

# **THE CHANGING US POLICY TOWARDS INDIA IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA**

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CERTIFICATE

This Dissertation entitled "THE CHANGING US POLICY TOWARDS INDIA IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA" by MR. RAMENDRANATH BISWAS for the Degree of Master of Philosophy is an original work and has not been previously submitted for any other Degree of this University or of any other University.

We recommend this Dissertation to be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

PROF. M. L. SONDHI  
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## PREFACE

The Cold War has ended and the whole world is going through a transitional period. Today there is no Soviet Union. The international system has been changed from a bipolar world to a multipolar world with the United States as the predominant world power. Excepts the two World Wars, The end of Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union are the most important events in the World Politics. It has influenced and continuously influencing every action and reaction of the international politics. Being the most popular democracy in the world, India's relations with other countries, especially with United States, is not out of this far reaching upheaval in the global system.

In this context, I have tried my best to understand the changing mood of the American policy makers towards South Asia and notably to India. The very constraint of Indo-US relations, i.e. the containment of Communism pursued by the United States since the World War II and India's friendship with the Soviet Union, has ended. Now it is quite expectable that these two giant democracies will come close to each other. But different perceptions of their respectable positions in the world and their assumed role in

the international politics became the major hurdles in making a good relationship between these two countries. When continuous pressure on India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to open its market are on, the recent US policy not to allow India to develop missile technology and forcing Russia to cancel the Cryogenic rocket engine deal, has revealed the US intention in a post Cold War World where nobody will challenge the dominance of the United States. My effort in this work is to understand the changing perceptions of the United States about India and the major constraints which still can prevent the two countries to workout a friendly relations.

Chapter one of the present dissertation deals with the international change in general and it shows how the whole world has come up with this change. In the second chapter I have dealt with the Indo-US relations in the Cold War period, where a detail description has been given on the various phases of Indo-US relations. The third chapter is about the recent changing mood of the US administration to India. It examines the various constraints which are preventing them to make a close tie. The concluding chapter attempts to evaluate the whole process of Indo-US relationship and tries to workout a practical formula from all these processes.

## CHAPTER - 1

### END OF COLD WAR AND RECENT CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

#### **INTRODUCTION :**

The disintegration of the Soviet Union as a superpower is the most important event in the last decade of the 20th century. It has drastically changed the world geo-political structure which has taken shape after Second World War, and it has entailed unpredictable consequences in both the world balance of forces and international relations. Few years back, nobody thought that there would not be any Soviet Union and Germany would be unified. But reality speaks and history goes its own way. The postwar era collapsed in 1989 with the blessings of Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika and Glasnost. Berlin Wall collapsed and whole Eastern Europe came in the grip of change. In the words of Barry Buzan, "The ending of the Cold War has created a remarkable fluidity and openness in the whole pattern and quality of international relations. Although the events of 1989 were centred in Europe, they represent changes of such magnitude that it is appropriate to talk of the end of an era for the international system as a whole."<sup>1</sup> He even goes to that

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\* 1 Barry Buzan, "New Pattern of global Security in the twenty first Century" International Affairs, 1991, Page - 431.



extent to say that historians will also come to mark it as the end of the 20th century.

Now, really the changes in the international system is drastic and it must have a far-reaching impact world over. Everybody knows that there is no communist government in the East Europe, no Honecker in East Germany as no Ceausescu in Romania. The new revolution, as is called by the western writer, which started with the Solidarity government in Poland, has disintegrated Yugoslavia in some warring factions and make Czechoslovakia into independent two nations. The whole concept of East-West thinking became irrelevant at least in Europe after the formal dissolution of Warsaw Pact and with the creation of fifteen more states in place of the Communist superpower, the Soviet Union.

A further dimension has been added to this changing scenario as some of the erstwhile republics of Soviet Union and East Europe countries are planning to get the European Community (EC) membership. Under such situation, where there is no East-West conflict, it obviously diminishes the importance of NATO and its mentor the United States in Europe. Understandably, after the unification of Germany and the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has lost its importance, this is very much revealed in the words of Pierre Hassner, "while the community (NATO) can easily

survive the demise of COMECON and even prosper from it, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the decline of the Soviet military threat, at least in its immediate and visible form, pose much more serious questions for the survival of NATO. After all, a military alliance let alone a military organisation, can hardly thrive without a potential adversary."<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet threat made NATO and US military power vitally important to Western Europe. NATO is, and from the viewpoint of Europeans always has been, about the defence of Europe.<sup>3</sup> So when there is no Soviet Union and no menace of Soviet expansionism, NATO loses its prime cause like other military organisations such as CENTO, SEATO etc. We know that NATO is the framework through which Americans were integrated into the task of deterring and, if necessary, defending Western Europe against attack. Regular communication and cooperation in this common task strengthened the relations between the United States and other NATO countries. But at present, most Soviet troops are withdrawn from the East Europe and from East Germany, which

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\* 2. Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond Partition and Unity disintegration or reconstitution?" International Affairs 1990 Vol - 66 - Page 465.

\*3. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Coldwar", Foreign Affairs 1990, Vol-63(1) Page - 14.

obviously will lead US to rethink about its presence in Europe at least militarily. At the same time, the relative decline in the US economic power, the rising pressure of budget and trade deficits made defence costs and the 'Superpower' responsibilities of the United States seem less necessary to the defence of Europe and more difficult to justify as to finance. With the coming of Clinton administration this new idea is surely gaining strength and the path is shown by the former Republican President Bush when he and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow on January 3, 1993. So it is no surprise when former US Secretary of State, James Baker talked about the non-military role of NATO in his Berlin speech, though this new role will not be welcomed by the European Powers like France and Germany who are trying for a single European society and market through EC and never wanted to recognise the US as a European Power.

The Process of ending the Cold War actually began with the coming of Gorbachev in power in 1985. His soft attitude towards Western powers and liberal policy to reform Soviet Society altered the then US President Regan's view towards Soviet Union. Though Regan was one of the great members of the new Cold War who were disillusioned from the detente of 1970s, and was highly antagonistic to any type of Soviet

design, he met several times with his Soviet counterpart Gorbachev to ease the tension between the two superpowers. At first, everybody was suspicious of Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika and Glasnost and the speedy change of Soviet attitude towards Europe as well as towards US. But 'Gorbachev's restraint in the use of force has transformed the situation in Eastern Europe, opened the way for a democratic revolution and altered relations with the United States and Western Europe.'<sup>4</sup> So it is not an exaggeration to call Mikhail Gorbachev an "event making man"; a man whose actions transform the historical context in which he acts.

Gorbachev has not brought democracy to the Soviet Union. But he has sponsored a new tolerance of diversity and restraint in the use of force that have had a profoundly liberating effect. He loosened the reins that have tightly controlled Soviet Society since the Bolshevik Revolution - largely eliminating censorship, permitting religious freedom, freeing emigration, allowing small ownership, overhauling the structures of government, changing Article 6 of the then Soviet Constitution which gave CPSU a one party dominance and providing elections with competitions. All those are internal changes, but it had much wider impact on the entire world politics. Because those were the main

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\* 4. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War" , Foreign Affairs 1990, Vol - 69(1), Page -3.

constraints between the so called liberal society and so called communist totalitarianism and which obviously were the prime causes of the Cold War. When the nature and the outlook of the society changed towards liberalism or to say towards capitalism, whole Eastern Europe came out of Soviet hand and instead of "End of Ideology", capitalism prevailed over socialism world over. it started in East Europe and went towards Far East and Latin America shaking the grounds of communist rule in many countries including Castro's stronghold Cuba.

The importance of all those events in the world can be realised when we see that ever since the Second World War the Soviet Union had shaped the relations among the major powers in the west. As Kirkpatrick puts it : "... the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Containment Policy, the Regan Doctrine and large American defence budgets were elements of the American and West European response to the stimulous of Soviet expansionism and force".<sup>5</sup> In a similar tone Phil Williams commented : "If differences in the Social, Political and economic systems of the two major actors are secondary, however, they are certainly not irrelevant. They are particularly important in explaining

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\* 5. See Kirkpatrick

the tendency of policy makers in Moscow and Washington to attribute the Cold War exclusively to the adversary."<sup>6</sup>

In this situation the whole security concerns have been changed and a new friendship started to begin from President Regan's period. A series of summit meetings between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Regan had culminated in the Washington Summit of December 1987 at which the INF Treaty was signed to remove all land-based medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. Similarly in June 1988 President Regan visited Moscow. Although the superpowers faced it impossible to reach an agreement on long-range arms reductions before Regan left office, it was clear that they had entered another period of relaxation in which they were increasingly willing to take steps to moderate and regulate their relationships and to cooperate on securities issues and it was obviously the beginning of the end of that zero-sum security game of the Cold War Period.

Then the annus mirabilis 1989 has made it clear that the Soviet Union and the United States now have it in their power to put and end to the Cold War - The most important, expensive and dangerous phenomenon of the Second half of our

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\*6. Phil Williams, "US-Soviet Realitions : Beyond the Cold War?" International Affairs, 1989, Page 275.

tumultuous century.<sup>7</sup> In 1989 there was a gradual but significant shift in the Washington from warriness to confidence about the reality of Moscow's commitment to major reductions in conventional forces. By the end of the year Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney was planning American reductions on a scale that he would have rejected as dangerous folly when he took office. At the Malta Summit in December 1989 between President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, the convergence of American and Soviet positions on most issues was unprecedented. Their relationship seemed likely to develop with minimum tension, low risk and at greatly lowered cost. Both the leaders well understood that their bipolar competition will no longer provide the dominant framework for ordering the system and disciplining the behaviour of other states.

The declining influence of ideology of both Soviet and American foreign policies and the changed perception of the security dilemma of Cold War period brought the two superpowers to cooperate in different fields and to be more friendly. In May 31 - June 2 (1990) visit, Gorbachev initiated agreement with the US President, George Bush, in

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\* 7. McGeorge Bundy, "From Cold War toward Trusting Peace" Foreign Affairs, 1990, 69 (1), Page - 197.

Washington that led to strategic arms reduction treaty (START), reducing long-range nuclear arsenals by 30 percent. This treaty came into existence on 31 July 1991 when Mr. Bush visited Moscow at the invitation of his Soviet counterpart. However, with the short coup in August 1991, the fate of the Soviet President became numbered. Though the coup had failed, Gorbachev had to resign at the year end (25 Dec 1991) and with him, Soviet Union became a past.

After the end of Gorbachev era, US administration started to take a very cautious policy towards the breaking Soviet republics, because it was a fluxional situation and was dangerous to the global politics with few more nuclear powers coming suddenly. Even US policy makers were hesitant to recognise the republics as independent states and feared fierce ethnic clashes among the republics. However, as like before, Bush administration was giving growing importance to the Russian President Mr. Boris Yeltsin and his reform policy. This type of attitude was clear from one official briefing after James Baker's visit of Moscow and other republics in December 1991. It says : "The richness of our relationships will depend from republic to republic on the degree to which they embrace democracy and free markets. And



on the republics fulfilling their assurance to the United States on nuclear security,"<sup>8</sup>

Now the question is, why should the US care whether Mr. Yeltsin is a real or fake democrat, as long as he supports American interests ? Probably the answer is that to the extent that Russia is a democracy it will be much less of a threat to the US, since democracies are less likely to initiate wars. During the Cold War the US did not really have the luxury or burden of choosing its friends. It simply had to identify who was with it in the grand struggle with the "Evil Empire" led by Moscow, and those people almost automatically became allies. Though America did press for free elections, free markets, they were not sole criteria to get economic aid and military support as was seen in case of Ferdinand Marcos of Philippines, Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan and others. But with the collapse of Soviet Union, the US has both the burden and the luxury of choosing its friend and only for that it is pressing for more democratic reform in the Soviet Republics as well as for other countries.

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\* 8. Times of India - 24 December 1991.

However, relationship between America and Russia and other Republics became more or less friendly. Though it is some sort of a complex bargain, it mainly depends on the American aids and the breakaway Soviet Republics response to more democratisation. On 1 February 1992, the US President, George Bush, and the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin signed a joint declaration at Camp David, to begin a new phase of friendship and cooperation between their nations. Their joint declaration said, "Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries. From now on, the relationship will be characterised by friendship and partnership founded on mutual trust and respect, and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom."<sup>9</sup> James Baker, the US secretary of state, also visited Moscow in the month of February to discuss various bilateral issues, Bush administration showed its willingness to support Russia and five other Soviet states to get quick membership in the IMF and World Bank which will further market oriented economic reforms in these newly independent states and to get billions of dollars in their reform process. It is regrettable that the recently dethroned superpower Moscow is virtually begging at the door of

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\* 9. Times of India - 3 rd Feb. 1992.

Washington to get more aids to provide food and basic necessities to the Russians. Apart from their bilateral relationship, both Moscow and Washigton showed a very friendly attitude to solve other crucial problems like Gulf War, Cambodian Peace Problems, Arab-Israel Peace talks etc. And lastly, their relations reached the high plateau when the President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on 3rd January 1993, to save the world from a possible nuclear holocaust by reducing two third of their nuclear arsenals.

A remarkable change has taken place in the Third World Politics after the end of Cold War. One of them is the Afgan Crisis which gave a new turn to the Cold War in 1979 when Soviet forces entered in Afganistan to defend the communist backed government. With the help of US-Soviet agreement with waring Afgan factions and Nazibulla government, Soviet forces withdrew within 1989. Now Islamic government of Burnhauddin Rabbani is ruling there in a more complex situation and Civil war totally has not put to an end. Other notable change is in Comboia where UN Peace Keeping Force was monitoring law and order situation to hold a peaceful election and transfer the power from the national government which is now running under president Norodom Sihanouk.

The most important event of this period was the gulf war which was the result of the sudden Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. All countries criticised this sudden Iraqi attack on its tiny oil-rich neighbour, but it antagonised the US interest more in the Middle East, which opposed Mr. Saddam Hussein to get a shot against the United State's sole superpower role in the world. With the help of the UN resolution, the US and its allies defeated Iraq with heavy bombing in the war of January-February and freed Kuwait in 1991. This victory established United States role as the watchdog of global peace at the cost of Iraq and after that world became totally unipolar where there is no counter balance to US power and every country, especially developing countries has to behave according to the US interests. James Petras put it very beautifully : " The United States War in the Gulf is an attempt to recreate Washington's role as world policeman, to resubordinate Europe to US power, to intimidate The Third World into submission. In a sense it is an attempt to regain the position of global supremacy held by the US at the end of the Second World War."<sup>10</sup>

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\* 10. James Petras, "Gulf War and New World Order" EPW, 2-9 March 1991, Page - 482.

After the gulf war and defeat of Iraq, US policymakers started to propagate that it is the beginning of a new world order. In the Words of President Bush :

"Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective - a new world order - can emerge; a new era - free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavour. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants, the rule of justice, a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."<sup>11</sup>

But, is it this new world order prevailing in the world now, as perceived by President Bush and James Baker ? Not at all. There are many critics who even say that this order is

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\* 11 President Bush, "Towards a new world order" US department of States Dispatch 1:3, 17 Sept. 1990. [Taken from Adam Robert's Article - A new age in International relations ? International Affairs Vol-67/1991, Page - 519.]

more deteriorating and more disappointing than the Cold War period, particularly to the developing nations. And this is very much revealed in Adam Roberts words : "If this has been a century of false messiahs, there is no reason to think that with the millennium, resources, population growth and the environment are inherently hard to tackle within our present international framework and look like becoming more rather than less serious."<sup>12</sup> Apart from these basic problems, many new problems are feared world over. For example, most of the developing countries now fear unwanted US intervention in their governmental function and speculation is there that what Iraq suffered yesterday, may come true to them tomorrow. On the other side continuous killings are taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina Civil War, Somalians are struggling under heavy food crisis and dying, democracy is suppressed in Myanmar and terrorist activities and narcotic business are growing day by day. The gulf between the developed and developing countries widening and the poor countries are becoming poorer with heavy budget and trade deficit leading to the debt-trap. Is this new world order for which Bush and his Western partners heavily bombed Iraq and killed thousands of innocent people?

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\* 12. Adam Roberts, "A new age in international relations ?"  
" International Affairs 1991, Vol-67, Page - 521.

Actually the gulf war in its broadest sense is an effort to reverse the world historical trends that are moving to relegate the United States to the status of a second-class power. James Petras has defined it very beautifully. He says : "It is meant to define a new military-centred global order in which markets, income, and resource shares are defined not by technological market power, but by political military dominance. Under these rules Washington's comparative advantage in military power would ensure US global supremacy, and would undermine the capacity of its competitors to mount an effective challenge to its position."<sup>13</sup> Actually, the new world order that Bush and Baker hope to fashion out of the Gulf War is based on the notion of subordinating Europe and Japan to US global ends, which are the major economic threats to it.

However, the end of cold war has brought a lot of change in the international scene. When the old theory of containment of Communism is no more, it makes a very friendly atmosphere in global politics and now a unanimous

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\* 13. James Petras, "Gulf War and the New World Order", EPW, 2-9 March 1991, Page - 483.

decision is possible in the UN Security Council on any serious problem which generally was a battlefield of big five in the past. The new path is already shown when Cambodian Peace Plan was agreed after Vietnamese armies withdrawal from Cambodia and now Arab and Israeli brothers are discussing their problems face to face which was started on 30th October 1991 in Madrid with full sponsorship of United States and Soviet Union. At present world's major concern is economics instead of politics, where by big industrialised states are busy with their trade interests vis-a-vis the environmental protection, which has become a new threat to the most developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Another major new trend is the strengthening of international society like IMF, World Bank, GATT, G7, NPT and especially United Nations. United Nations should take the lead to solve all the pending issues to implement its charter for which it was instituted to make the world safer from war and arms competitors and to make world prosperous and peaceful.

In such a changed position, India being the second populous country and having the high potentiality to further the world peace and development should pursue such a foreign policy by which it can show the light to the rest of the world. During the Cold War, third world alignments were



important symbols of success and failure in the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. This fact gave them a useful lever on the divided centre, though it also exposed them to unwanted intervention in their own domestic instabilities. But there is no ideological or strategic incentive for great power to compete for third world allegiance now. With this changed conditions, India has to rethink its global perception and to make a stable relationship with the sole superpower United States based on an equal footing and mutual interest. The Narsimha Rao government is pursuing a different policy unlike the past which is necessary in the changing scenario. So in this post Cold War Period, when every thing is under the current of change. Indo-US relationship might take a new turn and that is our main subject which will be discussed later on.

## Chapter II

### INDO-US RELATIONS IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

The major ingredient in the history of American foreign policy since 1947 has been the ebb and flow of the Cold War. Despite the pressing dilemmas confronting the United States in every part of the world and the difficult decisions they have forced, the attempt to meet the continuing menace of Soviet expansion has provided the continuing thread of American action and decision<sup>1</sup>. And it is true that most of the international events since the end of Second World War were shaped by the Cold War fever between the two giants the United States and the Soviet Union. The whole world became sharply divided between the two antagonistic groups whose interests were contradictory to each other. When US policy makers wanted to contain the so called Soviet expansionism through alliances and military aids to the client states, the so called free world, the Soviet Union tried its best to get as much power as to influence the socialist revolution in other countries to get passed American colonial design. Obviously, it led to many developments, including the formation of NATO, Marshal Plan, Warsaw Pact, SEATO etc. and all literatures of international politics were more or less

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1. Charles O. Lerche Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (Second edition) Prentice-Hall, Inc (1961), P-288.

became overburdened with Cold War descriptions and jarjans. Even a little event was not out of touch of this Cold War fever. However, here it is not our concern to discuss Cold War, but to see Indo-US relationship in the background of Cold War, which obviously was shaped by US policy of containment of communism and its global interest world over.

It is often said that India is the largest and America is the most powerful democracy in the world. So one can easily assume that there would be friendly relationship between these two and if not friendly there will be more co-operation than conflict. But reality does not say so. The two countries are distant from one another and neither poses a direct military threat to the other. As Rubinstein Alvin said :

"Despite all of this and despite an ease of communication between their elites through the medium of the English language, the Indo-American relationship has been more troubled than tranquil, more competitive than cooperative, more characterized by misperceptions and misunderstanding than accurate and considerate attention to the needs and concerns of the other."<sup>2</sup>

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2. Rubinstein Z Alvin in Nonman D. Palmer's book, The United States and India : The Dimensions of influence, Praeger Publishers : New York, 1984, (Page XIII).

Some scholars call these relationships as a 'love-hate' relationship, but why it is so and how it has evolved in the past forty years or so.

### Indo-US Relations Prior to Indian Independence :

Even before India formally gained the status of an independent state, it established diplomatic relations with the United States in October 1946. This was hailed as an event of great significance and aroused considerable expectations. It is also quite natural, because India started with a romanticized version of Franklin D. Roosevelt's role in pleading for Indian independence with Winston Churchill.<sup>3</sup> Most Indians expect a lot from the world's strongest democracy which also fought an anti-colonial independence struggle as early as 1776. And the Indian elite, which led the independence movement, was inspired by the concepts of liberty of America's founding fathers. Hence, when India became independent in 1947, the United States thought that India would be their natural ally. Because India inherited a lot from the British Colonialists, their systems of government, educational system, communication etc. Indian leaders were also mostly western educated, even Nehru

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3. Nihal S. Singh, "Can the US and India be real friends?", Asian Survey, September 1983, p- 1011.

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
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himself had a sympathy with western way of life and Cambridge culture. But when India took an independent path of development under Nehru's towering leadership and a non-aligned political posture, the US administration became stunned.

Nehru's non-alignment as a concept of state policy was born out of his fierce nationalism, his anti-colonial and anti-racial bent, and his Pan-Asianism.<sup>4</sup> Actually it was the assertion of India's sovereignty and a product of Post-colonial political culture, when every newly independent nation did not want to loose their independence for which it fought fiercely. Similarly, Indian leaders thought that they have nothing to do with Cold War and the arms race. Instead, they wanted world peace and rapid economic development by Keeping equal friendship with the United States as well as with the Soviet Union and it was the main motto of Indian foreign policy at the time of independence.

From the very beginning United States and India started to look at the World from two different angles. Since 1945 the main preoccupation of the US policy has been containment of communist Power and influence in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. But Indian Policy was to adopt an

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4. *Ibid*, p - 1012.

independent posture in the East-West conflict, to pursue the policy of non-alignment and seeking a world, particularly newly emerging countries of Asia and Africa, free from Cold War influence. So, whereas the United States pursued a policy of military alliances and creation of military bases all over the world in the name of containment of communism and making the free world safe, India always argued to keep Asia and Africa free from great power conflict and domination. India has pleaded that what the countries of Asia and Africa and other underdeveloped and developing countries need is not arms but assistance in their economic development and social upliftment.<sup>5</sup> Similarly when India urged recognition of any popularly based national movement, it contradicted US interest which always wanted to defeat all communist design, even by serving colonial interest of other European partners.

#### Indo-US Trade :

However, it is not to say that Indo-US relation began with disagreement from the very beginning. When American

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5. M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-56 New Delhi, 1964, P - 248-53.

people had their sympathy with the independence movement in India, it was making headway into the Indian market. By the time of World War I, the US became the second largest trader with India. Breaking the British cordon US, could increase its share in India's imports from 1.7 in 1907 to 3.8 per cent in 1911 to 7 percent in 1914-1919. US share in India's exports rose from 8 to 12 per cent.<sup>6</sup> The United States also took part in setting up of Tata Iron and Steel Works, in which 60 million dollars were spent on American equipment and engineers. In independent India US economic aids grew more and took a major part in Indian infrastructure building. So at the beginning Indo-US relationship was not that much bad, as it became afterwards. It becomes clear when we see Nehru's famous broadcast of 7 September 1946, where he said : "We send our greetings to the people of the United States of America to whom destiny has given a major role in international affairs. We trust that this tremendous responsibility will be utilised for the furtherance of peace and human freedom everywhere."<sup>7</sup>

6. Nikhil Chakravarty, "Indo-US Perspective : A Historical Overview", Man and development 7 (3), Spet-1985, p. 58.

7. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches, Sept 1946 - April 1961) New Delhi 1961, p. 3.

But the first shock came as early as 1947-48 through the Indo-Pakistan War over Kashmir when Indian leaders saw that US took a Pro-Pakistani Stand. Instead of pronouncing Pakistan the aggressor, which it was, the US and Britain converted the situation into an Indo-Pakistani dispute and seemingly favoured Pakistan.<sup>8</sup> Most Indians thought that the US attitude was influenced by Britain, its closest ally which itself was strongly influenced by a pro-Pakistani lobby. In the later periods also United States and Britain took pro-Pakistani stand in United Nations and supported Pakistani resolution against India.

#### Nehru's Visit to USA :

In October 1949, when Nehru paid his first visit to USA as India's Prime Minister, he went with hopes and expectations. Before his visit he wrote to his sister Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, then India's ambassador in America : "I want to be friendly with the Americans but always making it clear what we stand for." Here now we can see that Nehru first went to USA and not to U.S.S.R. But as such it was not a very successful visit and it became clear when Dean Acheson

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8. S. Nihal Singh, "Can the US and India be real friends?" Asian Survey, Sept 83, p-1013.



as Secretary of State noted that Nehru was "One of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal." To look at the cause Nikhil Chakraborty describe it beautifully, "The problems for Dean Acheson and his colleagues in US policy-making setup was that they found it difficult to reconcile the imperatives of America's global strategy - which has been an undeviating line of confrontation with the Soviet Union - with the independent aspirations of India, the essence of whose non-alignment was to keep away from military alliances under the aegis of great powers - in this specific case, that of the United States of America."<sup>9</sup>

#### Recognition of Communist China

In the following years Indo-US disagreement widened from one issue to another. When India recognised Peoples Republic of China under Chairman Mao and established diplomatic relations, US became totally disappointed. "To the American government it was a shattering blow since according to it, emergence of China was a victory of World Communism, the spread of which had to be stopped."<sup>10</sup> Again

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9. Nikhil Chakravarty, "Indo-US perspective : A Historical overview", Man and Development, 7(3) Sept 1985, p-60.

10. K.P.Misra , "Indo-American Relations Divergences Outweigh Convergences", Man and Development 7(3), Sept 1985, p-70.

in 1951 Indo-US strains developed on Korean War issue. Initially India supported the US in condemning North Korea's aggression, but did not support US declaration of war against North Korea. Differences of view became also visible at the time of Japanese Peace Treaty, when India refused to sign this treaty, but signed its own treaty with Japan in 1952, for swearing separations. Actually, India's policy of non-alignment and its role in persuading others to adopt it - had been a stumbling block in the way of Indo-American friendship. And we know that according to John Foster Dulles, high priest of anti-Communism, non-alignment was "immoral".

### Pakistan, an Obvious Choice for America :

The American world-view and the conditions in the Indian subcontinent produced a situation in which the former discovered in Pakistan "a counter force" to Nehru's non-alignment India.<sup>11</sup> Pakistan was an obvious choice since India's policy perspective were opposed to join any one of the two power blocks. The first United States Pakistan agreement for military aid was signed in 1954 and under this agreement Eisenhower administration started to give huge

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11. Ibid

sophisticated arms to Pakistan. Dulles enlisted Pakistan in the initial Middle East Defense Organisation (MEDO) that led to Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), after it became fully clear that India would have no part in them. This brought Washington and New Delhi to a collision course. Because arming Pakistan obviously hurt Indian sentiment which is India's main adversary in the subcontinent, besides it brought Cold War to India's doorstep. Similarly it seemed to be striving to negate India's natural pre-eminence on the subcontinent. It was also feared that America wanted to encircle India in the name of containment of communism.

#### Indian Reaction :

When the issue was raised to the concern of US administration, Eisenhower tried to mollify Nehru by publicly assuring him that US arms would not be used against India, an assurance which was never kept. The late Krishna Menon rightly wondered if there were guns which would fire only in one direction. In fact, in essential respects the two countries opted for alliances on account of different reasons, America to contain communism and Pakistan to fight India.<sup>12</sup> In reality one of the purposes of US military aid

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12. Ibid - P - 71.

to Pakistan was clearly checking India's power and influence in the region. On the other hand Pakistan leaders were competent enough to convince US administration to give it more sophisticated arms to protect US interest in the South Asian region and by promising to act as a spokesman of West Asian oil rich Islamic countries, which in fact it could not.

India's agony had some other reasons as well. India wanted Asia to be free from great power dominance and influence presumably because among other things it wanted to create like-minded, non-aligned nations and nations free from great power influence in Asia which could offer it opportunities of leadership of such nations.<sup>13</sup> India at least thought of emerging as an important regional power, an independent centre of power, with certain roles to play in South-East, South, and West Asia. We can clarify it by one of Nehru's remark in the Parliament in 1954 : "If you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong - wars and the like - the obvious fourth country in the world (after US, The Soviet Union, and China) is India." This very intention of India was opposite in direction of US policy of containment of communism or to say against US design of world domination.

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13. See, D.C. Jha, "US Policy towards India", The Indian Journal of Political Science , 37(1), Jan-March 1976, p-50.

The United States government had never considered India to be of major political significance to the future of Asia or of the third world. In 1971 Chester Bowles, once a long servicing ambassador of USA to India, makes it very clear when he said "Thus India has been seen as an impoverished nation struggling bravely but probably futilely to govern itself through democratic institutions, which for humanitarian reasons we have felt obligated to assist."<sup>14</sup> However, he showed the cause as ignorance on the part of American policy makers about India by saying "Lacking first hand knowledge of the complexities of Indian society and the hopes and fears of its people, it is not surprising that the Kiplingesque impression of India as an ancient land of Cobras, maharajahs, monkeys, famines, Polo players, overcrowded with cows and babies, still persists in the minds of many top officials in our government."<sup>15</sup> Actually there is a peculiar kind of communication gap, because the traffic of information and ideas is mainly one way, namely from America to India and not so much the other way round. Still its not the main cause behind US policy makers uneasiness to deal with India, what Bowlers also confessed :

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14. Chester Bowles , "America and Russia in India" Foreign Affairs, 49(4), July 1971, p - 638.

15. *Ibid* - p-639.

"When they assert their independence by refusing to see the world as our government sees it, leaders within the Administration and Congress have become by stages puzzled, frustrated, hurt and angered."

On the other hand Indo-Soviet relations improved radically after Stalin's death in 1953 and it reached on solid plain within two years. In 1955 the first Soviet loan agreement for Indian economic development was signed and Soviet agreed to set up a steel mill at Bokaro at a cost of 140 million dollar. This agreement had very important implication to the Indian Policy makers and broadly to the Indian masses, because it came after the US refusal to set up a public sector steel mill in India. Nehru also visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and was given an enthusiastic welcome. Marshal Bulganin and Nikita Krushchev returned the visit in December of the same year and gave the all important support to India on Kashmir and Goa. But the case was totally opposite with USA and it is well known that in the debate in the Security Council of the U.N. on Jammu and Kashmir, the United States and its allies took blatantly pro-Pakistani positions in 1957, 1962, 1964 and it was only the Soviet vetos in 1957 and 1962 and threat to veto in 1964 that saved Kashmir for India. Similarly United States took an anti-India position on the Goa issue and in a joint

communiqué with the Portuguese Foreign Minister on 2 December 1955, Dulles, then secretary of state, called Goa a "Portuguese province".

As both these issues were emotionally attached with Indian masses, US opposition and Soviet support acted heavily on Indian foreign policy. Once Nehru said, it was "a matter of deep regret ... that when matters concerning subjects which concern us greatly ... crop up, it should be our misfortune that the two Great Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, should invariably be against us."<sup>16</sup>

Due to negligence or unfavorable attitude of USA, India sharply tilted towards Soviet Union. Soviet attitude towards South Asia seemed to be rational to India, was another cause for this new development. The Soviet Union thought that by itself it would not be able to play a dominant power role in Asia, that it would be detrimental to Soviet interests if either USA or China were to dominate substantial parts of Asia and hence it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to promote diversity in Asia and welcome to coming into being of other independent centres of power in Asia with whom the Soviet Union would be able to work close friendly relations on the basis of equality and mutual

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16. See, D.C.Jha, "US Policy Towards India", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Jan-Mar 1976. p-54.

benefit.<sup>17</sup> Chester Bowles also showed same reasons when he said that there had been no clear national policies to guide day to day operations of New Delhi Embassy and Soviet operations in India were much more closely directed by the foreign office in Moscow than US operations directed by the state department in Washington.

#### Sino-Indian War :

Then came the Chinese attack on India in October 1962 and it provided a very good opportunity to improve Indo-American relationship. Due to Cuban crisis, at first Soviet Union was neutral, and as it was a war between a good friend and a socialist brother, they preferred to be neutral. At the same time power in Washington D.C. was with President Kennedy, one of the most able policy maker who was rational in out look as well as friendly to India. When Nehru asked for military supplies from the United States after our initial set back, they sent immediate military aid worth \$ 70 million and Indo-American relationship reached all time high. For a brief spell after the Chinese aggression also, the relations between India and the United States continued to be extremely happy. But it was a short lived phenomenon.

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17. D.C.Jha. p- 58.



After the Indo-China War in 1962, India seriously embarked on its defence plans and the modernisation of his armed strength. It, therefore, requested the United States for a \$ 500 million assistance to be spent over a period of five years. Even President Kennedy was considering the deal with India but he was assassinated very soon and the deal was cancelled by Johnson administration. Bowles tried his best to convince the US administration, but he regretted by saying, however, the old Dullesion arguments soon began to be raised again in the state department and Pentagon i.e. if we helped India even moderately to build up its defence capacity, we would upset our "loyal ally", Pakistan<sup>18</sup>. He also said that "since World War II, most of our military assistance outside Europe, I felt, had been given not for legitimate purposes of defence but in effect as a bribe to persuade the recipient governments to support US foreign policy."<sup>19</sup> It was only half the amount what US administration had already given to Pakistan for its military build up. But as a result of the pressure exerted by the Pro-Pakistani elements within the Pentagon and the State Department, a plan that had been carefully prepared to

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18. Chester Bowles, "American and Russia in India", Foreign Affairs, 49(4), July 1971, p - 640.

19. Ibid - p - 640.

help India in the task of modernizing its armed forces was scuttled.<sup>20</sup>

In such a situation, it is quite natural that India would turn towards Soviet Union and it also happened likewise. We also know that the United States had disguise support in Ayub Khan's demand to solve Kashmir issue at the time of Chinese attack which directly supported China. So India very rationally went to Russia to get sophisticated arms after the unsuccessful visit of Defence Minister Y.B.Chavan to USA in May 1964. Three months later, the same Indian negotiating team visited Moscow and returned to New Delhi with all they had asked for, and more. Today India's 28 divisions, its 700 plane air force and its small but competent navy are largely supplied with Soviet equipment.<sup>21</sup> According to Bowles in this way a major opportunity to use their own military assistance to promote greater political stability in Asia was missed.

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20. B.K.Shrivastava, "Indo-American Relation Retrospect and Prospect", International Studies 1975, Vol 14(1), p - 24.

21. Chester Bowler - P. 642.

### Indo-American Economic Relations :

Indo-American economic relationship was not so hot as their political relations were. Out of the total investment of \$ 21.3 billion in India's first two five year plans, the United States and its allies contributed \$ 5.2 billion, the US itself contributing \$ 3.3 billion, as against the Soviet bloc contribution of \$ 943.8 million.<sup>22</sup> Since December 1951 until 1971, the USA contributed \$ 8 billion in loans and grants to bolster India's economy and to help feed its people. Nixon administration claimed in 1972 that approximately \$ 10 billion had been given to India for various developmental and food programme. For several years in the mid fifties and even in the sixties the amount of economic aid that India received from the United States constituted more than half of the total foreign aid that it received. Apart from aid there was extensive trade relation between the two countries. Most notable of these aids was the food aid programme under PL 480, under which several million tons of wheat were given to India to save our people from the severe drought and the followed starvation. But the irony is that this vast amount of economic aid and food did not generate good will. "Perhaps the most important reason for this was that, in the total perspective, economic

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22. D.C.Jha , "US Policy Toward India", P. 43.

relations were overshadowed by political relations, which were far from happy."<sup>23</sup>

President Johnson's policy was to authorize each shipment of food aid after frantic calls from the US Embassy in New Delhi which reflected, Indian Officials panic over not being able to plan future food distribution with any assurance. The causes are highly known to the Indian leaders as well as masses. The United States wanted India's support, if not support at least silence, on Vietnam issue. Whenever the subject of aid came up before Congress or one of its committee, some congressman or other was bound to jump up and ask what the Indians had done in return, or express his amazement that, after having received so much aid, the Government of India had failed to support American foreign-policy objectives, or demand to know why Moscow - leaning Indian Government should be supported.<sup>24</sup> So obviously, an impression developed in India that when we were in desperate need of food, the US was forcing us to change our foreign policy in return of food. Even Mr. Bowles admits it, "During India's food crisis of 1965-66, President Johnson rather obviously attempted to use our wheat shipment

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23. B.K. Shrivastava, "Indo-American Relations : Retrospect and Prospect", P - 25-26.

24. Ibid - P. 27.

to persuade India to take a more tolerant view of our military activities in Vietnam."<sup>25</sup>

### Indo-Pak War of 1965 and Following Events :

Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 was another issue where Indian opinion went against US policy. Though in this war US remained neutral, Pakistan fought with all US made weapons and it was not condemned by American Administration, rather it stopped all aids and military help to both the countries. The little good will that had been generated in India for the United States as a consequence of its response to the Chinese aggression of 1962 quickly dissipated. "The United States, far from being seen as a neutral observer, was now perceived as a tacit supporter of, Pakistani interests and viewed with considerable suspicion bordering on outright hostility."<sup>26</sup> Actually this suspicion started when the United States cancelled Prime Minister Shastri's proposed visit before the Indo-Pakistan War.

With the coming of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in power in 1966, a new hope was aroused in both sides. But very soon this new hope was replaced by disagreements and frustrations. In

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26. Sumit Ganguly , "Of great expectations and bitter disappointments : Indo-US Relations under the Johnson Administration", Asian Affairs 15(4), Winter 1988-89, p-213.

25. See, Bowles , p - 646.

March 1966 India was quite critical of a US announcement of a decision to resume sales of certain 'non-lethal' military equipment to India and Pakistan - a move that Pakistan had been trying to persuade the United States to adopt and India opposed, for it would benefit Pakistan more than India.<sup>27</sup> Mrs. Gandhi visited the United States in March 1966. Both sides claimed it as a successful visit, though, there was no successful accord and pact or aid on the agenda. Two other most controversial issues which widened the gap between these two nations in the last phase of Johnson's administration, are the rupee devaluation of 1966 and the "self-help/short-tether" agricultural policies of America. Though Americans claim that US had nothing to do with rupee devaluation in 1966, actuality it was US pressure through World Bank which forced India to devalue its currency. It did not bring good results to India. "Neither the World nor the International Monetary Fund nor the United States nor any other country gave the kind of extra assistance to India that Mrs. Gandhi and Indians generally had been led to expect,"<sup>28</sup> Johnson's 'Short-tether' policy regarding food shipments to India was also heartbreaking. India was then

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27. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984 , p - 30 - 31.

28. *Ibid* - P - 32.

facing a severe drought and food shortage, but the United States by this 'short-tether' policy tried to influence our foreign policy on Vietnam and to silence criticism of Israel in the West Asian War of 1967.

### Nixon Era :

When Nixon came to power with his friend Kissinger in 1969, Indo-American relations started to deteriorate further. Nixon's anti-Indian stand was known from earlier period when he served as Vice President under Johnson. "They shared a dislike and distrust of Mrs. Gandhi, a considerable antipathy and bewilderment regarding India, and more positive feeling regarding Pakistan."<sup>29</sup> Again, this anti-Indian attitude is revealed from Kissinger's own writing "White House Years", when he writes, "No one could speak for five minutes with Nixon without hearing of his profound distrust of Indian motives, his concern over Soviet meddling, and above all his desire not to risk the opening to China by ill considered posturing."<sup>30</sup> And it was during this period, when Indo-American relations became the worst.

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29. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India, p-38.

30. Quotation taken from Palmer's book - P-42.

In the summer of 1969 when India nationalised its 14 biggest banks, official and unofficial opinion in the United States was highly critical and they welcomed Supreme Court's verdict against this nationalisation move. The United States became disappointed when Indian government instructed to close down its five cultural centres in some of our state capitals over the issue of Soviet Union's unauthorised cultural centre in Trivandrum. However, the most important event of this period was the Bangladesh Independence Movement of 1971, when India and US came at the verge of direct confrontation.

#### Independence of Bangla Desh :

After 25th March 1971, Pakistani army started to suppress East Bengali people mercilessly. In the following month about 10 million people poured into India and gave a huge burden on Indian government. Indian government tried to draw attention to its Pakistani counterpart as well as world leaders about its problem to feed such a large population and the security threats in its eastern border. But Pakistan continued its policy of genocide in its eastern part under Yahea Khan's rule with the United States provided arms. When India appealed to United States to stop arms to Pakistan and for a Political Solution, Nixon administration reportedly warned India that if by chance India intervened



in East Pakistan , it would have to pay very dearly for it.<sup>31</sup> And the United States did nothing to 'thwart' Pakistani aggression. The clumsy manner in which the US Government tried to conceal its military supplies to Pakistan in the 1971 War, after having declared that it had stopped them, is well known.<sup>32</sup>

When it became clear that Pakistan would not take any steps to stop the exodus of refugees and the United States would not pressurise Pakistan to work for a peaceful and democratic settlement in East Pakistan, India made preparations to meet the threat posed by the massive inflow of refugees. As it was not only an internal matter of Pakistan and there was a strong public opinion in favour of East Bengalis in India, it could not sit idle. During a three week tour of six nations in June, 1971, Swaran Singh, our foreign minister met US President Nixon and others and asked them to press Pakistan to find a political solution.<sup>33</sup> He also pleaded for not giving US sophisticated arms to Pakistan. But contrary to the assurance given to our foreign minister, "American arms continued to reach Pakistan

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31. Times of India, 1st August 1971.

32. Dinesh Singh , "Indo-US Relations" , Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal 6(1), July 1973, p-7.

33. See for detail, T.V. Kunhi Krishnan , The Unfriendly Friends : India and America, New Delhi: Indian book company, 1974, p-76.

until as late as November."<sup>34</sup> Earlier American administration told that the arms supplies after 25 March were items already "in pipeline" and when Kissinger reached New Delhi on July 6 en route to Pakistan and then to China, he gave a ridiculous explanation of the continuing flow of US arms shipment to Pakistan, that it was a "bureaucratic mistake that would soon be corrected."

But the real cause behind US arms shipment to Pakistan was much more important which had a global implications in the changed circumstances of that period. And it is very much revealed from Kissinger's own writing : "What made the crisis so difficult was that the Stakes were so much greater than the common perception of them. The issue burst upon us while Pakistan was our only channel to China. ... A major American initiative of fundamental importance to the global balance of power could not have survived if we colluded with the Soviet Union in the public humiliation of China's friend - and our ally."<sup>35</sup> So main thing was to keep Pakistan as the trusted ally what was meddling for Sino-American friendship that time and Nixon-Kissinger's main motivation

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34. Norman D. Palmer , The United States and India p-45.

35. Kissinger, White House Years p. 913 [quotation taken from Palmer's book, p-41]

behind the subcontinental policy was shaped by this consideration. On his brief stay in India in July 1971, Kissinger also warned India that if war broke out in the subcontinent, China might intervene and in the case of Chinese attack on India, it should not expect US help as was case in 1962.

Under this circumstances, India signed a "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation" on August 9 with the Soviet Union. Though this treaty was heavily criticised by United States and other Western Powers, as the failure of India's nonalignment posture and as a sharp Soviet tilt, it was most helpful at the critical period of Indo-Pakistan War of December 1971. When Mrs. Gandhi went personally to plead with Nixon and other Western Leaders to exercise their influence on Yahya Khan, Nixon turned a deaf ear while U.K. and others expressed their sympathy but also helplessness.<sup>36</sup> Lastly war started on 3rd December when Pakistan attacked some Indian airfields on Western Sectors. Within two weeks Pakistani forces were forced to surrender at Dhaka and Bangladesh was freed. However the most important fact is that throughout the whole episode United States and China showed a Pro-Pakistani policy. Apart from withdrawing all economic help to India and some Pro-Pakistani resolution in

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36. T.N.Kaul , "Indo-US Relations", Man and Development 7(3), Sept 1985, p-48.

the United Nations, US representative at the U.N. George Bush openly accused India of clear cut aggression. However, climax came when being frustrated by the retreat of Pakistan army United States sent a task force of the US Seventh Fleet empowered with nuclear arms into the Bay of Bengal. But the Soviet threat restrained China as well as US to take direct action against India.

When Nixon ordered the Enterprise to sail into the Bay of Bengal, his intention was not only to brow-beat India, but to save East Bengal for Pakistan. Though New Delhi was worried about the American move, it did not show any sign of panic for that move. And when Pakistani army in East Bengal became ready to surrender, Washington had held up for twenty-four hours the Dhaka Commander's request for permission to surrender before it was conveyed to India. During these crucial moments, Washington weighed the possibility of a limited action by US marines.<sup>37</sup> Nixon administration also press Soviet Union not to support India by threatening to cancel the proposed Nixon visit to Soviet Union. But nothing worked in favour of US and its ally Pakistan. India also did not listen American request for a cease-fire. Even after the war ended, the United States

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37. T.V.Kunchi Krishnan , The Unfriendly Friends : India and America, p-113.

gave all responsibility to India for war making and tried to take the credit for the survival of West Pakistan from Indian occupation. Actually with some practical problems, US could not fight India directly, but gave full scale support, even instructing Turkish pilots to fly American jet planes to Pakistan. Naturally Indo-US relations were lowest in the early 1970s.

The most sorry thing from India's point of view was that even after the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, the United States continued to justify its positions held during the conflict. On 27th February 1972, in the joint communique issued with Chinese Prime Minister at Sanghai, Nixon expressed US favour for the withdrawal of all Indo-Pakistan military forces to within their own territories and to their own side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Because he knew fully that more territories had come under Indian control than Indian territory seized by Pakistan. At the same time when Nixon administration admitted India as the most powerful country of South Asia, it insisted India to give proper respect to other South Asian countries notably Pakistan. There were some other issues on which Indian actions went against US interest. On January 7, 1972 India announced that its diplomatic representation to North Vietnam would be raised to the ambassadorial level, an

announcement that brought an official protest from the US government and a firm rejection of that protest by India. The recognition of the PLO, also evoked strong criticism in the United States.

**Establishment of Diego Garcia : Aero-naval Base :**

In 1973, another most hot issue came to the forefront of Indo-US relations, when Nixon administration decided to establish a naval-cum-communications station on a small British held island of Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean. At the first stage, it was proposed to be manned by 274 navy personnel and was to have a radio station, 8000 ft runway and a small harbour. But later, it was disclosed that the base would be able to accommodate aircraft carriers and KC-135 tankers planes that were used to refuel B-52's, that it would ultimately cost \$ 75 million and that the runway would be made large enough to handle carrier task force. Reasons showed by US administration are that having such a facility US can show its capability in the Indian Ocean and can bring conflicting parties in this region to the negotiating table. Actually it was an utmost step of American imperialism to control the littoral states of the region and it obviously brought Cold War tension in the Indian Ocean area. In this connection we can remember Dr. Jawatkar's remark, "The Anglo-American decision to set

up a major air naval base on this island which has now become operational, does not presage an abrupt return to Cold War posture, but comes as a timely warning to the Third World of an entirely new kind of super power rivalry on the international scene."<sup>38</sup>

Indian people reacted sharply, all newspapers criticised US policy in the Indian Ocean and accused that they brought Cold War in our doorstep. Government of Mrs. Gandhi feared that it would bring more Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean to equalise its strength which ultimately evaporate the peace from the region. India, therefore, pleaded to keep Indian Ocean a zone of peace and strongly protested against Diego Garcia base. But the US policy did not change and in May 1975 President Ford certified the expansion of Diego Garcia facilities and told it was "essential to the national interest of United States."<sup>39</sup>

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38. Dr. K.S. Jawatkar , Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1983, p-1.

39. See K.S. Jawatkar , Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy, p-54.

### Pokhran Test :

The United States also criticised heavily when India exploded on 18th May 1974 an underground nuclear device for peaceful purposes at Pokhran. US administration started to review whole aid programmes to India. It also mounted pressure on India by a threatening tactics not to give any spare parts and enriched nuclear fuel to Tarapur Plant which was started in the 1960s with the US help. India declined to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and it became a fighting issue between these two countries and continuing still today. Commenting on the Pokhran explosion, Palmer says: "The shadow of the atomic cloud that rose over Pokhran on May 18, 1974 has hung over India and the world and has adversely affected Indo-American relations ever since."<sup>40</sup>

### Shift in the US Policy :

However, by the end of 1974 Indo-US relations were once again on its normal track. US ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan had done a lot in that regard and it was he who piloted the agreement between United States and India in September 1973 under which United States agreed to write off two third of India's estimated debt of 3 billion rupees earned by sale of

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40. Norman D. Palmer , The United States and India, p-74.



PL. 480 wheat to India. Henry Kissinger also arrived in India on 27th October 1974 and signed an agreement to establish Indo-US commission for economic, commercial, scientific, technological, educational and cultural cooperation. He also affirmed India's dominant role and big size in the South Asia. But later when US lifted the arms embargo from Pakistan and showed some unacceptable reasons to give huge arms, relations with US became sour.

In the Nixon era, Indo-US relations was at the lowest. After 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and upto Nixon's ouster in the Watergate Scandal in August 1974, distrust and suspicion grew between these two great democracies. And main reason behind this suspicion was due to President Nixon's high handed anti-India policy. Hence, when President Nixon decided to resign for Watergate Scandal whole India greeted the American people to force him to resign. Swarn Singh, the Indian External Affairs Minister, said that President Nixon's decision to resign was in the best tradition of democracy.<sup>41</sup>

When Vice-President Gerald Ford became the President in August 1974, a new light of hope was seen from Indian people, as Ford was very liberal and did not have any anti-

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41. See Statesman (Calcutta) 10 Aug, 1974.

India feeling like his predecessor Nixon. At the same time it was also assumed that there would not be any major change in American foreign policy, as Henry Kissinger still remained on the helm of State department. However, the new US President sent a message to Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, stressing the importance he attached to continue good relations between the two countries. He was reported to be keen not only to maintain but further strengthen the Indo-American ties of friendship.<sup>42</sup>

But the new hope of friendship was short lived. Within a few months relationship between India and United States became as cool as ever. Even it became irritating when United States decided on 24th February 1975 to end the arms embargo on Pakistan and India. On February 25 Y.B.Chavan, the Indian Minister for External Affairs, expressed strong disappointment and deep regret at the US decision, which he characterized as a retrograde step that would have serious consequences for the hopes we had cherished for peace and stability in the subcontinent and for more mature relations with the United States. And being disappointed by the US decision Chavan postponed his proposed US visit indefinitely.

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42. See Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 13 Aug 1974.

Similarly India got angry with United States when President Ford did not hesitate to interfering in India's internal affairs when he criticized Indira Gandhi's decision of emergency in June 1975. The United States criticised heavily when India expelled some American journalists and imposed heavy censorship on the right of freedom of expression. In February 1976 the Ford administration suspended negotiations with India over the resumption of bilateral economic aid, partially as an expression disapproval of trials of Political opponents in India.<sup>43</sup> American newspapers and public opinion were also highly critical to Mrs. Gandhi's strict measures and authoritarian rule at the time of national emergency. US policy towards India remained totally cool in this period and did not improve until Janata Government came in power in 1977 general election. "Thus, by the end of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years, US-Indian relations had reached a certain degree of stability, with each other side warily viewing the other and pursuing policies that were in its own interest without too much concern for the interests of the other but still recognizing

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43. Norman D. Palmer , The United States and India; p-78.

that each was of some importance to the other and had to be taken into some account."<sup>44</sup>

#### Janta Party Government : Policy of Equidistance :

The early months of 1977 witnessed a sea change in domestic and foreign policy in both the United States and India, which paved the way for important developments in Indo-American relations. Democratic Party headed by Jimmy Carter came in government in USA in January 1977. He appointed Cyrus Vance Secretary of State and both Carter and Vance were different in outlook than their predecessor Ford and Kissinger. On the other hand Janata Party came in power through 1977 election defeating Mrs. Gandhi and her colleagues Morarji Deasi became Prime Minister and Mr. Atal Bihari Bajpayee became External Affairs Minister and both were known for their friendly attitude towards United States, though not anti-Soviet. Such was the American pleasure when the new government came in power that President Carter has praised India for practising democracy in the choice of its leadership. He said, "India's full return to the democratic path and common commitment of basic human rights and values would strengthen

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44. Thomas P. Thornton , "US-Indian Relations in the Nixon and Ford Years", book The Hope and the Reality : US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, edited by H.A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly, Westview Press, Boulder 1992, p-114.

our relations."<sup>45</sup> All American Newspapers and leaders highly praised the 1977 election results and hoped for a better ties.

It was widely assumed in both India and the United States that these major changes in both countries would lead to a happier era in Indo-American relations. This was indeed the case, although relations did not reach the levels that were anticipated.<sup>46</sup> But obviously it was an era of new hope with a new team in Indian government machinery. Within a few months, Prime Minister Morarji Desai promised to adhere to a policy of "proper non-alignment" and to extricate India from any special relationship (Indo-Soviet relations as conceived by Americans) and this was heavily welcomed in United States. But in reality Indo-Soviet relation in Janata period was as strong as in other period. So what Mr. Desai and other Janata leaders tried was to improve Indo-American relation at the same time having good relations with the Soviet Union.

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45. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 23 Mar, 1977.

46. Norman, D. Palmer , The United States and India ; p-80.

On March 31, the United States Congress voted to repeal an amendment requiring the US representative to the World Bank to vote against a low interest loan to India. Again US Congress voted for \$60 million for a grain storage programme and other agricultural programmes. Bilateral economic aid was started after a gap of seven years. At the same time, humanitarian PL 480 food aid was maintained at level of \$ 118 - \$ 136 million per years.<sup>47</sup> More important for India, The United States also maintained the level of its contribution in the fifth replenishment of IDA, the World Bank's window for soft loans.

In May 1977, Robert Goheen was appointed US ambassador to India who had been born in India of missionary parents. He had a special interest in India and his appointment was highly welcomed in India. Warren Christopher, then undersecretary of State, came to India in early July to discuss a variety of issues with Indian leaders. After talks with the External Affairs Minister Mr. Vajpayee, the US deputy secretary of state Mr. Christopher said that India and the United States were "on the verge of a new era of close

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47. See, Robert F. Goheer, "US policy towards India the Carter Presidency", in ed book by Gould and Ganguly - The Hope and Reality, p - 124.

and friendly relations."<sup>48</sup> The appointment of Mr. Nani Palkhivala as India's ambassador to US was also welcomed in the United States.

#### Carter's Visit to India :

Indo-US relations went to a high when President Carter paid a visit to New Delhi in January 1978. The visit to New Delhi spanned January 1-3, and was in almost all respects a highly successful exercise in personal presidential diplomacy. A warm welcome was given to Mr. Carter. An estimated 3 lakhs people lined the streets from Palam to Rashtrapati Bhavan and a crowd of 50,000 people attended the public meeting by Mr. Carter in Ramlila ground. Though there was no such fixed agenda, talk of President Carter with Prime Minister Desai was satisfactory and they signed a previously agreed upon Delhi Declaration. It affirmed "an unwavering faith in the democratic form of government," included the "right of each people to determine its own form of government and each nation its own political, social and economic policies," committed both nations to the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and called also

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48. See, *Hindu (Madras)* 24th July 1977.

for a more equitable economic order. But the relations lacked what has been called the hardware of diplomacy—namely, much commercial, trade, or other economic substance. Common national security interests and arms supply relationships were also missing. Besides it, there was a sharp difference between the two countries, on the issue of Non-Proliferation Treaty, because Mr. Desai did not assure American President that India would sign NPT or take full scale safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. On the other hand United States did not want to provide nuclear fuel for Tarapur Plant until India take full scale safeguards. And this 'differences on nuclear issues continued to be devil Indo-American relations through out the rest of 1978 and 1979.<sup>49</sup>

Prime Minister, Morarji Desai returned the visit in June 1978. He had several meetings with President Carter and members of congress and addressed several large public meetings. Despite continuing differences between the two countries on their nuclear policies, this visit, too, proved a successful exercise in high level personal diplomacy. United States also agreed to give bilateral economic aid to India and American investment in India also increased, which

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49. Norman D. Palmer ; *The United States and India* ; PP-85.



constituted about 30 percent of the foreign investment in the country. Two leaders also agreed on the dialogue to ease the relation on nuclear front, though there was no such great development. United States also appreciated India's stand on non-alignment and it had no such illusion that India is a Soviet lackey.

In June 1979, Desai had to resign due to the differences between various factions of his own party. Charan Singh became Prime Minister with a shaky ground and with uncommitted support of congress and remained in power for a very brief period and could not take any major policy decision in either domestic or foreign policy. In late 1979, Indo-US relations were stable and cool and taking a turn towards worse due to the political crisis in Afghanistan where opinions of the two countries were pole apart.

#### Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan and After :

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which was the most important event in 1980s led to an international crisis. This action led to a basic change in US relations with Pakistan, and it greatly complicated the already less than

satisfactory relations with India.<sup>50</sup> As the system of 'detente' was losing its importance in the late 70s, sudden Soviet decision to enter in Afghanistan revived the Cold War fever in world politics what many scholars termed as 'New Cold War'. To contain Soviet Union, United States started to give huge sophisticated arms to Pakistan. It disturbed India heavily, as past experience showed that most US arms were used against India than other. Prime Minister of India, warned that the competitive induction of arms into the region would only heighten tensions and create greater instability in the area, without in any way helping to sustain the independence of Afghanistan.<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, according to US perspective, the Indian reactions to the Soviet moves in Afghanistan revealed at best a deplorable and alarming ambivalence and at worst a decided pro-Soviet bias.<sup>52</sup> Actually India was more disturbed by the prospect of a renewal of huge US military aid to Pakistan than by the new threats posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

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50. Norman D. Palmer , The United States and India, p-86.

51. See, Hindu (Madras) 3 Jan, 1980.

52. Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India, p-86.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi's coming in power through 1980 election also made Indo-US relation more cool, because most American officials seemed her pro-Soviet. Here it should be clarified that India was not in favour of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It also wanted that Soviet troops should leave Afghanistan as soon as possible, but opposed an armed clash on high mounted tension on that issue: While the main US aim appeared to be to try to impress upon the Soviet Union that it could not repeat actions such as the one was Afghanistan with impunity, India's goal was to preserve the non-align nature of South Asia and to keep great power rivalry out. While both agreed on the necessity for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, they were not exactly on the same track on the need for a military response to the Soviet presence.<sup>53</sup>.

When Reagan came in power in 1981, US attitude towards Afghan problems hardened and Pakistan continued to get more political and material supports from Reagan administration. It remained the most contentious issue between India and the United States throughout 1980s. Though there were frequent visits by the Indian and United States officials to each other country, Indo-US relation did not improve beyond the general parameters of friend foe type. If we go to some detail we can understand it easily.

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53. See, *Hindu (Madras)* 28 Feb, 1980.

As leaders of both the countries believed that Indian and United States having so many similarities in ideology mainly in democratic system and freedom, there should be a cooperative relationship between these two countries. Hence there was no lack of goodwill, but whenever it come to reality, interests of the two contradicted. To make the relation friendly, India sent its most distinguished diplomat K.R.Narayanan to Washigton, similarly United States sent Mr. Harry Barnes as the ambassador to India. But whenever United States decided to send Mr. George Griffin as the political counselor in its New Delhi embassy, India objected with its strongest term. Because he had link with the CIA and India feared his appointment is a political move.<sup>54</sup> Indo-US relations also touched a new low when US government refused to honour its commitments to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur Plant and for its negative attitude on the question of IMF loan to this country. There were reports that the US commerce department had refused export licenses for the non-lethal equipment needed for India's space programme, some thermal plants and certain items needed for Tarapur and Narora Plants. Our Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi regretted by saying that many of the things that the Reagan administration does "are not in

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54. See, National Herald (New Delhi) 10 Sept, 1981.

India's interest."<sup>55</sup>

Mrs. Gandhi was invited by President Reagan and she went to USA in July 1982. According to both the countries government spokesman and media this was a successful visit. Various issues were discussed when Mrs. Gandhi met President Reagan and some issues were solved. The issue of uranium to Tarapur plant was solved by dialogue, when United States allowed India to purchase it from France. Another success of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's visit was an increase in Indo-American cooperation in the fields of science and technology, and education and culture. United States also assured India to support to get IMF loan amounting to 2.3 billion SDRs for various development programme. Still this visit had a limited goal and it did not fruit so much. It is very much revealed in Mrs. Gandhi's remark, "No two countries can have the same angle of vision. But each can try to appreciate the points of view of the others. Our effort should be to find a common area, howsoever small, on which to build and to increase cooperation."<sup>56</sup> The official Indian interpretation was that the visit had been successful in achieving its limited purposes, which were mainly to

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55. See, Times of India (New Delhi) 12th July 1982.

56. See, Hindu (Madras) July 31, 1982.

create a better understanding of India's foreign policy. I.K. Gujral in an interview to Mr. Harish Khare remarked "What has happened is a simple lowering of rhetoric. The major issues divide us have not been sorted out."<sup>57</sup>

Relations with the United States did not improve any further and it deteriorated when India saw that the US was arming Pakistan alarmingly. The US secretary of state George P. Shultz came in India on 30th June 1983, but he could not assure Indian government that his country would not give further weapons to Pakistan, rather he had shown no response to India's apprehensions that the continued arming of Pakistan threatens both its own integrity and peace and stability in the region. Only problems of spare parts to Tarapur plant was solved that India could purchase it from Germany, France, Italy, Canada and if not available in other countries, US would provide only those parts. Mr. Shultz also showed US interest to sell American arms to India, but India did not give any positive response.

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57. See, Hindustan Times, "Shultz visit a non-starter", 24 June 1983.

There were several meetings of Indo-American Joint Commission and delegates of both the countries discussed various issues of trade, commerce, educational and cultural spheres and scientific development. In July 1983 it was also decided to observe 1984 and 1985 as years of special focus for increased collaboration between the two countries in various fields. But there was no remarkable improvement in any front. Mrs. Gandhi also went to New York to join the 38th annual session of General Assembly and met Mr. Reagan in September 1983 and discussed various global issues, where Reagan hoped for a better understanding with India. Later he also understood India's stand of nonalignment and told he did not consider India as anti-American.

But all these were on the superficial level. Because when US Vice President George Bush came to India on 12th May 1984, he recognised India as "a major pivotal power-important in the region and important in the world" and wanted a strong, stable India, but he defended US arming of Pakistan.<sup>58</sup> India also protested heavily when US envoy to Pakistan told that US would come to Pakistan's help if India committed aggression.<sup>59</sup>

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58. See Times of India (New Delhi) 13 May, 1984.

59. See, Statesman (New Delhi) 16 Oct 1984.

### Rajiv Gandhi Era :

Americans have expected a change in India's foreign policy approach and therefore an improvement in Indo-US relations every time there has been a change of Prime Minister in this country. When Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in October 1984 and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi came in power, US administration hoped for better relations with India. But Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in his policy declaration already showed India's stand of non-alignment, friendly relationship with both USSR and USA and faith in new international Economic Order.

From CIA and State Department assessments the American media also picked up the theme that with his public school and British education and training as pilot, Rajiv Gandhi will be pro-West.<sup>60</sup> But Mr. Gandhi did not come out from his mother's or from his grandfather's style of foreign policy i.e. to keep good relationship with both the superpowers and independence of decision making. Actually India did not want to become an American client ever what United States wanted by its utterances of friendliness. It becomes clear when we see their course of action in Rajiv Gandhi period.

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60. See, Blitz (Bombay) 26 Jan 1985.



Rajiv Gandhi administration seriously wanted to make a friendly relationship with the US, particularly for India's need of advance technology and for American investment. It also started a liberal pattern of economy by reducing taxes and reducing various regulations. United States expected a business relation with India and that is why they even offered to sale arms to India. On the other hand Mr.Reagan never stopped to give huge sophisticated arms and war planes to Pakistan declaring it as a 'front line' state. This very issue rocked Indo-US relation throughout the late 80s and when Rajiv Gandhi went to USA in June 1985, he conveyed India's concern of this arms race and high tension to Mr.Reagan. But he did not assure Mr.Gandhi that America would not give arms to Pakistan and this policy continued. However some positive sides of Mr.Gandhi's US visit were that US admitted India's pivotal role in South Asia and a stable and undivided India for world peace. A memorandum of understanding on transfer of high technology was also signed, under which US agreed to sale sophisticated computer to India. They also agreed to combat terrorist violence jointly. General Americans were also highly impressed by Mr.Rajiv Gandhi's young charismatic personality.

But that was all. On most of the global issues there were disagreement and there was no much talking on economic

aid and trade relations. "Aside from professional optimists who keep telling this country every morning that things are improving between Reaganite America and Rajiv Gandhi's India, there will be few to encourage this line of dangerous self delusion in view of especially of recent reports of stepped-up weapons delivery to Pakistan."<sup>61</sup> Because the nature of weapons being contracted for delivery to Islamabad makes it clear that the pretence of the Afghanistan crisis as the justification for these military hardware was being cynically disregarded. Most of the arms given to Pakistan could be used better in plains of Punjab and Rajasthan than in hilly Afghanistan border and US also understood it highly that Pakistan wanted it against India.

Now one can think that there was no development in Indo-US relations, but it is incorrect to say that there was no development. As United States understood India's importance in South Asia and broadly in Asia, it changed its strategies and tried to make a working relationship even sometimes at the cost of Pakistan interest. But basic differences in way of looking global issues and to deal with it remained. When Rajiv Gandhi after attending UN general Assembly Session in October 1985 and meeting with President

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61. See, News Time, (Hyderabad) 23 Sept, 1985.

Reagan came to India via Moscow and remarked that US was less interested than Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons, United States was upset totally. Similarly, India condemned the US bombing over Libya and said it was a clear cut aggression against sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya. There were also wide gap in opinion over West-Asia and Latin American Problems.

The US administration, on the other side, always did not take India's interest in concern. The Pentagon was in dilemma and opposed to the transfer of any sensitive technology (mainly military technology) to India so long as the country does not sign a special security agreement called General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).<sup>62</sup> But in December 1987, the US congress approved \$ 4.02 billion in military and economic assistance to Pakistan and made it contingent upon India to sign the nuclear treaty or face the loss of high technology transfer, defence deals, scientific cooperation and asked administration to oppose multilateral aid.<sup>63</sup> Such was the attitude even in 1988 and there was no stoppage of the US arms to Pakistan.

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62. See, Times of India (New Delhi) 15 Feb, 1986.

63. See, National Herald (New Delhi) 6 Dec 1987.

So in the whole period from India's independence upto 1988, there was no remarkable change in Indo-US relations what Mr.T.V.Kunhi Krishnan has correctly said the 'unfriendly friend's. Obviously it was a love-hate relationship, but there was more hate than love. To look on the cause V.D.Chopra says : "The crucial issue is that as long as India follows a policy to create a nuclear-war-free and non-violent world, it would again and again come into conflict with Washigton. And if it gives up this policy and falls in line with countries like Egypt, this contradiction would be resolved."<sup>64</sup> Actually this is the main contradiction between India and United States, when US wants to make India a client state, India shows its independence of action and want to be self reliant. India being a big country and with a high potentiality does not want to be a satellite of any power and what is also not possible. This very basic difference of the two great democracies, with different degree of economic development have kept them apart from each other.

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64. V.D.Chopra , "Ramification of Foreign Hand" , Patriot (New Delhi), 13 April 1987.

Chapter III  
The Changing US Policy towards India in  
the Post Cold War era.

The year of 1989 is a Landmark year in the arena of international Politics. When many international events took place in this year, Indo - U.S. relations also changed towards a normal track. Actually 1989 is that year when cold war came to an formal end which was marked by the German unification move and total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. There was a conciliatory approach from both the super powers on most of the international issues. Under Mr. Gorbachev Soviet Union was transforming towards democratic system and most East + European nations were coming closer to their Western counterpart. Similarly under President Bush who came in Power in early 1989, United States had started to take more rational approach to the decaying communist nations. So in such a peaceful time, it was quite natural that the United States started to take a more rational attitude towards the third world countries and especially towards South Asia.

As the Cold war fever was fading away, United States relation with the Soviet Union became to a greater extent normal. And now the U.S. have no criterion to call India pro - Soviet and to declare Pakistan as a ' frontline State '

for giving huge sophisticated arms which rocked Indo - U.S. relations throughout the decade. Not long ago, the degree of warmth in Washington's relations with other countries was determined by their record of voting in the U.N. - those siding against Washington, with Moscow, were cold shouldered in a manner causing sharp irritation,<sup>1</sup> And India's voting pattern in the U.N. did not bring it close with the United States. But with the emergence of broader rapprochement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that situation has changed. It helps to understand India's position and potentiality in trade and regional stability by the American policy makers.

#### Bush Administration and in Indo-US Relations :

There was hope on Mr. Bush, as with the change of leadership, there might be a change in U.S. policy towards India. He also had not any in-built prejudice against India, but had a good personal relation with Rajiv Gandhi. James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State, declared that United State would seek to improve relations with both India and Pakistan. U.S. ambassador to India John Hubbard also said significantly that his country was determined to work more

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\*1. See Hindu (Madras) 21 Jan, 1989.

closely with India and wanted the rest of world to know that the U.S. was not only India's largest trading partner but was taking increasing pride as the most preferred source of high-tech computers and electronic and telecom equipment.

Actually " the traditional American policy towards India, China and Pakistan was contingent upon cold war consideration ".<sup>2</sup> Now with the end of cold war and with the dissolution of Soviet Union, Washington no longer looks at India as a regional power with " nuisance value " and friendly to its principal adversary, Even America started to appreciate India's non alignment policy with more tolerance.

There was also a marked development in Pakistan's internal politics, as Mrs. Benazir Bhutto came in power through democratic election. As a result, Indian leaders expected a more normal relations with Pakistan and it was a good sign of stability in the South Asian region which arose much interest in the mind of U.S. policy makers. As Pakistan

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\*2. Chintamani Mahapatra, "Washington's shifting priorities and policy towards South Asia", Strategic Analysis, March 1992, p - 1398.

always remained a major influential factors in the shaping of Indo-U.S. relations, obviously the rapprochement between India and Pakistan was a positive development. But, it is also wrong to say that the Americans have been quite able to free themselves from the Dullesian allergy to non-aligned India.

Though there are many international issues on which India and the United States have different views, both have understood each other's relative importance in their foreign policy making. While cultural, educational and scientific relations between the two countries have been established earlier, the burgeoning trade and commerce ties may now be supplemented by an equally strong defence and high technology co-operation between the two countries. In recent years, the U.S. has replaced the Soviet Union as the largest trading partner of India and the bilateral trade between the two countries reached a high of \$ 5.7 billion in 1988. Another noteworthy development between the two countries is their decision to co-operate to make certain defence related items. In fact, joint collaboration in the manufacture of a Light Combat Aircraft has already started and recently it underwent-flight in Bangalore. The former Indian Defence Minister went to U.S.A. in June 1989 and discussed various defence related issues with his U.S.



counterpart Mr. R. Cheney, where he sought U.S. submarine technology system to enable India to indigenously manufacture a submarine fleet. United States response was encouraging and they offered to co-produce an advanced fighter jet engine with India. Unlike the past, such co-operation is hardly expected to disturb the supporters of Pakistan and to bring out the pro - Islamabad lobby in the U.S. Congress.

India's choice in the foreign policy making has also been narrowed down after the Soviet collapse. India in the past mainly depended on the Soviet Union for its defence needs, but with the Soviet collapse, India has to take the hard reality into its account and even to change its options to get the needed defence technology. On the other hand United States likes to exploit the massive Indian defence market instead of being encumbered by ideological constraints. Reports say that there was a high pressure from the defence establishments on the Bush administration to take a liberal view on India's purchase of American weapons. This attitude became clear in late 1989 when U.S. Ambassador designate Mr. William Clark in his interview to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said, " To encompass the totality of our relationship with India, we need also to touch on the Security aspect of our respective positions".<sup>3</sup>

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\*3. See, Deccan Herald (Bangalore), 3 Nov 1989.

However all these are not sufficient conditions to say that there was a major break through in the Indo - U.S. relationship. Because, many U.S. congressmen and medias were highly critical of India's non - alignment policy and Soviet friendship. At the end of June 1989 U.S. congressman Wally Herger introduced an anti - India amendment to the Foreign Aid bill and called for an end to all development assistance to India unless the president certified to congress that India has ended its economic blockade to Nepal, allowed Amnesty International access to the Punjab region and made significant progress in reducing human rights abuses by local and paramilitary forces.<sup>4</sup> He was also critical of India's regional superpower attitude and its role in Sri Lanka. Though this amendment was defeated with narrow margin of 212 to 204, it revealed India's weak position in the U.S. congress.

**Major Irritants :**

At the same time Pakistan still remained a favourite ally to the U.S. policy makers. Mr. John Kelly, assistance secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,

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\*4. See, Tribune (Chandigarh) 1 July, 1989.

reaffirmed his government's commitment to Pakistan and asked India to rethink its policy of non-alignment. He also said that Pakistan was still under Soviet threat and justified proposed sell of 60 F 16 warplane to Pakistan. The United States media heavily criticized India's launch of ' Agni Missile ' and called it a global threat. The U.S. administration felt intermediate ballistic missile Agni has nuclear capabilities and therefore poses a threat to the security in the subcontinent. When Mr. Pant went to U.S.A., he told sharply that it was one type of technology demonstration and it was developed with India's own resources and expertise and India was not bound by the discriminatory MTCR pact where India is not a signatory. But Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer said - India's ambitious missile programme runs " directly counter " to the U.S. policy of controlling the spread of these delivery systems, and the U.S. would deny India technology which might be used to design, test, on produce nuclear capable missiles.<sup>5</sup> And it is the same logic by which United States is trying its best to pressurize Russia to cancel the cryogenic engine deal with India.

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\*5. See, Patriot ( New Delhi ) 22 sept 1989.

To preserve the national interest is the main goal of any nations foreign policy. U.S. is not an exception, even more direct and more unambiguous to follow its interest. They show it very clearly when they don't hesitate to punish the countries under super 301 trade laws, who are not succumbed to their interest. In 1989 U.S. singled out India with other countries to punish under its trade laws super 301 for its alleged violation of the U.S. intellectual property rights. Dr. Ashok Mitra puts it nicely : " A spectre is haunting New Delhi - The spectre of Section 301 of the U.S. trade law ..... It is a blunt enough message : if you want to export your goods to the U.S. and earn precious foreign exchange, you have to accord the Americans some extra special privileges in your domestic market. You must allow your economy to be ravished by American marauders".<sup>6</sup>

It is one kind of new imperialism which becomes easier to follow by the American policy makers after the end of era of the Soviet Union. There is no counter balance and the United States can give some countries most favoured nation status and keeping some countries under super 301 threat,

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\*6. Ashok Mitra, "Our Liberalism and their Blackmail", Telegraph (Calcutta), 14 June 1989.

depending on their self interests. In the name of protecting intellectual property rights United States impose their trade laws against the alleged nations but it hurts the poor nations most as they don't have the needed resources to give the US farms their demanded royalty or to purchase the patent products with high prices. And this Superpower 301 threat becomes a major obstacle in the relationship of India and the United States. Moreover, it should be clarified that still United States has not taken any major steps against India, but given many threats.

However, there was a greater understanding of India's position and its potentiality as a market from the US decision makers. Even once the great critic of India Dr. Kissinger in an exclusive interview in New York said, "In a measurable period of time, say 20 to 30 years, India will become a significant industrial country, certainly by far the strongest country in South Asia."<sup>7</sup> He also hoped India will play a global role in near future. "And as the Indian military power started having an impact in terms of image in the West, and especially on the US, and as the US strategic community realised the implications of the rise the Japan

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\*7. See, News Time, (Hyderabad) 5 April 1989.

and Western Europe as its technological rivals, the limitations in their relationship with China and undependability of Pakistan, the US started realising India's strategic importance and displaying somewhat greater interest in transfer of defence technology to India."<sup>8</sup> United States also suggested that there should be greater dialogue between the strategic communities of the two countries. And there has been an increasing interchange of defence oriented personnel between India and the United States including chief of Army staffs and many defence personnel from the U.S. There are many seminars on defence related subjects and problem - and both are happy over the free exchange of opinion.

#### V.P. Singh Period :

Indo - U.S. relationship entered into a new phase when V.P. Singh came in power in 1989 election. One can't say

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\*8. S. Subrahmanyam, "Strategic Dialogue", Hindustan Times, 6 July 1989.

that Americans were happy over the election outcome, as under Rajiv Gandhi, United States felt more easy to negotiate. But the U.S. praised Indian system of democracy and its smooth path of transfer of power. Mr. Peter Galbraith, Chief Policy Adviser for South Asia on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that there was absolutely no "nervousness" on Capitol Hill about the change of leadership in Delhi<sup>9</sup>. He said that the U.S. could work as easily with Mr. V.P. Singh and the minority coalition government as it did with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. Mr. V.P. Singh was known in the United States, particularly when he was defence and finance minister in Rajiv ministry and as an architect of economic reforms marked by trade liberalisation and great emphasis on privatisation. Mr. Galbraith also said that V.P. Singh "has basically similar views as Rajiv Gandhi on foreign policy". There was also no such major change in India's foreign policy in the brief period of Mr. Singh.

Another major development in the U.S. policy towards South Asia in this period was that the United States started

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\*9. See, Times of India (New Delhi) 1 Dec 1989.

to reassess Pakistan's role in destabilising South Asia and its ambitious nuclear weapons programme. In the past United States always advised India to sign the non - proliferation treaty but took a soft attitude to Pakistan's nuclear programme. But with the end of cold war and specially after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. started to take a firm attitude towards Pakistan. "Earlier in its overdominant concern for the strategy of containment of communism the U.S. neglected to verify the genuine credentials of India and Pakistan for entitlement of its friendship and alliance; it plumped for Pakistan's dubious alliance in preference to India's honest brokership. "<sup>10</sup> Now the cut off of American military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment since october 1991 is the ultimate firmness from the U.S. side to Pakistan.

**Kashmir Issue :**

On the Kashmir issue also there is a subtle change in the U.S. stand, though we can't say that it is fully

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\*10. M.J.Vinod, "Attitudes Towards India : Contrasting Approaches of the United States and the Soviet Union", India Quarterly, (Jan - Mar) 1990, p-40.



supporting India, it is not anti-India. U.S. officials are cautious in their public reaction to the Kashmir situation remaining content to urge both sides to allow ' political dialogue ' to address the problems of Kashmir. Even the U.S. is not very supportive of Pakistan's bid to internationalise the Kashmir issue. "The Bush Administration has not only repeatedly warned Pakistan assisting the terrorist elements in the Kashmir valley and, of course, in Punjab but also has refused to recognise the Kashmir issue as an international problem and has repeatedly suggested the resolution of this bilateral issue under the Indo - Pakistan Simla Agreement". <sup>11</sup> Representative Stephen Solarz also said that if allegations of Pakistani involvement in the disturbances in Kashmir were found true by American intelligence agencies, it could have " Serious consequences " for U.S. - Pakistan relations.

We can remember here that after the end of so called menace of communism, Islamic fundamentalism become the major enemy to the American policy maker's perception of global

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\*11. Chintamani Mahapatra, "Washington's shifting Priorities and policy towards South Asia", Strategic Analysis, Mar 1992, p - 1396.

stability. United States also threatened Pakistan to name it as a terrorist state with Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria etc. At the present time United States wants to phase out USAID programme in Pakistan and consequently the USAID mission in Pakistan no longer receives new funding from the U.S. Government.

But nobody should think that there is no friend of Pakistan in U.S. congress or in important organisation there. For example in its report Heritage Foundation of Washington says in a section on relations with South Asia " Better relations with India need not be at the expense of U.S. relations with Pakistan - and vice versa ". The report also says, " Delhi must understand, however, that the U.S. will provide necessary defensive weapons system to Pakistan."<sup>12</sup> The attitude of cold war time depicting Pakistan as " an ally " and India as a " difficult friend " has not been changed totally. Again Pakistan has not lost all its relevance to the U.S. administration, particularly for its West Asian policy where it seems Pakistan can play its role for the U.S. We should not think that the U.S. pressures on Pakistan for its nuclear programme and to abuse China for its human rights abuses are meant to please India.

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\*12 See, Times of India (New Delhi) 10 Feb, 1989.

Still " The U.S. policy makers believe that a reasonably friendly and pliable Pakistan may be useful for dealing with fundamentalist forces which are surfacing in most parts of the Islamic World."<sup>13</sup>

Actually US policy towards South Asia or towards India is guided by United States strategic and economic interests, not by a philanthropic cause. It becomes very clear with reference to the report of Heritage Foundation when it frankly admits that the real reason for listing India under super 301 appeared to be New Delhi's long history of public opposition to US initiatives in world trade forums, especially those covering intellectual property rights.<sup>14</sup> Again it says "In addition, because India represents such a relatively small market for US exports, Washington was confident that India could not inflict serious damage by retaliatory trade measures." In case of India, it is quite impossible for a country of its size and population to be a mere satellite , which a smaller country may be prepared to

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\*13. Chintamani Mahapatra, "Washington's shifting Priorities and Policy towards South Asia", Strategic Analysis, Mar 1992, p-1398.

\*14. See, Hindustan Times (New Delhi); 2 April 1990.

be. It is, perhaps, this instinctive realisation which makes the United States wary about India.<sup>15</sup>

The Gulf War and India's Relations with the US :

In late 1990 there was an international crisis over the sudden Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2. And about all international politics now revolved around Persian Gulf. In Indian Politics V.P. Singh Government had to step down due to withdrawal of support by Bhartiya Janata Party and subsequently Chandra Shekhar Ministry assumed office with congress support. Though Chandra Shekhar Ministry remained in power for a very brief period, Indo-US relations took a new turn in this period. Clearly noted differences existed between the perceptions of the two countries over their roles in the Gulf. India, for instance, was firm in supporting the United Nations sanctioned embargo against Iraq but at the same time preferred a UN sponsored handling of the crisis to the presence of massive numbers of Americans and other foreign troops in the Gulf region. Though India did not oppose any US sponsored resolution in

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\*15. A.P. Venkateswarah, "US and South Asia", World Focus, (Nov-Dec) 1990, p-15.

UN Security Council against Iraq, it also did not send any troops against Iraq. But the US always took a confrontationalist attitude and mainly stressed on armed solution of the Gulf Crisis and was unhappy with India's stand.

Gulf War started in mid January 1991 and Indian Public opinion was very critical of heavy US bombing over Iraq. But Chandra Shekhar government's decision to give the refuelling facility to the US transport planes from the warfields at Bombay was highly appreciated by the Bush administration. It was thought present government has sharply shifted from India's traditional foreign policy of non-alignment and surrendered to the US pressure. "Through this departure from the nationally accepted policy of India, the present government has given the impression that it has overtly and covertly begun to side with the US in the Gulf War."<sup>16</sup> It was also thought by many that the main thrust of India's foreign policy has been diluted. But according to some sections in India and mostly in USA it was the first sign of a more pragmatic Indian foreign policy which

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\*16. V.D.Chopra, "Indo-US relations : new turn", Patriot (New Delhi) 4 Feb, 1991.

floundered for more than a year in the face of a changing Soviet Union and the increasing irrelevance of the non-alignment movement.<sup>17</sup>

This so called pragmatism of Indian foreign policy also paid to some extent. The International Monetary Fund gave a massive loan to India and the White House approved the sale of second supercomputer. In March 1991 US administration opposed Mr. Dan Burton's bill which sought to cut off economic assistance to India for its alleged human rights record. In the opinion of the state department, India's record on human rights had problem areas, but there were many "bright spots" too. It is a nation where democracy prevails and the judiciary is independent.

But this was not a very long cooperation with United State's strategic interest. Due to heavy pressure of Public opinion and criticism by the Congress Party and National Front-Left alliances, Chandra Shekhar government was forced to withdraw the refuelling facility to the US plane. A

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\*17. See, Telegraph (Calcutta) 20 Feb, 1991.

leftist leader commented on the issue by saying, "If we view this developing cooperation in perspective, the refuelling of US military planes at Indian airports can be seen as part of the overall US designs to draw India into a long-term strategic cooperation taking advantage of the important changes which have taken place in the international sphere."<sup>18</sup> Actually America's main intention was to draw India in its own side, otherwise there were many places like Colombo, Karachi where US planes could be refuelled without any major controversy.

#### Indo-US Defence Cooperation :

Cold War was taking a backseat from 1988-89, but unopposing US dominance is established after the Gulf War. The United States will be the master of the whole world and others have to listen its direction, if not direction at least advice, what is in Mr. Bush's word the 'new world order'. And in this so called new world, there is a heavy change in perception of most countries to the US. India is not an exception. On the Indian side, the weakening of the

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18. Prakash Karat, "Refuelling US Planes Deeper Issues", Mainstream, Mar 2 1991; P-24.

Soviet Union, the traditional support and ally and the perception of a "Unipolar World" in which America is dominant has led influential sections of the ruling classes and some of the top echelons of the bureaucracy to argue for an accommodation with America in the "national interest".<sup>19</sup> Even in Indian army, which had no direct relations with the US army for the past forty years, shares this new mood. We can understand it with the former army chief Mr. S.F. Rodrigues' statement that the developing Indo-US defence ties is based on a "shared strategic perception, which will evolve into a mutual arrangement that benefits both equally."<sup>20</sup>

This new mood about the United States global role and position, with our present government's new economic policy have changed United States' perception about India and its role in the South Asia. Abid Hussain, the former Indian ambassador in Washington said, "The Bush administration has indeed unfolded a policy of growing friendship with India. Even in the critical hours of the Gulf War, they did not

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19. Prakash Karat, "Refuelling US Planes Deeper Issues", Mainstream, Mar 2 1991; P-24.

20. See, Times of India (New Delhi), 1 December 1991.



give up (the practice of) seeking aid and assistance from India, for they knew that India most often represented the Voice of Conscience".<sup>21</sup> And the ultimate stage of this newly found mood became very clear when Lt.Gen. Claude Kicklighter gave a broad Indo-US army to army cooperation proposal to the visiting Indian army chief Mr.S.F.Rodrigues. Main objectives of this proposal were to pursue a common policy of gradually strengthening ties towards expanded cooperation and partnership by the end of this decade through high level visits, exchanges and periodic policy reviews, Indian/US army staff talks and cooperative work in selected areas of common interest.<sup>22</sup>

The Kicklighter proposal included many suggestions of Indo-US defence cooperation. Some of the specific suggestions are : Visit by chief of staff on an annual basis to alternating countries; Setting up of an Indian/US Army executives steering council; Reciprocal visit by other senior commanders; staff information exchanges; Reciprocal training and individual training programmes; US and Indian army participation in the Pacific Commands joint committee

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\*21. See, Times of India, 18 Aug. 1991.

\*22. For detail see Times of India, 8 Sept., 1991.

level meeting programme, etc. Report said that Mr. Rodrigues showed immediate positive response and later the then Indian Defence Minister, Sarad Pawar also showed similar positive response for Indo-US defence cooperation.

With the deterioration in US relations with Pakistan, Israel in West-Asia is today the only dependable strategic partner that the US has in the area. But Israel is not a littoral state of Indian Ocean and United States is in search of a new friend. Strategic planners in the US therefore feel that exploring the possibility of a cooperative relationship with a regional power like India could be of advantage in the long term.<sup>23</sup> The recent frequent visits by Army Generals from both the countries and the joint naval exercises in the Arabian Sea showed this cooperative mood and implementation of the Kicklighter proposal. But the two main hurdles that still keep two parties from total cordiality are the signing of non-proliferation treaty and cryogenic rocket engine deal with Russia. On both these issues two parties keep their stand clear : when United States requests India to sign NPT and to

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\*23. See, Times of India, 8 Sept 1991.

cancel the Cryogenic engine deal with Russia, India opposes this view as to it NPT is discriminatory and India is not a party to the MTCR rule. India also did not response positively to the Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif's proposal of declaring South Asia a nuclear free zone, as nuclear proliferation is not a problem of a zone, but there should be a global framework.

Real Intentions of the US :

Now does United States want to make India a regional superpower or an independent centre of power in South Asia. It does not seem so. Because America's political and military mission in the post-cold war world will be to ensure that no rival super power emerges in Western Europe, Asia or in the former Soviet Union. "The United States is determined to do all it can to prevent India and other similarly missile-capable countries from further developing their missile making technologies."<sup>24</sup> The leaked Pentagon reports in March 1992 said about the South-West Asia region, "We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In this

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\*24. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Illusions about India-US Ties",

News Time (Hyderabad) 27 April 1992.

regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and place their nuclear energy facilities under the International Atomic Energy (IAE) safeguards. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean."<sup>25</sup> It also told about a constructive US-Pakistan military relationship for a stable South-West Asia, provided Pakistan discontinue its nuclear programme.

So, it is highly rational to infer, "The US will not help India to grow into a military power, certainly not as a missile and nuclear power. Since many technology are now are dual purpose and can be used both for civilian and military ends, India will not find it easy to buy certain kinds of technologies from the US."<sup>26</sup> The huge pressure of Bush and subsequently Clinton administration on Russia not to sell Cryogenic rocket engine to India is very much in that direction to make their new world order safe and not to

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\*25. See, Times of India, 9 March 1992.

\*26. Bhabani Sen Gupta, " Illusions about India-US Ties", News Time (Hyderabad); 27 April 1992.

allow India's 'hegemonic' aspirations. And for the same reason they have imposed two years ban on ISRO and Russia's Glavkosmos and advised other countries to impose the similar ban.

Another revelation frames a penetrating insight into the problem. A detailed review of the Indian space programme belived to have been prepared by the US mission in New Delhi has assessed that, if succesful, the Augmented Satelite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), the Polar Satelite Launch Vehicle(PSLV) , and the Geo-Stationary Launch Vehicle(GSLV) could offer stiff competition to the West as well as China in commercial launches and suggests that the application of extended sanctions could cripple the Indian space programme.<sup>27</sup> They also resent the Russian "underpricing",<sup>28</sup> because when the American similar engine costs \$ 4400 million, Russia charges only \$ 230 million and Americans fear that it will hit their arms industry. It is clear now that America may want to make India a powerful satelite, but

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\*27. See, Times of India, 7 July 1993.

\*28. See, Bhabani Sen Gupta's article in News Time; 27 April 1992.

not as an independent source of power which in any case compete it in future. Mr. Bush did not hide such intention when he said that he was broadly supportive of the Pentagon document on the US intention to remain the world's sole superpower. The new President Mr. Bill Clinton also represents the same view and his order of missile attack to Iraq on 27th June 1993 for the alleged Iraqi plot to kill the former President, Mr. Bush and his pressure tactics on Mr. Yeltsin not to sell Cryogenic engine to India when he met Mr. Yeltsin in Tokyo recently, reveals America's intentions.

The year of 1992 is an eventful year in the Indo-US relationship in recent time. Because so many decisions and policies taken by United States in this year and India reacted accordingly. One of the main issues in this period which troubled Indo-US relations is alleged human rights violation by the Indian security forces in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The state department contends that security forces used "excessive forces against mass gathering as in retaliation against attacks on them by armed militants."<sup>29</sup> Actually this allegation is made mainly depending on the wrong information by Pakistani elements in the United States

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\*29. See, Times of India, 5 Feb 1992.

and some of their friends in US Congress. United States is not happy with India as it does not allow Amnesty International, the noted London based human rights organisation, to enter in the sensitive border districts of Kashmir. However, it was not such a big issue to the US policy makers and there is a remarkable changes in US stand, it also now condemns the terrorist violence and therefore the US is recomonding Amnesty International that they should "include all sides that commit human rights violations instead of only blaming the Government of India."<sup>30</sup>

#### A Few Positive Developments :

But here we should admit that excepting some irritants, Indo-US relations developed in a positive direction in this period. United States is highly pleased by Narshimha Rao government's new economic policy and delicensing process. Hence, despite Mrs. Carla Hill's threat to India on IPR, United States did not take any major actions and in few occasions extended the dead line on that issue. Moreover,

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\*30. Chintamani Mahapatra, "Washington's shifting priorities and policy towards South Asia", Strategic analysis, March 1992. P - 1397.

the issue is not solved till now. United States has warned India of "larger steps" if it does not heed America's trade concerns and said denial of dutyfree entry for Indian pharmaceuticals and chemicals into the United States was only "the first small step." BUT the positive mood between the two parties is that they believe through negotiations and dialogue this issue can be solved.

Another aspect of changed policy of the United States to India is the army to army cooperation. Union Defence Minister Mr. Sharad Pawar visited the United States in the month of April (1992) and discussed various issues of defence cooperation. When Mr. Pawar described current Indo-US relations as "excellent", Mr. Dick Cheney, the US Defence Secretary, thought they were "in good shape."<sup>31</sup> Indo-US naval exercises took place on 28th May 1992 which Indian government justified by saying that it would help to learn new techniques from the US navy. The final version of so called Pantagon plan for US policy dropped any reference to India as power with "hegemonistic aspirations" in South Asia. Few army Generals from United States also visited India and there was a broad agreement that the US will sell many sophisticated guns including 450 M 109 self-propelled guns to India to strengthen its army.

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\*31. See, *Times of India*, 9 April 1992.  
Indo-US Cooperation : Problems and Prospects :



However, the US threat and pressure on Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to cancel the Cryogenic engine deal and finally ban on Indian Space Research Organisation continued and the year of 1992 on the Indo-US relation front revolved around on these specific issues. The issue of NPT was the most important one which makes the Indo-US relations more problematic than any other issue. After the end of Cold War US have got the world unopposed, obviously its pressure on India to sign the NPT becomes high. When Indian Foreign Secretary Mr. J.N.Dixit went to the United States in March 1992, he was told sharply by the US administration that they would like to see India joining NPT or to be a party to the proposed nuclear free zone of South Asia. The Carnegie Endowment's National Commission on America and the New World in its reports on India says : "We view nuclear non-proiferation objectives in India and Pakistan as particularly urgent, the end of the Cold War offers new opportunities for strengthening our ties with India, particularly as New Delhi proceeds with economic reforms."<sup>32</sup> And especially after French and China's decision to join the

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\*32. See, Times of India, 20 August 1992.

NPT, their full attention came down heavily on India, the disturbed friend of South Asia region.

Though Mr. J.N.Dixit talked about the bilateral dialogue with the US and with Pakistan, India's policy on NPT is very clear. Prime Minister Narashimha Rao within 24 hours of Mr. Dixit's visit said, "Our position on the NPT is well known. We have not signed it and we do not propose to sign it."<sup>33</sup> Returning to India Mr.Dixit also said that India was totally opposed to sign the NPT and would not sign it as it was "permanently discriminatory" not only in area of weapons but in terms of nuclear technology as well. India also opposed the concept of nuclear free zone of South Asia, as non-proliferation is not a concern of a particular area and this concept does not say anything about China's nuclear stock piles. On the Cryogenic engine deal, India tells sharply that it is not for launching any missiles but to launch our indogeneous satelites and does not cancel the deal even after the US ban on ISRO and Glavcosmos.

#### Clinton Administration :

The Democrat President Mr. Bill Clinton came in power in January 1993 with much hope and fanfare. But it is the

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\*33. See, *Times of India*, 13 March 1992.

other side of the same coin and Mr. Clinton also made it clear as early as November 1992 when he has the US president elect said that there would be essential continuity in US foreign policy under his administration <sup>34</sup> He again said, "Even as administrations change, America's fundamental interests do not . ." So the Indo-US relations, practically goes in the same direction, as Mr. Clinton does not deviate even an inch from his predecessor. If we consider some of his policy decisions, mainly those relating Indo-US relations, we can understand it easily.

United States stand on NPT and Cryogenic rocket engine deals became more tough in Clinton era. The pressure has been so high on Russia that Russian P.M. Mr. Viktor Cheromyrdin has to cancel his US trip in June 1993. <sup>35</sup> The Americans are insisting that Russia cancel the deal because they believe that the rocket engine can be used for military purposes. Similarly Clinton administration's over reaction to Iraq for its alleged plan to kill Mr. Bush and missile attacks on Baghdad shows the attitude of a world dictator. United States threat to North Korea for not withdrawing from

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\*34. See, *Times of India*, ; 6 Nov 1992.

NPT and the subtle game by France, not to renew the pact with India to supply nuclear fuel to Tarapur Plant which is lapsing in 1993 again, show the tough policy on nuclear issue. Today Russia is a poor country, it does not have the power or intention to play a global role and itself dependent on Western economic aid. Hence, we have to see how long it can face the US pressure. It should also be clear that Russia is now having a modified view on the rocket deal and a Russian foreign ministry source said in Moscow that one way out of the deadlock could be by holding tripartite talks, between the US, Russia and India.<sup>36</sup>

Some positive steps are taken from the Clinton administration as well. The United States now giving threat to Pakistan to name it as a terrorist state if it does not change its policy to support the terrorist groups in the Punjab and Kashmir. The CIA chief, Mr. James Woolsey, has told the Senate judiciary committee that Pakistan is "on the brink" of being branded a state sponsor of terrorism along with Sudan and it is providing "safe haven" to Kashmiri and

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\*35. See, Times of India, 25 June 1993.

\*36. See Times of India, 23 April 1993.

Sikh terrorists.<sup>37</sup> On the issue of ban on ISRO, US also tried to understand Indian position of satellite launching for developmental purpose and it was discussed with greater understanding when Prof. U.R.Rao, the ISRO Chief, went to USA recently. Clinton administration's decision to send Mr. Stephen J. Solarz, the most outstanding friend of India in the US Congress, as an ambassador to New Delhi is obviously a positive plan to make friendship with India.

Now it is seen that the oldest democracy USA and the largest democracy India are realising each other's relative importance for mutual benefit. When there is no such cold war fever and when India does not belong to the group of friends of its main adversary, United States should take a rational approach to India. On the other hand when India's options became limited and United States become the sole superpower militarily and technologically, it is better to arrive at a working understanding with the United States to advance its developmental process. But nobody can say that Indo-US relation would be totally smooth. As there is a great gap between their economic developments and that their individual demands from the prevailing international society

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\*37. See Times of India, 23 April 1993.

differed, it can't be so easy and smooth. "But the pace of relations between India and the United States will proceed despite minor jolts and snags."<sup>38</sup>

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\*38. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Illusions about India-US Ties", News Times, 27 Apr 1992.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSIONS

To write a conclusion on Indo-US relations is a tough task, particularly remembering its uncertain nature and especially in a time when the whole world is going through a transitional period. International situation at present is highly volatile and nobody knows how the breakaway Soviet Republics will shape their future. When a mild economic recession is hunting the developed Western countries, millions of people are still starved, suffer from health problems and extremely poor in the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is true that an all round development has taken place in international arena, but there also remain Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa and others. In such a situation being the oldest and most popular democracy respectively USA and India have a great responsibility to the other parts of the world. Obviously the relationship of the two great democracies, who are exactly neither friends nor foes, attracts attention of the concerned experts.

Since the independence of India, Indo-US relations passed through many phases and we have already discussed it in previous two chapters in detail. Although the Indo-US relations started with a romanticized version of President

Roosevelt's role in pleading for Indian independence with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill , in the following years, Indo-US relation did not remain friendly, but went through ups and downs, from a friendly relations at the time of President Kennedy to the worst at the time of President Nixon. India also did not get that much help from the American policy makers for its nation building tasks, which it deserved as the most popular democracy with a second largest population and a ravaged economy done by the British colonialist.

As the American foreign policy was totally shaped and influenced by the Cold War tension and containment of Communism, it could not accept Nehru's independent attitude and non-alignment policy with a friendly note. Similarly, when United States influenced by their British friend took a pro-Pakistani stand on the Kashmir issue as early as 1948, India became totally disappointed and frustrated by the American policy. Dullesian thought of 'those who are not with us against us' became a great obstacle in the process of making a friendly relations with India. After the death of Stalin when Soviet Union took a rational approach to India and started propping Nehru's planning process, Washington thought that in the name of non-alignment they actually belonged to the Soviet camp. At the same time



United States got Pakistan as their ally which surrendered fully to the Western camp for its cherished goal to be equal with India and to get more American fund for its military build up. As Pakistan was India's main adversary in the sub continent, this US-Pakistan hobnobbing aroused concrete suspicion in the Indian mind.

The Chinese attack in 1962 gave a very good opportunity to make the United States and India reliable friend. Though United States sent arms shipment for India, relations with India did not improve to a high plateau, because India demanded a long term help for its military build up without disturbing its good relations with Soviet Union. In the following years India's relations with United states deteriorated due to American arms supply to Pakistan and its indirect support in the war of 1965 and 1971. Even the relations came to its nadir when Nixon administration sent American Seventh Fleet in the waters of Bay of Bengal to brow beat India to save East Pakistan for Pakistan. Actually it is the American policy what equated Pakistan with India against India's pre - eminence in power and size, strained India's relation with the strongest democracy. If the United States was prepared to accept the reality of the Indian position, that it is a dominant power in South Asia and is an independent regional power by its own right, there was no reason why the Indo - US relations should not become warm

and cordial.

However, we can't say that there was no coordination between India and the United States. India and the United States both shared a similar democratic form of government, rule of law and having a similar type of economic system made progressive relations in the economic field, but the disagreement in Politics did not allow it to grow in a smooth way. And it is no surprise that United States contributed the most in India's infrastructure building in the first twenty years and now it is India's biggest trading partner in the 1990. When nobody claims that India's relation with the United States is friendly, there are thousand or more joint adventures in economic and in technical field. Actually it is not in contrast to the American interest to make India economically viable, may be for its won goal to make India a good market for American products, but US never wants to allow India to grow as an independent source of power what will play a global role in world politics. And it is this basic difference that kept India and the US pole apart.

Whatever may be the Similarities between the two democracies, their perceived role in world politics did not allow them to share the same view in most of the world affairs. Because when United States wanted to defeat

Communism and to keep itself at the helm of world politics, India wanted to pursue an independent economic development programme and to play a global role as a regional centre of power and to be a leader of the third world countries. Hence Nehru's non-alignment policy to establish peace in the cold war ravaged world posed him as the most difficult man to the American policy makers. Except in the brief Janata period, Indo - US relations remained as cool as ever. As India under Mrs. Gandhi or Mr. Rajiv Gandhi did not deviate from the India's known foreign policy, American decision makers did not show any such good intention by which relations between the two could be cemented. Mr. Chester Bowles, the long servicing American ambassador in New Delhi, showed a very good reason in this regard, that there was a gap of communication and lack of knowledge about India's nature and its society from the American decision makers. It is also not surprising that most of the Americans do not know where exactly India is, and if some body knows, he knows it as an over populated, poor, illiterate country full of cows and babies. So at first to make a friendly relations we have to stress on the people to people contact through various seminars, fairs and tourism.

In the Reagan period United States policy to India started to change slightly, because Soviet Union was losing

its ground world over. As the cold war was taking a back seat due to Mr. Gorbachev's frequent meet with President Reagan and his policy of Perestroika and Gorbachev as the decommunisation process in the Soviet Union, United States took a rational approach towards India and admitted his pre-eminent position in South Asia, though not directly. But huge arms supply to Pakistan for it being the so called front line state, US disappointed Indian leaders and they did not take any measure to alleviate the Indian fear. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's new economic policy though gave some satisfaction to the American policy makers, India's disapproval of the Non - Proliferation treaty, not to support the American view on Afghanistan and opposition in various world forum made it a distant friend not a close ally. India being a large country with second largest population and a possible potentially can't be a mere ally of a big power. This aspiration of a middle range power of the Indian leaders and Pakistan's total surrender to the US camp becoming a mere satellite of American design, made American policy makers' stand on South Asia some what strange.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union when some obstacles are removed from the field, issues like Non - Proliferation Treaty, Intellectual property Rights,

Cryogenic rocket engine deal start to rock the Indo - US relations. It is the same attitude by the Americans that they will only dominate the whole world and nobody will challenge their domination, which irritates India the most. Actually India wants its due share in the international politics, but Americans don't want to allow it, as is seen by Mr. Bill Clinton's pressure on Russia to cancel the Cryogenic engine deal. After the Gulf War when former President Mr. Bush declared his new world order, he envisaged a world where American superiority would be fully established. The central strategy of the Bush administration was to establish a new world order that takes enough account of the interests of other advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging their leadership. Obviously India's aspiration and its independent way of development have no role in their new world order.

But as time changes every thing, Indo-US relations can't be static and it is not so. With the end of Cold War many avenues are opened to make a greater cooperation from the developmental process to the defense tie. The recent assessment of the South Asia by the Bush administration and followed by the Clinton administration, which seems to be rational, is a major breakthrough in this regard. When there is no menace of Soviet expansionism, Indo-US relations

need no longer be subject to the changing vicissitudes of Pakistan's and China's relations with Washington. There is clearly a need for establishing an autonomy in the relationship and these can come about only through trade and economic mutuality of interests.

Bush administration took a rational approach to India's position in the South-Asian context. Hence it boldly admitted India's superiority in the region and subtly changed its stand on Kashmir issue from a direct support of Plebiscite in Kashmir to a bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan under Simla agreement. US attack on India for the alleged human rights abuses also faded away. Actually the United States could understand India's importance for regional stability and a strong market of American Products in comparison to Pakistan's unstable political system. India should exploit this opportunity to formulate a working relationship with the world's single superpower having the most sophisticated technological knowhow. But this working relationship should be based on mutual benefit and on equal footing, because a country like India can't be a mere satellite of any country whatever powerful it may be and this should be kept in mind by the US policy makers. On the other hand, India should realise that no useful purpose would be served by unduly criticizing the

US in matters which does not concern it and where it cannot make much difference in the position by merely criticizing the US.

Narshimha Rao government's liberalised economy with a heavy cut of tariffs and delicensing will help in the confidence building measures of the American policy planners. Presently there has been also a marked change in the Indian Foreign policy what has deviated a lot from the Nehruvian path of independent foreign policy decisions judging the merit of the particular events. Indian decision makers and bureaucrats also have no hesitation to give the United States a pre-eminent role in world politics, if they ensure at least some importance to India. No doubt it is a practical move, but our leaders should keep in mind that United States will do nothing for ourselves, we have to establish our position with a sufficient bargaining power what can be ensured only by a sound economy with a firm policy framework.

The coming of Mr. Bill Clinton in power makes hardly any change in US policy formulations. Because there is no basic ideological difference between Democrats and Republicans and Mr. Clinton already showed his inclination to the status quo. With a recession in United States manufacturing industry and with a huge deficit in its budget

there is no chance of removing US pressure on IPR to India or other defiant countries who do not protect the US patents. Similarly US pressure on Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty would be mounted high as has been seen in the case of North Korea. Because United States wants to make the world safe for its own dominant position and to ensure that in near future no country can challenge it. As a result this policy of world dominance would run against India's goal to be a regional centre of power out of American shadow. So the pressure on India to sign the NPT and to cancel the Cryogenic engine deal would continue. When American intention of total domination will not cease in a unipolar world and when no single country can challenge the American design, Indian policy makers have to work cautiously keeping the pressure on their head.

However, there is no lack of good intention from both the side. The common bond of democracy and faith in the rule of law will facilitate this intention. At the same time Indian Ambassador in Washington Mr. S.S. Ray and the US Ambassador designate Mr. Stephen J. Solarz have a responsible task ahead to provide genuine information and to maintain proper communication so that the Indo-US relations can't go to a wrong track. Further, it is the good intention based on mutual benefit, which can only ensure a progressive relationship between India and the United States



in the 21st century. And such approach will further te  
cause of world peace and stability. Let us hope for the  
best.

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