

# **DEMOCRACY AND PEACE**

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "DEMOCRACY AND PEACE" submitted by Ms CHETNA MISHRA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of this University has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university. This is her original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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## PREFACE

Peace has been the all time goal, an always cherished desire of those who want to see the world, a better place to live in. Scholars, in this respect, have put forward their ideas to be implemented in practice to see their goal come true. Long time back, Immanuel Kant proposed the idea of democracy as the force of peace. The Westphalia Treaty and the two World Wars, however, overshadowed his ideas and a Realist doctrine was developed which maintained that the war is rooted in the human nature itself and hence no idea can change the world. What the international community, and the people at the helm of affairs can do is to proceed with the same reality, i.e., wars at best can be minimized and that too within the same strategic framework - through 'balance of power', deterrence etc.

In recent times, however, the world has seen the dissemination of democracy - an open government, acting as a restraint. This has resulted in the belief that the Kantian dream of 'Pacific Union' can be realized.

This dissertation, is an attempt to analyse how far this debate has gone and the prospects of realising the Kantian dream.

Chapter-I, of the dissertation tries to prepare a framework - the causes of wars, the Realist method of Peace and the idealists' view about it.

Chapter-II discusses the ongoing debate on the hypothesis that democracy makes peace.

Chapter-III examines the West's and particularly US role in promotion and degradation of democracy.

Chapter-IV explores some aspects - human rights, liberalisation etc. which have come to be linked with the democratic ideal; and, the effect the democratization process can make on international system.

Chapter-V deals with the effect democracy has had in the South Asian region and the scene in the post cold war era.

Chapter-IV, i.e, the conclusion sums up the important aspects of democracy makes peace hypothesis, the prospects for democracy and the prospects, of Kantian vision.

## CHAPTER-I

### INTRODUCTION: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

International relations have been characterised by fluctuations of war and peace since the dawn of civilisation. Armed clashes of the ancient empires of Egypt, Syria, Babylon, Persia, Macedon and Rome were conscious attempts to suppress insurrections and external sources of potential imperial disunity. In the 16th and 17th centuries, when religious sentiments and dynastic claims were invoked to legitimize wars, more international aggression occurred than in any previous era of history. Nationalism and imperialism flourished in nineteenth century to guide decision-makers in the use of military means to achieve their goals. Ideologies extolling particular forms of value set up (political and economic) have been utilized in 20th century to sanction external wars.<sup>1</sup>

#### I

##### Causes of war

Since Thucydides wrote his memoirs the '**History of Peloponnesian War**' (431-404 Bc), theorists in international relations have speculated on the reasons why humans make war. Any effort, however, to identify a single cause of war relevant to all time is futile. Yet, a series of causes can be singled out in an attempts to suggest the circumstances in which war is most likely to occur.

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1. Michael Haas, 1965, "Societal Approaches to the Study of Wars". **Journal of Peace Research**, p. 307.

Humans are thought by many (especially realist thinkers) to be innately aggressive beings. British social philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) defined the basic political motivation in humans as struggle for dominance over others. He called upon the sovereign to place a check upon the people's appetites and their capacity to do harm to each other. English anthropologist Anthony Starr suggested that humans have a physiological system that responds to threats or frustration by producing violent behaviour.

Despite the record of human warfare, the issue of whether a tendency towards violence is innate in humans remains in vigorous dispute among anthropologists. On the one hand thinkers like Robert Ardrey have argued that humans satisfy their needs for identity, security and release from boredom by engaging in war. On the other hand, English anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer has criticised Ardrey's theory by pointing out that the experimental data in latter's thesis derive from studies of animal behaviour which cannot be transferred to the realm of international relations.<sup>2</sup>

Carol Ember and Melvin Ember in a cross cultural study suggest that war may be caused by a fear of nature and partially resultant fear of others. When people do not have enough of a resource, they take it from those who have. Warfare is used as largely adaptive, not only because some people get resources from others, but also because high mortality during warfare may reduce population pressure on resources.<sup>3</sup>

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2. Columbus and Wolf, **Introduction to International Relations : Power of Justice**, Princeton Hall of India : New Delhi, 1989. p. 195.
3. Ember and Ember, 1992. "Resource Unpredictability, Mistrust and War". **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, p.p. 243-44.



Secondly, the indicator most strongly predicting more war is socialization for mistrust, "People who grow up to be mistrustful of others, and who therefore fear others, may be more likely to go to war than to negotiate or seek conciliation with "enemies". However, fear of others may be at least partially a result of fear of resource scarcity." In any case mistrustful adults may be more likely to respond aggressively to the arousal of any fears and therefore socialization for mistrust may lead to more war." <sup>4</sup>

Another cause of armed conflict lies in the theory of inevitability of war. Consequently, a process of planning and organizing resources based solely on the presumption of the impending outbreak of hostilities is set in motion. By the summer of 1914, the governing elites of Europe were so conditioned to the prospect of a general war that they were incapable of resisting the demand for militarization that arose over an issue of Balkan politics. The self-fulfilling prophecies about the inevitability of war are often fortified by the attitudes of elites and publics that build up distorting and hostile images of other states and ethnic groups that there occurs a social distance between the way of life of two societies and they have either to defend or to oppose.

Those fueled by social Darwinism maintained that war was intrinsic to human development—an activity not only inevitable but essential to the health of mankind, eliminating, those societies unfit to survive and ensuring that the future should be inherited by morally, mentally, physically best adapted to guide it. Fascism was driven by such a doctrine and further reinforced it.<sup>5</sup>

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4. Ibid p. 245.

5. Michael Howard, "Causes of War". in **Studies of War and Peace**, ed. by Oyvind Osterud 1986, Norwegian University Press, p. 17.

To Popular mind, economic motives happen to be the most persuasive cause of war. Consider the lack of resources' explanation of Ember and Ember. In the modern complex era, the struggle to capture new markets or to control new sources of raw materials has driven the governments, persuaded by captains of industry to embark upon imperialist ventures that invariably resulted in armed conflicts. The classical advocates of free trade and the Marxists, both have identified economic forces as the main cause of war, but for different reasons.<sup>6</sup> The classical advocates of free trade L. T. Hobhouse found that the curtailment of free trade for the sake of protecting the domestic economic interests result in governmental subsidization of overseas colonization. Only a system of free trade would dissolve the symbolic relationship between political authority and financial interests seeking overseas markets and sources of raw materials.

On the other hand, for Lenin, free trade was the way to war. The inevitable growth of manufactured surpluses in capitalistic economy demanded the creation of new outlets beyond the domestic market which led to imperialism through overt operations. The historian J.F.C. Fuller pointed out that the British grand strategy in World War II aimed at the reduction of German trade and finance as well as military power.

Economic factors are also open to criticism. First, modern capitalism is the product of industrial revolution and hence, it cannot account for all wars of history. Secondly, the loss of British and German colonies was a fruitful venture for it led to European integration (EEC, 1958). Thirdly, the theory fails to

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6. Columbus and Wolf.

explain the wars between communist states (.e.g Chinese-Vietnam war) exclusively.

Liberal intellectuals such as Tom Paine, J. Bentham and Richard Cobden believed that wars arose simply from machinations of a feudal monarchist elite and was preserved by them as an institution to ensure their class dominance. Thus war was seen as an aberration, arising out of in just ordering of society and believed that if social relations could be reorganised on a "just" basis, war would no longer exist the end of feudalism or later capitalism would mean the end of wars.

It is, however, very difficult to identify the ingredients of "justness" and even the end of feudal monarchic order has not resulted in abhorrence of violence and war.

Michael Howard identifies two Principal reasons of war the use of force sometimes promises benefits; the failure to use force may threaten disaster.<sup>7</sup> By fighting to resist the secession of the confederacy, the United States prevented the Balkinization of North America and perhaps the retardation of its emergency as a world power. By fighting their Arab rivals for the possession of land of Palestine in 1948-49, the jews established the state of Israel.

The second reason : survival (the failure to use force may threaten disaster) causes major wars. Major wars, he says, are caused not by the kind of disputes which are justifiable but by conflicts in which states believe that their very existence is at stake;<sup>8</sup> conflicts which no amount of arbitration can mitigate.

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7. Michael Howard, 1986, p.20.

8. Ibid, p.26.

These conflicts are less likely to develop out of any sudden dramatic confrontation than from the perception of changing balance of forces; where although they dread war, yet the greater fear that the adversary might get stronger, if it is not checked now, forces them to dare wars. The first world war was also based on realpolitik : that if they did not fight, the power of their adversary might be so enhanced that their own nation state would survive, at best as a power of second rank and at worst as a client at the mercy of an alien hegemony. Some irrational elements enforced the war sentiments to make it prolonged and difficult to reach at compromise, all saw it a fight for freedom which unleashed the immensely powerful dynamics of patriotic sentiments.

## II

### **International System, Anarchy and Security Dilemma**

Michael Howard's explanation of war and conflict in international relations can be explained in the following terms. The primary distinguishing characteristic of the state system follows from the system's decentralized or anarchical nature. Each state as part of the external environment, must rely upon itself, for the protection of its political independence, territorial integrity and prosperity because it is a self-help system. Where the rule is "every state for itself" the issue of who receives what, when and how is decided not by a world government, recognised as, legitimate but by the interactions of states in the system. Because a human being's highest loyalty is to the nation, policy makers of all the states are intensely committed to the maintenance of national security, because only them its other values——its way of life could be secured. In the

anarchical environment as the policy makers perceive it, (they) react fearfully to the perceived threats to their country. But if the international system is characterised by anarchy, none of the states is bound to feel absolutely secure<sup>9</sup> -- a reality which drives them to enhance their power to reduce their insecurity. The insecurity of all states in the system couples each to acquire greater security by engaging in a constant scramble for increased power. But as each state watches neighbour power grow, its own sense to insecurity recurs. It then tries all the more, all the harder to gain even greater strength. The result is that each state is continually faced with a "security dilemma"

If there are two states, A and B, in a hypothetical example, both might explain the enhancement in their power status just to maintain status quo but each of the two cannot accept the explanations given by the other at its face value; afterall who might know is one of the two has aggressive rather than defensive drive. This is the central problem of international politics. The nature of the system tends to enhance mutual suspicion and distrust, exacerbating already existing conflict of interests. Nations seek power not because simple maximization of power is their goal but because they wish to guard the security of their "core values", their territorial integrity and their political independence.<sup>10</sup> They act aggressively because the system gives rise to mutual fear and suspicion. The dilemmas inherent in the state system is essentially to kill or be killed, to strike first or face the destruction, to show your strength or

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9. Spanier, 1990 **"Games Nations Play"**, Macmillans India Ltd, p. 97.

10. Ibid, p. 97

be cowed down, exploit or show weakness and get exploited. Thus, the states are always faced with a high potential for violence in the anarchical state system. It is for this reason that the international system is characterised as being in a state of potential war, it is the war or constant possibility of war that all too often determines who gets what and when. In an environment of conflicting demands, in which there is no accepted, credited centralised, institution to distribute the resources or to provide for non-violent solutions, war and aggression brings out the outcome of who gets what and when.

The characterisation of international politics as a state of potential war does not therefore seem incorrect. As Hobbes says,

Not in the battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time...as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lies not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition there to pp.<sup>11</sup>

### III

#### **Nuclear Weapons and Changing Nature of Warfare**

"War lurks in the background of international politics just as a revolutions lurks in the background of domestic politics", wrote English political observer E.H. Carr. However, the nature of warfare has been changing through its course of history. The French revolution embedded with nationalism gave birth to the concept of total war—destroy the opponent completely. Previous wars had been restrained because men had identified not with the nations but with smaller

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11. Quoted by Spanier, p.98.

units like towns or manors or with the universal entities such as Roman Catholic Church. The armies of ancient regime were composed largely of mercenaries and such elements as debtors, vagrants and animals—who fought not because of love of the country but because they were paid to fight and who were compelled to do so.<sup>12</sup> The French Revolution, however, was gripped with the fever of nationalism and a new era in military history was opened. Modern Military Technology fueled by Industrial Revolution brought the total war concept to its fullest realization. Mass armies were produced with mass produced weapons far more destructive than in the previous era, making it possible for nations to inflict greater damage on one another in shorter period. The atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb made it possible to inflict catastrophic damage in minutes. With the ascendancy of Nuclear weapons, the equations of war has absolutely changed. But before that a few words about the destructive nature of nuclear weapons.

A nuclear explosion has four physical effects : blast, fire, immediate radiation and long term radiation. The blast or shock wave is the almost solid wall of air pressure produced by an explosion, creating a hurricane type wind. The blast from a low altitude bomb exploding in a city will collapse all wooden buildings within six miles of ground zero for an 1 megaton bomb, within fourteen miles for 10 megaton bomb, and within thirty miles for a 100 megaton bomb. The heat in most instances would ignite wooden houses and other combustible objects over the same range. In the fire storm, the intense heat from the fire rises, heating the air in turn. The flames whipped by the wind and fed

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12. Ibid, p. 334.

further by the gas, oil and other incendiary materials of the homes and streets of the burning city, leap forward, enveloping the stricken area. There is no escape. Those who have not yet been crushed in their shelters are asphyxiated by lack of oxygen or by carbon monoxide poisoning. If they seek to escape into the burning streets, their lungs are seared, and their bodies exposed to intense heat, burst into the flame.<sup>13</sup>

The radiation impact can be maximized by a surface burst or a low altitude explosion. The resulting fireball scoops up debris and converts it into radioactive material. Besides the immediate radiation in the area of explosion, longer term, lighter particles fallout during the following days and weeks over an area, the size of which depends on the magnitude of explosion, the surface over which the explosion occurs, and the meteorological conditions.

The fallout can emit radiation for days, months and even years. A dose of 100-200 roentgens cause radiation sickness, a combination of weakness, nausea and vomiting that is not fatal, although it can result in disability also. At 200 roentgens, the disability is certain and death can also come within a month; at 500 roentgens, the possibility of death increases. Above 600 roentgens, the number of details continue to mount. The other effects of radiation include cancer and genetic transmutations that may affect subsequent generations. Further, a nuclear war would create so much smoke that it would fitter out sunlight thereby creating a "nuclear winter". The Northern hemisphere would be plunged into the darkness by plumes of dust and soot suspended in the stratosphere causing extensive freezing of the earth's surface including lakes and

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13. Ibid, p.336.



rivers even during the summer, leading to the extinction of a major portion of plant and animal life. Such a freeze might last for weeks, months or even years.<sup>14</sup>

The psychological impact of nuclear war on survivors will not be less. The elimination of a nation's largest cities, industries, deaths of more than 100 million citizens would demoralise its citizens, would possibly wipe out its vital elan, its optimism for a long-long time. It took Europe more than 40 years to recover from the psychological wounds of world war I, and the loss of a generation on the battlefields.

Coming back to how the nuclear weapons have changed the nature of warfare, the first point is that the war has become a phenomenon of total destruction. Therefore, this change in the character of war has made the choice of resort to war much difficult. Whereas the military innovations in the past would permit more or less a stable pattern of some durability, the present rapidity of change in military power is such as to forbid any kind of stability. What counts is the decisiveness of initial attack, however, even there all would end up in total destruction because of nuclear retaliation.<sup>15</sup>

Nuclear War can know no victors; all the contestants will be losers. Total wars may have been compatible with the weapons of limited destructive capacity, but they are incompatible with "absolute weapons." Infact, there was no concept of total war earlier because war as such implied the use of all the

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14. Ibid, p. 337.

15. Mahendra Kumar, 1984 **"Theoretical Aspects of International Politics."** Shivlal Aggrawal & Co. p. 22-24.

available weapons. But now since the use of all the available weapons has been rendered irrational, a distinction has been introduced between a total war and a "limited war". The concept of limited war is the product of nuclear age. Originating in the wake of Korean crisis, the concept acquired significance because of its two major characteristics, namely (a) there was an absence of a total military capability; and (b) there was no immediate concern for national survival. Because of a risk of escalation, it is not possible for the nations to commit all their military resources in a war. A limited war is fought for limited political purposes. The aim is not total victory. The most obvious goal is the capture or recapture of strategically located or economically imported territory. The Korean war provides a good example of this situation. The United States at first sought only the restoration of status—quo. But once the North forces had been driven back to the 30th parallel, the US seeing an opportunity to unify all Korea and destroy Soviet satellite regime, changed its objective. Soon, however, the Chinese intervention ensued. Fearing World War III the US reverted to its original aim. They had learned the consequences of what would occur in the nuclear age if the United States followed its historic policy of seeking a total victory on the battle field. It is because of the total destructiveness that the present age has been characterised as the "age of overkill", a term used by Max Learner, suggesting that "today we live in an age of potential overkill, of power surplus rather than power scarcity".<sup>16</sup>

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16. Quoted by Mahendra Kumar, 1986, p.27.

#### IV.

##### **Nuclear Deterrence and Peace**

If war is so havoc prone, so devastating and has in course of time become demonable, peace efforts also definitely must have been on. After all international politics "stands uniquely at the nexus of great issues of war and peace".<sup>17</sup> The 'utopianists' dreamt of a world where "power politics" will acquiesce to peace. In the 1940s, however, the study of international politics was knocked off its then utopian trajectory by an intellectual called E. H. Carr mainly because 'power politics' became dominant. This largely set the agenda of realism. It stresses the tragic and conflicted side of relations between states and sees foreign policy in terms of the pursuit of national interests defined as power. If the picture is what is described above, then war is inescapable. It is a Hobbesian world in which war is said to be rooted in the human nature. Infact, in a system where sovereign states compete for power and advantage to one another's detriment, war is seen as rational instrument of policy.

Neorealism, the offshoot of realism tried to paint power politics in a bit different framework. They accounted this to international system (to explain for state behaviour). That is, they abandoned the human nature to account for discordant cooperation in world politics and emphasise the structure of the state system as the basic reason of conflict. In his systemic theory, Waltz suggested that the international systems vary along three dimensions by their ordering principles, the specification of functions of formally differentiated parts and the

17. Ken Booth, July 1991 **"Security in anarchy; Utopian realism in theory and practice"**, p.528.

relative capabilities (or power) of the units themselves. Sovereign states respect no higher authority, there is no world government. In that sense anarchy is the ordering principle. In such a system, the functions performed by the units are alike. It is only the third dimension, that of distribution of power that the structures of international systems differ. What emerges, thus is the "positional structure", which portrays the placement of the units where they stand relative to one another rather than their intrinsic qualities. The unitary actors at the minimum seek their own preservation and at the maximum drive for universal domination. <sup>18</sup>

Both the realists and the neo-realists accounted for post world war II peace to bipolarity (in a balance of power sort of mechanism) and nuclear weapons. Bipolarity, said Morgenthau, "made the hostile opposition of two gigantic power blocs possible," but also held out the hope of regulating that opposition through an equilibrium of power maintained by moderate competition. Nuclear weapons made leaders more cautious. Waltz attributed the absence of war to bipolarity, which he maintained was less war prone than multipolarity. Nuclear weapons, he maintains have been the second force working for peace in post war world. Nuclear weapons deterred attacks on states' "vital interests", and because strategic weapons serve that end and no other, peace was held at the centre through almost five post war decades while war has frequently raged at the territory.<sup>19</sup> The logic is that the main function

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18. Robert Keohane 1986 **"Realism, Neorealism and World Politics"**, p. 14-15.

19. Quoted by Richard Ned Lebow, 1994. "The long peace the end of cold war and the failure of realism", **International Organisation**, spring, p.254.

of strategic military strength in the nuclear age is the deterrence of an all out attack. Deterrence protects a nation's security by preventing an attack rather than by defending the nation, after an attack. The opponent is threatened with such massive retaliation that it does not attack. Faced with the risk of virtual suicide, the enemy will desist to attack. Mutual deterrence between two states, each seeking to protect its own security interests, thus becomes a matter of conflict resolution. As Waltz says, "Wars that might bring nuclear weapons into play have become extraordinarily hard to start... Because of the profound change in the military technology, waging war has become more and more the privilege of poor and weak states. Nuclear weapons have reversed the fates of strong and weak states".<sup>20</sup> Scholars like Waltz maintain that since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, have great powers enjoyed a longer period of peace than we have known since the second world war and hence suggest that the problem of war has been resolved.

## V

### **The Liberal Peace Proposition and Critique of Deterrence**

With this we come to the last part of the chapter, and with a few questions. Can deterrence indefinitely solve the problem of war? Secondly, is there not any alternative solution to establish peace.

Strategic purity, the logic on which deterrence works is faulty. Because it seeks an artificial stability rather than encompassing alternative, nonlethal paths

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20. Kenneth Waltz, 1990 "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities", **American Political Science Review**, September, p. 744.

for adjusting the system. Secondly, deterrence contains an invitation to vertical proliferation via, reciprocal improvements in strategic capabilities. How well one can fight is determined to a considerable extent by the military capabilities of the prospective opponent : as they improve, one's own forces must also be improved.<sup>21</sup> Thus deterrence can also lead to arms escalation. However, this theory is insensitive to the historical pattern that predominates in arms competition, in which the accumulations of military strength have tended to culminate in war. The frequency of war throughout history suggests how often deterrence failed. But if nuclear deterrence failed, the mistakes would be irreparable. Deterrence theory supporters assert that nuclear deterrence has prevented the world war III. However, the question is, has deterrence induced prudence by great powers since 1945 or has it been that an era of great power prudence has made it seem that deference is working?

Thus, deterrence is a flawed approach to the problem of major warfare; an incomplete solution at the most for establishment of peace. "It is also a uniquely dangerous approach, for it enlarges the potential consequences of its failure. Given these flaws, we have no choice but to explore alternatives."<sup>22</sup>

Is it possible to supercede the realist principles—*anarchy, the security dilemma and self-help* — that have dominated practice to the exclusion of "liberal" or "idealist" ones since atleast the world war II. According to liberal scholars, atleast in part it is possible and especially since 17th century. Even

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21. George Modelski and Patrick Mogan, 1985. "Understanding Global War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, September, pp.407-410.

22. Ibid, p.412.

before the arrival of realist doctrine, Immanuel Kant made important arguments about international government and the relationship between "republicanism" and peace. After a long-long gap, the debate whether liberalism, republicanism democracy promotes peace has once again arisen. Politics within a democracy is seen as largely a non-zero sum enterprise, by cooperating all can gain something even if all do not gain equally, and the winners are restrained from crushing the losers.<sup>23</sup>

The realist doctrine, however, states that politics is a zero sum game, in which the principle of anarchy and self-help rule. The nature of states in international system is seen irrelevant in the sense that the behaviour of states is governed by international systemic features. Peace is a fleeting condition, dependent upon deterrence and eternal vigilance, because ultimately all states whatever their internal nature, will be guided by security dilemma and would be forced to enter into war. However, if liberal notion that liberalism promotes peace is established; if it is begun to be held that internal quality or internal nature of polity does matter in bringing about war or peace, then an alternative view of world could be built.

This dissertation proposes to examine this very notion or norm in the next chapters.

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23. Bruce Russett, 1993 **"Grasping the Democratic Peace : Principles for the Post Cold War"**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.25

## CHAPTER II

### DEMOCRACY AND PEACE : THE ONGOING DEBATE

Absolutistic states with geographically and functionally centralized governments under autocratic leadership are likely to be most belligerent, while constitutional states with geographically and functionally federalized governments under democratic leadership are likely to be most peaceful.

Quincy Wright, 1942.

It is believed that the chances of war can be minimized by an alternative to the method of arms escalation and arms race, i.e., peace can be established by means other than deterrence. It follows like this as all wars entail heavy cost for the masses, most thinking people have concluded that a system of government which allows the masses an effective say in decisions relating to war, is most likely to ensure peace among states, when peace is defined as absence of war. It is on this count that the argument has been placed that democracies are more peaceful. Before examining this proposition, however, it is imperative that some concepts are defined, relating to the chapter, viz., democracy and war.

#### I

#### **Democracy**

In democracy-peace relationship the scholars have taken democracy as the independent variable to study what is about this form of government that implies



something about its foreign policy. A concept looking so simple and familiar to all of us has found no consensus among scholars as to which of the constituent have to be studied and in which way so as to make conflict behaviour explainable on them. However, it is widely believed in the academic circles that the matter has been dealt with most extensively by scholars like Robert Dahl, Kenneth Bollen, Gurr and Jagers, Coppedge and Renicke et.al. According to Dahl's "Illustration, Political democracies must have eight institutional guarantees"<sup>1</sup> : (1) freedom to join and form organisations; (2) freedom of expression; (3) right to vote; (4) eligibility for public office; (5) right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; (6) alternative sources of information; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

These items Dahl argued, run through two dimensions : public contestation and public inclusiveness or participation. Public contestation is the "extent to which the eight institutional conditions are openly available, publicly employed and fully guaranteed to atleast some members of the political system", while inclusiveness is the proportion of the population, entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government — to participate in the system of public contestation. Thus, each of the eight items partake of both the dimensions. For example, the right to vote in free and fair elections when granted to the citizens by a regime, the regime

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1. Richard Merritt and Dina Zinnes, "Democracies and war" in **On Measuring Democracies, its Consequences and Concomittants**, ed. by Alex Inkeles (1991) Transaction Publishers, pp. 205-210.

moves toward greater public contestation. But the larger the proportion of the citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime.

Thus, for Dahl, the variables shaping a government's form are public contestation and participation in elections and office. Dahl then uses the two variables to develop regime classification of 114 states in the mid 1960s.

Coppedge and Renicke classified 170 states in 1985 on polyarchy following Dahl's approach. They developed two scales. One inclusiveness, which measures suffrage and the other, the political contestation scale. They assign cumulative scores ranging from 0 to ten points on four variables of political contestation<sup>2</sup> : freedom and fair elections, freedom of expression, availability of alternative sources of information and freedom to form and join organisations (They leave out inclusiveness from further discussion since almost all the countries with elections have universal suffrage). The most polyarchic countries, fortyone in number, score high on all the four variables and twenty seven least polyarchic countries score low on all of them.

One very important work enriching that of Dahl's is done by Kenneth Bollen. Bollen defines political democracy as the extent to which the "political power of the elite is minimized and that of non-elite is maximized"<sup>3</sup>. According to him, it is relative balance of power between elites and non-elites that determines the degree of political democracy. Where the non-elites have little

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2. Ibid, p. 210.

3. Kenneth Bollen, "Political Democracy, Conception and Measurement Traps" in **On Measuring Democracy, its Consequences and Concomitants (1991)** ed. by Alex Inkels, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey. p.5.

control over elites, political democracy is low. When the elites are accountable to the non-elites, political democracy is higher.

The minimization of elite and maximization of non-elite power remain fairly abstract ideas. How do we measure their relative political power?" For Bollen, one can indirectly gauge the relative political power of elites and non-elites. Political rights and political liberties reflected the political power of these two groups : political rights are typically assessed by examining characteristics of the electoral system. Leaders selected by elections, equal weighting of votes, the extent of the franchise, the openness of candidate selection process, the fairness of elections, the representativeness of the office holders and the timeliness of elections are specific examples of political rights in Bollen's framework.

Political liberties refer to the freedom that the population has in the political system. Characteristics such as freedom of media, the freedom of individuals or groups to oppose government policies or officials, and the absence of political censorship form political liberties. Following is tabular presentation of Bollen's conceptualisation of two dimensions of democracy :

**Table 1**

**Classification of Bollen's two dimensions of democracy into Political Rights and Political Liberties :**

Pol. Rights	Dimensions of Pol. Democracy	Pol. Liberties
(1) fairness of elections		(1) freedom of media
(2) executive selection		(2) freedom of individuals and group to oppose government
(3) legislative selection		(3) absence of political censorship

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
If a country's standing on political rights or liberties is low, this suggests that the elites in that society have greatest political power over the non-elites than in a society where these rights and liberties are high. Hence political rights and political liberties provide evidence on political democracy.

Further, its difficult for a system to maintain political liberties without political rights being in place and vice-a-versa. Thus, both reinforce each other and there is positive feedback relation linking the two dimensions.

Bollen's final political democracy index linearly transforms each of the six variables presented in the table between 0 and 100. Bollen scores 113 countries in 1960 (from 11.9 points in Yemen to 100.0 in Luxembourg, Iceland, Australia and Newzealand).

All these authors have developed a univariate analysis which makes it difficult to make out the meanings of scaled scores particularly those at the lower end of the democraticness continuum. This analysis is based on the assumption that all countries are more or less democratic and that the key question is to determine a country's degree of democraticness. The most democratic countries can be located at one end of the continuum while at the other end

**Figure 1**



less democratic or non-democracies, closed hegemonies or autocracies could be placed, as shown in figure 1. Further, the whole task of ranking regimes also rests on the assumption that for a given year or a long time span a standardized ranking from democratic to autocratic countries is possible. This however may not be very fruitful. Think for example, the following instance. Coppedge and Renicke (1990), at the lowest end of the continuum (scale score 10) placed 27 rather diverse countries including Afganistan, China, Mali, South Yemen and Soviet Union, Putting all these countries on a univariate continuum is questionable. To determine the nature of autocraticness of a country and accordingly analyse and predict its foreign behaviour on a continuum scale might not be a very relevant exercise.

## **War**

War has been studied as a dependent variable in democracy-peace war association but the concept is as problematic as the concept of democracy. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines war as a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations." The definition points towards two things : (1) the identification of legitimate entities regarding the behaviour in question, namely states; and (2) the interactive behaviour between those entities that qualifies as war.

There is no great degree of consensus among scholars on the identification of legitimate entities. The most glaring difference can be seen between the major datasets on war compiled by Wright (1942), Richardson (1960) and Small and Singer (1972). For Richardson, wars were a subset of the more general class of

deadly quarrels' <sup>4</sup> — "any quarrel which caused death to humans". This way, the legitimate entities for Richardson were human individuals, groups of individuals or states. Such a delineation for war was far too broad for both Wright and Small and Singer. Wright's list of war 'includes all hostilities involving members of the family of nations and the entities in the family of states, he identified, are those which had gained their actual independence before or after the Word War II, "rather than legal status under international law". The entities to qualify for statehood must have a population of 50,000 and legal international recognition through the existence of diplomatic mission from both France and Britain.

Differences also exist with respect to appropriate act or behaviour that qualifies as war. Richardson's deadly quarrels includes murders, bandrites, mutinies, in surrections and wars — small and large, but "excludes accidents and calamities such as earthquakes and tornadoes."

For Small and Singer, a war is not counted as one until it leads to atleast 1000 battledeaths among all participating system members.

For wright, "it is the legal recognition of the warlike action, the scale of such action and the importance of its legal and political consequences", that were used in deciding whether given incident was sufficiently important to include in a list of wars.

A consensus has been emerging among scholars to include in the list of wars only interstate wars because this way, to them, both the problem of entities

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4. As taken from Dina Zinnes and Richard Merrilt (1991), pp.214-15.

as well as the interactive behaviour recognition is solved. The interstate wars signify the war(s) between sovereign state(s) internationally recognized as such by other states, including by major powers whose recognition of a government typically confer de facto statehood. The scholars, thus, leave out colonial wars fought for the acquisition of territories inhabited by "primitive" people without recognized states, as practiced by nineteenth century imperialism, or for the twentieth century liberalism of these people. Thus, "war it may certainly be, but interstate it is not unless or until both the sides are having attributes of statehood."<sup>5</sup>

Now excluding colonial wars from the study may help in a better, empirical study but on normative plane it amounts to a western cultural bias. This is not the only problem. Numerous problems abound in democracy-peace proposition. As Zinnes and Merritt ask, does regime type predict involvement in war or war initiation only, i.e., are democracies not likely to initiate wars or are they seldom likely to participate in wars? "What happens when armistices occur during war? When hostilities begin a new, is it a new war or part of the old one? Should a state enter ongoing hostilities during their last week, is it considered a participant?"<sup>6</sup>

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
5. ✓ Bruce Russett (1993) **"Grasping the Democratic Peace : Principles for the post cold war world"**, Princeton University Press. p. 14.

6. Zinnes and Merritt (1991) **"Democracies and War in on Measuring Democracies; Its consequences and Concomittants"**, ed. by Alex Inkeles; Transaction Publisher, New Jersey p. 216.

## II

### Regime Type and War Behaviour

The section examines the proposition linking types of regimes to international conflict or democracy to peaceful behaviour in international system.



Regime Type and War Involvement :  
Correlational Analysis.

As shown in figure above, following will be an unidirectional study of the literature focusing on democracy's impact on war behaviour of states. The proponent of classical democracy Bryce never hinted at linkage between the governmental form and international conflict, though Tocqueville believed that democracy is a force for peace. Wilson, however, saw it clearly as the hope for "peaceful international order based on world law."

Quincy Wright was the first to argue strongly in favour of democracy. He however discussed all sides of it.

**Figure 3**

Regime Type and War Frequency

		Yes	No		
Democracy		1		2	Regime Type
Autocracy		3		4	

All cells are equally likely. No clear relation exists between democracy and war. In his words, "statistics can hardly be invoked to show that



democracies have been less often involved in war than autocracies".<sup>7</sup> Explaining call 1, he says, "democracies have displayed some aggressive tendencies" This is because of several reasons : First, democracies by their elective, representative nature are not capable of seeing beyond their own self that is, national interests.

Democracies demand that

the government should be the servant of the state and the state should be the servant of the national society... Foreign policy, though it affects the people of other states, should conform to the opinion of the people only of one state. That opinion can neither be representative of all interests involved, nor be adequately informed of the changing circumstances of international politics... Democratic statesmen are obliged to base their policies upon the opinion of the public... and to ignore... realistic dispatches of their diplomats or the resolution of international bodies when these are in conflict with that opinion. Therefore, democracies, while usually theoretically against war, often fail to measures, whether to balance power or to organize the world democratically, which might preserve the peace. Instead, they insist upon policies which, though consciously directed only to democratic ends, are in fact likely to lead to war... (thus) the tendency of democracy (is) to grow universal principles but to act only for national ends.<sup>8</sup>

Accordingly, those in charge of a democratic state see their job to be representing their state and its interests. If these interests conflict with those of other states, the leaders of democratic sates, knowing that they can be relieved of their office at the next elections, push relentlessly for their own special interest. Peace, a long term goal requires some short term sacrifices, but the leaders of these states are incapable of doing the same.

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7. Ibid, p.217.

8. Qouted in Dina Zinnes and Richard Merritt (1991) p. 218.

Secondly, democracies in principle oppose war but have shown little capacity to cooperate for peace through world organisation. The structural defects that cause democracies to stumble into conflict and war are also the basic problem that restricts any serious efforts toward peace :

The incapacity of democracies to maintain peace (in a) balance of power (international system) arises from the fact that democracy cannot give foreign affairs priority over domestic affairs, that with its party changes, it cannot pursue any foreign policy continuously; and that its procedures designed for deliberations, prevent the rapid balancing operations essential to stability under the system. In an inter dependent world in which governments are related by such a balance of power, democracies are not likely to survive.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, cell (1) shows that no difference may distinguish among regime types' propensity for war and (2) democracies carry within them the potential seeds of conflict and war. However, cell 2nd 3 are equally likely and describable that why democracies could be peaceful :

Democracy has inherent possibilities of being more peaceful... Autocrats tend to be aggressive types of personalities ... Democracies... tend to give leadership to personalities of conciliatory type to attach importance to respect for law, to oppose military preparation and war, and to value liberty, humanity and welfare above power... Absolutist states... under autocratic leadership are likely to be most belligerent, while constitutional states... under democratic leadership are likely to be most peaceful.

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9. Ibid, p. 218.

Following proposition can be drawn form above statement of Quincy Wright linking democracy and peace :

Since,

- \* Democracy gives leadership to personalities of a conciliatory nature; and
- \* Conciliatory personalities to not make decisions for war.


therefore,

- \* Democracy does not cause war.

Figurewise the proposition can be presented the following way

**Figure 4**

Leadership and War



Melvin Small and David Singer (1976) tried to end the debate forever (restarted by Babst in 1972, who proclaimed that democracies were a force for peace) by stating that neighbours are inclined to fight with each other, irrespective of their forms of government, while distant countries are not inclined to do so.<sup>10</sup>

Figurewise their proposition can be presented the following way.

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10. Small and Singer (1976), "War proneness of Democratic Regimes", **Jarusalem Journal of International Relations**, p. 67.



From this we can draw out the following ingredients linking democracy and peace.

Since,

- \* Democracy embodies multiple interests,
- \* Multiple interests lead to cross pressures;
- \* Cross-pressures permit no single coalition
- \* War embodies a single coalition.

Therefore,

- \* States without a single coalition do not cause wars.

Therefore,

- \* Democracy does not cause war.

His second argument rests on the assumed dislike of the masses for blood and taxes :

Political elites are dependent on the support of a public unwilling to bear the cost in taxes, property and blood in foreign adventures and interventions... The public cannot be trusted to pay the price of foreign violence... The essential diversity of interests and values of free people must be overcome... This is not true for the states whose political elites are unrestrained by a free press and contending centres of power and which are unaccountable through free elections... The freer the people of a state, the more non-violent its elites' expectations and perceptions and less likely they are to commit official violence against other states."<sup>12</sup>

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12. Ibid, p.28.

The following argument develops out of the above statement :

(a)

Since,

- \* In a democracy, the people's preferences are basic for decision-making;
- \* The people's preferences are not for taxes and spilling of blood;
- \* War entails both taxes and spilling of blood.

Therefore,

- \* Having no taxes and no spilling of blood means no war.

Therefore,

- \* Democracy does not cause war.

(b)

Since,

- \* Democracy makes its people free;
- \* The freer the people, the more they expect the elites to be non-violent.

Therefore,

- \* Elites governing freer people are not likely to commit official violence against

other states.

Therefore,

- \* Democracy does not cause war.

Rummel examined "all reported international conflict for 1976 to 1980 and a list of wars from 1816 to 1974 and of threats and use of force from 1945 to 1965. He reached at the conclusion that only 24% of the free states were involved in inter-state violence, compared to 26% of partly free and 61% of

non-free states. This shows that the more libertarian a state, the less its foreign violence.<sup>13</sup>


Rummel's pathbreaking article produced widespread response from Scholars like Steve Chan and Erich Weede. Chan (1984) attempted to reconcile the divergent findings and tested Rummel's proposition. "Political freedom promotes peace." Chan found no negative association between freedom and war and pointed out that the proposition,

Tends to be contradicted, if we focus only on monadic relationships, if we refer to wars from a distant past, if we include wars of an extra-systemic nature (i.e. colonial and imperialist wars) or if we assess political freedom cross-sectionally (i.e., comparing a country's political conditions with those of its contemporaries).<sup>14</sup>

The above proposition can be expressed via following figure:

**Figure 6**

Conditionalities in Democracy Peace correlation.



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13. Rummel's initial paper (1968) found no necessary relationship between regime type and involvements in wars that the issue almost seemed dead. Weede (1971) verified and confirmed Rummel's results.

14. Steve Chan (1984), "Morrer Mirror on the Wall; Are freer countries more pacific", **Journal of Conflict Resolutions**, p. 617.

The figure shows that the direct relationship of regime type-war behaviour and democracy-peace can be established if certain conditionalities are met.

According to Chan, these conditionalities are :

- \* if we focus only on dyadic relationships
- \* if we refer to more recent past
- \* if we exclude extra-systemic wars
- \* if we assess political freedom latitudinally for each country i.e., comparing a country's freedom status in terms of its own present or past political conditions.

Two of Chan's conclusions are extremely noteworthy, one that although during 1970's, the democracies became less war prone than other states, during much longer period prior to 1973, they were more war prone. And secondly, that although cross-sectional analysis does not confirm that democracies are less bellicose, longitudinal studies of the same states through time does indicate that they are less war prone when they have democratic regimes.

Weede responded to Rummel's report by using "various definitions of war and compilations of data for 1960 to 1980 to demonstrate that democracy and war involvement are not consistently and significantly correlated with each other. Some possible association in the late cannot be verified because of the absence of complete data. "Rummel's findings that democracy tend to be involved in war less often than other states is entirely due to his period of observation (1976-1980)." Moreover,

Theoretically,... the argument (is) fairly convincing that democratic governments are more concerned with the avoidance of war than are other governments. Such concern, however, may contribute



little to peace. Although the disinclination of citizens to pay for war with money, life and limbs puts pressure on democratic government to avoid war involvement, such pressure need not succeed. First, the very same citizenry that objects to military action may on occasions simultaneously object to the concessions required for maintaining peace. Second, even if citizen pressure on democratic government is devoid of such internal contradictions, peace loving people and democratic governments may try a policy of appeasement, thereby projecting an image of weakness and indecision that invites exploitation by more ruthless decision-makers abroad and thereby possibly increasing the risk of war."<sup>15</sup>

Undaunted by either Weede or Chan, and continuing his study of libertarian countries, Rummel reports evidence from new time periods. He continues to assert that the more libertarian a state is, the less it will be involved in foreign and domestic violence."<sup>16</sup>

David Garnhem (1986) in an empirical study of war weariness (the inhibitive impact of costly previous wars) found that war-weariness is not an universal characteristic of nation-state behaviour and that is more likely to affect democratic than non-democratic states. However, there is no statistically significant evidence "that weariness has constrained the conflict behaviour of the three principle democracies - France, USA and United Kingdom in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. ( $P < .05$ )."<sup>17</sup>

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15. Weede (1984), "Democracy and war involvement", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, pp.652-53.
  16. R.J. Rummel (1985), "Libertarian Propositin on violence within and between nations ; Atest against published research results", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, p.419.
  17. David Garnham (1986), "War-pronecess, War-Weariness and Regime Types : 1816-1980, **Journal of Peace Research**, August. p.287.

Like Chan, Randall Schweller (1992) also established that "democracy promotes peace" proposition is proved not without certain qualifications:

The shortcomings of correlational methodologies applied to highly aggregated data suggest that restricting the analysis to a particular type of war and set of initial conditions may lead to more conclusive finding.

He pointed out that the proposition is proved;

- \* if it is studied in respect of preventive wars<sup>18</sup> involving the power shift (initial condition held constant).
- \* if it concerns the power shifts between the states of roughly equal strength. It is not relevant to all power shifts. For example, the case of relative decline of a large state via-a-vis a much smaller state.

This is because the public opinion in democratic states generates a complex of factors that lessens the motivation to enter into preventive war. Unlike their authoritarian counter parts, democratic states lack the large conscript armies, flexibility, decisiveness and cold logic required to act solely out of consideration of realpolitik. The pacific effect of public opinion is somewhat contingent, however, on the expectation that war will be costly.<sup>19</sup> It is upon this logic that Schweller established that because the cost involved in case of war resulting from power transition between a strong democratic state

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18. The concept of 'Preventive War' refers to those wars that are motivated by the fear that one's military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising adversary.

19. Randall Schweller (1992) "Domestic Structure and Preventive War : Are democracies more pacific?", **World Politics**, p. 248.

and a weak authoritarian state would be less, i.e., the war would ensure quick victory for the relatively strong but declining democratic hegemon, that his hypothesis employs to power shifts between power of roughly equal size. He presents the following model to show that only declining authoritarian states, *ceteris paribus*, wage preventive wars; democratic states either accommodate the challenger's rise (in case the challenger is a democratic country) or they form defensive alliance if the challenger is an authoritarian state).

**Figure 7**  
Declining Leader

<i>Rising Challenger</i>	<i>Democratic</i>	Democratic Leader accommodates to challenger's rise	Non-democratic Leader wages a preventive war
	<i>Non Democratic</i>	Leader tries to form a defensive alliance system.	Leader wages a preventive war.

### III

#### Democratic Peace : A Dyadic Analysis

The entire analysis shows that there is no consensus on direct democracy-peace/war causation (i.e., democracies in general are peaceful). Throughout this time however, and despite the conflicting results, there emerges one finding on which all seem to agree. This is that democracies do not fight each other.

Surprisingly, though the intention of Rummel was to study the democracy-peace proposition at monadic level, he concludes his arguments by hypothesising about the interaction between regime types. One of three propositions he intends to test concern war between democracies :

Joint Freedom Proposition : Libertarian systems mutually preclude violence (violence will occur between them only if atleast one is non-libertarian).

This result is consistent with an observation made earlier by Small and Singer (1976) in an examination of all wars from 1816-65, nothing that "bourgeois democracies do not seem to fight against one another". Chan also distinguished between monadic and dyadic hypothesis and concluded that : "the relationship between freedom and peace tends to be confirmed, if we focus only on dyadic relationship".

The idea of 'peace between democracies has been largely borrowed from Kant's world famous essay "**Perpetual Peace**" written in 1795 and extended later on by Michael Doyle in a series of articles (1989, 1986, 1995). Kant anticipates for us the ever widening pacification of a liberal pacific union. He argues that the perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever widening acceptance of three definitive articles of peace : the 'republican constitution' law, the 'international law' and the 'cosmopolitan law'. There are constitutional mechanism in democracies which restrain them from going to war, because of the burdens war imposes on the population.

"...the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war should be declared, it is very natural that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down upon themselves all the miseries of war... But under a constitution where the

subject is not a citizen and which is therefore not republican, it is simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of the state is not a fellow citizen but the owner of the state and war will not force him to make the slightest scarifies... He, thus, can decide on war for the sake of propriety.<sup>20</sup>

And yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which, however, is not the case. Kant. was well aware that democracy would lead, not to the total abolishment of war, but only to peace between democracies. This is because of two reasons, one moral and the other economic. The moral reason has to do with the common values of legitimate rights, mutual respect and understanding between democracies; this leads to what Kant calls a 'pacific union' which is not a signed treaty, but a 'zone of peace' based on common moral foundation of the democracies. It is manifested in 'international law'. Peaceful ways of resolving conflicts domestically are seen as morally superior to violent behaviour and this view is transferred to international relations between democracies. The beginning of cooperation starts a virtuous circle of increasing cooperation<sup>21</sup> : as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace".<sup>22</sup> As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all

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20. Quoted by Michael Doyle, " Liberalism and World Politics Revisited" (1995), in **Controversies in International Relations : Realist and Neoliberal Challenge**, p.98.

21. George Sorensen (1992) : Kant and Processes of Democralization : Consequences for Neorealist Thought" - **Journal of Peace Research**, p.399 (1992).

22. Quoted by Michael Doyle (1995), p. 99.

the citizens and of all the republics (the second source) comes into play; and this sets up the moral foundation of liberal peace. The transparency of democracies is important for the whole process. Freedom of expression and free communication help establish mutual understanding internationally and help ensure that political representation are in accordance with the citizen's views domestically.

The economic reason is based on the benefits from international trade and investment. In the pacific union, it is possible to focus on the 'spirit of commerce' through cosmopolitan law (the third source), the possibility for mutual gain involved in international economic cooperation. The development of economic inter-dependence further strengthens the pacific union, when notions of autarky or self-sufficiency are set aside and the pursuit of mutual economic gain is given priority.

In sum, there are three elements behind Kant's claim that democracy leads to peace. The first is the mere existence of democracies with non-violent conflict behaviour which promotes peace; secondly this, leads to a pacific union between democracies based on their common moral values; finally, the pacific union is strengthened through economic cooperation. All the three elements are necessary in order to make the connection between democracy and peace. On the other hand, democracies continue to go to war with non-democratic regimes with whom they have no common moral foundation. On the one hand, the power struggle between states for security resources and prestige continues outside the pacific union; in this area, the realist picture of an international system characterised by anarchy applies. Democracies have reasons to be sceptical versus the governments that cannot claim to represent their people. War as the outcome of conflict is always a possibility under these circumstances.

On the other hand, democratic regimes can go to war for 'crusade' reasons; a wish to promote democratic values in new areas.<sup>23</sup> After all liberal wars are justified for liberal purposes.

Unlike the domestic pacifism concept (democracies in general are peaceful), where there exist no consensus among scholars, there is virtual unanimity in democratic peace (democracies are peaceful among their relations) concept. The scholars have tried to give varied explanations to show the robustness of the concept but all maintaining that democracies do not go to war against each other.

Mintz and Zeva in an experimental study point out that democracies do not fight each other because they are very few incentives to do so. This is because the use of force against fellow democracies is considered as a failure of foreign policy by the public :

In making cost-benefit calculations of using force against others democracies, the democratic leader... sees no political benefits, only costs. His or her gain is therefore, negative.<sup>24</sup>

The question to be pondered on is that does the Mintz-Zeva explanation not tantamount to same cultural-normative explanation, many have given, including Kant.

In a quite different explanation Arie Kacowicz point out that democracies do not fight each other since they are conservative powers, usually satisfied with the territorial status quo within and across their borders, because :

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23. Sorensen (1992), p. 398.

24. Mintz and Zeva (1993) "Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other; An Experimental Study", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, p. 489.

- \* they are generally fully-fledged nation-states and strong vis-a-vis their own societies;
- \* they are usually strong powers from both military and socio-economic point of view :
- \* they share normative consensus of international law and a common institutional framework which reflects their inherent bias toward the status-quo; and,
- \* their high level of economic growth and interdependence created vested interests for keeping the existing regional and international order.

But some non-democratic states are also status-quoist and may establish a zone of peace even with democracies for a different reason. On account of being weak domestically, they have a common interest in keeping territorial status-quo and focus their efforts in economic and social development and change. However pluralistic security communities (a Deutschian concept) could be maintained only among democratic states.<sup>25</sup> for the reasons explained above.

Micro economic explanation of democratic peace phenomenon, as alternative to Kantian approach have not been untouched D. Lake, for example, argues that democratic states will tend to be less expansionist than autocratic states. This is because the autocratic states which typically earn rents at the expense of their society, will possess an imperialist bias hence, tend to be more expansionist. Democracy, however, constraints the ability of the state to extract

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 25. A. Kacowicz, 1995. "Explaining Zones of Peace; Democracies as satisfied powers" **Journal of Peace Research**, p. 274.



monopoly rents at the society's expense. The above explanation also suggests that democracies will often be the object of expansion by autocratic states, because by their very nature, democracies act as magnet for emigration and role model for consequences of state rent seeking. This explains why the overall war involvement of democratic states is same as for autocratic states.

Further democratic states may also engage in expansion and even intervene in other countries but only when the initial costs of rule are less than the discounted present value of future economic profits, for example, the colonial expansion in nineteenth century and other interventions. Thus, "the proactive policy of democracies rests not on a morel imperative but on a rational calculus of preemption".<sup>26</sup> Only democracies are less likely to fight each other, for only in this area is the absence of an imperialist bias manifest.

#### IV


Regime type does matter in international politics, but to what extent is not a consensual affair. Since Quincy Wright's study, the scholars had agreed that democracies are not necessarily associated negatively with war involvement, though they are ideal form of government. Rummel's (1983) study embraced the debate with new vigour only to be dissented by subsequent scholars. The democracy and peace association, however seemed so enchanting that their ray of hope never seemed dead. Democracy matter, they proved, at dyadic level. As Most and Starr (1989) pointed out the only legitimate approach to the study of

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26. David Lake, 1992. "Powerful Pacifists : Democratic States and War". **American Political Science Review** (March) pp. 28-30.

war is at the dyadic level of analysis, since it takes two to make a war. The Researchers at the level of single nation state will necessarily come up short. The dyadic level empirical study has brought optimistic results. The exercise shows that figure 2 should be modified as follows :

**Figure-8**

The dyadic level analysis of regime type and war involvement.



The only difficulty, here, however, is that no consensus has emerged as to why democratic peace phenomenon. A cursory look at the whole analysis, however, suggests that the link between the views of the citizen on the one hand, and the out comes in terms of foreign policy decisions on the other is indirect, blurred and complex. The restraint shown by democracies is not directly attributable to the influence of peace loving citizens on the decision makers. The most convincing explanation which accords with Kant's general framework is that democracy promotes norms and expectations among citizens as well as among policy-makers concerning peaceful resolution of conflicts with other democracies. Democratic norms of peaceful resolution of conflicts and of other people's right to self-determination introduces an element of restraint or caution in the way in which democracies conduct international relations with each other.<sup>27</sup>

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27. Sorens, 1992, p. 401.

Secondly, it is not clear whether regime type is a unidimensional or multidimensional concept. The concept of war poses additional operational problems. It is not clear whether the arguments concern democracies getting involved in wars or initiating them. Not only that, one might consider the following problem : If A sends B an ultimatum and B responds by sending the marines; who is the aggressor—— A or B? If A sends B an ultimatum, B ignores it, A then amasses the troops at B's border, and B understanding from intelligence sources that A is planning an attack, launched pre-emptive strike against A-which is the victim? A thought on multiwars : If A invades B's ally C and B rushes to C's defense, is B the aggressor or the victim.<sup>28</sup>

The research on regime—war nexus is far from complete. As of now, we can only say that 'democracies do not fight democracies' proposition is a much more relevant concept, than democracies pacifism proposition, which so far has stood the empirical tests of almost all the scholars, even with varied explanations.

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28. Willian Dixon, 1993. "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict", **Journal of Conflict Resoultuon**, p.43.

## CHAPTER-III

### DEMOCRACY AND PEACE : THE COLD WAR PHASE

...advancing the democratic cause can be American's most effective foreign policy in terms of not merely of good deeds but of self interest as well.

Joshua Muravchik.

American founders began with the premise that man had been created in the image of God and that all were of equal worth and endowed with inalienable rights. In founding the modern world's first democracy, they set out to create a system that would follow this premise and that would suit human nature as they understood it.<sup>1</sup>

With this dictum in mind, America has taken upon itself the job of democratizing the world. As Truman in a speech to congress in March 1947 said. " I believe that it must be the policy of United states to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressurs". Wars in Korea, Haiti, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama and Iraq manifest this doctrine.

And yet, the United States cannot merely be described as the benefactor of democracy and democratic movements across the world. It even tried to destabilise, if not to sabotage the elected, representative governments in different states.

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1. Joshua Muravchik, 1991. **"Exporting Democracy : Fulfilling America's Destiary"** American Enterprise Institute Press (AEI), p.1.

The chapter consequently examines both the themes - the support for democracy and the covert action against the democratic governments on the part of United States in the cold war era. It is found that the two diverging themes are linked with the security perception — the strategic compulsions - and the economic interests of the United States.

It is also pointed out that the chapter studies the United States and democracy during the cold war phase for the reason that the US was the sole heavy weight of democratic world and that the other major powers some times acquiesced and sometimes protested mildly. The second reason is that there is not enough literature available for other power activities to examine.

## I

### **Support for Democracy : Direct Intervention and Economic AID**

Ever since the onset of the cold war, and assuming that it started soon after the Russian Revolution of 1917, the US has intervened in outside countries in the name of cherishing (rather say, exporting) the democratic rule. Infact, America entered the World War I, " to make the world safe for democracy."

When the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin succeeded in bringing about the downfall of autocratic Czars in 1917 and established the communist regime there, it created ferment in the western world. The liberal capitalist states of Europe and USA considered the emergence of a communist state in Russia as a major challenge to democracy in the World. When the news of Bolshevik seizure of power reached Washington, Bakhmetev, the Russian Ambassador commented that the event was of local and temporary significance. The US

foreign office informed him that the US would not recognize the Soviet regime because it lacked stability and representative character. Francis, the American Ambassador in Russia who had regarded Lenin as a German agent thought the whole episode disgusting and cynically hoped that the people of Russia would react in the same manner. Plans had already been laid down, with the American President's knowledge and tacit approval for an immediate Japanese intervention in Siberia and the subsequently Anglo-French intervention in European Russia. Wilson declared that the Mexican socialism was "unworkable and against the interests of the Soviet people."

By 1923, when most of the European powers including Great Britain and France had extended the degree recognition to Lenin's communist government, the USA still kept on withholding it, for Wilson believed that the Soviet government would militate against the people's wish. Only in 1933, when Washington perceived a major threat from the growing power of Germany and Japan that it decided to finally recognize the regime in Moscow.

At the thick of the World War II, the Grand Alliance was formed between 1941-45 in order to give a fitting reply to Nazi invaders. The USA, U.K., France and Soviet Union joined hands in such an alliance because USA considered fascists at that juncture a greater threat than Soviet Union. And yet the Americans along with the British made sure to minimize their human losses at the cost of Russians. American (and the western powers) were quite sure that fascists and communists would consume each other and America's purpose would be served.

That was not to be. Spread of communism in Eastern Europe and the formation of a bloc by Soviet Russia gave rise to discontentment in USA and Western countries that soon a major part of the world would become hostile to liberal ideals. The gradual emergence of bipolar world in the post war phase and the use of atom bomb by President Truman in the war against Japan widened the ideological rift between the Western liberal democratic world led by United States and the communist world led by Soviet Union.

The American elites have viewed the US as a country with special destiny and a sense of mission. Thomas Jefferson called his country "the last best hope of mankind and a barrier against the returns of ignorance and barbarism. John Adams predicted that the US was destined beyond doubt to be the greatest power on the earth". However, whereas for the first century and a half of its existences, the US had seen its mission primarily to serve as an example for those who fought for and sought political freedom the years following world war II saw the US adopt a more interventionist role in its efforts to support and aid nation states. The cold war realities had necessitated this move on the part of United States.

Conflict between Soviet Russia and Western powers in general and US in particular over the political ideology was unleashed for the first time over the affairs of Greece, Turkey and Iran. As soon as German forces left Greece in 1944, the British forces stepped in. Russia had acknowledged the British position in Greece according to the treaty concluded between herself and Britain. On the strength of that treaty, the British forces had entered the Greece. Meanwhile in Greece, an open clash between the leftists and the royalists began. British

support to the royalists at once led to the internecine war in Greece.<sup>2</sup> Upon the attack of British forces, the communists took shelter in the mountains. By a plebiscite held in 1945, monarchy was restored in Greece. But by continuous offensive, the communists harassed the Greek government. They began to receive help from the communist of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania in many ways.

Extending a helping hand to the British, the US President Truman appealed to the US Congress in March 1947 for a sanction of \$ 400 million and declared the famous Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947) It read, "it must be the policy of United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure". The chief aim of Truman Doctrine was to protect the independent nations from communist aggression and to preserve the balance of power with Soviet Russia by forming a bloc loyal to USA through economic and military assistance.

The US did not cease its attempts with Truman Doctrine in the direction of containing the communism. In June 1947, it sponsored the European Recovery Programme. It is known as the Marshall plan as it was prepared by US secretary Marshall. the purpose of the plan was to help the European countries, ravaged by war, restore their economics. Analysing the plan, Marshall had said that as long as poverty, economic depression and scarcity of food would remain in Western Europe, there will steadily develop social unease and political confusion on every side. '... our national security will be seriously threatened.

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2. A.C.Roy, 1992. **International Relations Since 1919**, World Press : Calcutta, p.353.



But if we furnish effective aid to support the now visibly reviving hope of Europe, the prospect would speedily change.'<sup>3</sup>

Trekking down the 'balance of power' road, the United states sought to balance the communist world with the democratic sphere of influence led by itself. In a number of states, it directly coerced to turn them into democratic representative countries. In still others, which it had occupied in the course of war, its presence itself had positive influence in many cases.

The following analysis will take up some cases of direct US action and its impact on democratic growth in those countries.

### **Japan:**

Japan continued under American occupation for nearly six years. America succeeded in imposing democratic rule in Japanese society marked by a tradition of extraordinary insularity and tradition. Democratization of Japan was instrumental goal and General MacArthur was in charge of the mission to guide the Japanese... to higher principles, to help them rise to full measure of new and loftier standards of social and political morality."<sup>4</sup>

The mission was achieved through purging. The purge began with figures in national politics and worked its way down to local officials, then branched out to other realms such as the economy and the mass media. Hundreds of thousands were screened and thousands were purged. Countless others removed themselves from posts or from considerations for posts to avoid subjecting themselves to the purge. In addition to individuals, organizations that had abetted militarism, were banned.

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3. Ibid, p.356.

4. Ibid, p.94.

According to protagonists of occupation, it (occupation) reversed the outcomes of the pre-war political battles and the democracies above the authoritarians. In addition to aiding indigenous democrats, the occupation created new constituencies of its own. Women were liberated by the new constitution, in comparison with their subordinate and disenfranchised status under the old regime. A substantial portion of peasantry became freeholders instead of tenant farmers as a result of land reforms. The new constitution invoked the provisions renouncing war and the maintenance of military forces.<sup>5</sup>

**Dominican Republic :**

America used direct military action in 1985 in Dominican government there.

In May 1961, Rafael Trujillo, who had ruled the nation for more than thirty years with a willful despotism, fell victim to an assassin's bullets.<sup>6</sup> The nominal president Joaquin Balaguer remained in office and Trujillo's son Ramfis took command of the armed forces. US understood this regime to be unstable, and at this time American alarm about the influence of Cuba was at its apex. Washington hoped for a transition to democracy in Dominican Republic both as a value in itself and as a means of forestalling communism it decided to support Balaguer in transitory phase, who was, though, not a democratic but still amenable to American wishes. USA was able to put pressure on Trujillo through

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5. Ibid, p.97.

6. According to Muravchik, by some accounts, CIA agents may have furnished the weapons.

Rodrigues of air force and by sending a naval task force to the area. Trujillo agreed in November to leave the country. But when two of his uncles suddenly returned from abroad, he cancelled his departure and fuelled suspicion that Trujillist coup was in the offing. However, when US put strong pressure, Trujillo fled.

By the end of 1961. Belaguer was also persuaded to shift power to a new council of state, in which he included members of democratic opposition. America in turn restored the diplomatic and a few trade relations.

A few weeks later, however, the same General Rodrigues who had helped thwart Ramfis coup, staged a coup of his own against the council of state. Two days after the coup, Rodrigues was arrested by other officers (USA had lobbied other elements of Dominican Republic in this task) and allowed to leave for exile in USA.

Within days, Belaguer too was forced to resign ; the new election was defined with the help of OAS (Organization of American States). Juan Bosch, the opposition candidate won the election. But after seven months, he was thrown out in a coup by military Junta. USA tried to prevent the overthrow of democratic leader and derecognized the junta. But after receiving assurances from the junta that it would hold elections in 1965, Washington extended recognition and resumed foreign assistance.

In April 1965, younger officers launched an insurrection aimed at restoring Bosch and his Dominican Republican Party. A civil war erupted. President Johnson of USA feared a communist upheaval and dispatched the US marines which thwarted rebels, restored order and installed an interim

government. Under US supervision, elections were held in June 1966. In those elections ex-president Belaguer defeated Bosch and a democratic era in Dominican Republic started.<sup>7</sup>

**Panama :**

Panama also faced the similar crisis. The crisis reached its boiling point with Presidential balloting in May 1989. General Noreiega, Panama' military potentate was accustomed to ruling behind a puppet president. In 1989 elections, Panamanian rejected Noreiega's candidate by a huge margin but election results were never made clear. On May 10, the government announced that the election was annulled as a result of obstruction by foreigners.

Just a week before elections, President Bush had warned against the fraud. A year and a half earlier also, USA had tried diplomatic pressure to oust Noriega but in vain.

The election fraud in 1989, spurred the USA to try with renewed vigour; US ambassador was recalled and an additional contingent of troops were sent to US bases there. Bush proclaimed, "the will of the people should not be thwarted by this man and a handful of Doberman thugs."<sup>8</sup> US administration turned to OAS for organized efforts. OAS condemned the electoral fraud and created a mediating team that visited Panama thrice in next three months, without any substantial results.

Washington then renewed its public expose of Noreiega's role in the

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7. Ibid, p.160.

8. Michal Shuman, Hal Harvey, 1993. "**Security Without War : A Post Cold War Foreign Policy**", Westview Press Inc, Colorado. p.47.

international drug trade and refused to recognize a new President installed by Noreiega in September and announced that it would not approve any administrator of the Panama canal nominated by the Noreiega government. But even these efforts bore no fruits. consequently in December, American troops invaded Panama, toppled Noreiega and installed Guillermo Endara, the rightful winner of May's elections, as president.

The invasion was welcomed by Panamanian but entailed costs. The 'Operation Just Cause' killed more than three hundred Panamanian and sent another thousands plus with mutilated parts into hospital.<sup>9</sup> The invasion was strongly condemned by OAS and the United Nations but according to Washington, its purpose, namely, the cause of democracy, had been served.

#### **Grenada :**

In addition USA invaded Grenada in 1983 to oust a government that was 'unfriendly' (but the one which posed no threat to Americans).<sup>10</sup> The Americans toppled the governing New Jewel Movement, which had seized power four years earlier and was attempting to solidify a communist dictatorship. The invaders did leave behind democratically elected government which has endured. Reagan claimed that the US invasion was a military operation to restore order and democracy.

The question of whether or not the United States should actively promote democracy is attracting increasing attention. Larry Diamond writes that 'Democracy should be the central focus : the defining feature of US foreign

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9. Ibid, p.47.

10. Ibid, p.47.

policy'.<sup>11</sup> Charles Maynes states that under Bill Clinton, '...the US will try to spread democracy.'<sup>12</sup> Allison and Baschel provide a lengthy list of suggestions that the US government and the others might follow to encourage democratic growth such as : (a) encouraging polarisation of societies ; (b) assisting in the development of market economics ; and, (c) socializing military and security forces to respect democratic norms and values. Few, however have advocated open use of force.

Richard Haass argues that : the United states should largely stay outside or minimize its role in situations requiring... nation building.<sup>13</sup>

Robert Art maintains that while promoting democracy is in US interest, military force ' is of little use' in this effort :

The aim of spreading democracy around the globe can too easily become a license for indiscriminate and unending US military interventions in the internal affairs of others. Democracies are best produced, rather by stalemating aggressor states, by providing a stable international framework that facilitates economic development and emergence of a middle class within states and by using economic and other types of leverage to encourage internal liberalization.<sup>14</sup>

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11. Quoted in James Meernik 1996, United States Military Intervention and Promotion of Democracy." **Journal of Peace Research**, p.392.
  12. Ibid, p.392.
  13. Richard Haass, 1994. "Military Force : A User" Guide. **Foreign Policy**, Fall p.36.
  14. Quoted in Meernik, p.393.

Meernik examines military interventions and democratic growth, and finds that in majority of the cases, US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy, regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured. Most nations retain their current level of democracy. However, when the nations intervened in with those that have not, the former group is more likely to experience democratic growth'... 'the use of US ground forces does lead to increased democratization.'<sup>15</sup> Second, when the United States appears to be truly committed to promoting democracy, it is generally quite successful. Thirdly, imposing democratic regimes on defeated enemies is going to be more fruitful.

'And imposing a government on a subjugated or defeated nation is something that can be accomplished through force of arms as the experience of world war II and Grenada and Panama evidence.'<sup>16</sup>

### III

#### **Covert Action Against Democracies : A Negation of Democratic Peace Concept.**

The above analysis discussed the American love for democracy and democratic leaders and took note of the methods the Americans adopted in the Cold war phase of history - direct interventions and economic aid. The analysis hence was compatible with the democratic peace proposition that democratic governments do wage war on non-democratic establishments with a mission to

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15. Meernik, 1996. p.400.

16. Ibid, P 393.

extend the 'peace-zone', following Kant's footsteps. David Lake also argued that democracies may proceed for such a democratic mission because they are likely to win most of the wars they engage in. And America, the world's most powerful country both in terms of economics and military capability seem to have accepted this proposition religiously, for after all, 'making the world safe for democracy' has been both the American ideal and a pragmatic goal to follow.

So far, everything seems to be fine and well within the explanatory framework of democratic peace proposition ; democracies do not use overall force against democracies, but only against non-democracies. But what about shifting the analysis from overt to covert action. Do democracies ever use covert force against other elected governments? Following analysis will show that United States has infact used forcible covert action against a series of elected government. According to Steven Van Evera, on about a dozen occasions since 1945, the United States has covertly acted against what he terms democratic governments. If this is the reality, then it violates the core tenet of liberalism 'that democratic governments believe all similar government should be free from outside intervention.'<sup>17</sup>

David Forsythe lists and analyses six such acts since 1950, which will be discussed here : against the governments of Iran (1953), Guatemala ( 1954), Indonesia (1957), Brazil (from 1961), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (from 1981).  
Iran (1953).

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17. David Forsythe, 1992. 'Democracies, War and Covert Action', **Journal of Peace Research**; Vol 29, No.4, p.385.



At the time of classic cold war period, the USA covertly intervened in Mosadeq's Iran. Mosadeq was chosen by clear majority in Parliament. Though Iranian Parliament had to share power with Shah, yet it could not be called authoritarian. Policies of redistribution of wealth, expropriation of foreign property, and welfare underway were, further, not incompatible with a democratic form of government. Though communist movement was underway, yet Mosadeq was neither a Marxist nor a Leninist. And yet his government was viewed by USA as troublesome. What USA feared was future.<sup>18</sup> Mosadeq's takeover of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was viewed as a challenge to western economic interests and leftist move which could have the way for future communist inroads.

#### Guatemala (1954)

USA intervened covertly in Guatemala as about the same time as in Iran and the ground for intervention was also similar one. Arbenz government there was elected popularly by a majority vote, and the degree of democraticness was clearly more than in Iran, where the leader was chosen indirectly. And yet, elections in Guatemala were restricted by the army in alliance with conservative economic interests. However, putting at test, Arbenz would have popularly won fully freed and fair elections. Populist movement was on in Guatemala as in Iran and Redistribution of wealth and expropriation of foreign owned property was

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18. David Forsythe, 1992. 'Democracies, War and Covert Action," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 29, No.2, p.387.

also undertaken, again like in Iran. Communist movement was also present but in the last analysis, Guatemala was basically democratic in 1954.<sup>19</sup>

US policy toward Guatemala in 1954 was clearly not very much interested in civil and political rights and certainly not in socio-economic ones. The definitive proof was the type of government, the US installed in that state by 'covert action' ; a repressive government. 'It was only moderate by comparison with the more brutal ones that followed, all with the US support until 1980s'.<sup>20</sup>

What then drove the US adopt this sort of policy? Gleijeses writes (quoted by Forsythe) :

US officials were alarmed by the rising influence of communism in Guatemala. And yet they knew that the communists were not in control of Guatemala. Neither the CIA, nor embassy officials nor the military attaches ever claimed that the Guatemala army was infiltrated by communists and the army, then noted, was Guatemala's key institution.

Clearly, then, in Guatemala the USA feared a democratic land reform programme involving expropriated US property that would encourage similar developments in other hemispheric states.

**Indonesia (1957) :**

The CIA covertly intervened against the Sukarno government during 1957. The Sukarno government had been elected in 1955 in a relatively free and fair elections. Later he restricted number of civil and political rights under his 'guided democracy' campaign, and yet it is doubtful that the quality of democracy in Indonesia directly impacted US policy to support a violent movement against Sukarno. On the contrary, at least some US concern stemmed

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19. Ibid, p.387.

20. Ibid, p.387.

from Sukarno's implementation of proportional democracy-sharing cabinet posts (25%) with communists in proportion to the votes (25%) received by them. This and Sukarno's normal relations with people's republic of China plus a little warm relations with Soviet Union did not sit well with USA. The result was Washington's decision to encourage through direct military and other assistance, an armed revolt against Sukarno by military faction. Washington policy makers had become prone to see the world in two hostile camps, communist and non-communist.

### **Brazil (1961)**

In Brazil, in the first half of 1960s, the CIA provided encouragement and support for threatened violence, which proved sufficient to bring down at least two sufficiently democratic governments : that of Janio da Silva Quadros in 1961 and Goulart in 1964. Quadros in 1961 had clearly won a free and fair election only to resign seven months later. It is alleged that the US supported a Brazilian military threat to take over the government.

Goulart assumed the presidency. Like his predecessor and like Arbenz in Guatemala, he was an elected, nationalistic, non-aligned and reformist leader. The Kennedy administration Like his predecessor focused on an alleged tilt toward the Soviet Union and softness towards Brazilian communists.

On these grounds, the CIA supported the Brazilian military with money, weapons and advice in order to overthrow president Goulart. In a bloodless coup, Goulart was thrown out. It was US policy to act covertly in Brazilian politics in several ways, one of which was to either engineer or support military take over.<sup>21</sup>

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21. Ibid, p.389.

### **Chile (1973)**

Chile had a sufficiently long history of democracy. Increasing political differences however, led to elections in 1970 of a minority socialist president. Salvado Allende got 36.2% of votes in elections which were described free and fair consistent with the Chilian tradition, he was then elected by a majority of Parliament. He thus became a democratically elected socialist president in non-socialist state.<sup>22</sup>

In the congressional elections of 1973, his governing coalition got 44% of the vote while the opposition parties got 55%.

The relatively democratic history or democratic elections in Chile did not deter US to get covertly against Allende. Because of essentially the same fears that drove US policy in Guatemala in 1954, covert force was used. It tried to bribe the Chilean Congress to block Allende's elections to fund truckers to in destructive strikes and to encourage elements of Chilean military to use force against Allende.

Allende was moderate and consistently committed to political rights ; his commitment to economic and social rights spurred the USA to show discontentment because that would have meant restriction of right to private property which could have affected US interests severely. Chileans finally forced Allende out and Nixon team made it clear that anti Allende violence had US support and that a new military government would be quickly rewarded with diplomatic recognition and foreign assistance.<sup>23</sup>

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22. Ibid, p.389.

23. Ibid, p.390.

## Nicaragua (1980s)

US covert action against Nicaragua is one of the most talked about in the history of interventions. At the time of US covert force against Sandinistas in 1981-82, Nicaragua did not have a democratic polity. Sandinistas had a strong disdain for Western style elections. However, they were striving for other forms of popular participation.

Sandinistas had presidential and legislative elections in 1984 in order to claim international legitimacy. Opposition parties were allowed to participate and won about a third of the seats in relatively 'free and fair' elections.

However, the principal conservative opposition political party headed by Arturo Cruz who had links with USA, boycotted the elections because allegedly the Sandinistas had harassed and restricted opposition parties. Democratic situation in 1984, in Nicaragua hence was unclear - an unfair vote with a technically fair elections.<sup>24</sup> The Sandinistas no doubt violated many civil right but the rebel 'contra' supported by USA were engaged in no lesser crimes. The Sandinistas however were quite serious about socio-economic rights and welfare in health and educational areas.

The question of democracy was, however, a second issue to Reagan administration at the time of intervention, it was only later that human rights issue was made the pretended goal of US intervention. What propelled the US to roll back of communism in that state was a perceived security threat linked to international communism through Cuba an ultimately Soviet Union. Reagan policy makers like the others in Washington before them had decided that a

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24. Ibid, p.390.

reformist and independent government with some links to USSR constituted a threat to US national interests. Thus, Washington was not genuinely interested in civil and political rights 'but rather in the rhetoric of rights in the service of perceived national security concerns.'<sup>25</sup>

The discussion of American involvement in covert operations cannot be complete without speaking a few words about the 'Reagan Doctrine' that was related to the secret military strategy that relied extensively on 'low intensely conflict' through hidden 'black' operations. The doctrine became an openly announced policy of intervention in the name of democracy and anticommunism. Reagan interfered in the internal affairs of another country, even for the purpose of overthrowing the existing foreign government and it was warranted (according to the doctrine) if communist forces could be overcome and more democratic political processes could be fostered :

Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy and to communicate these ideals everywhere where we can. We must stand by our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives--on every continent from Afganistan to Nicaragua - to defy Soviet supported aggression and to rescue rights which have been ours from birth.<sup>26</sup>

The Reagan Doctrine was a policy where 'ends justified means'. And during his tenure, his administration indulged in four overall and seventeen covert military interventions in the name of fostering democracy.

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25. Ibid, p.390.

26. Charles Kegley and Margret Hermann, 1995. "Political Psychology of Peace Through Democratisations" **Cooperation and Conflict** pp.14-15.

#### IV

In earlier section we saw how US, through direct action and economic aid promoted its policy of promoting liberalism's cause. It thus conformed to Kant's view of extended democratic 'zone of peace' even though in US case some (cases in which it intervened) were ridiculous in the sense that it involved huge losses of life and property of the nation intervened in.

That is, however, not all. On the one hand, it promoted democracy ; on the other and it worked against the elected governments. The reason was that the strategic and economic interests prevailed upon any strict democratic norms.

The USA acted on a fear of future possibilities, even at the expense of considerable ongoing practice of civil and political rights, not to mention socio-economic ones. US perhaps adopted a wider meaning of national security, not guided by immediate and present dangers but on fears of remote possibilities.

Even in cases where it promoted democracy by intervening overtly against non-democratic states, it was promoting its own interests. Promoting democracy abroad has served America's national security interest. First, goading people oppressed by powers hostile to US to dream of their eventual emancipation through democratic government is to channel nationalist energies in a direction favourable to this county.

Secondly, the Americans have known clearly in the 20th century that only democratic states could ensure the security of their economic interests across the world.

Thus, be it promoting democracy or acting against the very democratic states it cherishes to promote, the American strategic perceptions have been supreme.

## CHAPTER-IV

### DEMOCRACY AND PEACE : THE POST COLD WAR PHASE

During the height of the cold war the United States and its Western allies were concerned about the toppling of dominoes, that is, if and once a communist government was, imposed or installed in a state, the domino effect, or what in ordinary parlance is called the 'snowballing' (effect) will be installed and the neighbouring democracies would also fall in the communist lap. Communism was treated like a 'contagious' disease which could spread through contact. The domino effect or demonstration effect took place after the end of the cold war but in reverse direction. From 1989 to 1990, the world saw the successive falls of communist and authoritarian regimes to be succeeded by some form of democratic, pluralistic or polyarchic government. The collapse of the iron curtain, the disbandment of WARSAW pact and the dissolution of USSR, saw one formerly communist country after another holding free elections. The most recent example came in June 1996, when the Mongolians participated in their country's third democratic election. "Over 92% of those eligible cast their ballots... and handed an unexpected and overwhelming victory to the democratic opposition."<sup>1</sup>

In 1974, less than thirty percent of the world's countries were democratic. Today, the figure is over sixty one percent. Thus, for the first time in history a clear majority of the people live under democratic rule. The current or the 'third

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1. Strobe Talbott (1996) "Democracy and National Interests, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 75; No.6, Nov./Dec. p.55.



wave' of democratization started in mid 1970s with the demise of right-wing dictatorships in Portugal, Spain and Greece and in 1980s it gained momentum. Consequently, there has been dissemination or diffusion of democratic governments across the world.

## I

### **Dissemination and Consolidation of Democracy :-**

In Africa, democratization has made headway, the region where it faced some of its biggest obstacles and hurdles. South Africa has emerged out of apartheid (it has made a positive beginning, if not fully successful) and chosen Nelson Mandela, the black leader as the president of the Republic in the elections. In Sierra Leone, elections in March 1996, brought a respite in the country's five year old civil war. The individual examples led to the consolidation trend in many other countries. In 1994, the elected presidents of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana together put pressure on the Monarch of Lesotho when the latter threatened to disband the parliament. In another incident, the President of post-apartheid South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi succeeded in persuading the competing parties in Mozambique to participate in and then respect the results of U.N. supervised elections.<sup>2</sup>

In Latin America, the trend began in 1980's when Argentina, Brazil and Chile made the transition from military dictatorships to civilian parliamentary rule (though some American interventions are black spots). In 1991, the

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2. Ibid, p.55.

Organization of American States adopted the Resolution 1080 which requires the Foreign Ministers of member states to convene, in the event of any interruption of democratic process in the hemisphere. When president Serrano in Guatemala in 1993 suspended the constitutional rule, the OAS invoked the Resolution 1080 to condemn the action and raised the sanctions. The president had to resign and the constitutional order was restored.<sup>3</sup>

The dissemination and consolidation trends (of democracy) continued in Asia also. In 1992 Thailand's military tried to suppress the students of pro-democracy demonstrations. But the Thai business and professional classes, thanks to the media revolution (they saw on CNN what all was happening), took to streets of Bangkok in protest. Consequently by September 1992 elected civilian government returned to Thailand.<sup>4</sup>

The winds of democracy blew away the monarchical rule in Nepal; military dictatorship in Bangladesh and kept the army in barracks in Pakistan.

In Cambodia, relatively free and fair elections were held in 1993 and approximately 90% cast their ballots, many of which defied the death threats by Khmer Rouge.

China is the only major power left in authoritarian shackles. However, if Tiananmen Square incident (1989) is any indication, then perhaps in a decade or two, China might also see the light of democracy.

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3. Ibid, p.53.

4. Ibid.

## II

### **Democracy and Free Trade**

The Western world and particularly the United States were very clear after the end of the cold war that only democratic capitalism could succeed in winning over the other forms of regimes (i.e., politics and economics reinforce each other). It assumes that capitalism and free market brings prosperity and only filled stomachs could think of value of political freedom. Recall, the Marshall Plan. The "Marshall Plan mentality" caused Washington to make overseas allies self-sustaining participants in international economy even at the cost of American economic interests.<sup>5</sup> To achieve those ends Washington initially provided reconstruction assistance and then sought to make Europe and Japan self-supporting. From 1946 to 1953, the US extended some \$ 33 billion in non-military assistance, an amount equal to one fourth of all its exports. It granted various unilateral trade and tariff concessions to Japan.

After the end of the cold war, the North (and particularly the US) sought to export structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes authored by World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The panacea for almost all of the evils, it is assumed, is free market or liberalisation.

'Liberalisation — which essentially implies a withdrawal of the state from as many aspects of economic activity as possible or a move to *laissez faire* — is seen to be crucial in achieving more outward orientation and thus greater 'openness'. This is based on the belief that 'free markets' are the best way of

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5. Alfred E. Eckes, "Trading American Interests" **Foreign Affairs**, p.137.

achieving socio-economic goals and that market failures are less pernicious than the failure of government intervention. Liberalisation, it is held, leads to debureaucratization, which thus procures the freedom of the individuals. According to World Bank, the success story of eight South East Asian "superstars" — Japan, South Korea, Hongkong, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore suggest that the biggest lesson one could draw is to stop trying to control the economic weather.<sup>6</sup>

The above approach and policy prescription is based upon the doctrine that economic liberalisation is must for democratic success in political spheres. Peter Berger asks the question, "does political democracy require or depend upon a market economy?" The answer to it, he says, is "Yes". The reason he maintains, is very empirical :

- \* There has been no case of political democracy that has not been a market economy.
- \* When market economies are successful over a period of time, the pressure of democratization inevitably ensues.<sup>7</sup>

There could not be anything called market socialism. Two countries, Yugoslavia and Hungary that ran experiments with "market socialism" failed abruptly. Democracy cannot exist with an all powerful state, though capitalism is not the sufficient condition for democracy. And yet capitalism is a necessary

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6. Peter Drucker, 1994. "Trade Lessons from the World Economy". **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 75, No. 1 Jan./Feb. p.106.

7. Peter Berger, 1992. "Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol. 3, No.3 Pp.13-17.

condition for democracy. This is because it opens up the social space and opportunity for civil society and as people become more affluent, they develop more ambitious political aspirations. On the other hand, direct control of the state over economy, that is, the control of the very livelihood of all or most of its citizens, is to bring about a quantum leap in state power. Such extensive power is difficult to reconcile with democracy.<sup>8</sup>

The US is trying its best to implement the same doctrine in the former Soviet Union—Russia and newly independent states. The Premise is that the competitive free markets combined with economic stabilization and privatization will bring prosperity and economic growth (and hence will open up the social space for democracy to take firm roots). The US is pouring aid and investment in Russia to help the non-performing, loss-making enterprises to be replaced by new productivity oriented competitive firms. At the same time, the business tours of efficient people from Russia and East European countries to US are also on so as to expose them to new ideas. Russia is being exposed to Western ideas through media ; joint ventures in industries are also being set up, though still small in number.

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8. One very interesting thing to note from the Berger's article is that though capitalism is a necessary condition for democracy, democracy is not a pre-condition for capitalism. The economic successes of East Asian countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hongkong unfolded under non democratic regimes. The early Japanese endeavour of 1868-1912 was again under non-democratic regime. Spain Chile fall under the same category. Perhaps this is the reason why India's experiments with marketization have not been as successful as China's. Thus democracy is not suited for the birth and early growth of capitalism. US, however, is an exception to this rule.

### III

#### **Democratization and War Proneness :**

The victory of democratic capitalism after the end of the cold war cannot be taken to be irreversible. Huntington has already talked about the possible third 'reverse' wave. What is, however, more interesting and confusing is that some scholars are propounding the theory that the transitory phase to democracy, i.e., the democratization phase is more proficient to war. 'Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less and they do fight wars with democratic states.' (Mansfield and Snyder), Paraphrasing Mansfield and Snyder:

Infact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest leap from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy—like contemporary Russia—are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.<sup>9</sup>

This is because democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions and high energy mass politics. There emerge new social groups and classes on the political stage, incompatible to be reconciled. The elites (old and new) try hard to gain mass allies to defend their weakening position, the easiest way to do so finds expression in appeals to nationalism and nationalist propaganda. Military strongmen are doubly in need

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9. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 1995. "Democratization and War". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74. No.3, May/June. Pp.79-80.

of seeking allies to strengthen their position. The consequence is the reinforcement of nationalist sentiments leading to expansionist drive. Thus rising nationalism goes hand in hand with the rising democracy.<sup>10</sup>

The authors cite several instances from history where democratization and nationalism led to ill-conceived wars of expansion. In the French Revolution, the Radical Brissotin Parliamentary faction polarized politics by harping on the king's slow response to threats of wars with other dynastic states. In the ensuing wars of French Revolution, citizens flocked to join the revolutionary armies to defend popular self-rule and French nation. Napoleon later on was able to harness popular nationalism in the task of conquering Europe.

Bismark's successors in Germany could not control the rising democracy where everyone was highly politicised, but nobody could achieve their aims through the limited powers of Reichstag. As a result, people organised themselves in numerous pressure groups to articulate their demands in the guise of broader national interests. 'The mass nationalistic sentiment exerted constant pressure on German diplomacy in the Wilhelmine years before 1914 and pushed its vacillating elites toward war'.<sup>11</sup> Democratization and nationalism also got linked in Japan on the eve of Manchurian invasion of 1931.

Russett also notes that the norms between two democracies would inhibit wars between them but norms take time to develop.

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10. Ibid, p.88.

11. p.86.

Formal norms such as one of non-recourse to war can be written into a constitution, but becomes effective only with repeated practice of bargaining and conciliation.<sup>12</sup>

In this phase of immature norms, wars may take place between two democratic states. Thus, if violent conflicts between democracies do occur, it is expected them to take place between states, in which at least one is a nascent democracy.

#### IV

##### **Some Thoughts on Russia**

In the post cold war era, where democracy is spreading (as a norm) across the world and where past historical analysis points out about the dangers of democratization (which has even greater chance of suspicion following the economic reforms undertaken in most of them), it becomes imperative to shed some light on the case of Russia (which was the leader of the communist world in Cold war era) which is undergoing the democratic capitalist experience. Russia's case becomes an interesting test of Mansfield and Snyder's analysis where the discussion shows that the impact of democratization is both limited and mixed.

Democratization has brought the party political competition which in turn, has polarised foreign policy views. Opposition parties have tried to harp on

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12. Bruce Russett 1993 **"Grasping the Democratic Peace Principles for Post Cold War World"**, Princeton University Press : Princeton p.34.



nationalist broadsides (particularly due to the chaos which have followed the free marketization experiments). The electoral victories of Zhirinovsky and his neo-fascist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in December 1993 manifested this. On the other hand, the then Foreign Minister and Yelstin's aid Andrei Kozyrev asked for western aid on the ground that the government needed them so as to withstand the pressures for a more nationalist foreign policy. There are some in the centre of political spectrum called 'demopatriots' who have combined support for a more welfarist economic reform with the promotion of 'pragmatic nationalism' in foreign policy<sup>13</sup> Consequently, the Yeltsin government moved in late 1992 and early 1993 to adopt a more pragmatic nationalist position which manifested in competitive cooperation with the West in late 1994 and early 1995. This is the way Russia has sought to avoid harsh nationalistic foreign policy.

The competitive elections have been able to give direction to public opinion also. Here again there are mixed orientations. On the negative side Zhirinovsky's success in December 1993 was seen as victory of extreme nationalism. Zhirinovsky criticised the Western exploitation of Russia and Russia's humiliation and loss of 'great power' status. Despite that the vote bank which supported him sought rapprochement with the West. On the positive side (where interests of voters in avoiding costly wars matter) the popular views in the 'near abroad' (former communist partners in soviet empire) have been moderate rather than assertive. Everyone in Russia agrees on Russian Minority

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13. Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, 1996. "Democratization and Russian Foreign Policy", **International Affairs**, Vol. 72, No.3, pp.540-41.

rights in the 'near abroad' but they seem to be moderate on the use of force in CIS.

Democratization has also brought about political conflicts between the president and the parliament. The communist sponsored policies by Duma - say, for example, the 1996 resolution which sought to annual the agreement establishing the CIS have been at rift with president's policies. And yet shortly after that the Duma tried to ally the fear by stressing that its resolution was of political rather than legal significance. This strengthened not only the move for greater CIS integration but also in Yeltsin's recent victory.

Fragmentation in political executive is the by-product of newly democratizing states. This change also brought about somewhat similar effect in initial years of democratization in Russia. The interests of Russian elites in the initial years were so diverse and conflicting that holding together the governing coalition was almost impossible. However, by 1993 Yeltsin appeared to have recovered his position and in forging an agreement at the senior levels of administration. The results of this consensus led to a greater assertiveness. President Yeltsin sought to pursue the coalition-building by stealing the opposition's political clothes and sacrificing the support of principled liberals in the process.<sup>14</sup> He became willing to use a much harder tone in relations with west (first over the use of force in former Yugoslavia, then over NATO expansion) and to adopt a quasi-imperial stance vis-a-vis the other former Soviet States (over dual citizenship rights for Russians abroad, military bases and oil and gas exploration rights).

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14. Ibid, p.548.

Does all this mean that nationalistic sentiments have risen in Russia after the disintegration of Soviet empire? After 1993, its foreign policy has certainly become more assertive. But patriotism need not pose a threat to the consolidation of democracy. Applying Mansfield and Snyder's theory in Russian case would demand us to link democratization and nationalism and its effects on war-proneness. In 1994, Russia engaged itself in war with the break-away republic of Chechenya. That is the only instance of war. But as Malcolm and Pravda point out, Chechenya falls legally into the domestic rather than international sphere. "In practical political terms, though, Chechenya belongs to the 'inner abroad', straddling the blurred line dividing domestic policy from that part of foreign policy dealing with the former Soviet republics of the near abroad" chechenya aside, the effect of democratization on Russian foreign policy has mixed effect. No doubt fragmentation and weak coalitions have emerged. But on the other side is the domestic elements acting as safety-valve, encouraging timely adaptation of policy. "Moreover, stubborn popular opposition to the use of force in Chechenya and the role of mass-media in publicizing its negative outcomes, suggest that it would be difficult to maintain support for military ventures abroad in the current climate of opinion."<sup>15</sup>

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15. Ibid, p.552.

**Democracy, Human Rights and Interventions in Post Cold War World :-**

The interventions in post cold war era continues. One issue—the human rights issue—has been linked to promotion of democracy. The question of human rights itself is quite an entangled one. For, there is division between North and South as to what constitutes the human rights. While the West strives for promoting civil and political rights—which are also the main ingredients of democratic governments, the developing world maintains that the civil and political rights have little meaning in situations of economic, social and cultural deprivations. Indonesia, for instance, has for long argued that freedom from hunger and illiteracy should come before political freedom. The collapse of Soviet Union and the triumph of liberal democracy as the world's dominant ideology, however has given the West, especially the United States, a dominating say to implement its way. The West assumes that those states which deny civil and political rights to its citizens would be hawkish towards the other states in international community. And hence, it is the responsibility of the West to make the world more peace loving by adopting specific policies towards these states.

America recognised five "outlaw" or "backlash" states that allegedly shared the intention to damage America's desire for a democratic, capitalist and peaceful world and which engaged in serious human rights violations — Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Cuba. America asserted a "special American responsibility... to neutralize, contain and through selective pressure, perhaps

eventually transform these backlash states... into constructive members of the international community."<sup>16</sup>

For Iran and Iraq, it applied the "dual containment strategy through its pursuit of strict economic sanctions against Baghdad and the simultaneous isolation of Tehran. It declared that normal relations with Iraq were impossible until Saddam Hussein remained in power. It branded Iran as an "extremist" regime (though it maintained that it was not against Islam) and forbade Conoco, a petroleum unit of Du Pont from concluding an exploration contract with Iran in April 1995, America announced a total economic embargo on Iran.<sup>17</sup>

Against Libya, the American administration sponsored the Security Council sanctions aimed at depriving Libyan plans of international pending rights.

Of the five backlash states, North Korea was dubbed as the "greatest security threat to the US and the world today" (due to its clandestine nuclear programme) and hence America vowed in November 1993 to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. Bilateral negotiations, however, they found as the best method to engage the North Korean regime.

Dubbing Cuba as a "backlash" state was almost wholly due to the pressure of domestic political lobbies. Otherwise Castro was understood as leading a poor, bankrupt state who could not become a threat to American

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16. Richard A. Melanson (1996) **"American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War : The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton"**, M.E. Sharpe Inc, New York. P.262; 17 Ibid P.267.

17. Ibid, p.267.

interests. 'Helms-Burton' law against Cuba might alienate Cuba further and make the road to democracy still further.

There are places like Haiti, however, where America intervened directly. In December 1990, under close international supervision, Haiti held its first genuine elections in its grim and bloody past history. Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected President. His efforts to overhaul the army and his striving for economic reforms provoked a violent coup by General Raul Cedras. Aristide had hence less than eight months in his tenure as president, when his government was overthrown. The Bush administration unequivocally condemned the military move and supported a series of Security Council Resolutions which imposed tight economic sanctions.<sup>18</sup> That perhaps was not enough for Aristide to be restored.

In July 1994, the United States prevailed on the UN Security council to authorize "all necessary means" to remove the coup leader, and restore Aristide, the democratically elected leader. It was a landmark, for, the first time the United Nations had called for international action to restore a democratically elected leader. In September 1994, President Clinton dispatched 21,000 American troops to Haiti as the vanguard of a multinational force, that restored Aristide's Presidency. In the new elections held in February 1996, he turned over the Presidency to Reve Pavel. It was the first time in Haitian history that one democratically elected peacefully succeeded another.<sup>19</sup> President Clinton

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18. Ibid, p.262.

19. Strobe Talbott 1996. "Democracy and International Interest", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 75. No. 6 May/June p.58.

offered four main rationales for ousting Cedras and his colleagues. First, the human rights atrocities perpetrated by the military rulers. Second, the threat of mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in the American region. Thirdly, the claim that "democracies are more likely to keep the peace... to create free markets and economic opportunity and to become strong reliable trading partners." And Fourthly, Clinton suggested that the US also has strong interests in not letting dictators, especially in our region, break their word to the United States and the United Nations. "<sup>20</sup>

The Clinton administration initially gave good reason to think that it would act forcibly to promote human rights and democracy. As presidential candidate Mr. Clinton declared that "no national security issue is more urgent than securing democracy's triumph around the world", the think tank in Washington also believed that for an intervention such as that in Haiti to be more than a political quickfire for the administration, it should be done with the intention of promoting democracy and strengthening the ability of international institutions to defend human rights in different parts of the world. Washington reluctantly recognised that while leadership may require unilateral action on occasions, multilateral institutions are the most effective way to address ethnic, nationalist and religious hatreds, the human right abuses of neo-fascist governments... and the rising threat of nuclear proliferation. '<sup>21</sup>

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20. Richard Melanson p.264.

21. Tony Smith, 1994. "In Defence of Interventions", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 73, No. 6; Nov./Dec. p.43.

## VI

The globe spanning sequence of events which also included the grassroots Chinese democracy movement of 1989, the elections in Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia and the recent voting that legitimized the Palestinian authority in Ghaza and Jericho ; gave Taiwan its first freely elected president discredits the claim that democracy is exclusively Western idea. Infact Richard shifter in strongest terms denies that there is any democracy 'gene' specifically inherited by the Western World.

And yet, the process of democratization is long, hard and bumpy. Particularly in the post-cold-war era, where the former non-free states are trying to apply freedom both in political and economic spheres (liberalisation & market reforms), the speed breakers to democratic capitalism may be many. This is because in many countries, the gap between the poor and the wealthy is widening and the masses may turn disillusioned with the twin new experiences. The old elites who have lost the privileges may turn the tables again in the negative direction. Newly elected government unsure of their hold on power or too sure of their infallibility and indispensability use a heavy hand to silence the opposition. One example can be given that of Albania. In that state, after five years of progress toward democracy, the government of Sali Berisha presided in May 1996 over parliamentary elections, that were marred by rigging, intimidation and irregularities in vote count. Less than a year after, however, the situation in this Balkan state has come back to square one. With rebels taking control of most major towns, Mr. Berisha's resignation is not in doubt. The vagaries of free-market reforms have got exposed in Albania. Unless the benefits



of economic liberalisation are more equitably shared, the episodes like Albania are more to come upon the scene. In Albanian case, these pitfalls of economic reforms were compounded by Berisha's dictatorial style of functioning.

The same doubt is also being raised about Russia. However, there came a great deal of relief and satisfaction at Yeltsin's recent victory, his second stint as the President of Russia.

China by virtue of its size is the most notable exception to the worldwide trend towards democracy. The human rights (abuse) issue is also being linked with China. Chinese leaders maintain that economic development must precede democratization and cite the examples of South Korea, Taiwan and other "Asian tigers". These examples, however, show that as people's income rise and awareness broadens—thanks to information revolution they demand the right to participate in decision making and protection under law. Thus economic liberalisation in the long run is incompatible with centralised authority in the political spheres. Perhaps sensing that the United States has time and again sought to delink the question of human rights violations in China with the granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to it. US Policy towards China is predicated on the conviction that continued economic and cultural engagement is the best guarantee of democratization in that country. Secondly, economic success will also work as the safety valve against any shocks of initial democratization phase. This is also the reason why inspite of uncertainties, the US is pouring aid, private investment and technical assistance in Russia. For, economic failures will have fallouts in political sphere also. For example during 1993, the Russian economy was virtually on the verge of collapse. And the same

year in December, the parliamentary elections brought a large number of radical nationalists including Zhirinovskiy who was certainly for an expansionist Russia.

In the post cold war era, then, the trend towards democratization has strengthened and this has also given the hope of extending the 'Kantian Zone of peace'. The only worry for scholars and policy-makers in the dangers of transitory phase which is said to be more war prone until the democracies become more mature. Of course the frequent wars in this phase might again lead to nascent democracies turning into authoritarian states. But not in all the cases the democratization leads to war. The democratization of Germany and Japan were successes because of the occupation by liberal democracies and the favourable international setting provided by Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods economic system and the democratic military alliance. The recent border skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador, however, coincide with democratizing trends in both the states and a nationalist turn in Ecuadorian political scene.<sup>22</sup>

The dangers of democratization could be managed in Mansfield and Snyder's opinion by inserting 'more' rather than 'less' democracy — This can be done by practicing the following points :

- \* The elites threatened by the transition, especially the military are given the guarantee that they will not wind up in jail if they relinquish powers.
- \* The skills of former elites—military officer corps, nuclear scientists and industrialists—need to be utilized in privatization process and transition towards market economy.

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22. Mansfield and Snyder, p.28.

- \* Creating a free competitive and responsible market place of ideas in the newly democratizing states ; and,
- \* Abundant incentives in terms of trade opportunities and investment need to be created by the advanced democracies.<sup>23</sup>

Stabilising the democratizing states is the worthy investment the advanced democracies can make in order to enlarge the zone of peace in the post cold war era.

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23. Ibid, pp.95-97.

## **CHAPTER-V**

### **DEMOCRACY AND PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA:**

A study of democracy—peace/war proposition cannot be complete without a preliminary examination in South Asia. This is because we are part of South Asian region and this (region) has been a conflict ridden region throughout its contemporary history. However only a preliminary and not a thorough examination is possible, because there is a difference between conflict and war as all conflicts do not lead to war. But in our hypothesis (democracy-peace), peace has been defined as absence of inter-state wars. And inter- state wars as in other regions have not been numerous. For this reason, a short examination of conflicts other than wars and a case study of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India has been made.

#### **I**

##### **Inter-State Wars and Democracy**

Correlation of War data identifies nine international and civil wars in South Asia during the period 1947-1980. Using COW criteria a number of civil

**International and Civil Wars in South  
Asia (1947 - 80) - COW Data**

War/Parties	Battle Casualty	Typology
1) First Kashmir (India (Vs?) 1947-48	1500	Imperial
2) Hyderabad (India-Hyderabad) 1948	1000	Imperial
3) Sino-Indian (China-India) 1962	1000	Inter-State
4) Second kashmir India-Pakistan 1965	6800	Inter-State
5) Bangladesh (India-Pakistan) 1971	11000	Inter-State
6) Russia - Afgan (Afghanistan-Russia)	10500	Inter State
7) Pakistan Civil War (Pakistan-Bengalis)	50000	Civil War
8) Srilankan Civil War	2000	Civil War
9) Afghanistan (Kabul-Majahedeens)	10000	Civil War

wars in the region beyond 1980 periods can be identified <sup>1</sup> but no significant inter state wars. Secondly, COW data treats first Kashmir War as imperial war and not an inter-state war. However, this (war) by any standard, was an

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1. The noted civil wars beyond 1980 period are Mujahedeen insurgency in Afghanistan, Tamil ethnic conflict in Srilanka (1983- ), Kashmir Military etc.

inter-state war and the other data like, for example, the Better worth (data) also recognize this.

Coming to the examination of inter-state wars now, and repeating that the first Kashmir War (1947) has been taken as inter- state war, this very case disputes the thesis that democracy and war are inversely related in dyadic perspective.

However, this case along with a few more international cases has been treated as exception to our hypothesis<sup>2</sup> - a deviant case which can be explained away for the said deviancy. The explanation given is that Pakistan in the case under study was immature, unstable democracy. If, this explanation is accepted, then the hypothesis remains valid.<sup>3</sup>

In the other inter-state disputes (From COWw data), namely, Sino-Indian war (1962) and Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, there is no contention in the fact that while India was democracy, the other party involved was a non - democracy. This is very much within the democracy-peace parameter that a democracy can fight a war with a non-democracy.

It has also been observed that a democracy would like to spread its democratic culture in other states and in particularly the neighbouring country/countries. It is one of the reasons why a democratic country is engaged in wars with a non-democracy, more than average. Though in South-Asian

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2. James Lee Ray, 1995, **"Democracy and International Conflict** : p. 87.

3. If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one of the democracies would be unstable. Th is one of the principles in democracy-peace hypothesis. Russett, 1993: p.35.

contexts, all the three wars against India (a democracy) was waged by Pakistan (a non-democracy, or once in 1947 when it was unstable democracy), yet as far as effort to spread democratic culture on the part of a democracy is concerned, one or two observations can be made in this respect in South Asian context. First, India or Srilanka never tried to spread this culture through waging wars. Secondly, sometimes this culture is spread through by indulging in covert activities against the authoritarian regimes. Even this analysis is not clear in South Asian context except in India's involvement in Nepalese Exile case of 1960, when India provided assistance to rebel exiles (covertly and unofficially) which was a cause of concern for the Nepali monarch that had ousted Nepali congress from power.<sup>4</sup>

## II

### **Conflicts and Democracy in South Asia**

A major part of South Asian conflicts have been insurgencies, the root cause of which have been ethnic overlapping giving rise to 'majority-minority', 'we-they' complex in almost every country. This overlapping gives opportunity to the neighbouring country to exploit, thus aggravating the situation. Whether this support to insurgency by outside neighbours have been due to differences in political structure or some other reasons is still inexplicable. But one thing that is accepted universally is that promotion of democracy can abate this tendency. This is because in democracy, rulers have to be more and directly accountable

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4. Abdur Rob Khan. "Contemporary International conflicts in South Asia, A compendium" *BIIS Journal*, vol.14, No.4, 1993: p. 431.

to the people which is uncommitted to bear the exorbitant costs of violence and war. The rebuff that the government of India drew from its own public during its operations in Srilanka is a case in point.

The same has been India's assumption about its neighbours that democracy in neighbourhood would relieve those nations from anti-India stance or India bashing and bring about a change in their attitude to consolidate peace in the region.<sup>5</sup>

After 1988, India's foremost political preference was fulfilled. The current democratization wave or restoration of democracy in South Asia seems to be a part of global trend towards democratization.<sup>6</sup> With the end of the cold war, the only ideology that has emerged triumphant is the ideology of democracy. International environment, is thus, conducive for democratic growth across the world.

### III

#### **The Recent Trend**

One impact of democracy in the region is clearly visible that bilateral negotiations have got a fillip whether it be India-Pakistan dialogue on numerous issues including on Kashmir (The Foreign Secretaries level talks in Islamabad from June 19-23, 1997); India-Bangladesh negotiations (mainly on Farakka

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5. Dhrub Kumar: "Remaking South Asia: Major Trends and Imperatives". **BIIS Journal**, Vol. 13, No.2 1992; p.324.

6. According to Samuel, P. Huntington, between 1974 to 1990, some 30 countries have made transition in southern Europe, Latin and Central America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.



barrage) or Indo-Nepal cooperation (on various issues including Mahakali, Tanakpar barrage, trade and transit facilities and so on). In this sense, it must be noted that in the first stint of democratic rule in these countries, no meaningful agreements could be reached. This may be because of lack of stability and majority support in these countries. In the second stint, the talks have borne fruitful results and almost all the regimes are being ruled by majority number, except of course India (India's case however is compensated by the fact that democracy has taken firm roots in this country).

The one thing that the onset of democracy is likely to bring in the region is the bridging of image gap vis-a-vis India. Though compatibility of the political structure is not sufficient to remove tensions out of turn in South Asia, given the better historical background, it could, however, be a step forward in the process of relieving tensions as democracies broaden the canvas of participation and help remove barriers that restrict the politics among nations to the negotiating tables alone.

This is manifested in India-Pakistan dialogue on numerous issues including Kashmir or Indo-Bangladesh negotiations on sharing of Ganga water. Infact one of the major breakthroughs was reached on December 12, 1996, when a thirty year old agreement was signed, between democratic India and newly democratized Bangladesh. Infact, India went out of its way to mend fences with a neighbour whose legitimate water requirements were conceded in the final accord. Perhaps, this could not have been possible if Bangladesh would have been ruled by an authoritarian/military ruler. In this regard, it is worth-mentioning that the water-sharing issue between the two countries cropped

in 1970s itself. But no worthwhile solutions could be reached. Even in Khaleda Zia's tenure, no willingness was shown on the part of Bangladesh to come to negotiating tables. Instead, she was contented in taking the issue to the United Nations. The main reason of it, is that though she (Begum Zia) came through elections, she tried to project Bangladesh as an Islamic country with obvious anti-India references. The result was that fundamentalism got the lease of life and democratic forces got weakened. In that situation it was extremely difficult for her to come to talking terms.

Her successor Sheikh Hasina was more eager to resolve a genuine problem and the new government in India was also more willing to accommodate its neighbour (the Gujral doctrine'), because she feels that accommodating neighbours could be the best way to promote democracy in the region (and also to consolidate the fledging democracies in the region). The groundwork was prepared accordingly when Mr. I.K. Gujral visited Dhaka as the Foreign Minister of India and "the two Foreign ministers agreed to find a permanent solution to the Ganga - river dispute which had long defied solution".<sup>7</sup> It was culminated in Bangladesh's Prime Minister's visit to India to sign the water - sharing deal. The two sides also agreed to cooperate with each other in combating terrorism. Bangladesh reportedly, also agreed to provide transit facilities, for Indian goods through its territory.

Also worth mentioning is the Indo-pak Foreign Secretaries' level talks from June 19-23 in Islamabad. Over the last seven or eight years, democracy

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7. Haroom Habib. "A breakthrough on Bangladesh front. "in **Frontline**, April 4, 1997, p.17.

has got a chance amidst strong military traditions in Pakistan. Though no concrete results have come out within this time span (with regard to its external relations with India), yet a willingness was shown to talk despite domestic compulsions (this issue will be discussed in some detail in the next section). And a breakthrough of sorts was reached in the above mentioned official level talks between the two. The importance of this round of meetings have been that all the issues that have cropped up between the two countries ranging from trade and economic cooperation to Siachen and Kashmir (these all have been included in the agenda of next round of official level meetings to be started in September 1997). It is a very bold document but signifies the seriousness with which both the governments have undertaken to go in for a settlement of the major issues that have become the bone of contention between not only the two governments but even stirred up acrimony between the public of the two countries.<sup>8</sup>

Though democracies don't go to war with each other, yet occasionally, they might interfere in each other's internal affairs. India's intervention in Srilanka in 1980s is a case in point. In recent times, however, India has recognised the futility of its involvement in that country which cost it approximately 1200 soldiers and huge-waste of money and demoralization.<sup>9</sup>

India thus started recognizing that the ethnic problem must be sorted out by Srilanka and the Srilankans alone. Yet there are still problems which can turn into serious conflict over-time ; and hence both the sides recognize the

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8. Nikhil Chakrabarti. "Scanning a Landmark", **Mainstream**, June 28, 1997. p.2.

9. Deshbandhu Singh, "Diplomatic Thaw". **Rashtriya Sahara**, October 1994: p.75.

importance of dialogue. During Mr.Gujral's visit as Foreign Minister to Colombo, his Srilankan counterpart Mr.Kadirgamar stressed that dialogue between the two countries could sort out any problem. "Suspensions and apprehensions", he said, "have to be faced, talked through and dispelled."<sup>10</sup> Given the misunderstanding that existed between the two countries, dialogues and discussions are a major step forward in bilateral relations indicating that the two sides are willing to ensure that the problem does not become an issue of conflict.

#### IV

#### **Pakistan-India Relations: Democracy as a Factor**

Though South Asian nations' policies towards each other have had been more indebted to the historical past and as it has been maintained already that 'regime type' kind of conflicts or approach towards each other has been a mixed bag. Yet a brief study of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India from Gen. Zia to Nawaz Shaief would throw some light on the difference between the foreign policies of a military leader and a democratic leader even against a stern adversary.

Why has India been made a scapegoat in Pakistan politics? it is believed that it is less to do with the small size of Pakistan vis-a-vis larger India or better historical past. It is more to do with the collective paranoia of Pakistani ruling

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10. Amit Baruah, "A new entente with Srilanka", **Frontline**, April 4, 1997: pp.19-20.

circles.<sup>11</sup> It is in light of this fact that a brief study of Pakistan's India policy in two different regimes—Zia's military regime and Benazir's and Nawaj Sharief's democratic regimes—becomes much more interesting.

### **Zia's India Policy**

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had realised and initiated the process of suitable environment building for normalisation of relation between India and Pakistan. Several steps were taken after the historic Shimla pact was signed between the two. A number of agreements regarding trade, shipping and cultural exchanges had been reached and willingness was shown to comply with them also. No doubt he kept up a strong anti-India propaganda (mainly due to domestic compulsions), but he sincerely and successfully made efforts for normalisation of ties.

With the advent of Gen. Zia, on Pakistan's political map, normalisation process suddenly came to a halt. His government declined to review the trade agreement signed in 1975. Not only that, he restricted all trade with India only at the government levels; declined to open land routes (other than wagah) as stipulated in Visa and Travel Agreement of 1974. As was expected, anti-India propaganda was whipped up for India's 'wrong-doings' in Afghanistan.

He adopted the policy of covert war with India excepting (on) the battle front.<sup>12</sup> Ironically, he offered a 'no-war' pact to India which India rejected and  
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11. M.S. Rajan *India and its Neighbours: The policy and the problems in understanding South Asia : Essays in the Memory of late Prof. Urmila Phadnis*, ed. by S.D. Muni South Asia, Publishers, New Delhi, p.17.

12. Parminder Bhogal. "Pakistan's India Policy : shift from Zia to Benazir." *India Quarterly*, vol 45, Jan-March 89: p.39.

in lieu suggested a broader peace programme. The rejection of a pact by India gave him further opportunity for anti-India tirade. It involved itself more vigorously in India's internal ethnic problems, and support to militants in Punjab. Support to insurgents in Kashmir also began in his reign. Another grave issue which emerged during his era was siachen Glacier issue-a kind of limited war which still is going on.

His foreign policy towards India was a hawkish one, speaking something, practicing something.

It is often claimed that the military government in Pakistan after taking power in that country has made a special new 'demarche' in extending a hand of friendship to India, and has endeavored to accelerate the process of normalising of relations with us. The fact however speaks otherwise.<sup>13</sup>

He spoke about peace on the battlefield and stepped up the ideological war. There was no use trying Pakistani army to break-up India (it realised it could not do so). There, was a far cheaper way of achieving the same aim-make Indians fight themselves. After his plane crash in 1988, Indian Press observed, "Indo-Pak relations reached their nadir during his rule."<sup>14</sup> The legitimacy of hostile India, helped him make-up for the lack of popular legitimacy at home.

### **Benazir's India Policy.**

After a long time Pakistan saw the advent of democratic rule in the elections in 1988. The optimism in India was of high degree because of a

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13. K.D. Sharma, quoted by Parminder Bhogal, 1989.

14. Parminder Bhogal, 1989.

democratic government being at the helm of affairs. She also showed conciliatory mood,

I symbolise a new generation, I had never been an Indian. I had been born in independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of partition. perhaps the people were hoping that a new generation could avoid hostility that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grand parents to live together as friends. And I certainly felt it possible as I walked the warm and welcoming streets of Shimla. Did we have to be divided by walls of hatred or could we, like the once warring countries of Europe come to terms with each other.<sup>15</sup>

She and her Indian counterpart Rajiv Gandhi signed three accords and the two agreed not to attack each other's nuclear installations; develop closer relations in the field up art, culture, education and mass media, sports etc. They reached an understanding over avoidance of double taxation. India also agreed to help her re-enter the common wealth. They reached an agreement on chemical weapons and hastened the process of exchanging data on the location of nuclear facilities. Soon however, Benazir realised that her position got weakened for her being too 'soft on India'. For no doubt, she was sent by the people but military establishment had still the strongest influence in the ruling troika—President, P.M and the army. Consequently, she was dismissed in 1990. Of course softness on India's front was given one of the reasons along with the corruption charges. Nawaz Sharief came to power after her dismissal. H was in a more helpless situation, as he had the obvious lesson-act tough on India if want

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15. Quoted by Parminder Bhogal, 1989.

to survive. He, thus, had to take stand on such policies as shariat, Islamic cause. Sharief also met the same fate as his predecessor—dismissal by President. Sharief's second stint in this respect is important. This time he is trusted by the Establishment more than Benezir. Secondly, he has got a thumping majority. Thirdly, external environment is also conducive—China is in favor of Indo-Pak dialogue, United States also, is, less interested in spending for an area which directly does not have bearing on its interests, India's strong ties with Iran and so on.

Given the above background Nawaz Sharief made open his desire during the election campaign to open dialogue with India. Since then he has repeated the same in several fora. He also strongly put it that strong economic ties will be in favour of Pakistan. This had given hope that 'low politics' will get priority over 'high politics' and the difficult and contentious issues can be deferred for some time.

Above analysis shows the difference between foreign policy of a nation in authoritarian and democratic regimes even of a nation which had long military background. Both Benir and Nawaz Sharief backslided on their policies when military got extra paramountcy in the ruling troika. Otherwise both showed desire to opening a vent for better relations and economic prosperity.

## V

In the South Asia context, the issue of compatibility of regime types and preferences for regime types in managing bilateral or dyadic relations shows a mixed trend. What emerges from this brief study is that while studying



historical wars, and making post-facto to examination, wars have been fought between regimes or unlike pairs i.e, democracy on one side and non-democracy on the other. And in one war 1947-49 Kashmir war, explanation is given away as to why the two democracies—India and Pakistan fought? The only case of regime type dispute that came to a head was the Napali Exiles case in which a democracy's leaning for a democratic party was seen against monarchy. Thus only a limited examination and analysis is possible of our hypothesis in South-Asia context. A more thorough analysis could be possible after 1988, when the region was engulfed by a democratic wave. In this sense democracy makes peace hypothesis would emerge triumphant if no more wars are fought. It is for this reason that the bilateral negotiations between the parties was discussed in section III.

## CHAPTER-VI

### CONCLUSION

This is the last chapter of this dissertation and the ensuing discussion would present a short retrospective analysis of what has been discussed in the previous chapters and a prospective analysis of future of democratic peace hypothesis.

#### I

##### **Initial Debate**

The first round of debate was started by Babst (1964 and 1972) who examined data on 116 major wars from 1789 to 1941 borrowed from Quincy wright and found that no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments. He found his arguments strengthened by two World War cases. He maintained that it was extremely unlikely that all the elective governments (10 out of 33 independent nations, participating in world war I, and, 14 out of 52 in world war II should be on the same side purely by chance.<sup>1</sup>

Despite Small and Singer's objection to Babst's findings, a second round of debate was started by Rummel (1983) who forcefully maintained that 'libertarian' states were more peaceful and secondly that 'libertarian states never fought each other'

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1. Nils Peter Gleditsch. Democracy and Peace." **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.29. No.4: P.369.

Since then, almost all the leading international relations Journals have been a agog with democratic peace literature. Michael Doyle, Erich Weede, Steve Chan Bruce Russett, Maoz and Abdolali, Mintz and Zeva, David Lake, Randall Schweller and numerous other scholars have spoken at length about democratic peace proposition.

After nearly a decade of debate following Rummel's and Michael Doyel's (who was developing the theory on the basis of views presented by Kant) articles the finding which has emerged is that there is consensus or at least near consensus on two points : first, there is little difference in the amount of war participation between democracies and non-democracies (Rummel being major dissenter). Second, wars (inter-state) are almost non-existent among democracies. Infact, scholars have echoed Levy's statement that this 'absence of war between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations'.<sup>2</sup>

## II

### The Continuing Debate

'Democracies do not fight each other' observation was not made in the great classical studies of war led by Richardson and Quincy Wright though the

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2. Jack Levy "The causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence" in Philip. E. Tellock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul sterh an decharles Tilley (ed.) **Behaviour, society and Nuclear War**, Vol.1: Oxford University Press, New York, 1989: PP 209-13.

latter dealt with the relationship between democracy and war at some length (but didn't comment on absence of war between democracies). The late recognition of and consensus on this proposition might have been due to several factors; a few might be dealt with.

First, a number of early contributors to the literature were not clear whether to focus on national or dyadic level proposition and secondly, they confused the proposition at both these levels. The virtual knocking down of Babst's findings by small and singer confirms this sort of confusion.

Secondly, scholars were of the view that amidst multivariate techniques and regression analysis available, study of one variable alone, in the causal analysis was 'ridiculously naive'. Small and singer, for example believed that absence of war between democracies might be attributed to the factor of geographical contiguity, i.e., since wars tended to be fought between neighbours and a few democracies had common borders, the absence of wars between bourgeois democracies could be explained only with third variable. However, to conclude that geographical proximity is necessarily the perfect relational variable between democracy and war would be wrong. Although most wars have been between neighbours, but not all and although most democracies are not neighbours, some are.

Thirdly, when Kant discussed the 'pacific union' there were only three liberal regime on world map - Switzerland, France and U.S.A. and studying such an important, proposition just on the basis of above three countries only tantamounted to building speculation. But over the years, not only there have emerged more democratic states, but also there numbers are increasing.

Secondly, with this more democracies with common borders have come on map thereby making the dyadic study immensely plausible.

Fourthly, although the dyadic level finding of 'democracy—non-war' hypothesis is accepted, no theory presently exists for explanation of this striking empirical regularity. Though this criticism was more relevant in 1970s, yet there are varied explanations with no consensus as to which theoretical rationale accounts for observed relationship.<sup>3</sup>

Another difficulty for studying the democracy—non-war proposition is that it applies only in cases where a relatively high threshold is set for both 'democracy' and 'war'. For example, most scholars have followed, more or less the criteria specified by small and singer (1976) : (a) free elections with opposite parties; b) a minimum suffrage (10%) ; and, c) a parliament either in control of the executive or at least enjoying parity with it.<sup>4</sup> Over the years, scholars have added some new elements and modified some existing ones. For example, it was accepted that suffrage level should be extended to at least thirty percent and that some new elements like individual civil rights and a free enterprise economy should also be added among the criteriae set for recognizing a democracy. Lowering the threshold would make anomalous case, for example, Peloponnesian wars.

Lowering the threshold for wars below 1000 battle deaths a criteria used in Correlates of War data set and used extensively by scholars) also produces

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3. Nils Peter Gleditsch, 1992, p. 372.

4. Ibid. p. 370.

less clearcut results. For example, Mauoz and Abdolali (1989)- and Maoz and Russett tested propositions about democracy and war on the dataset on 'militarized inter state disputes' also generated within the COW project and found fifteen (15) cases of disputes on the above criteria between democracies. .

### III

#### Democracy and Military Intervention

With the above doubts in mind, can democratic peace theory break new grounds. At least initial enquiry holds promise. In chapter II we examined some overt interventions by the great powers of the West in other countries to promote democracy. Though intervention is not strictly within the frame work of this dissertation to study, yet with major wars almost becoming obsolete, low intensity conflicts, many assume, appears to have taken their place. It is in this background that it becomes pertinent to comment, on democracy peace hypothesis keeping in mind the overt interventions. This is going to determine the future of democratic peace proposition to a considerable extent.

Intervention implies "Military operations undertaken openly by a states' regular military forces within a specific foreign land in such a manner as to risk immediate combat". This form of coercive diplomacy is attractive to policy-makers because it provides control over "getting out" and the costs of military action.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, these types of interventions can be justified more

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5. Margaretta Hermann and Charles Kegley Jr. "Ballots, a Barrier against the use of Bullets and Bombs" **Journal of conflict Resolution**, Vol.40: No.3, 1996, p.441.

easily in the name of such high ideals as promoting, preserving and restoring; peace keeping; serving humanitarian purposes; or, protecting non combatant minorities from persecution by their own government.<sup>6</sup>

According to Kegley and Hermann, democracies were less prone to overt military aggressions of the adversary. Infact, they concluded that democracies were unlikely to be the targets of this form of coercive diplomacy, be the adversary a democratic nation or an authoritarian (anocrat and autocrat). In their empirical finding, they concluded that democracy acts as 'security shield' from these types of attack. This is because of the expectation conveyed to the other states that one values negotiation, mediation, compromise and consensus over the use of force. The barriers to intervention in democracies may be substantial because such governments respect for their citizen's freedoms (making coercive diplomacy against them difficult to justify.<sup>7</sup> The discovery that the polity type of the target (till now the belief was that the polity type of only the initiator of the attack matters) matters and does exert pressure to elaborate 'democratic peace theory by proposing that a country's security can be increased if it becomes democratic, that is, a country's capacity to deter attack can be increased by liberal reforms in its governing institutions and acceptance of civil liberties.<sup>8</sup>

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6. Ibid.

7. Ibid, p.455.

8. Ibid, P.455.

## IV

### Implantation of Democracy

In 1973, no more than forty percent of the states in the world were formally democratic and less than thirty percent could be said to be liberal democracies. By 1995, however formal democracies accounted for almost sixty percent of the states of the world.

Consolidating the trend, the Western governments and leading international institutions of the World like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) are providing policy prescriptions and some doses also to execute their desire. However, during the first half of 1990s, the Russian attempt to bring Chechenya to heel, the US military operation to restore democracy in Haiti and the continuing refusal of the Nigerian government to protect or promote human rights, let alone to return to democratic rule begs the question, is it possible to insert democracy into any society, at any stage of its history irrespective of its social structure, its economic conditions, its political traditions, and its external relations?

It is a commonly held view that there are certain conditions without, which stable democracy is impossible and if the above view is accepted, then it becomes clear, that in countries without those conditions, democracy would be difficult to be implanted.<sup>9</sup> What are those conditions?

First, the state must enjoy geographical, constitutional and political legitimacy, i.e., the people must accept the above three elements of the state. Second, the democratic process requires loyalty to the process itself both by the  
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9. Adrian Leftwich 1996. "Two Cheers for Democracy" *Political Quarterly*, pp.334-35.



losing party and the ruling party. It did not happen in South Africa, Nicaragua and many countries. Thirdly, victorious party must exercise restraints irrespective of how strong its position is. South Africa, in this respect, under Dr. Mandela is doing well, Fourthly, poor and unequal societies are not conducive for democratic growth. Fifthly, sharp ethnic and cultural differences weaken the democracy. Algeria, Egypt, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Fiji, all are victims of the above, giving occasional setbacks in some (India) and serious setbacks in others (Pakistan).

Sixthly and the most trivial is that major transformations of the economic and political structure of societies are not easily accomplished under democratic circumstances. China, South Korea, Japan all consolidated their economies under non-democratic structures.

In many of the newly emerged transitory democracies, the legitimacy of the state is weak, less consensus on rules of the game, gross inequalities exist, ethno-cultural divide is prominent and economic reforms are becoming impossible to be undertaken. The danger of backsliding always lurks and already troops have reemerged from the barracks in Albania, Algeria, Myanmar, Haiti, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and so on. In these circumstances, does not it become clear that instead of insisting blindly the West should facilitate the dedicated support to those elites who are bent on promoting economic growth in countries where conditions for democracy do not exist. Prosperity would lay the groundwork for reforms in political structures. Whether trade promotes peace is yet not unanimously held view but trade tempered with interdependence is certainly going to lay the foundation for politically liberal regime.

### **The Dream of Democratic Peace?**

It is noted clearly that Kant envisioned a separate peace between democracies - 'a zone of peace' - to three principles or pillars. (recollect chapter II). There are constitutional mechanisms in democracies which restrain them from going to war because of the burdens war imposes on the population. This element however is not enough because the same democracy can instill irrationality also. So the first condition is necessary but not the sufficient condition for democratic peace proposition. Kant, thus gives two more elements to it. The moral and the economic ones. The moral reason has to do with the common values between mutual rights, respect and understanding-a democratic culture - between democracies. In other words peaceful ways of solving conflicts domestically has to be transferred to international relations between democracies also. The economic reason or the 'spirit of commerce' ensures mutual gain (from trade and investments), and interdependence, thus consolidating the pacific union. Unless all the three elements are present that is, unless a consolidated democracy is established, there is no guarantee of peace between democracies. These elements do not come automatically, they are firmed in a process where early results of cooperation lead to further cooperative efforts. The reversals and backsliding are very much possible but if the norms are spread - a kind of self fulfilling prophesy - and repeated, the repetition (of those arms) helps to make them effective. Repeating the proposition as Russett maintains - that democracies should not fight each other helps reinforce the probability that democracies will not fight each other.

The answer to the above sub-topic whether Kantian dream can be realised or wider democratic peace could be built - is also related to one more question whether distance between realists and Kantian 'pacific union' concept or liberalist thought be covered? The idealist's view holds that conflict and violence can be overcome. Harmony is possible, provided man gives priority to the right ideas - in Kant's case, the idea of democracy. Realists on the other hand, see the world as it really is and not as it ought to be; power and dominance are distinguishing features of world, they maintain. Early realists attributed the above to human nature, the latter realists to the structure of the state system marked by anarchy. States do not recognise any higher authority over them and hence threat of violent conflict always lurks. As long as there is anarchy, the perpetual peace as envisioned by Kant is impossible.

The democratic peace proposition has hence, been criticized vehemently by realists and notably Mearsheimer. But as we asked, is it possible to cover the distance between these two world views. Mearsheimer starts his attack by maintaining that democracies are not more peaceful and public may be no less war prone than the authoritarian leaders. The above (neo) realists views do not contradict Kant or democratic peace concept. It is now a consensual view that democracies are as war prone as authoritarian states and only among themselves there exists a zone of peace. Secondly, it was also recognized by Kant that mere public restraint was not enough for the pacific union, there are two other pillars also - moral and economic. Russett and all also maintain that democratic culture or norms is important, in fact stronger ingredient of peace among democracies proposition.

Mearsheimer then, criticizes the moral union or common moral foundation between democracies, i.e. the second pillar of pacific union by maintaining that these bonds compete with other factors drawing towards conflict rather than peace. They are nationalism, religious fundamentalism etc. Kant also did not deny them but held that with ingrained democratic culture among democracies, the moral foundation will override the conflicting factors demanding loyalty. Thirdly, he (Mearshimer) maintains that there is always the danger of backsliding which requires the liberal democracies prepare for power maintenance among themselves. Thus it is anarchy which prevails. Kant also mentioned about the danger of backsliding but it is the most important point to ponder whether the occasional backsliding will negate the pacific union. George Sorensen, in this respect discusses the various forms of anarchy as recognized by realists themselves. They are 'raw anarchy', characterised by security alliances and balance of power; 'middle stations' (an immature and a mature security regime). Characterised by a will to solve problems amicably, more in latter and less in former; and, 'security community' at the extreme end, characterised by determination to solve conflicts by peaceful means. The version of anarchy called security community is identical with Kantian concept of Pacific Union. Security community is still anarchy because sovereign status of states still exists and states do not recognize any sovereign authority above them and yet they are determined to solve the conflicts amicably. Thus distance between realists and idealists on this issue is not as much as projected by realists.

The modern international system is commonly traced to the treaty of Westphalia and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal

affairs. In doing so it affirmed the anarchy of the system, without a superior authority to ensure order. It was also a treaty among autocrat princes. The writings that ensued thereafter, hence were reflections of the above. Moreover, the number of democracies was also abysmally low. A democracy which tried to operate by democratic norms was at a great disadvantage and very often had to shift policies to adjust to the risks.<sup>10</sup>

The emergence of new democracies at the end of cold war steered the way for a reformed international system. For the first time the majority of the states are ruled by democratic leaders. Many are in transitory phase with also the possibility of sliding back. But if enough states become stably democratic then there emerges a chance to reconstruct order which reflects a democratic way of behaviors interactions among states marked by democratic norms with all the positive outcomes of amicable solution to grave conflicts. As Russett says, a "system created by autocracies centuries ago might now be recreated by a critical mass of democratic states."<sup>11</sup>

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10. Russett 1993, p.198.

11. Ibid.

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