

**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

**A Critique of the Theories of Modernization :  
With Specific Reference to the Indian Situation**

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
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
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**DECLARATION**

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Modernization, by its very nature, can either be a sweeping force or a quietly active process bringing about changes in the lattice of our social and attitudinal structures. The sights and sounds of modernization can, in other words, be manifest or subtle. As such, I have greatly benefitted from a variety of humble sources and personal interactional experiences in the delineation of this study.

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**A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF  
MODERNIZATION - WITH SPECIFIC  
REFERENCE TO THE INDIAN SITUATION**



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**PREFACE**

Many books recently written on the subject of modernization bear testimony to its importance. The significance of the theme is beyond doubt as efforts everywhere and in all fields are directed towards attempts at the betterment of man and the conditions around him. In other words, the concept is all-pervasive.

The term 'modernization' bears specific reference to the societies of Western Europe during the sixteenth century. The initial impetus towards modernization which started in Europe could, however, not be sustained due to a variety of political and social factors, and the resurgence of the industrial spirit instead passed over to England. The Industrial Revolution started in England in 1856 led to subsequent spin-offs for the resurgence of the industrial spirit in Europe. The Industrial Revolution in England and subsequently in Europe, led in turn to the need to find markets as well as abundant new material sources for the industrial machine. The voyages of discovery, the process of colonisation, and the rise of the merchant-trading class led in rapid degrees to the growth of great power rivalries between the European nation states. The political structure under such a system was predominantly in the hands of the new merchant-trading class and the nobility in all these nations. The class structure was actually pyramidal, the working class base witnessing a rapid expanse.

Under such an emerging part-feudal system, geographical boundaries were subject to great stresses and strains, power, intrigue, and influence. The First World War was in many ways a culmination of these factors. While it caused changes in the political arena, the economic frictions between social classes and nations increased. The shattering effects of the Second World War manifested the profound dissatisfactions with the social and economic stagnation of inter-war years. There developed an urgent need to breathe new economic life into the shattered wilderness of Europe's extensive war zones. This marked the renewed advent of industrialisation and commercialisation. The process thus found its fundamental expression in England and Europe with its techno-economic and socio-political transformations. Thus the concept as such was ethnocentric, limited as it was to the rise of capitalism. It is needless to say that it bears strong marks of its birth, although now an infinite number of concepts have been fitted into the matrix of this complex concept.

As stated earlier, efforts everywhere are being directed towards the amelioration of social and economic conditions. This is especially true of Third World countries where the process of modernization is assuming increasing dimensions since the early twentieth century. The process in the Third World can be seen against the backdrop of three significant factors... the rapid liquidation of the colonial power structure, the emergence of a craving for development, and the international tensions manifesting itself in the form of fierce struggles to eliminate the legacy of imperialist domination. At present, perhaps the most signi-

ficant factor accelerating the process in the Third World is that it has seen quite clearly the need to initiate indigenous growth processes under forced political draft in order to maintain their independence.

From the end of the Second World War the story of the Third World... the developing nations... has been one of hope and despair. In the euphoria of the early years of independence, most of these nations launched ambitious and massive programs of economic development and technological change. Their ambitions were unbounded and their utopias unlimited: they hoped to accomplish in decades what Western Europe and North America had taken centuries to achieve. The pay-offs of painfully obtained economic inputs, however, has been too meagre. Consequently, their people are restive and some sections are attracted to desperate remedies.

The present study deals with several facets of this process. It is focused primarily on a review of the concepts and theories of modernization, in order to place it within a clear scheme of thought. A review of the concepts of modernization put forward by most theorists, suggests an underlying unanimity in what they term as a 'modern' society. This statement is in contrast to the popular impression of a lack of any such consistency. Thus we have Herowitz, among many others, who points that:

"... there is an obvious lack of logical consistency and uniformity of connotations in this concept".

This problem is dealt with in Chapter I, where we will try and trace connecting links in each concept leading to the formulation of a singular conception. However, what must be clarified is the fact that the lack of consistency lies not in what constitutes a 'modern' society, but in the means to achieve it.

We then proceed to examine the various theories on modernization. Our analysis of these theories shows that their main thrust is focused on technological and scientific development, the other aspects implied in the concept of modernization (i.e., equitable distribution of resources, and a greater sensitivity to the qualitative dimension of life involving economic, political, and social freedom) being ignored. In fact we could almost state with certainty that no theory so far has dealt with the problem of charting the means to ensure an equitable distribution of resources, and democracy in the actual sense of the term. If one argues that the Communist ideology has helped to some extent to successfully achieve social and economic equalization, we would point that this is only to a limited extent, and along with Celley state that:

"Liberals, Gandhians, Socialists, Marxists... they are all the same. Notwithstanding their diverse political affiliations they are united by a common cultural sub-structure which is the culture of the colonist or the bureaucrat... at its best it is a highly mental affair..."

The 'modernisation' which is going on in the societies of the West (including U.S.A., U.S.S.R., et cetera) and is fast catching up in the Third World countries today is something quite different from the original concept (which embodies technological and economic modernization, equitable distribution of resources, and freedom of thought and expression) if one lays emphasis on aspects such as equitable distribution of resources and opportunities (with reference to Western capitalist systems and their various imitative systems in the Third World), and a greater sensitivity to the qualitative dimension of life with specific reference to freedom of expression and thought (in the context of the various countries in the Communist block in Europe and South and South-East Asia). In fact in the context of these areas, one would wonder if any modernisation has occurred at all, or ever will. Satish Arora gives several examples from the Indian scene. Thus the rural rich in India have benefited more from the Community Development Programs than the poor for whom it was meant.

Some, however, may hold that the forces of modernization have yet to permeate most Third World countries and that the effects of modernization have yet to be seen. This statement loses ground if one looks back at societies long engulfed in the modernization process. Unfortunately, results do not support the hypothesis that economic growth raises the share of the poorest segments of the population. In fact the share of the top five per cent increases and that of the middle and lower income groups declines. Even in a society as prosperous as the United States, agricultural wage-earners can, in a sense, be generally classified alongwith their struggling counterparts in the more backward societies. Hence, in none of these societies has technological progress produced a levelling of inequalities and a proportionate sharing of resources. Further, there is the well known view of C. Wright Mills that:

"...the mid-twentieth century has seen the hardening of class divisions in the United States, rather than their decline and disappearance."

We have also John Westergaard who has challenged the view that there is any real basis for holding that social inequality in Britain has substantially reduced since the war.

The pace of modernisation which is taking place is, therefore, narrowly circumscribed to the technological sphere with the socio-psychological changes generally lagging behind in most societies.

It is seen in the context of the above discussion that most of the theories of modernization solely emphasise single factors. This study attempts a more integrated analysis of the forces that fuel and mould the modernization process.

The modernization process, as is going on in the Third World countries with its emphasis on technological change, is not without its problems. In its wake it brings along the typical problems of social

adjustment, psychological schisms, cultural and value lags, et cetera. Nevertheless, the process is a continuing one.

'Modernization' (or rather industrialization) as seen in this context is likely to succeed in most societies because of the material appeal it holds. And this is a fundamental social fact underlying the continuity of the process. Elites and governments welcome such changes especially since they are the main beneficiaries of such a process. In fact it is not uncommon for elites in the Third World to work in collaboration with foreign powers for personal gain.

It is in this context that the inevitability of modernization in Third World countries and the relevance of the Congruence Theory needs to be examined. Although there is a wide gap in the modernization of different societies, it seems evident that they are moving towards a similar 'industrial state' and have similar goals in this sphere, despite the persistence of cultural differences and moral values.

In the Chapter on the relevance of modernization theories in the Indian context, the approach adopted is that it is not necessarily the strong cultural base alone which acts as a barrier to the infiltration of modern values and institutions, but it is rather the lack of perceptive planning, political will, and foresight coupled with a lack of an effective and informed leadership, which is the principal hindrance to the momentum of the modernization process.

It needs to be pointed out here that though industrialization and technological growth is likely to succeed in most societies, neither the 'modernized' nor the 'modernizing' societies (with respect to industrialization) are likely to succeed in all the features characterized under the concept of modernization. This is because each aspect nurtures tendencies which contradict and prevent the development of the other. Thus, capitalism and private enterprise is not conducive to equitable distribution. The latter factor is automatically negated as private enterprise is based on competition which reinforces inequality, and consequently lack of opportunity in various fields. Similarly, if a society focuses its main drive towards equitable distribution, it may have to exercise the kind of social and economic control that will create a situation in which there is an absolute lack of freedom of expression, as in the Communist block. Are these aspects mutually exclusive? Or can these contradictions be ultimately resolved? Details of such an analysis will have to be researched into. It is, however, beyond the scope of this work.

In conclusion it should be pointed out that this study could not be as exhaustive as was desired. However, an attempt has been made to examine and analyse the principal variants in the theme of the modernization debate, and to place it within a clear scheme of thought.

**MODERNIZATION: A SURVEY OF CONCEPTS**



The term 'modernization' is aimed at capturing quantitative and qualitative changes, both in the dimension of scientific knowledge and societal institutions, that have been taking place with increasing rapidity particularly since the sixteenth century. Since then an infinite number of terms are either being replaced by 'modernization' or are being fitted into the matrix of this concept.

This has given rise to the popular impression that there is a lack of consistency in the 'concepts' of modernization, and that the implications of the term are vast and varied. Thus we have Horowitz who states that:

"...there is an obvious lack of logical consistency and uniformity of connotations in this concept."

He thinks that:

" 'modernization' lacks the merit of being a concept, and every attempt to define the concept in terms of an operational set of variables results in the introduction of new ideas which have relatively little to do with the original concept. "1

Contrary to popular belief our review of some of the major 'concepts' reveals an underlying unanimity in what may be termed as a 'modern' society. But before we try and underline the connecting links within the scope of each concept presented, we must analyse the fundamentals each concept seeks to establish.

The most common referent of modernization are the capitalist societies of the West. As Nettl and Robertson point 'modernity' is seen to represent a single final state of affairs... that found in the West.

Another very popular conception of modernization is its equation with industrialisation... and this too primarily in its Western European and American versions. As Moore states:

"... one could scarcely dispute the centrality of economic performance in the definitions and indicators of modernization, for it stands both as an autonomous goal distributively and collectively and as an essential means for implementing educational, political, and recreational goals. "2

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1 I. L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Underdevelopment - Theory and Practice of International Stratification, 1st edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1972.

2 Wilbert Moore, "Modernization as Rationalization: Processes and Restraints", in Manning Nash ed., Essays on Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honour of B. F. Hoggins, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, p 33.

Although the process of modernization is not analyzable exclusively in economic terms, we find that in most societies, especially the low-income ones, improving material standards of living are a major aim. Thus there is a tendency to view modernization as synonymous with economic development.<sup>3</sup> It is easy to see why the idea of economic rationality is so appealing to those considering problems of underdevelopment. Economic rationality, in the sense of seeking the most efficient way to employ resources is nowhere more needed than in the underdeveloped societies, where scarcity of capital and skilled human resources is the most arresting fact of life.

The obsession with material goals goes back clearly to the factors which gave rise to the modernization process itself. Briefly, starting with the First World War the world had witnessed several wars and economic crises. Later, the Second World War caused profound dissatisfaction with the socio-economic consequences of the stagnation of inter-war years. There arose an urgent imperative to regenerate Europe's war-devastated economies.

However, inspite of the numerous significant factors given in support of the economic dimension of modernization, we have the criticism of theorists such as Samuel Huntington who argues that economic development is not a related aspect of modernization, and may even be antithetical to it.<sup>4</sup>

The unilinear-evolutionary conception of modernization is well expounded in Toynbee's analysis wherein it is viewed as a process which would bring all societies to a level of cultural homogeneity obliterating their original cultural identities. The approach sets up a scale of contrasting systems of variables. Modernization is the simple movement from one point on the scale to another.<sup>5</sup>

A line of thought running contrary to the above universalistic conception, is seen in a recent essay on political development by Karl Hoering who suggests that ranking of nations according to some

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3 Chandler Morse, "Becoming versus Being Modern: An Essay in Institutional Change and Economic Development", in Chandler Morse, et al, Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Cornell University Press, New York, 1969, pp 238 and 259.

4 Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics.

5 Examples of the approach are Toennies' gemeinschaft/gessellschaft, Durkheim's mechanical/organic solidarity, Redfield's folk/urban dichotomy, et cetera.

unitary scheme must cede place to judging each in accordance with the subjective ranking it gives itself, vis a vis its chosen reference group among other nations. Further, for different elements of culture a nation may prefer to construct different models.<sup>6</sup>

Cyril E. Black views the core process of modernization as rationalization. This is the awareness of the possibility to seek a rational explanation of physical and social phenomena which is presumed to be law-governed.<sup>7</sup>

Many scholars have suggested the starting point of any definition of modernization is not the character of society, but the character of its individuals. This is so because they consider certain modern attributes as a necessary pre-condition for modernization.<sup>8</sup> Thus Inikles and Smith point,

"... a nation is not modern until its people are modern... we doubt that its economy could be highly productive, or its political or administrative institutions highly effective unless the people who work in the economy and staff the institutions have attained some degree of modernity."<sup>9</sup>

Eisenstadt presents a related but different view of modernization. He sees it to imply the establishment of institutions for the advancement of specialised roles, and its ability to continuously adjust to changing problems and demands. The emergence of such flexibility constitutes here the central issue and challenge of modernization.<sup>10</sup>

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6 Another important exponent of cultural relativism is Reinhard Bendix who suggests thinking in terms of concepts applicable to some (rather than all) societies. This strategy of analysis proceeds in the belief that concepts of universals are so emptied of content that they cease to be applicable constructively. Thus according to Bendix, "The industrial societies of today retain aspects of their traditional social structure that they have combined with economic development in various ways. They are like each other with reference to aspects covered by the adjective 'industrial', such as the occupational structure, the urban concentration of population, and others. Even that assertion is more complex than it appears to be, but it is merely tautological if all 'non-industrial' aspects of such societies are tacitly eliminated from the comparison." Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order, Wiley Eastern Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1969, p 8.

7 C. E. Black, the Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History, Harper and Row, New York, 1966, pp 9-13. Another proponent of rationalization is R. N. Bellah who states that modernization involves the rationalisation of ends which means that the goals chosen by a society should be 'rational' and subject to discussion. R. N. Bellah ed., Religion and Progress in Modern Asia, Glencoe, Illinois, 1965, pp 195-6

There is yet another issue involved in the concept of modernisation... D.P. Mukherjee defined modernisation not as growth but as the broader process of the unfolding of human potentialities. Similarly, Hobhouse states:

"The relations of men may spring from the natures of those engaged in them, and may return upon them heightening their natural capacities."<sup>11</sup>

Gerald M. Meir identifies the 'ideals of modernisation' as rise in productivity, social and economic equalisation, modern knowledge, improved institutions and attitudes, and a rational co-ordinated system of policy measures that can remove the history of undesirable conditions in the social systems that have perpetuated a state of underdevelopment. Most students of development, he points, would undoubtedly qualify the primary goal by requiring that the absolute number of people below a minimum level of real income should diminish and at the same time that real per capita income rises.<sup>12</sup>

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- 8 'Modernity' is seen to exhibit itself in characteristics such as the ability to adjust and empathise with people and situations (Daniel Lerner calls this 'psychic mobility'). Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, the Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, pp 47-51 and p 78; achievement orientation (McClelland) McClelland quoted in David B. Maclin, "A Socio-Psychological Perspective in Modernisation", in Chandler Morse et al, Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Cornell University Press, London, p 90; planning and efficiency (Alex Inkles) Alex Inkles and D. H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, pp 9 and 313; individuality and intellectual commitment (W. C. Smith).
  - 9 Alex Inkles and D. H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, pp 9 and 313.
  - 10 Inkles and Smith also refer to the importance of institutions and their spread when they state, "We feel our results make it clear that as developing nations acquire more modern institutions more widely & fused, to that degree their populations will come to include more and more men marked by their characteristics we have termed modern." Alex Inkles and D. H. Smith, *Ibid*, p 298.
  - 11 L. T. Hobhouse, Social Development, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1966.
  - 12 Gerald M. Meir, Leading Issues in Economic Development, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp 6-7.

As is evident most of the above concepts emphasise single factors in development. Among the approaches which present a multi-dimensional view we have Manning Nash who sees modernity as a social, psychological, and cultural framework, and modernization as a process for the institutionalization of such a framework.<sup>13</sup>

The above account highlights some of the major concepts of modernization. Apparently, the frames of reference are inconsistent and the model projected shows a lack of consistency. But as stated earlier, there is actually an underlying connecting link in the concepts, which we shall now try to systematically trace and which will lead us to the formulation of a singular concept.

Taking the very first concept and its reference to the West, we can trace its implication by highlighting the major features of Western society (capitalist). These, as is very well known, are capitalism, technological and scientific growth, private enterprise, and uncontrolled play of market forces along with political and social freedom.

Another conception of modernization is its equation with industrialisation, in its Western European and American versions. And a third concept states that for most low-income societies modernization has meant the improving of material standards of living. In the latter two concepts, as in the first, there is a clear indication of the centrality of economic development... primarily technological growth and industrialisation.

In the unilinear conception this central concern with economic development is not negated. As is evident, countries of the Third World are progressively channeling their energies in the direction of greater technical expertise and industrial growth.

Coming to Karl Hoering and his concern for subjectivity in what may be termed as modern, we find that his point holds well as an ethical issue... what should be. But evidently what is actually happening, and what is desired is very much the scientific and industrial pattern though it may not be totally exhaustive. It is important to note, however, that Hoering does not necessarily negate this model.

It is needless to point that Cyril Black's equation of modernization with rationalisation has encapsulated the framework of technical and

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13 Another proponent of the multi-dimensional view is M. W. Flinn who points that, "the quest for a cause unique is as fatal as it is alluring, and to insist on a single prime mover involves denial of the roles of expanding demand both at home and overseas, of an abundance of capital, and of changes in the rate of growth of population springing from non-economic origins. Referred in Tom Burns and S. B. Saul ed., Social Theory and Economic Change, Tavistock Pub., London, 1967, p 31.

scientific development... rationalisation being very much a part of this development process. In their stress on individual modernization, Inkles and Smith have not departed from the above model, but on the contrary have charted a way to it. Similarly, Eisenstadt emphasises flexibility as a major concern for the establishment of such a society.

The views of both L. T. Hobhouse, during an earlier era, and D. P. Mukherjee's more recent views do not specify a set of goals for modernisation to achieve. Rather they see modernization as a continuous process, developing and exhibiting the inherent potentialities of men. Here the technological and scientific dimension is encapsulated within a more qualitative framework... it is a latent force that automatically comes to the surface in the continuous process of man's development. Similarly, although Nash does not state it explicitly, the industrial and scientific spirit, and the corresponding socio-psychological conditions is very much embedded in his analytical framework.

In Meir's definition a further aspect of modernization is brought out... the equalization of social and economic resources.

One would perhaps be startled by Samuel Huntington's concept of economic development not being a related aspect of modernization, and further, that it may even be antithetical to it. However, deeper insight suggests, as in the case of Inkles and Smith, that he has not actually departed from the familiar model of economic development but rather has placed it within a time-dimension wherein it is suggested that in the initial stages of development sole concentration in the economic sphere could produce antithetical effects.

Having reviewed the concepts we find a fundamental issue either explicitly stated or implicit within the scope of each concept... i. e., economic modernisation through technological and scientific growth. Thus we have been able to trace a singular emphasis which each concept seeks to establish. A unification in the conceptual scheme has thus emerged... the concept of modernization being equated with economic modernization. However, within the purview of economic modernisation most students of development would qualify the primary goal of modernization as social and economic equalization. Besides the emergence of this issue we are faced with yet another significant aspect in formulating the concept of modernization, i. e., a consideration of the qualitative dimension of life involving democracy, uncontrolled play of market forces, along with political and social freedom.

Thus three fundamental issues emerge in a final conception of modernization... economic modernization (i. e., technological and scientific development), equitable distribution of resources, and finally a hope for greater sensitivity to the qualitative dimension of life (involving economic, political, and social freedom). These three issues are primary in almost every society, with emphasis on each of the issues varying in different societies. Their validity holds whether the pattern

of development followed is capitalist or socialist. But the issue which permeates most societies from the First World to the Third World almost unflinchingly, and moves to the forefront of social scientific attention is technological and scientific endeavour.

It is important to note that the three issues stated are still a future hope in Third World countries, although industrialization is now beginning to set in in most of these societies. The capitalist countries of the West have still to hope for equitable distribution of resources, though they are well developed industrially, and are characterized by social and political freedom. On the other hand, socialist societies are also characterized by industrial development and have also achieved a comparatively greater distribution of resources... but this is not without its price, which is the curtailment of freedom.

But despite these differences, a singular conception of modernization nevertheless emerges as has been discussed earlier.

Unfortunately, however, this positive picture is limited to the conceptual field (the area of goals). When we proceed further to the field of theory (put forth as means to goals) the lack of concensus progressively assumes gigantic proportions and threatens to remain a continuous dilemma today, as well as in future times. This diversity in the field of modernization theories shall be examined in Chapter II.

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**PERSPECTIVES IN MODERNIZATION: AN ANALYSIS**



As seen from the perspective of modernisation theories several conditions are noted as facilitative of the process of modernisation, and aid its development. However, the diversity of modernisation theories has necessitated its classification for analytical purposes. We have dealt with three of the major divisions which have evolved in the course of our analysis. These are theories based on a unidimensional approach, those based on a multidimensional approach, and finally the societal approach. The former, as the term indicates, lays emphasis on a single factor as all-important, and primary, in generating the forces of modernisation. A multi-dimensional approach, on the other hand, focuses on a multiplicity of factors working in unison, giving priority to no single factor. Thus, the former is deterministic, in that it makes modernisation dependent on a single variable. The broader sociological view regards it as the product of the interaction of a number of institutional factors. The societal approach, on the other hand, is more holistic. It does not deal with the dimensions, (as in the case of unidimensional and multidimensional approaches) but regards the working of society as a whole, whereby it progresses from one stage of development to the other.

We shall initially consider some of the major deterministic explanations in modernisation theories. These deterministic explanations have further been sub-classified for purposes of analysis into economic, political, social, and psychological approaches.

### ECONOMIC

The central role of economic modernization is clearly stated in B. Higgin's theory of change in which he states that cultural change is not always necessary to effect modernization. Where culture is incompatible with rapid economic modernization, the culture will adapt readily to economic effort.<sup>1</sup> Among the approaches to economic modernization that we examine here are the entrepreneurial role, and the role of industry and agriculture.

#### The Entrepreneurial Role -

The so-called 'entrepreneur class' is cited by some economic historians as being a prime agent in modernization. The group is supposed to derive its driving force from the fact that spurred by the prospects of potential reward it supplies the vision that creates enterprise that continuously improves the efficiency and foresight needed for modernization, and because it faces the hard realities of potential

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1 Supporting this view is Hetsler who points that a massive shift in the infrastructure of technology can cause profound institutional change. S.A. Hetsler, Technological Growth and Change: Achieving Modernization, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp 6-30.

losses, it will act with discretion.<sup>2</sup>

This approach has brought out a fundamental factor which needs to be considered in an analysis of modernization efforts... i.e., the phenomenon of rewards and losses which underlie man's psychology and cater to his 'root-interests' to use Hobhouse's term. This analysis of the psychological level is an important aspect of the modernization process. However, concentration on this aspect alone will do little to spur the process. Related aspects in the political, organizational, cultural spheres et cetera need consideration simultaneously.

The role of industry and agriculture, which we will now examine are two opposing view points as far as economic modernization is concerned.

#### **The Role of Industry -**

Modernization viewed as a series of crises through which every society must pass has limitations. Industrialization has been viewed as essential by this school, regardless of the size and resources of a nation. Of late, the universality of this approach is being questioned. One representative view postulates an international system, in which the industrialized and non-industrialized societies would fulfil necessary system functions and become connected by some form of organic solidarity. The industrialized world may supply sophisticated technology while the non-industrialized world may supply labour, raw materials, et cetera.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding the latter view we find that the postulate of an international system is baseless as no society can be expected to remain at the same functional level and at the same level of progress.

#### **Importance of Agriculture -**

With regard to new directions for modernization it is interesting to observe the most recent UN survey which points to the need to tackle the problem at the level of the individual nation. The UN stresses the critical role of lagging sectors, internal to the economy which it points, has a limiting effect on growth. Emphasis is on greater exchange between the traditional and modern sectors of the economy... on moving labour force from traditional to modern sectors. However, Fei and Ranis have pointed that the industrial centres, where there is already

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2 This has been emphasized by Hoselitz. Also see P.F. Drucker, "Economic Development and Human Talents", in The American Review, January, 1970, Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp 24-32.

3 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. I, The Penguin Press, Britain, 1968.

considerable unemployment, cannot be expected to absorb agricultural surplus. They hold that this kind of stagnation can respond only to an aggressive public effort directed towards assuring markets for modern enterprises and towards encouraging new attitudes in the traditional sector of the economy. This, and particularly the need for a major programme to re-vitalise the economic activity in rural areas, is crucial.

Thus it has been pointed that Third World recovery is significant only so far as agricultural output exceeds population growth. This means the adoption of a programme rooted in basic sciences. On the one hand, are the agro-engineering problems of better cultivation, and on the other hand, is the psychological and human problem of participation of workers on land. Stress must be placed on both areas. It is stated that only participation by most of the nation's members will move the economy forward. One of the most documented cases of growth through 'spreading' is provided by the history of rice output in Japan between 1900-65. Only one-fifth of the improvement came from development of new techniques. An important stimulating factor was the spreading of programme results to all regions of the economy not directly influenced by modernisation.<sup>4</sup> The result is added motivation and more vigorous entrepreneurship by both government and private sectors, especially small businessmen.

Regarding the role of agriculture it is doubtless that agro-engineering problems need attention. However, in the economic sphere the dilemma of concentrating on industry or agriculture is the problem that is facing most underdeveloped societies today. Myrdal makes a significant point when he states that most societies in South Asia give exclusive attention to the rapid growth of modern techniques in imitation of Western growth patterns. This growth pattern, he says, is not very relevant to the situation in South Asia. The most serious consequence of this is that agriculture becomes a symptom of underdevelopment that must make way for an efficient factory system. Myrdal makes an important point when he states that, though the dynamic element in Western Europe was manufacturing, it never possessed the kind of agricultural potential that many countries of South Asia have. This situation becomes clearer when problems of economic backwardness are thought of in terms of a vicious circle or in terms of 'circular causation', as Myrdal points. The general situation can be seen in terms of a chain of interlinking factors which serve to preserve the status quo of low production. It may be the case that attempts to extract more production from the agricultural sector by turning the 'terms of trade' between agriculture and industry in favour of the latter are self-defeating because it weakens the motive for the peasant to grow cash crops so that the marketed surplus of agriculture shrinks, and industrial employment and output in consequence have to

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4 W. Malenbaum, "Government, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth in Poor Lands", in World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 1, October, 1966, pp 52-68.

contract instead of expanding. (Often there is little link between output and remuneration so that it becomes difficult to maintain an economic level and increase production.) It may simultaneously hold true that there is only a limited possibility of evoking an increase in agricultural surplus by turning the terms of trade in favour of peasant agriculture.<sup>5</sup>

## SOCIAL

### The Role of Education -

Some scientists have moved beyond the assertion of a co-relation between the economic and the social aspects of modernisation to a statement that the social aspects are a necessary condition for economic modernization. It is this that has added urgency to the understanding of the potential usefulness of education as an instrument of modernization.

We have Etsioni's theory which asserts that knowledge is a key component in complex societies. He points that it should not be necessary to proclaim the significance of this vital ingredient in a society that relies on education, science, and the need of individuals to understand not only their own speciality, but their small place in the inter-dependence of billions of other elements. Nevertheless, it does seem necessary. Social scientists, he points, in their quest to understand this fragmented but delicately organized world, have devoted much more attention to power than to knowledge. The decisions that are made to keep the world running and accelerating are seen in terms of men in positions of power. More attention to knowledge is required. With strong knowledge a group or society can more effectively seek its goals. It is free from responding blindly to new conditions. Knowledge is therefore a major source of a society's capacity to guide itself.<sup>6</sup> The emerging societies, it is held, are placing prime reliance on technical education to initiate technological progress, while the modernized societies rely on it to sustain progress.

Regarding the role of education in rural reform a current doctrine states that the main task is to link education with agricultural improvement. In Africa, rural children educated in rural schools seek jobs in towns which are paid double the amount than in villages. To attract them back to the rural areas the modernization of agriculture and the growth of rural schooling must be kept in step. However, here, education is not considered a basic or even strategic condition of development. Equally important is the provision of employment

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<sup>5</sup> This was the kind of dilemma that confronted Soviet policy in the middle and late 1920s, and today confronts the underdeveloped societies having pre-dominantly peasant agriculture of low production.

<sup>6</sup> Amitai Etsioni, The Active Society, The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp 135-51.

opportunities. Changes in schooling must be accompanied by higher relative pay and status of technicians and agriculturalists. As long as the public sector rewards 'academic' qualifications and penalises technical ones, the wrong incentives will continue to be inculcated into the educational system. Further, facilities and amenities must be improved in rural areas and technical occupations. In view of the unreliability of man power requirements and of the continuous advancement of technological and agricultural knowledge, schools must train for mental flexibility.

Gore also points that education is an important instrument of change, but it can be fruitful only under certain minimal conditions... that is, a relative clarity about the means, the context of change, and a commitment on the part of the agents of change. But education, Dube points, tends to 'pile up' around the elites, who use academic institutions to forward their own ends. Goals are set beyond the institutional means of society and therefore become dysfunctional and unrelated to the employment structure. Besides drawbacks in the sphere of goals, several setbacks can be noted in the content of education in modernising societies. A tremendous obstacle to progress is caused by emphasis on acquiring 'culture' or 'civilization', rather than on technical skills.<sup>7</sup> Contradictions in the content of education further weakens consensus:nationness. A significant problem is caused when education is viewed as an end in itself rather than a means, and thus becomes an article of consumption involving considerable cost. This feature strongly characterizes most underdeveloped societies where education is used more as a symbol of status than for any constructive purpose. Unless such dilemmas are resolved, Dube points, it is doubtful whether education can make its proper contribution to modernization.<sup>8</sup>

Laying down such minimal conditions of modernization, as Gore has done, is of little analytical value since he merely assumes a fundamental framework within which modernization is possible. The major drawback of such theories is that they have little to say about how modernization is to be brought about, and often ignore its implications. Guy Hunter has put the matter well:

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7 The problem has been discussed widely in the African societies. For Kenya, example, see Employment, Income, and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1972, esp. Ch. 14, pp 233-52; Also see Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974.

8 Leela Dube and S. C. Dube, "Barriers to Modernisation", in S. K. Srivastava ed., Tradition and Modernization: Processes of Continuity and Change in India, Indian International Publications, Allahabad, 1976, p 81.

"Much writing on modernization simply assumes a political system within which modernization is possible. But, unless politics can provide a framework within which modernization can take place without constant uncertainty and even violence, all other aspects of modernisation policy will fall to the ground."<sup>9</sup>

However, all these terms related to education and progress are so value-loaded and open to different interpretations that it is difficult to determine the ways and means of acquiring them.

## POLITICAL

### Democratic Versus Authoritarian Debate -

Perhaps, the most significant of all, there has been serious re-thinking about the value of democracy in the process of modernization. Initially, political participation and in particular, political competition were stipulated as required for modernization. Today, however, there is serious questioning about the necessity of democracy... especially in the transitional phases. As Myrdal observes:

"Planning for development can be attained by an authoritative regime bent on their realization. Further, the substitution of an authoritative regime for a more democratic one gives no assurance that policies will be directed towards the realization of those ideals, or that, if so directed they will be more effective." <sup>10</sup>

Dealing with the theories stressing the significant role of the political elite, we have Gabriel Almond according to whom:

"The political system is the (formal) legitimate, order-maintaining or transforming system in the whole society." <sup>11</sup>

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- 9 Guy Hunter, Modernising Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p 230.
  - 10 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. I, The Penguin Press, Britain, 1968.
  - 11 G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, ed., Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960, p 7. Also refer Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 3, Sept. 1961, pp 493-514; Alex Inkles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries", American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, Dec. 1969, pp 1120-41.

The engineering of change in underdeveloped societies is in fact considered best left to a strong administrative apparatus. The bureaucracy, with a Weberian emphasis on impersonal rationality, has been viewed as the most appropriate force for transforming what are perceived as unstructured relations within traditional society. The argument runs, that if there is to be change, law and order is essential, and for this the civil administrative network offers the most appropriate instrument.<sup>12</sup> The centrality of public administration in the modernization process is derived from the fact that alternate modernizing institutions...private business enterprises, secondary associations, are looked upon with disfavour or suspicion. Besides this, Karl Mannheim points that there are structurally necessary causes for the special importance which values and value-oriented behaviour have for the political elites in a society.<sup>13</sup> His statement is substantiated by S. F. Nadel according to whom the elite is a :

"...stratum of the population which for whatever reason can claim a position of superiority, hence a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the community. The important point is that the political elite sets standards for society. It is in this sense that any established elite has been viewed as having the power to facilitate or hinder new developments, and generally to make new ideas acceptable to the group at large."<sup>14</sup>

Specifically the approach supports the ability of the political elite to constrain social disturbances experienced especially by early modernizers. Accordingly, the principal responsibility for tension management is seen to fall on the state. The state is supposed not only to manage tensions but in its omniscience to identify future points of malfunction within the system and smooth out these potential trouble junctures. Further, the political system is considered to be a fundamental instrument in making decisions and implementing them. Consequently, the final transformation of Third World societies is seen to require the incorporation of all institutions into a 'central societal framework' that is itself modern, and the creation of such a framework is largely a symbolic and cultural problem

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12 In addition, there is some ambiguity as to whether the military as well might aid the process. For a criticism of the military in systems analysis see J. P. Nettl, "Strategies in the Study of Political Development", C. Leys, Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, pp 13-34.

13 Karl Mannheim, ref. in A. R. Desai ed., Essays on the Modernization of Underdeveloped Societies, Vol. I, Thacker & Co., Ltd., Bombay, 1971.

14 S. F. Nadel, Theory of Social Structure, Cohen & West, London, 1969.

that depends on the existence and creativity of the governing elite.<sup>15</sup>

Regarding the pivotal role of the governing political elite, Myron Weiner has certain highlights to present. He points that the catalogue of problems the government faces is so formidable that for many new nations the prospects for political modernization seems dim. He questions the validity of expecting the governing elite to build a sense of national identity and legitimacy when their administrative capabilities are so limited, and when diverse highly politicized ethnic groups are fighting one another for political power. The answer, he points, must surely be pessimistic, and insists that one must not assume that the state has to solve all or even any of the problems either to survive as states or to modernize. Spain, he points, is still faced with the problem of legitimacy; Canada, Yugoslavia, Belgium still have unsolved problems of national integration, and many societies of Eastern Europe are confronted with the problem of political participation. Finally, he also notes that important as the state is in modern times for accelerating or facilitating the process of modernization and economic development generally, many economies have grown in the midst of extraordinary tensions and ineffectual governments. He feels that perhaps there is a minimum threshold of governmental authority and participation. But once this threshold is achieved some societies may produce enough innovational men to build modern industries, transform traditional agriculture, and establish schools, medical facilities etcetera. Further, he points, it is also important to note that although a strong political leadership might be acknowledged as a factor for promoting stability, for the most part the leaders of the underdeveloped world are viewed with undisguised mistrust and even contempt.<sup>16</sup> Edward Shils further points that, authority frequently engenders some dispositions towards rebellion. The more pronounced an authoritative regime the more likely is it to arouse disrespect and if not, then inward dissatisfaction.

Here other problems can be seen to emerge. Thus, given the objectives of modernization, a successful and single-minded elite may lead to the emergence of a cohort of occupants of new roles who are well equipped with pragmatic capacities, committed to the effective discharge of responsibilities. However, they are also likely to enjoy readily expandible material wants and to develop strong and somewhat competitive private interests in acquiring these various attributes. Not all of these qualities are necessary for modernization or capable of ultimate moral approval, but their emergence is difficult to avoid. Peter Worsley in 'The

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15 A similar point has been made in Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, pp 205-7.

16 Myron Weiner, "Political Participation & Political Development", Myron Weiner ed., Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, Basic Books, New York, 1966, pp 234-5.



Third World' demonstrates that:

"...populism will only last as a prevalent ideology until the rural cleavages and class struggles have sufficiently crystallized to make the populist leaders and solidarity makers an anachronism."<sup>17</sup>

In such a populist situation, the type of efficient 'administrators' in whom Eisenstadt and others seem to put faith, cannot but become supporters of the existing status quo of the land owners' interests and of foreign economic dominance.<sup>17</sup>

However, Eisenstadt, Apter, Nettl, Bendix, and even Myrdal have pointed that this strong centralisation of power had characterized the early phase of modernization in Western Europe, United States, and the English-speaking dominions, and it was this rigid centralized framework before the onset of industrialization which helped it become flexible and viable enough to absorb further doses of modernization and the rising aspiration of the masses.<sup>18</sup>

Debating the significance of the democratic and authoritarian approaches to modernization, we find that it is difficult to rule out completely one or the other approaches. As in the case of Western imperialism, a particular approach or phenomenon could have dual, and perhaps contradictory, impacts. Consequently, it is important to postulate conditions under which it is more effective to consider either approach. The need is therefore for a contextual type of analysis which would take both approaches into consideration.

Besides differences on the above issue, there are other significant problems in the ideological sphere which need consideration, and which pose tremendous obstacles to modernization. These concern difficulties in the convergence of ideologies, interests, goals, et cetera so necessary for modernization. This persistent diversity is based on the crucial problem of values not subject to question. Thus people in authority have interests conflicting with those subject to them. Further, among the masses themselves, ethnic, community, and national identities pose a continuous problem. If the ruling elite manages to formulate a common ideology, it seeks to constantly impose this on the masses and other power elites, as a means to consensus. But the revolutionary elite in order to maintain their position and sustain divisive forces, impose ideological constraints on the process of modernization. Resources are thus diverted from the production process and invested in ideological socialization instead.

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17 Peter Worsley, The Third World, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1967, pp 118-174.

18 Also refer D. E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965, pp 2-3.

Very often, governments are undecided about the means by which modernization should proceed. Imported systems have to be adjusted to local conditions. Countries which decide to develop their own system of government run into other difficulties. Indonesia is a case in point. Indonesia might well have been voted the modernizing society most likely to succeed when it attained independence in 1950. Yet fifteen years later the nation faced economic and political disaster. Indonesia's problems sprang in large measure from indecision concerning just what the Indonesian democracy is going to be. There was confusion with regard to immediate goals and the methods of attaining them. While everyone agreed on using village democracy as the new model, problems arose in translating it to the national level.

The nostalgia of tradition is another source of ideological conflict. Thus most modernizing societies launch their programmes of modernization with blurred images and conflicting goals. From this perspective it can readily be seen why cultural diversity complicates any leadership activity. Since men gain their identity from their cultures, cultural changes induced by leaders are likely to stimulate extreme emotional responses. Further, the information network utilized by political leaders carries a cultural bias. This is particularly the case if the political elite belongs to a single cultural group. However, when several cultural groups are part of the leadership, several different kinds of information flow to the political leadership, thus reducing efficiency in decision-making and action.

Besides this modernization is often curbed by sticky political and economic decisions. A double standard pervades decision-making among elites... the wish to further personal interests and those of their group. Because the elite may favour certain plans questionable in normative or knowledge terms and against the interests of the masses, it will have to often use power to gain a decision. And when this happens alienation increases. Objective social patterns are distorted and members show hostility to power-wielding elites. In such a situation changes remain highly superficial as the population submits by formal compliance to official orders but resists more fundamental change in subtle and passive ways. Authority thus conceived ceases to be legitimate or valid. When this happens the elite itself loses the ability to induce change without resort to enforcement. And this diverts resources and energy from more constructive issues and adds to the burdens of the governing elite.<sup>19</sup>

A related political problem to the above problem of enforcement, is the attempt to control behaviour rationally through formal means.

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19 Edward Shils emphasizes the lack of affinity between the recommending authority and the masses as a factor affecting absorption of change.

The reference here is to bureaucratization which represents the most sweeping and seemingly irresistible form of organizational change in the process of modernization. Where the acts of a large number of people have to be integrated, administratively co-ordinated specialization has become the standard organizational device for getting complex tasks performed. Planning represents an attempt to reduce the relevant variables in any given problem to a set of measurable and written specifications, coupled with an attempt to determine the interrelation between the variables in order to predict ultimate outcomes.

While planning may not be thought of as a process directed towards the control of human behaviour it ultimately has this consequence.<sup>20</sup> The reference here is to bureaucracy which is known to be the most efficient form of administration, but does not always produce high levels of efficiency. The proliferation of formal rules and legal codes could influence personality in ways that could adversely affect the process of modernization. Etsioni rightly sounds a discounting note on such a system when he points:

"... modernization requires commitment to the system in some spheres and compromise in others, if efficiency and initiative are to be sustained."<sup>21</sup>

However, the problem is not so easily solved in suggesting flexibility in a highly rigid form of organization. Complexities are multiplied when translated to practical political actions. In order to promote viability, government allows a certain amount of freedom of action and expression of interests but finds itself a victim of cross-pressures... Ethaic, civil service versus party factions, et cetera... it will lose control, and viability will breakdown. To further modernize, the government may need highly centralized executive powers, but may find itself nonetheless dependent on popular cooperation and the unhampered flow of information relevant to planning. If this flow is lacking, again, viability will break down.

We now come to an important aspect relating to the role of political elites in inducing changes in the cultural sphere. Amitai Etsioni points out that political elites must either first change contexts (i. e., institutional value systems, norms, and established patterns of functioning) or avoid changes altogether. His argument runs thus:

"A frequent question is 'To what degree do elites and to what degree do the people influence events?'"

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20 Ref. W. H. Friedland, "A Sociological Approach to Modernization", Chandler Merse et al, Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Cornell University Press, New York, 1969, pp 65-66.

21 Amitai Etsioni, The Active Society, The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp 162-8.

The 'text-book' theory of democracy, he points, holds that elites represent the people. The reaction against this theory is that most of the public has little knowledge about politics and much of it is moulded by the elites. This may be an over-reaction, and here Etsioni posits a third approach:

"Elites are relatively free to set the societal course so long as changes are 'bit changes' or related to vague issues. When, however, elites initiate changes that contravene institutional contexts, backlash will be powerful. Consequently, elites must first change the context, if fundamental changes are to be introduced."<sup>22</sup>

An active society has to confront these constraints.

Etsioni makes a seemingly significant point when he emphasises the necessity of change in institutions (value systems, norms, and established patterns of system functioning) before any fundamental change could be effectively introduced. But here a peculiar paradox is evident. What precisely do 'fundamental changes' imply if not changes at the level of values, norms, and established patterns of system functioning? The problem is really re-baptised in Etsioni's theory, as he does not discuss methods by which such institutional changes may be attempted.

#### The Role of Communication -

In the context of the above discussion information is therefore seen as crucial to the internal maintenance of the political system and its operational effectiveness. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the communication of information is so decisive that the system itself can be explained in terms of communication. According to Lucian Pye, for example, it seems likely that:

"... the basic processes of political modernisation and national development can be advantageously conceived of as problems in communication."<sup>23</sup>

Most significantly, culture itself can be viewed as information, and leadership or authority can be understood as the management of information. Therefore, it is held that an absolute pre-requisite for

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22 Amitai Etsioni, op. cit.

23 Lucian Pye, Communications and Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, p 8; K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1953; Daniel Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958, pp 46 and 55.

modernization is the construction of communication networks. A recurrent difficulty is that plans devised at the top and handed down, work out badly in practice. This is because people are not involved. Hence the necessity of a representative body popularly elected, through which the public can voice their opinion. These most highly contradictory tendencies derive, on the one hand, from the need for a free flow of information so that politicians know what to do, and on the other, the necessity of coercive capacity in order to ensure adequate action. Such a structural paradox does not provide a way out. It is from such a relation that a development constitution will finally have to be derived.

#### **Political Instability as an Agent of Change -**

Considering the structural paradoxes of centralization and decentralization the only solution, as pointed out by some sociologists, is to change the system as frequently as possible to facilitate a circulation of elites. Political instability may indeed be a course for political creativity. As constitutions fail, new options are opened for new political leaders where previous options had been closed. Such a theory of political instability is a socially disruptive method of approach according to Apter and Doornbos.

"The main objective of the constitution should be to see how the technocrats and civil servants could be politicized and how the politician could be made more sensitive to professional considerations of modernization."<sup>24</sup>

Therefore, it is held that the ideological message, especially in the early period of modernization may help a society overcome some of its most fundamental crises. More effective in the long run are likely to be ideologies that maintain closer contact with the evolving aspirations of those whose welfare is at stake. Skilful leaders, in the words of Lasswell and Holmberg, must:

"... think contextually and keep policy questions related to the goal values of all whose effective support is required for success. Too little promised may not mobilize; too much may embitter."<sup>25</sup>

As stated earlier the seemingly 'negative' quality of such an approach could have 'positive' effects in the modernization process. Apter and Doornbos in stating the negative quality of such an approach, and emphasizing instead the increased interaction of politicians and civil

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24 D. E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965, pp 175, 436-46.

25 Ref. in The Politics of Modernization, Ibid.

servants fail to analyse problems of their feasibility.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL

### McClelland's Achievement Orientation -

Several theories have been put forward based on a psychological approach to the modernization of societies. The most vigorous and empirically founded view point in effecting modernization that has so far been put forward is that of McClelland. His basic postulate is that a psychological characteristic termed 'need for achievement' (n Ach) is a pre-requisite for economic modernization. He holds that efficiency can be expected only of persons with a high degree of n Ach. For instance, managers more concerned with human relations ('need for affiliating' or n Affl) are not as good.<sup>26</sup>

McClelland's theory is supported by Dube who points that this absence of achievement motivation is associated with the kind of educational structure which characterized the developing societies, and also with the institutional framework characterized by ascription, particularism, and affectivity, not particularly propitious for modernization. It is remarkable, he points, how little thought the developing societies gave to structural modifications and institutional change. Emphasis on the sacred blocked the emergence of a new attitude complex that is often a pre-condition of modernization.<sup>27</sup>

Three questions arise from McClelland's analysis. (1) Whether the use of resources as skilled personnel and channels of communication i. e. 'investment' to raise levels of n Ach even in advanced populations is as effective a use as the same amount of investment along other lines, such as community development programmes. This is not only a question of what compliments are needed to make teaching n Ach worthwhile, but also involves the question of whether n Ach can be taught effectively.<sup>28</sup> (2) What will be the social manifestations for n Ach? The general tenor of these remarks is that n Ach can serve many ends. Thus, high need achievers may be deviants. (3) The third question relates to countries of the Third World where much behaviour is collective rather than individual oriented. Under such circumstances it becomes a matter of particular import perhaps, whether the Western form of achievement motivation, being more individualistic centered is really capable of being grafted

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26 David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., New York, 1961, pp 63-105, 159-67, 188-203, 391-406.

27 Leela Dube and S. C. Dube, op. cit.

28 David B. Macklin, "A Socio-Psychological Perspective on Modernization", Chandler Morse et al, Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Cornell University Press, New York, 1969. p 91.

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into social and cultural networks that do not reverse this orientation. Abegglen's account of the Japanese factory in which the characteristics of the cohesive, extended Japanese family are the prevalent bases of factory organization, prompts doubts concerning the necessity of the usual 'individualistic', 'universalistic', 'affectively neutral' concomitants of n Ach.<sup>29</sup> In conclusion, we have Horowitz's reaction to McClelland's n Ach theory which states that the theory does not hold ground simply because of the difficulty of validating it.<sup>30</sup>

Other theorists dealing with the psychological pre-requisites for economic modernization and cultural change are Inkles and Smith. In a massive investigation of modernizing attitudes among individuals in six different developing societies, Inkles and Smith charted out values essential for promoting modernization. Their basic strategy was to deduce what psychological attitudes are essentially a part of the modern industrial order. Choosing the factory as the key element in the modern social order they identified characteristics such as a sense of efficacy, innovation, a scientific outlook et cetera.<sup>31</sup> However, McClelland points, they cannot say whether these modern attitudes are causes or consequences of modernization. In general they take the view that institutions shape men. If this were so, the effective way to proceed is to set up modern institutions and rely on them to become tools of modernity. But if the reverse is true, if only modern men can create effective modern institutions, then men have to be educated into modern values first. In 'The Achieving Society' McClelland strongly suggests that certain human characteristics as n Ach, precede and promote economic modernization.

McClelland's analysis is as follows... McClelland coded children's literature in different societies for variables thought to be favourable to modernization. He then checked to see if these variables preceded rapid rates of economic modernisation at two different time periods. What the co-relations indicate is that societies with high n Ach scores in children's literature in 1925 and 1950 modernized more rapidly subsequently. A third correlation shows those societies which modernized more rapidly between 1929-50 did not have high n Ach scores in 1950, showing that n Ach is not the result of modernization. The second theme in 'The Achieving Society' dealt with the 'hard work' code. Questions on one's belief in efficacy deal with such matters as whether one thinks success

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29 J. C. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory, The Free Press, Illinois, 1963, pp 11 and 99.

30 I. L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Underdevelopment: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification, First Edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 1972.

31 Alex Inkles and D. H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, p. 9.

depends on one's own effort or on destiny. The third theme is called 'other directedness' or 'market morality'. It consists of a number of specific codes which dealt with such matters as whether people in children's stories did things for traditional reasons or whether they entered into a specific contract to perform a function for another, or whether they were pressurized by peers. In general, the societies which seemed to modernise most rapidly were those in which the media presented a concern for performing functions for others than for traditional authority. Many of the sub-categories of this other-directedness theme seem quite analogous to themes in the OM syndrome ( overall modernization syndrome ), such as openness to new experiences. The fourth theme is the activity inhibition or the control of action. Those societies which showed the most concern for discipline or control of action in their children's stories modernised most rapidly.

The second and third themes... the 'hard work' code and 'other-directedness'... have themselves drawbacks for which McClelland has criticized Inkeles and Smith i.e. whether these are causes or consequences of the modernization process. If these have been given as causes, then how are they to be effectively achieved? Or do these characteristics automatically follow from an Ach once the latter is achieved? Further, the third theme attributes certain negative characteristics to things traditional. But this, as has already been pointed out in Abegglen's account, need not always hold true.

It is needless to say that such a correlation between modernization variables in children's literature and economic modernization is difficult to validate because of the complexity of factors conditioning such a process. In conclusion, McClelland's theory deals with only one aspect of the modernization process... i.e., economic. Further, it completely negates the humanist approach, a factor particularly stressed today. Thus we have here Cyril E. Black's valuable insight to the problem of enforcement and the attempt to control behaviour rationally. He points that:

"... control of behaviour rationally through formal means does not always produce high level of efficiency. The proliferation of formal rules could influence personality in ways that could adversely affect the process of modernization."<sup>32</sup>

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32 Cyril E. Black, op. cit. It is important to note that though Black views the core process of modernization as rationalization he, like Amitai Etzioni (The Active Society, op. cit.), qualifies such a view.



Everett Hagen - The Environment and Personality -

Everett Hagen, another proponent of the psychological approach to problems of modernization, stresses the neglect of personality change as an element in historical explanation. Creativity, he points, is greatly influenced by family environment which impinges on an individual especially during his early formative years. Since family environment and methods of child-training differ among societies, creativity varies accordingly. The same may be true of other aspects of personality. Hence differences in personality among societies may be an important historical force.<sup>33</sup> Consequently, he has put forward the following hypothesis... that differences in personality rather than differential circumstances may be the central explanation of Britain's primacy in the Industrial Revolution. Before the eighteenth century Britain was technologically behind one or another continental country in almost all fields. Before the eighteenth century the Dutch were pre-eminent in many crafts ... printing, trade, et cetera. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Germans were ahead of the British in almost all branches of mining and metallurgy. But for several centuries (from the fifteenth century) the British had been catching up. In the fifteenth century British craftsmen were able to spin and weave as efficiently as those of the continent. In the sixteenth century Britain evolved the best naval organization in the world. In the seventeenth century having seen the advantages of the cotton goods produced in India, England made the technological changes necessary for cotton weaving far sooner than her continental rivals. Britain's advantage in the textile industry was not merely the result of her alertness in perceiving the good qualities of Indian textiles, but because of her technological advances. When the continental countries perceived the advantages of Britain's new cotton textile industry they were unable to catch up with her because they were insufficiently innovational. The Industrial Revolution was not merely the result of a few great inventions. It resulted from varied advances in many fields that had long been going on. The Revolution resulted from the acceleration of a continuous process. It was not the result of economic incentive and progress in physical knowledge, but of technological ingenuity. For instance, of the four Asian nations, Japan possessed the poorest natural resources and had the least contact with the West. Yet, Japan led the others in industrialization. Consequently, Hagen points, it is difficult to account for this fact except with respect to personality, which also seems a plausible explanation for the superiority of the British in technological innovation.

Among the relevant evidence of difference in personality between the British and those of the Western continental societies is the comparative behaviour in the field of government. Two characteristics of innovational persons are pertinent... one is trust in one's own capacity and the other is the ability to understand attitudes and reactions of others (empathy). In comparison to the Western continental societies, far more individuals in Britain in most social classes possessed these abilities. Moreover, the growing middle classes displayed much greater

trust in their own ability to arrive at judgments in public affairs than did the corresponding classes in the continent. Exceptions exist regarding these two characteristics. In the Soviet Union and Japan authoritarianism persisted while rapid progress occurred in the technological field. But the authoritarian government here was a creative solution to political problems which removed obstacles to economic modernization and acted on behalf of the entire society rather than a limited social group. The technological programme in France and Sweden preceding the eighteenth century can be explained by the presence of scattered innovational groups. But deprived of the energy of leading socio-economic groups technological innovation weakened and failed to keep pace with Britain.

However, Hagen also holds that personality change is not the only possible or important cause of an increase in innovational activity. In many historical cases of an increase in the level of innovational activity the best explanation seems to be that the group was faced with a new problem in circumstances in which its old pattern of response was not possible. During the Second World War the people of Germany, Japan, France, and Italy received severe psychological shocks. The social order proved impotent. Probably, the people were jolted out of old social and psychological ruts. These shocks are at least partial explanations for the sharp increase in the rate of technological innovation in these societies. Severe social trauma may change men's emotional mechanisms and personality, which may thereby cause technological change. But apart from these changes, innovation increased simply because people were forced to struggle towards new solutions.<sup>34</sup>

Reviewing the hypothesis put forward by Everett Hagen, we find that the author fails to note that personality differences chiefly result from differential circumstances. His example of Japan is in fact contradicted by his own statement later. In the case of Japan, he states it was personality differences which led it in industrialisation among the Asian states, rather than economic incentive or progress in physical knowledge... because Japan had the poorest natural resources (in Asia), as well as the least contact with the West. These are highly questionable propositions because poor natural resources could be an incentive for greater innovation. As Hagen himself points later, innovation could increase precisely because people are forced to struggle towards new solutions due to a variety of circumstantial conditions.

### MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH

Discussed below are the views of Benjamin Higgins and Clifford Geertz propagating a modernization plan that gives due weightage to social and cultural factors - a plan that moulds and takes cognizance of the in-built

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34 Everett Hagen, "British Personality and the Industrial Revolution: The Historical Evidence", Tom Burns and S. B. Saul ed., Social Theory and Economic Change, Tavistock Pub., London, pp 35, 37-9, 41.

advantages of certain traditional social and cultural values and institutions, without seeking to demolish them altogether. Mrydal in the subsequent analysis deals with the by-passage of traditional social and cultural values and institutions by accepted economic growth models, and makes a plea for models of growth in South Asian societies that incorporates an awareness of these constraints.

According to Higgins' theory of change the fact:

"... that society is not a seamless web, but a patchwork quilt, in which some patches can be changed without changing all or even most of them, is both bad and good news."<sup>35</sup>

It is bad, posits Higgins, because it means that we cannot count on economic modernisation alone to bring a satisfactory pattern of social and political modernization, nor can we rest assured that broader political participation or social modernisation (such as the shift from the tribe to the extended family and then to the nuclear family as the basic unit of social organisation) or even improved health and education, will bring overall modernization. But it is good in the sense that we need not wait until everything can be changed at once in order to get on with the job of changing and raising productivity, output, and incomes. We can start working on those aspects of society most obviously in need of change if levels of social welfare are to be raised.

On the question of what needs change and what does not, Clifford Geertz more than a decade ago stated:

"The issue properly stated, however, is not whether every aspect of society must change, or nothing but the economy itself must change in the process of economic rationality; clearly, neither of these extreme positions is defensible. Rather it is: what must change and what need not?"<sup>36</sup>

A wide range of cultures are capable of generating development, Geertz maintained, if the favourable factors (relative to the individual culture) are used and the unfavourable factors modified or suppressed. With respect to Indonesia, Geertz states, that drastic changes in the social

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35 Benjamin Higgins, "Economic Development and Cultural Change", Manning Nash ed., Essays on Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honour of B. F. Hoselits, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, p 106.

36 Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963, pp 147-56.

organisations and cultural patterns are not a pre-requisite to economic development. It is rather that economic development and planning should take due account of the differences in these factors and should not stifle the internal dynamics of individual cultures by trying to force every society within the same development mould.

A significant issue in Geertz's theory is that a wide range of phenomena are capable of generating modernisation. This is supported by the fact that the effects of change are not limited to the department of social life in which it occurs. An industrial change will have effects going far beyond the sphere of industry. It may alter class relations, and perhaps the balance of political power. So when we consider the conditions of modernisation in general terms we must begin with the reservation that no condition will act alone.

This point is further emphasized in the Interaction approach, and Mrydal's Institutional approach. According to the former, modernization entails marked changes in institutions, but these changes are dependent on changes in the psychological strata. Changes in either level is causative with respect to changes in its opposite. This interaction of social and psychological levels needs careful consideration. The value of such an analysis at both the social and psychological levels is succinctly brought out when viewing the causative role of failure in development. The social and psychological approaches present different pictures. Where the sociologist would say only that the expected change has not taken place, the psychologist may see the person as having acquired a new dimension in his awareness of his environment. It is possible that failure resulting in curiosity and frustration may eventually lead to highly successful change. It might also be that a single practice did not have sufficient impact to be persuasive. In short, there are more variations of success and failure than is represented in 'verification' and they can be elaborated only by some concepts from social psychology. Hence the more recent view is that any approach to modernisation must be comprehensive and multi-purpose.

#### **Institutional Analysis -**

Mrydal analyses not only the economic, but also the social institutions, political atmosphere, cultural heritage, and demographic and ideological trends. The non-economic factors, he points, are decisive especially in underdeveloped societies. Unlike in Western societies where the social matrix is permissive of economic modernization, the problem of modernization in South Asia, including India, calls for induced changes in the social and institutional structure which do not respond spontaneously to policies restricted to the economic sphere. Despite the fact that modernization in India, and other South Asian societies, is likely to be attended by acute social, spiritual, and political conflicts, nevertheless, Mrydal is in favour of a direct attack on this frontier... without which economic revolution may stop. Since the main resistance to change stems from attitudes and institutions, and a plan is fundamentally a political progra-

name, Mrydal is convinced that any attempt to modernize should be focused here.<sup>37</sup>

Reviewing the approach to modernization as put forward by Mrydal we find that besides focusing on the significance of institutions, he does not examine the question of how they can be changed or how their influence can be neutralized if it is so pernicious. Again, a basic Mrydal argument is that many persons in South Asia are not motivated to work and achievement. The statement may be true, and is perhaps universally so, but the important question is can governments induce people to work either by higher wages or appeals to patriotism, or religious and communal solidarity? These questions are not really examined, although Mrydal does imply the necessity of revolutionary changes. In effect, Mrydal's analysis does not chart the road to social revolution which it so emphatically recommends.

Mrydal points that developmentalists have to rely on 'spread effects' for their policies to be effective. This is related to the problem of the 'big push' and concerns the size and speed of modernization efforts ... the bigger the efforts are in a given period of time the greater the possibility of immediate results and widely dispersed effects.

However, terms such as 'spread effects' and 'big push' are impregnated with problems when viewed with respect to contextual change (whereby change attempted in any particular aspect of social reality involves corresponding changes in related aspects of society). Such terms necessarily imply a 'centre' from where change is generated, and consequently affect other fields, through a process of 'spreading'. However, in his Institutional approach Mrydal makes no note nor specifies any such 'centre' which could be instrumental in initiating such a continuous chain effect. Besides, once the concept of a 'centre' is assumed, which could be primary in such a process of 'spread effects', the entire notion of contextual change becomes invalid, because new change is initiated through a segmental process.

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37 M. W. Flinn and Dumont have also noted the significance of non-economic factors in growth. One approach sees increasing innovational activity as resulting from changes in the degree of tolerance accorded to deviance and changing attitudes to economic tasks. The focal point of theories supporting non-economic factors in growth is the proposition that the major problem facing such societies is the necessity to develop an institutional structure which is capable of continuously absorbing the various social changes which are inherent in the process of modernization. Unless traditional values undergo change an industrial ethic cannot be created. Also see W. Moore, "The Social Frame of Economic Development", Braibanti and Spengler, Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development, Durham University Press, Durham, 1961, pp 57-82. Also see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernisation and Sustained Growth", World Politics, Vol. XIII, No. 4, 1964, p 577.

Further, Mrydal's theory of the 'big push', according to which the bigger the efforts are in a given period of time the greater the possibility of immediate results, is questionable since, as Karl Deutsch points:

"... content and scale also may have some effects on the system, in that systems can become overloaded, and perhaps backfire."<sup>38</sup>

Thus we see, that determining problems of content and scale of social change are highly sensitive and subjective issues, generally not amenable to rational planning.

To conclude, according to the multi-dimensional approach there is no singular, sovereign cause for changing systems or components. The quest for simplification, which is an appropriate feature of scientific enterprise, has led to the identification of some important variables such as technological innovation or demographic variables, but the net result has been the development of 'special theories of change' for specific classes, structures, and conditions, and not a master theory that achieves independence from these restrictive variables.<sup>39</sup> The task of modernization thus is multi-tooled and multi-disciplined. Where economic or political relations have dominated comprehensive programmes for modernization, sociological, political, and psychological factors will need consideration.

### SOCIETAL APPROACH

We shall now discuss the societal approach. Here we have the Western analysis of Third World underdevelopment, and Durkheim's theory based on the division of labour.

#### **Third World Underdevelopment: A Western Analysis -**

The Western approach is yet another theory of change with reference to the underdeveloped societies. According to Manning Nash, underdeveloped societies by the fact of being underdeveloped are incapable of modernization without assistance from the modernized societies (i. e., the capitalist societies of the West). Further, the modernized societies have an altruistic attitude towards the underdeveloped societies.

Several writers, Hoselitz among them, have questioned the validity of the Western model of modernization for the Third World, on the ground

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38 K. W. Deutsch, "Some Quantitative Constraints on Value Allocations in Society and Politics", Behavioural Science, Vol. XI, No. 4, July, 1966, pp 245-52.

39 W. E. Moore, Order and Change: Essays in Comparative Sociology, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1967.

that not all features of traditional society are negative to materialize progress. The extended family and caste system, for instance, have helped in pooling family resources for modernization and in organizing family labour.<sup>40</sup> It is quite likely, that features found in the West today did not provide the framework within which growth of those societies originally occurred, but were later consequences of technological forces. Thus the requisites for 'being' modern differ from those required to 'become' modern. What was needed for a modernization syndrome of the nineteenth century may no longer be required in a technologically, and more important ideologically different twentieth century.

Besides this, the West itself (especially the U. S.) may face reform measures in the Third World with hostility. The reason is usually inherent in some type of commercial stake held by the West in the emerging societies.

Thus it is evident, that the majority of the societies of the Third World have achieved only formal political independence, and remain to a great extent a component part of the world capitalist system. One of the most important effects was and still is that the specific structure of the production process is dependent on foreign economy... this has been retained and further cemented. In most modernizing societies the level of exports is not only absolutely low but has been declining during the past few years. This is due to various reasons... For the majority of 'traditional' commodities (commodities of strategic significance apart) price reductions had to be accepted. These commodities do not serve the needs of industries belonging to the means of production which are of dynamic significance for the economy of the importing societies, and they are not subject to any essential change through development of technology. In exchange for 'dynamic' commodities they will therefore yield continuously decreasing proceeds.

On the other hand, the production structure moulded by the colonial system conditions considerable and rapidly growing imports. Three conditions particularly account for the growing need of imports... (a) In all modernizing societies the need for 'maintenance imports' is rapidly rising. These imports are not only necessitated by wear and tear and the need of spares on the part of the formerly established imperialist primitive industrial and handicrafts structure, but above all by the beginning of industrialization in many of these societies. (b) In most modernizing societies the agrarian question has not been solved. The feudal forces... already during colonial times they had been the main ally of imperialism... are dominating agriculture and preventing its rapid development so urgently necessary, above all, in the interest of overall modernization. They are impeding growth of

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40 B. F. Hoselitz, "Tradition and Economic Growth", R. Braibanti and J. J. Spengler ed., Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development, Duke University Press, Durham, 1961, pp 83-113.

production, which in the field of foodstuffs leads to a critical situation and to a deficit, in view of the growing demand for foodstuffs in these societies.<sup>41</sup> (c) Along with the growing deficit in trade, borrowings have increased. Indebtedness has assumed gigantic dimensions. Several writers, Gunnar Myrdal among them, maintain that trade between technologically advanced nations and emerging societies not only fails to help the latter but is an absolute detriment to them. The degree to which the cumulative impoverishment of the poorer societies is due to internal or external factors is difficult to specify, but an examination of foreign trade pattern relations indicates that the emerging societies have made no substantive gains through external exchange.<sup>42</sup> At the same time they are deeply involved in the world capitalist system. Thus the modernising societies get into a vicious circle. The effects of colonialism thus lead to a more intense neo-colonial exploitation.

Contrary to the above view is the dualist position which reduces itself to the statement that there is a disjunction between nations and these disjunctions are natural, and simply reflect the different rates of growth. The argument is most succinctly presented by Raymond Aron when he points:

"The high development of some countries is neither a cause nor a condition of the underdevelopment of other countries."<sup>43</sup>

He further points that to take any other position but the dualist one always involves placing responsibility for misfortune on another country. In point of fact the Latin American countries had they so wished, could have created the industries with the help of American capital. He does not deny that the advanced societies did draw substantial advantages from their position or that favourable rates of exchange were not welcome by the industrialized nations. But these, he points, are at best marginal factors. The advanced nations did not depend on these overseas communities for their survival. As evidence for this he points to the growth rate of countries of Western Europe that lost their overseas empires.<sup>44</sup>

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41 In the first half of the 1960s Pakistan's food imports rose by more than 40% annually. Today the share of these imports amounts to 20% of all the imports of India and Pakistan.

42 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. I, The Penguin Press, Britain, 1968.

43 Raymond Aron, The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967, pp 7-48.

44 Horowitz points that Aron has here confused 'traditional' colonialism and direct military control with 'modern' economic imperialism. L. L. Horowitz, "Qualitative and Quantitative Research Problems in Comparative International Development", M. Stanley, ed., Social Development: Critical Perspectives, Basic Books, Inc. Pub., New York, 1972, p 28.



A contrasting view of modernization to that taken by Aron is perhaps most sharply formulated by Andre Gunder Frank in his recent book on 'Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America'. Gunder Frank's basic contention is that underdevelopment in Latin America is the necessary and inevitable outcome of four centuries of internal capitalist development and of the contradictions of capitalism itself. He asserts that:

"... these contradictions are the expropriation of economic surplus from the many, and its appropriation by the few; the polarization of the capitalist system into a metropolitan centre and peripheral satellites; the continuity of the capitalist system through re-creation of these contradictions everywhere during this four-hundred year period in Latin America."<sup>45</sup>

According to Gunder Frank the 'satellite status' (industrial backwardness) is a consequence of the modernization process and not simply of lethargy or backwardness. It is his position that no peripheral country that has been firmly tied to the metropolis as a satellite through incorporation into the world capitalist system has ever achieved the rank of an economically modernized country except by finally abandoning the capitalist system itself. A significant part of Gunder Frank's monistic thesis is that underdeveloped societies have managed spurts of modernization only during war or depressions in the metropolitan centres which temporarily weakened their domination.

Horowitz poses the above problem of concept formation as follows:

"... are all nations to be considered as autonomous units or are they to be considered as inter-related parts of a larger systematic unity. There is no escaping the fact that the magnitude of analysis is an impediment to the solution of the nature of modernization. The field of development studies became really dynamic when Functionalism entered its final phase. At the outset the problems of underdevelopment were viewed discretely as related to the inner functioning of the underdeveloped society, but later it became increasingly apparent that a Marxian element was present, that the problems of under-

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45 Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brasil, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1967, esp. ref. pp 3-12, 99-120.

development were increasing in proportion to the problems of the advanced nations. This 'dialectical inter-dependence of development and underdevelopment' to borrow Sweezy's expression had two facets. On the one hand the wealth plundered from the underdeveloped societies became the bases of advancement of the developed societies. This was the external source of primitive accumulation of capital... the internal source being the forcible expropriation of the masses of agricultural producers from the soils. On the other hand, pre-capital modes of production were destroyed. The perception of the problem is thus linked to the issue of social stratification at the international level.<sup>46</sup>

So far we have been discussing the assumption of the West as a model of modernization for the Third World. It is suggestive of the fact that given the necessary infra-structural facilities and cooperation of the West, modernization could well be a feasible goal of the underdeveloped societies. However, as A. R. Desai points significantly, this ideological bias (i. e., equating modernization with the Western concept of industrialization and economic modernization), may lead developmentalists to urge measures which may lead to a profound 'crisis situation' in the underdeveloped societies.<sup>47</sup>

However, there are some positive aspects of a society's contact with the West. Thus a major impetus to change in nineteenth century Japan was fear of intervention by the West. Thus, unless the Japanese adapted a scientific technology, they were prey to external encroachment. However, colonial policy might vary, colonialism nevertheless set static traditional societies in motion. Even what may seem to be exploitation was in the end beneficial. A reactive nationalism emerged and spread even into the countryside. Of all forces that have helped to bring about modernization of traditional societies, this reactive nationalism has probably been among the most powerful. Marx has noted, that however disruptive the impact of the West, it had the merit of upsetting the tradition-bound village society.

Finally, in evaluating the utility of the West as an aid in the modernization of the Third World, it is fruitful to recall C. E. Black who points that, the problem is not one of sharp discontinuity or total

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46 I. L. Horowitz, "Qualitative and Quantitative Research Problems in Comparative International Development", op. cit.

47 A. R. Desai ed., Essays on the Modernization of Underdeveloped Societies, Vol. I, Thacker and Co. Ltd., Bombay, 1971.

immersion in Western sources of modernization, but one of adaptation. 48

**The Durkheimian Analysis : The Division of Labour -**

Durkheim ranged beyond the confines of economics to examine modernization and social change as a condition associated with the division of labour. He observed the division of labour to progress with time, and in the process to convert traditional values to those characteristic of the industrial community. 49

Durkheim points that it is the division of labour which causes a change of values from tradition to those characteristic of the industrial community. But it is important to ask what causes the division of labour? Durkheim has dealt with this problem in his book 'The Division of Labour in Society' where he explains that it is the material density (population growth) and moral density (intensity of social interaction) of society which causes such differentiation. Moral density is merely a peaceful solution to the problem of the survival of the fittest. Firstly, his theory implies an underlying assumption of the desirability of population expansion... that such a factor is a necessity for modernization and industrial growth. Granting population growth a positive role in modernization, Durkheim further fails to probe into the causes of population growth. But several theorists consider population growth a negative force in modernization and a factor to be curbed if any progress is to be made.

Resolving such contradictory stands we may put forth the following view... it may be stated that population growth must of course be proportional to the material resources of a society; but if population growth outgrows material resources consequent social imbalances may lead to the development of a new phenomenon which would have subsequent implications (positive or negative) for modernization. Similarly, if population growth lags behind material resources (i. e., a society is materially rich), a different kind of social phenomenon/phenomena results causing differentiation and variation in the complex matrix of social life. Consequently, there is no such thing as a 'must' in modernization... no such determinism is really valid. Any phenomenon, even those viewed as 'negative' could prove 'positive' at a later stage of progress. Or worse still its effects could go unrecognized due to the complexity of factors that any social science explanation has to deal with.

Similarly, Durkheim fails to probe the depths of social interaction... the factor of 'moral density'. Why is there such a phenomenon? He explains the presence of such a factor as a peaceful solution to the problem of the survival of the fittest. But why such a solution? Could we

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48 Cyril E. Black, op. cit., pp 26-34.

49 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, The Free Press, New York, 1947, pp 233-328.

trace any causal relation between such a phenomenon and man's innate qualities that are his as a species of nature. . . qualities such as gregariousness et cetera ? These and many more problems have to be analysed for any wholesome consideration and explanation of social change and modernization.

We have so far examined some of the major theories of modernization. Our analysis of these theories shows that their main thrust is focused on technological and scientific development. The limitations which become evident is their lack of emphasis and focus on the other aspects implied in the concept of modernization (i. e. , equitable distribution of resources, and a greater sensitivity to the qualitative dimension of life - involving economic, political, and social freedom). In fact we could almost state with certainty that no theory so far has dealt with the problem of charting the means to ensure an equitable distribution of resources, and democracy in the actual sense of the term.

Moving away from theory and evaluating the actual process of modernisation as is evident in various 'modernized' and 'modernizing' societies, we find the above limitations apparent once more. Thus, at both the theoretical and practical levels the process of modernization is a highly restricted one. Moreover, the process of 'telescoping' industrialisation within the span of a few decades (unlike the West where it had a more evolved growth) is leading to severe stresses, strains, and distortions in the process towards modernization. Consequently, some of the questions we will examine in the following chapter are on the inevitability of industrialisation in Third World countries, and the views of Congruence theorists on universal similarities of social institutions despite 'breakdowns' in the course of adaptation of modernisation ideals.

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**THE INEVITABILITY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE  
RELEVANCE OF THE CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS**

In the preceding chapter we had examined some of the major theories of modernization with their emphasis on the scientific and technological basis underlying the modernization process. We have also seen that they fail to focus on certain other important issues, namely, the sharp levels of inequalities in distribution networks, and the problem of democracy, i. e., ensuring social, political, and economic freedom. Further, the strain of telescoping Western growth models into a traditional social structure is not without its problems. In its wake it brings along the typical problems of social adjustment, psychological schisms, cultural and value lags, et cetera.

In this context one is automatically led to pose the question... Will industrialization succeed in Third World countries? Secondly, what is the validity of the views expounded by Congruence theorists on the gradual emergence of universal similarities of social institutions across societies? It is these factors that we shall now analyse.

The scholarship which emerged in the 1960s did not hold that the present underdeveloped traditional societies will automatically evolve into industrial societies. It recognized that there is no inevitability of industrialization, even with the aid of modernised societies. According to this group of scholars there is also a great danger of the industrial process breaking down in these societies because of the growing assertion of the masses for resources from the central political authority which may result in violent upheavals generating 'involuntary' trends. Thus it is stated that it is prudent not to count on automatically continuous 'sustained growth' in the future lest growth should recede in the absence of 'sustained effort'.

Besides, the catalogue of problems facing underdeveloped societies seems so formidable that it is tempting to conclude that for many new nations the prospect for political modernisation is dim. Thus, it is asked if governing elites can build a sense of national identity and legitimacy when their administrative capabilities are so limited and when diverse, highly politicised ethnic groups are fighting one another for political power? Will there be many civil wars like those experienced by the Congo and Nigeria, insurgency movements as in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam? And will some societies remain so paralysed by their problems, so torn by conflict, or so engaged in international conflict in pursuit of national ambitions that little or no industrialization will occur? To all these questions the answer, it is held, must surely be pessimistic. Myron Weiner points:

"Why should we assume that all states we now see in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East today will exist twenty years hence or that all nations must necessarily industrialise?"<sup>1</sup>

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1 Myron Weiner, ref. in A. R. Desai, op. cit.

The Third World has been trying for decades to develop along the capitalist path. However, a number of scholars who were optimistic in the 1950s about this path of development are slowly becoming sceptical about it and are also forecasting a gloomy future on the basis of current trends. Myrdal's 'Asian Drama', Worsley's 'The Third World', Gunder Frank, et cetera all reveal that the capitalist path followed in the Third World is leading them to a peculiar involutory trend.<sup>2</sup>

A stream of thought which sounds an optimistic note holds that industrialization is inevitable, however long drawn-out the process. It may involve 'breakdowns', which are continual, but finally the process is an integrated one. Thus according to Rostov's model every underdeveloped society will be lifted to the 'take-off' stage and then put on the path of maturity.

One would tend to support this latter stream of thought as an increasingly large number of societies are now turning to industrialization and mechanization despite its negative effects.<sup>3</sup> Besides, efforts to halt the forces of industrialization are useless because of the growing dependency of many societies on changing international markets and political organisations which precludes any freezing of the process of modernization.

More important, industrialization is likely to succeed in most societies because of a fundamental factor underlying it... that is, the material appeal it holds. Elites and governments welcome such changes as they are the main beneficiaries of such a process. In fact it is not uncommon for elites of the Third World to work in collaboration with foreign powers for personal gains. Besides the elites, the people themselves would welcome a comfortable standard of living which is mechanized rather than labour-oriented. One would state that material appeal alone is an insufficient condition for industrialisation to succeed, if the necessary infra-structure is absent. But the fact that the process has been adopted and is developing in most of these societies is indicative of the availability of at least the fundamental necessities. And the continuation of the process is assumed on the grounds of the forces of materialism.

This material appeal of the process can be traced to its origins. As seen from the perspective of modernization theories, the process of modernisation can be seen against a background of great social upheavals, world wars, national liberation movements, revolutions, and counter-

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2 Ref. in S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, and Modernity, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1973, pp 47-56.

3 Also ref. D. E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965, pp 1-2.

revolutions.<sup>4</sup> From the cold war to the nuclear armaments race and 'balance of terror' humanity has been living under the threat of atomic death. There have also been several unsuccessful revolutionary movements. Probably, the factor most significant was the shattering effects of the Second World War which caused profound dissatisfaction with the social and economic consequences of the stagnation of inter-war years. There developed an urgent need to breathe new economic life into Europe's war-devastated zones.

The process in the Third World can be seen against the background of three factors which stand out sharply... the rapid liquidation of the colonial power structure, the emergence of a craving for development, and the international tensions manifesting itself in the form of fierce struggles to eliminate the legacy of imperialist domination. There is another significant factor which led to the emergence of the process in the Third World, as pointed by Gail Omvedt. This is the process of emulation which began in the non-Western (and some Western) societies once the process gained ground in the West. The process succeeded in some societies as a result of some initial advantages of social structure. In other societies too the impact of the West both disrupted the traditional structures and started the crucial process of modernization.

One must question the Western model (namely, the developed capitalist societies of the West) at this point, and ask what are the distinguishing features which have made it almost universal.

The nation states of the West, due to certain economic and political pre-conditions<sup>5</sup> succeeded in industrialization, and consequently in originating the first version of what was to become a universal stage of society. Our understanding of the process therefore depends to a considerable extent on the experience and level of achievement of nations that pioneered the process. Therefore, one obvious reason that made the West a model for most non-Western and some Western societies was simply because it was the first of its kind.

However, not all 'firsts' are emulated. We must therefore seek

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4 Starting with the First World War (1914-18), the world has witnessed the October Revolution, the founding of the First Workers' State in the Soviet Union, rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany, the civil war in Spain, and the Second World War (1939-44). There was further the Korean War, the First Vietnamese War, wars in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

5 These political and economic pre-conditions refer to the effects of the First World War and the Second World War, and the colonization of Third World societies which ensured adequate supply of raw materials for the industries of the West.



reasons which make the core of Western society particularly appealing. It is easy to see why the idea of economic rationality is so appealing to those considering problems of underdevelopment. Economic rationality, in the sense of seeking the most efficient way to employ resources is nowhere more needed than in the underdeveloped societies, where scarcity and skilled human resources is the most arresting fact of life. Thus cognitive gain and fruitful hypotheses often lead nations to adopt promising patterns of modernization.

Another point related to the above issue is that the Third World has seen quite clearly the need to initiate indigenous growth processes under urgent conditions... if only to maintain their independence. Thus a major impetus to change in nineteenth century Japan was fear of intervention by Western states. Unless the Japanese adopted scientific technology and industrial advances... in short, until they created the hallmarks of modernization in their own country... they were prey to external encroachments and interference. The revolution of industrialization thus came to affect the entire world. Thus, most non-Western societies are forced to adopt Western economic rationality because, as points Karl Mannheim:

"... even the opponent, under the single law of 'competition on the basis of achievement', is ultimately forced to adopt those categories and forms of thought which are most appropriate in a given type of world order."<sup>6</sup>

We may ask if there are no other models which the Third World could use as a source of defence against the West? The message that most of the underdeveloped societies get is that economic success requires economic rationality in the Western sense. It is difficult for them to disregard the message, unless like China they treat the West as a hostile giant and hence commit themselves to the creation of an entirely different society along non-Western lines. However, as C. B. Macpherson points, there is a standing temptation to put material standards first, and this reinforces the tendency of those countries to accept Western economic skills, with the consequent difficulty of separating the skills from the Western assumption of economic rationality... this being that it is competition, above all, which is fundamental in spurring development.<sup>7</sup>

The impetus to change is particularly attributable to such factors as the disintegration of indigenous social structures, which

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6 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, New York, 1952, pp 221-3.

7 C. B. Macpherson, "Reflections on the Sources of Development Theory", M. Stanley ed., Social Development: Critical Perspectives, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1972, p 217.

was the consequent mainly of colonial conquest and rule, missionary activities, economic penetration, urban poverty, et cetera.

Besides the above factors the process retains its appeal for several other reasons. For one, the modern world appears to be turning gradually to less alienating means of control. In shops, offices, et cetera the shift away from coercive strait-jacketing is slowly emerging, although this still remains questionable. Work patterns change strikingly. On the average work is tending towards less supervision, and demands more skill, initiative, and responsibility. Relative trends are the rise in production, due chiefly to more efficient technology, the widespread increase in education, somewhat shorter hours of work, and the increased education of women. Further, and somewhat overlooked, are the facts that the medieval artisan worked under the most fatiguing conditions. Consequently, according to Kerr, workers' protests declines significantly with the development of industrialization. This contention is based on a variety of arguments: industrialization is attractive to workers, the dislocations of industry are less severe today, the rewards of industrialization are comparatively high for workers, et cetera.

Taking these factors into account we find that, harsh as the problem of individual adaptation may be to the industrial society, there are few cultures whose value system would not prefer it to starvation. This statement is supported by the fact that an increasingly large number of societies are turning to industrialization and mechanization in spite of its negative effects. And as Hetsler points, this whole area of psychological deprivation may be a passing phase wherein the individual is finally completely emancipated from production drudgery by a complete, or near complete, automation. But this, of course, is a debatable issue.

The hypothesis which emerges here is that industrialization is most likely to succeed in many modernizing societies. This hypothesis is based on some of the fundamental propositions that have been discussed. It is in this context of the growth of industrialization, that the relevance of the Convergence Theory needs to be discussed.

The term 'convergence' has been used to describe basic, institutional similarities among industrialized societies. These similarities eventually overwhelm cultural differences, and lead to a 'homogenized' industrial society. The literature on convergence is of recent origin, and has been summarized by Moore, Feldman, Faunce and Form, and Smelser. Moore describes the underlying theory of Congruence as the 'theory of structural constraints'. He points:

"The essential idea is that a commercial-industrial system imposes certain organizational and institu-

tional requirements not only on the economy but also on many other aspects of society. The idea in turn rests on a conception of close functional inter-dependence on the components of social systems.<sup>18</sup>

In the present section we will focus on the current state of modernization theory with reference to the troubled problem of homogeneity and heterogeneity in the contemporary world. Here we ask questions as: (a) How far is industrialization as a process evolutionary-universal in nature? (b) Is industrialization likely to develop particularistic patterns in specific historical existential backgrounds of different societies?

Economists it might be expected would be confident that industrialization in the more advanced societies of today could be repeated in the same form in today's modernizing societies. On the other hand, sociologists, anthropologists, and perhaps psychologists, being closer to social institutions and personal motivation are more keenly aware of differences among cultures and the need to adapt the modernization process to varying institutional contexts.

There are various formulations in connection with the problem of homogeneity. One important view is to treat industrialization as a unilinear-evolutionary process whose growth would bring all societies to a level of cultural homogeneity. The evolutionary approach is based on the pre-suppositions that all societies will ultimately evolve a similar structure and cultural form despite their historical dissimilarities, and that the historical factor will only determine the sequence of the evolutionary stages rather than their direction. The evolutionary approach has been divided into the 'evolutionary systematic', and 'evolutionary componental' approaches. The evolutionary systematic approach is found mainly in the writings of Marxists and neo-Marxist analysts of modernization. It postulates a single, uniform, ultimate destiny for all societies irrespective of their divergent historicities. The evolutionary componental approach to modernization is non-messianic, but this too assumes certain universal sequences in growth patterns, and although the sequences may be arrested in different societies, yet the direction of change is the same.

The propagandists of convergence were well aware that cultures had their own peculiarities and developed in different ways. But they showed that they always acted upon each other and that interaction had

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8 W. E. Moore, Impact on Industries, Prentice Hall, New Delhi, 1969, pp 11-12. Also ref. D. E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1968, p 334.

itself grown in the course of modernization, in the sense that the various developments which may take place in independent centres and shaped by immanent factors tend to converge and become increasingly inter-dependent.

Today other social scientists, as well as economists, are rightly challenging this view of society. One of the most forceful rejections of the theme comes from the distinguished Israeli sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt. The experience of industrializing societies since World War II has convinced Eisenstadt that there is no uniform pattern of industrialization and modernization. For example, a comparison is made between India and China. The problems that exist for the formation of a state that is already relatively culturally unified, differ in kind from those in a state of high cultural diversity. Even if other societal characteristics were alike, the cultural diversity of India would render its path to industrialization fundamentally different from that of China.<sup>9</sup>

Similarly, the process of social change that steadily increased the wealth-creating powers of the Western nations took place in a series of small stages, the cumulative effect of which was not apparent to their initiators. Increasingly complex organizational structures emerged as a cumulative consequence of activities at the grass roots. On the other hand, the societies that have undergone industrialization since the last quarter of the nineteenth century beginning with Japan (and even Germany) have seen quite clearly the need to initiate indigenous processes of growth and modernisation under forced political draft, in order to close in on the early industrial societies. Their efforts have been highly organized, and have started by adopting blue prints derived from Western experience. Industrialization, therefore, in the twentieth century is 'by design' following what Lewis in his essay 'The Social Limits of Politically Induced Change' calls an 'inverse model'.<sup>10</sup>

Further, the replacement of traditional by modern forms in one sector of society, example technology, need not launch a continuous process of change in all sectors. Instead, it may bring stagnation in some sectors, and breakdown in others. Thus, economic modernisation need not generate greater political participation.<sup>11</sup> Not all traditions will

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9 A theoretical discussion of this point may be found in Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, ch. 7.

10 J. W. Lewis, ref. in Chandler Morse et al, Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Cornell University Press, New York, 1969, p xiv.

11 One prominent example is Kuwait where the average income is from 4000-5000 \$, but the country is nevertheless an underdeveloped one. Here the big cities have all the characteristics of economic modernization, but the surrounding countryside is primitive.

disappear with industrialization. Some like the Indian caste system may prove highly durable. Similarly, most theorists continue to see Islam as a tradition that must be left behind for industrialization. Its collectivism has been seen as antithetical to individualistic economic enterprise. W.F. Wertheim has emphasized the possibility of non-Western societies by-passing Western stages to a new form of development. As Abegglen points out, the Japanese factory catching up with, and then surpassing Western technology, nonetheless retains a semi-feudal, discipline in social relations that is quite foreign to social organizations of factories in the West.<sup>12</sup>

Eisenstadt rightly sums up the entire controversy as follows:

"But it would be wrong to assume that once these forces (of industrialization) have impinged on any society they naturally push toward a given, relatively fixed 'end-plateau'. Rather as we have seen, they evoke within different societies in different situations, a variety of responses depending on the broad sets of internal conditions of these societies..."<sup>13</sup>

The number of possible permutations and combinations of elements of economic modernization and social change seems virtually unlimited.

Thus, if the laws of the physical universe and principles of science and technology have a largely absolute character, those of human relations have a highly relativistic character. If one may imagine that eventually there will be agreement on a set of ultimate human values, then it is clear that at the present moment in history there is at best only 'a series of first approximations to the ultimate'. Consensus may overlap but they are not identical. The naturalistic convergence towards similar sets of pragmatic principles, which is what a large part of economic modernization is about, neither requires nor implies a similar convergence with respect to moral and social princi-

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12 This point has also been stressed by ChieNeKane when she states that values of loyalty and devotion permeate from the family and social group to the Company. This lack of mobility in the Japanese corporate and social structure, due to small-group orientation in the Japanese social structure, is indirectly related to the growth of creativity and a sense of commitment. She further points that the absence of this tendency in India where the management personnel are generally highly mobile, due to rewards and promotion possibilities, is directly related to defects in the system of organizational functioning. However, it is clear that such a universal requirement of small-group orientation can not be made as several societies have progressed without it. Besides, such a statement would contradict with the view that industrialization does not imply similar socio-cultural settings. ChieNeKane, "Patterns

ples. Thus, while the instrumental values of modernisation can be rationally evaluated, and could therefore be uniform in all societies, the same cannot be true of the categorical or moral values.

These conclusions add up to a revolution in social thought. According to Lewis Coser:

"... what Eisenstadt records here is certainly the collapse of an over-ambitious effort to provide a grand theory of modernization. His work is of major importance, not because it comes from a disgruntled outsider, but from the very core of social science establishment."<sup>14</sup>

Eisenstadt provides no formulae for modernization, but his insistence on specifics is in itself very useful. Thus he states:

"Instead of asking for a general universal pre-condition of a universally valid model of modernization, more specific questions about the development or impediments to the development of different patterns of symbolic modernisation and rates of organizational development and modernisation in different institutional spheres must be developed."<sup>15</sup>

It is in this context of the concluding statement by Eisenstadt that it is hopeless to search for a universally valid model of modernization, because of culture-specific impediments to general modernization formulae, that chapter IV examines the validity of the general theories of modernisation in the Indian context... a society with its own highly evolved set of social and institutional values and traditions, its high degree of culturally sanctioned social inequalities, the concomitant economic inequalities and the further inequalities developed as a result of the process of modernisation itself.

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of Industrialization in India and Japan", India International Centre, 1979.

13 S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, and Modernity, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1973, p 358.

14 Lewis A. Coser, Review of S. N. Eisenstadt's Tradition, Change, and Modernity, in Science, Vol. CLXXXIII, February 22nd, 1974, p 742.

15 Another important exponent of cultural relativism is Reinhard Bendix who suggests thinking in terms of concepts applicable to some (rather than all) societies. This strategy of analysis proceeds in the belief that concepts of universals are so emptied of content that they cease to be applicable constructively. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order, Wiley Eastern Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1969, p 8.

**THE IMPLICATIONS OF MODERNIZATION  
IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT**

We have so far made a perusal of the various approaches and theories on the question of modernization, as also making a critical evaluation of the same. On the basis of the knowledge and insights gained so far, it would be of interest to introduce an element of specificity, by examining and analysing the implications of modernization in the Indian context.

Before we venture into this area, it must be stated that we would necessarily have to focus on the strong social and cultural base that prevails in the context of a developing society like India which often moulds and shapes the value systems and orientations of the people; this is because in the ultimate analysis it is the movement of the whole social system upwards, which is in fact what is meant by modernization, and there is no escape from this, if we want to be realistic. Having made this point, it is nevertheless true that if modernization is viewed as a scale, different societies will find themselves over a period of time, at different points of the scale, and at varying paces of momentum. This momentum is also dependent on a variety of other factors such as the kind and quality of its prevailing elite and bureaucratic structure, the ideological frame-work of the polity and its planning process, pattern and kind of technical and industrial modes adopted, spread and quality of education et cetera. A concomitant of traditional social and cultural base in any society is the ideational or value orientation... shapers of an individual's world view within any strata of society at a particular moment of time. A variety of researchers have posited the view that these tradition-linked values have acted as positive barriers to the process of modernization; where they have not acted as 'barriers' these values and traditions have joined hands in encapsulating the spread of modernization to peripheral areas of every day thinking, life style, and activity, or encapsulated them to the urban sections of India. Examples of such approaches to the study of the Indian situation can be found in the writings of Singer,<sup>1</sup> Marriot,<sup>2</sup> and Embree.<sup>3</sup>

#### Traditionalist Approach to Indian Society -

Several traditional scholars<sup>4</sup> debunked the view point that Hindu (Indian) society has been eclectic, open to new influences, absorptive

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- 1 Milton Singer ed., Traditional India: Structure and Change, Rawat Pub., Jaipur, 1975.
  - 2 McKim Marriot, "Changing Channels of Cultural Transmission in India", L.P. Vidyarthi ed., Aspects of Religion in Indian Society, Kedar Nath Ram Nath, Meerut, 1961.
  - 3 Ainslee T. Embree, "Tradition and Modernity in India - Synthesis or Encapsulation", Ward Morehouse ed., Science and the Human Condition in India and Pakistan, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1968, pp 29-38.
  - 4 Examples of such scholars are Milton Singer, *Ibid.*; McKim Marriot, *Ibid.*; Bernard S. Cohn, "Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture", Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn ed.,



or synthetic. They argue whether science, as understood in the West, could find a ready and compatible lodging within the values and attitudes that give Indian civilization its distinctive characteristics.

Let us briefly examine this approach and see whether there is a basis for the arguments in the context of other researches in allied areas. The traditionalists argue that of all the great world cultures, Indian civilization is in fact the least absorptive and least eclectic. On the other hand, it is stated that what people have in mind when they speak of Indian civilization as absorptive, as eclectic, and as tolerant, is that it has the ability to encapsulate other cultures, thereby making it possible for many levels of civilization to live side by side. Some explanations, of this phenomenon of encapsulation can be obtained by an identification of the values and assumptions that underlie Indian civilization.

There are five unquestioned ideas or assumptions that are characteristic of Indian society, so pervasive at all levels of culture, so much a part of the verbal literary tradition, that they can be identified as the keys for an understanding of Indian culture.

These ideas or assumptions are firstly, the understanding of the nature of time. Secondly, the idea of karma, closely related to the idea of time. Thirdly, the idea of rebirth or reincarnation which is inextricably linked up to the nature of time and karma. Fourthly, the assumption of a set of values and attitudes summed up by the word dharma, which is linked to the specific obligations imposed on each individual as determined by his birth within a social group. And finally, by the assumption that there are many levels of truth and that all men are incapable of having the same perception of truth.

Unlike the Hebrew or Biblical conception of time, which is that of a linear progression, the Indian understanding of time is to understand time as made up of cycles within cycles which repeat themselves endlessly. Three hundred million years is the length of the fundamental cycle (i. e. one cycle). Even this is a rounding out of the full story before it all begins anew. Within the rubric of such a perception of time, there is no place for the unique event, or even much likelihood of man taking too seriously his achievements in constructing political institutions... hence little attention to political history. Closely linked to the idea of time, is the second great assumption, the idea of karma, the belief that every action necessarily produces an appropriate result. [A good action produces good fruit, and evil action, evil fruit]. Aside from Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism also accept the idea of karma without question.

Dovetailing with the idea of karma and time, is the belief in rebirth.

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Structure and Change in Indian Society, Aldine, Chicago, 1968, pp 3-28;  
Ainslee T. Embree, op. cit.

As a consequence of the fact that the full working out of karma cannot find fruition in one life, rebirths result. The three concepts of time, karma, and rebirth interweave with each other, producing the colour and pattern of Indian life... and few people who live fully within the context of Indian society, even those who are not Hindu, escape the influence of these ideas. The other two assumptions which enrich Indian society is dharma, which is specific obligation or duty that life imposes upon each individual... an obligation that is defined for him by birth... of being born within a social group.<sup>5</sup> The concept of dharma, leads us to the fifth great assumption of Indian culture... the concept that there are many levels of truth, that all men are incapable of having the same perception of truth, and that all men are incapable of having the same perception of reality. Here the contrast with Islam and Christianity is complete. Both religions have at the heart of their systems an obligation to assert that all men can share in the same vision of truth. At no point is Indian thought more alien to other modes of thought than in this assertion that there are many levels of truth, and which gives to Indian civilization the characteristic that has been mistakenly understood as toleration. What is meant is not toleration but rather that all social practices can be encapsulated within society. To back up this reasoning of encapsulation it is sufficient to focus on three important contacts of Indian society with external forces... the Muslims or Mughals, the Portugese, and the English... all of whom failed to bring about any apparent infringement on the central core of the religious and cultural tradition which was so long guarded from alien intrusions.

Islam came to the periphery of India in the eighth century and to the political centre in the twelfth. Despite over five hundred years of Muslim sovereignty over much of India, one finds that there was little transference of fundamental values and attitudes from Hinduism to Islam or vice versa. The same situation prevailed in the case of the Portugese in India towards the end of the fifteenth century and during the sixteenth century. The reason for this strong sense of compartmentalization in the

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5 Kaker has also emphasized the role of the idea of karma, dharma and moksha in the Hindu cultural ethos and ideational patterns. "Hindu culture", says Kaker, "has consistently emphasized that as long as a person stays true to the ground-plan of life and fulfills his own particular task, his 'swadharma', he is travelling on the path towards 'moksha'." This knowledge of swadharma (or life task) and hence of "'right action' for an individual depends on 'desa; the culture in which he is born, on 'kala', the period of historical time in which he lives, on 'srama', the efforts required of him at different stages of life, and on 'gunas', the innate psychological traits which are the heritage of an individual's previous lives." "... right action and individual swadharma increasingly come to mean a traditional action, in the sense that an individual's occupational activity and social acts are right or 'good' if they conform to traditional patterns prevalent in his kinship and caste groups..."

case of both Muslim and Portugese influence within the Indian context, was due to the fact that both the Muslim and the Portugese articulated their deepest ideas and values in a form that was recognized as religious ... that is, pertaining to those aspects of culture most closely guarded from change. Creative interchange was, therefore, unlikely in those areas which both groups felt to be of most ultimate consequence.

In the case of the British, the reception was somewhat different. The new political arrangements that were made in India by the British, was influenced by the political and cultural revolutions such as the enlightenment, Locke and Hume, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the Utilitarians and the Evangelical movement. Unlike the Muslims and the Portugese, the British did not articulate the values and attitudes of their culture in religious terms. Instead they used a vocabulary that made it possible for Indians to accept new ideas without any apparent, infringement on the central core of their religious and cultural traditions. Despite the consequent hunger for Western science and technology in India during the early years of the nineteenth century, the emphasis of Ram Mohan Roy and others on the utility of Western science for the rejuvenation of Indian life, the nineteenth century saw relatively little of Western science introduced in India, except in the form of applied technology such as railroads and telegraphs.

An explanation put forward for the poor inflow of Western science into India is that the alien Government would not permit it lest India became a commercial and industrial rival to England. While there is some truth in this it seems that the truth lies more in the fact that despite the ready acceptance of the dominant cultural patterns of the West, those associated with Western achievements in science and technology, in fact, the aspects of Western thought that appealed to Indians were things such as Western Literature and political science. The explanation lies in the fact that "while they presented new avenues for intellectual exploration, they posed no threat to traditional society and were amenable to categorization under forms familiar to the culture."<sup>6</sup>

We now come to the focus of traditionalist arguments... Can science, as understood in the West, find a ready and compatible lodging within the context of the values and attitudes that give Indian civilization its distinctive characteristics? In other words, would the process of modernization, fuelled in the large part by modern science and technology, be a success in such a setting, or would it remain fossilized or restricted to certain areas?

The general view of the traditionalists is that the situation in India

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death in one's own dharma is praise-worthy, the living in another's is fearsome". Sudhir Kakar, The Inner World: A Psycho-Analytic Study of Childhood and Society in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1978, pp 37-38.

reveals that it is not possible to maintain the values that have characterised Indian culture and at the same time create a new society through the impact of the scientific and technological civilization of the modern world.<sup>7</sup> While it is true that the scientific and cultural impact of the modern world may transform it, the process would be marked not by a synthesis, but by erosion and decay of the traditional values and ideas of Indian culture. Embree, for instance, feels that as in previous encounters with alien elements, Indian society may encapsulate the scientific and technological learning of the modern world. Embree points:

"In practical terms, the result would probably be the creation of urbanized, Westernized, industrialized enclaves in the midst of a country-side still traditional, still living by the codes and values of the Indian inheritance. These enclaves, are already evident and would subject the country to peculiar social and political strains."<sup>8</sup>

The thesis of the traditionalists, therefore, seems to be that traditional norms, values and attitudes would largely tend to persist despite the onslaught of the process of modernization because the benefits of science and technology would largely be restricted to the urbanized islands... modernization would, therefore, largely be of a selective kind in the Indian context.

#### **A Critique of the Traditionalist Approach : Non-Uniformity of Values -**

It would be of interest in the context of this study to examine the validity of some of the observations held by traditional scholars. Thus, it is held that the five great assumptions or concepts, which underlie the ideational world view of every Indian, interweave with each other producing the colour and pattern of Indian life. The traditionalists hold that few people living fully within the context of Indian society (including non-Hindus) can escape its influence. It is held that the same situation prevails even today because of the localization of the forces of modernization to a few selected urban pockets.

A natural corollary of such a viewpoint would be the subsumption

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6 Ainslee T. Embree, op. cit., p 37.

7 "Vivekananda in his disparaging moments tended to see the 'rational' and the 'traditional' elements in this vision of 'modern Indian identity' as irreconcilably antithetical. In such moments, he fell back upon the widely and deeply held Hindu belief in the fundamental futility of all change, and proclaimed that no alteration of the outer social and physical environment ever made life 'better' but that this goal depended wholly on the devoted and systematic cultivation of the inner world." Sudhir Kakar, op. cit., p 182.

8 Ainslee T. Embree, Ibid., p 38.

that there is an almost flat uniformity in the formal outlines of Hinduism and religion (including religious knowledge and perceptions) as practised or acknowledged by the vast majority of people within the country.

The formulations in this sphere have however largely been built upon the perceptions of many traditional sociologists who viewed India as a rigid, socially immobile system in striking contrast with their own flexible and mobile one.

Briefly, the older picture described a society in which religious values and ideas were the sole determinants of attitudes towards, and chances for social mobility, in which little, if any, social mobility occurred, and in which there were no discrepancies or incongruities between an individual's position in the caste dimension and his position in other social dimensions. However, due to the efforts of field-oriented social scientists, the newly emerging picture of Indian society is in close proximity with reality. Thus, recent studies show that the differences in the formal outline of Hinduism and religion as practised by the majority of Hindus are considerable. These differences are seen both in the institutional-structural sphere and in the ideological-valuational dimension, which are the result of a wide variety of factors... regional, ethnic, religious, to name a few. Such "plurality, heterogeneity, or even conflict in values" are to be regarded as characteristic of the Indian system. Thus, Silverberg writes:

"A great heterogeneity of values is present and indeed seems to have been present in India for a long time."<sup>9</sup>

Pohlman similarly argues:

"The conflict in values and the unwillingness of low castes to accept their position today, raises the question whether belief in karma (and the like), the fatalistic acceptance of hierarchical rigidity associated with religious philosophy was ever really so overwhelming that all accepted the system.."

Marriot also reinforces the same point when he says:

"The caste system as a whole has been a very broad, pluralistic system made up of many queues of castes aligned behind various values. In the past, these reveal that alignments have been only partially integrated through local and regional accommodations and through

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9 James Silverberg, Social Mobility in the Caste System in India: An Interdisciplinary Symposium, The Hague, Mouton, 1968.

intellectual speculation. We must note that (today) there is coming to be a much greater uniformity in the values relevant to stratification. This is a kind of uniformity which is more secular in nature in contrast to the uniformity in values the traditionalists refer to.<sup>10</sup>

Uniformity, is a concomitant of spreading modern networks of mass communication, and an effect of having stronger governments in control of communications. A voter, or a school boy, or an ambitious group of low caste industrial workers are no longer offered a wide variety of varna models for conduct. Instead of that a common package of civic virtues is held up for emulation by all.

There is thus, as Y. B. Damle states, a need to distinguish between verbalized values and practised values. This means first, those values which are noted in the scriptures are not necessarily the ones that are shared and practised by people. For one thing, they are not a part of a single system of thought; also it is too much to assume that all people know about them. . . a survey of cognitive orientations of the people will be needed to describe the spread of these values. Secondly, the values inscribed in the religious texts reflect the upper caste view. For example, vegetarianism, teetotalism, monogamy, taboo against widow remarriage et cetera, are the values of the ritually upper stratum of society.<sup>11</sup> The values of the lower castes in regard to these aspects are very close to the Western modern ideal.<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, it has also been pointed out that all traditional values need not be regarded as obstacles to modernisation. Dube, for instance, has argued that traditional values contain several elements that can be successfully utilised for the promotion of economic growth. Thus according to him:

"... the doctrine of karma does not rule out individual volition completely. In fact it encourages it within certain limits to improve

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10 McKim Marriot, op. cit., p 119. Yogendra Singh makes a similar point when he says that "the reality of caste in India. . . cannot be compared from one region to another because in cultural styles, rituals, and with regard to interdictions on social intercourse, caste in one region of India differs fundamentally from those in another. Comparisons, however, can be made (only) in terms of structural criteria such as power, occupational status and economic status etc." Yogendra Singh, Modernisation of Indian Tradition - A Systematic Study of Social Change, Thompson Press, Faridabad, 1977, p 25.

11 Y. B. Damle, ref. in James Silverberg ed., op. cit.

12 Yogesh Atal, "Role of Values and Institutions", A. J. Fonseca ed., Challenge of Poverty in India, Vikas, Delhi, 1971, p 98.

the prospects of an individual's future. The emphasis on steadfast devotion to duty irrespective of its consequences provides a base for determined and disciplined action that can be effectively utilized for realizing the goals of economic development. <sup>13</sup>

#### Cultural and Psychological Detriments in the Indian Context: Impact of Traditional Values -

The focus of all these arguments is on the cultural and psychological underpinnings considered necessary for the modernization of a developing society. Thus, in Chapter II we had focused on McClelland's theory on the insufficiency of achievement orientation drives in many developing societies, <sup>14</sup> Inkles and Smith's identification of key elements such as efficacy, innovation, and scientific outlook, <sup>15</sup> and Everett Hagen's viewpoint that creativity is greatly influenced by the early family environment and child rearing practices in different societies. <sup>16</sup>

The point to be considered is what the psychological consequences, if any, are of the traditional values and styles of living in Indian society on the process of modernization. Kakar points to a series of cultural values as well as life styles in Indian society that tend to have a detrimental effect on the values and attitudes that would be considered necessary for the process of modernisation. Thus, Hindu culture as pointed out earlier, has consistently emphasized that as long as a person stays true to the ground plan of his life and fulfils his life task, his 'swadharma', he is travelling on the path towards 'moksha' or salvation. The knowledge of his 'swadharma', and thus of 'right action' is determined only out of the total configurations of four 'coordinates' of action... 'desa', which is the culture in which he is born, 'kala', the period of historical time in which he lives, 'srama', the efforts required of him at different stages of life, and 'gunas', the innate psychological traits which are the heritage of an individual's previous lives. 'Right' and 'wrong' are, therefore, considered relative within the ambit of these four coordinates of action. <sup>17</sup>

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13 S. C. Dube, "Cultural Problems in Economic Development as observed in Land Reform, Community Development, the Industrialization Process, and the Family Concept in Hindu Society." Paper presented in an International Seminar on Cultural Motivation to Progress, University of Philippines, Membla, 1963, p 5.

14 David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit.

15 Alex Inkles and D. H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, p 9.

16 Everett Hagen, op. cit.

17 Sudhir Kakar, op. cit.

Kakar postulates the viewpoint that one of the psychological consequences of this culturally sanctioned ethical relativism (i. e., lessening the burden of individual responsibility for action) is the generation in the individual Hindu, from the earliest childhood, of a pervasive doubt as to the wisdom or efficacy of individual initiative. To size up a situation for oneself and proceed to act upon one's momentary judgment is to take an enormous cultural as well as personal risk. For most Hindus, says Kakar, this kind of independent voluntary action is unthinkable.<sup>18</sup>

Such an attitude, Kakar posits, also has its consequences on the Hindu's work situation. Thus:

"An individual's work, or more generally, any activity through which he 'acts on the world' has two aspects or aims for the Hindu. The first is to earn a living and to satisfy the worldly interests of accomplishment, power and status, the householder's desire to create and care for his family, and perhaps also the broader social goal of community service. Yet, accompanying this outward worldly activity is a pre-conscious, culturally generated belief that the real purpose of activity is within the individual... how far it prepares him 'inside' and brings him nearer to that feeling of inner calm... the prerequisite for 'moksha'. "<sup>19</sup>

The widespread prevalence of the extended family in India with its inner hierarchical ordering based on age and sex (which acts as the primary field and foil for an individual's developing sense of identity) and the institution of caste or jati as the 'next circle' in a widening social radius also have a variety of adverse psychological consequences, Kakar posits, not only at the individual level but also for modern scientific organisations in a developing society.

In the context of the family system and its consequences socially, a man's worth and, indeed, recognition of his identity, are intimately bound up in the reputation of his family. Life style and actions... how a man lives and what he does... are rarely seen as a product of individual effort, aspiration, or conflict, but are interpreted in the light of his family's circumstances and reputation in the wider society. Individual initiative and decisions make sense only in the family context. To conform is to be admired; to strike out on one's own, to deviate, is to invite scorn and pity.<sup>20</sup>

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18 Sudhir Kakar, op. cit., p 37.

19 Sudhir Kakar, Ibid., pp 38-9.

20 Sudhir Kakar, Ibid., p 121.



Beyond the extended family, the jati's values, beliefs, prejudices, and injunctions, as well as its distortions of reality, become part of the individual's psyche, as the content of the ideologies of his conscience. It is the internalized jati norm which define 'right action' or 'dharma' for the individual, makes him feel good and loved when he lives up to these norms, and anxious and guilty when he transgresses them.<sup>21</sup>

Implicit in the organization of Indian society, in which each individual is part of a complex, hierarchically ordered, and above all stable net-work of relationships throughout the course of his life, is a psychological model of man that emphasizes human dependence, and vulnerability to feelings of estrangements and helplessness. The core of emotional life is anxiety and suffering, or 'dukha'. Traditional Indian society is therefore to be viewed, according to Kakar, as a 'therapeutic' model of social organization, in that, it attempts to alleviate 'dukha' by addressing itself to deep needs for connection and relationships with other human beings in an enduring and trustworthy fashion, and for ongoing mentorship, guidance, and help in getting through life, and integrating current experience with whatever has gone before and with an anticipated future.

In the relatively more activist and task-oriented social organization of Western countries, however, these dependency needs of adults are generally seen as legitimate only in moments of acute crises or circumstances of sickness.<sup>22</sup> In Indian society, however, bounded as he is by the extended family and his jati, along with its values and committant attitudes,

"...the Indian child learns that the core of any social relationship, therapeutic, educational, organizational, is the process of caring and mutual involvement. What he should be sensitive to (and concerned with) are not goals of work and productivity that are external to the relationship, but the relationship itself, the unfolding of emotional affinity."<sup>23</sup>

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21 Sudhir Kakar, op. cit., p 123.

22 Sudhir Kakar, Ibid., pp 124-5.

23 The fact that Hindu social organization (a 'therapeutic' model of social organization) accentuates the continued existence of the child in the adult and elaborates the care-taking function of society to protect and provide for the security of individual members, as also the absorption by the Indian child of the primacy of caring, the neutral involvement (i. e., the social relationships) over the goals of work and productivity, coincides with the viewpoint expressed by Everett Hagen (Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins, op. cit.) ...that creativity is greatly influenced by the early family environment and child rearing practices in different societies.

While as part of the modernization process of the last twenty to thirty years, the campaign against the real and imaginary evils of the caste system has fostered a wilful effort amongst educated Indians to banish from consciousness any sense of their jati affiliation, nevertheless, says Kakar:

"... the tenacious persistence of jati identity in an individual's inner world is often revealed in self-reflective moments."<sup>24</sup>

Thus, Nehru, the epitome of a modern Hindu acknowledges without spelling it out in detail, the psychological 'presence' of his Brahminness:

"Perhaps my thoughts and my approach to life are more akin to what is called Western than Eastern, but India clings to me as she does to all her children, in innumerable ways; and behind me lie, somewhere in the subconscious, racial memories of a hundred, or whatever the number may be, generations of Brahmins. I cannot get rid of either that past inheritance or my recent acquisitions."<sup>25</sup>

A highly placed civil servant, says Kakar, writes even more frankly of the influence of his jati, the Khatri, on his identity:

"As I could follow, Khatri was a derivative from Kshatriya, the warrior and princely class of the vedic and classical age: I took pride in stories that they (Kshatriyas) did not inter-marry or inter-dine with Aroras, said to spring from Vaishyas, the merchant class. I used to take pride in the fact that Kshatriyas are by and large good looking and have a fair complexion, without bothering about the fact that I possessed neither."<sup>26</sup>

Even if traditional values or social systems have been negatively sanctioned, we find that while the dissolution of caste appears to be a distant probability, several significant changes have been noticed. It has been pointed out by several scholars that caste and occupations are no longer synonymous. Even in the past, it is doubtful if there was such a one-to-one relationship. The politicisation of caste and the exploitation of caste sentiments for political gains, formation of caste associations, have significantly affected the world view of the people. Educa-

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24 Sudhir Kakar, op. cit., p 124.

25 Jawaharlal Nehru quoted in Sudhir Kakar, Ibid., p 124.

26 Sudhir Kakar, Ibid.

tion, industrialisation, and the urban impact has made mobility possible, and the number of neo-rich is getting larger and larger. At the same time, discontent arising out of the present position has become a characteristic feature of the present-day individual and if discontent is regarded as a pre-condition to personal advancement, the forces tending to generate it are bound to get stronger and stronger over a period of time.

On the basis of the analysis made so far it can, therefore, be stated that there are extremely wide fluctuations as a result of regional, ethnic, and religious differences. The traditional viewpoint that it is the uniform spread of these values that is continuing to promote encapsulating tendencies mitigating against the forces of modernization is, therefore, based on an unsound premise. While it is true that the offshoot of the planning process so far in India has been the 'creation of urbanised, Westernized, industrialized enclaves in the midst of a (largely) countryside still traditional, still largely living by the codes and values of the Indian inheritance',<sup>27</sup> the reason lies not so much in the uniform spread of traditional values, but in the faulty process of planning in our country. As Satish Saberwal points:

"... the political, economic, technological, influence during the past hundred years have been powerful enough to wring qualitative changes in the social order. A number of people in many castes have moved into new industrial and bureaucratic occupations."

The Ad Dharmis, for example, changed their occupation from weaving and shoe making to light engineering industry.

The point being made so far is that caste and the other cultural values are steadily being eroded under the pressure of technological forces and material benefits they offer. However, it must be stated that it is only those values which conflict with their new occupational roles which get eroded. In this context Singh refers to the problems of societies, particularly the traditional societies striving towards modernisation, which can be better understood, if it is remembered that in each society values are differentiated into (1) categorical or independent, and (2) instrumental types. All role-structures, whether traditional or modern, inhere both categorical and instrumental standards, thus leading to be a combination of both. Thus, a person who is well trained in the modern role-structure with high instrumental value, for instance, a surgeon, an engineer or a scientist, may be deeply committed to traditional categorical values. This is logically quite possible, Singh points, because the categorical values enjoy an autonomy over the instrumental values. Such instances are quite common,

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27 S. C. Dube, op. cit.

Singh observes, in Indian society. Elaborating further, he says, that ritual order and religions which are essentially based on categorical values of a traditional nature do not show any evidence of decline ('nor is there any easy possibility of their disappearance in the near future'),<sup>28</sup> further, categorical values can hardly be falsified by scientific proof, and hence the spread of science, holds Singh, need not logically lead to obsolescence of traditional categorical values. Singh terminates his argument by saying that it would, however, be wrong to conclude that modernisation will not eventually bring about structural and cultural similarity amongst various sections of people within a country or between countries.

**"As modernization proceeds, it would create uniform sets of role-structures with accompanying modern value commitments, instrumental or categorical. Inconsistent combinations of roles and values may still be present, but a large sector of societal and cultural life of societies would share uniformity of standards with other modern societies."**<sup>29</sup>

Singh somewhat qualifies his perception of the future by stating that the major factor in this would be the nature of value premises that societies adopt for modernisation. So far, however, he does not perceive any such uniformity of value premises.

On the basis of the argument advanced so far, it is clear that in any traditional modernizing society with a great deal of ethnic and regional diversity, elements of synthesis as well as encapsulation could be present both at the level of cognitive value structures as also at the level of the indicators of a modernizing society. As Singh has pointed out earlier, an element of synthesis of modern cultural and role-structural attitudes can take place within the traditional settings of a society. At the other end, Singh's analysis leads us to the view that patterns of encapsulation are evident in the cognitive structures of

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28 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 214. Singh's contention that 'as modernization proceeds, it would create uniform sets of role-structures with accompanying value commitments', would therefore imply (like Embree) that 'the scientific and cultural impact of the modern world would lead to the erosion and decay of the traditional values and ideals of Indian culture.' Embree, op. cit., p 38. It is necessary at this point to guard against the tendency which has been well brought out by Bendix when he says, "We are so attuned to the idea of a close association among the different elements of 'tradition' and 'modernity' that wherever we find some evidence of industrialization, we look for, and expect to find those social and political changes which are associated with industrialization in many countries of Western civilization.

people trained in modern role-structures such as surgeons, scientists, or engineers, in that, both categorical (or traditional) and instrumental valuations are held, and often cherished, by the professionals or potential agents of modernization.

At the start of this analysis of the implications of modernization in the Indian context, we had referred to the fact that apart from a consideration of the value and ideational base of our society, there is a necessity to focus on factors such as the kind and quality of its elite and bureaucratic structure, the ideational framework of the polity and its planning process, spread of education et cetera.

It would be desirable to examine some of these factors in greater depth. We will first focus on the role of the political elite and subsequently of the bureaucracy in the process of modernization of a traditional society... a category which Singh<sup>30</sup> had incorporated as one of the important offshoots flowing from heterogenetic changes in the social structure.

#### Role of the Political Elite in India -

Before we start our analysis of the role of the political elite in the process of modernization it must be stated that this analysis would necessarily incorporate a brief historical outline of the decline and rising of the traditional and modern elite political groups in the country. Such an analysis is necessary since:

"... the elite structure of society would represent not only its basic values, but also the extent to which these values find a concrete expression in the power structure and decision making process of the society."<sup>31</sup>

In other words, if the composition of the political elite is such that it is made up of members who have been exposed to modern education and values, then it is not unreasonable to assume, that this could be an aid to the slow process of modernization of a traditional society.<sup>32</sup> In this context, we can also keep in mind Myron Weiner's contention

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Implicit in this approach is the belief that societies will resemble each other increasingly, as they become fully industrialized." Reinhard Bendix, op. cit.

29 Yogendra Singh, op. cit.

30 Yogendra Singh, Ibid.

31 Yogendra Singh, Ibid., p 129.

32 Following Mason, it is proposed to define 'political elite', as people in top positions in political structures as cabinets, etc., that is 'whole-time' politicians. Philip Mason ed., India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p 224.

referred to in Chapter II that the catalogue of problems the government faces in modernizing societies is so formidable that the prospects for political modernization seem dim, taking into account the kind and quality of the political elite, their limited administrative capabilities, their infighting within highly politicized ethnic groups, as also their wish to further their personal interests as well as those of their groups.<sup>33</sup> We also have Amitai Etsioni's earlier reference to the crucial role that political elites have to play in modernizing societies in the sphere of trying to change or remould contexts (that is, institutional value systems, norms, and established patterns of functioning) before tackling or bringing about major institutional changes.<sup>34</sup> It would be pertinent to keep both Weiner's and Etsioni's views in mind while surveying the role of the political elites in our country.

Viewed in the historical perspective the downfall of the Mughal empire coincided with the decadence of the traditional elites. The social structure of elites in traditional India was based on the principles of hierarchy, holism, and continuity, the cardinal value of the Hindu tradition. The monarchical-feudal type of elites with the advent of the British were replaced by the national-liberal type. The colonial rule in India helped the process in many ways. It neutralized the military potential of feudal chiefs in India; it established the rule of law in the country; it introduced a modern system of education, administration, a modern army, communication channels, and technological and scientific know-how.

But the British had also continued to patronise the traditional feudal elites, they even created by permanent settlement, a new class of big landlords in Bengal and Bihar... for in many ways the British were still guided by the motto of 'counterpoise of natives against natives'.<sup>35</sup> This dual effect of British rule created a historical schism between the traditional feudal and, the emergent nationalist elite in India.

The nationalist elite which thus grew in India during the period of the British rule were urbanized, belonged to the professions (journalists, lawyers, social workers et cetera) more than the landed aristocracy, which was in most cases hostile to the national movement. They constituted a new Westernized middle class which grew in India as a result of English education and the expansion of administration, judiciary, and teaching professions. The expansion of higher education amongst the upper castes also affected the experience of the new political

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33 Myron Weiner, Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, op. cit.

34 Amitai Etsioni, op. cit.

35 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1951, p 283.

elite. 36

The growth of this type of elite represented a structural break from the feudal-monarchical character of traditional elites... since the new elites were there on the basis of their professional achievements and modern education. Their role was not ascribed to them nor was it delegated to them by feudal-patrimonial patronages. The new elites stood for the modernization of the economy and other social reforms.

Could the caste background of the political elites have had an impact on the process of adaption of Western social and cultural values? There are two viewpoints on this question. Thus according to Yogendra Singh, despite it's intellectual accomplishments, the social base from which these elites emerged still remained narrowly circumscribed. Thus, the majority of elites belonged to upper castes, particularly the Brahmin caste. The elite structure, thus, could not be said to have been 'democratized' in the real sense. The predominance of the Brahmins in elite roles also had a major sociological consequence, holds Singh. It introduced an element of moderation in the social and cultural adaption to the Western values. This is because these elites were fascinated by the Indian tradition, and wanted to preserve it in its essential form. This created a psychological schism in their outlook which has been variously described, but Singh points:

"... its common feature is a feeling of ambivalence between tradition and modernity, emerging from the differential demands involved in the quest for cultural synthesis on the one hand, and cultural identity on the other." 37

Beteille, however, argues that he does not agree with the often repeated assertions that the Congress Party of the 1920-40s period was dominated to a very great extent by the upper castes. While there may have been some correlation between the two before Gandhi's radical re-organization of the Congress in the 1920s, the social composition of the top political elites, according to Beteille presented a much more heterogenous picture after this. 38

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36 The upper castes who dominated the elite positions were the Brahmins (Chitpavan Brahmins in Maharashtra, Kashmiri Brahmins in the North, Bengali Brahmins in Eastern India, and various sub-castes of Brahmins in South India), Kayasthas, Parsis, Banias, and other Muslim upper castes. Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 134.

37 Yogendra Singh, Ibid., p 136.

38 Andre Beteille, "Elites, Status Groups, and Caste in Modern India", Philip Mason ed., op. cit., p 239.

The homogeneity of the political leadership in India during the 1920s and 1930s was derived more from profession and education than from caste, according to Beteille. Beteille quotes the study carried out by Malenbaum<sup>39</sup> to substantiate his viewpoint. An analysis made of the caste background of four of India's most successful nationalist leaders... Gandhi, Nehru, Subhas Bose and Patel... show an extremely wide range in terms of the categories of the traditional system. Gandhi was a Bania, Nehru a Brahmin, Bose was of the Kayasth caste (which in Bengal is generally held to belong to the Sudra and not Kshatriya category), and Patel was a Patidar (who declared that Patidars were Sudras). If Jinnah, a Muslim, is included, the heterogeneity is even more diverse. While their caste backgrounds were diverse, there is much in common in the occupational backgrounds of these leaders. Four of them (including Jinnah) were barristers, and Subhas Bose was an Indian Civil Servant (I. C. S.) who had turned down the appointment after being selected.<sup>40</sup> Further, all five men had completed their education in England. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s new leaders were being trained, largely as a result of Gandhi's movements, who not only came from a plurality of castes, but were socially heterogeneous in other regards as well. Many of these did not attain eminence till after Independence.<sup>41</sup>

Accepting Beteille's conclusions regarding the heterogeneity of the caste background of the apex political elite during the 1920-40 period, there is a need to re-interpret Singh's statement that:

"...the pre-dominance of the Brahmins in the elite role... introduced an element of moderation in the social and cultural adaptation to the Western values."

Thus the moderation in the social and cultural adaptation to Western values, was not because of the caste backgrounds of the apex political elite, but probably due to a variety of other factors such as... firstly, while the top political elite had a common educational background, and belonged to the modern occupational cadre, they were sensitive enough to realize that active encouragement to the adaptation of the traditional social and cultural patterns to Western values, was bound to lead to adverse repercussions. Further, a great majority of the Congress workers and newly emerging provincial and rural leadership would have resisted any such rapid social and cultural adaptation to Western values,

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39 W. Malenbaum, "Who Does the Planning", R. L. Park and I. Tinker ed., Leadership and Political Institutions in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, p 312.

40 Barristers and civilians (a word commonly used to denote I. C. S. officers) enjoyed the highest status in those days among occupational groups. Philip Mason, op. cit., p 239.

41 Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia", G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman ed., The Politics of Developing Areas, op. cit.



and this would, therefore, have led to the quick erosion of their political base. Secondly, while the top political elite had indeed had the benefit of Western education, they may still have had a respect for certain elements of Indian tradition and a desire to preserve it in its essential form. This:

"... psychological schism or the ambivalence between tradition and modernity emerging from the differential demands involved the quest for cultural synthesis on the one hand, and cultural identity on the other",<sup>42</sup>

therefore, flowed not from their exclusive Brahminical caste identities, but from their sensitivity to the feelings of the people and their respect and desire to preserve (at least at that particular time and stage) certain elements of Indian tradition.<sup>43</sup>

The form of elite structure changed further after Independence. The political and cultural goals which before Independence were diffuse and idealistic had now to be translated into specific goals, and former exhortations had to be converted into action. Since a strong opposition party could not grow in India, the operation of these group interests largely remained confined within the Congress Party.

The important trends of change in the elite structure which have appeared during the post-independence period are (1) increasing influence of rural-based political elites and slight decrease in the influence of elites drawn from various professions, (2) greater differentiation in the elite structure with a significant increase in the number of persons belonging to the middle classes, (3) greater articulation of regional and interest-group oriented goals in political cultural ideologies, (4) slight breakdown in the exclusiveness of upper castes to elite positions and its consequent demoralization.

The increase in the influence and trend towards rural-based political elites, as also the increase in the number of elites belonging to the middle or lower middle classes, can be had in the example of leaders such as Shastri and Kamraj. That the importance of such elements had clearly grown over the last two or three decades is seen in the emergence of other political elites at the apex such as D. Sanjivaya, Jagjivan Ram, G.L. Nanda, Charan Singh, Raj Narain, Kamalpathi Tripathi et cetera, whose cultural and political styles are much more

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42 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 136.

43 As Yogendra Singh has pointed earlier even a person trained in modern role structures with high instrumental values can still be committed to traditional categorical values. Yogendra Singh, Ibid.

traditional. At the other end, you have political elites such as Indira Gandhi, M. C. Chagla, Sachin Chowdhuri, K. C. Pant, George Fernandes, and Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, who in various degrees are individuals influenced by the Western idioms. There is also a group midway between the two made up of politicians such as Y. B. Chavan, A. B. Vajpayee, Shanti Bhushan, C. M. Stephen, H. N. Bahuguna, Chandrashekher and others.

It is thus very difficult to discern any pattern in terms of caste,<sup>44</sup> in either the various central cabinets of the past few governments in power or at the level of the various working committees... whether it be of the individual Congress before 1969, the present Congress (I) Government or the previous Janata or Lok Dal Governments. There are Brahmins, non-Brahmins of various kinds, Christians, and Members of the Backward Classes.

An indicator of the trend in the rural-based political elites is also evident from the study of the occupation backgrounds of the members of the Lok Sabha. In the provisional Parliament of 1947 there were only 6% members with an agricultural occupational background. They comprised 19% of the total strength of Parliament of 1952, 22% in that of 1957, and 26% in the Parliament of 1962. In contrast to this, the percentage population of members belonging to professions successively declined. In the provisional Parliament of 1947 their strength was 83% of the total. This in 1952 declined to 75%, in 1957 to 73%, and remained the same in 1962. The two professional groups which constitute a substantial portion of the strength of Parliament are the lawyers and social workers. Both these groups together constituted 46% of the strength of Parliament in 1947. In 1962 their strength was 48% of the total membership. Data on occupational background of the members of Parliament for the Seventh Lok Sabha (1980) reveals that agriculturalist with 40% have taken from the earlier professionals as the single largest occupational group. Advocates come next with 17.8% (dwindling from 23.4% in the Sixth Lok Sabha). The percentage of professional politicians who go by the glorified name of social workers, have suffered a set back, slumping from 20% in the Sixth Lok Sabha (1977-79) to 17.6%. The percentage of industrialists and businessmen which had plummeted from 12% in 1952 to 3.3% in 1977 has gone up in the Seventh Lok Sabha to 10%.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Caste has entered much more directly into the composition of political elites at the state level, where the regional (or linguistic) faction is constant. Thus, the Karnataka cabinet is dominated by Lingayats and Okkaligas, the Maharashtra cabinet by the Marathis, the Andhra cabinet by Reddies or Kamas, the Bihar cabinet by Kayasths, Bhumihars, or Rajputs, and some have referred to the Tamil Nadu cabinet as a federation of dominant castes. At this level, caste, may be important not only in the process of recruitment but also in the internal structure of the political elite.

The number of women M.P.s has gone up from 19 in the Sixth Lok Sabha to 26 in the present Lok Sabha. Again, as against 28 Muslims in the Sixth Lok Sabha there are now 48.

The new Lok Sabha also reflects the progress made by India since Independence. 38% of the parliamentarians are graduates, 26.8% are post-graduates, 2.1% have doctoral degrees, and another 2.1% hold lower technical qualifications.<sup>46</sup>

Apart from the increase in the number of political elites coming from an agricultural background is the increase in the number of persons in the middle class groups which has strengthened the elite structure at various levels, and eventually led to a rapid differentiation in the internal structure. Consequently the ranks of the intellectual and political elites separated into two functional elite groups.

Finally, the former monopoly of the upper castes of the role structure has to some extent been broken. In some of the southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and to some extent Kerala, the upper caste monopoly on political elite status has been foiled.<sup>47</sup>

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45 A reading of the following extracts from an article by Surender Suri on the pattern of membership of the Indian Parliament is revealing. It reflects the dynamism inherent in an active, modern, democratic, and representative structure. "While the proportion of professionals in Parliament has been declining, their role among the active members and as members of government remains high." "The agriculturists are not playing a role anywhere nearly commensurate with their numerical strength. They act as a veto group. In fact the importance of the different professional and occupational groups lies not so much in their own special fields as in ones outside their own. Agriculturists in Parliament are important for what they do and say about general economic and social policies. The driving force of socialism in Parliament stems from the agriculturists because they are critical of the growth of free enterprise in commerce and industry. The agriculturists are likely to be joined in this attitude by members representing the professions." Similarly, the drive for land reforms comes from business interests supported by the professionals. The most elusive group is that of the social workers. Members of this group are without a defensible occupation but professional politicians mostly belong to it. Surender Suri, "Pattern of Membership", Seminar, February 1965, p 16.

46 Based on data covering 471 MP's out of a total 524 in the Seventh Lok Sabha, India Today, February 1-15, 1980, p 78.

47 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., pp 138-9.

The absence of distinctive traditionalists elite... even the 'communal' political parties, where they have any strength, are not wholly traditional... means that the opposition between traditionalism and modernism, so far as it occurs, finds expression within the dominant elites. This opposition can be easily discerned, but not so easily evaluated in political life. In the individual Congress, it was expressed in the same measure by the differences between Gandhi and Nehru... but Gandhi was not simply a traditionalist and Nehru not simply a modernist. Similarly, some of the more recent political elites are more deeply concerned about cow protection, prohibition of alcoholic drinks, the development of the rural sections and rural small scale industries as against modern urban use or luxury industries, acquisition and building up of indigenous defence industries et cetera; but such differences have not produced any major rifts. If any single issue could be pointed to as a source of disunity at the present time, it would probably be the differences about the desirable scope of public as against private enterprise in India, or more broadly, the respective merits of socialism and capitalism as forms of society... and this is a thoroughly modern question. 48

The pulls and pressures that are being exerted by the forces of tradition and modernity are indicated to an extent in the Indian context by the co-existence of different 'styles' or 'idioms' of politics: modern, traditional, and saintly... a term employed by W. H. Morris-Jones. 49 The modern style is represented by the system of Parliamentary democracy. The traditional element is to be found largely in village politics, where caste, kinship, and factions have an important role. Finally, saintly politics has its basis in ancient religious ideas; it was one element in Gandhi's political thought, and it was fully expressed in our time by Vinobha Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan.

The differentiation of political styles refers primarily to the existence of levels or arenas of politics which are to a degree self-contained and separate from each other. Bailey's 50 study of factional politics in Orissa illustrates this point. The author distinguishes between an elite arena of politics, which is that of the state government, and a village arena. The former is modern, the latter traditional. But there is also an intermediate region, that of constituency politics, where the two extremes meet and have to accommodate to each other. In this process, Bailey suggests, the political activities of the state and constituencies tend to absorb and modernize those of the village.

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48 Andre Beteille, op. cit., p 246.

49 W. H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India, Hutchinson, London, 1964.

50 F. G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959, University of California Press, Berkely, 1963.

Viewed historically, an important change that has taken place in the orientation of elite interests and loyalties... particularly that of the political elites... is the increasing tendency to articulate the values and aspirations of the regional interest groups. The diffuse ideological orientation of the pre-independence days is found to be increasingly absent in the consciousness of the emerging new political elites. There is also a greater perception of a definite role which they feel they are expected to play, often touching upon the daily difficulties and problems of the people in their regions. However, the mobilization of regional interest groups among the political elites is not necessarily an unhealthy feature of the democratic process. In fact, these elites, despite articulation of regional sentiments are deeply involved in the national political system. This is because they still contend for power on an all-India basis. Thus the political leaders are inescapably caught up in national politics and many of those in the regional elites aspire to become national leaders. The problem regarding the articulation of regional sentiments lies not merely in primordial pressures and magnification of narrow regional loyalties, but has its roots in the unequal spread of the benefits of some of the forces of modernization generated from defects and oversights in the planning and allocation process. These range right from location and spread of various kinds of industries, big and small, development of infra-structural facilities, and adequate allocation for exploitation of natural resources, to location of various central institutes of research and higher learning, and unchecked inter-regional migration patterns et cetera. In other words regional loyalties are dependent on the pattern of relative deprivations on which the people of a state see vis-a-vis other states.

Aside from defects and oversights in the planning process, the relative deprivation of the various states can be better understood if it is kept in mind that in facts such as the location of industries, ports, and even national research and training institutes, political pulls and pressures of the more important and populous states play a significant part. In India, particularly among the intellectuals, the modernizing role of the political elite tends to be underplayed. What is emphasized is the generally low level of education of the new generation of political leaders, and corruption, nepotism and communalism, which admittedly, are likely to impede the process of modernization. It is true that while the education and directing skills of the present Congress (I) working committee could be below those of the people who started the Indian National Congress in 1855, it is, however, difficult to infer from this that a group of the latter kind would be more suited than the former to the task of modernizing a large independent country, comprising a high proportion of illiterate peasants, within a democratic framework. This is not to deny the real dangers of demagogery and sectionalism, but merely to raise a question about the substance, as opposed to the form of modernity.

The evidence at the present time seems to indicate a growing division in Indian politics, not between traditionalists and modernists, nor between regions, but between ideological groups of a modern kind. To some extent the development of ideologies had been obscured and hindered by the dominance of the Congress Party which encompassed a considerable variety of social and political views. However, in the last few years, there has been a vigorous conflict of doctrines following the emergence of the Janata Party and later the Lok Dal arrayed against the Congress (I) (which emerged after a series of splits in the former undivided Congress). The themes which dominate political discussion as the various elections approach, are not those of traditional culture versus industrialism, but problems more immediately related to the well-being and development of the nation and the individual such as the problems of economic growth, of the distribution of wealth and income, regional disparities, providing more employment opportunities, welfare of the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes et cetera.

#### **The Instrumental Role of Planning : Drawbacks -**

This brings us to a crucial problem... that of Planning as an instrument of the modernisation of a traditional society, and since in a Parliamentary form of government, policy decisions are taken by a minister or a group of ministers of the ruling party, it focuses on the political elite, their educational background and their capacity for a proper grasp and understanding of their respective areas of economy put under their charge.<sup>51</sup> Aside from these factors, other factors more important for the success of modernisation efforts through planning is a political leadership committed to the process of modernization and change, and the presence of a reasonably stable government. The process of planning also focuses upon the planners themselves, their educational background and their orientations.

History demonstrates that where a country's government is reasonably stable and the political leadership of a nation is deeply committed to the modernisation of their societies, the country generally develops even when there is no formal plan. Conversely, in the absence of political stability, and firm and continuing government support, development plans no matter how well devised, have little chance of being carried out successfully.

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51 In a Parliamentary form of government, the ministers are often generalists and sometimes even without a proper educational background. The bureaucrats attached to the various ministries are supposed to guide them in the areas under their control. Nevertheless, it is no doubt true that the presence of an educated minister could make much difference in the functioning of many ministries, as also the ability to undertake intelligent decisions. May be there is a statutory necessity for ministries, both at the level of the Center and the States to have a minimum level of education, unlike at present.

Specifically, let us focus on the Indian situation. In the past fourteen years three political parties have exercised power under totally different circumstances. The Congress (I), as it is now called, formed the government in 1966 and vacated it in 1977. The Janata Party held the reins for twenty eight months since 1977; then came the caretaker government, a further split, and now the Congress (I) is back in power. The Congress (I) had the largest tenure to see that its programmes and policies were translated into goods, employment, and income. Possibly, the Janata left even before the outcome of its new approach was visible. The former caretaker government (of the Lok Dal headed by Mr. Charan Singh) can claim nothing at all, except the general assistance to the draught hit areas and to the railway and post and telegraph workers. The only two parties whose performance can be compared are the Congress (I) and the Janata.

In the last eleven years that the Congress (I) was in power, national income rose at 4% and per capita income at 1.7% per year; in the two and one-third years of the Janata, national income went up at 5.8% and per capita income at 3.4%. However, nearly half of the increase in national output during the period of Janata rule was due to a bumper crop for which the good monsoon rains rather than the Janata Party were responsible. If the bumper part of agricultural production is left out, the performance of Janata would be at par with that of the Congress.

This is borne out by the fact that average increase in per capita income eventhirty years after Independence has been of the order of 1.7%. Presently, India is about hundred years behind the developed countries in terms of per capita income... a disparity which is fast increasing with the multiplication in population in the developing countries without a corresponding increase in the net per capita income. A World Bank survey report says that India, along with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Thailand, Nigeria, Uganda, Indonesia and Kenya, has slipped to the position of a 'fourth world'. These fast impoverishing countries have an average annual income ranging between Rs. 110 and Rs. 160 which works out to less than Rs. 16 per month per capita. The study further says that price-wise Indian cities are among the ten most expensive cities in the world.

Not only is the income per head of the population extremely low but all studies show that there are vast inequalities in income levels and living standards between rural and urban India... income inequalities are also extremely wide between the upper and the lower strata within the urban and rural centres. In the rural areas, where more than 70% of the Indian people live, less than 10% of the rural households operate well over one-half of the total area, and there are strong pressures for introducing labour-displacing mechanization in such farms.

In the case of land reforms, very little has been done, and adequate

loopholes seem to have been provided intentionally or otherwise to escape the provisions of the Act. According to Dr. Raj Krishna :

"...there is no doubt that the lacunae in the Land Reforms Act is deliberate, for otherwise the re-distribution would have been really much more. Thus of the 5.3 million acres of land declared surplus, only 1.5 million have been actually distributed due to a large number of petitions pending in High Courts challenging the ceiling laws."

Expanding further, Dr. Raj Krishna adds that, if we look at countries like Japan, Taiwan, and Mexico where land reform measures have been more seriously launched, we find that there are committees at the village level which are charged with the responsibility of redistributing surplus land, and on which the landless have at least 50% representation. In India, however, the implementation of the land reforms has been left to bureaucrats whose very class structure mitigates against their being active agents of change. Only in West Bengal, Kerala and Karnataka have village committees been set up which have been given the power to redistribute land to some extent.

Despite over thirty years of planning, about 294 million people in our country are below, and around, the poverty line. In the field of education, it is an area of darkness. Despite having spent more than Rs. 25,000 million since Independence on setting up a monolithic educational pre-structure which involves more than 180 million students in over 8,00,000 institutions, yet the country spends only 50 Paise per day on a child's education as compared to more than Rs. 20 in the U.S.S.R., Rs. 25 in Japan, and Rs. 5 in Malaysia and Thailand. Sixty out of every hundred students (above 10 years) are still illiterate.

A few further comments are in order to bring out the skewed patterns of modernization planning in the Indian situation. A few observations on the planning process can also be made in this context. Thus, planning is conceived in the broad sense of technical advice on the totality of governmental decisions affecting the use of economic resources. Since in a country like India, well over three quarters of economic activity, are in the private sector, with agriculture, commerce and small scale industry predominant, the governmental decisions that are of particular importance in affecting resource use have to do with taxation and subsidies, price controls, and the like. In this area, an examination of alternatives is important and very much needed in India, but the Planning Commission here stands on the periphery of decision making.<sup>52</sup>

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52 Edward S. Mason, "Comment on Planning in India", Max F. Millikan ed., National Economic Planning, National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, pp 369-72.



While the heavy equipment infrastructure built up particularly with public sector under the various plans did play an important role in meeting the needs of various other capital hungry sectors of the economy, to date this industrial complex has affected very little the rest of Indian economic activity. As in the Soviet economy, on whose development process this complex was indeed modelled, investment goods have been developed to the production of other investment goods. The point that is being made is that these fundamental decisions on the development of heavy industry having once been taken, establish the flow of large segments of public investment for a long time to come.

Whether this represents an optimal allocation of development expenditures in India is a point worth considering, particularly when it is kept in mind that the development of the rural sector of the economy is often overlooked in the process.<sup>53</sup> This symptom is evident even in the sphere of educational planning and resource allocation, where the rural sectors tend to be increasingly neglected. Thus while more than 65% of the 6,00,000 primary and middle schools are located in rural areas, 90% of the budget for providing facilities like laboratories, libraries, play fields and sports go to the urban schools.<sup>54</sup>

The roots of such lacunae in planning, wherein the benefits of the forces of modernization do not reach the rural areas lies both in the quality and orientation of political elites at the apex,<sup>55</sup> as also the composition of Indian planners. Thus amongst the early political leaders, Nehru with his elite Western educational background and orientation, dominated both the government and the planning process. The planners... ten or fifteen top economists<sup>56</sup> in Delhi who play a crucial part in the formulation of plans and in advising the government in various capacities while they have a diverse social and cultural background, had (and have) finished their education in one or another foreign university. It is, therefore, probable that the foreign training of most of India's top economic advisers had left them with a certain lack of awareness of the realities of the Indian situation. In the words of Wilfred Malenbaum:

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53 Edward S. Mason, op. cit., p 376.

54 "Education - An Area of Darkness", India Today, op. cit.

55 Edward Mason emphasizes that the Planning Commission is not the sole planning agency. He, in fact, describes Indian Planning as an open process with broad political participation, and calls attention to the activities of economic ministries, the National Development Council, and the advisory committees on problems of individual sectors and the consultative committee of members of Parliament and the various state governments. He goes on to say, however, that "these groups have not provided guidance for informed political participation in the process of planning". Edward S. Mason, op. cit., p 376.

56 Including 'bureaucrats' who are heads of government departments, as well as experts who are mainly academic people.

"...the Indian economist is a great admirer of the more developed countries. Despite their insistence that they are doing things their own way, it is hard to admit that an Indian way may, in fact, be different from the admired ways of richer countries. Leading Indian economists are held in high public esteem. There may be an unwillingness to admit how limited is their understanding of India's basic economic structure."<sup>57</sup>

Aside from their orientation towards Western models of planning which has its manifestation in the present structure of an industrial set up,

"...their desire to see the economy push ahead often creates in them an impatience (and a kind of psychological block) towards the demand of region, religion, and community which cannot just be wished away. Those who are responsible for planning will have to attune themselves not only to the goals of economic development but also to the ways of life of the people which the process of planning seeks to change."<sup>58</sup>

Our analysis so far has, therefore, revealed that planning has by and large failed in its task of bringing about a national spread of the benefits stemming from the attempts at modernization. Not only are there social inequalities still strongly prevalent, but economic inequalities have been growing, and so too the level of people living around or below the poverty line.<sup>59</sup> Living as a vast majority of the Indians are at various levels of subsistence and destitution, it is doubtful, if modernisation as a force... even at the level of cognitive values, attitudes, and styles of behaviour can really make a meaningful dent so as to bring about fundamental changes in the social structure and its concomitant attitudinal and value areas of the vast majority of people in rural India. Changes, if they have taken place are peripheral. Thus, if we considered the various 'ideals' of mod-

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57 W. Malenbaum, "Who Does the Planning?", R. L. Park and I. Tinker ed., Leadership and Political Institutions in India, Princeton University, Princeton, 1959, p 312.

58 Andre Beteille, op. cit., p 243.

59 There is a tendency to depict both the poverty ratio and the degree of economic inequality prevailing in Indian society as constant and not increasing. This truism is achieved by economists and statisticians by looking at both the phenomena and its magnitude from the viewpoint of the expanding population, and thereby pointing to a rather constant ratio. In absolute numbers, there has been a tremendous increase in both poverty ratios and levels of inequality.

ernization, discussed earlier, it is clear that in almost all these areas, the urban population has achieved a great deal more than their counterparts in the villages. Inequalities in the distribution of wealth and resources also have their roots, without doubt in the kind of political leadership and latter day political instability. Countries like Mexico, Israel, and Puerto Rico without any formal planning framework have been able to achieve growth rates ranging from 5-8%.<sup>60</sup> The success of these countries in promoting growth and modernization is a result not only of the strong drive and commitment to change of their political elite, but due to their general disregard of instruments such as direct control and restrictive administrative intervention which many governments with mixed economies, including India tend to apply.

#### Role of the Bureaucracy -

While considering the question of planned growth and modernization of a traditional society, the role of the bureaucrats necessarily comes into the picture. This is because it is the bureaucrats at various levels who are entrusted with the responsibility of implementing policy decisions taken by the political elite often in consultation with the former. Earlier in Chapter II, we had dwelt upon Gabriel Almond's<sup>61</sup> views on the role of bureaucracy in transforming unstructured relations within traditional society, as also Cyril Black's<sup>62</sup> contention of the ways in which increasing bureaucratization, with its proliferation of formal rules and legal codes, could influence personality in ways that could adversely affect rapid development. If one keeps in mind the high status and power attached to the higher level bureaucratic structure and the fact that they often have the law enforcement agencies under their command, then the importance of the bureaucrats as agents of change and modernization is indisputable. Their role in the power structure has been well brought out by Krauss, when he points out;

"In the societies of mainland Asia, a distinctive tradition of bureaucratic rule is still felt in the twentieth century. A special legitimacy has long been accorded to the learned official."<sup>63</sup>

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60 Albert Waterston, "What do we Know about Planning?", International Development Review, Vol. VII, No. 4, December 1965, pp 3-10.

61 Gabriel Almond and J. S. Coleman ed., op. cit., p 7.

62 Cyril E. Black, op. cit., pp 26-34.

63 Richard Krauss, William E. Maxwell, and R. D. Vanneman, "The Interests of Bureaucrats: Implications of the Asian Experience for the Recent Theories of Development", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXXXV, No. 1, 1979, p 137. The authors add that there is a tendency to view bureaucrats as "mere agents of the propertied classes, be they landed aristocrats, indigenous bourgeoisie or foreign capitalists". The authors state that "to be sure, bureaucrats like any social group often

Before evaluating the role of the bureaucrats in the process of modernisation, it is necessary to clarify certain definitional knots on the question of what exactly is a bureaucratic elite. Thus, it must be pointed out that the bureaucratic elite is not a unitary category. Its three main components are the administrative, the managerial, and the military elites. The distinction between the first and the second is the one that can be drawn between public and private bureaucracies, and while the army may certainly be viewed as a public bureaucracy, it would be convenient to discuss separately the civil and military services.<sup>64</sup> For the present analysis we will focus our attention on the civilian bureaucratic administration.

In order to have a proper understanding of the role being played by the bureaucratic elite in our country it would be necessary to undertake a brief historical analysis of their origins and development. The general social background and education of the bureaucratic elite and bureaucratic structure in India is largely a contribution of British rule.

The social structure of the Indian bureaucracy may be analysed in terms of three major evolutionary stages: First, at the inception and during the early phases of the East Indian Company rule (1600-1740)<sup>65</sup> when the ethos of trade was dominant in the civil service.<sup>66</sup> Second, the period of Company-Crown rule (1740-1947) when the civil service was guided by the ethos of professional career and the psychology of 'masters and guardians'.<sup>67</sup> The third stage is the one following Independence (1947) when the ethos of Indian bureaucracy imbibed elements of both professionalism and nationalistic consciousness.<sup>68</sup>

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discover that their interests coincide with those of other actors especially those of the propertied classes. And bureaucrats often find their interests are best served by maintaining a stance of neutral implementation of policies decided elsewhere. But the Third World bureaucrats cannot be dismissed as mere implementors simply because they lack individual rights to property, for control of administration offers bureaucrats a social basis unlike those of the propertied classes. Ties to property are important in identifying bureaucrats, but these ties are collective ones, resting upon control of the state administrative machinery".

64 Andre Betelle, op. cit., p 224.

65 Bernard S. Cohen, "Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India: 1600-1800", Ralph Braibanti ed., Asian Bureaucratic System Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, N. K. Duke University Press, Durham, 1966, pp 88-93.

66 Hugh Tinker, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", Ralph Braibanti ed., Ibid., p 24.

67 Philip Wood Rough, The Men who Ruled India, The Guardians, London 1954.

During the first stage, the bureaucratic system tended to be particularistic. The Company's directors used to nominate officers on consideration of kinship and friendship. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, professionalism in civil service began to grow. Appointment by 'patronage' gave way increasingly to appointment on the basis of merit. The entry of Indians to services was made possible only when the principle of open competition by examination was accepted for recruitment after 1855, when the first examination for civil services was held.

Thus a new phase of slow Indianization of the civil services started. Like most of the early nationalist elite, the Indian bureaucratic elite also came from the upper classes and the upper castes. In Bengal most of the early recruits to the I. C. S. were the reformist Hindu group of the Brahmins; in other parts too the Brahmins and other upper castes dominated.<sup>69</sup> To a great extent this was because the Brahmins, the Kayastha, and some other upper caste groups were in the professional services right from Mughal times and they had a better access to openings in the professional dominions because of a traditional elasticity in their attitude to adopt to the new standards of professional requirements.<sup>70</sup>

With Independence, there was a structural transformation of the bureaucratic elite in India. Prior to Independence there were 608 British and 549 Indians in the civil service; just after Independence there were only 33 Britishers in the service compared to 418 Indians. An analysis of 615 direct recruits of 1960 indicated that only 9% were from families with incomes below Rs. 300 per month.<sup>71</sup>

There is, however, some change towards levelling down of this class bias. Thus recruits from high, middle, and low family income groups constitute 37%, 39% and 24% respectively. Of further interest is the recent dramatic increase in the representation of Scheduled Castes and Tribes.

The data reveals that candidates whose parents belong to the professional groups dominate the recruitment to the I. A. S. The share of agriculturists' children who constitute more than 75% of the population is only to the extent of 8%.

The poor representation from the agricultural sector is not surprising and is due to obvious reasons... their educational backwardness, poverty, and lack of opportunities. It is, however, significant that within

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68 David C. Potter, "Bureaucratic Change in India", Ralph Braibanti ed. pp. cit., p 166.

69 D. B. Misra, The Indian Middle Class, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1960, p 322.

70 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 146.

71 D. N. Rao, quoted in David Potter, op. cit., p 253.

the professional groups from where most of the bureaucratic elite is being recruited, the share of the families with lower incomes is increasing, and monopoly of this status by the higher income groups and higher castes is slowly breaking down. On the whole I.A.S. probationers can be differentiated into the public school type and others. Beteille points:

"The dominance of the public school type is, however, not accepted without challenge. The challenge could come from two sources. These are, on the one hand, the attractions of regional as opposed to Western culture, and, on the other, the demands of certain emergent political forces. Both these processes lead to what may be loosely described as the Indianisation of the service... but this does not imply that the role of caste in it is necessarily strengthened as a consequence." 72

People coming to the service from areas such as Bengal, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu, which have well-developed and highly self-conscious regional cultures view with growing disdain the initiative Westernization of some of their colleagues. In other words, the Western style of life which was dominant in the old I.C.S. is likely to be opposed increasing by secular, regional styles of life in which the Western element is less obtrusive.

The political scene in India has also changed rapidly since Independence. District leaders and party bosses have much more power now and more effective contact with the centres of power higher-up than ever before. The I.A.S. officer has to begin his career in the districts where he has got to learn to come to terms on a new basis with political leaders whose styles of life are often very different from his own. Public school manners are not always likely to be helpful, and today a tactless officer is likely to come up against firm resistance from political leaders whom he cannot dismiss as easily as his predecessor might have done during the British Raj. There seems a growing awareness of this, not only among the new generation of probationers but also among those who are responsible for selecting and training them.

Bureaucracy in India offers a stable structural foundation for modernisation of the society and growth of a consensual democratic order. It certainly does suffer from internal cultural tensions which may arise from role conflict in inter-structural participation of bureaucrats, his familistic, caste, and kin-oriented particularism

clashing with the ideology of universalism in his bureaucratic roles and his personal loyalties which might cut across the legal anonymity and abstractions of his office. That these elements are producing tensions and unwanted linkages is clear from the fact that there has been an alarming increase in the instances of atrocities being committed on the Harijans and other backward classes in our country. The bureaucrats mostly I.A.S. officers in these districts along with the administration have completely failed in containing and diffusing the latent tensions and conflicts arising out of primordial values, attitudes, and loyalties in the districts put under their charge. The police administration (often under the control of these bureaucrats) have exhibited an alarming laxity bordering almost on tacit acquiescence and cooperation with the upper caste groups in the rural districts.

Thus, while the I.A.S. officer, all-India in his functional orientation, carries national ideology with him into every district where he articulates it constantly in his exposed position before the district population,<sup>73</sup> his manner of functioning has not served to effectively protect, reassure, and unite all sections of the rural populace in the task of modernization and development.

The failure of the bureaucrats in containing or diffusing latent tensions and conflicts arising out of primordial values, attitudes, and loyalties, arises from the fact that they themselves are often torn between the primordial attachments and the egalitarianism required of new functions. Kakar refers to this ambivalence when he states:

"Among those Indians closely identified with the process of modernisation, the well educated urban elite who hold positions of power in modern institutions, the psycho-historical fact of the primacy of relationships of family loyalties, of jati connections, is often a source of considerable emotional stress."<sup>74</sup>

For although intellectually the Indian professionals or bureaucrats may agree with their Western counterparts that, for example, the criteria for appointment or promotion to a particular job must be objective, decisions based solely on the demands of the task and 'merits of the case', they cannot root out the cultural connection that their relation-

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73 David Potter, op. cit., p 162.

74 Sudhir Kakar, op. cit., p 125. In this connection, it would be proper to refer to Mrydal's statement referred to in Chapter II that the social and institutional structure in South Asian countries (including India) often mitigates against policies designed to propel the forces of modernization. Gunnar Mrydal, op. cit.

ship to the individual under consideration is the single most important pattern in their decisions. The conflict between the rational criteria of specific tasks and institutional goals rooted in Western societal values, and their own deeply held beliefs (however ambivalent) in the importance of honouring family and jati bonds is typical among highly educated and prominently employed Indians... and dishonesty, nepotism, and corruption, as they are understood in the West are merely abstract concepts. These negative constructions are irrelevant to Indian psycho-socio experience, which from childhood, nurtures one standard of responsible adult action, namely, an individual's life long obligation to kith and kin... guilt and its attendant inner anxiety are aroused only when the individual actions go against the principle of the primacy of relationships, not where foreign ethical standards of justice and efficiency are breached.

On the question of the much resented implementation of land reforms too, the bureaucrats posted in rural districts have failed to effectively implement the land ceiling laws. The effective implementation of the land ceiling laws would contribute much to promoting social equality and improving the quality of life for many tenants and landless labourers. Dr. Raj Krishna, however, felt that:

"... the implementation of land reforms depended upon the civil servants, and while some of them were active as effective agents of implementation, others were not."75

Part of the reason for this lack of sensitivity to impending rural conflagrations could be due to the composition of the Indian Administrative Service which has so far been dominated by products of public schools and a few 'old-established colleges'. With the kind of genteel, Western education they have had, their relative lack of perception and appreciation of rural dynamics, and the inclination to get rid of their nasty rural posting at the earliest, these bureaucrats have miserably failed to act as one of the catalytic agents harnessing the forces of egalitarianism and modernization in those areas where the overwhelming majority of the Indians live. As Beteille remarks:

"The I.A.S. is likely to fulfil its modernization functions successfully only as its base of recruitment widens, and its members rid themselves of the consciousness of belonging to a world different from that of the people for and with whom they now have to work."76

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75 Raj Krishna, "On Agriculture, Poverty and Related Problems", Business India, May 14-27, 1979, p 79.

76 Andre Beteille, op. cit., p 243.



In the context of the 'exclusivity' of the bureaucratic elite, Krauss points out that in countries such as Thailand, India, and China the bureaucrats have sought to preserve their power and exclusivity by controlling and influencing the educational policies in their regions; this is sought to be achieved by bringing about a clear linkage of higher education to bureaucratic position, by controlling the universities, and by limiting access to higher education.<sup>77</sup>

Krauss's contention is that the bureaucrats adopt these courses because of the possibility of monopolizing expertise as a political weapon against other social groups as also due to the fact that since top bureaucrats can no longer confidently bequeath their power to children through the medium of land, higher education offers an alternative device for enabling bureaucratic families to preserve their social position over several generations. The only opposition to these plans of the bureaucrats says Krauss:

"...is the counter pressure applied by rural or working class interests through the political system. The bureaucrats on their part find a certain degree of support in their plans from social groups such as the business class who are apt to find the bureaucrats' policies less threatening than those advocated by rural or working class interests."

Krauss's finding regarding the Indian situation is that while it has not been possible for the bureaucrats to control access to higher education, nevertheless, higher education is still the route to bureaucratic position, though because of the surplus of graduates, bureaucratic position is no longer guaranteed. For thousands of Indian graduates, entry into the I.A.S. cadres, through a stiff open competition, guarantees their future unquestioned status. Krauss, however, finds that in India, there has been a successful relaxation of education-bureaucrat linkage by way of the government policy of reservation of a small percentage of government posts to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. However, even here, minimum educational criteria has not been eliminated, but only supplemented.

Regarding bureaucratic control of universities, the conflict has taken the form of a debate over university autonomy. Since colleges in India were first begun in order to staff the civil service, government has always played an instrumental role in the creation, financing, and regulation of higher education. The Vice-Chancellors, for instance, were often appointed by the government and the former often come from and returned to successful political or bureaucratic careers. However,

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77 Richard Krauss, op. cit.

as state control has largely shifted to rural political interests, the latter feel a need to replace the urban bureaucratic control with control by politicians representing rural interests. The interests of Indian bureaucrats, says Krauss have, however, tended to be associated with autonomy in opposition to political control which is weaker than direct bureaucratic control. Bureaucrats in India, have also been less successful than those in Thailand, says Krauss, in resisting demands for higher university education. Indian higher education has been growing at an average annual rate of 10%. Aside from the growth in absolute numbers, is the gradual shift to accommodate rural interests, for example, in the ten year period between 1956-1957 and 1966-1967, the enrolment in rural arts and science colleges grew by 642%, while urban enrolment only doubled.

However, every education official and government commission which has investigated higher education, finds Krauss, has sought to restrict its growth. The last education commission, again speaking for bureaucrats, called for a specific reduction to a 5.3% growth rate for arts, commerce, and science enrolments.<sup>78</sup> To meet this goal, it called for a policy of selecting admissions to replace the open-door access which had prevailed in most colleges, recommended the creation of a central testing organisation which would effectively transfer control of entrance from the local level, where the bureaucrats are weakest, to the centre, where they are the strongest.

However, the parliamentary response to the commission has been a clear rejection of any limit to an open-admissions policy.<sup>79</sup> More recently, there seems to have been some success in reducing the growth rate of university enrolments,<sup>80</sup> although posits Krauss, it is still difficult to tell without more detailed data whether the reduction represents a true decline or is only the result of shifting statistical definitions. Lay offs of college teachers in some areas reinforce the impression that the new school grading structure, the 10+2+3 plan, is being used (as its designers intended) to reduce university growth. If this is indeed so, the bureaucrats' success after 25 years of unheeded recommendations may well be related to the weakening of the rural landed interests during the Emergency.<sup>81</sup>

However, viewing the role of the political elite and the bureaucrat

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78. Report of the Education Commission 1964-66: Education and National Development, Ministry of Education, Government of India, New Delhi, p 304.

79 Report of the Education Commission 1964-66, Ibid.

80 University Grants Commission: Report for the year 1974-75, University Grants Commission, New Delhi, 1976.

81 Richard Krauss, op. cit., pp 137-140 and pp 142-7.

vis-a-vis each other and in the context of present day India, it is seen that political power in India is shifting from urban to the rural areas, from the upper to middle and lower classes, and from ideological nationalistic to regional-populistic type of political elite. Increasingly the political elite are representatives of indigenous cultures, many of them even without a university education, which most of the bureaucratic and intellectual elite in India have. The political elite dominate the more Westernized bureaucratic and intellectual elite. Although wider representation of political elite is what has been emphasised above, representatives of indigenous ends often have value systems that are not conducive to modernization. Singh points:

"This creates an imbalance between power relationships and cultural communication."<sup>82</sup>

The intellectual bureaucratic elite who are culturally nearer the value system of modernization are structurally, or in terms of power relations, less effective than the political elite. Moreover, often the structural goals of modernization, such as liberalism equality of opportunity, wider participation et cetera, themselves generate forces which change the balance of power relationship in favour of populistic elite rather than Westernized intellectual or bureaucratic elite.

"The imbalances of power relationship not only constrict but also distort the cultural goals of modernization, and lead to various forms of protest movements."

#### Role of Education -

In the beginning of this chapter, it was pointed out that the pace of modernization depends upon a variety of factors, some of which (aside from the kind of social and cultural base) are the kind and quality of its prevailing elite and bureaucratic structure, the ideological frame work of its polity and planning process, the pattern of industrial modes adopted, and the spread and quality of its education. Focusing on the role of higher education in the context of modernization in our country, we find that while higher education has provided trained civil servants and a politically articulate middle class, and while universities have stimulated 'modern' attitudes concerning caste, nationalism,

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82 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 149. The emergence of protest movements in India has been noted in the forms of caste associations, communal and ethnic groups and backward class movements. In this connection see M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India and Other Essays, Asia Publishing House, London, 1962; and Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.

and other issues, it is clear that the higher education in India has never permeated down to the masses. Instead the commitments and values which university education engender have contributed to the present split between the minority of educated people, largely in cities and towns, and the masses of the rural poor. It would be worthwhile to examine some of these issues further in the question of the role of higher education and modernization in India.

It must be stated at the outset that while there are many key roads to modernization in developing countries, nevertheless, a key ingredient in almost all socio-economic planning, is higher education.

Coming over to the role of universities...it has to instil a sense of nationality and national prestige in countries without basic national unity; it should provide the advanced technical training necessary for modern industry; it should educate teachers and agriculturists who can spread modern attitudes and techniques to the countryside; it should enable the nation to compete in the international market place of ideas. We will examine some of these assumptions concerning the relationship between higher education and modernization in India. Our basic argument on this question (on which there is a total lack of relevant studies) is that while higher education is a crucial factor in the economic, social, and political development of India, its role is limited both by objective factors and by the very nature of the universities. The universities have expanded dramatically since Independence, and an enormous amount of money has been spent on education at various levels. Yet, despite impressive gains, higher education has not succeeded in modernizing the country,

The reasons for such a state of affairs can only be understood on the basis of the historical background of universities in India. Thus the roots of higher education in India lie deep in the British colonial policy, and for almost a century the universities had little to do with modernization or with the conscious creation of a trained cadre which could take over the operation of an independent nation. In fact the British consciously wondered, after the Indian Mutiny of 1857, whether they should curtail higher education to which they attributed some of the impetus for the revolt. However, after Macaulay's famous Minute on Education in 1832 a policy of expansion of higher education based on instruction in the English medium was introduced. The desire to create a loyal second level of leadership in India combined with the need for trained administrators for the civil service for commercial concerns induced the British to take active interest in the expansion of higher education.<sup>83</sup> The universities were patterned

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<sup>83</sup> Philip Altbach, "Higher Education and Modernization: The Indian Case", Girdi Raj Gupta ed., Main Currents in Indian Sociology, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1976, p 204.

after British models. While Western style institutions were copied (albeit with much more limited facilities and larger areas of administration) and their organizational patterns imposed in the colonies, in many cases the standards and traditions of the imports were diluted in the process of transfer.<sup>84</sup> The universities were not specifically intended to contribute to any process of modernization of self-government in India. Implicit in this system was the notion of 'trickle down' education in which the benefits of Western style higher education would be given to a very small minority who would then be counted upon to spread enlightenment to the masses.

The contribution of the universities and colleges to the Independence movement and to the creation of a basis for Independent India was substantial. Most importantly, the universities trained Indian nationalist leaders, and provided them with a basic ideology, and practical political experience. The ideas of early European nationalist thinkers such as Mazzini and Garibaldi, entered India through the universities as did the later ideas of Fabian Socialism and Marxism which were influential among nationalists in India. Even Gandhi, who stressed the traditional Indian roots of the nationalist movement was strangely influenced by Western style higher education and their college experience in India. The universities in addition provided a basic pool of trained manpower which could effectively take over the reins of government from the British as also a small pool of scientifically trained individuals ready to serve a growing industrial and scientific establishment. University education with its emphasis on universal ideas and a somewhat cosmopolitan intellectual community in general, tended to break down caste and regional loyalties. A sense of national unity was developed, at least among the Western educated community in India.

Post Independence education has expanded at an unprecedented rate. Indeed, the rate of India's expansion at the university level has been one of the highest in the world, and India now has the third largest educational system in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union. The colleges despite their impressive quantitative growth, have not kept up in terms of quality. Their curriculum has not been basically modernized and text books and teaching methods remain outmoded. In many areas, the language of instruction has been changed from English to the regional language, but this shift has not been accompanied by a similar change to an 'Indian' curriculum or other reforms. The localization of the language as also of the composition of the student body has meant that some of the cosmopolitanism which previously was characteristic of the colleges, have been lost. As a result, it may well be

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84 See Eric Ashby for a discussion on the process of transfer of institutions. Eric Ashby, Universities : British, Indian, African, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1966, pp 47-147.

that the circulation of talent, which has broken down at least part of the regionalism in the cities, will cease.

Further, the impetus for much of the growth of higher education has come directly from those sections of the population which have wished to make use of the expanded college facilities. Thus, the educational system has responded to the demands of the market place, and the kind of education which has been provided is, to a substantial degree, that demanded by the customers. Government efforts to limit expansion effectively or to guide it has not been very successful. Since education at all levels is a state subject, with only minor intervention from the Center allowed, control has been even more difficult.

The fact that the education system has responded to public pressure has meant that the direction of the change has been shaped substantially by the nature of that pressure. Indian families see a college degree as a necessity for social advancement and employment in a society characterized by extreme difficulty in obtaining jobs. In addition, education, at least among the higher castes, has a traditional high status and this further increases the demand for advanced training. As colleges have opened their doors to larger numbers of students from different strata of population, the result of this accommodation has been, almost universally, a lowering of educational standards.

Education is in fact, not much different from other segments of Indian society with regard and to the effectiveness of planning. Just as it has not been possible to introduce an efficient planned economy or to effectively limit population growth, higher education has been allowed, for the most part, to expand at its own rate and according to no set guidelines.

"In a society in which decision making is often a matter of compromise and negotiation among many competing groups, this lack of effective planning, is not surprising." 85

To limit the expansion of enrolments would arouse strong opposition among many sections of the public. . . to enforce high academic standards would, and often does cause student opposition or even violence. Staff members who are less than highly qualified also quietly oppose efforts to upgrade the system.

While university trained people man most of the posts in a large and complicated bureaucracy, it is also clear that the university as an institution has not contributed decisively in a direct way to the process

of modernization. While there are limitations to the possible roles of higher education in direct social and economic development, yet it is nonetheless true that Indian universities could have taken a more effective part than has been the case at present.

Thus, the Indian university has not played a notably important role in moving such crucial problems as regionalism and traditionalism in Indian society. The universities have also not played a significant role in eliminating caste, religious, and regional preferences which divide Indian society. That such factors, apart from others, are not just restricted to various regional universities, but are manifesting themselves even in national research institutes and sections of scientific research and higher education, is brought out by the study conducted on scientists at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), at New Delhi. To quote:

"Scientists in the younger age groups were unhappy with the communication gap they face with the upper level scientists as well as the favouritism practised by the latter on extra-meritorious considerations such as regionalism and casteism. It is difficult to prove this, said many scientists, but they do exist."<sup>86</sup>

Further, in developing countries, higher education has been invariably an urban and an urbanizing phenomena.<sup>87</sup> The values which

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- 86 George S. George, Scientists in an Organizational Setting: A Case Study of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), M. Phil. dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1979, pp 410-11.
- 87 This urban bias is evident even in the schooling sector of education. Thus while more than 65% of the 6, 00, 000 primary and middle schools are located in the rural areas, nevertheless, 90% of the budget provided for facilities like libraries, laboratories, sports, and playfields, goes to the urban schools. Further, 70% of the schools in rural areas are still conducted under trees, with one school teacher. "Education: An Area of Darkness", India Today, op. cit., p 11. If one incorporates the fact that early education in India is diametrically split between those benefitting from public (or private) school education with its attached values and world view which is generally urban and Western in orientation... and those in government schools... who are a tribe apart in the sense that they are neither oriented towards the West in values and attitudes, nor are able to identify themselves with the rural sections, the parody of the situation is laid bare. The situation becomes even more ludicrous when it is seen that almost all brands of political elite (with or without a rural background) send their children to have a public school education... come what may.

are instilled by the university are basically urban values, and many graduates are unwilling to return to rural areas, feeling, with some justification, that cities can better support the style of education to which they are accustomed. Such simple things as existence of cinemas, bookshops, and readily available newspapers and journals are examples of this type of impact. Expectations concerning jobs and income are influenced by educational factors and by the university subculture as well.

Aside from the fact that universities have not succeeded as catalysts in promoting the forces of modernization, the universities in some parts of India have remained a key factor in the political equation. Universities have also been involved in politics, and academic institutions have often been the scene of political factionalism, or have launched political struggles. The role of the academic community in Tamil Nadu in the language controversies of 1965 is but one dramatic example of the key role of the university on the political scene. Extreme left politics in India, as by the Naxalbari Communists, originated to some degree in the universities, particularly in West Bengal. However, whether the continuing political importance of the universities in India is a contribution to modernization and nation-building is a debatable issue. Certainly, the historical role of the universities and the intellectuals in spreading 'modern' ideas usually of a radical nature is unquestioned. Student movements were important during much of the nationalist struggle. It is, however, doubtful whether the universities in post-Independent India (even as of this date) play such a role, at least in as direct a manner as before. This is because power is more diffused in present-day India and there is a much larger community of educated people. In addition, the universities themselves are no longer beacons of modern ideas in a sea of traditionalism, but have assumed many traditional aspects themselves as other elements of society have become more modern.

It is, therefore, clear from our analysis that the universities have not and are not playing any effective role in acting as catalysts to the breaking down of primordial values and regional loyalties, or have succeeded in any significant way in producing or evolving people who would be motivated to work in the rural areas and act as a widespread and growing link in promoting the forces of modernization in the country.

The prestige structure of the universities, which has traditionally emphasized liberal arts and such professions as law and public administration, also has an impact on the members and types of professionals who are produced. Such a phenomenon is manifesting itself not only in the urban sector or in the liberal-humanities sector of the educational set-up, but even in professional institutions such as agricultural colleges and universities, who are supposed to produce agricultural scientists with a liking and inclination to use the skills and knowledge picked up for improving productivity in the rural farms or who would like to work in agricultural research or agro-industrial units situated in rural centres.



To quote the report of the Review Committee on Agricultural Universities:

"Recent trends... show that agricultural graduates are drifting away from direct involvement in the management of agricultural land and livestock, and instead are going in for white-collar jobs, thereby getting alienated from the rural environment... The responsibility for this situation lies not with the universities alone but also with the society as a whole. Academic degrees are required more as status symbols and are liked by almost all sections for purposes of employment. Naturally several young persons have taken up higher agricultural education only for earning a degree, regardless of aptitude and aspiration. This has resulted in a situation where [candidates have been admitted to the degree programme in agricultural universities who have no aptitude and orientation of going back to villages to take up farming as an occupation or self-employment as a career.]"<sup>88</sup>

A few further points throw still more light on the situation. Thus most of the agricultural universities do not have any detailed manuals for conducting field operations and for implementing other practical training programmes... students often go for practical training in their usual dress. The idea of working with bare hands and bare feet is almost difficult with this type of dress because the students are afraid of dirtying their hands or soiling their clothes (costly and fashionable at times). A proper uniform should, therefore, be prescribed for field operations and practical training which should consist of khaki or grey half pants and half sleeve shirt.<sup>89</sup> Altbach rightly comments that:

"...the lack of well qualified agricultural technicians, secondary school teachers, and several other key occupations is directly related to the direction of higher education."<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Report of the Review Committee on Agricultural Universities, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New Delhi, 1978, p 53.

<sup>89</sup> Report of the Review Committee on Agricultural Universities, *Ibid.*, p 51.

<sup>90</sup> The trend towards urban concentration of educated people seems widespread in India, whether in the liberal-humanitarian disciplines or in the professional and semi-professional fields. While local lack of amenities in the rural areas, as also lack of other incentives, pro-

While analysing the spread and effects of the forces of modernization in India, two broad conclusions emerge. The first, relates to the changes that have been attempted in the external structures of a traditional society towards modernization, as also the verbalization of modernization ideals by the elite structures. The second, relates to the inter-structural tensions and conflicts that are generated by the process of modernization, both between the forces of tradition (past and contemporary) and between the latter and the former. Taking up the first point it is clear that following Independence, the modernization process in India has undergone a basic change from its colonial pattern. As an integral part of the developmental strategy, modernization is envisaged for all levels of the cultural and structural system. As Singh points out:

"Discontinuity in modernization between macro-structures and micro-structures, and between the Little and Great traditions as during the British regime, has now been consciously abolished."<sup>91</sup>

The introduction of adult suffrage and a federal parliamentary form of political structure have carried politicalization to every sector of social organization. Conscious legal reforms in Hindu marriage and inheritance laws have deeply affected the foundations of the traditional Hindu family structure. Community development projects have exposed the cultural norms and role structures of modernity to most Indian villages, and this, coupled with land reforms and elective village panchayats, has initiated villagers to a bureaucratic form of participation in local level management and administration of justice. Caste has also, in the process, undergone a certain transformation of roles, developed new functional adaptations,<sup>92</sup> and activated aspirations unleashed by the democratization of polity and the structure of power.

However, despite the changes that have been and are sought to be made in the external structures of our society, there are a number

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vided by the State and Central Government, is partly responsible for the circulation of talent within cities, orientation provided by the educational system has also contributed to this urban concentration. Philip Altbach, op. cit., pp 214-15.

91 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 204.

92 The effect of the forces unleashed by modernization is evident in the fact that the Namboodiri Brahmins of Kerala have now set up an Institute called the Tantra Vidya Peetham where the aim is to teach the Vedas to the children of Backward Castes. Due to the spread of education and the attractions of various white collar jobs very few Brahmin children are attracted to a priestly career with its long years of training and poor rewards. Concomitantly, it is also possible that the status of the priests have declined.

of factors that have been contributing to the potential breakdown in the Indian process of modernization. These can be attributed in one form or another, to structural inconsistencies such as democratization without spread of education or civic culture, bureaucratization without commitment to universalistic norms,<sup>93</sup> rise in media participation (communication), aspiration without proportionate increase in resources<sup>94</sup> in the social and economic fields, and distributive justice,<sup>95</sup> verbalization of a welfare ideology without its diffusion<sup>96</sup> in the social structure and its implementation in policy,<sup>97</sup> over-urbanization without industrialization, and finally modernization without meaningful changes in the stratification system.<sup>98</sup> The effects of the latter is felt not only at the level of the stratification system existing within society, but it also has its impact on the system of stratification and communication within scientific research organizations in the country. While the departments and areas of specialisation are generally charted along the pattern prevailing in Western scientific research institutes, the system of ranking and communication patterns are seemingly a by-product both of the

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- 93 Jan Dessau refers to a disastrous spin-off of such bureaucratization in the context of scientific institutions in India and other Third World countries when he says, "The social structures of these countries representing the historical product of interaction between structures of pre-industrial societies, colonial administrative structures, and the structures imposed by industrialisation requirements which are recent and, therefore, weak, are directly accountable for the origin of phenomena such as transfer of qualified scientific and technical personnel to administrative posts and hide-bound attitudes." Jan Dessau, "Social Fractions Affecting Science and Technology in Asia.", Impact of Science on Society, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1969, p 19.
- 94 Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity, op. cit.
- 95 Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit., p 278.
- 96 S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Development of Socio-Political Centres at the Second Stage of Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Two Types", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. VII, No. 1-2, March 1976, p 125.
- 97 Says Gunnar Myrdal, "Thus the combination of radicalism in principle and conservatism in practice, the signs of which were already apparent in the Congress before Independence was quickly woven into the fabric of Indian politics. Social legislation pointed the direction in which society should travel but left the pace indeterminate. Many of these laws were intentionally permissive. In banning dowries, child marriages, and untouchability, the government did not vigorously seek to enforce its legislation. Laws that were compulsory were either not enforced at all, or were not enforced according to their spirit and intention." Gunnar Myrdal, *Ibid*, p 276.
- 98 Gunnar Myrdal, *Ibid*; Irving Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development, Oxford University Press, New York, 1966.

traditional social system as also the outmoded norms and patterns of an outdated bureaucratic system. As a consequence scientists who have an important role to play in the process of modernization of a traditional society, feel constricted. They are thus inhibited from playing the role expected of them. To quote a scientist:

"How can you expect a rational spirit of scientific inquiry, the inquisitive questioning attitude, to flower and blossom in an institution which functions like a bureaucratic limb... where senior scientists belong to past schools of unquestioning obedience and respect, where preconceived ideas and prejudices vitiate the relation between elders and juniors... scientists in this Institute are yet to imbibe the spirit of science, and no amount of doctoral degrees and publications can transform a dry, infertile, and rigid scientific outlook and tradition, into a fresh, fertile, and receptive one."<sup>99</sup>

Gunnar Myrdal has referred to similar impediments to modernization in India in his 'Asian Drama'. This is because, nationalism and democratic institutions themselves according to him, have grown

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99 George S. George, op. cit., p 360. Sudhir Kakar also refers to a situation prevailing in modern scientific institutions in India when he says, "The hierarchical principle of social organization has been central to the conservation of Indian tradition, but it can also be a source of stagnation in modern institutions whose purpose is scientific inquiry or technological development. Such institutions require a more flexible, egalitarian structure in which the capacity for initiative as well as seniority governs role relationships, in which competence rather than age, legitimates authority, and in which the organizational mode is non-coercive and fraternal. In such modern institutions, younger people may have a voice in the decision-making councils; however, their say is a limited one; like children in the extended family, their concerns are tolerantly listened to but their serious attempt to initiate or influence the strategic policy decisions of the institutions are dismissed, if they are heard at all. Confrontations 'on the issues' simply do not occur; younger professionals have from childhood internalized the 'hierarchical tradition' so any discrepancy between the criteria of professional performance and the prevailing mores of the organisation do not produce either a confrontation with the older men or the persistent critical questioning necessary to effect change... the conflict between intellectual conviction and developmental 'fate' manifests itself in a vague sense of helpless and impotent rage." Sudhir Kakar, op. cit., p 120.

in a structurally uneven form in these countries. While in Europe, a strong independent state with a fairly effective government and a common pattern of law enforcement 'preceded nationalism and both preceded democracy', however, in South Asian countries democratic ideology, if not reality, has due to special historical circumstances, preceded a strong and independent state and effective government, and this was further complicated by the onslaught of nationalism. 100

This uneven history goes along with economic dependence of these countries on developed nations and a slow rate of economic growth (and a very low per capita income), and still slow pace of institutional change. In India particularly, which according to Myrdal has a more viable size of intellectuals and middle classes necessary for democracy, planned economic growth has not made as deep an impact towards liberalizing the structural bottlenecks of modernization as should have been expected.

Aside from these factors, the leadership in post-independent India have failed to go into the roots of our problems while introducing basic changes in the institutional structure of society. While a host of reasons could be given for this ranging from the social background and quality of the political elite, the fear of losing their political base or unleashing pre-mordial forces... to the rather consensual pattern of decision-making and weak implementation in India, one of the primary reasons seems to lie in the lack of political will among its political elite. Consequently, the inegalitarian structure of society has continued to grow and consolidate its position. We have also the perpetual gap between verbalization (even enactment) and implementation of policies of reform, the decentralization of power in rural sectors has led to the concentration of power in the hands of a petty plutocracy ... and at the same time, the leadership of the country as a whole has remained with those who are opponents of real economic and social change. 101

So far as modernization has been taking place in India, we find that on the whole there is a growing trend that traditional role-structures are giving way to modern ones. However, persons following these roles often retain categorical values of tradition instead of those of modernity. Generally, ritual order and religion which are essentially based on categorical values of a traditional nature do not show any evidence of decline, nor is there any easy possibility of their disappearance in

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100 Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit., p 119.

101 Gunnar Myrdal, *Ibid.*, pp 293-5.

the near future.<sup>102</sup> As Singh says:

"... since many of those categorical values differ from one society to another, there may always be a possibility of a unique combination of traditional values with modern ones: the categorical values can hardly be falsified by scientific proof and hence the spread of science may not logically lead to obsolescence of traditional categorical values."<sup>103</sup>

Thus while modernization can be looked upon as contributing to uniform sets of cultural and role-structural attributes, these attributes develop 'typical adaptations' within the conditions of Indian society.

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102 R. N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution", American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, June 1964, pp 358-74.

103 Yogendra Singh, op. cit., p 214. Eisenstadt echoing a related viewpoint states that, "while the instrumental values of modernization can be rationally evaluated, and could, therefore, be uniform in all societies, the same cannot be true of the categorical or moral values." S. N. Eisenstadt, op. cit.

## **CONCLUSION**

There has been a lot of confusion and uncertainty regarding the term 'modernization'... what it really implies. We have dealt with some of the major contemporary concepts and having re-viewed these 'concepts' have sought to trace a common link between them so as to move towards greater unification of thought and clarity of conception. Thus, we have found that the majority of 'concepts' have focused on economic modernization with its implications for technological and industrial growth.

This conclusion is in contrast to the popular impression of a lack of any such consistency. Thus we have Irving Horowitz, among many others, who points that:

"...there is an obvious lack of logical consistency and uniformity of connotations in this concept."

Similarly, Yogendra Singh points that:

"...concepts of change and modernization are loaded with ideological meanings."

However, what must be clarified is the fact that the lack of consistency lies not in what constitutes a 'modern' society, but in the means to achieve it.

The focus on technological growth... both at the theoretical and practical levels... has been problematic in many Third World countries because of the process of telescoping industrialization within the span of a few decades. This has been leading to severe stresses, strains, and distortions in the process towards industrialization. Thus the initial phases of industrialization, particularly, were characterized by rising demands of the masses for a government that would provide dramatic solutions to problems. This was caused by the intense social and political mobilisation of the masses, which had facilitated the liberation of Third World nations from colonial domination. However, lack of resources, particularly as regards the composition of the available manpower structure, posed problems to immediate change thus causing false expectations and public anger. This has had a strong impingement on the development of the process.

Further, in order to raise material standards of living and to catapult their largely traditional societies into the modern era, the emerging nations adopted centralized planning methods in order to achieve the programmes of industrialization. However, these plans have often followed Western growth model in their sectoral outlays and emphasis, and together with the penetration in allocation of vested political interests, it has given rise to a society of 'lumped' develop-



ment. Thus, we have vast areas of the countryside almost untouched by the forces of real development, on the one hand, and lumped urban-industrial conglomerates with its concentration of talent, and skills on the other. With very little interaction between the two, the forces of modernization have failed to provide any meaningful structural changes in the vast rural areas of the country.

But the most significant problem has been that of ambivalence, represented in the fragmentation of attitudes which is common in the industrializing societies. The area of foreign policy offers a dramatic instance, where technological and financial assistance are accepted despite the persistence of highly emotional views concerning imperialist and capitalist designs. Thus, fragmentation prevents a total re-contruction of attitudes, and often involves contradictory reactions inimical to industrialization and modernization.

Besides the above problems, important issues such as equitable distribution of resources, and a greater sensitivity to the qualitative dimension of life, involving social, political, and economic freedom, are ignored.

Thus some of the unique features characterizing late modernizers is crucially expressed in the following dilemma: acute awareness of poverty, rising aspirations of the masses, sharper demands on the political authorities to secure resources to satisfy these demands, and the inability of the central authorities to satisfy them, owing to the weak economic and industrial bases, apart from an absence of viable institutional and cultural mechanisms.

This distorted reality which is emerging in many modernizing societies has led some modernization theorists to a sceptical view regarding the even spread of the modernization process in the societies. They point to the process breaking down because of the growing assertions of the masses for resources from the central political authorities which may result in violent upheavals generating 'involutionary' trends.

However, our analysis of the above issue has shown that despite these problems certain factors fundamental to industrialization are responsible for its adoption by many Third World nations, and which presumably would also lead to its subsequent development. Thus, one important factor responsible for its 'spread' is the growing dependency of many societies on changing international markets and political organizations. More important, industrialization is likely to permeate most societies because of the fundamental factor underlying it... that is, the material appeal it holds. And this is the fundamental social fact underlying the continuity of the process.

We have also discussed certain crucial issues which have led

many industrializing societies to generate firm roots in their Western capitalist model. Of these, the most significant has been lucidly formulated by Karl Mannheim:

"...even the opponent, under the single law of 'competition on the basis of achievement' is ultimately forced to adopt those categories and forms of thought which are most appropriate in a given type of world order."

We may ask if there is no other model which the Third World could use as a source of defence against the West? The message that most of the underdeveloped societies get is that economic success requires economic rationality in the Western sense. It is difficult for them to disregard the message, unless like China, they treat the West as a hostile giant and hence commit themselves to the creation of an entirely different society along non-Western lines. However, as C. B. Macpherson in his article 'Reflections on the Sources of Development Theory' points out, there is a standing temptation to put material standards first, and this reinforces the tendency of those countries to accept Western economic skills, with the consequent difficulty of separating the skills from the Western assumption of economic rationality... this being that it is competition, above all, which is fundamental in spurring development.

In the above context of the convergence of similar sets of pragmatic principles... which is what a large part of economic modernization is about... the question of convergence of moral and social principles arises. The propagandists of convergence hold that cultures would grow increasingly similar as nations become increasingly inter-dependent. However, what we have found here, and in our analysis of the Indian situation, is that while the instrumental values of modernization can be rationally evaluated and could, therefore, be uniform in all societies, the same cannot be true of categorical or moral values.

One of the most forceful rejections of the Convergence theme comes from the distinguished Israeli sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt. The experience of industrializing societies since World War II has convinced Eisenstadt that there is no uniform pattern of industrialization and modernization. For example, a comparison is made between India and China. The problems that exist for the formation of a state that is relatively culturally unified, differ in kind from those in a state of high cultural diversity. Even if other societal characteristics were alike, the cultural diversity of India would render its path to industrialization fundamentally different from that of China.

Besides this issue of different traditions underlying differential

paths to industrialization, we find the dissolution of traditional, cultural institutions unnecessary, and perhaps fruitful, for industrial growth. As J. C. Abegglen points out, the Japanese factory catching up with and then surpassing Western technology, nonetheless retains a semi-feudal discipline in social relations that is quite foreign to social organizations of factories of the West.

Eisenstadt rightly sums up the entire controversy as follows:

"But it would be wrong to assume that once the forces (of industrialization) have impinged on any society they naturally push toward a given, relatively fixed 'end plateau'. Rather, as we have seen, they evoke within different societies in different situations, a variety of responses depending on the internal conditions of these societies."

The number of possible permutations and combinations of elements of economic modernization and social change thus seems virtually unlimited.

It is in this context that we have examined the Indian situation and the relevance here, of modernization theories. A variety of researchers have posited the view that it is the tradition-linked values that have acted as positive barriers to the process of industrialization. The approach we have adopted is that it is not necessarily the strong cultural base alone which acts as a barrier to the infiltration of modernization values and institution, but it is rather the lack of perceptive planning, political will and foresight, coupled with a lack of an effective and informed leadership which is the principal hindrance to the momentum of the modernization process. This is not to deny the influence of traditional values and cultural institutions, which necessarily qualify the process of industrialization and modernization, but rather to point that, against the forces of technology and the material benefits they offer, its restrictive capacities on the process, is limited.

Let us briefly examine the above traditionalist approach, and see whether there is a basis for the arguments in the context of other researches in allied areas. The traditionalists argue that it is the strong social and cultural base in India which has acted as a barrier to the process of industrialization and modernization. And where it has not acted as a barrier it has helped to encapsulate the process to the urban sections of India.

The traditionalists hold that culture and century old norms are so much a part of Indian society that few people living within its context can escape its influence. A natural corollary of such a view is the assumption of an almost flat uniformity in the formal outline of

Hinduism as practised or acknowledged by the vast majority of people within the country.

Kakar points to a series of cultural values and life-styles in Indian society that tend to have a detrimental effect on the development of attitudes considered necessary for modernization. Thus he discusses the crippling effects of 'co-ordinates of action' within Hindu culture, of the extended family system, and of caste.

Our review of recent studies, however, has revealed considerable differences in Hinduism and religion as practised by the majority of Hindus. These differences are seen to be resultant of a variety of factors... regional, ethnic, religious, to name a few. Thus, Silverberg points to the great heterogeneity of values which has been a part of the Indian system for a long time. Darnle, indeed, places the matter lucidly by emphasizing the significance of distinguishing between 'practised' and 'verbalised' values. Values noted in scriptures are not necessarily the ones practised. If today, there is any uniformity of values, it is more secular than religious.

Besides this, we have also noted that all traditional values and institutions need not be obstacles to the development of industrialization and modernization. Dube, for instance, argues that the doctrine of karma with its emphasis on steadfast devotion to duty provides a basis for disciplined action that could be effectively utilized for realizing goals of economic modernization.

Even if traditional values have been negatively sanctioned, we find that while the dissolution of caste appears to be a distant probability, several significant changes have been noticed. Education, industrialization, et cetera have made mobility possible, and the number of new-rich is getting larger.

On the basis of arguments developed on the pattern above we have shown the traditional view... that it is the uniform spread of these values that is mitigating against the forces of modernization... to be based on unsound premise. Thus, while it is true that the offshoot of the process so far in India has been the creation of urbanized enclaves, the reason lies not so much in the uniform spread of traditional values, as in the faulty process of planning in our country.

Apart from a consideration of the value and ideational base of our society, we have also focused on the kind and quality of our elite and bureaucratic structure, the ideational framework of the polity, the spread of education, et cetera... and their implications for the process of modernization.

Finally, the point being stressed is that under the pressure of

technological forces, and particularly the material benefits they offer, caste and other cultural values are steadily being eroded. However, only those values which conflict with new occupational role structures get eroded. This can be better understood if we recall Singh's classification of values into categorical and instrumental types, whereby, traditional categorical values enjoy an autonomy over instrumental values. Thus, coming back to the original context in which the Indian case has been discussed, we find that though modernization can be looked upon as contributing to uniform sets of cultural and role-structural attributes, these attributes develop 'typical adaptations' within the conditions of Indian society.

Before concluding our analysis of the various concepts and theories of modernization... the world of 'specifics'... it is necessary to focus and assess the significance of certain environmental, biological, psychological, and sociological underpinnings; an analysis of these factors would make clear certain limitational boundaries... whatever their degree of rigidity or elasticity... under which modernization theorists or agents of modernization have to work.

Considering the fundamental categories from which social life and historical events may be deduced, the French anthropologist Levi Strauss assumes that the fundamental categories of human mind are essentially the underlying unconscious reality which gives rise to human events and historical processes as conscious expressions. George Homans, in his critique of functionalism, also assumes that the only valid theoretical study of human actions, is psychological. His critique is in keeping with the methodological individualistic stand... that the attributes of the individual are ultimately determining.

The limitation of the above views is obvious. Thus, regarding the problem of fundamental categories from which an explanation of social life and individual life may be deduced, we may consider four principal factors on which the nature of individual and social factors is dependent. These are environmental, biological, psychological, and sociological. Regarding the first factor (environmental) we find that every living being must adapt itself to its habitat or perish. At every stage the physical environment has affected the economic structure and also bears on other aspects of society. Further, the environment determines the lines on which human energy can succeed. Thus, as a rule, the environment is unfavourable to development if nature is too barren or too lavish. But both these statements are subject to correction. For instance, barren soil may be provocative of invention, and lavishness may set human activity free for non-material needs of man. Regarding the biological factor, in a sense, it conditions all others, for in any society man must live and hence must satisfy his physical needs. Considering the psychological factor some important questions are... what are the distinctive elements in the human mind

which determine man's social relations and consequently social development? How do social relations react on the mind, developing or modifying its inherent tendencies? This brings us to the fourth factor, that is, sociological. We find that there are certain fundamental issues to be considered in an analysis of social structure in this connection. Is structure a pre-determined phenomenon or is it man's own creation? Are social factors derived from man's intellect or is man's intellect a product of social factors? We may say that social factors are derived from man's intellect which is pre-determined (man being a species of nature), that is, before he enters social life. This being so, the subsequent quality of social factors is a consequent expression of man's inherited intellect from nature. To this extent Levi Strauss' stand seems valid. But once society is established, social factors assume a peculiarly alien form, and wield a strong influence on man's intellect, thus shaping and moulding it. Durkheim subscribes to the predominance of social factors as against Levi Strauss' support of man's intellect as ultimately determining. But from the above analysis we see how a two-way relationship holds between factors peculiarly social and man's natural qualities... the latter being primary in the process of social life. Thus, dealing specifically with the question, that is, is structure a pre-determined phenomenon or is it man's own creation, we find that the social structure is pre-determined to an extent by man's inherent qualities as a species of nature, as well as by the physical world he lives in. Reviewing the four principal determining factors... environmental, biological, psychological, and sociological, ..the first two may be classified as first category determining factors as these are 'natural' categories (that is, derived from nature). The third determining factor, that is, psychological is partly a natural category and partly social (for reasons discussed above). The fourth determining factor, that is, sociological is a second category determining factor, that is, it is based on or derived from the first two natural categories as well as part of the third (psychological) category.

With such a perspective we find that for the analyses of data we need both supra-empirical and empirical models of development. As stated above all social relations are deducible from the four principle factors combined. The last two require a supra-empirical model, while the first two factors can be analysed through empirical models.

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