

**SECURITY OF SOUTH PACIFIC STATES:  
THE SUPER POWER DIMENSION**

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**GEETA TRIPATHI**

**CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,  
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI-110067, INDIA**

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जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI - 110067

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation  
entitled SECURITY OF SOUTH PACIFIC STATES :  
THE SUPER POWER DIMENSION, submitted by  
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work according to the best of my knowledge  
and may be placed before the examiners for  
evaluation. This dissertation has not been  
submitted for the award of any other degree  
of this University or of any other University.

*Savitri Chishti*  
( Prof. S. Chishti )  
Chairman

*K.P. Misra*  
( Prof. K.P. Misra )  
Supervisor

## P R E F A C E

The South Pacific region is one of the most important segments of the globe . Its inextricably interwoven twin dimensions - the role of external powers in the region which is not always benign and the multitude of national and regional problems of change and development are posing grave challenges to the managers of national and international affairs. Of all the world's oceanic areas none is today more pregnant with promises, heady with change nor so vital to our planet's affairs than the Pacific.

In the Pacific, two overriding concerns become clear :

1. The people of the Pacific from Sydney to Shanghai, from Jakarta to Los Angeles, from Belau to Vladivostok want contact not confrontation with their near and distant neighbours.
2. There is a perception that many of them having rid themselves of European domination and been through the Second World War, the Korean and the Vietnam war desire that no one power should control their destinies.

### Security of South Pacific States: The Super Power Dimension

is the result of my earnest desire to bring forth vital issues facing the Pacific region today. What we observe is a new picture emerging in the Pacific, a complex situation unfolding. This region of varied cultures,

different levels of economic development and political systems is today gaining enormous significance strategically too. The emerging trends in the Pacific have pushed the region into an arena of intense political and economic activities. With the increasing anti-nuclear sentiments, challenges are mounting. In this region, the issues of peace, co-operation and development are perhaps more acute than in any other area of the world. This is the region where geopolitical and national interests of many countries overlap. And to be more specific one can say that not a single major power of the world excludes itself from operating in this region. This makes the situation in this region extremely complex.

My endeavour in this dissertation has been to examine the emerging reality and trends in the South Pacific region. As the behaviour of superpowers casts a special shadow on world political scene, the possibilities can be either ways, a destabilising one or with increasingly co-operative international order.

I owe my indebtedness and profound gratitude to Prof. K.P. Misra my affable supervisor for the opportunity he provided me, and to my father and mother for the inspiration they have given me throughout my working on this dissertation. I am also indebted to my friends for all the help and encouragement.

*Gesta Tripathi*  
Gesta Tripathi

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

The security situation in the Pacific is going to be profoundly influenced by some basic changes in the international system within a short span of a year, some significant movements are apparent in the world politics. If these trends gather momentum they could leave an enduring and positive impact on the nature of international system. The second cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is showing clear signs of dissipation. The intense American-Soviet confrontation which poisoned the world security environment appears to have passed its peak. The inescapable compulsion to coexist has asserted itself, and the two nuclear giants are once again groping for a viable modus vivendi.

As recently as 1985-86 it appeared that the "ice age" that had descended upon the American-Soviet relations was here to stay. It appeared impossible to bridge the divergent Soviet and American positions on nuclear and space arms limitations and on a variety of other vexing issues including regional conflicts. But developments from 1987 onwards have dramatically transformed the gloom of the mid 1980's into one of hope and optimism. Opportunities today exist for taking the first steps towards a democratisation of the international system and move towards a more peaceful international order.

Detente of the 1970's had four objectives- The codification of the strategic parity between the U.S. and the USSR, to freeze the confrontation in the central military sector - Europe, expand East-West scientific technological and trade flow, and work out ground rules for Soviet-American competition in the developing world.

The assumption that the current Soviet-American dialogue could be different from being reinvention of detente, rests on the significance of two events in 1986 - the Reykjavik Summit and the Delhi Declaration issued by India and the Soviet Union. Both the events reflect the emerging possibilities for radical disarmament and the new opportunities for reshaping world politics.

The past year has seen unprecedented movement in a number of arms limitation negotiations - both bilateral and multilateral. A series of proposals from the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the dramatic reversal of traditional Soviet positions, and the range of issues involved have left most observers in a state of bewilderment.

At the root of Soviet Union's moves is a new philosophy of peace and security. The "new thinking" in the Soviet Union rests on a number of important formulations.

Given the integral and interdependent nature of the world, no country can enhance its security at the expense of others.

A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought, leading to a change in the military doctrine from being prepared to fight a nuclear war if imposed upon it, to the necessity of eliminating the nuclear threat.

A non-nuclear world is not only a desirable one, but politically feasible; the realization that the traditional Soviet pursuit of "equal security" has only led to even higher levels of armaments and a continuous state of competition. If the new goal is "reasonable" or "sufficient" to security there is no need for "parity" at every level of nuclear armaments.

The concept of glasnost (openness) can be extended to the military sphere without endangering national security. And, the new emphasis is on the primacy of political means - as opposed to military in ensuring national security.

In the US too, pressures to seek a viable relationship with the Soviet Union have become apparent. The conservative ideologues had hoped, by engaging the Soviet Union in a vigorous and costly arms race, it could be weakened and marginalised in world politics. But there is an increasing perception in the U.S. that America itself is in no position to engage in such a race. The transformation of the U.S. from a creditor to a debtor state, the mounting U.S. budget and trade deficits, and increasing



economic challenges from Western Europe and Japan have led to an acute awareness of America's own weaknesses.

It is in this context that President Reagan himself had tilted clearly in favour of striking arms limitations deal with Gorbachev. It has surprised everyone that an administrator, who had been intensely anti-Soviet and anti-arms control quickly moved in favour of arms limitation.

Today we are witnessing for the first time in many years, a great deal of new realism in the way both the USSR and the US approach regional conflicts and their interaction with developing world. At best we can call the current time a period of transition from confrontation to co-operation we should not <sup>fool</sup> ourselves into thinking that this transition has been or will be an easy one for either country. The residue for more than four decades of competition will not disappear from the maps of the developing world, nor from the memories of many in East, West and developing world.

Earlier in 1989, President Bush announced the end of the American policy of containment which has largely governed US actions and views toward dealing with third world conflicts for more than four decades. Bush has called the new era, "Beyond Containment". It is not clear however what this new era of "Beyond Containment" means in policy terms. The officials have demonstrated a propensity to seek dialogue and a more co-operative relationship with the USSR,

but not to the extent that one can call the current period a time of co-operation in dealing with regional conflicts.

With the process of democratisation in the Soviet Union and its East European allies, active Soviet participation in a rejuvenated UN sponsored system of monitoring and enforcement of human rights across the world, is likely to spark off considerable political pressures against the global network of repressive regimes located in many third world states and their underwriters in the developed world. In the long run, this might prove to be the most creative form of destabilisation of the Third World as well as a necessary pre-condition for its development as well as the democratisation of the global order which are dialectically linked. But in the short run, this global network may prove to be the most entrenched bastion resisting the process of relaxation in Perestroika. This problem becomes all the more acute due to the destabilising effects of the Soviet economy. The success towards changing the present world order to a more peaceful and co-operative one would require a peaceful Soviet Union. And, one cannot ignore the recent developments, eg. inflation, unemployment and ethnic riots which have surfaced in Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet leadership faces severe challenges on the internal front. As the process of democratisation has already been initiated

it would be harmful for the international community if the trends would take a reversal and it is for this sake that the survival of Gorbachev's leadership is tremendously important.

While there has been considerable movement towards radical nuclear disarmament over the past one year, the debate in the West over the INF accord reveals the tenacity of the old mindsets opposed to this process. While all the NATO governments have backed the INF accord publicly, apprehensions have been persistent on both sides of the Atlantic. Those who have opposed the INF accord include a number of leading statesmen and soldiers from the U.S. and West Europe. The former U.S. President Richard Nixon, his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in Europe Mrs Thatcher continues to extoll the virtues of nuclear weapons in keeping European peace for more than four decades. The French defence minister denounced the INF deal as the "nuclear Munich".

Therefore, one cannot overlook the fact that the nuclear cult is alive and well. The faith in nuclear weapons as useful instruments of policy and the belief that there is no alternative to nuclear deterrence in maintaining peace are far too strongly entrenched to permit any easy movement towards the goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. It is evident that the coming years would see

an intense battle between the radical ideas of new thinking and the conservative mindsets.

The end of the Second cold war is likely to lead us towards a more complex and multipolar order, an order that is more in tune with the fundamentally changed power position in the world. The US is under pressure today to simultaneously redefine its relationships with its main adversary (the Soviet Union) and the key allies (West Europe and Japan). The irrevocable loss of U.S. hegemony - militarily to the USSR and economically to its allies is at the root of the new compulsions. The economic trends, unleashed over the past few years are bound to reshape the international security environment, and it appears inevitable that the U.S. reconfigures its position in the world. The redistribution of world's economic might is inexorably driving the US to reconsider its global political role. The decline in US economic weight has been accompanied by declining technological capabilities. Even in the so-called high-tech sectors, the U.S. has begun to run trade deficits. The security implications of these trends are indeed being raised. Can the U.S., it is being asked, continue to lead its alliance systems as it goes increasingly into debt to countries that are its followers? Can it hold its allies in managing the global security system?

Just as the US is grappling with the loss of its role as the hegemonic power in international system, the Soviet Union is at pains to adjust itself to the limitations on

its role as the main challenge in the system, providing an alternative political, economic and social vision to capitalism.

There is a clear recognition in Kremlin just as the restructuring of the Soviet economy is central to the revitalisation of the Soviet society, a restructuring in international relations towards a more peaceful one is equally important for the security of the Soviet Union.

It is in this overall global situation one has to consider the security of the South Pacific states. The South Pacific is undergoing transformation at a rather fast pace and in the process becoming a theatre of contention and conflict largely on account of the policies of powers external to the region. This situation is affecting domestic as also regional politico-economic evolution in the region. In the Pacific, islands are mini-states, with small populations and insufficient resources. They are economically vulnerable and too small to defend their security interests. The task of nation building in these countries is therefore Herculean. They need assistance and understanding, guarantees from external powers to ensure their security and achieve a minimum degree of their socio-economic development. In some cases ethnic problems are formidable as had been witnessed in the case of Fiji in recent months. Under these desperate circumstances

an understanding between the countries of the South Pacific region and the major external powers which have interest in the region presents the only way out to ensure peace, security and development of the peoples of these countries. The principles of individual and collective self-reliance, to the extent it is possible and the ideas of South-South Co-operation as laid down by the Non-aligned movement along with the ten points of the Delhi Declaration issued by India and the Soviet Union in November 1986, may be the basis for future order of the South Pacific region.

As the superpowers are engaged in an endless search for peace and security in the international order, such a world order is largely dependent upon their activities in the Pacific. As Pacific is called the future arena, the activities of the external powers needs to be a cautious one, because the developments which affect the security of the South Pacific region cannot but affect their security.

The present study is a combination of both descriptive and analytic analysis of the superpower activities in relation to the security context of South Pacific States. Chapter one deals with the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the South-Pacific region. Chapter two tries to analyse the economic potentialities of the region which has drawn increasingly unwanted activities on the part of external powers with greater scramble

for resources. Chapter three attempts to throw light on the activities of US and USSR in the South Pacific region. Finally, chapter four describes the role of other powers and institutions in the region and their repercussions on the South Pacific countries.

## CHAPTER I

### GEO-POLITICAL AND GEO-STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION

Security is a universal urge and constant pre-occupation of mankind in its individual, social and corporate existence. The concept of security holds a central position in the study of international relations. However, no uniform application of the security concept would be relevant in the study of the security of Third World countries and the developed industrially rich countries of the Western World.<sup>1</sup> The emergence of numerous independent states in the Third World in the wake of decolonization has added new dimensions to international security. For, the epicentre of crises and confrontations in the post war period has shifted to the territories of the Third World, mostly with the involvement of big and industrially developed nations.

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1. Security or threat perceptions of a state are dependent upon the size of a country, economic potentialities, industrial development and the strength of the political system.



"The acute sense of insecurity in all spheres,<sup>2</sup> however, reflects not only the ineffectivity of the means adopted to ensure security....but also the elusiveness in conceptualisation of security problems. Bulk of the contemporary security debate is dominated by two paradigms - East-West-Central balance and conventional military oriented territorial or external security. Implicit in this conceptualization is another assumption that security problems are proportionate to their size. Post war developments in the domain of security do not entirely corroborate the validity of these paradigms"<sup>3</sup>

There are certain ambiguities in the concept of security, the under developed concept of security constitutes a substantial barrier to progress. In a sense security is a negative goal, the absence of a sense of danger or threat.

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2. The problem of insecurity cannot be discussed in isolation. Prof. K.P. Misra holds a multidimensional view, for the problem of security at various levels individual, subnational, regional and international though somewhat different are unextricably interwoven, they are different points along a continuum. There is an organic connection between socio-economic development and security. K.P. Misra, "Framework of Security for Asia," Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.7, No.2-4(1976), p.506.
  3. A.R. Khan and M.H. Kabir, "The Security of Small States: A Framework of Analysis" in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed, Security of Small States (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1987), p.3.

Narrowly defined security means the absence of a threat to survival, but survival is only rarely at stake and most people want to feel secure in more than just their survival. They wish to feel secure in their continued or future enjoyment of a number of other basic values. Since we can never be certain about the future, the question of security is a question of degree of uncertainty-how much are we willing to pay for a little more certainty.<sup>4</sup>

A lacuna in conceptualization of security occurs in its military oriented definition in terms of absence of threat or conflict. Consequently, security has come to be identified with accumulation of the instruments of power.

However, the use of force has become costly for major States as a result of atleast four conditions. Firstly, it involves the risk of nuclear escalation. Because the effects of nuclear war are so disproportionate to most political goals, the utility of nuclear force remains

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4. J.S. Nye Jr, "The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges", Adelphi Papers (London) No.235(Spring, 1989), p.23.

principally limited to deterrence of attack by others. Fault of deterrence theory is its static nature, it tends to assume a constant level of rivalry between countries such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union rather than looking at how domestic changes or political cooperation might alter the relationships and reduce risks of war.

Secondly, there is greater nationalism and greater resistance by people in the poor or weak countries. The social mobilization of populations has constrained the super-powers.

Thirdly, states find that the use of force may have uncertain and possibly negative effect on achieving their economic goals. Disruption of market and capital flow is another cost to be considered.

Lastly, domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force seems to have increased.

In a world where both goals and instruments have become more complex a definition of strategic studies limited to issues of military operations would be surely deficient.

At the conceptual level the conventional militaristic external oriented definition of security fails to capture the magnitude and variety of problems of the vast majority of the Third World developing countries. Most of these countries are still passing through the painful and traumatic process of nation building activities. The internal problems are complicated and magnified many times not only by external intervention, proxy wars, border conflicts and over-flowing ethnic explosions but also more subtle but debilitating threats to economic, social and cultural independence.

The Third World countries in general and small states in particular are susceptible to external manipulation. In general the small states are at the initial stages of nation building process many times more stupendous and complicated than that faced by today's developed countries partly because of the present international system of inter-dependence and fast communication and partly because of revolution in rising expectations of the common mass following political independence. The colonial legacies left the various social forces and institutions asymmetrically developed.

The small states have less resistance and shock absorbing capacity two very indispensable requirements to go through the painful processes of nation building activities. In addition to limited administrative capacity the diplomatic and economic leverages of these small states are also inadequate to influence the external environment.<sup>5</sup>

Dependency is, perhaps, one of the striking features of the national development efforts of the small developing countries (a dimension of dependency is the influence and manipulations of the various foreign and transnational bodies operating within the territories of these Third World countries).

"The term international security denotes the mutual dependence of the states in their security dilemmas, so long as international politics is anarchic in the sense that there is no government above the independent states, security will depend on the interaction of of state politics".<sup>6</sup>

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5. Khan and Kabir, n. 3, p.9.

6. Nye, n. 4, p.23.

Intellectual resources, however devoted to the field of security of small states have so far been negligible. There has also been a general lack of awareness among intellectual community about the special needs and problems of security of small states.

Security of small states needs special attention because the problems facing micro states are not only unique, their particular difficulties arises from their greater vulnerability and lower capacity to respond, by the very nature of their size they are particularly susceptible to both natural and man made disasters. Since many of the newly independent states are small they have specially been rendered vulnerable in conflict scenarios .

The reason for the peripheral position of the small states security is that the types of problems usually faced by the small states are often characterized as those of underdevelopment and backwardness rather than security as such. Only in very recent years small states security is attracting some academic attention.

South Pacific region though endowed with vast potentialities for world economic development has also been <sup>u</sup>sphere <sub>^</sub>

with less scholarly attention due to it. It has been said with a fair degree of justification that we are now entering the "Age of the Pacific" mainly because economically it is assuming great significance. With the emerging significance of this region, the geo-political and geo-strategic characteristics need closer look for it has a bearing on the security of this region as well as the Pacific rim countries and the super powers.

Sheila Harden in "Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World" brings to notice the recent example of crises in areas such as the Falkland islands (1982) and Grenada (1983) which have had a much wider repercussions. These are examples of a phenomenon where, the breaking up of the colonial empires has led to the emergence of a large number of small states, most of these states having too few financial resources and a number of them are subject to irredentist claims.<sup>7</sup> In addition, many of these states in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific because of their strategic positions can easily become pawns

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7. Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985), p. 1.

in the game of international power politics.

A coup in an island only 30 miles wide will have a far greater chance of success than one in a larger area, where it might be contained. Also just one hurricane can destroy the entire economy of a small State dependent on a single crop.

A group was assembled under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat to study the issues relating to the security of Micro States. In his address to the opening meeting Mr. Shridath Ramphal (Commonwealth Secretary General) referred to the familiar phrase coined, by the British Development economist Kurt Schumacher about how "Small is beautiful". The small states that find themselves in the post colonial era with no metropolitan power to guarantee their security or fund their infrastructure find that beauty in the form of beaches and palm trees must be turned into tourist or dollar resorts. But as Mr. Ramphal said, these states know that small is also weak and fragile, vulnerable and relatively powerless, they operate in a world where the weak are not rewarded for the beauty of their smallness but are ignored, imposed



upon and generally discounted.<sup>8</sup> One can quote the well known African proverb "When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers".

The security considerations stem from the presumption that militarily weak states are vulnerable to pressures of varying degree. Question is of determining and defining security of whom against what and how?<sup>9</sup>

The words of Karl Marx written more than hundred years ago about the importance of the Pacific region are turning out to be prophetic. In a contribution to the "New York Times" he stated that the Pacific would be the ocean of the future, around which human life would concentrate as was the case with the Mediterranean in the ancient times and the Atlantic during industrial revolution.<sup>10</sup>

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8. *ibid*, p.5.
  9. J.J. Holst, "The Need for an Overall Approach to Strategy", Adelphi Papers (London), No.231, (Spring, 1988), p.14.
  10. K.P. Misra, "The Emerging Centrality of the South Pacific region" in K.P. Misra and V.D. Chopra, ed., South Asia-Pacific Region: Emerging Trends (New Delhi, 1988), p.1.

In order to understand the importance of the Pacific Ocean it may be stated that it occupies a third of the earth's surface and its area is 179 million square kilometres. It is 35% of the globe, twice the area of Atlantic Ocean and three times the area of the Indian Ocean. The total area of the six continents is smaller than the total area of the Pacific. There are thousands of islands within it - "some big and others small" - The important countries which are located in and around the Pacific are the United States and Canada, many States of South America, two east Asian Giants - China and Japan, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. Then there are many island states which are mini in terms of their size, population and potential. The smallness and isolation of the island countries have attracted the outside powers - European as well as Asian to take interest and intervene in their affairs.<sup>11</sup>

Coming to the South Pacific specifically one may note that apart from Australia and New Zealand there are eleven island groups, nine of which have now achieved

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11. *ibid*, p.1.

independence. The other two are nearing this status.

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Countries of the South Pacific are :

<u>Name of the State</u>	<u>Year of achieving freedom</u>
The Cook Island	Internally self governing under New Zealand
Fiji	1970 from the U.K.
Kiribati	1979 from the U.K.
Nauru	1968 from the U.N. and Australia
Niue	Internally self governing under New Zealand
Papua New Guinea	1975 from Australia
The Solomon Island	1978 from the U.K.
Tongo	1970 from the U.K.
Tuvalu	1978 from the U.K.
Vanuatu	1980 from the U.K. and France
Western Samoa	1962 from New Zealand.

Due to the emerging centrality of the region in world politics, my paper would address itself to the following points :

- Geopolitical and geo-strategic significance of the region in the contemporary situation
- To what extent states in this region are viable in terms of their economic and other resources?
- What kind of military and police resources have been able to organize in order to protect their policies domestically and externally.
- What is the significance of the Treaty of Rarotongo which seeks to establish a Nuclear Free Zone in the region ?

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12. *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

- What kind of role major South Pacific countries Australia and New Zealand are playing ?
- What can India do to protect the interest of the population of the Indian origin in some of the countries and promote its interest in general in the region ?
- What are the interests of great powers - US, USSR, Japan, China (perhaps of France and England) and what are they doing to protect and promote them ?

In the South Pacific region, the main interest revolves around the following :

- Security and transport lanes
- Sea bed mining and accessibility to Antarctic resources
- Fisheries resources.

The South Pacific Region is significant from practically all points of view. The shipping and security lanes that transit it are considered vital by the U.S. and other Western powers. Any threat to this trade connections with the Pacific would disturb their economic development.

In order to protect its interest, as it perceives it the U.S. has established a large and seemingly permanent military presence in the region.

For obvious reasons, this is a cause of concern for the Soviet Union which would naturally refuse to accept the predominance of the United State.

A better appreciation of geo-strategic and geopolitical realities of the South Pacific region necessitates singling out the most basic features of the current situation and speculate about the possible changes in these features in the course of the next 15-20 years which may be called well nigh long term projections in our volatile age.<sup>13</sup>

First and foremost the Asia Pacific region is steadily becoming the most important zone of the world. It is the most rapidly developing region in today's world. The growth rates of Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and some others in this decade are much higher than those of most other countries of the world.

This region is leading the rest of the world in technological innovations. Silicon valley in California, Forest Valley in Oregon, Japan, South Korea are now island on the cutting edge of modern technology producing ever new products in electronic and robotics industries, in chemistry and Bio-technology.

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13. Henry Trofimenko, "Long Term Trend in the Asia Pacific Region : A Soviet Evaluation", Asian Survey (California), vol. XXIX, No.3, (March, 1989), p.238.

Most significant of all is that, this is the region where four out of five main power centres of the world - U.S., the U.S.S.R., China and Japan actually face each other, where their borders and maritime exclusion economic zones actually intersect. This is the region of rapid population growth. The ocean begins to play an ever bigger role in the life of the regional countries, not only in its traditional role as a medium of communication and a source of food but also as a source of energy and raw materials. The share of the region in the total fish catch in world oceans is about 60% and the bulk of the world trade in fish and fish products concentrates there. In the 1980's, the Pacific Basin countries produced 40,000 tons of oil per day extracted from the seabed or one fifth of all the world's oil produced by sea rigs. The Pacific Ocean is also the most promising place for deep sea mining having its reserves of manganese, nickel and cobalt in polymetallic sea-bed concretions surpass by many times those prospected on land. The Pacific regions profile would be incomplete without looking at the arms race which goes on here at the same rate as

elsewhere in the world. The main competition is in naval armaments, including nuclear <sup>arms</sup> are on the increase.

During the Reagan administration the Pacific maritime presence has resulted in an even more aggressive outlook and strategy, than in the Atlantic. Large scale and highly provocative military manoeuvres, have been conducted in far Northern Pacific waters by the United States navy at a far greater frequency than in any other region. In four consecutive exercises since 1982, the participating force has been progressively increased, to where each new exercise has become the largest fleet manoeuvre held in the Pacific, since the end of the second world war. The maritime strategy in the Pacific is intended to take advantage of Soviet military weakness in the region. The Soviet Union is thus forced to reply to the U.S. naval power projection, to build up its strength in the area, to restore the global correlation of forces.

Jammed between the two superpowers and closely allied with the U.S., Japan is increasingly dragged into the arms race, although dragged might not be the proper term

since there is plenty of evidence of indigenous enthusiasm. The military potential of two Koreas is high and still growing. Though China cut its land forces by one million men, it nevertheless continues to modernise them and is moving fast in nuclear arms buildup. Canada is also taking part in the race having developed a new programme for naval buildup including construction of new nuclear attack submarines.

It is natural that the strategy of every country in the region is aimed first and foremost at maximising its own gains and increasing the strength of its own positions against every other country in the region.

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HENRY TROFIMENKO believes that in conditions of further improvement of Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-American relations, continued normalization of relations between the U.S. and P.R.C. and China and Soviet Union and the probable improvement in the near term perspective of relation between the Soviet Union and Japan, the general political climate in the region will become more favorable for military settlement of conflicts and international disputes.

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14. Ibid, p.244.



Consequently the stimuli for military confrontations will be diminished. At the same time it is hardly realistic to hope for an early cessation of the conventional arms race.

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Jasjit Singh takes into account the fundamental changes in international order, a shift from bipolarity with adversarial power politics towards greater pluralism. Cardinal factors influencing global situation towards change should be taken into account eg. the futility of military power of the two superpowers including massive stockpiling of nuclear arms and the erosion of their power base due to international economic systems increasingly weighed down by the burden of internal and external debts, coupled with increasing expectations and aspirations of the people and communication explosion worldwide.

Question is whether this move from a bipolar to multipolar system would be more co-operative or a conflictual paradigm? For the international system to move towards a cooperative order with a degree of permanency the essential obstacles in the achievement of such objectives must

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15. "International Order: Changing Paradigms"-  
Paper prepared by Jasjit Singh for Indo-Hungarian Bilateral Seminar in March 2-3, 1989, at New Delhi.

be realised and managed at all levels.

Years 1987-88 saw first ever nuclear disarmament steps being initiated whose real significance lay in shifting from traditional arms control approach to disarmament and the willingness to accept on-site intrusive inspections, resolution of large number of regional conflicts and lessening of tensions and some tangible movements towards improvement of relations not only within east-west context but at various levels and areas of inter-state relations in the global situation.

The reality of new changes emerge from a large number of factors - one, the compulsions of socio-economic, political and military, strategic situation prevailing in 1970 has changed. Two, the bipolar world has now become multi-polar. Three, many of the problems are of universal nature for example environmental degradation, ecological imbalances, health care etc. Four, international economic system faces serious challenges of debt - burden and budgetary deficit.

Due to Soviet Union's series of bold and imaginative

initiatives, in restructuring international relations, East-West relations appears to undergo some fundamental changes. The diffusion of these antagonisms is a consequence of core threats perceived in terms of adversary power bloc in confrontational bipolar system, rapidly giving way to other core threats of global security. The strategic security parity between East-West was achieved by 1960, this strategic security paradigm was very significantly influenced by technological changes with reduced reaction times and increased accuracy along with obvious lethality of the system. Technology held out the greatest threat to both change itself, and in the framework of politico-strategic relations where change cannot be effectively managed with SDI and ASAT (anti-satellite) weapons, technology holds out the prospect of increasing rate of change. Such technological changes were threatening to shift outside the human information decision cycle. Stability needed to be managed by human race. INF treaty of December 1987 brings some hope over the situation.



Some may perceive the INF treaty as a cynical view of the first ever disarmament proposal. But the important point to be borne in mind is that stability in a dynamic framework with ever increasing changes can not be managed with in fix thought structures of the past which were evolved in a statusquoist framework. Management of change demands greater flexibility and capability to absorb and harmonize changes, INF treaty thus represents a landmark in the management of change.<sup>16</sup>

In a world characterized by pluralism and multiple power centres, all countries big and small, poor and rich, weak and powerful will have a greater role to play in the management of the world system. South Pacific region cannot remain an isolated entity, for it has both the potentialities of being influenced by the world structures as also the ability to bring changes in the world system.

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However to gauge the ability of the South Pacific nations to effect changes in the international system the strategies of the main actors in the Pacific and the

16. *ibid*, p.6.



Asia Pacific (due to geographical proximity) need a closer attention. For South Pacific is increasingly becoming the arena of superpower activities.

According to Henry Trofimenko<sup>17</sup> despite welcome changes in international scenario, strategies of the main actors in this region would be as follows :-

- the basic goal of US in the region for the next 10-15 years will be to preserve the status quo viewed in Washington as generally favorable for the US and try to block the development of adverse tendencies among which American politicians would count the increase in the influence of the Soviet Union and China, the rise of nationalism in Japan and the spread of anti-nuclear sentiments. For Washington the optimal situation would mean preservation of American-Japanese security alliance and the pro-American political orientation of Japan.
- the main goal of Japan will be to use with maximum effects, its new economic and technological potential, to increase its influence and improve its position in the pacific region.
- as to Soviet Union its goal in the area may be described as follows - to accelerate the economic development of Siberia and maritime provinces of the country, To work for peace and stability in the Pacific region. The basic outline of the Soviet Union's approach to enhancing security and

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17. Trofimenko, n. 13, p.246.

stability in the region has been formulated in the two well known speeches of MIRKHAIL GORBACHEV in Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk. The Soviet Union has advanced a wide programme for action to settle regional conflicts, to stop proliferation and accumulation of nuclear weapons in this part of the world, to limit the activities of the navies and the general military presence in the waters of the Pacific.

And if one proceeds from the presumption that a big war in the region is hardly likely in the next 10-15 years then the role of small powers becomes all the more important. For as current trends indicate their main foreign policy instruments will not be military hardware nor economic leverage but the instrument of peace. In a condition of mass aversion to war, of universal condemnation of imperial policies, of rising hopes for better living standards, of rapidly growing opposition to the presence of foreign troops, these smaller countries of the region struggling against economic hardships and striving to catch up with the more successful among them in economic development will become serious political and moral obstacle to those who cling to big-stick policy, to threats, intimidation and employment of arms even for limited purposes.

Thus against a background of positive, cooperational and integrational trends in other parts of the world it will become more and more difficult for any one not to reckon with the new mood in the Pacific.

The states and the territories of the Pacific basin fall into two distinct groups, the continental rim of mainly prosperous and influential states which border on the Pacific and the scattered groups of small island communities with few resources in the Pacific.<sup>18</sup>

The latter is my primary concern, since most of the micro-states are situated in this area.

It is worth noting that the states bordering on the Pacific include not only the two super powers but also China, Japan, Korea, the ASEAN states, Australia, New-Zealand, Canada and the Eastern sea-borne states of Latin-America lie beyond the southern most rim of the Pacific basin.

It has been estimated that by the end of this century 60% of the world's consumers will live around the Pacific rim and half of the world's supercities will be situated

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18. Harden, n.7, p.173.

there. The outer rim Pacific states are relevant to the study to the extent that they either pose a threat to the individual micro-state or contribute directly to their security and well being.

Main island groups of the central and South Pacific were populated over many centuries, by waves of migration from East and South East Asia. European explorers did not arrive on the scene until the 16th century. First the Spanish and Portugese followed by the Dutch, the British and the French. And from then onwards the islands of the Pacific became pawns in the international rivalries. By the beginning of the 20th century most of the archipelagos of the Central and South Pacific had come under some form of Western protection and control.

The British having successfully colonised Australia and New Zealand had also assumed control over Fiji, The Gilbert and Ellis island, the Soloman island and Tongo. The US took over Guam from the Spanish after the Spanish American war of 1898. They had been awarded Eastern American Samoa under the three power convention of 1898 although they formally took over the territory only in 1926. The Germans who arrived late in the scramble for



the Pacific set up a protectorate of the Marshall island in 1880 and subsequently bought Spains remaining micro-nesian possessions. They also acquired Nauru, New Guinea and Western Samoa.<sup>19</sup> The Islands of the South Pacific were comparatively unaffected by the fighting in the first world war. After the defeat of Germany however its Pacific territories changed hands becoming mandated territories of the League of Nations administered by one or the other of the victorious allies.

During the Second World war, however the Pacific was a major theatre of war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was launched from the bases in the Japanese mandated Pacific island territories and there after these islands as well as many other small islands in the Pacific suffered heavy civilian casualties and almost total destruction of their resources and their homelands.

Since the Second World War the winds of change have blown through the small islands dependencies. The former British territories of Fiji, the Gilbert and Ellice islands (now Kiribati and Tuvalu), the Solomon islands and Tonga

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19. *ibid*, p.174.

have all become independent members of the UN or the associate members of the Commonwealth. The Anglo-French condominium of the New Hebrides opted for independence as Vanuatu and has become a member of the Commonwealth and the U.N.

Of the former U.N. Trust territories Nauru the world's smallest state opted for independence and associate membership of the Commonwealth (but not of the U.N.). New Guinea administered by Australia opted to merge with the adjoining Australian dependent territory of Papua New Guinea as the member of both the U.N. and the Commonwealth. Western Samoa (administered by New Zealand) opted for independence and has also become a member of both the U.N. and the Commonwealth.

French dependencies - French Polynesia-New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna have the status of overseas territories of France. American Samoa and Guam are unincorporated territories of the U.S.

The Cook islands and Niue are self governing in free association with the New Zealand and associate members of the Commonwealth. Tokelau with an estimated population

of 1,620 remains a non self governing territory administered by New Zealand.

The colonial era in the Pacific has virtually drawn to a close and the European powers with the exception of France, no longer have dependent territories involving them directly in the affairs of the South Pacific. In place of the earlier colonial empires a number of small island states have emerged which are either incapable of defending themselves from military threats on the smallest scale or of protecting their fisheries and other marine resources, from poachers.

Question is what is the nature of threat, facing these countries, where can they turn for aid in safeguarding their newly won independence, protecting their resources and ensuring minimum living standards for their people. These small states are in possession of one or more strategic raw material that invites attention, potential as well as active interest of the international powers. This makes their position vulnerable. Many of the states in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific because of their strategic location eg. near a crisis

spot or being buffer between two powers makes them geopolitically vulnerable and they become pawns in international politics.<sup>20</sup>

National security can no longer refer only to the preservation of independence and territorial integrity of the state. In today's world of interdependence and today's realities of dependence, MNC operations and other foreign international organization, the phenomenon of creeping insecurity is no less formidable than the direct physical threat. This is not to ignore the need for military preparedness but to put it in the correct perspective, security involves interrelated character with development, for the two are enmeshed in each other.

The issue of insecurity of small states is fundamentally linked to the insecurity of the developing nations. The source of insecurity of the developing nation tends to increase in an inverse proportion to the smallness of a state, its state of underdevelopment, the fragility of

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20. D.W. Hegarty, "Small States Security in the South Pacific", in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed. Security of Small States (Dhaka, 1987), p.158.

its political institutions and vulnerability of its socio-economic structures.<sup>21</sup>

Underdevelopment coupled with smallness manifests itself in two ways - firstly the structural dependence of the most small underdeveloped economies with world capitalism and secondly the constraints placed on the material base of these societies and hence their capacity to be transformed.<sup>22</sup>

The issue of protection or threat to the small South Pacific island states have to be considered in the context of the policies of the outer rim states and the two superpowers. United States and Soviet Union in their roles as superpowers in the present world configuration are actively involved in respective search for political and economic security. Hence the majority of their externally

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21. Jasjit Singh, "Insecurity of Developing Nations, Especially Small States", in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed. Security of Small States (Dhaka, 1987), p.20.

22. A.Rahman and J. Haider, "Underdevelopment, Dependence and Instability in the Small States: What is the way out?" in M.A. Hafiz and A.R.Khan, ed, Security of Small States (Dhaka, 1987), p.58.

projected actions are designed to counter the strategies of each other. The policies of the two superpowers vis-a-vis the smaller states are primarily shaped by their relationship with each other rather than an assesment of what their relation should be with the individual smaller states. Both the superpower policy-makers perceive each political crisis within or between smaller nations in terms of how they affect the long term strategic balance between the superpowers.

Regardless of the friendly or hostile nature of such interactions, decision makers in both the governments perceive that they cannot ignore the other and in fact their goals are best served by constant monitoring and evaluation of each others policies. Resultantly there is only a small fraction of their time saved to interact with these nations which are considered peripheral to their interests.

It is the viability and cohesiveness of ones society's physical, economic and social structures coupled with the degree of its ability to cope with its external environment

that determines the pattern of its external as well as domestic behavior. The salience of the environmental factor with regard to ones nations external behaviour can be determined by ascertaining its geographical location, particularly with regard to the South Pacific.

The great powers have acquired the physical and industrial might which enables them to achieve their foreign policy goals as well as to ensure the security of their essential structures. The small powers on the other hand are normally concerned with the security of their essential structures.

In the case of small powers the environmental variable is relatively more potent in determining their foreign policies. The small powers do not normally have a wide range of means with which to implement their foreign policy objectives and hence are prone to external pressures. Because the small powers have little control or no control over the overall systemic changes, their policies are invariably affected by the changes in the overall power structure in the system.

Security perceptions of these island countries differ from those of the superpowers as their sole aim is the containment of each other and also the denial of influence to the other in the region. The security perceptions of the Pacific island countries is broader in scope. It is not limited to military threats but includes anything that might compromise their political and economic sovereignty and their control of regional developments. Limitation of size and resources makes this job all the more difficult.



CHAPTER IIEconomic Potentialities of the South Pacific Region

The emergence of South Pacific region on the globe as a centrestage of resources compels one to devote considerable attention to the economic potentialities of the region. Though it is planned to give a brief oversketch of the economic resources of the South Pacific region as a whole but the aim would not be to undermine the real individuality of the countries of South Pacific, which underlines the error of some past perceptions of the region as a group of friendly uncomplicated and indistinguishable islands. But too often the very real differences between countries such as Polynesian neighbours, e.g., Tonga and Western Samoa or such as Malenesian ones as Vanuatu and Solomons have been overlooked in generalized romanticized view of the Pacific.

These differences and commonalities have a bearing on the course of development that a particular country follows and also the fabric of relationships is becoming all the more complex year by year in the way which expands both the opportunities for co-operation as well as the

scope for disagreements between the countries of the region and the developed ones.<sup>1</sup>

History is a constant succession of transitional periods. But the 1990's seem to be shaping up as an even more transitional decade than usual.<sup>2</sup> In the more fluid and complex world of the 1990's nations will grow even more inter-dependent than they are at present. The conflict of past appears to be moving towards resolution but there is no guarantee that the world will be more stable and peaceful in this kind of environment. Economic affairs are moving more and more into the political sphere with the result that international economic conflicts may have a negative impact on political relations as well.

An attempt may be made to give a brief description of the important island countries in the South Pacific to facilitate a better appreciation of the regions economic resources and their contribution to world development. Over the years, international trade has been a powerful engine of growth for the world economy.

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1. Gareth Evans, "Australia in the South Pacific", World Review (Queensland), vol.28, No.2 (June, 1989), p.5.
  2. *ibid*, p.6.

Trade across the Pacific is now higher than trade across the Atlantic. Anyone who has visited the Pacific region readily sees the liveliness and competitiveness of the economies, the thirst for knowledge, the constant drive for excellence and getting ahead in sharp contrast to say Europe which is regarded as sluggish, old fashioned and decadent.

The Southern Pacific Region is one of the most important segments of the globe. Its inextricably interwoven twin dimensions — the role of external powers in the region which is not always benign and the multitude of national and regional problems of change and development—are posing grave challenges to the managers of national and international affairs.

Of all the world's Oceanic areas, none is today more pregnant with promises, heady with changes, nor so vital to our planets affairs than the Pacific.<sup>3</sup>

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3. K.P. Misra and others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific Perception and Strategies (New Delhi, Continental Publishing House, 1988), p. IX.

With the exception of Papua New Guinea, Fiji is the largest Pacific island country both in population and variety of economy. It has almost 7,00,000 people living on 100 inhabited islands out of approximately 320 in the country. Fiji has a total area of 18,330 square kilometres. It is also by far the richest of the Pacific island countries. Apart from the small phosphate island of Nauru its per capita income of \$ 1750 ranks it even higher than its giant neighbour Papua New Guinea. One of its main attractions is the sophisticated tourist industry which lures thousands of foreign visitors every year. Nevertheless, Fiji has been painfully discovering that even Pacific island paradises have problems.

Compared with other areas of the world with racially mixed population the people of Fiji have lived in relative harmony. Moreover, under the surface there are racial grumbles, the Indians complain about the difficulty of buying land as land ownership is vested mainly in indigenous Fijians, and Fijians are unhappy that the Indians who came late to the country have prospered better than they

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4. Michelle Misquitta and Kevin-Rafferty, "Pacific Islands", Asia and Pacific Review (London), (1985), p.251.

have. Thus, the Fijian polity has been polarized along racial lines.

In 1984, the sugar crop, Fiji's main export was in doldrums. In 1980, sugar exports reached about F \$ 175 million out of total exports of F \$ 230 million. By 1983 earnings from sugar had slumped to F \$ 112 million of total exports of F \$ 178 million. The short fall was because of damage caused by cyclones and then drought. By 1984, the crop had improved but its market prices had not.<sup>5</sup>

In the medium to longer term Fiji has undoubted potential. It possess much more variety than the smaller Pacific islands that are dependent on coconuts, copra and perhaps some fishing. It is more mature and experienced in political matters as well being bigger.

Plans to expand exports through timber and woodchip industry are well under way. But like other developing countries, Fiji also has a population that is growing rapidly at 1.9% a year and creating demands for new jobs.

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5. *ibid*, p.251.

The country has come through reasonably well but really cannot afford to stand still in the process of economic development.

The territory of Palau or the New Republic of Belau, had a particular problem concerning its compact with the U.S., allowing it to be self-governing but in free association with its former colonial master. The people of the territory voted to approve the compact in February 1983, by a 62% vote in favour. They also supported a companion measure waiving a ban on nuclear materials storage this time by 51% but this was less than the required 75% majority necessary to change the 1981 constitution which bans hazardous substances such as nuclear weapons or waste in Palau and in its territorial waters upto 200 miles beyond. The U.S. responsible for territories defence would be placed in a difficult position given that 40% of its ships are nuclear powered. Without a change in the constitution these vessels would be banned.

Like most of micronesia, land in Palau is the most precious commodity and the American forces will need land for any bases, of course the greater impulse to accept the

compact with the U.S. is that with it comes assistance of \$ one billion over a fifty year period. This is a very large sum of money for a mere fifteen thousand people.

The Cook islands are so small and economically vulnerable that they have not yet attained full independence. But events of the last few years indicate that democracy flourishes there. The 15 islands of the Cooks which together have only 234 square kilometres of land and 18,000 inhabitants are self governing in free association with New Zealand. One of the small ways in which it helped has been in providing jobs for the Cook islanders in New Zealand.

The Cooks economy was never very strong and has suffered from its remoteness. The best hope lies in the combination of increasing exports of fruits, though the poor soils wont support big money exports and secondly encouragement of tourism. Tourism earnings have already surpassed those of all exports together. However attendant threats from tourism should not go un-noticed, eg., encroachment by foreign and alien values and consumer oriented demonstrative effects on native cultures. A big

problem with exports is the high costs of inputs and shipping charges. The Cooks trade deficit is enormous with exports principally copra, fruit and clothing only a quarter of the size of imports. The deficit is made up by tourism and aid.

France came under renewed pressure in 1983 and 1984 to stop its nuclear tests in the Pacific but Paris responded by resuming the programme and conducting at least three new tests. However, a new element witnessed was that Tahitians, themselves began to demonstrate against the tests. Although the Polynesians had protested sporadically throughout the 1970s these were first large scale local demonstration in more than a decade. The Polynesians were joined by almost all the other countries of the Pacific.

Demonstrations in Polynesia itself were more specific. The first took place on March 1, 1984, to mark Bikini Day commemorating the victims 30 years ago when U.S. had tested a nuclear device in Micronesia. The several thousand demonstrators called the nuclear tests 'the work of the devil'. This attitude was something of a change from that of the late 1960's and early 1970's. Though the tests started



against the will of the Polynesians initially they triggered an economic boom. This lasted till 1975, when France switched to underground testing which is less labour intensive. Since then the economy has hit harder times and economic and social unrest spread through the sprawling islands. A new feature of the 1984 demonstrations was that this time they united the political parties together with environmental and human right groups which have previously been in the vanguard of the protests. However, France's response to the protest was a new series of tests.

The territory of French Polynesia an overseas territory of France consists of close to 150,000 people on 5 main groups containing 130 islands, covering a land area of 4000 sq. km. and about 4 million sq. km. of Ocean. The best known island Tahiti in the society group has the bulk of the people about 100,000 of whom 25,000 live in Papeete the capital.

On the whole French Polynesia has not been affected by the same strident demands for autonomy or independence that have recently rocked New Caledonia, the other French

territory in the Pacific. This is partly because Polynesia has enjoyed more freedom than Caledonia.

The economy of Polynesia has proved highly vulnerable in the past few years, particularly due to changes in the weather, cyclones have caused millions of dollars worth of damage. The tourist industry a major income earner was also hit by the labour unrest in 1983.

Apart from tourism, most economic activity is on a small scale. There is some textile production, brewing and handcrafts making largely to support the tourism industry. Like other South Pacific islands it used to be a source of phosphate but the mining ceased in 1960s. If properly developed there would be scope for fish farming. But at the moment this is an industry largely in the hands of foreign fishing fleets.

On maps of the Pacific Ocean Guam<sup>6</sup> is firmly located in the middle of Micronesia. It is in fact the largest of the Mariana islands. But Guam has long been treated separately from the other surrounding territories of which

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6. Michelle Misquitta and Kevin Rafferty, "Pacific Islands", Asia and Pacific Review (London), (1985), p.256.

geographically and in many other ways it is a natural part. So Guam has not been a part of the talks for dissolving the US run Trust territory of the Pacific islands. The reason for the islands special status is obvious. Guam is the home of an important U.S. military base with vital air and naval facilities. The twin influences of tourism and military strategic installations are the two predominant ones on the islands life today. Given the success of tourism, many islanders would like to attract more business, especially those of a financial nature. After all it is situated mostly between the rapidly growing Asian area and the United States.

The Republic of Kiribati is still a fledgling country having achieved independence from Britain in 1979, when it was known as the Gilbert islands. The main resources of this group of islands used to be phosphate mined in Ocean island but revenue from this source has dwindled. So, now the islands have been concentrating on their marine resources, eg. King fish snapper and tuna. Copra is the main export of Kiribati and new planting and improved agricultural methods have been

encouraged. Because of the poor natural resources like other Pacific islands Kiribati has turned to other sources of revenue such as tourism and overseas employment.

Marshall islands have achieved fame as a testing ground for American weapons systems Bikini Atoll, and then Eniwetok were one of the earliest testing grounds for atomic hydrogen bombs by the U.S.. Kwajaleen islands is important as the ground for the controversial MX missile and other Missiles. Instead in return for aid of \$ 1.8 billion in operating funds and capital improvement grants over the 15 years of the pact the US wants strategic denial preventing the military use of the islands by any other country for hundred years.

Culturally the South Pacific is diverse containing three distinct cultural grouping - (1) Melanesia; (2) Polynesia, and (3) Micronesia. The major distinguishing characteristics of these groups are the nature of their leadership and the structure of their societies. In short, Melanesian societies are small scale acephalous, non-bureaucratic and democratic (often to the point of anarchy) in which leadership is achieved and not ascribed.

Polynesian societies by contrast, have chiefly forms of leadership and are hierarchially structured, with systems of rank and status. Micronesian societies are more diverse, combining elements of egalitarianism and rank, and chiefly and achieved leadership.<sup>7</sup>

There is a considerable diversity, in the political systems adopted by the new states, reflecting their colonial heritage but also accommodating local power structures and traditions.

All States of the region qualify for the description of a small state and most qualify for the title of mini state. Papua New Guinea is the largest state in terms of both population and land area 3.2 million and 0.46 million square kilometers - accounting for 65% of the regions population and 84% of the land area. If we exclude Papua New Guinea (a Melanesian state) from our consideration of size the true nature of the regions small states becomes apparent. Fiji, the Soloman island, Vanuatu and New Caledonia (the Melanesian states) represent the larger

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7. D.W. Hegarty, "Small States Security in the South-Pacific," in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed; Security of Small States, (Dhaka: University Press Ltd; 1987), p. 160.

end of the scale (Fiji has a population of 670,000), Tuvalu, Nauru, and the Cook Islands represent the smaller end of the scale (Tuvalu has a population of 8,000).<sup>8</sup>

The South Pacific is a part of the third world and shares with other developing countries, the problems of achieving grants and minimizing dependency. Despite the potential for economic development, in the larger Melanesian states, the economics of all states are fragile. Although by no means destitute and impoverished all are heavily dependent on foreign aid and most have only one or very few crops and commodities to export.

The Prime Minister of Fiji Sir Kamisere Muta paid a visit to Washington at the end of 1984. He subsequently announced that he had negotiated an important aid agreement with the US and in return the Fijian Government had agreed to allow American nuclear armed warships to use the port facilities of Suva,<sup>9</sup> SIC (international relations does not operate on the basis of charity).

At present Japan's bilateral aid (some 65% of its total overseas Development Assistance) goes primarily to the

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8. *ibid.*, p.161.

9. Sheila Harden, ed; Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World, (London: Frances Pinlee, 1985), p. 178.

more developed countries of the Pacific basin; Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, China and the Phillipines. The <sup>r</sup>micostates of the region receive very little either in absolute terms or in comparison with and from others eg. in 1983, Japan provided less than 2% of Vanuatu's aid and only about 17% of the aid received by Fiji. In addition, Japanese loans are extended on relatively hard terms, with the grant element well below the average of OECD members. The proportion of untied aid, however, is above (63% against an average of 43%).<sup>10</sup>

Japan once again has important trade links with countries in the South Pacific, with significant Japanese investment in the area, Japanese businessmen and Japanese tourists are visiting the Pacific in increasing numbers. In 1982, it was reported that more than three quarters of the tourists to the Northern Marianas came from Japan and there were eleven weekly flights linking Saipan and Tokyo.

The Japanese are also pursuing a more active political role in the South Pacific. In January 1985 Mr. Nakasone undertook a tour of the South Pacific which included visits to Fiji and Papua New Guinea (the first official visit by a Japanese PM to either country) and the objective of the

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10. *ibid*, p. 180.

tour, was to establish stronger ties for the 21st century between Japan and these countries, what remains to be seen is how beneficial these stronger ties would prove for the countries of South Pacific.

The terms of trade continue to move against these essentially agricultural producing countries, external indebtedness and reliance on concessionary loans is increasing. Food imports a significant indicator of underdevelopment is in some cases as high as 20% of the total value of imports. For some of the atoll countries economic viability is not an option, their economies having atrophied have become transformed into consumer colonies. The vast ocean area of the South Pacific EEZ's suggest the potential for fisheries development but shortage of capital and skilled labour has inhibited the development of a significant local fishing industry, waters are thus leased to companies from 'Distant water fishing Nations' but there is often significant illegal fishing and over-fishing by these metropolitan companies.<sup>11</sup>

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11. *ibid*, p. 192.



The constraints of development include small size, isolation, transport costs, incompetent exports, limited skills, lack of natural resources and frequent presence of disasters (cyclones) complexities of land tenure and foreign ownership of some key sectors. Economic development is static and it is vital that new employment opportunities are developed in these countries in which the annual population growth often exceeds 3%.<sup>12</sup>

Without <sup>b</sup> substantial external aid they lack the means, <sub>^</sub> the infrastructure and the technical expertise to maintain even in modified form, the standards and services (including elementary health and educational services) which their people learned to expect under Western rule and the influence of Western ideas. It is no longer possible, in a world of modern communications, to put the clock back and revert to the way of life of their ancestors before the advent of the Europeans. For the foreseeable future therefore, the only way in which these small Pacific states will be able to

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11. *ibid*, p.192.

12. Ataur Rahman, "Small States in the International Security System" in M.A. Hafiz and A.R.Khan, ed., Security of Small States (Dhaka, 1987), p.223.

provide for their minimum needs will be to secure outside sources of financing and technical assistance. Economic self sufficiency could only be achieved by reducing already spartan living standards to a degree which would be unacceptable to the population and likely to promote political instability.<sup>13</sup>

Lack of funds, a shortage of trained personnel, inadequate infrastructure and remoteness from world markets are amongst the main constraints on development in the area. Aid for infrastructural projects and for education and technical training are both priorities, without adequate communications and reasonably reliable power supplies together with engineers, electricians and maintenance workers to service them, development seems to be a remote possibility.

Education, particularly higher education, teachers training and vocational training is an area where aid is particularly needed. In assigning such aid, recognition should be given to the high cost of sending students overseas for training, the consequent need to develop more

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13. Harden, n. 9, p.191.

local and regional educational and technical training centres in the longer term, and to provide student grants in the interim period.

Tourism is a growing industry in some parts of the Pacific understandably in view of its exceptional scenic beauty, unspoilt beaches and interesting culture. But development is at present limited by the lack of amenities (hotels, roads, water and electricity supply) in many islands and the remoteness of the area from world population centres, which makes the cost of travel at present unacceptably high for mass tourism. This is probably just as well since tourism can have adverse social consequences if expanded too rapidly. It should be carefully planned in order not to overwhelm small and fragile economies and to conflict with local customs and traditions.<sup>14</sup>

While the South Pacific is in no sense a zone of conflict or in any immediate danger of becoming one, it is no longer calm and tranquil as it once was, the potentiality for instability could arise because the region is not

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14. *ibid*, p.193.

homogeneous, there are large discrepancies in the level of economic development.<sup>15</sup>

Among this fold of developing countries one finds least developed countries (L.D.C.s) which find themselves trapped in a very discomforting situation due to diminished financial resource flows to the developing countries, with contraction in new lending and growing burden of debt-servicing. However, a silver lining which one notices is that much of the market monopolies of advanced nations is giving way to intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation.<sup>16</sup>

Despite the euphoria of independence or of its anticipation dependence does not by any means automatically terminate by virtue of her paper change in the political status, by the singing of a new national anthem or by creation of a flag carrying an airline. Moreover development is a

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15. F. Vychodil, "Views from An European Socialist Country", in M. Rasgotra and others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: A Region in Turbulence (New Delhi Continental Publishing House, 1988), p.33.
  16. Gokul Pokhrel, "Peace and Regional Cooperation: Smaller Nations' Perspective" in M. Rasgotra and Others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: A Region in Turbulence (New Delhi, 1988), p.43.

concept originating among the highly educated specialised elite of the developed countries who in their progressive fervour for change may envision everywhere mirror images of their own culture, society and technology. Very often the grandiose schemes which psychologically satisfy the planners in Washington, Canberra, Tokyo, or wherever are infact those which the post colonial governing class itself finds acceptable. However, such plans while impressive in theory and in magnitude prove for the most parts unrealisable in practice particularly in the small island states of the Pacific.

Moreover these plans are created in a vacuum without any real consideration of the actual wants and the needs of the general populace in a given society or of the unique cultural traditions of each newly delimited political entity.<sup>17</sup>

It should also be stated, that development may be a moot issue, if the population problem is not given immediate and serious attention. By virtue of unchecked

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17. G.K. Goodman and F. Moos, ed., The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea (Colorado: Westview, 1981), p.1.

population growth specially in the island-mini states any improvement which may in fact be generated by well intended funding most of it from outside sources, for example, grants, loans from government or private agencies are negated faster than progress can be achieved.<sup>18</sup>

It should also be noted that developed societies of Euro-America and Japan as well as semi developed socialist societies of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China all have their own politico-economic, military purposes in providing aid or in devising plans for less developed countries. Whether it is psychologically to unburden a particular country of guilt of its past misdeeds for example Britain in its former colonies or Japan in South East Asia to seek political advantage with particular local leaders.

Clearly then in such circumstances technologically limited assistance needed by the less developed countries to sustain and enhance their small scale subsistence agriculture particularly important in the Pacific island

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18. *Ibid*, p.2.

is either downgraded or overlooked in favour of showcase project requiring lavish funding and in turn theoretically giving political advantage to the donor states as well as the local recipient authorities in power.

To expect development specialists in the Pacific island to be more ecologically sensitive than their counterparts at home is obviously unwarranted. The result then is that increasingly the Pacific islands are becoming a maze of junkyards and remote stretches of the Pacific have become so polluted that they cannot sustain marine life and human activity.

In both Micronesia and Papua New Guinea the interests of the US and Japan seem at present to be operative in isolation from one another and often in direct competition with the other. This is to date more evident in the West Central Pacific, Micronesia than in Papua New Guinea.

In Micronesia for example the U.S. has usually expressed aspirations in political and strategic goals whereas Japan has repeatedly professed political and

military non-involvement due to Art.9 (No war clause) of the Japanese constitution and has accordingly established an overwhelming economic presence rapidly and effectively. Such differing policy emphais operating with minimal consultation and fr<sup>e</sup>quently generating mutual suspicions between the U.S. and Japan bode ill for future relations between the countries particularly in respect to Pacific. Unfortunately upto the present it appears that the Pacific island region has not been an area of high priority for either U.S. or Japan. In the immediate post-war years Japanese found it emotionally too painful to be reminded of their thousands dead and their military defeats in Micronesia and Papua New Guinea and the Americans preferred simply not to think of the Pacific war. Nevertheless U.S. retained political control of Micronesia for purposes of strategic denial while generally remaining aloof from the politics of Papua New Guinea.

In short although the Western Pacific is an area characterized by relatively small but concentrated populations, by a generally subsistence level economic life, by recently emergent and still quite unsophisticated



political entities and institutions, by limited exposure to the vicissitudes of superpower dominated international life the current trends of contemporary events are directly affecting the entire region. Even a power like U.S. which had limited interest in the area or like the S.U. which previously had almost none now see themselves as virtually concerned with places like Papua New Guinea and Micronesia. And these latter entities in turn have perforce to learn how to cope with the blandishments as well as the demands that emanate from such great nations.<sup>19</sup>

Threats to small states security can also emanate from actions and policies of what might be regarded as the regions traditional friends. The most obvious example of this in the South Pacific has been the U.S. refusal to recognise coastal states jurisdiction over tuna fishing. The U.S. regards tuna as a highly migratory species of fish and as such U.S. fishermen are entitled under the U.S. law to chase fish through other countries' EEZ's (Exclusive Economic Zones). If small states intercept these vessels (three occasions in recent times) U.S. under the Magnusan act automatically applies a trade

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19. *ibid*, p. 14.

embargo against the small states. This issue has done more to fuel anti-American sentiment in the South Pacific than any other.<sup>20</sup>

A recent agreement however between the U.S. government and the South Pacific Forum fishery Agency (representing the small states) which licences U.S. vessels in return for a substantial fee should go a long way towards resolving the issue.

On a muggy morning in March 1984 the weekly mail plane touched Tarawa (population 22,000) the capital of the small island nation of Kiribati, in the South Pacific. One of the postal bags aboard the aircraft contained an interesting letter. The return address was the embassy of Soviet union in Canberra, the principal Soviet diplomatic outpost in the region and the letter requested the government of Kiribati to consider granting the Soviet Union tuna fishing rights in the waters of the 33 isle archipelago.<sup>21</sup>

The Soviet request was not new. In the immediate past most of the island states in the Pacific had recieved bids from Moscow for co-operation of one sort or another eg.

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20. Hegarty, n.7, p. 164.

21. E.W. Desmond, "Rivalry in The Pacific: New Focus for Superpower Competition," Time, (New York), vol. 128, No. 21 (1986), p. 8.

ocean floor surveys, fishing rights and trade agreements.

The Pacific ocean is the most promising place for deep sea mining. Its reserves of manganese, nickel, and cobalt in polymetallic seabed concretions surpass by many times more than those prospected on the land.<sup>22</sup>

In the past Kiribati's answer has always been an unqualified no, a decision taken on the advice of Australia and New Zealand who warned of political subversion that might bob up in the wake of Soviet fishing boats. Beginning in 1979 however such apprehensions were overshadowed by a much more tangible threat to Kiribati the islands phosphate deposits had run out erasing 80% of export earnings, and the country of 65,000 was left with an economy based on a bunch of coconuts nobody wanted. Desperate to raise revenue, Kiribati had tried to negotiate a fishing agreement with the American Tunaboat Association. Not only did these talks stall but the American tunamen angered Kiribati even more by fishing in its waters without permission.

Thus in 1985 the Soviet request to Kiribati received

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22. Henry Trofimenko, "Long Term Trend in the Asia Pacific Region: A Soviet Evaluation," Asian Survey (California), vol. XXIX, No. 3 March (1989), p. 238.

a positive answer. The smaller country signed a one year accord with Moscow in return for a payment of about \$ 2 million, 16 Soviet trawlers would be allowed to fish for tuna in Kiribatan waters. The single restriction, one the Soviets accepted only reluctantly was that their fishermen could not go ashore.

Though it was claimed to be a commercial deal, within months the Soviet Kiribatan agreement began to look more like the opening move in a complex chess strategy than an isolated commercial deal. Vanuatu, formerly the British-French territory of New Hebrides also established diplomatic relations with Moscow.

Nor were the Soviets idle along the Asian fringe of the Pacific. In January (1985) Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze flew to Tokyo, the first visit in a decade to discuss relations long chilled by the failure of the two countries to sign a peace treaty after World War Second.

The climax to Moscow's conspicuous moves came on July 28, 1986, when Gorbachev delivered a speech in Vladivostock, reminding the world that the greater part of their territory lay east of Urals in Asia.<sup>23</sup>

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23. *ibid*, p. 240.

Moscow intended to be a principal political and economic player in the 'renaissance in world history' taking place along the Pacific rim. Though it made few headlines in the West, the speech certainly caught the attention of officials in the capitals of the Asia Pacific region, not to mention in Washington.

The singular benefit derived from Valkenier's painstaking scholarship is that in contrast to the conventional view of Soviet thinking and policies as static, she has traced marked changes over time in the way Soviet party leadership has perceived the problems of the third world and sought to adopt its economic policies to an increasingly complex reality, the movement away from the ideologically simplistic formulations of the Krushchev era to a more differentiated awareness of the complexity of the third world developments, but even more the movement from the Stalinist doctrine of two antagonistic world markets to a realization of Soviet self-interest in an interdependent global economy. The modifications in Soviet theory and practice over the past 25 years, have resulted from various disappointments with the initial expectations of easy success

for Soviet type socialist policies and institutions in the former colonies,<sup>24</sup>

Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and fall of the Great Powers argued that the U.S.A. is on decline as a global power. This decline, of course, is relative. Occupation of hostile territory in the era of growing nationalism and international acceptance of state sovereignty is of doubtful value and no longer a rational objective. Challenges to countries will be mainly economic and not military or political, safeguarding economic rights and resources will become even more relevant. What needs to be emphasized is that conflict will not be outdated, only its form will undergo changes, border, regional, ethnic and internal conflict will tend to pre-dominate. These conflicts would find manifestation in the political sphere, but the underlying economic causes cannot be overlooked which have a destabilizing effect on the body politic.<sup>25</sup>

In recent decades, the Asia Pacific region has become the 'new growth pole of the global economy'- Foreign direct investments by Transnational corporations from Japan, North

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24. see, E.K. Valkenier, The Soviet Union and the Third World, (New York: Praeger, 1983).

25. D. Banerjee, "South East Asian Security in the last Decade of 20<sup>th</sup> Century," Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. XIII, NO. IV, July (1989), p. 365.

America and Western Europe in the underdeveloped countries has played a major role in this transformation. It is the 'glamor area' other's refer to the Pacific economy of the 21st century.

Yet the impact of foreign direct investment on the non elites has been lamented. The transnational corporations are said to under-develop the region. The greater the Transnational Corporations domination the greater the maldistribution in these countries.

David Kowalewski presents the unequal economic profile of the region and writes about (1) the perpetuation of inequality through joint ventures- benefits granted from the special legal privileges, (2) establishment of mutually beneficial contacts with government elites. In the Pacific islands the directors of Transnational corporations are often government leaders. Logging TNC's displace thousands of settlers from huge tracts of land, timber. TNC's have made incursions into the customary landholdings of Solomon islands and small acquaculturalists experience a deterioration of their living standards because of

TNC investment.<sup>26</sup>

In the Pacific islands Japanese catch even very young fish offshore and damage the future protein sources of small aquaculturalists. Illegal fishing by Japanese Transnational has occurred off Belau, TNC trawlers have undermined small fisherfolk of Fiji, exports of fish in any form should be banned as it is criminal to export food when millions do not have sufficient food to eat in these countries.

This short sketch only represents a small amount of the growing body of qualitative evidence, detailing the intervening mechanisms whereby TNC's contribute to increasing inequality. Benefits which accrue to elites are intimately related to the deprivations, which are suffered by non-elites, growing inequality will eventually lead to resistance efforts on the part of the non-elites against the transnational elite establishments who have taken advantage of their powerlessness.

One of the most important global trends we have observed in the last half of the century is the enclosure of larger areas of the Ocean and its resources. Nation

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26. David Kowalewski, "Transnational Corporations and Asian Inequality," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), vol. 60. No. 4 (1987-88), p. 578.



states have become increasingly aware of the real and potential value of the ocean space and resources and also cognizant of the growing scarcity of natural resources on land. Consequently they have been exerting strenuous efforts to secure what they perceive as their rightful claims to ocean riches. They have been laying unilateral claims to their coastal waters and resources therein, they have been meeting bilaterally to settle competing claims over waters and resources that lie between them and have been negotiating in international and multi-national political forums, such as the United Nations conference on the 'Laws of the Sea' in an attempt to reach comprehensive agreement on a larger number of issues regarding management of ocean activities.

The heart of the question is who gets what, how, at what cost and why, views on international ocean regime vary widely. Some argue for the natural right of the coastal states to lay claim to their coastal water and also to regulate and when necessary exclude other nations from activities within their jurisdictional boundaries.

Others argue for the freedom of the seas and traditional users of sea should be allowed to continue their ocean activities unhampered by new coastal state claims and restriction.

Still others believe that the Ocean and its riches belong to every nation and that not only traditional users but also new comers to ocean activities as well as future users should be accorded equal rights, to the ocean space and resources on equitable basis.

Japan's extensive participation in the world wide ocean activities such as fishing and shipping has made it a major beneficiary of traditional ocean regime.

Japan through continued interest in the traditional uses of the sea and modern technological capabilities and financial resources that allow expansion into the area such as deep sea mining and ocean energy development continues to be one of the most extensive users of ocean space and energy resources. Its dependence on the ocean space and its resources is at the highest level of any developed state. The possibility of mining the enormous

amounts of manganese nodules on the deep sea-beds in the Pacific is very attractive to Japan estimated to be 500 billion tons and if successfully exploited would greatly exceed the world's present landbased resources.<sup>27</sup>

It is estimated that transportation costs account for as much as 20-30% of the import prices of iron ore, coal and crude oil. The Japanese are also concerned that increased shipping regulations and environmental restrictions on ocean transportation are likely to raise the already substantial shipping costs.

The declaration of 200 miles fishery or economic zones by an increasing number of coastal states in the 1970's has had both a symbolic and a real impact on Japanese ocean interest. The government has had to abandon its long standing positions in favour of the 3 mile territorial sea limit and against coastal states jurisdiction beyond that narrow limit. Not only the Japanese government abandoned its opposition to expansionist claims by other coastal states, it has itself established a 12 mile territorial sea and a 200 mile fishery zone.<sup>28</sup>

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27. Robert L. Friedheim, Japan and the New Ocean Regime (USA, Westview, 1984), p.2.

28. *ibid*, p.2.

In some governments new agencies have been created to consolidate powers of ocean management. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the ocean is a physical common in which different sets of rights cannot be geographically separated. The result is the problem of multiple use mining, fishing, oil drilling, transportation, recreation and pollution all takes place in the same body of water at the same time to the detriment of these mini-states' economic growth.

Peace as absence of inter-state war is one thing and peace as a non-violent co-operative international regime is quite another. While in the first development is taking place and is to be welcomed, we have to go for the second goal and the economic factor in the national stability is to be solved.<sup>29</sup>

If more Grenades are to be avoided, the very best manner in which the long term security of the commonwealth small states can be obtained is to introduce without delay, economic

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29. A paper Presented by K. Subrahmanyam to the International Conference on "Co-operation for Peace, Security and Development in Asian-Pacific Region in the Global Context" on 27-29 April 1989 at New Delhi.

and trading reforms in the international market place which will in turn introduce economic justice and equity. Economic development is the frontline of the battle against insecurity of these small states, remove the threat and and the debilitating effects of poverty and the first and foremost battle will be won and quite possibly the war.

It will never be enough or indeed good enough for the small states of the commonwealth to be just well defended bastions of poverty. The micro states of the region are facing a new form of subversion, with shadowy corporations which tend to operate from registered offices in Hawaii or on the mainland of the U.S. mostly in California or Nevada.<sup>30</sup>

Another example of a threat of this kind include a recent decision by the Australian government, to unilaterally cut its level of aid to the South Pacific on the grounds of economic difficulties. A small saving of perhaps a few million dollars for Australia is a gigantic loss for an island government whose budget may only total \$ 30 or \$ 40 million.

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30. Harden, n. 9, p.8.

Another source of threat to the integrity of small states is that arising from the activities of carpet baggers, conmen and other assorted spivs. Fast talking salesmen have been able to integrate themselves with island leaders and sell their spurious projects.

Threats to the security, both of the small states themselves and of the region can arise from domestic instability. In general, the South Pacific has a sound record of political stability, governments are changed regularly and in orderly fashion. There are no extra constitutional groups attempting to overthrow government of the day, dissent and opposition are contained within the existing political framework, and the delivery of the government services is still reasonably efficient. But there remains considerable potential for domestic instability particularly in the Melanesian states where the fluidity of political alliances, the lack of an integrative party mechanism and the existence of successionist tendencies inhibit effective national government. The polynesian states are not necessarily free of potential instability<sup>31</sup>;

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31. Hegarty, n.7, p.165.

the inflexibility of their social structures will in time cause some backlash but their problems are further away in time. In Fiji communal tensions between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians (descendants of indentured labourers from southern India) surface from time to time, confrontation between the two communities have rarely occurred but with the power and constitutional structure biased towards Fijians and the balance of population now favouring the Indo Fijians (53%), tension is close to the surface.

The South Pacific's two security 'hotspots'- New Caledonia and the Papua New Guinea/Indonesia border both have the potential to destabilise the regional security.

In essence the conflict in the French controlled territory of New Caledonia revolves around the struggle by the indigenous Melanesian (Kanak) who constitute only 43% of the total population of 1,56,000 for independence from France. Independence is opposed by the majority of the population which is comprised of French colons (including some of the former French colonies Algeria and Indo-China) from France's polynesian territories further east and small communities of Indonesians and Vietnamese. The territory is polarised, violent confrontations have occurred and an uneasy calm prevails only because the ratio of French security forces in the territory is 1 : 24 New Caledonians (or 1 : 10 Kanaks). French policy under the Chirac administration has aggravated the situation. In March 1986, Chirac reversed the tentative steps towards limited independence which the French Socialist government had implemented and declared that New Caledonia will remain French.

The Kanaks well organised through their National Liberation Front (FLNKS) have become increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of change. Despite support from the small states in the region the FLNKS have established a linkage with Libya largely in the hope of forcing France's hand but partly in the hope that Colonel Gaddafi may offer some material assistance to their struggle.

According to Sociologists<sup>32</sup> the basic problem in New Caledonia is social and economic inequality. Kanak independence as a notion emerges due to the massive concentration of Melanesians on the periphery of socio-economic structure, which by discouraging their social differentiation fails to allow the formation of inter-ethnic social categories favourable to independence but rather produces an ethnic polarization in this respect.

The effect of Nickel on New Caledonia's economy is well known. In 1976, well after the previous nickel boom of 1969-71, had come to an abrupt end New Caledonia was still the world's third largest nickel producer behind

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32. Michael Spencer, "New Caledonia : Some Problems and Issues", World Review (Queensland), Vol.27, No.3 (1988), p.8.



Canada and the USSR. In boom years Caldoches and immigrants deserted the land and other occupations to make a quick Pacific Franc as a result of the boom.

Story of agriculture has been depressing, three reasons can be attributed to this -

1. overall poor quality of land.
2. depressing effect on the rural economy of mineral industry.
3. Ongoing uncertainty about land ownership and land rights.

Important in the security considerations of the third world countries is the study of aid response of the receiving country, specially in terms of maintenance of the autonomy of foreign policy in the atmosphere of super power domination all over the world. The process of mobilization of foreign aid has two dimensions -

(1) the competition between the super powers to influence the process of political and economic development of the developing countries in order to strengthen their security and expand their economy; (2) developed countries are basically interested in their own economies, conceptually speaking, aid receiving countries can exhibit a great deal of autonomy provided they utilize foreign aid for development

that is removal of under-development.<sup>33</sup>

The theme of Linder<sup>34</sup> is that there is much scope for partnership since this is the region with both a large market and a source of both high quality manufacturers and technology.

Mr. Ramphal presents with passionate eloquence and telling use of statistics the case for a new world order<sup>36</sup> in which the principle of social justice is extended to global economic relations. He sees the ever-increasing gap between the developing and developed worlds as not only morally offensive but also a threat to world stability due to interdependence of national economies.

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33. See, Sushila Agarwal, Super Powers and the Third World (Jaipur : Aalekh Publishers, 1985).
34. Staffan B. Linder, The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism (California: Stanford University Press, 1986), p.309.
35. Shridath Ramphal, One World To Share (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p.8.
36. Georgi Shakhnazarov in his book, The Coming World Order (Moscow: Progress Publication, 1981) writes about the profound objective connection between economic and political phenomenon which makes it essential to examine them in close interdependence.

The economic system which provided relative stability in the past were based on the hegemony of a single country (the U.S. in the post war period). The present configuration of relatively equal major powers pursuing goals which often conflict, which is already central to the collapse of the post war system is perhaps the most difficult from which to create a durable and stable international economic order.

In trade the record is no better, produce more, still more and earn more that was the simple formula. However, with major efforts developing countries produced and sold more but their net earnings, their terms of trade steadily declined. The amount of cotton or sisal or tea they had to produce to export in order to buy say tractors or antibiotics or an irrigation pump kept increasing. They were developing on a diminishing basis. And, there were other problems when they tried to diversify their economic base, it led them to high tariff walls, differential freight rates and administrative obstructions to trade, frustrating their entry into world market.<sup>37</sup>

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37. Ramphal, n. 35, p. 7.

Aid is identified as mirage, the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer. For poor life was not a spectacle or a feast it was a predicament. Therefore aid flows must be sustained at a higher level and put on a predictable basis.

More than three quarters of mankind live in under-developed countries while their share in the world GNP barely surpasses 15%. Hundreds of millions of people live on the brink of hunger, poverty, the demographic explosion, disease and unemployment are permanent phenomenon with exponential growth. The world in which we live and the international community represent a single entity a "global village." Poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere stipulates ILO constitution. But these are empty words insufficiently understood and they have not been translated into genuine action and behavior. Development is the new name for peace.<sup>38</sup>

President Bush attended the 15th economic summit of the industrialised nations in Paris July 14-16, 1989

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38. Lazar Majsov, "Ethics for Development", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), No. 938 (1989), p.15.

hosted by French President Francois Mitterand and the other participants were PM Brian Mulroney (Canada) Chancellor Helmut Kohl (West Germany) PM Ciriaco De Mita (Italy) PM Susuke Uho (Japan) Mrs Thatcher (UK) and Jacquera Delors president of the European commission.<sup>39</sup> The members looked towards the future with opportunities as well as threats, committed to uphold the international standards of human rights (but extreme poverty and exclusion from society violated the dignity of everyone) the very protection of these rights is dependent upon the opportunity to develop balanced economic co-operation.

But this balanced development becomes a mere rhetoric in view of the widespread and acute problem of third world debt, (and this summit provides no support for a North-South conference or dialogue on this issue).

According to William Clark, Junior though the progress of the Pacific region is visible in the clothes they wear, the cars they drive and the appliances in their homes.

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39. "Summit of the Arch", Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington), Vol.89, No. 2150 (1989), p.7.

Yet economic development has not been evenly distributed even within the countries which exhibited exemplary growth rates eg. the Phillipinese economy has begun to recover from years of mismanagement. Except for Japan, Australia and New Zealand democracy is still very new to most countries of this region. Despite many assurances to the contrary, budgetary pressures will compel US to pull back from its longstanding commitments to the regions affairs, declining aid levels in real terms adds to this fear.<sup>40</sup>

David W. Hegarty writes that Grenada affair in the CARIBBEAN late in 1983 drew attention to the security of one of the worlds, other large but lesser known clusters of small island states, the South Pacific. Academics, security analyst and policy makers began to compare the political and strategic situation of the two island regions. The initial conclusion reached by many particularly those in oceania was that the South Pacific was a much more secure and stable region.<sup>41</sup>

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40. Department of State Bulletin : The Official Monthly Record of US Foreign Policy (Washington), Vol.89, No.2146(1989),p.10.

41. Hegarty, n. 7, p. 159.

While the states of both regions because of their small size were inherently vulnerable to external attack and while they shared many socio-economic features particularly their economic dependency and fragility, the differences between the two regions was substantial.

Political stability in the South Pacific was more pronounced and less volatile than that in Caribbean, the smooth decolonization process produced more stable politics, with little or no ideological competition within or between South Pacific states, regional solidarity was much more stronger than in the Caribbean and there was no Cuban equivalent within the region to offer an alternative model of political or economic development to the mini states. Demonstratively the South Pacific was of less strategic importance than the Caribbean situated as it was in the shadow of US.

The threat environment of the South Pacific in comparison with the Caribbean was benign. However in the changed atmosphere it is necessary to see how benign and calm this region is as the focus of superpowers activity and conflicts have shifted to the Pacific region. Chapter three attempts to perceive the nature of threat posed to these states due to increased superpowers activity in this region.

### CHAPTER - III

#### A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF SUPER POWERS

Gorbachev says "May the 21st century become the first century of life without fear of universal death<sup>1</sup>.

As to how much this world would remain free from the fear of universal death largely depends upon peaceful co-existence of the countries and their mutually beneficial relations in the Pacific region. Mankind now faces the most crucial threat in civilization's history. A choice that must be made today before it is too late, a choice between further straining international tensions or relaxing them, between escalating the arms race to cosmic proportions or curtailing it, between confrontation or cooperation is the need of the hour.

Since world war II, the US has considered itself the Pacific's paramount power, viewing the area as its own and by extension the West's preserve. Despite two conflicts, Korean and Vietnam, in which the US shed much blood and treasure, fighting Soviet supported forces, not even the

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1. Mikhail.S. Gorbachev, A Time for Peace (New York, 1985), p.55.



coldest of cold warriors in Washington had worried much about the Soviet Union as a rival in the Pacific. Vietnam and North Korea excepted, the nations on the Pacific's Asian rim, many of them prosperous, looked to the West, specifically the US for trade and security an attitude only temporarily shaken by the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia after the fall of Saigon in 1975<sup>2</sup>.

Today the US has more reason than ever to pay attention to the Pacific. This vast ocean is becoming the latest focus of super power rivalry.

With his vladivostok speech Gorbachev suddenly signalled that the SU intended to sail in an ocean so long described as an American lake. And this proposal was presented at a time when political currents in the Pacific are less than predictable. Some of the mini-states burdened by weak economies are looking for respite from whatever source. In the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia, indigenous Kanaks are agitating for independence. In the Phillipines the post

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2. E.W. Desmond, "Rivalry in The Pacific: New Focus for Superpower Competition", Time (New York), Vol. 128, No. 21 (1986), p.9.

Marcos era has brought challenges to the continued presence of the two largest US bases in the Pacific. The ANZUS alliances, a defence pact linking the US, Australia and New Zealand has lost one of its partners. In much of the region there is a bitterness over growing US protectionism and Moscow would be ready to exploit these frictions.

New elements in the security equation make the strategic game in and around the great ocean an increasingly compelling challenge for the US and its Pacific allies. The reach of the Soviet Unions Red Banner Pacific fleet has steadily extended in recent years. Modern ships have been added and Vietnam has made base facilities available to the Soviets, on the South China sea at Cam Ranh Bay a vast airfield and port complex. And as long as the Soviets are building up in the region, there is only one power that can balance their force and that is the US.

Most analysts suggest that the days of unchallenged US hegemony in the Pacific are over and Gorbachev's Vladivostok initiative could mark the beginning of unbridled super-power rivalry in the region, what worries Washington is that theirs is the position to lose.

The U.S. trade with Asia topped \$ 116 billion in 1980, surpassing for the first time the combined value of exports and imports to Europe and it has climbed steadily since. Japan is the U.S.'s second largest trading partner (after Canada). South Korea, Taiwan and some of the Asian countries have the fastest growing economies in the world, their ties with the US rival Washington's relationships with West European allies. The Pacific according to U.S. Senator Gary Hart has become the 20th century's economic foundation of youth.<sup>3</sup>

Moscow's trade with Asian and Pacific neighbours is still small, the region sends less than 4% of its exports to Soviet Union and receives less than 1% of its imports from there . The Soviet Union cannot count on many friends in the Pacific basin, apart from impoverished Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea which consumed \$ 1.6 billion in Soviet military and economic <sup>aid</sup> in 1986. North Korea is strategically valuable but unpredictable partner. The most important part of Gorbachev's message was his announcement of the withdrawal of 6,000 Soviet combat troops from Afghanistan, offered to pull out a considerable number of the 45,000 Soviet soldiers

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3. *ibid*, p.11.

based in Mongolia and dropped a long standing demand that the disputed border along the Amur rest on the Chinese bank rather than at the deepest point of the river. Sino-Soviet trade is expected to grow and both sides are eager to reinforce the commercial links.

Across the sea of Japan, the Gorbachev message was clearly heard. After Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in 1988 Japan sponsored talks on scientific co-operation in exchange for Soviet agreement to permit Japanese citizens, without visas to visit family graves in the northern island territories that the Soviets seized from Japan at the end of World War II. Behind Moscow's outstretched hand lies the desire to acquire Japanese technology - industrial robotics, microprocessors and bio-technology - as well as capital investment to develop gas and oil deposits in the Soviet Far East.

A lack of U.S. sensitivity towards the issues concerning the Pacific states helped set the stage for the arrival of the Soviets among the states of the mid-Pacific. In the fall of 1984, before Kiribati signed its fishing accord with the Soviets the U.S. Government took over negotiations from the American Tunaboat - Association Americans showed little respect for local laws.

U.S. officials fear <sup>that</sup> the Soviets might use their fishing trawlers, some of which carry sophisticated electronics gear to monitor more thoroughly the U.S. missile range at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands.

At the meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Suva (capital of Fiji) representatives called for independence of New Caledonia, an initiative that places the U.S. in a delicate position, on the one hand U.S. wants to gain friends by aligning itself with the forum members, on the other it does not want to antagonize France. The issue is further complicated by Libyan financing and training for the Kanak independence.

At Vladivostok Gorbachev proclaimed that the SU did not wish to strengthen its security at someone's cost but cautioned that the militarized triangle of Washington, Tokyo and Seoul has made the potential for militarization immense in the region<sup>4</sup>.

At the same time Moscow increases its influence by military means. Though most of the Red Banner ships are stationed in the far north clustered in the ports of Vladivostok and Petropavlosk which freeze during the winter, but

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4. *ibid*, p. 15.

Gorbachev's approval for the sale of an estimated 50 MIG - 23s to North Korea in exchange for port and overflight right, Longrange TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft, with the capacity to carry antiship missiles, have raised fear and suspicion in the region, this places the Soviet forces relatively close to the link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific and the tanker Lane for Persian Gulf Oil destined for Asianports.

The U.S. Navy has begun to make strategic adjustments as well eg. improving base facilities on Adak Island, in the Aleutian chain to better monitor and protect transpacific shipping lanes.

One development that could throw U.S. strategic calculations off would be the loss of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in the Phillipines. Aquino's Government has promised to honour the existing lease on the bases until its expiration in 1991.

Moscow is prepared to put in at any port where there is an opportunity to win friends or trade, a shortsighted abdication of interests by the US would make that goal all the more achievable.

Because of the military standoff between the two super powers the US and Soviet Union in the Northern Pacific region, the focus is shifting Southwards along the Western Sea board of the Pacific Ocean. Both super powers have a compulsion to keep possible tensions at as low a level as possible in the Northern Pacific region because this is the one region where any aggravation of tension would directly affect the homeland of both the countries. In the Northern Pacific the super powers cannot manipulate any other power except each other and this places severe restraints on their manoeuvrability. Such restraints do not operate further Southward where their competition and rivalry has greater room.<sup>5</sup>

There are half a dozen factors of vulnerability which should be understood in the security analysis of South Pacific, they may be threatened by great power rivalries, or by territorial claims from more powerful neighbours, be wanted for their strategic value, possess rich resources usually oil or other minerals which are yet to be exploited. They may be reluctant

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5. M. Rasgotra, V.D. Chopra and K.P. Misra, ed., Southern Asia Pacific: A Region in Turbulence (New Delhi, 1988), p.3.

hosts of political refugees or freedom fighters from neighbouring states with stronger military forces as in South East Asia and Papua New Guinea.

But most of all internal factors should receive first priority. Poverty and unemployment among the inhabitants, poorly trained and too few police and armed forces, corruption and suppression of democracy are primary factors and must be dealt with. This will require some hard political decision and Thomas Jefferson's<sup>6</sup> farsighted advice about eternal vigilance is as true as it was two centuries ago.

But for these small states eternal vigilance is a difficult proposition with scarce resources and greater instability fomented in these small states by external powers to reap benefits and seek leverages of various kinds eg. military, economic and political.

After World War II, the US emboldened by its greatly increased economic and military strength declared that its interests spread over the whole globe. It then began to

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6. Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous  
Micro States in a Macro World, (London,  
1985), p. 20



consolidate those interests by expanding its economic influence. US economic interest was focused on Latin America and Canada from the early post war years to the 1950's. In the 1960's Western Europe became the focus of the US economic activities. And since the mid 1970's the US has shifted its emphasis to Asia and Pacific.

The reasons why Pacific has become central to American policy makers are many 1) This is the region which provides raw materials the US must import to feed its booming electronics and aeronautics industry - 2) the relatively stagnant economies of all the Western European countries have speeded up the eastward shift of US economic interests - 3) products of the electronic industry are becoming the main strike force of Japan's foreign trade expansion - 4) while Japan's competitive ability is increasing the competitive position of the United States is becoming weaker and weaker. In recent years the quality and reliability of goods made in the US have declined to such an extent that this fact is recognised not only outside the US but by Americans themselves. A significant plank of American domination over Asia is through technology exports and it is aimed at gaining political leverage through

such exports.

The Militarism of the New Right in the U.S. has emerged because of serious domestic economic and social crisis and the US trying to establish its military leadership over Asia to compensate for the lack of economic leadership.<sup>7</sup>

This dissertation is about the issues that confront the Pacific. Apart from the excitement of conducting business on a day to day basis across immense distances and different cultures there are two over-riding concerns which become clear -

1. the people of Pacific want contact not confrontation with their near and distant neighbours,
2. there is a perception that many of them having rid themselves of European domination and been through the Second World War, the Korean war and the Vietnam war desire that no one power should control their destinies. The greatest fear that the people of the Pacific have is of Western Soviet rivalry.

Many pacific people have suffered the results of atomic weapons something which has not happened to people living

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7. Rakesh Gupta, "The United States of America's Role and Maritime Strategy in Asia-Pacific", in M. Rasgotra and Others, ed., South Asia-Pacific: A Region in Turbulence, (New Delhi, 1988), p.56.

in Europe or North America. The people of Japan are still suffering from the effects of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The women of Marshall islands produce deformed babies as the result of American tests on the Bikini and other islands. The French continue to test nuclear warheads 12 times a year in the South Pacific and as a result have succeeded in uniting the Pacific people against their presence.

Worldwide famine, raging epidemics, collective psychoses, even the spread of AIDS are among the wider speculations that some scientists have confidently announced for the aftermath of nuclear war.<sup>8</sup>

The phenomenon of radio active fall out was not seriously studied until after 1954, when a test explosion unexpectedly contaminated 7,000 square miles of the Marshall islands area of the Pacific with lethal amounts of radio activity. The weapons establishments of the world's nuclear powers were again taken by surprise over the threat that the nuclear weapons pose to the earth's Ozone Layer, the atmospheric shield

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8. Nicholos Wade, A World Beyond Healing: The Prologue and Aftermath of Nuclear War, (London, 1987), p.8.

that protects animals and plants from ultraviolet lights. Scientists studying a proposed supersonic passenger plane noted in 1973, that the Ozone Layer could be depleted by the exhaust gases known as nitrogen oxide only then was it remembered that nuclear weapons produce nitrogen oxide in profusion from the air they explode in and that these gases can ascend to the ozone layer.

Another overlooked nuclear side effect was the phenomenon of nuclear winter.<sup>9</sup> It is no secret that Hiroshima and Nagasaki burned and burning cities create soot which absorbs light and if enough smoke reached high enough in the atmosphere it might linger for months shrouding the earth in a black pall. The likely extent of such a veil is still a matter of keen scientific debate, but an evident possibility is that sunlight would be blotted out of land and crops throughout the Northern Hemisphere chilled and whole harvests would be destroyed. The hypothesis of the nuclear winter effect first suggested in 1983 and popularized in "The Cold and the Dark" by Carl Sagan and Paul Enrlich prompted a resurgence

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9. *ibid*, p.10.

of interest among civilian scientists in the climatic effects of nuclear war. The effects of nuclear war do not make a pleasant reading.

The most feared after effect of nuclear weapons is radio-active fall out, massive doses cause radiation sickness from which victims may take days or weeks to die. Those who survive lesser amounts face an extra risk of cancer in the years ahead. Even the fall out released in a single nuclear reactor accident such as the explosion in April 1986 at the Chernobyl reactor in the Soviet Union can expose hundreds of thousands of people to medically significant amounts of radiation.

Radio active fall out began to be studied seriously only after the test explosion at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific by U.S. in 1954 when an unexpected change of wind carried hazardous levels of radiation over inhabited islands code named Bravo, the device contaminated an area of 700 square miles with lethal amounts of radioactive fallout.<sup>10</sup> People

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10. *ibid*, p.64.

on Rongelap island and Alinginae atoll down wind of Bikini were evacuated after two days by which time some 267 had received heavy doses of upto 175 rad\*, more than one third of the lethal dose. The uninhabited northern tip of Rongelap 100 miles downwind of the explosion received 3,300 rads in the four days following the test. Some of the Marshall islanders suffered delayed effects such as thyroid abnormalities that started to appear 9 years after the blast. Global fallout is considerably less harmful than local fallout because it is far more dispersed and has longer to decay.

The survivors of a nuclear explosion would suffer from immediate and long term casualties. 3 kinds of immediate injury are - 1) wounds from the blast burns, ensuing fires and superfires and radiation sickness 2) medical facilities are certain to be overwhelmed by the number of wounded 3) food and water contamination.

The shockwaves from a nuclear explosion can damage the human body in a number of ways - the primary effect of the

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\* Rad is a unit used to measure ionizing radiation absorbed by the body.

blast wave is its sudden compression of the human body, it squeezes in the walls of the chest and stomach, so sharply that the inner organs have no time to adjust. In organs such as brain and heart for which an uninterrupted supply of oxygen is essential these blockages can be rapidly fatal and death can occur within few minutes. The thermal pulse of a nuclear weapon causes direct injury known as flash burns. Many at Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered from flash blindness in which useful vision<sup>was</sup> lost<sub>^</sub> for upto a few minutes and then returned. The most serious problem would be food, epidemics would be particularly serious if the immunological state of the population was depressed. I have treated the problem of radio activity due to increasing militarization of the Pacific which raises a psychological threat to the inhabitants of this area.

At the end of the 20th century the focus of world attention is shifting to the pacific. The reason why pacific has become of great concern to both the superpowers thus increasing their activity are basically three fold-

1. The growth of cross pacific trade between the US and East Asia means that the Pacific is now more important commercially than the Atlantic to the US.

2. The dynamism of the economies of Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore and South Korea means that the region is becoming the hub of world trade.
3. The growing military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States is causing concern that a regional arms race is underway.<sup>11</sup>

Not all European economies are falling behind as fast as that of the UK, but the trend generally is towards a relegated European position in the world economic league, behind Japan, the US and the newly industrialized countries of South East Asia.

It would be more accurate to argue that the current US preoccupation with the Pacific reflects a growing belief that the main threat to its status as a superpower comes not from the Soviet Union but Japan.<sup>12</sup>

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11. Rosnitha Voigtlaender, "Importance of the Asian-Pacific Region in the Struggle for Peace" in M. Rasgotra and Others, ed., Southern Asia Pacific: A Region in Turbulence (New Delhi, 1988), p.48.
  12. Henry Trofinenko, "Long Term Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Soviet Evaluation", Asian Survey (California), Vol. XXIX, No.3, (March 1989), p.242.



The main weight in the balance of power in the region will be economic and political and not military factors despite the dominance of the latter.

The economic factors will make themselves felt in the form of the economic, scientific and technological potential of nations, first and foremost in those aspects that can be utilized as instruments of regional and in the final analysis global influence in an increasingly interdependent international system. There is an increased confrontation between the US and Soviet Union occurring on a far greater scale, this is because of the build up of the Soviet Pacific fleet and the enlargement of the American 3rd and 7th fleet in the Pacific and the deployment by both countries of more short and intermediate range nuclear weapons system in the Pacific theatre.<sup>13</sup>

The US defence planning has been dominated both by the budget deficit which has led to a \$ 33 billion reduction (to \$299.5 Bn.) in the defence budget authority from the administration's request for financial year 1989-90 and by arms control negotiations, within the successful

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13. *ibid*, p. 244.

ratification of the INF treaty and good progress in START talks.<sup>14</sup>

US military operations in the Pacific consist of 2 Navy fleets 3rd (Pacific) <sup>and</sup> 7th (West Pacific).<sup>15</sup>

In both the Korean war and war in Vietnam, United States forces made use of bases in the Pacific. The American C-in-C Pacific is based in Honolulu, Hawaii, in the North West Pacific. The United States has other island bases and staging posts in the Pacific including Guam (Naval and Air Bases) the Marshall Islands (a missile range) the Northern Marianas, American Samoa and Johnston Island. It also has three important bases in Australia and New Zealand under the terms of the ANZUS Treaty and in Fiji under a recently concluded agreement.<sup>16</sup>

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14. The Military Balance 1988-1989  
(International Institute For  
Strategic Studies, London), p.13.

15. *ibid*, p. 20.

16. Harden, n. 6, pp.176-177.

US Pacific Fleet's - Third Fleet headquarters - is at Pearl Harbour which covers Eastern and Central Pacific, Aleutians Bering Sea.

Seventh Fleet - Headquarters at YOKOSUKA (Japan) covers, Western Pacific, Japan, Phillipines, ANZUS responsibilities and Indian Ocean.<sup>17</sup>

The Soviet defence forces face the consequences of Glasnost, Perestroika and the implications of arms agreement. They may also increasingly come to be affected by the New Thinking and associated concepts of reasonable sufficiency, which have been asserted, but have not had any discernible impact on force sizes and structures. Modernization of all elements of strategic nuclear force continues and the number of ICMS<sup>3</sup> have hardly changed.<sup>18</sup>

Trade and militarisation are inextricably linked in the Pacific, while the Pacific offers so many commercial opportunities and poses such a commercial threat to the US, this shift is unavoidable and cannot be reversed unless

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17. The Military Balance 1988-1989, n. 14, p.23.

18. *ibid*, p. 30.

Europe manages to regain the initiative in innovation, design and production of manufactured goods and services at some time in the future.

There is another reason why the US is seen to be more concerned with Pacific than with Europe. The Central front in Europe has reached a stalemate, peace movements have highlighted the levels of nuclear weapons in the region (Europe) and there is little room for the expansion of US force levels. The Pacific offers opportunities for containment of the Soviet Union, for new military advances and the deployment of new weapons system for the US.

In Europe the ground launched version revived the peace movements of Britain and Italy but in the Pacific while there is a vociferous campaign against all nuclear weapons particularly in Japan, Australia, New Zealand and many small Pacific islands the Tomahawk Sea launched cruise missile has been deployed at sea aboard and has encountered far less opposition.

American military policy in the Pacific is based on forward deployment and strategic denial. The US has mutual security treaties in the Pacific with Japan, South Korea,

the Phillipines, Thailand, Australia and until the United States abrogated themselves New Zealand. This is the US declaratory policy. There are other aspects of her security policy in the Pacific which receive less publicity. These include the maintenance of missile and SDI testing facilities on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshal Islands. In the event of war between the US and the Soviet Union, American policy also includes the mining with Japan of the Straits that lead from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific. American policy also aims to deploy enough force in the Pacific to be able to conduct a two front war in both Europe and the Pacific against the Soviet Union.

A specific threat to regional security of the Pacific is posed by the naval aspect of the arms race, dominating here due both to a certain degree of autonomy of a naval force in making decisions and to the diversified use of nuclear weapons by navies.<sup>19</sup>

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19. Mikhail G. Nossov, "The USSR and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region From Vladivostok to Krasnoyarsk", Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, No.3 (March 1989), p.254.

It is a common knowledge that the Military - Industrial complex in the USA is run by leading arms manufacturers, influential military figures and influential politicians who have a vested interest in escalating the arms race. It is also no secret that the military-industrial complex in the US has close links with the ruling circle, every aggressive move made by the white House brings a roaring sum of profit to the Military Industrial complex.<sup>20</sup> All along the USA's nuclear build up, the single most justification given has been, the Soviet threat. In the 1950's it was the "Tank Gap". In the 1960's it was the "bomber gap," in the seventies Americans talked about the naval gap. The latest American rumpus is over gap in operational tactical missiles. The two decades between Kennedy and Reagan have witnessed increased deployment of nuclear weapon. "The massive retaliation strategy" was replaced by the "flexible response doctrine" which calls for more sophisticated and clever ways for using the nuclear potential.<sup>21</sup>

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20. Udai Narain, Reagan's Nuclear Terrorism (New Delhi, 1984) p.11.

21. *ibid*, p. 9.

In order to shift the burden of the economic and monetary crisis on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the advanced countries are drawing the third world countries into an ever expanding arms race. The call given about a quarter of the century ago by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein in a manifesto against nuclear threat was "All equally are in peril and if the peril is understood there is hope that they may collectively avert it!"<sup>22</sup>

At the end of 1980's there are two issues which have alienated many pacific people from the U.S. The first is the nuclear issue where apart from the U.S.'s own disecration of various islands for nuclear testing, the American support for French testing in violation of the South Pacific Forum's Nuclear free zone\* (quickly dubbed SPNFZ as "Spinfizz") has led many people to believe that the great powers do not care about pacific regional concerns.

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22. *ibid*, p. 49.

\* Member nations are : Australia, Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia (observer), Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

The other issue which has not only alienated people from the U.S. but turned them towards the Soviet Union is fish. To the people of the Pacific islands fish is the most important harvest producing food and export. The American Tunaboat Association making use of the fact that the U.S. has not signed the 200 mile fishing rights exclusion zone under the Law of the Sea Convention has been fishing indiscriminately offering little compensation to local islanders. The Soviet Union has offered substantial amounts of money in return for fishing rights and port facilities. The U.S. has realized that testing fleets now would mean military bases later. This is an area of growing competition between the two super powers.

The amounts of compensation for fishing rights offered by Soviet Union are large to the islanders but small in the context of the Soviet economy, but the strategic significance of such deals has been one of the things which has forced the U.S. to rethink its Pacific policies. Rethinking has so far amounted to increasing the level and sophistication of armaments in the region and seeking similar fishing deals with islanders.



Because of American technical and logistical superiority at the sea the Soviet Union is always on the defensive.

The emerging territories of the South Pacific, which are rapidly progressing with great potentialities are areas originally belonging to U.S. Trust territories known as the U.S. Trust territory of the Pacific Island (TTPI). It consisted of four groups of separate islands<sup>23</sup>

1. Northern Marianas.
2. Federated States of Micronesia.
3. Republic of Marshall Island which broke off in 1970 from the federated States of Micronesia.
4. Republic of Palau.

The entire area came under the control of the U.S. after the Japanese defeat in the Second World War.

In the Pacific, Guam was administered from Hawaii (Honolulu) the fiftieth State of America. The U.S. defence strategy analyst considered Guam of importance as an American Naval base, for it was from here that the Vietnam operations were fed and directed not only this, with the American withdrawl

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23. Bhagwan Singh, "New Trends in the Pacific" in K.P. Misra, M. Rasgotra and V.D. Chopra, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: Perceptions and Strategies (New Delhi, 1988) p.123.

from Vietnam, this American territory became the biggest naval concentration in Asia and the Pacific. This together with the Clark Air Base in the Phillipines almost completes the American circle around the Pacific.<sup>24</sup>

Hawaii's strategical equation at the other end of the Pacific had to be taken note of while having an overall view of political trends in South Pacific. Down below the line ethnically Polenesian Samoa got carved out into the territory of American Samoa which is also an unincorporated territory of USA. Samoa has its considerable strategic and potential importance. It has one of the best natural deep sea harbours at Pago Pago. Its naval importance is that it enables to encircle South Pacific from all direction.

In the Marshall islands, Kwajalein island has been taken over for a complete nuclear base, the small bubble of the local population having been transferred away. They are waiting for compensation due to nuclear after effects, cases of compensation claims are still being settled in terms of

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24. *ibid*, p. 124.

the "compact Treaty of Free Association". The U.S. administration has negotiated this compact treaty with Marshall, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia. Free association with the USA covers for limited purposes, independence to some extent in return for complete defence rights.<sup>25</sup>

Northern Marianas have opted for common wealth status with the USA. All these territories are now members of the South Pacific Forum. Thus US in recognition has stationed a Resident Ambassador to these island groups. Australia has similarly posted an Ambassador plenipotentiary. This provides the semblance of sovereignty to island states. The attitude of the New Zealand government has been slightly at variance. New Zealand equates these countries with Cook Islands with whom it has substantial political and administrative adjustments.

The South Pacific is emerging out of its splendid isolation. As technology shrinks distance and time so are the affairs of each pacific country made ever more inter involved.

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25. *ibid*, p. 125.

The U S's most important Pacific alliances are with Japan and Australia. In Japan's case this includes 120 American military facilities and 45,000 American troops and in Australia's case the close military cooperation between the two countries is expressed in three major American facilities which between them contribute to American early warning systems, intelligence gathering and submarine communications.

Various mechanisms have been set up to achieve closer integration of trade within the region which refers to a Pacific basin community.

Question is can the non nuclear countries like New Zealand, Australia and Japan show a lead in providing regional stability through mutual security agreements or will the Pacific become as heavily armed and tense as Central Europe.

Land rights, nuclear issue and commercial exploitation are uniting some countries in opposition to the military and political alliances that the US would like to establish. The Pacific era could prove to be either a dramatic success or a military disaster.

The American ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, in 1986 said in reference to the threat to total American domination of the Pacific, whose attitude is that "we can still take care of ourselves in the Pacific". While the US may be able to take care of itself, the rim countries and the islanders are concerned about the buildup of tension between the two super powers particularly the tit for tat increases in nuclear hardware.<sup>26</sup>

After the 1986 Reykjavik meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev at which a breakthrough was nearly reached in arms limitation, Pacific leaders such as P.M. Nakasone of Japan, sought reassurance from Reagan that decreases in nuclear weapons would not lead to increase the East Asia.

The American Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger outlined the US's five priorities in the Pacific (apart from the basic strategy of remaining a Pacific power) in 1985 -

- i) security relationship with Japan,
- ii) preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula
- iii) building an enduring relationship

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26. Malcolm McIntosh, Arms Across the Pacific: Security and Trade Issues Across the Pacific (London, 1987), p.41.

with PRC, iv) support for political and economic viability of ASEAN, v) continuing the long standing partnership with Australia and New Zealand.<sup>27</sup>

Areas of specific concern in East Asia for the US include Vietnam, Thailand, the Phillipines and the South Pacific. The swing strategy of the 1970's whereby the American forces would swing from the Pacific to the Atlantic in times of crisis has been abandoned in favour of a two front war policy. Proof of the success of American economic and military policies in the Pacific is to be found in the inability of the Soviet Union to penetrate the region, only 7% of their exports go to this region and 12% of their imports come from the Pacific.

The U.S. Pacific Commands, stretches from the west coast of the U.S. into the Indian Ocean. The most important stretches of water within the enormous area are the straits which connect the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, particularly the straits of Malacca through which 90% of Japan's oil travels.

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27. *ibid*, p.42.

There are some 167 American bases in the Pacific including Atolls and islands with primary functions to act as listening centres and staging posts. The main threat to the Pacific countries comes not from regional conflicts but global confrontation between the two super powers.

PACOM (The Pacific Command) operates through CINCPAC (The commander-in-chief at the Pacific airforce) while the army is commanded by (the Western army command) in Korea by COMUSK. In order to maintain these forces in a state of readiness, the U.S. holds upto 90 exercises a year with her allies to lay the groundwork for increased cooperation with the U.S. forces in the event of general hostilities. The largest of these is the annual team spirit exercise when 30,000 American marines are airlifted into South-Korea to stimulate the American response if North Korea should invade the South. Exercises at sea include RIMPAC (which now involves Japan's maritime self defence force, Britain's Royal Navy, Canada, Australia and the U.S.). Other exercises at sea are designed to put pressure on the Soviet Union to stay at port.

According to George Shultz partnership with Japan, is the keystone of American foreign policy in East-Asia and the

foundation on which Pacific cooperation and dynamism are based. It has been a success so far in American eyes but Japan needs to spend more to help the U.S. in her self-appointed role as the world's policeman. Weinberger's Assistant Secretary Richard Perle has called on Japan to aid security on a global basis by funding poorer members of the NATO Alliance to ensure Japan's continued supply of Middle East oil. Japan provides home porting facilities for the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Midway at YOKOSUKA. The Midway is part of the two carrier Seventh Fleet which operates out of YOKOSUKA and SUBIC bay in the Phillipines. The seventh fleet is a part of the Pacific fleet which has 6 aircraft carriers, over 120 surface vessels and 45 submarines, 4 of which are strategic nuclear submarines.

In Japan there are 19 American intelligence gathering posts, Okinawa the southern most island in the Japanese chain is home to over 21,000 marines and army units as part of the Rapid deployment force. The U.S. fifth air force is based in Japan, headquartered at Yokota with bases at Kadena in Okinawa and Misawa in the north of the main Japanese island of Honshu. Kadena is the largest US Pacific Air Force base and is used



by F-16's, F-15's, RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft, SR-71 Blackbird sky aircraft, RC-135's AWAC's for airborne warning and control.<sup>28</sup> Interoperability is vital if the U.S. is to be relieved of some of the duties in the area in the times of crisis. By bringing Japanese forces upto a strength under American control the U.S. can deploy forces, men, ships and aircraft to other parts of the Pacific leaving Japan to play the regional role vacated by the U.S.

The American desire to involve Japan in any regional conflict in the North West Pacific and the plans for Japan to free American forces for the middle east deployment means that Japans military role has global significance.

As has been noted the U.S. admits to bring in Japan not just for Japan's security but also for her own. While the security perceptions of the Pacific are on Japan's doorstep's for the U.S. the same problems are on the other side of the ocean. In 1986 the ceiling of 1% was officially breached although it was always a nominal or political figure. Whatever the discussion over what the actual Japanese defence spending figure is, actually the breaking up of 1% limit will be seen as significant both inside and outside Japan. The U.S. is pleased that her ally is making moves to stop a free

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28. *ibid*,

ride on American defence spending, there will be those European's who see Japan as part of the Pacific NATO and hope that Japanese arms purchases come their way, whereas her near neighbours particularly the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the Pacific states will see it as a threat. Given that there are limits to the amount that Japan can spend on rearmament under her constitution the American suggested that Japan might like to subsidize poorer members of the NATO.

American creditors in Tokyo and Bonn who has steadfastly backed the dollar stability up through the election, issued stern warnings about the need for action on the \$ 150 billion U.S. budget deficit along with its congratulations to the President Bush who has inherited huge trade imbalances.<sup>29</sup>

Almost certainly the next four years will see a shift in the geographical focus of U.S. foreign policy, as Japan's enormous holdings of American debt and equity securities will give it a substantial if indeterminate influence over U.S. economic policies, in the few years any understanding between Japan or the lack thereof will shape prospects for

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29. Jerry W. Sanders, "America In the Pacific Century: Burden sharing or Economic Entente" World Policy Journal (New York), Vol. VI, No.1 (Winter 1988-89), p.47.

the Pacific century. Whether the new administration will measure upto these critical challenges is the key question. Much will depend upon their willingness to forsake the path of militarization trod in the Reagan era.

The legacy left behind by the pursuit of hegemony are the costs in swollen budgets and misplaced priorities and the consequences of neglect to the economic and social fabric. This will have a way of concentrating the minds of the next several administrators, to the new realities they will face in an era dominated less by geopolitics than by geoeconomics. The adoption of star wars plan has intensified militaristic trends in the policy of U.S. and encroached upon the economic interests of the developing countries. One can trace a connection between the developing nations' total debt of 1,000 billion dollars and the growth of U.S. military spendings in the past ten years. The star wars programme affects the developing nations directly. As the U.S. develops new weapons, more and more conventional weapons will be forced on newly liberated countries, speeding up the arms race in the third world and increasing its debt, especially dangerous is the chemical weapons including binary weapons and other weapons of mass annihilation <sup>which</sup> may be soon regarded as obsolete

and dumped in the third world.<sup>30</sup> If this happens the developing countries will be paying for much of the SDI programme besides being constantly exposed to the risk of being attacked from the space.

The experience of mass murder, torture and oppression is what Hannah Arendt called 'this terrible century' has made the U.S. and the international community increasingly conscious of the fundamental human rights throughout the world. The subject is of international agenda. The gross violation of human rights in the developing countries is a result of unequal distribution of economic resources and international division of labour.<sup>31</sup>

While we may not know exactly what the limits are of living beyond our means, surely even for a person said to inhabit a shining city on the hill as Ronald Reagan would say an international debt approaching \$ 600 billion with

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30. Vladimir Belous, Star Wars or Star Peace (Ahmedabad, 1988), pp.68-70.

31. See United States Foreign Policy and Human Resources Principles, Priorities, Practices: A Report of National Policy Panel of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. (December, 1979).

accompanying interest payment of \$ 40-50 billion a year is pushing that nations luck. This means, that the new administration will have to make bold departures from the past practices, before the option of policy choices is forfeited to the international financial market. To escape a future of economic decline and enforced austerity, the U.S. will have to rethink its role in the world of 1990's. For one thing it no longer serves as a guaranteed consumer market for export led economies, neither can it afford to ring the world with military bases and forces.

Bush's pronouncement on U.S.-Japanese relations are fanciful, as he promises to push the Japanese to open their markets, even as he looks forward to working with the Japanese in a new form of partnership, with the U.S. continuing to play the predominant military role and with the Japanese becoming a major donor of aid to the third world. In other words the U.S. would continue to exercise undiminished leadership while Japan would remain content in its role as a junior partner, even as its share of costs increased dramatically. But to believe this is possible is to ignore the considerable resentment voiced in Japan against bearing an increasing burden of responsibility without a comparable shift of power

structure and status.<sup>32</sup>

In anticipation of an uncertain environment, Henry Kissenger (who served as a senior advisor to Bush during election campaign) had written that the U.S. must prepare itself for a time when it will continue to play a pivot role as balancing military role, but without the benefits of reliable friends and steady allies. Musing on the state of world affairs in 1990's, he predicts a period of unstable and multisided competition with no third road available.<sup>33</sup>

Ideology has ceased to be a major cause of war and peaceful co-existence is recognized as an imperative of our times.

Having built up arsenals exceeding 50,000 nuclear warheads, the two foremost military powers have now jointly declared repeatedly at Geneva in 1985, at Reykyávik in 1986, Washington 1987 and Moscow 1988, Malta 1989 and Washington summit last month (May, 1990) that a nuclear war is not winnable and must not be fought. Nuclear deterrence is consequently losing its credibility among nations which are heavily armed with nuclear weapons.

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32. Jerry W. Sanders, n. 29, p. 49.

33. *ibid*, p. 50.

In today's world, war as an instrument of policy is unthinkable, even in the absence of nuclear weapons. There is a time lag in the military and political establishments of the industrialized nations, realizing that the density of industrialization, the extensive use of synthetic materials in clothes, buildings and articles of day to day use, atomic power plant and so on will make even an ordinary war with conventional explosives result in hundreds of Chernobyls and thousands of Bhopals engulfing continents besides the adverse impact on climate (whether it will result in a nuclear winter of the proportion predicted by Carl Sagan or not is beside the point). These have made even a conventional war nonviable as an instrument of policy among industrialized nations.

The history of the last four decades highlights that while it is feasible to occupy a nation at moderate cost it is extremely costly to keep a nation under occupation because of the rise in political consciousness of the people all over the world. Very significant changes are taking place in international balance of power. The U.S. has steadily been losing its hegemony but not to the Soviet Union alone. While militarily the USSR is the primary counter-vailing power, technologically

and commercially the U.S. is challenged by Germany and Japan and agriculturally by the EEC, Canada, Australia, Argentina etc. In 1992 Western Europe is planning to get integrated, with abolition of all tariff barriers and the Western Europeans are thinking independently of their own space programme, nuclear modernization, aircraft, naval and other modernization. The Soviet Union is attempting to implement Perestroika and China an economic and military modernization programme. Though in nuclear age no one anticipates wars between U.S. and its commercial and technological competitors there are likely to be conflict of interest. In the decades ahead a key question affecting the strategic balance will be whether Japan exercises its option to become a major military power, even if it does not, it may be influencing the strategic environment simply by its investment decisions. While it is difficult to forecast the kind of strategic balance that would emerge, it is obvious that the world order would no longer be dominated by a hegemonic U.S. or by U.S. - USSR rivalry. A world order with five centres of power will be a far more complex one, than the bipolar framework which has been the basis of much of strategic analysis in the last four decades.



Apart from these five power centres there are also likely to be a number of middle range powers who would act independently and whose manoeuvrability in the international systems would be considerably enhanced because of the existence of five power centres.

The increase in American and Japanese armed forces in the Pacific are according to the government of these two countries due entirely to the growing military threat from Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is seen as mounting a broad offensive in the Pacific, militarily, commercially and diplomatically.<sup>34</sup>

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Although historically the Russian, and later the Soviet navy, confined its Pacific sphere of operations to a fairly restricted area of the North Pacific, this is no longer a case. There has been a significant expansion of Soviet maritime power in the last five years. This includes the development of Soviet East Asia, the extension of her fishing activities and increase in the size and scope of her Pacific fleet. The number of Soviet bases in the Pacific region has increased. According to Sheila Harden a new Soviet base

is under construction on Can San Island in the South China Seas and an army corps headquarter has been built in the Kurile Island. Soviet naval exercises in the Pacific are becoming more frequent and they also operate, though less frequently, in the South Pacific and have occasionally been detected in the Tasman Sea.<sup>35</sup>

Distance of Fiji from Australia is 2600 kms., from Japan 7200 kms., and from U.S. it is 9600 kms, and with Soviet Union's bases in Kurile Islands and U.S.-Japanese alliance which are so close to the South Pacific any straining of relations between United States and Soviet Union could prove disastrous to the countries of the South Pacific who are still at the initial stage of their development.<sup>36</sup>

Gorbachev in his speech said 'We are convinced that the protracted feverish state of international relations harbours the threat of a sudden and fatal crisis. We must take practical steps away <sup>from</sup> the nuclear abyss. We need joint Soviet

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35. Sheila Harden, ed., n. 6, p. 144.

36. *ibid*, p. 199.

American efforts, efforts on the part of entire international community in order to improve relations.<sup>37</sup>

However, only future will unfold how cooperative the world order will be. And whatever the course of action whether confrontational or co-operative between the super-powers the South Pacific will be the one region to directly bear its share in such a world order whether for good or for the worse.

The Soviet policy since the 1970s has been to increase her pacific fleet with both surface vessels and with ballistic nuclear submarines and to deploy IRBM's targetted on Japanese, Chinese and American facilities in the North-West Pacific.

The Soviet Union is anxious to develop its Asian territories including the area adjacent to the Pacific. This is a policy which has been taking shape since the late 1970's but is only possible with the completion of the Baikal - Amur Railway which supplements the Trans Siberian Railway from Europe to the Pacific and the increased volume of Soviet

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37. M.S. Gorbachev, Speeches and Writings (Great Britain, 1987) Vol. 2, p. 54.

Shipping from the Black Sea to Vladivostok . . This shipping travels via the Straits of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia a choke point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans which is assuming a great strategic importance.

Japan's role in any future American war fighting scenario is to blockade the exits from the sea of Japan to the Pacific for any Soviet ship or submarine which leaves Vladivostok or the sea of Okhotsk.

What is feared in the Pacific is the increased number of Soviet survey vessels operations, it is likely that they are engaged in assessing the mineral potential of the ocean bottom. Many of the survey vessels are operating in areas where the Soviet Union already has or would like to have fishing rights. Many trawlers are electronic listening posts fishing for information rather than tuna.

The Soviet military newspaper Red Star talked in August 1980 of 'Nests of aggression in the Pacific Ocean Zone! The Soviet Union wants to be not just a Pacific State but a Pacific Power.'<sup>38</sup>

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38. Malcolm McIntosh, n. 26, p.65.

Different sources given varying figures for the number of submarines in the Soviet Pacific Fleet, ranging from a total of 127 of which 31 carry submarines launched ballistic missiles, to 77 submarines of which 25 carry SLBM's. Other nuclear forces includes 17 ISS-20's with a range of 3,000 miles able to hit targets in China, Japan and most of South East Asia. The main base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet is at Vladivostok, with other major bases at Soviet Skaya-Gavan, Magadan and at Petropavlovsk the main base for submarines.

Japan is the only country not to have signed a post Second World War peace treaty with the Soviet Union. The reason for this is entirely to do with the unresolved question of the Kuril Islands between Sakhalin and Hokkaido.

Under the 1945 Treaty of Yalta, the Kuriles were given to the Soviet Union by the U.S. and the U.K., in return for entering the war against Japan which the Soviet Union did only to be stopped from invading Hokkaido by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with the U.S., Japan renounced all rights to the Islands. However, since the mid 1950's

Japan has claimed the islands of Etorafu, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Habomai group. Her claims have been supported by U.S. even though it was U.S. that instigated the original treaties.

There is a good reason for why the Soviet Union wants to hang onto the islands and why the U.S. is supportive of Japan. The Soya Street between Sakhalin and Hokkaido about 9 miles wide, is the nearest exit from the sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean for the Soviet Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok. The islands in question allow the Soviet Union greater control over the narrow straits and giving them up would be strategically difficult.

Trade and investment in the Soviet Union by Japan has been hampered by two factors 1) Japanese have been forced to receive payments in the form of raw material supplies because of the Soviet lack of foreign hard currency ii) American pressure on Japan and China has prevented the sort of close trade links that both sides have wanted.

In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev said that Japan has turned into a country of first rank importance which means that Japan is a power in her <sup>own</sup> right which must be dealt with not merely as an adjunct of American foreign policy.

Soviet Union sees the increases in the Chinese submarine fleet as another threat to her ability to leave the sea of Japan and enter the Pacific ocean. Chinese purchases of arms from the U.S. have included anti-submarine warfare equipment, antiship missiles and the anti aircraft weapons to be fitted to destroyers operating in the China Sea.

The U.S., knows that in any global conflict the Chinese could keep the S.U. occupied on their common border. In peacetime the Chinese forces keep Soviet resources tied up and fulfil part of the U.S. policy of debilitating the Soviet Union by diverting resources from domestic developments to the arms production.

The Soviet Union is pushing ahead with moves to improve relations with China. These moves includes troops withdrawls from both Afghanistan and Mongolia, the suggestion of joint Space exploration and the hint of encouraging Vietnam to allow Kampuchea self determination, the mutually supplementary natures of the Soviet and Chinese economies offer appreciable opportunities for broadening these relations including in frontier areas.

It is noted that the Soviet Union because of its lack of overseas bases the need to maintain patrols a great distance from home posts and the consequent necessity to conserve fuel often move ships to deep waters buoys in the Indian Ocean for long periods of time.<sup>39</sup> Militarization in the Pacific enhances security threats to countries bordering Indian Ocean. It is the fishing issue which is central to the militarization of the Pacific because it is through fish that the Pacific is being turned into an area of super power confrontation.

Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech provides an important clue to how the new leadership in Soviet Union looks at the present strategic map of Asia-Pacific region and how it plans to change this map in the coming years and decades. Two factors add significance to this statement - i) it is fairly comprehensive as compared to earlier Soviet statements on similar subjects like the Brezhnev proposal for collective security in Asia put forth in June, 1969 ii) Since the announcement made at Vladivostok the Soviet Union has pursued the implementation of the new proposal far more vigorously than any of his

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39. Malcolm McIntosh, n. 26, p.71.



previous initiatives. The comprehensiveness of the Gorbachov proposal is such that it will have far reaching implications for the countries of the Asia Pacific. In the official statement of 23rd April, 1986, the Pacific component was prominently projected. The statement also underlined the Soviet desire for close cooperative relations with China, Japan and other Asia Pacific countries particularly because the Soviet Union was developing its Siberian and far eastern regions having long common borders with these Asia Pacific countries, it was also alleged that the US through the establishment of a supposedly economic Pacific community was trying to integrate Micronesia, Japan, the Phillipines and Australia into its star war programme since tracking and guidance stations for the space track system were build in these countries.<sup>40</sup>

To accelerate the economic development of Siberia and the maritime provinces of the country, in accordance with the Long Term State Program of economic Development of the

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40. See India and Gorbachev's Asia Pacific Security Proposal, Occasional Papers No.1 (Swedish Institute of International Affairs), 1987.

Soviet Far east until the year 2000 capital investment into the region will be 2.4 times greater than for the previous 15 years, the opening of special territorial zones for joint ventures is being considered. As has been underscored by President Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, the Soviet authorities are ready to take practical steps to implement the ideas and schemes for tripartite economic activities in the region involving Soviet, Chinese and Japanese firms or enterprises.<sup>41</sup> Such moves make it difficult to envisage US reactions.

To the politics of bloc building and division of the region into closed economic groupings, the Soviet Unions contrapositions, clear alternatives, great dynamism for bilateral and unilateral relations and development of as widespread economic cooperation as is possible is a welcome change. Economic relations with PRC could be used more widely for the development of the Far East including the use of

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41. Henry Trofimenko, "Long Term Trends in the Asia Pacific Region", Asian Survey (California), Vol. XXIX, No. 3, (March 1989), p. 249.

Chinese experience and assistance in organizing special economic zones.

One can clearly see three powerful impulses behind entire Gorbachev's approach - 1) the proposal has an east-west context particularly in relation to the Pacific Region. One has to state that militarization and escalation of threat of war in this part of the world are picking up dangerous speed. Having thus identified its concern the Soviet proposal warns that in the opinion of the Soviet Union if no curb is put on such a course of development, in the events in an area where the interests of many states in the world converge, can lead to serious aggravation of tension in the Asia Pacific Region. The fact that Soviet Union is really apprehensive of the Western moves and would not let them go unchallenged is clearly evident in the Parallel Soviet moves made to establish close contacts with the South Pacific islands. The newly established (December, 1986) South Pacific Forum popularly known as Rarotonga Treaty invited prompt Soviet support for its opposition to the movement of nuclear weapons in the region. It may not be out of place to mention here that the Soviet assertion for recognition as a major actor in the

Asia Pacific affairs has come at a time when a small but significant shift in the central balances of power between the two superpowers has taken place in favour of the Soviet Union. (2) impulse behind the Soviet proposal seems to be the concern for rapid economic development of the Soviet Union so as to meet the growing demand of the Soviet people as taking care of occasional economic slumps experienced in the Soviet Union. Peace for Soviet Union means more than the ending of hostilities and the reduction of tensions. It means extensive economic cooperation. (3) impulse behind the Pacific security proposal seems to be a strong desire to undo or atleast diffuse the isolation of the Soviet Union, by doing so the Soviet leadership wants to wrest a diplomatic initiative which was lost by its predecessors to the great disadvantage of the Soviet interests and diplomacy in the third world, the Gorbachev proposal made a suggestion for holding a Helsinki type conference for the Asia Pacific countries as a part of a mutual confidence building process.<sup>42</sup>

It is possible that with the stabilisation of the Euro-Atlantic scene there could be a further heightening of great power rivalry and tension in the east.

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42. Eduardo Faleiro and Others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: Current Trends (New Delhi, 1987) p.10.

In the overall view, the Gorbachev initiative is based on the assumption that the world is one integrated whole and it is no longer possible to view its problems of war and peace piecemeal, region by region or country by country. A situation in which reduction of nuclear arms in Europe is followed by heightened confrontation and an accelerated rate of nuclear arms in the Asia Pacific region would not be conducive to a greater sense of security and peace in the world. For this reason, Gorbachev's recent initiatives are to be welcomed regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with one or another of their details.<sup>43</sup>

The INF treaty has both its share of critics and Kudos, for it is the first step towards a genuine nuclear disarmament. However, the main stumbling blocks are two - firstly how to limit strategic defences in space and second, to limit long range sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) both have a significance in the Asia Pacific Region.<sup>44</sup> The central reality

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43. C. Raja Mohan, "India's Strategic Environment in the 1990s" Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. 1, April 1990, p. 24.

44. D. Banerjee, "Nuclear Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XII, No. VIII, November 1989, p.803.

is that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons can hope to provide strategic stability and measure of genuine security we are yet to fully comprehend and much less clarify the concept of comprehensive global security and much work needs to be done in this regard.

While summarizing this chapter two points draw our attention. The world can continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously towards a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both.

Irrespective of economic and social systems, irrespective of levels of economic development there is a mutual and enlightened self-interest among all countries in effective disarmament. The economy could become a factor for disarmament. The other reason for hope is the sharp public awakening of the tremendous risks that this generation and coming generations run if we allow the leaders of the world to continue their present course.<sup>45</sup>

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45. William Epstein and Lucy Webster, ed., We can avert a Nuclear war (Cambridge, 1983) p. 30.

For the humanity the issue has changed from being of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority into being an issue of survival. And this concern is all the more for the People of South Pacific which have been drawn into the US - Soviet sphere of influence and activity greatly jeopardising their security and survival.

## Chapter IV

### The Role of Other Powers and Institutions

The United States and the Soviet Union's activity in the Pacific by itself does not complete the power configuration of the region. In a multi-polar world the international scenario is much more complex. Western Europe, Japan and regional actors, eg., Australia and New Zealand are as much operative and in competition with each other as United States and Soviet Union. The South Pacific regions' profile would be incomplete and also erroneous without devoting attention to their role in contributing either to stability or insecurity. To neglect their significance would hinder understanding the security problems of these micro states and would also present an incomplete picture.

The present situation in the world shows positive developments that legitimately evokes hope. We are all gratified that the level of mutual understanding between the great powers is far more higher today than at any time in the past. It is very important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that this is a mere beginning of a process. Though it is a time of hope, it is



nonetheless not a time for complacency. Moreover, the current visible improvement in international relations is by no means all encompassing or universal for we must all agree that despite positive developments in international politics progress towards tackling the enormous economic problems faced by the overwhelming segment of international community, most specifically the developing world has been minimal at best or in fact sadly not existent at worst.<sup>1</sup>

The intense American - Soviet confrontation which has poisoned the world security environment appears to have passed its peak. The inescapable "compulsions to coexist" have asserted itself, and the two nuclear giants are once again groping for a viable modus vivendi.

A recently as 1985-86, it appeared that the "ice-age" that had descended upon the American - Soviet relations was here to stay. It appeared impossible to bridge the divergent Soviet and American positions on

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1. Enrique Tejera Paris, "Multipolar World", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XI, No. 944-945, (August, 1989), p.5.

nuclear and space arms limitation and on a variety of other vexing issues, including regional conflict. But developments in 1987, dramatically transformed the gloom of the mid-1980's into one of hope and optimism.<sup>2</sup>

But hope and optimism is much more manifest on the European theatre where shadows of gloom have given way to re-construction and democratization of the world order, rather than Pacific which still attracts external intervention in different guises, waters of the sea being turned into power projection field of the regional powers as well as external ones. It is obvious that the erosion of U.S. hegemony and the limitations on the Soviet challenge are compelling the USA and the USSR to scale down their strategic commitments. But the issue which needs to be dealt and importantly so is how far such compulsions operate against other countries, e.g., Japan, England, France, China, Australia and New Zealand. For the chess board of power politics is far more complicated in the Pacific than in other region. There may be differing,

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2. K.P. Misra and V.D. Chopra, ed., South Asia-Pacific Region: Emerging Trends (New Delhi, 1988), p.VIII.

motives, intentions, purposes and methods of operating but there can be no disagreement on one central issue, that is maximization of their strength to the detriment of other, and the magnitude of threats their activities pose to the mankind of this region and the adjoining areas needs a closer look.

This Chapter is devoted to understanding the role of other powers in the Pacific region and to present a picture of some viable alternatives to the peaceful development of South Pacific Region.

In the Pacific two over-riding concerns become clear- 1) the people of the Pacific from Sydney to Shanghai from Jakarta to Los Angeles, from Belau to Vladivostok want contact not confrontation with their near and distant neighbours, 2) There is perception that many of them having rid themselves of European domination and veen through the Second World War, the Korean and the Vietnam War desire that no one power should control their destinies.<sup>3</sup>

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3. Malcolm McIntosh, Arms Across The Pacific: Security and Trade Issues Across The Pacific, (London, 1987), p.IX.

These two points are inter-related and first is the logical corollary of the other. A multi-polar system though has a potential for greater manoeuvrability and competition has also the ability to set the pace for chaos. In the Pacific these many States are involved in the scramble for resources.

The role of Japan in the previous Chapter as an ally of United States has been discussed. However, the independent significance of Japan in this region is tremendous.

As Paul Kennedy says in his seminal work on the fate of the Great Powers "writing upon how the present may evolve into the future even if they discuss trends which are already underway, can lay no claims to being historical truth.....unforeseen happenings, sheer accidents, the halting of a trend, can ruin the most plausible of forecasts; if they do not then the forecaster is merely lucky!"<sup>4</sup>

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4. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York, 1987), p. 438.

Despite the attendant problems in our age and day it is the forecasts that are in greatest demand, and the whole political science is to a great extent geared to forecasting, not to speak of futurology. But the pace of change is now so rapid that futurology has slipped out of vogue despite taking into account all the thinkable and unthinkable scenario's in international relations.

However, understanding the present with a mind on how the present could evolve in future, eg., long term trends would help up to analyse the security threats to the countries of South Pacific.

It is evident that new technological revolution is now civilian, commercial technologies and not military ones that are on the cutting edge of innovation; instead of a spin off from military technologies into civilian industries one would soon see the increasing spin off from gadgets and techniques developed commercially into the sphere of military technology. That theoretically opens up possibilities of sudden jumps - drastic changes

in relative military potentials and capabilities of countries irrespective of their ranking on the scale of GNP generation or the quantities of certain traditional military hardware produced.<sup>5</sup> As it is in the Pacific that the technologically most advanced countries exist eg., Japan and the New Industrialized countries like Hongkong, Korea, Taiwan etc. Their role in the future of Pacific era would be very significant, whether technological acumen would be used for peaceful and developmental path or a destructive course would be followed, are likely to affect the South Pacific states effort towards increasing satisfaction of the peoples wants and needs or it could trap them into an ever-increasing arms race. Stability in the region might be enhanced by confidence building measures implemented on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis. The thrust of such measures ought to be greater predictability of behaviour by the members of the international community.

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5. Henry Trofimenko, "Long Term Trends in The Asia Pacific Region : A Soviet Evaluation, Asian Survey (California), vol. XXIX, No. 3, March (1989), p. 238.

Paul Kennedy says it will be difficult for Japan in such a situation to remain a mere trading state... As other nations have discovered in the past, commercial expertise and financial wealth sometimes no longer suffice in the anarchic world of international power politics.<sup>6</sup>

Taking into account the possibility of more or less easy transfer of the achievements of civilian industries, to military applications, one could not exclude the probability of a qualitative jump in Japanese military might which would drastically change the politico-military environment, in the region if not in the world.

At some point the Japanese military build up might slip out of US control and Washington will have very limited means to restore it. The implication of Japanese military build up could prove to be disastrous for the Pacific states.

Japan is already an economic super power with billions of dollars in capital surpluses available for

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6. See Paul Kennedy, n.4, p. 471.

investment elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine in these circumstances that Japan will continue for much longer to subserve American objectives, it has the potential for acting independently in the Pacific region.<sup>7</sup>

Increasing international attention is being paid to the mini states. Visits by Chinese Communist Party leader Yaobang, by Japanese PM Yasuhiro Nakasone and by high level delegation from around the Pacific Rim (including the ASEAN states) have substantially raised the regions profile.<sup>8</sup>

The recent spectacular economic growth of the Asian Pacific Region which has overtaken Western Europe as the biggest trade partner of the US took the world by surprise. How did a group of non-Western nations in an area longplagued by the fierce wars in Korea and Vietnam achieve such success. These questions lead naturally to Japan not only a driving force in the region but a dominant influence on the world economy.

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7. M. Rasgotra and Others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: A Region in Turbulence (New Delhi, 1988), p.3.

8. David W. Hegarty, "Small States Security in the South Pacific" in M. Abdul Hafiz and A.R. Khan, Security of Small States (Dhaka, 1987), p.159.



Will Japan's closest ties in the future be with the advanced industrialized countries of the West or with the less developed countries of Asia Pacific. Despite its strong economy, Japan has hitherto had no clearly defined role either in international politics or in the politics of the Asian Pacific region. Recently, however, there have been signs that Japan is becoming increasingly aware that it must play a more active role in international affairs and in particular that it must assume greater responsibility for regional development.

Japan's commitment to peace is quite pervasive and its avowed aim is to remain a major power without major military power.<sup>9</sup>

Will such a unique stance continue to be viable for a nation of Japan's size and influence in the increasingly complex regional environment of the 1980's and beyond?

Japan has begun to give aid though in modest amounts in 1960's with special emphasis on assisting the development of the countries of the Asia Pacific region.

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9. Shibusawa Masahide, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region : Profile of Change (Kent, 1984), p.9.

ASEAN's avowed aim of building peace, freedom and prosperity through its own efforts was highly compatible with Japan's emerging goals. Apart from geographical proximity and feelings of cultural affinity, South East Asia was important to Japan as source of economic security providing resources, markets and investments sites as well as maritime communications. In order to maintain that security a pre-requisite for Japan was first and foremost the political stability of the region.<sup>10</sup>

For although enhanced regionalism might liberate the U.S. from certain responsibilities it would in turn encourage regional actors to manage their own affairs independently which would not be in US interest. Nor would the Russians feel comfortable in a world order in which they have to not only compete with the US but many regional actors.

Anti Japanese movement in South East Asia was a reaction to Japan's domination of the South East Asian economy. Besides being the biggest market for its primary commodities as well as the biggest supplier of

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10. *ibid*, p. 46.

capital goods, Japan was flooding the daily life of South East Asia with every conceivable item of consumer goods. The Japanese were portrayed in general as being callous and heartless, interested only in exploiting the resources and markets of the region.<sup>11</sup>

Japan's direct foreign investment in the Asian Pacific Region was modest until the mid 1970's. In the second half of the decade, however, with the lifting of restrictions on capital outflows (through successive stages of liberalization of capital markets by the Ministry of Finance), Japan's direct investment was motivated by three considerations : access to raw materials, relocation of production to take advantage of lower local costs and establishments of bases to support trade through banking insurance etc. There is also complaint about insufficient technology transfer on the part of Japanese firms, a rather serious charge.<sup>12</sup>

Japan's spectacular economic success did not solve its problem of isolation. The basic problem remains

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11. *ibid*, p. 73.

12. *ibid*, pp. 152-153.

intact and therefore if Japan is to play its rightful role in the future regionally and globally, it will have to be able to define its position clearly in the world. Many are mystified by its tendency to avoid potential involvement either in the region or in the world.

It appears to lack a clear sense of purpose and as a result it is widely criticised for its indecisiveness in foreign policy and seemingly beggar my neighbour economic behaviour. As for defence it arouses ambivalent feelings in its partners. On the one hand, its Asian neighbours are wary of its re-emergence as a military power and on the other hand U.S. is critical of the low level of its military expenditure and hence its perceived free riding. There has been little similarity in Japan's process of development and that of the region. This raises fear of its domination in the adjoining countries of the Pacific.

Although Japan's military role in the Pacific today is restricted to its own defence, the Japanese are increasingly active in other spheres which indirectly contribute to the stability of the micro-states in the South Pacific. Indeed Japanese leaders often argue that

the most appropriate contribution that Japan can make to the security of the Pacific is through its economic aid and technical assistance programmes, since these promote the stability and the well being of developing countries in the region. If well directed to meet the genuine needs of the population, such aid could indeed contribute to the stability of the Pacific region, as well as to the prosperity of the small territories concerned.<sup>13</sup>

Although Japan does not have a generous record in aid she does have one of the highest levels of unconditional aid to the developing world. In keeping with her policy of leading efforts to preserve and strengthen the free trade system, much of Japan's aid in the Pacific is targetted at upholding Western leaning governments rather than merely being apportioned on humanitarian or economic grounds.

In shoring up pro-Western governments in the distribution of aid Nakasone has been encouraged by P.M. BOB Hawke's government in Australia and the Reagan Administration

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13. Sheila Harden, Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (London, 1985), pp. 178-180.

in the U.S. The Australians while seeing the South Pacific islands as their own aid territory have nevertheless encouraged Japan to give aid. They have been slightly alarmed, however, at the large amounts of aid that have been donated and the way Japanese trading companies might be coming in on the back of economic aid and threatening to swamp the small economics.<sup>14</sup>

More important to the security of the South Pacific is aid which not only secures Japanese fishing rights but also keeps the Soviet Union at bay. In 1986, Japan gave some \$ 24.1 million in aid to the Pacific islands, the largest amount going to Fiji (\$ 8 million).

Looking at the role of China one finds, that traditionally China has felt at ease with only small and weak nations on its periphery. It faces a changed situation in that it has several large and powerful or potentially powerful neighbours which betray little inclination to submit to its dictates or to act as its subsidiaries. The sweeping internal changes in evidence in Peoples China offer cause for hope that China's external outlook may also become more conciliatory and tolerant

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14. See Malcolm McIntosh, n. 3, p. 82.

in future. Because of the country's history and tradition China's role in world affairs will always be an independent one and it could be a grave mistake to think that China is forever committed to a pro-American or anti USSR course in world affairs. Sino-American alliance laboriously crafted at a time of Sino-Soviet mis-understandings and tensions may not survive beyond the present century.<sup>15</sup>

Trofimenko predicts that upto the end of this century at least PRC will concentrate on the continuation of economic reforms that would make China a real super power by the beginning of the next century. The degree of further success in modernizing and developing the Chinese economy will be the most important factor influencing the behaviour of the PRC in the international arena. The political and economic role of China in the Asia Pacific region will grow, though, on the economic side it is doubtful that in the period under consideration (15-20 years) the PRC would pose a challenge, to the US or Japan as an exporter of high technology products. At the same time, it is clear that no plans or schemes for Pacific wide economic or other

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15. See n. 2, p. 2.

organizations will have a chance to succeed if they are opposed by the PRC.<sup>16</sup>

As regards the South Pacific, one can say that Chinese modernization would enable it to play an important economic role in the region. China has no forward projection of military power in the Pacific at present, but the procurement of submarines and ASW equipment and her growing involvement both with the US and Japanese military establishment means that she could become a Pacific military power in the 21st century.

The size of her standing army and her limited nuclear capability make her a formidable opponent for any would be aggressor. China's role as half a super-power allows her to criticise both SU and US. A strong secure and independent China dedicated to peace and stability, such a China is no ones surrogate nor is she a threat to anyone.

However, there have been reports of the Japanese-Chinese liaison to bring joint exercises in sub-marine detection. The progress towards the establishment of

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16. See n. 5, pp. 248-249.



nuclear free zones in the Indian and Pacific Oceans has been supported by China. Hu Yaobang (the Chinese communist party leader until Jan 1987) told David Lange the New Zealand P.M. in April 1985 that he did not see China having a military role in the South Pacific in near future.<sup>17</sup>

However, China's increasing exports are more and more being carried by her expanding merchant fleet, which has grown to become one of the ten largest shipping fleets in the world. The more China trades across the Pacific, the more she is going to become concerned with protecting trade routes.

The proximity of China and India to South Pacific region and their undergoing process of modernization and development could lead to new realignment of forces, to the rise of new power centres, forms of competition and collisions.<sup>18</sup>

A significant point which needs to be borne in mind is whether Japanese political influence will successfully counter China's or will these two powers act in union

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17. See McIntosh, n. 3, p.73.

18. See Rasgotra and Others, n. 7, p. 33.

to the benefit of all. This cannot be answered conclusively and only their future course of action will determine their exact nature.<sup>19</sup>

As regards French they have decided to enlarge their military presence in the region by building naval base in New Caledonia. Just as the British tested weapons systems until the 1950's so the French continue to do so, this attracts support from the US and gives the latter moral support in their use of the Pacific for testing missiles and SDI technology.

While the Europeans may have gone home in force, their continued nominal show of military support for common aims and ideals, helps the US maintain their command over the area.

The United Kingdom is also part of the nuclear build up in the Pacific. The two main companies involved in mining uranium in Australia , British Petroleum and Rio Tinto Line are British. Until 1958, the UK used

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19. D. Banerjee, "South East Asian Security in the last Decades of the 20th Century", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. IV, (July 1989), p. 383.

Australia and Christmas island as nuclear test sites with scant regard for the aboriginal populations. She became further implicated in the military build up in the Pacific in 1986 by exercising with Americans, Japanese, Australian and Canadian ships as part of the RIMPAC exercises.

Of the four NIC's (Newly industrialized countries) South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the other members of ASEAN \* represent an important step towards future Pacific co-operation.

The concept of a Pacific Basin community is often derided because it seems to embrace everything but means nothing. How can so many varying nations with so different lifestyles, standards of living, religions, climate and population form any cooperative community that share common goals and have equal representation.

The Pacific encompasses the world's smallest independent state Nauru (8 sq. miles, 8000 population)

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\* Members of ASEAN - Malaysia, Thailand, Phillipines, Indonesia, Brunie, Singapore.

and China with (1.1 billion people, 4 million square miles). Even the economic differences between the powerful are staggering. Smaller nations are entitled to think that their interests may be forgotten as more economically powerful nations move on in the area. The military build up in the area has increased and there is a great deal of tension amongst the Pacific islanders as a result of the desire to be independent, to be free of both commercial and military domination. Many Pacific people feel that it should be possible to be small but secure.

In the next decade three principal security issues are likely to concern the region. These are :

1. How will nations relate to each other?
2. Will intra regional conflicts be controlled?  
Will regional resilience grow or diminish?
3. How will these countries relate to major powers outside.

Intra regional security issues amongst ASEAN have been resolved satisfactorily. Some minor issues do remain but these are not seen as major problems that can lead to conflict. Instead ASEAN is more conscious of threats from outside. However, the Cambodian issue

is one outstanding geopolitical question that holds key to the immediate future of the region.<sup>20</sup>

A stage was reached in 1986 when Vietnam announced its decision to withdraw from Cambodia by 1989, at the latest which she did. It was not in Vietnam's interest to remain in Cambodia any longer than was absolutely necessary. But the stability of the Phnom Penh regime against the Khmer Rouge had to be assured. All factions of Khmers can be accommodated in a political process within Cambodia. But the murderous Khmer Rouge armed forces and utterly discredited top leadership was not acceptable to the Khmers themselves or the rest of the world.

The peace in the Pacific would be largely dependent upon the amicable resolution of the Kampuchean problem.

One of ASEAN's aspirations to make South East Asian a zone of Peace, freedom and neutrality turned out to coincide with the interests of the great power. Therefore, the ASEAN governments began to concentrate their attention

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20. *ibid*, p. 369.

and energy on social and economic development which was considered to be the logical pre-requisite for the regions stability and resilience. It may well be that ASEAN was able to realize in a different form what non-aligned movement was aspiring to in the 1950's (to avoid undesirable super power intervention).<sup>21</sup>

The governments in the region learnt that in order to implement programmes of indigenous development and thereby enhance their legitimacy - essential steps towards political stability, they must first set up the environment, individually or collectively that would discourage outside powers from intervening in their internal affairs and August 1967 led to the most notable example of regional cooperation and this kind of cooperation did much to protect the area from domino effect.<sup>22</sup>

It is significant to recall that the PM of Malaysia Mahather Mhammed during his visit to the Soviet Union in August 1987 said that the ideas contained in Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech and the interview to the Indonesian

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21. See, Shibusawa Masahide, n. 9, p.4.

22. *ibid*, p. 34.

newspaper Merdeka was received with interest in Malaysia. His country he said proceeded with the premise that the Soviet Union is an Asian and Pacific power with interests in the region and in the world.

There are three problems challenging the world community. These are safeguarding of peace, achieving disarmament and ensuring development. These are three inter-related problems demanding immediate solution. Indonesia has witnessed marked changes in its foreign policy from one sided cooperation with the West has set out to achieve greater independence to enhance the Republics prestige in the world.

Meanwhile of late there has emerged profound objective differences between Indonesia and the United States. Indonesia needs a stabilization of the situation in Asia and the rest of the world while the U.S. with the arms race intends to involve Indonesia along with other states in its military-political schemings.<sup>23</sup>

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23. Eduardo Faleiro and Others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: Current Trends (New Delhi, 1987), p.25.

The course of development in the Southern Asia Pacific region, during recent years shows - new trends - anti-nuclear trends which have begun to assert themselves in the region. A wind of change is discernible, the decisive factors are the human element and the force of reason.<sup>24</sup>

Coming to the study of Australian and New Zealand's role in South Pacific one notices that although their populations are predominantly of European stock and many still retain political and cultural ties with Britain, first the Pacific war and then British entry, into the European community brought home to both countries the geographical fact of life and encouraged them to seek closer links with the countries of the Pacific Basin, including their neighbours in the South Pacific who share many of their concerns (notably on nuclear issues) and whose security and stability are vital to their own security.

That the micro states themselves accept Australia and New Zealand as full members of the South Pacific club

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24. *ibid*, p. 28.



is clear from the fact that they were invited to become members of the South Pacific forum (the political body set up on the initiative of the South Pacific micro-states themselves).

Both Australia and New Zealand provide development aid, technical assistance and defence cooperation to countries of the South Pacific. In the case of Australia, 38% of its 1984-85 Development aid programme and 46% of its Defence Cooperation Aid Programme for the same year went to the territories in the South West Pacific, including Papua New Guinea which as a former Australian dependency received the lions share. Almost all of New Zealand's aid is concentrated on the South Pacific. It also maintains mobile forces to provide on request, military assistance, technical aid, surveillance of outside activities, search and rescue and disaster relief services in the South Pacific. In addition, limited military training is offered in New Zealand to some South Pacific countries.<sup>25</sup>

In a regional context the two most important existing provisions for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Pacific are the ANZUS Treaty and the

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25, See, Sheila Harden, n. 13, p.181.

American-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Security (while the latter has been discussed in Chapter 3) the former is treated here.

The ANZUS Treaty was signed in September 1951 between US, Australia and New Zealand to co-ordinate their collective defence in the Pacific. The parties to the treaty undertake to consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific (Article III).<sup>26</sup> Each party is bound to act to meet the common danger according to its constitutional processes, since each party recognizes that an attack on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety (Article IV). An armed attack in the terms of the treaty, includes an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the parties or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific (Article V). Although article V specifically covers the dependent island territories of the parties to the Treaty, the signatories can also be expected to take a serious view of an attack on an independent micro state in the area since the general thrust of the Treaty

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26. *ibid*, p. 182.

is the preservation of peace in the Pacific.

The three ANZUS powers conduct joint exercises and exchange technical information and strategic intelligence. Defence cooperation and training are arranged on a bilateral basis with other countries in the region including the micro states in the South Pacific.

The government of New Zealand recently announced plans for a South-Pacific trouble shooting battalion.

There is, however, one security problem which is of concern to the ANZUS signatories, the nuclear issue. At the beginning of 1985, there were two incidents which highlighted the problem. In one incident, the Australian government of Hawke expressed its reluctance to allow American aircraft monitoring MX intercontinental ballistic missile tests to refuel and fly from Australia, although the arrangements had been agreed with the previous Australian government. The Americans diffused this crisis by making alternative arrangements following a meeting between Shultz and Hawke in Washington. More serious perhaps was the refusal by the New Zealand government to grant port clearance to the American warship

Buchanan, because of Washington's refusal to confirm whether or not the ship was armed with nuclear weapons. However, despite the subsequent furore the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Lange emphasized that his country is and intends to remain, a committed member of ANZUS. Nonetheless as a result of New Zealand action, the U.S. cancelled the 1985 ANZUS defence exercise and reportedly ceased providing New Zealand with intelligence.

Apart from the ANZUS treaty, New Zealand had until her suspension in 1986, a responsibility to the defence of Cook island, Niue and Tokalau. New Zealand also maintains an infantry baltalion in Singapore and has maintained defence relations with Tonga and Fiji. Through all these defence arrangements she has developed a role for herself both regionally and on a wider scale despite her very limited resources. The suspension of the ANZUS treaty because of the New Zealand's nuclear free policies has disrupted what has been a remarkably integrated tri-lateral relationship.

American reaction to New Zealand's adoption of nuclear free policies could be an example of what would happen if other countries adopt similar policies. The

United States greatest fear is that other countries will follow suit and for this reason the actions taken against New Zealand is to be measured. If the US takes too punitive a measure against countries which transgress her nuclear policies she will only enhance anti-nuclear stands. If on the other hand, she is seen not to be too concerned, then some countries may be encouraged to follow New Zealand's path.

Of more concern to New Zealand is the cessation of the flow of intelligence briefing material by both London and Washington since February 1985. New Zealand's pledge to spend more on conventional defence and to try and establish a regional security force for use in the South Pacific is aimed at placing New Zealand's defence priorities in perspective. Since 1983 New Zealand has maintained a ready Reaction Force for quick deployment to trouble spots, primarily in the South Pacific neighbours, who see New Zealand and Australia as their major trading partners.

Tokelauns\* rely heavily on aid from New Zealand which amounts to £ 1000 a year for each of its 1800 people.<sup>27</sup>

Early in 1970's the heads of the new states of South Pacific as well as Australia and New Zealand agreed to meet regularly in the South Pacific Forum, which has taken a series of steps to meet the practical requirements of the island states :

1. it has established the Pacific forum line which provides reliable shipping services for a number of member state.
2. Set up a Forum Fishery Agency.
3. it has negotiated a treaty agreement called SPARTECA under which products exported from forum island countries have duty free and unrestricted access to New Zealand and Australia.
4. deals with increasingly complex environmental problems of the South Pacific.

However, a problem with New Zealand is that of Caledonia a large island about 1000 miles - North West

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\* Tokelauns - Samoa is a group of islands North of New Zealand. GO 300 miles North from Samoa there are 3 little atolls separated by 100 miles of ocean - together they form Tokelaun.

27. Bryce Harland, "New Zealand and the South Pacific", Round Table (London), No. 307 (July 1988), p.303.

of New Zealand and bit closer to Australia which is still under French administration.

There the indigenous people have become a minority in their own country. The Kanaks as they are called, are demanding their own independence which is resisted by the Caldoches who insist that New Caledonia remain French. The people of the neighbouring countries specially Vanuatu have close ties with the Kanaks and support their cause. The other members of the South Pacific forum have lend their support too.<sup>28</sup>

This has become a matter of concern for New Zealand because the French have been their friends and New Zealanders also feel, that they have a valuable contribution to make in the South Pacific, but what concerns them is that Kanaks if alienated would look elsewhere for help and their understandable frustration could offer opportunities to outside powers, which do not have Kanak interests necessarily at their heart had hence for the security of the whole region. This necessitates that French should resume their dialogue with the Kanaks and work out an acceptable solution to all the inhabitants of New Caledonia.

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28. *ibid*,

In the South Pacific, decolonization of the French territories remains a top priority. In New Caledonia, mobilization of the indigenous people behind the independence movements is well advanced. In French Polynesia nuclear testing will have to be brought to an end, in order for those people to attain independence.<sup>29</sup>

Stability and security in the Pacific basin will be enhanced by demilitarization, regionalism, by independence of its colonized people and development.

Australia and New Zealand are normally thought of as having the same security priorities and the ANZUS treaty treats them as the same entity. Their security has in past been inextricably linked, but as New Zealand adopts a different posture with regard to nuclear weapons and as Australia becomes more strategically important to U.S., the two minor ANZUS treaty partners are inevitably going to determine their own defence policies.

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29. Helen Clark, "New Zealand's Perspective on Security issues in the Pacific Basin", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Boulder, USA), Vol. 19, No. 2 (April-June, 1987) p.12.



as seen in their participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars and argues for a strategy of denial by which attacking forces would be denied entry to Australian territory. This strategy involves the maintenance of maritime strike force with an increase in the number of submarines in use, ~~more~~ frigates and mine hunting crafts.

The review also puts forward the idea of an area of direct military interest meaning that Australia would patrol upto 1,000 nautical miles from her shores in the way that Japan announced she would do. The review said that there was no immediate threat to Australia from any direction but pointed out the need to be vigilant. Particularly with regard to the only possible direction that an invasion could be mounted from Indonesia which is described as protective barrier to Australia's northern approaches.

The Dobb review is an important document not just for Australia but for the Pacific and the world because

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31. *ibid*

it contained the beginning of a defence strategy based on securing the home base, using armed forces, defensively rather than offensively.<sup>32</sup>

Finally the adoption of "Advance Australia Fair" rather than 'God save the Queen' as the national anthem, the break in legal ties with London and the Australian Act 1986 distancing the Australian and British Legislative bodies means that Australia is taking an independent place in the world in the same way that New Zealand has done. For the South Pacific this can only mean more inter-regional co-operation in the trade and security areas.

Senator Gareth Evans on his visit to these countries of South Pacific saw the real individuality of the countries. Hence the fabric of relationship of Australia with these countries is becoming all the more complex year by year.<sup>33</sup>

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32. G.V.C. Naidu, "Strategic Developments in the South-Pacific and Australia's Role," in K.P. Misra and Others, ed., Southern Asia Pacific: Perceptions and Strategies (Delhi), p.91.

33. Senator Gareth Evans, "Australia in the South Pacific", World Review, (Queensland), Vol.28, No.2 (June, 1989), p.5.

An important feature of the situation is Australian commitment to making the South Pacific the most important priority. Development which affect the security of the South Pacific region, of which they are a part cannot but affect the security of Australia. Australia's set of interest involves assisting in the economic developments of the region as a whole, political stability and peaceful evolution on the one hand and optimum economic development on the other, are inseparable. Quite apart from its economic relationship with New Zealand - its third biggest trading partner the island states are a valuable market for a range of Australian investment (some \$ 85 million worth in the case of Fiji) and the site of important commercial ventures.<sup>34</sup>

In sharing such an important relationship with the island countries - Benign neglect - largely allowing events to take their course and reacting when they threaten Australian interests is not a realistic option.

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34. *ibid*, pp.6-7.

The essence of Australian policy could be described as one of constructive commitment, involves promotion of close, confident and broadly based bilateral relationship with all Pacific island countries, promotion of effective regional co-operation especially through the South-Pacific Forum and other Regional organisations like South Pacific Commission. The value of such an approach is that it identifies Australia as an integral part of the region. It is an indispensable part of the strategy of constructive commitment that nations continue to deal on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect with these countries of South Pacific.

The uncomfortable reality is that coups in Fiji represent a blow to democratic principles in the region. What sets Fiji apart from other countries is that events since May 1987 have constituted a step backwards. The economic decline in Fiji places impediment in the way of economic development of the region and the coups have also meant that the regions capacity to speak as one in the world forums and the confidence that its own home is in order is impaired. Australia's concern arises

because it is by far the Fiji's largest economic partner and the largest aid donor.

The labour governments of Australia and New Zealand made the nuclear problem the central theme of their foreign policy. Their statements on that score became more consonant with the stance of the nonaligned movement than with those of the other US allies.<sup>35</sup>

In May 1987 a military leader seized power in Fiji from the elected government with the declared intention of keeping control in the hands of the indigenous Fijians. Though Colonel Rabuka's action did not lead to widespread violence but it did arouse serious concerns both in Fiji, its neighbouring countries and most important of all in India. This was for the first time that a democratically elected government in the South Pacific had been overthrown by military forces. It brought to the surface concerns about the role and rights of indigenous people, a difficult issue that not only affected Fiji but more than that it affected India as Fijian Society is on a three legged

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35. Eduardo Faleiro and Others, ed.,  
n. 23, p. 23.

stool the Fijian land, Indian labour and the European capital weakening of any one of them could destabilize the Fijian economy. With the setback of democracy in Fiji this may be regarded as an era of military suppression and racial discrimination.

India has long standing historical and cultural links with a number of countries in South East Asia and the Pacific including a sizeable population of Indian origin in Singapore, Malaysia apart from Fiji. It has also deep interest in the economic development of this region.<sup>36</sup>

With the beginning of 1960's India's capacity to pursue its perceived interests in the region declined largely owing to the constraints of economic resources and political power. But India has always kept its interest alive and desired to play its legitimate role whenever there were possibilities to do so.

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36. See, India and Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific Security Proposal. Occasional Papers, No. 1 (Swedish Institute of International Affairs).

With regard to the bilateral context of Indo-Soviet relations attention must be drawn to the economic implications of New Soviet drive. In pursuance of the economic programme adopted by the Soviet Union, self sufficient in consumer goods and bring it to the level of a major world exporter of machinery, this means that the existing pattern of Indo-Soviet trade will have to be restructured radically. Indian goods may also face tough competition from other countries in the far east and South East Asia with which Soviet Union plans to develop co-operative relations.

For India, the climate is all the more adverse with fractured relations with Fiji. In view of changing international scenario India will have to devote greater attention to the Pacific.

The Indian Ocean and Pacific have become a formidable base for military confrontation and nuclear brandishment. The geographical location of India is such that one cannot ignore its role in Pacific.<sup>37</sup>

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37. See, Rasgotra and Others, ed., n.7, p. 18.

Of particular importance is the role that India can or is willing to play in this context. Hitherto the Indian Navy has remained a neglected sector of Indian defence forces and its strategic planning. The future dangers to India are likely to come not from the North or the West but from the high seas to India's South and South East. Therefore, Indian defence requirements in the coming decades should fit in well with the overall defence needs of the Southern Asia-Pacific region. In the recent years strategic thought and literature has been placing an increasing emphasis on the importance of this region. This region is believed to be rapidly emerging as the centre of gravity of international activity.

The most serious elements of the problem of security and peace in Southern Asia-Pacific could be resolved by working towards denuclearisation of Asia and the surrounding oceans. At the Delhi Declaration of November 1986 M. Gorbachev and Rajéev Gandhi made a specific call for such a convention in pursuit of a non-nuclear and non-violent world.

What is significant in the South Pacific is that the small island states are taking independent decisions



on foreign policy and are keen on joining the non-aligned movement. They are anti-nuclear and opposed to militarisation of the region. This is where India could step in and play an important role. The first effort should be to extend moral if necessary material support to the small island nations of the South Pacific, so that they could pursue their independent policies based not on exploitation but which is equitable, which is fair and which is just (as a member of NAM, G-77) and other multi-lateral forums.

As the vagaries of war, exploitation of one by the other and hegemonistic designs become more manifest adherence to nonaligned principles enkindle new hopes of survival and redemption.<sup>38</sup>

In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru was great architect of nonaligned movement "whether we are big or small we have to face big issues vital to the future of humanity".<sup>39</sup>

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38. *ibid*, p. 41.

39. *ibid*, p. 45.

Indian contribution in the security sphere of South Pacific can be gauged by Nehru's reference to peace being co-terminus with freedom and independence. It obviously meant a constant support for struggle against European Colonialism everywhere and anywhere. Nehru's policy of non-alignment had started influencing the foreign policies of a large number of newly liberated countries.<sup>40</sup>

In the 80's certain new contours have begun to surface in India's foreign policy particularly in its orientation towards the countries of this region. She has played a significant role in establishing relationship between disarmament and development. The famous Delhi declaration reflects the direction of change, that the world is bound to take. It has begun to develop relations with the ASEAN countries. This trend has to be seen in totality because these initiatives are manifestations of certain new tendencies in India's approach towards the problems facing the present day world and in this region.<sup>41</sup>

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40. V.D. Chopra, "Problems of Peace and Security in Asia & the Pacific", in K.P. Misra & others, ed., Southern Asia-Pacific: Perceptions and Strategies, (New Delhi, 1988), p.12.

41. *ibid*, pp.20-21.

There is a nonaligned wave sweeping across the South Pacific. During the summit meeting held in Delhi in 1983 Vanuatu was formally admitted as a member. The deposed government in Fiji had also expressed its firm decision to become nonaligned and much recently the new Government in Wintu (in Papua New Guinea) has also decided to join the nonaligned movement.<sup>42</sup>

The very fact that these countries which have been firmly in the Western camp till recently are turning into nonaligned is a major development which needs deeper probing into such a shift.

Intra regional tensions and decisions have surfaced between the mini-states along the Melanesian versus Polynesian cultural divide over defence and security issues and have raised uncertainties. The defence capacity in most South Pacific States is low to non-existent. Only PNG and Fiji the larger of the states maintain a relatively substantial defence capacity. PNG has a 3 battalion force of 3,000 men each with air and naval support arms. Defence spending in PNG's budget amounts to \$ 35 million or 35%, and Australia also contributes considerable amount to its defence objective.

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42. *ibid*, p. 87.

Fiji similarly maintains three battalions (2500 men) all of which are drawn from the indigenous Fiji population, 2 battalions of each 600 men are currently serving the UN peace keeping activities in the middle East. This arrangement provides valuable experience for the Fijian forces as well as being an important source of foreign currency for Fiji.<sup>43</sup>

Of the other states, Tonga has a small force of 300 men (mostly in the naval element). Vanuatu has a para-military force of 300 men designed largely to guard against internal dissent, from latent secessionists and the Solomon islands has a small para police mobile force, 70 men attached to its police force.<sup>44</sup>

While these forces are an important part of the state apparatus (and are important national symbols as well) their defence and deterrence capability is extremely low. None of the states has the capacity to monitor and police

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43. Amena Mohsin, "Regionalism and Security in the South Pacific," in Hafiz and Robkhan, Security of Small States, Dhaka, 1987) p.45.

44. *ibid.*

their exclusive Economic Zones, PNG authorities recently calculated the cost of even minimal security coverage of its fishing zones would be more than the return from fishing licences; fees and royalties. Few of the states are well placed to counter such domestic security problems which might arise from mischief makers, subversives or foreign intelligence operatives.

There is no evidence of any invasive threat against the territory of a South Pacific state. Threats to the political security of the small states emanates from the larger powers competition around the Pacific states and the rivalry between them for influence. Unfortunately that competition is beginning to increase now. A significant difficulty encountered by a micro-state seeking to ensure its security is the high cost of equipment and of its subsequent operation and maintenance. The weak resource base of such micro-states limits their ability to buy arms and the first task for the government should be set out clearly its defence spending priorities.

The security of small island states may be threatened in a number of ways :

1. the landing of subversive elements with a view to forcible overthrow of the government for either political or commercially dubious motives.

2. internationally financed smuggling of drugs, arms and other contraband,
3. illegal fishing (leading to loss of revenue, possible food shortages and in some instances the destruction of fish stocks,
4. illegal exploitation of other natural resources such as minerals,
5. occupation of or damage to offshore installations (most usually oil or gas),
6. Piracy (with consequent disruption and damage of lawful trade),
7. illegal dumping of harmful materials;
8. Local smuggling.

The environment in which the micro states operate is criss crossed and shaped by a multitude of organisations at the global, regional and sub-regional levels. These organisations have either a clear security or defence purpose or at least offer a forum in which disputes and disagreements can be argued out.<sup>45</sup>

The dismantling of the large overseas colonial empires of the West European powers has left a variety of new relationships in its wake. Some again with a strong element of support and assistance.

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45. See, Sheila Harden, n. 13, p.14.

Membership of UN has come to be regarded as particularly important for micro-states, it is seen by many as an expression of their international legitimacy, it provides them with ready access to the services of the UN and its specialized agencies.

The experience of international relations in recent years has shown that no comprehensive approach to security can be evolved without the UN as a regulator and balance beam of diverse interests. The UN in turn needs a concept of comprehensive approach to security providing guidelines for the organization to adapt to the big changes taking place in world.<sup>46</sup>

In the matter of security of third world countries, the UN has belied the hopes that were placed in them as an international system for safeguarding peace and strengthening cooperation among nations. The principal reason for this sad state of affairs is the fact that great powers have continued to act in the pursuit of their perceived national interest in old outmoded ways

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46. Vladimir Petrovsky, "A dialogue on Comprehensive Security", International Affairs (Moscow), November 1989, p.21.

in disregard of the philosophy and vision of peaceful international relations embodied in the UN charter.<sup>47</sup>

Consequently a new and significant strain has been placed on the international system. While the danger of escalation, can be exaggerated in the era of the jet, the missile and instant communications there can be no guarantee that a crisis in one of the world's "micro states" will be containable either locally or regionally. The threat to our stability is mutual whether we be citizens of the small territory at the centre of the crisis or of a large nation which finds itself drawn in the crisis.

Kurt Waldheim (former Secretary General of the UN) feels that without idealism, dedication and the will to act even in unpromising situation. This organisation cannot possibly live up to the hopes of the people of the world which it uniquely represents "we the people of the United Nations are determined to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war". These are the

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47. See, Rasgotra and Others, ed., n.7, p.84.



opening words of the charter of the U.N. They set a tone of hope for the future peace and well being of human society which in the space of a single generation had twice experienced the agony of world war.<sup>48</sup>

There is an increasing uneasiness as to the manageability of the affairs and especially the economic life and social organisation of the planet in the circumstances now prevailing. These uncertainties and unforeseen developments affect in different ways the lives and the future of virtually all the nations and peoples and gives rise to deep seated feelings of anxiety and frustration which in turn create a climate favourable to new and unprecedented events.

The history of the U.N. since its foundation has essentially been the story of the search for a working balance between national sovereignty and national interests on the one hand and international order and long term interests of the world community on the other.

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48. Kurt Waldheim, Building the Future Order: The Search for Peace in an Interdependent World, (London, 1980) p.4.

The fact that the world is becoming at the same time more nationally diverse and more interdependent, that power in the old sense of the term is more fragmented and that violence is ever more pervasive and dangerous affords both the strongest argument for world order and the reason why it is so difficult to achieve.<sup>49</sup>

We can and must develop a sense of human solidarity finding practical expression in a strong family of international institutions, if our major international problems are to be contained and ultimately solved. Such an approach requires simultaneous progress in several areas. It requires progress on disarmament, requires concerted and constructive efforts to resolve conflicts peacefully and a practical and effective approach to the better distribution of global economic opportunities. The problems and obstacles are uniquely complex and difficult and progress is slow but the focus and objectives are there.

The general easing of tensions which resulted from the improved relations between these two powers, in

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49. *ibid*, p. 5.

particular thanks to the personal efforts of Gorbachev and Reagan inevitably had a beneficial effect in the world organisation. In perspective, the world organisation has made its greatest contribution to preserving peace and security in the world. In his address to the U.N. General Assembly held in December 1988. President Gorbachev spoke at strengthening of the organisation as the centre of world co-operation in general and in particular of co-operation in the new domains such as environment and space.<sup>50</sup>

As regards commonwealth of the present 49 members, 27 have populations of under 1 million, 14 have population of less than 200,000 and 7 have populations of less than 100,000. The commonwealth microstates are mostly to be found in three areas, 10 in the Carribean, 4 in southern Africa or east African coast and eight in the Pacific.<sup>51</sup>

The Commonwealth not only provides forum for discussion on political and economic issues but has also established

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50. Milan SAHOVIC, "The United Nations At a Crossroads," Review of International Affairs, Vol.XL, No. 930, (5 January, 1989), p.25.

51. Harden, n.13, p.23.

a number of development funds operated by the Secretariat and other technical services such as the Commonwealth legal advisory service which have been widely commended.

The number and importance of regional and sub-regional organisations is growing. With the achievement of independence in the Pacific, separatist tendencies have usually subsided to be replaced in several instances with a renewed interest in regional co-operation. Although centrifugal pressures remain, there has been a growing discussion about the possible benefits of co-operation in affording contracts providing access to technical assistance and offering the possibilities of common services in general interest.

While the role of global institutions in promoting the safety and security of the South Pacific region cannot be denied, a better option for such states is greater concentration on regional institutions.

The development of first the nation and then the institutions, of regionalism as the mini-states became independent has facilitated a sense of security community within the region. The South Pacific forum comprising the

the independent and near independent states, the forums administrative arm SPEC (also provides economic and legal services), the older South Pacific Commission which includes all states and territories as well as the former and remaining colonial powers and the Forum fisheries agency with region-wise services in the management of fisheries, stocks and negotiations with foreign fishing nations have provided the mini-states with a range of services and foster a regional identity. These institutions however have the defence and security functions.<sup>52</sup>

A network of defence arrangements of various forms also constitute a force for security although it should be pointed out that all are consultative in character rather than obligatory and that none has yet been put to the test.

These defence arrangements include the following. The ANZAC pack concluded in 1944 between Australia and New Zealand which calls for both to share responsibility for a regional zone of defence. The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 which entreats its signatories to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, to co-ordinate efforts for

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52. Hafiz and Rob Khan, n.8, p.140.

collective defence and which in more recent years is interpreted as embracing the defence of the island world, 1977 Australia and Papua New Guinea's joint statements which calls for consultation at the request of either on matters affecting their common security or defence arrangements.

- Pacific island treaties concluded in 1983 between U.S. and Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Cook Islands which essentially requires consultations on matters of defence and security interest and oblige the mini-states to consult with the U.S. if third party shows an interest in establishing facilities there.
- New Zealand has defence arrangements (provision of training, advice etc.) with Western Samoa and Fiji.
- Australia has a multi dollar defence co-operation programme with all regional states, a part of which recently involved an offer to patrol boats to the regions mini state.
- Australia and New Zealand under their respective co-operation programmes provide united maritime surveillance services.
- PNG and Vanuatu as a result of an exchange of notes in 1980 maintain a defence pact.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone - the treaty of Rarotonga agreed to by forum members in 1985 is a regional

attempt at a form of arms control and hence is a attempt to enhance the security of the regional environment.<sup>53</sup>

This treaty as sponsored by Australia calls for a total ban on nuclear testing, nuclear storage, nuclear manufacturing and nuclear dumping in the region. The question of port calls by nuclear powered and nuclear capable ships however, is left to the discretion the individual countries, thus implicitly guaranteeing access for the U.S. navy to most of the island's ports. The treaty however, has resulted in regional differences of opinion - the Melanesian states arguing that it is not sufficiently comprehensive while the polynesian states, anxious to preserve a strong American presence and influence in the region were reluctant signatories.<sup>54</sup>

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53. See, G.V.C. Naidu and P. Moorthy, "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. 12, No.2, May 1987, p.177.

54. Ramesh Thakur, "A Nuclear weapons Free South Pacific", Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), Vol.58, No.2, Summer 1985, p. 216.

Whether or not the security of the Small South Pacific States and the region, is enhanced or eroded in the short to medium terms depends very much on the course taken by competition between the superpowers. The Soviet Union is making a concerted effort for influence in the region in which it has previously been excluded. Soviet interest in the region may be more instrumental than intrinsic that is aimed at more important strategic assets than the islands themselves. The small states in time may accept that the Soviet Union has interest as a superpower in all parts of the globe but whether they have the resistance to withstand jockeying and the pressures of superpower competition is an open question.

A related point is the extent to which regionalism and the general regional consensus on foreign policy and defence orientations can withstand the current disintegrative pressures. The prospects are particularly good. However a discomfoting feature is divergence in views between Vanuatu which welcomes a Soviet presence as a means of balancing Western hegemony and Fiji which wants a stronger U.S. commitment to the region which appears to be increasing.



One of the underlying questions of the present day reality, has been can small and vulnerable states win out in the struggle for security, so that their territorial integrity, minimum core values and a reasonable degree of independence in international action is preserved?

If there is an answer it seems that Maniruzzaman has pointed to it ,if only in general terms, to enhance their strength small states need a combination of astute diplomacy, an appropriate mix of international policies and a strong sense of solidarity amongst their people.<sup>55</sup>

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55. M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan, n. 8, p. 170.

C O N C L U S I O N

The East specially the Pacific region is now the place where civilisation is stepping up its pace. Amid the current debate on the Asia Pacific, the much talked about Pacific century seems to have arrived already.

The present boom in the Pacific is part of the ongoing process of decentralisation of power and demonstration of international relations. As bipolarism paves way for multipolarism it was indispensable that the economic clout of the West was also gradually dispersed, first for investments and secondly to create markets for the manufactured goods.

The Guam declaration of July 1969 by President Nixon opened up an entirely new vista emphasising the economic development as a means to curb the radical insurgent movements along with military disengagements. This American move also led to realignment of relations in the Asia-Pacific. Japan was entrusted with the major responsibility in the development of the region. This becomes obvious if one looks at Japanese investment pattern in the Third World. There were many other factors too that propelled this region into the prominence, both economically and politically, for it goes without saying that it is the economic power that brings along the political power. And, South Pacific is a region with great economic attraction for external powers in the form of marine resources, fisheries and minerals.

It is as much a reality that the Asia-Pacific is the fastest growing region in the world, as it poses a serious threat to American preponderance in the world. The relative American decline will in no way push United States into oblivion. On the contrary, it will remain the world's mightiest power, politically, economically and militarily well beyond the beginning of the 21st century.

Though the U.S. is the largest debtor, its federal deficits are around \$ 150 billion and trade deficit to the tune of \$ 160 billion. It may not forfeit either its military might or political clout. South Pacific is important for strategic and economic reasons to the U.S. American trade across the Pacific has surpassed its trans-Atlantic trade. The U.S. absorbs nearly two thirds of exports from this region. After Japan, the U.S. is the second largest investor in the Asia Pacific followed by E C countries. According to James Baker, the then U.S. Secretary of State (Feb.1989) "The United States will be leading well into the 21st century and beyond, and in the Pacific century the U.S. will continue to be the dominant economic force."

In the Asia Pacific region however, some of the recent political trends are fascinating to note. For instance, the economies of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong are merging faster than most people realise and there are distinct signs that a greater China concept is already half way

through. The economic integration without political reunification (which is unlikely to happen in the near future) of these countries can even overshadow Japan. The advocates of this idea are convinced that blending Chinese scientific and military research, raw materials and labour with Taiwanese money and marketing skills and Hong Kong's financial and communication conduits will result in a new commercial power house.

As a consequence of these developments, Japan has been toying with the idea of founding an Asian-Pacific economic bloc. The idea was in fact spelt out by the Australian PM Bob Hawke, which drew sharp reaction from the U.S. The South East Asian countries are quite sceptical about Japan's growing political power along with its present economic power. But these countries with whom Japan has emerged the largest trading partner (and Japan is also the largest foreign investor) probably have little option but depend on Japan as the major source of investment and technology given the present protectionist tendencies in the West, Japan will try to concentrate more and more on the South Pacific region. Analysing the investment pattern by the Japanese it becomes obvious that Japan has already started grooming the Asia-Pacific and the South-Pacific as its sphere of influence.

The Pacific region has emerged as the largest repository of raw material, manpower, market and manufacturing. However, unlike any region, that region lacks any uniformity either

linguistically or culturally or economically or religiously. That is what complicates a common security approach.

The security affairs of the Pacific region are going to be governed more by the economic issues than political ones.

Though Japan is still basically geared to make its policies within the framework of U.S.-Japan security treaty, the present patron-client relationship may not last long. Japan's 1% GNP (the tradition already broken) which is in fact more than one percent if the NATO standards are applied to defence estimates, makes it probably the third largest defence spender in the world. As its economy grows by leaps and bounds, Japan is also flexing its muscles militarily. Nakasone has declared already that Japan is in a position to defend a radius of 1000 nautical miles around. Given its strong position on some of the most crucial emerging technologies, such as robotics, mechatronics, microelectronics, fibre optics, biotechnology etc which have a dual function of civil and military along with its ambitious nuclear and space programmes, Japan is all set to become another super-power militarily. Japan has the added advantage of a booming economy unlike that of the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

It is apparent that whoever controls these emerging technologies will be the future leader of the world. And that is what worries the US, the Soviet Union, the PRC and the South East Asian countries. The Pacific countries dread the idea of what would happen if Japan convert its economic might into political and military

might. In a way, one can already witness this phenomenon. For the first time Japan took up the cause of NICS (Newly Industrialized countries) and the Third World debt problem at the latest round of Uruguay talks at Montreal early this year (1989).

As far as China is concerned, defence is also a part of the modernisation programme of the post-Mao leadership. China is wary about Japan's military resurgence, but at present and in the future both need each other. China badly wants Japan's capital, technology and managerial expertise for the success of its modernisation, and Japan wants China's success to offset the Western protectionist tendencies to a certain extent.

In the Pacific two issues are prominent in the minds of the present ASEAN leadership which might affect the security of the region, First, How the Kampuchean issue is resolved; Second issue is about the future of the US bases in the Philippines and the future of the country itself as a pro-US country.

In the South Pacific, turbulence has been brewing in the recent past. The two military coups in May and Sept (1989) in Fiji led by Colonel Rabuka has made that country a paradise lost and unlikely to be regained. Father Walter Lini's government in Vanuatu has been faced with dissensions and political instability. The independence issue in the French

colony of New Caledonia is beset with problems and yet to be settled to the liking of local Kanaks. In Papua New Guinea, apart from persistent economic problems, and the anti-Indonesian rebels on the border near West Irian recently troops have taken to the streets for better wages, thus creating unstable conditions. The French are continuing their nuclear tests unabated at Mururoa Atoll despite vehement opposition by the South Pacific countries. This anti-nuclear sentiment also created serious difference between the U.S. and New Zealand, thus jeopardising the very survival of ANZUS military pact. The U.S. has stopped supplying intelligence information to New Zealand and latter's membership is temporarily suspended.

There is no doubt that after the signing and ratification of the INF Treaty by the two major nuclear powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, political climate in the world as a whole has begun to change.

In fact, the concept of evolving some structures for dialogue, negotiations and agreements as spelt out by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech which he further elaborated in an interview to editor-in-chief of Indonesian national daily Merdeka, has been widely debated in the various countries of the Pacific region.

The reaction of officials and the mass media in the countries of South and South-East Asia and Oceania has been of

great interest, shown in the Soviet concept of promoting co-operation in Asia and the Pacific its support for declaring the South Pacific a nuclear free zone. On December 15, 1987, the Soviet Union signed protocols 2 and 3 to the Rarotonga Treaty and favored the Indonesian proposal on creating such a zone in South-East Asia, and the idea of an early settlement of conflicts in the region and extension of bilateral relations with the states in the region in particular.

It is no mere coincidence that the 17th session of the South Pacific Forum, held in mid August 1986 reaffirmed the determination of its members to create a nuclear free zone in South Pacific. Many countries in the region welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to take part in the conference on Pacific Economic Co-operation. The Soviet Union, it was believed, could effectively contribute to the growth of economic co-operation among the Pacific states.

A close scrutiny of the developments in the region reveals the emergence of two adverse developments in the region - the arms race and confrontational tendencies. Nonetheless certain positive developments in certain directions have begun to assert themselves. These are -

1. The movement for stopping the arms race and disarmament, nuclear weapons disarmament in particular is gaining momentum.
2. Bilateral relations among the countries of this region, irrespective of different social and political systems are now getting crystallised.



3. Though surely and slowly attempts are underway to promote broad and multifarious co-operation in economic, scientific and technical spheres.

Nonetheless, it will be naive to believe that the task of promoting mutual relations among the countries of this region will be smooth and easy. Co-operation between the USSR and the U.S. in nuclear disarmament shows that mankind can and must decide the most complicated questions, the regional conflicts in particular not on the battlefields but by political means. However, the harsh reality is that one of the obstacles to the settlement of regional conflicts is the active shipment of weapons into the zones of heightened tensions.

Admittedly there has been a quantitative change in the last few years in the global strategic scenario- the eighties are witnessing the progressive shift from confrontation to conciliation thanks to the superpower detente. Nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the national and global interests of these very superpowers contain within them the seed for future confrontation. Countries of the Asian region, and of the Pacific basin cannot afford to relax their vigilance merely on the basis of developing detente among the two superpowers. Rather they have to keep analysing the shifts and turns in international relations and juxtapose them with the realities of their own region and evolve a policy which is best suited to their interests.

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