

WEST-GERMANY, GORBACHEV AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "West Germany, Gorbachev and East-West Relations", submitted by Munindra Kumar in fulfilment of nine credits out of total requirements of Twenty-four credits for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) of this university, is his original work and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this university or of any other university to the best of our knowledge.

(Prof. R. Narayanan)
Chairperson

(Dr. R.K. Jain)
Supervisor

DEDICATED TO MY LATE GRAND FATHER

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PREFACE

This study attempts to examine West Germany's attitude towards East-West relations and focuses on the implications of the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev on Germany and Europe as a whole.

The first chapter deals with the historical background of the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany, its accession to North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Economic Community. It traces the attitude of German leaders from Konard Adenauer, the Grand Coalition and Willy Brandt and examines their views on East-West relations.

The second chapter analyses Bonn's perception of East-West relations from 1969-1985 and focuses on Brandt's New Ostpolitik. It highlights Germany's stake in preserving detente and emphasizes its divergent attitude towards the deployment of INF missiles and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

The third Chapter focuses on the vicissitudes of the question and discusses the views of the US, the USSR, UK and France.

The fourth chapter which deals with the motives behind Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" and its implications for Soviet society, Eastern Europe, and the world at large. It discusses the process of change and reform in Eastern Europe and GDR. It also discusses how the role of NATO and Warsaw Pact is likely to ^{be} redefined in view of the socio-political and military changes in Europe and the prospects of realizing the "Common European Home".

The concluding chapter summarises the major findings of the study.

I am grateful to my Supervisor who has helped me in acquiring a better understanding of European events. I got heavily indebted to 'Vicky' at the later stage of the completion of my work. To express my gratitude to Mr. Chahar who took inordinate pain to type it, I literally had to grope to find an appropriate word but of no avail. Among the institutions I express my sincere gratitude to my 'Alma mater' JNU.

MUNINDRA KUMAR

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Historical Background

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germany lay in ruins, its economy battered, and was plagued by unemployment, food shortages, and severe dislocation of transport and communication. Differences among the wartime allies emerged not only between East and West but within the West as well regarding the future status of Germany.¹

Unity of Western policy was restored only when East-West confrontation removed the uncertainty about Germany's future through the establishment of two German regimes--FRG and GDR-- that were committed and closely tied to the goals and foreign policies of their respective camps. On the other hand, in the middle-term and long-term sense, Germany remained a stake and a problem: a stake because whatever the outcome, continued division, reunification along communist, Western or neutralist lines, the way it would affect Germany's internal texture and Europe's

1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Future of Yalta", Foreign Affairs, Fall 1984, Washington, p.279.

stability was uncertain and would have to be faced later. Moreover, the elites in both German regimes believed that the division was only temporary and that the eventual victory of their side would bring along with it an absorption of the other part of the country.²

With the Cold War the dominant factor in European and world politics, the Western powers' sought to integrate the new German State west of the Elbe with Western Europe for several reasons. First, there was the immediate objective of enlisting West German cooperation and of mobilizing her resources in the struggle against the communist powers. Secondly, the West German nascent democracy had to be protected from internal and external theatre. Thirdly it was intended to alleviate, if not to eliminate, the consequences of Germany's historical position as a 'Land der mitte' (Land of the middle). This pivotal position between East and West, fraught with uncertainties, temptations, and dangers, had been at the root of Germany's sense of insecurity, her

2 Ibid., pp. 279-85.

frequent isolation, and her quest for identity. Europe as a whole had several times suffered from the tragic consequences.³

Thus, a new nation-state, truncated, besieged with muted sovereignty, was born of a unique conjunction of three forces, viz. pressures from political groups within Germany, the occupation policies of the Western Powers, and the imperatives of the Cold War⁴ combined to produce a political system that owed its very existence to a then inescapable commitment to the West. As Alfred Grosser asserted: "The Federal Republic was born in 1949 as a twin sister of the Atlantic Alliance. Their father was the cold war. It happened in 1949 and not 1945".⁵

Thus, FRG was established in 1949 as a non-sovereign state, but successive acts on the part of the Allies returned portions of sovereignty to the Germans, each time for a specific purpose, within clearly defined areas, and directing West German foreign activities exclusively to the West. Landmark revisions of the

3 Karl Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in Transition, OUP, 1968, pp. 6-13.

4 Hans-Peter Schwarz in Kaiser, n.3, p.13.

5 Alfred Grosser, see in Kaiser, n.13, p.13.

Occupation Statute and the gradual extension of sovereignty were therefore undertakings such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the (abortive) European Defense Community, and West Germany's admission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West European Union.⁶ However, the Western Powers reserved the right to make all decisions pertaining to the German division and Berlin.

Accession to EEC and NATO

The person singularly responsible for the conduct of FRG's foreign policy in its formative years was the grand old man of German politics - Chancellor Konard Adenauer. Having a strong nationalist feeling he was confronted with the problem of regaining German sovereignty in the conduct of foreign policy. A constellation of forces like economic recovery of Germany, the intensification of the conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Korean War.

6 David Childs, Germany Since 1918, (London: B.T. Batsferd Ltd., 1971), pp. 135-57.

Before the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950, Western policy had begun to shift from treating the FRG as a defeated enemy to seeking its inclusion in the Western alliance system as a major bulwark against Soviet aggression.⁷ West German leaders used such endeavours to gain greater independence and equality in domestic and international affairs. Thus, the proposal to establish the European Coal and Steel community was welcomed by Bonn as an attempt to remove restrictions on its sovereignty. The Western Powers were also able to enlist West German participation in the common defense of Europe in a supranational European defense community.

The Occupation Statute of 1949 was gradually revised in the course of the negotiations leading to the signing of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty in April 1951. The FRG was given partial control over its foreign relations and some of the most severe Allied controls over its domestic

7 Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 154-67.

affairs were gradually dropped. FRG also became a member of European Economic Community by signing the Rome Treaty of 1957.⁸

The raison d'etre necessitating the admission of FRG into NATO were almost the same as in ECSC. To counter communism, NATO required additional resources which was impossible to mop up without German contribution. Thus, in exchange for the promise of a German military contribution to the defense of Western Europe, Konrad Adenauer gained, for the FRG, "the full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs", a national military establishment, a major voice in the councils of Western Powers, assurances of Western military and political support against Soviet Russia, and finally, Western recognition of the Bonn government as "the only German government... entitled to speak... as the representative of the (entire) German people in international affairs".⁹

By raising the issue of German rearmament in December 1949, Adenauer sought to impress upon Western

8 C.G.D. Onslow, "West German Armament", World Politics, 3:4 (July 1951), p. 453.

9 Deutsch and Edinger, n.7, p. 161.

leaders the value of the FRG as an ally and the crucial role which it might play in a future conflict between the Soviet Union and the NATO powers. He claimed that the industrial and demographic resources of FRG might prove decisive in a future war. United States urged the governments of FRG, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to hammer out a scheme for European Defense Community (EDC) when the EDC Treaty was finally signed in 1952, it provided for the creation of twelve German divisions, an air force and a small navy, which were to become major components of a European military establishment. The EDC treaty was, however, defeated in French Parliament. On a British initiative, representatives of US, Britain, Canada and six continental countries which had signed the EDC treaty formulated a hasty substitute. It provided for the creation of a national German military establishment and the admission of the FRG to NATO as a sovereign and equal partner, subject not to certain limitations on its future military power and the retention of a few formal rights on the part of the former occupation powers pertaining to West Berlin and German reunification. By May 1955, all the governments concerned had ratified these 'Paris Agreements'.

Adenauer and East-West Relations:

The twin pillars of Adenauer's Ostpolitik had been the 'Policy of Strength' and the Hallstein Doctrine¹⁰. Thus, the entire Deutchland politik and Ostpolitik revolved around the problem of German reunification. It claimed itself to be the sole legitimate representative to speak on behalf of all Germans, since it was a democratically elected government which reflected the will of the people. That is the reason why the Basic Law of FRG provides for automatic citizenship of FRG to the people of GDR.

From the outset, Adenauer was pre-occupied with the question of how to overcome the permanent confrontation of the two blocs. During the early years of FRG, which coincided with the peak of the Cold War, Adenauer believed in the "crush theory". He believed that the European empire of the USSR would fall into parts as the more efficient community of free nations on both sides of the Atlantic was unified. The prospect of a collapse of the Eastern bloc and a rollback of the Soviet Union behind its own borders did not

10 According to Hallstein Doctrine FRG would sever diplomatic relations with a country which recognised GDR.

seem very unrealistic to him. Adenauer believed that only if the Kremlin could be sure that there would be no more military confrontation with the West, or if the Soviet interest in relaxation of tensions between East and West were to become overwhelming strong, would the Soviets chosen their grip on their empire. But how to get Moscow to do this? Adenauer had a series of answers to that question, which, for purposes of clarification, are summarized by Peter Schwarz into five theories:¹¹

1. The Theory of Frustration: Once the West was united and strong, Adenauer reasoned, Moscow would come to the conclusion that it would not make any progress and therefore would be ready for a negotiated solution.
2. The Theory of Disarmament: This theory was based on the belief that the Soviet Union would in the long run not be able to stand an armaments race with the West. Facing enormous tasks at home (promoting agriculture, developing Siberia, providing better transport and communication systems, raising the standard of living

11 Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dilemma: The Throes of Political Emanicipation, London: Weidenferd and Nicolson, 1974), pp. 178-210.

etc.), Moscow would be forced to shift its resources. Then the time would be right to settle, through general disarmament, territorial questions as well.

3. The Crises Theory: Adenauer always believed and during certain periods (the last time in summer 1963) was deeply convinced that the Soviet Union would have to cope with economic crises and deficiencies of the worst kind, especially in agriculture, but also in housing and consumer goods production the Soviet Union would, therefore, he reasoned, become dependent to a certain extent upon the West, which in turn, could make its economic help conditional on the fulfilment of political demands.

4. The Theory of a Relaxation of Tensions: During his long life Adenauer had seen many ups and downs in international system, and he regarded it as a basic fact of life that tensions between groups of states or between great powers would ease after a while. Sooner or later new enemies would enter the area, or other developments would render former disputes obsolete. He was convinced that the Soviet leadership, too, would not be able to resist the forces of change in the long run.

5. The China Theory: With the comeback of Red China in world politics at the Geneva Conference of 1954, Adenauer added a new point to these arguments. Due to the Chinese threat, he reasoned, Moscow would be ready to make concessions on its western flank, although may be only after a renewed phase of political pressure on the West. Adenauer's attention was heightened by various anti-Chinese remarks Krushchev had made during the former's visit to Moscow in 1955. Since that time the probability of a Soviet-Chinese conflict was a constitutive factor in his detente calculations.

There was an inherent contradiction in Adenauer's Ostpolitik. On the one hand, he saw no alternative to a peaceful solution of the German question except a policy of detente. On the other hand, he was always beset with mistrust whenever Washington, Paris, or London entered the road to detente. He saw every Western step toward detente with the utmost skepticism.¹²

12 He was alarmed by every thing: French plans for a Conference on the German question in the years 1951 to 1953; the Eastern policies of Mendes-France in 1954; the Geneva Summit of 1955; the London disarmament 'Conference of 1956-57; Macmilan's trip to Moscow in January 1959; the Augto-Saxon, Deutschlandpolitik during the Berlin crises.

Adenauer was convinced of the importance of direct contacts between the Soviet Union and the FRG. The idea behind establishing diplomatic relation with USSR was that the German Chancellor must have its own direct channel of communication.

In the case of the German question, the order of priority was: security, preservation of peace and reunification. To secure peace he relied, as did on later governments, on a strategy of deterrence; in go to war. In principle, therefore, the main goal of security had higher priority than peace. Reunification was concerned as a result both of successful Deutschlandpolitik and peace policy; it was connected with security policy within the western alliance as well as with the pursuit of peace--in principle, however, it remained subordinate to both. Adenauer never would have accepted any reunification formula that implied a risk for the West.

Grand Coalition's Ostpolitik

By the mid-1960s a considerable gap had developed between the policies of the FRG and her allies on the question of German reunification and relations with the East. Clinging to the 'Policy of Strength', Bonn had

become an island of orthodoxy amidst Western attempts to alter policies towards the communist world. FRG's interest in keeping open the problem of Germany's division and her ensuing refusal to accept the status quo were increasingly interpreted in the West (and, of course, in the East), as a threat to European stability, particularly in view of her implicit territorial demands and her steadily growing economic powers.

Some change in Bonn's policy towards the East was visible in initial statements of the Grand coalition. The changes were induced by Berlin crisis of 1961 and Cuban missile crisis of 1962, because of which the superpowers realized military confrontation provided no solution to political problems. The Western powers now began to accord greater priority to detente rather than German reunification.

Building on the groundwork that had been laid under Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroder in the early 1960s when trade missions were established in several communist countries.¹³ With the formation of the Grand

13 J.K. Sowden, The German Question 1945-1973: Continuity and Change, (London: Bradford University Press, London, 1975, pp. 252-83.

Coalition, Bonn's Dentschlandpolitik went through a period of unprecedented activity. The change to a policy of detente led to the casting aside of the 'policy of strength'. Second, the principle that progress towards a relaxation of global tensions required progress on the German question was reversed.¹⁴ Third, West Germany's isolation from Eastern Europe implicit in the 'policy of Strength' was abandoned. The abandonment of the 'policy of strength' was brought into sharp focus in a declaration of policy to the 1966 conference of the SPD by Helmut Schmidt, then its Deputy Parliamentary leader:

The more these states (of the free world) are democratically structured, the more their leaders are dependent on their public opinion. And today that means that they depend on a public opinion which at present is only mildly interested in Germany's reunification. They depend on a public opinion in which for a long time, to say the least, fear of the risks involved in changing the status quo in Europe has been greater than a desire to see Germany reunified. In other words, the policy of strength has definitely and unequivocally failed. (15)

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- 14 Roger Tilford, The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany, (Saxon House; Lexington Books, 1975), p. 79.
- 15 See in Karl Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in Transition, OUP, 1968, p. 17.

Instead, Germany's main goal was to improve the living conditions of the East Germans, to reduce the harmful consequences of the division, and to prevent the two parts of Germany from growing further apart. Institutional unity was relegated to the future after a long historical process has changed the political conditions of Europe.

The new diplomatic objectives of the Coalition were expressed in a declaration of policy by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kissinger in February 1967. His pronouncement demonstrates well to what extent the West German position had changed:

Our advancement of the point of view that there is only one democratically legitimate German state is not intended as tutelage over the people on the other side (East Germany). We will repeat to them again and again that we want to and shall respect their will. This presupposes that they are allowed to express this will to a growing degree. That this can not happen overnight and that it is only thinkable as a long evolution, we know that too...

Our efforts in what we call the easing of relations between us and the otherside should be seen in this context. We aim at our countrymen, at the people there. But since there happens to be a political organization

.....

on the otherside that one encounters in trying to reach the people, we have to seek dispassionately for possibilities to come, through this political organization, into better contact with the people on the other side. We all know that this is a difficult and delicate problem. We do not want to create the impression in the world that we were compromising our legal position (of being the only representative of the German people).⁽¹⁶⁾

Kiesinger went further and made it clear that the Bonn government accepted the communist regime as the "effective ruler of the East Germany, though not as the 'legitimate one'". We do not want to annex the Soviet Zone, the other part of Germany-- I use this expression deliberately since it aims at our countrymen -- but we want a reunification in peace and freedom according to the will of the population of both parts".¹⁷

In addition to abandoning the old hostility to the GDR and adopting a more conciliatory attitude on the border problems, West Germany revised endorsement

16 Speech at Oberhansen, 11th February 1967, in Bulletin, 15 February 1967. The same ideas were expressed more continuously in the government declaration of December 1966, Bulletin, 14 Dec. 1966, see n.3, Karl Kaiser, pp. 64-82.

17 Speech at Oberhansen, see n.3, Karl Kaiser, pp. 64-82.

of the Hallstein Doctrine. Bonn accepted relaxations with the East European countries. In January 1967, diplomatic relations were established with Rumania, in January 1968 with Yugoslavia. Similar attempts with other communist countries, despite initial progress in some cases, were stalled by the counter-offensive which the Soviet Union and East Germany launched in 1966.

On the inter-German level, it resulted in a replacement of Bonn's uncompromising hostility towards East Germany with a selective policy of seeking contacts and cooperation short of diplomatic recognition.

Thus, West Germany's attempt to enter into contact with East Germany assumed the dynamic orientation which Bonn's earlier critics had advocated: relations between the two parts of Germany as a means of liberalizing the communist regime, of easing the burden of the division, to preserve the heritage of a common nation, and a contribution to a detente in Europe through a detente within Germany.

Moreover, Germany now tried to put pressure on her allies to support her orthodox position, when in

reality some of them were interested in exploiting the opportunities that the thaw in East-West relations and the FRG's 'peaceful offensive' in the East offered them. In fact, in order to thwart what he regarded as a dangerous cutflanking manoeuvre by FRG, Walter Ulbricht even proclaimed 'a kind of Hansrein Doctrine in reverse'; Bonn's full recognition of East Germany would now to be the prerequisite for its diplomatic relations with communist countries.¹⁸

Willy Brandt and East-West Relations:

Willy Brandt was mayor of West Berlin when Berlin blockade transpired. And hence he perceived super-power relations and East-West relations differently than his predecessors. According to him, the traditional patterns of Western policy had proved ineffective. The Berlin wall glaringly revealed the limitations of Adenauer's German policy.

Adenauer's policy of negotiations from strength had not brought the FRG any nearer to its goal of German reunification. On the contrary, it often created strains with allies who then only paid lip service to the goal.

Brandt thought that the Cold War had moved into a wasteful stalemate and that it was now imperative to move towards development and prosperity. Berlin continued to be crisis-ridden and no success had been made in doing away with the division of Germany. It would be incongruent if Germany stuck to outdated and immobile attitudes when the world seemed to be moving away from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation.¹⁹

Moreover, he thought by isolating oneself, the country was losing an opportunity for more intensive trade and aid. He wanted to achieve German reunification by first normalizing relations between East-West. Hence, he went for treaties with the Warsaw Pact countries after assuming Chancellorship.

The postwar Deutschlandpolitik can be subsumed under six major tenets:²⁰

1) Unity was to be achieved through an elimination of communist rule in East Germany in the near future, either by free elections or overthrow from within and the subsequent establishment of all-German institutions.

19 Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975, (London, Collins 1978), pp.278-322.

20 Kaiser, n.3, pp. 74-76.

This tenet has been radically changed. Institutional unity is no longer at the centre of the reunification concept, but, rather, the preservation of the nation's common heritage and the improvement of political conditions in East-Germany achieved by a long historical process which may ultimately end in institutional unity as well. But the shape of the institutions cannot be determined in advance.

2) Since the government of the Federal Republic was freely elected and the GDR government was not, only the former was entitled to speak in the name of all Germans, including those living under the communist regime.

3) Until reunification, and in order not to preclude it, the communist regime was not to be recognised or made party to official contacts but, on the contrary, to be ostracized wherever possible. This policy was significantly altered in favour of a 'live and let live' attitude.

4) In order to keep the communist regime isolated and to prevent international recognition of Germany's division, the Federal Republic refused to have diplomatic

relations with Governments recognizing the GDR, except for the Soviet Union (the Hallstein Doctrine). This policy has been partially revised, beginning under the Erhard Government, and continued by the great coalition. The revision was limited to relations with the communist regimes in Europe.

5) The borders of a reunited Germany would remain provisional until settlement at a final peace conference. Nevertheless, German policy has shown signs of compromise implying the future possibility of German concessions in Exchange for progress in overcoming the division.

6) Finally, while German reunification remained the obligation and responsibility of the four great powers, if a relaxation of tension was to be sought by the West, reunification was to be its prerequisite. This postulate, which was so to seek a safety device in case the 'policy of strength' failed, has been reversed entirely. It is now held by the new German government that unity can only come as the consequence of a relaxation of tensions.

Conclusion

Some of these are older than the West's efforts to achieve detente and are activated by the same forces

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that in the late 1940s and early 1950s supported a 'third way(- or neutrality - by East and West; other persons advocating change, while being firmly oriented to the West, simply drew their own conclusions from the failure of the 'policy of strength'. Second, these radical and far-reaching proposals reveal a measure of disenchantment with the West. And, third, they reveal that the historical uncertainties about Germany's identity and her place on the continent has simply taken a new turn. The forces that sought a peaceful modus vivendi with the East, after being silent, powerless or frustrated for a decade, have been given the opportunity to reassert themselves.

CHAPTER - II

WEST GERMANY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 1969-1984

The world which emerged from the womb of World War II was a bipolar world centred around the super powers, viz. the US and the USSR. The NATO and Warsaw Pacts were begotten by the Cold War which ensued immediately after World War II. These alliances were considered to be imperative and inexpendable in maintaining security and peace from the onslaught of the adversary. The foundation stone for US foreign policy was laid down by George F. Kennan in his article in Foreign Affairs, 1949 "Sources of Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy".¹ On the other hand, Soviet foreign policy was determined by its geopolitics and communist ideology. The Soviets have always wanted to overcome their encirclement since the days of the Czars.²

Thus, the relationship which emerged between the two blocs was that of mutual suspicion, apprehension and antagonism. Western Europe needed the

1 Kennan strongly recommended for the containment of the Soviet expansionism in Europe.

2 In essence Soviet foreign policy remained the same in Europe even under the communist regime. The policy was to carve out a 'sphere of influence' in Eastern Europe, i.e. on the Western border of the USSR.

US nuclear umbrella to contain USSR. In the 1950s and the 1960s there was no controversy among the NATO alliance partners regarding the US strategy of "nuclear deterrence" and "flexible response" in Europe. But nonetheless there were divergences regarding the conflicts elsewhere on the globe.³

The Berlin blockade (1958) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), had impressed upon both the super powers the need for crisis management and detente. The growing strength of the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear strategic weapons appeared to make any nuclear confrontation a risk for the West European countries as well as United States. The successful launching of the Sputnik in 1957 and additional satellites of the "Lunik" series lent credibility to this. In 1961, the Soviet Union tested a 5000-Kiloton superbomb, indicating that she not only possessed adequate delivery capacity for long-distance strikes but also immensely powerful warheads. The shifts in strategic thinking that now took place

3 The most celebrated example is Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1967, which was viewed by US from a global perspective, whereas by Europe from a regional perspective.

focussed mainly on the credibility of massive retaliation. Nevertheless, any war was still perceived to lead inevitably to a nuclear holocaust.⁴

Second, United States was not capable of providing any support for the peoples of Eastern Europe when, in June 1953 and again in June and October 1956, they rose against communist party rule in GDR, Poland and Hungary. Thus, the policy of "roll back" and "liberation" did not survive its first tests.

In the Soviet Union, the evolution of the international environment caused a steady shift in policy toward the West and the United States. As a concession to the realities of nuclear weapons technology, the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU initiated the policy of "peaceful coexistence". "Peaceful coexistence" mainly meant prevention of nuclear war, intensified contest with capitalism in the social and economic field, aid to liberation movements in the Third World, and continuing ideological struggle without any concession.⁵

4 Daniel Frei and Dieter Ruloff, East-West Relations, vol.1, A Systematic Survey, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, 1983), p. 104.

5 Ibid., p. 105.

Between 1960 and 1979, the overall volume of trade between EEC and CMEA has multiplied by a factor of more than twenty. US exports to the USSR in 1979 even are a hundred times as large as in 1960, while Soviet exports to the USA multiplied by twenty in the same period. Exports from NATO countries to the Soviet Union and the CMEA in general have increased not only in absolute figures. The percentage share of these exports has also increased considerably. In 1961, less than 2 per cent of all EEC exports were accounted for by the CMEA. In 1975 nearly 5 per cent of EEC exports were shipped to CMEA countries. Since 1975 the percentage of EEC exports to the CMEA declined while the percentage of CMEA exports to EEC countries increased, reaching a share of more than 16 per cent in 1979. US-USSR trade relations seem to constitute a rather special case. There is an upward trend with some variations, reaching 2.5 per cent of US exports to the Soviet Union and 6.2 per cent of Soviet imports from the US in 1979. The fraction of US imports from the Soviet Union, however, remained below 1 per cent over the whole period of 20 years.⁶

6 Ibid., pp. 151-54.

The transfer of technology in fact constitutes a major dimension in East-West relations. In the period 1969-1979, the total volume of SITC-7 exports of the EEC to CMEA countries has multiplied by a factor of more than twenty (from \$ 30mn in 1960 to ? 6.9 b in 1979). Regarding technology transfer there has been a divergence of views among the NATO countries. FRG always was the chief furnishers of technology to the East, and the CMEA countries seemed to have preferred the FRG as their favourite supplier in this field. The volume of SITC-7 goods sold to the East by the FRG exceeds the volume of US technology exports by a factor of approximately 4.⁷ As a matter of fact, the US, although a leading country in this field, seems to have been rather reluctant to engage in unconditional supply of technology for the benefit of their ideological rivals.

At the same time the CMEA countries accepted a massive inflow of credits in convertible currency. This had to be done on an enlarged scale when the economic recession in many Western countries in 1974 and 1975 in the aftermath of the first oil crisis,

7 Ibid., p. 165.

destroyed the hopes of the CMEA countries that the accelerated modernization of their industry could be financed with the revenues from the goods manufactured on the newly imported equipment and sold on Western markets.⁸

The differences between US and European allies crop up because of the difference in perception regarding the role of NATO in world affairs. The first time when confrontation/crisis among the alliance partners broke out was in 1956 and then in 1973. The dis-agreements primarily concerned NATO's "out of area" operations. This is the only common ground between these two crises which placed the US on the one hand and some of their Western European allies on the other, in a totally opposed position. The fact that the area which provoked such turmoil within the Alliance was the Middle East naturally leads to the conclusion that tensions and conflict arising periodically in this area are one of the permanent factors of division.⁹ In 1956, the two European Allies

8 Ibid., pp. 169-70.

9 Robert O'Neill, (ed)., The conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s, (London:Macmillan, 1985). See Article by Mensi Simonet, "The Problems of the Western Alliance in the 1980s", p. 44.

jeopardized US global interests by their military actions in the Middle East. In 1973, on the other hand, the European Allies judged that the NATO alliance should remain neutral vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁰

The Europeans want to confine themselves to Europe only whereas US has to discharge global strategic commitments. Europeans also fear that the breakdown of deterrence would lead to war on the European soil.

Among the alliance partners, it is FRG which holds different views regarding the relationship of the West with USSR and other East European countries largely because of the FRG's geopolitical realities. It is on the German soil where the armies of the two blocs encounter each other face to face. Moreover, West Berlin situated in the middle of GDR territory has been highly vulnerable over the years. The Germans apprehend that any escalation or breakdown of detente would lead to war on German soil. Moreover, the FRG as the leading economic power in Europe, regard Eastern Europe as a potential opportunity for increased trade

10 Ibid., p. 44.

and aid. Thus, FRG had been a outspoken votary of US-USSR cooperation in the political, economic and military fields.

The groundwork for 'new Ostpolitik' was laid down by the 'Grand Coalition' (1966-69) but the concrete manifestations waited till 1969, when Willy Brandt became Chancellor.

Brandt's Ostpolitik

With the ascendancy of Willy Brandt in the Chancellery after the general elections of 28 September 1969, a fresh momentum was given to the Ostpolitik conceived and pursued by the great coalition.¹¹ As early as 1958 Brandt had conjured up the idea that there could be "no isolated solution of the German question" because it was linked with sensitivity and the Western powers must be associated with the discussions. Though he realized that "the Soviet theory

11 Brandt's Ostpolitik can, in fact, be regarded as the continuation of a lesson drawn by him at the end of the World War II. In 1948, he wrote, "Hitler's Germany was defeated by a coalition of the major allied powers. It can emerge from this crisis as a unified state only if the recovery takes place in agreement and cooperation with both East and West". Quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Framework of East-West Reconciliation, Foreign Affairs, January 1968, p. 268.

of two German states is one of the realities with which we have to deal today in German policy and in the struggle between East and West", he still could not reconcile himself to the existence of GDR. Reunification was a "well-founded demand of the German people" on which European order and peace was greatly dependent. And it could be achieved through "an unflinching, stubborn struggle for a peaceful solution by united action."¹² He was convinced that the west had been too much on the defensive in its dealings with the peoples of Eastern Europe. The fear of adverse impact of increased contact with the East and lack of confidence led "us to assume a defensive attitude and to dig ourselves in".¹³

To Brandt, the Adenauer era was a chronicle of lost opportunities in which Bonn clung to the status quo and was extremely chary of new proposals.¹⁴

12 Willy Brandt's address at Chatam House, London, 13 March 1958. Willy Brandt, "The East-West Struggle as seen from Berlin.", International Affairs (London: July 1958), pp. 302-3.

13 Ibid., p. 301.

14 According to Brandt, Adenauer only paid "lip service" to the goal of reunification. He was neither open to new proposals (i.e. he feels that the Soviet offer of 1952 of a united non-aligned Germany was not seriously taken up). Adenauer also did not encourage debate on the German question. Willy Brandt, People and Politics, (London, 1980), pp. 29, 53-54.

The construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 had a profound impact on the Burgomaster of Berlin. It was against the background of this Wall, he states that "my so-called ostpolitik--the beginning of detente--took shape".¹⁵ Brandt wrote: "My new and inescapable realization was that traditional patterns of western policy had proved ineffective, if not downright unrealistic. The Berlin Wall had "glaringly revealed the limitations of Adenauer's German policy and that of the Western powers as well."¹⁶

Student demonstrations in Germany and other parts of Western Europe critical of US role in Vietnam War were indicative of growing opposition to US policies among the younger group which constituted a significant membership of the SPD and which were wooed by Brandt in the 1969 elections. Thus, intra-party and the domestic political situation made a change in FRG's foreign policy imperative.

Motives of Ostpolitik

Adenauer's policy of negotiations from strength had not brought the FRG any nearer to its goal of German

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Ibid., p. 24-25, 37, 57.

reunification. On the contrary, it often created strains with allies who then only paid lip service to the goal. "The Western allies were willing to wait (for German reunification); they were not prepared to run significant risks on behalf of reunification--in past because a unified Germany raised in many West European and some American minds the spectre of new German hegemony".¹⁷

The main reason for detente has been an awareness that the cold war had moved into a wasteful stalemate and that it was now imperative to move towards development and prosperity. Berlin continued to be crisis-ridden and no success had been made in doing away with the division of Germany. It would be incongruent if Germany stuck to outdated and immobile attitudes when the world seemed to be moving away from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation. Thus, Brandt concluded, provisional solutions should be found where permanent is not possible.

Economic factors have been a major driving force behind FRG's Ostpolitik. Brandt and his associates

17 Henry A Kissinger, The White House Years, (London: 1979), p. 407.

reasoned that since reunification was only a distant possibility, there was no rational basis for the FRG to deny itself the benefits of mutually advantageous trade with the Soviet bloc. It was not advisable to lag behind other Western countries and Japan who were actively seeking to widen economic relations with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. German industrial interests lobbied the government for greater economic relations with Eastern Europe because it was easier and more advantageous to deal with these countries because of geographical propinquity. The desire to stabilize jobs at home and prevent retrenchment of workers was obviously another motivating factor. The urge to diversify markets and to gain greater freedom and manoeuverability in the conduct of foreign economic relations was undoubtedly an important consideration. Further, it was realised that it was in the mutual interest of both East and West Europe to stabilize military spending at a much more rational level.¹⁸

18 Bonn's Ostpolitik was never conceived as an alternative to Westpolitik, but only as a supplement.

Treaty Structure

Brandt's Ostpolitik found its concrete manifestations in the Ostvertage (Eastern treaties) which he concluded with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. The edifice of FRG's Treaty Structure, which laid the foundation and provide the framework for the subsequent development of relations between West Germany and its Eastern neighbours, was gradually built and completed during Brandt's Chancellorship. Realising that the key to reconciliation with the East lay in the Soviet Union, the dominant power in Eastern Europe, Brandt gave priority to the conclusion of FRG's bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union.

Thus, as an offshoot of detente, FRG entered into multitude of treaties with East bloc, both political and economic. Treaty with USSR was signed on 12 August 1970, with Poland on 7 December 1970, quadripartite agreement between Allied Power over Berlin was signed on 3 September 1971, with GDR on 26 May 1972, and with Czechoslovakia 11 December 1973.¹⁹

¹⁹ Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Confronting the German Question, tr. by Caroline Bray, (Berg, Oxford, 1988) pp. 35-7.

The Kernel of the treaties was that the states agreed to endeavor to further the normalization of relations in Europe and development of peaceful relations among all European states, and in doing so, they would proceed 'from the actual situation existing in this region! Further they agreed to be guided by the charter of UNO. Moreover, the countries undertook to respect without any fetter the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present frontiers, thereby, accepting the oder-Neisse line and the invalidity of the Munich Agreement of 1938. Although, FRG and GDR affirmed that the two German States" shall develop normal good neighbourly relations with each other of equal rights', but nonetheless it was clearly stated that the treaty objective of FRG to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination".²⁰

These treaties were interpreted by the both sides according to their own ideological orientations. East felt that it had gained by ensuring FRG's acquiescence of territorial integrity and inviolability. FRG felt that it can achieve German reunification by peaceful

20 · Ibid., pp. 35-7.

means, since 'policy of strength' had failed. Moreover, by awarding some economic benefits to the East, FRG hoped to have trade-off between German reunification and economic benefits to the East. In conclusion, one can say, the FRG treaties with the East were the European version of detente.

The FRG and European detente

After World War II, the German problem, including that of Berlin has been the main cause of East-West confrontation in Europe, and, as such it had to be the central issue in any European settlement. Any progress towards detente in Europe was intimately connected and inextricably bound with the German question.

The idea of a conference on European Security was first proposed by the Soviet Union in November-December 1954 with a view to forestalling West German rearmament and preventing its entry into NATO and West European Union. Moscow was apprehensive that a rearmed Germany, which was economically politically and militarily integrated with the rest of West Europe, would constitute a major threat to its security.

The idea of convening a conference on European security was revived by the Warsaw Treaty states in the mid-1960s. By that time the rigidity of the opposing power blocs had lessened and the two super-powers had also started on the course of detente and cooperation following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The monolithic solidarity of the communist bloc was showing signs of cracus with the onset of Sino-Soviet schism, while France under de Gaulle was seen breaking away from the US-UK dominated NATO and seeking conciliation with the Soviet Union and the other East European states.

The policy of detente and the idea of conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been used by the USSR to promote its national interests. Soviet political, economic, and geopolitical motives were probably a combination of the following:

(a) to legitimize the European territorial and ideological status quo by a multi-lateral reunification of force agreement, in other words, the legal and political consolidation of the status quo by cementing the results of the World War II;

- (b) to forestall or delay West European political and military integration by decreasing perceived security threats and freezing current institutional arrangements through treaty;
- (c) to increase trade and technical exchange with West Europe, which may be impossible without corresponding improvement in all aspects of East-West relations;
- (d) to reduce US role in Europe; and
- (e) to secure its West flank or European front in the event of Chinese hostilities.²¹

The East European countries favoured a conference on European security because the diplomacy involved in the Conference would give them "substantially more room to manoeuvre diplomatically and thus to assert varying degrees of independence from Moscow.

With the on-going process of superpower detente and the French initiatives towards the East, the FRG also embarked upon the path of rapprochement with East, which found its concrete expressions in various treaties.

21 See US House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Hearings on Conference on European Security, April-May and August-September 1972 (Washington: 1972); Gotzron Gross, "The CSCE Bundestag Debate", Aussenpolitik, no.4, 1974, p.378.

Thus the Final Act of CSCE was signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975²² after passing through the three stages of preparation. It consisted of three sections, viz. -

- (1) Questions relating to security in Europe;
- (2) Cooperation in the field of economic; science and technology and environment; and
- (3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields-- the so-called Basket Three.

The last section of the Final Act dealt with the follow up to the conference and has subsections dealing with "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament" and "Questions Relating to Security and cooperation in the mediterranean".

The first Basket of the Act covered such matters as sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, innolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, self-determination of peoples, cooperation among states, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

22 Text in Moscow News, no.32, 1975, Supplement, 4-16; Soviet Review (New Delhi), 25 August 1975, pp. 37-94.

As far as Basket II is concerned, West was primarily interested in improved contacts and information facilities for its companies and called for the relevant steps on the part of the East. The East, on the other hand, strove for "most favoured nation" status without any reciprocity for Western participation in major industrial projects. At the same time, the Soviet Union and East European countries rejected direct contacts with producers and final consumers on the ground that this was inconsistent with state monopoly in foreign trade.²³ The Preamble to Section II which defined general principle of cooperation in the field of economic, science, etc., contained, above all, the principle of "reciprocity" of advantages and obligations, which found place in the Final Act only at the last minute against strong Soviet Opposition.²⁴

Of particular significance to West Germany and to other West countries is the provision which allows

23 The Soviet Union and its East European allies struggled for incorporate a reference to the participating State granting each other most favoured nation treatment which would have given them grounds to claim de jure as well as de facto treatment and enabled them to argue that the EEC and certain other Western countries were no longer justified in applying quantitative restrictions on imports from East European countries. In response, member states of the EEC,

for the possibility of long-term cooperation on major projects particularly in the field of energy resources, petroleum, natural gas and the exploitation of raw materials, especially iron ore and bauxite as well as that of road communications, inland shipping, and contained traffic.²⁵

Controversy over "Basket Three"

Topic covered in Section III pertained to Human contacts, information, culture and Education. The humanitarian questions involving contacts at various levels--exchange of information and ideas, and most of people, including reunion of families--were of considerable interest and significance to West Germany.

It was stated that in order to facilitate contacts separated families applications for travels of this nature shall be favourably considered. Applications will be dealt with "without distinction as to the country of

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supported by most Western countries, sought a reference to "reciprocity" as the basis for the expansion of East-West trade.

24 Gotz ven Grok, "The Final Act of the CSCE", Aussen Politik, no.3, 1975, p. 259.

25 Ibid., p. 261.

origin or destination". Furthermore, it was stated that the participating states would "deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family. FRG's foreign minister Walter Scheel's proposal for improving working conditions for journalists was also incorporated in the Final Act, which provided that requests for visas should be dealt with within a suitable and reasonable time scale. There was provision for Direct contact with sources of information and lifetime of ban on the import of essential technical equipment. Newspaper articles, television films and tape recordings would be transmitted completely, normally and rapidly. Walter Scheel's proposal for the creation of a "scientific forum" was also adopted at the Helsinki conference.

The bone of contention was East bloc's proposal to confine the section of cooperation of state-controlled activities. The West powers were "above all concerned with better cooperation by a number of individuals and independent organizations. Therefore, they refused to accept a formula that would postulate state responsibility for the entire field of cooperation for all the acts of their citizens and representatives

of firms and non-state organizations, such as the press, radio and television networks.²⁶ It was only after difficult negotiations in forty-three working sessions that the West Democracies were able to get "cooperation among states" extended to cover "organisations, institutions, and individuals" as well. This agreement was reached on "freer most and contacts" across frontiers, on "the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds", etc. The socialist states of East Europe, however, made it clear that they would not tolerate, in the name of detente and cooperation, any "ideological subversion of their regimes or erosion of their system".²⁷

Therefore, section on "cooperation in Humanitarian and other fields" in the Final Act was, qualified by such phrases as "under mutually acceptable conditions", etc.

26 Gotz Von Grok, "The Geneva CSCE negotiations", Aussen Politik, no.2, 1974, pp. 160, 164.

27 Thus, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko pointed out that cooperation in the cultural field and the development of contacts and of exchange of information should be based on respect for the principle of sovereignty and non-interference. He asserted: "Any departure from this would be rightfully regarded as an attempt to intrude upon another's affairs. We should avoid this and also do away with the psychological consequences of the cold war; and this means strict observance of the laws, customs and traditions of each other" See Gromyko's speech at the first session of the CSCE at Helsinki, 3 July 1973.

Thus, the Final Act according to Gerhard Henze, a member of the FRG delegation to the CSCE at Geneva, did not create any new rights for the individuals. Nor did it reinforce any of the existing rights.

The Belgrade follow up Conference

The follow-up meeting of 35 nations that participated in Helsinki took place in Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978. In his opening statement, state Secretary in the Federal Foreign office, Guentner Van Well, reviewed the progress made since the Helsinki Final Act. He reiterated the need to incorporate the military aspects of security in the process of detente and expressed the hope that the possibilities of more open and intensive industrial and economic relations among participating states. He urged greater reciprocal cultural exchanges. He did not feel that any really balanced cultural exchange would be achieved so long as the efforts made by one country are regarded with mistrust by the other and subjected to petty censorship.²⁸

28 The Bulletin, 26 October 1977, Archive Supplement.

West German Perspective

Much of the dissatisfaction about the CSCE within the FRG and West European countries has stemmed from the tardy implementation of the provisions of the Basket. Three developments in Angola (1976) and Afghanistan (1979). US President Jimmy Carter laid much emphasis on the human rights issue, while the American media began to talk of a "second cold war" in the wake of the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola. To the CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss, who had denounced the CSCE as a 'gigantic',²⁹ Angola signified the failure of detente policy.

On the other hand, SPD/FDP coalition was fully satisfied with CSCE progress. It was argued, Angola, did not signify proof of the failure of detente policies in Europe because the Helsinki accords, were basically a European phenomenon and did not extend to areas outside Europe.³⁰ Much of the difference by a number of FRG and USA arose from the fact that while the former, a

29 Cited in Paul Moach, "CSCE from Helsinki to Belgrade", Problems of Communism (Washington: July-August 1978), pp. 62, n.7.

30 Schmidt's broadcast over Deutsche Welle.

regional power, proceeded from a European perspective, the US as a world power was guided by global considerations. It is no wonder that while in opposition the CDU/CSM had been critical of the results of the CSCE but after they came to power in 1982 they continued the process of detente in Europe.

The Western countries submitted as many as twenty two proposals for improving the implementation of the Final Act. Twenty out of these twenty-two proposals were co-sponsored by West Germany. Most of these proposals pertained to the area of humanitarian and other fields and were designed to enlarge the area of human contacts, and in particular to improve conditions for those in East European countries seeking to visit their families in the West or to be reunited with them, or to marry Western citizens.

The Soviet Union and East European countries argued that the West was imperiling the very process of detente by pushing human rights too far. The West was said to have resorted to "obstructionist tactics and demagoguery over the 'human rights' issue. It was clearly an attempt to embitter the international climate, slow down the improvement in international

relations, discredit the policies of the socialist countries and grossly interfere in their internal affairs.³¹

While the Belgrade concluding Document failed to achieve consensus on substantive issue, it provided that, in order to continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE, the participating states would hold a second follow-up meeting in Madrid in 1986.

Another important component of detente was mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) held in 1973. US and FRG initially called for MBFR with the common purpose of parrying domestic pressure on the US advice for a unilateral cut in American forces stationed in Europe. Between 1965 and 1969 the US withdrew about 20 per cent of their forces from the FRG and in 1971 a draft resolution by senator Moke Mansfield calling for a 50 per cent further cut in US troop presence in Europe was defeated in the Senate only with difficulty. The Nixon administration had to commit itself to aim at

31 V. Petrovsky, Dialogue for Peace (Moscow:1980), 252; O Bykov, G. Razmerov and D. Tomashevsky, The Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy Today (Moscow; 1981), p. 127.

agreements on MFR in Europe and to urge its allies to shoulder a larger share of the conventional defense. (the Nixon doctrine). To this extent MBFR was, until the early 1970s an instrument of alliance policy aimed at incorporating unilateral US troop cuts in a bilateral arms control process. In holding forth the prospect of MBFR the Americans hoped to overcome West European reluctance to accept US troop cuts, whereas West Europe, by showing willing on MBFR, hoped to delay any move by the US Congress. MBFR was dubbed quick fix for the potential rift in the Western Alliance. In the FRG, and especially among leading social democrats, it was also regarded from the start as an instrument of detente policy.

Western interest in MBFR did not go by the board, however. For the FRG its detente aspect came to the fore, while for USA its foremost purpose came to be the negotiation of an acceptable military balance in Europe. MBFR was reinterpreted as a means of military stabilization and integrated into NATO's flexible response deterrent doctrine. For the US flexible response meant holding back the Warsaw Pact for as long as possible by conventional means in the event of an attack so as to delay for as long as possible the juncture at which premediated escalation would be required. Since US allies in Western Europe proved in some cases unwilling,

in others incapable, when it came to an appropriate contribution or their own towards conventional detente efforts, the MBFR Jalus were intended to redress and stabilize the balance of military power. With MBFR in mind, West Europe was initially to be dissuaded from pre-empting a decision by unilateral troop cuts, a complete change in relation to the conditions that prevailed in NATO in the late 1960s.

This military policy instrumentalization of MBFR was immediately effective in operational terms in the formulation of Western negotiation targets, unlike its detente policy counterpart. Where the FRG is concerned this progressivediscrepancy by a number of an MBFR detente policy purpose as envisaged by political leaders and the negotiation purpose as implemented at operational level has been impressively demonstrated. Thus, in NATO negotiation targets, as evidenced in the alliance proposals, detente signals can hardly be detected, whereas chancellor Brandt and Defence Minister Schmidt had stated in the before talks began that symbolic troop cuts were both meaningful and feasible as a start to the negotiations.

Soviet consent to MBFR was originally politically motivated as the price Moscow was prepared to pay in return for Western approval of the CSCE project.

According to the proposals submitted by NATO at Vienna force reductions were, however, to be restricted to land forces, their conventional armament and the strictly limited force reduction area. In an initial phase US and Soviet forces alone were to be withdrawn: 29,000 US troops and the first Soviet Tank Army, consisting of 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks. The second phase was to include indigenous and European armed forces stationed outside their own countries and to lead to a manpower ceiling of 700,000 men for both sides. Within this ceiling national quotas were to be interchangeable. The Warsaw Pact would on this basis have had to undertake further troop cuts totalling 160,000 men, while NATO would have had to reduce armed forces manpower by about 50,000.

1 MBFR has been stripped on both sides of initial political purposes. The Soviet Union no longer needs to buy Western participation in the CSCE, having paid the price by taking part in the Vienna talks. It is now using MBFR to gain treaty recognition of the ratio of power it has achieved by dint of its arms build-up.

2 In the West, MBFR has lost importance as an instrument of detente, which is now rated as precondition for force reduction. NATO aims at a treaty change in the existing ratio of power that it has been unable to accomplish by means of military endeavors of its own.

Failure

(1) NATO, and the FRG refused to agree to national ceilings for the armed forces of European parties to MBFR because it ran counter to the NATO principle of integrated defence. It would hamper any restructuring or reallocation of roles and give the Soviet Union a droit de regard in connection with West Europe's security interests. So the Western insistence on collective ceilings is retained as a matter of principle within the existing MBFR parameters. Even an initial agreement on US-Soviet troops cuts will not be reached until it is clear what shape troop cuts in latter stages of MBFR will take. NATO's MBFR position is accordingly bound to indicate what developments Eastern participants can expect in the West.

A possible solution was outlined to the Bonn Bundestag on 9 March 1939 by Chancellor Schmidt. He felt it was quite conceivable that no participating state should maintain or supply more than half the NATO forces in central Europe. An agreement along these lines would both be in keeping with the Western demand for collective ceilings only and go some way toward meeting the Warsaw Pact's need to gain a clearer idea of trends in Western troop potential. In this context Chancellor Schmidt as he then was, rightly stressed the FRG's foreign policy interest in ensuring there was no shift in the balancing of military power within the Western alliance. This continued to be the case in view of developments in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as he expressly noted in the 28th February 1988 Bundestag debate.

Breakdown of Detente

By the penultimate year of 1970s all the three destabilizers of detente, i.e. upheaval in Eastern Europe, swing in the American domestic politics towards Republicans and instability in Third World and consequent inclusion of either of the super powers were insurrected.

The Legacy of Detente

The failure of East-West detente in the 1970s was dramatically underlined by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the last month of the decade and by the events in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s. It happened so because in one case, i.e. Afghanistan, Moscow saw no inconsistency between detente and its support for national liberation movements³² in the Third World. The US saw such support as violating detente. Both the super powers conceived detente in divergent ways. US saw detente as an attempt to persuade the Soviet Union to engage in self-containment, and therefore as being about restraint, the Soviet Union saw detente and arms control as being about equality. Differing and potentially incompatible interests were thus overlaid by divergent conceptions of what was or was not legitimate behaviour within the detente framework. In other words, the demise of detente was inherent in its origins and conceptions.³²

32 Phil Williams, "New East-West Relations",
International Affairs,

In the 1960s, credit relations between Western banks and Eastern European banking and trading organizations had been at a very low level. This changed dramatically in the early 1970s. Faced with a glut of petro-dollars, and acting on the assumption that central planning in the CEMA countries guaranteed strict financial discipline, that the Soviet Union would assist the smaller members if they were to run into liquidity problems (the 'umbrella theory') and that, therefore, all of CMEA could be regarded as one single area of low financial risk, Western banks began to extend credit liberally. As a consequence, the net debt of the Eastern European countries rose from \$ 6 billion at the end of 1970, to \$ 21.2 billion at the end of 1975. Western credit, both commercial and governmental, thus began to play a major role in the economies of the East European countries and provided a major stimulus for East-West trade.³³

An even more important perhaps decisive stimulus was provided by the improvement in East-West political relations. More specifically, the

33 O'Neill, n.9, p. 57.

Soviet acceptance of the inclusion of the US in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1970 laid the basis for a broad process of expanding political and economic relations. Concurrently, the evolution of West Germany's Ostpolitik deprived the orthodox forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of a powerful device with which to exclude that country from involvement in the area.

The first half of the 1970s brought a considerable increase in economic, financial, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of Europe. Personal contacts between members of governmental and non-governmental elites multiplied, and more enduring trust resulted. As for Western Europe, it was perhaps West Germany which benefited most. Not only did her trade with Eastern Europe increase by a considerable margin but she also gained in political status and influence. The Quadripartite Agreement (1971) and various inter-German treaties had improved the status and viability of Berlin. It was also becoming possible for the Eastern European countries to benefit from detente. Since the economic developments in the standards of living and met rising

popular expectations, Eastern Europe enjoyed a period of unprecedented stability and tranquility and the communist regimes gained greater legitimacy.³⁴

The Western governments, with the US acting most quickly, began to re-examine their basic economic, political and security relationships with the East in 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was realized rather suddenly that the Soviet Union had demonstrated conclusively that none of her fundamental values or policies had changed. In January 1980, ministerial level discussions were held in NATO on the most appropriate economic responses to Soviet aggression. The following summer, in Ottawa, President Reagan urged the Allies to re-examine East-West relations, our economic policies continue to be compatible with our political and security objectives. The Allied reorientation was given further impetus by the Soviet-inspired imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The US and her allies imposed economic sanctions on Poland, while the US went further and, acting unilaterally imposed restrictions

34 O'Neill, n.9, p. 50.

on shipments of oil and gas extraction and transmission equipment by US firms to the USSR.³⁵

In the spring of 1982, the US indicated her concern over Western subsidies of credit for the Eastern bloc. At the Versailles summit in June 1982, East-West economic relations were mentioned in the communique but following that meeting, it became clear that there were significant differences in interpretation among the allied panthers.³⁶

When President Ronald Reagan observed that there was no movement on important issues by either the Poles or the Soviet Union, he extended the sanctions on oil and gas equipment to subsidiaries of US firms and to licensees of US technology. Although the President would have preferred not to act unilaterally in this matter, his overriding priority was to demonstrate US resolve to oppose continued brutality and suppression of human rights in Poland. The extension of the oil and gas sanctions provoked severe protests from the allies of the US.³⁷

35 O'Neill, n.13, p. 106-7.

36 O'Neill, n.13, pp. 106-7.

37 O'Neill, n.13, p. 106-7.

US and its European allies perceive economic relationship with the East in diametrically opposed manners. Washington sea trade, aid and technology as levers to force USSR to bring her behaviour in consonance with the Western values whereas, Europeans and especially West Germans view economic relations as a means to improve political and strategic relations.

West Germany reacted vehemently over the issue of trade, aid and technology, embargo because FRG's political stability is incumbent upon its economic performance. And FRG's economy is highly inter-dependent on the rest of the world which is evident in the roughly 29 per cent of FRG's GNP that is derived from exports. The country is therefore one of the strongest proponents of the free trade. To protect its markets, West Germany must also demonstrate reliability of its products as well as of its delivery. This is one of the reasons why West Germany is so strongly opposed to interference in East-West trade. In absolute volume, West Germany's trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is relatively small (57% of total exports in 1981). But to stay in the business, the FRG must be able to

demonstrate to other more powerful (particularly in the Arab world) that it is a reliable trade partner.³⁸

During the late 1970s, the installation of the intermediate-range missiles, the SS-20s, the Soviets upset the military balance in Europe. This led to an animated defense debate in Germany in particular and Europe in general. In 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was the first to point out the dangers posed by this development in a lecture given to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

Strategic arms limitation remains confined to the United States and the Soviet Union, it was found to inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe. Schmidt stated:

If we do not succeed in removed the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations, so long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The alliance must therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and

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38 Gebhard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Setting, (Washington: Praeger, 1984), pp. 78-9.

to prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy. (39)

The critical question, however, was how to achieve deterrence. This was the central question for the alliance. If, as many West Germans feel, conventional defense at the central front is either undesirable because (a conventional way on German soil would leave Germany once again destroyed) or, given geographical factors and Soviet conventional superiority, doubtful, then deterrence must derive primarily from the threat of using nuclear weapons.⁴⁰ Because the FRG is barred from nuclear weapons of its own and the deterrent forces of France and UK offer no credible alternative, West Germany must rely on the guarantees of the US to use nuclear weapons in the case of an attack against West Germany. This shifts the burden of deterrence to the United States in a dual sense: To make those guarantees credible, the US must maintain forces in Europe equipped with nuclear weapons and certain to be involved when war breaks out, and the United States must be willing - particularly once the Soviets have the capability to retaliate - to risk the destruction of its own cities

39 H. Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", Survival, vol.xx, no.1, Jan/Feb.1978., p.4.

40 Gebhard Schweigler, "West German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Setting", Praeger, New York, 1984, p.63.

for the defense of West German ones.

Thus US, in order to make that burden less heavy, but also to make deterrence more credible, was interested in stronger conventional defense efforts. An all-out conventional effort on the part of West Germany was impossible, however: it would have detracted from deterrence and thus would have made war more likely: Thus the West German interest in deterrence and the US preference for defense were bridged in a compromise called "flexible response". This called for some conventional defense against an attack and an early use of nuclear weapons should the Soviet attack not be stopped in the forward defense positions.⁴¹

Dual-Track Decision

In the final phase of the Carter Administration and during the first Reagan Administration, the American and West German roles were reversed; Washington became more hostile to the Soviet Union than Kennedy had been, and Schmidt, and latter, and to a lesser extent, Kohl became less so than Adenauer had been.

41 Ibid., pp. 63-4.

In 1977 Schmidt had first proposed deployment of new intermediate range American missiles in Europe to counter the build-up of Soviet SS-20 missiles. After initial scepticism Carter had embraced his argument. By 1979, however, under increasing pressure from within the SPD, Schmidt insisted that simultaneously the US must negotiate with the Soviet Union to end all INF deployment, Western or Soviet, in Europe. The Schmidt government fell, because the FDP withdrew from it, primarily on domestic economic issues. But it was unlikely that he could have maintained SPD support for INF deployment and therefore, would have fallen on that issue eventually so strongly that only sixteen congress delegates (including Schmidt himself voted against an anti INF party congress resolution.⁴²

Thus for the first time since 1960, when the SPD, under Herbert Wehner's influence, had for electoral reasons abandoned its opposition to NATO and EEC, and American nuclear weapons on the soil of the FRG, the SPD again turned against American and

42 William E Griffith, "The American View" in Edwina Moreton, ed., Germany Between East and West; (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987), p. 56.

NATO foreign policies. Although it did not challenge Bonn's membership in NATO and European Community (EC), in other respects its challenge to NATO and American foreign policy was even greater.

Historically, anti-militarism has always been strong in the SPD. It had become firmly committed to detente with the Soviet Union, especially in Europe; it was proud of its Ostpolitik successes, and it was strongly opposed to what it saw as Reagan's dangerously confrontational policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. These policy changes were the result of a major, new phenomenon in West German domestic policies: the rise of a new Left wing in the SPD, composed of educated, radical young professionals who had begun the 'long march through the institutions' after the New Left failed in the 1960s and who staffed the West German Peace Movement. They advocated the 'Europeanization of Europe' a policy adopted by the SPD leadership after Schmidt's fall. This policy proposed that Western and Eastern Europe should both remain within their respective alliances but that each should strive for more autonomy from its own superpower and that both should form a 'security partnership' in Europe to deepen detente there.

With the coming of CDU/CSU in power in October 1982 with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor, NATO's dual track decision was taken on the basis of the following arguments:

- (1) with regard to alliance policy: to strengthen the confidence in the American nuclear guarantee;
- (2) with regard to defense policy; to deter the nuclear and conventional Soviet arsenals;
- (3) with regard to military strategy; to implement and to strengthen the strategy of flexible response and to deny the Soviet Union escalation dominance;
- (4) with regard to arms control: to include the problem of grey area weapons and to give the Soviet Union a detente incentive;
- (5) with regard to detente: to revitalize and to demonstrate the ongoing interest and belief that political detente must gain possible results in military arms control talks; and
- (6) with regard to domestic politics: to legitimise a decision for armaments by offering a parallel track for arms control.

Despite this, the importance to West Germany of continued detente has become very clear in the

period since the Afghanistan crisis. Despite its strongly pro-American stand on strategic issues and its solidarity with the Olympic boycott, the FRG has continued to insist that detente in Central Europe should not be jeopardized by a crisis in Central Asia. The importance of detente for FRG lies, not only in the economic significance of Soviet orders from the West German engineering industry, especially in a period of recession, or in the value to West Germany of Soviet natural gas, supplies which provide 3-4 per cent of Germany's energy requirements. There is also the vital human dimension represented by the fact that detente does something to soften the harsh division of the German nation. As a West German foreign policy expert argued in 1980 to a congressional committee in Washington, the West should not forget "those 8 million West Germans that can now annually go to East Germany, those 1.5 million East Germans annually visiting the West, or the 60,000 German emigrants we, extract every year out of East Europe."

Even though the GDR's position on detente in general remains tough and uncompromising, the FRG is likely to persist in its efforts. The main point to

note, in the context of the present argument is that in East-West relations as elsewhere (and quite notably in inner-German relations), the FRG is beginning to emerge as an autonomous international actor, negotiating its way through a confused and partially disintegrating environment, rather than functioning as a wholly integral part of a cohesive East-West structure of the kind envisaged when President Nixon proclaimed the 'Era of negotiations' at the start of the 1970s.

SDI and Western Europe

In 1980s another source of discord between US and its allies was SDI programme of President Reagan. SDI programme was seen with suspicion by West Europeans. The raison d'etre of NATO has not been that Allied territories be protected by superior war-winning capabilities but rather by a deterrent capability provided by the US - sufficient to threaten the survival of any major attack, even at the risk of America's own survival.⁴³ And the Allies had reservation about the

43 Christopher Bertram, "Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance", DEADALUS, vol.1, Spring 1985, p. 280.

technical infeasibility of the programme as well as its effectiveness to European countries because of geographical proximity to the Warsaw Pact countries, resource crunch of the alliance, etc. Moreover, the INF deployment in early 1980s had split Europe in two camps -- one section favoured it on the ground that it manifested a physical linkage of the American security with that of the Allies. Moreover, the other side opposed it on the ground that deployment of INF system manifested an American desire to limit a possible nuclear war to the European theatre only. The deployment of Strategic defense shield around the US would undercut the earlier argument for the deployment of the INF system.

Like other European allies West Germany was also not consulted before and consequently it was taken aback by Reagan's speech on 23 March 1983 on SDI. The immediate German response was cautious but negative.⁴⁴ Mans Ruhle, the Director of Planning Staff in the Ministry of Defence had commented:

44 Christoph Bluth, "SDI: The Challenge to West Germany", International Affairs (London) vol.2, Spring 1986, p. 247.

Less positive consequences should derive from the fact that the American President links his proposal to a clear critique of the basic assumptions and means of existing security system. This is not changed by the fact that he considers a transition period of at least twenty years necessary, during which time the present means of deterrence has to be maintained. By ascribing a generally offensive character to nuclear missiles and thereby classifying he thus accepts in this respect the essential points of the critiques of the dual-track decision in Europe and thus makes the political realization of this programme more difficult.(45)

Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and the Minister for Defence Manfred Worner, had criticized the project. In December 1983, Genscher was reported to have warned US Secretary of State, George Schultz about the threat of an arms race in space.⁴⁶

The reservation of West Germany on the SDI project was on the following counts:

First, the US is often criticised in the West European press for an absence of "sensitivity" to its allies and the introduction of the SDI was viewed as yet another example of this insensitivity. Chancellor Helmut Kohl was paying a considerable domestic political

45 Ibid., pp. 247-8.

46 Ibid., p. 248.

price in implementing the deployment of INF on its territory. Precisely at this juncture the introduction of SDI, with its moral condemnation of nuclear weapons and the promise to make them obsolete had strengthened the political opponents of the Chancellor.

Secondly, West Germany, because of its geographical location, is extremely sensitive to a possible Soviet attack. Germany feared decoupling of American security with that of the allies. The German Defence Minister, Manfred Warner had repeatedly warned about the "Fortress America", and unprotected Europe.⁴⁷

Thirdly, West Germany maintained that SDI, instead of strengthening deterrence by strategic stability would reduce it because it would produce strategic instability. Once the Nuclear weapons become obsolete, the Soviet Union would obviously exploit its conventional superiority over NATO.⁴⁸

47 James Mamcham, "Bonn is worried by US Arms Research", New York Times (New York) 14 April 1984.

48 William Broad, "Allies in Europe are Apprehensive about Benefits of 'Star Wars Plan'", New York Times, 13 May 1985.

However, from mid-1984 the German stand began to change the following points appear to be the reason for the reorientation of the German position:

- (i) The SDI is a research programme, not a deployment programme;
- (ii) any move towards offense would include protection for US allies; and
- (iii) the Soviet Union for years has been pursuing energetically its R & D Programme for strategic defense.(49)

Perhaps the most important consideration for this change in German stand was the realisation of technological spin off from SDI which could be put to other economic and fruitful use.

49 Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense ; 'Starwar' in Perspective", Hamilton Press, 1986, p. 196.

C H A P T E R - I I I

THE GERMAN QUESTION, 1945-1985

As West Germany's President, Richard Von Weizsacker, put it recently: 'Experience teaches us that a question does not cease to exist simply because nobody has an answer to it'.¹ The question he had in mind is the subject of this chapter: the question of Germany's future.

Traditionally, in postwar thinking, that question has concerned when and how this division of Germany might be overcome. Reunification has been seen as inevitable in the long term by those who worry that Europe can never be stable while Germans hazard by those who worry more about how such a reunited Germany would fit among its smaller neighbours in Europe.

With German unification almost imminent now, several questions have arisen about the future German role in Europe and the world. Will a unified Germany pose a danger to its neighbours in the East and the West or serve as a potential bridge between the East

1 Die Zeit, 30, ix, 83, quoted in The German question in the 1980s, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,) p.1.

and the West? Will the momentous changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe lead to a dilution of Bonn's links with the EEC and NATO? Will a United Germany accord less priority to the European Community and slacken the pace of integration? What will be the implications of a united Germany for the Third World?

The 'German Question' was back suddenly on the political agenda of the 1980s because it is still in Germany, that the European balance is decided. A more simple answer is that the Germans themselves have put the question there. As East-West detente seemed to cool in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. West Germany struggled harder than most West European countries to keep alive its spirit in Europe. When martial law brought an end to the Solidarity challenge in Poland in December 1981, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited East Germany. Although West Germans had done their part in sending food parcels, medical supplies and aid to the Poles, the two German leaders seemed determined to insulate their newly evolving political relationship from the deep chill that settled on relations between the superpowers.

The reason owes as much to the things West Germany can not change about its political situation as to those it can: committed by its constitution to work for German reunification, West Germany has been the only power involved in German question that is not prepared to accept the status quo in Europe. But, if West Germany is to resolve the question of partition on its own terms--meaning by encouraging East Germany to overcome the division between the two states and ultimately reunite with West Germany then it is East Germany's protective power and chief ally, viz. the Soviet Union, that holds the key. Thus, other Europeans may differ with the United States on East-West issues, but only West Germany is so uniquely vulnerable to Soviet pressure and encouragement. This is because West Germany is the frontline state of NATO where the Armed forces of both blocs face each other moreover, West Germany is committed to keep a special relationship with East Germany where the Soviets pull the string and accordingly affects FRG-GDR relations.²

2 Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management of Detente, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), p. 145.

Soviet Offer of 1952

On 10 March 1952, the Soviet leadership presented the three Western Allies with a note proposing the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany--FRG would undertake not to enter, into any 'coalitions or military alliances' directed against any state that had "participated in the war against Germany with its combat forces"; in addition, all occupation troops were to withdraw from the country one year after the conclusion of the peace treaty. Free elections for an all-German Parliament, specified the Soviet government in a second note on 9 April, was proposed to take place in the short term, albeit prepared by proportionally constituted FRG-GDR bodies under the supervision of the four Allies, and not, as the Western side had demanded under the observation of the UNO. The future status of Germany was to be established by the Allies before the assembly of the freely elected German government, but the Peace treaty itself was only to be signed by this government. Two further notes of 24 May and 23 August 1952 urged the Western powers to take steps towards the solution of the

German question on the basis of these proposals,³ the future policy of Germany as a whole by the permanent presence of GDR and USSR representatives in the process, leading up to free elections and the peace treaty.⁴

The chances of success of the neutralisation project were nevertheless remote from the outset. Insistence on supervision of the entire peace treaty procedure robbed the proposal for free elections in the whole of Germany of much of its attractiveness. Whilst commitment to the Oder-Neisse border robbed the appeal to national-conservative elements in Germany of much of its efficacy. A reunited Germany with a national army, albeit a restricted one, was bound to be greeted with substantial misgivings by the West Europeans, especially the French. The question really was whether the advantages offered to the Western powers by the proposal--the opening of the former GDR

3 The notes have been as controversially discussed in recent historical literature as among the contemporary public. 'Traditional' authors see in the Soviet initiative simply an attempt to wreck the founding of the EDC by encouraging internal Western conflicts. Among others, Gernard meeting is an exponent of this thesis. On the other hand, people like Klans Erdmenger, Gerd Meyer, Rolf Steininger etc. hold diametrically opposite opinion that Soviet leadership was really prepared to make sacrifices in order to achieve reunification.

4 Wilfried Loth, Division of the World, 1941-55, Routledge, London, 1980.

to Western influence, a fall in armament costs, and a reduction of tension in Central Europe--would be able to outweigh these misgivings. Furthermore, it must have seemed doubtful whether the Western powers, after years of thinking and dealing in terms of the Cold War, would be at all capable of weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed project against one another.

GERMAN QUESTION 1952-1969:

By 1952, the vast majority of West Germans in all parties had long agreed that democratic freedom must take priority over reunification. As far back as 1958, Adenauer secretly urged the Soviet Union to give East Germany the same status as Austria, with the freedom to build a democratic order but forbidden to unite with the Federal Republic.⁵

Otherwise, Adenauer kept the German question open. The twin pillars of Adenauer's Ostpolitik had been the 'policy of strength' and the 'Hallstein

5 Peter Bender, "The Superpower Squeeze", Foreign Policy, no.65, Winter 1986-87, pp. 113.

Doctrine'. FRG claimed itself to be the sole legitimate representative to speak on behalf of all Germans.

The Berlin blockade of 1961 and Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had shaken the world. These events led to world on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe. Hence, the superpowers moved towards crisis management and detente. The German question remained on the political agenda of the superpowers as an insoluble problem in the foreseeable future.

After the Cuban missile crisis, the perception of the West but for FRG about Soviet Union and methods to be employed has gone under seismic change. The Kennedy Administration realized that detente should precede reunification rather than follow it. On the other hand, the policy makers in FRG still believed that communist edifice would crumble down under the weight of its own contradictions and eventually reunification would take place. They thought reunification should be the precursor of detente.⁶

6 Gebhard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 46.

By the mid 1960s a considerable gap had developed between the policies of the FRG and her allies on the question of German reunification and relations with the East. Clinging to the 'Policy of Strength', Bonn had become an island of orthodoxy amidst Western attempts to alter policies towards the Communist World. FRG's interest in 'keeping open' the problem of Germany's division and her ensuing refusal to accept the status quo were increasingly interpreted in the West (and, of course, in the East) as a threat to European stability particularly in view of her implicit territorial demands and her steadily growing economic and military resources.

The groundwork for improved relations was laid down under Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroder. In the early 1960s, trade missions were established in Yugoslavia and Romania and other communist countries. However, Chancellor Erhard's deteriorating position within the CDU-CSU impeded the adoption of a more dynamic policy.⁷

7 Roger Tilford, The Ostpolitik and political change in Germany, (Saxon House, Lexington Books, 1975), p. 79.

The Grand Coalition (1966-1969) provided an opportunity to introduce some dynamism in FRG's Ostpolitik by renouncing the 'policy of strength' and by reversing the government's priorities by not making German unification a prerequisite for an improvement in East-West relations.

FRG now sought to improve the living conditions of East Germans to reduce the harmful consequences of division, and to prevent the two parts of Germany from growing apart. A more conciliatory attitude was adopted on the border problem.⁸ The new government realized the harmful consequences of the 'Hallstein Doctrine' and in January 1967 diplomatic relations were established with Romania and with Yugoslavia in January 1968. In regard to East Germany Bonn now pursued a selective policy of seeking contacts and cooperation short of diplomatic recognition.⁹

German Question in the 1970s

With the coming of power of Chancellor Willy Brandt, the German Question gradually underwent a

8 Oder-Neisse line was accepted as the frontier of reunited Germany and Munich Agreement of 1938 was declared null and void.

9 Karl Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in Transition, OUP, 1968, pp. 1-37.

major transformation. In his inaugural address to the Bundestag on 28 October 1969, Brandt reaffirmed the right of Germans to self-determination and his commitment to preserve the unity of the nation. He added:

... We must prevent any further alienation of the two parts of the German nation that is, arrive at a regular modus vivendi and from there proceed to cooperation...international recognition of the GDR by the Federal Republic is out of the question. Even if there exist two states in Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other, their relations with each other can only be of a special nature.(10)

Brandt did accept the theory of two states in one nation but not two states and two nations. Thus by acknowledging the existence of East Germany and accepting the present borders in Europe, as was done in the Eastern treaties, the FRG has by no means given up its declared goal of the German nation recovering its unity in "free self-determination". The Federal government refers to the "Letter on German Unity", appended to the FRG-USSR Treaty (1970) and the Basic

10 FRG, Press and information office, Chancellor Willy Brandt Government Declaration Delivered to the Bundestag on 28 October 1969, (Bonn), pp.5-6.

Treaty between the two German states (1972), and the "special nature of inter-German relations, as reflected in the heads of missions of FRG and GDR in each other's capitals being designated as "Permanent Representatives", rather than "Ambassadors", in support of that contention. Moreover, it is stated that what the Federal Republic had given up by signing the Eastern treaties was the forcible alteration of borders which the FRG had agreed to respect as "inviolable". The Eastern treaties are said not to preclude "any peaceful agreed change in the frontiers" or the possibility, of the two German states voluntarily deciding to reunite.

The Helsinki Act was signed on August 1975 by 35 nations, all European but for US and Canada. This Act consisted of three baskets, political, economic and human rights. It was an attempt to provide for All-European Institution which would be a platform for interaction of divergent social, political system and would provide a forum for sorting our differences. Although the West was careful to emphasize that the Helsinki Declaration did not constitute a formal treaty, and consequently did not endow the Soviet position in Eastern Europe with the de jure legitimacy that Moscow

so badly wanted, the Final Act went at least some way towards meeting Soviet aspirations. However, CSCE is perhaps most fruitfully understood in this connection as a multilateral form of the Ostpolitik pursued by Willy Brandt and the Westpolitik adopted by Brezhnev. In a sense, Helsinki simply provided a multilateral ratification and, therefore, an added level of formality to the agreements reached between Bonn and its East European neighbours.

The FRG had given up reunification as an immediate goal. The Helsinki Declaration was interpreted by both FRG and GDR according to their own convenience. GDR affirmed that borders can not be changed and thereby GDR gets universal acceptance. On the other hand, FRG interpreted that borders are 'inviolable' but not 'immutable', i.e. borders can be changed by peaceful means.

At the formal level the status quo was ratified, but the emphasis on human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as on the rights of all peoples to determine their internal and external political status without external interference suggests that the West was engaged in a more subtle challenge to the Soviet

position in Eastern Europe. The emphasis placed by the West on these provisions as well as on those of Basket III, reinforces Peirre Hassner's thesis that the Cold War has been replaced by a 'hot peace'.¹¹

State of Relations Between Two Germanys

Since West German government is committed by its Basic Law to represent all Germans, it is political exigency and necessity that they maintain their trade and humanitarian relations with the GDR.

For having wide-ranging trade credit relations, on the side of the FRG, three principal reasons may be put forward. First, its commercial relations constitute a commitment to those living in the other Germany; trade is 'representing' the flag rather than 'following' the flag of the adage. Secondly, the West German government perceives the non-commercial payments it makes to the GDR as a legitimation of that role. Thirdly, the normalization of inter-German economic relations helps to ensure the security of West Berlin.

11 Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, International Affairs, vol.61, no.3, summer 1985.

12 Gebhard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Setting, (Washington: Praeger, 1984)

In case of GDR, political objectives also figure in maintaining trade with the FRG. First, the flow of goods gives GDR citizens a sense of contact with their Western co-nationals--the GDR government is concerned lest other channels, notably the peace movement and the Protestant Church, be more used. Secondly, trade with the GDR encourages a positive interest on the part of the Federal Government in relations with Eastern Europe generally, keeping West Germany somewhat more natural with respect to the US than might otherwise be the case. Without such economic attraction, the argument goes, FRG would be more pliant towards the US and, for example, accept more of the SDI budget. But the principal motivation is economic.

As an exporter to the FRG, the GDR has two valuable advantages over other members of COMECON: a protocol to the Treaty of Rome grants it duty-free access to the FRG, though not to the rest of EEC, and the two central banks provide each other with a swing credit, which is of major importance for GDR imports. The GDR has regularly benefited from the annual swing

credit. From 30 July 1982 the swing credit was decreased from its previous annual rate of 800m DM in two steps to 600m DM, the level at which it ran for the calendar year 1985.¹³

By now, the GDR government has outgrown its early fears that trade would render the country so dependent that the West German government could exert political leverage on it; the expectation was held in West Germany also. At that time the GDR evolved the economic policy of 'promoting disturbance--free development' and political 'delimitation'. So far has the attitude changed that East German officials have reportedly said that the Federal Republic is now the only partner on which they could rely. West German attitudes can still be expressed in Egon Bahr's formula of the early 1960s, Wandeldurch Annaherung (change through rapprochement), but as Lowenthal put it,

It would be entirely mistaken to see this move towards rapprochement in the context of past hopes for reunification in a national state, let alone of dreams of Pan-Germanism. It is totally wooing to see it as mainly the fruit of West German economic bribes, as the Soviets pretend. Honecker is a communist and communists are not inclined to make political

13 Dr Gerhard Ollig, "Economic Relations with the GDR", Aussenpolitik, vol. 36, no.3. (Hamburg).

concessions in return for economic furors, gladly though they may accept the latter.(14)

Humanitarian Dimension

There are still many things which link the two societies. The Germans in the FRG and the GDR alike are first and foremost Germans. In other words, they are characterized by that collection of behavioural patterns and values--ranging from their alleged industriousness to their joviety and tendency to break out into the singing of choruses when inebriated--which in the course of history have come to be regarded as typically German, both among Germans themselves and among their neighbours in East and West. They see themselves as members of industrial societies which in their religious and ethical foundations are German in character. They consider themselves part of the same high culture. They share a common past, which means that when they look at history, they necessarily come across the same events and heroes.

Further, Germans in both states are still connected through family ties and acquaintances.

14 R. Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, pp. 313.

Their true number can only be guessed at. However, there are indications that their scale is still very considerable. For example in 1984 about 5 million trips from the FRG and West Berlin to the GDR were registered; in the reverse direction, where travel is possible only for those who have reached pensionable age, the figure was about 1.5 million; there were about another 60,000 visits connected with so-called urgent family matters.¹⁵ Since 1945 about 4 million people have moved from East Germany to West Germany.

The people in the two German states share more than a common nostalgia and sentimentality. There are real forces at work in the substructure of the two states: in the interpersonal relationships, in cultural interests and activities, in the feeling of personal involvement with events in the other state. Their effect inevitably counteracts tendencies towards separate development arising out of the existence of the two German states.

The Soviet View

Ever since World War II, Soviet leaders have seen Germany as crucial to their policy towards Western Europe.

15 Annual Report of the Federal Minister for Inter-German Relations, 1984.

Stalin was convinced that "the existence of peace-loving democratic Germany beside a peace-loving Soviet Union excludes the possibility of further wars in Europe, puts an end to bloodshed in Europe and makes impossible the enslavement of European countries by the world imperialists". Soviet control over Germany would make the United States presence on the European continent untenable, and thus assure the USSR's domination on its side of Atlantic. Conversely, a Germany firmly tied to the West was bound to be a roadblock to decisive Soviet influence in Western Europe. This analysis has shaped the Kremlin's attitudes and actions towards Germany throughout the postwar period.

Stalin felt that "the German's drive for reunification was the historical force which the Soviet Union could successfully exploit against the United States and its allies. That part of German provide the political glacis from which all of the country could be won over sooner or later, by appealing to this desire for reunification.¹⁶ This 'German Unity' line

16 Quoted in Edwina Moreton (ed.), Germany between East and West, by Gerhard Wettig, "The Soviet View", p. 35.

was down played after the uprising in East Berlin of 17 June 1953 had revealed the extent to which communism was resisted even by those Germans who were exposed to Soviet control. From then on, Soviet advocacy of German reunification was little more than a tactical propaganda device. The all-German slogans were dropped completely when in 1966, the West German communists at their word and offer a direct party-to-party dialogue with the SED.¹⁷

Evidently, the change of approach did not reflect a willingness on the part of the Kremlin to renounce on the part of the Kremlin to renounce its aim of control and communisation in exchange for neutrality, whilst counting on being able to dominate Germany in the future. As far as can be judged, the Soviet leadership has never until recently really considered given up East Germany in return for some Western concession on Germany's status. The GDR was viewed in Moscow not as a pawn or a bargaining chip but as a power position that could be used for further political advance.

17 See Gerhard Wettig, "Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp: The Soviet Union, East Germany and the German problem 1965-1972", Praeger, (New York), 1974.

What has changed over time is the Soviet leaders' perception of how useful the continued issue of German unification can be in the pursuit of their goals. Whereas Stalin felt that the German desire to live in a single state was both a powerful force that would prevail in the long run and a beneficial trend that lent itself to exploitation by the Soviet Union, his successors were more impressed by the anti-Soviet potential in German nationalism and German unity. They have acted on the assumption that the only hope of establishing firm and lasting control over Germany is to keep it divided. Their best hope would be for a communist East Germany plus a neutralized, increasingly dependent Federal Republic. West Germany would then cease to be either a barrier to the Soviet Union's political advance into Western Europe or a potential challenge to the stability of East Germany.

This Soviet determination not to give rise to the slightest hope for German unity became obvious during the missile deployment debate of 1980-83. Soviet propaganda tried hard to provide the West German public with an incentive for opposing the deployment of American missiles in the country. All kinds

of expectations, both positive and negative, were raised--but Moscow remained conspicuously silent on anything which related to the prospect of German unity or political rapprochement.

Soviets knew that by controlling GDR, they have leverage in influencing FRG's behaviour. The stronger East Germany is as a Soviet stronghold, the more chance it has to influence the West Germans.

American View:

Officially USA supports the proposition for German reunification but nonetheless there remains differences between Bonn and Washington over the pace, momentum and the method of achieving reunification. It is often said that there is no country other than the Federal Republic which really wants the reunification of Germany, since this would mean either that Germany would once again dominate Europe or that it would be neutralized and then fall under Soviet hegemony.

There is one other country, the United States, which has little to lose and much to gain from the reunification of Germany, in so far as it were to occur

within the broader context of the reunification of Europe and not as a result of some West German, or even all German initiative opposed by the other European States. This is so because the Soviet Union has become, and is likely to remain, so strong, while Germany--even a reunited Germany--would not be able to dominate Europe as a whole. Secondly, the reunification of Germany would inevitably change the balance of power in Europe to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union and to the advantage of the United States.¹⁸

Americans have been wary of FRG's move to court East European countries and in turn getting isolated. Henry Kissinger said,

The most obvious potential conflict between the Federal Republic and its Allies - and the danger which the communist countries may hope to use to prop Germany loose from its Atlantic ties - concerns reactions to the division of Germany. The problem is complicated by three factors: (i) NATO is an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal members seeks a basic change in the status quo; (ii) More of Germany's allies shares her national aspirations with equal intensity; (iii) Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust that creates special obstacles to its international role. These divergences would be difficult enough for a cohesive Alliance to reconcile; the rivalry between France and the United States threatens to make them insoluble. (19)

19 Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 209.

Finlandisation

The spectre of Rappallo was resurrected in the form of the concept of "Finlandization"--a term which was first used by Richard Lowenthal in 1962. James Dougherty defines it as -

...a somewhat inchoate and subtle process whereby the countries of Western Europe would be weakened gradually from a political, economic, sociological and military standpoints, separated from the overarching protective power of the United States; and slowly transformed into a set of isolated, neutralised states which would find the needles on their political compasses oriented increasingly toward Moscow as the single magnetic centre of power capable of shaping the outcome of events in Europe.(20)

The concept of "Finlandisation" was taken up enthusiastically by the CDU/CSU opposition, especially Franz Josef Strauss, to criticise Brandt's Ostpolitik and to foster distrust and doubt about the SPD/FDP coalition's intentions.

French View

The view from Paris is most straightforward. The success of the Paris-Bonn 'couple' has laid in the

20 James, E. Dougherty, "The Soviet Strategy of Finlandization of Europe: The external process", in Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.), Atlantic Community in Crisis: The Definition of the Transatlantic Relationship (New York, 1978), p. 125.

conscious and deliberate reconciliation of conflicting interests, not in any intrinsic convergence of views and politics. For the Franco-German relationship, East Germany is the constant shadow in the background, the alternative partner as well as the lure. The Soviet Union is using in the hope of drawing Bonn away from its anchorage in the West. Most French politicians agree with the traditional West German view of a special responsibility towards the other part of Germany and are sympathetic in particular to the goal of removing barriers to contacts between the German people. But there are limits to French support for Bonn's Deutschlandpolitik. Although welcoming West German contributions to more stable contacts at the frontlines of the Cold War, there is some concern in France that the effort to deepen and broaden German-German ties could develop a dynamic of its own right which might lead the Federal Republic to shield its 'special relationship' with East Germany while the Soviet Union uses the pull of inter-German ties to try to influence West German politics.

One might indeed question the extent to which the French in practice support the goal of 'reunification', but one has to admit that France has never disputed the right of the German people to self-determination. The

traditional Gaullist theme of 'going beyond Yalta' through the progress of democracy and communication in communist Europe has been picked up by President Francois Mitterand in recent years. The West Germans, on the other hand, backed away from insisting on the priority of the solution of the German problem in terms of state reunification and focus instead on the living conditions of the East Germans and gradual liberalization of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Almost twenty years after the Franco-German treaty of 1983, Mitterand's 1982 decision to revive the dormant military cooperation provisions of the Treaty was a further proof of the French intention to become more directly involved in the defence of Western Germany, as well as an admission of the impossibility of hiding behind a Maginot Line.

Good relations with Bonn have been the keystone of Mitterand's European policy, as with that of his predecessors. The choice France makes between the pursuit of one or the other policy option is based as much on a reading of the German situation as of Soviet and American policies. Alfred Grosser has rightly observed, on the meaning of 'solidarity with Germany' that the

lack of a long-term vision for the future will become a more serious problem to deal with than the imaginary danger of German 'national neutralism'.²¹

The British View

The British standpoint on the division of Germany was recently summarised by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher who pointed out that 'real' and permanent stability in Europe will be difficult to achieve as long as the German nation is divided against its will'. The British commitment to Germany's right of self-determination was also confirmed in the Prime Minister's support for the 'Political Declaration on the 40th Anniversary of the End of the Second World War, issued at the Bonn Economic Summit in May 1985', 'considering the climate of peace and friendship which we have achieved among ourselves forty years after the end of the war, we look forward to a state of peace in Europe in which the German people will retain its unity through free, self-determination.

21 Quoted in Edwina Moreton (ed.), Germany between East and West, Renata Fritsch-Bowinazel, "The French View", p. 81.

This commitment to self-determination for the German people has been a permanent element in British policy since the Deutschlandvertrag of 1954, which expressed close agreement between the FRG and the Western allies, including UK. In terms of the practical politics of this issue, all British governments since that day have held the same view as successive governments in Bonn on the essential point: if the price to be paid for the exercise of self-determination by the Germans (i.e. for reunification) were to be the shift by the FRG from the Western alliance to a neutral or non-aligned position, that price would be too high.

GDR's View

GDR's perception about the German Question is guided by the SED's ideology. SED used to hold the FRG in the image of an old enemy. It was against pluralism, and social Democracy. Having got finally anchored into the socialist camp, it claimed itself to be a member of the 'socialist camp'. Kurt Hager in his speech referred to the "socialist nation ^A developing in the GDR" and as evidence set out the following: "Attachment to the USSR; exercise of state power by

the working class; full sovereignty of the socialist state power, the borders of which are clearly defined and protected; communization of decisive means of production; propagation and enforcement of socialist thinking and action; and adherence to socialist internationalism'.²²

SED clearly demarcated the area and intensity of intercourse with FRG. This is because SED has consistently suffered from a "legitimacy deficit". McAdams maintains that it was a "policy" without any kind of independent national base or popular mandate".²³ The East German leadership was eager to preserve the social fabric of the Fatherland and safeguard it from the subversive influence of the FRG.

But the new constitution of the GDR of April 6, 1968 took a completely different attitude on the question of the nation's Article 8, Section 2 runs:

The establishment and entertaining of normal relations and cooperation of two German states on the basis of equality are the national purpose

22 Quoted in Bernd Weber, "SED Ideology: Rapprochement and Demarcation", Aussenpolitik, p. 46.

23 A. James McAdams, East Germany and Detente, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 3.

of the GDR. The GDR and its citizens are, over above this, striving to overcome the division of Germany forced upon the German nation by imperialism and to effect step by step rapproachment of the two German states until their reunification on the basis of democracy and socialism. (24)

Greens

In 1980s FRG^G witnessed a different brand of politics--the politics of Greens. The genesis of the Greens can be found in the Kaleidoscope of extra-parliamentary political movements--environmental, feminist and pacifist--that swept FRG in the 1960s and 1970s.

Rethinking the relationship between the FRG and GDR was not an early, focus for the Greens. But the Greens Deutschlandpolitik, as it has emerged from several years of intra-party debates now forms the counterpiece of their policy with regard to the whole European continent. Advocating formal acceptance of the existence of two German nation-states, the Greens abandoned the ghost of a German Reich, and with it, the goal of reunification.

24 Mike Denis, German Democratic Republic: Politics Economics and Society, (London :Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 91.

The Greens perceive Bonn's insistence on one German nation and the commitment to reunification as a prime source of inter-German tensions. The Greens aim to overcome this separation by a policy of total recognition, dispensing with the concept of "one Germany" and the special policy begins with what they call West Germany's self-recognition. "Self-recognition of the Federal Republic means to end the self-deception of an all-German identity and press forward with the cultivation of an independent democratic identity²⁵, self-recognition means self-limitation. West Germany would be viewed as an end in itself rather than the first stage of a reorganized all-German state. East Germany would be recognised as an independent state, and lingering hopes of regaining formal German territories east of the Oder-Neisse would also be given up.

SPD's Attitude

The Social Democrats opposed the deployment of the new NATO missiles in West Germany, which ended the consensus on defence and security policy that had

25 Bundesstagswahl programme 1987, Die Grunen, p. 31. Quoted in John H. Vangnam, "The Greens' of Germany", ORBIS, vol.32, 1988, p. 85.

been a cornerstone of West Germany's political stability since the 1950s. The SPD initiated a new phase of party-political Ost and Deutschlandpolitik with Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. Since Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats seemed to have managed to keep up reasonably good relations with East Germany, a policy which the Social Democrats had always seen as their own ever since Willy Brandt, now embarked on Ostpolitik phase II. Framework agreements in 1985 with the East German Communist Party, the SED, for a chemical weapons-free zone, were followed by similar talks on a nuclear weapons-free zone Czechoslovakia and Poland were also to be brought into the scheme.

German Question in 1985

German question had travelled through the vicissitudes of superpower conflict and rapproachment Detente and Cold War in last forty years. But with the transformation of Deutschlandpolitik, German Question too got relegated into background and even the CDU/CSU government of Kohl believed and pursued the same thesis which Willy Brandt had initiated. The thesis of finding provisional solutions where permanent solutions

could not be found. FRG as well as other NATO countries believed that as long as 'Iron Curtain' was not lifted, the unification of Germany would remain a myth.²⁶

Deutschlandpolitik was not being considered solely from the limited perspective of reunification, it was being considered rather in the framework of broader political fields such as peace policy, seaunity policy and European policy. But both at the level of the general public and at the political level, the division of Germany, the unity of Germany and, above all, the self-determination of all Germans was bound to grow into an active issue.²⁷

And thus in 1985, 'German Question' remained unresolved. It remained on history's list of unfinished business until all Germans had a chance to freely exercise their right to self-determination.

26 Berndt Von Staden, "Perspectives of German Foreign Policy", Aussen Politik, vol. 36, no.1, 1985, pp. 22-23.

27 Walter Leisler Kiep, "The New Deutschlandpolitik", Foreign Affairs, Fall 1984, (New York), p. 317.

CHAPTER - IV

GORBACHEV, GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA

After the demise of CPSU General Secretary Chernenko in 1985, the Soviet Union witnessed a fierce but subtle struggle for leadership in which Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU at the age of 54. Gorbachev proposed his 'New Thinking' at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1986. On the domestic front, he proposed sweeping changes in the Soviet economy, polity and society as a whole. On the international plane, he advocated a series of nuclear and conventional disarmament proposals.

Perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) epitomize his reforms. The major tenets of perestroika and glasnost are:¹

Domestic

- abandonment of the Marxist concept of 'dictatorship of the proletariat';
- abolish the monopoly of communist party over state and society, i.e. over 'Truth' and 'Power';
- new electoral procedures, with the secret ballots for communist party posts;

1 Christopher Walker, "Gorbachev calls for secret Soviet ballots", Times, (London), 28 January 1987.

- joint ventures with foreign capital;
- privatisation of land and retailing;
- restructuration of state industries;
- freedom of speech and expression; and
- freedom of religion.

In the international arena he repealed the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', revised the theory of 'nuclear deterrence', etc. The implications of his proposals are such that world-system is getting restructured, more democratised and equal.

Gorbachev's policies have had a major impact on European and world affairs. They have led to a loosening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, improved East-West and Super Power relations, and the resolution of conflicts through peaceful means in the Third World.

The motives behind Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' are primarily economic. The Soviet economy has been almost stagnating and had failed to cater the consumers' demands. It was precisely to overcome the contradictions of the Soviet Union that he went on to undo what his predecessors had done. These contradictions have been adeptly summarized in the words of Paul Kennedy:

....in a number of absolutely critical areas there seems to be opening up an ever-widening gap between the aims of the Soviet state and the methods employed to reach them. It proclaims the need for enhanced agricultural and industrial output, yet hobbles that possibility by collectivization and by heavy-handed planning. It asserts the overriding importance of world peace, yet its own massive arms build-up and its link with 'revolutionary' states (together with its revolutionary heritage) serve to increase international tensions. It claims to require absolute security along its extensive borders yet its hitherto unyielding policy toward its neighbours' own security concerns worsens Moscow's relations - with Western and Eastern Europe, with Middle East peoples, with China and Japan - and in turn makes the Russians feel enriched and less secure. Its philosophy asserts the ongoing dialectical process of change in world affairs, driven by technology and new means of production, and inevitably causing all sort of political and social transformations; and yet its own autocratic and bureaucratic habits, the privileges which cushion the party elites, the restrictions upon the free interchange of knowledge, and the lack of a personal incentive system make it horribly ill-equipped to handle the explosive but subtle high-tech future which is already emerging in Japan and California. Above all, while its party leaders frequently insist that the USSR will never again accept a position of military inferiority, and even more frequently urge the nation to increase production, it has clearly found it difficult to reconcile those two aims; and, in particular, to check a Russian tradition devoting too high a share of national resources to the armed forces - with deleterious consequences for its ability to compete with other societies commercially perhaps there are other ways of labelling all these problems, but it does not seem inappropriate to term them 'contradictions'.²

2

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (London:Fontana Press, 1989), pp. 631-32.

Given the emphasis in Marxian philosophy upon the material basis of existence, it may seem doubly ironic that the chief difficulties facing the USSR today are located in economic substructure. Gorbachev admitted to the 27th Communist Party Congress:

Difficulties began to build up in the economy in the 1970s with the rates of economic growth declining visibly. As a result, the targets for economic development set in the communist party programme, and even the lower targets of the 9th and 10th 5 year plans were not attained. Neither did we manage to carry out the social programme charted for this period. A lag ensued in the material base of science and education, health protection, cultures and everyday services.

Though efforts have been made of late, we have not succeeded in fully remedying the situation. There are serious lags in engineering industry in ferrous metals and chemicals in capital construction. Neither have the targets been met for the main indicators of efficiency and the improvement of the people's standard of living.

Acceleration of the country's socio-economic development is the key to all our problems; immediate and long term, economic and social, political and ideological, internal and external.(3)

The most critical area of weakness in the economy during the entire history of Soviet Union has been agriculture. Despite all the resources which the

1 Excerpts from Gorbachev's speech to the Party, New York Times, Feb. 26, 1986. See also 'Making Gorbachev Frown, Economist, March 8, 1986, p. 67; S. Bialer, 'The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s, Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.5, (Summer 1981), pp. 999-1020.

State commits toward agriculture, which swallows up nearly 30 per cent of total investment (of 5 per cent in USA) and employs over 20 per cent of the labour force (3 per cent in the USA), the standard of living of a Russian is far behind that of West. Merely in order to maintain standards of living, the USSR is compelled to invest approximately \$ 78 billion in agriculture each year, and to subsidize food prices by a further \$ 50 billion--despite which it seems to be moving further and further away from being the exporter it once was⁴ and instead needs to pour out further billions of hard currency to import grain and meats to make up its own shortfalls in agricultural output.

There are, no doubt, certain natural reasons for the precariousness of Soviet agriculture, but the biggest problems are simply caused by the 'socialization' of agriculture to keep the Russian populace happy, food prices are held artificially low through subsidies. The denial of responsibility and

4 M.I. Goldman, USSR in crisis: the failure of an economic system (New York, 1983), p. 86. For further analyses, see Bergson and Lenine (eds), Soviet economy: Toward the year 2000, chapters 4,5. How swiftly (relatively) the USSR's position has been worsened can be seen by rereading the rosier assessment of the gap between it and the US being closed by the year 2000 in Lanson's very sober Soviet-American Rivalry (written in 1976-77), p.272.

initiative to the individual peasants is probably the single greatest reason for disappointing yields, chronic inefficiencies, and enormous wastage. What could be done if the system were altered in its fundamentals - that is, a massive change away from collectivization toward individual peasant-run farming-- is indicated by the fact that the existing private plots produce around 25 per cent of Russia's crop output, yet occupy a mere 4 per cent of the country's available land.⁵

Similarly, there are host of signs that Soviet industry too, is stagnating and that the period of relatively easy expansion caused by fixing ambitious output targets, and then devoting enormous finance and manpower to meeting those figures has come to a close. Part of this is due to increasing labour and energy shortages. Equally important, however, are the repeated signs that manufacturing suffers from an excess of bureaucratic planning, from being too concentrated upon heavy industry, and from being unable to respond either to consumer choice or to the need to alter products to meet new demands or markets.

5 Goldman, USSR in Crisis, p. 83, and the remarks in ABC Move, Economic History of USSR, pp.362ff.

Yet if today's levels of Soviet industrial efficiency are scarcely tolerable, the system is likely to be even more damaged by energy wastage, and the disproportionate share of the GNP devoted to defence. The Kremlin appeared to have allocated around twice as much of the country's product to this area as has the USA, even under Reagan's arms build up;⁶ and this in turn means that the Soviet armed forces have siphoned off vast stocks of trained manpower, scientists, machinery, and capital investment which could have been devoted to the civilian economy. This does not mean that a large reduction in defense expenditure would quickly lead to a great surge in Russia's growth rates, simply because of the fact that it would take a long time before, say, a T-72 tank-assembly factory could be retooled to do something else.⁷

Thus, the USSR had to make a choice in its allocations of national resources between, i) requirements of security needs and ii) the increasing desire of the Russian populace for consumer goods and better

6 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (London), 1987, p. 644.

7 This point is made both by cotton, 'Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union', p. 91; and Bond and Lenine, "An overview" in Bergson and Lenine (eds.), Soviet Economy: Toward the year 2000, pp.19-21.

living and working conditions; and iii) the needs of both agriculture and industry for fresh capital investment, in order to modernize the economy, increase output, keep abreast of the advances of others, and in the longer term satisfy both the defence and the social requirements of the country.⁸

Through perestroika, Gorbachev wants to rejuvenate the Soviet economy through the institution of market, individual initiative, private property, infusion of foreign capital and know-how, etc. On the other hand, through glasnost he wants to provide freedom to individuals as well nations (East European especially) to choose their own destiny. It is his 'New Thinking' on security and East-West relations which has unleashed irreversible historical forces of change which has led to turmoil and turbulences in Eastern Europe. Through "New Thinking", Gorbachev wants to cut down the overstretched strategic commitments of the Soviet state.

8 L.H. Gelb, "A common desire for guns and butter", New York Times, Nov. 10, 1985, "The week in Review", section, p.2.

Soviet officials say military parity no longer represents a viable guarantee of peace. Addressing the 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev denounced nuclear deterrence as a threat to all countries and peoples, thereby creating the impression that the existence of nuclear weapons implied an automatic risk of nuclear war. He argued that it was fundamentally immoral to make the population of entire countries "nuclear hostages".⁹

Thus, under the aegis of "New Thinking", Soviets have started working toward a restructuring of interstate relations. They now argue that international security must be viewed from that all countries are interconnected by "mutual dependence", and that therefore mutual cooperation is necessary. They maintain that such cooperation should pertain not only in the areas of economics and technology, but in security as well. Emphasizing that no state is in a position to ensure its own security by unilateral efforts and military defense, they conclude that all countries must join in an effort to seek solutions through political means. All these postulates are subsumed by the Soviets

9 Documents and materials (Moscow), 1987, p.10.

under the slogan of "common security", which Gorbachev has borrowed from the vocabulary of Palme Commission.¹⁰

"New Thinking" implies a fundamental revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine applied to political and military areas. "Class conflict" is to be replaced by commonality and cooperation. "Peaceful co-existence" would no longer mean a specific form of anti-Western struggle.¹¹

Soviet politicians and spokesmen describe their solution to the nuclear threat in a number of ways. Among these is the statement that the size of forces and armaments must be limited to the needs of "sufficient defense".¹² They have conceded that military asymmetries between the Warsaw Pact and NATO exist and call for their elimination. They advocate nuclear disarmament on the basis that security should be guaranteed primarily by political, rather than military, means. Along similar lines, they demand that the offensive potential be eliminated and only preparations for defense be permitted.

10 The Palme Commission or the Independent Commission on Disarmament and security issues was launched in Vienna on September 13, 1980.

11 Gerhard Wettig, "New Thinking" on Security and East-West Relations", in Problems of of Communism (Washington, D.C., March/April 1988), p.2.

12 Gerhard Wettig, n.11, p.2.

In the political realms, the lead term in the Soviet vocabulary is "common security". According to this concept, all countries are to enjoy security on the basis of a new international order that would ensure that such principles of international law as non-intervention and respect for sovereign rights be universally observed. The Soviets maintain that practical implementation of "common security" must be sought within the framework of a "system of all encompassing security", that is a system which includes all countries and extends to all spheres of mutual interest.

While on an official visit to FRG from June 12-15 Gorbachev said,

* A peaceful situation in Europe requires not nuclear deterrence, but a deterrence of nuclear weapons and, better still, their elimination. The question of the complete destruction of tactical nuclear weapons can not be removed from the agenda. We are convinced that there are no grounds for postponing talks on tactical nuclear weapons.

Some scholars have reacted to the proposal of a "Common European Home" with scepticism. They feel that the proposal intends to create a schism in the Euro-US alliance, and ultimately establish its own hegemony

* Documents and materials, (Moscow), 1989, p.5.

over Europe. A constant and consistent objective in Soviet foreign policy has been to somehow drive back the Americans across the Atlantic.¹³ With nuclear missiles Soviet could not succeed. But this time they are armed with a very 'emotive' weapon--the weapon of love, brotherhood and togetherness. It is such an offer to West that West cannot afford to bypass it as an insignificant force in history.

A stage has come in the development of Europe where Europe gains precedence over the nation. The notion of "Pan-Europeanism" has gained wide currency in the minds of the people. Gorbachev has himself explained what he means by thinking "in a new way". "The present processes must not be promoted by the old formulae. New conclusions must be drawn that reflect today's dialectics of life".

To ensure life on the planet he has been instrumental in a series of disarmament and arms control agreements with the US. Dismantling of INF from Europe was the touchstone of his honesty and sincerity of the purpose to make the world and especially Europe, as

13 Ibid., p.8.

safe as possible. The signing of the INF Treaty (1987) was followed by the ban on the production and use of the chemical weapons and parity in conventional arms in central Europe.

By cutting down arms, Gorbachev wants to divert more resources for consumption and also create a military and political climate in Europe which accelerates the pace of economic cooperation between East and the West. For higher productivity and exploitation of natural resources, he needs Western technology and aid both. West can not transfer technology and aid financially unless a tension-free political climate is created. To answer the question, what he wants from West--more aid, more trade and better technology. In the words of Gorbachev himself,

In my opinion it is economic cooperation that provides solid ground on which to step up all other forms of cooperation and them stable. (14)

While addressing the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Cologne on 13 June, 1989 on state visit

14 Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at Bonn's Town Hall see in Document and Materials, (Moscow: 1989), pp. 16.

to FRG, Gorbachev said,

Now, with our ongoing process of reform and in the wake of the congress of People's Deputies, which ratified the principles of external economic policy along with those of domestic and foreign policies, the incorporation of the Soviet economy in the world one is becoming part and parcel of our internal development.(15)

The above paragraph gives enough evidence of Gorbachev's objectives. He wants Western help and especially FRG's in economic resurrection of the Soviet economy. To achieve that, "we will go all the way in dismantling the system of management by injunction by decentralising and democratising our economy, making it more flexible, mobile and dynamic."¹⁶

Domestic Reactions

The Central Committee Plenum, the party's highest decision-making forum passed a resolution that took the bite out of the Gorbachev proposals, revealing resistance among some party leaders.¹⁷

15 Ibid., p. 15.

16 Ibid., p. 21.

17 Gary Lee and Celestine Bohlen, "Gorbachev steps up drive for change", Los Angeles Times, Washington Post News Service, 10 June 1987.

Gorbachev was yet to convince powerful party colleagues like Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov, of the need to implement his reforms as quickly as possible. The one point that Ligachev often makes, the official notes, is a simple one: "why are we in such a hurry?" Gorbachev, on the other hand wants to move fast.¹⁸

The first public hint that Gorbachev's radical reform programme is meeting resistance inside the Soviet Army, as in other important sectors of the system, was provided in a Pravda article on 23 February 1987 by the veteran Defence Minister, Marshall Serges Sokolov.¹⁹ Despite the outspoken criticism of those not entering into the spirit of the sweeping reform programme Marshall Sokolov claimed that the armed forces fully backed the decisions of the Politburo which were designed to upgrade the efficiency of party work and stem abuses of power by officials long used to special privileges.²⁰ Similarly the KGB too opposed the reform proposals but not openly.²¹

18 Paul Quinn Judge, "Gorbachev's no.2 man", Christian Science Monitor, 7 June, 1987.

19 Christopher Walker, "Hint of Opposition to reform campaign in Soviet military", The Times (London) 24 February 1987.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

Nonetheless, Gorbachev has support among senior military leaders who believe they will benefit over the long-term from modernisation of the lagging Soviet economy.²² The major figure apparently rallying the opposition was Ligachev, who has criticised Gorbachev's campaign to expose corrupt party officials, has made public calls for a stronger military and is opposed to Gorbachev's calls for limited democratisation.²³ The opposition is still seething below the surface. The party, government bureaucracy, and above all the military, have so far been watching Gorbachev's performance as silent observers.

Western Reactions

The EEC on 23 February 1987 welcomed moves by Gorbachev towards a "more open and humane society" in Russia, but called for continued Western vigilance and a careful monitoring of the Soviet reform process. At a meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers, Sir Geoffrey Howe, said the West was witnessing only the beginning of a process whose scale and outcome were as yet unknown.²⁴

22 "Gorbachev runs risk with reform policies", Deccan Herald, (Bangalore, 1 May 1987).

23 Ibid.

24 Batlik, Gethani, "Soviet Misgivings over reform proposals", Hindu (Madras), 14 April 1987.

It was not yet clear whether we were seeing simply a new style of Soviet diplomacy "or something more profound", had to continue to defend its interests firmly and coherently. "There can be no question of sacrificing those interests so as to encourage Gorbachev down the road of reform".²⁵ Jean-Bernard, French Foreign Minister, who is a former French ambassador to Moscow, also welcomed signs of liberalism in Russia, but called for "double vigilance".²⁶

The idea of encouraging reforms in the context of political stability has become the core of the White House's East European policy. George Bush's key words are "patience", "caution" and "prudence". Washington has arrived at the conclusion that the processes underway in many socialist countries are not in conflict with US interests and that these processes will continue independently of US support.²⁷

Chancellor Kohl on his state visit to USSR on 10 November 1988, said:

25 Times (London) 24 February 1987.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

Everyone knows that our concepts of political and social order differs profoundly. Nevertheless, I wish to emphasize that if your policy which you describe with terms like "perestroika", "glasnost" and "democratization" offers more opportunities for mutual understanding and cooperation, then it has our approval and sympathy.

You speak of the "common European house". If that house has many windows and many doors, if the people can come to one another freely, if nothing and nobody impedes the exchange of goods and ideas, of science and culture, then I gladly agree with this description. (28)



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On the question of irreversibility of perestroika, no other Western leader has been more categorical than FRG's Foreign Minister Genscher. In a speech in Bologna in October 1988, he said that the reform process is irreversible. While giving an interview to Der Spiegel on 25 September 1989, he said, "there can be setbacks, even a standstill, but basically the course is irreversible". While speaking to Der Zeit, he said: "The West has the responsibility of helping to reinforce irreversibility through economic cooperation and by pushing ahead resolutely with disarmament process".²⁹

On the other hand, the US has been very cautious since the very beginning. First, the Bush Administration

28 FRG, Embassy in India, Policy Statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on his official visit to the Soviet Union, Bonn, 10 November 1988, Translation of advanced text.

29 Economist, London, October 28, 1989.

proclaimed non-interference in the "peaceful evolution of democracy" in Eastern Europe and warned extremists against taking any ill-considered actions. In his interview to the Washington Times, the US President described his position as follows: "I don't think one wants to swing so far that one encourages reckless steps by some in these countries and then we end up like we did in Hungary in 1956".³⁰

REFORM IN EAST EUROPE

The causal effect of negating the "Brezhnev Doctrine" has been sweeping reforms in East European countries from Poland to Romania. They moved from centralised planning to market economy, introduced social pluralism, and representative democracy. The sequence of events in East Europe has been the following.³¹

The spate of voting in Eastern Europe is over. The second-round vote in Bulgaria on June 17th, which gave the ex-communists, now called Socialists, a clear majority in Parliament, marked the end of the elections

30 Mikhail Kozhokin, "Old Words, New Line: vs policy in Eastern Europe", New Times, Moscow, no.28, 1989, p. 15.

31 Economist, (London), 22 June 1990.

that have brought in multi-party politics. Reform in Eastern Europe can be said to have the following features:³²

1. The fortunes of the ancien régime have varied widely. Voters in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia swept their former masters away. Under their own or new names, communist parties in these countries got no more than 11.16 per cent of the vote. At the other extreme, in Bulgaria and Romania, communists-turned-reformers won big. Poland, which is not due to have a properly free general election until next year, falls in between. Some people call the change in Romania and Bulgaria a sham. They are wrong in that reform communists were the people's choice in reasonably free elections. But the doubters may prove right at least about Romania, unless its new rules stop using thugs to silence dissent.

2. Few heads, literally, have rolled. Some ex-leaders Erich Honecker in East Germany, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria face trial. Romania is again the exception: the summary trial and execution of the Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife were a parody of even military

32 Economist, (London), June 1990.

justice. Ministries and local governments have in the main had the lightest of purges. After all, these countries need experienced officials.

3. The fates of secret policemen are different.

In Poland and Hungary these were relatively restrained in the last years of communist rule. Czechoslovakia's StB and East Germany's Stasi kept up their mischief: they or their informers, who in Czechoslovakia include some famous anti-communists, are being weeded out with some zest. Romania's Securitate was supposedly scrapped and Bulgaria's secret police reined in. Not all Romanians or Bulgarians believe it.

4. New parties or movements have done better than the so-called historical parties. Czechoslovakia's Civic Forum swamped Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. In Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, farm parties were among the strongest parties after the Second World War. In this year's elections Bulgaria's Agrarians got 8 per cent, Hungary's Smallholders 12 per cent, and Romania's Peasant Party 3 per cent.

5. As the common cause of anti-communism gives way to everyday politics, new patterns will emerge. Poland's Solidarity is split. Civic Forum, which includes shades

of opinion from neo-Marxist to Thatcherite, is likely to break up; this week two of its deputies in the federal assembly defected to a new party, the Liberal democrat.

6. Coalitions may split over economic policy. All the new governments say they will introduce market economics, but some are keener than others. Poland has been bravest, Hungary has already gone furthest. Czechoslovakia has bold intentions but shows caution in practice. In Bulgaria and Romania, talk of the market still sounds abstract.

7. Eastern Europe will keep a flavour all its own, many think, because of the claims of national minorities, now to be released with extra force for having been so long suppressed under communism. But this year's elections do not suggest an ethnic kettle waiting to boil over. Slovak separatists won just 11 per cent in their own republic.

8. The feelings of national majorities are another matter. In Poland Mr. Lech Walesa represents a national-populist streak. Ranged against him is a more European-minded group led by the Prime Minister, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Solidarity's leader in Parliament, Mr. Bronislaw Geremek. A similar fault line exists in Hungary.

9. The authoritarian patriot facing a weak Parliament was a common figure in pre-war Eastern Europe outside Czechoslovakia. Against his return there are no guarantees. But, there are protections. One is economic success. Another is shrewd constitution-drafting that balances President's and Parliament's power.

10. COMECON and the Warsaw Pact are unravelling. But making new foreign attachments will not be easy. The European Community does not want East European members of now, and NATO is not their obvious home. Among East Europeans wanting nothing to do with nationalism, hopes for "the return to Europe" are great. So, too, are the risks of disappointment.³³

East-West Relations in the transformed atmosphere

Germany sees these unexpected developments in Eastern Europe as an opportunity to cement the relationship with the East. In political field, with the loosening of the control of communist parties, East European countries may become a facsimile of Western polity. In economic field, FRG has been a consistent votary of more trade with the East even

33 Ibid.

though trade till now has not been all that spectacular (table 1). But nonetheless, FRG anticipates more intensive and extensive trade.

Diversification of the terms of economic cooperation is a most promising element of Soviet reform. This would help in overcoming the structural barriers' and stimulate the East European economies' growing participation in the international division of labour. Emphasis is placed on using the wide range of means of economic interactions, from joint R&D activity to intra-sectoral exchanges and joint enterprises.

Economic relations between the two parts of Europe have got substantially changed. Leaders of the West want 'per estroika' a grand success and hence they are pouring in aid in East European countries. FRG Chancellor on his state visit to Poland on 9 November 1989, brought a "peace offering" of DM 4.5 billion as a credit to Poland.³⁴ FRG and other West European countries have pledged to aid Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other East European countries.

In USSR itself, since 1987 over 100 joint ventures have been registered and about 500 similar projects are

34 Economist, (London), 18 March 1990.

IMPORTANCE OF EAST-WEST TRADE FOR WESTERN EUROPE

Exports to Comecon Europe as % of total exports

	1960	1972	1984	1988*
Western Europe	4.2	4.3	3.6	2.9
— EEC (12)**	3.7	4.0	3.2	2.6
— EFTA (6)	7.3	6.3	6.2	5.0

Imports from Comecon Europe as % of total imports

	1960	1972	1984	1988*
Western Europe	4.1	4.0	5.4	3.2
— EEC (12)**	3.7	3.7	4.9	3.0
— EFTA (6)	6.4	5.5	8.3	4.5

*January-September, ** including intra-German trade

Sources: OECD-statistics; Federal Statistical Office of the Federal Republic of Germany

Exports to Western Europe as % of total exports

	1960	1972	1984	1987
Comecon (7)	18.4	19.2	25.3	20.7
— Bulgaria	12.5	12.2	7.7	6.2
— CSSR	15.6	17.7	14.7	14.4
— GDR*	20.0	20.5	28.7	26.0
— Hungary	21.6	23.4	30.5	31.6
— Poland	26.8	26.2	28.0	28.7
— Romania	20.7	31.7	32.4	23.2
— USSR	16.4	15.1	26.5	18.2

Imports from Western Europe as % of total imports

	1960	1972	1984	1987
Comecon (7)	19.1	22.2	20.3	20.9
— Bulgaria	13.2	14.0	12.5	13.8
— CSSR	18.0	21.4	14.0	16.4
— GDR*	21.8	29.0	25.5	26.4
— Hungary	24.0	26.4	32.5	38.8
— Poland	19.1	28.5	24.2	25.5
— Romania	23.4	35.2	14.9	10.1
— USSR	17.7	16.2	18.8	17.0

*Including intra-German trade

Sources: Comecon statistics; IMF statistics. Due to the problem of converting Comecon data into Western currencies, the figures are indicative only.

under consideration. Firms in the FRG, Italy, USA and Finland account for nearly half of the total volume of foreign investments.³⁵

East European countries are further going for the harmonization of domestic and world prices by making their currencies convertible.³⁶ This would be a great source of attraction for the foreign firms. Moreover, EEC is thinking in terms of giving associate membership to Hungary, Czechoslovakia etc. Further, East European countries would be accommodated in GATT, World Bank and IDA also in 'observer status'.

On state visit to USSR, on 10 November 1988, Chancellor Kohl made a gesture of cooperation by offering a three year programme under which each year 1000 young people from USSR would come to FRG to study and receive training in many different fields and for information purposes.³⁷ This single piece of cooperation reflects how East-West economic relations have got mutated. Before 1985, nobody could have thought of exchange of this kind. The East had been throughout

35 Vladislav Malkerich, 'East-West Economic Relations and their prospects' Foreign Trade, Jan. 1989, p.28.

36 Ibid., p. 28.

37 FRG, Embassy in India, policy statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on his official visit to the Soviet Union, Bonn, 10 November 1988, Translation of the advanced text.

apprehensive that this kind of exchange would contaminate the minds of the youngsters and would slowly bring the norms, values and institutions of the brash capitalism.

INF and after

Since 1987 Moscow has given up its effort to punish FRG for deploying long-range INF, the Kremlin has welcomed high-level visitors from Bonn while endorsing Henecker's steps to expand formal dialogue and human contacts between the two Germanies. One legacy of the INF accord is a growing interest in more intensive dialogue with the Eastern bloc, most notably among party politicians who appear increasingly disenchanted with Bonn's allies.³⁸ On the far Right, a relatively obscure CDU parliamentarian, Bernhard Friedmann, argues that with the US clearly negotiating in its own interest and decoupling itself from Europe, the time is ripe for Bonn to insist that Germany's division, as 'the fundamental source of East-West tension' becomes a topic of superpower talks. Friedmann insists

38 Clay Clemens, "Beyond INF: West Germany's centre-right party and arms control in the 1990s," International Affairs, vol.65, no.2, winter 1988-89, p. 64.

that his ideal is a Western-oriented Germany, but many critics and sympathizers alike find neutralist overtones in his readiness to 'accommodate Soviet conceptions of a United Germany'.³⁹

Conservative parliamentary leader Alfred Dregger's annoyance with US policy over INF has led him to make unusually strong appeals--such as in Parliament in June 1987--for 'intense discussion and contacts' with the Kremlin adding that in Moscow he always finds 'noteworthy understanding for the security interests of our country'.

In December 1987, Strauss and much of the CSU leadership accepted a long-sought invitation to Moscow, where they met Gorbachev for over two hours. Strauss praised the policy of Glasnost and observed that the West need not fear 'offensive, aggressive' Soviet intentions. He underlined his support for Soviet arms control efforts, provided the end result was not Europe's denuclearization. 'The postwar period is over, he declared, "we are on the threshold of a new age".⁴⁰

39 Ibid., p. 65.

40 Ibid., p. 65.

These remarks from politicians long stamped as 'cold warriors' by no means represent nostalgia for a Rapallostyle relationship with the Kremlin. Yet at a time when they consider US policy unpredictable, Gaullists like Strauss and Dregger do want Bonn to have its own lines of communication with Moscow as insurance against being caught off guard by further shifts in superpower relations.

Since Genscher's FDP and CDU arms controllers endorsed an active dialogue with the East, this growing enthusiasm for ostpolitik among party Gaullists meant that Kohl's government now faced almost no domestic constraints in negotiations with Moscow and East Berlin. That flexibility was important because Kohl and his advisers (to say nothing of Genscher's FDP) aimed at 'converting the emerging favourable East-West climate into bilateral progress for the benefit of the people' in both German states and all of central Europe. Given the number of forthcoming controversial decisions on NATO policy, Bonn wanted to be free from any change that its policy could jeopardize ostpolitik. By putting relations with the Eastern bloc on a firm foundation Kohl hopes to reduce the likelihood that the latter will

try pressuring Bonn into concessions on security issues.⁴¹ With this end in mind, in 1988, Kohl visited Prague and in October made his long awaited second trip to Moscow, where he discussed ecological issues, nuclear reactor safety, and arms control. Warsaw and East Berlin were also on his future itinerary.

In pursuit of making the world safe for the humanity, Gorbachev advocated total disarmament by all nuclear powers by the end of this century. He talked of dismantling INF missiles in Europe also. He has also unilaterally declared to withdraw 5 lakh forces and 30,000 tanks from Eastern Europe. Moreover, he is on record that all the Russian forces from Warsaw Pact countries would be withdrawn by 1995 thus leaving East European countries to exercise their sovereignty.⁴² At the Washington Summit US-USSR agreed to ban chemical weapons and further dismantling of strategic nuclear forces.

41 Helmut Kohl, "policy statement in the Bundestag on the Washington US-Soviet Summit," 10 December 1987, Statements and speeches, vol.10, no.22, 11 December 1987, p.8. In 1983, for example, Bonn gave East Berlin a large trade credit before long-range INF deployment began, partly to prevent critics from arguing that deployment had led to freeze in FRG-GDR relations.

42 Indian Express, (New Delhi), 10 May 1990.

UNREST AND CHANGE IN GDR

Relations between East Germany and USSR underwent a difficult period during 1988 and early months of 1989, as the ruling SED, under the leadership of its General Secretary, Erich Honecker, asserted its opposition to many of the liberalizing trends being observed in the Soviet Union and other East European countries. At the same time the East German authorities stepped up their pressure on domestic opposition groups and there were repeated public protests against their treatment of religious groups, disarmament groups, and groups representing the estimated three lakh persons who had been refused visas to emigrate to West Germany or other countries.

Despite calls from the Soviet Union to endorse the principles of glasnost and free political discussion East Germany consistently emphasized their inapplicability to other countries. Speaking in an interview with an Austrian magazine published on June 15, Honecker said that the changes in the Soviet Union were inspired by purely Soviet circumstances, and he justified his opposition by recalling that East Germany's communists had declared as early as 1945 their opposition to a

simple import of Soviet political ideology.⁴³

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to GDR for the country's 40th anniversary on October 7, acted as the catalyst for the resignation on October 18 of the East German leader Erich Honecker. Pressure for democratic reforms had been growing and continued to grow in the light of the radical changes being introduced in Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. While thousands of East Germans fled to the FRG.⁴⁴ Faced with this crisis of confidence both in the country and in the ruling socialist party (SED), Honecker's successor Egon Krenz (initially regarded as a hardliner) progressively introduced reforms while continuing to stress that socialism in the GDR was not negotiable.

Although Egon tried to hold on to power with cosmetic changes but he failed miserably because by that time the virus of glasnost had spread to every nook and corner of GDR. During November 1989, Krenz sought to keep abreast of popular demands for rapid

43 Kessing's Record of World Events, vol.35, no.4, 1989, 36624.

44 Over 30,000 East Germans left GDR during August, September & October 1989. Although the numbers were small compared with the outflow to the West before

and radical reform. The SED Politburo was replaced, a new cabinet was formed under the reformist Nava Modrow, and free elections were promised along with an "action programme" of other reforms. On November 9 Krenz announced that East Germans could in future travel freely abroad, simply using on the eve of the 11th SED Congress in 1986, Honecker adopted the orthodox line towards FRG. He commented,

No (West German) politician who claims to be taken seriously can pretend that the realities which arose as a result of the second world war and post-war development do not exist. This includes the existence at the heart of Europe of two sovereign German states independent of one other--which embody different social systems.

But even Egon Krenz could not hold the tide of history. He had to abdicate within six weeks and a moderate, pro-reform Modrow took over the reigns of power in East Berlin. He immediately announced holding free and fair general election - for the first time in forty years of GDR history. Simultaneously, he allowed the formation of other political parties and banned Stasi.

from pre page

the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961; this exodus still represented a serious destabilization of the East German regime, especially since most of those leaving were young and often well-qualified.

Elections were held on 18 March 1990. A total of 24 parties and associations were in the fray. They ranged from CDU, the SPD, German Social Union, the Federation of Free Democrats etc. The issue in election was 'German Unity'. And the voters made a clear choice. The "Alliance for Germany"⁴⁵ became the longest Parliamentary grouping in the People's Chamber with 47.8 per cent of the vote, far more than SPD which got only 21.8 per cent. It holds 192 of the total of 400 seats.⁴⁶

German Unification

Chancellor Kohl proposed a ten point confederation plan on 28 November 1989 when the heat and dust of GDR election was yet to settle down. He suggested three broad stages on the road to unity. The first would have to be free elections in East Germany. Early changes would be essential both in East Germany's constitution and in its election law so that independent parties would be able to compete with the communists on an equal basis. In the second stage,

45 "Alliance for Germany" is the alliance of parties consisting of CDU, German Social Union(CSU) and Democratic Awakening.

46 Scala, 2 March 1990.

after free elections in East Germany, Kohl proposed setting up "confederal structures", including a joint government committee to coordinate policy and a body drawn from the members of both parliaments. Alongside, there would be much greater cooperation in such things as science and technology transport, tele-communications, health and culture. This would not mean a pooling of sovereignty, but it would draw the two states much closer. The third stage would be a full-fledged "federal state system in Germany" implying that East Germany would have the status of a Land.⁴⁷

Meeting with President Mitterand of France in Kiev on December 6, 1989, Soviet President Gorbachev reiterated the Soviet view that Germany's division into two states at the end of the World War II, had provided an element of stability in Europe. "Any artificial prodding and pushing of the German unity question", he said, "could only make the processes taking place more difficult".

For his part Mitterand maintained that West Germany should in the first instance concentrate on

47 Economist, December 2, 1989, p. 73.

strengthening the European Community, which would "establish a new element in the European reality". He also noted that "none of the countries in Europe can afford to act without considering the others and the historical situation", and that therefore the German people and their Governments would have to take into account the opinions of other European countries on reunification.⁴⁸

GDR Premier Modrow initially responded to Kohl's 10-point plan with a proposal about a "contractual community" and then, driven further by events, presented his own "personal" plan for a "united German Fatherland". He raised the catchword of "military neutrality".⁴⁹

Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger said, what would happen if, against all expectations against all rationality German decided on a policy of hegemonial power".⁵⁰ Kissinger also pointed out the danger which could arise from the impression that the Western democracies were not interested in overcoming the division of Germany or were even attempting to hinder it: "Germany's allies ought to think twice

48 International Herald Tribune, 19 May, 1990.

49 Gunther Monnemacher; "A German Room in the European Home" Scala, 2 March 1990, p. D 20017F.

50 Washington Post, 14th January 1990, p.10.

about jeopardising the Federal Republic's linkage with the West by forcing the Federal Republic's leading politicians to decide between their Western allies and their own national objectives. They must not create a German problem by attempting to avoid one".⁵¹

The pace of change in East Germany was so swift that there was semblance of anarchy, which prompted Gorbachev to tell Modrow that instability in East Germany could threaten perestroika and his own future as Soviet leader.⁵² It also goes for the Americans - hence the visit of James Baker to Modrow on December 12, (the first time a Secretary of State has held talks with East German leaders on their own territory) and his pledge of economic aid in return for reform.

Earlier in West Berlin Baker spelled out a vision for a new Europe built on a continued American presence and on collaboration with strengthening European community, a reforming NATO and the increasingly

51 Ibid., p. 10.

52 Economist, "The Germanies: Danger Zone", December 16, 1989, p.80.

important 35-nation Helsinki process. He also spoke out in favour of German unity. But to help comfort Gorbachev he made it plain that unity must come only gradually and that America would not try to use the current unrest in East Germany to unsettle the Soviet Union. His remarks came a day after the ambassadors of the four victorious powers of 1945 held their first meeting in Berlin for 18 years--to demonstrate that the German issue is not one for the Germans alone to solve.

The elections of 18 March 1990, clearly and convincingly demonstrated Germans commitment to democracy based on freedom and the rule of law, to the unity of fatherland, to the social market economy and to Germany's firm integration in the community of free nations.

In its policy statement of 12 April 1990, the government of the GDR committed itself to a single German state, to freedom, the rule of law, federalism and the social market economy. Thus the age of totalitarian one-party rule is also over between the Elbe and Oder.⁵³

53 FRG, Embassy in India, Statement by Federal Minister Rudolf Seiters, Head of the Federal Chancellery, in German Bhudestag on the progress of negotiation with the GDR, Bonn, 27 April, 1990.

Kohl did try to dispel the fears and suspicions of European neighbours by repeatedly affirming FRG's commitment to European Community and respect for the Post World War II borders.

Further, while speaking to the Bundestag on 1 December 1988, on the State of the Nation in divided Germany, he said:

To us the European dimension of the German question does not imply the seeming alternative of German national unity or European union. The Basic Law commits us to both - German Unity and a United Europe, we pursue both goals. We perceive Germany's future in a peaceful order in which the people and nations of this continent live together in freedom. (54)

The heads of state and government of the twelve member countries of the European Community (EC), meeting in Strasbourg, on 8-9 December declared the EC to be the "cornerstone of a new European architecture... at this time of profound and rapid change" in Central and Eastern Europe. The decalaration included their

54 FRG, Embassy in India, Report of the Federal Government on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag on 1 December 1988 (excerpts) Translation of Advance Text, pp. 5-6.

first joint public commitment to the reunification of Germany, within the context of existing agreements and treaties. "Each day in central and Eastern Europe", the declaration stated,

Change is asserting itself more strongly. Everywhere a powerful aspiration toward rights, prosperity, social justice and peace is being expressed. The people are clearly showing their will to take their own destiny in hand and to chose the path of their development. Such a profound and rapid development would not have been possible without the policy of openness and reform led by Mr. Gorbachev...we seek the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity through free self-determination. This process should take place peacefully and democratically, in full respect of the relevant agreement and treaties and of all the principles defined by the (1975) Helsinki Final Act (which included recognition of Europe's post-war frontiers) in a context of dialogue and East-West cooperation. It also has to be placed in the perspective of European integration ... At this time of profound and rapid change, the Community is and must remain a point of reference and influence. It remains the cornerstone of a new European architecture and, in its will to openness, a mooring for a future European equilibrium... construction of the Community must therefore go forward: the building of European Union will permit the further development of a change of effective and harmonious relations with the other countries of Europe.(55)

55 quoted in Kessing's Archives: Record of world events, December 1989, p. 37131.

Germany and a New Europe

EC acceded to German reunification because GDR has always been more a part of the EC than any other non-member country. The German Protocol of the Treaty of Rome made the GDR a sleeping partner in the EC from the start, with inter-German trade exempted from the EC's external tariffs. With the European internal market scheduled to open in 1992, East German goods would in any case move freely all over the EC territory. And the Soviet Union seems to have few objections to the incorporation of the East German economy into that of West Germany and Western Europe.⁵⁶

While Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, is on record in favour of East Germany's membership in the EC - either as a separate entity or as part of a Unified Germany - some of the member governments are more reluctant to accept this. Probably West Europeans think that the new Germany would simply be too big and powerful to make a reliable partner in West European integration.⁵⁷

56 Christoph Bertram, "The German Question", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, p. 54.

57 Ibid., p. 54.

France has been apprehensive because it fears that political unification of Europe may be jeopardized. France has been an outspoken votary of economic and monetary union as fast as possible. It fears that German unification might delay the process of European unification. This is because now EC is at a crossroads. It can either evolve into an all-European trade and monetary arrangement, or into a politically much more cohesive union of West European states. Further, a united Germany would have much more votes in EC and would be able to dominate it.

The French fear is that the impending reunification of Germany could stop, even reverse the trend of European integration towards Common Market and political unification because of two reasons. The German themselves, preoccupied with their newly achieved unity and proud of their status, could be to tightening existing EC ties further while at the same time not wanting to opt out. Some of Germany's partners also wonder whether any EC ties would be strong enough to bind a new, assertive Germany instead, the other members might prefer to retain their own traditional freedom of manoeuvre.⁵⁸

58 Ibid., p. 56.

On the other hand, Britain had been consistently opposing the Common Market and single currency concepts. Reporting to the UK House of Commons on 29 June 1989 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said there were other ways apart from those envisaged in the Delors Report "of going progressively towards a definition of economic and monetary union by consistently following similar policies but without (central) direction". She pledged that her government would put forward an alternative plan along these lines.⁵⁹

There is one more fear reeling among the EC members. That is that the FRG's money would now go for the reconstruction of East Germany besieged economy rather than to EC, which would tend to slow down the pace of European integration.

MONETARY AND CUSTOM UNION

The two Germanys merged their economies on Sunday, 1st July 1990, putting in place the essential building blocks of a single nation. Abandoning two major pillars of its sovereignty at the stroke of midnight of Sunday, the state of East Germany adopted the Deutsche Mark as its currency and officially dismantled border controls

⁵⁹ Kessing's Record of World Events, vol.35, no.6, 1989, p. 36740.

with West Germany. Although political union awaits parliamentary approval, the adoption of the powerful Deutsche Mark stripped East Germany of all control over its monetary policy and set it on a virtually irreversible path toward political unification.

Depending on their age, East Germans will eventually be eligible to change totals of 2000 marks, 4000 marks or 6000 marks at a rate of one East Mark for one Deutsche Mark. Savings in excess of these limits will be changed at the less favourable rate of two to one.⁶⁰

Although excessive euphoria was exhibited in East Germany on this historic event, a turbulent period was ahead for the East Germans, now with the introduction of a market economy, East Germans will have to compete with the West Germans for jobs. Even the East German firms will have face stiff competition from West German conglomerates. Sick firms are bound to be closed down, consequently creating unemployment. Moreover, with the abolition of subsidies, consumer goods are expected to be costlier leading to inflation.

60 International Herald Tribune, Singapore, July 2, 1990, p.1.

And thus all the evils of a market economy would creep into East Germany.

The Social Democratic Party Chairman, Hans-Joachim Vogel, listed areas of need, including more protection for East Germans firms. Suddenly pitched into the competitive malestorm of a free market, and social issues including women's rights.⁶¹ Franz Steinkhehler, Chairman of IG Metal Union the largest in the West, predicted strikes and rising unemployment as the former communist state wrestled with the change-over to a competitive Western-style economy.⁶²

GERMANY AND REDEFINITION OF NATO'S ROLE

With German unification imminent and the Warsaw Pact almost dissolved, NATO's role needs to be redefined. The raison d'etre of NATO was the containment of Russian expansionism. Now, Russia retreating back from Eastern Europe, the geo-strategic correlation of forces in Europe has changed. And hence a reassessment of NATO's role and a new security framework of Europe has to be worked out.

61 Statesman, Delhi, Monday, 2 July, 1990, p.1.

62 Ibid., p.1.

The Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn said that any reassessment of NATO's role has to bear three facts in mind:⁶³

- NATO's reliance on the threat of early first use of short-range nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack is no longer credible;
- its assumption that large numbers of US troops will be stationed in Europe is no longer realistic; and
- and its strategy for forward defense of the inter-Germany border is no longer viable.

Everyone argues that NATO must change, but when the Germans and their allies look ahead to the new alliance. They are not necessarily seeing the same thing. A lot of West Germans, including Genscher, talk as if an improved CSCE could some day become a substitute for today's alliance. Not surprisingly, East German ministers who are more than tired of the Warsaw Pact and have no affection for NATO, say much the same could the CSCE, in any form, offer a safeguard against a possibly resurgent Soviet Union or prevent longhits in Eastern Europe, America and Britain in particular are sceptical. They would like to have a unified

63 Sam Nunn, "Reassessing NATO's Role", European Affairs, February 1990, Amsterdam.

Germany's commitment to the Western alliance clearer before they sign away their residual rights as occupying cum-protecting powers in Germany.

The other view is that an alliance must be kept in being - not only because some Soviet conservatives may overthrow Gorbachev, and then try to reimpose the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, but because Russia is not the only danger to democratic Europe. The explosive Gulf, on which the West once again increasingly depends for its oil, is for many people the worry of the 1990s. A reunited Germany nags at other minds. All this needs a continuing Euro-American alliance but probably not, in the next few years, one as big as today's.

If Gorbachev gets nowhere with the idea of an American withdrawal from the whole of Europe, he would try for getting Americans out of Germany. Neutralisation of Germany is their over aim. Democratisation would be a step in that direction, because the Americans would be reluctant to keep their troops there without nuclear protection. This would require a reconstruction of the whole alliance. A united, neutral Germany would be a great military power facing a still nuclear Russia, it would have to think seriously whether it could afford to stay non-nuclear, most other West Europeans would want an

American presence in Europe as a counter-balance to this Germany. There could even be a French plea for the Americans to bring their divisions and their air-fields back to France.⁶⁴

Unification of Germany and its military status has become the important factor in the formation of common European Home. As Brezezinski said;

It is impossible to think of change in central Europe, or to envisage the emergence of a common European home, while Germany remains arbitrarily divided. That is simply a fact of life. We can have a divided Europe with a divided Germany or a shared European home with an artificially divided Germany. It is not just a question of a slogan about the Berlin Wall, but it is a matter of sheer common sense. There is a genuine problem here. Hungary and Poland can liberalise themselves, can democratize themselves, and they will still remain Hungary and Poland respectively.

He added:

...the creation of a European home will probably require very major institutional changes in the Soviet Union itself. A common European home will only be a common European home when it is built on the principle of the universal applicability of freedom of choice.(65)

64 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Toward a Common European Home", problems of communism; November-December, 1989, vol. XXXVIII, (Washington), p.5.

65 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

IMPLICATIONS OF DISSOLUTION OF THE WARSAW PACT

One fundamental change which would come, would be more equal relationship between the Soviet Union and other members of the Pact. This would make the East European countries sovereign de facto. Probably the "Eastern Question" would be reopened. But in the changed circumstances there is no power who can hegemonize these countries. (66)

The one possibility is that East European countries too would become members of the EC. This implied the dissolution of COMECON as well. The best way to resolve the divided and still contentions conditions of Europe, according to John Mueller, would not be to fragment or eviscerate NATO and the Warsaw Pact but rather to combine them.⁶⁷

PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY

At the Washington Summit, the Soviets repeated their call for a replacement for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a vaguely defined "Greater European Council", which would be part of the 35-nation

66 Hungary has already sought the EC membership. Even EC is flirting with the idea of giving 'Associate membership'.

67 John Muller, "A New Concert of Europe", Foreign Policy, no.77, winter 1989-90, (Washington), p.1.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) said Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov, "We want a United Germany to be integrated into an all European system".

With seismic change in Eastern Europe and USSR in military and political dimensions, Germany too argues for change in NATO strategy. And with this change it visualises the change in its foreign policy. Now United Germany's foreign policy will not have to take into account the expansionist Soviet state. Moreover, now it does not have to confront the mighty power of the Soviet State on the German soil itself. The Germans believe that NATO will have to abandon its doctrine of "forward defence", which looks obsolete. Now the front line is so much further east, they also want it to drastically cut its short-range nuclear weapons and abandon a successor to the Lance Missile. At the same time, they think the role of the CSCE should be strengthened by setting up new bodies, including an arms control checking body and an environmental protection office (both, the Germans suggest, could be cited in Berlin).⁶⁸

68 Economist, London, May 5, 1990, p.67.

The Soviet Union has until recently continuously wavered on the military status of United Germany. At one point of time USSR proposed non-alignment or neutrality. But neutrality is completely out of the question, say West Germany officials, and they will no longer seriously consider the so-called French option: membership of the political alliance but withdrawal from its military side.⁶⁹

Many foreign policy experts are convinced that Moscow will negotiate furiously for economic and security assurances before approving unification. Germany can give technology, loans and credits for disintegrating Russian economy. OECD countries have agreed to the appeal of Gorbachev to G-7 to provide \$ 15 billion aid to USSR.⁷⁰

It seems that at least some progress towards an European peace order may be possible. The London Summit of NATO is indicative of that order. Following are the salient features of the London declaration on a transformed Atlantic alliance:

- NATO declares nuclear arms to be weapons of last resort;

69 Time, June 11, 1990, p.25.

70 Indian Express, New Delhi, 11 July, 1990

71 FRG, embassy in India, Policy statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on his official visit to the Soviet Union, Bonn, 10 November 1988, Translation of Advanced Text.

- NATO cuts ~~ys~~ nuclear arms in Europe and limits a united Germany's armed forces;
- NATO tries to persuade Germany that a United Germany should be a NATO member; and
- NATO invites Soviet leader Gorbachev to its headquarters in Brussels to address a special meeting of the alliance.

With the dilution of the military role of NATO and Warsaw Pact, it has become more than clear that these two would exist, if at all they do, as more of political institutions. And the new framework for European security would be based on CSCE. Chancellor Kohl on 10 November 1988 stated that the Helsinki process "provides both the building plan and the house rules for the Europe of the future that we wish to construct".⁷¹

Even if the Warsaw Pact disintegrates, NATO would continue to exist. This is because traditionally, mutual defense has not been the only function of alliances. As historian Paul Schroeder has pointed out all alliances of that era in past restrained or controlled the actions of the partners in the alliance, and "frequently the desire to exercise such control over an ally's policy was the main reason" for the alliance!⁷²

71 (please see on pre-page)

72 John Muller, n.67, p.12.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

World War II changed the geo-strategic realities of Europe and altered the hierarchy of nations in power terms. It resulted in the emergence of two Super Powers, viz. the United States and the Soviet Union with conflicting national interests. The outbreak of the "Cold War" led to the division of Germany and Europe into two antagonistic economic and military blocs. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Western half under the security umbrella of US and the Warswa Pact in Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union.

In an atmosphere of Super Power detente, the FRG initiated a New Eastern Policy which sought political conciliation with its Eastern neighbours and the mitigation of the ill-effects of division. Brandt abandoned the twin pillars of Adenauer's Ostpolitik viz. the 'policy of strength' and the 'Hallstein Doctrine'. His philosophy was to go for 'provisional solutions where permanent solutions were not possible in the foreseeable future.

The early 1970s witnessed a period of calm and good neighbourly relations between the East and the West.

Inter-German relations too improved with easing of super power tensions. Trade relations were expanded. FRG provided GDR aid in return for humanitarian concessions.

The "demise" of detente due to turmoil in the Third World, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the deployment of INF missiles in Europe led to a schism in the NATO alliance. Europe and especially the FRG regarded detente as divisible and were not ready to toe the US line which encompassed strategic commitments beyond Europe as well.

With the coming of the CDU-CSU in power in October 1982 in FRG, earlier policies of economic cooperation and political conciliation were continued. The coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and his policy of perestroika, and glasnost have had important implications for the Soviet Union, Europe and the world at large. Gorbachev went on to propose a series of disarmament proposals and conclude several agreements with US, especially the INF Treaty, banning of chemical weapons and reduction of 500,000 armed

forces and withdrawal of Russian forces from Warsaw Pact countries. Further, he repealed the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' and encouraged trends for reform, change and popularly elected democratic regimes in East European countries. On the domestic front Gorbachev eventually abandoned the monopoly of Communist Party, and is gradually moving the economy towards a market-oriented one. He has introduced private ownership in land and industry, and is encouraging joint ventures with Western nations. Perestorika and glasnost led to the overthrow of communist rulers in practically all East European countries and the emergence of democratic regimes with market economies. GDR was no exception. The urge for freedom and liberty led to widespread and persistent demonstrations all over the country, forcing Erich Honecker and Egon Krenz to step down, paving the way for a liberal regime under the stewardship of Hans Modrow. Free Elections were held for the first time in 40 years of GDR's existence in March 1990. On 1 July 1990 FRG and GDR went for economic and customs union with the approval of the Allied Powers. There is likely to be all German elections by the end of 1990. The question of the membership of united Germany in NATO has recently been resolved with Gorbachev's approval apparently because of continued

membership and the presence of Allied troops on European soil would be in their interests as well to restrain revanchist tendencies and ensure continued good German behaviour.

The geopolitical realities of Europe have been irreversibly transformed. The bipolar world is fast making room for poly-centrism. With Europe fast moving towards economic unification with the 1992 Single Market and perhaps political unification at some point in future. Probably East European countries too would be integrated into EEC. Europe politically unified would be a centre of power in coming decades. And thus the division of Europe comes to an end and hence East-West relation gets changed beyond recognition. Warsaw Pact has virtually been dismantled as a military bloc. NATO would continue to exist but more and more defence burdens may be shared by the European countries themselves. NATO would inevitably have to redefine its role in the changed circumstances.

Thus the NATO's profile may change because security perception has changed. USSR is no more seen

as an expansionist power. Some critics argue that the motive behind the Soviets proposal for a Common European Home from the Atlantic to the Urals is to push the US out of Europe.

The 19 90s is not likely to be a period of smooth relationship between US and EEC and, US and Japan. US has long past lost its status as an economic superpower. Its share in the total volume of world produce has been consistently declining. On the other hand, Japan and Europe, especially Germany, have emerged as economic giants. Western Europe, economically unified, will undoubtedly be a centre of power. The 1990s are likely to witness more intense trade wars between the US, the EEC and Japan. There is already disagreement between US and EEC over the issue of agricultural subsidy.

It is fraught with dangers to prognosticate whether the polycentric world would be safer than the bipolar. But one thing which emerges from all this convulsions is that 'National security' can not be ensured merely by military power.

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