

**FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM AS APPROACHES TO
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION :
A CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

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CONTENTS

<u>Chapters</u>	<u>Pages</u>
Acknowledgements	i
Introduction	1 - 5
I Major Theoretical Approaches to the Development of International Organization	6 - 42
II Functionalist Approach : Characteristics and Limitations	43 - 73
III Neofunctionalist Approach : Emphasis on Regional Integration	74 - 108
IV Functionalism and Neofunctionalism in the European Community	109 - 138
Conclusions	139 - 147
Select Bibliography	148 - 157

INTRODUCTION

Regional integration as a form of international cooperation and organization is a post-Second World War phenomenon. During the last few years, regional integration has come of age. In the 1980s and 1990s it has become the dominant phenomenon in the World. Several regional associations have cropped up in most parts of the world, the latest being the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Regional integration is at a lower level as compared to global integration and is confined to a narrow geographical area. The United Nations recognized the significance of regional organizations to supplement the work of United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, and in performing economic, social and cultural functions at the regional level. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Arts. 52, 53 and 54) is devoted to various aspects of regional arrangements. But they were to be in consistence with the objectives of the United Nations. Hence, regional arrangements were blessed by the United Nations.

The thrust of the discussion that follows, is on regional integration as an approach to international organization. The development of the European Economic Community (EEC) as a regional organization is discussed within the framework of functionalism and neo-functionalism as approaches to international organization.

The phenomenon of international organization has stimulated intellectual theorizing by scholars ranging from the field of international law to political science and economics.

These intellectual exercises germinated a number of theoretical approaches such as, power approach, federalist approach, idealist approach, functionalist approach, and regional integration theory, to name a few important ones. These approaches perfect and sharpen our understanding of the phenomenon of international organization.

The Second World War witnessed the end of colonial empires which resulted in the emergence of independent nations in erstwhile dependent colonies. The concept of self-determination was epitomized under the aegis of the United Nations. Almost about the same time, a different trend was witnessed in Europe where co-operation was being forged, leading towards integration. While the dependent colonies in Asia and Africa were struggling to attain independence, the Western European countries were striving to realise closer and ever-increasing web of interdependence. Arguably, the Second World War and the international environment in the post-War years provided impetus to these divergent developments. The process of international organization has now enveloped most part of the World.

Functionalist theory was propounded by David Mitrany during the inter-War period. It tries to build a more enduring cooperation whereby specific activities (functions) come to be performed by international organizations rather than by separate nation-state authorities. It relegates state-action to the background in welfare activities. Nation-states delegate powers to the international organizations to perform certain welfare functions. Through this, David Mitrany tries to find a backdoor solution to the question

of limiting the sovereignty, which the nation-states tend to guard jealously. His thoughts were coloured by the experiences of the League of Nations. The development of international organization, therefore, partly came as a functional response to the complexities of the modern state system.

Neo-functionalism is a more recent stream of thought. The functionalist and neo-functional approaches provide useful insights to the study of international organization. These two theories talk of initiating international integration through functional/sectoral organization. Functionalism envisages a network of such sectoral organizations carrying out the welfare tasks. Neo-functionalism stresses on sectoral organization only in the initial stages. Ultimately, it hopes to build political integration upon the edifice of functional/sectoral organization. It propounds a more integrated form of international organization with larger objectives, than those envisaged by the functionalists. It is also more cohesive than functionalism in that it is between a group of countries within a region that co-operation is forged. Hence the term regional integration.

The discussion on these theories assumes significance in the context of growing importance of regionalism in the world. The objective of the present study is to discuss the importance of functionalism and neo-functionalism as theoretical underpinnings of growth of regionalism in the development of international organization, and to examine the contribution of these theories to the establishment and evolution of a regional organization like the European Community.

The first chapter broadly discusses various theories to the study of international organization. Through this survey an attempt is made to introduce the different streams of thought in the subject. It is argued that the theoretical conceptualisation has been in response to both the problem of institution-building and the quest for ensuring lasting peace. The theories have been critically surveyed under five heads: idealist approach, realist approach, functionalist approach, regional integration theory and decision-making approach. Under the idealist approach again, two theories are discussed: 'peace through law' approach and federalist approach. Under the broad title of regional integration theory transactionalist approach, neo-functionalist approach and associational approach have been briefly dealt with.

The second chapter deals with the functionalist approach. It traces the development of the approach during the inter-War period and a critical examination of the assumptions and premises of the approach have been considered. The chapter argues that although functionalist premises have been questioned on several grounds, it is an important approach to develop international organization on the lines of functional organizations.

Neo-functionalist theory and its thrust on regional integration forms the third chapter. The chapter begins with the assumptions and tenets of the approach. Then it considers the rethinking of the theory undertaken by the theorists. Reappraisal and conclusion follows at the end. Since neo-functionalist theory based its statements on the European integration process, the discussion of the theory is buttressed with examples of

European integration process. Also, in the course of discussion, the development of the European Economic Community (EEC) is traced till mid-1970s.

A brief look at the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the forerunner of the EEC and efforts at building political integration have been undertaken. Added to this, the development of the EEC after 1970s and particularly the Single Market envisaged in the Single European Act (1987) and the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty, 1991) are broadly surveyed in the fourth chapter. This chapter lays emphasis on the development of the EEC in the light of the functionalist and neo-functionalist premises and the broad contours of EEC in the 1990s.

A set of broad conclusions follows in the fifth and final chapter.

CHAPTER I

**MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The development of international organization has been a slow and continuous process. The essential prerequisites¹ for the emergence of international organization were met in the nineteenth century although the process had been underway since Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The emergence of nation-state system posed many problems to resolve and several questions to answer. The need for an institutional mechanism to tackle the ever-growing tensions among the nation-states was felt. Thus, the development of international organization partly came as a functional response to the complexities of the modern state system.

It was realised that nation-states embody ambivalent characteristics of conflict and cooperation. Hence, the institutional mechanism in the form of international organization was to endeavour to prevent conflictual tendencies and promote the cooperative ones.

¹ Inis Claude identifies four prerequisites. They are: (i) the world must be divided into a number of states which function as independent political units, (ii) and a substantial measure of contact between them. (iii) The states must develop an awareness of problems which arise out of their coexistence, and, on this basis (iv) come to recognise the need for creation of institutional devices and systematic methods for regulating their relations with each other. The first two are objective and the next two are subjective conditions. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshres: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th edn. (New York, 1971), p.21.

Just as the process of establishment of international organizations was a response to the grim reality of violent conflict among states and other problems, so was theorising about the phenomenon. The conceptual exercise was a response to the problems of institution-building in general and international organizations' ability to elicit cooperation of nation-states in particular. One such perennial problem has been that of national sovereignty. When the nation-states jealously guard their sovereignty, it poses serious challenges to the institution-building itself. Efforts to seek solutions to such thorny issues provided the launching board to the theoretical and conceptual thinking.

The thrust of this chapter is to survey major theoretical approaches to the development of international organization. The discussion will not necessarily be chronological; rather the approaches will be appropriately clustered on the merit of their conceptual thoughts falling into certain systematic thinking. They have been dealt under the following heads: Idealist approach, Realist approach, Functionalist approach, Regional integration Theory and Decision-making approach.

Two observations should be made at the outset: these theoretical approaches cannot be separated into water-tight compartments for they all study the same phenomenon of international organization. Also, each of them reflects and builds upon the contribution of others. However, to the extent they differ, each of them has an identity, with permeable stream of thought, distinct from others.

125

Functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches have been dealt in this Chapter very briefly, and would be sufficiently detailed in Chapter 2 and 3 respectively. Federalist approach, although considered to be part of integration theory, has been clubbed together with 'peace through law' approach, under the broad heading of the idealist approach. Decision-making approach has also been discussed, in concise, for it has a limited relevance in the sense that it attempts to analyse power relations and decision-making process within international organization; it is not a useful tool for the study of the development of international organization. Nonetheless, it has been included here as it is a very important approach to this field of study.

In addition to the theories discussed in this chapter, there are a number of theories in international relations which have been applied to the study of international organization, but have not found total acceptance in the discipline (e.g. System Analysis). This chapter focuses only on the discussion of major theoretical approaches that have been widely acclaimed. In view of the space and time limit that we have set for ourselves for achieving our objective the treatment has been kept selective and such as to achieve coherence.

Now a discussion on different theoretical approaches follows.

Idealist Approach

Under this heading, we will be discussing two major theories/ approaches: The 'peace through law' approach and the federalist approach.

(a) 'Peace Through Law' Approach :

'Peace through law' approach can be considered as an extension of pacifist - internationalist movement of the nineteenth century. It made international law as its chief tool to organize international relations. Until the outbreak of the First World War, the pacifists were in favour of improvement in place of radical alteration of international law. However, the traumatic experience of the War caused a change^{of} heart wherein more and more thinkers² advocated that radical changes be made in international law if it were to play a role in international relations.

Although theoretical antecedents of this approach can be found in the nineteenth century, it emerged during the tumultuous inter-War period. The First World War precipitated the production of proposals for the revision of the then existing international legal system. Numerically too its proponents increased many fold during this period. Hence, the 'emergence' epitomized the twin characteristics of numerical proliferation of adherents and "formation of a new consensus of opinion on the minimum standard which the international law must satisfy."³

² The chief components of this approach are G. Clark and L. Sohn, L. Oppenheim, H. Lauterpacht, J.B. Scott, etc.

³ H. Suganami, "The 'Peace Through Law' Approach: A Critical Examination of its Ideas", in Trevor Taylor, ed., Approaches and Theory in International Relations (New York, 1978), p.103.

As a theory of international relations, the 'peace through law' ^{is} prescriptive, not explanatory. It does not seek to explain why there is an impasse in the international society. It relies heavily on the concept that if peace is to prevail, then the loopholes in international legal system should be plugged. Therefore logically it assumes that the international law has an important role to play in the international societal organization.

The 'peace through law' approach of the post-First World War variety held the view " (a) that the improvement of the international law would create a better international order, and (b) that the quality of an international legal system should be judged to the degree to which it correspond ... with a domestic legal system."⁴ The central pillar of this approach is analogy between the domestic and the international law. Therefore, it is alternatively called as analogical approach. The salvation of international legal system is assumed to be embedded in the extension of domestic legal system to that level.

At the base of this pillar lies a set of more fundamental assumptions: the belief in the progressive nature of human history and in the harmony of 'true' national interests. The assimilative tendency underlying the approach is aptly summarised by E H Carr: "Just as individuals are thought, by pursuing their own good to enhance the good of whole

⁴ *ibid.*, p.106.

community, so nations in search of their 'true' interests are assumed by the upholders of this belief to serve humanity as a whole."⁵ This assumption comes somewhat closer to the Rousseau's concept of 'General Will'.

To the belief in the harmony of 'true' national interests was added, the need for a legal mechanism as a substitute for war; i.e., resolution of disputes / conflicts through an international mechanism rather than war. Establishment of such an institutional mechanism was considered to be a progressive step in human history. Clark and Sohn in their book say, "The proposition 'no peace without law' also embodies the conception that peace cannot be ensured by a continued arms race, nor by an indefinite 'balance of terror', nor by diplomatic maneuver, but only... with the establishment of institutions ... which maintain law and order within local communities and nations."⁶ To this end, the institutional mechanism suggested here is similar to a federal organization where the states would lose their sovereignty and would turn into bodies equivalent to member states of a federal union.⁷

The 'peace through law' approach of the inter-War period is, the critics say,

⁵ *ibid.*, p.107.

⁶ Granville Clark and Luis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p.xv.

⁷ Sugnami, n.3, p.109.

prescriptive, deductive and analogical. To talk of harmony of 'true' national interests amounts to wishful thinking. Hence, it is called idealist in its approach. The belief that human history is progressive or that the world is becoming more and more peaceful has not stood the test of empirical generalization. The outbreak of the Second World War negated the entire thesis.

The analogical nature of the thesis also poses some problems. Domestic analogy at the international level in relation to the enforcement of law is impracticable; for the international society is not endowed with the enforcement mechanism, like an international police force. Besides this, the international society may not have the same degree of consensus or solidarity for the enforcement of law.⁸

(b) Federalist Theory / Approach :

The federalist approach as a strategy for international integration came into prominence in the period immediately after the Second World War.⁹ As a method of obtaining political union, this approach aims at building a supra-national community by means of a formal constitution executed by the previously sovereign independent states. According to Amitai Etzioni, a political community possesses three kinds of integration:

⁸ *ibid.*, p.118.

⁹ Chief exponents of this approach are Clarence Streit, Carl J. Fredrich, Granville Clark, Luis B. Sohn, Roy Price, K.C. Wheare, Guy Heraud etc.

"(a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence... (b) it has a center of decision-making ... (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification...."¹⁰

The federalist approach seeks to confront political power directly before setting up any institutional mechanism. The conviction of the federalists has been that if a supra-national entity is to be brought about to solve socio-economic problems, then there is a need for political authority with power to do it. In this respect, it stands in direct contradiction with the 'functionalist' approach which seeks to circumvent politics in dealing with socio-economic problems. The federalists, in the ultimate, stress on political solutions and political institutions.

The essence of integrative process, according to this view, is the formation of a common supranational state, into which are merged the international identities of the constituent states. A formal constitution demarcates the jurisdiction so that these states and the federal government have complementary but independent powers.¹¹ Elaborating this requirement, Mackay defines federalism as a "method of dividing powers of government so that the central and regional governments are within a limited sphere co-ordinate but independent. The test of the principle is: does it embody the division of powers between

¹⁰ Cited in Charles Pentland, International Theory an European Integration (London, 1973), p.148.

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp.147-8.

central and regional authorities, each being independent of the other?"¹² Hence, federalism is directly addressed to the problem of maintaining diversity while forging unity.

The federalist approach has certain basic assumptions. The nation-state system is incapable of carrying out certain tasks which are crucial to the well being of mankind. The protection of sectional differences is both healthy and desirable. It relies heavily on man's rationality to perceive the need for change and the willingness to make the same.¹³ Thus, its advocates consider that federal government satisfies the twin criteria of efficiency and democracy.

Among the federalist proponents there are two streams, both in terms of strategy they adopt and in terms of their spatial concern, albeit their aims remain the same, i.e., the formation of supranational state. Whatever be the form, they all lay emphasis on two basic elements of independence and participation. Regarding the strategy, the revolutionary federalists favour the primacy of constitutional settlement at the time of formation of the supranational state. The evolutionary federalists go along with the proponents of immediate inter governmental co-operation accepting an incremental process

¹² Cited in R J Harrison, Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration (London, 1974), p.43.

¹³.George A. Coddington, Jr. "Federalism: the Conceptual Setting", in Paul Taylor and A J R Groom, eds., International Organization: A Conceptual Approach (London, 1978), p.327.

of federation. They make the Rome Treaty as the basis of their strategy. The evolutionary strategy comes close to the neo-functionalist thought. "In theory, however, the importance attached to the achievement of a federal political settlement, rather than the more general 'political community', leads to much greater emphasis on the development of representative institutions by federalists than is justified by neo-functionalism."¹⁴

Spatially speaking, the World Federalist Movement (or Universalists) built on the familiar edifice of the United Nations. Among the reasons given were that "it seems logical and reasonable to utilise an existing organization of such scope and experience."¹⁵ The main thrust of Universalists, of whom Clark and Sohn have been the most articulate, has been to entrust the supranational institution with the task of maintaining international peace and order, thus eliminating the need for national armies. While people like Clark and Sohn could assign only the maintenance of peace and order to the supranational institution and leaving other tasks to the constituent state, others like Clarence Streit enlarge the scope of activity of the supranational institution, widening its functions. The European Federalist Movement built on the model of European Community. Also, their relative emphasis is on the economies of scale, building Europe into a democratic Supranational institution.

¹⁴ Harrison, n.12 p.49.

¹⁵ Coddington, n.13, p.331.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the federalist strategy is the method which is employed to bring about the desired change. Public opinion and pressure is sought to be the basis of influencing governments, or rather political elites, as Harrison would have us recount, to give up their power to the supranational federal government. In the achievement of successive stages of federation the evolutionary federalists attach a great deal of importance to a campaign of public persuasion. "The radical federalist movement seeks to be a mass movement and a propagandist movement. Its resources are devoted to the promotion of studies, conferences, seminars, designed in most cases to attract and persuade opinion leaders in an atmosphere of maximum publicity."¹⁶

The advantages of federalism, as claimed by its proponents, are numerous. It is addressed to the problem of preserving diversity while creating unity. The belief underlying the federalist thesis is that unless local and regional interests are protected, it puts both the supranational federal government and the local interest into jeopardy. ~~allowing space for local interests~~ Allowing space for local interests is also essential for their adjustment of the merging states to a new identity.

As a corollary to this, the second claim is that "the federal system provides barrier against central despotism both through the autonomous powers of the states and the

¹⁶ Harrison, n.12, p.50.

participation of the states in federal government."¹⁷ Moreover, it^{is} attractive because it is realistic. It does not rely on back-door approach to integration that is advocated by the functionalists but rather it relies on the direct approach which recognises the importance of political and political settlement.¹⁸

According^{to} David Mitrany, the heart of the federalist fallacy is the belief that a federal government is adequate for present day needs. Federal states are considered notorious for their failure in performing such non- political tasks as banking.¹⁹ The essence of the functionalist critic is that "global federalism may be acceptable if set upon flexible lines, but is too remote a possibility to take seriously; regional federations which are far more practicable and thus offer a tempting form of gradualist strategy are positively dangerous."²⁰ For it is a potentially dangerous development towards concentration of remote power. Also, federal supra national government might prove ineffective in handling the situations like internal armed rebellion.

Much of the writing in the field is prescriptive and visionary almost on the verge

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.55.

¹⁸ Coddington, n.13, p.337.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Pentland, n.10, p.157.

of being idealistic. Some have refuted the idea that federalism will remain a guarantee of local autonomy, individual freedom or even democracy:

Empirical studies have amply demonstrated that the specification of powers in a formal constitution does not mean that there will be an absence of conflict over jurisdictions or that there will be no actual encroachment. Much depends on the exigencies of international politics....²¹

Federalism constantly reminds the politicians as to what they are supposed to yield; new political arrangements transcending existing ones. Federalism is so antagonistic to the interests of political elites that they can hardly be expected to do the needful. No political elite would willingly disappear into political oblivion.

Despite these refutations, evolutionary federalism has had the merit of recognising, long before the neo functionalists attempted to do the same, " that 'spontaneous' integration through the operation of process variables in the economic sector... could not penetrate the 'political' sector effectively enough to deminish... the ultimate sovereignty of the member states."²²

Federalism emerged in a post-War environment of unprecedented economic upheaval and political chaos. Every theory, grounded in the historical context, produces

²¹ Harrison, n.12, p.66.

²² *ibid.*, p.59.

the prescription most realistic in its understanding of the then prevailing realities.²³ To this end, federalism fulfilled the criteria to command consideration by all those advocating the formation of an international organization.

The Realist Approach

The International Relations literature is replete with the concept of power, a much-defined concept meaning, fundamentally, the ability to influence or change the behaviour of others in a desired direction. According to the Realist school,²⁴ in the words of Hans J. Morgenthau, "the main sign-post that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."²⁵ Realist school/ approach lays its stress mainly on power and national interest. Hence it is often variously called as power approach, Realism, national interest approach etc. Again, as Morgenthau puts it:

²³ *ibid.*, p.66.

²⁴ Major exponents of the power approach are E.H. Carr, G Schwarzenberger, M. wight, F.L. Schuman, R. Niebuhr, N. Spykman, H. J. Morgenthau etc.

²⁵ Cited in M.S. Rajan, "The Concept of National Interest and the Functioning of the United Nations", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.16, no.2, 1977, p.313.

International politics... is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics ... international politics is of necessity power politics.²⁶

E H Carr's book, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, which was highly critical of research and teaching in the field of international relations, and F Schuman's International Politics marked the beginning of the "Realist" approach in the study of international relations.



After the Second World War, the realist position was stated persuasively by Hans Morgenthau. He emphasized the importance of power in the attainment of national objectives. "Although Morgenthau had defined Power as the 'ability to influence the minds and actions of men' exercised by political, psychological and military means, there was a tendency for realists to emphasize the importance of military power."²⁷

The realists believe that it is "in the nature of state to acquire as much power as it can, because of the dangerous and anarchic world in which it exists."²⁸ In other words,

²⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. (Calcutta, 1973), pp.27-33.

²⁷ Chadwick Alger, "International Relations: The Field", in David Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York, 1969), vol 8, p.61.

²⁸ Trevor Taylor, "Power Politics" in Taylor ed., n.3, p.122.



in the contemporary international relations it is imperative that state should aspire and strive for power as a rule. States must maximise consolidation of their power, particularly the military power. Because states need to be secure and without such a power they cannot survive, and self preservation is the prime concern of any state.

A further assumption is the belief that it is possible to discern where exactly the national interest lies. For Morgenthau, statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power. "Many power politics writers saw people and territory as important sources of power and argued that states expand their area whenever possible."²⁹ Schwarzenberger says, "[i]f any power finds a political vacuum on its door-step, it is likely to fill it before other powers can establish themselves there."³⁰

The realists develop the thesis that it is inherent in the nature ^{of} a multi- state system based on sovereignty to engage in mutually hostile policies, for whatever motives. Some revisionist states always counter the efforts of a group of states devoted to the maintenance of the status quo in such a manner that approximate balance results. So general is this pattern that it qualifies to be a historical law.³¹

²⁹ *ibid.*, p.130.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p.131.

³¹ E.B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?", World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 5, no.4, July 1953, pp.467-73.

For the realist, international organization is a process by which power is exercised. According to Morgenthau, with regard to each of the attempts at international government (e.g., the Holy Alliance, the League of Nations and the United Nations) three questions must be asked: (1) Where does the authority to govern reside?; (2) By what principle of justice is the government guided?; (3) to what extent has the government been able to maintain order and peace? The fact is that all nations determine their policies in international organizations by their national interests, however couched the policies may be in the language of diplomacy.³² Therefore, for the realists, the Concert of Europe is the classical model of balance of power with four or five major powers able to regulate international affairs without having recourse to war against each other.

Again, while the principles and purposes of the UN Charter were drafted with a view to the future, the mechanism provided therein bears the imprint of the power realities prevailing at the time. The "Big Five" of the victorious coalition secured a privileged position in the power structure of the organization, as permanent members to the Security Council.

In Morgenthau's view, the U N Charter was drafted on the basis of three political assumptions. First, the Great Powers would unitedly deal with any threat to peace and

³² Morgenthau, n.26, pp.436-41.

security emanating from any source. Second, their collective wisdom and strength would suffice to meet all such threats without resort to war. Third, none of the Great Powers would themselves be a source of such threat.³³ These assumptions, he admits, have not stood the test of experience. The main threat to peace and security of the world emanates from the Great Powers themselves - directly or indirectly. Thus, the constitutional scheme of the Charter has been defied by the political reality of the post-War world in different intensity.

These claims of realist thought have been negated by critics of political realism who say that:

the establishment by governments and the functioning of International Organization, the United Nations in particular, is probably one of the most effective and standing refutations of the Realist view that statesmen think and act only in terms of interest defined as power.... In such a generalized legal and political framework as the UN Charter, it is rather difficult to identify the distinct national interest of any particular Member State and distinguish it from the national interest of other Member States or from the Purposes of the United Nations itself.³⁴

Furthermore, according to Claude, the concept of balance of power is ambiguous and has been susceptible to divergent interpretations. "What is perhaps more serious, it

³³ *ibid.*, p.461.

³⁴ Rajan, n.25, p.317.

can mean different things to the major powers themselves."³⁵ They say that an assessment of the national interest cannot be more than a mere subjective judgement based on selected and limited information.

Some contemporary "realists", according to Claude, have insisted upon construing the urge to establish a new world organization as an evidence of Utopian escapism- " a fatuous desire to forget about power and bask in a dream world where law and morality reign supreme."^{35a} Such judgement arises more out of conviction than real world experience. " For the record shows with ample clarity that the planners and the executors of the new experiment in institution- building (i.e., the United Nations) were cognizant of the problem of power and intent upon attempting to devise an effective system for dealing with it...." The very fact that American public conceived of the United Nations as a scheme for organizing power, through the evidences provided by the wartime public opinion polls, suggests that it was not an escapist devise.³⁶

In the study of contemporary power realities most theorists have switched over from the bi-polar to the uni-polar and/or multi-polar model. The realist approach

³⁵ Cited in L.M. Goodrich, " Approaches to the Study of International Organization" in Avi Shlaim, ed., International Organizations in World Politics Yearbook, 1975 (London, 1976), p.14.

^{35a} Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York, 1962), pp.155-6.

³⁶ *ibid.*

gained its currency mainly in the post-War era when two clear blocs emerged in international relations. Paradigm of bi-polarity is seldom applicable as there are now too many autonomous political units in the fray.

It is said that the realist theory emphasizing on "struggle for power fails to take account of the influence of doctrine. ...some times, ...States are restrained or impelled by ideals or by moral or ideological considerations, and that these are given pride of place among the factors influencing their decisions. ... it does not follow that adherence to an ideology is necessarily indicative of a neglect of power."³⁷

In a world in which economics is rapidly eclipsing strategic issues as the driving force of international relations, a significant change has occurred regarding the dynamics of power itself. "Western Europe as the biggest trader on the world market and Japan as a global economic power ... have acquired immense power though neither possesses a significant and independent military force commensurate with that role."³⁸ The recent threat of the EEC to retaliate US trade embargo on their products reinforces the underlying strength of this phenomenon.

³⁷ Alan James, "Power Politics", Political Studies (Oxford), vol.12, no.3, 1964, pp.308, 309.

³⁸ Silvu Brucan, "Power and Conflict in the Study of International Organization", in Georges Abi-Saab, ed., The Concept of international Organization (Paris, 1981), p.155.

The functionalists argue that "states would gradually lose their power to international organizations, which will perform more and more of the tasks of the state as the world becomes increasingly interdependent."³⁹ Further, moving from the nature and operation of the state-dominated international political system to its future prospects, power-politics reasoning leans heavily to the "status quo". Being a realist almost means that the elements reinforcing the status quo are made prominent while those making for change are neglected.

One positive aspect of the realist approach has been an effort to overcome idealist bias in the study of international relations. Until the realist theory came to the fore during the post-War era entire thinking on international organization was dominated by "Utopians" or idealists, engaged in wishful thinking. The intellectual content of the idealists had its genesis in international law. The influence of the realist approach on the study of international organization has been a break through indeed, in that, it has been responsible for giving international organization recognition as a field of study distinctly separate from international law, and as an area of specialization in itself.

The realists, in studying international organization have displayed a concern for the harmonization of conflicting interests. Associational and "peace through law" approaches trace their intellectual antecedent in this concern of the realism.

³⁹ Taylor, n.28, p.133.

Functionalist Approach

Functionalism basically is the theory of David Mitrany. His ideas were particularly important in the development of thinking about the role of international organization. The modern integration theory derives its theoretical antecedents from functionalism. David Mitrany produced his writings mainly in the inter-War period and during the Second World War.⁴⁰

International functionalism aims at establishing international organizations based on functions. These functions are in the socio-economic sphere concerned with general welfare and are essential to any nation-state. International functional organizations take up such tasks in the interest of all the member states and welfare of their subjects. The oft-quoted functionalist dictum is "form follows functions"; i.e., the function suggests the area and the extent of cooperation among the constituent member states. This develops interdependence and interrelationships.

Functional organizations are not territorial. Their concern is limited to the sphere of economic and social problems. Since nation-states tend to be possessive about sovereignty, functionalism eschews head-on collusion with political power. Through

⁴⁰ His major work was A Working Peace System: A Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London, 1943).

functional organizations, it tries to find a backdoor solution to the problem of state sovereignty. States are required not to give up sovereignty but only shed part of it to the international organizations in the interest of general welfare. Functionalism, therefore, does not take away sovereignty but believes in "slicing of sovereignty".

Functional organizations focus attention on elements of common interest and through this attempt to build habits of cooperation. Cooperation in some areas^a develops interdependencies which due to habits of cooperation expand to other areas. This phenomenon is known as 'spillover' in functionalist terminology.

Functionalism proved to be a useful antidote to the power approach. In the wake of rigid division of nation-states, functionalism does not express its helplessness to improve man's condition. It tries to rather avoid sensitive areas^a and chose non-controversial, non-political areas to circumvent conflict and promote cooperation.

Regional Integration Theory

Regionalism refers to a process of integration among two or more states on a geographically confined basis. It is at a lower level than the global or near-universal integration. The regional integration supplements the global process; it does not replace it, nor does it oppose it. Regionalism is based on such precepts as geographical contiguity, cultural and linguistic congruence, and historical similitude. All these

constitute what is otherwise called as historical and/or cultural 'baggage'. It is said that regionalism exemplifies these characteristics.

International integration is a process whereby decisions formerly made by the officials of separate nation-states come to be made by officials at a new center. However, according to Haas, even after years of research there has been no consensus among the scholars on a clear delimitation of the concept. To some scholars integration means the 'terminal condition', while others regard it as a process. Haas says:

Amitai Etzioni treats "integration" as the terminal condition, not as the process of getting there. Phillip Jacob and Henry Teune regard integration both as a process and as a terminal condition... Karl Deutsch speaks of integration as a process leading to the creation of security communities; I consider it a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms, a condition also described by Jacob and Teune.⁴¹

In 1958, he had defined integration as "the process whereby the political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new and larger center[emphasis added]"⁴²

⁴¹ E.B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of pre-Theorising", International Organization (Boston), vol.XXIV, no.4, autumn 1970, pp.610-11.

⁴² Cited in Chadwick Alger, "Functionalism and integration as Approaches to International Organization", in Abi-Saab, n.38., p.130.

Haas himself has radically revised his definition from his earlier position. In 1970, Haas offered a new definition: "... regional integration is concerned with ... how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves."⁴³ Hence, the emphasis has changed from " a shift in loyalties of political actors" to " acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict".

Karl Deutsch considered it as a condition and emphasised the attainment of 'sense of community'. He distinguished between "amalgamated security communities" (which involved the development of common governmental constitutions among formerly independent political units) and "pluralistic security communities" (which involved the development of a sense of community among political units that retained their formal independence and separate institutions). Although Deutsch and other transactionalists place less emphasis on institutions, they acknowledge that both types of integration (i.e., amalgamated and pluralistic) require some kind of organization at the international level, even though it may be very loose.

Despite such disparate definitions, there is a general agreement among integration theorists that joining nations together

⁴³ Haas, n.41, p.610.

by force is not integration. Also they agree that it consists of a merger of separate institutions into a larger unit, generally within a geographic region. Where they differ is whether integration is brought about by the invisible hand of mutual advantage or the conscious intervention and manipulation of an integrating elite.⁴⁴

(a) Integrational Approach

Within the broad arena of regional integration theory there are two approaches: integrational approach and associational approach. Under the integration theory we have two streams of thought splitting into the (i) transactionalist and the (ii) neo-functional approaches of Karl Deutsch and E B Haas respectively.

(i) Transactionalist Approach: Transactionalists measure integration by the growth of communications, trade and other transactional flows among people that bring about attitudinal changes, further resulting in the growing of a "sense of community." Transactionalists assume that integrative processes at the supranational or regional level are analogous to integrative processes at the national and sub-national level. At all the levels, intensive pattern of communication between units is assumed to result in a closer community among them. There is a direct relationship between increase in transactions

⁴⁴ Michael Hodges, "Integration Theory", in Taylor, ed., n.3, p.242.

and growth of a sense of community. "Associated with this suggestion are a number of familiar additional postulates regarding trust, friendship, complementarity and responsiveness."⁴⁵

However, a significant problem in analysing transactional flows lies in determining which transactions are most relevant in developing mutual interdependence. Often an increase in transactions in particular sector(s) (such as economic, political, military and social) might offset a decline in other areas. It is difficult to say whether such shift is a pointer towards closer integration or a movement away from it.

Ronald Inglehart adopts a somewhat different approach and questions Deutsch's emphasis on transactional flows. He concludes that there may be situations where transactions indicate towards community-building but necessary attitudes may be absent. Hence, Inglehart emphasizes that crucial factor is not the act of transaction, but the attitude which underlies it.⁴⁶ As Haas puts it, "... it is not trade or other kinds of transactions that are crucial to our judgement so much as the perception of present and future benefits in the minds of the actors."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Haas, n.41, p.626.

⁴⁶ Hodges, n.44, pp.248-249.

⁴⁷ Haas, n.41, p.627.

Donald Puchala further supports Inglehart. While questioning Deutsch's pessimism about stagnated European integration, Puchala observes that transaction flow indices have serious limitation of taking into account only quantifiable data. Those transactions which are not readily quantifiable are excluded. Moreover, the transactions can reflect on the progress of putative integration rather than causes for it, which frustrates any attempt at reliable prediction of future system behaviour.⁴⁸

(ii) Neo-functional Approach: It analyses the way in which supranational institutions having powers to make binding decisions emerge from the convergence of self-interest of the constituent units. The neo-functionalists accept the functionalist premise that integration has to be learned rather than imposed but, unlike functionalists, they believe that politics has to be part of this learning, if it is to result in larger political union. Haas says:

Neo-functionalism takes self-interest for granted and relies on it for delineating actor perceptions. Moreover, neo-functionalists rely on the primacy of incremental decision making over grand designs, arguing that most political actors are incapable of long-range purposive behavior.... Most neo-functionalists have not explicitly recognised, however, the crucial question of whether even this incremental style is not "foreseen" and manipulated by certain heroic actors- and eventually checked by certain equally prescient national actors.⁴⁹

Here is the weakness of the neo-functional approach. The intransigent national actors may forestall the process of spillover which General de Gualle suitably exemplified.

⁴⁸ Hodges, n.44, pp.248-9.

⁴⁹ Haas, n.41, p.627.

A detailed discussion on the neo-functional theory, its strategy and weaknesses will follow in the third chapter.

Lack of an agreed definition, critics point out, of the concept of integration has been the source of many of its troubles. Though many indicators and background conditions for integration have been developed, there has been little agreement as to what factors or combinations of them are necessary for the achievement of integration. The ability of the integration theory, therefore, to explain and foresee, regional integration in different parts of the world has been very limited.⁵⁰

Integration theory was developed in the industrialized, pluralistic West European laboratory. Efforts by academics to apply it to other areas of the world, chiefly developing countries, have been less successful. "In less developed countries there may not be very many technical, non-controversial tasks with which to push off the integrative bandwagon... integration is a fragile growth in regions where ideological differences are exacerbated by uneven economic development and excessive dependence on extra regional markets."⁵¹

In 1975, Haas expressed dissatisfaction with the regional integration theory and pronounced that it was "obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent - though still useful -

⁵⁰ Hodges, n.44, p.247.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, p.253.

in the rest of the world." In his opinion the integration in Europe has not progressed as expected due to the inability of the European Community to cope with the problems created by "functions of economic interdependence with trading partners outside of Europe." Haas concludes that "integration theories are becoming obsolete because they are not designed to address the most pressing and important problems on the global agenda of policy and research."⁵²

He refers to the integration theories as "pretheories" "because they do not now provide an explanation of a recurring series of events made up of dimensions of activity causally linked to one another."⁵³ Also, they have not demonstrated successful predictive prowess outside Europe: they have been better in predicting failures. However, while federalist approach stands falsified, the communications approach and the neo-functional approach have neither been very strong nor have been falsified.⁵⁴

(b) Associational Approach

Association is an extremely loose kind of adherence to an international organization. It

⁵² These ideas are from Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, as cited in Chadwick Alger, n.42, pp.137-8.

⁵³ Haas, n.41, p.623.

⁵⁴ . *ibid.*, p.629.

is a relationship established between one or more states and an international organization. Under this system, the nations-states do not shed their sovereignty or delegate entirely policy-making functions, but only associate with the international organization in formulating the policies. Also, an associated member-state cooperates with international organization in certain activities but not others: it integrates in some dimensions, while keeping others separate.⁵⁵

There are no agreed indicators of what constitutes association. It is a flexible institution adapted according to the needs of particular system. Association, thus, forms new sub-system within the core international system. In the post-War world, there has been a conscious effort to transcend nation-state system by the inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) which has proliferated the associations system. Association has proved useful in providing a meeting point between nations states and the IGOs.

The raison d'etre of association system is to avoid supranationalism. The primary focus is on flow of transactions in functionally defined areas. In the post-War era, association system has been introduced through economic institutions. The International Trade Organization (ITO) set the ball rolling in this direction. Although the Havana Charter of ITO never came into existence, the principle of association was implemented in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) which replaced the Charter in diluted form.

⁵⁵ This approach has largely been taken from J.N. Kinnas, "Association", in Taylor and Groom,(eds.), n.13, pp.155-68.

The European community also has association system with the overseas countries and territories in the form of Yaounde' I, Yaounde II and Lome' Conventions. In the Rome Treaty, this has been provided for to maintain association of the European nations with their overseas territories and ex-colonies.

It is often criticised that association system reinforces informal dominant-dependent relationship that may have existed in the past between these actors. This is particularly apparent in the association systems of the developed with the developing countries-"This view has been transformed into what today is called 'neo-colonialism' between the 'metropolises' and 'peripheries'. This situation arises in part from the fact that the societies of the Third World continue, in spite of their national independence, to be subject to a deep-rooted structural dependency ... supplemented by institutional dependence"⁵⁶

Association system with its primary focus on the network of transactions, eschewing sensitive issue of national sovereignty, comes close to the functionalism in its premise. Again, the main purpose of this system is to promote mutual interests of the associated members and to develop common interests among them. In this respect, the association system, like the realist approach, believes and relies on harmonisation of interests.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.163.

Decision-Making Approach

The decision-making approach in the post-War period chiefly attempted to analyse foreign policy of the states in the broad sphere of international relations. It has been an off-shoot of behavioural revolution in social sciences. The decision-making approach studies elite behaviour bearing an influence on the decision-making process.

This approach to international organization⁵⁷ has been to study power relations, both within and without formal power structure. It analyses the actual conduct of decision-making in the international organizations after they came into existence, rather than scrutinize the prerequisites for the development of international organizations. This approach, therefore, is outside the purview of the present dissertation. Yet, a brief discussion of this approach follows as it is an important approach to the study of international organization.

The decision-making approach is structural in nature. An important aspect of the study is the formal structure of decision-making, besides such others as the environment and interplay of relations between different groups. The starting point, however, would be a structural picture of power relations.

⁵⁷ An important book on applying this approach to the study of international organization has been by R. Cox and H. Jacobson, eds. The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organization (New Haven, Conn., 1973).

Moreover, traditionally speaking, the analyses has always been state-centric, for, the states considered to be the legitimate decision-maker. This springs from the premise that the State is the most important actor in the conduct of international relations. Lately, there have been efforts at taking non-state actors and social groups into consideration but it has been marginal. " The study of decision-making is, accordingly, a study of the dynamics of power relations. It begins with an analysis of the structure of existing power relations: and it seeks to understand how the decision process may tend to sustain or to change that structure."⁵⁸

Ideology is an important component of decision-making analyses because it sustains the existing power structure. The development, or rather shifts in the emphasis, of international organizations can be traced with the help of ideology. In the immediate post-War period, functionalism projected pluralist concept of society, only to be outclassed by developmentalism in the 1960s. In the 1970s, globalism and transnationalism replaced developmentalism. Except globalism, which formulates challenge of a new revisionist ideology, all others have been status quo supporting ideologies.⁵⁹

This approach within its broad framework regards international organization as a

⁵⁸ R. Cox and H. Jacobson, "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Organization," Abi-Saab eds., n.38, p.80.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, pp.91-92. This discussion briefly defines the concepts of developmentalism, transnationalism and globalism.

process -- a process in which hegemonic consensus of a particular time becomes institutionalized. " ... the decision-making approach to international organization analyses how ... key ... factors interact with the prevailing hegemony -- ()
- the environment -- and it seeks to understand the extent to which these interactions support the status quo or promote a change in the structure of existing power relations.⁶⁰

Conclusion: Efforts at building international organization has been a response to the grim reality of conflict among states. All the theories ultimately aim at tackling the problem of sovereignty, which, in effect, means entering the political sphere. Be it federalist theory, which believes in direct political integration, or functionalist theory, that postulates building up of world community through progressive expansion of social and economic cooperation, they all hope to deal with the issue of political and military struggle. Calude remarks that on the whole, international organization has reflected greater concern with the probability of the conflict than with the possibility of cooperation.⁶¹

The field of international organization has been subjected to the critical rigours of theoretical treatment by few scholars in the past. Also none of the theories considered so far, either independently or together, adequately conceptualize and explain the complete

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p.99.

⁶¹ Inis L. Claude, Jr., "International Organization: The process and the institutions" in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York, 1968), pp.33-40.

and/or complex phenomenon of international organization. No theory in particular authentically qualifies to be a theory of international organization in its entirety.

However, this should not blind us to the fact that although these theories build on the familiar edifice of international law, international relations and political science, they have given, the realist approach in particular, international organization a recognition as a separate field of study. " The extent of scholarly interest in the field, the kind of questions that scholars have been asking and the amount of serious scholarly work that has been done"⁶², is a pointer to this fact.

As Claude has suggested : "the growing complexity of international relations has already produced international organization; the world is engaged in the process of organizing. This process has a past ... which is ... significant. It has a present which is confused and troubled And, it may be confidently asserted, if man has a future, so has the process of international organization."⁶³ And, of course, the process of academic pursuit and theoretical prognostication.

⁶² Goodrich, n.35, p.3.

⁶³ Claude, n.1, p.3.

CHAPTER II

**FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH:
CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS**

FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH: CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS

Origin

Functionalism as an approach to international organization developed during the inter-War period. Its origin can be traced to the 1870s albeit. Exponents of functionalism include Paul S. Reinsch, Leonard Woolf, G.D.H. Cole, Pitman Potter etc. However, the chief exponent of functionalism, in the opinion of Haas, is undoubtedly David Mitrany.¹ The functionalist ideas are scattered in his numerous books and articles.

In the formative phase of functionalism during the early inter-War period, the dominant school of thought representing international relations theorizing was the idealist approach. However, this approach was discredited in the 1930s which also heralded the 'realist revival' in international relations theory. During this period, functionalism provided signpost only to those who were directly concerned with the setting up of international institutions. It did not, however, receive the recognition of being a general approach to the problems of international order.

The 1950s marked a new phase in the international relations theorizing.

¹ E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964), p.8.

Behaviouralism challenged the traditional, normative approach in social sciences. This phase also brought about two developments which gave a new lease of life to functionalism.

First, during this phase, scholars were showing increasing interest in regional integration, epitomized by European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). "The behavioural revolution provided the essential intellectual backdrop to the discovery of functionalism by American Scholars... as the starting point of a 'scientific' theory of regional integration which was later called neo-functionalism."²

Second, the adoption of functionalism by the regional integration theorists to build up their premises helped it to catch the attention of those concerned with the institution-building and the general problems of world order. The institution-building was seen in the mould of the creation of what Mitrany referred to as a working peace system. The relevance of functionalism to the problems of international system came to be more widely examined, the major ones being the works of E.B. Haas^a and J.P. Sewell.³ Since the 1960s there has been a proliferation in the literature on functionalism. The recognition of functionalism as an approach to international organization reached its hall-mark with an

² Paul Taylor's "Introduction" in David Mitrany, Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975), p.xiii.

³ Haas, n.1, and J.P. Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programmes Financing Economic Development (Princeton, 1966).

international conference on functionalism organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at Bellagio in 1969.

Functionalist approach developed also due to the exigencies of the nineteenth century. Prior to it, few functional organizations existed. The international relations represented billiard ball model with competitive and atomistic units (states) of the world society. The Industrial Revolution ushered in growing demand for cross-national transactions which was impeded by the national frontiers and nationalist upsurge following the French Revolution. Functional organizations were created as a response to this felt need.⁴

Mitrany himself finds the rationale for functional organization in the two characteristics of the inter-War period and during the Second World War. They were: "blatant disregard for the written rules and established rights" (which he sees as a cause for the failure of the League of Nations), and the universal pressure for social reform. The latter aspect is particularly seen by Mitrany as positive because it has changed the relation between nationalism and internationalism, "in a way promising if rightly used". He sees that the national and international relations are not "parallel" but "converging". Thus, the function is to "develop and co-ordinate the scope of social authority."⁵

⁴ A.J.R. Groom, "The Functionalist Approach and the East-West Cooperation in Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies (Oxford), vol.13, no.3, March 1975, p.22.

⁵ Mitrany, n.2. pp.106-7.

Theoretical/Conceptual Antecedents

The literature on international relations is based on two models -- the billiard ball model and cobweb model. The billiard ball model takes state as the unit of analysis. States are considered to be atomistic, competitive in a clearly defined sphere of jurisdiction. Although legally equal, in reality, they are organized hierarchically on the basis of power.

The cobweb model recognizes the shrinking of boundaries in the modern world in the face of growing interdependencies. Hence, this model views the world as a system of international and cross-national transactions, which are not necessarily based on power politics. Where role differentiation between states does occur, it is based on a "legitimized acceptance of a functional differentiation." Power politics can exist alongside a working peace system, a functional organization, of the everyday world. This coexistence of power politics and working peace system is the chief characteristic of the cobweb model. "Thus, if the cobweb model is the most apt description of world society, then functional organization may be one way of giving it an appropriate framework."⁶

Functionalism reflects major strands of political theory in its basic tenets. One finds traces of Guild Socialism,

⁶ Groom, n.4, pp.23-24.

Marxism, Pragmatism, Utilitarianism, Liberal individualism and even Anarchism. Functionalist analysis of human nature and human condition is derived from Guild Socialism. The Marxist thought is manifest only in the functionalist assumption of the causes of war, namely, social inequality and unequal distribution of economic benefits. The functionalists eschew grand constitutional schemes in favour of step-by-step development of cooperation according to the felt needs. It is here that pragmatism plays a major role in the functionalist ideology. Their idea of international cooperation based on shift in loyalties of individuals is founded in strong belief in utilitarian calculus. The individuals are expected to perceive that their welfare is best served by the international cooperation, thereby shifting their loyalties from nation-state to the international welfare organizations.⁷ In the functionalist scheme, the needs of the individual and his perception of the same are accorded a high priority. Also, democratic-liberal philosophy leaves the individual free to enter into a variety of relationships. Functionalist ideas remain popular among anarchist writers who emphasize on responsiveness, participation and consensus.

Functionalist approach by David Mitrany, however, should not ^{be} confused with functionalism in social sciences. All the same, functionalism in social sciences and functionalism as a perspective on international organization have more than semantic affinities.

⁷ Haas, n.1, pp.19-20.

Here, we briefly look at the link between the two. In social sciences, functionalism has influenced sociology, anthropology and lately, political science. As presented by Radcliff - Brown and Emile Durkheim, it suggests that "all social structures exist for the purpose of satisfying the functional needs of the social system as a whole."⁸ As against this 'systemic' view, Malinowski and Robert Merton consider that individual needs rather than system-requisites are the 'functions' performed by the structures. The obvious link between these and functionalism in international organization is the notion of 'need' which is to be fulfilled through structural adaptation. In all respects, David Mitrany and other functionalists are far from the rigours of the systemic thinking. "The essential principle", writes Mitrany "is that activities would be selected specifically and organized separately - each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment".⁹ Haas emphasizes that functionalists do not think in explicit systemic terms although notion of integration and community is immanent in Mitrany's theory. Haas further carefully demonstrates that however reluctant the functionalists might be "the brooding omnipresence of some species of system simply cannot be banished."¹⁰

There is disagreement among the scholars as to whether functionalism is a theory or an approach. Inis Clau^dse argues that functionalism, in the final analysis, is "not so

⁸ Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London, 1973), p.67.

⁹ As cited in *ibid.*, p.68.

¹⁰ Haas, n.1, p.7.

much a theory as a temperament, a kind of mentality, a style of approach to international affairs."¹¹ Functionalism has served some purposes of theorizing but not all; to call it a theory is perhaps misleading.¹²

Paul Taylor on the other hand argues that functionalism as a descriptive theory is "unimpeachable". He considers three purposes of theorizing -- of description, of explanation and prediction, and of formulation of prescriptions -- to justify that functionalism does stand the test of fruitful theorizing. The functionalist predictions cannot be positively refuted and it has important prescriptive element which is not spelt out in detail but the principles underlying it are clear. In his view, therefore, Claude may be right in saying that functionalism is an approach rather than a theory, insofar as the rigours of scientific method is concerned. But it displays greater concern of functionalism in presenting central principles of explaining, predicting and prescribing international integration.¹³ Hence, functionalism as an approach and exercise in purposive theorizing remains uncontested. As a Polish philosopher has pointed out "Functionalism cannot be

¹¹ Inis L. Claude Jr. Swords into Plowshares -- The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th edn. (New York, 1971), p.390.

¹² This point has been discussed in Paul Taylor, "Functionalism and Strategies for International Integration" in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, eds., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (London, 1975), pp.81-86.

¹³ *ibid.*, p.81.

classified as a theory of international organization only. Its theoretical principles are very broad and deep: Without doubt functionalism may be considered as a general theory of social affairs, based on philosophical principles linked with the tradition of liberal thought."¹⁴

Harrison feels that functionalism is a mono-causal explanation of social activity cogently presented in the dictum that "a community may be regarded as the sum of the functions performed by its members." Like all mono-causal explanations, it is inadequate.¹⁵

Assumptions and Tenets

Functionalism as an approach, as a set of values, is loosely integrated. yet it is a very "seductive" set of ideas used by academics as an explanation of phenomena in world society and as a prescription for action. It is founded on the distinction between political and non-political spheres of state and/or society. It assumes conflict between the particularistic nature of the former and the internationalizing implications of the latter. It emphasizes on exploiting the internationalizing qualities of the non-political sphere to circumvent the political obstacles, thus establishing lasting peace.

¹⁴ Francizek Golembki, as cited in Taylor, n.2, p.xix.

¹⁵ R.J. Harrison, "Testing Functionalism", in Groom and Taylor, n.12, p.126.

Functionalists, chiefly David Mitrany, are concerned with avoiding war and preserving general peace in international relations. Therefore, their theory is a programme for action aimed at eradicating the causes of war. The functionalist assumptions about the causes of war are three-fold. Firstly, to quote Claude: "War is regarded as the product of the objective conditions of human society... war is a disease of global society, caused by grave deficiencies in the economic and social circumstances of mankind."¹⁶ Hence, economic and social maladjustments need to be rectified. Secondly, war is due to the "institutional inadequacy of the state system." The nation-state is ill-equipped to meet the challenge posed by the economic and social problems. Also, the rigid formation of national boundaries hinder the larger promotion of general welfare. The nation-state system imposes vertical arbitrary division on welfare sphere. Finally, war is the product of subjective conditions of mankind. It is the result of "attitudes, habits of thought and feeling, and allegiances that are fostered by the state-system." Hence, as Claude argues, although the functionalist envisage functional organization as a vehicle of solving problems of human welfare, at bottom the theory is "an assertion and defense of the proposition that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and the elimination of war...."¹⁷

¹⁶ Claude, n.11, p.381.

¹⁷ As cited in Pentland, n.8, p.69.

From these assumptions of the causes of war emanates functionalist prescriptions about international organization. The functionalists criticize the integration based on federal union or geographic regions as they are assumed to be perpetuating further political divisions.

Before going into the details of the proposed international organization, one should look at four propositions of the functionalists that are called as "separability" propositions by Haas and Claude. For Claude, these propositions present sequential steps in the logic of functional envisioning of international organization.

(1) Power is separate from welfare (2) The governmental tasks are separated into social-economic tasks and military defence tasks. The former are called welfare-oriented and the latter, power-oriented tasks. With this assumption in mind, welfare-oriented tasks are given precedence over the power-oriented ones. Haas is of the opinion that this separation is only temporary. Ultimately functionalist "gathers these tasks together again into one". A corollary of this separation of functional spheres is the concept of transferability or spill-over. The "art of fruitful international cooperation" is transferred to other areas and contexts "until the dichotomy between functional contexts is overcome". (3) Another crucial separation is between technical and political, the role of the politician and that of the expert. However, the functionalist does not ponder over the question as to whom would the expert serve prudently -- a government or a private group? (4) The last separation is between the numerous loyalties a political actor is deemed to possess.

Any person is a bundle of loyalties. And individuals (or political actors) can entertain plurality of loyalties to a 'number of focusses'. All the same, functionalist hopes to help shift in loyalties through welfare-oriented service by the functional international organization.¹⁸

The functionalist argument starts with the notion that form should follow function; i.e., functional organization should evolve on the basis of the transaction patterns of the function being performed. Since the framework should be developed according to the need and changes in it, functionalists do not see a need for predetermined rigid constitutional framework. The framework should be flexible enough to accommodate necessary periodic changes. Thus emphasis is placed on functional transactions, and not on constitutions, "and boundaries are functionally determined and not state determined."¹⁹ By diminishing the conflict through cross-national transactions and ties through shifting of loyalties, through enlarging functional areas and through enmeshment of national governments, the functionalists argue, a 'working peace system' can be established.

One major principle of functionalism is that experience of fruitful cooperation can cause a shift in loyalties of men from the nation state towards the functional organization.

¹⁸ Haas, n.1, pp.21-22.

¹⁹ Groom, n.4, p.21.

Due to the wider functional jurisdiction, the welfare level obtained by individuals in the functional organization is greater than the level reached within the state system. "Individuals and groups could begin to learn the benefits of co-operation and would be increasingly involved in an international co-operative ethos, creating interdependencies, pushing for further integration, undermining the most important bases of nation state".²⁰

Mitrany himself is very explicit about the present problems of economic and social nature and he sets forth the broad contours of the putative organization. He says, all interests are not common to all and that such concerns are not equal to all. However, the common denominator is that in the international sphere most interests are present and these can be well represented in and fulfilled through only functional organization. The only way to proceed is "by a natural organic selection, binding together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they are common."²¹

The activities would be specifically selected and separately organized "according to its nature" and "to the conditions under which it has to operate". Mitrany cites the examples of aviation and broadcasting to suggest that these should be organized on a universal level, although there can be regional segments to provide more meaningful local

²⁰ Taylor, n.2, p.x.

²¹ Mitrany, n.2, p.115.

services. Such regional arrangements can be inserted whenever and wherever desirable; functional devolution would be as smooth as centralization because no political element is involved in it (there is no rigid constitutional framework to obstruct the smooth transition). Thus, functional devolution at regional level is not totally inimical to the functionalist idea; only as long as it aims at providing better services, as an organ of larger, universal framework. Again, certain degree of fixity is acceptable to Mitraný only in regard to the negative functions, such as those related to law and order or even those that are fairly static in nature, such as security, judiciary etc. Security and judiciary can be organized on interlocking regional basis. However, regarding the positive active functions such as economic, social and cultural, which are varied and changing, any regional devolution like the main organization must follow functional lines.

Here we discover a cardinal virtue of the functional pattern, what one might call the virtue of technical self-determination. The functional dimensions ... determine themselves. In a like manner the function determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of the action required...and.... powers needed by the respective authority.... Not only is there in all this no obvious need for constitutional division of authority and power, but any except the most general formal rules would embarrass the working of the system [Emphasis in original].²²

Mitraný cites Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as the most successful and glaring example of pragmatic response to the felt necessities of a pressing situation.

²² *ibid.*, p.118.

Many functionalists do not conceive of the process leading to anything more than intergovernmental cooperation. Others envisage the process culminating into a federal union. To the traditional functionalists like Mitrany, the end-product is a "complex interwoven network of cross-national organizations" actively involved in performing welfare functions, hitherto carried out by the nation-state.²³

Regarding the functional proposition that elements of world community are already existing and that functional/welfare organization would lead to community building, there have been ambiguous and contradictory studies. The sociological and social psychological community studies have not taken the functionalist logic far. Sociologists dispute Haas' assertion that a sense of community develops along the functionalist lines from international Gessellschaft (contractual association) into Gemeinschaft (a concept which includes normative - ascriptive bonds), and that it is "immanent in the evolutionary logic" of Mitrany. Some sociologists like Amitai Etzioni feel that the normative bonds associated with the concept of Gemeinschaft are a necessary prelude to the 'stability' of the (Gessellschaft) system. As opposed to it, another assumption is that the development of Gessellschaft is inherently detrimental to, and is at the expense of, Gemeinschaft. Haas notes that: "A modern political community tends to lack the warmth and devotion we associate with ascriptive ties...yet it is no less a community.... The modern nation-state, then is a Gemeinschaft that looks and acts much like the Gessellschaft we associate with

²³ Pentland, n.8, p.70.

our international system".²⁴ Many sociologists would disagree with Haas that this community lacking in ascriptive bonds of "warmth and devotion" is "no less a community". Although this debate on the nature and evolution of a community is inconclusive, empirical studies tend to support the view that Gessellschaft developments tend to undermine the existing Gemeinschaft. Many regard this transition as disintegrative rather than an integrative factor. The functional efforts in transcending national frontiers would almost simultaneously result in a sense of alienation and other disruptive effects in the face of eroding normative bonds.²⁵

Mitrany recognizes three problems in the path of functional organization. They are, the redrawing of frontiers, the question of national sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the problem of coordination. Change of frontiers will disturb social fabric, whether it is brought about peacefully or forcibly. The very purpose of peaceful change is to avoid such tremors in social life of the groups concerned. He sounds deterministic when he says that "the functional approach may be justifiably expected" to do that. In fact, the functional organization, in his opinion, should "make changes of frontiers unnecessary" by rendering them meaningless. A web of common activities, interests and administrative agencies envelop the national frontiers and transcend them.

²⁴ Haas, n.1, p.39.

²⁵ For a detailed discussion see, Harrison, n.15, pp.116-117.

Regarding the second problem of national sovereignty, it is not wholly avoided but is relegated to a lesser level so that it no longer remains obstructive in realizing functional goals. Functionalism does not offend against national pride and sovereignty. Also, there will be factual inequality between the states based on concern or interest and competence for a particular function. However, inequality in one function does not mean overall inequality. The position of inferiority of states will vary from function to function. Most states will thus have the satisfaction of being superior in one of the functional areas. Factual inequality assures even the weakest countries "of non-discrimination and of an equality of opportunity in the working benefits of any functional activity...."²⁶ Through this, "the system would make for that equalisation of social conditions and outlook which, better than any constitutional device, might in time provide a solid foundation for political union."²⁷

The third problem is the difficult question of co-ordination. It is a recurring theme in the critical account of functional approach. In the more complex areas of production, trade and distribution the problem of co-ordination is complex and poses a serious challenge to the functional organization. Mitrany says that as far as this question is raised

²⁶ Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.IV, no.2, 1965, p.139.

²⁷ Mitrany, n.2, pp.120-1.

²⁸ Mitrany, n.26, p.143.

as an abstract assumption, it only displays "the difficulty which our political thinking finds to conceive of authority, as part of the tradition of sovereignty, without a territory...."²⁸

However, he concedes that there may be a problem of autonomous organs working at cross- purposes resulting in duplication. But he does not prescribe any solution to it; rather he prefers to wait for the need to arise and for the experience to show the way. This is a clear reflection of strong belief in the functionalist dictum that 'form should follow function'. "To prescribe for the sake of traditional neatness something more definite than the guidance and supervision... would be to distort the whole conception from the start. To try to fit the functional bodies into a common mould would take away some of their special merits in working efficiency and flexibility of membership."²⁹

Functionalists believe that sovereignty will not be transferred on its own; nor can it be transferred through an agreed formula. It can only come about through a function. When a nation state entrusts an authority with a specific task and requisite powers and means, "a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new". An accumulation of such slices of sovereignty enables the formation of a true seat of authority in due course. It would, therefore, be rational to speak not of abdicating but of a sharing of sovereignty.³⁰

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ Mitrany, n.2, pp.128-9.

The functionalist, believe in separating technical "non-controversial" aspects of governmental conduct to develop a web of international co-operation on the basis of meeting such needs. They further separate "high" and "low" politics, making the latter their area of operation/achievement.

Two principles upon which functionalism rests are; first, there will be an 'attitudinal change' among people towards each other as a result of rewarding experience of common activity. This would also eliminate the damaging competitiveness; second, the common activity gradually develops in other functional areas, like concentric circle, through 'learning process' from previous experiences. "The development of a working peace system is contingent upon a learning process in which successful cooperation in one dimension spills over into other spheres."³¹ The functionalists assume that man is a bundle of several loyalties. It is essential to exploit multipolarity of loyalties in combating conflictual tendencies between them. The cross-cutting of loyalties in different spheres -- economic, social, and cultural -- will reduce incidence of conflict.

Functionalism heavily relies on man's rationality. It is assumed that men realise their welfare/interest so as to respond positively to signals of the functional organization. Also, when they realise it, they will shift their loyalties from nation-state to the

³¹ Groom, n.4, p.22.

international sphere. The underlying assumption is that man is a typical utilitarian indulging in hedonistic calculus. The argument runs that association and cooperation in problem-solving provides learning-situation in which men are "weaned away" from nationalistic allegiances towards cooperative ethos. This results in swelling cry for more functional cooperation, a situation known as spillover. "The process of attitude change through international cooperation is felt only by individuals involved in specific functional activities.... In the second phase the experience has become diffused throughout society by education and the media, while the scope and number of functional agencies have increased...."³² It is further assumed that men simply focus their attention on, and are prepared to be loyal to, those organizations which gratify their needs. Also, as Haas points out, man is expected to work in the interest of common good, or, in short, "the realization of the General Will". "This formulation presupposes some natural harmony of interests nationally and internationally. Functionalists hold this harmony to be immanent in an underlying common concern with welfare...."³³

The Functionalists entrust the working of the organization to the technocrats. The experts are assumed to be rational, devoid of any particular interests except service for the welfare of the individuals. The functionalists emphasize on decision-making by expert free from political or power pressures. Also, being a technocrat, he would not opt for soft

³² Pentland, n.8, p.84.

³³ Haas, n.1, p.30.

options due to particular political interests. "Such decision-making is thought to be efficient and to enhance welfare by keeping corrupting political pressures at bay as well as increasing participation in the sense that those with the greatest competence decide, rather than those with power."³⁴

The functionalists believe that international conflict can be toned down by entrusting the work of human welfare to experts. The specialists,

being interested in tasks rather than power, ... can be expected to achieve agreement where statesmen will fail. They will be concerned with "rightful" authorities and jurisdictions; rightful ends, proper functions to be performed, are their concern.... The differentiation seems to be the Rousseauan one between the General Will and the Will of All: the manager stands for the General Will, whereas the politician represents merely the Will of All....³⁵

This proposition presupposes some level of harmony of interests at both the domestic and the international level. Functionalists assume this harmony to be inherent in the general concern for welfare, while stressing on creative participation.

Criticism

Claude questions the central thesis of the causes of war. He disagrees with the statement that war is a product of unsatisfactory economic and social conditions in the

³⁴ Groom, n.4, p.27.

³⁵ Haas, n.1, pp.11-13.

world. Hans Kelsen argues that unsatisfactory economic conditions are not the cause but the consequence of war. Moreover, there is no direct relationship between national economic backwardness and aggressiveness. History is replete with examples where affluent nations have often resorted to warfare.³⁶

Claude disagrees with logical sequence of functionalism, what he calls 'separability-priority' thesis. He questions the rationality of separating economic and social strata from the political. This separability is particularly untenable in the face of increasing politicization of all issues in the twentieth century. "Is it in fact possible to segregate a group of problems and subject them to treatment in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves only with the cooperative use of the tools of mutual interest?"³⁷ Haas, criticising in a similar vein says, Mitrany has not taken adequate account of 'power' elements of human society, and sets himself the task of redefining functionalism in which he restates the four propositions of separability-priority thesis. They are:

(1) Power is [not] separate from welfare.... functionally specific international programs, if organizationally separated from diffuse orientations, maximize both welfare and integration.

(2) When actors realize their interest would best be achieved by adapting new approaches, and if these approaches involve commitment to larger organizations, then and only then does "learning" contribute to integration.

³⁶ Claude, n.11, pp.387-8.

³⁷ Claude, n.11, pp.387-8.

(3) International integration is advanced most rapidly by a dedication to welfare, through measures elaborated by experts aware of the political implications of their task, and representative of homogeneous and symmetrical social aggregates, public or private.

(4) Personal political loyalties are the result of satisfaction with the performance of crucial functions by an agency of government. Since actors can be loyal to several agencies simultaneously, a gradual transfer of loyalties to international organizations performing most of the crucial functions is likely.... To the extent, ... that the integration process is influenced by nations with ascriptive status patterns, traditional or charismatic leadership, the proposition is unlikely to hold [Emphasis in original].³⁸

However, to some scholars this restatement of functionalism seems very near to the original functionalism of Mitrany. Haas' restatement itself has been subjected to critical scrutiny.³⁹

Like Haas, Sewell says that Mitrany does not take an adequate account of power relationships. Functionalism, according to Sewell, "does not explain the source of human energy needed to transform human society". Furthermore, two 'short-comings' in the functionalist theory, in explaining the World Bank, he says, "... the functional thesis was helpful but insufficient. Our basic quarrel with it on these points is not that it is 'wrong', simply that it does not take us far enough." Also, that functionalism "takes too simplistic a view of the 'dynamics' of an organization like the World Bank."⁴⁰

³⁸ Haas, n.1, pp.47-50.

³⁹ For an incisive criticism see, Andrew Willison Green, "Mitrany Reread with the help of Haas and Sewell", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.VIII, no.1, 1969, pp.61-64.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p.60.

Haas and Claude criticize the concept of spillover. It leaves several questions unanswered. For, there is no limit to the expansibility of concentric circles; but the barriers may arise from political willingness which functionalism can not overcome. "Functionalism cannot guarantee that one thing leads inexorably and interminably to another in international relations."⁴¹ "On the contrary it may fail to develop and be forgotten."⁴² Mitrany is unduly optimistic about the practice of functionalism. There is no certainty that functional organizations will solve economic and social problems, particularly when they embark upon more difficult and resistant problems. There is again no reason to believe that once socio-economic problems are solved, political disputes will not arise. To say that solving socio-economic problems will put an end to political disputes would amount to giving a over simplified monocausal explanation. Even if we were to assume that the functional organizations will provide valid solutions, there is no reason that they will be seen as such by the target citizens. And, even if they are seen as valid, they might not be obeyed.⁴³ Mitrany is optimistic, humanistic and oversimplistic in his assumptions.

How are the functional needs to be determined, and by whom? If it is rooted in the demands made by the society, then the degree of consensus needed for such

⁴¹ Claude, n.11, p.389.

⁴² Haas, n.1, p.23.

⁴³ Green, n.39, pp.58-59.

identification of problem^{is} difficult to obtain. If this consensus is not assumed then the 'need' of the society is determined by experts or politicians; and here lies the danger.⁴⁴

Again, the growth of community is a result of 'learning process' and the eventual transfer of loyalties to the international organization. The tactical flaw here is that political elites, who initially cooperate with these organizations to contribute to the welfare, will not be enthusiastic enough to allow shift in loyalties. The political elites are the communication link between the people and the international organization. This plays a major role in the learning process and the attitudinal change. Then, is it not possible that the political elites will exploit the situation to their convenience? Or is it not a paradox to expect political elites to cooperate in integration endeavour and thereby face the probability of losing their jobs in the long run? Leaders cannot remain oblivious of the fact that international cooperation will not bring them any political harvest (or clout) without eroding their own roles. Hence, states might be expected to cooperate in the functional endeavour only if they perceive delegating of tasks to the international agencies as delegation and not partial abdication of sovereignty. But the "functionalists do not normally attribute such a state of mind to national governments. If governments are naturally cooperative, the problem of world order does not arise; if they are not, they can

⁴⁴ Pentland, n.8, p.85.

hardly be expected to dissolve themselves rationally or incrementally."⁴⁵ Functionalism, therefore, at best, relies upon the "enlightened selfishness" of states to produce world order."⁴⁶

The concept of technical self-determination, although seems impersonal has tremendous impact and dependence on human values and perceptions. "Whereas the material aspect made its auspicious debut through such concepts as 'technical self-determination' ", writes Sewell, "the human element enters in the guise of the 'felt common need'." The concept of 'technical self determination' appears to be a dubious, deterministic social organicism.⁴⁷

The functionalists no where tackle the problem of organization at the system-level. At what point do the functional organizations assume the responsibility for initiative from the states? Moreover, over a period of time, these functional agencies might develop their own vested interests, embodied in particularistic overtone of bureaucracies, thereby hindering the process of integration rather than being vehicles of it. Such resistances may be particularly visible in the area of coordination and/or abolition of the international

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, pp.82-83.

⁴⁶ Claude, n.11, p.386.

⁴⁷ Pentland, n.8, p.79.

agencies. "In short, the link between functional performance and structural change in the multi-state system might not operate as the functionalists expect...."⁴⁸

Functionalists' heavy leaning on the technocrats in the functioning of the international organization is criticised on the ground that it is difficult to isolate technical matters from politics. Moreover, technical matters do often have more than one answer; which means the competing answers thrusts us back into the realm of politics. "Technical matters can only be answered on technical grounds where there is a consensus on values which renders a technical matter 'technical' and not 'political'."⁴⁹ And this consensus is not easy to bring about.

According to R.J. Harrison, Mitrany's simplistic assumption that leadership of major states would be coherent, and readily accepted by smaller states is contrary to the present-day international relations. One of the most dynamic aspects of the present-day international conflict is the yearning of the developing countries to have equivalent status with the developed/advanced countries.

Thus even aid programmes are a source of dispute between the 'atimic' [relatively deprived] and the advanced societies. The criteria by which projects are to be selected for assistance tend to be seen differently by donor and beneficiary. The need for an international, formal, institutionalized framework for debate and for legitimisation of decisions on aid is consequently accepted in principle. This is an instance of the somewhat paradoxical positive relationship between conflict and consensus

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.80.

⁴⁹ Groom, n.4, p.27.

which functionalist theory fails to recognize.⁵⁰

Besides, most of the welfare functions tend to be reallocative. Countries at differing levels of economic development and ideology render the reallocation difficult, if not impossible. Such reallocative expenditure is unlikely to be agreed upon unless profound community sentiment were already in existence.⁵¹

Mitrany's examination of political considerations is incomplete at several points. He argues that attempt to reach constitutional agreement would touch the areas of disagreement and therefore put the process of functional cooperation in jeopardy. Harrison opines that fighting out disagreements at the drafting stage is healthier and may minimize area of disagreement, which the functionalists, not attempting to "offend the sentiment of nationality" may never touch it. Another point is that since Mitrany's writing, the welfare state has grown phenomenally. It has come to assume many functions in the socio-economic field as opposed to the negative functions [of law and order, defence] it performed in the past. It is a plausible a priori that the differences in welfare needs between different countries make welfare state rather than functional organization the best solution.⁵²

⁵⁰ R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration (London, 1974), pp.32-33.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, p.36.

⁵² *ibid.*, p.36.

Nettl and Roberston have pointed out that during the Second World War, economics as a discipline influencing policy had precedence over others. With the economic upheaval that followed in the aftermath of the War, every national and international problem was seen with an economic prism. "Thus, Mitarny's functionalism was very much in tune with the thinking of the time: an economic conception of social change, tending to neglect other factors."⁵³

Two empirical studies which tried to apply functionalism to specific organization provide little support for it.⁵⁴ Sewell found that in IBRD there was "not so much habituation in agreement as the trappings of continuing conflict". He further concludes that: "The functionalists completely neglect the context of the activities they propose to explain.... In the narrowness of its focus, the functional interpretation cuts off an understanding of the very dynamics which give rise to these activities and affect every aspect of their existence."⁵⁵

⁵³ *ibid.*, p.28.

⁵⁴ See n.3 above.

⁵⁵ As cited in Harrison, n.50, pp.38-39.

Conclusion

The functionalist approach provided useful antidote to the power approach to international relations. In the immediate years after the Second World War, power approach reigned unchallenged. Functionalism questioned the power approach and its relevance. With the emergence of functionalism, scholars realised that there is another way of looking at the international relations, where cooperation has precedence over competitiveness. In the recent years, the 'billiard ball' model has been replaced by the more accommodative 'cobweb model' in international society. "The functionalist approach has been recognised as a major precursor to this new vision of world society."⁵⁶ As Haas would say: "It is precisely the merit of Functionalism that it broke away from the cliches of Realist political theory. Its fault lies in not having broken radically enough."⁵⁷

By propounding functionalist approach, Mitrany wanted to provide panacea to the international society. His formulation of functionalism cannot be seriously considered as a scientific hypothesis. Nevertheless, his theory does give an insight into the "problems of world peace and political integration by provoking in us a profounder reflection on these difficult and important problems, and for strengthening our courage to try again to achieve

⁵⁶ Taylor, n.2, p.xvii.

⁵⁷ Haas, n.1, p.24.

a world which has more ordered liberty and less violence, even if we proceed without the confidence and hope his visions inspire"⁵⁸

The geometric proliferation of international functional organizations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, over the years, has been impressive. If anything, this is a pointer to the relevance of functionalism today.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Green, n.39, pp.68-69.

⁵⁹ Groom, n.4, p.24.

CHAPTER III

**NEOFUNCTIONALIST APPROACH: EMPHASIS
ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION**

NEO-FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH: EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The neo-functionalism, as the name suggests has its roots in the functionalism of David Mitrany. It has derived considerably from the critique of functionalism. In its earlier phase, neo-functionalism was developed and applied distinctly to study the integration of the European Economic Community. It is only during the 1960s that neo-functionalism scholars attempted to apply it to other integration systems as well. This attempt was also a conscious effort to both widen its applicability, and to formulate a more "inclusive" or comprehensive integration theory. One can discern the impact of development of American political science during the 1950s and 1960s¹, particularly epitomised by the behavioural revolution in political science. This, in part, explains the reason for the stress laid on empiricism by the neo-functionalism scholars, a group of American political scientists led by E.B. Haas.²

Assumptions and Tenents

Neo-functionalism relies heavily on group theory of politics. It is argued that

¹ Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London, 1973), p.100.

² Besides Haas, the neo-functionalism writings include works by Philippe Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, Lawrence Scheinman etc.

integration is brought about by the interaction of political forces, such as political parties, interest groups, pressure groups, and governments, which try to reap political benefits out of these pressures. An integrated community is believed to be pluralistic in nature in that there is a struggle among the political forces and elites for gaining the authoritatively allocated values. Hence, political groups -- both national and supranational -- keep their long-term gains in mind while mobilizing support for a specific policy in the integrated unit. The integrated community symbolises pluralism in one more sense; there is coalition and/or accommodation of conflicting interest. When many such conflicting interests converge, they may enhance the range and the level of decision-making authority/competence of the integrated system.³

To involve interest groups in the integration process, "the sector chosen must be important and controversial, but not so controversial that vital interests of the states are immediately affected, nor so that political elites feel that their power and vested interests are seriously threatened."⁴ The functions or areas of integration should be inherently expansive; i.e., co-operation in one field should cause significant ripples in other related areas to necessitate an ever-expanding integration in the new areas as well as within the same area. This enhances the scope and the level of integration.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Haas, as cited in R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration (London, 1974), p.76.

Before going into the conceptual ramifications of neo-functionalism, it should be contrasted with functionalism. First of all, the neo-functionalists do not seek mass support for the integration process. It is the key political forces with both power and influence that are held crucial to the community building. A corollary of this argument is that the pressure for integration does not come from pressures of functional needs but from the political forces. The benefits accruing from integration to different groups may be different; so also their perceptions and aims in supporting integration process. Hence, differences in social perceptions and expectations of the constituent units is assumed. Among the interest groups, economic groups are expected to be in the forefront, for, Haas feels that, it is economic groups which are most expressive, active and able to seek 'recognition of common needs'.⁵

While functionalism is not deterministic about the institutional structure, the neo-functionalists assign a primary role to the central institutions in harmonizing different interests. The functionalists envisage the growth of central institutions according to the functional necessity; the neo-functionalists stress on evolution of institutions, laws and norms which "must play not merely a passive but a promotional role in the integration process, providing the solutions which resolve conflict".⁶

⁵ E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964) as cited in Harrison *ibid.*, p.80.

⁶ Harrison, *ibid.*, p.79.

Neo-functionalism considers pluralistic industrialized societies as necessary backdrop for the political groups to perform the roles assigned to them. Hence, neo-functionalism is not general in its application; it is conditional. Here it chiefly differs from functionalism, which is more universal in its application. Also, neo-functionalism is essentially a theory of regional integration, it is not averse to global integration albeit. The functionalist and federalist theories aim at global/universal integration.

Neo-functionalism with interest politics at the base is a remarkable departure from the functional technocracy aspect of functionalism. Neo-functionalism restores the role of politics, and envisages an active participation of national governments and political parties in the integration process. National leadership is considered as much essential for integration as the supranational leadership.

Haas feels that in laying stress on group theory, one cannot lose sight of the importance of governmental structures. In the ultimate analysis the interest groups cannot remain immune from the formal governmental structure. Haas makes a criticism of functionalists for writing off the formal structure of state and the state-system in favour of voluntary groups. In fact, he feels that systems theory's conception of groups "as societal structures that articulate interests, as distinguished from aggregating them or translating them into policy; their overall systemic role is thus confined to functioning alongside political, and their life is subordinated to the dominant "style" and "culture" of

the system" is more congenial to their "use as building blocks in a theory that seeks to specify a process of integration or disintegration, whether at the national or international level."⁷ The interest groups articulate their policy preferences keeping in mind their gains, not so much for general welfare. As Haas remarks, there is agreement on "means for achieving welfare, but not on the content of laws and policies, not on the substance of the functions."⁸ Hence, it is necessary to have laws and norms to provide basic procedures for conflict resolution among the various groups.

Along with laws and norms, policy making bodies at the supranational level, i.e., central institutions should also be well-equipped to act when the consensus for integration exists. The central institutions translate the consensus into actual policy measures. Another key role central institutions play is to change the attitude and perceptions of concerned groups in favour of integration through policy-making process. It also gives rise to more demands and expectations. Although central institutions have a key role to play, their failure to assert themselves, in Haas' opinion, has marginal effect on the integrative process. Therefore, the interest groups, governments and central institutions have interdependent relationship but their applicability is limited.⁹

⁷ Haas, n.5, p.37.

⁸ Cited in Harrison, n.4, p.78.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp.79-80.

The neo-functionalists believe that the political groups are in a position to perform the roles expected of them only in certain settings -- the countries should be pluralistic, industrialized, ideologically homogeneous complex societies with several groups contending for basic values of the society, within the accepted norms of parliamentary or presidential democracy. The government represents conflicts among highly developed and articulate groups. Since neo-functionalists rely on groups, these background conditions are very essential to have full-fledged groups to fulfil the roles assigned to them. The groups help the integration process move forward because at each stage their calculation of advantage reaches a new level. However, in doing so, "these is no common good other than^{an} them that perceived through the interest-tinted lenses worn by the international actors. But international interest politics causes the tinting to fall into convers^ging patterns...."¹⁰ Deutsch's conception of integration leads to the formation of pluralistic or amalgamated security-community. He regards "initially compatible value systems, mutually responsive elites, adequate communications channels, a commitment to a "new way of life", and the existence of a "core area" as helpful background conditions for the formation of security-community.¹¹

Lindberg feels that the above enumerated background conditions by Haas and Deutsch do not adequately explain the process of integration and nor do they help in

¹⁰ Haas, n.5, p.35.

¹¹ Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, 1963), p.7.

differentiating the situation before integration from the situation during the process of integration. Hence, he identifies some additional variables as conditions to gauge how integration occurs. They are: "(1) Central institutions and central policies must develop. (2) The tasks assigned to these institutions must be important enough and specific enough to activate socio-economic processes to which conventional international organizations have no access. (3) These tasks must be inherently expansive. (4) The Member States must continue to see their interests as consistent with the enterprise."¹²

The concept of spillover is central to the neo-functionalist thesis. The 'expansive logic of integration' or what is otherwise called as 'spill-over', is defined by Haas as: "policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded...."¹³ Lindberg's variable "inherently expansive task" is embedded in this concept. he defines it thus:

In its most general formulation, "spill-over" refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.... Spill-over implies that a situation has developed in which the ability of a Member State to achieve a policy goal may depend upon the attainment by another Member-State of one of its policy goals.¹⁴

¹² *ibid.*, pp.7-8.

¹³ Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", International Organization, vol.15, 1961, p.368.

¹⁴ Lindberg, n.11, p.10.

There can be several ways in which the process would operate. Every measure of integration is reallocative in nature, benefitting some states more than others. When the benefits of reallocation are not clear, the states may be reluctant to agree for further integration. Also, as the integration expands to more number of sectors, "the reallocative effort might tend to produce progressive rather than regressive integrative reactions, because of the increased scope which would exist for the resolution of conflicts by bargains between sectors."¹⁵

Haas makes a distinction between 'low' and 'high' politics. 'Low' politics is "the incremental decision-making processes of the economic and technical spheres" and the 'high' politics is the "politics of diplomacy, strategy and national ideologies." He argues that neo-functional concept of integration is expected to take place in the former context; the extent of progress in the incremental integration in 'low' political sphere is, however, dependent "on the state of relations in the 'high' political sphere."¹⁶

There has been no agreement among the neo-functional scholars as to what is the end-product of the integration process. Haas, while defining end-product, initially defined

¹⁵ Harrison, n.4, p.82.

¹⁶ Pentland, n.1, p.109.

integration as a process, and "[t]he end result of a process of political integration is a new political community...."¹⁷ In 1961, Haas clung to his definition of integration as a process resulting in shift of loyalties to "a new and larger center", but refined the meaning of political community as: "A variety of constitutional and structural factors are compatible with this nation; political community exists when there is likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic claims".¹⁸ Haas radically revised his definition of integration in 1970 when he recognised the difficulties in rendering his earlier concept of integration operational. He said that integration is concerned with "how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves."¹⁹ Haas also shunned his earlier concept of political community as the end-product in favour of less sweeping concept 'authority-legitimacy-transfer'. This new concept presents a range of possible putative outcomes which are not ideal types like the political community. Hence, the new dependent variable, or the end-product of the integration process, can be 'regional state', 'regional commune' and 'asymmetrical regional overlap'.²⁰

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.101.

¹⁸ Haas, n.13, p.366.

¹⁹ E.B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-theorizing", International Organization, vol.24, no.4, 1970, p.106.

²⁰ *ibid.*, pp.630 and 634.

Leon Lindberg, following closely in the footsteps of Haas, adopts, in his own words, a more "cautious" definition of integration. He defines political integration as a process without referring to the end-point. His concept of political integration is "limited to the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous action by national governments."²¹ Pentland says: "In thus abstracting the process variables and playing down the structural goal and the policy-content of integration, Lindberg seems to be trying to avoid imputing a teleological quality to the integrative process."²² Despite his efforts to keep the semblance of end-product at bay, Lindberg cannot escape from it. His definition of integration process makes a reference to central organs and federal system in terms of political processes. In the ultimate analysis, integrated system for him is development of decision-making processes, i.e., central institutions, and a change of behaviour by those who make or help making decisions.

Neo-functionalism Revisited

Neo-functionalist theory has been subjected to a systematic revision over the years. The European Community provided initially the launching pad to the explanatory theory in terms of empirical applicability. However, the enthusiasm of the neo-functionalists was

²¹ Lindberg, n.11, p.5.

²² Pentland, n.1, p.104.

short-lived. In the light of troubled history of the Community since Haas first wrote in 1957, there have been radical revisions in the views presented by Haas and his colleagues. The symposium published in the Autumn number of the International Organization, 1970, set the tone of revised neo-functionalist thought. The revision has been necessitated due to such problems in the Community as de Gaulle's veto on the British entry into it. Haas revised his concept of 'spill-over' and 'dependent variable'. P.C. Schmitter has developed new concepts of 'spill-around' and 'spill-back'. Lindberg, looking at crisis in the Community, has noted that 'the evidence indicates that the governments can avoid the logical consequences of integration for an unexpectedly long time.'²³ Deutsch felt that the integration movement had reached stability in 1957-58, until questioned incisively by Inglehart.²⁴ Particularly in 1970, Haas admitted that, "Most neo-functionalists have not explicitly recognised, however, the crucial question of whether even... this incremental style is not "foreseen" and manipulated by certain heroic actors (Jean Monnet, Sicco Mansholt, Walter Hallstein, Raul Prebisch) - and eventually checked by certain equally prescient national actors (Charles de Gaulle)".²⁵

More than any other aspect, the revision of neo-functionalist theory has made it more inclined towards methodology. In their effort to make the theory more widely

²³ Harrison, n.4, p.87.

²⁴ R. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?", American Political Science Review, vol.61, 1967, pp.91-105.

²⁵ Haas, n.19, p.627.

applicable, and more accurate in its prediction and analysis, the neo-functionalists have rigorously employed methodological tools to develop a body of concepts, hypothesis, assumptions, variables etc. It is to this revision and methodological refinement of neo-functionalism that we now turn.

Haas has revised several of his concepts and questioned others. Prior to it, he considered that there was inherent "expansive logic" in the sectoral integration which spilled over from one function to another, what was termed by Mitrany as doctrine of ramification. The process of spill-over resulted from the "upgrading" of common interests by national government in a new international setting.

In 1961, Haas wrote that economic tasks have contributed most to the process to integration in Europe. However, he added, this cannot be considered as a general proposition, for, several economic organizations have failed to upgrade their common interests.

Not merely economic tasks, therefore, but the degree of functional specificity of the economic task is causally related to the intensity of integration. The more specific the task, the more likely important progress toward political community.... Functional specificity, however, may be so trivial as to remain outside the stream of human expectations and actions vital for integration.... The task, in short, must be both specific and economically important in the sense of containing the potential for spilling over from one vital area of welfare policy into others.²⁶

²⁶ Haas, n.13, p.372.

Despite "specificity" of functions, the European experience has shown that some functional contexts are "autonomous"; they do not "necessarily infect other activities, even if carried out by the same organization." While the external environment provides the favourable conditions for integration, it is not sufficient for the process to take place, "unless the task assigned...is inherently expansive" and "capable of overcoming the built-in autonomy of functional contexts...."²⁷

Scheingold and Lindberg feel that this problem of autonomy of functional contexts is not unique to European integration alone. It is true of all "pluralistic" political systems. When we turn a political system as pluralistic, it is assumed that no particular interest is able to rule supreme; the policy outcomes are a result of coalition of various particular/individual interests concerned with the policy in the pipeline. The coalition among various interests differs for each issue. New coalitions are worked out according to the weightage given to the policy by each interest group. "Power exercised in one area does not necessarily carry over into another, and there is no single power structure or elite that can control all decisions in the system.... In general, new coalitions of supporters must be built for each successive integrative step."²⁸

²⁷ *ibid.*, p.376.

²⁸ Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's would-be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), pp.108-9.

P.C. Schmitter in his article in 1970²⁹ acknowledged that his earlier article with E.B. Haas on Latin America³⁰ tried to attempt a statement of model of political consequences of integration and that it was a "successful failure". Hence, in his 1970 article, he offers a "revised formulization of the neo-functionalist" theory. He further suggested that the concept of spillover should be refined, modified and qualified in a typology of alternatives available to the actors. In his attempt to develop a dependent variable, he focussed his efforts upon specifying and predicting:

the conditions under which the consequences generated by prior joint decisions will lead to redefinitions of actor strategies vis-a-vis the scope and level of regional decision-making. Whether member states will expand or contract the type of issues to be resolved jointly (scope) or whether they will increase or decrease the authority for regional institutions to allocate values (level) are the two basic dimensions of the dependent variable.... [Emphasis in original]³¹

Providing a typology "crudely", he develops various strategic options available to the actors as plotted in figure 1 (p. ~~101~~^{106a}) reproduced from his article. The options available to the actor are:

²⁹ P.C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", International Organization, vol. 24, no.4, 1970, pp.836-7.

³⁰ E.B. Haas and P.C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America", International Organization, vol.18, no.4, pp.705-737.

³¹ Schmitter, n.29, p.841.

1) Spill-over, i.e., to increase both the scope and the level of... commitment concomitantly; (2) Spill-around, i.e. to increase only the scope while holding the level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference; (3) build-up, i.e., to agree to increase the decisional autonomy or capacity of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas; (4) retrench, i.e., to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institutions from certain areas; (5) nuddle-about, i.e., to let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values; (6) Spill-back, i.e., to retreat on both dimensions, possibly returning to the status quo anti initiation; (7) encapsulate, i.e., to respond to crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference.³²

Over a period of time, the integration process, according to this typology, is likely to be erratic, not depicting any cumulative trend. Successive spill-over encompassing new issue areas, and less conspicuous spill-around may result in major strides towards political integration.

Haas is of the opinion that the major drawback of all the integration theories has been their inability to agree upon a dependent variable. As a result, the three theories of integration (federalist theory, communications theory and the neo-functionalist theory) have been nonadditive in nature. The first step in formulating an integrated theory of regional integration, he pointed out, should be to identify a dependent variable, i.e., to clarify what the theory proposes to explain and/or predict.³³

³² *ibid.*, p.846.

³³ Haas, n.16, p.630.

Haas abandons any single ideal type of terminal condition, such as the concept of political community, with which he worked earlier. The ideal types foreclose the possible alternatives of the end-product. He, therefore, prefers to adopt scales of dependent variables, particularly those prepared by Joseph Nye, and Philip Jacob and Henry Teune. "The end-state... is a quantitatively specified 'point' on a scale; when several scales are used for several salient dimensions, the end state is specified convergence of separate curves."³⁴ However, he feels that such quantitatively specified definition can only attain theoretically relevant outcome, but cannot explain the phenomenon of final outcome. It can at best methodologically help in making methodological observation but it cannot provide the dependent variable. Haas uses the master concept "authority-legitimacy-transfer" or "sharing". He uses the notion of "institutionalization" as an indicator towards both authority and legitimacy.³⁵

Regarding the applicability of the theory to the regional groupings among the developing countries, Haas argues that instead of developing a special model for the Third World, the answer should be to broaden the range of independent variables, keeping in mind possible variations in different regional settings. The efforts at theorising hitherto have concentrated on Western European integration. The national-regional congruence

³⁴ *ibid.*, p.632.

³⁵ *ibid.*, pp.630-4.

of pluralism, incrementalism and instrumental behaviour in Western European model is absent in the developing countries. Latin American and African settings have revealed this lack of congruence. Now, Haas feels, the theory should be able to absorb different levels of economic development, ideology, and elite socialization.³⁶

Joseph Nye's main effort in his article in 1970³⁷ has been to provide a revised neo-functional model from his earlier writing³⁸ and also provide a review of Haas and Schmitter's work on integration in Latin America.³⁹ More than this, he tries to apply the theory to other common markets, chiefly in the less developed countries, such as the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).

According to Nye, when the integrationist-technocrats and the interest groups together press for the formation of regional economic integration organization, such institutionalization unleashes certain new forces which focus their activities at the regional level. If these forces are aided by certain "background" conditions (of symmetry between

³⁶ *ibid.*, pp.640-42.

³⁷ J.S. Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model", International Organization, vol.24, no.4, 1970, pp.796-835.

³⁸ *Idem*, "Comparative Regional integration: Concept and Measurement", International Organization, vol.22, 1968, pp.855-80.

³⁹ Haas and Schmitter, n.30.

national units, social pluralism, high transactional flows, and elite complementarity), initiation conditions, and process conditions, the net result is the political union. These process forces are called by Nye as "process mechanisms" or "integrative mechanisms". Another set of conditions which are determinant of the type of response to the pressures generated by the integrative mechanisms, are termed by Nye as "integrative potential" of a region. Nye presents a revised neo-functionalist model based upon "process mechanisms" and "integrative potential". Basing himself on the earlier works by neo-functionalists, Nye identifies seven process mechanisms which we discuss as under:

1) Functional Linkage of Tasks

Nye feels that the concept of spillover has been misapplied to "any sign of increased cooperation" even if it has been due to perceived linkages between problems or due to inherent technical reasons; or, when the integrating elite have consciously worked towards such cooperation, what Nye terms as "cultivated spill-over". As a result, this concept has been "robbed of its explanatory value". Nye argues that the interdependence or inherent linkages of tasks do create imbalances necessitating a redefinition of tasks by the political actors. But, such redefinition does not always lead to upgrading of common interests. It might even be negative. If linkages can cause spill-over, they also cause spill-back.

2) Rising transactions

This hypothesis commensurate with integration leaves two options open for political actors: Either they can deal with the pressing demands arising out of increased transactions at the national level, or by strengthening the central institutions. Hence, rising transactions need not result in widening of the range of tasks but in the strengthening of "central institutional capacity to handle a particular task."

3) Deliberate linkages and Coalition formation

Here Nye focusses on what he terms as accentuated spill-over. The tasks are linked into package deals not due to technical reasons, but due to political feasibility. Also, based on linked tasks, coalitions are formed. Although these efforts promote integration, they might have disintegrating effect, if the importance of a issue in the package deal or the fortunes of a political group in the coalition, declines.

4) Elite Socialization

Integration creates close bonds between politicians, national and international bureaucrats, due to increased interaction. This might result in support for integration scheme. However, if other "process mechanisms" are negative, then pro-integration elites may be isolated from political effectiveness.

5) Regional Group Formation

Regional integration stimulates the creation of non-governmental and transnational organizations. However, in the context of European Community, central America and Africa, Nye says that these organizations remain weak. At best they aggregate more general interests while more specific interests remain within the domain of national-level interest groups.

6) Ideological - Identitive Appeal

A sense of identity with the regional grouping is a powerful force for its success. If strong identity persists, then the opposition groups will be cautious in their attack. This may, however, increase the opposition of the insecure nationalist leaders and non-governmental interest groups, particularly when the gains from regional integration are uncertain.

7) Involvement of External Actors in the Process

Nye places greater emphasis on the participation of the external actors in the integration process than the earlier neo-functionalists. He views outside governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations as catalysts in the integrative process.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ For the entire discussion on process mechanisms, see Nye, n. 37, pp.803-811.

After discussing the "process mechanisms", Nye talks of "integrative potential". Under this he has (1) structural conditions; and (2) perceptual conditions. The four structural conditions are: (a) symmetry or economic equality of units; (b) elite value complementarity; (c) existence of pluralism; and (d) capacity of member states to adapt and respond. The three perceptual conditions are (a) the perceived equity of distribution of benefits -- the higher the perceived equity in the integrating units the better it is for augmenting further integration; (b) perceived external cogency -- that is, decision makers' perception of problems and threats posed by the external/outside world; (c) low (or exportable) viable costs -- a concept central to the neo-functionalists strategy is to make the cost of integration to be perceived as relatively low.

Nye compared the strength of process forces and favourability of integrative conditions in six organizations during the mid 1960s. Although the variables are given equal weightage, interaction effects are ignored, and are based on his intuitive scoring, the aggregate judgements presented in the following table help to illustrate, Nye claims, his "central point about a balance between strength of process mechanisms and the favourability of conditions."⁴¹

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.281.

TABLE
 PREDICTED OUTCOMES, SIX ORGANIZATIONS, MID-1960s⁴²

	Aggregate Judgement on process-mechanisms	Aggregate Judgement on conditions	Expected Response
EEC	High-Moderate	Moderate-High	Integrative
EFTA	Low-Moderate	Moderate-High	Status Quo
CACM	Moderate-High	Moderate-High	Integrative
LAFTA	Low-Moderate	Low-Moderate	Status Quo
EACM	High-Moderate	Low-Moderate	Disintegrative
CMEA	Low-Moderate	Low-Moderate	Status Quo

The striking aspect in this table is the case of EACM. The incommensurability between the strong process mechanisms and weak integrative conditions has resulted in disintegrative response.

On the basis of this comparison of six organizations, Nye hypothesizes four conditions "that are likely to characterize an integration process overtime." (1) Politicization, i.e., the way in which conflicts and contending interests are reconciled and

⁴² Reproduced in original from *ibid.*, p.822.

the way in which benefits are widespread to ensure broadening of support or "arena of participants"; (2) Redistribution, how welfare, status and power are equitably distributed both within the member states and between the member states. Crucial issue here is how distribution, benefitting some regions more than^{an} others, is compensated by growth to the benefit of the entire unit. This problem is particularly acute in the less developed areas in which it is difficult to ensure economic symmetry between the integrating member states. Also, "there is a tendency for industry to cluster to take advantage of existing external economies"; (3) Reduction of alternatives. As integrative process proceeds further, the alternatives available to the political decisionmakers are reduced. The costs of disentanglement from an integrative enterprise is undesirably high. This shrinking of alternatives is caused by the pressures of increased transactional flows and stronger ideological-identitive appeal on the political decisionmakers. It can have disintegrative effect if more tasks become interrelated through inherent links or package deals, because of "the danger of pulling the whole house of cards down."; (d) Externalization, the extent to which the member states develop a common stand on issues concerning outside the integrated region, their dealing with the nonmembers.⁴³ The revised neo-functionalist model developed by Nye provides a useful framework for comparing integration processes in developed and less developed regions of the world. He argues that micro regional, i.e., functionally specific, economic organizations are unlikely to progress toward replacing nation-states. But microregional economic organizations and macroregional political

⁴³ *ibid.*, pp.822-28.

organizations have contributed to the creation of "islands of peace". However, looking at the limited success of the regional integration, transnational enterprises seem to be more important trend in international relations.⁴⁴

Leon Lindberg lays stress on decision-making aspect in the study of political integration. Political integration is defined by him as "the evolution over time of a collective decisionmaking system among nations". To build a causal theory of relationship between integration as a process and the overall integration phenomenon, one should "document the emergence of collective decisionmaking institutions and processes among given cluster of nations...."⁴⁵ In his article in 1970, Leon Lindberg sets forth the task of proposing an analytical paradigm derived from systems theory and decision-making theory. He argues that most neo-functionalist efforts have concentrated on one or the other dimension of integrative process, which, for him, is an interactive multi-dimensional process. Much of his analytical paradigm will now be discussed here, apart from his article in 1970, from his work with Scheingold on Europe.⁴⁶

Lindberg adopts ten variables to explain "the extent to which a functional group of

⁴⁴ J.E. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A comprehensive Survey, 3rd edn. (New York, 1990), p.446.

⁴⁵ Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", International Organization, vol.24, no.4, 1970, p.650.

⁴⁶ Lindberg and Scheingold, n.28.

nations engages in collective decisionmaking at any point in time." They are:

- functional scope of collective decision-making, or the extent to which it embraces a large number or just a few issue areas;
- the stage in decision-making at which collective processes are involved;
- the importance of collective decision-making in determining public allocations on important or only marginal issues;
- the extent to which demands, large or few in number, are articulated into the collective arena for action;
- the degree to which collective decision-makers have available resources that are adequate to their needs;
- the continuity and strength of leadership at the level of the collectivity;
- the extent to which the bargaining modalities of the system help maximize the individual interests of nations or enhance those of the collectivity;
- the effect of collective decisions on the behavior of individuals, whether large or only small numbers of people are affected;
- the degree to which collective decisions meet with compliance, apathy or outright opposition; and
- the distributive consequences of collective decisions, whether they are important or very marginal for constituent systems and for actors within them.⁴⁷

With these variables, Lindberg suggests that higher the scope or ranking on any of these variables, greater the political integration. An increase or decrease in scores over time indicates integration or disintegration accordingly.

⁴⁷ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, n.44, p.447.

In this basic model for change, Lindberg and Scheingold use systems-analysis to apply it to European Community Political System (See figure 2 at the end of this chapter) to assess the contrasting decision-making sequences leading to different outcome patterns, as applied by David Easton to political systems. For them, the integration system involving functional scope, supranational institutions, decision-making norms, can accentuate under certain circumstances, a decision-making process that can change political perceptions in a favourable direction vis-a-vis the regional-level decisions. Supranational institutions and decision-making norms fall under the broad category of institutional capacities.

The four mechanisms which accentuate a decision-making process are: (1) functional spill-over, where they agree with Haas that although there is linkage mechanism, there is no automaticity of the actor response to a functional relationship. (2) Log-rolling and side-payments, are strategies to overcome autonomy of functional contexts. These are ways in which actors are brought into growth-inducing coalitions, which results due to efforts that are made to "balance the interests of the multitude of political actors Log-rolling refers to bargaining exchanges within a given decision area^α while side-payments involves their extension to other...areas."⁴⁸ (3) The autonomy of functional contexts can be overcome by actor socialization which forms the third mechanism. (4) Feedback, i.e., the outputs of a system have impact on perceptions and attitudes. Through the outputs and feedback, the non participants are involved in the decision-making process.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp.118-19.

These mechanisms are conducive to the growth of a system; however, they are not automatic. They may also have built-in restraints to growth. Some circumstances have to be present to activate the mechanisms. These are: (1) Demand flow:- The growth of a system relies heavily on demand flow. These might also lead to a source of stress; but the worst thing to happen to any system is the drying up of demands. Lindberg and Scheingold talk of "who" and "what" makes demands on the system. The answer clearly is that national political actors and their perceptions make the demands. Besides demand flow, a community derives support from external resources. (2) Systemic support:- is one such source it refers to willingness of elites and mass public to use the system or consider its existence and operation as legitimate. The last circumstance is (3) Leadership availability:- Collective activity requires political leadership. The national leadership identifies and evaluates the problems, and articulates them at the central institutions' level. The supranational leadership, i.e., bureaucrats and elites at the central institutions' level process the demands made on the system.⁴⁹

Lindberg and Scheingold apply systems-analysis and decision-making approaches effectively to explain, what Lindberg calls, multidimensional integrative process. Lindberg has further developed multivariate measurement which is outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that in his specific models for change, he has categorized

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, pp.120-133.

alternative process models of forward-linkage, equilibrium, output-failure, spill-back and systems transformation models.⁵⁰

Reappraisal

Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out that the stagnation in the European Community since the 1960s has been due to the distinction between 'low' and 'high' politics. Diversity of national objectives, lack of unifying efforts under the umbrella of "European" issues, and diverse national conditions, have betrayed economic integration spillover into political integration. Automaticity of spillover cannot be pushed beyond a point. Again, de Gaulle's veto should not be seen as an achievement by a charismatic leader, but that the Community's interest "was not a cause more sacred to the... member states than the national interests of their fellow members."⁵¹

According to Lindberg and Scheingold, Hoffmann belongs to the school of sceptics which "raises the most fundamental questions about the nature and prospects of the European Community." Hoffmann has voiced his fears that a viable polity cannot be built

⁵⁰ For an incisive discussion on this, see *ibid.*, pp.134-40; and for multivariate measurement, see Lindberg, n.45.

⁵¹ Michael Hodges, "Integration Theory", in Trevor Taylor, ed., Approaches and Theory in International Relations (New York, 1978), p251.

upon the foundations of a welfare community, which is the central thesis of the neo-functionalists.⁵² Hoffmann's fears about stagnation in the European Community as a result of 'high' and 'low' politics dichotomy, are rooted in the experiences of the Community in the years following de Gaulle's veto. However, events in the 1980s and the 1990s have shown that the Community has emerged from its ephemeral stagnation. The steps towards European Political Union envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty are within the confines of inter-governmentalism. But the European Community has certainly induced a sense of cooperation among the Twelve.

It is said that Lindberg's work independently and with Scheingold is more concerned with methodology. Although he asserts that "quantification is possible, Lindberg's essay... provides little more than a taxonomy of variables that require measuring, and no properly specified model is produced let alone tested."⁵³ The Haas and Lindberg-Scheingold approaches cannot be refuted until the problem of measurement is overcome; " yet at the same time they do not provide much insight into every-day Community affairs.... Rather than tackle such questions of substance, the theorists of integration have been seeking refuge in methodology."⁵⁴

⁵² Lindberg and Scheingoldn. 28, p.260.

⁵³ Nina Heathcote, "Neofunctional Theories of Regional Integration" in AJR Groom, and Paul Taylor, eds., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (London, 1975), p.45.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, pp.47-50.

Haas disagrees with Joseph Nye that the concept of integration should be broken down into its constituent elements of social, economic and political integration. It would only make the task of finding a dependent variable more difficult. Also, the question remains as to how do these three (economic, social, and political) rangers relate to each other causally.⁵⁵ Although this proposition looks attractive, "one of the major problems is that of classifying each example of joint activity. Is trade an economic, social, or political phenomenon?"⁵⁶

The concept of incremental process has been subjected to critical appraisal. Harrison has pointed out that the experience of the European Community has shown that the neo-functionalist strategy of the Community "system" having "growth-inducing" properties has largely been inoperative. The 'process variables' have not operated in Europe, the way Haas, Lindberg and Etzioni predicted. Often Common Agricultural Policy has been cited as an example to support the "growth-inducing" process. Some scholars are of the opinion that it has been a "easy" sector to achieve agreement. It is not an adequate example; it is rather an isolated case. The agricultural policy is not a product

⁵⁵ See footnote in Haas, n.19, p.632.

⁵⁶ Hedges, n.53, p.252.

of spill-over "or of a generally developed potential for integration from other sources."⁵⁷

Harrison's criticism of the neo-functional strategy of the "growth-inducing" properties cannot be considered beyond a point. Since the Community is in a transitional phase to Economic Union, reliable predictions about the "growth-inducing" properties of the European Community cannot be made. The task is compounded by the absence of economic indicators which are outside the scope of this chapter. It can be modestly asserted that the European Community is moving forward with renewed vigour in the integration process and development. The resilience of the Community under the crisis situation during the 1960s and 1970s, and the aspiration of the non-EC member-states to join the Community, are pointers to the fact that the stakes are too high in remaining outside the EC-fold.

Both the 'system' elite (or the supranational elites) and the interest groups have failed to become the engine of integration process. The Community elites have not provided a Community view point, and the interest groups have not increasingly involved at the Community level. Expectations, pitched on the role of groups and regional institutions have been disappointed. There has been no strengthening of the will to achieve unification. Rather, it is argued that, "will, dominated by national sentiment, has

⁵⁷ Harrison, n.4, pp.88-89.

triumphed over the process."⁵⁸

Neo-functionalism attracted the scholarship as a result of behavioural revolution. While seeking refuge in methodological refinement, the neo-functionalists have ignored the authoritative element in the decision-making. Despite according an important role to the institutions in the theory, power-relations and the ability of the governments to take decisions for continuous goal attainment have been insufficiently considered.⁵⁹

Regarding the ineffectiveness of groups, Harrison says:

Yet another weakness in the neo-functionalist argument is that interest groups do not really... anywhere fulfil the role described for them in the pluralist apologia which is so important a part of the neo-functionalist thesis... they do not compromise and channel in any society, to any marked degree, the demands of their members.... They cannot, therefore, in any significant sense be looked to as possible creators of 'community' or 'significant carriers' of an ideology of integration.⁶⁰

Far from reformulating functionalism and injecting into it a liberal view of political conflict, neofunctionalism repeats the functionalist premise on underlying political consensus. Neo-functionalism presumes a consensus on the common welfare of the

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, pp.89-90.

⁶⁰ Harrison, "Neo-functionalism" in AJR Groom, and Paul Talyor, eds., Frameworks for International Cooperation (London, 1990), p.147.

Community among the political elites. Politics, therefore, is only concerned with the individual groups and conflict between them in pursuit of their particular/individual interest. The idea of politics and the presumption about underlying consensus in neo-functionalism, therefore, is not markedly different from functionalism.⁶¹

Conclusion

Neo-functionalism as a theory has reflected the preoccupation of American Political Science during the fifties and sixties. They have strived to arrive at a systematic, coherent theory of integration, to explicate it in terms of concepts and variables. "The drive is always toward the construction and empirical testing of hypotheses and toward the measurement of the extent of integration achieved." To this end, it has shown moderate success. However, its importance lies in breaking free from the traditional/classical approach embedded in law and history, in favour of political sociology. Also, rather than statics, study of dynamics of integration with the help of systems analysis and decision-making approach has assumed salience. "[T]his conceptual and analytical liberation has produced a new and diverse collection of candidates for independent and dependent variables, and a range of more or less testable propositions."


⁶¹ Pentland, n.1, p.111.

Although these efforts are not without limitations, they should not obscure the 'conceptual and explanatory sophistication which neo-functionalism has already added to the field of integration studies."⁶²

This chapter has discussed the dynamics of the neo-functionalist strategy mainly upto the 1970s. The developments during the 1980s and in the 1990s, both in the neo-functionalist strategy and the European Community will be considered in the next chapter.


⁶² *ibid.*, p.112.

Fig. 1: PLOT OF ALTERNATIVE ACTOR STRATEGIES⁶³



⁶³ Reproduced in original from Schmitter, n.29, p.845

Fig. 2: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLITICAL SYSTEM⁶⁴



⁶⁴ Reproduced in original from Luidberg and Scheingold, n.28, p.113

CHAPTER IV

**FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

This chapter examines the relationship between functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches, and the European Community. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) will be briefly discussed as it is the forerunner of the European Community in the integration process and it is considered to be an apt expression of the functionalist approach. The main thrust of this chapter is on the development of the European Community as an international organization, viewed through the functionalist and the neo-functionalist prism.

The process of integration started by the Schuman Plan set the ball rolling in the direction of the European integration. The process has since come a long way to assume the characteristic of European 'Union'. There have been a number of attempts to bring about lasting and stable system in every area of European unity -- whether it be economic union, political union or defence and security matters. Individual plans (Pleven Plan, Fouchet Plan), governmentally-inspired initiatives (creation of European Political Cooperation at the Hague Summit), and institutionally-sponsored designs (EP's Draft Treaty on European Union) -- "taken together, their common characteristic has been that of transforming the integration process by seeking methods or processes by which further invariably deeper as well as wider, integration could occur."¹

¹ Clive Archer and Fiona Butler, The European Community: Structure and Process (London, 1992), p.187.

The functionalist concept of sectoral integration and the neo-functionalist approach to regional integration have had strange association with the European integration. The functionalist approach preceded the efforts at building cooperation in Europe. Yet, the ECSC established in 1952 was the best exposition of the functionalist theory. Although the initial purpose for setting up the ECSC was to enlarge the coal, steel and iron market among the six (they were: France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg) to plan the productivity and redeployment of resources so as to ensure optimum utilization and to eliminate the trade barriers, the thinly veiled political objective could be discerned. By making French and German economies interdependent, the ECSC project was to preclude the possibility of another war between the two states. The idea was to make war between the two "not merely unthinkable but materially impossible."²

The ECSC was assumed to be the stepping stone in the direction of further European integration by the founding fathers. Certainly, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet³ were committed federalists. The ECSC was the beginning of a long and arduous path leading to European federation in distant future.

² Speech by Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950, cited in *ibid.*, p.11.

³ Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, announced a plan to integrate the German and French Coal and Steel industries which was further developed by Jean Monnet, a civil servant. This plan formed the basis of the ECSC.

In the years that followed, the ECSC has, however, taken functionalist theory beyond its original propositions. The ECSC in some sense has transcended the narrow confines of the theory in its actual functioning. Most authors, including David Mitrany, have argued that the ECSC embodies the functionalist theory of sectoral integration. However, Earn st B. Haas has pointed out that the ECSC in its method of functioning has "represented a reformulation of the functional logic."⁴ It has not remained immune from the political influence. Its' very establishment had a political motive underlying it.

The establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the development of the neo-functionalist theory have several concurrent developments. In fact, the EEC proved to be the empirical expression of the neo-functionalist theory. The neo-functionalists almost stated their propositions keeping in mind the future developments of the EEC. Hence, the fate of the theory had been tied to the success or failure of the Community. The initial years of the Community set apace euphoria about European integration, and the neo-functionalists were quick in jumping to conclusions about the outcome of this process. The role of interest groups in integration, the end-product in the form of political community, the decision-making process, the institutional arrangements etc. all these captured the imagination of the neo-functionalists. Their optimism was supported by the adjustments of economic barriers, creation of customs

⁴ Cited in Charles Pentland, International Theory and the European Integration (London, 1973), p.94 .

union and other such economic strides. In the late 1960s, much of the euphoria cooled down with the 'de Gaulle phenomenon', and a certain amount of modest rethinking about the basic premises was undertaken.⁵ The neo-functionalists self-consciously attempted to give a systematic theory of integration based on the EEC model. For neo-functionalists, EEC was, "in a sense, their academic expression ... neofunctionalism assumed the status of an unofficial ideology in Brussels."⁶

To examine the validity of application of the theories to the EEC, a discussion of the evolution of the Community in the light of theoretical premises follows.

Evolution of EEC

In the immediate post-War years, Europe was faced with the task of rebuilding the War-torn continent. The task seemed ominous due to crippling economy in most European states. There was also innate feeling of American pressure in the form of Marshall Plan and NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Efforts at building cooperation in Europe thus had several reasons: to rebuild European economy; to keep the communist influence at bay; and to build a strong Europe to playdown superpower influence. Europe thus had unusual historical conjunctions prompting integration there.

⁵ This point has been discussed in some detail in Chapter III above.

⁶ Pentland, n.4, p.132.

In 1956, the Foreign Ministers of the Six ECSC members adopted the Spaak Report, which recommended the creation of a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and a European Economic Community (EEC). The treaties establishing Euratom and EEC were signed in Rome in March 1957 and came into effect on 1 January 1958. The effort in the Rome Treaties was to create both new 'sectoral' community on the lines of ECSC in the form of the Euratom, and multiple but inter-related sectors in the EEC.

When the EEC had begun tariff cuts, the non-OEEC (Organization of European Economic Cooperation) members pondered over forming a separate trade agreement. The United Kingdom was inclined towards only a free trade area within the framework of inter-governmentalism. Hence, in 1960, the U.K., Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal agreed to form the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) aiming only at free trade area.

The Treaty of Rome set two goals for the member-states. One, to create a "Customs Union " by eliminating artificial barriers to, and discriminations in, trade i.e., to remove customs and tariff barriers among them and to formulate a common external tariff (CET) for non-members. This was to eventually lead to more comprehensive "economic union". Second, to work towards political union among the Six. Although the second aspect was not precisely expressed in the Treaty, some contours of this could be traced in the Preamble which referred to an "even closer union among the European peoples." The programme towards economic and political integration in the EEC has been

a phased one. The Rome Treaty set a twelve-year time limit for the attainment of customs union and did not put any deadline on the establishment of the economic union or political union. It was left for future decision-making. The customs union was completed a year ahead of the scheduled date (in 1969). The broader and comprehensive economic union has been envisaged in the Single European Act (SEA, 1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1991). It is a three-staged programme for the economic union. Nothing concretely was specified about the political union in the Rome Treaty. The idea was only alluded to as a signpost for the future developments. The founding fathers as well as other Europeans seemed to believe that in the process of realising the economic aims of the Treaty, political union would come about.⁷ The economic and political union envisaged in the SEA and in the Maastricht Treaty will be discussed a little later.

Functionalism and Neofunctionalism in Europe

The functionalists view the development of the European Community from the perspective of what Paul Taylor calls socio-psychological Community (based on values, beliefs, attitudes and loyalties). They do not stress on decision-making powers and the role of central institutions. The functionalists see the society as based on consensus. A stable society is based on homogeneity. For them, the transfer of sovereignty is not through the transfer of power to central institutions; the functional institutions attract the

⁷ *ibid.*, p.135.

wider loyalties of the citizens due to their competence and efficiency. The popular pressure forces the governments to transfer functions to the sectorally integrated institutions. The transfer of function by the governments to the community institutions manifests transfer of sovereignty. Integration is the process of consensus-building.

The functionalists emphasize that the central institutions enhance their power due to refocussed loyalties. The 'community method' operates in a circular fashion where, the efficiency of the central institutions strengthens the socio-psychological interest towards the community. The social groups influence the governments to increase the competence of the functional organization, i.e., to let them move into new areas of integration. Simultaneously, this might result in refocussing of loyalties by socio-psychological community towards the functional organization, and away from the national governments.⁸ Unless socio-psychological community is brought about, transfer of sovereignty cannot be effected. To create such a community, stress should be laid on increasing the capacity and efficiency of the central institutions.

Applied to the EEC, the major problem in the progress of integration, in view of functionalists, has been the Commission's inability to develop its reputation for efficiency, particularly during the 1970s. The socio-psychological activity remained more or less static. The functionalists also recognize that Commission in the EEC should remain independent of the Parliament so that the latter may not vote the Commissioners out of

⁸ Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (London, 1983), pp.15-16.

office. This was all the more imperative during 1970s when the socio-psychological community had not developed.⁹

The neo-functionalists consider two aspects while looking at the dynamics of integration of a political community; decision-making process and central institutions. They define politics in terms of pattern of conflict-resolution or decision-making. In analysing the EEC, they often talk of 'community method' of decision-making which involves the transfer of decision-making powers from the governments to the EC institutions. The extent of integration is measured by the quantitative assessment of the scope of decision-making by the Community institutions as also the style and imperatives of decision-making.

Neo-functionalists have widely employed the decision-making aspect, chief among them being Leon N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold. The processes of decision-making at the EEC involving all the institutions¹⁰ is termed by the neo-functionalists as the 'community method'. In this the role of the Commission representing the Community interest is highlighted. Emphasis is also laid on the power of the Commission to initiate all legislations. The Commission is cast in the mould of the motor of European

⁹ *ibid.*, p.18.

¹⁰ The institutional structure of EEC has the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice. Occasionally the heads of the government meet which is called the European Council. Added to this are various consultative committees.

integration. The Commission also has the power to initiate proposals for modifying the terms of the Treaty.

This emphasis on central institutions and their role is particularly reflective of the neo-functional premise that economic integration can lead to political integration only if it entails the development of central institutions, activating major social groups in the member states, and if the tasks assigned to these institutions are specific enough to spill over into new areas. Commenting on the EEC, Lindberg says that the Community decision-making is a combination of shared and delegated policy-making. To him, "the Treaty of Rome in these terms... has a wide potential for political integration."¹¹

For Lindberg and Scheingold, political integration denotes a system where authoritative decisions are made for the Community as a whole; whether such decisions are in economic, military or social sphere is immaterial. The dynamics of integrative process lies in the development of links between the Community and its members. In their opinion:

the Community institutions have catalyzed much political activity by simply providing an arena in which meaningful questions are discussed or decided. Interest groups... are attracted to Brussels and Luxembourg simply because values are being allocated or because decisions are being made which affect the allocation of values by national governments.¹²

¹¹ Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, 1963), p.45.

¹² Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970) p.32.

The Community has embroiled the members in a symbiotic decision-making relationship. They have further attempted to measure the intensity of the Community by quantifying the locus of decision-making on a scale. Beginning from all policy decisions made by national processes denoting low integration, they move on to all policy decisions made by the Community processes symbolising high integration (see the figure below):

A SCALE OF THE LOCUS OF DECISION-MAKING¹³

LOW INTEGRATION	
1. All policy decisions by national processes	
2. Only the beginnings of Community decision processes	
3. Policy decisions in both but national activity	predominates
4. Policy decisions in both but Community activity	predominates
5. All policy decisions by joint Community processes	
HIGH INTEGRATION	

They also identified a list of decision-making areas, such as external relations functions (including military -security, diplomacy and commercial relations with other countries), political-constitutional functions, social-cultural functions, and economic functions. These areas were commensurate with the scope of decision-making in the Community. Using the scale of locus decision-making (represented in figure above) in each of the areas, they identified that economic functions ranked higher than other functions, and that over the years most functions (except a few like military-security area) were moving towards high integration.¹⁴

¹³ *ibid.*, p.69.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp.70-73.

Another dimension of the decision-making is the institutional capacity. The growth of Community is seen by them as dependent on the capacity of the Community "for producing collective decisions". In making these decisions, the Community influences (what they term a Community's "constituency") interest groups, elites, industrialists, and all such groups which are directly affected by the changed economic conditions. "By and large, such groups and elites have accepted the Community as a fait accompli and as a relevant arena in which to pursue their economic and political goals." [Emphasis in original]¹⁵ Thus, increases in scope and institutional capacity dimensions are used by Lindberg and Scheingold to denote system growth, which is commensurate with political integration. And, in their opinion, the Community has shown steady growth in both scope and intensity.¹⁶

Some other scholars are also of the opinion that decision-making in the European Community has been highly adaptive and has successfully overcome many crises. Despite the fact that the Community has been trodding an uneven path, the decision-making system has survived the occasional roadblocks.

Decision formation in the Community has reflected an adaptability responding to different times and circumstances. The process of decisionmaking has grown in capacity, complexity and sophistication.... The actual EC decisional performance record indicates both the expansion of cooperative initiatives and the long range

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.78.

¹⁶ For an incisive discussion on this, see *ibid.*, pp. 64-100.

increase in joint action. ... decisionmaking in the European Communities, whatever its changing nature, has been highly adaptive overtime....¹⁷

The neo-functionalist and federalist ideas meet at the importance they place on the common institutions. However, federalists envisage strong institutions in the constitution itself whereas, neo-functionalists stress the spillover process which grants more powers to central institutions to meet the new demands made on it. The central institutions may not be powerful initially but the demand for the same grows as the functions performed by them are enhanced. Using his 'system-elite' concept and the utilitarian, coercive power it may have, Amitai Etzioni observes that in the EEC, "the center of utilitarian power that emerged was located largely in a system-elite, in part is the supranational Economic Commission and in part in the Community-oriented though intergovernmental, Council of Ministers."¹⁸

Harrison feels that the neo-functionalists, while conferring on the central institutions the primary responsibility of steering the integration process forward, have paid insufficient attention to the minimum necessary conditions. Although Joseph Nye talks of 'resources and jurisdiction' and Etzioni coins the term 'system-elite', Harrison says they

¹⁷ Glenda Rosenthal and Donald Puchala, "Decisional Systems, Adaptiveness, and European Decisionmaking", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.440, November 1978, pp.54-55.

¹⁸ Cited in R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration (London 1974), p.210.

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are best as starting points; they have little explanatory value. Looking at the EC's own experience after twenty years, he felt that the Commission had declined in its value, Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) had become Commission's rival, and that the Council of Ministers was bound by unanimity.¹⁹

Regarding the problem of de Gaulle's much orchestrated veto, the neo-functionalists did say that it was a test for the central institutions and the Community as a whole. In 1966, Lindberg observed that the community was undergoing a stress. The stress, according to him, was "what can be a source of persistent tension in all political systems, and especially in incipient systems, i.e., the struggle over the form and the content of the structures and procedures responsible for the making of authoritative decisions."²⁰ Yet, he firmly held to the neofunctionalist idea, particularly in view of the de Gaulle phenomenon, that "the strategies and responses of the major actors do not contradict or invalidate theories of spillover or analyses of the integration process but that they represent, in a perhaps perverse sense, striking demonstration of the validity."²¹ To him, "the institutional system of the Community appears to have survived the crisis more or less intact."²² The crisis of the French withdrawal was later resolved by what came to be

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p.212-14.

²⁰ Leon N. Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System", International Organization (Boston, Mass), vol.20, no.2, 1966, p.234.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² *ibid.*, p.262.

known as the Luxembourg Compromise²³ in 1966.

It is said that the 1965 package proposals of the Commission linking finance of the agricultural market with the transfer of revenues to the Commission, giving the Commission independent source of income and strength seemed to be a reassertion of neo-functionalism thesis. The Central institutions attempted to assume more powers independent of member states' influence. In denouncing the de Gaulle phenomenon, the theorists were perhaps being too impatient to accept slow progress in the integration process. The delay in realising majority voting in the Council due to veto did not mean that the principle had been abandoned altogether. It should be stressed that majority voting was a goal envisaged in the Rome Treaty which reflected the intention of the member states to achieve higher level of integration over the years. It is widely accepted by the neo-functionalism scholars that the de Gaulle phenomenon was an exception rather than rule.²⁴

Majority voting has now been accepted in the SEA, 1987. Even sceptics like Hoffmann now agree that in institutional terms, the abandonment of Luxembourg Compromise by the majority voting agreed to in the SEA signifies, "the dramatic revival

²³ The Luxembourg Compromise agreed to protect a state's "very important" interests against an adverse majority voting. This ended the six-month French withdrawal from the Council. French insisted that negotiations would continue as long as unanimity prevailed. Thus, majority voting in the Council in the third phase beginning from 1 January 1966 as stipulated in the Rome Treaty was not introduced.

²⁴ Harrison, n.18, p.224.

of a largely supranational decision-making style".²⁵ Until 1970s, all the strides towards integration taken by the EEC were, what John Pinder calls, 'negative integration', i.e., elimination of obstacles to trade and to the free movement of goods between the member states.²⁶ Only in the 1980s has there begun some thought on 'positive integration', i.e., long-term planning, bringing about political union, giving more powers to the Community institutions.

The Maastricht Treaty (it will be discussed a little later) has restored much of the stature of the central institutions. It has certainly put them back on the rails. The European Parliament has been made more responsible, majority decision in the Council has been agreed to, and the Commission has again occupied the centre stage as a useful mediator and conciliator in EC negotiations.

After discussing functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches, it can be said that the interest groups have considerably contributed to the European integration process. While some scholars say that interest groups have not been able to coordinate their positions on major policy issues, there are others who disagree with it. Homogeneity of group activity is particularly marked in the European Parliament (EP). The majority of

²⁵ Robert O. Keohane, and Stanley Hoffmann, "Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change" in William Wallace, ed., The Dynamics of European Integration (London and New York, 1990), p.280.

²⁶ John Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC", World Today (London), vol.24, 1968, pp.90-91.

the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) are members of main political party groups and Community-level platforms such as the Socialists, the Christian Democrats represented by the European People's Party (EPP), and other various liberal parties. Transnational parties of this kind, particularly EPP and Confederation of Socialist Parties, have been instrumental in mobilising voters for the 1979 direct elections to the EP.²⁷ In recent years, the Greens have been able to evolve a semblance of common stand reflecting electoral unity. In the EP and elsewhere, there has been a consistent rise in 'Green' parties, ecology and conservation issues. There has been a politicisation of environmental issues in EP due to the presence of 'Green' parties which have formed the Rainbow Group in the EP.²⁸ The transnational corporation and interest groups in the field of agriculture have also been effective in coordinating their interests.

Moreover, there has been increasing engrenage among the governmental elite. There has been a striking change in the character of the Council of Ministers. It has now become a European organ rather than merely representing national interests. As a result there is upgrading of the common interests. The Council and the Committee of

²⁷ Juliet Lodge, "The European Parliament" in Juliet Lodge, ed., Institutions and Policies of the European Community (London, 1983), pp.27-28.

²⁸ idem., "The European Parliament - From 'Assembly' to Co-legislature : Changing the Institutional Dynamics" in Juliet Lodge, ed., The EC and the Challenge of the Future (London, 1989), p.319.

Permanent Representatives (COREPER) have frequent meetings which promotes increased interaction. All this has an important bearing on the attitudinal change and orientation of the elite.²⁹

European Community and Political Integration

The concept of political integration or political union involves formulating of common foreign and defence policies^{which} are considered to be highly contentious issues falling under what Stanley Hoffmann calls 'high politics'. The national governments jealously guard their independence in decision-making in these areas. The drifting character of national government in political sphere is also due to the fact that the results are not easily foreseeable or quantifiable.

The neo-functionalists begin their premise with economic and sectoral integration eventually culminating in political integration. They differentiate between the process and the end-product. Haas referred to integration as a process leading to the terminal condition called political community³⁰. Political integration is expected to spillover from the less contentious^u economic and/or functional sphere. In 1970, Haas abandoned the

²⁹ Stanley Henig, "The European Community's Bicephalous Political Authority : Council of Ministers - Commission Relations" in Lodge, ed., n.27, p.17.

³⁰ E.B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", International Organization, vol.15, 1961, p.366.

deterministic terminal condition of political community in favour of the concept of 'authority-legitimacy-transfer'.³¹

The European Community's progress towards political integration has been intermittent. There have been several efforts at accomplishing political integration, but it has proved to be a contentious issue. The national governments have been weary of enhancing the role of central institutions: rather they have shown inclination towards intergovernmentalism in the sphere.

The fate of the post-War Europe was inextricably tied with the United States. Europe had sought the help of the United States to overthrow Nazi menace during the War. As a result, the United States' presence in the European defence scheme was inevitable. Large American contingents were present in Europe to defend the continent. As a result of these factors, the United States showed increasing interest in political and defence cooperation in Europe. In 1948, Britain, France and the three Benelux countries - Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg - signed Brussels Treaty which, besides promising economic and political cooperation, provided defence guarantee for fifty years. The significance of Brussels Treaty lay in the signals sent to the United States and Canada.

³¹ Idem., "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising", International Organization, vol.24, no.4, Autumn 1970.

The Brussels Treaty members, the United States, Canada and states like Iceland, Denmark and Norway later negotiated a defence pact which came to be known as the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), which came into ^{or}face in August 1949.³²

Since the formation of NATO, the European defence cooperation has centered around it. Even after the European Community was established, there have been no significant strides towards European defence cooperation sans the United States or NATO. Any consideration of common security and defence policy has had to reckon with it. In the subsequent years, with the help of NATO the United States has been able to keep at bay its own fears of ^{an}closed European market (fortress Europe).

Several efforts were made by groups and associations to forge political unity in Europe, significant of them being the United Europe Movement which later influenced the formation of the Council of Europe in 1949. Yet, it could not be successful as it was an intergovernmental organization lacking real powers. Hence, all future attempts at political cooperation were done within the framework of the EC.

When the question of forming unified European army and the contribution of each of the member states came up, a proposal for the European Defence Community (EDC) regulated by a European Political Community (EPC) was put forward (known as Pleven Plan).

³² Archer, n.1, p.9.

The Plan fell through and a compromise solution was reached by enlarging Brussels Treaty, forming a new Western European Union (WEU) in 1955.³³

During the period of detente, efforts were made to institutionalise East-West cooperation. As a result, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE) was established in 1972. With renewed New Cold War, the CSCE temporarily moved to the backstage in early 1980s. However, new leadership in the Soviet Union revitalised CSCE, which helped to sign INF Treaty (intermediate range clear forces) in 1987. In the post-Cold War and post-Communist Europe, CSCE has found new areas of operation, such as monitoring human rights in Europe.

The Single European Act and the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty)

Now we consider the significant changes that are envisaged in the European integration through the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. The imminent Economic Union has radically changed the entire face of the EEC. The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty were meant to reform the Treaty of Rome. The EEC (it has been renamed as European Community now) has relaunched itself with the European Union Treaty. The new European Union consists of the three European Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euratom),

³³ *ibid.*, p.13.

the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and the inter governmental cooperation in justice and home affairs. While discussing the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, we will broadly discuss three contours of reforms in European integration: the institutional reforms, the economic and monetary union, and the more detached European Political Cooperation.

The proposals for Political Union put forward by the Commission in 1990 formed the basis of Maastricht Treaty. In this Treaty, the appointment of the Commissioners is a two-tier process wherein, the member states appoint the Commissioners with unanimous decision, but in consultation with the European Parliament. The Commission's term of office has been extended to five years from the current four-year term. This is expected to coincide with the term of the European Parliament. The total number of Commissioners at the moment is seventeen. Soon, the review of the composition of the Commission would be undertaken.³⁴

Regarding the Commission's functions, its right to initiate all legislation has been undermined by the codecision process.³⁵ It has also undermined the Council of

³⁴ Jereny Bradshaw, "Institutional Reform in the European Community beyond Maastricht", The Economist Intelligence Unit European Trends, no.4, 1991, pp.84-85.

³⁵ According to Article 189b, when the European Parliament sends its opinion on a draft proposal to the Council and Council gives its common position on it by a qualified majority, the EP may accept the proposal. If the EP rejects the council's position by an absolute majority, the Council will have to convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee.

Ministers' upperhand in decision-making process. This has made the Parliament a stronger body. However, the Commission's role has been expanded in the new areas of health, education, culture and transnational network.

The Council of Ministers has moved towards majority/qualified voting in its decision-making. "[I]t will lead to stronger, more effective legislation that does not have to reflect the lowest common denominator of agreement between member states."³⁶

The European Parliament has been made stronger. With the introduction of codecision process the EP now has more than mere consultative role in the legislation process.

On the whole, however, one cannot fully assess the EP's powers and functions merely by assessing the contents of the treaties; the ways in which the Parliament has sought to extend its role in the Community decision-making process... are perhaps more politically significant than the language of the treaties.³⁷

The attempts towards building a lasting and stable economic and monetary union (EMU) have been underway for the past twenty years or more. The 'snake in the tunnel system' was one where the EC currencies were allowed to fluctuate against each other by plus or minus 2.25 per cent margin within the area of again plus or minus 2.25 per cent

³⁶ Bradshaw, n.34, p.87.

³⁷ Archer, n.1, p.34.

vis-a-vis US dollar. Thus, the US dollar margin was the 'tunnel' within which the 'snake' of EC currencies could fluctuate. This was to enable the central banks to intervene in crises.³⁸ The 'snake in the tunnel' system and the subsequent European Monetary System (EMS) were not successful. Against this back drop of quest for EMU and unsuccessful attempts in the past, the agenda for the Inter-governmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union was set.

The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty are supposed to lead the EC towards EMU and ECU. The term economic and monetary union means common fiscal and monetary policy, single currency and exchange rate with a central bank at the supranational level. The Treaty of Rome envisaged the creation of a customs union and common market but left the question of economic union for the future years. The ball was set rolling for the EMU in 1988 when the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, was asked to submit a plan for EMU. The Delors^{TS} Report of 1989 envisaged a three-stage EMU and was adopted at Maastricht. The three-stages are:

Between now and 1994 [Phase I] EMU was to strengthen the fixed-exchange-rate parity of currencies through the exchange-rate mechanism. Phase II would promote the "convergence" of monetary and fiscal policy among the EC-12, so that Phase III could establish by 1999 a central bank and a joint currency, a modified version of today's European Currency Union (ECU).³⁹

³⁸ *ibid.*, p.80.

³⁹ Walter Goldstein, "Europe After Maastricht", *Foreign Affairs* (Washington D.C.) vol.71, no.5. 1992-93, p.119.

The Maastricht Treaty has, more or less, followed the suggestions of Delors Report. The Eurofed (European Central Bank) is expected to determine exchange rate with the non-Union currencies and formulate the European monetary policy. Finally, it provides for convening a conference of member states to review and reform the Treaty provisions in 1996.⁴⁰

The SEA culminated the process of formalising the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which had found base in 1973. The SEA has linked the EC and the EPC together in common provisions, to move together towards forging European unity. However, EPC has still remained within the framework of intergovernmentalism. Its institutional framework involves the European Council (heads of the state or government of the member states); at least four meetings of the foreign ministers of the member countries and a member of the European Commission; Presidency of the EC and EPC is common; and a Political Committee of the senior civil servants of the member states. The EC institutions have marginal role to play in the EPC. The EC and the EPC have remained separate but are parallel. The aim of the EPC is to implement "a European foreign policy" and play an active role in the security matters, albeit not at par with the defence forums such as NATO, WEU and the CSCE.

⁴⁰ Archer, n.1, pp.86-89.

Assessment

A pertinent question raised by scholars now is that what kind of Europe is emerging in the 1990s? There can be no definite answer to this question. The 1992 deadline to establish Single Market has been extended to enable the British and the Danes to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. The French referendum itself has come through with an insignificant margin. Both, supporters and sceptics of the European Union are being cautious in rushing to conclusions. Attempts to integrate Europe are embedded in the chequered history of the continent. The process of integration itself, therefore, has been rough and spasmodic. A definite form of the forthcoming shape of Europe is difficult to determine.

However, it is widely accepted that the EC bears a semblance of international organization. After 1992, it is viewed as a "very advanced international organization in institutional terms."⁴¹ While the EC is an advanced international organization, it has not yet reached, in terms of federalist approach, a supranational level of federation. It is ahead of intergovernmentalism and short of federal state: it is partly both and a complex mixture of the two. Its supranationality springs from the primacy of EC law over the law of the member states, and the applicability of EC law directly over the citizens of the member states.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.188.

John Pinder tries to moot a 'neo-federalist' idea wherein the EC would be somewhere between intergovernmentalism and a full fledged federal state. Federalists believe in creating federal state by changing constitution; Pinder talks of "a process with both a federal aim and steps towards it." In following gradual step-by-step approach towards federal state, Pinder enters the arena of neo-functionalists.⁴²

According to the neo-functionalist theory, the 1992 initiative marks a significant "integrationist impulse that is likely to strengthen the supranational institutions and responsibilities of the Community."⁴³ Some scholars feel that the 1992 initiative is a validation of the neo-functionalist theory. They argue that the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty, and the strengthening of the central institutions "represent a return to the Community's early course of incremental, step-by-step institution building a la Monnet."⁴⁴ However, in the ultimate analysis, the 1992 Single Market initiative has been:

...the product of complex interaction between forces and actors that, self-consciously or otherwise, moved the community toward greater economic and political integration, on the one hand, and, on the other, forces and actors that reflected the diverse national interests of the member states of the Community and the intergovernmental politics among those states.⁴⁵

⁴² *ibid.*, pp.189-91.

⁴³ David R. Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences" in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (Washington D.C., 1992), p.25.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p.26.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.30.

It is said that "what the EC-European Union is or becomes will depend... on a combination of internal politics and external events."⁴⁶ Same is the case with "economic fortress." Given the present economic interdependence, the EC is unlikely to become more protectionist. The EC has to reckon with Japan and the United States in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT. An inward looking EC will encounter stiff resistance from the US, for the latter's interest in exporting its goods lies in the EC market.

Institutionally speaking, each enlargement has created new problems and challenges to the EC. The institutional developments have not kept pace with the challenges. It can be said with a modicum of certainty that the impending enlargements will have new claims upon the institutional system. One such problem will be of decision-making process. With more members, the Community will have difficult time in arriving at consensus. It is for the institutional system to deliver the goods efficiently -- if the optimism about European Unity is to be sustained.

But the challenges will be greater if the enlargement involves the Eastern European States. These states do not satisfy any of the attributes of liberal democracy practised by their Western counterparts. The neo-functionalist premise of background conditions (plurality, modernisation, industrialised states) is not applicable to the aspiring East European states. In view of their economic situation, the policies of the EC will have to be reallocative. How far the advanced nations are willing to do this is yet to be seen.

⁴⁶ Archer, n.1, p.192.

The new members who "decide to join an organization which has already become so integrated must accept a degree of constraint not found outside of a formally constituted federation. Joining the post-1992 Community will require a far greater commitment to political and economic integration than joining the pre-1992 Community did."⁴⁷ However, the Community has been able to draw more aspiring states towards it. It is a pointer to the advantages tagged on to being part of the Community as also the high stakes of remaining outside it.

The common defence policy still remains an open-ended question. Will the security aspect become part of the Community or will it remain outside the Treaty of Rome? The European court of Justice has been excluded from this aspect all together. These are the set of questions that evade any successful forecast on the future.

The social policy has given a social dimension to the European Community. The debate is primarily between Britain and other EC members. Britain has not accepted the full implications of the social policy. The conservatives in Britain have been uneasy of the social chapter and its consequences on labour laws and labour working conditions. Other EC member states, largely ruled by Socialists or Christian Democrats have fewer reservations about the policy. The Social Policy is expected to give the European Community, a "human face". Since Britain has not accepted social policy, "opt out"

⁴⁷ Alberta M. Sbragia, "Introduction" in Sbragia, ed., n.43, p.15.

clause has been incorporated. The eleven members of the European Community have gone ahead with the Social Policy. As a last minute compromise at the Maastricht, the social chapter has been separated from the main body of the text by placing it in a separate Protocol, to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Treaty without accepting the Social Policy. The eleven members can make use of EC institutions to formulate social policies but they will not form part of EC laws.

The social policy and the United Kingdom's "opt out" has ushered in a new phenomenon of "agreement to disagree" in the European Community. This is in sharp contrast to the different set of calculation member-states had when the EC was established. Each government viewed the long-term economic and political benefits of remaining within the Community fold. This meticulous calculation emanated from an understanding of "agreement to agree", "perhaps even to the extent of specifying deadlines and tasks to be met."⁴⁸ It is premature to say whether this new phenomenon has put the Community on a welcome trajectory or it is a step in the reverse direction.

⁴⁸ Pentland, n.4, p.135.

CONCLUSIONS

Regional integration and cooperation has assumed great significance in recent years. Some theoretical approaches to the development of regional integration have been evolved. Of these, neo-functionalism particularly lays emphasis on regional integration. Functionalism and neo-functionalism have been considered important as theoretical underpinnings of growth of regionalism and development of international organization.

The main purpose of the formation of international organization has been to maintain peace, security, order and development (economic, social and cultural). International organization as an epitome of general concern towards international co-operation has become an accepted phenomenon in the twentieth century. Organizing for peace, co-operation and development as an imperative of the international community has come to stay.

International organizations perform variety of functions including political and non-political ones. However, at the core of these multifarious functions lies the basic objective of promoting and sustaining peace, security and development at all levels, be it local, regional, or international. During the inter-War period and prior to it, the main focus of international organizations had been on peace and security issues. Less attention was paid initially towards developmental and reconstructional issues, which are considered vital in creating pre-requisite conditions for a stable and peaceful world, although the League of Nations in its later years devoted substantial attention to economic and social issues.

However, the magnitude of the devastation caused by the Second World War provided a fillip to the emergence of international organizations and institutions in the sphere of economic development and reconstruction, besides creating organizations for peace and security. The establishment of Bretton Woods institutions at the global level and the EEC at the regional level is a pointer towards this trend.

To analyse the proliferation of international organization and diversification of its functions since the Second World War, several theoretical approaches were evolved. The idealist approach, as represented in the 'peace through law' approach gave primacy to the role of international law in maintaining international order. Its basic assumptions were the progressive nature of human history and the harmony of 'true' national interests. This theory found increasing acceptability during the inter-War period. However, the outbreak of the Second World War negated its fundamental assumptions about the progressive nature of the human history and the harmonization of the national interests. Also, the Second World War reflected the inadequacy of the then existing international legal system in maintaining peace and order.

The federalist approach envisages a supranational community with a formal constitution. It seeks to confront political power directly to bring about the political community. The underlying assumption is that the nation-state system is incapable of carrying out certain tasks which are crucial to the well-being of mankind. In this respect, it comes closer to the functionalist premise. However, the federalist theory has not been favoured by the statesmen. The international community has not witnessed the political

will required by the federalist theory to realize political integration. The politicians are indisposed to enter into new political arrangements that demand surrendering of political power and sovereignty.

The realist theory views international organization as an embodiment of struggle for power in the international relations. All the attempts at building international organizations, be it the Holy Alliance, the League of Nations or the United Nations, have exemplified the then prevailing power equations. The dominant states have secured a privileged position in the power structure of these organizations. The realist theory, therefore, believes that international organization manifests mutually hostile policies and attitudes of the sovereign nation-states. All nations determine their policies in international organizations by their national interests.

The realist theory pays insufficient attention to the developmental issues and improving the conditions of life. Its entire attention is focussed on the nation-state as an actor in the international relations. Individual as the subject and object of international community is not given due importance. Precisely these inadequacies of the realist theory prompted a new thinking among intellectuals on welfare issues. This new thinking came to be known as the functionalist approach.

Functionalist approach, as developed by David Mitrany, attempts to explain the need for economic and welfare organizations to promote conditions for peace. Functionalists tried to explain the causes of war before providing a panacea for the same.

They consider war as a disease of global society resulting from grave deficiencies in economic and social conditions. Poverty drives the countries to wage war, to conquer new places. War is also caused by the institutional inadequacy of the state system in meeting the welfare needs. State system cannot effectively perform the welfare functions, such as banking. These functions should be therefore taken up by the welfare functional organizations at the international level. States, accepting their inability to perform such roles, are expected to give up their responsibilities to the international organizations. Moreover, War is also seen as a product of certain attitudes precipitated by the state-system. The arbitrary national boundaries impose a check on intermingling of peoples and favourable attitudes toward one another. Functional organization, therefore, is a move towards eliminating causes of war rather than dealing with it post facto.

Functionalists envisage international organizations based on functions which are welfare-oriented. Functional organizations focus on positive aspect of peace-making through developmental functions. This approach recognises the non-political character of certain functions such as, telecommunications, postal service, civil aviation, etc., and tries to forge cooperation with minimal political interference. Through this an effort is made to limit the sovereignty and state interference in the welfare domain. Stress is also laid on efficiency and effectiveness of functional organizations by having limited and specific functions as the basis of cooperation. By virtue of this, the theory envisages attitudinal change in favour of cooperation at the societal level, what is called as developing 'habits of cooperation'. These positive attitudes help people to look beyond the war as a means of resolving conflicts and settling the differences.

The inadequacy of functionalism lay in its central thesis about the causes of war. It is said that war is not a product of unsatisfactory economic and social conditions. There is no relation between economic backwardness and aggressiveness. Often affluent nations have resorted to warfare. Moreover, functionalism took insufficient cognisance of the need for political initiative in bringing about cooperation. It does not take an adequate account of power relationships. Moreover, the functionalist strategy is a long term programme spanning over decades. Functionalists do not consider time as a constraint to achieve their goals. They anticipate and wait for the public pressure in favour of integration, and for the actual process of spillover to take place. Here lies the major weakness. Statesmen and politicians loath to support distant and unclear objectives. For, they calculate the perceived gains in political terms in the short run.

Neo-functional approach, being an offshoot of functionalism, recognises latter's inadequacies in part. As an improvisation upon functionalist approach, neo-functionalism restores political dimension to integration process. Neo-functional theory also talks of sectoral or functional integration. Integration is brought about by the interaction of various political forces, such as interest groups and pressure groups. In this, the concept of spillover plays an important role. That is, integration in one area necessitates integration in other areas too. Thus, there will be a process of progressive integration weaving a complex web of interdependence.

Central institutions and decision-making system assume importance in neo-functional approach. The central institutions play not merely "passive but a promotional

role" in the integration process. Stress on central institutions and decision-making signifies the salience of political aspect. Although primacy of economic functions to effective integration is stressed, political will is given due recognition. The regional political integration emanates from economic integration. That is, integration is expected to spillover from 'low' and less contested economic sphere to 'high' and contentions political (including military, security) sphere.

Neo-functionalism focusses on regional integration. It believes that socio-cultural homogeneity and geographical contiguity at the regional level helps in creating closer and cohesive integration. It is not averse to global integration; only the emphasis is more on regional integration. Hence, neo-functionalism is often referred to as regional integration theory.

However, Stanley Hoffmann distinguishes between 'high' and 'low' politics. By this, he implies that there is a practical limit to the integration process. Automaticity of spillover from economic sphere to political sphere has been refuted by scholars. Military and security sectors are considered to be highly segregated and autonomous. These sectors are perceived as essential pre-requisites of national independence, and as forms of international expression. Therefore, the inevitability of spillover can't be pushed beyond a certain point.

Neo-functionalists formulated their theoretical premises on the basis of the experience of the EEC (European Economic Community). The main spring of support for

neo-functionalism came from the EEC. This theory was not an abstract entity; rather it was embedded in the empirical essence of the EEC and has later developed as an independent theoretical prognosis. It is essential to study neo-functionalism to analyse the development of the EEC as an international organization. The EEC symbolises an experiment in economic integration. It has been successful in exhibiting itself as a model in this regard. Both academicians and visionaries of Europe have been overwhelmed by this development in international cooperation.

Although functionalism can help us to understand the integration process in Europe, it should be stressed that David Mitrany did not envisage the development of a supranational state, something of the kind of United States of Europe. Besides, the supranational institutions assumed the role for functional integration and not for political integration, or one that would largely replace the national governments. Mitrany's scheme of things aimed at global integration on functional lines, albeit not opposed to regional integration; but it was supposed to be only a beginning for the global integration. Neo-functionalism lays stress on the role of governments, central institutions, recognizing the political aspect in integration process. Over the years, Europe has borne out the neo-functionalist thesis in part. Largely speaking, the European integration process has defied being strictly subjected to the confines and limitations of any one theory. The process has outlived the theory.

The development of the EEC as an international organization has followed an uneven trajectory. In the initial years, it set apace euphoria about regional integration.

From its inception in 1958, until mid-1960s, the European integration process was viewed as a success story, to the extent that the phased completion of the Rome Treaty was accepted as given. The completion of the customs union ahead of time confirmed the optimism. But the slow progress of the process in the 1970s was described as 'Europaralysis', which sparked off 'Europessimism'. The reasons for this were manifold- the nationalistic attitude of de Gaulle, the enlargement of the Community to include new members which brought in its own bag of problems, and the recession of the 1970s prompted by the increase in the oil prices. In the 1980s the Community has slowly recovered its foothold and the Community-orientation has lent it a new lease of life. Since the late 1980s, the progress of integration has proved the sceptics wrong. The strides taken by the EEC in the new integrative areas are reflective of closer integration - to the extent that it has prompted a similar exercise in the NAFTA. European integration as envisaged in the Single European Act (SEA) and Maastricht Treaty has developed into a complex web of institutions and interactions.

The evolution of international organization under the EEC embodies an important possibility of growth of international organization at regional level wherein the member states delegate the decision-making and implementation powers to the supranational institutions in certain spheres of state activity. Moreover, it also envisages increasing abdication of sovereignty voluntarily to achieve economic and political union. The EEC also reflects how the supranational institutions like the Commission and the European visionaries like Jean Monnet, Alterio Spinelli and Jacques Delors can further the integration process. The Commission has always acted as a European body representing

European interests. In carrying out its responsibility of implementing the Rome Treaty provisions, the Commission has acted as the prime mover of the integration process.

The EEC in the 1990s has exemplified the divergent trends of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. In the economic sphere, the programme for economic union bears a semblance of supranationalism whereas, in the political sphere, political integration is being realised within the confines of intergovernmentalism. The European integration process in the 1990s, is an amalgamation of these ambivalent characteristics of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Other things apart, it is widely accepted therefore that the EC in the 1990s is a "very advanced international organization in institutional terms".

The Maastricht Treaty is however undergoing initial teething troubles. What form the EEC will take after the ratification of Single Market Treaty can't be decisively predicted. The problems encountered in the ratification process - particularly initial hurdle in the Danish referendum, (It has now come through in a second vote by 57.1 percent in favour of the Treaty), the French vote by an insignificant margin, and Britain's "opt out" of social policy - testify to the hurdles in its decisive outcome. However, it can be said with a modicum of certainty that the final shape of the European Community is dependent on the international environment and the political will of the member states of the Community. Much of it is also rooted in the chequered history of the continent in the twentieth century.

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3075