

**Social Background of Legislative Elites in Rajasthan and U.P.
A Comparative Analysis**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110 067
INDIA
1992


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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATIVE ELITE IN RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS" submitted by Mr. RAJENDRA SHAARMA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other university. To the best of our knowledge this is a bonafide research work.

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

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Professor C.P. Bhsmbri, who encouraged me at all states of the work, and whose critical comments helped me in many ways in improving the dissertation. I am also grateful to other faculty members at the Centre for Political Studies for their helpful suggestions.

My special thanks are due to Mrs. Kameswari Viswanatham for undertaking the typing work on priority basis.

New Delhi
21st July 1992


Rajendra Sharma

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Inequality and hierarchy are interrelated as unequal access to resources which ultimately leads to hierarchical relations in terms of high and low social positions, power and privileges. To understand this crucial and sensitive aspect of our social life mainly two approaches have been in vogue: (1) class approach, and (2) elite approach. These approaches are although not exclusive, yet they differ in a broad sense. The class approach places emphasis on economically determined social and political power, whereas the elite approach analyses political power in terms of its multi-factor determination. Analysis of the forces and means of production occupies a central place in the class approach as different classes such as bourgeoisie, middle classes and the working classes are treated as power blocs in the economic formation of society. Family background, cultural heritage, education, ethnicity, caste etc. as factors determining political power are also considered (along with economic factor) in the elite approach. To have a broad understanding about power elite, namely, legislative elites in the states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh it is proposed to examine the elite approach without underestimating the significance of

the class approach.

Since this dissertation is restricted to the analysis of selected literature on the theme, no claim is made here either for a comprehensive or for a depth analysis of the subject. The dissertation is divided into four chapters comprising of: (1) the conceptual framework, (2) legislative elites in Rajasthan, (3) legislative elites in Uttar Pradesh, and (4) a comparative analysis of the elites in the two states. The obvious reason for selecting the states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh is the marked difference between the historicity of the two states. Rajasthan was part of the Indian India, characterised by feudalism having princely states, jagirs and bhoms. Uttar Pradesh was part of British India characterised by Zamindari and Ryotwari systems of land tenure. Some of these points of historical and cultural significance would be reflected in our analysis of the two states. How far these historically distinct situations have determined the nature and character of the process of power elite formation in general and of the legislative elite in particular?

The Conceptual Framework

The Concept of Elites

For an understanding of the study of 'elites' in India one requires a full knowledge of the way in which the concept of elites was formulated, developed and used in the social sciences. It is clear to us that a single definition for such a key word as 'elite' is inadequate.

Regarding the concept of 'Elites', two quite distinct traditions of enquiry have persisted. In the older tradition - elites are treated as exemplars: fulfilling some historic mission, meeting a crucial need, possessing superior talents, and thus exhibit qualities which set them apart from others, namely nonelites. Whether they stabilize the older order or transfer it to a new one - they are seen as pattern setters.¹

The classical elite theorists such as Pareto, Michels and Mosca can be said to be the founders of this tradition.² These theorists were concerned mainly with the theories which considered the power-holders or decision makers at the macro level as power elites.

In the recent approach, elites are routinely understood to be incumbents; those who are collectively the influential figures in the governance of a sector of

society, an institutional structure, a geographic locality or translocal community. Unlike The macro-elite studies, the community power structure studies examine the details of the power structure and pinpoint the exact nature of elites within that structure. Studies by Lynd, Warner, Bahl, Hunter and Miller and Schulye fall in this category.³ These studies have generally examined the power structure of American towns and cities.

Classical Elite Theorists

The classical model of elite theory as propounded by Pareto, Mosca and Michels is based not on their view of an informed populace holding leaders accountable through elections, but on the understanding of a deceived and apathetic public unable to secure information about elite decisions and having virtually no input into those decisions.⁴ The fundamental notion of the elite model, then, is the unrestrained power of the ruling few over the masses. The dominant relationship of elites to masses as prevalent in all societies explains elites, even those who are nominally democratic in their functioning. Generally regardless of the nature of society, a small group comprising of elites, always holds the bulk of power.

Pareto's definition of elites is clear: the highest achievers in any area of human activity, whether it be

politics, arts, business and so on are elites.⁵ The distinction between such top achievers and the rest of the society, that is the masses is, according to Pareto, subject to empirical verification and requires no esoteric scientific formula to discern. Top achievers are obvious in all societies. Pareto defines elites "as a class of people who have highest indices in their branch of activity and to that class gives the name of elite."⁶ This definition of Pareto emphasizes the inequality of individual endowments in every sphere of social life and as the starting point for a definition of the 'governing elite'. For the particular investigation with which we are engaged, a study of the social equilibrium, it will help if we further divide that class into two classes, a governing elite, comprising individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable part in the government and a non-governing elite, comprising the rest---. So we get two strata in a population: (1) A lower stratum, the non-elite with whose possible influence on the government we are not concerned herewith; and then (2) a higher stratum, the elites who are divided into two: (a) a governing elite; and (b) a non-governing elite.⁷

Pareto further says that elites govern the masses through "force and fraud" - that is by means of coercion and through guile or cunning.⁸ This corresponds to the two

groups of political leaders, whom Pareto calls "lions and foxes". Those who fall into each group are endowed with certain psychological proclivities, which Pareto labels "residues".⁹ Here we see a fundamental psychological orientation in Pareto's thesis.

Mosca's explanation however is more sociological in the sense that he emphasises on structural and organisational factors as well as personal characteristics.¹⁰ For Mosca, the power of the ruling class results from its being an organised minority confronting an unorganised majority. Mosca writes: "Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisations, one is obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawning of civilization down to the most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal now more or less arbitrary and violent...."¹¹

Mosca explains the rule of the minority over the

majority by the fact that the former is organised. Here we find that Mosca's analysis of elites is comparable with Marx's concept of the 'ruling class', which refers to the rule of the minority over the exploited majority.

Both Mosca and Pareto, therefore, were concerned with elites in the sense of groups of people who either exercised directly or were in a position to influence very strongly the exercise of political power. Michels based his analysis of elites on his study of the German Social Democratic Party. Michels strikes squarely at the seemingly unavoidable emergence of elite rule created by the structure of modern social organisation.¹² Unlike the analysis of Pareto and Mosca, Michels's analysis is founded most basically on the key sociological variables of social organisation and division of labour rather than on psychological factors or innate human tendencies. Although Michel's focus of analysis is the German Social Democratic Party, in general it is applicable to all kinds of organisations. In short, it is a theory that fits the organisational form of politics in modern societies. Michels shows that if the tendency to oligarchy can be discerned in a party which practices democratic principles, it is unavoidable in any large, complex organisation. It is simply not possible to leave the decision-making power in the hands of a large number of

people. The only way is to give this crucial power of decision-making in the hands of the few.

When organisations acquire a certain dimension, division of labour emerges even among the leadership groups. Positions which are created are held by the persons with special expertise, and they become indispensable to the functioning of the organisation. Because of their specialized knowledge and expertise, elites become enabled to perpetuate themselves in high positions. Furthermore, leadership groups can control the training and recruitment process of the future leaders and thereby create a self reproducing class. Thus the gap between leaders and masses becomes increasingly wider. Michels further points out that the desire to retain power makes the elite conservative, even though they might have posed as revolutionaries in the initial stages. "The revolutionaries of today become the reactionaries of tomorrow."¹³

A Critique of Classical Elitist Theory

The classical theory is a theory of status quo because it very explicitly states that no matter whatever changes take place in society, polity and economy, there is always a minority of leaders who control political power. Secondly, these theorists have no faith in the

concept of equality because they believe that elites govern because of the superiority of their abilities, and masses are ruled because of their inferior capabilities. In other words, they believe in Plato's dictum that some people are born to rule and others are born to be ruled.

The classical theorists believe in change as elite is not static and there is always a 'circulation of elites' in which some elites slide downwards and others go upwards. Pareto sums up this process in his famous phrase: "history is graveyard of aristocracies". Bottomore raises a very pertinent question whether the 'circulation of elites' refers to a process in which individuals circulate between the elite and the non-elite, or to a process in which one elite is replaced by another.¹⁴ Bottomore finds both notions in Pareto's work, although the former predominates. Bottomore observes that when Pareto discusses the decay and renewal of aristocracies, he observes that the governing class is restored not only in numbers, but the more important thing is change in quality by families rising from the lower classes.¹⁵

Pareto refers again and again to this phenomenon using similar expressions. Pareto assigns the causes for the rise and fall of elites sometimes by relating it to

the process of the times and at times by relating it to psychology by saying that elites decline when their quality deteriorates and there is the rise of new elites because of the acquisition of the psychological dispositions of the elites by some people from among the ordinary people.

Similarly Mosca also talks about changes in the elite structure by introducing a sub-elite in his depiction of societal power comprising of a group made of intellectuals, civil servants, managers etc. Some of these sub-elites are co-opted as elites.

The elite theorists talk of circulation of elites but in their ultimate analysis, power remains concentrated in the hands of a few.

Pluralist Elite Theories

The Pluralists have to soften the rough ages of the classical theory by bringing in a number of changes in the elite theory, though retaining its essence. The Pluralist elite theorists believe that in the West, there is no single comprehensive elite structure but rather a complex system of specialized elites linked to the social order and to each other in a variety of ways. Indeed so numerous and varied they are that they seldom possess enough common features and affinities to avoid marked

differences and tendencies. Leading artists, business magnates, politicians and screen stars are all influential but in separate spheres and with quite different responsibilities, sources of power and patterns of selection and reward. This plurality of elites reflects and promotes the pluralistic character of modern societies in general. Lasswell and Lerner thus define elites as the 'influentials' in any society.¹⁶ There is, however, an important factor that differentiates these various elites apart from their different skills and talents: Some of them have more social weight than others because their activities have greater social significance. Suzanne Keller uses the concept of strategic elites to refer to those elites who claim or are assigned responsibilities for and have influence over the society as a whole.¹⁷ These elites are found in contrast with segmental elites who have major responsibilities in subdomains of the society. Strategic elites are those who have the largest most comprehensive scope and impact.¹⁸

Pluralists, define power as an active participation in decision-making. Persons are said to have power only when they participate directly in particular decision making. Pluralist scholars object to the presumption that people who occupy institutional positions, and who have formal authority over economic, governmental or

social affairs necessarily have political powers. Pluralists differentiate between the "potential" for power and "actual" power. Robert Dahl writes: "suppose a set of individuals in a political system has the following property, there is a high probability that if they agree on a key political alternative and if they all act in some specified way, then that alternative will be chosen. We may say of such a group that it has a high potential for control... But a potential for control is not there except in a peculiarly Hobbesian World, equivalent to actual control". Pluralists contend that the potential for power is not power itself. Power occurs in individual interactions. Top institutional office-holders may or may not exercise power, their 'power' depends upon their active participation in particular decisions.¹⁹

Pluralist recognise that an elite few, rather than the masses, rule over America, and that it is difficult, may be impossible, to see how it could be otherwise in large political systems. However, the pluralists reassert the essentially democratic character of western society especially America by arguing in the following manner:

- 1) While individuals do not participate directly in decision-making, they can join organised groups and make their influence felt through group participation.

- 2) There is competition between leadership groups that helps and protects the individuals countervailing centres of powers, who check each other and guard against abuse of power.
- 3) Individuals can choose from amongst the competing groups in elections.
- 4) Leadership groups are not closed. New groups can be formed and they can again access to the political system.
- 5) There is polyarchy' characterised by multiple leadership groups in society. These consist of leaders who exercise power over some sorts of decisions, and they necessarily do not exercise power over other sorts of decision.
- 6) Public policy may not always be a majority preference, but it is the rough equilibrium of group influence, and therefore, it is taken as a reasonable approximation of society's preferences.

It is clear that earlier formulations lack this pluralist assumption, and this is the main difference between the classical writers and the pluralists. Mosca and Pareto both presumed that a ruling class effectively monopolized the command posts of a society. Michels insisted that his 'iron law of oligarchy' was inevitable, as in any organisation an inner circle of participants'

would take over and run it for their own selfish ends. By contrast Lasswell's formulation in the 1930's was radically pluralistic in nature. Elites are those who get the most of what there is to get in any institutionalized sector of society and not only in the governing institutions and ancillary processes of organised political life. At every functional stage of a decision-making process indeed in many relevant arenas some participants are found who have sequestered disproportionate shares of those values, whether money, esteem, power or some other valuable condition of life which people seek and struggle for. Such people are elites at that stage and in that context. For Lasswell, a situation is fully egalitarian, if it extends elite-status to every participant, however, it is an empirical question and not a conceptual one.²⁰

Lasswell observes that the social formations, classes, communities, movements from which elites derive their power are not fixed.²¹ Elites can usefully be studied by asking which communities they represent or dominate, of which classes they are exponents, or a product of, which interests they reflect or foreshadow, which personality types they are prone to recruit or to shunt aside, which circumstances of time and place seem to provide mission and challenges for them.

Democracy and Elite Theory

Elite theorists whether they are the classical thinkers like Pareto, Mosca and Michels or the pluralists like Lasswell, Dahl, etc. have generally undermined the classical theory of democracy. The classical theory of democracy was based on the notion of freedom for the bourgeoisie, with its emphasis on individualism. The elite theory, on the other hand, emphasizes on inequality in the bourgeoisie society.

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CHAPTER II

Legislative Elites in Rajasthan

The question that this study seeks to answer is: What is the nature of the legislative elite in post-independent Rajasthan? How is the legislative elite of Rajasthan different from that of other states and why is it so? Whether political power in Rajasthan has passed into the hands of those who were deprived of it earlier? In order to answer these questions the focus of this chapter will be on the study of the socio-economic background of the legislators. The study is based on secondary sources. We will mainly rely on available published literature, documents and records.

Historical Background

It is very important for this study to focus on the preindependence polity, economy and society of Rajasthan because it will help us to study the nature of changes that have taken place due to the introduction of far reaching institutional changes such as democratisation of political governance, abolition of jagirdari system and development programmes.

Rajasthan virtually remained outside the British influence and control as the British did not disturb the

then existing power configuration in the various princely states of Rajasthan. In other words, Rajasthan was ruled by various Rajput clans who had carved out different regions for their political control. The dominant position of the Rajputs can be gauged from the fact that out of the twenty two princely states, nineteen were ruled by Rajputs, two by Jats and one was a muslim state. Rajasthan in its preindependence days was under the political control of the Rajput princes and jagirdars who could rightly be called ascriptively as the power elite.

The Rajputs did not form a strong unified power elite. In fact the princely states were segmentary in nature. The rajput elite were divided on the basis of regionalism. The various princely states did not have very cordial relations amongst themselves. The differences which were a feature of preindependence Rajasthan have continued to exist. Jodhpur, Jaipur, Udsipur, Bikaner and Kota continue to have differences at the political level. In fact leaders from one region or former princely state cannot see eye to eye with other regions Iqbal Narain and P.S. Mathur rightly emphasize this regionalism in Rajasthan politics which was an offshoot of feudalism in Rajasthan. Narain and Mathur observe: "Even though the social base of political domination has undergone a sea change, regional loyalties have yet to break out of the

moulds evolved over several centuries."²

Political Activity in the Princely States.

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The princes did not rule in a democratic manner. Though they were not despotic, yet some form of protests started taking place in the various princely states of Rajasthan during the early years of this century. Initially these protests movements took place in those princely states which were in more intimate contact with the British and these movements were confined to some urban areas.

The political movement in Rajasthan can be divided into two categories - (1) The Praja Mandals, and (2) the Kisan Sabhas. The Praja Mandals restricted their activities almost exclusively to some urban areas and the persons who led the Praja Mandals had an urban background. Not only were the leaders urban based, they were also exclusively recruited from castes of high ritual status. These elites had western education and they were familiar with the social reform movements taking place outside Rajasthan and were also in close contact with the nationalists movement in British India. The Praja Mandals were regional in character as the leaders of the Praja mandals in the princely states confined their political activities to their respective states only, they did not

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have a common strategy for the whole of Rajasthan. These regional differences could be seen in the post-independent polity of Rajasthan. Richard Sisson writes: "Leaders of the Praja Mandals were recruited almost exclusively from among Brahman, Mahajan and Kayasth castes, all of which enjoy a position of high ritual and social status."³ Sisson observes that the leadership of the Praja Mandals was not representative to a great extent. There were several social groups such as the lower castes which went unrepresented in the leadership of these movements. Even the Rajputs had limited representation. The Rajputs generally did not associate themselves with the Praja Mandals. They saw these Mandals as organisations following an anti-Rajput policy. Muslims and peasant castes also did not associate with the Praja Mandals.

The peasant castes such as the Jats were more active in the Kisan Sabhas. Sisson writes about the limitations of the political movement in the princely state. "The new political elite at the time of independence had not been able to mobilize mass movements although in some agitations large number of people had temporarily become involved. The elite structure was limited not only in number but also in the area and social scope of its recruitment. Protest was primarily an urban phenomenon, and the political elite was recruited from among those who

had been mobile and who had come in contact with a world of social action that extended beyond the confines of the traditional society in which they lived."⁵ The Praja Mandals were eager to have much closer relationship with the Congress and this objective of the Mandals was realised only in the 1940's. In fact the Congress was formed in Rajasthan only in 1946, and it incorporated the leadership of the various Praja Mandals.

The other movement in Rajasthan was the one launched by the various Kisan Sabhas. The Kisan Sabha's social base constituted mainly of the peasant caste, namely the Jats. The original aim of the Kisan Sabhas was to bring about social reforms among the Jat peasantry. The Kisan Sabhas were also limited in their territorial extension. Different Kisan Sabhas operated in different princely states. The Kisan Sabhas frequently clashed with the Rajput Jagirdars. Sometimes the conflict took a violent turn. The Jat peasants wanted security of land tenures, whereas the jagirdars apprehensive of land reforms evicted tenants, frequently without any reason. The leadership of the Kisan Sabhas mainly came from the moderately educated Jats. A segment of the pre-independence Jat elites rejected active involvement in the Praja Mandals and later declined overtures to enter the Congress party. The reason for the rejection of the Congress by the Jat elite was

that the urban elite dominated the Congress party and they would not understand the problems of the peasantry.

So we find that immediately after independence Congress in Rajasthan had a very insecure social base because two major segments of Rajasthan society the Rajputs and the Jats did not have sufficient representation in the Congress party.

Economy in Rajasthan

Sixty percent of total land of Rajasthan is covered by desert, hence it is not very fertile. Land is not only agriculturally infertile, but it is also deficient in minerals which are necessary for the state's industrial development. So one can say that the economy of Rajasthan is quite backward. The result of this economic backwardness is that in Rajasthan the 'agrarian question' is not very important, as it is in other states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Kanta Ahuja and Vidyasagar point out that in Rajasthan landless labourers and absentee landlords are more or less absent, because of the absence of these two conflicting rural segments.⁶ Politics in rural Rajasthan is more or less conflict free. Land is not a source of tension as it is in some other states such as Bihar U.P. and West Bengal. So in Rajasthan's political situation economic issues have not created tensions and

divides.

Society in Pre-Independence Rajasthan

Rajasthan is much more secular in certain respects than some other states like Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh. However, like other states of India, society in Rajasthan is also ridden with orthodoxy and caste-divides, but with a difference. Rajasthan did not adhere strictly to the Brahminical model as the Kshatriyas ruled in 19 princely states out of a total of 22 states.

This means that Brahminical norms were not quite effective as a cultural model for the people to emulate. People generally tried to follow the lead given by the princes and jagirdars in the cultural sphere. The result of this lack of emphasis on Brahminical norms was that society in Rajasthan was less rigid and more secular so far as inter caste and inter community relations were concerned, caste and religion have played comparatively a lesser role in Rajasthan politics. Caste and communal violence is a recent phenomenon in Rajasthan.

Political Situation in post-Independent Rajasthan

The state of Rajasthan was one of the two states to have democratic decentralisation from October 2, 1959. After the first general elections of 1952, the impact of

feudalism and its allied institutions began dwindling fast. It has/had Chief Ministers drawn from different castes and communities including brahmin, Rajput, Vaishyas, Kayastha, Muslim and Scheduled caste. There have hardly been any caste violence or 'caste wars' as often reported from Bihar and some other states. Communal riots, barring a few in recent years, have not occurred in Rajasthan. One rarely hears about oppression of the poor/agricultural labour by the rich land-owners. The post independent social formation in Rajasthan does not bear the shadow of feudalism of the pre-1947 period. Let us now have a look at the political situation as it has emerged after Independence.

Table : 1

**Caste Background of Members of Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha
(In Percentage)**

Caste	% Population	First Assembly 1952-57 N= 126	Second Assembly 1957-62 N= 166	Third Assembly 1962-67 N= 176
Brahman	8	17	15	17
Rajput	6	44	19	20
Mahajan	7	9	11	11
Peasant	18	11	18	18
Jat	9	11	11	16
Other Peasant Castes	9		7	2

Table 1 Contd.

Caste	% Population	First Assembly	Second Assembly	Third Assembly
Scheduled Caste	14	11	16	16
Scheduled Tribe	11	4	13	13
Others	18	4	8	5
Total	100	111	118	118

Other peasant castes comprise of Sirvi, Vishnoi Gujjars Ahir: Other include Muslims, Sikhs and Kayasthas compiled from Richard Sission and L.L.S. Harder, 1972, legislative Government and Political Integration - Pattern of Political linkages in an Indian state, Berkeley, California. The above data not only indicates the percentage of the different castes in regard to the total population of the state but also the caste of the legislators in percentage with regard to the total membership of the assembly. However, caste background of all the members could not be ascertained. Hence the discrepancy between the total strength of the Assembly and the numbers given in the above table. We find that in Rajasthan no caste can be called as the 'dominant caste in terms of its numerical strength to the total population. Infact all major castes have numerical parity with each other. The Brahmins comprises of only 8 per cent of the total population, the Rajputs are 6 per cent and the Jats are about 9 per cent. Scheduled castes make up 19% of the

total population, but they cannot be taken as a monolithic entity as the scheduled caste category consists of numerous castes such as Regars, Balais, Methers etc. No caste constitutes more than 10% of the total population. Infact we can say that a number of castes are at par with each other. These figures about caste composition are drawn from the census of 1931, and since then a lot of changes have accured due to scale emigration, particularly of the upper castes.

In the first legislative assembly we notice that the Rajputs have cornered a disproportionate share of the total seats, they constitute only 6% of the total population but had 44% of the total assembly seats. Can we call this as continuation of the dominance by the Rajputs elite? Rajput elite did not decline considerably even after the abolition of the jagirdars and the princely states infact it shows the adaptive capability of the Rajput elite to the demands of democracy and competitive politics and also the survival of the political traditions of the exprincely states in the post-independence period.

The election of number of ex-princes and jagirdars to the legislative assembly had great significance as a caste factor in political mobilization. The Rajputs constituting only 6% of the total population of the state managed to

get the electoral support of a number of castes. This shows that caste as a factor in political mobilization did not play a big role as it plays in other states. Iqbal Narain and P.C. Mathur observe that the participation of the ex-princes in the electoral process and the massive mandate they received in the first assembly election had a secularizing influence on the polity of Rajasthan.⁷ The role of caste in elections was minimized. The legislative elite in the first assembly did not use caste as a tool for garnering of votes. However, the ex-princes and jagirdars had enough sympathy and support in the 1952 elections, being rulers till then. This also reflected people's lack of consciousness regarding the new political system. In subsequent elections the number of Rajput M.L.A's declined considerably.

In the first assembly election the congress was defeated in the Jodhpur region because of the campaigning done by the ex-ruler Hanumant Singh. The Congress lost 31 of the 35 seats in this division. Nearly all independents supported by Hanumant Singh won. We can notice the continuity of the ability of the ex-princes to exercise influence over their former citizens. The congress party had given tickets to only two persons belonging to the Rajput caste for the first assembly elections, in comparison to 57 Rajput candidates fielded by different

parties and groups. In other words, in the first assembly congress had hardly any Rajput M.L.A.

The congress realised that its continuation in power would be unstable until it incorporated the Rajputs in its ranks to broaden the social base of the party. IN 1954, Chief Minister Jainarain Vyas managed to induct 22 Rajput MLA's into the Congress, most of whom were leading jagirdars. The Jats resented this move of the Congress, but the joining of Rajput MLA's certainly broadened the social base of the congress. According to Richard Sisson the attitude of accommodation of the Rajputs within the congress fold made political competition much more open in social terms.⁸ The congress tried to induce the ex-rulers to join it, but among the ex-priences a certain animosity remained towards the congress as it was seen in the 1967 elections when the congress was routed in the Jaipur region because of the efforts of Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur: So the integration of the Rajputs remained incomplete. Infact, we notice that congress elite managed to remain in majority in the assembly only because the Rajput legislators belonging to different regions could not come together and unitedly confront the congress in the electoral battle.

The following pattern emerge from the above analysis:

- (1) The social base of the Congress elite was not firm from the first assembly.
- (2) The preindependence Rajput elite did not go into oblivion after independence, infact the Rajput legislative elite became the main opposition to the Congress.
- (3) The social base of the legislative elite does not entirely rest on the mobilization of their castemen, as we can see that although the Rajputs constitute only 6% of the states population, they always had nearly 20% representation in the state legislative assembly. Though the Rajputs had maximum representation in the first assembly that is 44% of total membership, it came down to 20% by 1967. After 1967 elections, there has been further decline in the representation of Rajputs in the State Assembly.

Not only the Rajputs but the Jats also had a greater share in the legislative assembly than their population. In the first assembly the Jats had 11% representation in the assembly though they accounted for only 9% of the total population of the state. In the third assembly they accounted for 16% of the total assembly membership. This leads to the conclusion that other peasant castes such as

Gujars and Ahirs did not have adequate representation in the assembly.

Table : 2

Caste of Legislative Elites in the Seventh Assembly
1980-85

S.No.	Caste Groups	Number & Percentage of Castes (% in brackets)
(1)	Higher Castes (Brahmin, Jain, Kayastha, Mahajan)	53 (27)
(2)	Feudal Rajput Aristocratic (Rajput, Rawat, Dhakar)	23 (11)
(3)	Peasant Castes (Jat, Vishnoi, Gujar, Mali, Yadav, Bagri, Sikh)	50 (25)
(4)	Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribe and other Backward Castes, (Kumbar, Patwa, Kalal)	60 (31)
(5)	Muslims	10 (5)
(6)	Others	-
(7)	Not known	3 (1)
Total		200 (100)

Source : R.C. Swarnkar, 1988, Political Elites : A sociological study of legislators in Rajasthan, Jaipur, Rawat Publishing, p.79.

In the seventh assembly which lasted from 1980 to 1983 - we find that the legislative elite of Rajasthan are

of a pluralistic nature. No caste group is able to establish a position of predominance in the assembly. All the caste groups are equally balanced. Rajputs who dominated the first assembly by covering 44% of the total assembly seats, could get only 11% in the seventh assembly. Peasant Castes such as Jats, Vishnoies, Gujars, Yadavs, who had 11% representation in the first assembly now have around 25% representation in the seventh assembly. We observe that for any political party to get into power, it must have the representation of all the major elite groups. In the 1950's when the Rajput legislative elite did not support the congress, the position of the congress governments was always precarious. Similarly the Bhartiya Janta Party, which came into power in 1989 changed its policy by incorporating the Jats its fold. For the first time the BJP had a few Jat M.L.A's in its entire history.

Caste Profile of Chief Ministers : The top political elites of Rajasthan have been drawn from a number of castes, thus indicating the plurality of social base for political mobilization. The caste background of different Chief Ministers shows the plueglity of legislative elite in Rajasthan. Hira Lal Shastri, Jai Narayan Vayas, Tikka Ram Patiwal and Harideo Joshi were Brahamins; Shivcharan Mathur was a Kayastha; Barkatullah Khan was a Muslim;

Bhairon Singh Shekhawat is a Rajput; and Heeralal Deopura was a Maheswari Bania; Jaganath Pahadia belonged to a Scheduled Caste. Mohanlal Sukhadia was a Vaishya. Thus, Chief Minister of Rajasthan have belonged to different Caste Strata but it is strange that not one Chief Minister belonged to the Jat Caste even though the Jats are among the 3-4 numerically preponderant castes. The Jats are not only numerically strong but they have also improved their economic position in the last forty years. Iqbal Narain and P.C. Mathur write : "It can be said that a general prejudice seems to prevail among the political elite of Rajasthan regarding the unsuitability of jats as political rulers, even though several jats have occupied key posts in the council of Ministers as well as state level committees of the Congress Party. Names like Kumbha Ram Arya, Nathuram Mirdha and Paras Ram Maderna are indeed spoken of with great deference whenever the administrative performance of individual Ministers is discussed. But the fact remains that most urban educated members of the administrative and political elite still view the jats as rough-lawn agriculturalists unfamiliar with middle class graces and the niceties of social intercourse. Such attitudes of urban niceties are quite likely to be swept away by the emergent economic momentum of rural 'middle castes' like the jats, making Rajasthan's political pyramid

even more pluralistic in the future."⁹ It is true that Jats, unlike their counterparts in Haryana and U.P., have not become assertive in Rajasthan politics. One of the reasons for overall backwardness among the Jats in Rajasthan is that capitalist mode of production in agriculture in Rajasthan has not emerged like Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh. Historically too, the Jats of Rajasthan were backward as they were generally tenants-at-will and not ryots like the Jats of Haryana and U.P.

Sex Composition of Legislative Elite

Rajasthan has got an adverse sex ratio among all the states of the Indian Union. Only 42% of the total state population consists of women. This adverse sex ratio could be attributed to the role assigned to women in a feudal society. Women did not have much freedom in the Rajasthan society, they did not perform any public role. Politics was a taboo for women.

Table : 3
Sex-wise distribution of Legislative Elites

S.No.	Legislative Assembly	Total		
1.	1952-57	160	158	2
2.	1957-62	176	167	9
3.	1962-67	176	168	8
4.	1967-72	184	177	7
5.	1972-77	184	173	11
6.	1977-80	200	192	8
7.	1980-85	200	191	9

Source : R.C. Swarnkar, op.cit.

We may observe that legislative elites in Rajasthan are predominantly males. The number of women amongst the legislative elites has been around 4% of the total assembly membership. The above table indicates that the position of women in Rajasthan is still an untenable one. The legislative elites of the state are more or less exclusively consists dominated by male members. The maximum number of women legislative elites were found in the fifth assembly. When they constituted 6% of the total legislative elite. The lower participation of women in politics and their low representation in the ranks of legislative elite is perhaps due to the lower status of women in Rajasthan. Only 25% of women in Rajasthan after independence have been educated.

Educational Background of Legislative Elites in Rajasthan

Rajasthan is among the states which have a low literacy rate, but it is surprising that the members of the legislative assembly were quite highly educated and literate. Infact literacy among the legislative elites is comparable with the legislative elites of any other North Indian State.

Table to be followed

Table : 4
Educational Background of M.L.A's in
Second, Third & Fourth Assembly
(in percentage)

S.No.	Educational Level	Second Assembly	Third Assembly	Fourth Assembly
1.	Literate	11	5	3
2.	Primary	8	8	11
3.	Middle	19	21	12
4.	High School	16	15	23
5.	College	19	25	26
6.	Law	28	26	25

Source : Shashi Lata Puri, 1978, New Delhi, Abinav Publications, p.47

The above data clearly indicates that the members of Rajasthan assembly are more educated compared to the literacy rate of the state's population they represent. In the second assembly 11% of the legislators had no formal education. This was reduced to 5% in the third and to a bare 3% in the fourth elections. In the second assembly 63% of the members of the assembly had education higher than high school level, in the third assembly those who had education above high school increased to 66%, and in the fourth assembly the total percentage was 74%.

From the above data we may conclude that the legislative elites of Rajasthan are not only educated but

they also come from well off sections of society. Shashi Lata Puri observed that the majority of members who were non-matriculantes were from the scheduled castes and tribes and were elected from reserved seats.¹⁰

Conclusion

We observed that the legislative elites in Rajasthan as observed in some other states are divided on a regional basis. The legislative elites in Rajasthan are broadly divided on the basis of regional loyalties for example in the Congress Party the contest for the leadership of the legislative wing has always been between the leaders belonging to the Jodhpur, Jaipur and Udaipur regions. The reasons for this division among the legislative elite on regional grounds is the historical fact of rivalry between these regions perpetuating from the pre-1947 period till today. People of Rajasthan were bound by regional loyalties. For e.g. the first two Chief Ministers of Rajasthan Pandit Hiralal Shastri and Jai Narain Vyas could not see eye to eye because of regional sentiments.

(2). The second feature observed in the polity of Rajasthan is the survival of the preindependence feudal elite, though in much transformed form. The Rajput elite was able to rule itself to the demands of democratic polity. Infact in the initial years after independence the main

opposition to the congress in the assembly came from Rajput M.L.A's and the instability of the different congress governments was caused by the ex-feudal elements. However these patterns had become extremely weak in the post-1967 period.

- 3) The nature of legislative elite in Rajasthan can be said to be more secular compared to the elite in other states. Politics to a large extent did not revolve around caste. The Rajputs though constituting only 6% of the state's population, have also managed to get 12 to 15% of seats in the state assembly.
- 4). We find that though the peasant castes such as the Jats have increasingly played an important role in Rajasthan politics, but no Jat has become Chief Minister so far. The reason for this is the counterbalance established by the other castes such as Brahmins and Rajputs.
- 5). The legislative elite in Rajasthan generally comes from the relatively well off sections of society.

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CHAPTER III

Legislative Elites in Uttar Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh is politically the most important state of the Indian Union. It became the nerve centre of Indian politics during the colonial period as many congress statearts such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Madan Mohan Malviya etc. hailed from U.P. it was not only the centre of the anti-colonial struggle, but it also provided a nurturing ground to the separatist movement. After independence it retained its importance in Indian politics as it alone provided for around 18% of the country's population and around 16% of the total Lok Sabha seats. The sheer size of this state made it the fulcrum on which the government at the centre depended. The importance of U.P. can be gauged from the fact that seven Prime Ministers of India belonged to this state, only two came from other states. Similarly it was Uttar Pradesh which set the trends for national politics, for example, it was U.P. which gave jolt to the congress hegemony in 1967-1977 and 1989, parliamentary elections.

The focus of this chapter is on the legislative elites in Uttar Pradesh with particular emphasis on this socio-economic background. Analysis of the socio-economic

profile of the legislatures may help us in understanding the relationship between the patterns of political dominance and socio-economic formation in Uttar Pradesh.

Uttar Pradesh during the Colonial Rule

A brief description of the colonial history of Uttar Pradesh may help us in the understanding of the patterns of dominance since independence in the state.

The patterns of land tenure which emerged after the 1857 revolt were distinct in each region.¹ Western U.P. had ryots/peasant proprietors having full control over the lands they cultivated, resulted into more rapid introduction of commercial crops.² On the contrary eastern U.P. had zamindari system which paved the way for the emergence of absentee land lords who perpetuated values and norms adhering to ascriptive status, and took no interest in commercial agriculture. In the eastern region, the landed elites consisted mainly of the upper castes such as the Rajputs, Bhumihars, Brahmins and the Muslims. The British after the revolt of 1857 changed their attitude towards the landlords by making them their allies. The British restored the lands of the Taluqdars and Zamindars who were dispossessed after the revolt. So the landed aristocracy in U.P. sided with the British and opposed the nationalist movement led by the Congress. The

tenants generally belonged to the lower castes and they had no security of tenure. They were the greatest sufferers during the colonial period, and to some extent even after independence. The congress did not have a clear cut policy about the 'peasant question' because of the social background of its upper caste leadership. Gyan Pandey observes that the most active elements in the congress during the civil disobedience movement were drawn from the ranks of the small Zamindars Pattidars and upper tenants and from a variety of upper castes and subcastes² The participation of the Muslims in the various congress programmes was very low giving credence to the charge that it was basically a party of the Hindus. So religion played an important role in the politics of U.P.

The economic disparities in U.P. were reinforced by caste inequalities. There was a strong correlation between landownership and membership in the upper castes. The Brahmans and the Rajputs had maximum possible power in the social and the economic spheres before independence. Under the Zamindari system, the inequalities of status and power inherent in the caste system corresponded more or less to inequalities in access to and distribution of material resources. Before independence the Thakurs formed the bulk of the Zamindars in the state. In U.P. as a whole Thakurs and brahmins owned 57 per cent of the land

while the intermediate castes owned 32 per cent and the scheduled castes owned a mere. 09 per cent and Muslim Zamindars owned about 11 per cent.³.

The abolition of Zamindari in 1952 gave a perceptible blow to the landowning elite in the state. Principally the U.P. Zamindari Abolition act was targeted against the absentee landlords who paid fixed revenue to the British and collected rents more or less arbitrarily from their tenants. Zamindari Abolition was effective in removing the control of these intermediaries on land.⁴ But the landlords were given liberal compensation by the government and the land taken from them was not redistributed.

Caste and Legislative Elites in U.P.

Political leaders in U.P. before independence mainly came from the ritually high castes such as Brahmins, Baniyas and Kayasthas. The question that arises before us is whether this dominance by the high caste has continued after independence or not? And what were the challenges which the traditional elite faced in the changed circumstance?

Table to be followed

Table : 1

Distribution of Caste and Communities in U.P. in 1931

Caste Category	Specific Castes	Percentage of Total Population
A. Upper Castes	Brahman	9.2
	Thakurs	7.2
	Banis	2.5
	Kayastha	1.0
Total of Sub-group-A		20.0
B. Middle Castes	Jat	1.6
	Bhumihar	0.4
	Tyagi	0.1
Total of Sub-group-B		2.1
C. Backward Castes	Yadav	8.7
	Kurmi	3.5
	Lodh	2.2
	Koeri	2.8
	Gujar	0.7
	Kansar	2.3
	Gadaris	2.0
	Teli	2.0
	Barhai	1.5
Kachi	1.3	

Table Contd..

Caste Category	Specific Castes	Percentage of Total Population
	Kewat	1.1
	Murao	1.3
	Nai	1.8
	Others	10.7
Total of Sub-group-c		41.7
D. Scheduled Castes	Chamar	12.7
	Pasis	2.9
	Dhobi	1.6
	Bhangi	1.0
	Others	2.8
Total of Sub-group-e		21.0
E. <u>Muslims</u>	Shaikh	3.2
	Pathan	2.2
	Julaha	2.0
	Syed	0.7
	Moghul	0.1
	Others	6.8
Total of Sub-group-E		15.0

Source : 1931 Census- United Provinces at Agra and Awadh and also reported in Zoys Hasan, op cit.

The last census enumerating caste and community was

conducted in 1931, and it shows that in Uttar Pradesh no caste is large enough to exercise a prepondering influence by the sheer force of its numbers. The same situation we have found in the case of Rajasthan. The upper castes constituted 20 per cent of the total population and the backward castes 41.7 per cent the scheduled castes 21 per cent and the Muslims were 15 per cent. But then the groupings of the castes into 'higher' and 'backward' categories does not give the castes so grouped a homogenous character. For example, Jats and Bhumihars have been grouped under the category of middle castes, but Bhumihars consider themselves to be higher than the Jats. Similarly the scheduled castes category cannot be taken as a homogenous unit. inter-caste heterogeneity also can not be accounted for by way of such a broad categorisation. Hence, we would mention below some specific castes having political clout in post-independent Uttar Pradesh.

Table to be followed

Table : 2

Caste Composition of the MCA's in the U.P. Legislative Assembly (1952-1980)
(by per centage)

Caste	1952	1957	1962	1967	1969	1974	1984
Brahman	27	21	21	21.46	19.05	16.25	23
Thakur	14	17	20	13.92	16.23	15.59	20
Bania, Kayastha, Khatli	15	14	12	4.95	3.76	6.95	7
Jat, Bhumihar, Tyagi	5	6	5	7.95	4.94	6.95	5
Ahir, Kurmi, Lodh and Gujar	6	10	10	16.51	17.64	23.26	13
Other Backward Castes	3	2	3	12.74	9.17	5.10	5
Scheduled Caste	20	21	22	19.81	20.94	16.31	20
Muslims	10	9	7	5.66	8.23	9.60	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Zoya Hasan, *op. cit.*

The above table clearly brings out the fact that the legislative elite mainly came from the upper castes. In the first Assembly the upper castes, who made up for only 20% of the static total population had fiftysix per cent seats in the assembly. The striking fact that comes to our notice is the under-representation of the backward castes such as the Kurmis Yadavs, Lodhs etc. The backward castes accounted for forty one per cent of the states population, but they had a nine per cent representation in the assembly. The scheduled castes accounted for twenty per cent membership of the assembly. Perhaps the scheduled caste representation was higher because of the

reservation of seats for them.

In 1967 the upper castes legislative elite faced a grave challenge to their dominance for the first time. The challenge came from the backward castes such as the Yadavs and Lodhs. The backward castes had just thirteen per cent representation in the third assembly, but in 1967 elections the backward castes ranged to 29 per cent representation in the assembly by sheer caste-based mobilization and articulation of anti-congress sentiment.

The fact that comes to our notice is that in 1967 the congress in Uttar Pradesh for the first time could not manage a majority in the assembly. The losing of congress majority and the substantial strength gained by the backward castes in the legislative assembly leads us to the conclusion that the hegemony of the upper castes in the congress in Uttar Pradesh was not only weakened, but a new political force emerged, namely, the unified backward castes (AJGAR). Broad political mobilisation of the peasant castes against the entrenched castes taking advantage of numerical reponderance speaks of the actualisation of India's democratic polity.

In 1967 Charan Singh left the congress and along with his supporters joined forces with the opposition. Charan Singh became the first Chief Minister who did not belong

to the higher castes such as Brahman, Kayastha, Bania and Rajput. The coalition ministry differed from its predecessors in one respect. Backward castes which had only a nominal representation in the congress ministers got 29.63% representation in the coalition ministry 5 out of 27 ministers in the cabinet of Charan Singh 8 belonged to the backward castes. Whereas the ministry formed by C.B. Gupta did not have even one minister belonging to the backward castes. The question then why did the backward castes under the leadership of Charan Singh leave the congress and what were their major grievances against the congress?

Charan Singh left the congress and formed the Jana Congress in 1967, because he felt that the congress was catering to the urban interests at the cost of the rural populace. Though Charan Singh aspired to be called the leader of the rural populace, he was mainly representing the interests of the rich peasantry (Kulaks). Infact, Charan Singh vehemently opposed fixing of ceiling on landholdings as it could affect adversely mainly the substantial landowners. Such a situation was not warranted in Rajasthan as land has never been as scarce as it is in U.P. However, Charan Singh was generally accepted as leader of peasants in Rajasthan as well. The political parties formed and led by him had their organs

in Rajasthan.

The congress party in U.P. appealed to nearly all sections of society for electoral mobilization in its favour but the hardcore groups which formed the social base of the party were the Brahmans, the scheduled castes and the Muslims who accounted for around 44% of the states population, and all of them were not so united in favour of the congress party, as the backward castes were united against the congress and its upper caste/class leadership.

Thus, we find that the leadership of the congress party was restricted to the upper castes such as brahmans, Bania and Thakurs, whereas the middle and the backward castes were under-represented. Such a situation prompted the backward castes to rely around Charan Singh.

Table to be followed

Table : 3

**Caste and Community Background of the Congress
Members of the Legislative Assembly
(1952-68)**

Caste	1952-57		1957-62		1962-67		1967-68	
	No of Members	% of Total No. of MLA's	No. of Members	% of Total No. of MLA's	No. of Members	% of Total No. of MLA's	No. of Members	% of Total No. of MLA's
Brahmin	96	24.62	61	21.33	55	22.10	44	23.53
Bhumihar	6	1.54	8	2.80	9	3.61	4	2.14
Kshatriya	38	9.17	35	12.24	41	16.47	38	17.65
Vaishya	27	6.92	18	6.29	23	9.24	10	5.38
Kayastha	23	5.90	19	6.64	9	3.61	3	1.60
Other Higher Caste	4	1.03	7	2.45	9	3.61	3	1.60
Backward Caste	25	6.66	25	8.74	15	6.02	11	5.88
Scheduled Castes	79	20.26	68	23.77	54	21.69	41	21.93
Not Known	48	12.31	11	3.85	8	3.21	19	10.16
Total No of Hindus	347	88.98	252	88.11	223	89.56	169	90.38
Sikhs	1	0.25	1	0.35	-	-	-	-
Muslims	42	10.77	32	11.19	24	9.64	17	9.09
Christians	-	-	1	0.39	2	0.80	1	0.53
Total	390	100.00	286	100.00	249	100.00	187	100.00

Source: Saraswati, Srivastava - 'Uttar Pradesh: Politics of Neglected and Development' in Iqbal Narain, Ed- State Politics in India, op. cit.

The above data clearly shows the caste profile of congress legislative elite from 1952 to 1968. In the first assembly the congress party had 390 legislatures in the assembly, out of 390 members, 194 belonged to the higher castes, that is, fifty per cent of the congress legislators belonged to the upper castes such as brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthas, Baniyas etc. The backward castes had just 26 legislators out of a total of 390, they were under-represented, and were just 6.66% of the congress membership in the assembly. The scheduled caste members accounted for around 20% of the congress strength in the assembly. Muslims accounted for around 10% of the congress strength in the assembly.

Not only the dominance of the upper castes could be seen in the congress legislative wing, but also in the cabinets which were formed. The six U.P. cabinets formed between 1952 and 1974 were also dominated by Brahmins, Rajputs and Vaishyas. In the Sampurnanand, C.B. Gupta and Sucheta Kriplani Ministries, nearly half of the ministers belonged to the upper castes. Yadavs and Kurmis found no place until 1967⁶. In the C.B. Gupta Ministry formed in 1967 after the assembly elections, out of a total of thirteen ministers in the cabinet eleven belonged to the upper castes and one each belonged to the scheduled castes and Muslims.⁷ The Charan Singh ministry formed in 1967,

incontrast to the earlier C.B. Gupta Ministry had nine ministers belonging to the backward castes, the backward castes got this much representation in the council of ministers for the first time. We can say that there were sufficient grounds for the backward castes to appose the congress as their political aspirations could not be met by the congress.

Legislative Elite in Post Period

The abolition of Zamindari system and introduction of green revolution immensely helped the middle caste's peasantry economically. The backward peasant castes in particular have been benefitted economically more than other groups. It is this section of the peasantry which felt that it did not have the political power commensurate with its economic power and numerical strength. The Jats in western U.P. who had a legacy of enjoying peasant proprietorship gained maximum due to green revolution. However, Jats are not included in the category of backward castes. Charan Singh who was considered to be the leader of the rural people, in actuality espoused the cause of the rich peasantry. The Jats and the other backward castes took seriously their political marginalisation and viewed it as a discrimination perpetuated by the congress party. Charan Singh was the first congress politician to

recognize the political potential of mobilizing the discontent of the backward castes, most of whom belonged to the agricultural classes. Charan Singh wanted reservation in the public services for the backward classes. In fact it was Charan Singh who during his short span of Prime Ministership of the country, encouraged the backward classes to articulate their problems related to social and educational backwardness. The dominant group within the congress was not receptive to many of the ideas expressed by Charan Singh. In 1956 when Charan Singh presided over the Backward classes conference, his participation was opposed by the then dominant congress state leadership.

In 1967 elections to the state assembly the middle castes and the backward castes managed to get 33% of the assembly seats whereas in the 1962 elections they had just 18% representation. The backward castes realized that they could get better representation in the political set up if they organised themselves in political terms. Since the backward castes knew that the dominant congress leadership was not ready to share power with them they organised themselves as opposition groups informally within the congress party and formally outside it. It is evident that the representation of the backward castes in the cabinet in Uttar Pradesh has been substantial in non-congress

governments, whereas in congress governments they did not have any significant representation. Infact, all non-congress chief Ministers have come from the backward castes. Charan Singh, Ram Naresh Yadav, and Mulayam Singh Yadav, Kalyan Singh, the present Chief Minister who belongs to B.J.P. is an exception. It proves that the backward castes, have felt neglected in the congress party whereas in the non-congress parties they were able to have access to positions of power and authority. The socialist parties were the first to realize the political potential of giving positions to the members of these caste groups, which gave these parties the reputation of being champions of the backward castes.⁸

It was the Bhartiya Kranti Dal launched by Charan Singh in 1969 which tried to articulate the discontent of the rich and middle peasants in the upper Doab. The formation of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal offered the rich peasant proprietors an organisational alternative for asserting their political interests which they believed had been hitherto neglected by the congress. In the 1969 assembly elections, Bharatiya Kranti Dal secured largest number of seats after the congress party. Thus in the 1969 elections in U.P. the Bharatiya Kranti Dal capitalized on the discontent that had been developing particularly in the western part of the state among the

middle and rich peasants.⁹ Paul Brass considers that the rise of Bhartiya Kranti Dal was not at the expense of other parties such as the Jan Sangh. In fact the votes which the Bharatiya Kranti Dal got had hitherto gone to the independents.

Muslim Legislative Elites of U.P.

U.P. was the centre of separatist politics in the pre-independence days. The congress party did not have much of the Muslim support because it was basically seen as espousal of the interests of the majority community. But after independence the congress party made a deliberate attempt to cultivate the Muslim community, and the congress was successful to a great extent in mobilising Muslims in its favour. The muslim support provided the congress party political stability. Muslim members had 10% representation in the first assembly of U.P. and this trend persisted in the subsequent assemblies too. But the representation of the Muslim legislative elite in the U.P. cabinet was always around five per cent.. most of the Muslim members of the assembly elites came from the landed classes such as the ex-Zamindari or from the Muslim clergy. The leadership of the muslims generally remained in the hands of the conservative sections.

Occupational Profile of Legislative Elites in U.P.

Uttar Pradesh is one of the most economically backward states in India. The main occupation of the people of the state is agriculture. Most of the legislators have reported agriculture as their main occupation. In the first assembly out of the 390 members, 15 congress members reported agriculture as their main occupation. Among congress members legislators having business as their main occupation accounted for 54 members, law was supported by 86 members, and teaching by 29 M.L.A's.

In the second, third and fourth assemblies, agriculture accounted for about 40% of all the congress legislators. Law which accounted for 22% in the first assembly declined to 10% in the fourth assembly. The occupation/profession which acquired prominence was that of whole time political workers. In the first assembly only 3.90% congress members supported as full time professional politicians, but in the fourth assembly, the professional politicians accounted for 21%.

Even in a party like Jan Sangh which is generally considered to be the party of the business class, one can observe preponderance of M.L.A's having agriculture as their main occupation. In the 1957-62 assembly out of the

total number of M.L.A.s the party had reported that 17 of them had agriculture as their main source of livelihood. In the 1962-67 assembly out of a total of 49 Jan Sangh M.L.A's 10 reported agriculture as their main occupation, whereas M.L.A's belonging to business class accounted for only 10%. In the 1967-68 assembly 53 out of the total of 99 M.L.A's reported agriculture of which accounted for 53.53% of all the Jan Sangh M.L.A's.

Paul Brass observes that in actuality only 24 per cent of M.L.A's from 1952 to 1962 derived their principal income from cultivation. Many of the M.L.A's whose fathers were cultivators did not themselves practise agriculture. According to Paul Brass peasants have been under-represented in relation to the former land lords, big farmers and professional groups. Brass further observes that the middle agricultural castes have been relatively less represented than persons from upper castes.¹¹ Nevertheless, it is clear that a large number of legislators in U.P. have been elected from among the peasants.

Educational Background of the Legislative Elites in U.P.

Saraswati Sirivastava's study of politics in Uttar Pradesh shows that more and more educated persons were

getting elected as M.L.A's. A glance at the educational qualifications of the congress M.L.A's brings out the fact that the party was sending increasingly more educated persons as its representatives in the assembly. In the first assembly, there was only one congress M.L.A who had a Ph.D. degree, but in 1967-68 the number of congress M.L.A's who had a Ph.D degree arose to 3. In the first assembly post-graduates accounted for 4.62% of the total congress strength in the assembly, whereas in 1967-68 the per centage of post-graduates was 11.7 per cent. The percentage of graduate M.L.A's in the congress party was 19.49 in 1952-57, but in 1967-68 24.07 per cent of Congress M.L.A's were educated upto graduation.¹²

Saraswati Sirivastava shows in her study that more and more educated people are entering the U.P. assembly. We find that the legislative elite of U.P. has a higher percent of educated people among its members, than the percentage of educated population they represent.

Conclusion

The following trends could be discerned from the above analysis regarding the social background of the legislative elite in Uttar Pradesh.:

1. In the initial years after independence the U.P. legislature was dominated by the upper caste M.L.As

such as the Brahamanas, Kayasthas, Rajputs and Banias. But in the late 1960's and early 1970's the upper caste legislators faced challenges to their hegemony from the middle peasant castes such as the Jats., Ahirs, Gujars, Yadavs, etc. The representation of the Kayasthas and Banias decreased considerably in the U.P. legislature in subsequent assembly elections.

- 2) The number of legislative elites who have reported their main occupation as agriculture has declined. Most of the educated legislators in the first two assemblies were engaged in the legal profession, but with the passage of time, the number of assembly members engaged in the legal profession has also declined. The percentage of professional politicians has increased in the assembly over the years.
- 3). Women are under-represented in the U.P. assembly. The number of women legislators has always been around 5% of the total assembly seats. most of the women members are in some way connected with some political family. Women who have no political upbringing are hardly active in U.P. politics.
- 4). Among the Muslim legislative elite, there is a preponderance of the landed class and the clergy. The Muslims members comprise of nearly 10 per cent

of the total assembly membership. Muslims were one of the pillars for congress dominance in U.P. for a long time. But with the shift in the support of Muslims to the Congress party in 1980 the other political parties have improved their support-base in the last decade. Even the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have not remained sympathetic to the congress party now for quite sometime. It is surprising that there has not been even one muslim Chief Minister in U.P. However, Rajasthan had at least one muslim Chief Minister. Rajasthan had even had a scheduled caste Chief Minister.

Finally, we may however, conclude that democrati- zation of polity has occurred in U.P. such independence causing a break in the dominance of the upper castes. More and more communities which earlier remained under- represented have been increasing their share the power game.

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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Today a power elite in India have gained superiority over economic dominants and social and cultural elites. Superiority of the power elite speaks of the success of parliamentary democracy and its allied institutions in India. However, it is hard to draw a clear line of demarcation between power elite and economic dominants. The latter spend a lot of money either for contesting elections or in support of political parties of their choice to extract economic and political benefits and favours. Those who are able to reach the portals of State Assemblies and Parliament take their tenures as a business proposition and try to maximise their fortunes as far as possible. Barring a few exceptions such a nexus between political power and economic prosperity has become an established fact of our social fabric. Certainly due to historical diversity and cultural heterogeneity, we do not witness a uniform pattern in regard to this nexus, hence the present comparative study of the legislative elite in the states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.

We may also mention here that both class approach and elite approach are complimentary for the study of economic dominants and power elite. However, without undermining the significance of the class approach, we have examined

in our dissertation the elite approach to understand the socio-economic background of the legislative elite in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The more important constraint in restricting our study to the application of the elite approach is time factor. In this concluding part of the dissertation emphasis is placed on the similarities and differences in terms of social background of the legislative elites in the two states keeping in view their history and social composition in terms of castes and communities.

Let us first look at the historical differences between Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. As we have stated earlier in chapter II that Rajasthan was outside the purview of British India, and it had a distinct place in the Indian India as it was ruled by Rajput clans in 19 out of a total of 22 princely states. On the contrary Uttar Pradesh was under direct control of the British and it had two prominent land tenure systems, namely, Zamindari system in eastern Uttar Pradesh and Ryotwari system in Western Uttar Pradesh. Zamindars in eastern Uttar Pradesh were small landholders acting as intermediaries between the state and the tenants. The zamindars, who were mainly Rajputs and Brahmins, also kept substantial landholdings under their self-cultivation. In several districts in eastern Uttar Pradesh they paid more than 50% land revenue to the government as self-cultivators. The ryots were peasant proprietors as they were directly under the

control of the state. In western Uttar Pradesh many of the ryots were far better off economically and in terms of landholdings than Zamindars in eastern Uttar Pradesh. Such a situation did not exist in Rajasthan as it had mainly two land tenure systems, namely, Jagirdari and Khalsa. Jagirdars were grantees of lands given to them by the princes. They enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. Jagirs were much larger in size than the Zamindaris of eastern Uttar Pradesh. Jagirdars in practice behaved like princes within the princely states. Jagirs were infact a raj within a raj.

The Khalsa lands were under the direct command of the jagirdars and the revenue collected from them was earmarked for meeting personal expenses for the families of the jagirdars. Khalsa lands were not subject to any scrutiny by the superior authorities. Unlike Brahmins in Uttar Pradesh, the Brahmins in Rajasthan did not own substantial land holdings. Another difference between the two states is not land as it was never a scarce commodity in Rajasthan as it was in Uttar Pradesh. Infact the jagirdars sometimes forced some people to undertake cultivation and discouraged emigration. On the contrary land in Uttar Pradesh was quite fertile, and it was not available in abundance as it was in Rajasthan.

Rajasthan being a feudal state remained isolated to a large extent from the socio-cultural and economic

consequences of the raj. The British entered into treaties with the princes of Rajasthan that they would not take arms against the raj and the latter would not ordinarily interfere in their internal affairs. As a result of this the princes, jagirdars and smaller landlords became more atrocious, cruel and exploitative. The peasantry in Rajasthan generally remained subdued, suppressed and exploited. The people were not allowed to voice their grievances against the jagirdars. There were hardly any peasant movements in Rajasthan with the exception of Bijolia movement in Mewar and Kisan agitation in Shekhawati. Uttar Pradesh has, however, a long history of the peasant struggles, and the fact is that the peasants in Uttar Pradesh were far better off in terms of land tenure systems, protection against their exploitation and land reforms than the peasantry in Rajasthan. There is hardly any history of land settlements and land reforms in Rajasthan prior to independence. Ryots in western Uttar Pradesh enjoyed proprietorship long before independence, whereas 90% of the tenants in Rajasthan were tenants-at-will.

The two states also differed in terms of their social composition and cultural heritage. Education and awareness reached Uttar Pradesh much before than in Rajasthan. Allahabad and Lucknow universities and High Court at Allahabad were pioneering institutions in spreading education and awareness about legal rights. The

first university in Rajasthan was established on the eve of independence. A good number of lawyers in Rajasthan were educated at Allahabad and Lucknow.

So far as caste composition is concerned the numerical strength of the upper castes is more or less the same in the two states, but the difference lies in the fact that the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh acquired the middle class character much before the upper castes of Rajasthan. The upper castes therefore have been in the positions of power in Uttar Pradesh even after independence without interruption. Challenge to the hegemony of the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh has come from two distinct social sets, that is, the from among the well off jat peasantry of western Uttar Pradesh, and the neo-rich peasantry form among Yadavas and Kurmis of eastern Uttar Pradesh. These two have forged a sort of political unity since the late sixties. Charan Singh, a Jat by caste and lawyer by profession, took the leadership of rural peasantry by bringing together these two social sets of people under the banner of "AJGAR".

Political situation in Rajasthan after independence has never been so volatile as it has been in Uttar Pradesh and some other states such as Bihar. Though Jats as a single caste numerically constitute the most preponderant community, they have rarely been able to have unity with other peasant castes. There is nothing like an "AJGAR"

phenomenon in Rajasthan. The backward castes as a component of social formation in Rajasthan has almost been non-existent. The Jats, however, nourish even today rivalry against the Rajputs as they were their jagirdars in the past. No Jat so far has become Chief Minister of Rajasthan. No Rajput prince has also become the Chief Minister of the state. The present Chief Minister Bhairon Singh Shekhawat is a Rajput from the Shekhawati region. He was also the Chief Minister earlier during 1978-80. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat has been Chief Minister twice not because he is a Rajput but because he happens to be a prominent leader of Bharatiya Janata Party for the last forty years. This fact therefore cannot be construed as continuity of feudal elements in Rajasthan politics. Shekhawat was not even a jagirdar, he was a small landowner known as Bhomia.

The other Chief Ministers included leaders from among Brahmins, Banias, Kayasthas, Muslims and Scheduled Castes. Kayasthas Muslims and Scheduled Castes as communities have not been quite effective politically in the state of Rajasthan. It is a wellknown fact that Shiv Charan Mathur who was the Chief Minister twice, Bashatullah Khan, a Muslim and Jagannath Pahadia, a scheduled caste, were picked up as Chief Ministers by the central leadership of the Congress party. The Chief Ministers who had a strong social and political base included Hiralal Shastri, Tika Ram Paliwal, Jai Narayan Vyas, Mohan Lal Sukahdia, Harideo

Joshi etc. With the exception of Sukhadia and Joshi other leaders did not remain chief ministers for a long time. Infact, Shastri, Paliwal and Vyas who were freedom fighters of long standing they completed their terms as chief ministers by 1954 when Vyas was defeated in a leadership contest by Sukhadia who grabed Chief Ministership and remained in power for seventeen long years.

The Chief Ministers in Rajasthan, at least some of them, have not been highly educated including Sukhadia Joshi and Shekhawat. Some political leaders who have had solid social and political base have not necessarily come up to the level of state leadership. This is perhaps due to the fact that the leadership has remained confined to the local/regional interests. Many of the leaders are taken as leaders of either Jaipur, or Jodhpur or Udaipur or Kota or Bikaner regions rather than leaders of the entire state. Even leaders like Sukhadia, Vyas, and Shastri were criticised for being regional in their outlook and manifestations. The only positive development after independence in Rajasthan is the erosion of feudal elements from politics. The ex-princes and Jagirdars are spread over among various political parties, and there is no single party in which their presence is felt pre-eminently as a community. This is also true about other communities including Brahmins and Jats. The entry of Jats in the B.J.P. is a recent phenomenon barring one or

exceptions. They are mainly in the Congress and the Lokdal. The Brahmins are found mainly in the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party. Thus the legislative elite in Rajasthan is quite diversified and secular as they have been drawn from different regions, communities and political parties.

We have reported earlier in chapter III that there was a strong correspondence between landholding and caste in Uttar Pradesh. The upper castes, particularly the Brahmins and the Rajputs, owned more than 50% of the total land, and also enjoyed position of political power and authority in the state. Like Rajasthan, the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh including Brahmin, Thakur, Baniya, Kayastha and Khatri comprised of just 20% of the total population. But they had direct control over more than 60% of the total land in the state of Uttar Pradesh before independence. The Brahmins and Thakurs alone have held about 40% of the total assembly seats in Uttar Pradesh between 1952-80. This clearly speaks of the continuity of political dominance of these communities even after the abolition of Zamindari system. However, these castes have received a severe jolt in the last decade. The emergence of two leaders as chief ministers, namely, Ram Naresh Yadav and Mulayam Singh Yadav can be taken as an attack on the hegemony of the upper castes.

The middle peasant castes particularly since 1967 elections, have been politically alert and working against

the persisting hegemony of the upper castes. In 1967 elections, the backward castes managed to get 29% of the total assembly seats in Uttar Pradesh by sheer caste-based mobilization and articulation of anti-Congress sentiment. However, in case of the Jats of western Uttar Pradesh there is some kind of continuity as they were economically strong even in the pre-independence period, being peasant proprietors. But this is not true in case of the Yadavas, Kurmis and the Ahirs as were mainly tenants before independence and therefore their emergence in politics is a new phenomenon. By having a broad unity among the backward castes they have not only challenged the upper castes but have also weakened the political power enjoyed by the jats. Unlike Rajasthan and to some extent like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh is divided in same way between the forwards and the backwards. This may not be true about the districts of western Uttar Pradesh, but most districts of eastern Uttar Pradesh witness such a divide. Another significant consequence is in regard to the social base of the Congress party which was provided by the Brahmins, the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims. In the last general elections in 1991, it was clearly reflected particularly in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, though the same issues were not there in elections in these two states. The issue of Ram Janambhoomi/Babri Masjid attracted the electorate in Uttar Pradesh maximum, whereas the divide between the backwards and the forwards became a central

issue in Bihar. In Rajasthan the divide between the forwards and the backwards was totally absent as an election issue, and the Ram Janambhoomi/Babri Masjid issue was not as central as it was in Uttar Pradesh.

We may conclude our analysis of the legislative elites in the states of Rajasthan and Bihar by saying that in both the states the legislators are a highly diversified lot belonging to different castes and communities, having different levels of education pursuing different occupations and professions. The legislative elite in both the states enjoy a high degree of political power and authority. However, the main differences between the legislative elites of the two states are due to differential historically conditioned situations, namely, feudalism in Rajasthan, and British Rule in Uttar Pradesh. Zamindars and Ryots due to their solid and strong economic standing prior to independence have been able to reach to the positions of power after independence. In Rajasthan the upper castes particularly the Rajputs lost their economic and political power in an unprecedented manner and hence could not compete with other groups for political power as strongly as the Zamindars could do in Uttar Pradesh. The peasantry in Rajasthan was very weak and poor before independence and therefore it took a few years to cope up with the burden of electoral politics. Due to these differences, in Rajasthan the communal and caste factor has been less effective in power politics

than Uttar Pradesh. As we have stated earlier that caste and community based mobilization has been much more in Uttar Pradesh than in Rajasthan.

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