

**REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.**

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
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C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA submitted by Mr. SAROJ KANTA MALLICK in fulfilment of Nine credits out of total requirements of Twenty Four credits for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) of this University is his original work and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or any other University to the best of our knowledge.

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The present day world fraught with a lot of violence, bloodshed, ethnic unrest, civilian strife, compels a scholar to think through systematically the causes of social instability which impedes the prospect for peaceful resolution of the world's problems. In particular, the conflicts like those of Afghanistan and the tragic Sinhala-Tamil problem of Sri Lanka in our immediate vicinity compelled me to undertake a serious theoretical examination of the possible solutions to such crisis and to create an alternative focus of conflict - management in the post cold war era.

In the course of this study, I have immensely benefited from the words of encouragement and sound advice from my supervisor Prof. M.L. Sondhi. I am beholden to him for his help and suggestions.

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PREFACE

"In the twentieth century, war will be dead, the scaffold will be dead, hatred will be dead, frontier boundaries will be dead; man will live. He will possess something higher than all these - a great country, the whole earth, and a great hope, the whole heaven". Thus wrote Victor Marie Hugo, in the Nineteenth century. As the Twentieth century draws to a close, the situation in the developing world today belies any sense of optimism prophesied by Hugo. The developing world (and of late, parts of Eastern Europe to some extent) is falling apart being plagued by regional conflicts. It appears to resemble the Hobbessian state of nature, characterised by a condition of all against all and perpetual anarchy. The hope of 'world peace' generated by super-power decouplement continues to be clouded by spurts of local conflicts in the developing world.

Against this backdrop the proposed study seeks to probe into the causes of such conflicts and prepare whatever groundwork is possible for constructing an effective paradigm of conflict-resolution, and crisis management. With the disappearance of bipolar power-matrix, an epistemological theme has emerged in the intellectual realm of the need for probing into the

peculiarity of third world conflicts and proposing remedial measures for them along with theoretically grounded generalisations. The existing techniques for conflict resolution need to be reoriented in the absence of the super-power component in the power-game both at the local as well as international level.

The introductory chapter of the work gives an insight into the roots of conflicts in the Third World. Opinions of various scholars have been discussed at length. The daily turmoil and frictions of life under circumstances of economic struggle and rapid social change give rise to violence among groups and individuals within Third World Societies. The peculiarities of the Third World societies contain seeds of protracted conflicts and destabilisation.

The Second Chapter focuses on the emerging trend of regional conflicts in the new political order. The superpower decouplement from the regional conflicts of the developing world has manifested a kaleidoscopic variety of local conflicts in the Third World, as a result of "decompression effect". The problems previously overshadowed by the East-West rivalry, have come to the fore-front once the cold war was over.

The third chapter explores the techniques of

conflict management and crisis prevention in the post cold war era. I have devoted some portion of the chapter in enumerating the generic processes which have implications for a basic framework of conflict management; The need for a philosophical approach to crisis management can be explained in terms of the applicability of Kant's philosophy for world peace, which transcends narrow doctrinal positions.

Chapter four deals with the trends in the decouplement of superpowers from regional conflicts. This chapter explains both the incentives for superpower involvement in the Third World conflicts and the factors compelling the superpower decouplement. The emerging trends require new organizing concepts which may be at variance with received wisdom.

The need for the institutionalisation of the peacemaking process in the problem areas of the Third World has been highlighted in the Fifth chapter. The peacemaking potential of international organisations, especially the UN and the regional organisations can be enhanced by policy coordination in order to cope with the attendant strains and pressures of the post-cold war era.

The study draws to a close with a discussion of the

need for a positive approach to conflict management and crisis prevention, and for mobilisation of resources for the making and implementation of policy in Third World Countries, if super power restraint is really to enhance the prospects of universal peace.

INTRODUCTION

Conflict is one of the natural forms of human activity. It abounds in all forms of social behaviour. A situation of conflict is said to arise when two parties wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent,¹ though they operate within the same parameters and often aim at similar goals. This tentative definition is as true of single people as of groups. Conflicts within societies swirls around groups mutually antagonistic to each other. Such groups are sustained most often by an insatiable urge for victory over their rival ones. In an international context, such social conflicts assume shapes the analysis of which is the continuing preoccupation of thought and practice in international relations. Broadly conflicts can be categorized into regional and international ones. They differ in their scale of impact as well as orientations. But in the days preceding the new detente in a strict bipolar world, this difference looked thin and had little or no connection with political and policy choices. Internationalization of regional conflict was the prevalent trend during the cold war era. When loyalties towards the super powers ran across even neutral organizations like NAM, we can very well understand the compulsions behind such

1 Nicholson Mishael, Conflict Analysis (English Univ. Press: London, 1970), p.2.

internationalization. In their efforts to survive mutual challenges, the two power blocs moulded the international society in obedience to all pervasive conflictual patterns and power balances.

But under the changed circumstances, the whole scenario underwent an extraordinary metamorphosis. Once super power rivalry was muted on account of a wide range of inter-related factors influencing super power decision making, the conflicts switched back to their regional contexts, with a different chain of events. Some of the old concepts were clearly irrelevant to the evaluation of foreign policy performance in the new conflict situation.

Any attempt at studying the empirical and conceptual problems of conflict would suggest some sort of categorization. 'Taking into account conventional assumptions we can divide regional conflicts into two broad types: intra-state and inter-state, we can harness this classification to the analysis of Third World conflicts. The disproportionate exercise of strength by a great power in a region exacerbates antagonistic relationships and leads to inter-state conflicts.'² At

2 T.B. Millar, 'Conflict and Intervention' in 'Conflict and Intervention in the Third World' ed. M. Ayooob (Croom Helm, London, 1980), p.05.

other times the problem of origination of Third World conflicts is amenable to just the reverse situation.

As our study will focus on the conflicts in the third world, we will try to identify the causal relationships, although everything cannot be neatly region-holed. 'National fragmentation'³ within the Third world could be the cause why there is so much emphasis on the nationality-factor as the chief plank for revolutionary terrorist movements. In the west the spirit of nationalism was the result of a spontaneous movements which were not guided by concerted plans or programmes. As such national and territorial boundaries were almost identical. The case of the third world is different. Here the spirit of nationalism experienced external pressures from avaricious colonial masters. The 'national' pretensions cultivated by the national movements could not survive their liberation. Once they were free, identities crystallized along plural lines. The prioritization of political values of the modern state apparatus in such countries failed to submerge the particular identities in the whole when no satisfactory solutions can be found to remove incongruity and ambiguity in adjusting identities, conflict ensues,

³ Udo Steinbach, 'Sources of Third World Conflict', in Adelphi Papers, London 166, 1981.

leading to mounting violence as a response to political exigencies.

Revolutionary wars⁴ to wrest power from the existing ruling elite lead to situations of conflicts too. The Islamic Revolution in Iran is a significant pointer in this regard. A revolution of such kind becomes possible when a condition of multiple dysfunction⁵ provides a psychological and operational environment to an intransigent elite. The emergence of charismatic leaders like Khomeini or the formation of a clandestine armed movement pose a dramatic challenge to the status quo and precipitate revolutionary situations.

'Cultural clashes'⁶ could be the source of conflict too. When people of differing cultural traits inhabit the same territory there grow conditions of dissatisfaction which make compromise impossible. The cultural differences have potentials for conflict and many examples can be easily identified in Asia and Africa.

Manifestation of aggressive racism is still part of contemporary human experience. Today the entire black

4 Ibid.

5 World Politics, January 1966, p.165.

6 Udo Steinbach, op.cit., pp.22-23.

Africa is fighting for fundamental human values like dignity of man and human rights. National liberation movement have taken several forms leading to war and hostilities. Such movements include such diverse aims as the achievement of independence, the shaking off of the rule of white minorities, the breaking away from existing national entities or the upheavals of a socio-revolutionary nature. The liberation movements have waged their struggles with a high degree of political consciousness. The P.L.O. and Polisario are cases in sight. While the Palestine Liberation Organisation has kept the conflict alive in the Arab region, the Polisario is fighting to get back its own territory from Moroccan occupation. Seeking solutions to such problems would require fresh approaches in order to produce discernable outcomes when the issues are no longer being perceived according to a set of pre-determined values of the cold war period.

The range of explanatory possibilities includes economic necessity and expansionist imperatives. The Gulf-war merits close examinations. Iraq's aggression in Kuwait kept the entire Arab region under the scourage of war notwithstanding the pretences and justifications of Saddam Hussein. On the other hand the management of the

conflict in the region has led to serious speculation about U.N. role as that in a ritualised game under United States' direction.

The problem of development⁷ in the Third World is prima facie the chief factor responsible for most of the exacerbation of conflicts. Some would say that poverty, heightened aspirations and the process of development all define the narrow scope of alternatives available to societal and political forces. They would suggest that even if process of development is successful the inability to manage change would cause dislocation which in its turn would create disequilliberated conditions in the domestic political structure and make it ripe for conflict. As Soedja Tmoko suggests development often created internal pressures in favour of certain people and makes them violent. In case of an inequitable development in a plural society the less privileged groups would accuse others of reaping greatest benefits. Even if there is an economic breakthrough in one sphere, the underprivileged groups may experience destabilising effects and prefer to resort to violence to any process of rapproachment.

7 Soedjatmoko, 'Violence in the Third World' in Solidarity, Summer 1987, p.6.

The failure of a political system to defuse potentially explosive social tensions may ultimately precipitate a crisis situation.

When national boundaries are not territorially defined, such feeling of deprivation may spark off dissension in neighbouring countries. The existence of an oppressed or disaffected minority in country A, with cultural links to country B, may give an incentive for B to intervene in the affairs of A.⁸

The steady flow of armaments, mostly through smuggling across international border has made weapons readily available in the Third world and generally undermined the stability of territorial-political structures. Suicidal armed and rebellious groups are reluctant to be drawn to the negotiating table. At the same time mercenary groups can be mobilized to embrace and utilise elements who wish to destabilise the regional peace structure. The inherent instability on account of large scale arms acquisition results in creation of parallel military groups which provide the rules of the game in place of the authority in certain states. The cases of Burma, Vietnam, Ethiopia support this view. The prevalence of macro-terrorism in certain

8 T.B. Miller, op.cit., p.5.

areas changes the basic conditions under which societies function. In the Latin American region, the drug mafias exercise decisive say in the affairs of some states. Especially noteworthy is the example of Noreiga's actions in Panama.

That there are no panaceas available is brought out by the recent decouplement of super powers in Eastern Europe which has brought unpleasant realities to the fore. Europe with all its claims of a stable inter-state system is falling apart in its eastern sector. The happenings in Yugoslavia have shown that the revolution for the nation-state is yet to be completed. Smaller groups with claims of nationality are emerging with demands of autonomy and secession. Group identities have started maturing into full-fledged national personalities, asserting themselves in the arena of international politics.

According to Jose thiago Cintra 'the decompression⁹' effect after the closing of ranks between the super powers, has given rise to conflict in the third world in an ever increasing spiral. Many potential conflicts were lying fallow because of the

9 Jose Thiago Cintra, 'Regional Conflicts: Trends in a Period of Transition' in Adelphi Papers 23 April 1989 London, p.96.

controlling effect of super powers. Sudden disappearance of the super power shadow has created vacuums favourable for internal dissensions to grow. Whereas sectional interests in past were swept below the carpet either through super power persuasion of appeasement or because of lack of necessary media coverage, now they are adopting uncompromising stands. The recent Kurdish situation serves as an example. The dissatisfaction of the Kurds was nothing new but it was lying under cover for quite some time. But the recent Gulf war and the subsequent demoralization of Iraq prepared for the Kurds the necessary platform to place their demands upon international society, and effect the expectations and activities of other international actors.

The new political detente and the erosion of bloc loyalties has switched the world attention over to problems hitherto overshadowed by the super power conflict and has induced a new dynamism to internal tensions and conflicts.¹⁰ Increasing media coverage and intellectual discussion on issues which were hitherto held to be trivial provide new time-perspective for potential causes of conflict.

Managing conflicts as the world moves from a bipolar to multipolar world of many power centres

requires more flexibility and willingness to arrive at compromises. When the super power detente has made us all escape the horror of a possible nuclear war, we are still distant from the so called era of peace: We are caught up in the vortex of regional conflicts, with politics in the third world being in a state of flux. In the following chapters we will try to show how real rather than cosmetic changes are necessary if obstacles to conflict-management in the Third World would have to be overcome.

¹⁰ Ibid.

**NEW POLITICAL ORDER:
EMERGING TRENDS**

In the 1990s, the superpower relations are in a period of transition. The period of "neo-detente" or the "post cold war" demonstrates the disengagement of superpowers from regional conflicts in the Third World. The intensified discussion between the superpowers in the late 1980s on regional conflicts, and the increase of international pressure and domestic compulsions contributed to various peace breakouts of 1988 and 1989 and 1990. The decline of the ideological 'struggle' has meant for so many regions (including Eastern Europe), and increase in the local saliency of unsolved problems. The spirit of superpower convergence on issues including regional conflicts may well be irrelevant to the source of local strife. Paradoxically, the superpower detente and the disengagement of superpowers from the regional conflicts may also freeze the possibilities of security co-operation among regional adversaries in the absence of policies which address the local, social economic and political roots of conflicts.

Today, the Third World is seen as more complex and unstable than it was believed previously with grave implications for the future political order.

This chapter analyses the emerging trends in regional conflicts in the post-cold war era, and

suggests where the evolving circumstances may unfold new characteristics of regional conflicts in the new political order.

The emerging trend in regional conflicts shows that the developing world today is plagued by the germs of instability, due to the "decompression effect"¹ such as - civil war, ethnic strife, boarder disputes religious fundamentalism, violent coups, militarisation, civil strife, insurgency, military intervention etc.

Our categorisation of the emerging trends in regional conflicts in the new political order will be as follows:-

1. Conflicts as the immediate fallouts of "the decouplements of super powers
2. Long standing regional conflicts inherent to the Third World which escaped attention due to Super-Power rivalry.
3. Involvement of regional and medium powers in the Third World.

1. Jose Thiago Cintra-Regional Conflicts, trends in a period of transition", Adelphi Papers, Spring 1989 London No.237, p.95. Prof. Cintra describes, the decompression effect as the fallouts of the super power disengagements from the regional conflicts.

THE IMMEDIATE FALLOUTS OF THE DECOUPLEMENT

✓The post-war period saw, the division of the world into two blocs. The peripheral areas of the Third World have had to alienate one or the other of two rival blocs in contention (there being no genuine neutralists), Consequently the international values of the cold war and the East-West rivalry came to be internalised throughout large parts of the Third World. The ruling elites of the Third World took sides-Marxist or capitalist, depending upon their orientation. This also became an integral part of their political orientation, which also had a bearing on their view of state responsibility and system stability. In many cases, the super power derived military logic was imbibed in their national security doctrines. In the new order, with the disengagement of the superpowers, "a certain political inertia will continue to affect strategic options and could trigger conflict, where ever Ideological Polarisation is already responsible for tensions²

Another immediate repercussion of the absence of super powers in the Third World is a possible "Lebanonisation of Conflicts". Afghanistan provides a

2 Ibid., p.96.

good example. The withdrawal of Soviet forces has left the fragmented and fractionalised Mujaheddin groups busy in inter group and intra-group conflicts for power. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a fundamentalist Muslim, who leads the most effective and best organised force among Mujaheddins has been accused by rival Mujaheddin leaders of endorsing attacks on other Mujaheddin groups in order to expand his own power base. The number of incidents connected with serious infighting among the Mujaheddin since Summer 1989, has led to a very counter productive mixture of accusations and counter accusations between the resistance groups.³

The Third manifestation in this category is the bid for regional hegemony. As Iraqi aggression has shown, the haegemonic ambition in the absence of the super power rivalry by relatively small powers could have extremely serious repercussions in a particular region as well as throughout the world. The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait illustrates the degree and nature of the vulnerability that seems to have been enhanced for a small state in the new political order. Closely

³ Karleenst Ziem - "the Afghanistan conflict in its Regional Context" The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Summer and Fall. 1990, p.364.

associated with the regional haegemony is the military superiority some states have acquired over other states in the region. This aspect (Third World militarism) will be to be discussed in a later section in this chapter.

There are some conflicts, prevailing in the Third World today which did not receive adequate focus due to the Super Powers rivalry in the region. These conflicts are inherent in the Third World societies due to the peculiarity of the system. Which has already been discussed in the 1st Chapter.

A consequence of the forseable decline in superpower military involvement, based on tacit agreements leading to retrenchment, is that other conflicts will arise from decompression and from a loosening of the controls by the super powers either jointly or individually and lack of self control by many of the state formerly in fear of sanctions by super powers or/and by their allies.

CIVIL WARS & CIVIL STRIFES

A Civil war perse is an internal conflict between two contending power centres with the object of overthrowing the legitimate or de-jure government. In

Headley Bull's phrase: "International war as a determinant of the shape of international system has declined in relation to civil wars".⁴ In the Third World, civil wars are the manifestation of a weak or debilitated central power exploited by pressure groups, insurgents, rebels and terrorists. Their capacity to organise themselves and garner sufficient support to present a challenge to central power and draw down resources and energy otherwise required for the state management usually depends on an identifiable ideology, ethnic support, and some sort of political programme however vague.

Countless groups in Third World are fighting for 'aboriginal rights' arguing the primacy of primordial over state ties and the inadequacy of central government policy towards native peoples. Organised rebellion against state authorities by ethnic groups, secessionist movements or drug lords acting in collaboration or through terrorist groups are on the rise. Sometimes such groups are virtually created and almost entirely sustained by external powers as in the cases of Iranian support for Hizbollah activists in the Lebanon or South

4 Headley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Politics (McMillan: London, 1977), pp.197-99.

African's links with Renamo in Muzambique. In other cases, the links are less direct and the objects of support for the SPLA (Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army) in Somalia or the Putative assistance provided by Pakistan to Sikh extremists in India.⁵ These events particularly disturb those leaders in the Third World where the process of nation building is incomplete.

Increasingly, in Pakistan, Burma, Coloumbia, Panama, Peru and elsewhere, there is an organised challenge to the state apparatus by the narco-traffickers. The concept of "Narco Terrorism" has grown in stature in these countries. Narco-terrorism possess serious threat to public order and the rule of the law, with the narco traffickers operating transnationally and possessing more sophisticated armaments than some of the states have. In Coloumbia, drug leaders have penetrated and control major sections of the government and the judiciary, in Panama, they have become the government. India being an important link in the Golden Crescent is experiencing increasing clashes on the border between its forces and the narco-terrorists. The power of narco-terrorists not only affects the safety of the

5 John chipman, "Regional Stability in the Developing World: Managing the acceleration of History, BLIISS Journal, vol.11, no.1-1990, p.68.

population and diverts government attention from the tasks of the development, but tarnishes the image of the state in international and particularly American eyes which is illustrated by the American invasion of Panama.⁶

Right to self-determination by various groups has culminated in numerous conflicts in the developing world, thereby destabilising the Central State power. Four types of scenarios could be highlighted in analysing the threat posed by the right to self-determination.⁷ The first situation is of a government denying its population or a large segment of it, the opportunity of participation in government. The second refers to a situation within a state where there is demand of a particular type of political organization to replace the existing one. The third scenario refers to a people within a state or given territory which seek to join another people or a state because of certain ethnic, linguistic, religious or other links of the

6 K Subramanya, "The US Invasion of Panama in Perspective", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.13, no.IV, July 1990, p.426.

7 J. Moore's typology Cited in A.H.M. Moriruzzaman, "Self Determination as a Collective Human Right: An Appraisal", *BIISS Journal*, vol.11, no.1, 1990, pp.40-42.

former with the latter. The fourth relates to the cases of secession.

The groups, playing on an ideology of self determination can find easy support amongst citizens of provinces or remote areas who are victims of uneven state development or of the success of a particular ethnic group with a firm grip on the central organs of power. The erosion of democratic rights creates a crisis of legitimacy which is followed by different groups, indulging in large scale violence in support of their causes (as in the case of Tamils in Sri Lanka, various groups in Lebanon, Mujajeddin factions in Afghanistan, Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia, Sikhs in India, kurds in Iraq).

An additional point concern is the situation in which adjacent states employ the same tactic: supporting or even instigating military activity within communities across the common border. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia supports the Oromo Liberation Front and other opposition groups operating inside Ethiopia, while the later supports the (Somali National Movement) operating in the North of somalia. Both Iran and Iraq have supported secessionists within each others Kurddish

communities as well as non-community based groups.⁸

In each of these instances, the danger is that conflict by proxy will not only prolong hostility but could also lead to a resumption of major confrontations.

It has been the argument with many social scientists that ethnic, sectarian, or tribal affiliation are predominantly manifestation of communal conflicts in the Third World. The competition in the scarce resources of underdeveloped economies and the failure by the state structure to meet the twin challenges of security and development of some sections in society have compelled the dissatisfied groups to fall back on primordial ties for collective survival. These communal divisions affects a large number of Third World countries and are responsible for outbreaks of mass violence. Most of the countries in Africa and Asia, which have been unable to bridge the historical gap between different communities face a threat to national security created by the endemic political instability generated by communal conflicts. India, the largest developing country of all (except China) is composed of a wide range of linguistically, ethnically and

⁸ Yezid Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s Security in the Developing Countries", *Adelphi Papers*, Summer 1990, p.3-72.



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religiously defined communities contributing to the secession of Pakistan in 1947 and to the violence in Punjab, Assam, and northern areas. Pakistan has been similarly affected by ethnic tribal and religious conflicts both in Eastern and Western wings, leading finally to the secession of Bangladesh in 1971.⁹ The states of Africa - Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, had, have experienced large scale violence due to the Islamic and non-Islamic divisions. When political instability in Third World countries are threatened by any ethnic conflict or civil war, the situation develops the dangerous potential for an external intervention.¹⁰ The classic case in Asia is the Vietnam War. Countries in Africa and Latin America have also experienced such a trend. But the impact of external intervention has been the maximum in the Middle East.

The conflict scenario in the Third World has created a dangerous abyss between the conflictual parties with the rise of religious Fundamentalism.

9 S.D. Muni, "South Asia" in Conflict and Intervention in Third World (ed.) M. Ayooob, (Croom Helm, London, 1980), pp.38-72.

10 M. Ayooob in Conflict and Intervention in Third World, p.24, Ayooob says - "Regional Conflictss provide the dominant powers with a major excuse to intervene in Third World affairs, thereby further undermining its incipient autonomy".



Islamic fundamentalism is an obvious example as far apart as South East Asia and North Africa.

In each case, autonomous groupings attempt to promote or impose a particular view of society and the economy with far-reaching impact on foreign relations and alliances. This has led to internal violence in several countries. Yet some governments have also used their religious credentials to improve internal security and legitimise the use of force. The Moroccan, Jordanian and Saudi Kings, all stress their descent from the Prophet Mohammad to re-inforce legitimacy and gain public loyalty.

The growing assertion of religious identity of communities with the state could provoke the fears of other parts of the population that are secular and who belong to different religions and thus increase the risk of civil conflict. In Sudan, demands by northerners for the adoption of Islamic laws alarmed Southern Christians and animists and fuelled the SPLA insurgency.¹¹

Religious issues can have repercussions on the regional as well as the global level. The claim to Islamic orthodoxy has long been a major element in the foreign policies of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and

¹¹ Yezid Sayegh, *op.cit.* 39.

more recently Iran and Bangladesh. Such shared bonds provide the basis for mutual security assistance. Libya may have helped fund Pakistan nuclear efforts, while Turkey has tried to promote joint arms production projects with some Arab countries.¹² The call by Saddam Hussain during the Gulf War to arouse the Arab and Islamic identity and unity against the western allies, points to the fact that the rise of religious fundamentalism has the potential to result in more violent conflicts, and would work against the emergence of a post cold war world order compatible with modern values.

The presence of "Refugees" and 'Exiles' in large number have added to the worries of the developing world, as such groups act as pressure groups against defusing conflict, the presence of thousands of impoverished refugees receiving international attention and assistance can create resentment among both neighbouring countries and host communities. Obvious examples are the Khmers in Thailand, Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong, Afghans in Pakistan, Palestinians in Lebanon, Ethiopians in Suddan, Sudanese in Kenya. The presence of these refugees can have dangerous impact on the

¹² Ibid., p.40.

ongoing conflicts in the host countries. Pakistan is experiencing a resurgence of Pathan unrest due to the proliferation of arms and money to the Afghans. The outbreak of clashes in Pakistan between indigenous Punjabis and Muhajir community of former inhabitants of India-reminiscent of problems associated with the repatriation of refugee Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistanis province of Sind, offers one of the recent examples of the anomaly discussed above.

INTER STATE CONFLICTS

"Interstate conflicts have been the bane of the Third World."¹³ Notwithstanding, the Latin American spirit "Asian Nationalism", "Pan-Arabism", "Pan-Africanism", nations in the Third World are fighting among themselves on various issues, thereby preventing third world from achieving stability in the post-cold war period. The boundary disputes, which constitute the major issue in the inter-state confrontations are the legacies of colonial rule. Although the role of ideology as a source of inter-state wars is fast receding in the aftermath of 'de-ideologization' of

13 James N. Rossenau (ed.) Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p.340.

international politics, the threat of an inter-state war due to border disputes could increasingly work against stable peaceful solutions. This type of regional conflict is possible in the case of India-Pakistan (having experienced 3 wars already, 1947, 1965, 1971), Pakistan - Afghanistan on the question of Durand Line), India-China (Aksai-Chin and MC Mohan Line), Arab-Israel Tensions and conflicts in a host of other African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger, Benin, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Togo, Chad, Uganda, Malawi and Leotho) could be exacerbated on account of their involvement in boundary disputes with their neighbouring countries.¹⁴

THIRD WORLD MILITARISM

The narrowing focus of superpower competition and the tendency towards more selective involvement in Third World conflicts should offer some confidence about reduced arms transfers¹⁵ and a tendency towards less

14 Kenneth L. Adelman, African Realities (New York: Rane, Unach and Co., Inc. 1980), p.5.

15 This aspect is reflected in the reduced defence expenditure of both super powers in 1990. The USSR spent 17.7 bn. roubles in 1989 in comparison to 71.0 bn roubles in 1990. The US cut down its planned level of defence spending by \$600 billion. (Courtsey) Disarmament, a periodic review by U.N. No.3, 1990, vol.XIII, p.05.

polarisation in these conflicts, in the new political order. But there has been a corresponding rise in the militarism in the Third World. The rise of militarism has also been a major factor for the increasing incidence of armed conflicts and interstate violence in the Third World. Militarism connotes two things in the Third World: acquisition of arms of armamentism and militarisation of political and social institutions.¹⁶

The developing countries have witnessed a continuous upward spiral in military spending since 1945, much of which has gone into the import of modern weapon systems. Ironically, the defused Soviet-US rivalry in the late 1980s seems unlikely to curtail arms marketing efforts by the advanced industrial countries due to the persistent insecurity of developing countries which provides a lucrative market worth billions annually. The arms exporting countries of the industrialised world, are set to face a growing contradiction between their need for markets and the logic of their proffered interest in seeing a decline in the intensity and number of regional conflicts.

Another phenomenon of Third World militarism

16 Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide (ed.) The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World (Survey: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1979), p.232.

already visible but likely to increase is the development of domestic arms industries, in more developing countries which may grow along with resurgent nationalisms. The desire for regional prestige is a motivating factor apart from the existing insecurity in the society. But the most important factor in the rise of domestic production of arms is the desire to strengthen national security by guaranteeing supply of necessary arms and ammunitions. Its proliferation is also due to the revenue earning motive and the bid for effective roles at regional levels. India, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, Argentina and of late Pakistan are obvious examples, of actors in Third World militarism. As the larger developing states resort to domestic production, they may find themselves in a position to co-operate with others. They may also use the wealth of a smaller state to finance projects or to enter into a consortium to develop new weapons systems (eg. Iraq, and Egypt and the two of them with Argentina on the condor 11 surface to surface missile). According to one report, there are at least 23 countries in the Third World region which either produce or possess ballistic missiles.¹⁷ The presence of ballistic

17 Bangkok Post-Third World Missiles:A Cause for Much Concern: Bangkok, June 3rd, 1989, Cited from IISS, London

missiles and in some cases even with nuclear warheads can make the regional conflicts a great deal more dangerous.

Local conflicts may prove fatal to global peace and stability if warring local parties resorts to nuclear weapons. The Third World today is experiencing proliferation of nuclear regimes and adversaries. Of the current adversaries, only India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa are believed to possess that capability. Tomorrow, the list could include, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Brazil, Argentina and Korea. The chemical warfare capability which has already made an appearance in the Iran-Iraq war and the Rabta facility in Libya, is another potential inherent danger attached to the regional conflicts. In the absence of accurate guidelines to cover new contingencies in the neo-detente, the post-script to the cold war may provide incentives for those states to marry area weapons or weapons of mass destruction to the missiles to increase their effectiveness.

Depending on their characteristics, these weapons could be vulnerable to attack and hence they would be used essentially as first strike weapons - that is weapons giving both sides an incentive to strike. In

this case these weapons "lack of 'Survivability' will have effect of shortening the fuse"¹⁸ giving both sides an incentive to develop doctrines based on preemption that are inherently destabilising and dangerous during crisis.

Another feature of the new political order in the expanding role of developing countries in the regional conflicts¹⁹ eg. Pakistan's support for the Afghan Mujaheddin and to Sikhs and Kashmir militarists in India, Nicaraguan arms supplies to the Salvadorian insurgents; the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and the Libyans in Chad. The increase in local interventions also highlights the transitional nature of regional power balances and the gradual emergence of would be regional haegemons. Certain important local powers will have regional security and objectives which will call into play military force to mobilise power in support of their causes. Countries such as India, Syria Iraq, China, Vietnam and others will continue to seek the preservation and establishment of a regional

18 Shahram Chubin, "Third world Conflicts, Trends and Prospects", Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Summer and Fall, 1990, p.349.

19 Shahram Chubin, "Superpowers, Regional Conflicts and World Order", Adelphi Papers, 237, Spring 1989, p.76.

Security order attractive to them. Calculations of a regional balance of power (which may be little affected by the superpower interests or deployments) will move them to acquire arms and intervene in local crisis to ensure that their own regional positions are maintained. The neo-international detente could thus lead to more complicated regional balances and struggles depending upon the relative power and status of regional states and the concepts of national security they adhere to. On the other hand, the decline of external support to project force and withdrawal of financial and military assistance, could alter security perceptions away from a military bias.

A coherent and comprehensive understanding of the hegemonial designs of future aspirants will therefore be necessary in order to ensure that the new political order does not generate new expansionist imperatives while it imposes constraints on super powers.

**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION:
INTERNAL DYNAMICS**

War, armed conflict and organised physical conflict is a very ancient social activity and there are few signs that it is likely to disappear without new conviction and commitment regarding rejection of military values. Corresponding to the perennial existence of conflicts in the society, human-kind has been managing and regulating conflict for centuries. Philosophers since recorded history, have tried to evolve methods and procedures to stop and prevent conflicts in the society. The political prescriptions of Plato, Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Quincy Wright, Gandhi, Galtung to name a few have provided alternative explanation of problems of regulating conflict within and between societies. The use of oracles, trial by ordeal, regulated warfare, private and judicial duels and arbitration were the permanent techniques in the development of conflict management.¹

In conflict analysis every effort must be made to focus attention on likely trends in the future. Because of the everchanging nature of conflict as a social process, no particular framework can remain valid for all time to come.

1 Johan Galtung, "Institutionalised Conflict Resolution", Journal of Peace Research, no.4, 1965, pp.384-97.

The conflict framework should include the following ingredients:

A-Conflict History - This includes the origin and evolution of the conflict and its context.

B-Conflict Context - The study of the context or the scope and character of conflict is very important. Such dimensions are geographical boundaries, political, structure, relations and jurisdictions, communication networks and patterns, decision making methods.

C-The Parties Involved - Among the actors involved in the conflict, are included, the primary parties or the parties who are directly involved in pursuit of the alternative goals; the secondary parties, or the parties who have a indirect stake in the outcome of the disputes but who do not engage themselves directly in the conflict. The case of superpowers involvement in the regional conflicts is the best example of this category, since both the U.S. and the Soviets sought global leadership through proxy wars in pursuit of their respective goals. The third parties are generally those who have a pronounced interest in the prevention and resolution of

conflict.² International organizations and the regional organizations could both be included under this category.

D-Values, Issues, Norms, Ethics and Interests have to be studied in models which provide taxonomies for comparing conflicts. They effect the domestic and external power structure around which normally a conflict revolves. Each of these could be a point of disagreement that should be resolved. Most of the numerous conflicts existing in the Third world today, are a result of political mobilization in response to the clash of values, issues, interests, norms and beliefs. Thus, the study of these preconditions is necessary for comprehending contextual approaches to a conflict management. The peacemakers should take into account the issues like - Ethnocentrism, Nationalism and patriotism.

E-Conflict Management and Prevention Resources - These resources may include:

- i) Techniques of conflict management - These techniques should be widely used and known to

2 James Lave, "The emergence and institutionalisation of Third Party roles in conflict", in Sandole and Taroste (ed.), Conflict Management and Problem Solving. Interpersonal to International Application, Francis Pinter, London, 1987, p.17-18.

all parties like negotiation, mediation, conciliation, dialogues, conferences, parleys, debates, bargaining etc.

- ii) Internal Limiting Factors - The common interest of values of both the parties and which neither wants to destroy.
- iii) External limiting factors like a superior and higher authority, who could impose its will on the conflicting parties, for the regulation and management of conflict.
- iv) The interested third parties - Third parties play a vital role, being neutral in regulating the conflict:

The various levels of analysis and theoretical studies of procedures for "conflict management" and "conflict prevention" must be subjected to further development and synthesis of arguments if conditions conducive to the reduction of war-proneness of regional systems are to be created. An obsolete framework for conflict-resolution will only produce sub-optimal results and may accentuate threat - images resulting in the escalation of conflict rather than its resolution.

A review of literature suggests the need to address

the following questions: What methods are to be evolved in managing regional conflicts and preventing them? What can be done to preserve peace in these conflicts where settlements have been reached? and what role can the super-powers and third parties play in the management and resolution of regional conflicts?

In order to gain a more comprehensive knowledge between the major political events in the super power relationships and the wider societal developments which will determine conflict dynamics both causality and context are important. The study of the process and measures of conflict management aims at understanding the following processes:

1. Institutionalisation of the "security regime".
2. Confidence building measures.
3. Regional security co-operation.
4. Third party intervention.
5. Super-power security co-operation and conflict management and prevention.
6. Extensive arms control measures.
7. Domestic origins of crisis management and peace.

I Institutionalisation of the "Security Regime"

The concept of "regime" includes the whole set of explicit and implicit norms, rules and decision-making

procedures developed within a given issue area which serve to constrain the behaviour of participating states and around which their expectations converge.³

In other words, the basis of a regime is a code of conduct. Regimes usually involve structured forms of co-operation according to the rules and principles that have been formally accepted by the parties.

In a world full of conflicts and crisis, devoid of any "rules of the game" and "rational code of conduct, building up of a security regime" occupies a very pivotal place.

The concept of "regime" is particularly valuable because it moves discussion and enquiry away from the narrow focus on moves and strategies for solving a "Prisoner's Dilemma" (tit for tat) type situation that has preoccupied game theorists. Indeed, regime theory shifts attention to the relevance of agreements that establish principles, procedures and institutions for regulating competition as well as facilitating co-operation in specified security sub-issues.⁴

3 Cited in US-Soviet Security co-operation, Achievements Failures and Lessons ed. George, Farley, Dallin, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1988), p.13.

4 *Ibid.*, p.13.

While, it is impossible to evolve a comprehensive security regime, it has been possible to foster partial security regimes or institutional co-operative security arrangements, most notably in the areas of arms control, crisis avoidance, and crisis management, in the Third World.⁵

IFCONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

The goal of a confidence building is to reduce uncertainty and constrain the opportunities for using military force and the option of surprise military action. The relevant model in East-West relations is the agreement issuing from the Stockholm conference on Disarmament in Europe which was signed in September 1986 by thirty-five members of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.⁶ It requires all countries to give advance notice of manoeuvre, thereby making the military processes in Europe more predictable.

Misunderstanding and mistrust have been responsible for many a conflict and violence in the world. The super power confusion over regional conflicts was frequently

5 Ibid., p.14.

6 Signed Polling (ed.) "Disarmament in the field of conventional weapons and confidence building measures", Disarmament 10, (Fall 1987), p.18-23.

manifested in the activism on the part of the two and in escalation of regional conflicts. Contemporary events like shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007, killing all 269 people, by the Soviet Union on September 1, 1983 highlighted the mistrust, misunderstanding and fear existing between the two super powers.

Third parties play an important role in the creation and development of confidence building regimes through "peace keeping", "fact finding" and "observation forces", United Nations peace-keeping forces have played the most prominent role in this regard, even though there is no formal provision made for such forces in the UN Charter. As a confidence building activity, peacekeeping seeks to dispel mistrust and build trust.⁷ Peacekeeping also lends an international prominence to regional conflicts and thereby places the disputants on notice that their behaviour must be in consonance with international norms.

The United Nations observer forces were sent to monitor the ceasefire along the Iran-Iraq border to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. U.N. peacekeeping and observer forces were also active

7 Kjell Skjelsbach, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes by the United Nations and other Inter Governmental Bodies", Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Studies, 21 Sept. 1986, pp.144-5.

in Namibia, to supervise the agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa for the independence of Namibia and a phased Cuban troop pullout from Angola. Similar observer forces have been sent to Central America to monitor the implementation of Esquipulas II accord, for Central American peace argument. But the special context of peacekeeping needs further analysis. In general the experiment of the International peacekeeping forces as a technique is not conducive for conflict resolution but only conflict regulation.

The management of Third World intra-state conflicts are not always facilitated by intervention by the UN, or by any other body, representing the international community. The record also shows that it has also become difficult to manage conflicts at the interstate level as provided in the UN Charter)⁸, without getting involved in domestic or intercommunal disputes. This poses a major dilemma for the peaceful resolution of disputes generally and for the UNited Nations peacekeeping, confidence building process in particular.

Voluntary associations, peacekeeping bodies and philanthropic associations in the state can take up the responsibility of building up the confidence building

⁸ Article 2(3) of the UN Charter.

measure in case of the intra-state conflicts.

III REGIONAL SECURITY CO-OPERATION

The regional security co-operation regimes can pay close attention to idiosyncratic variables and thus can achieve what the international organisations can not in furthering peace proposals and conflict management in accordance with distinctive aspects of values and institutions of individual countries. These arrangements by regional groupings can deal with both interstate and intra-state conflicts and aim at limiting the involvement of external powers in the region, by evolving consensus on regional political process and values.

A recent example of the regional security approach was embodied in the peace plan for Central America which was proposed by President Arias of Costa Rica⁹ and embodied in the Esquipulas II agreement. The Esquipulas II agreement calls for national reconciliation with opponents, a ceasefire within existing constitutional frameworks, democratisation in each country, efforts to halt foreign assistance to insurgents and for a free and

9 Prof. Jose Thiago Cintra, "Regional Conflicts: Trends in a Period of Transition", *Adelphi Papers*, 237, (London, IISS Spring 1989), pp.100-1. democratic elections.

-democratic elections.

The Third Party certainly has something at stake (reputation of professionalism, for example), but will not be affected by the allocation of resources, the exercise of power. The third party stands on a different bone.¹⁰

We may include among the third parties, the international organisations (especially the UN), the regional organisations and even the superpowers (after the decouplement of super powers from the regional conflicts) today. The UN activism in settling regional conflicts and crisis prevention in the last few years highlights the importance of third party negotiation in involving regional conflicts. Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle east in 1974 and Jimmy Carter's mediation and intervention at Camp David were the examples of the ability of the "Third parties" to generate and sustain peace building.¹¹

In particular, the third party consultation¹² has been applied to a number of regional conflicts including

¹⁰ James Lave, "The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third Party Roles in Conflict", pp.17-18. (F.N.2).

¹¹ Ibid., p.22

¹² R.J. Fisher, "The Third Party Consultation: a method for the study and resolution of conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, (16 March 1972), pp.67-94.

the Middle East, the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, Lebanon, the India-Pakistan Conflict and the Cyprus settlement.

V SUPER POWER SECURITY CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Alexander George terms the superpower code of conduct on "the rules of prudence in US-Soviet relations"-Alexander George enumerates the following rules for managing the superpower Security co-operation and the basic rules of prudence:

1. Neither superpower shall exploit its advantage in a crisis to impose on the other, a policy dilemma between backing down in defeat or desperately initiating the use force.
2. Each superpower shall operate with great in its policies and actions towards areas of vital interest to the other superpowers.
3. Neither superpowers shall permit a regional ally to drag it into a confrontation or shooting war with the other superpower.

"Each superpower shall accept military intervention by the other superpower in a regional conflict if such intervention becomes necessary to prevent the overwhelming defeat of a regional ally; moreover in order to

remove the other superpower's incentives to intervene in such situation, each super power shall accept responsibility or pressures its regional ally to stop short of inflicting such a defeat on its local opponent.¹³

Evolving a constructive "Code of Conduct" for the superpower relations with each and the Third world attains a very important position in the light of the superpowers activism in the Third world regional conflicts as a part of the bid for hegemony.

Now, however, circumstances have changed and a mutually beneficial and efficient code of conduct and the "new rules of co-existence", (which Gorbachev talks about) could be devised, on the lines of the Declaration of Basic principles agreement of 1972.

Such "new rules" could be-

1. Each bloc's political interests should be pursued through diplomacy not military threats or the use of force.
2. Secondly, taking into account the first rule, each bloc's military forces should be restructured to

13 Alexander L. George, "US-Soviet Efforts to co-operate in crisis management and crisis avoidance", in US-Soviet Security cooperation - Achievements and failures, and lessons ed. George, Farley and Dallin, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988), pp.583-84.

defensive postures and reduced to a balance at subsequently lower levels.

3. Thirdly, the superpowers should not get involved in regional conflicts co-operation should substitute competition.
4. Finally, there should be extensive use of the International organisations, by all the nations in general and the super powers in particular in solving regional and global problems including the regional conflicts.
5. Democratic means of solving regional problems.
6. Superpowers as balancers, as U.K. used to be in the pre-war era.

VI Extensive Arms Control and Demilitarisation measures

Extensive arms control measures should be evolved in order to govern conflict escalation in regional conflicts and effectively halt the arms race . The arms race in the Third World is largely fuelled by weapons from the developed countries, thereby multiplying the propensity of the deadly Third World conflicts.¹⁴ The evolution of an arms control regime which directly seeks

¹⁴ Peter Grior, "Arms Spending Slows Worldwide", Christian Science Monitor, 6th September 1989.

to reduce the vulnerability of regional security areas may enhance The settlement capabilities of erstwhile regional combatants.

Moreover efforts should be made for Third World demilitarisation by adherence to the following principles.-

- Respect for Sovereign equality of States.
- Non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States.
- Non-assistance to terrorists or other subversive activities directed against the regime of another State.
- The recongnition of the inviolability of frontiers.

VII DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PEACE MAKING

Robert F. Randle, has tried to relate the domestic influences on the process of peacemaking and conflict management to more general foreign policy objectives. He enumerates the following organs in the process:

- (1) The public
- (2) The Legislative
- (3) Non military elites
- (4) Decision makers and their advisors.¹⁵

15 Robert F. Randle, "The Origins of Peace, A study of Peacemaking and the structure of Peace Settlements", (The Free Press, New York, 1973).

Public opinion is such a force which policy makers must ultimately reckon with even in authoritarian and totalitarian polities. An alert public opinion could preclude the governors from venturing into unnecessary adventures, or against any unwarranted involvement.

To the extent that the legislature is responsible to the public opinion, the people's will for peace, will elicit a similar response from the legislature. The legislature is an institution; and in the democratic polity there are institutionalised means for the legislature to exert its influence more or less regularly upon the executive. Aside from elections and referendum, the public has no formal means of access. Thus, it is necessary that the Legislature adopts a positive approach to peace making and conflicts management.

To the extent that elites control the legislature through patronage or influence or mobilise the public opinion, of majority of the general public, the legislature will be responsive to the elite opinion. Business leaders and members of certain political and Social groups will prefer indeed, they often demand peace overtures, if the values for which they have associated or organised are threatened by a continuation

of war or conflict.

Finally, the strong personality could add to the process of peacemaking and conflict management. The case of Mikhail Gorbachev, could be cited as one of the recent examples.

The role of Media occupies a very important place in the domestic peace making process. The efficacy of the news media lies in their ability to educate (or propagandise) the public and other elite groups for peace making and conflict avoidance.

THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

The main area of examination in conflict management process the have been conflict management process have been characterised in terms of the following distinct stages :

1. The pre-negotiation phase of formal peace negotiations (what it actually take to get the parties to the negotiating table.
2. The negotiating phase, the negotiations process provides the parties or disputants an opportunity to exchange promises and commitments through which they will resolve their differences and reach an

agreement."¹⁶

The phase of negotiations involves discussions, deliberations, dialogues, conferences, meetings and mediations. Dialogues and discussions occupy a very vital place in the peace making process, as it gradually eradicates the existing confusion and misunderstanding between the two parties.

3. The peace settlement or agreement itself and measures taken concurrently or subsequently to ensure that the parties to the accord live upto their obligations under the terms of agreement.
4. Institutionalising the peace making process in order to reduce the likelihood of a resumption or escalation of conflicts and hostilities.

An elaboration of the following points are essential for the policy makers to foster the peace making processes:

- a) Confidence among the negotiating parties.
- b) There should be a political and technological way to overcome obstacles for achieving consensus.
- c) The time factor should be taken into account for

16 Thomas Colosi, "A Model For Negotiations and Mediation" in Conflict Management and Problem Solving From Interpersonal to International Applications (ed.) (Sandole and Staroste Francis Printer, London, 1987). p.86-87.

negotiations.

- d) One should have a cost-benefit study" or a "Feasibility study" of the whole process.
- e) To have a correct assessment of the influence of both sides.

Professor John Lewis Gaddis¹⁷ has made an important contribution to the research on issues of conflict resolution in the post-cold war world in his coherent thematic analysis of the new context between the forces of integration and fragmentation in the contemporary international environment.

In the lights of these rapid structural change, the following goals seem crucial in conflict management and conflict prevention:

- i) The need for a "middle course" which would avoid "the rocks and shoals that lie on either side". If the logic of war and violence is not to be transferred from global to regional and local levels, a balance has to be maintained between forces of integration and fragmentation at all levels. Professor Gaddis challenges the conventional interpretation of "integration" by arguing that the

17 John Lewis Gaddis, "Towards the post-cold war world", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, pp.102-22.

breaking down of barriers that have historically separated nation and peoples in such diverse areas as politics economics, religion, technology and culture is not necessarily benign. In the Third world especially the contest between the forces of integration and fragmentation could lead to greater legitimisation of the use of violence, unless the procedures of conflict management and resolution are guided by harmonising perceptions and new practices are adopted for strengthening the balance between integration and fragmentation, and major sources potential disruption are avoided.

- ii) Conflict management and prevention should take into account the consequences of both the "collapse" of soviet ideologically motivated values and norms and the nature of redeployment which the United States is undertaking in order to develop a new global military posture. Building of trust among Third World regimes is the issue which lies at the heart of all decision-making for conflict control , and in a changing world policy making must focus on mechanisms by which equilibrium of expectations is achieved. Social psychology can make a very important contribution to overcoming difficulties in

policy coordination and designing systems of peacebuilding. By merely insisting on the political sovereignty of nation states and not taking the broad range historical and contemporary experience on interdependence into account, Third world conflict-managers tend to forgo opportunities provided by the change in the international political landscape.

iii) Finally, a new approach to conflict management and conflict prevention could take advantage of the metadiscourse on the salient goals of maintaining stability in the international political system. Some of Immanuel Kant's assumptions have the potential to provide an interpretative framework which may lead us out of potentially dangerous paths. Kant enumerated two factors which could hasten the achievement of perpetual peace :

1. Fear of danger- This feeling helps the attainment of universal peace through the greatest havoc and destruction brought about by conflict and war. "The greatest source of evils.....which oppressed civilised nations is the ever increasing preparations for a future war".¹⁸

¹⁸ Kant, cited in Howard Williams-Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1983), p.13.

Kant also talks about the code of conduct, controlled military regimes and demilitarisation in the process of peacekeeping. "A small beginning could be made through the international agreement of rules governing the relations of a states at war. This agreement might possibly form the basis of or the increased supervision and regulation of military conflict in turn, lead to a lasting system of general security.

2. The need for the sense of moral responsibility among the citizens of various countries of the world. Not many thinkers on international relations stress about this aspect of peacemaking. This positive approach-the growing sense of moral responsibility put forward by kant touches the thought process of man.

The old saying that "war takes birth in human mind" emphasizes the need of Kant's advocacy of "moral responsibility" as the most effective method in the ablation and education of the human mind for positive good. "Moral maturity will enforce greater international co-operation." And moral maturity could be achieved through a long process of civil education. But regrets that " Our rulers have no money to spend on public-

education.....because all their resources are already placed to the account of the next war".

Kant emphasizes the role and importance of people in the peace making process and therefore advocates for a Republican form of government, where people can get involved in the formulation of political decisions directly or indirectly. The people should have the right to know the reasons for which they are fighting for.

"Once the stage is reached where individuals stand to lose a great deal from war (as opposed to those who are employed to prosecute wars), it is most important from the viewpoint of establishing a permanent peace that states should have Republican constitutions."¹⁹

Conflict resolution and conflict management can in a Kantian sense be related to the fundamental issues in the spread of democracy to the Third world. The prospects of transcending conflict and violence can be strengthened by a rich spectrum of approaches to democratic transitions. The evolving strategies of cooperation at the international level need to be linked to cooperative techniques at the regional level and both should be used to abolish artificial restraints on

19 Kant, Cited in Williams, p.06.

democratic choice. The idiom of a "new European architecture" has been used to stress flexibility in thought and action for completing the process of transformation in Eastern Europe. The Third world should take advantage of the opportunity generated by the innovative programmes of maintaining stability in international political system. At the same time, Prudential controls are necessary for ensuring that conflict resolution follows paths that are the result of conscious decisions in the regional context and not merely the result of blind imitation of blueprints from distant international arenas.

**DECOUPLMENT OF SUPER
POWER RIVALRIES FROM
REGIONAL CONFLICTS**

The pattern of relations that has emerged over the last decade between the super powers is auI generis. The emergence and development of detente II between the US and the Soviet Union reflects a mutual desire to move away from the dangerous confrontationist policies of the cold war era leading to eclectic compromises in the Third Worlds. In the words of Dr Shahram Chubin, it is possible to admit that the US and the Soviet Union are seeking to implement a "regulating competition through agreement on principles or on rules of engagement". These rules of engagement are oriented in two possible directions - agreeing on an area of acknowledged predominance or a passive, joint approach - which can be summarised as a formal decoupling measure.¹

✓ Even where interests conflicted, the concept of "Formal Decoupling" of super powers from the regional conflicts, led to remarkable versatility in the management of conflict. The end of 1980 brought about negotiated settlement of some major regional conflicts which had plagued the Third World throughout the 1970s

1 Dr Shahram Chubin, Ch.1, United States, in Robert S. Litwalk and Samuel F Wells Jr (ed.) Super power competition and security in the Third world, (Cambridge M.A.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), p.22.

and 80s. The Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan under the auspices of the U.N. The Iran-Iraq war which had persisted for most of a decade with enormous loss of life and property came to a halt under a UN sponsored ceasefire. The conflict of Cambodia is being actively negotiated for a peaceful settlement with the help on instrumentalities evolved by fresh bargains between warring factions. A peace agreement was hammered out between Cuban, Angolan and South African representatives under the U.S. mediation to end the thirteen year old war between South Africa and Angola and thus resulted in establishing a Free Independent Namibia. The countries of Central America agreed to a peace plan proposed by Costa Rica's President, Oscar Arias Sanchez. Even on the Korean peninsula which has inherited an almost permanent situation of cold war, signs of flexibility on the part of both Koreas can now be discerned. The unanimity exhibited by both the super powers on measures to solve the Gulf crisis (Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), and the continuing efforts by the United States in solving Gulf crisis, reiterate the commitment by the super powers for "formal disengagement" from the regional conflicts.

The super power relations in the last two decades have been marked by a paradox, due to the incompatibility of the relationship between Arms control structures and general policy management of regional issues. On the one hand, both super powers have sought to stabilize their political relations through arms control agreement that could reduce the danger of nuclear and conventional war and on the other, political relations between the two super powers have frequently been marked by differences over developments in the Third World; thereby contributing significantly to the breakdown of detente and almost wrecking the process of arms control at the end of 1970s. ✓ Former American National Security adviser, Zbigniew Brezensky's famous remark that Salt II lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden somewhat underscores the political reality, i.e. - arms control cannot be separated from the regional issues.

It was important here to highlight the relationship between the arms control and the Saliency of regional issues, as in the past, both the super powers have tended to underestimate the Saliency of regional issues. The CAT (Conventional Arms Transfer Talks), failed as a

result of the fundamental contradiction in the choice of both objective and strategy of super powers, thereby resulting in the refusal of the two super powers, to discuss on the regional issues.² These regional issues may be as important as the arms control negotiation themselves.³

The picture looks absolutely different today, with the "Heros of the Zero Sum" withdrawing away from the regional conflicts, with a sincere and positive approach in solving regional conflicts and tempting the political analysts to declare the emerging of the "post cold war" era of a phase of Neo-Detente".

Why was the Third World considered important and vital to the interest of the super powers?, what are the reasons which compelled the withdrawal of the super powers from the regional conflicts? These are some of the questions one has to answer while discussing the decouplement of super powers.

2 Janne E Nolan, "US-Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Negotiation" in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin ed., US-Soviet Security Cooperation, (Oxford University Press, 1988), p.520.

3 Eduard Luard, "The Super Powers and Regional Conflicts", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986, p.1006-25.

Why the Third World Matters?

One of the most significant features of the globalisation of US-Soviet Cold war has been the prominently increasing role that the Third World plays in the US-Soviet struggle for influence, advantage and security.

For us, it is vital to throw light on the Third World vis-a-vis the super powers, because it is here that most of the regional conflicts have taken place either due to the super powers manoeuvrability and manipulations or due to the internal problems, and finally leading to dangerous confrontations and erosion of super power relations. Since 1960, the United States and Soviet Union have twice moved close to a warlike confrontation. In both cases, the arena of confrontation was the Third World. The first instance was during the Cuban missiles crisis in 1962⁴ and the second occasion the Middle-east crisis in 1973⁵. The Soviet actions in the Third World during the mid and late 1970s, in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan played a major role in

4 Cuba at that time had not yet officially joined the Third World.

5 Alexander L George in Managing US-Soviet Rivalry, (Westview Press: Colorado, 1979), pp.130-48.

undermining and eventually destroying detente.

The interventionists put forward the following arguments as regarding the importance of the Third World in the super power relations. First, it (Third World) is seen as an arena of political competition. Secondly, it is an area of economic importance to both super powers. Third, the Third World is considered to be an arena which is strategically and militarily important to the super powers. Fourth, both recognise the potential of the Third World as a breeding grounds of real and potential instability, and an area of illegitimate and exploitative involvement by the other side. Finally, it is argued that "Domino Effects" and the "credibility costs" endow the Third World status with importance beyond their intrinsic strategic value".⁶

For a better understanding of the above mentioned factors, let us try to analyse each of the factors separately.

IA THEATRE OF POLITICAL RIVALRY

Both the super powers view the Third World as an arena where they could gain the maximum international

⁶ Stephan Van Evara, "Why Europe Matters? Why the Third World does not? American Grand and Strategy ater the Cold War", The Journal of Strategic Studies, London, vol.13, June 1990, pp.18-19.

political mileage by attracting as many countries as possible in the Third World to their strategic fold. Another manifestation of the political rivalry between the two super powers is to use "pro-American" status and "Pro-Soviet" status to illustrate the superiority of the respective model of political-economic organisation. More recently, the United States has pointed frequently to the newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia as proof of the advantages of Free Market Economies.⁷ The Soviet Union also points to the pro-Soviet states, particularly, the states of "socialistic orientation" as shining examples of countries where new societies based on equity, socialistic democracy and fairness to all were being developed. These states included Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania etc. The Soviet Union argued that decades of past colonial exploitation and continued neo-colonialism has complicated the development efforts in these countries, but the Soviet system was the viable alternative and the platform for future advances.⁸

7 George Shultz's address to the Wilson Centre, "ASEAN: A Model for Regional Co-operation", May 27, 1987, in US Department of State, Current Policy, no.965.

8 Daniel S.Papp, Soviet Perspectives of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), Ch.3.

II THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE THIRD WORLD

It is argued that, the Third World nations matter much despite its low industrial output of the fact because of western nation's for their required raw materials. The two super powers were conscious of each other as regarding their intentions to monopolise the Third World raw materials. To quote President Truman in 1952:

"much of Asia... is under attack, and the loss of any of these countries would mean... the loss of vital raw materials, the loss of points of critical strategic importance to the free world."⁹

Dependence on the Middle-east petroleum is only the most dramatic example on a more general Western reliance on the supply of Third World raw materials.¹⁰

As far as the US is concerned, the Third World is also an important trading partner and location for investment. About 5 per cent of the total US oil supply came from Persian Gulf states alone in 1986.¹¹ Between

9 Quoted by Stephan Van Evara, op.cit., p.43.

10 Jerry F. Hough, "The Struggle for the Third World Soviet Debates and American Options", (The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1986), p.02.

11 Time, May 25, 1987.

1980 and 1983, the US imported 35 per cent of its Bauxite from Jamaica and other three per cent from Guinea, 35 per cent of its Cobalt from Zaire and 29 per cent of its manganese from Gabon. During the same period, it also imported 63 per cent of total tin from four Third World countries. The entire chrome supply of US is imported. On US government Board's warns that the US is more vulnerable to a Chromium cut off than a cut off of any other national including oil.¹²

But the Soviet economic interest in the Third World cannot be overlooked either. One recent study of Soviet relations with Third World states concluded that as much as 80 per cent of the Kremlins imports from the Third World in 1980 may have been raw materials.¹³

III AN AREA OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Both the super powers have interests in many areas of the Third World for reasons of state security. The Soviet Union shares borders with the two Third World states (Iran and Afghanistan) and it has within 250 miles of its territory, four other Third World states

12 Van Kvara, op.cit, p.20.

13 S. Papp, op.cit., p.99.

(Syria, Iraq, India, Pakistan). Thus, it is obvious to realise Kremlin's concern about security implications derived from proximity to these states. The US also shares a border with one Third World state (Mexico). President Reagan has on numerous occasions pointed to the security implications of central America and Carribean.¹⁴

Secondly, to sustain the hegemony and to further it, the super powers have used bases or have ports and airfield rights in many of the Third World states. In this view. Third World areas are strategically important if the super powers occupy choice location for bases.¹⁵ For the US, bases in Phillipines and at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean are significant. The Soviet Union, has access to ports and airfields in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Libya, Syria etc., apart from the bases in the Socialist States of Cuba and Vietnam.

Again, both the super powers being two seafaring nations heavily depend on ocean-borne trade. Thus, it becomes vital for both the super powers to maintain the

14 President's Reagan's Address to the Nation, "Central America and the US Security", Current Policy", Washington, number 805, March 16, 1986.

15 Stephan Van Evara, op.cit. p.19.

sea lanes of communication (SLOC)'s around the world.

The naval choke points in the Third World which concerns America are the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar, the strait of Hermuz and the strait of Malacca. The Kremlin also attaches great importance to the southern sea route to transport supplies and equipment from the European Soviet Union to the far east.

The Third World is also viewed by both the US and the USSR, as playing a major role in their geo-strategic plans.

IV THE THIRD WORLD AS A THEATRE OF "ZERO-SUM" AND "INSTABILITY"

Until recently, the Third World was considered by the US and USSR as a theatre of the deadly zero sum game-one man's loss is another man's gain and vice-versa. Despite the two power's greater awareness of the complexity of the Third World instability both remain concerned that the other tries to take advantage of its own weakness in the Third World. Indeed both frequently do move to exploit the other side's vulnerabilities in the Third World. The soviets often sowed disinformation in the Third World, in an effort to undermine US

prestige and influence, also on occasion provided arms to insurgents attempting to overthrow established governments in the name of "national liberation"¹⁶ In the Soviet view, the process of national and social liberation would culminate in the transition to socialism.

For its part, the US under the Reagan Doctrine has taken steps to aid and support insurgents fighting against pro-soviet regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.¹⁷

In other words even where there were possibilities of negotiating differences with flexibility, the "hotbeds of tension in the Third World were a result of collision between an irresistible force (the struggle for national liberation) and an object which though perhaps not immovable was difficult to budge Western and especially American Imperialism"¹⁸

16 S. Niel McFarlane, "Soviet Concept of Regional Security" in Kurt M. Campbell & S.N. McFarlane (ed.), Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas, pp.1-10 and 365-91.

17 Mark N. Katz, "Anti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growing Trend and Passing Phase"? ORBIS (Summer 1986), pp.365-91.

18 S. Neil McFarlane, op.cit., pp.08-09.

A Brief History of the super power involvement in the Third World and the regional conflicts

Two great frozen political blocs opposed each other on almost every international issue, trying to win over by overt force or by covert methods, those who did not belong, perpetuating numerous regional conflicts. Millions died in wars around the World, instigated or exploited by one or other of the two super powers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Third World arena witnessed the "Heros of the Zero sum Game" busy with their calculations, manipulations, devoid of any "ground Rules", or the "Rules of Game".

For most of the post world war II era, United States has seen its policies towards the Third World as being based on a mixture of opposition to expand communism, support for economic development, and promotion for Third World independence and stability. Meanwhile the United States projects the Kremlin as engaging first in Marxist driven expansion but has on occasion moved to a position of viewing Soviet policies to Third World as motivated by combination of Marxist

ideology and traditional Russian Imperialism.¹⁹ At the same time, the Soviet Union considered its own Third World policies to be based on opposition to imperialist expansion, strengthening of Soviet security, and support for the "historical process" of Liberation. Simultaneously the Kremlin believed the United States pursued policies of economic imperialism and suppression of national liberation.

The super power involvement in the Third World can be studied in three distinct phases. The first period from the late 1940s through the early 60s was one of clear predominance of the American presence and influence in the Third World affairs but also witnessed the beginning of expanded Soviet presence and influence in the region. The second period from the mid-1960s to 1980s saw the prepondrence of the Soviet influence and presence in the Third World. The 1980s saw the two super powers adopting a cautious and restrained approach towards the Third World areas, with neither side

19 Papp, Soviet Policies, op.cit., p.29-38. The author identifies six objectives of Soviet Policies towards the Third World - the reduction of US and Western presence and influence, reduction of Chinese promote and influence, expansion of Soviet presence and influence, enhancement of Soviet security, obtaining economic benefits and pursuit of Geo-political and strategic advantage.

appearing too committed to expanding its own presence and influence.

The Soviet policies in the Third World could be perceived in terms of these policy orientations - radical activism, pragmatic activism and crisis prevention.²⁰

Radical activism held that risks of escalation from local conflict to global war were not great as long as Soviet Union was strong and vigorously exploited sensitivities against U.S. counter-revolutionary actions. Risks of escalation in local conflicts were seen as result of U.S. attempts to exploit Soviet defensiveness. The radical activated orientation encompassed the expansive definition of Soviet internationalist duty to aid the process of world revolution, class struggle and the establishment of socialism.

Pragmatic activists favoured relations with moderate states as basis of an anti-imperialist strategy.

Strategy and generally advocated modern means of progressive transformation and aid. They may be

²⁰ George W. Breslaur, "All Gorbachev's Men", *The National Interest* no.12, 1988, pp.991-1000.

supportive of revolutionary change but are cautious in their assessment of a direct Soviet role in the of forces for liberation and skeptical about building effective Soviet influence through radical states alone. Pragmatic activism. It preferred moderate means and moderate targets in securing Soviet interests and it sought to minimise the risks of military confrontation. Thus, pragmatic activism could be active when the broader risks of war with the United States were low.

Advocates of crisis prevention held that risks were inherent in escalation. They analysed the horrendous and mutual consequences of nuclear war and emphasised the urgent Soviet obligation to prevent such conflicts.

The period from mid 1950s to late 1960s was dominated by pragmatic activism. The 80s saw both radical activism and pragmatic activism in operation. The 80s were governed by the policy crisis prevention.

I. First Phase - Throughout most of the first phase, US policies towards the Third World driven by twin challenges of preventing Communist expansion and furthering western influence. The United States also supported decolonisation and economic development, but these considerations were rarely placed near the top of

the policy agenda. The United States used a variety of policy tools to achieve its objectives, including economic and military assistance, establishment of a system of military alliances that extended into the Third and occasional intervention. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 had announced a sweeping US commitment to intervene every where in the world where governments might be threatened by communism regardless of security interests involved in the prospects of success for any American effort.²¹

The American Third World policy in some essential respects was reflected in the document incorporating instructions by the then Secretary of State Acheson in July 1949 to Ambassador-designate Jessup, in the formulation of an American strategy for Asia.

"You will please take your assumption that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in Southeast Asia Area... what I desire is... that we are neglecting no opportunity that would be

21 "America as a World Power: A Realist Approach from Wilson to Reagan", (Scholarly Resources Inc. Washington, 1984), p.165, Courtesy, Norman A Graebner.

within our capabilities to achieve the purpose of halting the spread of totalitarian communism in Asia."²²

Late in June 1950, the Asian containment policies of the United States required a commitment of ground forces to prevent a Communist led country from erasing its boundary with a non-communist neighbour within the concept of the recent conceptualisation of Communist aggression in Asia, the rationale of American involvement in Korea was clear enough. Asia and Far east received a top billing under Eisenhower's policy of "New Isolationism".²³

Reacting to Indochina situation in the 1954, President Eisenhower affirmed John Foster Dulles's stand that, "this nation (USA) must block communist expansion by whatever means were available, if one more nation went down the others, like a row of Dominances would follow."²⁴

While the American interests generally prevailed in the period, the Soviet Union was not far behind. From the Soviet perspective, contemporary international relations were dominated by the struggle between the two competing social systems. One system, the older of the

22 Quoted in Ibid., p.168.

23 The Concept of New Isolationism was a brain child of Joseph R. McCarthy, the then Senator.

24 Time, April 19, 1954, p.19, Eisenhower's Press Statement of April 7, 1954.

two was based on capitalism and private ownership and was headed by the United States. The other system, socially more advanced despite its comparative youth, was based on socialism and public ownership and was headed by the Soviet Union.

Despite Soviet claims, that the contemporary international relations was dominated by an intersystemic struggles, the Soviet authorities recognised that a considerable percentage of the world's states were allied neither to the socialist bloc nor to thus capitalist bloc, and most of these were colonised or had been under imperialist domination. This recognition has led the Soviet leaders to develop a conception of the origin of the Third group states which in Soviet terminology was "the developing world", "the newly independent states", "the liberated countries", "the emerging states", "the young nations" etc.²⁵ and about their role in the ongoing struggle between the socialist and the capitalist system.

To Lenin, Capitalism, meant not only exploitation but also imperialism and war and only by eliminating

25 Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis, (Lexington Mass., Lexington Books, 1985), p.01.

capitalism could be exploitation, imperialism, and war be eliminated.²⁶ To Stalin,²⁷ communist had to "break the ongoing sleep of the oppressed people of the East" and "rouse them to fight imperialism", for without the colonial peoples "the definite triumph of socialism" was "unthinkable". Therefore, one duty of the communists was to intervene in the growing spontaneous movement in the East and to develop it further into conscious struggle "against imperialism".²⁸ Meanwhile, Stalin's post war view on developing nations changed, decrying the independence of the new nations and terming the national bourgeoisie of these countries as imperialist collaborationists and counter-revolutionaries, even including Gandhi and Nehru in the fold. Stalin argued that the Soviet Union could not afford to involve itself with the colonial world.

26 Ibid., p.5.

27 During Stalin Era, all wars were classified into four different types:

1. War in defence of the Socialist Homeland.
2. Civil War between proletariat and bourgeoisie
3. National Liberation wars, and
4. Wars between imperialists states. According to Stalin, the only type of war in the Third World that involved the indigenous popular forces, were wars of national liberation. The Communists have to help the Third World in their cause of national liberation.

28 Quoted from Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Perceptives, op.cit., p.06.

However, in the post war period, after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union abandoned Joseph Stalin's position that the Third World was not a significant independent actor in world affairs. In a formal sense, Stalin's outlook was finally rejected at the twentieth Congress (XX Congress) of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in 1956.²⁹ In this report Khrushchev proclaimed that a "zone of peace" including socialist and non-socialist states had arisen in Europe, Africa and Asia. At the policy level, the Soviet Union had in 1955 already begun to supply selected non-communist Third World states with economic and military aid. Much of this economic assistance was directed toward large scale projects such as Aswan Dam in Egypt; the Stadium in government complex in Accra, Ghana; and the Bhilai Steel plant in India. Though there were the Soviet arms transfers made to Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Yemen and Cuba, they were not made to national liberation movement (except Yemen & Algeria which had requested them) but to governments which had requested them.

But the Soviet Union's military aid surprisingly

29 Mark, N. Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought, (Croom Helm, London and Canberra, 1982), pp.13-34.

remained limited throughout the period. We could attribute certain compulsions and developments during the Khrushchev regime to this fact. In his speech reporting on the 1960 Moscow Congress, Khrushchev abandoned the traditional Soviet military classification (F.N.27) and substituted his own classification with three categories - world wars, local wars and wars of national liberation.³⁰ Applying the concept of justness to this categories, Khrushchev declared that a world war was unjust because, it threatened to destroy everything, including socialism. The local wars were also unjust because they led to world war but national liberation wars were just and should be encouraged and supported.

But there seemed to be a contradiction in Khrushchev's policy. While national liberation wars were to receive Soviet support, the Soviet Union was also to avoid potential clashes with United States in local wars. In other words, Soviet support would be forthcoming only upto the point when a national liberation war threatened to become a war between states. The USSR would not become involved in local wars

³⁰ Ibid, p.23.

which the US entered.³¹

With the exception of the Cuban missile crisis, the USSR was extremely cautious about undertaking military actions in the Third World, including arms transfers. Khrushchev's optimism of a "peaceful co-existence"³² resulted in a contradiction in the stance of the military and party during Khrushchev era. Nevertheless, thinking about conflict in the Third World became much more developed during this era and it was evident that the Soviet Union intended to become more developed during this era and it was evident that the Soviet Union intended to become more active in Third World affairs. Indeed, by the time, he was ousted as party leader in 1964, Khrushchev had visited Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India and Indonesia and with his unflagging energy developed new arenas of competition. By mid 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union had in fact become rivals in many Third World countries.

31 Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1964), pp.118-24.

32 At the 20th CPSU Congress, 1956, Khrushchev stated that through pursuing a policy of peaceful co-existence, the Soviet Union would make sure that world war did not occur.

II The Second Phase

The phase which stretches from the mid 1960s to the end of 1970s is characterised by the operation of Soviet policies of "Radical activism" and "Pragmatic activism",³³ inspite of a few set backs for the Soviet support for "national liberation movement", in the Third World.

On the American side, both Kennedy and Johnson accepted without question, the assumptions and objectives of national action abroad which had been established earlier by Truman and Eishenhower. The uncritical acceptance of Soviet and Chinese aggressiveness determined the responses of the United States till the Johnson years. Such assumptions underwrote the continued American commitment to NATO, the support of Asian allies in SEATO and elsewhere, the non-recognition of the Beijing Regime, and the war in Indochina. All these politics reflected the single goal of containing communist power in all its forms as the organised determined enemy of the western world.

But in contrast to the Soviet activism in the Third World during this phase, the United States was

33 Wallander, op.cit, p.36.

reappraising its role in the Third World. In 1965, the United States spent \$3 billion (measured in 1961 dollars) on economic assistance to Third World states - 0.5 per cent of the US GNP. By 1974, United States spent only \$2 billion (Measured in 1961 dollars) on economic aid - 0.28 per cent of the GNP. American hesitancy to get involved in Third World affairs had clearly moved beyond military.

The barriers to US activism in the Third World were clear. The US activities in the Third World got constrained by a combination of reaction to the Vietnam war, the Watergate scandal, and the congressional executive branch deadlock over presidential power and foreign policy.

Nixon expressed the sense of limits to pax-Americana in his address at the US Naval Academy in June 1974: "America was no longer a giant towering over the rest of the World with seemingly inexhaustible resources and a nuclear monopoly."³⁴

The Soviet Union enjoyed a fruitful phase, and throughout the period, it attempted to increase its presence and influence in the Third World. But the

34 Graebner, op.cit, p.250.

Soviet policy received setbacks in the initial years of the phase with the removal of Sukarno in 1965 by Indonesian military, sacking of Ben Bella in Algeria in 1965, Kwane losing power in Ghana in 1956, and the removal of Keita in Mali in 1968. But in spite of the setbacks, Kremlin's contacts in the Third World persisted and even expanded in number. By mid 1970s, about Forty Third-World countries received Soviet economic and as many as twenty eight Third World states received Soviet military assistance. In absolute terms, Soviet economic and military aid to the Third World states also expanded considerably during this time. Between 1955 and 1965, the Kremlin extended over \$2 billion of economic assistance over \$4.5 billion of military expenditure to Third World states; these figures climbed, respectively to \$ 9 billion and \$9.2 billion for the following decade.³⁵

The growth of Soviet military power was a second factor that abetted the program and sought to promote revolution in the developing world. In this period, the Soviet Union, slowly but steadily also improved its

35 Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Policies toward the Developing World During the 1980s: The Dilemmas of Power and Presence, (Montgomery Air University, 1986), pp.14-20.

ability to project military force. Soviet attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s was equally important. The U.S. acceptance of that parity, constrained the ability of the United States to intervene whenever it desired, without fear of Soviet response. The growth of Soviet force projection capabilities also carried immediate benefits, not only as evident by the USSR's successful airlift of military supplies and equipment to Egypt during the 1973 Arab - Israeli war but also by the creation of a blue water navy to show the flag - and influence events - in regions of the world far removed from Soviet soil.³⁶

Significantly, Soviet officials during the early 1970s began to comment regularly on the external functions of the Soviet military. In 1974, the Soviet Minister of Defence Andrei Grechko observed that:

"the historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not restricted merely to this, defending our mother land and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity, the Soviet state actively and purposely opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resist

36 Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perspective...*, op.cit. (pp.14).

imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear..."³⁷

The early 1970s also marked the emergence of an era of "detente". The urge for mutual restraint by the two powers resulted in the signing of the "Declaration of Basic principles, on the last day of the Brezhnev-Nixon summit in May 1972. The second principle of the declaration specifically stressed that both sides would exercise restraint in their mutual relations and settle differences by peaceful means."³⁸

From the American point of view, "Detente" was justified in part by the need to moderate Soviet behaviour and "finding an honourable exit from Vietnam".³⁹

An additional goal which Nixon and Kissinger sought

37 Andrei Grechko quoted in US Department of Defences, Soviet Military Power (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982), p.9.

38 Alexander L. George, "The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972: Origins and Expectations", in Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Westview Press, Boulder, Colombia, 1983), pp.105-106.

39 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation - American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp.69-70.

to achieve was the creation of a "network of relations" that would restrain Soviet behaviour.⁴⁰ From the Soviet point of view, detente was made possible by the parity, it attained with America, in terms of military strike capability.

"Parity does not mean absolute equality of available means. It means that we can mutually destroy each other".⁴¹

But the Soviets never believed that detente should effect either Soviet domestic policy or Soviet support for revolutionary and socialist regimes abroad.

Brezhnev himself, after the signing of the 1972 and 1973 agreements, told the World Congress of peace-loving forces that, "revolution, the class struggle and liberation movements cannot be abolished by agreements. No power on the earth is capable of revising the inexorable process of renovation of the life of society."⁴² Moscow saw in detente a "means of curbing the aggressive forces of imperialism and stopping

40 Harry Gelman, "Rise and Fall of Detente", Problems of Communism, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, mar-April, 1985.

41 Col. D. Proecktor, Cortsey, Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, op.cit., pp.57-58.

42 Cited in Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, op.cit., pp.42-44, Speech Date 26 October 1973.

imperialist export of counter-revolution."⁴³

It was perhaps this stand of the Soviet Union that led to a spurt in the Soviet activism in Third World in the mid and late 1970s, thereby eroding the spirit of detente in the process.

The Soviet activism began with the joint Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975.⁴⁴ Moscow radically supported MPLA (Popular movement for liberation of Angola) with arms and helped it come to power thereby making inroads in a strategically important country.

Between 1975 and 1979, seven pro-Soviet communist parties seized power or territory in Asia or Africa:

1. In the spring of 1975, North Vietnamese troops took control of South Vietnam.
2. At the same time, the pathet Lao, Clients of the North Vietnamese, took power in Laos.
3. In the Angolan civil war of 1975-76, Augustinho Neto's popular movement for the liberation of Angola

43 Gromyko and Ponomarev, (History of the Foreign Policy of USSR, Moscow, 1986). Cited in Roger C. Marwick, "Peaceful co-existence, Detente and Third World Struggle: The Soviet View, From Lenin to Brezhnev", Australian Journal of International Studies, Jan. 1991, pp.183.

44 Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and The Third World" in Foreign Affairs, 1986, pp.717.

(MPLA) defeated all other contenders of power.

4. In Feb. 1977, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power Ethiopia.
5. In april 1978, Nur Mohammed Taraki's people's party seized power in an armed coup in Afghanistan.
6. In June 1978, the community in the rulers of coalition of South Yemen carried out a successful armed coup against the non-communists.
7. In Jan. 1979, the North Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and replaced the Pol Pot government with a pro-Soviet regime.⁴⁵

Though, not solely responsible, the Soviets were actively involved in all these instances. The activism of this period resulted in an increase in the number of Third World Marxist-Leninist clients which rose from three in mid 1960s to almost 20 a decade and half later.⁴⁶ In the same period, the total cost of the Soviet empire rose, from an estimated range of 13.6 billion to \$21.8 billion in 1971 to between \$35.9

45 Donald Zagoria, "In to the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World" in Hoffman and Fleron Jr. (eds.) Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1980), pp.495-96.

46 Fukuyama, op.cit. p.717

billion and \$46.5 billion in 1980.⁴⁷

The Soviet stand on the erosion of detente was made clear in "History of Soviet Foreign Policy (1986). This official compilation concludes that, adherence to detente was one sided and the US did enough to erode the Basic Principles Agreement (BPA) July 1972 saw the expulsions of Soviet military adviser from Egypt (on Sadat's initiative but to Washington's advantage), Dec. 1972 witnessed the unprecedented US carpet bombing of Hanoi, and in 1973 Sept. Allende's govt. in Chile was overthrown with the connivance of CIA. October saw the greatest debacle of all, a US nuclear alert during the Middle east wars was followed by a humiliating Soviet backdown.⁴⁸

Amidst the charges and counter charges, one point becomes clear, and that is the fact that misunderstanding of intentions and the lack of "Rules of Game" between the two super powers led to the escalation of regional conflicts in the Third World and this also hindered the arms control process between the two adversaries (shelving of SALT by Carter).

47 Ibid., p.718

48 Courtsey Marwick, op.cit., pp.42-44.

III The Third Phase

As the 1970s drew to a close, to many, it appeared that the 1980s would be a decade of potentially dangerous US-Soviet confrontation and conflict in the Third World. Surprisingly, the feared confrontation and conflict did not come to pass - at least in part because US and Soviet attitudes and policies towards the Third World were seen as more refined and restrained. The 1980s started the development of the "crisis prevention orientation"⁴⁹ amidst the height of hegemonic rivalry.

The United States, galvanized by the capture of American hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in the following month, began to adopt more active policies toward Third World affairs in early 1980s. The fact that, the Soviet Union had embarked upon a major expansion of its influence in the Third World and was willing to use force overtly or covertly. Significantly contributed to the conservative tide, that swept Ronald Reagan into office and to the strong wave of anti-Soviet sentiment that animated his first term.

⁴⁹ Wallander, "Third World in Soviet Military thought", World Politics, vol. 42, no. 1, Oct. 89, p. 37.

In effect, the "Reagan Doctrine" was an effort to apply "Rollback Theory" of the 1950s in Eastern Europe to the Third World. It differed however from other doctrines such as the "Truman Doctrine" of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" in that whereas the goals of these doctrines were defensive to support governments threatened by communist insurgencies or aggression - the goals of the Reagan doctrine were offensive: to overthrow or destabilise the established leftist or communist regimes. Indeed the doctrine, reflected a belief that the initiative in the Third World had shifted from the USSR to the US.

US activism in the Third World became more and more evident after Carter left office and Reagan assumed power in 1981. When the United States and Libya confronted each other in the Mediterranean the United States shot down two Libyan fighters. The US military forces landed in Lebanon in 1983 and invaded Grenada later the same year. In 1986 US planes attacked Libya on two separate occasions, once because of Libyan action against US sea operations in the Mediterranean and a second time because of Libyan support for terrorists. Additionally, and importantly, the so called Reagan

doctrine also gave notice that the United States would provide military assistance to national liberation movements fighting radical pro-Soviet regimes in several Third World countries. The United States thus gave military assistance to UNITA in Angola, the Mujaheddins in Afghanistan, the countries in Nicaragua, and the non-communist resistance under norodam Sihanouk in Cambodia, all under the auspices of the Reagan Doctrine.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin pursued a more moderate policy course in the Third World during the 1980s. It did not abandon any of its previous commitments, but neither did it take on any new ones. It must be admitted that Nicaragua and Grenada may or may not be considered exceptions. Thus, although Soviet ties with Nicaragua and Grenada strengthened considerably during the 1980s, a strong case can be made that the ground work for both the Soviet Nicaraguan and Soviet-Grenadian alignments was laid during the preceding period. For example, five Soviet Generals visited Managua within a few weeks of Sandinista's July 1979 victory,⁵⁰ and the Sandinistas and CPSU signed a party to party agreement in March 1980.

⁵⁰ Robert S. Likien, *Fantacism and Facts*, "The Soviet Union and Nicaragua", *Current History*, Oct. '84, p.315.

The Soviets appeared to be trying to consolidate previously attained positions rather than taking on new commitments. Many factors may have been responsible for the Soviet inactiveness during this period - resource limitation, questions about benefits, a succession crisis, a greater US assertiveness etc.

Gradually in political security and economic matters the adversarial relationship of the two super powers moved beyond existing structural commitments, and the will to intervene militarily in the Third World affairs markedly diminished. This led to a formal "Decouplement of super powers" from the regional conflicts and the onset of an era of "post-cold war" or "neo-Detente".

Before analysing the policy changes of the super powers following the rise of power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, it will be useful to enumerate the costs of cold war to the participants and the factors leading to the decouplement of superpowers from regional conflicts.

THE VALUE OF THE "ZERO SUM GAME"

What can have caused the swift transformations from cold war to unprecedented detente? According to Paul

Kennedy, the author of the best selling, "The Rise and the Fall of Great powers" (1987), the simplest answer is that:

1. when security commitments and economic strength of great powers, move out of balance, they fall into decline. The implication is that the United States and the Soviet Union are at such a point today.
2. Secondly, due to the reason, that the Soviet Union "cracked". Unable to match the American re-armament programme because of its inefficient and stagnant economy, a more realistic leadership under Gorbachev decided that compromise was necessary.
3. Thirdly, having failed to "Win" the arms race, the Soviet Union needed to get out of the economic crunch as expeditiously as possible.
4. Fourthly, due to the appreciation of mutual folly of the mad arms race by the two super powers. In other words, Kennedy says they (US & USSR) "began to ponder the lessons of history".
5. Finally, the ironical message that, the losers of the second world war Japan and Germany becoming the real winners of the cold war, struck home the point that threats to economic security was more serious

than threat to military security.⁵¹

According to Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's changing attitude is attributed to their reassessment of three following issues after the death of Brezhnev, in Nov. 1982.

1. The economic cost of Third World empire.
2. The impact on US-Soviet relations of Soviet activism and
3. The poor economic and political performance of Moscow's recently acquired Marxist Leninist allies.⁵²

THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS

Paul Kennedy's thesis regarding the economic crunch compelling the super powers to disengage themselves from the Third World activism may be fully applicable in case of the Soviet Union. It appears that under Communist rule (i.e. from 1917) though the Soviet Union has been able to achieve unprecedented progress in military

51 Paul Kennedy, "Super powers, Learning from History", Hindustan Times, Dt. 4th June, 1990, Reproduced from Los Angeles Times.

52 Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the Third World, op.cit., p.718.

technology, thereby achieving parity with USA or superceding it, in almost every aspect of military affairs, the performance in economic and the other technological fields has been dismal. The GNP growth rate, estimated at 6 per cent per annum in 1960s, 4 per cent per annum in the 1970s and 2 per cent per annum in the early 1980s has been stagnant for the past several years. This economic backwardness has brought to the fore many complicated social issues which are threatening Soviet Society with disintegration. As some Western political theorists have been calling it, the Soviet Union is only "One dimensional great power, whose might depends on a single component- the military".⁵³

Gorbachev, in Perestorika, spoke of a society in crisis. He recognised that it would be difficult, if not impossible to finance the investment required to expand productivity and make the Soviet Union into strong competitor in the global market, in the twenty first century without reducing, the inordinately high level of defence expenditures. The most prominent critic of open ended Soviet Assistant to Third World clients was Brezhnev's immediate successor, Yuri

⁵³ Review of International Affaris, vol. XXXIX, no. 925, Belgrade, pp. 3-8.

Andropov., who in June 1983 said: "We contribute also, to the extent of our ability, to (The Socialist oriented states) economic development".⁵⁴

For USA though the economic crunch is not all that acute as that of the Soviet Union, but the superiority in the economic sphere which it lost to Japan and Western Europe, have undoubtedly caused to change its world vision towards the present World orders. The continued domestic economic recession over the last two decade has considerably weakened the position of the USA in the capitalist world. By 1953, the American percentage of world economy was 44.7 percent, by 1980, it had fallen to 31.5 percent and it was still falling.⁵⁵

Kennedy argues that, the uncompetitiveness of US industrial products abroad and the declining sales of agricultural exports have together produced staggering deficit in visible trade-\$160 billion in twelve months to May 1986. The continuation of such trends, would push the US national debt around \$ 13 trillion by the

54 Cited in Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the Third World, op.cit., pp.718-19.

55 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Confrontation from 1500 to 2000, (Fontana Press, London, 1988), p.558.

(fourteen times that of 1980).⁵⁶

US FEDERAL DEFICIT, DEBT AND INTEREST ⁵⁷

	In Billion of Dollars		
	Deficit	Debt	Interest on Debt.
1980	59.6	914.3	52.5
1983	195.4	1387.9	87.8
1985	202.8	1823.1	129.0

But it cannot be said that the U.S. cannot fight another cold war, but the domestic economic constraints and its relegation in world economic market to Japan, have forced the US to think in terms of disarmament and development. The American economic constraints could be judged from the fact that, the US could not bear the financial cost of the Gulf War all by itself, which could have been possible a decade back.

RISK OF DESTRUCTION THROUGH NUCLEAR WAR

Another important factor which is common to both super-powers and which influenced them to change their world vision in the increasing awareness of the

56 Ibid., pp.680-81.

57 Ibid., pp.681.

dangers of bi-polar confrontations and nuclear warfare. With their military capabilities in particular, with their nuclear arsenal, both superpowers have had only one option before the war - either existence or non-existence.

Nearly fifty years after Albert Einstein developed the nuclear bomb, the worlds inventory of such weapons has increased from zero to fifty thousand. On average, each of them has a destructive power approximately thirty times that of Hiroshima bomb, a few of which could destroy the whole world.

✓ Taking the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) doctrine into consideration, the superpowers had reached a consensus that, in this nuclear age, crisis management is dangerous, difficult and uncertain, it is not possible to predict with confidence the consequences of military action between the superpowers and their allies because of misjudgement, misinformation and miscalculation and therefore, all efforts should be made for crisis avoidance, the result of which could be seen in the signing of the INF Treaty 1987. ✓

"It is crystal clear that in the World we live in, the world of nuclear weapons, any attempt to use them to

solve Soviet-American problems would spell suicide."⁵⁸

IRRELEVANCE OF IDEOLOGY

Another factor responsible for the changing superpower attitude towards the world is the failure and the irrelevance of the Soviet ideology based on Marxism-Leninism in bringing about long-lasting solutions to the Socio-economic problems that the Soviet Union has been facing. It appears that Marxist-Leninist ideology has not been successful in providing concrete solutions to such problems as the economic crisis, national and ethnic issues, the evergrowing bureaucratic power, human rights, the tendency towards autocratic rules etc. As a result, the belief in communism as both a prophecy and a vision of the world has eroded ...the attractiveness of the Soviet model and thereby the Soviet Union as such has become tarnished by a number of bad experiences. As a result, with time, the second important component of Soviet Union's power next to the military component - ideology, also began to loose credibility. What is more, its ideology began to be counter productive, with

58 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New thinking for Our Country and the World, (New York, Harper & Row, 1987), pp.219.

the ideological arsenal at its disposal, the Soviet Union did not manage to insure for itself even a relatively optimal economic development, much less keep abreast of the outmoded capitalist development.⁵⁹ The growing disillusionment with communism has led Soviet Society to seek a more pragmatic political philosophy to deal with its internal and external problems. This conviction has been clearly manifested with the introduction of "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" by Gorbachev, based on the principles of re-examination, correction and modernization of old policies, beliefs and concepts in order to deal effectively with the new challenges.

THE DISTORTION OF SOCIAL VALUES AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

The domestic problems and the degradations of social values have in some way contributed to the changing super power attitudes towards the World order. The socio-economic problems in the Soviet Society have forced the leaders in Kremlin to shift the emphasis from military adventurism to domestic problems.

⁵⁹ Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, vol. XXXIX, no. 925, pp. 3-8.

In USA, as a result of the high defence expenditure and low economic growth, the society is facing, unacceptably, high levels of unemployment, particularly among the blacks and teenagers a rapidly growing "under class", high and rising rates of drug abuse and drug related crime, a failure to adequately address the problems of the poor and disadvantaged; a deteriorating physical infrastructure; severe distortion in sectoral and regional growth patterns; and irresponsible economic policies toward other nations in both the developed and developing world.⁶⁰

Both U.S. and Soviet foreign policies have to focus on modifying their structural commitments to unlimited global rivalry and develop meaningful contact for overcoming Socio-economic problems.

RISE OF GORBACHEV

The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, could be seen as the most significant opinion forming influence for stabilising the process of super power decouplement. Mikhail Gorbachev represents a profound break with the Soviet past. Gorbachev presented the West with an

⁶⁰ Paul Kennedy, op.cit., p.686-87.

unprecedented opportunity to redefine the basic assumptions and conditions of East West relations. In his words and his deeds, he appears to offer the west the optimum chance to end the cold war.

The new thinking of Gorbachev which helped bringing about a super power rapprochement can be grouped in the following.

1. A nation's security interests should be pursued through diplomacy, nor military threats or use of force. "The use of threat of force no longer can be an instrument of foreign policy".⁶¹
2. Secondly, security can not be pursued unilaterally, it must be strengthened in co-operation with other states. "In the context of the relations between the USSR and USA, Security can only be mutual and if we take international relations as a whole it can only be universal."⁶²
3. Thirdly, Co-operative efforts to solve Global and regional problems. In addition to seeking to lessen the superpower tensions, Gorbachev has proposed

61 Gorbachev, Dec.7, 1988, Speech to UN, New York Times, Dec. 1988, p.A16.

62 Gorbachev, Feb.1986, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), p.72.

strengthening mechanisms for diffusing potential Third World conflicts.

The new thinking unleashed by Gorbachev made the "Reagan doctrine" obsolete, thereby ushering a "superpower Detente" and the "superpower Decouplement" from the regional conflicts.

In the next few pages, we will be enumerating the events signifying the formal decouplement of the superpowers from the Third World conflicts.

TRENDS IN SUPERPOWER DISENGAGEMENT FROM REGIONAL CONFLICTS

The post-cold war era marks a tendency by both the US and the USSR in disengagement from the regional conflict, in redefining their Third World policies and the reassessment of their priorities. As a result, the complex and inter dependent world today presents a different picture than it did a few years back. "The countries are just at the very beginning, of a long road to a long lasting peaceful period".⁶³ The post cold war era reflects a superpower rapproachment over solving regional conflicts rather than the superpower rivalry

63 Gorbachev's statement during Malta Summit 1989, Dec. 2-3. Courtsey Keeshing's Record of World Events, vol. XXXIV, July 1988.

over differences on the regional issues. The joint statement by both the superpowers over the latest Middle East crisis bears testimony to this fact.

"Nothing short of complete implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions is acceptable."⁶⁴

There has emerged a determined endeavour by the super powers in resolving the regional conflicts in the last few years, culminating in the resolution of the Afghan crisis, Iran-Iraq war, Namibian Problem, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and scores of other events. "The US, Soviet and multilateral co-operation need to anticipate regional conflicts and try to resolve them before they lead to war. Regional conflicts prevention must become a goal of US-Soviet co-operation.

The Soviet attitudes toward the Third World and the role of regional conflicts have changed significantly under Gorbachev. Soviet analysis have come to see the Third World as far more complex and unstable than they had previously believed, at the same time, they have begun to show greater appreciation of non-class factors such as religion, tribal rivalries and ethnic

64 Joint US-USSR Statement in Helsinki, Quoted by James Baker, in the Speech to American Committee on US-Soviet Relations Oct. 19th 1990, Current Policy, no.1309, Wshington D.C.

nationalism in fostering conflicts in the Third World.⁶⁵

Soviet thinkers have also begun to revise their views about the transition from capitalism to socialism in these states. In many Third World states, in fact, capitalism is seen as experiencing a "Second Wind" while the majority of Socialist oriented countries are in a state of deep stagnation. Andres Kozirev, a Foreign Ministry official puts it in the following words, "Most countries in the Third World are suffering not so much from capitalism as its shortage"⁶⁶ The Soviet Union, today considers, the gains from the advancement of Soviet interests in the Third World, as far more ambiguous and transitory than they were a decade ago.

The Soviet leaders today, attach a significant importance to maintaining equilibrium and control in the regional conflicts Third World, "The under-estimation of the relevance of the Third World to bilateral Soviet-american relations, was one of the reasons why the emerging important agreements in the military strategic

65 Neil McFarlane, "The USSR and the Third World - Continuity and Change under Gorbachev", The Hariman Institute Forum, pp.1-7.

66 Andris Kozirev, "Confidence and a Balance of Interests", International Affairs, (Moscow, March 1989), p.68.

sphere were disrupted in the mid 1970's.⁶⁷

The expensive optimism vis-a-vis prospects in the Third World that characterised the Brezhnev era has been replaced by a much more sober, even pessimistic view of the prospects for social transformation and political gains in Soviet Union.

The new Soviet approach to regional conflicts and the Third World is reflected in the following prescriptions:

1. Adherence to the "Rules of Conduct" and joint endeavour with the US in resolving the regional conflicts. Instead of seeing the regional conflicts as opportunities for unilateral gains, the Soviets now and to stress ways in which the two super powers can co-operate to dampen them. Mikhail Gorbachev said in Fall 1989. "The Soviet Union alone can not resolve all these issues. And we are not ashamed to repeat this, calling for international co-operation."⁶⁸

67 Andris Kozirev and Andris Shomikhin, "East and West in the Third World", *International Affairs*, Mar. 1989, p.68.

68 Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, op.cit. p.137.

2. Renouncing the efficacy of Marxist-Leninist Ideology and the Export of Revolutions. Gorbachev's new-thinking has also broken with classical Marxism-Leninism by declaring that conflict need not be considered the norm in the international system. In "Perestroika" Gorbachev wrote that the concept of class struggle-perhaps the basic Marxist conception-should be replaced by "peaceful co-existence" and mutual interdependence".⁶⁹

Again, Moscow has modified its attitude towards support for "national liberation movements, explicitly renouncing, the "Export of Revolution". The report of Mikhail Gorbachev to the 27th party Congress says- "Gone are the ringing offers of military and economic support for the "Liberated countries".⁷⁰

3. Faith in international organisations.

Another feature of the new Soviet-approach is the faith in the international organisations especially the UN as a means of resolution of conflicts. After

69 Ibid. 146-49.

70 Cited in Fukuyama-Gorbachev and the Third World, op.cit., p.715.

viewing the UN as a club house and a propaganda forum, the Soviet Union has begun to realise the potential of the UN as a peacemaker. The soviet endorsement of Resolution 598 and Resolution 678 of the Security Council bear testimony to this fact.

In Sept. 1987, Gorbachev outlined an eleven-point proposal for expanding the authority of the United Nations on such issues as military conflicts, international economic relations, terrorism and global environmental issues. He suggested granting the UN Security Council with greatly broadened powers in the sphere of conflict resolution and the verification of arms control and peace treaty.

In Oct. 1987, the Soviets announced their intention to pay in full their outstanding \$ 225 million debt to the United nations.⁷¹

The UN mediation in Afghanistan conflict provided an important faced saving means for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and has enhanced the value of the organisation in Soviet eyes. The Soviets see the Afghan accord as a possible model for resolution of

⁷¹ New York Times, Oct. 16, 1987.

other regional conflicts.⁷²

Moscow's efforts in the settlement of regional conflicts is visible in almost all parts of the Third World. Although, not all tensions have been ended, the position of the adversaries are often far apart and there persist major divergences on a number of points between the Soviet Union and the United States resulting in the cancellation of the latest Bush-Gorbachev Summit more than once. Nevertheless, recent years have witnessed progress towards settling practically all conflicts.

As a result of sustained efforts, a package agreement on an Angolan Namibian Settlement was signed on Dec. 2, 1988, in New York.⁷³ It was a major breakthrough in ending one of the long standing conflicts in South West Africa. The accords reached made it possible to use UN mechanisms for the Decolonisation of Namibia.

Before 1988, the Soviets showed little interest in settling the Angolan dispute (They initially opposed any

72 Sheverdnadze's Speech, July 1988, the 19th All Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. *International Affairs*, (Moscow, Oct. 1988), p.22

73 USSR Foreign Ministry Survey, *International Affairs*, (Moscow, Jan. 1990, p.30).

linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban troops and independence for Namibia).

Guaranteeing the external security of the peoples' Republic of Angola was an important result of the settlement in South West Africa. South Africa's troops have pulled out of Angola. This made it possible to proceed to a phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops stationed in Angola at the request of its legitimate government to repulse south African aggression.

The plan for an intra-Angolan Settlement drawn up in June 1989 by the leaders of 18 African countries at a meeting in Gbadolite on the basis of an Angolan leadership proposals won the approval of the organisation of African Unity (OAU) and international community as a whole.⁷⁴

Soviet policy towards South Africa has also undergone a revaluation. Today there is far less optimism regarding the collapse of South African regime. At the same time, the Soviets have begun to down play the idea of an armed struggle and put emphasis on the need for a political settlement.⁷⁵

74 Ibid., p.30

75 Christopher Cocker, "Moscow and Pretoria" A Possible Alignment, *The World Today*, January 1988, pp.6-9.

In May 1989, the leadership of Ethiopia, a country close and friendly to Soviet Union, took a major peace initiative. It called on Eretreian Organisations to start talks without strings in order to end the year long fratricidal war in the northern part of the country. The first round of Such talk took place in Atlanta, US.

The Soviet Union has pledged full support for the peace initiative, it is willing to contribute by every means at its disposal to the negotiating process between Addis Abbaba and the Eritrean rebels".⁷⁶

Moscow has shown an increasing interest in a political settlement of conflict in Central America. After president Bush came to power in US the Soviet American dialogue on the problem of a settlement in the region assumed a more constructive character. In view of an overall detente, in the military, political situation in Central America and following appropriate consultation with the Sandinista government, the Soviet Union suspended from early 1989, arms delivery to Nicaragua.⁷⁷ This decision played an important part in

76 USSR Foreign Ministry's Survey, op.cit. p.31.

77 Ibid., p.32.

creating an atmosphere that helped the five central American presidents reach agreement.

Soviet policy in the Middle East has also recently undergone a significant shift. The primary soviet objective to limit the political and military influence of the US - remains unchanged,⁷⁸ but there has been a greater emphasis on "conflict avoidance" and even "conflict resolution" in order to eliminate prospects of American military engagement.⁷⁹ This can be seen above all in Moscow's willingness to support the "UN mediation of the Iran-Iraq war (Resolution 598) as well as resolution No. 678 of Security Council calling Iraq to withdrawal from Kuwait.

The Soviet Union has come to pay an active part in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. "One way to achieve this aim (averting an escalation of hostilities) would be to end arms deliveries from without to all Cambodian parties in the conflict and desist from

78 During the Gulf War, the Soviet Union was accused of maintaining a pro-Iraq stand in stationing Soviet military experts in Iraq, during the war. A Soviet military official said during an interview with BBC that, the USSR can not afford to lose what it has got through persistent efforts.

79 Primakov, "USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts", *International Affairs*, (Moscow), no.6, p.7-8.

interfering in the conflict and desist from interfering in Cambodia's internal affairs, in any form, moves likely to aggravate the situation. The Soviet Union has called on some countries to announce a moratorium on military aid to all Cambodian forces".⁸⁰

The above discussion highlights the fact that, the Soviet's view of the world and of the US-Soviet competition has clearly changed. In their new thinking they are now in the process of reevaluating a broad range of policies and potential costs, including reconsideration of the nature of security in the contemporary world; the importance of co-operative solution to regional and global problems; Soviet diplomatic activity in the Third World, etc.

THE US APPROACH TO THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR.

The change in the American approach toward the regional conflict came during the second phase of the Reagan Administration in reaction to the drastic changes carried out by Soviet Union under Gorbachev, both in its domestic and foreign policies through "perestroika and "Glasnost". The First phase of Reagan administration

80 USSR Foreign Ministry Survey, op.cit. p.30.

was marked by the intensity of the "Reagan Doctrine"-the provision of military aid by the United States and its allies to guerrillas fighting against pro Soviet Marxist Third World regimes. The "Reagan Doctrine" remained active and meaningful (from the American point of view till the rise of Gorbachev.

Gradually, the Reagan Doctrine began to lose its relevance, importance and meaning, corresponding to the spectrum of changes made by the Soviet Union in its policies. The doctrine was designed to counter Soviet influence at a time when Soviet expansionism was the most important threat to the US interests and World order. In the changed scenario continuation of the Reagan Doctrine seemed counter productive in the larger context of the US foreign policy.

Subsequently the Reagan administration started co-operating with the Soviet Union in resolving regional conflicts.⁸¹ The most important achievement of the Reagan administration in this field was the signing on 22nd Dec. 1988 of the Angola/Namibia Accords which

81 For example, the US sponsored talks between Angola, South Africa and Cuba. It is true however, that there was little unanimity of Southern African Issues in the administration. On this topic, refer M. Clough, "Southern Africa, Challenges and Choices", Foreign Affairs, 66(5), summer 1988, pp.1066-69.

provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola in return for Namibia's independence. The Accords were a direct result of U.S. mediation, especially by the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker.⁸²

Another attempt by the Reagan administration in resolving regional conflicts was the signing of the Geneva Accords in April 1988, providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The Reagan Administration also deserved considerable credit for making the resolutions of regional conflicts an integral part of the bilateral dialogue with the Soviet Union. Reagan emphasized that the US-Soviet dialogue could not be limited to arms control, but had to include a frank discussion on regional issues. Regional topics were a major subject of discussion at all the summits, reflecting a qualitative change in outlook.

Like Reagan, Bush has given a high priority to the regional issues and made it clear that progress in resolving these issues will have a direct influence on

82 C.W. Freeman Jr., "The Angola-Namibian Accords", *Foreign Affairs*, summer 1989, pp.126-41.

the prospects for an improvement of bilateral relations. The Bush administration adopted the course of pursuing those foreign policy measures that were successful in the past; supporting the NATO, continuing good relations with China and opposing Marxist and other Third World regimes, backed by Moscow. But Bush administration pursuing the Reagan Doctrine to the same degree was not feasible due to the reasons discussed above (Soviet expansionism in doubt). The trend, particularly since Afghanistan appears to be towards an exploration of prospects for super power co-operation in limiting and assisting the resolution of Third world disputes troubling the bilateral Soviet-US relationship. In the absence of truly salient Soviet-US confrontation in the Third World, attention of policy makers seems to have drifted to the matters only tangentially related to Soviet-US competition. The salient issue of the late 80s for example, appeared to be how to get rid of Noriega than how to get rid of Sandinistas, or getting the Arabs and Israelis on to the same table than to refuse Arafat to speak in the UN General Assembly. The thrust today is for a "New World Order" instead of containment.

One sees, in the American literature of current

period, a strong case against Third World intervention. US should cease intervening to protect national securities or to bolster Third World democracy since the results on intervention seldom serve either purpose... The humanitarian purpose of preventing war among Third World states is defeated if American pursues this goal by massive use of force.⁸³ The analysts opine that the conflicts in the Third World are rooted in local causes and that dominions do not necessarily fall.

In this perspective, it is argued that the cold war competition in the Third World is receding. The evolution of perspectives of both powers on the Third World suggests a growing understanding of the code of conduct and the basic rules of precedence as has rightly been coined by Alexander L. George.

But one should always remember that this is not the first time that a super power convergence on regional issues has been made possible. It had also been materialised in the past (Declaration of the Basic Principles of Argument 1972) and had got eroded in course of time. By the end of 1970s, it was all back to square one.

Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to observe that there

is a great deal of differences in degree between the situation right after 1972 and the confusion, disagreement and suspicious between the two super powers were still persistent. This situation today encourages one to think that the phase of neo-detente as the post-cold war in going to prevail and get consolidated due to the positive approach of yester years, "Heros of the Zero Sum", to make the world a better place to live in, leaving behind the unhappy interlude.

**INSTITUTION BUILDING -
PEACE-MAKING OPERATIONS
IN CONFLICT REGIONS**

The end of 80s produced dramatic changes, and rising hopes for a new world free from the risks of war. Several regional conflicts though intractable became amenable to some forms of settlement. With the Super Powers realising the grave dangers of un-constrained competition at the regional level they considered it crucial to set up active dialogue on regional issues to resolve some of these long-standing disputes. But the beneficial effect of a reduction of international tensions were not evenly spread around the globe as was evident from the fact that some regional conflicts continued unabated. These conflicts characterised by the complexity of the issues and the variety of parties involved, continued to be resistant to internal catalysts for settlement of conflicts and third party attempts at peaceful resolution.

These conflicts have thus far resisted the efforts to find a political modus vivendi as they are mostly rooted in a combination of interstate, intra-state and communal interaction.

The peaceful processing of Third World conflicts more often than not is dependent upon the institutionalisation through cease-fires, confidence-building measures, a halt in military aid to insurgents

and domestic political reforms as no peace process begins or ends with formally negotiated peace treaties. The contribution of third parties in these and developments of more durable forms of security cooperation and lasting peace settlement is an important factor in the institutionalization of peace process.

In the changed scenario of new detente in East-West relations and widely perceived declining influence of two Super Powers, the United Nations and other Regional Organizations have a special new role to play in conflict management and settlement process as are capable of containing process of conflict expansion while dismantling key elements of regional conflicts.

Institutions like UN or other regional organizations incorporate special practices of organised roles playing coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the players of these roles. In every case, the existence of an institution sets up a network or pattern behaviors that lends order or predictability to human affairs.¹ Institutionalisation is therefore, considered a

¹ Oran Young, Internal Cooperation, Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p.32.

desirable and perhaps even necessary objective of conflict management as it lends stability and predictability to security relations while helping to deescalate or diffuse armed hostilities. Institutionalised co-operation is especially important in those settings where the parties have little or no prior experience in conflict management, trust is virtually non-existent, security dilemma is acute and cross cultural differences (exacerbating trust and misperception) are great. Within such a setting, partial regimes can serve a number of functions interalia -(i) preventing arms race and crisis instability; (ii) blocking or reducing incentives for escalation; (iii) promoting or facilitating descalatory measures; (iv) regularising new patterns of behaviour and expectations leading to the creation of new and more durable norms of conflict management.

INSTITUTIONALISING UN PEACEKEEPING

The declining utility of the national military force in preventing a conflict or ensuring practical imperatives for peacemaking has raised suspicions regarding its efficacy. Third World conflicts are conflicts that are not amenable to solutions brought

about by the logic of violent contests. Against this backdrop, one should consider the growing utility and the potential peacemaking capability of UN peacemaking. A careful look at recent history demonstrates that multilateral peacekeeping under UN supervision although, certainly no panacea, can be more successful than unilateral and bloc related efforts to dampen military conflicts because the unilateral acts lack legitimacy. Peacemaking by Super Powers and others have been less successful due to their lack of neutrality and legitimacy (for example, the four-power Western intervention in Lebanon in 1982-83, proved disastrous for the United States, and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, failed to stem the rot). On the other hand, peacemaking by UN is considered legitimate because of its following features - neutrality, ² broad international support, adherence to the rules established by the world community and sensitisation to a wider effort to eschew violence.³

2 Alan James, "The Politics of Peacekeeping in the 1980s", in Hugh Hanning ed., Peacekeeping and Technology: Concepts for the Future (New York: International Peace Academy, 1983).

3 Whether in Angola, Namibia, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Central America or Western Sahara - everywhere on turns - UN monitoring is atleast under serious consideration because it offers more hope than unilateral forms of policing.

Article 1.1 of the Charter declares the primary aim of the UN as being to maintain international peace and security. The Charter specifies two chief means to this end, namely, pacific settlement of disputes and collective enforcement against threats to or breach of peace. The trend towards narrowing the permissible range of unilateral resort to force by nation states has been matched by the historical movement to broaden the range of instruments available to states to settle their disputes by means short of war. The UN Charter devotes the entire chapter VI (Articles 33-38) to the subject of the pacific settlement of disputes. The techniques of peaceful settlement ranges from bilateral negotiations between the disputants to formal adjudication by third parties. Pacific settlement thus assumes that war is an outdated technique, for settling international disputes, that prevention of war is both possible and desirable, that the way to achieve this goal is by providing a functional equivalent to war, and that the task of international organisations (especially the UN) therefore is to provide a variety of peaceful substitutes to war and encourage disputants to use them. The Security Council cannot however compel member states to implement resolutions adopted under Chapter VI. The



efficacy of the UN action for the peaceful resolution of disputes is circumscribed by the retention of the principle of voluntarism. Nevertheless, the proposition that the international community has a stake in war avoidance justifying its involvement in bilateral disputes between member states is no longer questioned. Similarly, states wishing to resort to armed force beyond their borders must today act under the pressure of demonstrating that prior attempts at pacific settlement were tried, exhausted and proved fruitless. That is, the normative principle of the primacy of peaceful over forceful means has become firmly entrenched.

The achievements of the UN in the field of pacific settlement of disputes are meaningful. On balance, the organization has helped states to behave less conflictually, to form habits of cooperation, to develop norms and perceptions. United Nations peacekeeping⁴

4 UN peacekeeping as an institution evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement. It grew side by side with preventive diplomacy. The technique of preventive diplomacy was to be used to forestall the competitive intrusion of the rival power blocs into conflict situations that were either the result or the potential cause of a power vacuum in the cold war. the common theme of UN peacekeeping is to promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of great power rivalry. Ibid.

invented during the twin crisis of Suez and Hungary in late October 1956, is a halfway house between conflict reducing measures (Chapter VI) and cooperative enforcement measures against aggression. While the United Nations cannot honestly be said to have maintained international security and peace in the measure means any for the future development of global society, the security Council has nevertheless played a peace influencing role and the General Assembly too has undertaken a peace-shaping role, in their engagements in crisis decision-making and management.⁵

The existing lacunae in the UN peacekeeping efforts is its handicap to enforce world peace, as they lack both mandated authority and operational capability to do so. UN peacekeeping has been used essentially as a mechanism for dealing on an ad hoc basis with crisis in which third party involvement is viewed as desirable or necessary.

In the light of the above handicap and the potential capability of the United Nations for peacemaking and crisis avoidance, there is an urgent need for a the creation of a permanent UN force for

5 For details, see, Ramesh Thakur, "International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force" (Boulder: Westview, 1987).

peacekeeping recruited by the UN from among individuals who volunteer among many nations. Such a force could be effectively trained and organised and employed to carry out demanding tasks of peacekeeping and international politicing more effectively than ad hoc forces. It would be loyal to the UN authority acting on behalf of the world community and would be responsible to no particular bloc or country. An effective UN peacekeeping force would also need the granting of blanket authority to the Secretary General by Security Council to mediate and negotiate besides curtailing the veto powers of the permanent members to some extent.

The existing mode of conflict management has focussed obsessively on violence once it is imminent or has actually broken out. What is needed is to apply far more political and diplomatic muscle to conflict anticipation - early warning and prevention - before the disputes turn into conflicts and wars. Unarmed UN monitors need to be sent by the Secretary General to any part of the World at any time, so that unnecessary adventurism, by potential hegemons may be discouraged.

In actual practice, the nature of UN peacekeeping operations have been diverse in function and size. The

diversity in functions results from the need to confront different types of situations. The tension on a volatile international frontier or cease-fire issue can be dampened by stationing a UN border patrol⁶ as a physical buffer or intermediary, for example, two emergency forces between Egypt and Israel (UNEF - 1956 to 1967 and 1973 - 1979). UN border patrols could be useful on boundaries between Libya and Sudan, India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan India and China and in many of the borders in the African continent. The UN can help dampen the intrastate tensions and prevent it from fermenting into international conflicts, as in Cyprus (United Nations Force in Cyprus, UNIFICYP, 1969) and Congo (in the early 1960s). The present state of affairs in the third world, where most of the countries are threatened by increasing strifes, clashes and secessionism by various groups, calls for a increased involvement of the UN peacekeeping forces in avoiding possible fragmentation of the countries and holding the countries together. Again, the UN peacekeeping Force (UNPKF) could help smoothen the process of transition of

6 P.F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace", Political Science Quarterly, vol.103, Autumn, 1988, pp.485-507.
P.F. Diehl, Peacekeeping and Peace, bulletin of Peace Proposals, 18(1), 1987, pp.47-53.

a country from a colonial to an independent entity as in the case of Namibia. The UN Security Council Resolution (435) contained the plan for achieving the independence of Mamibia, under which a 7,500 strong UN military force the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was to be stationed in the Namibian territory to ensure suitable conditions for the holding of free and fair elections. The United Nations is monitering the transition in Cambodia,⁷ by providing necessary guarantees to all factions of the dispute. A permanent force already established and experienced in dealing with such problems would be a valuable asset.

A UNPKF could enhance the security of the small and weak states in the Third World against the powerful ones and the potential hegemons. The dishonour that would come to an aggressor in attacking a UN protected country would help deter some aggression. The power vacuum created by the de-couplement of Super Powers from the regional conflicts in the Third World, has the potential to give rise to a centripetal drive by the potential hegemons to fill the vacuum. The UNPKF being neutral, legitimate and all-inclusive would have the potential

⁷ E. Erlanger, "Cambodia's Factions Begin Second Round of Peace Talks", New York Times, 17th February, 1989, p.5.

for genuine and effective peacemaking.

The Super Power detente has witnessed a growing dependence and faith of the Super Powers in the International organizations and especially the UN in crisis-preventing, conflict resolution, and peacemaking.⁸ The positive points of the UNPKF vindicates the soundness of the principles of UN peacekeeping and suggests that the Super Powers would be well advised to channel their efforts at peacemaking, through the authoritative framework of the United Nations.

The institutionalisation of UN peacekeeping Forces as an effective instrument in the development of global political strategy would replace the 'war system' with 'peace system'.

Improved Super Power cooperation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an effective UN peacemaking and peacekeeping. To make them work better requires adoption of a new strategy and a far more serious commitment. "The commitment is to 'preventive action' aimed at better anticipation of incipient conflicts,

8 The super power inclination of a multinational action around the globe is reflected for the 'World' government approach by the Soviet thinkers. (G. Shakhnazarov, "Governability of the World", International Affairs, (Moscow), no.3, 1988, pp.16-18 and as per one study 71% of the US public favours creating a standing UNPKF.

instead of ingrained custom of attending after the damage has been done. The strategy aims at "insulation" and "isolation" from outside meddling in local confrontations from which wider wars can develop. Both run against the grain of established practices and short-term perspectives - perhaps even against human nature".⁹

State borders, state institutions, social and political structures and economic growth are all at risk, if internal violence are not controlled and inter-state conflicts peacefully resolved. Some collaboration on a regional basis is certainly essential to reduce, contain and perhaps prevent such conflicts threatening the well-being and the survival of independent self governing states. Regional organisations, though loosely structured political partnership can provide legitimised institutional help to collaborating states in maintaining a 'regional peace regime' with their narrowly drawn political agenda aimed at isolation, containment and solution of such very specific security problems. This is all the more important given the fact that the developed world is neither willing or able to

⁹ Lincoln Bloomfield, "Coping with Conflict, in the Late Twentieth Century", *International Journal*, Autumn 1989, p.794.

intervene effectively in either conciliatory or containment role in much of the internal and inter-state violence raging today, barring a few exceptions. To the extent that regional states can facilitate equitable solutions or play a damage-limitation role they can help bring about an era of mutual trust and self-confidence in the resolution of various conflicts in their immediate neighbourhood.

Closely on the heels of the UNPKF, the institutionalisation of the regional organisations as peace-makers in the Third World assume importance, considering the complexity and intricacies involved in the Third World conflicts and the danger of the big power involvement in the local conflicts leading to major international conflicts. Thus, the twin task of the regional organisations is to prevent big power involvement in the conflicts of the region and evolving peacekeeping and conflict prevention measures in the Third World region. Moreover, a regional order pattern would also have to take care that the smaller states in the regional order do not bear the brunt of the aggressive designs of a bigger regional power. In other words, the independent identity of the smaller nations can be strengthened through such regional order pattern,

which rejects resort to war and violence as a means of resolving internal difficulties.

CONCLUSION

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The current optimism generated by the significant changes taking place in the realm of world politics has given a new dimension to the character of regional conflicts. Less than a decade ago, there was a reintensification of cold war antagonisms in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of Afganistan and Reagan Administration's contentious rhetoric and ambitious military build up. Few could imagine then that a series of political and economic upheavals and reforms in the socialists countries accompanied by a strikingly more pragmatic and accomodating Soviet foreign policy would by 1990 bring an end to the cold war era, resulting in the decouplement of super powers from the Third World conflicts. In the process, inspite of continuing tension of opposing views, the stock of the United Nations has risen, due in part to a spate of diplomatic achievements and with the five permanent members of the Security Council displaying a willingness to work together to address threats to world peace. The counterproductive and self-defeating Machiavellian approach to foreign policy, which only a few years ago appeared to be an inherent feature of the international state system seems to be giving way to a new pragmatism

among leaders who recognise that welfare of their subjects depends on a much higher level of cooperation in addressing problems of international and global scope.

It is the contention of this work that in the responsiveness to the euphoria generated by the decouplement of super powers from regional conflicts, the negative repercussions should not be ignored. Paul Kennedy reminds us - "The history of international affairs over the past five centuries has all too frequently been a history of warfare".¹ the trend in the last four decades toward fewer conflicts between great powers has yet to be translated into fewer conflicts among all States. It is in the Third World that wars have been concentrated and the situational distortion in the nature of regional conflicts in the post war era is apparent from the fact that the super power disengagement from Third World conflicts have not resulted in a corresponding decline in the number of regional conflicts in the Third World. As has already been enumerated in the introductory chapter and the second chapter the issues previously overshadowed by the

1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (Fontan Press, London, 1988), p.537.

East-West conflicts are coming to the forefront of the global agenda. The scenario in the developing countries indicates turbulence rather than stabilisation. The stresses and strains of economic development, political integration, legitimation and institutionalisation in the Third World society in the post cold war era, have exposed the vulnerability of the Third World society. The regime stability in the Third World is decreasing due to the increase in the system complexity which is also effected by a whole series of extrinsic factors. The reasons why there would be a continuation of the conflicts in the Third World in the post cold war period are the following:

1. Dissatisfaction with the status-quo or perceived relative deprivation by various groups due to uneven economic growth and distribution.
2. Incoherence and incompatibility of ideas, interests, culture, habits and norms due to the diversity and multiplicity of the Third World societies.
3. A centripetal drive by the potential regional hegemony to fill the "power vacuum" created with the disengagement of super powers from regional conflicts.
4. Lack of political stability.

The complexity of internal and international security in the developing world is growing. Given the infirmity of governments, and the lack of ability to control the effects of change, it is important to consider what kinds of institutions and modes of organisation might help to enhance adjustment and reduce injury to a minimum. Learning to manage conflict without resort to violence is a process in which the whole international community must participate.

✓ What should be a future system of security that will be effective, decentralised, amenable to change and broadly accepted ? ✓ What should be the role of Superpowers and other powers on containing the Third World conflicts in the post cold war era ? what role should the UN play in the role of a peace maker in the Third World ? What changes in ways of thinking about foreign policy systems are needed if new patterns of regional stability are to emerge ? These are some of the questions that need to be answered if increase in post cold war regional conflicts, is to be kept within acceptable bounds.

The future system of security needs to be multi-layered. Its foundation should be the Superpower relationship, which co-operative, regulative, based on a

rational "code of conduct" and a "cost-effective analysis". The superpowers should perceive that they have a strong interest in managing their rivalry in the Third World in order to control its costs and risks. Secondly, there is need to diversify and broaden responsibility for security with the association of important developing countries and other powerful States like Japan, and China, in a new institution modelled in the great power role in the concert of Europe, as suggested by Evan Luard.²

The most important challenge to the leaders in the developing world is to strengthen and maintain the coherence of the State. The cohesiveness of a society does not depend exclusively, or even primarily on its laws. Cohesion depends much more on the existence of a general social consensus that the institutions of a society are reasonably fair, just and accessible. Without this basic consensus, the rule of law becomes entirely dependent on enforcement, with the police and the army functioning as occupying forces within their own countries. The case of India demonstrates the lack of cohesiveness, which results from the failure to

² Evan Luard, "Super Powers and REgional Conflicts", Foreign Affairs, vol.64, no.5, Summer 1986, p.1024. consciously articulate alternatives. The consent of the

governed is not just a moral requirement but a practical necessity for a non-violent society, and the onus is on policy makers to develop accurate views of both domestic and international change.

There is an urgent need to build up social resilience in the Third world countries. Resilience allows a people to accept change without losing their own cultural identity. Resilience permits faith in a system of justice to be maintained even in the face of flaws in the system. The quality of resilience lies in the much broader sphere of civic culture. A collective commitment to the public good, to managing conflict without resort to violence depends on community groups, non governmental organizations, religious institutions, volunteer groups, political parties, educational institutions, the media, the legislators and other agencies, all of which have the responsibility and the capability for nurturing a sense of civic responsibility.

The increasing multidimensional militarization of the Third World emphasizes the urgent need for better cognitive performance leading to greater restraint by the Third World leaders from further aggressive and warlike adventures. Corrective action will be possible

only if all international actors realize that they have a stake in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, limits on the production and import of arms, and the vigorous application and extension of humanitarian law. Again, it is in the interest of the Third World societies to wean themselves away from external military support and involvement. External involvement always increases the scale and destruction of violent conflicts, by providing weapons that multiply the number of casualties and inflict considerable damage to the social and economic infrastructure in the area of conflict. Regional organizations can play a vital role in the formulation of a code of conduct that might be devised to discourage interference in armed conflicts by any external power, and to encourage growth in confidence and consensus among regional powers.

The resolution and prevention of Third World conflicts calls for a rational analysis and study of regional conflicts. In place of strategic decisions based on worst case assumptions, it is necessary to operationalize wider concepts and categories. To analyse conflict and stability in the developing world, the decision-maker needs to marry his knowledge of area studies with his appreciation of international

relations, his perceptions of public policy problems with assessment of inter-societal conflicts, and above all his sensitivity to the contending interpretations of the domestic political culture. With an overall awareness of international environment, there must be an articulation of linkages of the formal polity with economic and ethnic forces which can affect cataclysmic changes. In approaching the security concerns of a particular geographical region, it will be all the more necessary to take into account the core variable that would link stability and instability. The particular dynamics of each region is different as is the hierarchy of issues which affect stability. Accordingly incentives and inducements and trade-offs should be crafted which can make a contribution to regional conflicts management, with due emphasis on internal harmony.

Though the menace of renewed Third World conflicts threaten the peace and security of the Third World, we conclude with the hope that positive and sincere efforts for peacemaking by social scientists may provide the impetus for reducing violence in the Third World and make the earth a better place to live in.

The commitment to a peaceful international order will remain perfunctory unless the intransigence and

destructiveness of Third World regimes is transformed through a domestic value consensus on political reconstruction and democratic development at both empirical and normative levels.

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