

**STATE AND SEPARATISM IN AFRICA :
A STUDY OF SUDAN
(1983-90)**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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

Gift Warille

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MAP OF AFRICA

Map No.1



Source: The Oxford School Atlas, 27th Edition, 1990, p.45.

CHAPTER 1

Chapter 1

STATE AND THE PROBLEM OF SEPARATION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In recent years there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in the State among social scientists.¹ Various theories have tried to explain the nature of the state and politics in the post colonial Africa. Modernization theory, Neo Marxian theory, and dependency theory are important theories which attempt to understand and evaluate the nature of changes occurring in the political, economic, and social sphere within the Third World.

In the 'Pluralist' perspective, the state was a neutral arena in which competition over the authoritative allocation of values took place. In the 'Elitist' critique of pluralist, the state remains an arena, but rather than being neutral, it is biased in favour of the rich and powerful. The marxist perspective on the state, on the other hand, sees the state as an organized and coercive mechanism. But even in this view, the state is primarily an arena for revolution social competition and conflict.²

According to Ralph Milliband, in such a case, the relationship between

¹ David F.Gurdon (1986) Decolonization and the State in Kenya, West View Press, Boulder and London, p.9.

² Ibid., p.9.

economic and political power has been inverted: it is not economic power which results in the wielding of political power, but the state assumes a very high degree of autonomy indeed, and almost become a state for itself, or at least for these who command it.³

Apart from the marxist paradigm, the modernization theory attempt to theorized political development in developing countries through structural-functional approach. Among the important scholars of development theories are G.A. Almond, David Easton, David Apter etc.

Almond laid stress on an orderly transformation of transtional countries on the models of the advanced countries of the West. Further he believed in the essential continuity between colonial and post-colonial societies, in view of the fact that nationalist leaders inherit an adequate administrative political apparatus, and were capable of taking their societies on the path of modernisation, and nation building.⁴

However, application of these approaches to Africa is difficult where clear-cut class formation has not taken place. So new modified theories have come in. Some of the important scholars are Hamza Alvi, Poulantzas, John Saul etc. Hamza Alvi, a prominent third world scholar talked about the over

³ Ralph Miliband (1977), Marxism and Politics, Oxford University Press, London, p.108.

⁴ G.A. Almond (1966), Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, New york: Fetter and Simons, p.2.

developed state. According to him the super structure in the colony is overdeveloped as the colonial state is equipped with a powerful bureaucratic - apparatus military approaches and mechanism of government, which enables it through its routine operations to subordinate the relative social class. The apparatus of the state assumes a new and relatively autonomous economic role.

Infact the underling assumption is that, state is an arena of class struggle. Poulantzas sees the state as being not a class constant, but the state of society divided into classes. To him, the post-colonial state is "Bonapartist", where the contending classes have weakened themselves, thus allowing the ruling cliques to cut themselves off from their class base, and to appear to raise the state above the class struggle.

Neo-marxian scholars such as A.G. Frank have concentrated upon external rather than internal social forces.⁵ The basic assumption of this theory is that, the moment the state comes into association with capitalism, the process of uderdevelopment sets in. It assumes a mechanical, deterministic relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, and sees everything as the creation of foreign forces. This theory has been subjected to servere criticism on the ground that it is based upon

⁵ Magnus Blomstrom & Bjorn Hetten (1984) The Development Theory in Transition the Dependency Debate Beyonds: Third World Responses, Zed Books, Ltd., London, p.155.

pessimism which completely undermines the dynamics of indigenous social forces.

Apart from this, within the dependency framework, scholars like Wallerstein and Samir Aman has put forward the theory of world capitalist system.⁶ The basic defect of all these theories is that they lack concrete empirical evidence, most of them started research with a preconceived theory, which generally obscures the truth.

To overcome this, scholars have done research on certain specific African countries. Martin Beckman, while studying Nigerian state and society, accept that much of a dependency amount at the level of description, while retesting his disagreement with its theoretical frame work. On the other hand, Gavin Kitching's, studying the Kenyan state,⁷ completely rejected dependency theory. Like Beckman, Kitching criticizes the mechanical determinism of depending theory.⁸

Much of the writing on the post colonial state has focused primarily on the state's position in the accumulation process, down-playing the constants imposed by the structure imperative towards control. This has generated an image of the state as an active powerful initiator, creating the conditions for

⁶ David F.Gurdon, op.cit, p.8.

⁷ Gavin Kitching's 'Explaining the Crisis of Capitalist in Kenya', Middle Eastern Studies, vol.29, No.2, April 1993, p.39.

⁸ Ibid., p.40.

accumulation in an almost mechanistic manner.⁹

Focus of Enquiry

The main objective of this study is to understand the problem of separatism and the nature of state response in an African country, Sudan. The 'state' in Sudan was established during colonial period, to protect the interest of the dominant land owning class, on the one hand, and the British interest on the other. After independence the significance of the state has increased as has its involvement in every aspect of the economy.

The importance of the state is further highlighted because the post-colonial era has a leadership that has used the state as a primary instrument for their self-enrichment and enrichment of their own tribe or sect. As Sudan is a multi-cultural multi-lingual and multi-religious country, large sections of its population were subjected to exploitation. As a result separatism became a possible option for discontented groups.¹⁰

A basic question the study explores, is regarding the factors that breed separatism? To answer this question there is a need to define the term Separatism as used here. Separatism can take many different forms. It can

⁹ David F.Gurdon, *op.cit.*, p.11.

¹⁰ M.Crawf and Young. Ed. (1975), New States in The Modern World, by the President and Follow of Harvard College, USA, p.60.

mean breaking-off, and forming a separate country, or demanding Regional autonomy or merely challenging the central institutions of the state as a reaction to exclusionary policies rather than inclusionary policies which include all people regardless of their place of birth, faith, tribe, region, sex etc. Whereas exclusionary policies do not include all and hence differentiate. The state then becomes an instrument in the hands of a particular groups and seeks to impose policies. In most-African countries Separatist groups seek to establish a separate state.¹¹

Separatism hence means a breaking off of a group or region from the larger group or a country to which it belongs and creating a separate one. In Sudan the Separatist movement have ranged from complete severance of political ties with the former territory, to the mere invocation of the separation alternative as a negotiating lever to obtain certain advantages within the existing framework.¹² Hence it is a complex phenomenon consisting of different movements at different points of time.

In our view the considerations which come into play in assessing the merits of the demand for separatism fall into five categories: (i) lack of inclusion into the existing political structure. (ii) racial and Ethnic equality,

¹¹ Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan Ed. (1988), The Precarious Balance State and Society in Africa, Westview Press/Boulder and London, p.298.

¹² M.Crawf and Young, op.cit, p.65.

(iii) the viability of the post-separatist state, (iv) the effects on other nations and world order, and (v) alternatives to separatism. These are used in order to understand the various separatist movements in Sudan.

Above all in a large state like the Sudan, outlying areas like Southern Sudan, Beja in the Red sea, the Nuba mountain, etc. Can envisage withdrawal from the system as an option which is simply not available for an area in the central part of the country. Possession of minimum political economic resources permits the separating areas to envisage independent status with some confidence.¹³

Major factors underlying Separatist Movements

One of the major factors underlying Separatism is ethnic diversity. People belonging to different-ethnic/cultural groups do not wish to live together in one country. Partially overlapping the Ethnic factor is regional divergences. An administrative division, or a recognizable geographical area may feel different from the rest of the country. For a sharp sense of deprivation to occur on this basis, remoteness from the capital seems to be a necessary condition.¹⁴ Often self-awareness takes a regional rather than

¹³ Danstan M.Wai Ed. (1978) The Southern Sudan, A Problem of National Integration, London: Frank Cass, p.32.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.93.

an Ethnic form because the zone is a Mosaic of Ethnic groups, or has one which is larger or cohesive enough to implant its own stamp on the movement.

In these circumstances, separation may come to be seen as an effective remedy for prolonged neglect or at least an ultimate threat if some more satisfactory distributive justice is not secured.

Relevance of the Study

The study focuses on, the Separatist movement and more importantly the response of the state. Both internal and external factors have played a role. The internal factors include the role of central and regional government and interest groups, while external factors include the foreign policies adopted by the state. The focus here is, however, on internal as well as external factors.

Analyzing the role of the regional governments, interest groups, religious leaders, parties, etc. is necessary because their activities have an impact on division-making. Conflicts among these various groups and structures are endemic in Sudan. Lack of institutionalization of political parties and the apparatus of the state also leads to conflicts.

Therefore, this study pays special attention to the degree of the autonomy that the state has in making politics and decisions regarding the

question of the separatism. The focus of the study would be on how these groups influence the state. Interest groups are two types (a) the ruling Elite and (b) Military Generals. Within the ruling Elite, there are different interest groups, such as the modernized Elite (Educated class) both from the north and the south, who are more concerned with their narrow self interest rather than that of the country. Other groups represent the traditional conservative religious based parties such as Umma, Khatimyha and National Islamic Front, and Opportunistic Southern Regionalist Parties. Therefore, it is very important to understand role of two major parties. The UMMA Party (Ansar) and DUP (Khtmyha), they were two of the largest sects in Sudan and were vigorous competitors with each other for a period that started before the condominium.¹⁵

The Khatmyha dominated much of the East, Central and North of the Sudan. The Ansar or Mahdist dominated most of western Sudan and some areas of Gezira non of them sect, had supporters in other parts of the country for example all the three southern regions, they have no supporters.¹⁶

However, the British uses those sect to balance the power, it was mainly economic means that the British attempted to maintain the balance.

¹⁵ Afaf Abdel Majid Abu Hasabu, (1985), Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist Movement 1918-1948, Graduate College Publications, No.12, University of Khartoum (Sudan), p.17.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.17.

Military Generals, are the top leaders of the army, who have captured political power in Sudan. However, they do not rule alone but form a coalition with the civilian political groups.

Separatism in Ethiopia and Somalia

Ethiopia, the only country in Africa that escaped colonial rule, is described as an Ethnic museum with 70 groups distinguished by separate origin, physical appearance, culture religion and language.¹⁷ More than 200 dialects are spoken in the country, but only 8 languages are widely spoken. Amharic is the official language, and Tigring, and Arabic are the official language for Eritrea.¹⁸

Infact, Ethiopia has had many different separatist movements, in her long history under the Empire Haile Salase.

The British occuption to Eritrea set the division between the sedentary christian, and the lowland normad muslim. The British aimed at partition of this land, but this could not take place, this failure come to an end by 1952, when Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia.

This division shows two factors, (1) the policy of Amharization followed

¹⁷ Harald B.Marcus, "Haile Selasce 1", Ethiopian Review, July, 1992, p.17.

¹⁸ Bernard Schechtermen, "Horn of Africa Liberation Movement", Middle East Review, Fall 1986, p.47.

by the government (2) the role of orthodox church which had established itself long time ago, and owned nearly one third of the land.

The sense of belonging, therefore, become problematic, the concept such as 'we' and 'they' had become the major force that shape the political boundaries in Ethiopia.

The Ethnic policy followed by the government has been termed as Amharization, which means gradual reduction of the Ethnic distinction of groups other than Amhars and Tigrains.¹⁹ The state was seen as being overrun by non-Tigrain, the interaction of Ethnic, culture religion, socio-economic political factors become complex and produced unspeakable tension between the communities. The policy of assimilation of one groups without recognising the difference has been always the source of the problem.²⁰

Infact, many people attribute the problem to the artificiality of colonial territorial boundries, which placing one group in one territory and some were added to another with whom they had little in common.

Major separatist groups

Ethiopia had faced an assortment of Liberation movement ranging from left to right. One of the great ironies is the Derg, which came to power in

¹⁹ Ibid., p.47.

²⁰ Harald G.Marcus, op.cit, p.20.

1974.²¹ They advocate an ideological (political) liberation. Another liberation is called Oromo, Tigray, they are clearly Marxist it proposes to transform soil and Economic reactions by instituting land reforms, price and rent controls. A third liberation movement, the Eritrea Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Front. (ELF-PLF) led by Osman Saleh Subble,²² it is smaller group, operates in a narrow band along the Sudan border.²³

However, many other movements, emerged subsequently in other parts of the country.

Despite the efforts of the regime to control the movement, the Eriterian Liberation movement become dominant, for the following reasons (1) The muslim populace objected all along, feeling their interests as a minority would not be protected in a christian state. They opposed the union with Ethiopia. (2) Ideologically the two areas were different, an absolute monarch in Ethiopia centralized with a decentralized constitutional government in Eritrea.²⁴

This two conflicting factors added more complexity to the problem of integration. However, by 1962 Haile Selassie, the monarch, completely violated the federal treaty, and reduced Eritrea to a mere province. At this

²¹ Bernard Schechtermen, *op.cit*, p.49.

²² *Ibid.*, p.49.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.51.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.52.

point of time, a formal rebellion had erupted in western Eritrea led by the 'Separatist' to fight a war for independent Eritrea.²⁵

Somalia and Separatism

Somalia the most homogeneous population in a Africa, with 85% of its population belonging to hamitic stock, 14% to the Banto stock. It has one language, culture as well as religion²⁶ i.e. Islam. Many people have attributed the genesis of Somalia problem to the colonial era, which divide the one family people into five different powers, with extreme ignorance of its Ethnic lines.

As a result post independence Somalia state, had number of unsuccessful wars with her neighbour in an effort to unit the Somali people to a greater Somalia land.

It achieve independence in 1960, when both the British Somalia and Italian Somaliland join and constituted independence state.²⁷ Other parts of Somalia remains in the custody Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.

The Separatist movement emerged early in the life of a new state directed against the Somalia government. The two most important liberation

²⁵ Bangladesh Times, Dacca, March, 4, 1987.

²⁶ Times of India (New Delhi), Oct., 12, 1977.

²⁷ David D.Laitin and Said S.Samatar, (1987) Somalia, Nation in Search of a State, Westview press, Boulder, p.69.

mismanagement.

Such politics embrace movement seeking a separate region. Arms were supplied by the Ethiopians and Libyans to some of those movement. However, they lost the momentum because of the external sponsorship and lack of appeal in the context of internal tribal diversities with the exception of two communist dissenting groups. However, his policies plague the country into civil war.

Unlike the other movements, Somali politics has produced its own rivalry opposition mainly to oppose the dictatorial rule of Mohammed Siaad Barre, and his failure to adopt the Islamic ideology, and to end his rule. He could survive, by shifting his loyalties to both the superpowers in accordance with his political convenience, he lost the support of the superpowers by the end of cold war. Subsequently, his government could not stand the onslaught of the warlords of the country, who had grown strong enough to oust him from power due to the continuous supply of weapons to them.

Sudan in Context

The most interesting and important debates in recent years concerning the 'state' in Sudan, have been taken up by an important scholar on Sudanese politics. Gabirel Warburg, in a Review Article in Middle Eastern Studies which discusses three scholars who have written on Sudan recently

movement', were the Somali Salvation front (SSF) in 1979, and the Somali Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF) and the Somalia Workers Party (SWP) combined, they formed the democratic front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) a united movement in 1981.

Infact, Somali present different kind of movement, one is allegations of corruption and incompetence on the part of the Mohammed Siaad Barre regime. A key changes stress on Islamic ideological failure. The commitment to ideological liberation and Islamic ideas over secessionism was also confirmed.

However, the Somali politics has been traditionally structured in terms of the clan system which organizes agro-postal society. Those clan-based alignment have provided the line of conflict to struggle for the recognition of status and prestige.

Saaid Barre regim,e indeed disrupted the balance of clan interest, he played the colonial policy of setting traditional tendencies to compromise, or accomodate conflict. Some-time he impose one clan hegemony in the state administration: the result was politization and militraization. Since clan-consciousness forms the basis of politics in Somalia, President Siaad Barre followed the policy of divide and rule and try to play the role of a mediator.

This practice poses a threat not only to the clan structure, but also to the unity do the country. Siaad Barre increasingly perpetuated injustice and

namely, Abel Alier, Mansour-Khalid, and Peter Woodwad.²⁸ All three are primarily concerned with Sudan's contemporary politics, its religious, Ethnic and regional complexities, and its future chances of survival as a nation-state Or what we may call A crisis of governability²⁹; not surprisingly all three of them seem to arrive at rather pessimistic conclusions regarding the prospects.

Peter Woodward defines the state in Sudan as 'Always relatively weak, since there were limited resources for governing a vast and poor country... indeed by the late 1980's it was becoming an open question, whether the Sudan as legally constituted could continue.....'³⁰

According to Peter Woodward, the new state was a creation of imperialism and hence, it is 'an imposed, alien, and relatively Sudan piece of state-building - a very artificial construction from the stand-point of indigenous society....' this society was plagued with problems of Ethnic identity, clan difference and religious heterogeneity to such an extent that it has nearly brought it to extinction.³¹

What then is Woodward's central message? - It is the thesis of his book,

²⁸ Gabriel R.Warburg, Sudan:Diversity and Conflict in Unstable State, by Peter Woodward review in Middle Eastern Studies, vol.29, No.2, April 1993, p.340.

²⁹ Atul Kohli, (1991) Democracy and Discontent, India's Growing Crisis of Governability, Cambridge University Press, p.ix.

³⁰ Gabriel R, Warburb, op.cit, p.341.

³¹ Ibid., p.342.

that the limited capacity of state in Sudan, under different rulers, and different forms of government has necessitated heterogeneous forms of clientelism, which have constrained development because of the competition and incompatibility of various groups, parties and movement and that has led not only to unstable government, but has threatened the survival of the state itself with significant international as well as domestic consequences.³²

He highlights sectariatism as one of the more important aspect of clientelism, with adverse effects on statehood. He then concluded the 'unstable state' suffers from his choice of its starting point.

Mansour Khalid, relate the roots of his country's failure as an independent state to many factors. He blames primarily the so-called "secular Elite" for this failure. This northern Sudanese Elite allowed ideological predilections, cultural prejudices, vested interests and, worse still, personal rivalries to obscure issues of fundamental importance to the nation as a whole:³³

He mentions three major characteristics of the Northern Sudanese elite.

- i. opportunistic political leaders.
- ii. exploitation of religion for political ends.

³² Peter Woodward (1990), Sudan, 1898-1989 Unstable State, London & Boulder: Lester Crook, Academic Publisher, p.240.

³³ Gabriel R.Warburb, op.cit., p.346.

iii. the Elite failure to come to grips with the multi-Ethnic and multi-religious nature of the society.

Unlike many Northern Sudanese writers he admits that, the British policy only reinforced already existing mistrust between the regions of the Sudan, but cannot be held responsible for creating it. He believed it was the failure of intellegentia to comprehend the intricacies of nation's integration in a multi-cultural country like Sudan. The assimilation process of Arabization, and the demands of the South was ignored in a united Sudan Northern politicians.

In 'recent years, Redivision was opposed in the South.'³⁴ It was seen as a simple act of divide and rule by the President once he realized that the south was increasingly opposing his policies.

The so-called Islamic path of the regimes commitment to appease the Northern Muslim population, and the Islamic laws of Aug.-Sept. 1983, are described by Khalid, 'as the final blow against peaceful co-existence in Sudan. 'Numeiri in his view imposed an Islamic legal system on a state, one-third of whose population is non-Muslim'.³⁵

Abel Alier, a well known southern politician, and an author of number

³⁴ Sudanow, vol.7, No.11, November, 1982, p.12.

³⁵ Mansor Khalid (1990), The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution, London and New York, Kegan Paul International, p.52.

of books, on Sudan sums up the situation, at the time of Addis Ababa agreement as for the first time in 73 years since beginning of the condominium administration, the southern politicians were responsible for their own people. It was therefore no wonder the south achieve regional autonomy. 'Alier regarded the abrogation of that treaty, on 5th June, 1983 as a disaster for the Sudan and a personal tragedy for himself.³⁶

Hypotheses

This study of the nature of the in state Sudan is based upon the following.

1. Many scholars held that state institutions do not play a significant role in the political process and came to the conclusion that they are either weak, or non-existent. However, this study is based upon the hypothesis that the state has emerged as a powerful repressive organ. The State in Sudan has strong administrative and organisational capabilities and control over resources. The army officers occupying important positions in the state apparatus are very powerful.
2. However, the power of this authoritarian state is limited due to the existence of diverse ethnic and cultural groups which have a base within the state apparatus and are capable of obstructing of process of national integration in order to fulfill their own self interests.

³⁶ Abel Alier (1990), Too Many Agreement Dishonoured, Exeter: Ithaca Press, London, p.35.

3. The sharp regional imbalances in the economy of Sudan have also contributed to create a complex pattern. This has made it difficult for the state in Sudan to satisfy all groups.

Chapterisation

Chapter I - This chapter deals with theoretical approaches, and concepts, issues, and provides a review of literature and debates, for the study of state in Africa and Sudan in particular. It also examines the reasons why some of these theories are not applicable in the post-colonial state. This is precisely because these 'states' are still fighting for their own existence. This explanation leads us to evolve a framework to understand the problem of Separatism and a review section on Ethiopia and Somalia has been examined.

Chapter II provides a historical background, of the establishment of the modern state in Sudan. It describes its diverse socio-economic, multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-linguistic society and above all, her geographical position in terms of location as a gateway to both the Arab world and Africa. This has produced a duality in the policy, and identity, as a result of which Sudan has failed to build a single community, a factor, that rendered her unity, and integrity fragile. (Three tables for Sudan's GDP as per 1983 Numerical Third Phase) has been looked at.

Chapter III examines the evolution of the Separatist movement in Modern Sudan. It fall into two phases, the first phase: 1954 to 1982, analysing of this period, provides a background to the second phase: 1983-1990, which is examined in Chapter IV. The shift in the nature of the movement and the extent in which the movement was successful in creating mass awareness, not only in the south but in the remote areas of western and eastern Sudan has also been examined in Chapter III.


Chapter IV, explores the impact of state politics in several key issues, within the framework of a united Sudan, such as the question of redivision of south Sudan, and the Islamisation policy, which led to the outbreak of the second phase of the Separatist movement. The machiavellian approach of Numeiri regime is also examined and its response to the Separatist movement.

Chapter V an attempt has been made by relating the Ethiopian and Somalian experience to the theoretical and analytical issues raised about the state and the Separatist movement in the introductory chapter.

This Chapter tries to compare the Ethiopian experience with Eriteria, and Sudanese. In view of the changing demands of the Sepratist movement in the recent years, Sudan's foreign policy mainly with Libya and Ethiopia has been examined to draw a link between the internal and external factors. Lastly, it put forward conclusions and suggestio



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CHAPTER 2

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MODERN STATE IN SUDAN: A HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

In this chapter an attempt has been made to describe the historical process of state formation in Sudan.

The Republic of Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with an area of about 2.5 million square kilometer (980,000 sq. miles).¹ It shares its borders with Egypt and Libya in the North, Chad and Central African Republic in the West, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya in the South, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the East, and faces Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea.

Sudan's geographical position produces a duality in her policy and identity, namely one of identification with the Arabic and African world.

Scholars describe her position as a gate-way to both worlds, (Map No. 1) a point underlined by Agree Jadan, at the time president of Sudan African National Unity, (SANU). The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, terms of geographical area, Ethnic groups and cultural systems. The Northern Sudan is occupied by a hybrid race who are united by a common language, culture, and religion, and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and

¹ Bodour Osman Abu Affan (1985) Industrial Policies and Industrialization in the Sudan, Graduate College Publications, No.16, University of Khartoum, p.1.

political inspiration.

The people of the Southern Sudan, on the other hand belong to the African Ethnic group of East Africa. They not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origins arrangement and basic systems. There is nothing in common between the various sections of the community no body of shared belief; no identity of interests, no local signs of unity. As a result Sudan has failed to compose a single community.²


Population density in relation to its size is very thin. Population is "about 25 million and, a 3% rate of growth which will reach more than 34 million in the year 2002".³ Environmental conditions governs the way of life of different regional groups, and hence, the means of their livelihood differ from one part of the country to another. Hunting, fishing and Agriculture is the main source of livelihood.

Therefore, identities of people living in different parts or have in Sudan different features. They are culturally interact with each other in many ways. Some times through wars between different tribes, in order to dominate or enslave others or through marriages between one region and another. These factors led to evolution of Ethnic groupings. (Map No.2)

²v Dunstan M.Wal Ed. (1973) The Southern Sudan's the Problem of National Integration. Frankcass and Company Ltd. UK, p.107, also seen in Aggrey Jadaan's Speech to the Round Table Conference, March 1965, cited by George W.Shephard, Jr.S. National Integration and the Southern Sudan's the Journal of Modern African Studies 4, 1966, p.155-65.

³ Republic of Sudan Publication (1997) Khartoum University Press, p.3.

MAP NO. 2 MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS IN SUDAN



SOURCE: PETER K. BECHTOLD, "POLITICS IN SUDAN"

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS NEW YORK WASHINGTON LONDON
1976, p. 9

Ethnic and Tribal Identity in Sudan

The identities of people living in the Sudan are complex and often overlapping in confusing ways.⁴ As a result, it is necessary to think of the diversity of the people and cultures of the Sudan on overlapping levels or layers of cultural and historical experiences. The major components of this multidimensional picture are Ethnic and tribal identities, language, and region.

The largest of these groupings are Arab, Dinka, Beja, Nuba, Nuer and Nubien.⁵ Although Arabs are not, ethnically, a majority of the population, they have had significant social power in the Sudan for a number of centuries. Since the medieval times, there has taken place a gradual process of arabization of Sudanese society, primarily in the northern 2/3 of the country.⁶

Broadly, they can be further divided according to the regions like, Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk in the south, the Beja, in the Eastern highland regions and among the Red Sea coast. The Nubians, are of the Nile Valley in Southern Egypt and north most of Sudan. Other groups represent small but significant portions of the population. The tribe of the Nuba mountain area of Kardofan

⁴ John Obert Voll & Sarah Potts Voll, (1985) The Sudan, Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State, Westview Press, Boulder, London, p.6.

⁵ Ibid., p.7.

⁶ Ibid., p.10.

in the west make up 5 percent of total population, another group 5 per cent, and the west African immigrant group.

Ethnic Groupings and Culture Differences

For the purpose of this study, there have been divided along linguistic lines into a number of general categories, perhaps the largest in the group called the Nilotes, which includes the Dinka. Other major Nilot groups are the Nuer (almost 5 percent of the total population), the Bari (2 percent), and the Shilluk (1 percent).⁷

Other major tribes from different languages groups are, the Azande (2 percent) and the More (1 percent). Those are of real importance in terms of the way people act politically.

Therefore in the Western region are relatively small group (about 2 percent of the population) but have been Historically significance they provided the basis for a major state premodern and early modern times.⁸ However, more formal government sponsored efforts to increase the pace of Arabization in the Southern Sudan have aroused fears and opposition. In the North Arabization appeared to be able to take place without the destruction of local culture autonomy but Southerners feared that Arabization in their region was a threat to their own special tradition and identities. The use of

⁷ Ibid., 16.

⁸ Ibid., 17.

language choice has been a basis for conflict as well as cohesion.

The major language are the Afro-Asiatic group, it is spoken by Beja tribes in the East. There are local various among the different Beja tribes. However, some languages like Hausa, have been brought to Sudan by West African immigrants. The language of Fur in Western Sudan is identified by Greenberg as a separate branch of the Nilo- Saharon family, even more complex is the Linguistic situation of the inhabitants of the Nuba mountains. The language of Nuba area form a special language family, called the Nigero-Kordofanian. This family has, five other subgroups .

Infact, the complexity of languages situation in the Sudan has been a divisive factor. No single local language has served to over come tribal boundaries. Arabic language some times served this purpose but usage of Arabic is tied to other political and cultural issues. As such the post colonial period, Arabic was made the official language in the Sudan.

Religious Identities

Religion is an important part of the identities of Sudanese people it is difficult however, to clearly isolate religion from other aspect of life.

A description of the religion dimension in a profile of the Sudan must do more, then simply list the number of specific religion.⁹ Sudan is known as country of two religion. Roughly 2/3 of the Sudanese population are

⁹ Ibid., 16.

Muslims. They are concentrated in the North regions of the country with 5 percent of the population who are Christian.

About 29 percent of the population are Christian primarily in the Southern region.¹⁰ Clear distinction are often difficult to make. For example because of local customs have been influenced by contact with Islam and Christianity.

However, because of the contact between Muslim and Christian and the frequent identification of non-Muslim with Christian, non-Muslim southern often adopt a Christian identity when they wish to distinguish themselves from the Muslim Sudanese majority.

At the present, Islam is the official Religion of Sudan. As an Islamic country, it has been named under the present regime the Islamic Republic of Sudan.

This cultural difference added to the Ethnic separateness and its extreme remoteness, has been expressed in economic backwardness and a tendency of political distinctive which have been the main cause of frequent disturbance in Southern Sudan.¹¹

¹⁰ Ibid., p.16.

¹¹ Regional Survey of the World, Africa South of the Sahara (1993) 22nd Ed. Europe Publication Limited, 1992, London.

Sudan can be divided into two parts in terms of its population 60% of the total population. Lives in the North, 2/3 of people speaking Arabic and local dialect, among these tribes are Fur, Zagawha in Dar Fur. The common factor binding them together is Islam.

The South contains 40% of total population. They speak a wide range of languages and more than 250 dialects. Dinka is the largest tribe in the Southern Sudan. They comprise about 25 separate groups followed by Nure, Shulluk, Zandi, Bari and More. According to the 1956 census, the population of Sudan was divided Ethnically as follows:¹²

Arabs	39%
Southerners	30%
Non Arab	28%
Others	3%
Total	100%

Economic Performance

Sudan is predominately agricultural state, is a supplier of food products to much of the Middle East, and in a normal year the country has one of the largest nations incomes in Africa. The pogress of the Economy has, however, been hampered in the 1980's by recurrent drought, political instabiling and infrastructure Shortcomings, and only in 1984/85 has it showed any

¹² Taken from Dunstan Wai, p.111. The Southern Sudan we use it care to show the Ethnic diversity and division in the tribal society.

significant signs of improvement.¹³

Agriculture accounts for over one third of GDP, and is mostly related to processing of Agricultural products,¹⁴ with a GNP per capita of 440 dollars in 1982, Sudan ranked at the bottom of what the World Bank referred to as "Lower middle-income countries". Yet by 1983 as its GNP per capita fell to 400 dollars it slipped into the "Lower-Income Economy" classification in 1984 the figure dropped further to 340 dollars, partly due to continued drought. Infact, between 1975 and 1989 GDP showed little or no real growth while population grow at about 2.8 percent, so that Sudan's per capita real income declined by 2.8 percent a year on average. This highlights Sudan's present desperate economic situation and slim prospects for the future.¹⁵

Despite the promise of oil wealth, Sudan's Economy is still very heavily dependent on Agriculture, The Source of over 36% of GDP in 1983 and the employer of the vast majority of the workforce farming represents the country's only real source of foreign exchange; in the second half of 1984.¹⁶

Table 1, 2 and 3 shows the decline throughout the period, 1980-1985.

¹³ African Economic Handbook, (1986) Published by Euromonitor Publishers Ltd., U.K., p.73.

¹⁴ Farzin Y.H., (1988) *The Relationship of External Debt and Growth, Sudan's Experience 1975-84*, Washington, World Bank, p.3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁶ African Economic Handbook, 1986, op.cit., p.73.

Table 1 Sudan: Composition of Gross Domestic Product

**% of total GDP,
for the Islamic year of 1981/82**

Agriculture	36.6
Manufacturing	6.2
Utilities	2.1
Construction	5.4
Commerce	18.4
Transport and communications	10.7
Finance and real estate	6.0
Personal and household services	2.5
Government services	12.0
Total GDP	100.0

Source: Bank figures, based on official data.

African Economic Handbook (1986), Published by Euromonitor Publication Limited, U.K., p.74.

Table 2 Sudan: Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments

million Sudan pounds

	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	July-December	
				1983/84	1984
Exports (fob)	376.4	417.1	484.9	698.8	357.0
Imports (fob)	768.5	949.8	939.6	857.0	397.0
Trade balance	-392.1	-532.7	-454.7	-158.2	-40.0
Net services	209.2	103.7	220.4	84.7	71.6
Current account balance	-182.9	-429.0	243.3	-73.5	31.6
Net capital transfers	28.2	131.6	41.7	40.0	1.8

*Source: Bank of Sudan
Op.cit.*

Table 3 Sudan: Principal Export Commodities

	million Sudan pounds					% of Total exports
	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	
Cotton	91.0	60.1	201.7	447.5	50.1	
Livestock	25.1	43.5	82.6	91.2	10.2	
Sesame	24.7	36.9	59.7	87.9	9.8	
Gum arabic	24.6	37.0	54.7	87.9	9.4	
Dura	48.8	57.0	98.5	41.1	4.6	
Cake and meal	15.6	30.0	19.0	22.4	2.5	
Groundnuts	52.3	42.1	18.5	21.5	2.4	
Groundnut oil	8.4	8.7	6.2	19.3	1.9	
Hides and skin	7.0	6.4	12.0	16.8	1.9	
Karkadeh	1.9	2.5	3.7	4.6	0.5	
Others	31.7	20.8	50.2	56.6	6.3	

*Source: Government of Sudan
Op.cit.*

The cultivated area in the Sudan falls into two distinct parts. One part is irrigated for example the area watered by the Gezira Scheme. The second part is the "rainfed area which is mostly farmed traditional methods. This area includes the mechanized rainfed farm sector which has grown in importance.¹⁷

¹⁷ Bodour Osman Abu Affan., *Op.cit.*, p.2.

The vast development potential of the available agricultural area remains untapped due to number of obstacles. Agricultural development continues to be weak, due to poor infrastructure and a large subsistence Agriculture sector which discourages all attempts at modernizing traditional methods of cropping and animal husbandry.

However, the vast development potential of the Agriculture sector cannot be questioned, due to number of obstacles stand in the way. The dream of making Sudan productive remain unrealized. Future Agriculture development continue to be weak, poor infrastructure and a large substance Agriculture base (which discourages all attempts at modernizing traditional methods of cropping and animal husbandry).¹⁸ The limited capacity of the existing transport system leaves large areas of the country virtually isolated, with only limited access to the market. Sudan also has a large expanse of forests and fisheries which have not yet been developed and appropriately exploited.

About 23% of the country's area is covered by forests. Most of the forest, is found in the Southern region, and the rest in the western region and produce the country's second cash crop gum Arabic Sudan produced about 75% of the total annual production of gum Arabic in the world.¹⁹ Industrial

¹⁸ Ibid., p.2

¹⁹ Ibid, p.3.

sector in Sudan forms a comparatively small part of the economy. It produces primarily import substitutes for consumers goods and uses imported machinery equipment, and both local and imported raw materials.²⁰

Political History

Before the Egyptian conquest of the Land in 1820 A. D, Sudan represented neither a united people nor a definite geographical area. It was not until Mohamed Ali Basha conquered Sudan, the term Sudan began to acquire some geographical outlines. It was viewed by Arab traders as the Land of Sudan, i.e. South Egypt, there was no specific area as such. Under the Turbo-Egyptian rule which dominated the country from 1820-1885, Sudan began to take, its present shape and boundaries, but most of the present boundaries were established between 1899 and 1916 under vidget who succeeded Kitchanar.

The Egyptian government would probably have never agreed to self-government for the Sudan if the old structure of Egyptian politics had not been suddenly swept away by the Nassor-Naguib Revolution in Egypt in July 1952.²¹

²⁰ Ibid., p.4.

²¹ Robert O.Collins & Francis M.Deng (1884) Ed. The British in the Sudan, 1898-1956 the sweetness and the sorrow, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University Standard, California, p.25.

Sudan became independent in 1956, from the combined British and Egyptian rule which established its joint-control in 1898 after the defeat of El-Mahdi at Khartoum. Interestingly, the anti-British struggle produced two different internal movements, both religious based: the Umma and the Khatmyyah, both adopted separate policy towards the combined rule. Khatmyyah belongs to the al-Margani family, and Umma belongs to the El-Mahdi family. These two movements became important in the post-independent period as political parties which dominated Sudan's politics till the recent decade. One of the significant features of these parties is that they produced weak coalition governments due to the tense situation between the two. Since both had adopted different methods, goals etc. The Umma party demanded independence for Sudan, as the El-Mahdi movement was against the condominium, and wanted to free the country from foreign rule. Whereas the Khatmyyah advocated the unity with Egypt. As a result weak political parties, working against each other has been a major feature after independence. The political parties could not provide a stable government of their differences, since the early 1920's.

One significant characteristic of these parties is lack of political will at the national level which prevented the leaders from achieving national integration. Instead each party works for its own enrichment.

The failure of political parties create a situation open to military involvement, coup' detat and guerrilla wars has become depressively familiar in the Sudan's 37 years of independence. The vacuum which occured from the weak of party system, allowed the military take over by General Ibrahim Abboud in 1958, just two years after independence. This military regime in aaacoalition with political leaders lasted upto 1964. The military assuming political power is a purely post-independence phenomina. The Anglo Egyptian rule in Sudan did not create any standing army, it had only a small police with weak equipment. By 1969 when General Jafaar Mohamed Numeiri in a bloodless coup assumed power.

He represented a modernising military regime which looked forward to bringing a change in a society ruled by conservative parties. He argued that the sudan under his leadership, world reject parliamentary democracy as a capitalist method of subjugating the people, and world adopt instead scientific socialism aimed at transforming the poverty of the sudanese masses into prosperity.²²

He sought to legitimize itself by pointing to the inefficiently and instability caused by the political parties, and promised instead to initiate reforms. This complex situation give rise to diversive tendencies and prevented

²² Mukhtar Al Assam (1989), Bureaucracy and Development in the Sudan, Journal of Asian and African Studies XXIV;1-2 p.38.

the emergence of a unitary state in the last three decades since independence. Successive regimes have experimented with various arrangements ranging from federation to limited regional autonomy, and the one-party state without reaching a workable framework. In such a situation dictatorship has appeared the only viable system on more than one occasion.²³

Political Economy of Development in Sudan

Class and regional inequalities became inherent in the Economic Structure of Sudan under the condominium rule. This situation provides the key to understand the country's emerging social and political dynamics. The first is the division between those individuals who were in a position to benefit from the condominium and reinvest in productive fields further strengthen the opposition and the remainder on the population.

The second is the division between those parts of the country which experience economic development under the condominium and those which did not. The colonial developmental effects were concentrated in an area resembling an inverted 'T' imposed on Sudan composed of the valley of the Nile both North of Khartoum, the Blue and White Nile area immediately South of Khartoum central Kordofan, and the Southern part of Kassala province.

During the colonial period, the imperialist failed to integrate those groups or even unite them under a unified Administration.

²³ Sean Moroney Ed. (1989) African Vol. I Handbook Facts on the publication USA, p.505-516.

Table 4

Regional Distribution of Gross Domestic Investment, 1955/56 (thousand £S)

Provinces	Total Investment	Percent of Total	Government investment	Percent of Total	Public Corps	Percent of Total	Private Enterprise	Percent of Total
Khartoum, Northern and Kassala	11 906	56	4770	64	1276	32	5860	60
Blue Nile	4178	20	1147	15	721	18	2310	23
Kordofan and Darfur	3533	17	1035	14	1325	34	1173	12
Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el- Ghazal	1616	7	514	7	610	16	492	5
All Sudan	21233	100	7466	100	3932	100	9835	100

Source: C.H.Harvie and J.G.Kleve, *The National Income of Sudan, 1955/6* (Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 1959), p.88.
Tim Niblok, *Class and Power in Sudan* (London: Westview Press, 1986), p.145.

In the post-colonial period the national leaders too have failed to acknowledge the diversities and offer a workable compromise as a foundation for state formation. Therefore group consciousness Sudan has been founded on race, culture and religion. These factors are powerful and have been used to distinguish one section of tribe from another. This practice accentuated inter-group relation in a pluralistic society.

Like many other third world countries, Sudan's economy is poor. This is not because she lacks natural resources, but because of lack of modern technology and the capacity to use these resource.

There are sharp regional imbalances in the economy of Sudan. These arose mainly during the period of condominium rule. (Table 4 shows the Regional Distribution of Gross Domestic Investment) Inter-province migration is common due to uneven economic development. These areas contained the major agencies schemes, (private and public) and benefited most from the spread of Education and health service. The less developed areas are largely in the South. Although the imbalance in development was often as marked within the individual problems. (Table No 4 outlining the regional distribution of gross domestic investment for the year 1955-56).

Scholars attributed the economic failure of the country to governmental policies which failed to established a dynamic economic program most of the available resources are spent on the army. As a result the stae has become a

police state. It has not been able to put forward programmes for the benefit of the people. People shifting from the less developed to the more developed areas in search of work. Due to these regional imbalances political power in Sudan is concentrated in the hands of the people living in the more developed regions.

To large sections of the population in the less developed fringe areas of Sudan, the state seems a distant and alien entity just as it did in the colonial era. During the colonial period, The people of Southern Sudan had little access to the benefit which the colonial state bestowed such as education, health servicing, remuneration, government jobs, etc.)²⁴

As a result today most of the state personnel do not share the same cultural and ethnic values of the people of the backward areas. The political effect uneven development produced forces which later turn to be destructive and a threat to the survival of the state. Uneven development of the major regions of Sudan underlies the Separatist movement and constitute a challenge to the central government.

²⁴ Tim Niblock (1987, Class and Power in Sudan. The Dynamic of Sudanese Political 1898-1985, the MacMillan Press Ltd., London, p.146.

CHAPTER 3

FIRST PHASE OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN SUDAN AND RESPONSE OF THE STATE 1954-1982

In this chapter an attempt has been made to examine the first phase of the Separatist movement. This movement arose out of feelings of ethnic separateness and the loyalty to one particular region, rather than the whole country. In this phase many groups were not prepared to accept the boundaries laid down by the ex-colonial power and saw them as artificial.

Sudan's ethnic diversity is far more complex, than the picture presented often by the policy-makers. However, it is important to realise that both ethnic and economic factors are important and in fact-form a complex inter-related pattern in Sudan.

The size and activities of this movement are hard to contain because of exaggerated claims. The movement undertook guerrilla operations, propaganda broadcasts, and diplomatic campaign against the existing government. It generated some soldiers mutinies rebellion and defection within the national army, proof lay in the separatist movement in the Southern Sudan. Others remain marginalised and less politically motivated. In defining national liberation movement, Gabral, as quoted by Basil Davidson

in the liberation of Guinea, Gabral believed that National Liberation movement means not only the right of a people to rule itself, but also, that right of a people to regain its own history: to liberate the means and process of development of one's own production forces.¹

Some of these movement carried the demand for national liberation. Each has its strengths and weakness, concepts of political organisation, political ideology, structure and social programme as well as competing prevails, and power struggle.²

Movement in the First Phase

It is important at this stage to distinguish between a separatist movement and an insurgency. Separatism arises out of the aims and beliefs of an ethnic or cultural group of people within a country who wish to establish their own separate state within the region inhabited by them instead of being ruled by the existing government of the country. The term 'insurgency' is used to refer to an armed uprising within a given national territory. In due course an insurgency may grow into something bigger such as a revolutionary

¹ Richard Sherman, (1980) Ertria the Unfinished Revolution, Praeger Publications, New York, p.xviii.

² Ibid., p.xviii.

movement conducted by guerrillas.³

Some scholars have described the movements in this phase as insurgency or rebellion against the centre due to the lack of ideology and capable leadership. However, these can be seen as separatist movements. They are an acute threat to the integrity of the existing state in Sudan.

During the first phase, different types of separatist movements emerged in different parts of the country. The common feature among them was that, they all challenged the power of the central government.

The Beja Movement in the Red Sea Area


The beginning of 1954 saw the emergence of the Beja Separatist movement in the Red Sea region. This movement has not been studied by scholars who have directed their attention to the better known separatist movement in Southern Sudan.

The Beja tribe inhabits the region near the Red sea and much of Kassala province, which constitute the largest under-developed region in the north. The Beja constitute a large ethnic group with a common language.⁴ Their feelings of Separatism arose both from their geographical isolation from

³ Peter B.Harris (1979) Foundations of Political Science, Hutchinson & Co-publication Ltd., London, p.180.

⁴ John Morton, (1986) 'Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan' African Affairs, 78(312), July, p.66.

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SOURCE: THE TIMES, LONDON, 1st MAY, 1985.

the Central areas and their ethnic-cum-cultural distinctiveness.

The economy of the Beja region is a pastoral one. They depend on geographical reaction, and also on variation of climate over the year by cultivation, by large-scale sale of livestock, and by wage-labour. Hence, their territorial, cultural and emotional values remain distinct from other inhabitants in the region.

The Separatist demand began in the pre-independence period itself. The Beja rejected the newly formed state and the colonial boundaries. According to their belief the modern state of Sudan is built on 'their' land and they consider the Arabic-speaking people to be outsiders. They hence demanded a separate state, rather than be under a united Sudan. Upto the 1969 different coalition governments were formed at the centre. Part of the Beja did not join or co-operate with the central government and did not wish to join a united Sudan.

The Beja tribe make up an estimated 6 to 7 percent of the total population of Sudan. Some of the major Beja tribes are the Ababda, Bishariyyin, Hadondowa, and Beni Amer. It is as tribes and clans that the Beja have acted in most of modern Sudanese history, despite common Beja institution and customs.⁵

⁵ John Obert Voll and Saran Potts Voll (1985), The Sudan Unity and Diversity in multicultural State, West View Press, USA, p.11.

The Beni Amir and Habab are mainly self employed in Port Sudan, mostly as wage labourers. They are politically active in Sudan today. The central government did not formulate any particular policies or give the movement any importance. This was because it was not a violent or mass based movement.

Ethnic and regional policies followed by the military regime of Numeiri which took over in 1969 affected the Beja. The regime consolidated itself in a one-party state under the SSU. It gave the Beja area regional government and as parts of regionalisation policy. This policy however, created problems both within the Beja group and their relationship with the centre.

At the regional level a government was formed by the SSU. The Beja and Beni Amer tribes did not support the SSU, some section of its members supported the regional government. It was weak and powerless. All the appointments come from the central leader. The Governor do not have power. Infact, the Governor did not represent the people of the province, or recognition of the special needs of the Beja. The result was a passive acceptance by the Beja to the Numiri government.

The Beja leaders though it took part in the elections, called to work in favour of the region rather than promoting the regime's politics. The successive government could not influence the Beja to a great extent. The Beja formed their own separate organisation known as the Beja congress, which

became the established party of Beja. The organisation had regionalism appealing to all the Beja. This organisation had links with regionalist movements, and with the communist party, elsewhere, in parts of the country. The Fur, Funj and the Nuba also expressed the separateness, but no regionalist was returned in Dar Fur and Blue Nile province.⁶

The region inhabited by the Beja is very backward in terms of economic development. Poor infrastructure, lack of good transportation and education led to the under development of the region. Political awareness was also weak. There was no strong political organisation which could voice their demands. Though they are extremely heterogeneous, this include Muslims and Christians, they share a history of oppression, and were able to later form their own party. The Sudanese National Party, a Nuba party. However, all the leadership of political parties failed to understand the grievances of the large population of their region.

This dissatisfaction increased due to the famine in the mid 1980s which led a sizable number of its population to join the ongoing separatist movement in the Southern Sudan. The movement continues and its members have joined the Separatist movement in the South.

⁶ Ibid., p.12.

Separatist Movement in the South

The religions and ethnic factor does not play much importance in uniting the tribes, but their future political order within the south region unites them collectively against the Khartoum government. They have nothing to do with other minorities in the North with whom they have less in common.

The reason that motivates the Southern Separatist movement, can be seen in different aspects generally people ignore the fact of the mechanism by which people collectively can achieve the shared goals. The various separatist movements would have jointly defeated the government in the centre if all the goals were aimed at bringing a change, and create a new system based on equal distribution of share and benefits. Understanding of both the background of the Separatist movement in the North and the South might have provide a solution to the ongoing crisis in the country.

The root of the problem must be understood so that it could be prevented from escalating into a major tragedy and disaster for both the North and the South.⁷ The nervousness of the so-called leaders, and their unwillingness to face the existing realities which the nationhood inherited in independence, paved the way for fighting the second liberation.

The outside world knows little about the South-North relationship. The

⁷ Mohammed Omar Bashir (1968), The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict, C.Hurst & Co., London, p.vii.

British Administration of 1898 to 1956 treated the country as two different nations. This difference arose not only because of geographical, and ethnic factors, but also because administration of the South remained under the Close Areas Act, which restricted movements of people from South to North. As a result the South remained under developed in every sphere.

There are economic differences between the North and South which have led to different political movement. The South has only 29 percent of the total population of the country. It is considerably underdeveloped, largely rural, poor and the uneducated inhabitant have been at a disadvantage compared to the more advanced northern region. The economic activity in the south is based on shifting agriculture, and cattle-farming. The 'Dinka' represent the dominant tribe within the region.

Inspite of these differences between the south and the north, There are some common elements which could create a united Sudan. These are their common past and culture.

The estimated number of cattles were about 2,397 in the southern region (the upper Nile, Bahar Gazal, Equatoria), the 150 sheep and goats were about 2,562,100).⁸ In order to ensure survival of any successive integration the economic factor is very important in determining the effective of the partnership.

⁸ Dunstan M.Wai. (1978) op.cit., p.9.

The policy of British administration regarding the relationship between the north and south, known as the Southern Policy Act, resulted in the late rise and development of political movements in the south relative to the north. Even the resistance movement of the North against colonialism is viewed as a Northern protest, the south did not take part in the movement.

It was only in the post-colonial period that political agitation and organization began to develop among the educated Southern elite, who began to agitate for a better share in national resources particularly after the 1955 revolt of the southern army regiments against the central government.

The Anya-Aya Movement in the South

Unlike the Separatist movement in the North, the Anya-Aya movement represented a military uprising by a section of the army against the domination of the North. It began in 1955. The military in the South, however, was a poorly organized force, not likely to be able, to overcome a major Sudanese army garrison, or take over any sizable town for more than a few days.

By 1955 tension was so high that the entire Southern corps mutinied at the Torit barracks, an event that signaled the outbreak of the first Southern insurrection.⁹ The southern Separatist forces within the army were largely

⁹ Sean Moroney (Ed. 1989) Op.cit., p.509.

inspireds and financed by a mission-trained intelligentsia. The dynamics of the Southern movement have been less closely studied than conflicts in other countries of Africa¹⁰ notably those against Portuguese colonialism. What is clear, however, is that the Separatist movement did not cohere into a broad liberation movement transcending parochial interests.

The Separatist movement could not overcome the divisive effects of tribalism. The south has no unified ethnic core or pre-existing common institutions which could unite them. Due to limited resources the movement had to face problems. As a result the Separatist were unable to gain the kind of international recognition needed to gain external aid. The movement remained limited to the Southern region, and their goals, was self-determination for the south.

In the early 1960's various groups united to form the Sudan Africa party, Closed Districts National Union. It was soon renamed the Sudan Africa National Union (S.A.N.U), headed by Lohure, Oduho and Deng and as a result it was able to mobilize a section of the people. The final stage began when Major-General Lagu began to unite the secessionists, and after securing Equatoria region he took overall command of the Anya-Aya forces. They received arms from Israel. International campaign was started in Britain by Southern Sudansese in self-exile. The Separatists claimed that although they

¹⁰ Michael Wolfers "Race and Class in Sudan", Race and Class, 32(1) Summer 1981, p.69.

were not strong enough to obtain the help of recognition of African and other countries they were supported by the vast majority of the Southern Sudanese. This was clear from the rising number of the recruits to the movement.

Historically the Southerners have felt that both economically and politically they have been exploited by the north. This has led to widespread mistrust and fear of the North regions among the Southern people. One notable factor is that the South does not welcome Islamic and Arabic culture. While North believes that the South has no culture and has to be brought into the main stream of Arabic culture. The concept of a united Sudan voiced by Northern intellectuals has no foundations, but is a result of western rule that sought to bring people so completely different under one united political entity.

These feelings affected the first conference in 1947 leading to suspicion mistrust etc., between the Southern delegation and the Northern delegation. A missionary delegate to Sudan argued that, the Northern Sudan, made up a majority Muslim population, would recognize Islam as the state religion, curtail the religions freedom of the people and bring educational system of the south under the State control. However, the south in many occasions showed that it was not in a position to join with the North to form a united Sudan.

The Southern leaders were not included the historical discussion in the early 1950s which took place in Cairo between the Northern politicians and

the Anglo-Egyptian joint government. This confirmed the desire of the North to belittle the South and ignore its demands.¹¹

Indeed it would not be surprising to characterise the Southern Sudan since independence as an internal colony. The emergence of Anya-Aya movement presented a new phase in the development of political awareness in the South. As mentioned the British policy of close district areas applied to the south region create a situation in which south lack behind economically and politically, as such it remains separate from the rest of the country. Therefore, many Southern Elite went in self exile and formed number of movements demanding independence for the South.

Like many Separatist movements in Africa, the Anya-Aya fought a war of seventeen years for liberation of the South from the North. They argued that historically South had a separate identity and record of resistance to Arabic encroachment.

The period between 1962 and 1972 can be regarded as the main period on "forgotten war". During this period they received negligible political support from other countries, although little aid had arrived from Uganda, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Israel. It should be noted that involvement of Israel in to the problem invited the attention of the Arabic world which extended its support to the central government.

¹¹ Mohamed Omer Bashir, (1987) The Southern Sudan from Conflict to Peace, U.K., p.71.

Unrest in the South grew increasingly under the Abboud regime, leading to the outbreak of the war between the Separatist movement and the government establishment in the major cities of the south. Political agitation intensified among the educated class, demanding the end of the feudal system for the South, the recognition of Christianity as state religion on par with Islam, English language on par with Arabic, and a demand for an independent army and more economic development for the south.

The government attempted to eliminate the southern particularism - their aspects of language, culture and religion which formed the basis of Southern demands for Separatist treatment. Use of force became a permanent feature to ensure the enforcement of the New Culture. In its six years in power Abboud was not successful. In addition to the economic crisis the problem of social integration remained unsolved. The attempt to impose the New Culture resulted in the South becoming politically distinct. The political repression during the Abboud regime led to the formation of a number of Separatist political parties both within Sudan and outside. This led to the establishment of party in the Southern region - The Sudan African National Union (SANU) was then created to function as a party in the 1960s. This was due to the return of William Dang to Sudan in 1965.

The SUNU wing of Aggrey Jadan was founded in the 1960s as the only Southern party outside the Sudan. But soon after, Joseph Oduho, a former

member of Parliament and his group formed his Azania Liberation Front. which pledged to establish a free independent African Nation in the Southern Sudan called Azania.¹²

Infact the number of Separatist organisations increased leadership factionalism within the Separatist movement both within and outside the country. Until the mid 1970s, five government in exile were formed and named as follows. The Nile Republic Provisional Government, the NNYIDI Revolutionary Government. The Anya-Aya National movement, Sudan Azaina and Sue Republic. All of these claimed to be the legitimate speakers for the South.¹³

The Spokesmen of most of these movements were defeated by the government or broke up due to factionalism. They were weak and had no military support. Colonel Lagu, united all the various groups into a single Anya-Aya movement and held peace talks with the government. This does not mean however, that all those factions have united and given up their separate identity. Most of them were confused and lost contact with the real issues facing the country.

Most movements suffer from the lack of any serious intention to serve the people they claim to lead. Another factors which also affected the various

¹² Dunstan M.Wal (1978) Op.cit., p.163.

¹³ Ibid., p.163.

factions, is their egoistic nature that occupy much of the time. Tribalism has also plagued the Separatist movement in the south. That is reflected in the formation of the Anyidi Revolutionary Government which was basically tribal whereas the Nile government, aimed at Dinka domination. Although the word revolutionary government was used it was a reactionary regime.

Hence, the failure to resolve the Separatist movement in Sudan has had dire consequences, it has led to political disintegration of the country.

Response of the State to the Separatist Movement

In Sudan, state and society have historically been adversaries. The state action requiring any kind of popular support is extremely difficult. The state of Sudan historically had problems in achieving an agreed framework, which would be agreeable to all the regions and ethnic groups residing there.

Due to the nature of Separatist movement in Sudan, the response of the state has been different towards the movements in the North and those in South. The movement in the North has not received as much state response as the Separatist movement in the South. State response to the North has been within the legal constitutional framework. There have been no military attacks or culture enforcement. Whereas successive government treated the problem in the South as a law and order problem leading to war between the government troops and the Southern Separatist Movement.

General Abboud who came to power in a bloodless coup (1958- 64) was a disaster for the South region. He believed that National Unity could be achieved by enforced Arabization and Islamization of the whole Southern people.

He forced the Southern people to abandon Christian names in favour of Arabic ones, order the use of Arabic language in the Administration and schools; and established Koranic schools and displayed a heavy anti-southern bias in recruitment into the police and Army. This was the first stages of response of the centre to the Separatist movement in the south.

General Numeiri had a different solution to the Separatist movement of the South. In his declaration, of 9 June 1969, he said that the government recognized the historical and culture difference between the North and the South, and firmly believed that the unity of the country must be built upon these objectives realities. He decided that the 1969 coup had become necessary because Sudan's independence had been crippled by the successive governments which had no ambition other than that of power, and self-enrichment of their members. Numeiri therefore signed the Addis Ababa agreement with the Southern Separatist leader Joseph Lagu and his group.

Addis Ababa Agreement (1972)

Under the Addis Ababa agreement, the south was to have its own Regional People's Assembly and a Higher executive council that would serve as a regional cabinet.¹⁴ The Anya-Aya Guerrilla would be absorbed into the police force, the prisons service and Armed forces and the wildlife department. It was agreed that there should be equal balance between north and southern troops in garrisons in the southern region at least in the five years following 1972 agreement.¹⁵

Northern political leaders opposed the agreement and described it as a fraud as it was signed with only one Separatist group. Their accusation seemed real when most of the members of the Separatist delegation were appointed to the top ministerial position in the South Regional Government and the Central Government. The southern delegation, led by Joseph Lagu, said that it was in general satisfied despite his remarks, "that not all Southern were not content to accept autonomy, many wanted complete independence, and the Anya-Aya themselves under impression that what they have been fighting for all the years was the independence. They did not accept the cease fire, but reluctantly."¹⁶ According to Joseph Lagu his group would co-operate fully once they (Southern) were recognized as full citizens of the

¹⁴ John Obert Voll and Sarah Potts Voll (1985), op.cit., p.85.

¹⁵ Andrew Mawson, 'Southern Sudan: A Growing Conflict' The World Today, Dec. 1984, pp.520-527.

¹⁶ Edgar O Ballance (1977) The Secret War in the Sudan 1955-1972, Faber, London, p.143.

Sudan.¹⁷ This showed that their support was conditional.

General Numeiri a powerful leader attempted to enforce the agreement. In order to convince the Southern region he took a number of steps. He removed the pro-Egyptian and pro-Arab ministers in his cabinet with men who took a soft or line towards the South. He lifted the state of emergency in the south which had been in force since 12th Aug., 1955. A detailed law defining the constitutional position of the south and granting it regional autonomy within a united Sudan was passed.

It is important to define the principles on which the agreement was based - unity, diversity, self-government, power sharing between the centre and Southern region, and equality were later incorporated into the Constitution. Article One of the constitution which was amended stated that the Sudan (like no other country in Africa) is an Afro-Arab country. Article 8 recognized and emphasize both the unity of the country. The act of self-government for the south was passed along the based upon the Addis Ababa Agreement.¹⁸ (See Appendix) From 1972 to 1982 Numeiri inspite of opposition, was able to enforce the Addis Ababa Agreement.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.144.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.520.

The problem of Separatist movement in Sudan has gain more attention than any other issue since Sudan's independence in 1956. The first phase described above clearly illustrates the sad situation prevalling in the country.

The Addis Ababa agreement was Numeiri's main achievement. It was violated in 1983 in an attempt to apply the Reagionalization policy which led to a return to a war between the North and the South. The agreement succeeded to bring temporary peace and development in the southern for a decade. Sudan's second phase of Separatist movement begining with the violation of Addis Ababa agreement.

CHAPTER 4

SECOND PHASE OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND THE NUMERI REGIME 1983-90

The second phase of the Separatist movement began in 1983. However, it is necessary to take a brief look at the Numeri regime, its nature and politics.

Sudan is one of the several African countries where the military has intervened, and stayed in power for a considerably long period. A prime example for this generalization is provided by the political career of colonel Jaafar Mohamed Numeri, who had been involved in several abortive coup attempts before he finally succeeded on May 25, 1969.¹

He gave at least four reasons for his action, in 1969. First, he accused the earlier government for mishandling the South problem and thereby perpetuating disunity and hatred in the country. Second, he conformed that the jockeying for power among the sectarian's leaders and the Muslim Brothers had produced a high incidence of political instability which rendered the machinery of the state important. Third, he argued that political instability had led to deterioration of the economy, and in the view of the progressive

¹ Peter K. Bechtold (1976) Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation, New York: Praeger Publishers, p.259.

element in the army continued neglected of the improvised masses was intolerable. Fourth, he thought that Sudan had lost its prestige in the Arab world and in Africa, as a result of a foreign policy lacking the adequate vigor and realism necessary to deal with the situation in the Third World."²

He declared that his government would at least do away with sectarianism and realize the socialist programme of October 1964 revolution.³ General Ibrahim Abboud, assumed power in a bloodless coup in 1958, and had the blessing and support of the conservative party, who hoped that the military Generals would stabilize the political situation which was in a state of chaos and anarchy.

General Jaafar Mohamed Numeiri in contrast established a modernizing military regime, which wanted to bring change in a traditional society ruled by conservative parties like (the Umma and the Khatmyyah). He argued that Sudan under his leadership, would reject Parliamentary Democracy as a capitalist method of subjugating the people, and would adopt instead scientific socialism, aimed at transforming the poverty of the Sudanese masses into prosperity.⁴ These statement brought mass support to the regime and his new officer were described as free officers. People welcomed

² Dunstan M.Wai, The Sudan: "Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Numeiri", African Affairs 78 (312), July, 1979, pp.297-317.

³ Gabarl Warburg, 'Islam in Sudan's Politics' Jerusalem Quarterly, (13), Fall, 1972, p.50.

⁴ Ibid., p.51.

the new moves, because they were dissatisfied with the functioning of the political parties. His address to the nation stressed on the Revolutionary vanguards as forces which would bring change for the benefit of the people, thereby leading the country into a new era, building its unity, its economic and social life along the road of socialist development.⁵ The relative autonomy of the new regime is seen in its ability to adopt policies which prejudices the interests of the previously dominant Sudanese establishment and bourgeoisie.

To achieve such a revolutionary goals, the regime created a one party system to strengthen the masses to support its series of programmes of Nationalisation, which includes banks, industries, factories, etc.

The party which was called Sudan's Socialist Union (SSU) was the only political party organisation allowed in the country. Like many others, he had become thoroughly disillusioned with the regime's betrayal of its own ideals, a betrayal of a nation and a generation.⁶

It must be emphasized here, that the norms and institutions created by the regime does not fit into Sudan's social reality. There was the rise of what may be described as Islamic Fundamentalism, and the failure of traditional

⁵ Mukhter Al Assam (1989) "Bureaucracy and Development in the Sudan", Journal of Asian and African Studies, XXIV;1-2, p.38.

⁶ Mansoor Khalid (1985) Nimeri and the Revolution of Dis-May, KPI, Limited, London, p.1.

political parties to accommodate political dissent.⁷ However, Numeiri had his own order of priorities, and soon he combined both the powers of head of state, and commander in chief of the Army in his own hands. Subsequently the events that followed took a revolutionary turn. In this Chapter a detailed account of Numeiri's policies is not attempted, rather the concern is to trace his contribution to the outbreak of the Separatist movement.

It is interesting to note that during this phase emerged Anya-Aya II, an opposition to the government in Khartoum. The Anya-Aya II is a unique movement which since its inception over a decade ago, has survived inspite of great difficulties. It was founded in 1975 by a group of southerners who were disillusioned by the course of events in the country. Initially the demands, of Anya-Aya II were based on further clarification of the issues covered by the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972. Later however, the movement appears to have developed a separatist tendency.⁸

Another opposition which emerged in the region, under the leadership of John Garang, was the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM was the major source of opposition in the south, although it is not a Southern Separatist or even a Southern rights movements. Garang proclaims

⁷ Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim (1989), "Constitutionalism and Islamization in the Sudan", *Africa Today*, vol.36, No.3&4, p.17.

⁸ *Sudanow*, (1986) *Khartoum Sudan*, vol.II, no.7, July, p.27.

that the SPLM's goals is the Liberation of the whole Sudan. It calls for all Sudanese to rise against the domination of what it calls the ruling Pseudo-Arab nationalist burgers is Khartoum.⁹ Its members are mainly drawn from the Dinka, while the Anya-Aya II movement has its base among the Nuer tribe.

The Sudan's Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), the military wing of the SPLM, is drawn mainly from the Dinka, the largest tribe in the Southern Sudan, and other tribes such as the Shilluk and Nuer are easily encouraged to take up arms against the government. Subsequently, many other opposition, joined the movement across the country.

However, both the movements, the Anya-Aya II and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, (SPLA) could not agree upon demands and goals. By 1984, The relationship between the two began to fall a part, and there was rise factionalism. Clashes between the SPLA and Anya-Aya II appeared party ideological, since the former wished to overthrow Numei's regime, and establish a radical alternative for the whole Sudan, while the latter was more secessionist. There was also Ethnic tension between Dinka and Nuer.

Their goals differed, the Anya-Aya II wants Southern Sudan to be given a greater political and economic role to play in a united Sudan. While for the SPLA, since it was Numei's politics that created the problem, he was not to

⁹ John O Vol,(1986) "The Sudan after Numei", Current History, 85(510), May, p.215.

be trusted and to overthrow him remains the SPLA's declared objectives.¹⁰

However, before going into more details of the development of Separatist movement, it is necessary to examine Numeiri's two major policies which led to his decline and beginning of the Second phase of the separatist movement. These were redivision of the south and Islamization.

Redivison of the South

Many scholars argued that, among the factors that they enumerate for the present state of war in Sudan, is Numeiri wilful tearing up of Addias Ababa agreement, by redividing the south into its original three province.¹¹ It is true that under the Addias Ababa agreement. Southern Sudan would remain three regions with the capital in Juba. The arrangement gave autonomy to the South, with its own legislature, cabinet, and civil service but within a united Sudan. It has not quite a federation because there were no regions, there is a Southern region with in national unity.¹²

The people saw the division of the south into more regions as a colonial policy of divide and rule. Though it was supported by certain section of Southern elite who saw benefits in a divided south. It was opposed by the rest

¹⁰ Peter Woodward, 'Sudan: Threats to Stability', Conflict Studies, No.173, p.13.

¹¹ H.M.L. Beri, (1984) "Turmoil in Sudan", Strategic Analysis, September, pp.537-45.

¹² An Interview with Francis Deng, Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in African Report, March April, 1977, p.13.

of the elite who continued to demand self-determination for the south.

The Addis Ababa agreement "not only put an end to the conflict that had continued for seventeen years between the North and South, but it had paved the way for the Sudanese to embark on ambitious economic and social development projects, which could have been impossible had the war continued.¹³ Agreement has to be respected by the government but they have rarely been respected for long by the government concerned, or for that matter by the secessionist, as was the case with the Iraqi Kurds in the early 1970's, the Moros of the Philippines in the mid-1970s. The evolving miracle - as southern leaders had characterised it only a few years previously had come to an end.¹⁴

After the Breakdown of the agreement Numeri was opposed strongly by the Southern, elite which was regarded by most of the conservative parties as the Separatist even after the peace agreement. The regime earlier was popular in the South and had lost the support of the Northern Muslim majority. Some

¹³ Mohamed Omar 'Beshir, Southern Sudan Striking Recovery', Middle East International, 69, March 77, p.9.
Also seen in Andrew Manson, Southern Sudan a Growing Conflict, The World Today, December 1984, pp.520-27.
Also seen in Ann Mosely Leach, 'Confrontation in the Southern Sudan' Middle East Journal, 40 (3) Summer 1986, pp.410-428.

¹⁴ Interviews with Abel Abier 'Nine Years an Evolving Miracle', Sudanow Khartoum, March, 1981 pp.12-14.
(Former Vice-president of Sudan and President of High Executive Council for Southern region)

sections of the Sudanese population which wished to work against the spirit of regional autonomy, had argued that the agreement has given too much power to the Southern region, and this might lead to secession.

Nevertheless, some Southerners have argued that, due to breakdown of the Addis Ababa agreement, the present state of war is due to the inadequacy of its implementation. The Southern politicians, including the Separatist elements oppose to the Nueri's, decision, and aim to fight it, and others supported the regime and hope for a better share in the new arrangement. It became very difficult to control the situation in the south. The two groups opposed each other leading to inter-tribal warfare.

Widespread violence and agitation began in the main cities of the south, particularly in the Equatorial region. Through presidential decree, the southern province were divided into separate regions, weakening the southern political strength. Through a divide and rule formula political boundaries was gerrymandered to annex the oil rich Bentiu in western Nuer/Dinka area to the Northern territory. The southern military command was to be transformed to the North without prior consultation with the Southern senior officer. All those decisions compounded the problems and reopened old wounds.¹⁵

Inter-tribal conflict was high and was seen on a large scale in the

¹⁵ David D.Chand, (1989) 'The Sudan's Civil War: Is A Negotiated Solution Possible? Africa Today, vol.36, No.3&4, p.55.

Southern region. The politicians use this as a means to exploit the situation in the southern region for selfish interest. Big politicians directly and indirectly supplied the tribals with arms in order to support their interest. Sometimes they wanted to counter balance among other tribes. The event as such could hardly be described as a tribal war, rather it was a war for capturing leadership. This was evident in the election of 1983 for the regional assembly which saw the struggle between the former separatist movement leader Col. Joseph Lagu, and the vice-president Mr. Abel Alil. Both are signatories of Addis Ababa agreement.

The situation become worse when central government intervened and tried to support one group and appease the other. This led to chaos in the south. This period also saw a new alignment coming into existence, along tribal lines. The breakdown of the agreement marked the final failure of Numeiri to maintain peace as agreed upon. Numeiri had never been genuinely committed to the principles of the Adis Ababa agreement. For the architects of the agreement the settlement was the cornerstone of national unity.¹⁶

In fact for Numeiri autonomy was merely a price that he prepared to pay to the South in return for the support against his enemies in the North. Another reason for the growing Southern suspicion of Khartoum is the feeling that economic decisions are being systematically taken out of their hands. For

¹⁶ Mansoor Khalid (1985), Op.cit., p.234.

example the decision to locate the oil refinery at Kosti across the border in the North.

Numeri did not feel that the south needed to be consulted on the issue. This deliberate ignoring of southern sentiments caused resentment against the Numeri regime.

By 1983, his popularity had all but disappeared, and his power slipped. The Southern population had rejected any policy made by Khartoum. Protest and unrest was seen in most of the cities. Numeri made more and more concessions to the Islamic Fundamentalists, who were demanding that Sudan should become an Islamic state, and that the Shariat law should be applied throughout the land, an idea that antagonised southern opinions.

Numeri and Islamization

The ideal of Islam, --- is not just that God is one, absolutely one, but also existence is one; also life is one. All life is just one programme of worship, whether it is economic, political, sex, private, public or whatever and society is also one. so unitarianism is a fundamental principal that explains almost every aspect of doctrine or practical Islam.¹⁷

[Summary of Turabi's Remarks]

A major question asked by analysts since the institution of the Islamic

¹⁷ Summary of a Lecture and Round-table discussion with Hasan Turabi, prepared by Louis J. Cantori and Arthur Lowrie, 'Islam, Democracy, The State and the West', Middle East Policy, vol.1, (1992) No.3, p.50.

code (Sharit Islamia) in 1983 is why Numeriri adopted a programme that contradicted his earlier effects to build concensus?

Various explanations have been put forward for Numeri's action. Some saw it as an attempt to appease the Northern political parties, who are critical of Numeri's socialist programme, and others saw it as an attempt to turn away people's attention from the growing economic problems.

Other, saw it as an attempt to win the support of Saudi Arabia to gain financial aid which Sudan desperately needed. In fact, the debate on Islam has been the major subject in recent years trend, and the most divisive force the country.

Due to historical and cultural factors Sudan would find it difficult to apply the Islamic laws. During the colonial period, the British followed a deliberate policy of Christianity in the south while in the north, Islam was allowed to influence the society. Therefore, Numeri's move to implement the Sharia laws was seen as a threat against the value and norms of the south. At the same time, the interpretation of Islam within the Muslim North is not the same. Although, they had common Islamic orientation. But do not agree on the principle which Numeri has attempted to apply. Numeri himself was not very clear about the kind of Islamic principles he wish to implement.

The Muslim brothers supported the regime, Dr. Al Hassan Turabi, a very able man believed strongly that Islam was the only answer to the

country's many problems. During 1983-84 Numeiri due to the influence of the Muslim Brothers changed his Islamization policies often.

The south rejected these laws and decided to fight the regime. Discontent among the southerners was much deeper than just over Numeiri's decision to introduce Sharia laws and to change the country's constitution to make it an Islamic state. However, this decision contributed greatly to the revolt in 1983-84 in the three southern regions, especially in the Upper Nile where thousands of people were killed on both sides in a number of major engagements.

However, united opposition to Numeiri's programme provide no basis for an effective consensus. Southern opposition to Numeiri's programme and some northern groups, like the Sudan Congress Party (SCP), called for the full abrogation of the September laws (Sharia laws) and the establishment of an essentially secular state.¹⁸ On the other hand the Muslim Brotherhood the Islamic National Front (INF) advocated the continued application of Islamic law and opposed only those aspects of Numeiri's Islamization programme that were the mistaken products of Numeiri's personalised approach.¹⁹ Between those two opposite groups, the more traditional political groups center around the Ansari Umma Party, and the party associated with the Khatmiyyah and

¹⁸ John O.Voll, (1986) 'The Sudan after Numeiry' Current History, vol. 85, No. 507, May, p.214.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.215.

forces in South, and groups in the North who had opposed the Addis Ababa agreement, and saw it as a policy of appeasement to the south. His two strategies of redivision and Islamization were also a failure.

During the Transitional period the SPLA posed five conditions to the transitional military council TMC. These conditions were to be fulfilled prior to any negotiation regarding the separatist in the Southern regions. These conditions are one, cancellations of the Islamization law, 'second, organisation of a national conference to discuss Sudan's problems. (it does not called it the southern problem as other political parties have called it). third, the resignation of Transition Military Council TMC and the current cabinet, forth, lifting of the state of emergency, and fifth, cancellations of all military pacts with foreign countries especialy militray pact with Libya and Egypt. From 1985 onwards these five questions remained central to any attempt to solve the separatist problem.

After the overthrow of Numeiri, there was a period of transition during which there was a re-alignment of political forces

Response of State

Maj. General Swar Al-Dahab the head of the TMC offered various concessions, to the Separatists including the cancellation of the redivision and the reinstatement of the Southern Executive Council (HEC) in Juba under the

A series of negotiations have occurred between the government and the SPLA/SPLM, which were designed to achieve a just and durable solution that would minimize deaths and human suffering and bring about a return to peace and stability.²⁵

The TMC, unfortunately did not reach a solution, nor even address the fundamental grievances of Sudan, i.e. war, Separatism, socio-economic development, decentralization or federation, foreign policy, including Sudan's relation with Arab world which the SPLA opposed. Instead the TMC, launched a military attack as well as the SPLA. At the same time the process of militarization of tribes in the North and the southern part of the country took place. Two kinds of struggles can be seen at this point. Firstly the struggle between the TMC and the SPLA. Secondly, the struggle between the various factions of the SPLA itself.

It must be noted that the SPLA leadership in 1985 was not fighting for separation, but rather a restructuring of the system to provide greater participation and see federalism as the best method to create the 'New Sudan'. Clear evidence of this can be found in the following resolutions of national dialogue and peace which the SPL/SPLM politic-military High command presented to the TMC in September 1985.

²⁵ David C.Chand, (1989) The Sudan's Civil War: Is A Negotiated Solution Possible', Africa Today, vol.36, No.3&4, p.57.

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²⁵ David C.Chand, (1989) The Sudan's Civil War: Is A Negotiated Solution Possible', Africa Today, vol.36, No.3&4, p.57.

cancel Numeris' Shariat Laws and cancel Numeris treaties with Egypt.²⁶

The second stage of contact between the government and the SPLA came after the election in April 1986. El Sadiq El Mahdi of the Umma party became the Prime Minister. No party secured a majority, hence he formed a coalition with the Democratic Union Parties (DUP). The DUP was the new name for the traditional Khatamyha party. Hence, the two traditional parties came together again. He articulated a three proposed policy to end the war: 1) He would deal with the fundamental issues underlying the rebellion by convening a constitutional conference 2) strengthening the armed forces and 3) seeking an agreement with Ethiopia to persuade the SPLM to negotiate.²⁷ He wanted to use diplomatic pressure in order to convince the SPLM to talk.

At the political level, a break-through appeared possible when Mengisto arranged a meeting between El Mahdi and John Garang in Addis Ababa on July 31, 1986.

The SPLA demanded that the state of emergency should be completely lifted as a pre-condition for peace talks. The question of Islam remained an obstacle, because Sadiq himself represent the Islamic fundamentalist force. In fact most of the political parties in the North are rooted in the Islamic

²⁶ Ibid., p.58.

²⁷ Ann Mosely Lesch, "A View from Khartoum Foreign Affairs, 65 (4) Spring 1987, pp.807-26.

sector. However, the Kokodam meeting in Ethiopia called for the cancellation of the 1983 September laws, Garang stated that any religiously based system was unacceptable since it would perpetuate religious discrimination and inequality.²⁸

In the third stage the diplomatic approach was attempted; the former military ruler of Nigeria, General Olusengue, Obasanja, Dr. Francis Dang a Southerner and the former US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger attempted to negotiate between the TMC and the SPLA in order to stop the war. This meeting consisting of high diplomats could not also bring about a peaceful solution to the problem. This failure was attributed to the fact that, President Mengisto Haile Mariam of Ethiopia continued to support Garang's SPLA as a counter balance to Khartoum's support to Eritrian rebels.

The Muslim Brotherhood (now called National Islamic Front) became increasingly influential in the North, criticising the government for not ending the war, and even insisted that Shariat Law should be applied throughout the land. This indicated that Sadiq, even if he willing to do so, had no capacity to end the war. His own party would not have allowed him to do so.

Kokodam agreement was not accepted by the Sadiq government but he proposed that the Sharia Laws be put on a national referendum. On the other hand the SPLA held that those Laws should be abolished. So no agreement

²⁸ Ibid., p.815.

could be reached.

In April, 1986 the situation in the South began to deteriorate, when 1000 Dinka people were massacred near El-Dhaen in Derfur province. Similar massacre took place in WAU, and many other parts of the country.

In 1987 an agreement was signed between Garang and the Democratic Union Party (DUP). By 1988, the South was close to anarchy and starvation which affected the population in the war zone in the South. Various international aid organisations attempted to come to agreement with the SPLA to allow airlifting of food to the towns affected by famine.

However, Garang's Democratic Union Party (DUP) agreement was welcomed with protest in the capital Khartoum. The opposition National Islamic Front (NIF) took to the Streets and attacked the government shouting no peace without Islam. Sadiq refused to commit himself to the 1987 agreement between SPLA and the DUP in Addis Ababa. As a result the DUP left the coalition government because his peace plan for the South had been rejected by the Umma party. This rejection led to the break down of the coalition government of Al-Sadique. A new coalition was formed between Umma party of Sadique and the NIF headed by Dr. Hassan El Turabi, who was leader of opposition.

However, the situation in the South and Western Sudan became disastrous, at least quarter of a million people had died as a result of famine,

largely because neither the government nor the SPLA would allow food supplies to be taken to the people in the affected regions. It was a war in which few military casualties occurred, the majority who died were civilian either killed by various parties or starvation to death.²⁹ In 1989, the Senior Officer of the Army gave the government an ultimatum to attempt a new consensus and end the Civil War in the South. The western donors also wanted the government to end the war in the South.

Infact, the new coalation of the Umma and NIF led to increase the war in the South. Umma Party did not command a majority in the Parliament, and was not interested in accepting the peace agreement of 1987 between the SPLA and the DUP. The NIF on the other hand joined the coalation in order to see that the September Laws should not be abolished. This attitude, intensified the war in South.

However, the war was costing an already crippled economy, an estimated \$ 1 million a day.³⁰ General Bashir's bloodless coup in June 1989 could not change the situation. He is also a prisoner of the fundamentalism. The significance of this period in the clashes between the Muslim and tribesmen and non-Muslim Shilluk of the South. He appealed to Arab

²⁹ Guy Arnold, (1991), Wars in the Third World Since 1945, Cassell Publishers Ltd., New York, U.S.A., p.405.

³⁰ Al Enkhz Al Watani, (Khartoum/Sudan) April, 15, 1989.

Countries for support so that it could destroy the SPLA by the 1990's. Therefore, Khartoum government in 1990 appeared to be dominated by Islamic fundamentalist interests which still insisted on Sharia Law, hence, this indicated the war was set to continue indefinitely.³¹

By doing so the government has not realised that people of those affected areas might turn against the government and join the movement for better change. The basic human rights are suppressed. The people had no rights for free expression, they are not allowed to make a funeral in public or in some occasion. The government has shown the dictatorial style. However, a Southern elite, Col. Martin, then in the Cabinet, reacted on a question that Sudan is called an Arabic State. He says "You judge a man (Gen. Bashir) by what he says not a radio or TV."³²

In a statement General Bashir declared that the military, junta give up the military option in order to reach a peaceful settlement through negotiation. He immediately added that, but we are ready and can resume fighting if war were forced upon us.

In fact, it has become a tradition that the Southern response to any government in the Khartoum was based on certain principle, a spokesman William Ajal Deng (a Southern) responded that our support to the new regime

³¹ Cater, N. The South, A Kingdom of Destruction, New Africa, no.261, June 1989, p.13-14.

³² Cater N, (1989) Sudan's Mr.Tough Guy, New Africa, No.262, October, pp.11-12.

is conditional. The government should work for peace in the South or forget our support.

We can say that Numeris contribution in the ongoing crisis will remain, since no leader is free from Islamic values and does not intend to sacrifice his seat. The extent of support of the South people to the government is determined by the government attitude to end the war.

The SPLA on the other hand has proved to be the most powerful movement that has ever emerged in Sudan's long history although some factionalism had ranted the unity, still the SPLA remain the mainstream challenging the regimes and its peace proposal.

What the government should do is determined by the present situation, and the political trend, not only in Sudan but the world around us. The main factor which posed a threat to south-north relation is the unacceptable abolition of the Sharia Laws by the Government and the rejection of secular values as demanded by the SPLA. The government should find a solution to those problems so that the country's unity and integrity would be built rather than war leading to disintegration. Eriteria might be a good example to the present situation if the government refuses to reach to solution with the movement.

CONCLUSION

The state in Sudan, has suffered a great deal, especially in the recent years, when the rise of separatist movements, and the claim for self-determination had threatened life of many states in the region.

In our discussion about the state and separatist movement in Africa, it becomes very clear that, the separatist movement and the response of the state has be viewed in many ways. This study shows that the separatist movements it emerged as a reaction to state policies which do not take into consideration the ethnic and cultural differences of the various regions and the people living in them. The state acts merely as instrument of oppression, used by central leaders to legitimize their rule. State-society relation becomes deadlocked, because the state emerged as an alien apparatus for the oppression of the people. Economic differences also contributed to the separatist tendency.

Firstly, the Sudan represents state that has failed to make a reality of independence. The state failed to include the interests of all the masses, leading to political tensions; and even disorder and violence. As such the claim for self- determination has again captured the headlines.

Infact, the claim for self-determination for the south is not new, the southerner, basically demanded a federal solution, in the 1940s, they argued

that a state divided by racial, religions and cultural differences could only remain united if it recognized those realities and introduced decentralized government in the country. But, no Sudanese government after independence whether civilian or military, has been willing to accept a federal solution the most important reason for this objection, was probably the fear that federation would only be a first step towards complete secession. In addition, the center realized that by compromising with the south demands, they might be compelled to grant similar rights to other regions in the North itself such as Darfur, Nuba Mountain, Beja (Map No.3).

While studying literature of Sudan we find that these demands were there since 1947, when the south and the north delegation met for the first time to discuss the future of Sudan. Infact, many scholars, argue that if those demands were accepted by the northern politicians in first phase of the movement at that time Sudan could have been the best example of a federation in Africa as a whole (See the minutes of meeting in the Appendix 1).

The demand again is dealt with in Chapter Four. It takes a different turn, when there is demand for greater clarification of the issues highlighted in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 and slowly turns into a broad-based movement, in 1983, under the leadership of Dr. John Garang.

It was the reaction against the government repressive of Islamization and re-division policies which led to considerable misunderstanding in the south and ill will. Southern Sudanese are very Heterogeneous groupings of Dinka and non-Dinka, people, who generally felt themselves to be excluded from critical decisions affecting the interests of people in the south, such as the oil refinery which was to be located in port Sudan instead of Bantiu the actual oil field,¹ and development projects in the South which remain poor, and administrative decentralization etc., As a consequences, many southerners reacted angrily and subsequently they give their support to the various guerrilla movement which sprang up in the region.

In the north and west of Sudan, the initial resentment arose in the mid 1950s among the people, because of the failure of the state and the regional government to deliver the goods. The Beja, and the Nuba Mountain people later began to join the movement for a greater revolution. In recent years the demand for separate statehood for the south has been voiced by the politician as the only solution. The war in the south, between the government troops, and the separatists has caused the people in the south more hardship. The famine has uprooted complete tribes and their distinctive customs.² In the North as well customs and values are being reluctantly changed and adopted

¹ Sudanow, vol.6, No.9, September, 1981.

² The Hindustan Times, 9.2, 1993.

to the new circumstances of life. Douglas John's³ in his chapter on the South-North issues, emphasised the gravity of the conflict and its various implications for the question of the National Unity and Integration. He relates the civil war to the political attitudes of those in power and politics extended to the South region during the Numeiri regime.

The government regarded the separatist tendencies, in the south as signs of renewed imperialist attempts to destroy an independent united Sudan from within, and almost all the successive governments treated the problem as the British Legacy which aimed at a point of time to separate the South from the North. Monsour Khalid⁴ argued that, the British have contributed like elsewhere, but cannot be solely, held responsible. It is the outcome of Northern politics of opportunism, which time and again has been played by different political parties for their own benefits, as shown in Chapter Four there is no clear indication whether the movement which began with the goal of liberating the whole of Sudan, is aiming to separate the south because the nature of the movement has taken a different direction since the mid e1980s. ITs membership open to all sections of people across the country, the demand in the 1980s was to overthrowing the Numeri region.

However, events in the recent years, show that the movement is likely

³ Review Article, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.29, No.2, April 1993, p.240.

⁴ Ibid., p.242.

to take a new direction towards self-determination for the south, a demand which was not clear when the movement started in 1983.

Secondly, the study shows that Sudan's greatest disappointment was the failure of the 1985-1989 democracy, and its ability to solve the question of Separatism. None of the political parties tried to make it success, their leaders could no longer attract mass support, the ambition of the ruling elements was merely to secure state positions, ministerial posts or portfolio. A tradition feature of Sudanese politics, has been weak and badly divided. The weakness of civilian institutions led to military rule. Thus the basic issues facing the country have not been resolved: the war in the South, and the Sharit Law of September 1983 still remain in the agenda.

Two recent books have attempted to make fresh analysis of the Question of Separatism. Lama Akol⁵ has argued that it was not only the failure of the Addis Ababa agreement but factionalism and self interests in a section of southern leadership which contributed the failure of the agreement leading to civil war. Abel Alier⁶ on the other hand, blame Numeri for the breakdown of the agreement. Lam Akol point some characteristics of Southern regional politics which Abel failed to highlight in his book. Understanding

⁵ AFrican Watch (1992).

⁶ Abel Alier (1990) Southern Sudan: Too many Agreement Dishonoured, Exeter: Ithaca Press, London.

those points would provide a key role in the understanding of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972. Those points can be seen as follows:

1. Pervasive corruption and ethnic favoritism in the High Executive Council.
2. Its questionable commitment to democracy, manifested in its determination to proceed with schemes such as Jongli Cananel in the face of popular opposition (Jongli Cananel is a scheme sponsored by the Central Government and the Egyptian Government).
3. Inter regional tension within the High Executive Council, which led to dismissal of Joseph Lagu and his subsequent support to the redivision of the South, with the claim that, the Southern politics being dominated by the Dinka.
4. Willingness of the High Executive Council to abrogate democratic and constitutional principles for the sake of fictional, personal and ethnic advantages.

Thus, in those circumstances it was not difficult for Numeiri to find allies within the Southern Elite.

Lam Akol acknowledged that the degeneration of Sudanese politics in the 1970's and 1980's led to the 10 year war, to struggle against the regime and his politics. The movement and its leaders failed to move beyond Ethnic politics and personal rivalry.

Thirdly, Sudan foreign policy under Numeiri and its association with the Arabic world has contributed to the Separatist tendency. Numeiri, held that Sudan is an Afro- Arabic Country. Chapter four highlights Numeiri's foreign policies which contributed to Separatism.

First, his acceptance of the aspiration of the National Islamic front of making Sudan an Islamic Republic. This policy attracted the attention of many neighbouring countries. The Economic decline arising from Numeiri's New Economic Policy of 1980's as demonstrated in Chapter two, increasingly sharpened with Sudan's resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt. His support to the Camp David agreement isolated Sudan from the oil rich Arab countries. The oil supply to Sudan was cut off, Political considerations therefore affected the generous aid extended to the Sudan, by the Arab countries and the West. Earlier they had expected that Sudan would become a bread basket.

Numeiri in an effort to gain more aid from the west, moved away from neighbouring Arabic states. In 1984, he made an accusation against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.⁷ That it had committed an aggression against Sudanese territory, threatening its security and violating the UN charter and International Law. Its Minister for foreign affairs said that Jamahiriya had bombed Omdurman and killed five Sudanese citizens. Libya denied the

⁷ U.N. Year Book, vol.38, 1984, p.185.

actuation, and said that Sudan had been experiencing continuous revolutions and disturbance for a number of year's and it was trying to find justification through empty accusations against neighbouring states.⁵

Infact Numeiri feared that Jamahrya was supporting the revolution in the Southern Sudan to Liberate the reset of the country. Over the years, the Sudan had been subjected to attacks by the Jamahriya, and has experience more than 18 attempted coup'deta since 1969.

However, Numeiri political trends varied from that of Nasser's Socialist Ideologies, on the one hand to Islamic Fundamentalism on the other.

Another external dispute which the regime used to distract attention of people from its internal problems has been the Ethiopia-Sudan dispute. Numeiri frequently accused the Ethiopian war-plan, of conducting recurring fights on Sudanese territory, and helping the out laws (Separatist). Numeiri, believed that, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was being helped by Ethiopia. At the same time Eritrean Liberation Movement was being supported by the Sudanese Government.⁸

Infact, some western reports raised the possibility that Sudan had launched the raid on its own people in an attempt to obtain US Aid. However, the UN rejected the allegation because there was lack of evidence. While, other states view the act as an imperialist plot and attempt to create hatred among

⁸ Ibid.

other states and provoke conflict in region.

On the basis of the study of the Separatist movement in Ethiopia and Somalia, one can make some observations and comparison with Separatism in Sudan. Ethiopia and Somalia present two models regarding Separatism in the Horn of Africa as discussed in Chapter I. It is necessary to examine whether Sudan falls in any one of the models.

Ethiopia and Sudan, experienced a Separatist movement, of not less than two decades. This begin in early 50's and even today phenomena as threat to the existence of these state. The result was instability not only in those countries, but in the Horn of Africa as whole. A comparison of Ethiopia of Sudan shows that in both cases Eritrea in Ethiopia and the South in Sudan the sense of belonging was missing since the colonial era, or even before the colonial era, the different communities lived in complete autonomy from each other.

Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia in 1952, after being under British rule for a short period. The feeling of oneness or National affinity did not exist. Secondly, the Ethiopian policy of Amaharization and the violation of the federation led to Separatism and finally division.

In the South Sudan, the roots of suspicious go back to 1947, when the Southern were to come for the first time in contact with the Northern Sudanese. In that discussion the gap was very clear between the two

delegations, the Northern delegation represented by the high Educated Elite, including Professors in the University, where as Southern representatives were mainly conservative and uneducated tribal chiefs. They rejected idea of unity with the north. The main consideration in the discussion was, that, the Sudan though a vast country in area is small in wealth and population, and if the Sudan is ever really to become self- sufficient and self-dependent it should not be divided up into smaller weak units. Those who prepared the report of the meeting believe that the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese came together and worked together they would begin to cooperate. Finally they joined with the North on the condition, that the South should get special attention interms of development etc.

The Sudanese experience places it closer to the Eritrean rather than the Somalian model. In Somalia there was no marked ethnic or religion differences in the population which considers itself as a single nation. The major dividing factor has been economic and ideological.

In the end it can be said that it is not the Government that should be held solely responsible the different actors/parties/military general/religious groups and above all the Educated Elite who should try their level-best to solve the national crisis through compromises, rather than Arms struggle. Otherwise Sudan will soon be disintegrated into two different countries.

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NEW'S PAPERS

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUBA CONFERENCE ON THE POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTHERN SUNDAY, JUNE 1947
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

The following were present :

J. W. Robertson, Esq., MBE, Civil Secretary, Chairman

F. D. Kingdom, Esq., Governor Upper Nile

B.V. Marwood, Esq., Governor Equatoria

G.H. Barter, Esq., Director of Establishment

M.F.A. Keen, Esq., Assistant Civil Secretary (Councils)

T.R.H. Owen, Esq., Deputy Governor Bahr al Ghazal

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti

Ibrahim eff. Badri

Kamyangi Ababa

Sgt. Major Philemon Majok

Clement Mboro

Hassan Fertak

James Tembura

Chief Gir Kiro

Pastor Andrea Apaya

* Dunstan M.Wai, Op.cit., pp.185-188.

Chief Ukuma Bazia

Edward Adhok

Buth Diu

Chief Lolik Lado

Chief Lapponya

Father Guido Akou

Siricio Iro

Chief Tete

Chief Luoth Ajak

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman

Dr. Habib Abdulla

Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli

The meeting opened at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday, June 12th. The Chairman in his opening speech said:

Gentlemen,

I should first of all like to say how glad I am to see you all here today, and on behalf of those of us who are visitors I wish to thank the Governor, Mr. Marwood, and the other residents in Juba, who have welcomed us so hospitably and generously.

The origin of this meeting lies in the recent developments of administration and policy in the Northern Sudan. Last year, the Governor General, Sir Hubert Huddleston, set up a Conference in the North to seek ways and means of associating the Sudanese more closely with the government of their country. As you know, there has been in the Northern Sudan for the last three years, an Advisory Council, and one of the recommendations made by the

Conference is to develop the Advisory Council into a more authoritative and responsible body, with the power of making laws and to some extent, of controlling the work of the administration.

The Advisory Council has not had power to concern itself with the two Southern Provinces of Equatoria and the Upper Nile and there are therefore no Southern Sudanese on the Advisory Council. The report of the Conference however, which has just been published, recommends that the Southern Sudan should send representatives to the new Assembly which it is proposed should be set up, and in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this report you will find its recommendations and the reasons for them.

The reasons are important; the main consideration is that the Sudan, though a vast country in area, is small in wealth and population, and if the Sudan is ever really to become self-governing and self-dependent it must not be divided up into small weak units. Those who prepared the report believe that the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese come together and work together and work together, the sooner they will begin to coalesce and cooperate in the advancement of their country. This belief is sincerely and genuinely held by many Northern Sudanese, and they hope that by including Southern Sudanese in the future Assembly, the process of unification will be hastened. I am confident that their recommendations are based on the very highest motives, and think they do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward tribes in the South.

The Conference in Khartoum did not include Southern representatives, but I invited the Governors of Equatoria and the Upper Nile to attend in order that they should know what was being proposed, and should be able to inform the Conference of conditions and feelings in the South. This they did.

Now that the report of the Conference has been submitted to the Sudan Government and action on it is expected, I have summoned this meeting here of men both from the North and the South, in order to consider the unification of the two parts of the country. I should like to explain to you present Government policy in regard to the South.

The policy was defined in 1945 as follows:

It is only by economic and educational development that these peoples can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be

eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa, or partly with each.

Since 1945 there have been developments both economically and educationally in the South, and it has begun to be clear, I thin, that the Southern Sudan, by its history and by the accidents of geography, river transport and so on, must turn more to the North rather than to Uganda or the congo, and I believe that our policy regarding these areas should be restated as follows:

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of Southern Sudan are distinctly African and negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle East and Arabs of the Northern Sudan and therefore to ensure that they shall by educational and economic development be equipped to take their places in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.

If this to be the Government's policy regarding the Southern Sudan I should like the views of this meeting on one or two points of immediate importance.

You have all received copies of a Memorandum giving the terms of reference of this meeting and I think have already had opportunity to discuss them and form your opinion.

MEMORANDUM

The Sudan Administration conference in paragraphs 12 and 13 of its report dealing with the future closer association of the Sudanese with the Central Government has made certain recommendations about the Southern Sudan.

In order to study the implications of these recommendations about which I shall have to advise His Excellency the Governor - General, I have decided to hold a meeting in the Southern sudan at which I wish to discuss the proposals with Southern Sudanese and with officials, who have Southern experience, both British and Sudanese. I have therefore arranged for a meeting to be held at Juba on June 11th, 1947 at which I hope representatives from Equatoria and the Upper Nile Province will attend.

The terms of reference of the meeting will be :

1. to consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference about the Southern Sudan;
2. to discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese being represented in the proposed assembly and if it is decided to be advisable to decide how such representation can best be obtained in the present circumstances; and whether the representation proposed by the Sudan Administration Conference is suitable;
3. to discuss whether safeguard can be introduced into the forthcoming legislation setting up the new Assembly, to ensure that the Southern Sudan with its difference in race, tradition, language, customs and outlook is not hindered in its social and political advancement;
4. to discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan should be set up to deal with Southern affairs from which representatives might be appointed to sit on the assembly as representatives of the Southern Sudan;
5. to discuss the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference in paragraph 13 of their report which deals with matters not strictly relevant to the political development of the Sudan, which the Conference recommended as essential if the unification of the Sudanese peoples is to be achieved.

Chief Ukuma Bazia then laid before the meeting a set of written answers to the points raised in the Civil Secretary's Memorandum [see Appendix III]

APPENDIX 2

PRESIDENT GENERAL NIMEIRY'S POLICY STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN QUESTION.

9th JULY, 1969**

Dear Countrymen.

Warm congratulations and greetings to you on this historic occasion of your revolution.

No doubt you have heard of the broad aims of the revolution outlined in my speech and in that of the Prime Minister which was broadcast on the 25th of May. Our revolution is the continuation of the October 21st, popular revolution. It works for the regeneration of life in our country, for social progress and the raising of the standard of living of the masses of our people throughout the country. It stands against imperialism, colonialism and whole-heartedly supports the liberation movements of the African and Arab peoples as well as other peoples throughout the world.

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Dear Countrymen,

The revolutionary Government is fully aware of the magnitude of the Southern problem and is determined to arrive at a lasting solution.

This problem has deep-going historical roots dating back to the last century. It is the result of the policies of British Colonialism which left the legacy of uneven development between the Northern and Southern parts of the country, with the result that on the advent of independence Southerners found themselves in an unequal position with their Northern brethren in every field.

** Dunstan M.Wai, Op.cit., pp.219-220.

The traditional circles and parties that held the reigns of power in our country since independence have utterly failed to solve the Southern Question. They have exploited state power for self-enrichment and for serving narrow partisan interests without caring about the interests of the masses of our people whether in the North or in the South.

It is important to realize also that most of the Southern leaders contributed a great deal to the present deterioration of the state of affairs in that part of our beloved country. Over the years, since 1950 to the present day they have sought alliances with the Northern reactionary circles and with imperialism whether from inside or outside the borders.

Personal gain was the mainspring of their actions.

The enemies of the North are also the enemies of the South. The common enemy is imperialism and neo-colonialism, which is oppressing and exploiting the African and Arab peoples, and standing in the way of their advance. Internally, our common enemies are the reactionary forces of counter-revolution. The 25th May Revolution is not the same as the Coup d'etat of November, 1958. That was a reactionary move staged by the imperialists in alliance with local reaction into and outside the army. It was made to silence the demands of the masses of our people in both the North and the South for social change and genuine democracy.

The Revolution of May 25th, is the very opposite of the Coup d'etat of 1958. Our revolution is, we repeat, directed against imperialism, the reactionary circles and corrupt parties that destroyed the October Revolution and were aiming at finally liquidating any progressive movement and installing a reactionary dictatorship.

Dear Countrymen,

The revolutionary Government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities. It recognizes the historical and cultural differences between the North and South and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built upon these objective realities. The Southern people have the right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Socialist Sudan.

In furtherance of these objectives the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers held joint meetings and after a full discussion of the matter resolved to recognize the right of the Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a united Sudan.

REGIONAL AUTONOMY PROGRAMME

Dear Countrymen,

You realize that the building of a broad socialist oriented democratic movement in the South, forming part of the revolutionary structure in the North and capable of assuming the reigns of power in that region and rebuffing imperialist penetration and infiltration from the rear is an essential pre-requisite for the practical and healthy application of Regional Autonomy.

Within this framework and in order to prepare for that day when this right can be exercised the revolutionary Government is drawing up the following programme :-

- 1) The continuation and further extension of the Amnesty Law.
- 2) Economy, social and cultural development of the South.
- 3) The appointment of a Minister for Southern Affairs and
- 4) The training of personnel.

The Government will create a special economy planning board for the South and will prepare a special budget for the South, which aims at the development of the southern provinces at the shortest possible time.

Dear Southern Countrymen,

In order that we may be able to carry out this programme it is of the utmost importance that peace and security should prevail in the South and that life return to normal. It is primarily the responsibility of you all whether you be in the bush or at home to maintain peace and stability. The way is open for those abroad to return home and cooperate with us in building a prosperous Sudan, united and democratic.

APPENDIX 3

DRAFT ORGANIC LAW TO ORGANISE REGIONAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SUDAN*, 1972

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the democratic Republic of the Sudan and the realization of the memorable 'May Revolution Declaration of June 9th, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the government of their country.

Article 1:

This law shall be called the law for Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force on a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2:

This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and confirmed by two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.

Chapter III Definitions

Article 3:

- i) Constitution refers to the Republican Order No.5 or any basic law replacing or amending it.
- ii) "President" means the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

* Dunstain M.Wai, Op.cit., pp.225-33.

- iii) "Southern Provinces of the Sudan" means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood on January 1st, 1956, and any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex as may be decided by a referendum.
- iv) "Peoples Regional Assembly" refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.
- v) "High Executive Council" refers to the Executive Council appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.
- vi) "President of the High Executive Council" refers to the person appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Peoples Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.
- vii) "Peoples National Assembly" refers to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.
- viii) "Sudanese" refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the Sudanese nationality Act, 1957, and any amendments thereof.

Chapter III

Article 4

The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region with the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region.

Article 5

The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and powers of which are defined by this law.

Article 6

Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan, and English the principal

language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which may serve a practical necessity or the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region.

Chapter IV

Article 7

Neither the Peoples Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are:

- i) National Defence.
- ii) External Affairs.
- iii) Currency and Coinage.
- iv) Air and Inter Regional River Transport.
- v) Communications and Telecommunications.
- vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
- vii) Nationality and Immigration. (Emigration).
- viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development.
- ix) Educational Planning.
- x) Public Audit.

Chapter V

Legislature

Article 8

Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a Peoples Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and conditions of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.

Article 9

Members of the Peoples Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct Article 10

- i) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the Peoples Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one quarter of the Assembly.
- ii) The People Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of the business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during its first sitting.
- iii) The Peoples Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.

Article II

The Peoples Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following:

- i) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region.
- ii) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.
- iii) Legislation non traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.
- iv) Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.
- v) Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.
- vi) Promotion of local languages and cultures.
- vii) Town and Village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programmes.

- viii) Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders licences and formation of co- operative societies.
- ix) Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.
- x) Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centres, dispensaries and dressing stations.
- xi) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.
- xii) Promotion of tourism.
- xiii) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organization of trade and cultural exhibitions.
- xiv) Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.
- xv) Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.
- xvi) Land use in accordance with national laws and plans.
- xvii) Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.
- xviii) Development, utilization and protection of forests, crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.
- xix) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.
- xx) All other matters delegated by the President or the People National Assembly for legislation.

Article 12

The Peoples National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of administration in the Souther Region.

Article 13:

- i) The Peoples Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President to relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such request.
- ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.

Article 14

The Peoples Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request.

Article 15

- i) The People Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any bill presented to the Peoples National Assembly which, in their view, affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the Peoples Regional Assembly.
- ii) If the President accedes to such request, the Peoples Regional Assembly shall present its views within fifteen days from the date of accession to the request.
- iii) The President shall communicate any such views to the Peoples National Assembly together with his own observations if he deems necessary.

Article 16

The Peoples National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts to the Peoples Regional Assembly for their information. The Peoples Regional Assembly shall act similarly.

Chapter VI

The Executive

Article 17

The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the President.

Article 18

The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall act with the approval of the President.

Article 19

The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the Peoples Regional Assembly.

Article 20

The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council.

Article 21

The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President and to the Peoples Regional Assembly for the efficient administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.

Article 22

The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the Peoples Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote, unless they are also members of the Peoples Regional Assembly.

Chapter VII

Article 23

The President shall from the time to time regulate the relationship between the High Executive Council and the central ministries.

Article 24

The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional public service.

Chapter VIII

Finance

Article 25

The Peoples Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislations and orders to guarantee the collection of all public money at different levels.

Article 26

- a) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:
 - i) Direct and indirect regional taxes.
 - ii) Contribution from Peoples Local Government Councils.
 - iii) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with the National Plan.

- iv) Funds from the National Treasury for established services.
 - v) Funds voted by the National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.
 - vi) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the Peoples Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of the June 9th, 1969.
 - vii) See Appendix B.
 - viii) Any other sources.
- b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure of regional, security administration and development in accordance with National Plans and programme, and shall submit it to the Peoples Regional Assembly for approval.

Chapter IX

Other Provisions

Article 27

- i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the Peoples Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the Region.
- ii) The use of the Peoples Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defence shall be controlled by the President on the advice of the President of the High Executive Council.
- iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the Peoples Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements.

Article 28

The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National Constitution, provided the Peoples Regional Assembly, after receiving the

President's views, may reintroduce the Bill.

Article 29

The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the Peoples Regional Assembly.

Article 30

Any member of the Peoples Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without a sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive Council.

Article 31

All citizens are guaranteed the freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen or citizens solely on grounds of public health and order.

Article 33

- i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.
- ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

Article 34

Juba shall be the capital of the Southern Region, and the seat of the Regional Executive and Legislature.

APPENDIX (A) Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.

2. Equality of citizens.

- i) All citizens without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.
- ii) All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the right to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interests.

3. Personal liberty.

- i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.
- ii) The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
- iii) Retrospective Penal Legislation and punishment should be prohibited.
- iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.
- v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with due process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty- four hours without judicial order.
- vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation or torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his favour or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.

4. Freedom of religion and conscience.

- i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinions, conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favour of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.
- ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with their choice.

5. Protection of labour.

i) Forced and compulsory labour of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.

ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.

6. Freedom of minorities to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.

Appendix (B)

Draft Ordinance on Items of Revenue and Grants in-aid for the Southern Region

1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as result of exporting products of the Southern Region.
2. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the central list of the Ministry of Treasury.
3. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.
4. Profits on sugar consumed in the Southern Region.
5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.
6. Royalties on leaf tobacco and cigarettes.
7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.
8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects, (5% of net profits of factories, cooperative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).
9. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses, e.g. Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, stamp duties, and any other item to be specified from time to time.
10. Licences other than those provided for in the Peoples Local Government Act, 1971.
11. Special Development tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region, the rate of which should be decided by the Peoples Regional Assembly.
12. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as well as in the Army,

Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political establishment.

13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run by Regional Government, (5% of the initial cost).
14. Contributions from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise, (20% of the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).
15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in the following manner:

Educational institutions: 20% of expenses.

Trunk and through Road and Bridges: 25% expenses.

Relief and Social amenities: 15% expenses.

Tourist attraction projects: 25% expenses.

Security: 15% expenses.

Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan: 20% of grants; outside the Sudan: 30% of grants.

Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural activities: 25% of expenses.

APPENDIX 4*

SUDAN

BASIC DATA	Sudan	East Africa	Africa (excl.S.A.)	Industrial countries
Population and land, 1982				
Population, millions, mid year	20.2	14.2	11.4	38
Land area, thou sq kilom	2.506	752	66.5	1.628
Density, persons per sq. kilom	8	18.9	17.6	23
Urban population, %	23	15	22	78
Populn growth rate. % per year	3.2	2.9	2.9	0.7
Economy: output and income, 1982				
GDP, SUS millions	9.290	3.642	5.031	420.660
GDP per head, SUS	440	282	482	11.070
Economy: structure, 1982				
Agriculture. % of GDP	36	46	29	3
Private consumption. % of GDP	89	79	72	62
Public consumption. % of GDP	13	16	15	20
Investment. % of GDP	16	16	22	18
Exports. % of GDP	9	12	20	19
Imports. % of GDP	27	24	29	19
Economy: growth, 1970-82				
GDP growth. % per annum	6.2	3.0	3.2	2.8
GDP per head growth. % per annum	3.0	0.1	0.2	2.1
Agriculture growth. % per annum	4.1	2.0	0.8	1.8
Private cons. growth. % per annum	7.8	4.3	4.1	2.7
Public cons. growth. % per annum	2.3	5.3	8.1	0.6
Investment growth. % per annum	9.0	2.4	5.3	3.2
Exports growth. % per annum	-5.1	-3.8	-1.7	5.6
Import growth. % per annum	3.5	-1.1	7.3	4.3
Economy: other				
Terms of trade (1980=100). 1982	85	84	84	99
Aid. % of GDP, 1982	4.5	4.9	4.9	-
Income share of poorest 40%. 1968	12.9	12.7	13.8	18.6
Inflation. % per year. 1970-82	15.2	15.0	14.8	9.9
Debt service, % of GDP, 1982	0.8	1.9	3.0	-
Debt service, % of exports, 1982	7.5	11.4	13.5	-
Govt. spending, % of GDP, 1981	19.1	21.6	26.7	28.3
Budget deficit. % of GDP, 1981	3.2	-	-	-
Black mkt ex. r., % of official, 1970-79	160	205	160	-
Education, 1981				
Primary (% of 6-11 group)	52	69	78	100
Secondary (% of 12-17 group)	18	11	15	90
Higher (% of 20-24 group)	2	1.2	1.7	37
Adult Literacy rate, %, 1981	32	41	37	99
Health				
Life expectancy, 1982	47	49	49	75
Population per doctor, 1980	8.930	27.202	21.120	554
Population per nurse, 1980	1.430	3.557	3.361	180
Caloric intake, % of requirement, 1980	101	88	90	132
Government spending, 1980				
Health expenditure. \$ per head	1	3.7	5.3	357
Education expenditure, \$ per head	5	9.7	16.1	156
Defence expenditure. \$ per head	4	7.8	10.3	426

Source: Derived from UN, World Bank and Picks.

*

Statistical Fact File, African Economic Handbook, Published by Euromonitor, Publication Limited, UK, 1988, pp.310-311.

Pounds million	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
GDP	1,246	1,511	1,646	2,340	2,883	3,254	4,072	4,792	6,218		
Private consau	646	1,231	1,341	1,627	2,360	2,606					
Gross investment	140	214	362	313	323	339					
Govt. consumption	181	208	236	276	331	407					
Exports	167	169	206	230	218	257					
Imports	177	363	363	396	459	447					
Population, millions	15.34	15.73	16.13	16.95	17.56	18.13	19.66	19.24	19.80	20.36	20.84
Exchange rate, Pounds per \$US	0.348	0.348	0.348	0.348	0.376	0.426	0.500	0.535	0.839	1.300	1.300
Black market ex. rate Pounds per \$US	0.641	0.704	0.654	0.625	0.649	0.847	1.087	0.900	1.408	1.754	
Consumer price Index, 1980=100	34.6	42.9	43.6	50.9	60.8	79.8	100.0	124.6	156.6	204.5	
Main exports											
Cotton, value Pounds million	43.3	70.2	97.8	133.2	122.9	151.3	121.9	66.5	122.0	395.9	
Cotton, volume Index, 1980=100	86	161	233	213	136	152	100	44	84	171	
Cotton, price Index, 1980=100	49	43	46	61	84	79	100	138	119	179	
Main imports											
Petroleum, value, Pounds million	29.6	33.4	31.1	44.3	49.9	71.9	168.6	168.3	337.8	451.3	
Exports, principal commodities, Pounds million, 1979											
Animals	7.1										
Cotton, long-staple	93.7										
Cotton, other	57.6										
Cotton by-products	1.6										
Sorghum	13.5										
Groundnuts	10.0										
					Groundnut oil	3.6					
					Gum arabic	18.2					
					Hides and skins	3.7					
					Sesame seed	6.3					
					Sesame cake and meal	1.3					
					Sesame oil	0.5					
Imports, principal commodities, Pounds million, 1980											
Sugar	16.2										
Tea	9.5										
Coffee	7.9										
Wheat	23.8										
Textiles	46.3										
Footwear	0.7										
Fertilizers	15.9										
					Machinery	115.1					
					Metal manufactures	24.6					
					Petroleum and products	94.6					
					Pharmaceuticals	18.7					
					Iron and steel	27.4					
					Transport equipment	53.2					
					Other	402.3					
Domestic output, by sector, Pounds million, 1977											
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	1,052										
Mining and quarrying	2										
Manufacturing industries	215										
Electricity gas and water	39										
					Construction	119					
					Wholesale and retail, hotels, etc.	556					
					Transport, communication, etc.	279					
					Other	622					