

**THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMAN  
UNIFICATION, 1985-90**

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This dissertation entitled "THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMAN UNIFICATION, 1985-90" submitted by ASHOK KUMAR SAHOO, Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY, is an original work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full for any other degree or diploma of any University.

This may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the DEGREE OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY.

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## **PREFACE**

Peace, security and collective coexistence are the need of hour. Peace and security was in danger in the wake of nuclear catastrophe. The division of Germany seemed to be a potential danger to world peace. The cold war which started after Second World War was the product of ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the USA. Germany was worstly hit by it. No doubt, maintenance of peace and security was the main concern of the Soviet Union. It was evident from the presence of concept of 'peaceful coexistence' in Soviet foreign policy. But the type of peace inherent in the concept of peaceful coexistence was temporary one. The permanent peace was out of scene due to the presence of class struggle in international field. However the Soviet attitude to peace and security changed after assumption of office by Mikhail Gorbachev. He deideologised Soviet foreign policy by introducing certain new features. This new dynamism in Soviet foreign policy introduced by Gorbachev changed attitude of the Soviet Union towards Germany unification. In this backdrop of changed international relation, the role of Soviet Union in bringing about Germany unification is commendable.

This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Each chapter is further subdivided to pay justice to the discussion concerning the Soviet policy and response towards Germany unification. The First Chapter opens up with the brief historical account of Germany, how it was divided and

several unification efforts upto the Gorbachev era. It also seeks to discuss Willy Brandt's 'Ostpolitik' and its impact on the Germany unification effort. Added to this, is also the Soviet proposal for Germany unification, has been discussed in this chapter.

The Second Chapter takes special care to investigate the connection between Gorbachev's policy of 'New Thinking' and fragmentation of socialist bloc. The chapter also examines how Gorbachev's policy was instrumental in bringing about unification of Germany. The Third Chapter examines, the issues and problems before German unification. The issues were European Integration and convergence of ideology etc are looked into in the context of German unification. The problems were the recognition of Oder-Neisse boundary line between Germany and Poland by the West, and what should be the military status are also discussed.

The Fourth Chapter delienates the real unification process which started with the breakdown of Berlin Wall. It also analyses the features of Helmut Kohl's Ten Point Programme and Hanns Modrow's blue print for the German unification. It also discusses the four-plus-two formula according to which the process of German unification was completed.

The Last Chapter is the concluding part of dissertation which includes overall assessment of the findigs of the work.

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**CHAPTER I**  
**TWO GERMANYS IN THE POST-WAR**  
**PERIOD AND THE SOVIET POLICY:**  
**A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT**

The unification of Germany in 1871, its subsequent division in 1949 and recent unification have been major events in the annals of history. With the division of Germany at the end of World War II the Cold War started in Europe. The struggle of ideology which had played a substantial role in European politics had also made two Germanys its victim. Because of historical position, geopolitical location, and division into two opposing state systems Germany was the epicenter of cold war in Europe. Thus the unification of Germany was viewed as the key to European security, global cooperation, and above all long desired European Union. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned it viewed the question of German unification strictly from the angle of its own security and the maintenance of political, ideological and military system in East Europe under its leadership. Germany was the symbol around which a multi-dimensional inter-systemic struggle between the Soviet Union and the USA was conducted in Europe in the post-War decades. Thus the main focus of this chapter is on the brief historical account of politics around Germany in the post-war period. It examines the factors that led to division of Germany into two parts and the perpetuation of this division. within the broad framework of history, the chapter analyses and elaborates several unification attempts made by both Germany and the Soviet Union in the period between Joseph Stalin's tenure and the advent of Mikhail

Gorbachev. This chapter also throws light on Willy Brandt's 'Ostpolitik', and its influence on German unification effort, 'East German Peace Plan', and 'Basic Treaty', concluded between two Germanys in 1972. It may be emphasised here that the purpose of the chapter is to analyse the problem mainly from the point of view of the Soviet policy.

Ever since the unification of a multitude of smaller principalities into one German state under the leadership of Bismarck, the Prussian Prime Minister, in 1871, Germany has held a key to European balance of power. Similarly, after its division into two German states - the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, it again became a bone of contention in super power rivalry and ideological confrontation. Since World War II, Germany has been the decisive factor in European policy of the Soviet Union.

The first half of 20th century had witnessed the futile attempt on the part of Germany to extend its hegemony over the world in general Europe, in particular. The attempt of Kaiser William II ended with a discriminatory treaty of Versailles in 1919. Later on the attempt of Hitler also ended with his suicide and subsequent Potsdam agreement for the division of Germany.

The division of Germany was a war strategy of victors to ensure against her possible emergence as a formidable

power in future. The primary concern of the major Allied Powers during and after the Second World War was to arrive at an understanding about the future of Europe in general and Germany in particular.<sup>1</sup> It was agreed during the war that after the surrender of Germany an All Allied Control Commission consisting of representatives of three big powers should take over administration of the country. But the peaceful solution as to the future of Germany was hindered by the deteriorating international situation in the wake of the cold war. In fact the differences between the USSR and the Western Allies had deepened even during the war, due to the suspicion over each others intentions. Nevertheless, in September 1944, in an Anglo-American meeting at Quebec in which Henry Morgenthau Jr., put forward the proposal of division of Germany.

#### THE YALTA CONFERENCE

The next conference was held at Yalta from 15 February 1945. The discussions about Germany in this conference covered the following four aspects:

- ( i) The future form of German State;
- ( ii) The Question of reparations;

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1. See James Joll, Europe Since 1870: An International History (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), pp.368-69.

- (iii) The Eastern frontier with Poland; and
- (iv) The agreements for the zones of occupation.<sup>2</sup>

In Yalta Conference the decision was also taken to give membership to France in inter-allied Council and to have an occupied zone under its control.

#### THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The Big Three -- President Truman of USA, Prime Minister Attlee of England and Stalin, the Soviet leader met from 17 July to 2 August 1945 at Potsdam, a town which was a symbol of Prussian Greatness and of Hitler's extravagant ambition.<sup>3</sup>

The discussions at the Potsdam Conference demonstrated the differences in approach between the USSR and the West.

Subsequently, the Three European Zones were fused into one zone with the name of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) under the chairmanship of Konard Adenaeur. A constitution was quickly drafted at the behest of Western interest which came into force as the Basic Law of the FRG on 25th May 1949. Bundestag (Federal Diet) election, as provided for in the Basic Law was held on 14 August 1949. The

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- 2. See John L. Sneel, Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: The Phausser Press, 1959), pp.139-44.
  - 3. Paul J. Dine, A History of Germany (Max Mueller, Munichen, 1968), p.311.

election was a meek fight between Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U) under tutelage of Dr. Adenauer and Social Democratic Party, resulting in the stunning winning of C.D.U. On 15 September 1949, the German Bundestag elected Konard Adenauer as Federal Chancellor of the new republic and Prof. Theodor Heuss became its first President.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR), the other German State, was founded on 7th October 1949, only after the creation of the F.R.G. The Soviet-East German Treaty was signed on 20 September, 1955 between Marshall Bulganin and Herr Grotewohl, the Prime-Minister of the GDR. The treaty recognised the de jure sovereignty of the GDR.

In the Potsdam Conference, Stalin demanded a sum of ten billion dollars as war reparations and the recognition by the West of the Oder-Neisse line as the western boundary of Poland, as compensation for territory which the Soviet Union annexed in the eastern part of Germany from Poland. Both the American and British leaders objected to the reparation formula and to the Soviet proposal of a new German-Polish frontier. The Conference was adjourned for two days due to British election. When it was resumed again, the new British Prime Minister Clement Attlee of labour party represented his country instead of Winston Churchill of Conservative Party.

The Western powers were at low bargaining positions due to the Red Army alert in Eastern Germany. Eventually all

conceded the Oder-Neisse line by which parts of Eastern Germany and East Prussia were given to Poland. Subsequently, what came to be known as East Germany was in fact Central Germany in an undivided State.<sup>4</sup> The Conference agreed to divide Germany politically into four zones, each under an Allied power. Accordingly, France took South-West part, the United States took Bavaria, Wuttenberg, Bades and Heroe. Britain took northern Germany and Rhine land, the Soviet Union took eastern provinces of the Reich between the rivers Elbe and Werva in the West and rivers Oder and Neisse in the east.

The occupation regime ended with the conclusion of the treaty. But the Soviet occupation forces remained in the GDR. The Soviet High Commission was abolished and in its place the Soviet Embassy was put up.<sup>5</sup>

The G.D.R. in course of time became one of the most important socialist partners of the USSR in Eastern Europe. The Soviet predominance in the region was so great that even the political forces in GDR were created under her tutelage and sponsorship. The GDR's leading political force, the German Socialist Unity Party (SED) was created under the Soviet influence on 19 April 1946 by the merger of the Communist Party - KPP and the Social Democratic Party -

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4. Deare & David Heller, The Berlin Wall (London: Frederick-Muller Limited, 1964), p.133.
  5. David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's Ally (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p.27.

S.P.D.<sup>6</sup> Thus GDR's socialist party owed its ideological heritage to Marxism and Leninism. It maintained a deep ideological linkage with the Soviet Union.

The main determinant of the GDR's foreign policy throughout its existence was its relationship with the Soviet Union. The Constitution of 1968, which replaced the East German constitution of 1949, sought to bring GDR further closer to the Soviet constitutional arrangement.

Article 6 of 1968 constitution of the GDR stated that "the GDR develops in accordance with the principles of Socialist Internationalism, comprehensive cooperation and friendship with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and other socialist states". Article 7 laid down provision for "the military cooperation between the GDR, the USSR and the other socialist states". Further, Articles 4 and 8 of the Constitution of the GDR as amended in 1974 bound the two States to give military assistance to each other in case of attack. The Friendship treaty between the GDR and the USSR concluded on 7th October 1975 pronounced the eternal friendship between the two countries.

But for the unification of the two German States in 1990 this treaty was supposed to be in force for twenty years and then be renewed automatically for a further period of ten

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6. John Wiley & Sons INC, World Mark Encyclopaedia of the Nations, Vol.5, p.99.



years, unless one of the parties gave twelve months notice before the end of the treaty period. The treaty was signed before the Alliance treaty of 1964 had expired. The Alliance treaty contained the possibility of German Unification. Such a provision was, however, absent in the treaty of 1975, yet the old treaty was not formally renounced.<sup>7</sup>

It is quite obvious that the relationship between the GDR and the USSR, though cordial, was always tuned to Soviet interest and principle of "Socialist Internationalism".

On the other hand, the relationship between the USSR and FRG was, not cordial owing mainly to super power antagonism and ideological differences. The Soviet relations with FRG involved, in turn, its relationship with the United States of America. After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union had recognised the FRG. The FRG was a cat's paw of America, furthering American and Western interest. The policy of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the FRG was just opposite of SEP. There was no consensus for unification. Dr. Adenauer followed the policy of "peace through strength".<sup>8</sup> Thus the FRG joined NATO in 1955 and later became a founding member of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. She was also accommodated in West European

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7. See Childs, n.5, p.308.

8. World Mark Encyclopaedia of Nations (Europe), vol.5, p.108

Union, which was known previously as Brussels Treaty Organisation.

Moscow established diplomatic relation with the Federal Republic in 1955. The proposal to establish diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union was unanimously approved by FRG's government on 19 September, 1955 and by the Bundestag on 23 September 1955. It was also ratified by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet two days later. It was followed by the Soviet repatriation of Germany's military and civilian prisoners in exchange for Soviet refugees in the Federal Republic.<sup>9</sup>

Starting with the division of Germany until the sixties issues like Oder-Neisse line and recognition of GDR continued to cause unease between Poland and GDR, on the one hand, and Federal Republic and GDR, on the other. Soon after the establishment of diplomatic relation with the GDR, Bonn announced the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine" on 9 December 1955. The West German Foreign Minister Dr. Heinrich Von Brentano proclaimed that any state establishing diplomatic relation with East Germany would forfeit its relation with the FRG. But an exception was made in connection with the USSR out of dire necessity. The Hallstein doctrine proved valuable weapon in Federal Republic's campaign against East

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9. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, July 23-30, 1955, pp.148, 64.

Germany's recognition. Subsequently, the FRG broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia due to the fact that the latter had decided to recognise East Germany.<sup>10</sup>

It is significant to note here that the Potsdam Agreement had also envisaged the suggestion for preparing the plan of reunification of Germany on democratic basis. It could not, however, be made a possibility due to uncondusive international atmosphere in the decades following the war.

The USA had launched the Marshall Plan to reconstruct capitalist economy in the Western Europe. But the real intention of the USA was to check what it called the Soviet expansionism. The other feature of America's European policy were Schuman Plan\* and the EEC. These were devised to integrate West Germany into capitalist set up. The policy of containment was adopted by the USA in bold response to the Berlin blockade and communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

The Soviet influence over Eastern Europe was safeguarded by the following three instruments devised by it:

- i) through the presence of strong soviet troops in the GDR, in Hungary since 1956, and in Czechoslovakia since 1968.

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10. See Childs, n.5, p.309.

\* Schuman Plan was formulated for the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community. It was a stepping stone towards greater unity in the form of the Common Market. The proponent of the plan was Rubert Schuman of France.

- ii) through a network of bilateral treaties of consultation and alliances - Warsaw Pact since 1955 and Treaty with the GDR since 1964; and
- iii) the economic fusion of the countries of Eastern bloc through COMECON set up in 1949.<sup>11</sup>

The COMECON was established in 1949 as a counter measure by the USSR to the formation of OECD in Paris. The task of OECD was to administer and accelerate the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The Socialist countries like, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia withdrew their pledge to attend the Paris Conference for the European reconstruction programme in favour of COMECON though Yugoslavia was not one of its founder members. The founder members of COMECON were the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The GDR became a full member in 1950. At the base of COMECON were those nations who were members of W.T.O., -the constituents of the "Socialist State Community".<sup>12</sup>

#### UNIFICATION EFFORTS (1949-85):

The unification of Germany was a process, whose promise and setbacks depended on changing international scenario. The efforts made by the two German governments for

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- 11. Helmut Schmidt, The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and Super Power (London: William Kimber, 1971), p.94.
  - 12. Bradley C. Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany: An Evolution of Socialist Democracy (London: Westview Paper, 1984), p. 176

unification had evolved in the course of super-power politics. During the 50's and 60's there were hardly any attempts from either of the two German states for unification. However, the relations between them changed considerably for the better with the launching by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt of his "Ostpolitik" in 1970s. From then onwards, the attitude in the inter-German relations showed a remarkable improvement.

The main hinderance to the unification efforts was the ideological difference existing between the two Germanys and thereby the two super powers. As it is well known, soon after its division Germany was caught in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American bloc wherein each side tried to use Germany as a bulwark against the other.

#### The Berlin Blockade and After

The city of Berlin, like Germany, was divided between four victors. The area on the Western part of Berlin was in the occupation of the USSR, which happened to be the means of communication to Berlin city. The Soviet Union blockaded the Western sector of Berlin in June 1948 and cut off all food, and fuel supplies to the city. It was a pressure tactic by the USSR against other Allied powers. The Western powers, in response to it, continued airlift for 323 days, which was later reconciled through dialogue between the USSR and the USA.

The benign normalisation process started with the Soviet note of 10 March 1952. The Soviet note, which included Stalin's proposal, envisaged a neutralised United Germany to be determined by a peace conference.<sup>13</sup> The participants of that conference should be, as the note suggested, those countries which had participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany. Accordingly, the participants would be UK, USSR, USA, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Holland, etc.

The treaty to be concluded among above mentioned states, Stalin stressed, would outline the following political and other provisions:

- i) Germany is reestablished as a unified state, thereby an end is put to the division of Germany and a unified Germany has the possibility of development as an independent democratic peace-loving state;
- ii) All armed-forces of occupying powers must be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of peace treaty. Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany must be liquidated; and

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13. See Gerhard Wetting, Confronting the German Question (New York: Berger Publishers, 1983), pp.142-43.

- iii) Germany obliges herself not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power, which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany.<sup>14</sup>

It was further proposal that the treaty would also outline military provisions for Germany which would be as follows:

- a) Germany would be permitted to have its own national armed forces (land, air and sea) necessary for the defence of the country; and
- b) Germany would be permitted to produce war materials and equipments, the quality and type of which must not exceed the limitation required for the armed forces established in Germany by the peace treaty.

The Governments concluding the peace treaty with Germany would support the application of Germany as a member of UNO.<sup>15</sup>

The Stalin proposal was flatly relegated to the background by the West. It was, in the opinion of Richardson, a "lost opportunity". He was also of the view that the Soviet negotiating position of March 1952 was both a

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14. See James L. Richardson, Germany and Atlantic Alliance (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.24.

15. See *ibid.*, p.25.

delaying bid and bargaining bid. But in the light of post-War Soviet and Western differences over Germany it held out a little chance of arriving at acceptable bargain.

Due to widening hiatus between Soviet and Western policy the good opportunity to achieve unification was lost. It was crystal clear that the Western policy on Germany's unification was conspicuously one sided. They insisted that an all-German government chosen through free election should be permitted to join any military alliance of its own choice. The West, in practice, demanded that the unified Germany should join NATO.

Such an onesided approach of the West was not acceptable to the USSR due to the fact that the Social Democratic Party in Germany had a glimmer of hope of winning election. The forward strategy of NATO by that time was also a challenge to system and ideology -- "International Proletarianism". Further alliances among socialist countries to counter NATO had not been evolved by that time.

The USSR proposal was not acceptable to the West due to the following two apparent calculations:

- i) The neutral German state could have been exposed to the Soviet pressure due to geographical proximity; and
- ii) Germany being the birth place of Marxism might have been prone to Marxism-Leninism.



Even Adenauer hammered on the policy of neutrality saying that Soviet proposal of neutrality of Germany would necessarily lend to communist control of Germany.<sup>16</sup> He said,

Soviet Russia has wanted a neutralised Germany for years. But that means permanent control of Germany with no allies and a restricted army. It would mean, further, that the USA would very probably completely change its policy towards Europe. The end of the story would be that even a unified Germany deprived of alliance in a world of continuing extreme tension would be conquered by the Soviet Union in the course of Cold War.<sup>17</sup>

However, the German neutrality could not acquire the status of Swedish neutrality due to the geo-strategic position of Germany which was also key to European unity. The status of Swedish type neutrality for Germany might have prevented the European unity.

The Foreign Ministers Conference of the four powers namely the USA, the USSR, UK and France which took place from 25 January to 18 February 1955 ultimately resulted in the signing of the German Treaty of 23 October 1955. The year 1955 was also crucial in the intra-German relations for the fact that the FRG joined NATO on 9 May. As a reaction to it, on 14th May Warsaw Pact was founded by the Soviet Union with GDR as its member.<sup>18</sup> In a quick succession of events the

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16. See *ibid.*

17. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.25

18. Ferenac A. Vali, Quest for a United Germany (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), p.27.

famous Geneva Conference was also held from July 23 to 30 in 1955. At the Summit Conference of Head of governments of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, who met each other on German unification issue, instructed their respective foreign ministers to meet in Geneva in October to prepare effective measures for the solution of such questions as European security, German reunification, disarmament and contact between the east and west.<sup>19</sup>

In this Conference, Marshal Bulganin, turning to German problem, said "the remilitarization of Western Germany and her integration into military grouping of the Western powers, represent the main obstacles to the unification of Germany". He himself stucked to Stalin's proposal.

Another important event in the intra-German relations in that year was the visit of the FRG's Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow to resume diplomatic relations with the USSR. Immediately after, Otto Grotewohl, the Prime Minister of the GDR, visited the USSR to secure sovereign right of the GDR. Subsequently on 20 September 1955, after the signing of treaty between Marshal Bulganin and Herr Grotewohl, complete sovereignty was granted to the GDR.

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19. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.10, p.14325, p.15087.

The Soviet government after according recognition to the GDR moved in the direction of what it called Lenin's principle of "rights of nations to self-determination to achieve German unification."<sup>20</sup> Realising the complete obedience to its hegemony the Soviet government maintained that the restoration of German unity was an affair of German people themselves. Both sides also expressed complete unanimity that under existing circumstances, there was only one way to unite Germany, namely by discussion and agreement between the governments of the two German states.

Marshal Bulganin was succeeded by Khrushchev who, on German question, "made it clear that the Oder-Neisse line between Germany and Poland is final and any attempt to change it would involve the risk of thermo-nuclear war".<sup>21</sup>

Again on 27 December 1958, the intra-German relations entered a critical phase with Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum, through which he commanded the West to evacuate from the Western part of Berlin. The Berlin crisis erupted when the USSR aired her decision to hand Eastern part of Berlin to East Germany and suggested that the city of Berlin be united and given to East Germany or to be made a free city under the aegis of UNO. The USSR gave an ultimatum to the Western powers to evacuate West Berlin within six months. To resolve

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20. See *ibid.*

21. *ibid.*, p.14864.

the crisis a conference was convened at Geneva. The Conference was attended by foreign Ministers of all concerned countries. It failed to evolve any tangible solution. The Western proposal was for a Mixed German Committee to draft election laws. On the basis of an electoral law an all-German government was to be free to join either NATO or the Warsaw Pact or even keep independent of these military pacts. The proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

In 1961, Khrushchev and Kennedy summit could not find any viable solution to problems concerning Berlin and Germany. This promoted the Soviet Union to erect the Berlin wall, bringing about complete geographical separation of the city. The "Rapacki Plan" -- an atom free zone in Central Europe could not be effectuated.

#### The East German Peace Plan

On 6 July 1961, the East German Parliament unanimously adopted a 'German Peace Plan' presented by Herr Walter Ulbricht, the Chairman of East German State Council. This Peace Plan embodied Rapacki plan also. Following were its important proposals:

1. The setting up of German Peace Commission consisting of representatives of both German Parliaments and governments, with the task of reaching agreement on all German proposal for peace treaty and on a goodwill

agreement aiming at immediate improvement of their relations;

2. Both German states should renounce nuclear arms and agree on immediate ending of further armament;
3. Both would support non-aggression treaty between Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO countries as well as the creation of nuclear free zone in Central Europe;
4. Neither of them would interfere in the social order of the other and each would regard the decision on the other's social order as an act of self-determination of other population;
5. Both German states would undertake to renounce any threat or force, or use of force on their international relations to settle international dispute by peaceful means only and to follow a policy of peaceful-coexistence between peoples and states;
6. Both would support the creation of militarily neutral Germany, the inviolability of this neutrality, being guaranteed by the principal members of anti-Hitler coalition;
7. The existing German-frontier would be confirmed and the inviolability of sovereignty of each German state guaranteed;

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8. The contracting parties would recognise the full-sovereignty and self-determination of the German people, including the right to bring about Germany's reunification as a peaceful state without any foreign interference;
  9. All contracting parties would support Germany's cooperation in UNO and other organisation on a basis of equality and pending Germany's unification, would support the admission of both German states to the United Nation;
  10. Until Germany's reunification, West Berlin would have the status of a neutral free city; and
  11. Because of the existence of two German states with different social orders, reunification, could only be achieved through a creation of a German confederation aimed at their cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence and creating the pre-requisite for reunification in a peaceful, democratic, neutral states.<sup>22</sup>

The West German Government Bulletin commented on 4th July 1961, that the Soviet Union had rejected all constructive proposals made by three Western powers and the

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22. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1961, pp.18226-27.



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Federal government with the aim of achieving a permanent and just peace settlement through an all-German government elected by a free decision of the whole of German people. The Federal Republic again stuck to the previous proposal that just settlement could be achieved only by granting the entire German people the right of self-determination.

The term "Peaceful Coexistence" (Mirnoe Sosushestvovanie) was used to convey what the term 'detente'<sup>23</sup> subsequently came to signify in the West. It was, however, loaded with and the objective of its propagation socialist ideology. Thus, the interference in the internal affairs of other nation for "just" purposes was not prohibited in this framework of policy and strategy. The encouragement of revolutionary movement in other countries did not amount to interference in their internal affairs. On the other hand, the efforts of capitalist states to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries was threated as a groos interference because such attempts amounted to a design to frustrate the expansion of socialist ideology.

The theory of Peaceful Coexistence of States was first enunciated by one of the earliest decrees of the Soviet government namely "Decree on Peace" issued on 8 November

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23. See Zafar Imam, 'Soviet View of Detente', International Studies (ND), Vol.3, no.9, October-December 1974, p.611.

1917. It was concretised and elaborated by V.I. Lenin himself.<sup>24</sup> Article 28 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR spoke out that the Soviet state steadfastly pursued a Leninist policy of peace and stood for strengthening of the security of nations and broad International Cooperation.<sup>25</sup> Thus it was evident that the goal of Soviet foreign policy was both national and International. Moreover, there was a difference between peaceful coexistence (temporary peace) and permanent peace. Peaceful Coexistence meant the absence of war, which included the disarmament initiatives and arms control. But permanent peace could be available only in classless society. Thus the principle of Peaceful Coexistence was the parameter of Soviet foreign policy. It also continued to play an important role in Soviet foreign policy, though its meaning of late, has been changed due to deideogisation of Soviet foreign policy.

Coming back to the Peace Plan of GDR it would worthwhile to recall that it had also focussed on the ideologically defined concept of "Peaceful Coexistence". Socialist ideology supported the encouragement of revolutionary movement in other countries in the name of just war. The Soviet Union was the Socialist Motherland and main force behind the

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24. *ibid.*, p.612.

25. Boris Meissner, 'The Brezhnev Constitution and Soviet Foreign Policy', Aussen Politik (Hamburg), Vol.29, no.3, pp.264-65.



world revolution or international class struggle to curb ultra-imperialism.

However, the 'Ostpolitik' had brought about flexibility in the FRG's foreign policy. The policy of 'Ostpolitik' was a pragmatic attempt to reduce the dogmatic element in politics.<sup>26</sup> The ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, the Chancellor of the FRG, envisaged good relation with East European countries. By that time the international atmosphere also had become relatively better leading to the signing of disarmament programme between the two super powers. The NPT of 1968, and Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty were also signed during the some period.

The first meeting between Willy Brandt and Willy Stoph, the Prime Minister of East Germany took place on 14th March 1970 at Erbut followed by the second meeting at Kasoel on 21st May 1970. On 12th August 1970 the West German - Moscow Treaty was signed in accordance with which the FRG formally accepted the East-German border with West-Germany.

A Basic Treaty was concluded between Egon Bahr, the State Secretary at Federal Chancellor's office and Dr. Michael Kohl, the State Secretary of the Council of Ministers of the GDR in 1972. According to the provision of that

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26. Paul Frank, "German Ostpolitik in a Changing World", Aussen Politik (Hamburg), Vol.23, no.2, 1972, p.22.

treaty a normal, good neighbourly relationship between the two Germanys was established. Further, the two States reaffirmed the border existing between them and agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity in future. They exchanged permanent representatives to each other's state. Thus the most important feature of the Basic Treaty was the formal recognition of the GDR by the FRG. These events marked an important phase in the relationship between the two German States. Soon after the conclusion of Treaty both these states obtained their membership of the United Nations.

On the whole the net result of Ostpolitik was the initiation of the process of adjustment from a confronting situation to one of limited cooperation. However the unification effort which started in the wake of Ostpolitik suffered two gravious setbacks in 1974 namely, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and NATO's decision on 12 December 1979 to deploy Pershing Missiles in Western Europe including West German soil.

Inspite of these events, there was a meeting between the then West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and East German Premier Eric Honecker at Warbelinse in the GDR from 11th to 13th December 1981 to deal with bilateral issues. The normalisation process had smooth sailing due to West Germany's willingness to revoke the installation of Pershing

Missiles. At that time international conditions were near conducive to such normalisation process, because arms control negotiation had already been started between the two superpowers. Above all, Gorbachev's advent to power was a watershed in reunification process.

**CHAPTER II**

**THE NEW THINKING: CHANGE IN  
SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY-  
STRATEGIC POSITION IN EAST EUROPE**

A. Introduction

After assuming power in early 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a series of reforms to bring about far-reaching transformation of domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. His proposals in the field of foreign policy and international relations came to be known as "The New Thinking".

The New Thinking signified an innovation in determining the relationship between states and other actors in international arena in the context of ideologically opposing state systems. It effected a major shift from the old thinking in Soviet foreign policy and thereby led to epoch-making changes in international realtions, too.

The old thinking, in general, was based on what may be called a realistic theory of international politics, emphasizing balance of power and national interest. In the long run, the old thinking brought about queer competition for raw power, which eventually made the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe an impossibility. The socialist ideology, as professed by the USSR reinforced such an approach to international politics, no less than imperialism. The major problem that confronted Gorbachev was the old concept of balance of power with war as a necessary and inevitable part of it. Similarly, the foreign policies of all countries were also designed within the narrow definition of "national

interest" that constituted the biggest danger to peace and stability in the world.<sup>1</sup>

Among the most important results of the New Thinking were the changes in East European countries, following the introduction of reform package by Gorbachev. The vibrating changes in East Europe, apart from pulling down socialist regimes, modified the strategic military position of the Soviet Union in the region and ultimately compelled Gorbachev to thoroughly redefine the old Soviet relations with East Europe. Besides examining the concept of New Thinking in general which included, among others, such important ideas as "comprehensive global security", "common European Home" and "freedom of choice", "balance of interest",<sup>2</sup> etc. this chapter will specifically address itself to the issues related to the changing dimensions of Soviet foreign dimensions of Soviet foreign policy in East Europe under Gorbachev.

#### B. Gorbachev's New Thinking

The first manifestation of new thinking can be traced to a speech of Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress. Later in his book 'Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World' he made systemic elaboration of this concept. He said

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1. See P.N. Haskar in V.D. Chopra, ed., Mikhail Gorbachev's New Thinking: A Critical Assessment (New Delhi, Continental, 1988), pp.129-130.
  2. Hannes Adomeet, "Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking Realignment of Power", Problems of Communism (Washington), vol.39, no.4, July-August 1990. p.1.

that the basis of new way of thinking was the recognition of the priority of human values. In precise terms, he placed importance on the question of humankind's survival. The security of the world was said to be threatened by international tension, emerging as a result of the cold war, apparent ecological doom and looming nuclear holocaust. The New Thinking rejected class motivated approach to all phenomena and made a departure from Marxian philosophy of which class antagonism was a hallmark.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the philosophy behind 'New thinking' envisaged that survival of human being was more important than class interest. The very existence of human being could bring conflict, competition, cooperation, cohesion among themselves. Without the existence of human being on the globe, the ideology has no meaning at all. He made it clear that peaceful human existence will be the precondition for the survival of human being.

New Thinking brought about resolute renewal of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It added a new dynamism to Soviet foreign policy in as much as it was not a closed doctrine like peaceful coexistence. In order to bring fundamental change in international relations, Gorbachev's New Thinking made the following far reaching proposals.

- (i) a system of comprehensive security

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3. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and World (London: Collins, 1987), pp.146-147.

- (ii) peaceful coexistence
- (iii) balance of interest
- (iv) reasonable defence sufficiency and doctrine of non-offensive defence
- (v) freedom of choice
- (vi) international economic security
- (vii) reduction of the level of arms as a way towards strengthening national and regional security
- (viii) withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territories
- (ix) confidence building measure
- (x) interdependence of states, humanising interstate relationship
- (xi) Common European home.<sup>4</sup>

It would be in order here to analyse in brief some of these proposals.

(i) Security

Security, along with national interest, political and economic potentials, defence requirements were traditional features of the soviet foreign policy. The security concept had correlation with non-traditional factors inherent in foreign policy, that was ideology. The past dogmatic adherence to ideology in foreign policy was reinterpreted by Gorbachev in the light of changing international scenario.<sup>5</sup>

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4. Times of India (New Delhi), June 29, 1988.

5. See Zafar Imam, Soviet Foreign Policy (1917-90) (New Delhi: Sterling, 1991), p.1.



But the new political outlook was based on one simple axiom that security was indivisible.<sup>6</sup> the threat to peace by one state also involved the threat to peace of all. For example, the insecurity of the U.S.A. causes insecurity for the Soviet Union too. Such an approach ran counter to the narrow definition of security which argued that "security can be defined in terms of absence of threats and conflicts and accumulation of instruments of power to ensure it".<sup>7</sup> It was further argued that due to what was called the 'balance of terror' and 'deterrence' in international relation, the accumulation of armaments and ammunition would not be able to ensure the security of a nation. Thus a broader and more urgent idea of security was needed.<sup>8</sup>

The nuclear revolution and bipolar international system that emerged after World War II, totally changed the international security. No doubt, the idea of security as cited above emerge out of taking the cognisance of realities which prevailed in international relations in post Second World War era. Thus Gorbachev's concept of security was the

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6. Gorbachev, n.3, p.140.

7. M. Abdul Hafiz, "New Challenge to Security Studies", Bliss Journal (Dhaka), vol.11, no.4, 1990, p.421.

8. It would be logical here to note a broader concept of security as defined by McNamara: Security means development, security is not military hardware, though it may involve it. Security is not military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development, there can be no security.

See Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York, 1968), p.149.

most consummate articulation of the understanding of this reality. In his view security could not be achieved by the use of naked force or military means.

Security was indivisible and there should be equality of security of all members of world community. Universal security was based on recognition of the right of every nation to choose its own path of social development by renouncing the interference in the domestic affairs of other states and becoming self-critical of its own security.<sup>9</sup>

There was a time when a war produced revolution without destabilising international security. But since the nuclear revolution, any sort of war had the potential of becoming a threat to global security. Gorbachev sought to find the interdependence of war and revolution. In the past, revolution was followed by war. The glaring example was the Paris commune, that was the result of Franco-Russian war. The 1905 Russian revolution was also preceded by Russo-Japanese war. Further the World War I kindled the October Revolution in Russia and the World War II brought about a new revolution in East European countries. The cause and effect relationship between the war and revolution had changed due to the fact that the potential nuclear catastrophe in international arena had assumed the alarming proportion. He said "a nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political,

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9. Gorbachev, n.3, p.143.

economic, ideological and other goals".<sup>10</sup> Gorbachev also continued to say that nuclear war was senseless, irrational and suicidal.<sup>11</sup>

(ii) Peaceful Coexistence

It was evident that war in one part of globe had disturbed peace in the other part of it. Gorbachev in his 'New Thinking' reinterpreted the concept 'peaceful coexistence' suitably to ensure global security. Peaceful coexistence having Marxist ideological connotation was the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy. Lenin, had made the twin concept of peaceful coexistence and 'proletariat internationalism' the basic aim of soviet foreign policy. However, till Gorbachev, the term had been interpreted by Soviet leaders only in the context of socialist ideology. Peaceful coexistence meant to them only temporary truce between two opposing state systems. The permanent peace could emerge only after the conclusion of class struggle. Lenin, who declared peaceful coexistence the sheet-anchor of peaceful relation between states with different socio-economic systems, had also emphasized peaceful competition between two systems and collective self-defence.<sup>12</sup> But Gorbachev emphasised that permanent peace could be achieved only through collective coexistence. He immunised the above

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10. Ibid., p.140.

11. Ibid., p.140.

12. See L.C. Kumar, The Soviet Union and European Security (New Delhi: Radiant, 1987), p.22.

concept from Marxian ideology. Peaceful coexistence could be effected through dialogue and cooperation, not through peaceful competition between two opposing state systems.

(iii) Balance of Interest and the Doctrine of Reasonable Sufficiency

It is clear that peace and security are indivisible. Peace and security could be established and sustained by maintaining balance of interest and not balance of power. Balance of power was a concept of realistic theory in international politics which eventually brought about 'balance of terror'. Balance of interest, on the other hand, called for accommodation and interdependence among states. The balance of interest was mainly between two opposing state systems. In order to achieve the balance of interest, negotiation, compromise, mutual give and take would be taken into consideration in interstate relationship.<sup>13</sup>

(iv) Freedom of Choice

The freedom of choice was also a hallmark of New Thinking. Gorbachev, in this regard, said that the East European states must make their own history. The East European states, which were once under control of the Soviet Union in the name of ideology were given freedom to decide their path of development independently. Gorbachev rejected what he called paternalism and hegemonism pursued earlier by

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13. Imam, n.5, p.155.

Moscow which had been evident in Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Stationing troops in the GDR and in other parts of the world was said to be a design to expand Soviet hegemonism. Further, the Soviet doctrine of socialist internationalism and export of revolution was squarely abandoned by Gorbachev in favour of freedom of choice, equality and voluntary cooperation. The easing of ideological fundamentalism and deideologising of Soviet foreign policy made it a success.

(v) Common European Home

In the European context one of the aims of the New Thinking was to achieve what Gorbachev called 'Common European Home'. It was not that Gorbachev talked of the concept for the first time. In fact, he gave a practical shape to the concept. Since 1957, following the Treaty of Rome, the idea of European integration had been emphasised by successive generation of leaders. The idea of Common European Home as visualised by Gorbachev was basically based on the broader principles of the New Thinking discussed earlier. Balance of interest and shunning the military competition were to be the guiding principles to achieve this goal. . Added to its security aspects was also the objective of political and economic union of Europe inherent in the concept.

C. **NEW THINKING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

As a process, New Thinking also received external

stimuli from international environment and internal impetus from the restructuring of Soviet society. The disarmament package between two superpowers and structural changes in international system accelerated the tempo of the process of New Thinking.

Gorbachev accelerated the disarmament process in order to contain clash and confrontation between the two opposing state systems head by two superpowers. The disarmament initiative was geared through negotiation and dialogue.

The disarmament summits laid emphasis on phased destruction of nuclear arsenals for peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev pushed further his concept of New Thinking by signing the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) Treaty with the US President Ronald Reagan without insisting on American suspension of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 1987. The INF Treaty envisaged the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground launched missiles system with the range between 500 to 5000 k.m. Openness in nuclear age is the requirement of time for the common advantage as was advocated by American Nuclear Physicist Nid Bohr. Indeed Gorbachev considered, the time ripe to make out his policy of openness in international system.<sup>14</sup> The 1986 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Stockholm introduced certain disarmament package. IN this conference Gorbachev's role was no less important. The Stockholm Document included on-site

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14. McGeorge Bundy, "From Cold War Towards Trusting Peace", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.69, no.1, 1990, p.212.

inspection of strategic places in respective countries. The on-site inspection had considerably reduced the fear-psychosis between the two rival countries. Further the Geneva Summit (1985), Reykjavik summit (1986) and above all the Moscow Summit were also very important in bringing disarmament question nearer to solution. Moreover the good understanding between summitteers (Reagan, Bush and Gorbachev) brought about dynamic relationship between the two super powers.

Likewise, the Sino-Soviet detente came about in the wake of formal ending of enmity between the two communist giants in thirty years. The Soviet disengagement from adjoining socialist countries and regional conflicts and withdrawal of troops from different parts of the globe expedited the disarmament process. The unilateral withdrawal of troops and budget cut on defence were also remarkable moves in that direction. The supply of arms to the developing countries by the Soviet Union was curtailed.

The New Thinking as a process democratised the international relation. It took bold initiatives for the protection of environment, human rights, freedom of travel and information.<sup>15</sup>

Above all, Gorbachev as an individual became a factor of considerable importance. Being a man of vision, he proved himself to be a man of practice, too. In Sidney Hook's words

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15. See Imam, n.5, p. 157.

"Mikhail Gorbachev is an event making man, whose actions transformed the historical context in which he acts".<sup>16</sup> It is pertinent to note here that Gorbachev shared Khrushchev's ideology and objectives but differed from him in *modus operandi*.

#### D. NEW THINKING AND EAST EUROPE

Eastern Europe as a block under the Soviet leadership was formed after the Second World War. The ideological contest at systemic level between two superpowers may also be said to have started in the same period. The origin of cold war could be traced back to the ideology. To set it differently, Cold War between two superpowers was an ideological struggle between two antithetical world ideological systems.<sup>17</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union had vigorously tried to extend their respective influences beyond their territories. As a result the Eastern Europe came under the Soviet sphere of influence and was constituted as socialist bloc. The Eastern Europe's geographical proximity with the Soviet Union facilitated this transformation which was further strengthened by ideological expansion pursued by the Soviet Union.

Before the First World War, East Europe served as a buffer zone between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

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16. Jeans S. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.69, no.1, 1990, p.2.
17. Ivor B. Neuman, "Soviet Foreign Policy Towards her European Allies: Interest and Instruments", Cooperation and Conflict (Norway), vol.23, no.4, 1988, p.222.



A number of small states emerged out of this buffer zone after the break up of these empires. These states lay between the Soviet Union and Germany. During the Second World War Moscow released these small states from Hitler's stranglehold. Later Joseph Stalin imposed communist rule in all these East European states as a reaction to the expansion of capitalism. Thus, if the Soviet and East European linkage had been established during Second World War, and the Soviet control over this region was consolidated in post War period.

a. Soviet East European Linkage Since Second World War

The linkage between the Soviet Union and East European countries was established and maintained through several instruments. In this connection, Neuman's classification of the Soviet foreign policy instruments into three categories deserves mention. They were as follows:

- i. Ideological instrument;
- ii. Military instrument; and
- iii. Economic instrument

i. Ideological Instrument

The early post-war phase of the Soviet foreign policy aimed at achieving upperhand in ideological contest. It marked the period of cold war. Ideology which was a part of political culture also helped expand Soviet political influence over East European countries. However, the fact was that the Soviet Union had equated the communist interest

with her interest and was behaving as the big brother in world communist system. Thus, the principle of socialist Internationalism had contributed substantially for the development of Pan-Russian nationalism. The doctrine of socialist internationalism was also the code word of Soviet hegemonism and a cardinal principle of Soviet foreign policy. It was substantially reinforced by Brezhnev by making intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.<sup>18</sup> Even during Second World War, the Soviet Union tried to tighten her grip over communist parties of East European countries in the name of ideology. The Cominform was founded in September 1947 in Poland with that motive. It was represented by communist parties of the most East European countries viz. Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, alongwith communist parties of France and Italy. Moreover, the imposition of communist model on East European countries by Joseph Stalin, was further supplanted by the introduction of certain features of Soviet socialism in the hand of subsequent Soviet leaders. Therefore, It was no mistake to name all these East European countries as satellite of Moscow. These countries helped maintain the status of Soviet Union as the leader of socialist bloc in the international sphere. Further, the Soviet Union could use these countries for the collective defence and furtherance of her national interest in the name of ideology.

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18. Boris Meisoner, "The Brezhnev Constitution and the Soviet Foreign Policy", Aussen Politik (Hamburg), vol.29, no.3, pp.270-271.

ii. Military Instrument

The Warsaw Pact provided the military extension of the Soviet Union over East European countries. The dual hegemony in Europe under the caption of Pax-Americana and Pax-Sovietica had shaken the world. In the name of collective defence, two superpowers established two military pacts for their respective security. It is important to note here that under Article 51 of United Nations charter, the collective defence for collective security is permitted but the charter does not permit military pact of any sorts. In spite of that provision, WTO and NATO as instrument of socialist bloc and capitalist bloc respectively were founded for security purpose.

The military instrument of Soviet hegemony was Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). On 14 May 1955, the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland and Romania signed at Warsaw the capital of Poland, a twenty years treaty of friendship and collaboration. It was formed with bold response to the FRG's admission into NATO's fold in 1955. The NATO, which was formed in 1949, pursued the policy of forward strategy to contain the expansion of socialism in international sphere, thereby the influence of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact had remained politically a useful instrument in time of peace and a little more than an appendix to the Soviet High Command in time of war. The provision was that the majority of non-general staff in the event of war were to be placed directly under the command of the Soviet general staff. The East European high command and

parliament was to be bypassed. The only exception in this regard was Romania which, despite considerable Soviet pressure, maintained control over her armed forces. The Soviet Union established her influence over East European countries by stationing troops in East Europe including the GDR and giving military aid also.

iii. Economic Instrument

The economic extension of the influence of the Soviet Union was maintained by a multilateral economic organisation, namely COMECON. It was setup in Moscow and had its founder member among East European countries. These states were USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Later, Albania, the GDR, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam were also admitted into the fold of COMECON. The objective of COMECON was to safeguard common interest of all socialist countries against capitalist countries domination, through expanding mutual economic cooperation. The COMECON member countries had to rehabilitate and reconstruct ravages caused on them in the Second World War. It was designed in response to Marshall Plan of USA, the aim of which was to reconstruct war ravaged countries by providing aid. The COMECON had introduced 'transferable ruble' a national currency for settling accounts among its member countries. But, in practice, the transferable ruble was not transferable to any third member country of COMECON.<sup>19</sup> It is

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19. R.G. Gidadhubli, "COMECON: Can it Survive", World Focus, July- August, 1990, p.19.

quite evident from above analysis that the Soviet Union had strong control over East European states in economic matters also. Further, the Soviet Union had been providing to its allies economic aid and raw materials, especially oil. Through strong cooperation with the Soviet Union, the East European countries could withstand the general economic crisis of 1960s and many other subsequent problems.

b. Gorbachev's Proposal and Soviet Foreign Policy Conduct and its Impact on East Europe

One of important postulates of New Thinking, as discussed earlier was 'freedom of choice' which was highly significant from the point of view of changes that occurred in East European countries. Gorbachev declared that the East European countries must make their own history. The old Soviet control over East European countries was denounced by him. His leadership had given ample freedom to socialist countries to pursue their own model of development, independent of Soviet Union's control. Further the political and economic changes in the Soviet Union had brought about dramatic changes in political and economic domain of East European countries, too. We described below some of the most dramatic of these events in countries of East Europe.

Romania

The most violent political transformation took place in Romania. On 22 December, 1989 the communist leader, Nicolae Ceausescu was deposed and later executed. With the overthrow

of Ceausescu, the communist regime in Romania came to an end. The National Salvation Front (NSF) headed by Ion Iliescu assumed leadership of the Republic of Romania thereby brought an end to the communist linkage between the USSR and Romania. Thus, the old relationship was transformed into a mere bilateral relation based on mutual interest. It was said that Ion Iliescu was deeply influenced by Gorbachev, as he had association with Gorbachev during his student life at Moscow university.<sup>20</sup>

Ethnic issue was also a factor that had been disturbing the Soviet position in Romania. The Moldavian republic of the USSR had been advocating independence from the Soviet Union, though they had not made it clear to join Romania under Ceausescu's leadership. But after the demise of Ceausescu, the Moldavian popular front expressed willingness for Soviet Moldavian's aspiration for unification with Romania. It may be noted here that most of Moldavia's people were ethnically Romanian and had common border with Romania also.

### Poland

Unlike Poland witnessed the downfall of communist regime in a peaceful way. Before the Solidarity party came to office Poland had relationship of different kind with the USSR determined more by ideological, political and military

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20. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, December 1989, p.37105.

considerations. Moreover, the question of Poland's boundary with GDR was the prime concern for both USSR and Poland in Poland in any process related to German unification. The relationship between the two countries after the change of leadership in Poland was based on bilateralism. The 1965 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the USSR was renegotiated by removing communist elements of the document. Moreover Poland and the USSR had taken the pledge for the transformation of the existing bloc alliance into new system of collective European security.

### Hungary

Like Poland, Hungary also produced a very peaceful scenario. The centre right populist Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) emerged victorious in the election to National Assembly. The other political parties, got proliferated in the communist party were the Christian Democratic Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Patriotic People's Front. It brought about the multi-party system and these parties were largely independent of Soviet control.

Added to these changes in political sphere, certain changes were also introduced in economic sphere, thereby bringing the old economic dependence East Europe on the Soviet Union for development to a halt. The market economy was started to be introduced in these countries following the economic reforms in the USSR.

Another proposal of Gorbachev with regard to East European countries was his declaration on East Europe in 28th Congress of the CPSU. He declared that "the closest relationship with East European countries could only be one built on the principle of voluntary association and mutual respect and cooperation". Later, Gorbachev also placed focus on following points at a meeting of political consultative committee of WTO in June 1989.

1. That the Warsaw Pact needed to be transformed from a military one to a politico-military one. This would infact promote the move towards the disbanding of the WTO.
2. There were no universal socialist models and no one has the monopoly on the truth. Thus each country must choose its own future.
3. There must be no interference in socialist state from outside, no matter what the pretext might be.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, it is clear that the relation between the USSR and East European countries underwent changes as they did not have common enemy after deideologisation of the Soviet foreign policy. In line with the Soviet undertaking in 1989, to bring home all its foreign based troops by the end of this century, the USSR agreed in March 1990 to withdraw all its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungay by mid -1991. The

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21. Quoted in Anuradha M. Chenoy, "New Thinking and Soviet Relations with East Europe", unpublished article.



strategic importance of the Soviet Union in East Europe had already become weak due to the disengagement of its bases from this area. After the withdrawal of troops from East Europe, Warsaw Pact became a loose organisation and eventually it was disbanded on 31 April 1991.<sup>22</sup>

The Soviet leader initiated market economy in recent past to bail out the country from economic stagnation. But the consequence was dangerous as it brought about food shortage and economic instability. It had adverse impact on the economic cooperation among socialist countries, too. The major factor for such adversity was the inability of the Soviet Union to fulfil the contractual agreement with East European states to keep the supply of energy intact. Moscow reduced its export of crude oil to East Europe by 30 per cent in 1990. In the first half of 1991 also, the Soviet trade with East Europe dropped by more than 50 per cent.<sup>23</sup> Owing to financial crunch, the Soviet Union could not provide raw materials and financial aid to Eastern Europe. Rather the USSR had expressed its desire to become member of EEC. As a result East European states were also seeking financial aid from the IMF and world bank.

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22. Libor Roucek, 'USSR, Eastern Europe: A Wary damage - limitation' World Today (London), Vol.47, no.6, June 1991, p.96.

23. See Ibid.

c. Implication of Strategic-Military Changes of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe

From the foregoing analysis, the implication of the change of strategic-military position of the USSR in East Europe could be summed up on following lines.

- (i) The Warsaw Pact and COMECON were virtually dead, thereby the instrument of the Soviet influence has also came to an end.
- (ii) normal bilateral relations were established between the Soviet Union and the East European countries, and
- (iii) with the policy of 'Common European Home' a major drive was initiated towards the greater unity of Europe. In other words, it signified the tendency of the Euro-centrism among East European countries.

Gorbachev's policies and proposals about East Europe; enunciated in the principles of New Thinking brought about changes in East Europe that ensured peace. It was a factor which proved extremely helpful in creating conducive international situation that quickened the process of German unification.

**CHAPTER III**  
**GERMAN UNIFICATION:**  
**ISSUES AND PROBLEMS**

## Introduction

The question of German unification as a process had involved several problems and issues. The attempts, before Gorbachev to bring about German unification were surrounded by problems. It was indeed impossible to achieve unification without solving these problems. With the earlier leadership of the Soviet Union and the policies pursued by it the accomplishment of German unification would have remained more in the realm of dream and aspirations. However, with the rise of Gorbachev to power, and the change in international scenario it became possible to translate the dream into reality. Moreover, the German unification opened the door for larger European Integration, also.

This chapter seeks to examine the issues involved in the process of unification which were of three different kinds, viz. security and world peace, end of ideology and European integration. Moreover, it would also be relevant to point out the existence of correlation between issues and problems involved in the process of German unification. Among them mention may be made of economic, ideological and territorial- boundary problems which were the main concern of the Soviet Union

### A. Issues

It may be argued that the unification of Germany was brought about in the context of

Pan-European unification. The completion of unification process also paved the way for East-West linkage. As already pointed out the outstanding issues before German unification were as follows:

1. Security and world peace;
2. End of ideology; and
3. European integration

These issues were also accompanied by so many problems because the fulfilment of these issues attracted certain ostensible problems. It is pertinent here to discuss these issues in detail.

1. Security and World Peace

Gorbachev rightly emphasised that peace and security are indivisible. The challenge to security in one part of globe also endangers the security and peace in other part of the globe in view of the fact that the regional war has every possibility of rolling into a global war. Thus even a regional war has global repercussions. Indeed every country is related to international community in one way or other. Chan Young seek in his 'White paper on world peace' had discussed about the problems and challenges to world peace. In his view, the present changes in the world is the third revolution which is the synthesis of first and second revolutions. The third revolution, he argues is to achieve universal democracy and peace for people. He calls the French Revolution, the first revolution and Bolsheivk

revolution as second democratic revolution. The basic spirits of universal democracy are humanisation, internationalisation, rationalism and internationalism. The unification of Germany and democratisation of East European countries had urged Europe to strive towards continental unity and one world order. It practically influenced the dissolution of WTO on 31 April, 1991 and the comecon.<sup>1</sup>

But there problems also in the path to achieve world peace. Even if WTO ceased to exist the presence of NATO reminds the apparent danger to peace. Though NATO has rejected the forward defence strategy, there is no guarantee that USA may not take recourse to old strategy to strengthen its interest. The USA is now the unchallenged leader in world politics. President Bush's idea of new world order is based on US leadership, which may again invite the hegemonistic doctrine of Pax Americana.<sup>2</sup> Now the role of USA in Europe swings between the sole balancer and guarantor of peace and security. The previous attitude of USA was based on the combined principle of deterrence and detente. Now the role of USA seems to be fourfolds.

- to balance the nuclear power of the countries of former USSR

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1. Chan Young Seek, White Paper on World Peace, (Kyung Hee University Press, 1991), p.445.
2. Michael Stulrmer, "European Security in the 1990s and the Role of Germany", World Affairs (New Delhi), June 1991, p.23.

- to give assurance to the East European nations about their future security between Germany and Russia.
- to balance west Europe
- to be the leader of open market.<sup>3</sup>

### Role of Unified Germany in European Security

The role of Germany in European security was very important in the light of European integration. The military status of Germany would determine the role of Germany in European security. But it was precisely, the military status of Germany which was a bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the F.R.G and her western allies. However, the military status of Germany can be looked into, taking into account the following three options for Germany:

1. Membership of the Warsaw Pact.
2. Neutrality or non-alignment
3. Membership of NATO.

The option of joining Warsaw Pact became unrealisable as Warsaw pact had been dismantled on April 31, 1991 and with that one of the old cold war military alliances came to a virtual end.

The second option of neutrality was suggested by Hans Modrow, the last Prime Minister of former GDR in his plan for German unification. That proposal represented the SED position in East Germany. However, it lost its significance

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3. Ibid., p.24.

after the general election held on 18 March, 1990. In the election, SED lost the election battle to Christian Democratic Party's alliance under the leadership of Maizer. That proposal was outrightly rejected by the West German government. The plan recalled the proposals suggested by Stalin in 1952. The west had also disapproved of it because of the inadequacy of the means available to ensure its durability. Furthermore neutrality of the Austrian and Swedish type was also currently debated for the other east and south European countries as well. Swelling of ranks of neutrals would be dangerous in itself and not conducive to peace and stability in Europe. Further, neutralism had meaning only in relation to the two adversarial forces pitched against each other in bipolar system. The bipolar structure was virtually dysfunctional now. In any case, it would not help build the 'European Common House'. Neutralism was not acceptable to France the USA and UK. France wanted Germany to be part of EC and the USA and Britain wanted it to be the part of NATO.

Thus the third option appeared to be only practicable solution - United Germany to be a member of NATO. There were however two compelling reasons why a United Germany would be interested in NATO.

a. Geopolitical Proximity

After parting away of Baltic republics from the Soviet Union, the latter still remained the dominant landpower in



Europe. There was an apprehension that a future Soviet might still seek to use its residual military force in western Europe for political purposes. Thus, due to geographical proximity with the Soviet Union, Germany needed a sufficient deterrent against such danger. At the same time, there was expected to be strong political pressures operating both within and outside the country to keep German armed forces limited and to rely on a mixed German and allied power. successive generation of FRG leaders from Konard Adenaur to Helmut Kohl have agreed that only the United States could provide the proper balance of power in Europe.

ii. Germany's Adherence to NPT

Germany being a non-nuclear power in the Soviet neighbourhood wanted to be in the fold of allied powers to safeguard its interest. After unification, Germany has also reaffirmed its commitment to NPT to which the FRG was also party before hand. However, the non-nuclear Germany would continue to require an extended nuclear guarantee in the light of Soviet nuclear capabilities. For that reason, the option for joining NATO became clear which had nuclear gaints like USA, and UK etc. as its members.

Most of the European countries including Balkan countries (the countries between Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea) Benelex countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Lexumburg) and the western allied countries were suspicious of German unification. Though it was included in NATO structure and

debarred from producing war materials, they feared that under any circumstances it might awake again to shake the world. That is why the issue of German unification was of such greater concern for superpowers as well as European powers than for German themselves. While Germans were looking at their future, others were looking into Germany's past history and were afraid of the rise of another German power in the name of racial superiority. Hence they wanted that Germany should become a European Germany and that Europe should never be allowed to become Germany's Europe.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet version of the security of Germany lay in the reemphasis on the neutral status of Germany. Gorbachev, in the beginning of his tenure, reiterated the proposal of Stalin. About the status of Germany in Europe, he feared that the inclusion of Germany into NATO's fold would strengthen the superiority of the USA which might cause European destabilisation Europe. But in the latter phase of his tenure he conceded to the proposal of two plus four formula. In fact the inclusion of Germany in NATO was implicitly evident in the proposal. Though Gorbachev had rejected the proposal of Hanns Genscher, the foreign Minister of the FRG for inclusion of Germany in NATO structure, he agreed it indirectly for European integration.

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4. Hannes Adomeit, "The German Factor in Soviet-West Politik", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Washington), vol.481, no.5, September 1985, p.27.

ii. End of Ideology

Every event moves in a zigzag way. Antithesis comes as a challenge to thesis as a result of which synthesis emerges. The synthesis is a development of the concept or event. The apparent end of one ideology has brought cessation of challenge to other ideology which is obtaining in the prevailing circumstances. The ideology which owes its origin back to the Greek period is changing itself for its survival. But Marxism, due to its unadaptability could not prove to be a mature ideology. The end of ideology means the convergence of two ideologies. The liberalism has already accepted certain features from socialism in a piecemeal way. Daniel Bell is one of the foremost proponents of convergence of ideologies.<sup>5</sup> The end of ideology, once upon a time regarded as an utopia, became a reality, with the completion of German unification process. It brought about the unchallenged leadership of USA in world politics. Further the cold war also receded as a result of this epochal event. Cold war was indeed a product ideology and Germany was the worst victim of it. The convergence of ideology made the achievement of global peace a near possibility.

iii. European Integration

The German unification was effected in the context of European community and pan-European process for common

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5. M.P. Jain, Political Theory (authors Guild, New Delhi, 1987), p.612.

security. The process of German unification was interlinked with the ongoing process of constant and intensified integration of European community. From the very beginning, the FRG as a separate state had stressed that European integration and German unification were not mutually exclusive but were sides of one and same coin. Even the treaty of Rome in 1957 and the preamble to the German Constitution (Basic Law) held the existence of interlink between German unification and European integration. Bertrand Russel had visualised that world federation could materialise in three ways:

- agreement among states to achieve integration.
- Victory of one of the superpowers could be instrumental in bringing about federation.
- Agreement between the two superpowers to achieve federation.

The last alternative has been gaining ground after the moves made by Gorbachev leadership. Both the Soviet Union and the FRG have been demanding institutionalisation of CSCE process and the establishment of multilateral bodies. The institutions proposed by the Soviet Union included the followings

- a. a council of Greater Europe - a form of the top leaders of CSCE member countries, which could meet in the capitals of member countries. Alternatively, not less

than once every two years, to consider principal problems of European politics and work out on the basis of a consensus principal decisions and specific solutions.

- b. a committee of foreign ministers, convened twice a year could become the body responsible for the implementation of these decisions.
- c. a small permanent secretariat.
- d. a consultative mechanism consisting of ambassadors from 35 countries of the CSCE, and
- e. a European verification agency.<sup>6</sup>

To these proposals Mr. Genscher, the Foreign Minister of the FRG, had added a few more points for the establishment of additional institutions, such as

- a. a pan-European institution for the protection of human rights. The court of human rights and the human commission of the council of Europe;
- b. a European centre for the early and political settlement of conflicts;
- c. a centre for establishing the European legal area and harmonising European law;
- d. a European environmental agency; and
- e. an institution for promoting economic cooperation in Europe.<sup>7</sup>

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6. R.K. Jain, "German Unification and East West Relations", unpublished, p.13.

7. Ibid., p.14.

Even Mr. Harris in his book 'Fatherland' mentioned that Germans in 1942 thought of founding a European economic community, and European Central Bank which Hitler wanted to base in Berlin. He said that now Chancellor Kohl wanted to base it in Frankfurt.<sup>8</sup>

The present process European integration is not confined to western Europe alone. Previously the West European Union (WEU) was assigned the stupendous task of bringing in such integration. Now the European integration attracts the participation of all countries including United Germany.

#### Economic Integration

Economic integration in Europe is the main issue on the way to its political integration. The FRG was a dominant economic power in Western Europe and consequently a linchpin of East-west relationship. The FRG was also the largest donor of aid to Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, the biggest trade partner of COMECON and the Soviet Union and had the largest share in joint ventures.<sup>9</sup> The European Monetary System (EMS) established in March 1979 has been regarded as an extension of Deutsche Mark Zone in which the Bundesbank became the monetary centre of gravity.<sup>10</sup> Such a process of European integration, in spite of vehement opposition from

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8. Times of India (New Delhi), 10 May 1992.

9. See Jain, n.6, p.15.

10. See *ibid.*

statespersons like Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain is heading in positive direction.

## B. Problems

Besides these issues, there were problems in achieving integration and German unification. These problems were the main concerns for the Soviet Union and other related countries.

### 1. Boundary Problems

The boundary line between Poland and the USSR was of utmost concern for both the countries. It was due to this problem, the USSR had shown ambivalent attitude to the problem of Germany's unification. The boundary issue was a problem for Poland due to an historical accident. The eastern part of the GDR was granted to Poland by the Soviet Union in order to suitably compensate for the territory of eastern Poland which was included in the Soviet Union on the basis of agreement concluded between Hitler and Stalin. Further, 24 per cent of German population lived beyond the Oder-Niesse line.<sup>11</sup> The Germans living in Poland might arise in future and demand their assimilation into the German fatherland. The boundary tangle was however, amicably resolved as the FRG had to pay for it. The FRG agreed to accord recognition to the existing borderline between Poland and the GDR on permanent basis.

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11. Walter Hubatch ed., The German Eastern Territories (New York, Berder Book Centre, 1967), p.305.

ii. Economic Problem

The other important problem was related to industrial and commercial area. The FRG was having a market economy with the capitalist mode of production and a network of social security. But with the unification and consequent monetary union, the East Germany faced the problem of how to come out of the communist mode of production and the Soviet type of centrally planned economy. The impacts of unification on the psyche of East German people were also profound. To reject the long standing culture infavour of market economy, though not a unacctable proposition, was hard to implement. The initial stage of unification saw the loss of job for most East Germans. The unemployment problem was alarming with it attendant burden on the FRG.<sup>12</sup>

a. Cost of German Unification

The entire cost of German unification was to be met by the FRG. The development and prosperity of the FRG in comparison with GDR was much greater. The ratio between the West German Mark and the East German current has been reduced from 1:3 to 1:2. Further, investment in the GDR and to balance the development of United Germany became the concern of chancellor Helmut Kohl, The market economy has replaced the socialist planning in the GDR.

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12. Gerhard Wetting, "Problems of German Unification", Aussen Politik (Hamburg), vol.41, no.4, 1990, pp.316-17.



The problem was visible in state apparatus also. With the demise of SED, the CDU and its allies became victorious in the elections in the GDR. Some of these alliance parties have shown inclination towards socialist principles. The role of these parties in changed situation is also a puzzle.

The present position of Germany is also feared to be posing problems for some other countries. Obviously the new Germany will be economically stronger in the context of the European community. Such a position and role of Germany is not so much accepted by Britain.

Even France worried about European dominance by Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany as is well known was leading economic power in Europe. Unification with East Germany has increased its population by over 27 per cent. Its combined military power now number 1.8 million regular and reserved forces. Thus, the forces of combined Germany is the most formidable factor in Europe. With such a formidable position it would not be unlikely that German would want to play a leading role. Further, the prospects of an investment boon in Eastern Europe accompanied by the unification of two Germanys into one powerful state has generated a feeling among Europeans that the 90s will be the German decade. In the framework of 'Europe 1992' European economies are likely to grow rapidly with Germany being in their lead.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand,, the memories of the two World Wars are still afresh among all European countries.

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13. Newsweek (New York), 26 February 1990.p.7.

That was the reason why once they endorsed the division of Germany.<sup>14</sup> Now they fear that the leading role of Germany may lead again to the worst product of racialism.

It is evident from above facts that with about 80 million people, a formidable army and one of the leading and fast growing export driven economy at the global scale United Germany poised to emerge as a super power, though its traditional post-war status may not be termed as superpower in traditional post-war sense. In the contemporary world economic strength is the yardstick of power rather than military might. It is fact that as long as the world remains in a state of equilibrium, super power status will be defined mainly by commercial and monetary strength than by military powers. However, in both respects the unified Germany might qualify for superpowers.

These above mentioned problems were tackled in effective manner to bring about Germany unification. The remaining problems inherent in unification of German states It was agreed would be resolved through dialogue. The apparent danger of cold war has subsided with the convergence of ideology. In solving these problems, related to the unification of Germany. The role of the Soviet Union was by all means. decisive.

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14. James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, Havard University Press, 1966), p.366.

**CHAPTER IV**  
**PLANNING THE UNIFICATION**

## A. INTRODUCTION:

The map of Europe had been redrawn for several times as a result of major wars that had been fought on the continent. With the German unification this map was again redrawn. This chapter analyses several proposals for German Unification. These proposals included the Modrow plan, the proposals of Hann Genscher and the two-plus-four Formula. This also examines Gorbachev's German policy and how it helped accelerate the unification process. Further, it looks into the attitudes of Gorbachev towards the issue of unification in different stages of his tenure.

There are divergent views as to the term German Unification. Some scholars call it reunification, while others prefer to call it unification. The basis of naming it reunification of Germany lies on the fact that Germany was unified once before the present unification. The previous unification was effected under the leadership of Otto Von Bismarck, through his "Iron and Blood" policy in 1871. Ironically, the war which had brought unification was also responsible for Germany's division in 1945. However, those who name it as German Unification, perhaps call it so due to the importance of unity of two Germanys for international peace and security. Further, the previous unification was brought about under duress. But the latter unification was more of Germans than Germany's. It was German people who

wanted unification. The Germans in the GDR initiated the process by infiltrating into West Germany through Hungary and Austria for better economic opportunity and meeting their kith and kin in spite of opposition from Eric Honecker's government. In this connection Dr. Thomas Meyer observes that while the unification of the German Reich in 1871 started with the annexation of Alsace Lorraine, the unification of the new Germany commences with declaration of the guarantee of the western border of Poland. While the unification of 1871 was implemented by a hypertrophic state from above, the unification of the new Germany had been brought about by peaceful resolution from within society against a hypertrophic state. Whilst there had always been a strong desire for some particular form of deep rooted German culture as opposed to western civilisation, the western tradition of pluralism, culture of conflict resolution and individualism was genuinely enshrined in German culture itself. The present unification did not take place against any of the neighbours of Germany, but in the context of the European Community and the Pan-European process of Common Security.<sup>1</sup>

We prefer here to call it unification. However, the term reunification in this chapter is also referred to at selective places. The German Unification of 1871 was brought

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1. Dr. Thomees, Meyer, 'German Unification and European Integration (unpublished) presented at IIC (ND), (14-17 Sept 1990), p.3.

about under the tutelage of Bismarck. The main architect of present unification were Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet Union, Dr. Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor of the FRG and Herr Hans Modrow, the Prime Minister of the former GDR.

No doubt, the proposal and plans were being put forward by two German states to each other backed by one of the two super powers, since the formation of the FRG and the GDR. But there was not any vigorous attempts to bring about the actual unification. All attempts and policies except the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, the former Chancellor of the FRG, had been frustrated due to their unacceptability by one of the super powers. The proposal for neutral Germany and Basic Treaty between two Germany could not bring about unification. However, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was an exception. The reason underlying such acceptance of Ostpolitik to both Germanys was that the ruling parties in both Germanys had considerable like mindedness owing to their commitment to socialist values in their party objectives. The attempt of Willy Brandt brought in the international recognition of two Germanys in 1972. However, later on he opposed unification and looked for other alternative to achieve cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

Gorbachev was more responsible for bringing about such a hasty unification. His policy of new thinking and glasnost

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2. See International Herald Tribune 8 Dec 1989

created the favourable international climate. The freedom of choice as advocated by Gorbachev made it possible for East Germans to decide their destiny and decide their destiny and nature of political system out of the clutches of Soviet paternalism. The fall out of Glasnost and perestroika was the liberalisation in neighbouring socialist states of East Europe which in turn pushed the German question to the fore. The changes in these countries boosted the morale of East Germans for defying the stalinist rule of Eric Honecker. The Solidarity Party's coming to power in Poland and formation of non-communist government in Hungary were also the sources of inspiration for East Germans. The opening of border between Austria and Hungary made it easier for East Germans to influx into West Germany. Thus the process of unification began on 4 May, 1989, with opening of border between Hungary and Austria. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and, the Foreign Minister of the FRG, Hanns Deitrich Genscher welcomed the refugees in West Germany. Mr. Genscher had also defected from East Germany to West Germany in 1952. He attributed this mass exodus to the lack of political will to reform in the GDR.<sup>3</sup> In fact, Genscher's allegation was one of the main reasons for the mass exodus. There were also other reasons for mass exodus. Large chunk of population had been debarred from maintaining contacts with their relatives residing in the

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3. The Partient (N.D.) 2nd Oct 1989

FRG, after the construction of Berlin wall in 1961. Further, economic sluggishness in East Germany and opposition to introduce new economic policy had also no less impact on refugees exodus. Above all, the East Germans had been lured by West German media -- ARD Television. ADN News Agency, (media network of the FRG) towards economic development in that part. It is undeniable emphasised that it was the people of East Germany who took bold initiative for unification. Hence it is aptly called as unification of Germans along with that of two Germanys.

#### B. GORBACHEV'S GERMAN POLICY (1985-90)

Gorbachev's policy on the German problem evolved on four different but interacting levels.

- (i) Changes in the Soviet Union.
- (ii) Redefining of the Soviet-East Europe relationship.
- (iii) Events in East Germany.
- (iv) Soviet West Politik

##### (i) Changes in the Soviet Union:

There was revolution in domestic sphere of the Soviet Union, as a result of the policy of glasnost and perestroika. The Communist Party was slowly relegated to unimportant position, with the emergence of various parties and forces. The election which was a matter of selection earlier became the real electio in true democratic sense. The most far-



reaching was the introduction of market economy in the place of state planned economy as a result of which, the price began to be determined by the fairplay of demand and supply instead of being administrative price. The banned literature and religious institution again got independence. Another most important change was brought about by the policy of self-determination of republics. The Baltic republics defied the central authority of Moscow. These changes had direct impact on other socialist countries to whom the right to determine their fate had already been given simultaneously under the policy of new thinking.

(ii) Redefining of the Soviet-East European Relationships:

The relationship between the Soviet Union and East European countries were given a new shape, which was the direct result of Gorbachev's policy of new thinking. Instead of behaving like a big brother the Soviet Union climbed down to the role of a state adhering to the principles of correct bilateral relations. In place of monolithic socialist bloc, a number of independent and interdependent states came into being feature for international peace and security. These states were accorded the right to make and shape their own destiny in their own way. That was why a number of non-communist parties came to power in these countries.

(iii) Events in East Germany:

Events in the GDR, in the beginning, was unfavourable for unification. The hardcore Communist Party leader Eric Honecker who was in office even opposed Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika. Eventually, he had to bow down before public pressure by stepping down from office. Herr Egon Krenz came to office and stepped down after a short period on the charge of corruption against him during the reign of Eric Honecker. He was succeeded by Mr. Gregor Gysi. Both of them opposed the plan of German unification given by Helmut Kohl, popularly known as Kohl's ten point programme for Germany's unification. Although the East German constitution had recognised one German nation and held out the hope of reunification of the two Germanys upto 1958. The German Democratic Republic had since 1960s been involved in inculcating a socialist German national consciousness and developing East Germany as a part of the communist world. The move for unification again started in 1987 when East German leadership started to move towards Bonn. However, a clear positive step came to surface, when Prime Minister Eerr, Hanns Modrow came with his blue print. He said introducing the plan that "Germany should again become the unified fatherland of all citizens of German nation"<sup>4</sup> The most important event in bringing about de jure unification was the election in East

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4. The Times (London) 2nd February 1990.

Germany in which Lolhar de Maizer became victorious. The likemindedness between the two parties in two states fructified the defacto unification, after breaking the Berlin wall on 9th November 1989. Before de jure unification, common currency between these two states - Deutschmark also expedited the process.

(iv) Soviet West Politik

Finally, Soviet west politik was the recording of Soviet relation with the United States and Western Europe including West Germany.<sup>5</sup>

After coming to power Gorbachev paid an official visit to Bonn and created conditions for Helmut Kohl's visit to the Soviet Union. The easing of tension with USA had also a soothing effect on West Germany as West Germany was the main ally of USA in NATO. But Gorbachev did not make clear his intention of German Unification with the introduction of his policies of glasnost, perestroika and new thinking.

It is possible to divide Gorbachev's German policy chronologically into three main stages:-

First stage: 1985 to October 1988- Safeguarding stability and status quo;

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5. Hannes Adomeit - Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of thinking and realignment of Powers Problems of Communism (Washington) vol. 39, No.4, July - Aug. 1990, p.3.

Second stage: October 1988 to January 1990- The New Conceptual approach;

Third stage: January 1990 to December 1990- Consent to unification.<sup>6</sup>

(a) Stage One: At the first stage the major emphasis was on domestic affair of the USSR. During that period the political and economic reforms were introduced. The GDR was stable and the German unification was far behind. The relation between the USSR and the west was cool. Gorbachev at the beginning did not make clear his intention of unifying Germany. The plausible explanation was the implicit Soviet apprehension about the risk involved in this exercise. The apprehension of Moscow was the revival of old of Germany claim to demand a part of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The area of eastern Poland had been incorporated into Byelorussia and Ukraine according to the infamous Stalin-Hitler deal in 1939. Later at Potsdam, the USSR with the connivance of USA and UK cut off a substantial part of pre-1937 Germany to compensate Poland.

Also the Soviet Union annexed the northern part of East Prussia again with Western blessing. Even before German unification, Poland had expressed his concern over Oder-Neisse line. Eventually that boundary line between the GDR and Poland was accorded recognition by the west.

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6. *ibid.*, pp.3-4

Gorbachev's policies closely corresponded with his perception of the GDR. The Soviet leader concentrated on better relation with the USA. That was also evident in a number of summit meetings between Gorbachev and the President of the USA, Ronald Regan for disarmament and arms control. Europe played a subsidiary role in Soviet West Politik and west Germany was also given the cold shoulder. Gorbachev's west politik started with his concept of 'common European Home' announced in 1985.

In first stage, there were a number of official visits by the FRG official to elicit Gorbachev's interest in German unification. Hannes Adomeet mentions three visits by chancellor Helmut Kohl to Moscow in July 1983, March 1985 and October 1988, one visit by the President of the FRG to Moscow in July 1987, and five by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and one by Prime Minister of Bavaria and Budan Wurttemberg.<sup>7</sup>

But, Gorbachev made the point clear in October 1988 in the presence of Helmet Kohl at Moscow that he had already spoken several times about the so-called German problem but that matter still needed clarification.<sup>8</sup>

(b) Stage Two: The conceptual reinterpretation of new thinking made a shift in Soviet policies towards Eastern

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7. *ibid.*, p.4

Europe and with regard to German issue. The most important innovation was the principle of freedom of choice. That was first articulated at 19th, All Union Conference of CPSU in June 1988. Again, that principle was clarified by Gorbachev in his December 1988 speech at the United Nations. Gorbachev said that "the Soviet Union had the obligation of the principle of freedom of choice is above every doubt"<sup>9</sup> In February 1988 in Kiev, Gorbachev maintained that relations with the socialist states should be based on unconditional independence, full equality and strict non-intervention in internal affairs of each other. It presupposed the responsibility of the party and government of each socialist country towards its own people. The Soviet Union outrightly rejected Brezhnev's doctrine of intervention and Soviet hegemony. Thereby the Soviet Union made possible for these socialist states to develop their system in accordance with their own wishes.

A Joint Declaration signed between Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl during his visit to West Germany in June 1989 clearly mentioned that the right of all peoples and states were free to determine their destiny. It also accorded with the precedent of international law in domestic and international politics. Gorbachev also agreed to show unqualified respect

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8.    ibid., p.4

9.    ibid., p.5

for norms and principles of international law - the right of people to self-determination.

The Joint Declaration also contained two other important indications of a shift in Soviet thinking on German problem. That was the substitution of a single letter for another - a change in Russian letter from 'i' to 'a'. The very first sentence of the document refers to the Federal Republic of Germany as "*Federatevanaya Respublika Germaniya*' rather than '*Germanii*'<sup>10</sup>. This alternation implied that there was only one Germany (*Germaniya*) with a federal structure rather than two Germanys with only one having a federal structure. This modification was a great achievement for West Germany since the West Germany had persistently tried to get Soviet Union to agree to it.

But the recalcitrant attitude of Eric Honecker made the alienation of SED of the GDR from CPSU Gorbachev even tried to exert pressure on Honecker to reconsider his stand. He reminded the East German leader that "Those who are late will be punished by life itself."<sup>11</sup>

The major breakthrough came with Gorbachev's declaration of reduction of Soviet armed forces by 50,000,

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10. *ibid.*, p.5

11. *ibid.*, p.5

alongwith six Soviet divisions to be withdrawn from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Even in his Vienna talks he agreed to give Soviet concession on conventional forces in Europe (CFF).

(c) Stage Three: At the Soviet - American summit conference at Malta on 3, December 1989, Gorbachev had still asserted Moscow's traditional position on German problem. He reiterated that "these are two German states in Europe today". Hann Modrow on 30, January, 1990 in Moscow acknowledged that pressure was building up for German unification.

But a sudden shift in the stance of the Soviet Union came on account of the fact that irresistible desire of German people had made it feasible to bring about unification at the earliest. Further, the decline of the Soviet power had already been visible in international arena. The market economy helped the big businessman to hoard consumer goods for more profit which shook the financial strength of the Soviet Union. The popular support for perestroika was no more among public. Moreover, the economic predicament of the Soviet Union were also deepened by domestic political developments. Most of the Republics were demanding autonomy and independence from the central rule of the Soviet State.

The institutional framework of Soviet influence and control had become illegitimate and irrelevant. Even the GDR,



Moscow's strategic ally had ceased to be a socialist state with the victory conservative forces in March 1990 elections. The immigration of people from the GDR into the FRG was also alarming. In December 1989 the rate of immigration had fluctuated between 2,000 to 4,000 persons a day. In January 1990 also the GDR Finance Minister revealed that the budget deficit had fallen between 5 to 6 billion East German Marks. The mood of German people was in favour of unification. At the first demonstration of the new year in Leipzig, an estimated 150,000 people participated. They chanted the slogans such as *Deutschland einig Vaterland (Germany United Fatherland)* and *SED auflösen Deutschland Vereinen (Dissove the SED, unite Germany)*<sup>12</sup> In the election held on 18, March 1990 in the East German Parliament (Volkskammer) the SED ceased to be a potential political force in the life of the country. The outcome of this election confirmed the dominant role of Bonn and the West Germany is political parties in East German affairs. The conservative alliance for Germany (Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, Democratic Awakening) won almost an absolute majority of seats.

However, Kohl's historic visit to Moscow in February 1990 brought about historic development with the assurance from Gorbachev that Moscow would respect the right of two Germanys to decide for themselves the timing and structure of

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12. See *ibid*, p.9.

their reunification. The Soviet Union was also aware of the fact that the unification would not be brought about by Germans themselves as the German problem did not exist in isolation from international political situation. The security aspects of unified Germany was also a cause of disturbance and ambivalence in the attitude of the Soviet leaders. Further, the Soviet Union was also fully aware that the unified Germany might most probably shift to the side of NATO structure which was undoubtedly looked upon as a potential danger to the Soviet Union and world peace. The reasons for leaning towards NATO was the role played by CDU in unification and the simultaneous unpopularity of socialist party in East Germany. Gorbachev was reluctant to share the early eagerness of Kohl for unification owing to the above mentioned reasons.

The plethora of proposals put forward by Moscow in the period from mid February to mid July 1990 were convincing evidence of its indecision also. The proposals included:

- (1) the dissolution of the two military alliances and their replacement by permanent Pan-European security structures;
- (2) an Europe wide referendum on international and security aspects of German unification;
- (3) the neutralisation and demilitarisation of Germany;

- (4) a military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France;
- (5) the continued though modified exercise of four powers' occupation right in Germany
- (6) the formation of a centre in Berlin to control all military forces in Germany;
- (7) membership of Germany in both NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation;
- (8) membership of the Soviet Union in NATO; and
- (9) membership of the Federal Republic in NATO and associate states for eastern part of Germany in Warsaw Pact.<sup>13</sup>

These proposals showed the ambivalent position of the Soviet Union. The ambivalence of Soviet attitude was in search of new security arrangement in Europe which would be conducive for ensuring peace and security in the world. Even in 'Four plus two' talks on Germany the Soviet Union had emphasised the same specific conditions. Those included NATO's abandonment of the strategy of 'forward defence', prohibition of NATO forces on what was GDR territory, limitation of the overall size of German armed forces, sufficient reduction of the number of US and other forces in western part of Germany, stationing of Soviet troops in eastern part of Germany only for a transitional period, no

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13. *ibid.*, p.11.

German access to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, no modernisation of US nuclear weapons stationed in West Germany and gradual removal of nuclear weapons from German soil.

On the issue of transformation of military alliances, the Soviet Union was on a lower position in Warsaw Pact foreign ministers conference in Prague in March 1990. Only foreign minister of USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze and East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer insisted on neutralised Germany. Other foreign ministers went to the extent of saying that neutrality would be the worst alternative.<sup>14</sup> By that time only East German counterpart supported the stance of the Soviet Union. That is why the Soviet Union had to concede the proposals of West Germany at later stage with some conditions. The Soviet Union agreed to unified Germany's inclusion into NATO with the conditions that the Soviet troops would remain in the eastern part of Germany until 1994. According to the agreement the stationing cost would be borne by West Germany. At the end of June 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany had consented to pay 1.25 billion Deutschmark (US \$780 million) by the end of December to defray the stationing cost and would continue to do so in all likelihood until the completion of troop withdrawal.

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14. *ibid.*, p.15.

Another reason of concern was the Oder Neissa line as the boundary between Poland and the GDR. The GDR had recognised the finality of the East German and Polish border in the Gorlitz Treaty in 1950. The Federal Republic had also affirmed, in the Warsaw Treaty of December 1970, the inviolability of the existing frontiers now and in the future. In the same treaty the two countries had declared that they had no territorial claims whatsoever against each other and they would not assert such claims in future.<sup>15</sup> It was also decided in two-plus-four talk that "the Parliament of unified Germany will confirm the Oder-Neisse border with Poland in the shortest possible time, after unification and remove from its law any language suggesting the border is provisional". That settled the growing concern of Poland on boundary line issue.

(c) Real Unification Process: The process of German unification began on 9th November 1989 with the crumbling down of the Berlin wall. The Berlin wall had been constructed in 1961 resulting in cessation of interaction between peoples of two Germanys. But this 28 years old symbol of divided world crumbled down signalling the beginning of positive relation between them. James Baker, the US Secretary of State said "the opening of the Berlin wall was the most democratic event in the East - West relationships since

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15. *ibid.*, p.17.

Second World war". Tass also hailed the eventual collapse of Berlin wall as positive and important event Gorbachev said in this context - "they are moves which will facilitate the construction of Common European Home".<sup>16</sup>

Art 146 of Basic Law envisaged the attaining of national unity with a new German constituent Assembly entrusted with the task of drafting a new constitution for unified Germany as a whole which would replace the existing Basic Law<sup>17</sup>. There was ample evidences of provision in fundamental law of both countries for unification. But what accelerated the process of unification was the policy of Gorbachev But most scholars were convinced that unification would not have come so early. Their belief was based on three assumptions.

The first assumption was that the GDR was relatively stable in many ways, while other countries had undergone radical political changes by that time.

Secondly, in West Germany a firm consensus had emerged that there was no alternative to former chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, a policy of small steps in accommodating the GDR. The successive West German governments had increasingly adopted policies aimed at ameliorating at the

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16. The Bangkok Post, 13 Nov 1989.

17. The Bangkok Post, 13 Nov 1989.

cost of partition.

Finally the final guarantor of German partition was Moscow, where the Soviet definition of ideology, security and international prestige for most of the post -War period clearly had been intertwined with Germany's division.<sup>18</sup>

But two events, proving to be turning points, which took place in Germany made the glimmering hope almost nearly bright. They were:

- (a) crumbling down of Berlin wall on 9 November, 1989 and
- (b) toppling down of Stalinist regime of Eric Honecker subsequently.<sup>19</sup>

In fact Eric Honecker had opposed Gorbachev's policy of glassnost and perestroika. Though it is generally considered that Gorbachev's policies were responsible for such drastic changes in international sphere the unification process might have taken a few years to find its conclusion had Eric Honecker not been toppled..

Another external factor which had deep impact on the process was the opening of border between Hungary and Austria. As has been mentioned in preceding pages the

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- 18. H.S. Chopra, "Unified Germany: A break with Past", World Focus (ND) Vol.12, 7, July 1991. p.1.
  - 19. See Ronald D. Asmus "A Unified Germany" Foreign Affairs (New York) Vol. 69. No.27, spring 1990. p.63

opening of border made East German people to influx into the FRG en masse. On the other hand, the East Germany, were not demanding unification at the outset. They were demanding initially

- (1) a restructuring of their government
- (2) an open access to the west<sup>20</sup>

But the Honcker regime could not be able to suppress such mass migration. The socialist regime of East Germany had other socialist countries in the neighbourhood undergoing rapid changes. Further, the support of USSR in this regard was lukewarm.

Meanwhile chancellor Helmut Kohl came with his Ten Points Programme for unification. Though it was entirely rejected by Eric Honecker, Some of its points found expression later in Modrow's four point programme. On the other hand, the blue print of Helmut Kohl was denounced by Poland and the USSR .<sup>21</sup>

(a) Helmut Kohl's Ten Point Programme for Unification:

Chancellor Helmut Kohl enunciated his plan on 28 November 1989 in Bonn. It envisaged a confederative structure of two states after free election by stages. Confederative structure would be established through expanded network of

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20. The Bangkok Post, 13 Nov 1989

21. The Times (London) 29 Nov 1989



German - German committee leading to the creation of a single German Federation within the existing structure of east-west relations. Within the context of a further strengthening of the EC, the developing security talks under the Helsinki process and the progress of arms control in Europe eventually envisaged a united Germany but to get a date for German unification.<sup>22</sup> The chancellor called 10-point plan did not deal with many issues related with a final settlement of the German question not exhaustive and comprehensive. The question of final responsibility and the role of western powers were mentioned as also was the question of alliance membership.

The East German Prime Minister, Egon Krenz was of the opinion that reunification could be possible only after taking necessary steps before unification. The East German government also denounced it as capitalist colonialism and insisted that reunification would only be possible as neighbours in a common European Home.<sup>24</sup> The USSR and Poland also implicitly denounced the plan. The stance of the USSR was not cooperative due to several factors mentioned earlier.

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22. East Reger, ed., Keessing's Record of World Events. (Longman, U.K.)-Nov 1989 PP 37025-26
23. Peter R. Weilemann - The German contribution towards overcoming the Division of Europe - Chancellor Helmut Kohl's 10 point, 'Aussen Politik' (Hamburg) Vol. 41, No.1, 1990. p.18
24. The Times (London) 29 Nov 1990.

(b) Modrow Plan: One of the most important blue print was also given by the Prime Minister of the GDR Hans Modrow. He was more moderate and liberal than his predecessor. He said "Germany should once again become the unified fatherland of all citizens of German nation".<sup>25</sup> The first stage of Modrow Plan outstripped Kohl's 10-point programme. It called for basic elements of a confederation -- including economic currency union and compatible legal system. His plan is known as East Germay's four point programme for unification.

The Modrow plan included:

- (1) the conclusion of a treaty on cooperation and good neighbourliness as a contractual community, which should already contain essential confederative elements like an economic currency, transport and communications union as well as the harmonization of legal provisions;
- (2) establishment of a confederation between the GDR and the FRG including the joint authorities and institutions such as parliamentary committees, and assembly of the Lander, and joint executive bodies in certain areas;
- (3) transfer of sovereign rights of the two states to authorities of the confederation.
- (4) establishment of a single German state in the form of a German Federation or a German 'Bund' following election

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25. ibid 2 Feb 1990

in both parts of the confederation, convening of a single parliament which would decide on a single constitution and a single government having its seats in Berlin.<sup>26</sup>

The Modrow Plan also envisaged a few accessory prerequisites for achievement of the unification. These are as follows:

- The obligation of both of these two states is that they should follow the practice of non-interference into each other's affair. The GDR will be divided into Landers
- It upholds the interest and rights of four powers and concern of all people of Europe for peace, sovereignty and secure border. The four power definitively settle all issues in connection with the presence of foreign troops on German soil and the affiliation to military alliances.
- military neutrality of the GDR and the FRG on the road to becoming a federation. It also clearly delienates that the process of unification of Germany evolves on the basis of agreements between the parliaments and governments of the GDR and the FRG.

The apparent difference between the Modrow plan and Kohl's plan was that the former envisaged the achievement of

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26. Blue print for a road to a united Germany, Backgrounder - published by Embassy of German Democratic Republic in India, N.D., 3 Feb 1990

unification as a gradual process, while the latter spoke about the hasty process to achieve unification of Germany. Besides, military neutrality of the united Germany was one of the clauses of Modrow plan but Kohl's proposal rejected the neutral design for Germany.

Another plan also deserves mention in this regard, that of Herr Hans Dietrich Genscher. His plan envisaged that the united Germany should remain within NATO, if the latter was to become a political rather than strategic body. It also laid down that NATO troops should not be stationed in the GDR.<sup>27</sup> Genscher's plan was also not acceptable to the GDR and the USSR.

The election to Volkskammer; the East German Parliament also made the process favourable in the direction of achievement of unification. Helmut Kohl and his allies,, the SPD under Brandt's defacto leadership rushed into the GDR as pace setters of German unity. They were desperately trying to secure a likeminded party leader in the election to achieve German unity. Material support and massive campaign on behalf of SPD followed. The party was backed by its west German counter part. It was not because of nationalism but due to pulls and pressure of democratic politics to which the west Germans subscribed to. On the other hand, SED, under the

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27. Keessing's Record of World Events, Vol. 36, No.2, 1990, p.37259

leadership of Gregor Gyasi and Modow government, still thought that they could resist the forces of 'Germany - united Fatherland'. They were hopeful of doing so and could become winners in the election due to divided opposition. But to the surprise of a few, the elections of 18th March 1990, brought the victory of East Berlin coalition under the leadership of Maidzer.<sup>28</sup> The Volkaskammer discussed the procedural arrangements for first all German elections. The discussion also veered around the question, whether accession to united Germany should take place before or after the election.<sup>29</sup>

(c) Currency unification: Before all German unification, two plus four formula for currency union were also major factors to bring about unification. In fact, currency union was to be prelude to real unification. On 18th May 1990 Theo Waigel and Walter Romberg, respectively the west and east German Finance Ministers signed a treaty on the creation of a monetary, economic and social union between the two countries. The treaty provided for the introduction from July 1990, a currency union with a unified currency area and the Deutschmark as the common currency. The West German Bundesbank (Central Bank) would be the issuing bank. The basis of such a union was the social market economy

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28. Josef Joffe - "Once more the German question" - Survival (London) 1990. p.135

29. Manfred Rexia - "The GDR on the way to Germany" Aussen Politik (Hamburg) Vol.41, No.9, 1990, p.327

determined particularly by private ownership, the establishment of the prices and the fundamentally full freedom of movements of labour, capital goods and service.<sup>30</sup>

According to the treaty the East German citizens were allowed to exchange their savings for Deutschmark (DM) of 1 to 1 (upto 2000 East German marks for children upto the age of 14 years, 4000 for persons between the age group of 14 to 59 years, 6000 for persons of 59 years age and above) Other accounts held by citizens and institutions would be converted at a rate of 2 to 1 and persons from outside the GDR generally were to accept a rate of 3 to 1.<sup>31</sup>

(d) Two-plus-four formula: Two plus four formula process started in May 1990. The formula included the presence of members of four allied powers in World War II, the USA, UK, France and the USSR and two Germanys to evolve any decision for unification. The two plus four talk ended in September 11, 1990 at Moscow. The treaty was signed by Foreign Ministers of all those six countries. The provision of the agreement included:

1. Guarantee of full sovereignty of united Germany, with the assurance that there would be no resurgence of Nazism in Europe.

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30. Keessing's Record of World Events No. 27 1990, p.37259

31. Hans Willgerodt "German Economic Integration in European perspectives", Aussen Politik (Hamburg) Vol 41, No. 4, 1990, p.329

2. The Soviet troops would remain on the eastern part of united Germany till 1994. Even after withdrawal of Soviet troops the NATO would not be allowed to deploy any nuclear force in the eastern part of Germany.

(3) NATO forces stationed in the FRG would not cross into the eastern part of Germany.

(4) Within three weeks, the two Germanys would sign treaty of reunification. In that grand ceremony, the leaders of four war time allies will also participate.

(5) The treaty allowed the sovereign Germany to choose military political status which for all practical purposes meant that the country would remain a part of NATO.<sup>32</sup>

The will of the majority members of Volkskammer to carry out both accession and election on 19th October 1990 was opposed by the left wing parliamentary parties. However, after lengthy and difficult discussion in East Berlin and Bonn, 2 December 1990 was fixed as the date on which the authority of a united Germany would be determined by free elections. The GDR however, would cease to exist as a European state and merge into a united Germany following the application of Article 23 on or before 3 October 1990.<sup>33</sup> In

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32. Ruscin no. 30. p.327

33. The Patriot (ND) 13 Sept 1990

all German election of December 1990 Helmut Kohl emerged victorious becoming the first chancellor of Germany. With the end of unification process a new chapter was opened in history. The world had been heading for peace and European integration. So the unification of Germany was regarded a major event in this decade. The role of Soviet Union in bringing about the unification was also praiseworthy.

A brief chronology of the steps towards German unification during the year 1990 are as follows:

Step I - March 1990. First free election was held and a coalition government was formed in East Germany and the first meeting of the new volkskammer legalised the unity with west Germany as quickly as possible.

Step II - April 1990. A new round of two-plus-four talks held between two Germanies and four wartime victors in east Berlin and Washington over the regions that would form part of United Federal Republic viz. Mecklenburg, Saxony, Berlin, Brandenburg, Thuringia and German Pomerania.

Step III - May 1990. Detailed talks between East and West German governments on the question of property ownership in the East and resolved issues on monetary union.

Step IV - June - July 1990. Formal declaration of monetary union, currency, social welfare systems, restructuring of East German tax system.



Step V - September-October 1990. Election for Lander (regional government) in East Germany setting up a legal structure for unification on a federal basis. The conclusion of talks on conventional force levels in Europe.

Step VI - October-November 1990. Conclusion of two plus four talks and the opening of the 35 nations conference on cooperation and security in Europe (CSCF)

Step VII - December 1990. All German national election.<sup>34</sup>

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34. Keessing's Record of World Events - 1990.

**CHAPTER V**

**CONCLUSION**

The analysis of the subject in foregoing chapters leads to the conclusion that ideological confrontation between the super powers had its deep impact on Germany. Germany was divided between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and later their respective ideologies were implanted in both the divisions of it. Thus, so long as there was ideological struggle, the unification of Germany was a near impossibility. That is why, the proposal of the Germany was unacceptable to the other German state due to ideological difference between them.

As the interests of two super power were involved in Germany, the unification could not be possible in the 50s and 60s due to ideological and political differences between them in international field. Instead of bringing unification, they integrated two parts of Germany into their respective blocs. The FRG became an ally of USA, joined NATO and later became founding member of EEC. Similarly, the GDR was integrated into socialist bloc constituting the Soviet Union and the East European countries. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader, extended Soviet hegemony over the GDR.

Involvement of two superpowers in internal matters of two Germanys made the process more complicated. That is why Soviet proposal for neutral Germany was denounced by Konard Adenauer, the then Chancellor of the F.R.G. The demand for Neutral Germany by the Soviet Union was in the interest of

the Soviet Union. Its fear was that the militarised Germany might be a potential danger to the Soviet Union and being independent, it might go into the fold of capitalist bloc. On the other hand, the apprehension of the West was the Germany being geographically nearer to the Soviet Union and birth place of Marxism might step into the fold of the latter. Further, instead of a neutral Germany, the FRG had demanded an All-German free election to determine their political set up.

The other finding in this study is that Gorbachev's ascendancy to office was an important event in bringing about German unification. The normalisation process in international field started with the introduction of New Thinking by Gorbachev. In case of a conservative communist leader at the helm of affair in the Soviet Union, the deideologisation of foreign policy of the Soviet Union, might not have been taken place. Without deideologisation of foreign policy, the Soviet hegemony over Socialist countries would not have been disturbed. But for, changes in socialist countries including the GDR, the drive for unification would not have been started. Thus, it is clear that the real unification process started after the rise of Gorbachev to the post General Secretary of C.P.S.U., in 1985. He made Soviet foreign policy more flexible by delinking it from class inspired values.

In the place of class inspired values, human existence, peace and security were accorded importance. Gorbachev's policy of 'New Thinking' and 'Glasnost' brought the two opposing ideologies to a meeting point. Further, his policies gave rise to revolutionary changes in domestic sphere of the Soviet Union with new features of market economy and multi-party system. These changes in domestic sphere had its repercussion in adjoining socialist countries also. The upheavals in socialist countries, sounded death-knell of communism. It changed the relation between Soviet Union and East European countries. Instead of "Socialist brotherly" relation, bilaterism among these states was initiated. The organic link between the Soviet Union and adjoining socialist countries was broken down. The linkage which was established since the formation of Warsaw Pact was broken down. The instruments of maintaining their linkage viz. - WTO, CMEA became defunct. Thus, the breakdown of link and organic relation produced such a conducive international atmosphere that the unification of Germany finally became a reality in 1991.

Had Gorbachev conceded the point that the United Germany would be free to choose her military-political status, the unification might have come a little earlier. In the beginning he stuck to his proposal of neutral Germany. Even Hans Modrow's blueprint for unification upheld the proposal of Gorbachev. Before the Modrow Plan, however,

Helmut Kohl had also put forward 'Ten Point Programme to achieve unification, envisaging a confederative structure of two states after free election. It was only on 11 September 1990, at Moscow, Gorbachev acceded to the 'Two-plus-four' formula.

The changing Soviet perception about international peace made its policy towards Germany more flexible. Though peaceful coexistence was the main plank of Soviet foreign policy, it did not try to achieve durable peace. What it tried to achieve was temporary peace in the context of two competing ideological systems. But Gorbachev emphasised that peace was indivisible. For global peace, the narrow ideological context was to be eschewed. For peace, the strategy of confrontation was replaced by cooperation. In order to establish cooperation between the east and the west Germany and linkage of the east and west, the unification of Germany was the utmost necessity.

Furthermore, Germany was unified in Pan-European content. It was unified to bring about larger integration. The European integration was deemed to be a factor to maintain peace, because the cold war, being a threat to peace, had its epicentre in Europe and Europe was the hot-belt of ideological struggle.

Finally, the role of Gorbachev in bringing about German unification was commendable. Without his astute

statesmanship, Germany's unification would not have come so early. The unification of Germany, it may be assumed, will ensure peace and security in international field and be a stabilising factor in international relations.

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