

RELEVANCE OF NAM FOR INDIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY*

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
DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "RELEVANCE OF NAM FOR INDIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS", submitted by UPENDRA CHOUDHURY in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.Phil) of this University, has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University and is his own work.

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TO MY PARENTS
WITH LOVE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

While fault-finding is an easy task, fact-finding requires a lot of dedication and hard-work. This was the feeling I developed while studying 'The Relevance of NAM for India in the post-Cold War Years'. Honestly speaking, the study looked me stupendous and Herculean from the very beginning but the constant encouragement and consistent guidance of my Supervisor coupled with his liberal attitude made this task easy and comfortable for me. For this, I express my sincere gratitude to Professor A.K. Ray.

The collection of materials for this study was, no doubt, difficult but the cooperation and cordiality extended by the staff of different libraries - Sapru House, Teen Murthy, JNU etc. - did not let me feel it difficult at all. I am very thankful to all of them.

I am also thankful to persons like Dr R.S. Yadav, Allu Bhai, Raghu Bhai, Ratan Bhai, Jitendra, Harbir, Dillip and Sailendra without whose support and encouragement, I would not have finished this work in time.

Finally, I would like to thank Mr Shudh Swaroop for the pains he undertook and the extraordinary enthusiasm he showed to type out my manuscript which was illegible at times.

Now that I am at the end of it all, there is an inescapable feeling welling up inside me: the study could have been bettered.

Upendra Choudhury
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INTRODUCTION

The contemporary validity and the continuing relevance of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) is the theme of many learned discourses today. The discussion takes place in newspaper columns and seminar circuits with leading Indian diplomats joining the fray. While many are optimistic about the future of the Non-aligned Movement, very few of them talk of the relevance of NAM for India in the post-Cold War years. The present study is a humble attempt in this direction.

For a better understanding, the study has been divided into five chapters followed by a brief conclusion, each with its defined scope within the main body of the discussion. A brief introduction of each chapter is given below.

The first chapter examines whether the policy of non-alignment as adopted by India, was an idealist doctrine or a pragmatic design. For the conceptual clarity of both, a glimpse of India's cultural and philosophical tradition as well as the internal and external compulsions of post-independence period, has been given. This became necessary to find out whether the reasons which compelled India to follow such a policy, are relevant today or not.

The second chapter gives a brief account of the role of India in the formulation and development of non-alignment as a foreign policy choice. It also touches India's role and activities in various non-aligned summits starting from Belgrade to Jakarta.

The third chapter is a detailed study about the role of Non-alignment and Non-Aligned Movement in serving the interests of India during the Cold War phase. These interests are of two types: politico-strategic and economic.

The fourth chapter deals with the arguments both for and against the Non-aligned Movement in the post-Cold War era. It also analyses the negative trends of the emerging world order and finds the necessity of NAM for waging its struggle against these trends. It also suggests some ways to strengthen the Movement.

The fifth chapter is the most crucial one. It highlights the relevance of NAM for India in the post-Cold War years. For this purpose, the chapter has been divided into two major parts: politico-strategic and economic - humanitarian. By channelising the forum of NAM, this chapter tells, how India should serve its national interests in the above mentioned areas. After the end of this chapter a brief conclusion has been given.

CHAPTER I

INDIA'S NON-ALIGNMENT: AN IDEALIST DOCTRINE OR A PRAGMATIC DESIGN?

The primary purpose of any country's foreign policy is to promote its national interests - to ensure its security, safeguard its sovereignty, contribute to its growth and prosperity and generally enhance its stature, influence and role in the comity of nations. A country's foreign policy should also be able to serve the broader purpose of promoting peace, disarmament, and development and of establishing a stable, fair and equitable global order. This latter purpose may at times appear to conflict with the former, but in the medium and long run it too is likely to serve the country's national interest.¹

India's foreign policy is inspired by the ideals and vision of our nationalist leaders and reflects the best elements of our cultural and philosophical heritage. It was shaped and articulated in the early years of independence by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of modern India. The policy combines national interest with the broader

1. Muchkund Dubey, "India's Foreign Policy in the Evolving Global Order", International Studies, April-June, 1993, P.1.

objectives mentioned above. Its sheet-anchor is non-alignment - not as a negative or neutral concept of keeping out of the rival power blocs which dominated the period following the Second World War, but as a positive concept of exercising independence of judgement and action in matters of foreign policy, judging each issue on its merits and not just toeing the line laid down by others or, as Nehru said, becoming the "plaything" of others.²

Interestingly when people talk of India's foreign policy, they generally equate it with her policy of non-alignment. For example, some people describe that India's foreign policy was one of non-alignment between the Communist and the non-Communist bloc of nations. This is totally incorrect in the sense that non-alignment, like the temper of peace and the friendship with all countries, is only one means by which India seeks to achieve her foreign policy objectives. But so important has this means become in her foreign policy and so distinguishing a characteristic of the policy is it that India's foreign policy

2. Ibid.

as such is now often labelled with considerable justification as non-alignment.³

The policy of non-alignment, while on the one hand, is a product of India's age old rich cultural heritage, it is, also, on the other hand, a demand of her geo-political settings to serve her national interests. When we say that India's non-alignment is a product of her rich cultural heritage, we mean that nobody has originated the policy of non-alignment. "It is a policy", to quote Nehru, "inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of India's mind during her struggle for freedom".⁴ Similarly, when it is said that the policy was a demand of her geo-political settings, it means that it was deliberately designed by our policy-makers to meet the exigencies of the domestic circumstances and the external environment prevailing in and outside the country.

3. M.S. Rajan, Studies on India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1993, PP. 30-31.

4. Cited in Rikhi Jaipal, Non-alignment. Origin, Growth and Potential for World Peace, New Delhi, 1987, P.8.

From the above account it becomes clear that the policy of non-alignment as adopted by India stands on two important pillars: (i) the cultural and philosophical heritage of India, and (ii) the domestic and external compulsions in which she was placed.

THE CULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE OF INDIA:

The main sources of India's cultural heritage dates back some thousand of years to the scriptural texts of the Hindus, the Vedas, the law books, the Dharmasastras; the great epics - The Ramayana and Mahabharat; stories, legends and chronicles of great national events and theological treatises and manuals of worship'.⁵ A close look to all these sources shows that a preference for the middle path is the hallmark of Indian culture and tradition. According to an old Sanskrit saying, "ati sarvatra verjayet" (let us eschew excess at all

5. A. Appadorai, Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1972, New Delhi, 1981, P. 28.

times)⁶. This saying underlines India's philosophical abhorrence of absolutes, of extremes, of the tendency to see things strictly in terms of black and white.⁷ To quote Prof. Michel Brecher in this context "the central message of India's philosophical tradition dating from the Buddha has resolved round the rejection of absolutes and extreme positions. On the contrary, it has stressed philosophical relativity, intellectual catholicism and co-existence of good and evil, in short, the golden middle path of compromises and tolerance of opposites".⁸

In view of such a cultural philosophical tradition, it is natural for a country like India to prefer the middle path between the two rival international ideologies of the day - the Western Liberal Democracy and the Soviet Egalitarian Communism. With the West, India shared such values as the dignity of the individual and the sanctity of the civil liberties, democratic political institutions, the rule of law, respect for the scientific approach and the need for modern technology. At the same time, she was

6. Nalini Kant Jha, "Cultural and Philosophical Roots of India's Foreign Policy", International Studies, Vol. 26, No.1, January-March, 1989, P. 46.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid, P. 48.

opposed to what was considered as the West's 'hysteria' about Communism, its "pactomania" and its strategy not only to contain Communism but also to combat what it termed as 'neutralism'. India praised the unequivocal Soviet support to the liberation movements of the third world countries, her state controlled economy and above all, her Asia-mindedness. She was at the same time horrified by the Soviet totalitarianism and the use of force to suppress the rights and liberties of the individual. India, therefore, refused to align herself with any particular bloc or ideology and resolved to cooperate with both the blocs in furtherance of her own ideals.⁹

The above analysis of the ancient Indian philosophic tradition shows the traditional faith in reason and the rejection of the dogma. As an old Indian saying goes in this context "vade vade jayate tattvasiddhih (enlightenment is achieved through debate). It is this undogmatic approach and rational tradition that led the makers of our foreign policy to reject the philosophy of Cold War - the philosophy which entailed the acceptance of the membership of any one bloc and, therefore, unquestioning adherence to

9. K. Shridhrani, "The Philosophical Bases of India's Foreign Policy", India Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2, April-June, 1958, P. 198.

the decisions of the leader of that bloc'. They chose non-alignment instead which meant, in essence, to deliberate, discuss and decide each international issue on its merit or to retain independence of judgement in respect of problems and events instead of prejudging them according to our own ideological and other predilections.¹⁰ This fitted in with India's ancient tradition with its debates and discussions and with the disapproval of any monopoly of truth.

The disapproval of any monopoly of truth constitutes the core of Indian culture from which flows the spirit of tolerance. The essence of tolerance is that the views other than one's own should be respected. According to Rigveda¹¹, truth is one, though sages call it by different names. Similarly, the Upanishads also declare that just as cows which are of varied colours yield the same white milk, all the different paths lead to the same goal.¹²

The idea of tolerance was not merely confined to books, but also practised in social action. Many invaders and immigrants came to India through centuries, but were

10. Jha, n.6, P.51.

11. Cited in Appadorai, n.5, P. 29.

12. Ibid.

gradually assimilated into the society, each group, however, retaining its own identity. Ashok's inscription on his rock pillars highlights the prevailing idea of tolerance. Although there were some religious prosecutions during the Muslim rule in India, yet the tolerant attitude remained, to certain extent, even then. There were numerous instances of Muslim kings like the Great Akber (1556-1605) who had shown a remarkable sense of tolerance towards other faiths. Thus, hospitality to the followers of all faiths, born out of tolerance, has been a cornerstone of Indian history and culture. Despite the rise of a communal outlook in the first half of the twentieth century, ending in the partition of India and recurrent religious and caste tensions and violence, notwithstanding the clear injunctions of the Constitution and the law of the land, it is still true to say that the tradition of tolerance is fundamental to the thinking and life of the common people in India.¹³ Recognising the fact that the ideal of tolerance is still an active force in the life of the common man, how it is possible for a country like India to be intolerant in her dealings with other countries? This is why the tradition of tolerance is one major factor underlying her policy of non-

13. Ibid, P.30.

alignment which she followed since her independence and it is due to this reason that Ehrenfels in his "The Culturalogical Approach to Non-Alignment" consider non-alignment to be culturally an Indian creation.

Another important value of our unique culture and tradition is the belief that the means to be employed to achieve an end are as much important as the end itself - a principle best preached and practised by Mahatma Gandhi when he led India's freedom struggle against the mighty British Imperialism. Two most important quotations can be cited from the ancient Indian texts in support of this contention. First, one should not do a good thing by following a bad path.¹⁴ Second, to seek to further the welfare of the state by enriching it through fraud and falsehood is like storing water in an unburnt mud pot and hoping to preserve it.¹⁵ Speaking in the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December, 1956, Jawaharlal Nehru said that "the means are as important as ends. If the means are not right, the end is likely to be not right, however much we

14. Ibid, P. 32.

15. Ibid, PP. 32-33.

may want it to be right".¹⁶ It is this firm conviction on the equal importance of means and ends that made India to realise that "peace can only be preserved by methods of peace, i.e., non-alignment. It cannot be promoted by creating the positions of strength that the Super Powers believed and did in the cold war through their respective alliances, namely, NATO and Warsaw Pact; on the contrary, the creation of the positions of strength might become a threat to peace - for every party will naturally try to increase its strength vis-a-vis its rivals and such an attempt is suicidal in the atomic age. So when one wants peace, one must think of peace and prepare for peace, instead of thinking of war and preparing for war."¹⁷ This can be rightly done, India realised, not by aligning oneself with any one of the two rival power blocs thereby making the situation from bad to worst, but by remaining non-aligned which in itself, if not a sufficient guarantee of peace, can, at least, minimise the area of confrontation.

The equal importance of means and ends naturally implies the faith on non-violence or ahimsa. According to a

16. Appadorai, P.34.

17. Rajan, n.3, P.17.

Vedic Command "don't injure any being" !¹⁸ Similarly, Lord Buddha taught us, "let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good".¹⁹ However, this ancient tradition of non-violence did not suggest us that it could ever be used as a weapon to achieve certain political or social ends. Thinkers before Gandhi had taught that non-violence was a virtue and even it was recognised that the average individual could not achieve perfect non-violence in practice. But certainly the ideal was to minimise violence as far as possible. The revolution that Gandhi brought was in applying the concept of non-violence to politics - first against the racial discrimination in South Africa and then against the British Imperialist Government in India.

Due to this tradition of non-violence, India had always opposed the politics of cold war characterised by the spirit of revenge, hatred and use of force for achieving foreign policy objectives. Instead of it, she had given importance to discussion, negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes among nations through her policy of non-alignment. India realised that "negotiations are better than a deadlock in a tension ridden world and sometimes even a stalemate or

18. Appadorai, n.5, P.35.

19. Ibid.

deadlock better than no solution at all, and certainly better than resort to force or threat of force - for, these, in turn, create further problems, instead of solving the one against which the force or threat of force was directed".²⁰

And finally, comes the ideals of our freedom struggle which are no less an important reason behind India's policy of non-alignment. As we know that since 1921, the All India Congress Committee began to take an increasing interest in India's relations with her neighbours and to make pronouncements on the elements of the foreign policy of an independent India. Jawaharlal Nehru became the head of the foreign department of this committee in 1925, and shortly thereafter in 1927, the Indian National Congress opposed the use of Indian troops in China, Mesopotamia and Persia. In the same year, it sent fraternal greetings and support to the peoples of Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Syria who were fighting against imperialism. And in 1939 when the Second World War broke out it proclaimed the desire of the Indian people to remain out of the war between imperialism and fascism, both of which were opposed by them, so that peace and freedom for India could be preserved. This Indian trend to keep aloof from the power games of European states

20. Rajan, n.3, P.23.

explains her remaining non-aligned in the cold war between the Communist East and the Democratic West. India even refused to align itself with Britains enemies in the hope of furthering its own nationalist aims, because it had always been its policy to stand on its own feet and do its own fighting, and never had any intention of being the plaything of others.²¹

The aforesaid account shows that the policy of non-alignment was a gradual outcome of the long and rich cultural ethos of India. What was needed was to give an authentic voice to this policy in due course of time. It was Jawaharlal Nehru, a great visionary of twentieth century, who saw the circumstances prevailing after the Second World War as ripe for espousing the policy of non-alignment.

THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMPULSIONS:

India adopted non-alignment under the pressure of her domestic political needs and compulsions. The needs arose from a variety of factors. Firstly, there was the need for political stability and for minimising the competition for

21. Jaipal, n.4, P.9.

political power, which could be partly achieved by a abroad common front of divergent political and ideological parties and groups held together by agreement not to be aligned with either of the blocs in a bipolarised world.²² And since this policy, remarks Liska, appeals to a wide spectrum of the public and various factions of that public, it helps to insulate factional and regional struggles from the strains of outside interference.²³ Secondly, India had to win her independence after protracted struggles for over two centuries from Britain. Our nationalist leaders, therefore realised that to align with Britain or her Western bloc with any sort of military alliances could be to court unpopularity. On the other hand, as most of our leaders were educated and brought up in Western liberal tradition, Communism did not have that much appeal for them as a system of governance. Hence, the only choice open to them within the framework of domestic political consideration was to be non-aligned. Thirdly, India, as a new born state, needed to mobilise its people, irrespective of their political or ideological affiliations, for the many sided work of

22. M.S. Rajan, Non-alignment and Non-aligned Movement, New Delhi, 1990, P. 24.

23. Ibid.

national development and it saw that it could do it by remaining non-aligned. She could also secure assistance and cooperation of both the western and the communist bloc of nations through her policy of non-alignment. And finally, all of our political parties were opposed to alliance with one or the other bloc and non-alignment emerged, therefore, as the other side of the precious coin of independence.²⁴

Besides the above political needs, India was also faced with a number of domestic compulsions. The country had been partitioned bringing in its trail a communal bloodbath. The princely states were yet to be integrated into independent India. The economic strength of the country was devastated by the British Raj and it reached to its culmination with the outbreak of the Second World War. The steering wheel of the country was still in British hands. For the first time, the country was about to enter the arena of international politics and diplomacy as a sovereign nation state without having the experience of conducting its affairs on the world stage. Hence, it was natural for India to avoid alliances and to maintain its hard won independence from encroachment by richer and more powerful nations as there was always a fear that by aligning oneself with any one

24. Jaipal, n.4, P.12.

power bloc one surrenders one's opinion and give up the policy which he would normally pursue.

Economically also India was in a very deplorable position. She was poor, undeveloped with a low standard of living and dependent upon other countries particularly on the West for her very survival. Although India possessed adequate natural resources and vast manpower, exploitation of these resources was not an easy task since it required resource mobilisation, development of indigenous technology and import of technical know-how from the more advanced countries. However, notwithstanding her economic backwardness, India was committed to improve the living standards of her people and especially, the expectations of the people who had democratic rights gave it high priority in the Government policies to maximise production and equalise distribution. This demanded planned economic development, planned economic development, in turn, demanded, in the Indian context, capital and technical assistance from developed countries.²⁵ Realising this, our foreign policy makers directed the country's external economic policies to the acquisition of the above two means from whatever source they could be acquired without any

25. Appadorai, n.5, P.2.

preconditions. Alignment with any one bloc or Super Power would have limited India's scope of getting sufficient assistance towards the desired goals. Hence, non-alignment was preferred as the only available strategy by which both the Super Powers could be the equal partners in the economic development of India.

Moreover, from the experience of many aligned nations, India realised that 'alignment had as much impact on domestic development of a country as on foreign policy choices'. While the Western bloc, more or less, wanted to promote "free enterprise or market economy", the Eastern bloc a "state controlled or command economy". In either case, the system and its norms were determined and defined by the leader of the bloc, the USA or the erstwhile Soviet Union. Any deviation from either pattern of development by a member of the bloc was difficult if not impossible and if someone dared to do it, as did the former Yugoslavia, she was penalised in a number of ways adversely affecting the economic development of the country. As a last resort, the leader of the alliance might even use, or threaten to use force to prevent any departure from the collectively determined system as defined by the boss. In this sense, the member state was a silent spectator whose freedom was directly or indirectly restricted by her alignment. When

some states like France defied the collective pressures of the dominant leader, they had to suffer certain disincentives, if not outright penalties. It was the fear of such an impact on domestic development that motivated peace-loving India to opt for non-alignment.

The geo-strategic location of India and the compulsions of the international environment also prompted India to go for non-alignment or avoid alignment. Our decision makers realised that if a country like India aligned herself with a more powerful neighbour, say for example, former Soviet Union, it would inevitably result in subservience to that neighbour due to her comparative economic backwardness and weak military strength. On the other hand, if she aligned herself with a distant powerful country like USA, that might be an undue provocation to the powerful country across her border. Secondly, alignment with a more powerful country would not contribute to promotion of general international peace and security. Nor would it reinforce the security of that more powerful country. Thirdly, alignment with one of the Super Powers or blocs would in all likelihood result only in involving a small or militarily weak country in great power conflicts in which it had no interest.²⁶ On the

26. Rajan, n. 22, P.22.

contrary, alignment with any one of the Great Powers was likely to render it difficult, if not impossible, the solution of any local or regional problem and conflict in which they themselves had no interest. Fourthly, the experience of small countries like South Korea showed that it would be futile to look for security through alignment. And finally, the makers of our foreign policy also realised that by non-alignment the newly independent India could use her scarce resources wholly for her economic and social improvement without being forced to spend them for military preparedness.

Apart from this, the geo-strategic location of India in South Asia also convinced her not to join any of the two power blocs. Speaking to the members of the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru said that "look at the map; if you have to consider any question concerning South-East-Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also with the Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with South-East Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in terms of regional organisations in Asia, you have to keep in touch with the other regions. And whatever regions you may have in mind,

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the importance of India cannot be ignored".²⁷ The two Super Powers as well as their respective statellites were very much well aware of such a significant position of India without whom no alliance system could be successfully operationalised in the region. Given a severely tense international environment riddled with uncertain American friendship, there existed a tremendous pressure on Indian decision makers to commit themselves to one of the sides in order that it could ensure its own survival and add to its own power potentialities by gaining from the military and economic values of the alliance system.²⁸ Now had India abandoned non-alignment, it would have created a series of adverse consequences beginning with a sense of fear and insecurity in the minds of her neighbours. The perception of threat from a mighty country like India joining one of the Super Power Camps and this adding to its might could have been easily exaggerated by her small neighbours and they would have had no other option but to join hands with either of the Super Powers.²⁹ Thus, the whole South Asian

27. Cited in A. Appadorai & M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, New Delhi, 1985, P.7.

28. Manoj Soni, "From Cold War to Hot Peace", Third Concept, December, 1993, P.9.

29. Ibid.

subcontinent would have been turned into a constant state of fear, insecurity and instability. Moreover, the location of two giant Communist Powers, China and Soviet Union - the former touching India's boundary line and the latter some twenty miles away from it - placed India in a very difficult position. A military alliance with either bloc was ruled out by this factor as the impact of any war between the two blocs would immediately make itself felt on India.³⁰

Another major reason behind India's policy of non-alignment was emotional or psychological compulsions in her mind that she should not only to be free, just in the formal sense, but also to seem to be free from every vestige of Great Power domination or influence. As we know it that she was a former colony of the United Kingdom and had suffered racial discrimination under its rule in different degrees. It was, therefore, almost impossible for India to enter into a political or military alliance with Britain or to join her bloc which was a constant supporter of British imperialism over India. Nor could our decision makers consider to let the country align with the communist bloc. Because, first of all a country like India could not even get her independence acknowledged by the communist block for quite

30. Appadorai & Rajan, n. 27, P. 44.

some time after she formally attained independence. Secondly, having long been the colony of British Empire, she shared certain ideas and ideals with the west and had faith in western institutions. The outlook of our nationalist leaders as a result was allergic to communism. Hence, there was no question of joining the communist camp, however, much they might have liked Marxian teachings or praised the socialistic achievements of the countries of the Soviet bloc. India, therefore, saw non-alignment as the only ideal solution to her dilemma. Non-alignment enabled her to keep out of the western block, even though, ideologically, she was nearer to it than to the communist bloc, as well as to share a socialistic outlook without being a member of the communist bloc. It helped her to maintain friendly relations without antagonising either.³¹

The bipolarisation of the world into two hostile power blocs, just after the Second World War, on ideological grounds, one led by the United States and the other by the former Soviet Union, was also another important reason for India's adherence to non-alignment. Both these nations assumed the status of 'Super Powers' and followed vigorous policies as well as methods to extend their 'sphere of

31. Rajan, n. 22, P.21.

influence' for their respective ideologies, namely, 'democratic liberalism' and 'egalitarian communism'. Each tried to occupy as many territories as they could to outnumber their rival. In the process, they used the method of persuasion, brute force, economic aid, security umbrella etc. which directly resulted in heightening the cold war tension in the world.³² The cold war had begun with a resounding note that sooner or later the nations of the world would be engulfed into a 'nuclear holocaust' thereby jeopardising the very existence of the human race.

It was at this time India realised that the division of the world into blocs through the "war of ideologies" was conducive neither to her national interests, nor to the good of the world at large. She not only considered the bipolarisation of the world as dangerous to the maintenance of world peace, but also unhelpful to those conditions of the international society under which alone she could preserve her vital national interests, especially her survival as an independent state and her economic development. Soon after assuming the charge of the foreign affairs portfolio in the interim Government of India,

32. Dilip Mohite, "Ideological Foundations of Nehru's Non-alignment", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol..53, No.1, January-March, 1992, P. 24.

Jawaharlal Nehru made a historic statement on 7 September, 1946 that "we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale".³³ It was in this sense India felt that the only way she could make her modest contribution to the promotion of world peace, was not by aligning herself with either of the two power bloc of nations, but by following an independent policy which would express itself in taking an ad hoc stand based on the merits of the specific issue at hand, and not by adopting a mechanically automatic position dictated by the country's ideological disposition.³⁴ India's joining either of the blocs would probably make little difference to the bloc concerned, in view of her comparative economic backwardness and weak military strengths, and in any case, it would not necessarily to be a contribution to peace as such.³⁵ But as Nehru said, her remaining outside the two blocs could make some difference when they are evenly balanced in strength.

33. Cited in Rasheeduddin Khan, "Non-alignment: Context, Dimension and Challenges", in his (ed) Perspectives on Non-alignment, New Delhi, 1981, P. 10.

34. Rajan, n.3, P.33.

35. Ibid.

Moreover, if all the nations of the world were divided up into two hostile power blocs, then, it was thought, a world wide conflict would be inevitable. If some nations kept outside the two hostile camps, they could perhaps be of some use in promoting understanding and accommodation or at least offer a channel of communication so that any conflict might be obviated or at least postponed as long as possible.³⁶

And finally a country with the size and magnitude of India cannot be a follower of one or the other bloc or even given a secondary role. Speaking in the Constituent Assembly on 22 January 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru said that "India is a great country, great in her resources, great in her manpower, great in her potential, in every way... May the time come when this ancient land will attain its rightful and honourable place in the world and make its full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and welfare of mankind."³⁷ But how could India attain her "rightful place" in the world without following the policy of non-alignment. There are three important reasons, in

36. Ibid, P.291.

37. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946, April, New Delhi, 1961, P.13.

this context, that explain India's decision to follow this policy for getting what she deserved. First of all, India cannot follow the traditional foreign policy choices like imperialism, isolationism, neutrality, alliances, balance of power and nationalistic universalism as they restricted the freedom of states and divided the international community into groups and blocs.³⁸ Secondly, the stress on materialism and the omission of humanitarian principles from the two rival ideologies of the day, namely, Capitalism and Communism can be said as another reason for India's policy of non-alignment. And thirdly, India was too weak, both economically and militarily, to adopt any other policy than that of non-alignment. Fortunately or unfortunately, the vulnerable western colonial domination of the world, the subsequent emergence of large number of Afro-Asian countries as sovereign nation states and the confrontational poise between the Communist Soviet Union and the Non-Communist Western countries were all helpful rather than obstructed to get India's desire fulfilled. Ever since India declared the policy of non-alignment, it was followed by a large number of newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who found it pleasing and relatively costless and

38. Rajan, n.3, P.324.

India became one of the leading countries in Belgrade in 1961 when non-alignment was launched from a mere foreign policy choice to an international movement. In this sense, the policy of non-alignment is India's distinctive contribution to international politics.

In conclusion, it can be said that the policy of non-alignment was not the product of any arbitrary choice, but had its roots in our past history and ways of thinking as well as the fundamental national exigencies. In this sense, India's non-alignment is both idealist as well as pragmatic. But undoubtedly, it is more pragmatic than idealist because no nation can be non-aligned towards its national interests. Pt Nehru was consequently right when he remarked that "we may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we may say. But in the ultimate 'analysis', a government functions for the goal of the country it governs and no government dares to do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of the country".³⁹ The national interests of India was not, however, in Nehru's

39. Appadorai's n.5, P.14.

view. incompatible with the legitimate interests of other nations. Indeed, in his view, a nation's self-interests may itself demand a policy of cooperation with other nations.⁴⁰

40. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

NON-ALIGNMENT AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Immediately after the Second World War when the two military alliances the NATO and the Warsaw Pact had bagged a number of countries to join them , those which stood out and refused to be aligned to the military blocs are known as the 'non-aligned'.¹ In other words, assertion of independence in the matters of foreign policy without being entangled in any military alliances or blocs is the very essence of non-alignment. In this sense, non-alignment is seen as a foreign policy option of the individual nations. But Non-aligned Movement is "an informal collection of nations sharing certain common principles and objectives"² which, in fact, came into existence in 1961, exactly one and half decades after India had openly refused to join either of the two military alliances led by the United States and the former Soviet Union. In a radio broadcast to the nation on 7 September, 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, after assuming

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1. Nikhil Chakravarty, "Is Non-alignment Dead"?, Mainstream, June 13, 1992, P.3.
 2. Cited in M.S. Rajan, Non-alignment and Non-aligned Movement, New Delhi, 1990, P.47.

charge of the foreign affairs portfolio in the interim Government of India, declared:

"We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past two World Wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races".³

However, it was not easy in those days for the countries like India, economically backward and militarily underdeveloped, to stand out of the Cold War power game. In those days, globalisation was taken to mean in joining with one or the other of the two military alliances and not left out of the company of the high and mighty in International Politics. Many statesmen, scholars, intellectuals and media persons of those days, attacked or made fun of India staying away from the bloc politics. For example,

3. Cited in Rasheeduddin Khan's "Non-alignment: The Context, Dimension and Challenges", in his (ed) Perspectives on Non-alignment, New Delhi, 1981, P.10.

John Foster Dulles (The US Secretary of State under the Eisenhower Administration) branded non-alignment as a 'sin' because it refused to join the crusade against the evils of Communism.⁴ Similarly, Richard Nixon, dubbed it as 'nonsense'.⁵ Stalin, the Soviet dictator, also felt that those who were not with us, were against us'.⁶ Even the Chinese Communist Leader, Chairman Mao, did not support non-alignment as he declared that a country must 'lean to be on one side or the other and a third path does not exist'.⁷

But notwithstanding the above criticisms, India went ahead with its policy of non-alignment. Pt Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna Menon had taken a lot of pains to clarify that non-alignment was not the same as was erroneously compared by some Western scholars with the concepts like isolationism, non-commitment, neutrality, neutralisation, unilateralism and non-involvement. On the contrary, 'it was the assertion of independence in foreign affairs - the refusal to be herded into one military alliance or the

4. Cited in Chakravarty, n.1

5. Cited in K.R. Narayanan, "Non-alignment in Changed Context", The Hindu, 30 March 1991.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

other'.⁸ A non-aligned country would exercise its own independent judgement on a specific issue as and when it comes out without being guided or tied down by the compulsion of any particular military bloc.

It is in this sense that Pt Nehru has been rightly described as the originator of the concept of non-alignment, a thing which he often denied. He was also the first person to elevate non-alignment to the level of state policy.⁹ He realised that to remain non-aligned with the two hostile power blocs was not only in conformity with the vital interests of India, but also of other newly emerging nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Hence, he took all necessary steps to familiarise the new concept.

In March, 1947, with the initiative of Pt Nehru, India hosted the first 'Asian Conference' in New Delhi, the aim of which was to foster Asian unity. The mutual consultations between and among some 230 delegates (both official and non-official) from 28 countries who attended the Conference, paved the way for the evolution of the Non-aligned Movement. Again in 1949, India took the initiative in holding the

8. Chakravarty, n.1.

9. K.C. Chaudhary, Non-Aligned Summitry, New Delhi, 1988, P.2.

Second Conference of Asian Countries to ponder over the Dutch attack on Indonesia.¹⁰ The Conference represented the first attempt by Asian leaders to speak with one voice and take concerted action on an important issue affecting an Asian country.¹¹ The fact that the Asian nations were learning to work together on matters of common interest and thus breaking away from Western tutelage was clearly a further step in the evolution of the Non-aligned Movement.¹² The Bandung Conference, which was held in 1955, is considered as "the first crystallisation of collective thought on non-alignment".¹³ It was a period when Cold War was in its full swing and the tenacles of imperialism could be seen in Asia through its military pacts like SEATO.¹⁴ At the concluding session of the Bandung Conference, Nehru said that 'we have met here together, seen and made friends with one another and argued with one another to find a solution

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10. G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-alignment, London, 1966, P.14.
 11. T. Rajamoorthy, "The Origins of the Non-aligned Movement", "Third World Resurgence", No.26, 1962, P.21.
 12. Ibid.
 13. Rasheeduddin Khan, "India and the Non-aligned Movement", in Satish Kumar (ed) Year Book on India's Foreign Policy", New Delhi, 1984, P. 78.
 14. For details see Jansen, n.10, PP. 14-15.

for our common problems".¹⁵ He stressed the need for peace in the world and its interconnection with each and every country. A year after Bandung, Nehru, Nasser and Tito met at Brioni in July 1956, which symbolised the emergence of the three as the 'pioneers' of the Non-aligned Movement. This meeting of the trio was finally followed by the emergence of the larger gatherings of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade in 1961. Thus, before the advent of Non-aligned Movement as an institutionalised body, India had taken successful steps for the development and consolidation of the policy of non-alignment.

However, in the beginning both the Super Powers were suspicious to India's policy of non-alignment. But when India's consistent commitment to an independent policy based on peaceful co-existence got overwhelming support by the newly liberated countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the attitude of both these Powers started changing. In August 1953, Soviet Premier Malenkov praised the efforts of peace-loving countries, directed towards the ending of the 'Korean War' and singled out India for a "significant

15. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1971, P.219.

contribution".¹⁶ The most significant evidence of change in Soviet attitude was available in Khrushchev's Report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956.¹⁷ The Congress gave an authoritative recognition to the Movement for Non-alignment as a third reckoning force in international politics.¹⁸ But the USA remained somewhat adamant in its position until 28 October 1974, when in a speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, the visiting USA Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, referred to the question of the American perception of non-alignment and said "in the present, it (non-alignment) is for nations, such as India, an altogether understandable and practical proposition; the United States accepts non-alignment".¹⁹

16. Cited in Choudhary, n.9, P.10.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Cited in S.C.Gangal, "Non-alignment: Policy, Postulates and Movement", Employment News, 4 May, 1990, P.1.

**INDIA'S ROLE IN NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT:
FROM BELGRADE TO JAKARTA (1961-1992)**

In September 1961, twenty-five countries including India were assembled in the Yugoslavian capital Belgrade for the first Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Movement. Although India had certain reservations in the initial stages regarding the time and the nature of the new group, yet along with Yugoslavia and Egypt, India provided the necessary strength and vision to the Conference.²⁰ According to reliable sources of the Belgrade proceedings, the Summit was initially divided on the question of the immediate or foremost priority of NAM.²¹ For leaders like Tito, Sukarno, Nasser and many others, the primary issue was colonialism. Nehru, on the other hand, was of the view that the process of decolonisation in Asia and Africa - following India's independence in 1947 - had been accelerating and many former colonies notably, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Burma, Malaysia, Nigeria, Ghana, had already awakened into freedom from colonial subjugation. And many more colonies were moving fast towards independence

20. Shahber Pasha, India's Role in the Evolution and Development of NAM (Unpublished), 1988, P.6.

21. Gangal, n.19.

under the combined impact of global pressures and their national liberalisation struggles.

Hence, to accord the priority of pace on the issue of colonialism or decolonisation (at the end of 1961) would have meant getting entangled in a problem which was already substantially resolved and was on its way towards further resolution. On the contrary, the Cold War - a direct threat to peace due to its devastating nature - between the East and the West was at its height. The Berlin crisis was burning and the much published Kennedy-Khrushchev Summit in Vienna had just ended in a fiasco. On top of this was the resumption of nuclear testing by the two nuclear Super Powers - the United States and the former Soviet Union. Not too far from the venue of the Summit, the USSR conducted a nuclear test on 30 August - just as the delegates to the Summit were getting assembled at Belgrade. The prime problem therefore (as Nehru put it at Belgrade) was the focus on the awesome dangers of an escalating Cold War and nuclear arms race and the threat to the survival of mankind that they pretended.²² Even from the long term point of view, Nehru argued, 'peace' should be the dominant and tireless concern of humanity in general and of the newly

22. Ibid.

independent non-aligned countries in particular because as he put it, "if war comes (and peace is disrupted) everything else for the moment goes".²³ Finally, Nehru's view point - with its accent on peace - prevailed at Belgrade.

The Second Summit of Non-aligned Movement was held in the Egyptian capital Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964. Like the Belgrade Summit, ideological bipolarisation continued in Cairo at the Plenary as well as in the Political Committee. On the one side were those leaders who believed that peaceful co-existence was essential not only for the Great Powers but also in the relationship between them and the developing countries and on the other were those who accepted the first proposition but denied the possibility of the second. The principal advocate of the latter view was Sukarno of Indonesia and the fight against him was led by Nasser, Tito and Lal Bahadur Shastri. However, notwithstanding the above differences, it can be said that the Second Summit did not differ markedly from the first as the promotion of World Peace - the original impetus for the creation of the Movement - continued to be its priority and that was still the issue which united the Movement rather

23. Ibid.

than divided it along ideological lines. To quote Prime Minister Shastri in this context, "It is this factor of common adherence to certain principles and policies that binds us together, for in our unity lies our strength".²⁴

There were some differences between India and Yugoslavia at the Third NAM Summit in Lusaka (1970) on the question of admitting Pakistan into the Movement. While Yugoslavia favoured Pakistan's inclusion in the hope that Rumania might also be accepted, India strongly opposed it and took a principled stand that Islamabad would be welcomed to NAM the moment she quits her two alliances (CENTO and SEATO) which unquestionably had been concluded in the context of great power conflicts.²⁵ Moreover, India argued that 'respect for non-alignment from the Great Powers, which was badly needed, would by no means be enhanced by permitting countries belonging to their alliances to join the Movement'.²⁶ However, India's position was finally upheld when it was decided that the

24. Cited in Chaudhary, n.9, P.81.

25. Rikhi Jaipal, Non-alignment: Origin, Growth, and Potential for World Peace, Ahmedabad, 1987, P.91.

26. Ibid.

new members would be admitted only on application as Pakistan had not itself applied for membership and in accordance with the 1961 criteria. In the meanwhile, there was also some problem on the question of Cambodian participation in the Movement as division surfaced among the non-aligned countries on the recognition of rival governments of Cambodia. While 21 countries supported the claim of Sihanouk's government in exile, the Lon Nol's government had the support of seven countries. 12 countries including India and Morocco argued that the Conference should not express any views on a member countries internal affairs, thus favouring non-admission of either party.²⁷ With careful backdoor manipulations and skilled diplomacy, as shown by India and some others, the issue was successfully resolved so that neither found a seat.²⁸

In the Algiers summit (1973) there had been exchange of hot words between Fedel Castro of Cuba and Cornell Gaddafi of Libya. But showing enough maturity, India did not get involved in the tussle. Instead, she stressed the need for the unity of the non-aligned countries and warned against the power politics of the Great Powers to divide and weaken

27. Chaudhary, n.9, P. 101.

28. Ibid, PP.101-102.

the Movement. India also tried to build consensus on various issues of the day like the question of Palestine, South Africa, the demand for New International Economic and Information Order etc. India's Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, in her speech in Algiers said, "we are responsible not to our individual countries alone, but to the peace and prosperity of the whole world... Non-aligned countries should speak for those whose number were large, but whose voices were muted. Their claims to a just share of world's goods, right to a life of dignity was indisputable and could not be resisted" ... Indian tradition helps to look at the world as one and today science and technology open immense possibilities to transform this dream into reality. How much more necessary it becomes to ensure that various hues of racialism and other forms of narrow-mindedness do not come in the way of man's freedom.²⁹

The fifth Non-aligned Summit which was held in Colombo in 1976, once again focussed on the contentious issue of defining non-alignment in the light of the major changes in world political and economic relations. While Yugoslavia and some other countries favoured a certain flexibility of membership criteria in view of the changing international

29. Cited in Pasha, n.20, P.10.

situation, India and others disfavoured dilution of criteria to the point where non-membership of a great power military bloc ceased to be regarded as essential.³⁰ They believed that the Non-alignment Movement needed unity above all to fight for their objectives and that unity depended fundamentally on retaining their essential character.³¹ However, there was total consensus among the member countries on various issues like Apartheid, Namibia, Palestine, etc. The Colombo Summit also issued an Economic Declaration and a detailed Action Programme for Economic Cooperation, the main aim of which was cooperation among non-aligned and other developing countries in various areas like raw materials, trade, monetary and financial matters, industrialisation, food, land, agriculture etc.

In the Havana Summit of the Non-aligned Movement (1979), there was a major controversy between Cuba and Yugoslavia on the question of 'non-alignment' and it was feared sooner than later the Movement was heading for a division. Cuba perceived Western imperialism and neo-colonialism to be the sole threatening factor to the NAM, whereas its interests coincided

30. Chaudhary, n.9, P. 165.

31. Ibid.

with the Socialist States. Perception of that kind resulted in the Cuban contention that the Socialist countries were the 'natural allies' of the non-aligned states.³²

Yugoslavia provided the lead to the supporters of classical non-alignment. Though the Yugoslav concept of non-alignment did not perceive equidistance from the two blocs, it saw the Third World threatened not only by imperialism and neo-colonialism but also by 'hegemonism' and 'other form of foreign domination'.³³ It believed that the power aspirations of the major powers were not a trait of capitalist states only and for that matter, both the East and the West equally threatened the non-aligned. However, it was due to the bold efforts of the more moderate countries like India, a compromise could be finally brought out. The then India's Foreign Minister, S.N. Mishra said in this context that "we cannot have one foot in non-alignment and another in alignment".³⁴

32. Ibid, P.193.

33. Ibid, PP. 193-94.

34. Cited in Kapileshwar Labh, "Intra Non-aligned Discords and India", India Quarterly, Vol. 38, January-March, 1982, PP. 70-71

Apart from this, there was also another major problem in the Sixth Summit. The Camp David Agreement signed between Egypt and Israel was vehemently opposed by most of the Arab states and they demanded the suspension or expulsion of Egypt from the membership of the NAM on the ground that the Agreement was contrary to the decisions of the Non-aligned Summits over the Arab-Israel Conflict. Although India took a critical view of the Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty, it opposed the Arab move to suspend or expel Egypt from membership. Cautioning the growing regionalisation of the Movement, India said that it was unfair to bring into question the membership of any member of the Movement.³⁵

The Seventh Non-aligned Summit was held in New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983. Welcoming the eminent assemblage to New Delhi, the then Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, reminded them the guiding polestar of India, the philosophy of tolerance which had held together the diversities of this ancient civilisation. She recalled an ancient Indian saying "Truth is one but the wise discern it variously" perhaps implying that it should be a good enough maxim for the non-aligned nations to pull together as a

35. Ibid.

'single "moral and political movement" to preserve the world's diversities'.³⁶ Mrs Gandhi also advocated that 'Non-alignment was national independence and freedom'. It stood for peace and the avoidance of confrontation, the democratisation of international relations, and global cooperation for development on the basis of mutual benefit'. She emphasised that by staying out of military pacts, the Non-aligned countries could use their collective wisdom and influence to tip the balance in favour of peace and international cooperation.³⁷

"The Non-alignment Movement", she proclaimed, "was history's biggest peace movement" and added "we desire only peace, freedom, development and justice, which were denied in some measure or other to several non-aligned nations".³⁸ The 'Conference', she claimed, 'had renewed and reinforced the faith and vision of the NAM and consolidated the Movement for the maintenance of their independence and the assertion of the supremacy

36. Jaipal, n.25, P.197.

37. K. Ramamurthy and Govind Narain Srivastava, NAM Today, New Delhi, 1985, PP.107-8.

38. Cited in Jaipal, n. 25, P.197.

of their principles'.³⁹ It was not a Summit meeting, she said, for, they still had a long way to climb to attain their goals'.⁴⁰

Referring to the Iran-Iraq dispute, Mrs Gandhi told to the gatherings that the only principle that India cited was "all differences and disputes between non-aligned states should be resolved by peaceful means and the objective should be an honourable, just and enduring peace".⁴¹ On the question of Cambodian representation in the Movement, she made it clear that in the interest of the Movement neither party should be invited and the seat should remain vacant. In her inaugural speech, she also said that India hoped for an early solution to the problem of Afghanistan.

Regarding some other political issues like Palestine, Namibia and South Africa, India along with some other NAM countries attempted to give further impetus to the efforts directed towards their solution. It supported the heroic struggle of Palestinians, demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab lands. It urged for the speedy achievement of Namibian independence, highlighted the need

39. Ibid, P.208.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid, P. 203.

for peace in the world and extended support to South Africans in their fight against racism and apartheid.⁴² It strongly recommended to augment the role of the United Nations in resolving these issues and to maintain peace and security in the world.⁴³ Regarding the contribution of India as an organiser of the Seventh NAM Summit, K. Ramamurthy and G.N. Srivastava remark that "it used its political prestige and strength to draw the participants as well as world's attention to issues like the struggle for averting nuclear war, putting an end to the arms race and the need for disarmament, against colonialism and racism and for the progress of non-aligned countries and for a New International Economic and Information Order. In clear words it said that the world peace depends on disarmament and only complete disarmament can create conditions for genuine security".⁴⁴

42. K.P. Mishra, Non-aligned Movement: India's Chairmanship, 1987, P. 11.

43. K.P. Mishra, "Delhi Summit and After", Review of International Affairs, Vol.36, No. 855, 20 November, 1985, P.11.

44. Ramamurthy & Srivastava, n.37, P.100.

INDIA'S ROLE AS THE CHAIRMAN OF NAM (1983-86)

India took the Chairmanship of Non-aligned Movement from Cuba in a very critical situation when Iraq was unable to host the Seventh NAM Summit due to its war with Iran. During her three years of Chairmanship, India under the leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi and later her son, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, gave the Movement a new dynamism, content and cohesion.

The Non-aligned Movement suffered a major setback when, during the Chairmanship of Cuba, attempts were made to promote bloc oriented divisions within it. This adversely affected the cohesion and unity of the Movement. Honestly, we can say that the stand of the NAM and the Socialist bloc, led by the former Soviet Union, on issues like apartheid, Palestine, Namibia and the like, were often coincided. But this in no way provided any justification for the pernicious doctrine of the Socialist bloc being the 'natural ally' of the Non-aligned Movement - a doctrine which was unhappily sought to be fostered during the Havana Summit regardless of the fact

that a bloc oriented approach is the very negation of non-alignment.⁴⁵

Being a large Movement, embracing several newly liberated countries of Asia, Africa, Caribbean, Latin America and Europe, the non-alignment had within its fold many nations either tilted towards Washington or Moscow. This trend which came into open during the Havana Summit, when not countered, inevitably injected Cold War politics into the Non-aligned Movement on such issues as Afghanistan, Kampuchea (new Cambodia) and Grenada. Thus, much greater bitterness, discord and divisiveness than ever before became the hallmark of the Non-aligned Movement during this phase. But when the Chairmanship had passed to India, certainly, the polarisation was made a thing of the past. In other words, the Movement was back to its original moorings under the bold and eloquent leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi.

During the Chairmanship of India, there were some contentious issues within the Non-aligned Movement like the problems of Cambodia and Afghanistan which had created a lot of hit and dust and exchange of unpleasantness at the time of Non-aligned Summit. The Indian sponsored consensus on

45. Inder Malhotra, "India, Three Years of Chairmanship", World Focus, May, 1986, P. 18

leaving the Kampuchean seat vacant at all non-alignment gatherings till the problem was solved and the call to solve the Afghan problem through a negotiated political settlement by respecting the sovereignty and the non-aligned status of the country, had kept these issues out of the tussle from the non-aligned countries. Thanks to India, it was unlikely that either Afghanistan or Kampuchea (new Cambodia) would have again become a source of contention at any major gatherings of the Non-aligned Movement. Similarly, on some other issues such as Apartheid, Namibia, Palestine, Cyprus and Central America, the Movement under India's leadership had taken a number of measures as follow-up action to the decision taken at the New Delhi Summit.

All these are commendable, no doubt, but the much greater accomplishment of India as the Chairman of the Non-aligned Movement had been that it had succeeded in placing the issue of the survival of mankind from the mounting threat of nuclear annihilation at the top of the Movement once again. It rejected the dangerous myth that nuclear armament and disarmament was a game which only the two Super Powers could play and that others, especially, the non-aligned who knew very little about the nuclear complexities

and nuances, need not bother about it.⁴⁶ At New Delhi in March 1983, the Non-aligned Movement began to realise the rude reality that the furiously making nuclear arsenals of the few were directly threatening their own survival. It was also realised that even if a country or region was not directly involved in a nuclear exchange and no matter how distant geographically such an exchange might be, the entire globe was bound to be suffered by a nuclear winter that would destroy all life if the so-called "limited and winnable nuclear war, ever became a reality. No wonder then that the Delhi Declaration gave the pride of place to a call for the elimination of nuclear weapons from earth and the prevention of their spread to enter space through such high falutin doctrines as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or 'Star Wars'.⁴⁷

The demand for a freeze on the production and testing of nuclear weapons had the unqualified support of the entire Non-aligned Movement. So did the suggestion for no-first use. But the essence of the position of the Non-aligned Movement, never compromised since the Seventh Summit, is that nuclear weapons of mass destruction are a menace to

46. Ibid, P.19.

47. Ibid.

mankind, their use would be a crime against humanity and therefore they must be outlawed.⁴⁸

This is not all about. As we know that the Non-aligned Movement is about three Ds - Disarmament, Decolonisation and Development. For quite some time, the leaders and thinkers of the non-aligned countries have been laying stress on the link between disarmament and development. Clearly, the resources saved from the relentless nuclear arms race can and must be put to use to accelerate the attack on world poverty, hunger and inequality.⁴⁹ The idea, needless to add, did not find favour although strenuous efforts have all along been made at the UN to organize a Conference on disarmament and development under the auspicious of the world body. After the New Delhi Summit, this move received powerful impetus and with the initiative of Mrs Indira Gandhi in her capacity as the Chairperson of NAM, a seminar of State and Government leaders was held during the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the problems of the Third World's economic development and disarmament. The late Prime Minister also addressed letters to all the participants of the London Summit of industrialised

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

countries and sent her personal emissaries to the capitals of these countries to impress upon them the significance and continuing validity of the approach suggested by the New Delhi Summit on economic issues.⁵⁰ The industrialised countries were called upon to take a more constructive attitude towards the problem of the developing countries as well as the structural problems facing the world economy.⁵¹ She also set up a Group of Experts consisting of leading economists from Algeria, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Yugoslavia to examine the functioning of the existing international monetary and financial system and the modalities of the proposal for an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development.⁵²

In an inspired moment during her Chairmanship of NAM, Mrs Gandhi described non-alignment as "the largest peace Movement in the world" and warned that the alternative of peaceful coexistence is the end of existence. This was not a mere rhetoric. Indira followed her words with deeds. A commendable drive by the organisation of world parliamentarians enabled her to take a strong and

50. Ramamurthy & Shrivastava, n. 37, P. 98.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

imaginative initiative.⁵³ In May 1983 at the UN Disarmament Commission, she as the Chairperson of NAM, firmly rejected the USA-NATO theory of nuclear umbrella. India's representative called for intensifying ways and means of dealing with the threat of nuclear war and giving an impetus to negotiations on nuclear disarmament.⁵⁴ Similarly, a six-nation Summit was held in New Delhi in May 1984 which issued a joint appeal to the five nuclear-weapon nations to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems followed by substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals and forces.⁵⁵ This appeal for nuclear sanity spreaded all continents and all differences of size, development and wealth. It also cut across the alliance structures, for Greece joined the other five countries, led by India.

Another important role India played after assuming the Chairmanship of the Non-aligned Movement was the attention it had given to the problems of Africa in general and South Africa in particular. The cause of the African people was so dear to Mr Rajiv Gandhi who succeeded his mother in

53. Malhotra, n. 45, P. 19.

54. Ramamurthy & Shrivastava, n. 37, P. 101.

55. Malhotra, n. 45, P. 19.

October 1984 that even in the midst of elections, he was worried about the famine in Ethiopia. At the conclave of Commonwealth leaders at Nassau in Bahamas, he pressed Britain hard on the issue of sanctions against the racist Pretoria regime.⁵⁶ As a demonstration of Indian solidarity with the valiant struggle in South Africa, Mr Gandhi undertook a tour of 'frontline states' in 1986.

Last but not least, being the Chairman of NAM, India put the UN once again in the centre of the Non-aligned Movement's scheme of things. It also started a process of wide ranging consultations among the non-aligned countries on this subject as on many others. It was its idea to use the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly for consultations at the highest level among nations whether non-aligned or aligned.⁵⁷ Ironically some Western leaders did not support India but no fewer than 24 heads of state or their representatives enthusiastically responded to its call. Both East and West, North and South were amply represented. In the words of Mrs Gandhi, they came together seeking 'a dialogue, a probing of the obstacles and meeting of minds' to ensure that "humanity can have the life it is

56. Ibid, p. 20.

57. Ibid.

entitled to free from indignity, dishonour, tension or fear".⁵⁸ At the 40th Session of the UN, intended to celebrate the landmark in the world body's chequered life, Rajiv Gandhi was among the principal participants.

Referring to India's Chairmanship of Non-aligned Movement, Prof. K.P. Mishra says, "Under India's Chairmanship, the Movement was neither supposed to do wonders, nor did it actually achieve them. In the global situation, intractable problems were evident between and within states. However, the impact of India's functioning could not go unnoticed. Within the Movement, there emerged greater harmony between different points of view. Outside the Movement, the hostility which had been created earlier against it, was lessened. India's non-confrontationist approach and its successful efforts to keep the authentic principles of the Movement substantially intact, were widely recognised and appreciated. The Movement in three and a half year's history acquired a new meaning and a better thrust. India's constructive nurturing of the Movement was writ large on the deliberations of the eight Summit."⁵⁹

58. Ibid, P.20.

59. Source, The Hindu, 12 April, 1994, P.20.

By way of conclusion, it can be said that there is no point in making the list of Indian services and achievements exhaustive. Suffice is to say that the Non-aligned Movement became stronger, more cohesive and more purposeful when India handed over the Chairmanship to Zimbabwe than it was when the Chairmanship passed into Indian hands.

The Eighth Summit of the Non-aligned nations was held in September, 1986 at Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. The outgoing Chairman, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, while passing over the Chairmanship of NAM to the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe commended "non-alignment as an alternative world view" and proposed for the establishment of an African Fund to provide emergency as well as long term assistance for infrastructural development of the frontline African states to enhance their capacity to withstand the effects of sabotage, economic blackmail and economic aggression by the racist South Africa. The Summit endorsed the proposal of the Indian Prime Minister and a fund known as Solidarity Fund for South Africa was set up under the Chairmanship of India. The Summit also set up a Committee of Foreign Ministers consisting of India, Nigeria, Algeria, Argentina, Congo, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe to visit USA, UK, West Germany and Japan for persuading their governments to agree to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa as these

were considered essential for forcing the racist Pretoria regime to abandon apartheid and restore the due rights of the people of South Africa.

Regarding the independence of Namibia, the Summit also demanded a special session of the UN General Assembly and a Committee was set up comprising of India and some other NAM countries to plead the case in the United Nations.

The Harare Summit of 1986 represented the last major non-aligned meeting to be held in the context of Cold War certainties.⁶⁰ It was followed by the 9th Non-aligned Summit held in Belgrade in a time when the changing nature of the world becoming visible. Countries like India, Yugoslavia and Egypt realised that their Movement must be modernised to meet the new challenges while at the same time opposed the attempt of some member countries to institutionalise and thereby to stereotype the Movement. The Movement, they also realised, would not be able to play its full role if the members failed to establish an effective machinery to resolve their regional conflict, economic and political.

60. Sally Morphet, "The Non-aligned in the New World Order", International Relations, Vol. XI, No.4, April, 1993, P.371.

Taking the initiative on a pressing problem facing the entire world, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, proposed at the Summit for the establishment of a Planet Protection Fund (PPF) to be used for saving the environment by developing and purchasing conservation-compatible technologies in critical areas. Such technologies could then be made available to all the members. The Fund would have universal membership and would be financed through contributions on the basis of 0.1 per cent GNP contribution with exemptions to the least developed countries. This Fund could become the fulcrum of a truly global cooperative effort in the vital area.

Mr Gandhi also presented the report of the Africa Fund and regretted that the Western countries had not contributed their due share. The Fund had the total amount of nearly 476 million dollars in cash and kind. Apart from this, India also played an important role in the Belgrade Summit in formulating a 'six point agenda' for action like to eliminate the causes and horrors of war, establish just international economic relations, give freedom to people under colonial or alien domination, protect the environment, promote human rights and strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations.

The 10th and the recent Summit meeting of the Non-aligned Countries was held in the Indonesian capital Jakarta in September 1992. This Summit was important in the sense that it was the only Summit to be held after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Realising that the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the block politics was the primary aim of the Non-aligned Movement, some prominent members of NAM like, Egypt, questioned the very relevance of the Movement in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet era. They even suggested the merger of NAM into the Group of 77 or even to change its name. In a very hard-hitting speech, India's Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, remarked:

"If we go back to history, we will see that the Non-aligned Movement has had several missions at several times. In the beginning, it was the mission of decolonialisation when many countries were still colonies. Once blocs appeared on the world scene, the Movement's second mission started in that context. It became non-aligned between blocks. Today, the blocs are gone. But there is a great disparity between the rich and the poor nations, the North and the South. Then there are great problems of environment. The new problems that have arisen have to carve out a new role for the

Movement. That role will be defined at the Jakarta Summit."⁶¹

Mr Rao further added,

"Taking the essence of non-alignment as the assertion of independence, non-alignment does not become irrelevant at any time. What is perhaps being objected to is the same. What is being asked is: Now that there are no blocks, why do you still say you are non-aligned? But if you are not non-aligned, are you aligned? No one among us would favour alignment with one bloc even if it is the only bloc. We may agree with it on issues on merit, but we are not aligned with it. So how can you escape the concept of non-aligned".⁶²

Mr Rao stressed the need for complete disarmament, resumption of North-South dialogue, democratisation of UNO especially the Security Council, transfer of environment friendly technologies from the developed countries to the developing countries, South-South Cooperation, a non-discriminatory approach to human rights etc. India also played an important role for evolving consensus on major international issues in the Jakarta Summit like the

61. Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao said while addressing the 10th Non-aligned Summit held in Jakarta on September 2, 1992. Source: Mainstream, 12 September, 1992, P.6.

62. Ibid, PP. 6-7.

status of Yugoslavia, the problem of Cambodia, Palestine, Somalia, the importance and need for North-South and South-South Cooperation, the reform of UNO, the question of human rights, disarmament and environment etc.

From the aforesaid account, two things become clear: (a) whenever there was any major difference between the Non-aligned Countries, India was always in the forefront to sort out it and (b) it had a major contribution in bringing NAM in accordance with the changing realities of time by giving importance to some issues over others.

CHAPTER III

NON-ALIGNMENT AND NATIONAL INTEREST: THE CASE OF INDIA IN THE COLD WAR PHASE

As we know that the promotion of national interest and the strengthening of national independence are the two very important manifestations of the policy of non-alignment.¹ There is no contradiction or clash between the policy of non-alignment and the pursuit of national interest. In other words, non-alignment as a foreign policy choice does not demand a country to be non-aligned in relation to its national interests. The pursuit of national interest should, therefore, not to be taken as a derogation or deviation from non-alignment for achieving less than noble purpose. The only condition, in this context, is that national interest is to be promoted within and in consonance with the legitimate interests of all other nations. The interest of one nation ends where that of another begins. Moreover, national interest, however, sacred for an individual country, cannot override the overall demands of

1. P.V. Narasimha Rao, "Non-alignment Today and Tomorrow" in K.P. Mishra & K.R. Narayana (ed), Non-alignment in Contemporary International Relations, New Delhi, 1981, P.1.

the universal good. The policy of non-alignment should, therefore, be seen as a unique method adopted for the promotion of national interest within the overall framework of peace, co-existence and cooperation.² And this is what distinguishes a non-aligned country like India from all other nations.

India's non-alignment has served her national interests in two important ways, politico-strategically and economically.

POLITICO-STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS:

Jawaharlal Nehru, the founding father of India's foreign policy, was one of the first to realise the inherent limitations and dangers of a world divided by ideology and military alliances. He offered non-alignment and its component concept of peaceful co-existence to a war-weary and ideologically divided world.³ Nehru's bold and efficient leadership combined with the non-aligned

2. Ibid.

3. Former Prime Minister, V.P. Singh said while delivering the Fourth Indira Gandhi Memorial Lecture on "India's Contribution to International Peace" in New Delhi on May 1, 1990. Source, Mainstream, May 12, 1990, P.10.

status of India, permitted this country to play a disproportionately larger role than its actual capabilities in the cold war period. Whether it was the war in the Korean Peninsula or the conflict in Indo-China, the question of Suez or the problem of Cyprus, India was always called upon to play a moderating role.

At a time when India counted for nothing in terms of political, economic or military power, she took a stand on the Korean issue (1950) which was so unpopular in the initial period that it was rejected by both the sides. Yet it became so valuable in 1953 that this economically dependent, militarily weak and politically cloutless India was asked by both the parties to become the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which was essential to bring the war in Korea to an end.

In 1954, India was not even invited to the Geneva Peace Conference on Indo-China. But Krishna Menon was personally present there. Yet whoever has written the history of Geneva Conference of 1954, had had to concede that India which was not invited to that Conference played such a crucial role in bringing about peace in Indo-China that it was India and not any other country that was asked to become the Chairman of the Commission that was set up to supervise

and maintain peace in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.⁴ The Commission fulfilled its obligation to oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces from Laos and Cambodia as well as the elections which brought Prince Sihanouk to power. Clearly, it was not the failure of the Commission but intervention from outside in Vietnam and foreign instigated coups in Cambodia which led to the region being engulfed in hostilities for decades.⁵

India also played a similarly independent role in the resolution of the Suez and the Hungarian conflicts even though opinions might differ as to the degree of relative non-alignment shown by her in respect of these two questions.⁶ With regard to the former question, in which the Great Britain (with whom India had ties of Commonwealth loyalty) was involved as an aggressor against Egypt, New Delhi's independent role was especially impressive.

Thus, during the period of 1947-61, there was hardly any major international question or situation with which

4. Mani Shankar Aiyar, "India's Foreign Policy Objectives", World Focus, November-December, 1992, P.16.

5. Singh, n.3.

6. M.S. Rajan, Studies on India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1993, P.36.

India was not directly or indirectly related: the Palestine problem, the war in Korean Peninsula, the Indo-China War, the Geneva Conference on Indo-China (1954), the Suez question (1956-57), disarmament and the banning of nuclear tests, peaceful use of atomic energy, the conflict in the Straits of Formosa (1955), the emergence of the Afro-Asian Community and the Bondung Conference (1955) and the first Conference of Non-aligned countries in Belgrade (1961). By the end of 1950's, India was acknowledged as the *de-facto* spokesman, if not the leader, of the Afro-Asian nations. On questions like colonialism and racialism, when Nehru thundered about these issues, he was listened to with respect, even by those who did not like his views.⁷

From the above account, it becomes clear that the development of India's foreign relations both in scope and in depth towards the beginning of 1960's was in many respects remarkable and it was certainly due to her status as a non-aligned country. As the British Journal remarked "what India has lacked in power, she has made up in influence and this influence is now more important than

7. Ibid, P.156.

ever".⁸ By the mid fifties, Nehru could justifiably claim that New Delhi 'has become, in recent years, a centre of friendship and peace in the world'.⁹ The leaders of many nations praised India a number of times for its role as a peace-maker. Whenever there was a conflict or an aggression or a grave dispute, there were voices abroad suggesting or hoping that India could play a role in their resolution.¹⁰ Manchester Guardian wrote, in this context, that "when the history of the time is written dispassionately, it will perhaps cause surprise to see what a useful part India had often played in helping to stave off the final collapse which all fear".¹¹ In view of such an important role of India in world affairs, there were suggestions by certain governmental (including the former USSR leaders like N.A. Bulgonin and N.S. Khrushchev) and non-governmental leaders that India should be accorded the Great Power status and a permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council either in place of the Republic of China (The Formosa Regime) or even otherwise.

8. Ibid, P. 223.

9. Ibid, P. 224.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

Why was such importance accorded to a country which became independent only a little over a decade before. The reason was that India had the courage to articulate her point of view without any fear or favour on all the major international issues that arose in the world. She never said that because she was weak and underdeveloped, she had no right to say anything in the world. She mattered in the world because she stood up for what she believed in. India counted herself in terms of the way she had the courage to stand up for what she believed in and had the capacity to persuade others who were initially of a different view to come round to her point of view. It was only because she was able to persuade the world that there was a third way. Round about the end of the fifties, the emerging countries, as the winds of freedom blew across Africa, came to the conclusion that the only foreign policy which a country emerging from the throes of colonialism could have, was the foreign policy which was first articulated by India, the policy of keeping away from power blocs.¹²

In 1962, the border dispute that erupted between China and India led to the Sino-Indian war by the two Asian neighbours. During the course of war, India had to seek USA

¹². Aiyar, n.4.

military assistance which prompted the opposition to question India's status as a non-aligned state. Moreover, the Nehru Government faced severe criticism for its inability to protect India's security concerns and vital national interests. But actually speaking, due to the non-aligned status of India, New Delhi could successfully encounter the Chinese aggression by seeking military assistance from not only the United States, but also from the erstwhile Soviet Union. This can be said as a "perceptible gain" from India's non-alignment.

During the time of Sino-Indian border dispute, the Soviet Union had already abandoned the Stalinist Orthodoxy towards the non-aligned states. So the Chinese action against India amounted to a direct attack on the new Soviet strategy towards the developing countries and on her policy of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union expressed its resentment in several ways. First, according to Krishna Menon, "it stopped fuel supplies to China".¹³ Second, the Soviet aid to India flowed as usual. Third, the Soviets announced that they would honour all their commitments to India, including the delivery of MIG fighters. And finally,

13. Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, London, 1968, P. 159.

while reasserting Soviet Unions neutrality in the Sino-Indian border dispute, Khrushchev reminded China that "even the most complicated negotiations are better than war".¹⁴ All this brought sharp criticisms from Beijing and the People's Daily (of Beijing) wrote in protest:

"Those who accuse China of having pushed the Nehru Government to the West are mistaking the very cause for the effect. Throughout the Sino-Indian border dispute, they have all along confounded right and wrong, pretending to be neutral, calling China 'brother' while actually regarding the Indian reactionaries as their kinsmen".¹⁵

"They" were none else but the Soviet Leaders.

This pro-Indian tilt shown by the Soviet Union during the Sino-Indian war which became particularly apparent after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, epitomised her changing attitude towards the friendly non-aligned states. The manner in which India operated the apparatus of her non-alignment also shaped the Soviet stance.¹⁶

14. Cited in R. Vaidyanath, "The Reaction of the Soviet Union and other Communist States", International Studies, Vol. V, July 1963 - April 1964, P.73.

15. Ibid, P. 77.

16. Rajen Harshe, "India's Non-alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction", Economic & Political Weekly, February 17-24, 1990, P.401.

Besides getting the indirect Soviet support, India's non-alignment was also helped to seek direct military assistance from the United States during the time of war. Obviously, India asked for such a large scale military assistance for the first time. This request, according to some critics, was inconsistent with India's policy of non-alignment. But as Nehru remarked, 'Non-alignment was a vehicle of serving India's national interest. Especially when the security interests of India were threatened, the apparatus of non-alignment provided room for seeking military assistance from either of the Super Powers to repel an aggression.¹⁷ Hence, those who think that non-alignment precludes the receiving or giving of *ad hoc* military assistance in an emergency, should keep in mind that neither the receiving nor the giving of military assistance by one country to another in an emergency (say for example, USA provided military assistance to India in 1962, similarly, India provided necessary military support to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives) is a departure from the policy of non-alignment. After receiving USA military assistance, India still remained non-aligned in the sense that

17. Ibid.

she had no military alliances; but she could hardly, in the changing context, avoid foreign military entanglements.

Thus, the United States decision to provide prompt military assistance to India strengthened India's position vis-a-vis China. The USA obviously sought to tilt India's non-alignment towards the West through its military assistance, but certainly, it never asked India to join the Western military or political camp. On the contrary, the Americans publicly expressed their support to India's policy of non-alignment. Michel Brecher has tried to establish a connection between the possible strength of the USA backing to India and the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by China with an intention to withdraw its forces behind the Mac Mohan Line.¹⁸ An intensification of war by China could have led to a massive US air intervention in the sub-continent which would have increased India's dependence on Washington and restrained her autonomy in international affairs. Apart from avoiding the risk of confronting the United States, the Chinese were responsive to the overtures of peace launched by the Colombo Powers through their

18. Ibid.

mediatory efforts. China's withdrawal, paradoxically, contributed towards a continued legitimisation of non-alignment.

In short, by invoking the direct military support of the USA and keeping the USSR neutral in her war with China, India was able to restore peace in the sub-continent. And this undoubtedly became possible due to her status as a non-aligned country. But in the aftermath of the war, she was forced to modernise her defence forces by diverting the precious resources towards armaments.

Similarly, in September 1965, Pakistan attacked India on the question of Jammu & Kashmir. Taking advantage of this when the Chinese made threatening noises on India's northern frontier, the Soviet representative in the United Nations Security Council, Mr Federanko, observed that the continuation of the conflict benefited only the forces which were "pursuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples so as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims".¹⁹ Since both the United States and Great Britain, like the Soviet Union, wanted that the fighting on the Indian sub-continent should cease forthwith, "the forces" condemned by Mr Federanko could only be the Chinese leaders.

19. S/PV, 1241, September 19, 1965, P.25.

Subsequently, in the same debate, he accused China, without naming her, of using the conflict for her own selfish interests.²⁰ The Soviet Union was also believed to have exerted pressure on China to stay out of the South Asian conflict. Highlighting the merits of India's non-alignment, Professor Schleicher writes in this context that "In India's controversy with Communist China over contested areas on her northern borders, the Soviet Union at least remained neutral and she supported India against Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir dispute. Aligned with the West, the Soviet Union would have taken a position less favourable to India"²¹

The non-aligned India faced another major challenge from Pakistan in 1971 which eventually led to the birth of Bangladesh. India was severely worried about the terrible atrocities then being committed by the Pakistan army in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and the consequent overflow of millions of refugees across her border. Repatriation of refugees, in this circumstances, was ruled out without the independence of Bangladesh.

20. Ibid, P.28.

21. Cited in Atul Chandra Roy, International Relations, Calcutta, 1990, P.195.

The USA and China had restrained from formally condemning the brutal deeds of the Pakistani military junta. Both of them were obviously concerned about the frightful consequences of the disintegration of Pakistan for their respective interests in the sub-continent.

Under the circumstances, India utilised the instrument of non-alignment with a diplomacy of extreme caution.²² By allowing the flow of refugees inside her borders, she consistently appealed to the humanitarian sentiments of the world community. By then, a number of European intellectuals had started condemning the policy of the military dictatorship of Pakistan. Taking advantage of this growing discontent, Mrs Indira Gandhi, on a marathan tour to Europe, enlightened the European states about India's position.

In the meantime, due to the emerging US-China-Pakistan axis designed to check the growing Soviet influence in the sub-continent, India chose to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in 1971. The Treaty had two basic features. First, it could not be strictly described as a military pact since there were no provisions which explicitly provided for automatic assistance by one

22. Harshe, n.16, P.402.

party to another in case of aggression by a third country.²³ Second, the Soviet Union upheld India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirmed that such a policy constituted an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world²⁴ (Art.IV). India realised that if the United States and China were going to support the Pakistan military junta for its brutal activities in East Pakistan and would gang up against her as implied by the announcement in July 1971 by President Nixon's proposed visit to Beijing only in the same year, she also needed a powerful friend and supporter who could come to her rescue. Surprisingly, the signing of the Treaty with Soviet Union proved to be a sufficient guarantee to successfully meet the threats to India's security emanating from the USA Seventh Fleet. Thus, by supporting the *de jure* existence of Bangladesh against Pakistan, India was able to reshape the map and the balance of power in the Indian sub-continent.

The validity of India's non-alignment was once again questioned after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971). But such questioning was undoubtedly coloured by

23. Ibid.

24. Cited in Rajan, n.6, P. 312.

the static perceptions of non-alignment. In a democratic country like India, the policy of non-alignment had continuously evolved while handling the growing complexities of international politics. Indeed, non-alignment as a foreign policy choice had become an instrument of relatively powerful state that was in search of altering the balance of power in the changed context. Also, non-alignment, due to its inherent dynamism, had proved flexible enough to incorporate the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union within its broad framework. For such a Treaty did not stop India from establishing cordial relationship with the other states, India opted to respond to the acute great power contest that was transforming the politics of the region. A powerful state of India's size could not have remained a silence spectator in the power game of the sub-continent. Her active role not only restored peace in the region but also paved the way for India's dominant status in the Indian sub-continent.

Thus, India's position in the sub-continent as the undisputed regional power was reinforced by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It was the complementarity of national interests between India and the Soviet Union that acted as a bastion against the possibilities of growing Sino-US intrusions in the politics

of the sub-continent.²⁵ The Treaty was, undoubtedly, signed between two unequal powers. But this inequality in power positions did not pave the way towards the conventional "dominant dependence syndrome" that is common in the relationships between the advanced industrialised states and the developing states of the Third World. A large-sized state like India, unlike most Afro-Asian States, always had the potential to exercise sufficient measure of autonomy in foreign affairs. A few revealing facts after the post-treaty years can highlight India's gains as well as the strength of her bargaining power. First, during the Indo-Pakistan war the Soviet Union vetoed all the resolutions which called for immediate ceasefire at the UN Security Council. In essence, the Treaty succeeded in cutting Pakistan into two equal halves. Second, the disintegration of Pakistan reduced India's military dependence on the Soviet Union. Third, the Treaty facilitated economic cooperation between the two countries. In 1973, India had signed a 15 year economic accord with the Soviet Union. Besides supporting the Indian Five Year Plans, the Soviets put two scientific space satellites in orbit for India. As India was resolving its food crisis, the Soviet Union

25. Harshe, n.16, P.402.

came to India's rescue by offering two million tonnes of wheat.²⁶ When the oil prices began to increase after 1973, the USSR proposed a barter deal on conditions favourable to India in 1976. During the same year, they advanced credit worth 450 million dollars to India to expand the latter's steel making capacity in the public sector.²⁷ India had also received on a commercial basis considerable supplies of defence stores including submarines and aircraft from the USSR. The Socialist Republic also assisted India to establish a factory for the production of MIG-21 aircraft. The scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries had also done a great deal to advance scientific know-how in India.

Now the question arises: why the Soviet Union provided political, economic and even military support to India? During his last visit to New Delhi, Brezhnev declared in his speech at the civic reception that "we conceal from no one that we wish to see friendly and peace-loving India strong and

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

capable of successfully defending its independence.²⁸ But again the question is: why this interest in strengthening India's capability to defend her independence? The answer is: in so far as India was able to assert her sovereignty, strengthen her economic independence by advancing towards self-reliance and build her capability to defend her independence, the Imperialist and Neo-colonialist Camp was weakened and the Socialist Camp strengthened.

In short, whatever might be the aim of Soviet Union to support India, it can be said without any doubt that the capable and effective handling of the apparatus of non-alignment had won peace for this country during the major wars which she fought against her adversaries in the sub-continent. In political terms, India's non-alignment could straddle through and intersect criss-cross power configuration from a bipolar to a multi-polar world.²⁹ By the early seventies, India had become powerful enough to shape the destiny of peace in the Indian sub-continent.

28. Cited in Girish Mathur, "Socialist Camp and Non-alignment: Convergence of Interests", in Rasheeduddin Khan (ed) Perspectives on Non-alignment, New Delhi, 1981, P.215.

29. Harshe, n.16, P. 403.

ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS:

India utilised the policy of non-alignment not only to serve her politico-strategic interests, but economic interests as well. On the threshold of her independence, she had to formulate a foreign policy which would safeguard her political and economic interests and give her an international status in the comity of nations. Doing so by economic cooperation with other countries, mainly the developing ones, was one of the directions of India's foreign policy. She began this process by aiding most countries in the developing world, though she herself was a recipient of massive aid.³⁰ The framework of British Commonwealth and the United Nations served India as bases to establish and forge links with other countries of the Third World. After the Non-aligned Movement was established, it complimented India's options. In this sense, non-alignment can be viewed as a strategy to create and secure conditions for gaining comparative advantage.³¹ The decisions of

30. Anna Nodzynska-Rakajczyk, Economic Dimensions of the Non-aligned Movement (Unpublished), 1990, PP. 203-59.

31. Ibid.

the NAM and the framework of its programme offered India an opportunity to pursue her economic interests in a more sophisticated way.

India directed her first aid mainly to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma. In the 1950's her contribution stood in fifth place among the donor countries. Since then, the volume, scope and coverage of Indian participation in various economic and technical programmes steadily increased. By the middle of the 1960's, she had emerged as a major partner in the economic development of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Her motivation to extend aid, although projected in altruistic terms as duty, help, responsibility, even "philanthropic considerations" and 'moral obligations', is similar to the economic and political motives by the big powers and other developed countries.³²

There is another way in which non-alignment served the economic interests of India. Exports and their promotion received little attention of the Indian government until it experienced the first balance of payment crisis in 1957-58. Thereafter some measures of export promotion had been introduced and augmented by the early sixties. These decisions had also been partly influenced by suggestions

32. Ibid.

coming from the World Bank and IMF. Since 1965, export promotion became a fixed policy of the Indian Government. The necessary part of this policy was changing the composition of exports from traditional to non-traditional goods. During the 1960's, Indian products increasingly found new markets in Africa and Asia in addition to the traditional markets in Europe and North America. This became possible due to India's membership of NAM and the changing emphasis of the Movement from political aspects to economic advancement of the member states.

The structure of Indian economy until recently had limited the possibilities of her capitalist growth. Industrial development was curbed by a very small market for the finished products which did not expand due to lack of purchasing power and poverty of the majority of the population. The saturation point had been reached for many industries producing for urban consumers. This had led to the chronic problems of the Indian economy and its public and private industries. They were faced with the interrelated problems of underutilisation of capacity, lack of demand, lack of investment etc. An answer to those problems was to go abroad, expand Indian industries, open up and exploit productive markets wherever it was possible, mainly in Asia and Africa. In this way India became

a donor of service, aid, finance and technology. She established industries, banks and other institutions in other developing countries. Although it occurred beneath very well known rhetoric of cooperation, self-sufficiency etc, within the NAM forum, there was no doubt that Indian institutions penetrated economies of other countries and achieved some level of control over them.³³

Let us turn to another major point. The increasing influence of China in the Third World through her aid diplomacy and the defeat of India in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, caused a relative decline of India's power and privilege. Before 1960's, the foreign policy implications of economic cooperation and aid to other developing countries were not fully appreciated by India. The Chinese challenge, however, gave her an important impulse for reassessment of her system of aid diplomacy and developmental thinking. India realised the necessity to counteract the Chinese influence through adequate economic measures. She recognised the opportunity offered by the NAM forum to more contacts with other developing countries which would help for her economic expansion. Newly independent countries from all parts of the world were joining the non-

33. Ibid, PP. 123-202.

aligned movement for their economic progress. Thus, India came forward with her help and entered into bilateral cooperational agreements with many of them.

This is not all about. The earlier forms of foreign investment offered mainly by the industrialised countries had been viewed in the developing world as one of the strategies designed to carry on the dominance of the traditional colonial centres over the less developed countries. This prompted the newly independent countries of Third World to opt for foreign investments in the form of joint ventures coming from other developing countries, most of whom are also the members of the Non-aligned Movement. Among the NAM countries, India enjoyed the historical advantage of attaining political independence before most of the states within the NAM. Furthermore, factors like large geographical size, strategic location, well established army including nuclear potential, substantial trained manpower, industrial and technological advancement and a stable political system gave India an edge over most other NAM states.³⁴ Hence, she came forward to set up joint ventures and by 31st December, 1987, there were 182 joint Indian

34. Harshe, n. 16, P.404.

ventures in various parts of the world.³⁵ Out of these, 158 units were in operation and 24 were at different stages of implementation.

A study conducted by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade named three-fold advantages expected from the policy of promoting joint ventures abroad (a) creating opportunities for export of capital goods and services; (b) serving as foreign out-posts for collection of first-hand market information and widen area of contacts and finally (c) projecting the image of India as a supplier of quality goods by showing successful implementation of joint venture projects in the fact of competition in the international market.³⁶

The study did not mention the joint ventures as being India's duty towards other developing countries or as instrument of cooperation within the third world or instrument of achieving self-sufficiency. It did not contain any of the rhetorics used in the NAM forum.

The effects of India's economic diplomacy became visible by the early 1970's manifesting themselves as political and economic gains. Her policy encouraged

35. Ratajczyk, n. 30.

36. Ibid.

followers of non-alignment, influenced the increase of the demand for Indian commodities, services and technical know-how, joint ventures and training facilities within the third world.

Many authors like D.C. Vohra, Brajendranath Banerjee, project India's cooperational or aid extending behaviour towards other developing countries in altruistic terms ignoring the advantages she takes from her policy of cooperation and aid. This policy brought her spectacular gains in the form of increased exports or secured the supply of some imports which she barely needed. It influenced her capacity to expand her commercial interaction with the world market both as a buyer and seller. This is indicated by the fact that the value of her foreign trade increased by more than fifteen times during the last few years. Her export between 1951-52 and 1987-88 grew from Rs.1,106 crores to Rs.15,741 crores and imports from Rs.1,979 crores to Rs.22,399 crores.³⁷

Apart from this quantitative increase, the structure of India's exports also changed qualitatively. Primary commodities like textile, tea and jute constituted in the 1950's more than 54 per cent of India's exports. Her

37. Ibid.

exports diversified since then and in the 1980's, these commodities accounted for less than 25 per cent and engineering goods rate 10 per cent. The stress has shifted now on consumer sensitive export items like readymade garments, leather goods, gems and jewellery. Being dependent on imports of petroleum, phosphates, cadmium, antimony, nickel, tin and lithium, India tried to secure for herself supplies of these minerals through her foreign investment.

Besides these measurable gains, her aid and economic cooperation with the NAM countries enabled her access to the economies of the recipient countries, opened their markets to her goods, more so, as many of the loans and grants had been extended in convertible Indian rupees compelling the recipients to spend exclusively on Indian goods. Hence, Srikant Dutt suggested that the South-South cooperation provided India with a convenient opportunity to dispose of her industrial over-production. He goes as far as to opine that India was attempting to find colonies while "looking for a solution of its internal crisis by actively seeking markets abroad with new fields to invest and conquer and, ultimately, influence and

control politically".³⁸ Even if this is an overstatement, it highlights another dimension of India or for that matter, of any other developing country able to do the same role in the South-South cooperation.

Indian aid not only opened export markets for Indian goods, it also prepared the ground for Indian investment, enhanced procurements for her goods and services, facilitated the penetration of Indian financial and other economic institutions in developing countries. This mechanism gave India certain amount of control over the direction of development in countries and to pursue the objectives of her foreign policy.

India's participation in the South-South Cooperation was expanded further through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) launched in 1964-65. India shared through it her already developed and relatively diversified industrial experience, advanced technological capability, skilled manpower, her numerous training and research facilities and extended loans and grants.

Training was one of the most important services of the ITEC and had been particularly

38. Ibid.

emphasised in the initial years of its existence. As the developing countries school, their personnel mainly for technical jobs, it was expected that persons trained and moulded through ITEC would influence the decision-making to India's advantage and subsequently, industrial and agricultural cooperation between India and the countries sending their trainees would expand and become more effective.

The aforesaid account shows that India's 'non-alignment was not an exercise in sainthood'.³⁹ As a foreign policy strategy, it had served the national interests of India wherever possible and whenever necessary. While the policy of non-alignment served the politico-strategic interests, the membership as well as the leadership role of India in the Non-alignment Movement made it convenient for her to promote her economic interests. Consequently, Muchkund Dubey was right when he remarked that "the policy of non-alignment 'admirably served our national interests. It gave us an international profile larger than warranted by our economic strength and military power. On several

39. K.P. Mishra, Non-Alignment in International Relations, New Delhi, 1994. Source, The Hindu, April 12, 1994, P.20.

occasions, it helped in lowering tension between the rival power blocs and pulling them back from the precipice so as to enable the world to gain the urgently needed breathing space to pursue goals of economic development and political consolidation. It made it possible for us to maintain normal relations with all the major powers of the world in varying degrees of warmth and intimacy and enlist their help in carrying out the tasks of development".⁴⁰

40. Muchkund Dubey, "India's Foreign Policy in the Evolving Global Order", International Studies, April-June, 1993, PP.1-2.

CHAPTER IV

INDIA AND NAM IN THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER

The intensity and pace of change that has swept the globe in the past few years is unparalleled in recent history.¹ The unification of Germany, the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the passing of the Cold War into the pages of history and finally the emergence of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in place of the erstwhile Soviet Union constitute the central events of this historical change. The scope of this process of change has been further enhanced by several other developments which had been taking shape for quite sometime. The more vital among these are West Europe's economic unification accompanied by a somewhat slower evolution of its political unity, the revival of Germany as an eminent economic, political and military force in Central Europe, the rise in the East of Japan as an economic,

1. Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, "India's Foreign Policy in New Historical Conditions", The Patriot, 30 March, 1992.

political and military Super Power and the steady growth of America's economic and security stakes in the Asia Pacific region.²

Undoubtedly, the change in this magnitude is bound to affect international relations and most countries including the Great Powers will be forced to modify their foreign policies substantially.³ For example, the United State can no longer build its economic and political relations with the rest of the world on purely ideological opposition to Communism or political and military confrontation with Russia. The economic and security interests of America will now focus more sharply in the Asia Pacific rim where the major markets of the future are.

Similarly, Russia having abandoned ideology as a major component of its internal and external policies, has become an old fashioned Great Power which is true to some extent of the USA as well. Permanent ideology based on military alliances and bloc

2. Ibid.

3. Upendra Choudhury, "New Delhi, NAM and New World Order", Link, 4 April, 1993, P. 14.

politics of Cold War have become outdated. Russia, America and other Great Powers like United Kingdom, France, China, Germany and Japan are now likely to conduct their foreign relations on the basis of some flexible alliances.

Where are we? Should we still attach such importance to our traditional foreign policy principles like non-alignment as we did during the days of Cold War? Or should we abandon Non-aligned Movement and align with the forces of the new world? These are some of the questions raised both inside and outside the country on the present and future role of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in the post-Cold War era.

This is, however, not for the first time that the relevance of NAM has been questioned. From the early seventies when the dawn of *detente* was beginning to break over the international horizon, it used to be said that non-alignment has lost its relevance as the Super Powers were getting together in some kind of a duo-politic domination of the

world.⁴ Later it was said that a multipolar world was emerging in which non-alignment has no role to play. After the recent Gulf Crisis - with the United States appearing as the sole Super Power - it is said that the only thing to be done with non-alignment is to burry it.

According to some scholars, Non-aligned Movement was the product of Cold War and bipolarism. Since the Cold War has ended and the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the NAM has lost its relevance. To some others, NAM's work programme which was charted out earlier, has been accomplished. For instance, colonies have gained independence, apartheid has been dismantled, foreign bases have lost their significance, a modest beginning has been made in the nuclear arms reduction and more peculiarly when alliances have been disintegrating why there is non-alignment? Still there are some others who think that Non-aligned Movement should be disbanded because of its ineffective performance which become particularly evident after the recent Gulf Crisis.

4. K.R. Narayana, "Non-alignment in Changed Context", The Hindu, 30 March, 1991.

These friendly critics of non-alignment should not forget that although NAM had emerged as a new additional foreign policy choice in the years of Cold War and the bipolar world, its continued relevance had little to do with either of contexts. It is a mere coincidence that the policy originated and evolved at the time it did.⁵ While decolonialisation was the central basis of the Non-aligned Movement, the Cold War - or rather the aversion of Cold War bipolarity - only helped the form that the Movement would take in the years to come. In its founding in 1961 at both the Preparatory Ministerial Conference in Cairo in June and the Summit in Belgrade in September, NAM's declarations expressed an aversion to cold war bipolarism only as a caveat to any possible military cooperation with any of the Super Powers, rather than as a defining feature of NAM identity itself. In short, if the cold war was a tragedy for the post-war world, the denial of non-alignment in the post Cold War would be a similar tragedy for a humanity that values peace with internal sovereignty.⁶

5. M.S. Rajan, "India's Foreign Policy: The Continuing Relevance of Non-alignment", International Studies, April-June, 1993, P.142.

6. Bunn Nagara, "The Importance of Being Non-aligned", Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.20, 1992, P. 325.

Moreover, who can say that the so-called end of the Cold War between the USA and the former USSR means the end of the "very concept" from the dictionary of International Politics? As long as power politics guides the behaviour of Great Powers towards each other, there is the danger of the Cold War between and among them being resumed. All that we can say at the moment is that the Cold War as we knew it in the past, has abated for the present and that the power alignments of the past have changed. We have to wait for some more time to see how the process will finally settle down and what pattern it will eventually take. We cannot rule out the possibility of new types of alliances or even new power blocs getting formed in the near future.⁷ There may be new types of tension and confrontations which at this stage may be difficult to anticipate. Hence, any hasty conclusion about the demise of Cold War or about the big power tensions will be disastrous.

It also needs to be remembered that the end of the Cold War between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union has not made the essence of non-alignment irrelevant. The essence is the right to consider every issue on merit and

7. P.C. Alexander, "India's Foreign Policy", The Tribune, 3 May, 1992.

the right to take whatever action is considered feasible, against what is regarded as a wrong irrespective of whether that wrong is perpetuated by one power bloc in a unipolar world or by one or both the Super Powers in a bipolar world.⁸ As Nehru stated in his address to the United Nations in New York "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral".⁹ To say it in another way, "taking the essence of non-alignment as the assertion of independence in foreign affairs, non-alignment does not become irrelevant at any time. What is perhaps being objected to is the same".¹⁰

The most telling argument against the concept of NAM's irrelevance was put forward by the former President Mr R. Venkataraman in his address to the Association of Indian Diplomats. He said, "Non-alignment is not an ism. It cannot become outdated any more than commonsense can become outdated. The Cold War has ended. This does not made the UN Charter irrelevant.

8. R.C. Dutt, "India's Foreign Policy: National Interest and Principle", Mainstream, May 2, 1992, PP. 27-28.

9. Cited in Alexander, n.7.

10. Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao said whiling addressing the 10th NAM Summit in Jakarta. Source: Mainstream, September 12, 1992, P.6.

The non-aligned countries represent the will and voices of three-fourths of humankind. No nation, no group of nations, can disregard the NAM. There must be something to it for China to seek membership and Germany to get observer status of NAM... In the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties, NAM spearheaded the struggle against colonialism and racialism. It must today raise its voice against the injustices and inequities of the current decade and of the emerging 21st century".¹¹

The above analysis shows that the disappearance of the power blocs or the disintegration of one Super Power or the effectiveness of an organisation which acts as an instrument for world peace, cannot be the yardsticks for disbanding a peace oriented Movement. If that logic were to be applied, then it may well be asked: Has not the experience of many poor countries round the world in dealing with the United Nations been both exasperating and frustrating? Has the UN always been effective? Should it then cease to exist?

11. Source: The Patriot, 17 Maarch, 1992.

The world has no doubt changed, but the many ills plaguing it have by no means disappeared or evaporated.¹² It may be that the quality and content of the crises which the world will face in the coming decades will be different but no less menacing for the non-aligned countries. There are at least eleven major points which confirm this thesis.

Firstly, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Russia's decision to abdicate its status as a Super Power by resiling its commitment to security overseas and forging a link of active strategic cooperation with the Western Powers, the United States has emerged as the only Super Power in the world.¹³ Indeed it has the habit of playing the role of world policeman and of dominating others. The absence of a countervailing power against the USA poses a new challenge for the foreign policy makers of India and other countries of the Non-aligned Movement.

12. S. Viswam, "Relevance of NAM Today", World Focus, November-December, 1992, P. 22.

13. Muchkund Dubey, "India's Foreign Policy in the Evolving Global Order", International Studies, April-June, 1993, P.119.

Although America is militarily the only Super Power, as far as the economic matters are concerned, the world is multipolar. Three new centres of economic power have emerged - North America dominated by the United States, Europe dominated by the United Germany and Asia and the Pacific region dominated by Japan. These new centres are competing with each other for the world market, raw materials and political influence.¹⁴

In spite of their competition in the economic field, these powers have a common security and strategic objective; they have a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo* in view of the rise of new powers like India, Indonesia, Brazil etc. in the Third World. Instead of two rival power blocs contending for hegemony as in the era of the cold war, today, we have a "new alliance" striving to establish its hegemony by imposing what is known as the "New World Order" which the late Rajiv Gandhi feared might mean "a world made to order". This alliance consists of both East and West and Japan against the rest of the world, particularly the Third World. Germany and Japan are still dependent on the USA for their

14. Ibid.

own security. China due to her socio-political compulsions is also a member of the new alliance. Being aware of the limits imposed upon it by the economic factors, the United States prefers to work through the new alliance rather than all alone.

For the developing countries this multipolarity presents an uncertain, complex and gloomy environment in which there may not be many new opportunities, but increased vulnerability. At present there seems to be no change of the developing countries being able to exploit the differences that obtain *inter se* among the major economic powers. Of course, the situation may change in the medium and long run.

Secondly, after the collapse of the Socialist Community, only one model of political/ economic development for all nations is being championed by the world's Capitalist Countries and is being meekly accepted by many other nations".¹⁵ The issue involved is not the merits and demerits of the two different political/economic models, but the fact that there are tremendous diversities of all kinds among nations, no single model is appropriate for all states.

15. M.S. Rajan, "The Emerging New World Order", World Focus, November-December, 1992, P.5.

The fact that the Western developed states led by the United States are presently dominating the world scene is distorting the merits/demirits of the different political and economic models and misleading many nations. This is particularly noticeable in the so-called conditionalities of the World Bank/IMF being imposed by these institutions on the developing countries. The truth of the matter is that there have never been in operation (or never been tried successfully) pure Capitalist or Socialist economies either in the United States or in the former USSR. There have always been different degrees or models of either or both the models.

The Third World countries are also being pressurised to agree to all the demands of the developed world on the question of opening of markets and intellectual property rights, even though the fact of the matter is that protectionist trends are rising in the developed countries at the time when most of the developing countries are seriously reforming their economies and providing for market regulation.¹⁶ So also is the impression being fostered that the Third World is somehow responsible for environmental

16. V.P. Dutt, "New World Disorder, "World Focus, November-December, 1992, P.8

pollution when actually it is the wanton wastage of resources by the Northern countries that has been the chief source of environmental degradation.¹⁷ The Northern governments are bent upon maintaining their unsustainable production and consumption systems. At the sametime, they expect the Southern governments to make all the adjustments and sacrifices necessary to keep the environment safe for the North. Now the prospects of the North imposing sanctions and other punitative measures on the South in the name of environmental protection looms large before us.¹⁸

Thirdly, there is a tendency on the part of the developed countries to impose stringent restrictions on the transfer of technology to the developing countries. The ever-growing list of items subjected to the so-called dual use restrictions effectively threatens to deprive the developing countries of the fruits of technological progress in many key areas.¹⁹ Such restrictions have come to cover everything from computers to machine tools, to specialised alloys to

17. Ibid.

18. K.R. Panikkar, "Has the Non-aligned Movement Became Irrelevant", Third World Ressurgence, No.26, 1992, P.23.

19. Rao, n.10, P.36.

chemicals and even to medical equipment. They are imposed in the name of preventing proliferation even though the major responsibility for proliferation often rests with the very countries that are imposing the restrictions. This is extremely unfair.

Fourthly, the world continues to be divided into the nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots'. The nuclear 'haves' seem to be determined to retain their arsenals of the nuclear weapons, albeit on a reduced scale and to prevent others from acquiring such weapons. The irony is that the targets of nuclear weapons are now the countries of the Third World as these are being looked upon as the main threat to the security of the nuclear-weapon powers. Instead of being discarded after the end of the Cold War, deterrence is being retained and honed for being used discriminatory against the countries of the Third World. The countries of the Third World are now under tremendous pressure to desist from developing weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their alleged excessive military expenditure.²⁰

20. Dubey, n. 13, P. 121.

Fifthly, instead of revitalising multilateralism under the United Nations, the new alliance headed by the United States has successfully mounted an all out campaign to destroy the multilateral character of the world body to alter its agenda and to undermine its functioning in certain areas. Hard-core economic issues like the removal of poverty, developmental plans, trade, money, finance and debt have been taken off the agenda of the United Nations and transferred to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, over which they have greater control and which permit them to use cross-conditionalities and cross-retaliation.²¹ Organisations forming part of the UN family are being held in leash through denial of the finances due to them. And in the UN Security Council, it is the permanent members which, acting in close cooperation, take all the decisions affecting world peace and security.

Sixthly, the world is still divided between the industrialised countries which constitute the North and the developing countries of the South. Trade and commerce, science and technology, banks and insurance companies, airlines and shipping companies all tie the

21. Ibid, PP. 121-22.

world together but the strings are held by the rich industrialised countries which constitute the Centre of power.²² The developing countries, representing three fourths of the world population are merely the periphery. Here is a system, a legacy of colonialist-imperialist era which operates to the advantages of the North and in which the developing countries have little or no say even in matters which affect their vital interests. The new alliance instead of reforming the existing international framework, would like to see it further strengthened.

Over the period, various programmes were initiated both at the national and the international levels, to improve the living conditions of those enduring hunger, disease, unemployment and shelterlessness in the developing countries. But there has been hardly any improvement. The 1980's have witnessed further deterioration because of the debt trap, shrinking commodity prices and protective economic measures adopted by the countries of the North. The

22. K.P. Saksena, "New World Order and Human Rights", World Focus, March, 1992, P.4.

debt burden of the developing countries have reached the mind-boggling figure of \$1.3 trillion.²³

The World Economic Survey 1991 refers to the 1980's as the lost decade for the developing countries and predicts a grimmer picture for them during the ensuing decade. There has been a reverse flow of financial resources from the South to the North, amounting to some 200 billion dollars during the last seven years.²⁴ Thus, the poor South is forced to contribute to the growing affluence of the rich North.

Lack of financial resources and increasing burden of transferring their hard-earned foreign exchange resources to meet debt-serving and related obligations have forced most of the developing countries to cut down on allocation of funds for medicare, education and social service etc.

As noted by the former Secretary General of the UNO, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, in his last Annual Report (1991) the rising affluence in the North and increasing poverty in the South are a pronounced paradoxical feature of the present world scene. About 80 per cent of the world outputs is

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

exploited and consumed by the countries of the North presenting some 15 per cent of the world population. Mr Cuellar had warned that no system of peace and security would be viable unless workable solutions were sought to the problem of poverty and destitution afflicting a greater part of the world. While pleading anew for the need of building a framework of partnership between the North and the South to resolve global economic issues, he once again drew attention to the growing "intensified alienation between increasingly affluent and homogenous North and increasingly impoverished and desperate South "which if allowed to persist would be a tragedy of great proportions".²⁵

Seventhly, there is a quest for regional balance of power through induction of sophisticated arms from abroad. The motive is both strategic, i.e, to prevent regional powers from upsetting the regional balance in their respective regions, and commercial, i.e., to dispose of the arms rendered surplus with the end of the Cold War and to prevent the closure of the industrial units which produce arms. Modern arms have a fluidity of their own.²⁶ They are not necessarily used by the country to which they are

25. *Ibid*, P.7.

26. Dubey, n. 13, p. 122.

supplied and in the region of their first destination. They have a destabilising effect both in the region where they are originally inducted and in the adjoining regions to which they travel. This also has an adverse effect on the overall process of disarmament.

Eighthly, there are a number of *ad hoc* discriminatory regimes aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These include regimes for chemical weapons (the Australian Club) nuclear weapons (the COCOM Arrangements) and Missiles (the Missile Technology Control Regimes, or MTCR). The lists of dual purpose technologies, substances and equipment which cannot be exported to the countries of the Third World under these regimes are so extensive as to have the effect of freezing the technological and industrial development of the developing countries in those vital areas.²⁷ It is also very difficult to judge whether the restrictions applied in any particular case are motivated by the commercial consideration of preventing the country concerned from developing competitive capacity or by the consideration of ensuring non-proliferation. These regimes

27. Ibid.

have no sanction of international law. As they are outside the United Nations and their membership is restricted, they have the effect of undermining multilateralism.

Ninethly, all the Third World countries are facing today the threat of the disintegration of nation-states. The examples are Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Being sure of their own national integrity, which is underpinned by their military power or that of their allies and in view of their own relative political stability and economic prosperity, the countries of the new alliance have started espousing causes and championing principles aimed to encourage fissiparous tendencies in those countries of the Third World where the economic and political situation is far from stable.²⁸ This may lead further disintegration of nation-states; recently discovered enthusiasm of the new alliance for self determination in parts of sovereign states, its determination to use its political and economic leverage to interfere in the affairs of other states in the name of human rights and good governance and

28. Ibid.

the sanctions that it has successfully sought for intervention in other countries on humanitarian grounds - are all pointers in this direction. Sovereignty, of late, has never been absolute, but now it is being subjected to further curtailment and abridgement.

Tenthly, there is a trend at present in the field of trade to resort increasingly to unilateral and bilateral coercive measures as exemplified in the application of the Special and Super 301 of the US Trade and Competitiveness Act, to negotiate reciprocal access to markets and to use cross-retaliation. This practice has not been stopped even after signing the GATT Treaty at Marrakesh by 115 countries²⁹ including America in April 1994. Moreover, the attempt by the developed countries to raise new issues not directly linked to trade, such as labour standards, social conditions and environment as the recently concluded GATT Treaty shows, clearly proves that the newly formed world trading system is not going to serve the interests of the developing countries.

29. Frontline, May 6, 1994, P.123.

Last but not the least comes the question of armament. The USA and Russia, even after START-11 is fully implemented by 2003, would possess 6,500 strategic (and unspecified non-strategic) warheads³⁰ which could destroy the world only twenty-times as compared to the capacity to destroy it sixty-times at the peak of the Cold War. The United Kingdom and Russia have signed a Treaty of Friendship and USA-Russia perceive a "strategic partnership" for the future (and are discussing cooperation in ballistic missile defences).

The second tier nuclear weapon states (China, France and the United Kingdom) are showing no signs of even beginning to reduce their arsenals. All of them are modernising their nuclear arsenals and the United Kingdom, in fact, will increase its strategic stockpile from present 196 warheads to over 500 by 2003.³¹ China already possesses close to 1600 nuclear warheads,³² while closely cooperating with Russia in military, nuclear, technological fields and with an increasing trade technology relationship with the USA and its allies.

30. Jasjit Singh, "Future of NPT", World Focus, November-December, 1992, P.24.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

The above analysis shows that with the end of the Cold War, the threat to and pressure on, the independence of the non-aligned countries have assumed new forms. The present negative trends in the world are contrary to the aims and objectives of the Non-aligned Movement for a just, equitable and democratic world order. None of the NAM countries or group of countries, however big or rich they may be, can be able to face these new realities alone. Hence, the countries of NAM must continue to hang heads together for common thought and action.³³ But question arises: how to bell the cat? The answer is: the non-aligned countries can reverse the above negative trends by three important ways: (a) reforming and strengthening the United Nations; (b) encouraging South-South Cooperation; and finally, (c) consolidating the Movement through necessary reforms.

First of all, it is a matter of great satisfaction for all the Third World countries that the United Nations has, at last, come into its own in the fifth decade of its existence. While even today, there is a tendency to subordinate the global agenda to narrow national concerns,

33. M.I. Chambas, "The NAM in the Post-Cold War Era". Review of International Affairs, April 5, 1991, PP.6-7.

we are happy to note that the UN is more effective than ever before.³⁴ To make it even more effective, the Non-aligned Countries should actively work to strengthen the multilateral system under the United Nations so that the world body can be more responsive to their demands and needs by successfully countering the negative trends of the post-Cold War era. This can be possible by the following ways:

- i) There is a need for an enhancement of the General Assembly's security role, briefly enunciated in Article 14 of the UN Charter. Further under Art.22 a 'Security Commission' of the General Assembly should be established to monitor, anticipate conflict situations around the globe and take timely action for their peaceful settlement.³⁵ The UN Secretary General's security related role should be linked to the Commissions functioning in order to enhance both.
- ii) There is also the need to restructure and revitalise the United Nations in the economic, social and other related fields so as to strengthen and make them more

34. Rao, n.10, P. 35.

35. D. Jeevan Kumar, "NAM in the Post-Cold War Era", Deccan Herald, 4 March, 1992.

responsive to both changing realities and the development needs of the developing countries.³⁶

- iii) The NAM countries should lend support to the recommendations of the UN Secretary General for the establishment of a Permanent Peace Keeping Force of the United Nations.³⁷
- iv) They should vigorously pursue the proposal of India submitted to the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, for the establishment of a multilateral verification system under the United Nations.
- v) They should further take the lead in strengthening the dispute settlement mechanism under the United Nations by introducing an element of compulsion and enhancing and strengthening the role of the International Court of Justice.
- vi) And finally, the United Nations would not be able to function independently for the benefit of all the countries of the Third World until its funding is put on a long term automatic basis.³⁸

36. The Statesman, 1 September, 1992.

37. Dubey, n.13, P. 125.

38. Ibid.

However, if the decision-making process in the United Nations, particularly in the UN Security Council, is not democratised, reform of the UN on the above lines would be counter-productive for the non-aligned countries. The strengthened United Nations would be used against those countries by way of imposing the peace keeping force on them, subjecting them to compulsory arbitration for compliance with norms and standards on environment etc. and authorising interventions in those countries on humanitarian grounds.³⁹ Given some of their unique problems, the NAM countries would be vulnerable to such pressures. Hence, the Non-aligned Movement should press for the democratisation of the UNO especially its Security Council.

Second, the non-aligned countries must themselves learn to recognise their own capacities and come out of the spell of the glamour of the developed countries. The South must respect the South as a first step towards South-South Cooperation.⁴⁰ The theory of interdependence in the economic field should be applied among the members of the Movement, the strengthening and consolidation of which will be the

39. Ibid.

40. Rao, n.10, P.35.

surest weapon for the protection of their political independence.⁴¹ This economic cooperation between the NAM countries should be strengthened both at the intra-associational and inter-associational levels.⁴² In extending this cooperation:

- a) The NAM must agree on each member contributing one per cent of its GNP to establish a Common Development Fund so that the least developed countries could be brought up to the levels of others.
- b) The Movement must also agree on liberalisation of trade within the South. Each member country must extend to the other the most favoured nation treatment. The larger countries within the South must extend to the smaller ones unilateral concessions in the field of trade.
- c) And finally, the transfer of technology within the South must take place on convenient terms.⁴³

41. Wafaa Hegazy, "Impact of Detente on the Future Role of NAM", Review of International Affairs, 20 April, 1991, P.14.

42. R.S. Yadav, "NAM in the New World Order", India Quarterly, July-September, 1993, P.62.

43. Satish Kumar, "NAM must set its House in Order", The Times of India, 7 October, 1991.

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Rather than lamenting the plight of the South, concrete steps must be taken within the South to uplift its condition. Once this begins to be done, the help of the North will not be needed.

But nothing could be possible unless and until the Non-aligned Movement sets its own house in order. The foremost problem faced by the NAM today is the membership issue.⁴⁴ Though its membership has increased four fold (from mere 25 in 1961 to 109 in 1994) along with a number of guests and observers, yet the admission has been somewhat indiscriminate in certain cases. The five criteria⁴⁵ laid down by the 21 nation Preparatory Committee at Cairo in 1961 were neither "precise nor unambiguous". Yet care must be taken in considering the requests for new admission. Mere strength without conviction on the part of its members, will

44. Yadav, n.41, P.60.

45. The five criteria for membership are:

- a) The country concerned should adopt an independent policy based on co-existence of states;
- b) It should support the national liberation movement;
- c) It should not be a member of multilateral military alliance, concluded in the context of Great Power Conflicts;
- d) Bilateral military agreements should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of great power conflicts; and
- e) If it has conceded military bases that should not be made in the context of a great power conflict.

destroy the identity and credibility of the Movement instead of preserving it. Secondly, lack of self-discipline on the part of the NAM countries is also a matter of great concern. The member countries should refrain from interfering each others internal affairs and settle their disputes peacefully. Members violating these principles should be heavily punished by way of sanctions from the movement as a whole. Thirdly, in order to be effective, the NAM should also devise mechanisms for monitoring global events and timely intervention, wherever necessary.⁴⁶ And finally, the Movement should change its procedures and methods of work. The method of consensus should be abandoned in favour of two-thirds majority for reaching any decision.

In conclusion, we can say that the future of the Non-aligned Movement depends on what we make of the Movement and how we respond to the world's political economic and military order. In this regard, it would be the endeavour of leading countries like India to give this Movement a new direction and a new thrust in the light of the cataclysmic changes that the world has recently witnessed. Those who argue that the end of the Cold War has rendered non-alignment obsolete are, in fact, saying that

46. Dubey, n. 13, P.126.

the Third World should leave it to the West to shape the destiny of humanity as a whole. As the only universal political forum for developing countries, the NAM is a potential venue for discussing a number of political, economic and humanitarian issues like the democratisation of international relations especially the UNO Security Council, security for small and weak nations, disarmament, collective measures for achieving economic progress, lightening the debt burden of the developing countries, halting the deteriorating terms of trade, the North South dialogue, human rights, environmental issues, drug trafficking, international terrorism and religious fundamentalism, New International Economic Order, New International Information and Technological Order, etc. and to find out solutions for them. It is not that the benefits which the Non-aligned Movement will get out of its struggle against the hegemonism of the West will not be shared by India. Hence, the question of abandoning non-alignment by India in the post-Cold War era does not arise at all.

CHAPTER V

RELEVANCE OF NAM FOR INDIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS

Soon after assuming power in June 1991, the new Indian Government under the leadership of Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao, has decided to follow the "Nehruvian Line" in foreign policy and reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the Non-aligned Movement and the Policy. In party politics, while the traditional national consensus on many foreign policy issues appears to have broken, the old consensus on India's continued adherence to the policy of non-alignment seems to be as solid as ever.¹ Mr Rao, a former Minister for External Affairs in a speech in Tokyo in June 1992 said:

"The pursuit of a non-aligned policy is even more relevant today than ever before. Non-alignment basically consist of the espousal of the right of the nations to independence and development regardless of the bloc phenomenon. Whether there is one bloc or more at a given moment, the urge of a non-aligned country would continue to be to maintain its independence, to take decisions according to its lights, not tagging itself in advance to others"²

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1. M.S. Rajan, "India and NAM", World Focus", November-December, 1991, P. 24.
 2. Cited in M.S. Rajan, "India's Foreign Policy: The Continuing Relevance of NAM", International Studies, April-June, 1993, PP. 143-44.

But the question that India needs to raise in this context is whether the continued membership of NAM would enable it to further its national interests or not? In today's context, our overall priorities are to maintain unity and territorial integrity of the country, to ensure our geo-political security by creating a durable environment of stability and peace in our region and to build up a framework conducive for the economic well-being of our people by encouraging a healthy economic environment.³ Will NAM bring pressure to bear on Pakistan to halt its mischief in Jammu and Kashmir? Will it appreciate our stand on nuclear proliferation? Will it promote more investments and transfer of technology to this country? These are some of the questions at present which should be properly answered.

The relevance of NAM for India in the post-Cold War years can be studied by suitably dividing it into the following broad categories: (i) politico-strategic, and (ii) economic and humanitarian.

3. S. Viswam, "Foreign Policy Initiatives", National Herald, 8 July 1994.

POLITICO-STRATEGIC:

Considering that the assertion of independence in foreign affairs is the very essence of Non-alignment, at the politico-strategic level, this policy always remains valid and relevant for India, as it was during the world of two Super Powers. This is because that no Government in this country would dare to abdicate independence of judgement and action - the pre-requisite of a sovereign nation state - in the years to come. Apart from this, there are also some other reasons why NAM should continue to occupy an important place in the foreign policy of India.

POLITICAL:

In the political sphere, the linking of Human Rights with the economic assistance by the West in general and the USA in particular is a matter of serious concern for a country like India. In fact, it has been used by these countries as an excuse for interfering in the internal

affairs of other countries.⁴ Financial aid and even trade is now sought to be made dependent on the observance of civil and political rights. For example, John Mallot, a senior US official who visited India last year said that the Clinton Administration was under tremendous pressure to make trade and economic assistance conditional on India's improving human rights records, gently pointing out at the same time that even assistance from the IMF and the World Bank could be jeopardised if the alleged human rights abuses in Punjab and Kashmir continued.⁵ Besides US, now-a-days Japan has also become a staunch supporter of human rights by linking developmental assistance with it. Similarly, to Canada - another developed country - progress and human rights should be the central element of developmental assistance.

Aid giving institutions such as World Bank, IMF and the United Nations Developmental Programme (UNDP) are also laying extra emphasis on human rights dimensions. Concepts such as devaluation, trade liberalisation, withdrawal of subsidies, privatisation and free entry of foreign capital are indiscriminately applied to every country irrespective

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4. Upendra Choudhury, "New Delhi, NAM and New World Order", link, 4 April, 1993, P. 15.
 5. S. Viswan, "India and NPT", World Focus, May, 1993, P.18.

of its specific socio-economic problems forgetting at the same time that these measures have an adverse effect on human rights'.⁶

What is more ironical is that 'the human rights which provide a shield for the innocent to protect them from atrocities'⁷ are being 'hijacked' by the countries like America to bring Pressure on India on issues like the nuclear non-proliferation. They encourage countries like Pakistan to export terrorism and shed crocodile tears for the alleged violation of human rights of the terrorist groups who torture and kill hundreds of innocent civilians, brutalise and rape women, selectively target politicians, human right activists, media persons and academicians, set fire to houses, government buildings, bridges, T.V. and other communication centres etc., to uproot the local population. These terrorist outfits are variously described as 'armed opposition groups', 'the political opposition', 'freedom fighters' in order to impart legitimacy to those

6. K.P. Saksena, "New World Order and Human Rights", World Focus, March 1992, P.7.

7. H.N. Shingal, "Kashmir: Human Rights Trap", The Hindustan Times, 26 April, 1994.

using force.⁸ Tactics such as 'self-determination of the Kashmiri people', 'taking into account the wishes of the people of kashmir', 'Kashmir as a disputed territory' etc. are being used to create internal disturbances and force the Government of India to toe the line dictated by Washington. There cannot be a situation in which human rights are seen to be the preserve of the practitioners of terrorism, while those battling the menace courageously in extreme difficult circumstances are falsely condemned for the violation of human rights.⁹ Let us not forget that Abraham Lincoln who was such a stickler for constitutional proprieties had no compunction about throwing human rights to the winds when the question was one of preserving the Union of the United States.¹⁰ The Union of India has every sort of rights to take recourse of such means. Moreover, if the Americans did not stand for the British mediation during their Civil War of 1866, then why should the Indians will support America's mediation to solve their problem in Jammu and Kashmir?

8. M.K. Dhar, "The Human Rights Clash in Geneva", The Hindustan Times, 7 March 1994, P.12.

9. Ibid.

10. Manishankar Aiyar, "Clinton from Lincoln", Sunday, 20-26 February, PP. 34-37.

If the so-called 'champions of human rights' are really moved by the humanitarian values and not by political considerations and want to be effective in maintaining their policy around human rights and aid, there is a need for both credibility and consistency. Credibility is related to the ability of a particular country to ensure that within its national borders groups like refugees, migrant workers and its own underprivileged classes are not subject to discriminatory and arbitrary treatment. There can be no such credibility if there is conspicuous disparity between domestic practices and international policies on the question of human rights. The vicious beating of Rodney King (an American Negro) by the white American Police and "the not-guilty verdict of the American judiciary despite impeccable evidence against them, is a stark example in this context.

The issue of consistency arises when there is selectivity with regard to the countries who are subject to punitive measures. A stark example of the double standards followed by the leading nations is that while the genocide in Bosnia and Burundi is overlooked, the alleged atrocities against the Shia Community of Iraq bring massive air-attack of the Western countries. All this even without UN's approval.

Is the decision for suspending or terminating development assistance based solely on human right considerations? It is palpable that factors such as geopolitical importance, economic model pursued by the recipient country and the domestic needs of the donor country are much more likely to influence such decisions. Again, in the matter of sanctions in trade, it is more a protectionist tactic than true concern for human rights. The best example is the attempt by the USA and its Western allies to introduce a "social clause" in the newly signed GATT Treaty at Marrakesh to get unfair trade advantage over the developing countries.

So any attempt by the developed countries to interfere in the internal affairs of the developing countries in the pretext of human rights by linking it with trade or aid should be strongly opposed. As India is not the only Third World country to suffer from such evil designs of the West and other countries are equally vulnerable to such tactics, it will be easy for India to get the collective support of all Third World countries for resisting such pressures. Non-aligned Movement as the only forum for the developing countries, provides an ideal platform to ventilate these grievances. It is

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important to mention in this context that the 10th Non-aligned Summit's call for delinking human rights from trade is a step in the right direction.

Secondly, with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the United Nations (UNO) has got a new lease of life. In order to make it more effective and challenging to the realities of the post-Cold War era, all the 15 members of the UN Security Council met for the first time in New York at the Summit level on 31 January 1992 by acknowledging the need to strengthen the United Nations in the following words:

"The international community faces new challenges in the search of peace. All member states expect the United Nations to play a central role at this crucial stage. The members of the Council stress the importance of strengthening and improving the United Nations to increase its effectiveness".¹¹

This is, no doubt, commendable, but what is, however, ironical is that the objective is sought to be achieved through management reforms not through structural changes. There is nothing in the statement to suggest that for a

11. Cited in Satish Chandra, "Towards a Stronger and More Democratic United Nations - India's Role", International Studies, April-June, 1993, PP. 173-88.

greater role of the world body, the democratisation of the Security Council is needed especially when the membership of the United Nations has reached from a mere 51 in 1945 to 184 at present.

But, the sentiment in favour of bringing the Security Council in line with the present day realities, was expressed by the Prime Minister of India who attended the Summit as India was a non-permanent member of the Council at that time. In his speech, Mr Narasimha Rao said, "as the composition of the General Assembly has trebled since its inception, the size of the Security Council cannot remain constant any longer. Wider representation in the Council is a must if it is to ensure its moral sanction and political effectiveness".¹²

According to a report of the International Herald Tribune (August 14, 1992), the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, has suggested that the Security Council should have 5 more permanent members - Brazil, India, Germany, Japan and Nigeria. The paper published its report a day after the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, had made public Bonn's intention of staking its claim for a permanent seat in the Security

12. Ibid.

Council. The paper had also written that the Government of Germany, which had maintained a rather low profile on the question, become conspicuously active when it learnt that Japan had informed the United States and other countries of its wish for a permanent seat in the Council with the next three years.

India has also formally staked its claim to a permanent seat in the Security Council on 25 September 1992 when India's Minister of States for External Affairs, Eduardo Falerio, addressed the U.N. General Assembly. Falerio observed how, together with economic criteria, it was necessary to give weightage to certain other relevant issues too at the time of expanding the Security Council. In saying so, he reinforced the view held by the members of the other developing countries that the population and the size of a country as well as its standing in the region concern needed to be given due weightage.

Although there is increasing recognition of the need to review the composition and the procedures of the Security Council, it is obvious that there are wide differences of opinion. Some states want to maintain *status quo* as they are the beneficiaries of it; others want change as they feel left out of the global power structure. For instance, China, already a permanent member of the Security Council, which

attended the 10th Non-aligned Movement's Summit in Jakarta in September 1992 as an observer, "did not show much inclination towards the consensus view on enlarging the membership of the 15 nation Security Council".¹³ Similarly, France and the United Kingdom have not shown much enthusiasm for expanding the Council as they do not apparently relish the prospect of Germany joining their ranks.

The United States has indicated its grudging acceptance of the candidature of Germany and Japan in the event of the Security Council being expanded without sounding encouragement about other countries in the field. This means the obvious qualification for the USA is that a country must be either a nuclear power or an economic power before it can aspire to sit on the hallowed table.

Not all the permanent members of the Security Council today can be said to belong to the category of militarily most capable states. They are just nuclear weapon states and have vast arsenals of conventional weapons. When, however, it comes to economic capability, China is no match for the other four states. Within the spell of past one decade or so Germany and Japan have surpassed France and United Kingdom in economic strength. And in the last two

13. Ibid.

years, the Russian Federation - a successor state to the Soviet Union - has undergone an economic collapse. In terms of per capita GDP, India and China are very close to each other (in 1989 India's per capita GDP was \$340 and China's per capita GDP was \$350).¹⁴ In other aspects also India is fully qualified to be given a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. For example, one quarter of the world's population lives in South-Asia - most of them in India. Early in the next century, India will overtake china as the world's most populous country. It is the world's largest democracy and the second largest English speaking country. It has the fifth largest economy, the fourth largest army, the third largest scientific and technical community and the second largest number of software professionals.¹⁵

But the question is how it is possible for India to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council? As the 50th anniversary of the United Nations is approaching nearer (October 24, 1995), there is every possibility that the international community might agree to some sort of vital reforms of the world body including the democratisation of

14. Ibid.

15. L. Hamilton, "Indo-US Relations", The Hindustan Times, 18 May 1992, P.13.

the Security Council. The Jakarta Summit of the Non-aligned countries (1992) has already demanded the restructuring of the United Nations and set up a High Level Working Group "to elaborate concrete proposals and suggestions for the restructuring, democratisation and enhancing the effectiveness of the UNO".¹⁶ India which is already a member of this Group, should fully explore the opportunity and mobilise the world public opinion through the Non-aligned Movement in favour of her just and legitimate demand. David Lange, a former Prime Minister of New Zealand, was consequently right when he remarked that "many of us hope that India, a nation of great influence untrampled by alliance and with proud history since the Republic was founded of not being the cat's paw of any great power might take a lead amongst the disempowered to radically reform the Charter of UNO by 1995. It is time to break out of the venality and institutionalise hypocrisy which characterise current international diplomacy and forge a world order where principles stand a fighting chance

16. Chakravarthi Raghavan, "NAM Works Towards UN Restructuring", Third World Resurgence, No.26, 1992, P.33.

of surviving the challenge of money and power."¹⁷

And thirdly, the Non-aligned Movement provides the best forum for India to exercise its traditional leadership role. This is especially important when out of the three founding members of NAM, Yugoslavia has been disintegrated, and another member Egypt, disowned the Movement at the Accra meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned countries in September 1991. Further, the Socialist bloc led by the erstwhile Soviet Union which had given unequivocal support to the Movement did not exist anymore. Under these circumstances, it is the moral duty and the long term national interest of India that it should provide its bold and dynamic leadership to the NAM. Moreover, India's continuing adherence to Non-alignment and leadership of the NAM are important not just because India is a pioneer but mainly because the country has been a faithful model for others.¹⁸ Its contribution to the traditional foreign policy choices available to states till the beginning of the Cold War and its steadfast adherence to that policy for

17. Cited in I.K. Gujral, "Restructuring the UNO", World Focus, November-December, 1992, P.20.

18. Rajan, n.1, P.25.

over four decades despite some domestic, political and other changes, is well known. It is therefore important not only for the sake of India but also for the rest of the 108 members of the NAM (including especially for the other South Asian States) that India should continue to hold high the flag of the Movement.¹⁹ Last but not least is that the doctrinal framework of NAM provides philosophical moorings to India's foreign policy. Its abandonment will bring India neither respect nor quick and easy financial or other gains. India's distinct role in the world 'not as a power but as a civilizational force' will cease to exist.²⁰

STRATEGIC:

Besides the above political reasons, there are also some strategic reasons why NAM is relevant for India in the post-Cold War era.

19. Ibid, P. 26.

20. M. Rasgotra & K.P. Mishra, "Future Agenda of Non-alignment", Monthly Public Opinion Surveys, September 1991, P. 13.

For the last two decades, India has been under consistent pressure mostly from nuclear weapon states, to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed the pressure has been there from the 70's from the time when the NPT came into force but it intensified after India exploded a nuclear device in Pokhran, in Rajasthan, in 1974.²¹ While successive governments in India had consistently refused to sign the Treaty on the ground that it was discriminatory in nature, the present government finds it difficult to ignore the issue altogether.

According to India, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty provides legitimacy to nuclear weapons in the hands of a few countries and detracts from the objective of complete nuclear disarmament. It does little to stop vertical proliferation and seeks to deprive non-nuclear weapon states of even peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE).²² It does not confer uniform obligations on nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT is not even an international regime in the true sense. It not only allowed but even encouraged proliferation of nuclear weapons by the

21. Viswam, n.4, P. 17.

22. Lakhan Mehrotra, "India's Foreign Policy Options in the Changing World", World Affairs, Vol.1, 1992, P.21.

nuclear weapon states. It is also considered as a measure designed to disarm the unarmed. Paul Loventhal of the Washington based Nuclear Control Institute has rightly remarked that the NPT "invited catastrophe" because of its inherent short-comings.²³

While India shares the concern with regards to nuclear proliferation, "she does not believe that partial and unjust measures or punitive action on a selective basis will achieve the desired results",²⁴ said India's Ambassador, Satish Chandra to the UN Commission on Disarmament on 20 April 1993. He said that close door club groups and regimes created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade and technology, equipment and material on discriminatory basis would not prevent proliferation. Nor can initiatives which in reality only preserve the monopoly of a few states over weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, land export proliferational weapons contribute to prevention. He also said that while non-nuclear weapon states such as India scrupulously adhered to a policy of non-proliferation despite acquiring a nuclear technology capability and

23. Upendra Choudhury, "Options for the NPT Review", National Herald, 5 August, 1993.

24. Cited in World Focus, May, 1993, P.22.

refrain from assisting any other state,²⁵ there is free and frantic competition among the nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear destructive capability. It is important to mention here that the number of nuclear warheads increased four-fold since the NPT was signed in spite of the nuclear disarmament commitment by the five nuclear weapon states.

Reports from the US say that the Clinton Administration is "seeking a comprehensive, step-by-step approach, first to cap, then to reduce and finally to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery from South Asia".²⁶ With those last two words removed, India will have no quarrels with the objective - Mr Clinton must be told about the futility of invoking punitive US laws and procedures to pressurise India.

In a reply to the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, has recently reiterated that "India will not sign the NPT unless it was universal, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable".²⁷ The letter states that the global

25. Ibid.

26. The Hindustan Times (Editorial), 5 May, 1994.

27. The Hindustan Times, 5 May, 1994, P.10.

nuclear environment has witnessed many important changes. In the name of non-proliferation, attempts are on to perpetuate monopoly of nuclear weapons of some, while compelling others to close their options in this regard. We have always advocated peaceful use of nuclear energy. We continue to believe that to be effective, non-proliferation measures must be universal, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable.

Given our security environment, we cannot agree to construct any constraint which do not address our security concerns adequately or that are discriminatory against us. What we really want is a scenario which brings about complete and total nuclear disarmament within a time frame. This is a national stand which we have taken and there is no way we can resile from this stand. We took it in most unambiguous terms in 1988 and since then that is our stand.²⁸

However, if India just takes a stand on the question of nuclear issue and remains at home, it is not that all her problems will be solved. When the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is going to be finally reviewed in the next year at

28. Ibid.

Geneva (September, 1995), India should take all necessary steps in this direction so that its view points would be suitably accommodated and its interest served. It is in this sense that forthcoming NPT Review Conference is crucial not only for India but also for those who have not signed it.

According to reliable sources, with 155 countries now party to the NPT²⁹ most of them desire for an indefinite extension of the Treaty. India should examine this thesis seriously. It is true that no state will risk an open confrontation and demand scrapping of the NPT or withdraw from it at this stage save North Korea. Nor it is necessary. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that 179 out of 184 states are comfortable and satisfied with making nuclear asymmetry a permanent feature. Even states party to the NPT would expect the five nuclear haves to honour their obligations and substantially reduce the gap between nuclear states and non-nuclear states.³⁰

Under these circumstances, India should cooperate with the like-minded countries both parties as well

29. Upendra Choudhury, "Implications of North Korean Withdrawal from NPT", Mainstream, 29 May 1993, P. 23.

30. Jasjit Singh, "Future of NPT", World Focus, November-December, 1992, P. 25.

as not parties to the NPT who also constitute the members of NAM, for extending the Treaty by incorporating certain amendments which will make it just and non-discriminatory. However, in no way India should go for an indefinite extension of NPT because keeping in view the present day realities, it will be better for the international community, if the present NPT is replaced by a more Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). But since a CTBT cannot be concluded overnight, the NPT should continue for a limited period of time within which India should take all necessary steps with other members of NAM for convening an international conference for this purpose. But much active diplomacy with the software of persuasion, incentive and compensation rather than the threat of economic sanctions or the use of force is needed for this purpose.³¹

Another area in which the strategic interest of India can be served through the Non-aligned Movement is the Indian Ocean. Mr Alfred Mahan - a pioneering naval strategist - once remarked that "in the 21st century, the destiny of the

31. Choudhury, n.21.

world will be decided on its waters".³² This statement explains the fact that whoever controls Indian ocean will dominate Asia.

Indian Ocean, which consists of some forty Third World countries, is considered to be a huge reservoir of raw materials, some of which are among the rarest in the world. More than half of the world's known oil reserves are in this region. The deep water regions of the bottom of the ocean are considered to be an extremely rich source of potential mineral resources, metals, iron-manganese, phosphorites, brine and alumina.³³ With the development of more sophisticated technologies for under-water exploration, the possibilities of discovering other types of minerals are immense.

It is also important to note that India has an estimated 220 million tonnes of off-shore oil reserves and 180 billion cubic meters of gas. Bombay High is full 100 miles away from our shores. Our navy will have to safeguard these installations. Further, India's economic zones cover

32. Cited in Tapan Das, "NAM and Indian Ocean Peace Zone Goal", National Herald, 27 December, 1991.

33. Adi H. Doctor, "India's Indian Ocean Policy", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No.3, July-September, 1990, P. 361.

an area of 71,500 square miles. Effective exploration of this region calls for a developed naval capability. India can be proud that today it is the only developing country to be given the status of pioneer in sea-bed mining under the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Recognition as the pioneer will give India in obtaining contracts from the International Sea-bed Authority to mine the sea-bed.³⁴

India's location in relation to the Indian ocean and the importance of that ocean to India's foreign trade cannot be under-estimated. The peninsular character of the country with its extensive and open coast line and with a littoral which is extremely fertile and rich in resources makes India entirely dependent on the Indian Ocean. It would be correct to say that some eighty-five per cent of India's foreign trade passes through the Indian Ocean; this trade includes import of the essential capital goods and the raw materials needed for India's economic development.³⁵ Moreover, India has vital interests in the Persian Gulf area. As an oil importing country, it is like other importing countries,

34. Ibid, P.377.

35. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, New Delhi, 1985, P.10.

interested in the unhampered flow of oil.³⁶ The Gulf is also a source of valuable foreign exchange-via-remittances of Indian nationals working there and as a growing market for its exports. Peace and stability in this region is therefore an important economic and security concern of India.³⁷

With regard to the defence of the country, the Indian Ocean is also important for India. If we go back to history, we will see that we were subjected by the Europeans by sea because we were not a naval power, we also cannot forget that even in modern times India was subjected to threats from the Ocean front. In the 1965 war with Pakistan, the Indonesian Navy had offered to assist Pakistan by carrying out diversionary attacks, according to the then Pakistan's air Chief Air Marshall Asghar Khan.³⁸ However, it was the 1971 war that for the first time brought home to us the crucial role of sea defence and the kind of future threat that may emanate from the seas near our continent. During this war the Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi, on a

36. P.N. Dhar, "India and the Changing World: An Indian Perspective", Link, 16 May 1993, P. 29.

37. Ibid

38. Doctor, n. 31, P. 376.

mission to torpedo INS Vikrant, was lying in wait in the harbour channel Vizag Port, when a chance discovery led to its destruction.³⁹ But the potentially more significant lesson of that war was the deployment of the US Enterprise (carrying nuclear weapons) meant to be a show of force to restrain India.⁴⁰ For the first time, India was threatened by nuclear blackmail from the sea. The USA naval presence near our waters means not only possible use of military force, it can also mean instigating domestic crisis by supply of arms to dissatisfied elements in the island territories, monitoring and intercepting our telecommunications, blocking sea supplies etc. In fact, the Bangladesh episode made some strategists argue that till such time, when India would be able to take care of naval problems on her own, some sort of under-writing by the Soviet Union would be necessary and for this purpose we should not mind some Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it seems that India becomes more vulnerable to a surprising American attack at any time.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid

It is in this context, K.M. Panikar has wrote that "while for other countries it is only one of the important Oceanic areas, to India, it is the vital sea. Her life lines are concentrated in that area. Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her shores are fully protected. The Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly India".⁴¹

From the aforesaid account, it becomes clear that India has considerable interest in the Indian Ocean and she should take all necessary steps in this direction to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. For this purpose India should befriend the littoral states like Iran, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Afghanistan, Mauritius, Maldives etc. through such multilateral forums like the Non-aligned Movement. She should launch a diplomaatic offensive to make these states realise that too close an identification with the outside powers is counter-productive in today's world politics. This would imply India more vigorously championing the cause of non-alignment and of at least making the littoral states realise the advantage of not closing their options totally.

41. Cited in Appadorai & Rajan, n. 32.

Through the collective support of these littoral states India should also put diplomatic pressure on the USA into agreeing for an early convening of an international conference on Indian Ocean which will pave the way for the implementation of the December 1971 United Nations resolutions on Indian Ocean declaring it as a zone of peace.⁴² If that is going to be an impossible task, as it indeed appears to be, India and other littoral nations should work for an acceptable limit to the presence of big powers' arms and navies in the Indian Ocean area.

It is noteworthy to mention that India's initiative and campaign have already paid some dividends in the past. Under the constant pressure from the littoral states, the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union did consider certain arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean region during the four rounds of negotiations that took place in 1977-78. Again, thanks to India's diplomatic offensive, littoral countries are finding it rather difficult to go against the wishes of the non-aligned states in identifying with any of the Great Powers or in granting base facilities to external navies. But should India slacken or abandon its attempts at

42. P.S. Jayaramu, "Non-alignment must be Reshaped", Deccan Herald, 27 December 1990.

making the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, this will certainly result in changes in the perception of some of the littoral countries and may as well facilitate outside powers in obtaining base facilities.⁴³

ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN:

The economic interests of India in the post-Cold War period demand that she should give due importance to the Non-aligned Movement in her foreign policy.

Today, India is a minor actor in the world economy. India's share in the world market has not only been small but has been falling steadily. Its share in the world exports was about 2 per cent in 1950 which has now come down to half of one per cent.⁴⁴ In global finance, India figured till recently as a poor developing country and therefore as a recipient of concessional financial flows. It did not have to turn to commercial borrowing. With the decline in aid, this situation has been changing sharply. Thus, the country's share in concessional financial flows from all sources to developing countries has come down from 6.1 per

43. Doctor, n. 31, P. 375.

44. Dhar, n. 33, P. 22.

cent in 1984 to 2.8 per cent in 1990.⁴⁵ During the same period, there has been a rapid rise in commercial borrowing. The external debt is now estimated at 74 billion US dollars and the debt servicing burden has reached a level of 29 per cent of the nations exports, a level beyond which lies the debt trap.⁴⁶

Secondly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has sharply reduced India's exports to that part of the world. One fifth of India's exports used to go there. Furthermore, the rupee trade agreements lessened its foreign exchange constraint. Soviet military supplies and diplomatic support enhanced our sense of security. This situation has suddenly disappeared: particularly serious has been the shrinking of export markets in the Soviet Union and the East European countries that it has happened at a critical time in the economic reforms programme when India desperately needs to increase its export fast.

And finally, given the nature and extent of its poverty and the resultant vulnerabilities, India's overriding national interest is to accelerate its economic growth, eliminate waste and promote greater social cohesion. To

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

solve all these problems, India should adopt (i) an aggressive drive to increase her exports, (ii) an effective campaign to attract foreign investment, and (iii) a concerted attempt to channelise technology flows. Fortunately, these have been given due importance by the Narasimha Rao Government when it adopted economic liberalisation programme in July 1991.

But the question is how to increase exports? Where to get markets? How there will be more foreign investment and technology transfer? No doubt, the implementation of the liberal economic policies and the signing of GATT by India are some of the right steps in this regard. But, apart from these follow up measures, India should also stress due importance to the Non-aligned Movement in her foreign policy. Earlier by successfully using the forum of NAM, India had served her economic interest and warded off the political and economic pressure from the countries of the North. It needs this forum more than ever at this critical juncture.

India should encourage South-South Cooperation and Technical and Economic Cooperation (TCDC & ECDC) among the non-aligned countries. This is important in the sense that when India is particularly not able to compete with the major economic powers of

world like the USA, Japan, Germany etc. in the domain of North, the encouragement of these types of cooperation will help her for better capital investment, technology transfer and market facilities for her products in the South. For this purpose, India should also activate and utilise such forums like the G-77 and G-15.

As a country of continental size with large variations in population density, natural resources, climate conditions, infrastructural availability, education and technical knowledge of the people, India has a better scope to do it. As the 'economic laboratory for the Third World Developmental experiment' and 'as the most developed of the developing countries', as she has often been described, India should take advantage of the opportunities provided by the NAM and thereby serve her economic interests.

On the humanitarian grounds, NAM also continues to be relevant for India in the years to come. Today, India witnesses the use of terrorism as a weapon of war. Externally sponsored terrorists and foreign mercenaries have created havoc in the country. For example, while in

Punjab terrorist violence had taken a toll of about 12,000 lives in the last decade and nearly 7000 in the last three years, in Jammu and Kashmir about 4,000 people including 2,600 Muslims have been slaughtered by the terrorists. The systematic religion based extremism by terrorist elements, has resulted in an exodus of 2,50,000 members of other religious communities from the Kashmir Valley.⁴⁷ Keeping this in mind, India will be wise to make use of opportunities Non-aligned Movement offers to ventilate its concern as it did at the recently held Cairo Foreign Ministers' Conference of the Non-aligned countries in June 1994. In this Conference, India achieved a major diplomatic victory over Pakistan when it successfully convinced the member countries to delink terrorism with the struggle for self-determination.⁴⁸ In the near future, India should also continue to mobilise the support of the non-aligned countries in this regard because the threat that she faces from cross-broder traffic in men and material is one that confronts other members of NAM. On the

47. The Hindustan Times, February 25, 1994, P.14

48. The Times of India, 4 June 1994.

pattern of the 1977 European Convention of 1987, India should also propose for a Convention among the member countries of the Non-aligned Movement to eliminate terrorism.

Besides the question of terrorism, India can also use the forum of NAM as a shield against the issues of general concern-poverty, hunger, illiteray etc. On the issue of drug trafficking, India should call the non-aligned countries to direct meaningful action at syndicates, banks and illegal processing houses whose activities support the growing abuse of trade in drugs. India should also cooperate with the other non-aligned countries on such environmental issues like global warming, depletion of ozone layer, preservation of bio-diversity etc. and protect the environment through a multilateral approach, while retaining the developmental priorities of the Third World countries. She should also demand for the adoption of effective international measures to prohibit the dumping of toxic and other hazardous wastes in the territories of other countries.

The above account shows that Non-aligned Movement is as relevant for India as it was during the years of Cold War. What is needed is not to abandon the NAM, but to make it more effective and more useful so that it can serve our politico-strategic and economic interests in the post-Cold War years.

CONCLUSION

Organizations and Movements, if not dynamic in content and context, become moribund with the passage of time. Their role and relevance lie in their capacity to change when the change in focus is required without losing the essence and essentials of its original ideals and goals. This is as much true for the United Nations as it is true for the Non-aligned Movement. The present study is an humble attempt to put NAM in a new set up and examining its continuing relevance for India in the the post-Cold War years.

The thirty-three year old chequered history of NAM shows that the Movement emerged as a response to a given historical situation, namely, the Cold War, which was fought between the two anagonistic power blocs - NATO and Warsaw Pact - headed by the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The NAM provided a framework for existence to more than hundred newly independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America (presently 109, the latest being South Africa) and

served the interests of these countries in the post-colonial era. In a sense, it provided a third pole to the bipolar Power structure of the world in terms of numerical strength if not in terms of military capability.

During the last three decades, the NAM has played a very positive role in international politics. It raised its voice against colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, racialism and exploitation in various forms of the newly independent countries. It had evolved into a strong votary for the promotion of international peace and for building bridges of understanding and cooperation between the two antagonistic blocs. Whenever the world was confronted with a crisis situation threatening international peace, the Non-aligned Movement was ever ready to initiate moves for diffusing tensions and contributed in its own humble way in finding positive solutions. Though its members were neither militarily nor economically strong, the Movement made a healthy impact on events since it was recognised as a strong moral force in international politics having the backing of two-thirds of human race. It

moulded world public opinion on positive lines in favour of promoting international peace and for the welfare of the human race.

But the breathtaking changes that took place in the world political scenario since the second half of 1989 kept the Non-aligned Movement in a state of fluctuation. The unification of Germany, the ideological transformation in Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War, and above all, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all encouraged the critics of the NAM to question the very relevance of the Movement in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet era. Some of the founder members of NAM like Egypt and Yugoslavia even went to the extent of merging the Movement with the Group of 77 or at least changing its name. Under this circumstances, India, alongwith the active and constructive support of Indonesia, Malasia, Ghana and many others, championed for the continuing relevance of the Non-aligned Movement and justified that with the emergence of a unipolar world the Movement has become even more relevant than it was during the days of Cold War.

Notwithstanding these differences, all the 108 members of NAM met in the Indonesian capital Jakarta in September 1992 and reposed their faith on the Movement. They also vowed to fight for such issues like the North-South Cooperation, reform of the United Nations especially its Security Council, linking of human rights with trade, disarmament and environmental issues. They also stressed the need for greater South-South Cooperation to resist the economic hegemonism of the West. President Suharto of Indonesia who became the new Chairman of NAM, in his address remarked that "so long as world peace is endangered, the freedom of nations diminished, the fundamental aspirations of peoples reduced and economic injustice continued, so long shall NAM have to be in the forefront of the struggle to oppose them".

India has always maintained that in spite of the end of the Cold War, NAM continues to be relevant and it has a vital role to play in fashioning a new international order based on equity and justice. The Movement was never meant to be merely a neutral buffer between the two rival power

blocs. One of its main objectives was to ensure freedom in foreign policy as far as the Third World countries are concerned. The disappearance of one Super Power has not changed its objective. In fact, the weaker the non-aligned nations, the greater the need for them to stick together. At a time, when many groups based on ethnic, religious and other narrow considerations have emerged, NAM offers an open forum which can counter such centrifugal forces. India also envisages useful role for NAM on issues like disarmament and environment.

But the question is: Why India is interested in the Movement? Is it just because she does not want to abandon her brain-child after it attains the age of thirty-three? Or, will it serve the interests of India in the post-Cold War years? The later seems more appropriate in this context than the former.

India can neither be a member of the US led Western Bloc nor can it join the G-7. If it happens, then it will not be treated as an equal member because the countries which are its members

outnumber India in every respect. But the interests of India and other non-aligned nations are complementary to each other. The recent trends of the emerging world order show that the Third World countries including India will face the same kind of deprivations and pressure tactics by the developed countries in the years to come. Hence, India's future lies with all the Third World countries consisting of the Non-aligned Movement.

As we have already seen, from 1950's to 1980's, India was recognised as a major force in International politics not because of its economic and military power, nor it was due to its regional predominance in South Asia, but because India had given and followed an alternative approach to the problem of peace and development in the world, different in every respect from the existing power politics model.

And due to this unique policy, i. e., NAM, India has been able to muster the following of the large number of developing countries. So in the present context, its importance cannot be recognised

if it becomes a junior partner of any power bloc or a single dominant country, rather it can be acquired by its unique posture in foreign affairs through the support of a large number of the developing world. Seen in this sense, NAM has not become a liability but an asset for India's foreign policy.

The interests of India which can be served through the Non-aligned Movement in the post-Cold War years, are of two types: (i) Indirect interests, and (ii) Direct interests. The threats arising out of the unipolar nature of the world in terms of military power and multipolarity in terms of economic power, imposition of a particular socio-political and economic model on the developing countries, stringent conditionalities on the transfer of technology even for peaceful purpose, destruction of the multilateral character of the UNO, wide economic disparity between the developed and the developing countries, transfer of sophisticated arms from abroad to disturb the regional balance of power, existence of discriminatory regimes like the NPT, MTCR, etc., external support to the anti-social

elements for creating havoc in the Third World countries, continuing nuclear arms race by the second tier nuclear weapon states to attain parity with the first-rate nuclear weapon states, etc. are some of the issues against which the struggle by the NAM will promote the interests of India in an indirect way because India is a part and parcel of the Non-aligned Movement.

Besides these indirect interests, there are also some direct interests of India which can also be served by the NAM. The desire of India to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as and when it goes for expansion, the linking of human rights with aid or trade, accommodating India's interests by amending the NPT in the forthcoming Review Conference at Geneva, declaring Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, advocating South-South Cooperation for the mutual benefit of all countries, eliminating terrorism, drug-trafficking and environmental hazards are some of the areas where India is directly involved. But since other non-aligned countries are indirectly involved with these issues India can mobilise the collective support of NAM in favour of her just and legitimate interests.

However, domestic factors, such as national unity, stability of the political system and economic clout are among the pre-conditions for the success of any foreign policy. Their absence would act as a fundamental constraint on foreign policy and can set an absolute limit to the success of diplomacy. For example, the Ayodhya episode of 1992 definitely lowered the image of India in the international arena as a secular country and marginalised foreign investment in our country. Nehru was consequently right when he remarked that 'foreign policies depend ultimately on internal conditions and developments'. Internal progress for us, therefore, becomes essential if we are to play an effective part in world affairs.

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