

**AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE OF REGIONAL
SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that this dissertation entitled "AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA", submitted by Miss SUCHARITA SRIRAM for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is an original work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of any university. This may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

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PREFACE

This study aims at analysing the role of Australia's perspective of regional security in the Southeast Asian Region. It has examined various aspects of Australia-southeast Asia relationship and focused the importance of southeast Asia for Australia. Whether it is economic, political, defence or environmental issues, Australia cannot remain aloof to the developments in Southeast Asia. Australia is one of the dialogue partners of the ASEAN and has been involved in the politics of the region ever since the signing the SEATO.

Australian perspective of regional security has been discussed here in five chapters. the first chapter gives an introduction. It takes care to analyse various factors that influence decision making in Australia particularly about regional security. Thus the reference has been made about South Pacific Forum, SEATO, ANZAM etc.

The second chapter evaluate Australian urge to seek Asian identity and its deepening involvement in Asia. It has discussed Australia's regional approach and its willingness to be tagged as an Asian nation.

The third chapter makes an appraisal of regional security in the Southeast Asian region with an emphasis on the few regional issues and Australia's ability to resolve them. Australia's contribution in confidence-building-measures at the regional level is also discussed.

The fourth chapter focuses on Australia's quest for comprehensive security in Southeast Asia, its role in ARF, its objectives in signing defence treaty with Indonesia and also the Timor-gap treaty.

FOREWORD

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This is a universal experience that security has been a constant preoccupation of mankind in its individual, social and corporate existence. Security is, to a large extent, a subjective matter, that is a matter of perception, for example, war or environmental catastrophies. Security perceptions tends to create a reality of their own.¹ In doing so, they affect state behaviour at the domestic, regional and international levels with regard to a wide range of important issues, such as nuclear arms control, internal and external threat, international trade or environmental protection.² Hence with the burgeoning scholarly interests in its causes and consequences, it incorporates a range of different concerns.

Many debates and negotiations at the international level have demonstrated that the objective and subjective parameters affecting security at the subnational, national, regional and global level vary to a great extent across the countries. In other words, countries do not attach the same relevance to specific security problems. The debate in the 1970's and 1980's over the New International Economic order (NIEO), or the Earth summit in Rio d'Jeneiro in 1992, for example, have

¹ Stephen Philip Cohen, The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives, (New Delhi, 1987), p.260.

² Abdul Hafiz & Abdur Rob Khar, Security of Small State, (Dhaka, 1987), p.329.

shown that there is a significant cleavage in terms of security perceptions particularly between developing and developed countries.

This cleavage relates to traditional military security factors as well as non-military aspect of security. The strong aversion of most developing countries against nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence and military alliance has remained unchanged since the beginning of post-colonial era. The developing countries attach more importance to non-military aspect of security.³ The mentioned variance in perception is in part due to the social, political and economic situation of the countries concerned. Many industrialised countries enjoy a relatively high degree of political stability and economic prosperity, but finds difficult to cope with problems such as environmental degradation, migration, or drug related crimes.⁴ Many developing countries, on the other hand are struggling with problems such as social and ethnic unrest, civil war, border disputes, hunger, poverty, disease, illiteracy, corruption or the debt problem.

The end of the cold war has not failed to affect the security environment in South East Asia where vacuum was created by the withdrawal of the Superpowers. Australia being one of the powerful countries of the region, always feel concerned about regional security and wants to contribute in strengthening the security system of Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

³ Jasjit Singh & Vatroslav Vekaric, Non-provocative Defence: The Search for Equal Security, (Delhi, 1989), p. 213.

⁴ *ibid.*, p.214.

Australia's perception of security in the military sense has given way to a more comprehensive concept of security that takes into account of non-military threats.⁵ Australia's conceptualizations of security discussion is characterised by an over whelming systemic bias and an inadequate comprehension of the component of whole relationship. It is conventionally and conveniently assumed that security of the whole or the system would ensure the security of the components. Empirically, however, this is not necessarily the case for one, the security and stability of component countries are affected by a host of domestic and regional problems.

Security is not military security alone, it does not lie only in the absence of external military threats. Security has its intrinsic elements: Presence of values, striving unhindered for growth and development-military or instrument of force has its own value to security to the extent that it is required for the elimination of the external or coercive sources of threat to security; on the other hand, if security entails presence of certain positive elements, then an altogether different approach would be required. At the contextual level, the conventional militaristic external oriented definition of security fails to capture the magnitude and variety of the problems of the vast majority of the developing countries. Internal problems of the developing countries are complicated and magnified many times not only by external intervention, proxy wars, border conflicts and overflowing ethnic explosion but also by more subtle debilitating threats to economic, social and cultural in dependence conceptually, the positive elements of security is emphasised, they are inherent in

⁵ K. Subrahmanyam, Security In a Changing World, (Delhi, 1990), p.266.

the very process of nation state formation. The very process leading to their emergence is manifestation of a set of positive values. the spirit of nationalism, desire for remaining independent as a unit of the international system.

Security in the context of Southeast Asia does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed in western discussions of the concept, Southeast Asian state like the other states are conscious of the need to make themselves secure with the incidence of violences, ethnic and border issues. The task for the region is qualitatively different, however most of the countries in the region have nationalistic feelings and forces of divisiveness, cleavages, primordial loyalty and particularism which affect social and political cohesion. The region's lack of administrative capacity; the diplomatic and economic leverages are also inadequate to influence the external environment. Political, economic and social structures are weak and often inflexible, The problem of internal insecurity makes the problem of external insecurity all the more acute and vice versa. This kind of the scenario provided the opportunity for a country like Australia to influence in the region to a major intent. The region's lack of control over external environment has great implications for their ability to control the domestic economy, social and political domain although physical threats cannot be ruled out. States in recent years have become more concerned with threats of a non-military character-external domination of country's economy by foreign corporations, dependence on other countries for scientific research and technological developments, unrestricted movement of ideas resulting in the erosion and eventual loss of national identity viewed in this sense, national

security can no longer refer only to the preservation of independence and territorial integrity of the states. It is appropriate to view security in Robert Mc Namara's words as he puts it "Security means development, security is not military hardware though it may include it, security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security" ⁶Australian Perspective of security in Southeast Asia:- Australia's strategic location is prominent from a glance at the map. She forms the end of a great land bridge from mainland southeast Asia into the Pacific; and in this age of rapid communications, she is ideally situated to control major access routes into the Indian ocean as well as the Pacific. Australia is unique in having a pre-dominantly white population and in being an advanced industrialised environment. Australians have long been conscious of these anomalies, which have strongly influenced Australian security considerations. Particularly her proximity to the Southeast Asian region, which includes ten countries viz Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. These countries lying between India and China and the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Southeast Asia occupies a pre-eminently focal position in contemporary world Politics and its security is linked with Australia. Besides its geographic location, Southeast Asia is important for Australia's all around development for its growing economy and security reasons. Therefore "Australian Security considerations, particularly her proximity to the Southeast Asian land bridge

⁶ Robert Mc Namara, The essence of Security, (New York, 1968), p.65.

has dictated an awareness of the necessity to play a strategic role in any collective security or defence arrangement relating to Southeast Asia."⁷

In the first few years after world war II, American concern with the establishment of a new regional "Zone of defence" in the Pacific seemed to ebb. And while the Australian labour government's policies in the immediate post-war period appeared to be directed toward delineating a new concept of regional security through the cultivation of friendship with the rising nationalism and independence movements in the "near north"- and particularly Indonesia - the conclusion of a Pacific security arrangement including the United States remained a basic policy objective. Since the Second World War, Australia engaged itself effectively in multi-national co-operation for achieving regional security. The first important exercise of Australian regional initiative was of-course within the common wealth countries, resulted in the ANZAC pact of 1944 with New Zealand, under which the two countries agreed that a "regional zone of defence be established". The pact led to the establishment in 1947 of the South Pacific commission, comprising the Six Pacific Trust Territory administering powers. i.e. Australia, New Zealand, the USA, the UK, France and Holland aimed at promoting the economic and social welfare of the South Pacific region. As Australia is trying to gain Asian identity it eventually adopted the strategy of forward defence supported by US which aimed at the containment of China by supporting anti-chinese governments in Southeast Asia.⁸

⁷ Justus M. Van der Kroef, Australian Security Policies and Problems, National Strategy Information Centre, (INC, 1970), p.30.

⁸ Ravindra Varma, Australia and South East Asia, (New Delhi, 1974), p.61.

Even with the hope that such support would be reciprocated in the event of an attack against itself. Australia, Britain and New Zealand reached an agreement known as ANZAM for co-ordinating their defence planning in the area. Australia, New Zealand and the United States entered into the ANZUS treaty, which came into force on 29 April, 1952. It provided that an armed attack on any one of the signatories whether "in the Pacific area", on "the metropolitan territory", on any of the "island territories" under the jurisdiction of the contracting parties would be considered "dangerous" to the peace of all, requiring action to meet the common threat in conformity with the "constitutional process" of each of the signatories. The former Governor-General of Australia in ANZUS "finds expression in a constant exchange of views and in working together in many fields".⁹ ANZUS through was a 'healthy development', Australian decision did not extend the American commitment under ANZUS on September 8, 1954 Australia joined New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States in signing the Manila treaty establishing SEATO, its basic objective was "anti communist bias", To the Menzies government, SEATO was a diminishing degree natural extension of the ANZUS agreement. Even to the Menzies government's successors, the main value of SEATO has been to protect south east Asia as an access route to Australia. This is was sharpened by a general feeling in Australian military circle that the 1954, Geneva Accord could not provide a definitive settlement of the Indo-China

⁹ Current Notes on International Affairs, (Canberra: department of external Affairs, March 1968), p.81.

problems, and that additional protective cover in the region was required for the future. Moreover, the Menzies government felt that unless the United States become a formal participant in a Southeast Asia Security arrangement, its interest in the Asian regions as a whole might well begin to decline. At the same time, Australia was well aware of Britain's reluctance to move in the direction of a formal defence arrangement for the region. But the need to root the American ally firmly in the unstable politics of the new southeast Asian nations was controlling, and behind the scenes Canberra greatly assisted Washington in overcoming London's misgivings. Although SEATO's value diminished its existence appeared to be essential to Australian Security psychology.¹⁰

The Strategy of "Forward defense"

Preservation of the American alliance, though pivotal by no means exhausts Australian Security policies and interests. Since 1949, Australian diplomacy has developed a distinctive rationale of its own. Fundamental to this concept has been a recognition of the fact of the global cold war power struggle in which Australia must choose sides. Harold Holt who held brief Prime-ministership of that time made "absolutely clear to the World that Australia is Asian".¹¹ This recognition is primarily expressed in two ways. The first is through Australian participation,

¹⁰ Paul Dibb, Australia's External Relations in the 1980s, (New York, 1983), p.68.

¹¹ "Developing Our Asian Relations", The courier mail, (Brisbane, December 23, 1968).

"Actively and constructively "as a senior politician put it, "in a number of regional bodies with many of its Asian neighbours, Australia welcomes the growing movement towards regional co-operation in Asia". It is expressed, secondly, by giving "special weight to the economic element in international affairs". Australia contributes economic assistance to other nations, particularly in South east Asian region, and Australian policy has held "that continued international action in the economic field is essential in tackling world problems."¹² "Responsible internationalism", from Australian's point of view, has meant support for the United Nations and close co-operation with "Our neighbour and sister nation "New Zealand, as well as with the common wealth countries in our region and vicinity" (Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Malaysia, Singapore and Mauritius) But for Australia judgements would need to be made from the time to time. On what is right as well as what will keep Australia safe".¹³ Not only the demands of safety but also of "What is right committed Australia to a policy of constructing a defense perimeter in which Australian military assistance to Malaysia and Singapore, and adhesion to SEATO are vital elements. The "forward" defense Zone was the main policy focus of the post-war era in Southeast Asia. To start with, Australia extended political and military support to Malaysia and Singapore, the countries worked for military co-operation between the powers concerned under ANZAM. The stationing of Royal Australian forces and the RAAF jet fighter in Malaya in 1955 and the subsequent

¹² Current Notes on International Affairs, (Australia, March, 1968), P.81

¹³ Developing Our Asian Relations, The courier Mial, (Brisbane, Dec. 23, 1968).

Australian association with the 1957 British-Malayan Defense agreement, were in large measure the natural outcome of wartime practical co-operation. The Australian government decided in 1968 to keep its forces in the Malaysia- Singapore region until the final British departure in 1971, the forces could be used against "externally promoted and inspired communist infiltration and subversion", of the kind that Malaya had experienced in the 1950's. The Australian government decided the forces to be avoided in Malaysia when Australia was concerned over Malay-Philippines issue over Sabah.

Australia's involvement in the Vietnam war began in 1962, at the invitation of the Saigon government, "Australia had sent 800-man combat battalion, six RAAF caribou transport planes etc as the most useful contribution it could make to the defense of the region at that time and also to ensure the American presence in Asia and a commitment to defend Australia in future emergency".¹⁴

In the course of time, with the American troop withdrawal from Vietnam, there was public and academic discussion and consequently alternative security arrangements emerged.

The answer is new regionalism. In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), composed of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore was established, of which Australia became a dialogue partner in due course. Another new regional arrangement that involved Australia, Japan, and India,

¹⁴ Paul Dibb, ed., Australia's External Relations in the 1980's, (New York, 1983), p.220.

was the formation of ASPAC. These were important attempts towards economic cooperation rather seeking military alliances. 'The nine-nations' Asia Pacific council (ASPAC) founded in 1966, concerned with economic co-operation amongst Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, S. Vietnam, the Republic of China (Taiwan), South Korea, and Japan.

Australian-Indonesian relations gradually improved by the middle of 1966. The possibility of armed clash between Australia and Indonesia vanished with the end of Indonesia's anti-Malaysia "Confrontation" policy. The Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik repeatedly stressed that "a strong economy and ideology" are worth more in defense than reliance on "the U.S. nuclear umbrella"¹⁵ Australia went out its way to accommodate Jakarta in one of its most sensitive policy problems: retention of the territory of West New Guinea.

The transformation in Australia's security relationship with the Asia-Pacific region over the last five years has been remarkable. At present Australia considers engagement with Southeast Asian region as national priority. The Prime minister Paul Keating stated on 15 Feb 1995 that, 'Unless we succeed in Asia, we succeed nowhere'¹⁶ The new regional security policy needs to be understood in the context of Australia's growing economic enmeshment with East Asia and Southeast Asia. Defence co-operation with Southeast is burgeoning to the point where Asian states conduct more defence co-operation activities with Australia than they do with each

¹⁵ The Jakarta times, (August 20, 1968):

¹⁶ The Hon. P.J. Keating, address to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 'Australia and Asia' The Next steps, (Perth, 15 February 1995), p.1

other. The relation has been improving compared to the past, for example, Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) officers fly on RAAF p-3c orion maritime surveillance operation in the Timor-Gap, and RAAF maritime personal fly on Indonesian Navy search-master flights ¹⁷And since 1993 all Singaporean Air Force pilots have conducted their training programs in Australia.

There is no doubt about the commitment of the Australian government to constructive and co-operative engagement with Asia. However, the argument is in the volume, the issues need to be addressed if Australia's engagement with the Asia-Pacific is to continue to be constructive. Australia does not have a strategy for Asia-Pacific Security i.e. a clear set of policies, balanced objective, and means of implementation which are carefully tailored to the political and resource constraints rather, Australia has a high level of professed commitment which have been articulated in varying degrees of detail, but the connections between these policies have been sketched only in outline and contain both conceptual tensions and potential policy dilemmas. In this respect Australia's policy of security engagement is quite presumptive. Recent developments from 'Comprehensive Engagement' to Multilateral Security Dialogue.

Since 1971, successive assessment reviews of the strategic basis of Australian defense policy have reiterated that there are no imminent or foreseeable threats to Australia, New planning concepts and methodologies had to be developed: The

¹⁷ Desmond Ball, "The political Security Dimension of Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region" The Indonesian Quarterly, (vol XXII, no.3, 1994), pp.227-46.

defence of Australia 1987, a white paper published by the minister for Defence. Kim Beazley, in March 1987¹⁸ The attention given to developing these tasks far outweighed the considerations for regional defence cooperation. The 1987 white paper suggested that regional stability should be approached mainly through self-reliance. The Department of Defence argued that the best contribution (Australia) can make to the continued stability of our region is an Australian defence force able to deal effectively with the most credible challenge to the nation's sovereignty.¹⁹

To assist regional states develop defence capabilities, was most often underwritten by Australia's security interests at the time, for example, to prevent regional communist parties coming to power, to keep Australia's allies, first-Britain and then the United States engaged in the region and later, to keep the Soviet Union out of the region. Australian assistance was given as 'defence aid' and the first program, for the specific purpose of cooperative defence activities was to Malaysia in 1963-64²⁰ During the rest of the 1960's and 70's defence aid was provided to Indonesia. Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea (PNG), South Vietnam and various South Pacific States. The most enduring arrangement were with

¹⁸ The Defence of Australia 1987, Australian Government Publishing Service, (Canberra, March 1987).

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Leszik Buszynski, SEATO: The failure of an Alliance Strategy, Singapore University Press, (Singapore, 1983). p. 71.

PNG and the South Pacific islands, through the Pacific Patrol Boat Project²¹ and other maritime surveillance arrangements Under the auspices of the Five Power Defence arrangement (FPDA), As the region become more stable during the 1970's and 80's the previous justifications for defence aid dissipated and by the time the white paper was published in 1987 it was widely accepted that Australia's military co-operation with Southeast Asia was 'modest'²²

In December 1989, the Minister issued a major statement, Australia's Regional Security, which officially articulated a Multidimensional approach to Australian Security Policy and planning: The policy responses or instruments available to protect Australia's security are multidimensional. They go well beyond strict military capabilities, essential though these are, they also embrace traditional, diplomacy, politico-military capabilities (in the border-zone, between defence and diplomacy), economic and trade relations, and development assistance and they extend to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, information activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity.²³

The statement was also Evans first attempt to outline philosophy of 'common-security' i.e., seeking 'security with' states not against them. The intellectual and

²¹ Anthony Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Co-operation, Australian foreign Policy publications programme, Australian National University, (Canberra, 1994). p.65.

²² The Defence of Australia, Reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Canberra, 1987).

²³ Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Canberra, December 1989), p.2.

practical directions of 'security with' states were established through two concept: 'Comprehensive engagement', which applied to Australian's relations with South east Asian states, and 'constructive commitment' which applied to states in South West Pacific.²⁴

The statement reflected traditional thinking about security. Absent from Evan's vision for enhanced collaboration with the region were such measures as confidence building, arms control, multilateral security institutions, or other practices based on the principles of 'common security' and 'cooperative security.'²⁵ These principles are much talked and worked in the Association of Southeast Asian nations, the institution is regarded as the landmark development as far as security relation between the countries of the region is concerned, therefore this topic shall be discussed at a greater details in the forthcoming chapters.

²⁴ ibid., p.4.

²⁵ Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-pacific Security Policy in the 1990's. (Canberra, 1996), p.37.

Chapter II

AUSTRALIA'S ASIAN IDENTITY

Whether Australia should be considered a part of Asia or an outsider?, Whether it should always be a distant observer, as an outsider, or an active regional actor, are relevant questions today of Australian foreign policy debates over the past few years and it remains the central international issue for any Australian government and for the Australian people. It is an issue that also evinces interest in Australia's neighbours, because the way Australians attend these issues which have implications on them too. There is no doubt that this region will be stronger, more prosperous and more stable if Australia is considered an intrinsic part of Asia, contributing its resources and talents to the influx of regional prosperity.¹

The pertinent point is whether Australia, a central participant in the affairs of the region or an integral part of the neighbourhood? The answer to these questions have positive reactions. There is a dense network of links of all kinds between Australia and Southeast Asia, i.e., economic, social, educational, political, security etc. which binds Australian connections with Southeast Asia & the South Pacific. Australia has been involved with Asia for many decades, of course. But never before in Australia's history all their interests have come together so intensely. Thus the background of Australia-Southeast Asian relations particularly, the security and economic dimension of relations are pertinent to be probed.

¹ Paul Keating, "Why Asia needs Australia?", Sarawak Tribune, (Canberra, 9 August 1996).

In Australia's quest for a 'modus vivendi' with the neighbouring Asia, Sympathy has been only less important than fear. If Australia's link-up with its "great and powerful friends" through ANZUS and SEATO can be understood against a background of fear sympathy explains some of the non-military approaches evolving during this period for supplementing what had been achieved through military alliances. Effects by the government and certain private groups in Australia towards providing economic and technical assistance to Asia represent this stand. In this, however, philanthropy was combined with opposition to communism, awareness of the long-term national interest and a desire to make up a diplomatic leeway in country's emerging relationships with the new states of Southeast Asia.²

During the Second World War, the region of Southeast Asia had been a battleground of conflicting interests. The colonial economy of this area had now to pay a heavy toll for the ravages of the war. The damages of "Scorched earth" and "denial" policies were manifested every where. In the immediate post-war period, Australia gave a modest amount of emergency and technical assistance to Indonesia and other Asian countries. Its credential had been so well established with the Indonesians that, three weeks before the Linggadjati Agreement, Republican leaders were reported to be anxious for Australian aid and plans were ready to send students and buyers to Australia. Australian government routed the bulk of its economic aid through the United Nations. Australia thus made contributions through

² The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia : Third annual report of the consultative committee (October 1954), p.14. The figure is for 1946-47,

UNPRA, UNICEF and UNESCO.³ Time and again, Australian spokesmen laid stress on the advancement of the people of the Pacific. The creation of the South Pacific Commission represented the direction in which the Australian government was moving. The government was quick to announce in 1947 that instrumentalities similar to the South Pacific Commission should be established for South East Asia and West Pacific as well.⁴ Had Labour retained the reigns of power in Canberra, there is no doubt that they too would have evolved some form of aid programme on an enlarged scale.

The only significant step in this respect during the period of Chiefly government was the Commonwealth loan to Burma. In 1949, Burma was in the throes of insurrection and the neighbouring Dominions, particularly, Australia and India were greatly concerned. On 27 February 1949, informal discussions on the situation in Burma were held in New Delhi, in which both Nehru and Evatt were present along with Britain's Bottomley and High Commissioners for Ceylon and the United Kingdom, this resulted in the grant to Burma of a loan of \$ 6,000,000 Stg., in which Australia joined other members of the Commonwealth of Nations, namely Ceylon, India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

The ALP government had hardly come round to defining its attitude towards the vexed question of aiding underdeveloped Asian countries when it was swept out

³ Ravindra Verma, Australia and Southeast Asia, Abinav publications, (New Delhi, 1974). p.48.

⁴ T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1988-1977, (Australian National University press, Canberra, 1978), p.48.

of power by a coalition of liberal and country parties led by Robert Menzies. Percy Spender, for long the chief spokesman of foreign affairs in the opposition shadow cabinet became the minister for External Affairs in the new government. His first task as a minister was to represent his country at the commonwealth Foreign ministers' conference in Colombo from 9 to 14 January 1950. The meeting of Commonwealth Statesmen was of importance in many ways, first it has been stated, it was "a meeting of giants",⁵ Second, The newly independent state of the South Asian realm-India, Pakistan and Ceylon were represented at the meeting as equals of the British and other Dominion representatives.

In the conference, Spender did not find support on the question of creating a Pacific Pact for meeting the expansionist challenge of international communism. The emphasis, therefore, shifted to building up an economic bulwark against under development of political as well as economic. Referring to the climate, premiere Senanayake of Ceylon had himself declared in his opening speech: The fundamental problem of Asia was economic and not political, and it was necessary for world peace that positive steps be taken to tackle Asian poverty and improve the standard of living.⁶

In Colombo's meeting, where the Commonwealth statesmen were assembled and the Australian representative was able to bring home to others the point that the situation in South East Asia was too delicate to allow for any qualms about

⁵ T.B.Millar, Australia in peace and war, External Relations 1948-1977, (Australian National University Press Canberra, 1978), p.28.

⁶ The Times (London, 10 January 1950).

buttressing it by any means available-economic as well as political. For this, he suggested short-term needs as well as long-term remedies. Thus came into being a plan of economic development, which, to an Indian writer, marks "a great success for this Australian diplomacy as well as that of the western Bloc."⁷ Spender himself wrote, nineteen years later that the story of the Colombo plan "provides a dramatic example of how a small nation, as Australia still is, may influence history."⁸ When the Colombo talks ended on 14 January, Spender visited several south east Asian countries and stressed on one component which was American assistance. Without which, he felt, the plan could not succeed.⁹

Australia's initiative in pioneering the Colombo plan showed that while the Menzies government was seeking an alliance with the United States for under-writing Australia's security vis-a-vis Asia, it was also seeking to buttress the coveted alliance and the resulting security through a non-political and non-military approach, symbolised by the Colombo plan. Spender himself wrote later: Security in the Pacific, economic and technical aid and political stability in South east Asia were, to me, rather like two sides of one coin.¹⁰ The success of the two-pronged policy


⁷ Mitra Nandan Jha, The Origins of the SEATO, unpublished Ph.D. Indian School of International Studies, (New Delhi, 1963), p. 79.

⁸ Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969), p.271.

⁹ *ibid.*,

¹⁰ Sir Percy Sinder: Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo plan, (Sydney, 1969), p. 274.

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was revealed from the fact that the ANZUS treaty was initialled only 12 days after the launching of the plan on 1 July 1950.

Though the initiation for the Colombo plan came from the Common Wealth of Nations, it was clear at the very outset that Non-Common Wealth Countries were to be invited to join it as soon as possible. The plan in 1950 started with the membership of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (among the donors), and Ceylon. India, Pakistan and the British territories of Malaya and British Brunei among the recipients. Recipients draw up their own projects, spend whatever they can on them and then ask for the balance from the donors. This assistance is mainly for the development of industry, power, fuel, agriculture, transport and communications. By the end of 1953-54 Australia had spent or planned the expenditure of a sum of A 17.8 million, which was approximately 56 percent of the total contribution of A 31.25 millions, in December 1950 by the country.

It was left to the Australians themselves to ask if their aid was consistent with other aspects of foreign policy and their political and defence aims, promoted their trade, nourished the growing institutions of regional co-operation, and projected their ideals of material welfare beyond national boundaries. The Colombo plan-an Indian writer asserts, was "the first concrete attempt to organise some kind of regionalism in the economic sphere"¹¹ As a regional economic grouping, its purpose appeared to be running parallel to that of the ECAFE, which was a regional agency of the

¹¹ Sisir Gupta, India and the Regional Integration in Asia. (Bombay, 1964), p.78.



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United Nations since 1947. Australia's membership of it was cited as an example of its regional identity with Asia. The Colombo plan thus became "one of the many instances showing general weaknesses of UN's system of international economic co-operation."¹²

Australia's Asian neighbours viewed all aid with suspicion, howsoever mild it was. For example, Prime minister Lee Kuan-Yew of Singapore said, when he was leader of opposition: And talking of subversion, here is subversion: Colombo plan aid. I give you free milk shake, then I sell you milk. Then I send my fellows along to test you for Royal Australian college of surgeons' membership. Then I help you in the fight against tuberculosis. We welcome all these things, but I think one must draw attention to the fact that in this part of the world, the Australians are gently moving, in which the British are gently oozing out.¹³

There were other motives also, some of them less perceptible. Australia only used its aid effort under the aegis of the Colombo plan in serving its policy objectives vis-a-vis south east Asia.

The last twenty years have seen an increasing preoccupation by most government in East and Southeast Asia, with economic growth in what has become an increasingly competitive yet interdependent region. On the one hand, Japanese-American trade is still expanding, and despite its persistent trade deficit, America's exports to Japan have been rising at a faster rate than Japanese exports to the united

¹² R.G. Casey, Friends and Neighbours, (Melbourne, 1954), p. 93.

¹³ Sisir Gupta, India and The Regional Integration in Asia, (Bombay, 1964), p.88.

states.¹⁴ On the other hand, trade frictions have renewed intensity and are now a normal feature of the relationship. Japan, for its part, has become the leading source of capital, aid and technology for much of the Asia-pacific region. More recently, South Korea and Taiwan have also become a source of investment, particularly in south east Asia.

To moderate these actual or potential conflicts within the region and at the same time enhance leverage vis-a-vis other major centres of economic power, various proposals have been advanced for greater regional economic co-operation and the creation of a Pacific trading forum. One such initiative is the Australian-inspired Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group which held its first ministerial meeting in November 1989. APEC's expansion to include China, Hong Kong and Taiwan will be an important step in the direction of greater inclusiveness, but several unanswered questions still cloud the future of the organisation, will it include the interest of the region's poorer or less developed economies (e.g. Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, South Pacific island)? will it provide an arena for resolving regional tensions and averting conflict between trading blocs?¹⁵ Will it be able to balance and reconcile the objectives of industrial competitiveness, export performance, and economic growth with other important criteria of security, including distributive justice, political autonomy,

¹⁴ Gordon. B, 'The Asia-Pacific Rim', Foreign Affairs, (Vol 70, no.1, Fall 1991), p.154.

¹⁵ Elek. A, "The Challenge of Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation", The Pacific Review, (vol.4, no.4, 1991), pp.322-323.

democratisation, protection of the environment and demilitarisation? How will it handle the complex linkages between economy, environment and military security? How will it relate to other forums, let alone competing models, of regional or sub-regional co-operation. (e.g. the East Asian Economic Group proposed by Malaysia)? All of these questions bring us face to face with the purpose, structure and content of regionalisation. Soviet Union's answer is a Asia policy, Gorbachev called for a forum modelled perhaps on the conference for security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) whose task would be to consider a number of proposals aimed at lessening tensions in the Asia Pacific region.¹⁶

This was an attempt to apply the notion of common security to the Asian Pacific theatre where it had so far made relatively little headway. Though regional responses were not immediately enthusiastic, Gorbachev's proposal has since gained considerable currency, with similar suggestions emanating from a number of quarters. In May 1990, the Indonesian Defence Minister, Benny Murdani, floated the idea of a regional forum to discuss a post-cold war security order.¹⁷

In similar vein, in July 1990, Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans, expressed the hope that 'new Europe-style patterns of co-operation between old adversaries (would) find their echo in this part of the world', and perhaps lead to a new institutional frame work, a conference for security and cooperation in Asia (CSCA), Capable of addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist

¹⁶ The Current Digest of the Soviet press, (27 August, vol. xxxviii, no.30, 1986), p.8.

¹⁷ International Herald Tribune, (13 September 1990), p.2.

in Asia.¹⁸ In subsequent statements Australian policy-makers, in response to Washington's negative reaction sought to moderate the scope of the proposal (by all accounts a poorly articulated and ill-prepared proposal) and dispel any impression of inconsistency with existing security arrangements. A number of other contributions surfaced in 1990-1991 from both governmental and non governmental sources, all proposing, despite widely diverging perspectives, improved or expanded consultative mechanisms on issues of regional security.¹⁹

As we have already noted, the United States has tended to view with considerable suspicion, any attempt to establish a new multilateral framework for regional security. The U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Richard Solomon, cast doubt on the utility of an all Pacific security grouping, and echoed secretary Baker's assessment that it was preferable to adopt existing, proven mechanisms to meet the challenges of changing circumstances before creating new ones. The United States could see little merit in any initiative which might disturb its strategic pre-eminence in the region particularly any arms control measure which might restrict its navy's freedom of action. Washington's hostility to many of the proposals stemmed from its marked preference for the existing security architecture based on the 'spoked-wheel' concept, that it is on a network of bilateral security relationships with itself as the hub. From the American vantage point these arrangements, which have the US-Japan security 'partnership'

¹⁸ FEER, (9 Jan, 1992), p.10.

¹⁹ N.D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington, 1991), p.128.

as their centrepiece, offer the United States considerable freedom of action and a useful degree of ambiguity in dealing with allies China and Russia. The U.S centred unipolar security system, by taking advantage of America's global organisational outreach and cementing its role as ultimate guarantor of regional and sub-regional security, might also be used to maintain access to resources, markets and technology. Attractive though it may be to U.S policy-makers, the spoked-wheel concept is theoretically and practically flawed on several counts: firstly, the relative decline of America's economic position secondly, its steadily diminishing capacity to sustain the cost of its extensive military presence in the region. Thirdly, the failure to recognise that the United States can no longer perform the same stabilising function which it assumed at the height of the cold war. fourthly, the risk that bilateral security relationship and arrangements will fuel new suspicions and animosities. lastly, the need to integrate the substantial improvement in relations between Russia on the one hand and the United States, China and Japan on the other into a more permanent and predictable institutional arrangement.

Japan's initial response to the multilateral approach has also been negative. The Japanese government presumably prefers the bilateral frame work as the basis for resolving the Northern territories' dispute with Russia, and sees advantages in making visible progress in the resolution of the Korean conflict and further reduction

of Russian forces in the Far East preconditions for a multilateral security dialogue²⁰ But this reasoning too, is seriously flawed:

1. The resolution of the Korean conflict (and the prospect of Korean signification) will require significant input from all four neighbouring great powers.
2. Excessive emphasis on bilateralism by Japan may inflame Chinese, ASEAN and Australian suspicions.
3. Japanese acceptance in the region will presumably have to be grounded in the institutional web of a regional multilateral frame-work that makes its economic dominance less abrasive and subject to a degree of oversight.
4. A multilateral framework may also hold the best prospects for handling the increasingly sensitive U.S-Japan relationship.

Therefore the initial U.S. and Japanese reactions are more a reflection of habit than self-interest and will sooner or later have to take account of rapidly changing political realities. The unwillingness of the two most powerful states of the region to play a key role in shaping a new security framework is no reason, then why the effort should be abandoned.²¹ It simply means that for some little time yet the initiative will lie elsewhere, primarily with the governments of smaller states and range of national and regional non-governmental organisations. This is an opportune

²⁰ Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific "Rethinking the security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region".

²¹ *ibid.*,

moment to move towards a fully-fledged multilateral framework which encompasses²² the United States, the relevant republics of the former Soviet Union, all the countries of East and Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands states. The task of this new security framework would be to respond effectively to the shift from East-West confrontation to East-West cooperation, phase out obsolete military alliances and agreements whose origins lie in the Cold war, and provide a vehicle for elaborating and applying notions of common and comprehensive security. This is not to say that the transition to such a framework will be swift or uniform across the region.²³

With the end of the cold war and the withdrawal of military forces by the superpowers, the region calls for a country to take a leadership role, Australia, Indonesia, China are competing among each other to influence the region of southeast Asia. Australia since long is been fighting to possess its Asian identity as we have discussed above. As far as the recent developments in the relationship between Australia and southeast Asia is concerned, would be discussed at the later stage under the Umbrella for a Pacific House including the multilateral institutions like ASEAN and ARF as the focus of the topic.

Australia has been trading with Southeast Asia for many decades, The trade is increasing intensely. Last year, 65 percent of Australian exports went to Asia, and

²² Peter Polomka, "Towards a Pacific House", survival, (vol.xxiii, March/April 1991). p.174.

²³ Alan Dupont, "The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement", The Indonesian Quarterly, (vol.xxiv/2, 1996) p.195.

40 percent of Australia's import trade was from the region. The investment plans of Australia's leading companies are over-whelmingly focused on Asia. Australia is one of the region's most heavily integrated economies.²⁴ One reason for this is the natural complementarity between Australia's efficient mining and energy sectors and the resource needs of North Asia.²⁵ Australian resources literally fuelled much of the great process of industrialization in Japan and South Korea over the past 30 years. And, in a slightly different way, similar patterns are emerging in the Australian economic relationship with China, whose investments in Australia mainly in the resources sector, are among its largest in any country. With countries like Indonesia, a different pattern of complementarity is developing. This is based not so much on resources as on the natural fit between the development needs of Southeast Asia and Australia's high-technology industries and sophisticated services, including health and education. As for defense and security, Australia has deep relationships with the region. Some are multilateral, such as the long-standing Five Power Defense Arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore. Some are bilateral, like the Agreement on Maintaining Security that Australia has signed with Indonesia late last year, or the arrangements under which Singapore conducts its air-force flight training in Australia. Some like participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, engage Australia in a broader security dialogue. The prime minister of Australia made it a point that

²⁴ Paul Keating, "Why Asia Needs Australia?," Sarawak Tribune, (Canberra, 9 August 1996).

²⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Changing Modalities of Southeast Asian Security", Indonesian Quarterly, (vol.xxiv/4, 1996), p.376.

Australia's engagement with Asia needs to go well beyond the economic and political, has to involve a comprehensive cultural and social shift as well. For example Australia has proportionally more students learning Asian languages as a second tongue-particularly Japanese, Indonesian, Chinese and Korean than does any other country in the world.²⁶ and it is one of the reasons, that in a recent survey of young Australians by the Business council of Australia showed that every one of the respondents expected their country to be a republic by the year 2010. The Prime Minister Paul Keating of Australia believes that Australia will never feel completely at home with its geography while the head of the state is also the Monarch of Great Britain. The country's links with Britain are an important part of Australia's history. Britain helped shapes Australia's institutions and beliefs of Australian neighbours like Hongkong, Malaysia and Singapore. They are a valuable legacy.²⁷

Over the years Australia has changed dramatically. Immigration from Europe and Asia has transformed the perceptions of Regionalism and Internationalism. In 1985 the percentage of overseas born Australians who came from Asia was 11.7 percent. By 1995 it was 21 percent. On 6 November 1996, Australia reaffirms its commitment to the elimination of racial discrimination at the UN General assembly. It is inevitable that engagement between Australia and southeast Asia will continue but the speed and comprehensiveness of the change depends on the determination of

²⁶ Gareth Evans, "Australia's Foreign policy and The Environment", The Round Table, (vol.31, 1990). p.12.

²⁷ Gareth Evans, "Australia's Foreign Policy and the Environment", The Round Table, (vol.31, 1990). p.18.

Australians to press ahead with it. some still fear it, some wants to turn the clock back, or at the very least to hold the hands of the clock where they are.²⁸ But it would be in the benefit for Australia to continue to work actively with the region, to understand its dynamics and culture and develop relationship with southeast Asia on all fronts. Paul Keating stressed that besides only governments efforts it is also the matter for Australia's business people, teachers, writers and the artists, film-makers who are all the critical part of the process to make the deal successful.²⁹

This is a critical time for Southeast Asia. Its continued prosperity and security depends on whether it can maintain the economic growth that has transformed it in the past decades. The region has to face the increasing challenges. Environmental and resource constraints, including shortages of trained people, are already some of the insisting problems. The answer to this, of course, is to maximise the flexibility with which it can draw on resources and experience from around Asia-Pacific to address individual countries' needs.³⁰ That is why APEC is so important for the future and why every businessman and woman in the region should be encouraging national leaders to strengthen APEC'S capacity to bring down the barriers to trade and investment, to harmonise regulations and standards and to work

²⁸ ibid.,

²⁹ Paul Keating, "Why Asia needs Australia?", Sarawak Tribune, (Canberra, 9 August, 1996).

³⁰ Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's, (Canberra, 1996), p.42.

more intensely on other problems facing the region, like the environment and education.

It is also why Australia is important to the region's future and why it needs to be encouraged to continue down the path it is on.³¹ with its resources and its space, with its highly trained and educated people, and above all with ideas, Australia is emerging an invaluable partner in the construction of a genuine community of nations in this part of the world.

³¹ Paul Keating, "Why Asia needs Australia?", Sarawak Tribune, (Canberra, 9 August, 1996).

Chapter III

THE MAINTENANCE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION: AUSTRALIA'S INTERESTS

The uncertainties and tensions in the regional security environment have both provided the imperatives for cooperation and have created major difficulties in achieving it. This chapter discusses in greater detail some of the key characteristics of the regional security environment and indicates how they may provide opportunities for further cooperative security approaches between Australia and Southeast Asia. Tied up with the locational and strategic importance of Southeast Asia is the fact that Southeast Asian lands and forests have been veritable treasure trove of mineral wealth and tropical products from the earliest times. As the Malay saying goes, *manada gula ada semut* (where there is sugar, there are ants).¹ One results of this favourable juxtaposition of an advantageous pivotal location and wealth of diverse and desirable natural resources has been that much of Southeast Asia has from ancient times been an arena of conflicting foreign interests, which have markedly influenced its history and development. Australia, as we have discussed in the previous chapter has identified herself with Asia, looks to Southeast Asia for its interests and in the overall development of the region. Australia, because of the background, its perception, its remoteness, and isolation and weakness, have

1 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1888-1977, Australian National University Press, (Canberra, 1978), p.50.

always been susceptible to the notion of a single, fearful threat: in the nineteenth century, in succession, the French, the Russians, the Germans, the Japanese again, the Germans again, the Indonesians, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, the Russians.

In recent years, the security scenario has changed drastically, the single most important characteristic of the regional security environment is the rate and extent of change itself. Australia has emphasized the reciprocal nature of the aid, that is, the importance of Australian defence forces co-operating with those of the reciprocal power and thus gaining training and experience and developing good working relationships. In the year 1961/62, defence co-operation program budget came to \$42 million, of which \$18.5 million was allocated to ASEAN states. The reason behind the Australian Co-operative aid, according to a senior defence official, is that "we can best contribute to world's stability through encouraging stability in our own region and neighbourhood."²

The following points are relevant to the stability of the region and the security of Australia:

1. So long as the ambitious powers in the region appear to be in search of power seeking opportunities, the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-operation, Australia would like the continuance of US bases in Japan.
2. In view of the overwhelming importance of Australia's trade with and through the region, especially with Japan, unimpeded passage of the straits

2 Peter Lewis Young, "The New From Australia: An Analysis of Australian Perceptions on Regional Security Policy", *Strategic Digest*, (vol.XXVI, no.12, December 1996), p.1748.

is imperative. This is one of the reasons why Australia should maintain friendly ties with ASEAN states, particularly with Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Australia worries about three things (i) global strategic balance, (ii) the possibility of a breakdown of internal security in one of the oceanic neighbours, with external interference of a sympathetic or hostile nature that may make demands upon Australia. (iii) the possibility that acquisitive powers may make increasingly pressing or peremptory demands upon the oceanic neighbours for access to resources, perhaps leading to Russia's acquiring base that would upset the strategic predominance of the United States or Australia in the region.³

ECONOMIC CHANGE

The most important change is economic. The economic strength has become the single most important index of national power, eclipsing even the possession of significant quantities of nuclear weapons. The determinate role of economic factors in shaping the architecture of security in the Asia-Pacific region has been recognised by US defence planners. For example, Dr Paul Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 April 1990 as follows: You've got to recognise the name of the game in the Pacific is economics... I don't think we should be under any illusion that 10 years

3 Grigory E. Fay, "Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific", *Pacific Affairs*, (vol.54, no.3, Fall 1981). p.238.

from now the US role is going to be determined by our military posture. Its going to be determined most of all by our economic competitiveness and by the kinds of trading and economic relationships have out there.⁴

The centrality of economic factors in the region does not favour Australia as much as it does to many other regional states. The combination of low and relatively instable rates of economic growth, a high foreign debt and current account deficit makes Australia's future ranking in the region uncertain. Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans recently warned that, competition is increasing rapidly from both within and out side the region and competitive advantages that Australia is under pressure.⁵ Nonetheless, this economic dynamism is somewhat fragile, it is dependent upon energy resources and raw materials from outside the region. Sea Lines of Communications (SCOCs) are very long and quite vulnerable, to the extent that the economic dynamism is reflected in high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic inter-dependence, there is cause for both optimism and uncertainty. Economic growth creates what is now called the 'new economic security dilemma'⁶ on the one hand, economic growth also increases political and military power, which may generate uncertainty about the intentions of states. The regional uncertainty is all due to the above factors.

4 Alan Dupont, "The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement", The Indonesian Quarterly, (vol.xxiv/2, 1996), p.198.

5 Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Transcript of Joint Media Conference at the Conculsion of the East Asian Hemisphere, Heads of Mission Meeting at Parliament House, (Canberra, 5 May, 1995).

6 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, p.98.

Geo-Strategic Change and the Increasing Complexity of Security

The most obvious geostrategic change is the collapse of the USSR and decline of influence of the US which has led to a transition from bipolarity to yet undefined form of multipolarity. The U.S bases and facilities which were maintained in the Philippines have now been nationalised and the forces withdrawn. Some of them have been redistributed to Hawai's and the US west coast, and to lesser extents to Japan and Singapore. US capabilities in the region were reduced by about 15 per cent and the future of US in the region is anyway uncertain. For Australia to emerge as a leader is a difficult task as other major powers are becoming more active like Japan's strategic reach is increasing and it is already involved in maritime operations. China's power projection capabilities in the South China Sea have been enhanced with the construction of an air base and anchorages at Woody Islands in the Paraos, and the acquisitions of an air to air refuelling capability for its naval air forces. In Southeast Asia, there is concern about the possibility that China might be able to assert military supremacy over the South China Sea. These developments are having a major arm acquisition programs, involving the modernisation and enhancement of air and maritime capabilities. ASEAN countries are transforming their naval capabilities from essentially surface warfare-oriented patrol to navies with greater range and a broader spread of capabilities. For example, they are now all (except for the Philippines) equipped with Harpoon and Exocet anti-ship missiles, Singapore and Thailand has two corvettes equipped with Harpoons. Indonesia has acquired six Van Speijk frigates equipped with Harpoons, Brunei and Malaysia has

two frigates and eight patrol craft fitted with Exocets, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia have modern aircraft like the F-16's, Malaysia has e e eighteen MIG-29s and light F-18's,⁷ With respect to East Asia and South East Asia around to Burma, but including South Asia, the share of global arms imports and licensed production increased from 12.4 per cent in 1984 to 21.1 per cent in 1993.⁸ Vietnam - were ranked in the top ten recipients of arms deliveries. Other countries that have occasionally made, it into the top ten over the past half decade are Thailand and Burma.⁹ There is no single factor explaining for the robust regional arms acquisition programs. In the case of the ASEAN countries, for example a series of studies of the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth from the early 1960's through to the late 1980's have consistently shown that there is a close and positive correlation between them.¹⁰ Those countries with the highest rates of growth of Gross National Product (GNP), such as Singapore and Malaysia, have had the highest rates of increase in defence spending, while those with slower economic growth, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, have had the slowest increase in defence spending.

7 Sandy Gordon, "The news Nuclear Arms Race?", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, (vol.69, no.6, November 1992), pp.28.

8 Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region", *International Security*, (vol.18, no.3, Winter 1993-94), p.78.

9 *ibid.*

10 Geoffrey Harris, "The Determinants of Defence Expenditure in the ASEAN Region", *Journal of Peace Research*, (vol.23, no.1, March 1986), pp.41,49.

Economics growth does not explain the increase in defence spending. Rather, it provides the capacity for acquisitions that are, by and large, a response to the demands of self-reliance in the context of increasing regional uncertainty.¹¹ It is wrong to characterise the regional military requisition programmes as 'an Asian arms race'.¹² Any arms race has two distinctive features: first, a rapid rate of acquisitions, in order to remain at the head of the race. Second, some reciprocal dynamics in which developments in the defensive and offensive capabilities of one adversary are matched by attempts to counter the advantages thought to be gained by another.

The Increasing Complexity of Security

Security development is also becoming much more complex. In part, this arises from an increasing number of states becoming major security actors in the region - the Seven ASEAN countries, China, Japan, India, the United States, Russia and Australia. The primary interests of some of these actors are intra-regional; for these the stability of the region is "a secondary concern. A more profound source of complexity however is the broadening of the concept of security itself. Security is becoming more multi dimensional. Military concern will ofcourse remain - the strength of insurgent and separatist forces in Burma, Cambodia, the Philippines. Papua New Guinea, etc. the steady expansion of the naval and counter maritime

11 Ball Arms Acquisition in the Asia Pacific.

12 Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military acquisitions in the Asia Pacific Region", International Security, (vol.18, no.3, 1993-94), p.79.

capabilities of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and the measuring power projection capabilities of Japan, China and India. However, in addition to military Security there are concerns about economic and environmental security.

Economic security at the broader level involves the maintenance of growth of the economic centres of ASEAN. The multiplicity of the protection of trade links, protection of SLOCs; rights of transit through straits and internal waterways, reefs, and seabed and ocean areas, and the protection and exploitation of marine resources. The Indonesian restrictions' in 1988 on passage through the Lombok and Sunda Straits, illustrates the potential for significant disruption of merchant shipping through the region.¹³ Environmental security issue are also becoming more salient in the region. Global pollution, desertification, deforestation, and the green house effect, with attendant issue of rising sea-levels, are real problems. Oil spills in the Malaysia straits on the South China Sea could do irreparable damage to marine life and other offshore resources. Deforestation in Malaysia and Kalimantan is already portending adverse, environmental effects on Southeast Asia.¹⁴

Imperatives for Regional Security Cooperation

it is generally accepted that security, co-operation is imperative for many important reasons. Mechanisms to be established to deal with security issues.

13 Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's, (Canberra, 1996), p.28.

14 Philip Hurst, Rainforest Politics: Ecological Destruction in Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur, 1991), p.56.

Secondly it is necessary to counter the centrifugal possibilities within the region. A more diffusive regional security environment is emerging, with the potential for states to each pull in different directions. New conflict issues are arising, particularly in the South China Sea. Thirdly, the concern of various major advanced weapons acquisition programs currently under way in the region. One of the reasons is because the national self-confidence which is generated by the acquisition of these advanced capabilities. However, programs do not lead to a regional arms race. Fourthly, acquisition be accompanied by dialogue and transparency as well as other confidence - building arrangements. Fifthly, there is the concern that nearly all countries in the region have been practising the "law of the Sea". All have signed the 1982 UN convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which has defined the legal regime of the seas and is a major Confidence Building Measure in its own right. The convention is ratified by Indonesia and the Philippines which states, that the High Seas 'Shall be reserved for peaceful purposes'. Sixthly and much positively regional co-operation is necessary for the achievement of 'regional resilience'. Finally, with respect to Australia's own long-term strategic interests, the promotion of multilateral security - and confidence building arrangements provides Australia with a significant role in the region. Although most of the initiatives for regional security co-operation quite properly come from the ASEAN and South Pacific Capitals, there is an unabashed recognition within the region that Australia is the principal repository of the experience and skills necessary to convert the various

notions into viable operational regimes. Australia has not been diffident about capitalising on this important opportunity for regional involvement.¹⁵

Australia's Current Response: The Military Dimension

The changing regional security environment and the imperatives for security co-operation have impressed upon Australian Policy-makers, the need to develop a multi dimensional means to security. While most of the public focus has been on security dialogue, other military and strategic measures have also been undertaken by the two main players, the Department of Defence/Australian Defence Forces (ADF) and Department of Foreign and Trade.

ADF has not had plans for military co-operations in Southeast Asia Since the very early 1970's The ADE had to accept that the defence of Australia is a national responsibility. some Australian defence analyst are concerned that the alleged demands of a policy of regional engagement will inevitably impact on force structure development - and do so at the expense of the capabilities required for the defence of Australia.¹⁶ Australia's substantial contribution to international peace keeping operation (e.g., Cambodia in 1991-93, Somalia in 1993-94, and Rwanda in 1994)

15 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, (Canberra, Australia, 1986), pp.52-53.

16 Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack, "The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia", in Paul Evans, ed., *Studying Asia Paper Security*, University of Toronto, York University, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Canada and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, (Indonesia, 1994), p.69.

probably degraded the ADF's capabilities to respond effectively to some short-warning contingencies in northern Australia. But these were judged to be most improbable at the time.

As Paul Dobb argued in 1986 official Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Security policy should protect the nation from armed attack and from constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack.¹⁷ The argument, often made by regional states, that security is broad or 'comprehensive' concept is endorsed by Defence only in so far as it has consequences which could impinge on Australia's security as defined above. For example, Defence has little interest in co-operating with regional states to enhance 'regional resilience' where it is concerned with governance and economic development, even though a number of ASEAN states see this as part of 'comprehensive security'. Second, in comparison to many regional states Australia has a long history of relative openness with regard to defence policy.

Defence cooperation with Southeast Asia

Defence cooperation between Australia and its Southeast Asian neighbours is now burgeoning. In 1993-94, Australia spent some \$229 million on Co-operative defence activities with Asia-Pacific Countries. The reciprocal side of Australia's defence cooperation with the ASEAN countries is perhaps even more remarkable.

17 Paul Dobb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, (Canberra, Australia, 1980), p.56.

Most of the ASEAN countries, and especially Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, are now more engaged with Australia with respect to cooperation defence activities than with any other country, including their own ASEAN¹⁸

Intelligence Exchanges

In May 1991, in a major speech on Australia's security interests in Asia, the Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, suggested that increased cooperation with respect to intelligence exchanges would serve as an important regional confidence-building measure.¹⁹ Exchanges of intelligence assessments and regular discussions among regional intelligence officials should lead to greater consensus concerning regional security and greater regional transparency. Cooperation with the intelligence and security agencies of the ASEAN countries is primarily the responsibility of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), which has established formal liaison arrangements with Malaysian External intelligence Organisation (MEIO), Internal Security Division of Singapore, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) of Philippines, State Intelligence Coordinating Board of Indonesia (BAKIN), Department of Central Intelligence of Thailand and almost all the ASEAN Countries.

A significant advance in transparency occurred in June 1993, when the Australian strategic Review Team, which produced the strategic Review 1993

18 Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australis's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's, (Canberra, 1996), p.30.

19 The Hon., R.J. Hawke, 'Australia's Security in Asia', First Asia Lecture to the Asia-Australia Institute, (Sydney, 24 May 1991), p.11.

(released by the Minister for Defence in February 1994), held consultations with Senior Defence personnel to confirm regional perceptions of regional security developments and to ensure that they were concordant with Australian perceptions. In 1993-94 some 609 members of ASEAN defence forces came to Australia for training and study purposes under the auspices of the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP). In addition to training and study activities undertaken under the DCP, there has also been an increase in the number of ASEAN defence personnel undertaking training and study activities arranged on a direct service-to-service basis and activities undertaken on a fee for service contractual basis. This is especially the case with respect to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). In March 1995, the Department of Defence announced that Australia and Singapore were examining proposals which would increase the Singaporean presence in Australia by another 1200 personnel.

Joint Exercises

Joint Military exercise can be extremely productive in terms of yielding close defence relations.

Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) training

Australia has established a training centre for PKO at RAAF Base William town, near Newcastle. ASEAN senior officers have agreed in principle on the utility of a regional PKO Training Centre. Australia is willing to involve, the William town facility in any regional venture - 'either to serve itself as a regional centre (suitably

transformed or augmented to accommodate regional interests), or to train the directing staff for a centre to be established somewhere else in the region at some future date.

Recent Arrangements for Coordinating Defence Cooperation

In the last few years, Australia has established a number of bilateral arrangements with various regional countries to further coordinate and develop cooperative activities. Australia believes in bilateral security relations for the regional security. Among the most important are the following:

The Malaysia - Australia Joint Defence Program (MAJDP). Established on 17 February 1992, the MAJDP provides a framework for bilateral defence activities conducted between Malaysia and Australia.²⁰ The program is jointly sponsored by the Malaysian MINDEF Secretary General and the Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence.

On 8 August, 1996, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer called for a renewed relationship that would offer Malaysia and Australia unprecedented opportunities for Mutual advancement. He said Australia and Malaysia are entering "an exciting new stage" in their relationship, defined by transformation in both countries and by historic change in the Asia Pacific region. "It is a stage of new opportunities... I want to look forward to, he said in a talk on "Australia Malaysia

20 Malaysia - Australia Joint Defence Program, Department of Defence, (Canberra, February 1992).

Relations: Cooperating for a Better Future" at the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations Malaysia (IDFR). Among the 200 people present at the talk were Foreign Minister Ratu Abdullah Ahmad Radwi and IDER Director General Datuk Ghazzal Sheikh Abdul Khalid. The Australian Ministers said: "we not only have long standing ties but, as young and dynamic economies. Australia and Malaysia have common interests in the Asia Pacific region."²¹

Malaysia's relations with Australia under the former labour government were strained at times, with Kuala Lumpur blaming Canberra for what it viewed as unfaltering film and television portrayals of Malaysia. Ties hit a low point in late 1993 after the then Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called Prime Minister Datuk Seri. Dr. Mahathir Mohammad a 'reluctant' for not attending the inaugural Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APCC) Summit in Seattle. Downer said the new Australian government wanted to get the political foundations of the relationship right from the beginning.

On political and security cooperation, Downer said what needed now is strengthening the political dialogue at the ministerial level. "Closer cooperation at the bilateral level will naturally strengthen both countries' joint efforts in the region",²² he said, since the two countries share a strong mutual commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, Australia would "warmly welcome" Malaysia's presence at the conference on Disarmament in Geneva. "with an

21 Sarwak Tribune, (9 August, 1996), p.5.

22 The Hindu, (11 August, 1996).

unfinished agenda on so many issues - from nuclear to 'biological weapons - the world needs Malaysia's involvement at the centre of the debate,"²³ he said. The bilateral trade and investment is impressive and reflected the changes in the respective economies. The opportunities to expand trade are enormous.

Downer hoped Australian information technology and multi-media companies will contribute strongly to Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor and Putrajaya new administrative centre projects on regional economic co-operation, Downer said Australia would welcome Malaysian participation in the South Pacific Forum's post-forum dialogue process.

The Australian-Indonesian Defence Committee (AIDPC) established in 1994, the AIDPC (originally called the Bilateral Defence Discussions) is co-chaired by Australia's vice chief of the Defence Forces and the Indonesian equivalent KASUM ABRI. The AIDPC brings together defence personnel from both countries consider the development of the relationship'.²⁴

The Australia-Indonesia Defence Coordinating Committee (IADCC) . The AIDP also sponsors the IADC which 'acts as the executive committee (at one star level) to the AIDCP with responsibility for coordination, directing and implementing all aspects of the relationship".²⁵ The IADCC has established a number of working

23 Sarawak Tribune, "Canberra Calls for Renewed Australia - Malaysia Relationship", (9 August, 1996), p.5.

24 Inspector General's Division, Department of Defence, Defence Cooperation, Directorate of Publishing, Defence Centre, (Canberra, 1995), p.14.

25 ibid.,

group to manage different areas of activity. There are currently four in operations and exercises; education, training, exchanges and attachments; communication, electronic warfare and information technology, and requisistics.²⁶

The joint Australia Singapore Coordination Group (JASINCG) established in 1992, the JASINCG provides a bilateral framework for coordinating cooperative activities. According to the Defence Department, "Defence cooperation" is becoming a relatively small element of broader activities, and increasingly Singapore undertakes fee for service arrangements for military training in Australia.

Australia maintains less formal arrangements with other countries in the region, for example, Thailand participates in Defence Resource Management Seminars and in 1992-93 took part in a Research and Development Planning Program. Australia also has limited arrangements with countries in Northeast Asia, although under the heading of 'constructive engagement' further activities are planned. At this stage most arrangements are for defence discussions and ad hoc visits among senior defence officials; for example the Dibb-Beaumont talks between Japan and Australia started in 1992, and the visit to Australia in February 1995 by the deputy commander of the Chinese PLA, General Xu Huizi.²⁷

Constraints on further enhancement of defence cooperation between Australia and regional defence forces: Resources are limited, and the cooperative programs are not cheap. In the case of Australia, which spends quarter billion dollars out of a

26 Discussion with Department of Defence Official, (8 November 1995). in Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr's Presumptive Engagement.

27 Sydney Morning Herald, (4 February, 1995).

defence budget of \$10 billion (2.5 per cent), In two years, it would amount to more than sufficient to cover the acquisition of an air borne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability, which remains one of the ADF highest priority projects.

It was evident in 1991 that the ADF (and, in particular, the RAN) was finding that its regional exercise commitment were impinging on the effective carriage of nationally - oriented tasks and roles, and that further regional involvement could not be undertaken without increased allocation of resources to the ADF for the purpose of 'regional engagement'.²⁸

The resource demands of enhanced defence cooperation are not limited to financial allocations: perhaps of greater importance is the demand on management and planning resources. Although some progress has been made with the establishment of the various coordinating committees, much of the current range of exercise and other cooperative activity between Australia and the ASEAN defence forces remains almost adhoc, lacking clear and coherent frame works and modalities, and hence very demanding in terms of planning and coordination effort.

It is unlikely that the extraordinary pace of cooperative activity over the past several years can continue to increase in the foreseeable future.

28 Desmond Ball, Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (DSBHS) in the Asia Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.83, Strategy of Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, (Canberra, 1991), p.50.

Chapter IV

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: QUEST FOR COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

"Security Community" is defined by Karl Deutsch as a group of states whose members share "dependable expectations of peaceful change in their mutual relations and rule out the use of force as a means of problem - solving"¹. The importance of Security Community is the availability of a condition wherein disputes among all members should be resolved peacefully.

ASEAN's formation in 1967 was based on the belief that local disputes were wasteful and self-defeating".² The goal of ASEAN since its formation has been to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region. ASEAN has not yet reached the stage of a "Security Community".³ It is, however, striving to achieve that goal in the post-cold war era.

Before the formation of ASEAN, most of its members were engaged in a series of confrontational moves and countermoves that threatened peace and security. The stable political environment has been fostered since it was founded in 1967. Singapore's tension-ridden ties with its Malay neighbours following its separation

¹ Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1957), p.5.

² Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in 1990's", Asian Survey XXIX, (no.6 June 1989), p.581.

³ Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military - Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN", Journal of Peace Research, (no.29, Feb 1, 1992), p.12.

from Malaysia in 1965 added to the challenges facing the viability of the ASEAN experiment. Against this backdrop, ASEAN's first urgent task was not to forge military alliance, but to defuse the sources of tension among them.⁴ Military co-operation is not the prime concern of ASEAN in promoting its security co-operation which could become a barrier to the development of an ASEAN "defence community". It could however be viable towards the formation of an ASEAN "Security Community".

Security lies not in military alliances but in a broad redefining of security in terms of Socio-economic development.⁵ The two major developments in the Asia-Pacific region that forced ASEAN to seriously consider to promote security cooperation which pushed towards regional "Security Community" are: First, the withdrawal of US military presence from the region. Second, China's development of its Military Capabilities, especially her strategic capabilities (air and naval) beyond what is considered adequate for its own defence requirements.

The current state of relations between ASEAN states is qualitatively different from the time of the grouping's formation. Indonesia and Vietnam, actively cultivate images of themselves as regional great powers, but both have weak economies to support any bid for regional hegemony. Because of the inistence of enormous

⁴ Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast-Asian Nations: Security Community or Defence Community?" Pacific affairs, (vol.64, no.2, Summer 1991), p.161.

⁵ Paridah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad, "ASEAN's Role and Development as a Security Community", Indonesian Quarterly, (vol.XXIII, no.3, 1994), p.68.

disparities among member nations, the political and economic integration of ASEAN has been time consuming. The development of Indonesia - Malaysia - Singapore "triangle" raises the question whether ASEAN can truly be regarded as a "Security community". This growth Triangle involves the participation of the central governments, and the public sectors. The success of the Growth Triangle needs the support not only from the states/provincial leaders (Johor and Riau Cases) but also from the national political leaders come under central authority.⁶ However, such Growth Triangle cannot make ASEAN into a "Security Community" in Deutschian terminology. The prospect for a "Security Community" is not only the Concern of the role of ASEAN in resolving the disputes which currently divide its present membership but also its role in successfully managing and resolving the wide regional conflicts such as Cambodia do not affect members directly, this unsettled crisis could have threatened the resilience of ASEAN but for its efforts to resolve the crisis. An ASEAN "Security community" in Karl Deutsch's sense, therefore fits, in which there no longer is an expectation of the use of force by one member against another.

Intra-ASEAN Disputes

The obvious territorial conflict is the claims over Sabah. Less obvious but increasingly important are the ill-defined boundaries between Malaysia and Thailand.

⁶ Pushpa Thambipillai, "The ASEAN Growth Triangle: The Convergence of National and Sub-national Interests", Contemporary South East Asia, (vol.13, no.13 December 1993), p.299.

Besides, there has been a series of strained fluctuating relations between Malaysia and Singapore.

The territorial disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines was only one of a number of tests of the Unity of ASEAN evident in its early years. The inevitably high level of tension between the Philippines and Malaysia in 1988 over conflicting territorial claims in the South-China-Sea confirmed that intra-ASEAN peace still cannot be taken for granted.

The spratlys dispute can be quoted as the next potential flash point for conflict in Southeast Asia.⁷ Most of the claimants (the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Brunei) maintain some military presence in the Spratlys, with Vietnam and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) having the largest military presence. Significantly, hostile confrontation between the two occurred in 1988 and rhetoric has remained high on both sides. On the whole, the occupying nations in the spratlys appear determined to consolidate their established footholds and pursue their respective territorial claims.⁸

The island-State of Singapore was also at the centre of intra-mural tensions which arose from the related circumstances of its separation from Malaysia and Malaysia's reapproachment with Indonesia.

⁷ Sheldon W. Simon, "The Regionalisation of Defence in Southeast Asia", Pacific Reviews, (no.2, 1992), p.122.

⁸ Paridah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad, "ASEAN's Role and Development as a Security Community", Indonesian Quarterly, (vol.XXIII; no.3, 1994), p.71.

The issue of Malaysia's and Thailand's common border has interposed to a troubled relationship. Thai foreign Ministry officials made known their concern over Malaysia's irredentist procrivity. In July 1976 a Malaysia para-Military presence was instructed to withdraw from its long standing position just north of the border following an armed incursion from the Malaysian side.⁹

All these problems have remained unresolved and thus is a complexity of attitudes towards each other (distrust, suspicion, fears and even animosity) which is the Major reason for the Southeast Asian Countries to develop their military programmes massively. In 1990, joint exercises were suspended by the Malaysian side. In may 1991, when the malaysian defence minister announced the planned resumption of naval and air exercises, he made it clear that there was no immediate prospect of further bilateral land exercises.¹⁰ Bilateral Malaysia and Singapore defence co-operation which has in reality been rather limited and superficial hardly constitute a "Security Community".

The ASEAN "Security Community" as it stands now, needs to be not only strengthened and secured against a host of potential inter member conflicts. ASEAN "Security Community" could be served by the organisation's being devoted, to preserve intra - ASEAN political cohesion, and resolving the contradictions that

⁹ Lau Teik Soon, New Direction in the International Relations of Southeast Asia: The Great Powers and Southeast Asia, Singapore University Press, (Singapore 1973), p.165.

¹⁰ Tim Huxley, "ASEAN Security Cooperation - Past, Present and Future" in Allison Broinwski, ed., ASEAN in the 1990's (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990), p.93.

surround the professed objective of ZOPFAN and SEANFZ (South East Asia Nuclear Free Zone). The other conditions for forming and maintenance of a security region is the need of the great powers support to establish the regime¹¹ that is, they must create a more regulated political environment in which all states behave individualistically. Geoffrey Wiseman Suggests that there is evidence if an emerging security regime in ASEAN.¹² There is the existence of the condition where the member states cooperate to Manage their disputes and avoid war.

Considering the above facts, perceived threats, potential disputes in the region, on 25, July 1994 Eighteen foreign Ministers, including six from ASEAN laid what many saw as the first brick in a new post cold war security, structure for Asia. The arena was the newly created ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ASEAN has a small role to play in a regional multilateral effort for "co-operative Security" in the region through ARF, as the region needs "new thinking", the achievement of ASEAN as a community of Security interests", especially in the area of preventive diplomacy and CBM's for the Southeast Asia, for the promotion of ideas on strategic developments of the region.

Promoting Australia's regional engagement approach is also the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The department considers its priority tasks to be twofold:

¹¹ Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", International Organisation, (vol.36, no.2, Spring 1982), p.358.

¹² Geoffrey Wiseman, "Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region", Pacific Review (vol.5, no.1, 1992), p.46.

- (i) To advance Australia's Strategic interests through:
- enhancing the regional security environment based on acceptance of cooperative security approaches in the region.¹³
 - Limiting the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, particularly in the region.¹⁴
 - Strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in cooperative security arrangements.
- (ii) To advance Australia's economic interests through:
- Strengthening the multilateral trading framework and further liberalising trade;
 - consolidating Australia's economic integration into the Asia Pacific region, including through the further development of Asia Pacific Economic co-operation (APEC)¹⁵

The department's current approach to enhance regional security has several distinguishing features with regard to regional leadership, the security agenda, and conceptualisations of security. The first is that Australia considers ASEAN to be the key regional player in organising security dialogue forums. Although Foreign

¹³ Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's, (Canberra, 1996), p.70

¹⁴ Ibid.,

¹⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1993-94, Australian Government Publishing Service, (Canberra, 1994), p.14.

Minister Gareth Evans refers to Australia's initiative at the 1990 ASEAN PMC in Jakarta as an important impetus for the ARF.¹⁶

A second feature of Australia's current approach is that, with the establishment of the ARF, the department's long-standing objective to add Substance to the regional agenda is being given even More attention. Australia tabled its paper. The Australian Paper On Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation,¹⁷ at first ARF SOM in May 1994 and again at the first ARF meeting in the following July. The paper set out a comprehensive set of measures for fostering regional cooperation. Some four months later Australia invited regional officials and non-officials to participate in a second-track meeting in Canberra to discuss practical trust-building measures and transparency. These activities demonstrate Australia's confining determination to add to the process of dialogue by adding substance and issues to the regional discussion.

It is important to discuss the approach to trust - building measures for regional co-operation :-

Category - 1

- a) limited exchange of military information.
- b) A regional security studies centre
- c) A maritime information database

¹⁶ Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, "Australia and the Emerging Asia Pacific Community", The Edward 'Weary' Dunlop Asia Link Lecture, (Melbourne, 14 October 1994).

¹⁷ Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's, (Canberra, 1996), p.65.

- d) Strategic planning exchanges
- e) Observers of military exercises
- f) Peacekeeping training

Category - 2

- a) Maritime co-operation
- b) A regional arms register
- c) Notification of major military deployments
- d) A multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents.

Category - 3

Consideration of more formalised trust - building measures; for example, collaborative environmental security arrangements, the establishment of zones of cooperation in contentious geographical areas, and regional maritime safety and surveillance cooperation agreements.

Source : Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994.

Yet another recent and radical development in Evans's thinking about security is the application of 'cooperative security to the level of the individual, as opposed to the level of the state. Evans now argues that 'Security - is as much about the protection of individuals, it is about the defence of territorial integrity of States'.¹⁸ Human security according to Evans is 'prejudiced by major intra-state conflict as it is by inter-state conflict.'¹⁹ On the economic front - greater economic cooperation encourages the modalities of cooperative behaviours more generally. At the most fundamental level, APEC promoter the concept of regionalism. As Prime Minister Keating said on 22 November 1994, because of APEC, 'Suddenly we are talking as a region - in many forums... thinking as a region'²⁰ nextly, championing the cause of APEC has provided an important role for Australia in regional affairs - based not just on its trade and other economic interaction with the region, but, more importantly, on Australia's ability to produce ideas and provide the effort for strengthening cooperative activities in the common interest.

Practical activities conducted by DFAT:-

Some of the areas in which the department has been particularly active over the past half decade or so are:

¹⁸ Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990's and Beyond, Allen and Unwin, (Australia, 1993), p.6.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ The Hon. P.J. Keating, Address to the AAP Conference of Asian, Australian and Pacific Media Executives, (Sydney, 22 November 1994), p.3.

Dispute Settlement and peacekeeping. Australia has been actively supportive of UN and multilateral mechanisms for dispute settlement and peacekeeping operations on the Korean peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. The most notable initiative in 1990, concerned the Cambodia settlement, with the impasse produced by the failure of the First Paris Peace conference in August 1989 and the escalation in fighting and the Khmer Rouge advances that followed the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in September 1989, Australia put forward a set of proposals (incorporated in the Red Book)²¹ which advocated that the UN itself assume direct control of the civil administration in Cambodia during a transitional period, enabling elections to be held, a constitution to be adopted and a new government to be formed.²² Following an intense period of Australian diplomatic activity, involving consultations with the principal Cambodian parties, regional governments and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5), the Australian plan became the basis of the peace settlement signed at the second Paris conference in October 1991. Promotion of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

²¹ Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal, Australian Government Publishing Service, (Canberra, 1990)

²² Douglas Sturkey, 'Cambodia' Issues for Negotiation in a Comprehensive Settlement, in Jawahar Hassan and Rohana Mahmood, eds, Quest For Security: Proceedings of the Fourth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur, 1991), pp.51-62.

Since 1983, when Bill Hayden became Foreign minister in the Hawke labour government, Australia has been very active with respect to international effort to limit the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. As Foreign minister Hayden stated in a major policy paper published in July 1984, the search for peace through armed control and disarmament was a foremost item on the agenda for the government'.²³ Two of the "priority disarmament objectives' of the mid-1980's - promoting 'the Universal acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty [NPT]' and achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT)²⁴ - continuing to command attention a decade later. In recent years, Australia has actively promoted the indefinite extension of the NPT 'Lobbying in regional and other capitals and multilateral fora', and contributing through its efforts to 'a further five countries joining the NPT',²⁵ In 1993-94, Australian diplomats played a key role in finalising the mandate for CTBT negotiations for the conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and prepared a complete draft CTBT text to serve as the basis for a treaty.²⁶

In addition, Australia has been active in international efforts to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), strengthen the Biological weapons

²³ The Hon. Bill Hayden, Uranium, The Joint Facilities, Disarmament and Peace, Australian Government Publishing Service, (Canberra, 4 July 1984), p.2.

²⁴ *ibid.*, pp.19-20.

²⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report, (1993-94), p.115.

²⁶ Alan Dupont, "The Australia - Indonesia Security Agreement", Indonesia Quarterly, (vol.XXIV/2, 1996), p.198.

convention (BWC), and promote the missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) intended to limit the proliferation of missile delivery systems.²⁷

Constraints and Problems:

There are Some problems in the approach besides the significant steps, the department has made towards developing 'cooperative security' with Asia-Pacific.

The concept of cooperative security provides a security philosophy but fails to address some critical issues about the nature of security. Evan's claim that 'cooperative security' is multidimensional in character, that it is concerned not only with political and diplomatic disputes but also with factors such as 'economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated population flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human rights' abuses' is unclear.²⁸ It does not answer the question of whether or not the 'referent object'²⁹ of security is the state; nor does it make clear whether 'economic underdevelopment, trade disputes', etc in themselves constitute insecurity, or whether they are merely causes of insecurity more conventionally defined, for example war and other forms of violent conflict.

²⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report, (1993-94), p.117.

²⁸ Gareth Evans QC, "Cooperating for Peace", Paper Delivered to Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, (Bonn, 6 July 1994).

²⁹ The referent object of Security means 'that [which] is to be made secure. See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear'. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Lynne Rienner Publishers, (Boulder, 1991).

There are also some domestic constraints on DFAT. The most obvious is the public concern that the DFAT approach to human rights in East Timor is too timid, a concern which inhibits further initiatives by DFAT with respect to cooperation with Indonesia the department is also restrained by a budget of only \$ 2.3 billion, which is insufficient to support the full range of cooperative activities for which DFAT is responsible.

The Timor Gap (problem) and the following event of the Timor Gap Treaty is the best case where Australia proves its cooperation towards the region. Therefore it is important to deal with the Timor Gap Treaty and the pros and cons about the whole issue. Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty on 11 December 1989. This provides a zone for joint development of petroleum resources in the area between Indonesia East Timor and Northern Australia, pending agreement on permanent boundary delimitation in the area.³⁰ The treaty represents a substantial step forward in the relations between the two countries and provide an important example of international co-operation, especially since it has great potential for successful implementation. However, the agreement has been challenged at international law by a third-party suit in the International court of Justice. Objecting to Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor Portugal has challenged Indonesian authority to conclude a binding treaty for the area.

³⁰ "Hands Across the Timor Sea", Economist, (23 December 1995- 5 January 1996).

In 1971 and 1972, Australia and Indonesia signed treaties establishing sea bed boundaries, extending out from Papua New Guinea in the east and Indonesian Timor and north western Australia in the west.³¹ Yet Australia sought a sea bed boundary agreement with Portuguese East-Timor, the negotiations were unsuccessful. Consequently, seabed boundaries surrounding the Portuguese Colony remained unsettled.³² This area in the Timor sea without a maritime boundary became known as the "Timor Gap". In 1975 Indonesia took control of East Timor and, in July, 1976, officially incorporated it into the Indonesian Republic.³³ Initially, Australia refused to reconcile Indonesia's de jure control of East Timor, but in 1979,³⁴ Australia began negotiations with Indonesia to settle the maritime boundaries of the Timor Gap.

Conflicting rules of international maritime law in light of the geographical location of the two states has impeded progress toward the establishment of

³¹ Agreement Between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of Indonesia Establishing certain Sea Bed Boundaries, May 18, 1971, Australia-Indonesia, 1973 Australia. T.S., No.31, John R.V. Prescott, Australia's Maritime Boundaries 103 (1985) in Diane Pickersgill and Willian Martin, THE TIMOR GAP TREATY, The Treaty Between Australia and Indonesia on the zone of cooperation in the Asia between the Indonesia Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec.11, 1989, Australia-Indonesia, reprinted in 29, I.L.M. 469 (1990), Harvard International law Journal, (Vol.32, 1991), p.566.

³² "Hands Across the Timor Sea", Economist, (23 December 1995), 5 Jan 1996.

³³ "Hands Across the Timor Sea", Economist, (23 December 1995-5 January 1996).

³⁴ Keith Suter, "Australia's New Policy on Recognising Governments", Australian Quarterly, (Autumn, 1989), pg. 60.

permanent Sea bed boundaries. Australia's maximum claim is based on the geographical feature of the continental shelf, while Indonesia's is based on distance.³⁵ Curiously, international maritime law supports both claims.

Australia and Indonesia first agreed in principle to the concept of a zone of cooperation that would permit for shared exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in the Timor Gap in 1985.³⁶ In Sept. 1988, the parties defined the joint Development zone geographically, dividing it into three areas.³⁷ The negotiations culminated with the signature of the treaty by Australia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Gareth Evans, and Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Alatas, in a mid-air ceremony over the "Zone of Cooperation" on December 11, 1989.³⁸

The Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Zone of cooperation treaty is a detailed document containing thirty-four articles and four annexes.³⁹ The zone of cooperation encompasses an area of approximately 61,000 square kilometres.

The treaty specifies that the two countries must resolve any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty through consultation or negotiation. Although the official dialogue between the two countries was suspended

³⁵ Diane Pickersgill and William Martin - "The Timor Gap Treaty", Harvard International Law Journal, (vol.32, 1991), p.568.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.568.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.569.

³⁸ Dianne Pickersgill and William Martin: "The Timor Gap Treaty", Harvard International Law Journal, (Vol.32, 1991), pp.576.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p.569.

when the Timor Gap dispute developed in 1978, and relations remained volatile during the mid-1980's, however, in recent years, relations between the two countries have improved. The Timor Gap Treaty, one of the most substantial bilateral agreements between Australia and Indonesia in their forty years of diplomatic relations.⁴⁰

The government of portuguese has interpreted Australia's agreement with Indonesia over the Zone of Cooperation to constitute de jure recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor and, therefore a violation of international law, Consequently, Portugal brought an action against. Australia before the I.C.J. challenging the treaty's validity.⁴¹ The suit renews Portugal's sixteen year old protest against the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Portugal regards the treaty as "Violating the rights of the people of Timor to self-determination and their sovereign right to their resources", as well as disregarding Portugal's status as administrator of East Timor. Australia's defense to this suit will rest on the theory of recognition.⁴² In support of its challenge, Portugal might rebut the first argument by claiming that Indonesia has not established sovereignty over East Timor because it does not have complete control over the entire island. Australia recognised de fure Indonesia's control over East Timor in 1984.⁴³ As a result,

⁴⁰ ibid., p.568.

⁴¹ Dianne Pickeregill and William Martion: "The Timor Gap Treaty", Harvard International Law Journal, (Vol:32, 1991), p.580.

⁴² ibid., p.581.

⁴³ Ibid., p.579.

despite the potential success of the treaty, its future depends on the decision of the I.C.J.

On 18 December 1995, Australia and Indonesia signed what some observers have described as a watershed security treaty.⁴⁴ the first between the two former adversaries, and the first ever signed by Indonesia with any other state. Officially known as the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on maintaining security and to cooperate together in the development of the region. The security Agreement contains three key clauses. It commits the government of Australia and Indonesia to:

- Consult at Ministerial level, on a regular basis, about matters affecting their common security, and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and that of the region.
- Consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party, as to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken by them individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each government, and
- promote, in accordance with the policies and priorities of each co-operative activities in the security field.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Alan Dvrpont: "The Australia-Indonesia security Agreement", Indonesia Quarterly, (Vol.24, 1996), p.195.

⁴⁵ Press Release by the office of Prime Minister keating concerning the "Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining security", 14 December, 1995 in Alan Dupont, The Australia-Indonesia Security by Agreement Indonesian Quarterly, (Vol.24, 1996), p.195.

The security agreement can be seen or providing framework for discussing and managing many of the emerging non-military and security issues. After the agreement was signed Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, drew attention to the multidimensional nature of the Agreement, pointing that it should be seen in the context of "regional instability...It's to deal with issues like terrorism and narcotics and piracy and other internally derived sources of instability of this kind".⁴⁶

The Agreement sends a direct and unambiguous signal to the region, that Australia now fully accepts its future well being as nation will ultimately depend on its own ability to build constructive relations with its Asian neighbours. While the agreement only relates to security, it must be seen in the context of Australia over all bilateral relationship with Indonesia, and the increasing cooperation between the two countries towards the goal of regional economic integration. Domestically, the Agreement lend weight to the arguments of the anti-Indonesian lobby in Australia and internationally, that Australia has sacrificed its commitment to liberal values, democracy and human rights on the altar of "Real politik".⁴⁷

In short, Indonesia-Australia security Agreement limits the ability of future Australian governments to criticise Indonesia. It would be impossible to project Indonesia as a security threat. Again the Agreement has also been viewed as a

⁴⁶ Alan Dupont, "The Australia-Indonesia security Agreement", Indonesia Quarterly, (Vol:24, 1996), p.199.

⁴⁷ Dermond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's (Canberra, 1996), p.47.

significant political and military success for Indonesia, because Australia has assured to remain friendly. Australia's potent regional military capabilities, its access to advanced western technology, training and intelligence, and its close relationship with the United States, might now be utilized for Indonesian security and defence needs.

CONCLUSION

Prime Minister Keating had declared that "as we enter the twenty-first century it will be determined by the success of Australia's policies for Asian engagement.¹ Nonetheless, there are significant elements of the Australian polity which remained to be persuaded about the overall philosophy and logic of Asian engagement. The kinship ties of most of the Australian are with Europeans than with Asians. There has been two centuries of ignorance, suspicion and fear concerning Asia. Therefore there remains major opposition to high levels of Asian identity and aspects of multiculturalism.² The economic relations between Australia and Europe in few sectors are stronger than those with Asia, yet the opposition is supportive of the general thrust of the governments policies of closer economic and security cooperation with Asian neighbours.

Public opinion is sharply at odds with government policy concerning important aspects of regional engagement especially where relations with Indonesia are involved. According to the survey conducted in March-May 1993, about 57 percent of voters believed that Indonesia would pose a security threat to Australia in ten to fifteen years: and only 28 percent of voters opined that agreements relating

¹ P.J.Keating, address to the chinese chamber of commerce on 'Australia and Asia: The Next steps; Perth, 15 February 1995, p.12.

² Yearbook of Australia 1995.

to trade with Indonesia were more important than differences over East Timor.³ These views are not shared by the Federal members of Parliament (who polled 38 percent and 55 percent on these issues)⁴ or by the policy-makers in Canberra. This had little impact on government policy, but when policies are not supported with public opinion, their future remains uncertain.

Australia's interests in Asia (Southeast Asia in particular) are broad and the objectives of Australia's regional engagement policies are multiple. There are domestic constituencies and foreign policy interests. In February 1995, Prime Minister Keating said:

- Our economic links with Asia are vital... but it is a profound error to see that as the whole story... our interest in Asia has a much broader focus and a much wider purpose.
- Success in the efforts we make in Asia will affect not just Australia's prosperity but its security...
- And, more than that, closer engagement with Asia is already helping to transform Australian society...
- Asian culture and Asian values will, in very short time I believe, begin to work their impact on mainstream Australian culture.⁵

³ Lan Mc Phedran, "Australia Remains Suspicious of Indonesia", Canberra Times (13 September 1993).

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Keating, address to the Chinese chamber of Commerce on 'Australia and Asia', 1995 p.2

The basis of Australia's regional security policies publicly explained has been based on economic liberalism, domestic deregulation and structural adjustment and free trade abroad, as well as for closer regional economic cooperation, which are argued at the highest national levels. On the other hand, the connection between the Asianisation of Australia's immigration flow and the increasing Asian ethnicity, and Australia's economic success in Asia has not been clearly explained. The Prime Minister has declared that 'Australia's Asian Community will be a key' to the success of economic engagement⁶ and has observed that Australians of Asian ethnicity can be used to 'get into' Asia,⁷ but there is little analytic basis for this view.

In October 1991, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, stated that: The great turn-around in contemporary Australian history is that the region from which we sought in the past to protect ourselves - whether by esoteric dictation tests for would-be immigrants, or tariffs, or alliances with the distant great and powerful - is now the region which offers Australia the most. It has come to be accepted now almost as a commonplace that our Australia's lies in the Asia Pacific region, this is where they live, must survive strategically, and find a place and role of developing full potential as a nation.⁸

⁶ Ibid., p.12.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, 'Australia in East Asia and the Asia Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass', Lecture to the Asia-Australia Institute, Sydney, 20 March 1995, p.1, in Desmond Ball & Pauline Kers, *Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's* (1996), p.99.

The commitment of the Australian government to constructive and cooperative engagement with Asia is obvious and however clear, by its strong and bold steps to solve the regional issues, the few of them are: In 1962 Australia's involvement in the Vietnam war began with the invitation of the Saigon government. Australia made its important contribution by sending 800-men combat battalion, six RAAF CARIBOU transport planes etc. which was to ensure the success of containment drive at that time.

In the recent past, the most important step by Australia for regional security in its initiative in resolving the Cambodian issue by evolving peace proposals, which had been supported by the regional actors, and subsequently by sending engineer's battalion and volunteers to assist the UNTAC activities to establish peace in Cambodia.

Australia is also trying to contribute in resolving the vexed problem of jurisdictional issues over the Spratlys, where China and the ASEAN countries are involved. Conflicting claims in the South China Sea, specifically in the Spratlys, emanates from competing jurisdictions. Most of the unresolved territorial problems originate from disagreement over the modes of acquiring the territories and the differing approaches to delimitation of the boundaries. International law has prescribed various modes for territorial acquisition eg. cession, occupation, prescription, discovery and accretion. In the past international law also sanctioned title through conquest. Both concept and conquest and cession by force are no longer valid under the current principles of international law. Many of the present problems

in the Spratlys precedes the 1982 Convention. However, the convention was compounded the problems as states become more assertive through unilateral enforcement of some of the rights prescribed by the new convention. "over lapping jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf is an inevitable outcome of the new ocean regime."⁹

Six nations have laid claims to the numerous islets in the Spratlys area of South China Sea, because of its richness in oil, gas and fish, the conflicting claimant states are involved in exploring hydro-carbon resources which has led to some nasty incidents like the arrest of three Filipino vessels off Permatang Ubi (Ardasier Bank) in April 1988, an area which Malaysia has claimed well within its exclusive economic zone demonstrates the extent to which states are prepared to enforce jurisdiction and the likely consequences arising from competition for scarce resources. There has already been armed clashes regarding the dispute. Therefore Australia pointedly pronounced that confidence-building measures to be realised to prevent the escalating Military Conflict, the nations of incompatible interests to maintain a maritime order based on a system of accepted rules and practised at Sea that fairly accommodates the different interests at stake and at the same time to seek solutions to their different interests by peaceful means. Australia stresses the need to create transparency in military activities as a condition for the process of confidence - building - measures to evolve through mutual restraints and mutual

⁹ Hamzah B.A., "Jurisdiction Issues and the Conflicting Claims in the Spratlys", Indonesian Quarterly, vol.18, no.2, 1990.

respect and recognition of the national sensitivity surrounding the present military deployment in the South China Sea, next to stop further annexation of territories in the disputed area. However confidence-building measures can effectively be put in place only with mutual agreement of the parties concerned. Australia also stressed on joint exploration of the natural resources in the area. But Australia lacks a strategy for Southeast Asia - i.e, in having a clear and coherent set of policies, objectives, and means of implementation which are carefully tailored according to political and resource constraints.

Australia however, has a major level of professed commitment to a set of policies which have been articulated to greater and lesser extents, whose connections have been sketched only in outline, basically these policies and concepts are not framed carefully. Therefore, it is inevitable to compromise in policy development, policy implementation, and some of the pressing issues will have to be addressed soon if the engagement process is to be efficiently and effectively managed. Australia's policies towards Southeast Asia is rated as positively good and fair. By and large it also depends on the changes in international relations in the post-cold war world, and specifically with the economic changes in the region. Whatsoever, the conceptual questions still remain unresolved, especially economic interdependence and the promotion of regional stability.

In the field of development, foreign policy, diplomacy, defence capabilities, trade, investment, development assistance, immigration policy, educational, cultural activities and regional security policies, Australia has a multidimensional approach,

which reflects realistic appraisal but they broaden the complicated nature of national and regional security. However, Australia lacks the national policy-making machinery to co-ordinate and check the short-comings, especially, issues such as the relationship between defence expenditure and economic performance, and their contribution to regional engagement, and relationship between ethnic pluralism and regional engagement.

Defence self-reliance and regional cooperation are core of Australia's security policies, yet containing tensions within, their composition is a rational response to regional uncertainty. All what is necessary is greater cooperation and enhanced regional dialogue Australia should also encourage the individual countries of Southeast Asia to attain self-reliance. However, the legs of self-reliance and regional cooperation need to be carefully balanced; but determining the right balance is a difficult task as it requires an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of quarter of a billion dollars currently being spent by the Department of Defence.¹⁰

Therefore, Australia has a long way to go vis-a-vis Southeast Asia especially in the defence cooperation programs and the initiatives for trust building measures.

¹⁰ Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990's (Canberra 1996), p.101.

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