NATIONAL SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL STUDY

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BOBBY POULOSE

DISARMAMENT STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANISATION, AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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NEW DELHI-110 067
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जवाहरलाल नेहरु विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI – 110067

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
"NATIONAL SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL STUDY" being submitted
by Mr. Bobby Poulose, in partial fulfilment of require-
ment for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy
in this University, is a record of the student's own
work, carried out by him under my supervision and
guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has not
been presented for the award of any other degree or
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(M.L. SONDHI)
CHAIRPERSON

(M. ZUBERI)
SUPERVISOR

GRAM : JAYENU TEL. : 667676, 667557 TELEX : 031-73167 JNU IN

NATIONAL SECURITY : A CONCEPTUAL STUDY

BOBEY POULOSE

CONTENTS

PREFACE

PREFACE

This study is an attempt to examine the concept of national security in terms of its meaning, scope and relevance in the varied contexts in which it is applied.

In the first chapter, a brief introduction to the concept is attempted. The origin, development, meaning and scope of the concept of national security is discussed along with the context it finds itself in today.

In the second chapter, the concept of national security in the United States of America is examined. The development of the concept from 1812 onwards is traced, with the various factors that have influenced its course of maturation. Also discussed are the impacts of various institutions on this development.

In the third chapter, the conception of national security in the former Soviet Union is discussed. In it the Marxian basis of the Soviet security perception is examined. Next, the development of the concept from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution till the end of the Second World War is traced. The post-war perceptions of Soviet security policy are discussed after this. Finally, the national security policy under Gorbachev is examined.

In the fourth chapter, the application of the concept in the Third World is examined in terms of: (a) What is the Third World and what is it characterized? (b) How did the concept get transferred to the Third World is discussed? (c) What has been

the operational experience of the application of the concept in the Third World? (d) Lastly, has it been a fruitful experience in overall security terms for the Third World nations? The fifth and final chapter is the Conclusion.

I am deeply grateful to my Supervisor Prof. Zuberi for his kindness, patience, and encouragement in guiding me. Without his support I could not have done this dissertation. I am also thankful to my father for his constant support. My special thanks to my sister Pamela and mother. My sincere thanks also go to Roopak, Shyam Babu, Dr. Kamal and Anuradha Chenoy, and Patrick for their encouragement and support. I would also like to thank my class fellows - Kalyan, Manish and Lynda for their encouragement. My thanks also to the library staff of JNU and IDSA for their cooperation.

However, if there are any mistakes in this dissertation, I accept responsibility for it.

<div style="text-align: right">BOBBY POULOSE</div>

New Delhi
20 July 1992

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION : THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION : THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Origins:

The modern day concept of national security has its origins way back in history. In the days of universalistic Christiandom people considered themselves Christian first and Venitian second. Thus it was an age when it was blasphemous to talk of "worldly interests" as apart from 'spiritual interests'. However, with the collapse of the church and the emergence of monarchy, there emerged a concept of 'the will of the prince' which was replaced by 'dynastic interest' with further secularization. Duke de Rohan in 1638 beautifully summed up the change when he said, "Princes rule peoples, and interests dominate the princes". Thus one saw the rise of 'interests' in the language of diplomacy and politics, but it took some time before the concept of 'national interests' emerged from which came 'national security'.

Soon the concept of 'dynastic interest' was eclipsed by 'Reason of State' which again with the coming of parliamentary bodies which questioned the undefinable concept of 'reason of state', and it was replaced by 'public interest'.

Two things really changed all this and finally the concept of 'national interest' emerged. Firstly, with the coming of the twentieth century as trade, commerce and economic relations became the major concern of national diplomacy, 'the nation' became the

Center of discussion. Secondly, with the emergence of the United States where leaders used terms like 'the people', 'the nation' and 'the commonwealth' the concept of 'national interest' was born.

The shift from 'national interest' to 'national security' took place in the USA during the Second World War when war had become 'total' in its character, involving all sectors of the economy, society, polity, along with the unification of the various services of the military. This intense focusing of the whole national effort to war led to the National Security Act 1947, which termed US as a 'national security state' and specific institutions like the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the National Security Council (NSC) were created to deal with national security. The emphasis after 1940 in national security was in terms of the military dimension.[1]

Meaning and Scope

'National Security' is a widely used term and thus "has come to mean different things to different people". However, the main objective of national security is to protect[2] and extend national

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1   R.D. Mclaurin, "Managing National Security : The American Experience and Lessons for the Third World", in National Security In The Third World : The Management of Internal and External Threats (Eds.) Edward E. Azar and Chung-in-Moon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 258-260.

2   Kaufman, McKitrick, Leney (Eds.), US National Security : A Framework for Analysis (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 3.

values. Values constitute the essence of a nation and determine its basic character. There may be a disjunction between the values held by the masses and the leaders. In such a case, usually it is the ruling group or class which determines the national values.

The traditional view of national security was militaristic in its view of what constituted security. Such a view saw the 'protection from external attack' the primary source of threat. However such a view of national security is extremely narrow; and if pursued can leader to greater insecurity. In fact, Harry Truman, a great realist and believer in military-based security, himself said: "National Security does not consist only of an army, navy.... It depends on a sound economy, on civil liberties and human freedoms[3]". What is required is to move beyond this narrow conceptualization which is deeply western in its bias and understand the concept in its entirety.

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3   R. D. Mclaurin, "Managing National Security : The American
     Experience and Lessons for the Third World", in Edward E. Azar
     and Chung-in-Moon (Eds.), <u>National Security In The Third
     World : The Management of Internal and External Threats</u>
     (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 260.

National Security Today

In today's world however, such a traditional view is totally inadequate, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus the end of the so-called 'cold war'. National security even in its home in the West is faced with the dilemma of redefinition. The threats to a nation's security in a highly complex and interdependent world are from all sides. The environmental collapse taking place in many parts of the globe, discussed at the first Earth Summit in Rio de Jenerio attended by leaders of all governments irrespective of military or economic power, represents the fact that if national security as a concept has to survive the dimensions of threats it takes into account have to be very wide-ranging.

National security today has to accept within its theoretical fold environmental security; food security; resource security; and economic security; political, cultural, ideological and integration variables too have to be accommodated into the domains of national security.

In fact national security has to lose some of its 'nationalism' and accept the fact that nations are interdependent and within a globe. Thus it should merge with international security and conceptions of common security, in a positive manner, if human destiny has to be saved from the myriad catastrophes it confronts today.

Chapter II

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Chapter II

AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF NATURAL SECURITY

Since the earliest days of the republic, the United States sought to ensure the political and territorial integrity of the nation without the assistance of other powers. The United States, though willing to cooperate with other nations in economic matters, was singularly unwilling to allow outside involvement in questions of national safety. Statesman have only two basic tools at their disposal when pursuing the national interest - diplomatic and military force. Diplomatic negotiation implies compromise. Absolute security, on the other hand, cannot be negotiated; it can only be won. Thus this solitary or unilateral approach to security affairs carried with it an implicitly absolute goal - not to permit America's security to be undermined by the behaviour of other powers. It implied an emphasis on the military approach as a response to any perceived threat.

Americans have therefore right from their independence gone to war for a variety of reasons - e.g. to expand their territory for economic gain; in response to efforts to their national honour and territorial integrity; to secure their nation's role as the guardian of freedom and the promoter of democratic values. But the overarching response in all cases for national safety has been the use of unilateral action as the surest method of achieving national security. But through these historical experiences American statesmen have come to accept this goal as an ultimate end of foreign policy.

This principle of American security policy was first driven home in the war of 1812 with Great Britain, when a new breed of American nationalists - whose zeal, unlike that of the Founders, had not been tempered by experience - spurred the country into open hostilities with Great Britain so as to remove even the possibility of future British interference on the borders of the United States. The war of 1812 saw military stalemates and finally the destruction of the American capital. This burning of Washington only heightened the sense of urgency for America's search for Absolute Security, which grew as American power grew worldwide.

In the mid-to-late nineteenth century began an obsession in American foreign policy over the threat of British intervention in the Western Hemisphere. This obsession did not evaporate even in the 1890s when in actuality British threat had vanished.

Then again, at the turn of the nineteenth century with the domestic American economy increasingly dependent on foreign markets, there was search for security against rising naval and economic powers - Germany and Japan. Like the obsession with the British threat to interfere in the hemisphere, the fear of Germans and Japanese led to heightened American fears of strategic and economic dislocation, resulting in the US creating a world class fleet for operations in the remote parts of the world to control markets and trade routes.

During the first half of the twentieth century, this giant superpower was once again caught up in an obsessive fear of a new

threat - Communism, and Fascism. Both affected American conception of security deeply. While the rise of Imperial Germany and Japan represented a clear danger, national socialism, communism and anarchism were not territorial, but represented perils which would undermine the strength and even the physical safety of the US by promoting internal dissent and civil strife. American Presidency countered this threat most notably in the person of Woodrow Wilson who began to export Liberal democracy - under the protection of US troops to Latin America, Europe and Asia. Thus during the Second World War, and after it, during the Cold War America began to intervene globally on a scale it had never done before. Vietnam and Lebanon are the more recent examples of America's search for absolute security, which reached its height with the coming of President Reagan who began to search for absolute security in a new realm - outerspace.

In the following pages I would like to highlight those key historical events in America's search for absolute national security in as brief a manner as possible.

The Burning of Washington - Absolute Vulnerability: 1811-1815

On 3 August 1814, a force of 5,000 British soldiers, sailors and marines embarked from Bermuda for the mid-Atlantic coast of the United States. Among them were 3,800 seasoned Infantry men who had defeated Napoleon. For the last two years the US had been at war with Britain in North America, but the war remained

To Frederick

BALTIMORE

Patapsco River

Rockville

Rock Creek

Potomac River

Severn River

Bladensburg

WASHINGTON

Annapolis

Alexandria

Marlboro

Wood Yard

Chesapeake Bay

N

W — E

S

Benedict

Potomac River

Patuxent River

**THE BRITISH ADVANCE
ON WASHINGTON, 1814**

0   10   20   30 miles

stalemated in 1814. It was because of this that their two key leaders - General Robert Ross and Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn - were lading the British troops up the Atlantic Coast. Even by 19 August American observers reporting back to the capital were not aware of the specific intentions of these enemy movements. Except for James Madison, none could properly grasp the danger though they knew something was going on. The Secretary of War John Armstrong incredulously summed up the popular sentiment prior to the British invasion on Washington: "They certainly will not come here; what the devil would they do here."[1] However, steps were taken at the insistence of President James Madison and Secretary of State James Monroe, and the evacuation of Washington was on. On 24 August 1814 the attack finally came and the American forces were in flight from Bladensburg. The capital was looted, and many important buildings destroyed, though there were no wild massacres. On the night of Thursday, 25 August, General Ross and Admiral Cockburn withdrew from Washington and moved back to the East Coast from where they left for Jamaica. Though the Treaty of Ghent was signed between UK and US in December 1814, the lessons formed the basis for American conception of national security.

The first lesson was, the aggravation of an Anglo-American antipathy/was that to be the constant worry of American security policy makers till it was replaced by the fear of rising Germany and Japan.

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1   James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable : The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit Books, 1988), p. 20.

Secondly, it taught the 'war hawks' of 1812 a lesson the founding fathers were forced to accept long before, that - invulnerability was not within their reach.

Thirdly, the British march on Washington, though having no military significance, in the end proved vital for American morale and psychology. The lesson was straight, that a nation that allowed itself to view 'any' designs on its integrity as insignificant could never hope to secure absolute security.[2]

Lastly, and most important, despite the fact that US on 8 January 1815, two months after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, won New Orleans from Great Britain, the message always remained, that foreign nations might at any time try to strike at the very heart of the Republic - i.e. absolute invulnerability.[3]

The Florida Campaign and Monroe Doctrine - 1816 to 1823 : Security Implications for the United States

If anybody were to be looking at a crude map of North America in 1815, he would see a body of land just south of the United States whose outline all too closely resembled a massive, threatening pistol - called the Spanish Floridas.

The butt of the pistol was the Peninsula of East Florida, a large swampy region with a long and strategic coastline. The

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2   Ibid., p. 37.

3   Ibid., p. 40.

ALABAMA TERRITORY

GEORGIA

Escambia River

Perdido River

Pensacola

Fort Barrancas

Apalachicola River

Fort Scott

Fowltown

St. Mary's River

Fernandina

AMELIA ISLAND

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Fort Gadsden

St. Mark's

Suwanee River

St. Augustine

FLORIDA

GULF OF MEXICO

Boleck's Village

FLORIDA CAMPAIGN OF ANDREW JACKSON

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 miles

✗ Skirmish   ▲ Indian Village   ♜ Fort

NORTH DAKOTA

MONTANA

SOUTH DAKOTA

OREGON

IDAHO

WYOMING

WISC.

MINN.

MICH.

NEVADA

UTAH

NEBRASKA

IOWA

ILL.

IND.

San Francisco

Monterey

CALIFORNIA

Colorado R.

COLORADO

KANSAS

MISSOURI

TENN.

PACIFIC OCEAN

ARIZONA

NEW MEXICO

OKLA.

Arkansas R.

ARK.

Mississippi R.

Red R.

ALA.

TEXAS

Sabine R.

LA.

MISS.

THE ADAMS-ONIS TRANSCONTINENTAL LINE

0 100 200 300 400 500 miles

MEXICO

Rio Grande

Nueces R.

GULF OF MEXICO

TAMPA BAY

trigger guard – the valley of the Apalachicola River in West Florida – was made up of some of the best farm lands in South East. So too was the pistol's barrel, a long strip of land that cut under the Alabama and Mississipi territories and above New Orleans nuzzling menacingly against the most coveted artery of all in North America – the Mississipi.[4]

Here stood a Negro fort upon a place called Prospect Bluff just overlooking and controlling the most fertile sections of the Apalachicola Valley in this Spanish Florida. It was managed by a British Officer, who from the time of the 1812 Anglo-American war used Creek and Seminole warriors, as well as runaway slaves, to harass the Southern border of the United States and perhaps assault New Orleans.

Andrew Jackson knew that without these provinces, filled as they were with runaway slaves, foreigners and Indians,would always prove a security problem to the US and for a safe process of westward expansion. He also knew Spain had no control over this area which was being used by Britishers to incite attacks on Americans.

Following the conclusion of the Fort Jackson Treaty, without any congressional authorization, Andrew Jackson marched into the provincial capital of Pensacola in West Florida using the presence of a British officer as a justification. At Pensacola, he

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4   Ibid., p. 42.

delivered a stinging message to the Spanish Governor, which was not to be the first. Later on as the months of 1815 passed along with murders and reprisals committed all along the borderlands, the Negro Fort of the Spanish Florida became a symbol of the lawlessness that made America's Southern border a totally vulnerable place. Thus, early in 1816 Andrew Jackson sent another threatening message to the Spanish Governor of West Florida. Jackson's mind had become set on annexing it, for he knew there was no other way to maintain law and order. He ordered General Edmund P. Gaines, military commander in Georgia, to cross into Florida and attack any lawless elements there. Should Negro fort be taken over it should be done. On 26 July 1816, Commander Sailingmaster Jarius Loomis ordered a mortar attack on Negro Fort, and in one blow the whole fort and most of the men there were killed. This attack put the Floridas at the centre of an intense debate on American foreign policy. Negotiations were on between America and Spain, which was ready to release the Floridas for some satisfactory boundary adjustments between her North American possessions - Mexico, Texas, and California - and the Western territories of US.

Negotiating was difficult, and President Monroe's Secretary of State John Quincy Adams knew something more was needed to make Spain accept American terms.

The opportunity came, when on 30 November, when an American travelling Lieutenant with a small party of American women and children/by boat up the Apalachicola river were ambushed by Indians and killed.

There was an outrage among the citizens of Washington, and the President sent a message to General Gaines to march across Florida. By fate the man to whom General Gaines gave this responsibility, was Andrew Jackson. By 1817, Jackson was on his way, while Quincy Adams unaware of this, was deadlocked in negotiations with Spain.

Between 1 April and 24 May 1818, Jackson occupied regions of Florida controlled by Seminoles with the Spanish Governor of Florida Don Jose Mascot. The British officers were captured and sentenced to 50 lashes each. The Spanish Floridas were occupied, the Spanish official at Washington was stunned as much as US officials in the midst of negotiations. Most Americans too, though they agreed that acquiring the Floridas was necessary, but to acquire them through a congressionally unauthorized invasion smacked of a martial spirit that made the country uneasy. However, only one man, John Quincy Adams, defended it because he knew the conquest of Floridas was vital for American security, and he out-argued the Spanish that it was an act in self-defence and simultaneously threatened Britain not to interfere in the Americas.

The Secretary of State was clearly wanting to send the message that no interference by Europeans in the Americas would be tolerated. On 22 February 1819 the Transcontinental Treaty was signed between USA and Spain giving the Floridas to the US for $5 million. Quincy Adams, knowing the significance of the treaty, said: "It was near one in the morning when I closed the day with ejaculations of fervent gratitude to the Giver of all good. It

was perhaps, the most important day of my life...."[5]

Next, US now could turn its eyes on the newly independent States of Latin America. Adams knew the Latin American colonies. The US could not view Latin American affairs with detachment. Jefferson believed that the destiny of the US was to control, and perhaps, even rule the "whole northern, if not the southern continent." This continentalism crossed all party lines in the early years of the republic. Latin American colonies, when they became independent from Spain in the last years of 1790s, were greeted with coolness in Washington. From the beginning, Latin American leaders did not get support for their independence struggles from the US but rather got it from Britain.

The Monroe Doctrine was announced much later, after the ongoing deliberations between Quincy Adams and Russia, Britain and Austria came to a standstill. For the Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, a broad range of security issues faced America in 1823. In the Pacific Northwest, Great Britain, Russia and the US were contesting the precise borders of their territories and the limits of their various commercial interests. American rights had to be asserted on territories as far north as the Columbia River, and if possible as far as the 49th Parallel. The issue of Spanish Southwest had been opened with Mexican independence in 1821, and several European powers were looking with greedy eyes on California. Cuba was also a key concern.

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5   Ibid., p. 66.

All these continental considerations weighed heavily on
Adams's mind as he argued that the only way out of the threat of
a Holy Alliance, and the independence of Latin American colonies,
was a unilateral and broad statement of the vital interests of the
US embodied in the President's message to the Congress - called
the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine, promulgated on 2 December 1823, contained
three basic points: First, 'Non-Colonization Principle', i.e.,
that, "the American continents, by the free and independent
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not
to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European
power"[6].

Second, the doctrine is an affirmation of American neutrality
in the wars of Europe as echoed in the language of Washington's
farewell address: "It is only when our rights are invaded or
security menaced, that we resent injuries; or make preparations
for our defence."

Finally, the doctrine linked all territories in the hemi-
sphere that were not already the distinct possession of a major
power (such as Canada or West Indies) to the national interest of
the US: "We could not view any interposition for the purpose of
oppressing them, or controlling (sic) in any other manner, their
destiny, by any European Power, in any other light, than as a

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6   Howard Jones, The Course of American Diplomacy (New York:
     Franklin Watts, 1985), p. 107.

manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the U.S."[7]
This triple thrust was aimed at all would-be intertoppers on
the Americas.

Despite this bold statement of American interests, only
Monroe and Adams knew well what war with a foreign power over the
integrity of American claims meant, as the US did not have the
strength to back those claims. The force behind the daring
statements in 1823 may not have consisted of overpowering naval
and military strength, but its strength lay in the determination
and that was real indeed. It had already been demonstrated in
Floridas.

American Annexation of California and Texas: 1842-1849

From the South American Coast near Callao Peru, on the
afternoon of 7 September 1842, three ships led by Commodore Thomas
Catesby Jones sailed out to the Californian port of Monterey near
the San Francisco bay. The reason for the voyage was simple as
read out by the Commodore from the letter he received from Mr.
John Parrott, the US Consul at Mazatlan: "... a letter ... which
contains the manifesto of the Mexican Government ... in relation
to the difficulties pending between the US and the Government of
Mexico - from which it is quite probable that the US and Mexico
are now at war."[8]

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7   James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest
     For Absolute Security From 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit
     Books, 1988), p. 73.

8   Ibid., pp. 75-76.

So Commodore Jones, thinking that Mexico and US were at war and knowing that California would be the most likely spot for aggression, landed at Monterey port. After giving an eighteen hours' grace period to the citizens to decide, he started marching on shore with 150 Americans.

However, two days later Commodore Jones at the insistence of a local American citizen, glanced through the newspapers and realized that he had made a mistake, in fact there was no war between the USA and Mexico. The rumours of English occupation were also false/ and in fact Mexico was dispatching a new Governor to California to recruit fresh troops for the militia and reassert Mexican authority over the province.

Commodore Jones realized his mistake and said: "The motives and only justifiable grounds for demanding a surrender of the territory were thus suddenly removed, or at least rendered so doubtful as to make it my duty to restore things as I had found them with the least possible delay."[9] The withdrawal was conducted peacefully and as suddenly as they had appeared, the American forces vanished from California.

What Jones had mistakenly done reflected the extreme anxiety of American leaders regarding California. If the situation in the province were ever again to become uncertain, the Governments of Great Britain and Mexico were now certain the US would resort to force to seize California and that is what exactly happened.

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9   Ibid., p. 81.

The issue of the Mexican province of California quickly came up in the next elections after the tenure of Andrew Jackson ended. The man who was to be the architect of the annexation of California and Texas was one of Jackson's most trusted political lieutenants - a man nicknamed "Young Hickory" during the 1844 Presidential campaign. His real name was James K. Polk.

Polk had identified himself not only as the candidate for expansion into the South and the North-West, but also as a candidate who would most aggressively counter foreign threats to that expansion. Polk defeated his rival Henry Clay by a narrow margin on 4 December 1844 to become the US President. London and Mexico were clearly worried at his election. On 31 December Lord Aberdeen sent a note to the British Minister in Mexico that Great Britain would look very unfavourably at any attempt by 'any' nation to establish a protectorate in the increasingly troubled province of California. Rumours floating around by March 1845 that Britain might take over California by money payment led President Polk to announce just before his inaugural address on 4 March 1845 four things his administration was committed to:

1. The settlement of the Oregon Question with Great Britain.

2. The acquisition of California and a large district on the coast.

3. The reduction of the Tariffs to a revenue basis.

4. The complete and permanent establishment of the ... 'Independent Treasury'. 10

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10   See ibid., p. 92.

Texas, too, was on his list, because for Polk the settlement
of the Pacific boundary was more vital to American security. And
there was another important reason why Polk, though he annexed
Texas, did not mention it in the inaugural address as Texas was a
complete slave state and the 1840s saw a wave of anti-slavery
movement in US, and so if Texas had to be admitted it required
that first it be changed, but that was difficult.

Texas was annexed, and despite fears of the union breaking
up on the issue of slavery, at least at that time, it did not
happen. However a strong anti-slavery leader John Quincy Adams
knew the sensitivity of the matter and when Texas was annexed by
Polk he called it "the heaviest calamity that ever befell myself
and my country."[11]

The annexation of California and Oregon by outright conquest
was out of the question for Polk. Thus he devised a secret plan
to annex California. The plan involved a secret mission, and
orders were sent to three key actors in the drama - Commodore John
Drake Sloat, Thomas O. Larkin of the 1842 Jones incident who had
been appointed US Consul in Monterey, and John Charles Fermont of
US Army's topographical Engineers.

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11   Ibid., p. 93.

The task entrusted to each was to occupy Monterey and take over government in California by force, but if it could be done peacefully, residents, whatever be their nationality, would have to be shown the advantages of independence first, and then annexed as had been done in the case of West Florida and Texas.

Thomas O. Larkin at Monterey and much later Commodore Drake Sloat followed the various orders from the Secretary of State to move quietly and peacefully. The operation began from 1845 when Polk sounded Thomas Larkin, and asked Commodore Sloat to move towards California - as well as sent Fermont to Monterey under the guise of a scientific expedition to map the region for a suitable route for a Pacific railroad. Confusion began in March 1846 when Fermont who arrived there started behaving in a highhanded fashion alienating the Californian community, and began to openly incite American settlers to declare independence from Mexico. Little later in April 1846, Fermont was joined by another of Polk's representatives, Lieutenant Archibald Gillespie who after meeting Fermont in Sacramento Valley, where he was hiding on being thrown out by Californians from Montrery - due to some mysterious reasons, now openly incited violence in Montrery. Coincidentally none of these players knew that US and Mexico had gone to war on 25 April 1847. Fermont and all were joined by Commodore Sloat who reached Montrery on 2 July 1846, and it was a case of Americans openly supporting a minority insurrection inside a foreign territory. Polk, taking into consideration that the war was on, dispatched land occupation forces to California under General Stephen Watts Kearny late in 1846. California was taken over and Fermont court-martialed in November 1847.

By the spring of 1848 a Treaty of Peace was concluded with
Mexico and it ceded California to USA. Similarly in the case of
Oregon, Polk was able to gain peace with Britain through the Oregon
Treaty of 15 June 1846 establishing the 49th Parallel as the
official boundary, thus securing Oregon by threats without going to
war. Thus Texas, California and Oregon were won and Polk was able
to secure his greatest dream, i.e. secure continental boundaries
behind which the US could freely grow immeasurably strong.[12]

However, unlike Jackson, Polk did not have any inheritor so
profoundly concerned about US national security, and since 1850 the
nation's focus became more internalized with the ardent nationalism of
slave owners like Polk dying out, and slavery in US becoming the
key divisive issue. Polk's last dream was to annex Cuba, but as he
left office this desire had become mixed with both a reluctance to
increase the slave territories in US, and a very real fear of the
island ending up in British hands. Franklin Pierce who took over
from Polk realized the oncoming storm and could not take Cuba.

Even as late as 1860 when Lincoln was President, his Secretary
of State William H. Steward argued that the nation could be unified by
invading Cuba, but he was blocked by Lincoln, due to Cuba's slave
status and knew he could not stop the internal security crisis.
The Civil War proved to be the greatest calamity in the American
history leading to the US withdrawal from the world affairs for
two decades.

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12   Ibid., p. 106.

But when the rebellious South was finally quashed and slavery banned, the US once again began to turn outward and this time it was beyond Cuba, far into the East and the Pacific. The age of American imperialism had begun.

1890-1912 : Imperialism and the Implications for American Security

This period was a key period as far as the development of the basic elements of US national security policy is concerned. It was a period when America stepped out from its island of North America and, having established Latin America as its sphere of influence, looked outward to Western Europe and the Far East. Truly the makings of a world power were on. Americans who lived happily in their Atlantic moat suddenly realized that it was no longer so splendid and that it was choking America to an economic death. The depression of 1890s hit the American industry really bad. They knew the only way was to do the thing they fought against in their war of Independence (and the reason why they hated the Europeans) - colonize, expand. The period of 1890-1912 represents the phase of American imperialist expansion.

During the Civil War of 1861-1865 when America was busy grappling with their own problems, Europeans were busy chipping away at the sacred Monroe Doctrine and in 1864 Napoleon III proclaimed Archduke Maximilian of Austria Emperor of Mexico backing him with French troops. By 1867 Secretary of State William H. Steward Skillfully through use of threats, combined with the valiant and successful resistance of Benito Juarez, forced Napoleon III to give

in and Maximilian the Emperor faced a Mexican firing squad. In
1867 the US managed to secure the Russian provinces of Alaska and
Midway Islands. Simultaneously American commercial and residential
presence was secured in Sandwich Islands and Hawaiian Isles, as
well as US got the lease of Pearl Harbour in 1087 - all for
controlling the growing trade with China.

The 1890 Economic Depression hit America and the message of
James G. Blaine, the "Plumed Knight", who had died by this time,
became relevant. He had said in a speech at Waterville, Maine
in 1890:

> ... Our great demand is expansion. I mean expansion
> of trade with countries where we can find profitable
> exchanges. We are not seeking annexation of territory....
> At the same time I think we should be unwisely content if
> we did not engage in what younger Pitt so well termed
> annexation of trade. 13

After the depression of 1890, it was agreed that USA had to
look beyond the Americas if its trade had to survive. And the
place was China, where the French, the Germans, the Japanese, the
Russians, the British as well as now Americans were trading. But
before this, in 1895 the dispute with Venzuela and Great Britain
over a boundary almost turned violent. Washington proposed to
England's Prime Minister Lord Salisbury to submit the issue to
international arbitration, which he refused. Grover Cleveland's
Secretary of State Richard Olney sent a note to the British Prime

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13   Ibid., p. 120.

Minister which created a sensation in Europe saying that

> ... the US is practically sovereign on this continent,
> and its fiat is law... It is because, in addition to
> all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with
> its isolated position render it master of the situation
> and practically invulnerable as against any or all other
> powers. 14

Lord Salisbury finally agreed to arbitration. Latin America was thus the sounding board for American power and prosperity. America had once again asserted its authority and it was going to pursue its goals unilaterally.

The underlying need for markets pushed the American decision makers, and planners to use Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories as the great justification for such expansion. In 1890 when the US was undergoing a depression, and men like James G. Blaine were saying that the only way to save America was to expand, Mahan's theory of naval expansion into the Far East and the Pacific as the backbone for protecting American trade and competing with Japan, Britain, and Germany, was music to the ears of Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, and William McKinely.

From 1890 onwards till the conquest of the Philippines by Commodore Dewey on 25 February 1898, the naval expansionists began a tirade at all governmental levels, especially the Congress where upto as late as 1916 the anti-naval expansionists controlled these expansionists. Mahan, Lodge, Roosevelt and a little later

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14 Ibid., p. 121.

Lieutenant William Kimball were the architects of this policy. Once Roosevelt became the Assistant Secretary in the Navy Department, he began to push these theories into reality. And by September 1897, Roosevelt was preaching the desirability of war with Spain over Cuba and the Philippines to every one from Lodge to President William McKinley.

At the time Roosevelt gave orders to Commodire Dewey on 25 February 1898 to take over Subic Bay and Philippines, he had totally forgotten to consider what the US might do with these captured Spanish provinces. Lieutenant William Wirt Kimball of the Office of Naval Intelligence had given one answer in his paper entitled 'war with Spain' which he presented to the War College on 1 June 1896, much before the take over of the Philippines. He said US should attack the Philippines Islands "for the purpose of reducing and holding Manila, of harassing trade, of cutting off revenue..." and holding its ports "until a war indemnity were satisfactorily arranged for" by Spain.

But when actually the Philippines, Cuba, Guam, and Puerto Rico were captured and Cuban independence given, the big question came - what was to be done with a bargaining chip when the enemy had already come to terms? Spain had surrendered the Philippine Islands without any resistance to Commodore Dewey. This deeply unnerved Washington.

President William McKinley resolved this dilemma after many sleepless nights by saying that "there was nothing left for us to

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

USSR
Chita
Ulan Bator
MONGOLIA
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKOO)
SAKHALIN
Vladivostok
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA (CHOSEN)
JAPAN
CHINA
Peking
Port Arthur
Seoul
HONSHU
Hiroshima
Tokyo
Yellow Sea
Nanking
Nagasaki
Yangtze River
Shanghai
Chungking
EAST CHINA SEA
OKINAWA
Iwo Jima
RYUKUS IS.
Amoy
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
PACIFIC OCEAN
Canton
Hong Kong
FRENCH INDOCHINA
LUZON
PHILIPPINES
MARIANAS
Saipan
Guam
SIAM (THAILAND)
Manila
Philippine Sea
Leyte Gulf
Saigon
PELELIU IS.
Yap
CAROLINE
Palau
Truk
ISLANDS
MALAYA
SARAWAK
MINDANAO
PACIFIC
Singapore
SUMATRA
BORNEO
CELEBES
Hollandia
Djakarta
DUTCH EAST INDIES
NEW GUINEA
JAVA
Java Sea
BALI
TIMOR
Port Moresby
Darwin
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
Townsville

ALEUTIANS
Bering Sea
KURILES
PACIFIC OCEAN
INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE
MIDWAY
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
OAHU
Pearl Harbor
HAWAII
Wake Island
Eniwetok
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Kwajalein
GILBERT IS
OCEAN
Tarawa
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Bougainville
Guadalcanal
NEW HEBRIDES
FIJI ISLANDS
SAMOA
Coral Sea

Source: James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invincible: The Quest For Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit Books, 1988) PII2-113.

do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and christianize them" and following this decision McKinley said he "went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly."[15]

1912-1941 : From Wilsonian Intervention to a Reckoning in The East

Just prior to the First World War many important events were taking place. But something critical was taking place in Russia. In March 1917 Romonov dynasty was overthrown and replaced by a Provisional Government that created a constituent assembly; called for land reforms; abolition of the social and political structures of the country and rededicated itself to the prosecution of the war against Germany.

In America President Wilson was generally relieved by these developments. But still a certain anxiety over the events was reflected in his April 2nd War Message. About Russia he said:

> The wonderful ... things that have been happening ... in Russia ... Russia was known ... to have been always in fact democratic at heart... The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it has stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian ... and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty ... to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honour. [16]

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15   Honesto A. Villanueva, "Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War", Chapter 5, in Philippine Social Sciences and Humanitarian Review, 15, No. 2 (June 1950), p. 116.

16   Chace and Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security From 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit Books, 1988), p. 168.

One cannot believe that just one year later the same Woodrow
Wilson would order thousands of American troops into Russia,
where they would work with the most reactionary elements whose
very overthrow had previously given him so much satisfaction -
all for amazingly making "the world ... safe for democracy."

Such behaviour was characteristic of Wilson who would
swing from one end to another and whose knowledge of happenings
in Russia and Communism was more in terms of how it would affect
American security than anything else.

The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks under Lenin and
Trutsky at St. Petersburg on 7 November 1917 caused a sensation
and eventually panic and alarm in Washington and Western Europe.
The Russian Provisional Government had fallen because of Allied
insistence of Russia's continued participation in the war, as a
condition for financial and material assistance despite the
absolute exhaustion of the Russian people.

So when on 3 March 1918, after the Bolsheviks took over
power and signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, whereby
Russia lost one-third of its population and 60% of its European
territory, to withdraw from the war, the Allies were shaken.
Immediately, the Allies began to step up their calls for inter-
vention in Russia to aid those groups who were carrying on the
fight against Bolshevism in the South and in Siberia.

The Secretary of State Lansing's great concern was not
Japanese expansionism but that Japanese military presence in

Siberia would drive the people into the arms of the Bolsheviks. Thus when he agreed for the intervention, it was partly to police the activities of the Japanese. This he believed was the only way to fight Bolshevism. However the deep contradictions in the Wilsonian policy of intervention were soon exposed. One American official having toured the Siberian zone summed up the situation of Americans in Siberia aptly when he said, "But, who in Hell are 'they'? 'They' need help - financial, economic, military, and need it imperatively.... But in the silence of the night. I wonder who 'They' are." [17] American General Graves himself said, the confusion in Siberia was "growing worse daily... We are by our mere presence helping establish a form of autocratic government which the people of Siberia will not stand for and our stay is creating some feeling against the Allied governments because of the effect it has." [18]

But none of these were to move President Wilson who was in a crusade to "teach" the entire world the virtues of "good government". His active method of responding to the twin fears of internal disorder and external interference by military intervention was first successfully practiced in Latin America - in Mexico in 1911, Nicaragua in 1912, Haiti in 1915, and the Dominican Republic in 1916 - now had become a worldwide crusader

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17 William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931), p. 4.

18 James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit Books, 1988), p. 172.

without knowing that the Far East was not Latin America. So when criticism came on his policy in Siberia, he said, "My policy regarding Russia is very similar to my Mexican policy. I believe in letting them work out their own salvation, even though they wallow in anarchy a while."[19]

While the Peace Conference in Paris was going on the American soldiers remained in Siberia. The embodiment of their President's increasing fear that though the power of the radical right had been defeated, the radical left was still to be dealt with. Wilson, returning home, tried to defend the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles to gain American support, but on 19 November 1919, the Senate did not ratify the Treaty.

All this while, the American troops only wanted to know when they would be leaving for home. The Siberian disaster was such that in October 1919 the San Francisco Examiner wrote: "None of us knows when they were sent away to Siberia. None of the men themselves knows why he went, why he fought, why he saw mates fall or stricken of melancholia."[20] The Examiner went to quote one returning American official as saying: "For God's sake tell the American people to get the rail road corps out of Siberia as soon as possible or they will go crazy.... They are going to pieces mentally."[21]

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19   Ibid., p. 172.

20   Ibid., p. 177.

21   Ibid., p. 177

Meanwhile the maker of all this, Woodrow Wilson himself, out of sheer confusion and failure to ratify his Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, on 15 September 1919, suffered a heart attack and remained half-paralysed and emotionally unstable till the end of his term, while a small clique centred around the First Lady controlled the Executive. In 1923 Wilson said: "The world has been made safe for democracy. But democracy had not been made safe against irrational revolution.... Our civilization cannot survive materially unless it is redeemed spiritually. It can be saved only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ."[22]

In the end the preacher had reemerged to eclipse the politician. The Siberian intervention was the greatest blow to American policy of intervention and its approach to securing its security by force. But it seems, American leaders learned little and repeated the same blunders.

'The Reckoning in the East' as Chace and Carr said, was to prove America's rudderlessness, as far as deciding on how to deal with the newly emerging national security threats. Americans were really caught up between a search for ideal security and a reality wherein increasing power globally was becoming one characterized by realpolitik. The Washington Naval Conference did produce three Treaties and the Kellogg-Braind Pact was signed in 1929. But the Idealism of Wilsonian League of Nations, or the legal moralism of William Barah, Kellogg-Braind, President Coolidge, President Herbert Hoover, or Henry Stimson could not stop the worldwide drift into

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22 Ibid.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 1914-45

USSR
SIBERIA
Krasnoyarsk
Lake Baikal
Irkutsk
Chita
Amur River
Nikolayevsk
SAKHALIN
Ulan Bator
MONGOLIA
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
CHINA
Peking
Vladivostok
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA (CHOSEN)
JAPAN
Port Arthur
Seoul
HONSHU
Hiroshima
Tokyo
Yellow Sea
Nanking
Nagasaki
Yangtze River
Shanghai
Chungking
EAST CHINA SEA
OKINAWA
Iwo Jima
RYUKUS IS.
Amoy
Canton
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
Hong Kong
PACIFIC OCEAN
INDIA
BURMA
FRENCH INDOCHINA
LUZON
PHILIPPINES
MARIANAS
Saipan
Guam
SIAM (THAILAND)
Manila
Leyte Gulf
Bangkok
Philippine Sea
Saigon
PELELIU IS.
Yap
Palau
MINDANAO
PACIFIC
MALAYA
SARAWAK
SUMATRA
Singapore
BORNEO
CELEBES
Hollandia
Java Sea
DUTCH EAST INDIES
NEW GUINEA
Djakarta
JAVA
BALI
TIMOR
FARTHEST JAPANESE ADVANCE
Darwin
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
Townsville

THE SIBERIAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1918-1920

Lena R.
SIBERIA
Irkutsk
Lake Baikal
Chita
Shilka R.
Amur River
AMUR RR
Nikolayevsk
SAKHALIN
Verkhneudinsk (Ulan Ude)
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
Blagoveshchensk
Khabarovsk
Ussuri R.
Iman
Manchuria Station
CHINA
Ulan Bator
MONGOLIA
CHINESE EASTERN RR
Harbin
Pogranichnaya
Spasskoye Dalni
Nikolsk (Voroshilov)
MUKDEN-DAIREN RR
Suchan
Vladivostok
Changchun
Manchurian RR — section guarded by U.S. Army — International Boundaries

Attu
Bering Sea
ALEUTIANS
MIDWAY
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
OAHU
Pearl Harbor
HAWAII
Wake Island
INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE
FARTHEST JAPANESE ADVANCE
Eniwetok
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Truk
CAROLINE ISLANDS
Kwajalein
OCEAN
GILBERT IS.
Tarawa
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Bougainville
Guadalcanal
Port Moresby
NEW HEBRIDES
FIJI ISLANDS
SAMOA
Coral Sea

the Second World War.

It was only on 7 December 1941, the Americans felt the full effects of their unwillingness to come to a reckoning in the East. The bombing of Pearl Harbour presented the greatest threat to American security since the burning of Washington in 1814. Pearl Harbour awoke America out of the illusions of legal moralism and idealism. Of the two, one tendency had to win, and it was decided American would never again pursue idealism at the cost of realism. America had arisen to its full responsibilities as the pre-eminent world power.

After World War II American leadership became clear about one thing - any threat to the American security perimeter must evoke an immediate and forceful response. This was to be the great legacy of the Stimson-Roosevelt Era after the war. And this was to be so in Korea, Vietnam and Latin America.

American Security in the Post-1945 Cold War Era

The old multipolar European world system had collapsed with the rise of Communist Russia in the form of the USSR, which was in no position after losing 20 million people during the war, and 70% of its towns and cities totally destroyed to challenge USA. Yet, for many of the policy makers it became a convenient enemy in the post-war bipolar world.

The Truman Era : 1945-1952

Truman was a man who did not know how to deal with the USSR and secure American national security without threat or use

of force. Truman had remarked when Nazis invaded USSR that "if we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.... I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances."[23]

Truman was assisted by men like Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, George F. Kennan, all hard anti-communists wanting to universalise the Soviet Communist threat. The Truman Administration was unilateral in its approach. This group was unlike Stimson and FDR, who recognized the legitimacy of Russian security goals, accepted Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe based on the non-conflicting interests of Russia and US. This new breed like James Forrestal were of the view "that we ought to be more firm with the Russians and hold them up."[24]

With such an aggressive foreign policy it was not surprising that by 1947 Soviet-American relations had reached their lowest point. This was further aggravated by the Secretary of State George Marshall announcing the famous Marshall Aid Plan for Western Europe on 5 June 1947. Molotov walked out of the Paris Conference on 2 July 1947, convened to work out the terms of American relief, saying that the American aid plan would split Europe into two.

Next came the famous article by George F. Kennan under the pseudonym Mr X in Foreign Affairs in 1947. In July 1947 the

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23   Ibid., p. 230.

24   Ibid., p. 231.

National Security Act (NSA) was passed creating the NSC and CIA.
In September the Rio Pact was signed with Latin American countries.
NATO was created in 1947.

Then came the final blast from Soviet side. In June at
London, USA, UK, France and the Benelux countries agreed to permit
a West German Assembly to draw up a constitution to make sure the
vast industrial establishments of Rhur were taken over, and finally
a new West German Deutsche mark was introduced. That was it. USSR
was stunned by this obvious move to divide Germany because the
neutralization of a unified Germany had been one of the foundations
of Stalin's own security programme which now was clearly not
acceptable to USA. On 23 June 1948 the Western powers announced
that the new Germany currency would circulate in West Berlin as
well. The next day with great speed, the Red Army cut all overr-
land entry into West Berlin and shut down that part of the city's
electricity. The Berlin Blockade had begun.

This was the second great test of American international
resolve, the conditions of which had been partly America's own
making. It foreshadowed the reaction to North Korea's invasion
of South Korea two years later. To counter the Blockade the
Americans devised the ingenious - Berlin Airlift, turning Stalin's
attempt to force a more satisfactory German arrangement on the
Western Allies into one of Russia's worst diplomatic disasters.

In the post-World War II era America had won the first
battle and incorporated West Germany, Greece, Turkey and Western

Europe successfully into its perimeter of vital interests, and American confidence was bordering on arrogance. Stalin's suspicions were now really aggravated that the West wanted to frustrate Soviet security.

After securing the European perimeter, the American leadership next was shifting its focus to the Far East where the "loss" of China to communism in 1949, had led Dean Acheson to declare at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950 that the American "defensive perimeter" ran "along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus"[25] and from there stretched to the Philippines. But nothing could stop the mad witch hunting that was going on against communists in USA by Senator McCarthy. On 9 February 1950 McCarthy had declared at Wheeling, West Virginia that "the State Department ... is thoroughly infested with communists."[26]

The idea struck a chord throughout US, providing many Americans with an adequate explanation for Mao's victory. Dean Acheson was the prime accused for having Communist sympathies leading to his Senate hearings.

It was in such circumstances that the Secretary of State and the President were presented with a comprehensive study of America's world position and policy options prepared by a group led by Paul Nitze, which is known as NSC-68. It accorded highest

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25   Ibid., p. 247.

26   Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade : America, 1945-1955 (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 141-42.

priority to the universalization of American security threats.
Even George Kennan was stunned by the report's conclusion and
recommended military increases. With these aggressive postures
and perceptions of threats, it was not surprising that the Korean
invasion took place. However for the administration, reeling under
an attack of being soft on communists the North Korean invasion was
a great boon to reassert itself domestically. On 25 June 1950
Acheson working through the UN Secretary-General Trigve Lee, and
due to Russian boycott managed to secure UN's condemnation of the
North Korean attack on South Korea, he got passed the famous
"Uniting for Peace Resolution" by the General Assembly, and under
General McArthur, a full-fledged counter-attack against the invading
North Korean forces was on. McArthur turned the tide quickly, but
things started going awry, when the General crossed the 38th Parallel
and on 21 November 1950 reached the Yalu river where fighting
between Chinese and American troops began. The Chinese attack
pushed back McArthur and five days later it was Chou Enlai's turn
to speak of the unification of Korea - as Communist!

However disaster was averted for the US, and McArthur was
dismissed for publicly disagreeing with Truman's policy and talking
of a full-scale war with China.

The Second Phase : 1952-1968

The 1952 election of Eisenhower as President marked a new
phase in the American policy of containment as well as the strategy
of nuclear deterrence.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles promulgated the doctrine of "massive retaliation" hinting that Communist aggression would possibly elicit a nuclear response. He brought cold war rhetoric to its peak. Unfortunately, such rhetoric of globalizing American nuclear threats with the rise of nuclear weapons, which now the Soviets also possessed, put the administration in a dilemma. The dilemma was that: if conventional land conflicts were opposed by large numbers of Americans, and if 'massive retaliation' offered the unacceptable possibility of nuclear holocaust, - how could America attend to its security in those key regions which it viewed as vital? The problem was compounded by the increasing frequency of internal communist uprisings throughout the world. In that sense Vietnam represented all that American security policy could not deal with. First, Ho Chi Minh's struggle was far more difficult to portray to the American public or to the UNO as "aggression" than North Korea.

Second, America began now to start a policy of internal subversion in Vietnam in the name of universal liberation by not signing the Geneva Accords and creating a military alliance, called the SEATO.

Third, even though Dean Acheson supported Kennedy's expansion of American presence in Vietnam, by 1963 large-scale conventional aggressions had given way to nationalist guerrilla uprising that were woven inextricably into the civilian fabric of Third World nations. America's traditional policy of using a large number of conventional troops to defeat such movements could hardly work.

Fourth, by 1967 the number of American servicemen stationed in South East Asia had climbed to hundreds of thousands, and it had become quite apparent to critics both in and out of the government that the war in Vietnam was, neither the clear-cut containment of communism that Lyndon Johnson was claiming, nor was it a winnable conflict that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed was possible.

Fifth, the American military effort ignored many fundamental features of the Vietnamese situation. Unlike Korea, the lines of the Vietnamese war were fluid. The 17th Parallel was largely an artificial boundary, one that could neither interdict the movements of the native South Vietnamese communist rebels, the Viet Cong, nor prevent infilteration by large numbers of North Vietnamese forces. Victory in such a war could most certainly never be won through conventional battlefield engagements.

Sixth, popular criticism of the war was heightened by President Johnson's continued bombing north of the 17th Parallel. The bombing became the focus of domestic and international outcry by allies also, and as the strategic bombing by B-52s failed to achieve the goal of making the North Vietnamese stop their efforts to unite Vietnam militarily, the ranks of the doubters within the administration grew. Acheson himself did not agree with Lyndon Johnson's policy of strategic bombing. He said: "It is just not worth the casualties and the pilots know this. LBJ's problem is how to stop. I have argued this point with him and while he won't

admit, this is the problem."[27]

Seventh, the convictions of hard-core supporters of Johnson's Vietnam policy were finally shaken by the Tet offensive that exploded in January 1968. Just as American generals and administration spokesmen began claiming victory, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army struck at American positions, not just in the front lines but deep inside South Vietnam. The attacks were repelled but at a heavy cost and the psychological effect on the American troops and citizens was devastating.

Eighth, in February 1968 Americans again got a big druming when the American marines at the Vietnamese town of Khe Shah began to become increasingly like the doomed French stand at Dien Bien Phu fourteen years earlier, and LBJ did not know at all what to do.

Ninth, in Vietnam by the time Nixon came to power in January 1969 and with Dean Acheson's death in October 1969 it was clear that the means employed had exeeeded all reasonable ends that could be attained in a region that was of marginal importance to USA in the first place. The Vietnam intervention, unlike the other interventions in Latin America, turned out to be domestically the most divisive experience. Acheson was right when after examining all the secret documents said "we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time, we have left, and we must take steps to

27   Chace and Karr, America Invulnerable, Chapter VII, Defining
      the Perimeter, p. 260,(cited from Acheson Personal Papers)
      (New York, Summit Books 1988) p 260.

disengage."[28]

Tenth, by questioning the US presence in Vietnam what was being demanded was a fundamental re-examination, not only of America's involvements overseas in the post-world War II era, but of the nation's traditionally expansive definition and pursuit of national security itself.

Lastly, what had happened in the process of Vietnamese intervention was that the American perimeter of interests which Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and LBJ had done so much to define, had become by 1970s a zone of uncertainty of not only to the territorial integrity but to the moral authority of the US.

Apart from Vietnam, Latin America in the post-war era must also be looked into if one wants to grasp the fullness of post-1945 American strategy to secure its national security. Between 1965 and 1986 Latin America came many times in the focus of American assertion of security interests. Santo Domingo the capital of the Dominican Republic in April 1965; Cuba from 1959 when Castro came to power to the Bay of Pigs disaster on 17 April 1961 and culminating in the Cuban Missile crisis on 14 October 1962; then 1973 Chilean crisis and assassination of Allende; 1979 in Nicaragua, where the Samozas family was finally deposed and Managua fell to the communists; El Salvador in 1984; then finally came Granada in 1983 when Americans stormed the Island.

28 Walter Issacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 694.

The goal of American security policy in the Dominican intervention when within a couple of days of 24 April 1965 the troops build up was touching something like twenty-one thousand troops is sufficiently evident in the conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Johnson, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and John Barthao Martin, former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. Dean Rusk said: "that it was a very serious matter to start shooting up a capital city with American troops". John Martin observed: "that's the last thing we want to have happen, Mr. President" to which Lyndon Johnson replied, "No, it is'nt. The last thing we want to happen is a communist takeover in that country."[29]

Similarly in Cuba, it seems no one was quite aware of Castro's communism even much after his takeover. He was a nationalist and better than Batista. It was only a year after his takeover that he began to introduce socialist policies within Cuba. In 1960 he signed the Russo-Cuban Trade Agreement and it was only when in 1961 Kennedy announced his policy of 'Alliance for Progress', i.e. aid to pro-American regimes in Latin America, and after the CIA disaster at Bay of Pigs that Castro declared: "I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I shall be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life."[30] In 1967, when the cold war was at its

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29   John Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986), pp. 662-675.

30   Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days : John Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 794.

peak, American U-2 spy planes on 14 October 1962 saw photos
showing missile launching sites under construction in Cuba, and
also partially assembled Russian ballistic missiles on ground.
Kennedy was really shaken, and would not let it turn into another
Bay of Pigs. On 22 October 1962 he went on TV to announce that
henceforth there will be a "Quarantine" of all offensive military
equipment coming by ships to Cuba and said: "It shall be the
policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from
Cuba ... as an attack by the Soviet Union on the US requiring full
retaliatory response."[31]

In an effort to undercut Castro and Khrushchev, Kennedy
appealed to the Cuban people to reject this latest gamble by their
leaders so as to have peace in the region. It worked and on
27 October 1962 Khrushchev blinked in the "eyeball to eyeball"
contest and the missiles were removed from Cuba. After 1945 it
was the first time the two super powers came so close to a full
scale nuclear war.

Later on, in Nicaragua, Granada, and El-Salvador, the
American national security policy was clear - to keep it out of
all foreign threatening influences, especially those that came in
the form of Marxism.

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31   James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable : The Quest
       for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit
       Books, 1988), p. 284.

The Nuclear Dilemma : Implications For American National Security

According to Winston Churchill, when the news of the successful testing of the Atomic Bomb was conveyed to Truman at the Potsdam Conference on 16 July 1945, the President's attitude towards negotiations with Russians altered, "He was a changed man". Winston Churchill said of Truman, "He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting."[32]

Little did Truman's arrogance, and America's new-found faith and security, know that this period of 'absolute security' was not going to last for long. In August 1949, the Russians exploded a nuclear device. It shook Truman completely, who was made to believe by his scientific advisers that the USSR would take 20 years to make the bomb. But even then Truman's America felt confident as it possessed a superior and still the only delivery system of a fleet of nuclear bombers. But in May 1951 the Russians detonated a thermonuclear device designed by nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov. Still the Russians lacked a delivery system. But that was overcome by 1953, and for the first time the US was faced with a nuclear dilemma wherein despite its stockpile of nuclear weapons, continental United States was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack.

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32   Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace : Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 115.

In August 1957, the Soviets announced the successful testing
of their first intercontinental ballistic missile. This posed a
significantly greater threat to the US than the bombers. Two
months later the Soviets launched a satellite into orbit atop an
ICBM called <u>Sputnik</u>. Teller recalling those days said, "Sputnik
caused fear.... Watching Sputnik flash overhead in the night,
Americans realized as never before that our nation was in the range
of Russian rockets - rockets that could carry the terrible
destructiveness of nuclear weapons ... from hemisphere to hemisphere
in twenty minutes."[33]

Faced with this unprecedented threat, Americans tried once
again to achieve absolute security. In 1959 Albert Wohlstetter
of RAND published a path-breaking article. He argued that the
only way to get out of the "deep pre-sputnik sleep" was by -
shifting reliance on bombers or missile to a vast range of delivery
systems, i.e. ICBMs and SLBMs which will prevent Soviets the
advantage of launching a 'preemptive strike'.[34] It meant going to
science and technology once more to seek technological break-
throughs for overcoming the problem of nuclear deterrence and may
be winning a nuclear war.

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33   Edward Tellor and Allen Brown, <u>The Legacy of Hiroshima</u>
     (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), p. 124.

34   James Chace and Caleb Carr, <u>America Invulnerable : The
     Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars</u> (New York:
     Summit Books, 1988), p. 306.

Kennedy's scientific adviser Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner concluded
that - deterrence represented the limit of any significant
technological contribution to nuclear strategy. Thus in 1964
Dr. Wiesner and Herbert F. York in an important article published
in the Scientific American stated:

> Both sides in the arms race are ... confronted by the
> dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily
> decreasing national security. It is our considered
> professional judgement that this dilemma has no technical
> solution. If the great powers continue to look for
> solutions in the area of science and technology, the result
> will be to worsen the situation. 35

However the advice was to fall on deaf ears. The American leaders,
the military-industrial complex, and even the American people were
always being seduced by the 'deceitful dreams' of 'absolute
security'.

The next technological escape route out of this 'nuclear
stalemate' was called variously by different Administrations -
'Mutual Assured Distinction' (MAD) by Robert McNamara; Nixon-
Kissinger called it "nuclear sufficiency" - by MIRV-ing of the
ICBMs and SLBMs. It was a new and dangerously unsettling
technological solution to the problem of security by deterrence.
MIRV-ing created a new problem, i.e. on the one hand it seemed to
heighten the possibility of assured destruction, as some would
penetrate the ABM shield; but alternatively, the vast increase in
the number of nuclear warheads, and their precision gave new life

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35   Wiesner and York, "National Security and the Nuclear Test
     Ban", Scientific American, 211, No. 4 (October 1964).

to the temptation among the super powers that a pre-emptive nuclear strike might be successful. The result - more insecurity, less security.

Once again the American leaders were not willing to accept such a chilling prospect. None of the technological breakthroughs in the form of B-Is replacing the B-52, the new MX missile, Trident Class submarines, cruise missiles, were bringing America closer to security from the prospect of a pre-emptive strike. In fact, each new twist and turn was coming back to security through nuclear deterrence. The so-called "window of vulnerability" was not being closed.

It was at such a time in the late 1970s with SALT-II not getting ratified and Soviets invading Afghanistan, and the Second Cold War descending on the globe that America's new nationalistic, aggressive, President Reagan got elected to office in 1980.

After his election he met Senator Harrison Schmidt, Chairman of the Senate's Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space. Schmidt, recalling the conversation later, said: "Then half way through the session; he made a statement that he was concerned that we could not just keep building nuclear missiles - that ultimately their proliferation would get us into trouble. He asked what I thought about the possibility of strategic defence, especially with lasers."[36]

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36   James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars, Chapter IX - Star Wars: The Search for Absolute Security 1967-1986 (New York, Summit Books, 1988), p. 312.

Reagan had a close relationship from the 1960s with Edward Teller who had deeply influenced his thinking about nuclear weapons, and this dream of a technology that could outdo nuclear weapons was a potent factor in Reagan's thinking. After one year of consultations among the relevant people, Reagan was convinced by March 1983 that he could take the case to the people.

Thus, in his dramatic national speech on TV on 23 March 1983, he asked the American people in his characteristic simplicity: "Would'nt it be better to save lives than to avenge them?" As to the answer, Reagan went on: "Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base.... I call upon the scientific community ... to turn their talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."[37] It was a leap in logic and a bending of facts reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson. It was unbelievable. Alexander Haig Jr., a member of Reagan's Cabinet said: "I know the aftermath, the next day in the Pentagon, where they were all rushing around saying, 'what the hell is strategic defence'?"[38]

"Rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" had become the rallying cry of America's new search for security the Strategic Defence Initiatives (SDI). However, pretty soon the scientific community and the top men began to into the nitty-gritty of this

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37   Ibid., p. 313.

38   Ibid., p. 314.

awesome technological attempt. It was realized that lasers even if they were put on space could only destroy ICBM, SLBM; but what about nuclear warheads on bombers and cruise missiles. Next, the were just mind boggling and no Congress was ready for dolling out money for such an enterprise. The Center for Defence Information summed up the fate of the Star Wars project well: "It will build a leaky roof on a house with no walls."[39] Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger explained the objectives of the Reagan Administration in attempting the Swar Wars project, he said, "If we can get a system, which is effective and which we know can render their weapons impotent, we would be back in the situation we were in, for example, when we were the only nation with the nuclear weapon and we did not threaten others with it."[40] Thus Reagan's vision was in fact a heartfelt embodiment of America's search for invulnerability. And in this context Robert McNamara has aptly observed: "In the end, the root of man's security does not lie in his weaponry. In the end, the root of man's security lies in his mind."[41]

39 Ibid., p. 315.

40 The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York: Vintage, 1984), p. 28.

41 James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable : The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit Books, 1988), p. 309.

The Institutional Arrangements of American National Security Policy-Making

After examining the process of the evolution of America's conception of national security from the burning of Washington in 1812, till today, we see a long history of struggle by a young nation, that step by step became a super power after the Second World War in 1945. As Henry Adams had once observed: "Of all historical problems, the nature of a national character is the most difficult and most important." In maintaining the integrity of their country, American leaders established patterns of behaviour that eventually became national characteristics, and determined the manner of America's interaction with the world community. As far as USA was concerned, two key institutions – in giving the leadership, the Congress and Presidency – rose to the occasion and performed that role of dealing with all threats and challenges to America's security. These two institutions perform a key role in all important aspects of American life, either by legislating or by taking executive decisions. National security may be a new concept emerging after 1945, but security affairs as have been traced from 1812, have exercised a powerful influence in the debate and discussions within the United States.

In this section, I will examine what roles do the Congress and the Presidency play in the making and implementation of national security policy.

The Congress

If one wants to understand national security policy-making then such big terms as "Congress", "Presidency", "Executive" or "Legislature" are really very misleading, because "... the political process, rarely if ever, involves a conflict between the legislature and executive viewed as two monolithic and unified institutions. The actual competing structures on each side, are made up of elements in the legislature and in the executive, reflecting and supported by organized and unorganized interests".[42] In reality, this Congressional-Presidential relationship is powerfully influenced by like-minded individuals and groups in both the institutions arrayed against each other over establishing a particular point of view regarding national security policy.

Richard Haass throws more light on the fact that Congressional behaviour, when articulating itself, represents certain definite interests and influences. He says: " The willing- ness of Congressmen to align themselves with other members or outsiders underscores a central point: to understand the collective impact of Congress one must understand that its influence is often exerted by one of its many parts".[43]

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42   David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 433.

43   Daniel Kaufman, et. al. (ed.), US National Security: A Frame- work for Analysis; Chapter 11, Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy, by Richard Haass (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1985), p. 263.

If one wants to understand these influences on the
functioning of the Congress, then it is important to remember
that "the most powerful administrative units within the Congress
have traditionally been the committees. Both the Senate and the
House of Representatives are divided into more than twenty
committees apiece, to which members are assigned by their
respective parties in numbers reflecting the overall balance
between the parties in Congress. In all cases, the Chairmen are
members of the majority... Each committee has responsibility for
a broad area : foreign relations, armed services, energy and so
on."[44] The power of the committees have been so until recently,
that it was rare that its recommendations would be overruled by
the full membership of the House or the Congress. Thus Woodrow
Wilson, described US once as "... a government by the Standing
Committees of the Congress".

As regards national security policy-making, neither the
Senate nor the House of Representatives have a single committee
like "National Security Affairs Committee". Instead, there is
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs
Committee, with limited purview. The primary legislative
responsibilities are - firstly to share with the Appropriations

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44 Ibid., p. 264.

Committee the annual foreign military and economic assistance
packages when legislation for it "reaches the floor". Secondly,
neither committees have a monopoly on the consideration of most
national security matters. Issues in this are dealt by 16 Senate
and 19 House Committees and an even larger number of subcommittees.

The net result is that "not only are foreign and defence
issues considered by a large number of separate committees, but
often the same matter is considered by two or more committees".[45]
And so due to this structural disunity dividing the Congressional
perspective, the creation of an integrated and coherent legislation
and policy is almost impossible for the Congress. Compromise is
the key to policy differences within the Congress. Thus Les Aspin,
commenting on the role of Congress in defence and foreign policy-
making, said: "Legislative conflicts in the Congress are resolved
more often than not by political pressure, not by any rational
presentation of the issues".[46] The weakening of formal authorities
e.g. party leaders, committee chairman in favour of the individual
Congressmen who have far greater resources and capacity for access
to information, by way of increase in the Staff Assistance
available to all Congressmen, as personal staffs, or through
committees, the enlargement of existing "support agencies" as well

45   Ibid., p. 265.

46   Les Aspin, "The Defence Budget and Foreign Policy: The
     Role of Congress", DAEDALUS (Summer 1975), p. 164.

as creation of new ones, and the greater capacity to benefit from information and expertise of the Executive Branch - all have reduced the overall capacity to act as a coherent body and reduced its powers on the national security policy making.

The Congress has tried to recover its power in national security policy-making by using its 'inherent or dormant power', i.e. through a reassertion of the Senate's power of 'making treaties' and 'approving certain executive officials'. These two powers are conferred on the Senate under Article 2 Section 2, which reads :

> The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army
> and Navy, of the United States; and of the militia of
> the several states... He shall have Power, by and with
> the Advise and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties;
> provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and
> he shall nominate Ambassadors; other Ministers and
> Consuls.... 47

The power to make treaties unlike most others is thus a shared power, forming in Hamilton's words "a distinct department ... to belong, properly neither to the legislature nor the executive."[48] Moreover this power is shared not between President and Congress, but only between the President and the Senate. Again, the Federalists, in this case John Jay gave the reason. He said Senators were "... men ... the most distinguished by their abilities

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47   Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, Herman Betz,
     The American Constitution : Its Origins and Development
     (6th Edition, Tata McGraw Hill Publication, 1986), p. 755.

48   Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers No. 95, p. 451.

and virtue". He claimed "it was wise ... to provide not only
that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and
honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient
time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns."[49]
Although in theory, the Treaty Making Power is to be shared between
the Executive and Legislature, in practice most of the responsibility
has rested with the Executive, i.e. the President negotiating and
conducting of diplomacy. After some time the division of labour
so grew, that final judgement of acceptance or rejection of a treaty
was with the Senate. Thus the Constitution's ADVISE and CONSENT
clause came to refer to the "Senate's action on a treaty which had
been submitted to it by the President after negotiations are
completed but before ratification".[50] Thus, in the recent years
the Senate has begun to demonstrate a greater willingness to exercise
'its independent political judgement', and its 'consent' clause
has shifted more to offering specific advise on treaty negotiations.

The 'advise' or 'treaty making' role of the Congress has
taken several forms: The most common is by a resolution, which
either 'liberates' the executive by urging a particular course of
action, e.g. the Resolution passed before the PTBT, NPT and SALT I
Negotiations; or the Resoolution can "constrain" an executive

49   John Jay, The Federalist Papers No. 64, pp. 391-392.

50   Daniel Kaufman et. al. (ed.), US National Security : A Frame-
     work For Analysis, Chapter 11, Congressional Power : Implica-
     tions for American Security Policy by Richard Haass (Lexington,
     Lexington Books, 1985), p. 269.

action as e.g. adopted by the Congress before the Panama Canal and SALT II negotiations. The second way the Congress gets involved in advising or negotiating treaties, is by its power of ratification whereby it can either approve or reject a treaty when it is presented by the President in the Congress. When it involves itself in this power to ratify, apart from accepting or rejecting, can also by resolution add 'understandings' or 'interpretations' which clarify certain provisions without changing the legal effect; or add 'reservations' which limit rather than simply clarify the legal effects of the treaty, and which can provoke the other contracting party to issue its own set of reservations or even repudiate the treaty; finally it can by resolution add "amendments" to the terms of the treaty which in effect means the executive must renegotiate it. The Senate has used these powers many times. It used its power to issue its "reservations" in regard to the March 1978 'Permanent Neutrality' Panama Canal Treaty. In the case of SALT II Treaty all the three kinds of resolutions were used.

Apart from approval or non-approval of the treaty or part of it by way of 'Resolutions', the Congress also has used its right of not allowing the Executive to 'terminate' a treaty without a majority approval of the Senate by 2/3rd vote. This was done in December 1978 when President Carter announced that he was to give notice to the Republic of China (Taiwan) on 1 January 1979 terminating the Mutual Defence Treaty.

How has the President responded to this growth in
Congressional Power through the 'advise' and 'consent' in treaty-
making clause? The President has responded by reducing the
number of treaties he signs, and instead began signing a new thing
called "International Agreements Other Than Treaties" (IAOTT)
which allows the Executive to enter into arrangements without
worrying about Senatorial approval. Until recently, IAOTT was
called 'Executive Agreements'. Such Agreements are one of the
various types of treaties that are signed by the US Government,
the other two are - Congressional-Executive Agreements, and Treaty -
Executive Agreement, both of which require Congressional approval.
Presidential Executive Agreements, as IAOTT was previously termed,
are based solely on the Executive authority e.g. 1877 Rush-Bagot
Agreement between the USA and UK governing the levels of military
on the reat Lakes. The 'Joint Resolution' process has been the
result of Executive Unilateralism and Senatorial treaty-making
Power, whereby negotiated treaties or agreements are approved by
simple majority of each chamber to be then signed into law by the
President. Louis Henkin, a constitutional expert, has said of
this confluence and sharing of authority between the Executive and
Legislature that "It is now widely accepted that the Congressional
Executive Agreement is a complete alternative to a treaty: the
President can seek approval of any agreement by joint resolution
of both Houses of the Congress instead of two-thirds of the Senate
only".[51]

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51   Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
      (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 175.

The last basis of Congressional power is by the constitutional clause whereby the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court and all other Officers of the United States". This power is distinct from the Congressional and treaty-making power. Rather this is a divided power, because the President alone shall nominate while the Senate alone can consent. Congressional participation can take place in the various parts of the national security policy making. The areas are: (i) Defence, (ii) Foreign Assistance, (iii) War Powers, (iv) Nuclear Proliferation, (v) Military Transfers, (vi) Intelligence.

Robert Ingersoll, the former Deputy Secretary of State, speaking on "The Executive and the Congress in Foreign Policy : Conflict or Cooperation" way back in 1976, summed up the problem. According to him: "What inhibits bipartisan cooperation today is the diverse and chastening experience of Vietnam and Watergate and the lack of public consensus about America's future role in the world". The restoration of the post-war foreign policy consensus, is a pipedream today because, as James Chace points out, "... "American interests are too diverse and American power now much less predominant.... Most issues may have to be taken upon a case-by-case basis; and the President will have to look for support for his foreign policy much as he might seek to do for

his domestic programmes".[52]

Thus the more realistic writers argue that the key to a more shared and cooperative relationship that will prove useful for the national security policy is reassessing the quality of relationship between the two branches and achieving a working relationship. Eugene Rostow has summed up the problem and solution very well, he says, "the problem of harmonizing Presidential and Congressional authority in the field of foreign affairs is not institutional or constitutional, but human and political...." He believes this tension between the two branches reflects not a lack of consensus over policy per se, but struggle for power. Thus John Lehman sums up the challenge of the question thrown up by the separation of power principle, on the relationship between the two institutions beautifully: "There are in short, no frameworks, no cook books, no valid models; and no 'golden ages' of administrations past to which we might refer in judging a proper distribution of powers or even 'constitutional' relationship between branches."[53]

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52   James Chace, "Is Foreign Policy Consensus Possible?" in
     Foreign Affairs, 57, No. 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 15-16.

53   John H. Lehman, The Executive and Foreign Policy: Studies
     of Nixon Administration (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 214.

The President

The President is the only person in the government who is in a position to take the broadest view of what exactly is required by the nation for its security. He is the constitutional leader of the nation and the person with a knowledge of the long-term needs of the nation.

If national strategy is a mosaic fitted together over time and slowly piece by piece, then the only person who can appreciate the entire mosaic is the President. His range covers foreign, defence and domestic policies, the sum of which is national security. The evidence of his national strategy becomes evident in the presentation of the national budget. Lance Lehoup has said: "The preparation of the executive budget ... presents the President with perhaps his greatest opportunity to affect national priorities. It is also at this stage that he faces the most difficult choices in reconciling many conflicts and competing interests".[54] To realize his vision he also has to select individuals to head executive departments and agencies who see the world as he does.

Presidents, if they have to be the architects of national strategy, have to be national strategists by temperament. They must have a coherent vision of what they want to do and where they want the nation to go. Great Presidents come into office with a clear vision of what is to be done and what should be the priorities.

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54   Lance T. Lehoup, Budgetary Politics (Brunswick, Ohio: King's Court, 1980), p. 131.

This vision can be simplistic. It is not the complexity that matters but how accurately it reflects what the country needs and what it can realistically achieve. What is more important is its philosophical consistency and clarity. Thus Ronald Reagan had a clear vision and agenda - i.e. to build up the nation's defences, encourage business, reduce the role of the federal government, reduce social programmes, emphasize law and order, and take a hard line towards the Soviet Union - all this without raising taxes. Reagan's success lay in the fact that, he was able to explain them to the public and able to translate public enthusiasm to real programmes. Fundamental, of course, was Reagan's ability to persuade his bureaucrats that it was in their interests to support him and act on his ideas. It should be noted that Reagan was one of the most hated Presidents by his opponents in history and simultaneously the most admired by his supporters. Thus whether one agreed with his policies or not, his years in Presidency provided to the American people a perception of philosophical consistency, however bad you may call it, and this is the key to a successful Presidential national security policy.

The President can also effect national security policy-making by the nature and quality of relationship he has with other leaders of the world; the treaties he negotiates; the Trade Agreements he signs; the quality of the men he selects as envoys to other nations. These abilities will allow him to even forge national strategies on his own. Thus, for example, he can open relations with a former adversary, as President Nixon did with China or set a precise arms control course for the nation, as

Carter did during the SALT II.

The Constitution makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. However the War Powers Resolution enacted in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, restricts the President's ability to wage prolonged undeclared war and attempts to legislate the collaboration of the President with the Congress before a commitment is made to go to war. However this has not prevented Presidential discretion and he has acted freely ordering military action without prior consent from the Congress, e.g. in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, in Lebanon and Granada in 1983, and in Libya in 1986. It is of course very doubtful whether the American people would have supported a more aggressive involvement of US forces in Libya in 1986 to unseat Gaddhafi. But if national interests so demand, the state can go to war under the Executive order without obtaining Congressional approval. After the Pearl Harbour attack by Japan, US forces fought back for a full day before the Congress declared war on Japan. Thus constitutionally, it is precisely at times when the situation is unclear, but the danger is real, that the President must act; and the US constitutional system allows him that freedom. But he cannot escape Congressional approval of his actions, which/should be done as soon as possible once he has acted. However, given the destructive power of war or military action in the nuclear age - can the President turn the constitutional system upside down and act so. On this point the constitution has no clauses, answers or guidance. Thus the President, though the architect of national security strategy, bears the real burden of the dangers, risks and chances of disaster.

For the President national security is more important than legislation; it is a life and death struggle.

Inter-Service Rivalry

Apart from the Presidency and the Congress who form the core of the making of national security policy, inter-service rivalry also plays a vital role, given the scale of US armed forces.

The main pressure from the services on the national security policy comes from their competition for more funds and for acceptance by the government of their pet projects. The problem comes elsewhere. Although there is general agreement within the defence establishment on the goals of US national security and foreign policy, the precise role of each military service is uncertain. Thus, says Samuel Huntington, "Strategic programmes are not the product of expert planners who rationally determine the means necessary to achieve desired goals. They are the result of controversy, negotiation and bargaining among different officials and groups with different interests and perspectives". Nothing has been able to moderate this sharp inter-service rivalry.

In the 1940s the rivalry was over who would possess the bomb. The Air Force sought to maintain its exclusive control, with the argument that the next war would be won by strategic bombing alone, although the Strategic Bombing Survey had proved

the uselessness of 'strategic' bombing in bringing Japan to surrender. The Survey pointed out that the Japanese were going to surrender any way and the A-Bomb was not the reason for the surrender. The rivalry over the A-Bomb led to all the other services developing their own nuclear niche for themselves, though they failed to dislodge the predominant position of the air force.

Inter-service rivalry found its most intense battle in the budget in the 1960s as "each service launched its own projects independently of others in the hope of laying claim to some future mission and thereby its share of available funds". [55] The result was duplication of functions and wastage of valuable funds. Thus, for example, in the 1950s the army and navy developed their own IRBMs. However, when the government finally gave the contract to the navy, the Army became interested in the BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) and in 1967 sufficient pressure was put on Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defence who did not support BMDs, to announce the decision to deploy a thin ABM system. It was only after the McNamara era that the power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was restored. However during the Carter period too there was criticism of his Secretary of Defence being an agent of White House and not a guardian of the defence interests. However, these concerns were over when the Services succeeded in getting a higher defence spending and their projects accepted. It resulted in having a debilitating effect on the performance of the armed

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55   W. Kaufman, _The McNamara Strategy_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 31.

forces, e.g. the disastrous attempt in 1980 to rescue the American hostages in Iran wherein one saw each service wanting the mission for all the glory, and blame the other service when it suffered a disaster. It also leads to an aversion of new technologies as was the case with the cruise missiles, which when initially developed was rejected by all services as they feared that it might threaten their roles or eat into their scarce funds. The opposite is the case with the B-1 Bomber which is being attempted to be forced by the services on the government. Thus inter-service rivalry is crucial to the end product of national security policy.

Military Industrial Complex (MIC)

The above-mentioned case of the B-I strategic bomber is a good example of how the military industrial complex, through the service chiefs, Congress, media, lobbies, and other means is trying to make the Government accept the project, not for the sake of defence needs, but because the company manufacturing it wants to sell it. Carter had cancelled the B-I because the Air Force already had Stealth and ALCMs to do the same job, yet the Strategic Air Command (SAC) kept harping on its use even during the Reagan period.

The MIC consists not just of the services, but of numerous arms producing companies and Congressional constituencies which depend for employment on defence contracts. The justification for all these new expensive, wasteful projects is 'national security' –

that 'ambiguous symbol' as Arnold Wolfers said more misused for private purpose than any national good. Thus false 'missile gaps' or 'bomber gaps' have to be created and fears of communism exaggerated in the public to get a higher allocation for defence.

Conclusion

The examination of how US national security perceptions evolved shows various factors - tragic experiences like the burning of Washington in 1812 or the Pearl Harbour attack in 1945, false alarms like "Missile gaps% or an exaggerated threat of Communism finding expression in the rabid McCarthyism. All the events examined, and the institutions and factors involved point to a large mosaic of national security. But in this long journey there are some very sanguine reflections which shed some light on America's search for absolute national security:

Firstly, Americans to deal with real or imagined threats to national security have consistently as opportunity could have it resorted to use of force;

Secondly, Americans to secure to their dream of absolute national security have always shown a tendency to act on their own *.. walking a solitary path ... toward the kind of safety that might free us of any and all threats to our exceptional land."[56]

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56 James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable : The Quest
    for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York:
    Summit Books, 1988), p. 319.

Thirdly, the pursuit of this 'deceitful dream' as Alexander Hamilton said, based on false confidence in American moral exceptionalism and geographical remoteness, and on exaggerated fears that the USA, because of its democratic government and wealth of natural resources, is always a target for attack by foreign powers. This fear leads each generation to go beyond 'relative security' and try and reach for absolute security. Thus the territorial integrity offered by the Treaty of Paris in 1783 was insufficient for the war hawks of 1812 who tried to remove the British from North America altogether. Similarly "... an expanded but still uncertain Western border was unacceptable to James Polk, who established the American presence on the Californian Coast and the Rio Grande; ... Well defined continental boundaries meant little to men such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, who viewed an American presence in the Pacific as vital to the nation; and predominance in the Western Hemisphere, in much of Europe and in parts of Western Pacific and East Asia proved too little to quiet America's fears during the Cold War".[57]

Lastly, this recurrent search for being 'absolutely' secure compared to all others on the globe of course has its social and economic cost within the country. All through and until the 1970s, the US could sustain such a high spending search for 'absolute security'. But despite such tremendous costs, America seems to have become more insecure than ever before.

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57   Ibid., pp. 318-319.

As of today Lawrence Friedman says, "The fundamental dilemma of nuclear strategy remained as intractable as ever. If there was any consensus, it was that the West's security problems would be eased substantially if only it were possible to have stronger conventional forces and so be less reliant on nuclear weapon'."[58]

Thus as America moves into the 21st century the traditional military-based definition of national security created during the cold war, or even the 'search for absolute security', both have failed in achieving for America what they set out to achieve. In fact 'national security' viewed as a search for absolute security with an emphasis on force is no longer applicable as a doctrine in the changed circumstances. America should radically alter its notion of 'national security' and instead search for 'relative security'.

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58   Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 778.

Chapter III

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

In this chapter I would like to examine the conception of national security in the former Soviet Union. Although one does not find a direct replication of the concept of national security as in the West, security of the Soviet federation was high up on the national agenda. Security, and what it meant to erstwhile Soviet leadership in terms of economic, political, social and military variables shall be the concern of this chapter.

Firstly, I would trace the Marxist-Leninist basis of the Soviet conception of security. Secondly, the focus would be on development of the security concerns from the time of the Revolution in 1917 till the end of the Second World War. In this section the eras of Lenin and Stalin will be covered. Third will be an examination of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. The 1956 Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU will be taken as the starting point. Finally, there will be an examination of the last leader of the former Soviet Union era. Gorbachev's efforts at dealing with the Soviet security concerns will be the focus of analysis.

I.

The origin of the former Soviet Union's conception of national security lies in the writings and thinking of Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin. National Security, in its fourfold dimensions of domestic, economic, psychological and

military variables was not something alien to Marxism. Rather
these fourfold dimensions of modern warfare were the basis for
launching a proletarian revolution across national borders. This
revolutionary, and anti-status-quo orientation of national
security is what distinguished Soviet from the American or Western
conceptions of security. Thus, when Marx said in Theses on
Feuerbach "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in
various ways, the point, however is to change it", Marxism became
a creed that was not Utopian but deeply action-oriented based on
a 'scientific' understanding of social development. So Marxian
analysis of national security was based on considerations of the
concrete material world, and not some abstract theory.

The 'strategic' relationship between economic security and a
nation's security was anticipated much earlier than was by liberal
theory. Economic collapse, as a basis for social and political
unrest and its utilization for a revolution against the very system
which was creating such depressions was hinted at by Marx way
back in 1840-50. Engels in the introduction to Marx's ' The Class
Struggles in France 1848-50' said, "The world commercial crisis
of 1847 was the real cause of the February and March revolutions;
and the industrial prosperity which arrived gradually in the
middle of 1848 -- was the vitalizing fact of the renascent
European reaction. This was decisive". Thus for the Bolsheviks,
the strategic significance of the economy to Soviet Security was
never forgotten. In fact Gorbachev in his prestroika and glasnost
was only reemphasising this aspect of security.

The Bolshevik emphasis on the proper understanding of the revolutionary situation as a basis for a planned and dynamic intervention well timed so as to release the revolutionary potential in society and not provoke a backlash of reaction, was important to the conception of national security envisaged in the former Soviet Union. This understanding of a sound strategic doctrine based not on rash desire for action or violence, but one that patiently took into account all variables in the strategic situation was emphasized for the revolutionaries way back in one of a series of articles written by Engels, but published in the name of Karl Marx, in the New York Tribune on the 1848-49 Revolution in 1851-52. Engels wrote: "Insurrection is an art as much as war -- and subject to certain rules of procedure... Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your play... Secondly, the insurrectionary career once entered upon, act with the greatest determination and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed uprising... Surprise your antagonist... Keep up the moral ascendancy which the first successful rising has given you... In the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known, ' De l'aduce, del'aduce, encore del'aduce'."[1] This aspect was always emphasized by the leaders of the former Soviet State in their analysis of the national security situation, prior to taking decisions.

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1   Sigmund Neumann and Mark Von Hagen, "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society" in Peter Paret (Ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy : From Machivelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 267.

War, revolution, and nationalism have been crucial to Marxian analysis of the so-called concept of national security. Marx and Engels knew how civil peace was only a temporary and ever changing variable. They knew how it was really a mask for continuous unending class struggle not just within nations but across nations. The Crimean War was an example of this. Marx and Engels hoped that the Crimean War would mean a doom for monarchism and reaction at the hands of nationalism and pan-Slavic nationalism. However despite the terrible devastation caused by the Crimean War, revolution never came. It was then that Engels realized the danger to a genuine working class revolution in Europe by nationalism, which turned into reactionary expansionist Bonapartism. Pan-Slavism which instead of helping the working class put them against each other, and finally it was clear that the Crimean War was being waged to preserve the reactionary monarchical order and capitalism. It was used as a means to divert the working class away from revolution. Thus, Engels realized the futility of Marxists hoping to see revolution occur through Wars. In fact these realizations influenced the Bolshevik policy towards wars, nationalism as well as the nationality problem. Thus the former Soviet rulers never advocated war as a means of class struggle and revolution; neither did they support or encourage nationalisms of any sort within the Soviet state because of the terrible blow it would deliver to a genuine working class consciousness that aims at dealing with the disease and not the symptoms.

The role of armed forces in the national security conception of the Soviets was also based on Marxian analysis. Marx and

Engels initially hoped that the military could be a medium for revolution. They would have concurred with the optimistic analysis of one of their disciples, Jean Jaure's that... "the 'nation-in-arms' represents the system best calculated to realize national defence in its supreme and fullest form. The nation-in-arms is necessarily a nation motivated by justice. It will bring to Europe a new era, it will bring hopes of justice and peace".[2] Instead, the military became the greatest force of reaction not just in Europe, but in the post-war World in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The military believed in all those cultural values of the reactionary capitalist state. Thus when the Bolsheviks were forced due to sheer necessity to build a Red Army to preserve the revolution and bring peace from war and intervention, most of them never liked the idea. This was so because they had seen that the armed forces have always been loyal to Fascists, Nazis, and Capitalists. The socialist states thus, when forced to create a strong military, took care to politicize it completely and purge it off all bourgeoisie and reactionary values and instill instead socialist values. Despite its success, one casuality of reliance on the military to deal with class threats to the socialist states from within and without, was freedom. This proved to be a costly mistake for many of the socialist governments in the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.

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2   Ibid., p. 280.

One last lesson that Marx and Engels realized and was accepted as crucial to Soviet security was the role of technology. Here too, while in the western notion of security, technology was used for preserving status-quo in terms of class relations, the former Soviet state used technology to initially fight their way to power and then to preserve the state from later capitalist threats. Thus technological innovation in the fields of economy, science, industry, agriculture and most of all, in the military, was the key for the survival of the Soviet state. These few factors in Marxism were fundamental in influencing the course of future Bolshevik history from 1917 till the 1990s. In the next section, I will examine the various factors that influenced the course of development of the Soviet conception of national security.[3]

II.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the socialist state took place in very complex circumstances. There was an ongoing civil war, as well as a world war. The Bolsheviks had very little clues as to how to go about dealing with these threats to the embroyonic socialist state. The only clues they received were from Marxism, which was for the first time being utilized in Russia. To harmonize the theory with the practical reality was the great challenge and many of the decisions were taken out of sheer necessity and not theory.

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3   Ibid., p. 278.

The first clash between expectation and reality was the question of the significance of the revolution, i.e. what to do now? The circumstances did not offer much of a choice, and the question of whether to go in for a world revolution or preserve the socialist revolution in Russia was decided by Lenin in favour of the latter. Stalin later made it the aim of the Soviet state, i.e. 'Socialism in the Country'. Condoleezza Rice said in his article on the Soviet strategy that "The decision to protect the existing gains of socialism within Russia, rather than reaching for worldwide revolution was the single most important decision that the early Bolsheviks made."[4] Lenin's signing of the humiliating Brest-Litovsk Treaty was an example of this, and it did save the Revolution.

The next question that the Bolsheviks faced in terms of the future of Soviet security was - how to preserve the revolution? The answer lay in creating a Red Army. A centralized, disciplined, and trained force was required if the ongoing military offensives of the interventionists and the Germans had to be defeated. The decision towards this was made and it was Trotsky, as the people's commissar, who did the job. However, given the situation, necessity forced them also to make some compromises with the fundamental tenets of Marxism. The Bolsheviks due to shortage of Volunteers had to force people to join the Army, and had to recruit former

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4   Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy" in Peter
     Paret (Ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy : From Machivelli to
     the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 649.

Czarist military officers into the Red Army due to lack of experienced 'Red Commanders'. Thus by August 1920 the number of former imperial officers euphemistically called 'military specialists' rose to 48,409.[5] The Bolsheviks to keep these officers loyal developed a commissar system of political officers within the 'Soviet Armed Forces' or 'Red Army' called 'Red Commanders'. However the tension between the 'military specialists and 'Red Commanders' continued long into the Soviet military system.

As the Civil War drew to a close and the Soviet state had succeeded in preserving its security, the next question confronted them was what was to be the security strategy for the next war? Within the CPSU and the Red Army the question of strategy took the form of a debate between Trotsky and M.V. Frunze.

Frunze argued that the Soviet state must prepare the whole nation for the war. It was to be a strategy of total war, i.e. mobilize all aspects of Soviet society for the task of preserving the revolution. The economy, industry, technology, students, workers, peasants, and everything was to be mobilized for the national security strategy. He proposed a "unified military doctrine" whereby the Red Army was to be trained in a manner so that it becomes a 'unified organism' welded together by political ideology, and trained on the basis of the experiences of the

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5   Ibid., pp. 650-651.

first proletarian victory i.e. the Civil War. The army was to
be a cadre-based army and not a militia. Technological
upgradation was to be given prime concern if the war was to be
won. Authority and decision in the circumstances, Frunze argued,
had to be centralized. Offence and not defence was the basis of
the proposed strategy. The Civil War was considered 'the' prime
example for future strategy of the Red Army. The experience of
the strategy of manoeuvre and defence was central to the future
Soviet military strategy.[6]

This argument in the debate on security strategy was opposed
by Trotsky, the people's commissar for war, who had directed the
armed operations of the civil war. Trotsky was of the view
that, one cannot base the future Soviet security strategy just on
the experience of the Civil War. He believed the Civil War was
no doubt a great proletarian victory, but to glorify it to the
extent of basing the whole of Soviet military strategy upon it
was too much. Moreover, Trotsky argued that if at all the Civil
War taught anything, it was that of not offence but defence-based
strategy was the reason for success. Thus he rejected Frunze's
emphasis on the offensive. The only thing that was to be kept
in mind for future strategy was always "Be on the alert and keep
your eyes open".[7]

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6   Ibid., pp. 655-656.

7   Ibid., p. 656.

The struggle between these two views and personalities over the fate of future Soviet security strategy was not just an ideological debate but also one that was deeply personal and political. Thus when Frunze finally defeated Trotsky's line, it was as much a political victory as it was the end of Trotsky's political career. So finally Soviet military strategy based itself on the primacy of offence and manoeuvre and the 'unified military doctrine'. This was to be so till the Great Purge of 1937.

The war clouds were already visible on the Soviet horizon. A two-front war was a real possibility. Japan's designs on Siberia and the weakness of Soviet Far Eastern defences were a worrisome factor to the Soviets. The Japanese actions against Manchuria in September 1931 brought the 'yellow peril' out in the open. The Soviet forces were on high alert along the Soviet-Manchurian border as they continued to maintain a strict neutrality. With the Japanese occupation of Shanghai the Soviets were forced to create a Pacific fleet and Soviet-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate between 1933 and 1938. Skirmishes broke out but due to the skillful diplomacy and the deterrant effect of the Soviet build-up a war with Japan was prevented. With some settlement for temporary peace on the East, the Soviets could concentrate on the West, where Stalin was engaging in a series of delicately balanced diplomatic manoeuvres. At this very time, some of the

top Red Army officers among them Tukhachevsky, according to Stalin's analysis, were departing from their strictly military concerns and were becoming increasingly pro-German. Stalin, not wasting any time, decided to purge these 'Red Commanders'. Thus in 1937 due to reasons of political unreliability and others known perhaps only to Stalin; he executed about 25 to 30 per cent of the Officer Corps. It was a political move that proved extremely costly in terms of Soviet national security. The result of the purge was that it came at a time when Soviet theory of combined-arms operations in depth was just maturing in 1936. Defensive operations and the war of position were being discussed. In fact much of Trotsky's viewpoint was in the process of being incorporated into Soviet military strategy.

The purge put Soviet military strategy into total chaos, with the army on the eve of the War being caught between preparation for a strategy of offence and defence and a war of position. The net result was the Red Army could fight neither. This chaos was exemplified by the words of a beleagured officer who said "We are being fired upon. What shall we do?"[8]

Despite such blatant chaos the Bolshevik Revolution was saved once more from German annihilation. The experience of the Second World War really altered Soviet military strategy and brought it out of the freeze into which it had gone during Stalin's

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8   John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (New York and London, 1962), p. 405.

dictatorial purges. Defence was no more a forbidden word. In fact defence-based strategy was back into the Red Army's praxis and the war of position gave victories. However, later in the war, offence too came back into the strategy with the victory of the Red Army in Stalingrad in 1942. It was a victory of offensive strategy and doctrine of manoeuvre. Combined-arms-operations and in-depth operations too came back. Thus the Second World War revived Soviet military strategy and gave a position for both defence and offence. It had a broad range now and was flexible. Apart from this, the war also left the legacy for future Soviet strategy of total mobilization of the nation. It was a victory of Engel's, and Frunze's concept of 'total war' or 'nation-in-arms'.

Apart from this, victory in the Second World War reinforced Stalin's and other Soviet leaders' belief that their security system was a success, and that it had enabled the Soviet Union to expand territorially and emerge as a super power. The security system as it emerged from the 'Great Patriotic War' was based on - (i) excessive centralized power, (ii) strict and disciplined hierarchy not only in the military sphere but in the political and social spheres, (iii) a 'closed' system based on security, lack of debate, whose extension into the social sphere was later to be the cause for its collapse, (iv) the premise of continuous struggle and extraordinary vigilance - all of which was couched in the ideological language of Marxism-Leninism were the guidelines of Soviet Union's post-war security strategy.

III.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 was the important starting point for the post-war era of Soviet national security strategy. At this Congress Khrushchev put forth some of the key principles of Soviet security strategy in the post-war era.

The Principle of Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet Security

Relations with Capitalist States

At the Twentieth CPSU Congress Khrushchev said Soviet relations with capitalist states were to be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. He said "there are only two ways : either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way."[9] Peaceful coexistence with capitalist states was to be based on four points; they are (a) Respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (b) non-interference in internal affairs, (c) non-aggression, (d) equality and mutual benefit. All these together would govern socialist and capitalist state relations.

Apart from this, peaceful coexistence meant more than an absence of war or merely unstable truce between wars. It meant a mutual renunciation of war as a means of settling disputes. In fact peaceful coexistence was supposed to be "a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism."[10] It was said

9   P. Nikitin, Fundamentals of Political Economy: Popular Course
     (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p. 339.

10   Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations
     (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), p. 47.

to facilitate proletarian internationalism because it preserved peace and provided the external political conditions necessary for building socialism. Peaceful coexistence meant support to national liberation movements. Khrushchev thus evolved the doctrine of a 'zone of peace' by which he initiated alliances with ex-colonial countries (e.g. India, Egypt, Burma, etc.) so as to form a broad alliance against imperialism, colonialism and racism. This doctrine was developed to challenge US hegemonism and led to the expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World.

Peaceful coexistence did not mean export of revolution although it meant free proletarian internationalism between the working classes of socialist and capitalist states. Thus a relationship of peaceful coexistence did not mean that the socialist internationalism could guarantee 'class peace' in the capitalist nations. The Soviets believed class struggle was an underlying reality which could not be changed. Thus while the principle of peaceful coexistence guaranteed non-interference by the Soviet State, it in no way guaranteed civil or ideological peace. In fact peaceful coexistence was a means to increase the intensity of the ideological and cultural struggle to compel the capitalist West to accept peaceful coexistence, which it otherwise would not.[11]

Having explained what the principle of peaceful coexistence meant for Soviet relations with the capitalist world, one must

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11   V. G. Trukhanovsky, "Proletarian Internationalism and Peaceful Coexistence", _International Affairs_ (1966) 8: pp. 54-59.

examine if it succeeded in compelling the West. In Khrushchev's
time peaceful coexistence really ran into more troubles and
failures than success, than in Brezhnev's time when it enjoyed
great success as a security strategy. There are some reasons for
its failure during Khrushchev's time. Firstly, the contradiction
between peaceful coexistence, which defined state relations between
capitalist West and socialist Soviet Union, and proletarian
internationalism, which defined the class relations between
socialist and capitalist state, became difficult to resolve and
created more misunderstandings about Soviet intentions in the West.
Secondly, the Chinese criticism of the principle really cast
another shadow on the validity of the concept. Thirdly, the
American administrations in Khrushchev's time was led by
Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, Kennedy and McNamara, all of whom
were hawks. Thus the principle really did not cut much ice.
Fourthly, Khrushchev's own ambivalance added to the mess. He was
always seeming to attempt two contradictory things at the same time,
i.e. projecting Soviet influence in the Third World, as well as
improving East-West relations. Thus his foreign policy seemed
erratic, and with the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, the
Berlin Crisis in 1958-61, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,
Western policy-makers were convinced that peaceful coexistence
meant nothing really new in Soviet international relations.

However, Brezhnev enjoyed greater success with the doctrine.
The SALT-I accords, the Helsinki Agreement on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the NPT in 1968, the mutually advantageous

economic agreements and Soviet proposals for disarmament,
collective security and nuclear free-zones, all were affirmed as
successes of the principle of peaceful coexistence.[12]

Soviet Security Policy Towards National Liberation Movements In Less Developed Countries And Non-Alignment

At the Twentieth CPSU Congress, Soviet leadership led by
Khrushchev announced its policy towards the Third World LDCs and
non-aligned nations by characterizing them as a 'zone of peace'.
Khrushchev in 1955 had toured with Bulganin India, Burma and Egypt.
The non-aligned world of Afro-Asian nations was seen by Khrushchev
as a potential zone to check US expansionism and military alliances.
These nations of the Third World came to be accepted favourably
in the Soviet global security strategy, because they were anti-
imperialistic, followed a non-capitalist path of development,
opposed military alliances, believed in self-reliance, took
progressive measures regarding land reforms, restricting monopoly
capital, not allowing foreign investment and put the state sector
at commanding heights following the Soviet model of development.

However the success of Soviet policy was marred by some
failures which were significant. The Soviets lost a powerful ally
in the Third World, i.e. China; they lost prestige in the inter-
national communist movement by maintaining relations with regimes

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12   Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations
      (London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1988), pp. 137-142.

that suppressed local communist parties (e.g. Egypt). The
Soviet Union was also a victim of post-independence coups and
regime changes e.g. in Ghana and Mali; it blundered by backing
rivals Somalia and Ethiopia and was forced to abandon Somalia,
thus losing valuable naval bases; it supported the loser in an
independence movement coalition in Zimbabwe and thus had difficulty
in establishing relations with the winner; and finally it favoured
cruel, and unreliable leaders in Uganda, Afghanistan, and Libya.[13]

Soviet Security Policy Towards Socialist Nations: Socialist Internationalism

The principle of socialist internationalism had governed the
erstwhile Soviet Union's relations with fellow socialist nations.
Khrushchev in the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956 said that to be
called a socialist brother and have this unique relationship, the
nation must have a working class party as the vanguard of the
nation. The Soviets touted socialist relations as not being
similar to relations between capitalist nations, which were based
only on self-interests. Socialist internationalism was based on
respect for each other's sovereignty and equality. It was said to
be a different type of 'international relations' altogether.
However facts were to prove it wrong. Just after the Twentieth
CPSU Congress Soviets invaded Hungary to suppress the revolt which
was talking of a different version of socialism based on neutrality
and liberalization. This was not only the case during the
Khrushchev era, but in the Breshnev era too. The Soviets had to
suppress change in political government in 1968 at Prague in

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13   Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations
     (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1988), pp. 111-113.

Czechoslovakia. In Poland martial law was imposed in 1980 when Solidarity had virtually hijacked the working class movement away from the official Polish Communist Party.[13a] Finally, one saw the Soviets' complete withdrawal from East Europe in 1989 under Gorbachev.

IV.

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, few western observers thought he would be the man to take so many initiatives towards changing the whole gamut of international relations and really alter/the whole scenario of cold war in Europe and the globe. Fewer still could ever have imagined that the process which Gorbachev unleashed would have ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. The speed and intensity of change has left analysts stunned, unable to grasp the full dimensions of change. In this section I will examine Soviet Union's national security conception under Gorbachev.

On becoming General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev had inherited Brezhnev's dual track approach to national security. This approach was characterised by (i) a conviction that continuous expansion of Soviet military power automatically enhances Soviet security; (ii) a belief that diplomatic negotiations, particularly arms-control negotiations, were a valuable complementary means of managing East-West competition; (iii) a vigorous determination to expand Soviet influence in the Third World; and (iv) a desire to

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13a Ibid., pp. 194-200.

draw on Western economic inputs while simultaneously insulating the Soviet domestic system from Western political and cultural influence.

By the 1970s these policies had become part of a broad political consensus within the party and military culture.[14] However this consensus on national security broke up by the time Gorbachev came to power and there are many reasons for it. Firstly, the aggressive approaches of President Carter and President Reagan raised doubts about the security benefits of negotiating with capitalist powers. Secondly the West's vigorous political and economic response to the invasion of Afghanistan generated uncertainty about detente, grain and technological imports. Thirdly, the sudden drop in Soviet economic growth and fourthly, the Polish explosion created a genuine spector of internal collapse not only in Eastern Europe but within the USSR itself. Lastly, the generational change in the men along with Gorbachev who had no personal stake in defending past policies, allowed him to change the Soviet security policy.

The change in Soviet national security policy came at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. Here he unfurled his new national security strategy. In its military dimension, Gorbachev proposed a new doctrine of 'reasonable sufficiency' according to which Soviet national security in its military dimension was no

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14   Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev", in Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec. 1988, Vol. XXXVII, p. 2.

longer going to be based on the old offensive strategy. Instead both at the nuclear and conventional force structural levels it was going to reduce the quantity as well as quality of weapons to provide for a 'minimum deterrence' and not 'maximum deterrence' as was the case before. This change was vital because Gorbachev believed the superpowers were not involved in a 'nuclear missile war' but a 'nuclear missile catastrophe' where the axion of war as 'continuation of politics by other means' made no sense.[15]

The military strategy he proposed was a defence-based strategy. Gorbachev wanted to change the political and military-technical levels to a strategy that would aim at defence and maintaining strategic stability. This implied a security system based on economic security rather than military security. To do this Gorbachev agreed to unilateral cuts in strategic nuclear forces, and later decoupling SDI from INF elimination to a double zero-option. Added to this was a 'glasnost' in the military sphere - publication of the accurate budget figures for defence; on the site inspection; extensive verification facilities; and openness to allow monitoring of international arms control obligations.

Gorbachev argued that Soviet security depended on economic dynamism. He said the USSR would not "irrationally and automatically" adopt military programmes that the United States was trying to foist on it through the arms competition.

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15   Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking In Soviet Military Doctrine", in Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988), p. 151.

At the Party Congress Gorbachev emphasised the political factor in changes. A defence journal of the former Soviet Union **Military Thought** observed a few months after the February 1986 Party Congress: "Security in the nuclear age must be evaluated differently. Assessing security is more and more becoming a political task. It can only be resolved by political means... It is unthinkable...to resolve the problem of security in an arms race, perfecting the 'shield' and the 'sword'."[16]

As regards the former socialist state's relations and proletarian commitments to the Third World, Gorbachev hinted at this downgrading. He hinted at a relaxation of efforts to promote pro-Soviet regimes and wanted the people to decide on the revolutionary or evolutionary paths, including their freedom to preserve the "status-quo". Overall, he was keen to hand over controversial areas of Soviet involvement to the UN.

As regards internal 'glasnost', Gorbachev was ready to widen the scope of the national security agenda to include cooperation in political and "humanitarian" matters as well. He was ready to deal with human rights protests by ethnic minorities in conformity with Soviet legislation and obligations assumed by the former USSR in the Helsinki Final Act and in the UN Human Rights documents. This was a major step towards 'democratisation' of politics.

However, despite these changes in the military, economy, polity and society of the former USSR, from 1986 one saw a super-

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16   **Ibid.**, p. 134.

power unable to control the events that marched ahead and all
of Gorbachev's plans to hold the Soviet Union floundered. The
USSR collapsed and Eastern Europe 'liberated' itself, to follow
the capitalist path. The fifteen republics became independent
and today there is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
instead of the USSR.

The one lesson that the Soviet experience in dealing with
the multiple dimensions of national security is that, national
security today is a very delicate issue and any effort to deal
with it requires great skill, and patience. Gorbachev's floundering
may not be solely his responsibility, but it only goes to show
that national security is not the responsibility only of a party
leader, or department, but the entire people of a country are
participants in it.

Chapter IV

THIRD WORLD PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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'National Security' as a concept which was totally alien to the Third World nations has now become institutionalized and according to some observers national security itself is a full-fledged ideology of state which ensures survival of elites ruling these countries.

In this chapter I would like to look into various aspects of the prevailing application of the concept of national security in the Third World. First, what is the Third World, and what is it characterized by? Second, how did the concept of national security get transferred? Third, how is it being operationalized in the Third World countries. Finally, has it been a fruitful experience?

I

The Third World constitutes the single largest group of countries in the community of nations, spreading over the continents of Africa, Latin America, and Asia. There are various ways of characterizing these countries - developing countries, newly independent countries or least developed countries (LDCs). Either way, reference is being made to a vast majority of the people of the globe, who attained their independence from Western colonial rule only in the twentieth century.

The Third World is very different from the First World countries which, according to authors Bobrow and Chan, are characterized by "Relative integration - cultural affinity, political empathy, common institutions, frequent governmental interactions, active exchange relationships and communicative ties and collective arrangements for joint action."[1]

The Third World countries have been characterized by some analysts as "nations in the making" because being products of centuries of colonial rule, and having extremely diverse populations in terms of ethnicity, linguistic variations, religious differences, regional and cultural differentiations - they have yet to become nations. Clifford Geertz characterized this transformation as the "Integrative Revolution". Rupert Emerson aptly characterized this process which is called 'modernization' in his book rightly entitled 'From Empire to Nation'. Thus for these nations of the 'South' the process of nationhood has been an outgrowth of a struggle for independence which in many cases have been marred by events that have left the task of integration even more difficult. For instance, in the case of India, the dream of a united and secular republic came crashing down with the creation of Pakistan, a nation based on religious nationalism.

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1   Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, National Security In The Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988); David Bobrow and Steve Chan, "Simple Labels and Complex Realities: National Security for the Third World", p. 53.

For Third World States being born in a world deeply divided by ideology, and cold war into two camps it was a difficult beginning. Not just were they completely a part of the world capitalist centers, but more ironical was the fact that they might have become politically free but economically it was a continuing relation of dependency. A.G. Frank characterized this post-colonial relationship as 'development of underdevelopment'. Thus these newly independent countries in many cases were partitioned on ideological grounds e.g. the Koreas, religious grounds - India, and the creation of zionist Israel; badly bordered i.e. their frontiers were those marked by their colonial masters now became a point of conflict between two newly independent nations, e.g. India-China on McMahon Line. This is particularly the case in African and also Latin American countries. There was much euphoria following liberation, but as it died down, the national governments got to work, their path of development itself became a focus of tension. Outside, the world was getting divided into warring military, economic, and ideological blocs -- NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, Rio Pact, Warsaw Pact, and many other military based economic-cum-political alliances came up. Thanks to the weakness of the Third World and the disputes among themselves, pretty soon the 'cold war' that had divided Europe and Germany divided the Third World also. Thus in South Asia, e.g. you have Pakistan opting for the American backed CENTO and India still attempting to balance between the East and West. A new dimension, hitherto unknown, was now injected into the security atmosphere of the

Third World. Tensions without economic, political and arms
support would have remained dormant, became aggravated and
suspicions grew pretty soon leading to wars in many parts of the
Third World. While Europe, the centerpiece of American and Soviet
conflict, was experiencing what somebody called 'armed peace',
the Third World was increasingly descending into a cycle of
endless and purposeless wars.

Bobrow and Chan have pointed out the following distinguishing
characteristics of these Third World countries:

1. Endemic internal political instability.

2. The ruling groups in these countries tend to lack a
   very wide and deep base of support in the general
   population.

3. Most of these states have very little widely accepted
   rules for peaceful power transitions.

4. Most states are characterized by either one party rule
   or one party dominant rule even if they are democracies.

5. As there is a blurring of the distinction between
   regime security and national security, thus foreign acts
   tend to be seen as direct threats to the office holders
   and not just to the nation, as is the case in the Western
   world.

6. The state capacity in the Third World is one that is
   either united, as in the case of new states in Africa,
   or are suffering from a contradictory "Weak-Strong state"
   dilemma.

Thus the state as far as performing the functions
of resource extraction, democratic mobilization,
information search, bonding activities in International
Affairs are still developing compared to the developed
states. This deeply affects the nature of threat
perception.

7. There is a lack of role specialization by the coercive
institutions and the military in particular.

The result of such weaknesses is that they suffer from the
problem of 'security and dependence' leading to "... a premium on
foreigners acting in ways that strengthen incumbents and refraining
from acts that weaken them."[2] This develops an extraordinary
dependence "... on foreign inputs to provide surrogate state
capacity...' in terms of intelligence, communications, weapons,
capital, food, etc.

All these, according to Bobrow and Chan, represent "... the
side of the coin that implies weak leverage".[3] Thus they see Third
World nations facing a totally different kind of threat. In fact
they have quite rightly disaggregated the Third World into -
Achievers, Golaiths, Davids and finally Weak States. Discriminating
the 'Third World' is important if one wants to understand what has
been the experience of internationalizing the national security
conception of the West.

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2   Ibid., p. 55.

3   Ibid., p. 55.

According to Bobrow and Chan, Achievers score over the global media on all three variables of national power i.e. size as measured by per-capita income, GNP, and military capability as measured by defence spending. The Achievers occupy the semi-periphery of the world economic system. They rose by riding the wave of raw material exports or export-led industrialization to relative wealth. In the Third World, 'Achievers' can be characterized as having substantial human, economic and military capabilities. Examples are Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, Chile, Peru, Venzuela, Middle Eastern OPEC Cartel, South Korea, Taiwan.

Golaiths are those Third World nations that stand substantially high on the variables of size and military capability but are much below as far as economic development is concerned. They are nations which are politically the most active in the international community and most independent in their attempt, yet their economy is their weak point. Thus their performance is not as great as their rhetoric. Examples are India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Egypt.

The Davids stand substantially above the global median of national power as far as economic development and military power but are low as regards size and population. Israel is a classic example. Others are Thailand, Kuwait, UAE, and Libya.

The Weak states are the majority of states in the Third World which are weak on all counts e.g. Ethiopia, Sudan, and the many others like Lebanon, racked by civil war, or are too small to make an impact on the world scene.

These distinctions of Achievers, Go/aiths and Davids are really very relative and only an attempt to emphasize the point that the security needs in the Third World are far more complex and demanding than in the First World countries. There are deep contradictions in terms of wealth distribution and access to development benefits.

II

With such distinctions between the developed and developing worlds, it is wise to ask the question - can the Western concept of national security be applied to the Third World?

Nicole Ball has argued in her book _Security and Economy in the Third World,_ that the process by which the concept of national security got operationalized involved not just a mere transfer of the concept only. Rather the Third World nations had accepted 'national security' as part of the overall politico-economic paradigm of liberal democracy, development through heavy industrialization, and internationalization of the values of the 'modernization theory'. A very important point in this choice of values and political life is that, many of the Asian nations did not opt for communism. Development was to be assisted by a military which would aim at ultimately creating externally oriented market economies. In this change the military was presented as a 'modernizing' element.

Nicole Ball notes also that while the liberals were arguing so, the Left argued that the incorporation of 'national security'

into the variable of 'economic development' was a means to justify military force to crush any radical questioning of the state strategy of integrating the economies of the Third World into that of the world capitalist system. The leftists believed national security ideology was not allowing free development of Third World economies. Rather through the institution of armed forces these new states were being subjugated into the world capitalist economy which was creating underdevelopment.[4]

Ethan Kapstein points out that the ideology of national security was not indigenous to most Third World countries. Rather it was imported from USA where it had developed fully into institutions like National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 creating the CIA and giving the President constitutional powers which created tension between democratic governance and unaccountable Presidential authoritarianism. The same anti-communism that marked the national security ideology in USA got transferred to its dependencies in the Third World. The regimes set themselves up as the legitimate defenders of national core values that were threatened by aetheistic communism. Thus in employing this ideology these states tied themselves to the cold war, and they identified with America's struggle against the Soviet Bloc. It was generally their hope that increased US economic and military aid would follow. Kapstein says "Common to authoritarian rule in

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4   Nicole Ball, _Security and Economy in The Third World_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 3-5.

Brazil, Peru and S. Korea was the formulation of economic development policies that had 'national security' as opposed to nationalism - as their ideological theme." Thus he concludes: "... This ideology ... did not arise full blown from Third World origins. Rather it passed along a transmission belt that was rooted in Washington."[5]

III

The percolation of values and concepts into the Third World has been slow but the fact that the ruling elites have themselves been facing threats from within led them to assimilate the national security ideology which preserved their ideological and material position within the overall structure of things.

In this section I would like to examine what has been the experience of Third World countries in the application of national security as a policy. I will examine how various factors, that in some ways may be unique to the Third World context have influenced the nature, character and substance of the Third World national security policies.

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5   Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, National Security In The
     Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988),
     p. 145.

The Influence of the Geopolitical Factors on National Security : Location, Population and Resources

Location:

Geography is a very important factor in the national security environments of aspiring middle powers. As far as developing countries are concerned their very locations along crucial strategic lines have been vital to super power rivalry.

One finds that nowadays resource location is proving to be important in determining strategic value. Thus Nigeria, Zaire, Iran, or Abu Dhabi are focal points of competitive commercial activity. Similarly in today's geopolitical rivalry even the micro-states such as Maldives, the Seychelles, the Island of Tonga, Granada, and Diego Garcia and Ascension Island are crucial for super powers. Thus their ideological stances, alignments and sensibilities are of vital security interest to the super powers. An example of how powerful the location of even a small island is for a nation can be illustrated by the speech given by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on the various security reasons why the islands of the Pacific were crucial to the United States' future - especially Hawaii, and Sandwitch Isles. He said:

> Those islands; even if they were populated by a low race
> of savages; even if they were desert rocks, would still be
> important to this country for their position. On that ground
> and that ground alone we ought to possess them.... There in
> the centre of that triangle, in the heart of the Pacific,
> where I am pointing now lie the Sandwitch Islands. They are
> the key to the Pacific. 6

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6   James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest
     for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit
     Books, 1988), p. 126.

He further pointed out: "Mr. President, it is on account of the military and strategic importance of the Sandwitch Islands that I so greatly desire their control by the United States."[7] Thus one can see that geopolitical factor of location is very crucial in the new age of commercial and financial expansion. It was important way back in the 1890s as it is today for US National Security strategy.

Oman, Somalia, South Yemen, Indonesia are located at important maritime choke points, particularly so as they are oil producing countries too. They have become thus important objects of big power attention which has affected their national security strategies. This focus has given them leverage for arms acquisition, as well as using their territory for a quid-pro-quo for assistance against regional antagonists. Their vulnerability has prompted them to acquire arms, which in turn has augmented their role as determinants of their own and regional security arrangements.

Increasingly, as several developing countries threaten to become nascent nuclear powers - e.g. Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Iraq - their location is being linked to the ranges of their delivery systems by the major powers. Most were closer to the former Soviet Union than to the USA. This has possibly accounted for the Soviets being always interested in supporting even Western moves to halt nuclear proliferation. Today we are moving from a

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7   Ibid., p. 126.

world of bilateral deterrence to a more complicated world of
multilateral deterrence in which factors at different levels of
nuclear capability have varying influence on each other. Today's
nuclear scenario is one wherein security cannot be guaranteed due
to proliferation.

Location along with such factors as size of the country,
political character, topographical features and the strategic
value of the contiguous states deeply affects the nature and level
of conventional military threats to the developing states and their
immediate security requirements. Thus there are many variations
in security policies:

(a) Some developing nations like Nigeria and Brazil are
large states surrounded by weaker states. This condition gives
them a hegemonic position preventing any grand coalitions of their
smaller neighbours or being completely subjugated by a super power
due to their sheer size.

Brazil has to cope with the Argentine military and economic
pressure on the Southern and South-Western frontier and a danger
that the Bolivnanian countries to the North and North-West, i.e.
Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, and Venzuela might transform the Andean
Pact into an anti-Brazilian alliance. Thus Brazilian foreign policy
has traditionally encouraged nationalism in Paraguay, Uruguay and
Bolivia as a tactic for guarding their re-absorption into Argentina.
This was especially important in the light of the constant
nationalistic calls of the first Peron era (1945-55) in Argentina
of recovering these 'lost' territories.

During the past century Brazil has always maintained that it would not contemplate using military force against its neighbours aside from operations to repel any invasion. However, Brazil wants friendly non-radical governments in its neighbours, thereby reducing any threat to Brazil.[8]

In the case of Nigeria, despite the Libyan challenge and the fact that Tanzania supported the Biafran Revolt during Nigeria's civil war, none of the African countries can compete with Nigeria at the regional as well as continental level except South Africa. In fact some of the African states are looking up to Nigeria for economic assistance and protection. Some of these states are physically large but are held back either by small populations or pitiful economies. Those that possess any ideological intensity and sense of mission tend to be both small and poor. Perhaps the closest serious competition comes from Zaire. But Zaire's armed forces total only a quarter of Nigeria's and the country struggles with a $ 3 billion debt and volatile copper export prices.[9]

Thus in both cases unless Argentina or South Africa were to go nuclear openly the hegemonic positions of Brazil and Nigeria will be maintained.

(b) Some other developing states, by contrast, are in a very precarious situation. Their very survival is threatened by

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8   Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, 'Security policies of Developing Countries' (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 58-59.

9   Ibid., p. 291.

actually or potentially negative regional imbalances of forces.
Israel, South Africa, Pakistan and South Korea fall into this
category. These states possess doubtful political leverage over
other states and enjoy uncertain outside support.[10]

Others like Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt
by virtue of their stable political character having high national
legitimacy and being big in size do not have their survival and
essential national legitimacy in jeopardy. However, being located
in strategic areas of the world, they have been thrust in the
vortex of conflict. These nations are forming what is called an
emerging bloc of regional powers seeking regional dominance, but
under the umbrella of one of the super powers.[11]

(c) Some of the developing states, for example Argentina by
virtue of their location are favoured by geographic marginality
which gives them a distance away from core conflict centres. Thus
they do not face important threats or find themselves on the front
lines of major power struggles.

However Edward S. Milensky says that such geographical
marginality has become a paradoxical cause for a national malaise.
The resulting psychological void may tempt trouble. H.S. Fams

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10 Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation",
International Organization, 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981), pp. 135-63.

11 Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, 'Security Policies
of Developing Countries' (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1982),
p. 335.

says "Geopolitics has made a contradictory contribution to the Argentine world view. Remoteness from the main centres of international conflict and location within the traditional sphere of US strategic concerns has contributed to a sense of security. However, Argentinians have more frequently expressed resentment of US domination of the hemisphere and their apparently diminished ability to pursue its aims on the global level. The net result is a traditional sense of marginality or non-participation in world politics."[12]

The opposite of this is the influence of location on the national security policy of Indonesia. Peter Lyon brings out this influence. He points out that Indonesia is an archipelagic state defended by waters requiring maritime forces for power projection. Its strategic position along the major oil and naval sea lanes makes it extremely vulnerable to the designs of other states.

Peter Lyon brings this geographical aspect of Indonesia. Indonesia is the world's most geographically fragmented major state. The geographical span of its territory extends 3,000 miles broadly athwart the equator from the Andaman sea almost to Australia. It is an archipelago state comprising of several thousand islands, with a population of approximately 135-140 million in 1980. Indonesia is located right in the midst of a circulatory web for trade, tourism, and communications. In fact, the islands of Indonesia

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12   H.S. Ferns, Argentina (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1969),
      pp. 246-257.

together with the Philippines and Papua New Guinea are the links between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The relatively narrow and shallow straits are strategically and commercially important sea lanes for movement from West to East and vice-versa. The straits of Malacca, Hombok, Sunda, and Ombai-Wetar are the key arteries of the seaways of the world, rivalled only by the Strait of Dover and the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf for seaborne traffic.[13]

This location in the sea has deeply conditioned Indonesian diplomacy, particularly since 1957-58 when by unilateral declaration and then by its diplomacy at the UN Law of the Sea Conference, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja presented the well known archipelagic principle by which territorial waters are defined by drawing imaginary straight lines between the outermost points of the country's outmost islands with territorial waters and economic zones then being measured from this base line. This principle helped Indonesia swiftly lay claim over 660,000 square miles of ocean incorporating within its natural waters such important straits as Loombok and Makassar.[14]

Again in November 1971 we see Indonesia and Malayasia, both riparian states, together refused to accept the international status

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13   Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, 'Security Policies of Developing Countries' (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1982), p. 157.

14   Ibid., pp. 160-161.

of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. They declared that
henceforth they will be governed by the legal regime of innocent
passage through territorial waters. Malaysia extended its
territorial waters from three to twelve miles in August 1969 and
Indonesia in December 1957. In March 1970 the two governments
concluded a treaty delimiting the territorial sea boundary in the
Straits of Malacca. They made this joint initiative as there was
a need to supervise maritime traffic through the congested straits
with its risk of collisions and spillage.[15]

Again in March 1980 President Suharto formally declared an
exclusive 200 mile economic zone (EEZ) for the exploration and
exploitation of waters, seabed and subsoil surrounding the terri-
torial waters. This of course required bilateral negotiations under
the Law of Sea Agreement with Australia, Kampuchea, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Burma, the Philippines, China and
Japan.[16]

(d) Another manner in which location is playing a crucial
role in formulation of national security policies is the impact of
certain key territories along the borders of nations. Thus a
large number of developing nations have border disputes, some of
which are major, e.g. Israel and the Arab states over occupied
territories, India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Argentina and Chile

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15   Ibid., p. 161.

16   Ibid., p. 161.

had quarrels over the Beagle Channel, and with Britain over Falkland Islands.

Population:

(a) Nations differentiated on the basis of population constitute a different class of nations as for example, if one were to move from India with 800 million people to Israel with 3 million. India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan all have large populations which, added with other factors, make foreign military occupation virtually impossible.

Egypt's population is a key factor in the Middle Eastern conflict equation that cannot be ignored by Israel. India's size and population give it a seemingly irreversible advantage over Pakistan. Similarly Nigeria's and Brazil's populations are important elements in support of their regional hegemonic claims. Pakistan and Argentina, despite their relative large populations, are still inferior to their local regional competitors.

(b) In the case of Israel, Somalia, South Africa and Saudi Arabia, it is their insufficient populations that are a key factor in their increased fears of defeat and may be even extinction. The manpower is still so unskilled that Riyad has to rely on mercenary soldiers from the more populous Pakistan. Somalia's small population has put it in a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis Ethiopia.

Libya is seriously hampered in extending its sway over North Africa and the Middle East because its population is too small.

Nor is its pool of technically trained talent large enough to take advantage of the modern military equipment brought by its oil revenues. An example was the downing of two Libyan aircrafts by American jets in August 1981.

(c) Population size, GNP, and per capita GNP are extremely crucial to the capabilities of the LDCs for indigenous weapons development or weapons production. Small nations with advanced but small scientific establishments and a relatively high per capita GNP may have advanced indigenous military design establishment and capability (e.g. Israel's air and missile technology production). However the weakness of such small nations is that they lack the comprehensive industrial infrastructure necessary for autarkic production. This forces them to rely extensively on imported components, e.g. the case of Iran wherein this level of dependence can be great enough to affect national security performance.

Some of the larger nations even with low per capita incomes or GNP's e.g. India, Pakistan, Brazil - still have significant technological and scientific weapons production complexes once the requisite technology is at hand. Egypt, Nigeria, and Indonesia have still not arrived at this rung of the ladder.[17]

Marcel Leroy in his article "Human population as a factor in Strategic Policy and Action" provides some interesting empirical evidence on how population is affecting National Security in both

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17   Ibid., pp. 337-338.

developed and developing countries. The relationship between population as a factor leading to war and hostilities though tenuous still is a factor. In fact, one of the reasons for the Second World War was the uninhibited German annexations and conquest of territories, and one of the reasons given by Hitler and Germans for such expansion was the need for added living space or LEBENSRAUM. The population density in Germany at that time was 190 persons per square kilometer, which meant really a lack of space.[18]

The one conflict in the Third World which has been clearly cited as having been caused by population density was the Elsavador-Honduras War of 1969 called also the "Football" or "Soccer War". W.H. Durham who studied the causes of this war concluded that certain groups in Honduras had succeeded in "translating an internal problem of resource competition into an external one."[19]

The population density of El Salvador was in 1964 - 158 persons per square kilometer, with a growth rate of 3.7 per cent giving a doubling time of 19 years invaded its neighbour Honduras. The population density in Honduras was 22 persons per square

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18   Arthur H. Westing (ed.), Global Resources and International Conflict (SIPRI Publication, Oxford University Press, 1986), "Wars and Skirmishes involving Natural Resources : A Selection from the Twentieth Century", Appendix I, p. 205.

19   A.H. Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), p. 209.

kilometer. The two major objectives of the war by El-Salvador were,

(i) to prevent Honduras from expelling its unauthorized immigrants from El Salvador who amounted to 12 per cent of the Honduras population; and

(ii) to force Honduras to accept immigrants in the future.

El Salvador attained the first goal of the "Soccer War" but failed in the second, thanks to the intervention by the Organization of American States (OAU).[20]

With population increase the pressure on resources can become more acute and people are seeking illegal emigration to nations where living conditions are better. This will create serious problems in the recipient countries with group tensions on the rise as today globally all nations are facing a resource scarcity.

Thus for example between 1978-1980, 700,000 Ethiopian refugees settled in Somalia; and during 1980-82 more than 2 million. Again refugees settled in Pakistan. The UNHCR Report of 1984 clearly says that - in both cases the presence of such large numbers of refugees in a relatively restricted portion of the host country has precipitated new environmental problems especially deforestation for construction and fuel and soil erosion owing to

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20   Arthur H. Westing (ed.), Global Resources and International
        Conflict (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),
        p. 169; p. 207.

overgrazing by livestock.[21]

The Inter-Governmental Committee for Migration (ICM) has pointed out that as of 1984 there are between 10 to 15 million undocumented migrants in the world with the number of those entering the industrialized countries increasing.

The only saving grace, according to Marcel Leroy, is that "... it must be stressed that aggressive foreign policy is not the only option open to states seeking to expand their resource base: negotiation, trade, substitution, and improved technology are the more usual means. Demographic elements relate to conflict situations through a complex set of intermediate variables. It is concluded that whereas the population - resource equation is unlikely to precipitate global conflict directly, differential population growth is likely to produce substantial shifts in the global distribution of power and influence."[22]

Resources:

The relationship between a nation's security and natural resources is very crucial to understand if we want to know about the behaviour of nations. In this Section I will examine (i) What are those key natural resources that today have become a matter of

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21   Ibid., p. 174.

22   Marcel Leroy, "Human Population as a Factor in Strategic Policy and Action", in Arthur H. Westing (ed.), Global Resources and International Conflict (SIPRI Publication, Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 176-77.

life and death for nations and peoples. (ii) How are these key resources affecting a nation's security behaviour?

There are two types of natural resources: (i) <u>Non-living Resources</u>, consisting of (a) Land (dealt with under population); (b) Fuels; Oil and Natural Gas; (c) Non-Fuel Minerals; (d) Fresh Water Resources. (ii) <u>Living Resources</u>: (a) Ocean Fisheries; (b) Food Crops (Staple).

(i) <u>Non-Living Resources: Oil, Minerals, Fresh Waters and National Security</u>

<u>Oil</u>:

Oil is without any doubt a vital ingredient in the modern industrial world. Transportation all over the globe from an aircraft or to a car or an engine in a factory require oil. Given this crucial importance one can well understand that those regions where oil is found would be the most coveted.

Oil as a natural resources really hit the headline when in 1973-74 the OPEC (formed in 1960) shocked the Western world by imposing an oil embargo after which it raised the price of oil per barrel manifold, hitting the developed and developing nations' economies. This embargo itself was due to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflicts in which the USA was clearly seen as an Israeli protector in the Middle East. The United States depended for 34 per cent of its oil on the Middle East after the oil shock of 1973-74, its dependence has been as of 1984 reduced to 4 per cent only. Yet in 1980 President Carter proclaimed: "Any attempt by any outside

force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including
military force."[23]   All this intervention for a nation which imports
only 4 per cent of its oil requirements from the Middle East.
Surely America's interest in the Middle East is something other
than oil. The Western strategy looks far into the future when even
after the exhaustion of oil resources in the North Sea and other
areas in the West, the oil resources in the Middle East will be
considerable and oil prices crucial to the world economy.

Oil has been the cause of conflict not just in the Middle
East but in other parts of the world as well. In 1973 the discovery
of oil deposits in the Aegean Sea's Island of Thasos led to Greece
and Turkey making rival claims to the oil rich sea-bed of the
island in the Aegean sea. Two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey,
virtually came to war over the contested jurisdiction of the sea-
bed in the Aegean Sea. In 1974 two communist brothers - Vietnam
and China - laid claim to the Paracel (Hsi-sha) Islands in the
South China Sea which were supposed to have oil. The conflict has
yet to be resolved with both stationing garrisons there. Antartica's
territorial status remains unresolved, and its known oil and mineral
reserves are crucial. Thus USA and USSR and the other 16 consulta-
tive nations prevent any settlement by not allowing it to becoming
the property of some states laying claim to areas, or becoming a
'common heritage' of all mankind. Thus the issue remains unresolved.

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23   Ibid., p. 30.

Oil can lead to separatism also, as was the case in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 when the South Eastern Region representing 8 per cent of the territory and 22 per cent of the population and primarily populated by the Ibos, declared independence. The Nigerian Government, despite the interference by France, the pro-Biafra lobby in USA and the oil companies supporting the separatist movement took 34 years to suppress it.[24]

Thus we can see that oil resources are a danger to national security by way of attracting powerful nations who have a powerful army, economy and political clout to intervene directly, as is the case of US-led invasion of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1990.

Minerals

There are three crucial minerals of critical importance for most of the Western world - chromium, cobalt and uranium. Chromium is used mostly for metallurgical purposes. Its most strategic significance for the West lies in the fact that it is an indispensable additive for the making of stainless steel which is most most widely used in industrial applications due to its high tensile strength. Out of the known reserves of chromium in the world, 68 per cent is in South Africa, 30 per cent in Zimbabwe, and Finland has 1 per cent.[25] As far as production and exports are concerned,

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24 Ibid., pp. 34-35.

25 Ibid., p. 72.

South Africa and Albania together produce 69 per cent of the world chromium and exporting 72 per cent of the gross exports worldwide of the mineral. Added to it is the factor of the chromium extraction by private multinational corporations who completely monopolized the chromium trade in all its aspects. Chromium has no world market price. The prices are fixed in corporate negotiations with the US government or other MNCs in USA and Western Europe. Thus even the very process of trade is deeply restrictive. This leads to a situation where less privileged buyers of the Third World are totally left out of the trade.

The next strategic mineral which has deep implications for security is cobalt. Cobalt too is a mineral that can provoke conflict between South Africa and the neighbouring nations. In fact, in 1976 itself transportation of cobalt from two of the three main exporting countries - Zaire and Zambia - were interdicted by the civil war in Angola. In 1978, military forces opposed to the Government of Zaire attacked mining installations in Shaba Province. It is to be noted that 49 per cent of the known cobalt reserves are in Zaire which is 47 per cent of total world production, and its exports amount to 55 per cent of the world market exports. Zaire is followed by Zambia, the former USSR and Finland, all of which produced between 15 to 19 per cent of world's cobalt. Thus cobalt resources became for Zaire a national security threat. Between 1960-64 internal turmoil followed independence from

Belgium because of an unsuccessful attempt by Katanga (now called Shaba) Province of the Republic of Zaire (the Congo). The UN forces helped Zaire in 1977 and 1978 fight the Katangese who launched their attacks from neighbouring Angola. Belgium supported Zaire government in the fight against Katangans, but the trivial part about it was that the succession was in a large part fomented by Belgium itself and other MNCs to protect their investments in cobalt, copper and other minerals in Katanga.[26]

This was amply demonstrated the fragility of Third World national security to corporate a neo-colonial interest by governments.

Uranium

As regards uranium again, South Africa has more than 21 per cent of the world's known reserves; followed by Australia 20 and Canada 12 per cent. As regards production, South Africa produces 20 per cent, USA 21 per cent, and Canada 17 per cent of the world's production. South Africa's share in the world exports market of uranium is as high as 34 per cent followed by Canada at 29 per cent, and Australia at 14 per cent. The biggest consumers of uranium are Japan which imports 30 per cent of world's production, France imports 19 per cent, and Federal Republic of Germany 14 per cent. Uranium is a strategic mineral not just because of its usage for peaceful nuclear energy but the fact that it can be used to produce nuclear explosives. Thus the world's uranium trade is shrouded in secrecy, and uranium extraction is firmly regulated. 90 per cent

26   Ibid., pp. 74-77.

of all uranium sales are covered by long-term, i.e. at least 10-year contracts with restrictive clauses. Only a small proportion of the world trade is done without governmental participation and there is no market price. Availability and security of supply are more important to importers than the price. Again a major portion of uranium production is controlled through a vertical integration of big multinational conglomerates, e.g. GE, Exxen, Westingtious Corps. USA, and of course Anglo-American Corps of South Africa, the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation in UK, Newmont Mining Corporation in the USA. From the strategic and national security point of view the dynamic factors that influence uranium trade are: (a) the evolution of the global arms race; (b) the extent to which the policies of countries with a potential to develop nuclear explosives can be controlled or at least foreseen; and (c) developments in South Africa's troubled polity and society.

The future of South Africa is thus a key concern of the West because of its mineral resources and contributes to tensions in the region.[27]

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[27] Helge Hveem, "Minerals as a Factor in Strategic Policy and Action", in Arthur Westing (ed.), _Global Resources and International Conflict_ (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 77-81.

Minerals

Table 4.1 : Imports of selected minerals by the United Kingdom, USA, and USSR a

| Mineral b | Proportion of domestic consumption imported (per cent) | | |
	UK c	USA d	USSR e
Aluminium	100	94	50
Antimony	100	53	6
Barium	58	38	49
Chromium	100	91	0
Cobalt	100	93	47
Columbium	100	100	0
Copper	82	14	0
Gold	100	28	0
Iron	89	22	0
Manganese	100	97	0
Mercury	100	49	0
Nickel	100	73	0
Platinum	100	87	0
Silver	100	79	10
Tantalum	100	97	0
Tin	65	84	19
Titanium	100	47	0
Tungsten	99	54	43
Uranium	100	7	0
Zinc	100	58	0

Sources and notes:

a. Table prepared by A.H. Westing.

b. The minerals listed are among those (other than oil and natural gas) of major strategic importance.

c. The values for the United Kingdom are for 1974-76 and are from Crowson (1979, p. 160), except for barium, columbium, and uranium, which are for 1982 and from Karpinsky (1983).

d. The values for the USA are for 1980 and are from Bullis (1981, p. 22), except for silver, which is for 1980 from Bullis (1981, p. 79), and uranium, which is for 1983 and from Neff (1984, p. 278).

e. The values for the USSR are for 1980 and are from Levine (1983, pp. 783-84), except for columbium, which is for 1980 and from Bullis (1981, p. 172), and uranium, which is for 1983 from Levine (1983, pp. 802-903).

Source: Arthur Westing (ed.), Global Resources and International Conflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 61.

Table 2

~~Table 4.3.~~ Concentration in the global chromium, cobalt, and uranium regimes[a]

| Mineral | Proportion of global total in top three countries (per cent) | | | |
	Known reserves[b]	Production[c]	Exports[d]	Imports[e]
Chromium	South Africa[f] (68)	USSR (30)	South Africa[f] (28)	Japan (22)
	Zimbabwe (30)	South Africa[f] (28)	Albania (26)	Sweden (12)
	Finland (1)	Albania (11)	USSR (18)	China (10)
	Top three (99)	*Top three (69)*	*Top three (72)*	*Top three (44)*
Cobalt	Zaire(49)	Zaire (47)	Zaire (55)	USA (44)
	Zambia (15)	Zambia (13)	Zambia (18)	Japan (13)
	USSR (9)	USSR (10)	Finland (6)	FR Germany (12)
	Top three (73)	*Top three (70)*	*Top three (79)*	*Top three (69)*
Uranium	Australia (22?)	USA (21)	South Africa[f] (34)	Japan (30)
	South Africa[f] (21?)	South Africa[f] (20)	Canada (29)	France (19)
	Canada (12?)	Canada (17)	Australia (14)	FR Germany (14)
	Top three (55?)	*Top three (58)*	*Top three (77)*	*Top three (63)*

Sources and notes:

[a]Table prepared by A. H. Westing.

[b]Known-reserve values (i) chromium for *ca* 1979 from Morning *et al.* (1980, page 171); (ii) cobalt for *ca* 1979 from Sibley (1980, page 204); and (iii) uranium for 1982 from *UN Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 33, table 104 (1982); the compilation for uranium, however, does not take account of reserves in China, Czechoslovakia, Israel, the USSR, and perhaps elsewhere, for which the data are not made public.

[c]Production values: (i) chromium for 1983 from Papp (1983, page 217); (ii) cobalt for 1983 from Kirk (1983, page 261); and (iii) uranium for 1982 from *UN Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 33, table 104 (1982), adjusted for the missing value for the USSR, assumed here to be two-thirds that of the USA; however, the missing uranium values for China, Czechoslovakia and Israel, assumed to be substantially smaller, are not taken into account.

[d]Export values: (i) chromium for 1983 from Lofty *et al.* (1985, page 43); (ii) cobalt for 1979 from Sibley (1980, page 208); and (iii) uranium for 1983 derived from Neff (1984, pages 215, 217).

[e]Import values: (i) chromium for 1983 from Lofty *et al.* (1985, pages 44–45); (ii) cobalt for 1983 from Lofty *et al.* (1985, pages 57–58); and (iii) uranium for 1983 derived from Nef (1984, pages 227, 235, 241, 247).

[f]The values for South Africa include those for Namibia, a *de facto* possession of South Africa.

Source: Arthur Westing (Ed) Global Resources and International conf lict (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986) pp 62-63.

<u>Fresh Waters:</u>

For the Third World developing nations fresh water resources from river, streams, wells, aquifers, are vital for industrial, agricultural and overall socio-economic development. This criticality of fresh waters has resulted in many disputes and in some cases even war.

The fresh waters dispute are of various types. Firstly, there are disputes regarding upstream withdrawal, as between Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan over the usage of the river Jordan; also the Ganga waters dispute between India and Bangladesh; and the tensions between Egypt, Sudan and other neighbours over the Nile river owing to increased water consumption upstream. Secondly, there are disputes regarding upstream pollution, as in the case of the river Rhine between the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, France and the Netherlands; also the Colorado river dispute between USA and Mexico. Thirdly, there are disputes regarding rivers as contested international borders. The dispute between the former Soviet Union and China along the <u>thalweg</u> (i.e. the line following the lowest part of the valley) of the Ussuri (i.e. Wu-Su-Li) river, which keeps shifting, thus leading to a dispute of where exactly to draw the line. The dispute led to a military clash between former Soviet Union and China in March 1966. Similar was the dispute between Iran and Iraq part of whose border is demarcated by the Shatt-al-Arab waterway which forms the confluence of Euphrates and Tigres. Frustration over the issue since the 1937 agreement was a contributing factor in Iraq

launching a war on Iran in 1980. Fourthly, there are disputes regarding multinational aquifer. There are two important disputes which can be cited. The dispute between Texas and New Mexico over the utilization of the fresh waters from the Mesilla Bolson Aquifer. Another case of fresh water aquifer dispute is the Nubian Sandston aquifer which has an amazing ground water reservoir that is 500 to 1000 meters deep, shared by four countries - Egypt, Sudan, Chad and Libya. Egypt has plans to use the fresh waters for agricultural development in its New Valley project. Libya sees it as the cornerstone for providing fresh waters for its huge artificial river planned as the country's major artery. Thus the fresh water needs of nations acquiring the utilization of the aquifer in times of increasing water scarcity has all the makings of a future conflict. Lastly, there are some other sources of dispute regarding fresh water resources. There have been tensions over surplus and deficiency e.g. Bangladesh which has been expressing the desire to store water upstream in India or Nepal for it during the rainy season, allowing it more waters for the dry season. Similar is the case of Egyptian interest in the Jong Lei canal project in Sudan which can provide water in more quantities than now for its ever increasing population. There are also disputes regarding inadequate safety conditions in a river basin due to poor maintenance of upstream dams. There is the danger that leakages might result in flash floods. Thus, for example, the dam at the outlet of Lake Victoria at Owen Falls face the danger of being exposed to unpredictable water levels that can threaten its stability. Conversely, unanticipated low levels of waters

might also lead to dispute, an example is, the African drought
of 1970s and 1980s led to this problem in the Lake Chad basin.[28]

An examination of the various disputes regarding fresh
waters clearly demonstrates the point that - as there is no way
to define what exactly is an equitable share, disputes and conflicts
will continue in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa.

(ii) Living Resources: Ocean Fisheries and Food Crops -
     Implications For National Security

Ocean Fisheries:

Today the oceans annually yield about 67 million tonnes
(i.e. fresh weight) of fin fish (i.e. true fish) plus shell fish
(i.e. crustaceans and molluses). It comes to a useable protein
content of about 10 million tonnes per annum, i.e. 9 per cent of
the world's protein intake comes from fish foods. This dependence
is more acute in the case of some of the developed nations e.g.
Japan consumes 39 per cent of its protein consumption from fishery,
the USSR about 13 per cent, and USA about 6 per cent. The remain-
ing 50 per cent of the world fish catch is consumed by the poorer
developing nations.

However the rapid rise of population in the Third World is
shifting their dependence more on fisheries, thus obviously in the
future reducing the amounts exported to the developed world.

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28   Ibid., pp. 88-102.

Table 3. Ocean fish catches for selected countries, 1953-83[a]

Country[b]	Catch[c] (10^6 tonnes, fresh weight)			
	1953	1963	1973	1983
Canada	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.3
Chile	0.1	0.8	0.7	4.0
China	(1.9)	?	2.8	3.4
Denmark	0.5	1.0	1.7	2.3
Iceland	0.4	0.8	0.9	0.8
India	(0.8)	(1.0)	1.2	1.6
Indonesia	(0.6)	(0.9)	0.9	1.6
Japan	(4.6)	(6.7)	9.9	11.0
Korea, DPR	(0.1)	?	0.9	1.5
Korea, Rep.	(0.3)	(0.5)	1.5	2.4
Mexico	(0.1)	(0.2)	0.4	1.0
Norway	1.6	1.4	2.9	2.8
Peru	0.2	6.9	2.3	1.5
Philippines	(0.3)	(0.6)	1.1	1.3
Spain	0.6	1.1	1.6	1.2
Thailand	(0.2)	(0.4)	1.5	2.1
United Kingdom	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.8
USA	2.7	2.8	2.7	4.1
USSR	(2.0)	(4.0)	7.8	9.0
All others	— —	—	12.9	13.9
Global total[d]	**18.9**	**36.3**	**55.9**	**67.6**

Sources and notes:

[a]Table prepared by A. H. Westing.

[b]The countries are all those whose ocean fish catch was one million tonnes (fresh weight) or more in at least one year during 1953-83. The values for Denmark include those for the Faeroe Islands and Greenland.

[c]The catch is the total ocean catch of finfish plus shellfish. However, the values in parentheses include the inland (freshwater) catch. The values for 1953 are from *FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics*, Rome, 24, tables A1 and A2-1 (1967); those for 1963 are from *ibid.* 26, tables A1 and A2-1 (1968); those for 1973 are from *ibid.* 54, table A-4 (1982); and those for 1983 are from *ibid.* 56, table A-4 (1983).

[d]The total global ocean catch increased in essentially a straight line during 1953-83, at the rate of 1.657 million tonnes (fresh weight) per year (on the basis of a linear least-squares regression analysis).

Source: Arthur Westing (Ed) Global Resources and International Conflict (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986) p118

In today's world there are three key areas of ocean fishery disputes which have a great potential for future conflict. They are - the Indian Ocean, the North Atlantic Fisheries, and the Antartic Fisheries.

The Indian Ocean Fisheries - is one of the most under-exploited as far as resources are concerned. Its reserves of Tuna, Skipjack, Yellow fin, Bigeye, Souther Blue Fin Tuna, and Alba core are largely unexploited. It is the one ocean where foreign trawlers from Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, former USSR, and China come and fish in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the littoral states of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Somalia, and other developing states, which do not as yet have the naval infrastructure to monitor their EEZs and preserve their fishery zones from foreign exploitation. However as the dependence of these littoral states are increasing they are increasingly investing more to control their high seas and it is likely that in the future the foreign trawlers would have to go elsewhere. In fact already there have been many conflicts between local fishermen and foreign trawlers leading to burning of trawlers in the high seas. Thus the Indian Ocean is a sure zone for future conflicts.

The North Atlantic Fisheries - have both economic and strategic significance as it contains not just fishery resources, but oil and gas. Thus here one finds the littoral states enforcing their littoral rights strictly and leading therefore to conflicts. In 1972-73 there took place what has been called the 'Cod' war

between Britain and Iceland in the Artic habitat of the North
Atlantic. In 1972 Iceland unilaterally extended its coastal
fishing rights from 22 to 93 kilometers. Britain with the support
of the ICJ refused to recognize this and in the ensuing diplomatic
war the two NATO members virtually came to use force. Icelandic
gunboats drove out British trawlers and frigates by force. For
Iceland it was case of protecting its strategic interest, as its
economy is sustained by fishery exports. Though the matter got
settled, but Iceland again extended its fishing limits in 1975 to
370 km. i.e. up to its EEZ.

In 1980 another dispute broke out in the North Atlantic
when Norway which had annexed in 1929 the Jay Mayen island
declared a 370 km. EEZ around it. Denmark and Iceland immediately
questioned the basis of such a declaration as according to law
an island without any population cannot claim an EEZ. The matter
was not pressed further by Denmark and Iceland and remains
unresolved, but it can get complicated as both in Norway and
Iceland the fishermen's votes are crucial. Apart from this there
has been the Svalbard archipelago dispute. The Svalbard
archipelago lies in a militarily strategic place under the flight
paths of US and Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers. In 1920
the Spitsbergen Treaty was signed giving virtual sovereignty of the
archipelago to Norway providing also that all parties be allowed
equal rights to economic activity on the islands and its terri-
torial waters. A compromise was arrived at with USSR whereby
Norway allowed the Soviet fishing vessels within the zone but with
Norwegian officials on board.

The Antartic Fisheries - The Antartic fishery resources are
being exploited by two main fishing nations i.e. Japan fishing
Krill and USSR fishing the Pelagic Wales. The problem in
Antartica is that there is nobody to manage the fishery resources
there, thus the two countries go about fishing on a species-by-
species basis with complete disregard to the eco-system which can
lead to disaster and already alarm calls by the Green Peace are
being sent for stopping such fishing. Thus in 1980 a 'Convention
on the Conservation of Antartic Marine Living Resources' came
into force from 1982 providing a form for dealing with disputes
and authority to enforce strict management of fisheries.[29]

As fisheries grow more vital for increasing population in
the coming years, and man is forced to depend more on ocean
resources and even living space, disputes are sure to arise and
can even turn violent.

Food Crops:

Food adequacy is at the heart of national security. In
countries where food is scarce, the problem of food related
conflict can be extremely high and dangerous for internal security.
The recent revolts relating to food illustrate how politically
significant food is. In Poland in 1980 increases in the price of
food led to the formation of Solidarity, the complete loss of
legitimacy of the Polish Communist Party and the declaration in
1981 of a martial law. In Tunisia in 1983 riots followed the

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29   Ibid., pp. 116-139.

Food crops

Table 4

Major world trade in grain (cereals), 1983–84[a]

Country[b]	Wheat[c] (10^6 tonnes)	Rice[c] (10^6 tonnes)	Maize[c] (corn) (10^6 tonnes)	Total[d] (10^6 tonnes)
A. Exports				
Argentina	9.6	—	5.9	15.5
Australia	11.6	0.4	—	12.0
Canada	21.8	—	0.4	22.2
France	14.0	—	4.7	18.7
USA	38.9	2.1	47.4	88.4
Others[e]	4.1	8.3	6.4	18.8
Total[e]	99.9	10.8	64.8	175.5
B. Imports				
China	9.6	—	0.1	9.7
Japan	5.9	—	14.5	20.3
USSR	20.0	0.5	9.5	30.0
Others[e]	64.4	10.3	40.7	115.5
Total[e]	99.9	10.8	64.8	175.5

Sources and notes:

[a] Table prepared by A. H. Westing.

[b] The countries are all those whose trade in grain was 10 million tonnes per year or more.

[c] The data are from the US Department of Agriculture (Lane, 1986, page 157). The data for wheat are for July 1983–June 1984; those for rice, January–December 1984; and those for maize (corn), October 1983–September 1984.

[d] The trade in grains not included here (barley, oats, etc.) would increase the presented world total by about 10 per cent.

[e] The category 'others', and therefore also the 'total' values, do not account for a number of very minor grain exporting and importing nations.

Source: Arthur Westing (Ed) Global Resources and International Conflict (Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press 1986) p 147.

increases in food prices. In Morocco in 1984 riots broke out in protest against cut in subsidies on food and other basic commodities followed by the government cancellation of the price rises. In Sudan in 1985 the regime was overthrown following strikes and riots over rise in food prices.[30] Thus conflicts over food can take revolutionary dimensions and directly threaten a nation's security. The reason why food affects national security so immediately, more than any other resources is because it directly hits the daily existence of an individual.

Today the situation as regards food in the world is seriously unbalanced against the Third World. In fact two thirds of the global population lives in the developing world, but its share in the world agriculture is less than 40 per cent. Thus the remaining one-third of the global population in the developed countries produce more than 60 per cent of the world's grain production. In the Third World an estimated 400 million people are seriously under-nourished. It is also in the Third World that repeatedly famines have occured. Thus the development of food and agricultural stocks are vital to the national security of the Third World countries.

When we talk about food security, the key food-stuff we are talking off is foodgrain and it is by examining this that we can find out how food and a nation's security are crucially related.

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30   Arthur H. Westing (ed.), Global Resources and International Conflict (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 144.

In today's world in the 1980s and 1890s there is only one
prominent producer of foodgrains and that is the USA which produces
more than 50 to 60 per cent of the world grain production, followed
by Argentina, Australia, Canada, and France. Much of the foodgrain
in USA is in the hands of a few private grain companies. The
demand of food has been most in USSR, China, Japan, and as for the
Third World countries it is not a case of 'relative scarcity' but
a case of absolute scarcity where it is a matter of life and
death.

This preeminent position of USA obviously puts it in a
position to use food as a political weapon and it did against
Bangladesh because it sold jute to Cuba and also against USSR its
largest foodgrain buyer, which is used for livestock.[31] The
'politics of food' clearly illustrates that for developing countries
self-sufficiency in foodgrain is really of great importance to
internal security. The dilemma in the domestic sphere of Third
World countries is between the industrial-urban centres and
agricultural-rural centres. If the government were to raise food
prices as the agriculturalists would want, the urban citizen's
standard of life would fall so drastically that there would be food
riots, however-if subsidies for farmers are removed then the costs
of inputs would so increase for him that his standard of life will
fall and so you would have farmers protests. Thus for the Third
World countries the question of food security is very crucial and

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31   Ibid., pp. 149-155.

at the same time politically a very sensitive issue - a matter of life and death'.

Thus as regards the Third World governments' national security policies vis-a-vis natural resources are concerned be it - oil, minerals, fresh waters, ocean fisheries, or food - the link between the two is extremely vulnerable to slight internal or external pressure. Unlike the developed world the added problems of weak government, low policy capacity, low legitimacy, and integration make the impact of any tensions over the resources they have, extremely dangerous to national security and overall international security.

The Influence of Ideology on National Security

Ideology is an important factor deeply conditioning Third World conceptions on what should constitute national security, because national security apart from being physically manifested in economic and military terms is deeply psychological and sometimes even spiritual.. Thus, for example, the idea of deterrence itself is primarily a psychological phenomena involving calculations about the behavioural dispositions of the adversary state. Ideology is a comprehensive holistic belief system affecting every aspect of the social, political and economic life, and having a basis in real historical experience. Thus when we think of the national security conceptions of the Third World countries we must remember it is deeply rooted in historical experiences.

For the Third World the key historical experience whose
legacy hangs even today, is the experience of colonialism.
Colonialism destroyed everything - the economy, the society, the
polity and most of all the sense of individual pride and identity.
Thus the shameful experience of living as slaves in one's own
nation deeply affected the psychological makeup of Third World
leaders like Kim Il Sung of North Korea, Mao, Ho chi Minh, Lenin,
NKrumah, Nehru etc. In the case of China, there was a profound
sense of national humiliation at Chinese defeat in the Opium War
(1839) and the fact that China was being virtually raped economi-
cally. Similarly in the case of North Korea the national humiliation
was deep at Japanese colonization from 1910-1945 which went to the
extent of attempting to wipe out the Korean identity by forcing
them to adapt Japanese names. Thus the experience of colonialism
left among the Third World countries a deep feeling of shame, while
at the same time an emphasis on their cultural identity. The Third
World nations in the process of their struggle for independence
became fanatically committed to freeing themselves ideologically and
economically of Western control. This led to them espousing the
doctrine of self-reliance which found varied experessions in the
Third World.

As far as we are concerned we want to find out what effect
this ideological heritage had on their conceptions of national
security. China and North Karea are two model cases of Third
World countries following the ideology of self-reliance not merely
as a political slogan, but as a living manifestation in their
economic, political, military and cultural arenas successfully.

China

In China the concept of national security is perceived in more inclusive terms than merely the "power commodities" of military strength and economic power. Military self-defence and economic self-reliance are key operational components of the Chinese national security policy. According to World Bank estimates, between 1963-1983 China spent more than 31 to 48 per cent of its budget expenditure on military. To support this kind of military expansion, China during the 'Great Leap Forward' in the 1950s industrialized heavily. The successful testing of the Atomic Bomb in 1964 was an expression of Chinese self-reliance in the face of Soviet withdrawal of nuclear technicians and blueprints from China in 1960.[32]

Military self-defence was a key component of Chinese national security, and it involved more than just spending. The structure of Chinese Army and its war fighting strategy were so made that it is an expression of the Chinese determination to be self-reliant. The Soviet Commissar system of party control over armed forces was strictly adhered to. The 1960s programme of 'Learn from the PLA' placed the politicisation of the military squarely above everything else. Ideological political indoctrination through the military curriculum emphasized political commitment to Marxism-

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32 Edward Azar and Chung-in-Moon (Ed.), National Security in The Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), p. 120.

Leninism in the shape of Maoism. The concept of "People's Army" and "People's War" was an expression of this ideological emphasis.

Jane Price explained this aspect of Chinese industrial and military self-reliance beautifully, she says: "The Chinese Communists ... have made the military a major instrument for transforming Chinese institutions and society. In this capacity, the Red Army became the backbone of the Chinese Communist Movement and the organizational model for other aspects of communist political and social life."[33]

This increased involvement by the military can be seen by the fact that at the 9th Congress in 1969, 127 active military members were present in the Central Committee of the CCP, i.e. 45.5% of the 279 present, which represented a massive increase from 48 of the 193 members (i.e. 24.9 per cent) in the previous i.e. 8th Congress in 1956. Similarly Chinese armed forces were involved in all areas of the Chinese society under the "Learn from the PLA" Programme.[34]

In the economic sphere too the ideological emphasis directed the pattern of developments. China adopted serious policy measures during Mao's time to promote self-reliance, this included policies for a balanced economic growth, avoidance of trade deficits,

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33   Jane Price, Cadres, Commanders, Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920-1945 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 66.

34   Ibid., p. 122.

indigenization of science and technology, preservation of raw materials, and most important injection of the "right spirit" into the mass belief systems. Deng's liberalization even though increased China's trade surpluses and allowed China to trade with non-communist countries yet, it has been criticised and in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party on 28 September 1986, a resolution entitled "The Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideology" harshly criticized the Liberalization.[35]

Thus self-reliance continues to deeply influence China's national security conception in the key areas of military and economy and the slant is deeply ideological.

North Korea

North Korea is another case where the national ideology propounded by the charismatic Kim Il Sung called JUCHE directs all decisions in the key areas of economic, military and political activity. Kim Il Sung said in his book _Immortal Juche_ that "the implementation of self reliance in national defence is a military guarantee for political independence and economic self sufficiency of a country."[36] He further says "when one relies on others in national defence he is bound to study their faces and moods and cannot say freely what is in their minds."[37]

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35   _Ibid._, p. 126.

36   Kim Il Sung, _The Immortal Juche Idea_, p. 324.

37   _Ibid._, p. 325.

Thus North Korea increased its military spending especially during the Sino-Soviet rift in 1960s to 1/3rd of the national budget. North Korea has been exporting military equipment in the 1960s to more than 30 countries and sent experts to 40 countries. Within North Korea the increased representation of the military in the Politbureau in the 1960s represented the politicisation of the armed forces and North Korean military strategy emphasized people's militias. Kim Il Sung has himself said, "Modern warfare is three dimensional... In fact, no demarcation line can be drawn between front and rear. Hence ... all peoples should be ready to fight with arms in hand, and the whole country be turned into a strong fortress."[38]

Even regarding the hardships of economic underdevelopment, Kim Il Sung emphasized the 'Spirit' of self-reliance. He said: "As economic construction ... is a revolutionary struggle, without the spirit of self-reliance one cannot understand the arduous and complex task facing the construction of an independent national economy. He who lacks the idea of self-reliance can do nothing".[39] An evidence of this is the fact that North Korea became agriculturally self-sufficient despite the fact that the Northern part of the Peninsula is ill-suited for agriculture.

China and Korea are therefore expressions of Third World nations whose historical experience formed an ideological core

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38   Ibid., p. 327.

39   Ibid., p. 317.

with which it built powerful self-reliant nations despite all odds, and ideology definitely was that key variable of the soul and spirit moving dreams into reality.

The Influence of National Security on the Direction of Economic Development

After examining as to how the 'ideological' perceptions about threats to security deeply affect the economic decisions made by Chinese and North Korean leadership, we might hope to expect that the much touted "free world" to be free of this so-called "ideological" malaise, and economic decisions in the "free world" to be made without 'ideology based' identification raw physical threats.

However, an examination of the economic decisions, made by the nations of the free world clearly shows that economic decisions were made keeping in mind not just plain and simple military threats, but specifically identified 'ideology based' threats of force. Thus the pattern of economic development in the non-communist Third World states was very much based on this premise which was accepted by their leadership, elites, and powerful classes.

In this Section I would like to examine the nature of economic development in the non-communist Third World nations.

South Korea

South Korea is a classic case of a nation's economic policy being specifically addressed to the State's security needs. The

failure of UN troops to win a unified Korea during the Korean war forced Syngman Rhee to secure his nation's physical security by creating a military industrial complex. Rhee argued in his discussions with USA, its ally, that South Korea's greatest needs were for "an army and the heavy industry to support a large defence establishment".[40] The same emphasis was carried on by President Park's regime and during his tenure South Korea was spending more than 75 per cent of its available investment funds on what Edward Azar and Chung-in-Moon say "the heavy industrial sector with linkages to the military industrial sector."[41]

American economic assistance during this crucial 'Cold War' period from 1951-65 was $6.8 billion over 1.5 times its defence expenditures. Emile Benoit a famous economist in her famous study entitled "Defence and Economic Growth" clearly knew where most of the aid was aimed at, and commented that "such aid was clearly intended to make it possible for Korea to maintain a large military effort, and at the same time achieve rapid economic progress which would strengthen the political support it could obtain from its own people."[42]

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40 Gene Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961), p. 174.

41 Edward Azar and Chung-in-Moon, "Third World National Security: Toward a Conceptual Framework", in International Interactions, Vol. 11 (1984), p. 122.

42 Emile Benoit, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), p. 249.

This importance for military investment continued even into the 1970s, thus during 1970-82 period defence expenditures rose from 23 per cent to 35 per cent of the central budget. This increase was occuring at a time when American troops were withdrawing from South Korea in 1975 and the South Korean government levied as "special defence tax" to finance the military sector.

Thus we may see how the South Korean economic policy was responding to military backed ideological threats from across the border.

Latin America

Similarly Latin American governments too were taking economic decisions based not on account of economic threats but threats to the regime and state. For Latin American governments, the threat of pursuing an economic policy based on pandering to the consumerism of the middle classes, came from within the borders. The enemy was an idea - communism. The Cuban Revolution of 1958 was an epitome of internal communist threat. The solutions were simple. No! not to resolve the internal inequality of wealth and ownership of lands and properties in Latin America, but firstly to put forward an economic policy of 'development' designed to do two things: first, seduce the discontented middle class by targetting them for developmental programmes and consumer goods to satisfy and placate their desires.

Second, allocate resources for the military which was argued will be the medium for directing this 'modemization' and

'development', as well as, being an instrument of brute repression crushing any threats to the security and stability of the path of economic development and state. Secondly, to put forward apart from economic policy, a full blown 'national security doctrine' emanating from institutions like Escola Superior de Querra (ESG) which saw the 'threat' to government as part of what Bradford Burns calls a "struggle between east and west in which there could be no neutral position", and preaches "an almost pathological brand of anti-communism."[43]

Thus what happened to economic policy was that it ended up removing nationalism as main ideological theme vis-a-vis state and economy, and putting instead a rather pathologically demented theme of 'national security' for all aspects of the state. It need not surprise us that this ideology of national security did not arise in the Third World but was based in Washington D.C.

The Impact of Arms Acquisition Strategy on National Security

For the developing and even developed countries that are acquiring arms for national security there are three analytically distinct options - firstly, a country may seek to rely solely on either producing arms domestically; secondly, it may import its arms from abroad; and thirdly, it may choose to manufacture some weapons locally and import others. Even though there are only

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43 E. Bradford Burns, Nationalization in Brazil (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 121.

three distinct options, there are numerous variations in implementing them. (1) Arms Import: (a) from a single predominant source or (b) from multiple source. (2) Military Import Substitution. (3) Local Production and Import Acquisition LP/IA.

Arms Import from Single/Predominant Source

It was during the period immediately following Independence that a single or predominant source acquisition was most in vogue. At that time it was obvious because the Third World nations had just acquired freedom and the industrial infrastructure still had to be laid. Inevitably, the newly emergent nations imported all their arms from their former colonizers, thus United Kingdom was the dominant supplier over most of the newly decolonized world, followed by France. Each was the sole supplier to its former colonies. Britain supplied to Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and even India till the 1960s. The French were the sole suppliers to Northern Africa - Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo and Morocco. The USA and the USSR, impelled by the logic of the Cold War, aggressively promoted arms sales and in many regions began to take the place of the British and the French as arms suppliers.

The Third World nations realized very soon that reliance on a single source made their national security more vulnerable because

Firstly, there was always the threat of an arms embargo - the United States and Britain imposed embargos on both India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 wars, and Argentina faced a similar embargo from the EEC in April 1982 when it invaded Falklands.

Secondly, it increased dependancy for spare parts, personnel equipments, and repairing facilities. In 1975 the US had 9,535 military personnel serving in 132 technical assistance and training teams in 34 countries, thus controlling critical elements of the national defence.

Thirdly, the various restrictions imposed by arms suppliers on the end use of the military equipment came to be realized as another security risk. Thus for example the US Administration told Israel not to sell its American designed Kfir fighter planes to Ecuador and Taiwan.

Fourthly, it gave suppliers dangerous leverage to manipulate a nation's foreign policy decisions.

Fifthly, it provided the supplier country opportunities for direct intervention in the internal affairs of a country. In 1953 American officials in the Philippines engineered Magsaysay's election to the Presidency.

Sixthly, the supplier country can manipulate the course of ongoing peace negotiations. The United States has often manipulated flow of arms into the Middle East to promote its objectives in the region.

Seventhly, the United States has often used violations of Human Rights for terminating arms sales and military assistance to many nations. In 1974 US Congress legislated to terminate sales to Chile to put pressure on the repression that the military junta was perpetrating after overthrowing Salvadore Allende.[44]

Thus these dangers of a single or predominant source for arms acquisition induced the Third World nations to diversify their sources of supply.

Arms Import from Multiple Source

To counter the constraints on a nation's behavioural autonomy and freedom the next option of buying from many sources was tried. Thus for example Nigeria and Egypt expanded from UK to importing from other sources. Yet this strategy also failed because - firstly, it did not actually reduce dependence on imports but only made importing appear as somewhat more benign. However, this polyglot of military equipment complicated training and maintenance efforts and the Third World governments found themselves worse off than before in terms of managing the variety of equipment; secondly, standardization, the original aim of Third World nations, got side-tracked; and thirdly, there is always the danger of any one of the suppliers witholding spare parts or support and maintenance units

44   Edward Azar and Chung-in-Moon (ed.), National Security in the Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), pp. 157-163.

for vital equipment e.g. aircrafts that require frequent servicing, seriously curtailing the air operations.[45]

Military Import Substitution

The failure to keep one's political and military autonomy which was the real issue of acquiring arms in the first place, led the Third World countries to a strategy of military imports substitution, whereby nations started substituting indigenously produced armaments for imported ones, thereby eliminating the vulnerabilities of imports. Military Import Substitution (MIS) meant passing through various stages:

(i) Weapons Assembly - wherein prefabricated components were imported to be assembled in the country.

(ii) Some components began to be 'locally fabricated' under licence agreements with foreign suppliers.

(iii) Actual production of complete weapons, i.e. foreign military equipment is 'manufactured' under licence.

(iv) In the fourth stage the nations engaged in MIS utilize the technological skills and capabilities acquired in earlier stages to modify, redesign, and reproduce imported equipment. In this stage some research and development takes place.

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45 Ibid., pp. 164-65.

(v) In this last stage the MIS strategy finally results
in the nation producing indigenously designed arms
based on local research but still incorporating foreign
designed components, or through complete indigenous
research and production.[46]

The MIS strategy was the most successful way of freeing
oneself off the absolute dependence on imports. Thus by 1950
four developing countries - Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and India
were producing any of the four types of major conventional weapons,
i.e. aircrafts, armoured vehicles, missiles, and naval vehicles.

However, the MIS strategy has been criticised by many
analysts. Anne Cahn mentions thus: "Instead of creating indepen-
dence, indigenous production usually creates a new set of
dependencies."[47] Another analyst Michael Moodie says that dependence
of the Third World on industrial countries has not disappeared
rather it has only changed from being previously relying on
industrial producers for arms to dependence on them for inputs to
make arms. He says: "Third World arms producers have traded one
form of dependence for another. They have shifted the nature of
requirements from the need for finished weapon systems to the need
for the technologies to manufacture those systems."[48] Thus instead

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46   Ibid., p. 167.

47   Anne Hessing Cahn, et. al., Controlling Future Arms Trade
      (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1977), p. 78.

48   Michael Moodie, "Vulcan's New Forge: Defence Production in
      LDCs", Arms Control Today, Vol. 10, No. 3 (March 1980), p. 2.

of achieving the proclaimed goal of military self-reliance,
Third World producers are merely exchanging dependence upon
imported arms for dependence upon imported military technology.

Andrew L. Ross, however, points out that the criticism of
weapons import dependence being transformed by MIS into technology
import dependence, is not true because if one were to examine the
cases of Brazil, India, Israel, South Africa, and South Korea one
finds that they have been able to reduce the degree of their
previous xxxxxx dependence both of foreign finished products and
foreign technology. Today Brazil no longer needs to import either
the technology or equipment for making light military aircrafts,
armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers, wheeled armoured
fighting vehicles, light tanks, rockets, missiles, small naval
vehicles, or small arms and ammunition.[49] Brazilian arms imports
have fallen from $304 million in 1979 to only $38 million in 1983,
while its arms exports have grown from $xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx1975xxxx
$49 million in 1975 to $300 million in 1982.[50] Similarly because
of MIS in the case of India by 1984, 63 per cent of IAF inventory
of 1500 aircrafts had been built by HAL and by 1984, 65 per cent of
Indian Army's tanks were the indigenously produced Vijayanta Tank.

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49   Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (ed.), National Security in the
     Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988),
     p. 172.

50   US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ICDA), World Military
     Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985 (Washington D.C.: ACDA
     Publication 123, August 1985), p. 97.

Such is also the case of South Korea whose arms imports fell from $722 million in 1978 to $278 million in 1983 while arms exports rose from a mere $8 million exports in 1975 and $ 950 million in 1982. In 1966 USA provided 85 per cent of the Korean defence expenditures, but by 1976 USA was funding only 12 per cent of the defence budget and from 1977, according to the Report on Korea produced by the US Embassy in Korea, South Korea was "funding" essentially all of its defence costs."

Andrew L. Ross argues that there is a degree of difference between weapons import and MIS, which entailed importing phase by phase from assembling to complete manufacture and R/D of weapons. He says:

> A static dependence relationship is inevitable when a country relies upon foreign arms suppliers. But when arms production programmes are initiated, and military production technology rather than arms are imported, a more dynamic relationship is established, one that has an inherent potential for the reduction, if not elimination of military dependence. 51

However a certain amount of imports of weapons will still continue for certain Third World countries who are located in a high threat zone and technologically sophisticated military environment e.g. Israel, India, South Korea, South Africa, who by virtue of their security environment are compelled to acquire weaponary at the cutting edge of technology.

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51   Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (ed.), National Security in the Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), p. 170.

Thus the Third World nations have to follow a strategy
of local production and import acquisition or a 'mixed' approach
to weapons acquisition. In practice what has happened is that
the two analytically distinct options - the MIS option and the
mixed LP/IA - have been merged as one strategy.

In the final analysis thus the choice for Third World
countries is: either acquisition from abroad either entirely
or predominantly from a single source or from several sources
or local production/import acquisition. The latter option of
MIS and import acquisition even though it has failed to give
absolute autonomy but has definitely reduced military dependence
in dealing with threats for the LDCs and in doing so prevented
to an extent their national security.

Democracy, Military and National Security

Democracy and National Security

The relationship between national security and democracy
is crucial to understand if a liberal and free civil society has
to be preserved, and if the nature of national security doctrine
has to be understood in its application in the Third World
countries. To examine this we look into the usage of national
security doctrine in Argentina.

A liberal democratic framework would entail according to
liberal political theory the right to free expression, the right
to form associations, to put forth one's collective viewpoint.

However, in times of war or other national emergencies, political rights according to the UN Charter and international law can be 'suspended' for a while and not indefinitely. But there are certain rights - like right to life, right against arbitrary confinement without reason or judicial basis, right against physical torture, enumerated as 'human rights' in liberal political theory which cannot ever be abrogated even in times of national emergencies. Thus in the much touted liberal regimes it would be axiomatic to expect that even if political rights were suspended, the right to life would not be abrogated.

However, despite such clearly written covenants of commit- ments to which all the countries in the world represented by their governments are signatories, we find that in the case of Argentina, these very governments invoked national security to justify abrogation of these very basic human rights on a mass scale. After 1964 when military leaders with similar visions of nationhood and security took power all across Latin America including Argentina, in 1966, in one year alone about 9,000 to 25,000 people just "disappeared" in Argentina; similarly another 5,000 to 30,000 people disappeared in Chile. All this in Kennedy's 'decade of develop- ment'.

According to the self-proclaimed 'nationalists' who through a 'coup coalition' suspended democratic government and took power, it was a period of a "Dirty War" or _Guerra Sica_, in which survivors were determined to transform Argentina into a satellite of Soviet

Union, which through the use of Marxist ideology, wanted to annex more territory into its imperial domain. It was a war against 'terrorist delinquents' hiding inside the social fabric who wanted to take control and destroy Western Christian civilization. They believed that a strange foreign ideology had entered Latin America which was destroying all order, authority and civil society. They believed it was caused by a small minority of foreigners, referring to the Russians and Jews. Thus it advocated a certain nationalistic chauvanism and racism, and xenophobia combined with an almost pathological anti-communism. Of course, this doctrine did not originate in the minds of Latin American 'nationalists' only but came from USA.

The real reason for the collapse of all so-called liberal norms was something far deeper. Carlos Egan says that on closer examination of history one finds that these cycles of human rights' violations took place most during periods of exceptional social strain caused by major changes in the international division of labour. He argues that Argentina, like many other Latin American countries, is dependent upon the world market right from its independence in the 19th century. Thus its economic, political and social health was determined by the international fate of world capitalism. He says Argentina's economic journey is very much like the journey of other LDCs. It went through various phases.

The first phase began from the time of its independence, from 1860 to 1929, when Argentina began producing only two

commodities, both of which were for export - meat and grain. This period is viewed as the "golden years" of Argentine economy. Exports were fine and the whole domestic economy got its foreign exchange through this means. However, this first phase ended with the 1929 world economic depression, and the people of Argentina began to question this sort of agro-based economic model. Thus the 1920s and 1930s saw radical movement erupting all over Argentina like all over the globe.[52] The 1917 Communist Revolution's message spread far and wide, and Argentina saw its first national security regime wherein during the tragic week in early January 1919 more than 1000 demonstrating metal workers were simply shot dead. Many thousands were simply vanished during these early years of unrest when the masses questioned the utility of capitalism and demonstrated in the streets for its overthrow. Fifty years later this was repeated again in the 1960s and 1970s. However, after the first round of human rights' violations the economy rebounded. So began the second phase of international capitalism wherein the core allowed the peripheral nations like Argentina called the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model which aimed at establishing light industries and consumer products industries in Argentina. It worked. The economy was becoming again from 1930s till 1960s, when this model exhausted itself and the second crisis of capitalism took place.[53] Again the world economy stagnated and

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52 Ibid., pp. 199-200.

53 Ibid., pp. 200-201.

came to a halt, a depression like situation of recession took over. Argentina's economy was hit with retrenchment, unemployment, and revolutionary fervour. The Cuban Revolution had taken place and the fact that Marxism had made its first dent at a time of great weakness which led Argentine economic elites, combined with the military and private armies of the rich, to launch under the garb of "national security threats" a planned and brutal reign of repressions.

The National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) created by President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina on 15 December 1983 to investigate the events surrounding the 'Dirty War' between 1976 and 1983. The Commission's findings, by an eminent writer Ernesto Sabato, revealed that there was a clear involvement of high ranking members of the military junta in the disappearance of more than 8,000 Argentines which was "the greatest tragedy of our history and the most savage".[54] The seven months of testimony during the course of these investigations left no doubt that the excesses were the result of arid ecologically formed, deliberate state policy dependent on international cooperation for its successful implementation.

Carlos Egan says about this second phase of national security based human rights' violations in 1960s till 1980s that "In the course of the subsequent political realignment that occurs after the crisis is over and the economy begins to rebound,

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54   Ibid., p. 220.

an organized labour movement cleansed of its militant members
is coopted by ameliorative legislation; wage concessions and
partial inclusion in the political game. During the second step
the state is able to retract its claws in order to renegotiate;
for a while, a social pact in which gross violations of human
rights is simply unnecessary."[55]

Thus democracy and national security at least after its
manifestation in Latin America, do not appear to go together.
Rather the national security doctrine is deeply status quoist,
anti-democratic, racial, and the effects of such a 'core' nation's
doctrine further applied to 'peripheral' areas like Latin America
or the Middle East can have a devastating effect on the societies
of many developing countries.

Military and National Security

After examining how national security operates at the
ideological, economic, arms import and democratic levels one can
in the course of examining China, North Korea, South Korea and
Latin America clearly see the very crucial role for the military
in the programme of national security.

Once the economic developmental model of the West was
transferred by way of economic aid, military acquisition, and
most of all through the paradigm of 'modernization' and
'developmental economics', then the 'modernizers' like Lucian Pye,

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55   Ibid., pp. 198-199.

Edwards Shills, Guy Pauker, Rupert Emerson, Samuel Huntington and others gave shape to a specific role for the armed forces in the Third World context. They argued that the military in Asia and Africa had "strong leadership, ... organizational structure, and moral authority"[56] which was totally lacking in the civilian leaders. The army was supposed to be a disciplined and skillful force. Morris Janowitz another modernizer, had argued that the military had a strong "public service tradition"[57] which would be the reason why the military can fight corruption of the civilian government and bureaucracy and set the Third World developmental process in order. The army's record of fighting corruption must be noted because of the 29 coups in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1958 and 1980, 13 of them cited corruption as the reason for take over.

However, despite these positive qualities cited by the modernists, the record of the military regimes which took over after 1966 virtually all over the Third World is quite different. In fact these regimes ended up creating greater insecurities in all spheres and thus involving many of the poor nations in fruit-less wars. There are two reasons for this. First, the very theoretical and epistemological assumption of the modernization theory, which was accepted by the Third World, proved to be false

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56   Nicole Ball, _Security and Economy in the Third World_ (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 7.

57   _Ibid._, p. 11.

and divorced from reality. Secondly, empirical evidence in fact shows that the military ended up promoting more underdevelopment than so-called development.

We first take up the modernization theory, because it propagated that the military was a modernizer in the Third World. Nicole Ball points to the various reasons why the 'military-as-modernizer' assumptions were wrong. Firstly, the proclaimed link between modern weapons acquisition and industrialization leading to 'spin-off effects' of developing and modernizing the economy was as time went by found to be false. In fact such a model resulted in the agricultural sector being totally neglected. The result was imbalanced development, urban-rural divide, greater social tension. Also the basic requirement of food security was forgotten in favour of military security, leading to warped priorities.

Secondly, the 'military-as-modernizer' model theorists had argued that the armed forces of Asia and Africa and Middle East were "dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress and the task of modernizing traditional societies that have been subverted by the corrupt practices of the politicians."[58] However, this was not true. The military regime that took over in Ghana could not do a single thing better than the deposed

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[58]   Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization", in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 69.

NKrumah regime except raise the defence budget. Robert Price,
a political scientist who examined the role of military in Ghana,
observed that the Ghanian military did not replace the corrupt
bureaucracy as it had no one else to use for administration. So
nothing was done to stop bureaucratic power, arrogance and
corruption which in fact increased because for six months after
the coup not even a cabinet was formed. Decisions were taken
without considering their implications and therefore, says Robert
Price, "It is not surprising that the three and one half years of
military rule in Ghana were characterized by drift and stagnation.
The problems ... became worse."[59] He further said, "In the economic
sphere the GNP per capita remained stagnant, inflated prices ...
grew higher and the number of unemployed rose greatly."[60] This also
was the case in South Korea where corruption simply changed hands.
In fact, a popular record released in Ghana during 1968 with the
title "The Cars Are the Same, Only the Drivers have Changed" aptly
sums up the progress and modernization that had taken place, both
for Ghana and South Korea. Not surprisingly the record was
banned.[61]

Lastly, and most importantly, the modernists had theorized
on a very narrow empirical base. When they pronounced this theory,
the only region which had experienced military rule was Latin

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59   Robert Price, "Military Officers and Political Leadership:
      The Ghanian Case", Comparative Politics, 3 (April 1981),
      pp. 377-78.

60   Ibid., p. 378.

61   Ibid., p. 365.

America, and they were not ready to accept or consider it as evidence of the role of military in the Third World. Thus it was a theoretical assumption that was bound to fail.

Another reason as to why the military failed to provide any real 'national security' and rather misused it to end up creating more insecurity, is that there is substantial evidence to suggest that the military had helped in the development of underdevelopment in the Third World. The evidence suggests a few things which must be taken note of.

Firstly, the pre-independence role of the Third World military of using force to direct the form of economic, political and social development under the guidance of the metropolitan centres continued, but in a more sophisticated garb called 'development' or 'modernization'. Nicole Ball says the military after independence in the post-war world, was given new tasks - i.e. protection of raw material concessions now being secondary, their vital task was to back up the growing penetration of Western capital, breakdown of the labour and radical resistance, ensure a gradual decolonization, and in some cases become direct instruments for the West in the East-West conflict, especially in Latin America. 62

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62   Nicole Ball, _Security and Economy in the Third World_
      (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 18-19.

Secondly, the military moulded the economy towards the goals of the West, liberalizing, opening free trade, industrialization, allowing consumerism, and neglecting agriculture which was in fact a much bigger sector compared to the industrial sector.

Thirdly, transfer of technology led to the West slowly influencing the Third World's culture and society in a way that generated greater tensions between tradition and modernity, almost positing one against the other. It led in some nations to revivalism and religious and other primordial loyalties gaining ascent when modernization was supposed to put down these very variables.

Fourthly, evidence in the case of the coups in Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Dominican Republic in 1965, Uganda in 1971, Egypt in 1952, Peru in 1968, and Chile in 1973 shows that the military intervened whenever the polity and popular sentiment was moving towards radicalism. The military in this sense all over was acting the agent for the West and stalling the national political development of the Third World peoples.[63]

Lastly, the socialist nations of USSR and China too used military as a way to intervene and control Third World polity, society and governments. Idli Amin in Uganda received support by USSR even though his regime was repressive. The case of Afghanistan where Soviet military intervention virtually tore the nation apart in the ongoing East-West feud is a living example

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63   Ibid., p. 21.

of the so-called 'progressive' role of the military.[64]

The Influence of Legitimacy, Integration, and and Policy Capacity on National Security

Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon have delineated three dimensions of national security policies: security environment, hardware, and software. While security environment is an essential indicator of external threat and alliance pattern, the hardware side of national security involves the physical capabilities; strategic doctrine; force structure; and weapons choice.[65] Software refers to political legitimacy, integration and overall policy capacity. The traditional approaches to national security, i.e. the realist approach, has been preoccupied with security environment and hardware side of national security only thus hindering a realistic understanding that national security in the Third World means more than this. It must today pay attention to the so-called 'Software side' of fragility of political legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity.

How much do these variables of political legitimacy, integration and policy capacity affect the national security in the Third World?

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64   Ibid., pp. 27-30.

65   Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (ed.), National Security in the Third World (England, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), p. 77.

Legitimacy and National Security

It is important to remember that the form of the government or regime does not matter. What really matters is the content. Legitimacy is an integral part of the software, because it shapes the macropolitical context of the national security management system. Legitimacy determines to a large extent the national will; morale and character, and conditions all levels of security management ranging from threat environment to policy capacity.[66] Legitimacy is a key to understanding the relevance of the regime type and authority structure to security performance, because sometimes even a 'benevolent' dictatorship with high legitimacy can enhance national security performance compared with a pluralist democratic fragile and incompetent regime with low legitimacy. High levels of legitimacy for the government means popular support and it would mean the regime's policies will be accepted at large strengthening national security.[67]

However, Third World countries by and large suffer from serious legitimacy crisis which constrain their national security performance. A legitimacy crisis thus results in various national security dangers to the governments.

Firstly, a crisis of legitimacy will encourage adversaries to be emboldened to pursue their designs. Thus even though all

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66   Ibid., p. 78.

67   Ibid., p. 81.

border disputes between Iraq-Iran were thought to be settled
the serious national security crisis caused by the removal of
the Shah and the crisis of governance following the Revolution
made Iraq's leader Saddam Hussain think it was the right time to
attack Iran. Thus began the Iran-Iraq war that went on for
eight years.[68]

Secondly, a legitimacy crisis of a regime could make it
desperate leading to an external adventure at a time when the
nation is at its weakest. It can spell a national security
disaster. President Galteri of Argentina did exactly the same,
when he was facing serious legitimacy crisis at home by attacking
Falklands. Unfortunately Argentina was defeated and the Galteri
government fell and the nation too lost its face.[69]

Thirdly, a legitimacy crisis exhausts the policy capacity
of a nation, the capacity of the government and its functional
autonomy is destroyed.

Fourthly, such a crisis means a loss of national morale
and national will as people lose confidence in the government and
no longer are ready to support the regime. It means internally
there is no political consensus or support for the government
which is dangerous for national security.

Lastly, a legitimacy crisis forces the regime to seek
external support from one of the super powers. In the long run
this puts the nation at a greater security risk and the country

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68   Ibid., p. 82.

69   Ibid., p. 83.

ends up becoming a satellite of the power it is dependent upon. [70]
An example is Pakistan, or the East European nations.

This legitimacy as a variable of national security affects
all levels of the Third World's security environment.

The Significance of Integration to National Security

Integration is that key variable which moulds the social
and cultural infrastructure of the security management system.
Both the formulation of national interests and overall software
mechanism are conditioned by the level of integration. The failure
in the Third World countries to integrate the diverse social groups
in a unified political force brings about new security threats,
fragments metropolitical infrastructure, and weakens policy
capacity. Integration is more relevant to the Third World because
of the pervasiveness of political and social disintegration. Many
developing nations will suffer from a colonial legacy diverse
communal (ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural) groups
competing for their rightful place after achieving independence.
Ironically modernization has only accentuated the fragmentation
and communalisation of Third World societies thus making integration
an urgent necessity.

The relevance of integration to Third World national
security can be understood by the fact that of 132 nations of the

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70   Ibid., p. 85.

Third World only 12 could be said to be essentially homogeneous. About 90 per cent of the Third World nations are characterized by communal diversity. In 52 states 40.2 per cent of the Population was divided in more than five significant communal groups. Modernization and development, in fact, have intensified the fragmentation process.[71]

How does all this affect national security? Distinct ethnic, religious or cultural groups - Kurds in Iraq; Muslims in India; Shia, Sunni, Maronite, Druz and Greek orthodox in Lebanon (or Tamils in Sri Lanka) emphasize the importance of integration as an absolute necessity.

Policy Capacity and National Security

While legitimacy and integration shape the contextual framework of the software, policy capacity constitutes its dynamic core, operational mode and content. Policy capacity is characterized by detecting and processing of information of threats, choosing and articulating policies in all sectors, control, allocation and mobilization of resources and capabilities, and their overall final implementation. Policy capacity steers the security management system by determining the scope and range of internal and external behaviour. In the Third World where the security environment is relatively fluid and the provisions for hardware are difficult to have, effective and adaptive policy

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71   Ibid., pp. 86-90.

Capacity is vital to overall national security performance.

Speedy, efficient and flexible implementation is rare in the Third World : Gunnar Myrdal in his book Asian Drama has characterized Third World States as 'weak' or 'soft' states not able successfully to impose their policies on their peoples. There are too many structural bottlenecks, rampang corruption and lack of financial supports to allow successful implementation, and time does not allow the luxury of trial and error. Decisions have to be taken and implemented fast.[72]

Israel and South Korea are examples of nations with high policy capacity. Israel, despite deep political divisions and even subgroupings, has emerged as a nation with strong capacity to implement its decisions. South Korea has not been so successful, though it has a homogeneous ethnic population, because of a low level of political legitimacy which is not the case in Israel. Lebanon is a classic case of a nation with virtually no policy capacity.[73]

Thus these three crucial variables - legitimacy, integration and policy capacity - are individually as well as collectively crucial to a successful national security policy.

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72   Ibid., pp. 92-93.

73   Ibid., pp. 93-95.

IV

The complexity of Third World vulnerabilities implies
that we must look deeper at the underlying structure and the
broad spectrum of issue-nexuses in the Third World security.
A search must also be made for the different resources, and
capabilities that are required to confront the different types
of threats in the Third World. Excessive emphasis on military
power might entail extensive trade offs with domestic, social,
political, and _ . issues, which would eventually undermine
the overall security posture.

In the Third World context, the security environment is
vital but it does not necessarily determine or dictate the nature
of security issues. Domestic factors such as legitimacy,
integration, ideology, and policy capacity play equally important
roles in shaping the national security posture.

Finally, a reproduction of First World's national security
management tools and techniques without making them more context
bound for the specific situation in a Third World country can
lead to wrong assumptions and analysis of threats by the Third
World security analysts and therefore wrong prescriptions and so
disaster.

Thus the conventional concept of national security may not
be wrong per se but by itself it is only a skeleton with flesh
and blood to be supplied by the Third World policy analysts and
political leaders themselves. The two key questions that confront

the Western notion of national security when applied to the Third World in policy terms are - security for whom?, and security for what? In the West the answer to the question 'security for whom?' would evoke a simple answer in most cases - security for the state. In the developed world, nation-building, development, social integration, and modernization have successfully bridged the gap between nation-and-state and state-and-society. Thus one can associate security for oneself with the security of the state. However, in the Third World there remains a wide gap between state security and security for the nation. In fact there is a serious disjunction between state and society which has yet to be overcome. As regards 'security for what?', since there is such a high degree of aggression between state and the individual in industrialized world, the destiny of the individuals and of the nation-state are coterminous, whereas this is not the case in the Third World context. So national security in the Third World must address itself with more emphasis on political and territorial survival, preservation of economic well-being and prosperity, organic survival of the national population, and communal and social integration.

CONCLUSION

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

In the four preceding chapters an attempt was made to study the concept of national security in terms of its meaning, origin, and development. In chapter II an account was given of how the concept developed in the US and what were the factors that influenced its development. In chapter III the conception of national security in the erstwhile Soviet Union until its collapse was examined in terms of its unique origin, nature, development and how it has some serious lessons to national security analysts. In chapter IV the concept of national security in its application to the Third World was examined.

The analysis of the concept in the West, East and Third World has brought forth many aspects which are vital if the concept has to survive and grow in a world where nation-states are in many cases collapsing, while in others, national sovereignty has almost very little meaning and substance. National security in its traditional nation-based military orientation is no longer relevant, because today military threats are not the only threats to the core values of a nation. In fact today, the whole idea of national values as being something unique and to be adored is losing its intensity. In some cases, national values are deformed and irrelevant by the fact that it means hardly anything to the poor man in the street. In others, the rise of globalism and the dramatic increase in migration not for a better livelihood, but due to famines, wars, natural disasters is creating serious

problems to those who claim purity of nationhood by virtue of race, ethnicity, or nationality. In fact international social mobility has boomed to such levels after the Second World War that governments are finding it increasingly difficult to evoke national fervour, except negatively against refugees. The nature of demographic change all over the world is going to be a point that will be difficult to be accommodated within the narrow rubric national security. Similarly environmental threats, pollution, nuclear hazards, preservation of global environmental resources like Antartica etc., cannot be accommodated into a concept of the old concept of 'national' security. Even if one were to talk of unique ideological, religious, or cultural values, the globalization of culture, ideologies of all kinds, really puts a strain on the theoretical domain of national security. The role of mass media has really altered national values all over the globe, thus making citizens less and less culturally, or in terms of global consciousness, unique or independent, though national identities will always be attempted to be kept alive. National Security, therefore, as a concept in the 1990s and coming century may face extremely rough weather, but definitely not extinction, as nation-state will continue to be maintained, if only for negative reasons. Thus the concept of national security should be enlarged in order to accommodate concepts like global, international, or 'common security'.

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