THE NEW WORLD ORDER: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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RAJESH KUMAR MISHRA

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT,
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067
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CERTIFICATE

ORDER: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS", submitted by Rajesh Kumar Mishra in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is his own work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

K.S.JAWATKAR

Chairperson

SUSHIL KUMAR

Supervisor

Dr. .K S. Jawatkar

Chairman
Centre for International Politics
Organization and Pisarmament
School of International Studies
Jawabarlal Nebru University
New Lelbi-110 C67

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PREFACE

The end of the 1980s seemed to suggest a search for the new paradigms in International Politics. End of the Gulf war and the subsequent declaration of the New World Order by George Bush sensed an urge for new equations in international relations.

In this small piece of creation, with an introduction of the characteristics of the end of the cold-war, second chapter deals with the expectations and consequences of the Gulf war and its culmination into a declaration of new era.

Each of the perceptions chosen in the third chapter, projects the underlying meaning of the new world order. Besides, it explains the nature of inter-state relations among the developed, the developing and the underdeveloped countries.

As the new world order also imbibes regional configuration of states, my fourth chapter concentrates on two specific responses from the South Asia and the newly independent Central Asian States. It deals vivdly with their choices, means and the goals.

The discussion draws to a close in the last chapter with inferences and future possibilities of the new world order in the international political arena.

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THE NEW WORLD ORDER : PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The end of the Cold-War

"One of the hallmarks of human history in the last twentieth century is the increasing internationalization of the world: in production, trade, finance, technology, threats to security, communications, research, education and culture. One major consequence of this is that the mutual penetration of economic, political and social forces among the governments of nation-states are progressively loosing degree of direct control over the global forces that affect them. For social scientists, this phenomenon of internationalisation poses a kind of conceptual challenge; to re-think the fundamental assumptions, long established in our disciplines, that the primary unit of analysis is the nation, the society, or the culture".— Neil J.Smelser.

While the unsavoury features of the cold war-years started disappearing from the late 1980s, the Iraq war against Kuwait (1990-91) and its ending by the intervention of multinational force led by the United States (covered by the fig-leaf of UN legitimacy) initiated a new phase in international relations.

Further, the crumbling of Iron-Curtain proved that the change is inexorable and a constant factor in any environment. Especially in its international dimension with interaction of nearly 200 sovereign states, it is unrealistic to expect statism. However, there comes a time when cataclysanic or revolutionary changes alter the premises of international order and compel a search for fresh paradigms. Such a change is at hand with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war confrontations.

Even if history is not at an end, it is possible that it moves in a certain direction. Over a decade ago, Ralf Dahrendorf, putting much emphasis on economic and human rights aspects of the subject, gave some lectures on a new world order at the University of Ghana, and said. "The notion that a new world order should be created in one fell swoop is not only unrealistic, it is also on a naive belief in benevolent government which many have learnt to distrust"1 "On 11th April 1990, president Gorbachbev told a meeting of the World Media Association in Moscow: we are only at the beginning of process of shaping a new world order." 2

^{1.} Ralf Dahrendorf - A New World Order ? Problems and Prospects of international relations in 1980s. (Accsa, Univ. of Ghana) p.86. 1979

^{2.} Cited in Alan K. Henrikson - "Defining a new world order: toward a practical vision of collective action for international peace and security. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Melford, Mass, 2-3 March, 1991, p. 16.

However, it was after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait of 2 August 1990 that the phrase "New World Order", with its suggestion that order has indeed to be kept against aggressors, entered contemporary parlance. On 11 September 1990, President Bush, appearing before a joint session of both the houses of Congress, reiterated four "simple principles" that he had earlier outlined regarding the Gulf crisis, and then added a fifth:

"One of these troubled times, our fifth objective - a new world order - can emerge; a new era - free from the threat of terrors, stronger in pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. 3

A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path in peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavour. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."

^{3.} President George Bush. "Toward a new world order", US Department of State Dispatch I: 3, 17 September. 1990, p. 91.

The introspect of Bush's speech and dismantling of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989 was a metaphor for the end of an era, and therefore the beginning of another. "The world, in T.S. Eliot's phrase, was "throbbing between two lives." It didn't have a wait even a year for a first broad hint of its new life. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, provided the first discriptive metaphor for the puzzles of the post-postwar era. The metaphor was mixed, befitting a world of mixed cultures, mixed ethnic and religious loyalties, and mixed ideologies about international governance. But the fundamental change was illustrated by the newfangled world reaction to Iraq's old fashioned move to swallow at a gulp its rich little southern neighbour.

The world of the 1990s and beyond is fundamentally different from anything in our cultural and socio-politico memory of international relations. No "power has the power to undertake on its responsibility "to make the world safe for diversity." Historically, it is already apparent that a nobody -in-charge world will be more volatile and more crisis prone than the potentially fatal yet eerily stable confrontation of nuclear tipped superpowers glaring at each other from their hardened silos.

Nevertheless. "For more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and fall of

great powers." ⁴ In the multipolar era, twelve great powers appeared on the scene at one time or the other. at the beginning of world warII, seven remained; at its conclusion, two always before, as some states rank, others rose pattern; for the first time in world of sovereign states, bipolarity prevailed.

For almost 50 years it was assumed that world warII was truly "the war to end wars"among the great and major powers of the world. During the war, Nicholas Spykman foresaw a "postwar international order no different "from the old", 5 with international society continuing "to operate within the safe fundamental power patterns. "Yet despite deep ideological and other differences, peace prevailed at the centre of international polities. " Changes in the intertnational structure, and in the weaponry available to some of the states, have combined to perpetuate a troupled peace." 6

^{4.} Waltz K,N. - International Security Vol.18, "The meerging Structure of elaborate international Politics"; pp. 44.

^{5.} Nicholas J.Spykman- America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power" New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942, p. 461.

^{6.} Gaddis and Mearsheimer, "The Long Peace" International Security Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 99-142.

Some countries may strive to become great powers, others may wish to avoid in doing so. however, is a constrained one. Bescause of the extent of their interests, larger units existing in a contentions arena tend to take on system-wide tasks. As the largest in the system, the United States and the Soviet Union found that they had global task to perform and global interests to mind. However, " The conflation of peace and stability is all too common. The occurrence of major wars is often identified with a system's instability." Yet systems that survivemajor wars, thereby demonstrate this stability. The multipolar world was highly stable, but all too warprone. The bipolar world has been highly peaceful, but unfortunately less stable than its predecessors." 7 And if the old world order provided a stability of sorts. war exacerbated a number of Third World conflicts, but economic conflicts among the United States, Europe and Japan were dampened by common concerns about the Soviet military threat. Bitter ethnic divisions were kept under a tight lid by the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. A number of Third World conflicts were averted or shortened when the super-

^{7.} Kenneth N. Waltz - "The Stability of a Bipolar World", Daedalus Vol. 93. No.3. Summer , 1964

powers peared that their clients might drag them too close to the nuclear abyss. The various Arab-Israeli wars, for example, were brief. 8 ." In fact some experts believe that a stronger Soviet Union would never have allowed its Iraqi client to invade Kuwait. If so Kuwait can be counted as the victim rather than the cause of the new world order." 8

Some analysts see the collapse of the cold war as the victory of liberal capitalism and the end of the large ideological cleavages that drove the great international conflicts of this century. There is no single competitor to liberal capitalism as an overarching ideology. Rather than the end of history, the post-cold war world is witnessing a return of history in diversity of sources of international conflict. Liberal capitalism has many competitors, albeit fragmented ones. Examples include the indigenous neo-Maoism of Peru's shining path guerrilla movement, the many variants of Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of ethnic nationalism in several East European countries.

This doesn't mean that the new world politics will be "back to future." 9 There is an enormous difference between

^{8.} Nye., S.Joseph - "What New World Order?" Foreign Afairs, Spring 1992, pp. 84.

^{9.} John Mearsheimer - "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security Summer, 1990.

the democratically tamed and institutionally harnessed nationalism of western Europe and the revival in eastern Europe of untamed nationalisms whose ancient animosities were never resolved in the institutional structure of state communism and the Soviet empire.

In discussing the likely emergence of new great powers, one can concentrate on Japan as being by population and product, the next in line after the U.S.A. When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, Homer Bigart of the New York Herald Tribune wrote that "Japan, paying for her desperate throw of the dice at Pearl Harbour, passed from the ranks of the major powers at 9.05 A.M.today." 10 In 1957, when Carter, Herz and Ranney published the third edition of their Major Foreign Power, 11 Japan was not among them. In 1964, projecting national economic growth rates to see what countries might become great powers by the end of the century, now Japan is ready to receive the mantle.

Japan might take effective steps towarads opening her economy. One May accept that as "a new major economic power." Japan has an obligation to work for stable growth of the world economy.

^{10.} Quoted by Richard Severa - "Homer Bigart, Acclaimed Reporter, Dies" in New york Times, April 17, 1991. p. c23.

^{11.} G.M.Carter, John H. Herz, John C. Ranney - Major Foreign Powers, New York 1957.

Adding to it on economical capability issues, uncertainty is a synonym for life, and nowhere is uncertainty greater than in international politics. Anarchy places a premium on foresight. If one cann't know what is coming, developing a greater resource base for future use takes precedence over present prosperity. Reflecting Reich's informal finding, " Network/ Gallup poll of September 1989 showed that 52 per cent of Americans thought the economic power of Japan was a greater threat to the United States than the military power of the Soviet Union. 12 "Whatever the limitations on the national use of force. the international political realm countries to be an intensely competitive one. Concern over relative gains countries to be the national preoccupation of states." 13 If Japan's methods continue to prove successful, other countries will emulate or counter them. Many have argued that, as Richard bernet has put it, with the "globalization of the econnomy, states have lost the power to manage stable economies within their Frontiers." 14 Japan certainly has not and is not likely to

^{12. &}quot;The Perceived Threat: A Newsweek Poll", Newsweek, October 9, 1989.

^{13.} David Baldwin ed. - "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary debate", New York. Columbia University, Press, 1993.

^{14.} Richard . J, Barnet. "Reflection, Defining the moment'. New York , July 1990. pp 56

do so. To manage globalization, leading states are likely to strengthen their economic influence over states on which they depend on to which they are closely connected. Since incentives to compete are strong the likely outcome to a set of great powers forming their own regional bases in Asia, Europe and America, with Russia as a military power on the economic fringe. "Japan will lead the east Asian bloc, now forming; questions about China's and northeast Asia's roles are as yet unresolved. Western Europe, including the EC, trades increasingly among the countries that the EC comprises, while its global imports and exports are gradually declining."15 And if NAFTA succeeds, the United States will be at the Centre of the world's largest economic bloc with presently about six trillion dollars in annual Same is the case with APEC. Hence, countries and regions that lag in the race will become more and more dependent on others.

Further, the socalled few established Farcists facts of the cold war period have been replaced by seeming disorder in many parts of the world - in Southern Europe, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, West Asia, and South West Pacific, not only by aspirations for political power by

^{15.} Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman - "1992, Recasting the European Bargain," World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1. pp. 122-123.

certain sections, but also hitherto suppressed nationalisms. And thus a step is being taken towards "democratization of human society." But it has been inheriting a peculiar phenomenon as described by ;Frederick Buechner - "Martin Luther said once that if he were God he would kick the world to pieces-ourselves that we hardly need God for this job." 16

Like the advent of spring, which releases a deluge of freshly melted snow, the end of the cold war has triggred immense speculations regarding the future of international security. Perhaps the security problems will result from the "non-traditional" aggradizenments; which would be the reflected in (i) environmental issues (ii) Nuclear - proliferation (iii) Ethnic regionalism (iv) immigration conflicts or transborder fraternization (v) abetting terrorism in neighbouring country or international terrorism (vi) Drug-trafficking and (vii) Human rights issues.

Besides, "Not only the states are less unitary, but the effects of international anarchy are less pronounced than in earlier periods." "First, the existence of nuclear weapons means that the great powers cann't use war to solve the conflicts that arises between them, and this lessens

^{16.} Frederick Buechner - "The Son of Laughter" New York 1993.

potential security dilemmas."¹⁷ "Disputes between great powers must be settled in more ordered fashions to ensure state survival." ¹⁸ Again the multilateral institutions and international regimes created after World War II to regulate and stimulate a world capitalist economy have served to temper the effects of international economic scenario by decreasing transactions costs, providing information, and thereby reducing uncertainity. Adding to it, "the rise of democratic principles within great powers has contributed to more regular and predictable behaviour between the great powers" ¹⁹

And at last, the growing homogeneity of norms and ideas about the domestic and international nature of politics and economies among the global community, is giving rise to a great power society in the international system. However, it is difficult to quantify, the level of order and the acceptance of norms about legitimate international behaviour in relations between the so called, developed and the developing countdries. Even when serious conflicts errupt

^{17.} Kenneth Oye - "Cooperation Under Anarchy", Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 126.

^{18.} Steve Weber - "Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons", International Organisation.44 (winter, 1990).

^{19.} Stanley Kober - "Idealpolitik" Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, pp. 13-18.

over perceived national interests, such as those in the recent Urugary Round negotiations, nobody talked about military means to solve these conflicts.

CHAPTER - 2

Gulf-War and the Declaration of New World Order

Since the Gulf crisis broke out in August 1990, the US president George Bush had repeatedly suggested building a new World Order. Not long ago, in his address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine Soviet Republic, he again had indicated that he would keep on working at his suggestions. Now global community is more concerned about what kind of new world order he had suggested to be shaped into. "American newspapers viewed that Bush's idea of building a new world order came after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when he went fishing with Brent Scowecroft, national security advisor, near his home in Kennenbunk Port Since then, Bush had repeated his call for a "New World Order". On September 11, 1990, in his speech on the Gulf Crisis to the joint session of the Congress, he said - "we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move towards a historic period of co-operation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective - a new world order can imerge; a new era free from the threat of terror,

^{1.} Beijing Review Vol. 34, No. 43, Oct. 28 - Nov. 17, 1991.

stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North, and South, can prosper and live in harmony." He also said that events that happened in the gulf region had shown that there is no substitute for American leadership."

On October 1, 1990, Bush indicated in his address to the United Nation's General Assembly that it was in "our hands to press forward to cap a historic movement toward a new world order. We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends cold war; a partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitments; a partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase peace and reduce armsAnd I see a world building on the emerging new model of European Unity, not just Europe, but the whole world and free"

In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 1991, Bush referred further to a "new World Order". He said, "It is a big idea, a new world order -where diverse nations are drawn together in a common cause, to achieve the universal

^{2.} President's Speech to the joint session of the Congress, September 11, 1990; Courtesy USIS Official Release.

^{3.} Courtesy: USIS Official Release.

aspirations of mankind; peace and security, freedom and rule of law.... For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable."

On March 6, 1991, Bush again raised the "new world order" issue when he talked about the American policy after the Gulf War. He said, "Now we can see a new world coming into view.... A world where the United Nations, free from the cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations." 5

Bush set forth four principles in building a new world order on April13, 1991, when he talked to the American Air force students at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. He said, "As the cold war drew to an end we saw the possibilities of a new order....The new world orders...refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and above all, to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world

^{4.} President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 1991; USIS Official Release.

^{5.} International Herald Tribune, March 11, 1991, "Victory for all the Coalition: Bush". USIS Official release.

based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations, peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples." Bush also stressed on the importance of the US - Russian cooperation for the new world order. He said, "America's policy toward Russia in these troubled times is, first and foremost, to continue our efforts to build the cooperative relationship that has allowed our nations and so many others to strengthen international peace and stability." 6

Moreover, in his report on National security strategy of the united states presented to congress on August 13,1991, Bush indicated that the US'interests and objective in the 1990s is to build "a stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish". He emphasised on the preface of National Security Strategy of the US that "we have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed - to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals......For America, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our

^{6.} USIS Official Release.

citizens and our interests , but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish.

If we go into the details of underlined motives of Bush's aforesaid statements which were implict in each and every US action in the gulf war, we can judge that the United states war in the gulf was an attempt to recreate Washington's role as world policeman, to re-subordinate Europe to US power, to intimidiate the the third world into submission. In a sense it was an attempt to regain the position of global supremacy held by the United states at the end of the second world war. In this sense George Bush was executing the political vision of Regan period in its utmost The massive build-up of military power, the fashion. worldwide pressure on clients, allies, and neutrals to collaborate, the vast economic expenditures, the unprecedented unleashing of aerial bombardment, all speak of the momentous historical changes that underlied this war.

"The preparation for this war demonstrated the enormous capacity and resources that Washington had at its disposal. It also reflected a deep-rooted sense of decline and the fear of the growing challenges to that global supremacy. The war was not about 'oil' - and even less about 'self-determination' (no country can match the US record of

^{7.} President's Report on National Security Strategy, August 1991: USIS Official Release.

violations over the past two decsades), but about creating the foundations of launching of a new set of political, economic, and social relations to sustain the United States as the dominant power in the world. That was the meaning of the Bush and Baker vision of a New World Order and the war was being waged on its behalf."

Prior to the Gulf war there were numerous indications that the Global decline of the United States was accelerating: in Eastern Europe and Russia "the ideological victory" over Stalinism also revealed the tremendous incapacity of the US to provide economic resources to "reshape" these economies to its needs or even to subsidise new client regimes. Instead, most observers saw Germany as the dominant power in the region. In Western Europe the decline of NATO substantially weakened US leverage over European governments and economic policy; European centered military and security proposals paralleled deeper economic integration. At the policy level, declinilng influence became obvious in Washington's incapacity to impose its liberal agricultural and "services" (banking, finances, etc.) agenda during the Uruguay round of the GATT meetings.

^{8.} James Petras - "Gulf War and the New World Order" Economic and Political Weekly. 26 (9-10) March 1992; 482-84

Union of Europe was seen as a strategic threat, closing off markets in the Western Europe and challenging the position of the US elsewhere.

The cumulative gains of Japan and its virtual displacement of the United States as the major investor and trading partner in Asia - the almost dynamic growth region in the world - was a clear signal of declining influence. In a world in which global power is increasingly determined by industrial and financial activities and market exchanges based on strong industrial states, Washington strategists recognized that the US is a sure loser.

The decline of the US global power was even evident in Latin America, where hapazard efforts had been made to preserve areas of traditional domination. Bush"s "Enterprise for the Aamericas" proposal was more rhetoric than substance, more pillage of existing markets and resources than any strategic commitment to large-scale, long-term investments to expand productive capacity. "The initial sums promised (\$ 300 million) would have covered Latin America's foreign debt payments for four years. more to the point, continuing massive outflows of interest payments and profits from Latin America to the US (\$35 billion/year) and the incapacity of the United States to reconstruct the economies

of small reconquered nations (Greneda, Panama, Nicaragua) demonstrate Othe tremendous gap between the power of the US to dominate and its incapacity to rebuild economically viable client states."

This global context of deteriorating power - power lost to capitalist competition and the Third World challengers would, if it continued over time, either force internal structural changes in the United States or lead to the relegation of the US to a statue of non-hegemony. impending loss of global supremacy and the incapacity to take economic advantage of the openings in East Europe, Rusia, China and the rest of the Asia was frustrating to US policymakers. Blocked by their economic weakness from seizing the new openings, Washington's frustration had increased because of the tremendous stockpile of advanced military weaponry at its disposal. The disjuncture between military and economic power in the post-cold-war conjucture had been acutely felt and was instrumental in the launching of Gulf-War. Of what use were guided missiles and stealth bombers in competing for influence in Western European Markets? How were Pentagon budgets to compete with Deutschbank loans for influence

^{9.} Barbara Stallings - "The new international context of development", SSRC Items 47 (1), 1993, pp. 1-6.





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Eastern Europe or the Russian provinces. The contradiction was transparent: in the post-cold-war period (and even before) the rules for achieving global power were rooted in competition in the world market, while the US was still geared toward projection of military power.

"The US war in the Gulf was in its deeper sense a means of changing the rules of global power: of subordinating economic competitors to military power; of fray forming economic competitors into dock-bankers of US military conquests; of converting economic resources from market toward war subsidies of US-centered coalitions; of trading Third World debt payments for military contingents under the US command."10

The Gulf war was in its broadest contours an effort to establish world historical trend that are moving to relegate the United States to the status of a second-class power. It is to define a new military centered global order in which markets, income and resource shares are defined not in technological market power, but by political military dominance. Under these rules Washington's comparative advantage is military power, which would undermine the capacity of its competitors to mount an effective challenge to its position.

^{10.} Ibid.

"The war, as presented by the state and the media, was defined strictly according to the military censors. Television and radio programmes were organised to focus on military strategies of war. News commentators selectively interviewed rank-and-file-soldiers, giving the Pentagon a "back home folksy" face. Bombings were described in terms of objects destroyed, according to technical formulas approved by military officials. The issues and prospects of the war are defined by the military and the chief policy-makers. Congressional officials competed with the executive branch in embracing the new military metaphysics. And if the Gulf War was primarily about the US reshaping a New World Order anchored in military supremacy over its market-based competitors, it also involved the protection and cultivation of client regimes. The United States' defence of the domestic and external diplomatic issues are always implicit into its operations."11

In the world of late 1940s, however, there clearly was no community of power. Although America's position was in many respects even more ascendant than it was in the Gulf crisis, it did not go unchallanged. The onset of the long conflict with the Soviet Union, a conflict which made

^{11.} New York Times, 8 May 1991.

irelevant the order of the charter, gave rise of necessity to efforts at creating a limited community of power. these efforts, occuring roughly over the period 1947-52, that resulted in the great transformation of American foreign policy. In undertaking to create with the nations of Western Europe a partial community of power for the purpose of countering the power of the Soviet Union, the United States abandoned its historic policy of isolation - something it had not done by participating in the UN. Whereas membership in the world organization committed the nation to very little that broke from historic tradition, the creation of Western alliance broke from the entirety of that tradition, centered as it was on the avoidance of entanglement - above all, permanent entanglement - in Europe's politics. In a period of only several years, American foreign policy shifted from the new politics of collective security - which President Roosevelt characterised in his last address to Congress as "the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, and the balance of power" to the old politics that had supposedly been left behind in establishing the UN. " 12

^{12.} Address to Congress, Mauhl, 1945, cited in Ronald N. Stremberg - "Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO'', New York, 1963, P.18.

This reversion to the old politics, though not easy, was in some measure facilitated by the manner in which the change was perceived. An embrace of the old politics was frequently characterized as a realization of the new politics. Thus the Senate hearing on the North Atlantic Treaty were marked by the case with which the treaty was distinguished from the traditional military alliance which was, as "Senator Arthur Vandenberg noted, a "partnership for power" rather than, as was the case with NATO, a "partnership for peace". 13 A State Department memorandum on the differences between the North Atlantic Treaty and traditional military alliances sought to distinguish between the two by noting that alliances "were designed to advance the respective nationalistic interests of the parties in pursuit of such objectives became invoved in war", NATO, however, was a pure application of collective security: "It is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting "balance of power" but to strengthen the balance of principle." 14

^{13.} Senate Committee on Foreign Relation Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty (81st Congress, 1st Session), Part 1, p. 145.

^{14.} Ibid, Note 3. pp. 334, 337.

In time, a balance of power diplomacy based in the main on the Western alliance came to be accepted for what it was. Yet what it was, did in fact go beyond the vital task of balancing power against power. Although the Western alliance was painly directed against a specific party, it not only formed a community of power but of ideals as well. What came to be known as the "free world" has as its essential core the nations that made up the Western alliance. This creation of a partial, not a universal, community of power and value was the great achievement of American foreign policy in the post-war period. It was the principal achievement of the policy of containment.

The post-war order was an order irreparable from containment. With some exaggeration, it may even be seen at the order of containment. Although this order brought a remarkable measure of security, peace, and prosperity to the nations of the western alliance, we were never quite satisfied with the policy that made these results possible. Conservatives critisized containment from the outset for being too defensive and for failing to hold out the solic prospect of bringing the great contest with the Soviet Union to an early and victorious end. Indeed, untill the eve of

the Soviet Union's sudden collapse as a superpower, the right continued to insist, even more emphatically than in earlier years, that containment, if continued, would issue catastrophe. Liberals, too, though for the opposite reason, came increasingly to believe that the pursuit of containment would lead to disaster. From the time of Vietnam, those who had once been containment's strongest supporters came more and more to equate that policy with the excesses that had led to the nation's involvement in South-east Asia. Caught between these attacks from the right and the left, containment survived only in practice. Even the startling and unexpected vindication of that policy at the close of the 1980s has apparently not been sufficient to rehabilitate it in the nation's memory.

"The policy that essentially defined the American position in post-war world finally came to an end. Containment had come to entail a quite modest price in blood and treasure." 15

This persistence of belief in the ease with which collective security may be implemented, responded to the deeply ingrained American habit of wanting grand ends and

^{15.} Gad Barzilai, Ronklieman and Gill Shidlo-"The Gulf Crisis And Its Global Aftermath" Routledge, New York, 1993, pp. 173.

only modest means. Though the means, President Bush employed against Iraq were anything but modest they were in fact very modest when measured in terms of American casualities and Moreover, the costs of financial costs to the nation. sustaining the new world order would have to remain modest if it were to have a promising future. For there was nothing in the Gulf experience which set aside the lesson that public support for a foreign policy requiring substantial sacrifice could only be assured, provided, it could be demonstrated that vital security interests of the nation are at stake. Role have to be effectively equated with security, and security given, in the first instance, a conventional meaning. It was the failure to make this equation effectively that provided the principal cause of the opposition to the intervention in Vietnam.

The new world order also rested in the likelihood of the co-operation of the permanent members of the security council. "Whether that cooperation would be forthcoming, however, is very uncertain. The instability that marked the domestic politics of the Soviet Union and China might well deprive the United States, in a future crisis, of the support it enjoyed in 1990-91 in the Security Council." Whether it could rely, in that event, on the endorsement of the western 16. ibid.

alliance was by no means assured. Despite alliance support of the American-led action against Iraq, it was by no means apparent that comparable support could be assured in future actions. The alliance support given in the Gulf crisis was given, after all, in the context of UN support. "In a future crisis, assuming that it arose in the developing world, an absence of the latter might well give to the former the appearance of renewed North-South confrontations." Whatever their other reservations might be, it seemed safe to assume that at least some alliance members would strongly desire to avoid giving this appeaarance. That desire might even lead them to withhold endorsement of an American led initiative.

The fate of the new world order is necesarily speculative. Yet it was striking that, in the second year of the Bush Administration, the United States had returned to the vision, woodrow Wilson's vision, with which it began the long odyssey at the outset of this century, only attended by circumstances that appeared to hold out the promise of a more successful, might prove to be not much effective. For the principal threats to order after the Gulf War stemmed not from the prospect of naked territorial aggression against

^{17.} ibid, pp. 175.

which the new world order was primarily directed, but from the distinct possibility of the disintegration of existing states as a result of the insistence of peoples on self-determination (what I would discuss in details in Chapter 4). The great problem that confronted Woodrow Wilson, and that he sought to address by proclaiming that every people should have its own state, also confronted Bush. To the extent the new world order addressed this prospective danger, however, it did so largely by dismissing it. And hence, Bush's "new world order"contains the following points;-

- "1. The objective of building a new world order is to achieve peace, security, freedom and the rule of law in the world.
 - 2.American's leadership is indispensable and cannot be substituted.
- 3.It is necessary to form a partnership with allied countries to equitably share both cost and commitments, and to cooperate with Russians to deter aggression and to achieve stability proisperity and, above all, peace.
- 4. The United Nations should be given a role to play in the new world order. Washington appreciated what the UN has done to America in the Gulf Crisis.

5. The new world order must be based on American values and ideals, which should flourish in the world so as to ultimately build a world whole and free." 18

In addition, Bush's "new world order" shows one characteristic - it pays more attention to the role of big and developed countries, avoiding the North-South problem. Obviously, Bush's proposal was to create a structure and world order that can maintain the US' dominant position and promote the US' interests in the world. But his ideas of new world order will meet a number of difficulties, because there are many underlying restraints.

First, there is a gap between the ambition of the US leadership and its strength. After world War II, due to its superior economic, political and military strength, the United States occupied a dominant position in the Western alliance and the world from the 1940s to the 1960s. With German and Japanese strength rapidly increasing since 1970s, the US dominance has greatly been reduced. Its economic strength has not been superior as it was during the post-war periods. Senior editor of the US News and World Report,

^{18.} Pan Tongwen - "China views the world"; Beijing Review, vol. 43.

David Gergen said, "At the moment, the white House and many of the President's best and brightest are striving mightily to build a 'New World Order'. Far more critical is the creation of a New American Order. Yet, just as Dwight Eisenhower warned four decades ago, we must realise that our national security rests fundamentally upon our strength at home." 19

Secondly, US allies hold different views. Although, Bush had continuously made speeches on his new world order, the main US alied countries have shown indifference towards it and even raised objections. On the issue of establishing a new world order, the United States stressed its leader ship in order to promote its interests while the West European countries and Japan stressed joint participation and the establishment of a tri-polar world to win a bigger voice in the future world order and to better safeguard and expand their own interests. "The Japanese Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu, in his letter to Bush on January 9, 1990 said that tri-polar world - Japan, the United States and Europe - must be seen as the main body of the new world order." 20

^{19.} David Gergen - "US News and World Report"

^{20.} A. Gamble - "Shaping a new world order: political capacities and policy challenges" *Govt. opps.* v. 28, p. 325-38, 1993.

Further, "the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, said that in the present pattern of the world a multi-polar world should be set-up and the world affairs would not be dominated by one or two superpowers. The United Nations Security Council should play a leading role in setting up a new international order." ²¹ The German position is similar to that of France to some degree.

Britain has always kept its traditional and special relations with the United States in world affairs, and often supported the US stand, but it has not entirely agreed with the US new world order. "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Hurd, pointed out that nobody should claim one country could decide everything. Neither peace under the US rule nor peace under the Atlantic rule is realistic. Americans should not monopolize the power after the Gulf War and not establish a new world order based on models conceived by Washington, London or other European countries." 22

Finally, as the US-Russian relations are unpredictable Bush's new world order could not be established without the US-Soviet Co-operation. Bush appreciated the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev's cooperation in bringing about

^{21.} ibid.

^{22.} Pan Tongwen - "New World Order: According to Mr. Bush". Beijing Review, Vol. 34, NO. 43.

the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, Unification of the two Germanys, the settlement of regional conflict, the ending of confrontation between East and West, and during the Gulf crisis. However, there exists serious disorder and political crisis in the earstwhile Soviet Union region. The relations will not be so smooth as Bush wants them to be.

CHAPTER 3

PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THIRD WORLD

The New World order is a term that bursts onto the scene with the outrage accompanying Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and seems to have passed as rapidly from the scene as its creator (what I have discussed in the earlier chapter) . As a rallying cry, it certainly has falled from favour, but as a kind of conceptual shorthand it continues to engage anyone interested in the character of the post-cold war. historian's perspective on the New world order is that the policy pundits have wrong notions about the order. They feel that a new disorder has not replaced the new world order. The historic moment has not passed. Something important remains in the discussion of the new world order, something that will help the United States and the international community to get their bearings in this period of uncertainity, to chart a course away from the anarchic tendencies of the moment and toward a world more orderly in its affairs, especially the First World - the Third World relations.

The divorce of the First and the Third World accelerated by the end of US - Soviet rivalry. Regarding military matters, the great powers will neither intervene to preserve the security of the Third World states nor constrain these states from undertaking belligerent actions unless economic interests are threatened. If there is no balancing in the First World, they will not be engaging themselves in the peripheral states, " With the cold war strait jacket removed, wars in the developing world will not be deterred or promoted by the possibility of core state military actions."1 Rather core state military engagements in the periphery will be determdined primarily by vital interests such as acess to oil and strategic mineral supplies," 2 and to a lesser extent by special interests of domestic constituents. As in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the absence of true polarity within the developed states has removed those international structural constrains which may have inhibited military actions by great powers in the past. But while the great powers will move to protect the vital interests, they will not show the same resolve when called upon to protect an

^{1.} Jose Thiago Cintra. "Regional Conflicts: Trends in a Period of Transition (London: Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 94-108.

^{2.} ibid.

African Country from invasion or an Asian country from revolution. "The relative absence of concern from the civil wars in Liberia, Sudan, and even Ethiopia - the same type of events that only a decade earlier attracted major intervention by great powers - pertends a new relationship between the greart powers and the regional security systems.3

This decoupling of the developed states security structure from the third world security structure suggests that states in the developing world will have to seek means for enhancing security within their own states or regions. Classic structural realist balance of power theory delineates the options available. First, "states can devote greater resources both to purchasing weapons and to developinng domestic arms production capabilities." The Indian-Pakistani, Israeli Syrian, and North Korean-South Korean arms races are clear examples or regional balancisng by building up domestic arsenals. "NOt all states, however, have the ability to follow this first course. As a consequence, acquisition of military firepower has not been evenly

^{3.} The Conference Papers on "United Nations Peace-keeping", Survey, Vol. 32, May-June, 1990.

^{4.} James Everett Katz -- "The implications of Third World Military Industrialization: Sowing the Serpent's Teeth", Lexington Books 1986, pp. 277-92.

distributed, and regional hegemons have emerged." ⁵ To ensure security in these situations, the less militarized states throughout the Third World face the choice of policy options offered by realist theory - that of balancing or bandwagoning. Saddam Husain's quests for regional hegemoney, for example, forced the other Middle Eastern states to act, with Jordon choosing to bandwagon and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria choosing to balance against the rising threat.

Regarding economic matters, capital and trade flows will circulate within the developed economies, while the periphery will continue to get relatively poorer. Likewise, economic assistance causing from the core will dwindle. "The United States has already reduced its foreign assistance expenditure, while Japan, now the largest aid doner in the world, spends only 0.3 per cent of its gross national product on foreign assistance." ⁶ The assistance that remains available is increasingly devoted to macronomic structural adjustment policies and tied to core state export production." ⁷ If peripheral states want to remain linked

^{5.} Michael Kalre - "Wars in the 1990s: Growing Firepower in the Third World. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1990, pp. 9-13.

^{6.} Meera Koichi - "Problems in the aid Programme" Economist, Spring 1989, pp. 15-18.

^{7.} Robert L. Ayres - "Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty", Cambridge MIT Press, 1985.

to the core economies, they will be compelled to accept the terms of North-South trade investment poroposed by the industrialized states and the major international lendinky agencies.

"At an institutional level, democratisation is much easier than economci liberalization..... Economic reforms, in contrast, particularly which it involves the dismantling of a command economy, is much more easier to organise elections than to organise markets." 8 So, after a decade of ideological and institutional decline, the state is set for a renaissance, albeit in revised format. The lessons of both NICs and structural adjustment programmes, point to a necessary role for a "new " state in terms of economic direction, infrastructural development and welfare The new conciousness of the unacceptable human provisions. and financial costs of un/underemployment, vulnerable groups, infrastructural decay and rising levels of crime annd insecurity, especially for women and the elderly, point to the imperative of a strong rather than a weak or shrunken state. As jobs replace debts and depicts as the criteria for policy, so the state may be rehabilitated in the post-Its anticipated renaissance is in part monetarist era.

^{8.} Samuel P. Huntington, "Cart before the horse" Financial Mail, 129(5), 30 July 1991, p.39.

related to the next point: any new state's accountability, responsibility and transparency.

Adding to it, "as encouraged by the new global acceptibility of democracy, the international community has had to come to accept the legitimacy and activity of several types of influential non-state actors. These have historically included multinational corporations (MNCs) and major religions, but they now extend to international and local non-governmental organizations (INGOs and NGOs) such as ethnic, environmental, indigenous people's, women's and young groups."9 Together with the media, as well as 'old fashioned' cooperative and labour groups, these constitute 'civil society', which as suggested below, increasingly exists at global as well as at national level: a non-state and extra-economic set of representative popular or social movements. If contemporary democratization includes such 'informal processes or well as 'formal' multiparty constitutions and elections then the state may also yet be rehabilitated in the south as elsewhere.

Despite the apparent hegemony of the ideology of democracy, including civil society and multipartyism, in the continued absence of ideals and institutions which

^{9.} Richard Rosecrance - "Biopolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", Basic Books, New York. 1993,pp. 315-16.

Bienefeld characterises as the "old World order", 10 there is a continuing counter-tendency : the threat of authoritarian or corporatist reactions, including military rule and descent into anarchy. Indeed, there is a fundamental tension between the parallel pressures towards economic and political liberalizations: the former may necessiate political centralization, coercion or exclusion rather than participation. Clearly some of the consequences of ubiquitous structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) as well as continuing structural changes may lead towards political concentration rather than democratisation : the demise of the middle class and the rise of vulnerable groups, especially in the poorer worlds. Together, these mean that repression may be an essential corollary of structural adjustment programme reforms if the latter are to be perpetuated until at least the end of the decade. Hence the attraction to endangered regimes of various types of corporatism: inclusive arrangements among state capital and labour to the exclusion of other social forces. All of these macro-tendencies - rehabilitated states, burgeoning non-state actors and renewed authoritarian and corporatist inclinations - have profound implications for political

^{10.} Manfred Bienefeld - "The New World Order: echoes of a new imperialism", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, NO. 1, 1994, p. 30.

economy and foreign policy in the third world both now and in the forseable future; they complicate any simplistic anticipations or predictions.

The range and impact of any new relation in international arena will depend in part on the number of states and issues. In general, howevwer, given ongoing globalization and regionalisation, any novel relation will tend to develop around the emerging consequences of such processes: e.g. differentiation, environmental stress, feminism, flexibilisation, marginalisation, etc. In short, in the absence of effective national regulation, global responses will become ever more imperative to moderate market forces, including the later's tendency towards concentration and monopolisation. Such responses will tend to be "mixed actor'; i.e. including actors other than states from within civil society, such as NGOs, professional associations, unions, women's groups, etc. Such neo-Keynesian tendencies in emerging global civil society may be re-inforced by "counter-revolutionary" 11 pressures in favour of renewed statism from Japan and the NICs, as suggested by Bienefeld.

In addition to such elements advancing a global warfare state, there will also be demands for new functional ll. Marfred Bienefeld - "The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994, pp. 31.

organizations to confront new issues. At the global level, these will tend to be concentrated in areas of new technologies, such as electronic telecommunications from mobile phones and faxes to direct satellitc broadcasting, and new threats, such as AIDS, global-warming and Ozonedepletion. And at the regional level, they might range from common services such as basic R and D, central bank and currency, comunication including airline and airports, phones, post and TV, environmental regulation, policing, taxing etc. In short, "inter-related process of fragmentation and economic integration are dialectical: more and small states require and more and larger extra-national arrangements. And as the latter increase in number and scope, so pressure will grow for their democratisation: i.e. they will be subjected to observation and evaluation by international civil society. Including an attentive media. "12

Moreover, "the combination of old inter-state institutions in the UN and IFI system and old non-state actors like the MNCs and religious groups, alongwith the new varieties of both means that the range and roles of inter and transnational organisations are increasing. And as their

^{12.} Michael Dolan "Global Economic Transformation and Less Developed Countries" in *Slater*. Note 2, pp. 259-82.

salience grows by contrast to that of proliferating yet diminished states, so their function as global regimes becomes more effective and authoritative, symbolised by the almost universal acceptance of neo-liberal structural adjustment directions and obligation., " 13 Indeed, as states shrink as well as multiply, so (inter) national markets and global regimes become effective structure of rules and relations - unless Bienefeld's advocacy of an old world order becomes widespread.

Two sets of questions related to this trend arise for the immediate future. First, the place of regional organisations in the South; how influential compared to either national governments or global institutions can such extra-national structures be? And second how democratic can they be?

First, "the post-war tension between global and regional organisations in terms of reinforcing or undermining biopolarity has disappeared. Nevertheless, that between globalisation and regionalisation remains and may have intensified, especially in terms of market access i.e. how protectionist can the EU and North American Free Trade

^{13.} Ibid.

Agreement (NAFTA) become, given GATT and effective counterstrategies in the South, especially from Pacific Rim Organisations, from the ASEAN Free Trade Area(AFTA) to the Asia Pacific Economic Comunity (APEC) 14

And second, given the global trend towards, at least formal acceptance of democracy, how can civil society insist on terms of accountability, participation and transparency in global and regional institutions? Indeed, it is ironic, that, in the present period, as the state becomes less important in contrast to economy and civil society so it becomes more democratic." If effective regimes are now inter- and/or trans-national then democratisation of them becomes ever more crucial. Already, influential INGOs have demanded and organised `alternative' conferences and consultations at major global events, like special sessions on child, environment and women, as well as IFI annual meetingts. Moreover, both UN and IFI systems are advocating dialogue and joint acitivities with NGOs, increasingly divorced from their own constituencies. Given the recency of both formal and informal democratic spaces and practices in both East and South, the autonomy of civil society is a

^{14.} R.B. Finnegan - "International Relations: The Disputed Search for Method", Review of Politics, 34, pp. 40-46.

crucial issue, with profound foreign policy as well as domestic development implications." 15

Besides, "there is the delicate issue of internal decision making within NGOs themselves: how democratic and accountable is it? Despite their collective positive image, not all NGOs are either homogeneous or egalitarian. Any typology of both NGOs and other groups in civil society would distinguish among several factors, such as generation, leadership, orientation (how advocative ? how pragmatic ?), sector(s), size, structure, relations with other NGOs and with state and international institutions". 16 Bebbington and Farrington suggest that there is a recent additional type of so-called NGO-'technocratic' - resulting from both public and private sectors". Situated within the prevailing neoliberal paradigm, such NGOs only criticize the government on the grounds of its inefficiency rather than its distributional and political biases. They go on to admit that, "Technocratic is a generous term. They might also be

^{15.} Timothy M. Shaw, "Civil Society, the State and African Development in the 1990s: NGOs under SAP conditionalities, AACC/MWENGO Workshop, August 1993.

^{16.} David C. Korten, "Third generation Strategies: A Key to people based development", World Development, 15 (Special Issue) Autumn 1987, pp. 145-149.

ealled opportunistic NGOs (even) "yuppie NGOs"

! 17 Our arguments rests heavily on belief that the trend among the great powers is toward economic liberalism and political democracy and that these two factors are the key to a change in great power politics. If any of the current or potential great powers reverts from democracy to authoritarianism or if a non-democratic nation becomes a great power, our argument will be considerably weakened. We now consider various possibilities.

One potential great power, China, has already quashed the trend toward democracy and freedom that was blossoming in the 1980s. Despite its size, China is not yet a great power and does not have the capability to disrupt the great power society that we have described. It is a powerful regional actor, but it has neither the economic strength nor the military power projection capabilities to play much of a global role to date, despite its nuclear weapons. Its ability to disrupt the scenario we have outlined, lies primarily in the military threat it can pose to Japan. If it does threaten Japan militarily and if Japan seeks the

^{17.} Anthony Bebbington and John Farrington - "Governments, NGOs and Agricultural Development" Journal of Development Studies, 29(2), January 1993, pp. 202, 216.

military means to respond, the resulting spiral of hostilities could trigger a larger security dilemma between the great powers.

A more serious problem would be a return of communist rule in the Soviet Union or fascist rule in Russia, which might lead the United States to engage in balancing this country once again. The trend toward both democracy and markets in the former Soviet Union is still tenuous. successors of Gorbachev try to hold the union together by force, then the development of new norms in the Soviet Union will be slowed. But strong forces that seek to move the country closer to Western norms of politics and economics exist both in the central Soviet government and in the Russian republic- and a new Russia could play the role of a great power. Institutionalizing democratic governance in Russia will remain a long-term process, but leaders are already constrained by new political forces that have emerged in both the state and society and are opposed to authoritarian rule.

"Even Russian right-wing revanchism might not be as disruptive as some might imagine. Reactionaries in Russia may not favour democracy and markets, but they may also seek

to isolate the country in such a way that it no longer acts as a great power in world politics." ¹⁸ Russia and the Soviet Union face such severe internal problems that an isolationist foreign policy is a real possibility for this former superpower." While the former Soviet Union still possesses the nuclear weapons and conventional capabilities that it once used to extend its reach throughout the globe, losses in Afghanistan and the difficulty of acting abroad when faced with civil war at home have combined to make the return of the Soviet Union as a superpower antagonistic to the rest of the international system guite unlikely.

Another potential cause for concern is the alleged fragility of democracy in Germany and Japan. Some argue that a political culture imported from the United States is not firstly implanted in these two countries and that they might revert to their pre-World War II past. With dictators seeking imperialist expansion in their respective regions. The possibility of this scenario, however, seems remote. While there are right-wing elements in Germany and Japan (as there are in all liberal democracies), the political costs of returning to a dictatorial past would be extremely high for

^{18.} G.Murphy and E.Angeli - "International institutions, decolonisation and development." International Political Science Review, 14 (1), 1993, pp. 71-85, p.81.

either of these countries. The return of authoritarian regimes would frieghten neighbours, antagonize the United States, and risk collapse of the present international order from which Germany and Japan profit.

A considerable caveat is that a new-great power which is neither economically nor politically liberal could emerge. A large country in the periphery that developed nuclear weapons and was led by a dictator like Stalin or Saddam Hussein could trigger balance-of-power politics among the remaining great powers. The emergence of a new power that could challenge the existing order in fundamental way, however, does not seem on the horizon at the moment.

More so, in the NIDL and NIDP, both economic and strategic issues associated with foreign policy are being redefined. The contemporary 'reivisionist' mood has meant that security now embraces environmental, material and personal as well as 'national' or presidential security. Similarly, "the range of foreign policy issue is almost infinite: inter-or transnational competitiveness, crime, diseases, drugs, emergencies, environment, gender, infrastructure, migration, protectionism, standards, technologies, etc. These necessiate creative responses in

terms of structural as well as financial and technical elements, often involving civil society and MNCs as well as states and international agencies: mixed actor coalitions or organisations." 19

To be sure, the old Cold War 'high politics' agenda has not disappeared entirely: arms race, guerilla threats, nuclear proliferation (especially given the number of new states, including those with nuclear capacities in the FSU), regional conflicts, shifting aliances, etc. These may now be structured along new post-bipolar and non-aligned axes such as religion, especially 'islamic fundamentalism", and ecology (e.g. division over tropical forests or the ivory trade) and they may intensified because of the high price of SAPS: global un-and underemployed.

They may also constitute the other side of a new centres for strategic rather than economic dominance.

Michael Klare has recently cautioned about increasingly sophisticated and lethal arms imports by the South, particularly by the states concentrated in the Middle East or Pacific Rim . These include the latest high-tech fighter, frigates, missiles and tanks, especially by NICs like Korea,

^{19.} Mare Williams - "Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The role of the Environment Agenda", Third World Quarterly, 14(1), 1993 pp. 7-9.

Taiwan, and other middle power such as Brazil, China Egypt.

India, Iraq and Turkey; 20

".... as we processed further into the 1990s, it appears that the *decline* in East-West hostilities is being counter-balanced by an increase in regional Third World conflicts, and that wars of this type will be fought at even-increasing level of violence and destructiveness."²¹

Besides, the New World Order may be marked by the further development of regional military— industrial complexes in which aspirant middle powers advance both, their economic and strategic interests through the establishment of quite sophisticated technological capacities for weapons' design and production. Some of these were supported in the Cold War era by the superpowers. They include Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, and South Africa. They are now joined by others, some of whom are also pariahs. There may thus be a coercive as well as a developmental aspect to regionalism in the future as in the past, despite the demise

^{20.} Michael T Klare - "Deadly convergence: The arms trade, nuclear/chemical/missile proliferation and regional conflict in the 1990s", in MIchael T Kalre & Daniel C. Thomas (eds)" World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End". New York St. Martin's 1991.

^{21.} ibid

of bipolarity and the demands of IFI's conditionalities. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons manufacturers further increase the structural pressure to trade, notwithstanding contrary tendencies to democratisation and caps on military expenditures: the elusive 'peace dividends'. Such escalation and proliferation pose new challenges to international agencies in terms of regional confidence building, disarmament and peace-making - a rather pessimistic prospect -one in contrast to the optimistic perspective of Steve Clan on the 'growth-democracy- peace triangle in contemporary Asia, although he too recognizes some negative countervailing influences even around the relatively ebullient Pacific Rim." ²²

^{22.} Steve Clan - "America and the world " , Foreign Affairs 72 (1), 1993.

CHAPTER 4

REGIONAL RESPONSES : CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

The international system at the end of the cold war may produce an upsurge of regional political turbulence. Although both superpowers 'engaged in subversion and other mischief, they also acted at times to restrain some of their clients when the danger existed that a local conflict might lead to a superpower confrontation. That was particularly true in the volatile Middle East. Moscow's ability to impose such limitations is now virtually gone, and even Washington's ability has deviated from military to economy. Regional powers now have far greater latitude to pursue their own policy agendas. Struggles between status quo and revisionist powers are nothing new, and forcible territorial adjustments in international affairs for have been the norm centuries. " Iraq 's invasion of Kuwait was an omen of a post cold-war world characterized by a proliferation of local or regional conflicts. Iraq is not the first country, nor will it be the last, to expand its territory or seek to exploit regional power vaccums." 1

^{1.} Ted Galen Carpenter - The New World Disorder, Foreign Policy, Fall 1992, p. 30.

Many parts of the world are still dealing with the legacy of the colonial era. Throughout the middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, and other regions, the European imperial powers carved out colonies without reference to ethnic, linguistic or economic factors. In some cases, ancient enemies were grouped together in a single political jurisdiction; in other cases, ancient cultures were arbitrarily bisected. When the colonies received their independence, those problems were not rectified, or in such cases as the partition of the Indian subcontinent between India and predominantly Muslim Pakistan, were resolved imperfectly.

It is unrealistic to assume that boundaries imposed by long-defunct colonial masters must be regarded by the victims as equitable and immutable. Iraq's territorial Claims on Kuwait, for example, Long predate the rise of Saddam Hussein; they have existed since the early 1920s when the British established boundaries that preserved London's Kuwaiti protectorate and deliberately limited Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf. Baghdad's failure to enforce its claim in the Gulf war does not mean that the claim will vanish. A more likely scenario is that it will be added to the long list of festering Arab grievances.

Instability in distant regions does not threaten America's security in a serious sense. "There is no longer any challenge from a would - be hegenionic power such as Nazi or the Soviet Union. But, interfering in the regional imbrogeios in an effort to maintain stability possess far greater dangers to the USA than the remote possibility that a limited conflict might spiral out of the control and ultimately threaten America's well-being. The observation of defense analyst Earl Ravenal that "alliances and other security commitments are transimission belts for war", converting minor local or regional struggles into potentially lethal entanglements for the United States:, applies with special force to US - led collective security enterprises in a post-cold-war setting. A serious effort to implement Bush's new world order could easily entangle the United States in a host of obscure conflicts.

A. SOUTH ASIA

"Whether or not history has come to an end, the changes have generated two very critical new dimensions in current world politics -(i) geostrategic

and(ii) Philosophical". 2 The strategic divergence-ridden environment, in which SAARC was originally given its concrete shape, now has changed to a significant extent. barring Bhutan, democracies are in operation in all the SAARC countries and this is no doubt an important beginning towards the initiation of a uniform political system in the region. This has, however, incidently coincided with the democratic upsurage in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. "The break-up of the world bipolar system has reduced the possibility of the small neighbours wooing external powers to counter-balance India. In the past, Pakistan had an alliance relationship with the USA, Sri Lanka sought to involve external powers by sponsoring a UN resolution to make the Indian Ocean a Nuclear-Free Zone, and Bangladesh has sought close links with Pakistan, the Islamic states, the USA and China with the avowed intention of escaping from Indian hegemony." 3 The transformation of the world has tended

^{2.} Dr. Zbigniew Brezezinski - "The Consequences of the End of the Ciold War for International Security" in **Adelphi Papers** 265, Part I, Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-6.

^{3.} Gowher Rizvi - "South Asia After the Cold War", Paper presented at the *International Seminar* on "South Asia's Security in the 1990s: *Primacy* of Its Internal Dimension "Organised by BISS, Dhaka, 5-7, January 1992, p. 52.

towards the end point of the maxims of the past, that is, the attempt to neutralize the neighbour by forming some sort of alliance with the neighbour's neighbour or a distant power. On the other hand, "the smaller neighbours, and India as well, have come to realize that the cost of confrontation is unacceptably destructive for regional peace and stability and it must give way to the benefits of co-operation." 4

Strategic dimensions:

"The new strategic alignments in South Asia primarily involve the evolving pattern of relationship between India and the United States. The shift of the US traditional tilt from Islamabad to New Delhi is a marked feature of the new alignment." ⁵ "The new tilt towards India was first heralded in December 1990 with the visit of a sizeable American defence delegation led by Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security, Henry Rowen, for talks with his Indian counterparts. This was followed in August 1991 by a visit to the US of an Indian delegation led by General Sunil Francis Rodrigues, chief of staff of the

^{4.} Md. Nuruzzaman - "Global Change and Regional Cooperation in South Asia", Regional Studies (3)5, Summer 1993, pp. 52-53.

^{5.} P. Lyon. cited according to V. M. Hewitt - "The Internnational Politics of South Asia", Manchester, 1992, p. 75.

Indian Army. The new alignment takes its concrete manifestation in the kiekleighter proposals which provide for defence consultations and eventually joint military exercises between the two countries. These proposals were first made by the former comander of the US Army in the Pacific, Lt. Gen. claude Kickleighter, in April 1991." 6

It would be interesting to analyse what factors led India and the Unnited States to develop the new strategic links. There are, indeed, a number of motives operative behind the new Indo-US strategic alignments in a cold war free world. Both India and the US have their respective calculations and interest perceptions that signnificantly converge in the new world strategic realities created in the wake of Soviet disintegration. This merits discussion here in proper perspective.

"The change in the USA's South Asia perceptions relates both to its perceptions of global strategic order in the post-communist world and its pattern of alignment with

^{6.} Strategic Suvery, 1991-92 (IISS, London), pp. 162-63.

Pakistan in the Cold War period. The US tilt towards Pakistan, according to American assessment, entailed heavy costs for the United States and contributed only to poisoninng its relations with New Delhi. Moreover, the tilt only brought some temporary advantageds from Pakistan, especially the use of electronic monitoring facilities adjacent to Soviet Central Asian international ballistic missile (ICBM) test sites and anti-satellite test and launching sites, and the use of Pakistani agencies as a conduit for weapons aid to Afghan Resistance. With the end of the cold war the strategic importance of such facilities has declined and Pakistan, therefore, figures low in current US strategic calculations."

"The new emerging US inclination towards India, on the other hand, is viewed by Americans as potentially significant on some grounds which fall in line with America's overall strategic interests in the Indian Ocean." First, India has the potential to emerge as a world military power with a formidable blue-water navy. Therefore, American access to the Indian Ocean and, to a lesser extent, the Persian Gulf, will require a compatible relationship with the Indian navy. Second, the Americans view the so-called

^{7.} Selig S. Harrison - "South Asia and the United States: A chance for a Fresh Start" in *Current History*, Vol. 91, No. 563, March 1992, p. 98.

growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the Islamic world, which now also comprise the former Soviet Central Asian Republic, as something more serious than the threats posed by the now defunct communist Soviet Union. Also, Pakistan's continuing efforts to acquire nuclear technology, which has an alleged Islamic and anti-Zionist aspect, is a major cause of concern to the Americans. Here Indo-US interests converge as both are opposed to the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim cresent from Pakistan to Morocco. 8

On India's part, three definite reasons prompted her to get entangled into an alignment with the United States. The disintegration of the Soviet Union leaves her no option but to respond to US proposals and thus to realize neutralization of Pakistan's longstanding alignment with the United States. Second, for India the Gulf War carried the message that Soviet military technology, on which the Indian war machine currently relies, ie, to some extent equipped. It compelled the Indian Military strategies to seek avenues for more developed and highly sophisticated US military technology. Third, the new alignment also seems to amount to dejure recognition by the US of India's supermacy in South

^{8.} Strategic Survey, 1991-92 (IISS, London), p. 164.

Asia which the Indians are trying to assert. India got the de facto recognition earlier through her intervention in Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis in 1987 and its policing role in the Maldives in 1988. Pakistan was so far the stumbling block to India's regional ambition but the diminishing strategic value of the former to the US now clears the road for India.

Although not parallel to the shift in US-Pakistan relations, Sino-Pakistan relations also appear to be undergoing a change. The increasing number of high level visits between India and China may tend to dilute the traditionally strong relationship between China and Pakistan. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's visit to New Delhi in December 1991 and again Indian Prime Minnister P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing in 1994, which is a belated reciprocation of late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 1989 visit to Beijing, has succeded in restoring confidence between the two countries by dispelling the mutual phobia created after the 1962 war. There is even a possibility, in the absence of the ex-USSR threat to China, of reverting to the 1950's type of relationship between China and India." 9

^{9.} Chin Kin Wah - "Changing Global Trends and their Effects on the Asia-Pacific" in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Vol. 13, June 1992.

"The traditional 'enemy image perceptions' of the neighbours vis-a-vis India, on the other hand, is most likely to be sharpened further in the wake of the new strategic developments in South Asia. India itself is not immune from perceiving her neighbours as 'potentials, particularly Pakistan and China. Ever since independence in 1947, India and Pakistan are locked in perceiving an enemy image in each other."

Besides the above-mentioned alignment motives and counter-motive of inter-State relations, one of Washington's major concerns is that the nuclearization of South Asia might stimulate nuclear activities in the troubled South-West Asia and Persian Gulf region - an area of vital strategic importance to the West. This could occur either as a result of South-west Asian powers being encouraged to develop their own nuclear arsenals or as a result of direct transfer of nuclear technology. Indeed, evidence has recently come to light suggesting that Pakistan may have played a role in transferring uranium - enrichment technology to Iraq in the period prior to the 1991 Gulf-war. A sale by India of a small experimental reactor to Iran was prevented as a result

^{10.} Partha S. Ghosh - "India's Perceptions of Indo-Pakistan, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Nepal Relations", Papers presented at the Seminar, Colombia, 13-15 July 1990.

of pressure from Washington. China, however, has since gone ahead with the sale. China has also sold intermediate - range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and short - range Ballistic Missiles to Pakistan." ¹¹ Each of these cases demonstrates the way technologies of mass destruction developed in one region of instability can flow to another. However, US administration efforts to promote a mutual "rollback" or "Freeze" of their nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, are not likely to succeed in the face of deep-rooted nationalist resistance, especially to the intrusive inspections necessary for so called verifications. A more promising approach is another American initiative now unfolding to encourage a nuclear arms control dialogue between India, Pakistan, the United States, China and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The United States indicated its readiness to join with these powers in a South Asian nuclear-free - zone agreement. This concept involves mutual pledges not to deploy nuclear weapons in an area encompassing India, Pakistan; the Tibet, and Xinjiang regions of China where Beijing deploys IRBMs targeted at India; and the Diego Garcia atoll in the Indian

^{11.} Kesara Menon - "Did Pak Scientists give N-Secrets to Iraq"; The Hindu 2 October 1991.

ocean. Since the no deployment pledges would not cover China's ICBMs, such an agreement would also require explicit pledges by Beijing and the other two non-regional powers not to use their nuclear capabilities against India and Pakistan. Morover New Delhi and Islamabad would pledge not to use their capabilities against each other.

"The "first-use" policy is part of an overall United States nuclear posture that clashes directly with nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Indian and Pakistani officials often point to this policy as well as to the administration's rejection of proposals from the former Soviet Union and others for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban. How can the United States be a credible advocate of non-proliferation, they ask, while it not only continues to maintain a large nuclear weapons stockpile but also adheres to cold-war attitudes on "first use" and a test ban?" 12

Challenges for South Asia (Economic Perspective)

In meeting high levels of poverty and large population challenges, South Asia interacts with the rest of the world and faces constraints and opportunities arising out of the global economic interdependence.

^{12.} Selig S. Harrison - "South Asia and the United States: A chance for a Fresh Start".

"South Asia has a disproportionate number of the developing world's poor. While this region has 30 per cent of the developing world's population, it has 47 per cent of its poor. About 51 per cent of the population in South Asia are considered to be below poverty line compared to no more than 33 per cent of the total population in the developing world."

During the 1970s and 1980s, South Asia had a consistently lower growth rate in per capita GDP than that of low income developing countries as a whole. The South Asian economic grew at 2.0 per cent and 3.25 per cent respectively, as against an average of 2.4 per cent and 4.0 per cent for all low income developing countries. East Asian provides a striking contrast with a growth rate in percapita GDP during 1the 1980s which was twice as high as that of South Asia. The aggregate GDP growth rates for East Asia were also about 50 per cent higher than those for South Asia. Population growth rates, on the other hand, were considerably lower in East Asia at 1.5 per cent, against 2.3 per cent for South Asia.

^{13.} Pritchett, L. - "Measuring outward Orientation in Develoiping Countries: Can it be done? Working Paper WPS 566, World Bank 1991.

In terms of various indices of social or human development, South Asia also ranked amongst the poorest. Only sub-saharan Africa was poorer. Life expectancy for the region was 58 years as compared to 51 years of sub-saharan Africa and 68 years for East and South East Asia. About 56 per cent of individuals had acess to health services compared to 45 per cent and 75 per cent for Sub-Saharan and South-East Asia respectively. Similarly, only 54 per cent of the population had access to safe water and only 11 per cent had access to sanitation. The literacy rate in this region was the lowest in the world with adult literacy at 41 per cent in 1985.

As I have discussed in the earlier chapter, the disappearance of the East, and also the impossibility of the emergence of a unified Eastern bloc, have perhaps dealt the most griveous blow to the interests of the South. The South, not being a cohesive and unified power bloc, might increasingly fall prey into the gravity of western economic alies. Lacking any ideological bond, the South at present is in no position to mount any worthwhile challenges to the West. Yet Western perception, particularly of the US, is shaped and reshaped to a significant degree by possible threats arising from the Third World. The invasion of

Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent war against the latter by US led forces is often cited as a prelude to possible Third World threats of the future.

At its juxtapose, South Asian governments have recognized that improving their economies must be their foremost priority to ensure stability at home. They have largely accepted that their inward-looking, centrally planned economic policies have failed. Further they have also realized, of late, that insular, State- run economies have not achieved the levels of growth needed to catapult their large populations out of poverty. Instead, these policies isolated their countries and deined them the benefits of international trade, while the countries that have prospered around the globe are those with dynamic private sectors. Taking these factors into account, leaders in the subcontinent have instituted economic policies that reduce the public sectors' role in the economy, decrease state regulation of private industry and embrace the global economy by encouraging foreign investments and promoting exports.

Hence "South Asian countries need to exploit the opportunities which an effective participation in the world economy opens up for them, by taking advantage of access to

financial resources and technologies. Changes in domestic policies will be required for integration into the world economy. At the same time new international rules of behaviour, economic and political, need to be devised - an effort in which South Asia must participate. The nature and speed of changes in the world economy, including conditions of trade and financial flows, will affect South Asia. Also, changes that take place in the policies and per ceptions, both political and economic, of the international community will have an impact on South Asia." 14

ROLE OF SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)

In the past, South Asia has rightly been described as a "region without regionalism." ¹⁵ This aptly characterises the situation of a region which, up until the mid 1980s, had not set up an organisation or institution concerned with regional problems. After the second world war, a number of international organisations were initially created in the wake of the East-West conflict which were tied to the

^{14.} Nurul Islam - "South Asia, Regional perspective on the New World Interdependence", *Development*; 1992 p. 49.

^{15.} P. Lyon. cited according to V.M Hewitt - "The International Politics of South Asia", Manchester, 1992, p. 75.

superpowers, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the military field or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the European Comunity (EC) in the economic field. During the period which followed, other organisations emerged which focused more strongly on regional interests (such as for example, the Association of South East Asian Nations) and which sought a comon policy for the solution of their economic and political problems. After the cessation of the East-West antagonism, attention again concentrates to a greater extent on these organisations. Liberated from former ideological straitjackets, they provide an opportunity for cooperation designed to resolve problems which - as in the case of environment - have long since no longer been resoluble within the national framework alone.

A region is taken to denote a "geographically restricted area cuturally united but often politically divided". ¹⁶ South Asia, known formerly as the Indian subcontinent, is today viewed as encompassing the countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This region, which is clearly demarcated geographically by the Indian Ocean and the Himalayan and Hindu Kush Mountain ranges, was previously characterised by a

^{16.} N.D. Palmer - "The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific" Lexington, 1991, p. 196.

paradox with respect to forces of cooperation. Despite a common histor4ical and cultural past and numerous similar political and economic problems, an organisation concentrating on regional cooperation, the SAARC, has only existed since 1985.

The government leaders adopted a charter which poostulated inter alia the following goals of the SAARC: - improvement of the general living conditions; - the promotion of economic growth, social progress and cultural development;

- the mobilisation, promotion and extension of own resources to satisfy basic needs
- active cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields,

(self-reliance")

- the strengthening and improvement of regional position in the international bodies." 17

They reaffirmed the principles of the Delhi Declaration and also laid down the organisational structure of the future organisation. The foreign ministers were entrusted with the supervision of the activities as a whole, "technical committees" were created for the areas of cooperation in

^{17.} F. Ashraf - "South Asian Association for Cooperation", Islamabad, 1988, p. 59.

which all states were involved, and an "action committee" was set up for smaller cooperation projects between individual states. In Kathmandu, a secretariate was set up in 1987 in order to strengthen the institutional frame of the SAARC. Kathmandu was also the venue of agreements on a regional fight against terrorism and on a common regional food reserve in line with the ASEAN model in the case of crop failure and famines. The "SAARC 2000 Basic Needs Perspective" 18 was adopted at the summit in Islamabad in 1988, and the field of education was included in the list of areas of coperation.

Almost in a decade, after the official constitution of SAARC, hardly any tangible successes have been achieved so far. In the regional, international and econhomic field the SAARC is still far from having assured a significance such as that achieved in the meantime by, for exasmple, the ASEAN states in the economic and deplomatic fields. Whereas in Matters relating to integration and economic and political cooperation the EU (European Union) would take a leading position in the table of regional communities, the SAARC would stil find itself at the bottom of this table at its current stage.

^{18.} Ibid., p. 60.

According to B. Pradhan, "there were 150 meetings of working groups and committee's dealings with the SAARC in 1986, and 135 activities of this kind in 1987. In view of the lack of presentable successes and the poverty which exists in these countries, his complaint about the resultant allocation of time, money and manpower does seem understandable." 19

However, "with the growing bilateral disputes and dissensions, the member countries of SAARC took the bold initiative of launching South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) at the Seventh SAARC summit at Dhaka in December 6, 1993, as a confidence building measure to boost the sagging morale of the regional organisation." ²⁰ SAPTA is intended to be based and applied on the principles of mutuality of advantages so as to benefit equitably all member states. The provisions of Article 11 are worth noting. It states that the provisions of the agreement shall not apply in relation to preferences already granted or to be granted by one member state to another member state outside the framework of this agreement and to third countries through bilateral plurilateral and multilateral trade agreements. In

^{19.} Cf. B. Pradhan - "SAARC and its Future", Kathmandu, 1989, p. 184.

^{20.} Rodney Tasker - "Revival of SAARC with SAPTA" New York Times, January 1994.

adddition, "under GAAT Protocol relating to trade, 14 signatories (including India, Bangladesh and Pakistan) have exchanged trade preferences. Further, under Indo-Nepal Trade and Transit Trearty, primary products traded between the two countries are exempted from basic customs duty. additional 79 items containing not less than 55 per cent Napalese or Indian materials and labour also enjoy preferential entry into India. To exclude all such products from preferential trade would imply taking out the wind under the sail of SAPTA. " 21 Still, nowhere does the text on SAPTA state how the regional preferences are to be retained as MFN (Most favoured nation) tariff rates are brought down. Even though the preamble of SAPTA text states the Sri Lankan proposal to establish a free trade area by 1997, the text nowhere specifies the date by which the member states have to deposit their instruments of ratification.

SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry which is likely to be operational soon will play a crucial role in the rapid growth of intra-trade and investment. Presidentship will go to the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry and its headquarter will be at Karachi. However, India will be a nodal point for the chamber having given a

^{21.} ibid.

commitment to share more than one-fourth of its annual budget.

Despite several SAARC pursuits, the various facets of regional instabilities such as in Kashmnir (Indo-Pak relations); in Jaffna Penisula (Indo Srilanka relations): in Tinbigha and refugee problems (Indo-Bangladesh); and the problems related to distribution of river water (IUndo-Nepal) "The evidence supporting the view that the problems of local, national and regional instability are closely linked is compelling. Further more such linkages affect neighbouring regions and even international security. The view that strategic and security studies can ignore vast tracts of the globe locked into crisis, or that internal insecurity is somewhat unconnected with international insecurity, is hardly any longer a tenable view, if indeed it ever was. Collective security mechanism will not themselves reduce disorder in regions of chronic instability. It will be necessary for the United Nations and other bodies to find ways of addressing larger structural issues and resource issues that, although they do not appear to precipitate disorder, certainly play a powerful role in exacerbating it." 22

^{22.} Sandy Gordon - "Resources and Instability in South Asia", Survival, Vol. 35(2) Summer 1993, p. 85.

However, in the form of the SAARC, South Asia, the "Earth's poorhouse", now has a discussion forum to foster confidence-building measures between its members. This could form the basis for the region from which to bring its political weight to bear and to voice its regional interests in the present changing international system. In view of the growing economic competition on a worldwide scale, this wil become increasingly important when it comes to keeping pace with the world economy.

At the same time "the SAARC provides an opportunity to promote the socio-economic development more intensively and energetically at a regional level, to ensure that regional cooperation is also beneficial for the people and does not merely remain a political show event. This, however, requires cooperation in the economic field too, although no one knows today what this cooperation will be like and how it can be of equal benefit to all countries." ²³

^{23.} Christian Wanger - "Regional Cooperation in South Asia. Review of the SAARC" Aussen Politik. V. 44, 1993, p. 190.

B. CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS:

A contest for influence is being acted out in the vast expanses of central Asia. Many disaster scenarios exist for the successor states of the former Soviet Union. One of President Yeltsin's Chief advisors warned darkly in 1991 that "Kazakhstan could soon degenerate into one thousand Yugoslavias. The apocalyptic visions range from permanent chaos and civil war to violent Islamic revolution and genocide."²⁴

The disintegration of Soviet Union has led to the emergence of new sovereign states in Central Asian region. This Central Asia is one of the world's earliest inhabitated places and the home of an ancient and highly developed civilization. It has been of fundamental importance in the history and politics of Eurasia. Having been a region of unnstable frontiers, the balance of power between its own population and the surrounding states has determined its political status. This area was a zone of triangular contest between Britain, Russia and China during the 19th and the first two decades of the 20th Century, which has been romanticised as the "Great Game". Ironically, (And) at the

^{24.} Robert A. Lewis. ed, "Geographic perspectives on Soviet Central Asia" London, Routledge, 1992.

present changing global system as well as in the coming future, this great game is going to be replayed.

Whereas the Central Asian States have earnestly begun to rediscover their roots on quite a new basis, three blocs of states have stepped into the vaccume so as to resume the "Great Game". Those blocs are:

- 1. US, Japan, Turkey and the West European Countries;
- Islamic countries, especially Iran,
 Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
 and
- 3. the two Asian giants India and China.

"Caution and moderation are the guides of the American and West European countries' policies in this Central Asian region." ²⁵ They have more concerns other than market benefits and denuclearisation in this region. Set-up of democratic governments, prevention of any regional conflict, establishment of human political and civil rights - are the issues in prominence in American policy agenda. The

^{25.} Kazemzaden (Firuz) - United States Policy towards Central Asia: Caution and Moderation Vital Speeches of the Day, 58(22); 1 September, 1992, pp. 678-81.

United States is in plan for acquainting the peoples of newly independent republics with American history and culture. They are very much aware of not to create any anti-American feelings among the peoples, who have been trying to assert a new identity.

At the same time Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria have stepped in to fill the vacuume by playing islamic cards with temporary economic assistance to the newly emerged states. Turkey obviously comes as an important actor in the region. Firstly, it counter-acts Iran's policy through its brand of democratisation, industrial development and market-oriented policies and secondly, it serves as a perfect alterego to the USA.

Besides, due to its geographical proximity to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistann, Pakistan, China, Russia and India, Central Asia is going to play an important role in the geopolitics of this region (as well as) of the whole world.

In the following discussion, first, I have mentioned the domestic conditions of the Central Asian republics with their needs and compulsions and then I have elaborated the external factors influencing the Central Asian policies and at its juxtapose, how these republics have been responding to external impulses.

DOMESTIC FACTORS:

(i) Ethno-religious resurgences:

Identifying ideological tenets within Central Asia, either at the level of the region, the state or national societies, is no simple task. "Ruling elites throughout Central Asia have been searching for some form of ideological identification in order to gain legitimacy within their respective political jurisdictions. This search has been complicated significantly by the fact that, without exception, the composition of the ruling elites in Central Asia has not changed much since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Although there have been personality changes at the highest level of the executive in Tajikistan as well as in Azerbaijan, the administrative and military establishments have remained largely as they were prior to independence."26 The disintegration of Soviet Union has led the subsequent emergence of the newly independent and sovereign Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyjistan, and Kazakhstan besides the caucassian state of Azerbaizann. "1970s and 1980s were marked

^{26.} Gharabaghi Kiaras -" Development Strategies for Central Asia in the 1990s; in search of alternatives", Third World Quarterly. 15(1); 1994 pp. 104.

by an increasing tendency among the Muslim peoples of Central Asia towards national exclusiveness and ethno-centrism. This not only thwarted the Soviet efforts to achieve the ultimate aim of fusion of different nationalities but also lent strength to divisive forces. In fact demonstrations were organized by Uzbeks in Tashkent as early as in May 1969 and by Tajiks in Dushanbe in May 1978 demanding the Russians to qet out." ²⁷ The ethnic problem in Central Asia assumed serious proportions in the past few years when violent interethnic clashes rocked Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tazikistan and Kyrghijistan. Various factors such as ethnic seclusion, nationalist and religious resurgence, growing unemployment, low agricultural and industrial productions that resulted in shortages and decline in standard of living are stated to be responsible for the heightened inter-ethnic tensions in Soviet Central Asia. The problem is compounded by the ethnographic complexity of the region. Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tadjiks, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, and Kara Kalpaks inhabit definite territories where they form a predominant majority. This is the direct result of territorial delimitation of 1924 which redrew the map of Central Asia by creating separate national

^{27.} K. Warikoo - "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in "Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia", 1991, New Delhi. p. 63.

republics and autonomous oblasts whose population acquired greater homogeneity than before. "Tajikistan still feels deprived by the supposed loss of territory to Uzbek republic as a result of this delimitation. Historical Ferghana is now shared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghijistan. Inheriting an ancient and rich cultural heritage Tadjiks would not like the Uzbeks to act as a big brother. But it is the Uzbeks who are the most developed group among the Central Asians. The Uzbek republic contains all the cultural and historical capitals of old central Asia - Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand, Urgench, Shahr-i-Sabz and Khiva. The best academic and scientific institutions are located in Uzbekistan. Similarly the seat of Muslim Spiritual Directorate and the famous medresseh at Tashkent and Bukhara are in Uzbekistan."

"Substantial presence of settlers from European parts of Russia and Cenntral Asia ethnic minority groups in various republics lends yet another dimension to the ethnic problems. This became evident in a series of violent Russian-Kazakh, Kirghiz-Uzbek, Vzbek-Tajik and Uzbek-Meshkitian Turk clashes in Alma Ata, Osh, Dushanbe and

^{28.} K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu - "Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia" New Delhi, 1991, pp. 63.

Ferghana during the period 1986 to 1990.29 As per 1989 census figures, Uzbeks formed 71.04 % of population of Uzbekistan and they are also scattered in Tajikistan, Kyrghizistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan at the ratio of 23.44 % , 12.8 %, 8.97 %, 2.01 % respectively. Similarly Kazakh settlers in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan formed 4.05% and 2.49 % of their population respectively. Russians constituted 21.37 %, 9.45 %, 8.30 %, 7.59 % of the population of Kyrghizistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. regards Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs represented 39.45 % of the total population in 1989 whereas non-Kazakhs were in majority (Russians - 37.60 %, Ukranians - 5.40 %, Germans - 5.78 % and others - 7.08 %)." 30 There are still a number of small other ethnic groups like Turks, Tatars, Dungans etc. scattered in each of the Central Asian republics in varying proportions. The linguistic heritage of various ethnic groups is as varied as their cultural and social origins. Though Turkman, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Kara Kalpak and Uighurs belong to the Turkic group Kipchaks, Uighurs, Taranchis, Arabs, Kalmuks, Meshkitian and there are substantial differences not only

^{29.} ibid pp., 64.

^{30.} Source: Central Asia Today (Moscow State University of African and Asian Studies), No. 3, 1993.

between these languages and the old Turkic language but also among themselves. But the persian speaking Tadjiks, who represented an urban tradition and rich cultural heritage, are of Iranin stock as against all central Asian ethnic groups who belong to the Turko-Mongol race. Ethnic jigsaw in Central Asia is further complicated by the trans-border settlement of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kazakhs, who have been living on both sides of Soviet Central Asian borders with Iran, Afghanistan and China. "There are four and a half million Tajiks, one and a half million Uzbeks and half a million Turkmens in Afghanistan. In addition, some 700,000 Kazakhs and 80,000 kirghizs are living in adjoining Xinjiang region of China. Five lakh Turkmens are settled in Iran, .: " 31 Any cross border fraternization of this Central Asian population on ethnic and religious lines will result in politico-economic and social instability in this whole region which is ultimately a threat to global peace and security.

(ii) Power and Politics in the Region:

"It is realistic, not merely cynical, to observe that Karimov, Nazarbaev annd Niyazov, the first secretaries -

^{31.} B. Brown - "The Public role in Perestroika in Central Asia, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 9, NO. 1, 1990, p. 88.

turned - presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are products of a society which expects strength and firmness in its leaders. The Communist Party has been renamed in Central Asia," 32 , but certain tools are still in the background, like intelligence and interior Ministry, using the long established methods and tactics devised by the CP to withstand challenges to its monopoly of Niyazov has been eager to emphasise his preparedness power. to accommodate both ethnic diversity and an Islamic beliefsystem. With respect to the former, he has confidently asserted -- "The Russian speaking population is slowly being freed from anxiety about its future. Moreoever, those who, giving in to the general panic, left Turkmenistan in past years are beginning to return, not having found happiness in 33 their historical homeland."

The constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a secular state. Niyazov explains -

"We have firmly proclaimed the principle, and it is codified in our constitution, that Turkmenistan is a secular state. The Muslim clergy is firmly committed to this

^{32.} Anthony Hyman - "Moving out of Moscow's Orbit: the outlook for Central Asia", International Affairs, 69, 2 (1993), p. 290.

^{33.} Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIV (42), 1992, p. 6.

principle, and we have no reason to believe that anyone intends to change it."

This does not imply, however, that Islam has been altogether rejected in the country;

"As for the concrete influence of Islam on the life of society, it has an influence - a favourable one. I believe - in the moral and ethical sphere of life. Islam preaches purity and nobility of thought, it preaches mercy, and it criticizes greed, avarice and cruelty." 35

It is perhaps most telling of the character of Niyazov's regime that "the state media have taken to describing the ex-party First Secretary Niyazov by the new title of Turkmenbas (Chief of Turkmen), a name modelled on Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey's modernizing dictator." ³⁶ He favours gradual political and economic reforms as opposed to any grand scheme as the Shah's white revolution' or the more contemporary Western - designed adjustment programmes -

"No one knows our problems better than we do: consequently, we should determine the rhythm and pace of

^{34.} ibid.

^{35.} ibid.

^{36.} Anthony Hyman - "Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: the outlook for Central Asia' International Affairs. 69(2), April 1993, p. 291.

our reform ourselves on the basis of local conditions, and not according to the demands of some sort of classic, democratic formulas or prescriptions worked out in some prosperous Western country." 37

"Much as in all the other Central Asian republics, ethnic diversity and an uncertain role for Islam in the society have proven to be a significant obstacle in the development of a cohesive nationalism or any form of coherent national identity in Uzbekistan." ³8 Further, "separate political groupings represent the Ferghana Velley, Samarkand and the key regional centres inthe eastern and western parts of the republic." ³⁹

Predictions about the role of Islam in Uzbekistan is not very clear despite keeping in mind the stronghold of Islamic centres such as Samarkand and Bukhar in Uzbekistan. However, Migzanyan has argtued that—" ...when the present

^{37.} Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIV (42), Note 9, p. 6.

^{38.} Gharabaghi (Kiras) - "Development Strategies for Central Asia in the 1990s: in search of alternatives" Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, NO. 1, 1994, p. 106.

^{39.} Martha Olcott, "Central Asia's post empire politics", Orbis, Spring 1992, p. 258.

government grows weaker, it will most likely be replaced by a religious government. Uzbekistan has great Islamic traditions, religious figures are influential and there is no Islamic opposition only becsause there is no acknowledged Muslim leader. As time goes on, Uzbekistan will be drawn deeper and deeper into the Muslim World." 40

"Karimove, the president of Uzbekistan, an economist and former CP bureaucrat, is reliably quoted as being keenly jealous of the higher prestige and reputation accorded in the west to Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Their republics are obvious rivals for leadership or domination of the region, becsause of their demographic and economic weight. For all that Nazarbaev has been praised as a liberal, his chosen models of development are Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.... What the Southeast Asian model has to recommend it, of course, is rapid growth through economic liberalism under a political system of guided democracy i.e. one strictly controlled and supervised from above." 41

^{40.} Migzanyan - "Migzanyan looks at ex-Soviet republics future", Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press, XLIV (43), 1992, p. 13.

^{41.} Anthony Hyman - "Moving out of Moscow's Orbit : the outlook for Central Asia". International Affairs, 69 (2), 1993, p.291

Besides, President Nazarbaev has consistently supported the continuation and greater institutionalisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As it has been commented - "Naazarbaev is faced with a difficult situation, despite an outward appearance of stability. He has to reckon with the fact that the Kazakhs, like the Russians, make up 40% of the population, while other groups account for the remaining 20%. That is why he is pursuing an aggressive...policy to preserve the CIS. This is not for the long run, not a geopolitical necessity but a tactic. Kazakh leader needs to gain time. To leave Russia now would mean loosilng Russian-speaking East Kazakhstan."42 Further, "the problems which exist between the Kirgizians and the Uzbekis, both of whom belong to the Sunnite branch of Islam, manifest themselves in cultural, ethnic, language and religious differences. Whereas Mongolian and Kazakh culture elements prevail over Iranian influences in the case of Kirgizian, the Uzbekis were strongly

influenced by the Persian-Islamic culture." 43 However, the

^{42.} V. Migranyan - op cit, Note 14, p. 13.

^{43.} Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. (CDPs), XLV (5), 1993, p. 279.

government of Kyrghistan, headed by President Askar Akaev, has managed to diffuse the conflict temporarily, but not entirely. Akaev vetoed for example, a proposed preamble to the land code, which read "the land belongs to the Kyrghyz people." 44 Such accommodations on the part of Akaev in favour of minority ethnic groups, however, earned him criticism from the kyrghiz intelligentia, which argued that "the President was thinking about all peoples except the kyghizs. "45 A media observer argued that "although the ethnicity dimension in kyrghyzstan is presently relatively calm, the potential for ethnic 'conflict explosion' is still high. Kyrghizistan, therefore is the most likely candidate to replay the the bloody and seemingly endless war in neighbouring Tajikistan." 46 The President of Kyrghyzstan believes that this mountainous land with a diverse population, capitalist reforms and a liberal political regime can rapidly create a Central Asian Switzerland where prosperity and democracy can flourish, enjoying the stability which it lacks.

^{44.} CDSP, XLIV (10), 1992, p. 4.

^{45.} ibid.

^{46.} Igor Rotar, "Could Tajik War be replayed in nearby States?" CDSP, XLV (3), 1993, p. 11.

In Tajikistan, religious factors have played a major part in the political development of the country. "One important cause of Islam's enduring influence in Tajikistan is the fact that a large proportion of the population wants Islam to remain a part of their way of life." ⁴⁷ There are two sources of Islamic influence in Tajikistan - (i) the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) is an official opposition party competing in elections. It has been suspected by many observers that the IRP's ultimate objective is to build an Islamic republic modelled after the one in Iran. "⁴⁸ and (ii) the source is Afghanistan. "The Islamic Party of Afghanistan has been providing combat training camps for Tajiks, giving rise to speculation that there may be plans for some type of Islamic Afghan-Tajik territorial union." ⁴⁹

Chinese authority, who recently established diplomatic contact with Tajikistan, has been extending loans and political support. Clearly the Chinese are concerned about the potential spread of Islamic activism into the Xinjiang region."

^{47.} Muriel Atkin, "The Survival of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan", Middle East Journal 43 (4), 1989, p. 606.

^{48.} CDSP, XLIV (36), 1992, p. 8.

^{49.} CDSP, XLIV (38), 1992, p. 17.

^{50.} CDSP, XLV (10), 1993, p. 18.

The religious factor by itself does not provide an adequate understanding of political allegiances in Tajikistan. Clanship also figures prominently in this respect. "Clan allegiances are divided between three major groups: the Leninabad clan (traditionally the clan of the ruling elites), the Palmir clan and the Kulyab clan (traditionally the clan of most opposition groups in Tajikistan)." 51

In the midst of such unstable circumstances and several strifes, "the former communists were returned to power in Tajikistan, aided by a decisive intervention at the end of 1992 by armed forces of Uzbekistan, Russia and other neighboiurs. It was hoped their return would end instability and restore the regime of the ousted President Nabiyev." 52 Still the future is highly uncertain at the present time. "State-society relations are effectively non-existent, as in any form of reigme legitimacy. Reversing these tragic realities may well prove to an insurmountable challenge." 53

^{51.} CDSP, XLIV (37), 1992, p. 10.

^{52.} Anthony Hyman, "Moving Out of Moscow's Orbit: the outlook for Central Asia", International Affairs, 69(2), April, 1993, p. 291.

^{53.} Gharabaghi, "Development Strategies for Central Asia in the 1990s: in search of alternatives", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15(1), 1994,p.lll.

External Factors:

US, Japan & the West European Countries:

"For countries not geographically close to the region, the emergence of the newly independent states of central Asia has generated considerable interest, but has not been treated as a major strategic priority. Nuclear proliferation and the threat of Iranian expansion were the principal exceptions. In the first two years of Central independence, pressure was effectively brought to Asian bear on Kazakhastan to honour its agreement to be a nonnuclear state and the Central Asian States managed, with the partial exception of Tajikistan, to resist the allure of Iranian-style radical islam. Once these concerns were resolved relatively satisfactorily, the West and the wider world have tended to focus their energies on other more pressing international issues and have found it hard to focus much attention on the problems and difficulties facing the Central Asian States." 54

In the absence of any major external strategic interest, marginal US interests in Central Asia are - possible economic and commercial gains which can be achieved if the region is politically stable and economically viable

^{54.} Roland Danneruther - "Creating new States in Central Asia" Adelphi Paper (288): March 1994, p. 67.

for the proper investments. Central Asia can provide a market of 52 million people for the United States and Washington can help the states of that region to build a modern economic and technological infrastructure. "The Central Asian region could be a source of attraction for the United States given the immense diposists of natural resources. Uzbekistan has 25% and Kazakhstan has 9% of former USSR's gold reserves. Kazakhstan has the second largest unexploited oil reserves of the former Soviet Union." 55

Technological expertise and hard currency are two important needs of the Central Asian States and given its economic and technological clout in the West, the United States can be of help to these states.

As pointed out by an American Professor in a hearing before the sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, United States:-

"Since inter-ethnic antagonisms and rivalries would be the most likely cause of problems among the republics of Central Asia, the US should be even handed in its dealings with them, offer mediation, promote stability and offer

^{55. &}quot;Confidence building in Central Asia: Strategic Studies, 16 (3) Spring 1994, p. 78.

inducements to the peaceful resolution of disputes. At the same time it should be careful not to become too deeply involved in parochial quarrels, not to interfere in local affairs, except by offering friendly advice, and not to attempt to impose solutions that would help create anti-American feelilngs in countries where none exist at present. Caution and moderation should guide America"s policies in a part of the world which she knows little, and with whose history, language, and traditions she is quite unfamiliar. The US may legitimately expect that those whom it helps should live up to certain minimal standars of civilized behaviour embodied in the various charters, declarations and treaties under the United Nations while one cannot expect. the newly independent Central Asian Republics to provide to their citizens with quarantees of human and political rights equal to those enjoyed by the Swiss or the Dates, one should make it clear that American commitment and support do depend on the treatment a given state affords its citizens." 56

Besides, the activities of Islamic groups in Central Asia against political status quo are also disturbing for the United States. Turkey is being encouraged by the US

^{56.} Firuz Kazemzadeh - "United States Policy Towards Central Asia", op.cit. pp. 49-50.

to play an active role in Central Asia both to act as a bulwork against Islamic force and to promote a secular model of governance.

The West has similarly given most of its attention to the economic situation in Central Asia and has generally received a favourable response. The Central Asian States have been energetic in trying to tempt Western investment. Overcoming their initial suspicions, the leaders of these states have supported the involvement of the World Bank, the IMF and other development agencies kyrgyzstan has led way in economic reform, but Kazakhstan has not been far behind and IMF and World Bank officials remain hopeful that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will eventually step on to the same path.

"Ignoring the reservations of the Muslim and Arab world, Israeli diplomats and businessmen have been welcomed in the Central Asian countries." ⁵⁷ And hence, Israel has been signing several technical assitance agreements, notably in drip-irrigation and bilateral trade agreements.

"Numerous western companies are exploring business opportunities, such as Mercedes Benz and Newmount Mining Corporation of the United States with a \$ 100 million project

^{57.} Shaul Eisenberg - "Investments made by the Israeli entrepreneur", Financial Times, 28 January 1993.

to reclaim gold at the Murantau Gold Mine in Uzbekistan, often claimed as the world's largest deposit. Natural gas and oil are also attracting foreign investments." 58

The west can most realistically hope to influence the politics and attitudes of the central Asian region through support for structural economic and institutional reforme. However, the window of opportunity will not last forever. Donor countries will not indefinitely support disproportionate generosity to the countries of former Soviet Union when the claims from Africa and the rest of the Third World are just as urgent. Within the region itself, Central Asian faith in Western economic help and aid has only a limited time-frame. If the west is popularly perceived to have failed to live up to its poromises on aid and economic support, the attraction of the anti-Western rhetoric of some of Central Asia's neighbours will increase.

Visible support for economic reform is even more vital since the Western record in its policies towards Central Asian security cannot be judged a glittering success. The extension of the CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to the Central Asian states was an ill-conceived move which did little to alleviate the security concerns of Central Asia or its immediate neighbours.

^{58.} Anthony Hyman, "Moving out of Moscow's Orbit the outlook for Central Asia", International Affairs. 69 (2), 1993, p. 301.

"The failure of the United States to contemplate any substantial involvement in the Tajik Civil War, despite requests from a number of Central Asian states, has similarly limited the influence of the West and the international community in the region. Even the mildest criticism of Russian peacekeeping operations appear hypocritical in Moscow when the West is in effect leaving Russia with the sole responsibility for resolving connflicts on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Although UN secretariat has rightly been concerned about its excessive commitments elsewhere, its de facto policy during 1992 of leaving the former Soviet Union out of bounds for peacekeeping operations did send the wrong signals. Even though the political obstacles to large troop contributions will undoubtedly continue to be insurmountable, the sending of smaller missions such as UN military observers, can have significant value." 59

"Japan and Taiwan are also exploring opportunities, while South Korea has been particularly active in Central Asia, largely because of the business initiatives of prosperous entrepreneurs from the ethnic Korean community deported under Stalin and resettled in Kazakhstan and

^{59.} Roland Danneruther - "Creating new states in Central Asias", Adelphi Paper, (288); March 1994, pp. 68-69.

Russia:

As far as Russian role in central Asia is concerned, two important points are taken into account. First, Moscow knows the fact that the newly indpendent central Asian states are still heavily dependent on the Russian economic and military suport. Russian troops are still deployed in Tajikistan to support the secular government of Dushanbe. Second, the Russian speaking population has a sizeable influence on the central Asian Politics. It is true that because of the rise in the activties of Islamic groups, the Russian population feels insecure and 500,000 Russian have fled from the central Asian states (excluding Kazakhsthan). But despite such a situation there is little possibility of total rupture in Russian - central Asian relations. According to the Russian foreign Minister - "Moscow would protect the Russian population and Russia's interest in a tough manner, wherever it is needed and whoever it concerned, even if it be our

^{60.} MIchael Kaser and Santosh Mehrotra - "Central Asian Economies after Independence (London Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992),p. 16.

friends. The treatment of official Russian representatives, servicemen and our compatriots on the territory of any state, be it near or far abroad, is litmus paper on which good neighbourly relations with any state will be based." 61

Iran:

The development of the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with Central Asia present an active neighbour's Earlier, "Iran was presented by the West, Russia and role. the Arab world as the greatest threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian States." 62 This sense of threat was further strengthened by the perceived Iranian moral and material support given to the Islamic groups in Tahjikistan, particularly during the escalation of the crisis in 1992. An icy cold-war atmosphere were reduced to minimum. Iran has a large continous border with Central Asia and is unavoidable geostrategic presence in the region. "Niyazov was the first to realise this and has assiduously developed bilateral economic relations and advanced projects for connecting the Central Asian rail network to Iran and developing a gas pipeline through Iranian territory.

^{61.} News Report, "Kazakhstan Slams Moscow's toughness on allies", in the News Karachi, November 20, 1992.

^{62.} Yaacov Ro'i, "Central Asian riots and disturbances" Central Asian Survey, vol. 10, no. 3, 1991.

Kazakhstan has also been promoting economic cooperation in the Caspean Sea and has viewed Iran as a potential route through which oil from that region might be transported." 63

These represent only cautious openings and opportunities for increasing its influence are not unlimited. Its internal economic problems and its international isolation limit its capabilities to act as a catalyst for Central Asia's economic development. So long as revolutionary Shia regime is in power in Tehran distrust of Iranian intentions will persist within the secular nationalist leadership and generally among the Sunni population of Central Asia." 64

Turkey:

"According to some circles, national circles in Turkey are looking forward to a unified power of 200 million Turks stretching from Balkans to China. Pan-Turkism or Turk Islamic synthesis has always been a force in the Turkish politics."

65 As reported in London Economist, the Turkish state

^{63.} Middle East Economic Digest, 4 Dec. 19 , p. 32.

^{64. &}quot;MEED Special Report on Iran", Middle East Economic Digest, 19 February, 1993.

^{65.} R.S.Akhtar - "Turkey and Central Asian Republics", The Frontier Post, Peshawar, March 5, 1992.

television is operating in all the Central Asian region and caucasus. 10,000 Central Asian students are studying in various Turkish universities and high schools. Turkey also granted one billion dollars of aid and trade credits to various central Asian states and sponsored their membership into the United Nations and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)."

More so, Turkish role in central Asia is not without predictable challenges. As it is pointed - "So far Turkey has been more successful in extending its influence in central Asia, not only because it has appealed to the central Asian Turks, but the west also preferred the Turkish model as a better option for the central Asian nation-building process. However here too, any approaches to a regional unity or a regional cooperation community on the lines of Pan-Turkish concept wiil be confronted with the difficulty of regional complexities and the polyethnic population of Central Asia. Sub-nationalism, regionalism and tribalim may hinder such concept taking proper shape. Tajikistan will not welcome such an idea. Moreover, Uzbek nationalism is the most potent factor in the complex ethnic make-up of Central Asia. There have be numerous fights between the Uzbeks and Kirghis.

^{66.} The Economist, December 26 - January 8, 1993, p. 45.

Uzbeks also fought Turks in the recent past, Besides, Pan-Turkish itself has enough potential to assume an Islamic character. Apart from major divisions between Turks versus Iranian ethnic and cultural background, a potential fault line exists along nomadic versus settled people, urban versus rural, mountainous versus valley, and so on and so forth. **67

Afghistan:

As a reason that "Afghanistan also borders Central Asia, its disintegration over the ten years of Civil War and the worrying precedents this has set for the fragile internal constitution of the Central Asian States has been a source of acute anxiety in this region." 68

The political ascendance of Afghan groups who openly espoused the export of jihad and the simultaneous prominence of Islamic groups in Tajikistan were not viewed as entirely coincidental. The vigorous arms trade across the Afghan-Tajik border, reports of fundamentalist training camps in northern Afghanistan and rumours of Afghan mujaheddin participating in the Tajik fighting, only confirmed the worst

^{67.} P. Stobdan "International Aspect of Conflict Situation in Central Asia", London Observer, reproduced in Dawn Karachi, March 14, 1993.

^{68.} Adelphi Paper (288), March 1994, p. 65.

fears of the spread of instability from Afthanistan into Central Asia.

"Support for the Tajik opposition groups has indisputably been flowing from Afghanistan. Arms were traded in large quantities and Afghanistan has acted as a base for the opposition forces to regroup and open new offenses. The 80,000 Tajik refugees who fled into Afghanistan have been a source of recruits for Islamist militias who have been given sanctuary by local Afghan leaders." The opening of an office for the Saudi-based World Muslim League in Kunduz indicates that external financial support is being given to Islamic groups to continue the guerilla war in Tajikistan. There are suggestions that some 3-5,000 members of the IRP are undergoing military training by Afghan Mujaheddin, supported by Arab and Pakistani islamists."

The degree of influence emanating from Afghanistan into Central Asia is more than matched by the influence flowing the other direction. "Uzbekistan, and to a lesser degree

^{69.} Firuz Kazemzadeh, "United States Policy Toward Central Asia", op cit. pp. 49 - 50.

^{70.} News Report, "Kazakhstan slams Moscow's allies" in the News Karachi, November 25, 1993.

Turkmenistan, have developed a good working relationship with Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek Warlord controlling all north-west Afghanistan west of Mazar-e-Sharif. Dostum has been the main conduit through which Uzbekistan, Russia and the other Central Asian states have sought to secure their interest in Afghanistan." More controversially, Karimov has toughness on described the Uzbek population as his brothers and noted that he cannot be indifferent to their fate." To

Pakistan:

Considering the local and international scenario, it is clear that the independence of Central Asian republics has come at a crucial time both for Pakistan and these republics. The historical connection between Pakistan and Central Asian states extends so far into their past "that there is evidence of overland routes, long before the urban settlements of the Indus Valley civilization at Harappa and Mohenjodaro that are 5000 years old." In the vast belt of the Asian heartland extending from Central to West and South Asia, the of one

^{71. &}quot;Persian Speaking Countries Forum Fermed", The Frontier Post, Peshawar, February 20, 1992.

^{72.} Iran to help Central Asian Muslims", op cit.

^{73.} Dani A.H. - "Newlight on Central Asia" Sange - Meel Publication, Lahore, 1993, p. 24.

cultural standard was possible because ree movements of people and brisk trade, that ng the constituent states, in spite of wars and conflicts. 74

Meanwhile, the Russians expressed concern at the rapidly increasing influence of Iran and Pakistan. "The Russians realised, as commented by the Russian government daily Rossikaya Gazette, that' on the one hand, Iran was trying to push Russia out of the region, on the other hand, Pakistan was trying to set up a anti-India aliance with the help of the Central Asian republics. The paper further commented that Pakistan also intended to use its nuclear knowhow for its military programmes It was in the Askhabad Meeting on 11 May, 1992 that the newly independent republics - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghyzstan and Turkmenistan, joined hands with Iran and Turkey in supporting Pakistan's stand on Kashmir."

However, "the underlying organic link may have its roots in islam, but it is necessary to realise that the religious resurgence in Central Asia is of "Cultural" Islam, not of "ideological" Islam. The present power elite in the

^{74.} ibid., p. 44.

^{75.} P. Stobdan - "Central Asian Regional Security", Strategic Analysis, August, 1992, p. 476.

region is headed by secular minded leaders, with close link to Moscow, who are fearful of fundamentalism."⁷⁶ Their mistrust of Iran on account of the rhetoric of its Islamic regime, makes most of them inclined to favour Pakistan as the outlet to the Arabian Sea. There has also been significant change so far as the interaction of this region with South Asian countries is concerned."⁷⁷ Still Pakistan has to adopt an approach; most suitable to the Central Asian region - economic diplomacy as well as cultural diplomacy, keeping in mind the international changes.

China:

The fear that the independence of the Central Asian States might be just as much a threat as an opportunity is also felt in China. Also, the interests of China, which has common borders with three Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan are both political and economic. It has led to concerns over the potential destabilising effect of independence on China's own Central Asian imperial appendage in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. "China's Muslim Turkic minorities, who are mainly to be found in Xinjiang, include around 7 million Uighurs, 1 million Kazakhs and 150,000 Kyrgyz. Ethnic unrest in Xinjiang has 76. Annice Mahmood - "Collapse of the Soviet Union and its implication for Central Asia" Strategies. 16(3), spring 1994, p. 35.

^{77.} ibid.

occurred periodically, such as in April 1990 and early 1992, and the ;Chinese authorities resorted to force to repress these demonstrations." The prospect of further instability spreading from the newly emergent state of Central Asia into Xinjiang or even inner Mongolia has been an unwelcome development. The activity of a Free Uighurstan Party in Kazakhstsan and Kyrghizstan has increased these fears."

At its juxtapose, China, given its size and nuclear status, its unreconstructed imperial pretensions and its traditional historical claims on the region, represents a threat far exceeding that of Iran. "Particularly amongst the Kazaks and Kyrgiz, the fear of China borders on paranoic. was one of the main factors which led Nazarbaev to consider retaining his nuclear arsenals."80 Amongst the Kyrgyz, every disaster is routinely blamed on the Chinese. The series of earthquakes in April 1992 in Southern Kyrghizstan were popularly believed to have been deliberately caused by a nuclear test Nor." in Lop

^{78.} J. Richard Walsh - "China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia", Asian Survey, Vol. 33 (3), March 1993, p. 274.

^{79.} Nezavisimaya Gazetta, 29 July, 1992.

^{80.} Michael Dobbs - "Kazakh sets conditions on A- Arms" Washington Post, 6 May, 1992.

^{81.} Middle Asia: Reference Materials - History, Politics, Economics (Moscow: Institute gumanitarno-politchekykh issledovanii, 1992), p. 58.

However, China as well as the Central Asian republics are trying to overcome their mutual misunderstandings in view of the changing world order. Both are intended towards the market economy. Rail link between Urumchi and Alma Ata has been expanded. "In the first nine months of 1992, it was reported that Chinese goods represented 56% of Kazakhstan's imports and overall trade reached \$ 1.2 bn." 82

Any assessment of China's future role in Central Asia revolves round two things - (i) China's internal sociopolitical conditions and degree of conformity in political and economic liberalisation and (ii) the future relationship between Russia and China, if it were to deteriorate, the resultant of this power struggle will be unfortunate for the Central Asian region.

Nevertheless, according to one Western analyst, "Beijing fears the influence of militant Islam, inspired by Iran and Pakistan, but appears to be even more concerned over Turkish backing for the concept of a Greater Turkistan." 83

INDIA:

"From the decades of its close relations with the former Soviet Union, India has inherited established contacts as well as markets for its goods. Lacking a common border,

^{82.} Russian TV, 10 November 1993 in SWB SU/1845 G/1.

^{83.} Lillian Craig Harris - "China considers the Middle East. I.B. Taurie, London 1993, p. 269.

India would look for trade routes that would keep its exports competitive. It is playing on the concern of the current central Asian leadership over the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to seek preferred access to what it considers to be its traditional markets. After all, despite the setback to its standing in the region, India has considerable assets to pursue the goals of developing commercial and cultural cooperations with the newly independent republics."84

As soon as the republics became indpendent, Turkey made it known that Istanbul was replacing Moscow as the hub of Central Asia. However, these countries did not get out of the Russian grip to subserve to Turkey. Even, they do not like the over-weaning Turks. This attitude makes their own region more accessable to Indians. Indians rely mainly on two issues to approach the Central Asian region. Those are - (i) cultural and traditional historicity of Indian -Central Asian relationship; and (ii) India provides a secular and democratic form of government with a belief in the market economy, which is the need of the hour for Central Asian States.

India, therefore, has good ground on which to build political relations committed to secular politics both

^{84.} Roland Danneruther - "Creating new states in Central Asia" Adelphi Papers (288), March 1994, p. 32.

domestically and internationally. "Pakistan's attempt to mobilise Islamic sentiment there, with its patently non-religious state interests in Kashmir, is likely to have the limited impact of securing resolutions in certain Islamic meetings, but probably little more with the exception of Tajikistan at present. The other Central Asian States need to promote a secular Islam to attract Turkey and to reassure America and Russia. India will be beneficiary and should work towards this with confidence and energy." 85

Keeping in view the above possibilities, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Narashima Rao, pulled off a successful visit to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 23-26 May 1993, even as Western and Islamic influences buffetted the two former Soviet republics. Rao and Karimov (the Uzbekistan's President) expressed apprehensions about rising radicalism and cross-border terrorism. According to the trade and cooperation treaty, Uzbekistan will enjoy a most favoured nation (MFN) status with regard to India. Besides signing treaties on peace and cooperation, "India released credit worth \$ 10 million to Uzbekistan for importing Indian goods and services." ⁸⁶ Besides positive responses in economic

^{85.} Madhavan K. Palat - "India and Central Asia", World Focus, 1993, p. 25.

^{86.} N.V. Subramanian - "Coping with Change", Sunday, 6 - 12 June 1993, p. 10, ibid. p. 11.

arena, "Nazarbaev (Kazakhistan's president) backed India's position that the issue had to be settled within the ambit of Shimla Agreement."

In nutshell, "the best option to prevent the possibility of conflict escalation in the newly independent Central Asian states is to adopt Confidence Building Measures at military and non military levels. Theoretically, CBMs would lead to the gradual resolution of conflicts." ⁸⁷ There is an urgent need to establish mutual trust among the Central Asian countries as well as among the global community, particularly by promoting interactions and establishing close economic, trade and socio-cultural ties.

^{87.} The Economist, December 26 - January 8th, 1993, p. 45.

CHAPTER - 5

CONCLUSION

From the facts, figures and inferences discussed in earlier chapters, one can conclude that although the cold war has largely ended in Europe and led to the lessening of puzzled tensions elsewhere, a global crisis remains unresolved when national and international sicurity issues are evaluated from a planetary and long term perspective. More so, the declaration of the democratic global civil society by George Bush in his 'New World Order' and the proclamation of victory in the cold war, may be politically satisfying in some circles but they are no substitute for analysis. The Americans with their economic and military advances have been trying continuously for the dominance over the world affairs, be it Gulf-crisis or for that mater at any international forum. It attracts particularly more investigations when they ignore events in the Third World. Increasing poverty, environmental neglect and military spendings as earlier mentioned numerous armed conflicts within and between states, are among the signs that global insecurity is deepening.

What concerns more regarding the regional responses, is of diversifying nature. While European Union, NAFTA, SAPTA, ECO, ASEAN etc., are thriving for more economic adherence at

their level best, the regions like South Asia and the Central Asian Republics are in search for stability. In the light of discussions in chapter four, one can say that while South Asian Countries (India and Pakistan) are in race for regional dominance over each other under the veil of SAARC platform, the Central Asian States have been throbbing with the two choices - (i) to restore its historical roots, or (ii) to go more west. Definitely, both the regions are in disorder in response to the declaration of the new world order.

Convincingly, in spite of progress of civilization and advances in science and technology, the basic instincts and innovations of man has not really changed much from that of their ancestors. Scinece, civilization and progress have not been able to change and improve human nature and mentality. The search for peace in terms of "security" could well be said in the words of Shakespeare -- "And you all know security is mortals' chiefest enemy". Nevertheless, mankind has to be in self-relations as what Jean-Jacques Roussean mentions in his "The Social Contract" -- "The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying "This is mine", and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and

misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, 'Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody'. "

Really, people in the different corners of the earth have found many changes in the world system such as the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the conclusion of the 1990 CFE treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the end of the Warsaw Pact as an operational body, the unification of Germany, the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait by an alliance acting with the authorization of the United Nations, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These changes seemed highly improbable in the 80s of this century, and even before it since the establishment of cold war institutions. Familiar compass-points have disappeared. Not only the facts have changed, but also that existing interpretations of the international system are challenged. There is a prevalent sense that we are living in a time which is fundamentally different from all defined past eras.

"The world of the 1990s and beyond is fundamentally different from anything in our cultural memory of international relations. No "power" has the power to

undertake on its own responsibility "to make the world safe for diversity. It is already apparent that a nobody-in-charge world will be more volatile and more crisis - prone than the potentially fatal yet crisis eerily stable confrontation of nuclear - tipped superpowers glaring at each other from their hardened silos."

Almost every part of the world is in the hope for a prosperous and healthy future. But the condition of the nations of "small brother" status are presently in more confusing state, for example - in Africa, tribal hatreds are still at boiling point in the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Liberia; In the Middle East and around the Persian Gulf,. arguments about procedures for peace veil renewed preparations for war; Indians and Pakistanis are still wondering about how to settle the Kashmir issue; in Afghanistan, the pullback of the superpowers has merely "Afghanized" the conflict; Yogoslavia is still in turmoil: the republics of former Soviet Union are more anxious in dealing with their domestic upheavals than to think on international peace; shining path guerillas in Peru, drug dealers Peru masquerading as freedom fighters, criminals dressed up like bankers - there is no end to the trouble in near future.

Harlen Cleveland - "Birth of a New World foreword by Robert McNamara. Jossey-Bass Publishers - San Francisco, 1993. p. 78.

Nevertheless, one commonly finds good reasons to think that the forms of geoppolitical conflict with which the cold war has made us familiar are indeed withering away. The "common market culture" running through post-cold war era will sustain a modern form of perpetual peace. The structural basis underpinning the transformations is "the primarcy of politics" and "the primacy of economics'. The two primary objectives, to be in a peaceful and prosperous new world order, can be achieved through bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

The stability at home will ensure the peace at global front. Hence all the domestic conflicts are to be resolved through democratic opinions and values with utmost human dignity.

Arms production `ad infinitum' in the face of one of the key lessons emerging from the cold war period: the production, maintenance, and disposal of huge quantitities of arms incur significant environmental damage and immense financial costs. Governments and their arms contractors have hardly begun to come to grips with legacy of 50 years of "Peace through strength". Enormous amounts of military generated hazardous waste need to be detoxified and dispossed of, countless sites with heavy contamination of soil and

water await cleanup and rehabilitation, and mountains of obsolete and surplus weapons need to be dismantled in a democratically acceptable manner by the global community.

The challenge of living substantially on the earth will never be met, however, if population and environment conference are the only forums in which it is addressed. Success hinges on the creativity and energy of a wide range of people in many walks of life. The scientists' Warning to Humanity ends with a call to the world's scientists, business and industry leaders, the religious community, and people enverywhere to join in the urgent missions of halting the earth's environmental decline. But one can opine that everyone is aboard the same ship. The Plimsoll line carries the same meaning for all. And time appears short to accomplish the challenging task of lightening the human load.

Besides, if recent history can prove anything it proves that North-South divide - if not the only real thing - at least the most perennial one. However, one cannot deny it's nature of resilience and selience. Hopefully, it will see its salience attentuation, if not its resolution.

Further, with the erosion of the values of war peace - intensive development strategies will be carried on in the

developed as well as in the developing countries with different manifestations, for example - peace movement, the environmental movement, the rehabilitation movement, the women's liberation movement, ethnic and linguistic movements etc. All such movements share a fundamental critique of 'mainstream development'. These middle class based movements are for obvious reasons much weaker in the Third World. Nevertheless, the process of intermingling of agrarian and industrialized economies will add strength to the new social movements.

In a nutshell, if one is thinking about international politics in the light of the New World Order, he has always to move round an evolving `cold be'. The field is indeed characterised by both continuity and change, as N.J. Rengger recently concluded:

"If it is true that the arrival of the millennium has the effect of concentrating people's minds on both what should be preserved from the past and what should be hoped for in the future, then the arrival of this millennium, atleast for students of international relations, might have come none to soon."

N.J.Rengger. 'No Longer "a tournament of distinctive Knights? Systematic transition and the priority of international order', in Mike Bsowker and Robin Brown (eds), From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.169.

APPENDIX - Î

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BUSH VOWS COALITION EFFORT IN GULF WILL SUCCEED (Text: State of the Union address) (4100)

Washington -- President Bush pledged January 29 that the allied coalition's effort in the Persian Gulf region "will succeed," declaring that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's aggression "will not stand."

In his State of the Union address, Bush said Saddam Hussein's "unprovoked invasion" of Kuwait "violated everything the community of nations holds dear. The world has said this aggression would not stand -- and it wil not stand."

Bush said he was heartened that the United States is not being asked to bear alone the financial burden of the struggle to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

"Last year, our friends and allies provided the bulk of the economic costs of Desert Shield, and having now received commitments of over 40,000 million dollars for the first three months of 1991, I am confident they wil do no less as we move through Desert Storm,' Bush said.

The President's address focused on developments in the Persian Gulf, but he also discussed U.S. -Soviet ties, trade relations, the U.S. economy and other domestic issues, including civil rights, anti-crime measures and health care.

Following is the text of the President's address:

(begin text)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, members of the United States Congress. I come to this House of the people, to speak to you and all Americans, certain that we stand at a defining hour.

Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands. We know why we're there. We are Americans: part of something larger than ourselves. For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity.

what is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order -- where diverse nations are drawn together in comon cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children's future.

The community of nations has resolutely gathered to condemn and repel lawless aggression. Saddam Hussein's unprovoked invasion -- his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful neighbour -- violated everything the community of nations holds dear. The world has said this aggression would not stand -- and it will not stand.

Together, we have resisted the trap of appeasement, cynicism, and isolation that gives temptation to tyrants. The world has answered Saddam's invasion with 12 U.N. resolsutions, starting with a demand for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal -- and backed up by forces from 28 countries of six continents. With few exceptions, the world now stands as one.

The end of the Cold War has been a victory for all humanity. A year and a half ago, in Germany, I said our goal was a Europe whole and free. Tonight, Germany is united. Europe has become whole and free -- and America's leadership was instrumental in making it possible.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union is important, not only to us, but to the world. That relationship has helped to shape these and other historic changes. But like many other nations, we have been deeply concerned by the vilence in the Baltics, and we have communicated that concern to the Soviet leadership.

The principle that has guided us is simple: our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union. In our recent discussions with the Soviet leadership, we have been given representations, which, if fulfilled, would result in the withdrawal of some Soviet forces, a reopening of dialogue with the Republics, and a move away from violence.

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We will watch carefully as the situation develops. And we will maintain our contact with the Soviet leadership to encourage continued commitment to democratization and reform.

If it is possible, I want to continue to build a lasting basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, for a more peaceful future for all mankind.

The triumph of democratic ideas in Eastern Europe and Latin America -- and the continuing struggle for freedom elsewhere around the world -- all confirm the wisdom of our nation's founders.

Tonight, we work to achieve another victory -- a victory over tyranny, and savage aggression.

We in this union enter the last decade of the 20th century thankful for our blessings, steadfast in our purpose, aware of our difficulties, and responsive to our duties at home and around the world.

For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and requires sacrifice.

But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us.

We are Americans: We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do -- fredom works.

The conviction and courage we see in the Persian Gulf today is simply the American charcter in action. The indomitable spirit that is contributing to this victory for world peace and justice is the same spirit that gives us the power and the potential to met our toughest challenges at home.

We are resolute and resourceful. If we can selflessly confront evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be.

If anyone tells you America's best days are behind her, they're looking the wrong way.

Tonight, I come before this House, and the American people, with an appear for renewal. This is not merely a call for new government initiatives, it is a call for new initiative in government, in our communities, and from every American — to prepare for the next American century.

America has always led by example. So who among us will set this example? Which of our citizens will lead us in this next American century? Everyone who steps forward today, to get one addict off drugs. To convince one troubled teenager not to give up on life...to comfort one AIDS patient...to help one hungry child.

We have within our reach the promise of a renewed America. We can find meaning and reward by serving some purpose higher than ourselves -- a shining purpose, the illumination of a thousand points of light. It is expressed by all who know the irresistible force of a child's hand, of a friend who stands by you and stays there -- a volunteer's generous gesture, an idea that is simply right.

The problems before us may be different, but the key to solving them remains the same: it is the individual -- the individual who steps forward. And the state of our union is the union of each of us, one to the other: the sum of our friendships, marriages, families, and communities.

We all have something to give. So if you know how to read, find someone who can't. If you've got a hummer, find a nail. If you're not hungry, not lonely, not in trouble -- seek our someone who is.

Join the community of conscience. Do the hard work of freedom. That will define the state of our union.

Since the birth of our nation, "We the people" has been the source of our strength. What government can do alone is limited -- but the potential of the American people knows no limits.

We are a nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed idealism. We are Americans: We are the nation that believes in the future. We are the nation that can shape the future.

And we've begun to do just that -- by strengthening the power and choice of individuals and families.

Together, these last two years, we've put dollars for child care directly in the hands of parents, instead of bureaucracies. Unshackled the potential of Americans with disabilities. Applied the creativity of the marketplace in the service of the environment, for clean air. And made homeownership possible for more Americans.

The strength of a democracy is not in bureaucracy. It is in the people and their communities. In everything we do, let us unleash the potential of our most precious resource -- our citizens. ?We must return to families, comunities, counties, cities, states, and institutions of evedry kind the power to chart their own destiny, and the freedom and opportunity proviced by strong economic growth. That's what America is all about.

I know, tonight, in some regions of our country, people adre in genuine economic distress. I hear them.

Earlier this month, Kathy Blackwell of Massachusetts wrote me about what can happen when the economy slows down, saying "My heart is aching, and I think that you should know -- your people out here are hurting badly."

I understand. And I'm not unrealistic about the future. But there are reasons to be optimistic about our economy.

First, we don't have to fight double-digit inflation. Second, most industries won't have to make big cuts in production, because they don't have big inventories piled up. And third, our exports are running solid and strong. In fact, American businesses are exporting at a record rate.

So let's put these times in perspective. Together, since 1981, we've created almost 20 million jobs, cut inflation in half, and cut interest rates in half.

Yes, the largest peacetime economic expansion in history has been temporarily interrupted. But our economy is still over twice as large as our closest competitor.

We will get this recession behind us, and return to growth --soon. We will get on our way to a new record of expansion and achieve the competitive strength that will carry us into the next American century.

We should focus our efforts today on encouraging economic growth, investing in the future, and giving power and opportunity to the individual.

We must begin with control of federal spending. That's why I'm submitting a budget that holds the growth in spending to less than the rate of inflation. And that's why, amid all the sound and fury of last year's budget debate, we put into law new, enforceable spending caps -- so that future spending debates will mean a battle of ideas, not a bidding war.

Though controversial, the budget agreement finally put the federal government on a pay-as-you-go plan -- and cut the growth of debt by nearly 500,000 million dollars. And that frees funds for saving and job-creating investment.

Now, let's do more. My budget again includes tax-free family savings accounts; penalty-free withdrawals from IRA's for first-time home-buyers; and, to increase jobs and growth, a reduced tax for long-term capital gains.

I know there are differences among us about the impact and the effects of a capital gains incentive. So tonight, I am asking the congressional leaders and the Federal Reserve to cooperate with us in a study -- led by Chairman Alan Greenspan -- to sort out our technical differences so that we can avoid a return to unproductive partisan bickering.

But just as our efforts will bring economic growth now, and in the future, they must also be matched by long-term investments for the next American century.

That requires a forward-looking plan of action -- and that's exactly what we will be sending to the Congress. We have prepared a detailed series of proposals that include:

- A budget that promotes investment in America's future -- in children, education, infrastructure, space, and high technology.
- -Legislation to achieve excellence in education -- building on the partnership forged with the 50 governors at the education summit -- enabling parents to choose their children's schools -- and helping to make America No. 1 in math and science.
- -- A blueprint for a new national highway system a critical investment in our transportation infrastructure.
- -- A research and development agenda that includes record levels of federal investment and a permanent tax credit to strengthen private R and D and create jobs.

- -- A comprehensive national energy strategy that calls for energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, and greater use of alternative fuels.
- -- A banking reform plan to bring America's financial system into the 21st century -- so that our banks remain safe and secure and can continue to make job-creating loans for our factories, businesses and home-buyers. I do think there has been to much pessimism. Sound banks should be making more sound loans, now -- and interest rates should be lower, now.

In addition to these proposals, we must recognize that our economic strength depends upon being comeptitive in world markets. We must continue to exapand America's exports. A successful Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations will create more real jobs and more real growth -- for all nations. You and I know that if the playing field is level, America's workers and farmers can out-work and out-produce anyone, anytime, anywhere.

And with a Mexican Free Trade Agreement, and our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, we can help our partners strengthen their economies and move toward a free trade zone throughout this entire hemisphere.

The budget also includes a plan of action right here at home to put more power and opportunity in the hands of the individual. That means new incentives to create jobs in our inner cities, by encouraging investment through enterprise zones. It also means tenant control and ownership of public housing. Freedom and the power to choose should not be the privilege of wealth. They are the birthright of every American.

Civil rights are also crucial to protecting equal opportunity. Everyone of us has a responsibility to speak out against racism, bigotry, and hate. We will continue our vigorous enforcement of existing statutes, and I will once again press the Congress to strengthen the laws against employment discrimination without resorting to the use of unfair preferences.

We're determined to protect another fundamental civil right freedom from crime and the fear that stalks our cities. The
attorney general will soon convene a crime sumit of our
nation's law enforcement officials. And to help us support
them, we need tough crime control legislation, and we need it
now.

As we fight crime, we will fully implement our National Strategy for Combatting Drug Abuse. Recent data show we are making progress, but much remains to be done. We will not rest until the day of the dealer is over, forever.

Good health care is every American's right and every American's responsibility. So we are proposing an aggressive program of new prevention initiatives -- for infants, for children, for adults, and for the elderly -- to promote a healthier America and to help keep costs from spiralling.

It's time to give people more choice in government, by reviving the ideal of the citizen politician who comes not to stay, but to serve. One of the reasons there is so much support for term limitations is that the American people are increasingly concerned about big-money influence in politics. We must look beyond the next election, to the next generation. The time has come to put the national interest above the special interest -- and totally eliminate Political Action Committees.

That would truly put more competition in elections, and more power in the hands of individuals. And where power cannot be put directly in the hands of the individual, it should be moved closer to the people -- away from Washington.

The federal government too often treats government programs as if they are of Washington, by Washington, and for Washington. Once established, federal programs seem to become immortal.

It's time for a more dcynamic program life cycle: Some programs should increase. Some should decrease. Some should be terminated. And some should be consolidated and turned over to the states.

My budget includes a list of programs for potential turnover totalling more than 20,000 million dollars. Working with Congress and the Governors, I propose we select at least 15,000 million dollars in such programs and turn them over to the states in a single consolidated grant -- fully funded -- for flexible management by the states.

The value of this turn-over approach is straightforward. It allows the federal government to reduce overhead. It alows states to manage more flexibly and more efficiently. It moves power and decision-making closer to the people. And it reinforces a theme of this administration: appreciation and encouragement of the innovative power of "States as Laboratories."

This nation was founded by leaders who understood that power belongs in the hands of people. They planned for the future. And so much we -- here and around the world.

As Americans, we know there are times when we must step forward and accept our responsibility to lead the world away from the dark chaos of dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day.

Almost 50 years ago we began a long struggle against aggressive totalitarianism. Now we face another defining hour for America and the world.

There is no one more devoted, more committed to the hard work of freedom, than every soldier and sailor, every marine, airman, and coastguardsman -- every man and woman now serving in the Persian Gulf.

Each of them has volunteered to provide for this nation's defense -- and now they bravely struggle, to earn for America, for the world, and for future generations, a just and lasting peace.

Our commitment to them must be the equal of their commitment to their country. They are truly America's finest.

The war in the Gulf is not a war we wanted. We worked hard to avoid war. For more than five months we, alongwith the Arab League, the European Community, and the United Nations, tried every diplomatic avenue. Un Secretary General Perez de Cuellar; Presidents Gorbachev, Mitterand, Ozal, Mubarak, and Bendjedid; Kings Fahd and Hassan; Prime Ministers Major and Andreotti -- just to name a few -- all worked for a solution. But time and again, Saddam Hussein flatly rejected the path of diplomacy and peace.

The world well knows how this conflict began and when: It began on August 2, when Saddam invaded and sacked a small, defenseless neighbor. And I am certain of how it will end. So that peace can prevail, we will prevail.

Tonight, I'm pleased to repdort that we are on course. Iraq's capacity to sustain war is being destroyed. Our investment, our training, our planning -- all are paying off. Time will not be Sadam's salvation.

Our purpose in the Persian Gulf remains constant: to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, to restore Kuwait's legitimate government, and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region.

Let me make clear what I mean by the region's stability and security. We do not sdeek the destruction of Iraq, its culture, or its people. Rather, we seek an Iraq that uses its greater resources, not to destroy, not to serve the ambitions of a tyrant, but to build a better life for itself and its neighbors. We seek a Persian Gulf where conflict is no longer the rule, where the strong are neither tempted nor able to intimidate the weak.

Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to stop Saddam now, not later. They know this brutal dictator will do anything; will juse any weapon; will commit any outrage, no matter how many innocents must suffer.

They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression. They know that we need to build a new, enduring peace -- based not on arms races and confrontation, but on shared principles and the rule of law.

And we all realize that our responsibility to be the catalyst for peace in the region does not end with the successful conclusion of this war.

And we all realize that our responsibility to be the catalyst for peace in the region does ndot end with the successful conclusion of this war.

Democracy brings the undeniable value of thoughtful dissent - and we have heard some dissenting voices here at home -some reckless, most responsible. But the fact that all
voices have the right to speak out is one of the reasons
we've been united in purpose and principle for 200 years.

Our progres in this great struggle is the result of years of vigilance, and a steadfast commitment to a strong defense. Now, with remarkable technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians.

Looking forward, I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes -- whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies.

The quality of American technology, thanks to the American worker, has enabled us to successfully deal with difficult military conditions and help minimize loss of life. We have given our men and women they very best. And they deserve it.

We all have a special place in our hearts for the families of our men and women serving in the Gulf. They are represented here tonight by Mrs. Norman Schwarzkopf. We are very grateful to General Schwarzkopf and to all those serving with him. And to the families, let me say our forces in the Gulf will not stay there one day longer than is necessary to complete their mission.

The courage and success of the RAF pilots -- of the Kuwaiti, Saudi, French, the Canadians, Italians, the pilots of Qatar and Bahrain -- all are proof that for the first time since World War II, the international comunity is united. The leadership of the United Nations, once only a hoped - for ideal, is now confirmsing its founders' vision.

I am heartened that we are not being asked to bear alone the financial burden of this struggle. Last year, our friends and allies provided the bulk of the economic costs of Desert Shield, and having now received commitments of over 40,000 million dollars for the first three months of 1991, I am confident they will do no less as we move through Desert Storm.

But the world has to wonder what the dictator of Iraq is thinking. If he thinks that by targeting innocent civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia, that he will gain advantage -- he is dead wrong. If he thinks that he will advance his cause through tragic and despicable environmental terrorism -- he is dead wrong. And if he thinks that by abusing the coaliktion POWs, he will benefit -- he is dead wrong.

We will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression.

The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order -- where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggreession will meet collective resistance.

Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort. Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the onlym nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace.

This is the burden of leadership -- and the strength that has made America the beacon of fredom in a searching world.

This nation has never found glory in war. Our people have never wanted to abandon the blessings of home and work, for distant lands and deadly conflict. If we fight in anger, it is only because we have to fight at all. And all of us yearn for a world where we will never have to fight again.

Each of us will measure, within ourselves, the value of this great struggle. Any cost in lives is beyond our power to measure. But the cost of closing our eyes to aggression is beyond mankind's power to imagine.

This we do know: our cause is moral. Our cause is right.

Let future generations understand the burden and the blessings of freedom. Let them say, we stood where duty required us to stand.

Let them know that together, we affirmed America, and the world, as a community of fonscience.

The winds of change are with us now. The forces of freedom are united. We move toward the next century, more confident than ever that we have the will at home and abroad to do what must be done -- the hard work of freedom.

May God bless the United States of America.

(end text)

APENDIX - II

File Date/ID: 04/15/91 TX-104

Text Link: 180231

Text:

*TXT104 04/15/91

GULF WAR WAS FIRST TEST FOR NEW WORLD ORDER, BUSH SAYS (Text: April 13 Maxwell Air Force Base speech) (2400)

Montgomery, Alabama -- The "new world order" made possible by the end of the Cold War got "its first real test" in the Persian Gulf War, when a coalition of nations from all over the world "joined together to stop aggression," says President Bush.

"For the first time, a regional conflict -- the aggression against Kuwait -- did not serve as a proxy for superpower confrontation," Bush told the Maxwell Air Force Base War College April 13.

"For the first time, the United Nations Security Council, free from the clash of Cold War ideologies, Functioned as its designers intgended -- a force for conflict resolution is colective security."

Bush also made these points in his speech, which was billed as the first in a series concerning the new world order:

- -- "The Cold War's end didn't deliver us into an era of perpetual peace The quest for the new world order is, in part, a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay."
- -- The international community will now further guarantee in the gulf that Saddam Hussein's "ability to threaten his neighbors is completely eliminated by destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction."
- -- "The nations of Eastern Europe, for so long the other Europe, must take their place now alongside their neighbors to the west we must help to ease crossover from poverty into prosperity."
- -- U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is to continue to build a coperative relationship but also support a reform process aimed at political and economic freedom.

Following is the text of Bush's speech, except for introductory remarks:

(begin text)

For more than four decades, America's energies were focused on containing the threat to the free world from the forces of communism. That war is over. East Gdermany has vanished from the map as a separate entity. Today in Berlin, the wall that once divided a continent, divided a world in two, has been pulverized, turned into souvenirs. And the

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sections that remain standing are but museum pieces. The Warsaw Pact passed into the pages of history last week. Not with a bang, but with a whimper -- it's demise repdorted in a story reported on page A16 of the Washington Post.

In the coming weeks, I'll be talking in some detail about the possibility of a New World Order emerging after the Cold War. And in recent weeks, I've been focusing not only on the Gulf, but on free trade -- on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, and the essentiality of obtaining from the U.S. Congress a renewal of fast-tract authority to achieve our goals. But today I want to discuss another aspect of that order -- our relations with Europe and the Soviet Union.

Twice this century, a dream borne on the battlefields of Europe died after the shooting stopped. The dream of a world in which major powers worked together to ensure peace; to settle their disputes through cooperation, not confrontation. Today a transformed Europe stands closer than ever before to its free and democratic destiny. At long last, Europe is movisng forward, moving toward a new world of hope.

At the same time, we and our European allies have moved beyond containment to a policy of active engagement in a world no longer driven by Cold War tensions and animosities. You see, as the Cold War drew to an end we saw the possibilities of a new order in which nations worked together to promote peace and prosperity. I'm not talking here of a blueprint that will govern the conduct of nations or some supernatural structure or institution. The new world order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or

forfeiting our interests. It really describes a responsibility imposed by our success. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace.

It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of Principles that undergird our relations. Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.

This order, this ability to work together got its first real test in the Gulf War. For the first time, a regional conflict -- the aggression against Kuwait -- did not serve as a proxy for superpower confrontation. For the first time, the U.N. Security Council, free from the clash of Cold War ideologies, functioned as its designers intended -- a force for conflict resolution and collective security.

In the Gulf, nations from Europe and North America, Asia and Africa and the Arab world joined together to stop

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aggression, and sent a signal to would-be tyrants everywhere in the world. By joining forces to defend one everywhere in the world. By joining forces to defendone small nation, we showed that we could work together against aggressors in defense of principle.

We also recognized that the Cold War's end didn't deliver us into an era of perpetual peace. As old threats recede, new threats emerge. The quest for the new world order is, in part, a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay.

Today, thank God, Kuwait is free. But turmoil in that tormented region of the world continues. Sadam's continued savagery has placed his regime outside the international order. We will not interfere in Iraq's civil war. Iraqi people must decide their own political future.

Looking out here at you and thinking of your families, let me comment a little further. We set our objectives. These objectives, sanctioned by international law, have been achieved. I made very clear that when our objectives were

obtained that our troops would be coming home. And, yes, we want the suffering of those frefuees to stop, and in keeping with our nation's compassion and concern, we are massively helping. But, yes, I want our troops out of Iraq and back home as soon as possible.

Internal conflicts have been raging in Iraq for many years. And we're helping out, and we're going to continue to help these refugees. But I do not want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq that's been going on for ages. And I'm not going to have that.

I know the coalition's historic effort destroyed Saddam's ability to undertake aggression against any neighbor. You did that job. But now the international community will further guarantee that Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors is completely eliminated by destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

And as I just mentioned, we will continue to help the Iraqi refugees, the hundreds and thousands of victims of this man's -- Saddam Hussein's -- brutality. See food and shelter and safetyu and the oportunity to return unharmed to their homes. We wiull not tolerate any intereference in this massive international relief effort. Iraq can return to the community of nations only when its leaders abandon the brutality and repression that is destroying their country. With Saddam in power, Iraq will remain a pariah nation, its people denied moral context with most of the outside world.

We must build on the success of Desert Storm to give new shape and momentum to this new world order, to use force wisely and extend the hand of compassion wherever we can. Today, we welcome Europe's willingness to shoulder a large

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share of this responsibility. This new sense of responsibility on the part of our European alies is most evident and most critical in Europe's Eastern half.

The nations of Eastern Europe, for so long the other Europe, must take their place now alongside their neighbors to the West. Just as we've overcome Europe's political division, we must help to ease crossover from poverty into prosperity.

The United States will do its part -- we always have. As we have already in reducing Poland's official debt burden to the United States by 70 percent; increasing our assistance this year to Eastern Europe by 50 percent. But the key to helping these new democracies develop is trade and investment.

The new entrepreneurs of Czechoslovakia and Poland and Hungary aren't looking to government, their own or others, to shower them with riches. They're looking for new opportunities, a new freeedom for the productive genius strangled by 40 years of state control.

Yesterday, my esteemed friend, a man we all honor and salute, President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia called me up. He wanted to request advice and help from the West. He faces enormous problems. You see, Czechoslovakia wants to be democratic. This man is leading them towards perfecting their fledgling democracy. Its economy is movisng from a failed socialist model to a market economy. We all must help. It's not easy to convert state-owned and operated weapons plants into market-driven plants to produce consumer goods. But these new democracies can do just exactly that with the proper advice and help from the West.

It is in our interest, it is in the idnterest of the United States of America, that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary strengthen those fledgling democracies and strengthen their fledgling market economies.

We recognize that new roles and even new institutions are natural outgrowths of the new Europe. Whether it's the European Community or a broadened mandate for the XCSCE, the United States suports all efforts to forge a European approach to common challenges on the continent and in the world beyond, with the understanding that Europe's long-term security is intertwined with America's and that NATO remains the best means to assure it.

And swe look to Europe to act as a force for stability outside its own borders. In a world as interdependent as ours, no industrialized nation can maintain membership in good standing in the global community without assuming its fair share of responsibility for peace and security.

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But even in the face of such welcome change, Americans will remain in Europe in support of history's most successful remain in Europe in suport of history's most successful alliance -- NATO. America's commitment is the best guarantee of a secure Europe, and a secure Europe is vital to American interests and vital to world peace. This is the essential logic of the Atlantic Aliance which anchors America in Europe.

This century's history shows that America;'s destiny and interests cannot be separate from Europe's. Through the long years of Cold War and conflict, the United States stood fast for freedom in Europe. And now, as Eastern Europe is opening up to democratic ideals, true progress becomes possible.

The Soviet Union is engaged in its own dramatic transformation. The policies of confrontation abroad, liker the discredited dogma of communism from which those policies sprang, lies dormant, if not mortally wounded. Much has changed. The path of international cooperation forstered by President Gorbachev and manifested most clearly in the Persian Gulf marks a radical change in Soviet behavior. And yet, the course of change within the Soviet Union is far less clear.

Economic and political reform there is under severe challenge. Soviet citizens, facing the collapse of the old order while the new still struggles to be born, confront desperate economic conditions; their hard-won freedoms imperil. Ancient ethnic enmities, conflict between republics and between republics and the central govdernment add to these monumental challenges that they face.

America's policy toward the Soviet Union in these troubled times is, first and foremost, to continue our efforts to build the cooperativde relationship that has allowed our nations and so many others to strengthen international peace and stability. At the same time, we will continue to support a reform process within the Soviet Union aimed at political and economic freedom. A process we believe must be built on peaceful dialogue and negotiation. This is a policy that we will advocate steadfastly, both in our discussions with the central Soviet government and all elements active in Soviet political life.

Let there be no misunderstanding, the path ahead for the Soviet Union will be difficult and, at times, extraordinarily painful. History weighs heavily on all the peoples of the USSR -- liberation from 70 years of communism, from a thousand years of autocracy. It's going to be slow. There will be setbacks. But this process of reform, this transformation from within must proceed. If external coperation and our progress toward true international peace is to endure, it must succeed. Only when this transformation is complete will we be able to

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take full measure of the oportunities presented by this new and involving world order.

The new world order really is a tool for addressing a new world of possibilities. This order gains its mission and shape not just from sharped interests, but from shared ideals. And the ideals that has spawned new freedoms throughout the world have received their boldest and cldearest expression in our great country, the United States. Never before has the world looked more to be American example. Never before have so many millions drawn hope from the American idea. And the reason is simple: Unlike any other nation in the world, as Americans, we enjoy profound and mysterious bonds of affection and idealism. We feel our deep connections to community, to families, to our faiths.

But what defines this nation? What makes us America is not our ties to a piece of territory, or bonds of blood. What makes us American is our allegiance to an idea that all people everywhere must be free. This idea is as old and enduring as this nation itself -- as deeply rooted, and what swe are as a promise implicit to all the world in the words of our own Declaration of Independence.

The new world facisng us -- and I wish I were your age -it's a wonderful world of discovery. A world devoted a
unlocking the promise of freedom. It's no more structured
than a dream; no more regimented than an innovator's burst of
inspiration. If we trust ourselves and our values; if we
retain the pioneer's enthusiasm for exploring the world
beyond our shores; if we strive to engage in the world that
beckons us, then and only then, will America be true to all
that is best in us.

May God bless our great nation, the United States of America. And I thank you all for what you have done for freedom and for our fundamental values.

(end text)

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