THE END OF THE COLD WAR : ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE U. S. NUCLEAR STRATEGIC DOCTRINES

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

VANDANA BOSE

DISARMAMENT STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067.

1991

जवाहरलाल नेहरु विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

8th July, 1991

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGIC DOCTRINES" being submitted by Miss Vandana Bose, in partial fulfilment of requirement for the AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY in this University, is a record of the student's own work, carried out by her under my supervision.

It is hereby certified that this work has not been presented for the award of any other degree or diploma.

Sumitra Chishti
(SUMITRA CHISHTI)
(CHAIRPERSON)

(T.T. POULOSE)
(SUPERVISOR)

GRAM : JAYENU TEL. : 667676, 667557 TELEX : 031-73167 JNU IN

C O N T E N T S

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PREFACE

This dissertation attempts to analyse the implications of the end of the Cold War on the U.S. nuclear strategic doctrines. For more than four decades, the primary objective of the U.S. defence policy was the containment of the Soviet Union. But now that the Cold War is over, and the Soviet threat has receded, the American nuclear strategy is bound to undergo some alterations, if not a complete change.

Chapter one examines the factors and events, that finally brought the Cold War to an end. The changes within the Soviet Union, the transformation of Eastern Europe, dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the arms control negotiations, the reunification of Germany and finally the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact represent the most important developments that finally proclaimed the end of the Cold War.

Chapter two is a study of the U.S. nuclear strategic doctrines spanning the Cold War years. Fundamentally strategic ideas and policies were designed to deal with a bi-polar world dominated by two hostile powers blocs. The U.S. recognised only one enemy, the Soviet Union. And so, the U.S. strategy was almost entirely oriented towards containing the Soviet Union.

Chapter three concentrates on the doctrine of deterrence, that has been the cornerstone of American

nuclear strategy. It examines three important aspects (i) deterrence as it applies to the U.S.; (ii) extended deterrence, as it applies to Europe; (iii) relationship between conventional deterrence in Europe and U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons deployments and doctrines.

Chapter four is an analysis of the implication of the end of the Cold War on the U.S. nuclear strategy. While the grand strategic objective of the U.S. was the geopolitical goal of preventing Soviet hegemony over Europe remains sound, changed circumstances make it possible to modify the military strategy. In particular changing the nature of forward defence and alliances.

I acknowledge my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Professor T.T. Poulose, for his encouragement, guidance and valuable suggestions, without which I could not have completed this dissertation.

I would also like to thank the staff of the Libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, American Centre, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis.

Thanks are also due to Mr. Taneja for having typed the manuscript with utmost care, patience, and efficiency.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their constant encouragement, inspiration and support; which made it possible for me to complete this dissertation.

Needless to say, any inaccuracies in this work are solely my responsibility.

Vandana Bose
(VANDANA BOSE)

NEW DELHI
Dated: 8.7.1991

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The postwar era collapsed in 1989. When the year began, relations among countries were essentially what they had been for forty years : a divided Europe, a Soviet Union that maintained an East European empire by force, and an America that assumed 'super power' responsibilities along with its NATO allies. By the year's end the countries of Eastern Europe seem to have been liberated from the pressures of the Brezhnev (though Soviet troops remained). Communist governments held there by force crumbled.

The division of Europe had been overcome symbolically with the collapse dismantling down of the Berlin wall and with the progressive opening of borders between Hungary and Austria, Czechoslovakia and Austria, and the Reunification of the two Germanies.

Meanwhile the relative decline in U.S. economic power, the rising pressure of budget and trade deficits and the apparently declining Soviet military threat made defence costs and the super power responsibilities of the United States seem less necessary to the defence of Europe and more difficult to justify or finance.

Now, that the Cold War is over, it would be interesting to trace back the causes that gave rise to

the Cold War, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Origins of the Cold War

An examination of the origins of the Cold War - the Soviet and American national security calculations that give rise to it and the mutual misperceptions that fuelled it - must begin with Soviet-American diplomacy during the final year of World War II. Beginning with the Tehran conference of the Big Three - Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin - in November 1943, the allies sought to shape the post war order.

Among the most troublesome issues in 1943 were those that dealt with the future political make up of the soon to be liberated European States. The traditional interpretation of the Cold War holds that "Russia's striving for power and influence far in excess of its reasonable security requirements was the primary source of the conflict, and at the same time that the Western and particularly American failure to respond quickly to Stalin's moves was an important secondary cause".[1]

Soviet Ideology And the Cold War

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and part

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1 Vjotech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 283, 306.

of Germany in 1945 gave the Soviet Union greater security and more political influence than was imaginable before war. In June 1947 the Soviet Union unilaterally established the economic administration of their zone and drastically curtailed contact with the other zones of occupation.

France, Britain and the U.S. opened negotiations in London on the formation of a West German State. The following month, in response, the Soviets walked out of the four power control council and in June the decision to establish the West German State was announced.

A week later on June 18, the three Western powers announced the imminent introduction of a currency reform in their zones. The Soviets followed with a currency reform in their zone and in all of Berlin. The Western powers brought the new West German currency into West Berlin on June 23, and the Soviets responded the following day by blockading the Western zones of the city.

The Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949 was clearly an attempt to force the West out of Berlin and pressure the West into negotiations on larger German issues. Above all, Stalin hoped to prevent the establishment of a unified armed West German States firmly allied to the United States and Western Europe.[2]

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2 Ken Booth and others, ed., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (Croom Helm, London, 1975), pp. 34-44.

The blockade was lifted in 1949, after the U.S. airlifted supplies into West Berlin, refusing to accept the Soviet proposals of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany was established in September 1949 as an independent State.[3]

U.S. Economic Policy, the Cold War and Containment

By 1947, communists were in complete control over Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia and soon to take unopposed control over Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Germany was inexorably divided itself along East-West lines.

The Truman Doctrine

The story of the deteriorating relationship between the Super Powers and the deepening American entanglement with West Europe in the later part of the 1940s is too well to be reiterated at great length. The dispute over the free elections in Poland and the coup in Czechoslovakia marred relations between America and Soviet Union; differences over the future of Germany destroyed the remaining vestiges of trust and good faith.[4]

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3 Ibid., pp. 288-290.

4 H. Fels, From Trust to Terror (Blond, London, 1970), pp. 82-90.

As a result, Washington became more and more committed to off-setting Soviet power as well as rehabilitating the States of Western Europe. With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the implementation of the Marshall Plan, and the signing of the NATO, the foundations of post-war American foreign policy were firmly established. The objective of the policy was very clearly the containment of the Soviet Union.[5]

After the British informed the U.S. in February 1947 that they could no longer support the defence of Greece and Turkey because of its depleted treasury after the war. As a result, on March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was announced promising U.S. support to free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.[6]

A reappraisal of Soviet intentions led Truman to declare that, "Communism has pass beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will

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5 The rationale underlying the containment policy was outlined in G.F. Kenna's famous article entitled "X" the Sources of Soviet Conduct in, Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4, July 1947. For details, see, G.F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Hutchinson, London, 1968), pp. 354-367.

6 Robert McNamara, Out of the Cold: New Thinking for American Foreign and Defence Policy in the 21st Century (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 18-45.

now use armed invasions and war".[7]

The Soviets interpreted the Truman Doctrine as an effort to involve itself in an area of the World far beyond its traditional sphere. Since the U.S. could have defensive reasons for involvement in Greece and Turkey, the Soviets interpreted American motives as being offensive. In addition to these political divisions, in the post war period the U.S. initiated economic policies that appeared to the Soviets to be designed to isolate and threaten the communist States of Europe.[8]

The Marshall Plan

The plan for reconstruction and development of Europe was introduced by the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall. The plan dealt with Europe in general not with any particular State or States as was the case with the Truman Doctrine. It was essentially an economic plan, though political objective of the plan cannot be denied.

Moscow's response to Marshall Plan was to create in September 1947, the communist information bureau

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7 H.S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope - Memoirs, vol. II (New York, Signet, 1965), pp. 385-86.

8 J.L. Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 52, no. 2, January 1974, p. 386.

or cominform. Both the American and Soviet analysts point to the creation of the Marshall Plan and the COMINFORM as the events that solidified the divisions of Europe into two hostile camps.[9]

To quote Adam Ullam, "with the Marshall plan the Cold War assumes the character of position warfare. Both sides became frozen on mutual unfriendliness".[10]

These misperceptions were based largely on misunderstandings of the ideologies of each other, policy makers in the U.S. believed that the Soviet ideology was aggressive and so did their Soviet counterparts.

The Evolution of Alliance Systems

By July 1948 a month after the imposition of the Berlin Blockade, negotiations began on establishing an alliance system. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was the first product of this system. The NATO came into existence on April 4, 1949. It was signed by the original five signatories of the Brussels treaty alongwith Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the U.S.

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9 R.E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1962), pp. 25-30.

10 McNamara, n. 6.

It was after the Federal Republic of Germany was granted membership in NATO did the Soviets see the need to create the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO or Warsaw Pact). It was signed between the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European States in May 1955. It is generally agreed that its origins were primarily political than military.[11]

The creation of these pacts did what was expected of them, to create a rift between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. All the above factors can be considered as reasons important enough that started a Cold War between the Super Powers which continued till the later half of 1989. Now, it shall be appropriate to analyse the factors that finally led to the end of Cold War. From 1945, the World witnessed a United States bent upon following the policy of containment and the Soviet Union trying to counter the American moves. Today now, there has been a dramatic change in the outlook of both the countries towards each other.

The Beginning of Events That Marked the End of the Cold War

By 1989, major processes of changes were at work reshaping what had come to be called East-West relations: (i) Liberalization and reform inside the Soviet Union,

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11 Malcom Mackintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today", Survival (London), vol. XVI, No. 3, May-June 1974, pp. 122-26.

(ii) Democratization of East Europe. All these changes were important, but most important was the change within the Soviet Union.

Liberalization and Democratization Inside the U.S.S.R.

Mikhail Gorbachev is what Sidney Hook called an event making man: a man whose actions transform the historical context in which he acts. He has already loosened the reins that have tightly controlled the Soviet society since the Bolshevik revolution largely eliminating censorship freeing emigration, permitting religious freedom not enjoyed in the Soviet Union since 1917, overhauling the structures of government and providing the elections with competition.[12]

Gorbachev has not brought democracy to Soviet Union - but he has sponsored a new tolerance of diversity and restraint in the use of force that have had a profoundly liberating effect. Civil society is being liberated from the clutches of the State. So far economic reforms have disrupted the Soviet economy without increasing production. But all this activity and diversity, all this openness and restructuring, are transforming the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and

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12 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War", Foreign Affairs (New York), no. 1, 1989-90, pp. 1-3.

East-West relations. Perestroika and Glasnost, were the two main policies followed by Gorbachev to improve conditions in his country, which also helped in changing the international environment.[13]

Since 1985, Gorbachev sought to redefine Soviet perceptions of national security by introducing his new "thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. The new thinking featured at least three concepts strongly at odds with the traditional Soviet approach:

(1) A nation's security interests should be pursued through diplomacy and not by military threats or use of force.

(2) A nation's security cannot be guaranteed at the expense of the security of others. Security cannot be pursued unilaterally - it must be strengthened in cooperation with other States.

(3) International organisation and bilateral efforts can serve to solve regional and global problems.[14]

In a speech at Uladivostok, Gorbachev argued that the Soviets require a radical break with traditional political thinking.[15]

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13 Ibid., pp. 3-10.

14 McNamara, n. 6, pp. 109-121.

15 TASS Press Release, July 28, 1986.

The Democratization of Eastern Europe

Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953 and a senior official before 1949, entitled his memoirs, Present At Creation. This was an apt title for the early, formative postwar period when most of the institutions and policies that were to serve the West well over forty years were put in place. Today, we are again present at the creation of a post Cold War World.

For Europe, 1989 was truely a year of drastic changes. The national revolutions that took place in the closing months of 1989 were largely unexpected, both in scope and timing. The structure that is created during the coming decade, which is likely to be determined by the initiative began in 1990 and developed over the next few years may well be the framework of the European order for the next half century.[16]

These changes could not have taken place without the acquiescence of the Soviet Union, which in turn, is in the midst of its own political and economic revolution. Moscow made the historic calculation that it was more to its long-term advantage to allow the communist states in Eastern Europe to slip away without resistance than to seek to retain its hegemonic hold.

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16 Andrew J. Pierre, "The U.S. and New Europe", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 89, no. 550, November 1990, pp. 353-356.

It chose not to interfere while communist regimes were toppled and in several cases (like Czechoslovakia and East Germany), it indirectly assisted in the process.[17]

That the Cold War in Europe would end so percipitously was not self-evident as the final denouncement began. During the first of 1989, protracted "round table" negotiations were held in Poland among the communist government of President Wjoeciech Jeruzelski, the Solidarity Movement led by Lech Welesa and the Roman Catholic Church. These resulted in open elections in June, which paved the way for the solidarity led government of Jadeuscz Mazowiecki, the first non-communist government in the region. In Hungary, an already liberalized communist party renounced Marxism and embraced democratic socialism as its guiding doctrine in October 1989.[18]

After Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania were to follow. In Romania however, the transition was bloody and turbulent. The liberation of East Europe has opened a new era in world politics.

Reunited Germany

While the revolutions of 1989 produced new regimes

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17 Ibid., pp. 355-360.

18 Lawerence T. Caldwell, "Soviet-American Relations: The Cold War Ends", Current History, vol. 89, no. 549, October 1990, pp. 306-44.

with the overthrow of communism, they also produced a new Germany in the heart of Europe. The moves towards German unification acquired unprecedented urgency after the collapse of the communist regime in East Germany. The Berlin Wall was dismantled in November 1989. Initially the Soviet Union found it difficult to accept the unification of Germany in NATO. But the Soviet acceptance was finally achieved after a meeting between Helmut Kohl and Gorbachev in July. In his meeting with Gorbachev Kohl agreed that future German military forces would not exceed a manpower ceiling of 370,000 down from the current 667,000 in the armed forces of the two German States.[19] These measures paved the way for Soviet acceptance that in future Germany would be free to choose to belong to any alliance; and it would be granted free and unrestricted sovereignty.

The Arms Control Negotiations: The INF Treaty

On December 8, 1987, the most turbulent chapter in the history of East-West arms control culminated with the Washington Summit meeting of the Treaty on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). Its proper designation is treaty between the United States of

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19 **Ibid.**

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate range and shorter range missiles.[20]

For the Soviet Union the agreement marked the success of a long effort began in the late 1950s, to prevent deployment in Europe of land-based medium-range U.S. nuclear missiles capable of a rapid, destructive strike against vital targets in the Western U.S.S.R., including Moscow itself, while keeping U.S. forces in reserve. The ultimate success of the INF talks after a long and often dramatic negotiations probably resulted more from the emergence of a conciliation minded Soviet deterrence leadership than from a particularly Western negotiating approach.[21]

One outcome of the INF treaty already seems to have clearly developed; and that is the entire INF episode did more than nearly any other single-development of the past forty years to change the nature of the military relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and also the European members of the NATO alliance.[22]

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20 J. Dean, The INF Treaty Negotiations, SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press), 1988, pp. 389-91.

21 Ibid.

22 Pierre, n. 16.

The treaty eliminates all U.S. and Soviet ground based missiles of 500 - 5500 kms. and prohibition of their future production.

Significance of the Agreement

How did this outcome, remarkable by any previous standard of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, came about? Several factors played a role in the outcome; absence of any one of them might have brought a different result. On the Western side, the evident concerns of the West European public brought about separate INF negotiations in 1980 after the collapse of SALT II Treaty ratification, and brought about resumption of these negotiations in 1981 by the newly elected Reagan administration.

The actual deployment of the U.S. missiles, especially the Pershing IIs, whose threat to the USSR was so often emphasised by Soviet negotiators, may have influenced a Soviet decision to pay still more for the elimination of the U.S. delivery systems, to the extent of wholly eliminating the SS-20s.

Some Western officials believe that the Reagan defence build up was the decisive factor, but the Soviet Union had no apparent difficulty in adding additional warheads and strategic delivery systems to keep up with increases in US strategic forces.[23]

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23 Jonathan Dean, The INF Treaty Negotiations, SIPRI Yearbook, 1988, pp. 390-91.

Broad changes in the Soviet position on arms control, which in addition to moves on INF, brought major Soviet moves with regard to reduction of strategic nuclear arms, prohibition of chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, was the major factor in the successful outcome of the INF negotiations. The main motivation for this broad change of moves appears to be a Soviet desire to improve relations with the West. From this viewpoint, concluding an INF Treaty - technically the most separable aspect of the current or prospective East-West arms control agenda, less complex than U.S. Soviet reductions or reducing conventional force in Europe - was a logical step, even at high cost in Soviet moves toward the Western position. Certainly, the Soviet leadership was willing to pay a high price to eliminate US INF missiles.[24]

The INF agreement is also a substantial first move towards lowering the level of the East-West military confrontation in Europe. Thus, in an interim balance of gains and losses in the entire intermediate range nuclear forces experience, the U.S. sacrificed more in the political sense, the Soviet Union more in military sense. Both made a gain in security, as

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24 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1987).

did all peoples of Europe. The future will determine whether that gain can be consolidated and become enduring.[25]

Arms Control: Malta and Washington

Despite growing military dissent, Gorbachev kept Soviet policy on track, concluding both a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) and a treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). Again the bargaining was intense and it was complicated by the full Soviet agenda. There were two fundamental set of issues. On the issue of strategic arms limitations, both sides continued to work to complete the details of agreements reached between Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.[26]

The first major step toward completing these two negotiations came during a visit by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardanadze to Secretary of State James Baker vacation home in Jackson, Wyoming, in September 1989. Shevardnadze had brought a letter from Gorbachev to President Bush; the combination of the letter and the Wyoming meeting brought real progress. Soviet leaders agreed for the first time to inspection of some strategic nuclear weapons before the signing

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25 Dean, n. 20.

26 Caldwell, n. 18, pp. 344-46.

of the treaty. Apparently they also backed down on an earlier demand that the U.S. extend the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) for ten years, a ploy intended to restrict the development of stars wars technology.[27]

And, for the first time Soviet negotiators pledged to dismantle their radar station at Krasnoyarsk, an installation that the U.S. had long believed was a violation of the ABM Treaty.[28]

START AND CFE were given a further nudge when Gorbachev met with President Bush for the first time in Malta, December 2-3, 1989. No significant agreements came out of that meeting, yet in atmospherics Malta was a great success. The two Presidents met on the United States cruiser Belknap and on the Soviet cruise ship Maxim Gorky. The summit had been intended to speed up both START and CFE by committing the chiefs of State to that purpose in Washington and Moscow.

By the time Baker actually went to Moscow in February 1990, President Bush had taken a major

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27 Ibid.

28 The most extraordinary development on the Kransnoyarsk radar station came on October 23, when foreign minister Shervardnadze admitted before the Supreme Soviet that it had been a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The New York Times, October 24, 1989, pp. 1, 4.

initiative on conventional arms. In his first State of the Union speech, the President proposed that Soviet and American troops in Central and East Europe be reduced to 195,000 each. This proposal drove the proposed ceilings down from the 275,000 troop targets that had been the focus of the Vienna CFE negotiations.[29]

A Significant Change

Gorbachev was prepared to accept the new lower ceilings in - either 195,000 or 225,000 - but wanted equal ceilings for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This, in itself, was a significant change in the Soviet position, because the Soviet forces had been developed and deployed not only to equal U.S. forces, but to be capable of offensive operations against the combined NATO armies. Moreover, the 195,000 troop ceiling would require a reduction of 370,000 Soviet troops and only 110,000 US forces.[30]

A framework agreement was signed for START when the two Presidents met from May 30 to June 3. It had been in the works for many months and its major components went back to the Reyjavik Summit between Gorbachev and Reagan. Each side would limit its

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29 Caldwell, n. 18, p. 346.

30 Ibid.

strategic forces to 6,000 warheads. The total of ICBMs and SLBMs could be no more than 1,600.[31] In all, the Washington Summit had been a success.

The CSCE Summit in Paris Formally Ends Cold War

The leaders of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held a summit in Paris from November 19-21. The gathering formally marked an end to the Cold War and the period of tension between the Eastern and Western blocs that had begun with the end of World War II.

It was the second CSCE summit; the first had been held in Helsinki, Finland in 1975. The highlight of the summit was the signing on November 19 of a Treaty aimed at dramatically reducing conventional weapons in Europe.

French President Francois Mitterrand opened the summit at the Elysee Palace on November 19. He observed, "this is the first time in history that we witness a profound transformation of the European landscape which is not the result of a war or a bloody revolution".[32]

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31 Caldwell, n. 18.

32 CSCE/CFE, Editorials on File, November 16-19, 1990, p. 1384.

The Arms Treaty was the outgrowth of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in Vienna. The CFE Forum had included the 22 CSCE nations that belonged to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the close of the summit on November 21, the leaders signed a document called the Charter of Paris, for a new Europe. The document proclaimed an end to "the era of confrontation and division in Europe" and vowed "a new era of democracy, peace and unity in the continent".[33]

In order to implement the goals of the CSCE, the Charter called for the creation of a Secretariat in Prague, a conflict resolution centre in Vienna and elections resource centre in Warsaw. The CSCE foreign ministers were to meet at least once every year and a CSCE follow-up summit was to be held in Helsinki in 1992.

"The Cold War is over", President Bush said at the end of the Summit. "In signing the Charter of Paris, we have closed a chapter of history".[34]

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33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

CHAPTER II

U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGIC DOCTRINES: THE COLD WAR YEARS

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U.S. STRATEGIC DOCTRINES: THE COLD WAR YEARS

Strategy according to Karl Von Clausewitz, "is due employment of the battle to gain the end of war; it must, therefore, aim to the whole military action which must be in accordance with the object of the war".[1]

In much the same way that political realism forms the philosophic backdrop for contemporary strategic thought, so did the cold war pattern of international politics provided the essential model for much strategic speculation. Ideas of deterrence, arms control, limited war, flexible response and crisis management were all elaborated by scholars and practitioners whose ideas and thoughts were decisively shaped and moulded by the intellectual climate of their time.

Fundamentally, strategic ideas and policies were designed to deal with a bi-polar world dominated by the two hostile power blocs led by the two super powers. The United States recognised only one enemy, the Soviet Union. The strategic policy was almost entirely oriented towards containing the Soviet threat.[2]

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1 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 241.

2 Robbin F. Laird, The Soviet Union, the West and and Nuclear Arms Race (New York, 1986), p. 49.

political, economic and military strength of the free world. After a extended discussion, the first three of these were rejected.

A continuation of current policies would lead to further deterioration of America's relative military strength as the Soviet nuclear programme developed; isolation would deprive the U.S. of the supplementary strength of its allies and hence only enhance the relative position of the Soviet Union; and preventive war would probably be unsuccessful, as it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would fall for such an attack before launching one of its own.

The recommended course of action was, therefore, broadly based on rapid build up that would include a substantial increase in expenditure for military purposes. The conclusions of NSC 68 were expected as a statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years at a meeting on September 29, 1950.[5]

NSC-68's main purpose was to impress upon its bureaucratic readership the Soviet threat to world peace, best blocked through increased military preparedness in the non-Soviet world. This role, of getting over the message of the seriousness of the Soviet challenge to all responsible sections of the State and Defence

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5 Ibid., pp. 134-138.

Departments, may account for the turgidity of the style. NSC-68 offered a prospect of persistent East-West hostility, with a danger of war not only from miscalculations in the midst of a crisis, but as a consequence of premeditated Soviet aggression.[6]

In addition NSC-68 accepted the propositions that the natural way to fight a nuclear war was to get in a surprise attack and that the totalitarian States enjoyed comparative advantage over open societies in the ability to strike swiftly and with stealth. The NSC-68 however reflected the proposal for a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.[7]

As the American nuclear stockpile expanded rapidly in due wake of the Korean war and the 1949 Soviet atomic test, so the target list began to grow. In 1950 the Strategic Air Command (SAC) began to draw up an operational plan with three different categories of target: namely Bravo targets - pre-emptive strikes against Soviet nuclear forces aimed at blunting their effectiveness. Next came Romeo targets, which would slow (or retard) the progress of Soviet forces into Western Europe. And finally, the destruction of Delta targets would disrupt Soviet war making capacity. With SAC

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6 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1981), pp. 69-71.

7 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

dominating the targeting process and without a clear strategy from the political leadership[8], a high emphasis on pre-emption emerged. Whether Truman knew of this is uncertain. Truman left office without establishing a nuclear strategy or even the principles for guidance in nuclear planning.[9]

It was, therefore, left to the Eisenhower administration to formulate the first declaratory American nuclear strategy, although a pre-emptive strategy had been emerging at the employment level for some years.

U.S. Nuclear Strategic Doctrines:

Massive Retaliation

The first general period in the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy was between 1945 and 1960. What highlights this historical period were the issues concerning the delivery of nuclear weapons and the structure of potential targets in the Soviet Union. The formulation of a basic and comprehensive national security policy was regarded by Eisenhower who took office on 20 January, 1953, as one of the most urgent and important tasks of his administration. In May 1953, he inaugurated 'operation solarium' which was described as an effort to

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8 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London, 1983), pp. 6-7.

9 David Alan Rosenberg, U.S. Nuclear War Planning 1945-60, in Desmond Ball, ed., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (New York, Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 43.

determine future national security policy in the broadest sense.[10]

The outcome of this study was NSC 162/2, which was approved by President Eisenhower on 30 October, 1953, and which laid the foundation for the doctrine of massive retaliation announced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his historic address before the Council on foreign relations on the essence of the doctrine on 12 January, 1954, "And the basic decision was ... to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and places of our choosing".[11]

The doctrine of massive retaliation required that the U.S. maintain and be prepared to use effective means to make aggression too costly to be tempting. The immediate interpretation given to this doctrine was that this meant a U.S. response to any aggression anywhere of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons.

In his speech Dulles clarified, as done in NSC 162/2, that the U.S. air striking power while now a dominating factor may not have the same significance for ever. Furthermore, massive atomic and thermonuclear reaction is not the kind of power which could most

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10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence: Strategic Programme in National Politics (New York, 1961), pp. 59-61.

11 New York Times, 13 January, 1954.

usefully be evoked under all circumstances. He repudiated the notion that the U.S. intended to rely wholly on large-scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression. Though such an option would always be available. It was only one of a wide variety of means available for responding to aggression.[12]

As it happened, there was in fact reasonable cause for concern about the doctrine. The work of Albert Wohlstetter and others at the RAND Corporation in the early and mid-1950s showed quite clearly the potential vulnerability of the U.S. strategic forces even to the much smaller Soviet forces. In 1956 the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had about 1650 strategic bombers capable of striking the USSR (consisting of some 1300 B-47S, 250 B-36S and about 100 B-52S) while the Soviet Union had less than 150 bombers capable of reaching the U.S., but almost the entire SAC force was based in peace time at only 30 lightly defended bases in the U.S. and had only another 70 bases overseas available to it in wartime.[13] In its crudest form, this strategy of massive retaliation envisaged little more than a tripwire to detect aggression. Once aggression had been

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12 John Foster Dulles, Article, Foreign Affairs, 1954.

13 Albert Wohlstetter and others, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (The RAND Corporation Report, 1954), p. 266.

detected the response would be a massive nuclear strike.[14]

This deterrence by punishment appeared in its gross simplifications not highly inflexible, but also incredible and dangerous against limited threats. Once the Soviet Union gained its own retaliatory capability so the United States would be unable to defend its allies conventionally and unable to use its nuclear weapons for fear of Soviet retaliation against American allies. The U.S. President would be placed in a situation 'suicide or surrender' thus undermining the credibility of Western defence.[15]

The early years of the Eisenhower administration were marked by a belief, never made public, that SAC could execute an effective first strike against Soviet nuclear weapons. This would remove the Soviet retaliatory threat, and sufficient chaos in the Soviet Union to paralyse the country.[16] Although massive retaliation was far from the stereotype its critics portrayed it as being the moral of implications of overkill, and in

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14. McInnes, n. 14, p. 147.

15 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

16 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 134.

particular the problems of credibility against limited threats, led to widespread dissatisfaction among civilian defence analysts.[17]

With the new Kennedy administration in the early 1960s and in particular under Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, nuclear strategy was reviewed and the criticisms of civilian strategists (many of whom acquired roles in the making of policy) were taken to heart. The result was a shift away from pre-emption and overkill towards flexibility and limitation.[18]

Flexible Response

No single public figure has influenced the way we think about nuclear weapons quite as much as Robert S. McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defence from 1961 to 1968. Under McNamara the focal point for innovation in strategic concepts shifted back to the Pentagon (though to the civilian rather than the military officers). While he was in office many new concepts were introduced, of which the most important were assured destruction, damage limitation and flexible response.

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17 Freedman, n. 6, p. 228.

18 McInnes, n. 14, p. 148.

Announced in 1962 first at a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Athens and later in an address to the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, McNamara's new strategy of flexible response marked a fundamental change in U.S. declaratory policy. Cities were to be avoided and emphasis was to be placed instead on a series of limited counterforce strikes aimed at encouraging negotiation and war termination. The United States would be capable of fighting a variety of wars from the conventional upwards reacting to enemy aggression at the same level. The threat of escalation and continuation of negotiation introduced an element of bargaining into the process.

McNamara also emphasized the ability to defend America against attack (damage limitation) as a necessary part of his strategy and positive political control over the use of nuclear weapons to enable both bargaining and control over escalation. The strategy, therefore, was one of deterrence by warfighting rather than punishment.[19] This new strategy was far from universally popular, however. European hesitancy was revealed by the five years from McNamara's initial outlining of the strategy in 1962 to the formal NATO acceptance of flexible response in 1967.[20] The Soviet Union was

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19 McInnes, n. 14, pp. 145-62.

20 Freedman, n. 14, p. 285.

similarly uncertain both about whether restraints were possible and more important in its fears that counter-force targeting could serve as a guise for a U.S. first strike policy.

Within the U.S., as well doubts were raised about the possible first strike implications of the policy and whether collateral damage would be so high that limitation was not feasible. Most important of all, McNamara himself began to doubt the strategy. Damage limitation appeared expensive and ineffective, restraint seemed impossible and the requirements of counterforce appeared merely an excuse for the military to demand more weapons.[21]

In 1967, the defence planning committee produced the concept of "Flexible Response" (NATO's new strategic guidelines), this implied a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.[22] The main trouble with flexible response, as it had evolved in practice, stemmed from the unwillingness of the allies to provide sufficient conventional military potential, as a result, considerable emphasis was placed on the threat and use of nuclear weapons.[23]

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21 McInnes, n. 14, p. 149.

22 David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983).

23 Baylis, n.3, p. 282.

"Flexible response" in contrast with "massive retaliation" was supposed to have been less nuclear, to have offered more rational options, to have raised the nuclear threshold and to have created more credibility.[24]

By 1964-65 McNamara was beginning to move to another strategy, that of Assured Destruction. The underlying assumptions of the Theory of Mutual Assured Destruction[25] were that, for the forseeable future, the offence would be able to maintain the advantage over the defence. Because of this, all one could do to prevent the other from inflicting crippling devastation was to threaten retaliation. Returning much more to the punishment model of deterrence, this offered as a deterrent to nuclear attack the corresponding threat of unacceptable retaliatory damage (a figure which fluctuated between one third and one fifth of the Soviet population and three quarters to one half of its industry).[26]

In many ways, MAD reflected more McNamara's frustration with nuclear strategy than a satisfactory policy. For its critics, not only was the strategy

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24 Ibid.

25 Donald Brennan, coined the acronym MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction).

26 McInnes, n. 14, pp. 146-49.

intellectually redundant, but somehow immoral in its emphasis on the threat of mass genocide as the only means to stability. Moreover, its lack of flexibility would leave the U.S. President with a suicide or surrender response to Soviet nuclear attack. As Nixon argued in his 1970 foreign policy message to Congress:

> Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?[27]

Counterforce Targeting And Countercity Targeting

In 1959 Bernard Brodie was tempted to write, "one basic restraint has always to be present if the term 'limited war' is to have any meaning at all; strategic bombing of cities with nuclear weapons must be avoided".[28]

McNamara's counterforce strategy was to sought and discriminate between military and civilian targets. Thinking along these lines led McNamara in the early 1960s to distinguish between counterforce and countercity targeting. In his search for options, for alter-

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27 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: IISS, 1983), p. 18.

28 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 310.

natives to either surrender or armageddon, he thought that it might be possible to respond to a Soviet strike in a limited way concentrating the retaliatory blow on the enemy military forces. The object of these counterforce strikes was to give any opponent "the strongest possible incentive to refrain from striking our own cities".[29]

The idea of deliberate city avoidance strikes was an interesting one, but in the 1960s it did not catch one. There were at least two reasons for this, first, when McNamara enunciated the idea, the technology, in terms of accurate small yield weapons and sophisticated command - and - control arrangements, did not exist. Second emphasis on counterforce targeting led the Russians to believe that the U.S. was pursuing a first strike strategy aimed at taking out Soviet retaliatory systems in a single devasting disarming bloc that would leave the Soviet Union crippled and defenceless.[30]

During the 1960s the distinction between counter-force and countercity targeting faded into the back-ground of strategic analysis. Ideas of assured destruction still dominated American defence plans.

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29 Freedman, n.6, p. 235.

30 Baylis, n. 3, p. 98.

But of course, the problem that had so concerned did not go away. Successive administrations wrested with the problem of what to do if deterrence failed, but it was not until James Schlesinger became Secretary of defence in 1973 that a coherent attempt was made to solive it.[31]

In mid-1972 President Nixon directed his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, to head a top level group to develop more options at the strategic nuclear level, and a similar panel started work in the Pentagon. These studies eventually led to the strategy of limited nuclear options, the Schlesinger Doctrine, the key document of which (National Security Decision Memorandum) NSDM 24, was signed by Nixon in January, 1974.[32]

The key idea of the Schlesinger Doctrine was that of escalation control - the ability to control escalation at the strategic level by a series of limited, selective strikes. By thus increasing the flexibility and range of options open to a President, it was hoped to avoid the 'suicide or surrender' decision highlighted by Nixon, and thus to enhance credibility.[33]

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31 Ibid., p. 199.

32 McInnes, n. 14, p. 150.

33 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

In the pauses between these selective strikes the two sides could attempt to negotiate a ceasefire, while avoiding certain high value targets, hostages would be created to deter further escalation (withholds). Targeting focused on counterforce and the Soviet recovery economy.[34] This reflected the strategy's emphasis on restraint in the use of nuclear weapons, selectivity in their targeting and above all their usability.[35]

Despite an initial interest in returning to form of assured destruction, planning under Carter Administration soon reverted along the lines of the Schlesinger Doctrine. In the summer of 1977, Carter ordered another review of strategic nuclear targeting. The result was the countervailing strategy, announced by Secretary of Defence Brown in 1979 and implemented in signing of Presidential Directive (PD) by Jimmy Carter on 25 July, 1980.[36]

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34 The Soviet ability to recover quickly from the effects of a nuclear war, and therefore, be in a position of superiority after the holocaust.

35 Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Strategic Imperative - New Policies for American Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 76-80.

36 McInnes, n. 14, pp. 150-54.

warfighting nature of this strategy was reflected in the new SIOP drawn up to accompany PD 59. SIOP 5D listed more than 40,000 potential targets divided into four main targets:[39] (1) Soviet nuclear forces, (2) other military targets (OTM), (3) the military and political leadership, (4) the war-supporting and war recovery industries.

Although all out retaliation against a massive attack was not ruled out, the emphasis was clearly on warfighting as opposed to deterrence by punishment.[40] Although the growing warfighting nature of American strategy was criticized not only for being unfeasible, but for having first strike connotations and for making nuclear war more thinkable, the emphasis was maintained under the Reagan Administration.

The key Reagan document on nuclear strategy, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 13, and SIOP 6 appeared to secure American victory in such a war, and with a resurgence in the belief that nuclear weapons could be used in a broader political context to bolster American diplomacy, nuclear strategy under Reagan appeared to be different in kind to that of his

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39 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (London: IISS, 1983), p. 268.

40 Ibid.; Brown, pp. 268-69.

predecessors.[41]

Innovations in Strategy (1981-1989)

By 1980, a striking discontinuity thus existed in American strategy, in military capabilities, and in thinking about military strategy. At the nuclear level the entire emphasis was on the offensive. At the conventional level the overwhelming stress was on defence.

The most important thrust of strategic developments during the Reagan years was to diminish this continuity, to introduce a defensive element into thinking about nuclear conflict and offensive elements into thinking about conventional conflict, and hence to initiate the process of creating a more balanced, coherent, and intrgrated military strategy.[42]

The Strategic Defense Initiative

President Reagan's well known "star wars" speech of 23 March 1983 touched off a furore that history may judge to have been out of proportion to its significance. The President called for a research and development programme to explore the possibility of ballistic

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41 Joseph Kruzel, ed., American Defence Annual, 1987-1988 (Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 23-29.

42 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

missile defence (BMD) although he specified no particular technology path for getting there.[43]

One might have the impression from the intensity of the SDI debate that the idea of missile defence is something new. However, the implications of missile defence for strategic stability have been debated for many years, and the U.S. community has been through several rounds of arguments about the topic, the most memorable having preceded the conclusion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) of 1972 between the Super Powers.[44]

President Reagan's highest priority strategic programme was the strategic defence initiative (SDI). The purpose of it was to identify ways to exploit recent advances in ballistic missile defence technologies that have potential for strengthening deterrence - and thereby increasing the security of the U.S. and its allies.

The overall offensive and defensive tendencies of the Reagan era innovations, have been of much debate. The overall import of the strategic shifts during the Reagan administration had been to adapt U.S. military

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43 The New York Times, 24 March, 1983, p. 20.

44 Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense: Star Wars in Perspective (Lanham, Md: Hamilton Press, 1986), pp. 168-69.

strategy to conditions of relative parity in nuclear capabilities. These shifts have all been in the direction of imparting greater balance to U.S. strategy in each type of potential conflict and of securing greater overall integration and consistency in U.S. strategy.[45]

No longer would a purely offensive strategy for the use of nuclear forces be juxtaposed to a purely defensive strategy for the use of conventional forces. Instead the U.S. is moving on across the board mixture of offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. If these changes are carried through, the great dichotomy in American strategy between a nuclear offence and conventional defense will eventually disappear.[46]

The innovations of the Reagan years appropriately enhanced the role of conventional weapons and capabilities in U.S. strategy. The most probable strategic defenses rely on non-nuclear means of destroying nuclear armed missiles. The development of conventional offensive strategies and capabilities enhances their deterrent role and reduced reliance on the threat of nuclear escalation. Future American strategy, is unlikely to ignore completely the role of defensive capabilities

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45 Samuel P. Huntington, U.S. Defence Strategy: The Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years, American Defense Annual, 1986-1987 (Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 40-43.

46 Ibid.

in nuclear exchanges and of offensive operations in conventional wars.[47]

A study of the U.S. Nuclear Strategic Doctrines from 1945 till 1989, has proved one important fact and that is, that the cold war had dominated the defence policy formulations of the United States. The American strategy was largely framed to contain the Soviet Union. But today, the international scene is different, and so are the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It does not imply that the U.S. nuclear strategy would undergo a complete metamorphsis, but one can predict some changes keeping in mind the current strategic environment. The last chapter of this thesis examines these changes in detail.

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47 Ibid.

CHAPTER III

DETERRENCE: THE CORNERSTONE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY

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In the early 1970s an American analyst posed the question, "can nuclear deterrence last out the century".[1] In the early 1980s an increasing number of critics suggested that unless there were fundamental changes in the attitudes of both super powers, the answer would almost certainly be no. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the strategic debate in the early 1980s was the growing pessimism about the prospects for avoiding nuclear war.

In the beginning of the 1990s, we still stand witness to the successful working of the theory of deterrence, though, of course, with many changes to suit the present scenario.

The Concept of Deterrence

In its simplest form deterrence can be seen as a particular type of social or political relationship in which one party attempts to influence the behaviour of another in desired directions. Deterrence is an example of coercive influence and rests explicitly upon threats of sanctions or deprivations.

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1 F. Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 51, no. 2, January 1973, pp. 267-285.

Deterrence is an attempt by one government to prevent an adversary from undertaking a course of action (usually an attack on itself or its allies) that the government regards as undesirable, by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon the adversary in the event the action is taken. Although this definition is not particularly elegant, it captures the essence of deterrence.[2]

In other words, deterrence makes certain course of action that are available to the opponent and that may appear potentially attractive to look most unattractive. Any gains that might be made must be outweighed by the losses that would be incurred in the event that the prohibited action is taken.[3] This is one of the reasons why analysts such as Alexander George and Richard Smoke suggest that deterrence strategies often need to be combined with positive inducements, thereby not only maximizing the cost of action but minimizing the costs of inaction to the challenger.[4]

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2 G. Snyder, Deterrence And Defence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

3 John Baylis and others, Contemporary Strategy - I (Croom Helm Ltd., Great Britain, 1987), pp. 113-117.

4 A. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy : Theory and Practice (New York, Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 82.

The complexities and difficulties of implementing a deterrence strategy contrast starkly with the basic simplicity of the notion itself, calling to mend the remark made by Karl Von Clausewitz that "in strategy everything is simple but not on that account very easy".[5] If deterrence is to succeed in circumstances where there is real as opposed to an imaginary or exaggerated threat, therefore, it must meet certain basic requirements.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF DETERRENCE

Communication:

The first requirement for an effective deterrent posture is that the adversary be made aware of precisely what action is prohibited and the kind of price he might have to pay for disregarding the prohibition. Clear and careful communication is, therefore, a necessity. Ethnocentric perceptions, political shortsightedness, and bureaucratic parochialism, all militate against successful communication. But the problems of communication do not all lie with the deterrer. The recept, analysis, and interpretation of signals is probably fraught with even more difficulties than their transmission.[6]

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5 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War (London, Penguin Books, 1968), p. 243.

6. R. Wohlstetter, Cuba and Pearl Harbour: Hindsight and Foresight, Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, no. 4, July, 1965.

In some ways, this may require that the communications run the whole gamut of the bureaucracy. Though bureaucratic organisations are indispensable, they are not without serious deficiencies and defects that may have significant and far-reaching implications for the interpretation of information.[7] At times, preconceived beliefs may result in the acceptance only of ideas and facts confirming those beliefs and rejection of anything contradicting them. The consequences of this are sometime incalculable. "Misperceptions among nations may have disastrous effects on policy decisions".[8]

Thus communication is one of the three important factors in the successful implementation of deterrence. The other two factors, are, capability and credibility.

Capability

Perhaps the most obvious of these other requirements is that the State attempting to deter an adversary has the physical capacity to inflict harm or deprivation upon it. Unless the deterrent threat is a bluff the State issuing it requires a capacity for inflicting unacceptable costs relative to any gain the adversary

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7 H.L. Wilensky, Organisational Intelligence (New York, Merrill, 1968), pp. 60-94.

8 J. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness (New York, Random House, 1971), p. 4.

could hope to make.[9]

The problem is that those assessments of cost and gain depend on the challenger. There is a presumption that the challenger makes national calculations and acts according to the outcome of his cost-gain or cost-cost calculus. This assumption of nationality is by no means an absolute one, however. As one analyst has noted, the danger in focusing on the presumed rationality of enemy behaviour is that one "fails to consider the fact that this behaviour, perhaps rational in its own terms, is rooted in perceptions of the world that are not themselves rational or universally shared."[10]

In other words, the crucial determination is the challenger's value system, which establishes the weight to be attached to particular objectives and the level of sacrifice that will be acceptable in order to obtain them. It is not simply the physical capability of the deterrer that matters, therefore, equally important is the way it is perceived and evaluated by opponents.

In many circumstances, however, assessments of relative military capabilities were problematical at best. There was considerable room for miscalculations

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9 Baylis, n. 3, pp. 118-21.

10 G.H. McCromick, Surprise, Perceptions and Military Style, Orbis, vol. 26, no. 4, Winter 1983, p. 835.

and mistakes, and ample opportunity for rival States to initiate hostilities, each with a firm expectation of victory.[11] The third requirement for deterrence to succeed is credibility.

Credibility

Any analysis that focuses exclusively on the mere possession of a capability to inflict unacceptable costs on the opponent is inevitably somewhat artificial. For a deterrent strategy to work it must make any potential challenger aware not only that the costs of taking prohibited action could exceed the gains to be made, but that probability is that they would do so. In other words, some threats are inherently credible; others have to be made so. And the difficulties of making them so are compounded when the implementation of a threat would be harmful for the State making it.[12]

Nuclear Deterrence

In examining nuclear deterrence from an American perspective there are three levels that can be considered: deterring an attack on the American homeland, deterring an attack on America's major allies, especially Western Europe, and deterring lesser Soviet actions in the gray

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11 J. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974).

12 Baylis, n. 3, p. 121.

areas. Deterring an attack on the homeland is sometimes defined as passive deterrence, and it is this that must be examined first.

Passive Deterrence

Throughout the 1950s it was assumed by many people that deterring an attack upon the American homeland was a natural and inevitable consequence of the possession of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery vehicles. Largely, as a result of the work of Albert Wohlstetter at the Rand Corporation, however, this perception changed and considerable emphasis was placed on the need for invulnerable strategic forces. Wohlstetter argued that deterrence capabilities were both relative and dynamic.[13]

The Kennedy administration's strategic programme laid great emphasis on the achievement of invulnerability through the emplacement of minute missiles in hardened silos and the dispersal of forces in the polaris submarines. For a period in the mid-sixties it seemed that a plateau of strategic stability had been reached. And when in 1972 both super powers agreed to limit the deployment of ABM systems this was apparently confirmed. Yet these hopes proved to be illusory and the deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles

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13 Ibid., p. 122.

or MIRVs together with improvements in accuracy raised the prospect that under certain circumstances a first strike attack against the adversary's land-based missile forces would pay large dividends.

In the United States the potential vulnerability of minuteman became a national obsession in the late 1970s and early 1980s and it was widely argued that for a short period in the mid-1980s there would be a "window of vulnerability" that could be converted into a "window of opportunity" by the Soviet Union.[14]

Although those concerns were greatly exaggerated, a more serious problem concerned the vulnerability of the command, control and communication facilities (C3) of the two super powers.[15] This problem was recognised by the Carter administration, which began a major program to rectify the deficiency - a programme that had been augmented under President Reagan. The problem of vulnerability at present is not primarily a problem of force vulnerability but of command vulnerability. As McGeorge Bundy has argued, "the greatest single threat

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14 Ibid., p. 123.

15 On this point see Challenges for U.S. National Security: Nuclear Strategy Issues of the 1980s, Strategic Vulnerabilities, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; Theatre Nuclear Forces, A Third Report prepared by the Staff of the Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control (Washington D.C., 1982).

to the strategic deterrent is the threat to its nervous system and its brain".[16]

In the future, of course, the fears about the vulnerability of land-based missiles could also have more credence. Nor can the possibility of a breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) be entirely ruled out, thereby adding another potential source of instability. Indeed one analysis of the dangers of nuclear war has suggested that "ASW could invalidate the very foundations of the basic strategy of nuclear deterrence".[17] Strategic stability at the level of passive deterrence therefore depends not only on the acquisition of invulnerable retaliatory capability of oneself but on the adversary maintaining a similar capacity.[18]

According to Barry Buzan, the assumption that the adversary is difficult to deter provides a readymade rationale for further augmenting one's capabilities.[19] The same point was made more graphically and more specifically by General Jones, the outgoing Chairman

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16 McGeorge Bundy, quoted in D. Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (Croom Helm, London, 1983), p. 50.

17 Ibid., p. 49.

18 Baylis, n. 3, p. 124.

19 Barry Buzan, Deterrence Logic and System Structure, Paper presented at the British International Studies Association Conference (University of Birmingham, 19-21 December 1983), p. 10.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he described the Reagan administration's notion of prevailing in a protracted nuclear war as 'a black hole' that could constantly devour scarce resources.

But the proponents of SDI argue that defensive deployments will encourage restraint on and possibly even substantially reduce offensive system. Critics, however, argue rather more plausibly that SDI deployment will simply stimulate Soviet countermeasures designed to overcome any defensive shield, as well as Soviet deployment of ballistic missile defences of its own.

If both super powers go ahead with the deployment of extensive defence systems and each also takes countermeasures to offset the defensive capabilities of the adversary. Then a vicious new twist will be given to the arms race. Much, though will depend on whether measures designed to overcome a defensive system are cheaper than the defence itself - what is sometimes called the cost-exchange ratio.[20]

It is, however, at this point, that one of the other dilemmas of nuclear deterrence has to be confronted. If stability depends on the prospect of mutual destruction and therefore on mutual vulnerability of each

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20 Baylis, n. 3, p. 128.

side's society - as opposed to its strategic capabilities - mutual vulnerability itself poses problems for the credibility of deterrent threats.

As John Steinbruner puts it, "The established strategy of rational deterrence has long been plagued by the paradox that if deterrence should fail and war should begin then it would not be rational actually to carry out the threat of massive retaliation upon which deterrence is based".[21] The American move to a deterrent posture based on a capacity of war-fighting was partly an attempt to reconcile the differing requirements of peacetime and wartime, but it was also a response to technological opportunity and to the possibility of United Soviet strikes against the United States. It should not be assumed, however, that this move is of recent origin. It goes back to the days of Robert McNamara.

McNamara argued that deterrence was best achieved through threatening the adversary's war-fighting capabilities.[22] Although by 1965 the Secretary of Defence had apparently abandoned this idea in favour of a posture

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21 John Steinbruner, Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions, World Politics, vol. 28, no. 2, (January 1976), p. 231.

22 Desmond Ball, U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?. International Security, vol. 7, no. 3, (Winter 1982-83), pp. 31-60.

that emphasised "assured destruction" of the adversary in a retaliatory attack, the assured destruction concept was a handle for force planning and not a targeting strategy. Counterforce may have been abandoned at the declaratory level, but a capacity to fight a nuclear war and the possession of options other than massive attacks against civilian targets were still essential components of America's strategic posture and were fully reflected in American targeting priorities.[23]

Extended Deterrence

After examining the role of passive deterrence in American nuclear strategy, it is also necessary to understand the American concept of 'Extended Deterrence' and its role in U.S. Defence. What exactly does the term extended deterrence mean. In simple terms, extended deterrence is an attempt to use deterrent threats to protect a third party. For example, the U.S. guarantee to Europe.[24]

Theoretically, there may be doubts about the utility of retaliating after an attack on one's homeland. On a strict strategic analysis, the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe was credible only so long as the United States could retaliate against any Soviet attack on its allies with impunity.

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23 Ibid.

24 Baylis, n. 3, p. 310.

As soon as this condition disappeared, the perpetuation of the guarantee required that the United States, in effect, be prepared to commit suicide on behalf of its allies. And as Henry Kissinger put it in 1979, "It is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide".[25]

The American response to the 'credibility' gap was rather different. Discouraging the development of European nuclear forces, Washington replaced the strategy of "massive retaliation" by one of "flexible response" on which the emphasis was on proportionality, on meeting the enemy at the same level as his initial attack occurred. The strategy adopted by NATO in 1967 was a compromise between American urgings for a full-blown strategy of deterrence through denial and European distaste for this alternative. Indeed, the NATO strategy of flexible response differed from the American prescription in several ways. Although it acknowledged the need to bolster conventional forces to provide an "assured response" to any aggression, it also placed emphasis on "flexible escalation".[26]

In the early 1980s there has been some reconciliation of American and European perspectives, prompted

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25 D. Frei, The Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (Croom Helm, London, 1983), p. 101.

26 T.W. Stanley, A Strategic Doctrine for NATO in the 1970s, Orbis, vol. 13, no. 1, (Spring 1969), pp. 87-89.

partly by the rise of the peace movements in Western Europe and partly by the proposal of no first use policy. Although the no first use of nuclear weapons seems unlikely to be adopted by NATO, there is a growing willingness on the part of many Europeans, especially those on the centre-left of the political spectrum, to accept the idea of delayed first use and a higher nuclear threshold which are desirable goals for the alliance.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Deterrent As It Applies to Europe

The first answer offered by NATO is that U.S. strategic forces help to deter nuclear aggression against Western Europe. The Soviet Union could use neither nuclear weapons or nuclear blackmail, without the expectation that U.S. strategic forces would be employed in response. And as long as Soviet territory is vulnerable to strikes from those U.S. strategic forces, the credibility of those forces in response to Soviet nuclear aggression in Europe is high.[27]

In principle one can agree with this assertion that U.S. strategic forces help to deter Soviet nuclear aggression or nuclear blackmail against Western Europe. There is, however, one caveat. U.S. declaratory and employment policies since the Nixon administration have

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27 Stephen J. Cimbala, Extended Deterrence: The U.S. and NATO Europe (Ohio, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), pp. 124-128.

been moving in the direction of selected and flexible strategic nuclear options.[28] The Doctrine of flexible response has always had to straddle differences in perspective between the United States and its European NATO allies. Adopted as MC 1413 in 1967, flexible response provided that the alliance would respond to Soviet conventional attack on Europe with conventional defence while maintaining the capacity to escalate to the use of short, intermediate or intercontinental range nuclear forces if necessary.[29]

The adequacy of U.S. strategic and U.S./NATO theater nuclear forces for deterrence in the context of flexible response was called into question by former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his noted address to the international institute for strategic studies, London. In 1977, he argued that super power strategic parity made the theatre nuclear balance between the blocks more important and that adverse trends favouring the pact had to be corrected.[30]

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28 John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, ed., American Defence Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 227-234.

29 David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 187.

30 Ibid., pp. 214-216.

In a widely reported speech in Brussels in 1979, former Secretary of State Hensry Kissinger articulated similar concerns about the dubious credibility of U.S. commitments to use nuclear weapons in defence of Europe.[31]

Kissinger's critique pointed specifically to the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence for Europe absent more capable strategic and theatre nuclear forces. The implication was also that the declinated States could not control escalation to its advantage (whether escalation control was always to the advantage of NATO Europe was contentious between Americans and Europeans).[32]

Deterrence and Compliance

Whether active defence contribute to extended deterrence also depends upon the extent to which U.S. strategic offensive forces are appropriate for extended deterrence missions. NATO strategy depends upon a spectrum of deterrent and compellent threats beginning with direct defence, followed by deliberate escalation to theatre nuclear warfare, and ultimately, continuing to the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces against targets in Europe or the Soviet Union.

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31 Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years" in Strategic Deterrence in a Changing Environment, Christr oph Bertram, ed. (London, IISS, 1981), p.109.

32 Stephen J. Cimbala, Extended Deterrence: The United States and NATO Europe (Lexington Books, Ohio, 1987), pp. 146-47.

NATO strategy implicitly assumes that U.S. strategic forces will provide insurance and coercive power to make up for the deficiencies in alliance conventional forces, compared to those of the pact which are already deployed in Europe and/or rapidly capable of being inserted there.[33]

Although the precise SDI technologies to be deployed in the U.S. or in Western Europe are not determined, the prospect of deployment presents some problematic issue for NATOs flexible response strategy. Credible deterrence of Soviet aggression against Western Europe has been presumed by NATO to lie in direct defence by conventional forces accompanied by the threat of nuclear escalation. It has been assumed that U.S. strategic forces, if necessary, will be called upon to deter Soviet forces which might otherwise prevail in theatre conventional or nuclear war.[34]

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33 Ibid., pp. 160-61.

34 Ibid., p. 162.

Conventional Deterrence

The status of U.S. - NATO conventional deterrence is misconceived if it is understood as simple model of non-nuclear force balance and mobilization capabilities. NATO's flexible response strategy imposes declaratory requirements for escalation control that are at variance with the implication of NATO deployments that escalation may not be controllable. NATO deployments of nuclear weapons from storage sites during crisis, for example, might provoke the Soviet preemption that the deployments were designed to prevent.[35]

Nuclear escalation could occur through loss of control, as Bracken has emphasized.[36] Soviet strategy for conventional war in Europe apparently emphasizes rapid penetration of NATO forward defences and deep operational attacks on decisive axis against high-priority objectives.[37]

NATO strategy also anticipates deep attacks against Soviet second echelon forces with robust

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35 Graham T. Allison, ed., Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York, W.W. Norton, 1985), p. 196.

36 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 57-58.

37 Cimbala, n. 32, p. 48.

conventional munitions according to follow-on forces attack (FOFA) doctrine.[38] Implementation of either doctrine implies fluid battle conditions, much initiative on the part of division and corps commanders, and diminished critical times within which decisions must be made. If NATO loses conventional war rapidly, its doctrine calls for nuclear first use. If NATO resistance succeeds, the Soviet Union would have to introduce nuclear weapons or settle for less than its original objectives.[39]

In sum, NATO conventional deterrence is subject to some technology and doctrinal improvements, although marginal tweaking rather than paradigm change should be anticipated in the East-West deterrence relationship in Europe.

Nuclear deterrence may not last our the century as Fred Ikle once posed the issue, but it has lasted in strategic theorizing, although not without serious disputation and amendment.[40] Bernard Brodie's original supposition in 1946 was that nuclear weapons would

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38 Bernard W. Rogers, "Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities", NATO Review (Washington, D.C.), vol. 32, no. 6, December 1984, pp. 1-9.

39 Cimbala, n. 32, pp. 48-49.

40 Ikle, n. 1, pp. 267-85.

no longer be weapons for war, but only for deterrence of war. Insofar as this pertained to all out wars between the U.S. and Soviet political systems, Brodie was undoubtedly right. Moreover he also anticipated that the nuclear forces of the super powers would cast a shadow over theatre nuclear and conventional war in Europe.[41]

Lawerence Freedman has certainly summarised very well the results of several decades of nuclear strategizing and nuclear force planning: "The question of what happens if deterrence fails is vital for the intellectual cohesion and credibility of nuclear strategy. A proper answer requires more than the design of means to wage nuclear war in a wide variety of ways, but something sufficiently plausible to appear as a tolerably rational course of action which has a realistic chance of leading to a satisfactory outcome. It now seems unlikely that such an answer can be found".[42]

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41 Cimbala, n. 27, p. 27.

42 Freedman, n. 6, p. 395.

CHAPTER IV

THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

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The rationale for America's Cold War foreign policy is disappearing as its aims are being achieved. Soviet expansionism has abated, the Soviet Union is cutting its military forces and the Soviet economy is in crisis. Thus, the conditions that gave rise to the Cold War - the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe and the threat of further Soviet expansion into Western Europe - are gone; and America's aim of mellowing of Soviet power - have been accomplished.

The primary aim of this chapter is to examine the implications of the end of the Cold War on the U.S. nuclear strategy.

Strategy: The Key to Force Planning

Strategy establishes priorities without a coherent strategy, all interests and all threats appear to be equal. Ends far outstrip means, for resource for defence will always be limited. Strategy must answer the question: what plan should be followed in order to best achieve the ends of national security, given the scarce resource for defence.

In the absence of strategy, planners are left in the situation described by Fredrick the Great:

"He who attempts to defends nothing", strategy is the most important element in the force planning process, for its strategy that provides the link between the goals of U.S. policy and the resources to achieve them.[1]

What is the strategy of the United States? Does it need to be modified in light of changing world conditions? If so, what are the implications of the changes in U.S. strategy?

Characteristics of U.S. Military Strategy

If the rationale for U.S. grand strategy remains intact the focus shifts to military strategy or the employment specifically of military power to achieve national goals, globally and regionally. The relationship between strategy and force planning is clearly established in Discrimination Deterrence. According to the January 1988 Report of the Commission on Integranted Long Term Strategy: "our strategy must be designed for long term, to guide force development, weapons procurement and arms negotiations".[2]

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1 Mackubin T. Owens, "Force Planning in Era of Uncertainty", Strategic Review (Washington D.C.), vol. XVIII, no. 1, (Spring 1990), pp. 9-14.

2 Discrimination Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington D.C., 1988), p. 1.

If any aspect of military strategy changes, one would expect a corresponding change in force structure. For instance, if forward defence in Europe is deemphasized in U.S. military strategy, one can expect to see less spending on heavy army divisions and air force tactical fighters deployed in Europe and more spending on strategic airlift and sealift, as well as a shift of assets from active duty establishment to the reserves.[3]

A key element or descriptor of the current U.S. military is deterrence. Deterrence is contrasted with a strategy based on offensive or aggressive intent. Deterrence takes two forms, punishment and denial. In the first case, a nation threatens to respond to aggression by another in such a way as to make the cost of aggression by another similiar way as to make the cost prohibitive. In the second case, a nation seeks to prevent another from achieving the goals of aggressive policy through defensive measures; for example (SDI) or a countervailing war fighting approach that aims to defeat the enemy's strategy.

During the last four decades, the U.S. strategy has partaken the character of punishment. The current approach is one of flexible response and escalation;

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3 Henry C. Barttett and G. Paul Holman, "The Concept of Strategy: Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning", Naval War College Review (Washington D.C., Autumn, 1988), p. 64.

restraint rather than massive retaliation. Deterrence may be achieved by both nuclear and conventional means. In the case of conventional deterrence the U.S. sought to defend selected regions of Eurasia, usually in conjunction with allies.[4] Often conventional deterrence has been sufficient. Sometimes as in the case of Vietnam, it has failed.

Thus, the cornerstone of the U.S. deterrence strategy has been reliance on nuclear weapons. Obviously, the threat of nuclear retaliation has not been directed against small countries, where it would not be credible for reasons of proportionality, but against the Soviet Union. The fact that the Soviets have not directly attacked the United States or its allies may be taken as indication that nuclear deterrence has been a success.[5]

A second fundamental of U.S. nuclear strategy as an integral part of deterrence is forward defence, as opposed to a central reserve located within the continental United States (CONUS). As William Kaufmann has shown, the U.S. has on several occasions during the last forty years, attempted to shift away from

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4 Stephen J. Cimbala, Extended Deterrence, The United States and NATO Europe (Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 14-19.

5 John Baylis and others, ed., Contemporary Strategy I (Croom Helm, London, 1987), pp. 113-24.

from a defence posture based on forward presence to one based on strike forces located in CONUS, but able means of strategic sealift and airlift, to respond rapidly to a crisis anywhere in the world.[6]

A third fundamental aspect of U.S. military strategy is collective security based on a series of alliances, as opposed to unilateral action. On the level of policy or grand strategy, U.S. planners recognised that the best means of containing the 'heartland' power of the Soviet Union was through a series of alliances with maritime nations of the Eurasian rimlands.[7]

Programming Versus Strategy

Current U.S. military strategy was developed in order to achieve geopolitical goals in light of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and other nations hostile to the interests of the United States. If the threat has changed, in particular if the Soviet threat has receded, what elements of strategy should be revised, and what are its implications for force planning.

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6 William Kaufman, Planning Conventional Forces, 1950-1980 (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 20-43.

7 Owens, n. 1, p. 13.

There are two possible answers. One being that if the Soviet threat has diminished and no other threat has arisen to take its place, force planning can be reduced. For example, what is the threat to NATO now that the situation in Eastern Europe has changed?

The number of U.S. divisions and air wings programmed for that contingency was based on certain assumptions about the warning time and the mobilization schedules of NATO and the WTO. Planners believed that the WTO could launch a three front attack in short warning or a five front attack with more preparation. Recent analysis has indicated that the warning time has increased considerably for both contingencies.[8]

A purely programmatic approach would call for substantial reductions in U.S. forces in Europe and concomitantly across the board. The best example of a programmatic approach to force planning is provided by William Kaufman of the Brookings Institution. In his recent Glasnost, perestroika and U.S. Detorise spending Kaufman proposes radical reduction in U.S. force structure, both nuclear and conventional in response to the reduced Soviet threat.[9]

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8 Robert P. Haffa, Jr., Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces (Washington D.C., National Defence University Press, 1988), pp. 38-64.

9 William W. Kaufmann, Glasnost, Perestroika and U.S. Defence Spending (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1990).

Through agreements with the Soviets on strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), U.S. forces would be drawn down by stages in over ten years. The programmatic approach tends to be myopic, focusing only on a particular threat. A more fruitful path is to re-evaluate strategic requirements in light of changes in the security environment, and then to propose substantive changes in force structure that reflect more than simply force reduction.[10]

Alliances and Forward Defence

Should the United States reevaluate its forward defence posture in the light of developments in Eastern Europe and the USSR? Should the U.S. be taking another look at the alliance policy? The answers to these questions must be considered in terms of the objectives of U.S. grand strategy over the last five decades: preventing a single nation or coalition from dominating Eurasia. This objective seems valid. However, the ability of the Soviet Union to exercise such hegemony seems to have diminished, considerably. As a result, the U.S. can, slowly and deliberately, began to restructure the forward defence component of its military strategy.[11]

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10 Owens, n. 1, p. 14.

11 Ibid., p. 17.

Recently Senator Sam Nunn, said that the U.S. commitment to NATO should be based on the principle of comparative advantage and an intra-alliance division of labour. The U.S. has a comparative advantage in maritime and expeditionary forces, high tech conventional systems, and nuclear weapons. Now is the right time to change the forward defence posture based on this comparative advantage.[12]

The United States would begin a phased drawdown of forward-based ground units in Europe and Korea. In Europe these reductions should not be unilateral, but be made in the context of CFE to ensure, in so far as possible that Soviet offensive capabilities are severely bounded. The numbers for the U.S., 195,000 within the central region and 30,000 elsewhere in Europe seem a reasonable starting point. Former Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger and Sam Nunn have suggested a figure of 75,000 to 100,000 in five years.[13]

The United States would still provide the strategic reserve for NATO. Ground units left in Europe would be structured to streamline the introduction

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12 New York Times, April 20, 1990.

13 Senator Sam Nunn, "A New Military Strategy", Speech to the U.S. Senate, April 19, 1990, Vital Speeches of the Day, April 20, 1990.

of this reserve in the event of war. Equipment and ammunition would still be prepositioned in Europe, but more logistics responsibility for the Alliance as a whole would devolve on the Europeans.

The United States would still maintain aviation assets in Europe, as well as nuclear weapons, including short-range systems. Some have argued that allied arsenals and U.S. dual capable aircraft coupled with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), provide a sufficient nuclear deterrent. But tactical and short-range nuclear systems would play an important role in a post CFE environment.[14]

A danger with lower force levels arises from the fact at some point, force-to-force ratios, or force density, favours an attacker, should he be willing to risk massing his forces. Tactical and short-range nuclear weapons increase this risk presumably enhancing deterrence.

In short, while the grand strategic objective of the United States, the geopolitical goal of preventing hegemony over Europe remains sound, changed circumstances make it possible to modify military strategy.

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14 Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Soviet-American Relations: The Cold War Ends", Current History (Washington D.C.), vol. 89, no. 549, October 1990, pp. 345-346.

Force Planning for the Future

Although geopolitical reality and the goals of U.S. grand strategy remain fairly constant, i.e. the United States must be able to deter a nuclear attack against the U.S. homeland and influence events on the Eurasian landmass, changes in the security environment, especially events in Eastern Europe, means that U.S. can modify its military strategy.[15]

1. Deterrence will remain the goal of U.S. military strategy but its form will change.
2. Forward deployment, the actual basing of U.S. forces on the Eurasean continent will be reduced.
3. Power projection will increase in importance in proportion to the decline in forward deployment.

As these descriptors of U.S. military strategy change, force structure should change as well, leading to new priorities among the three traditional force planning categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO, and regional contingencies, and to restructuring within each category as well.

Nuclear Deterrence

Changes in the Soviet nuclear threat arising from domestic conditions and arms control means that

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15 Owens, n. 1, pp. 18-21.

U.S. nuclear forces can be restructured. The goal is stability at lower levels while maintaining the ability of the United States to execute its nuclear strategy if necessary.

Force Structure Implications

1. Land based missiles - To cancel MX and the mobile small ICBM. Replace Minuteman - IIs with a Silo based form of the SICBM, and the Minuteman - IIIA with another new version of a Silo based missile. Such a system would have a maximum of three warheads modelled on the W87 CMX warhead. Such a land-based force structure takes into account the political reality that it is impossible for the U.S. to deploy a true mobile missile, yet by reducing the number of warheads on each Silo-based missile, it raises the cost to the Soviets of attempting a disarming first strike.
2. Sea-based missiles continue retrofitting Trident submarines with the D-5, Trident - II missile. The number of missiles aboard each boat should be reduced.
3. Bombers and cruise missiles - There will continue to be a need for a flexible bomber force, but marginal cost of the B-2, the purported backbone of such a force, outweighs its marginal utility.

The B-2 should be pursued mainly in terms of a "competitive strategy" that forces the Soviets to expand resources to counter its potential threat. Thus, in the near term, only two wings of B-2 Bombers should be procured. On the other hand, Stealth technology, especially for cruise missiles, should be assiduously pursued. The advanced cruise missile should be developed and deployed.

4. Defence - The U.S. should seek to achieve a defence dominated strategic environment. Such an environment would maintain deterrence while increasing stability. However, the transition to a defence dominated situation is difficult, and if it is to be achieved must be accomplished through phased limited deployments and arms control.[16]

NATO Defence

U.S. army and air force structure will be most affected by changes in the European security environment. At present half of the army's 28 active and reserve divisions are earmarked for Europe, while the air force has 8 of 36 tactical fighter wings currently deployed to Europe. As warning time increases army

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16 Owens, n. 1, p. 19.

and air force units can safely be cut back. The administration has already proposed a reduction of three active tactical fighter wings.

While two heavy divisions and two tactical fighter wings could have to be demobilized to comply with a CFE agreement, additional reductions could be achieved by transferring more forces to the reserves.[17]

Future U.S. force structure in Europe would consist of two army divisions and six tactical fighter wings, with U.S. reinforcement capability transferred to the reserves. What is the role of NATO in a post Cold War World?

Traditionalists talked of NATO evolving into a primarily political organisation, while others particularly the French, whose military forces for decades have not been assigned to NATO, saw the alliance fading away, its purpose served and its time past.[18]

NATO's role may thus shift from deterrence of a Warsaw Pact invasion to that of a watchdog over a united Germany, rather than protecting the West from the East, NATO will become the collective security

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17 Ibid.

18 Joseph Kruzel, ed., Whence the Threat to Peace? U.S. Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era, American Defense Annual, 1990-91, pp. 1-14.

instrument of the new European order, offering reassurance to both sides that a united government will not dominate the security affairs of the European continent.[19]

Regional Contingencies

U.S. force structure must reflect the increasing importance of force projection and rapid deployment of mobile, lethal and sustainable forces. Contrary to some commentators, the army in particular should not be shifting to a lighter force structure. For instance, the light infantary division (LID) has only limited tactical mobility, fire power and sustainability.

A force structure for power projection i.e. Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and the army's 82nd Airborne Division, must be rapidly deployable and have a forcible entry capability. Naval forces are by far most critical for meeting regional contingencies. Carriers and battleships have great utility in this case, although it is also critical to maintain amphibious shipping for at least three marine expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). Naval force structure will undergo some modification in light of the importance of this case.[20]

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19 Owens, n. 1, p. 19.

20 David A. Quinlan, The Role of Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces (Washington D.C., National Defence University Press, 1983), pp. 3-21.

A Conventional Force Structure For the Future

If current trends continue, modifications in U.S. military strategy will dictate a new force structure within the next five to ten years that looks something like this:

Army - 20 divisions, 10 active, 10 reserve. Of the active divisions two would be airborne, one air assault, the rest mechanised infantary and armoured.

Air force - 30 tactical fighter wings, 14 active and 16 reserve equipped with multi-role aircraft.

Navy - for reasons pointed out by Norman Friedman, the planning of naval forces is inherently more complex than planning other forces.

Mobilization and Technology : investment in the industrial base and in R and D becomes more important as the size of active forces declines. The proportion of the defence budget going toward these areas should increase or at least remain the same. A defence investment strategy should stress advanced manufacturing technologies that give U.S. industry the flexibility to shift rapidly from peace time production to meet wartime requirements.[21]

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21 Ibid.

Changing U.S. Military Strategy: Deterrence

Changes in the threat to U.S. interests make it possible to reevaluate and in some cases change, the descriptors of U.S. military strategy. It is safe to say that the first descriptor of U.S. military strategy, deterrence will remain the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy. But how they deter may change.

During the last decade the U.S. sought to deter the USSR by developing warfighting capability, both nuclear and conventional. On the one hand, President Carter's PD-59 and President Reagan's NSDD-13 revised U.S. nuclear strategy by calling for the capability to deliver selective strike as opposed to an all-out retaliatory response against Soviet military leadership and industrial targets in the event of limited nuclear war.[22]

This revision provided the rationale for modernizing the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. More emphasis was placed on counterforce targeting, including a prompt hand-target kill capability against Soviet missile silos, and the means to attack hardened command and control installations and later mobile

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22 Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution", Strategic Review, Winter, 1984, pp. 19-28.

targets such as the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25.

In addition nuclear planners stressed on the development of a command control, and communication and intelligence (C^3I) system able not only to survive the outbreak of a nuclear conflict, but endure throughout a protracted war.

In the conventional realm, deterrence was also enhanced through modernizing capability. Service doctrines explicitly emphasised non-nuclear warfighting. A warfighting emphasis was in response to what some had seen as the tendency in the 1960s and 1970s to view conventional forces, particularly in Europe, as merely a tripwire for nuclear weapons.[23]

In both the conventional and nuclear arenas, the changes in policy and doctrine, and improvements in capability were designed to put teeth into deterrence. The claim to deter without the capability to do so is merely bluff. Deterrence is enhanced by improving the war-fighting capability of both U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.

How should U.S. deterrence policy be modified and how does this affect the U.S. military strategy? If deterrence is to remain the cornerstone of U.S.

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23 Owens, n. 1, pp. 12-16.

military strategy, and cuts in the defence programmes must be made deliberately and prudently and not wholesale cutting.[24]

Deterrence may be reevaluated in light of another factor, arms control. The classic goals of arms control are: to reduce the likelihood of war to reduce the consequences of war should it occur; and to reduce the cost of preparing for war.

The best that can be said for arms control is that it has a role in international affairs as long as it is tempered by reasonable expectation. Under the current circumstances, arms control may be able to enhance deterrence. The U.S. desires stable security environment in which the USSR/Warsaw Pact lacks the capability and incentive to initiate a surprise attack, either against the U.S. homeland or against NATO with conventional armoured formations.[25]

If the U.S. can get an agreement from the Soviets to eliminate or at least limit their first strike weapons, as START presumably will limit the SS-18 and reduce Soviet offensive capabilities against NATO stability and hence deterrence will have been enhanced. The critics of arms control note that the

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24 Ibid.

25 Sloss, n. 22.

U.S. ability to influence Soviet behaviour through arms control has been notoriously unsuccessful in the past. But economic pressures and domestic turmoil seem to be working as a better agent. The outcome could very well be an agreement to restructure U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces so that the arsenals of both sides are less expensive and less dangerous, in other words to achieve an equilibrium based on minimal deterrence.[26]

The recent arms control talks held after the INF Treaty negotiations in 1987, are START and CFE agreements.[27] These treaties have improved the atmosphere of arms control between the super powers, and in a way contribute to the successful functioning of deterrence.

The United States and the Soviet Union are both committed to future negotiations on strategic arms. These future negotiations will seek to enhance strategic stability and predictability, especially through the reduction of incentives for a nuclear first strike. Both are committed to reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic arms, notably heavy missile and MIRVed ICBMs (that have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles).

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26 Owens, n. 1, p. 16.

27 For details, see Chapter 1 of the dissertation.

"Both strategic and conventional arms control must be integrated in our policy because these two aspects are closely related. Finally, we want to broaden the traditional arms control agenda to deal with new global dangers, such as missile proliferation and an old problem - chemical warfare that unfortunately has been revived".[28]

The passing of the Cold War world by no means implies an end to American involvement in whatever world is to be followed. It only means that the nature and the extent of that involvement are not yet clear.

Deterrence of the Soviet Union has ceased to be the all consuming international concern for the United States. The end of the Cold War, however, does not bring an end to the system of relations among sovereign States in which threats can arise, and the U.S. will continue to exercise its veto in these conflicts.[29]

The difference is that, henceforth, the dangers to the security of America's friends in Europe and Asia are likely to be more distant and nebulous

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28 James Baker, Recent Developments in U.S.-Soviet Relations. Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C, June 12, 1990. United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, pp. 2-3.

29 John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post Cold War World", Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 101-108.

than the sharply defined threat the Soviet Union was seen to pose over the last four decades.[30]

The newly united Germany in particular will need some form of protection. German-Soviet relations are now cordial. But Soviet military force, still has potential leverage over Germany should new disputes arise between them. Germans will be vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

A Germany without a security tie to the U.S. might feel the need to strengthen its own armaments, perhaps even nuclear weapons. An armed Germany would create uncertainity, alarm and instability in Europe. Perpetuating the American commitment to Western Europe is a hedge against this undesirable and potentially dangerous sequence of events. This is why the Bush administration's determination to maintain the basic structure of NATO is well advised.[31]

In terms of doctrine and strategy, NATO Europe will continue to benefit from an 'existential deterrent' in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, whether or or not any weapons are deployed in the continent. The doctrine of flexible response - MC 14/3 - should

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30 Ibid.

31 Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, 1991, pp. 12-14.

be interpreted flexibly like the U.S. Constitution, and it must be adapted to new, non-static concepts of force deployments.[32]

For the rest, NATO should follow a few simple principles. These include not 'singularizing' Germany and not trying to deal with out of area problems, like the Middle East, within NATO. As in the past, this effort would surely fail.[33]

At the same time, the United States needs to develop new linkages to Europe: perhaps with the Western European Union (WEU), if it takes on major significance as part of European Unity. Certainly there should be significant U.S. ties to European political cooperation.[34]

It is also now clear that the U.S. must adjust to a new role for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Like it or not, CSCE will provide the philosophical basis in Europe for legitimating other security arrangements (like NATO), and it has the special value if including all 'European States' including the Soviet Union and especially

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32 Robert E. Hunter, "America's Role in New Security Architectures", Adelphi Papers, no. 256, Winter 1990/91, p. 111.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

newly liberated central and East European countries that are looking for a European role.[35]

The Post-CFE World

As the United States enters the post CFE world, it should consider what modifications to NATO's military strategy and what further reductions in forces may be warranted. Even after major reductions the Soviet Union will remain the largest military power in Europe, within close striking distance of U.S. allies and vital interests. Huge military forces remaining in the Western Soviet Union could be reintroduced and reinforced in Central Europe, a mere 370 miles away.[36]

In contrast, any U.S. forces removed from Central Europe would have to cross 3,700 miles of ocean to counter such a move. Unlike withdrawn Soviet forces, withdraw American forces will no longer be an immediate influence on the Eurasian military balance. The U.S. will continue its focus on limiting the offensive capability of conventional forces in Europe, so as to prevent any one nation from maintaining a

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35 Ibid.

36 Ronald F. Lehman II, The U.S. and Future of Arms Control, Adelphi Papers, No. 256, Winter 1990/91, p. 52.

disproportionate military power on the continent.[37]

Guidelines for New Security Architectures

The emerging multipolar world and the diffusion of power that it entails cannot be addressed by a single policy; but the United States, if it can combine a tradition of pragmatism in the management of its strategic interests, may have a unique opportunity to redefine its strategy. The seven following guidelines might be applied:[38]

1. A reflection of condominium with the Soviet Union as a central feature of policy.
2. A full recognition of the EC as an independent actor, which gives more flexibility to the international system.
3. A decentralized management of relations with Europe, which means accepting that NATO may not always be the main channel of U.S.-European contact, and in the military dimension of the Europe - U.S. relationship recedes, and as the EC becomes a major political force.
4. An emphasis on coordination and good communication.

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37 Ibid.

38 Jean Marie Guehenno, America's Role in New Security Architectures, Adelphi Papers, No. 256, pp. 109-110.

5. Integration of Japan into the world community, not centred on security issues or security-related organisations.
6. An approach to areas of crisis not dependent on regional perspective promoting regional integrating structures.
7. Reinforcement of the U.N. system as the ultimate guarantor of World structures, combined with full support for more ambitious regional efforts such as CSCE or CFE.

CONCLUSION

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1. If the trends in Europe continue, U.S. military strategy may deemphasise reliance on forward deployment of U.S. troops in Europe.
2. While deterring a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland remains a central grand objective, the U.S. goal would aim at a stable strategic balance, in which neither side has the incentive for or the vulnerability to a first strike.
3. Primacy of the Soviet threat; conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is no longer the primary focus of U.S. strategic thinking. The Soviet Union at present is not able to challenge the West militarily in Europe. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved. Yet, the Soviet Union still has massive and modern strategic nuclear forces; that has the ability to destroy the U.S. Thus, although the Soviet Union will not be the all important central focus of the U.S. strategic and military planning as it was years ago, it will still be a significant ingredient.
4. The principle of substitution of technology for manpower will remain dominant in the U.S. strategic thinking. Arms control considerations, however, may increasingly influence the kinds of technology the U.S. pursues. Early, in the CFE

talks, primarily at the behest of the Soviets, there was talk of emphasizing on defensive technologies, i.e. technology meant for defence of the territory. Questions about which technologies should be preferred, will be based on considerations of both arms control and cost and feasibility of weapons technology.

5. The United States would still provide the strategic reserve for NATO. Ground units left in Europe would be structured to streamline the introduction of this reserve in the event of war. The U.S. would still maintain aviation assets in Europe, as well as nuclear weapons, including short-range systems.

6. Arms control will influence grand and military strategy in the foreseeable future, and will continue to be a major element of defence policy making. In Europe, further reductions beyond CFE seem certain. In the START negotiations combined with budget pressures on the U.S. and the Soviet Union, seem likely to lead within the next decade to a strategic nuclear force level of no more than several thousand warheads.

7. Security and stability in Europe will continue to depend significantly on a substantial American presence and continued cohesion within the Western Alliance. The Soviet Union even as its

forces are pulled back entirely within its own territory will remain by virtue of geography and size a major military factor in Europe. A U.S. presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe mesh themselves into a larger and evolving Europe.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX - I

London Declaration on a "New Europe"

On July 6, 1990, a summit conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued a declaration of NATO's new roles as a result of changing conditions in Europe. The cold war has ended, according to the NATO allies, and a new role is evolving for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Recognizing this "New Europe", the members of NATO invited Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to address the North Atlantic Council. Excerpts follow, as transcribed by the Associated Press:

Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

* * *

We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defense, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community

must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the cold war, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all of our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.

The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the C.S.C.E. (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Final Act. We invite all other C.S.C.E. member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.

In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of other Central and Eastern European countries, to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council.

We today also invite the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

Our alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

* * *

The significant presence of North American conventional and U.S. nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defense.

To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put

the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe along with the completion of a meaningful C.S.B.M. (confidence and security building measures) package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a C.F.E. (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the C.F.E. Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.

* * *

As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multi-national corps made up of national units.

- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

* * *

To keep the pace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

* * *

The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union,

the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

* * *

Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.

Reproduced in, World Documents, Current History, vol. 89, no. 549, October, 1990.

APPENDIX - II

THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

Following are excerpts from the prepared intervention given by Secretary Baker before the North Atlantic Council meeting, June 7, 1990, Turnberry, Scotland.

Next month, our leaders will gather in London to chart the future of this alliance. In their first meeting since the liberating democratic upheavals of 1989, their task will be to adjust NATO's missions and capabilities to a world free of the conflict that divided this continent for over a generation. NATO will need to solidify and build the peace in the decades ahead as effectively as it has prevented war for 40 years. Our alliance, in short, must be suited to the task of ensuring the new Europe's legitimacy, prosperity, and stability while maintaining the capability to contain and deter aggression.

Our task is to lay the groundwork for a successful summit - to accelerate the alliance's on-going process of reassessment and renewal. I would like to begin this task today by reviewing with you last week's meetings between President Bush and President Gorbachev and by discussing the implications for our work.

The President's meetings with President Gorbachev were a success because of both the agreements we

completed and the personal relationship and chemistry that developed between the two leaders. They were able to talk frankly and openly, with one full day spent in discussions in a very relaxed setting. Even where they disagreed, the tone of the meetings was not confrontational.

Bush, Gorbachev Agreements

The mutual search for common interests carried over into the agreements that were reached. While Gorbachev and the center are clearly under pressure, he demonstrated that he can make decisions.

On nuclear arms control, we issued joint statements on START (strategic arms reduction talks) and on future nuclear and space arms negotiations. Our joint statement on START recorded agreement on almost all the major substantive issues. Some of the remaining issues are difficult - for example, heavy missile testing and Soviet assurance on the Backfire bomber. But we believe they can be solved, and we believe that we will be able to meet both Presidents' objective of signing the actual treaty later this year.

Our statement on future negotiations made it clear that the nuclear arms control process will continue after START. This statement moves us in a very important direction. It reflects a joint commitment to

extend the search for strategic stability and predictability. In particular, it outlines a commitment to reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic arms, notably including heavy missiles and MIRVed (Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles) ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). Movement toward de-MIRVing land-based missiles will, we believe, greatly bolster strategic stability and lower potential fears of a first-strike.

On nuclear testing, we completed a 15-year-long effort by signing the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

On chemical weapons, we signed a bilateral accord to destroy the vast majority of our stockpiles. This agreement, and the destruction of vast quantities of chemical weapons mandated by it, is valuable both as a stand-alone result and as a practical road map for achieving the President's goal of a global ban on these horrific weapons. It demonstrates the commitment of both East and West to extend our arms control agenda to cope with the dangerous weaponry of regional and worldwide conflict. I hope it will provide an impetus for the alliance to lead to the way in rapidly moving forward the Geneva negotiations.

We also signed a long-term grains agreement and a commercial trade agreement. We will not send the

commercial trade agreement to our Congress till the Soviets pass their emigration legislation. In addition, we explained that we did not believe the Congress will approve this agreement until the deadlock over Lithuania is broken.

Lithuania was one of the two key issues on which President Bush and President Gorbachev remain far apart. We again heard from President Gorbachev a commitment to settling the Lithuanian crisis peacefully and through dialogue. We also believe we heard a commitment to compromise. The gap may be narrowing between the Soviets and Lithuanians, but we are not there yet.

The two presidents also had extensive and involved discussions on Germany. The President reiterated our approach to unification and the Two-Plus-Four process. He said the peaceful unification of a democratic Germany was the realization of a long-held Western goal and that it could be accomplished in a way that made all of Europe stronger and more secure. He stressed that Four Power rights should be terminated at the same time as unification - with no discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty and no singularization of a united, democratic Germany.

President Bush also assured President Gorbachev, that no one wanted to isolate the Soviets. But the Soviets' own policies on Germany could well have this

effect if the Soviets were to take negative stands on the external aspects of unification. In this event, their approach would put them in conflict with most European governments, East and West. The very logic of new thinking would be contradicted. It would be a lost opportunity for the Soviet Union to develop constructive relations with a united Germany and the other democracies of Eastern, Central and Western Europe.

The Nine Assurances

We laid out nine assurances that we and others have offered and which we believe respond to many Soviet concerns.

First, we are committed to follow-on CFE (conventional armed forces in Europe) negotiations for all of Europe, which would also cover forces in the central region of Europe.

Second, we have agreed to advance SNF (strategic nuclear forces) negotiations to begin once the CFE treaty is signed.

Third, Germany will reaffirm its commitments neither to produce nor to possess nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Fourth, NATO is conducting a comprehensive strategic review of both conventional and nuclear

force requirements and strategy to fit the changed circumstances.

Fifth, NATO forces will not be extended to the former territory of the GDR for a transition period.

Sixth, the Germans have agreed to a transition period for Soviet forces leaving the GDR.

Seventh, Germany will make firm commitments on its borders, making clear that the territory of a unified Germany will comprise only the FRG, GDR, and Berlin.

Eighth, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process will be strengthened.

Ninth, Germany has made it clear that it will seek to resolve economic issues in a way that can support perestroika.

While Gorbachev was reassured by these points, German membership in NATO - and the Soviet position in Europe after unification - remained his major concern. President Bush stressed that a unified, democratic Germany would pose no threat to Soviet security, and that Germany's membership in NATO was a factor for stability and security in Europe. He reiterated his support for Germany's full membership in NATO, including participation in its integrated military structures. He said that Germany must enjoy the right, as stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose freely its own

alliance and security arrangements. Gorbachev seemed to accept this point.

We can and should be prepared to meet reasonable Soviet concerns. But we cannot acquiesce in an effort to block a full return to German sovereignty or to use ostensible security concerns over Germany as a surrogate for weakening the alliance.

Key Summit Questions

Let me turn now to the key questions the President believes should be addressed in either the summit communique or in a serious review process initiated by the summit.

On Conventional forces, we need to prepare a thorough approach to further CFE negotiations. To further enhance conventional arms control, I am pleased that NATO has now agreed to the idea of an arms control verification staff that we proposed last December, it suits well the evolving nature of the alliance.

We also need to examine our conventional force structure. If, as we hope and expect, Soviet troops are withdrawn behind Soviet borders, then we should examine how best the objective of protecting the full territory of all our members can be met. We need to determine how this can be done at lower levels of conventional forces, structured to reinforce in a

mobile fashion. We agree wholeheartedly that multinational units may have an important role to play as we structure our forces.

On nuclear forces, we need to move rapidly on our reassessment. We need to weight the strategic rationale, military effectiveness, and political viability of changes in our nuclear posture. For our part, we want to share the nuclear risk as widely among the alliance as possible while holding to a nuclear posture that our publics and the rest of Europe find politically reassuring.

Before turning to the political dimensions of our review, I want to stress one point that bears repeating. We do not want to make Europe safe for any war, conventional or nuclear. Each proposal we consider must be judged by how well it supports our fundamental goal: preventing war and deterring aggression by maintaining Western cohesion - politically and militarily.

NATO's Political Role

In conjunction with reshaping the alliance militarily, we must clearly articulate its political place in an undivided Europe. The President's speech in Stillwater, Oklahoma, raised two interrelated questions that drive to the heart of NATO's future in this new world: What should be the future political task of

the alliance? And, what should be common allied objectives for the future of CSCE? Let me answer the second question first.

CSCE can serve the European common interest best by acting as a forum where the states of Europe discuss common problems and concerns. I've called it the "concscience of the continent", a place where the political and moral consensus of the time can be shaped based on democratic values. CSCE's three baskets make it uniquely suited for building consensus to meet Europe's major challenges: ensuring political legitimacy, economic liberty and prosperity, and strategic stability and predictability. As I stressed yesterday in Copenhagen, CSCE should stand upon the building blocks of democracy: free and fair elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law.

Yet, by its very nature - 35 disparate states, each holding a veto on action - CSCE is unlikely to be able to make the difficult decisions needed to safeguard security. This does not mean we should miss an opportunity to work to strengthen CSCE; we should meet this challenge. Most of us have made proposals, including the Soviets, and we look to the upcoming preparatory conference to sort through these ideas, evaluate them, and shape some for possible action. I think views are coalescing on practical, realistic steps that can

strengthen CSCE. We can build a more efficient and meaningful CSCE that complements NATO. But we must build up CSCE mindful of its comparative strengths and weaknesses. And we should not try to make it something it is not - an alliance that can maintain the peace.

We believe that role ultimately must continue to reside primarily with NATO. We all know what NATO has been: the most successful alliance of free nations in history. And we all know that the alliance remains: a bedrock of stability in an era of uncertainty, even confusion.

The real question is: What role will the alliance play in Europe's future? NATO will remain an important contributor to the legitimacy and stability of the new Europe, although its functions and capabilities will evolve with the new times of changing challenges. One cannot cleanly and crisply allocate responsibilities among NATO, the EC (European Community), CSCE, and other organizations. Europe faces many overlapping problems, not a single one. And in our view, overlapping, multiple institutions are the commonsensical answer to diverse, interrelated problems. Clearly, NATO must maintain itself as an irreplaceable association of free states, joining together to deter aggression and prevent war.

Building the Peace

But now, with the clear and present military

danger from one source waning, surely the alliance can look beyond the narrower task of preventing war to the broader one of building the peace. The mandate for this can be found plainly stated in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty:

> The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

Moving in this direction does not require a revolution in our thinking. It just requires that we adapt to new realities and build upon our proven collective defense structure a broader notion of security. This notion must recognize that NATO cannot only prevent war but can also build peace. And that the way to build the peace is to reassure the Central and East Europeans and the Soviets that they will not be left out of the new Europe.

Just as other organizations are broadening their mandate to include the newly emerging democracies of the East, so, too NATO can strengthen its ties with the rest of Europe. One way we can do this, as I stressed in a speech in New York a month ago, is through a solid dialogue and even regular consultations, both military

and political. We need not necessarily do this bloc to bloc; indeed, there may be a virtue of having NATO reach out to all of Europe, including neutral and non-aligned nations.

By embracing Europe whole and free, the London Summit (NATO ministerial meeting, July 5-6, 1990) can show the world that we already know: The work of our 16 democracies through NATO will maintain some functions of a past age of Europe while adapting to the next age. In the largest sense of NATO's historical objectives, the real work of promoting and securing a Europe whole and free has just begun in earnest.

Published by, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

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