

ELECTORAL POLITICS OF NAGALAND

**A Study of Three Assembly Elections
(1982 — 1989)**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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Certified that the dissertation entitled **Electoral Politics of Nagaland: A Study of Three Assembly Elections (1982-1989)** submitted by **Jaangsillung Gonmei** is in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy**, is his bonafide work and has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

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to my parents

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ABBREVIATIONS

D.P.	-	Democratic Party
J.R.L.P.	-	Joint Regional Legislative Party
N.B.C.C.	-	Nagaland Baptist Churches Council
N.C.N.	-	National Convention of Nagaland
N.F.A.	-	Naga Federal Army
N.F.G.	-	Naga Federal Government
N.M.A.	-	Naga Mothers' Association
N.N.C.	-	Naga National Council
N.N.D.P.	-	Naga National Democratic Party
N.N.O.	-	Naga Nationalist Organisation
N.N.P.	-	Naga National Party
N.P.C.	-	Naga Peoples' Convention
N.P.P.	-	Naga Peoples' Party
N.S.C.N.	-	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
N.S.F.	-	Naga Students' Federation
U.D.F.	-	United Democratic Front
U.F.N.	-	United Front of Nagaland
U.L.P.	-	United Legislative Party.

The increasing Frequency of Elections and it's association with the common masses have undermined it's significance in the political process. Electioneering have come to be taken for granted without probing into it's deeper meaning and characteristics. Beneath it's exterior image projected as just a mere part of the political process, remains the basic structure of mechanism that makes the working of democratic political process possible. In fact, today, apart from the issues debated by various parties during election, the entire process of democracy rules around this central point that is, Election. With the onset of Modern Representative Democracy, Election have become the central and the most important aspect of Democracy. It's important place in the process of Democracy could be clearly understood by tracing back the history of Democracy and it's development into a perfect and popular ideal for the masses.

1. THEORETICAL CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS

The Origin of Democracy is rooted in the Ancient times ever since it was theorized by the Ancient greek Philosophers and others. Since then, people of all

generation have loved and clinged to it's ideals. It is undeniable that it's ideals have a unique charm that has drawn masses and supporters to it. At the same time, masses have revolted for it and strived to make it exist and function against the strong opposition of the various forms of Autocratic rulers that have guardedly stood firm in defending it's powers and position. The underlying reason for the strength of this ideal is it's central theme which is Man. Man is the 'end' rather than 'means'. Following this, human values and welfare of man are it's essence. Democracy, therefore covers every aspects of human life be it Politics, Social, Economic, Morality and so on. It cannot be restricted to a single aspect of humankind. Rather, it has to encompass every aspects of society, which is the largest institution of man. Because, "... no society can call itself democratic if it uses democratic method in some fields and autocratic method in others."¹ The fallacy is that, democracy has been understood mostly in terms of political process. This projects a very narrow and limited scope of Democracy. The error however, is gradually diminishing by the rise of Welfare State theory in modern times. Defending this point of view, Asirvatham Eddy, a reknowned political scientist and writer, writes, "In

1. Bhandari, Kusumlata, India: Electoral Reforms, New Delhi, Shiv Lal, Election Archives, 1988 p.2.

addition to being a form of government and a type of state, democracy is an order of society. A democratic society is one in which the spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity prevails."²

This ideal deals with the basic nature of mankind and seeks to create a condition that would enable man to be at his best, enriching his life irrespective of any particular aspects of society. Therefore, it follows that no activities is more important than the other. Rather, every activities are essential to man and that this basic ideal has to permeate in each and all to serve mankind better. At the same time, in the process, it's real potentialities as an ideal principle could be realised. Stressing on the basic and all encompassing nature of the ideal, Maxey, in his "Political Philosophies" writes, Democracy "is a search for a way of life in which the voluntary free intelligence and activity of man can be harmonised and coordinated with the least possible coercion, and it is the belief that such a way of life is the best way for all mankind, the way that is most in keeping with the nature of man and the nature of universe."³

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2. Asirvatham Eddy Political Theory op. cit. p.373. in Bhandari, K., op.cit., p.2.
 3. "Democracy", in Notes on Political Theory, Saint Xavier's College, Ranchi, 1981, p.61.

Notwithstanding its broadbased and noble nature, it was either strictly limited to politics and statecraft in the Ancient Greek city-states or opposed and repressed vehemently throughout the past history by autocratic rulers. It was only in the 18th century, a very long period after its "discovery" that the concept of modern democracy originated from the time of the French Revolution. While the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution prepared the ground for Democracy,⁴ the French Revolution sowed its seeds.⁵ Thereafter, it spread rapidly all over the world. Besides this, it attained varied and different forms shaped and modified by people of various regions to adapt to the peculiar characteristics and needs of the region. Needless to say, it was glorified, so much so that almost every other form of government was scorned at and were either crushed by revolution or sacked of its real powers. Democracy had finally established itself in the consciousness of man and his society. However, all these historic developments mostly revolved around the establishment of a democratic polity. It might have been too early to be concerned of other aspects of Democracy. Practically so, as it is quite impossible to

4. H.G. Wells, Outline of World History, London 1941 in Bhandari, K., op. cit., p.1.

5. Nehru. J. Glimpses of World History, New Delhi, 1912. Bhandari, K. op. cit. p.1.

have Socio-Economic Democracy in the full sense under a non-democratic political system. This also means that political democracy has to come first and prepare the base for other aspects of Democracy to nurture and grow. This highlights the importance of Political aspect of Democracy in comparison to the others.

As a philosophy as well as in it's working, the growth and development of Democracy is slow, gradual and evolutionary, with no set principles or direction depending much on the circumstances, time and attitudes of the people. Against this background, it can be said that it is only recently in this century that the democratic ideals so far practical only in political arena have gradually being made to spread into other socio-economic aspects as well. K. Bhandari notes that "While Democracy has made great strides in the social and political fields, it has made little heading in the economic or industrial fields."⁶ This implies that the political aspect of Democracy is still the most prominent one.

In the course of it's development, Political Democracy have shifted from Direct Democracy to Representative Democracy of the modern nation-States. The former is the

6. Bhandari, K., op. cit. p.1.

purest form of democracy that ensures the direct participation of all the citizens in running the political machinery. But this is not conducive for a large nation-state. The people as a whole are too numerous and too inexperienced and incapable to have a decisive vote in the government and administration. Therefore, that task is entrusted to the selective "few", who are the representatives chosen by the people to formulate and express the will of the people in running the government. There has been many philosopher and thinkers of our time who have defined Democracy on these lines. A.V. Dicey has appropriately stated that "Democracy" is a form of government in which the governing body is comparatively a large fraction of the entire nation."⁷ Similarly, J.S. Mill writes, "Democracy is that form of government in which the whole of the people or some numerous portion of it, exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected by themselves."⁸ However, Mayo goes further in his definition to include the conditions necessary for selecting the representatives. He says, "A democratic political system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis,

7. Reddy, Dr. Agarela and Ram, Dr.D.Sundar, Electoral Reforms in India, New Delhi, Uppal Publishing House 1992. "Democracy and Indian Electoral System: Need for Reforms", p.17.

8. Ibid., p.18.

by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom."⁹ From the above, we can sum up that "Election" is the corner stone of Representative Democracy. The former lends substance, vitality and viability to the latter and the latter is the *raison d'être* of the former.¹⁰ It's contribution to democracy is manifold. A few basics of them are, it provides Representatives, offers choices for governments, makes government, Influences policy, strengthen political elites, Educate voters and most importantly adds legitimacy to the representative government. Besides these, there can be undoubtedly more to add to it's list of contributions. W.J.M. Mackenzie in his book "Free Elections" has listed two more contributions of Elections. He points out that though free Election is not a supreme end, they are just a device of the highest value because there is no other better political contrivance like it for securing in large societies two conditions necessary for the maintenance of government in any society. The two conditions are, First elections can create a sentiment of popular consent and participation in public Affairs even when government is so

9. Jain, M.P., Political Theory, New Delhi, Authors Guild, 1989, p.444.

10. P.C. Baral, "Electoral Reforms in India: Why and How", Reddi, Dr.Agarela and Ram, Dr.D.Sundar, *op.cit*, p.127,

complex as to be beyond the direct understanding of the ordinary citizens. Secondly, election can provide for orderly succession in government by the peaceful transfer of authority to new rulers when the time comes for the old rulers to go, because of morality or because of failure.¹¹ In the light of these two conditions, we come to the conclusion that there are certain preconditions for holding fair elections. Firstly, the electorate have to be politically educated, well-informed of the issues involved in the elections, Besides, he has to literate to understand the new and intricate issues that crop up during each election. This will lead him to participate actively in the electoral and political process which is also the second precondition. Thirdly, elections should be held periodically. In other words, it should be provided and guaranteed by the constitution of the state. Finally, the most important precondition is that Elections should he held in a really free atmosphere. It means, the presence of freedom for the voters to exercise their franchise in a free atmosphere where there is political equality, freedom of speech and opinion, and a total absence of coercion upon the peoples' opinion by vested groups or parties.¹² These four preconditions are the basic and most important criterias for a successful election.

11. Mackenzie, W.J.M; Free Elections, New York, Rhinehardt and Company, 1958, p.13.

12. Ibid.

However, akin to the process of growth and development of Democracy, the electoral process, system and it's rules guiding them have not remained static. It has changed with the changing times. The agents of these changes are judicial interpretations, constitutional amendments and political traditions and culture of the political parties. Universal Adult Franchise based on the Benthamite principle of "One man, One vote"¹³ have been greatly amended by reducing the voting rights to the lowest limit of eighteen years, thus ensuring that the maximum number of electorate gets to be represented. Regulations to control Election Expenditures, booth capturing, intimidation of candidates and voters, are other instances which reflect the changing scenario of Electoral process. Meanwhile, the electorate too have become politically conscious leading him to participate actively in the political process. This and various other factors have created a rather confusing and complex situation thus necessitating timely adjustments in the electoral process and system. Consequently, it has changed the electoral system and processes and in the process have revealed the innate nature of political system. For, as Norman D. Palmer states, "Elections are particularly conspicuous and

13. P.C. Baral, "Electoral Reform in India: Why and How?", in Reddi, Dr. A. and Ram, Dr. S., op.cit., p.17.

revealing aspects of most contemporary political systems. They highlight and dramatize a political system, bringing it's nature into sharp relief and providing insights into other aspects of the system and the basic nature and actual functioning of the system as a whole..."¹⁴

Today, election is no longer restricted to only the function of providing a platform for choosing representatives. It's purpose and significance have increased manifold, due to the growing number of factors that's influencing it. It's significance in the Democratic process and the need for it to cope with new challenges in order to provide better performance has caused various Electoral Reform Projects to be initiated.

2. ELECTION PROVISIONS IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Election in India is comparatively new in contrast to that of Developed countries such as U.S.A., U.K. and France. Because unlike these countries, India's parliamentary democracy have no history of evolutionary growth. To some extent, it's historical background could be traced back to the Acts of 1919 and 1935 when the British introduced a limited form of Adult Franchise and participation in the

14. Reddi, Dr.A.and Ram, Dr.S, op.cit., p.2.

governance of the country. But this is negligible and do not serve as a basis of origin for our parliamentary democracy.

The actual history of India's democracy starts with the framing of the constitution after independence. Even though the Indian constitution was a product of the research and deliberations of a body of eminent representatives of the people, who sought to improve upon the existing systems of Administration of the erstwhile British regime as well as borrowing various features from other Constitutions, it provided the framework for a body politic much needed by a newly independent nation. The known fact that our constitution is the lengthiest serves to prove the need felt by the constituent framers to lay the foundation of every aspect and feature of a parliamentary democracy due to the lack of any political and historical background upon which the political system could have eventually developed. Thus, with a chequered history of disunity, invasions, British rule and consequently the absence of an evolutionary political foundation, India had to seek its political foundation in no other place than the constitution of the new nation. To a large extent, it has appeared to make up by including almost every aspect within a parliamentary system.

The inclusion of "Democratic Republic" in the Preamble of the constitution sufficiently indicate the provision for

a Parliamentary system of government with an Elected head of State. The rest of the features follow from this by adopting and adapting various features of similar system prevailing in other parts of the world. Making a departure from the usual practice of constitution to leave election as a comparatively unimportant subject to be dealt with by the legislature, the constitution of India has provided a separate chapter on Elections in Part XV of the constitution, Articles 324 to 329.¹⁵

Article 324 provides for the setting up of an Election Commission, its composition, appointments, condition and tenure of service, with a special emphasis on the Chief Electoral Officer's immunity from impeachment except in the like of Supreme Court judges etc.

Article 325 contains provision for one general Electoral roll for every territorial constituency.

Article 326 provides for Universal adult Franchise uptill the age of 18 as amended in 1989.¹⁶ While Article 327 gives parliament ultimate power to make laws regarding

15. M.V. Pylee, "Indian's Constitution", 1979 in Bhandari, K., op.cit., p.15.

16. Ranghavan and Balachandran Forty Years of Worlds Largest Democracy, New Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1990, p.5.

elections to parliament, state legislatures and preparation of Electoral roles. The state has concurrent powers in these matters. The powers under Articles 327 and 328 are safeguarded by constitution by denying any interference by courts and it's immunity from being called in question in any courts except by election petition.¹⁷

The Representative of the people Acts of 1950 and 1951 (as amended by the Representative (Amendments) Act 1966) lay down the election procedure and also provide for the composition of the legislatures.¹⁸ Besides, it covers other aspects of election such as defining corrupt practices as well as electoral offenses.

The constitution by providing for the same structure of government both in the centre as well as the states have subsequently provided for the same procedure of elections except in certain cases where the need to alter arises. By doing so, it has ensured a unified electoral system in the country. The reluctance of the state legislatures to make regulations by law with regard to state election inspite of the provision given in Article 328 of the constitution have further ensured a single unified electoral system thus giving uniformity in the matter through-out the country.

17. Bhandari, K., op.cit, p.17.

18. Ibid., p.34.

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17. Bhandari, K., op.cit, p.17.

18. Ibid., p.34.

Other basic features of the electoral system are, each territorial constituency is single seated while each State Assembly constituency have a population of around six thousand. The method used is First-Past-the-Post-System (FPTP) except for few selective posts. Voting is by secret ballot for the electorates till the lower limit of 18. Electoral Rolls are prepared by the Election Commission. With a Multi- Party System, the election system has a very competitive atmosphere during elections often causing confusions, disputes and conflicts. The scenario of Indian Elections are changing fast uniformly in every states as well as in the national perspective. Guided by the same law, the ill effects and defects in the system is also equally creating havoc with the political system nation-wide in terms of degrees. There are other social-economic factors responsible for these too. But the electoral system itself bears the main responsibility. Most importantly, Political traditions, political parties and eroding political culture have been the main causes for the difficulties of the electoral system to function efficiently. In the light of this election scenario in the national perspective, one can understand state politics and elections and the turmoils and problems faced by the states.

3. BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF NAGALAND

The state of Nagland is thirty years old. It was formed on 1st December, 1963, out of the territory of the erstwhile Naga hills-Tuensong Area (NHTA). With a territory of 16,579 sq. kms, it is located in the eastern most corner of North-East India on the border with Myanmar. It touches the boundaries of three of the seven sister-states of the North east, specifically Arunachal Pradesh in the North, Assam in the west and Manipur in the south while the eastern side is bordered by the international boundary with Myanmar. It's population of 12,155,73 (1991 census) is entirely tribal consisting of various Naga tribes which is constitutionally recognised as scheduled tribes. On the other hand, there is a sizeable Naga population consisting of various tribes (32-odd) living outside Nagaland proper in the neighbouring states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Myanmar in the areas contiguous to the state boundaries of Nagaland.¹⁹ In it's thirty years of statehood, many changes and development in the social political and Economic aspects have taken place at a a fast pace with a measure of confusion and puzzlement. Beneath the status of a state within the Indian constitution, it's political turmoils arising out of the age old sovereignty demands of the

19. Horam. M., Naga Insurgenc - The Last Thirty Years New Delhi, Cosmo Publication, 1988, p.10.

Nationalists continue, creating a conflicting politics between parliamentary Democratic politics of the state apparatus and the politics of the Nationalist Organisations such as NNC, NSCN etc. While this has created political turmoils in the last three decades, it has also shaped the outcome of state politics to a great extent. As is the fact today, the parallel politics of Nationalist Organisations continue to influence the present and future course of the Nagas' future and also that of state politics.

Basically, the present status of state and its politics was the outcome of Nationalist activities. This suggest a peculiar state politics unlike the rest of the states in the Indian Union, which is rooted in the political historical background dating back to pre-state period and beyond. The political culture and tradition too are rooted on the same background. As such, it will be impossible to understand the peculiar politics of the state via-a-vis the centre and National Politics without a reference to its past.

The Naga People do not have a political history of its own. Since time immemorial, inter-tribal warfare have compelled them to live in relatively isolated conditions. The only known administrative structures are village democracies headed by a hereditary chief appointed from

amongst the body of village elders. Decisions on various issues are taken on the basis of consensus. However small, this administrative structure was efficient in maintaining order in the society, while giving due amount of freedom in respect of every fields to the village population. This ensured a tightly knit village societies that withstood time and challenges. Significantly, this traditional method of keeping order in society have seemed to determine the Naga people's concept of authority and subsequently politics in the modern era.

It was not until the coming of the British that all the Nagas were unified under one administrative control. One positive contribution of the British for the Nagas was unifying all the tribes though unintentionally and only for their administrative convenience, which ultimately laid the ground for the latter to come together under one political platform and steer the course of the Nagas' political history. The advent of the British into Naga hills in 1832 following the 1826 Yandaboo treaty with Burma and Manipur Raja, was soon followed by fierce wars with Nagas villages and thereafter gradual consolidation of it's authority over the Naga areas. Though this was done primarily to protect it's economic interest in the plain areas of Assam from the raiding Nagas, circumstances, compelled it to gradually

establish its administrative centres, first in Samaguting (Chumukedima) in 1866, Kohima in 1876 thereafter spreading to other areas. Subsequently, the Naga hills district was formed in 1866. However, except for political control, they exercised no control over other socio-economic matters and thus, the people were virtually left alone in these matters making no impact for socio-economic development. A few regulations such as Innerline Regulation Act was passed. As such the Nagas received only legal attention from the British government.

While economy remained untouched throughout the British rule, social development were attended to by the British Christian Missionaries. Education was imparted on modern lines through schools while at the same time religious preaching taught the people new social ethics in contrast to the traditional customs and beliefs. "Christianity and the Western education it brought with it, which combined the christian ideas of universal love with the political and social beliefs of western liberalization, no doubt helped the individual to overcome the negative aspects of tribal isolationism..."²⁰ It also led to emergence of the educated middle class that were to later lead the people on political issues.

20. Mishra, Udayon, North East India Quest for Identity, New Delhi, Omson's Publication, 1988, p.26.

As a result of these Developments, the first organisation of the Nagas, "Naga Club" was instituted in 1918 by a few educated nagas. Though mainly a social set-up, it also took up political issue as evident from the memorandum it submitted to the 1929 Simon Commission in which they demanded certain political arrangements for the nagas in the near future. This was soon followed by the formation of various Tribal councils in the twenties. In 1945, C.R. Pawsey then D.C. of Naga Hills formed the Naga Hills District Tribal Council (NHDTTC) by bringing together all the Tribal councils with the purpose of uniting all the nagas and preparing a common platform. This was a bold initiation which provided impetus to the unity of all Nagas. As in can be seen, in no time, this organisation was converted into Naga National Council (N.N.C) in 1946. From then on, the Naga Politics took it's roots under the leadership of N.N.C.

The era of politics beginning with the N.N.C formation greatly shaped the political history of the Nagas through it's activities leading to another phase of politics with the formation of Nagaland state. Purely a political organisation, the N.N.C. demanded a sovereign political unit throughout it's struggle. In the seventeen years between it's information and grant of statehood, the "prickly Naga

problem began to emerge in early 1947" on the "open-ended commitments specially of the last point of the 9-point Hydari Agreement signed in June 1947."²¹ As a result of this, the N.N.C. led by A.Z. Phizo declared Nagaland sovereign Independent state on 14th August 1947, just a day before Indian independence day.²² Subsequently, the continuous failure of the centre to meet the demands of the N.N.C. compelled the latter to announce the boycott of the two general elections of 1952 and 1957. The continuous deadlock between the Indian Government and the N.N.C. gradually created a tense atmosphere deteriorating in 1953 and thereafter. Violence erupted and Police and army patrol intensified. At this stage, a few N.N.C. leaders were reported to have gone underground due to the order to arrest them. Consequently, the innocent people were the victims of the outbreak of Political turmoil.

At this stage, an important event took place that determined the course of two parallel political force which we have today as the State Politics and the Nationalist Politics. The N.N.C. came to be divided between the extremist pro-Phizo which tightened it's demand and the

21. Horam, M., Naga Politics, Seminar paper presented at Nagaland House, New Delhi,

22. Luithui and Haksar Nagaland File, New Delhi, Lancerns International, 1984, p.22.

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Moderates that sought peaceful non-violent methods to settle the political issue. Their difference grew acute in 1955. Finally, with the murder of Sakhrie, a moderate, in 1956, the two factions parted company almost for good.²³ While the N.N.C extremists took to open armed confrontation with the government agents i.e. Armies and sticking to it's demand for complete sovereignty, the moderate faction under Jasokie, T.N. Angami etc. pursued peaceful constitutional methods. As early as 1955, the Moderates had demanded the reorganisation of the N.N.C. on peaceful lines.²⁴ Eventually, they formed a Reforming committee chaired by T. Nakhro. It issued a statement on 18 February 1957 opposing violence and extremist methods thus giving a formal confirmation on the split between the two factions.

The Moderates' Reforming committee cooperated with the Indian Government sending three candidates unopposed to Assam Legislative Assembly in the Second General Election of 1957.²⁵ Meanwhile, the appalling conditions of the people inflicted by turmoil and the government's willingness to concede to certain constitutional demands to solve the

23. Yonuo, Asoso, The Rising Nagas, Delhi, Vivek Publishing House, 1974, p.214.

24. Op.cit., p.213.

25. Op.cit., p.222.



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crisis and also it's subsequent encouragement made the Moderates to organize the First Naga Peoples' convention (NPC) in August 1957 which was representative in character. As a result of this convention, Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) was created on 1st December, 1957, as a separate administrative unit under the External Affairs Ministry to be administered by the governor of Assam. It had three districts namely, Kohima, Mokokchung and Tuensang. This was the foundation for the creation of the state. In the second N.P.C. held in May 1958, efforts were made through an appointed Liaison Committee to contact the Extremist underground and get it's opinion in the constitutional demands. With no response, the N.P.C. went ahead and drafted the 16 point memorandum demanding statehood within India.

The third and final N.P.C. held in October 1959 adopted the memorandum. A year later, the final decision of granting the status of state was announced in August 1960 and passed by Parliament in 1962. The state came into being on 1st December 1963.

The Moderates though at the initial stage were insignificant, received mass support after the successful first convention. This took the limelight away from the undergrounds for a while. They emerged as the new leaders of the people. By the grant of statehood, they had established

themselves as leaders. Meanwhile, the N.N.C resorted to more violent methods and though still undeclared unlawful, was occupied in the undeclared war with the armed forces. The moderates too were the target of N.N.C's propaganda and criticisms. On the threshold of entering the next phase of political history i.e. statehood, there was a seeming contest between the two factions over the question of which political pursuit either that of the "Federal Government" of the N.N.C. or the state structure envisaged would be a practical solution to the peoples' political aspirations and problems. The politics of both took roots apart sowing the seeds for the growth of parallel politics equally strong in influencing the naga people. The opposing camps only caused an obstacle for the normal development of state's politics in a specific direction thus confusing the people as well as having to bear the consequences of political turmoils.

The Nationalists still remains a strong force till today, influencing the entire society as a whole as well as the state politics. Over the years, many changes have taken place in this camp. However, it has become a formidable force and continues to be a major factor in state's politics while at the same time reiterating it's single most important demand for sovereignty. On the other hand, parliamentary democracy has slowly taken root in the state.

Meeting all the challenges of inexperience, unstable political periods, difficulties of adapting to a new political system etc., state politics have survived, and nearing maturity. Today, like all the rest of the states in India, it faces major problems and difficulties that arises within a modern political system. In the 30 years of statehood, it has created a new political history consisting of the electorates, political parties and programmes, elections and formation of governments. On the threshold of it's maturity, it is left to the people in making the right decision.

4. ELECTION IN NAGALAND (1964-1982)

It was not till the coming into being of the nagas under a compact administration structure that they got the opportunity to experience electioneering. The British provided only legal administrative service to a limited extent. Even being placed as a hill district under Assam offered limited opportunity. While, the boycott call given by the N.N.C. took away the chances of participating in the 1952 and 1957 general elections. No franchise was exercised in both these elections, though, three candidates were returned unopposed in the 1957 election. Thus, it was only after the formation of state that elections came to be experienced. But the progress since then have been dramatic.

Elections in the state are conducted normally according to the constitutional provisions. Till date, eight elections have been held including the recently concluded 15 February 1993 Assembly election. The political instability has necessitated the holding of frequent election than what is normal for a period of three decades. The Election commission was set up in 1962 and along with it the periodical revision of Electoral Rolls and Delimiting seats had ensured the normal functioning of Electoral process.

The state had only three districts in 1964 among which, Tuensang was placed in a separate category. Out of 46 seats in the Assembly, 40 were in Mokokchung and Kohima districts while 6 seats were reserved for Tuensang district under Clause (a) of sub-section II of Nagaland Act 1962.²⁶ Then, representatives of the reserved seats were to be chosen by members of the Tuensang Regional Council from among its members. This provision was duly amended and the number of seats increased to 12 by the Act 61 of 1968 raising the strength of the Assembly to 52.²⁷ In 1974, the three districts were reorganized into seven districts and the total seats were increased to 60 under the provision of

26. Report on the Second Assembly Election, Nagaland, 1969, Published by Chief Electoral Officer Government of Nagaland, p.3.

27. Op.cit., p.3.

Section 8 of the Delimitation Act 1972.²⁸ For the first time, Tuensang seats were deserved and open for contest. At present, the distribution of seats in each district stands as follows:

	DISTRICT	SEATS
1)	KOHIMA	14
2)	TUENSANG	11
3)	MOKOKCHUNG	10
4)	MON	9
5)	ZUNHEBOTO	7
6)	PHEK	5
7)	WOKHA	4
	STATE TOTAL	60

Out of 60 seats, only one seat is open to non-locals. The rest are contested only by the local candidates. Though the state has a multiparty system, practically, the main contest is between two main rival parties namely Congress (I) national party and any stronger Regional party or amongst them. Electoral politics is gaining momentum as we can see from the records of the present and preceding elections. Before

28. Report on the third Assembly election, Nagaland, 1974,
Published by Chief Electoral Officer Government of
Nagaland, p.7.

1982, four elections were held. A brief reference of each would serve to make one understand the elections beyond 1982, the scope of this study.

(a) First Assembly Election (1964)

The first Assembly Election of 1964 heralds the beginning of Electoral politics of the state. From this period onwards, the state has carved out for itself a politics that has its impact and implications on the people within its boundaries. Until then, Elections and state politics were mostly confined in the larger arena of Assam state where the people was only a minute part and therefore, politics and election had no impact on the people. As such, the new situation brought in an era of purely state politics that involved the whole Naga masses.

An electorate of 1,24,231 voted for the 40 assembly seats spread over two districts. Polling was recorded at 76.4%²⁹ and was heavier in rural areas often as high as 95% in some constituencies in Mokokchung. Out of 59 candidates, a record 14 were returned uncontested. The Naga National Organisation (NNO) a registered party, composed of most of

29. Report on the First Assembly Election Nagaland, 1964,
Published by Chief Electoral Officer Government of
Nagaland,

the moderate members from the erstwhile Naga Peoples Convention and the Democratic Party (D.P.) formed by A. Kevichusa were the only two parties contesting along with a few number of Independents. The distribution of seats after the elections were, N.N.O-26, D.P.12 and Independents 2. Later, the two independents and six nominated members from Tuensang district joined the N.N.O which formed the ministry with a strength of 34 headed by Mr. P. Shilu Ao. He was the Chief Executive Councillor of the erstwhile Interim government.

However successful, the election was held under the threat of the Extremist undergrounds. For the N.N.O. it was not only an electoral victory but also a victory in successfully accomplishing it's goal of leading the people and the state into a new era of democratic process as well as establishing it's leadership as the spokesman of the people as a whole. Much of future politics depended on the N.N.O's initial role as a political party as it set the political tradition from the first year of statehood. Having a good rapport with the centre, it occupied an important place in state politics. Moreover, since it was also the only agent of communication for the centre with the Naga public. The role of N.N.O. could not be undermined since it proved itself to be the only hope for unity, peace and progress in the initial period.

The position of N.N.O. was consolidated after the en-bloc resignation of 12 of the D.P. legislators 10 months after the election. As a result, the first By-Election was held in 1966 in which all the 12 seats were won by N.N.O. The term was therefore virtually a one party rule.

On coming to power, settlement for peace was the first initiative of the N.N.O.; With the initiative of the Church which constituted the Peace Mission in January 1964, and the cooperation of the N.N.O. ministry, the Cease-fire Agreement was signed on 24 May 1964 between the underground and the government of India. The agreement which lasts for a month was extended each time for a long spell. This brought about a spell of peace in the state. Describing the situation then, Kranti Sen comments, "If peace is a negative concept meaning a mere absence of continued clash of arms over an entire area, peace prevails in the state. If, however, peace has a positive meaning, signifying freedom from fear and anxiety for the future, from that uneasy feeling that one is living in an hourly danger of a fresh eruption of violence the situation is far from peaceful. It may perhaps be called a 'state of peace' as opposed to a 'state of war'".³⁰ Though there were still a few incidences of clashes between the Army and the undergrounds the overall atmosphere was relatively peaceful in contrast to the preceding years.

30. Mainstream, 13 April, 1968, p.9.

The paradox in the present situation is that, even after assuming power, the first ministry had no say over the nationalist political issue. They were not recognised by the nationalist and as such were kept out of major dealings on this issue by the undergrounds. Rather, it was the Church members and the Peace mission that wielded much influence over the issue. On the whole, there were still doubts as to whether the people have really accepted the authority of the new government. In spite of the fact that it is in a better position, the people were still sympathetic to the N.N.C. The underlying reasons are the overwhelming influence of the N.N.C. and its programme on the consciousness and sentiments of the people. As the first political organisation, it had captured the imagination and faith of the people in its programme much before the democratic political organisation came into being. Besides, the present democratic structure originating out of the deadlock between the demands of the N.N.C. and the staunch opposing stand of the Government of India did not help the new political party in power to receive massive support against the interest of the N.N.C. which had openly declared the new ministry of the political party to be unrepresentative and unrecognised. This resulted into a period of uncertainty. The people were undecided as to which of the two were more legalised to be the representative of the people. The question remained as

to how to shift the loyalty, sympathy and support once reposed in the older N.N.C. organisation to the new political organisation claiming to be the legitimate and representative leader of the people. The period was one of decisive moment. The choice was between two different course. The absence of a clear-cut decision left the two opposite camps to exercise their influence and authority paradoxically. There were areas where the state government's writ runs during the day and the underground's during the night.³¹ The situation compelled the new ministry to tread cautiously in establishing it's authority. For most part of the period, the ministry confined itself to normal administrative procedures and setting up of state administrative structure. Summing up, it's single role during this period was making it's presence felt in the state, specifically, the new democratic system it was associated with and state power.

Midway through the term, Mr. P.Shilu was replaced by Mr. T.N.Angami as the second Chief Minister. This was the first of the precedent that was to follow later in every term of each election creating instability in state politics. The second ministry completed the rest of the term without any hindrances.

31. Mainstream, 13 April, 1968, p.38.

(b) Second Assembly Elections (1969)

The second assembly election was held amidst a political situation of uncertainty and violence as the one prevailing in the last few years. Despite the 1964 Cease fire agreement, arson, clashes, sabotage of government property and so on continued. Fresh batches of newly recruited underground were sent for training in neighbouring countries while the N.N.C revamped itself militarily and organisation. The cease fire was breached by both sides. Even the Peace mission was dismantled by the Centre soon after the cease fire was in operation. During the same period there were six round of talks between the Centre and N.N.C. in between 1966-67, which failed badly. With the stalemate in finding a solution and weak position of the state government, the political situation was one of Status Quo. While the Nationalist activities continued, the state machinery went through the next election.

The total member of Assembly seats were raised to 52 but the contested seats remained at 40. As in the past, there were only two parties contesting the elections. On one side was the N.N.O. while on the other side was United Front of Nagaland (UFN). U.F.N. was formed newly by A.Kevichusa, the leader of the dissolved Democratic party. It was earlier dissolved with the intention of paving the way for

underground talks with centre to run smoothly after the cease fire agreement. However, with the failure of the talks and the consequent stalemate, the ex-D.P.members reformed the party under a new name. As such it's party policies and ideological stand were the same as before. A remarkable development in this election was, the number of contestants had gone up to 144 out of which N.N.O. filed 40, U.F.N. for 30 seats while the rest were independent candidates.

The number of electorates also increased by 42.42% to 1,76,931. Unlike in the previous election, all the seats were contested signifying a more politically active and conscious society. Polling had slightly improved at 78.4%. In the outcome, N.N.O. secured 22 seats while U.F.N. and independents secured 10 and 8 seats respectively. But the N.N.O. scrapped through the power by bringing into it's fold the 12 nominated members from Tuensang district and the Independents.³² Significantly, a hint of political rivalry could be noticed for the first time within a political party specifically N.N.O. when Mr.Hokishe the new leader and Chief Minister ousted his near rival ex-Chief Minister T.N.Angami. This almost threatened the unity of the ruling party. The factor in Hokishe's favour was his apparent influence over

32. Lal, Shiv., Election Archives, No.18, April-June, 1974, p.44.

the new moderate faction of the N.N.C. led by Kughato Sukhai in which hopes were placed that the former would manages to bring them overground.³³ But more significantly, it indicated the trend of rivalry and leadership crisis that were to come about in the party in future under the newly aligned party, Congress (I).

The victory of the N.N.O. was officially hailed both inside and outside parliament as a demonstrative evidence of the Naga vote for a union with the rest of the country.³⁴ But this was far from truth. In the words of Kranti Sen, "It is a fact that they do no want the peace to be disturbed. But it is equally true that majority of the Nagas are not prepared to give up the demand for sovereignty. The allurements of a Sovereign "Federal Republic of Nagaland" is still overpowering in for many of them".³⁵ His impression of the naga psychology in the present context is justifiable. In spite of a repeated show of a high democratic participation, Nagas have always retained their sympathies for the Nationalist organisation. The continuing disturbed conditions attests the validity of the facts.

33. Ratan, Rudra, "Latestest trend in Nagaland", Mainstream, 24 September 1969, p.33.

34. Mainstream, Art. cit., p.33.

35. Kranti, Sen, "Peking in Shadow Over Nagaland", in Mainstream, 13 April, 1968, p.38.

The coming into power of the N.N.O. did not improve the situation. In its first six months of rule, the law and order situation continued to deteriorate. This term also saw the beginning of manipulative politics over the elected members and ministry by the underground. Following the assassination attempt on Hokishe in 1972, the Centre imposed the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967. Consequently, more or less as a sign of siding with the underground, some members of N.N.O. defected to the opposite party U.F.N. in 1972. This was a set back for the N.N.O. in the next election. To make matters worst, the centre took a strong stand and came down heavily on the undergrounds. The Cease-fire agreement which has been ensuring a relatively peaceful atmosphere for the past few years were not renewed despite requests from every section of society. Under the Act imposed, the Army was given special powers to deal with the undergrounds. This worsened the situation. Under a tense situation, the term came to an end. The single most outstanding feature of this ministry was that in the entire political history of the state, it completed the term under the same leader and the cabinet.

(c) Third Assembly Election (1974)

The period between the 1974 election and 1977 election

is the most eventful period in the state's political history. Many important events happened in a synchronized pattern. Each had its impact on both the state's political process as well as the nationalist organisation and its movement. In a short period, all the disturbing developments were over, but it altered the course of the two parallel politics while at the same time consolidating each of them in their own line of politics. For state politics, it marked the beginning of a heightened political activity and increasing nationalisation in the Indian Perspective. On the other hand, the accord signed during this period sounded a temporary death knell for the nationalist movement, so far led by the N.N.C., which was revived by a few leaders apposed to the Accord under the newly formed group National Socialist Council of Nagaland (N.S.C.N.). It marked a distinct departure from the previous organisation in that it was invigorated, well-trained in arm and organisation and followed a distinct and clear-cut ideology and policy in achieving its aim. Along with the above, other ill effects of democratic politics such as defections, ministerial instability, corruption, nepotism, took its roots in the state. The period provides an overall reflection of the current politics.

The polling took place for three days in February. There was a raise of 124% in the electorates mainly due to

the inclusion of Tuensang district in the direct election process after the expiry of its 10 years reserved provision and the increase of the Assembly seats thereby, to 60 under Delimitation Act 76 of 1972.³⁶ However, the polling percentage dropped to 75.34% the lowest among all the elections. In the same tradition, there were only two political parties in fray, the N.N.O. and the United Democratic Front (UDF). The latter was a reformed party composing of the erstwhile U.F.N. members and the 1972 N.N.O. dissidents. For the first time, the electoral fortunes changed sides for the two parties. The N.N.O. which had been in power for the last one decade lost to the U.D.F. securing only 23 seats. The U.D.F. won 25 seats while 12 seats went to the Independent candidates.

The victory of the U.D.F. was mainly due to the faults of the N.N.O. and not mainly through any well planned electoral strategy of the former. The faults lay on many factors in the last five years of the N.N.O. ministry. They are:

First, the Unlawful Activities (prevention) Act 1967, was promulgated in 1972 following the assassination attempt on Holshe, to curb the underground activities. At the same

36. Report on the third Assembly Election, Nagaland 1974, Published by Chief Electoral Officer Government of Nagaland, p.11.

time, the Cease-fire Agreement of 1964 which had been in force for the last ten years since it's signing was not extended for the same reason. These two factors turned back the clock on the underground which had so far been enjoying the lenient attitude of the government under the earlier arrangements. The present steps taken by the centre would now mean a rough time for the undergrounds. The link between these factors and the N.N.O. is that the centre supports and have good rapport with the N.N.O. and it's leaders, specially Mr. Hokishe. The failure of the ministry to convince the centre to dessist from taking such a step was seen as a weakness on the part of the ministry as well as getting back at the undergrounds for their attempt on Mr. Hokishe. The underground has strong public sympathy and any unfavourable treatment of them naturally tend to create disillusion among the people.

Secondly, the failure to repeal the Act and extend the cease-fire alienated the public as well as a section of N.N.O. legistors who defected to the opposition party. This created a split in the N.N.O. undermining it's unity and strength.

Third, the N.N.O. was gradually drawing closer to Centre through the Congress I which was in power at the centre. That, the Congress I patronise N.N.O. is an open

fact. The people so far was totally opposed to any association with Indianness as it would undermine their distinctness as separate entity as well as mean acceptance of India which is naturally against the nationalist movement and spirit. The failure to take steps to prevent the centre's strong policy on the underground strongly convinced the people that the party had lost it's concern for their own people and are toeing the line of an "alien" authority.

Fourth and last, it's decade of power at the state has considerably strengthened it's position. In the process, corruption had crept in into the rank and file of the party thereby eroding the party's credibility and efficiency. The opposition party made an issue out of this weakness in the election campaign of 1974 promising a cleaner government. This undoubtedly appealed to the people who were in search of an alternative government.

The UDF on coming to power, however faced obstacles in establishing it's credibility as a constitution abiding party convincing enough for the centre. It has often been labelled as the overground extension of the insurgents for it's sympathy for the undergrounds. Defending the party, it's president Mrs. Rano Shaiza called this "false allegation". The cause for this allegation was that some of it's members were ex-members of the underground. But the

argument is, almost every prominent leader have associated with the underground at some time or the other, since, this political movement was entwined with the society on the basis of Naga solidarity feeling. As a result, it was baseless to accuse only the U.D.F. The centre's doubt over the nature of the U.D.F. and for that matter, having an attitude of ostracizing the party is very much evident in the governor's behaviour prior to the formation of the ministry. In an interview, he admitted that he got "Categorically assured" by Mr. Vizol and others of his party, that they would stand by the constitution and integrity of India. He is also reported to have said, "If I had not got these assurances, even though the U.D.F. had a majority, I would have thought seriously if I could invite him (Mr. Vizol) to form the ministry".³⁷ It was ironical that the centre had to resort to such extra-constitutional method despite the party being elected through the legal constitutional process that has also legitimised it's electoral victory to occupy the seat of power. It was clear the centre was not attaching any deep political significance to the party's victory over it's more trustworthy ally.³⁸

37. Lal, Shiv., Election Archives, No.18, April-June, 1974, pp.46-47.

38. Op.cit., p.46.

Apart from its primary responsibility to clarify its identity, the U.D.F. had almost similar programmes as that of N.N.O. Before it could prove itself administratively, its ministry collapsed as a result of defection of seven of its members to the N.N.O. The machination of the centre is undoubted according to reports.³⁹ It was replaced by the N.N.O. ministry on March 1975, which also met the same fate due to counter defection just eight days after coming to power due to the disapproval of the people.⁴⁰

Thereafter, President's rule was imposed which continued for thirty two months.

During this period, five important events took place.

1. The Shillong Accord was signed on 11 November 1975, which led to the surrendering of arms and personnel of the underground. It was nearly the culmination of the Naga Movement. Vehemently apposed by a section of the underground, this section revived the movement in equal intensity under the new group National Socialist Council of Nagaland (N.S.C.N.) with a clear-cut ideology, programme and better organization. It later split into two factions.

39. Economic and Political Weekly, 15 April, 1975.

40. Economic and Political Weekly, 5 November, 1975 and 18 March, 1975.

2. In 1976, the N.N.O. merged into the Congress I. Consequently, it lost its regional identity and along with it, its massive traditional support that had stood by it due to its regional affinity and identity in the past. For the Congress I, there could not have been a better chance and method to step into state politics and guide the state into the national mainstream in line with its party policy. For, in the N.N.O., it found a ready made base to launch itself which could have been an insurmountable task of near impossibility for an outside national party to perform singly in a state that is openly opposed to any national intrusion into its territory.
3. A new regional party "National Covention of Nagaland" (NCN) was formed in 1977. Its entry in state politics would be crucial in realigning the party system and divide the Regional Votes in elections.
4. The U.D.F. won the 1977 Parliamentary (Rajya Sabha) Election. This boosted the image and credibility of the party's identity and morale.
5. The National Emergency imposed by the Congress Government came to an end in 1977 and the Janata party came to power at the centre. This had its impact on the state due to new party and power alignments between the centre and the state.

These development shaped the future course of politics in the later years.

(d) Fourth Assembly Election (1977)

On the expiry of the President's rule, this election was held in November 1977. The political environment prevailing in the state soon after the President rule was the same as that of the nation in the aftermath of the Emergency. After a long spell of lull, political activity picked up slowly just prior to the Election. The development in the past two years showed itself in the mood of the people which could be only justified as apprehensive of the future outcome. It is a probability that 'reason' had come to dominate the people's political consciousness thereafter as a result of the past dramatic political development and changes in the state. Taking into account the popularity of the N.N.C. in terms of tribal support it received as well as the deep attachment and feeling of oneness the people had for it, one could gauge the impact it would create on the people when it took the historic decision to sign the treaty. Leaving aside the question of morality of the accordists who have been vehemently criticized, the act itself have opened many doors of thoughts over the Naga political question revolving around 'logic' and 'reasoning' rather than 'right' or 'wrong'. State politics vis-a-vis

Naga nationalist politics was viewed in an objective perspective. In the end, the people accepted the facts and the reality of the situations, reasoning getting a hold of them. Though undoubtedly, their feelings and sympathies continued to be reposed on the Traditional institutional - like Nationalist Organisation, now carried on by the other sections of the N.N.C. and NSCN, they committed themselves to the democratic process of the State and made the effort to make the best use of it for the simple reason that for the time being, it was the only structure they could have, to provide them a normal life.

In the ensuing elections held in November 1977, there were three parties for the first time, - Congress I, U.D.F. and N.C.N. A record number of 220 contestants were in the fray. Polling was 83.27% the highest so far. On the whole, this election indicated a heightened political participation as indicated by the number of candidates, parties and the voters turnout. In the outcome, Congress I secured 15 seats, U.D.F. - 35, N.C.N. - 1 while 9 seats went to the Independent candidates.

The second successive victory of U.D.F. established it's position in the state. It's success was mainly due to the public sympathies after the premature end of its first ministry widely believed to have been the work of the

centre, the N.N.O. merger with Congress I and its new identity as a national party, and the prospect of having a non-Congress I government in the state at a time when the centre was in the hands of the Janata party. But despite its absolute majority, it collapsed mid-term owing to the large defection led by Mr. S.C. Jamir who later on formed, the U.D.F. (Progressive) party. On 29th March 1980, it aligned with Congress I and N.C.N. and formed the United Legislative Party (U.L.P.) and its ministry. However, it was short-lived lasting only 48 days due to the second wave of defections from the party to the parents U.D.F. party again. This paved the way for the U.D.F. to form the third ministry in the term. The U.L.P. later merged with Congress I.

The 1977 term was the most unstable with intense politicking so far. As a result, there were three ministries inter changing between parties and temporarily aligned parties. Mass defection took place for the first time setting a new trend for future politics. An important indication was that, in the past Shillong Accord, the realisation of the fate of Nationalist movement have prompted the leaders to direct their energy towards state politics that could offer them power, position and material benefits. The lucrative opportunities in the new set-up would invariably be the central rallying point around which the future politics would take shape and centre on.

5. NATURE OF STUDY

Election is a revealing aspect of Democracy. As much as it contributes to the successful and normal working of the Democratic process, it reveals the politics within it during the exercise of franchise. As a noted scholar of Election studies observed, during elections, when the contest between the parties is at a peak, the underlying politics of each party is challenged by it's rivals and put under debate, discussion and scrutinized by the people. This is just one revealing aspect. Another is, the political process is tested under the strain of Electioneering. Election is like a testing ground for Public opinions and the party system and political process. The outcome of Election bear many meanings of the underlying system and processes, signaling from time to time, it's condition. Election therefore, is a very significant feature related closely with politics and it's processes. In the words of Reddi, "Electoral politics is modern politics". In other words, they are intertwined and one.

In this study, I intend to research on Election and Politics in Nagaland. Specifically, my study centres on the linkages and influences between the two which had thereby shaped the pace and direction of state politics. In other words, the study is an attempt to understand the Electoral politics of the state in general.

For this purpose, I have selected for my case study, the Assembly elections of 1982, 1987 and 1989 for special reasons. Firstly, the party system had stabilized after two decades of turmoil and instability of party system and political process. The multi party system with two dominant rival parties was gradually taking firm roots. Secondly, political activity confined purely within the democratic structure and process had stepped up considerably by the turn of the 80's. Lastly, the entry of Congress in the state politics and it's emerging status set a new trend of politics which I have described as "Congress Trend" which influenced the state with the features of contemporary politics. This trend remained with the Congress till the mid-term of 1989 when it's ministry collapsed. But it's features remained imprinted on the political process, as can be seen from the general trend of politics and functioning of the non-Congress I governments thereafter. It is evident that it has determined the course of politics of the 80's and remained for the period afterwards. The stable long period of trend presented itself as a suitable adequate political atmosphere for study that would equally represent the meanings of the other election. For, to my mind, the state of 80's was a time when, the state politics had just reached a point midway between extreme isolation and National mainstream.

On the methodology for this research, I have not adopted any particular scientific methods for the simple reason that psephology is still new to India and is therefore, still in a formative state to be effectively used in the Indian context, specially for the states. A few western models based on two party system such as "Cube law" and Butler's "swing" have been adopted and modified to suit the Indian situation. But it has many limits for the Multiparty system in India. A recent successful method was devised by Prannoy Roy and Ashok Lahiri. They combined the "Swing" method, used to measure winning party's margin of victory, with their own "Split factor" a measuring index for opposition unity that determines a lot in splitting votes and thus the margin of victory of Indian elections. The principle behind this model is that, any change in the margin of victory of a party can be due to:

1. Swing factor i.e. a change in party's popularity, and,
2. Split factor i.e. a change in the unity of the opposition parties.

Though useful, I have not applied it's techniques for the state election but followed the principle of this model. In my analysis, I have used the traditional method in the study of these elections i.e. by critically analysing, the political history during and in the preceeding period of

each election as well as the Election outcome. [to analyse any election, it is necessary to set it against the past].
(Prannoy Roy)

The contents of this work has been divided into six chapters. The first highlights the aspects of Election and it's significance in the Democratic process. It also contains a brief political history of the state covering the period from pre-statehood to the Fourth Assembly election in 1977. This chapter is intended to serve as a background to throw a light on the electoral politics of the post 1980's, covered in the rest four chapters.

The second and third chapter deal exclusively with the political scenario, political parties, Election outcomes, Ministry formation, party realignments etc. of the Assembly elections of 1982, 1987 and 1989. In these chapters I have tried to establish and study the links between political situation and Election performance of parties.

The fourth chapter deals with the controversial President rule imposed on 7th August 1988. Here, the governor's dubious role in the exercise of his powers according to the Centre's directives, rather than in accordance with his constitutional obligation and duty have been extensively discussed.

In the fifth chapter, I have accumulated and discussed all the main factors that have influenced the Election in general and have been a major influence in shaping the current political history. The last chapter is conclusion in which I have personally summed up my entire study in the preceeding chapters. Here, I have sought to point out the changes that have taken place in state Elections as well as in Politics and the trend that is prevalent today.

Inspite of my best efforts to present this study objectively and precisely, one may come across errors and limitations in this work for which I bear the sole responsibility, I present this dissertation with a hope that it will throw some light on the current Election and Politics in Nagaland.

FIFTH ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 1982
BEGINNING OF CONGRESS TREND
AND POLARISATION

This Election was held normally in schedule on the expiry of the preceeding term. Over the years, with each election, there had been a remarkable change in the political situation which in turn had influenced the elections. Each election had therefore acquired a unique characterstic shaped by the political atmosphere preceeding it. Starting on a dull note in the first two elections, it had heightened in the Third Election in 1974 at a time when the democratic structure and process had established itself. The 1974 election were significant in the sense, the decade rule of one party was finally broken down giving way to an alternative party. This raised hopes for many since it signified that democracy was working in the party system. But the pace of political development grew quicker. In no time, the new ministry collapsed and President Rule was imposed for the first time for a long spell.¹ Even then, during the rule, which also coincided with the National Emergency imposed by the Congress, which lasted till the Fourth Assembly Election of 1977, many important events took

1. President rule imposed in 1974 lasted for 32 months and was the longest in Nation's history till then.

place that shaped the future course of politics. Of these events, the two most influencing were the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975, while the other was the merger of N.N.O. and Congress I in 1976.

The Shillong Accord provided some clarity and direction for the next course of politics to follow.² Until then, State politics and Naga underground Nationalist politics were intricately mixed up with the latter often overshadowing the state politics because of its deep attachment with the people and their support. As a result, state politics had no life in it. Till then, the state machinery were powerless due to its presence and the centre therefore, had to play a strong role in dealing with the undergrounds and their issue. At the same time, being placed in a situation with two parallel political force influencing them, the people were in a state of confusion and indecision. The paradox was, the people were within an established democratic state institution to which they also owe their allegiance. On the other hand was the Nationalist Organisation with which, they have their sympathies, support, attachment and strong bond. As such, their loyalties were divided with neither getting the people's full attention.

2. The Shillong Accord of 11 November 1975 had three points. One of which was surrendering of arm and personnel at appointed place.

At this juncture, the Accord came as an agent of change. As per the Accord, the undergrounds were to lay down their arms and give up their demand. Though in reality, this accord did not provide the final solution, whereby, other factions reformed and took to arms, yet, in the legal sense, it also meant a lot. It denoted the decision of the underground to give up their demands. This very fact cleared the whole confusing situation. It was only natural for the people to be convinced that the past is a foregone conclusion and that they have to give their attention to the present state process. The attitude of the people obviously underwent a change. And the way was cleared for more active participation in the politics. This was a turning point for the people which led to their increasing participation in the future elections.

Coinciding with this development in the peoples' attitude, was the 1976 N.N.O. - Congress I merger. With this, state politics also took a turn towards a new phase of politics. Though the Congress I lost badly in it's first election in 1977, it had finally entered state politics and was building it's base. During the U.D.F. term of 1977, it reorganised itself out of the erstwhile N.N.O. party base. As evident from it's rising position and dominant role in the future election and politics, this period apparently

laid the foundation for the new phase which can be preferably and most appropriately called "Congress Trend". This trend or phase started with the 1982 election though with a poor show in terms of the seats it secured and continued through the next two elections of 1987 and 1989. During this period, the Congress I politics was a strong influence on the state politics. It's national characteristic was gradually being infused into the state. In other words, being a more advanced national party, it introduced contemporary democratic politics into the state with all its good and ill effects. This naturally changed the state's political scenario which was until then exposed to local Regional Politics. In the process, party politics became active. So too were the masses involved. At the same time, political equations changed and new issues cropped up.

1. POLARISATION BETWEEN REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM

Apart from the money culture that took roots in this phase as starkingly evident from the 1982 elections, a prominent feature of the changed political equation that developed was the polarisation between National party and Regional parties.³ The Congress I represented Indian Nationalism and the Regional parties, regional sentiments and identity. It was mainly based on the identity which each

3. Hindu, 6 June, 1980.

one represented based on their leanings on either Indian National Parties or maintaining a separate regional identity without affiliation to any other national party. In a deeper level, ideological differences were also there. The Regional parties stressed that only a regional party can understand the peoples' aspirations and assist in their development as they are closer to the people and in a better position to serve than 'distant' leaders of National parties.⁴ Besides, maintaining a distinct regional identity would safeguard the peoples' identity from being eroded in the process of mixing. On the other hand, the Congress I held that only it can bring economic development and progress to the state and solve the naga problem vis-a-vis the centre's stand. At the same time, it assured the people of its pledge to preserve and protect their tribal identity and way of life and stressed that it is best to have a government which is also in power at the centre.⁵ The contrast between the two parties was also fueled by the peoples' perception of National party and their deep attachment to their land and social life, besides their support and identification with the nationalist movement in the past whose ideology and cause was deeply engrained in their consciousness.

4. Statesman, 9 November, 1982.

5. Seema Guha, "Nagaland's most Crucial Election", in Telegraph, 9 November, 1982.

The polarisation was very much evident in pre-Congress I period. But became markedly distinct after it's entry in the state. This may have been due to it's stark different identity rooted in the heartland of India. Evidently, it's initial stage to establish itself was met with strong opposition. When it however finally managed, polarisation in politics took shape and grew acute in elections thereafter from 1982 onwards.

(a) **Roots of Regionalism**

The polarisation has it's roots in the strong regional sentiment and identity shaped by the Naga nationalist movement. The solidarity feeling of nagas, greatly influenced and brought about by this movement was surely bound to exclude any other exterior influence or intervention. Thus it could be said that, Regionalism did not come into existence in the state like in other parts of India. In general, Regionalism in state politics normally comes about when there is a weak party at the centre with no alternative national party to take over or to fulfil the regional needs. In other words, when there is a power vacuum in the centre, there is a growth of Regional parties in the states.⁶ Other factors for rise of regionalism is when the centre is over dominant over the states to the extent that it starts

6. Statesman, 19 November, 1982.

instilling the fear among the locals that their identity, culture and aspirations would be belittled or negatively affected. These two factors largely determine the rise of regional parties in India.

Specifically, the Congress I party which is the dominant party with pre-independence historical roots as it's base is a very popular party. It's strength lies in the public sentiments attached to it for it's past leaders and role in the Independence movement. As such, it's the fact that this party determines to a large extent the national political atmosphere and power equations. It's fluctuating position from popularity during the times of Nehru and other senior party leaders as well as the latter part of Indira Gandhi's regime, to the lowest ebb of unpopularity during the Emergency period and the aftermath have always been associated by a spirit of unity and oneness as well as splits in the party and consequently, the formation of various other parties based on regional cause and sentiments. There is no dearth of instances in this regard. The main feature of this process is therefore, changing political equations. However, this version of the origin of regionalism does not seem to hold true in Nagaland.

Like in other North Eastern States, regionalism is based on Ethnic in the state.⁷ As mentioned above, it's

7. Jyoti Jafa, "Safety in Regionalism", in Statesman, 19 November, 1982.

origin lies in the Naga nationalist movement for political sovereignty. Myron Weiner had stated that tribals share an element of ethnic-self-awareness and collective behaviour.⁸ There is social cohesiveness and solidarity. The presence of this characteristic greatly helped the Naga movement. The strength of the movement lies in the support of the Naga people.

In the new set-up, after the democratic process had begun and the Naga movement labelled as antinational, the people looked to the regional political parties to identify with and for the preservation of their identity. The N.N.O. party which was the first and popular regional party, took to this role and became the main representative of the people both in the political and sociological context. For a decade, it had undaunted support of the people till when it merged with the Congress I in 1976.⁹ The end of its role and popularity was caused by its accommodating a wider national identity. And by doing that, it was perceived as a party that could no longer stand for the peoples' regional identity and cause. This alienated the people who withdrew

8. Weiner, Myron, Electoral Politics in Indian States, Vol.II, Delhi, Manohar Book Service, 1975, p.99.

9. Economic and Political Weekly, 22 May, 1976.

their support effecting their electoral performance evidently in the immediate 1977 elections following it's merger.

Simultaneously, the majority shifted their loyalty to the other regional party, U.D.F.¹⁰ It soon developed into a formidable regional party. The fact that this party refused to merge or align with any other national party assisted in maintaining a clear regional character and most importantly, peoples' support.¹¹ Over the years, it's electoral performance came to be greatly determined by the regional support than other factors. Meanwhile, the N.N.O.-merged-Congress I remained a party opposed to this second trend of ideology and identity. It is quite clear therefore that regional feelings though it has changed it's course and content, remains a strong factor in state politics.

Though the origin of regionalism is not rooted in the National politics, yet the fact remains that it's growth was fuelled by national politics to a large extent. India's central leaders, in an effort to integrate the tribal population into national mainstream, stressed their

10. The regional party denoted here is the latest till then in the chain of regional parties, D.P., U.F.N., U.D.F., which have been undergoing constant reforming process but have retained the same character and content.

11. Economic and Political Weekly, 26 November 1977.

participation in national politics eliminating at the same time, the isolation, secessionist, separatist and loyalist politics.¹² In the process, they followed a "carrot-and-stick" policy instead of making the effort to understand the tribal feeling and psychology.¹³ Undoubtedly, the Nationalisation process was viewed suspiciously and made them fall back upon regional parties for preservation of their identity and aspirations. The apprehension of swamping of outside forces as a result of N.N.O. - Congress I merger led to the people to collectively support the next regional party U.D.F. which ultimately won the 1977 election. There is no doubt that the regional identity of N.N.O. prior to its merger enabled it to have a massive support only to collapse after its merger. While the regional parties like U.D.F. and N.N.D.P. etc. have always stressed on regionalism and has won a few elections. This suggests the impact of the National party that have led to strengthening of the position of Regional party of the state.

(b) Polarisation of the Naga Electorate

One aspect of the polarisation was that, it was taking place within the naga society. Until then, polarisation was between the naga society as a whole and outside agencies.

12. Weiner, Myron, op.cit., p.82.

13. Op.cit., p.83.

This change could be due to the changed political set-up. In the past, which was predominant with Naga Nationalism, the Indian Government was projected as the 'alien' authority, an obstacle to achieving sovereignty. The entire society then, had flocked behind the nationalist organisation, their ideology and cause. Thus, they were vehemently opposed to the nation and its presence in the region. But in the present context, Indian democratic system had been established within the society. The working of the party system being such that there has to be two or more different opposing groups particularly representing different views and opinions of various region for the democracy to work, has resulted in the bifurcation of the society's single regional identity. This along with the peculiar characteristics of a tribal society have resulted in this situation.

In a tribal society, where loyalty for one's own tribe leader is strong and goes hand-in-hand, it is but natural for the tribes to follow its leaders notwithstanding to whichever party he belongs. This has resulted into two main separate electorates on the basis of the two parties system. With the passage of time, both parties began to have mass support and base. It created two strong opposing forces within the society and along with it, the tensions, competitiveness and increased politicking which reached its

height in this election. It became the testing ground for the two forces. Interestingly, this polarisation only brought out some of the ancient tribal loyalties to the fore, giving a local dimension to the modern concept of democracy.¹⁴

The separate support base of the two parties in each election thereafter is an instance in this regard. So too are the behavioural patterns during the electioneering process. But this is not to be taken for granted that the masses have fully merged with national identity. This polarisation of the masses is mainly caused by the opposing party position and the leaders occupying in them. Following the leaders, the loyalty of their supporters have naturally created the polarisation among themselves. In other words, it was necessarily because of the nature of the party system and tribal linkages. The consolidation of the leaders' position in the party have in turn consolidated the supporters the parties giving a clearcut demarcation between two groups which have gradually come to be identified on the lines of the identity of the parties.

14. Hindu, 6 June, 1980.

(c) **Distinction of Regionalism and Proto-nationalism**

In the present context Regionalism is represented by the Regional political parties. The various acts of centre's high-handedness has indirectly strengthened it's position. As a regional party, it was viewed suspiciously to be aiding and supporting the naga movement. This is based on the centre's wrong notion for taking Regionalism or Loyalist feeling in a narrow sense, i.e., which is always associated with secessionism and anti-nationalism. Defending his party, Chief Minister Jasokie emphasized that patriotism and regionalism can go hand-in-hand.¹⁵ And that, one did not necessarily exclude the other. In other words, one can have regional sentiment and deep attachment to one's soil and culture within the larger arena of Nationalism. Regionalism is a concern for 'Self' and does not necessarily mean secessionism. Regionalism which is state nationalism is wrongly mixed up with proto-nationalism. This is understandable due to the presense of secessionist movements in the region. But it would be wrong to classify every regional party anti-National. Jyoti Jafa has classified three distinct roles and identity of regional party.¹⁶ She defined parties like N.N.D.P., U.D.F. etc. as Ethnic, and

15. Seema Guha, Telegraph, Art.cit.

16. Statesman, 19 November, 1982.

A.P.H.L.C., N.N.O., Peoples' Conference (Mizoram), U.L.D.F. (Assam) etc. that have alligned with national parties and strangthened regional allegiance to the centre while opting for local autonomy as Integrative parties. In the third category, N.S.C.N., N.F.G., M.N.F., U.L.F.A., etc., were classified as Secessionist and Anti-national. It would therefore do well for the centre to identify clearly the regional organisations and parties. For Regional parties are the best link to the local people as it understand their problem and needs best. Also, it has a lot of peoples' confidence in it. It's effective role can serve as a strong foundation for the government at the centre. Identifying and alligning with central parties should not be the only criteria for placing confidence in a state party. After all, the process of national integration do not take place only through national parties.

In the context of Nagaland, the merger of N.N.O. with Congress I do not emphasize, that, the identity of it's members have fully merged with the National feeling. Old ties of regional loyalty remain. Clearly, they have been labelled as Nationalism because of the Congress I party's national status. Otherwise, the frequent change of party shows that the spirit of Nationalism has still yet to take its roots.

2. FACTORS IN THE ELECTION

In the immediate period preceeding the election, party performance, it's position, party stability and leadership crisis played a crucial role in shaping the election outcome. Briefly, they are as follows:

(a) Position of Congress I

The Congress I was then a new entrant in state politics. It merged with N.N.O. in 1976, but did not prove fruitful as expected. The people being wary and cautious of a national party, the Congress I only eroded the N.N.O's past popularity and support. To make matters worse, earlier in the 1974 election, the N.N.O. had lost the election to U.D.F. AT the same time, the Congress I government in the centre was unpopular due to the Emergency it imposed. As such, if the Congress I was disintegrating in the centre, it was totally disorganized in the state. Many senior leaders of the erstwhile N.N.O. party had left the Congress I in protest against it's merger. What remained was a few handfuls with a doubtful mass support. Many were getting enlisted into the rival party. In the 1977 election, it won only 15 seats and also lost the parliamentary election to the U.D.F. In 1979, the Congress I suffered a major split under Mr. Jasokie who formed the N.N.P. and later merged

into U.D.F. At the same time, U.D.F.(P) under S.C. Jamir formed out of the split faction of U.D.F. aligned with Congress I to form the U.L.P. Ministry. Later, it merged with Congress I. But the recruitment of new members through defection did not allay the fear of disloyalty. Besides the leaders which brought along with them their party members created more problem of leadership crisis and accomodation of the new members into lucrative ministerial posts in future. Within the party itself "bargaining" became a feature. With Mr. S.C. Jamir's entry into Congress, there was a leadership crisis with Mr. Hokishe, Mr. R.C. Jamir and Mr. T.N. Nguillie. Dissensions within the leaders created uncertainty within the whole party structure and the members.

The centre had much concern about this state of affairs, as it had a lot to lose as well as gain immensely by this election. Primarily, it was loosing ground elsewhere in the country and therefore had to find additional bases of support even if minor. The oncoming elections in Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura in the next six months compelled the party to win the Nagaland elections. The victory in this election would also serve several purposes for the party. Firstly, it would mean the defeat of Regionalism which they perceive as anti-nationalism and therefore would mean a success in it's policy of national integration. Secondly, it would mean

making inroads into the state politics and establishing it's roots. As such, they conducted a high profile electioneering in this election.

(b) **Position of N.N.D.P.**

On the other hand the rival N.N.D.P. also had much at stake, in that, it had to maintain it's position it has achieved. The past two elections were won by Regional parties which was an achievement. Now that the Congress I had become a strong opposition, it had to defend it's position much like what Martin Harrop wrote "Oppositions don't win election, governments lose them".¹⁷

The party has had a testing past which ultimately saw its survival. In 1974, it won the election for the first time only to be toppled and President rule imposed. The 1977 victory was hard earned in the face of suspected party identity, unsure support base and stiff Congress I opposition. The party too had a series of defections and topplings to it's credit. Having formed mostly out of reforming the earlier party, it had many leaders and new members. The 1977 ministry was toppled by members defecting into Congress I. What it received as new member which

17. Harrop, Martin, Elections and Voters, London, Macmillan Education Ltd., 1987, p.230.

enabled it to form the third ministry in the same term were defeated Congress I members under Mr. Jasokie. Mr. Vizol, the erstwhile U.D.F. party leader and Chief Minister and his accommodating policy enabled Mr. Jasokie's ministry to complete the latter half of the term. With the oncoming elections, a leadership crisis had developed between the two leaders in the same party.

Besides, the N.N.D.P. Ministry's performance was not up to the people's expectations. And with Congress I's strong rivalry, the most important task for the N.N.D.P. was to get reelected and continue it's policy.

(c) Naga Political Issue

In this election, the underground did not call for any boycott of elections or threat to candidates or voters unlike in the past. Their role in influencing the election is not undermined and undoubted in the past. Peoples' sympathy and support had strengthened their strong influence and as such it had been the fact that no political party in the state could ignore the underground and it's issue. Because it could otherwise mean alienating the people indirectly and affecting the election result. For decades, therefore, each party and ministry had placed the naga issue on it's list of top priority. The change over of the

underground attitude this time is attributed to the recently signed Shillong Accord, 1975 which has put them into confusion and the need for regrouping and replan it's strategy. At the same time, the N.S.C.N. formed after the Accord as a result of disagreement with it was still in it's formative stage to be a major influence in the election. As such, this election saw the least influence of the undergrounds.

(d). Other Issues

The social structure of the state being very different from the other parts of the nation, outside political and economic affairs have had little influence over the state elections. National politics has little relevance. As such, no major issues are involved. Economic and developmental issue are always there and is raised by the parties in their election propaganda. But the people is not so much concerned of it as their duty to discuss it. Rather Stable government and maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in the state assumes importance. Having tasted a period of peace, any party will be judged on the basis of whether it can provide these. Along with it, the choice between a Regional and National party stands out the most in the election.

3. CAMPAIGN

This election show the most hectic and brash campaign similar to any where in the country. The low profile electioneering methods of the past were suddenly replaced by loud and extravagant methods. Money took the central place and everything was reduced to money politics. The political buildup of the crucial election had led to change in electioneering. As Martin Harrop put it, "...Campaign are not so much sepreate from the pre-election process."¹⁸ It is in fact, only a review of the past performance during which the government's record is put to debate. In a real sense, campaign begins, specially for a party in power, from the day the last tenure starts, with a steady buildup in intensity as the polling day approaches. He writes further, "On the whole, election campaign do not determine election results. They are more like end-games at chess, putting the final touches on a predictable outcome."¹⁹ Mann has also argued that "The outcome of most congenial election are determined well before the onset of active compaigning."²⁰ Therefore, adds M. Harrop, "Even in an era of electoral volabilty, voters are swayed not much by the frenetic electioneering of the campaign as by the overall record of

18. Op.cit., p.227.

19. Ibid.

20. Op.cit.

the governing party."²¹ As such, government parties are crucially dependent on their record since they can only offer more of the same in the future. By contrast, opposition parties can propose a change of direction, a fresh start and change. Similarly, the N.N.D.P. party which is in power had much to face the criticism and rivalry of the opposition Congress I to retain it's power. The Congress I's loss of power in the last two election had all the more made it determined to grapple the power from the N.N.D.P.. Added to it by the ideological clash, the electoral atmosphere became all the more tense.

The Congress I's determination can be judged by it's high profile electioneering methods. Having come to power in the centre in 1980, it had all the resources, manpower, money and influence. The campaign was led by the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and a host of cabinet and chief ministers of various neighbouring and far off states. The party leaders hailing from different states and region appealed to their small section of people residing in Nagaland. But this only alienated the majority of the local people who were unaware of their identity.²²

21. Telegraph, 10 November, 1982.

22. Harrop, Martin, op.cit., p.233.

(a) **Role of Money**

Money played an important role. The traditional method of having discussion between the contesting candidates and the village elders of the constituencies to decide whom to elect gave way to distribution of money and other benefits. Youths who vote by the decision of the village elders were drawn away by free money. In urban areas, the traditional method of house-to-house visit by campaigners was neglected, and replaced by slogan shouting processions consisting of scores of vehicles and automobile carrying party sympathisers. Each candidate was reported to be generously given huge sums of money for electoral expenses. Money intensive campaign was the new trend. Bright coloured party banners, numerous party candidates' camps which dole out daily payment for it's camp workers, feasting, frivolous use of vehicles, pamphlets, press releases were the highlights.

Both parties had good money resources. While the Congress I depended on the abundant resouces of the party in power at the centre, the N.N.D.P. had financiers among the Marwari businessmen of the state as well as it's accumulated fund from it's government. It all revolves around the principle that though there's no guarantee that money buy votes, it does enable a candidate's voice to be heard above

the electoral babble.²³ And the reality is, the average naga voter have accepted the change.²⁴

(b) **Party Issues and Meetings**

Election meetings were however few as the electorate were still politically immature and disinterested in issues. Hence, it's irrelevance. Likewise, the party programmes and propaganda had little effect on the people as personality of leaders and tribal affiliations play more important role. The major election meetings held were those organised during the Prime Minister's and Central leaders' visit. The Congress I campaign was mostly based on the 20-point Economic programme.²⁵ It stressed on stability and development. Corruption in the N.N.D.P. government has been made into a major issue by the Congress I. It has become a critical issue for the N.N.D.P. too as the people had shown their distaste for it's records. Refuting the corruption charges, the N.N.D.P. countered that it was the Congress I responsible for bringing the practice into the state. However, on this issue both parties have a weak defense.

23. Indian Express, 7 November, 1982.

24. Statesman, 9 November, 1982.

25. Art. Cit.

On the other hand, the main election plank of N.N.D.P. is regionalism. It claims, a regional party to be a better choice as it understands the local peoples' needs and aspirations. As noted above, it could only defend its past performance, programmes and claim for a better performance in future. One of the most striking steps it took during the campaign in response to defection is, it made its candidates promise on oath, that on being elected, he would not leave the party.²⁶ Its steps taken were limited since the matter is out of state jurisdiction. On development programmes, it differs little with the Congress I. On the naga political issue, both parties skirted it for the time being but asserted that they would put the effort to solve it fast and permanently. This was an issue which no party could ignore.

It has been pointed out that whatever issue the parties raises, this has little impact on the people of the state. Various reasons like illiteracy, political immaturity, economic levels etc., could be cited. But this is not the sole reason. Nor it is the case with the state only. As an election expert has pointed out, "In the real world, voters do not approach a competitive election with an open mind about candidates, parties and issues... In that sense they

26. Art. Cit.

do not make a free choice. Instead, they are bound by ties of conviction and loyalty, and their attitudes and political choices are further conditioned by the social and geographical environment in which they live... The era of the rational voters, unconstrained by ties of loyalty and fellow feeling is still a long way off."²⁷

Interpreting it in the state context, I refer to Myron Weiner's, "Core" tribal constituencies in Indian states in his book "Electoral Politics in Indian states". He says, if tribals do vote as a bloc, this should be especially evident in core reserved constituencies. "Many tribes do have institutions of tribal authority; and while in most instances these are in disuse, there is at least a tradition of political cohesion which can provide the basis for collective political action in contrast... to non-tribal society".²⁸ Tribals share an element of ethnic self awareness and collective behaviour involving substantial number of individuals within the tribe as active participants or as sympathetic bystanders.

The tribal society with it's basic characteristic as described by Myron Weiner is clearly evident in Nagaland.

27. Harrop, Martin, op.cit., p.99.

28. Weiner, Myron, op.cit., p.99.

The presence of many Tribal councils, Area councils, village councils as well as other social organisations serve as a platform for political cohesiveness. Traditionally being a democratic society, consensus is the hallmark of past village democracies. The tradition is to some extent carried forward to this day, where, the elders decide whom to vote for collectively. Such being the social environment of the state, the people have no free choice in the real to vote on issues. The fact that majority of the area is rural and under such arrangements, this is all the more true. The only limited exception is in the few urban areas where the society is more modern without any social groupings and the people more literate and mature in understanding the intricate issues. But this is just a fraction and therefore does not matter in terms of the real picture in this regard. As it is, the social characteristic leaves little for change in political behaviour even with higher literacy, economic levels etc.

(c) Conflicting Stand of Two Views

On the crucial contest between regionalism and nationalism, the N.N.D.P. pointed out that any leaders of a party alligned with centre would just be a centre's "stooge" performing his tasks only on the direction of the centre and not in response to the peoples' needs. And that would mean

neglecting the peoples' wish and imposing the centre's legislation alien to the local needs. The stress was on Congress I's 'alien' identity. The Congress I in an effort to bring it's 'alien' identity nearer to the people, assured to preserve and protect their distinct way of life and culture. It identified with the sentiments and aspirations of the people. Going further, it stressed that it is best to have a government which is also in power at the centre. In this connection, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the campaign had reportedly promised generous grants and benefits if voted to power. This approach is however not conducive for democratic practice.

Following the above discussion, it is obvious for leaders to have an important place in politics in such a society. While there are provisions for tribals leaders to exclusively stand for election in their own tribal constituencies so as to represent each tribe of the state in the assembly, the tribesmen are bound to place their importance on their leaders to get elected rather than giving any importance to the affiliated party's election fortunes. Political parties, issues, programmes etc., become entirely irrelevant. The competence of the leader and his loyalty to his tribe gains importance. As a result, there is absence of party loyalty and discipline among the political leaders

leading to chronic defection, counter-defections, realignment of parties and finally instability, which is the political scene of the state today, all counter-effective for a real party democracy to function.

Though ineffective in the real sense, campaigning is a regular election feature in the state and heightens at the last hours with processions, slogan shouting and exchange of money. The 1982 campaign was in many respects, the most magnitude and height of all, the state has ever come across.

4. POLLING AND RESULTS

(a) Polling

The one day poll for the sixty assembly seats took place on 10th November 1982. The revised number of electorates based on the 1981 census of 7,74,930 was 5,96,453 a nearly 5 times increase over the 1964 electorate. Kohima district had the highest number of electorates followed by Tuensang, Mokokchung, Mon, Zunheboto, Wokha and Phek. The number of electorates in each constituency varies from 6000 to 10000 with a marginal difference between the number of men and women. The Congress I and N.N.D.P. polled almost the same amount of votes securing 32.1% and 31.9% votes respectively.²⁹ However, constituency wise, there was

29. Report on the Fifth Assembly Election, 1982, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

great variance in the number of votes polled by both main parties. High polling for Congress I was recorded in the district of Mokokchung and Zunheboto which is also the party's stronghold credited to the influence of its two popular Congress I leaders namely Mr. S.C. Jamir and Mr. Hokishe respectively. The districts of Kohima, Phek and Tuensang recorded a high polling for N.N.D.P., again accredited to the host of influential Regional party leaders like Messrs. Vizol, Vamuzo and Jasokie. The two former districts are the traditional stronghold of the Regional parties.³⁰

Meanwhile the independents polled the highest above the two parties. The indecisiveness of the voters over the choice between two strong rival parties within a small electorate could have prompted the majority to vote for the independents who hold the advantageous position in such a political situation. But this cannot be wholly justified because of high ratio of difference between the number of contestants of the parties and the numbers of independent candidates which stood at 125.

Overall statewide, polling was recorded at 74.40% which is the lowest, though marginally in comparison to the polling recorded in four previous election: 76.5%, 78.7%,

30. See, Election Data in the Appendices.

75.3% and 83.2% respectively.³¹ However, this is high according to the nation's standard. This is in keeping with the facts brought out by Myron Weiner's election studies of tribal constituencies that, there is a tendency for the core tribal constituencies to have a larger turnout than the mixed constituencies.³² Moreover, this is not the result of increased literacy, exposure to the mass media, and the improved organizational efforts of political parties on tribal constituencies as in the case of non-tribal constituencies, where it has greater impact of these factors.³³ Cohesive tribal voting is the main factor behind this tendency which is very related to Nagaland's core tribal constituencies.

(b) Results and Analysis of the Outcome

The outcome of the poll was, Congress I and N.N.D.P. - 24 each and Independents - 12 seats. The number of seats secured by each party in each district and the votes polled shows traces of stable party constituencies as well as gives

31. Report on the Assembly Elections of 1964, 1969, 1974, 1977. Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

32. Weiner, Myron, op.cit., p.91.

33. Op.cit., p.93.

evidence of the influence of the political atmosphere before and during the election period in the other constituencies over the choice of party and Independence candidates. A districtwise analysis is as follows:

KOHIMA: At the first instance, Kohima district can be adjudged as the most stable regional party stronghold. Mostly inhabited by the Angami tribe, to which the Father of Naga movement Phizo belongs, this district has always returned a majority of the Regional party candidates. There could be no other reason than loyalty to tribal leaders who stood for the Nagas' Political cause. Being the immediate generation of a popular leader, the regional tribal sentiment of it's leader is bound to be inherited by them. Thus, people and it's leaders of this region have come to be deeply attached to Regional party providing a fertile base for it.

Inspite of this fact, the district could not return all of the 15 seats because, apart from the Angami Area, there are other regions inhabited by other tribes such as Rengmas, Zeliangrong and a few other constituencies of mixed population with varying degrees of political party affiliations. While these areas have seven constituencies the Angami area holds eight constituencies. In every election, out of the eight Angami constituencies not less

than seven Regional party candidates or independents had always won the seats giving no more than one seat for congress each time.

In the other seven constituencies, party fortunes had fluctuated in the four constituencies within the Zeliangrong and Rengma regions. While the remaining three seats in the commercial town of Dimapur having a sizeable non-local population has virtually remained the Congress I stronghold. Due to the composite population in the district, the seats get evenly divided between the parties with a slight edge over the other by the Regional party.

PHEK: Another Regional party stronghold is Phek District inhabited by Chakhesang tribe. They hve similar reasons like the Angamis to support the Regional parties. So far, they have never returned any Congress I candidates out of it's five seats. Their electoral records reveal them to be staunch supporters of Regional parties only. Prominent Regional leader like Mr. Vamuzo hail from this district.

MOKOKCHUNG AND ZUNHEBOTO: In Contrast, these districts could be said to be the Congress I stronghold judging by it's votes polled and seats won in the few election held so far. Before the changeover of Mr. Jamir into Congress I, his U.D.F. party held sway over the Mokokchung district. In 1977

election it returned ten U.D.F. candidates out of ten seats. But the trend changed in favour of Congress I dramatically after his joining the party as a result of the U.D.F. party defection he led in 1980. His adeptness in gaining votes is beyond doubt proved by his success in getting votes for his previous U.D.F. party in several Assembly and Parliamentary elections. In the 1982 election, the party secured five seats out of ten, while the rest got evenly distributed between the rival party and independents. The fortune of the party in this district greatly fluctuates with the influence of the leader indicating the important role of tribal affiliation in supporting the leader and indirectly his party.

Likewise, Mr. Hokishe, a respected Congress I leader holds sway over his tribesmen in his Zunheboto district. His popularity as the party leader with good rapport with the central draws his tribesmen, mostly within the party fold. Out of six seats, Congress I has always been returned with a majority with the remaining seats shared by the independents. The present records also indicates a favourable trend for the Congress in this district.

MON AND TUENSANG: The case of district Mon, inhabited by the largest tribe Konyaks is quite different. Here public support for party fluctuates from one election to the next.

This can be noticed by the wide margin of victory of the ministry party accept in the 1982 election where the Congress I secured five and the other five evenly distributed among the rest of the party and independence. There is no trace of a stable party base covering a wide area in the district. It is only restricted to a few constituencies even for Congress I. One reason is that it is an insurgency prone area receiving a lot of influence from this quarters.

The same thing follows for Tuensang district in the north eastern corner of the state. Another region of insurgency influence, the district returned a majority of 5 and 7 Regional party members in the 1977, 1982 election respectively out of thirteen seats. But it cannot be said to be a stronghold of any party. In the 1977 election, the Congress made a strong progress, keeping up the past N.N.O. record of 1974 and before. In between the two parties, a significant feature of this district is the role of independent candidates. So far, it has the highest number of successful independent candidates in the state except in the 1982 election when no candidates won. The conflicting interest of political parties and the underground can be an important cause for the magnitude of Independents. However, like most other candidates, their success depends on their background and position in society. Underground influence as

well as village councils' play a prominent role in effecting any parties' performance in each election in this district.

WOKHA: Finally, Wokha district with four seats has certain Congress I pockets. However, it does not hold a complete sway over the region. In every election, all the seats get evenly divided between all the contesting parties. The 1977 election result serves as a perfect example. All the contesting parties, Congress I, N.C.N., U.D.F. and Independents got one seat each. No party could get majority support in terms of seats to represent the district. In 1982, the Congress I secured 2 seats sharing the other seats with the other two parties.

The fact that each district except Kohima and Tuensang, is composed of only one single tribe makes it possible to interpret the electoral data of each district in terms of tribal affiliation to any of the party. With few exceptions, they provide the facts as to determine the party having mass support from specific tribe gives a clear picture of how a tribe, clan or kin influences and is crucial in the politics of a tribal state much more than any other factors that influences contemporary state politics.

The overall trend of the election is that the electorate is divided mainly into three parts, with two

camps supporting each party, with another massive section supporting the independents. Studying the concentration of votes for a party in one particular area inhabited by a single tribe, we can come to the conclusion of there being bloc voting. And all districts being tribal with affiliations to either of the party, the high level of bloc voting has therefore resulted in the parties securing the similar amount of votes and seats. In tribal constituencies, there is less competition in the real political sense, i.e. issues, due to it's characteristic tribal electoral cohesiveness which influences all spheres of political activity.³⁴ Candidates are therefore heavily dependent on tribe support. In the absence of the importance of issues, we may describe the situation as laid out by Martin Harrop that, the people in such a situation fail to differentiate between the parties and instead identify with the party on the basis of their sympathy and linkages.³⁵ What follows is a "party protection" effects which projects the party as to be closer to the voter than what it really is. Issueless politics hardly effects the vote. As is the case here, much is determined by tribe consciousness to secure votes. With the result that these tribal votes come in bloc which

34. Op.cit., p.100.

35. Harrop, Martin, op.cit., p.154

eventually makes marginal difference in the parties' electoral results.

On the whole, what can be perceived is that the electorates did not actually respond to the ideological conflict between Regionalism and Nationalism prevailing in the pre-electoral stage. As a matter of facts, the parties were only identified with it's leaders and their tribal affiliations. Ideology, though considered, was put aside. As usual, traditional supporters of party merely voted to put the party inpower. Thus, the losing of 14 seats by the N.N.D.P. could not be merely described as having loss the support for it's stand. To prove the point, it's losses were to the Independents.³⁶ And it was not to the Congress I which otherwise could have meant change of support for the party's ideological stand. Similarly the Congress I had only regained it's lost constituencies which had traditionally supported it and had not made a dent in the strongholds of the N.N.D.P.³⁷ Significantly, both parties had won from the same areas from which they used to get elected in the past. Meanwhile the host of successful independents reprsented another section that did not subscribe to both parties' stand. All there only proved the point that the voters'

36. Mainstream, 20 November, 1982.

37. Mainstream, 20 November, 1982.

choice was not influenced in any way by ideological matters. It was just another tribal politics following the trends of the past. However, it cannot be denied that with this election, tribal consciousness in differentiating between the support for Regional and National party deepened and created a sort of cleavage in the years later.

5. POST-ELECTION PARTY REALIGNMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT

The same number of seats secured by both parties created the need for "horse trading" by both parties. As a rule, the independents in such a situation have a say in determining which party could form the ministry through its bargaining power. This election had 12 elected independent candidates. The Congress I with vast experiences in this matter and money power as well as being a central government finally succeeded to win over 11 from among them and formed the ministry with a strength of 35, under Mr. S.C. Jamir the new party chief.

As regards the Congress I party leadership crisis, one lost the election, while the other was rewarded with a high ministerial post. As for Mr. Hokishe, the central party leaders appointed him as the governor shortly after the election. He had not contested the election presumably on the advice of the central leader so as to avoid leadership

crisis. The central leaders deftly handled the crisis with more to follow later that showed it's control and manipulation of state politics through it's state leaders and minister. But as it turned out latter, the solution happened to be temporarily.

There is a difference between the formation of a ministry and it's continuation for the full term specially in the state where the majority is based on a ramshackled majority formed out of political convenience. And the fact that most legislative members were defectors in the past, questions the stability of the ministry. Past records have shown that the average term of each ministry the state has so far had is 2 years. Party loyalty is almost absent and so change of parties, leadership crisis and toppling game is therefore prevalent.

In March 1985, the Congress I ministry was rocked when six of it's ministers resigned in protest against the death of 2 students in police firing. This was only the immediate cause for the ministry to collapse in 1986. In the preceeding months, several issues fueled discontent among the people. They are the widening of the Disturbed Areas Act from 5 kms. to 20 kms. which brought about more than 108 villages under the Act and consequently under the army

rule.³⁸ Secondly, it was the centre's proposal to demarcate seven seats for non-local.³⁹ Thirdly, several leaders and members of the ruling party were charged of corruption.⁴⁰ Lastly, under the leadership of Naga Students Federation (NSF) the induction of non-local I.P.S. Officers was objected to, to which the ministry staunchly opposed.⁴¹ This marked the death knell for the life of the ministry.

Sensing the shaky ground of the Congress I ministry of the state, the central party leaders had already began preparing the base for the next step and changeover. As such, when the trouble started brewing in the state, Mr. Hokishe, who was then serving as the governor of Himachal Pradesh was inducted into the Rajya Sabha through nomination. When the time came for the collapse of Mr. Jamir's ministry, he was directed to take over the Congress I state ministry.⁴² He was replaced in the Rajya Sabha by the former. This was only another incident of political misuse of governor's post and nominated posts of Rajya Sabha for political ends.

38. Telegraph, 29 March, 1986 and Statesman, 13 September, 1986.

39. Statesman, 13 September, 1986.

40. Telegraph, 19 October, 1986.

41. Statesman, 30 October, 1986.

42. Mr. Hokishe was elected through Bye-Election from Dimapur-I Constituency in 1986.

The second Congress I ministry of the term eventually completed the rest of the tenure. What can be seen as a compromise by the Centre to pacify the people and retain it's ministry is in it's sudden withdrawal of the prickly issues like Parliamentary Bill and the 20 kms. belt issue. Apart from Mr. Hokishe's credibility, the centre showed a lot of cooperation in state politics in the latter stages.

ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1987 AND 1989
TRENDS AND FEATURES

The Sixth (1987) and Seventh (1989) elections followed in rapid succession to the term of 1982. The period in between these two elections were marked by political intricacies with regard to ministry formations consequently creating a period of acute instability. As a result, this period saw two terms of Presidents Rule out of three, which has been imposed in the state so far. Politics had gained ground in the state in total contrast to the reservations of the people towards it in the past and have become the focus of everyone in the eighties. Most people had shed their apprehensions in actively participating it. While, many outsider had hailed it as a willingness on the path of the people to join the national mainstream. But, it followed it's own course. Politics only came to be used as a means for personal benefits. Position of power being the main "bone of contention" for the political leaders.

In a state like Nagaland where, party programmes and loyalties have no meaning and in fact subordinate to tribal loyalties and Naga cause, the situation worsened with leaders vying for lucrative posts. This situation had gradually been taking shape before the eighties. It only

intensified during the eighties soon after the 1982 elections which were won by the Congress. The result is the period of high instability between and after the elections of 1987 and 1989.

The political developments of this period only revealed the condition of State politics which has come about. But the factors that led to such a situation is not solely the state leaders. Among many are the manipulation politics of the Congress I to stay in power by any means, right or foul as is witnessed in other parts of India. It's politics soon created a trend in the State over the years. Being a national party, it was in a comfortable position to follow it's whim, but ultimately destroyed the fabric of a profile clean politics Through the Congress I, the state could be said to have been keeping in step with the National politics that was also in shambles.

The political developments in this period apart from revealing the state's political conditions also proved the fragility of constitutional law and provisions. The post of the Governor were used by the party in power at the centre to serve it's purpose in the state. Laws were bent and the presidential power became just another means for the party in power. It was ironical that what the same leaders were trying in the past to show and draw the people of the state, then inflicted with separatist movements and feelings, in to

the Indian Constitutional structure, then perceived as the only 'big brother' who could give future to the Nagas, were now indulging in extra constitutional acts. This certainly contradicted their whole purpose. It deceived itself and showed the weakness of the constitution in which the people were to believe. The central leader particularly the Congress I failed to draw the people into national mainstream in the right spirit and direction. It's policy of inducements and to stay in power only belied its efforts and created havoc within the state's politics.

The period between and after the said two elections could be said to be a continuation of the congress trend, beginning by the turn of eighties. It consecutively won the three elections. And naturally, the state politics was shaped by it to a large extent. But it was soon bogged down by its own methods and working which ultimately led to its collapse and the accute unstable period in the state's political history.

In the following pages, a separate and composite account of each election is given so as to bring out its innate features, however small, and present a clearer view of the trends that have been taking shape by compacting all the three elections simultaneously.

1. ELECTION 1987

The first Congress I ministry of 1982 had come to an end. And with that, it paved the way for the holding of the next Assembly election. As such, the changeover was a normal democratic process and not the outcome of any other factors. And the same reason has also meant the seeking for any major influencing factor in the recent past rather than in the immediate period. The previous term saw the collapse of the party ministry under Mr. S.C. Jamir, under crises and his replacement by Mr. Hokishe. The crises which led to the former's fall and replacement did have repercussions in the present elections. But the center of all activity remained the Congress I party with it's improving position in the State, Party dissensions, leadership crises, etc. In short, it has still been keeping up it's trend.

Following the developments of the earlier term the chances of both the main parties - Congress I and NNDP and particularly the former were weighed in this election. The Congress I had much in stake as it's position was ebbing away due to the crises and dissensions within the party ranks. Any loses in the election could be detrimental to the consolidation of it's position in the State. Following the crises, the people have suspected the party's loyalty to the regional wishes. It's bowing to the direction of the Central leaders have only proved the allegation of opposition leader Mr. Vamugo. But the major issue of concern for the party is

its intra-party dissension arising mainly due to leadership crises.¹ The party having accommodated many defector over the years have only created for itself the problem of adjusting it's members in their proper positions. In the last election, there were four contenders for the party leadership post. It was due to the intervention of Central Party High Command that the leader was eventually chosen and the remaining absorbed into other posts. However, the solution was temporary and soon cracks developed again. This very fact has been the cause of disunity and vulnerability of the party ministry in the earlier term. And the same has posed as a problem with the nearing of the Election. With the absence of the practice of democratically electing the party leader even at the centre, the state branch could neither look for such methods which is practically the only way to solve the leadership issue permanently. The usual method of selecting the leader is appointment by the central party leaders which greatly dissatisfies the rest of the senior party leaders of the state. With each election, the crises is temporarily solved by appointment guided by the immediate situation prevailing. This has only made the issue acute threatening its electoral performance and Party Unity. For the present, Mr. Hokishe was chosen as the leader only because of the fact that Mr. Jamir, the former leader had

1. Deccan Herald, 17 November, 1987.

become unpopular due to the earlier crises. However, this has generated a lot of dissatisfaction among the member for being made to accept a leader not of their choice, specially so for Mr. Jamir's supporters. This has resulted in the two groups in the ruling party headed by the two leaders to support rival candidates against the other.²

The Congress I's position was all the more threatened by N.N.D.P. which had capitalised on the Congress I's crises. It's consolidated position as a stable Regional party strongly challenged the opposition. It also has leadership tussle though not as acute as that of the Congress I. What could be perceived as the reason is that it does not have to depend on any higher authority to solve it's problem. It is totally left to itself thus providing ways for an amicable settlement between it's leaders. Another advantage is that most of it's leader hail from the same region of the state giving due place for tolerances among them. It's main weakness is it's failure to expand it's support base. So far, it's support base is mostly confined to two districts.³ It has not been able to cut into the Congress hold. Instead, it's support gets divided with the presence of other regional parties proving to be it's

2. Deccan Herald, Art. Cit.

3. Kohima and Phek Districts.

liability. Meanwhile, the Congress I as the single national party gets majority of remaining votes. In this election, the party took different stands on issues in stark contrast with the Congress I's as never before. In the past, the election being issueless most of the programmes of both parties had been almost similar. But the developments of domestic crises created the situation for such an opposing stands by both parties.

1. ISSUES: Though issue do not play an important part in Nagaland Election, some immediate issues that developed recently had served as a cause for raising it as an issue in this election.

(a). **Assam-Nagaland Border Dispute**

This is an age old dispute dating back to pre-independence period. It's origin could be traced back to the British forward policy in the aftermath of the 1857 Revolt.⁴ After which the Naga hills district was formed by roughly demarcating in 1925 the boundary between Assam's Sibsagar and Nowgong districts and the Naga hills. This had led to the loss of Naga area to Assam's District as claimed by the Naga leaders. Their dissatisfaction had led to their (NNC) submitting a memorandum to Sir Akbar Hydari in June 1947.⁵

4. Mainstream, 13 July, 1985.

5. Mainstream, Art. Cit.

The NNC asserted that it stood for unifying all the areas inhabited by Nagas. Following this, a modification administrative division was embodied in the Clause 6 of the Nine-point Hydari Agreement. It provided that all the forest~~lost~~ to Assam's district be transferred to the Naga Hills. However, this did not materialise and the issue remained unsolved.

The formation of the state made this issue more acute. Both the state governments disregarded each other's claims and took steps to lay their claims on the area. This led to more tensness. Subsequently after 1965, the Chief Minister of both states agreed to maintain status quo till the border issue was settled peacefully. Despite high level meetings and consistent efforts to solve this issue peacefully, armed skirmishes broke out between the two states' police on March 14, 1972.⁶ This was followed by an ~~agreement~~ agreement between the two governments to maintain a status quo. But seeming discontent erupted again into armed conflict on January 5, 1979 at Merapani leaving many dead and injured. The (1971) Sundaram Commission was not accepted by Nagaland because of it's stand which was similar and favorable to Assam.⁷ While the Assam government accepted the boundary as defined by the 1925 notification, the Nagaland government staunchly

6. Mainstream, 13 July, 1985.

7. Newstime, 22nd November, 1987.

rejected it on the ground that the British demarcated this boundary for its own imperial and economic interest without respecting the age-old traditional boundary of the Nagas. Both the states till now, have maintained the same stand and so has the issue remained the same as before. As solution is not forthcoming from any quarters, the two states under the directives of the Centre have agreed upon to maintain the status quo as before. Likewise meetings of various official levels of state take place in routine, of which the most notable is the meeting of the Border Magistrates which take place every Monday as per the standing instructions. However, soon after the 1979 incident, tension rose steeply on both sides and soon became heated discussions in the respective Assemblies. The most recent incident in the pre-1987 election took place in June 1985. When again, many were dead or wounded. This brought the issue fresh again in the political circles, turning into an urgent issue in this election.

Besides this, there are other factors that have made this issue relevant to elections. This issue also crops up during elections mainly due to the setting up of polling booths in the areas. Over the years, the Nagas had sparsely occupied the area and it was the duty of the state government to provide them the opportunity to exercise their franchise. But in doing so, the state government faced

strong objections from the Assam government. And each time, the centre had to interfere. But the solution was as a routine, always temporary lasting only during the elections. As such, the problem had not abated till now. For the same intensity of resentment the people have over the 1925 boundary, that means, the loss of their land, the political parties cannot ignore this issue just as the Naga Problem issue. Therefore this boundary issue always remained a significant issue in each election.

This issue cropped up again and intensified in this election too. The armed conflicts and booth capturing apart, this time, it took on a political note. Just before the election, the A.A.S.U (All Assam Students' Union) called for the Economic Blockade of Nagaland in retaliation to the proposal by the latter to set up polling booths in the Dispute Area.⁸ This further raised the controversy. However, underlying all these is the political intrigue of various parties belonging to both state and centre for electoral gains. Assam, then ruled by AGP,⁹ a Regional party had reached an understanding with it's counterpart N.N.D.P. to support and campaign for the latter in the forthcoming elections. Sensing a formidable combined opposition, the centre which had played upon the dispute for political

8. Link, 22 November, 1987.

9. It is full form in ASSAM GANA PARISHAD.

reasons, specifically to arrest the unity of both states which were inflicted with secessionist ideology and groups as well as to weaken the regional parties' unity, encouraged the setting up of polling booths in the region.¹⁰ Then, Nagaland, was under a Congress I government. This made the AASU, to retaliate with the full backing of the A.G.P. through Economic blockade.¹¹ This step naturally strained the A.G.P. N.N.D.P. Alliance. As the blockade continued, the Congress I capitalised on it by criticising the N.N.D.P.'s approach to the problem and then it also played upon the regional sentiment. The AASU's subsequent withdrawal of blockade following the Prime Minister declaration that it would not be tolerated, further enhanced the position of the Congress I. It presented itself as the only party that have control over the whole issue and in whose hands, the issue could be solved. In contrast, the N.N.D.P's electoral plan failed and was relegated into a helpless position. It was obvious that the boundary issue was racked up by the Congress to prevent the AASU and A.G.P. campaigning for its ally the N.N.D.P.¹² It was a highly politicised one in Nagaland and the AASU's decision for creating economic blockades therefore proved to be rather short sighted.

10. Economic and Political Weekly, 17 December, 1987.

11. Art. Cit.

12. Art. Cit.

(b) Naga Problem Issue

Till the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975, the N.N.C. led the Naga movement for political sovereignty. However, with the Accord, it sowed the seeds of its decline. Most of its members left the organisation and joined the mainstream excepting a few. Some of its leaders and members who had just returned from training in China, denounced and opposed it as it was not in line with the 1951 plebiscite and against the political principle laid down by Naga leaders. The public too did not lend any support to it. By being a signatory to this Accord, the N.N.C. in a way found itself limited in its role as the leader of the Naga movement. Consequently, the leaders who opposed it formed a new organisation called N.S.C.N. (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) on 31st January, 1980 to continue the movement in the same direction as in the past.¹³ Another group of leaders disagreeing with the accord continued the movement under the same banner of NNC with its armed wing (WFA) and government (NFG). Much later on, these two groups split into different factions and groups. But each retained its parent group's name, in the way, using the leader's name to identify themselves respectively.

13. Horam, on "Naga Polity", Seminar paper present in 29 Aurangzeb Road, Nagaland House, New Delhi.

In a matter of few years, the N.S.C.N. became the most militant among the groups. It formed an alliance with the K.I.A. (Kachin Independence Army) from whom it received Arms support. It increased its activities manifold, due to which, Indo-Burmese government joint operations were taken in 1985 and 1986.¹⁴ However, the result was not successful and the N.S.C.N. continued its major strikes against military in mid eighties. Its success soon drew the other secessionist forces in the North East region such as U.L.F.A., T.N.V., etc. for its aid and support. Soon, all the insurgent groups in the region had a common network aiding and helping each other. These developments compelled the centre to make a fresh approach to Naga problem vis-a-vis the N.S.C.N.

In this regard, the Congress I government at the Centre, made it clear that it would strive to reach a settlement with the N.S.C.N. only.¹⁵ In their opinion, the unity of the underground factions is an issue that must be settled by the groups themselves.¹⁶ This explain the inability of the government to consider the views of every faction that would prove to be insurmountable and impossible. This was expressed by the Prime Minister in his electoral

14. Statesman, 27, May 1987.

15. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 December, 1987, p.2194.

16. Deccan Herald, 7 November, 1987 and Economic and Political Weekly, 19 December, 1987.

speech. By contrast, the N.N.D.P. aimed to unite every faction on a single platform from where they can have a unanimous settlement with the Centre. The Congress I approach, at this juncture when the factions were having serious differences only proved to be practical and paved the way for early negotiations. And being in power at the centre, this gave an upper hand for the Congress I on this issue.

In 1982, being newly organised, the N.S.C.N. were not sufficiently able to influence the elections. With the increase in it's activities, and making it's presence felt in the state, it received the recognition it desired for negotiations. Grounds were prepared for talks by Congress I governments in the state. Because of the ongoing process for talks, the N.S.C.N. took a neutral stand in the 1987 elections as well as the 1989 elections.¹⁷ As such, in these two elections, the strong influence of the groups in the elections of the past, were minimal or absent now. The active and direct participation of the groups in the past were now absent. But the importance of the issue continued to dominate the election process. Being the core of Naga political process, no party could ignore it's importance if it do not want to alienate the people and spoil election chances. All these have brought the issue into the centre of this election again.

17. Telegraph, 9 November, 1987.

(c) **Other immediate issues:**

- a) A bill seeking to dereserve one seat in the Assembly for the general was passed by the parliament under the 58th Amendment Act amending Act 332. The Bills' proposal in parliament was vehemently opposed and voted against it by the Assembly. Both these had taken place during the Congress I ministry and had therefore been blamed for it's lackness on this matter. Spearheaded by the N.N.D.P., the act was opposed by many other non-governmental organisations.¹⁸ Undoubtedly, the Act was violative of the 16-point agreement of 1960 between the Central government and the Naga People's convention(N.P.C.) which stated that the Nagaland Assembly shal comprise representatives of the various tribes of the state only.¹⁹ As such, the Act left many dissatisfied over the Congress I's role. At the same time, a short duration of only 9 days given for filing objections and suggestions on this Act has only stifled the peoples' voice and raised more discontent on the same.
- b) The discontent over the bill had led to a wave of anti-outsiders. Nagaland has an inner-line permit which is over 110 years old restricting the entry of any

18. Times of India, 19 September, 1986.

19. Deccan Herald, 7 November, 1987.

outsiders as well as owning lands and property. This was passed during the British time to ensure the preservation of the tribal life and culture. This provision came to be strictly enforced. The "outsider" or non-locals were discouraged from getting enrolled in the electoral rolls and exercising their franchise. This however affected the Regional parties electoral fortunes than the Congress I's. The developments only made the Regional and National differences acute, with this time echoing much in the grassroots level giving the election a repetition of 1982 election in which the variation was very strong.

- c) Prior to the 1987 elections, few newer arrangements and legislations took place. Firstly, the Anti-Defection Bil 1, 1985 was passed by Rajiv government. This has put the entire candidates on a cautious footing in regard to their election strategy vis-a-vis ministry formation in the event of being elected. Both the main rival parties have sought to select candidates based on loyalty to its constituency and the party, leaving out the probable candidates who would change loyalty.

Independent candidates who have always had a say in elections are fewer. However, most of them are Congress I members who had not managed to get the tickets. In the event of their being elected, it will be in the favour of the

Congress I. The Anti-Defection Act has however made the Independents wary of whether the electorate will continue to favour them.²⁰

Whatever issue remains, are mostly to do with the day to day affairs such as economic development, employment, anti-corruption, education, etc. which both the parties take almost the same stand. Each do not have a specific programme on these but stresses on it's ability to perform better either to solve problems or bring developments.

2. CAMPAIGN

In comparison to the earlier election, the campaign in this election were low-keyed. But the methods of campaigning were the same and money played an equal prominent role. The difference was only in terms of degrees.

As usual, both the parties invited central leader for the campaign. The prime minister and a host of cabinet ministers and a few state Chief Ministers campaigned for the state Congress I. The N.N.D.P. was aided by Telegu Desam leader and A. P. Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao and Lok Dal Leader H.N. Bahuguna.²¹ But more than the Congress I, the N.N.D.P. could not gain much from the joint campaign. The main reason is the difference of geo-politics of the region

20. Deccan Herald, 19 November, 1987.

21. Tribune, 21 November, 1987.

and the region to which the outside party leader belongs. In spite of the fact that the background of both parties are regional, each has its own programme and ideology based on the local issues and socio-economic political structures. Having a common opponent in Congress was not a sufficient criteria to cause a common bond. Some similarities of being a regional party, likewise could offer only a surface level of identification with each other. A leader from another party could hardly relate the local issues to his case and present a similar front on behalf of its ally. Nor his distinctiveness from the local population be accepted by the people. These factors limit the role of a joint Regional parties' effort in campaigning.

As for the Congress, this is partly evident as most of its outside leaders are unknown and therefore difficult to relate to for the locals while at the same time, their presence over shadows the local leaders and the time-tested traditional method of campaigning. However, the state and central member being from the same party under one programme, ideology and leader, benefits the state party unlike the case of the N.N.D.P.

The B.J.P. contested the election for the first time with two candidates in the fray.²² Since this was just a foundation laying exercise, it refrained from indulging in

22. Deccan Herald, 7 November, 1987.

issues and taking any stand on the various issues. It's campaign was restricted mainly on the constituencies where it was contesting. It is therefore, incapable of influencing the election nor affecting the votes of national parties. It's Rightist Hindu Policy is in direct conflict with the Christian Principles which largely dominate the region. Until it changes it's stand and corrects the impression of the people of its communal policy, it does not have even a minimal chance. It's presence in the election is therefore very insignificant.

Another regional party in fray is the N.P.P. formed in 1980 by Mr. Huska²³, who sought to keep out of the 1980 merger of Vizol's UDF and Jasokie's N.N.D.P. forming into N.N.D.P. and consequently it's ministry. This party, however new became a strong probability to divide the regional votes. Its candidates had few strong pockets spread over the state. Contesting 32 seats, this party would determine the NNNDP's electoral fortunes , rather than the Congress I's. In terms of party programmes, it has non that stand out in contrast to the two main rival parties. However, it appeals the people on most similar issues like others on a Regional stand. The fact that it's winning candidates could be a bargaining factor have made both the main parties to vie for it in preparation for the outcome.

23. Deccan Herald, Art. Cit.

The issue, of Naga problem, 58th Amendment, Boundary dispute etc. were the key issues and mainly circulated among the N.N.D.P. and the Congress I shadowing the rest. Practically, the issues raked up by the parties served no purpose in gaining votes as the decision of the electorate of the state are not issue based. Instead what it managed to do was to further create a distinctness and differences between the Regional Party and National party in like with and in a higher degree than the last election. Other than that, the process of campaigning followed the same pattern of the previous elections such as, house-to-house visits, slogan shouting, processions, few meetings, etc. Overall, the whole process was of lesser intensity than it's preceeding one.

3. POLLING AND RESULTS

The one day polling took place on the 18th November, 1987. There were 214 candidates contesting, with the N.P.P. and B.J.P. accounting for 32 and 2 respectively. There was an increase of 366% in the number of electroates over the 1964 electorates. However, the number of voters have fallen by about 18,000 since the 1982 election, due to the deletion of bogus voters from the electoral rolls. Overall state poling was 84.47%²⁴ which have picked up again the 1977 record. The Congress I and N.N.D.P. polled 39.84% and 30.32%

24. Report Sixth Assembly Election, 1987, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

respectively followed by independents 20.60%. The N.P.P. and B.J.P. polled 9.027% 0.19%.²⁵ The Congress I secured 34 seats followed by NNDP, independents and NPP with 18,7, and 1 seats respectively while the B.J.P. received nil and forfeited it's security deposits.

Districtwise, Congress I stronghold like Mokochung and Zunheboto returned 7 out of 10 seats and completely swept the 7 seats in the latter district. The party leadership crises does not seem to have affected the former district much. Whereas, the centre's favour towards Mr. Sema does seemed to have swayed his district in his party's favour.

In other mixed party stronghold of districts such as Tuensang, Kohima and Mon, the Congress I received majority returns. In the former and latter, it's seat was more than the seats divided between the rest. While in Kohima, the N.N.D.P and Independents' total seats secured was above the Congress by 2 seats. In all the three districts, the N.N.D.P's performance was neither poor as it managed to secure majority of the remaining seats from the other competitors other than Congress I. Except, in Kohima, it had to share an equal number of seats with the Independents.

However, in the Phek and Wokha districts, the N.N.D.P. fared better seeming majority seats. Unfortunately, the

25. Report Sixth Assembly Election, 1987, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

party lost one seat in it's traditional stronghold Phek district to the Congress I. In Wokha too, the trend were in favour of the N.N.D.P. Partywise, the Congress has improved drastically it's votes polled in contrast to the previous election, while the N.N.D.P. has almost remained the same.

The performance of the parties specifically the N.N.D.P. and Congress I have been influenced by certain factors that were absent before. The presence of another regional party with the same support base as that of N.N.D.P., as well as the majority of Congress members who failed to get the party tickets contesting as independents divided the N.N.D.P. votes. The fact that N.P.P. was a split of the parent U.D.F. to which the N.N.D.P. member too belonged in the recent past only undermined the strength and support of the N.N.D.P. On the other hand, the presence of National Opposition Party leader in support of N.N.D.P. election campaign only destroyed it's traditional separate regional identity. By following the footsteps of Congress I in this regard, the people only equated it with Congress I, the latter being a stronger party, preferably opted for it. But the crux of it's fault was the poor strategy during the Economic Blockade of AASU. It failed to realise the highly politicised strategy of Congress I in response to the A.G.P. - N.N.D.P. alliance. Though the root cause was made out to be the setting up of polling booths in the dispute area, the N.N.D.P. could have seen through with its plan if it's

associate A.G.P. were made to understand the politicisation of the issue. Instead, it's failure was capitalised by the Congress I by segregating the relation of the two parties and criticising, the N.N.D.P.'s policy on the Dispute issue.

Another factor is that the N.N.D.P. though it maintained it's regional identify, has discarded most of its former Regional Party character and identity. In contrast, it was influenced to a large extent by the Congress I methods of Electioneering. This put them at par with the Congress I in the peoples' eyes and latter had little to differentiate between the two thus making the regional votes fluctuate to the other side. In other words, the charismatic identity of being a Regional oriented party had diluted leaving little hope for Regional loyalist voters to cast their votes for it.

The above factor had it's impact on the N.N.D.P.'s performance. On the other hand, the Congress I had improved it's position over the last election. One important factor has been that, the voter in favour of national party were intact. In spite of it's leadership crises, it's party's organisation managed to remain firm and consistent. It's success in completing it's earlier ministry and the outcome of many pre-election issues in it's favour helped it. Nevertheless, the leadership of the party in the hands of a young dynamic leader Rajiv, appealed to the Naga psyche. Practically, the split and division among the Regional party greatly helped to improve it's performance in this election.

4. POST ELECTION

Securing absolute majority, the Congress I faced no obstacle for forming a ministry. This time, it was headed by Mr. Hokishe Sema. But as a reflection of the past intra party dimensions, there was a compulsion to accommodate most of it's elected party legislators. Subsequently, the ministry with 21 members was the largest ever formed in the state. The remaining were absorbed in other key departmental and semi-government organisation posts. The party being faction ridden, Mr. Sema had to keep his ministry intact by gratifying all it's members. So much so that though initially, he had refused to create a deputy C.M. Post, a party leader contender R.C. Chiten Jamir had to be finally inducted after a week for the post to avoid further party dissensions.²⁶ This only revealed the threat over the ministry's survival.

In spite of the party's absolute majority, the party's recent crises leaves little doubt for an unstable government. The crises centering over leadership, the party had at least four contender for the post. In the ensuing competition, Mr. S.C. Jamir and Mr. Hokishe stood out prominent. The fact being that Mr. Jamir is most tactical in making his party survive even during the most unstable times. As reported by an observer, he is formidable in a

26. Indian Express, 4 January, 1988.

fluid situation having made an unmade ministries.²⁷ Though reportedly charged with misuse of funds, he was capable of keeping his members pacified. No doubt his popularity is more statewide and reaches the lower rungs than others. On the other hand, Mr. Hokishe is an eminent politician and enjoys the confidence of the Centre. However, his absence from state politics for more than a decade had restricted him from keeping in touch with the current development and the upcoming younger generation of party members. As a result, his support within the party had eroded. The choice was however Hokishe as his leadership suits best in this situation.

In the immediate instance, the centre appointing a leader for the state party of its choice without consulting the members and rejecting the popular demand of Mr. Jamir as their leader only served to sow the seeds for further dissension. As a result, the chances of the Congress I ministry lasting for the full term was suspect.

The underlying dissatisfaction within the party soon revealed itself eight (8) months later after the swearing in of the ministry when 13 legislative members, cabinet ministers and a deputy speaker of the party resigned enbloc on 30th July, 1988 in the absence of the Chief Minister who had gone abroad.²⁸

27. Statesman, 10 January, 1988.

28. Times of India, 1 August, 1988.

They later fo^{und}nd the Nagaland Regional Congress and then finally merged with N.N.D.P. and others to formally form a new party, Nagaland Peoples' Council, (N.P.C.) With an absolute majority, Vamuzo it's leader approached the governor for forming his ministry. But the governor did not oblige. Thereafter, the governor's role in the crises led the state into a constitutional crises and the President Rule. His refusal to allow the new party to prove it's majority nor get it's opinion for further action clearly proved his partisan role in favour of the Congress I which had appointed him. This was clearly a case of a governor toeing the line of the party in power at the centre.

Within a week of the crises, the President's Rule was imposed for the second time in the political history of the state and the Assembly was dissolved paving the way for a fresh election in the near future.

2 ELECTION 1989

1. BACKGROUND

There was a brief spell of non-political activities during the President's rule. The crises which could have spelt another period of instability was snubbed at it's roots. Though in political circles, the imposition meant sabotaging of a proper democratic process, in reality, it brought refuge from unstable governments. Having seen many

instable periods and governments, it seemed to have been the best alternative and answer to such a situation. As such no matter to what extent the imposition had been controversial, it reportedly did not seem to have created annoyance among the people. Deploring the role of the Congress during the crises and sympathising with the NPC for an unfavourable outcome for it, the people took the President's rule nonchalantly. This also gave a brief break for the state's political machinery.

On the other hand, the President's rule created a conducive atmosphere for political parties of the state itself. The past political history of the state shows the continuous process of parties formation, split, re-alignments, re-grouping, dissensions, etc. This has checked the parties' growth into maturity and firmness. While at the same time, it has caused instability in the state. With the political process maturing into a more complex and complicated stage, the need had arrived for the parties to make a fresh start and cope with the growing situation and demands. In the immediate context too, the situation demanded the same from the parties. And the timely president Rule offered the opportunity.

For the Congress I, there could have been nothing better than for the President Rule to come to its aid at its time of crises. In reality, the central party leaders

have themselves sensed their helplessness and have therefore indirectly been the hand behind this imposition. The reason were manifold. Having managed to entrench it's roots in state politics just a few years back, it was in no way ready to pass on a recently won election term to the opposition party. This could mean discrediting itself of it's successful past. Moreover, it had laid the foundation of it's various policies in it's earlier term. In that case, another term of opposition party would naturally destroy it's record or better still take credit for it's progress and success sounding a death Khell for the Congress Party's future electoral performances. Of specific concern for the centre is the age old Naga problem. It had made fresh inroads through it's two Chief Ministers in negotiating for opening a fresh round of talks between the centre and the underground groups. This was a determined effort from the part of the Congress I and as such would prove to be disastrous for the party's credibility if in any way, the process is disrupted.

On the other hand, the party was having a chronic dissensions within the party's rank and files.²⁹ The practice of accommodating various defections over the year only evoked leadership clashes. The party has four main contenders for the leadership post. The conflict had erupted

29. Deccan Herald, 17 November, 1987.

from time to time and it was only the intervention of the centre that had solved the crises, mostly temporarily. In the recent case, Mr. Hokishe had to give place to Mr. S.C. Jamir in the 1982 election whereas in 1986, both had to exchange the place at the instance of the centre. The denial of party ticket to Jamir and the subsequent formation of Hokishe's Ministry in 1987 where R.C. Chiten Jamir another contender had to be accommodated in the ministry as Deputy C.M. are a few instances. Worst still, each leader had a good following of loyal supporters which created factions within the party in line with their leaders' stand. This naturally created cracks in the unity of the party.

At the same time, the party had been inflicted with splits. The latest being the split by the N.R.C. in July 1988. This has greatly weakened the party as it loses its popularly elected member most of which are prominent public leaders. Over all, the party dissensions and defection greatly effected the party members' morale. Its weakness mainly arising out of intra party conflicts, it therefore sought to revamp its party's moral and unity. The imposition thus saved it from getting further embroiled in the state's political process where it also stood to lose, and provided the opportunity to look into its own party affairs.

For the NPC, the imposition of the President's Rule was a sabotage of its chance to form a ministry. It had made the party dissatisfied and doubtful of the democratic practice. Following this, it had filed a case in the Gauhati High Court against the validity of imposition and had got a favourable verdict. However, it could do little to improve the situation. Nevertheless, the President rule proved to be a boon for them too. Little did they realise that even if they had managed to form the ministry, it could have been unstable and shortlived judging from the fact that the party was formed in a series of fast sequence within a very short period during the week long crises of July/August 1988. Its composition itself were formed out of several dissatisfied members of its parent party. In other words, it was grouping for convenience arising out of political destabilisation. This itself is not a base for a sound and stable party and as such would mean a premature end for the party's ministry if any, and affect its party's future poll prospects too.

The brief spell of quietness enabled it to re-consider its organisation in specific areas such as, party programmes, direction, strategy, support base, consolidating its position and making its presence felt in the state. The Regional parties had followed the same line of approach and pattern as envisaged by the first opposition regional party of 1964, the D.P. But the frequent changes of its nomenclatures, leaders and compositions have rendered it a



mixed up identification by the people. Regional identity is the only characteristic that stood out, while the party representing it have failed to exude its party identity and working, clearly to the people like the case of Congress I. This has befuddled the electorate. Therefore, in the present circumstances, it's efforts to streamline and strengthen the party became the most important task.

Having lost the 1982 and 87 elections after two consecutive victories in 1974 and 1977 elections, it was losing ground in state politics. To regain the position, winning the 1989 election became an urgent necessity.

This demanded that it's energy be recouped and reviewed much in advance of the nearing election. Truly, it made hectic and well planned preparation, finalising the list of candidates to contest, party propaganda and strategy months ahead of the Election Schedule. Literally, the period was an "incubation" period for the newly evolved party.

2. PRE-POLL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

The atmosphere in the immediate pre-poll period was one of political build up to the election. The outstanding feature is the state of preparation of both the main parties after a lull in political activities. The efforts of both to revamp their parties during the president rule could be noticed to have taken shape. The N.P.C. had successfully

mobilized a large section of the electorate mostly the youths. Party programmes were brought out which made a stark difference in improvement from its earlier election. Candidates were chosen on the lines of party loyalty and popularity and suitability in each of the constituency. Mr. Vamugzo was unanimously chosen as the N.P.C. party leader.

In the Congress Camp, the party organization and discipline were streamlined. But it could not make much progress in curbing leadership crises. This has ultimately led to its late selection of its candidates and leader. It was only at a very latter stage that Mr. Hokishe Sema was replaced by Mr. S.C. Jamir as N.P.C.C. (I) Chief after several rounds of deliberation between state and Central party leaders. Mr. Jamir's popularity among the lower rungs of the party, a better vote catcher and his deftness in steering a stable ministry during fluid situation helped him in his being selected.³⁰ His ministry of minority number of member in 1982 in contrast to Mr. Hokishe's shortlived majority ministry of 1987, put him in good stead in the opinion of the High Command finding him to be the suitable leader in the present situation of unpredictability in state politics. However, the denial of ticket to Mr. Hokishe had its repercussion when his tribesmen organised an eight hour

30. Deccan Herald, 1 January, 1989.

bandh in Dimapur. This became a factor in the election that had it's fallout on the poor performance of the party in the district of the leader.

Despite the preparedness of the parties, each had it's own apprehensions about the loyalty of its members. Rightly so because out of the 27 former legislative members given Congress tickets, only 20 were elected on party ticket in 1987 while the remaining 7 fought against the Congress on Independent and N.N.D.P. ticket.³¹ Of the remaining 33 new members, 8 members had fought against the Congress as Independent and N.N.D.P. tickets.³² Thus altogether, there were 15 members, who over a year ago stood against the Congress, now fighting under the same party banner.

On the other hand, the N.P.C. also had 20 members within the party banner, who had earlier fought on the Congress I ticket and as Independents against it in 1987. Only 13 had been elected on the N.N.D.P. ticket previously.³³ Thus, the Congress I and N.P.C. are fielding candidates, many of whom have been crossing over to the opposite party frequently giving cause for apprehension to the party leaders. Understandably the parties had to impose strict disciplinary code on its members in this election.

31. Hindu, 22 July, 1981.

32. Art. Cit.

33. Art. Cit.

Among the political developments, the repercussions among the Sema tribe arising out of the denial of ticket to Mr. Hokishe a prominent state leader and figure of the tribe is noteworthy. Being a tribal state political fortunes are dictated by tribal and clan affiliation and linkages. Party identification and loyalty is absent. In such situation, a party gets votes mainly through the leader who is popular among his tribesmen. From the angle of a voter, his votes is cast for the leader, indirectly meaning voting for the party to which the leader belongs. Subsequently, the leader's party is the party of majority of his tribe. This only means that the abdication of the party by the leader would be followed by loss of support for the party. This is the reality of the state's political feature. The case of Hokishe provides a case in point.

Following the denial of ticket, his tribesmen, organised an 8 hour bandh in Dimapur in protest against the Congress High Command's action.³⁴ The party's central representative, stationed in the state to oversee the party's election were gheraod and demanded of their cooperation in issuing the ticket. The efforts having failed, there was a lot of dissatisfaction among the tribe's people. So far, the presence of Mr. Hokishe had ensured consistent massive **Support** for Congress in the district which has seven constituency seats. This political development has only

34. Link, 1 January, 1989.

indicated a less fortunate result in the semi dominated district and other areas for the Congress I.

3. ISSUES

As in the 1987 election, the important issues remained the same. The main being the Assam-Nagaland boundary dispute arising out of the immediate cause of setting up polling booth in the disputed area, and the Naga problem. The short interval between the two election did not effect any change in the degree of its importance. In short the euphoria had not settled yet and as such was just a review of the past. Like in the past election, the intensity of both the issues mattered prominently in the election. What is to be noted is that neither of the parties' stand on those issues has changed much either. While the Congress I has opined that it would have talks with the N.S.C.N. only, leaving the question of unity among the different factions to themselves, the N.P.C.'s stand was that, it would strive to unite all the factions to bring them on one platform through which they can unanimously negotiate with the centre.³⁵ On the Dispute issue, both parties differ on the approach to the solution while maintaining the same stance that no area under dispute would be given away. Neither could claim capability in solving these issues without

35. Deccan Herald, 7 November, 1987 and Economic and Political Weekly, 9 January, 1989.

taking into account the ground realities of the political equations in which each will be placed after the outcome. The urgency of both issues have placed the parties in taking them into consideration in their election programmes.

Other than these, there were no other major issues. The remaining issues that were raked up by political parties are economic development, education, employment etc. which failed to pick up since the people is not so concerned of issues. The trend of the past hints that the people take slight interest and concern over an issue only if it is major. Otherwise, it is Personal credibility of the leaders that determine the choice.

4. CAMPAIGN:

The campaigning in this Election too like the 1987, did not match with the height of the 1982 Electioneering . Except that, the trend of campaigning set by the 1982 election continued. The usual methods of canvassing were used. The Congress I brought in various Central party leaders to campaign. The Prime Minister was no exception in this regard. While touching on the various long term sensitive issues, it continued to stress on quick economic development through its government. The Congress strategy behind the promises of Economic development were two pronged. First it seeked to induce economic benefits to

flush out the insurgents and thereby end the political conflict. Secondly, economic development and stability would ensure accommodation of all the people within the economic structure and gradually, the assimilation of the people into the national mainstream.

As a new strategy adopted in the 1982 election, the Congress I identified itself with the Regional aspiration and feelings. Having learnt from it's past failures, it took caution in imposing itself which it has realised that the people considering it an outsider repels with the very idea of it. As a national party it has also exerted that it represents the region's interest and is not adverse to it. In the process, it has upheld the local issues while it has been making the efforts to draw the people onto it's side.

The N.P.C.'s main electioneering plank was Regionalism. It's claim to understand the local needs better was repeatedly pointed out. The main issue that's being stressed in this regard is the Naga Problem. No doubt, it's identity which is closer to the people, consequently brings it closer to the insurgent groups. But practically, in the modern context, this do not hold out any longer. Because, the Congress I too had also made much inroads in establishing contact with the insurgents. While at the same time remaining in an advantageous position of being in good

connection with the centre which is not so for the N.P.C.

In other issues such as economic development, education etc., it is no match to the congress' abundant resources which is a key factor for ushering in economic development. On the question of stability, anti - corruption etc., it stands to lose much as Congress I, since the past have shown the weaknesses and fault of both parties. The overbearingness of the Congress I over several issues however does not effect it's regional votes, which draws people with a feeling of oneness to it. Unlike the 1987 election, the N.P.C., has refused to invite any opposition leaders from outside the state to campaign, as the previous election have proved to be counter productive.³⁶ This is so because of the difference in programmes, aims and objects inspite of both being Regional parties. The geo-politics of a region differs from place to place. So is the case in the state which is far remote from most of the regional parties in other parts of the country. Difficulties arise while trying to bridge this massive gap. Nor does the people respond favorably to an outsider's appeal even if it is on a state party's behalf.

More than anything, money again played a crucial role in drawing the people's support. These occupied the major part of the electioneering process despite the strong objections raised by powerful non - political groups like

36. Telegraph, 9 Janary, 1989.

Naga Mothers' Association (NMA), Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and Nagaland Baptist Churches Council (NBCC).³⁷ The inequality among parties caused by money power in facing the election has made a farce of Democratic process while at the same time destroying the social fabric. Complaints and Appeals were put to the Election Commission to check the massive use of money in Elections. But it was not heeded. The "money culture" had taken its roots in the state politics.

Tribal affiliations still is a major influence Elections. Though it is not communicated openly, it remains a strong factor in contributing to a party's or candidates' performance. The campaign finally concluded on the 19th January, 1989.

5. POLLING AND RESULTS

There were three parties in fray namely, Congress I, N.P.C. and N.P.P. The latter two were Regional parties. Besides there were a few number of Independent candidates. A total of 140 candidates contested the election. Except for the 1984 election this was the lowest number among the elections while the 1982 election recorded the highest number at 245. The two main parties fielded its' candidates in all the constituencies while 12 independents contested.

37. Indian Express, 21 January, 1989.

In 1982, the Independents were 125 in all. The decrease is due to the less importance of Independents as a result of the increasing polarisation of Regional and National parties.

Polling took place on 21st January, 1989. It was recorded at 85.64%, a marginal increase over the 1987 but in stark improvement over the 1982 record.³⁸ Among the districts the mean was 86%. While the Mokokchung district polled the highest at 94.73%. Party-wise, the Congress polled 51.45%, N.P.C. 41.61%, N.P.P. 2.76% and Independents 4.19%. The Congress drastically improved its' performance over the earlier elections. While the N.P.C. tailed behind it, however maintaining a steady improvement. The Congress lead over the main rival began with the 1987 elections and managed to retain the position in this election too. With the majority of the voter going in favour of the two parties, the third party and the independents were left far behind in the race. This positions was a repetition of the 1987 elections. In 1982, all the contesting parties shared almost similar amount of votes. The present trend is attributed to the growing popularity of the two major parties as a result of the Regional and National polarisation. This political development eased out the other minor contestants leaving the field clear for the two parties. The Trend suggest the gradual consolidation of two party system in the State.

38. Report Sixth Assembly Election, 1989, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

Statewise, the Congress I got absolute majority of 36 seats followed by N.P.C. 24. the rest of the contesting groups secured nil. The N.P.C. secured majority seats in Kohima and Zunheboto districts while the Congress I got majority in the rest of the five districts.

The results of the two districts of Mokokchung and Zunheboto, both traditional Congress strongholds provides clues to the influence of Tribal affiliation in elections. Both have been a Congress base due to the presence of two prominent Congress State leaders Mr. Jamir and Mr. Hokishe. Comparing their electoral records of several elections with other districts, these two districts had unflinchingly returned majority of the Congress candidates. But a marked change in its' results in tune with it's respective leader's prospect in the political ladder indicates the practical reality of tribal affiliations. In this context, the election data of 1987 and 1989 reveals a lot.

In 1987 when Hokishe replaced Mr. Jamir, as Congress I leader, the Zunheboto district to which the former belongs returned all the Congress I candidates, while Mokokchung result showed a dismal performance of the party. But the trends reversed in the 1989 election when Mr. Jamir replaced the former as party leader. Mokokchung district returned all the Congress I candidates while the other district

returned only three Congress and four N.P.C. This was clearly a case of rejecting the party for its unfavorable treatment to their leader. Their dissatisfaction over it had been demonstrated just before the election. The result is the outcome of the preceding events. If it had not been for the leadership crises that inflicted the party, the choice of party leader could not have effected the result as in the 1982 election when both districts returned majority of the Congress candidates. Clearly the tribal affiliations turned the leadership issue into a contest between the tribes and effected the party's performance.

Kohima, Tuensang and Mon with support base of both parties have returned almost equal number of candidates from both parties. The difference between parties is marginal unlike in the earlier election. In Kohima, the N.P.C. has done fairly better than its' rival and the 1987 elections. Less diversion of votes to the second Regional party or independents have enabled it to secure a majority this election. In Tuensang and Kohima, the Congress I managed to retain its' previous number of seats while it lost one in Mon district. On the other hand the N.P.C. improved marginally in all the districts.

In Phek and Wokha districts, the Congress I made major gains and improvement over its' rival and the earlier

elections records. Of specific importance is Phek district, the traditional stronghold of the Regional Party, where for the first time, it secured more seats than N.P.C. The other district which had always given an equal verdict for all parties, showed a clear support for Congress I.

Overall, the Congress I had made much gains in the rival party's territory. Unlike before, its' seats are spread all over the state evenly and is not confined to specific region or pockets.³⁹ The verdict is clearly in favour of the party. The N.P.C. inspite of the fact that the other regional party N.P.P did not cut into it's votes, could not make much improvement. The likely cause is it's weak strategy. The Congress I's electioneering experience could not be matched by the newly reformed party. Meanwhile, the N.P.P., and the Independents drew a blank. This is not surprising as political activities had centered between the two major parties. The N.P.P. could not offer itself as a strong alternative regional party due to the presence of N.P.C. which belongs to the erstwhile NNDP, the parent party of the former too. Being a split faction of NNDP it only echoed the regional identity which, reformed party NPC mainly stood for. So much so that even it's single seat won in 1987 could not be retained in 1989.

39. See Election data.

The Independents had been an important factor in ministry formation in case of neither of the party securing absolute majority. In all the previous election, their bargaining power had enabled parties to come to power. In 1982, when the Congress I and NNDP secured equal number of seats, Independents joined the Congress I and formed the party ministry.

Such instance are many and have indirectly encouraged a high number of independent candidates. But the trends changed with the polarisation of political parties form 1982 onwards. Their number declined thereafter touching the lowest at 12 in this election. Clearly, the new trends have turned unfavorable for independent contestants.

The results indicates that there is marginal difference in performance of the parties between the 1987 and 1989 election.⁴⁰ Due to a short interval between, the trend has not altered much. the latter election has only made the 1989 verdict more acute and clearer. In the process, it has eliminated the weaker forces in the political arena, giving the people only two choices. The chronic instability that has become a part of State politics could have compelled the electorate to give a clearer verdict and pave the way for stability and development. The 1989, party position in the Assembly provides an arrangement for a stable functioning of government.

40. See Table Election Data of 1987-1989.

3. CROSS ANALYSIS OF THREE ELECTIONS AND TRENDS

The trend of the last three elections reveal that the Congress I had managed to consolidate it's position in the state. In 1982, it faced a strong opposition for the reason that is a National, 'outside' party. One reason for it's gradual acceptance and assimilation into the region is it's changed approach to tribal electorate. It identified itself with the tribal nature and aspirations while maintaining a respectable distance. It gave due importance to it's culture, tribal laws, traditional democratic structure like village courts and administrative set up, and paved the way for it's existence side by side with modern democratic set up. It restrained itself from imposing many provisions alien to the tribal Society. Over the years, it shed it's insensitivity, characteristic of most central leaders, in dealing with the local issues of the Nagas. The insensitivity of the Janata Government of the 70's in dealing with several sensitive issues of the Nagas only alienated the people from them. In Contrast, the Congress I adopted a more practical approach in solving the issues under Indira Gandhi, which had been pursued by her successors.

By and large, the people began to shed the old inhibitions towards the national party as many of the

leaders got enrolled in the party. The easy access to benefits under the party ministry was an added factor to draw people within its fold. Being a dominant national party, it spread its influence all round the states. The frequent change of the party loyalties helped in spreading the Congress culture into other parties as well. In the course of time, the Regional parties which had always maintained the clear Regional character adopted the Congress Culture of politics, (e.g. 1987) eroding its own image. Difference in nature between the parties became minimal and the people were left with no distinct choice. Thereafter, the slogan of regional versus National party lost its shine. It was replaced with the credibility of the party irrespective of its Regional or National character. The performance of both parties' government in the past has proved the point that more than party character and nature, credibility counts more. This has gradually veered people away from the wave of Regional or National sentiments. To justify the point, when the Congress I first contested the 1977 election after merging with NNO, it was defeated by UDF mainly due to the regional wave. In the following election of 1982, when the regional sentiment was still very strong, the Congress I managed to score even with the NNDP mainly due to its high profile intensive electoral effort to break into state politics. By deftly maneuvering, it secured the

support of the independents and formed it's first ministry. This opportunity was utilized prudently in building it's image and credibility. It's efforts bore fruits in the 1987 and 1989 elections when it improved it's position in the face of stiff challenges from the Regional parties.⁴¹ Though it's success is accredited to it's money power, electoral malpractices and the advantage of being in power at the Centre, on the other side, it had also consistently worked on being credible in the eyes of the people. In this process, the changes taking place in the character and methods adopted by the Regional party indirectly helped the Congress's progress. By emulating the congress politics, it gradually lost it's old regional aura thereby losing the hold over regional sentiments. From then on, parties came to be judged on the basis of it's creditbility in delivering the demands of the people rather than the early eighties' trend of Regional or National sentiments.

For the regional parties, this has become a reality. In the changed atmosphere, they can no longer stick to the older methods of gaining support as they had not performed fully upto the expectations of the people. Since the 1982 elections, their same stand on regionalism has not borne fruit in terms of electoral victory. The requirement of the

41. See Election Dat, 1987-1989.

day is a practical approach to strengthen its position. In this connections, they need to chart out a proper ideological guidelines for its party. This would help like minded leaders to stand firm in the party. It's past records of splits, merger, reformation and change of party nomenclature had only checked it's growth into a mature party. So far, the regional character is the only factor that has linked it to its predecessors though it was not in reality, intentional. This ought to be stopped and a permanent identity, character and programme needs to be laid out. Only then can the party strengthen it's base and as well as other aspects to become a formidable challenge to the Congress I.

The Congress trend had taken roots in the state like in other parts of the nation. Along with it, the political equations and processes have undergone dramatic changes in contrast to the pre-1982 period. Politics have come to be more actively pursued and in the process have politicised the major part of the society. Politicisation of societies is said to be the first sign of development. But the truth of the saying could not be justified in the context of the state where unstable governments, lack of political direction etc. is the feature of state's democratic structure, the most important symbol of modern democratic society.

The Congress entry into the state was accompanied by many ills of modern politics. Engineering defections and bargaining independent members to form ministry, increasing roll of money in politics, are some of the features that have been infused into state politics by the Congress. With it's increasing influence, the politics of the state made a gradual changeover, distinct from the period prior to 1982. More than maintaining a stable government and clean administration, politicking became the order of the day. Power and benefits became the main target for parties and short term gains became the principle. As a result, winning the elections grew to be the most crucial issue for all the parties. Politics then turned out into a messy field inflicted with instability, corruption, constitutional crises and so on. These only created confusion for the people. The changed scenario changed the old loyalty to regional cause. Placed in a new situation full with its complexities, the people were left with no option but to follow the trend. This in turn effected the socio-economic fabric of the state.

The electoral pattern of the past election indicates a gradual elimination of weaker parties and groups. The composite nature of the assembly of multi parties and independents have gradually given way to two major parties, regional and national. Apart from the intensity of the

sentiments, the parties had come to represent each. And in the process, have created a niche in state politics. The two party equation have finally re-emerged again akin to the first few years after statehood. This was indicative of the two party system having strong roots in the state.

4. POST ELECTION RE - ALIGNMENT

With an absolute majority, the Congress I formed the third ministry under Mr. S.C. Jamir whose leadership was unopposed. He had earlier headed the party's 1982 ministry. The opposition party's weak position in the Assembly offered the possibility of a stable government for the term. However, the Congress I's intra-party dissensions had not been fully solved. The quietness during the election phase were temporary, due to electoral strategy of the party directed by the Central leaders. Meanwhile, the dissensions kept festering. The replacement of Hokishe which had created discontent even before the election were soon to erupt again. This came about 14 months later after the ministry was sworn in.

Under K.L. Chisi, a split took place which later merged with the NPC. They later formed the 2nd ministry of the term which however lasted for only a month. In spite of the National Front Government appointee governor M.M. Thomas's repeated attempts to restore this ministry, it's further defections led to it's collapse.

It was replaced by the third ministry of the term formed out of a coalition of NPC and Congress I and headed by Vamuzo, leader of the NPC. It called itself "Joint Legislative Front" (JLF). This also lasted a little less than two years and collapsed in the first week of April 1992. Due to the inability to form another ministry, the Assembly was dissolved and the third President Rule was imposed on the state on 3rd April, 1992.

Within a span of four years since the 1987 election, there has been three ministries with two President rules, one preceding the election and the other after the failure of 1989 ministry. The term is the repetition of the 1977 election where too it faced three ministries. But unlike the former, this is interspersed with President's rule and worse. Even in the new era of politics, the three elections reveal that, the nature of the past, pre-'82 election period have remained. Indications are that though the context have changed, politics have always remained the same.

PRESIDENT RULE 1988: GOVERNOR
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

The President's rule that was imposed in Nagaland on seventh August 1988 following the week long ministerial crisis and the subsequent collapse of the Congress I ministry became a major constitutional controversy due to its many questionable grounds on the basis of which the rule was imposed. The method and justification of the governor in leading the state into such a situation against the interest of the party that was equipped with sufficient legislative members to form an alternate government revealed the political machinations in the use of the powerful provision, Article 356. It also revealed the misuse of governor's office and the influence upon President in the exercise of his discretionary powers by the Congress I, the political party in power at the Centre for its own benefit. Consequently, these proved the loopholes present in the constitution provisions that have been capitalised to a large extent by the political parties. In the process, it has undermined the working of parliamentary democracy in the states. The duly elected members are placed at the mercy of the Autocratic rule of the centre that had finally assumed enormous powers over the years. Through threats of

dissolution, non-cooperation in implementing policy, Financial Grant, Central Rule, Party discipline etc., the centre had grown dominant over the state governments compelling it to follow the former's directives. On a slight pretext of disobedience or non-compliance with the centre's directives, it was faced with the consequences of termination of the concerned ministry or the change of leadership.

This is more so in the case of state ministries whose party is different from that at the centre. The ambition of the central government to install only its party ministry at the states for reasons of effective coordination in legislation has been the main factor behind this practice. Specifically, the centre draws its strength from the states through the party representatives it sends to the centre as well as by supporting its policy and showing good results of the policy in the states. This, subsequently enhances its party's image and election prospects. As such, there have been an indiscriminate use of special powers such as the Article 356, for the sole purpose of installing the concerned party's own ministry at the states.

In the race for power, democratic institutions and procedures have been sidestepped and reduced to mere tools for this purpose. In the end, the blame goes to everyone

that have been a part of this political conspiracy. But the fact remains that the party in power at the centre bears the sole responsibility for all these.

The controversy in Nagaland is only a part of this political game. But the surprising fact that this has to happen at a time when it has just managed to establish a democratic process, also, much aspired by the central leaders, after a long history of turmoils arising out of naga nationalist demands and movement, is ironical to think of it. It's fragile democracy which is at a stage of infancy has not been spared in the larger interest of the party. Instead, it seems to have been fed with more doses of the ills of modern democracy which it is not well accustomed to. Besides, this act has sown the seeds of destabilising politics and eroding faith for the constitution provisions and the Central leaders.

In the Background of the national politics and application of Article 356 in various circumstances in Indian states, the controversial President Rule of 1988 imposed in Nagaland can also be suitably studied. In recent years, India's parliamentary democracy, has been facing a lot of threats from several destabilising factors at work. And as a routine, many have pointed at extra-constitutional activities such as Proto-nationalism, sub-nationalism,

secessionism, Religious fanatics, anti-socials and the like. Excepting a few who have gone deeper into the issue and have laid the blame on the basic federal structure and it's parliamentary system, not to mention the political and democratic process that have evolved out of this arrangement. Leaving aside the constitutional provision for the present democratic structure, it comes to light that the forces of destabilisation is at work from two quarters and direction. One is the extra-constitutional activities such as secessionism, that one has come to be acquainted with in the country, and the other is, the ruling elite of the nation comprising of Union ministers, high level bureaucrats and the rest who occupies the top echelons of power and run the nation. The latter's role is particularly referred to in the controversy being discussed here.

1. ARTICLE 356 AND IT'S FREQUENT USAGE

The Constituent framers have given wide powers to the centre due to the nation's sub-continental dimensions replete with immense socio-economic disparities, multitudinous people with possibly divided loyalties.¹ Besides that, disruptive forces and widespread violent disturbances in the wake of partition and the centrifugal

1. Kashyap, Anirban, Governor's Role in Indian Constitution. Delhi, Lancers Books, 1993, p.602.

forces during the formation of the country convinced them of the need to bestow the centre with special powers. Over the years, these powers have been supplemented with more powers through Amendments, Legislations, and to some extent Court's ruling on constitutional matters. This is truly in keeping with the definition of the constitution as "Federal in structure and unitary in spirit". In recent years, it has taken the true form of a Unitary system. The powers of the centre had grown to such a height that it is virtually in command and control of almost every aspect and over all the states notwithstanding the separation of powers under three lists: Union, State, and Concurrent, providing the centre and the states with separate and well defined areas for legislation. This has already antagonised the state government and have resulted in eroding and straining the centre-states relation. It is a well known fact that the disgruntled states have launched a demand for redefining centre -states relation mainly in terms giving more autonomous power to the states.

Among the many points of discontentment for the states, the main is the centre's interferences in the political affairs of the states. Herein comes the Article 356 into the picture. It has been the most controversial power of the centre and the main cause for straining centre-state relations. "It is one of the coercive powers at the hands of the union to maintain the democratic form of government.

A wide literal construction of Article 356(1) will reduce the constitutional distribution of powers between the union and the states to a license dependent on the pleasure of the Union Executive. Further, it will enable the Union Executive to cut at the root of parliamentary form of government in the state and will act against the idea of Federation making the central government and the parliament unpopular in the state concerned" writes Anirban Kashyap.² This explains the consequence that have come about in the present scenario due to the misuse of this provision.

The frequency of it's misuse could be gauged by the fact that until 1991, President rule under the provision of Art. 356 have been imposed on 86 occasions.³ The very fact that during Nehru's tenure, the Congress had resorted to this provision for partisan reasons in some cases, explains the trend it is in today. The Sarkaria commission has compiled the data of it's frequency as tabulated below:

Sl. No.	Period	Frequency ⁴
1.	1950-54	3
2.	1955-59	3
3.	1960-64	2
4.	1965-69	9 (7 cases in 67-69)
5.	1970-74	19
6.	1975-79	21 (9 cases in 1977)
7.	1980-87	18 (9 cases in 1980)
9.	1988-91	11
Total (in 41 years)		86 Occasions

2. Op.cit., p.603.

3. Op.cit., p.613.

4. Ibid.

The frequency of it's use increased with the passage of time. In the period before 1967, President's rule was not quite frequent because until that year, the Indian politics was one of the one party dominant system.⁵ The one dominant party Congress I was in power at the centre as well as in most of the states for a very long period and this ensured that the tensions arising between them could very often be resolved through the party mechanism.⁶ The rise of frequency in the post 1967 is attributed to the congress losses in many of the states in the 4th general Election 1967 which unnerved it's leaders and compelled them to take resort to Article 356 to regain it's position.

Studies by various constitutional experts have shown that the Congress I have most frequently used this provision than any other national parties. This can be due to it's long tenure of being in power which can provide wide opportunities for it's use in comparison to other parties that have virtually remained as opposition parties except for brief spells. Nevertheless, except in a few cases, the Congress I had mostly misused the provisions for the party's interest. Among the Congress I's Prime Ministers, Indira

5. Arora, S.C., President's Rule in Indian States, New Delhi, Mittal Publishers, 1990, p.1.

6. Op.cit., p.2.

Gandhi was the most frequent user of Article 356.⁷ It is apparent that the frequency of the election is related to the fortune of the party in power. This is revealed in the fall of frequency around 1970 and post 1971 general election due to Congress party stabilization after the party split of 1969 and the victory in the 1971 general election.⁸

There has been persistent criticisms both in regard to the manner and frequency of the use of this provision in accordance with the whims and fortunes of the parties in power. Truly, this has been misused on inadequate grounds such as to frustrate the formation of non-party state governments, to get rid of inconvenient state governments, to remove political deadlocks and factional rivalries within the party etc. The most glaring examples of it's misuse and frequency occurred in the period 1975-1987. On coming to power at the centre in 1977-79, the Janata government dismissed nine state governments of the Congress I on the ground that the party had lost majority support as indicated by the defeat of the Congress I at the parliamentary election of 1977. This raised questions as to how a parliamentary election results can be linked to popular

7. Kashyap, A. op.cit., p.614.

8. Op.cit., p.620.

support at the states. The worst that followed was in the period 1980-1987 when the Congress I after coming to power at the centre after their resounding victory in the Parliamentary election of 1980, avenged the Janata's acts by dismissing nine state governments including some governments installed by the Janata government.⁹ This were the first two occasions when the centre have openly demonstrated the misuse of Article 356 - for political reasons. It is no surprise then, that it's misuse have remained unabated.

The apprehensions of the founding fathers have been justified by the widespread misuse of this provision.¹⁰ On the other hand, the golden purpose of this Article, in their intentions, to restore democracy when the need arises have been adhered to only in a few exceptional cases. Instead, political parties in power have gone to the extent of creating instability and constitutional crisis and breakdown in the states in stark contrast to it's purpose of rescuing and normalising a constitutional breakdown. In the midst of this whirlpool, not only has the sanctity of constitution and parliamentary democracy gone down, but other government institutions and offices associated in the exercise of this

9. Op.cit., p.614

10. Op.cit, p.621.

provision, such as governor and his office, speaker, Election procedure, Chief Minister and his cabinet etc. have also been effected. All these, along with the destabilising politics of the Central leaders are taken into account in the implications and controversy surrounding the President's Rule of 1988.

2. FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO PRESIDENT'S RULE

The Congress I had come to power after the Assembly Election of 1987. It secured 34 seats against 18 of N.N.D.P., 7 of N.P.P. and 1 independent. It's comfortable margin made way for it's ministry to be formed under the leadership of Mr. Hokishe Sema. This was the second term of the Congress I and the first time it won with a clear cut majority. In their first contested election in 1977 it lost most of the seats to the main opposition party U.D.F. In 1982, it got an equal number of seats with the N.N.D.P. the main opposition party, mainly, due to it's high profile electioneering and money power. Due to the same criteria, it managed to rope in all the twelve independent members and formed the ministry lasting it's full term. In the period then, covering both these elections and since the year of it's entry into state politics in 1976, it had been constantly struggling against the local inhabitant's anti-national party attitude. Along with the consolidation of

it's position in the state, it had to cope with intra-party dissension. Leaders of various factions that had defect into the party clashed for leadership.¹¹ This percolated down to the members of the different groups. As a whole, there were four leaders contending for the post. Mr. Hokishe Sema and Mr. S.C. Jamir being the main contenders, the other two were Mr. Chiten Jamir and Mr. T.A. Ngullie.¹² The intensity can be gauged by the fact that when Mr. S.C. Jamir was appointed the leader by the High Command for 1982, Mr. Hokishe had to be absorbed into the Rajya Sabha and later appointed governor. On the other hand, Mr.T.A. Ngullie was given a berth in the state cabinet. Only under such an arrangement, the leaders were pacified, but it was obvious that it was not the final solution. The appointment of Mr. Hokishe mid-term as the Congress leader after the collapse of Mr. S.C. Jamir's ministry in 1986, and his continuation of the leadership post for the 1987 election, further strained the relation between them.

Eight months into the term after the successful Congress I victory in 1987 election, the ministry of Mr. Hokishe was destabilised by the resignation of 13

11. S.C. Jamir's U.D.F.(P) turned U.L.P. Merged with Congress I in 1980.

12. The Statesman, 2 November, 1982.

legislative members from the party on 30th July 1988.¹³ It was apparent that this was the consequence of party dissensions. It is also obvious by the fact that Mr. Hokishe, on forming the ministry, had to pacify the dissenting members by inducting them in the ministerial posts as well as reluctantly create a Deputy Chief Minister post for Mr. R.C. Chiten Jamir.¹⁴ No doubt, his ministry of 21 members in a mere house of 60 was the largest so far. It also signified of the things to come.

The reasons cited by the thirteen dissenters was indicative. In the letter to the speaker, they cited that "they are not happy with the leadership of Mr. Sema" as "the style and functioning of the Congress under the leadership of Mr. Sema is not acceptable to the people Nagaland."¹⁵ Their complain also included misuse of finance, deteriorating social and administrative conditions, and breakdown of law and order.

Soon after, the members formed the Nagaland Regional Congress (NRC). The Speaker duly recognised the split which legally crossed the 1/3rd limit of the party in accordance

13. Times of India, 1 August, 1988.

14. Indian Express, 4 January, 1988.

15. Times of India, 1 August, 1988.

with the Anti-Defection Act 1985. He also legally recognised the new party formed. Immediately following this, the N.R.C. aligned with the N.N.D.P., N.P.P. and four independents and formed the Joint Regional Legislative Party (JRLP) with a strength of 35. The following day, the J.R.L.P. transformed itself formally into a new party, Nagaland Peoples' Council (NPC). The erstwhile N.N.D.P. leader Mr. Vamuzo assumed the leadership of the new party.

Being in a majority with 35 members, against the reduced Congress I strength of 21, the N.P.C. leader requested the Governor for forming their ministry. But the Governor did not oblige to his request. Nor did he accept the Party's claim of having a majority. In fact, he refused to accept the fact that a Split had really taken place and questioned the legality of itself.¹⁶ He charged the speaker for having acted promptly to recognise the Split and the forming of the new party without studying the real reasons behind. He also claimed that the new party formed was illegal since it has not been recognised by the Election Commission. It was his belief based on the Chief Minister's version that undemocratic and coercive methods had been used by Vamuzo in obtaining the support of the members.

16. G. Pardesi, "President's Rule in Nagaland", in Link, 3 July, 1988, p.26.p.26.

Following the Chief Minister's allegation that his thirteen Congress I members were being unlawfully detained by N.P.C., the Governor's office led an enquiry, on the request of Mr. Vamuzo for verification. The inquiry led by high ranking officers found the allegation to be untrue as the members had claimed that it was of their own will and decision that they are in the N.P.C. fold.¹⁷ In spite of these findings, the Governor remained adamant on his earlier stand.

During the period of crisis, the Governor was reportedly stationed in a neighbouring state's capital, leaving the state crisis unattended. Neither any efforts were made to objectively study the crisis and find solutions. The N.P.C. was not asked to prove its majority, nor was the minority Congress I ministry asked to establish its majority. This was in spite of the offer of the N.P.C. to prove its majority outside the parliament.¹⁸ The Governor's inaction created a deadlock and constitutional crisis.

Meanwhile, the Central Congress Government loss no time in sending its various Union Ministers and other high

17. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.634.

18. Ibid.

ranking party leaders to the state to solve the crisis by way of bringing back its defected members and restoring its ministry. Having won the election for the second time with an absolute majority, the Congress I was not in a position to let its ministry collapse within a very short time. The likely consequence on its failure to restore the ministry was a dim future election prospects, destabilisation and erosion of its improving party base and submission to the Regional force which has for long been its political opponent. It is obvious that for these reasons, it was not prepared to give its place to the opposition parties combine. Their efforts were therefore, intensive and manipulative.

The Opposition parties in the parliament were restive too. They staged a walkout in the parliament in protest against the governor's inaction and denial of forming a ministry to the N.P.C. A memorandum was later submitted to the President on this regard.¹⁹ Pressure on the Central Government was building up from various quarters for early action. Due to this pressure and having realised its failure in bringing back its members, the Central Government released its hold over the situation. However,

19. Times of India, 6 August, 1983.

it was not as many expected. The Governor returned to the state at the end of the week since the crisis began and in a partisan move, consulted only the deposed Chief Minister and recommended in his report for President rule.²⁰

Part of the Governor's Report stated that the Governor had not received any written information from the Congress I dissidents regarding their split and the forming of their new party. He claimed ignorance of the substantial grounds on which the members had left the party. Besides, he pointed out that the speaker had not personally written to him about the recognition of the new party and that it is yet to gain the recognition of the Election commission. He further dwelt on the morality of the members' action mentioned as, "The manner in which a new party was formed by the dissidents group overnight and the prompt decision taken to merge it with other opposition groups was not really to function as an independent party with any ideology or objectives for service to the people, but really to topple the constitutionally elected ruling party government by forging an alliance of convenience with the opposition with an eye on office and attendant benefits".²¹ Consequently, the

20. Times of India, 7 August, 1988.

21. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.635.

President's rule was imposed on 7th August 1988, a week after the crisis began. The parliament later approved it on 10th of August.

Considering his constitutional duty, and his reluctance to permit a normal changeover of power, for the sake of pleasing his Congress Political Masters, the governor came in for a lot of criticisms. The ground realities stood in stark contrast to the claims of the governor in his report. It was clear that the immediate cause for the imposition was the governor's partisan role. The case of Nagaland is not a new phenomena, but a trend that have picked up over the years. The other similar cases are Jammu and Kashmir (1984), Sikkim (1984), and Karnataka (1989). Therefore, the crisis is analysed mainly from the angle of Governor's role as well as the higher authorities which directs almost every decision of the governor which constitutionally is his "discretion".

3. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR PRESIDENT'S RULE: ARTICLE 356(1)

The Provision of Article 356(1) reads, "The President is empowered to make a Proclamation, when he is satisfied that the Government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, either

on the report of the Governor of the state or otherwise."²²

This provision follows as a result of the duty bound responsibility of the Union to look after the states that the constitution has provided through the Article 355 which reads, "It is a duty of the Union to ensure that the Government of every state is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution."²³

Enshrined in Part XVIII of the constitution, this article is one of the most powerful provision. On the proclamation of President's rule, the entire state machinery passes into the hands of the Union which exercises it through the Governor of the state. The state legislature is either suspended or dissolved. However, within two months of the proclamation, Parliament have to pass it.²⁴

The relevance of this provision is such that if exercised correctly, it may operate as a safety mechanism for the political system. But can destroy the constitutional equilibrium of centre-states relation if it is misused or abused.²⁵ President rule is purely a transitional phase and

22. Basu, D.D., Introduction to the Constitution of India, 14th Edition, New Delhi, Prentice Hall of India Private Limited, 1992, p.321.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., Clause (3) of Article 356.

25. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.603.

it's purpose is to bear the brunt of the shift that is to take place.²⁶

The practical application of the provision have been under much criticisms and debate all due to the fact that the scope of the provision is vague. The constitution do not provide a detailed guideline, direction and clear cut scope for the use of this provision. A brief analysis of it's literal meaning and practical reality which can throw a light on it's nature are as follows:

(a) Actual Meaning of President's "Satisfaction"

The immediate factor, according to the Article 356, that leads to the promulgation of President's rule is his "Satisfaction". His satisfaction is to be based on the assurance and conclusions drawn on the facts and materials given in the governor's report or from sources 'otherwise. Therefore, the satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent to the exercising of Article 356.

But in the context of whose 'satisfaction', this is not a reality. The President is only a nominal head of state with no real powers. That his executive powers are exercised by his Council of Minister is a known fact as provided in

26. Arora, S.C., op.cit., p.7.

Article 74(1).²⁷ This restricts the President from exercising his discretion on any matter. Whatever is referred to the president on any matter given in the constitution is therefore constitutionally taken up by the Council of Ministers for discussion and collective decision. It follows therefore, that it is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on such a situation that can lead to the promulgation of President's rule. The president's only role is to give his opinion and suggestions which is not at all binding on the Ministers. The President's satisfaction is therefore, the satisfaction of the Ministers, which is the legal and constitutional position.

Article 74(2) prohibits the court from enquiring into the materials, advice tendered to the president and reasons on the basis of which he had formed his opinion and acted.²⁸ Therefore, his actions are not justiciable. However, following the indiscriminate proclamation in 1977, the Supreme court in the State of Rajasthan Vrs. Union of India, held that the courts may possibly strike down Proclamation if it be shown that it was issued malafide or on grounds irrelevant to the satisfaction of the President.²⁹ But since

27. Basu, D.D. op.cit., p.164.

28. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.607.

29. Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.324.

the President is not bound to disclose the materials and state the reasons for his acts, the lack of evidence for courts naturally made the Supreme court's verdict baseless.

A little headway was made for judicial review of President's proclamation in the Karnataka case of Bommai in which the High court held that the courts should base their decision only on the disclosed materials without probing any further.³⁰ On the basis of this, judicial review of President rule is possible to the extent of the materials in the Governor's report laid on the table of the house. But still, it has very limited power to quash the decision of the president already arrived at and promulgated.

(b) Occasions for Use

The most controversial has been the vague and subjective phrase describing the condition in a state that calls for such proclamation. The term that seeks to explain it, "a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution" lacks clarity. Nor has the Constituent framers given any clue or explanation in any part of the constitution in this regard. As a fact, they even harboured conflicting ideas as to how and when Article

30. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.607.

356 should be applied.³¹ This has left the Constitutional experts to figure out it's scope of applicability on the basis of the present scenario. D.D. Basu have listed three occasions for it's applicability which are as follows:

- a) when a ministry resigns after defeat in the legislature and no other ministry commanding a majority can be formed. Dissolution being an expensive process, Article 356 may be applied to allow the state of flux in the assembly to subside.
- b) the party having a majority declines to form a ministry and the governor fails in his attempt to form a coalition ministry, and lastly,
- c) failure to carry out the directions of the Central Government.³²

Basu admits that none of the numerous past occasion specifically refers or confirms to the third category.³³ P. Singh's description of a constitutional breakdown in states is, "if the judiciary declares a law as unconstitutional but the state executive flouts that verdict; and again if the

31. Op.cit., p.623.

32. Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.324. Also, Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.624.

33. Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.324.

Ministry does not obey the directive of state legislature. Likewise, if the civil service in the state manifests a spirit of revolt against the ministry.³⁴ This means that if there is a struggle between the various organs in the state with the result that the administration cannot be carried on in accordance with the constitution, the occasion deems fit for the use of the provision.

However, in one's opinion, P.Singh's probable situations though possibly true, is hardly come by these days due to the changed administrative and political set-up that have ensured many checks, balances and a clearcut jurisdiction for each organ of government. The need is to identify the situation arising out of the political processes. Varadachari and the Sarkaria Commission have listed many similar occasions that can be confirmed as a constitutional breakdown.³⁵ In both the cases, they have included D.D. Basu's major points as well as expanded its meaning and scope. For brief reference, the Sarkaria Commission's categorization into four broad heads are as follows:

34. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.624.

35. Op.cit., pp.624-625.

1. Political Crisis.
2. Internal Subversion.
3. Physical Breakdown.
4. Non-Compliance with Constitutional Directives of the Union Executive.³⁶

Under the first category, the situation described is mainly the absence of a willing majority party to form the government. Secondly, when the state government run by majority government disregards the constitution and law in it's conduct, pursues a policy bringing the system of government to a standstill or deadlock, designedly flouts principles and conventions to substitute with dictatorship, violates or misuses the constitutional provisions, and forments a violent revolt, there is consitutional breakdown due to Internal Subversion. Physical breakdown can be due to the refusal of the state ministry to discharge it's responsibilities leading to administrative paralysis, or when natural calamities of unprecedented magnitude occurs. Lastly, breakdown due to Non-compliance can occur when the Union executive's directives to states under the provision of Articles 256, 257 and 339(2) or during National Emergency is not complied or when, if public disorders endangering law and order and the security of the state occurs and the state

36. Op.cit., p.625

fails in its constitutional duty to keep the Union government informed.³⁷

In practice, there has been no concerted guidelines nor grounds for the identification of such situations. As such, on many occasions, circumstances and the individual judgment of the governor and the concerned ministries of the centre has guided in identifying the situation needing President's rule. At the same time, the vague scope of the Article has made the party leaders concerned to define the situation to make way for imposition of the Article when it suits the party's interest.

(c) **Governor's Report**

The other controversial issue has been the source through which the President can be satisfied that such a situation needing President rule has arisen. In Article 356, the President is to base his satisfaction on two main sources i.e. the Governor's Report or "otherwise". With this particular clause, the Governor's role is enhanced in the process of declaring President rule as his report form a part of a major source on which the President is to rely for his satisfaction and subsequently his decision. But his role is limited to making a report. On the other hand, the

37. Op.cit., pp.625-626.

President is free to accept or reject the governor's report as he has to be satisfied first that such a situation has arisen.³⁸ Besides, he does not rely on only the report but other 'sources' as well. Such as, Intelligence departments, newspaper reports, public meetings etc. For instance, President's rule was imposed without the governor's report in nine states in 1977 during Janata rule and again in nine states in 1980 during the Congress I rule. But in most cases, the President's rule have been imposed only on receipt of the governor's report. This can be because, the process is formal and is more legitimate since it has been specifically mentioned in the Article. Therefore, a governor's report, nevertheless, plays such an important role in the imposition of President's rule.

Governors's report has to be objective, impartial, containing all the materials, facts and circumstances reflecting the situation so that the facts are relevant to assess the situation. The study team of the Administrative Reforms Commission also concluded that, "in all cases, the Governor's report has to be objective, according to the facts as he sees and interprets them and not as his ministers or the centre interprets them. Briefly therefore, in reporting to the President whether in routine or in

38. Op.cit., p.608.

unusual circumstances warranting the Presidential intervention, the governor is expected to exercise his own judgement".³⁹

In the preparation of his report, the governor has to use his discretion. D.D. Basu says that this is a necessity as the report may sometimes be against a ministry in power. It is therefore obvious that such reports cannot be prepared with ministerial advice.⁴⁰ At the same time, discretion should not be impeded upon by the directives of Central leaders as it reportedly happened in Kerala (1959). But in practice and reality, the governor do not exercise any discretion. It has become a normal practice for the governor to consult with the President or the Prime Minister of the likely content of his formal report to assure himself about its acceptance before sending it.⁴¹ Besides, his fortnightly reports give sufficient clues in advance to the centre and thus, his formal report is only prepared after some indications are given by the centre. It is obvious that through this same process, the centre indirectly influences his formal report at the final stage.

39. Op.cit., p.611.

40. Op.cit., p.612.

41. Arora, S.C., op.cit., pp.30-31.

Thus the governor is an important factor in the process of proclamation. As a result, this has also made him a victim of political pressures and machinations. The increasing practice of governors being a political appointee has created obstacles in his functioning due to the need of pleasing his political masters. Subsequently, in almost all proclamations, the governor's role has been controversial.

(d) **Real Issuing Authority**

From the provision of Article 74(1)⁴², it follows that the Council of ministers exercise the executive powers of the president. The president's power is limited to giving his advice and suggestions which is not binding on the council of ministers. In the context of Article 356 and the proclamation the entire process leading to it is handled by the Council of Ministers in the name of President. When the Governor's report reaches the President, he refers it to the Prime Minister with his suggestions, who then sends it to the Home Ministry. The Ministry with its note, sends it to the Political Affairs Committee of the cabinet which is latter discussed in the cabinet meeting.⁴³ Their decision is

42. 42nd Amendment Act 1976, cited in, Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.614.

43. Chatterjee, S. Governor's Role in Indian Constitution, New Delhi, Mittal Publishers, 1992, p.189.

conveyed to the President who acts according to the cabinet's decision. Thus, the Council of ministers exercises the real authority and as such literally proclaims the President rule.

Summing up the nature of this provision, it is both constitutional and political. It is best described in the words of S.C. Arora:

"Constitutional use of Article 356 and its political use are not two separate categories. The two in fact cannot be separated. Political use of Article 356 is not its constitutional abuse. The constitutional reality is incomplete unless political reality is also taken into consideration... In fact, a proper understanding of the political system reveals that political reality is more compulsive and expedient than what is said or provided for in the constitutional provisions. In terms of political reality, Article 356 is a political instrument that brings about and ensures a smooth shift of power. It is purely a transitional stage and its purpose is to bear the brunt of the shift that is to take place. It brings about a smooth, legal, constitutional and peaceful change of government - a valuable instrument. However, it is valuable only when it is operated with certain restraints. These restraints are to be decided by political norms or constitutional conventions

which are necessary for the proper functioning of any constitutional or political system".⁴⁴

4. GOVERNOR'S POWER IN RELATION TO PRESIDENT'S RULE

The Governor is the Constitutional Executive head of the state. Apart from it, he also has legislative and judiciary responsibilities. What stands out most is his responsibility to the centre, specifically the President who appoints him. On this basis, he is the agent of the centre in looking after the democratic process in the state. He keeps the President informed of the political developments in the state through periodic reports which is the most important aspect of the governor's office. In respect of centre - state relation, he is the only constitutional link between the two sets of government. His part involvement in the state administrative structure keep him informed of the state's political development which subsequently enables him to inform the president in turn. He is again responsible to pass on any president's directive to the state. This has become an important channel for centre-state relation.

In discharging his duties, Article 163(1) provides for a Council of ministers to aid and advice him in exercising his functions. At the same time the Article also gives him

44. Arora, S.C., op.cit., p.7.

discretionary powers unlike for the President, over certain matters not specified for in the constitution.⁴⁵ Further Article 163(2) states that his decision to act discretionally on any matter is final.⁴⁶

Thus, in view of his responsibility to the president as the centre's agent and his discretionary powers the governor plays a pivotal role in the proclamation of President's rule and during it's period.

The crucial part of the governor's function is his discretion in preparing his fortnightly and formal report.⁴⁷ Though no guidelines have been laid down for it's preparation, conventions and practical reasonings have made it a necessity to use his discretion in his best judgement. His report must be guided by impartiality and objectivity. At the same time, he has to be guided by a proper and balanced appreciation of the interests of the centre and the implication that would follow in the state's political process. His sound judgement of the situation is the main criteria to ensure a judicial use of Article 356.

45. Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.223.

46. Op.cit., p.224.

47. Arora, S.C., op.cit., p.23.

The governor's report therefore constitutes the most vital, document for the issuance of the president's proclamation as it is a formal and legitimate account of the situation inspite of the fact that his role is minimum. Thus, it's importance.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENT RULE

In retrospect of the facts discussed, the 1988 President's rule was not imposed in strict conformity with the provision of Article 356. Evidence of the governor misusing his powers not in conformity with the contitutional provisions comes to light. So also is the political manipulation of the situation and the governor by the centre. The conspiracy between the governor and the party's central government and political machination is very apparent too. Therefore, the consequence was not an outcome arising out of dire necessity which in the intentions of the Constituent framers, the Article was to be used only as a 'last resort' for restoring normalcy. The way it was used negated the very purpose for which it was created. It was therefore, not in any sense a normal process of democratic process. In accounting for the errors and illegal practice, leading to the proclamation, the governor was found to bear the main responsibility. Thus, his role and office was the major implication in the present controversy.

In the first place, the governor in his capacity as the constitutional guardian and executive head of the state as well as being an agent of the centre, should have responded promptly to the developing crisis. The absence of the Chief minister in the state due to his visit abroad was another reason for him to deal with the crisis promptly. His inaction during the entire week of crisis had driven it into a stalemate. There is no doubt that through his absence, he was offering the opportunity to the Congress leaders to re-install its ministry as evident from the large number of Central leaders present in the state then. The exit of the central leaders after their failure in bringing back the dissidents, and the governor's first intervention into the crisis by sending his report indicated a synchronised planning between them. One can say, he acted as an agent of the Congress party rather than of the President. This is much more evident in other matters as well.

In the midst of the crisis, he did not call upon the N.P.C. to prove its claim of majority inspite of the fact that the party had offered to prove its majority even in front of the parliament.⁴⁸ Similarly, he did not ask the

48. S.Sahay, "A Close Look" in Indian Express, 23 February, 1989.

Congress leader to establish it's majority in the house. In a crisis where two parties claim majority to form the government, it is the governor's constitutional duty to substantiate the claims. However, at no stage did he try to meet the defectors and other leaders of the opposition and ascertain their views to assess the situation objectively. Instead, he laid the responsibility of his ignorance of the situation on the dissidents and the opposition. In his report, he stated that the dissidents had not written to him stating their position and as such, did not know the substantial grounds for their defection. In fact, earlier, the leader of the opposition party, to which the dissidents have joined, had written a letter to the governor informing him of the alliance of the two parties and the Congress dissidents.⁴⁹ Moreover, the speaker had already sent him a circular of the developments regarding the split and the formation of the new party and later the alliance.⁵⁰ Notwithstanding these letters and the facts it contained, he dwelt upon the latter and views from the dissidents which he might have thought that he is legally supposed to get. It is either, he thinks that the letters do not really represent the dissident members' views or it is misconstrued.

49. Art. cit.

50. Art. cit.

Going by his report, if he had felt that he was not being well informed, the question is why has he not tried to contact them personally in his official capacity. The constitution bestows upon his office sufficient powers to deal in such occasions. It was in his knowledge, according to the information he receives, that the dissidents were forcibly confined by the opposition. If that could be the obstacle, it still remains to be asked as to why did he not get them released and inquire of their views. In any case, besides sufficient constitutional provisions, he also has extra powers under the Special law and order provisions for the Governor of Nagaland under Article 371A(1)(b) of 1962.⁵¹ However, he exercised none of these nor made any real efforts to meet the dissidents. Even worse is the fact that inspite of the due information and letters he got from reliable persons, he did not cooperate to probe deeper into the issue. It is therefore, quite clear, he left the situation in the hands of the central Congress I leaders, arrived there to pacify the dissidents and bring them back to the party fold.

The governor's unconstitutional method in this issue is highlighted by the Guwahati High Court judgement of 7th December 1988.⁵² The Writ petition was filed by Mr. Vamuzo

51. Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.224.

52. P.M. Bakshi, "Dissolution of Nagaland Assembly", in Indian Express, 29 March, 1989.

the leader of the opposition N.P.C. against the validity of the imposition of President Rule. Refuting the opposition of the Attorney General to the writ petition that the President and Governor were protected under Article 74(2) and Article 361 of the constitution respectively, the court passed the judgement based on the governor's report laid on the table of the parliament.⁵³ The principle followed was in the lines of the court verdict of the Karnataka Bomai case in which it was held that the courts could base the decision on the governor's report without further probing into the materials unreleased by the President.⁵⁴ The verdict of Mr. Vamuzo's writ petition, given by Chief Justice Mr. A. Raghuvir and Justice Mr. B.L. Hansaria indicted the governor on three counts. A brief background to the three counts and the verdict are as follows:⁵⁵

First, when the split took place, the Speaker duly and legally acknowledged that the Split had taken place. For the reason that, under the Anti-Defection Act 1985, if a group consisting of not less than one-third of the members of a legislative party, breaks away from the Original party, it

53. Art. cit.

54. Katuria, op.cit., p.356 and Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.607.

55. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.636

is qualified as a 'Split' and the members shall not be disqualified under the provision of the Act.⁵⁶ The thirteen members who broke away constituted more than one third of the total strength of 34 Congress I legislatures and as such the validity in the speaker's recognition. Further, under Clause 7 of the same article, the speaker is the sole judge and authority on this matter and is not questionable in the courts, nor any other authority. But, the governor questioned the validity of the Split and declared the Speaker's action illegal as he had not taken into account the reasons and motives of the dissidents. As such, the court ruled that, "Under the relevent law, the speaker is the sole judge of whether a split has occurred. And the Speaker had recognised the split. It was beyond the powers of the governor to declare the Speaker's action illegal".⁵⁷

Secondly, in the midst of the crisis, two high ranking government officials had investigated into the allegations of the Chief minister, that Vamuzo had used undemocratic and coercive methods in getting support from the dissident congress members. Their findings found the allegation

56. 52nd Amendment (Anti-Defection) Act, 1985, cited in, Basu, D.D., op.cit., p.415.

57. Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.636.

false. The governor however had not included this vital fact in his report. This fact can provide a strong base for the N.P.C's claim of having the dissident's support and the lack of it in the report had surely weakened it's position. The governor on his part is legally supposed to provide sufficient relevant facts for the president. Therefore, the court found that "the relevant material which was available was not looked into and not adverted to by the governor".⁵⁸ As such, he was found guilty on this count.

Thirdly, the governor had questioned the motive of the dissidents behind their act. He also reasoned that none of the dissidents had explained their grievances to the Chief minister. In his report, the governor mentioned that the dissidents' move was "really to topple the constitutionally elected government... with an eye on office and attendant benefits".⁵⁹ On this regard, the court held that these charges were irrelevant to the governor's exercise of power under Article 356. Legally, it is not the governor's duty to judge the morality of the activities of the members of the legislatures. His tasks is practically confined to ascertain which party has majority and then administer the oath for taking over the ministry.

58. Ibid.

59. Op.cit., p.635.

It is true that the governor have been found to be at fault on various counts and thus have not performed his constitutional duty in a just manner. But the consequence was not solely the result of his whimsical manipulations. As noted earlier, the process that leads to President rule is not confined to the officials on whom the constitution had specifically assigned to exercise the provisions. President and governors are constitutionally the responsible members to perform this task. But in reality, several government agencies, ministries and the council of ministers are involved in discharging the duties under the provision. However, if their performance is strictly in conformity with the constitutional principles, the provision can undoubtedly restore the constitutional breakdown. But, the trends have proved that in practice, it is not so. As quoted earlier, "Constitutional use of Article 356 and its political use are not two separate categories".⁶⁰ The author also contends further that "Political use of Article 356 is not its constitutional abuse".⁶¹ In other words, constitutional use of the Article 356 cannot come about unless it is politically used in the context of political reality. It is therefore a valuable political tool. But this is true in so far as it is not misused.

60. Arora, S.C., op.cit., p.7.

61. Ibid.

In the present context, this tool have in reality been exercised by the political leaders and parties. Not that they are not empowered to do so. But mainly because they have used it for their party's interests. In reference to the Nagaland situation, the setting was perfectly matched for the Congress I to misuse the provision. The ministry was of the party while the governor was also a Congress I appointee.⁶² At the centre, the Congress I was in power with an absolute majority in the house due to the sympathy wave in the 1986 general election. In the state, having come to power after a challenging task of establishing itself politically against the stiff competition of the opposition party, and also because of the talks with the naga undergrounds which it had initiated again under Mr. Hokishe, it was determined to hold on to power.⁶³ As such, the central Congress government had every reason to manipulate the crisis.

The first indication when the crisis began⁶⁴ was the presence of several party leaders⁶⁵ in the state and the

62. Governor (General Retd.) K.V. Krishna Rao appointed by Rajiv Congress I Ministry.

63. Link, 21 August, 1988, p.26.

64. On July 30, 1988, Reported in Hindustan Times, 1 August, 1988.

65. Economic And Political Weekly, August 13, 1988.

absence of the governor. The governor did not act at all nor gave any concrete opinion on the crisis obviously with the knowledge of the efforts of the Congress I in bringing back it's dissidents. In spite of the many efforts and proofs of the N.P.C's claim, he did not cooperate to find out the facts. It was only when the congress admitted it's failure and disengaged from the situation, that the governor intervened.⁶⁶

However, this was done not in the interest of performing his constitutional responsibility, rather, it was for the Congress I. On his return from Imphal, he had consultations with only the deposed Congress I Chief Minister who recommended him to dissolve the legislature.⁶⁷ Constitutionally, he is supposed to get the views of both parties and form his opinion. But it was more apparent that he had already been instructed by the Centre. His report contained flimsy excuses which however was accepted by the party in centre and was followed by it's consequence. The whole process of deciding the direction that the crisis was to take was undoubtedly preplanned and synchronised between the centre and the governor with a slight cooperation from

66. On August 6, 1988, cited in Kashyap, A., op.cit., p.634.

67. Link, 21 August, 1988.

the Congress Chief Minister. It was evidently a one-sided decision directed by the Congress I in it's favour. The entire drama was a partisan move and not an act to uphold the constitutional principles.

As can be seen, the governor was just a part of a wider political machination of a single party. In fact he was following the orders of his political masters. As the recent trend is, constitutional obligation has given way to political party's obligation for the governor in discharging his duties. Referring to discharge of the responsibilities directed by the Prime Minister, Assam Governor Bhisma Narain Singh is reported to have said, "The governors are not the agents of the President".⁶⁸ Truly, governors are now responsible to the political party in power at the centre. And this has been true for the Nagaland governor. In the end, it can only be concluded that the political parties, it's leaders, political practice and conventions, are equally at fault as the governor who, instead of living up to the constitutional obligation and dignity of his office, submitted to unconstitutional political manipulations.

68. Gehlot, N.S., State Governor in India, Trends and Issues, New Delhi, Gitanjali Publishing House, 1985, p.356.

6. NEGATIVE EFFECT OF MISUSE

The imposition of President Rule in the state had many political implications. This is undeniable given the fact that the political situation is always in a flux. The Nationalist politics of the undergrounds is always a threat to the survival of Democratic politics. The two are most of the time at a Confrontationist position. Between them, the underground politics is much older and imbedded deep in the sentiments and consciousness of the people. While Democratic politics is comparatively recent and at the same time an outcome of Naga underground activities in the 50's and it's nationalist politics by way of state formation. As such, Democratic structure and politics is still very new and fragile.⁶⁹ This can be said so even after three decades of it's functioning since it's inception along with the grant of statehood. Because, all along it's existence, underground politics had not ceased as expected. Instead, it grew and expanded at the same pace as the Democratic politics. It established itself as the parallel body politic with definite structure.

This equation paved the way for both to exercise influence over the other. With the presence of the two, the

69. Link, 7 December, 1988.

loyalty of the people was divided. The half hearted participation of the people in the Democratic process did not help for its development and in the process, slowed it's growth. The perpetual underground activities to this present day have remained as a threatening force for it to stabilize.

During such a stage, proclamation of president's rule was not conducive for state's democratic process. The state had come out of the turmoils of the last many years. But the fact remains that the peoples' commitment to democratic institutions are still fragile. This does not mean that the imposition of Article 356 is generally harmful to new democracies. In fact, it was a tool devised to be used a last resort to save state democracies new and old, from constitutional breakdown. But, as is well known, it's misuse has many disadvantages and the severest is on the new and fragile democracies.

It can therefore be concluded that the present controversy was also that of misuse of the Article 356. It is true that the constitutional arrangement have broken down. But the breakdown was engineered by the Union government itself.⁷⁰ Therefore, there would have been no

70. Art. cit.

constitutional breakdown had the normal legislative procedures been followed.⁷¹ The supposedly new criteria for the use of this article seems to be whether the sequence of events turns out to be advantageous to the Congress party. Everything else, constitutional provisions, the governor's discretion, interpretation of an existing legislation, are thus subservient to that supreme need.

The most probable consequence of this is the people taking to extra-constitutional paths as before, even including that of insurgency, as reportedly observed by the N.N.D.P. General Secretary.⁷² Along with this, the peoples' faith in the constitution and Democratic process will erode. This can in turn create a political problem for the same leaders who are now creating constitutional crisis for partisan interests.

71. Art. cit.

72. Art. cit.

MAJOR FACTORS OF INFLUENCE IN
THE STATE ELECTIONS

Every political system has its own peculiar characteristics that influence and shape its nature and contents. These factors manifest themselves during Elections and shape the outcome of the Elections. The result is therefore the product of the various factors within a political system. On the other hand, the opinions and views of the Electorate are the carriers of the factors and forces within the system. Both the factors and the people's perception of them influence and shape each other. Therefore, the outcome of the election, again, is an indicator of the People's aspirations and wishes in the political system.

Since Elections are to a large extent influenced by these factors, Electoral Politics are shaped by the changing position and trends of these factors. Parties convert these into an election issue and fight the elections. However, in the Indian context, politicalisation of these issues and the propaganda on these by rival political parties may not have much impact on the understanding and consciousness of the public directly due to a high rate of illiteracy and lower economic conditions that do not facilitate the easy reach of information of these factors. But it's overwhelming

presence, importance and prominence in the national perspective can influence the decision of the voters. Thus, it can affect the Election outcome and shape its's future trends. This is aparent in the state's election in Nagaland also.

For the purpose of the study, these factor influencing the election have been divided into two categories: (1) Short term, and (2) Long term.

The first category consist of immediate factors such as socio-economic development issues, political crisis, change of political equations, calculated political defections and so on. Their main characteristic is, they rise to prominence for a short period around the Elections and may or may not effect the election outcome. They can have varying degrees of intensity. A few instances of such factors are the denial of congress ticket to Hokishe in 1989, which led to demonstration by his tribesmen and consequently effected the congress votes in the Election securing only three seats which is one of the lowest Congress record in the district occupied by his tribe.¹ Secondly the 1983-85 unrest over the I.P.S. issue, increase of disturbed area from 5-20 kms. under the Special provision for Army control, and corruption charges against the then congress ministry effected the

1. Link, 1 January, 1989.

Congress result in the 1987 election.² Another important instance is the role of money that undoubtedly played an important role in enabling the Congress I to win the 1982 election by securing equal votes with the opposition and then later on roping in the elected Independent members.

These factors are shortlived as they are not deeply rooted on a historical base and therefore, their influence is confined within a short period specially around the election.

A peculiar feature in the state is that these issues mostly do not effect the voting pattern of the entire state. As issues are not important here and is subjugated to leader's personality and tribal, clan linkages in terms of securing votes, issue therefore makes little sense. The exception is, it can exercise it's influence only in select area such as within a tribe, between two tribes, within a district occupied by a tribe, etc. However, since almost all the districts have similar number of seats, the effect of the issue on say, a single district can determine the overall election result. Notwithstanding it's importance in each election, these short term issue have not been discussed in detail as they are wide ranging, temporary and

2. Telegraph, 29 March, 1986 and Statesman, 30 October, 1986.

differs from each election. Also because, their pattern of occurrence and shaping the election outcome is more or less similar to the happenings in elections of other states as well.

Long term issues have been categorised as those which has historical roots and have perpetually remained in the political scene in the state. These issues have wide ranging impacts. First of all they have shaped the course of the state's political history. At the same time, they have remained a factor directing the voter's decision. Election behaviour patterns are greatly determined by these factors. Their influence is not only confined to elections but in its aftermath and in the political process of the state. Lastly, these major factors have also been the cause behind the rise of short term issues and factors.

The factors discussed here are all on these major issues. Their importance and significance cannot be undermined as well as the fact that they give an indigenous character and nature to the state politics as distinct from those belonging to other states. A brief account of some selected major factors are as follows:

1. INSURGENCY

Ever since the Naga National Council (NNC), the first political organisation of the Nagas went underground in the early fifties and formed it's government apparatus, Naga Federal Government (NFG) and it's armed wing, Naga Federal Army (NFA), insurgency has been a part of the Naga society.³ As is well known, N.N.C. was formed in 1946 with the purpose of striving for a seperate homeland for the Nagas. Throughout it's existence, it's sole aim has been to realise a sovereign Naga state comprising of all the naga inhabited areas.

Meanwhile, Nagaland state was created in 1963. In it's aftermath, the state which was the result of the moderate's efforts and the political organisation of the N.N.C. came to exist side by side. In the years that followed, both the structure evolved it's politics in stark contrast with one another. As a whole, the Nagas came to have two parallel political organisation and politics influencing them. This situation kept the people in an indecisive position. The new democratic structure i.e. state, was an outcome of the search for peace and security from the turmoils and sufferings creating by the N.N.C's Extremist policy. The

3. Horam, Dr. M., Naga Insurgency - the Last Thrity Years, New Delhi, Cosmo Publications, 1988, p.58.

people therefore cannot retread to the past situation by not cooperating with it's functioning. For the security it provides, even if in terms of degrees, the people owe it's allegiance to the state. And the undeniable fact and reality remain, that only through the existence of a state apparatus, the people were able to have socio-economic development. The people's aspiration of development of "self" can be realised only through a modern democratic structure like state, have striked their consciousness. On the other hand, the N.N.C. is the first political organisation initiated by the people for a cause that is very much theirs. Having founded on the mass support of every tribe and it's leaders, it has connotations of tribal solidarity feeling. It is seen as a single platform in which all the nagas and tribes are equally one. They had a firm faith in it's attributes and aim. The people identified with it and associated it with a social character. As such, there was a deep attachment with it.

In the present circumstances, the N.N.C. was declared unlawful. This restricted the people from it. In the resulting process, the people accepted the circumstances they were in i.e. they took to participate actively in the democratic process while their sentiments and sympathies went to the N.N.C. As noted earlier, this divided loyalty hampered the growth of democratic politics. It had a slow

process of taking root in the state. At the same time, the sympathies and support of the people fueled the N.N.C's attack on democratic politics. This further eroded the democratic structure. As the N.N.C. grew in its strength, it became a major influence in the democratic politics. And election was one arena in which influence were exercised upon.

In the first few elections held in the state, it gave a call for boycott. In their view, the state government was illegal and unrepresentative as it was imposed by an 'alien' power.⁴ They asked the people not to cooperate or participate in the electoral and political process of the state. During this period, they had a strong influence over the people. This can be gauged by the fact that in the 1952 and 1957 election prior to the formation of the state, the people heeded its boycott call and none contested nor exercised their franchise.⁵ Even the three uncontested and returned candidates in the 1957 election were put up by their rival, the moderates, in defiance to their call. In the first three election after statehood till the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975, the elections were held in a

4. Hindu, 11 February, 1989.

5. Report on the First Assembly Election, 1964, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland, p.2.

disturbed atmosphere of threats from the N.N.C. and armed conflicts with the Army. In many parts of the state, polling booths were ransacked and election process sabotaged. In the 1974 election two officers on election duty were killed besides a host of unfortunate victims.⁶ The situation were the same throughout and the 1964 cease fire agreement were not complied by the Army nor the N.N.C. neither. Because of it's dominant presence and overwhelming support of the people, the state government was powerless and appeared to be an illusionary representative body. It could neither take stern measures against the N.N.C. as it would antagonize the people. Neither could it impose it's will and power on the people because of this strong support and attachment of the N.N.C. At the same time, Democratic process was new to the people and so patience was needed for the people to join this mainstream. This status quo was maintained for a long time.

Slight changes also took place in the policy of the N.N.C. The backing of the state government by the central government made the duo a formidable foe. Therefore, it resorted to infiltrating the state machinery and influencing the government policy. There is no evidence to show that the

6. Report on the First Assembly Election, 1964, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland, p.5.

N.N.C. had put up dummy candidates in elections. But it is quite clear that they supported and canvassed for certain candidates who were willing and sympathised with their cause.⁷ In this regard, they have associated mostly with the member of the regional parties and in districts like Mon and Tuensang and constituencies such as Wakching, Phomching, Tehok, Tobu, Longkhim-Chare etc. where their writ run large and have major supporters.⁸ It was on this count that the Central Government suspected and had reservations about the regional parties such as D.P., U.F.N. and U.D.F. The same reason was the cause of President's rule imposed in 1975 after the U.D.F. came to power for the first time, for the centre's fear for it's disrupting and sabotaging the parliamentary democratic process. Even while forming the ministry after this second consecutive victory in 1977 election, Vizol and his colleagues had to give their assurance to the governor prior to their swearing-in, that they would remain loyal to the constitution.⁹ No doubt, the centre was very much aware of even Vizol's links with Phizo.

Upto the level of making it's presence felt through it's representatives in the state machinery, the N.N.C.

7. Indian Express, 8 November, 1982.

8. Indian Express, Art. cit.

9. Economic and Political Weekly, 9 March, 1974.

could be said to have been very successful. But in the formulating or influencing government policies in their favour, it made no progress. Practically, it is impossible to bargain for itself from a position within a structure created by the 'alien' government. The gains it accrued was limited to preparing ground for holding negotiations with the centre, and restraining the centre from taking any stern measure to deal with the situation. Meanwhile changes were taking place again in state politics. Large numbers of the N.N.C. members were surrendering.¹⁰ Their strong influence came to an end in 1975 after the signing of the Shillong Accord.

The N.N.C. underground influence was then taken over by the N.S.C.N. after it's formation in 1980 in opposition to the Accord.¹¹ It was largely composed of the N.N.C. members and as such, continued the same pattern of influencing state politics. Being revamped on modern lines of guerrilla tactics and revolutionary ideas, it's influence and activities appeared more streamlined as well as intensive. In the 1982 election, it made no impact as it was in a formative stage. Besides, it was also establishing it's links with the Congress I.¹² The declaration of Congress I

10. Economic and Political Weekly, 16 March, 1974.

11. Horem, Dr. M., op.cit., p.243.

12. See for mor details, Indian Express, 8 November, 1982.

government of Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 that they were eager to negotiate with only the N.S.C.N. projected them as the new leader and spokesman of the underground.¹³ In line with the centre's policy, the state Congress I government who ruled the state from 1982 onwards patronised the N.S.C.N. with the hope of solving the Naga problem quickly. Under Mr. Hokishe and Mr. S. C. Jamir, grounds were prepared for negotiations between the N.S.C.N. and the centre.¹⁴

In this changed political equation, conflicting views and position cropped up among the various factions of the underground and also between the opposition parties and the Congress-I. There was conflict among the factions of the underground as to the legitimate spokesman and nature of the negotiation. On the other hand, the opposition parties held that the state government should bring together all the factions on a single platform and let it negotiate with the centre.¹⁵ In contrast to this, the state and centre Congress I governments held that the responsibility of uniting and forming a single opinion belongs to the factions while it will negotiate with only the N.S.C.N.¹⁶ The position of the political parties created a cleavage between two lineage of

13. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 December, 1974.

14. Deccan Herald, 7 November 1987.

15. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 December, 1974.

16. Economic and Political Weekly, Art. Cit.

party and underground faction combined giving a twist to state politics. As a result, during elections, Congress I candidates reportedly got the support and help of the N.S.C.N. The N.S.C.N. abided by the Congress I directives in matters of not disrupting the state elections to enable the creation of a conducive atmosphere for negotiation. The other factions meanwhile supported the opposition party members with the same hope of being brought into the negotiating table. Clearly, for the first time, underground factions were used in state elections and politics. Now, that the centre is well aware of the single demand for sovereignty, it is not an important point to be stressed anymore. At the same time, the undergrounds are convinced of the determined stand of the Centre not to negotiate beyond the constitutional limit i.e. within the constitutional provision and apart from the question of sovereignty. So, the only important question that remains is who will negotiate with the Centre and on what basis.

The state government have now established it's authority and legitimacy. Most importantly, it has attained a position of negotiation vis-a-vis the underground and the central government. This is in stark contrast to its position a decade back. But till today, it cannot ignore the undergrounds if it does not want to alienate the people for

the simple reason that the latter still has the people's support and sympathy. All the political parties are aware that they cannot disassociate with the Naga Problem issue or the undergrounds if they wish to win the elections and come to power. As such the underground influence in elections is still very strong.

2. REGIONALISM

Regionalism is currently an important factor in India's political system. Almost every part of the sub-continent is going through this process in varying degrees threatening the very integrity of the nation. This have accentuated in recent year. Regional patriotism has become a competing factor with Indian nationalism. Regionalism in a broad literal sense, is a strong feeling of pride or loyalty that people in a region have for that region, often including a desire to have more power to govern themselves, or sometimes the desire to be a separate state.¹⁷ In the contemporary world, this is normally based on Ethnic consciousness or Ethnic Identity which arises out of man's quest for "belonging".¹⁸ This quest has been intensified in the

17. Definition of 'Regionalism' as in Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, Collins Birmingham University, Lond and Glassgow, 1988.

18. B.K. Roy, Burman, "Prospects of Tribal Development in North East India", in Economic and Political Weekly, 1 April, 1989.

context of contemporary crisis of civilization subsequently giving more impetus to Regionalism.

In the context of modern era, Regionalism have taken the shape of two major forms. Proto-nationalism and Infra-nationalism on the one hand, the sub-nationalism on the other. The first two are phases of identity expansion of Ethnic groups which remained isolated from the dominant political process of the nation state or of the political mobilisation leading to state formation. Subsequently, when comparatively isolated tribal communities closely articulate with a state structure, almost as a reflex action, they adopt a viability strategy. While the goal is to forge a united identity for protecting traditional rights and interests particularly in respect of the resources which constitute essential ingredients of their survival system, Proto nationalism not only serve to protect the interests but also to expand them and search for access to new resources and new opportunities.¹⁹ It can serve as the nucleus of diverse types of socio-cultural and socio-political movements. A significant feature of proto-nationalism is it's secessionist political content. In this context, the Naga Nationalist movement falls under this category.

19. Economic and Political Weekly, Art.Cit.

In contrast to the above two varieties of Regionalism, sub-nationalism is a phase of interaction of ethnic entities which got intimately involved in the dominant political process of the state, but among which self centred loyalties come to the surface as an outcome of the unfair and unjust functioning of the state apparatus.²⁰ In other words, it arises out of a feeling of dissatisfaction with state process and apparatus and therefore is an indication of demanding more out of the state. It is not necessarily a secessionist movement, but it can lead to such movements if the intensity is heightened due to non-response of the concerned state authorities. Unlike the other two, sub-regionalism, arises out of the party system deep within and the dissatisfaction it caused. In short, it can be said to be a phenomenon of striking against the party system or political process of a state for not delivering the demands and necessities of the Ethnic group. Again, it can also be due to newly emerging needs which the state needs to cope and in which it has failed or is very slow in delivering.

Regionalism in India began to surface after the Independence. But its roots lie in the nature of princely states, provinces with varying degrees of willingness to accede to the Indian Union during its formation. The

20. Art. cit.

present scenario is said to be the cause of a deep discontent in the state structure and process. Regionalism in the North-east is related to tribal-Ethnic identity. And out of it has sprung different forms of Regionalism. In the context of this discussion, Regionalism referred to is sub-regionalism, a product of dissatisfaction with the political process. Again, in the same context, the form of discontent discussed here is not that of secessionism or anti-national activities, but against the political system of the state particularly through Regional parties.

By now, quite a number of Indian states have their local regional political parties which generally try to emphasize the local issues. They have determinedly posed themselves as an alternate to the national parties whose policy have not been satisfactorily benefitted by the states. This has resulted in the conflicting position between Regional interest and national interest as a whole, also giving a new dimension to centre -state relations and the federal system and integrity of India. Regional parties thrive specially when there is a power vacuum in the centre or when the centre is over dominant over the states. The latter seems to be more true in the Indian political context.

The political scene in Nagaland also dramatically changed after the entry of the national party Congress I in

1976 into state politics. In the sense that it's identity and presence distinguished two characteristics distinctly, Regionalism and Nationalism. Prior to it's entry, the two main state parties were both regional oriented. Though N.N.O. is linked with the Congress I since it's inception, it still retained it's regional characteristics and nature by not associating with it completely. This very fact have drawn the people closer to it who had naturally developed a distinct Ethnic tribal consciousness which is especially an outcome of the Naga nationalist movement of N.N.C. which was also rooted in maintaining Ethnic tribal identity, tradition and 'way of life' of the Nagas. From this we can also conclude that the modern regionalism feeling is deeply rooted in the Naga nationalist movement. The process of development of this phenomenon could be seen this way. After the formation of Indian Union, the activities of the N.N.C.'s demand became antinational or secessionist under the constitution. As a result, they were declared unlawful. Till then, the people had supported it whole heartedly. They symphised and had deep attachment with it's cause. Participation in it's activities were in large scale. Reportedly, most of the people joined the underground with the sanction of their entire villages.²¹ Since all the

21. In an interview cited in Indian Express, 8 November, 1982.

tribes associated with it, it assumed the form of a socio-political nationalist movement. In other words, it was intricately linked with the whole naga society and was the pivotal part of it around which the nagas garnered around. In the political developments which followed, circumstances such as it's extremist policy and it's being labelled unlawful and unconstitutional, deprived the people of a common platform to which they can identify their identity with. In this changed political situation, the political parties formed by local leaders after statehood, offered the alternative for the people to identify itself with. Thus, the regional feeling of solidarity came to settle on the regional parties giving it a prominent role in state politics.

At this juncture, the N.N.O. being the main party that was also responsible for ushering in the new democratic structure i.e., state, naturally took up the role of representing the regional identity. That is to say, till the time of it's merger with Congress I. After that it's association with a national party gave it a new identity, national, which was opposed to the peoples' strong regional sentiment. As a result, this role as a regional representative shifted to the opposition the next regional party i.e. U.D.F. which is a continuation of the U.F.N.

party lineage. The election result of 1977 surrounding this development clearly indicates this. In this election, the U.D.F. secured absolute majority over its rival N.N.O. that had been in power for a decade earlier. The 1974 election result in which the U.D.F. won the election for the first time through marginally over the N.N.O. is a significant indication of the growing alienation with the N.N.O. due to its closeness with the Congress I and the development that took place shortly. It can therefore be said that from this stage onwards, two political parties got polarised on the lines of ideological and political leanings. The Regional parties lineage, the like of U.D.F., N.N.D.P., N.P.C. came to represent regionalism while the state Congress I was identified as nationalist, meaning Indian nationalism centered around national integration. Thus we can conclude that the Regional parties of Nagaland originated from a distinct historical roots.

Statehood thus, changed the whole context of state politics. What was once an anti-national movement of Naga nationalism shifted to cooperation of which statehood was a result. Even then, in the second phase, the identity of the Nagas remained compact under the N.N.O. party inspite of its link with the national party. Besides, at this phase the feeling or consciousness of being a separate entity or Ethnic in contrast to Indianness were still there. And the

new state political process also functioned under the atmosphere of a distinct identity. Thus there were no polarisation of the society within the party system then. The third phase after Congress I entry into state politics transformed this. It's identity, merged into N.N.O. clearly created a contrast with the Regional character. Thereby, it created a cleavage in the so-far-single identity by first segregating the N.N.O. members. While the Congress I propagated and stood for nationalism and national integration, the regional parties took up upon themselves the responsibility of safeguarding regional identity and aspirations. The politics of the late seventies and Eighties saw the polarisation of these stand by two political parties and eventually led to influencing the electorate thereby segregating them on these lines. Later the Elections were also fought on these same lines.

In the 1977 election, the U.D.F. won the election with an absolute majority due to the regional wave that swept soon after the N.N.O. Congress merger. It was expected as even some Congress leaders had defected to the opposition in protest of the merger. In the 1982 election, Congress I and the N.N.D.P. (former U.D.F.) got equal number of seats. The reason given by political observers was that while the presence of strong regional sentiments helped the N.N.D.P.,

the Congress I's improved performance was due to its money-intensive campaign. But apart from that, the large scale defections and counter defections between the Congress I and U.D.F. members prior to the election also helped to stabilize the Congress I position vis-a-vis the strong regional sentiment for the opposition party. It is a fact that naga electorate identify themselves with their own leaders rather than on party basis. The exchange of party members and leaders between the two party could have possibly influenced the changed attitude towards the Congress I and thus enabled it to secure to some extent equal number of seats with the opposition.

In the following years, three distinct groups of electorate emerged. It was mainly determined by the position of their respective leaders in either of the party. On each side were the supporters of the Congress members and the N.N.D.P. The third consisted of mixed supporters of both parties. This is due to the fact that loyalty and clan linkages play a major role in Nagaland election. Majority of the tribes support the party in which their most popular leader is in a prominent position. As such the electorate following this line of support got clearly demarcated into separate electorates. This can be deduced from the fact that the area of distribution of the party's supporters are distinct, in that, the major tribes or subtribes occupy a

specific district or a sub-region. The exception are few. From the election data, we can identify the traditional stronghold of each party and determine the two formed working, through the votes secured by both parties. Eventually, we can come to the conclusion that the electorate is clearly divided on two major lines. Meanwhile the votes of mixed electorates were mostly determined by the influence of both parties and the undergrounds.

But the increasing support for Congress I necessarily does not mean the supporters have decidedly accepted national integration or nationalism policy of the national party. Rather, the truth is they have shed their old inhibition towards a national party. Gauging the level of nationalism or acceptance of Indian mainstream, being a behavioural science, it is a difficult matter to be decided as to what extend this has reached. But in each election both parties even Congress I notwithstanding it's national identity have stressed their identity with Regionalism and has made claims for providing better solution to Naga problem and improving socio-economic conditions. Their stand on most issues are the same except on their approach to Naga problem issue. The criss-crossing of members between the two parties have blurred their separate identities have brought them into the same position. Difference in terms of

Regionalism and nationalism have remained a party identity only based on their leanings either on the national party or remaining unattached to any. It has remained as a point to be repeatedly stressed only during elections. But, their traditional party bases have not changed much. And the regional party still retains the old regional sentiment created by the Naga national movement. In all the following elections of 1987 and 1989, the difference between the two parties have been projected only during elections mainly by the Regional parties to secure votes on the basis of the age old regional loyalty ties. As K.R. Bombwell noted, "The cumulative impact of... the regionalisation of political parties in India has been the cause as well as effect, among others things, of the growing importance of the rural vote and the emergence of regionally oriented elites in state capitals and the districts."²² And as such to this day, regionalism has not lost it's charm in influencing Nagaland elections.

3. TRIBE AND CLAN AFFILIATION

Coming to the state level, a major factor that influences elections are tribal and clan linkages and

22. K.R. Bonbwell, "Regional Parties in Idnian Politics: A Preview", cited in Bhatnagar, S. and Kumar, Pradeep, Regional Political Parties in India, Delhi, Punjab University D.G.C. Publications, 1988, p.11.

affiliations. The state is purely a tribal state comprising of many tribes and sub-tribes. Going back to the social history of the Nagas, village and village democracies were formed on the basis of clan and tribe. Along with this they occupied a particular geographical area demarcating their possession. The village structure, society and democracy rested mainly on the bonds between clans. Family being the smallest unit has a lesser role. But it formed the link between the different clans. This served the purpose of strengthening the bond between the members of the village society. In a wider context, the bond that existed between members of the village society, drew the tribe members together forming into a cohesive unit.

In the modern context, with the formation of state and parliamentary democratic process, the bond and linkages within the tribe remained intact inspite of changes. In the new democratic setup, all the tribes came into contact with each other on one platform distinct from that of the N.N.C. The exposure also enhanced the bond within each tribe., Over the years, each tribe grew conscious of itself in terms of it's position in the new setup. The main factor that led to this situation was the re-demarcation of district and also sub-divisional boundaries according to the geographical area occupied by the tribes. Another is the allocation of assembly seats to each district in terms of their

population. The last and most important is the convention of reserving ministerial berths for each tribe or district to give the government a representative character.

Since the arrangements were done specially in accordance with tribe and geographical lines, every tribe occupied a distinct position in the new setup. At the same time, this changed the outlook of each tribe in terms of its position in the larger society comprising all the tribes of the state. In the political arena, this arrangement suited the tribesmen to collectively support their own leader belonging to their own tribe. As a result the electoral battle became a contest between the tribes rather than political parties. Notwithstanding to which party the candidate belonged, his tribesmen voted for him. This is in the case of mixed electorates consisting of tribes other than one. But the same were noticed in constituencies inhabited by one tribe where, clan factor played the role of securing votes for the candidate. This is in keeping with Myron Weiner's justification that tribals, in a core reserved tribal constituencies do vote as a bloc.²³ From the above discussion, his other claim that the territorial

23. Weiner, Myron, Electoral Politics in Indian States, There Disadvantaged Sectors, Delhi, Manohar Book Service, 1975, p.100.

cohesiveness of tribals enhances their electoral potential can also be justified.²⁴

Tribalism or inter tribal competition in state politics is most apparent in the selection of leadership of the state government. Unlike in the constituency level where the context is mainly within a tribe or between it's clans, at the higher level of ministry formation, the selected representatives of each district or preferably each tribe is placed in a single platform. Contention for leadership therefore become a crucial issue not only for the members themselves but also for his tribe. For the fact that holding the top post in the state usually benefits the tribe as a whole not to speak of the entire state too. For the same reason, the position of the most popular leader of a tribe in his political party is of outmost importance. The higher he is placed in the party hierarchy, or has a high prospect of holding the rein of power at the top, he is overwhelmingly supported. Instances could be cited of Messrs. Vamuzo, Hoksishe, S.C. Jamir and Chingwang K. at their respective region. The protests and demonstrations of Hokshe's supporters in 1989 for his being denied a Congress ticket is another such instances. Even if there is a prospect for a ministerial berth, the case is the same and this prevails in varying degrees in each tribe.

24. op.cit., p.99.

This factor has undermined the value of campaign, issues, political parties, propagandas and other features of modern elections in the state elections. A lower level of politicalisation of the people, literacy, economic standard could be taken into account for this aspect. But the electoral data and records show that these other factors even if improved will not make any difference or impact in influencing the voters. Taking into account the socio-economic conditions, literacy, employment and other statistical aspects, there has been a dramatic change from the sixties when the state was newly formed. But the voters' turnout has remained the same ranging between 74% to 84% from 1964 to 1989. Moreover, the voter's turnout had been evenly distributed in proportion to the number of electorates in each district. These suggests that more than any modern electoral methods, tribe and clan linkages play a major role in deciding the outcome of the elections.

But this factor has also undermined the chances for the state politics to grow beyond tribalism into a more matured politics. The party system and structure gives a semblance of a true democracy. Power have shifted between two main parties alternately in a true democratic pattern. But a true democratic practice and convention is yet to develop. Provided, the main obstacle traditional tribal feeling and clan linkages is segregated from politics.

4. LEADERSHIP

Leadership crisis is now a common phenomena in all the modern democratic institutions. This is no exception in Indian Parliamentary democracy either. Therefore, it would not be surprising for the states with multi-party system to have such leadership crisis. The scene in Nagaland is no different in this regard. Intra-party leadership conflict and the yearning for leadership of state government have created dissensions within the party ranks and also instability in the state. This can be seen from the fact that in a gap of thirty years between 1963 and 1993, there has been fifteen Chief Ministers interchanging between eight leaders of the two main parties. The duration of each ministry averagely is two years. At the same time, only one ministry of Hokishe in 1969 completed the term whereas the others were toppled due to defections and counter defections. In addition to these facts, the shortest ministry lasted ten days before President's rule was imposed in 1975. In thirty years, eight elections and fifteen Chief Ministers and ministries is an unproportionate figure and belies the hope for a stable democracy. This also reveals the condition of politics in the state besides, the crisis in leadership.

The faults lie mainly on the political system itself, unhealthy conventions set by ambitious political leaders, lack of democratically elected party leaders, lack of party discipline and political culture. The defects of the national political culture pilfers down to the states and enacts the same in varying degrees. The root cause is therefore the national politics as practiced and shaped by the National parties and the politicians.

The other factor is change in the leadership pattern in the tribal areas due to politicisation. "Politicisation" refers to the increasing articulation of the interest of the people resulting in their intense political participation directly the consequence of the introduction of universal Adult Franchise. The emerging tribal leaders are not content with confining their operation within the closed status groups of their own. On the contrary, they are in search of acquiring political status and influence outside their group. The switchover has resulted in many aspiring contenders for political leadership creating a complex situation distinct and in contrast to leadership in the Naga's traditional society where leadership is based on consensus.

The culmination of the above two factors particularly in the latter half of seventies saw the rise of leadership

crises in politics. Prior to that period, there was absence of such crisis. This is attributed to lower level of politicisation and participation because of the initial stages of democratic process and the active insurgency movements whose leaders discouraged the people from participation. At the same time, the absence of a strong opposition contending for state leadership, made the N.N.O ministry stable. The disturbed political condition in which the single important role of the party in power was to steer the state machinery through the turmoils can also have restrained any ambitious members. Besides, the lack of political zeal among the members due to the low status and recognition accorded to the state machinery by the people can be another factor.

The changeover came in 1974 when the opposition U.D.F. won the election for the first time. The centre's political machinations to topple it, doubting it's loyalty to the constitution, the subsequent imposition of President's rule, signing of the Shillong Accord 1975 and the N.N.O.'s merger with the Congress I in 1976 prepared the ground for increasing politicisation of the masses and leaders. Following this, the large scale defections and counter defections that took place in both parties in the 1977 term of U.D.F. which also had three ministries alternating, sowed the seeds of defection, instability and leadership crisis.

The defecting members had to be accommodated in the new party and in the process, the leader of the faction clashed with the original party leaders for the post of party leadership thus creating a leadership crisis within the party. The Congress I had a more complex problem since it already had sufficient member of leaders mainly from the erstwhile N.N.O. party. The new additions made the competition between the leaders more acute.

Leadership crisis is mainly a feature of the Congress I party. It began right from the period soon after its entry into state politics by merging in 1976. In the 1982 election, S.C. Jamir took over the leadership from Hoksish creating a rift between the supporter of the two leaders. Obviously to pacify the supporters, Hokishe was inducted in the Rajya Sabha and was also appointed Governor. But the crisis did not end there. In 1986 when Jamir's ministry was rocked by several issues, the Centre, sensing the collapse of their ministry, replaced Jamir by Hokishe while the former was inducted into the Rajya Sabha. The conflict continued through the 1987 and 1989 election and in each of these elections, the centre had to interfere and solve the crises even though temporarily. Besides these two leaders, there were others in the fray. And the best that the Centre could do to pacify the other two contenders is to offer them

lucrative post in the ministry or in the party. The problem is made worse by the presence of strong supporters of each contender which the High command is aware of the consequence it would create for the party, if any group led by its leader were to defect. This has posed a serious problem for the party.

Underlying this situation is the various factors that have led to this. Firstly, after the 1982 elections, the Congress I's prospects in the state had increased. It was gradually taking over the opposition which had won the earlier two elections on the Regional vote. As a result of its improved position, it attracted members from other parties as well. Besides this, in accordance with its normal practice, it had brought over many elected independents during each election to improve its position. This increased the party size in the top layer. Secondly, the state party leaders are normally appointed by the High Command. As such the leaders who are trustworthy in the eyes of the high command are usually the first choice. This has made the disgruntled aspirants to look for other means to grab the post of leadership by foul means such as toppling its own ministry headed by a rival leader. Thirdly, besides appointment, the High Command is in constant control over who will hold the reign of power. In other words, when it deems necessary to change a leader due to a crisis, it does

so without consulting any of the State Congress members. The lack of a proper democratic system in selecting a leader has created cleavages among the leaders and their supporters. Lastly, the party culture at the centre which is also at it's lowest ebb due to a single leader's hold over the entire party structure had eroded the democratic spirit. This has pilfered down to the state too and have stagnated the smooth working and coordination in the party setup.

On the other hand, the issue is not a complex one in the opposition regional party. The main reason being most of it's leaders hail from the same region paving the way for adjustment and accommodation. For instance, the party chief Mr. Vizol made way for Mr. Jasokie to take over the leadership and form the 1977 ministry after coming to an understanding. Moreover, there is no outside influence in the selection of it's leaders. A leader is selected after discussions and consensus within the party. This ensures the acceptance of the party leadership by the members thus creating no conflicts later on.

Leadership crisis is mainly based on the fact that the Naga psyche is revengeful. The toppling of one leader^{leads} to the other. Besides that, tribal support behind the leaders have added to worsen the crisis.

5. FLEXIBLE PARTY LOYALTIES AND SHIFTING ALLIANCES

The state's political atmosphere is one of Chronic Instability. Such that, no ministry could last its full term. It has therefore been said in the context of this situation that winning the election and maintaining the ministry for the full term are two separate respects. For the same reasons of instability, three president rules have so far been imposed. The root cause for this is the flexible party loyalties of the members. Mass-scale floor-crossing and en-bloc resignation from the party are not new. In fact, it has become a trend. So much so that majority of the members have been in the opposite party atleast once in their entire political career. Even with the enactment of the Anti-Defection Act of 1985, this major crisis have not been solved. Members have deftly steered clear of the Act and have resorted to this practice as frequent as before. The causes for this practice is many for which legislation is not the sole answer to this. Besides the influence of national political scene or the Congress culture, other root causes also lie in the social background and the perception of the people and the members to party system and politics.

In the state, party system is yet to mature. So far, politics mainly revolve around tribal and clan linkages and this has created problems for the working of the political

system. As Dr.Horam noted, "lineage solidarity and the feeling of belonging to a particular tribe... have posed problems in the working of the Naga political system in modern times".²⁵ The reality could be seen clearly during elections. Candidates depend on his tribe's support mainly to get elected. Nothing is more important than tribal and clan linkages in such occasions. The electorate places no importance on the issues and programmes of the candidates party. As such, these do not play even a minimal role in elections. In other states' elections, reasons cited for disinterestedness or low participation could range from illiteracy to lower political maturity of the people. The same may also be true in Nagaland. But then, in the state context, this do not wholly explain the entire pattern. As can be seen from the electoral records, even in the early stages of statehood, when literacy, economic levels and so on which is supposed to be the agents of higher political participation had been at a record low in comparison to the present times, the voters' turnout in elections had remained high in all the elections irrespective of the changes that have taken place. This proves that tribal linkages have been the most important factor that determined political loyalties than any others factors. For the same reason, this factor has undermined party system. Political parties and

25. Horam, M., op.cit., p.21.

party membership have no relevance in the state. For many, political parties is only a platform to fight elections. This has obviously weakened the attachment between the members and his party thus paving the way for easy defection.

In addition to this, is the Congress culture introduced soon after its merger. Like it's evident today in most states and in the centre, the Congress I in the state have also been resorting to other extra-constitutional means to remain or come to power at any cost. One of it's chief method is engineering defections from the opposition camp by luring the members with lucrative offers such as ministerial posts, monetary benefits, etc. The first defections occurred in the states political history in 1975 before the Congress - N.N.O. merger. It was reportedly engineered by the Congress I to replace the U.D.F. ministry whose loyalty to the constitution appeared doubtful in the eyes of the centre, then ruled by the Congress I and bring back it's trusted ally, the N.N.O. into power. In the later years, this practice had only intensified. "Horse trading" was another method used by the party after every election, such as the 1982 election, when it secured equal seats with the N.N.D.P., to come to power. In the subsequent elections, their position in each election improved thereby lessening

the use of these methods. However, whenever it's ministry was shaky it never hesitated to use it's well-developed methods. In the process, this set a trend in the Assembly whereby, member, came to be constantly in search of such opportunity for personal benefits. To make matters worst for itself, it's own disgruntled and dissatisfied members became a continued threat to defect as a ploy to attract a better deal for themselves. This culture has gradually spread into the entire political system and has become a factor for instability. Defection have therefore become an easy and lucrative practice.

Cravings for state leadership post has also been another major factor. Apart from the competition from the opposition party, the conflicting interests is prevalent even within the same party. This is more evident in the State Congress I which has atleast four main contenders of which the rivalry between Mr.Hokishe and Mr.S.C.Jamir is more obvious and open.²⁶ Each leader and his supporters no matter to which party he belongs, vie for the post. So much so that, when one assumes leadership and form his ministry, his rivals get into the process of destabilising his ministry to pave way for themselves. This is particularly the result of the ambition of individual members. Dr.Horam

26. Deccan Herald, 17 November, 1987.

has also appropriately related this to the Naga Psyche, when he says, "... revenge is a very deep-rooted phenomenon in the Naga mind and Naga politics is ultimately linked with old enmity between individuals and tribes".²⁷

As a result of all these factors, party loyalty has receded to the background. And politics has remained revolving around acquisition of official position and power, tribalism, material benefits, etc. giving way for flexible loyalties, political instability and a stunted growth of a healthy party system and political process.

6. ROLE OF MONEY

The role of money is increasingly becoming a major factor in Elections. Though the scene is the same throughout the country, it needs to be emphasized in the state's context. It's role became prominent since the 1982 Election when the Congress I made a determined bid to win the Election and establish itself. Along with it's high profile campaign consisting of several central party leaders and ministers, it was also the most expensive election for the party".²⁸ This trend followed in the following elections. As a result, corruption has crept into the political and

27. Horam, M., op.cit., p.22.

28. Telegraph, 19 November, 1982, and also in Link, 15 December, 1982.

social structure. The gravity of the situation could be gauged when non-governmental organisations like N.S.F., N.M.A and N.B.C.C. took up the issue to curb elections expenditures.²⁹ The enormous money power of the Congress I had put the contesting candidates and parties on an unequal footing which is not conducive for a proper democracy. Purchasing of votes hitherto unknown have taken the place of honest and sincere voting, with it's 'buying rate' going up as the polling day of each election nears.³⁰ With this trend, the Congress I, has managed to steer the election and political course in it's favour. But practically in the long run, the Congress' bargaining for the loyalty of the Independent members or the like, to maintain it's majority has only backfired as the fluctuating loyalties only proves to be a drain on the party resources.

The Congress I's measure to apply it's money politics in a large scale, comparable to it's expenditure on other bigger states, in a still fragile and small state politics has only destroyed any hope for clean and firm democracy. It's policy of establishing itself firmly as a counter measure against the undergrounds and the policy of contentment followed later to restrain the youth from

29. Indian Express, 21 January, 1989.

30. Deccan Herald, 17 November, 1987.

joining the underground through it's money politics have only nurtured an economically dependent state which can only be a burden to the centre in future. In this process the social fabric and, in turn, the political process and election have also been deteriorating at a faster pace. The Congress I being the sole party and agent with vast resources undoubtedly has played the main role in introducing money politics.

The above factors have continued to remain influential in Elections till date. Changes have occurred in each of it with the circumstances. But they remain as a part and parcel of the Election feature. In some cases and at times, they have tended to become very acute and at the same time making it's mark on the election process and the outcome. Though it normally subsides again, it however remains within the system and perpetually influence it. Of these factors, leadership crisis is at present the strongest factor of influence. It has led to many political consequences, such as defections and instability. At best, these can be described as the features of the politics of the eighties and early nineties. Another is tribalism that have cropped up again along with active participation and politicisation of the people. These two along with money politics have changed the entire feature of Elections. As they normally

are interlinked, their excess can be harmful to Democracy. Objectiveness and restraints are therefore necessary in the context of these factors to maintain the balance in order to let democracy function smoothly.

Many changes have taken place in Nagaland over the years. This would not be surprising considering the fact that the present year is its thirtieth year of its existence as a state. An insider may not notice the change so much. But the reality could be understood by the observations of several outsiders, British and Indian who were at one time posted there as officers before the statehood. Their general comment had been that many changes had taken place drastically in so short a period which normally would have taken place over a much longer period of time. Notwithstanding their good remarks, one needs to realise the difference between Change and Development. They are not synonymous and changes can take place without development. It's true that changes have taken place in social, political, economic, education and other fields. But one cannot gauge to what extent these changes have benefitted the people or led to their improvement. Development can be said to have taken place when changes move vertically bringing the peoples' condition to a higher level or stage. Going by this, one needs to make a careful study and come to the conclusion.

Among the many features of society, changes in the

political system is more remarkable and distinct. This can be undoubtedly true, after all, it is the pivotal point of the social structure. This can be seen in the context of Electoral Politics of the state which has been discussed and analysed here. Though limited in scope and content, I have sought to uncover a few underlying facts, that in my view had been a factor of influence and development of politics and Election. In the process, I have also realised other facts that have been analysed and placed along with others according to my best judgement. As I found out, there are still many other features unexplored that have to be studied from a particular angle. Shortage of specific literature and studies on Elections of Nagaland can prove to be a hurdle. Nevertheless, this aspect of study throws light on other aspects, socio-political history as well. Finally, in the course of my study and preparation for this topic, I have noted certain main points that need to be mentioned along with the rest of the chapters. Therefore, a brief summary of each chapter and certain other main points are mentioned as follows.

In the beginning chapter, I've dealt with the theoretical aspects of Democracy and Election together as they are an inseparable part in the context of modern democracies. They form the core of a democratic society

around which other aspects such as politics, social, economic and others revolve. At the same time, they are evolutionary and is constantly and gradually changing in adjustment to the changing needs of mankind. It is an accepted fact that democracy is a process towards a higher stage of life. But it remains to be seen how and into what will it's evolution take place. But more importantly, in this process, it is the people who are to mould it's shape for the future. Modern Democracy is still a recent experience. Matter of fact, it was only in this century that it started functioning despite threats from other forms of government. Though it has survived, it cannot be said to have survived properly. In many of Asian African and Latin American countries, many dictators and autocratic forms of government are being run under the guise of democracy. The truth has been that they have used the name of democracy to gain peoples' support as well as to confer legitimacy on their governments for, Democracy being the most popular form of government in modern times attract the respect and approval of others. At the same time, powerful developed countries have acted undemocratically within and outside their jurisdiction on various grounds breaking the democratic principles on which basis their constitution also rests. This trend is to be arrested if democracy is to survive in the next century. Finally, every good thing has

it's bad points too. And Democracy being no exception, the people should not be blinded by it. Rather, it should be guided and used properly to benefit the whole society.

But Democracy cannot stand alone. It has to be interpreted into reality. And that's where Election becomes an important aspect of Democracy. In the same chapter, it's important functional aspects have been discussed. So also are the pre-condition, necessary for holding it as well as it's nature and characteristic relating to it's growth and development. What will be relevant to add now is it's misuse which is prevalent in almost all the democratic nations. As mentioned in the chapter, Election has many functional aspects. But only one have stood out and which is also greatly misused. This aspect is the making of legitimate government. Though Elections do not have the constitutional status to grant legitimacy, it does so instead by being a means and mechanism to make government and through this, legitimises the government. The central point in this is the voting act of the electorate. By going through elections and winning it, government can claim that they are the choice of the electorate. Thus, election is also a powerful mechanism. Knowing this, election have been misused in certain countries with dictatorial form of government. In order to gain legitimacy, fake elections are conducted in which the ballot papers and results are tampered with to show the

peoples' approval of their government. Besides this, election procedures are also interrupted by vested interest groups such as in India where ransacking of polling booths, booth capturing, countermanding votes, intimidating voters etc. are common. These and other false means erode the real value of elections. Apart from these grave misuse and interruptions, another aspect to be looked into is Electoral reforms. Election is an evolutionary process. It has to keep up with the changes in time or else its effectiveness will disappear. The Indian government has also initiated many electoral reforms. Some changes in age, conduct of elections, etc. have been made. But these are peripheries. Structural changes is essential to meet the challenges of the modern period.

References have been made on the constitutional provisions for Election. Our constitution unlike most other constitutions have included a separate chapter on Election. This is unique and it shows the importance placed on elections. Articles 324 to 329 in Part XV deals with Election provisions through which it provides for Election Commission, Adult Franchise, filing of election petitions etc. In addition, there are several other legislations like the Representative Acts of 1950 and 1951, Delimitation acts etc. Constitutions are divided according to the population

which should be proportionate to the number of members representing in the house of the Assembly, In short every details for election are laid down either in the consitution or in several legislations. Judging from the fast deteriorating election procedure, the point to be stressed is timely re-modification of laws where required and initiating changes with the aim of changing the structural part too where it is evidently very faculty.

Following this, a brief outline of Naga political history is given along with an account of the elections held in the state prior to 1982 to serve as a background for the chapters on the latter pages. Naga political history can be said to begin from 1918 when the first naga organisation, Naga club was formed. Since then, many tribal Councils and organisations were formed culminating in the NNC under which the Naga Nationalist Movement for Independence grew under Phizo. In the mid fifties, the deteriorating condition between it and the Army compelled a section of N.N.C. moderates to oppose the N.N.C.'s extremist method of functioning. As a result this new section organised separate conventions to discuss issues and to settle the problem peacefully, between 1957-1959. Out of this convention, a resolution was drafted for statehood which was accepted and approved by the parliament between 1960-62. The state was finally formed in 1963. Meanwhile, the N.N.C. was retained

by the Extremists when the moderates drifted away from the N.N.C. The Extremists, soon after the departure of the moderates, went underground and formed it's various wings such as N.F.G. and N.F.A. Since then, there has been two parallel politics and political organisation in the State. These two are often in conflict with each other because of the opposite direction both taking. But at the same time both has very often influenced the other. Over the years, both have undergone change and development. In spite of the many long years of existence, the movement of the Nagas have not died mainly due to the support of the people in spite of the fact that the state structure has already been existing.

To understand the reason behind, it is maintained that the N.N.C. the parent body of the Naga movement was the first all Naga common platform. Though political, it was also socially intertwined. And being the only common platform of all the Nagas, the Nagas had reason to be deeply attached with the N.N.C. The formation of the State was largely due to compulsions arising out of the turmoils. As such, after the formation of the state, the people were faced with two parallel organisations in the form of N.N.C. and it's politics on one hand and the State and the political process. Their loyalty come to be divided. While participating in the democratic process of the state, it

retained it's sympathies and support for the N.N.C. As such, the case was such that they could not participate in either of them fully or effectively. This hampered the growth of state democracy more than the N.N.C. parallel organisations and governments.

The movement has changed hands from N.N.C. to N.C.S.N. after the 1975 shillong accord. The movement, has intensified and in the process has changed the political equation. Even the underground are divided into many factions, namely, three factions of N.N.C. and two factions of N.S.C.N.

And this has caused disunity among them. Besides that, the separate position taken by the two different political parties have further affected the political equation. Previously, the undergrounds had been influencing the election of their own will. But in later years, political parties were clearly drawing them into the picture and overstressed the Naga problem. All of these were mainly only for electoral gains as no political parties could ignore the Naga issues for election's sake since that would mean alienating the people.

In the elections between 1964 to 1977, the scene has grown dramatically stage by stage. For the first two terms, there was no political activities at all. This was all due

to the fact that the political process was still new to the people besides, the presence of the strong influence of the underground that is opposed to government and elections. As such, the two terms under this period was the most peaceful and stable in the entire state's political history. But from 1974 onwards, political activities started picking up and at the same time, defections and counter defections took place. The first recorded mass defection took place in 1975 after just one year of U.D.F. ministry which led to it's collapse. The following N.N.O. ministry of Jasokie was the shortest term lasting 10 days after which the longest President rule had to be imposed. This also signified the beginning of political instability in the state due to defections. The trend continued through the term of 1977 in which mass scale defections and counter defections between the two rival parties - Congress I and U.D.F. resulted in the formation of three ministries within the same term. This became the pattern of each term in the latter years.

Significantly in between the period 1974 and 1977 which were mostly under president's rule, two important events took place that greatly shaped the politics of the 80's and thereafter. One was the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975 and the other was the merger of Congress I and N.N.O. in 1976. Their importance cannot be undermined as their

strong influence on state politics reveals itself in the course of history. Their nature and influence have therefore been discussed in the first chapter.

Elections have to be studied on the basis of it's historical context irrespective of the various methods used, both scientific and tradition. With this in mind, the first Chapter has been prepared to serve as a background and basis for the next two chapter which deals with the three elections which I have selected for my case study.

As such, in the following chapter, I have discussed the 1982 election exclusively. The importance of this election lies in the fact that it set forth a different trend of politics which I have preferably called the "Congress Trend". The appropriateness could be seen in the manner the Congress party had gradually managed to establish itself specially between the years 1982 and 1990 and remained in power for nearly a decade. This was inspite of the initial strong opposition it faced from the regional parties and the anti-National Party attitude of the people whjich had resulted in it's poor performance in it's first 1977 election. Though it's a well known fact that the party had resorted to other means such as money and influence of it's central government to scrap pass and win the election, it made good use of the opportunity. After roping in the

successful independents, it formed its ministry under Mr. S.C. Jamir which however had to be replaced by Mr. Hokishe, another popular congress leader, in mid-term due to several crises.

This term consolidated the Congress I position in the state while at the same time it shaped and set the trend of new politics for the state as well as for the party itself. By ``new politics'', I mean to distinguish the politics of this period from the pre-80's period which was markedly different. No doubt, the politics of this period brought about and shaped mostly by the Congress I was on contemporary lines. But the features of contemporary Indian politics is well known and understood. To provide a clue of it, the state politics of this period was marked by money culture and politics, corruption, leading to chronic defections, increasing politicalisation, leadership crises misuse of power and so on. The result product was instability as never faced before. As can be noticed in the chapter, the period from the 1982 election to the end of its term presented a picture of hotch-potch politics with every section of groups and leaders craving for power and benefits which the state has only a limited offer for a few. Party discipline and principles for a proper functioning of democratic process were therefore sidestepped.

This trend continued and in fact heightened in the next period covering the two elections of 1987 and 1989 in which the Congress I won the elections again with a clear cut majority which also signified its improving position. The political scene was the same and rather intensified. So much so that in spite of the party's absolute majority in the Assembly, its party dissensions and leadership conflict led to its early downfall in 1988, eight months after its successful 1987 election. This brought in a period of heightened political machinations and politicking between the members of the party as well as in the state politics as a whole. The centre's hand in manipulating state politics also became very evident. With the stalemate arising out of instability, President's Rule had to be imposed in August 1988, the second one in its series already imposed in the state so far. Though it lasted for a short spell of six months, it had created a lot of controversy about its validity. Nevertheless, it provided an opportunity for the parties both for Congress I and the N.N.D.P. which had so far been under several party problems and crises, to revamp itself during the period.

The President's rule was shortly followed by the Seventh Assembly Election of 1989 held in January. Apart from the changing political equations and fast pace of political development, most of the issues in the election

remained similar as in the past elections. No drastic change could be noticed. The Congress I won the election again with an absolute majority for the third consecutive time. And for a change, the centre appointed Mr. S.C. Jamir in the place of Mr. Hokishe. The main reason behind this was to serve as a measure to pacify the leaders and solve the leadership crisis. Besides, in the former, the centre took the opportunity to utilise his adeptness in roping in independents, defectors and the capability to steer the government in a flux political situation. The situation demanded this step of the Congress and likewise, it placed the ministry in the hands of this leader. But then, in a matter of few months, the party dissensions which was never solved except temporarily brought down this government too as a result of defections. It was followed by an opposition coalition ministry, and finally the imposition of the third President's rule.

The period in between the two elections of 1987 and 1989 was marked by a controversial President Rule, as the rule was the result of Centre's machination and governor's action. The manner it was imposed was clearly seen as the Centre Congress I government's intention to stall the formation of the next ministry for the reason that it preferred to have only Congress ministry at the state. As

this was a clear obstruction in the normal functioning of political democratic process, it was significant in the context of Electoral politics of the state. Behind this development was the competition and conflict between the two parties in the field of politics and elections and subsequently, holding the reign of state power. It's significance in Electoral politics is undoubted and therefore have been discussed in a separate chapter the fourth in this work. The implications of the governor, centre, the then Congress Chief Minister and other factors have been discussed extensively on the background of constitutional provisions of the Article 356 and it's usage prevalent in the country. This ought to throw a light on the centre-states relation of Nagaland as well.

Coming out of the purview of State Electoral politics is a chapter on several major factors that have influenced and shaped elections and politics in Nagaland. It is undeniable that politics and elections are shaped by the peculiar socio-economic and other factors and features of a geographical region besides the influence of contemporary politics.

This gives the politics of a region or state a unique and distinct character. As such, I have selected a few major factors which have been playing a major role in state

politics and elections. For this purpose I have categorised the factors into two: Short term and Long term. The former comprises of immediate socio-economic and political factors that erupt as a consequence of the prevailing situation and have a short impact in varying degrees on the election. It however does not remain for long in the political scene after some adjustments or solutions are found. As it's influence is shortlived and varies widely, it had been generalised and not discussed in detail. Instead, the Long Term factors have been stressed more and discussed, as these factors have historical roots and background, and have virtually been a part of the whole political system since its inception. All along, it's influence had remained perpetual and thus have shaped the outcome. It's dominant and effective role therefore necessitates a detailed discussion for which the fifth Chapter have been set aside.

The discussion in the contents of this work indicates the different stages of political changes that have come about in the state. In looking back at the early political history and comparing it with the present, one can admit that a lot of changes have already taken place. From the first decade of instability out of underground activities, the state has gone through the period of change in the 70's. This was soon followed by contemporary politics more in the line of Congress culture in the 80's. Throughout this

decade, apart from establishing itself, the Congress had gradually influenced and shaped state politics. By the end of this decade and around the turn of 90's, the negative result of the Eighties politics could be noticed.

The beginning of this decade was marked by the third President's Rule which was also the outcome of instability arising out of party members' flexible loyalties. That this is still prevalent since it's beginning in the mid-seventies indicates the politics of today. Like in the past no ministry have managed to stay in power for long due to this factor. And it continues to inflict the state politics till today. Besides this, Triablism, money culture, underground factor etc. have remained the same. In fact, it could be said to have grown more acute in recent years with the growth of more opportunities in various fields. The answer lies no where but in the redefining of political culture, party system, democratic processes etc. In this connection, it ought to be noted that changes have to be initiated by suitably adjusting modern political system to suit the traditional democratic system and the society. The diversity of people, culture, economy etc. of India gives sufficient reason to plan in terms of this line. The social economic set up and history of each region and society is different and varying in the country. With this in mind it is

impracticable to have uniformity in all respects. In fact the constituent framers, knowing this feature, have therefore provided for a federal set-up and feature for the country with a slight measure of unitary features. But the changing time and circumstances have reduced these into a mere constitutional provisions. As the current trend shows, India have attained a more unitary status by the increasing power of the Centre. This has robbed the states and periphery region of it's autonomy and regional character. The result is that it has created the dissatisfaction and revolt among the states and in turn have subsequently created instability in the whole country. Judging from these two aspects, India's political system needs to be redefined and restructured.

For instance, Nagaland has a long history of village democracies which is the outcome of the social life of the people. This, along with other aspects of society is well formed and a result of growth over a long period. At the same time, the region being a miniscule part of the country, their feature, like other similar cases in other remote corners of the country is naturally not taken into account in framing any national policy and programme. As a result, the same legislation and structure that is introduced in the state assumes a distinct and different position much in contrast to the region's indigeneous character. The

traditional structure and method of democracy such as Tribal Council, Village Council, Tribal laws etc. still prevails in the state. And as such, the two features come into conflict. This also do not serve the purpose of the centre's policy nor does it provide easy solutions to the society. As such, the unique character of the region or state and the people need to be taken into account for new legislation to be implemented. For this, the Centre has to sidestep it's intention of providing uniformity all over the country in several aspects to ensure National unity and integration. To some extent, the centre have followed this policy in respect of tribal areas such as Nagaland where Tribal laws and courts have been legitimised, Traditional democratic structure and organisations have been preserved and made to function at least limitedly.

However, these exceptions are mostly within the lower part of the state apparatus and does not serve the entire society nor, guarantee change in the state level as a whole where the majority of the people have come to be involved with the changing nature of society. Therefore, finally, the change has to be initiated for the state as a whole in the nature to suit and adapt to the state's indigenous character. Meanwhile, the centre had to curb it's over dominant role over the states and give a free hand to the

states to run their own affairs. Instead of using state machineries for it's own end, the centre, along with the national parties have to inculcate a refined political culture and tradition in the states which could go a long way in solving various political and constitutional crises in the State. With a change in policy and approach, there is little doubt that the instable politics of Nagaland can aslo be solved and usher in a new era of electoral politics.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE STATE OF NAGALAND ACT, 1962

PART III

Representation in the Legislatures
THE COUNCIL OF STATES

6. Representation in Council of States: As from the appointed day:
- a) there shall be allotted one seat to the State of Nagaland in the Council of States;
 - b) in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution in the Table:
 - i) Entries 16 to 19 shall be renumbered as Entries 17 to 20,
 - ii) after Entry 15, the following entry shall be inserted namely:
"16. Nagaland.....I",
 - iii) at the end, for the figures "224", the figures "225" shall be substituted.
7. Election to fill vacancy: As soon as may be after the appointed day, there shall be held an election to fill the seat allotted to the State of Nagaland in the Council of States.
8. Term of office: The term of office of the member for the first time elected to fill the seat allotted to the State of Nagaland in the Council of States shall expire on the 2nd day of April, 1968.

THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE

9. Representation in House of the People:
- 1) As from the appointed by -
 - a) there shall be allotted one seat to the State of Nagaland in the House of the People;
 - b) in the First Schedule to the Representation of the People Act 1950:
 - i) the Entry "25, Naga Hills-Tuensang Area.....I" shall be omitted;
 - ii) Entries 16 to 24 shall be renumbered as Entries 17 to 25;
 - iii) after entry 15, the following entry shall be inserted namely:
"16. Nagaland.....I".

- 2) The whole of the State of Nagaland shall form one parliamentary constituency to be called the parliamentary constituency of Nagaland for the purpose of filling the seat allotted to that State in the House of the People.
- 3) For the period referred to in clause (2) of Article 371A, Section 13-D of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, shall apply in relation to the parliamentary constituency of Nagaland with the modification that it shall be necessary to prepare and revise separately the electoral roll for that part of the said parliamentary constituency which comprises the Tuensang District and the provisions of Part III of the Act shall apply in relation to the said part as they apply in relation to an assembly constituency.
10. Provision as to sitting member: The sitting member of the House of the People representing, immediately before the appointed day, the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area shall, as from that day, represent the State of Nagaland in that House and shall continue to do so until a person is elected in accordance with law to fill the seat allotted to the parliamentary constituency of Nagaland.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

11. Strength of Legislative Assembly: (1) The total number of seats to be filled by persons chosen by direct election in the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland shall be 60:

Provided that for the period referred to in clause (2) of Article 371-A, the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland shall be 46, of which-

- a) six seats shall be allocated to the Tuensang District and shall be filled by persons chosen by the members of the regional council from amongst themselves in such manner as the Governor, after consulting that council may be notification in the Official Gazette specify, and
 - b) the remaining forty seats shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from assembly constituencies in the rest of the State of Nagaland.
- 2) In the Representation of the People Act, 1950 -
 - a) in section 7, the following proviso shall be inserted as the end, namely:

"Provided that for the period referred to in clause (2) of Article 371-A, the total number of seats allotted to the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland shall be 46, of which -

- a) Six seats shall be allocated to the Tuensang District and shall be filled by persons chosen by the members of the regional council referred to in that article from amongst themselves in such manner as the Governor, after consulting that council, may be notification in the official Gazette, specify, and
- b) the remaining forty seats shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from assembly constituencies in the rest of the State of Nagaland".
- c) in the Second Schedule, after Entry 14, the following entry shall be inserted, namely:
"15 Nagaland.....60 (for the period referred to in clause 2) of Article 371-A, 46)".

- 3) In the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in Section 5, in clause (c), the following proviso shall be inserted at the end, namely:

"Provided that for the period referred to in clause (2) of Article 371-A, a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill any seat allocated to the Tuensang District in the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland unless he is a member of the regional council referred to in that article."

- 4) The Election Commission shall delimit the assembly constituencies in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution on the basis of the latest census figures, and in doing so the Commission shall have regard to the following provisions, namely:
 - a) all constituencies shall, as far as practicable, consists of geographically compact areas, and in delimiting them, regard shall be had to physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of communication, public convenience and linguistic affinities of the people,
 - b) all constituencies shall be single-member constituencies, and
 - c) the population of each constituency shall not, as far as practicable, be more than six thousand.
- 5) For the purpose of assisting the Election Commission in the performance of its functions under this section, the Commission shall associate with itself five persons

of whom three shall be elected by the members of the Interim Body established under Section 3 of the Nagaland (Transitional Provisions) Regulation, 1961, from among themselves and two shall be nominated by the Central Government:


Provided that none of the said associate members shall have a right to vote or to sign any decision of the Election Commission.

- 6) The Election Commission shall:
 - a) formulate its proposals in regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (4) and public them in the Official Gazette of the State of Assam and in such other manner as the Commission may consider fit, together with a notice inviting objections and suggestions in relation to the proposals and specifying a date on or after which the proposals will be further considered by it;
 - b) consider all objections and suggestions which have been received by it before the date so specified, and for the purpose of such consideration hold one or more public sittings at such place or places as it may think fit;
 - c) after considering all objection and suggestions which have been received by it before the date specified, determine the matters mentioned in sub-section (4) by one or more final orders and cause such order or orders to be published in the Official Gazette of the State of Assam: and upon such publication the order or orders shall have the full force of law and shall not be called in question in any court;
 - d) amend the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1961, so as to include therein the Parliamentary constituency of Nagaland and the Assembly constituencies delimited under this section.
12. Rules of Procedure: The rules as to procedure and conduct of business in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to the Legislative Assembly of Assam shall until rules are made under clause (1) of Article 208, have effect in relation to the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland subject to such modification and adaptations as may be made therein by the Speaker thereof.

APPENDIX II


NAGALAND

STATE BOUNDARY — · — · — · —
DISTRICT BOUNDARY - - - - -



This map shows the position of the three districts of Nagaland since 1963 which remained so till the re-demarcation and division into seven districts just before the 1974 election. Thereafter, the Constituency seats were also re-distributed as follows: Kohima (14), Tuensang (11), Mokochung (10), Mon (9), Zunheboto (7), Phek (5) and lastly Wokha (4).

Source: Report on the First Assembly Election 1963, published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland, Kohima.



APPENDIX IV
DATA OF THREE ELECTIONS

TABLE 1
FIFTH ASSEMBLY ELECTION, 1982

District	No. of Electorate		Valid Votes Polled			%age vote	Seats Secured			Total Seats
	Total	Voted	Cong.I	NNDP	IND		Cong.I	NNDP	IND	
KOHIMA	190853	122311	33527	33993	52657	62.95	4	7	4	15
TUENSANG	133298	104205	32018	32293	38524	77.14	6	7	0	13
MOKOKCHUNG	86929	66474	24169	23811	17837	75.71	5	2	3	10
MON	49116	45806	16488	16038	12508	91.68	3	2	2	7
ZUNHEBOTO	47361	38659	10777	8330	18922	80.29	4	1	1	6
PHEK	43709	34520	12192	14444	7237	77.95	0	4	1	5
WOKHA	45187	32000	11249	11203	9288	70.24	2	1	1	4
STATE TOTAL	443972	596453	140420 (32.1%)	140112 (31.9%)	157173 (36%)	74.4	24	24	12	60

Source: Report on the Fifth Assembly Election, 1982, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

TABLE 2
SIXTH ASSEMBLY ELECTION, 1987

District	No. of Electorate		Valid Votes Polled					%age vote	Seats Secured Total					Total Seats
	Total	Voted	Cong.I	NNDP	BJP	NNDP	IND		Cong.I	NNDP	BJP	NDP	IND	
KOHIMA	206516	147320	53013	31565	1985	19786	41956	Data not recorded	6	4	-	-	4	14
TUENSANG	82633	76830	29944	24422	-	6254	17210	Data not recorded	6	4	-	-	1	11
MOKOKCHUNG	78682	29324	19552	9160	-		13807	Data not recorded	7	1	-	1	1	10
MON	82256	76978	36000	28315	790	1060	10813		6	3	-	-	-	0
ZUNHEBOTO	45733	39843	16876	11692	-	6511	4764		7	-	-	-	-	7
PHEK	44997	38162	15335	17673	-	1001	4143		1	4	-	-	-	5
WOKHA	41484	33866	12727	13859	136	-	7244		1	2	-	-	1	4
STATE TOTAL	582301	484942	193219 (39.84%)	147078 (30.32%)	2911 (0.19%)	43782 (9.02%)	99937 (20.60%)	84.47	34	18	-	1	7	60

Source: Report on the Sixth Assembly Election, 1987, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

TABLE 3
SEVENTH ASSEMBLY ELECTION, 1989

District	No. of Electorate		Valid Votes Polled				% vote	Seats Secured				Total Seats
	Total	Voted	Cong.I	NPC	NPP	IND		Cong.I	NPC	NPP	IND	
KOHIMA	204850	155910					76.10	6	8	-	-	14
TUENSANG	582426	498822					85.64	6	5	-	-	11
MOKOKCHUNG	79254	75078	District-wise votes polled by Parties not recorded				94.73	10	-	-	-	10
MON ,	82382	73837					89.62	5	4	-	-	9
ZUNHEBOTO	54764	39509					86.33	3	4	-	-	7
PHEK	45016	40282					89.48	3	2	-	-	5
WOKHA	41956	35659					84.99	3	1	-	-	4
STATE TOTAL	582426	493296	253792 (51.45%)	205283 (41.61%)	13596 (2.76%)	20626 (4.19%)	85.64	36	24	-	-	60

Source: Report on the Seventh Assembly Election, 1989, Published by Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Nagaland.

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