scholar put to the yoke of dissertation writing. And if there are any blemishes in this work, I am alone responsible for it.

New Delhi
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Ram Briksha Kumar

ABBREVIATIONS

ACR	: Arms Control Reporter
AFAP	: Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles
ALCM	: Air - Launched Cruise Missiles
ATTU	: Atlantic To The Urals
BMD	: Ballistic Missile Defence
BWC	: Biological weapons Convention
CBO	: Congressional Budget Office
CSBM	: Confidence And Security Building Measures
CDI	: Conventional Defence Initiative
CFE	: Conventional Forces In Europe
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CMEA	: Council For Mutual Economic Assistance
CMF	: Conceptual Military Framework
CSCE	: Conference On Security And Cooperation In Europe
CTB	: Comprehensive Test Ban
CWC	: Chemical Weapons Convention
CWFZ	: Chemical Weapon Free Zone
FOFA	: Follow On Forces Attack
FOTL	: Follow On To Lance
FY	: Fiscal Year
GON	: Public Monitoring Of The Reduction Of Armed Forces And Armaments
GPG	: General Political Guidelines
INF	: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
LRINF	: Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
MBFR	: Mutual And Balanced Force Reduction

MFR(or,MURFAAMCE) : Mutual Reductions Of Forces And Armaments And Associated Measures In Europe

MIRVs : Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles

MNC : Major NATO Commanders

MOD : Ministry Of Defence

NNA : Neutral And Non-Aligned States

NPT : Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRRC : Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre

NTM : National Technical Means

OSI : On-Site Inspection

PNE : Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

POMCUS : The European Prepositioning Of Material Configured To Unit Sets

PTBT : Partial Test Ban Treaty

RV : Re-Entry Vehicles

SACEUR : Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SDI : Strategic Defence Initiative

SLCM : Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

SNDV : Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

SNF : Short Range Nuclear Forces

SRAM : Short Range Attack Missiles

SRINF : Short Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

START : Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TASM : Tactical Air To Surface Missile

TLIs : Treaty Limited Items

TNF : Theatre Nuclear Forces

TNT : Tri - Nitro - Toulaine
TTB : Threshold Test Ban Treaty
WEU : Western European Union
WP : Warsaw Pact
WTO : Warsaw Treaty Organisation

CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

END OF AN ERA IN EUROPE : A SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

For forty years the world has been divided into blocs: East and West. The "Iron Curtain", barbed wire and walls, insurmountable and permanent.

There were no questions of opening anything, whether German or anything else. No matter what dreams of a changed European order there might have been, the systems and the basic power structures were never questioned. It was a case of coming to terms with the world the way it was : Capitalism here, Communist there; at most there was a little bit less of one or the other.¹

Though the blocs began crumbling, especially the Communist blocs and the international scenario came to be characterized by a marked relaxation of East-West tension between the two super powers and the members of their military alliances, this unique phenomenon was not a sudden development. Rather it emerged out of long felt international perceptions and other interactions which got underway

1. Thomas Loffelholz, " A Permanent Order Begins to Crumble", The German Tribune (Hamburg), No. 1839, 1 October 1989, p. 2.

as a result of rigour and intensity of the menacing Cold War for decades after the World War II. Therefore, it should be studied in the historical context of mutual motivations and compulsions of the major international actors.

The relations between the two super powers following the traumatic experience of the Cuban missile crisis at the end of 1962 was characterised by a relaxation of tension and a measure of mutual understanding and co-operation. This first phase of detente witnessed three US-USSR summits and signing of several significant agreements between or sponsored by the two super powers. But as it happened, the countdown or reversal of this process started at the end of 1979 and soon degenerated into a Cold War II accompanied by a marked cooling and, then embitterment, of relations between the two super powers and on either side of the "Iron Curtain".

Indeed, as early as 1975, one could see the beginning of the process of the erosion of detente as a result of American reverses in Soviet-backed Vietnam and due to the Soviet inspired Cuban military support to the MPLA in Angola. To counter the adverse impact of these setbacks President Carter

pledged himself in 1978 to a 3% real increase in military expenditure which ran contrary to the spirit of detente. Tirade of Ronald Reagan against the USSR, expressing the view that the latter has stolen a march over the US in nuclear and conventional arms capability, infected the air of mutual trust, which constituted the foundation stone of the edifice of detente. With around 70,000 troops, as if it were predesigned, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 was the last straw that brought impoverished detente structure tumbling down and the senatorial ratification of the SALT II was indefinitely postponed.

Thus began the eventful decade of 1980s with battlelines drawn for a new conflictual relationship between the two super powers and the Cold War II had come into play. When America's 40th President Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1980, he was already sore at the Soviet advance towards arms parity with the US and was critical of Soviet moves in Angola, Central America, Cuba and Afghanistan. The Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law and suppression of the independent trade union movement in Poland aggravated the situation further.

As he won office with the slogan, "Let's make America great again",² from the very start he mounted a powerful verbal attack against the Soviet Union and described it as "the focus of evil"; categorised as a supporter of "international terrorism"; and accused them to assassinate the Pope and added that in furtherance of their global political and military objectives the Russians could well "lie, cheat, and steal". This may be seen as the summit of the Cold War II reminiscent of Churchill's Fulton Speech and Joseph Stalin's pronouncement that the western powers will be duly "bashed up". Russians gave back in kind and called Ronald Reagan "a Hitler" out to "terrorise" and impose American "hegemony" all over the world.

Subsequently, Reagan announced on 23 March, 1983 the development and deployment of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), or the "Star War" project and to hit the "source of insurgency" (Cuba) as well as his plans for a larger US military presence in the Gulf and the South-West Asia reaching, thus, close to the Soviet Central Asian parts.

2. Lee Edward, "Ronald Reagan : 40th President of the United States", (USA, n.d.) , no. 81-031 (112).

In the next 2-3 years the USSR deployed intermediate range SS-20s missiles in Eastern Europe allegedly to counter the threat to the security of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation from British submarine-based Polaris missiles in the Mediterranean Sea, the independent French nuclear arsenals and the American arms supplies to the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. When in November 1983 NATO began deployment of the first Pershing II in the FRG the Soviet Union walked out of the INF talks and START which had been any progress in Vienna since 1982. This was the high water mark of the Cold War II.

Then developed suspicions about each others' strategic intentions and plans and among both super powers there developed the fear Psychosis that the other might be able to utilize the period of lull to steal a decisive lead over the other in nuclear weapons or delivery systems. Though the ongoing research on weaponry and its production continued - it was thought necessary to reach some understanding or accommodation on the issue of nuclear armaments to rationalize their escalating defence budgets and control deficits. To this

end a new breakthrough was the meeting of the foreign ministers of the US and USSR - George Shultz and Andrei Gromyko - in Geneva (7 January 1985) and thus preparing the ground for the first Gorbachev and Reagan summit meeting in November 1985 described as the "fireside conversation" between the two leaders; in truth, it signified the first firm and major step in the direction of the so-called 'Neo-detente' after about half a decade of Cold War II hatred and tensions. This is exemplified by the decision of the two leaders to continue the dialogue as well as their declared common perceptions that a nuclear war is "unwinnable" and since it can not be won, therefore, should not be fought.

Since then the summit meetings have become a regular affair. Of these summit meetings, the Washington summit of December 1987 is very momentous due to INF agreements about the elimination of the INF (medium and short range) along with elaborate inspection and verification measures. In Malta (December 1989) Bush and Gorbachev made the historic declaration about the "end of the Cold War". Accordingly at the Washington summit (June 1990), the two leaders cleared up some stumbling blocks to

the conclusion of the 50% START agreements. This treaty, if finally concluded as proposed, would be an unprecedented event in the history of disarmament and detente.

But this change of heart came not all of a sudden. Dramatic developments of the mid-1980s altered the very rationale for this perilous rivalry between the super powers and their respective alliance systems. The United States continued to suffer the adverse effects of the "Vietnam Syndrome". By mid-1980s its economy started facing serious challenges. From a creditor nation it turned into the world's largest debtor nation. For almost two decades the Presidency and the Administration remained victims of different crises: the Watergate Scandal, Iran-Contra affairs, Pentagon corruptions and now the involvement in Gulf, are but the symbols of a larger underlying malaise of a political system burdened by fixity of thought structure. Moreover, not only the US belief in the use of force and superior technology have repeatedly faced serious problems, but there also emerged new centres of powers, such as Japan and West Germany as an economic-technological power (the economies US helped to

take shape after the World War II) and China as a politico-military power. Weakening of the US economic citadel was sure to weaken the Western European alliance security system. In addition to these the Greens and Peace movements against the war and installation of the nuclear (INF) weapons in Western Europe shook the confidence of the people who seemed no longer supporting the doctrine of "balance of terror".

Powerful effects of these "vox populi" as there have been, the developments in the Soviet Union have in large manner provided the fulcrum by means of which events have been lifted onto new ground. Seventy years after the storming of the Winter Palace which swept Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power, the Soviet Union found itself at a critical juncture. The Soviet Union seemed reviewing its priorities; overturning some dogmatically held positions unthinkable only a few years ago and generally willing be seen as a constructive member of the world order. The daunting task that Gorbachev set for himself when he came to power in 1985 - that of revitalizing a stagnating Soviet society and economy, in brief - another revolution, was

to be accomplished - one without shots, but a revolution nonetheless.

The charismatic and dynamic Gorbi revolution not only pushed the stagnated international system but made the terms "glasnost" and "perestroika" as familiar to the world as "bread and butter". The Soviet leadership clearly saw the "glasnost" as a tool of "perestroika", one which allow and encourage intellectuals and workers to uncover and criticise managerial and bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. Difficult and dangerous instrument to use, as it was, Gorbachev has walked so far on a knife edge between encouragement and control. The referendum on the theme of Russian federation conducted and their results on 17 March 1991 bear enough evidence of this statement.

Needless to say, the ethnic problems and the demands for more autonomy as well as for the separation of the Baltic republics have continued to date. These ethnic unrest, which then surfaced in rallies in the Baltic Republics and demonstrations by the Crimean Tartars in Moscow in 1987, took on a new dimension in February 1988 when the Armenian

problem exploded on the demand for the return of the largely Armenian - populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia - was but the tip of the ice-berg. When the disturbances continued throughout the year with huge demonstrations and found an echo in ever more far-reaching demands for autonomy in the Baltic republics, it became all too apparent that the USSR, the last remaining undivided colonial empire, was facing an unprecedented challenge to its very cohesion. ³

Sir James Cable observed : "... In 1989 revolution became not only rife, but contagious, in East and Central Europe... The piercing of the Berlin Wall in November was an event as momentous and as symbolic as the capture of the Bastille on 14 July 1789. It was a reluctant concession under pressure ... Some pilgrims stayed out, but most wanted only to try the test of freedom before returning to see whether this heady wine would travel. It did and seemed to intoxicate hitherto docile masses and to poison their rulers". ⁴

3. Strategic Survey 1988-89 (London), p.74.

4. Sir James Cable, " Revolution and War ", International Relations (London), Vol. X, No. 1, May 1990, p. 45.

The year 1989 was not of Europe but more of Germany. The events of the closing month of the year confirmed that "Perestroika" and "Glasnost" were no mere transient phenomenon but key points from which Socialism would have to find its new bearing. Two basic principles of communism followed in Eastern Europe, namely, the democratic centralism and leading role of Communist Party, have been discarded. It was felt unrealistic to pursue a righteous end by unrighteous means. Not only the creation of political inequalities militated against the continuation of East European regimes but even the rulers blundered by overlooking the human element in politics.

The German unification acquired unprecedented urgency after the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In September 1989 about 60,000 East Germans crossed into West Germany thus forcing the leadership to change its views. The clear fall of communism from grace eroded the very reason for the existence of East Germany as a separate state. History seemed repeating once more and economic unification (like the Zollverein of the previous century) preceded the political unification even

this time. On July 1, 1990 by economic merger of two states there came into being a single monetary zone having social market economy, private property and free competition. Both Germanys signed a landmark unity treaty on 31 August 1990 to harmonize their legal and political systems after both merged on October 3, 1990. Thus the unified Germany now consists of about 76 million Germans forming 45% larger than France and 75% more than the United Kingdom and accounts 1/3rd GDP of the European capital.

More recently the just concluded war in the Gulf tested the stability of the European order. On the one hand it sowed discord and division within the NATO at a time when the Western Alliance needed unity to preserve its future in the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, the European Parliament temporarily blocked its proposal to provide \$ 1 billion worth of food aid to the USSR to express protest over the Soviet repression of pro-independence agitators in the Baltic republics in the first week of 1991 complemented by Boris Yelstin's demand that Gorbachev must resign.

Amidst these developments and with the scrapping of the military role of the Warsaw Pact there are talks for the creation of the "new world order". President Bush and Gorbachev are finding progress toward a "new world order" to be a very mixed doubles. Yet so far, despite the Gulf War and the Baltic disturbances, neither of the two crisis managers has come a serious cropper.

In a large sense, the Cold War began because of events in Eastern Europe. Trillions of dollars have been spent on both sides of the Iron Curtain on armaments because of profound differences between communism and the western values. In the economic, political and ideological sense, communism and central planning have been lost in Eastern Europe, but democracy and the market system have not yet won.

The new year that followed the "end of the Cold War" did not get off to a particularly promising start. The Moscow super power summit planned for February 1991 was cancelled, and not just on account of Operation Desert Storm.

The summit was shelved partly because Gorbachev chose to gag independence movements in the Baltic and after the orthodox Soviet military leaders had successfully stymied the arms control talks is a surge of reactionary self-assurance.

In Geneva the START (strategic arms reduction talks) is dragging on, while in Vienna the talks on improvements to the Paris treaty on conventional security in Europe were shelved. Despite domestic troubles, supra-regional economic catastrophe and murmurs of discontent from Capitol Hill the US continues to bank on Gorbachev as the only partner it feels to be reasonably predictable, worthy of confidence and, for the time being, indispensable.⁵

Thus in less-than-existential terms, the Cold War is over, at least for the time being. Unlike the past events of Berlin Blockade (1948-9), Berlin Crisis (1958-62) or the invasion of Afghanistan (1979), today the super power relationship is marked by mutual restraint and the search for mutual accommodation - from INF to START, from trade to technology, from Afghanistan via Central America to Angola

5. Lee Wieland, "The Big Powers Tread Carefully Together to Maintain Basis of Relationship", The German Tribune (Hamburg), no. 1459, 10 March 1991, p. 2.

and Cambodia. Never before in the history of detente have so many dimensions of the conflict been tackled in so short time.⁶ And one can safely say, today, instead of the Brezhnev Doctrine there is the "Sinatra Doctrine " proclaiming every Warsaw Pact country's absolute freedom of choice.

"But we must not suppose that we have seen the end of change or that change is irreversible or that all its consequences will be generally acceptable. There is no predictable connection between the justice or the popularity of a cause and the results of its achievements, between the Glorious Revolution of which we have recently celebrated the tercentary and the twenty years of war in which it involved us. Change is a catalyst : whether for evil or for good we may have to wait years to judge ".⁷

6. Dr. Josef Joffe, "After Bipolarity : Eastern and Western Europe, Between Two Ages ", Adelphi Papers (London), No. 247, Winter 1989-90, p. 73.

7. Cable, n. 4, p. 53.

CHAPTER TWO :

THE FATE OF NATO AND WTO WITHOUT EAST-WEST RIVALRY

"... Clear thinking is a strategic weapon and advantage in today's complex and turbulent world. Decisions on long-range strategy must be based on plausibilities and probabilities".¹

Institutions and structures designed in an earlier, very different phase of post war European politics, such as - the NATO, the WTO, the EC, the Vienna arms control negotiations and the CSCE process -all are in a state of imcompletion, of promise more than of certainty. Structuring the peace of the post - Cold War era is no less a challenge than was "winning the peace" after World War II.²

The major sources of change in the military doctrine and strategy of the USSR and the WTO could be summarized as follows:

* A full recognition of the catastrophic consequence of nuclear and conventional war between the USSR and USA, and between the WP and NATO;

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1. Moshe Lewin, "Perestroika: A New Historical Stage", Journal of International Affairs (Columbia), vol. 42, no.2, Spring 1989, pp. 314 ff.
 2. Christoph Betram, "The German Question", Foreign Affairs (Newyork), vol. 69, no. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 60-61.

- * The profound, deep, political and economic reform in the USSR and in some East European countries, leading to reassessment of past experiences and concepts in the areas of national security and military strategy as well as the need to re-distribute the resources away from the military and defence sectors of the economy;
- * Efforts to transform the WP from a military-political to a political-military alliance.³

The NATO's restructuring, on the other hand, is not less pronounced. The central theme- and the title of Secretary Baker's speech - at the Berlin Press club in December 1989 was: "America in Europe After the Cold War". However, Baker's vision of a "New Europe: Europe on the basis of a New Atlanticism", with NATO as its central institution, reflects the familiar American view of NATO as a multi-purpose alliance of democracies, a view Europeans have always resisted..

3. Dr. Andrey A. Kokshin, "The Future of NATO and Warsaw Pact Strategy" Adelphi Papers (London), no. 247, Winter 1989/90, p. 60.

Baker proposed four new functions for NATO in the "new security structure for Europe". France objected to the first - a NATO arms control verification staff-even before Baker articulated it in Berlin. The second - a larger NATO role in dealing with regional conflicts and unconventional weapons has been successfully resisted by Europe throughout the Cold War because almost all NATO countries pursue their own national interests in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

So they are not likely to be enthusiastic about Baker's third suggestion that the West work through the Helsinki conference on security and co-operation in Europe to develop measures to promote human rights and democratic institution-building in the East.

Finally American leaders need to face the fact that while most NATO members feel friendly and even grateful to the United States for its help through the long period of Europe's vulnerability, they do not regard the US as a European power. The Americans were neither invited to join EC nor the Europeans were enthusiastic about the creation of a new Europe on the basis of a new Atlanticism.

Therefore, Americans need to learn to be a power, not a super power and need prepare psychologically and economically for reversion to the state of a normal nation. ⁴

The Soviet Union is also not a modern industrial society. It is rather, as The Times of London has noted, a Third World country with First World weapons. Its structures and traditions do not encourage development. ⁵

THE WARSAW PACT:

Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note, as its corpse was carried to the ramparts. At a subdued ceremony in Budapest, Foreign and Defence Ministers of the six Warsaw Pact states formally agreed to wind up the Pact's military structures at the end of March 1991.

Founded in May 1955 as a counterpart to NATO when the Federal Republic of Germany joined the

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4. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War", Foreign Affairs (Newyork), vol.69, no.1, 1989/90, pp. 15-16.
 5. Ibid, p.5.

North Atlantic Pact, the Warsaw Pact, which was to be based on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, has passed away quietly at the age of 36.

Except a handful of Soviet generals no one was likely to have shed a tear on its death-bed. Its heirs are likely to rub their hands in satisfaction or glee even though the Pact's political structure is to be maintained until the beginning of 1992.

The signing of the military death certificate merely followed multilaterally what began at the end of 1989 in central and Eastern Europe when communist system in countries bordering on the Soviet Union collapsed.

In agreeing to the voluntary dismantling of the Pact President Gorbachev was merely pre-empting threats by other members to resign from it.⁶

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, having recently embraced democratic reform after decades

6. Harry Scheicher, "Not Even a Drum Roll as Military Pact Slides into Oblivion", The German Tribune (Hamburg), no. 1459, 10 March 1991, p. 2.

of socialism, increasingly regarded the pact as an obstacle to good relations with Western Europe.

With the Cold War thaw and agreements with NATO to reduce conventional forces in Europe, the military protection afforded by the Pact started to seem redundant. ⁷

The evaporation of ideological and political points held in common and the demise of the German Democratic Republic deprived the Warsaw Pact of any sense of reason for its survival.

In early 1980s two themes were discussed with officials and academics from WTO nations: i. transforming the WTO into a non-ideologically-oriented organisation emphasizing political consultation and non-interference in the internal affairs; and ii. maintaining the two alliance system.

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Vivid and astonishing examples of these trends came in a series of calls by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa in January 1990 for the total removal of all Soviet forces

7. Times of India (New Delhi), 26 February 1991.


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by the end of 1990, and in the repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine by the WTO countries which had participated in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The ministerial Communiqué of the WTO in October 1990 also stressed that "it is not useful to include military-political alliances into the solution of bilateral controversies". This might be interpreted to mean that WTO forces should not be employed against member states. The WTO, might be viewed, in other words as exerting "existential deterrance" against attempts within its borders to solve disputes by non-peaceful means.

The situation was, of course, very fluid. A people's revolution is not something which governments, parties or organisations can neatly manage. What precisely is intended by increasing the "political role" of the WTO can be interpreted as meaning that the organisation will accommodate great diversity with the East Europeans distancing themselves from the USSR in the process of democratization. So, despite some scepticism, it was quite apparent that the WTO (like the CMEA) was moving in the

direction of greater pluralism, and some concrete ideas about creating new WTO institutions and roles had already been advanced.

Before this meeting that dissolved WTO militarily, the leaders of the WP in their annual session in Moscow on 7 June 1990, the first such summit since the collapse of governments in Eastern Europe, had on their agenda the issue of transforming the WP from a "military-political" to a "political-military" organisation.

Gorbachev announced in January 1989 that the defence budget would be cut by 14.2% ; and the production of military weapon and equipment by 19.5% . The subsequent statements indicated even more significant reductions as well as withdrawal of troops. For example, in response to demands by the new governments of Czechoslovakia and Hungary and in tune with the Soviet undertaking given in December 1989 to bring home all its foreign-based troops by the year 2000, the Soviet Union agreed during late February and early March to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia (73,500) and Hungary (52,000)

by July 1991. On February 11 the Soviet government offered also to begin negotiations on the withdrawal of the 40,000 Soviet troops stationed in Poland.⁸

From the moment of its foundation, the Warsaw Pact acquired all the characteristics of a typical Soviet political and defence organisation and High Command. Within 18 months of the foundation of the WP, the Soviet Union faced its first major rebellion within its East European buffer zone, the Hungarian rising of October 1956. In the following years, politically the Soviet Union also appeared to limit the role and contribution of the East European countries within the WP.⁹

The Socialist states of Eastern Europe made up a region of 800 or more kilometres in depth providing both a defensive buffer and an offensive launching platform for the Soviet Union. It means it tried to do something that NATO does not attempt, namely to enforce an ideological uniformity. The

8. See, Keesing's Record of World Events (Bristol), vol. 36, no. 2, February 1990, p. 37258.

9. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Developments in Alliance Politics: The Warsaw Pact", RUSI and Brassey's Defence Year Book 1986 (London), pp. 148-149.

satellite nations made a contribution of about 1,211,000 regular military personnel to the Pact's force of 6,307,000. The Soviet contingent came to about 5,096,000 or more than four-fifths of the total. The Soviets, therefore, made up a much higher proportion of the Pact's army than do the American forces in NATO, and they bore at least 80% of the costs of the Warsaw Pact, as opposed to the American contribution of about 60% to NATO. Instead of the military structure of the NATO, the Warsaw Pact was satellite formations slotted into the Soviet chain of command. The strength and weakness of the Warsaw Pact was, therefore, to a large extent those of the Soviet Union. ¹⁰

Historically, the Soviet Union's East European allies not only provided a "conveyor belt" for Soviet decisions to the East European countries and a military buffer, but also constituted the nucleus of the world socialist system. Gorbachev recognised that the main threat the Soviet Union

10. Hugh Faringdon, Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Super Powers (London, 1989), p. 115.

faced was not external but internal.. He probably also judged that efforts to enforce continued orthodoxy in Eastern Europe carried no assurance of success and consequently, he moved bloc relations toward a non-ideological footing, and started to play a more active role in advocating reforms in the East European states.

Although Moscow was still unwilling to dissolve the Warsaw Pact or release its allies from their alliance commitments, it showed itself to be prepared to tolerate a remarkable degree of independence in East European foreign and domestic policy.¹¹

Renee De Nevers examined three possible security outcomes. One of these was the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as it happened on 25 February 1991 at Budapest. The removal of the Soviet influence from Eastern Europe due to Moscow's increasing pre-occupation with internal crises and the concurrent development of distinct foreign and security policies

11. Renee De Nevers, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The End of an Era", Adelphi Papers (London), no. 249, March 1990, p. 4.

by various East European states resulted in the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact as a military power. It could well pave the way for disintegration of its political role as well. East European states now find themselves on their own, seeking new ways to define their security interests and military requirements.

Several new security arrangements could emerge as a result, including the possibility that some states in the region might still wish to maintain strong ties with the Soviet Union whatever the circumstances due to historical, geographical and economic factors may be, for example, Bulgaria and Poland (the latter primarily for security guarantee from the Soviet Union if it is forced to confront a united Germany).

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in itself however would not remove all ties between the Soviet Union and its allies. Economic interests alone could lead both East Europeans and the USSR to

favour continued trade relations even after this collapse, and Moscow's economic, political and military relations with its allies are already proceeding at different rates.¹²

The people of Eastern Europe are bound together by their backwardness relative to Western and, even Southern Europe. But this gap between Eastern Europe and the rest of the continent was not due solely to the Soviet military presence in the region or to the world wide crises of Marxist-Leninist system. After all, the crisis of the Soviet system cannot account for the near collapse of Yugoslavia, which has been free of Soviet influence for over forty years.¹³

Nationalism is endemic in many parts of the erstwhile socialist world. Having been unable to germinate openly in the socialist era, it was bound to come out of its cocoon.

12. Ibid, pp. 72-74.

13. Nicolai N. Petro, "Re-discovering Russia", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 34, no. 1, Winter 1990, p. 51.

The drastic redrawing of the ethnic map in Eastern Europe might explain along with the fading memory of past injustices and the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist experiment why peoples of the region recently seemed capable of solidarity beyond petty nationalism.

NATO:

There are two conventional ways of speaking about NATO. The first is to praise its achievements: the peace that has been maintained for over four decades (due to the fact that the NATO has lasted longer than any alliance in the history of the world since the Greeks formed the anti-Persian League of Delos in 477 B.C.). Alternatively it is also possible to deplore the unresolved issues: the gap between the announced military strategy and what is being implemented; the imbalance between detente and defence; the pace and direction of arms control; and the growing mistrust between a generation of Americans and Europeans who have lived their entire lives sheltered by the Alliance

they assault. ¹⁴

There has been complaints that the present NATO structure is simply not working, either in defining the threat or in finding methods to meet it. Existing arrangements are unbalanced. When one country dominates the Alliance on all major issues, little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to re-define the requirements of security or to co-ordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results. ¹⁵

Thus the "NATO has been brought face to face with two questions: How much unity do we want? How much pluralism we can stand? Too formalistic a conception of unity risks destroying the sense

14. Henry Kissinger, "Issues Before the Atlantic Alliance", in his, Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays 1982-1984 (London, 1985), p. 167.

15. Henry Kissinger, Excerpted from an article published in Time (Newyork), 5 March 1984.

of responsibility of the Allies. Unavoidable differences in the perspective of NATO member arise due to the fact that the US is the only member of NATO having world-wide interests. As the detente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive (NATO members claim NATO to be defensive) concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. The need, in short, is to go from alliance to community".¹⁶

Today, however in view of the reduced immediate military threat posed by the political WTO countries and their changing political orientations, can the dissolution of NATO be far behind ? Or has the Alliance assumed any vital responsibilities for managing the process of change ? And if the answer is positive, and to retain its relevance and vitality as circumstances change, NATO must look beyond these familiar tasks to a broader agenda.

The treaty describes no event that would invite

16. Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (Newyork, 1965), p. 10.

the dissolution of the Alliance and for that matter it nowhere refers to the Soviet Union. Although Article 5, the "core" of the treaty, commits the parties to regard an attack on one as an attack against them all, the raison d'etre of the alliance does not depend on an existing, identifiable military threat. Article 2, for example, speaks of political and economic roles and Article 10 allows the parties to invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty to safeguard democracy, political liberty and the rule of law- to become a party.¹⁷

And this is despite the fact that even this time the traditional Soviet objective of dissolving both alliances was repeated,¹⁸ for which the Warsaw Treaty specifically mentioned in Article 11, stating that the treaty shall cease to be effective "in the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe".

17. Peter Cortorier, "Quo vadis NATO?" Survival (London), vol. 32, no. 2, March/April 1990, pp. 141-142.

18. During the 2-3 December 1989 Malta Summit, President Mikhail Gorbachev stated that NATO and the WTO "should not remain military alliances", but instead evolve into "military political alliances and, later on, just political alliances".

NATO has been, of course, both a political and a military alliance from its inception and it need no longer view its relations with the WTO countries as necessarily invoking Goethe's dilemma of choosing between justice and order. The alliance now has the most promising opportunity to realize its long standing goal of overcoming the division of Europe, as set down in the 1967 Harmel Report. But the developments after 1989, will also be recalled as the genesis of a period of intense examination of whether NATO can in fact, "shape and manage this historic process", or whether the Alliance is, as Dostoevsky ponders in Crime and Punishment, like victims on their way to execution who became passionately interested in any object they chance to see on the way. ¹⁹

Between these two visions there is an "insurance policy" concept that the West is better off with NATO than without it. Nevertheless, NATO will clearly face a different security environment in the 1990s. The principles of the Alliance's conventional force

19. Cortotier, n. 17, p. 146.

posture will need re-examination (such as Forward Defence) and lower levels of forces must necessitate new conceptual thinking. Thus, NATO defence requirements cannot avoid further downward adjustment that may be necessitated due to the pressure of domestic budgets and demographic and environmental trends as the Allies cannot be expected to continue to sign up a concept that cannot be implemented.

The burden sharing debate has been an endemic controversy within the Atlantic Alliance since its inception. Defence free-riding by West Europeans is a legacy of the early post-World War II period, which today no longer can be justified. Now politically rehabilitated nations, such as, Japan and Germany, should assume greater share of the defence burden. In 1988, for example, the US spent 6.1% of its GNP on defence, while Japan spent 1.0%, Luxemburg 1.1%, Canada 2.0%, West Germany 2.9% and Britain 4.3%.²⁰ In contrast the Soviet Union is estimated to spend at least 12% (in 1990 and 1991) though

20. Dennis L. Bark, ed., To Promote Peace: US Foreign Policy in the Mid- 1980s (California, 1984), p. 117.

the figure for 1981 was 15%.²¹

In the late April, 1990, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, senator Sam Nunn called for the Administration to slash the level of American troops in Europe from the present 255,000 to between 75,000 and 100,000 over the next five years.

But if viewed in isolation, the fiscal approach to burden sharing tends to give partial and distorted reflection of the true range of benefits associated with alliance membership. The defence burdens of the US and the other NATO allies reveal uniquely privileged character of the alliance. The US differs in theoretically expected ways not only in the level of its contribution to collective security but in the influences that shape its defence burden.²²

21. Figures have been made upto date. See, for the NATO and Japan, SIPRI 1990, pp. 196. 198; and for the USSR, Military Balance 1989-90 (London); p. 32.

22. John R. Oneal, "Testing the Theory of Collective Action : NATO Defence Burdens, 1950-1984", The Journal of Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbour), vol. 34, no.3, September 1990, p. 422.

The Europeanization of NATO could prove a two edged sword. For the US loss of influence over important Allies, and for Europe a loosening of the US commitment to its security.²³ Moreover, the US is not only still linked to Europe by ties of heritage and common values but, more tangibly, America has a stable and productive economic relationship with the old continent.²⁴ And besides, American firms' have a direct investment of over \$175 billion in Europe. Thus, Europe has been the key-stone in the arch of America's foreign and defence policy.²⁵

If continued, the ongoing profound changes will lead to a fundamental restructuring of the European security system. In this new environment the danger to NATO is not that it will fall apart, but that it will increasingly be seen as irrelevant. If NATO is not to become an anachronism, it must demonstrate a resolve and vision in serving not only as a force for stability, but also as an

23. B. Steinberg James, " Rethinking the Debate on Burden Sharing", survival, vol. 29, no. 1, January/February 1987, p. 72.

24. Faringdon, n. 10, p. 170.

25. The Economist (London), vol. 317, no. 7684, December 8, 1990, p. 33.

instrument for change. ²⁶

In a Wall Street Journal column (July 15, 1981), entitled "NATO at a Dead End", Irving Kristol wrote a premature obituary informing readers of "the impending collapse of NATO". His thesis was that while the US NATO policy makers were relying on the huge US nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union as a guarantee of Atlantic security and a deterrant to Red Army bellicosity, the situation was changing drastically. ²⁷ But what about now? Will the Alliance endure ? To date, no member of NATO has actually called for dismantling the Alliance. Apparently, most Europeans and Americans understand that there are still several reasons to preserve their mutual defence arrangement.

First, it would be highly imprudent to base Western security on the expectation that Soviet liberalism and East European stability will last because the Soviet Union remains a domestically

26. Sam Nunn, "Challenges to NATO in the 1990s", Survival vol. 32, no. 1, January/February 1990, p. 3.

27. Bark, n. 20, p. 243.

unstable power with thousands of nuclear warheads while Eastern Europe remains a seething cauldron of nationalism; secondly, NATO could also serve as a more general mutual defence pact, facilitating security co-operation among its members; and, third, it should be preserved as a check on a new, united Germany.

In sum, NATO is likely to continue as a viable organisation for sometime, although it will be changed in many ways. However, any organisation's existence depends on the willingness of members to pay for its costs. ²⁸

Nevertheless, some Americans, like economist Melvyn Krauss, have given calls for an end to America's NATO commitment on this basis: "Americans have the wisdom to create NATO when it could do good", Krauss argues, "We should have the wisdom to dismantle it now that it does harm". ²⁹

28. Stanley K. Ridgley, "Can NATO Assess Dues Fairly", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 34, no. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 344-345.

29. Melvyn B. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (Newyork, 1986), p. 238.

A meeting of heads of state and government of the 16 NATO member countries in London (July 5-6) concluded with a declaration which effectively formalised the end of the Cold War by redefining the organisation's military strategy and political goals. The declaration included a decision that recourse to nuclear weapons should be considered only as a last resort. The meeting also looked forward to the prospect of a reduction in the armed forces of a united Germany. Noting that, "Europe has entered a new promising era", the declaration stated that "as a consequence this alliance must and will adapt" and must "reach out to the countries of the East... the hand of friendship". However NATO would remain defensive alliance and must continue to provide for the common defence, while enhancing its political component.

As the Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a CFE Treaty stands implemented, fundamental changes to NATO's structure and strategy

would include smaller and restructured active forces highly mobile and versatile and relying increasingly on multinational corps comprising national units, "scaled-back readiness of active units, with less training requirements and exercises; and more reliance on the mobility to build up larger forces if and when needed. While NATO must maintain for the foreseeable future a mix of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, no weapons be used except in self-defence".

Further, as a result of the changes in Europe, the size and tasks of nuclear deterrant forces would be modified and adapted and the role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range would be significantly reduced. However, in the transformed Europe NATO would be able to adopt a new strategy "making nuclear forces truly weapons of the last resort".

If would also prepare a new military strategy moving away from "forward defence" towards a reduced forward presence, and modifying "flexible response" to reflect dependence on nuclear weapons. ³⁰

30. See, Keesing's Record of World Events (Bristol), vol. 36, no.7, July 1990, p. 37599.

Within the logic of common security the emphasis is on co-operation, whereas the formation of military pact inherently emphasizes "opposition". In the end common security seeks and requires the dissolution and replacement of the current military pacts.

The fundamental structural principle of a collective security system can be illustrated with the axiom "one for all and all for one".³¹ Common security does not have "only" the long term aim of replacing pact and blocks as well as establishing a system of collective security. Along ~~side~~ (or better expressed, closely related to) these elements is the concept of a New European Peace Order, which Gorbachev calls "our common home" and which his advisers describe as "the growth continent".³²

31. Dieter S. Lutz, "Towards a European Peace Order and a System of Collective Security", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Norway), vol.21, no.1, March 1990, pp. 74-75.

32. Michael Parks, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 20 November 1990.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PEACE DIVIDEND :

ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING TALKS IN EUROPE

The nuclear arms race initiated by the United States was one of the reasons for the division of Europe, giving rise to military confrontation structures and the consolidation of the West in opposing the Soviet Union.¹ Ironically, at least at present, arms control follows rather than leads political change. It is true that security issues can not be sacrificed. But after the CFE agreement of November 1990 pressures for immediate follow-on SNF negotiations can not be resisted for long. This is so not just because of trends in the East but also because of desires in the West to reduce military spending and cash in on the "peace dividend". A headlong rush among the NATO nations towards shedding defence burdens could dramatically compound the burden-sharing debate and yield less net security for the West - perhaps even by way of negating

1. Pavel Bayen and others, "Is a Third Zero Attainable ?", International Affairs (Moscow), April 1990, p. 4.

the effects of the CFE treaty.² The movement in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons shall help in principle demilitarize security system and the elimination of TNWs would reduce the likelihood of any conflict rising fast to a nuclear level and then to the level of a global nuclear conflict. However, both militarily and politically, the nuclear balance in Europe is linked most intimately with the balance of conventional forces.³

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev has arrived on the scene, he has been the driving force, especially in formulating policy on conventional forces - beginning with his speech on 18 April 1986 in East Berlin through 7 December 1988 speech in the UN General Assembly and culminating in the abolition of the WTO in March 1991.

Perhaps the uni-polar world we are living

2. Peter Cortorier, "Quo Vadis NATO ?", Survival (London), vol.32, no.2, March/April 1990, pp.149-150.

3. Bayen, n. 1, pp. 7-9.

today, is not the result of any sinister design or the handiwork of any conscious and continuous advancement in this direction. If it is as such and if it has altogether come about, it is the result of some historical compulsions, economic necessities as well as due to the constant pressurization from the people, such as by the Greens, and above all after the realization that per head calories are much more important than the per head TNTs.

Above all, the year 1985 was a year of expectations, many of them unfortunately still unrealized. The accession of Gorbachev to the pinnacle of Soviet power brought greater promise both internally and internationally. People and governments in the West hoped this new wind from the East would be softer and more reasonable. The mood was summed up by Margret Thatcher in December 1984, three months before Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, when she said she liked him, and felt that the British Government could do business with him. The USSR's return to the arms-control negotiations in Geneva and the agreement by the leaders of the two super

powers to meet (their first summit in six years) fuelled expectations that a real improvement in East-West relations was imminent. Subsequently, the Geneva summit that took place from 19-21 October 1985, resulted in no new agreements of significance but it did at least initiate a new exploration of East-West relations at the highest level.

Despite the summit meeting, there was confrontation between the US and the USSR in 1985 and early 1986. Perhaps the most intense East-West confrontation of the year was the dispute over compliance with arms-control treaty provisions, such as Russian Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS-25 ICBMs which were condemned as violations of the ABM Treaty and SALT II, respectively. The Soviet denials were strong, and the Kremlin brought its own charges against the United States. The INF deployment in Europe was cited as a violation of the SALT II limitations, SDI as a violation of the ABM Treaty and the planned upgrading of the Thule and Fylingdales radars as a further infringement of this Treaty.

The most important event in East-West relations

in 1985 was the resumption of the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union essentially walked back into negotiations from which it had walked out in 1983, although none of the demands occasioning its withdrawal had been met. The grand design of both leaders were curiously similar: both aimed quite explicitly at the impossible goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, however, Ronald Reagan's time scale was not precisely spelt out.⁴ Perhaps, the most important change in negotiating position was Gorbachev's willingness to separate the INF negotiations from SDI and to negotiate directly with the British and French governments on their nuclear forces, thus leaving the West to hoist with the petard of its own zero-option. But despite these efforts, the first half of the 1985 was relatively uneventful.

During the summer the first signs of Gorbachev's initiatives in the arms control arena became apparent for example: the 7th April announcement of "suspension" of INF deployments. In July, Soviet negotiations in Geneva for the first time showed its willingness

4. See, Strategic Survey 1985-86 (London), p.6.

to discuss elements of a strategic arms reduction proposal on an informal basis, hinting that they would be willing to see a reduction of 50% in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and perhaps even in "charges" (e.g., missile and bomber warheads).

On 29 July 1985, in an attempt to facilitate the cessation of the dangerous competition in the build-up on nuclear arsenals Soviet Union announced a unilateral halt to all its nuclear explosions.⁵ In October, during a visit to Paris, Gorbachev talked publically on the 50% reduction proposal⁶ and also suggested, for the first time that an INF agreement might not have to await resolution of the defence and space entanglements.

Before the Geneva summit, the USA announced

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5. It was meant both for military and non-military purposes. The moratorium was to start on 6 August, the date of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima 40 years before and last until 1 January 1986; it was to continue in effect even beyond that date if the US were able to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions.
 6. Which was matched by a similar proposal by the USA on October 31, 1985 using the 50% reduction concept.

its four objectives for the Geneva talks as :

Radical reductions in the number, and destructive power of offensive strategic arms; the elimination of intermediate range forces, or their reduction to the lowest possible equal global limits; a reversal of the erosion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ...; and a discussion of the possibility of both sides moving away from deterrence based solely on the threat of massive retaliation toward increased reliance on non-threatening defences, whether ground or space-based, against nuclear ballistic missiles. ⁷

The objective of the Geneva summit (19-21 October 1985) was to begin to review differences over a wide range of areas where the interests of the US and the USSR diverged - not only arms control but regional security issues, human rights and trade as well.

The Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986 indicating

7. USIS, 1985 (note 127), p. 5.

a time table for eliminating offensive nuclear weapons was greeted in Washington as a positive development though there was considerable complexity to the Geneva talks and provided a new dimension to the task of identifying common ground. In the first phase, the super powers would implement the Soviet 50% reduction proposal and eliminate their intermediate range missiles in Europe, while Britain and France would freeze their forces at current levels. This phase would continue for some five to eight years. During a further five to eight years from 1990, the other nuclear weapon countries - Britain and France, but also presumably China - would begin the process of eliminating their nuclear forces. In the third phase, beginning in 1995, the super powers would gradually reduce their nuclear forces to zero. The whole process would be completed by the end of 1999.⁸

Thus in accepting the notion of eliminating

8. Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev - General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, January 15, 1986 (Moscow, 1986), pp. 4-6.

nuclear weapons as a goal and attaching a timetable to it, the Soviet Union secured to take President Reagan's often-repeated pledge at face value. Thus in the INF area, the Soviet offer amounted to a "zero option" in Europe.

The US response of February 22, 1986 while endorsing the "zero option" for INF, made it clear that it would have to be global; that reductions to zero would be phased over a three-year period; that the process of reductions would have to involve proportional cuts in the SS-20s to reduce threats in Asian parts; that no commitments would be undertaken in respect of British and French systems; and that while the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons remained a goal, it could only be achieved when the conventional force imbalance had been rectified and effective verification measures had been devised.

New proposals also appeared in various multilateral arms control negotiations, such as, in chemical weapons.

Despite agreement on the broad principles of eliminating chemical weapon stockpiles, differences remained over the method of verification. The MBFR talks in Vienna was twice briefly stirred to life, while the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) continued to meet during 1985 in Stockholm focussing its agenda on "Confidence-and-Security-Building-Measures, designed to reduce tensions in Europe. ⁹

1986 was a year of considerable drama in the arms-control arena, but also one of disappointment. The spirit, if not the substance of the 1985 Geneva summit meeting persisted in 1986. The Soviet proposals continued to build on the concept of stability established by the SALT process and the ABM Treaty. The US proposals explicitly called for a co-operative transition in the deployment of extensive strategic defences.

9. Confidence-Building Measures were first adopted by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, in a Document on Confidence-Building Measures and certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament which is part of the Helsinki Final Act, signed on 1 August, 1975.

In 1986 Reagan and Gorbachev began to breathe life into the arms control negotiations and confidence-building measures. They opened a direct dialogue, sustained by personal letters and meetings between their foreign secretaries culminating in the Reykjavik summit of 11-12 October, 1986. For example, the speed with which the US counter-proposal (of 22 February 1986, to match the 15 January 1986 proposal of Gorbachev) was put together and the fact that it was delivered directly to Gorbachev as well as being publicized in a statement, reflected the new character of the bilateral arms-control dialogue: it was conducted both in public and at the highest level. It resulted in two somewhat contradictory trends. First, in an effort to mobilize public opinion, behind their proposals, the two leaders (esp. Gorbachev) articulated broad, publicly appealing arms-control objectives which generated public interest in the arms-control process but were inherently difficult to negotiate; second, the public interest that had been aroused put each leader under pressure to respond quickly with proposals that seemed to be moving the process forward. As a result the arms control dialogue began to

develop proposals that were based on radical objectives, but at the same time contained elements of flexibility regarding the core issues.

At the opening of the September round in Geneva the US responded by modifying its INF and START proposals. These modifications, along with Reagan's 25 July letter, formed the basis of the American position going into the October meeting in Reykjavik. The USSR also modified its proposals on INF, START and the defensive and space weapons, before going for the summit.

Thus, despite differences, the major structural differences between the US and the Soviet positions had been narrowed. The progress on INF and strategic offensive systems made in the first twenty-four hours of the Reykjavik meeting surpassed all that had been achieved at Geneva during the previous twenty months.¹⁰

Multilateral arms-control negotiations, on the other hand, showed a degree of innovation. The central provisions of the agreement reached in Stockholm (CDE) required an exchange of calendars

10. Strategic Survey 1986-87 (London), pp. 57-58.

of significant future military activities; notification of 42 days in advance of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks; observation of military activities involving 17,000 or more troops; and ground and aerial inspections to verify compliance. Each country can only be inspected three times per year and aerial inspections were to be carried out by means of aircraft and pilots provided by the host country. And a notifiable military activity in excess of 75,000 troops has to be placed in the calendar two years in advance. Although limited, the CDE agreement was a sure move towards reducing the secrecy of military operations. Its major achievement was symbolic and unlike the 1975 Helsinki Accords, its provisions were mandatory, the verification procedures went beyond simple agreement in principle to arrangements for on-site inspection, and the inspection procedures were spelled out. ¹¹

Throughout 1986, the USSR continued to observe its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, begun

11. Ibid, p. 68.

in August 1985, as well as to call for a comprehensive test ban (CTB). While the Reagan Administration maintained that this was an ultimate goal of US policy, it remained opposed to a CTB on the familiar grounds that, so long as the West depended upon nuclear weapons for deterrance, it needed to continue to test them and also. The US Administration believed that a CTB cannot be satisfactorily verified.

Notwithstanding the opposing US and Soviet positions on nuclear testing, a series of bilateral discussions were held in Geneva in July and September to explore verification improvements, punctuated by Reagan's announcement on 10 October - in response to pressure from the Senate - that he would submit the TTBT (1974) and PNET (1976) to the Senate for consent and ratification. Any progress that was made fell by the way side, like all else, at Reykjavik, with the final disagreement over SDI. In addition, Gorbachev's unilateral moratorium expired on 1 January 1987, and, after two US explosions early in the new year, a Soviet test took place on 26 February 1987.

In an important development on 28 February 1987, Gorbachev proposed separate negotiations on medium range missiles in Europe, dropping its insistence on link to restrictions on US SDI programme and freeze on French and British nuclear weapons, that at the end of year resulted in the "double-zero" agreement signed on 8 December 1987 containing a number of novel features with significant implications. The agreement required the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons: long range and short range intermediate nuclear forces. Unlike previous agreements, it made no efforts to achieve a balanced reduction between the two sides; the USSR agreed to a considerable asymmetry of destruction, giving up 851 launchers and 1,836 missiles, while the US was to eliminate 283 launchers and 867 missiles. Much of the criticism of the agreement centred on the way it was reached, its form rather than its substance and the momentum it created in the direction of a non-nuclear Europe. In itself, however, the agreement was a modest achievement as it will remove only about a fourth of the available nuclear forces in the world.

Thus, it was a first step only.¹²

The INF Treaty was also unique due to its unlimited duration and global application as well as its application to both nuclear and non-nuclear missiles. The verification provisions in Articles XI, XII and XIII of the Treaty, as well as those in the attached Protocols were by far the most extensive verification proposals ever associated with an arms-control or disarmament agreement. Apart from the usual allowances for the use of national technical means (NTM) of verification, this was the first time that extensive and intrusive forms of on site inspections (OSI) were agreed upon by the major powers since the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919.¹³

The INF implementation process, it seems, has provided an area of activity in which the new

12. For details see, SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament (Stockholm), pp.4-8, and, 375-93.

13. Stephen Iwan Griffith, "The Implementation of the INF Treaty", SIPRI 1990 (Stockholm), p. 443.

spirit of detente between the USA and USSR has been able to quitey flourish.

Yet another area of confidence building where agreement was reached in 1987 was on the concept of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC). After the Reykjavik summit and Geneva negotiations on 13 January and 3-4 May 1987, the agreement between the USA and the USSR on the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres was reached. It was signed in Washington, D.C. on 15 September 1987. This agreement was also of unlimited duration, committed each party to establish an NRRC in its capital. Each party was free to staff its NRRC according to its own needs and it became operational in April 1988. The main function of the NRRCs, in relation to the INF Treaty, is to forward notification of changes that have or are about to take place in areas covered by the Treaty. ¹⁴

When the historians review 1988, they may well see it as the year in which the Cold War ended.

14. Ibid, pp. 453-54.

On 15 February, 1989 precisely on scheduled, the last Soviet soldier, the Commanding General, walked across the border out of Afghanistan. Throughout 1988, the negotiations in Geneva focussed on five main areas: the ALCM, mobile missiles, SLCM, strategic defences, and verification. In each of these areas important details were agreed, but significant differences remained specifically on the draft text for a START treaty. Disagreement on this issue reflected the dichotomy between the traditional and the broad interpretations of the ABM Treaty's terms.¹⁵

1989 ushered in a new chapter in the long history of efforts to control conventional arms in Europe. On 2 February, the fruitless 15-year NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe ended

15. The "broad" interpretation championed by the Reagan Administration maintained that full-scale space testing of strategic defence components based on "new physical principle" is allowed under the Treaty. The traditional or "narrow" interpretation argues that Article V of the Treaty bans the development and testing of any sea-, mobile-, air-, or space-based ABM system or component.

at their 493rd plenary. They were replaced on 9 March by new negotiations in Vienna, covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) ¹⁶ and termed the "Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" (CFE), which included all Alliance and Warsaw Pact countries. Simultaneously, a parallel negotiation, the second 35- state Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), began to address operational arms control and seek further to enhance transparency and mutual confidence by building on the Stockholm Agreement of 1986. ¹⁷

Since World War II, the Soviet leaders have used arms control diplomacy as an integral part of their security policy to limit the nuclear threat to the Soviet homeland, to maintain control over their East European buffer zone and to curb the political and military potential of NATO. However, with the coming of Gorbachev, the most important

16. "From the Atlantic to the Urals" is usually taken to include the territories of all the European member states of NATO and WTO plus the Soviet military district west of the Caspian sea and the Ural river.

17. Strategic Survey 1988-89 (London), pp. 5.43 ff.

new element in Soviet policy, appeared to be the greater priority given to arms control as a means of reallocating resources from the military to the civilian sector of the Soviet economy. 18 Fired by this need Gorbachev launched a programme of extensive arms control and disarmament-drive. In April 1986 he proposed more radical cuts in conventional arms that proved both the last nail in the coffin of MBFR and the catalyst for the new CFE negotiations. Gorbachev was not content, however, to wait for a multilateral agreement to reduce the Soviet military burden, but initiated unilateral cuts even before the CFE negotiations started.

On the first anniversary of the INF agreement on 7 December 1988, in a speech to the United Nations, he assembled all the various pieces into a coherent expression of the whole of the Soviet "new thinking" on international relations. According to this view, if one side gains, the other need not lose - both can, and will, gain through mutual effort.

18. S. Bialer, "Change in Russia: Gorbachev's Move", Foreign Policy (Washington), no. 68, Fall 1987, pp. 59287.

He announced the reduction of 500,000 men from the Soviet armed forces by 1991; 50,000 men and their equipment, including 5000 tanks, would be withdrawn from the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet divisions remaining in Eastern Europe would be restructured to make them strictly defensive. In addition to cutting forces and equipment "the armament economy" would be converted into a "disarmament economy", and the USSR would make public this experience in conversion.¹⁹ In January, he also announced cuts of 14.2% in the defence budget and 19.5% in military procurement over the next two years. In June 1989, Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev said that the WTO doctrine now stipulated that WTO forces would repel an attack by defensive actions only for a period of three to four weeks before adopting counter-defensive tactics. He claimed that the NATO doctrine, by contrast, was still highly offensive, especially in calling for the use of nuclear weapons after a period of 7-10 days.²⁰

19. See, Speech of Mikhail Gorbachev, 7 December 1988, Soviet Diplomacy Today (Moscow), 1989, pp 40-47.

20. Jane M.O. Sharp, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe", SIPRI 1990 (Stockholm), pp. 459-62.

Since the WTO cuts were announced as unilateral measures, there was no contractual obligation to co-operate with the West in verifying implementation by overflight, on site inspection or any other means of monitoring. As an exercise in political confidence building and glasnost on the domestic front, a Moscow based group was established for Public Monitoring of the Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments (GON).

The Soviet and East European cuts were appreciated by the NATO officials, as helpful measures designed to correct quantitative asymmetries between NATO and WTO ground forces, rather than gestures that required reciprocal NATO cuts. By November 1989, the US Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney, judging low level conflict, asked the armed services for proposals that would allow a cut of \$ 180-195 billion from the defence budget (inflated?) over the period 1992-94. The US Army suggested cutting manpower from 764,000 to 630,000, and cutting air and ground forces in Europe to 150,000 from the current 305,000. The Pentagon officials also urged that the cuts

be made in the context of a CFE agreement and urged the Administration to make bolder proposals in Vienna. These, along with a number of other western decisions, were described by the Deputy Chairman of the GON, Sergey Rogov, as "the first practical response by NATO countries to the USSR's unilateral cuts".²¹

In the framework of the 35-nations Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the 7 WTO states and the 16 NATO states began the negotiation on Conventional Armed forces in Europe (CFE) on 6 March 1989. In a mandate signed on 10 January 1989 the 23 participating states agreed that the objectives of the CFE negotiations were to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security and to eliminate as a matter of priority the capability to launch surprise attack and to initiate largescale offensive action. The participants agreed to include conventional armed forces and equipment based on the land territory

21. Ibid, p. 476.

of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, the naval and chemical weapons were left unaddressed. But there was agreement amongst the 35 states to conduct two parallel sets of negotiations in Vienna, both under the auspices of CSCE: the 23 allied states would negotiate force reductions (CFE), and the 35 states would participate in separate negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

Each negotiating round had different priorities, but discussion revolved round five issues: (a) what to limit, covering both choice and precise definition of treaty-limited items (TLIs); (b) how to limit, covering numerical limits for each group of states as well as regional and national sub-ceilings; (c) the disposition of TLIs, whether to withdraw and redeploy, or dismantle and destroy; (d) how to monitor and verify compliance with CFE limits; and (e) what stability measures should complement numerical limits.

By the time of the Washington summit in mid-1990 a conventional arms agreement that had earlier been earnestly hoped for has had to make way for

tortuous negotiations on strategic arms. Even within the strategic realm, the two leaders were only aiming for an "agreement in principle". And even the Open skies plan agreed in Ottawa, Canada, on February 12-13, 1990, to fly unarmed military or civilian re-connaissance aircraft from each bloc,²² broke down in early May after the Soviets offered renewed resistance. But most importantly, this was the first occasion since the 1950s to be the summit of palpably unequal powers in the light of the fact that the most massive arms control accomplishment of all time occurred over the past six months - the removal of Central Europe as the most militarized and potentially explosive spot on earth sans any arms accord at all.²³

Again at a meeting in Brussels of the Defence Planning Committee on May 22-23, the NATO Defence Ministers formally abandoned their 13-year old

22. See, Keesing's Record of World Events (Bristol), vol. 36, no. 2, February 1990, p. 37267.

23. N.C. Menon, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 26 May 1990.

target of 3% real annual increase in national defence budgets. They also agreed to relax the state of readiness of their forces and to reduce military exercises. The cut-back in training involved the cancellation of 10 exercises; a further 22 was to be merged and 22 reduced. The Defence Ministers were agreed that "the threat from a united Warsaw Pact no longer exists". The Allies, however, made clear their intention of maintaining the basis of the NATO concepts of "forward defence" and "flexible response" with a mix of conventional and nuclear forces and continued US presence in Europe but sharing of more burdens. ²⁴

Earlier than this, President Bush's decision to cancel development of new tactile nuclear missiles (the Follow on to the Lance programme.) was endorsed and acclaimed by all of them.

The July meeting of heads of state and governments of the 16 NATO member countries in London was

24. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol.34, no.5, May 1990, p. 37473.

concluded with a declaration which effectively formalised the end of the Cold War by re-defining the organisations, military strategy, and political goals. The summit invited President Gorbachev and other East European leaders to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council and to establish regular diplomatic mission with NATO. [Noting that "Europe has entered a new, promising era", the declaration stated that "as a consequence this Alliance must and will adapt" and must "reach out to the countries of the East ... the hand of friendship".²⁵

On 19 November 1990, the 16 NATO countries and the six Warsaw Pact nations signed an agreement to arms cut in Europe; blessed German unification and gave the CSCE, (up to now just a "process") an institutional life of its own. The 34 nations agreed to set up a small secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and an office in Warsaw to gather data on elections, and perhaps

25. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol.36, no. 7, July 1990, p. 37599.

later to monitor them. There will also be vaguely defined parliamentary wing, called the Assembly of Europe. The Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, even spoke of a Welfare Wall replacing the Iron Curtain.²⁶

In all, the NATO and WTO were allowed to have a maximum of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armoured personnel carriers, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 aircrafts and 2,000 helicopters in four zones from the Atlantic to the Urals. The table "Number Game" makes it very clear.

This thrill of Europe's rebirth should go down also as the biggest scrap-metal deal in history. The Treaty makes detailed provision both for the destruction of the excess equipment and for checking that the parties abide by the rules.²⁷ However, the lesson is that the USSR does not violate agreements, but it exploits loopholes still loomed large.

26. The Economist (London), vol. 317, no. 7682, November 24, 1990, pp. 51-52.

27. *Ibid*, p. 52.

For example, Western intelligence agencies estimated that perhaps 21,000 tanks, 28,500 artillery pieces and 28,000 other armoured vehicles had already gone East of Urals to get it out of the Treaty area.

Moreover, in the haphazard way the conversion has proceeded has introduced difficulties in the USSR. Meanwhile, budget funds are being used to compensate for lost earnings - 330 million roubles in 1990 alone.²⁸ Such refrains from defence industry and armed forces representatives are so constant that one suspects it is being used to exert pressure on the authorities to moderate the conversion drive, further substantiated by the revelations of Eduard Sheverdanadze, after his resignation.²⁹

The conversion of the defence industry to civilian uses are easier said than done - dis-armor's

28. In connection with projections to 1995, it has been estimated that 40 billion roubles will be required for funding technical re-equipment and retraining.

29. Julian Cooper, "Soviet Military Has a Finger in Every Pie", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (Chicago), vol.46, no. 10, December 1990, p. 24.

Pipe-dream? Conversion is a problem for Western economies too. The re-use of military equipment was never going to be easy, for example, who needs tractors weighing 40-45 tons churning up their fields, with 800 horse-power engines burning up fuel? How much will all this save? But disarmament costs money: equipment has to be destroyed, agreements checked. ³⁰

The moment of truth may be approaching for the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). There are allegations that the Soviet Union still has a number of formations in place that its spokesman said had been disbanded or removed. But the catch 22-the checking work cannot proceed until the Treaty has been ratified. And it is unlikely even to be ratified if congress comes to believe that the Russians are trying to cheat, or even to exploit loopholes. ³¹ The NATO and WTO troop cuts will be negotiated later on.

30. See, "The Tank Trap", The Economist, vol. 317, no. 7685, December 15, 1990, p. 17.

31. See, "All at Sea", The Economist, vol. 318, no. 7693, February 19, 1991, pp. 46-47.

At the October 1986 summit meeting in Reykjavik, President Reagan and Gorbachev had gone a long way towards establishing the basic framework for a strategic force agreement. They re-affirmed the decision on 50% reductions in strategic forces reached at their meeting a year ago. One issue not settled at Reykjavik concerned mobile missiles. However, the most acute strategic arms issue facing the two sides after Reykjavik was how to extend the basic framework to include specific warhead sub-limits. At the end of 1988, the ABM, the SDI and the SLCM issues were identified as the main obstacles to a START agreement.

Negotiations were resumed in June 1989, after a pause during which the Bush administration conducted a review of the US position. The review emphasized the need to stress crisis stability and the ICBM survivability in START, rather than reductions for their own sake.³² While the obstacles were not resolved during 1989, they were taken out of the START negotiating framework and thus no longer

32. See, Military Balance 1989-90 (London), p.212.

impede the conclusion of a treaty. The issue of the ALCMs which assumed some prominence in 1989, also appeared to be solvable. Thus, the principal task for 1990, then, appeared to be the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory verification system.

The latest agreed provisions of a START treaty includes: a ceiling of 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with no more than 6000 accountable warheads and a sub-limit of 4900 ballistic missile warheads, leaving 1100 war-heads to be carried by strategic bombers.³³

As an alliance of maritime nations heavily dependent on sea-links, NATO seeks to avoid limits on its naval capability. Thus, at the Washington summit meeting in December 1987, the USA and the USSR agreed to exclude the sea launched cruise missiles from the 6000 warhead limit. Overall, the size of the strategic reductions envisaged in a START treaty does not meet the often cited 50% figure.³⁴

33. Regina Cowen Karp, SIPRI: World Armaments and Disarmament 1990, P. 423.

34. R. Einhorn, "Strategic Arms Reduction Talks", Survival, vol.30, no.5, September/October 1988, p. 390.

The reduction estimates vary because of different forces mixed under START and the fact that the ALCM counting rules still have not been resolved. Yet despite the fact that actual warhead numbers exceed (as after START implementation the US and USSR both will be left about 10,000 to 12,000 warheads) the limit of 6000 accountable warheads, individual cuts and limits are significant.

Viewed differently, a START agreement cutting central systems by 50% will not affect the essence of the present strategic relationship. With a diminished US nuclear arsenal, the British and the French nuclear deterrent would gain in importance, particularly if they continue to possess weapons which have been renounced by the super powers. Similarly, strategic defence would require additional utility if offensive capabilities are being reduced.³⁵ Therefore, Paul H. Nitze, suggests that it would be better to insist now on a truly stabilizing

35. Dr. Wilem F.V. Eekelen, "The Future of NATO and Warsaw Pact Strategy", Adelphi Papers (London), no. 247, Winter 1989/90, p. 58.

treaty, rather than being satisfied with the half-hearted measures currently proposed.³⁶

Yet another area in which several countries expressed interest in 1989 is in chemical weapon free-zones (CWFZs). Paris hosted the Conference on the Prohibition of chemical weapons as the depositary nation for the 1925 Geneva Protocol which not only supported the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapon control, but also affirmed to contribute to restrictions on export of technology and chemicals for chemical weapons.

When Gorbachev delivered the 7 December 1988 speech at the United Nations General Assembly on unilateral arms-cut, The Newyork Times responded the next morning:

"Perhaps not since Woodrow Wilson presented his Fourteen Points in 1918 or since Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winstin Churchill promulgated the Atlantic charter in 1941, has a world figure demonstr-

36. Paul H. Nitze, "America: An Honest Broker", Foreign Affairs (New york), vol. 69, no. 4, Fall 1990, p.9.

ated the vision Mikhail Gorbachev displayed yesterday at the United Nations".

It is however, important to observe some essential differences: The elimination of bloc patterns in international relations in Europe has resulted in the disappearance of the bloc dimension of the CSCE; the matter has now become far more diversified, and that there is no longer any reason to oppose regular follow-up meetings, which may be expected now to become routine, e.g. they will be convened at set periods and strengthened institutionally.³⁷

On the whole, the arms industry have become victims of the peace dividend. On the unlikelihood of a US-Soviet military conflict following the political change at the end of 1989 and once the Soviet force reductions become an accomplished fact, drastic cuts in military expenditure (up to \$180 million between 1992 and 1994) have not been excluded by the US government, provided there are no more "Operation Desert Storms".³⁸

37. Ranko Acimovic, "CSCE During the Nineties", Review of International Affairs (New York), vol. XLI, no. 970, September 5, 1990, p. 7.

38. See, SIPRI 1990, p. 333.

CHAPTER FOUR :

IN SEARCH OF A NEW FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PEACE

" Nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to be different ". That remark by E.H. Carr in his book, What is History ? applies perfectly to the events in Europe after 1989. ¹ Gore Vidal, in a heart searching article in 1986 wrote that the arms race between the two super powers has frozen the bipolar power arrangement as nothing else could. The Soviet Union, he said, is a Second World country with a First World military capacity. Now the long-feared Asiatic colossus takes its turn as world leader, and we - the White race - have become the yellow man's burden . The remedy he suggested: There is now only one way out. The time has come for the United States to make common cause with the Soviet Union. The bringing together of the Soviet land mass (with all its

1. E.H. Carr, What is History ? (London, 1981), p. 96.

natural resources) and our island empire (with all its technological resources) would be of great benefit to each society not to mention the world.²

At its hour of triumph, the NATO alliance, the longest standing multi-national military alliance in history brought signs of political exhaustion with many uncertainties about the future of Western strategy and divisions of opinions about the best basis for future security. On the other hand, Moscow's policy revealed in arms control, human rights, regional conflicts and economic dogmas, combined with the communist leader's admission of historical error - the virtual surrender of the Soviet Union in many areas of the East-West struggle - paradoxically bred in much of Europe a "Gorbymania", that eclipsed any sense of vindication. But these posed policy dilemmas of a new kind. How would European stability evolve in the face of sharply reduced military threats and ideological

2. See, Gore Vidal, "Asia on the Rise", Hindustan Times : Sunday Review (New Delhi), 9 March 1986, p. I.

pressure from the East ? What was the West European vision of the future political and security landscape of their continent ? In sum, it was to seek adjustment when the European consensus started to crumble.³ The eagerness for more funds for social spending, partly to offset fears of social Darwinism as the EC reduces internal barriers to competition, added rigidity to the burden-sharing argument. The prospect of an integrated post-1992 Western Europe brought with it fears of greater American use of industrial protectionism in defence, under the guise of national security. These reactions gained strength in every European country, but most of the trends were strongest in West Germany. Thus, the way in which Germany has marched, or rather run to its re-unification was by no means inevitable.

First, European security after the Cold War requires the definition of a new relationship between the countries of Europe and the super powers. American influence on the various European processes

3. "Western Europe Facing a New Challenge", Strategic Survey 1988-89 (London), p. 77.

will continue to decline - though not vanish - given America's economic and military presence to West European dependence on US force for the security of its supplies of oil from the Middle East. Second, the new relationship with the USSR will depend on the outcome of the new Russian revolution. Protracted turmoil, violent conflicts among nationalities, and political paralysis at the top would impede co-operation between the European countries and their troubled neighbour and perpetuate fears of an overflow of violence across the borders.

Finally, a common West European policy and strategy of what is called in NATO jargon "out of area" issue is lacking. The differences amongst the partners were amply shown during the Gulf war of January-February 1991. Not only has there been minimal European cohesion, but the crisis also threatened to raise tensions between the US and its allies.

Thus, the problems in constructing a new Europe is immense. Europe as a zone of security and stabili-

ty due to the presence of super powers with nuclear weapons may return to long repressed rivalries and animosities, once the Damocles' sword is removed. Nevertheless, Europe is likely to be in a troubled world, a "security community" in the sense defined years ago by Karl Deutsch.

It is also possible that the same may not happen due to a palpable "battle fatigue" about war and violence among the younger generations. Another is the attraction of prosperity. Finally, there is nothing inevitable about the further deepening of the EC, economic integration and the habit of co-operation among elites of national independence.⁴

Suffice to say that peace is never achieved forever. Even if the Soviet Union were to become, within the next two decades, a peaceful pluralistic democracy, peace would not be guaranteed on the old continent without carefully prepared new security arrangements. Moreover, political leaders are

4. Staneley Hoffman, "The Case for Leadership", Foreign Policy (Washington), no. 81, Winter 1990-91, pp. 34-38.

often like chameleons. And to base strategies on the favourable view of a single leader may lead to the Hobbesian conclusion that when you are on a false ground, the more you build, the greater is the fall. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty is currently so high that it would be self-destructive to start now to demolish the Western edifice which, over the last 40 years, has been built so successfully that the Soviet Union has clearly lost the first round of the post-war East-West match.

Therefore, to achieve integration, there is need to create irreversible institutional linkages. Economic integration is not enough. European integration implies the ability increasingly to strengthen political co-operation, notably vis - a - vis the Soviet Union's participation for a common approach to security and defence issues. If Western Europe does not overcome its identity crisis, the Western alliance as a whole might be unable to contribute cohesively and, therefore, positively to the new circumstances of East-West relations. A process of dis-integration might even develop. It would indeed be a major political mistake to encourage a sort of discrimination within Europe.

Integration is hardly thinkable for a community much larger than the present, having 12 members currently, and if more are included it may become a very loose co-operative structure, like the old "Concert of Europe", unable to deal with the international conflicts which inevitably emerge. The risk would be even greater in the event of a collapse of the Soviet empire, at a time when the consequences of the World War I, in particular the fall of Ottoman Empire, have not yet been fully absorbed.⁵

The historical lessons of the post-war European security system do not inspire confidence in the nations for designing a new security system. The territorial integrity of members of the security system was its primary objective. Experiences show that the military security system is costly and, therefore, in the past it created differences on the question of burden-sharing. Moreover, it provided short-lived solutions; at times, its legitimacy was questioned, leading to peace movements in Eu-

5. Thierry De Montrial, "Implications and Options for the West", Adelphi Papers (London), no. 248, Winter 1989/90, p. 87.

rope. Above all, it created an atmosphere of alliance and inter-alliance relations.

The economic integration of the West European countries have always been linked to security. The integration of EC could be advanced not only in respect of economic interests but its members have a constellation of interests regarding political social, cultural and security matters as well. Lately, it has broadly been linked to the integration of Europe through the CSCE process. On the other hand, apart from the best gurantee against any revival of German militarism, the NATO provides a strong foot-hold for the US in Europe to influence European developments. Regarding the other regional organisations, like the EC and the CSCE, the US is either an outsider or it has little clout to determine its deliberations.

Perhaps all European countries, especially the Western allies, have not freed themselves from the trauma of the Cold War. Despite the Helsinki process, the military machinery seems to be the only means to counter military danger and not political and economic process based on trust and co-

operation. Indeed, history can not be wiped out in a short period.

Apart from the shortcomings of the Atlantic approach to manage European security through military means alone, it ignores the fact that the Soviet Union is a military power. Without the co-operation and active involvement of the Soviet Union any military oriented security is likely to be challenged by the Soviet Union in the future.

The CSCE has played a constructive role in creating a cordial atmosphere to bring about an agreement on the reduction of conventional weapons. It is widely felt that if the CSCE is going to provide a new European security order, it has to undergo significant structural improvements, such as, permanent governing body, permanent institutional structure, political authorization and parliamentary control etc. Thus the introduction of supra-national structure will certainly curtail some sovereign rights of members and, therefore, constellation of interests for maintenance of peace should be

its major objective. It is likely that the CSCE may enlarge its areas of activities to include issues relating to environment degradation, scientific co-operation, terrorism, ethnic conflicts etc. However, the political will is the major factor that can bring about peace and stability in any region or continent.⁶

At the opening of the 1990s the continent of Europe is in a flux. It has landed in a geographical environment reminiscent of old inter-war configurations, particularly due to re-appearance in the heart of the continent of a vigorous united Germany as a leading industrial power with an advanced technology. Obviously, interaction in the triangle of economic hardships generated by the process of system transformation, the reawakening of nationalistic emotions and the weakness of the newly established democratic institutions does not contribute

6. O.N. Mehrotra, "New European Security Order", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. XIII, no. 8, November 1990, pp. 898-907.

to stability.⁷

Liberals as well as conservatives anticipate a benign international order resulting from the decline of the Soviet power. For example, a former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski concluded "that democracy - and not communism - will dominate the twenty-first century".⁸ The noted liberal scholar, John Mueller, wrote: "... if the Cold War evaporates as the Soviet Union begins to act like an ordinary Great (or semi-Great) power rather than as the carrier of a messianic universal ideology, one of the few remaining potential causes of major war will no longer be around. It will be the end of the world as we know it".⁹ And Francis Fukuyama has gone to the extent of saying that that is "the end of history as such : that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy

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7. Marek Thee, "The Post-Cold War European Landscape", Current Research on Peace and Violence (Tampere), vol. XIII, no. 2, 1990, p. 62.
 8. Z.Brzezinski, The Grand Failure (New York, 1989), p. 258.
 9. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989), p. 214.

as the final form of human government".¹⁰ He went on to predict; it "... means the growing Common Marketization of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large scale conflicts between states".¹¹

However, the decline of the Soviet power will not necessarily herald the dawn of a new, peaceful era in international relations or in the continent of Europe. As Paul Kennedy wrote, "... Such transformations occur at very great cost, and not always in a predictable fashion". Kennedy also warns that "... there is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully ...".¹²

The US and its allies must realize that the decline of the Soviet power will not lead to the "end of history" but in the emergence of new tensions

10. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", The National Interest, no. 16, Summer 1989, p. 4.

11. Ibid, p. 18.

12. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, 1987); p. 514.

and conflicts, amply evident from the war in the Gulf. Defence planners and policy makers must, therefore, redesign force structures and weapon acquisition plans to meet the more localized, but increasingly likely threats that will emerge.¹³

The problem of security in Europe is not a matter of military forces or a problem of over-armament as arms are not the cause of tension, but the consequence and it is necessarily political. This can be seen a contrario¹⁴: armament programmes by themselves do not generate distrust between two non-antagonistic countries. Therefore, arms control talks should not be expected to yield more than they can produce: more disarmament does not necessarily mean greater security.

There is, indeed, a large measure of agreement

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13. N. Katz Mark, "The Decline of Soviet Power: Implications for International Relations", Survival, vol. 32, no. 1, January/February 1990, p. 15.
 14. Extract from Prof. Raymond Barree's 1987 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture: Foundation for European Security and Co-operation : Survival, vol. 29, no. 4, July/August 1987, p. 292.

in the West over its preference for seeing the Soviet Union retain its present borders, with perhaps the Baltic states staying out. The main reason for Western empathy for the Soviet Union's integrity is that any large-scale re-organisation of its borders can only create instability for Europe.

Though the most formidable division between the two halves of Europe have come down, given the economic disparities across the divide, new sets of restrictions may well spring up. Now that East Europeans are free to go West, West Europe is fearful of being swamped by "economic refugees", this time not as distinguishable as people from the Third World. The onrush of the East Germans was a major factor in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's decision to speed up the monetary and political union of the two Germanys. In West Europe's case, their poorer cousins in the East will find that though the political division of Europe might have ended, harsh economic realities dictate the setting up of new barriers. Ironically the "poverty wall" has replaced the Berlin wall.

Europe is in a state of flux. For the first time there is a chance that the countries concerned will free themselves from their exaggerated fixation on questions of military security and again give priority to political aspects.

In the early post-war years a frequently heard slogan was: "Nothing less than the whole of Germany will do ...". The slogan made it clear what was meant. Observers of the lively discussions about Germany in Europe will feel reminded of this slogan, which could be re-phrased as follow: "Nothing less than the whole of Europe will do ...". This time, however, the content is also indistinct.¹⁵ And German Chancellor Helmut Kohl took care enough to assure the European people in the following words: "The Germans, who are uniting in the spirit of freedom, will never pose a threat to, but will rather be an asset for, a Europe which is growing together ...".¹⁶

15. Berndt Von Staden, "Nothing Less Than the Whole of Europe will Do ...", Aussen Politic (Hamburg), vol. 41, no. 1, 1990, p. 24.

16. Excerpted from speech by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the German Parliamentary Budget Debate: Policy toward Germany, 28 November 1989.

The beginning of the end of Europe's post-war order can be dated precisely: 9 November 1989, when the Berlin wall was breached by jubilant Berliners thronging back and forth between two cities and two worlds and, certainly, the best explanation for this dynamics of mutual decay consists of one word: Gorbachev, who in final round took the process of "de-imperialization" past the apparent point of no return in the autumn of 1989 by declaring open season on Honeker, Jakes, Zhivkov and Ceausescu, the pillars of the ancient regime in Eastern Europe. By the end of the year, the USSR had announced that it intended to bring back all of its foreign troops based abroad by the year 2000.¹⁷

So far as the security model of European peace is concerned, it is difficult to speculate as to how the NATO, the only surviving military alliance

17. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, on 15 December 1989, put the total number of foreign-based troops at 627,500 as quoted under the title "Kremlin to Bring Home all Troops by the Year 2000", in The Times (London), 16 December 1989.

will function when WTO stands dissolved and the Soviet forces, lacking either hinterland or purpose are withdrawn. But more difficult, is the question: if the US follows suit, what will happen to NATO? Will it turn into an Atlantic rump alliance, centred on America's traditional allies, France and the UK? If so, what would its purpose be? Holding the balance against a diminished and remote USSR? Or, against a United Germany?

In a Europe denuded of the US and Soviet forces-in-being, Germany is bound to become the dominant power and in that case it is hard to see how "Yalta" will be superseded by a "Common European Home" in which all nations will pursue happiness and prosperity in a good neighbourly spirit. Moreover, if the USSR is so weakened as to retreat gracefully, NATO might not lose its capabilities but its rationale. Why to keep something that is no longer needed?

Another favourite notion is about NATO's transformation into an alliance of the political democracies, which would at first draw sustenance from supervising

Europe's total disarmament and then become a "management agency" of trans-European politics, with membership extending to the ex-socialist countries and even to a suitably democratized Soviet Union. Yet, whatever the activities of this "agency", it would be an alliance. The idea of an alliance is logically inseparable from the idea of defence or conquest. Alternatively, "Greater NATO" would become a true collective security, dedicated to the proposition: "all for one, one for all". However, the historical record of collective security should give pause to anyone contemplating such an arrangement for post-bipolar Europe. Nor has the UN been able to live up to its charter obligations of collective security because nations are loath to sacrifice their particular interests on the altar of abstract justice. ¹⁸

One underlying problem is still the Soviet Union, a chastened but still very large power amidst a number of small to middle ones. The other even

18. Josef Joffe, "Once More: The German Question", Survival, vol. 32, no. 2, March/April 1990, p.137.

older underlying problem is Germany: too strong to be left alone, too weak to go it alone. If the past hundred years are a guide, Germany has done best when anchored to a community; but the worst had happened when Germany has been left alone treated as an outcast.

It may well be that we are in the midst of a "paradigm change" in international politics - where military power will be permanently devalued and the rivalry of the nations will be restricted to the conquest of export markets and the quest for olympic gold medals. On the other hand, it may be precisely the very abundance of force that has devalued and neutralized military potential in Europe.

Once "uneven development" has been levelled out, all of Europe could initiate the kind of multiple integration that would banish the problem of power by sharing it. In such a system, the issue of alignment would become moot because each member would be tied to everybody else.

The very speed of the collapse of the WTO

and the CMEA in the face of the German unification offers a source of assurance when compared with the enduring reality of NATO and the EC. Both born in the Cold War, NATO and EC persist inspite of the breath-taking demise of the Soviet sponsored institutions. That suggests not just intention but functionalism and legitimacy.

31 December 1992 is a magic date for Europe when a single market with equal opportunities will become a reality. But 1992, is like an onion. No sooner has one peeled away one barrier than there is another one underneath. One goes from the obvious like getting rid off tariffs to the not quite obvious, like differing standards or labelling rules or company law, to the deliberately obscure, like the preferences in government procureme-nt and to the very heart of national feeling, like currency and the education system. All have to be changed, if one is to have real freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people. ¹⁹

19. Maurice Zinkin, "1992 and All That", International Relations (London), vol. X, no. 1, May 1990, p.55.

Little more than a year ago the Madrid Summit adopted the goal of forming an Economic Monetary Union (EMU) by 1992. It is designed to transfer monetary sovereignty from the national governments to a new European Central Bank and to make the Community an international monetary force. Some important issues are still to be cleared, such as whether the ECU (European Currency Unit) will replace national currencies and whether the deficit of each country will be controlled centrally. Britain has been almost the only member having some reservations. The treaty is expected to be ratified before the end of 1992.

Whatever be the obstacles, small or big, they are insignificant compared to the progress already made in coming together and forming a single Economic Unit by 1992. Within themselves the 12 members of the Community will form a single market of 340 million people, an economic area corresponding to the size of the US. With the addition of six EFTA members and three associate members the combined strength of the EEC will be enormously raised.

Association of East European Countries will further swell the importance and the size of the community. Thus the total area of operation and influence covering the members of the community, their associates and partners will become something like the following: ²⁰

	National Product (Billion US \$)	Population (Million)
12 Members of the EC	4800	340
6 Members of EFTA	705	32
3 Associate Members	83	57
8 East European Countries	3612	426

Despite this emerging scenario on the economic front, there is a striking imbalance between the two major powers on the European continent, the united Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, with Russia as its kernel, remains a military super power even as it flounders economically. Germany, which has accepted the renunciation of

20. See, "Europe 1992: The Emerging Leader", by D.N. Patodia in Hindustan Times, 9 October 1990.

nuclear weapons and reduced troop levels, is an economic super power. How these two countries interact, given these contradictions, will determine, to a large extent, the future of Europe.

The treaty of Rome did not foresee that one day even the Soviet Union would be knocking at the European community's door. In terms of new applicants, the EC faces an embarras de richesse, and spells a coming crisis of choice between identity and universality. While the East Europeans today are paying the price of dismal failure in the coinage of Community loss, the West Europeans, ironically, may soon be paying the same price as a result of the EC's very success in expanding and attracting new members. The Community, fed by a separate West European identity, was after all a product of the Cold War, whence it would follow that it cannot survive in its current guise once Europe is whole again.

Indeed, all of Europe is now caught up in a process that will transform the bipolar structure put in place in the aftermath of World War II.

In terms of domestic change-leisurely in the West, dramatic in the East-Eastern and Western Europe are hardly comparable. But both halves are in the same boat when it comes to the systemic, i.e., external forces acting upon the nations of Europe.

It is clear that the super powers are the victims of declining bipolarity-in terms of intra-bloc influence lost. At a minimum, both the US and the USSR would like to maintain a large measure of influence over Europe, the single most important strategic stake in their enduring global contest. Eastern Europe in particular, has been the fountain-head of international conflict in this century. "Two World Wars originated here", Vojtech Mastny reminds us, "and so did the Cold War".²¹ While the pacification of Western Europe may take strong roots that it will outlast the American presence, however, that bet is not so clear in the case of Eastern Europe.

It is true that Gorbachev was not elected to preside over the dissolution of the Russian

21. William E. Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern Europe : The Opening Curtains ? (London, 1989), p. 12.

empire in Eastern Europe including the Baltic republics. However, he could not succeed in erecting the outerwalls of the "Common European Home" before the collapse of the Eastern wing. For nobody, not even the Soviets, know what the Soviet "bottom line" is. All East Europeans would like to see Europe fused in liberty and justice for all; on the other hand, very few of them would countenance this outcome at the price of security lost and stability forgone. ²²

The existing security and political structure of Europe based on the political, military and economic division of the continent would become outmoded and untenable after a decade or so of uninterrupted progress of reforms in Eastern Europe accompanied by a growing involvement of Western European states in the modernization of the East European economy; an increased number of economic ties between the two parts of Europe; the probable establishment of the first pan-European institutions

22. Dr. Josef Joffe, "After Bipolarity: Eastern and Western Europe: Between Two Ages", Adelphi Papers, no. 247, Winter 1989/90, pp. 69-77.

resulting from the CSCE agreements; and a visible, gradual demilitarization of European relations whereas the initial period, covering the decade of the 1990s, would have a predominantly psychological importance by providing credibility to the "new thinking" and by establishing the depth of rapprochement between the two alliances, the subsequent years would mark the fundamental institutional and legal changes in Europe.

The economic aspects of East-West relations during the next decade will probably appear much less dramatic than the political and military ones. The integration of the EEC will by then be a largely accomplished fact. As far as the East European states are concerned, economic reforms should be maturing. Their economic structures, financial and bureaucratic systems, communication networks, convertibility of currencies and openness of markets, may permit them to aspire to a closer association with the Western Common Market. However, such an association may still not have the character of full membership. A substantially more favourable

situation may exist for the East-European states willing to associate themselves with the European states Free Trade Association (EFTA), because of the less stringent legal, political and economic conditions posed by this organisation.

Regardless of changes in their labour markets and industries, labour will still be cheaper in the Eastern European states and the products less competitive; hence the dangers of their "Colonization" and exploitation of continuous "brain drain" and of constantly disadvantageous terms of trade. Thus, from the perspective of East European states, too, the vision of a close association with the EEC may not be entirely encouraging. It is, however, beyond doubt that despite all misgivings and apprehensions, the network of economic, trade and financial linkages and dependencies between Eastern and Western Europe will be more extensive than it is at present.

If and when the military and economic aspects of relations between the European states reach this level of cohesiveness and interdependence the final step of establishment of a common European

security system may be contemplated. Its crucial characteristics would be the multitude of security, economic, cultural and social interactions across the continent and the feeling of belonging to a "Europe of Nations", composed of states with permeable borders, with common institutions able to solve potential conflicts of interest. ²³

In the contemporary world, military force is no longer necessary to achieve most political goals: a superior economy may be sufficient. Where does all this lead a new Europe, now bereft of the debilitations of the Cold War ? For one thing, the "new golden age" of Europe is still far away. While politicians, strategists and arms merchants will continue to view the continent in terms of weapons and troops, its fate is more likely to be decided by its leader's ability to resolve the horrendous economic problems of the Soviet Union, East and Central Europe.

23. Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, "Transition of the East- A New Beginning for Europe?", Adelphi Papers, no.247, Winter 1989/90, pp. 88-90.

The success of the European Economic Community is not in doubt, and its impending economic union will give it greater economic and political clout. But the vision of a new Europe - from the Atlantic to the Urals, in General Charles de Gaulle's somewhat different perspective, will remain a mirage until the Eastern part of the continent is nearer the West's economic mores.

Meanwhile, Europe must face the anachronism of setting up new barriers between the West and the East and even among the nations of the East. Two contradictory forces are at work at the same time : the urge towards coming together in the EEC and in a larger Europe and the desire to emphasize one's particularity as a sub-national group or a nation, as in so many countries in East Europe.

There is need to emphasize as realists that today's security cannot be based on tomorrow's visions and expectations. The need of the hour is to lay broader, firmer and stronger foundations

for future security.²⁴

Of late, there has been talks of a "new world order" esp. by President George Bush, based on the principles of "collective security and the rule of law". The former Secretary of the State, Henry Kissinger, however, sees it impossible to take shape. Those who hope for a "community of power" have been disappointed by both the League of Nations and the United Nation, he believes. Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that the "new world order" has to be given a substantive definition. The word "order" is perhaps not the best word to use because it implies freezing the status quo. But the world needs constructive change, not static order. A new framework of European peace should also advance on a constructive track.

24. Hans Dietrich Genscher, "Towards a European Peace Order", German News (New Delhi: Embassy of the FRG), vol.XXXI, no. 8, August 1988, p.7.

CHAPTER FIVE :

CONCLUSION

Guenter Anders wrote in his book 'On Antiquated Man' : the phrase "all humans are mortal" has been superseded by "all mankind can be killed at a stroke". However, the apocalyptic nature of nuclear weapons also offers an opportunity for reflection. They only permit us to choose between perishing in a nuclear holocaust and realizing that we can survive jointly. Thus, commenting on a fourteen-point plan (was echoing Woodrow Wilson by a coincidence) produced by a joint US-Soviet study group in May 1988, G.A. Arbatov observed that the Soviet Union was in danger of becoming a developing country and the USA a "semi-colony" of Germany, Japan, and possibly South Korea. He called for super power "humility" at an uncommon juncture of "synchronized phases of development" (another echo, not just coincidental, although probably unwittingly, of the terminology) of Braudel and Porshner.¹

1. Paul Dukes, The Last Great Game : USA verses USSR, Events, conjunctures, structures (London, 1989), p. 189.

A retrospective examination of a strategic thinking during the first four decades of the nuclear era reveals a sterility and abstract quality which belies its seriousness. Arms have literally waged war against war. Weapons, and of course strategies to use them, have always been the unruly ally of organized human conflict. The difference in the nuclear era is that now they have won. Nuclear weapons have, also, frozen politics by making war impossible. Power in its ultimate sense has become unusable. Considering this frustration of the strong in the nuclear era, rhetoric aside, each side has a major stake in the stability, even well being, of its adversary.²

Perhaps the realization of this profound truth has led major powers to uproot old guide posts. Led by Gorbachev, the Cold War adversaries are confessing to decades of paranoid misjudgements and so easing the agony of re-appraisal. American

2. Robert L. O'Connell, Of Arms and Men : A History of War, Weapons and Aggression (New York, 1989), pp. 301-304.

political scientists are beginning to accept that redundant militarization emasculated America's real strength and turned it from the world's greatest benefactor into the biggest debtor nation. After decades of ideological self righteousness, the Soviet Union now unabashedly advertises the magnitude of the problems implicit in Perestroika, coping with sub-nationalism in central Asia, nationalism in the Baltics and the challenge of transforming a party dictatorship into an open and efficient mixed economy. But the confession of weaknesses instead of raising temptations of tightening the screw of attrition on the "evil empire" has actually won indulgent sympathy and material support from the West. This may have given Gorbachev a new lease of life even if it may not be the gurantee of political longevity.

For more than a century, the repercussions of Europe's conflicts and tensions have been felt around the globe. Over and over again, efforts have been made to establish a European system which would ensure greater stability. NATO and the Warsaw

Pact built up military power of so awesome nature that the accepted strategic doctrine which prevented actual conflict was mutually assured destruction (MAD). The Paris Agreement of November 21, 1990 among the 35 nations of the conference for security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE) appears to be the first formal step in establishing a new pattern.

Other confidence-building measures - political, economic and military - were also envisaged. Not much progress was achieved, though the process was kept alive, through a series of conferences. The logjam was finally broken by Gorbachev and Reagan. The metamorphosis of governments in Eastern Europe with the acceptance of democratic systems and micro-economics and the agreement on unification of Germany with Soviet concurrence in 1989 has radically altered the situation. However, the first casualty of the changes in Europe was the Warsaw Pact itself.

Gazing into the crystal ball in search of Europe's structure and attitudes provide no certain

answers. Immediate threats to peace and stability appear to be more likely from dissatisfied ethnic groups, mainly in Eastern Europe. Northern Ireland and the Basques are already examples of long simmering discontent in the West. The long - term answer to these has to be political and economic, although a short term law and order approach may also be required. Sheer inertia will probably ensure that NATO will not just go out of existence: "Out-of-area" crises, such as, the one in the Gulf, may provide it more justification for its existence than Europe will. ³

Inside Europe, Germany, already a major force in the EEC, will acquire more leverage in its old sphere of influence - "Mittel Europe". Consequently some marginalisation of Britain and even France is enevitable. On the other hand, the Gulf crisis has shown that the USA may have the military power, but does not possess the economic capacity to project

3. See, Eric Gonaslaves' article "Europe in the 1990s", Hindustan Times, December 12, 1990.

it unilaterally around the globe as it was able to do in the past. The break-up of empire often produces results that cannot be easily foreseen, therefore, no thinking person or nation will like the USSR to break-up into a number of independent states. The frontiers have been accepted and should remain unchanged. While dreamers will hope for a United States of Europe, there are still too many hardles to allow this to come about in the foreseeable future.

"Whatever our protestations about coming in peace, we should ask ourselves : "When have we ever come in peace" ? Man is an imperial beast, born with a weapon in his hand. It may always be so. Perhaps weapons will be needed to preserve our kind, if not, then we can only hope we do not destroy ourselves".⁴

4. O' Connell, n. 2, p. 310.

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T A B L E

TABLE : I

The Numbers Game

	Limit for each alliance	Sufficie- ncy limit*	Current NATO holding	Current Warsaw-Pa- ct holding	Current Soviet holding
Tanks	20,000	13,300	26,650	33,200	20,700
Artillery	20,000	13,700	21,200	26,950	13,850
Other armoured vehicles	30,000	20,000	34,500	42,950	29,350
Helicopters	2,000	1,500	1,630	1,800	1,350
Aircraft	6,800	5,186	6,100	8,350	6,450

Note : All figures rounded to nearest 50. Reductions to be completed within 40 months of ratification of treaty by all countries, with two intermediate stages : 25% of excess equipment to be destroyed within 16 months and 60% within 28 months.

* Maximum number for any one country.

Source: The Economist (London), vol. 317, no. 7682, November, 24 1990, p.52.