

**THE MODE OF LITERARY EXPRESSION :
THE RĪTI AND THE SUBLIME**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

VINAY KUMAR VARMA

**CENTRE FOR LINGUISTICS AND ENGLISH
SCHOOL OF LANGUAGES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067
1991**



जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067

Date:03.01.1991

CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled "The Mode of Literary Expression: The Riti and the Sublime" submitted by Vinay Kumar Varma, Centre of Linguistics and English, School of Languages, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is an original work and has not been submitted so far, in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of any University. This may be placed before the examiners for evaluation, for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

Dr. Kapil Kapoor
[Supervisor]

Dr. Kapil Kapoor

Associate Professor
Centre of Linguistics & English
School of Languages
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Mehrauli Road
New Delhi-110067

Prof. H.S. Gill
[Chairperson]

H. S. GILL

Professor & Chairman
Centre of Linguistics & English
School of Languages
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

To

Mother and Father

P R E F A C E

Ever since the study of Sanskrit literary theory has developed as a full-fledged and independent discipline, critics have endeavoured to discover corresponding features between the concepts of Sanskrit poetics and the literary theories of the West. Such an exercise has become specially fruitful in the present century, since a rise in the study of linguistics and stylistics has shaped the development of the current literary theories. The language of literature has become, almost for the first time in the west, the object of close critical attention.

In India, on the other hand, language has been at the crux of almost all the literary theories; whether it be the Rasa-theory of Bharata, the Dhvani-theory of Ānandavardhana, or the Vakrokti-theory of Kuntaka. As language-based theories of literature have evolved in the West, we can now more readily speak of correspondences between Indian and Western criticism - not only between the concept of Rasa-realisation and the Aristotelian notion of catharsis (as well as T.S. Eliot's postulation of the objective correlative), but also between formalism and the Vakrokti-theory, both of which have a common foundation in the concept of defamiliarisation or the deviant use of language. Or we may

note the only too obvious similarities between the Dhvani-theory of Ānandavardhana and the reader-reception theories put forward in the twentieth century.

In the light of the foregoing, an attempt is made in the present work to compare two concepts: the Western concept of the sublime as enunciated by Longinus and the Sanskrit theory of Rīti, evolved systematically and coherently for the first time by Vāmana.

For this work, I remain indebted to many: Most of all to Dr. Kapil Kapoor (to whom I owe a greater debt of gratitude for reviving and channeling my interest towards Indian literary theories) - for his constant encouragement and supervision.

I would also like to thank all my friends for the pains they took to read and record for me.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Mr. S.P. Sharma for his invaluable assistance in getting this work ready.

Finally, I would like to thank Veena and Reeta for their timely assistance.

Vinay Verma

NOTE

Since quotations from the primary texts are frequent, references to their titles have been abbreviated. The *Kāvyaśāstrakārasūtra* has been rendered as K.A.S., and *On the Sublime* has been referred to as O.T.S.

C O N T E N T S

	Page
Preface	i
Note	iii
Chapter - I Introduction	1
The Subject of Enquiry	2
The Method of Analysis	9
The Constituents of Rīti	13
Notes and References	31
Chapter - II Vāmana and the Theory of Rīti	36
Introduction	37
The Doṣas	42
The Guṇas	49
The Alaṅkāras	65
Notes and References	98
Chapter III The Sublime	101
Introduction	102
Grand Conceptions	109
The Figures of Thought and Speech	120
Noble Diction	130
Synthesis	139
Other Topics	142
Notes and References	146
Chapter - IV A Comparative Study	148
Introduction	149
The Use of Language	153
The Content of Literature	164
Closing Remarks	166
Appendix - The Scheme of Transliteration	169
Bibliography	170

C H A P T E R - I

I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. The Subject of Enquiry

This work proposes to undertake a detailed analysis, followed by a comparative study, of two treatises: Vāmana's *Kāvya-lamkārasūtra* and *On The Sublime*, a work generally attributed to Longinus.¹ As our prefatory remarks would suggest, some amount of similarity is to be expected between the theories of the two traditions. But the case of Vāmana and Longinus is an exceptionally striking illustration of the fact that two theorists, writing in different parts of the world at different times, may deal with similar issues, talking in more or less the same terms, and may exhibit some degree of similitude in their conclusions.

Both theorists exercised a remarkable influence on the shaping of their respective traditions, and are held in the greatest esteem by their successors. For the Augustan critics one of the most important classical influences was that of Longinus. A favourable judgment on Shakespeare was often arrived at by an appeal to the authority of Longinus, and Pope's praise of Homer's 'fruitfulness' in the Preface to his translation of the *Iliad* is also in the true Longinian spirit.

The Indian tradition, by its very nature is cumulative; not only in philosophy and Dharmaśāstra, but in almost all the disciplines. In poetics, for instance, the later theorists, instead of ignoring the speculations of

their predecessors, attempted to incorporate some or all of the elements of these theories within their own systems; with the result that though their views may differ considerably from those of their predecessors, they have nonetheless held these early writers in high esteem.

In Vāmana's case, for example, the doctrine of Rīti propounded by him was later rejected in favour of the Dhvani theory, but most of the components of the Rīti system found a place in later theorists like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. To take only one instance: Vāmana's principle of the classification of Doṣas is adhered to by Mammaṭa and some of his successors.

Moreover, Vāmana's work marks a great advance on the preceding poets, and represents a landmark in the history of Sanskrit poetics. The history of Sanskrit poetics can be broadly divided into two parts: (1) the pre-Dhvani period and (2) the Dhvani and the post-Dhvani period. Credit must go to the theorists of the latter class for comprehending and defining clearly the locus of literariness in the principle of Dhvani or suggestion, and evolving coherent theories of poetics centering round it. The pre-Dhvani writers on the other hand, had only a partial glimpse of the factors that constitute literariness, and consequently their treatment lacks fullness and maturity. But Vāmana, though belonging to the pre-Dhvani period, was able to

formulate a system of poetics, which was not only coherent and fully-developed, but also, for the first time, took into account both the form and the essence of literature. His predecessors, i.e. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, had been interested only in the external garb or the body of poetry. Vāmana on the contrary, enunciated that Rīti was the soul (i.e. the essence) of literature, whose body was constituted by the word and its sense.

But, interestingly enough, these two treatises at least from a formal point of view, appear to be as different from each other as is perhaps possible. Vāmana, in the manner characteristic of the Śāstra, presents his ideas in a concise but lucid style, made especially terse by his adoption of the much-esteemed Sūtravṛtti form in place of the Kārikā form. Longinus, however, writes in the manner of a learned speaker delivering a lecture before an audience (the treatise, according to his own testimony, is addressed to his friend Terentianus), so that in form the work is closer to a Bhāṣya rather than to a primary text of the Indian tradition.²

As a consequence of his extreme conciseness, Vāmana puts forth his arguments in the form of an elaborate and well-organised typology. Longinus, too, provides his readers with a broad typology at the outset (i.e., the five sources of the sublime); but whereas Vāmana adheres closely

to his typology, imparting a sort of scientific precision to his text, Longinus is sometimes carried away, as a result of his enthusiasm, from the subject at hand into lengthy digressions.³

Another reason for the formal difference between the two texts lies in the fact that Vāmana's approach is objective as opposed to that of Longinus, who devotes considerable space to the criticism of individual authors. Such criticism is apt to lead any theorist into lengthy digressions. And, as if this were not enough, the text of Longinus, as we have it now, is somewhat fragmentary, having no less than six lacunae⁴, while Vāmana's work has been handed down to us in its complete form.

These are, however, only formal differences; and they should not make us lose sight of the basic similarities between the two treatises. Even on the formal plane, we may note that both Longinus and Vāmana adopt the same procedure in supplementing their definitions etc. with apt illustrations, in order to make themselves as intelligible as possible. This distinguishes Longinus and other Western critics of antiquity from most of the English critics, who have for the most part, devoted their works to abstract discussions devoid of illustrations. In the Indian tradition, on the other hand, illustrating the point under discussion is the rule rather than the exception; so that, at

least in this respect the older Graeco-Roman texts are closer to the Indian Śāstras.

But of far greater significance are the thematic correspondences between Vāmana and Longinus - the parallelisms as well as the differences which turn out to be mutually complementary. For Vāmana, the locus of literariness inheres in the Rīti (of which three types are discussed by him), consisting essentially of the beauty of representation along with that of the subject matter. The beauty results from a unification of what the Sanskrit theorists have termed 'Guṇas' (i.e., qualities or excellences), aided by the use of Alaṅkāras or the figures of speech. Stress is also laid on the avoidance of faults, so that along with the Guṇas and the Alaṅkāras, Doṣas or defects also find a place in the work.

The Rīti, which literally means the path by which to travel⁵ may be understood to signify the mode of literary expression. Vāmana states that it is the Rīti which is the Ātmā (lit. soul, i.e. central principle or essence) of literature.

Longinus, too, argues in favour of an underlying property of great literature, designating it by the word 'hupsous' (usually translated as the sublime). This is not one of many qualities which great literature should possess, but its very essence. It is the name given to the effect

achieved by a proper fusion of the other qualities (which Longinus classifies under five heads, and refers to as the sources of the sublime). These qualities are :

- (1) ability to form grand conceptions;
- (2) the stimulus of powerful and inspired emotion;
- (3) the proper formation of the two types of figures - figures of thought and figures of speech;
- (4) the creation of a noble diction, including the choice of words, the use of imagery and the elaboration of style; and
- (5) dignity and elevation (O.T.S., Sec.8).

The last three sources refer specifically to the use of language, and even the first two require, in Longinus' own words, "the command of language, without which nothing worthwhile can be done." It would not be wrong, therefore, to conclude that like Vāmana, Longinus too is concerned with the mode of expression suitable for literature.

It may be argued that Vāmana's comparison with Cicero, Demetrius or Quintilian⁶, rather than with Longinus would be more appropriate. These writers distinguished three (four in the case of Demetrius) kinds of styles, while Longinus does not attempt any classification of styles. Moreover, Longinus is associated with passion and ecstasy, with enthusiasm and inspiration, and his treatise is hailed as a victory of passion over verbal rhetoric.

While accepting their affinities with Vāmana, we would like to point out that the influence of Demetrius and other rhetoricians of his time on English criticism has been quite negligible when compared to that of Longinus. Furthermore, the critics who stress the importance of passion in Longinus' theory⁷ tend to pass rather lightly over his remarks on language, which, as Wimsatt and Brooks have noted⁸, fill a very large part of what survives of the work. Any discussion which leaves out the linguistic dimensions of the subject may do some justice to the sublime of Edmund Burke⁹, but not to the concept of the sublime as found in the treatise of Longinus. Despite his talk of transport and rapture, Longinus does not outline any systematically-developed theory of esthetics. (Such a theory perhaps formed a part of his observations on passion, which are no longer extant). The only fully-developed system that the essay presents discusses the mode of expression proper to a literary text, which in its turn sways the reader and takes him out of himself. One could almost say that like Vāmana's word 'Ātmā' (Soul) Longinus' 'hupsous' (Lit. height or elevation) is nothing more than an illuminating metaphor.

Finally, let us take the argument that Longinus does not take into account the different kinds of modes, as Vāmana and the Rīti theorists have done. It is true that distinctions of this kind are not stated explicitly in the treatise, though this is probably because three or four kinds

of verbal styles had been generally accepted by his time, and Longinus took the subject to be a part of common knowledge. We may even conjecture that there was a passing reference to them in one of the lacunae, most probably in the one appearing at the end of the second section. At any rate, when the third section resumes, Longinus is in the middle of a discussion of the vices bordering on sublimity, of which three are named: (1) Bombast, (2) Puerility and (3) False sentiment. The sublime is represented as a kind of mean between these vices. S.K.De too, in the course of his analysis of Vāmana, notes that the Vaidarbhī is the complete or ideal Rīti, which unifies all the poetic excellences, whereas the other two encourage extremes. The Gaudī lays stress on the grand, the glorious or the imposing, the Pāñcālī on softness and sweetness; whereby the former loses itself often in bombast, the latter in prolixity.¹⁰

Besides, Longinus' awareness of the different modes is illustrated by his treatment of the five sources of the sublime, which implies that anyone of the sources, or any combination of them, can lead to the sublime. He was evidently conscious of the different kinds of sublimity, though he does not name them explicitly.

2. The Method of Analysis

From these remarks it is not difficult to conclude that for both Vāmana and Longinus, the discussion of language

is of the utmost importance. Since we propose to carry out a comparative study of the two texts, assessing the contributions of the two critics and their relative merits, a linguistic model can come in handy for our purpose. The comments of Norman Page may be of a special assistance in our endeavor to formulate such a model. He notes that most discussions of literary language, apart from the most general and theoretical ones, may be grouped under one or more of four main heads, according to whether they emphasize or concentrate on (1) vocabulary and diction, (2) grammar and syntax, (3) imagery and the use of figures, and (4) versification and such phonological elements as rhyme, rhythm and onomatopoeia.¹¹

Being one of the most obvious features of a writer's individual style - the quality which makes a passage by him immediately recognisable to those who have some acquaintance with his work - diction has received much attention from theorists. Longinus' fourth source of the sublime is noble diction, and a number of Vāmana's Guṇas refer specifically to the choice of words.

But an author's lexis - his individual choice from the stock of words available in his time - is, after all, only one aspect of his language. Dictionaries, indispensable though they are, convey a false impression by treating words in isolation; for in practice words are used

in conjunction with other words, and acquire at least apart of their meaning from the company they keep. Literary theorists before the 20th century tend to pay little attention to syntax. Longinus makes some observations about syntax in the course of his discussion of figures (O.T.S., Sec. 21). For Vāmana and other Indian theorists syntactic variation forms one of the bases of the classification of figures.

Imagery is an element that has received close and some times systematic attention, in the 20th century as well as in earlier critical writings. In the West, a discussion of imagery usually implies a focus on the use of metaphor, which has been assigned a special position in the scheme of figures. With Indian theorists, such a discussion includes not only the metaphor, but a number of other figures also. This is the subject on which both Vāmana and Longinus have much to say.

No account of the resources of literary language is complete without some reference to that dimension of words which relates to their auditory effect; the combination and repetition of the sounds of vowels and consonants, the tempo and inflection that the words impose upon the sensitive reader, the rhythm (whether highly patterned, as in most verse, or more irregular, as in most prose), etc. Under this head would be covered the treatment of verbal tropes like

Anuprāse and Yamaka by Sanskrit writers. In the West, these phonological devices have received attention both in the present century and in the works of older writers. Longinus' fifth source of the sublime, i.e. dignity and elevation, takes under consideration some phonological devices, such as the sound of words, repetition, rhythm etc.

But these categories alone, useful as they are, would not be enough for our present purpose. In the course of their discussions Vāmana and Longinus dwell on some sources of literariness which the above categories would not take into account. Longinus' first source of greatness - grand conception - is a case in point, which is defined in non-linguistic terms. Similarly, some of Vāmana's Guṇas and Alaṃkāras relating to meaning would have to be left out if we were to adopt a purely linguistic approach for our analysis. Such an exclusion would not do justice to either of the theorists, and so we propose to take into consideration factors of a non-linguistic nature, such as those relating to content etc., alongside the study of literary language as analysed by the two critics.

Keeping all this in mind, we propose to evaluate the two texts in terms of their own typologies - i.e., the *Kāvyaālaṃkārasūtra* with respect to Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṃkāra and *On The Sublime* in relation to the five sources of elevation. For purposes of arriving at the conclusion of the

investigation and a comparative evaluation of the two critics, this would be followed by an examination of the texts in terms of the linguistic categories supplied by Norman Page, supplemented by a consideration of the non-linguistic elements that are incorporated within the two theories.

3. The Constituents of Rīti

Before we move on to the *Kāvya-lāmkārasūtra*, let us briefly outline the general characteristics of Rīti and the relative positions of its constituents, i.e., Doṣas, Guṇas and Alāmkāras, as found in the works of Vāmana's predecessors. Besides making it easier to follow the arguments of Vāmana, this will also enable us to make a note of the advances made by him on the earlier theorists, since Doṣas, Guṇas and Alāmkāras are the basic building blocks of almost all the theories of Sanskrit poetics.

The Doṣas or defects

With the exception of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, theorists usually deal with Doṣas before they go on to speak of Guṇas and Alāmkāras. This is evidently in keeping with the popular maxim that evils should be avoided prior to one's pursuit of welfare. The Doṣas figure as negative attributes - as features from which a literary composition should be free. Whatever controversy might have existed among theorists of different ages and schools regarding the

character and relative importance of Guṇas, Alaṅkāras etc. in their systems, they have all agreed upon one fundamental point, namely that they have insisted upon the avoidance of Doṣas or defects, since these, as their very name indicates, have a deterring effect on writing, inasmuch as they mar its beauty.

The seventeenth chapter of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Chaukhambhā text) gives us, for the first time, an outline of Doṣas along with other topics pertaining to poetics. The general theoretical position of the Doṣas, Guṇas and Alaṅkāras in Bharata's scheme appears to be that they constitute the beauty or otherwise of the language in which dramatic characters speak. It is in this way that they bear a relation to Rasa or the principal dramatic mood in a composition, which is the primary concern of Bharata. We come across a list of ten Doṣas¹², of which seven are the defects of meaning (referring to instances of obscurity, incoherence, repetition of the same meaning etc.), while the remaining ones pertain to form (defective collusion of words etc.).

The first work on poetics proper, Bhāmaha's *Kāvyaślokaśūtra* enumerates two sets of Doṣas - one in the first chapter, and the other in the fourth. The first set consists of ten Doṣas¹³, six of which are defects of meaning. The remaining four account for the defective use of words,

which may lead to such blemishes as harshness and improper signification. All these are mentioned in a context where Bhāmaha has been speaking about the general characteristics of poetry. These Doṣas represent faults in Vakrokti (artful locution) and may be termed 'Vakroktidoṣas'.

The second list of Doṣas (chapters 4-5) comprises of eleven defects, and here also the defects of form are intermixed with those of meaning. While the first list of Doṣas concerns Vakrokti or the inner nature of poetry, this second list mentions only such defects as are more or less external.

In the third chapter of his work, Daṇḍin enumerates ten Doṣas¹⁴, which are in name, substance and even the order of enumeration identical with Bhāmaha's second list of Doṣas, with the only exception of the eleventh fault. This is the Doṣa of defective logic, which is recognised by Bhāmaha, though rejected by Daṇḍin as a fault difficult to judge and unprofitable to discuss. The problem, according to him is a purely technical one, and belongs mainly to the domain of logic; a dry discussion of it in poetics would be both inappropriate and useless.

Bhāmaha's first list of Doṣas corresponds in general to the features which Daṇḍin mentions as absent in the Vaidarbha mode of composition and characterizing the Gauḍamārga.¹⁵ Most of them are not mentioned explicitly, but

they are understood to be the opposites of the Guṇas which are to be found in the Vaidarbhamārga.

A number of characteristics are generally defined as Doṣas by these theorists, though the names assigned to them may vary with each writer, as the table below illustrates:

Table - 1

<u>Defect</u>	<u>Name given by Bharata</u>	<u>Name given by Bhāmaha</u>	<u>Name given by Dandin</u>
1. Cacophony	-	Śrutikaṣṭa	-
2. Grammatical incorrectness	Śabdacyuta	Śabdahīna	Śabdahīna
3. Absence of Collusion between letters	Visandhi	Visandhi	Visandhi
4. Lapse in metrical structure	Viṣama	Bhinnavṛtta	Bhinnavṛtta
5. Misplacement of the hiatus	-	Yatibhraṣṭa	Yatibhraṣṭa
6. Absence of the proper sequence of words	-	Apakrama	Apakrama
7. Indecorousness	-	Śrutiduṣṭa	-
8. Collusion of words giving rise to indecorousness	-	Kalpanāduṣṭa	-
9. Obscurity	-	Kliṣṭa	-

Contd...

10. Farfetchedness of expression	Gūḍhārtha	Neyārtha and Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna	-
11. Word used in a little-known sense	-	Avācaka	-
12. Word used in a sense that it does not carry at all	Arthāntara and Bhinnārtha	Anyārtha	-
13. Meaninglessness	Arthahīna	-	-
14. Tautology	Ekārtha	Ekārtha	Ekārtha
15. Self-contradiction	-	Vyārtha	Vyārtha
16. Absence of collective meaning resulting from unconnected phrases or sentences	Abhiplutārtha	Apārtha	Apārtha
17. Dubiousness	-	Saśamsaya	Saśamsaya
18. Indecorousness of meaning	-	Arthaduṣṭa	-
19. Incompatibility with place, time, the canons of art, ordinary experience, the scriptures or tradition	Nyāyādapeta	Ayuktimat and Deśakālakalā-lokanyāyāgamavirodhi	Deśakālakalā-lokanyāyāgamavirodhi
20. Defects of logic	Nyāyādapeta	Pratijñāhetu-dṛṣṭāntahīna	-

The discussion of Doṣas raises some interesting issues; for example, the question whether the presence of defects in a particular place mars the poetic effect of that

single part, or of the whole poem as such. Daṇḍin clearly holds the latter view, for he emphatically enjoins that even a slight defect ought not to be tolerated in poetry, as even a single leprous spot is sufficient to render a handsome body ugly.¹⁶ Though Bhāmaha does not have anything to say on this point, Daṇḍin's view is usually accepted and elaborated by later writers.¹⁷

The question whether or not the Doṣas universally mar the poetic effect has also received some attention. Theorists right from the time of Bhāmaha were aware of the fact that what is ordinarily understood to constitute a fault serves to enhance the poetic charm in certain circumstances (or at least ceases to be a fault); for instance, when it is in keeping with the situation depicted, or, in the words of later theorists, maintains the rules of propriety. In the words of Bhāmaha:

Sometimes even objectionable words shine by the position given to them, just as mere green leaves look pretty when interposed amidst the flowers of garlands. Some objectionable words attain a grace on account of the place they occupy, just as collyrium, which is really dirt, when applied to eyes of a beautiful damsel."¹⁸

The Guṇas

As P.C. Lahiri has noted¹⁹, no writer of the pre-Dhvani schools, with the exception of Vāmana, offers a

general definition of Guṇa. All these early writers have thought it sufficient to mention the different Guṇas as undefined excellences of poetry, assigned a place to them in their systems, and merely described and classified various kinds of such excellences.

A fundamental distinction between Guṇas and other poetic elements such as Alāṅkāras and Lakṣaṇas is not apparent in Bhārata's work, for he seems to take them as beautifying factors of poetry generally. He names ten Guṇas, viz., (1) Śleṣa, (2) Prasād, (3) Samatā, (4) Samādhi, (5) Mādhurya, (6) Ojas, (7) Saukumārya, (8) Arthavyakti, (9) Udāratā and (10) Kānti,²⁰ which are described as the negations of the Doṣas. The definitions of the Guṇas are not easy to grasp (especially as they are not illustrated), and the commentators differ in their interpretations of them.

Bhāmaha does not appear to attach much importance to the elements of Guṇa and Rīti, and he nowhere uses the term 'Guṇa' in his work (except in connection with the figure 'Bhāvika', which has been designated as 'Prabandhaviṣayaguṇam',²¹ but where the term does not seem to be restricted to the technical poetic excellence that we are dealing with but refers in a wider sense to poetic beauty in general).

At the beginning of the second chapter Bhāmaha enumerates three entities, viz., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda,

which are the names assigned to some of the Guṇas of Bharata. But unlike Daṇḍin and Vāmana, Bhāmaha does not speak of them in connection with what we call Rītis (referred to by him as 'Kāvya'), but holds that these three entities should be present in good Kāvya generally. So his Guṇas are absolute entities, bearing no relation to any other poetic element. The differences in the length and number of compound words are the distinguishing features of these Guṇas.

Daṇḍin is the earliest writer who treats of the Guṇas in connection with the Rītis (which he calls 'Mārgas'). In the first chapter of his work Daṇḍin discusses at some length the special characteristics of the two modes of composition, namely the Vaidarbha and the Gauḍa, and in this context explains the application or otherwise of the ten standard Guṇas or excellences.²² They are identical with Bharata's Guṇas in name and number, but Daṇḍin's conception of his Guṇas differs somewhat from that of Bharata.

The Guṇas form the distinguishing features between the two Mārgas. They are described as the life-breath of the Vaidarbhamārga, while the Gauḍamārga often presents a different aspect of these Guṇas.²³

The following table is an attempt to briefly outline the characteristics of the Guṇas as defined by the three theorists:

Table - 2

Name of the Guṇa	Bharata's conception of the Guṇa	Bhāmaha's Conception of the Guṇa	Daṇḍin's conception of the Guṇa
1. Śleṣa	Coalescence of words connected with one another through the collection of meanings desired.	-	Compactness due to the use of syllables containing aspirated letters.
2. Prasāda	Comprehension of the sense, (even if not directly stated) due to the clearness of expression.	Ease in comprehension, limited use of compounds.	Ease in comprehension, due to the absence of far-fetched expressions.
3. Samatā	Evenness due to the absence of redundant and difficult words and freedom from too many compounds.	-	Evenness of syllabic structure.
4. Samādhi	Special charm in the sense which is understood by the connoisseur.	-	Metaphorical mode of expression resulting from the transference of the qualities of one thing to another.
5. Mādhurya	Sweetness where a sentence, even after repeated hearings or readings, does not produce weariness or disgust.	Composition which is pleasing to the ear and free from long compounds.	Employment of alliteration and an absence of vulgarity, producing a pleasing effect.

TH-3953



Contd...

6. Djas	Use of varied, striking and dignified compounds, having letters agreeable to one another, richness of word and sense so that even a low object becomes worthy of exaltation.	Employment of long compounds.	Superabundance of compounds.
7. Saukumārya	Agreeably employed words and well-connected euphonic units, producing an agreeable sense.	-	Absence of harshness due to the use of mostly soft syllables.
8. Arthavyakti	Immediate apprehension of the meaning, description of the real nature of things by means of well-known predicates.	-	Explicitness of sense, where there is no necessity of bringing over extraneous words or ideas for the completion of the sense.
9. Udāratā	Exaltedness marked by super-human and other varied feelings especially in the Erotic and Marvellous Rasas, charming ideas expressed in elegant and peronomastic language.	-	Elevation consisting in the expression of some high merit by commendable or eulogistic epithets.
10. Kānti	Words and gestures which appeal to the mind and the ear.	-	Absence of the unnatural and the incredible, making the composition agreeable to the whole world.

Though the splitting up of these Guṇas as relating to Śabda and Artha did not, as a theory, develop till the time of Vāmana, the Guṇas of his predecessors can be understood as belonging to the word or to the sense. For instance, it

would not be wrong to hold that Daṇḍin's Śleṣa and Samatā are Śabdaguṇas, his Smādhi and Kānti are Arthaguṇas, whereas his Mādhurya refers both to Śabda and to Artha.

Theorists of all ages have dealt with Guṇas alongside the Doṣas, establishing a relation between the two elements. Bharata's Doṣas are 'positive entities', i.e., they have been given a positive value besides their inherent negative capacity, and the Guṇas are described as the negations of these Doṣas.²⁴ The reason for this seems to be that it is easier to identify a fault and grasp its function, while an excellence is more easily comprehended by conceiving it as a negation of and easily-understood fault. As we shall see later, this position of Bharata is criticised by Vāmana, who endows his Guṇas with a positive value and regards the Doṣas as their negations.

Bharata's position would imply that the mere absence of Doṣas is an excellence, and even those writers who do not accept his views on the Guṇas suggest that the absence of faults itself is a great merit Keśavamyśra writes;

The absence of faults is an excellence.²⁵ It is for this reason that theorists generally lay a greater emphasis on the absence of Doṣas than on the presence of Guṇas and Alāmkāras. The later opinion regarding the nature of Guṇa and Doṣa appears to be that each of them conveys a positive meaning, despite the fact

that some Doṣas approach the condition of Guṇābhāva (the absence of Guṇas), and some Guṇas approach the condition of Doṣābhāva (the absence of Doṣas).²⁶

The Alāmkāras or Figures

Though all Ācāryas list, classify and discuss various figures of speech, they do not always agree among themselves about the number of figures and the principle of classification. Bharata names and illustrates four figures, viz. Upamā, Rūpaka, Dīpaka and Yamaka.²⁷ Bhāmaha regards Vakrokti or artful locution as being at the root of all Alāmkāras, and defines and illustrates 39 Alāmkāras (chapters 2 & 3). Daṇḍin deals with 36 alāmkāras - simile and other ideal figures in the second chapter, and Yamaka or chime in the third.

The following is an alphabetical list of figures found in the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. As opposed to Doṣas and Guṇas, the general characteristics of the Alāmkāras as defined by theorists down the ages have remained more or less similar (though there may be differences in the number of subvarieties of individual figures and other minor details), so that we have not provided their definitions here. These will be taken up in the context of Vāmana's figures. The list is an adaptation of P.V Kane's list of Alāmkāras.²⁸

An Alphabetical List of Alamkāras

1. Ākṣepa: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
2. Ananvaya: Defined as an independent figure by Bhāmaha alone. Daṇḍin regards it as a variety of Upamā, calling it 'Asādhāraṇopamā'.
3. Anuprāsa: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, the latter defining it in the context of his Guṇa Mādhuraya.
4. Apahnuti: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
5. Aprastutaprasāmsā: Defined by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
6. Arthāntaranyāsa: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
7. Āsīḥ: Found in Daṇḍin; According to Bhāmaha this is not accepted as a figure by all theorists.
8. Atiśayokti: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
9. Āvṛtti: Treated by Daṇḍin alone.
10. Bhāvika: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
11. Dīpaka: Defined by Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
12. Hetu: Found in Daṇḍin alone.
13. Lava or Leśa: Found in Daṇḍin; Bhāmaha does not accept it as a figure.
14. Nidaraśana or Nidarśanā: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
15. Parivṛtti: Defined by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, But Bhāmaha says that it should contain Arthāntaranyāsa within it.
16. Paryāyokta: Found in both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
17. Prativastūpamā: Regarded as a variety of Upamā by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

18. Preyas: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
19. Rasavat: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
20. Rūpaka: Found in Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
21. Sāhokti: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
22. Samāhita: Found in both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
23. Samāsokti: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
24. Saṁsr̥ṣṭi: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; the latter calling it 'Saṁkīrṇa', which includes both Saṁsr̥ṣṭi and Saṁkara in it.
25. Sasandeha: Defined by Bhāmaha as an independent figure; Daṇḍin includes it under Upamā, calling it 'Saṁsayopamā'.
26. Sūkṣma: Defined by Daṇḍin alone. Bhāmaha denies to it the status of a figure.
27. Śleṣa or Śliṣṭa: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
28. Svabhāvokti: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. As Bhāmaha regarded Vakrokti as the principle underlying all figurative expression, he was unwilling to accept it as a figure; it appears that as a concession to his predecessors he acceded to the view that Svabhāvokti is an Alāṁkāra. Daṇḍin refers to the figure as 'Jāti' also.
29. Tulyayogitā: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. The latter adds that it should be employed with a view to praise or blame the object described.
30. Udātta: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

31. Upamā: Found in Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
32. Upamārūpaka: Defined as an independent figure by Bhāmaha. Daṇḍin includes it under Rūpaka.
33. Upameyopamā: Treated by Bhāmaha as an independent figure. Daṇḍin takes it to be a variety of Upamā, calling it 'Anyonyopamā'.
34. Ūrjasvin: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
35. Utprekṣā: Treated by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
36. Utprekṣāvayava: Defined by Bhāmaha as an independent figure, and included by Daṇḍin under Utprekṣā.
37. Vibhāvanā: Found in Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
38. Virodha: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
39. Viśeṣokti: Treated by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
40. Vyājastuti: Found in both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
41. Vyatireka: Defined by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
42. Yamaka: Found in Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.
43. Yathāsamkaya: Defined by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. According to Daṇḍin, it is styled 'Sāmkhyāna' and 'Krama also.

We do not come across any classification of figures in Bharata's work, perhaps because their number is so small. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin give a twofold classification of figures into Śabdālaṅkāras (devices of verbal form, such as Anuprāsa and Yamaka) and Arthālaṅkāras (devices of meaning such as Upamā, Rūpaka, etc.). In the latter class, figures involving

similarity are the most abundant in poetry. The importance of Upamā or simile involved in other figures is recognized from Bhāmaha's time, and it is given a place of honour at the commencement of the discussion of ideal figures in most treatises on sanskrit poetics. The special mention of the defects of upamā (for instance by Bhāmaha²⁹) also suggests its all important place in the system of figures.

The Rītis

As V. Raghavan has pointed out³⁰, we first hear of the Rītis in the introductory verses at the beginning of Bāṇabhaṭṭa's (Harṣacarita). Distinguishing four prevalent modes of composition, Bāṇa writes that the Northerners abound in *double entendres*, the Westerners write the bare idea, the Southerners roll in imaginative conceits, while the Easterners make a display of wordy tumult. In other words, he has spoken of four different styles, each definite and distinct, with its own emphasis on one particular feature, but has voted for carping away an overemphasis on any of these four characteristics, and for moderately and appropriately combining them in one good style, which looks like the essence of the four.

By the time of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, we come across only two modes of composition, the vaidarbha (Southern)

and the Gauda (Eastern). (The Northern and the Western ones, which existed in Bāṇa's time are lost). The conceptions of these also had undergone some change, and the Vaidarbha mode was generally preferred to the Gauda, as the latter abounded in excesses of figures and sound-effects. Accepting the current habit of distinguishing writing into two modes, Bhāmaṇa nonetheless argues that both are acceptable if they do not overdo their special features, but possess the most general and necessary virtues of all good compositions. He points out the possibility of a good handling of the Gauḍī, and similarly the possibility of a bad Vaidarbhī. He would not stress these two catch-words very much but would emphasize the other features of greater importance which all good compositions should have. At any rate, he does not use the term 'Rīti' to denote the two modes, but refers to them as 'Kāvyaś' - a word which literally means 'poetry', but is used to signify literature in general.³¹

The term 'Rīti' as standardized by Vāmana does not appear in Daṇḍin's work either, who uses the expression 'Mārga' (lit., path) to designate the two modes of writing prevalent at his time. He explains the application or otherwise of the ten Guṇas (which form the criteria for the distinction between the two modes), and gives a somewhat preferential treatment to

the Vaidarbha. But despite his professed partiality for the Vaidarbha mode he gives the Gauḍa its due recognition as a Mārga of a different type, which might not have been totally acceptable to himself but which had an established tradition of its own, differing in many respects from the widely preferred Vaidarbha. Moreover, at least five of the ten Guṇas are the essential features of Gauḍa literature also; and if the Gauḍa writers deviate from the other Guṇas, it is done for the purpose of attaining a different ideal.³²

It is on this groundwork laid down by his predecessors that Vāmana erected his theory of Rīti. He not only developed what he found in the works of these early writers, but also smoothed out the irregularities of Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, and chalked out a coherent theory of Rīti.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Although the identity of the author is unknown, we follow the nearly universal convention of calling him Longinus. For questions of authorship and date, cf. G.M.A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics*, (Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1965), pp.340-42. For Vāmana's date, see P.V. Kane, *A History of Sanskrit Poetics*, (Motilal Banarsidas, New Delhi, 1967), pp.146-47, and S.K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, (Firma, K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1960), Vol.1, pp.78-80.
2. Explaining these terms, Rājaśekhara writes in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*;

The expression of a comprehensive proposition in a very terse form is termed 'Sūtra'. According to the Sūtra writers it consists of a very small number of syllables, is free from doubt, concise, and devoid of superfluity, far reaching in its implications, and embodies a meaning that is uncensurable. A commentary outlining the substance of the Sūtra is known as 'Vṛtti'. A verse that represents the meaning of the Sūtra, but is composed in simple language, is termed 'Kārikā'. An exhaustive analysis of the Sūtras, raising up doubts and problems from outside (i.e. not explicitly stated in the text, but expected to be encountered by the reader in the

interpretation of the Sūtras), and then resolving them in the course of the analysis, is called 'Bhāṣya'.

Cf. Rājasekhara, *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, tr. and ed. Kedarnath Sharma, (Bihar Rasthrabhasha Parishad, Patna, 1965), p.12.

3. For example sections 33-35, (which try to answer the question whether flawless mediocrity is preferable to faulty genius), are a digression from the theme of metaphor, the subject of the preceding section. Cf. "Longinus on the Sublime", in T.S. Dorsch (ed.), *Classical Literary Criticism*, (Cox and Wyman Ltd., London, 1965), pp.143-48.
4. *Ibid.*, Secs. 3, 9, 12, 17, 18, 30-31, 37, 38.
5. For the etymology of Rīti and other related Topics, cf. R.S. Tiwari, *A Critical Approach to Classical Indian Poetics*, (Chaukhambhā Orientalia, Delhi, 1984), p.208.
6. Cf. Cicero, *De Oratore*; Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*. For a concise account of their views on the use of language, Cf. G.M.A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics*, *op.cit.*, pp.168-92 and 284-310 respectively. For Demetrius cf. W. Rhys Roberts, *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1902).
7. For instance Wordsworth, who writes:

Longinus treats of animated, impassioned, energetic, or if you will, elevated writing. cf.

Vernon Hall, *A Short History of Literary Criticism*, (The Merlin Press, London, 1977), p.16. It is not difficult to see that Wordsworth (who himself developed a theory of poetic language) was not thinking of the linguistic devices putforth in the essay.

8. Cf. William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Kleanth Brooks, *Literary Criticism, A Short History*, (Oxford & I.B.H. Publishing Co., Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1957), p.101.
9. Cf. Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, ed. James T. Boulton, (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1958).
10. S.K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit.*, Volume 2, p.91.
11. Cf. Norman Page (ed.), *The Language of Literature: A Case Book*, (Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1984), p.15.
12. Bharata *Nāṭyaśāstra*, English Translation translated by a board of scholars (Shree Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1988), XVII, 88ff.
13. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaśāstra* tr. and ed. I.D. Nagnath Shastry, (The Wallad Printing House, Tanjore, 1927), I, 37ff.
14. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaadarśa*, tr. S.K. Belvalkar, (The Oriental Book Supplying Agency, Poona, 1924), III, 125ff.
15. *Ibid.*, I, 43ff.
16. *Ibid.*, I, 7.
17. See, for instance, Kuntaka's remarks on the subject in

- K. Krishnamurti (ed.), *The Vakroktijuvita of Kuntaka*, (Karnataka University Press, Dharwar, 1977), Vṛtti on I, 57.
18. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, I, 54-55.
19. P.C. Lahiri, *Concept of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics*, (Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, 1970), p.21.
20. Bharata, *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, XVII, 96ff.
21. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, III, 52.
22. Cf. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, I, 41ff.
23. *Ibid.*, I, 42.
- Some controversy exists over the meaning of the term 'Viparyaya' in this verse; some take it to mean opposition or contrariety, while others interpret it as difference or divergence. For a detailed discussion on this issue see P.C. Lahiri, *Concept of Rīti and Guṇa*, *op.cit.*, pp.61-63.
24. Bharata, *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, XVII, 95.
25. Keśavamiśra, *Alaṅkāraśekhara*, II, 1; quoted in P.C. Lahiri, *Concept of Rīti & Guṇa*, P.25.
26. On this point, see S.K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, *op.cit.*, p.99.
27. Bharata, *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, XVII 43-88.
28. Cf. P.V. Kane, *A History of Sanskrit Poetics*, *op.cit.*, pp.148-53.
29. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaśāstra*, *op.cit.*, II 39ff.

30. See V. Raghavan, *Studies on Some Concepts of the Alāmkārasāstra*, (The Vasanta Press, Madras, 1973), p.148.
31. See Bhāmaha's *Kāvyaalāmkār*, *op.cit.*, 30-35.
32. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyaḍarśa*, *op.cit.*, I, 40ff.

C H A P T E R - I I

VĀMANA AND THE THEORY OF RĪTI

CHAPTER - II

VĀMANA AND THE THEORY OF RĪTI

1. Introduction

The *Kāvyaśāstrasūtra*¹ is divided into three parts: the Sūtras, the Vṛitti thereon, and the examples. As we noted in the last chapter Vāmana writes in the "Sūtra" style as opposed to the "Kārikā" form, in which his predecessors (and most of his successors) composed their works.

The work is divided into five Adhikaraṇas or chapters which are further subdivided into Adhyāyas or sections. The first Adhikaraṇa is entitled "Śarīra" (implying in this context, the constituents of literature), of which the first Adhyāya is devoted to a discussion of the uses of literature.

Vāmana starts with the proposition that poetry (i.e. literature) becomes acceptable by reason of Alaṅkāra or embellishment (K.A.S., I, I, 1), and the accompanying Vṛtti defines poetry as the word and subject-matter adorned by the qualities and the figures. The word "Alaṅkāra" generally refers to the figures of speech, but as the next Sūtra states, here it is used in its wider sense and stands for the principle of beauty (K.A.S., I, I, 2). As it is essential to literature, the means of achieving this embellishment are next pointed out (K.A.S., I, I, 3). These are the avoidance of faults and the utilisation of the excellences and figures.

The Adhyāya ends with some general remarks on the uses of literature.

The next Adhyāya opens with a statement concerning the importance of the faculty of discrimination for a writer (K.A.S., I, II, 5), and the Sūtra proceeds to its central theme, i.e. the discussion of the Rīti. At the very outset Vāmana asserts boldly the central importance of Rīti, calling it the soul or essence of writing (K.A.S., I, II, 6). The succeeding Sūtra defines it as the particular arrangement of words, which results chiefly from the harmonious blending of the Guṇas. We may note here that Vāmana is the first writer on poetics to make any statement about the essence of literature; for his predecessors the study of poetics was confined to what they call the body of literature.

Next, Vāmana distinguishes three kinds of Rītis viz. the "Vaidarbhī", the "Gauḍī", and the "Pāñcālī" (K.A.S., I, II, 9). The names proceed from different geographical regions and are based upon the names of places in which the Rītis were predominant. The first of these, i.e. the Vaidarbhī, is replete with all the Guṇas, and does not possess even the slightest faults (K.A.S., I, II, 11), comparable in its sweetness to the notes of the lute. The Gauḍī exhibits a marked predilection towards Ojas (compactness of structure and boldness of conception) and Kānti (richness of words and the conspicuous presence of

Rasas). To attain these excellences, it abounds in long compounds and harsh-sounding words, and as a consequence is totally devoid of sweetness and softness (K.A.S., I, II, 12). On the other hand, the Pāñcālī is endowed with the qualities that the Gauḍī lacks: Mādhurya (sweetness resulting from the conspicuousness of words and a periphrastic manner of utterance) and Saukumārya (freedom from harsh words and disagreeable ideas) are its characteristic qualities. To procure the distinctness of words and avoid harshness, it has to be totally devoid of harsh-sounding words and long compounds; and as a result, it lacks Ojas and Kānti (K.A.S., I, II, 13).

The above definitions of the Rītis make it amply clear that the Vaidarbhī is the complete or ideal Rīti for it is flexible enough to unify all the literary excellences (and is, therefore, capable of much variety), whereas the other two encourage extremes. In this light, Vāmana's preference for the Vaidarbhī seems to be justified. He advises the poet to adopt it, rejecting the other two Rītis (K.A.S., I, II, 14-15). The latter cannot even serve the purpose of steps leading upto the Vaidarbhī, since the nature of every Rīti is peculiar to itself - the proper Rīti cannot be attained by one who begins with the improper (K.A.S., I, II, 16-18).

The presence of compound words is one of the distinguishing features between the Gauḍī and the Pāñcālī,

while the Vaidarbhī can exhibit some variety in the use of such words. When the compounds are absent, it is called "pure Vaidarbhī", in which even the slightest excellence of subject matter becomes appreciable (K.A.S., I, II, 19-20), apparently because the absence of compounds results in the ease of comprehension.

Thus, Vāmana systematically develops the teachings of his predecessors, establishing a much more intimate relationship between the Rītis and the Guṇas. He adds Pāñcālī to the two Rītis of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, placing it in direct opposition to the Gauḍī as a mode leaning towards the other extreme.

The last section of the chapter focuses on the equipment of the writer, giving a list of qualifications that he should possess. These are explained as knowledge of the auxiliaries of literature, which are grouped under three heads:

1. The operation or action of the animate and inanimate things that constitute the world;
2. The science of poetics; and
3. The miscellanies.

The science of poetics presupposes a knowledge of grammar and the lexicon, prosody, the fine arts (singing, dancing etc.), the science of erotics and the science of politics. The miscellanies include genius, instruction by

superiors, acquaintance with the subject-matter and a concentration of the mind on the task of composing. Along with these they also include technical skill in the composition of various stanza-forms, the employment of figures and the choice of appropriate words.

This is followed by a division of literature into prose and verse (K.A.S., I, III, 21), of which the former is very difficult to compose, since the absence of metre lends it an indefinite character. It can be divided into three kinds:

1. Vṛttagandhī, i.e. prose which bears parts of verse;
2. Cūrṇa, or prose in which the compounds are not very long; and
3. Utkalikapṛāya, or prose that contains long compounds and harsh-sounding words (K.A.S., I, III, 22-25).

These characteristics have more relevance to Sanskrit than to other languages, so that it is difficult to provide English equivalence. Perhaps the closest parallel in English to the Vṛttagandhī prose would be free verse, though in this case it is verse which savours of prose and exploits its rhythms, rather than being the other way round.

The presence of compound words has already been mentioned as the distinguishing feature between the Gauḍī and the Pāñcālī Rītis, therefore a classification of prose on this principle would seem somewhat superfluous. The

distinction has apparently been made because being devoid of the restraints imposed by metre, prose gives greater freedom to the writer; so that it can exhibit much more variety in the use of compounds than lies within the scope of verse.

Moving on to verse, the *Sūtra* lists its divisions, beginning with those based on stanza-forms. There can be another classification of verse, according to whether they are (i) stray, or (ii) cumulative. The poet is advised to acquire proficiency in the composition of stray verses before he attempts to write continuous poems, which should be his ultimate end (K.A.S., I, III, 27-29).

2. The Doṣas

The second chapter is an exposition on the subject of the Doṣas or defects, which are defined as the opposites of Guṇas. Once the nature of the Guṇas is understood, the Doṣas can be comprehended by implication (K.A.S., II, I, 1-2). The Guṇas produce beauty in poetry, so the Doṣas, being their opposites, would naturally detract from this beauty. Though some of the Doṣas are the exact opposites of some of the Guṇas, the majority of them spring from an ignorance or misapplication of the auxiliaries of poetry, so that their separate mention becomes necessary.

The Doṣas are grouped under four heads:

- (1) Padadoshas (defects of words);
- (2) Padārthadoshas (defects of the meaning of words);
- (3) Vākyādoshas (defects of sentences); and
- (4) Vākyārthadoshas (defects pertaining to the meaning of sentences).

The Padadoshas are explained first. These are :

- (1) A Sādhutva or grammatical incorrectness (K.A.S., II, I, 5).
- (2) Kaṣṭatva or unmelodiousness, which results from the use of a word which is unpleasant to the ear and disturbs the flow of the verse (K.A.S., II, I, 6).
- (3) Grāmyatva or Vulgarity, which consists in the use of a word that is current among the common people only, and not among the learned (K.A.S., II, I, 7)
- (4) Apratītatva or unintelligibility, consisting in the use of expression that constitute the technical vocabulary of a discipline, but do not find a place in usage (K.A.S., II, I, 8).
- (5) Anarthakatva or meaninglessness, referring to words (mostly indeclinables) that are added up only for the sake of filling up gaps of sentences (K.A.S., II, I, 9). If the words lend a graceful form to the sentence, their use is permissible.

Like the defects of words those related to the meaning of words are also five in number. These are:

(1) Anyārthatva, i.e., making a word convey a sense that is entirely different from its accepted denotation, but is only deducible from the etymology (K.A.S., II, I, 11).² In the illustrative verse, the word "Prasmaranti", which means "to forget", has been used in the sense of "to remember". The latter meaning is deducible from the etymology, since the word consists of the prefix "Pra" (excellent) and the verb-root "Smr" (to remember).

(2) Neyārthatva or the use of a word in a fanciful sense (K.A.S., II, I, 12). In other words the meaning desired to be conveyed is such as the word is never known to bear, since the logic by which it is assigned to the word is rather fanciful. In the example "Ulūkajit" has been made to convey Indrajit (one of the name of Megthanada) by supposing that since the word "Kauśika" denotes both "Ulūka" and "Indra" these two may be considered as synonymous. But an exception is made for words that have been incorporated in usage.

(3) Gūḍhārthatva or difficulty in comprehension, resulting from the use of a word in a little known sense (K.A.S., II, I, 13).

(4) Aślīlatva or indecorousness, consisting in the use of a word which has, among other significations, one that is objectionable (K.A.S., II, I, 14-19). The objection may be due to three reasons, according as the word gives rise to

(i) shame, (ii) disgust or (iii) forebodings of evil. If the vulgar signification is not a part of common knowledge, or is only remotely indicated, such words may be used.

(5) Klišṭatva or obscurity which is caused by a word that is used in a far-fetched sense, so that there is a delay in comprehension (K.A.S., II, 1, 20). The defect also includes such disorders in syntax as produce the same effects (K.A.S. II, 1, 22).

It is not difficult to perceive that excepting Aślīlatva, all the other Padārthadoṣas highlight causes which pose problems in ascertaining the desired meaning. In all these cases, an unusual meaning is assigned to the word, so that it is not easily decipherable. The Doṣas are classified on the bases of the processes by which the unconventional meanings are assigned to the words.

The defects of sentences come next in the order of treatment, taking up the next section of the chapter. The defects that pertain to the formal structure of the sentence are the first to be discussed. Three such defects are named:

(1) Vṛttabhedatva or deficiency in metre, arising from a violation in the number or order of short and long syllables of a stanza (K.A.S., II, 11, 2).

(2) Yativhramṣatva or misplacement of the hiatus referring to instances where a noun or a verb-root is broken up by the hiatus occurring in the middle of the word, with the

result that the sentence becomes awkward, Unharmonized and unpleasant (K.A.S., II, II, 3-4). But if the hiatus disrupts a collusion between two words, it is permissible. An exception is also made for other parts of speech.

(3) Visandhitva or the unharmonious or cacophonous effects produced by the juxta-position or collusion of two words (K.A.S., II, II, 7-8). The words may be disjoined (where the collusion between them is avoided even when it is possible according to the rules of grammar), indecorous (when their juxta-position or collusion becomes indicative of something vulgar or indecent, giving rise to shame, disgust or forebodings of evil) or discordant (resulting from collusions that are unpleasant to the ear and impede the free flow of the verse).

The last group of Doṣas, the Vākyārthadoṣas or the defects of the meaning of sentences, consists of seven members. These are:

(1) Byarthatva or contradiction, produced when a word in a sentence contradicts what precedes or follows it (K.A.S., II, II, 10). The defect may proceed from an incomplete knowledge of the lexicon, as the example suggests.

(2) Ekārthatva or redundancy, i.e., repetition of the same meaning resulting from the use of superfluous words (K.A.S., II, II, 11). But the repetition is not objectionable if the additional word adds an extra

qualification, or modifies the meaning in some other manner (K.A.S., II, II, 12-18). For example, in the case of the word "Muktāhāra", the word "Hāra" itself denotes a necklace containing pearls, but without the addition of the word "Muktā" (pearl) there would be nothing to show that the necklace contains *only* pearls and no other gems.

(3) Sandigdhatva or dubiousness, referring to a sentence in which doubts arise through the mention of common attributes and the non-mention of distinctive characteristics (K.A.S., II, II, 20). In the line

Sa Mahātmābhāgyavaśānmahāpādāmupagataḥ

it is doubtful whether the high-minded person "fell into trouble" (Āpadāmupāgataḥ) "through ill-luck" (Abhāgyavaśāt), or whether he "reached a high position" (Mahāpādāmupāgataḥ) "through good luck" (Bhāgyavaśāt), depending upon how one chooses to break the collusions. Such doubts are especially liable to arise when, for the comprehension of the real meaning there are no such aids as those of the context.

(4) Ayuktimattva or disregard of usage, a defect very rarely found in writing (K.A.S., II, II, 21). It is said to consist in a sentence the signification attached to which is purely imaginary or illusory.

(5) Apakramatva or lack of symmetry, arising from the absence of proper order between the members of two interconnected sequences (K.A.S., II, II, 21). In the

illustration

Thy fame and glory are like the sun and the moon.
the fame is intended to resemble the moon, and the glory the sun; and for this reason the moon should have been mentioned prior to the sun in the sentence.

(6) Lokavirodhitva or incompatibility with ordinary conceptions (i.e., place, time and the nature of things) (K.A.S., II, II, 23); e.g. to speak of the Kadamba flowers in Spring (the Kadamba blooms during the rains only).

(7) Vidyāvirodhitva or incompatibility with scientific conceptions, which includes the violation of the established principles of arts and sciences (K.A.S., II, II, 24). For instance, the line

Enemies are conquered by means of pride, - what,
then, is the need of policy?

is against the science of politics.

The above defects - both of words and of sentences - originate, for the most part, from a neglect of the auxiliaries of poetry, such as grammar, the lexicon, prosody, the arts and sciences etc. While it is true that Vāmana improves upon the ideas of his predecessors and gives a much more scientific account of the Doṣas based on their four fold classification, he could not help adhering to the conventional number of Doṣas. The Padadoṣas and the Padārthadoṣas add upto ten, as do the Vākya-doṣas and the

Vāk̄yār̄thadoṣas. To conform to the number, some of the Doṣas which could have been subsumed within others have been given an independent status and vice versa. For example, the distinction between Kliṣṭatva and Neyār̄thatva is hardly appreciable, since both rely on far-fetched expression.

3. The Guṇas

As with the Doṣas, Vāmana theoretically follows his predecessors Bharata and Daṇḍin, in the number and nomenclature of his Guṇas, yet he practically doubles the number (as in the case of the Doṣas) by splitting up each of the Guṇas as relating to the Śhabda or to the Artha. The distinctions between the Śhabda guṇas and the Artha guṇas, the Śhabda doṣas and the Artha doṣas, and the Śhabdā alaṃkāras and the Arthā alaṃkāras, as standardized by Vāmana, were accepted and developed by latter writers.

Perceiving the two fold character of some of the Guṇas of Bharata and Daṇḍin, Vāmana extended it to all the Guṇas; and with the eye of a novel theorist read a new aspect in the Guṇas of his predecessors. This will become obvious as we take up the individual Guṇas for study.

It may be urged that inasmuch as the Rīti (of which the Guṇas form the essence) has been defined as the speciality of word-arrangement (K.A.S., I, II, 7), what is the use of enumerating Artha guṇas? The objection is easily met; for we must not forget that the Guṇas served to impart

special charm to the words-structure, and so far as that is concerned, it does not matter whether the Guṇas belong to the word or to its sense, provided that the one does not go without the other. In the case of a particular Artha guṇa, we are to understand that the Guṇa serves to impart speciality to that word-structure to whose sense that Guṇa belongs. Or it can be said that it embellishes the sense primarily and directly, and the word-structure only secondarily and indirectly.

Before proceeding on with the individual Guṇas, Vāmana thinks it proper to set down clearly the difference between the Guṇas and the Alaṅkāras, both of which are included under the term "Alaṅkāra" (i.e. beauty) in the first chapter. At the outset of the third chapter, the Guṇas are defined as those elements which create or constitute the charm of poetry (K.A.S., III, I, 1), a function assigned to both Guṇas and Alaṅkāras by Daṇḍin. The Alaṅkāras or the figures of speech are such entities which serve to enhance the charm already produced by the Guṇas (K.A.S., III, II, 2). Hence the Guṇas are taken as inseparable attributes of poetry (Nitya) and the Alaṅkāras - which are not absolutely indispensable for the production of literary charm, but only heighten it - are relegated to a subordinate position. The Alaṅkāras without the Guṇas cannot by themselves produce beauty in a poem, though the latter can do so without the Alaṅkāras. If literature is compared to a young woman, the

Guṇas would correspond to her youth and beauty, and the Alāṃkāras to the external ornaments that add to her grace.

As each Guṇa is split up and looked from two different points of view, it would be more appropriate to deal with both aspects side by side, instead of taking the Śhabda guṇas and the Artha guṇas separately, as has been done in the text.

Vāmana's guṇas are identical with those of Bharata and Daṇḍin in number and nomenclature, though the order of their enumeration is different. We have not given English equivalence of the Guṇas, as we have done with the Doṣas, for the nature of Guṇas, especially in Vāmana's system, is much more complex than that of the Doṣas, and it is very difficult to provide corresponding words in English which bear all the connotations of a particular Guṇa. The following is a brief account of Vāmana's treatment of the Guṇas.

(1) Ojas.

a) Compactness in the arrangement of words (K.A.S., III, 1, 2). Vāmana does not go into details about how the compactness is to be achieved, but on the basis of the illustrations provided by him the commentator Gopendra Tripurahara deduces that it is due to the frequent use of conjunct consonants. Especially effective are the combinations between the letters of the same class of consonants³, and the conjunction of "r" and "y" with other

letters. The use of compound words is also helpful. Loose syllables are also avoided; if they appear, they do so along with comparatively harsh ones, producing as a total effect a cohesiveness in the structure.

b) Maturity and boldness in the expression of ideas (K.A.S., III, II, 2). This has been explained in five different ways:

- (i) The use of a phrase or sentence for a single word, e.g., "The light born of the eye of Atri", used to signify the moon. But since such expression relies on the deviant use of words, Vāmana has a word of caution for the writer: It is not right to carry the process to an undue extent, because such dilatory style adds charm only within certain limits.
- ii) The use of a single word in order to convey the sense of a sentence; e.g. the word "winks", mentioned with reference to a lady, with a view to declare that "she is human and not divine" (from the convention that Gods never wink).
- iii) Deffuseness of sentences, where the selfsame idea is sought to be expressed in more ways than one. The illustrative verse

The rotation of happiness and unhappiness proceeds variously. Either happiness or sorrow comes about. Then both cease entirely. After this there follows happiness and unhappiness.

consists of as many as five sentences which denote a single idea, i.e., happiness and sorrow revolve in a cyclical order.

- (iv) Brevity or synthetic expression of ideas, where several sentences (or phrases) are joined together in one integrated whole through the use of suffixes sanctioned by grammar as in the verse:

Having taken leave of Himālaya, seeing Śiva and declaring to him the success of their mission, then being dismissed by him, they flew away into the sky.

- v) The appropriateness of meaning due to the use of particular epithets, which, through ellipsis, bear a special significance. In the example

This very son of Candragupta, bright as the moon and the patron of the men of letters has, by good luck succeeded in his labour.

the expression "patron of the men of letters" has been added with the special purpose of indicating that the Prince had the learned Vasubandhu as his minister.

2. Prasāda

- a) Laxity of structure (K.A.S., III, 1, 6-10). Meeting the possible objection that this constitutes a veritable Doṣa, as it is the opposite of the verbal Ojas,

Vāmana holds that Prasāda as a Śabdaguṇa is an excellence only when it appears along with Djas, and not by itself. The combination of the two can be of various kinds, depending upon the proportion of the two Guṇas. In some cases there is equality between the two: in others, superiority of one over the other.

b) Clearness of meaning, arising from the use of such words as are absolutely necessary (K.A.S., III, II, 3). In the example

A maiden of the same caste, endowed with beauty and budding youth,

the qualifying adjectives are not superfluous. The ideal form of Prasāda is really the excellent literary quality which avoids superfluity.

3. Ślesa

a) Smoothness, resulting from such a close proximity or coalescence of several words by virtue of which they all appear to constitute a single whole (K.A.S., III, I, 11). Besides close proximity ease in pronunciation is also essential.

b) Congruity or commingling of ideas (K.A.S., III, II, 4). This is further explained as the achievement of congruity between incongruous ideas by means of a clever procedure. In the illustrative verse, the hero cleverly manages to please two heroines simultaneously, which is otherwise a difficult task.

4. Samatā

a) Homogeneity of diction and manner throughout a verse or a literary work as a whole (K.A.S., III, I, 12). For example, there should be uniformity in the use of compound words, as well as in the construction of the sentences.

b) Non-relinquishment of the proper sequence of ideas (K.A.S., III, II, 5). The illustration is the description of the period when the winter has ended and the spring has just set in, so that the mention of the Malaya breeze in the verse, which belongs to the middle of spring, has given rise to some inconsistency. If the reference to the Malaya breeze is replaced by an appropriate attribute of the period being described, the inconsistency would be resolved and the verse would become an instance of the Arthaguṇa Samatā.

Besides, this Guṇa also includes ease in comprehension as one of its characteristics (K.A.S., III, II, 6). This results from the observance of the natural syntactical order, so that the meaning is comprehended clearly and at once.

5. Samādhi

a) Orderly sequence of ascent and descent (K.A.S., III, I, 13-20). This admits of two ways of interpretation. In the first place, it may occur when the wording is such that the heightening effect of the vigorous diction is toned down by a judicious sprinkling of softening

words and vice versa. Vāmana does not clarify what he means by "softening" and "heightening". The commentator Gopendra explains that the softening effect is produced by words having short syllables and lacking conjunct consonants, while the heightening effect results from words that have long syllables and conjunct consonants.

The second type of Śābdasamādhi occurs when there is a gradual rise from the feeble to the vigorous, and a gradual decline from the vigorous to the feeble, i.e. an alternating gradation of the soft and the forcible diction. It may be argued that Samādhi thus defined cannot be a separate excellence by itself, because the ascent and descent are nothing more than the excellences of Ojas and Prasāda. To this Vāmana answers that it is not invariably true that in Ojas there is ascent; similarly, descent is not a universal feature of Prasāda. The ascent and descent are essential only in certain height and stages of Ojas and Prasāda respectively; because in these cases the ascent and descent depend upon the particularity of the situations, as distinct from the general nature of Ojas and Prasāda. In other words, ascent and descent are not the essential or specific characteristics of Ojas and Prasāda; whenever these two excellences attain special heightened stages, the ascent and descent may occur in some of the parts. For this reason, Ojas and Prasāda are often interwoven in ascent as well as in descent, and there is no objection to accepting Samādhi as a

separate Guṇa on the basis of ascent and descent. In other words, Samādhi is the quality which, by the alternations of ascent and descent, prevents the composition from becoming monotonous.

b) A concentration of the mind for the proper comprehension of the meaning (K.A.S., III, II, 7-10). Vāmana classifies the meaning under two heads, viz., (i) absolutely original; and (ii) borrowed from some other source. As illustrations Vāmana quotes two verses; and though the latter has been put in a more charming manner, its idea has been borrowed from the former. But while the first has justly been esteemed above the second, Vāmana does not condemn the latter verse; he readily concedes that literature may echo great passages from antiquity.

On another principle, the meaning is further classified into (i) the Vyakta or explicit; and (ii) the Sūkṣma or subtle. The latter is again divided into two categories, viz.,

- (iia) Bhāvya, or that which is comprehended after a little thought; and
- (iib) Vāsāniya, or that which is more abstruse and is comprehended by deep thought.

The first variety is exemplified by the verse:

The pair of lovers lies in the pleasure-house, having the brightness of their teeth enhanced by mutual contact, and the pupils of the eyes mingling together, - the eyes indicative of a mixture of tears, fear, anger etc.

The fact that the verse illustrates love in separation can be easily grasped, since each detail, by itself is suggestive of it.

As an example of the abstruse meaning, we have the lines:

She cast her glances on me, while her thighs were trembling under strong emotion; her breasts pointed towards me, and she fondled her necklace with her right hand.

That the lady in question is tormented by the separation from her lover, and wishes him to embrace her, is conveyed so subtly that it does not become apparent immediately but is grasped after deep thought.⁴

6. Mādhurya

a) Distinctness of words, associated with the exclusion of long compounds (K.A.S., III, 1, 21). This is in keeping with the definition of the Pāñcālī Rīti, of which the excellence forms a dominant feature. It should be stressed

here that it is the use of long compounds, rather than the collusion of a number of uncompounded words, that is objectionable in Mādhurya.

b) Strikingness of utterance (K.A.S., III, II, 11), by which is meant a statement in an impressive but periphrastic manner, in order to give a special charm thereto. For example:

Nectar is sweet, without doubt; honey is also not otherwise; sweet is the juicy fruit of the mango; yet for once it has to be declared without partiality by the efficient in discriminating flavours, if there is anything more delectable than the lips of the beloved.

The whole verse wants to say that the lips of the heroin excel all standards of comparison, and this has been expressed in an indirect, though charming, manner.

This aspect of Mādhurya should not be confused with the third variety of the ideal Ojas, i.e., the Diffuseness of sentences. In the latter, the selfsame idea is sought to be expressed in more ways than one. In Mādhurya the idea is expanded and expressed in a round about manner, but repetition is not involved in the expansion.

7. Saukumārya

a) Freedom from harshness (K.A.S., III, I, 22).

Harshness generally arises from the use of harsh syllables, therefore it is the soft syllables that combine to produce Saukumārya. These are syllables that contain unaspirated letters (i.e., the first, third and fifth letters of the five classes of consonants), and the semi-vowels ["Y", "V", "R" (sparingly) and "L"].

b) Freedom from disagreeable and inauspicious ideas (K.A.S., III, II, 12); e.g., to speak of a dead person as "one whose sole remnant is his good name". The excellence is clearly the negation of the defect of indecorousness.

8. Udāratā

a) A certain liveliness of composition, "in which the words seem to be dancing" (K.A.S., III, I, 23). It is not clear what Vāmana means by the "dancing" of words, but he adds that it arises from the graceful turn of syllables, which in its turn enlivens the composition with a peculiar swing of words. The illustrations do not enlighten us any further, and it can be safely concluded that Vāmana admits some subjective valuation in this Guṇa.

b) Avoidance of vulgarity in the manner of the sense (when there is a risk of perpetrating it) (K.A.S., III, II, 13). In the illustration

You are full of beauty, he also is not devoid of charm; both of you are well-versed in the arts; each

of you is quite in keeping with the other; if what remains to be done under these circumstances does come about, all victory and success then to the presence of good qualities.

The union of lovers has been delicately hinted at.

Like the ideal Saukumārya, the ideal Udāratā has also been conceived negatively, resulting in an absence of uniformity in Vāmana's conception and treatment of the Guṇas.

9. Arthavyakti

(a) Explicitness of words, whereby the meaning is easily comprehended. A Kārikā quoted by Vāmana in support of his definition maintains that when the idea of the thing expressed comes before the apprehension of the words themselves, - the meaning being readily comprehended - we have the quality of "Arthavyakti". This Guṇa comes very close to the Arthaguṇas Prasāda and Samādhi, and the distinctions between them are extremely subtle.

b) Explicitness of ideas, which makes the nature of things clear (K.A.S., III, II, 14). The excellence consists in the natural description of the subject-matter, rather than in a description in natural and simple language.

10. Kānti

a) Richness of words (K.A.S., III, I, 25). Without this excellence the composition is stale and a reflection of

conventional things. P. C. Lahiri⁵ suggests that the quality consists in the avoidance of the commonplace which a true literary instinct always obeys. This, according to Gopendra, lies in the use of more polished and elegant terms of expression instead of the ordinarily used ones.

b) The conspicuous presence of Rasas (K.A.S., III, II, 15). By "conspicuous presence" Vāmana means that the excitants which bring out the emotional elements of a poem are vividly represented by this excellence, as in the example:

In the evening, when the lover had fallen down upon her feet (in repentance), she had with an oath, rejected him; upon this, when he, in a dejected mood, proceeded to move away, as soon as he had moved two or three steps, she ran forward, holding with her hand the loosened clothes, and caught him up in her arms and fell upon her feet; - really wonderful are the ways of love!

This verse vividly depicts the emotional state of the lady, and would, in accordance with the views of later theorists, be classed under the category of "Rasadhvani" (the suggestion of Rasa).

Vāmana sums up the discussion by reiterating that it is only when all the qualities are fully manifest that

literature is said to be fully developed. If literature possesses grammatical correctness, but its subject-matter is obscure and the Guṇas are not happily mixed, it is worthless.

It will be obvious from the foregoing that Vāmana includes the excellences of form, as well as those of content, among the characteristic features of his Guṇas. As might be expected the former aspect is more dominant in the Śabdaguṇas, while the Arthaguṇas delineate the beauties of ideas. But the distinction between the Śabdaguṇas and the Arthaguṇas is not always definite and consistently maintained. It is difficult to see, for instance, why the clearness of meaning in Arthaguṇa Prasāda, which depends upon the mention of what is absolutely necessary, should be taken as the distinguishing characteristic of an Arthaguṇa, when it clearly restricts the use of words. The Arthaguṇa Saukumārya and the first four varieties of Arthaguṇa Ojas raise a doubt whether they are related really to the sense or to the word. It is also not convincing why Artha Vyakti should be taken as a Śabdaguṇa in spite of the fact that even here the question of the Artha is involved, and there is no reference to the arrangement of words (Bandha) at all.

It may be argued that Śabda and Artha cannot be strictly kept apart like body and soul, and that we are to apply the designation in accordance with the prominence of the one or the other in each aspect of the Guṇas. Still in

order that there is a distinction worth the name, there must be a uniformity in the principle of its application, "the violation of which," according to P.C. Lahiri

proves the defective nature of the scheme, as well as of the standard itself.⁶

Critics have also complained about the lack of convincing distinctions between some of the Guṇas. In the words of S.K. De⁷,

It is natural to suspect that they [the distinctions] are made for the sake of symmetry of having two sets, each of ten excellences.

The four distinctions of Arthaguṇa Djas might also be taken as forms of the strikingness of expression, which is singled out as the prominent characteristic of the Arthaguṇa Mādhurya. The distinctions between the alternative explanation of the Arthaguṇa Samatā (i.e. ease in comprehension), Arthasamādhi and the Arthaguṇa Arthavyakti are so fine that all three could be comprehended in the Arthaguṇa Samadhi. *

Despite these drawbacks, Vāmana's treatment of the Guṇas attempts to encompass a wide variety of poetic excellences within its scope, and marks a great advance on his predecessors. He goes a step further than the Alāmkāra writers in including Rasa among the necessary characteristics

in the Arthaguṇa Kānti, thereby admitting it as one of the essentials of literature; while Daṇḍin acknowledges it in some of the non-essential figures. The central place of Dhvani or suggestion in poetry had not been worked out by Vāmana's time but he seems to have realised that words may sometimes have a deeper significance than what they express directly, and included such instances under his Arthaguṇa Samādhī.

As P.C. Lahiri has noted^B, the Śabdaguṇa Kānti which consists in the employment of elegant and polished expressions, approaches very nearly to some aspects of Kuntaka's Vakrokti, as do the first four varieties of Arthaguṇa Ojas as well as the periphrastic mode of utterance peculiar to the Arthaguṇa Mādhurya. Vāmana was evidently aware that beauty in literature can be achieved by a deviant use of language, though he does not state it explicitly. The very attempt of an early theorizer like Vāmana to incorporate in his system of Guṇas as many ways of creating charm in poetry as were known to him deserves our commendation.

4. The Alāṅkāras

After explaining the Guṇas Vāmana moves to a consideration of the Alāṅkāras or the adornments of literature, which enhance the charm that has already been produced by the qualities. As with the Doṣas and the Guṇas, the Śabdāṅkāras are discussed first. These are:

(1) Yamaka or Chime (K.A.S., IV, 1,1).

When the same word is repeated in its different significations, or when the same syllable is repeated, we have chime or Yamaka. But the repetition should not be random, it is permitted only in well-defined places. According to the places of repetition, Chime may admit of several varieties. There may be the repetition of the entire foot of a verse, as in

Asajjanavaco Yasya
Kalikāmadhugarhitam̄.
Tasya Syādviṣataroḥ
Kalikāmadhugarhitam̄..

(That person who listens with respect to the words of the wicked - productive as they are of ill-feeling - for such a person even the honey from the blossoms of the poisonous tree would not be something to be disregarded.)

Here the entire foot "Kalikāmadhugarhitam̄" is repeated, and the meaning is different in the two cases.

Similarly, there may be Chiming within the same foot, where the word is repeated in the same foot of the verse. This may occur at the beginning, the middle or the end of the foot. These patterns are usually followed in all the four feet of the verse. Chiming might also occur in consecutive

feet where a word in the first foot is repeated at the same place in the second foot; the same pattern is continued in the third and the fourth feet also. This can also be present in the beginning, the middle or the end of the feet.

On the same principle, there may be chiming between alternate feet, or chiming of all the four feet. Chiming at the end of the feet corresponds to the rhymes at the end of lines of stanzas employed in English poetry; but as verses in Sanskrit are for the most part blank, this type of chiming is productive of special charm.

In the chiming of syllables, one or more syllables are repeated at fixed places in the verse.

Though Vāmana's classification of Yamaka is less detailed than that of his predecessors (especially Daṇḍin), he introduces another factor into the discussion, i.e., how the charm inherent in Yamaka is brought to its full realization. Vāmana holds that the charm is constituted by the "Bhaṅga" or caesura between the words, of which three types are mentioned: (i) the Śrīṅkhala, (ii) the Parivartaka and (iii) the Cūrṇaka (K.A.S., IV, 1, 3-4).

When the transference of the Caesura is caused by the separation of an entire syllable, we have the "Śrīṅkhala" (K.A.S., IV, 1, 5). In the verse "Asajjanavseo" etc. quoted above, the expression in the second line is

"Kalikāmadhugarhitam" which is equal to "Kalikāmadhuk" + "Arhitam". In the word "Kalikāmadhuk" the Caesura falls on "li", between "Kali" and "Kāmadhuk". In the fourth line the expression resolves in to "Kalikāmadhu" + "Garhitam". Here the break falls on "Kā", between "Kalikā" and "Madhu". The Caesura is transferred from "li" to "kā", forming a sort of Śrīkhalā (chain or sequence).

Where, on the cessation the collusion (with another letter), a letter resumes its own form, we have the "Parivartaka" (K.A.S., IV, 1, 6). In the same verse, the letter "A" of "Arhit" in the first line resumes its own form only after the cessation of its collusion with the letter "K". Due to the collusion, the word "Arhit" has been transformed into another word, i.e. "Garhit". This type of transformation is the distinct feature of the "Parivartaka" break.

Where, on the disruption of a conjunct syllable, a word disappears completely, we have the "Cūrṇaka" (K.A.S., IV, 1, 7). For example:

Yocalakulamavati Calam
 Dūrasamunmuktaśuktimīnām Kāntaḥ.
 Sāgni Vibharti Ca Salilam
 Dūrasamunmuktaśuktimīnāṅkāntaḥ..

(The Lord of the Timi fish (the Ocean) protects the

family of mountains having removed their griefs; he bears within himself water along with fire, - throwing on all sides the signs of shells and fishes.)

In this verse, we have the conjunct syllable "Kti" in "Śukti"; the disruption of this gives rise to two words "Samunmuktaśuk" and "Timinām", and the word "Śukti" becomes entirely obliterated.

To sum up in Śṛṅghalā the Caesura occurs between two syllables, in Parivartaka between two letters that have colluded together, and in Cūrṇaka between the two constituent consonants of a conjunct syllable.

(2) Anuprāsa or alliteration (K.A.S., IV, 1, 8).

This is defined as such repetition of words and letters as has not been specified under Yamaka. This implies that words with the same meaning can be repeated, and the repetition may be at the same, or at any other points in the verse.

The poets are advised to refrain from such alliteration where the letters are glaringly conspicuous. This kind of alliteration is rated inferior to the alliteration where the letters are not easily noticeable (K.A.S., IV, 1, 9).

Vāmana does not think it necessary to list

and illustrate all the varieties of alliteration that are possible within a verse, remarking that the different kinds of alliteration of the verse-feet are to be classed and enumerated on the same lines as the chime of the verse-feet (K.A.S., IV, I, 10). A few examples are thought sufficient. For instance, alliteration at the beginning and in the middle is illustrated by the lines:

Ākhaṇḍayanti Muhurāmalakīfalāni.

Bālāni Bālakapilocanapiṅgalāni..

(They eat the fresh Āmalakī fruits, yellow like the eyes of a young monkey.)

Here we have alliteration in the middle of both feet, as well as in the beginning of the second foot.

With regard to Arthālaṅkāras or the ideal figures of speech, as Upamā or comparison lies at their root, it has been taken up first. The remarks in connection with it apply to most of the figures based on comparison.

(1) Upamā or Simile (K.A.S., IV, II, 1).

This is defined as the slightest resemblance of qualities between two things, technically known as the "Upamāna" and the "Upameya". The "Upamāna" is that object possessed of superior qualities with which the resemblance or similarity of another object is pointed out; and the "Upameya" is that other object with inferior qualities which

is pointed out as resembling the former.

If the comparison is a part of the common knowledge (as between the "moon" and the "face"), the simile is called "Laukikī" (real); but if a novel comparison is made on the basis of a number of common qualities, it is called "Kalpitā" (imaginary) simile (K.A.S., IV, II, 2). Such is the simile in the sentence :

The orange resembles the newly-shaven chin of the intoxicated Hūna.

Apart from this division into real and imaginary, simile can be classified from a formal point of view. It can be divided into "Pūrṇopamā" (complete simile) and "Lūptopamā" (elliptical simile) (K.A.S., IV, II, 4-6). There are four constituents of a simile - the object of comparison, the standard of comparison, the common property and the word denoting similitude. If all these are present, the simile is said to be complete; as in:

Beautiful like the lotus is the face.

When there is an absence of one or more of the constituents, we have the "elliptical simile". In the sentence

The king is like the moon.

the word denoting the common property is absent. [The absence of the Upameya or the Upamāna constitutes the figures of

"Samāsokti" (modal metaphor) and "Ākṣepa" (hint) respectively, which are defined later.]

Vāmana next demonstrates the functions that simile (and other figures based on comparison) performs in a text. There are three such functions. Simile may be employed to praise, as in

An affectionate wife is like nectar.

Or it may accomplish the reverse, when employed to dispraise; e.g.,

A wife not possessed of good qualities is like poison.

When the simile is not intended to praise or dispraise, it is employed to describe the real state of things. In other words, it enlivens the description, as it were, by its vividness; as in the verse

Among the groups of stars, know that to be the asterisk of Rohiṇī as appears in the shape of a cart.

As simile lies at the root of all the figures based on comparison, theorists from the time of Bhāmaha have thought it proper to point out the defects that may disfigure a simile, implying that these may taint other figures as well. The defects account for the various causes that may lead to the unsuitability of the Upamāna for the Upameya or

vice versa. Vāmana names six of these defects: (i) Deficiency; (ii) Excess; (iii) Disparity of gender; (iv) Disparity of number; (v) Non-similitude; and (vi) Impossibility (K.A.S., IV, 11, 8).

By "deficiency" is meant the inferiority of the standard of comparison to the object compared, with respect to cast, magnitude or details of quality (K.A.S., IV, 11, 9-10). For example, in the sentence

The sun is shining like a spark of fire.

there is inferiority of magnitude.

The defect of excess is the exact opposite of deficiency, consisting, as it does, in the superiority of the standard of comparison in cast magnitude or qualities (K.A.S., IV, 11, 11). Though some amount of superiority of the Upamāna is involved in all instances of simile, excess lies in those cases where the bounds of credibility and propriety have been stressed. To illustrate this, Vāmana cites a comparison between the bosom of a woman and the globe.

Disparity of gender arises when the gender of the object compared is different from the standard of comparison (K.A.S., IV, 11, 12). "Gender" refers to the grammatical, rather than to the biological gender. The disparity of number is analogous to the disparity of gender.

The fault of non-similitude (K.A.S., IV, II, 16-18) originates when the similarity of the qualities intended to be expressed is not fully comprehended, as in the verse:

I am going to prepare the moon of poetry, with its meaning expanding like the moon's rays.

It can be perceived that the expansion of meaning is similar to the scattering of the moon beams; but it is not comprehensible what similarity is intended between poetry and the moon in the first place. It is only after the similarity between "poetry" and "moon" has been established that any similarity is possible between the "meaning" and the "rays".

The last defect to be defined is that of impossibility or incongruity (K.A.S., IV, II, 20-21), which is said to occur when an Upamāna, which is absolutely impossible is mentioned. For example:

Within her shining mounth the faint smile appears as beautiful as the first moonlight within the blooming lotus.

The blooming of the lotus in moonlight is a physical impossibility, hence the simile is defective.

After Upamā, Vāmana goes on to define and illustrate other figures of speech, which have been called "the modifications of simile" (Upamāprapañca) (K.A.S., IV, III,

1). Though the importance of Upamā involved in other figures is recognised from Bhāmaha's time, Vāmana defines all his figures with reference to the idea of comparison. After the discussion of Upamā, the Arthālāmkāras to be defined are as follows:

(2) Prativastūpamā or typical comparison (K.A.S., IV, III, 2)

This occurs when the Upamāna is mentioned in one sentence, and the Upameya in the other. In fact, the two sentences, taken as two units, embody the Upameya-Upamāna relationship; as in the example:

Having attained to the position of the queen, how can she be lowered to the position of a common maid? Verily, a jewel marked with the figure of a deity is not capable of being worn.

3. Samāsokti or modal metaphor (K.A.S., IV, III, 3)

If in Prativastūpamā, the sentence representing the Upameya is omitted, it gives rise to another figure, called "Samāsokti" (Lit. "Concise assertion"), so named on account of the brevity of the form caused by the elision of one sentence. In other words, the object of comparison is not mentioned at all. For example,

The position of the leafless Karīra in the desert is praiseworthy, on account of its affording relief to

the fatigued traveler; fie upon the glory of the Kalpa tree (the wish-fulfilling tree) on the Mount Meru, which does not afford any relief to the needy.

Here the direct mention of the rich person who does not help the poor is suppressed.

4. Aprastuta Praśāmsā or indirect description, i.e. the description of the Upamāna (K.A.S., IV, III, 4)

Samāsokti is characterised by the non-mention of the Upameya, but there may also be a slight mention of the Upameya followed by an elaboration of the Upamāna. This constitutes a figure different from Samāsokti, known as "Aprastuta Praśāmsā". ("Aprastuta" is another name for the Upamāna or the standard of comparison). For example;

She is a most peculiar ocean of beauty; herein are floating lotuses along with the moon; out of this the temples of elephants are issuing forth; and herein are also found the stems of the plantain-tree, as well as lotus stalks.

Here the object of comparison, the beautiful woman, is just slightly mentioned. that "lotuses", "moon" etc. refer to "eyes", "face" etc. is left unstated, to be inferred by the reader.

5. Apahnuti or concealment (K.A.S., IV, III, 5)

Where the Upameya mentioned in a sentence is concealed, set aside or rejected by the Upamāna mentioned in another sentence, with a view to impose the character of the latter upon the former - we have "Apahnuti". For example

What are seen in the Ketaka flowers are not its shoots; they are the (taunting) smiles of fate against people straying from home. What flashes yonder is not the lightning; it is the glittering gleam of the Love-God.

Here the Ketaka-shoots are "concealed" or set aside by the "smiles of fate", and the lightning by the "glittering of the Love-God".

6. Rūpaka or metaphor (K.A.S., IV, III, 6)

By reason of the similitude of the qualities between the Upamaya and the Upamāna, where the character of one is imposed upon the other, it is "Rūpaka" or "metaphor". That is to say, the one is described as identical with the other.⁹ For instance;

She is Lakṣmī in my household; a stream of nectar to my eyes; this touch of hers is a copious flow of sandal essence over my body; this arm round my neck is the cool and soft string of pearls; - what of hers

is not lovable! But separation from her would be unbearable.

7. Śleṣa or Paronomasia (K.A.S., IV, III, 7)

A kind of identity between the Upameya and the Upamāna (with respect to their qualities, actions and names) may also be established through the coalescence of letter sounds (even when there is dissimilarity in the meaning). In other words, the same set of expressions may be made to refer both to the Upameya and the Upamāna. In the illustrative verse, the same set of epithets is applied to both the Upameya (the breasts) and the Upamāna (the warriors), though the similarity rests only in sound. For example, the expression "Ākr̥ṣṭāmālamāṇḍalāgrarucayaḥ", in the context of the warriors means "having taken upon themselves the glory of defeated armies"; while in connection with breasts it signifies "having shining orbs and fronts". Words with different meanings coalesce together and are pronounced alike; and this coalescence indicates the similarity between the Upameya and the Upamāna.

8. Vakrokti or homonym (K.A.S., IV, III, 8)

The metaphorical mode of expression can also be based on a transference of sense or indication (Lakṣaṇā or Upacāra). There are a number of bases for the transference to occur, such as similarity, association etc., but according

to Vāmana it is only when the indication is based on similarity that we have the figure "Vakrokti". For example:

In the lakes the lotus opened; and in a moment the
lily closed

The "opening" and the "closing", really belonging to the eye, indicate "blooming" and "drooping" respectively, and the indication is through similarity.¹⁰

This mode of metaphorical expression is distinct from Rūpaka or metaphor based upon identity. Distinguishing the identity metaphor from the metaphor based on Lakṣaṇā, Kapil Kapoor points out the formal difference between the two, remarking that the metaphor based on imposition takes the form of an equative sentence, while in the metaphor based on Lakṣaṇā, the transference of the qualities of one thing to another is accomplished by the employment of a suitable lexical verb. The difference between the two types amounts to a distinction between the verb "to be" and the lexical verb; of which the latter requires re-interpretation before the meaning can be grasped.¹¹

9. Utprekṣā or poetic fancy (K.A.S., IV, III, 9)

When what is not similar or cognate with another is represented, - for the purpose of showing its excellence - as similar or cognate, it is "Utprekṣā".

This is distinct from Rūpaka or Vakrokti, as there is no absolute imposition or indication, but only a representation of the Upameya as the Upamāna. But despite their representation, it is also different from Upamā, because the similarity does not exist in reality, but is imagined by the poet. The figure is exemplified by the verse:

May the moon protect you! - The moon who is curved, like the end of a fresh lotus-stem; is placed on Śiva's forehead, which is yellow like fire; is being daily besprinkled with sprays from the dripping Gaṅgā; and is shooting out like a sprout from the crystal-white forehead.

Here in the likening of the moon to the "sprout" lies the poetic fancy; there being no actual similarity between the two. But the representation serves the purpose of showing the peculiar beauty of the moon.

10. Atiśayokti or hyperbole (K.A.S., IV, III, 10)

In Utprekṣā a resemblance between the Upameya and the Upamāna is fancied. But along with this if an additional excellence is also imagined as present in one of the terms of comparison (which, in reality, has no existence), so as to make the comparison more appropriate; or if an existing excellence is imagined in its heightened form, it is "atiśtyokti". For example;

If in the sky there could appear two concurrent streams of the Celestial Gaṅgā (the Milky Way), to that alone could be compared his blue chest adorned with the pearl necklace.

Here the concurrent streams have been imagined for the purpose of indicating the excellence of the chest; to which nothing that exists can be regarded as similar.

As an example of the other variety of Atiśāyokti, we have:

The moon shining brightly, lovely women repair to their lovers with joy and free from care; having their bodies clothed in white raiments, indistinguishable from the moonlight by reason of their bodies being besmeared with sandal-paint, their necks glittering with pearl-necklaces, and their faces shining with white paintings.

Here the poet has elevated his conception of the whiteness of the women's complexion, necklaces etc., and this has been done by describing the women as 'indistinguishable from the moon light.

11. Sandeha or the dubious (K.A.S., IV, III, 11)

When there is doubt as to the character of the object and the standard of comparison, it is "Sandeha". The doubt

results from extreme similarity between the Upameya and the Upamāna, and is put forward for the purpose of implying some excellence in the former. For instance:

O beautiful one! My heart cannot ascertain whether this is a lotus at your ear or your eye; it remains wavering in uncertainty.

While in Rūpaka there is identity between the Upameya and the Upamāna, resulting in a perception of non-difference, there is only extreme similarity in Sandeha, so that the mind cannot decide whether what is being perceived is the Upameya, or the Upamāna to which it resembles.

12. Virodha or contradiction (K.A.S., IV, III, 12)

Where there is semblance of contradiction (i.e., where things not really contradictory appear as such), we have this figure; as in :

Wonderful is the way of love, O beloved one! The wine has been drunk by you while it is my mind that is intoxicated; you have painted your body with saffron, while it is I who am Rakta (red/in love); it is you whose movement is slackened by reason of the weight of your breasts, while the consequent trembling appears in me; it is you who are slender in waist, and yet the consequent instability is mine!

There is semblance of contradiction (and no contradiction in reality) in all these cases, because:

- (i) What is meant by intoxication is not the condition caused by wine but that which is brought about by feelings of excessive love.
- (ii) In the context, "Rakta" does not mean "red" but "attached in love"
- (iii) The trembling is not caused by a heavy burden, but is one of the physical manifestations of excessive love.
- (iv) The instability is not caused by tender limbs, but by excessive emotion.

13. Vibhāvanā or peculiar causation (K.A.S., IV, III, 13)

When the presence of a certain action is denied, and yet the presence or manifestation of the well-known result of that action is affirmed, it is the figure "Vibhāvanā"; e.g.:

In the naturally pure hearts of the wise no impression is made, even by the company of the wicked.

The company of the wicked usually leaves some impression on the hearts of those who come in contact with them. By declaring that such an impression is not left upon the hearts of the wise, the poet has complimented their purity and wisdom.

14. Ananvaya or unique (K.A.S., IV, III, 14)

It is "Ananvaya" when one and the same object is the Upameya as well as the Upamāna. In other words, the object described is unique; there is nothing else which can be put up as a standard of comparison for it. As for example:

As the sky is like the sky and the ocean like the ocean - the battle between Rāma and Rāvana is like that between Rāma and Rāvana.

15. Upameyopamā or reciprocal comparison (K.A.S., IV, III, 15)

When the same object is made the standard of comparison in one clause and the object of comparison in another, it is "Upameyopamā". We have an instance of this in the following:

The water is like the sky, and the sky is like the water; the moon is like the swan, and swan like the moon; the stars are like the lilies, and like stars are the lilies.

This figure implies that though the two objects are distinct from each other, there is neither inferiority nor superiority of either of them, as there is perfect equality between them. Therefore, either of them can be put forward as a standard of comparison for the other.

16. Parivṛti or exchange (K.A.S., IV, III, 16)

Where there is an interchange of like or unlike things, it is "Parivṛti". The exchange of likes is illustrated by the verse:

The young woman takes the leaf of the lotus for her ear ornament, and imparts to it the redness of her feet.

The lotus leaf and the ear ornament are two similar things.

As an example of the exchange of unlikes, we have the verse from *Kumārasambhava* :

Of indomitable will, she gave up her necklace and sandal-paints, and bound up her chest with red bark garment, which had its seams bursting with the rising breasts.

The bark garment bears no similarity with the necklace.

Both Upameyopamā and Parivṛti involve an exchange between the Upameya and the Upamāna, but whereas in the former the exchange is mutual, it is one-sided in the latter. Moreover, only equal and similar things are compared with each other in Upameyopamā, whereas in Parivṛti the exchange may take place between unlikes also. Most important of all, in Upameyopamā, the two things are only compared with each other, whereas in Parivṛti the exchange takes place in reality.

17. Krama or sequence (K.A.S., IV, III, 17)

Where there is a sequential connection between a number of Upamānas and Upameyas, it is "Krama". As for example:

By her (i) sweet voice, (ii) smiles and (iii) eyes have been subdued (i) the lute, (ii) the lily and (iii) the lotus.

18. Dīpaka or illuminator (K.A.S., IV, III, 18-19)

When there is a single verb common to a number of clauses mentioning the Upameyas and to those mentioning the Upamānas, it is illuminator. The juxtaposition of unrelated clauses does not constitute this figure; there has to be an Upameya-Upamāna relationship between the clauses. This is the reason for its inclusion among the modifications of simile. As an example of Dīpaka, we have:

Adorned are the harem-gardens with young flowers, young women with graces beautified by the charms of Spring, the Brāhmaṇas with the performance of duties enjoined in the Vedas, and the kings with their glory born of the suppression of enemies.

Depending upon the position of the common verb in the sentence, this figure can be of three kinds, according as the common verb occurs at the beginning, in the middle, or at the

end of the sentence. The verse quoted above illustrates the first kind.

19. Nidarśanā or illustration (K.A.S., IV, III, 20)

When a verb indicates or points to a relationship or connection between its action and the cause of that action, it is "Nidarśanā". For example:

The faded leaf is falling from the tree, pointing out to rich men the fact that the attainment of a very high position always leads to fall.

Here by means of the verb "falling" is indicated the relation between the action of "falling" and its cause, "the attainment of a high position".

As with Dīpaka, the use of only one main verb imparts a brevity to this figure; but the causal connection inherent in Nidarśanā is absent from Dīpaka.

20. Arthāntara Nyāsa or corroboration (K.A.S., IV, III, 21)

When in support of a statement in fact there is a statement of another, it is "Arthāntara Nyāsa". The statement in support should be expressed in the form of a sentence, it should not be conveyed by a mere phrase; and the sentence should state at the reason only in an implicit manner. For instance:

On her plump breasts was placed by the lover a garland in the presence of her rivals - this garland, even when withered and damp, she did not throw away; the value of a present lies in the love that prompts it, and not in the thing itself.

The last sentence supplies the reason in an implicit form.

21. Vyatireka or dissimilitude (K.A.S., IV, III, 22)

This figure consists in the pointing out of the superiority of the Upameya to the Upamāna. The superior qualities possessed by the Upameya may be explicitly stated, or may be only implied. As an illustration of Vyatireka, we have the verse:

Really would the beautiful face of the fawn-eyed woman be similar to the moon; but the latter is spoiled by dark marks.

Here the Upameya excels the Upamāna in beauty.

22. Viśeṣokti or peculiar allegation (K.A.S, IV, III, 23)

Where the similarity is strengthened by the assumption of the absence of some quality in the Upameya (thereby accentuating the other points of similarity), it is "Viśeṣokti". The figure usually takes the form of a metaphor. For example:

The elephant is a moving fort.

The epithet "moving" indicates absence of fixity or immovability, excepting which, the elephant may be virtually regarded as a fort.

23. Vyājastuti or dissembling eulogy (K.A.S., IV, III, 24)

This figure bears a close similarity to Viśeṣokti. Where for the purpose of praising a person, there is a deprecation based upon his not doing something that has been done by a very superior person, and which (it is implied) is capable of being done (by the person sought to be praised), we have "Vyājastuti". For example:

Rāma bridged up the ocean with hills and with a single arrow he pierced seven palm-trees; not having done these yet, thou bearest an unaccountable pride.

This implies that on all other points, except the two mentioned, the person referred to is equal to Rāma; and even the two exceptions are not such as cannot be accomplished by him.

Thus, in Viśeṣokti extreme similarity is established between the Upameya and the Upamāna by declaring that the Upameya lacks only one attribute of the Upamāna. But beyond this, there is no intent to praise or dispraise the Upameya. In Vyājastuti it is the intention to praise the Upameya that

underlies its comparison with a superior Upamāna.

24. Vyājokti or artful assertion (K.A.S., IV, III, 25)

When by a cunning contrivance, the pretended thing is spoken of as similar to the real, it is "Vyājokti" (also termed "Māyokti" by some poeticsians). As for instance

The moon-white grass-flower blown with the wind, has fallen into thine eye; by which thy face is made to appear as if with drops of tears.

The tears actually proceed from strong emotion, but the lover pretends that they are caused by the falling of a flower-particle in the lady's eye. He imagines that the particle comes from a flower that is moon-white, and hence indistinguishable from the surrounding moonlight; and as it was blown with a strong wind, it could not be checked. By these "cunning contrivances", he has made his pretence seem real.

25. Tulyayogitā or equal pairing (K.A.S., IV, III, 26)

When for the purpose of indicating equality with a superior Upamāna, the Upameya described is mentioned as endowed with the same action and at the same time, it is "Tulyayogitā"; as in :

The Lord of serpents (Śeṣa), as well as your arm, bears the burden of whole of this sea-girt earth.

26. Ākṣepa or disparagement/hint (K.A.S., IV, III, 27)

This figure consists in the repudiation or rejection of the Upamāna. The definition is open to two interpretations:

(a) The standard of comparison is rejected for the purpose of indicating that it is useless in the presence of the object described, as in the verse:

In the presence of her beautiful face, what is the use of the full moon? When her charming eyes are there, what is the use of blue lotuses? What, too, is the use of the fresh leaves in the presence of her lips? How wonderful is the creator's desire to bring into existence useless things over and over again!

(b) The Sūtra may also be taken to mean that the figure is present when the Upamāna is only hinted at (and is not directly comprehensible), and the figure then is called "Ākṣepa" in the sense of "hint". For example:

The autumn, bearing upon her white clouds (breasts) the rainbow resembling the nail-mark, proceeds to appease (make beautiful) the blameworthy (dark-marked) moon, and thereby causes heat (pain) to the sun.

What is hinted at here is that the autumn is like a

prostitute, the moon like a favoured lover, and the sun like his rival - the "prostitute", the "lover" and the "rival lover" being merely hinted at paronomastically.¹²

27. Sahokti or connected description (K.A.S., IV, III, 28)

When the two actions of two things are described, by means of an expression implying simultaneous occurrence, it is "Sahokti". For instance:

The sun has gone to set, along with the enemies;
therefore, withdraw the forces.

The phrase "along with" suggests that the departure of the enemies and the setting of the sun have taken place at the same time.

This figure should not be confused with *Dīpaka* or *Tulyayogitā* to which it bears some similarity. In *Dīpaka*, a common verb is related by transference to two or more clauses, but the actions described by the common verb in the different contexts may take place at different times. In *Tulyayogitā* and *Sahokti*, the two actions of two things are described as occurring at the same time; but whereas in the former the similarity of the *Upameya* with a superior *Upamāna* is meant to be indicated, in the latter neither superiority nor inferiority is intended to be expressed between the two things.

28. Samāhita or conformance (K.A.S., IV, III, 29)

This is the last of the individual figures defined by Vāmana, and results when the Upameya actually becomes transformed into the Upamāna. Vāmana cites Kālidāsa's *Vikramorvaśīyā* as an illustration, where the creeper likened by the king Purūravas to his beloved Urvaśī actually becomes Urvaśī on being touched by him.

Vāmana is aware that these figures may appear individually or conjointly; if there is a conjunction of two or more of these figures, he designates it by the name of "Saṁsr̥ṣṭi" or commixture (K.A.S., IV, III, 30). Two kinds of commixture are explicitly named :

- (a) "Umapamārūpaka" or simile-metaphor (K.A.S., IV, III, 31) and
- (b) "Utprekṣāṣāvayava" or fancy-root (K.A.S., IV, III, 32).

These had been defined as independent figures by his predecessors, but Vāmana subsumes them under Saṁsr̥ṣṭi.

° Simile-metaphor refers to a metaphor based upon simile, as in:

Your operations being endless and independent, you are like the primeval tortoise, being the very root of the creeper of the fourteen worlds.

Here the metaphor contained in the phrase "root of the creeper of the worlds" is based upon the simile contained in the rest of the verse, i.e. between the king and the tortoise-shaped Viṣṇu.

The "Utprekṣāvayava" or fancy-root is that figure of speech (such as metaphor etc.) which forms the origin or source of the Utprekṣā or the poetic fancy. For example:

The moon kisses the face of the night - after having removed (caught hold of) the darkness - which resembles the hair of the woman - with his beams - which resemble the fingers of the man - the face of night having the lotus, which resembles the woman's eye - closed (through modesty).

The fancy that the moon is kissing the face of the night-woman has its root in the simile between the darkness and hair, as well as that between the lotus and the eye.

This analysis of the figures dealt with by Vāmana makes it quite clear that he tries to define all Arthāḥlāṁkāras with reference to the idea of comparison, in terms of the relation between the Upamaya and the Upamāna. On account of this fundamental postulate, his definitions of figures like Viśeṣokti, Apahnuti, Ākṣepa etc. differ widely from those given by other writers, and he has also to exclude such figures as Paryāyokta, Preyas, Rasavat, Ūrjasvin,

Udātta, Bhāvika, Sūkṣma, Hetu and Leśa, which he does not define.¹³ The importance of Upamā involved in other figures is recognised from Bhāmaha's time and consequently this figure which is the source of all the figures grouped together by later writers as "Sādrśyamūla", is always given a place of honour at the beginning of most treatises on Sanskrit poetics. But along with this the theorists were also aware of the possibility that Upamā may not be involved in all poetic figures; but this did not deter them from including these figures in their works.

It is not difficult to realise that this scheme of figures is extremely refined; the figures are based on comparison, but encompassed between the boundaries of Ananvaya (self-comparison) and Samāhita (transformation of the Upameya into the Upamāna) are a large number of figures, exploring varying shades of figurative language. For instance, on the one extreme we have Ananvaya, where the Upameya is compared with itself because it is unique; this is followed by Vyatireka, in which the Upameya is described as superior to the Upamāna. In the first variety of Ākṣepa, the inferior Upamāna is actually rejected in favour of the Upameya.

On the other side, there is a sequence of figures which attempt to establish extreme similitude between the Upameya and the Upamāna. In Sandeha a doubt is expressed

whether the object described is the Upameya or the Upamāna; if the doubt resolves into perfect certainty that the object is the Upamāna and not the Upameya, we get the figure Apahnuti. But if the Upameya and the Upamāna are described as identical, so that the question of doubt does not arise at all, the result is Rūpaka.

Samāsokti, Aprastutaprasāmsā and the second variety of Ākṣepa form a class of their own; they result from a partial or indirect mention of either of the terms of comparison.

Grammar forms another basis for a number of figures. The emergence of Alāmkāras like Dīpaka, Krama, Sahokti, Prativastūpanā etc. betrays the obvious influence of grammar.

It would, however, be misleading to suppose that the theory of Alāmkāras is a theory of rhetorical categories only. Vāmana is not explicit on the point, but he appears to suggest that though a poetic figure corresponds to a certain extent, to a figure of speech in a formal scheme, something more belongs to a poetic figure - Some special charm, which endows it with the capability to impart additional beauty to a poetic composition.

The Adhikaraṇa on the figures is followed by the last Adhikaraṇa entitled "Prāyogika", of which the first section speaks of certain conventions to be observed by the poets,

such as the non-employment of words like "Khalu" at the beginning of a foot of a verse. The second Adhyāya supplies some useful hints concerning the correct use of words - a subject that had interested Bhāmaha also. Grammatical incorrectness has already been listed as a defect; and since the Rīti is defined as a special arrangement of words, a stress on the correct forms of words is justifiable. But we need not pursue the subject in detail, since most of the Sūtras in this Adhikaraṇa center around the technicalities of Sanskrit grammar.

Notes and References

1. The English translation used here is that of Sir Ganganath Jha. Cf. Ganganath Jha (ed.), *The "Kāvyaśāstra" of Vāmana*, Second and revised edition, (The Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, Poona, 1928). We have also consulted the Hindi translation of Dr. Bechan Jha, (Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi, 1976).
2. It is a metarule of Sanskrit literary theory that the conventional denotation of a word, accepted by usage, gains precedence over the meaning that is deducible from the etymology or in any other similar manner ("Rūḍhiryogamapaharati"). In these defects, the conventional sense is rejected in favour of a meaning which is not only excluded from common vocabulary, but may also be far-fetched.
3. On the basis of the similarities in pronunciation, consonants have been grouped into five classes, viz., the gutturals, the palatals, the cerebrals, the dentals and the labials. For a list of the consonants arranged on the basis of these divisions, see appendix below.
4. The classification of meaning into "explicit" and "subtle" has its parallel in the works of later writers in their division of meaning into the "Vācya" (literal) and "Pratīyamāna" (implied or symbolic) types. The two

kinds of subtle meaning are included in the second division of Pratiyamāna (or suggestive) literature, designated "Vivakṣitānyaparavācya", which is based on Abhidhā or denotation. In "Vivakṣitānyaparavācya", as in the subtle meaning of Vāmana, the expressed sense is intended, which eventually resolves into the unexpressed.

5. P.C. Lahiri, *Concept of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics, op.cit, p.107.*
6. *Ibid, p.109.*
7. S.K. De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics, Vol.II, op.cit., p.97.*
8. P.C. Lahiri, *Concept of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics, op.cit., p.107.*
9. Kapil Kapoor draws attention to the fact that Vāmana is the first thinker to make a distinction between the foundation and the expression of a metaphor. Up to his time the Metaphor is defined as the perception of a particular relation between two disparate objects, and how the relation is cognised. But Vāmana analyses the foundation of the metaphor as well, and employs the metaphor of "imposition" to describe it. Cf. Kapil Kapoor, "Metaphor in Sanskrit and English Criticism", in *Journal of Literary Criticism*, (Doaba House, Delhi, 1985), Vol.II, p.34.
10. Vāmana's conception of Vakrokti differs considerably from the views of other writers on the subject. The

etymological meaning of the term is "crooked speech", and it appears in the verbal poetic figure defined by Rudrata (Kāvyaśāstra, II, 13-17) and after him by all later theorists, who connote by this figure a kind of pretended speech based on paronomasia or peculiarities of intonation. Bhāmaha (Kāvyaśāstra, I, 36) uses the term to imply a selection of words and a turn of ideas peculiar to poetry, and the essential principle of figurative speech generally. Kuntaka develops the idea, and builds a unique theory of śāstra on its basis.

11. Kapil Kapoor, "Metaphor in English and Sanskrit Criticism", *loc.cit.*
12. This would constitute an exact opposite of the figure "Samāsokti" as defined earlier (K.A.S., IV, III,3); but as S.K. De has pointed out (*Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol.II, p.70), this explanation of Ākṣepa "would be equivalent to the Samāsokti of some writers".
13. Vāmana, in fact, mentions the smallest number of figures. His list includes 30 Śāstras excepting Saṃsṛṣṭi, while Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin define 39 and 36 figures respectively.

C H A P T E R - I I I

THE SUBLIME

CHAPTER - III

THE SUBLIME

1. Introduction

Perhaps the most curious feature of the criticism centering around the work of Longinus is that critics have generally tended to ignore his systematic approach to the subject, and have gone to the extent of taking him to be a mere impressionist, or at best, a theorist who talked of passion and enthusiasm, and who may be considered as the forerunner of romantic criticism. Gibbon has an oft-quoted remark on Longinus in his *Journal* :

Till now I was acquainted only with two ways of criticising a beautiful passage; the one to show by an exact anatomy the distinct beauties of it and whence these spring, the other an idle exclamation or a general encomium, which leaves nothing behind it. Longinus has shown me that there is the third. He tells me his own feelings upon reading it, and tells them in such energy that he communicates them.¹

It is this type of criticism that has led to the neglect of the dialectical apparatus that underlies the work, i.e. the proper equipment of the writer and the necessary qualities of the work, which produce on the reader the effect of ecstasy or transport. That such an apparatus is central

to the text will become apparent as we proceed with the study.²

Expressing his dissatisfaction with the treatise of Caecilius, Longinus insists that Caecilius has neither defined the nature of the sublime nor indicated the methods by which we may attain it in our writings, but has merely contented himself by giving illustrations of sublimity. So, complying with the request of his friend, Postumius Terentianus, Longinus undertakes to write a treatise on the subject. Since the censure of Caecilius rests on methodological grounds, it may be safely assumed that Longinus has constructed his treatise, not as a collection of fragments (as some critics have supposed), but as a reasoned structure.

At the very outset, Longinus remarks that sublimity consists in a certain excellence and distinction of expression (O.T.S., Sec.1, p.100). It is from this source alone that the greatest poets and prose-writers acquire lasting fame. In connection with the effect produced by elevated language, Longinus states that it does not persuade the reader, but transports him out of himself. The extent to which he can be persuaded is under the reader's control; but the sublime exerts an irresistible force and mastery over him.

The sublime should not be confused with mere

technical skill - such as proper order and disposition of material, or inventive skill. As these are contextual - i.e., they run through the whole texture of the composition - they reveal themselves by slow degrees; a well-timed stroke of sublimity, on the other hand, "scatters everything before you like a thunderbolt, and in a flash reveals the full power of the speaker" (O.T.S., Sec.1, p.100).

Thus, in his opening remarks Longinus has indicated the importance of language in his theory, which is stressed again when he takes up the sources of the sublime. He also introduces the triad, consisting of the author, the text and the reader, upon which the whole treatise is structured.

Before any rules can be laid down, however, it must be answered whether the attainment of sublimity is teachable by art. Longinus states the view of those who hold that the sublime cannot be explained away as a set of precepts, "the bare bones of rules and systems" (O.T.S., Sec.2, p.101), for it is produced by nature alone. It has even been urged that works of nature are only enfeebled and wizened by rules of art. But Longinus counters these charges, arguing that nature itself is systematic, and therefore the rules underlying her activity may be formulated. The argument that nature or genius itself is sufficient elicits Longinus' response that though genius is of the utmost importance, curbs on it are needed so that the poet does not succumb to

vices; just as good fortune may be frittered away without proper counsel (O.T.S., Sec.2, p.101).

Lastly, the very fact that certain linguistic effects derive from nature alone, cannot be learnt from any other source than art (i.e. criticism, reflective judgment, or the recognition of having failed to achieve nature by artificial means). He reaches the inevitable conclusion that both genius and art are needed.

The text resumes, after a brief lacuna, in the midst of a discussion of faults into which genius, unassisted by art, may fall. There are three of these: (1) tumidity or bombast; (2) puerility; and (3) parenthyrsus or false sentiment. The first of these is illustrated from Aeschylus:

Quell they the ovens' far flung splendour-glow,
Ha, let me but one hearth-abider mark,
One flame-wreath torrent-like I'll whirl on high,
I'll burn the roof, to cinders shrivel it....
(O.T.S., Sec.3 p.102).

Passages of this kind, Longinus argues, are not tragic but pseudo-tragic; the imagery is confused here, rather than suggestive of terror. Even in tragedy, which by its very nature is majestic and admits of some bombast, misplaced tumidity of this type is unpardonable. It is still more out of place in factual narration, and writers like Gorgias,

Callisthenes, Cleitarchus, Amphicrates, Hegesias and Matris who employ such turgid expressions in the quest of the sublime are ridiculed as being high-flown. This is one of the most difficult faults to guard against, for those who aim at grandeur in the hope of escaping the charge of feebleness and aridity become a prey to it.

Puerility, on the other hand, is a complete anti thesis of tumidity; it is entirely low spirited, "the most ignoble of faults" (O.T.S., Sec.3, p.103). The fault consists in an over-elaboration of a thought until it trails off into frigidity. It is exemplified by the odd conceits of Timaeus, and even by some of the phrases of Xenophon and Plato. For instance, Xenophon speaks of the pupils of the eyes as "modest maidens" (an idea echoed by Timaeus also), whereas the shamelessness of people is revealed in nothing so much as in their eyes.

The third fault, Parenthyrsus or false sentiment, results from hollow emotionalism where emotion is not called for, or immoderate passion where restraint is needed. In such cases, writers are carried away by their enthusiasm into outbursts of emotions that leave their hearers unaffected.

To sum up, given a subject matter which lends itself to sublimity, the passion of the speaker may exceed the subject (so that the composition becomes tumid), may fall below it (resulting in frigidity), or may be unrelated to it

(in which case parenthesis results). All these are faults of ideas rather than of words or sentences, and arise from the craving for intellectual novelties (O.T.S., Sec.5, p.103). It would not be wrong to conclude with Alder Olson³ that sublimity may be located as a kind of mean between these extremes.

As every device is subject to abuse, it becomes essential to distinguish the sublime from the faults that are so closely bound up with its achievement - in other words, to discriminate between the true and the false sublime (O.T.S., Secs.5-6, p.106). But this is not easy, for the ability to judge literature develops from long experience (O.T.S., Sec.6, p.106). But for the benefit of the aspirant, Longinus provides some touchstones which may be of assistance in distinguishing the true sublime from the false. The true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exultation and a sense of vaunting joy just as though we had ourselves produced what we had heard (O.T.S., Sec.7, p.107). It can stand up to repeated examinations, and it is difficult, or rather impossible, to resist its appeal. In other words, Sublimity ... exists in such works as please all men at all times.⁴

The false sublime on the contrary, gives an impression of grandeur by means of much adornment indiscriminately applied. It can be shown as mere bombast

when these are stripped away; so that with every successive reading it loses more and more of its effectiveness.

Once the sublime has been defined in terms of its touchstones, Longinus passes on to a consideration of the sources of sublimity. There are five of these, and all of them presuppose as a common foundation,

The command of language, without which nothing worthwhile can be done (D.T.S., Sec.8, p.108).

These are :

1. The ability to form grand conceptions (the most important of the sources);
2. The stimulus of powerful and inspired emotion;
3. The proper formation of the two types of figures - figures of thought and figures of speech;
4. The creation of a noble diction, consisting of the choice of words, the use of imagery, and the elaboration of the style; and
5. Synthesis, or dignity and elevation of structure (a source which embraces all the others).

Of these, the first two are innate - they refer to the state of the poet's soul - while the three remaining ones are the products of art. Longinus' treatment suggests that any one of these, or any combination of them, can lead to sublime expression.⁵ But it may be argued in defence (as

Grube has done⁶) that sublimity may be of different kinds.

The enumeration of the sources is followed by a detailed consideration of each of them, though the treatment of the emotions is unfortunately lost. Only a few remarks survive on the subject - most of them in the portion of the eighth chapter which is now extant, and some stray references in the following chapters. Therefore it would be better to deal with the other sources before taking up the emotions.

2. Grand Conceptions

Among the five sources of sublimity, the most important is the ability to form great conceptions, which in its turn originates in the author's soul. Though the ability is for the most part innate, the author is advised to do all in his power to train his mind towards the production of grand ideas, impregnating them with noble inspiration, for a person having mean and servile thoughts and aims cannot be expected to produce a work worthy of lasting fame (O.T.S., Sec.9, p.109). So an author wishing to endow his works with great conceptions must have a mind that is not mean or ignoble, for sublimity, Longinus writes, "is the echo of a noble mind" (O.T.S., Sec.9, p.109).

Although Longinus says that stately expressions come naturally to high-minded men (O.T.S., Sec.9, p.110), he is primarily speaking of grand ideas, rather than of their expression. As an instance of such grandeur of ideas he

cites a passage from Odysseus' visit to the Underworld (*Odyssey*, XI, 543), where unlike the other spirits, Ajax strides away without saying a word (something quite in keeping with his character).

This is succeeded by another lacuna, and when the text resumes, Longinus is apparently discussing the means by which greatness of conception may be achieved. The first means (as the text seems to suggest) is the direction of the author's mind towards great objects. He begins with the Gods, and quotes the passage from Homer (*Iliad*, V, 770 ff.), where the leap of the divine horses is measured in terms of cosmic distances - the distance between a man sitting on a mountain-peak and the distant horizon visible in the midst of the wine-dark sea.

If the steeds of the Gods make two leaps in succession,

Longinus exclaims,

they will no longer find room on the face of the earth.

There follows another illustration from the *Iliad*, describing the Battle of the Gods in a grand manner. But he has reservations about the descriptions of the Battle, for it has been tainted by the accounts of the wounds suffered by the Gods as well as by "their quarrels, their vengeful actions,

their tears, their imprisonment, and all their manifold passions" (D.T.S.,Sec.9, p.111). Unless it is taken allegorically, it is altogether ungodly and does not preserve our sense of what is fitting. Homer has, in fact made men of the Gods and Gods of the heroes fighting at Troy.

As a result of this, the passages which represent the divine nature as pure, majestic and undefiled - as it really is - are ranked higher than the ones just considered. Such are the lines on Poseidon, representing him in all his majesty. As another example of this kind Longinus refers to the passage on creation in *Genesis*, quoting a couple of lines:

God said,"Let there be light, and there was light; let there be land, and there was land."

This is clearly the expression of a high conception of the power of the Divine Being, and Moses the law-giver of the Jews, is praised for it.

From Gods Longinus now moves on to men, once again illustrating the greatness of ideas from the *Iliad*. This is the famous prayer of Ajax, requesting Zeus to lift up the darkness from the battlefield so that he is enabled to see and continue the fight. Even if he meets his death in the daylight, it will be a death worthy of his courage.

Unlike the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* does not possess the

same intensity of grandeur, and this leads Longinus to the conclusion that Homer composed it in his old age, when his genius was falling into decline. "The sublime passages," says Longinus, as he puts forward his views on the *Odyssey*,

have not that consistency which nowhere lapses into mediocrity, nor is there the same closely-packed profusion of passions, nor the versatile and oratorical style studded with images drawn from real life.

Instead, it is mostly narrative, where the fabulous predominates over the actual (i.e., the Aristotelian "probable"). The decline of the emotional powers usually leads a writer to a study of character, and the *Odyssey* may be thought of as a comedy of manners. For these reasons, it has been assigned a lower place as compared to the *Iliad*.

Another means conducive to great conceptions is the selection of the most vital details and features in a situation, and the ability to relate them to one another in such a way as to make of them a single organism. He illustrates this by Sappho's *Ode to Anactoria*, which exhibits her skill in selecting and fusing the most extreme and intense manifestations of the emotions attendant on the lover's frenzy. To this Longinus adds an excellent critical paragraph wherein he points out how the poet unites contradictory feelings into a vivid description of

overwhelming passion (O.T.S., Sec.10, pp.114-15).

Homer is also praised for his ability to single out and unify the most terrifying properties of storms. But the author of the *Arimaspeia* is blamed for the evident and just reason that the details of sea faring which he enumerates are hardly those by virtue of which the sea itself is sublime. Sea sickness, which forms the climax of his description, scarcely gives the impression of solemnity. Similarly, Aratus, in saying that

A slender plank wards off destruction,
(*Phenomena*, 1.299)

is not sublime, because in all cases of sea faring only a few planks keep of death. There is no terror in these words, for the plank does keep away the destruction; the sea is not terrifying at all times, but only when it rages. Keeping all this in mind, Longinus cautions his readers to guard against the interposition of anything frivolous, undignified or tiresome.

Quite similar to this kind of sublimity is the quality known as "amplification", and to avoid confusion Longinus discriminates between the two in the next two chapters. Amplification cannot be defined as language which invests the subject with grandeur (as some of his predecessors have done), for this definition, he says,

could apply equally well to sublimity and to the emotional and the figurative styles.

(O.T.S., Sec.12, p.117)

Differentiating it from sublimity he writes,

...Sublimity consists in elevation, amplification in quantity. Thus sublimity is often contained in a single idea, whereas amplification is often associated with quantity and a certain amount of redundancy.

(O.T.S., Sec.12, p.117)

There are countless ways of affecting this quantitative expansion. To name but a few, it may be managed by the rhetorical development of a common place, or by exaggeration, or we may resort to the orderly disposition of factual points. But like all other devices, amplification should be regarded only as a means of attaining sublimity, and not an end in itself.

After a comparatively brief lacuna, there is a delightful comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero - the former characterised by sublimity "which is for the most part rugged", and may be likened to a thunderbolt or a flash of lightning; whereas the latter is "like a conflagration that rolls on to consume everything far and wide" (O.T.S., Sec.12, p.118). Cicero's abundance is compared to that of "a steady

and enduring flame, which can be let loose at whatever point he desires, and which is fed from one source after another." The Demosthenic sublimity is suited to emotional passages, where the audience is to be swept off its feet; while profusion is appropriate to descriptive writing and to works of history and natural philosophy, as well as to perorations and digressions.

Besides amplification, two other methods which may assist the author in forming great conceptions are suggested. The first is *mimesis*, i.e., imitation or emulation of the great writers of the past. For if the authors of antiquity have attained sublimity by greatness of conception (implying that their thoughts were commensurate with great subjects), it can be argued that if an author makes his thoughts commensurate with their thoughts, he likewise will achieve greatness of conception. Clearly, Longinus uses *mimesis* in the broadest sense, not in the restricted rhetorical sense of the reproduction of the tricks of style. This is borne out by his analogy of the Pythian priestess, who due to the divine vapour as it issues from a cleft in the ground is impregnated with the heavenly power,

and is at once inspired to make oracles. In a like manner certain emanations are conveyed from the genius of the men of old into the souls of those who emulate them; ... even those who show very few signs

of inspiration, derive some degree of divine enthusiasm from the grandeur of their predecessors.

(O.T.S., Sec.13, p.119)

As instances, Longinus names Herodotus, Stesichorus, Archilochus, and above all Plato, - all of whom drew their inspiration from Homer. He also rejects the charge that such a procedure is plagiarism, and calls it a noble strife,

where even to be worsted by one's predecessors carries no discredit.

(O.T.S., Sec.13, p.120)

In accordance with his method, Longinus provides touchstones for the author, formulating them in terms of the fundamental triad of author, work and audience. In composing, the author is to consider Homer and the great ones as composing in his place (knowing them, as he does, through the medium of their works); in judging his work, he must regard them as his audience; and further, he must ask how the ages to come will esteem his composition. (O.T.S., Sec.14, pp.120-21)

The second aid to great conception is the power of the imagination, by which Longinus means both the employment of imagery and the invention of appropriate details to suit the description. An image is defined as a "mental picture", and the term is applied to a passage in which, carried away

by his feelings, the author imagines that he is actually seeing the subject of his description, and enables his audience to see it as well.

Our author makes a distinction between the poetic and the oratorical imagination; for whereas with the poets the imagination seeks to enthrall the audience by working on the feelings, the oratorical imagination produces vividness of description, though here also an attempt is made to stir the feelings (O.T.S., Sec.15, p.121).

The poetic imagination is illustrated from Euripides, where the mad Orestes is pictured as seeing the Furies;

Mother, I beseech you, do not set upon me those
blood-blotted and snake-like hags. See there! See
there! They approach, they leap upon me!

(*Orestes*, 255-57)

Here, as Longinus puts it, the poet himself "sees" the Furies, and almost compels his audience to see what he had imagined. For this reason, though not, possessing natural grandeur, he still manages to touch tragic heights by the use of imagery. His description of the scene in which the Sun-God hands the reins of his chariot to Phaethon is also praised:

Would you not say that the soul of the poet goes into

the chariot with the boy, sharing his danger and joining the horses in the flight? And he would never have formed such an image, had he not been swept along, neck by neck, with these celestial activities. (O.T.S., Sec.15, p.122)

Aeschylus is also praised for his images "of a most heroic cast", as when he pictures the seven resistless warrior captains swearing a fearful oath (*Seven Against Thebes*, 42-46). But the praise of Aeschylus is marked by a note of caution, for "sometimes Aeschylus introduces ideas that are unfinished and crude and harsh" (O.T.S., Sec.15, p.123); and Euripides, from a desire to emulate him, comes dangerously near to committing the same faults.

No such qualifications, however, restrict the praise of Sophocles, who is commended for his excellent imagery in describing the death of Oedipus, as he entombs himself amid portents from the sky (*Oedipus At Colonus*, I, 586-666), as well as for his account of how at the departure of the Greeks Achilles shows himself above his tomb to those who are sailing away.

All these examples of poetic imagery display a good deal of romantic exaggeration, and everywhere exceed the bounds of credibility. But the finest feature of the oratorical imagery is its adherence to truth - it must remain in the limits of the probable, only the poetic imagination

should go beyond probability into the realm of the mythical and the incredible. For this reason Longinus censures the orators who announce in tragic tones that they see the Furies, forgetting that when Orestes seems to see them, it is nothing more than the hallucination of a madman.

On the other hand, if properly used, imagery in oratory can infuse passion and energy into the speaker's words and can even master the audience if it is combined with argumentative passages. Such is the defence of Hyperides who was impeached when he had proposed the enfranchisement of the slaves after the great defeat of Chaeronea. His answer was that it was not he, the orator, who had framed the measure, but the Battle of Chaeronea. Demosthenes can also bring the scene quite vividly before his readers' eyes. In all such cases the vividly drawn pictures of the orator overpower their audience, and the speech transcends the bounds of mere persuasion.

Thus, Longinus gives us a fuller discussion of imagination and imagery than any other ancient critic. The distinction between the poetic and oratorical imagination is also novel, and though the boundaries between the two may well be blurred at times (as indeed his own illustrations show), the distinction is nonetheless a valid one. With this treatment the first source of the sublime comes to an end, and Longinus moves on to discuss the figures.

3. The Figures of Thought and Speech

Having dealt with conception, Longinus now moves on to a discussion of the figures, the first of the linguistic sources. Figures can be considered as words in combination, so that we can regard them either non-syntactically as constitutive of such modes of discourse as question, prayer, oath, etc. (in which case we have "figures of thought", since such modes are prior and independent of any syntactical consideration); or we may take them syntactical as constituted of certain grammatical elements (in which case we have "figures of speech", such as asyndeton, hyperbaton, polyptota etc.). Of these, the figures of thought are taken up first.

Ancient rhetoricians usually deal with figures at considerable length by means of long lists and illustrations. How many figures Longinus dealt with (he says he will take up only a few) cannot be ascertained, since there is another lacuna at the end of the 18th Section. At any rate, unlike his predecessors, he repeatedly stresses that figures by themselves do not constitute sublimity. Thus any merely rhetorical definitions of the figures are insufficient to indicate their use in the production of sublimity; consequently in his treatment of figures he is careful to include some statement of the literary circumstances in which they would produce sublimity, and of those in which they would not.

For instance, adjuration, i.e., oath or apostrophe (the first of the figures to be discussed), involves a solemn appeal to something sacred to witness that a statement is true, or that a contract is binding. Longinus takes the famous Marathon oath from Demosthenes' *De Corona*, and analyses the underlying causes of its effectiveness (O.T.S., Sec.16, pp.125-26). In the passage under discussion (*De Corona*, 208) Demosthenes is defending his aggressive policy which resulted in the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea. The most natural procedure for doing this would have been to argue that the warriors who undertook the struggle of Chaeronea for the freedom of their countrymen had a precedent for this in those who fought at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea. Instead, he was suddenly inspired to give voice to an oath by these past champions of Greece;

By those who stood the shock at Marathon, it cannot be that you were wrong.

By the use of the figure of adjuration he has deified his ancestors, for the oath suggests that we ought to swear by men who have died such deaths, just as we swear by Gods. Moreover, affected by this eulogy, his audience begins to feel just as proud of the war of Chaeronea as of the triumphs at Marathon and Salamis.

The orator is conscious of the objection that he is speaking of a defeat, whereas his oath relates to victories,



so that he measures every word with care and cunningly avoids any mention of the result,

showing that even in orgies of the imagination, it is necessary to remain sober.

(D.T.S., Sec.16, p.126)

As a contrast to this oath, Longinus cites an oath from a comedy of Eupolis (which according to some was the inspiration for Demosthenes), but shows that the oath in the comedy is ineffective by comparison. Though, rhetorically speaking, it is an oath, the context does not invest it with grandeur.

Besides proving that figures naturally reinforce sublimity and are supported by it in turn, the oath from Demosthenes also illustrates that the very brilliance of the figure and the passion of the speaker can allay suspicion - indeed hide the very fact that an artful figure is being used. A rhetorical figure is most effective when the fact that it is a figure is not apparent. This is especially true if the speech is addressed to a judge with absolute authority, and still more to despots, kings or rulers in high places;

for such a one, if at once annoyed, is like a simple child who is caught on the wrong foot by the rhetorical devices of a highly-skilled orator.

Accepting the fallacy as a personal insult, he sometimes turns quite savage; and even if he masters his rage, he becomes utterly impervious to the persuasive quality of the speech.

(O.T.S., Sec. 17, p.127)

Next comes a treatment of rhetorical questions, once again Demosthenes providing the illustrations:

Now, tell me - you want to go about asking one another - is there any news? What stranger news could there be than that of a Macedonian conquering Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but he is ill. What difference does it make to you, for even if anything should happen to him, you will soon invent another Philip.

(*Philippic*, I, 10)

Here the inspired rapidity in the play of questions and answers, together with the device of meeting his own objections as though they were someone else's,

has not only added to the sublimity of his words, but also given them greater conviction;

(O.T.S., Sec., 17, p.128)

The figure, Longinus goes on to say,

beguiles the audience into thinking that each

deliberately-considered point has been struck out and put into words on the spur of the moment.

(O.T.S., Sec.18, pp.128-29)

Another brief lacuna interrupts the text, and when it resumes, we find Longinus occupied with the figures of language or speech. Asyndeton, consisting in the omission of conjunctions, is the first of these, and is illustrated from Homer and Xenophon:

They pressed forward, fought, slew, were slain.

(*Historia Graeca*, IV, 319)

Here the words are poured forth, almost too fast for the speaker himself, and

give the impression of an agitation, which at the same time checks the utterance and urges it on.

(O.T.S., Sec.19, p.129)

But more than individual figures, it is a combination of them for a common purpose that has the greatest effect endowing the passage with force, persuasiveness and beauty. The author that comes readily to mind as exemplifying this virtue is once again Demosthenes, and Longinus quotes from him at length (O.T.S. Sec.19, pp.129-30), this time from his speech against Meidias:

For the aggressor might do many things, some of which

the victim would be unable to describe to anyone else; by his manner, his looks, his voice; when he acts with insolence, when he acts with hostility, when he strikes you with his fists, when he strikes you like a slave....

Here the asyndeta are interwoven with the figures of anaphora (repetition of words) and diatyposis (vivid description), and the combination adds to the general effect.

But if we put in the conjunctions in the above passage in the manner characteristic of isocrates:

Furthermore, this too must not be overlooked, that the aggressor might do many things; first, by his manner, then by his looks, and then again by his mere voice...,

the drive and ruggedness of the emotion that is being exploited will be lost, for

emotion resents being hampered by conjunctions and other appendages of the kind.

(O.T.S., Sec.21, p.131)

Very similar to asyndeton is the figure of hyperbaton or inversion, which consists of an arrangement of words and ideas that differs from the normal sequence. In using the figure, the orator imitates a person who, under the influence

of strong emotion - as he is being dragged in every direction by the rapid change of moods - keeps altering the arrangement of his words and ideas, losing their natural sequence, and introducing all sorts of variations (O.T.S., Sec.22, p.131). In other words, like the outbursts of natural emotions, the figure creates gaps in expectation, either by delay or by prematurity. For instance, Herodotus writes:

For our affairs stand on a razor's edge, men of Ionia! - whether we are freemen or slaves, and runaway slaves at that - now, therefore, if you are prepared to accept hardship straightway, there is toil for you; but you will be able to overcome your enemies.

The speaker has transposed "the men of Ionia", starting at once with the thought of the fear, as though, in this pressing danger, he would not even address his hearers first. Moreover, instead of saying that they must endure toil - which is the point of his exhortation - he first gives them the reason why they must toil.

Thucydides and Demosthenes are also praised for their inversions (O.T.S., Sec.21, p.132), especially the latter, who makes his hearers fear that failures of both syntax and logic are imminent, and since this is a sign of vehement passion, the audience is persuaded that the discourse is an instance of genuine emotion.

Another class of figures, called polyptota (accumulations, variations and climaxes, as well as changes in case, tense, person, number and gender) are also very powerful auxiliaries in the production of elegance and of the sublime. Writing about the changes in number, Longinus remarks that the use of a plural in place of the singular has a very resounding effect (O.T.S., Sec.23, p.133). For instance, in the lines

O marriages, marriages! It is you that begot me, and gave me birth; and then brought to light again the same seed; and showed fathers, brothers and sons as being all kindred blood; and brides, wives and mothers too, and all the foulest deeds that are done among men.

(*Oedipus Tyrannus*, 1403-8)

the expansion of the number serves to pluralise the misfortunes of Oedipus. However, Longinus adds that the figure should not be employed except on occasions when the subject admits of amplification or redundancy, or exaggeration and emotionalism.

The reverse process - the contraction of plural ideas into a singular form - "sometimes achieves an effect of sublimity" (O.T.S., Sec.24, p.134), for the compression from multiplicity into unity gives a strong impression of a single entity, as in

And when Phrynichus produced his play *The Capture of Miletus*, the theatre burst into tears.

(Herodotus, VI, 21)

Interchange of tense is also recommended; for

if you introduce circumstances that are past in time as happening at the present moment, you will turn the passage from mere narrative into vivid actuality.

(D.T.S., Sec.25, p.135)

Similarly, a direct personal form of address brings the hearer right into the middle of the action being described.

As Longinus puts it,

You will affect him more profoundly, and make him more attentive and full of active interest, if you rouse him by these appeals to him personally.

(D.T.S., Sec.26, p.135)

Still more effective is the conversion to the first person - when a writer, while speaking of a character, suddenly breaks off and converts himself into that character. The figure is used when a certain crisis does not give the author time to linger, but compels him to change at once from one character to another, as in the lines of Demosthenes:

And will none of you be found to feel disgust and indignation at the violence of this vile and

shameless creature, who - O you most abandoned of men,
whose unbridled speech is not shut in by gates and
doors which might well be opened....

(*Aristogeiton*, I, 27)

With his sense incomplete, the orator has made a sudden
change, and in his indignation has all but split a single
phrase between two persons.

It would be obvious from this that the figure of
Polyptoton involves a deviant use of language; though most of
these rhetorical devices have now become somewhat ineffective
due to their wide application.

A kind of deviance is also involved in periphrasis,
the next figure in the order of treatment (O.T.S., Secs.28-
29). Periphrasis (if it is not bombastic or inelegant, but
pleasantly tempered) often harmonizes with the direct
expression of a thought, and greatly embellishes it. The
figure is illustrated from Plato (*Menaxenus*, 236D), who
refers to death as "the appointed path of men", as well as
from Xenophone (*Cyropaedia*, I, V, 12), who, by rejecting
"you are willing to work hard" in favour of "you make toil
the guide to a life of pleasure", adds a certain grandeur of
thought to his eulogy.

But the author is warned to remain on his guard
and not let the figure get out of hand. The lack of

timeliness or of a sense of proportion in the use of figures, especially periphrasis lapses into insipidity, "akin to empty chatter and dullness of it" (O.T.S., Sec.29, p.138). Even great writers like Plato may fall a prey to the vice, as when he says:

Neither golden nor silver treasure should be allowed to establish itself and dwell in a city.

(*Laws*, 801B)

With these remarks advocating caution in the use of figures, the treatment of the third source of the sublime comes to a close. These figures, Longinus once again feels compelled to add, are all means of increasing the animation and emotional impact of style, and consequently play a large part in the production of the sublime.

4. Noble Diction

In their *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, Wimsatt and Brooks have questioned the existence of any convincing distinctions between the third and the fourth sources of the sublime.⁷ They regard it an inversion of the values of dignity that the abnormalities of syntax and other peculiarities of structure are designated as "figures, when the queen of figures, metaphor (along with comparisons, simile and hyperbole) is treated under the head of diction.

But as Alder Olson has maintained⁸, the distinctions

between the five Longinian sources are valid and may be explained quite convincingly. In the present case although both of these sources are acquired faculties and involve words, different aspects of words are the objects of each. If we consider words as signs in combination, we get the figures of thought and speech. On the other hand, words may be regarded as simple, all grammatical distinctions being dropped out. The problem Olson goes on to argue, is reduced to the imposition of signs for things and their qualities. The imposition may be strict i.e., literally standing for the thing, when the problem reduces to a choice of synonyms or it may involve a comparison, when the matter is one of a choice of metaphors. These problems, for Longinus, are strictly the problems of diction, and their solution establishes the fourth source of the sublime.

Concerning the choice of words, Longinus lays down that the choice of appropriate and high sounding words should be the aim of all orators and authors, for it moves and enchants the audience, and

imparts to style as though to the finest statues, at once grandeur, beauty, mellowness, weight, force, power and any other worthy quality you can think of, and endows the facts, as it were with a living voice; for words finely used are in truth the very light of thought.

(O.T.S., Sec.30, p.139)

But as with the figures, the employment of high sounding words is also liable to abuse. Longinus has already indicated the vices bordering on the sublime (Sections 3-4), and one of them springs from an improper use of grand expressions. The choice of a grand word for a thing of lesser stature is likened to the fastening of a large tragic mask upon a little child.

On the other hand, vulgar and homely words may be preferable to ornamental language and may be used for an effect which is not vulgar, when sheer accuracy and credibility are concerned. Such are Theopompus' words about Philip:

Philip had a genius for stomaching things.

Appreciating the homely term employed here Longinus writes:

...In connection with a man whose greedy nature makes him put up patiently and cheerfully with things that are shameful and sordid, the words "stomaching things" are extremely vivid.

(D.T.S., Sec.31, p.140)

Herodotus and Anacreon are also praised for their homely diction.

The reason for Longinus' somewhat unconventional treatment of metaphor and other tropes under the choice of

words has already been stated. He starts by questioning the propriety of limiting the number of metaphors in a passage to two or three, as Caecilius etc. have done (O.T.S., Sec.32, p.142). It is not difficult to infer from his remarks here that he regards metaphors as means, not as ends. As a consequence, he maintains that there are no literary regulations as such governing the use of metaphors; the proper determinant of their number is the passion of the author, since whatever numbers and kinds of metaphors will appear appropriate to him in his passion would also appear appropriate to an audience, to which that passion has been communicated (O.T.S., Sec. 32, p.141). When the emotions come pouring out like a torrent (as they do in the quotation from Demosthenes) an accompanying host of metaphors is quite appropriate.

On the same grounds, the advice of Aristotle and Theophrastus about softening bold metaphors by the use of phrases like "as if", "if one may put it like this" etc. is also criticised,

for the onward rush of passion has the property of ...requiring bold imagery as something altogether indispensable.

(O.T.S., Sec.32, p.141)

In his support, Longinus refers to the depiction of the human body by a series of metaphors in Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, I,

IV, 5); and as if not yet content, quotes at length from a similar account in Plato (*Timæus*, 65C-85E).

This, however, does not let him lose sight of the fact that like the other beauties of style, the use of metaphors is also prone to excess. For all his admiration for Plato, Longinus does not fail to take note of the "harsh and intemperate metaphors and bombastic allegory" which occasionally disfigure the works of the otherwise divine Plato; for instance, when he calls water "a sober God", and describes its mixing with wine as "Chastening" (*Laws*, 773B-C).

Defects like these have given Caecilius a pretext to represent Lysias as being superior to Plato; but the reason for this assessment seems to be his excessive fondness for Lysias and an equally strong hatred for Plato.

This leads to an interesting discussion - a digression drawing a strong contrast between flawless mediocrity and faulty genius. Longinus does not hesitate to express his preference for the writers of genius, careless though they often are. Rather, he argues that the highest genius is very far from being flawless, and entire accuracy runs the risk of descending into triviality (O.T.S., Sec.33, p.143). Men of mediocre endowments enjoy a greater freedom from error (as they never run any risks), while great abilities remain subject to danger by reason of their very

greatness. For this reason, virtues which are greater in themselves deserve a precedence over a greater number of inferior virtues; so that one would choose to be Homer rather than Apollonius, Pindar rather than Bacchylides, and Sophocles rather than Ion. On the same principle, Demosthenes is preferred to Hyperides, in spite of the fact that he lacks many secondary qualities that the latter possesses in abundance. So also with Plato and Lysias (O.T.S., Secs. 34-35).

This is followed by a lyrical passage upon the vision of the demi-gods of literature, whose passion for grandeur has been implanted within their souls by the working of Nature. By some natural instinct, we admire the grandeurs of Nature - the Nile, the Rhine, the Danube, the Sun, the craters of Aetna - even though they are marred by blemishes, and hold cheap all that is devoid of greatness, useful and necessary though it may be. Similarly, writing of a sublime nature lifts the author above the level of common men; and they are able to redeem all their failures "by a single happy stroke of sublimity" (O.T.S., Sec. 36, p. 147).

There is an obvious truth about all this; but as Wimsatt and Brooks have remarked⁹, this truth seems to get out of hand in our author's enthusiasm, and sweeps him along to something very much like an implication that mediocrity is, on the whole, apt to be flawless, and genius strongly (if

forgivably) inclined to make mistakes. Two possibilities (they go on to argue) - that a mediocre writer might be full of faults and partly because of these faults might be mediocre, and that a great writer might be faultless (or rather, the greatness might be in proportion of the fewness of his faults) - have scarcely been accounted for.

The Longinian notion of a single happy stroke of sublimity redeeming the careless oversights of genius has also been criticized. To quote Wimsatt and Brooks once again:

The discussion would scarcely countenance the idea that in a large literary work as in a large practical enterprise, ... a relevant mistake, one that is really a mistake, will be more catastrophic. If we conceive both perfection and grandeur as qualities which ought to be resident in a poem, the antagonism suggested by Longinus seems bound to be troublesome.¹⁰

But it may be noted in passing that the excusable faults, for the most part, are the faults of style. Faults of ideas or conception (see f.Secs.3,4 and 10) are of a more serious nature, and Longinus' statements imply that they are more difficult to blot out by the lightening-like strokes of sublimity.

This lengthy digression over, the text reverts to the discussion of figurative language. Because of their close association with metaphors, similes and comparisons are next taken up, but the discussion is interrupted by yet another lacuna. The text resumes in the midst of the following section, which is devoted to hyperboles. We have already shown that for Longinus a metaphor is an imposition of a sign for a thing - the imposition in this case not being literal, but involving a comparison. In metaphor the comparison is absolute, whereas in hyperbole words exaggerate the thing in terms either of excess or of deficiency by likening it to what is more than it or less than it. Thus for Longinus, the inclusion of hyperbole under word-choice is also justifiable.

In the portion of the 38th Section now extant, Longinus is apparently condemning hyperboles that overstep the mark of propriety. As in the case of figures, if hyperboles are abused, they may fall flat and produce the opposite effect to that which was intended. Isocrates (*Panegyric*, 8) illustrates this superbly; for when he exaggerates the power of language to delude the audience, he has all but made a prefatory announcement to his auditors that he himself is not to be trusted.

To help the writer avoid such faults Longinus reiterates the advice he had given in connection with the

figures:

The best hyperboles are those which conceal the fact that they are hyperboles; and this happens when under the influence of powerful emotions, they are used in connection with some great circumstances.

(O.T.S., Sec.38, p.149)

An example of this kind is the account given by Thucydides of the fight in Sicily, in which context he writes that though the water of the river was polluted with mud and blood, it was drunk,

and most of them still thought it was worth fighting for.

(Thucydides, VII, 84)

Here the hyperbole is made credible by the height of the emotions excited by the circumstances.

For the same reason, even incredible hyperboles seem plausible in comedy when they are in keeping with the emotion of laughter. As Longinus explains wittily :

Hyperboles may apply just as much to petty things as to great, and over-straining of the facts being the common element. In a sense, satire is the exaggeration of pettiness.

(O.T.S., Sec.38, p.150)

5. Synthesis

Like the figures and diction, the fifth and last source of the sublime, synthesis (i.e., dignity of word arrangement and elevation of structure) also deals with the use of words, but once again, a different aspect of words is the object of the source. In this case, words are taken simply as sounds, constitutive of rhythms and harmony. In an almost lyrical passage, Longinus extols the harmony of words as the highest form of music, since it also expresses meaning and therefore appeals to the mind as well as to the senses, and in so doing,

draws our thoughts towards what is majestic and dignified and sublime.

(D.T.S., Sec.39, p.151)

To illustrate this, Longinus takes a Demosthenic sentence (*De Corona*, 185) to show that a simple change in the order of words, or even the addition of one syllable by using a lengthened form of a word, completely alters the rhythm - and therefore the total effect - of the sentence.

In the enumeration of the sources (section 8), Longinus had remarked that synthesis contains within it all the other sources of the sublime, for the arrangement of words presupposes thought, passion, figures and diction. The idea is developed in section 40. If there is a lack of harmony in word-structure, the elements of grandeur would be

dispersed so that sublimity is scattered in all directions; while there are writers (like Philistus, Euripides and sometimes even Aristophanes) who have no natural gift of sublimity, and who, for the most part, employ common and popular words (which carry no extraordinary inspiration), have achieved dignity and even the appearance of grandeur by the mere combination and fitting together of the words in the right order (O.T.S., Sec.40 p.152).

It is quite evident that Longinus' primary concern here is with rhythm. This becomes even more obvious in the next two chapters, which express his dislike for short and broken rhythms. He also disapproves of rhythms that are too obvious for in such cases the style does not communicate the feeling of the words, but instead distracts the attention of the audience towards the rhythm. Short rhythmic phrases, which usually result from a desire for excessive compression are no better. One further point is made, namely, that the use of trivial words completely spoils a great passage. Since at this point he is concerned chiefly with the sound of words, Longinus begins by noting some cacophonous expressions in Herodotus' description of the storm (VII, 188). But this passage is also censurable because it contains vulgarisms and other words that are inappropriate to the dignity of the subject. This leads to another digression, for this aspect of the use of words belongs more properly to diction than to synthesis. Our author takes a passage from Theopompus - his

account of the Persian king's descent into Egypt - to illustrate how a few expressions, appearing in a passage which is meant to be sublime may mar its effect. Theopompus enumerates the offerings that were brought to the king of Persia by the rulers of Asia, but in the process he runs from the sublime to the trivial. He gives a wonderful report of the equipment - the golden and bejeweled mixing bowls, the silver plate, the pavilions of pure gold etc. - but spoils it by naming alongside it such paltry things as bags and sacks of spices and other provisions. Instead of a direct mention of these things, he could have suggested them remotely; e.g., he could have referred to them as "all the delicacies of caterers and good cooks."

These comments of Longinus should not be seen as contradicting his earlier statements about the superiority of faulty genius to faultless mediocrity. While it is undeniable that faults may appear even in the best of compositions, it should be the endeavor of the author to minimise their number. At any rate the great passages of the work must possess no defects. A sublime passage may redeem the composition by overshadowing the faults that occur in its less conspicuous portions, but if the sublime passage itself is tainted, the defect may appear even more glaring by contrast.

6. Other Topics

The remainder of the extant treatises is given over to a consideration of the causes of the lack of sublimity among the authors of Longinus' time. The subject may be shown to be of some importance, for if the times constrain the artist to the point where he cannot operate, all rhetorical tuition is useless. An unnamed philosopher, who had recently investigated this question, speaks first, and gives the lack of freedom as the cause, since the intellectual faculties of the writers of his time have not declined in comparison to the authors of antiquity. As he puts it,

Just as the cages, in which they keep the pygmies (or dwarfs, as they call them) not only stunt the growth of those who are imprisoned in them . . . , but also shrink them by reason of the fetters fixed round their bodies; so all slavery, however just it may be, could well be described as a cage of the soul, a common prison-house.

(O.T.S., Sec. 44, p157)

Longinus disclaims this argument, reasoning that we are apt to find fault with the age in which we live, rather than with ourselves. Instead, he gives the love of money and the love of luxury as the causes for the decay of eloquence. But the disclaimer to the first argument is not very forceful, and it is not clear whether Longinus' good friend

the philosopher, is an opponent putting forward a wrong headed argument, or simply Longinus himself unveiling his delivery (good orator that he is) by putting one of the two equally valid arguments in another voice.

Whatever the case may be, Longinus also amplifies the second cause at a considerable length, another masterpiece of rhetoric:

It is not the peace of this world that corrupts great natures, but rather this endless war, which holds our desires in its grasp. - Yes; and further still the passions that garrison our lives nowadays, and have utterly debased them; for the love of money (that insatiable craving, from which we all now suffer) and the love of pleasure make us their slaves, - or rather, one might say, sink our lives, body and soul into the depths; the love of money being a disease that makes us petty-minded, and the love of pleasure and utterly ignoble attribute.

(O.T.S., Sec.44, p.157)

Longinus leaves the age to its own failings and promises to proceed onwards with the subject of the passions, but unfortunately the treatise comes to an end at this point, before anything has been said on the topic.

But from his stray remarks throughout the work, we can have some idea of the role that the passions are supposed

to play in the production of the sublime. Caecilius had neglected some of the sources of the sublime, and the most significant omission was that of passion. If Caecilius has omitted passion, Longinus argues (O.T.S., Sec.8, p.108), it may be because he thought that sublimity and passion were identical, and were essentially bound up with each other. But in this he is mistaken; for though passion is an important source of the sublime, it is not an essential source, and there may be great passages devoid of passion. As an example Longinus quotes the attempt of the Titans to scale Olympus (*Odyssey*, II, 315-17).

Besides this (Longinus argues), some emotions can be found that are mean and not in the least sublime, such as pity, grief and fear. No reason is given for the exclusion of these emotions from the sphere of the sublime, but Grube has suggested¹¹ that Longinus has in mind the emotions felt by the writer or the character in the drama, rather than those of the audience.

It may be noted in this context that a display of improper passion is also condemned by Longinus as a fault (O.T.S., Sec.3, p.103). Writers who indulge in such excesses in their quest for the sublime flounder into faults of this nature. Such irrelevant outbursts of emotions may produce upon them the effect of ecstasy, but leave their hearers unaffected. For these reasons, there is nothing wrong in

supposing that passion is not an essential feature of the sublime.

On the other hand, if Caecilius did not speak of passion because he did not think it conducive to sublimity, he is once again in error; because

... nothing contributes so decisively to the grand style as a noble emotion in the right setting; where it forces its way to the surface in a gust of frenzy, and breathes a kind of divine inspiration into the speaker's words.

(O.T.S., Sec.8, p.109)

The truth of this statement is reinforced throughout the discussion, especially in the context of the figures. As has been said above, noble emotion in the proper place overshadows the excesses of figures, along with those of metaphors and hyperboles. Due to the onrush of powerful emotion, the figure appears natural to the audience; and if skillfully employed, is not even perceived, with the result that its effectiveness is increased.

Thus Longinus pursues his subject with admirable precision, though it is the mode of expression peculiar to great literature rather than the sublime, which is his object of study. As a theorist he must be saluted, for his precise analysis as well as for his penetrating insights.

Notes and References

1. Quoted in David Daiches, *Critical Approaches to Literature*, (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1955), p.47 footnote.
2. We have used the English text collected in T.S. Dorsch (ed.), *Classical Literary Criticism*, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1965). We have also referred to the editions of D.A. Russell, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965), and A.D. Prickard, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906).
3. Cf. Alder Olson, "The Argument of Longinus' *On The Sublime*", in R.S. Crane (ed.), *Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern*, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952), P.242.
4. Whether indeed it is possible for any literary passage to please all men in all ages has become more doubtful, as we learn more about other cultures and traditions. But it must be conceded that with respect to the author's own tradition, Longinus' remark contains at least a germ of truth.
5. This method of treatment on Longinus part has led some critics to question the distinctions between the five sources, and the validity of their enumeration. On
6. Cf. G.M.A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics*, (Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1965), p.344.

this point, cf. Wimsatt and Brooks, *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, (Oxford and I.B.H. Publishing Co. Ltd., New Delhi, 1957), p.103, and George Saintsbury, *A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe*, (Random House, New York, 1902), pp.161-62.

7. Wimsatt and Brooks, *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, *loc.cit.*
8. Cf. Alder Olson, "The Argument of Longinus *On The Sublime*, *op.cit.*, pp.244-47.
9. Wimsatt and Brooks, *Literary Criticism: A Short History*, *op.cit.*, p.106
10. *Ibid.*
11. G.M.A. Gruba, *The Greek and Roman Critics*, *op.cit.*, p.344.

C H A P T E R - I V

A C O M P A R A T I V E S T U D Y

C H A P T E R - I V

A C O M P A R A T I V E S T U D Y

1. Introduction

The preceding sketches of the two texts should barely leave any room for a doubt about the ends of their authors, i.e., to delineate the modes of expression suitable for literary composition. As far as Vāmana is concerned, the proposition would be accepted without a demur, but (as we have endeavoured to show) it is no less applicable in the case of Longinus. For though he constantly talks of ecstasy, and analyses most of the sources of sublimity in terms of the effect they have on the reader, we do not come across any well-formulated theory of aesthetics in his treatise. Ecstasy or transport is left undefined, and the only thing deducible from the text is that it is quite distinct from persuasion, and has an irresistible effect upon the reader. In what manner is the condition of transport as produced by a source of the sublime different from the transport that results from another source is not always clear, for the precise nature of the effect that a device produces on the reader is not always stated. There is no separate theoretical discussion of transport, but only in relation to the devices. Hence it would not be wrong to conclude that the treatment of transport in Longinus' scheme is only incidental, and that it deserves attention only insofar as it

serves as a touch stone of the sublime. Or perhaps Longinus regards it as one of those things that we know by instinct - something "born and bred within us" (O.T.S., Sec.39, p.151) which does not necessitate any explanation.

But whatever the case may be, if we choose to neglect that aspect of the treatise which deals with expression, and glorify instead the element of transport, we will not only be misinterpreting Longinus, but may, in all likelihood, end up with the same kind of scorn for the author as is implicit in Gibbon's famous remark. Therefore, the best approach is apparently to regard transport as a touchstone of what Longinus calls the sublime, which in its turn may result from different modes of expression.

Before embarking on a detailed comparison of the two works, it would be appropriate to start with a general consideration of the two basic concepts that underlie our primary texts. The sublime is defined in terms of five sources, any of which singly, or any combination of any number of the remaining sources, may give birth to it. These are "(i) grand conceptions; (ii) powerful passion; (iii) figures of thought and speech; (iv) noble diction; and (v) dignified word-arrangement. Similarly, Rīti is explained as constituted by a particular arrangement of words (K.A.S., I, II, 6), which involves the use of Guṇas and Alāṅkāras. As we noted in the preceding chapter, the last three Longinian

sources deal specifically with expression, and involve different aspects of word-arrangement. Thus the definition of Rīti would seem to correspond, at least in its essence, to the last three sources of the sublime. But most of the Arthaguṇas of Vāmana possess features that do not have any direct connection with word-arrangement, but are related to meaning or the content of literature. The first two sources of the sublime also refer to content, and as such are similar in kind to the Arthaguṇas. So on a broad, general level it can be safely concluded that both theorists cover much the same ground, and that the issues which are raised in the course of their discussions are common.

Moving on to the classification of modes and the distinctions between them, we note that by Vāmana's time the Pāñcālī was recognised as an independent mode of writing. It had acquired a sizable following among writers - significant enough for theorists to accept it as a third Rīti and place it alongside the Vaidarbhī and the Gauḍī Rītis. The geographical basis of the nomenclature of the Rītis suggests that they did not have a theoretical existence only, but were part of the literary activity of the time.

Of these three, the Vaidarbhī is replete with all the Guṇas, so that it is the complete and ideal Rīti, while the other two encourage extremes. The Gauḍī lays stress on the grand, the glorious or the imposing, the Pāñcālī on softness

and sweetness; so that the former loses itself often in bombast, the latter in prolixity.

We do not come across any classification of styles in Longinus, but his treatment of the sources of sublimity implies that there can be innumerable modes of writing, depending upon the combinations of the sources. Perhaps it was his perception of the hopelessness of any attempt to define and distinguish between all the possible modes that directed his decision to leave the subject untouched. The three or four kinds of styles distinguished by his time are not mentioned because he saw no point in limiting them to three or even four, when innumerable variations could be possible.

In spite of this, it is remarkable that Longinus mentions bombast and puerility as vices bordering on the sublime. These would correspond to the extreme forms of the Gauḍī and the Pāñcālī Rītis. The sublime may be understood as a kind of mean between these extremes, just as the Vaidarbhī, replete with all the Guṇas, may be thought of as standing mid way between the Gauḍī and the Pāñcālī.

As the concepts of the Rīti and the sublime are developed, further correspondences - both parallelisms and differences - come to light. Since both theories have their base in language (art, both critics feel, is as essential as genius for literary creation), the correspondences that

emerge are mostly of a formal kind. These are interspersed with observations on content and non-linguistic elements. As was stated at the outset, we will compare the remarks on language in terms of lexis, syntax, imagery and phonological devices, and then proceed onward with the issues that do not fall within the scope of the investigation of language.

2. The Use of Language

It would be apparent, even from a superficial acquaintance with the texts that a sizable portion of the treatises is devoted to topics that have a direct bearing on the choice of words. The correct use of words is emphasised by Vāmana, who holds the knowledge of grammar and the lexicon as a pre-requisite for literary activity. Lack of proficiency in grammar is the origin of the defect termed "Asādhutva" (K.A.S., II, I, 5), while a defective knowledge of the lexicon may give rise to redundancy and unintended contradictions (Kas, II, I, 10-11). Longinus has nothing to say on this point, but Vāmana devotes the last chapter of his work to some practical suggestions that may help the writer in securing grammatical correctness.

But the poet's task is not finished once he has mastered grammar and the lexicon. He has an infinite number of words to choose from and the choice is governed by a variety of considerations. Words that are used by the common people only and are vulgar are excluded from literary

vocabulary by Vāmana (K.A.S., II, I, 7) as well as by Longinus, (O.T.S., Sec.43), though the latter allows some concession in this respect if the words are more expressive than their dignified synonyms (O.T.S., Sec.31).

The choice of elegant diction is encouraged; it constitutes the Śabdagaṇa Kānti of Vāmana (K.A.S., III, I, 25), and Longinus recommends it as a means of achieving sublimity (O.T.S., Sec.30). On the other hand the desire to avoid common place words should not prompt the writer to make use of the specialised vocabulary of a technical discipline for it may make the passage difficult for the comprehension of the general reader (K.A.S., II, I, 8). For the same reason, words that are made to convey the desired sense in a far-fetched manner are also censured (K.A.S., II, I, 12 and 20). Not only do they make interpretation difficult, but such far-fetched expressions also produce an effect that is not grand but its exact antithesis, and on this account they have been condemned by Longinus as well (O.T.S., Sec.4, p.104). For the same reason, an excess of bombast is also censured by Longinus.

In Sanskrit, pompous diction implies the use of long and cumbrous compounds. Compounds constitute one of the chief distinguishing features of the Rītis - the Pāñcālī is almost totally devoid of compound words, while the Gauḍī abounds in long compounds (K.A.S., I, II, 12-13). Once again

the Vaidarbhī presents itself as a suitable alternative, since it employs compounds of average length, but leaves some room for flexibility to suit the needs of the subject-matter etc.

Any superfluity in diction is eschewed, whether it is caused by words that are put in only to fulfill the requirements of prosody and do not convey any meaning in the context, or by words that repeat what has already been expressed by another word (K.A.S., II, I, 9 and II, II, 12). Instead, the use of only such words as are absolutely essential, i.e. precision of diction, is considered a virtue (K.A.S., III, II, 3).

Besides this, Vāmana also excludes those words from the literary vocabulary which have some indecorous significations attached to them - even if the objectionable sense is not intended. But he makes an exception for words whose offensive significations are not a part of usage.

There is another aspect of word-choice, which, in modern-day terms, may be characterised as deviance (though deviance is not enunciated as an underlying theoretical principle by either of our authors). The most obvious instance of the deviant use of words is the figure of polyptoton (O.T.S., Sec.23-27), a name given to the interchanges of case, tense, person, number and gender.

The principle of deviance also underlies the Longinian figure of periphrasis (D.T.S., Sec.28-29) - the most difficult of the figures - which is defined as a roundabout way of saying something. As for Vāmana, circumlocution appears as a feature of two of his Guṇas: The first variety of the ideal Ojas is explained as the use of a phrase or sentence to convey the sense of a word (K.A.S., III, II, 2). Similarly, the ideal Saukumārya consists of periphrastic expressions that serve as euphemisms for words which express harsh or disagreeable ideas (K.A.S., III, II, 12). A periphrastic mode of utterance is also involved in the Arthaguṇa Mādhurya, the dominant characteristic of the Pāñcālī Riti (K.A.S., III, II, 11). But periphrasis should be employed with care, and both Longinus (D.T.S., Sec.29) and Vāmana (K.A.S., II, I, 12 and 20) caution against its excessive use, which may reduce its effectiveness and (as we said earlier) make the task of interpretation difficult.

The second variety of Vāmana's Arthaguṇa-Ojas, can also be explained as the deviant use of words. As opposed to periphrasis, it consists in the use of a word to express an idea which is normally conveyed by a phrase.

Finally, the diction employed in a verse or a passage should be uniform; and when shifts are made according to the context the writer is cautioned not to make them in an abrupt manner (K.A.S., III, I, 12). But if the changes from the

simple diction to the grand or vice versa are gradual, they endow the passage with charm and constitute the quality called "Samādhi" (K.A.S., III, I, 13-20). Longinus does not make any observations on the uniformity of diction, but he does remark that the choice of words should be determined by the nature of the subject-matter, and for this reason grand diction should not be used everywhere (O.T.S., Sec.30).

As compared to diction syntax does not have much of a role in the speculations of the theorists under consideration. Since Sanskrit is a highly - inflected language it does not leave much room for syntactic devices. Even some of Vāmanas figures which seem to represent syntactic variations of the Simile, cannot be interpreted solely as devices based on syntax.

But in the case of Longinus, as Wimsatt and Brooks have noted, some of the figures depend upon the abnormalities of syntax. Asyndeton (which gives the impression of rapidity and agitation) results from the omission of conjunctions; if the conjunctions are added and the syntax is ordered, the ruggedness of the emotions is toned down and they lose their power (O.T.S., Sec.19-21). The fourth variety of Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Ojas also involves compression, but it is not achieved by any syntactic device. The compression results from a use of suffixes sanctioned by grammar, which help the writer to compress his sentences. Similarly, the Longinian

hyperbaton consists in the arrangement of words or ideas out of their normal sequence and mimics a speaker highly charged with emotions (O.T.S., Sec.22). Both asyndeton and hyperbaton exploit the possibilities of obscurity that temporarily blocks the understanding of the reader, but soon resolves into clarity like that of a lightning-flash. But in Vāmana's view obscurity, even if only temporary, is a fault; so that he does not approve of any disorder in syntax that makes comprehension difficult (K.A.S., II, 1, 22).

Variations in syntax are at the root of other Longinian figures as well. Such are rhetorical questions (O.T.S., Sec.18), which beguile the audience into thinking that each deliberately-considered point has been struck out and put into words on the spur of the moment. In the same way, the figure of adjuration (O.T.S., Sec. 16), at least from a formal standpoint, may be interpreted as the variation in the normal syntactic order, though Longinus insists that there is nothing grand about adjuration as a mere rhetorical device. It is the place, manner, circumstances and the motive that invest it with grandeur.

The importance of imagery is much greater than the syntactic devices just considered; and both critics have much to offer on the subject. Vāmana's study of imagery takes the form of a chapter on the ideal figures of speech. Longinus deals with it in two places: first in a general

manner as a part of his first source of sublimity (i.e., grand conception), and then in relation to metaphor, hyperbole etc.

Longinus has generally treated oratory along with literature, and has hardly made any distinctions between the two. But he notes an interesting difference between the use of imagery in oratory and its employment in literature (O.T.S., Sec.13). Though its aim is to produce vividness of description as well as to work on the feelings, in oratory, the emphasis is on vividness, while in poetry the stress shifts to the stimulation of feelings. Consequently, strict adherence to reality is required in oratorical images, though in literature the bounds of credibility may be stretched to a certain point. But even in literature, an image that contradicts a well known fact is not permissible (O.T.S., Sec.4, p.105). Vāmana also censures the images that involve the mention of something impossible (K.A.S., IV, II, 20). On the other hand, images that are grand but not incredible are praised by Longinus (O.T.S., Sec.9, pp.110-12), but images drawn from everyday life, he adds, do not produce the same effect of elevation.

Along with incredible images, those that are unfinished, confused or vague should also be avoided. In the opinion of Longinus, these characterise one of the extremes that border on the sublime (O.T.S., Sec.3, p.102). Here also

Vāmana seems to be in agreement with him, for one of the defects of simile refers to instances where the comparison is either vague and difficult to grasp or is unfinished (K.A.S., IV, 11, 16). Other defects of simile named by Vāmana include the unsuitability for each other of the standard of comparison and the object compared, and disparities in number and gender between the two. Longinus is silent on the latter point (no doubt because number and gender do not have the same importance in the languages with which he was conversant as they have in Sanskrit), but he does criticize the comparisons where the terms are not appropriate for each other, and includes them under the fault of frigidity (D.T.S., Sec.4).

So much for imagery in general. Apart from this, individual figures are discussed; but these need not be considered in detail here, as they have been analysed at some length in their proper place. We may note in passing that Vāmana has made no observations on the abuse of figures, but has thought it sufficient merely to define and illustrate the various figures. Longinus does not take up the same number of figures, but his treatment of the ones that he chooses to explain implies that there is more to a figure than the rhetorical device that embodies it, since every such device is subject to misuse. To illustrate this he quotes some bad metaphors and hyperboles. To avoid any breach of propriety, the figures should be accompanied by strong emotion, for the

timely expression of violent emotions is an appropriate antidote for the excesses of figures - whether it be a series of bold metaphors, or hyperboles so far-fetched that they come dangerously close to the limits of credibility.

Another point pertaining to figures deserves mention here. It concerns the relative importance of simile and metaphor in the two texts. In the opinion of Sanskrit poetics, comparison lies at the root of most of the ideal figures, so that they are described as the modifications of simile. But for Longinus, the basic figure is the metaphor, and simile, hyperbole etc. are defined with reference to it. The reason for this has already been explained; since these come under the domain of diction, they are conceived in terms of the imposition of one thing on the other, which in its turn involves a comparison. Metaphor is the basic figure because in it the comparison is absolute; whereas in hyperbole words exaggerate the thing in terms either of excess or of deficiency, and in simile the comparison is only partial.

The last part of the investigation of literary language relates to the auditory effect of words, and takes into account such factors as rhythm, verbal figures, the elements of prosody etc. The last of these, i.e. prosody, was not usually dealt with in a work on poetics, and specific works on the subject were composed, so that there are only

stray references to it in Vāmana's work. It is named as one of the sciences whose knowledge is a pre-requisite for poetic composition (K.A.S., I, III, 6), and in another context Vāmana condemns as faults the deficiency in metre and the misplacement of the hiatus (K.A.S., II, II, 2-7).

Other phonological devices that assist in the production of a harmonious arrangement of sounds have been assigned an important place by both writers. The fifth source of sublimity, i.e. synthesis, comprises of such devices which, Longinus claims, can invest even a common place subject with grandeur (O.T.S., Sec.40). Though they are examined at some length, it is not possible to make any comparisons (except of the most general kind) between the devices of Vāmana and Longinus. They depend upon the peculiarities of a particular language, and it is difficult to find equivalents for them in other languages. Any disturbance in the proper flow of words is not tolerated, whether it arises from harsh words (K.A.S., II, I, 16), or has its origin in broken and agitated rhythms (O.T.S., Sec.41).

There are no equivalents in Longinus' system for the verbal figures of Vāmana, apparently because they are over-rhythmical - a characteristic that he contemptuously describes as a superficial jingle, which distracts the reader's attention from the main subject and merely

communicates the feelings of the rhythm (O.T.S., Sec.42). For a similar reason, apparently, Vāmana expresses his preference for the alliteration "which is not too glaringly conspicuous" (K.A.S., IV, 1, 9).

Two further points that relate to literary language in general deserve mention here. The first concerns the differing views of obscurity or ambiguity that emerged from the two texts. As we said earlier, most of Longinus' figures result from abnormalities of syntax and other peculiarities of structure, and rely for their effect upon the production of a temporary obscurity, which finally resolves into a lightning-like flash of comprehension. Vāmana, on the contrary, repeatedly lays stress on clarity; ease in comprehension forms a feature of four of his Arthaguṇas - Prasāda, Samādhi, Samatā and Arthavyakti. Any difficulty in comprehension (whether it arises from lexical, or from syntactical, causes) is condemned as a fault.

The second point concerns the tolerance of faults. Longinus is ready to make allowances for the faults of language, especially if they are mitigated by great virtues. But for Vāmana (as for most Indian theorists) a fault is a fault - condemnable and intolerable, which should, under no circumstances, be permitted to creep into a composition. As far as faults of conception are concerned, these are denounced by Longinus also (O.T.S., Sec. 3-4 and 10).

3. The Content of Literature

While accepting that the Rīti theory and the concept of the sublime are of a predominantly linguistic nature, it would nonetheless be a serious oversight to pass lightly over the observations that have a bearing on the content of literature. The first source of great writing, according to Longinus, is the ability to form grand conceptions; and the Arthadoṣas, the Arthaguṇas and the Arthālaṃkāras of Vāmana refer more properly to the ideas of literature.

Ideas that are opposed to place, time, nature or the established principles of arts and sciences are not permitted in literature (K.A.S., II, II, 23-24 and III, II, 5). Longinus also holds a strict adherence to reality as an essential feature of oratorical writing (O.T.S., Sec. 15), and even in tragedy, which may venture in to the realm of the mythical and the incredible, ideas that are opposed to established facts are to be eschewed. It is on this ground that he condemns a simile in Xenophon (O.T.S., Sec. 4).

Also to be avoided are frivolous, undignified and long-winded details, for they ruin the total effect of a passage, like air-holes fostered on to impressive buildings. Trivial ideas - Longinus notes more than once (O.T.S., Secs.10 and 43) - terribly disfigure the sublime. Instead, a harmonious fusion of the most appropriate details should be the aim of the writer, for it invests the passage with

grandeur (O.T.S., Sec. 10). Sappho and Homer exhibit this characteristic in abundance, and for this reason they have been praised by Longinus. Vāmana also recognises this feature as one of the essentials of poetry; his Arthaguṇa Kānti is defined as the conspicuous presence of Rasas (K.A.S., III, 11, 15), for which a proper selection and unification of details is required.

Writers are also required to possess the ability to form grand conceptions of their subjects. This ability, Longinus maintains, originates from the nobility of soul, and for this reason the author must have a mind that is not mean or ignoble (O.T.S, Sec.9). Homer and Moses are praised for their grand conceptions; as is Alexander the Great, whose reply to Parmenio Longinus quotes with approval. Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Śleṣa, as well as the first variety of meaning whose comprehension constitutes the Arthaguṇa Samādhi (the meaning that is absolutely original) also rely on grand and clever ideas for their effectiveness.

But it is not possible for every subject to be grand, and ideas that are commonplace may acquire at least some amount of grandeur by the use of amplification (O.T.S., Sec.11). It may be managed in a number of ways, e.g., by exaggeration, or by the rhetorical development of a common place. The latter is also a feature of Vāmana's Arthaguṇa Ojas (i.e. the third variety of Arthapraudhi, consisting in

the diffuseness of sentences) (K.A.S., III, II, 2), and also characterises his Arthamādhurya (K.A.S., III, II, 11). But he cautions against the excessive use of these methods, since such dilatory style adds charm only within certain limits. Longinus also cites instances where this technique, improperly employed, leads to the fault of frigidity (O.T.S., Sec.4).

Since greatness of mind is a pre-requisite of great conceptions, the aspiring writer (whose mind has not yet reached that stage of elevation) may train his faculties by an imitation of those that have attained greatness before him. In other words, if he can make his thoughts commensurate with their thoughts, he may succeed in forming noble ideas (O.T.S., Secs. 13-14). In Vāmana there is nothing that directly relates to this issue; but in his classification of meaning into absolutely original and that which is borrowed from others (K.A.S., III, II, 8), he seems to accept that literature may echo great passages from antiquity. The concept of imitation as found in Longinus is very wide and elevated; whereas in Vāmana (as his example of the second kind of meaning illustrates) it narrows down to a reproduction of ideas and the tricks of style.

4. Closing Remarks

The preceding comments should leave no room for doubt

that it is the mode of expression peculiar to literature that remains the central concern of Vāmana and Longinus. It is true that each has much that is novel and not to be met with in the other, but the similarities between the two are remarkable. The divergence of opinion results from the differences in points of view, which are inevitable in the case of theorists whose traditions had evolved quite independently of each other.

It does not fall within the scope of the present work to consider at length the concepts of the sublime and Rīti as developed by succeeding theorists. We may note that the sublime was introduced to the French and English critics by Boileau, who, for the first time, provided a French translation of the treatise. As noted earlier, Longinus' allowance for faults was to become the basis for much liberal criticism in the eighteenth century. Besides this, Burke and Kant evolved their own theories of the sublime. But the influence of Longinus tended to wane somewhat from the end of the eighteenth century, and the theorist could not again attain the same popularity that he had enjoyed during the time of Dryden and Pope.

In the Indian tradition, the three Rītis of Vāmana were generally accepted by the orthodox schools; though the unorthodox writers differed from them both in the names that they assigned to the Rītis, as well as in their conceptions.

But for even those that recognised the three Rītis of Vāmana, they lost their central importance, which was taken over by the principle of Dhvani or suggestion. The Guṇas of Vāmana were also minimised to three, viz. Djas, Prasāda and Mādhurya. Moreover, these were no longer regarded as the characteristics of the Śabda and Artha, but were taken as the attributes of Rasa. Vāmana's conception of Guṇas as relating to Śabda and Artha was developed by a few unorthodox writers, such as Bhoja and Prakāśavarṣa.

A P P E N D I X

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

Vowels	:	a	ā	i	ī	u	ū	r	e	ai	o	au
		अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ	ऋ	ए	ऐ	ओ	औ
Anusvara	:	ṁ										
		अं										
Visarga	:	ḥ										
		अः										
Consonants	:											
gutturals	:	k	kh	g	gh	ṅ						
		क	ख	ग	घ	ङ						
palatals	:	c	ch	j	jh	ñ						
		च	छ	ज	झ	ञ						
cerebrals	:	t	th	d	dh	n						
		ट	ठ	ड	ढ	ण						
dentals	:	t	th	d	dh	n						
		त	थ	द	ध	न						
bilabials	:	p	ph	b	bh	m						
		प	फ	ब	भ	म						
Semi-vowels	:	y	r	l	v							
		य	र	ल	व							
Sibilants	:											
palatal	:	ś										
		श										
cerebral	:	ṣ										
		ष										
dental	:	s										
		स										
Aspirate	:	h										
		ह										

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

- Allen, W., "The Terentianus of the *Perihupsous*", in *American Journal of Philology*, Vol.62, 1941.
- Atkins, J.W.H., *Literary Criticism in Antiquity*, Cambridge, 1934.
- Baldwin, C.S., *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetics*, New York, 1924.
- Belvalkar, S.K., *The "Kāvyaḍarṣa" of Daṇḍin*, Poona: The Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, 1924.
- Bharata, *The Nāṭya Śāstra*, tr. A Board of Scholars, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1988.
- Bradley, A.C., "The Sublime", in *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1955.
- Burke, E., *A Philosophical Inquiry into Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958.
- Chaitanya, K., *Indian Poetics: A Critical and Comparative Study*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965.
- Choudhary, S., *Essays in Indian Poetics*, New Delhi: Vasudev Prakashan, 1965.
- Daiches, D., *Critical Approaches to Literature*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1957.
- De, S.K., *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1960.
- Dorsch, T.S. (ed.), *Classical Literary Criticism*, London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1965.
- Enright, D.J. and Chickera, E.D.H. (Eds.), *English Critical Texts*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Fry, P.H., *The Reach of Criticism: Method and Perception in Literary Theory*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983.
- Gilbert, A.H. (ed.), *Literary Criticism from Plato to Dryden*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962.

- Grube, G.M.A., *The Greek and Roman Critics*, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1965.
- _____, "Notes on the *Perihupsous*", in *American Journal of Philology*, Vol.78, 1957.
- Hall, V., *A Short History of Literary Criticism*, London: The Merlin Press, 1977.
- Henn, T.R., *Longinus and English Criticism*, Cambridge, 1934.
- Jha, G.N., *The "Kāvyaśāstra" of Vāmana*, Poona: The Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, 1928.
- Kane, P.V., *A History of Sanskrit Poetics*, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1987.
- Kapoor K., "Metaphor in Sanskrit and English Criticism", in *Journal of Literary Criticism*, Vol.II, Delhi: Doaba House, December 1985.
- Krishnamurthy, K., *Essays in Sanskrit Criticism*, Dharwad: Karnatak University, 1965.
- _____, "*Vakroktijīvitā*" of Kuntaka, Dharwad: Karnatak University, 1977.
- _____, *Indian Literary Theories: A Reappraisal*, New Delhi: Mehar Chand Lachhman Das, 1985.
- Kushwaha, M.S.(ed.), *Indian Poetics and Western Thought*, Lucknow: Argo Publishing House, 1988.
- Lahiri, P.C., *Concept of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics in Their Historical Development*, New Delhi: The Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1974.
- Monk, S.H., *The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in Eighteenth-Century England*, Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, 1935.
- Mukherji, R.C., *Literary Criticism in Ancient India*, Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1966.
- Olson, A., "The Argument of Longinus' *On The Sublime*", in R. S. Crane (ed.), *Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Page, N., *The Language of Literature*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984.

- Prickard, A.O. (tr.), *Longinus on the Sublime*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.
- Raghavan, V., *Bhoja's "Śṛṅgāraprakāśa"*, Madras: The Vasanta Press, 1978.
- _____, *Studies on Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāra Śāstra*, Madras: The Vasanta Press, 1973
- Rājaśekhara, *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, tr. and ed. Kedarnath Sharma, Patna: Bihar Rastra Bhasha Parishad, 1965.
- Roberts, W.R. (ed.), *Longinus on the Sublime*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906.
- _____, (ed.), *Demetrius on Style*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902
- _____, *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism*, New York, 1928.
- Russell, D.A., *Longinus on Sublimity*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Saintsbury, G., *A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe*, Edinburgh, 1941.
- Sastry, I.D.N., *Śrībhāmahaviracita "Kāvya-ālaṅkāra"*, Tanjore: The Wallad Printing House, 1927.
- Tate, A., "Longinus and the New Criticism", in *The Man of Letters in the Modern World*, New York, 1955.
- Tivari, R.S., *A Critical Approach to Classical Indian Poetics*, Varanasi and Delhi: Chaukhambhā Orientalia, 1984.
- Vāmana, *Kāvya-ālaṅkārasūtravṛtti*, tr. and ed. Bechan Jha, Varanasi: Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Sansthanā, 1976.
- Wimsatt, W.K. and Brooks, C., *Literary Criticism : A Short History*, New Delhi: Oxford and I.B.H., 1957.

