

**CONFLICT AND COMPATIBILITY IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
ON TAIWAN AND KAMPUCHEA DURING THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION**

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
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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled
"Conflict and Compatibility in Sino-U.S. Relations
on Taiwan and Kampuchea During the Reagan Administration"
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of the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in
Jawaharlal Nehru University, has not been previously
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
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Lawynn M. Pariat

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Preface

After the normalization of relations between China and the United States in 1979, Sino-U.S. relations started improving, gradually leading to a better working relationship between the two nations. However on the regional issues, especially in East Asia, Sino-U.S. relations had assumed the dimensions of conflict and compatibility. On the one hand, there is the issue of Taiwan which continues to keep the United States and China in constant conflict. On the other hand, there is the issue of Kampuchea, where the interests of both China and the United States converge to a very large extent, thereby giving their relationship a dimension of compatibility. The present study examines the conflictual pattern on Taiwan, and the compatibility trend on Kampuchea in Sino-U.S. relations during the Reagan Administration.

The least likely conflict, but one that would have the most disastrous effect on Sino-U.S. relations is an attempt by China to resolve the Taiwan reunification question by force. Under the terms of the 1978 communique, both sides agreed that Taiwan was a province of China and that reunification was a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide. However to allay domestic political concerns, the U.S. passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in March 1979 which was designed

to maintain informal ties with the people of Taiwan and ensure their security. The TRA lays down, in part, that Taiwan would be provided with "arms of a defensive character" and that the United States would "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan." The United States regards Taiwan as a country for the purpose of formulating foreign policy and military assistance programmes. Such a U.S. approach and the TRA are interpreted by China as America's "two China" policy. For its part, Taiwan has steadfastly refused to enter into any substantive discussions with the mainland, at least publicly. It has simply relied on the TRA and continuing U.S. defence arms sales to perpetuate the status-quo of us. The short term objectives of this approach were to undermine relations between Washington and Beijing and to make use of the implicit American defense commitment to frustrate any possibility of negotiation. This "stonewall" strategy was strongly encouraged by several remarks made by Reagan in favour of a "two-China" policy, during his campaign for presidency. Reagan even spoke of reversing the Carter-initiated normalization process and restoring diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

After Reagan's election to the US presidency, it was not clearly known what priority the U.S. government would assign to the Sino-U.S. relationship. This uncertainty was due, not so much to a lack of appreciation for the strategic utility of the connection, but rather to President Reagan's reluctance to retreat on his campaign promises to Taiwan. China consistently rejected any U.S. action suggestive of a "two - China" policy and particularly arms sales which had the practical effect of challenging the mainland's sovereignty claims over Taiwan and precluding any real possibility of a negotiated settlement.

The arms sales issue continued to be an irritant to the relations between the United States and China. Though the Reagan Administration retreated in early 1982 from the sale to Taiwan of some \$ 500 million in new weapons including the FX and F-5G Tigershark Aircraft and sophisticated air-to-surface and ship-to-ship Harpoon missiles, Washington opted for continued co-production of the F-5E fighter and the sale of \$ 60 million in military spare parts to Taiwan. The Chinese protested vigorously but did not take steps to downgrade relations as they had threatened to do earlier. Primary consideration was the Chinese' own

need for American arms, specially of antitank and anti-aircraft missiles, early warning radar devices and other defensive weapons.

Meanwhile the Reagan Administration took care not to jeopardise the Sino- American relationship on the Taiwan issue and lose the "China-Card" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. As the TRA became a source of conflict between these two states and a source of strength for Taiwan, the Reagan Administration tried to win the favour of both countries with an ambiguous joint U.S. - China communique issued in August 1982. The United States declared that it "does not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to Taiwan" and pledged that its arms sales to Taipei "will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms" the level of those supplied since 1979. In deliberately ambiguous language the communique also stated that the U.S. "intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution".

Significantly the Reagan Administration managed to sell arms to Taiwan during both its terms. The second term of the administration was especially significant in that there were many important changes

in Taiwan highlighted by the initiation of the democratic process in the form of a lifting of martial law, restoration of civil and human rights, and formation of opposition parties. Taiwan had also begun to open its doors to the mainland by allowing its citizens to travel freely and have commercial interaction with the mainland Chinese and thereby relaxing the state of confrontation. The mainland too, as the study indicates, was showing a keenness for reunification with Taiwan, and a U.S. role in effecting the reunification process. However, though the Reagan Administration reviewed its Sino-U.S. policy because of these changes, it held on to its earlier stand, that of leaving the reunification issue for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to decide for themselves. Thus a resolution of the issue has not come about and the Sino-U.S. conflict on Taiwan has continued with no end in sight.

Though conflict is what has characterised Sino-U.S. relations on Taiwan, compatibility is what characterises Sino-U.S. relations regarding Kampuchea. Driven by a common quest to check the Soviet Union's expansionist designs in East Asia, vis-a-vis its support of Vietnam and its occupation of Kampuchea, the

Chinese and the U.S. have followed parallel policies aimed at bringing about Vietnam's pullout from Kampuchea. Together with ASEAN, the U.S. and China have resisted the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea and opposed the PRK regime installed there by Vietnam. Both the U.S. and China feared that Vietnam played a vital role in the Indochina region in the broader context of Soviet global strategy. Hence the emergence of tandem Sino-U.S. interests of containing Vietnam with an object to contain the Soviet influence in the Indochina region.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION : SINO-U.S. NORMALIZATION

From the early 1950s through 1969, the goal of American policy had been to isolate and contain "Communist China". The United States refused to recognise the Chinese Communists as the legitimate rulers of China. They strongly opposed proposals for their seating in the United Nations or other international fora, firmly supported the international position of the defeated Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan, underwrote the control of the "Republic of China" over Taiwan and other areas from which it had not been driven, and gave strong support to nations on the periphery of China that American policy makers saw as threatened by Chinese "aggression".

By 1968, the assumption under which this policy rested began to come under serious question. Sino-Soviet unity, which had never been so great as many perceived it to be, was demonstrably a thing of the past. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August of that year, which was justified by the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" on 26 September, seemed ominously to provide a precedent and rationale for Soviet escalation of the war of words with China into armed conflict. In March 1969, following a series of minor incidents, serious

fighting broke out along the Sino - Soviet frontier. The Chinese "Cultural Revolution" which was heightening Chinese rhetorical aggressiveness, had meanwhile revealed a China so at odds with itself as to present a diminished threat to neighbouring countries. In the United States the Vietnam war had created a mood in which, for the first time in two decades, the old anti-communist assumptions were subjected to re-examination. It was against this background that prominent leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties began to propose changes in the China policy of the United State during the 1968 presidential campaign.

By 21 June, 1968, Vice President Humphrey had told the editors of the New York Times that the United States should lift its embargo on trade with China except for strategic materials.¹ For the first time in two decades, the presidential nominees of both parties, Nixon and Humphrey, were thus on record as favouring reconciliation with China.

After his election, President Nixon and his administration pledged "new initiatives to re-establish more normal relations with Communist China".² In early February 1969, the new president had initiated a major

study of policy options toward China. On 24 May, President Nixon had Secretary of State William Rogers, then in Pakistan, ask Pakistani Chief of State Yahya Khan to find out from the Chinese about expanded talks with the United States.³ On 21 July the administration began a series of actions to relax barriers to Sino-America trade and contact, announcing that beginning 23, July U.S. citizens travelling abroad could bring back upto \$ 100 worth of Chinese goods, and authorizing travel by several categories of U.S. citizens (including members of Congress, journalists and scholars) to the Chinese mainland.⁴ On 1 August President Nixon, visiting Pakistan, reiterated U.S. interest in expanded dialogue with China to Yahya Khan. The next day in Romania, he made a similar approach to President Nicolae Ceausescu.

On 5, September, Undersecretary of State Elliott, L. Richardson formally enunciated what later evolved into the doctrine of "evenhandedness" (which governed relations between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow throughout the 1970s), stating that the United States would not seek to exploit the Sino-Soviet split but would "pursue a course of progressively developing better relations" with both countries.⁵ About two

months later, on 7 November, the United States quietly ended the Seventh Fleets' 19 year patrolling of the Taiwan Strait. The Seventh Fleet was placed there during the Korean War to protect Taiwan from invasion from the Chinese mainland.

Efforts to improve relations with China continued and, in his 18 February, 1970 report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, President Nixon reaffirmed his desire for "improved practical relations" with Beijing. In the months ahead, dialogue between China and the United States continued through other channels of communication, particularly Pakistan and Romania. Following Pakistani President Yahya Khan's visit to Beijing on November 10, 1970, Chinese Chairman, Mao Zedong told an American journalist Edgar Snow that he would be happy to receive President Nixon in China. Meanwhile, the Romanians also informed, the United State of a proposal of Premier Zhou Enlai that President Nixon visit China.

While China and the United States continued to exchange messages through third parties, each government also took some direct steps to ease tensions. On the U.S. side, all restrictions on the

use of American passports to China were removed within a year (March 15, 1970 to March 1, 1971)⁶, licenses were granted for commercial export of certain selected goods to China; and American carriers abroad were permitted to transport certain goods consigned to the China mainland between ports in third countries. Moreover, President Nixon, in his second annual foreign policy report to Congress, stressed that America was prepared to see China playing a role that was more constructive towards the "family of nations", thereby explicitly abandoning two decades of U.S. efforts to isolate China. On the Chinese side, the government had begun since 1969 to release American prisoners.⁷

Responding to these U.S. gestures in a dramatic manner, the Chinese ping pong team participating in an international competition in Japan on 6, April 1971, formally invited its American counterpart to visit China.⁸ The visit began on 10 April. Four days later, the Department of State announced that the 21 year embargo on trade with the Chinese mainland would be relaxed, with trade permitted in commodities nearly equivalent to those traded with the Soviet Union, and that U.S. currency controls affecting China would be ended. In addition, the

Department of State declared that visas for any Chinese seeking to visit the United States would be given quick attention to.⁹

Meanwhile, the 30 April issue of Life magazine made public Mao's invitation to President Nixon. On 11 June Zhou Enlai formally accepted an American proposal of a July 9 - 11 Kissinger visit to Beijing. This visit took place as planned, with the result that President Nixon was able to announce to the world that he had accepted the invitation to visit Beijing.

President Nixon's visit to China took place from 21 to 29 February, 1972. This historic visit resulted in the signing of the Shanghai Communique in which the United States acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China". The Shanghai Communique also affirmed the United States' interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves". The Chinese side gracefully refrained from spelling out their conditions for normalization, which remained as stated much earlier by Zhou Enlai to a delegation of the committee

of concerned Asian Scholars on 19 July 1971 : the United States must recognize Beijing as the sole legitimate government, of China, break diplomatic relations with Taipei, withdraw its forces from Taiwan, and abrogate the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty with the Chinese Nationalist regime.¹⁰ However, having reached a temporary agreement with the Americans on the Taiwan issue, the Chinese fully abandoned their 21 years-old restrictions against trade and cultural exchange with the United States.

For the next few years, until agreement on "normalization" was finally reached and announced in the Joint Communique of 15, December 1978, the Shanghai Communique served as the basic charter governing the relationship between the United States and China.

Up till the end of Gerald Ford's presidency in 1976, neither the Americans nor the Chinese made any serious effort to achieve a breakthrough in the ongoing process of normalization of relations between their two nations. However, on 6, December 1976, following the death of both Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong, a new coalition government led by Hua Guofeng was formed in Beijing.

Less than a month later, Jimmy Carter was elected the 39th president of the United States. The political leadership on both sides of the Pacific had changed and, while both the United States and China continued understandably to stress the importance of their strategic relationship over bilateral issues, it soon became clear that each was now seriously prepared to consider the negotiation of normalization, which would remove all political barriers to closer cooperation.

The Chinese who had made their position public years before, had indicated in the November 1973 communique' that they required some more explicit American confirmation of the "principle of one China" than that in the Shanghai Communique' which reads in part : "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one china and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. The Chinese adhered to their July 1971 position : the United States must recognize Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China, break diplomatic relations with the rival Chinese regime in Taipei, "abrogate" the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with that regime, and withdraw all military forces and

installations from Taiwan. Thereafter, - the Chinese said - the United States could have unofficial relations with Taiwan, maintaining practical relationships with the people of the island but refraining from any official contact.

Even before his inauguration, President - elect Carter, speaking through Secretary of State - designate Cyrus Vance (after a meeting at the Department of State with the chief of the Chinese Liaison office on January 8, 1977), had endorsed the Nixon and Ford administration's" policy of normalizing relations with Beijing.¹¹ Later, in a similar meeting President Carter reaffirmed the Shanghai Communique and also made clear his administration's intention to "move toward full normalization of relations" on the basis of the recognition of one China, while reiterating the importance of settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves by peaceful means.

Based on extensive consultation with members of Congress and others, the Carter administration had determined that the United States could only establish diplomatic relations with Beijing if such action could be accomplished in a way that did not damage the well-

being of the people on Taiwan or reduce the chance for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. The United States had long been prepared to "confirm" the principle of one China and to transfer recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The United States had already removed all but a few hundred of its forces from Taiwan in accordance with its pledge in the Shanghai Communique. Thus in the early summer of 1978, following National Security Adviser, Dr. Brezezinski's visit to Beijing, President Carter authorized Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, then chief of the American Liaison office at Beijing, to begin presentation of a series of items of normalization to the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua. In five meetings, Ambassador Woodcock laid out the American position, and in completing his presentations on 4 November, told the Chinese that the United States would be willing to work toward a 1 January 1979 target date for normalization, if its concerns were met.

The Chinese response was delayed until early December by the illness of Foreign Minister Huang Hua. After further negotiations, Woodcock was invited to meet with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping on 13 December. This was the crucial meeting which led directly to a

second meeting with Deng the following day, in which an agreement with the United States was finally reached. The two governments simultaneously announced the agreement in the form of a Joint Communiqué (formally dated 1 January, 1979) and two unilateral statements on 15 December 1978 in both Washington and Beijing.¹² According to the former document, the two countries agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of 1 January, 1979.

Thus the goal of normalization of relations between the United States and China, which was initiated by President Nixon was finally realized by President Jimmy Carter, who formally signed the Joint Communiqué with the Chinese.

In the two years following the exchange of mutual recognition and diplomatic missions between the United States and China, bilateral relations in virtually all spheres progressed with surprising speed. This was exemplified by the establishment of an elaborate framework of agreements for cooperation in the cultural, scientific and technological, economic, consular and other fields, and by the exchange of

visits by leaders of both countries to discuss matters of mutual interest.

Until the end of 1978, two incumbent presidents of the United States, Nixon and Ford, had visited Beijing, but no top Chinese leader had reciprocated due to the presence of the Kuomintang embassy in Washington. With the removal of this obstacle on January 1, 1979, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping paid a week-long visit (January 29 to February 5) to Washington and other parts of the United States.

Deng's visit was a milestone in Sino-American relations that, in the words of President Carter, set "a new and irreversible course" in the history of the two countries.¹³ During this visit, the two sides concluded several basic agreements for cultural, scientific and technological cooperation and for the establishment of consular relations. A Joint Press Communique, issued by Carter and Deng on 1 February promised to facilitate the appointment of resident journalists in Beijing and Washington, and undertook to conclude trade, aviation, shipping and related agreements in the near future.

After this historic visit, the interflow of personnel, ideas, goods, and services between the two countries increased by leaps and bounds. The Department of State noted the extraordinary growth in human contact between the two countries, citing as examples : (1) Vice-President Mondale and five U.S. Cabinet members have visited China; Vice-Premiers Deng Xiaoping, Fang Yi, Kang Shi'en, Geng Biao, and Bo Yibo as well as many Chinese ministers and department heads have visited the U.S.; (2) Almost every department and agency of our Federal government, including the Department of Defense, now had a productive relationship with its Chinese counterpart. State and local governments as well as universities and other private institutions have begun to forge similar ties; (3) More than 100 Chinese delegations now visit the U.S. each month; (4) Almost 5,000 Chinese scholars and students are now in the U.S., while hundreds of Americans are working, doing research, or studying in China.

With respect to trade, and economic exchange, the Department of State took note of the fact that :

"Sino - American trade ... has significantly exceeded the most optimistic earlier projections China now buys about half of all U.S. cotton exports and is a major importer of U.S. wheat, corn and soyabeans; exports of U.S. manufactured goods are the fastest growing item in our trade. Textiles and oils head the list of Chinese imports to the U.S."

Finally, the Department of State recorded activities and exchange in other fields :

"A large and growing number of cultural exchange activities, undertaken at both the governmental and private levels, are giving the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's artistic and cultural achievements. Early in 1981, the U.S. - PRC Joint Science and Technology Commission will hold its second annual meeting in Washington to review the hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programs the U.S. and China have initiated since early 1979 under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology. These programmes currently cover 13 fields from high energy physics to earthquake studies.¹⁴"

Vice-President Mondale's visit to China (August 25 to September 1, 1979) had provided the impetus for these remarkable developments in the new relationship. Speaking at Beijing University and to an unprecedented nationwide television audience in China on 27 August, the Vice-President proclaimed American support for "a strong and secure and modernizing China". He told the Chinese people that "despite the sometimes profound differences between our two systems, we are committed to joining with you to advance our many parallel strategic and bilateral interests. Thus any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests. He then declared that the objectives of the United States with respect to China were : (1) To build concrete political ties in the context of mutual security; (2) To establish broad cultural relations in a framework of genuine equality; (3) To forge practical economic bonds with the goal of common benefit.

In announcing that U.S. exports would be available, to help with several massive Chinese, hydroelectric and irrigation projects, the Vice-President confirmed the designation of China as a "friendly nation" for purposes of the Foreign

Assistance Act.¹⁵ And he told the Chinese that the United States was prepared to extend up to \$ 2 billion in credits over the coming five years through the U.S. Export - Import Bank.

Another major boost to the Sino - American relationship had been provided by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to Beijing. By the time of Vice-President Mondale's trip to China, most branches of the Chinese and American governments had established normal contacts and relationships. However, there was one notable omission - and that was the Department of Defense. During Mondale's visit, it was agreed in principle that Secretary Brown would make a trip to Beijing, and a tentative schedule had been set for early January 1980.

The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 directly challenged Chinese interest as well as those of the United States and its European and Japanese allies, with the result, that the context and outcome of Secretary Brown's discussions with the Chinese were greatly altered. At his 6 January, 1980 welcoming banquet in Beijing, the Secretary noted that "under these circumstances,

increased cooperation between China and the United States can be an important - and is a needed element in the maintenance of global tranquillity. Improved relations between China and the United States are not directed against any third country, though the actions of others will affect the nature of our relationship ... (our) cooperation ... should remind others that if they threaten the shared interests of the United States and China, we can respond with complementary action in the field of defense as well as diplomacy".¹⁶

Accordingly contacts in the defense field were also established and developed, including the visit to the United States of Chinese Vice-Premier Geng Biao and a high level delegation from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in late May and early June, 1980 and another PLA delegation to study the U.S. Army's logistics management system in September, when Under Secretary of Defense William Perry paid a reciprocal visit to Beijing.

Meanwhile controls on exports of high technology items from the United States to China were significantly liberalized. For the first time, the United States government permitted the sale of such

items to China, specifically for military end - use. Moreover, the United States agreed to consider the commercial sale, on a case-by-case basis, of military support equipment (but not weapons) to the Chinese, subject only to the approval of U.S. allies in the Coordinating Committee or COCOM at Paris. Specifically the Department of State published a list of military support equipment that could be considered for sale to China in its Munition Control Newsletter No. 81.¹⁷ The Department of Commerce also moved China to a new and distinct category of export control, technically known as "Category P", which stipulated that exports of dual-use equipment and technology to China would not be considered a precedent for exports to other controlled destinations such as the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

Related to this was an agreement between the United States and China to conduct a series of regular consultations on developments in Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean area. It was for this purpose that Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wenjin visited the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Area Command (CINC PAC) Honolulu, and Washington with a small delegation in mid-March, 1980. His discussions with senior American officials marked a new stage in

friendly and open consultation on international issues.

These significant developments were made within the first two years of normalization of Sino-American relations.

However, Sino-U.S. relations had a conflictual phase even after normalization especially with regard to the status of Taiwan. This issue is discussed in detail in the following chapter.

NOTES

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2. Department of State Bulletin, Washington D.C., No. 1559, 1969, pp. 397-400, Hereinafter cited as DSB.
3. DSB, No. 1564, 1969, p. 505.
4. DSB, No. 1573, 1969, p. 126.
5. DSB, No. 1578, 1969, p. 260.
6. DSB, No. 1607, 1970, p. 496, No. 1659, 1971, p. 510.
7. New York Times, 7 December, 1969, p. 1.
8. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 709.
9. DSB, No. 1666, 1971, p. 702.
10. New York Times, 21 July, 1971, p. 1.
11. New York Times, 9 June 1977, p.3.
12. Gene T. Hsiao and Michael Witunski, (ed.) Sino-American Normalization and its Policy Implications, (New York, Praeger, 1983), Appendix B, Nos. 2 and 4, pp. 243-246.
13. DSB, No. 2024, 1979, p. 5.
14. Gist, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C., September 1980.
15. There were about 100 federal laws that required amendment in order to make China eligible for U.S. assistance in various fields.
16. Fox Butterfield, "Brown, In Peking, Urges Cooperation to Counter Moscow", in New York Times, 7 January, 1980, p. 1.
17. Gene Hsiao and Michael Witunski, no. 12, Appendix F, No. 2, p. 377.

Chapter II


TAIWAN : A SOURCE OF CONFLICT

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The Taiwan issue was an unexpected by-product of the Second World War and the subsequent victory of the Communist Chinese forces on the mainland of China. The leaders of the anti-fascist alliance had decided that the island of Formosa (Taiwan) would retrocede to the Republic of China at the conclusion of the war. The island had come under imperial Japanese jurisdiction by the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (which concluded the Sino-Japanese War) and remained a Japanese colony until 1945. After the mainland Chinese authorities accepted the Japanese surrender of Taiwan, they immediately began to reconstruct a Chinese administrative apparatus to govern what had once again become a province of China.¹

Between 1945 and 1949, civil war ravaged the Chinese mainland. In early 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had decided to make the island of Taiwan a place for the ultimate defense of the Republic of China. The remnants of the national government and the Nationalist armed forces were transported across the 100 miles of the Taiwan Strait, and the "temporary capital" of the Republic of China was established at Taipei. Communist Chinese armies began to mass along the shoreline of Fujian Province, across from Taiwan,

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in preparation for an amphibious assault on the last stronghold of the defeated Nationalist forces. An invasion of Taiwan by the forces of Mao-Zedong seemed imminent.

Authorities in Washington advised U.S. foreign posts to prepare for the final extinction of the Nationalist Republic of China. However, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, which signalled the outbreak of the Korean War, dramatically changed the situation in East Asia. The United States immediately responded to what it took to be an act of aggression orchestrated and directed by the Soviet Union. The United States prepared to intervene in the conflict on the Korean peninsula and received the support of the United Nations. "Volunteers" from the PRC engaged the U.N. Forces and the United States and its allies found themselves in armed conflict with the newly established communist Chinese regime on the mainland. The island of Taiwan suddenly assumed strategic and logistical importance; it had become a critical link in the anticommunist chain of defense that stretched from the northern Japanese islands to the Phillipines.

By the end of the Korean War, U.S. defense policy required a string of bases strategically located on the periphery of mainland China. Consequently, mutual defense treaties were signed between the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

An important component of the United States "anticommunist containment policy" then, was the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan. That treaty, the U.S. refusal to recognize the communist regime in Beijing, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taipei would determine the pattern of Sino - U.S. relations for the next 25 years.

With the deployment of U.S. naval forces in the Taiwan Strait following the outbreak of the Korean War, the issue of Taiwan's international status became one of Beijing's primary concerns. In 1943, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party began to refer to Taiwan not as a potentially independent national state but as part of sovereign Chinese territory. In 1949, Beijing insisted that its sovereignty over the island had been established by right of succession. The PRC considered the communist

government, the successor of the defeated Nationalist government. In effect, after 1943, and particularly after 1949, the authorities in Beijing based their claim to Taiwan on the Nationalist Policy of full integration of Taiwan into the unified Chinese nation.² They considered their failure to gain control over the island, as well as the Pescadores (P'eng-hu) and the offshore islands (Kinmen and Matsu), the consequence of U.S. "imperialist" intervention - the effort by Washington to make of Taiwan a capitalist "colony". After 1955, Beijing characterized Taiwan as an alienated portion of Communist China "illegally occupied by American imperialist forces".

It has been pointed out that, historically, Taiwan has been a part of Chinese territory which was taken by Japan as booty after China's defeat in 1895.³ The United States, since 1949, has consistently denied, challenged, and frustrated the Chinese claim to the island. While the real cause, of this US policy is deeply rooted in its opposition to Chinese Communism, a pretext had been found in the lack of a formal confirmation of China's sovereignty over Taiwan in the peace settlement with Japan. Preceding from this argument, the United States has claimed that it has a

moral and legal obligation to protect Taiwan against the use or threat of force by the People's Republic.

These conflicting claims over Taiwan have made the dispute between China and the United States a serious one : they blocked the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States for more than 25 years and almost caused a major war involving the threat of nuclear weapons being used by the United States against the mainland of China in the 1950s. Even though rapprochement was achieved by the Carter Administration, the tenuous Sino-American relations resulting from enormous cultural and ethnic differences, profound ideological conflict, memories of the Korean War, vast economic and military disparity, and other factors, the Taiwan question remains a potential area of a major diplomatic, if not military, conflict in the future.

When the first moves towards rapprochement between Washington and Beijing were initiated in 1971, the Communist Chinese authorities dropped their contention that Taiwan was "occupied" and that its reversion to the PRC had been prevented by US imperialism. After the issuance of the Joint

Communique' in 1972, Beijing simply insisted that the "government of the People's Republic of China" was the "sole legal government of China" and that Taiwan was "a province of China". The authorities in Beijing further insisted that they would "firmly oppose" any effort to create "one China one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "Two Chinas", or an "independent Taiwan". Finally Beijing objected to any suggestion that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

Normalization which was achieved by President Carter resulted in the diplomatic recognition between the two countries, which officially began on January 1, 1979, as laid down in the Joint Communique' of December 15, 1978. Under the terms of the Joint Communique' both the United States and China agreed that Taiwan was a province of China and that reunification was a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide. At this juncture, probably the least likely conflict between China and the United States, but one that could have the most deleterious impact on their relationship was an attempt by China to resolve the Taiwan reunification question by force. Therefore, to allay domestic political concerns, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)⁴ in March 1979

which was designed to maintain informal ties with the people of Taiwan and ensure their security. This legislation stipulated that it was the policy of the United States that : (1) "normalization rests upon the expectations that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means"; (2) "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes" would be regarded as a "threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States"; (3) Taiwan would be provided with "arms of a defensive character" as determined by the president and the Congress after a review by US military authorities; and (4) the United States would "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan".

The first public protest by the Chinese, of the TRA came about on 26 March, 1979, at a meeting between Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Ambassador Woodcock in Beijing, during which Huang criticized the TRA as a disguised extension of the US mutual defense treaty with the Kuomintang (KMT) of Taiwan, an interference in China's internal affairs, and an

attempt to provide Taiwan with official status in future relations with the United States. Huang also cautioned that if this legislative act was signed into law, then, "great harm will be done to the new relationship that has just been established between China and the United States". After Carter had however signed the bill into law on April 10, 1979,⁵ Deng Xiaoping seized the opportunity during the interview with a visiting delegation of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to warn the US government that the passage of the law had come close to "nullifying" the normalization of relations, and promised to carefully watch American actions on Taiwan. Meanwhile, he revealed some interesting thoughts regarding the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations. First he said, the United States should not be concerned about a Chinese attack on Taiwan because Beijing would not have the military capability to do it before 1985. Second, he repeated an earlier promise to Carter that China would not use force against Taiwan unless the Taiwan authorities refused to enter into negotiations with Beijing indefinitely or the Soviet Union became involved in the Taiwan question. Third, he implied it had been his hope that through normalization the US government would encourage Taiwan to open talks with the Chinese

government, but the defense related provisions of the TRA had adversely affected the whole issue, making Taiwan more adamant. Fourth, he hinted at China's interest in buying American weapons if the ban were lifted. Finally, in reply to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.'s question whether Beijing would allow the United States to install electronic intelligence equipment in China to monitor Soviet military activities in Siberia and Central Asia, Deng said that the Chinese government would cooperate and share the resulting intelligence with the United States provided China's sovereignty was not impaired.⁶

Following Deng's interview, the Chinese government lodged a formal protest with Washington on 28 April, emphasizing its unyielding objection to the "two-China" policy. Otherwise, the Chinese still held out high hopes for the development of relations by accepting the Carter Administration's assurances that the United States "is totally committed to the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations with China."⁷

Traces of Chinese discontent over the United States' policy on Taiwan go as far back as the TRA.

However, it was not until about three years after diplomatic rapprochement with the People's Republic, that the Taiwan question re-emerged as a major crisis that threatened to nip this relationship in the bud. The crisis was triggered by the inauguration in Washington, of "conservative" Ronald Reagan as the new president of the United States. In a series of speeches and actions before and after the 1980 election, Reagan vowed to improve relations with the KMT, an old ally of the United States through the full implementation of the Carter - initiated TRA, including the continued sale of updated US weapons to Taiwan, despite the fact that the United States had derecognized the KMT as the de jure government of China and that the defense-related provisions of the TRA are in serious conflict with the Joint Communiqué' of December 15, 1978.

After Reagan's election, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang sent him a telegram which expressed the hope that "the existing good relations of cooperation between China and the United States will continue to move forward on the basis of the principles of the Joint Communiqués".⁸ A similar message was delivered to the president-elect on the eve of his

inauguration. But contrary to Chinese expectations, Reagan struck a rather ominous note with regard to his view of the Beijing government. Responding to a question whether his administration would sell arms to China, he said :

"This is a subject that would take a great deal of study. I would like to envision a China that could eventually be a legitimate ally of the free world. I think there has to be a certain degree of caution, remembering that this is a country whose government subscribes to an ideology based on a belief in destroying governments like ours. I will meet them with an open mind and in an honest attempt to improve friendly relations, but I am also going to keep in mind that I do not want to go so fast that some day the weapons we might have provided will be shooting at us."⁹

Thus, even before his inauguration, a significant degree of distrust between Reagan and the Chinese leaders could already be detected. Meanwhile, in defiance of all diplomatic protocol, Reagan invited a number of Taiwan officials to attend the ceremony of his inauguration. No sooner had that diplomatic

incident receded into the background of the ceremony than the KMT submitted a list of requests to the White House for the improvement of relations. These requests included : the purchase of updated weapons, including the so-called FX fighter planes, the Harpoon ship-to-ship missile system, and anti-submarine helicopters;¹⁰ direct access to US officials, particularly Department of State officials; and an increase in the number of Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) offices in the United States from 9 to 14, the latter being the number of consulates - general maintained by the KMT in the United States before derecognition.¹¹

Seizing the occasion of a sale of two submarines by the Dutch firm to Taiwan, a move approved by the Dutch government on 29 November, 1980, the Chinese government protested on 19 January - the day before Reagon's inauguration - that the Dutch government had violated the joint communique of 1972 which promised that the two parties would mutually respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, and that the Dutch government would respect the Chinese position that Taiwan is a province

of the People's Republic. The Chinese further noted that the act of the Dutch government had not only seriously infringed upon China's sovereignty and interfered with the "cause of peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland of China" but also had done harm to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States was informed of the Dutch deal with Taiwan in advance, and it was certainly meant to be a Chinese message to the Americans about the possible consequences of arms sales to the KMT.

However, the Republican Administration seemed determined to carry out President Reagan's campaign pledges.

Before secretary of State, Alexander Haig, Jr. made his visit to China, it was already known that one of his missions there was to offer arms to the Chinese government as a means of strengthening a common anti-Soviet front and inducing the Chinese to accept the sale of new weapons to Taiwan.¹² The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this by issuing a statement saying that China would rather forego the privilege of purchasing American weapons than accept "continued US interference in our internal

affairs". Otherwise the foreign ministry warned that China "certainly will give a strong response".¹³ The Chinese government further raised the question as to what had motivated the United States to enhance Taiwan's defense capabilities, when tension no longer existed in the Taiwan Strait, as a result of China's policy to reunite Taiwan by peaceful means after rapprochement with the United States.

This reaction by the Chinese undoubtedly overshadowed Haig's announcement in Beijing on 16 June, 1981 that the United States would henceforth, sell weapons to China on a case-by-case basis.¹⁴ In addition, Haig announced that bilateral relations with China would be carried out in accordance with the Joint Communiqué' while relations with Taiwan would be unofficial; President Reagan intended to treat China as a "friend", though not as an ally, with common interests. Later, however, Haig's claim that his mission was among the 'most productive', was marred by two related incidents.

While Haig was visiting Beijing with his expressions of the administration's goodwill, Reagan's daughter, Maureen, had arrived in Taipei on a "personal

tour". Then barely hours before, Haig's departure from Beijing on June 17, President Reagan said in Washington:

"I have not changed my feeling about Taiwan. We have an act, a law called the Taiwan Relations Act that provides for defense equipment being sold to Taiwan. I intend to live up to the Taiwan Relations Act."¹⁵

The legal and political implications of this and other American moves became so serious, that the Chinese government declared in July that China might be forced to resort to "unpeaceful methods" to reunify Taiwan with the mainland if the defense related provisions of the TRA were to be fully implemented by the US government.¹⁶

Then there came the Cancun summit in Mexico where President Reagan met with Premier Zhao Ziyang to discuss issues of mutual concern, notably the arms sale question. But no significant progress was made. This was followed by another meeting between President Reagan and Foreign Minister Huang Hua on October 29, 1981.¹⁹ At this meeting, Reagan rejected the Chinese

request for postponement of the proposed arms sales to Taiwan, by saying that it was a matter for the United States to decide. In reply, Huang threatened to downgrade diplomatic relations; Haig intercepted by stating that the United States would reciprocate in kind. Upset, Huang walked out of the conference room.

It was after the failure of the two top-level meetings with President Reagan on the aspect of the US rejection of China's right to be consulted in arms sales decisions, and the increased possibility of revival of the two - China policy under Reagan - that the Chinese leadership decided to use the arms issue as a conveniently justifiable cause to prepare for a final settlement of the entire question of Taiwan with the United States.

On 7 January, 1982, President Reagan approved a mission, headed by John H. Holdridge, assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, to Beijing, in accordance with a memorandum signed by Secretary of State Haig, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and CIA Director William Casey, with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Jones. The document ascertained that Taiwan's defence needs then,

could be adequately served by additional sales of F-5E fighter jets which the KMT had co-produced with the American manufacturers, Northrop Corporation, since the 1970s, rather than the new, more powerful F-5Gs sought by the KMT. To placate the pro-KMT elements in the United States, however, the memo also suggested selling Harpoon missiles and rescue helicopters to Taiwan. The basic purpose of the Holdridge mission was to explain this policy recommendation to the Chinese government.¹⁸

However, no sooner had the Holdridge mission begun to discuss the matter with the Chinese on January 10, than the White House announced through the Department of State (11 January). Reagan's approval of the recommendation mentioned above.

The Chinese viewed the presidential action as insult added to injury - something that was "too oppressive" to accept. The Chinese foreign office now lodged a strong protest against the Reagan decision on 12 January, contending that the whole question of arms sales to Taiwan is a major issue affecting China's sovereignty" and hence must be settled through discussions between the two sides; the Chinese Government would not accept any unilateral decision by

the US government. This was followed by an open warning from Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping who declared that continued arms sales to Taiwan would "encounter a sharp Chinese reaction".¹⁹

This unexpected escalation of the arms sale dispute enhanced the possibility of a real diplomatic downgrading on the one hand, and the sharpening of mutual criticism on the other. As a precaution, concerned government agencies in America, were instructed to prepare for the consequences that would arise from the lowering of Chinese diplomatic representation in Washington in December 1981, and postponed the establishment of a consulate-general in Chicago. Meanwhile, in response to the revival of Mac Arthur's old statement that "Taiwan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier",²⁰ the Chinese angrily denounced it as an attempt to perpetuate the two-China policy, and to appose the Chinese in strategic terms since the defense of Taiwan is clearly aimed at the China mainland.

Accordingly, the Chinese cancelled all public celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the Shanghai Communique' and urged the nation to prepare for bad

times ahead as China had been pushed to a position where there was no more space for manoeuvring. The Chinese authorities also contended that the real motive of the United States in continuing military supplies to the KMT was not solely derived from its investment and other business interests that it might have in Taiwan, or from its long historical relationship and special affection for Taiwan, but, more importantly, from an ambition to counter-balance the China mainland through permanent control of the island.

Sino - US relations were reaching a very low ebb, and to reverse such a trend the United States began to make attempts at bringing about a reconciliation between the two nations. Secretary Haig called in Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin on 5 April, 1982,²¹ and two personal letters from President Reagan to top Chinese leaders were transmitted. In his message to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, the president made several significant points : (1) he emphasized the growing threat from the Soviet Union and its satellite countries and then identified Afghanistan, Iran, Southeast Asia, the Western hemisphere and nuclear weaponry as the areas in which both countries have a

common interest; (2) he reassured the Chinese that the United States "adheres to the positions" agreed upon in the Joint Communiqué, namely "there is only one China", and that the United States "will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this [one - China] principle"; (3) he reiterated that "the United States has an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question", and (4) he expressed his appreciation of the Nine-point Peace Proposal put forward by the Chinese to the KMT, and wished to create "a cooperation and enduring bilateral and strategic relationship" between the two countries through the resolution of their differences over the Taiwan question²². Finally he suggested that Vice President Bush be invited to visit Beijing. In his letter to Premier Zhao Ziyang²², President Reagan added that "the differences between us are rooted in the longstanding friendship [that exists] between the American people and the Chinese people who live on Taiwan. Repeating his support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, the president stressed that "in the context of progress toward a peaceful solution, there would naturally be a decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan".

When Vice President Bush finally visited China after an invitation by the latter, he issued a statement which reaffirmed "the United States' position recognizing only one China" and that the Reagan Administration "considers China an equal partner in world affairs".

As the pace of negotiations for a settlement of the arms issue was stepped up in Beijing following the Bush mission, "conservative" individuals and organizations also exerted additional pressure on the White House not to change its stand towards Taiwan and to ensure that the KMT would get what it wanted. 41 US Senators urged President Reagan to sell F-5E fighter planes immediately to Taiwan. All these movements were interpreted by Beijing as "an anti-China current" for the purpose of undercutting US-China relations.

These and other intensified criticisms, notwithstanding common strategic interests between China and the United States demanded a solution to the arms sales issue. This led to the issuance of the 17 August 1982, joint communique'. The communique' was a somewhat rushed compromise that did not really settle the arms sales issue. But time was running out and

Reagan had to inform Congress on his decision to continue co-production of the F-5E fighter in Taiwan. The Chinese meanwhile continued to reaffirm their policy of seeking peaceful reunification of Taiwan. The United States, abiding by the joint communique' disavowed any intention to infringe on Chinese sovereignty or to pursue a "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan" policy. The United States also said it did not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that such sales would not exceed in quality or quantity the levels supplied since 1978. In deliberately ambiguous language, the communique' also stated that the US "intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution".

Objections to the 1982 communique' were subdued by the fact that it was formulated at a time when the Chinese also needed limited quantities of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as early warning radar devices and other defensive weapons from the United States. Negotiations were therefore underway between China and the US for sale of American weapons and other defense related items. As a result,

the issue of arms sales to Taiwan began to recede to the background for the time being.

This brief lull in the Sino-US conflict over Taiwan however was shortlived, when the Chinese learned in 1985, that the United States had begun to license exports of sophisticated technology for the manufacture of weaponry by Taiwan.²⁴ This technology was much more advanced than Taiwan's existing military hardware. Beijing dismissed American arguments that the 1982 communique did not cover transfer of technology. The Chinese pointed out that even though technology transfers are not mentioned directly, they are clearly covered in the reference to 'qualitative' increase. They further argued that arms sales and transfer of technology for the manufacture of armaments are one and the same thing. This Chinese protest however, proved to be only a rhetorical exercise that did not have any apparent effect on the existing Sino-US relationship pattern.

What was really significant now, were the changes within Taiwan itself, that had become manifest as early as 1986, when Taiwan announced to the world that it would be holding the first ever election in its history.

Thus during the second term of the Reagan Administration, significant development within Taiwan gave the Taiwan - China relationship a new dimension. The democratic process in Taiwan was highlighted by the lifting of martial law, restoration of civil and human rights, and formation of opposition parties. Simultaneously, Taiwan began to lift its restrictions that had earlier prevented its citizens from having any interaction with the Chinese mainland. Taiwan's "opening" to the mainland put Beijing in a dilemma, for along with it there began a spate of "reunification" sentiments among the Taiwanese. In connection with this, it had been reported that the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had been showing increasing impatience for the earlier lack of enthusiasm for reunification on the part of Taipei.²⁵ The same report quoted Foreign Minister Huang Hua as saying that the "Taiwan question [entails] a [PRC] struggle with America". The implication is that the United States is seen as an obstacle to Beijing's reunification with Taiwan. It follows therefore, according to the Chinese, that only if the United States removed itself as an obstacle, will a solution be possible.

It has been pointed out that Huang Hua's remark points to a possible role for the United States in regard to Chinese reunification.²⁶ If Huang Hua was indeed hinting at a US role, that idea was certainly not in accord with the policy of the Reagan Administration.

Since 1979, US policy toward the reunification issue has maintained that it is a matter the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must work out by themselves. The Americans are concerned only that it be solved by peaceful means. Though the Reagan Administration made a review of its China policy, when signs of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement began to surface in 1986,²⁷ after careful consideration the administration did not change its existing policy toward Chinese reunification. Thus the Reagan Administration until 1988 was careful not to get involved in any respect of playing a role that would lead to the unification of Taiwan. It also disassociated from promoting any unification attempts between the two. Overall, the U.S. policy was guided by the consideration that the democratization process in Taiwan and mainland China should resolve the

unification question. Certainly the United States hoped that the democratization process would take place in the PRC. Until such a time, the United States was not prepared to coerce Taiwan into unification. On the other hand, the PRC hoped that the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC should lead the United States not only to give up support of Taiwan, but also to pressurize Taiwan to a unification process with the PRC. As this role was not forthcoming from the United States, Sino-U.S. relations had this irritant and built-in conflict in their relationship, as far as Taiwan was concerned.

Notes

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Chapter III

KAMPUCHEA : DERIVATION OF COMPATIBLE RELATIONS

Sino-U.S. relations with regard to Kampuchea are marked by compatibility arising from a parallel Sino-American interest of containing Vietnam with an object to containing the Soviet influence in East Asia which includes Indochina.

By 1978, the cold war between China and the Soviet Union was reaching the edge of a precipice. There were tensions too in Indochina. These tensions which had a long history, have stemmed from regional and cultural differences between Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. These tensions had remained dormant for a long time, but when Hanoi ousted the United States in 1975 following a decade of war with Vietnam, there emerged a revival of the old dream of an Indochina federation, consisting of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. Because of its large size and military strength, Vietnam which had the support of the Soviet Union, was sure to dominate such a federation.

The Chinese watched the growing tensions in Indochina with increasing concern. Because of growing Sino-soviet conflict and closer Vietnam-Soviet relations, the Chinese perceived that Vietnam had become the "agent" of Soviet "world hegemony" in

Southeast Asia. The PRC also feared that Vietnam had developed its own regional hegemonic designs as well as becoming an "Asian Cuba"¹ for Russian expansionism.

By the middle of 1968, there was growing evidence that the Sino-Soviet global struggle was going to erupt into an open war in Indochina. However, the war was not going to be fought directly by China and the Soviet Union, but by their client states, Vietnam and Kampuchea. In January 1978, national security adviser to the Carter Administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, predicted that "the Soviet Union and China may be engaged in a new Indochina conflict by proxy".² Meanwhile U.S. intelligence reports at the time also revealed strong evidence that Vietnam, with strong support from the Soviets, was preparing to attack Kampuchea, China's only ally in Indochina.

Vietnam commenced military operations against Kampuchea on 25 December, 1978. The Vietnamese reached Phnom Penh, the capital city of Kampuchea after a two-week blitz against the Kampucheans. Once there, they ousted the Pol Pot³ regime that was supported by China. In its place, the Vietnamese installed a new government under the prime ministership of Hun Sen. The defeat of

Kampuchea by Vietnam signified a victory for the Soviet Union and of course, a humiliation and setback for China which had only a month earlier (15 December 1978) established full diplomatic relations with the United States.

China now faced a challenge and a dilemma. It could not afford to remain a passive spectator of the overthrow of its ally in Indochina, but any military action against Vietnam could lead to a direct confrontation with Moscow. China was therefore faced with two unacceptable alternatives: to lose its prestige in Asia or prepare for a direct and disastrous confrontation with Moscow. During his visit to the United States in January and early February of 1979,⁴ Deng Xiaoping in his exclusive talks with President Carter, made it clear that China would have to take some military measure against Vietnam. The U.S. government expressed concern about the proposed action, which Beijing called a "punitive measure" against Hanoi. Washington feared a direct Sino-Soviet armed conflict was bound to have grave global consequences.

However, according to a U.S. intelligence source, as many as 150,000 to 170,000 Chinese troops

massed along the Sino-Vietnamese border.⁵ China charged that Vietnam had violated its borders, thereby endangering the peace of China; Vietnam then countered with a complaint of naked aggression by a big power.⁶ Finally the Chinese military action began on 17 February, 1979 and continued for seventeen days until China announced the withdrawal of its troops on 5 March, 1979. China had expected an easy and quick victory, but the victory was neither very easy nor very successful. However, it did save China's image as a major power in Asia.

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Chinese attack on Vietnam, and the normalization of relations between China and the United States, brought about a new quest for cooperation between China and the United States. The Chinese seemed to be convinced that the Soviet Union's backing of Vietnam's conquest of Kampuchea, and also its direct aggression of Afghanistan were parts of a Soviet global strategy to dominate Asia and the rest of the world. The Chinese have called upon the non-communist Asian countries, the United States, Japan, and NATO and the ANZUS countries to unite "to contain the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Cambodia and not allow it to advance further".⁷ The

Reagan Administration's tough policy toward the Soviet Union and the Chinese desire to contain the Soviet Union's expansionist designs have provided a new impetus for improvement of Sino-American relations, which includes military ties between Washington and Beijing.

Because of the two countries' common though not identical, views about the Soviet Union's global policy and designs, an announcement was made on 13 May, 1981, that Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, would visit China in June. It was stated by the U.S. Department of State that Haig's talks with the Chinese would cover the two countries' views of the world, in particular their concerns about the Soviet Union. Specific topics were to include the future security ties between the two countries, U.S. military sales to Taiwan, and possible support for anti-Vietnamese Kampuchians.⁸

The Reagan Administration was now moving toward decisions that were giving more of a "military cast" to Sino-American relations. On 4 June, 1981 the U.S. National Security Council met to consider removing "China from the list of communist countries subject to special export controls,"⁹ which would allow transfer

of military technology, such as engine and electrical equipment used in the new F-16 fighter plane, and the sale of TOW antitank missiles. The issue before the Reagan Administration was whether China would be treated in the same category as the Soviet Union, meaning restrictions on the export of materials which had potential military applications; whether the PRC would be put in the same special category as Yugoslavia, in which exemptions can be made for items of a military use; or whether it would be placed in the same general category as Britain and India, with virtually no restrictions.

There was total agreement in the administration that China should not be treated in the same way as the Soviet Union. It was agreed too that China should not be treated like an unfriendly state like Russia when the United States was prepared in principle, to sell almost any material to a State like India, which buys arms from, and has a friendship treaty as well, with the Soviet Union. There was a consensus among many in the Reagan Administration that the United States should try to find ways of strengthening a common anti-Soviet front in cooperation with the PRC.

The 1979 Chinese war with Vietnam, which has been described as a "Chinese lesson" for Vietnam, proved to be a lesson for the Chinese leaders in regard to China's military capabilities. They came to realize that the Chinese military machinery was needing a major overhaul if China was to engage directly or indirectly, in any military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Thus, the issue of military ties with the West, including, of course, the United States, acquired added urgency and significance.

Similarly, some people in the Reagan Administration, including Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Haig, had concurred that military links with the PRC could have a great significance for the United State's tough policy toward the Soviet Union. Haig's visit to the PRC occurred under highly favourable circumstances for initiating such links.

On 16 June, 1981, Haig announced, after wide ranging talks with top Chinese leaders, that the United States had agreed, for the first time, to supply arms to the PRC.¹⁰ Haig added that the Chinese arms requests

would be considered on a "case by case basis" after consultation with the U.S. Congress and U.S. allies.¹¹

The U.S. arms sales decision considered in the context of what Chinese and U.S. officials described as "growing coordination and cooperation against the Soviet Union", was bound to provoke a strong reaction from Moscow. Time magazine reported that Moscow criticized Haig's trip to China as being "all part of a campaign of blackmail against the Soviet Union."¹²

It was obvious, that Haig's main objective had been to strike a "strategic consensus" with the Chinese in order "to limit the Soviet Union's opportunities for exploiting its military power."¹³ A notable feature of the Haig visit to China was the U.S. decision to denounce what the Chinese called, the Soviet Union's hegemonic policies and actions. Haig said that the strategic realities governing the Sino-American cooperation were "more pressing than ever" and that China and the United States now saw "eye to eye" on the need to expel foreign occupation forces from places like Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

Despite the speed with which the People's Army of Vietnam (PAV) dislodged the Pol Pot regime and overran Kampuchea in January 1979, substantial Khmer Rouge forces escaped to reassemble in mountainous areas of the Thai-Kampuchean border. Later, as large numbers of Khmer fleeing warfare and famine massed in the border area, two non-communist resistance groups also established themselves there, Prince Sihanouk's Moulinaka and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), led by the venerable statesman and former prime minister, Son Sann. In 1982, despite strong mutual antagonisms, the three factions, with important assistance from ASEAN, established the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with Prince Sihanouk as president, the Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan as vice president, and Son Sann as prime minister.

Each of the resistance factions maintained its own armed forces. All three are well armed: the Khmer Rouge are supported by the Chinese; the non-communist forces receive some Chinese arms as well as officially unacknowledged arms from ASEAN sources.¹⁴

Although the military strength of the resistance is not adequate to drive the Vietnamese from Kampuchea, it has imposed substantial requirements on the Vietnamese for military counteraction. Moreover its presence and activities in Kampuchea were a political burden for the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Further the resistance nullified the PRK claims that the Heng Samrin regime enjoyed popular support, thereby making evident its dependence on Vietnamese arms. Equally, the coalition enjoyed a political asset in its command of a substantial armed force operating on Kampuchean soil. The internationally accepted CGDK, whose right to the Kampuchean seat in the U.N. General Assembly had been consistently supported by a large majority, now blocks Hanoi's objectives for the PRK, and has constituted a valuable bargaining chip at the U.N.

Since 1979, Kampuchea's future has been the subject of almost continuous dialogue between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam. ASEAN which is fortified by the support of China, the United States and Japan, as well as much of the West and the Third World, has been continually putting pressure on Hanoi to move forward to a negotiated political solution of the Kampuchean

problem. ASEAN has persisted in demanding the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the establishment under international supervision of an independent neutral and representative government in Phnom Penh.

Kampuchea's invasion by Vietnam and the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, brought about a China-U.S.-ASEAN alliance directed against Vietnam and its Soviet mentor. The Reagan Administration coordinated its UN diplomacy against Kampuchea with the PRC and ASEAN. It was the ASEAN states that had laid the groundwork for a settlement of the Kampuchean problem by mobilizing international opinion against Vietnam (which has accounted, in part, for Vietnam's economic distress), and by motivating the Kampuchean resistance forces to work together against the Vietnamese occupation. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea resulted in its direct involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus another major actor was required to help Vietnam extricate itself from this conflict. The U.S. alone had the credentials to play this role. However, despite its alliance with the ASEAN states and China, the United States had been playing only a distant and indirect role in the Kampuchean conflict.

The ASEAN countries have the fastest growing economies of the Third World and, combined together form the fifth largest trading partner of the U.S. The foreign ministers of the U.S., Japan, the European Community, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, participate annually in the meetings of the ASEAN foreign ministers, a testimony of the growing significance of ASEAN. The U.S. enjoys close economic and political ties with each of the ASEAN states and has a treaty relationship with two of them, namely, Thailand and the Phillipines.

As vital trade and strategic routes pass through the ASEAN region, the United States has shown continued interest in the political stability and economic growth of the region. The U.S. government in this regard, has maintained an active interest in the Kampuchean issue, which was perceived as the biggest single threat to ASEAN security. The U.S. had several times reaffirmed its security commitment to Thailand, ASEAN's frontline state and had promptly airlifted military equipment in response to Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory.

Though the U.S. government has been obliged to take into consideration its global interests, which include its relations with China and the Soviet Union, regarding the Kampuchean issue, it has chosen to play only an indirect role in the matter, by aligning itself with ASEAN. The United States followed ASEAN's lead which had been able to use the United Nations to increase pressure on Hanoi to withdraw. U.N. resolutions with regard to Kampuchea from 1979 onwards, have been calling on Vietnam to quit Kampuchea, and also urging the convocation of an international conference to debate the country's future.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam's (SRV) riposte had been to seek for the creation of a demilitarized zone covering the Thai-Kampuchea borders, thus creating a no-man's land between the two states and forcing the Khmer Rouge which operates from the border, further into Thai territory. Thailand has objected to this concept as a device for falsely attributing regional instability to hostilities between Thailand and Kampuchea, thus exonerating Hanoi from any responsibility and leading simultaneously to the indirect recognition of Vietnam's Kampuchean client, the PRK. Hanoi remained adamant through 1981, rejecting

all demands for a withdrawal of its forces from Kampuchea so long as Thailand provided sanctuary to the resistance. However, Vietnam began to moderate its position as early as the summer of 1982, stating a willingness to withdraw its troops from the Kampuchean-Thai border region if Thailand agreed to a new status for the region as a demilitarized zone. Moreover, Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach asserted for the first time that Hanoi would agree to a total withdrawal from Kampuchea if China stopped supporting the Khmer Rouge, lifted its threat to Vietnam's northern border and signed a non-aggression pact with Vietnam.¹⁵

China which had long had border disputes with Vietnam had been stressing that to settle the dispute in a manner acceptable to the Chinese, the Vietnamese would have to withdraw their forces from Kampuchea. Moreover China has been sustaining the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge along Kampuchea's Thai border. The Khmer Rouge insurgents obtained supplies both overland through Thailand and by small boats from China. It is in Beijing's interest to sustain Khmer insurgency as long as possible for it had tied down a large chunk of the Vietnamese troops far from China and, more

importantly, because it continues to demonstrate Vietnam's imperialism to ASEAN and the United States. Beijing has also insisted that only by forcing Vietnam more and more to the Soviet embrace will Vietnam's leaders realize the Soviets are using Vietnam for their own strategic purposes against the United States and China, through their use of the Cam Ranh Bay and Danang base facilities extended by Vietnam. Beijing had upheld its stance on Kampuchea by stating that "China seeks no self interest on the question of Kampuchea. China is willing to refrain from any form of interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, to respect the independence, neutrality and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, and to respect the result of the Kampuchea people's choice made through a genuinely free-election to be held under UN supervision."¹⁶

In the mid-1980s, despite differences of approach among its members, ASEAN had persisted in its demands for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the establishment of an elected, neutral and independent government. ASEAN's actions have continued to be governed by a continuing consensus that Vietnamese military control of Kampuchea is a threat to Thailand and that legitimation of Vietnamese aggression

would threaten ASEAN's standing and objectives as well as the security of individual ASEAN members.

The great powers have counted the cost of supporting one side or the other as appreciably less than the benefits. Beijing is unperturbed by the necessity of maintaining a large military force on its border with a hostile Vietnam. Although China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 did not succeed in causing Hanoi to withdraw from Kampuchea, Beijing still seems confident that over the long run it could block Hanoi's ambitions in the region. Beijing has also been confident that, in due course, Vietnam would find its dependence on the Soviet Union intolerable and move to improve Sino-Vietnamese relations. Meanwhile, Vietnam has remained bogged down in Kampuchea while China continues to improve its standing with Thailand and the other ASEAN countries.

The Soviet Union while it found Vietnam a demanding and expensive ally, valued the rewards for its support of Vietnam - which is access to Cam Ranh Bay and other Vietnamese facilities for its naval vessels, military aircraft and intelligence collection activities - as they contributed for the expansion of

its Pacific military power. The United States, by limiting its role in the conflict to faithful support of ASEAN's stance had limited its leverage. But, however, public controversy has been minimized, while American support for ASEAN has contributed to the organization's strength and prestige. Moreover, U.S. relations with the ASEAN group of countries which were having increasing political, economic and strategic importance in the region, had greatly improved.

The semiannual meeting of Indochinese foreign ministers, which had frequently been a source of new proposals on Kampuchea, produced no new results when it convened for the tenth time in January 1985. Its communique was, however, notable for what had seemed to be gestures toward the United States, which "should assume a responsible role in contributing to long-term peace and stability in Southeast Asia."¹⁷ The ASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting in February 1985 similarly produced no settlement-related proposals, although it did, for the first time, call for increased support and assistance for the Khmer resistance. The appeal was formally addressed to the international community but was understood to be directed toward the United States.

ASEAN has had cause to be reasonably satisfied with the low-key, but supportive American role in the Kampuchean conflict. American initiatives have been confined to the massive refugee and border relief problems generated by Vietnam's behaviour in Kampuchea; U.S. programmes and the American role in mobilizing the international community have relieved ASEAN of that burden. While doubts remain regarding what action the United States might take to fulfil its security commitment to Thailand in the event of a major threat, increased American military assistance to Thailand had thus far been adequate to the requirements of the situation. Although there had been no reason for ASEAN to relinquish its leadership role to the United States, ASEAN has pressured for a high American posture toward the Kampuchean issue. This reflects ASEAN's belief that settlement prospects of the Kampuchean problem might be improved should the United States more actively press Moscow and Beijing to modify their positions, as well as an ASEAN desire to balance the Chinese role.

Pressures on the United States to supplement with military assistance the humanitarian aid it has provided under international auspices to the Sihanouk

and Son Sann factions originated primarily in Singapore. Actual requirements for military equipment were not the motivating force. Rather, it was hoped that so tangible a sign of American support would both heighten the morale of the non-communist forces and strengthen them against the Khmer Rouge, balancing Beijing's patronage to the latter. Other ASEAN countries, notably Indonesia, however, had reservations about the wisdom of this course, and when the formal ASEAN appeal was made in February 1985, it was addressed to the international community and did not specify arms aid.

The appeal was understood to be clearly addressed to the United States for it was quickly recognized as such by the Chairman of the Asian and Pacific Sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman Stephen Solarz, whose efforts resulted in committee authorization of \$ 5 million in "appropriate aid" which was understood to include military assistance.¹⁸ Moreover, the Reagan Administration was known to have taken a more active role in Kampuchea politics than its predecessor administration. Reagan had sent more than \$ 3 million a year in overt non-lethal aid to Sihanouk and Son Sann

in his second term. The State Department had long persisted in its long-standing opposition to military assistance. This was evident in the remarks made by Secretary of State George Shultz at a news conference in Kuala Lumpur. The United States, he said, saw no special need for American military assistance to the resistance, finding a better role in providing food, clothing, medicine and other supplies which "people need as much as they need guns". However, despite these remarks, rumours of covert military aid, which had existed for a long time, were confirmed when in 1988, Sihanouk himself claimed that he was receiving \$ 35 million a year from the C.I.A.¹⁹

In the mid-1980s as in previous years, events which had seemed to portend the possibility of some substantial change in the Kampuchean situation in the end, left it very little affected. Even the years 1986 and 1987 left no indication that any of the actors in the Indochina drama would find any practicable solution to the Kampuchean status quo. The debate over a solution has continued with nothing but stalemate as the end result. However, due to persistent ASEAN initiated pressure with the backing of china, the U.S. and other western countries, Vietnam announced in May

1988, that it was withdrawing 50,000 troops from Kampuchea by the end of 1988. The announcement specified that this phased withdrawal of troops would begin in June, and that observers would be invited to watch the withdrawal.²⁰ The announcement of the withdrawal has indicated Vietnam's adherence to the August 1985 communique issued at the end of the Indochinese foreign ministers meeting. According to the August 1985 communique, Vietnam pledged the total pullout of its troops by 1990 which would be conducted in "yearly gradual withdrawals".²¹

The Kampuchean strife was not merely a conflict between freedom fighters and Communists or of the Kampucheans and the Vietnamese occupiers. The truth is more complicated for there are Communists involved on both sides. The Vietnamese _ installed government in Phnom Penh is avowedly Communist, as is its main foe, the Khmer Rouge.

The two other Kampuchean factions -the so-called non-communist resistance - have the political support of the United States and most Western governments, but they are by far the weakest militarily. Their military weakness has caused them to

join in an uneasy alliance with the Khmer Rouge in an attempt to overthrow the Hun Sen government. With the onset of a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, the United States and other Western countries thought that the Phnom Penh government might agree to an interim coalition government that included Sihanouk's and Son Sann's factions, to be followed by internationally supervised elections.

In the face of an imminent Vietnamese withdrawal, Hun Sen made concessions and agreed in principle to hold elections. He offered the position of head of state in an interim government to Sihanouk, though the United States and Sihanouk complained that the prince would be only a figurehead.²² However, objections by Phnom Penh arose over the role of the Khmer Rouge, which was responsible for the deaths of more than 1 million Kampuchians under the leadership of Pol Pot. The Phnom Penh government has refused to have any power - sharing with the Khmer Rouge. Even Sihanouk himself, warned in July 1988 that a return of the Khmer Rouge to power would result in a "holocaust". Yet Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge have the same sponsor, China, and Sihanouk has been insistent that the Khmer Rouge should share power in an interim government.²⁷

The United States though it has very little at stake in Kampuchea shares a very good bit of the responsibility for the country's plight. In a very real sense the fighting in Kampuchea is a continuation of the Vietnam War, a war that was extended into Kampuchea by the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Disruptions from the war resulted in the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and, eventually, the coming to power of the murderous Khmer Rouge.²⁴ Even after the end of the Vietnam war, the United States kept its hand active in the politics of the Indochina region. When the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, the United States placed an economic embargo on Kampuchea. The embargo continued after the Khmer Rouge was ousted by the Vietnamese in 1978, and continues to this day.

The government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and its sponsors, the Vietnamese, faced a very daunting situation when they took over control from the Khmer Rouge in January 1979. The PRK inherited a country whose infrastructure had been almost completely destroyed by the Khmer Rouge. Eva Mysliwicz, a relief official in Kampuchea explained: "Of 450 doctors before 1975, only 45 remained in the

country in 1979. The rest had been murdered or had escaped abroad. Of 20,000 teachers in the early 1970s, only 7000 remained.....The fishing industry was hampered by the lack of boats and nets. Few archives and books were left so that at first books, school and training curricula had to be restructured from memory. Only a handful of lawyers were left in the country to write a new constitution and rebuild the entire judicial system There was no public transport system ; no trains ran and ...There was no public transport system; no trains ran and the roads were damaged and unrepaired. There was no postal system, no telephones and virtually no electricity, clean water sanitation or education."²⁵ The Khmer Rouge had even abolished currency and blown up the country's central bank.

The only assets that the PRK had initially, were the goodwill of the Kampuchians who had survived the Khmer Rouge regime. But if there was good will toward the PRK within most of Kampuchea, there was a lack of it outside the country because of the Vietnamese occupation. The lack of recognition of the PRK by the United Nations meant that though the country could receive relief aid, it was cut off from U.N.

development aid. Due to non-recognition, international development banks such as the World Bank have refused to deal with the PRK, making Kampuchea ineligible for loans needed to develop the country.

The consequences of non-recognition were no surprise to the countries that blocked recognition, primarily the United States, China and the non-communist countries in the region. In fact withholding recognition was meant to weaken the PRK government. The problem that the international community, especially the United States had was that it found unacceptable the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by its neighbour Vietnam.

The United States in maintaining a common stand with China to contain the Soviet Union by checking its ally Vietnam, had to support, indirectly, the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot. As discussed, the non-communist resistance supported by the U.S.A. and ASEAN, had an inevitable alliance with the Khmer Rouge faction because of their comparatively weaker military strength. Hence the U.S. support of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

At the end of the Reagan Administration, signs of Vietnamese willingness to withdraw from Kampuchea, leading to a future total withdrawal had already emerged. Meanwhile Sino-U.S. relations were further strengthened as a result of the common quest by both countries to check Moscow's expansionist designs in the East Asia region. Military cooperation had already been secured between the two nations following Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger's visit to Beijing in 1986. The Sino-U.S. military cooperation had definitely been aimed at bolstering Chinese armed strength to counter Soviet power. Both China and the U.S. followed tandem policies toward Kampuchea with the aim of checking Vietnam thereby leading to a containment of Moscow, its ally. A compatible Sino-U.S. approach to Kampuchea emerged which saw its firstfruits with the beginning of Vietnam's pullout from Kampuchea.

NOTES

1. Golam, W. Choudhury, China In World Affairs : The Foreign Policy of the PRC Since 1970; Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1982, p. 234.
2. Washington Post, 4 January, 1978.
3. Pol Pot was the leader of the Khmer Rouge which ruled Kampuchea before the Vietnamese takeover. Atrocities perpetrated by this regime caused the death of millions of Kampucheans, making its reign one of the darkest chapters in the history of Kampuchea.
4. Choudhury, no. 1, p. 226.
5. Washington Post, 10 February, 1979.
6. For texts of the Chinese and Vietnamese statements, see New York Times and Washington Post, 18 February, 1979.
7. Choudhury, no. 1; p. 196.
8. New York Times, 14 May, 1981.
9. New York Times, 5 June, 1981.
10. For details of U.S. arms sales decision, see Washington Post and New York Times 17-18 June, 1981.
11. *ibid.*
12. Time, 29 June, 1981, pp. 28-30.
13. *ibid.*
14. Evelyn Colbert, "Vietnam in Cambodia: Continued Stalemate?" Vietnam in Cambodia: Continued Stalemate?" Asian Issues 1985; Boston, London, University Press of America, 1986, p.20.
15. Sheldon W. Simon, "Vietnam: Regional Dominance Arising from the Failure of Great-Power Balances," in Raju Thomas, ed., The Great-Power Triangle and Asian Security; Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, D.C. Heath and Co., 1986, p.90.

16. Guo Yan and Dong Nan, "The Kampuchean Issue - Its Origin and Major Aspects", Beijing Review, 12 September, 1983, p. xviii.
17. Evelyn Colbert, no. 14, p. 27.
18. *ibid*; p. 29.
19. "Cambodia's Never - Ending Civil War," Editorial Research Reports (Washington D.C.) 22 September, 1989, p. 524.
20. New York Times, 26 May, p.18.
21. Evelyn Colbert, no. 14, p. 28.
22. Editorial Research Reports, no. 19; p. 524.
23. *ibid*, p. 524.
24. *ibid*, p. 528.
25. Eva Mysliwiec, Kampuchea: Punishing the Poor, Oxfam, 1988, p.11.

CONCLUSION

The normalization of relations between the United States and China which officially began on 1 January 1979 brought about a new dimension in the relationship pattern between the two nations. There was an overall improvement resulting in a multifaceted relationship that encompassed, apart from foreign policy, trade and investment, security ties and cultural relations.¹ The Reagan Administration had helped to broaden the base of U.S. - PRC relations to include such a wide range of areas but, had also contributed to a large extent, in giving the dimension of conflict to the relationship, with regard to Taiwan. However, in spite of the conflictual relationship over Taiwan on the one hand, there had emerged a Sino-U.S. convergence of interests over Kampuchea on the other, giving that same relationship the dimension of compatibility.

Fears though remote that China might resort to the use of military force for resolving the Taiwan reunification question, had led the United States government to pass the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which was designed to maintain informal ties with the people of Taiwan and ensure their security. The Reagan Administration had held on to the TRA while also

regarding Taiwan as a country for the purpose of formulating foreign policy and military assistance programmes. China had interpreted the TRA and such an American approach to Taiwan as America's "two-China" policy. Under the terms of the 1978 joint US-China communique, both sides had agreed that Taiwan was a province of China and that reunification was a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide. Hence China's suspicions of the United States regarding the status of Taiwan. Moreover, the Reagan Administration's arms sales to Taiwan had the practical effect of challenging mainland China's sovereignty claims over Taiwan and precluding any real possibility of a negotiated settlement.

The arms sales issue was a major irritant to relations between the United States and China. Though Reagan retreated in early 1982 from the sale to Taiwan of some \$ 500 million in new weapons which included the FX and F-5G Tigershark aircraft and sophisticated air-to-surface and ship-to-ship Harpoon missiles, Washington opted for continued co-production of the F-5E fighter and the sale of \$ 60 million in military spare parts to Taiwan. As the arms sales issue escalated into a major source of conflict between the

United States and China, Reagan initiated the issuance of the joint communique of August 1982 in which the United States declared that "it does not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to Taiwan" and pledged that its arms sales to Taipei "will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms" the level of those supplied since 1979. The communique also stated in deliberately ambiguous language that the U.S. "intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution". No specific time-frame was given by the United States for reduction of arms sales to Taiwan thereby allowing the Reagan Administration to continue arms sales throughout both its two terms.

The changes in Taiwan during Reagan's second term were highlighted by the initiation of the democratic process in the form of a lifting of martial law, restoration of civil and human rights, and formation of opposition parties. Taiwan had also begun opening its doors to the mainland by allowing its citizens to travel freely and have commercial interaction with the mainland Chinese. The mainland too, began showing a keenness for reunification, calling on the United States to play a role in

effecting the reunification process. The United States however, held on to its earlier stand, that of leaving the reunification issue for the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to decide for themselves.

The Reagan Administration was guided by the consideration that the democratisation process in Taiwan and mainland China should resolve the unification question. The United States was certainly hoping that the democratisation process would take place in China too. Until such a time, the United States was not prepared to play the role of influencing Taiwan into unification with the mainland. On the other hand, the Chinese had hoped that the normalization of relations would lead the United States to give up its support of Taiwan while at the same time convincing Taiwan to reunite with the mainland. Since this move was not forthcoming from the United States, the conflict between the United States and China has remained unresolved, so far as Taiwan was concerned.

Significantly Sino- U.S. relations on Kampuchea witnessed the least conflict which amounted to compatible relations between the two nations during the Reagan Administration. The normalization of Sino-

U.S. relations, China's need for U.S. arms, and Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea had together contributed as elements promoting the compatibility trend in Sino-U.S. relations towards Kampuchea. Both the U.S. and China felt the need to check the Soviet Union's expansionist designs in East Asia. The two countries perceived that Vietnam played a vital role in the Indochina region, in the larger context of Soviet global strategy. They therefore worked in concert to contain the Soviet Union by opposing its ally Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. Together with ASEAN, the United States and China resisted the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea and brought the issue to the international arena by securing a seat for the CGDK in the U.N. The PRK regime installed by Vietnam was opposed by both the U.S. and China. Together with ASEAN, they pressurized Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea. Such combined Sino-U.S. efforts bore fruit with the beginning of the Vietnamese pullout from Kampuchea in 1988.

Thus it is significant to note that the United States could have with China two types of relationships without one influencing the other. The United States had successfully delinked the

normalization with China in determining the U.S. policy towards Taiwan. The U.S. stance that Sino-Taiwan unification was a domestic matter and that it would not be involved in promoting it, was not acceptable to the PRC. The PRC expected the normalization process would provide the opportunity for the U.S. to promote unification. Even if this was an expectation from the PRC, the U.S. tried to avoid the commitment by introducing another major U.S. foreign policy objective, namely, the democratisation process in China and Taiwan. Since China is not interested in the democratic process, the way the Soviets are, it has therefore remained hesitant on this count. Nevertheless the Chinese are disappointed over the U.S. stand on Taiwan.

The Chinese disappointment on Taiwan did not result in non-cooperation with the U.S. when it came to the question of regional balances in the Indochina region. As the United States perceived Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea as the Soviet Union's success, and at the same time needed a counterforce to contain the Vietnam-soviet collusion in the region, aligning with China became essential. Hence, containing the Soviet Union became the objective of China and the

United States. The past and the present differences between the two nations were submerged and a coordination of policy in the Indochina region assumed priority. This coordination of policy with an objective to contain Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and to build up pressure for Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea was conducted by both China and the United States at the bilateral level, the regional level with ASEAN, and the international level through the U.N. This coordination has been seen by the present study as a compatible Sino-U.S. relationship producing the desired objective of Vietnam's announcement of withdrawal from Kampuchea in May 1988, the last year of Reagan's second term as president of the United States.

NOTES

1. For details see Mary H. Cooper, "China: Quest for Stability and Development", in Editorial Research Reports (Washington D.C.) 13 April, 1984. .1s1

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