ROLE OF MILITARY PACTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "ROLE OF MILITARY PACTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA" submitted by Mr ADITYA KUMAR in fulfilment of nine credits out of total requirements of twenty four credits for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M. Phil.) of this university is his original work and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this university or any other university to the best of our knowledge.

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PREFACE

The recent changes especially since 1989 has proved to be seminal in the international relations. Hardly any one had predicted that the Berlin Wall will collapse, Germany will be reunited and all the Eastern European Communist regimes will fall one after the other. The changes were such that it led not only to the end of Cold War but it also led to debate over 'end of History' which claimed that Communism has come to an end. It finally culminated in the disintegration of former Soviet Union.

In the light of these revolutionary changes, the present study becomes important as military pacts being the instruments of Cold War were directly affected. Its founding assumptions are being questioned. The questions expand even to its future role as well as its rationale for existence.

The entire dissertation has been divided into four chapters plus the conclusion. The First Chapter deals with the historical backgorund of Cold War as well as why alliances are formed.

In the Second Chapter, the entire focus is on evolution and working of NATO and Warsaw Pact from 1949-1985. It has been kept till 1985 because this year marks the beginning of new era in international politics. This chapter also deals with the relationship between NATO and Western Europe in case of NATO. Internal problems get more prominence in Warsaw PAct as they are manifested in the host of crises and

the role of intervention by former Soviet Union has also been discussed.

The third chapter marks the departure from the history and evolution as the chnages in international areana started affecting the raison d'etre of these pacts. It deals with Mikhial Gorbachev's 'New Political thinking'. Various changes which took place ranging from superpower relations to dissolution of Warsaaw Pact has been discussed. Due to shortage of space it is not possible to cover all the minute details but effort has been made not to leave even the minute details which are significant for the present study.

In chapter four due to fluid and vibrant nature of Intrnational relations no concrete view has been taken. Instead, the debates which started in the wake of new changes continued to be significant in the post-cold war era has been discussed in this chapter. In the post cold war era the debate over European security is getting complex day by day as the stabilizing factor prevailing during cold war era is over. All the debates form the subject matter of this chapter.

Finally in conclusion it has been discussed that future European secuirty is likely to be dominated by Intra-State problems rather than Inter-State violence. Hence the role for NATO assumes less prominence in the light of increasing reliability and expanding scope of institutions like CSCE and WEU.

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Origin of the Cold War

In order to understand the creation of military pacts,i.e. North Atlantic Treaty Oragnization(NATO) and Warsaw Pact Organization(WTO), it is essential to understand the circumstances prevailing at that time and also preceding it which led to its formation. In other words, it draws heavily from the cold war situation which was the characteristic feature of post World War II era.

Though the cold war began about the time of the Potsdam Conference in 1945, at which America, Russia and Britian met but the difference and suspicions could be seen as early as two years from the outbreak of the second world war.

When the Nazis attacked the Russians in June 1941 both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to send out aid to the Russians. The grand alliance that was formed between USA, USSR and UK, and its decisions during the war determined the territorial structure of post war Europe. Western relations with Russia have never been very cordial and in the period 1940-45 they were clouded by mutual suspicions. However, two Western powers sent massive aid to the Russians but Stalin was not satisfied with the aid and demanded increased western action in particular the opening of the second front. In 1941, when Atlantic Charter was drafted, it was general statements, conventions on which post war settlements might be settled. At that time, both powers made categorical assurances that no national gains would be

attempted after the war and also no territorial changes contrary to the wishes of inhabitants would take place. All People - Charter proclaimed would have the right to choose their own formal government in a new world of economic cooperation. Aggressive nations would be disarmed. But as the War continued and Stalin's diplomatic condition improved, by 1945 Red army was in occupation of most of East Europe. The differences between allies thus became more accurate.

They also disagreed as to Japan's political future. Russia also wanted to join Western powers in the occupation of Japan when Japan surrendered. But the key areas which divided the Soviets from the West was disagreements about political future of Germany and Poland.

Poland was the first issue which revealed the inability of allies to compromise and became a touchstone of great power relationship. The West disagreed with the Soviets sharply on the question of Poland's post-war frontiers and government. It may be recalled that Britian officially had gone to war in 1939 to defend Polish independence and wished Poland to recover the lost territory and have independent government. The Russians on the other hand were not prepared to return their gains made at Poland's expense but would allow Poland to receive compensation at Germany's expense. Stalin was particularly vehemently opposed to creation of anti-Soviet authority in Poland.

The German problem was wider in magnitude. At Yalta,

it was agreed that Germany was to be divided into four zones controlled respectively by USSR, USA, UK and France. It was also emphasised that this occupation was indeed temporary and that there would be free and fair election in Germany and its political future to be decided on that basis. It was also emphasised in peace treaties and Yalta conference that Germany should be treated as single economic unit. Similarly, Berlin was again divided. The Soviets and Western powers, it soon became very clear, disagreed sharply over the treatment Germany was to receive. Russia was always fearful of Germany and wanted it to be crippled permanently.

Central problem remained around Berlin and the Russsian attempt to gain control of Germany quickly ran in to trouble. The worsening situation in Germany and the complete failure of the four occupying powers to reach any agreed solution and even Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britian, France and the Soviet Union did not reach agreement on the German question(1947). Thereupon, the Western powers decided to form their three zones of occupation into a separate state called the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The Soviet response was to form a parallel separate communist state in the eastern zone called the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

"The steps taken by the Western powers in 1947-48 to establish a German state threatened the Russian ambition to keep Germany whole and turn it commmunist"[1]. They also

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1. Peter Calvoceressi, World Politics after 1945,2nd ed., (Longman Group, London,1971),p.13.

foreshadowed the revival of an independent German power in world politics, armed and hostile to the USSR. The Russians decided to make a major issue of these developments and to resort to force to stop them. The result was the Berlin Blockade thus cutting the road, rail and water routes by which the Western occupiers communicated with Berlin. The Western powers decided to pierce the Russian siege by air and were able to feed two milllion West Berliners. In May 1949 Stalin admitted moral defeat and agreed to lift the blockade.

Cold war was formally declared by the West. In his speech at Fulton(Missouri) in 1946 Winston Curchill declared that an "Iron Curtain"[2] had descended upon Eastern Europe after seeing the commitments not being honoured made at Yalta and Potsdam conferences respecting Eastern Europe. Here the West could not ignore the danger of communist expansion not only in Eastern European states but also Western European Communist parties owing allegiance to Moscow as well as in Asia. The fear was justified when the Soviet forces occupied Korea down to the thirty-eighth parallel and the influence of Mao Tse-tung in China was increasing.

The role of ideology too became prominent in post World War II. "The two central elements of the cold war were Russian-American rivalry and the advent of nuclear

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2. Quoted in Prakash Chandra, _International Relations_
   (Vikas Publishing House Private Ltd, 1983), p.11.

weapons"[3]. The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as super powers made the world bipolar. The Soviet-American hostility extended virtually into every part of the globe and affected almost all major and minor international issues, such as the economic recovery and defence of western Europe, the political development of societies in eastern Europe and the stablity in Asia. Emphasis was on ideological conceptions of security.

The establishment of communist states in Eastern Europe and communist regime in Czechoslovakia proved clearly the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. The American and Western statesmen took political and military measures to stem the expansion of Communism in the West. The NATO was formed. Federal Germany was rearmed. The two factors related to it contributed and escalated the cold war and they were, the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine of containment. Marshall Plan was for the West European economic recovery and in 1947 Truman applied to Congress for authority to give assistance to free nations threatened by Communist aggression. It was first applied to Greece and later to Turkey which faced an external threat from the Soviet Union. These were the beginnings of policy of containment.

Basis of Alliance Formation

According to Stephen M. Walt, Alliances are formed in order to respond to threats. When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either Balance or

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3. P. Calvoceressi, Op.cit.,p. 13.

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Band Wagon[4]. "Balancing" means allying with others against the prevailing threat, whereas "Band Wagoning" refers to alignment with the source of danger. Thus two distinct hypothesis about how states will select their alliance partners can be identified on the basis of whether the states ally against or with the principal external threat[5].

One of the reasons to form alliance is to prevent the stronger power from dominating the weak which forms the core of traditional balance of power theory. The weak states are presumed to ally against the stronger so that others do not achieve a dominant position..

Despite the powerful evidence that history provides in support of balance behaviour, the other response in terms of Bandwagon, that is, to align with the stronger is more wide spread.

Bandwagoning beliefs have also been a recurring them throughout the Cold War. Soviet efforts to intimidate both Norway and Turkey into not joining NATO reveal the Soviet conviction that states will accomodate readily to threats, although these moves merely encouraged Norway and Turkey to align more closely with the West.

Soviet officials made a similar error in believing that

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4. Stephen.M.Walt, "Alliance in Theory and Practice:What lies ahead?",Journal of International Affairs,Vol.43/No.1, Summer/Fall 1989,pp.4-5.
5. Use of the terms 'balancing' and 'Bandwagoning' follows that of Keneth Waltz (who credits it to Stephen Van Evera)in his "Theory of International Politics" pp. 128-129.

the growth of Soviet military power in the 1960s and 1970s would lead to a permanent shift in the correlation of forces against the West. Instead, it contributed to a Sino-American rapproachement in the 1970s and the largest peacetime increase in US military power in the 1980s[6]. These refernces show that states are attracted to strength. The more powerful the state and the more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with it.

Apart from balancing and Wandwagon as response to external threats,ideaology too plays important role in alliance formation as put by Stephen M. Walt "the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union has been a competition for allies"[7]. Thus the United States is said to favour liberal democracies while the Soviet Union was believed to attract leftist or marxist regimes, primarily for ideological reasons. Like the Bandwagoning reason, this view has been popular throughout the Cold War.

Cold War and the Military Facts :
NATO and WARSAW Facts

After a brief background of the Cold War and oasis of alliance formation it is proposed to study factors for their formation or its raison d'etre.

NATO

After the end of the second World War the wartime co-

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6. Dimitri K. Simes, "Soviet Policy Towards United States"
   in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., (ed), The Making of America's
   Soviet Policy, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1984),
   p. 307.
7. Stephen M. Walt; Op.cit., n.4, p. 1.

operation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allied powers soon came to an end. The reason for the Western European states to feel threatened was the way the Soviet Union expanded its sphere of influnce in eastern Europe. Also Western Europe in the immediate post war period,denuded of military strength following the rapid Allied Demobilisation was also economically and politically prostrate. In this condition, Europe faced the largely undemobilised and massive military strength of the Soviet Uinion. It was this "contrast between Soviet strength and purpose on the one hand and Western European weakness and lack of concentrated direction on the other which promoted the formation of a western security system"[8].

Moreover, there was then a real threat of internal subversion in Europe. The spectacle of the collapse of the Eastern European states, in the face of unrelenting and even brutal communist pressure, was clearly visible. In this respect the treatment of Poland and subjugation of Czechoslovakia were perhaps the most eloquent examples.

After the war it had become apparent to the American leadership that the need for the economic and moral rehabilitation of Western Euorpe was imperative. The need was met by the Marshall plan , but it lacked security.

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8. MCcloy J.John, the Atlantic Alliance: its origin and its Future, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 25.

The efforts to work out a four-power all German solution met with no success. In the meantime, the Soviet were stripping East Germany. The hostility and extent of their propaganda activity, though present at all times after the close of the war, became intensified in 1947 and 1948.

Europeans acted on the assumptions of threat and danger and cooperated in recovery programs. In formation of alliance otherwise in absence of the United States response to assist European recovery, it was clear that Europe could only have looked forward to a growing accomodation to Soviet power and influence and a gradual dimunition of its own integrity and independence.

Hence, already in 1948, the states of Western Europe, recognizing the inability of the divided United Nations to preserve peace and fearing the success of the Soviet advances in Eastern Europe, banded together to oppose this new threat. The instance of their alliance was the Brussels Treaty, a fifty year multilateral pact between Belgium, France, Luxemberg, Netherlands and the UK[9].

Early in the same year, Canada proposeed the idea of a single mutual defence system, subsuming and superceding that of the Brussels Treaty.

Later, on June 11, 1948, the US Senate adopted the "Vandenberg Resolution" (Appendix II) which recommended among others, the "association of the US by constitutional

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9. Reprinted in Don Cook, Forging the Alliance : NATO, 1945-1950, (Secker and Warburg; London, 1989), pp.127-131.

process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" (Appendix II)and called on the government of US to contribute "to the the maintainance of peace by making clear its determination to excercise the right of individual or collective self defence under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security" (Appendix II). This enabled the US to join and Atlantic alliance in time of peace. In July 1948, preliminary talks began in Washington between the US, Canada and five Brussels Treaty parties.

On April 4, 1949, while the Berlin Blockade was still in force, twelve states signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington (Apendix I). The treaty entered into force on 24 August 1949. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. These events were accompanied by vehement protests by the Soviet Union, which contended that the creation of NATO was in contravention of Charter of U.N..The membership stands at sixteen.

The Alliance was, therefore, primarily an answer to the great disparity of strength and purpose between the communist-dominated countries of the East and the weakness and fragmentation of Western Europe. It was also a response to the overall problem of recovery in Western Europe and the lack of any current prospect of working effectively with the Soviet Union to achieve a Europe-wide settlement.

The main purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law"[10]. This was to be achieved by collective defence, that is "an armed attack against one or more of the member states in Europe or North America is to be considered an attack against them all, and member states consequently undertake to render assistance in such a situation by exercising the right of individual and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the charter of UN" (Appendix I).

"NATO defence policy was based on deterrence"[11] and so everything within the Alliance in terms of men, weapons, command and control, communications and the political direction and economic co-operation are there simply and solely to create and sustain this one overriding element as NATO by definition is a collective defense alliance.

There are indeed only a few major elements in deterrence. The most evident is the military capability to match aggression at all levels from bullying or harassment, from minor incursions or probes or adventures, to limited war by land, sea or air, finally to general war and a stategic nuclear exchange.

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10. NATO Handbook (NATO Information Service, April 1986) p-13.

11. Sir Peter Hill-Norton; No Soft Options: The Politico Military Realities of NATO, (C. Hurst and Company; London, 1978), p. 21.

Warsaw Pact

Formation of Warsaw Pact on 14th May 1955 was direct consequence of the formation of NATO on April 4, 1949 in the backdrop of the Cold War and subsequent events. Events such as the Paris agreement signed by Western powers on October 23, 1954 was important and it is as follows :

(a) the Brussels Treaty Organization was turned into the Western European Union;

(b) the FRG and Italy were included in it;

(c) the military bodies of this union were united with the military organisation of NATO and then, in violation of the Potsdam, West Germany became a member of the aggressive North-Atlantic bloc; and finally,

(d) this new member of the bloc was granted the "right" to form a half-a-million strong army with modern weapons that led to the formation of Warsaw Pact"[12].

The danger of peace presented by the Paris agreements was increased by an official statement of the signatory powers recognising the government of the FRG as the "only German Government" entitled to act on behalf of Germany in international affairs disregarding the existence of GDR. A threat to peace was also posed by FRG Chancellor Adenauer's repeated statements on non-recognition of Poland's Western frontiers along the oder and the western Neisse which gave

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12. Quoted in Shashi Bhusan, The Warsaw Treaty, (Progressive Peoples Sector Publications; New Delhi, 1976), p. 15.

encouragement to West-German revenge-seekers who were
calling for the forcible revision of these frontiers.

Thus, prior to the ratification of the Paris agreement
the Socialist States did not seek to form a multilateral
alliance although the West had already built. It was the
formation of NATO and the inclusion of FRG in it that forced
the European Socialist States with the necessity of
improving their joint defence and setting up their own
military-political organisation.

The FRG's accesssion to NATO, was not the only factor
at work. The development of Western backed Alliances outside
Europe was also a relevant consideration. The Alliances in
particular were ANZUS, formed in 1951 (Australia, New
Zealand and the USA), SEATO (South East Asia Treaty
Organisation, including Australia, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, The Phillipines, Thailand, The UK and The USA),
formed in 1954, and the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO, formed in
1955 (Central Treaty Organisation, including Britain, Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, with the USA as an associate member)[13]
This suggests that the WTO was seen as serving a global
political/diplomatic purpose of demonstrating the USSR's
ability to form its own alliance, but this amounted to an
indirect admisssion of weakness since the USSR was unable to
call an alliance system as geographically widespread as the
USA's.
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13. Valentin Alexandrov, The Warsaw Treaty and Peace in
    Europe (Novosti, 1980). p.11

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Within Europe, 1955 did not, of course, mark the beginning of the Soviet alliance system. It was clear due to cold war in the period between 1945-1955, and the policies of Marshall Plan and Truman doctrine in 1947 and the division of Germany into FRG and GDR, the Europe was already divided into two antagonistic ideologies. By the 1955 Eastern Europe was already firmly tied to the USSR by a network of political, economic and military ties. COMECON had been formed in 1949, though it was hardly a functioning economic mechanism by 1955[14]. In June 1953 the GDR had suffered the first of a series of crisis within Eastern Europe which seemed to threaten the region's political stability as part of an alliance of socialist states closely allied to the USSR.

The very inception of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was solely due to an objective necessity. Article 11 provided for dissolution of the Treaaty in the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe (Appendix III). The Warsaw countries maintained that as long as such military blocks existed, effective measures on disarmament were not carried out, the Warsaw Treaty countries deemed it necessary to build their defence capability and to develop close co-operation among themselves in this direction.

From the outset the purpose of the Warsaw Pact

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14. Arlene Idol Broadhurst, (ed), The Future of European
    Alliance Systems : NATO and The Warsaw Pact (West View
    Press/ Boulder, Colorado; 1982), p. 238.

Organisation was not to effect the integration of non-Soviet establishments with the Soviet military machine that already existed. The Warsaw Pact was not, therefore, a preconceived and premeditated step of military rationalization even allowing for the creation of the Joint command, which can be regarded as an institutional replacement for what Dr. Ross Johnson calls the "Personalized Stalinist system of Soviet hegemony"[15].

It is generally agreed that the establishment of the Warsaw Pact organisation was primarily a political act, the Soviet explanation concentrates unequivocally on the threat of a rearmed Germany as Soviet tried their best to prevent the accession of West Germany to the Western European Union and ultimately to its membership in NATO[16].

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and mutual assistance, signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, "is in some ways modelled on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty"[17], the similarity is far from accidental or coincidental . The treaty has one unique feature: Article 9 invites "all European States," irrespective of social and political systems to join the present treaty ,"(Appendix III) a point underlining Moscow's emphasis on NATO's refusal to consider a Soviet request for membership made in March 1954.

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15. A Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations," in Dale R. Herspring and Iran Volgyes,(ed), Civil Military Relations Communist Systems, P.247.
16. Robin Alison Remington, The WARSAW Pact: Case Studies in Communist conflict Resolution, (Cambridge, 1971), p. 10.
17. Gerald Holden, The WARSAW Pact, Soviet Security and Bloc Politics,(Basil Blackwell, 1989),p.10.

The treaty was to remain in force for twenty years to be extended automatically for a further ten years for those who did not renounce it (Appendix III).

As for actual institutions, the treaty made only vague reference to the political consultative committee(PCC), composed of representatives drawn form each member government or of specifically appointed representatives. The PCC was generally committed to hold consultations and to consider problems arising from the terms of the treaty and empowered to create, where necessary, supplementary or auxiliary bodies.

EVOLUTION AND WORKING OF NATO :

AND WARSAW PACTS(1949-1985)

NATO

All security problems in Europe – if not security problems in the world generally- were a compound of genuine conflicts of interest, perceptions, and institutional development. Within the Western Alliance, in particular, the internal politics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization especially the role played by the United States and the collateral uses for which the Alliance was designed – largely determined the way in which NATO countries interpreted the Soviet 'threat' and chose means for reacting to it.

NATO and USA

In the early years of its formation Marshall Plan Phase which viewed the Soviet threat primarily as economic and political was replaced by the NATO Phase which saw the Soviet threat as military after the Korea war of 1950 and established an American dominated alliance. NATO established a militarized transatlantic connection and plans to rearm Germany began to be drawn. Thus, not only was containment militarized but it also became the rationale for a closely integrated western alliance under American direction.

Several of America's Atalntic Allies were themselves important political, economic and military powers when they accepted American leadership they did so because, on balance it appeared in their own interest to depend on the American

strategic deterrent to balance the immense Soviet nuclear force. Most, including the Federal Republic of Germany, had been no other strategic defence. In addition, NATO vested the United States with organizing and leading Europe's territorial defense. Thus an American general was NATO's Supreme Allied Commander(SACEUR), and an American grand force of ten divisions was either stationed in West Germany or waiting to be sent there if needed. According to London Institute, a large American tactical air force then guarded European skies, and a large American fleet was "permanently stationed in the Mediterranean"[1].

But this American Hegemony was not without serious differences. Burden sharing was one of the most important issues of disagreements between the members of NATO. The United States was not satisfied with the attitude of the European allies towards burden sharing.

The issue of burden sharing was at the core of NATO Planning for collective defence. According to Klaus Knorr, "burden and their distribution tend to become in alliances for two reasons"[2].

First, problems arose when defensive allainces obligated their members not only to come to one another's aid in the event of attack but also to mount — at all times— large efforts for military deterrence and defence in order

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1. The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS), The Military Balance 1985-86,(London : IISS, 1985) pp.13-14.
2. Knorr Klause, "Burden Sharing in NATO: Aspects of US Policy", Orbis(Philadelphia),vol.29, No.3. Fall 1985, p.517.

to discourage aggression. This was precisely NATO's purpose. Second although relations by the allied governments might be shaped in large part by mutual co-operation, occasionally by notion's of loyality and fair play, these governments might try to manipulate the net utility they derived from the alliance by deliberately shifting the flow of burdens and benefits.

For achieving this purpose the allies adopted certain unilateral acts e.g. cutting defense expenditure or by hard bargaining, for instance, by threatening to withdraw from the alliance unless other members contributed more to common defense. Friction with the allies of the USA over relative levels of military spending and the distribution of responsibilities would inevitably increase. The mechanism for redistributing burdens within the alliance were limited, and its allies faced important constraints in responding to the new US initiatives[3].

American public opinion was always critical of the legitimacy of the US spending on European security. As a result the United States was continuously demanding a better burden sharing on the part of its European allies. The US argument was that "the West European nations can remain free and can prosper unconcerned by the Soviet Union while remaining at peace among themselves"[4].

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3. Golden, James R, "The Dynamics of Change in NATO" (New York:Praeger, 1983),p.ix.
4. Knorr, Klaus, Op.cit., p.532

On the contrary, the European allies thought that the United States had other military commitment in the Far East, Middle East and the Western Hemisphere-indeed, potentially throughout the extra European world. Apart from specific commitments in Japan and South Korea it was committed to take up the option of countering the military expansion of the erstwhile Soviet empire anywhere and of intervening militarily in the Third World conflicts that threatened vital American interests[5].

On matters concerning American Hegemony, membership in an alliance was "apt to curtail national freedom in the making of foreign and defence policies."[6] This cost of concerted effort was especially onerous in an alliance headed by a super power that naturally expected to dominate in the formulation of alliance policies.

US military and political weight had shaped formal and informal NATO procedures right from the beginning. "But US dominance proved inflexible when Western Europe's economic and military power removed"[7].

Divisions among the allies on how to deal with situations affecting the interests of some or all of them outside Europe have been numerous. First came the Anglo-French Seuz intervention in which the U.S. disappointed both and it already had disappointed French in Indochina in 1954.

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5. Ibid, p. 530.
6. Ibid, p. 519.
7. Jackson, Robert J, Continuity of discord :crises and responses in the Atlantic community,(New York : Praeger, 1985),p.146.

So the French, disillusioned about the prospects for manipulating the Americans , turned decisively toward building a European bloc. And hence in 1958 France made a proposal for creation of American-British French global directorate to exert greater leverage on American global policy to which France could not succeed[8]. Differences became bitter and De Gaulle took drastic steps to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated command. Consequently, NATO forces were denied automatic use of French territory and air space. The French did not, however, denounce the Atlantic Treaty.

Till 1960, American and European policies toward the Third World came to terms easily though the cooperation was not structured. Howeve, later, transatlantic consensus had been undermined by wars in Vietnam and the Middle East and, in the 1970s, by the oil crisis. European while demanding consultation, had often distanced themselves from particular American policies toward the Third World. This could be seen particularly in Vietnam war, Arab-Israeli wars, the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the US bombing of Libya. "The Europeans sought to develop their own special relationships often in disagreement and competition with the Americans particularly since the oil crisis of 1973"[9].

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8. Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally : France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 166-167.
9. David P. Calleo, "The European Coalition in a Fragmenting World,"Foreign Affairs 54, no.1(October 1975), pp. 103-112.

Differences over strategy became more real till 1950s. By 1960s strategic parity was hypothetical. However, by the late 1970's it had grown real. With the United States now as vulnerable as the former Soviet Union, the difficulties of extended deterrence grew much more complex. Strategy of "Flexible Response" too created problems as it called for major armament and it required a great expansion of conventional forces to contain at a non-nuclear level which called for Americans to provide major army for Europe. While Europeans accepted additional troops, they were not pleased with the new military strategy. Flexible response was clearly an American strategy reflecting American pre-occupations; several of its features were difficult for the European allies to accept[10]. Europeans were apprehensive that it would lead to nuclear war between the superpowers and they would not be spared. Also they argued that aim of deterrence was not to limit war but to prevent it. Emphasising conventional forces implied that NATO's nuclear force might not be used and it seemed to invite for Soviet military incursions into Western Europe. Europeans were almost as frightened of a conventional war as of a nuclear war.

Later, in 1982 the new differnces arose in the wake of Strategic Defence Intiative(SDI) which opened wide debates and reactions.

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10. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (London : MacMillan, 1983), pp. 293-302.

The existence of such a research program i.e. SDI posed serious problems for the Europeans and the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, keeping with the Americans would mean huge new expenditures. For the Europeans, American offers of cooperative research carried numerous difficulties. Failure to participate could mean being left out of technology that might be of great importance to civilian industrial development as well as to military prowess. Moreover, the European countries also argued that SDI would lead to a major new arms race and destablilise the East-West Military Balance. They also accused Washington of "seeking European co-operation and finance for SDI but refusing to allow the transfer of new technologies which it was likely to aspire"[11].

Economic aspects were another major area of difference which affected NATO. American direction in international economic matters to the perceived detriment of European interests had generated widespread criticism abroad, "as reflected in the diverging statements emanating from the 1981 Ottawa economic summit"[12]. On the European side, charges were that US imposed restrictions on the export of certain high technologies to the Eastern bloc that were motivated less by defence and security consideratons than by a commercial desire to restrict West European access to the Soviet bloc market.

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11. Patriot(New Delhi), 13 February, 1985.
12. Brady,Linda, P and Kaufman, Joyce,P., NATO in the 1980s: Challenges and Responses, (New York, Praeger 1988), p. 10.

For the past three decades the US has in effect been in a position to offer the rest of the world depriciating dollars in return for goods, services and capital required by her. The scale of Pentagon's military expenditure programmes, which have been so dramatically accelerated under the Reagan administration, have therefore founded from the savings drawn in through the dollar based banking from Western Europe, Japan and Third World[13]. The drift of protectionism and increasing trade friction across the Atlantic Alliance was another feature.

Rates of national economic growth slumped unexpectedly after 1978. The first half of the 1980s witnessed a serious ecnomic depression, with rising rates of unemployment and the appearance of budget deficits throughout the world of Atlantic Alliance[14].

Alliance relationships where thus in a critical state. Both West Europeans and the United States charged each other with unreliability. The increased political uncertainty created by this exchange had made it more difficult for the Alliance as a whole to cope with the military and economic challenges that it faced in the 1980s[15]. The absence of a coherent strategy for coping with these challenges led to even greater political uncertainty, which exaggerated

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13. Palmer,John., Political Quarterly(London) Vol. 59, No.3, July-September 1988, p. 313.

14. Knorr Klaus, Op.cit., p.527.

15. Brady,Linda,P and Kaufman, Joyce .P, Op.cit., p.11.

charges of unreliability on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, the "apparent rise in European neutralism and American unilaterism"[16] caused the lessening importance of NATO.

NATO's Strategy

The strategic doctrine of NATO began with 'forward strategy', a political doctrine designed to protect the nations of Western Europe against a threat as far forward geographically in Central Europe as possible: that is, in West Germany itself. It was clear that the security of NATO was linked to the capability and willingness of the United States to carry out its nuclear guarantees to the West Europeans. The Alliance had very small conventional forces and the strategy relied on the guarantee that, in the event of an attack, nuclear weapons would be used.

The erosion of confidence in the US nuclear umbrella can be traced back to the mid-1950s. Although the United States held a position of superirority in strategic nuclear forces during the 1950s and could therefore have extended deterrence to its Western European allies without major risk to itself, "both Western Europeans and the Americans began to question the US resolve to defend Europe after the Soviets began to test thermonuclear weapons in 1953"[17]. Confidence was weakened in 1957, where Soviet Union launched first successful intercontinental ballistic missile.

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16. Domke, William,k. and others,"Consensus Lost? Domestic Politics and Crisis in NATO" World Politics(Princeton) vol.39, no.3, April 1987,p.384.
17. David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas(Washington D.C.,Brookings Institute, 1983),p. 61.

Widespread fear was expressed as a result panel of US experts came out with Gaither report which said that "As long as the US population is wide open to former Soviet attack, both the Russians and our allies may believe that we shall feel increasing reluctance to employ SAC(Strategic Air Command) in any circumstance other than when United States is directly attacked"[18].

The 1950s strategic environment was characterized by US nuclear superiority but later on with the coming up of Soviet ballastic missiles the nature of the threat started changing.

So while US vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack was increasing-and such a condition was deemed stabilizing according to the deterrence theory based on mutual assured destruction(MAD), NATO officially adopted a strategic doctrine (flexible response) operating within the context of mutual vulnerability, with the requirements for extended deterrence. Upto 1967 the emphasis was on deterrence by nuclear weapon and this strategy changed with the advent of the flexible response.

The emphasis later shifted to a greater dependence on increased conventional forces in conjunction with nuclear forces, to create flexibility in response to a variety of possible forms and places of aggression and to raise the nuclear threshold, creating a better margin in support of

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18. "Deterrence and survival in the nuclear age", The Gaither Report of 1957, Committee Print,cited in David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas,p. 56.

the decision making process. This strategy, known as flexible response was adopted in 1967. It is a deterance strategy strategy involving a combination of defence and, where necessary, retaliation with no first use of any weapon by NATO as long as no aggression occurs. The availability of nuclear weapons does not make the strategy an offensive one. NATO's policy and strategy dictate the role of these weapons; similarly, initiatives for the possible use of new techniques do not form a basis for changing the strategy but rather dictate rules for its implementation. There is room for improvement of conventional forces to make and keep the flexible response really flexible, and to eliminate the risk of surprise.

In the same year, NATO came out with "report on the future tasks of the Alliance" or "Hermel Report" (Appendix IV) which concluded that it was necessary to improve relations with the Soviet sphere while keeping in tact the military balance.

The report declared that the first main function of NATO was "to maintain adquate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur" (Appendix IV).

The second main function was to pursue progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues could be solved. This made possible a policy of detente which, according to Hermel report, is not

incompatible with military security but complementary to it.
But detente could not last long as it was not deep rooted
and limited to Europe.

Differences over flexible response cropped up which
has already been discussed under (US-NATO) heading relating
to conventional arms build up and America's obligations.
There was dissatisfaction among the British and the French.
They pressed on with building their own modest nuclear
forces, despite American displeasure. Whereas America
preached the dangers of nuclear proliferation in general.
France and Britian argued the advantages of multiple
deterrents. Instead of flexible response, "French strategic
Doctrine called for a massive nuclear strike on Soviet
cities whenever French national sanctuaire was under
attack."[19]

With Alliance debates over flexible response in the
1960s, the debate over Strategic Defence Initiative was more
provocative and of wider nature on evolution in NATO
strategy than the shift from massive retaliation to flexible
response. The significant nature of the SDI issue arose from
the fact that it forced the Alliance to reevaluate some of
the core premises of its security policy in the nuclear age,
it spotlighted the problematic viability of both NATO's
central Strategic concept of flexible response and its
central component, the US strategic nuclear guarantee.

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19. David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony, (Basic
    Books, Inc, Publishers : New York, 1987), p.46.

With SDI, the Reagan administration proposed using new
technology to build a shield, partly in space, against
missiles poised for attack. At a minimum SDI promised to
help protect American missiles closing the window of
vulnerability without adding new offensive weapons. At best,
SDI would form a shield, to protect American cities. If
such a comprehensive defence ever be developed, the
President suggested, it could be given to the Soviets

and used to cover Europe. In theory, the consequences would
be strategic revolution. Offensive nuclear weapons would
become useless. With an absolute defence, nuclear deterrence
would disappear[20].

WARSAW PACT

The WTO's chief body is the Political Consultative
Committee (PCC), which was specified in the text of the
Warsaw Treaty. The PCC is identified in Soviet sources as
the WTO's supreme political body, though there are also
times when it appears identified as a military body.

The PCC's first meeting in Prague in January 1956 saw
the power to create addtional organs used to set up a
Permanant Commission (PC) and, according to its communique,
a Joint Secretariat (JS) and decided that the PCC should
meet not less than twice a year and established a rotating
chairmanship, the twice a year specification had seldom been
met.

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20. Reagan's Intial SDI speech of 23 March 1983, New York
    Times, 24 March, 1983, P.A.20.

As the distinction between Political and Military institutions is not very clear in the treaty sometimes they tend to overlap. So the next institutional arrangement to the Warsaw Pact was the Joint Command, whose existence was announced with startling alacrity on the day the treaty was signed. Technically, the Joint Command was subject to the supervision and the authority of the PCC. At a January 1956 meeting, the PCC formally approved the appointment of Marshall of the Soviet union I.S. Koniev as Commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Warsaw Pact also emphasized the form of Soviet hegemony through Article 5 by legtimizing the stationing of Soviet troops on Pact territories. But it is equally pertinent that the creation of the Pact accompanied a revitalization of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA), which in its new guise embodied a brake with pure Stalinist autarky and proposed a division of labour. Strong political overtones were attached to the whole notion of economic cooperation.

Though the PCC in Warsaw PAct met only three times between 1957 and 1961, still the pact was not isolated from major political struggles and developments[21].

Intervention and Block Management

The WTO's was little more than a year old when the Hungarian crisis erupted in 1956, and the organization as

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21. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc : Unity and Conflict, Rev. ed. (New York : Praeger, 1961),p.447.

such played little part in its resolution. The events of 1956 in Hungary grew out of a combination of worker and peasant discontent and intellectual anti-Stalinism, with Imre Nagy becoming head of government just before the transition to violent conflict. At the height of the crisis, Nagy abolished the one Party System and announced Hungary's withdrawal from the WTO and neutrality. The USSR used its own forces to restore its authority, though it presumably had Romanian and Polish co-operation since some of the troops involved were stationed in those countries. USSR cited the Warsaw Treaty as a justification for the intervention. Whatever might have been its claims, Warsaw Treaty certainly did not specify a general right of Soviet intervention. Actually, the intervention was a clear breach of Article 1 the non-use of force) and Article 8 (on non-interference in internal affairs), and no PCC meeting seems even to have discussed the Hungarian crisis.

During 1960's Czechoslovakia also began to voice some unhappiness with the WTO's Political organization. In May 1968, the Czechoslovakian Goltwald Academy floated publicly a number of possibilities for an alternative Czech defence policy, including a Central European Security System without the Soviet Union and outright neutrality[22]. This implied criticisms of Soviet Political hegemony within the WTO, and also Soviet military strategy itself.

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22. From Accounts in Christopher D. Jones,Soviet Influence in East Europe : Political Autonomy and The Warsaw Pact, (Prager, 1981),pp. 69-74.

The critique of National Security Policy which emerged during 1968 from within the Czech armed forces was only one strand in the political developments which took place in Czechoslovakia. Within the Soviet leadership, there were a variety of other reasons like "Communist Party of Czechslovakia losing control over police, judiciary, the lifting of Press censorship and revision of democratic centralism which were seen as threatening, ranging from fear of 'spill-over' into domestic dissent and implications for Soviet economic reforms, to fears of the delegitimization of Soviet leadership of the bloc"[23].

As intervention was not permitted according to the Warsaw Treaty, during the summer of 1968, pressure was put on Czechslovakia in a variety of ways. Military exercises were co-ordinated both inside and outside Czechslovakia ; Political meetings took place both on a bilateral as well as multilateral basis involving WTO leaders but no meeting of the PCC or any other WTO institution. Romania did not attend. When the decision to intervene was finally taken, after hesitation and probably divisions in the Soviet leadership, the Soviet armed forces themselves took command of the actual operation.

The intervention led to the renunciation of the Warsaw Treaty by Albania, which had been estranged from the Soviet

23. Karen Dawisha, "The 1968 Invasion of Czechslovakia : Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for the future" in Karen Dawisha, and Philip Hanson (ed.), Soviet-East European Dilemmas : Coercion, Competition and Consent, (Heinemann, 1981),pp. 16-17.

Union since 1961, and the refusal by Romania to accept that the Warsaw Treaty provided grounds for the action. The crisis fundamentally altered Romania's relationship with Warsaw Pact. The threat of a Soviet invasion nudged Romania, a Warsaw Pact member, and Yugoslavia, a "rightist revisionist", into a close and lasting relationship. The crisis also drew the PRC, a "leftist revisionist", into relations with Pact member Romania and ultimately with Yugoslavia.

Poland's apparent support in the 1968 crisis resulted from internal pressures beyond the control of either the Polish or Soviet leaders. Hence, the Soviets again, if for the opposite reason, had cause to question Poland's reliability.

After the Soviet intervention of Czechoslavakia in 1968 new institution was created in 1969 by which PCC approved certain institutional changes in the Warsaw Pact, "further perfecting the structure and command organs". It had political significance too.

During late 1960s and 1970s WTO evolved into something more of a mechanism for settling conflicts without the use of force. There has been occasions when USSR has retreated or compromised when clashes arose.

In 1967 accomodation was reached between the USSR and Romania over strengthening the WTO and Romanian claims to independance. Throughout the 1960s, the USSR had to deal

with challenges from China to its authority and legitimacy as leader of the World Communist movement, a problem unforeseen in 1955. Romania in particular was able to use some of the lecway afforded by the Sino-Soviet dispute to expand its limited area of autonomy, when it became important for the USSR to have the visible public support of the Eastern Europeans[24].

Tensions grew between the GDR and the Soviet leadership as Soviet policy towards the FRG and the West in general grew more complex in the late 1960s as a result in 1971 Walter Ulbricht was replaced by Erich Honecker as First Secretary of the GDR's Socialist Unity Party.

This problem merged with the wider Questions of bloc management under conditions of emerging detente and of limiting West German influence in Eastern Europe. Here the handling of issues by the WTO had to be dealt with by fudge and compromises. The invasion of Czechoslovakia represented the most extreme form of problem-solving within the bloc, but a number of other problems were resolved thruogh a more sophisticated, and less decisive bargaining process. It was not done in WTO institutions but it added significantly to the alliance's capacity to diffuse possible conflicts between leaderships.

These problems did not disappear in the 1970s, for though the Helsinki process was successful in achieving a major goal of the Soviet and Eastern European leaderships,

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24. Christopher D. Jones, Op.cit., pp.274-278.

recognition of the territorial status quo. It could also be argued that the relaxations of detente created a different set of problems for bloc management in Eastern Europe. Increased economic co-operation with the West helped to raise living standards, but also caused indebtness and so helped to worsen some of Eastern Europe's economic problems, contributing indirectly to the Polish crisis at the end of the decade.

The 1976 creation of the WTO's committee of Foreign Ministers was intended both to recognize the role played by the Eastern European leaderships during the Helsinki Process and to deal with the possible dangers of polycentrism. The CFM certainly did not give the USSR any way of out manoeuvring Romania on questions like China or defence spending, which continued to rumble on unresolved during the late 1970s. The China issue became even more sensitive as China moved closer to USA and NATO, only to shift to a more equidistant position again in 1980s.

Then came the change of leadership following worker's riots on the Baltic seaboard in Poland in 1970. The Soviet leaders were on this occasion preapred to allow the Polish Central Committee to work out its own solution, and to throw their weight quickly behind the new Gierek/Jaroszewiew leadership once Gomuelka had been forced out. Soviet troops in Poland were confined to barracks throughout the crisis.

The Soviet Union reacted with similar restraint in 1976

when Poland underwent a second crisis sparked off by worker's disturbances. On both occasions it supplied economic aid promptly in order to assist in the tasks facing the Gierk leadership. The third crisis which Poland experienced in the summer of 1980 was more serious in that the strikers who brought the Gdansk Shipyards to a halt included a number of patently political points among their demands. The recognition they won of the right to form trade unions which were independant of control by the Polish United Worker's Party was something which, if preserved, could have the most far-reaching implications.

The Polish crisis again placed severe strains on the WTO's political structures and military unity. It may well be that the alliance would not have survived another Soviet intervention, since the Polish army would probably have resisted. But it was the Polish army which imposed martial law on 13 December 1981. Party authority had collapsed and Solidarity had been legalized. The Soviet handling of the crisis suggested greater reluctance to intervene then in 1968, and so perhaps a clearer understanding of the political disutility of direct military intervention as well as its military difficulties.

These distinctions between the different crises and the Soviet response in each case point to a further problem of 'Breznev Doctrine' analysis. Although such a doctrine might underline basic geopolitical realities it does not provide

adequate guidance as to why and how Soviet responses were made. But 'Breznev Doctrine' was an ex-post Facto explanation for the USSR as much as it was for the West, and that actual Soviet decision making was for more complex than this conceptualization suggests"[25].

Detente and WTO

The involvment of the WTO in central question of East-West relations was implicit in the treaty itself, with its commitment to a European security settlement and disarmament. Starting from greater stress of alliance's diplomacy on Germany which continued till late 1950s, including the 1958 endorsement of a GDR Proposal for a German Confederation and Poland's arms control initiatives suggested the possibilities for detente somewhat independantly of USSR[26]. Later on porposals for a European Security Conference began to be made again more insistently from around 1964, after US-Soviet relations had recovered from the Cuban crisis and improved with the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and endorsed by WTO bodies.

When the European detente treaties of the early 1970s were signed, SALT negotiations between the USA and USSR had also been in progress since December 1969. European detente

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25. Valenta Jiri, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968 : Anatomy of a decision (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 13-14.
26. Jane M. O. Sharp, "Security through detente and Arms Control", in, David Halloway and Jane M. O.Sharp (eds.), The Warsaw Pact : Alliance in Transition ? ((Cornell University Press, New York, 1984),pp. 161-162.

treaty illustrated the ways in which the GDR had to go along with the requirements of Soviet detente policy even if full recognition was not forthcoming. It stood for peace in Europe by resolving conflicts through peaceful means. Then NATO as a whole wanted to establish dialogue with the USSR on conventional force reductions and shift in Soviet's acceptance of US participation in a European Security Conference. Thus, there was sufficient shared interest on all sides for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or Helsinki Process, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks to go ahead from 1973.

The establishment of these new negotiating forums introduced a new element of complexity into relations within the WTO, since they simultaneously stabilized the more extreme risks of centrifugalism and provided opportunities for the Eastern Europeans discreetly to articulate their own preferences but the interests of the Eastern European leaderships still coincided with those of the USSR-like inviolability of borders and the other principles of the bilateral treaties with the FRG.

The CSCE process was seen as enhancing the status of small nations, encouraging of East-West trade, and possibly reducing pressure for higher defence spending. Romania in particular was able to act as a relatively independent agent in CSCE forums.

One negative fallout of the detente was that the West

put the WTO to the defensive on Human Rights violations as the growth of civil rights and dissident groups within WTO countries in the post-Helsinki period caused problems for the individual leaderships and for the evaluation of detente process as a whole-like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia.

The breakdown of detente can be traced to the USA and USSR's differing conceptions of the process. The real problems with detente were the inherent contradictions in its combination of co-operation and competition, which both recognized and challenged the status quo.

From the WTO's point of view within Europe Political dissent in the 1970s seems to have been a conseuence the various governments were able to control and consider offset by the political gains. Eastern European leaderships, in turn, had opportunities for quietly 'dissident' activity. During the late 1970s there were "rumours of Hungarian and Romanian disquiet over deployment of SS-20 missiles in USSR and also some of the Easterrn Europeans to drag their feet even over missile deployment"[27]. There was also foot dragging over military spending, and the spending burdens of some, of the Eastern European States seemed to have declined during this period.

The breakdown of detente of 1970s culminated in Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. While the intervention was not the sole cause of the breakdown of detente, it was qualitatively new commitment of Soviet Combat forces outside

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27. Ibid; p. 185.

traditional areas of deployment, and symptomatic of the wider breakdown of East-West relations. The Eastern European WTO members it appears, were not consulted or even informed in advance, and were embarrassed by the intervention. The GDR and Hungary endorsed Soviet action while Romania criticized.

In the matters of Foreign Policy, the individual East European regimes lacked direct and positive leverage over much of the foreign policy of their major ally. As a result, the pressure to co-ordinate policy under the Soviet umbrella was often intense. Hence "the SALT Talks, Sino-Soviet relations, superpower relations in general, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are all examples of the ability of the USSR to conduct a global foreign policy without reference to its allies"[28], even when the repercusssions of Soviet actions have a direct impact on East European Security Concerns. Perhaps, the most revealing events of the early 1980s were those surrounding the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) controversy and the eventual WTO decision to Station 'counter deployment' missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

But the greatest problem has been role of public opinion and attitudes towards the alliance within Eastern European societies. It can be said that popular enthusiasm for the alliance with the USSR was probably at its most

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28. Edwina Morton, "Foreign Policy Perspectives in Eastern
    Europe" in Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson (eds), Soviet-
    East European Dilemmas (Heineman, 1981), p. 191.

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lukewarm in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. This created problems for the Eastern European leaderships who needed to convince their domestic public opinion that they were doing their best to safeguard national interests within the alliance. They also had to reaffirm the alliance to reassure the USSR about its security interests in the region.

To conclude, the WTO's institutions were "essentially simialar to NATO's in that they 'provided a forum for reaching agreement or consensus within a predetermined set of assumptions"[29]. The WTO's major crises have occured when those assumptions have been questioned from within.

As far as the relations with the West was concerned, Soviet and WTO Policy was over a prolonged period more concerned with ensuring stability and predictablility within Europe, rather than with the 'wedge-driving strategy' so frequently attributed to the USSR. A large part of the motivation for this search for stability had been the concern to retain Eastern Europe security within a Soviet military and political sphere of influence.

29. Mary Kaldor, "The Imaginary War", in Don Smith and E.P. Thompson, (eds), Prospets for a Habitable Planet (Penguin, 1987), p. 77.

Changing International Relations and Military Pacts

With the coming of Mikhail Gorbachev and becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, a series of decisions he took started showing the seeds of change and shifts whether it be in the policy making at home or abroad. His entire concern was at humanity level guided by immediate economic reasons. The economic situation was grim marked by stagnation, inefficiency and rising debt. The real change was noticeable after Gorbachev's 'New political thinking' which was the theoritical base of the charges in international arena and the content evolved through successive summits between the US and USSR starting from Geneva(1985), Reykjavik(1986), Washington(1987), Moscow(1988). Before analysing summits and its impact on the international scene, we will examine Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking'[1].

New Political Thinking

The reports submitted by Gorbachev to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All Union CPSU Conference, CPSU Central Committee General Security's statement of January 15, 1986 and other major political documents gradually shaped the foundations of the philosophical concept rightly called the 'new political thinking'.

It says that the world is 'complex' but 'integral', 'interdependent' and dynamic, and that universal values are

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1. 'New Political Thinking' outlined in the Speech of
   Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th Party Congress, reprinted
   in his book, Towards a Better World (Frome and London,
   1987), p. 172.

superior to class values. One of the key aspects of the concept of the new poltical thinking is the principle of 'freedom of choice'. It treats the multiformity of social development in various countries as rightful and therefore considers it necessary to tolerate other's views and preferences. Freedom of choice and balance of interests could guide approaches towards solution of problems. There exists global problems which can be resolved only through international co-operation and solidarity. Nuclear war is unwinable and nobody will survive it.

At 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev advanced the concept of interdependent world and universal comprehensive security which highlighted security as a multidimensional concept having not just the military but also the political, economic and humanitarian dimensions. This concept becomes important as it talks of reasonable sufficiency and disbandment of military alliances and touches all the aspects, so we will see the fundamental principles of this system. In his book : 'Towards a Better World' Gorbachev himself enumerates these priciples :

1. In the Military Sphere

(i) Renunciation by the nuclear powers of war — Both nuclear and conventional-against each other or against third countries;

(ii) Prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction of chemical weapons,

and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation;

(iii) A strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable adequacy;

(iv) Disbandment of military alliances, and as a stage toward this-renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones;

(v) Balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets.

2. In the Political Sphere

(i) Strict respect in international practice for the right of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development independently;

(ii) A just political settelement of international crises and regional conflicts;

(iii) Elaboration of a set of measures aimed at building confidence between states and the creation of effective guarantees against attack from without and of the inviolability of their frontiers;

(iv) Elaboration of effective methods of preventing international terrorism, including those ensuring the safety of international land, air and sea communications.

3. In the Economic Sphere

(i) Exclusion of all forms of discrimation from international practice; renuncication of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions if this is not directly

envisaged in the recommendations of the world community;

(ii) Joint quest for ways for a just settlement of the problem of debts;

(iii) Establishment of a new world economic order guaranteeing equal economic security to all countries;

(iv) Elaboration of principles for utilizing parts of the funds released as a result of a reduction in military budjets for the good of the community; of developing nations, in the first place;

(v) The pooling of efforts in exploring and making peaceful use of outer space and in resolving global problems on which the destinies of civilization depend.

4. In the Humanitarian Sphere

(i) Co-operation in the dissemination of the ideas of peace, disarmament, and international security; greater flow of general objective information and broader contact between peoples for the purpose of learning bout one another; reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and concord in relations between them;

(ii) Extension-while respecting the laws of each country-of international co-operation in the implemntation of the political, social and personal rights of people^2.

New political thinking presupposes renunciation of the concept of confrontation as a principle of foreign policy; it is aimed at ending the domination of ideological standards and at deideolising state to state relations.

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2. Ibid; pp. 172-173.

Referring to the role of ideology in foreign policy in his book 'Prestroika', Gorbachev writes : "The ideological differences should not be trasferred to the sphere of inter-state relations nor should foreign policy be subordinate to them"[3]. "Ideologies may be poles apart, but the interests of survival and prevention of war stand universal and supreme"[4].

Impact of 'New Political Thinking' : on International Relations

Gorbachev's initiatives have contributed towards bringing about a fundamental change in the erstwhile USSR's relations with the United States and other parts of the world which led to the transformation of the international situation.

Arms Control

The new thinking provided the basis for a much more flexible and dynamic arms control policy. Gorbachev advanced numerous proposals for arms control since his January 1986 and called for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000. The most notable achievement initially has been the INF treaty which was signed on December 8, 1987 and came into force on June 1, 1988. It is significant not only because it eliminates a whole class of nuclear weapons but also it permits unprecedented on-site inspection to verify

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3. Mikhail Gorbachev, Prestroika : New Thinking for our Country and The World, (Collins, 1987), p. 143.
4. Ibid.

compliance with its provisions[5].

The INF Treaty provides for complete elimination of two classes of erstwhile Soviet and US nuclear missiles weapons, missiles having a range of 5000 to 5500 km, their launchers and related facilities.

Also to be eliminated are the nuclear warheads of all the missiles listed including 72 American warheads for the Pershing-IAS belong to FRG.

INF treaty provides ban on the production and testing of weapons covered by it. To monitor compliance with this provision, permanent checkpoints have been set up at the gates of missile plants in erstwhile USSR and the USA.

In December 1988, during the visit to New York, Gobachev's unilateral decision to cut Soviet military forces by 500,000 troops, at almost 15 percent, and to withdraw more than 40 percent of its tanks from Eastern Europe, together with 50 percent of its tanks, is a major shift in its approach.

The Soviet Union further delinked SDl/ABM from START and not to include SLCMs in the START talks. Much headway took place in START talks on 50% reductions. The Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe also made considerable progress at that time. The two sides reached agreement on troops cut in Central Europe. The Soviet Union made yet another concession by agreeing to the US retaining

5. Facts on File, World News Digest with Index, Vol.47, No. 2455, December 11, pp.906-907.

30,000 troops outside Central Europe while the former Soviet Union would retain only 195,000 troops in Central Europe.

On April 11, 1989, the Warsaw Treaty countries presented the NATO countries with a proposal for separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear component of dual purpose weapons. But NATO did not respond accordingly though they agreed in principle to talk on tactical nuclear weapon in NATO Council Session meeting in Brussels on May 29 and 30, 1989.

In line with the new political thinking, Soviet Union decided to cut military spending by 14.2% and production of weapons and military equipment, by 19.5%. They converted 40 percent of their defence industry potential to civilian production. By 1995, this is to exceed 60 percent.

As far as implentation is concerned, fulfilment of the commitments under the ABM treaty is examinned by the special-US standing consultative commission set up in 1973. In 1989, a special control commission was appointed to make decisions on questions relating to implementation of the INF treaty.

Under the document of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security building measures and disarmaments in Europe, the WTO member states conducted in 1987-1989 fifteen inspections of the NATO nation's military activities. Respectively, the NATO nations conducted 17 inspections of the erstwhile WTO nation's military activities. The inspections confirmed observance of the

obligations assumed by the nations.

After watching cautiously, US under President Bush started responding slowly when both the superpowers met at Malta in December 1989 and then at Washington in June 1990. The two sides "formally agreed on the provisions of an accord to cut their arsenals of chemical weapons. Neither nation was to have more than 5000 tons, or 20% of the US stocks of chemical arms by the year 2002"[6]. On strategic front, "the accord basically set a limit of 1600 strategic delivery vehicles per side and a total limit of 6000 warheads per side on arms delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles or strategic bombers. There was a total sublimit of 4,900 per side on IBCM and SLBM warheads"[7].

So Gorbachev's new thinking has helped to create a favourable political climate for arms control and disarmament. But still many problems are unresolved as START treaty did not cover 50% reductions. It touched only 30% and nuclear proliferation still thus goes unabated in many of the countries outside US and the erstwhile Soviet Union.

Regional Conflicts

Under Gorbachev, Moscow had acquired no new clients and had on the whole been strict with existing ones, for example, chastising the Vietnamese and the Cubans for wasting Soviet aid, and denying the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and the Marxist government of Angola its support.

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6. Facts on File, Vol 50. No.2585, June 8,1990, p.417.
7. Ibid.

Due to changes in international situation, an agreement on Angolan-Namibian settlemnt was signed on December 22, 1988, in New York. It was a major breakthrough in ending one of the long standing conflicts in South West Africa. The accords made it possible to use UN mechanisms for the decolonisation of Namibia. South Africa's troops stationed pulled out of Angola. This made it possible to proceed to a phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops stationed in Angola, which led to the beginning of a dialogue on national reconciliation in Angola, where a bloody civil war had been going.

In the Middle East and Gulf, the Soviets had considerably improved their relations with Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Iran[8]. Co-operation with all Arab countries, primarily with those directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict had been sought with US and Israel and inducing UN for its active role which resulted in first international conference on the Middle East in Madrid on 30 October 1991.

But the most important regional conflict which led to the breakdown of detente of 1970s and started second Cold War was Afghanistan. It was important decision of Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan which was also one of the obstacles in solving Sino-Soviet rift. "Its troop withdrawal marked a major shift in Soviet foreign policy

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8. David Abele,"Recent Soviet Moves in the Persian Gulf", REERL,Radio Liberty Research,RL 306/87,August 10,1987.

rather than simply a tactical retreat from an over extended military position"[9].

The Soviet Union had come to play an active part in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. With due regard to the situation shaping up in and around Cambodia, the government of that country proposed national reconciliation in 1987. This move provided decisive prerequisites for furthering the process of political settelement, and the Soviet Union contributed its share by establishing contact with the Cambodian and Vietnamese governments and maintaining an intensive dialogue with the ASEAN countries, the United States, France and China. On September 26, 1989, Vietnam "completed the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia which led to qualitatively new stage in the solution of the problem"[10].

The Soviets had also cultivated relationship of late with a number of important Latin American and Central American countries. For the first time, the Soviet foreign minister visited Mexico(1986) and Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina(1989) with a view to "upgrade bilateral relations"[11]. The Soviet Union stepped up its efforts to contribute to a peaceful political settlement in Central America to support moves by Latin American countries

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9. Michael Mandelbaum,"Ending the Cold War",Foreign Affairs, Spring 1989,p.20.
10. Based on "The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of USSR-A survey prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Affairs,(Moscow),January 1990, p.30.
11. Ibid.

themselves. It backed the peace proposals of the Contadora Eight. It also backed the accords reached at meetings of the Presidents of Central American States. The Soviet Union made concrete proposals for ending Soviet Union and United States arms deliveries to Central America, for announcing a moratorium on such deliveries. During Gorbachev's visit to Havana in April 1989 he proposed ending arms deliveries to Central America and suspended arms deliveries to Nicaragua. It provided useful prerequisites for a gradual normalisation of relations between Nicaragua and the United States.

Many regional issues still remain unresolved despite the improvement in the international situation from confrontation to cooperation and East-West relations like Korean-Soviet relations which was still bitter. Also, Cyprus question, a long standing regional problem existed in the eastern Mediterranean.

Thus, the new Soviet approach to the regional conflicts is a direct result of new political thinking. The Soviets saw in regional conflicts a big obstacle in the improvement of their relations with the USA and other Western countries. As Arvind Gupta puts it : "The renewed Soviet approach to these conflicts consisted of laying great stress on political solutions, national reconciliation, political and ohter compromises, involvement of regional countries and due' attention to their interests, encouragement to the UN involvement and international conferences etc"[12]. This

12. Arvind Gupta, Soviet Perspectives on the Third World : Strategic Analysis, July 1990, Vol. XIII, No. 4, p. 421.

approach has been used by the Soviet Union in resolving the regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Angola and Nicaragua.

So in the new era of co-operation with change in ideological conceptions of security in the context of new thinking, relations of the Third World countries with the Soviet Union were put on a new footing. Third World would remain important to the Soviets but for different reasons. Third World are no more important for the liberation movements or for socialist revolution but because its problems are seen as threatening peace and stability in the region. Thus they are likely to pay attention to a different set of Third World countires while scaling down their relationship with some of their former Third World allies.

East-European Changes

The new Political Thinking in the Soviet Foreign Policy centred on encouragement to socio-economic reforms in these countries, non-interference in each other's affairs and thus discarding Breznev doctrine, renewal of the basis of bilateral relations and transformation of the CMEA and WTO and lastly building a "Common European Home"[13] by taking cooperative approach towards West European countries.

The new thinking had the seeds of transformation of East-West relations but what surprised every one was the pace at which developments took place in Eastern Europe

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13. Mikhail Gorbachev , Prestroika, New Thinking for our country and the world., (Collins, 1987), pp. 194-195.

which was primarily peaceful, except Romania in 1989. The long established Communist regimes fell one by one rapidly. Thus 1989 was important for East Europe as it was marked by fall of Berlin Wall and Process of German Unification gained momentum.

Ideologically, the foundation of the East European alliance started sinking, the edifice of its socialism started cracking. With the emphasis on deideolization in Gorbachev's new thinking the Czechoslovak-USSR joint communique(April 1988)issued after Husak's visit to the Soviet Union dropped the reference to "socialist-internationalism" and was no mention of "World Socialism"[14]. In this respect foreign minister Shervarzdnadze's statement early in May 1989 that he could imagine no occassion in which Soviet troops might intervene in a Warsaw Pact country was not a dramatic revelation[15]. The East Europeans became less important to Moscow as military allies as Gorbachev moved towards detente in Europe.

The process of demolition of the former Soviet East European empire began with the installation of the Solidarity-led Coalition government in Poland in July 1990. At the same time Edward Shevardnadze assured James Baker in Paris that his country would not use force to stop the reform process as a result after Poland, one country after another started falling under Communist rule. The process

14. Moscow News Supplement, No. 17, 1988.
15. International Herald Tribune, May 6, 1989.

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was hastened with the scaling down of the Berlin Wall as, at the same time, Todor Zhikov, the longest serving Communist leader of Bulgaria, was pushed out of power in a carefully planned coup.

While the crumbling of the Soviet East European empire was widely welcomed within and without, the exodus of East Europeans to West Germany via Hungary and Austria led to the fall of Eric Honecker and finally, the holding of free elections in a multi-party system in East Germany created a serious problem of unification of the two Germanys which were kept divided for more than four decades. Then, West Germany proposed a unified Germany as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but NATO forces would not be deployed in erstwhile East Germany. At the same time Soviet Union "preferred a unified Germany to be neutral but later on agreed to allow a united Germany to belong to NATO in an agreement between Gorbachev and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl"[16]. Then the final reunification of Germany became true for October 3, 1990. When "two-plus-four represented by two Germanys and four victorious allied World War II powers on September 12 1990 signed a treaty granting full soverignty to a unified Germany and setting Soviet troop withdrawals from former East Germany"[17]. This reunification of Germany was the most visible change in East European context.

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16. Facts on file, Volume 50, No. 2591, July 20, 1990, p. 525.
17. Fact on File, Volume 50, No. 2599, Sept. 14, 1990, p. 679.

Changes in economic sphere was no less great. Attention was given to overhaul the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMCE) as it was in the economic integration of the Socialist countries that Gorbachev saw the chance for Socialist renewal. The bureaucratism and centralism of the CMEA structures was condemned and the main imperatives before the CMEA were identified as : the shift from inter-state barter to direct commercial links between enterprises, introduction of markets, price reforms, links with Western countries, identification of High technology. The 44th Session of the CMEA was devoted to the economic reforms-commodity, money relations, price reforms etc. This session was held in the wake of the announcement that the EEC had formerly recognised the CMEA[18].

The changes in the economic structure and reforms were necessary as the command economies of the Communist countries had become stagnant and inefficient leading to shortages and long queues which increased the disappointment the existing Communist regimes and thus made the situation ripe for revolutionary changes already initiated by political initiatives.

Apart from the new liberal democratic system and a free market economy being established in new Europe, they have to conduct their bilateral and multilateral foreign relations in an entirely new international environment and hence new concept of "European Common Home" was mooted by Gorbachev on

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18. Kessing's Record of World Events, Vol. XXXIV, September 1988, p. 36183.

the basis of deepening of the Helsinki Process. It has become relevant due to every East European country looking towards the West for economic assistance and the plans of integration. But difficulties do remain on matters of bearing the cost of burden for reconstruction of the East European countries and doubts about the reunified Germany in Europe due to its notorious past.

All these above mentioned radical changes in the international arena was possible due to changing international relations initiated by Gorbachev and were responded by Bush administration after cautious watch which resulted in the end of cold war.

At the Malta Summit on December 3 1989, President George Bush declared that the world was on the "threshold of a brand new era of U.S.-Soviet relations"[19]. To which Gorbachev responded : "The world leaves one epoch of Cold War and enter another"[20]. As a result U.S.-Soviet relations improved further on a new setting and they again met at Washington on 31st May to 3 June 1990.

Finally, the end of Cold War was confirmed when both the superpowers at that time reached consensus on gulf crisis in a meeting at Helsinki on 9th September 1990 and issued a Joint Statement.

The statement inter alia reads : "we are united in the belief that Iraq's agression must not be tolerated. No

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19. Facts on File, Volume 49, No. 2559, December 8, 1989, p. 901.
20. Ibid.

peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbours... Today, we once again call upon the government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally form Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait. Nothing short of complete implementation of the United Nations security Council Resolutions is acceptable"[21].

Implications for Warsaw Pact and NATO

Changes in international arena were of seminal nature and it affected almost every aspect of International Relations ranging from ideolization to deideolization, confrontation to cooperation and dialogue leading to changes in conceptions of security which had its impact on whether it is Disarmament, Regional conflicts and Revolutionary Changes in Eastern European countries. Changes loosened the structures of Warsaw Treaty Organization and started questioning the rationale of NATO. Changes in Eastern European countries were so drastic that it was directly linked to survival and made WTO irrelvant and ultimately it led to its demise. It also raised many problems for the deterrence role of NATO in the new era.

WARSAW PACT

Gorbachev had hoped that the improvement in the quality of interaction between the various socialist countries would

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21. Facts on File, Volume 50, No. 2599, September 14, 1990, p. 669.

lead to further strengthening of the socialist countries and the CMEA and WTO would be restructured to make the integration of the Socialist countries more beneficial to all but the rapid changes belied the expectations. Earlier, WTO was extended in 1985 for another twenty years due to its importance for the world.

In 1987, the WTO adopted a defensive military doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency. In 1987, the communique spoke of "a new way of thinking, a new approach to the question of war and peace"[22]. The main ideas of the new WTO thinking on security matters were that it sought parity with NATO at low levels. Secondly, it favoured strengthening "all European processes", thirdly, it advocated the "reasonable sufficiency" principle on a reciprocal basis and lastly, it invited NATO to a dialogue on military doctrines.

The shift in policy changes was such that ultimately it led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact which was preceded by series of events which were favourable to its disbandment and were indicated by Eastern European leaders. Hungary was the first of Eastern Europe's post communist regimes to seek to leave the Warsaw Pact. Then, again Hungarian Premier Jozsef Antall, in a speech to CSCE leaders on November 20 1990, indicated that "Warsaw Pact would disband, at least as military alliance by 1992"[23].

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22. Moscow News Supplement, No.23, 1987.
23. Fact on File, Volume 50, No. 2609, Nov. 23, 1990, p. 862.

With the prospect of East-West war in Europe much less likely, future of NATO and Warsaw PAct was a main issue at the Summit. Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel had characterized the Eastern alliance as "an outdated remnant of the past"[24] in a speech dated November 19 1990.

Again Marshall Sergei F. Akhroneyer, adviser to Gorbachev, on October 4 1990 predicted that Warsaw would disband as a military alliance in 1991. He contended that Warsaw Pact could survive as a political organisation. Like wise, he called for NATO to transform into a purely political body[25].

Reasons for its demise are as follows : Firstly, Warsaw Pact countries came into being as part of overall Soviet Union design to counter security threat from West and immediate reason was inclusion of FRG into NATO in 1955. Now that atmosphere is no more with the end of emphasis on ideology affecting every issue and crisis.

Secondly, the development of Communism followed in Eastern European countries on the shoulders of Red army. It was not of indigenous nature as in China and the Soviet Union. It was superimposed on them by force. And once the Soviet Union loosened its hold it was bound to follow its own course as it already has shown in 1956, in Hungarian crisis and in 1968, Czechoslovak crisis. So it regained its freedom and autonomy and became responsible for Pact's

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24. Ibid.
25. Facts on File, Volume 50, No. 2602, Oct. 5, 1990, p. 745.

disbandment.

Thirdly, erstwhile Soviet Union was no more interested and was not in position economically to bear the burden of its Communist allies in the name of World Socialism. It reduced defence expenditure, started reductions and withdrawal from East European countries thus going against `Breznev Doctrine'.

Moreover, the WTO, though professing to be a defensive alliance, was almost unique because on at least two occasions it has gone to war against one of its own members. This had been its greatest weakness that the Warsaw Pact had been used more often to solve its internal problems rather than the NATO threat. So once the superimposing power is no more with the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe the rationale for its existence was automatically questioned and led to its dissolution.

Impact on NATO

New changes has great impacts on NATO too. It affected NATO in various ways especially in its strategy and deterrence after INF Treaty. Later on, it opened debates on its rationale., future role, relationship with other European institutions.

The Disarmament initiative in terms of INF `Double Zero Agreement' did disrupt `Flexible response' strategy of NATO. The strategy had previously been articulated as requiring a capacity for nuclear reataliation on the former Soviet Union from Westen Europe whether or not there were SS-20s

targetted on the West from the former Soviet Union, and so the removal of Cruise and Pershing II missiles was indeed in theory a disruption to questions of escalation. In this respect "The growing nuclear energy in public opinion of Western Europe started showing fears that 'flexible response' doctrines in effect reduce Europe to a nuclear war theatre"[26].

Also the signature of the treaty prompted the reemergence of differences among Western European elites on policy towards the East. Later on changes in East Europe and international arena raised serious questions over strategy of deterrence, whether it is needed or not in the new era. The cautious approach was adopted at the London Summit of NATO members on July 6, 1990. They declared that with the total withdrawal of the Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, the allies can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. Hence, "in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy, making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort"[27]. So minimum use was not abandoned but also declared that Western nuclear forces in Europe must be kept upto date where necessary. Related to it arose the problem of modernisation of short range nuclear forces in West Germany, that is to modernise short range Lance missiles and deploy new tactical Air-to-Surface

26. C. Raja Mohan, "Is NATO unable to adjust to a non-advers-arial world", The Times of India, (New Delhi), July 17, 1990.
27. Times of India (New Delhi), July 7, 1990.

nuclear missiles (TASMs) in Europe. However, after heavy opposition from West Germany due to its vulnerability in case of attack, modernization plan was dropped even after London Summit military alliance remain wedded to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and continued to hold that nuclear weapons are necessary to keep peace in Europe though for the Pan European security system efforts under CSCE are going on.

The next two debates which arose in the wake of new changes are U.S.-European realtionship and relationship of NATO with other European institutions like European Community (EC), Western European Union (WEU) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

London Summit of NATO members also declared that Soviet Union and East European countries should establish diplomatic liasion with NATO and move towards true and friendly relations since security of each state is linked to the security of its neighbours. So East no longer exists as East as used to exist in the Cold War era. In this context talks on Pan-European Security System on the lines of CSCE is being suggested and questions the role and existence of NATO.

It also raises the question of U.S.-NATO realtionship in the new era. This debate is not new as already discussed in detail in second chapter, but today's circumstances are entirely different in comparison to 1960s and 1970s or for that matter even 1980s. The problems have remained over

burden sharing, U.S. hegemony, economic differences and on nuclear strategy. New changes has accelerated the differences and started questioning even the U.S. presence in European Security. Now debates are continuing about Europe without America. All these debates will form the subject matter of next chapter.

MILITARY PACTS AND POST COLD WAR ERA

Military alliances were the vital instrumentalities of the adversial East-West confrontation that characterized the cold war. Since the Cold War is over so naturally question of future role of the military alliances with declining military utility of the alliance systems, especially with the disbandment of one of the military pact, i.e. Warsaw Pact, it became important and even existance of NATO poses a question.

Today, in the post-cold war era we are not concerned with the strategy of NATO because in the post-Cold war era whether NATO should continue or not is the main issue of debate, and no debate over form, sttructure or strategy. Its basic founding assumptions are being questioned. So the debate which started in the wake of new changes after 1985 became prominent in the post-cold war era. Some of the issues on agenda are : (a) NATO's role in future or NATO's area of activity (b) US relation with NATO in post cold war era, (c) NATO's relations with other European institutions like European Community (EC), West European Union (WEU) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

NATO's role in future

The realignment of central and Eastern European States has led to the question of how to replace the cold war security structure. In this context question is : whether NATO is still effective force in maintaining the stability and security in Europe ? Many doubt that it is and several

arguments follows : Firstly, it is argued that the purpose for which the alliance, i.e. to combat the former Soviet military threat has disappeared and so the alliance has no reason to continue. People like Strobe Talbott asked if the time had not come "to think seriously about eventually retiring the North Atlantic Organisation"[1].

A second argument follows that the ideological challenge is no more : the alliance established to unite states that share a common approach to governing and human rights. No longer such division of European states into two politico-economic groups exist. This was stated in NATO's London Summit in a Joint Statement on July 6, 1990 which declared that "we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to restrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression"[2].

Moreover, the Western alliance has always been a U.S. dominated organization, which no longer conforms to the new reality in view of Western European integration, Eastern European democratization and the altered political and economic relationship of Europe and North America. "Both the U.S. capacity to coerce and the ability to persuade, the hallmarks marks of American Foreign Poilcy since 1945, are diminished"[3].

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1. _Time Magazine,_ January 1, 1990, p.40.
2. _The Times of India_ (New Delhi),July 7,1990.
3. Davidson, Isn,"The Search for New Order in Europe",_International Affairs_(London), Vol.66, April 1990, p.323.

There are other set of arguments like NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner who asserts that "NATO's role will continue to be as important in the future as it has been in the Past"[4]. The entire debate is focussed around Western view which is trying to give a rationale for the future role of NATO and the Non-Western which is against it. Even U.S. Secretary of State James BAker and other Western officials have proposed that the alliance, now losing much of its military rationale, become a more political alliance in the future. Secretary Baker's essential premise, the focus of an important speech delivered late in 1989 in West Berlin, was that a new European security architecture 'should reflect that America's security politically, militarily and economically - remains linked to Europe's security"[5]. The Secretary of State argued that NATO's future role could focus on coordinating verification efforts required to implement the treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). In addition NATO could help develop common Western approaches to regional conflicts and weapons proliferation outside Europe and build economic and political ties to the East. Even if the agreement is there for the existence of NATO as the Western political caucus, there is wide disagreement on the fulfilment of its purposes. The NATO contries have always found it difficult to coordinate approaches to Third World regional security issues, and even

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4. NATO Review, No. 2, April 1990.
5. Excerpts from Baker's Speech on Berlin and US Role in Europe's Future; New York Times, 13 December 1989, P.A. 18.

more difficult to use NATO to do so. The corodination of policies towards the East fits conceptually with NATO's past role, particularly as defined in the 1967 Harmel Report, but this role appears less and less relevant as much of the East becomes part of the West.

The debate whether United States should emphasize the need to preserve NATO or whether it should begin to prepare a shift towards greater reliance on all-European Securiy Structures linked to the CSCE has split the administration, both the national security council staff and the Department of State taking different approaches. The Department of State with its natural inclination to understand and adjust to changing international circumstances, was more responsive to strengthening the CSCE. National Security Council approach was reflected by an April 1990 interview, in which Administration official said, "the notion that NATO is going to disappear to be replcaed by some nebulous, 35 nation Pan-European Security Structure is "nonsense"[6].

The post cold war era is charaterized by change in the nature of threats to security in Europe. Cold War was charterized by different antagonistic power blocks. But today the challenges are few explicit and hence complex. The main threats and challenges to security in Europe are likely to be fourfold. First, security risk is the residual Soviet or Russian threat. This is sufficiently real to prompt the

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6. Thomas L. Friedman, 'A Baltic Chill on Realtions', New York Times, 8 April, 1990, p. 15.

central and southeast Europeans to negotiate bilateral treaties with their Eastern and Western neighbours, such as treaties signed by Hungary and CSFR with USSR shortly after failed coup of August 91. Second flows from the loss of central control of Nuclear Weapeons in the former USSR and acqusition of weapons of mass destruction by unstable regimes. Third risks and challenges to European security will arise from instabilities within Eastern Europe, including ethnic conflicts, secessionist pressures, refugee flows, and the numerous difficulties involved in making the transition to democarcy and to viable market economies. The recent turmoil in Yugoslavia is but one problem facing Eastern Europe. Finally, threats to European Security may arise from outside Europe , as illustrated by the risks Turkey faced during the Gulf War.

In the light of these challenges and threats NATO's new role is being debated in terms of its new military, new political role and NATO's role in conflicts outside the North Atlantic Area. With the traditional role of NATO to deter Soviet aggression gone and strategy of flexible response transformed at the London Summit, its new role are being envisaged to fulfill the military function of deterring war for as long as the European NATO allies regard such residual deterrence as a stabilizing force in Europe. The military role within the frontiers of NATO territory was not questioned as in the gulf war when it created Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force to deter attack on Turkey

by Iraq but outside NATO : territory, its role creates disagreements and controversies. It can be seen provocative by East European States and Soviet Republics. Moreover, it is argued that it is a role better performed by other more broadly-based organization such as CSCE or the United Nations.

The London Declaration of NATO, 1990 spoke of building "new partnerships with all the nations of Europe"[7] created a political role for it to establish liasions with the East. The United States supported it. But differences remained over giving CSCE greater role. Another potential political role for NATO would be to serve as an instrument for helping to reslove intra-European conflicts involving ethnic and nationality disputes. But compared to CSCE, NATO has neither the capabilities nor the composition to perform disinterested mediation. "In supporting the development of CSCE's institutional structures, including a CSCE conflict prevention center in Vienna, the allies seem to have recoginized this fact"[8]. By continuing to provide a political caucus of the Western democracies in these times of turmoil and transition in Eastern Europe, NATO can perform a valuable stabilizing function. But by attempting to take on a broader political agenda however NATO risks spreading itself too thin, exposing disagreements among its members.

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7. The Times of India (New Delhi), July 7, 1990.
8. Charter of Paris, Reprinted in NATO Review, Vol. 38, No. 6, December 1990.

Coming to its third new role in out of area conflicts the allies have long recognized that regional conflicts outside Europe may affect their security. The differences in past have remained over NATO's out of area role. The French government is strongly opposed to any moves in this direction, as are a number of other allies, including Norway and Spain. French officials instead advocate developing European capabilities to respond to out of area crises through the WEU[9]. In case of gulf war, NATO allies were consulted only when security interests of its ally, Turkey, was directly threatened by Iraq. Germany expressed considerable ambivalence about participating in the defence of Turkish territory[10].

Quite apart from differences within its allies, any enhanced formal role for NATO in out-of-area conflicts might compete inappropriately with the role of the United NAtions. NATO is obligated under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and entitled under Article 51 of the UN Charter, to take military action in collective defense of any of its members who are subject to an armed attack, a more open-ended military and crisis management role for NATO not tied to the North Atlantic Area could interfere with responsibilities more appropriately exercised by a reinvigorated UN Security Council. Moreover, "a greater NATO

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9. International Herald Tribune, (New York), Nov. 15, 1990.
10. International Herald Tribune, (New York), January 23, 1991.

out-of-area role is likely to be viewed with suspicion and resentment by Third World and hence increasing the insecurity of developing countries"[11].

In the post-cold war era, "the CFE Treaty removed the fear of surprise attack and provided system of verifying residual limits on reduced arms through exchange of detailed information and on-site inspection on the ground"[12]. It also provided that "German forces are not a threat through Tow Plus Four Treaty"[13]. As a result the "Paris Summit also decided to establish a number of standing institutions in the security field including yearly meetings of foreign ministers, establisment of a Parliament Secretariat and establishment of a conflict Prevention Center"[14].

In fact the debate over strengthing of CSCE can be seen strongly in the thinking of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. According to him, the CSCE process offers the framework of stability within which to establish the peaceful order in Europe frm the Atlantic to the Urals[15]. France too opposed bloc to bloc relations in Europe and have welcomed the current tendency away from the two alliances. But the then Prime Minister Thacher initially resisted the pull of the CSCE, in April 1990[16]. However, the British

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11. Jasjit Singh, "New Doctrines of Warfighting : Implications for Third World" Strategic Analysis, April 1985.
12. Facts on Files, Vol. 50, No. 2609, November 23, 1990, p. 861-862.
13. Ibid;
14. Charter of Paris, op.cit..
15. International Herald Tribune (New York), March 6,1990.
16. Facts on File, Vol. 50, no.2576, April 6, 1990, p. 250.

government joined the growing European consensus that strethening the CSCE would help smooth the way towards a new European environment.

So the Charter of Paris already founded on the lines of 1975 Helsinki Act enjoys legitimacy and popularity, especially in Eastern Europe and erstwhile Soviet Union where a new instituion is needed to, make the Conference an ideal venue for security structure.

But CSCE in its present form is not without weaknesses. The mechanisms available to the CSCE states to deal with interstate disputes - mediation, arbitration, conciliation and even the use of the armed forces of some CSCE states can help damp down violence in Europe. However, CSCE is unlikely to be able to act effectively if there is no consensus among member states, and it is wholly unable to act if there is disagreement among its larger member states. It is doubtful whether the CSCE as such will be strong enough to cope with the dissolution of Yugoslavia or to intervene to stop bloodshed which is next major test of post-cold war era after the gulf war.

U.S.-European Relationship

The content of European-American Security relationships is bound to be deeply transformed as the traditional adverssary disappears. President Bush has frequently stated his resolve to see that the United States remain an active participant in Europe. With the traditional threat no more

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its hegemony over European Security has been questioned. In Europe, West European countries have wide differences over future presence of the U.S. in European Security. While Britain supporting it Germany and France supporting to strengthen CSCE argued for less U.S. role even "they supported for European armed force to secure Europe instead of U.S. forces"[17]. Before signing the Rome Declaration there was hectic discussion on future role of the US in Europe though they finally declared its presence in Alliance[18].

-According to Paul Kennedy the U.S. had declined as a superpower. It was the economic and tecnological development which was going to account for one's influence in World politics"[19]. U.S.A. has declined in both. It was overburdened by budgetary deficits and debts which raised the question over 'burden sharing' in today's post cold war era. Today Germany and Japan with their economic might can create economic problems for the U.S. The U.S. already has trade deficit with Japan hence it can raise serious questions over costs in fulfulling security obligations in Europe.

But, on the other hand, NATO is the primary instrument of legitimacy of the US role in Europe. There are leaders who would like to see continuance of that role. Manfred Woerner, the Secretary-General of NATO, claims that "NATO had

17. Kessing's Record of World Event, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1991, p. 38295.
18. 'Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation', as Reprinted in NATO Review, No 6 December, 1991, p.19.
19. These are the main arguments in Paul Kennedy's Rise and fall of Great Powers (New York : Random House, 1987).

oriented the United States away from isolationism and towards a lasting commitment to uphold peace and stability in Europe"[20].

At the same time, NATO is the only formal vehicle for U.S.-European Alliance. The US has no direct role in European affairs through any of the other mechanisms like the EEC. As Europe continues on the path of self-reliance, especially in military terms in the face of fading threat, eroding military capabilities of the erstwhile Eastern bloc countries, it will need the US less. In fact, "a self-reliant Europe is an alternate to NATO"[21]. But this would shut out the United States from the role in the future of Europe. As a result, America could lose both its military presence and political influence in Europe. NATO is the main institutional point of entry for the United States to the interface between East and West. Washington dearly wants to keep a major voice in European affairs, hence new roles are being envisaged for NATO in the post cold war era.

In post cold-war era the U.S. sees new threats and uncertainties in Europe. The U.S. vital interests will continue to include issues that have a basic breaking on the functioning of an international system in which it cannot fail to have a major economic or political stake. Events in Western Europe, North-East Asia and the gulf will therefore continue to be important to it. The post-cold war Europe is

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20. Manfred Woerner, "NATO in the 1990s", NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 35, No. 3, June 1990.
21. Jasjit Singh, "The Future of NATO", Strategic Analysis, December 1990.

no longer the seat of confrontation. This does not mean to the U.S. that its presence in these regions is superfluous.

For U.S A. , several areas of special interest are there regarding Europe. Firstly, residual traditional Soviet or Russian Military presence is enough to justify keeping U.S. forces in Europe. Secondly, contribution of U.S. forces in Europe and of NATO infrasturcture to victory in the gulf has raised the importance of out of area contingencies as a rationale for U.S. presence in Europe. Thirdly, the U.S. has an enormous stake in Western Europe's economic prosperity[22]. It has domestic political advantage of generating a slight surplus for the U.S. in contrasting to US-Asian trade deficit.

Now three questions arise from NATO and European relationships. First, whether the US continued focussed role for NATO which has already been discussed in the light of new roles being envisaged for NATO in the post cold war era because its role in European Security is linked to future of NATO. Second question is related to maintenance of U.S. military presence in Europe which is being relegated to background due to CFE Treaty and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) under Charter of Paris for new Europe. As a result both the US and NATO countries have cut their force level. But in order to be cautious, Rome Summit of November 7, 1991 came out with NATO's "Strategic

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22. Francois Heisbourg, "Future of the Atlantic Alliance : Whither NATO, Whether NATO", Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15-2, Spring 1992, pp. 127-131.

Concept"[23] breaking new ground which said that the US
interests will be well served by maintaining a permanent,
albeit much reduced military presence in Europe. Lastly, the
question is that of the U.S. support for establishment of
West European Security and Defence organisation. If it
supports them it may appear to be a major break with
principles of Atlantic Solidarity and hence it will entail
lower profile for NATO. But the United States and other
governments would also like NATO to consider creative new
ways to work with other institutions to maintain stability
and integrate the Eastern States into the new European
order.

The Bush administration's approach to liasion reflects
the responsibility sharing among European institutions set
out in James BAker III's Berlin address of 1989 to build a
new security architecture which said that no single
institution, including NATO, is capable of realizing the
President's vision of Europe "whole and free". The European
Community (EC) and the CSCE also have important roles to
play in integrating the East into the community of free
nations. The NATO States remain a driving force in the
development of the CSCE[24].

So the US is trying to carve its place in post cold war
European security. It can be seen by public opinion in the
US public support for the US commitment to peace in

23. 'Rome Delaration on Peace and Cooperation',Op.cit.
24. Excerpts from Baker's Speech on Berlin and US Role in
    Europe's Future, Op.cit.

Europe[25]. But American presence will not be without problems

like, question over desirability of US presence and problems

over funding. There are other limits to what the U.S. can

adopt to its future security relationship with Western

Europe. The establishment of a 'fortress Europe' (through

economic and political union by Maastricht Treaty of

December 1991) associated with breakdown of set of rules for

global trade sanctioned by GATT would challenge perpetuation

of transatlantic security compact, both because trade and

economic issues take on greater salience as cold war threat

dissipates.

NATO's Realtionship with Other : European Institutions

In today's radically changed environment when East has

come much closer to the West and are becoming partners

through NATO's London Declaration of 1990, the older

instruments of maintaining security are losing its

predominant role and hence in era of closer cooperation in

world and particularly in Europe various European

institutions like Western European Union (WEU), European

Community (EC) and Conference on Security and Cooperation

are being given due importance to ensure security in Europe.

It was reaffirmed at NATO's Rome Summit held on November 7,

1991. When they declared that NATO remained essential but

welcomed the growth pf a "European identity"[26] in defense

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25. David Shribman, Wall Street Journal, 16 March 1990,
    P.A. 16.
26. 'Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation', Op.cit.

matters, expressed in the European Communities (EC) and in the Western European Union (WEU). The NATO leaders stressed their "support for the CSCE which grouped East and West European countires, the USA and Canada — and urged that the CSCE's role be enhanced and expanded"[27].

Many European states too wanted the expanded role for CSCE to shoulder the burden in responding to the most immediate challenges to European Security, such as the need to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe, to resolve secessionist disputes, and to root democratic freedoms and institutions and economic reforms. "The Alliance has already acknowledged the growing importance of CSCE with its inclusive Pan-European membership and its potential to address the broad and complex security concerns growing out of the political economic and social transformation of Eastern Europe"[28]. But its capcity is doubted because the consensus principle on which CSCE operates is likely to impede it from taking effective action just when its mediating capabilities are needed most, as for example, in response to the civil war in Yugoslavia or to potential ethnic violence or military crackdowns in the Soviet republics.

On the other hand, several European allies, particularly France and Germany, support further development of the WEU as the beginning of a European defence identity.
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27. Ibid; p. 21.
28. Ibid.

Europeans while debating on purely European Defence Identity (EDI) reached an agreement at Maastricht European Community Summit in December 1991 for strengthening role for the Western European Union (WEU)[29], which had been dormant till late 1980s. Thus, it can become security componant of European Community by implementing the decisions on security matters. But the "treaty states that no attempt would be made to reduce the role of NATO"[30]. The United Sates and Britain, in contrast to Germany and France favour deployment of the WEU as a European pillar of the Alliance. In that role, it would reinforce rather than compete with NATO, preserving a strong transatlantic security link well into the future. But here the greatest problem is that the memberships of the WEU, the EC and NATO do not overlap neatly, making transitions some what more difficult. Norway and Turkey are members of NATO but not of WEU, yet their territory is more exposed than the other states of Western Europe. Moreover, three members of the EC are not members of the WEU, namely Denmark, Greece and neutral Ireland, complicating any proposed merger of the WEU and the EC, as non-members Norway, Denmark and Turkey would want access to WEU decision-making. In December 1990, the North Atlantic Council proclaimed that security in Europe can best be achieved "by a framework of interlocking institutions in which the interests of all European states can be

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29. Kessing's Record of World Events, Vol. 37, No. 12, December 1991, p. 38658.
30. Ibid.

accomodated"[31]. That framework would include the Alliance, CSCE, and "the process of European integration"[32]. The communique showed the divisive issues surrounding the development and evolution of a uniquely European defence entity. On the one hand, the communique welcomed a "European security identity and defence role, reflected in the construction of a European Pillar within the Alliance"[33] on the other hand, it went onto "support current efforts to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European Political integration"[34].

31. North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, Dec. 1990 Reprinted in NATO Review, No. 6, Dec 1990, pp. 22-23.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

Military pacts exist or operate to counter a common threat or common enemy. Post World War II period was marked by where war ended but peace did not take its root. In other words, the threat to security loomed large and hence the world was divided into two ideologically based super powers both expanding and exercising control over their spheres of influence. In this respect, military Alliances become inevitable and their main function become deterrence. Thus, military pacts, mainly NATO and Warsaw, played very vital roles during the cold war period where some sort of stability was maintained though not without problems and crises.

NATO and Warsaw pact survived. But NATO is still continuing whereas Warsaw Pact is gone with the wind of change. Their durability has been marked by both internal as well as external dissensions. NATO being defensive organization with a purpose to deter against an aggressor in case of their allies also carved out its role in cases of outside its allies or out of area role. It faced serious differences on issues of Suez crisis in 1956, among allies French coming out of military command and then in oil crisis of 1973 with the United States. In case of NATO, no country was attacked by its own allies. Contrary to it, in Warsaw pact allies, its own allies have been intervened militarily e.g. Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Warsaw pact had been used to solve more of its internal

problems than to face attack from outside.

NATO's problems exsited since its inception with the United States. It got accentuated as the circumstances changed. There arose difference over burden sharing. Then again it arose over strategy of extended deterrence when in 1970's Soviet Union gained an upperhand as military power with almost nuclear parity with the United States in late 1950's. Strategy of flexible response was the solution and it worked well but it again put questions over maintaining the US conventional forces in Europe which called for Europeans to contribute more for their own self defense and hence less role for U.S.A. The whole debate centred around deterrence got somewhat diluted due to detente of 1960s and later on NATO came up with Hermel Report of 1967. But all these were of short duration as the superpowers again got to the earlier positions of hostility. NATO's strategy still remained flexible and important.

On the other hand Warsaw Pact countries had no autonomy. They were under complete domination of erstwhile Soviet Union. The legitimacy of the leaders of East-European countries were directly related to its relations with the Soviet Union.

The complete break became visible with coming of Mikhail Gorbachov with his new thinking which led to revolutionary changes in disarmament starting with INF Treaty seriously affecting flexible response strategy. The

changes were revolutionary, especially in improving the superpower relations and East European changes. The changes in East European countries were of such a great magnitude that it affected the whole communist ideology and it led to great debate over "end of ideology" by Francis Fukuyama. It also led to serious problems over autonomy to Russian republics which finally led to its disintegration.

When the unifying bond which had existed for the last three decades over Eastern European countries by force loosened, it began asking questions for autonomy and finally, it led to dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This common ideology and force was not the case with NATO countries as its unity was derived from common threat or enemy.

Since its establishment in 1949, the alliance has grown accustomed to being the central security institution in Western Europe. Efforts to develop a European defense identity through the WEU or otherwise have not caused any serious questioning of NATO's primacy until recently. In today's radically changed environment when former Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Eastern Europe, Western Europe is strong and prosperous, Germany is unified and integrated into Western institutions; and Communism in Eastern Europe has collapsed. The urgency of the Alliance's original military purpose — to deter erstwhile Soviet aggression against Western Europe and to defend NATO territory in the event of an attack — has receded

dramatically with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and disintergration of erstwhile Soviet Union.

In this post-cold war era, the NATO's role has considerably declined due to signing of conventional forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and charter of Paris for new Europe and unification of Germany. But in order to keep it well in tact new roles are being envisaged. NATO's new functions are being sought to cooperate in arms control, verification, mutual confidence building, defensively oriented military forces, and so on. By looking at the security improvement in the world and especially in the Europe these newly assigned roles and functions to NATO do not sound logical. In fact, NATO is left with minimum military function of residual deterrence. In fulfilling this role it is trying to become overcautious.

In dealing with its out of area approach, it is faced with many problems. Consensus is lacking within NATO as it became evident in the Gulf War because of threat to Turkey. Serious differences cropped up by Germany and France against U.S.A. over NATO's out of area role. It would be unjusticiable to both U.N. organs as well as developing countries if NATO is given the role to go for out of area military role because there is already collective security vested in U.N. to protect peace and security in the world. The need of the hour is to strengthen U.N. and not to replace U.N. by NATO, especially when in the post cold war era the role of U.N. becomes more important and this has

been pointed out in a landmark report entitled "Preventive diplomacy, peace making and peace keeping"by the United Nation's Secretary General, Dr. Boutros - Brotros Ghali. He has argued that the U.N. has emerged as the central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. It also envisages enhancing the UN's military and political role.

Moreover, the European NATO allies are coming closer on the issue that any collective response, military or otherwise, to crises in Europe outside the traditional NATO area is best handled by a Pan-European institution such as the CSCE or a West European institution such as the WEU and EC thus limiting the role of NATO.

In the changed circumstances NATO is struggling to define a meaningful political role for itself. Following in the tradition of Hermel Report of 1967, London Summit of 1990 came up to give NATO a political role and invited representatives from East European countries to establish diplomatic liasion with NATO. Also they envisaged solving Intra-European conflicts like nationality disputes and ethnic conflicts but it is not clear that there is an 'enhanced' political role for the Alliance beyond its traditional role of providing for political consultation and cooperative action on developments that directly affect the security of its members. But to play any meaningful political role consensus is required which is declining day

by day. Moreover, there are other institutions best suited to resolve Intra-European conflicts such as CSCE and WEU which are gaining more support for its enhanced role among NATO members as the agreement to strengthen CSCE has been reaffirmed through successive NATO summits of London and Rome. Also the efforts to institutionalise CSCE are going on like establishment of CSCE conflict prevention centre at Vienna.

In the post cold war era if less roles are left with NATO, it affects the US predominant role but the continuing US political engagement and US military presence has been reaffirmed in the speeches of President Bush and James Baker because the United States recognizes that it exercises its greatest influence on matters of European security in the councils of NATO, and that American influence will diminish as broader European institutions expand in scope and importance. Already France and Germany are in line for common European security and defence policy. But United States will always search for new rationale in order to continue NATO as the West has been increasingly emphasizing "new threats" to security of the West and Europe.

Among these new threats are regional conflicts, proliferation of modern weapons technology, terrorism and so on. Recently, it justified the NATO's military role in Gulf War. The United States perceives instabilities and uncertainties in erstwhile Soviet Union also as a threat to security e.g. control over nuclear weapons in the republics

of Russia, ethnic conflicts and flow of refugees. These are new challenges which NATO has to face according to USA and so its rationale to countinue and therefore for the time being allies are agreed for the US military presence in Europe, though greatly reduced, will still permit the United States to play the role of both guarantor and balancer as reaffirmed in the London and Rome declarations. But this is not to suggest that these declarations came without deep differences and disagreements over future European security arrangement. In the same declarations, support to strengthen CSCE also came up more vigorously.

In the improved security environment of today, the relationship between the CSCE, the EC and the WEU takes predominant role as to many Europeans institutions hold out more promise as vehicles for addressing the multi-faceted challenges to European security and stability in the years ahead. This suggests a less dominant future role for NATO.

The CSCE is likely to become much more important as the new democracies of central and Eastern European are enthusiastic about it. And also it will be desirable as a primary security organization because the non-Commonwealth of independent states (CIS) central and eastern European states have neither the might of the CIS nor the security and economic advantages of NATO membership.

The role of WEU will not be of less considerable importance as france and Germany support the enhanced role for WEU as begining of European defense identity and USA and

Britain arguing for WEU as 'European pillar' within the Alliance. The support for WEU was reaffirmed at the Maastricht summit of 1991. In the midst of efforts at current political union of Europe, the basic objective has been the common European defence and security which too fulfils the support to European security identity and reducing the role for NATO. It offers advantages too as it extendes security gurantees or even membership to Eastern European states. Also, uniquely European defense identity could have a greater flexibility and capacity to evolve in response to changing conditions in Europe than NATO. It could also reassure Germany's neighbours, just as NATO has, that Germany's substantial military capabilities remain integrated in a collective European institution.

So with much of flexibility and capacity to meet self defense in the changed atmosphere of today, NATO is being kept seeing as more cautious approach to act in situation of deteroiting security environment with less focussed role than going for new envisaged roles which are more appropriate and suited to other Europen institutions. This is the challenge for NATO to face in the coming years.

As it is very difficult to predict in International Relations, there is possibility that indications about the future in this dissertation may go wrong. But one can hope that the direction of change should be such that Europeans play predominant role in their security.

APPENDIX I

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all people and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisatin of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by paceful means in such manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations form the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these instituions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article III

In order more effectively to achieve the onbjectives of this Treaty, the Parties, seperately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article IV

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article V

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence

recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to resotre and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic Area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
there of shall immediately be reported to the Security
Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintain international peace and security.

Article VI[1]

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more
of the Parties is deemed to inlude an armed attack on the
territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America,

on the Algerian Departments of France[2], on the occupation
forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the
jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north
of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this
area of any of the Parties.

[1]The definition of the territories to which Article 5
applies has been revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the
North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

[2]On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Coucil heard a
declaration by the French Representative who recalled that
by the vote on self-determination on July 1,1962, the
Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the
independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In
consequence, the President of the French Republic had on
July 3, 1962 formally recoginsed the independence of
Algeria. The result was that the "Algerian departments of
France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time
the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic
Treaty had no longer any bearing.
Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as
the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned,
the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable
as from July 3, 1962.

Article VII

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the
Charter of the Parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security.

Article VIII

Each Party declares that none of the international
engagments now in force between it and any other of the
Parties or any third State is in conflict with the

provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagment in conflict with this Treaty.

Article IX

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 4.

Article X

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in Position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North. Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depostiting its instrument of accession with the Government of United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parites of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article XI

This Treaty whall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be depostied as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France , Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article XII

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of United Nations for the maintenance of international pece and security.

Article XIII

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article XIV

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Source : Taken from Don, Cook Forging the Alliance NATO, 1945-1950 (London : Secker and Warburg, 1989).

APPENDIX II

The Vandenberg Resolution

US Senate Resolution 239

80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11th June, 1948

Whereas peace with justice and the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international co-operation through more effective use of the United Nations : Therefore be it *Resolved*, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used expect in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of The Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter :

1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations , and from the admission of new members.

2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the charter.

3. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangments as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

4. Contirbuting to the maintaenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

5. Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guranty against violation.

6. If necessary, aftr adequate effort towards strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under Article 109 by the General Assembly.

Source : taken from Don, Cook, Forging the Alliance NATO, 1945-1950 (London : Secker and Warburg, 1989).

APPENDIX III

Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance

Between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People' Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People 's Republic , the Romanian People's Republic, the Union of Sviet Socialist Republics,s and the Czechoslovak Republic.
14 May 1955
The Contracting parties,
Reaffirming their desire for the organization of a system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the European states, irrespective of their social and state system, which would make it possible to combine their efforts in the interests of securing peace in Europe,
Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe as the resust of ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the 'Western European Union' together with a remilitarized Western Germany and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another war and creates a threat to the national security of the peace-loving states,
Convinced that, under these circumstances, the peace-loving states of Europe should take the necessary measures for safe-guarding their security, and in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nationss Charter,
In the interests of further strengthening and promoting friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs,
Have resolved to conclude this Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance and have appointed as their authorized representatives:
[The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania-Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania, The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria-Vulko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's republic of Bulgaria,
The Presidium of the Hungarian Peoplee's Republic - Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of the ministers of the Hungarian people's republic ,
The Presidium of the German Democratic Republic- Otto Grotewohl, Prime minister of the German Democratic Republic,
The state council of the Polish people's republic - Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chair-man of the council of ministers of the Polish People's Republic,

The Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian People's Republic — Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the council of ministers of the Romanian Peoples Republic, The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the council of ministers of the USSR,

The president of the Czechoslovak republic — Viliam Siroky, Prime minister of the Czechoslovak Republic,] having presented their credentials, found to be executed in due form and in complete order, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations Organisation, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so as not to endanger international peace and security.

ARTICLE II

The contracting parties declare their readiness to take part, in the spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international undertakings intended to safeguard international peace and security, and they shall use all their energies for the realization of these aims.

Moreover, the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, in agreement with other state desiring to co-operate in this matter, of effective measures towards a general reduction of armamemnts and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and the other weapons of mass destruction.

ARTICLE III

The contracting parties shall take council among themselves on all important international questions relating to their common interests, guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security.

They shall take council among themselves immediatly whenever, in the opinion of any of them, there arises the threat of an armed attack on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty, in the interests of ensuring their joint defence and of upholding peace and security.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states, each state that is a party to this treaty shall in the excersise of the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Aritle 51 of the charter of the United Nations Organization, render the state or states so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in consider necessary, including the use of armed force. The states that are parties to this treaty shall immediately take council among themselves concerning the necessary joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of resorting and upholding international peace and security.

In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organiztion, the Security Council shall be advises of the measures taken on the basis of the present article.These measures shall be discontinued as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security.

ARTICLE 5

The contracting parties have agreed on the establishment of a joint command for their armed forces, which shall be placed , by agreement among these parties, under this command, which shall function on the basis of jointly defined principles. They shall also take other concerted measures necessary for strengthening their defence capacity,in order to safeguard the peaceful labour of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers. and territories and to provide defence against possible aggression.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of holding the consultations provided for in the present treaty among the states that are parties to the treaty ,and for the purpose of considering problems arising in connection with the implementation of this treaty , a Political consultative committee shall be formed in which each state that is a party to this treaty shall be represented by a member of the government, or any other specially appointed representative.

The committee may form the auxiliry organs for which the need may arise.

ARTICLE VII

The contracting parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions and alliances and not to conclude any agreements the purposes of which would be at variance with those of the present treaty.

The contracting parties declare that their obligations under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

The contracting parties declare that they will act in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the object of the further development and strengthening of the economic and cultural relations between them, adhering to the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

ARTICLE IX

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states- irrespective of their social and state system - which may express their readiness to assist,through participation in the present treaty, in combining the efforts of the peace- loving states for safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. This act of acceding to the Treaty shall become effective with the consent of the states which are party to

the Treaty, after the instrument of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

ARTICLE X

The present treaty is subject to ratificatin, and the instruments of raticication shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.
The treaty shall take effect on the date on which the last ratificaton instrument is deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall advice the other states party to the treaty of each ratificaion instrument deposited with it.

ARTICLE XI

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For the contracting parties which will not have submitted to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement denouncing the Treaty a year befor the expiration of its term, it shall remain in force thoughout the following ten years.
In the event of the organization of a system of collective security in Europe , and the conclusion of a genersal European Treaty of collective security to that end, which the contracting parties a shall unceasingly seek to bring about, the present Treaty shall cease to be effective on the date the general European Treaty comes into force.
Drawn up in Warsaw on the 14 May 1955, with one copy in each of the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, each of which has the same force. Certified copies of the present treaty shall be sent by the government of the Polish People's Republic to all the other signatories.
The authorized representatives have certified this by signing the present treaty and affixing their seal to it.
sources: Pravda 15 May 1955; author's translation from V. F. Mal'tsev (ed.), Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1985, dokumenty i materialy, Izdatel'stvo Foliticheskoi Literatury, 1986.

1985 Protocol of Renewal
PROTOCOL

On prolonging the period of validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955.
26 April 1985
The member states of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance- the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic- have decided to sign the present protocol and agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955,shall remain in force for the next twenty years. Fo the contracting parties, which a year before the expiry of this period of time shall not present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic statements of denunciation of the treaty, it shall remain in force for another ten years.

ARTCLE II

The present protocol is subject to ratification. The instrumments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The protocol shall enter into force on the day of the presentation for deposition of the last instrument of ratification. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall inform the other states party to the treaty of the presentation for deposition of each instrument of ratification.

Done in Warsaw on 26 April 1985 in one copy in each of the Bulgarian, Hungariaan, German, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Czech languages, each of which has the same force. Certified copies of the present protocol shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the other parties to the protocol.

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria:Tododr Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

For the Hungarian People's Republic: Janos Kadar, General Secretary of the HungarianSocialist Workers' Party.

For the German Democratic Repu;blic: Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, President of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic.

For the Polish People's Republic: Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic.

For the Socialist Republic of Romania: Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Prty of Czechoslovakia, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

APPENDIX IV

Hermel Report or Future Tasks of the Alliance

Report of the North Atlantic Council, December, 1967 (The Harmel Report)

1. A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to 'study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace'. The present report sets for the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs Schutz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler and Fatijin. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situtation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super-powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of peaceful co-existence has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonization has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between development and developing countries security in Europe.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functioins. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this tasks. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as neccessary, a suitable military

capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby, creating a climate of stability, security and confidence. In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Miulitary security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide his policy in the light of close knowledge of each other' problems and objectives. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepended and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel course, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and creully manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a detente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of along-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is now mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, ofcourse, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of the these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reduction. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective detente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. the South-eastern flank. In this repect the current situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle East falls without the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies or such of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialized studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion

of detente and the strengthening of peace. Since
significant problems have not yet been examined in all their
aspects, and other prblems of no less significance which
have arisen from the latest political and strategic
developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have
directed the Farmanent Representatives to put in hand the
study of these problems without delay, following such
procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the
Council in permanent session, in order to enable further
reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in
Ministerial Session.

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