

**NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR :
THE CASE OF INDIA**

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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, **NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR : THE CASE OF INDIA**, being submitted by **Mr. Birendra Kumar Chaudhary** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University. This is his own work.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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***“WITHOUT YOUR EXPECTATIONS OF ME
THIS WORK WAS AN IMPOSSIBILITY”***

**DEDICATED
TO
MY
MOTHER AND FATHER**

PREFACE

From the end of the Cold War, a debate has begun on the concept of Security. This is a theoretical and policy debate of some complexity. Now that the anchors of the Cold War - Superpower competition worldwide undergirded by nuclear weapons - has gone, there is growing interest in what global security will be like in the coming century. Whatever shape it takes India will be a key component of that security system. India's security, like that of other states, after Cold War has element of the past but also is faced with new challenges and opportunities.

This dissertation attempts to lay bare the areas in which India faces threat and how it is going about dealing with those threats. We shall see that there are substantial areas of continuity but also emerging areas of concern. India will have to spend more time that it has to clarify its strategy for the next century.

I am grateful to my supervisor Dr. Kanti P. Bajpai without whose encouragement and guidance at every step, I would have been handicapped. I am deeply indebted to him particularly for the patience with which he went through the dissertation, making, every now and then, valuable suggestions for improvement. Words fail me to thank him adequately.

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Birendra Kumar Chaudhary

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ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	—	Asia Pacific Economic Community
ASEAN	—	Association of South East Asian Nations
AASU	—	All Assam Students Union (India)
AAGSP	—	All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (India)
AGP	—	Asom Gana Parishad (India)
ATC	—	Air Traffic Control (India)
BSF	—	Border Security Force (India)
CENTO	—	Central Treaty Organisatin
CRPF	—	Central Reserve Police Force (India)
CENTCOM	—	U.S. Central Command
CTBT	—	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CD	—	Conference on Disarmament
DRDO	—	Defence Research and Development Organisation (India)
DGCA	—	Director General of Civil Aviation (India)
EU	—	European Union
HAL	—	Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (India)
ISI	—	Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
IPKF	—	Indian Peace Keeping Force

ICBM	—	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	—	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
IGMDP	—	Integrated Guided Missile Programme (India)
ITBP	—	Indo-Tibetan Border Police (India)
ISRO	—	Indian Space Research Organisation
JKLF	—	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
LTTE	—	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
LAC	—	Line of Actual Control
MBT	—	Main Battle Tank
LCA	—	Light Combat Aircraft
MNF	—	Mizo National Front (India)
MTCR	—	Missile Technology Control Regime
NWFP	—	North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)
NSDD	—	U.S. National Security Decision Directive
NSS	—	National Security Service (Maldives)
NPT	—	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	—	National Security Guard (India)
NNPA	—	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (U.S.)
NRC	—	Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.)
NAFTA	—	North American Free Trade Agreement

OIC	—	Organisation of Islamic Conference
POK	—	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PNE	—	Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PLOTE	—	People's Organisation of Tamil Eelam
PLA	—	People's Liberation Army (India)
PSLV	—	Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
PWG	—	People's War Group (India)
PACCOM	—	U.S. Pacific Command
R.D.F	—	Rapid Deployment Force (U.S.)
RAPIDS	—	Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Divisions
RAMIDS	—	Reorganised Army Mountians Infantry Divisions
SEATO	—	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
SGPC	—	ShriGurudwara Prabandhak Committee (India)
SAARC	—	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperataion
SSM	—	Surface-to-Surface Missile
TAPP	—	Tarapur Atomic Power Plant (India)
TNV	—	Tripura National Volunteers (India)
ULFA	—	United Liberatin Front of Assam (India)
VOA	—	Voice of America (U.S.)
NSC	—	National Security Council (India)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION : WHAT IS SECURITY?

The end of the Cold war, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the continuing conflict in the Third World demands new frameworks for thinking about security. There should be broader definition of security that considers not only freedom from physical violence but also the material well being of individuals. However, the end of the Cold War has not led us towards peaceful world bereft of traditional security issues. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the growing militarisation of the third World have highlighted the difference between the costs of war and the economic welfare of individuals. The Gulf war of 1991 has shown that modern warfare is still a serious threat to security. The post Cold War scenario must codify the concept of the security by taking the economic and developmental aspects into account.

There are six major shifts which have affected international security in this post Cold War World order. Firstly, there is the transition from Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics¹. Economic issues have emerged as a powerful national factor of strength, primarily due to the ongoing process of globalisation of the world economic order, the increasing liberalisation of national economies of the developing countries and the formation of

1. Swaran Singh, "Post Cold War World and India's National Security", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVII, No. 4, July 1995, p. 524.

certain economic power blocs like European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) and their continuous interactions. We are entering into a world where the two nations, militarily adverse towards each other are cooperating for linking their national economics for mutual benefits.

Second, the transition from External aggression to internal instability.² During the Cold War period, the superpower blocs competed against each other. To contain the U.S.S.R., the U.S. pursued policy a of “Containment”. For this they drew into their alliances those states, who would oppose the other side. With the elimination of the U.S.S.R., this policy become redundant at one stroke. In the post Cold War period, there began to be armed conflicts within regions and within states. Thus, the pattern of conflict in the post Cold War era has clearly shifted from inter to intra-state, often with a large element of external involvement. Most of the conflicts being fought today are low intensity conflicts.

The third transition is closely linked to the prior one i.e. militrasition of societies.³ The supply of sophisticated weaponry during the Cold War by the great powers was undertaken to check the advances of rival blocs. Now, with the collapse of a superpower, this has changed. Weaponisation

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

is taking the form of smaller arms and is leading to a militarisation of societies.

Fourth, this is another transition from global to regional powers.⁴ Increasing regionalism, has given rise to numerous power centres capable of sustaining developments on their own. These emerging power centres are going to make the world polycentric. Earlier world power was primarily based on military power. This has lost its pre-eminence. The upcoming regional powers are making their presence felt due to their economic strength or due to their vast market potential.

Fifth, there has been a rise in ethnicity and religious conflict.⁵ Most conflicts today are being fought around the globe for reasons rooted in ethnic and religious issues. This is so because the Cold War order, which had kept these forces under control, has disappeared. With the absence of any serious threat to world peace, other issues more local issues like ethnic nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism and human rights have suddenly become the focus of world attention.

Finally, the sixth transition is from competition to cooperation.⁶ The post Cold War era has forced the states to seek cooperative ties even with erstwhile adversaries. They are moving towards constructive engagement.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

Examples include the Middle East, North and South Yemen, the conflict in Angola, the end of apartheid in South Africa.

DEFINITIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Earlier national security signified the protection of territorial integrity. In this sense, it meant primarily the use of or threat of use of force to protect and promote national security. However, it has increasingly shifted from the protection of territories to encompass other national values. Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Booke define national security as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat⁷. Walter Lippman argues "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war"⁸. Lippman considered war an indispensable means to safeguard the nations legitimate interests.⁹

Similarly, Arnold Wolfers suggests "security in an objective sense, measuring the absence of threat to acquired values, and in a subjective

7. M. Berkowitz and P.G. Booke "National security", in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (London : Macmillan, 1968), Vol. 11, p.40.

8. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150.

9. Ibid.

sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”.¹⁰

Robert McNamara categorised these core values in the form of developmental activities. In his definition, “Security is not military force though it may encompass it, security is development and without development there is no security”¹¹. Thus, national security cannot be maintained unless national economies can be sustained and upgraded.

K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian specialist on security and defence studies, has this to say: “National security does not merely mean safeguarding territorial integrity. It means also ensuring that the country is industrialised rapidly and has a cohesive egalitarian and technological society. Anything which comes in the way of this development internally or externally is a threat to (India’s) national security”.¹² Subrahmanyam’s definition, though made with reference to India, stands as a generalisation for the vast majority of Third World states.

Kanti Bajpai has exhaustively enlarged the concept of national security and specified these core values emphatically. To him, “Security is the protection of core national values. A nation’s core values are territorial integrity, foreign policy autonomy, internal peace, economic development,

10. Ibid

11. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) pp. 141-162.

12. K. Subrahmanyam, Our National Security, (Delhi; ABC, 1972) p. VII.

and the maintenance of a certain way of cultural, economic and political life. The nation must have land, and that land must be safe from other nations. The nation must be free to choose its friends and enemies from among other nations. The nation must manage internal disruption. The nation must achieve an ever higher standard of living. And the nation must be able to live cultural, political and economic life as it chooses".¹³

Thus, it could broadly be maintained that the domain of national security has widened its course much more than the traditional military notion. It is now widely felt that development of the state and greater stress toward equalisation of the world order would also be necessary components of national security. Therefore, the ideal security policy is one that would lead to a distribution of values satisfactory to all nations such that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimised.

CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The concept of national security in the post of Cold War era is not what it used to be. It is necessary to attempt to group these various conceptions.

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13. Kanti P. Bajpai, "Regions, Regional Politics, and the Security of South Asia", in Marvin G. Weinbaums and Chetan Kumar, South Asia Approaches the Mellenium: Reexamining National Security, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 205.

THE REALIST CONCEPTION

For realists, national's security is defined in terms of power politics. Conceptually, it was synonymous with the security of the state against external threats, which was to be achieved by increasing military capabilities. Therefore states must rely on their own capabilities for the achievement of security because the international system has no authority to curb the other's aggressive ambitions. However, this notion of maintaining security through a self help system made other side vulnerable to other former's security preparedness. This contradiction is known as "security dilemma"¹⁴. a term coined by John Hertz and it refers to the inability of one country to distinguish between the others defensive or offensive population and therefore a tendency to plan for the worst on both sides. As a state enhances its military power, it create threats to other states. Such behaviour destabilises the weaponized equilibrium leading to an arms races which in its furtherance decreases the overall security of the system and its member states. The escalation of the arms race during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet union could be characterised as a classic example of the "security dilemma."

The most extensive realist conceptualisation of security has been given by Barry Buzan in his book People, States and Fear. For him, security is

14. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in International Relations, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p.3.

about the pursuit of freedom from threat in the context of international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity”¹⁵. He has bonded this definition of security to include freedom from military, political, societal, economic and environmental threats. His definition of security is multidimensional.

Buzan, also enlarges security to include the perspectives of the individual, the state and the international system. He concludes that the most important and effective security provider is the sovereign state. He argues that strong states will provide a greater degree of security to individuals.¹⁶

THE NORTH’S CONCEPTION

There are two trends in the contemporary definitions of security in the industrialised North.

First, “Common” or “Comprehensive Security” theorists have adopted a multidimensional definition of security which emphasises security interdependence. The security of states depends on the security of their

15. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The Agenda for International Security Studies in post Cold War era, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 18.

16. Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: The National Security problems in International Relations, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books), pp. 36-69

citizens. Common security assumes that there are global dangers which threaten the entire global system and which cannot be solved by boundary protection. It emphasizes common threats and appeals for cooperative behaviour for collective self interest. In other words, insecurity includes economic and ecological threats and natural disasters. (Richard Ullman:¹⁷ defines national security as an attempt to protect against events that threaten to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of states. He lists threats as an inability to meet basic needs, environmental degradation and natural disasters. Thus, common security thinking has two main characteristics ; first, multidimensionality i.e., military, economic and ecological threats; and second, common security thinking.

Second, there is the American model of security. After the collapse of the Soviet union, the U.S. is seen as having the potential to become the guarantor of global security. The proponents of a new Pax Americana see security similar to post 1945 realist thinking. One view is that most of the dangers are located in the South, where small and backward states are emerging as threats to both regional and global security, South Asia and the south china Sea, are example. There are some who continue to see military dangers in a post Cold War

17. Richard Ullman "Redefining Security", International Security Vol.8, 1993, pp.129-53.

Europe.¹⁸ similarly, much apprehension has occurred over the cultural faults line in the balkans, Samuel, P. Huntigton in his article “ The Clash of Civilizations” makes this point forcefully¹⁹. Much of the new thinking on security has made a shift towards a North-south framework.

THE SOUTH’S CONCEPTION

“The security predicament of the Third World state is adversely affected by the workings of an international system in which the concerns of Third World states are marginal to the security of the international system as a whole. This perception on the part of the major powers permits and , on occasion, encourages the proliferation of both intra state and interstates violent conflict within the Third world.²⁰ Third World countries are often used as pawns in the “great game” being played by the major strategic and economic powers in the international system. In fact, it has been argued that during the Cold War, superpower conflicts were exported to the Third World.

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18. J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future; Instability in Europe After the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 15, 1990, pp.5-50.
 19. Samuel P. Huntigton, “The Clash of Civilization”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp.29-35.
 20. Mohammad Ayoob, “ The Security Predicament of the Third World State”, in Brian L. Job., ed., The Security Dilemma: National Security of Third World States , (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 74.

From the perspectives of the South, the northern definition of security was seen as synonymous with the preservation of U.S. hegemony. The Third World sees security threats in a northern build up of high technology weapons for war intervention, in northern control of a highly unequal world economy and over-consumption of natural resources with its negative consequences for the global environment.

Many scholars claim that security should not be defined solely in terms of military threat, but more in terms of threats to values and identities, the nature of which will vary across time, space and issue area. Many regions of the Third world are more preoccupied with economic threats and with threats to national identity than military threat for external actors.

Caroline Thomas also stresses the economic dimensions of national security²¹, She defines security not only in terms of the internal security of the state, but also in terms of food, health, money and trade. Thomas also emphasises the lack of control over the external environment where weak states operate in an international economic order that favour the powerful.

CONCLUSION

The debate on what is security and overall the conception of international relations that underlies the definition is dense and is likely to

21. Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), pp 1-8.

persist. What our brief review has ^{revealed} ~~revealed~~ is that no definition which is restricted to threats of force from external actors is sufficient. In this study, we will take simple view of security as being concerned with threats to core values which inmate both form the external as well as domestic environment. These threats are directed not only at territorial integrity and foreign policy autonomy but in addition to the sanctity and stability of the basic ^{political} ~~potential~~ order. Thus we will be looking not just at the threats to India posed by Pakistan and China as well as the United States but also at various internal secessionist or separatist militancies which have caused great internal upheaval and violence and have disrupted the ^{political} ~~potential~~ and economic way of life of very large numbers of Indian citizens in kashmir, Punjab , and Northeastern states.

The focus of the study is the situation after the cold War, but in order to appreciate the roots of India's present problems it will be necessary to sketch in Indian security problems during the cold War period. To this task we turn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

INDIAN SECURITY IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

Every State aims at preserving its political independence and territorial integrity by safeguarding its international boundaries. The means may vary from balance of power and alliances to nonalignment and panchsheel, but national security and the preservation of territorial integrity is almost coterminous. National security of different nations and even of the same nation at different times stems primarily from the stage of social and economic development has reached.

India got independence in 1947. India's most important national security value, outside of preserving political independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity, was economic development, improving living standards of the poor people by increasing production and a more equitable distribution of national wealth. The first Prime Minister of India, Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru, declared on the eve of independence that the national goal was to wipe every tear from every eye¹.

National security is formulated in past according to the country's strategic location. India's location in South Asia links it to West Asia, South

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1. Jawahar Lal Nehru Speech on August 14, 1947 at Midnight. Cited in A.A. Athale, "An Enigma That is India : A Holistic View of National Security," Strategic Analysis, Vol. XII, No.12, 1989, p.1407.

Asia and East Asia. Thus, Nehru told the members of the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949, "If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, You can not do so without India. So also with the Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with South East Asia, both are connected with India².

The second important factor is India's location in relation to the Indian Ocean. As K.M. Panikkar has pointed out : the peninsular character of the country with its extensive and open coastline, and with a littoral which is extremely fertile and rich in resources makes India entirely dependent on the India Ocean. It would be correct to say that some eighty five percent of India's trade passes through the Indian Ocean, this trade includes import of essential capital goods and the raw materials needed for India's economic development. A hostile power dominating the Indian Ocean could be harmful, It could be dangerous for India's security³.

Another important factor is India's land frontiers. Land frontiers are no problem if, as between the United States and Canada which have the longest land frontier in the world, friendly relations are maintained between the two adjacent states. But India's land frontier is different. India has a

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2. Jawahar Lal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (New Delhi : Publication Division, 1961), p.22.
 3. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1945), p.82.

long land frontier of 9,425 miles bordering China, Pakistan and Bangladesh⁴.

The existence of the Himalayas is a great security cordon for India. The Himalayas extend from the Indus to the Brahmaputra, a length of 1500 miles and runs through the entire northern boundary of India with an average width of some 150 miles and an average height of 20,000 feet. Thus, it is said that "for over a thousand miles to the north, Hindustan has a protective area which no other country possesses⁵. But the natural barrier is not impenetrable. It could not prevent China from aggression in 1962. Before 1955, K.M. Panikkar warned that "an organised modern state in Tibet will alter the character of the Himalayan problem⁶. On the other hand, India's frontiers with Pakistan are manmade frontiers. Since Independence, Pakistan has forced India into three war: 1947-48, 1965 and 1971.

Domestic stability and prosperity is the foundation stone of national security. Prime Minister Nehru told the Constituent Assembly : " External affairs will follow internal affairs"⁷. Nehru always devoted his energy to the economic and social progress and the betterment of the people of India.

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4. India 1985 (New Delhi : Research and Reference Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1986.), p.1
 5. Ibid., p.1.
 6. K.M. Panikar, India and the Indian Ocean (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1945), p.69.
 7. Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates , Vol. III, p. 1767.

Thus a true democratic set up would provide economic justice to the people, That is why defence was not emphasised properly and small size of armed forces and the appreciation that the major threat was internal and not external was the basis of policy. The leadership put greater faith in diplomacy as a tool to achieve national security.

On the other hand, in a world dominated by contending military blocs, believed Nehru that pursuit of an independent, non aligned policy, of judging ever issue on the merits of the case and in the light of India's interests would be not only beneficial for India, but also enable her to play the role of a balancer in world politics. As Nehru clarified the meaning of Non-alignment : " What is called 'Non-alignment' has also not fared badly. This, strictly speaking, represents only one aspect of our policy; we have other positive aims also, such as the promotion of freedom from colonial rule, racial equality, peace and international cooperation, but 'Non-alignment' has become a summary description of this policy of friendship toward all nations, uncompromised by adherence to any military pacts⁸.

Therefore, national security could be safeguarded not merely by military preparedness but also by an effective foreign policy. Nehru's strategic posture was based on peace and pacific settlement of disputes. As Nehru said, "Tolerance, friendliness, the protection of the rights and

8. Jawahar Lal Nehru , " Changing India", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No.3, April 1963, p.455.

dignity of the individual, peaceful settlement of disputes, the persistent effort to reach agreement through compromise and persuasion, these are the values we have been trying to uphold⁹. But the Chinese attack in 1962 changed the perception of Indian security policy. Nehru clearly indicated. "In the past, our preoccupation with the human problems of poverty and illiteracy was such that we were content to assign a relatively low priority to defence requirements in the conventional sense. We will now clearly have to give considerably more attention to strengthening our armed forces and the production within the country, to the extent possible, of all weapons and equipment needed by them¹⁰.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi followed the path of her father but in her period realism came into force to protect the nation through diplomacy along with prepared armed forces. Indira Gandhi also emphasised the policy of non-alignment. She said, "Nonalignment implied neither noninvolvement nor neutrality. It was and is an assertion of our freedom of judgement and action¹¹. She signed a 20 year treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union on the eve of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 to counter balance the United States- Pakistan-China alignment¹². On the question of sovereignty,

9. Ibid., p. 461.

10. Ibid., p. 459.

11. Indira Gandhi, "India and The World," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No.1, October 1972, p.68.

12. Francine R. Frankel, "India's Promise," Foreign Policy, No 38, Spring 1980, p.52.

she resisted pressure from the Soviets for closer alignment and refused to consider their proposals for Asian Collective Security Plan¹³. In 1980, she criticised the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. During this period, India tested its first nuclear device.

Finally, the role of India the armed forces was elevated further in Rajiv Gandhi's time. The overhauling of the army took place in the name of Brasstacks led by General K.Sundarji, the largest military exercise in the history of the India armed forces. The army also conducted Operation Checkerboard in Arunachal Pradesh along the McMahon line in late 1987¹⁴. The military action in Sri Lanka and Maldives with the consent of the respective governments showed that Indian was prepared to be militarily more active¹⁵.

India's national security during the cold war was preoccupied with the bipolar superpower rivalries. In addition, regional problems were central. War had a very significant role in this context. In 1962, Jawahar Lal Nehru's peaceful and non-alignment policy was given a rude shock by the Chinese. The India - Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971, all these proved that India's external security concern was multi-dimensional and needed

13. Ibid.

14. Raju G.C. Thomas., South Asian Security in the 1990's Adelphi Paper 278 (London : International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1993, p.46.

15. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.36.

to be revamped. The search for an ally was become inevitable which culminated in the 1971 Indo-USSR treaty. The nuclear option was kept open. It was designed as a deterrent and the Pokharan Explosion in 1974 was a part of that design. The 1979 Afghan crisis brought the superpower rivalry on the South Asian landmass, very close to Indian territory. Also in the 1970's, the Indian Ocean had become a playground for the superpower navies.

At the same time, internal security was being threatened by various separatist agitations in different part of the country. In Punjab, it was religious, in the North East it was ethnic and in Jammu and Kashmir it was movement for autonomy and secession. These occupied India at various times throughout in first 45 years of independence.

PAKISTAN

The cold war posed a broader challenge to India's security. The more specific and serious threat came from the immediate neighbour, Pakistan. Since its inception, Pakistan has fought two wars over Kashmir in 1947-48 and 1965. In the 1971 war, it once again unsuccessfully attempted to gain Kashmir. By advancing the argument that Kashmir should belong to Pakistan in view of its Muslim majority, Pakistan also posed an ideological threat to India's secular edifice. Pakistan constitutes an ideological threat to India not so much because Pakistan is a theocratic state and has declared itself as an Islamic Republic, but because of Pakistan's claim to be the

symbol of the aspirations of the Muslim community in the subcontinent. Pakistan still believes that it has the right to speak on behalf of Muslims in India¹⁶.

The most important component of the Pakistan threat during the Nehru era was politico strategic in character. In October 1947 tribesmen from NWFP of Pakistan invaded Kashmir with a view to liberating the Muslims of Kashmir from the Maharaja. When the raiders reached the Valley of Kashmir, the Maharaja of Kashmir appealed to New Delhi for help. To get military help from India to drive out the raiders, it was legally necessary that Kashmir should have acceded to India ; an Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja on October 26, 1947 (and sent to India.). Mountbatten urged that in India's reply accepting accession, India should add that this was conditional on the will of the people being ascertained as soon as law and order was restored¹⁷. This principle was at once freely accepted and unilaterally proposed by Nehru¹⁸. The Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir and was duly accepted by India. Mountbatten's reply was dated October 27, 1947.¹⁹

16. U.S. Bajpai., (ed.), India's Security ; The Politico-Strategic Environment (New Delhi : Lancers Publishers, 1983), p. 72.

17. Cited in A.Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985), p. 79.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

The Government of India decided to lodge on January 1, 1948 a complaint against Pakistan to the Security Council under article 35 of the UN charter. Prior to it, the Maharaja of Kashmir's accession was supported by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference in October 1947. In February 1954, the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir ratified the decision. In November 1956, this decision which was constitutionally and legally complete was given formal sanction by the people of Jammu and Kashmir as reflected through their democratically elected Constituent Assembly. In other words, it was "Settled by a reference to the people", and through the democratically elected Constituent Assembly. The later intrusion of the term "Plebiscite", although conditional, has enabled India's critics to fasten onto the plebiscite while forgetting the condition regarding law and order and Pakistan's vacation of the state²⁰.

The Kashmir problem was made worse for India by arms supplied by the United States to Pakistan in the late 1950's and early 1960's under the anticommunist alliance network, the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). This greatly aggravated Indian Security. The transfer of American arms included M-47/48 Patton tanks, and F-104 Star Fighters, F-86 Sabres, and B-57 Canberra combat aircraft. The total value of such equipment at the time was estimated at about \$ 700 million, to this was added another \$ 1.3 billion

20. Times of India (New Delhi), April 16, 1957



worth of infrastructural support such as communications systems and training programmes²¹.

The next round with Pakistan was in 1965, Pakistan invaded Kutch in early 1965 and later the same year the infiltration was escalated into an attack on Kashmir which led to fighting all along the Western front of India. One of the most important reasons was the heavy militarisation of Pakistan by the United States to contain International communism, whereas Pakistan's sole aim was to use all its sophisticated weapons against India. It is sufficient to say that India's experience since 1964 confirmed the earlier fears that Pakistan would use American military aid to commit aggression against India. A former US ambassador to India, John K. Galbraith, told the Senate Foreign Relations committee in 1966 : "If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought a military solution²².

The 1971 war was a landmark for Indian security. The humiliating military defeat and the bifurcation of Pakistan shattered the Pakistani myth of being an equally influential actor in the Subcontinental arena. The dramatic and decisive ending to the war even made the US acknowledge the preminent position of India in the subcontinent. Since Partition, the

21. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p.21

22. The Hindu (Madras), April 29, 1966.

U.S. had always tried to prop up Pakistan as an effective counter weight to India's dominant position in the region. Thus the regular supply of U.S. (and Chinese arms) encouraged Pakistan to destabilise India. The United States, China, and Pakistan were a severe security threat to India during the 1971 war and the dispatch of the U.S. carrier U.S.S. Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal during Indian operations in Bangladesh aggravated the scenario. The Indo - Soviet treaty was negotiated because of the fear of the misconceived US tilt and China's hostile attitude to Bangladesh's desire for independence. Anyway the dispatch of the carrier Enterprise has become in the Indian mind a symbol of attempted American coercion.²³

The ten years of Soviet occupation (1978-1988) of Afghanistan gave Pakistan the chance to become a frontline state of America to contain Soviet communism. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought about a revival of the American link with Pakistan. By 1980, it was quite clear that Pakistan was on the road to acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other side, Pakistan was using the Afghan crisis to bolster its conventional armed forces against India. In 1981, the US waived the Symington Amendment and announced the first tranche of military aid to Pakistan²⁴.

23. Jagat S. Mehta, "India and Pakistan. We know the Past; Must We Live It?", in Stephen Philip Cohen (ed.), The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives., (New Delhi : Vistaar Publishers, 1988), p. 185.

24. K. Subrahmanyam. " Indira Gandhi's Quest for Security". Strategic Analyses, Vol. XI, No. 4, July 1987. p. 393.

The new cold war started in the subcontinent. The Afghan crisis led directly to the extension of massive US economic and military aid to Pakistan, the first tranche of it amounting the \$ 3.2 billion. The aid package facilitated the procurement of advanced military technology, notably, 4-F16 air combat fighters and the Abrams M1 main battle tank²⁵. In 1987, A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, admitted in an interview that the nuclear establishment could offer General Zia a nuclear weapon if so requested²⁶. Therefore, two factors started threatening India's Security : The conventional arms transfers to Pakistan and that country's nuclearisation.

Until April 1984, the undemarcated Siachin Glacier range in Jammu and Kashmir had remained an 'unoccupied' area, a sort of no man's land as it was ice clad. However, Pakistan had been sending mountaineering expeditions consisting of foreigners to the area as feelers to gauge Indian reaction. As India responded to Pakistan by moving troops to the area, the tension started, resulting in occasional clashes with Pakistani troops, Skirmishes between the rival armed forces involving human casualties have been taking place since April 1984. In September 1985, both sides intensified air and ground battles. The last serious clash reportedly took place in October 1989.

25. Chris Smith, India's Adhoc Arsenal ; Defence or Drift in Defence Policy (Oxford; SIPRI : Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 106.

26. Ibid., p. 107.

From the strategic point of view, the Siachin Glacier is important for India. In the words of an Indian General, "The strategic Tibet-Sianking (Xinjiang) road passes through territory captured by China east of Siachin (in 1962). Northwards we have a new road from Pakistan going through the Khunjerab pass. These form a noose around India's jugular. If they took Siachin, they would be holding a dagger to our backs in the Nubra Valley"²⁷.

Since 1989, the Siachin issue appears to have been submerged into the larger issue of Jammu and Kashmir where Pakistani inspired and trained Muslim militants advocating secession from India have succeeded in creating chaos. In sum, by 1989-90, India - Pakistan relations seemed to have come full circle since the 1960s to vest once again on Kashmir.

CHINA

Jawahar Lal Nehru 's approach to security based on nonalignment and peaceful coexistence appeared to be a practical solution that neutralised a potential Chinese threat. It needs to be emphasised that while the broader and general nature of the Chinese challenge was very well perceived by Nehru, who was himself Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of India, he failed to perceive a military confrontation between India and China.

27. "Gunfire on the Glacier", India Today, July 31, 1985, p.79.

In 1954, India and China signed a general treaty on Tibet, in the preamble of which both parties pledged themselves to mutual nonaggression and respect for each other's territorial integrity which is known as 'Panchsheel'²⁸. China militarily took Tibet on October 21, 1950. The Deputy Prime Minister of India, Sardar Patel, characterised China as a potential enemy of India in his letter regarding Tibet to Nehru on November 7, 1950. He added that "while our western and north western threats to security are still as permanent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north east. In my judgement, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain these objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident"²⁹.

In July 1962, Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley in the Western sector. On September 8, 1962, the Chinese troops suddenly marched across the well-established and till then peaceful boundary in the Eastern sector i.e. McMahon line. This was followed on October 20, 1962 by massive attacks by China in both the Western and

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28. Jawahar Lal Nehru , India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches September 1946 - April 1961 , (Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi 1961), p.304.
 29. Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder; The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962 , (Bombay : Thakker, 1969), pp. 489-95.

Eastern Sectors of the border. The Indian Army was badly humiliated and defeated. The war suddenly changed the perceptions of Panchsheel. Nehru said : "The attack from across the Himalayas undoubtedly gave us a severe jolt, it aroused anger and disgust at what we felt to be a wanton betrayal of friendship"³⁰.

The Himalayan ranges were no longer a protective barrier and economic development without adequate defence was now seen to be futile. The immediate Indian reaction to the shock of military defeat was to seek arms from the West, especially from the United States and Britain³¹. The first consignment of US arms arrived on November 3, 1962, even though the formal pact between the two countries was signed on November 14, 1962. On November 19, 1962, New Delhi made an urgent and specific request to the United States for American fighting air support³². In July 1963, the government of India decided to accept an Anglo American offer of joint air exercises later that year to test the country's air defence³³. On November 21, 1962, however, the Chinese announced unilaterally their ceasefire and withdrawal declaration.

30. Jawahar Lal Nehru, "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, Vol.41, No.3, April 1963, p.462.

31. Raju. G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p.20.

32. D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay : Tulsishah Enterprises, 1968). p.20.

33. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy. P. 26.

The 1962 war was the turning point for the Indian defence forces. India decided that its strategy for dealing with the Chinese threat rested on a combination of military and diplomatic approaches. Ten mountain divisions were formed for high altitude warfare against the Chinese. The Indian Air Force was also trained for high altitudes. On the diplomatic level, India developed its relations with the Soviet Union to counter the Chinese relationship with Pakistan. The 1971 Treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union was a response to the US - China - Pakistan axis. It is fair to say that from 1962 onwards except for sporadic border incidents, there has been diplomatic tension and military preparedness but little actual fighting with China. In 1967, there was an exchange of fire at Nathu La which was heavy and India acquitted itself well. At the time of the 1965 and 1971 war with Pakistan there was some concern that China might intervene but it did not do so. It was not until 1987 that there was to be a serious confrontation. In 1987, serious tensions occurred in Sumdorong in Arunachal Pradesh. India conducted a military exercise Operation Checkerboard in Arunachal Pradesh along the McMahon line in late 1987 and a pattern of Indian and Chinese military move developed which seemed dangerous. In the event, both sides exercised restraint. Since then the Sino-Indian border has been quiet. The Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, visited China in 1988.

In sum, during the cold war, China was security threat to India : Firstly, the 1962 war ; secondly, the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 ; and finally

the close military relationship with Pakistan.

SOVIET UNION

"The Soviet Union Shared the Indian view on the maintenance of peace and the elimination of racialism and colonialism. On these issues it has supported the Afro - Asian stand in the United Nation and elsewhere . When matters vitally concerning our national security and integrity, such as, Goa, Kashmir and more lately Bangladesh, became subjects of international controversy, the Soviet assessment of the merits of the case coincided largely with our own³⁴. So said Indira Gandhi in 1972. Following the possibility of a split between East and West Pakistan, the Soviet Union seemed to have visualised India's position as a major power in the region. Moreover, the impressive victory of India over Pakistan in 1971 reinforced the view that India had emerged as a strong and cohesive power.

The Soviet Union had indeed fully supported the Indian liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule in December 1961. In 1955, the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin, and Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party, had visited India. At a civic reception held in Madras, Bulganin said, "There is no justification for the continued existence of the Portuguese colony of Goa on the territory of India. This is a shame to civilised people. The sympathies of the Soviet people are always on the side of those fighting

34. Indira Gandhi, " India and the World", Foreign Affairs , Vol. 51, No.1, October 1972, p.20.

colonialism"³⁵. On Kashmir, the Soviet Premier said in Srinagar on December 9, 1955 that it was a northern part of India. Khrushchev's statement on December 10, 1955 was more categorical. He said, "Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have themselves decided to become a part of India"³⁶.

In the 1970's, the United States, China and Pakistan together were encircling India. The Nixon Administration started its diplomatic rapprochement with China. The close ties between Pakistan and China enabled the Pakistan government to arrange for the secret diplomatic visit of Henry Kissinger to Beijing in July 1971. This was also the year of the prolonged Bangladeshi crisis. At a time when millions of Bengali refugees were flowing into the volatile Indian state of West Bengal. Assam and Tripura to escape Pakistani military oppression, the Nixon administration's policy was to avoid alienating Pakistan, the ally of China, so that U.S. efforts to normalise relations with China would not be jeopardised. Indeed, Kissinger threatened not to dissuade China from intervening in the Subcontinent on Pakistan's behalf should India resort to force to solve the Bangladesh issue. The complex experiences of 1971 led India to fear the development of a U.S.-China-Pakistan security axis³⁷.

35. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 28, 1955.

36. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), December 11, 1955.

37. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1986), P.31.

Therefore, India turned increasingly to the Soviet Union. As Indira Gandhi said, "The treaty of Peace and Friendship [in] 1971 affirms the determination of both countries for greater cooperation in various fields and to consult one another, if need be, on suitable measures to safeguard their peace and security. It contains no secret clauses, nor is it aimed against any country³⁸. The treaty was seen by Indian as a stabilising factor for peace and security. In the event of an attack or a threat from a third party, both countries would enter into immediate consultations to take appropriate measures to effectively counter such an attack. This treaty would act as a deterrent to any power which had aggressive designs on either country. Especially for India, the treaty was seen as a deterrent to American or Chinese intervention in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war³⁹.

Article 8,9 and 10 of the 1971 treaty had prohibited either side from entering into military alliances directed against the other, prohibited the giving of assistance to the other side's adversaries, required the contracting parties instead to enter into consultations to secure peace in the region and prohibited any secret or public agreement with other states that might cause military damage or disadvantage to the other contracting parties⁴⁰.

38. Indira Gandhi, " India and the World ", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No.1, October, 1972, p.20.

39. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton : Princeton University Press 1986), p.20.

40. Raju G.C. Thomas, The defence of India : A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics (New Delhi : Macmillan, 1978), pp. 58-60

In spite of the treaty, India opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Brezhnev's plan for a collective security pact in Asia in 1969 and Gorbachev's security pact in Asia, were not accepted either. In short, India Cultivated the Soviet Union as a balancer against the U.S. and China and as a source of weaponry. There was also an economic relationships. But the two were not allies in a strict sense.

THE UNITED STATES

The United states of America emerged as one of the Suerpowers in the post World War II era. The major objective of American foreign policy was the containment of communism and Soviet expansionism by rearmament, military alliances and economic and military aid to friendly nations. On the other hand, India opposed the cold war and the bloc system in international politics. It refused to align itself with either power bloc. India adopted a nonalignment policy. Nonalignment meant no permanent involvement with any military bloc. India would be friends to all and would not join any alliances. Therefore, the United states and India differed on the basic tenets of the international system. The U.S. was in search of an ally in South Asia. The American search culminated in the Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty and Pakistan's entry into SEATO and CENTO in May and October 1954 and August 1959, respectively⁴¹.

41. Anita Inder Singh," The Superpower Global Complex and South Asia", in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, (eds), South Asian Insecurity and The Great Powers (London : Macmillan, 1986) p.208.

The U.S. supplied sophisticated arms and weapons to Pakistan in the 1950's and 1960's under the term of the alliance. In addition, the American stand on Kashmir remained pro-Pakistani and unsympathetic to India. On the other hand, during the 1962 war with China, when the Government of India made an urgent appeal to Washington for military supplies to meet the Chinese threat. The U.S. responded positively. The first consignment of US arms arrived on November 3, 1962, while the pact between the two countries was signed on November 14, 1962.⁴² The global fight against communism no doubt prompted the US and UK to offer India military help during her disastrous war with China, yet this was a time of strategic closeness between the two countries. In 1965, during the war with Pakistan, Washington remained more or less neutral. Its decision to cut off arms supplies to both countries helped India because Pakistan was more heavily armed with U.S. weapons.

The 1971 Bangladesh crisis saw a determined but unsuccessful Nixon - led U.S. effort to help Pakistan avoid a war with India. During the war, the United States tilted towards Pakistan without in any way affecting the outcome of the war. In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. faced intense criticism at home for its handling of the whole affair as well as bitter disillusionment in Pakistan⁴³. The US openly backed Pakistan in the 1971

42. D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 , (Bombay : Tulsishah Enterprises, 1968), p.64.

43. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 152-153.

war but the most serious engagements with India was its deployment of the USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal. The memory of that act has not yet been erased in India's security thinking.

The victory of the 1971 war convinced the United States that India as a major power was bound to play an important role in Asia. For the first time, President Nixon acknowledged India as South Asia's most powerful country. The breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh produced official U.S. recognition of new political realities on the Subcontinent. Nixon expressed his desire in 1973 to "Join with India in a mature relationship founded on equality, reciprocity and mutual interests"⁴⁴.

Relations were again strained, this time by the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA). Under this act, the U.S. Government is required to stop sales of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant (TAPP) near Bombay after March 1980, unless India submits all its nuclear facilities to regular comprehensive inspections, what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) calls " Full scope safeguards"⁴⁵. In fact, India was the primary target of the 1978 Non- Proliferation Act, which places strict conditions on the nuclear energy programmes of any country buying fuel from the United States.

44. Francine R. Frankel, " India's Promise" , Foreign Policy , No 38, Spring 1980. p.53.

45. Ibid., p.54.

However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought an instant revival of American links with Pakistan. The Symington Amendment was repealed. The U.S. ban on arms for Pakistan, imposed after it was revealed that Islamabad had secretly established a nuclear plant to produce weapons grade uranium was immediately lifted. The US administration dispatched in January 1980, \$ 400 million of military and economic aid for Pakistan in the name of containment of Soviet communism. Pakistan was using the Afghan crisis to bolster its forces against India. Not surprisingly, the military aid programme had an adverse impact on Indo-U.S. relations.

The Rajiv Gandhi period showed some improvement in Indo-US relations and the United States gradually started realising the complexities of Indian security. President Reagan signed National security Decision Directive (NSDD-147) on October 11, 1984, instructing U.S. Government agencies to seek improved relations with India by accommodating Indian requests for dual (civilian and military) technology⁴⁶. The United States was interested in building a defence supply relationship with India from the mid 1980's onwards in order to both enlarge its own ties and reduce Soviet leverage with India. Nevertheless, tensions remained. India continued to be at odds with the U.S. over proliferations. From 1989, there have been differences over Kashmir. India continues also to be suspicious of U.S. Policies towards Pakistan. The Brown Amendment of 1995 which

46. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1994), p.157.

allows Pakistan to buy arms against its earlier payment for F-16 aircraft has caused India to increase its defence budget to match Pakistan's purchases. The U.S. therefore remains a concern of Indian security even though a long term commercial and trading relationship is being built.

INDIAN ARMED FORCES

Until the 1971 war with Pakistan, the 1962 war with China had been the most significant factor in India's short history as an independent nation state. Since that humiliating defeat, successive Indian governments have purposely given defence a high profile to ensure that among both the voting public and regional adversaries there is sufficient confidence that India is well defended⁴⁷.

After 1962 the key change in Indian defence planning was that India faced a two front threat which could only be met by raising force levels. After the war, a defence perspective plan was drafted which recommended expanding all three services. The army was to be enlarged by raising ten mountain divisions (basically infantry divisions with more vehicles and lighter weaponry), six additional infantry divisions and a second armed division. This allowed the Army to increase its pre- 1962 strength of nine divisions to 25 by the time the 1971 Indo- Pakistani war broke out. Six new ordinance factories were set up to produce small arms and ammunition.

47. Chris Smith, India's Adhoc Arsenal : Defence or Drift in Defence Policy (Oxford ; SIPRI : Oxford University Press, 1994) . p. 4.

The Air Force, Similarly, was to be raised to 45 squadrons and a phased withdrawal of its subsonic aircraft was to be carried out. The Air Force now was to be built around two types of Supersonic aircraft (the MIG - 21 and the HF-24) backed up by the transonic Gnat⁴⁸.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi understood the need for the military and kept defence preparedness up. In 1971, this paid off in the victory in East Pakistan. This triumph restored the confidence of the military and revealed the progress that it had made⁴⁹, In 1974 India conducted the Pokhran nuclear test on May 18. The Canadians immediately stopped all further technical aid and the industrial countries including the Soviet Union formed the London Suppliers group with the object of denying technology to all those countries which would not accept safeguards⁵⁰. Still, the Bangladesh victory and Pokhran nuclear test projected an improved image of Indian power, India had become a victorious military power and the sixth nuclear power.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created a new cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The new cold war impinged upon the Indian Subcontinent in three ways: Firstly the Soviet invasion of a

48. Raju G.C. Thomas, The Defence of India : A Budgetary Perspective (New Delhi : Macmillan, 1978), p. 191.
49. George. K. Tenham, Indian Strategie Thought : An Interpretive Essay. (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1992), p.73.
50. K.Subrahmanyam, " Indira Gandhi's Quest for Security". Strategic Analysis, Vol. XI, No.4, July 1987, p. 392

country within the Subcontinent confronted India with some awkward policy choices⁵¹. Secondly, started under Carter but pursued with a great deal more commitment by the Reagan Administration, the evolution of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and deployment at both Diego Garcia and several Indian Ocean littoral states presented India with new perceived security threat from the Indian ocean⁵². Thirdly, the decline in East-West relations and the invasion of Afghanistan were accompanied by a revival of the containment forward defence policies of the 1950's⁵³.

India had to respond these threats. The period 1980-87 was marked by a major military build up. The Army acquired T-72 tanks, Bofors 155 mm howitzers, and BMP-2 ICV's (infantry combat vehicles). The Air Force emerged with one of the most modern fleets in the developing world : Mirage 2000's, MIG-23s, 27s and 29s and the Jaguar ground attack aircraft. It built up a strategic transport component with acquisition of the IL-76. The most spectacular growth however, was of the Navy. The Navy got a second aircraft carrier equipped with squadrons of Sea Harrier aircraft. Harriers now equipped two carriers. Also purchased TU-142 long range maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, India leased a Charlie I nuclear attack submarines from the Soviet's⁵⁴.

51. Chris Smith, India's Adhoc Arsenal : Defence or Drift in Defence Policy (Oxford, SIPRI : Oxford University Press, 1994), p.106.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Amit Gupta, " Determining India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine", Asian Survey Vol. XXXV, No.5, May 1995, p.448.

The build up was possible for number of reasons. Firstly, India's foreign exchange situation had improved by the early 1980's to the extent that it was able to procure major weapons from Britain, France, Germany and Sweden. Secondly, throughout the 1980's, the Soviets offered India virtually every conventional weapon System in their inventory, often before supplying the Warsaw Pact countries⁵⁵. And finally, the political leadership sought to use India's military strength to pursue its foreign policy goals⁵⁶. India always opposed outside intervention in the region. It criticised Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean. India had to face the hard reality of outside support to Pakistan. In response, it is said that Indira Gandhi evolved the "Indira doctrine" in 1983 to prevent external powers from exploiting the internal crises of other South Asian states. Changes in the Indian strategic environment over the last thirty years have produced significant shifts in Indian defence policies. However, these changes have rarely, if ever, been officially assessed and communicated through strategic doctrines. There has been, for instance, no Nehru, Gandhi, or Desai defence doctrine similar to an Eisenhower, Nixon or Brezhnev doctrine. Instead, Indian defence policy has usually been characterised by flexibility and ambivalence⁵⁷. The largest military exercise "Operation

55. Ibid., p. 448.

56. Ibid., p. 448

57. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton : Princeton University Press., 1986), p.14.

Brasstacks” was conducted under the leadership of K. Sundarji in 1987. It used for the first time Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Divisions (RAPIDS), each division had one mechanised brigade that provided it with greater mobility and allowed it to be mobilised quickly for either defensive or offensive purposes. Sundarji also planned to set up Reorganised Army Mountains Infantry Divisions (RAMIDS) and an Air Assault Division. The RAMIDS were equipped with more modern artillery, and were to have greater mobility and firepower by employing four types of helicopters—light, utility, heavy and attack⁵⁸. The development of this new force structure was put down in Sundarji’s 1987 perspective plan Army 2000. According to this plan, by the year 2000 the Army was to build upto a force level of 45 (from 34) divisions including four tanks divisions, eight mechanised infantry divisions, seven RAPIDS and two Air Assault Division⁵⁹.

INDIAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN SRI LANKA

India’s policy toward Sri Lanka passed through three phases following the eruption of violence between the Sinhalese ethnic majority and the Tamil speaking minority in July 1983. The first phase, was from July 1983 to July 1987; the second phase from July 1987 to September 1989 ; and the

58. General K. Sundarji, “ Interview”, Indian Defence Review ,January 1988, p.38.

59. Amit Gupta, “Determining India’s Force Structure and Military Doctrine” , Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, NO. 5., May 1995, p. 450.

final phase from September 1989 to the complete withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)⁶⁰.

In the first phase, the ethnic conflict erupted between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority in 1983. Tamils constitute only 20 percent of Sri Lanka's population . There was violence against Tamils that rocked Colombo in 1983 which were unprecedented in scale and dimension. Significantly, the Liberation Tiger's of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leadership largely belongs to the fisherman caste and, consequently, has strong ties with the counterpart community in Tamil Nadu. It is, therefore, quite explicable that a vociferous section of the Tamil Nadu leadership began pressing the Union leadership to intervene vigorously in Sri Lankan affairs and secure the rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils, despite the Union Government's initial reluctance to enlarge its extra territorial responsibilities⁶¹.

New Delhi tried to resolve the ethnic crisis by mediating between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil separatists. It is also believed that state governments in Tamil-Nadu often acted independently of the Central government. The training and equipping of Sri Lankan guerrilla forces by Tamil Nadu began, for instance, prior to the anti Tamil riots in July 1983.

60. Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine", Asian Survey, Vol., xxxi, No.4, April 1991, p. 353.

61. P.R. Chari, "The IPKF Experience in Sri Lanka (Urbana, Illinois : ACDIS, University of Illinois, February 1994), p.3.

Restrictions imposed by the Central Government on the activities of these forces in October and November 1986 were nullified by Tamil Nadu's non cooperation.

In the second phase, the Tamil demands in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Nadu factor in Indian politics congealed, providing both the backdrop to and the incentive for the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 29, 1987.⁶² Consequently, IPKF arrived in Sri Lanka on July 30, 1987, one day after the agreement was entered into provisions. The agreement included the following :

- * Both countries would not allow their territories to be used for activities prejudicial to the other's unity, territorial integrity and security⁶³.
- * That an early understanding would be reached between them on employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel to ensure that their presence would not prejudice Indo Sri Lanka relations⁶⁴.
- * Trincomalee or other Sri Lankan ports would not be made available for military use to other countries in a manner prejudicial to India's interests⁶⁵.

62. P.R. Chari, The IPKF, The IPKF Experience in Srilanka (Urbana, Illinois :ACDIS, University of Illinois, February 1994) p.3.

63. Ibid., p.3.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

- * The two countries would undertake the work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank farm⁶⁶.
- * Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organisations would be reviewed to ensure that they would not be used for military or intelligence purposes⁶⁷.

At the time the treaty was signed, the cold war had revived due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. On the other side, the massive weaponisation of Pakistan was initiated by the United States and its allies. Subsequently, Pakistan became the frontline state for Western countries in the name of the containment of Soviet communism. The Indian Ocean became the playground for the superpower navies. India's concerns about Trincomalee increased with the Sri Lankan Government's proposal in 1981 to lease some one hundred disused World War II oil storage tanks there to make them the nucleus for enlarged refuelling facilities. These could be used by U.S. forces and would complement the oil storage facilities established in Diego Garcia. Routine access to Trincomalee would thus be available to U.S. naval vessels transiting to Diego Garcia from Singapore⁶⁸.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

Secondly, India's concern with "foreign broadcasting organisations" derived from an agreement that Sri Lanka has entered into with the United States to permit expansion and upgrading of the Voice of America (VOA) relay station at Chilaw. India was apprehensive that this radio station would be utilised to spread disaffection against countries that opposed the United States⁶⁹.

Third, Israel's Mossad and Shin Bet, and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and various mercenary agencies were involved in Sri Lankan assistance. There might have been extended into Tamil Nadu. Thus India's security was threatened in three ways.

Under the terms of the agreement, the Indian Army was charged with guaranteeing and enforcing the "Cessation of hostilities" in Sri Lanka, while the Indian government pledged to take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka⁷⁰." It was during this period that intermittent but heavy fighting broke out between the Indian Army and recalcitrant Tamil insurgents in the northern and eastern regions of Sri

69. J.P. Anand, "India's Indian Ocean Neighbours", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XII, No 2, May 1989, pp.155-52.

70. Kumar Rupesinghe, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia : The Case Study of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)", Journal of Peace Research, No.25, December 1990, p. 146.

Lanka. The Indian presence also produced a violent backlash among radical Sinhalese nationalists in the southern parts of the island⁷¹.

The third phase of India's involvement in Sri Lanka began in September 1989 when, under heavy pressure from Colombo, New Delhi agreed to withdraw the IPKF by the end of the year. Finally, the IPKF was removed in March 1990. At the time of withdrawal, official estimated casualties were 1100 dead and 2,800 wounded⁷².

The Indian strategy had been to stabilise the situation in Sri Lanka, through diplomacy and military operation (IPKF), to protect the Tamil minority from government security forces and to forestall the intervention of external forces, primarily Pakistan and the United States. That is why Rajiv Gandhi supported the legitimate rights of Sri Lanka's Tamils within the frame work of a united Sri Lanka. Importantly, the Sri Lankan Tamils are ethnically very close to the Tamils of Tamil Nadu, so the domestic pressure had mounted and under pressure Rajiv Gandhi had to order the Indian Air Force to parachute relief supplies into the Jaffna Peninsula in June 1987. It can be said that the IPKF was the response of both internal and external threat to India's security. James Spain, the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka, described the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of July 1987 as "a short,

71. Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine". Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI, No 4, April 1991, p.353.

72. Ibid.

pithy, very brave and constructive agreement".⁷³

OPERATION CACTUS IN THE MALDIVES

The significance of the Maldives for New Delhi lies in the island's strategic location, 450 miles from India's south west coast. A former British military airfield is located on Gan Island in the southern most part of the chain. Among the suitors for access to Gan over the years has been the Soviet Union, which first sought the rights to use it in the late 1970s, presumably as a counterweight to the American military presence on Diego Garcia, 240 miles to the southwest⁷⁴.

In this strategic location, the abortive coup in the first week of November 1988 was led by a group of mercenaries apparently recruited by disgruntled expatriate Maldivian citizens. The brain behind the operation was Abdulla Luthufee, a Maldivian businessman, who has been settled in Sri Lanka for years. With the help of his collaborator, Sagar Ahmed Nasir, who is reported to have made a fortune through smuggling arms to the Tamil militants, contact was established with the Peoples Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) led by Uma Maheshwaran. Uma Maheshwaran was

73. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of Indias Foreign Policy (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 159.

74. Devin T. Hagerty, "Indias Regional Security Doctrine", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI, No 4, April 1991, p.359.

promised US \$ 2.5 million and the use of one island in the Maldivian chain⁷⁵

The mercenaries infiltrated into the Maldives in small numbers, with the last batch of about 200 landing in the capital, Male, around 4.00 a.m. on November 3, 1988. Their plan was to mount a surprise attack on the 1500 strong National Security Service (NSS) capture President Gayoom in his palace and seize power. The plan fizzled out. The President took shelter in the NSS camp and made contact with the outside world. President Gayoom contacted the Governments of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and United States, but as clarified later, military help was sought only from India⁷⁶.

India's quick action in dispatching 1600 paratroopers not only negated the plans of the invaders, but also restored the democratically elected government. 'Operation Cactus' achieved its objectives in full and it took the mercenaries, who never expected such a rapid response from India, totally by surprise. In a chase across the high seas, the Indian Navy captured the 'Progress Light' and mopped up the remaining insurgents who tried to flee from the island⁷⁷.

The U.S. also welcomed Indian initiatives in the region. President

75. Thomas Abraham, "The SriLankan Link", Frontline (Madras), December 5, 1988, p.32.

76. The Hindu (Madras), November. 7, 1988.

77. Ibid.

Reagan congratulated New Delhi for its valuable contribution to regional stability. The U.S. Assistant Secretary, Richard Armitage, said, “ It does not make sense for the US not to have a congenial relationship with the largest democracy and the dominant military power in the subcontinent and with a country that will clearly take its place on the world stage in the 21st Century⁷⁸.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The internal security problems of Jammu and Kashmir did not emerge all of a sudden and the external factors have not alone caused the escalation of the Islamic militancy. When no cognisance was taken of the grievances of the people, they gained in dimension and complexity, resulting in a public outcry, agitation and ultimately in violence. The state government lost its popular mass base and did not take any hard decision to curb the militancy at the initial stages. It allowed the militancy to gain in strength and stature. The demoralised state police force established their own links with the militants to safeguard their own security and future career. The kidnapping of Home Minister's daughter was a watershed in the history of the militancy in Kashmir in 1989. The authorities surrendered, encouraging the militants to adopt the new instrument of kidnapping for their freedom. This was a

78. V. Suryanarayan, “ The Maldives and India Security” in Satish Chandra, B. Arunachalam and V. Suryanarayan, (eds), The Indian Ocean and Its Islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical perspectives, (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 1993), p.114.

golden opportunity for Pakistan to create dissatisfaction among disgruntled people against India in the name of Islam. The religious forces joined hands with Pakistan and its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The militancy was aided, abetted and guided by Pakistan. The Kashmir Problem in India's views, has always been a mixture of its own mistakes and external subversion. Pakistan has at various points interfered in Kashmir to try and wrest the state. Over the years, Kashmir became part of the wider geopolitics of the region, which non-regional power such as the U.S. becoming involved for its own ends-anticommunism and more lately non-proliferation. Thus in, 1947-48 Pakistani forces entered Kashmir, even before the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, by posing as tribesmen. They helped capture so called Pakistan - occupied Kashmir (POK). Pakistan, being an aggressor in Kashmir, it was asked to vacate the territory by the United Nations Security Council. But the United States complicated the issue to include all other Indo-Pakistani problems under the influence of its ally Pakistan. While, the United States did not challenge the legality of the Kashmiri accession to India and recognised Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, when it came to declare Pakistan an aggressor in the Security Council, the United States declined to do so. There was no official American criticism of the murder, arson, rape and terror perpetuated by the invaders in Kashmir with Pakistan's active help⁷⁹.

79. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1985), p.20.

The Indian approach to Kashmir was three fold : First, to defend Kashmir against external military threats from Pakistan; second, the use diplomatic means to prevent external, non-regional involvement in Kashmir. Here, the Soviet's were helpful in balancing against the West and by vetos in the U.N; and thirdly, India moved to integrate Kashmir within India with a special degree of autonomy signified by Article 370. There are three accords which helped integrate of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The first, the Instrument of Accession, was agreed to by the governments of Prime Minister Nehru and Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947.⁹⁸ The second accord , the Delhi Agreement, was reached between Nehru and Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah in 1952. It reaffirmed and reinforced the unique status and special rights granted to Kashmir in Article 370 of the 1950 Indian Constitution⁸¹. In February 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir ratified the decesion⁸². The third, the Kashmir Accord, was struck between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah in 1975. This agreement made accession to India final. Article 370 was reaffirmed⁸³.

80. Robert G. Wirsing, "The Kashmir Conflict", Current History, Vol. 95, No. 600, April 1996, p.175.

81. Ibid., p. 175.

82. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1985), p. 44.

83. Robert G. Wirsing, "The Kashmir Conflict", Current History, Vol. 95 No. 600, April 1996, p.175.

PUNJAB

The Punjab problem was the result of shortsighted political policies. The creation of a separate state of Punjab was one of the reasons that culminated in the volatile situation in the 1980's. The Akali agitation drifted into the hands of Bhindranwale and the extremists and though both the Congress and Alkalis tried to limit and manipulate the religious instrument in Punjab politics but they lost control in the circumstances of the late 1980's.

Earlier, the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) control over the Akal Takht had been particularly useful for the Alkalis and in their hands SGPC became an important political weapon. The turning point came in Punjab politics, when the Congress persuaded Bhindranwale to field his men to contest the SGPC elections against the Akalis in 1979⁸⁴. The political leadership of the Akalis weakened and extremist elements began to dominate the scene. The little known religious preacher Bhindranwale emerged as a major force in Punjab politics by the early 1980's. In the meantime, the Akali party started the movement for autonomy on the basis of the controversial Anandpur Saheb resolution of 1973. The Anandpur Saheb resolution, which has three different versions in circulation, has among other things urged greater state power, the limitation

84. D.P. Sharma, The Punjab story : Decade of Turmoil , (New Delhi : APH Publishing, 1996), p.26.

of Central intervention in matters of defence, foreign affairs, post and telegraph, currency and railways, and readjustment of the state's boundaries⁸⁵. This resolution also for the first time described the Sikhs as a nation and was later endorsed by the SGPC and Akali Dal⁸⁶. The Dharam Yudh Morcha launched by the Alkalis in August 1982 confirmed the extent to which unbridled rivalry in the religious and political sphere had contributed to a break down of the system.

The first time the cult of terrorism surfaced with sectarian feuds between the Akalis and Nirankaris in Punjab in the 1970s. The Akali-Nirankari clash on Baisakhi Day in 1978 was a watershed in Punjab politics. Significantly, Bhindranwale, who used the religious factor, emerged as a kind of messiah of a separate State. The political leadership could not understand Bhindranwale's true intentions and the nation had to pay in terms of thousands of innocent lives and the peace of the state.

The demand for a Sikh homeland was first raised in 1946 by a small group of Akalis led by the late Master Tara Singh. Though the demand did not get much support, it was kept alive by some extremists who went abroad and campaigned for a Sikh homeland. Khalistan or Khalsa country, the term was coined in 1947 by Kapur Singh, a professor of Comparative

85. Nancy Jetly, "India : The Domestic Dimensions of Security", in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, (eds), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers , (London : Macmillan, 1986), p.52.

86. Ibid., p.52.

Religions at Oxford University, England, and an advisor to the then Maharaja of Patiala⁸⁷. Later, it found some response from extremist groups on the fringes, notably the Dal Khalsa, under the broad patronage of Bhindranwale. The movement under Bhindranwale since 1980 changed the contours of the agitation from a party stir to a religious stir encompassing divergent orientations and rationales, further diminishing the prospects of a negotiated settlement⁸⁸. By failing to take prompt action against Bhindranwale and religious fanaticism, the government deliberately allowed the situation to escalate for narrow political advantage⁸⁹.

During the early 1980s, Sikh and Hindus became greatly polarised in their identities and forces were unleashed which became difficult to control. Between August 1982 and 1984 almost 600 people were killed by the terrorists, 200 alone in the two weeks before June 6, 1984. The victims included Hindus as well as moderate Sikh politicians, businessmen, and other civilians. There was also sporadic killing of policemen, both Hindu and Sikh, who were perceived as symbols of government authority⁹⁰. Under these conditions, when all the peace appeals had failed and when even heavy deployment of paramilitary forces such as BSF, CRPF and SSB, apart

87. D. P. Sharma, Punjab Strory: Decade of Turmoil, p.33.

88. Nancy Jetley, “ India: The Domestic Dimensions of Security, p.52

89. Ibid., p.53.

90. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1986), p.60.

from the Punjab Police, could not restore law and order in the state, the Central Government on June 2, 1984 decided to call in the Army to aid the civil authorities in Punjab. The Army moved into the Golden Temple on the evening of June 5, 1984. The mission of the Army was to restore the sanctity of this sacred shrine by clearing it of the extremists. The mission was accomplished by the early morning of June 7, 1984⁹¹. Operation "Blue Star" hurt the Sikh psyche and pride. To an extent, the anti national activities of the terrorists and their death in this operation were legitimised by the Sikh Panth. Army troops mutinied at Ganganagar, Ramgarh, Jammu and Pune⁹². This was the most serious crisis of discipline and loyalty for the nation's security.

The Rajiv - Longowal Accord 1985 intended to normalise conditions in the Punjab. Unfortunately, Longowal was assassinated by Sikh extremists a few days after the agreement was signed. The elections were held in Punjab but the new Akali Government led by Surjit Singh Barnala could not survive under heavy assault of militants. Finally, Operation "Black Thunder" in 1988 had to clear the Temple again. Finally, the Punjab came to normalcy in the 1990s.

The lack of foresightedness, and a clear vision had led Punjab into

91. D. P. Sharma, The Punjab Story: Decade of Turmoil , p.75.

92. Col. Ravi Nanda , National security Perspectives , policy and Planning (New Delhi : Lancers, 1991), p.112.

turmoil. It had allowed Pakistan to find an opportunity to meddle in India's internal affairs. In the course of more than a decade of terrorist violence, over 12000 persons were killed. This was the greatest threat to Indian security during the 1980's.

THE NORTH EAST REGION

The whole of the North Eastern area including Assam consists of seven States (Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya) with 10 percent of India's land mass and with rich natural resources. This is also a fragile area that was long neglected by the rest of India. Linked to India by a narrow 70 kms. corridor, it is surrounded by Bhutan, China, Burma and Bangladesh, The area is composed of many ethnic groups which also reside in the neighbouring countries. The whole area has been in a state of turmoil for four decades. The demand for greater autonomy or independence can be traced back to the time of India's independence. Abundant evidence exists on the meaningful ties that most of the ethnic groups have established with neighbouring countries the Nagas with Pakistan, Burma and China ; the Mizos with East Pakistan in 1963, with Burma in 1972, and with China in 1973 and 1975; the Meiteis (Manipur) with China and Burma in 1979; and the Tripuris (Tripura) with East Pakistan in the 1960's⁹³.

93. Harish Kapur, India's Foreign Policy 1947-92 : Shadows and substance, (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 1994), p.30.

Unchecked immigration in Assam and some other North East states has complicated the situation. The hated "outsider" is seen as threatening the ethnic balance in these states against the interests of the local population. For decades, the people in these states have experienced cultural insecurity and economic deprivation. .

NAGALAND

The insurgency in Nagaland was the bloodiest and lasted the longest (nearly three decades) but in 1975 the dominant underground faction signed what is known as the Shillong Peace. By this agreement, a separate state was carved out for the Naga tribe with the promise of safeguards cultural, ethnic, political as well as economic⁹⁴. The Naga insurgent movement started in the 1950 and it was led by A.N. Phizo. The Nagas finally realised that independence was not possible, then decided to settle the problem through a separate state. The new state was given special status under the Constitution, outsiders were forbidden to take up jobs or buy property there, and a subclause was added to the Constitution giving Nagas exclusive ownership of mineral resources in the region⁹⁵.

94. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role , Adelphi paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),. p. 25

95. Ibid., p.26.

MIZORAM

The Mizo Hills have geographical advantages for conducting guerrilla warfare, and the region has common borders with Burma and Bangladesh. Before the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan had assisted the Mizo movement with training and supplies. The Mizo demand for independence began in the early 1960's and was led by the Mizo National Front (MNF).⁹⁶ The MNF leader, Laldenga, was persuaded by two decades of bloodshed that even if he and the core of his followers survived the bush war they would not achieve sovereignty⁹⁷. It was possible by the early 1980's to reach a negotiated settlement with the Mizo majority. The MNF moved over ground, following an accord signed in 1985, and was elected to power in the election held specially under the accord. It was roundly defeated in the subsequent election, completing the process of its absorption into India's constitutional mainstream.⁹⁸

TRIPURA

Tripura's problem stemmed from the large number of Bengali immigration from Bangladesh. Consequently, a tribal majority state

96. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1986), p.63.

97. Shekar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1995), p.26.

98. Ibid., p.26.

converted was into a Bengali majority state. That is why the tribal population started a movement for autonomy within a defined area. The insurgent movement was led by the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) who established their bases in Bangladesh. The 1988 Accord ended the TNV insurgency in the Tripura. The Accord accommodated the basic demands of the tribals without compromising on national unity and integrity.

MANIPUR

The People's Liberation Army (PLA), a product of Meitei nationalism and communist ideology, is working for the liberation of the Manipur valley⁹⁹. Seeing the results that The secessionist groups in Nagaland were able to achieve, the PLA began to establish their own organisation. The people of this province were motivated mostly by economic hardships. By the mid 1970's, the PLA terrorist group started threatening the stability of the state.

CONCLUSION

India enjoyed a stable security environment during the 1950's. External security was mostly dependent on diplomatic means and a low

99. Nancy Jetly, "India : The Domestic Dimensions of Security," in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, (eds), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers , (London : Macmillian, 1986), p.48.

defence budget. The humiliating military debacle in 1962 was a turning point in Indian security planning and defence set-up. The 1965 war was not a victory for India in real terms. That War emboldened Pakistan to take the steps in the East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the 1971 war. The clear superiority of Indian arms demonstrated in 1971 has contributed significantly to the years of peace between India and Pakistan since then.

It was only after the 1971 victory over Pakistan that the world recognised India as a regional power. This did not end India's security problems but it did bring greater stability to the region, at least from India's point of view, until the internal issues in India began to be linked to the external in the 1980. Two other events which took place in the 1970's deepened the international perception of India as a growing power. The first was the Pokharan nuclear explosion in 1974 and the second the resumption of India's naval growth.

During the 1980's, the term 'regional power' began to be used in relation to India for the first time. Four events took place in the latter part of the 1980's ; first, the dispatch of the IPKF to Sri Lanka; second, the acquisition of a nuclear powered submarines; third, intervention in the Maldives; and fourth, the test firing of Agni and Prithvi missiles.

Internal security was the greater threat to security for India during the latter part of the Cold War. The case of Kashmir, Punjab, and the North East took the form of both external and Internal threat. Internally, the

Political leadership failed to pay enough attention initially. The need was for a political solution but ultimately the military solution was opted for because outside forces started aiding and abetting secessionist forces. The Cold War, geopolitical dimension aggravated the deteriorating situation in Kashmir. Broadly, then, we can say that internal stability is essential for external security and vice versa.

CHAPTER THREE

INDIAN SECURITY IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD:

EXTERNAL DIMENSION

National security as a protection against external threats is perceived to be the primary goal of all nations. Even those nations who do not have a recognisable adversary place this goal in the forefront. The absence of any threat does not mean that it will not emerge in the future. This aspect of external security applies to India. For a peninsular nation suspended from the roof of the Himalaya's and historically the largest of innumerable aggression, invasions emanating from the outside were the focal point of the original Indian concept of national security¹.

Most of the security problems faced during the Cold War Period by India have been passed on to the post Cold War era. But new developments and new changes in global politics have made India face not only similar problems but also new ones. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India has lost a faithful and reliable ally which would have bailed out India in any embarrassing situation whether it is security threat at the border or diplomatic activities at the UN Security Council. Secondly, the arms supply

1. Harish Kapur, India's Foreign Policy, 1947-92, (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 1994), p.18

from the erstwhile Soviet Union has also been disrupted and with the dismantling of the 'Rupee-Rouble Agreement', this has become more difficult.

The Gulf War of 1991 has demonstrated the inferiority of Russian military equipment which India has armed itself with and brought home a feeling that in terms of military superiority the U.S.'s arms are more efficient. The cryogenic deal cancellation under the pressure of the US and the Russian demand for making South Asia a nuclear free zone go against India's interest. The cryogenic cancellation showed that Russia is more interested in to cooperating with the US than its old relationship with India. But a very significant development in India's security is the reduction in tension between Indian and China.

Hence, in examining the traditional external threats to India from Pakistan and China and the more recent one from the U.S., the dramatic impact on India's security of the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War must be understood clearly². The security framework of a country changes with corresponding changes in the global and regional security environment. India's security concerns are a function of global changes which influence the behaviour of the regional players.

2. Ravi Rikhye and Pushendra Singh, "External Threats and India's Conventional Capabilities," in Bharat Karnad, (ed), Future Imperilled: India's Security in the 1990's and Beyond (New Delhi : Vicking, 1994), pp.84-115.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan, broadly speaking, poses three kinds of threats to Indian security. First of all, it has built up a formidable conventional force and likely has nuclear weapons as well. Secondly, it has mobilised various Muslim countries against India at key moments. Finally, it has been involved in India's internal quarrels particularly in Kashmir and Punjab but also in terrorism more generally.

Pakistan is a perennial threat to Indian security. Since independence, India has been forced to fight three major conventional wars against Pakistan. The modernisation and expansion of the Pakistan Armed Forces have increased the security threat to India. After the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front line ally of the United States and its allies and received \$ 3 billion worth of modern and sophisticated arms, from the West and especially from the U.S.

The end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the disintegration of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the favourable position of Pakistan. The United States has much less strategic interest in Pakistan. At the same time in October 1990, the Pressler Amendment came into force and suspended all military supplies to Pakistan. Pressler stemmed from grave concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. The immediate consequences have been disastrous for the Pakistani armed forces which were midway towards being built up

and modernised with top-of-the line equipment including F-16 fighters, P-3C maritime reconnaissance/anti-submarine warfare aircraft, M-1A1 main battle tanks³.

In November 1995, the Congress passed the Brown Amendment and cleared the way for the resumption of American arms supplies to Pakistan⁴. This will destabilise the region and promote an arms race. India will be forced to respond. Apart from Pakistan's proven support to insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and other low intensity operations, in terms of its defence build up Pakistan has recently acquired 40 new F-7 frigates from China and ordered three new Agusta submarines for nearly one billion US dollars from France. Pakistan has also improved its relations with the United States and the result is Brown Amendment. Pakistan has got M-11 and Scud missiles from the time of the Afghanistan war and it can certainly destabilise and increase the security threat to India. In the post Cold War world period, India's defence expenditure has stayed at 2.5 percent of GDP but Pakistan has maintained its 7 per cent or more of GDP⁵.

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3. Ibid.
 4. Rahul Roy Chaudhuary, "The Brown Amendment : Implications for the Indian Navy", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVII, No.11, February, 1996. pp.1453-64.
 5. Swaran Singh, "Post Cold War World Order and India's National Security" Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No.4, July 1995, p.531.

China remains the main source of supply of heavy equipment, the bulk of which is main battle tanks, but there are American Patton tanks also. Pakistan is buying surplus equipment from European countries. Since, 1989, Pakistan has deployed its two short range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2. Pakistan has also been indigenously developing the Hatf-3 with a range of about 800 km, with extensive technological assistance from China, and this would be capable of striking Delhi from positions deep inside Pakistan⁶. Recently, Pakistan has deployed the nuclear weapon capable M-11 Chinese missile in the vicinity of its border with India⁷. China has also transferred 5000 ring magnets for Pakistan's nuclear program and is assisting Pakistan to set up its plutonium production reactor at Khushub⁸. The M-11's have a range of about 400 km's with a payload of 800 kg which is big enough to carry a nuclear warhead. Pakistan has enough fissile material and weapons technology to fabricate several nuclear bombs and may have already built up to 15 nuclear bombs⁹.

On the other side, the Pakistan Air Force has enough combat aircraft in its inventory i.e. F16's, Mirage 111/5, and F-6. In addition, Pakistan

6. The Hindu (New Delhi), June 15, 1996.

7. Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Pak-deploys M-11 missiles", The Hindu (New Delhi), June 13, 1996.

8. K. Subrahmanyam, 'India must Formulate Response,' World Focus, Vol.16, No.5, May 1995, p.16.

9. Times of India (New Delhi), February 1, 1995.

could acquire the Mirage 2000 because negotiations are going on with France. Simultaneously, the Brown Amendment has allowed a military hardware package to Pakistan worth \$ 368 million¹⁰. The Pakistan Naval Forces poses little threat to India because the Indian Navy is far superior. Britain has transferred six ex-Royal Navy type 21 and four Leander class frigates to Pakistan.

Pakistan has also mobilized Muslim states against India and this poses another long term threat to security. On the other hand, with the Soviet withdrawal from Muslim Central Asia and the formation of a fundamentalist mujahidien government in Kabul, India has nine Islamic countries on its north west flank. Previously, India had several friends among the Muslim countries to counter Islamic fundamentalism. These included Afghanistan and Iraq. Even though India has second largest Muslim population in the World. Pakistan, in the name of Muslim fraternity has an advantage in the Islamic world which it uses against India. Finally, Pakistan has had a hand in India's internal problems. The March 1993 RDX bombings in Bombay were planned and trained by the Inter Services of Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan¹¹. Pakistan sponsored activity seems to be shifting to the

10. Krishnaswami, "Fit case for Curbs on China Pak". The Hindu (New Delhi), June 6, 1996.

11. Shekhar Gupta, "The Memon's : India's Most Wanted Family", India-Today, April 15, 1993, pp.40-51.

metropolitan cities of India. The bomb blast at the Lajpat Nagar market in New Delhi is the most recent example of Pakistan's sponsored terrorism.¹²

In addition, although, India having been able to effectively control the situation in Punjab and peaceful Lok Sabha elections took place in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani interventions in India's domestic unrest continues. The ISI continues to be suspected of causing disruption and violence in Kashmir and as far away as the Northeast.

CHINA

Perhaps the most important development is for Indian Security is the Sino-Indian thaw, evident in the wide-ranging agreement between the Asian giants to freeze the border issue, embark on a programme of mutual disengagement and troop withdrawals, institute confidence building measures and increase trade and cultural relations¹³. Thus, both India and China have agreed to reduce the level of troops on the border, to delineate the line of control, open-up cross border trade and build confidence through a series of high-level military and civilian visits.

Narsimha Rao's visit to China was hailed as a 'land mark' by the Chinese and a 'watershed' by Indian officials. The several agreements

12. Sabina Sehgal Saikia, "Internal Security", Times of India (New Delhi), June 5, 1996.

13. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role , Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.56.

were signed during Prime Minister Rao's visit to China in 1993 to enhance mutual and equal security. These are as follows¹⁴.

- * To respect the line of actual control (LAC)
- * To hold consultations among military and scientific experts for delineating the LAC.
- * To implement troop reductions along the border through mutual consultation
- * To provide prior notification of military exercises
- * To avoid intrusions into each others airspace
- * China accepted the applicability of the LAC along with Sikkim border and India reiterated its familiar position on Tibet
- * To open a new border crossing between India and Tibet

The overall aim is to maintain peace and tranquility by stabilising the line of actual control. China has accepted Sikkim as an integral part of India. The Chinese Ambassador to India has denied its backing to any insurgencies in India and pleaded that the Kashmir problem should be tackled bilaterally through the Simla agreement. China has now adopted a position of 'careful neutrality' on Kashmir. It is also informed by the concern that a successful breakaway movement in Kashmir might inspire

14. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy. (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1994), p.83.

separation in its own Muslim majority provinces of Xinjiang and in Tibet, which are contiguous to Kashmir¹⁵. Both India and China have agreed that the border dispute needs to be resolved outside the political arena, based on the evidence of objective historical data and on administrative convenience of topography¹⁶.

Therefore, China is reconsidering or reformulating its old policy of 1950's. This policy includes the return of Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful co-existence incorporated into the 1954 Sino-Indian Treaty that governed relation between India and China and the global projection of a united front by the two countries to counter Western dominance¹⁷.

The new relationship with China has provided a significant gain for India. The demilitarisation of the border has already helped India to divert armed forces to the western front with Pakistan and for internal duties problems.

In addition, in a surprise move in 1995 China agreed to supply nuclear fuel for India's Tarapur plant to replace supplies cut off by Washington as

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15. Sandy Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War", Asian Survey, Vol XXV, No.10, October 1995 p.881.
 16. Raju G.C.Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990's , Adelphi Paper 278 (London : International Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1993), p.6
 17. Ibid., p.13.

part of its non proliferation policy¹⁸. Similarly, in December 1994, China also showed an interest in sharing its technologies and expertise by participating in India's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, as it has already mastered these advanced aircraft production techniques¹⁹.

Yet, Indian policy makers consider China, rather than Pakistan, India's major external threat due to its size, population and military strength including its nuclear capabilities. It was China's nuclear forces that gave it great power status in the 1970's, with some hundreds of Intermediate Range Ballistic missiles (IRBM), scores of Intercontinental Ballistic missiles (ICBM) and a clutch of strategic long range missiles that could hit targets 6000 miles away. China has also deployed its nuclear ballistic missiles in Tibet.

India is most concerned about the transfer of weapons and ballistic missiles technology to Pakistan and China's newfound friendship with Myanmar, which shares a long border with India. The Chinese are establishing refuelling facilities and a radar system in the south west of the Myanmar coastline. A major naval base is being planned for Bassein, hardly a days sailing from the Andaman Islands. The developments have

18. Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War", Asian Survey, Vol XXXV, No,10. October, 1995, p.880.

19. Swaran Singh, "Post Cold War World Order and India's National Security", Strategic Analysis , Vol. XVIII, No.4, July 1995, p. 530.

rattled Indian defence planners²⁰.

China has continued with its military modernisation and has consolidated its relation with Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka encircling India which can potentially make India's national security hostage to Chinese power projections. The border dispute continues to be central to Sino-Indian relations. It is also important that the cordial Sino-Indian relations of the 1950's eventually led to a conflict between the two countries in 1962. Therefore, learning from past experience and keeping in mind the present world scenario India needs to develop a balanced relationship with China.

RUSSIA

The erstwhile Soviet Union had been India's tested friend and ally, providing moral and material support whenever required. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has neutralised the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. Russian diplomacy has shifted away from India. Russia even supported Pakistan's proposal at the United Nations (UN) in 1991 to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia against the wishes of India²¹. This is first time Russia has done so.

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20. Ravi Rikhye and Pushpendra Singh, "External Threats and India's Conventional Capabilities" in Bharat Karnad, (ed.), Future Imperilled : India's Security in the 1990's and Beyond (New Delhi : Viking, 1994) p.98.
 21. Raju G.C.Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990's , Adelphi Paper 278 (London : International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1993), p.5.

Despite the attempts to maintain the arms, ammunition and spares pipeline, Indian policy makers are resigned to the demise of the security relationship with Russia. Even more than arms supplies, India is damaged by the loss of strategic partners²². The former Soviet Union always supported India at the UN on the Kashmir issue but now it cannot rely on a Russian veto.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has had not just military and diplomatic effects but also economic ones which are relevant to security. With the demise of Soviet Union, the "Rupee-Rouble trading" also collapsed. India cannot import Soviet military equipment at the old fixed rupee-rouble exchange rate. Economic deals with the newly independent Soviet Central Asian countries must also negotiated on the basis of international market prices. In January 1993, during Yeltsin's New Delhi visit, New Delhi and Moscow arrived at an amicable solution to the 'Rupee-Rouble' dispute. It was agreed that according to the calculations of the applicable exchange rate existing on January 1, 1990. India would repay 230 bn. roubles over 12 years in rupees and the remaining 140 bn.roubles in interest free instalments spread over 45 years²³.

22. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role , Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.61.

23. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1994), p.123.

Another rude shock came in 1993 when Russia reneged in the old agreement (1991) signed by its space hardware manufacturing company, Glavkosmos, to supply India with technology for cryogenic engines to be used in India's ongoing Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) programme. The deal was cancelled under intense US pressure. The deal has now been modified to include the supply of some engines, but no technology²⁴. India blamed the cancellation squarely on the United States. The cancellation of the deal would set back India's satellite programme. The United States imposed trade sanctions on both Russia and India for the violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Neither India nor Russia is the signatory to the MTCR.

In spite of these difficulties and differences, there are possibilities that India and Russia will discover new common concerns and interests. Russian policymakers have already begun to see the enormous commercial scope of expanding a modified security and technology relationship with India. Significantly, the new Russia appears to be more willing to share military technology with India than was the old Soviet Union. During Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit in 1994, the two countries formalised agreements to set up joint ventures in the field of civil and military aviation. India has entered into a series of arrangements with Russian companies that promise to enhance its own defence industrial base. Over the longer

24. Shekar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.61.

term, such a relationship should prove more efficacious in terms of building Indian power than the previous arrangements, which depended largely on off the self purchasing or licensing agreements that frequently amounted to little more than assembly of knocked down or semi knocked down kits²⁵. For example, the Russian aeronautical firm Mikoyan (designer of the MIG range) has established a joint venture with Hindustan Aeronautical Limited of India (HAL) to manufacture spare parts for the MIG range of aircraft. A new firm, known as Indo-Russian Aviation Private, has been established for this purpose and will also be involved in upgrading over 100 of India's MIG-21 aircraft. The partnership has considerable economical potential, since two thirds of the world's fighters are of Soviet origin and many are badly in need of refurbishing.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Yarov on a visit to India in 1994, talked of reviving the Soviet proposal to build a safeguarded 2000 MW nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu, besides finding ways to continue business in the fields of space and nuclear science without violating international regimes and agreements India got assembled cryogenic engine from Russia, and India has probably obtained a good deal of the technology for the engines. Finally, collaboration on other aspects of space research has also been stepped up²⁶. The Indian Air Force has already finalised the

25. Sandy Gordan, "South Asia After the Cold War", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No.10, October, 1995, p.882.

26. Ibid.,

deal for the SU-30K which outclasses both the French 2000-5 and US F-16's. And there is a talk about India buying an aircraft carrier, with Russia's Admiral Gorshkov being a strong contender.

The post Cold War security environment has brought India, Russia and the United States on the same plank on same issues. They are united in opposition to growing Islamic fundamentalism. India and Russia shares an interest in moderating the resurgent fundamentalism of Islam which could threaten the territorial integrity and border regions of both states. During his visit to India in January 1992, Senator Larry Pressler warned of the possibility of a threat from the confederation of nine Islamic States : five republics of the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran²⁷.

Developments in Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan concerns India, firstly, because of the damaging after effects of the disintegration of the Moscow-New Delhi axis; secondly, because of the desire to counter Pakistan's influence; thirdly, because of the goal of containing the spread of Islamic consciousness ; and finally, because of the need to insulate Muslim-majority Kashmir from the turmoil to the north²⁸. Therefore, during

27. The Statesman (Calcutta), January 12, 1992.

28. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics of Economics of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1994), p.135.

1991-92 India moved swiftly to establish direct links with the Central Asian republics, re-established diplomatic missions, exchanged high level visits and signed bilateral cooperation agreements.

Things have changed with Russia. But there are some common security concerns. The greatest importance of Russia lies in its potential revival as a strategic ally and even as a balancer to both the United States and China. Clearly, India's security establishment would like to encourage such a trend.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Emerging Indo-US military relations in the post Cold War period contrast with those of the Cold War era. The Bush Administration called on both India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully in accordance with the 1972 Simla agreement. The U.S. also threatened to brand Pakistan a terrorist sponsoring state if it did not stop training and arming the insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. This change in American policy produced widespread pro-American sentiments in India in the post Cold War period.

The Indian shift towards the United States was encouraged by the disastrous performance of Iraq's Soviet military equipment in the 1991 Gulf War, the success of high tech-Western weapons systems, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the urgent need for direct investment into the Indian economy. These changes led to India giving refuelling facilities to the US

military aircraft during the Gulf War.

A high level American defence delegation visited India at the Khadakvasla Defence Academy near Pune in India²⁹. This was followed by a series of other military exchanges which cleared the ground for a long term 'forces-to-forces' level relationship. Such Indo-US military cooperation assured Australia and the countries of South East Asia that Indian military growth poses no threat to their country³⁰.

At the same time, there are important security goals shared by both India and America. These include the security of Gulf Oil supplies, prevention of leakage of nuclear material, containment of Islamic fundamentalism and combating drug trafficking. As far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, the US is reducing its presence in the post Cold War world. It is important to the US to have a large, democratic and status quo power such as India on its side and positively engaged in regional security maintenance. India has already conducted exercises with at least 15 navies since 1991, many of them from outside the Indian Ocean³¹. The US presence is desirable in terms of oil security. India is more heavily dependent on Gulf oil to fuel its industrialisation.

29. Indian Express , (New Delhi), January 25, 1992.

30. Raju G.C. Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990's ,Adelphi Paper 278 (London : 11SS, July 1993), p.9.

31. Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War", Asian Survey, Vol.XXXV, No.10, October, 1995, p.884.

In the 1995, the visits of U.S. secretaries of Defence, Energy, Commerce and were signs of the growing relationship. New Delhi. The Defence Secretary, William Perry, signed the Indo-US Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for defence cooperation on January 13, 1995. Under this agreement, for the first time, the security component emerged as the most important aspect of post Cold War Indo-US ties. William Perry himself described it as “not only significant” but “historic”. Importantly, the new arrangements envisaged far more comprehensive naval exercise than had been held in the past and more comprehensive cooperation in defence production and research. It also established a “hot line” between the Pentagon and India’s Ministry of Defence. Four joint naval exercises have been held, one involving a US nuclear-powered submarine³². On the actual ground, various US companies have already been actively involved in India’s Light Combat Aircraft project. Besides, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) has shown great interest in India’s high altitude warfare expertise, like India’s successful operations at the Siachin Glacier. Similarly, the U.S.’s Pacific Command (PACCOM), which is responsible for all military strategy in the region, from India along the Pacific Asia rim upto Japan, has already taken initiatives for joint naval exercises.

India is interested in building strong defence ties with this sole military superpower of the world and has shown visible interest in obtaining state-

32. Sandy Gordon, “South Asia After The Cold War”. Asian Survey, Vol.XXXV, No.10, October 1995, p.886.

of-the-art technology. There are five factors influencing a closer security relationship between New Delhi and Washington. Firstly, the collapse of the Soviet Union removed a perennial irritant in Indo-US relations Indian defence forces have also turned their attention towards Washington. Secondly, the events in Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia increased the fears in both the countries about an emerging Islamic confederation. Thirdly, both the countries were concerned about a potential military axis developing between China and Pakistan. Fourthly, India opened its vast market through economic liberalisation and both countries attracted each other. Finally, the US rediscovered India as a well established democracy and emerging power.

Broadly trade, economics , commonly shared perceptions of regional stability and the threat of expanding militant Islam will be areas of agreement between India and the US in the near future. But the areas of disagreements are vast and capable of damaging the entire relationship³³. Firstly, Russia cancelled the cryogenic engine deal under intense US pressure in 1993³⁴. Earlier, the US had willingly allowed negotiations of take place for the sale of this system by Pratt and Whitney and later General Dynamic's. General Dynamics price was \$ 700 million for the engine without the transfer of technology. It was only when India decided to

33. Shekhar Gupta, "India Redefines its Role", Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.60.

34. Times of India (New Delhi), July 17, 1993.

purchase the cheaper Russian version for \$ 250 million including technology, that the US started an hue and cry. Whenever India clarified that the cryogenic engine was for India's space programme not military purposes, the US claimed that the transfer deal comes under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, the deal was reduced to engines but not technology. And Washington imposed a two year ban on trade and technologies transfer to both Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

Secondly, Pakistan has deployed the Chinese nuclear weapon capable M-11 missiles in the vicinity of its border with India³⁵. The latest transfer is part of an enduring patterns of nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan in the military sphere. The US is well aware that China has transferred ballistic missiles to Pakistan at least five years ago. These missiles have been with the Pakistani Army since March 1991³⁶. When the Chinese first advertised the M-11 in the late 1980's, it was supposed to have a range of 400km with a payload of 800 kg. This is well beyond the limits placed by the MTCR guidelines. Even this missile capability could be upgraded upto 600km. On the other hand, the US State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, has warned India about deploying ballistic missiles because there are very clear international restrictions on the

35. Atul Aneja, "Early deployment of Prithvi, Agni", Times of India, (New Delhi), June 6, 1996.

36. Jasjit Singh, "Indian Missiles Versus US Double Standards", The Statesman (New Delhi), June 20, 1996.

acquisition and use of ballistic missiles³⁷. India sees missiles as integral to its national security. In the context of the large number of countries in its vicinity, including the Central Asians, China, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who possess such missiles³⁸.

Thirdly, Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. Pakistan is conducting a proxy war in the name of Islam in Kashmir. Unfortunately under President Clinton, the US's pressure on Pakistan has eased. Thus, Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia said, "The instrument of accession did not mean that Kashmir was forever an integral part of India"³⁹. Her statements on Kashmir infuriated India. India was engaged at that time in a siege of armed Islamic militants barricaded inside the Hazratbal Mosque in Kashmir. The hurt was increased by US President Clinton's letter to American Congressmen and even to a self-confessed propagandist of Kashmiri terrorists in which Kashmir is mentioned as 'a disputed territory'.

US-India relations present a mixed picture therefore Obviously India is in need of foreign investment and is a vast market which attracts U.S.

37. "U.S. Will Oppose Nuke Deployment by India", The Hindu (New Delhi), June 16, 1996.

38. Jasjit Singh, "Indian Missiles Versus US Double Standards, "The Statesman (New Delhi), June 29, 1996.

39. Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.172.

commercial interests. The Indian Navy and US Navy have conducted joint exercises. There is American interest in defence production cooperation. The US also no doubt sees India as a force for long term strategic stability in South Asia and further afield. But over Kashmir, Pakistan and Proliferation, there are differences. The U.S. therefore remains a security concern for India though not perhaps a direct threat.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

One area of concern is non-proliferation. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was extended unconditionally and indefinitely on May 11, 1995. There were five declared nuclear weapon states (US, Russia, China, France and Britain) and 173 non-nuclear weapon states. Unfortunately, the international community has legitimised nuclear weapons. With its permanent extension, the world has been demarcated into 'haves' and 'have nots'. The non-nuclear weapon states reaffirmed their commitment not to conduct nuclear tests. In other words, these countries put an end to the problems of horizontal proliferation. On the other hand, the international community has given a free hand to five declared nuclear weapon states, a licence to have nuclear weapons forever. Simultaneously, these five powers are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

India, Pakistan and Israel are the nuclear weapon capable states and are not signatories to the NPT. On May 12, 1995, India reemphasized its stand against the discriminating arrangement envisaged in the nuclear non proliferation treaty. The indefinite extension of the NPT perpetuates these discriminatory aspects and provides legitimacy to the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. India has stated that will not sign the NPT in its present form but will continue to work for achieving genuine non-proliferation through elimination of all nuclear weapons⁴⁰.

India is pledged to a no first use of its nuclear weapons capability and to work towards a nuclear weapon free world⁴¹. India favours the elimination of nuclear weapons on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. It insists that the nuclear weapon states give an undertaking to dismantle their arsenals in a time-bound period. The first step should be no first use, the second step a verification regime, and finally international monitoring system.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

The United States is formulating a strategy with a view to completing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prior to the meeting of the 51st session of the UN General Assembly in September 1996⁴². Since 1994,

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40. Times of India (New Delhi), May 12, 1995.
 41. K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Must Formulate a Response", World Focus , Vol.16, No.5 , May 1995, p.17.
 42. Sridhar Krishnaswami, "US Counting on India over CTBT", The Hindu (New Delhi), January 31, 1996.

the 37 member Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been drafting the CTBT and 23 additional countries have been admitted into the conference in June 1996⁴³.

India has declared its inability to sign a global ban on nuclear testing. Ms. Arundhati Ghose, Indian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, said on June 20, 1996 that the current draft of "the CTBT is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and is not in India's national security interest"⁴⁴ India has been advocating global disarmament since the 1950's. This was not the CTBT that India envisaged in 1954. India argues that the present treaty only bans traditional nuclear explosions and new forms of testing, like laboratories tests by computer or hydro nuclear and sub-critical tests are ignored. To the extent that these are not covered Indian fears that the nuclear powers will go on refining their nuclear weapons which will endanger India.

India's national security especially is threatened by the open or clandestine nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan. India cannot restrict its own capability when other countries remain unwilling to accept the elimination of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive ban on all forms of testing. If China is able to carry on non-explosive testing it could provide

43. C.Raja Mohan, "Nuclear Power hijack CTBT talks", The Hindu, (New Delhi), June 20, 1996.

44. C.Raja Mohan, "India Says 'No' to CTBT at Geneva talks", The Hindu, (New Delhi), June 21, 1996.

Pakistan with weapons designs. Pakistan could therefore have weapons which it has not tested which have a high degree of reliability vis Chinese non-explosion tests.

India argues that the nuclear weapon states have a right to test their weapons for security while denying this right to others. The US Defence Secretary and National Security Adviser have declared that they need nuclear weapons for the next 50 years and beyond⁴⁵. Also, President, Clinton has said that the US will reserve the right to waive the treaty in consultation with the U.S. Congress on the grounds of supreme national interest and to conduct the necessary testing if the safety or reliability of U.S. nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified⁴⁶.

The Indian public seems opposed to any government signing the CTBT. As long as others have the capacity to threaten India with nuclear weapons, New Delhi is not prepared to sign a document which would cap its own evolving nuclear capabilities. In this sense, The CTBT is seen to be opposed to India's security.

45. K.Subrahmanyam, "Banning Nuclear Tests", Times of India (New Delhi), June 12, 1996.

46. J.Pasupathy, "Test Ban : Technical issues", The Hindu (New Delhi), February 6, 1996.

INDIAN DEFENCE

New challenges confront India's armed forces as they defend the country's security along 14,103 km. of land border including the 7000 km borders with Pakistan and China, a 7,600 km coastline, and a 2.5 million sq.km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In addition, more than 500 islands and offshore hydrocarbon installations are to be protected. The Himalayas in the north, the jungles in the east and the north east and the deserts and the swamps in the west, together make-up one of the most difficult terrains that any army has to operate in⁴⁷.

With the break up of the Soviet Union, Indian defence forces are facing severe problems in the post Cold War period. Soviet equipment constitutes around 70% per cent in the Indian forces. Spares and replacements are difficult to find. A critical task is to remove the shortage of spare parts, and now India has to deal with different former Soviet republics and factories separately. The indigenous production of spares is a lengthy process and it affects the readiness of the armed forces. The arms industry remains dependent upon the West and the former Soviet Union. The supply of technology has been restricted due to Western controls on technology exports⁴⁸.

47. John Cherian, "The Indian Army Faces up to New Challenges", Frontline (Madras), March 8, 1996, pp.4-8.

48. Amit Gupta, "Determining India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine", Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No.5, May 1995, p.456.

India was considered an emerging regional military power in the 1980's but now the financial crunch, budgetary cuts in defence expenditure and most importantly the collapse of the Soviet Union have changed the regional projection of power. That said, the growth in the Indian economy allowed the 1994-95 defence budget to be raised to Rs. 230 billion, the first real increase in defence spending in the 1990's⁴⁹.

On the other hand, significant improvement in relations with China have resulted in the withdrawal of Indian troops from some forward posts in the North East. On the Pakistani front, the threat remains. The present Army Chief, Gen. Shankar Roy Chowdhary, said that the major 'threat perception' emanated from Pakistan, which was once again billing itself as a 'front line' state on behalf of the United States. Islamabad's recent acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry has given the Indian Army cause to be extra vigilant⁵⁰.

Three major reviews have been carried out in the past three years to optimise the Army's organisational structure to make it more cost effective. The logistics system has been streamlined and consequently there has been an improvement in the Army's "teeth-to-tail" ratio which is one of the best in the world. The Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun has been cleared for

49. Ibid., p.455.

50. John Cherian, "The Indian Army Faces up to New Challenges", Front line, March 8, 1996, p.5.

mass production in 1996. So, the Indian Army has started the implementation of plan 2005 which has been formulated by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The thrust is on meeting about 70 per cent of the military's hardware requirements indigenously. The production of vital spares is high on the Plan 2005 agenda. The Government's strong support for the LCA and Arjun projects and Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao's repeated statements calling for self-reliance in defence matters show that the government is serious.⁵¹

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (1995-96) has noted that the Pakistan armed forces already have in their inventory surface-to-surface missile variants, Hatf-1, Hatf-2 and Hatf-3 and are also in possession of nuclear capable M-11 missiles from China. The committee said it was imperative for the Government to take a quick decision on the induction and deployment of the Prithvi missiles⁵². Pakistan has already deployed the M-11 nuclear capable Chinese missiles. Therefore India must deploy the Prithvi missile. At the same time, the longer range, Agni, missiles must be further developed and inducted into operational service at an early date. Thus, the Indian Army is gearing up to meet the new challenges of the post Cold War era.

51. Ibid.,

52. Ibid.,

INDIAN ARMY

The Indian Army is organised into thirty four divisions with three armoured, nine mountains, three RAPIDS (Reinforced Army Plains Infantry Divisions) and nine infantry Divisions. There are three strike corps and another eight Holding Corps⁵³. Presently, five divisions are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir and three in the North Eastern. The reserve brigades are usually held as Army Headquarters Reserve. The Indian Army is in need of Rs.1000 crores for upgradation and modernisation of weapons. It is looking, among other things, for new self-propelled guns, anti-tank missiles and transport aircraft.

INDIAN AIR FORCE

The Indian Air Force has 45 squadrons, and it has been modernised and trained to fight in a two front war : Pakistan and China. Air power is the prime determinant of war on land or sea, as was seen during 'Operation Desert Storm' in the Gulf War of 1991. The induction of the first light combat aircraft (LCA) is due in 1997. The sixty six Advanced Jet Trainers at a cost of Rs. 3,500 crores are under negotiations. The Negotiations are also in progress with Russia for the purchase of 30SU-30 aircraft.⁵⁴

53. Ravi Rikhye and Pushindra Singh, "External Threats and India's Conventional Capabilities", in Bharat Karnad, (ed.), Future Imperilled, (New Delhi : Viking, 1994), p.111.

54. Avirock Sen, "Defence : Battling for Attention", India Today, June 30, 1996, pp.78-79.

INDIAN NAVY

The Indian Navy has 140 ships of various sizes and functions. The strategic location of the Indian peninsula in the centre of the arc of the Indian Ocean littoral requires India to play a major role in the Indian Ocean in the post Cold War world. The Indian navy is beset by the poor state of maintenance and preparedness. This is illustrated by the flooding of the engine room of INS Virat which remained in the dock for nearly six months. In May 1994, the Navy's other aircraft carrier; INS Vikrant had a fire on board, resulting in two deaths. The Indian Navy is now seriously looking at the 4400 tonne Ukrainian aircraft carrier as a replacement for the INS Vikrantt⁵⁵. The navy is also looking for Airborne Early Warning systems to counter Pakistan's P3CII Orion maritime patrol and strike aircraft⁵⁶.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, has concluded that India needs to allocate a minimum of 3% of its GDP to ensure credible conventional defence, if geopolitical threats remain unchanged in the next decade. He says that even to regain the 1986-87 levels of training and preparedness, the force will need to spend an additional billion dollars⁵⁷. A good part of this will have to go to the

55. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford University Press, 1995), p.42.

56. Avirook Sen, "Defence : Battling for Attention", India Today (New Delhi) June 30, 1996, p.79.

57. Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defence Expenditure", Asian Strategic Review (1992-93) (New Delhi : IDSA, 1994), p.33.

Navy whose platforms are expensive items.

INDIA'S MISSILE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

MISSILE PROGRAMME

India's Integrated Guided Missile Development programme (IGMDP) was initiated by Dr. A.P.J. Kalam in 1983. Five types of missiles are fully developed, to be used as surface to surface, surface to air, and anti tank weapons.

Prithvi is a tactical mobile battlefield missile system with a 150-250 km. range. A special artillery regiment has been established to operate it. The Indian Army is expected to acquire 75 missiles of the short range (150km) version while the Air Force is expected to get the long range version (250km) with lighter conventional warheads⁵⁸.

The medium range Agni (1500-2500 km) has been successfully tested but the government has termed it a 'technology demonstrator' and said that it is not for deployment⁵⁹.

The two versions of the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are the short range Trishul (9 Km) and the longer range Akash (25 km). These are already

58. John Cherian, "The Indian Army Faces up to New Challenges", Frontline, March 8, 1996, p.8.

59. Ibid.,

being serially produced and are expected to be with the armed forces in 1996⁶⁰.

Nag, a third generation state-of-the-art anti tank missile with 4 km range is expected to be inducted into the Army in the near future⁶¹.

By successfully test firing an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Agni, in 1989 and 1994, India has demonstrated that it could deliver nuclear weapons to places as distant as Sanghai (China), Riyadh, Tehran and Kuala Lumpur. But the Agni can hit Chinese targets only if it is launched from the North Eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam with payloads much lighter than one tonne. The Agni, with a one tonne payload, has a range of 2500 km. Its development underlined the potential transformation of the Indian military from a defensive force to one with a strong retaliatory capacity.

NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

The change in regional and global dynamics have forced the Indian Government to rethink aspects of its nuclear policy in the post Cold War era. The core elements of Indian nuclear policy are opposition to discriminatory global arms control regimes and keeping its nuclear option open.

60. Ibid.,

61. Ibid

On the one hand, because the five nuclear weapon states refuse to commit themselves to a timebound plan for disarmament and elimination of such weapons, India continues to view all global disarmament and arms control regimes with suspicion. The US has made it explicit that it does not believe the Non Proliferation Treaty not stop proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in India's neighbourhood. Thus, China has transferred ring magnets to Pakistan as well as M.11 Missiles. The US could not do any thing to restrain either China or Pakistan. These leakages in the 'non-proliferation regime are an additional source of worry'.

Therefore, India continues to keep its nuclear option open. India's capabilities are demonstrated but, as a matter of policy, New Delhi exercises restraint, even though countries around its continue their weapon programmes either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, Indian cannot accept any restrains on its capabilities and will no doubt continue to commit resources to retaining the option to deploy nuclear weapons at short notice if and when necessary.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, making full use of these new circumstances and openness of the post Cold War world and also a follow-up to its new national security thinking at home, India has been trying hard to build new security partnerships even with countries which were not so friendly towards it during the Cold War years. This includes countries like China, Israel and

the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). India has become a dialogue partner of ASEAN and security partner of ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Similarly, India has now established diplomatic ties with Israel and the two countries are making towards building fruitful defence cooperation. This has been partly possible due to India's improving relations with those powers in the Western bloc which were not so receptive to India during the Cold War years. Thus, these equations with important powers have a direct bearing on India's national security.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDIAN SECURITY IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

INTERNAL DIMENSION

It is an axiomatic truth that the real strength of a nation lies in its unity and solidarity and that national security is essentially built on the base of internal stability. Conversely, domestic instability and internal conflict, undermining as it does the government's domestic credibility, erodes the very base on which national security is built and makes the state vulnerable to external threat and manipulation. Internal factors, then, can at times jeopardise national security more critically than external dangers, and it is in this context that domestic dimensions of national security deserve greater attention than they have so far received¹.

India has seen the turbulent internal situation in the post Cold War period. The country is passing through a period of uncertainty and drift which can lead to dangerous consequences. There is no one factor that is contributing the state of violence and insecurity. There are many and among these are the problems of Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Naxalism in

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1. Nancy Jetley, "India : The Domestic Dimensions of Security", in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, (ed.), South Asian Insecurities and the Great Powers, (London : Macmillan, 1986), p.37.

Andhra Pradesh, the terror bombings in Bombay, and the Purulia arms drop. This chapter will deal with each of these in turn.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The situation in Jammu and Kashmir is the most serious security problem for India in the post Cold War period. Since independence, India has fought two wars over it in 1947-48 and 1965. During the 1971 war, Pakistan unsuccessfully tried to make gains in Kashmir. Pakistan could not win Kashmir through open war. Therefore, Pakistan initiated the method of proxy war. This has been part of a larger plan to destabilise India including terrorist attacks in metropolitan cities.

The Kashmir problem has both an internal and external dimension. Like many other separatist movements in India, Kashmir has an international dimension². Some Kashmir insurgent groups have accepted Islamic fundamentalist beliefs, learned from the insurgency tactics of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and have assumed the style and approach of the Palestinian intifada³. The 1991 Gulf War angered parts of the Muslim population of South Asia. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism encourages

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2. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.31.
 3. Raju G.C. Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990's , Adelphi Paper 278 (London : International Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1993), p.3.

similar movements in South Asia and aggravates Hindu-Muslim tensions in India⁴.

The extreme pro-American fringe and anti-Indian elements, drawing lessons from the Gulf-War scenarios, might hope that if an India-Pakistan war should break-out, another U.S.-led international coalition would intervene. Like Kuwait, Kashmir would then be “liberated” and a U.N. regime established which would permit “self-determination” for the state. Such direct intervention even in the post Cold War convergence of the great powers is unlikely. Kashmir does not have the strategic importance of oil form the Gulf. Moreover, Kashmir is legally a part of India and not a separate sovereign state, and India is not a brutal dictatorship⁵.

The sudden explosion of insurgency in the Jammu and Kashmir has virtually paralysed the state since 1989. The more serious problem in Kashmir today is the attempt to revive the movement for self-determination, some of it under pan-Islamic fundamentalism. The substantial involvement of Pakistani, Afghans, Sudanese, Arabs, Egyptians and Palestinians⁶.

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4. Ibid., p.21.
 5. Jagat S. Mehta, “Resolving Kashmir in the International Context of the 1990’s”, in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed., Perspective on Kashmir : The Roots of conflict in South Asia, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1992), p.397.
 6. P.Stobdan, “Kashmir : The Key issues”, Strategic-Analysis, Vol. XIX, No.1, April 1996, p.113.

The battle-cry for these elements Bosnia or Palestine and Muslims under threat. There is evidence that money comes in substantial amounts from West Asia and Pakistan. And arms are available in abundance from the Afghanistan war. A report of the American Republican Task Force on terrorism, which has studied militancy across the globe for years, states : “For Pakistan, Kashmir constitutes a combination of regional interest and commitment to the global Islamist cause”⁷.

The situation in Kashmir worsened in 1989. It resulted in an intensification of militant activity and heavy violence in the Kashmir Valley. At the same time, the former Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. Afghan manpower, expertise and arms now became available. In the last seven years of insurgency and counter insurgency, over 13000 lives have been lost. In 1988 and 1989, the total number of persons killed was 31 and 91, respectively. But since 1990 onwards, the graph has been on the upswing. The total number of persons killed in 1995 was above 3000. The upward trend in the beginning was due to high casualties against civilians, killed by foreign mercenaries such as in the Valley and Doda. The number of armed militants killed by the security forces also showed an upward trend, especially after 1994, when insurgent groups started to fragment, and the Afghan style guerrilla tactics became less effective in

7. Shekhar Gupta and Rahul Pathak, “Pan Islamic Fundamentalism”, India Today, May 15, 1994, p.46.

the valley. As many as 6,451 militants have been killed in the last six years⁸.

The Army, the new Rashtriya Rifles (RR), the Special Operation Group and the Jammu and Kashmir Police have helped in combating militancy in recent years. It has been noticed that the number of civilians killed in the cross-fire between the militants and the security forces came down to 171 last year, whereas the total number of militants killed was 1,332 last year, by far the highest figure for any single year. This indicates the weakening capabilities of the militants at the tactical level as well as support level from the Kashmiri people⁹.

The recent revelation of figures by the Kashmir Police Chief, M.N. Sabharwal, shows that the trend among the militants to lay down arms has increased¹⁰. The total number of militants who surrendered went up to 569 in 1995. Militants have been hitting only soft targets. Their operational tactics remain hit and run affairs in the recent years, relying on grenades and improvised explosive devices in the populated areas¹¹.

Pakistani intelligence agencies had established an alliance between the Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami and Valley-based organisations

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8. P.Stobdan, "Kashmir : The Key issues" Strategic Analysis , Vol.XIX, No.1, April 1996, p.117.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Times of India , (New Delhi), January 1, 1996.
 11. P.Stobdan, "Kashmir : The Key Issues", Strategic Analysis , Vol.XIX, No.1 , April 1996, p.118.

like the People's League, the Islamic Students League and the Islamic Jamaat-e-tulba. Newer and younger recruits were brought into the movement and trained in camps inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) Initially, it was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) that started and controlled the agitation, but its broadly secular credentials and its thrust on "azaadi" for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir (including POK) led Pakistan to patronise the more fundamentalist and pro-Pakistan Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Al-Jehad. Arms supplies and funds were provided to the pro-Pakistani groups and consequently more than seventy per cent of the militants are linked to Pakistan.

The 'proxy war' in Jammu and Kashmir has changed with the induction of Islamic mercenaries from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Palestine and Egypt. The arms and ammunitions are easily available in these countries through open arms bazaars. There is evidence that elements of the Pakistani government have sponsored a significant flow of arms to Kashmiri militants The Washington based Human Rights Watch Arms Project has noted in its report "Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir", that Pakistan, especially the ISI, has been supporting, training and equipping the militants in Punjab and Kashmir against India¹². It draws a direct link between the militants easy access to sophisticated weapons and the suffering of the people in both states.

12. M.Rahman, : Terrorism : An Arsenal of Evidence", India Today, September 30, 1994, p.79.

The majority of the weapons in the possession of militants in the Kashmir comes either from arms bazaars of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) or from the stocks controlled by the Pakistani intelligence services. These include Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifles, but the vast majority are Chinese type-56 assault rifles, pistols, stick grenades and rocket propelled grenades¹³. The arms recovered on the Jammu and Kashmir border between 1990 and mid 1993, include 150 rocket launchers, 1926 AK-type assault rifles, 710 pistols, 34 guns, 366 rockets, 5248 grenades and bombs, and 643 land mines¹⁴.

In addition to providing material support for the militancy, Pakistan has been internationalising the Kashmir issue at different times. A Pakistan sponsored resolution on Kashmir at the UN Human Rights Commission meet in Geneva in 1994 had to be withdrawn by it at the last moment in the wake of pressure from all sections, notably the European Union, Iran and China¹⁵. The 53 member organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) has played a key role in trying to convince Pakistan of the difficulty in garnering support for moving draft resolutions on Kashmir in the UN General Assembly. Most of the OIC members have been avoiding such a course of

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13. Chris Smith, "The Impact of Light Weapons in Security : A Case Study of South Asia", in SIPRI Year Book, 1995, (New York : Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.583-593.
 14. Times of India, (New Delhi), May 6, 1993.
 15. M.J.Vinod, "Kashmir and India Pakistan Relations : Problems and prospects", Strategic-Analysis, Vol.. XVII ,No.8, November 1995,, p.1144.

action, given the expanding economic ties with India. But Pakistan continues to raise the issue wherever it can. Prime Minister Bhutto even brought up Kashmir at the U.N. Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995.¹⁶

While India has done a good deal to deal militarily and diplomatically with the problem in Kashmir, it has to look to various internal economic and political measures also. Much needs to be done to revitalise the development of the state. The tourism industry has to slowly be rehabilitated. The handicrafts industry must be promoted. Greater constitutional autonomy and decentralisation of powers are being considered within the broad framework of the Indian Union. The government has to launch a bold political initiative to tackle in earnest the domestic political situation in Kashmir. The transparency that the Indian government has shown in recent times has also gone a long way to convince the outside World about the dimensions of the militancy in the Valley. In addition, Prime Minister Rao's promise to consider autonomy short of independence has helped open room for negotiation. The United Front government has repeated the offer.

For India, recapturing the trust of the Kashmiris is a political challenge and an urgent one. The challenge before India is to restore the faith of the

16. Ibid .,

Kashmiris in a democratic political order. To do this, the central government held the Lok Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996. The significant voter turnout has proved that people there, by and large, want peace. The reasonably good turnout, even if this was coerced by the government forces in some places, registered in the face of grave threats from pro-Pakistan and other militant outfits and intimidation by the All Party Hurriyat Conference, was a rebuff to the gun culture promoted by the militants. The election constitutes a landmark in the sense that it has demonstrated the willingness of the people to respond to the call of democracy and, secondly, enhanced the credibility of the administration's claims about its preparedness for ensuring a fairly smooth and free electoral process¹⁷.

PUNJAB

Punjab was a major internal security problem for India from 1984 until 1993. In June 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the Army into the Golden Temple. Operation Blue Star was an effort to break the back of the Khalistani terrorists. The complex of the Golden Temple includes some of the holiest Sikh shrines but had become the base for Sikh militants. However, after Blue Star, militancy increased. In order to avoid capture by the Indian Army, the Sikh militants escaped to Pakistan.

17. The Hindu, (New Delhi), June 8, 1996.

The Sikh terrorists were relatively few in number and never commanded great support, even from the Sikh population. However, problems were increased by the combination of training, ruthless tactics and access to advanced weaponry, much of it received from across the India-Pakistan border. Many militant leaders who had crossed over to Pakistan and who were arrested after their return to India revealed that apart from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, some groups of Afghan Mujahideen had also been imparting training to the Punjab militants¹⁸.

The level of terrorist activity against civilians leading to loss of life seems to correlate with the number of weapons seized by the Punjab police and paramilitary forces. In 1989, the Punjab Police seized 314 assault rifles and during the same year 1168 civilians were killed. In 1990 the Police seized 553 assault rifles and 2591 civilians were killed¹⁹. The first use of an AK-47 assault rifle was in the Punjab in 1987. Since that time, over 2000 Kalashnikov's and copies have been seized. Of the assault rifles seized in Punjab, fewer than 10 have been found to have Russian Origins and the overwhelming majority have been of Chinese origin. A very small number of AK-74 rifles, have been seized together with about 160 AK-47's without markings. In late 1992, a government intelligence agencies reported that the militants were in possession of 1543 AK-47's, 106 rocket launchers

18. D.P.Sharma, The Punjab Story : Decade of Turmoil, (New Delhi : APH Publishing, 1996), p.274.

19. Times of India,(New Delhi), April 10, 1993.

and 112 general purpose and like machine guns²⁰. In May 1994, Punjab Police recovered the largest ever cache of arms, which included 43 assault rifles, 15,000 rounds of ammunition, 50 kg of RDX explosives and two rockets²¹.

After Operation Blue-Star in 1984, the central government had handed over the counter-insurgency operations to the Punjab Police. For the first time in the long history of counter-insurgency in India, the local police, consisting mainly of Sikhs, carried out raids, ambushes and road checks while the Army confined itself to a secondary role, such as providing cordon security during search operations²². The Sikh policemen were familiar with the locals and knew the terrain. Importantly, the police were not seen as an instrument of an oppressive anti-Sikh government. Several other innovative techniques were used to counter the terrorists. The militant tactic of kidnapping police officer's families was answered with counter-kidnappings and subsequent exchanges. Large cash rewards were offered for key militants and informants were given new identities in distant parts of country to escape retribution²³.

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20. D.Kumar, "Punjab Terrorists Re-group on Quiet", Times of India , (New Delhi), November 24, 1992.
 21. Asian Age (New Delhi), June 1, 1994.
 22. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role , Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.28.
 23. Ibid.,

In 1988, the construction of a double fence along the border started to check the movements of arms from Pakistan and the flights of militants to sanctuary. Ultimately, the militants contributed to the success of these tactics by criminalising their own movement, including extortion, rape and reckless vendetta killings. If the government succeeded in turning the local police against the militants, the militants managed to turn most of the population against themselves and that signalled a decline in the violence as the decreasing number of killings in the state testifies²⁴.

With the hope of bringing back normalcy in the State, the central government announced elections to the Assembly and Lok Sabha by February 1992. The electoral process was restored to Punjab and the Congress (I) came to power. Beant Singh became the Chief Minister of Punjab and declared his priority would be peace²⁵. The situation in Punjab started improving after the middle of 1992. In 1992 with a significantly higher turnout, municipal elections were held, and most of the seats were won by independent candidates. Thus, the political process in the state was revived after being in the doldrums for nearly a decade. Further, because the Khalistani terrorists in Punjab are in fragmented groups, counterinsurgency operations were more successful. The Army was able

24. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role , Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.29.

25. D.P.Sharma, The Punjab Story : Decade of Turmoil ,(New Delhi : ABH Publishing, 1996), p.350.

to capture and kill a number of militants, thereby breaking the back of several terrorist groups²⁶. But terrorism can raise its head any time. Beant Singh, who brought peace and normalcy in the state, was brutally assassinated by a human bomb in September 1995, a grim reminder that complacency is dangerous²⁷.

The militancy requires to be tackled on two fronts military as well as political. Police action alone cannot eliminate terrorism. Economic development, social reform and bringing misguided elements into the political process are essential ingredients, if the militancy is to be rooted out once and for all. The Akali Dal won the majority seats in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, this is evidence that the people of Punjab have rejected the militancy. And the Akali Dal victory is also a good sign for mass participation by young Sikhs who must be brought into the mainstream of the country's political life.

ASSAM

The roots of the problem in Assam arise from resentment over the large scale immigration of Bengalis and other groups. These are perceived

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26. Amit Gupta, "Indian Security Planning in the 1990's", in Marvin G. Weinbaum and Chetan Kumar, eds., South Asia Approaches the Millenium : Rexamining National Security (Boulder : Westview Press, 1995), p.195.
 27. Ramesh Vinayak, "Punjab : Striking Terror" India Today, September 30, 1995. pp. 48-59.

to threaten numerically and culturally the indigenous population. The Assamese do not want the foreigners, i.e. Bangladeshis, who migrated to Assam during and since the 1971 Bangladesh War. Native Assamese fear that the Bangladeshi immigrations, along with the Bengalis (both Hindu and Muslim) who settled in Assam earlier, are altering the ethnic if not the religious composition of the state. The Assamese have therefore demanded revision of the state's electoral roles on the basis of the 1967 records so that they are not swamped by powerful "outside" influences. The Assamese also believe that the resources of their state, that is, oil, tea and forest products, are being exploited by outsiders.²⁸

The antforeigner agitation was started by the Students Organisations, All Assam students Union (AASU), and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP). The agitation was supported by different political and non political organisations in Assam. AASU and AAGSP demanded the expulsion of migrant Bengalis from Assam. They threatened to resort to widespread and extreme violence if the elections were held before the immigration issue was resolved to their satisfaction. The election were held in February 1984. Six thousand men, Women, and children died when Hindu Assamese attacked Muslim Bengalis suspected to be illegal

28. Baladas Ghoshal, "Internal Sources of Conflict in South Asia", in Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., South Asia After the Cold War ; International Perspectives (Boulder : Westview Press, 1993) p.73.

immigrants from Bangladesh. Indian Army units were called into quell the violence and to prevent further bloodshed²⁹.

Rajiv Gandhi sought to placate the grievances of the Assamese Hindu population, which is fearful of becoming a minority in its own state. Elections were called in Assam in December 1985. Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), a coalition of various factions, demanded the expulsion of nearly all Bengalis from the State. Led by Prafulla Kumar Mohanta it came to power in 1985. While AASU and AAGSP was leading the anti-foreigners agitation, another more radical organisation was taking shape, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)³⁰. The AGP government could not resolve the immigration issue. There is a basic difference between AASU, AAGSP and ULFA. AASU and AAGSP never demanded "Swadhin Asom" but ULFA's main objective is the creation of an independent state of Assam (Swadhin Asom).

After 1985, the 'anti-foreigner's agitation' was taken up by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which began in 1978 as an organisation. The "anti-foreigners" agitation of 1979 to 1985 was now led by ULFA. In the late 1980's the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) became more violent and demanded the outright secession of the state. In 1990-91, the

29. Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy , (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1986) , p.67.

30. Baladas Ghoshal, "Internal Sources of Conflict in South Asia", in Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., South Asia After the Cold War : International Perspectives . (Boulder : Westview Press, 1993), p.73.

ULFA gained national attention.

ULFA's objective was and still remains the creation of an independent state of Assam "Swadhin Asom" on the basis of a proclaimed distinct Ahom identity. To attain its strategic objective of Swadhin Asom, the ULFA over the years has resorted to extreme forms of violence, extortion, kidnapping and many other cruel acts to spread fears among those who do not agree with their demands³¹.

ULFA's base is large both in the cities and villages and particularly among the student community and the peasants. It is well provided with money. Its area of activity encompassed the most strategic region of the North East, the entire "Brahmaputra Valley", essentially the upper Assam Districts. ULFA is said to have bases in Bangladesh and Burma³².

The Indian military launched counter insurgency operations against ULFA in 1990. The strategy for the North East is more complex than just military operations and consists of three parts : to fight the insurgency with military force for some time; then, when the rebellion seems to be tiring, after negotiations; and finally, when the rebels are convinced that no matter what the casualties on either side, they are not going to be able to secede, to win them over with the offer of constitutional sops, invariably

31. Ibid.,

32. Ibid.,

resulting in power being given to them following an election. All this is done within the parameters of the constitution, although after it has been amended³³.

In this way, ULFA was weakened by a series of military and administrative actions during 1991 and 1992. At the ULFA's peak in the late 1991, the military operation involved at least four Indian Army Divisions and some 270 paramilitary companies. First, Operation Bajrang, launched in November 1990, compelled ULFA to call for a cease fire. But when ULFA kidnapped 14 Indian officials, Operation Blueprint began in June 1991 to track the training and operating camps of the militants. On September 15, 1991, a surgical exercise called Operation Cloudburst was launched at two camps of the insurgents operating from Arunachal Pradesh. This was expanded into Operation Rhino which carried out a major sweep of Assam in search of the leaders and followers of ULFA. The devastating military blows inflicted by these military operations have brought ULFA to the negotiating table with the promise of government amnesty if their separatist movement is ended³⁴.

Recently, however, the insurgency has intensified. The ethnic violence in the Kokrajhar district and neighbouring Bongaigon have claimed

33. Shekhar Gupta. India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.25.

34. Subra Nag Choudhury. "Going Back to Blood and Tears", India Today, June 15, 1995, pp. 74-75.

hundreds of lives and rendered nearly two lakh people homeless following the torching of several villages allegedly by Bodo militants. There have been developments within the ULFA. The cadres who surrendered or SULFA. are fighting ULFA. A superintendent of Police and former minister in the last Hiteswar Saikia government was killed by ULFA. On the other hand, a prominent newspaper editor of Assam was gunned down by suspected SULFA militants³⁵.

Even before the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government led by Prafulla Kumar Mahanta assumed office in 1985 disturbing reports on the prospects of the resurgence of violent activities by the Bodo militants the United Liberation Front for Assam (ULFA) had given adequate warning to the authorities. The newly elected Chief Minister's argument that the Army has no role to play in the state was proved wrong by the sudden eruption of ethnic violence in Assam. The Army was subsequently deployed in the disturbed areas of Assam. In addition, the government of India has decided to fence and floodlight the North East borders to check infiltration from Bangladesh and Myanmar, after successfully sealing the India Pakistan border in Punjab³⁶.

It would be premature to believe that ULFA has been destroyed. The support for ULFA among the native Assamese has not been eliminated.

35. The Hindu (New Delhi), May 24, 1996.

36. Times of India, (New Delhi), June 7, 1996.

The contacts, links and support in Bangladesh and Myanmar have not been eradicated. The Indian and state government has won several of the battles in Assam but it has not yet won the war.

PEOPLE'S WAR GROUP IN ANDHRA PRADESH

Another area of concern as far as internal security is concerned is the Naxalite problem in Andhra Pradesh, led by the People's War Group (PWG). Naxalism, with its philosophy of power through the barrel of the gun, took its roots in Andhra Pradesh in the mid 1960's with Srikakulam district as the focal point. The People's War Group (PWG) was founded by Kondapalli Sitaramaiah in 1980. Sitaramaiah recently surrendered due to his old age and faction politics. PWG has claimed responsibility for many murders, blasts of government offices and private buildings, and kidnappings. The naxalites made themselves close to the poor and oppressed sections of society in the rural and tribal areas by providing them instant justice, by settling wage issues, distributing the excess land holdings of the rural rich, and stopping economic exploitation.

The naxalites have their strategy well planned for guerilla warfare. After gaining the confidence and affection of the poor who ensure a regular supply of food, medicines and information about police movements, they secure a steady supply of money through donations from the rich landlords,

businessman and industries who have interests in the rural and tribal areas. The money secured is utilised for purchasing arms and ammunitions, for the medical expense of the seriously injured members, and for distribution to the poor³⁷.

Another area where PWG concentrate is hitting police targets. While they avoid direct confrontations, as they cannot match the police firepower and strength, the naxalites make individual policemen or officers targets. A police officer who is firm against the naxalites or involved in fake encounters gets onto the hit list³⁸.

Another aspect of the PWG strategy is to resort to kidnapping to secure the release of their captured leaders. This seems to be paying dividends. The Government has been forced to release some naxalites leaders in view of the dangers to the lives of the hostages. The naxalite's first attempt involved eight IAS officer at Gurthedu in 1987. The Government released some high level functionaries of the PWG in exchange for the eight officers³⁹.

Recently there has been a perceivable shift in the Naxalite strategy. The Naxalites are now objecting to the construction of roads, as their

37. G. Narsimha Rao."The Naxalite Strategy , "The Hindu (Madras) February 4, 1996.

38. Ibid.,

39. Ibid.,

survival depends on the forests. Roads will allow easy access to the police and government authorities. The Naxalites have also resisted the destruction of forests. The PWG activists have warned tribal families against allowing their children to join the police force. They have begun obtaining a 'bond' from parents to ensure compliance⁴⁰.

The Naxalites have an advantage over the Police in their familiarity with the terrain. The members are "locals," and it is easy for them to move around without being noticed or to escape in case of attacks by the Police. The police handicap is that they are pitted against people who know the jungles and routes intimately.

The People's War Group (PWG) has also worked out details for a new state of "Dandakaranya" This state will include forest areas in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh and stretch from the West of the Godavari to Balaghat and from Nanded to Srikakulam. Documents seized by the police reveal the future strategies of the PWG. A map of the proposed "Dandakaranya" and a diary giving details of the naxalites coffers were found in the documents⁴¹.

The PWG made rapid progress in a short time and spread across

40. P.K. Surendran, "PWG Moots Plan for New State", Times of India (New Delhi), February 20, 1993.

41. Ibid.

Andhra Pradesh and beyond to Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Its frontal organisations are Rythu Coolie, Sangam, Revolutionary Youth League, Jana Natya Mandali, and Virasam. The group has acquired modern weapons and techniques of insurgency. For some time, it ran a parallel government in large stretches of Telengana and north coastal Andhra Pradesh by distributing surplus lands, mediating in local disputes, and holding "Praja Courts".

According to police officials, from 1990 to 1992, the PWG accounted for 698 murders, which is more than the total murders committed in the previous 23 years. These included 110 policemen, most of whom were killed by landmines. Besides, they committed 3090 other offences including 35 dacoities. The Group also kidnapped 407 persons, ranging from petty government officials to elected legislatures. Around 325 extremists were killed in 325 encounters and more than 15,000 militants and sympathisers were taken into custody. The naxalites main thrust is to attack selective targets as a way of maximising the psychological blow to the state. The killing of DIGs of Police and the kidnapping of MLAs fits into the naxalite's Scheme of action⁴².

The rate of killings and violence have been maintained. There were over 540 PWG related incidents in Andhra Pradesh in 1995, accounting

42. Ashok Das, "Resurrection of Naxalites in Andhra", Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), February 15, 1993.

for a death toll of over 100 persons. Already the first four months of 1996 have witnessed 400 incidents in which over 50 people have been killed. While the PWG activities are concentrated in the North Telangana district of Karimnagar, Nizamabad and Adialabad, the left extremist group is reported to have strongholds in virtually every district of the state with the possible exception of Hyderabad and Rangareddy⁴³.

The police and paramilitary forces have not been able to wipe out the naxalite movement despite their strong presence in the affected areas and unlimited powers given to them. On the other hand, the naxalite movement has survived primarily because there has not been enough of an effort to meet the challenge politically. This is not an easy task. There has been a definite upswing in violence in Andhra Pradesh after N.T. Rama Rao lifted the ban on the People's War Group in 1995. Which gave the group some respectability. Precisely what kind of political manoeuvre is required is not clear, yet India's experience shows that state repression only works upto a point.

TERROR IN BOMBAY

During the month of March 1993, while the United States recovered from the bombing of the World Trade Centre, India was suffering from its

43. Sabina Sehgal Saikia. " Internal Security: A Serious Problem for the New Government," Times of India (New Delhi), June 5, 1996.

44. Hindu (New Delhi) March 13, 1993.

own terrorist tragedy. However, at 1.26 PM on March 12, 1993, bombs attacks rocked the city of Bombay, in a period of just over two and a half hours 13 separate explosions rocked the city⁴⁴.

The terrorists attacked such landmarks of the city as the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Grain Trading Centre and the headquarters of Air India. Other targets included three international hotels, and two main outdoor shopping centres. As a result of the tremendous power of the explosions, the body count stood at over 300 two days after the attack while some 1500 more were seriously injured⁴⁵.

High explosive like RDX and TNT were used and set off by timers. The use of these explosives and detonating mechanisms required extremely sophisticated training and expertise. Terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir have used C-4 plastic bombs, but never to such effect. The Bombay explosives were vastly superior. The blast were more powerful and the devices were placed inside a closed car which converted the automobile into one huge device. More importantly, the terrorists knew how to direct the thrust of the explosion exactly where they wanted. All this indicated sophisticated training and access. Almost certainly there was a foreign hand which provided the expertise. However, to store such a huge quantity of explosives, to shelter the whole learn and to purchase the cars was not possible without

45. Dillip Bobb, "Terror in Bombay", India Today, March 31, 1993, pp.43-53.

local assistance and massive financing. The cost of explosives was at least 3 crore rupees and such large amounts only the intelligence agencies of foreign powers can control.

There is evidence that the ISI used its contacts with the smuggling syndicates to transport the explosives. The plan was masterminded by one of the fundamentalist organisations based in Peshawar and drawing sustenance from ultra right wing groups in West Asia which espouse Pan-Islamic causes and mostly function outside the ambit of state power. The network of militant fundamentalists has taken upon itself the task of righting the perceived wrongs done to Islam and is financed by fundamentalists across the Muslim world⁴⁶.

The Western countries, including America, have accepted the links between Pakistan and pan Islamic fundamentalism. Top US sources said, "An ISI brigadier masterminded the Bombay blasts in his free lance capacity. The brigadier got the Arabs in Peshawar to give money while his cell provided logistics, safe passage and explosives to the saboteurs." In fact, some have linked the New York bomb blasts and the Bombay bomb blasts⁴⁷. A pan Islamic fundamentalists conference was held in Colombo

46. Sekhar Gupta, "The Memmons : India's Most Wanted Family", India Today (New Delhi), April 15, 1993 pp. 40-51.

47. Shekar Gupta and Rahul Pathak, "Pan-Islamic Fundamentalism", India Today , May 15, 1994, P.43.

on December 27, 1992. The U.S., India and Egypt were marked out for punishment as countries victimising Muslims. The operation in Bombay was given holy sanction by the conference. By the last week of January 1993 , the organisations from Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE had raised \$ 100 millions⁴⁸.

PURULIA ARMS DROP

On the night of December 17, 1995, an Antonov - 26 dropped three parachutes with huge wooden boxes containing large quantities of sophisticated arms over Purulia in West Bengal. The arms and ammunitions included 105 AK - 47 rifles, 700 empty magazines of AK-47 rifles, 9,800 7.62 mm ammunitions, 7 rocket launchers, 57 antitank grenades, 2560 9mm ammunition, besides massive quantities of fire arms⁴⁹.

The airplane had taken off from Karachi on December 17, 1996 and landed in Varanasi for refuelling. From Varanasi it took off for Calcutta and on the way dropped the consignment and reached Calcutta. From there it went to Phuket in Thailand. The flight had obtained permission through an agent in Delhi to fly over India with a halt for refuelling in Calcutta on the way to Phuket as well as on the way back from Thailand. The pilot misused the permission given by the Director General for Civil Aviation

48. Shekhar Gupta, "The Memons : India's Most Wanted Family", India Today, April 15, 1993, p.49.

49. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) December 24, 1995.

(DGCA) and landed in Madras on the return journey which eventually led to the forced landing.

This was the first known illegal air drop of lethal arms in the nation's history. The intelligence agencies informed the central government in November 1995 about the arms drop. An European businessman had approached an individual to pilot a small plane between Karachi and Dhaka, delivering arms enroute to communist rebels in the area of Dhanbad. An AN - 26 plane was purchased and it left for Riga, Latvia on November 15, 1995. This report was provided by a British intelligence officer to Indian intelligence. It was also reported that the plane would make a brief unscheduled landing at an airstrip in an area called Panchit Hill in Purulia, West Bengal⁵⁰.

The central government apparently dispatched a registered letter to West Bengal Government on December 12, 1995 and this reached the state government a full nine days after the arms were parachuted down. The arms drop had highlighted a serious lapse of security. The intelligence agency pointed to the Boro airstrip in Giridih in Bihar about 90 km from Purulia and concentrated its surveillance activities there⁵¹.

However the airport authority claims that Air Traffic Control (ATC)

50. Harjinder Baweja, "Purulia Arms Drop: Straining Credibility", India Today, March 31, 1996, pp 54-58.

51. Ibid.

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was not told that the plane was to be treated as a hostile one. The Indian Air Force (IAF) insists that the Movement Liason Unit (MLU) in Bombay had given a written note to Air Traffic Control that the plane is to land in Bombay for investigation. Curiously, the intelligence team of interrogators did reach, the tarmac, but the plane's door had been opened and the main culprit had driven off in an official airport vehicle on the plea that he had to pay airport charges. The Airport Authority claimed the reason the vehicle was given clearances was because the culprit had radioed for it and they had no reason to suspect foul play. Even more suspicious is the fact that he was allowed to pass both customs and immigration without a check⁵².

In sum, it can be said that all the concerned agencies were responsible for a series of lapses that led to a breach of national security. The Purulia arms drop case exposed the huge gaps in communication and coordination between various intelligence agencies. That is why there is need for a greater degree of cooperation between agencies,

THE PARAMILITARY FORCES

The perennial use of the armed forces to combat insurgency and terrorism within the state can lead to the politicisation and corruption of the military. The former Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, General S.F. Rodrigues, stated in June 1992 that "large scale and frequent deployment

52. Ibid.

of troops to combat insurgency certainly affects the training of troops in their primary role of combating external aggression and safeguarding the security of national borders”⁵³.

The continued use of the armed forces for the maintenance of internal security will also alienate the military from its own people. They will see them increasingly as the enemy rather as their protector. Therefore, the internal dimensions of the Army’s role has prompted serious rethinking about its use and India has, over the years, attempted to bring in other forces to take on these duties.

One of the units is the National Security Guard (NSG). It is an elite anti terrorist force under civilian control and patterned on the German GSG-9⁵⁴. The force is recruited mainly from the Indian Army. The NSG was used in the second operation against the Golden Temple in 1988 (Operation Black Thunder) to root out the terrorists inside the temple.

Second, the Border Security Force (BSF) was set up in 1965. In addition to border duties, the BSF men are often deployed in internal security duties especially in the North East, Punjab and the Jammu and Kashmir. It has 140 battalions. The direct correlation with internal troubles

53. Raju G.C. Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990's, Adelphi paper 278, (London : International Institute for strategic studies, July 1993) p.41.

54. Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role , Adelphi paper 293,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.35.

is seen by a 55 % growth in this paramilitary force in 1981-91⁵⁵.

Third, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was formed in 1939. It was extensively deployed in various parts of the country to cope with naxalite violence, terrorism and insurgency. The Force also worked under the operational control of the Army in Punjab during Blue Star in 1984. Its battalions even set foot on foreign soil in 1987 to form a part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. It is 119 battalions strong and growing and showed a 35 per cent growth between 1986 and 1991⁵⁶.

Fourth, the Assam Rifles (AR) was established in 1835. Today, it comprises 39 battalions. The role of the Assam Rifles are to provide security for the North Eastern mainly sector, mainly on the international border. The Assam Rifles are deployed especially in Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Mizoram and have also carried out internal operations.

Fifth, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) was established in 1962 in the wake of the Chinese aggression. The ITBP has specialisation in the field of unconventional warfare, counter insurgency, anti terrorist operations and mountain warfare. Until 1993, scores of ITBP companies had been deployed to guard banks in Punjab against terrorist depredations⁵⁷. It

55. Ibid.,

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

consists of more than 30,000 personnel spread over 24 service battalions and 4 specialised battalions.

The size and budget of paramilitary forces have been increased. The security forces operating in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and the North East are now mainly the paramilitary forces. Intervention by the regular armed forces usually occurs when an external military factor is involved. The budgets of all paramilitary forces have been more than doubled with the total bill exceeding Rs. 30 billion per year between 1986 and 1994.

CONCLUSION

The Indian internal security situation is fairly grim in the post Cold War period. The greatest threat to the nation is externally supported internal problems Pakistan and its Intelligence agency ISI's well organised efforts to destabilise the country by inducting trained persons and weaponry across the borders to foment fundamentalism and insurgency. The Punjab situation is still to be brought fully under control and Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern states are a cause for continuing concern. With India's security forces revamping their presence on northern and western land borders, the ISI has resorted to coastal intrusions. The bomb blast in Bombay in early 1993 revealed that weaponry and other instruments of destruction had been inducted into the country along the western coast.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The end of Cold War has changed the international security system. Regional security has become more important. That is why, the regional groupings are emerging and evolving, such as the European Union (EU), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These are essentially economic groupings with an emphasis on trade and commerce. Importantly, these groups also share security concerns and they are assuming a regional security role. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1993 to cope with the uncertain post Cold War security situation in South East Asia. With these increasing regional interactions and changing power equations around the globe, India will face new opportunities and threats.

The immediate neighbour Pakistan continues to constitute the most regular and imminent threat to India's national security even after the end of the cold war. There is a deep concern at Pakistan's continued support, encouragement and abetment to terrorism against India. It is a direct confrontation challenging the basic foundation of the nation through subversive and terrorist means. The importance of this threat cannot be underestimated. However, depending on how things go in Kashmir and how the present thaw since the Deve Gowda government came to power

develops relations with Pakistan may be poised for change.

The continuing improvement in Sino - Indian relations, India's improved military preparedness and nuclear capability rules out armed conflict between the two countries in the future. At the same time, India will remain watchful of China which at its present rate of economic and military growth and modernisation is set to become the next superpower. One of the major new opportunities is South East and East Asia. India is increasingly looking East for its economic and security links with neighbouring ASEAN especially. Member countries of ASEAN have a stake in peace and tranquillity in the Indian Ocean. They share a concern over China. So this relationship is most vital to India's future security.

The most vital element in India's new security environment is America's interest in military cooperation with India. It has been triggered by the end of the Cold War and the opening of the Indian market to foreign investment. The two countries have a common stake in stability and peace in the Indian Ocean region and once while differences will persist - over Pakistan, over again China, proliferation - The two seem compatible over the next several decades at least, as India strives to develop by involving outsiders and as the U.S. seeks big markets for its products and investments.

Russia remains an important factor for India in the defence sector. India's relationship with Russia has survived that country's trials and tribulations and will gain in strength as its economy recovers and its new

democratic polity becomes stable. Significantly, the new Russia appears to be more willing to share military technology with India than was the old Soviet Union.

Therefore, the post Cold War international security system has given a new direction to Indian national security policy. India is becoming harder, more selfish and pragmatic regarding its national security. The rejection of the CTBT is the best example of India's new "realism" regard to national security. This realism can also be seen its continuing military growth and sophistication. After a brief downturn, it looks like defence spending is picking up again. The three forces are placing orders for new systems. The missile programme is being protected as is the nuclear programme.

As far as India's internal security is concerned, there is an urgency to deal with proxy wars and insurgencies. The answer does not lie entirely in a military response. The first and foremost initiative should be devoted to strengthen national resilience. National resilience could be improved through effective administration, economic development and political participation. A military response is necessary in most cases but good governance gradually can replace a military response. The fast returning normalcy and peace in Punjab is the result of such a mixed strategy. And this process has been initiated in Jammu and Kashmir by the Narsimha Rao government. Kashmir is the most serious threat to internal security. The innocent people of Jammu and Kashmir are tired and harassed by the

militant violence. This is the proper time to adopt a consistent and long term approach to counter the militants and subsequently a political response should be continued to return the disgruntled youth of Kashmir to the democratic process. The coming state Assembly elections will be vital from this point of view. The Asom Gana Parishad government of Assam has to be cautious about the re-emerging insurgency in the state. It is important to note that when the AGP was in power last time, the ULFA activities increased greatly. Apart from Assam, the situation is far from normal in Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura. These happenings show the vulnerability of internal security but what must not be ignored is the fact that India is a large country and its democratic institutions and administrative structures have repeatedly been able to tackle internal problems.

Economic prosperity is the backbone of a country's stability. The economic well being of a state is the primary consideration because a threat to the economy weakens state and security throughout the land. As India's economy strengthens under a liberalising system, India will become more powerful both militarily and economically. Therefore, India's security concerns are not only political, they are economic too. The economic factors have become one of the most effective bonds for Indian unity.

Since independence, there has been no systematic attempt to formulate a coherent national security policy. Major policy decisions continue to be taken in an ad-hoc manner. There is an urgency to create an appropriate

institution which can evolve the Nation's security policy. It has to be in response to national security objectives.

The National Security Council, act was passed by Parliament in 1990. The new United Front Government has announced as a top priority the setting up of a National Security Council (NSC). External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujaral has also reemphasised the importance of the NSC : " The importance of the NSC lies in the fact that it can provide varied inputs on the basis of which the most comprehensive picture of the country's security needs can be outlined. For instance, whether India should have a nuclear deterrent or not is to be based on the most scientific and systematic assessment of the country's security environment. This task can be best done by an agency like NSC".¹

The National Security Council should act as the key policy making body on strategic and security matters. It should integrate the ministries of defence, external affairs, home, finance and the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force. Apart from this security theorists and academicians should be included in the NSC. The NSC should be made a statutory body.

In other words, the National Security Council could give a definition, rigorous operationalisation of India's national security. The NSC's composition must be statutory so that it will never become a tool of

1. Prakash Nanda, "Foreign Policy will Reflect Security Concerns", Times of India (New Delhi), June 3, 1996.

personalities but will remain a means for the evolution of national security policy. Efficient security management needs to be forward looking. The Indian security establishment has always reacted to threats after they have materialised. In other words, mere reaction to events can never provide security. An active, efficient, forward-looking NSC is the need of the day. From our review of India's national security it would appear that such a body has numerous challenges ahead of it.

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