

REAGAN: GORBACHEV SUMMIT AND PEACE BUILDING

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
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**REAGAN AND GORBACHEV SUMMIT
(1985-88)**



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P R E F A C E

This dissertation is an examination of the Superpower Summit diplomacy under Reagan and Gorbachev and its impact on the changing international context of peace-building.

In the first chapter I have dealt with Gorbachev's peace strategy in some detail since it is directly relevant to the relations and interactions for the future direction of international relations. The second chapter highlights the relationship between peace initiatives and Soviet "new thinking" without which it would have been difficult if not impossible to pick up the threads again after the collapse of detente. The third chapter deals with the changing world scenario to which the basic perceptions and conceptions of the two summit partners have to be related as they move forward to a framework for the future. The fourth chapter is a case study of the INF Treaty which points to the common ground on strategic relations. In the concluding chapter the Reagan-Gorbachev summitry is assessed to extent the horizons of international political analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this study is to identify the main factors in the Reagen - Gorbachev summitry and to assess their potential for peace-building.

The processes of summitry can be related to the quality of the decisions which emerge from the negotiations between the principal decisions-makers. In the present case the compelling vision of Gorbachev was conveyed through his commitment to the solution of problems which resulted in an impasse in US Soviet relations. Despite the intensity of conflict over many issues, Gorbachev developed new forms of interaction with Reagen on the basis of his authority and legitimacy as the person in complete command of Soviet foreign policy. Once he committed himself to a certain line of action, say in favour of disarmament, there was no question of the Soviet military establishment coming in the way of even the most far-reaching proposals. Ofcourse the central role of Reagen in arranging the circumstances of the summits is equally obvious. But it would be legitimate on balance to justify a determining role to Gorbachev on shaping the agenda of the summits in a manner which has resulted in some of the following developments which should prove to be fruitful in the future : the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty; the progress in surmounting the verification issue; the agreement to

create a nuclear risk-reduction centre; the provision for advance notice of ballistic missile test launches; the commitment to observe the ABM Treaty; improvement in compliance with the Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Gorbachev's behaviour pattern at the summit level has led to the diminution of confrontational exchanges and the commitment to building a stable cooperative relationship between the two Superpowers. The perceptual framework that has provided the underpinning to Gorbachev's efforts at the summit is so radically different that it has often been viewed with suspicion. His seriousness in saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war is a powerful personal factor which has over time developed a cumulative process for strengthening the psychology of peace. Robert A. Hinde lists the following ten steps towards achieving cooperative international relations in place of mutual fear and mistrust :

1. Promotion of a common appreciation of the risks and wastefulness of the current situation, including the disastrous consequences to both sides of a nuclear war.
2. Promotion of a general appreciation that alternative styles of international relations are possible.
3. Creation of a new ethic in international relations.
4. The involvement of third parties, perhaps through a strengthened United Nations.
5. Increasing familiarity with the other side.
6. Positive efforts by Governments to personalise those who live under other system.
7. Trust cannot be imposed exogenously, but

its indigenous growth must be promoted. 8. Moves towards the building of trust made by the other side must be reinforced. 9. The building of trust between groups will be facilitated by the building of trust between governments and individuals; and 10. The expansion of social conscience to embrace the whole world.¹

Gorbachev's weltanचाung invests all the ten points mentioned above with considerable significance, and he has created an atmosphere at all his summits which has gained him a very high degree of credibility. To bring about a dramatic reduction in tension between the superpowers. Gorbachev had no hesitation in giving up the unrelenting positions adopted by his predecessors in relation to the situations in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, Angola, Namibia and elsewhere. At home he started revamping and democratising the political structure in order to secure the collective support of the masses and the intellectuals.

Conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States will be disappear. It is, however, evident from the preliminary assessment of the conduct of summit diplomacy that the need for peaceful competition has been accepted by both sides.

1. Robert A. Hinde : *"Trust, Cooperation, Commitment and International Relationships: Current Research on Peace and Violence (Tampere Finland) 2-3/1987, pp. 88-90)*

The Reagan-Gorbachev summits (Geneva to Moscow) marked a genuine break in the closed circle of the Nuclear arms race and the beginning of a serious effort to avoid its undesirable outcomes. It is clear that since 1917 the Russian Revolution, the US-Soviet relationship has evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal contact, a wartime alliance, an intense cold war, hopes for detente, and disappointments when the competitive aspects of the relationship proved dominant.

During most of this period, the Soviet approach to the world their marxist-Leninist ideology, vast military buildup and pattern of interventionist activism abroad and repression at home made the US-Soviet relationship essentially an adversarial one, integrated only by a mutual acknowledgement of the need to avoid nuclear war. The parameters set by Gorbachev has increasingly allowed greater freedom at home in the context of Perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), and promised greater restraint and a less threatening military posture abroad. Should these trends continue and become irreversible fact, the basic nature of the US-Soviet relationship could be altered profoundly.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, support for settlement of regional conflicts, implementations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and announced

unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces, and moves towards internal democratization etc. all have consequences, which are favourable to a general movement towards an open and peaceful international order.

In the introduction to his political report to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev said,

"A turning point has arisen Not only in internal but also in external affairs. The change in the development of the contemporary world are so profound and significant that they require a rethinking and comprehensive analysis of all its factors. The Situation of Nuclear confrontation call for new approach, methods and forms of relations between different social systems states and region".²

How has this change in the Soviet Union come about in a country such as the Soviet Union, where social, economic, and cultural forces are largely subordinated to political consideration? these changes in the Soviet Union are taking place because a new leader took the reins to power and found them either desirable or necessary to change the distribution of power in pursuit of his own self-interest Although the transition in leadership was a necessary course of the changes, it was far from

². Charles Glickman, : *New thinking on security in Soviet East- European Survey*, Westview Press USA -1988, P. 86-87.

sufficient. Six major factors combined to bring them about:

- 1) The domestic performance of the Soviet System in the Brezhnev era;
- 2) The new requirements for Soviet economic Growth;
- 3) The changed nature of Soviet Society and the conditions for its stability;
- 4) The character and consequence of the technological revolution;
- 5) The deterioration of the International position of the Soviet Union;
- 6) And finally, the ascent not only of a new individual but of an entire new political generation to leadership"³

A constructive dialogue over the configuration of strategic interest characterised the historic meeting between the General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan at Geneva on Nov. 19-21, 1985. The Soviet side conducted that dialogue in the spirit of the new thinking, and the essence of the question under consideration was discussed in an atmosphere of openness and respect, taking into account the interest of other side. Despite the presence of serious difference on a number of key issues at the Geneva talks, agreement was reached on the necessity to improve Soviet - American relations, and the

3. Seweryn Bialer : *Gorbachev's Program of Change : Sources, significance*
Prospect Political Science Quarterly, Vol,103, No.3, fall 1988, P. 405.

International situation as a whole.

The basic principle of the new thinking was clearly expressed in the joint statement, which said that the USSR and the USA "have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Recognising that any conflict between the USA & USSR could have catastrophic consequence, they emphasised the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. Neither side would not seek to achieve military superiority..

The Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and many other have noted, what is significant about Nuclear weapons, is not 'overkill' but mutual kill. That is no country could win an all out nuclear war, not only in the sense of coming out of the war better than it, but in the sense of being better off fighting than making concession, needed to avoid the conflict. The effect of nuclear weapons on superpower politics spring from the fact that the devastation could occur extremely quickly, within a matter of days or even hours. This is not to argue that a severe crisis or the limited use of force-even nuclear force - would inevitably trigger total destruction, but only that this in a possibility that cannot be dismissed".⁴

In preparing for the Jan 1985 Gromyko- Shultz meeting the U.S. devised a 'strategic concept' for the upcoming U.S.

4. *Bernard Brodie (ed) : The absolute weapons Atomic Power and world order (New York : Harecourt- Brace 1946) Thomas Schellus; Arms and influence (New Haven : Yale University Press 1966).*

Soviet negotiation in Geneva on Nuclear defense and space weapons.
Paul Natze describe it in feb. 1985 an follows -

"During the next ten year, the U.S. Objective, is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stablization on of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms. Whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced level of nuclear arms and enbanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition would lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree".⁵

The Geneva talks covered a whole range of nuclear and space issues and the state of diplomatic negotiations on other aspect of disarmament, barring and eliminating chemical weapons, reducing armed forces and armaments. It created the prerequisite for further progress in Soviet American relations, primarily for the second meeting between them, which later took place in Reykjavik.

5. Paul Nitze : *On the road to a more stable peace, current policy*, No. 657, Washington, D.C., Burean of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept of State Feb.20, 1985.

The Reykjavik talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan were held on Oct. 11-12, 1986 in the capital of Iceland. The Soviet position was based in the statement of Jan 15, 1986, and a desire to conduct a constructive dialogue taking into account the interest of the partner. In Reykjavik the Soviet Union introduced set of proposal on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. It tabled a whole package of important measure which, if adopted would have signalled the start of a new epoch in the life of humanity, the epoch of a nuclear free world. The topic of discussion was not simply to limit nuclear armaments as it was in the SALT-I, SALT-II, and other treaties, but the 'elimination' of nuclear weapons or a comparatively short period of time. Everlasting the results of the talks in the Reykjavik. Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised that 'it was indeed a breakthrough, Reykjavik was not just another round of negotiation, but rather a moment of turth, an opportunity arose to embark upon the path leading to a world without nuclear weapons'. (M. Gorbechev).

The Soviet package of measure on eliminating nuclear weapons contained a number of large scale proposals. The

- Prospects concerning the radical 50% reduction of strategic offensive weapons and their consequences complete elimination by the end of the 20th century.
- Proposal on the elimination of INF missile in Europe, with in subsequent extension to other region of the world;.

- Proposal on strictly abiding by the regime set down in the 1972 ABM Treaty and barring the test in outer space of all space based elements of antimissile defence;
- Proposal on ^{the} banning and stopping N. Weapon tests the fact that the USSR remained flexible contributed to an understanding being reached between the USSR and the USA, on solving the issue of strategic offensive armaments and medium range missile. The viability and scope of the summit was favourably effect by the special role of Gorbachev in outlining the opportunity to radically, reduce and later completely eliminate nuclear weapons.

However, that opportunity was not translated into a concrete agreement, because of the inflexible stand taken by the United States on SDI. The American side insisted in the right to test everything related to SDI both in the laboratory and in outerspace.

Another there were sharp differences at the Summit talks in Reykjavik, the agreement that came out and it was important and essential. USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze emphasised that at the meeting " an agreement in principle was reached on the entire package of measure of nuclear disarmament, with the exception of one - the SDI issues". The talks were significant because both sides agreed to eliminate all nuclear devices, within the span of ten years.

The rapid but balanced diplomatic activity of the USSR and the USA, that took place on account of informal coordination by both sides, paved the way for the success of the Washington summit talks in Dec. 1987.

The agreement on the establishment of nuclear Risk-reduction centre signed by Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz in Washington on 15, 1987 has a positive influence on promoting test in the military field and reaching an agreement in the main principle of INF Treaty.

The main result of the Soviet - American talks in Washington was that an agreement, was reached in principle on concluding the INF Treaty. It was reiterated that all nuclear warheads on missile with a range from 500-5000km. Should be eliminated within the span of time, set down in the proposed treaty. The arrangement for implementing the agreements, the volume and methods of control and verification, and other principal provision were also agreed upon.

A wide range of issues concerning Soviet American relations, were discussed in the course of the talks in Washington (Dec 7-10, 1987). In the joint statement the two leaders reiterated that "they will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They

are determined to prevent any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The Washington Summit had a favourable impact on the expectations and calculations of the two sides. The following features endow it with a special significance?. They are -

- 1) Its goals, the elimination of two classes of USA & Soviet Nuclear Weapon.
- 2) The Novelty and scale of the envisaged control measure;
- 3) Its vital contribution to strengthening International stability in the world as a whole;
- 4) The possibility, it was ^areveled, of changing course from the arms race towards disarmament, that in of reversing the existing tendencies in world politics;
- 5) The fact that, it introduces the new thinking in a major field of world politics, which is of great significance for the Soviet concept - of the new thanking and of action in several;

'A Dialogue with a long-time horizon was the key message of the Moscow Summit (May 29 - June 1988). The Regan-Gorabchev joint statement spell out the imperative why the dialogue has to endure " because^{vse} it is based on realism and focussed on the

the achievements of concrete result. It can serve as constructive basis for addressing not only the problem of the present but of tomorrow and the next century.

The most important event at the Summit was the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty (INF). The ratification was not just a formality - it had to go through the US Congress, when the two summiters signed the protocol for the exchange of ratification instruments. The Soviet leader M. Gorbachev made the profound claim that "The Era of Nuclear disarmament begun"; President Reagan also characterised the INF treaty "as the first true nuclear arms reduction treaty in history calling for the elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet missile".

It is not just a control but the actual elimination of a class of nuclear weapons, voluntarily agreed by the super-powers. There will be mutual verification of the destruction of the missile, by the official team of the two countries. The ratification of INF Treaty brings out in bold relief that the two chief military power of the contemporary world have come to realise that the nuclear weapon could be contemplated only at the peril of total annihilation of humankind. President Reagan while addressing the student of Moscow University spoke about his dream to see the end of all nuclear weapons. When Soviet

leader Mikhail Gorbachev joined the Indian Prime Minister in calling for "a nuclear weapon free non-violent world" in Delhi in Nov. 19, 1986.

At a time when the world was overly pessimistic about the preservation and consolidation of peace in the world. The Reagan Gorbachev Summitry held to find ways and means to move towards systematic peace and universal human goals.

C H A P T E R - I

THE GORBACHEV STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE

THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF AMERICAN-SOVIET INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Regan-Gorbachev summit, meeting in Geneva 1985, has started a new relationship between both the super powers. It is also known as a new era in the International Relations because after a gap of six tense years it raised hopes for a revival of detente and more immediately in a visible way constituted a positive step in the listless nuclear arms control talks between the two side.

In keeping with past practice, Gorbachev presented his new disarmament-proposals with the objective of a step by step and consisted process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons, to be implemented and completed within the next fifteen years before the end of this century. It is just about first time, that he has proposes actually eliminating nuclear weapons. Never before such great gesture were made for peace as the Mikhail Gorbachev has done with the sole aim of banishing the fear of a nuclear holocaust.

Besides the reversed soviet-American dialogue the most significant factor which has kept up peoples faith in disarmament is the radical new thinking on security issues. This new thinking in the Soviet Union has been symbolized by Mikhail Gorbachev who has kept up a barrage of peace proposals such as nuclear free world by the turn of the

reaching reforms. He has successfully projected the idea that the fundamental impetus for change lies in the gravity and magnitude of the challenges the Soviet Union faces. These are not new challenges. Indeed western scholars have openly and Soviet scholars in Samizdat have long catalogued the mounting political, Economic and social problems, confronting successive Soviet leaders. The new Soviet realism proceeds from the recognition that the Soviet system that Gorbachev inherited was "Thus the Soviet communist party having marked by a gross failure in political management in an over all sense, and economic suffered a serious loss of initiative under Brezhnev, Shackled with a hypercentralized stalinist administrative system that establishes production quotas, set prices, and controls labour and investment, the Soviet economy was unreceptive to innovation, grossly inefficient, and steadily stgnating. Soviet manufactured goods which suffer from poor quality and dated technology were losing and in foreign markets not only Western products but also to exports from the newly industrialized countries"

Gorbachev demonstrated that he was prepared to learn from past mistakes and like Lenin, he believed that " in creating the new world' we will have to modify, alter and start from the beginning again and again" Guided by a pragmatic assessment of the gap between desired ends and

Moscow and Washington were to overcome the intractable conditions which were holding up the general transformation process which the world seemed to need. The Gorbachev regime mobilised its political will to achieve new and effective means of ensuring international political stability and equilibrium between the two super powers. The intriguing question was whether Gorbachev could overcome through his summitry the frozen attitudes without increasing the danger or untorseen disasters.

1. THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF AMERICAN-SOVIET PEACE
BUILDING AND GORBACHEV'S LEGACY

When Gorbachev came to power he saw that his most urgent tasks not in precipitate action, but in formulating policy documents and particularly the party programme, which would contain recommendations about future domestic policy and about the position of the Soviet Union in the world. In General Gorbachev introduced very few social and political changes in his first years in office. This reflects the instincts of a professional party official who that liberalization or democratisation may turn against him, unless supported by adquate institutional backing.

Gorbachev's charisma, political savvy, and strong leadership significantly improved the prospects for far-

and available means; the new Soviet leadership was prepared to exercise hard choices and was searching for policies that would yield the highest possible pay offs¹.

Other policy innovations associated with perestroika, and glasnost, such as the new emphasis on performance (especially discipline, efficiency, and accountability) were designed to rejuvenate Soviet Society, and restore confidence in the system. Of course the reforms would prove sufficiently effective to avert long term systemic decline the Soviet Union departed from old rigidities. Gorbachev told a group of editors in early 1988 "we are for openness... without limits, but openness in the interest of socialism" similarly the process of democratization is more an instrument to serve the larger goal of economic reform than an end in itself.

The Stalinists legacy in international relations was reflected in the persistent objective of Moscow's policy to mount political pressures on Washington and to threaten retaliation whenever American actions became intolerable. Of course in practice Soviet leaders often displayed considerable pragmatism, but there was clear evidence of a Soviet mind-set which had developed powerful incentives to consider United States-Soviet frictions as

1. Cynthia, Robert, : *The new Realism and the old Rigidities : Gorbachev's STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE, THE Washington Quarterly, (Cambridge, summer 1988 pp. 213.231*

normal and to regard the enemy image as basic to the formulation of foreign policy tasks. Stalin's successors could modify this legacy to a limited extent under the new circumstances they faced. Khrushchev developed a momentum in both domestic and foreign affairs in his efforts to erode the Stalinist personality cult. Brezhnev talked about the new correlation of forces in the world and attempt to formulate the code of detente with Nixon, but could not break the old pattern of viewing the U.S as an enemy of mankind and a source of capitalist subversion. It is only with Gorbachev's accession to supreme leadership that perestroika and uskorenie are linked to a stable international environment and lasting peace between Washington and Moscow.

2. ECONOMIC VERSUS MILITARY POWER

Central to the resurgence of real politics under Gorbachev is the recognition that economic power looms ever more importantly in international politics and that without it the Soviet Union cannot sustain its world power status in the twenty first century. The Soviet take pride in their present superpower standing and global influence but worry that such economic and technological giants as Japan may exert more influence in the future. The linkage between domestic economic imperatives and foreign relations was

also evident in Soviet interest in reducing " the cost of empire", particularly those associated with an activist revolutionary foreign policy in the third world". The enhancement of the profitability of foreign policy was a new concept in characteristic Gorbachevian language.

The Gorbachev and Shevardnadze has both demonstrated remarkable skill in revamping the style and tenor of Soviet diplomacy. In addressing foreign audiences, the General Secretary and other officials repeatedly have insisted that Soviet foreign policy would be handled in a manner that would not heighten confrontation ; that ideological differences between Socialist and capitalist states should not preclude cooperation to resolve such pressing global problem as nuclear disarmament, and that reliance on military force to solve disputes should be abandoned. So too has he embraced a variety of pragmatic initiative including arms control concessions and a marked warming of relation towards Western Europe in the hope of securing, increased joint ventures.

The revolutionary fervour which marked the entry of the Soviet Union into the international political system could not provide insights how the economic and military sectors were structurally related. Under the most favourable circumstances the Soviet Union could not have indefinitely

postponed the unavoidable dilemmas which were created by agricultural stagnation and malfunctioning of industry while the regime sought to project its military power abroad. It is a striking feature of Gorbachev's leadership that not only has he rejected stalinist terror like Kruschev, but he has focussed Soviet ambitions on overcoming economic stagnation and leading the country to high economic and techné-scientific achievements. His goals are consistent with reduced hopes and expectations on the deployment of military force, while safeguarding Soviet national security in an overall sense. His economic modernisation programme may be upset by unforeseen circumstances. But a determined and coherent strategy can only be formulated on the basis of interdependencies which help in fulfilling economic needs of the Soviet people and also provide incentives for controlling the arms race with the United States.

3. RECONGNITION OF MUTUAL SECURITY

Gorbachev seeks an enduring international security environment that is more comprehensive and more effective. National security policy is another critical realm where compelling external factors have led top Soviet officials and numerous academic specialist to wrestle with old rigidities. In particular they obviously have thought a

great deal about how to prevent a nuclear war. Gorbachev himself has expanded significantly on his predecessors acknowledgement that there can be no winner in a nuclear war, which would be a catastrophe for civilization. In several speeches he has emphasized that security can only be mutual the insecurity of one side will diminish the security of both super powers for " the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age engender unpredictability in policy and concrete actions.

Beyond recognizing that the imperatives of the nuclear age require mutual security and the prevention of nuclear war, Gorbachev apparently in one of few world leaders who truly grasped the implications of the security dilemma. He recognized implicitly that the pursuit of absolute unilateral security is not only unattainable but also rebounds to the USSR's disadvantage by encouraging Western rearmaments. Although, international circumstances are more likely to impede the prospects for revolutionizing and enduring changes in Soviet foreign and defense policy.²

Certainly the Soviet Union has progressively acquired

2. Andrew C. Goldberg : *The present Turbulances in Soviet military Doctrine the Washington Quartly summer 1988, pp. 159-68.*

a state in an international order at once completely rejected Gorbachev also seeks to expand Soviet integration into the international system and to play a more useful role in resolving global problems. Yet the pressures of bipolarity linger and are reinforced by diminished but still tangible ideological predispositions as evidenced in Soviet support, however restrained for Angola, Nicaragua and other marxist Leninist regime, in the Soviet handling of the Iran-Iraq war, in Soviet unwillingness to tolerate major political disruption in Eastern Europe , and general Soviet inflexibility on host of other critical issues.

Second, if as the world becomes more multipolar, there may well be more uncertainty and less stability. In particular of, the Soviet Unions global status and power decline precipitously some Soviet leaders may be more tempted to exploit international opportunities and less willing to make concessions to adversaries. Gorbachev has distanced himself from the adventurism implied in such scenarios

4. THE MOMENTUM OF CHANGE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS:
FROM REAGEN'S "EVIL EMPIRE" CONCEPT OT A NEW APPROACH
TO EAST - WEST DEVELOPMENTS.

The momentum of change in Soviet policy has helped to change the Reagan's messianic approach towards Soviet Union as an 'evil empire'. The new formulation of Soviet foreign policy focusses on a new approach to East-West development at the 27th CPSU Congress, Mikhail Gorbachev formulated an entirely new approach to world affairs, from 1985, onwards he projected a new diplomacy of global confidence building and cooperations. Its three main new approaches :-

1. Rebuilding a realistic detente with the U.S, aimed at ridding the world of the spectre of Nuclear annihilation;
 2. Finding ways and means to resolve regional conflicts;
 3. Promoting economic and technological cooperation between and among nations on a global scale.³
-

IMPACT OF GORBACHEV

It is relevant for our discussion to relate the impact of Gorbachev to the popular aspirations of the majority of the Soviet people and the elite groups which are eager to move away from the paths which have been taken by conservative and totalitarian elements. As any other political actor Gorbachev has sought to strengthen his position both at home and abroad. His whole project of democratic reform makes good not only in terms of moral values but in relation to the current demands of the new Soviet elites which have come into being as a result of the programme of industrialisation and economic development. These elites have been dissatisfied with both the domestic and external policies of the Soviet establishment which have exacerbated social conflicts at home and created tensions abroad. As a good communist, Gorbachev retains an overriding interest in maintaining the primacy of the Communist party of the Soviet Union but he does not think this should come in the way of the release of democratic forces at all levels of society. This is clearly evident from the large number of new associations which have been formed in the Soviet Union since he came to power. The practical urgency with which Gorbachev has advocated universalistic values of democracy and stable peace is evident

in his rejection of conservative ideologues, in his struggle against bureaucratic vested interests, in his rejection of the narrow framework of class interest in his from above, in his redefinition of national liberation, In his peace proposals for regional conflicts and in his use of preventive diplomacy.

1. OVERCOMING THE CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGUES

Finally, the interactive link between international condition and domestic political factors may well sustain the competitive tendencies in Soviet behaviour more than it bolsters the new trends towards moderation for instance the need to contain nationalist unrest at home and in Eastern Europe could exacerbate conservative hardline tendencies in Soviet Politics. Gorbachev has insured himself against such outcomes by outflanking the conservatives and putting them on the defensive. His new thinking has extended to building a new architechtonics of peace, detente and internal reforms and showing as entirely irrelevant to the new International environment. Gorbachev has maintained a centrist position by restraining those who wanted to accelerate the pace of reform beyond optimum proportions.

2. CONFRONTING THE POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC VESTED INTERESTS

The Soviet system has earned the reputation of a bureaucratic setup in which there is no accountability to the public. The large bureaucracy to a large extent monopolies the game of politics. The new Soviet leadership drawing up the agenda for change that has faced a formidable accumulation of problem in this bureaucratic pyramid.

To overcome the bureaucratic confrontation and enlist a broader public support, Gorbachev has not hesitated to propose a number of reforms which resemble Western models. He has promised to improve respect for the civil rights and liberties of ordinary citizens, greater press freedoms and openness from Soviet officialdom, more internal party democracy, and shift of power away from the party and State bureaucracies to the USSR supreme Soviet and local Soviets

This focus on domestic reform as the nation's highest priority has had important implication for national security policy. First, it has put a premium on constraining defense spending. Asserting that the true index of a nation's

security is to be found in the sophistication of the science and technology, he rejected the the nation, that more arms bring more security. Gorbachev announced in a 7 Dec. 1988, speech before the United Nations Gen. Assembly that over the next two year the Soviet Union would Unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 persons. Gorbachev evidently seeking to reduce the weight of the military in the national security decision making process.³

The decentralization of Economic planning and resource allocation, will inevitably weaken internal party and bureaucratic control. In accomodating itself to a non-socialist world economy, the Soviet Union ofcourse risks diluting its revolutionary fervour and commitments and "losing its socialist soul".

3. GORBACHEV'S " REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE " AND CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN SOVIET POLICIES

Gorbachev's policies can be understood only in the light of the total ideological, historical, political and social contexts, which he has inherited from his predecessors whom he can not repudiate.

3. Michael Armacost : *Implications of Gorbachev for US-Soviet relation : Journal of International Affairs (New York), Vol.42, No. 2, spring 1989 pp. 445-57*

There is no compelling reason to conclude that Gorbachev's foreign policy and military goals are substantially different from those of his predecessors those goals are shaped by a combination of a factor; marxist Leninist ideology and the national interest of a traditional Russian nation-state with a certain historic sense of universal.

The Gorbachev proposal of Jan 15, 1986 it held out the vague prospects of verification by both National technical means and on-site inspection. It indicates a readiness to negotiation on chemical weapons. It called for the reduction, within five to eight years, of Soviet and U.S strategic arsenals, to no more than 600 warheads, contingent upon the renunciation of the development testing and deployment of space strike weapons. In effect he seemed to be subscribing to Reagan's zero-zero option of Nov. 1981.

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev can be expected to seek the same foreign policy and security objective as in the past. Thus it will continue -

- To augment its military power relative to that, not only of the U.S, but of all its potential enemies combined, so that it may achieve equal security, not mere parity

with its principal rival ;

- To strengthen its Economic, technological, and industrial base ;
- To do what it can, to weaken and divide the Western capitalist imperialist system;
- To work against emergence of a permanent American - Chinese coalition of Economic technological and military significance.
- To maintain control of its security zone in Eastern Europe ;
- To reestablish its leadership and dynamic image within the International camp of Socialism ;
- To demonstrate its capabilities as a world power of global mobility, by intervening in foreign conflicts in areas which suits its current policy purposes;
- To win international propaganda battle which it is waging with the US;

Gorbachev most urgent task, of course is to slow the momentum of the strategic defence initiative (SDI) and prevent the US from gaining any significant military and technological lead as a result of its efforts in strategic defense research.⁴

4. William, R. Kinter : *Arms control : The American dilemma*
 Department of State Bulletin, (Washington) Vol. 88, No. 2132,
 winter, 1988.

4. REDEFINING NATIONAL LIBERATION :

In Feb 1986, Gorbachev formally pledged support for "wars of national liberation" saying that encouraging revolution from outside, and doubly so by military means ; in futile and inadmissible. His statements on this subject indicate mixed motivations of the Soviet decision-makers in relation to the Third world. His distinctive contribution is in the direction of reducing emphasis on the use of force to overthrow regimes and replace them by Marxist ones. His effort has been to cut loses by winding up Havana's intervention in Angola and that of Vietnam in Kampuchea. His reinterpretation of the national liberation doctrine helps to relate Soviet policy to broader aspects of the economic modernisation of Third world countries and the help that can be given to them by the international community to strengthen their roles in regional and international organisations. There has accordingly been a clear shift in Soviet rationale away from the practice of deploying Soviet help merely to keep a Marxist government in power. Gorbachev has continued to use the rhetoric of the Soviet Union's international duty towards Marxist-Lenninist movements and regimes but his commitment to an emerging peaceful world order has made him extremely loath to introduce elements of friction with the other super power merely out of a

feeling of community with regimes calling themselves Marxist. The logical consequence of such an interpretation is that the Soviet Union is eager to determine the viability of Third world regimes not in abstract ideological terms but in relation to their political stability and their ability to pursue coherent economic programmes.⁵

5. PEACE PROPOSALS FOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS :

*"An indispensable condition for establiship, lasting International security along with real disarmament, is peaceful settlement of regional conflicts, which are like bleeding wound on the body of mankind. New thinking is the main component of the policy in the field of regional conflicts"*⁶

The development of the international situation can only take a turn for better of disarmament, the easing of tensions and mutual trust are shared by all continents and all nations. Assuring peace and security in the Asia and the Pacific especially important, because the destiny of all mankind depends largely on how the situation in this extensive region evolves. Thousands of political

5. Mark N. Katz : *Soviet military policy towards the third world under Gorvachev*, Praeger Publishers, New York 1989.

6. Alexender Kislov : *The New political thinking and Regional conflicts world Marxist Review*, (Prague), Aug. 1989.

economic and other ties link Asia and the adjoining regions in the Pacific and Indian Ocean to the rest of closely-knit world. The situation in Asia and the Pacific is undoubtedly affected by the legacy of the past differences between the historical evolution of the nations territorial disputes and clashes of local interest. The present challenges pose a far greater threat, though as the direct foreign military presence, here grows and as the nuclear weapons race spreads in the region.

Mikhail Gorbachev, proposes programme for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the current century, is harmonious with the sentiments of the people of Asian continent, for whom the problem of peace and security are no less urgent than the people of Europe. The wholly implementation of the programme of peace proposals for regional conflict, would fundamentally change the situation in Asia, rid the nations in that part of the globe as well as the fear of nuclear and chemical warfare, and bring security in that region to a qualitatively new level

6. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND SUPER POWER RELATIONSHIP

" The pervasive need for techno-economic and socio-political reform within the Soviet Union creates powerful incentive for a relaxation of tension, and for slow the arms race. The possibility now arises that a super power arms accord

might progressively denuclearize Europe. The success of Washington, Intermediate Nuclear force treaty (INF), strengthen the United States and Soviet Union's relationship and the acceptance of double zero options⁷

The Jan. 1986 documents to eliminate nuclear weapons, however, much an instrument of propaganda, of super power to advance denuclearization campaign ; it can also be read as plan for domestic reforms. An arms accord that slows the nuclear arms race and the pace of modernization, especially in defensive system, would relax the economic and technological burden of East-West conflict without essentially underlying United States - Soviet Union parity.

In last, ratification of the super power missile accord for Europe, while establish no weakening of Western defenses, still does not reduce the threat. These threats can only be diminished by deep cuts in both categories of weaponry. Trade off between East and West, while never easy, one not enhanced by keeping nuclear, non-nuclear and economic negotiation and bargaining insulated from each other

7. Edward A. Kolodziej : *British Nuclearization and European Denuclearization : challenge for American Policy* . Atlantic Community Quarterly (Washington) Vol 26, Nos. 3, winter 1988 pp. 315-19.

FORMAT OF THE STUDY

The de-ideologisation of foreign policy under Gorbachev has made a considerable difference to the analyses of the Soviet Union's summit diplomacy. It was inevitable, therefore, in this study that there should be a departure from the way in which the legacies of earlier summits have been discussed. In line with the Marxist theory of imperialism and the Lennist views on international relations the Pre-Gorbachev summits were examples of ideological competition in one sense or the other. We can perceive this clearly in the Khrushchev-Eisenhower summitry and in the Khrushchev-Kennedy meeting in Vienna and the Kosygin-Johnson meeting at Glassboro. The Nixon-Brezhnev summits although productive of a large number of agreements, could not be regarded as examples of ideological coexistence. Similarly the Brezhnev-Ford Summit at Vladivostock and the Brezhnev-Carter summit at Vienna had a built-in ideological component. It is only as we approach the Gorbachev-Regan summit in Geneva in November 1985 that we can discern that the ideological constructs no longer play a determining role in the superpower summitry. Ideological statements can still be found but they no longer effect the path of negotiations. The building blocks of Gorbachev's diplomacy have been de-ideologised and the new context of Soviet-

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American politics can be seen in terms of ideological coexistence.

The format of this study marks an important departure from the traditional focus in the study of Soviet international relations especially in the ideological dimensions. The relationship of peace initiatives in Super power relations and Soviet new thinking, the changing world scenario in relation to international security, and the radical restructuring implicit in the INF Treaty, all are the result of the acceptance of pluralist trends which were accelerated by the removal of ideological impediments to Soviet-American summitry. Soviet diplomatic positions under Gorbachev cannot be comprehended by adhering to earlier Soviet perspectives. The Gorbachev era is full of convulsions but it breaks entirely new ground. This study therefore concentrates on examining the new Soviet commitment to a fundamental transformation of international relations and highlights the newly acquired flexibility in Soviet summit-diplomacy, as a crucial factor in the enhanced Soviet-American cooperation in global and regional affairs.

C H A P T E R - I I

PEACE INITIATIVES AND SOVIET NEW THINKING

Mikhail Gorbachev has effectively challenged the unilateral and monolithic assumptions underlying the use of Soviet power by his predecessors. The new perspective on the use of Soviet power which Gorbachev has opened up the possibility for more peaceful and relaxed developments at a time when Mankind is at a crucial moment in history. After World War II, all life on earth is threatened by thermonuclear war. Nothing is more important and urgent than to assure peace and International Security, to limit arms and achieve disarmament. The modern world has become too small and fragile for wars and policy of strength. The Gorbachev proposed programme for abolishing weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century, and forming a comprehensive system of International security, have received worldwide support.

Confrontation between the two world system permeates the entire sphere of International relations, and Powerful military industrial bureaucratic complexes, have fuelled militarism. The arms race, power politics and the threat of force and implementation of their plans to militarise space would have disastrous results by aggravating military rivalry.

The threat of nuclear war awakened masses throughout the world to the need, to work for peace. Peace movement have required unprecedented scale taking an specific forms in socialist-capitalist and developing countries. This made the peace movement

a major factor of International relations, and exerted a endures influence on the alignment of the war and peace forces both in the World blocs. Peoples of East- and West want peace, security, disarmament and fruitful International cooperation. The community of their, aspirations makes up a very important foundation of the peace movement, and thus contributed to increases multipolarity.

Scientists from both blocks began to play a big role in presenting a nuclear disaster through movements like the payable conference because their humanism is scientific, rather than abstract and is based on profound knowledge. They are competent to judge the danger posed by nuclear gambling in the world arena. They realised better than many others that detente and peaceful co-existence between the two world system was the only sensible alternative to nuclear - missile war.

In sum, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had to respond to the various challenges as well as the opportunities that the widespread sentiment of anti-nuclearism created in both East and West. The new perspective was clearly stated at the 27th CPSU Congress :

"Our ideal is a world without weapon and violence. a world in which each people freely chooses its path of development, its way of life. This is an expression of the humanism of communist ideology, of its moral values. That is why for the future as well as the struggle against the nuclear threat,

against the arms race, for the preservation and strengthening of Universal peace remains the fundamental directions of the party's activities in the International arena".¹

1. DE-IDEOLOGISATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The fundamental position of the Soviet government before Gorbachev's innovations has been that in international relations the efforts of Moscow were consistently to develop the objective reality in terms of the "class struggle". This entrenched outlook on ideological competition in all international transactions produced considerable friction and irritation in world politics. During the most intense phases of the cold war, ideological rivalry assumed enormous proportions and precluded moderate and realistic tendencies in diplomacy. The system transformation engendered by the Gorbachev-Reagan summitry could not have been envisaged in the absence of the de-ideologisation of international relations which Gorbachev has promoted. Both Gorbachev and shevardnadze have looked at the role of diplomatic actors and events in a framework in which the traditional conceptions of the revolutionary process do not prevail over the pragmatic efforts to contain the global rivalry of the superpowers through intensive rounds of negotiations.

1. Gorev, Alexander : *A Nuclear - Free Non-violent World , The world & your*, Allied Publication Pvt. Ltd, (New Delhi) 1987, pp 27-42.

2. LESSONS FROM THE DEMISE OF DETENTE

American policy analysts have related the demise of detente in the pre-Gorbachev period to Soviet behaviour in the Third World. The Soviet comment on the U.S. foreign policy behaviour has ranged from denunciation of the inherent militaristic character of American capitalism to a willingness to admit mutual responsibility for the damage to Soviet - American relations. Both sides have in practice gained a more sophisticated understanding of the linkage of issue areas and their interactions during the Reagen-Gorbachev summitry have been politically less volatile than in the past. The crucial lessons from the demise of detente have led to a genuine concern about the dangers of cleavages and misunderstanding which impede dialogue between the superpower. By adopting coherent global and regional approaches Washington and Moscow are unlikely to interrupt diplomatic intercourse in the unfortunate manner in which it happened after the Afghanistan imbroglio.

3. SPECIFIC APPROACHES FOR DE-ESCALATION AND REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

The Nuclear arms race had been among the main reasons behind the cold war which poisoned the world climate. But at the first summit in Geneva in 1985, agreements reached at a level, that there it was concluded that Nuclear war can not

be won and should not be fought and that security can best be achieved by lowering the level of military confrontations.

The Soviet- American summits are not only a step forward in lowering the level of military confrontation. They also herald a future breakthrough in the overall process of disarmament. Emerging as an effective and regular forum of negotiations such meeting's can keep to promote the vision of a peace order offerd by the peace movement, like east-west cooperation on a more constructive basis and creating enduring conditions for the next stage of detente.

In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the Soviet leadership, he came with a series of ideas to promote a disarmed world. Many of his ideas were not new, but it what was significant that his initiatives clarified many options which were under consideration in the security debate all over the world.

- He unilaterally imposed a moreatorium on Nuclear test in August 1985, for six months, the monatorium expanded to the end of the 1986.
- He imposed a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons by the two super powers, during his visit to paris in Oct. 1985.
- He offered in Jan 1986 a comprehensive programme to eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of this century.

- In June 1986 Gorbachev along with other leaders of Warsaw countries, made an appeal to reduce conventional forces by 25 percent in the early 1990's.
- At the Reykjavik summit meeting in Oct. 1986 he agreed with President Reagan to eliminate long range ballistic nuclear missile in the next ten years, in case the US agreed or not abandoning the ABM Treaty for the same period and limiting the SDI research to laboratories.
- He announced in Moscow on Feb 28, 1986 that Soviet Union was willing to sign 'without delay' our agreement to eliminate medium range nuclear missile from Europe within five years.²

He indicated that his proposals for a speeding deal would be desired from the tentative bargain he struck with President Reagan at Reykjavik Summit meeting. The deal called for dismantling Soviet-SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe, as well as Pershing - 2 and ground launched cruise missile deployed in Western Europe. Gorbachev however, proposed during the address to the 27th CPSU Congress in the Feb 1986, that the Soviet Union is ready for strict onsite verification measures for arms control agreements. He said Disarmament without monitoring is impossible, but also monitoring without disarmament is meaningless. At times critics have blamed Gorbachev for not being more

2. Mehrotra O.N.; *Gorbachev Foreign Policy, Strategic analysis (New Delhi)* Vol 12, No. 1, April 1987, pp 25-38.

accommodating to Reagan on the issues of SDI. If both superpowers agreed on elimination of all long range ballistic nuclear missile and medium range nuclear missiles in Europe, there would not be any need to deploy the space based missile defence system, argued the Soviet leadership. The USSR was only seeking a moratorium on field testing, and a total ban on SDI research. However, President Reagan made it clear that he would never bargain away his SDI programme for any arms control agreements.

On Feb 25. 1986 Gorbachev said that " in the present situation there is no alternative to cooperation and interaction between all states. He stressed that " conditions have arisen in which the confrontation between capitalism and socialism can take place only and exclusively in the forms of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry. For us peaceful co-existence is a political course that the USSR intends to adhere to rigorously in the future too. He made it clear that his country does not want confrontation with the imperialist world, even on the question of liberation movement in the world.³

4. FOREIGN POLICY AND PEACE BUILDING : SHIFT IN ORIENTATION

The Soviet concept of New Political thinking makes it easier to mitigate International tension and to rid the world of mistrust and opens the way to a lasting peace. It is very important

3. *Ibid*, pp. 28.

that this approach has been initiated by a prominent politicians representing one of the most powerful nations in the modern world. New thinking is an expression of creative approach and political boldness in tackling the major problem; the problem of war and peace. By moving international politics away from dangerous stereotypes, Gorbachev provided shared values to all who favoured a radical shift in orientation.

The Gorbachev proposals to create a nuclear free and non-violent world by the end of this century, demonstrates a capacity to advance humanism in statecraft. This initiative, somewhat of a respite after the tension of recent years. Soviet proposals gives us hope that there is a way out of the nuclear impasse, although the road to the realization of these goals will not be an easy.

As it is clear that over the past decades the world has known periods of tensions and temporary relaxation, flare-ups of the cold war and relative than in the International climate. But one thing remained unchanged; the level of arms, primarily nuclear arms, kept rising, while the level of general security was declining. And now the first time, it was become possible to start moving in the opposite direction - not to an arms build up and not even to a mere arms freeze, but to cut in nuclear arsenals.

The Washington treaty provides for abolishing, just four to five percent of the deadly weapons. But it is no less, and even more, important that this is the first decisive steps towards a nuclear free worlds race. It creates a kind of initial infrastructre for disarmament and involves the mastering various instruments, forms and methods without which no further headway can be made in this process. The Treaty has been signed by the two countries but in fact there is every reason consider it as a "collective creation of international reason".

FOR THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND : THREE-STAGE PLAN :-

The Soviet peace - initiative in the International year of Peace 1986, have literally took the world by storm. On 15 Jan 1986, the Mikhail Gorbachev pur forward a historic programme for the stage by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. In this proposal he proceeded from the firm conviction that future security would be nuclear-free. He opened up a perspective of the next fifteen year which in three-stages of disarmament will ensure total nuclear disarmament, and end of other weapons of mass destruction. It is just about the first time that anyone has ever proposed actually eliminating nuclear weapons. According to the proposal, the first stage will be implemented within the next 5-8 years beginning from 1986. During this period the two superpowers will set an example for the other nuclear powers to

follow. In the first stage : -

- A 50 percent reductions in Soviet and American Nuclear arms, capable of reaching each other's territory, and setting a limit of 6,000 warheads, for the remaining delivery vehicle of this type.
- A mutual pledge by the Soviet Union and US, Not to develop test or deploy strike weapon in space.
- A complete elimination by the Soviet Union and the U.S. of their ballistic and medium range cruise missile in Europe, combined with, not to supply strategic or medium range missile to other countries.
- In case the Gorbachev proposal for nuclear disarmament is accepted, the verification will be an instrument essential for its compliance. As far as machinery for verification of the implementation of nuclear test ban agreement is concerned , there are technical means to monitor violation of such an agreement.

In the Second Stage : -

- Gorbachev proposed that in the second stage which should start no later than 1990 and last for 5.7 years; the other nuclear power would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. The first major step will be
- " To freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them in the territories of other countries". It has been argued

widely that the first step towards nuclear arms control will be freezing, nuclear weapons at the present level before agreeing to further reduction. While the USSR has shown its keenness to agree to such an agreement, the US has not welcomed the move.

- The radical proposals in the second state is that

"All nuclear powers eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, namely the weapons having a range of up to 1000km".

This would require Britain, France and China to scrap their battlefield nuclear weapons. In the other words, all the nuclear weapons. countries will have to negotiate and agree on elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Hence according to the second proposals, both superpower will eliminate their medium range as well as tactical nuclear systems from the European theatre. Since the second stage involves all the five nuclear weapons countries, more problem are likely to be raised here.

- "A ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction".

Since the proposals envisages nuclear disarmament in the next 15 years, barring of nuclear weapons tested by all is

an essential part of the proposals. If all countries agree on nuclear disarmament, there should be no difficulty in enhancing the existing partial test ban treaty to a comprehensive test ban treaty, notwithstanding French and Chinese non-compliance of PTBT.

In the Third Stage :-

Stage three of the Gorbachev plan would begin no later than 1996. According to the plan at this stage :

- " The elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed. By the end of 1999, there will be no nuclear weapon on earth. A universal accord will be drawn up that such weapons should never again come into being".

The ideal of achieving nuclear disarmament may be commendable but it be set with a number of problems. The Gorbachev proposal envisages on-site inspection, national technical means and other additional verification measure to reach an agreement,

- " Special procedure will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as the dismantling reequipment or destruction of delivery vehicle. In the process, an agreement will be reached on the numbers of weapons to be destroyed in each stage, the sites of their destruction and so now".

Summarising nuclear disarmament, Gorbachev again stressed on abandoning the space based missile defence programme. He assures Reagan that he is prepared to allow inspection of Soviet laboratories for verification that no space-based programme is operational.

Mikhail Gorbachev also proposed the complete elimination of chemical weapons. " We are in favour of intensifying the talks in order to conclude an effective and verifiable (fundamental) international convention prohibiting chemical weapons and destroying the existing stockpiles of those weapons as agreed with President Reagan in Gorbachev". He reaffirmed that Soviet foreign policy including issue of disarmament is based on the comprehension of profound changes in the world.

The Soviet Union also put forward various proposals in relation to confidence building in Europe, for security in Asia and Pacific region, offered cooperation in peaceful use of, and establishing international condition for the safe development of nuclear power. It also submitted to the United Nations a programme for building "star peace", for establishing a world space organization, as an alternative to the star wars programme.

On the 27th Congress of the CPSU Gorbachev said " Now as never before, it is important to find ways for closer and more productive cooperation with govts, parties and mass organization

and movements that are genuinely concerned about the destinies of peace on earth. With people our order to build an all embracing system of International Security".⁵

DELHI - DECLARATION :

The ten principles of Delhi Declaration course major aspects of contemporary collective life. It is a clarion call to reconstruct a world without hate, fear, suspicion, exploitation, poverty, terror and violence, a world without-destructive weapons, a magnificent world of cooperative states, in defence of peace and prosperity. The world we have inherited, belongs to present and future generations, that primary be given to ⁱuniversally accepted human values. The right of every nations and every person to life, freedom of peace and the pursuit of happiness must be recognized. The use or threat of force must be abandon. The expansion of Nuclear arsenals and the development of space weapons undermine the university accepted conviction that Nuclear war should never be fought and can never be ^{WON} won. The following principles for building a Nuclear weapon force & non-violence world -

- Peaceful co-existence must become the universal norm of Internatinal Relations.
- Human life must be recognized as supreme;

5. Frank Gundre. A, " Gorbachev's Peace Initiative" : steps in the right direct, *Economic & Political Weekly (New Delhi)*, Vol 23, No. 49, Dec. 3, 1988, pp. 25-27 -77.

- Non-violence should be the basis of communtiy life;
- Understanding and trust must replace fear and suspicion;
- The Right of Every state to Political & Economic independence must be recognized and respected;
- Resources being spent on armaments mustbe ⁿⁿchanneled towards social and Economic Development;
- Conditions must be guaranteed for the individuals harmonious develooment;
- Mankind's material and intellectual potential must be used to solve global problems;
- The balance of terror' must give way to comprehensive International Security'
- A Nuclear weapon free and Non-violent world requires specific and immediate actionfor disarmament.

It called upon the people and leaders of all countries to take urgent action that would lead to a world free of weapons of mass distruction, a world without fear". In the nuclear age it is ncessary that International Relations are restructured so that confrontation is replaced by cooperation, and conflict situation resolved through military means. It is only man's creative genius that makes progress and development of civilization possible in a peaceful environment. Mistruct a fears suspicions between the nations and people distort perception

of real world. They engender tension and in final analysis harm the entire International Community.

A new world order must be built to ensure economy justice and equal political security for all nations. An end of the arms race is an essential pre-requisite for the establishment of such an order. Only disarmament can release the enormous resources needed for combating economic backwardness and poverty. All nations must work together to solve urgent humanitarian problems and cooperate in the area of culture, education etc. for the all round development of the individual. The solution must be found to solve global problems.

International security can be guaranteed through the adoption of integrated measures in the field of nuclear disarmament using all available and agreed measures of verification and confidence building Test policy settlement of regional conflict through peaceful negotiations and cooperation in the political economic sphere⁶.

In the nuclear age humanity must evolve a new thinking a new concept of the world that would provide credible guarantees for humanity's survival. People want to live in a safer world and it deserve a better fate than being a hostages

6. Zuberi.M : Please security And Delhi Declaration world world four focus (New Delhi) Vol . 9, No. , Annual 1988.

to nuclear terror and dispar. It is necessary to change the existing world situation and build a nuclear weapon free world, free of violence, and hatred, fear and suspicions.

The Delhi Declaration signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi in Nov. 1986, provides the philosophical and political framework for rebuilding relations between states and ushering in a new world world of competitive coexistence. Its ten basic principles of nuclear-weapon free and a non-violent world constitute a mature enunciation on which an equitable international order can be built. It seeks to end the 'nuclear syndrome' and move away from the dubious doctrine of 'mutual assured destruction' as the cornerstone of deterrence on which was predicated for decades the hope of detente and peace.

Gorbachev stresses the " vital importance for mankind to give priority to universal human values, to building a world without violence and wars, to recognising diverse ways of social development, to dialogue and cooperation in the interest of development and survival, and to progress towards a new world order". This is what he calls new political thinking in International Relations But he affirms that major elements of the new political thinking are the recognition of everynation's right to decide to its future, together with adherence to the principles of non-interference in other states internal affairs⁷.

7. Bradley Bill, and Genscher, Dietrich Hams : *Implication of Soviet New thinking* (whetehead New York, Institute for East & West Secutiry studies 1987) .

It can be achieved through such way:

- Complete destruction of Nuclear arsenals, before the end of this century ;
- Barring of all weapons from outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind;
- Banning of all nuclear weapons tests ;
- prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction ;
- Banning of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles;
- Reducing the level of conventional arms and armed forces.

It is necessary that building a nuclear weapons free and non-violent world, requires a revolutionary transformation of outlook, and education of people for peace, mutual respect and tolerance.⁸

6. CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE.

The Gorbachev is determined not to leave any escape route for the West to get out of their own proposal of zero option. It represents radical new thinking on the issues of arms, their limitation on peace.

8. Alexander Gorev : *A nuclear Free non-violent, world (The World & You, Allied publication Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 1987, pp. 27-42).*

Gorbachev proposal is significance not just to Europe but to the entire world. It is part and parcel of the search for a nuclear free and non-violent world. In Jan 1986 he called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century. No more tinkering around with destruction nuclear weapons in the name of arms control but a determination to eliminate them. In his Delhi declaration along with Rajiv Gandhi last November, he urged the transition to a non-violent world order where the survival and development of entire hummanity is assured.

Gorbachev is not just seeking the elimination of weapons (hech is important) but grouping towards the construction of a comprehensive global security system a political mechanism for a disarmed world.

The Soviet Union appears to have givenup the approach of counting in arms limitation which sought equality on parity at every level of nuclear armaments. The Gorbachev package stems from an understanding that the time is now to put an end to the arms race and turn resources from arms building to disarmament. Hence his peace initiative are integrally related to his determination to make the Soviet Union into

an economically vibrant, technologically dynamic and more genuinely democratic Society. International and relocation of tensions are indispensable to this domestic drive.

Gorbachev's Euromissile initiative certain to transform the security debate in Europe. By foreign the west Europeans to reexamine their dependence on nuclear weapon for security. by opening the door for a non-nuclear order in Europe, and by drawing out a review of the policies of the Altantic alliances, he could well be setting the agenda for European debate on war and peace in coming years His move on Euromissile ensures that Gorbachev retains the initative on European security issues and allows him to continue the pressure against the US to come to terms with him on "stars wars" and strategic arms limitations.

Within Europe the initiæive should strengthen the voice of all those elements of sanity who have sought a more cooperative attitude towards the Soviet Union. It should also encourage the peace movements to strive harder for a nuclear free Europe and for a Europe at peace with itself. That in the long run, could be most signifiant outcome of the Gorbachev initiative on Euromissiles. But in the short run, West European leaders

would be forced to look at alternatives to American nuclear deterrence in assuming their own security, even as they shun all Soviet approaches to nuclear disarmament.

7. MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO PEACE BUILDING : GORBACHEV'S ANSWER TO REAGEN'S NEO-GLOBALISM

Reagen's neo-globalism was reflected in various ways. after coming into office, he intended to enhance US military force levels in order to facilitate an outcome in conflict management which would place heavy constraints on the Soviet Union. By developing multilateral approaches to peace-building, Gorbachev dealt with the realities and pressures created by the Reagen administration in a creative manner. In the real world of politics, Gorbachev did not answer Reagen with conceptual or theoretical question. He developed both bargaining and structural power through his commitment to an alternative strategic world. He did not use duplicitious Soviet propaganda as Stalin might have done. With patience and sophistication he utilised 'Soviet diplomatic activism for full scale peace processes at both the central and regional levels. Reagen's neo-globalism had nothing much to offer regarding systematic thinking about the future; Gorbachev's conflict management catered to the hopes and ideals of the widest constituency.

8. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS CREATIVE PEACE INITIATIVES

Before Gorbachev came on the international scene there was extreme pessimism on account of the general failure to manage international conflict, in spite of the favourable impact of mutuality of interests on many global and regional issues. It can be argued that before Gorbachev the potential of confidence building measures pointed out by experts was by and large underestimated by world leaders. There is no doubt that Gorbachev has been seeking institutionalised arrangements to induce new kinds of behaviour in the Third world and in Eastern Europe. His critics at home feel that he has been making unilateral concessions without receiving adequate quid pro quo. In favour of Gorbachev it can be stated that he has restored soviet. credibility on the world scene and if he has rejected the pursuit of narrow Russian egoistic self-interest, he has done this because he believes that the epoch of unilateral adventurism is over. Nations have to solve all problems at the negotiating table and that is why Gorbachev has been leading the Soviet Union to multilateral solutions.

The proces of establishing confidence - and security building measures (CSBMs), among the 35 states participating in the conference on security and cooperation and Europe, began with the signing of the Helsinki Final^A Act in 1975. The act contained a number of confidence - building measures, including encouraging nations to modify each other of, and invite observers to certain military activities that take place on land in Europe. These measures were a good start.

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE :

These nogotiations, knows as the conference on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE), opened in stockholum in Jan 1984 and concluded in sept 1986. When the 35 CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) states adopted the stockholum document, they assumed new commitments that went well beyond the measures contained in the final act, desinged to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding of mis-calculation of military activities. The Conference considered the problem of verffication of the observance of commitment and arrangements among others confidence building issues in the military sphere. This was a major innovation and the first East-West accord in which the Soviet Union agreed to inspection of military activities on its territory.

9 19 John Borawski : From Stockholm to Vienna : Confidence and Security Building measures in Europe, : Arms control today, Vol. 19 No. 4 May 1989.

On Jan, 17, 1989 the CSCE follow up conference in Vienna, agreed on the parameters for further talks on CSBMs, to begin march 9 in Vienna. These will build upon and expand the agreement reached in the stockhelum CDE negotiation. The Vienna CSBM talks are charged with building upon and expanding the results of Stockholm by adopting " a new set of mutually complementary (CSBMs), designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation. In Address

Although both negotiations have security and stability as their largest, the focus of each negotiation is substantially different. The CSBM negotiation will focus on openness and predictability in the field of military information and activities in the zone. In order to create greater openness and transparency of military organization, NATO plans to introduce a proposals for a wide ranging comprehensive annual exchange of information concerning military organisation, major weapon developments manpower and equipment in the zone. The alliance also will propose the establishment of a random evaluation system designed to assess the exchange of information.

Today, such progress does not appear possible for the near term future. The International system is not highly prove to such changes - mutual confidence in low, and it is require- ment of time to produce confidence building measure in all sphere, to normalize situation. And it also se under taken within the

existing security environment without endangering peace and security on any level.

In context of regional or sub-regional conference, could be convened in order to discuss confidence building measures among the recipient states. It seems especially important to study how different states in a region formulate their security needs and how they perceive the external threat to their own security.

The Washington summit managed to elaborate new confidence and security building measures, to enhance the peace and security. These summits continued to establish a new political psychology, a new mentality in International political relations. While in a joint statement of Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan in Washington noted, that the "implications of the provisions of the Stockholm conference in CSBMS, and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability and spoke in favour of continuing and consolidating their process.⁸

10. Thomas Ohlson (eds) : *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, Assessment : The need for confidence building*, (SIPRI) Oxford University Press 1988, pp.245-46.

The summit, on peace and security in the world contains agreements on confidence building measure, and some aspect of security and disarmament. This notes the connection between confidence building measure with military sphere ; but merely connection with military is not adequate, it should have with other spheres, as Economic Political, Humanitarian etc., Such measures could include, those used below : -

1. IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE :

- The strict respect in International ^a practice for the right of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development independently ;
- Just political settlement of International crises and regional conflict ;
- Elaboration of a set of measures aimed at building confidence between states and the creation of effective guarantees against attack from, without and of the inviolability of their frontiers ;
- Elaboration of effective methods of preventing International terrorism, including those ensuring the safety of International land, air and sea communications ;

ECONOMIC SPHERE

- Exclusion of all forms of discrimination from International practice ; renunciation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions,
- Joint quest for ways for a just settlement of the problem of debt ;
- Establishment of a new world economic order guaranteeing equal economic security to all countries ;
- The pooling of effort in exploring and making peaceful use of outer space and in resolving global problems on which the destinies of civilization depends ;

MILITARY SPHERE

- ^{renunciation} Renunciation of by the nuclear powers of war - both Nuclear and conventional - against each other or against third countries ;
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear ^{to} weapon tests, and the total destruction of such weapon, ^{and} the destruction of chemical weapons, and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation.
- A strictly controlled, lowering, of the level of military capabilities of countries to limit of reasonable adequacy ;

- Disbandment of military alliances, and as a stage towards ; this - renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones ;
- ^{at} Balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets,

HUMANITARIAN SPHERE

- Cooperation in the dissemination of the ideas of peace disarmament and International security ; reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and concord in relations between them ;
- Extirpation of genocide, apartheid, advocacy of -- fascism and other forms of racial, national or religion exclusiveness ;
- Extension while respecting the laws of each country of Internatoonal cooperation in the implementation of the political, social and personal rights of the people ;
- Strengthening of and quest for new forms of cooperation in cultural, arts, science, education and medicine .

^{This}

This refers above all to the problem of extending confidence building measures to the activities of the airforces and navies and the agreement on CBM for the new generations. including those of a restrictive nature. All these measures would contribute to deminishing the danger of a surprise attack and enhancing openners, and would

bring about predictability in the military sphere⁹.

The Military and political aspect of the concept of the International security system incorporates a model for a nuclear free world, the way it is already taking shape based on the new developments in world politics, first and foremost in relation between the USA and the USSR. The material basis for such a model can only be provided by large scale disarmament measures. The world politics has already accumulated enough positive experience to provide the foundation for such a system. In the present day situation also favourable for a future security system. As the number of the International treaties convention, and agreements banning mass destruction weapons and reducing them.

" The normalisation of bilateral East - West relations throughout the whole of Europe and in the world, pave new way to international relations and building confidence among states. It created a new political approach to global problems, shaped a new behaviour for the stable and peaceful world. The development of bilateral cooperation on a mutually beneficial, long term and large scale basis, could also

11. Nikolai Nikolsky : *The Philosophy of New thinking and the Soviet initiative* , Allied Publishers New Delhi 1987.

have a profound positive influence on their political relations, alongwith the lines of improving international security. These efforts are a decisive factor in promoting the balance and alignment of forces in favour of peace and global security "

In last, if these confidence building measure were to be carried out, it is conceivable that the necessary modidication of attitude towards such concept as disarmament, development peace and security could be facilitated.

9. REGION-ORIENTED SUPER POWER DIPLOMACY

The region-oriented super power diplomacy which the world has witnessed was not deliberated started by either Gorbachev or Reagen. It is the outcome of a certain process which was regarded a desirable and acceptable by both the world leaders. Once the principle which led to the sharp polarisations of the New Cold war were replaced by pluralistic tendencies, the regional issues could no longer be pushed to the sidelines. There are ofcourse different interpretations of the real significance of these regional developments in super power diplomacy. Some still argue that the measures are more

apparent than real and that the US and Soviet Union may once again aspire to a centralised and nuclearised security order. It can, however, hardly be denied by any one that the region-oriented super power diplomacy has been propitious for developing solutions in a large number of trouble spots in the Third world. It was initiated and defined a process of resolving third world conflicts through constructive move. Gorbachev's contribution in taking initiatives which were blocked by outmoded centralised security order lies in the clear and specific guidelines provided by him in contrast to the ambivalence in the pronouncements of other statesmen.

10. GORBACHEV'S PEACE BUILDING : FROM STATUS QUO TO SYSTEMIC CHANGE

One of the most important questions for the applications of "New thinking" to peace - building concerns the appropriateness of ways to establish a new and enduring dialogue between the principal actors on the world stage. Thus it has become necessary to look upon superpower arms control negotiations not merely as a method of bringing the physical capabilities of both sides into a bargaining range. The important consideration now is to discard the old rules of the game based on mutual mistrust. The situation of strategic parity is fairly well understood by

both US and the Soviet Union ; yet even when they reach mutually acceptable agreements a lot of mutual mistrust remains which can be dangerous in view of the enormous quantities of lethal nuclear weaponry that they possess. Superpower diplomacy must therefore help to maintain the enduring stability of strategic situations and for this purpose arms control negotiations must take on a wider meaning which is to serve as a continuing source for providing new windows of opportunity. The skillful practice of summit diplomacy by Gorbachev has provided a fresh approach which aims not only at removing deadlocks in negotiating situations but in offering powerful perceptions of the potentiality for superpower interactions in benign directions. At the 27 th CPSU Congress Gorbachev stated this approach quite clearly : " The fight against war and

" The fight against war and military preparations, against advocacy of hatred and violence is regarded by us as an inalienable component of democratisation of all international relations, of genuine improvement of the political climate on the planet"¹².

Gorbachev has built his platform for leadership in peace-building on nothing less than the improvement of the

12. Material of the 27th CPSU Congress. Moscow 1986 page 346.

Political climate on the planet^u He has persisted his efforts even when he did not get any particular policy responses from the United States. It is noteworthy that even though at the summit in Moscow Gorbachev could not get the Americans to finalise a strategic arms reduction (START) agreement, he ensured progress on a number of other arms control issues. By exchanging the instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty he ensured that the momentum of peace-building was kept up at the Moscow summit. He also pushed ahead with the agreement on the advanced notification of all ballistic missile launches. He also enhanced the importance of the Moscow summit by reporting progress on the issue of mobile ICBMS and ALCMS (Air-launched cruise missiles and expressed firm hopes on the future of the AEM treaty.

The Gorbachevian new thinking on peace-building also includes efforts to check destabilising prospects, which arise out of the very nature of policy-infighting in Washington between various lobbies and vested interested. One manifestation of this phenomenon has been the blocking of the ratification of the SALT-2. Although it has often been troublesome for Gorbachev he has not allowed his occasional frustration with United States prevarications to deflect him from his steady course. The Soviet Union

has shown its steady interest in maintaining the balance between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation even to the extend of developing a certain mutual empathy which can extend to a common destiny for these hostile military formations. Whenever there was a stalemate on the issue of procedure, Gorbachev's peace building approach has led him to stress the need to go beyond military and technical means and bypassing the concept of " absolute security"

CHAPTER - III

PEACE AND SECURITY : THE CHANGING WORLD SCENARIO

THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Gorbachevian framework of a system of all-encompassing security serves not only the political needs of the Soviet Union in East-West negotiations but also helps in projecting perceptions and attitudes of national actors in different regional contexts. The Soviet withdrawal from the Third World in places like Afghanistan need not lead to any undermining of Soviet prestige and influence in a world of growing interdependence. The great powers must accept the fact that the international system cannot be organised in terms of alliances and counter-alliances since various combinations and permutations have been tried in the last four decades and found wanting on the score of human survival. Gorbachev's new foreign policy placed international politics in both short term and long term perspective. Although he does not put it in so many words he accepts the relative decline of both the Super powers. In the political-military dimension it is necessary for both of them to reduce their commitments to their allies originating in the period of the Cold War. The Soviets have not hesitated to bring pressure for softening the negotiating positions of their hardline allies. Although some may criticise Gorbachev for appeasement, yet there is no other way for East-West negotiations to succeed in the future in an enduring manner if their commitment to negotiated settlements is undermined by more orthodox alliance partners. The example set by the Soviet Union

at its summitary with the United State should suggest a demonstration effect of how other negotiating partners can discover parallel interests. In the new international setting political manoeuvring must take into account the more general problem of credibility which was ignored in the past by the traditional nation-state nationalism. Superpower activism must take new forms in which the military relationship is underplayed and substituted by a variety of socioeconomic instruments to pursue vital interests without destroying the atmosphere of reduced tension and enhanced confidence in the international system.

As we have mentioned elsewhere Gorbachev's January 15, 1986 disarmament proposals can provide the basis for giving up escalatory confrontations. Gorbachev has ensured that the Soviet foreign policy system does not regress to the Brezhnevite Stagnation. If his lead is following by the states, nations can live without fear of one another.

1. IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES:

Peace and Security is not just the absence of world war, but it is absence of those factors which lead to violence and war. As Political, Economic, Social injustice at the international and national, level. Political and military aggression are not the only threat to peace, they are the final stage of the breakdown of peace. Economic social aggression represents serious threat to the maintenance of peace and are usually the

initial phase which eventually lead to civil violence and armed conflicts.¹

Peace and Security are the major requirements of the present time, every nation & state, whether socialist or capitalist are demanding, and emphasising on peace and security, because since long time people have been living in the full of tense to Nuclear war. Now the time has come to solve the Nuclear problem, both superpowers are also degree to eliminate nuclear weapons, have already been sign INF treaty, and wanted to entry into twenty first century without a fear of nuclear holocaust; and Reagan - Gorbachev Summit and INF treaty (Intermediate nuclear force) are the best example of normalisation of International Relation, and changing world scenario. It is a Gorbachev's new political thinking, to maintain peace and security in the world; and to solve regional conflicts by peaceful negotiations.

The Soviet Union may be promoting a new approach to Internal security because of perceived international imperative rather than because of domestic troubles. In fact contrary to the prevailing view in the country, the new realism evident in soviet foreign policy position is compelled more by international pressure them by changes in leadership and domestic

1. *Paul Pillar : Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a bargaining process, Princeton University Pres,, 1983.*

Priorities; Beyond recognising that the imperative of the nuclear age require mutual security and the prevention of nuclear war. Gorbachev apparently is one of few world leaders who truly grasp the implication of the security dilemma.

In an effort to give a new direction to International Relation, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has specifically maintained : -

" Peoples are tired of tensions and confrontation, They prefer to search for a more secure and reliable world; a world in which everyone would preserve their own philosophic, political and ideological views and the way of life".²

In his book 'Perestroika', he elaborated the significance of Perestroika for his country's foreign policy, calling for a correct understanding of the its momenclature for comprehending the Soviet foreign policy he wrote:

"The truth about Perestroika accords with the interests of universal peace and international security calling upon the best to subject our work to a responsible; honest and unbiased scrutiny, we proceed not only from our own interests. The inability or unwillingness to grasp the essence of perestroika is either a startling point for misconception about our intentions in the world arena or another attempt

2. Hari sharan Chhabra : *The challenge of Regional conflicts, World Focus, (New Delhi), Nineth Annual Number : 1988, pp 81-86.*

to maintain and deepen mistrust in relation among countries and people".³

Acknowledging that the threat to peace from imperialist militarism still exist and, that there are no guarantees as yet that the positive processes that have begun are irreversible. Gorabchev feels that the new political thinking enable us to see and find new opportunities for opposing policies of strength on a broden politcal basis than in the past. In his opinion there has been an improvement of in the Soivet - US. relations, and the war danger has been pushed back. Power Politics, he thinks has became obsoloscent and trends towards a gradual demilitarisation and humanisation of International relations have become quite visible as the world as the world moves towards the turn of the century.⁴

The challenges of Regional conflicts are the main threat to peace and security in the world, and the second cold war between US and Soviet - American confrontations, which has poisoned the world security environment appears to have passed to peak. The inescapable "compulsion to co-exist!" has asserted itself, and the two nuclear giant are once again groping for a viable modus vivendi. They are agreed in principle that the problems of world should be solved through political negotiations and not military means.

3. Mikhail Gorbachev : *Perestroika : New thinking for our country and the world.* Collins, London, 1987, pp.

4. Devendra Kaushik : *Perestroika desire for Peace : World focus*(New Delhi), Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1988, pp 13-17.

In less than three years, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan have met four times and hold detailed talks with a view to bringing about a transition from confrontation to a broad political dialogue on cardinal issues of the day. The Nov. 1985 summit in Geneva and the Oct 1986, meeting in Reykjavik may not have produced any concrete result but an understanding was reached to give a constructive directions in International Affairs. Significantly in Geneva the two leaders declared that " a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

The Third Reagan-Gorbachev Summit held in Washington in Dec. 1987, indeed a momentous one, because the two leaders signed a treaty on the elimination of Intermediate short range missile (INF). which have been threatening to peace and security in Europe. The Moscow Summit was a big leap in ending years of suspicion and bringing about an era of confidence building. The enemy image is transforming into partnership image. Opportunities today exist for taking the first, towards a democratization of the International system and move towards a more peaceful international order.⁵

Exchange of instrument of ratification of INF treaty was the most important achievement. The treaty, with its built in clauses for monitoring, inspection, verification of each others

5. H.S. Chhabra : *Regional Issues : The optimistic Move*. *World Focus*, Vol, 3, No. 5, May 1988, pp 21-25.

production facilities, storage and deployment in many ways, unique in the annals of the super powers disarmament, diplomacy in the post war era. At the Moscow summit, Gorbachev in an optimistic mood said, "The era of Nuclear disarmament has begun". Reagan characterised the INF treaty" as the first true nuclear arms reduction treaty in history, calling for the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles.⁶

The Moscow and Washington Summit did not confine themselves to nuclear disarmament programme along. They took up " regional conflicts" which are disturbing peace in the third world. Richard Nixon, in his book 'The Real Peace' has said. The greatest threat to peace comes not from the possibility of a direct conflict between the United states and the Soviet Union, but from the chance, that a small war in the third world will drag in the two super powers and escalate into a world war". When the interest, of the great power collide in areas like the middle East and the Persian Gulf (urban missile) any small war between their respective allies, can rapidly escalate into a war. In the middle East crisis of 1956, 58, 67, 73 for example, the super powers, were drawn toward the precipice of direct conflict by the action of their allies in the region.

President Richard Nixon, describe, in his book 'The Real Peace' that "There can be no real, Peace, in, the world

6. *Joint Soviet US. Summit statement of the ceremony of the Exchange of the TNF Treaty Ratification Documents and materials, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow June 1, 1988, pp 75-79.*

unless a new relationship is established between the limited states and Soviet Union. The two super power can not afford to go to war against each other, under any circumstances, because both have nuclear weapons and retaliation capacity:.

Since 1985. Summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan removed the tension of six years. and Changes world scenario as easing international Relations among countries, and ceasefire of major world conflict, such as, Iran- Iraq conflict withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghainstan, Palestive problem, Kampuchea Southers Africa, Namibia etc. negotiation. The Geneva accords on afghnistan which have opened the way to a peaceful settlement of one of the most acute regional conflicts and the improvement of the International climate in general.

The new political thinking is thus being put into practice. The peace actions of the leaders, of the Delhi six, and the decision of the eight countries non-aligned summit in Harare can also be considered a manifestation of this approach. These were based on the principles of equality and equal security, and look into account the interest of all nations. The dialogue is continue to generate repurcussions world wide , because "This dialogue was an appeal addressed to the whole of mankind". A humanity deserve a better fate that being hostage to nuclear

terror and despair . It is necessary to change the existing world situation and to build a nuclear weapon free world, free of ^{is} violence and hatred, fear and suspicions".

The Soviet approach to the peace and security; is based on the belief that in todays intedependent world, the people of all continents and countries have the same concerns, and the same hope. We observed Mikhail Gorbachev are in favour of peace and security, and good neighbourliness, trust and mutual understanding.

On Feb 28, 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement proposed singling out the problem of medium range missile in Europe & Asia Pacific region, and concluding a separate agreement on it, namely removing these missiles both Soviet and American, from the European continent over a five year period and reducing during this time the number of these missile in the Asian part of the USSR and on US Territory : and proposed certain measure : -

- reducing naval activity in the Pacific, especially that of nuclear capable ship;
- Implementing agreements already achieved and creating in practice nuclear free zones in various parts of the Asian Pacific region;
- curtailing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia to reasonable level;

- getting down to discussing confidence building measures and non- use of force in the region.

The Soviet Union is prepared to guarantee contractually non-use of nuclear weapons against state, which do not possess them, do not produce them and do not have them on their territory. "The Soviet also call upon all Asian and Pacific nation to cooperate for the sake of peace and security : Everyone who strives towards these goals, and who hopes for a better future, for one's people will find that we are willing to talk and are honest partner".

'In a preface to his book peace has no alternative' he (Gorbachev) explained the Soviet foreign policy concern about peace; and he said that " the maintence of weapons stockpiled in the world have led to a situation where humanity finds itself at a point, beyond which lies the total ruin of civilisation; and the turning of our planet into a radio active wasteland; this danger imperatively places before all nation, and this is the moment to start agitation against testing of nuclear weapon, for survival of human being.⁷

2. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The change in (have) Soviet Union may appear revolutionary enough. But the International stituation has also changed very

 7. *Mikhail Gorbachev ; Peace has no Alternative; Speeches, Articles, Interviews, Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1987.*

radically initiatives continue to flow from Gorbachev. That there were many currents elsewhere in favour of change in nature. He has opted in favour of seeking cooperation rather than confrontation. Wherever possible, and towards this end has outlined a new world order which would make this possible. It is a conviction that ending all tests of nuclear weapon would be a major contribution to the strengthening of strategic stability and peace on earth. Gorbachev says that "May the 21st century become the first century of life without fear of universal death"⁸.

While the regional issues came up for discussion at the summits, that super powers actions effects the destinies of the world, say that they do not wish to impose their hegemony over the third world disputes, but they would like to get settle through dialogue and political negotiations. In his book in Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev wrote; we call on the United States administration to join hands with us in searching for solution to the third world problems, with cooperation. Not confrontation, is required to have universal human values firmly established throughout the world.⁹

In relation to regional issues the joint Soviet U.S. statement in Moscow point out " the two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established,

8. Eric Gonsalves : VSSR Initiative a New World Order; world focus Nineth Annual Number 1988, pp 24-25.

9. Gorbachev Mikhail : Perestroika , New thinking for our country and the world, (collins, London, 1987).

represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimise real difference of history, which will continue to characterise the relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure because it is based on realism, and focussed on the achievement of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing, not only the problem of the Present but of tomorrow and the next century. They reaffirmed their intention to continue discussion at all levels, aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts, find peaceful solution, which advance their independence, freedom and security.

Gorbachev emphasised the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institution to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts. It will be appropriate to point out that Gorbachev spares no platform, to talk to peace and cooperation. The time and realities of today's world require a stake, to be made on rendering the dialogue and negotiating process international.

In his speech, he showed much optimism about the settlement of regional conflicts. He said the year 1988 has also brought us a ray of hope, in this common concern. It has touched upon nearly all regional conflicts and there have been sign of improvement. He also referred to the outgoing year that would remain in people's memory as " the year of big changes, for the

better, in International Relations. At the same time, in the message to the American, he said realistically that Americans seem to be rediscovering the Soviet Union, and we are rediscovering American. Fear and suspicion are gradually giving way to trust and feeling of mutual liking.

The genesis of all the regional conflicts, would point to differences in approach to their historical origin, and while they concern third world countries, they are enmeshed in East-West tensions.

The Afghanistan issue had destabilised, areas, beyond its geographical limits, and was provoked by outside interference; there is hardly any doubt that the Geneva accords brought about through negotiation, between all the parties to the conflict and with an active contribution from the United Nations, opens up the prospect of progress, both on the external and domestic aspects of the Afghan problem. The Geneva documents call for an end to the undeclared war against Afghanistan by Pakistan - US. aided rebel groups, corresponding guarantees by the two super powers, encouragement to the Afghan refugees to return home peacefully and in honour and dignity and setting forth the stages of the Soviet military pull out.

But the prospects of peace in Afghanistan, and the establishment of a govt. of national unity in Kabul are being

hampered by the intransigence of the alliance of the seven rebel group, based inside Pakistan; have rejected the Geneva agreement, saying they intend to fight till final victory. Even as Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan before the Feb 15, deadline, the situation was made complicated and dangerous by the Afghan rebel; who not only attacked the departing Soviet Convoy's but fired rocket at Kabul, Kandahar and Many other cities.

Meanwhile, that Dregó cordovez, the UN mediator on Afghanistan, will continued his attempt to forge a political settlement through diplomacy. The post Soviet withdrawal scenario in Afghanistan is clear.

As to other regional problem concerned, peace in Gulf after ceasefire in the eight year old Iran-Iraq war has been greatly welcomed by the Gorabchev regime. Although there is peace, the UN security council resolution 598, contributed much to normalize, situations. United Nation is taking effective measure to bring about a comprehensive peace in the Gulf. A move is also supported by Moscow. It is an effort of UN, and new thinking that changes relationship, and makes possible to it, to political negotiation if Iran-Iraq conflict.

The Soviet initiative are taken into consideration, the ideas and initiatives of other Asian state. Soviet proposal

seek to secure the balance of interest and show the Soviet Union flexibility, its readiness for compromises and consideration for all sides opinion. A long and tortuous way, which lies ahead cannot be travelled alone, that way leads to a peaceful nuclear free world, in keeping with global interest.

Kampuchea was an old issue that had been destabilising the South East Asian region. The announcement of the phased withdrawal of the vietnamese troops raised the prospect of peace in Kampuchea, as well as in the region. During the last general Assembly session, both vietnamese and the ASEAN countries spoke of the possibility of imminent peace. In Jakarta, the Indonesian Govt. was lending a helpful hand, in bringing the parties concerned to a negotiating table.

The chances for peace are improved in West-Asia too, after Palestinian chairman Yasar Arafat accepted Israel's right to exist. The resolution of the Palestinian question looked so much more encouraging, when one Britain and other European countries taking to Arafat, and appearing to play a mediating role between Israel and PLO. Intifadah's success and Jordan role in cutting all ties with Israel, led to the proclamation of the state of Palestine. It was development that appeared to improve prospect of independent state Palestine, homeland on the International horizon.

Soviet response to all the fast moving development concerning Palestine has been more than positive.

The signing of agreement at a ceremony at the United Nation on Dec. 22, for the independence of Namibia, in accordance with the Security council resolution. and for the phased with drawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the UN secretary said, the agreement were the successful conclusion of eight months of intensive negotiation between South Africa, Cuba and Angola, with the mediation of the United States and the support of the soviet Union , having played an important and constructive role in the peace process Southern Africa. Analyst see the Soviet role in this region as a visible success of Gorbachev's new thinking. It is hoped that southern Africa region after independence will be peaceful, and also follow the path of peaceful coexistence¹⁰.

The Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that the level of arms in Asia should be reduced to limits of reasonable sufficiency for defence alone. Aware of the Asian and Pacific countries concern, the Soviet Union has stated that it will not increase the quantum of Nuclear weapon in the region.

Most analysts has credited that these development are the new thanking of Mikhail Gorbachev, that has sought an end to regional conflicts. So that Moscow could invest more on the domestic front. Perhaps more than anything else, 1988 brought a watershed in a US - Soviet relation . The two side displayed a greater degree of multual trust cooperation than at any time since world war II, by agreeing to sign an agreement on eliminating all medium range missile from Europe.

The 27th Party congress also made an important contribution to the development of the concept of a comprehensive system of International security, which is based mainly on the principlè of ensuring security through political means. The new concept maintained that equal security could be achieved not by the highest possible, but by lowest level of strategic parity from which nuclear and other type of weapons of mass-destruction must be totally excluded.

3. INNOVATIVE POLICIES : THE TREND AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION

Most of the regional conflict analysed above are showing some sign of solution. The soviet Union is obviously interested to avoid a military confrontation in Asia and

the Pacific region. Gorbachev also appealed for an international conference for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace by the year 1990, to usher in a new era of peace and security in this military sensitive region

The USSR claimed that it would like to see Asia, as well as the whole world enter into the 21 st century free from nuclear and chemical weapons, to ensure an end to armed conflict, and regional conflicts, and military preparation there. the Soviet proposals as follows :.

- A - To block the proliferation and build up of Nuclear weapon in Asia and the Pacific '
- B - To ensure a settlement of regional conflicts ;
- C - To reduce the activity of naval forces, particularly that of nuclear armed ship
- D - To work for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace;
- E - To start gradually reducing conventional armament and armed forces ;
- F - To work out confidence building measure for the countries of the region ;

4. THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE-BUILDING AND THE CENTRAL SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP

The priorities and objectives of peace-building follow-

ing the Gorbachev-Reagan summitry reflect the deeper understanding of the spill-over effects of the regional and sub-regional conflict into the central superpower relationship. The Basic principles Agreement of 1972 could not overcome the perception gaps in the context of the particularisms of the two bloc systems. Their interventionist tendencies in the Third world could only lead to a bleak prognosis which worked against mutual abstention and restraint. In bringing about a satisfactory balance to insulate the central superpower relationship, the new East-West accords do not aim at any short-term fixing but are intended to provide the bedrock for predictable long-term U.S. SOVIET relationship.

There has been a definite learning process from the bitter experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s when both the superpowers found that they were ensured by their own paranoid policies and could not arrive at any meaningful agreements. Gorbachev's emphasis on self-restraint and Reagan's willingness to develop superpower cooperation on regional disputes has dramatically changed the conflictual situation between Washington and Moscow.

C H A P T E R - I V

THE THEORY AND CASE STUDY OF THE INF TREATY

The case study of the INF serve the purpose of examining questions and criteria which affect the dynamics of peace-building in an era when the appraisal of realities of human survival is the crucial task for summit diplomacy. The collapse of the Soviet-American detente in the earlier part of the eighties led to the realisation of the need to change the pattern of confrontation in the international environment. Gorbachev's new thinking helped to change both Soviet and American perceptions and expectations. The INF Treaty provides the analytical lens through which the new system of values and attitudes in Soviet and American foreign policy can be viewed. By freeing the world of all land based intermediate range missiles (from 500 to 5,500 k.m.) Gorbachev and Reagan opened the door to a new arrangement in the distant future when strategies of both side could be moved towards non-offensive defence. The West has been often unresponsive to Gorbachev's signals but whenever these has been picked up the dynamics of peace-building has been accelerated. The touchstone of Gorbachev's vision for a stable peace can be found in his following words :

" The path towards the realisation of reasonable sufficiency we see in governments not having more military strength and armaments than is necessary for their reliable defence, and also in their armed forces being structured in such a way that they will provide all that is needed for the repulsion of any possible aggression but could not be used for

offensive purposes¹ "

The INF Treaty can properly be regarded as a move towards an intermediate stage on way to the final achievement of peace-building through non-offensive defence. It is only if we understand the connection of the INF effort with the overall move towards substantive rejection of offensive forces that the various levels of Gorbachev's grand strategy can be perceived. The INF is not only a first step in the compromise between US and Soviet Arms control proposals ; its is an important corrective action for achieving a macro-perspective of a global environment for a stable peace.

It began a hope of life free from fear, because nobody would have ever thought of such an intimate exchange and such an opening between the two great adversaries. It is a direct consequences of the Gorbachev's steadfast commitment to achieving real arms reductions, rather than merely limiting increases as in previous treaties. It also is the result of NATO solidarity in responding to the threat posed by the Soviet deployment of Ss-20 missile. There has been some progress too on such a key issue, as the reduction of strategic

¹. Letter from M. Gorbachev 16 Nov, 1987 in IAS Report, Journal of the Federation of American scientists Vol. 41, No.2 February 1988.

offensive weapons, also close to harmonisation are the fundamental issues of the future universal convention ; on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons Hitherto, unknown standards of openness and of the scope and depth of mutual verification and control are being asserted in the sphere of disarmament, there have also been the first, but highly important steps towards a restructuring of international relations.

The Gorbachev persistent efforts and bold peace initiative began to have a deep impact on East- West relations, and it changes the world scenario. A summit meeting in Geneva, the leader of the countries recognises them special responsibility for maintaining world peace ; and also that any conflict whether nuclear or conventional between the two would have catastrophic consequences emphasising the importance of preventing any war, they also declared that they would not seek to achieve military superiority. President Reagen in a meeting with NATO allies expressed that :-

" We must and will engage the Soviet in dialogue, as serious and constructive as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world ; reduce the level of arms,

and build a constructive working relationship².

The joint statement issued by the U.S and Soviet Union at Geneva, noted, secretary Shultz and foreign minister Gromyko, agreed that the new negotiation would address a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range with all the questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship Secretary Shultz expressed the hope that these negotiations would ultimately lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms every where. It has won the principle of trust, supported by means of effective implementation of its provisions. By eliminating nuclear weapons, a major step would be made towards genuine democratisation of relations among states, towards their equality and equal responsibility.

Geneva summit as an important step in the process of normalising international scenario. It paved the way to comprehensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues, an agenda encompassing arms control

2. Olsson Victor E. The Geneva talks on Nuclear and Outer space weapons : NATO Review (Brussels) , Vol. 23, No. 1 pp. 10.11, Feb - 1985.

human rights and humanitarian matters, settlements of regional conflicts and bilateral relations. In spite of this, they have put forward concrete and radical proposals in the negotiations, on nuclear and space arms

- Halving of all nuclear system of the USA & USSR, capable of reaching each other territory;
- Reduction of 50% of nuclear arsenals ;
- Direct negotiations with Britain & France for reduction of their nuclear weapons ;
- Prohibition of space strike arms ;

Although, the Geneva summit failed to bring about the expected result, but it paved the way for another summit in Reykjavik, chance of 50% cut in strategic weapon appeared very bright. There were also prospect for complete elimination of Soviet and US medium range missile in Europe.

At Reykjavik, the Gorbachev made effort to reach an agreement by offering substantial concession. The summit once again confirmed that the soviet Union's staunch and steadfast adherence to the concept of a comprehensive system of a common universal security. Gorbachev opinions it only ensures that equal danger of each of them continuation

of the nuclear arms race will bring this equal threat. He emphasised that genuine equal security is guaranteed not by an excessively high but by the lowest possible level of strategic parity.

Reykjavik summit was a result of the consistent peace initiative of the Soviet Union, and the world wide support generated by them. But it was also notable to produce suitable result, because of Reagen's adherence to SDI programme.

On Dec 31, 1985 a few minute before the UN as new year set in, a year that was designated by the UN as the International Year of Peace. Mikhail Gorbacheve again sounded a clarion, call to preserve peace avert the threat of a nuclear war and to prevent a fatal disaster. He declared that

" In the Nuclear age people of the earth are all in one boat, it is irresponsible to rock this boat by military adventurism" (M.Gorbachev)³

3. *" The Reality and Guarantee of a secure world" Pravda (Moscow) Sept 17, 1987 pp. 23.*

Reykjavik meeting open up fresh prospects, and it proves that the two giants can agree if they want to. Further move it raise hopes world wide for further reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons. Before INF treaty few people believed that nuclear disarmament was possible, whereas now the world is about to take a big step towards a nuclear - free world. But the first time, in the history of nuclear weapons or soviet - American nuclear confrontations, to be more precise it has become possible to agree on destroying two classes of nuclear weapons. But this is a only beginning, no doubt,⁴

The INF treaty is important for several reasons, not least because it represents the first nuclear arms reduction agreement entered into force by the super powers and for the first time the two sides agreed on site inspections of warheads and missile, and for the presence of observer in the plants where the weapons are produced and assembled. At the same time, the treaty provides for the elimination of all US and Soviet INF missile system in the range of 500-5500 km (about 300-3400 miles) and the

4. Haley Edward.P : *Lessons from Reykjavik*, Orbis (Philadelphia) Vol. 31, No.1 1987 , pp. 25-96.

elimination or conversion of related facilities within three years after it enters into force. The treaty bans all production and flight testing of these missile immediately. After that the treaty will ban all facilities, for deployment, storage, repair and production of these missile system. The verification rules of this treaty is devoted to this subject, and it is the toughest and most rigid verification schedule ever. Although there is encouraging for mankind. At last, peace seems to have gotten the chance it needed.

The treaty represents the successful, outcome of a strategy which NATO adopted in Dec. 1979. The alliance was confronted with the threat, highlighted by the deployment of the SS - 20, of the growing disparity between NATO and the WARSAW PACT in the INF missile. The alliance agreed on a course of action to reduce this disparity ; a programme of U.S deployment in Europe and an offer of US-USSR negotiation to establish a balance at the lowest possible level. U.S. Defence minister in a meeting with defense minister of NATO, in Brussels, said -

" The recently concluded INF agreement, between U.S and Soviet Union is a milestone in an efforts to achieve a more secure and stable peace at lower levels of arms. We look forward to the early entry into force "

of this agreement "5.

The president Reagan has said that it would be better to have no arms control agreement that cannot be effective verification. According this treaty contain the most stringent verification provision in the history of arms control compliance with it can be effectively verified. The treaty meets the objective, the US has established for verification of the treaties terms. These objective are to :-

- Ensure confidence in the agreements ;
 - Deter violations of the treaty by increasing the likelihood, that such violation would be detected ;
- Specially the Verification provision included :
- An unprecedented exchange of data on the system, limited by the treaty, including numbers, locations, and technical characteristic of all INF missile and launchers ;
 - Inspectors at INF sites to confirm the validity of the data exchanged, to help verify elimination of

5. Shultz, George : *Achievement of the INF Treaty" United States, Department of state Bureau of public affairs (Washington D.C) May . 16, 1988.*

these weapons and relate infrastructure and to help verify that INF activity has ceased ;

- Short notice on site inspection at INF related sites during the 3 years reduction period and for 10 year after wards ;

- Prohibition on interference with verification by national technical means⁶ ;

BASIC OBLIGATION OF TREATY :

President Reagan and Gen. Sec. Mikhail Gorbachev exchanged instruments of ratification at the Moscow summit on June 1 and the INF treaty immediately entered into force and the first week in July both have begun sending teams of inspectors to each other sites, to help in the process of assessing compliance with the INF Treaty.

The INF treaty obligates the US and Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate and shorter-range missile & system, and prohibited each side from possessing them thereafter. It also requires that missile related facilities be eliminated. After that neither side may

6. Culley Harriet, *INF Treaty : A success story* : Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington) No. 202, pp. 647. Dec. 1987.

produce or test any missile. Whatsoever, they may launch upto hundred intermediate range missile during the first sixth month of the elimination period for the sole purpose of destroying them. Such launches for destruction purposes cannot be conducted in a manner that could produce useful information for missile development, and inspectors will be present for these launches. Now as the treaty provisions are :-

Verification obligation : Then each side will continue to use its national technical means, as the principal method of monitoring the treaty, another important means to assist in verification is through the unprecedented on-site inspection rights established by the treaty. with a force of 200 inspectors 200 monitor, and 200 air crew members from each side.

Baseline-inspection, to be conducted shortly after the INF treaty enter into force to verify the number of missiles and launchers at declared facilities, including bases at which missiles are operating, repaired and stored.

Close out inspection : To ensure that only when all INF associated activity has indeed terminated will

declared a site be deactivated and removed from the list of declared facilities both the US and USSR will have right to conduct inspections to observe that treaty limited activities have ceased at that facility.

Elimination Inspection : the US and Soviet Union have an obligation to observe the destruction of missile and launchers at elimination facilities. A side will provide 30 days notification that elimination of treaty limited item will commence. In the case of elimination by launcher, 10 days notice will be required. Since more than one missile on launchers can be destroyed at a time. During the three years elimination period, the side will conduct as many inspections as are necessary to observe the elimination of all items in the treaty subject to elimination.

Short notice Inspection : The US and USSR are entitled to conduct a specific number of short notice inspections per year of agreed location. Thus during the first three years of the treaty, before all systems have been eliminated both nations will have the right to short - notice inspections per year the first five years after the complete elimination of INF missile systems, both sides can conduct - on - site inspections each year. For the last five years each can conduct ten similar inspections per year.⁷

7. Statement by Max. Kampelwan: On negotiation and Ratification. Dept. of State Bulletin (Washington) March, 1988 pp 41-42.

For the special case of the Soviet SS-25, ICBM which is assembled at a facility where SS-20 missile formerly were assembled. The Soviet has explicitly agreed to allow the United States to establish a continuous monitoring system at the SS-25, and United States has agreed to allow the Soviet to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at the former Pershing-II missile facility.

The INF treaty satisfies the requirements by establishing precise, unambiguous obligation by creating a network of inter related constraints and measure, that allow careful monitoring, and to raise the cost and difficulty of cheating and the risk of getting caught, and by creating a mechanism for addressing compliance concerned. In sum the verification regime of the treaty provides an extensive network of checks and cross checks, appropriate to a zero level environment where the production, flight testing, indeed, the existence of INF missiles is prohibited.

The INF agreement is of course, historic proportions because never before have two worlds powers agreed to eliminate an entire category of existing weaponry. Although it is a positive example of United States and Soviet determination and ability to resolve controversial issues, and to work to resolve a security problem and to consolidate

peace and International security, to restructure the system of International relations on democratic of peaceful co-existence of states, for averting the threat of world war.

INF treaty is a first step towards a Nuclear free world, signed by Secretary M. Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Washington! it is as a symbol of the real hope to avert the risk of Nuclear weapon, facing humanity. The Zero-Zero treaty between them, marks the starting point for real progress on the road to disarmament. It is a turning point of historic importance to the whole world; and showed for the first time ever that disarmament is possible. The elimination of Zero warheads does not remove the danger; inspite of this there are around 50,000 such warheads in the world. But this step is, moreover, only possible direction towards human survival. Mikhail Gorbachev deserves every credit for the ability and sense of purpose he has shown. It is a good beginning for the process towards the total abolition of weapons of mass annihilation.

The treaty is not at all the fruit of policy from strength or of the intensive arms race. It is a result of the unprecedentedly favourite climate for the cause of peace and disarmament; created in the world by growing awareness of the perils of arms race. That ground swell of struggle

for peace, contributed significantly towards the treaty. It is most important aspect was the innovative and dynamic foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which put forward a series of bold and far reaching proposals for disarmament. They gave a new dimension to the mass movement for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe and for curbing the arms race.⁸

The effective policies of peace initiative relies on New political thinking that has originated from the Soviet Union, and is a reflection of the dramatically changed realities of the late 20th century. New thinking with its common criteria and emphasis on human reason and consciences exerting ever greater influence on International affairs. It emphasise that world is owe and interdependent that the alternative is to survive or to perish in it together, that security is guaranteed today not through the escalation of armaments but through mutual accords; and demands a new approach to global problem.

The paramount global problem is that of safeguarding peace, and INF is the first tangible result of New thinking. The road to agreement was smooth and easy, let us recall just some of the points on its last stretch,-----

8. *George Shultz Statement on the INF Treaty, Department of State Bulletin (Washington) March, 1988, pp 31-40.*

--- In August, 1985, the Soviet Union unilaterally, halted its all Nuclear explosion and called for immediate talk on a total Nuclear test ban. That moratorium was extended five time but the United States did not reciprocate. This initiative gave a strong impetus to the mass movement of millions, all over the world for a Nuclear test ban.

--- In November, 1985, the General Secretary of CPSU, and the United States President said in his joint statement at the end of the Geneva meeting that Nuclear war must never be fought and that there will be no winner in it.

--- On January, 1986, the Soviet Union announced a programme for the total abolition of Nuclear weapons in the world by the year 2000, which because veritable manifesto of human survival. The idea and programme for the Nuclear free world were further elucidated in the Delhi Declaration on the Principle for a Nuclear weapon free and Non-violent world.

--- The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries launched at the United Nation a series of New major initiative including a blue print for a comprehensive system of International security.

--- The Warsaw treaty members countries addressed NATO and the European states with the proposal for cutting the armed forces to the level of structural non-aggressiveness. They also advanced the idea of comparing the military doctrine of the two alliance, removing suspicious that has accumulated over the years and revising the military doctrine so as to take them exclusively defensive. They suggested that Zones free from both Nuclear and chemical weapons be established and the chemical weapons be prohibited and eliminated. Another proposal was for the elaboration of effective measures of verifying arms reductions, including on site inspection.

--- The treaty protects future options to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and sustain its strategy of flexible response.

--- It created, opportunity for taking step towards a democratisation of International system and move towards a more peaceful International order.

--- It will remove more than 2000 Nuclear weapons from Europe, thereby lessening the level of confrontation in the US Soviet relationship. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the agreement as historic because it called for

genuine disarmament and it would open the door to further arms control.

--- The accord mark the end of the arms race and the beginning of the destruction of Nuclear arsenals;

--- The INF has broken New ground on the vexed questions of verification. The shedding of long standing Soviet inhibitions on intrusive site inspection, under Gorbachev, facilitates movement across the board in all arms limitation talks;

--- The INF Treaty created New possibilities in Disarmament, it is indeed the first time that USA-USSR have agreed to eliminate entire categories of Nuclear weapons. In the past only aged and obsolescent Nuclear weapons were retired. The New accord would lead to the removal of the some of the most modern Nuclear weapon system like the Soviet SS-20 and United States Pershing II and the ground launched missile (GLCM).

The importance of INF, it created a climate of relative mutual confidence which has been signally lacking in the super power relationship that can normally be expected to spread to other aspect of East-West relationship as a whole. INF is a harbinger of political and military cooperation for European audiences. (The Financial Times)

Further arms reductions and the increasing normalisation of super power relation are also the necessary means to the goal of revitalising detente. Gorbachev emergence and the INF accord have encouraged the allied public to look forward to further improvements. Denmark's politiken labelled that the INF Treaty an epoch making agreement because it symbolises the beginning of a New period of detente. Norway's Afterposten called at a good basis for the efforts towards detente in a wider perspective.

Finally the INF treaty provides a model that can be applied to other arms control Negotiations. It provides a new wind of international detente that blowing from Washington towards the rest of the world. but the question, arises, upto what extent it is able to maintain peace in the world, whereas it is only four percent of both Nuclear arsenals. Answer is that, INF is a first step towards this it provides new opportunity, new approach, new process, if such process continued in the future, I hope, that no doubt, the twenty first century will be peaceful.

As for as peace is concerned, the favourable tendencies are gaining ground international level. A development has started moving along the path paved by Washington summit. It indeed became a turning point in world History, it showed the possibility of improving the world situation.

It was Gorbachev that confirmed the correctness of the need for and constructiveness of new political thinking gleams of hope have emerged, however, not only in the field of medium and shorter range missile; the banning of nuclear testing have started, it engendered and intensified worldwide demand for an end to test.

The Soviet - US meeting in Washington gave a new dimension to the struggle against Nuclear threat. The leaders of the USA and USSR reached an understanding on the possibility and need for drastic reduction in the Nuclear arms arsenals.

The United Nation sponsored international conferences on the relationship between disarmament and development in New York, in August-September, 1987, stated that disarmament and development are the two most urgent problem facing mankind today. The reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and non-militarization of space therefore constitute an economic as well as political imperatives. The concept of disarmament for development is winning broader support.

The Treaty gives a strong impetus to all the peace campaigner by demonstrating that, the West German

peace movement, for instance, as campaigning throughout the early 1980's against the deployment of perishing and cruise missile in the country. Although the main goal was not achieved, the political climate in the F.R.G. changed . It is now clear that generally optimism, patience and perseverance are a must in the struggle for peace and disarmament.

It is possible that people are convinced to create condition which will rule out world war. The first step towards a nuclear free world taken and obliges all of us to work ever more concertedly and purposefully in the struggle for the greatest value humanity has life.

The conclusion of a INF treaty. It is extremely important because among other things, it gives people the confidence that we can move on to the next step. There is now a general feeling that we have moved the whole process of saving humanity from Nuclear distruction. People are now aware that the worldwide peace movement does produce suitable results. The peace policies and initiative of the Soviet Union and the other countries, it is possible to come to agreement even in difficult times. The peace movement has gained strength and would have the way to Nuclear disarmament the year 2000.

The Warsaw treaty members countries regarding the consolidation of peace, the elimination of the threat of war to mankind, and the development of extensive mutually beneficial International cooperation, as the supreme goal of their policy. They intend to contribute their supreme goal of their policy. They intend to contribute their all round efforts to further comprehensive and equal security. The states represented at the meeting confirm their determination to do everything in order to achieve new accords in the field of disarmament and make the process of disarmament continuous and irreversible; establishing a New International economic order and setting without delay, ecological and other global problem.

The solution of problems that determines survival of mankind and the progress of civilisation demands common efforts and active participation of all countries and people. Within this context, the state represented at the meeting stress the need for enhancing the role of the United Nation and the readiness to facilitate this in all way. The Warsaw treaty members countries resolutely come out in favour of:-

- ensuring security by political rather than military means
- asserting the primacy of International law in Inter-state relations;

- maintaining normal relations among states irrespective of their ~~social~~ and political system.
- replacing confrontation and hostility with a policy of partnership, mutual understanding, trust good neighbourliness;
- mutual consolidation for the interest of all states
- cooperation in the field of human rights and in the humanitarian sphere with one accord for commitment for commitment assumed.

The following are the vital requirement of policy of security, mutual understanding and cooperation among states:-

- strict respect for national independence, sovereignty and equality of all states, equality of peoples and the right of each people to self determination and a free choice of the way of its social and political developments;
- Non-interference in domestic affairs;
- Unconditional renunciation of the use of the force or threat of force in any forms.

--- strict respect for the established territorial and political realities, inviolability of the existing borders and the territorial integrity of states.

--- settlement of any disputes exclusively peaceful ways.

These developments are reshaping the international system from the erstwhile bipolar conflictual model into a more pluralistic multipolar system in one respect, and a shift from the hierarchical model towards a more democratised system. Because of emergence of new centres of powers in the world - Japan, especially as an economic technological great power. China as a politico-military power modernising and reforming across the board to be above to be a front-ranking power in the world by the end of the century. The two super powers would undoubtedly continue to be the prime influences in global affairs, but additional essential actors are likely to have their own paradigm of relationship and influences in relation to the super powers, amongst themselves, and towards the rest of the world.

The people at large are ready for change, and Mikhail Gorbachev symbolised the hopes, aspirations and operationalisation of that change. He moved in his view

ways of thinking from equality and equal security to the broader concept of mutual security which includes the notion that the adversary's insecurity works to one's disadvantage. Similarly the idea of reasonable sufficiency relies on a sophisticated appraisal of long term balances of interest.

The Washington Summit provided Gorbachev with additional international stature and perhaps with increased authority within the Soviet leadership. Whether that prestige and authority can be translated into domestic political power to sustain the pace of perestroika, depends in part on moving beyond the INF Treaty to even more significant and clearly beneficial arms control agreements, thus containing any military and political backlash that may be building.

*The Real prospect of the complete elimination of Nuclear weapons in the Asian Pacific region is linked not only with the establishment of deep confidence between the USSR and the USA, but also with a serious improvement in the International Political climate as a whole*⁹

9. Gorbachev I, *Peace and security in the Asian Pacific Region, The Results of the Past Year. Soviet Review, (New Delhi) Vol.25, No.2, 1988.* pp 42-43.

The Washington meeting with the President Reagan may cause a kind of peaceful chain reaction in the field of strategic offensive arms and non-launching of weapons into outer space. The United States should welcome the restructuring process because it will reduce a risk of a Nuclear clash and regional instability. But moreover some Western feels that restructuring may weaken the political and economic unity of Western Europe. The USSR will reach its market, and will exert greater political influence on the developing countries, Soviet military and other aid to them may be increased, and some of them will want to adopt the model of the soviet economy, if it proves competitive vis-a-vis the United States economy. There has been intense debate going on, in the West whether should the capitalist state cooperate Gorbachev or not. Alan B. Sheer in his book 'Soviet objective in Gorbachev era' writes that -

"..Perhaps no Soviet leader has evoked so much of interest and euphoria, as the present Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev His policies towards global peace and disarmament-and his numerous initiative in Asia-pacific and many other areas have been appreciated widely. They have taken every West European countries by surprise" - Alan B. Sheer.

Finally he advocates that the West must understand Gorbachev's sincerity and help him in bringing in an era of mutual trust and cooperation.

10. Sheer Alan B, *The other side of Arms Control; Soviet objective in the Gorbachev era*(London) 1988, pp 325.

C H A P T E R - V

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSION

The dramatic developments in Soviet - American relations following the Reagen-Gorbachev Summitry cannot be understood in simplistic terms. Those scholars who were only used to hegemonic conceptualisations and were not prepared to give them up, have by and large failed to comprehend the far-reaching changes in the very logic of contemporary international politics. The cardinal role played by Gorbachev in rethinking the dogmas of the national security discourses in both the Soviet and United States led blocs has not been appreciated fully by those who are tenaciously holding on to the basic categories of the logic of nuclear deterrence at a time when these have become completely outdated. The present study can only serve as an introduction to a wider study of the peace-building process which is suited to the modern age where human survival has an overriding urgency. The setting for our study was the wide vista of international politics that the I.N.F.Treaty has opened, and in which we perceive Gorbachev's role not only in terms of the decision-making process on the Soviet side but in the large dimensions of the output of international diplomacy throughout the world arena. Our analysis has shown that it is necessary to probe more deeply into nature of there^a Reagen-Gorbachev summitry if the new political,

economic and social realities on which the peace-building process depends are to be comprehended. We have tried to highlight Gorbachev's personal role and his responsibility in introducing a new perspective on global security issues by providing a radically different *raison d'etre* of the Soviet-U.S. relationship to the one he had inherited and which was marked by an oscillating cold war and mounting arms race. The mainstream international relations analysts are reluctant to explore the avenues opened up by Gorbachev. It is the specialists in peace research who are raising significant questions : what are the new challenges which led to the Reagan-Gorbachev summitry and what were the implications of the joint declaration in Geneva the nuclear war could not be won and should not be fought ? What are the cleavages on the American establishment's side to the bold Soviet initiatives under Gorbachev ? What is the future for the doctrine of deterrence ? Can the momentum in the removal of militaristic values initiated by the Reagan-Gorbachev summit be maintained in the international system ? What will be the future role of summitry in achieving multi-lateral strategic cooperation ?

We can sum up the main points of this study by listing five sets of issues which have opened up a new opportunity for peace-building in a militarised and less hegemonic world :

1. ISSUES RELATING TO THE NON-WINNABILITY OF
NUCLEAR WAR

The negotiating position of Gorbachev has been consistently built upon the acceptance of plain fact of the inability of any power to win a nuclear war. He was therefore eager to have this attitude accepted at the 1985 Geneva summit by suggesting the phrase "inadmissibility of nuclear war" inclusion in the joint statement. Ultimately for the sake of compromise he agreed to Regan's formulation "a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought". Gorbachev's approach to arms control, regional conflicts and bilateral U.S.-Soviet issues cannot be understood without appreciating the substantive content of his stance on the inadmissibility of nuclear war under the conditions of mutual vulnerability is which the superpowers find themselves. In practical terms, Gorbachev has employed a number of devices such as moratorium on further deployment of SS-20 missiles and the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to further his summit initiatives. He has utilised a variety of factors to induce a change in perceptions about the acceptability of nuclear war and has successfully transcended the national security discourse on this issue which was developed and projected on the international

agenda by his predecessors, like Molotov, hruschev, and Brezhnev.

The impulse to avoid nuclear war permeated Gorbachev's politics in both the short term and long term perspectives. He has successfully contended with reagan's own impulse to create a SDI-dominant world which would erode mutual vulnerability. Gorbachev's January 15, 1986 disarmament proposals provide a more acceptable basis to bring into realisation a credible scenario.

2. ISSUES RELATING TO THE PERCEPTUAL CHANGES IN RELATION TO THE UNITED STATES'S " EXTENDED DETERRENCE" DOCTRINE

Although U.S decision-makers have devoted much thought to the prevention of nuclear war, they were impeded to work towards consideration of the theory and practice of the control of nuclear war situations. A doctrine of " extended deterrence " was developed which created anxiety in many quarters about the United States taking risks which could lead to nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The idea of being able to fight a limited nuclear war as a perception certainly came in the way of developing a common perspective on the part of the two Superpowers. It is too early to say that the reagan-Gorvachev summitry has resulted

in an agreed conceptual framework on nuclear weapons, but it is quite obvious that by keeping the negotiating process moving forward the atmosphere which prevails now makes it increasingly unrealistic to consider nuclear war fighting options. The higher level decisions have helped to move strategic planning way from "extended deterrence" and Gorbachev has the satisfaction of seeing the success of his diplomacy in the development of a new US-Soviet attitude towards nuclear weapons in which the development and use of counterforce capabilities can hardly be considered in any meaningful way. The institutionalisation of the US-Soviet relationship now precludes any further extension of the deterrence doctrine on the part of either side.

3. ISSUES RELATING TO THE GENERAL CREDIBILITY OF
DETERRENCE IN SUPERPOWER STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

Although it is easy to point to the continuing relevance of nuclear deterrence, it is clear that the Soviet-American summitry in its latest phase can only be understood in the context of the growing opinion which challenges the concepts and approaches regarding the credibility of deterrence. The collapse of the Soviet-US detente in the early eighties led to a lot of soul searching about the central role played by concept of deterrence. Reagan's strategic Defence Initiative itself was a testimony to the general

ambivalence about deterrence doctrines. The wide range of Gorbachev's agenda indicates that he has looked at problems of security and peace from a perspective which is much wider than the orthodox proponents of deterrence. Gorbachev has given several signals of change although he has not formulated a critique of deterrence doctrine in so many words. His serious dialogue with the Americans has not arisen out of an adherence to Mutual Assured Destruction or in terms of a Warfighting strategy. Instead he chosen to deal with America in the context of international relations and security policies which do not depend upon the wielding of the threat of force. Thus by his example he has shown that he would like to base the rationality of Soviet policy beyond the narrow limits of a deterrent relationship. On the American side also, although the logic of deterrence is still employed, there is a noticeable shift to compromise solutions which would not have been endorsed by the original founders of the deterrence doctrine.

4. ISSUE RELATING TO DE-LINKING OF MILITARISTIC
VALUES FROM THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS

A comparative account of the Reagan-Gorbachev summitry with the earlier US-Soviet of 1960 and 1972 would suggest that there is strong evidence of the de-linking of military values from the visible aims of diplomacy. In 1960 the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane on the eve of the Paris summit pointed to the potential of military conflict to reach dangerous levels. Similarly in 1972, while the Nixon-Brezhnev summit was on the bombing of Haiphong harbour took place in a demonstrative manner. The agreed framework of the Gorbachev-Reagan dialogue indicates a perspective which is based on considerable political accord on constraining militarily offensive action. Both sides have realised that militaristic values can only exacerbate their security dilemmas. Both the negotiating parties have, therefore, been eager to identify the mechanisms for change away from the logic of military threats towards the restructuring of political understanding. Apart from the significant bilateral agreements which Gorbachev and Reagan have achieved, in dramatic contrast to his predecessors Gorbachev has achieved a confidence building experience with his dialogue partner which did not involve any manifestation of the Soviet intention to use military power. While affirming that he is a Marxist,

Gorbachev has clearly distanced himself from the Marxist Principle of world revolution which was responsible for giving a profile of ideological opposition to the relationship of the Soviet Union with the United States, over decades. Gorbachev refused to fuel the arms competition any further and developed an evolving role for the Soviet Union as a country which adheres to the principles of the United Nations Charter. Although Soviet interests have been clearly at stake in Eastern Europe, the approach which Gorbachev has adopted has been of desisting from any military or political action which might destabilise superpower relations. Thanks to Gorbachev's rhetoric policy thrusts the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty organisation and the Warsaw Pact has been transformed in a manner which could not have been prophesised when these two military pacts entered into force. We have only to recall the manner in which Khrushchev had made his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany during this period of his summitry which Kennedy to realise the different style and substance of Gorbachev's summitry. Gorbachev has consistently focusses on peace-building as the prime factor underlying his negotiations. It is evident from the record he did not seek a temporary detente; the elimination of militaristic values is central to Gorbachev's game plan

5. ISSUES RELATING TO MULTILATERAL STRATEGIC COOPERATION
IN THE ERA OF COMMON SECURITY

Gorbachev's proposal of January 15, 1986 not only provides a new strategic concept; it also unfolds a plan in which three crucial steps are taken towards worldwide nuclear disarmament. Moreover it is an integral part of Gorbachev's thinking on going beyond Soviet-United States strategic relations to multilateral cooperation in the new era of common security. The basic reason why Gorbachev has been able to overcome the earlier gap in the two superpowers perceptions on the question of arms control is that he has always had at the back of his mind the larger considerations which can help to move the focus away from the coercive aspects of Soviet-US. strategic relations towards the new dimensions of multilateral strategic cooperation which will ensure that the cold war in never again revived. In the post-cold War world all states must institutionalise their interest in avoiding war, and all strategic relationships must be regulated on a fresh basis. Hitherto in the name of national security, multilateral strategic cooperation has been neither dynamic nor durable. By refusing to continue the confrontational mode of Soviet-American diplomacy and giving a global dimension to the task of stabilising the dynamics of peace, Gorbachev did

not just imitate Reagan's conception of superpower dialogue. He created a common ground between the two powers which had hitherto been regarded as the global policemen, and created legitimacy for a new conceptualisation in which their role would be non-interventionist and non-hegemonic. There is no place in Gorbachev's strategic theory and practice for the Brezhnev doctrine or other similar aberrations. By withdrawing from Afghanistan and by not militarily intervening to prevent the democratisation of East Europe, Gorbachev clearly indicated that under him the Soviet Union has given up the theory of spheres influence in the form in which it led to Western and Eastern bloc formation. The implicit assumption in his exploring new of regulating the Soviet-American rivalry has been a more subtle and sophisticated understanding of security thinking applicable to a world in which nuclear weapon do not menace human survival any longer. Looking ahead then Gorbachev's main contribution may have been to initiate an innovative policy which will help not only the superpowers but all states to achieve a durable and stable world order in which multilateral strategic cooperation becomes a realisable goal.

Text of U.S.-Soviet Treaty to Eliminate Their Medium- and Shorter-range Missiles

Following is the text of the treaty between the U.S. and Soviet Union, signed at the White House in Washington, D.C. Dec. 8 by U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, eliminating U.S. and Soviet shorter- and medium-range missiles from Europe:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-after referred to as the Parties:

CONSCIOUS that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

GUIDED by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

CONVINCED that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

MINDFUL of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

(A Glossary of Terms)

[1]

The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

[2]

The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

[3]

The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

[4]

The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

[5]

The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers (625 miles) but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers (3,437 miles).

[6]

The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers (312 miles) but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers (625 miles).

[7]

The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and with which one or more missile operating bases are located.

[8]

The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

[9]

The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

[10]

The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

[11]

The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

[12]

The term "non-deployed missile" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

[13]

The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

[14]

The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

[15]

The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

ARTICLE III

[1]

For the purpose of the Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSJ-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and SS-5, respectively.

[2]

For the purposes of the Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing 1A, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

ARTICLE IV

[1]

Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

[2]

To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this treaty:

(i) The number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBM's of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBM's to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

ARTICLE V

[1]

Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

[2]

No later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

[3]

Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1,000 kilometers.

ARTICLE VI

[1]

Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

[2]

Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM

not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

ARTICLE VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

(1)

If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(2)

If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBM's or GLCM's of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBM's or GLCM's of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

(3)

If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

(4)

The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article I of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBM's or GLCM's that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBM's or GLCM's that have a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

(5)

The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(6)

Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(7)

If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBM's or GLCM's.

(8)

If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

(9)

The number of missiles each launcher or an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(10)

Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBM's which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBM's which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCM's, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

(11)

A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fired land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

(12)

Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

(1)

All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

(2)

Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

(3)

Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

(4)

Transit of a missile or a launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

(5)

All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

(6)

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(7)

Neither party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

(8)

A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

(9)

Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Article.

ARTICLE IX

(1)

The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to the Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(2)

The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

(3)

No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(4)

No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

(5)

Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

[6]

Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

Article X

[1]

Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

[2]

Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

[3]

When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

[4]

Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ.

[5]

Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

[6]

Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the

Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

[7]

Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and the support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

[8]

Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

[9]

If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

ARTICLE XI

[1]

For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

[2]

Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

[3]

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the numbers of missiles, launchers, date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

[4]

Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimina-

tion of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

[8]

Each party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

[6]

Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter range GLBM's were produced. The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall insure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

[7]

Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

[8]

Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV, and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

ARTICLE XII

(1)

For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

(2)

Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Article by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

(3)

To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBM's with a range capability in excess of 3500 meters, which are not former missile operating as eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation. Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

ARTICLE XIII

(1)

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

(2)

The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

ARTICLE XV

(1)

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

(2)

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject

matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII

(1)

This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

(2)

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU

(Continued from page 906D3)

The discussions revolved around the thorny issues of strategic arms and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

A bilateral working group on strategic weapons arms had begun meeting Dec. 8. The group was headed by Paul H. Nitze, a U.S. arms-control expert, and Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev.

(Akhromeyev held separate talks at the Pentagon Dec. 9-10 with his U.S. counterpart, Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. They agreed to seek ways to improve communications between their opposing military forces.)

According to administration insiders, the Star Wars issue immediately arose in the talks on strategic arms, with the Soviets insisting that the U.S. adhere to a strict interpretation of the 1972 ABM (anti-ballistic missile) treaty. [See below]

Reagan apparently made no progress in getting Gorbachev to set a timetable for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. [See below, p. 900G3]

Gorbachev was reported to have expressed a willingness to pull out the forces over a 12-month period, but declined to specify when the pullout would begin.

The President and the general secretary lunched at the State Department. Gorbachev returned to the Soviet embassy for a meeting with a group of American publishing and news media executives.

The Soviet leader displayed testiness at the gathering when the executives began to question him about human rights.

Taking the offensive, Gorbachev said to them, "The whole world criticizes the United States" on the problems of the poor and homeless. "What right does it have to be the teacher? . . . I told the President: 'You are not the prosecutor and I am not the accused. So let's have a conversation of equals, or nothing will come of it.'"

The Gorbachevs hosted a dinner for the

Reagans at the Soviet embassy later in the evening.

Coolness Between First Ladies—Nancy Reagan and Raisa Gorbachev met for coffee at the White House Dec. 9. A swarm of reporters trailed along as the American first lady took her visitor on a tour of the official residence. [See p. 891E2; 1985, p. 867C2]

Although each repeatedly denied it, a coolness was evident between the two. Mrs. Gorbachev several times stopped to speak with the journalists, only to be hurried along by Mrs. Reagan.

At one point, a reporter asked the Soviet first lady if she would like to live in the White House. She replied through an interpreter: "I would say that, humanly speaking, a human being would like to live in a regular house. This is a museum."

(In concert with the summit, the Soviet Novosti news service Dec. 9 issued biographical information on Mrs. Gorbachev that had not been generally known in the West. "Raisa Maximovna Gorbacheva, a Russian, was born in the Siberian city of Rubtsovsk, in a family of a railway engineer," Novosti said.)

The Final Day—Vice President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed U.S.—Soviet relations before and during a breakfast at the Soviet embassy Dec. 10.

Following their discussions, Gorbachev, Bush and their aides boarded limousines for a trip to the White House for the final meeting with President Reagan. During the journey, the Soviet leader unexpectedly ordered his limousine to stop at the busy intersection of Connecticut Avenue and L Street NW.

Gorbachev left the car and began shaking hands with surprised pedestrians. "Hello, I'm glad to be in America," he proclaimed in English.

The entire motorcade came to a halt and nervous U.S. and Soviet security men scrambled from the vehicles as a large crowd gathered. Bush, too, left his car, but attracted far less attention than Gorbachev.

When Gorbachev reached the White House, 90 minutes late for his meeting with Reagan, the President quipped: "I thought you'd gone home."

The two leaders held their final discussions. As they met, the joint working group on arms control conducted last-minute negotiations at the White House. (The group was joined by the two foreign ministers, Shultz and Shevardnadze, early Dec. 10.)

The talks failed to produce an accord on strategic arms, although the superpowers agreed to limits on certain subcategories, such as sea-launched cruise missiles.

The Star Wars program remained a sticking point, with the two sides continuing to hold to their positions on permissible testing under the ABM treaty.

In other areas:

■ Reagan made no apparent progress on convincing Gorbachev to further liberalize the U.S.S.R.'s human-rights and emigration policies.

(An unsanctioned international rights forum convened with great difficulty in

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