

THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of

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D E C L A R A T I O N

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, " THE
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MD. AHSAN REZA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
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is, to the best of my knowledge, his own work and may be
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CHAPTER - I

DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

AND THE BEGINNING OF INDIAN RESPONSE

The 19th century is the European century par-excellence. During this century hardly any part of the globe escaped European attention. With it began a new era of European colonialism. One of the chief characteristic feature of colonialism was that it was largely confined to the continent of Asia and Africa. This can be divided into two parts : one in which the land was formally colonized and controlled through a handful European civil and military officers. Thus the area under this category came to be called a colony. Second, in which the control and influence was indirect through various instruments like loans, military assistance, financial help, moral and material support and sometimes even inciting dissident activities among groups and nationalities. Gallagher and Robinson have called it as Formal and Informal Empires.¹ India, Indonesia, Indo-China, entire African continent can be cited as an important the first category ie. Formal Empire. Egypt, Persia, China and the Ottoman Empire can be cited as the example of the latter ie. Informal Empire, where the country in question was not altogether annexed. These countries had formal independence but the real and effective control was in the hands of the imperial powers. Who apart from other privileges, also enjoyed extra - territorial rights. The imperial powers had developed considerable interests in these countries but they could not formally colonize them mainly due to mutual bickerings and intense rivalries. In other words it was the mutual rivalry of the powers which saved these countries from being converted into a formal colony.

Given a strategic location and geographical proximity to Europe the Ottoman Empire could have hardly escaped European attentions and encroachments. Though the process of European encroachments had started in the 17th and 18th centuries¹ it was the 19th century which witnessed rapid and effective intervention in the Ottoman Empire, resulting in its rapid decline and converting it into an Asian Empire from a trans-continental Empire, spread over three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. The period not only saw outright annexations of its territorial possessions in its outlying provinces but also an active intervention in the very heart of the Empire, some times as protectors of the christian subjects of the Empire but largely to control the Ottoman Government and the State. Beginning with the successful Greek war of Independence in the 1920's the Ottoman Empire not only faced threats of external encroachments but also threats of disintegration from within.² The christian minority had in the meanwhile began to clamour for independence mostly with covert and overt support of one or the other European powers. Thus the centuries old Empire of the Ottoman began to face tremendous pressure from both external and internal subversives.

Initially, the European powers started carving out what we call peripherally located areas of the Empire.³ French activity in Algeria and Tunisia, British in Cypons and Egypt as well as in the Persian Gulf region, Austrian in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russian in the Balkan region and Caucasia can be cited as the example. Gradually these areas became the protectorate of these powers.

Not content with this, they even began to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire itself. By the middle of the 19th century, a lot of interest was taken by these powers. These interests were political, economic, strategic and cultural in nature. Quite often these interests of the powers clashed with each other, thus creating periodic crises which came to be known as Eastern Questions in Europe which was nothing but failure on the part of the contending powers to agree to a negotiated settlement of the Eastern Question. They were scared of each other as to who should take the place if the Sick Man of Europe collapses all of a sudden. No power was ready to let the other to have dominant position in the Empire but ready if it was done with the concurrence of others as well. Mutual agreement was acceptable to them. Hence in the case of the Ottoman Empire, it is futile to say that the rivalries of the European Empire gave enough life blood to it to keep it alive.⁴ These rivalries did not help in preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Never do we find any instance in the annals of European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire that such rivalries helped the Ottoman Empire. One can very well judge it if examined various stages of the Eastern Question. Right from the Greek war of independence, the Ottoman Empire had to sacrifice some of its territory or other interests at one time or the other to the cupidity of European colonialism. Mutual rivalry was in the very nature of colonialism. But when it became necessary, they patched up their mutual differences and began to collaborate with each other as the agreement among the Entente powers for the partition of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 is a glaring example in sight.⁵ The Ottoman Empire sacrificed at every stage of the

Eastern Question some of its vital interests. Thus after the strait's convention of 1841 following the defeat of Mohammad Ali of Egypt, Egypt and entire Fertile Crescent was thrown open to direct European exploitation.⁶ The Crimean war was fought to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire but even it further eroded the prestige of the Empire by giving autonomy to Serbia and Romania. Similarly the Berlin congress of 1878 following the Russo-Turkish war gave independence to Serbia, Romania and Montenegro and transferred Bessarabia to Russia, Dobruja to Romania, and Herzegovina and Bosnia to Austria thus confining the Ottoman Empire to Asia only and more precisely to Anatolian and Arabian peninsula. Cyprus was annexed by Britain and few towns in Caucasia by Russia. Thus whatever part the Empire had in Europe was seized from it. At every stage there was mutual rivalry but they were sorted out to the satisfaction of all colonial powers. This is to show how the European powers were entrenched in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. They also cast their shadow in the African possessions of the Ottoman Empire by developing areas of concerns and spheres of influences such as British and French in Egypt, France in Tunisia and Algeria, Italy in Tripoli. Slowly and gradually these territories were detached from the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the Empire became an Asian phenomenon for all practical purposes.

The Berlin congress of 1878 did one more harm to the empire by legalizing European intervention in it on behalf of the Christian subjects,⁷ ostensibly to supervise reforms so as to modernize the Empire and make it able to stand on equal footing⁴ with European powers. But the real motive was to seek conces-

sions from the Empire in the name of reforms. Whenever, they wanted concession these powers clamoured for reforms thus concession hunting became another side of reform.⁷

Let us dwell upon the instruments through which the European powers interfered so effectively in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Though one of the causes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was its relative backwardness vis-a-vis Europe, but its condition was better than many of the European countries. The Ottoman Empire had brought about many reforms to make it more advanced than many of the backward countries of Europe. The basic cause of the decline of the Empire was foreign intervention. Its internal question were often internationalised by the powers to get desired concessions.

One of the basic instrument which shook the very foundation of the Empire was the millet system itself. This, along with extra-territorial rights in the shape of capitulations was most consequential in undermining the Ottoman sovereignty.⁸ The millet system was the concession granted by the sultan of the Ottoman Empire to each sect of the religious minorities of the Empire by which they got certain religious concessions. The state was not supposed to interfere in the religious affairs of the religious minorities. Since the Empire was composed of diverse religious minorities, it was deemed essential for the stability of the Empire. Thus instead of integrating them, the state gave each religious minority a distinct identity with full freedom in religious and cultural affairs. The state did not convert them either into the fold of Islam. Till the beginning of the 19th century, the

millets had a purely religious character. But as the years rolled in the 19th century, the element of nationalism began to influence and penetrate into the millet framework—thanks to the interest shown by the imperial powers who saw in it an effective instrument of intervention so as to seek desired concessions. These millets resultantly began to search foreign patrons and protectors. The European powers were ever-ready to offer such a patronage. The process started with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynoria of 1774 by which the Russian Czar was recognised as the patron of the orthodox christian church. Later other powers too sought patronage over other millets with whom they shared religious affinity. Thus France got patronage over catholic church and Britain that over the protestant church. Evangelical mission as well came under the protection of the great powers. The schools and colleges run by these missions were most effective in disseminating modern ideas of nationalism. Had there been no patronage of the European powers, the idea of nationalism could have been checked.⁹ The long term effect of this patronage was disastrous for the Empire because these millets later on resisted all attempts of integrating them into one Ottoman citizenship, for their interest were served best in the weakness of the Empire rather than in its strength.

Another institution that undermined the Ottoman sovereignty and authority was the capitulations which was nothing but extra-territorial rights enjoyed by the foreigners residing in the Empire. Originally these privileges had been granted by the sultan unilaterally to the foreign merchants living in the Empire. That way it was a counterpart of the millet system and the same religious freedom was granted to the foreign merchants as had

been enjoyed by other religious minorities under the millet system. In course of time it was extended to the states to which these merchants belonged. But later on these privileges began to be interpreted as rights by these states, not to be violated unilaterally by the Ottoman state. Thus a practice, designed to facilitate interaction between the European and the Ottoman Empire, in course of time became a liability of the Empire. The powers by means of these extra-territorial rights, could obstruct any measure being considered by the state for bringing strength and stability if they felt that these violated their interests.¹⁰ For example when the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the political organ of the Young Turks wanted to introduce certain measures to centralize the state, these powers resisted it to the last. Similarly they resisted the Young Turks effort to raise the custom duty by 4 percent so as to protect the Ottoman industries, they were stubbornly resisted by the powers because they claimed that this measure violated their extra-territorial rights which could not be changed or revised unilaterally without their consent.¹¹

Similarly, the millets without these privileges could have tried to further their interest through the Ottoman state by supporting the state in its effort to protect the indigenous industries. The active participation of the millets in the economic development could have strengthened the state as well as the millet themselves. But it is worth noting that the commercial elements among the non-Muslims were not nationalist. They thought their interest would be best served in a large multinational state, not in a small nation state.¹² They allied with the foreign powers and many of them acquired foreign nationality in order to avail the extra-territorial rights. Hence they had

every interest in keeping the Ottoman state weak and prone to foreign interference.

Another instrument of interference was the financial support due to the financial insolvency of the Ottoman Empire. Had the economy been dynamic, the revenues necessary for financing the reforms might have been generated from within. Western economic domination ended even this possibility. Revenues formerly coming from commerce and manufacturing was substantially reduced after the introduction of free trade practices, since 1838 during Tanzimat era.¹³ The Ottoman Empire henceforth was rendered merely a raw material producing economy to feed the starving industries of Europe. Now onwards, the import of manufactured goods of Europe increased substantially, whereas its export did not increase in the same ratio. Of course, its raw materials were exported, but once again they hit the already dying industries due to rise in the cost of raw material. Thus the industrial sector was badly affected removing any chance of fiscal improvement. Initially agricultural sector got the boom but it too in the long run suffered losses due to long periods of slumps in the last decade of the 19th century. The result was insolvency of the state. Intermittent wars also made the matter worse because it incurred huge expenditures. Now the only option open to the state was to contract foreign loans in ^{the} international money markets. It was during the Crimean War in 1854 that first loan was contracted. Later on, foreign loans became an established norm to fill the gap of deficits in the state budget, most of which were spent on unproductive sectors.¹⁴ These loans as a result became a burden on the state because they were not in a

position to generate enough resources to repay debt obligations. The situation became so grave in 1875 that the Ottoman Empire declared its bankruptcy because its debt obligations in that year amounted to 14 million gold Liras against the total revenue of 18 million Liras of the state. The state unable to meet its debt obligations to its foreign creditors, was obliged to accept foreign financial control of its economy in 1881 when Ottoman Public Debt Administration came into existence. To it, the state surrendered its economy to be managed by a consortium of foreign financiers. Having an example of Egypt in view, the Ottoman authorities feared that alternative to debt administration would be a direct foreign control of the state by the creditor powers. But even then the consortium, ie. Ottoman Public Debt Administration controlled the state since it controlled one fourth revenue of the state that too of the choicest revenues so as to pay back the debts of both foreign and domestic creditors. It greatly infringed the Ottoman sovereignty because the state had to conform to the suggestions of the consortium, quite often to the detriment of the state interest.

Participation in the developmental process was yet another source of European intervention in the Empire. This was due to the insolvency of the state. The state had no surplus to invest in the productive sector of the economy. It could not give proper attention to industrial developments. Improvement in the means of transport and communication and other service sectors which could have strengthened the state infrastructurally. Whatever the saving of the state was invested in the modernization of the army, hence no proper care was taken for infrastructural development

which is vital for any country. So the state unable to provide fund for its development was forced to grant concessions to foreign entrepreneurs. The state could not have provided such a large sum even through loans. These concessions greatly embittered the mutual rivalries of the imperial powers, because they thought that one power was gaining concession at the cost of other. This further eroded the prestige and territorial integrity of the state. At the same time, these concessions did not bring the desired result. These foreign entrepreneurs invested only in those sectors which were likely to give maximum profit at minimum time.

From the on going discussion one thing becomes crystal clear that by the end of the 19th century, European powers had developed considerable political, economic, strategic and cultural stakes in the Ottoman Empire. Each power had specific concerns as well as areas of concerns.

Economically, the Empire had become a semi-colony of the European powers, importing finished goods and exporting raw materials. Its finances were under foreign control which rendered the Empire crippled economically and made it dependent on Europe for financial resources. The means of transport and commerce were either in the hands of the foreign companies or in the control of the minority communities which again was allied with foreign companies.

Politically, it was in a state of decay as all its outlying provinces had gradually become independent or annexed by the colonial powers. The non-Turkish elements in the Empire were

clamouring for independence largely at the instigation of colonial powers. This way these powers accelerated the process of disintegration by encouraging centrifugal forces.

Culturally each power began to patronize one or the other religious minorities - thus defying Ottoman sovereignty. As a result these religious minorities began to take airs of independence. The colonial powers readily extended a helping hand to such subversive forces. They established their own schools, post offices and banks which worked to undermine the authority of the state. Infact a state within a state began to run.

Strategically too, its vulnerable locations were occupied by these powers. Thus France and England entrenched themselves fully in Egypt. Russia in Eastern Armenia, Britain again the Persian gulf, France in the Levant. Thus the Ottoman Empire was encircled from all sides.

Response in the Ottoman Empire:

The history of the Ottoman Empire over the last years of its existence is largely the history of reactions and responses to the challenges of imperialism and colonialism in one form or the other. Usually, a country under colonial yoke struggles for independence but in the Ottoman Empire, the situation was different. The Empire did not become a formal colony of any colonial power but at the same time it was under constant pressure of the imperial powers. This way its experience is very much similar to that of Persia and China. Like these countries the Ottoman Empire too made consistent effort to free itself from the clutches of the

imperial power. Hence the major thrust of its effort was on change and reform so as to make it stand ^{to} the colonial pressures.¹⁵ At the same time, the effort was to make it acceptable to all sections of the population. All attempts were directed to arrest the centrifugal forces and preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The response and reaction which it attracted can be divided into two parts for convenience. One, which was liberal one directed towards improvement and betterment in the existing set up and make ^{it} worthwhile by European standards. They believed that if reforms were brought about, the Empire would be acceptable to all sections of the state irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliations. They wanted to establish one citizenship that of Ottoman one, cutting across all diversities. By these means they strove to keep the colonial power away from interference in the Ottoman Empire, because now they would be having no locus standi in the Empire. They, in their efforts readily accepted European institutions which they considered to be the key to many of the problems facing the Empire.

The other response came from the conservatives who used religious and ethnic symbols. They too were patriots but their suggestions were contrary to that of the liberals. They wanted to go back to Islam and ethnic origins. They were of the view that the basic cause of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was the neglect of Islam and ~~imitation~~ of the west. Modernization and westernization to them were thus the basic cause of the decline of the Empire. Nevertheless, one thing common, they had with the liberals, was the sense of patriotism.

The Tanzimat were one of the earliest responses to the challenges of imperialism. It was the culmination of a series of reforms which began in the days of sultans, Selim III and ~~Mohammed~~ II undertaken to save the Ottoman state which had become enfeebled internally as well as externally.

Tanzimat-i-Khariya is the term used to denote the reforms introduced into the government and administration of the Ottoman Empire, formally inaugurated by the charter generally called Khatt-i-Sharif of Gulhane, since the reign of sultan Abdul Mejid. The underlying need of the Tanzimat reforms was to arrest the decline of the Empire and give a sense of participation to the subject nationalities. It was also intended to make the Empire acceptable to Europe at large. It attempted to put restriction on the powers of the sultan and enhance the power of the bureaucracy at the same time. The Tanzimat reformers were mostly people associated with the Ottoman bureaucracy.

The people intimately connected with these reforms were Mustafa Resad Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha who during 1839-71 ran the empire either as grand vizirs or conducted its foreign policies. These people were convinced westerners and having seen Europe at close quarters they came to ^{the} conclusion that it was better to imitate the west than to resist it.¹⁶

Consequently the period 1839-1871 witnessed sustained legislations for reforms, oriented towards modernization of the Empire and centralization of the state by limiting the power of the

sultan with corresponding increase in the power of the bureaucracy. The area of activity of the state too sought to be expanded to areas, earlier considered to be outside the purview of the state. The idea behind this expansion was to provide the non-Muslim subjects a share in the governance of the Empire because of their relative alienation from the state.¹⁷ In other words, it was an attempt to win back the confidence of the non-Muslim subjects and at the same time to deprive the outside powers to intervene in the internal affairs of the state. Given the multi-ethnic and multi religious character of the Ottoman Empire it was a tactical move by the Tanzimat reformers.

The imperial rescripts issued in 1839 in the name of Khatt-i-Sharif of Gulhane and in 1850 as Khatt-i-Humayun curtailed the autocratic power of the sultan. They also aimed at bringing separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. The executive power was vested in the functional ministers which along with Ottoman bureaucracy carried on the government. For judicial purposes, the council of Judicial Regulations were created to settle secular cases and to act as court of final appeal. For legislative purposes, there was the council of state as a central legislative body. It was expected to frame all laws and regulations, investigate matters of public importance, and decide disputes between the executive and judicial bodies, give advice to ministers on the enforcement of laws, and adjudicate cases of misconduct by public officials. One novelty in the council was that it had representatives of various interests. But the system of representation was indirect one. All classes

of people both Muslims and non-Muslims were represented in the provincial legislature and these representatives sent their representatives to the central legislature to give it a popular base.¹⁸

Attempts were also made to curb the powers of the provincial governors. Here the basic aim was to extend central control over the provinces. First of all, to remove financial abuses, indirect system of tax collection was curbed. Next, uniform administrative units were created with corresponding officials. A clear cut demarcation line was drawn for the sphere of activity of the officials at various levels. It was a major step forward in rationalizing the provincial system of administration of the Empire.¹⁹ Finally, they were provided with advisory councils composed of the representatives of the ruling classes as well as the principal subject groups in each province. The provincial governor were also relieved of military obligations. Now onwards each provincial command was to be led by a Field Marshall appointed by and responsible to the central government.

The imperial rescripts also ensured security of life, honour and property of the subjects. It advocated equality of all before law along with universal application of law. The non-Muslims were extended all those privileges which hitherto been the reserve of the Muslims eg. equality in education, military service and taxation. The tendency henceforth was to treat all subjects as individuals rather than a member of a particular group.²⁰

In legal matters too, mixed courts were purported to be established if it dealt cases involving more than one community. Meanwhile, a whole series of secular laws were enacted based especially on French Code, treating all subjects alike. This was especially true with the penal codes which restricted the authority of bureaucracy in interpreting the penal laws. A natural corollary to this was the creation of a hierarchy of secular courts of law. The new law reduced the authority and jurisdiction of the religious courts. The new courts were so popular for the mass of the people that not even the ulama whose traditional monopoly of justice was disappearing, ventured to make too strenuous an objection.²¹

The revenue policy of the Tanzimat too was bold which speaks volumes of their farsightedness. They made efforts to supplant the indirect system of taxation with direct one ^{to be collected} by salaried officials so that all revenue should have gone direct to the state treasury. In addition, all customary charges were abolished and a uniform rates were promulgated so that tax burden be shared by all equally.²²

Probably the most significant of all reforms was the expanded area of state activity. Now the state no longer remained only an administrative machinery collecting taxes and maintaining law and order. The state now assumed the role of welfare state in a limited sense. Many works of public importance were taken up one such area of activity was education. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Education a hierarchy of schools were established. For providing teachers to these schools, Teacher's Training Colleges were set up, one

for male teachers and another for female. Besides, the state also established a number of technical schools. A university was also purported to be established in 1869. One can very well judge the performance of the state in the direction of education by the fact that during 1867 to 1899, the number of schools and students more than doubled.²³ The new environment also created a class of new writers who transformed the Turkish language and literature both in content and style. These writers emphasized on clarity rather than external beauty of the language.²⁴ They also made an attempt to purify the language from Arabic and Persian elements which was to become a symbol of Turkish nationalism in later days. Three names stand as the most important in this regard. They are Ibrahim Sinasi, Zia Pasha and Namik Kemal.

Steps were also taken to improve the means of transport and communications during this period. They gave special attention to the development of roadways, post and telegraph and steamships. On railways, they could not give much attention due to financial constraints as it incurred huge expenditure. For this they invited foreign financiers to develop it.

Therefore, it becomes clear that the Tanzimat reforms did their best to modernize the Empire. Though some of their reforms proved disastrous for the Empire such as free trade which ruined the indigenous industries. The enhanced role of bureaucracy also gave birth to autocracy of the high officials which was later on resented by the Ottoman intellectuals. Nevertheless, one cannot question the sincerity of the Tanzimat reformers. They paid close

attention to all sectors of the Ottoman society and in less than three decades modernized the Ottoman Empire, comparable to many of the European States.

The other liberal response came from a group of new writers and intellectuals. The group consisted of younger generation familiar with the western representative institutions. They were impatient with the pace of reforms of the Tanzimat era. Moreover, they detested all out imitation of the west and forgetting indigenous moorings. This group was most active during 1865-1876 when a constitution was adopted. This group was the product of Tanzimat reforms especially educational one by which they received modern education either at home or abroad. They became the self-appointed critic of the system as prevalent. Collectively they came to be called as Young Ottomans.

These intellectuals used press as the most effective medium to disseminate their ideas and influence public opinion. They advocated the ideals of nationalism, parliamentarianism and patriotism. 'Muhbir' and 'Hurriyat' became their mouthpiece. Besides, they also contributed in other papers and journals of the period which are replete with their ideas and ideologies. These intellectuals even used theatre as an effective organ of propaganda.

They rejected the very premise of the Tanzimat reformers that true modernization could only be imposed by an elite class from above which in their view was liable to failure unless

accompanied by certain fundamental and structural changes. These intellectuals also criticized the Tanzimat reformers for undermining the moral and ideological basis of the Ottoman society without providing a suitable substitution.²⁵

While the Young Ottomans were united in their opposition to the Tanzimat, their proposed solutions varied widely. Nevertheless, there were at least three basic ideas on which they all agreed. These were constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and Ottomanism. By the first, ie. constitutionalism they sought to limit the power of the Ottoman bureaucracy because a constitution would define the rights and obligations of all without any exception. A constitution, thus would protect the individual from arbitrary action of the bureaucracy and the state. By the second, ie. parliamentarianism they sought to establish representative institutions so that it might provide a forum to all to vindicate their grievances. It would act as a check upon the government because it will ensure that all administrative machinery functioned properly within defined lines. This would also strengthen the sense of one nationhood because of its representative character and check the centrifugal forces which had been at work since long. By the third, ie. Ottomanism they sought to make all subjects of the Ottoman Empire as one Ottoman citizen, be they Greeks, the Slavs, ^{the} Armenians, the Arab or the maronites, all were to be Ottomans regardless of ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. They wanted to establish one common nation.

While the Young Ottomans were providing intellectual leadership to the constitutional movement of the Ottoman Empire, a

coup - de - etat was engineered by an alliance of commanders and, of the army and navy/leaders of the civilian administration. This enabled the Young Ottomans to carry out their ideology into practice. Sultan Abdul Aziz was overthrown and a constitution was adopted in 1876. But these achievements were shortlived. Soon Sultan Abdul Hamid II who initially consented to the constitution, later on suppressed it and established his personal rule in 1878. Nevertheless one cannot summarily reject the achievements of the Young Ottomans. They prepared a background for the next generation who successfully established constitutional monarchy in Turkey in 1908. This way their successor, ie the Young Turks, owed much to the Young Ottomans.

Still another liberal response to imperialism was that of the Young Turks. They were the ideological heir of the Young Ottomans. But unlike the Young Ottomans who were the descendants of higher bureaucracy, the Young Turks came from the petty bourgeoisie class. These groups worked more clandestinely. They gradually penetrated into the army and the bureaucracy so as to bring a change in the Ottoman society by force if it was deemed essential.

Like the Young Ottomans they too rejected the basic premise of the Tanzimat reformers of introducing reform from above without fundamental and structural changes. They argued that physical reforms, however, successful was liable to failure unless they were accompanied by fundamental political and social changes. Since they knew the fate of the Young Ottomans and the espionage

system of sultan Abdul Hamid II they worked secretly and some time in exiles. Their anti-imperialist struggle will be discussed in the next chapter.

II

Among the conservative responses to the threats of imperialism, mention must be made of pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. They wanted to pay back the imperialist in their own. The first urged the need for uniting all Muslims throughout the globe to oppose the onslaught of western threat. The other underlined the need for unity among the Turanis of Asia against the imposition of foreign domination.

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The Pan-Islamic movement grew out of the frustration among the Muslim intellectuals when they realized that Muslim land were gradually falling prey to imperialism. The Young Ottomans too were advocates of this idea. Its real beginning can be traced back to the writings and speeches of Jamal-ud-din al Afghani. To him, west appeared in two contradictory role. On the one hand it made aggressive conquest of the Muslim world, on the other hand, it had demoralising effect on the minds of the Muslims who fell prey to these imperialist powers.²⁶ Quite often, these powers undermined Islam and its teachings which had created very bad impressions about Islam in the minds of Young Muslims. He suggested that the best way to do away with it was to oust the imperialist powers and prevent them from making further conquest. For this he underlined the need of concerted action and urged the Muslims of the world to unite against foreign domination. He also

denied such Muslims who collaborated with the foreigners or accepted their ways of life. To him, it was not the internal weakness of Islam but the aggressiveness of the west that was the root cause of the agony, the Muslims of the world were undergoing.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II made the maximum use of it because it suited his scheme of harassing both Russia and Britain who had substantial chunk of Muslims in their empires. He sent emissaries to various parts of the globe to stress the need of Islamic unity under the authority of the Caliph - the position which he claimed to himself. It also aimed at placating the non-Turkish section of the Muslims of the empire, as religion is the weakest point in human behaviour.

Pan-Turkism was the child of the same set of circumstances which had given birth to Pan-Islamism. Here the stress was ethnic identity. The Turks were not only in the Ottoman Empire. The Russian had occupied a large area in central Asia populated by the Turks. It was this feeling which gave rise to Pan-Turkism. Moreover, Turks were detested as rude and everything associated with them were considered as uncivilized. These treatment greatly exasperated the Turks.

The activities of the minority subjects of the empire, the unification of Germany and Italy and the illtreatment of the Turks by the Russian and the consequent migration of the Turks into the empire confirmed the believe in Pan-Turkism.

RESPONSES IN INDIA

Ottoman Turkey and India resembled each other in the 19th century in being a large assemblage of diverse people speaking different languages and professing different religions. Both were struggling against western encroachments. In both the countries, Muslims were at the receiving end. The christian minorities of the Ottoman empire progressed at the cost of the Muslims - thanks to the active help of the foreign powers. In India too, the Muslims were the most hated community in the eyes of the imperial power because it were the Muslims who had been dislodged from the position of privilege. They were usually discriminated against. The Indian Muslims made a last bid to dislodge the British in 1857, hence target of intense hatred in the eyes of the British. But unlike the Ottoman Empire, it was a full-fledged colony of the British. The Ottoman Empire was to some extent free - thanks to the failure among the European power to agree for partition of the empire of the Ottomans was the last outpost to be relatively free from foreign domination - hence it attracted the attention of the Indian Muslims. They were not ready to accept the same fate for Turkey to which they had been subjected. Therefore, what transpired in the Ottoman Empire, found its expression among the Indian Muslims. They were well informed of the happening on the Ottoman Empire. It occupied Indian mind for a considerable period of time in the 19th and 20th centuries. Apart from colonial experience too bitter to be swallowed the Indian Muslims had two other reasons, which shaped their political thinking in the 19th century. Firstly, the Ottoman sultan claimed the status of a Caliph of the

Islamic world. The Caliph was supposed to be both ecclesiastical and temporal leader of the Muslims of the world. A Caliph is the deputy of the prophet in Islam. Secondly, all the Holy places of Islam were located in the Ottoman Empire. That is why the sultan also assumed the role of custodian of the holy places of Islam, ^{ie.,} Mecca and Medina. But one should not be misled that it was the religious affinity alone which attracted the attention of the Indian Muslims. Moreover, earlier too, the sultan of Turkey claimed that status but he did not attract the attention of the Indian Muslims. It was only in the 19th century that the sultan began to influence the Indian Muslims. This proves conclusively that it was the imperialist experience which drove them to the lap of the Ottoman sultan. They thought that he would act as saviour of the Indian Muslims.

Moreover, the overthrow of the last Mughal king Bahadur Shah II in 1858 had a tremendous influence on Indian Muslim psyche, whose name hitherto been used by the Indian Muslims in their congregational prayers. Now with the changed situation, the name of the sultan-Caliph began to be recited increasingly in Friday congregational prayers.²⁷

Another factor which prompted this change in the attitude of the Indian Muslims was the increasing use of the sultan's position by the British in India. In their drive to check the Russian designs the British strove to form an Anglo-Islamic bloc as if only Russia was the enemy of the Muslims. For the first time, the British used the name of the sultan during the Crimean war driving home to the Indian Muslims that the British

empire was the defender of the Ottoman empire. Secondly, they used and invoked the decree of the sultan to condemn the revolutionaries of 1857.²⁸ This way they enhanced the significance of the sultan in the eyes of the ordinary Muslims. The British empire was portrayed as if the greatest Mohammadan empire, engaged in defending the Caliph and the Holy places of Islam. Though the British were scared of the danger of frequent use of the position of the sultan, the Russo-Phobia forced her to give it a helping hand.²⁹

The sultan, in order to counterpoise British, French and Russian pressure, increasingly used his position as the Caliph of the Muslims of the world. This also had an impact on the attitude of Indian Muslims. He sent several missions to the Muslim world, stressing the need for Pan-Islam unity of Muslims.

One more aspect of it was that the Ottoman Empire was basically an Asian Empire, though spread to Africa and Europe. But the seat of government was in Turkey. It was engaged in an anti-imperialist struggle against the onslaught of the west. Hence it naturally attracted the attention of even non-Muslims. They also showed solidarity with the Ottoman Empire which like India was engaged in fighting against the west.

But the most important aspect which turned the attention of the Indian Muslims towards the Ottoman Empire was the bitter experience of the Indian Muslims themselves which has not been given due attention by modern scholars. Following the establish-

ment of British rule in India, the Indian Muslims became the target of British attack. Earlier they had atleast psychological satisfaction ^{of} being a ruling class. Many of them were attached with the princely courts. But with the establishment of alien rule, all their privileges vanished away. The British followed for a considerable period of time 'the policy of breaking Muslims up and keeping them down'.³⁰ Their economic and educational policy kept the Muslims out of employment.³¹ Consequently the Indian Muslims had to undergo traumatic experience. The revolt of 1857 was the culmination of long standing grievances of the Muslims. It is no secret that the most sufferers of the revolt of 1857 were the Muslims due to the vindictive attitude of the British who singled out them as the sole instigator of the revolt. For the Indian Muslims it was the last bid to get back the lost position and privilege.³² After the revolt the attitude of the British rulers stiffened towards Indian Muslims because they were dubbed as the main culprit of 1857.³³ Besides the first civilian protests too were started by the Indian Muslims, i.e. the Wahabi and Fraizi movements which continued to haunt the British till 1870s.

Thus it seems that the Indian Muslims had good reasons to be alienated from the British government. At this critical juncture, Ottoman-Turkey provided a good solace to the Indian Muslims because Turkey being relatively free was under constant pressure of the imperialist powers. Thus whenever, there was any attempt to dismember the Ottoman Empire, it evoked wide criticism and protest in India. It is in this background that one must examine the response of the Indian Muslims in particular and Indians in general to the events in Turkey.

Though it was the Crimean war of 1856 which for the first time attracted the attention of the Indian muslims, the real beginning of the interest started with the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-77. It gave a definite shape to their response because it was the first occasion, when the Ottoman empire lost all its European possessions. Russia was knocking at the door of Constantinople. The result of the war was disastrous for Turkey. This time the sympathy of the Indian muslims was much more pronounced and definite. At various places meeting were organized and resolutions adopted expressing strong resentment over the lack of British sympathy and help to Turkey.³⁴ Prayers were offered at various places for the success of the sultan. They also raised subscription for Turkish Relief Fund throughout India.³⁵ The press especially run by the muslims wished for the defeat of the Russians. The interest aroused was so intense among Indian Muslims that several of the vernacular papers brought out their daily editions in order to give latest position of the war.³⁶ Gladstone came under heavy attack from the Indian muslims for his bags and baggage policy in the Ottoman Empire. He was dubbed as anti-Muslim.³⁷ Some Muslims even went to Turkey to fight along the Turkish army³⁸ who were fighting a losing battle. As compared to the Crimean war, this time, they were well informed - thanks to the growth of communication and the press - hence the strong response. It was later discovered that the origin of the Pan-Islamic movement in India lay in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78,³⁹ because the result of war was even more disturbing to the India-Muslim after the Berlin Congress. In it all the imperialist powers joined together to share the spoils in Turkey

with no distinction of aggressor and the defender of the Ottoman Empire. It appeared to Indian Muslims that the west was united while dealing with the Ottoman Empire - hence the need of Pan-Islamism against western encroachments.

The next occasion to protest was provided by the British declaration of protectorate over Egypt in 1882. It offended all sections of Indians. The vernacular press found in it a fresh attempt to dismember the Ottoman Empire and lower the power and prestige of the sultan - Caliph.⁴⁰

Apart from it, the Armenian and Greek question too influenced the Indians. The Armenians were the minority community of the Ottoman Empire and were generally economically well off. At the instigation of the European powers, they began to demand autonomy and independence. It attracted the attention of all sections of the Indian press during 1894-1896. The press detested the strong language of Gladstone against the sultan and questioned Europeans including Britain raison detre in Armenia. They saw in it an effort to coerce Turkey into providing a base for British mediterranean fleet.⁴¹ Protest meetings were organized at various places. On British suggestion of providing christian governors for Armenia, they asked Britain to provide, in turn, Muslim and Hindu governors in India instead of chrisitan governors. At the same time, the sultan was asked to do the same as the British was doing in India⁴² by providing only Muslim governors in Armenia.

Similarly the Indian Muslims closely followed the course of Greaco-Turkish war of 1897. Despite the help rendered by western

powers, to Greece, the Ottoman forces were successful. It was hailed in India. There were rejoicing in cities as wide apart as Shimla and Bombay. A Muslim deputation waited on the Turkish consul-General in Bombay to convey to the sultan the congratulations of Indian Muslims.⁴³ Besides, they sent directly innumerable letters of congratulations to the sultan who personally acknowledged them. His name began to be used more frequently in Friday prayers.⁴⁴ A Nadvat-ul-ulama, i.e. convention of ulama was held in Kanpur on 8-9 March 1898 in which supremacy of the sultan Caliph Abdul Hamid II was acknowledged and the allegiance of Indian Muslims were resolutely assured. It also envisaged the provision of scholarships to enable the muslim youths to study at Cairo from where they were likely to return thoroughly imbued with Pan-Islamic ideas.⁴⁵

Besides these problems of territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, other aspects too influenced the Indian opinion. For instance, when the sultan took up the Hejaz railway project, Indian muslim contributed lavishly. Even the common people began to take interest in it.⁴⁶ Professor A. Vambery, a Hungarian indologist has estimated the contribution made by the Indian muslims which comes around 1.5 crore rupees.⁴⁷

The Macedonian crisis of 1903 further aggravated Muslim feelings in India. They resented the policy pursued by the European powers in Macedonia. A mass meeting was held at Lahore on 6th December 1905 and after the meeting the following resolutions were telegraphed.

"The Lahore Mohammedians request the British government that as Emperor of India counts largest Mohammedan population at his loyal subjects on false representations of christian rebels, it should neither take any step itself nor should join European powers in coercing the Islamic Caliph."⁴⁸

Another example of Indian response was the Turco-Egyptian dispute in the gulf of Aqba in 1907. The Indian Muslim at this time too were greatly perturbed at the outbreak of the dispute and several mass meetings were held all over the country to voice protest against the unhappy event.⁴⁹ The most important event was the protest meetings held at Aligarh which was till then considered to be immune from such influences. They sent telegram to the viceroy imploring an amicable settlement of the Aqba dispute. It was suspected that the meeting was held at the behest of the local secretary of the congress Hasrat Mohani. This caused alarm and concern to the British authorities.⁵⁰ Pan-Islamic ideas had already begun to affect the students of the college. There was a wide spread feeling of anti-imperialism in the campus.⁵¹

As a result of these developments, there grew increasing contact of the Indian Muslims with the Ottoman Empire to keep themselves abreast of the latest developments in the Ottoman Empire. In India, the Turkish Consul-General became a medium to give the accurate news of the empire. A number of delegations met him during the last decade of the 19th century and first decade of the 20th century.

From the above mentioned account it appears that the late 19th century witnessed intense anti-imperialist and anti-christian feelings in India. Though these feeling could not lead to anti-imperialist struggle in India because it was in nascent stage. Nevertheless it was an important landmark in the Indian national movement because it provided the seed necessary for the growth of nationalism in India among Indian Muslims. It was in the second stage i.e during the Young Turk period that it fully grew into a national feeling among them. It also proved to ~~be~~ the eye opener to the non-Muslims of India because in the ill-treatment of Turkey they saw the double standard of the British government. It also proved to be of educative nature to the rising middle class.

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CHAPTER - II

THE YOUNG TURKS AND
ANTI-COLONIALISM

The Young Turks were a heterogenous body of intellectuals with conflicting interests and ideologies. However, their common goal were opposition to the Hamidian absolutism, preservation of the Ottoman Empire from the onslaught of western imperialism, end of capitulations enjoyed by the European powers, and conservation of the ideals of Ottomanism and modernism.

Though they were the ideological heirs of the Young Ottoman traditions of constitutionalism, Ottomanism and freedom, they did not come from the elite bureaucratic circles to which the latter belonged. They belonged to the emerging middle class, a product of the reforms of the Tanzimat. They served the empire in a junior capacity had come out from the modern secular, military or civilian professional schools. Some of the Young Turks were frustrated Young Ottomans and belonged to upper bureaucratic circles at one or the other point of time. But their number was small. Most of them were junior officers or worked as pleaders and journalists. As regards their characters, Feroz Ahmad comments :

"They belonged to newly emerging professional classes : lecturers in recently established government colleges, lawyers trained in western law, minor clerks in the bureaucracy and junior officers trained in western style war colleges. Most of them were half-educated and products of state (high) schools. The well-educated one had no experience of administration and little idea of running a government. There was not a single experienced statesman among them."¹

That they belonged to the rising bourgeoisie can be ascertained by the fact that almost all the reputed leaders belonged to one or the other profession. To mention only a few, for instance, ~~Talat~~ Pasha was only a small postal clerk in

Salonica with only a junior High School education, Even Pasha was the son of a public prosecutor and trained in recently established academics, Cavit Bey was a teacher and a small bank official.²

The Young Turks being heterogeneous in character were basically divided into two groups representing two tendencies from the very beginning. The liberals among them were in favour of decentralization and autonomy for religious and national minorities. They formed Ahrar (liberal) party which ultimately became liberal union amalgamating other like minded parties. They were popular among the religious and national minorities. They had also good relation with the old Ottoman bureaucracy. But this party ~~could not cut much ice in the~~ Ottoman politics except for a very short period. The most important leader of it was Prince Sebahuddin. The other group was much more organised than the liberal one. Its most important association was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) founded in 1889. It worked clandestinely and with strict discipline. Secretly it proliferated throughout the Empire at local levels. To influence the government and its policies it even secured entry in civilian and military offices. Its most avowed objects were end of the Hamidian absolutism, establishment of the constitution of 1876 and Ottomanism. But unlike the liberals, this group stood for centralization. It was most instrumental in bringing the revolution of 1908, not only this, it also preserved the revolution, through its dedicated cadres. Their commitment to the Ottoman Empire can be gauged from their manifesto which they issued in 1890.

"In order to warn our Muslim and Christian countrymen against the system of government of the present regime which violates such human rights as justice, equality and freedom, which withholds all Ottomans from progress and surrenders our country to foreign domination; an Ottoman society of Union and Progress has been formed composed of men and women, all of whom are Ottomans."³

Thus we get the impression that the Young Turks, represented by ^{the} CUP were patriots to the core of their heart. Their fight was for strong and united Ottoman Empire and against all centrifugal forces, intent to dismember the Empire both from within and without.

Let us examine the legacy which the Young Turks inherited from the ancient regime at the time of the 1908 revolution. First and of prime importance was the continuation of capitulations which were nothing but a set of privileges enjoyed by the foreigners in the Ottoman Empire. They were most consequential in undermining the sovereignty of the state. They attracted the immediate attention of the Young Turks because other ills were closely linked with them. The sooner they were abolished, it was better for the good of the Empire. Then there was the problem of centrifugalism posed by the religious and national minorities, mostly aided and abetted by the European powers because of two reasons (a) they acted as compradore of foreign manufacturing and commercial interests in the Empire. (b) Through it they could de-establish the porte. The cessationist movements of the subject nationalities were one of the most urgent pre-occupations of the Young Turks. Then there was the problem of financial

insolvency of the Ottoman Empire. It played dominant role in deciding the future course of history of the Ottoman Empire. Due to capitulations and minority compradore activities, the domestic revenue was not enough to finance the Young Turk reforms of modernization and westernization. Then there was ever present Foreign Intervention and encroachments by the European powers. There were many more problems, which they inherited but these four were the most important which demanded immediate attention of the Young Turks. One significant feature of it is that almost all of them had the bearing on imperialism in one shape or the other. The Young Turks tried ^{at} their level best to tackle these problems.

Though the revolution of 1908 commenced with a limited goal of restoring the constitution of 1876, its long term objectives were far more ambitious. They were nothing less than to rejuvenate and transform the Ottoman Empire so as to make it acceptable to Europe as equals. Nothing describes the ambitious of the Young Turks better than their claim to be the Japan of the near East. Internally that meant converting the Empire from the status of a semi-colony controlled and exploited by European powers, to a sovereign capitalist state, exploiting its own material resources for its own benefit.⁴

The Young Turk movement can be divided into two broad historical periods : liberal or conventional reformist (1908-1913) and bourgeoisie revolutionary (1913-1918).

The first period started with the bloodless revolution of 1908. In the period, the young Turks and their best organised association had not yet come to power. Between 1908-1913 although the political arena was dominated by the young Turks, the cabinet was still largely recruited from among the traditional Ottoman bureaucracy. Till then they controlled the government by their control of parliament, armed forces and occasional ministers whom they contributed to the cabinet.⁵

In the period they had no intention of altering the basic state structure. They merely wanted the implementation of the constitution. Arbitrary rule, they believed, was the main reason for Ottoman under-development and disintegration.⁶ They fervently believed that if a regime of justice and equality before law, along with representation in parliament of various elements, was established, the diverse nationalities of the empire would not pursue separatist ends. The Young Turks' response to these nationalist and separatist movements can be summed up in Tal'at Pasha's words uttered in 1910 at a CUP convention at Salonica.

"We have made unsuccessful attempts to convert the non-Muslims into a loyal Ottoman and all such efforts must inevitably fail as long as the small independent states in the Balkan Peninsula remain in a position to propagate ideas of separatism among the inhabitants of Macedonia. There can therefore be no question of equality until we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the Ottoman Empire - a long and laborious task in which venture to predict that we shall at length succeed after we have at least put an end to the agitation and propaganda of the Balkan States."⁷

Therefore, the young Turks regime in this period passed at least two laws directed toward centralization of the Ottoman Empire.

One was the law of associations and the other was the law for the Prevention of Brigandage and sedition. The Law of Associations prohibited the formation of political associations based on or bearing the name of national or ethnic communities. Following the enactment of the law, all national and ethnic organisations were banned. The Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and sedition, facilitated the repression of Balkan nationalism. Besides it other efforts too were taken to extend the central control over the provinces and local administration. A National Police Force was also established in the Ministry of interior. Many of the reactionary elements in the bureaucracy were dismissed following the counter revolution. By the end of 1970 most of the government bureaucracy was reconstituted.⁸

Similarly, a uniform legal code was drawn up in order to eliminate the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, subjects of the empire. It was hoped that new laws would mark the end of the millet system which had given to each millet certain social and religious rights. These legal reforms envisaged equality of all before law and to make Ottomanism a reality. It incurred the displeasure of both Muslims and non-Muslims subjects though on different grounds. Muslims because they did not want equality of status with the non-Muslims on psychological grounds. Muslims considered themselves as a ruling class. The non-Muslims opposed it because, due to ^{the} millet system they enjoyed certain privileges which now they would not avail. They were not ready to sacrifice them. But in spite of these protests, the Young Turks went on with the legal reforms. They were determined to end the special privileges enjoyed by

the foreign and compradore minority under capitulations.

They tried to accomplish this through two forms of activities by adopting or enacting civil and commercial laws and regulations, and, through negotiations with western powers to abrogate the capitulations. Despite some successes in the first, none of the goal was achieved before 1913 due to internal and external pressure. When they invited the western powers to enter into negotiation to abrogate the capitulations they were not paid any heed. Thus neither this, nor their request to raise the custom duty by 4% and certain taxes to be applicable for foreigners, was honoured by the western powers.⁹ Even a loan request from European economic sources in 1910 to finance the much needed reform projects was rejected.¹⁰ After these bitter lessons, the Young Turks' admiration of western civilization underwent a drastic change.

In this phase, the foreign policy too was reformist and persuasive in character. The old regime was heavily alligned with Germany while not altogether subverting the German option, the Young Turks tried to moderate their foreign policy. In order to win the acceptance of the Great Powers and have them abandon all the privileges they enjoyed through capitulations, they first turned to Britain which had the backing of both the Unionists and the Liberals. By encouraging Britain to compete with Germany and France for new concessions, the Young Turks hoped to break France and Germany's hold and acquire greater autonomy for Turkey. Meanwhile the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and crete by Greece further com-

plicated the matter. This further enhanced anti-German feeling in Turkey because Austria-Hungary was German ally. They could do nothing for the violation of the Berlin Congress except for organising boycott of Austro-Hungarian and Greek goods. This was protested by Britain as Greece was its dependent ally in the Balkans. Even then the Young Turks sent two prominent Unionists Ahmad Riza and Dr. Nazim to discuss the matter of formal alliance with Lord Grey and Sir Charles Hardings. The proposal was politely rejected.¹¹

Despite this rebuffs, the Unionists did not abandon their pro-British attitude. They considered Britain the lynch-pin of the Triple-Entente. They believed that if she could be won over then even Russia and France too could be. They were optimistic that their programme of reform would impress Britain. They continued to appease Britain but to no benefit. At each stage, the Young Turks were disappointed. During the Italian and Balkan wars too, the Young Turks effort to get an alliance with Britain or any of the Entente powers as a whole or individually failed. They could not get favourable response either from Britain or France. In 1910, when the Finance Ministry tried to negotiate a loan without political and economic strings, French supported by Britain offered humiliating terms which amounted to French domination of the Ottoman economy. The Unionists refused to accept such terms and after protracted negotiations finally floated the loan in Germany.¹²

years

Thus the first three/ of relations between the new regime and the Great Powers were demoralising and frustrating for the Turks.

The powers refused to make any concession over capitulations and loosen their grip over the Empire's internal affairs. The Turks were powerless because whenever they raised such issue almost all the powers united in one to oppose such proposals despite their own imperial rivalries. Not only this, they actively aided the centrifugal forces in the Empire.

Now let us have a look on the ideological plank of the Young Turks in this period. There seems to be three distinguishable ideologies of the period viz, westernism, Ottamanism and Pan-Islamism. Westernism : From the beginning of the 19th century, westernization became the constant concern of all the Turkish reformers. Constitutionalism, parliamentarism and private enterprise were magic word of the time. But neither of the reformers including the Young Turks understood the material roots of either their own or western society.¹³ They failed to see the structural limits that would prevent their dependent economy from successfully copying the west. They believed that their sincere efforts for reform would be hailed in the west and the western powers would stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of non-Muslim nationalities. It would enable the Empire equal status with western powers thus helping in the abolition of capitulations. But they failed in their effort to change the attitude of the western powers. They soon realised that legal reforms oriented to westernization would not save the Empire from further disintegration. Ottomanism : Ever since the Tanzimat, the Ottomanism was the slogan of the Turkish intellectuals to counter the disruptive forces, acting against the very concept of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. By it

the Young Turks too wanted to bind all diverse element into one Ottoman state. They hoped that the establishment of the constitutional rule would attract all nationalities to a genuinely representative parliamentary system and thus preserve the state.¹⁴ They did not tolerate the secessionist movements. Turkish nationalism was not an issue in the conventional reformist phase.

Pan-Islam: This concept was important because this was the only ideal which was common to Turks and the non-Turk Muslims of the Empire. Besides, this was also an anti-imperialist doctrine in its Pan-Islamic form. Though expansionist in character, it had often been used by the Turkish authorities to counter -balance the pressures of the imperialist powers especially against England, France and Russia which had substantial population of Muslims in their empires. Sultan Abdul Hamid II had utilised it to ^{the} utmost. The Young Turks had limitation while using it. But once the christian population became independent, they too used it. Earliest use of it during this period can be traced back to 1910. As mentioned the Young Turks basically being secular, also wanted to crush the power of the clergy which were agents of counter revolution.

Thus we see that in this period, the Young Turks were primarily interested in the adoption of legal reforms and western institutions in order to modernize the backward Ottoman society. In the economic field they naively believed that through negotiations with the western powers they could bring the capitulatory regime to an end. They believed that since capitulations were an obstacle to capitalist development, by following the free trade doctrine of the period, both the empire and the west would

profit from the development of the empire. Similarly in foreign policy, they did not fall in one power's lap so as to keep it free. But the optimism of the Young Turks proved to be unfounded. They could neither get the capitulations abolished, nor could get the blessings of the west for its genuine efforts towards reforms. It lost many territories which used to be ^{the} life blood of the Empire during this period. Instead of espousing and relishing for its reforms, the Great Powers became apprehensive of the new regime because of its nationalist policies — hence the disillusionment of the Young Turk regime from the benevolence of the west.

Let us examine the policies and programme of the Young Turks in the most crucial phase of their struggle against imperialism. In this phase which began with the successful Bab-I-Ali coup in 1913, the CUP was at the helm of affairs in the Ottoman Empire. This phase witnessed radical approach in the Young Turk policies. From the ongoing accounts it becomes apparent that the Young Turks were quite a failure in persuading the non-Muslim nationalities to remain in the Ottoman Empire. Infact, whole of European Turkey was lost by the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars. Those non-Muslim nationalities who ^{still} remained in the Ottoman Empire within its confines, too were clamouring for independence. They infact protested the Young Turks Ottomanisation programme supported and abated by the European powers. They functioned as the representatives of European manufacturers in the Anatolian hinterland and also directed the flow of raw materials from the Empire back to Europe. On the other hand, the Young ^{Turks} had been unable to persuade the European powers to withdraw capitulations. Not to speak of withdrawal of capitulations they even started supporting christian minorities in the belief that these dependent nationalities

would be easy to control than a strong Ottoman Empire. They also could not win the appreciation of the European powers of their reforms not to speak of any definite alliance. It is in this background that the Young Turks came to the conclusion that the remedy was in their own hand and no European powers was expected to rescue -- hence radical programme so as to save the Empire.

This can be gauged from the policies and programmes they adopted during this period. As stated earlier Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism were the pre-dominant aspects of the Young Turk ideology in earlier phase of their struggle. But when imperialist scheme of the European powers and the nationalist instructions of the subject nationalities including the Muslim one, converged on the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman internationalism and Pan-Islamism increasingly became Turkish nationalism of Turanism type. It was like Pan-Islam which sustained national pride in the face of the humiliating Ottoman defeats received on the western front. The Young Turks grandiose scheme of national liberation from western colonialism encompassed the liberation from western colonialism of other Turkish people from the Russian yoke. At the same time, Pan-Islam was not altogether, abandoned. Because, the Empire still possessed other non-Turkish muslims like the Arabs. Hence the effort was to unite them into one Turkish Muslim Empire.¹⁵ Their Pan-Islamic activity will be discussed later in this chapter.

Next radical programme of the Young Turks was the secularization of the Empire and elimination of the wornout Ottoman bureaucracy. First of all, they eliminated the Shaikhul-Islam from the cabinet in 1916. The Shariat courts were transferred

from the jurisdiction of the Shaikhul-Islam to that of the Ministry of justice. Similarly medreses, religious schools, were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Shaikhul-Islam to the Ministry of Education. The pious foundations too were transferred from his jurisdiction to that of the new Ministry of Awqaf. Other steps too were taken to curb the power of religion in the state.

After reducing the power of the Ulama, the Young Turks turned their attention to the traditional Ottoman bureaucracy. The corrupt and redundant officials continued to be given compulsory retirement. But the largest purge came after the Balkan defeat when the Minister of war Fzzat Pasha was forced to resign and in his place Enver Bey was appointed Minister of war. In January 1914, he got rid of all officers who were not graduates of the recently created war Academies.

On the economic front, the Unionists took the most radical steps. Unable to secure favourable terms in external loans, refusal to enhance the custom duties by 4% on the part of the capitulatory powers and the stubborn attitude on the question of abolition of capitulations itself they came to the conclusion that there was no way out except to depend on themselves. Hence, they decided to create and develop their own national bourgeoisie which they earnestly believed would sustain the Empire.¹⁶ This social class would be a vanguard of the Turkish economic and political nationalism, on the plea that this class was the main source of strength of Europe. But one thing which they failed to realize that it was a historical force - a product of the time in Europe. Whereas in the Ottoman Empire there were many limitations to its development. Any how they conceived on these lines.

The new doctrine, also received inspiration and impetus from the migrants of central Asia who had fled in the wake of Russian colonization of the area. They brought the news that rich Turkish capitalists prospered in Azarbaijan, Crimea and other Russian territories inhabited by the Turks. This news convinced them of the possibility of national bourgeoisie being developed in the Empire. Moreover, the Turkish migrants, many of whom were intellectuals, joined the ranks of the Young Turks at a time, when the latter were looking for a way to save the Empire from its desperate economic and social condition. These migrants became the major exponent of this ideology.

The political programme drawn up in the 1913 CUP party congress envisaged financing of long-term, low-interest capital loan to Turkish agriculture and industry. For this purpose a National Credit Bank was opened in January 1917, under the auspices of the Bank, other enterprises also began. First of all two insurance companies were opened. These were followed by other insurance companies funded with private capital. These concerns sought to encourage private enterprises keeping in view the creation of national bourgeoisie.

A complimentary policy encouraged consumers cooperatives. A society for National Consumption was founded as early as 1913. The society launched a large scale campaign to encourage the consumption of indigenously produced goods and services.¹⁷ Many consumers co-operatives appeared in the capital which functioned successfully until the end of the World War I.

The Unionists were also instrumental in organising Turkish commercial bourgeoisie into a number of import-export companies, producers co-operatives and credit institutions. All were created through the contribution of National Capital. Various branches of traditional arts and crafts too were organised within a guild system in the hope that they would devote themselves to the complementary production of raw and finished goods. The architect of this programme was Karakemal Bey. These organisational efforts were supported by local branches of the ^{committee of} union and progress throughout the Empire.

But the Unionists recognised that these measures were insufficient if the capitulatory regime were to remain intact and the minority and foreign compradore bourgeoisie were to preserve their superiority in the national economy. We have mentioned earlier how detrimental were these forces to the interest of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the Unionists here took one of the most boldest step ever taken by any one in the Empire. They attacked the very root of the problem when they attacked the raison d'etre of capitulations.

Consequently, foreign companies were required to have a certain number of Ottoman subjects on their board of directors and concessionary companies were required to keep their books and administer their business transactions in Turkish.¹⁸ But the boldest step was taken when the Unionist unilaterally abolished the capitulations in November 1914, when they failed to get it done through negotiations. Consequently custom duties were raised to 14 and 15 percent and luxury items were taxed upto 100 percent. The foreign post offices were closed.

Their next target was the minority compradore bourgeoisie. Among them two were most consequential in undermining the sovereignty and authority of the Empire. They were the Armenians and the Greeks. The European powers' protection of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire aimed at protecting a class whose economic role was as the middlemen of the west. They functioned as the representatives of European manufacturers in the Anatolian hinterland and also directed the flow of raw materials from the Empire to Europe.¹⁹ Another aim of the western powers was to encourage cessationist movement among the diverse nationalities of the Empire. Because of these movements, many small and dependent nations would be much easier to control.²⁰

The Armenians were of strategic significance to the western powers. They were economically well off. They appeared good tool in the hands of the western powers to control the Ottoman Empire.---- hence the Young Turks determination to deal with them firmly. During the World War I, the Armenians were responsible for Ottoman defeat at the hand of Russia. During the course of the war many of them deserted the Turkish rank and joined the Russian forces with Turkey. They also indulged in fifth column activities. Moreover, they were³hinderance to the Young Turks effort in creating national bourgeoisie. In these situation, the Unionists issued the Deportation Law. Under this law, Armenians were deported to Mesopotamia.

Next they also took tough stand against the Greeks. The struggle against the Greeks had started right from 1908 when Greece annexed crete . They were mostly concentrated in western Anatolia. The boycott against Greek goods and services started

in 1908 which was intensified after 1913. The main victim of the boycott were the Greek merchants, producers and transporters who controlled most of Turkey's import and export commerce and maritime transport. with a systematic programme, the Young Turks tried to bring them into submission. During the World War, the Unionists asked the foreign firms of Izmir to expel all Greeks and employ Turks instead. Under the leadership of Enver Pasha, two basic policies were systematically implemented. First they established national banks, corporations, credit unions and wide scale organisation of Turkish local artisan groups of the Aegean region in producers co-operatives. Secondly, they applied intimidation and force against the rich Greeks of the region to leave the area and migrate to Greece. In their place, the Unionists intended to resettle the migrants and the local Turks.

The Young Turks radical step can be seen in their dealings with foreign powers. In their desperate bid, they made an alliance with Germany on the eve of the first world war and consequently entered the war by the side of the Allied powers. But if we look into the course of events just preceeding the war, we will come to the conclusion that there was no other alternative available to the Young Turks.

The Unionists had seized power in 1913 and they were more convinced than ever before that only an alliance with Britain and the Entente powers could guarantee ^{of} what remained ^{of} the Empire. Therefore, in June the same year, the subject for an alliance was reopened by Tevfik Pasha who restated the offer of 1911. But once again it was turned down. Then the Unionist under Tala-l-Pasha and Cemal Pasha approached Russia and France

respectively but to no avail. They even refused to give financial help to ^{the} ~~unionists~~ proposals. All these rebuffs convinced the Unionists that the Entente powers had taken the Turkish neutrality for granted. But it was only Germany, which all along had been ready to help the Unionists. They offered the financial help but on the condition that Turkey joined the war. Thus in this desperate situation, the Unionists made a formal alliance with Germany and joined the war. The situation was so critical that alternative to war seemed to them perilous and disastrous. The public opinion was charged with war menia, since it provided the Turks a chance to show their valour. They thought that if they remained out of the war, they would be left isolated. Though the Allies ultimately got the defeat at the hand of Entente and it brought unfold miseries on the defeated powers both in terms of man and money as well as territory. But one thing is clear that their decision to join the war was wiser one. The Entente powers had already made up a plan to divide the Ottoman Empire among themselves which was only revealed when the Russian Tsar was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in the Russian revolution of 1917. Among them ^{few} ~~the~~ agreements are most revealing. First was 'Constantinople Agreement' signed between Britain, France and Russia on March 18, 1915. Second was the 'Secret Pact of London' signed between Britain, France and Russia on April 26, 1915 and the third was the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement' signed between Britain, France and Russia on May 16, 1916 and last was the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement signed between Britain, France and Italy on April 17, 1917. This is to show that there was no option to the Unionists but to enter the war. They were convinced that the liberation from economic bondage could not

be won at conference table but had to be fought at the battle field.²²

THE YOUNG TURKS AND PAN-ISLAM

The use of dissident group within hostile states has been a characteristic features of Machiavellian state policy. The Bourbons of France traditionally incited scottish and Irish risings against England. In the 20th century, however, the dimension widened with the induction of political ideologies. By inciting minority and religious or revolutionary groups, the attempt was now to weaken the present or future potential ^{is} enemies. This is what the European powers have been doing in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman sultan too in his capacity as the Caliph of the Muslims and upholder of the Holy places of Islam utilized his position to incite Muslims throughout the world against England, France and Russia because these powers had large Muslim population in their empires. He sent a number of emissaries to various countries with this objective.

The Young Turks too found it useful to counter-balance the imperialist pressures. In the initial stage, the Young Turks did not invoke Pan-Islamism. They used only emissaries as feelers. Many emissaries were sent to India. Let us have a brief look over their activities. By the year 1911, the CUP had definitely adopted the Pan-Islamic programme and was employing agents in various countries with the object of

exciting the Muslim subjects of non-Muslim rulers to look to the sultan of Turkey as their legitimate sovereign. - Two Turkish Missions were sent to the East in this connection. The first Mission which was on behalf of sultan Abdul Hamid was sent before his deposition. It arrived in India in March 1909 and visited Bengal. The second Mission was sent by the Young Turks to visit India via China.²³

However, the Pan-Islamic activity of the Unionists intensified after the Balkan war. Before the outbreak of the world war I, they ^{sent} many emissaries to India to fan Pan-Islamic and anti-British feelings among the Indian Muslims. Although only a few of these visitors gave any evidence of their Pan-Islamic activities, the warmth and intimacy with which these guests were received in India by the prominent Pan-Islamists always roused British suspicion.²⁴ First of all S.M. Tevfik Bey a journalist of Istambul and corespondent of the Sebil-er-Rishad arrived in Bombay from Baghdad on 8 June 1913 with the ostensible objective of collecting funds to start an Urdu paper on his return to Turkey.²⁵ But before leaving Bombay on 11 March 1914, he visited several places in India. Then came Mohammad Samey Bey Ex-private Secretary of Vali (Governor) of Basra and Mustafa Sadia, a Lieutenant in the Ottoman army. They gave the impression that they were in the confidence of the Young Turks and their visit to India have been undertaken with the precise intention of cementing the relations between the Young Turks and the Pan-Islamists in India. It was the warm welcome given to them by the Pan-Islamists which roused British suspicion.²⁶ Another emissary was led by Abdul Majid the

editor of the Ultaz who was accompanied by an Ex-captain of the Egyptian army. They visited India in August 1914 when Abdul Majid's papers were searched, he was found in possession of two violently anti-British printed pamphlets. He was arrested and jailed at Karachi.²⁷ Two Turkish doctors Omar Kamal Bey and Adnan Bey also visited India before the war. They had come to thank those who had contributed funds to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. They visited a number of places in India. Another important emissary was led by Hafiz Wahabi who visited India before the 1st World War. He came in close contact with the Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba. (Society of the servants of Kaaba).²⁸ Besides, it the Unionists gave warm welcome to all those who visited Turkey during these years. Among them were Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mushir Hussain Qidwai, Dr. M.A. Ansari and Maulana Mazharul Haque.

During the world war I, the Unionists sought the help of Germany in the Pan-Islamic propaganda. Germany had all along been considered as the defender of the Caliph, Islam and the Holy places by the Indian Muslims. Germany on her part too was in search of dissident group to harass the British in India. Naturally their choice fell on the Ghadriles and the Pan-Islamists. Enver Pasha laid out comprehensive plans to organise revolutionary movement and send German Officers to Afghanistan.²⁹ The Turkish ambassador at Tehran sent letters to the Amir of Afghanistan through two Persians, calling upon him to join the war in defence of Islam. But both of them were captured by the British. Soon after the declaration of the war, Turkey sent Obedullah Effendi Professor at Smyrna and a

deputy in the Turkish parliament to Afghanistan to present a sword of Islam to the Amir.³⁰

Enver Pasha even formulated a scheme for the despatch of a force of three regiments in India to stir Muslims against the British.³¹ At Constantinople there was a committee, which included Enver Pasha, the Shaikhul-Islam and the German ambassador³². The Shaikhul Islam upon the declaration of the war had already issued fatwa (decree) for open jihad (religious war) against the British, French and Russians.

Shaikh Sawish - a famous Pan-Islamist in Turkey had prepared a manifesto which was to be sent to India and Egypt. He was also to accompany a group of 13 emissaries and deliver^{a letter} to the Amir of Afghanistan. The British authorities were alerted about this plan and asked to seize him if he came to India.³³ Enver Pasha even instructed the Vali of Basra about German plan to send arms and ammunitions to India and he was asked to help it so that it may stir troubles in India, Baluchistan and Afghanistan.³⁴ But these efforts bore no fruit due to timely action by the British intelligence officials.

But the Young Turks were instrumental in helping the Ghadriles under Raja Mahendra Pratap and Ubaidullah Sindhi to establish a provisional government in Afghanistan of free India in 1915. They also helped the Indian revolutionaries in inciting disaffection among the Indian army stationed in the Persian gulf and Suez Canal area during the 1st World War.

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CHAPTER - III

THE YOUNG TURKS[✓] AND
INDIAN RESPONSE

The Ottoman Empire took a step forward in terms of nationalism when the Young Turks brought about a revolution in July 1908. It has been rightly regarded as a transitional phase to republic which was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923. This phase had far reaching consequences especially for the colonies in Asia. In India, this phase had special meaning since it had indirectly helped the cause of Indian National Movement. The Indian Muslims had started taking interest in the affairs of Turkey since the beginning of the second half of the 19th century. This was largely the result of Pan-Islamism - a movement intended to unite all Muslims against the colonial and imperial designs of the west. What was new in this phase was the amount of interest taken by the non-Muslims as well in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Now onwards the non-Muslims too began to take active interest in the affairs of Turkey as a gesture of brotherhood of colonial orient. Their interest rested on different premise. This phase also saw the emergence of extremism in India's nationalism which demanded self-rule instead of progressive realization of responsive administration under the aegis of the British.

The nationalists saw in the success of the Young Turks' Revolution in 1908 the affirmation and fulfilment of their aspiration because with the Young Turks coming to power in Turkey, there dawned a new era of democracy and constitutionalism. The autocratic and personal rule of the Sultan had come to an end. This was the demand that the extremist nationalists were making. The Indian Muslims took pride in the fact that the Young Turks

would not only bring about stability but also give a fresh lease of life to the Ottoman Empire. A section of them had already begun to take active interest in the national movement in India. Their participation in the national movement increased as the years rolled because now there was no justification for the British government to be inimical to Turkey. In fact this phase strengthened the belief of the Indian Muslims in the high handedness of the British and, as the years passed, they began to understand the true nature of the British colonialism. Those section of Muslims who were opposed to the Indian National Congress now began to collaborate with it in its struggle for freedom.

As anticipated by the Viceroy Lord Minto it afforded the Indians an opportunity to criticise and attack British policies.¹ G.V. Joshi, an eminent nationalist asked the people to emulate Japan and Turkey to regain their lost honour.² R.C. Dutt acclaimed the Young Turks Revolution in these words,

"The East is following in the footsteps of the West after a lapse of 60 years as 1908 will be as memorable as 1848" in European history³

It had long been argued that India being a country of diverse people, creeds, sects etc. was unfit for representative institutions. This was said about the entire orient. But the events in Japan and Turkey shattered all these myths. The nationalists cited the example of Turkey and Japan in support of their demand for representative institutions and democracy in India. Various commendatory descriptions of the Young Turk

revolution were published in the Indian Press.⁴

The Indian Muslims had responded favourably at the change. The Musalman observed,

"The transformation of the Turkish Empire into a constitutional monarchy is emblematic of the fact that the (Indian) Muslims is no longer in sleep and that the sick man is convalescent. It is a matter that will inspire a new spirit in the Muslims of India".⁵

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad writes that his meetings with the Young Turks convinced him that Indian Muslims must cooperate with their compatriots for the liberation of India. He planned to launch a new movement in India among Indian Muslims.⁶ On his return to India, he thought over his future programme of action and one of the major steps taken by him was the launching of an Urdu journal Al-Hilal in 1912 to propagate his views.

But a section of the conservative Muslims in India viewed the change with reserve - thanks to the amount of sympathy created by the Pan-Islamic movement for the Sultan of Turkey. The revolution was staged against the authority of the Sultan. Moreover the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUF) the premier political organisation of the Young Turks was not clear outside Turkey. They were known outside as athiests and anti-Islam. Hence the conservative section of Indian Muslims were alienated from the Young Turks.

This revolution was to follow the second one. The conservative sections in Turkey led by clergy had staged a

counter-revolution against the Young Turks. Though it is not clear as to what was the role of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in it but he was implicated by the Young Turks and deposed and replaced by Mohammad V. This event too attracted the attention of the Indians.

There were two streams of response among the Indian Muslims. One appreciated the deposition but a large section did not like the idea of the deposition of the Sultan Caliph. But soon, the dilemma was overcome. Meetings were held at several places in India to sympathise with the deposed Sultan but at the same time congratulate the new incumbent.⁷ The Anjuman-I-Islam Ahbab organised a meeting on 16 May 1909 at the Zakaria Mosque Bombay to resolve the prevailing differences of opinion.⁸ Moreover the political upheaval in the Ottoman Empire did not affect the Pan-Islamic activities in India. In fact the Young Turks soon realized the potentialities of the Pan-Islamic movement and accepted it as a matter of principle. This change in policy also changed the attitude of those Indian Muslims who hitherto did not like the Young Turks due to its anti-Sultan policies.

The non-Muslim sections of India also welcomed the deposition of the Sultan. Bal Gangadhar Tilak wrote in his paper that Islam is a democratic religion but now it has been forgotten and set aside.⁹ The two successive revolutions in Turkey strengthened the nationalist conviction. The myth of oriental inability to have representative institution had been demolished which had for long been the mainstay of British imperialism in India.

The Young Turks faced a lot of difficulties which came one after another. since its coming to power. The first trouble came from Austria which annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (territories in her mandate since 1878) on 7th October 1908, just after the Young Turk revolution. Then came the question of crete. It expressed its willingness to merge with Greece. To the surprise of the Young Turks, the powers who had guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, it was allowed to merge with Greece in lieu of some monetary compensations. But the most important event took place in 1911 when Italy attacked and annexed Tripoli, the last outpost of the Ottoman Empire in Africa. Then came the Balkan wars which deprived the Empire whatever had been left by the Congress of Berlin in Europe. All the European part of Turkey was annexed by the Balkan States with the connivance of the Powers.

These last two episodes in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire attracted violent response of the Indian people in general and Indian Muslims in particular. These difficulties of the Young Turks created for them considerable sympathy among Indian Muslims. Mohammad Ali, the editor of Comrade wrote "The sympathy of all right minded people must be with the heroes of one of the most successful revolutions of the world.¹⁰ It was even suspected that some secret agency was fomenting trouble in Turkey. The Young Turks were expected to deal with the situations strongly.¹¹

The Italian aggression on Tripoli aroused considerable indignation among the Muslims as well as the non-Muslims in India. Syed Amir Ali, President of the London Branch of the All India

Muslim League recorded his protest in a letter published in the Times of London. He pointed out that Italian example would provoke a war of creeds and races.¹² Likewise the Bengalee of S.N. Banerji voiced a protest against the Italian attack, showing that the indignation was not confined to Muslims only. It expressed deep sympathy for Turkey and remarked that when she (Turkey) was rapidly assimilating western methods of government, the Europeans embarked upon a war of spoilation against her.¹³ Upon the declaration of British neutrality in the war between Turkey and Italy, ~~the~~ Indian Muslims demanded British intervention to safeguard the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ Meetings were held at several places in India to express sympathy for Turkey. A meeting was held at Calcutta which resolved to collect funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent society. The Council of the All India Muslim League advised the Indian Muslims to boycott Italian goods.¹⁵ During this period Government of India received numerous representations and resolutions from individuals and Muslim organisations mostly passed at public meetings after Friday prayers in mosques.¹⁶ The indignation and anger was such among them that even future relations between the British Government and Indian Muslims was put at stake. Failing to get proper British response they began to see British complicity in Italian attack on Tripoli.

Even the Bengalee of S.N. Banerjee voiced concern at the Italian attack. It advised the Europeans that strong and settled Turkey would be a better guarantee for European peace. It advised Britain not to allow the powers to dismember Turkey in her own interest.¹⁷

It was suspected that Britain had secretly pledged support to Italy in Tripoli. In fact it was there if one judges the policy of Britain in the Mediterranean. It was the traditional policy of Britain not to allow any activity in the Mediterranean. But failure of Grey to represent any protest to Italy in its attack over Tripoli proves its complicity though not explicitly. There are other reasons also to suspect Britain. On the declaration of neutrality the British Government in India assumed the protections of Italian interest in India.¹⁸

It was argued that the Tripolitan war would deepen Pan-Islamic sentiments in India. The British refusal to allow the Turkish troop pass through Egypt further aroused the anguish of the Indian Muslims.¹⁹ Great concern was expressed when the Italians threatened to bombard holy places at Mecca and Madina, if Turkey did not sue ^{for} peace. Nawab Viqarul Mulk, a prominent Muslim Leader of Aligarh observed that this attitude of Italy would harden the spirit of India Muslims once for all.²⁰

The Italian aggressions on Tripoli seemed to shake the Muslim faith in Britain. They began to suspect the British for its covert help to Italy. There was a widespread rumour among them that there existed a secret pact among the Christian powers of Europe against Islam. The most affected province was the United provinces. So much so that the government of United provinces instituted a secret enquiry where upon it found that there was a wide spread resentment among Indian Muslims in the province. There upon the Government of India also directed other provincial governments to gauge the feelings of the muslim on the Tripoli issue. The result was a comprehensive report.²¹

The most disturbing was the development of solidarity between Shia and Sunni Muslims on the Turkish issue - something not to the liking of the British. In India, it was the policy of the British government to keep these communities separate from each other so as to ensure divide and rule policy in India.

Even in the North West Frontier Provinces where the tribal Pathans had till then been quite apolitical, now began to be influenced by the developments in Tripoli. There was a universal sympathy for Turkey in the province. The tribal Pathans strongly believed that christian powers of Europe are arrayed against Islam. The province was flooded with a number of vernacular papers. The report pointed out that these papers were responsible for the new development.

In Punjab, where the Pan-Islamic sentiment was strong the sympathy for Turkey was more strong and universal among Muslims. The Punjab Government believed that Muslim discontent would grow further unless the British government did something to bring about the termination of the Tripolitan war as soon as possible. There was also signs of rapproachment between the Hindus and Muslims. This was seen as a means of coercing the British government - thanks to the development of Ghadrates in the Province.

In Bombay there existed a widespread sympathy for Turkey on the Tripolitan issue. It was interpreted as a step of European suppression of Islam. This belief was supposed to have been strengthened by the visting emissaries from Persia, Turkey and Egypt to spread the message of Pan-Islam in India during

this year. The response to the Red Crescent Society of Turkey too was widespread in the province.

In Bengal, the Muslim press moulded the opinion of the educated classes. The boycott of Italian goods was vigorously advocated and enforced in the province. A Red Crescent Society was established on the occasion to collect funds for the Turks. In this context, the Bengal Government believed that the Turkish success would be more embarrassing to the government than its reverses.

In Madras too, there was sympathy for the Khalifa and Turkey as this secret report reveals.

Taking advantage of the Italian invasion of Tripoli, the Balkan states formed a confederacy and declared a war on Turkey to expel it from Europe. Compelled by the circumstances, Turkey concluded peace with Italy in 1912 and agreed to give autonomy to Tripoli under Italian Suzereignty.

The Balkan war in close succession to the Tripolitan war, convinced the Indian Muslims that there existed a conspiracy among christian powers of Europe ~~once~~ again and that no sympathy was to be expected from any of the European powers. It was in fact believed that without a promised support of the powers, the Balkan States could not have ventured to declare war on Turkey.²²

What was significant at this juncture was the widespread support of the non-Muslims as well. The Tribune of Lahore was very critical of the utterances of British Prime Minister

Asquith. It carried an article, entitled, "Is Britain the sole arbiter of the Near East?"²³ The Bengalee wrote strong editorials criticizing Britain and other European Powers on the Balkan issue.²⁴ Maulana Mazharul Haq in his welcome address at the Bankipur Session of the Congress observed,

"what moved the Muslim Community most was the universal sympathy shown by their Hindu brethern.... The moral and material support we have has gone straight to our hearts and conquered us. And in this respect no one has done nobler work than our veteran leader Mr. S.N. Banerji."²⁵

Bipin Chandra Pal and some other leaders attended meetings and spoke in support of Turkey. He asserted that Turkey be preserved in Europe with its different races, creeds and religions because it was the only place where nationalism could grow in perfection. At Surat at a public meeting presided over by Sardar Ali El-Edreess - a local notable, several resolutions were passed. One such resolution thanked all non-Muslim communities of India for sympathy for Turkey.²⁶

In these circumstances, the Turks were advised to join with Afghanistan, Iran, Arabs and India in order to check European expansion. They should do so on the principle that Asia is for the Asiatics and unless they act on such principles Europe would remain a terror for them.²⁷ At about this time when negotiations were on between the ambassadors at London after the Balkan war, a memorial was presented to Edward Grey - the Foreign Secretary of Britain, who was the Chairman of the Conference, on behalf of the Muslims of various countries strongly denouncing the attitude of christian powers towards

Muslims.²⁸ They listed their grievances as the breach of treaties guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey, doubts over the true nature of Entente Cordiale and continuous pressure on Turkey since the coming of the Young Turks, thus preventing internal reforms in Turkey. In particular, they denounced the attitude of Russia and pleaded with Britain to make an alliance with Germany to check the Slav menace in the Balkans. The memorialists suggested four possible solutions.

- a. preservation of the status quo
- b. grant of autonomy to various provinces under the suzerainty of Turkey
- c. creation of independent Kingdoms in various provinces
- d. Secession of some territories to Balkan states

Of these options, the memorialists preferred the first one because its enforcement would revive trust in treaties and in Europe when all the nationalities obtained representation in the Turkish Parliament, there would be no cause of complaint. They further contended that Adrianople should remain with Turkey because it was an Islamic territory. Furthermore it was contended that it held the key to Constantinople which was the capital of the empire.

Upon hard terms of the Treaty of London, the Turks were advised by Indian Muslims to resume the war, once more and not to surrender.²⁹ Subsequently when the Turks recaptured Adrinople from the Balkan allies following the rift among them over the spoils of war, it was hailed and celebrated in India. A lot^{of} resentment was expressed when it was learnt that the

European powers had sent a note to Turkey dissuading it from occupying Adrianople from the Balkan allies. Britain was advised to observe the strict neutrality and not to take part in coercing Turkey when it was having an upperhand in the Balkan crisis.³⁰ At Lucknow, the Leading Ulama and Muslims addressed the following warning to the government,

"In the interest of the British Empire, we appeal to Britain not to loose irretrievably the goodwill of Indian Muslims for it is great asset and its loss will entail serious consequences"³¹

Similarly All India Muslim League to the India office, London pointing out that Turkish effort at regaining her most strategic post is essential for her independence and at the same time it is not harmful to British interest in any part of the world.³²

Meanwhile, Enver Bey became a Hero in the popular imagination of Indian Muslims. There was strong rumour that he was contemplating to visit India after the war. This alarmed the British Government which wanted to know it from the British ambassador at constantinople. They made it known that political condition of India was most undesirable to allow an individual of Enver Bey's stature and political views in India. His visit would produce immense incitement to Indian Muslims. The ambassador was asked to discourage him otherwise, the government will refuse the facilities.³³

RELIEF MEASURES AND MEDICAL MISSIONS

Turkish ordeal invoked immediate response from Indians particularly the Muslims. News of atrocities moved them to contribute to the Turkish Relief Fund. Some of them contributed on humanitarian grounds, others purely on Pan-Islamic and religion grounds.

Besides it, an Indian Red Crescent Society was established at Calcutta, Mohammad Ali the editor of comrade and Hamdard established another Red Crescent Society at Delhi. All these societies derived their name from Ottoman Red Crescent Society at constantinople of which Hilmi Pasha was the President. Mohammad Ali requested the viceroy Lord Harding to become the patron of Red Crescent Society. Lord Harding accepted the offer and approved the collection of money by the Red Crescent Society for huminitarian purposes.³⁴ Harding himself contributed one thousand rupees towards the fund. His example was followed by other officials of the Government of India. Mohammad Ali felt gratified and believed that his (viceroy's) gesture would dispel the notions lurking in some peoples' mind about the purpose and policy of the government. He assured the authorities that he would try to remove such misconceptions.³⁵ Syed Ali Iman and others also thanked the Viceroy for his generous donations and said that it would have a soothing effect on the Muslims of India. Mohammad Ali even requested Lady Harding to involve herself in the drive to enlist the support of Muslim Women of Delhi. A Zanana (ladies) branch of the Red Crescent Society was also established at various places in Indi and organized meetings to collect funds.³⁶

The students, staff, trustees, old boys and well-wishers of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh also formed a Red Crescent Society. They collected both in cash and kind for the sick and wounded and for the families of the soldiers killed in Tripolitan war. Students also passed resolutions not to take delicious food and donate the saving of such frugality towards the Turkish relief fund. The Principal of the college Mr. Towle sent the fund on behalf of the students to the British ambassador at constantinople for onward transmission to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society or the Grand Vizir of Turkey.³⁷

Zafar Ali Khan, the editor of Zamindar organised a separate Turkish Relief Fund. He held meetings in connection with the Balkan wars and urged all sections of Muslims to contribute towards the Fund. He also denounced the Muslim leaders for misrepresenting the matter to the Turkish authorities.³⁸

Following the rejection of the Muslim university charter the Pan-Islamic leaders even suggested that the university fund be diverted to the Turkish Fund. Some even pleaded for its giving to Turkey in the shape of loans. But the trustees of the college vehemently opposed such proposal.³⁹

The funds for Turkey were mostly collected by leading newspaper like the Comrade, Zamindar, Paisa, Akhbar, Watan contribution to these funds generally came from the middle class families of the Muslims. There was even suggestion to make it a permanent body keeping in view the future problem of Turkey.⁴⁰

The clergy also did not lag behind in this venture. The Ulama of Deoband issued a fatwa making it incumbent on Muslims to subscribe towards the fund and even declared that it was lawful to direct the money out of the price of skin of sacrificed animals at Eid-ul-Azha, to the Turkish relief fund.⁴¹

Anticipating a generous response from the Indian Muslims the CUP even despatched agents to India to raise loans by selling Turkish Treasury Bonds.⁴² Mohammad Ali began writing in his papers about the Turkish bonds.⁴³ The Viceroy too did not consider the selling of Turkish bonds in India to be against British policy although he had doubts about its repayment.⁴⁴ But the bond scheme could not find as much response as anticipated. It was subsequently dropped.

Apart from monetary help rendered by Indian Muslims for the Turkish cause, other forms of help were also extended. One such idea of sending of medical missions to Turkey to give medical aid to the victims of war in Turkey. Subsequently three missions were sent initially opposed to such moves the Indian authorities ultimately decided not to put any obstacle on it especially due to the recommendation of Grey, Foreign Secretary of Britain.⁴⁵

The first mission was sent from Bombay by Anjuman-i-ziaul Islam. But this mission was not successful and returned back soon. But the most famous and successful mission was sent by Mohammad Ali from Delhi. The Viceroy Lord Harding himself saw this mission

off from Delhi. The mission was led by Dr. M.A. Ansari, an eminent medical practitioner of Delhi. This mission was well equipped, well organised, and well provided with funds.⁴⁶ It was most successful and gained considerable popularity in India as well as Turkey. In recognition of their services, the Turkish authorities named the hills and villages of Amreli by an imperial Edict as Hindustan jebal and Hindustan keny. The sultan of Turkey also conferred decorations on the members of the Medical Mission which was presented at a ceremony in the Turkish consulate at Bombay on 12 November 1913.⁴⁷

Another mission was also organised by the London Branch of the Muslim League. Syed Amir Ali sponsored a medical mission from London. But this mission too was not as popular as that sent under Dr. Ansari.

Apparently the objective of the missions was humanitarian and genuine response of the Indian Muslims to help the Turkish victims of war, it was also the product of Young Muslim political in India.⁴⁸ Above all it was intended to impress upon Europe that Islam was still a corporate body and each and every member of the community cares for it.

BOYCOTT MOVEMENT

As a protest against the Italian aggression in Tripoli, the Muslims of Calcutta decided to launch a boycott of Italian goods at a meeting held on 22 October 1911 on the Federation Hall Ground. At the meeting Ghulam Hussain Arif, Dr. Suhrawardi and Maulana

Abul Kalam Azad urged the people to join the boycott movement.⁴⁹

The Indian resentment against European aggression on Turkey during the Balkan wars was better expressed when they resolved to boycott all European goods. Support to the movement came from the erstwhile revolutionaries of the Swadeshi movement in Bengal like Maulvi Liaqat Hussain, Bipin Chandra Pal and Shyam Sunder Chakravarti. The latter organised a public meeting when Bipin Chandra Pal advocated for a systematic boycott of all European goods. Even the Imam of the famous Nakhoda mosque at Calcutta extended his support to it and advocated fraternal relation between Muslims and Hindus.⁵⁰

The boycott movement gathered momentum atleast ideologically and went a long way to bridge the gulf that existed between Hindus and Muslims in Bengal. Apart from advocating boycott of European goods, more emphasis was put on the unity of Indian people. From Bengal, the movement spread outside also. Hasarat Mohani of Aligarh inaugurated the movement at Aligarh. He got a fatwa issued by the Ulama of Aligarh in support of the movement.⁵¹

The boycott movement might not have been a success so far as its observance and implementation was concerned but it certainly helped to bring about unity of Hindus and Muslims. And it also completed the alienation of Indian Muslims which had been brewing since the Tripoli war. The Indian authorities took the interest taken by the Aligarh students in boycott movement and agitational politics, as undesirable.⁵² The Government of

India decided to write to the United Provinces^{and}/Punjab Governments to check the growth of the boycott movement and nip it in the bud. A general enquiry into the state of feeling of the Muslims followed. In UP, Lt. Governor Meston decided to suppress the boycott movement. The authorities got alarmed at the growth of this movement and advised the government of India that if it was not supported in time, it will cause irreparable loss to the British Empire.⁵³

Shankat Ali, brother of Mohammad Ali conceived a new way to help the Turks. He appealed to Muslims to go to Turkey in the Balkan war to volunteer services by the side of the Turkish army. The editors of zamindar and Muslim Gazzette endorsed the proposal of Shankat Ali. Shankat Ali enquired the Government of UP whether there would be any objection to Indian Muslims proceeding to Turkey to fight with their co-religionists against the Balkan confederacy.⁵⁴ He made it clear that these volunteer would be on their own expenses and not in the pay of the Turkish government. He contended that the declaration of neutrality by the British government did not prohibit Muslims or christian subjects to fight on either side. On the basis of newspapers reports, Russian volunteers were already fighting on the side of the Balkan confederacy⁵⁵ as he claimed.

On this, the reply of the government of UP was in negative it said that the position of the Indian Muslim would go against the neutrality of the British government. But Shankat Ali anticipating such a reply, wanted only to know the attitude of the British authorities. He reiterated that no one can stop

Muslims proceeding to Turkey on other pretext and then join the volunteer.⁵⁶

There was various other proposals like establishing a colony at Anatolia for the refugees of Macedonia and Thrace, an Islamic Bank at Constantinople with branches all over the world, and a proposal to found a university at Medina which were to fulfil the requirements of the Muslims all over the world.

But the most ambitious scheme was to form a private militia to protect the Holy places of Islam. Consequently an association called Anjuman-i-Khuddam Kaaba was established following the threat of Italy to bombard the Holy places of Islam. Its protagonists were Mushir Hussain Qidwai and Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Lucknow. They planned to collect one crore rupees in a year and utilize the money for acquiring sophisticated weapons like dreadnaughts aeroplanes and establish army and navy to protect the Holy places of Islam.⁵⁷ The scheme was made public by Shankat Ali at Amritsar in March 1913. He called upon all Muslims to combine in a society called Arjunan-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba (society of the servants of Kaaba) with the aim of protecting Holy places from non-Muslim aggression.⁵⁸

A committee was set up with Maulana Abdul Bari as Khuddam-ul-Khuddam with Mushir Hussain Qidwai as one of the two secretaries and Hakim Abdul Ali (Lucknow), Dr. Naziruddin Hassan (Barriester Lucknow) and Mohammad Ali as its treasurers.

The final constitution was adopted in early 1914. When its objectives were broadened. The central organisation was to

be located at Delhi. Under the rules, Rupee one was to be collected from every Muslim rich or poor each year.⁵⁹ This amount was to be divided into three parts. One part was to go to an independent Muslim power who controlled the Holy places. The second part was to go to different orphanages and schools. The remainder was to be kept for use at times of need in the defence of Kaaba.⁶⁰ Evidently the object of the society was to protect the holy places but the real object was to give substantial help to the sultan-Caliph. It was given a religious garb to keep it safe from government interference.

Keeping this view in mind a proper organisation of the society was set up complete in administrative hierarchy from circle, district and provincial units to an all India organisation.⁶¹ The society had two types of membership. Those who paid their subscription and swore allegiance to the objects of the society were called Khadim-i-Ka'aba. Those who took oath and undertook to devote their lives in the service of Ka'aba were enrolled in the society as Shaidan-i-Ka'aba. In the case of the latter, the society undertook the responsibility to support their families from its funds.⁶²

Efforts were also made to make the society representative of all sections of Muslims. But it was the society of Young Party of the Muslims who had grown up in recent years against the leadership of traditionalists.

The promoters of the society failed to get official recognition of the government.⁶³ The government was suspicious

of the real motive of the society and not ready to take it at its face value. It carefully watched the growth of the society in Punjab and UP. More so because the society was an organisation in which young elements were associated, therefore, always potentially dangerous in India.⁶⁴ Its members were considered more dangerous than all the Bengalis and Marathas put together.⁶⁵

The government of India made enquiries to know the extent and support enjoyed by Anjuman-i-Khuddam Ka'aba especially in Punjab which was becoming an important centre of Muslim politics. It was believed that it had following among urban people having Neo-Muslim and Pan-Islamic leanings.⁶⁶

The World War I began in 1914 and with this the Indian response To Turkish issue witnessed a metamorphosis. It was a well known fact that Turkey would soon join the war along with the Tripple Allies and against the Tripple Entente even before the actual conflagration. The young Turks had no option but to join the war along with Germany.

Added to it, it was also well known to the British that Indian Muslim who had developed deep sympathy for the young Turks would side with Turkey. During the years preceding the war, the relation between the Indian Muslims and the British had deteriorated considerably due to double standard of the British policy vis-a-vis the young Turks.

Hence the doubt of the British government vis-a-vis Indian Muslims was natural. Even before the actual fighting, Cradock Home Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council submitted a memorandum to the government and pointed out the possible source of trouble during the course of the war. The report singled out Muslims and Sikhs to be the main source of trouble.⁶⁷

Meanwhile among the Indian Muslims there were two trends as regards Turkey joining the war. The Pan-Islamists were the votaries of Turkey joining the war so as to seize the opportunity to get back its lost territory which had been taken away by the European powers. They infact praised Germany because Germany was to be the possible ally of Turkey in the war. Germany was presented as friend of Muslims and Islam. The Pan-Islamists wanted so because the Tripple Entente had Russia as its members which was considered by the Pan-Islamists as the greatest danger to Islam

But the most rational among Muslims who knew the strength of the British power took a balanced view. They advocated that Turkey should adopt neutrality in the coming war. Mazharul Haq said at a public meeting at Bankipur Patna on 5th September 1914 that if any country desired peace that was Turkey. He asserted "Turkish nation is fully alive to her Islamic obligations. They feel the responsibility of being the guardian of Islam and our Holy places. And this is what binds us most to them."³¹ He asserted that since the Turkish government was not in a position to defend these places against Tripple Entente, so it could not enter this world conflagration.⁶⁸ He asserted that Indian Muslims should rally to a man behind the British government.

Upon the declaration of war by Turkey, the British government initially wanted to keep the Indian Muslims in dark. At the same time steps were taken by the British government to prepare the public of India to appreciate the policy of the government. It was made to believe that the British government never wanted a war with Turkey. Later on the Indian administration gave up its policy of keeping the Indian public in dark about the actual situation.

Therefore, it thought it essential that the princes and public of India be informed of the facts without any delay, indicating the consistently aggressive attitude of the Ottoman government adopted at the behest of Germany.⁶⁹ A communique was issued by the British government showing how owing to Turkey's hostile attitude towards Great Britain relation between the two countries had deteriorated. The communique further asserted that Great Britain was the greatest Mohammedan power in the world and faithful and consistent friend of Turkey. But due to chauvinistic elements in the Turkish government it had allied with the enemies of Great Britain.⁷⁰

Britain declared war on Turkey simply extending the existing order in council to cover the Ottoman Empire. It however, excluded the Holy places of Islam from any attack by the naval and military forces of Great Britain, France and Russia so long as there was no interference with the pilgrims from India.

The entire British Indian administration in the meanwhile geared up to forestall any hostile public opinion by securing a prompt declaration from leading Muslim associations and individuals in support of the government. Sensing the gravity of the situation, assurances of loyalty poured in from the Muslim association and individuals to the government. The Agha Khan, the Nizam and all other important princely states issued assurances of steadfast loyalty to the British government.⁷² The Begum of Bhopal impressed upon her subjects and Muslims in general that how Britain was fighting for the cause of smaller states against the rapacity of Germany and appealed to Muslims to remain loyal to the British government.⁷³ Similarly other princes like Nawab of Rampur, Tonk, Maler Kotla etc issued declaration of loyalty to the British government.

Meetings were also organised by other associations and parties to express loyalty to the British government. Among the organisations and public bodies which passed loyal resolution were All India Muslim League of the Bombay Presidency, UP, Bihar, Bihar, Punjab, All India Sufi Conference, Trustees of MAO college Aligarh and Committee of the All India Educational Conference.⁷⁴ They welcomed the assurances of the British government regarding the safety of Holy places.

Several religious bodies also sent similar assurances, including Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. But all these assurance and declarations of loyalty were neither spontaneous nor sincere - and did not reflect the perturbed mind of the Indian Muslims at that time. The pronouncement of the Indian princes were

diplomatic utterances which reflected neither their own feelings nor those of the people of the state. They were obliged to follow the instruction of their British masters. The best example of this can be cited by the attitude of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Fridunji who was picked up by the British Resident at Hyderabad to educate the Nizam confessed that the Nizam had soft corner for Turkey. The Nizam is reported to have said that if Hyderabad would have been an independent state like Afghanistan, it would have fought on the side of Turkey because if Turkey is defeated, Muslims would be like Jews and Parsees having no home of their own.⁷⁵ In spite of the Nizam's undoubted sympathy for Turkey he was forced to issue declaration of loyalty and asking the Indian Muslims to rally round the British government in this hour of crisis.

The news of the declaration of war with Turkey created great panic in India. All kinds of rumours were afloat. The Jama Masjid Dhaka was thronged by persons anxious to know whether the Sultan's name would be recited in the prayers because there was a strong rumour of its ban in India. They were relieved to know that no change had taken place. It was a small incident but it showed what was the real feeling of the Indian Muslims.⁷⁶ They realizing their helplessness, suppressed their feelings under foreign rule. They considered it wise to issue declaration of loyalty in spite of the fact that Britain and Turkey were at war.⁷⁷

SYMPATHY FOR TURKEY

The Indian Muslims' sympathy for Turkey however, did not evaporate so soon. They were in a divided state of mind. This

has been very aptly presented by Morrison - Principal MAO college who in close touch with some leading Muslims of India. He writes :

"The anguish with which they (Indian Muslims) see England attacking Turkey is the most terrible trial that they have experienced since the beginning of of British rule in India."⁷⁸

The concern of the Indian Muslims for Turkey is truly reflected by the contention of Shankat Ali that there is not a Musalman who in his heart does not pray for the victory of Khalifa and defeat and destruction of enemies including England.⁷⁹ Although they did not contend the argument that Turkey was fighting a political not a religious war, it did not mean that they had no sympathy for the Turks. The plea that the young Turks represented a worldly kingdom representing both Muslims and non-Muslims in their government⁸⁰ did not carry weight in view of their sentimental and emotional attachment with Turkey. Those who were trying to prove that Indian Muslims had no connection with the sultan of Turkey were severely criticized as demon of hypocrisy and mischief who were faithful neither to God or faith nor to his government.⁸¹ There was a growing party in India which considered that all discussion with reference to the Caliphate should be stopped as it was only liable to create bad feelings.

Some of the speeches of the English statesmen were unwelcome and were met with chorus of protests from Indian Muslims Lord Lyod George's comparison of the prophet with William Kaiser of Germany was taken as slandering to their religion which further accentuated their suspicion specially in view of

the fact that on earlier occasions too, the British statesman had declared on the eve of the Balkan war, indicating their contempt of Islam as a religion. Asquith's speech of 9 November 1914 as regards to future of Turkey was taken by the Indian Muslims as lacking in balance and precision.⁸² In this speech he had predicted the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Despite the fact the open opposition and hostility was non-existent mainly due to repressive measures, there was open insinuation that in recent years, the British government had abandoned the role of a friend and protector of Turkey.⁸³ Turkey's action in siding with Germany was sympathetically viewed and defended. It was pleaded that the action taken by Turkey was in accordance with its long cherished goal of defeating Russia and recover the land occupied by it earlier.⁸⁴

There was also a section of Muslims openly supported Turkey's action. Abdul Kalam Azad opined^{that} the Turks who have plunged themselves in such a great war must have had some very weighty reasons for playing with blood and iron.⁸⁵

The Pan-Islamists in India made secret efforts to assist the Turks. After the entry of Turkey into war, efforts were made by Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Ka'aba to tamper with Indian troops stationed in Egypt. One such person enjoined to perform such duty was Haji Ghulam Naqshband and the other was Syed Ahmad Shah Jilani.⁸⁶ Besides, others who were active were one Imam Din and other Fazlshah who are reported to have been in touch with Indian troops in Egypt.

Besides Egypt other centres of the society ie Anjuman-i-Khud⁸⁸am-i-Kaaba, was in Arabia where member of the society went at the pretext of Haj and then propagated Pan-Islamic and anti-British feelings among the Haj pilgrims some of them even got enlisted in the Turkish army.⁸⁷

The Indian Muslims also protested when the Arabs revolted under the leadership of Sharif Hussain of Mecca against the Ottoman Empire at the instigation of the British. The Indian saw it with great anguish and called Sharif Hussain a puppet of the enemy of Islam.

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CHAPTER - IV

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

From the beginning of the 19th Century, the Ottoman Empire went through a number of crises resulting in its progressive decline. Gradually the Ottoman Empire Shrank to Asia only. The European parts of the Empire were either annexed by the colonial powers or declared their independence with the active support of one or the other European power. With the coming of the Young Turks, a new era of colonial activity in the Ottoman Empire began.

All these crises in the Ottoman Empire created a lot of resentment among Indian Muslims who had emotional attachment with it since the Ottoman Sultan was also regarded the Caliph by the Indian Muslims. The Sultan was also the custodian of the Holy places of Islam. So the trials and tribulation of the Empire naturally attracted the attention of the Indian Muslims. Consequently a strong Pan-Islamic movement struck root in India. The Indian Muslims began to show their solidarity with Turkey largely on religious ground. By now, Pan-Islamism produced a lot of anti-West feeling among Indian Muslims. Slowly anti-West feeling turned into anti-British in course of time. But, initially this feeling did not result in creating a sense of nationalism among Indian Muslims. The general Muslims remained aloof from political activity in India. One major cause of such a behaviour was the relative backwardness of the community vis a vis their compatriots. Secondly the leadership was in the hands of conservative Muslims who collaborated with the British. Lastly the policy of divide and rule pursued by the British did a lot in maintaining a gulf between the Muslims and Hindus for

long.

But the situation changed as the Young Turks came to power in Turkey. They were patriots and forward looking. They tried to modernize Turkey and took all steps to keep Turkey united. But their sincerity and nationalistic outlook were not to the liking of the colonial powers. They saw in the Young Turk power a threat to their colonial designs. Hence a new era of colonialism began in the Ottoman Empire. The remaining outlying provinces of the Ottoman Empire were annexed by the European powers. The nationalist upsurge was fanned to de-stabilise the Young Turks regime. In fact the Balkan states declared war on the Ottoman Empire to expel the Turks from Europe.

The developments in Turkey had been keenly watched in India. The Young Turk revolution was hailed by both the Hindus and the Muslims. Their policies of constitutionalism and reforms were greatly praised in India and it was claimed that henceforth, the European power would have no cause to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey. But the continuous chain of crises in the Ottoman Empire shook the faith of Indian Muslim in particular in British claim that it was the greatest Mohammadan power and that it was the friend and protector of the Ottoman Empire, the stake which an average Indian Muslim had very close to his heart largely on emotional ground. Gradually a sense of anti-British feeling began to take roots among Indian Muslims. Already they had been seeing the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 with suspicion.

The Young Turks in the meanwhile intensified Pan-Islamic activities. They even urged the Indian Muslims to cooperate with their compatriots in India against the British. In fact they were surprised to know as to why the Indian Muslims were camp follower of the British.¹ During the World War I they even declared jehad against the Tripple Entente and urged the Indian Muslims to rise against the British.

The Indian Muslims were greatly inflamed at the depradation of Europe on Turkey. They gave all moral and material help to it in its fight against such depradations. But more important was the fact that now Indian Muslims began to develop political consciousness. Maulana Azad who was to become prominent Muslim leaders of the national movement, writes that while in Turkey and Egypt. He was greatly influenced by the Young Turks and his contact with them confirmed in his political belief.² He was convinced that Indian Muslims must cooperate with the Hindus for the independence of the country subsequently he planned to launch a new movement among Indian Muslims and one such step in this direction was the launching of al-Hilal, an Urdu journal in 1912.

Likewise, the Hindus too were influenced by the develop-
ments in Turkey during the Young Turks period. They particularly hailed the establishment of constitutional regime in Turkey. Tilak went to the extent of praising Islam as a democratic religion. They claimed the same set up in India and argued that if it can be established in Turkey with such diversities then why not in India. The entire press of the time is full of commendatory reports and articles of the achievements of the Young Turks. They pledged all help to the Young Turks in their fight against

colonialism. Though unlike the Muslims, their support was entirely based on secular and nationalist grounds.

Thus the Young Turks and events related to Turkey provided a common platform for the first time after the revolt of 1857 to both the great communities of India. In other way, the Young Turks indirectly helped the cause of India's national movement by helping the two great communities on one platform. In course of time, both the communities came together and fought unitedly for the national cause.

The year 1911 marked a new phase both in Turkey and India. For a new thrust of colonialism when Italy attacked Tripoli, the last outpost of the Ottoman Empire in Africa. In India the partition of Bengal was revoked in December 1911 at the Delhi Durbar. Both these developments greatly unnerved and inflamed Indian Muslims. Indian Muslims began to see British hand in Italian attack on Tripoli though there was no direct evidence of British complicity in Italian venture. On the failure of the British government to side with Turkey and revoke its neutrality infuriated the Indian Muslims. The revocation of the partition of Bengal brought home to the Indian Muslims to need of an agitational politics. Thus the political consciousness of the Indian Muslims developed further. There was often talk among them to join the congress. Syed Ali Imam, the law members of the Viceroy's executive council confirmed the strong tendency of the growth of a young party among Indian Muslims who wanted to join hands with the congress.³

Similarly when the Balkan confederacy declared war on the Ottoman Empire closely following the Italian attack, it invited universal condemnation in India both from Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Gradually a feeling arose that there existed a secret conspiracy of christian powers against the Ottoman Empire. All these developments created tremendous anti-British feelings in India among Indian Muslims.

The anti-British feeling of Indian Muslims become quite evident from the reports, surveys and articles that appeared in different newspapers, particularly Muslim press. The press played significant role in arousing anti-British and pro-Turkish feelings by probing deep into various aspects of the Turkish question. The multitude of the masses who till then had been in deep slumber, awoke to the call of the press. They became so anxious to know the current news of the happening in Turkey that the journalists thought it necessary to start fresh vernacular papers as the demand for information was growing day by day. People living in distant and inaccessible areas went to near by towns every other day to get the Turkish news. Quite often one paper circulated in too many hands till it became pulverised. The only ambition of Indian Muslims in these years was to help Turkey.⁴

The disillusionment with the British bred a new trend in Indian politics. Now the Indian Muslims realized more than before the importance of Hindu-Muslim co-operation.⁵ On the eve of the Tripoli war and British declaration of controversial neutrality, the London Branch of All India Muslim League went to the extent of appealing Indian Muslims to cast their lot in with the Hindus

and to identify themselves with the political objective of the congress, something which was unthinkable in the league circles before. They had till then refused to collaborate with the Indian National Congress calling it the party of the Hindus only.

The British were quick to notice the change of the tide in favour of unity. A British intelligence report said L

"Many of the barriers to a Hindu-Mohammadan Union have thus been thrown down and the Modern Mohammadan is too fully cognisant of the success of Hindu method of agitation..... But the Mohammadan is less quiescent and much quicker to action than the Hindu and it is quite possible that events in Turkey or elsewhere might occur to rouse Muslim feeling to action independently.... of their political leadership."6

Thus the upsurge and restlessness of the Indian Muslims on the eve of Tripolian and Balkan wars contributed significantly in a rousing them to political action against the British-- much more than the Hindus and in broadening their mass base, for [^]now the masses of Muslims readily cooperated with their leaders. It influenced even those sections which till now had maintained indifference to politics. Thus the upsurge and disaffection was universal.

Even the Indian National Congress could not fail to discern the significance of the new change. It also emphasized the need of Hindu-Muslim Unity to frustrate the imperial game of divide and rule. Therefore, the Congress heartily welcomed the new trend among Indian Muslims and in their politics, Hindu-Muslim unity became the topic of discussion of the day. Earlier it was unusual for Hindu leaders attending exclusively Muslim

meeting convened for the purpose of discussion of the problem of the community. Now it became usual for Hindu nationalist leaders attending such meetings. At one meeting, a resolution was passed expressing sympathy of all Hindus to the Sultan who was victim of the Balkan wars. The meeting further called for boycott of Balkan goods.

But the most noticeable and perceptible change occurred in the Muslim League politics largely due to its dissatisfaction with the British on Turkish issue. The League in its Sixth Session for the first time gave a call for the establishment of a unified League to be open to all classes and creeds, ^{and} to evolve a common Indian nationhood. It condemned the attempts that were being made to create a gulf between the Hindus and Muslims. The most remarkable change occurred in its 7th Session when in 1913 the Muslim League revised its constitution making it in tune with the objectives of the Congress. It declared that "no country could remain for ever under foreign rule, however beneficial that rule might be and added that India was its motherland and must in the end be handed over to Indians. The League constitution substituted the word the goal of suitable self-government in India for the objective of loyalty to the British government. The League thus moved very close to the Congress objective of self-government.

In fact the process of this change had started earlier in 1910 from the Delhi Session. But during these two years the events in Turkey accelerated the process. A new group emerged in the League which did not like the collaborationist attitude of the old guards. This young group were progressive in outlook

and were ready to cooperate with any force to oppose the British designs. It were they who ousted the old conservative leadership of the League from positions in the League politics. The old leadership failed gravely on the Turkish issue and stood discredited and condemned before the Muslim masses. By 1913, the process of change was complete as is shown by its resolve to fight for the self government in India. Many prominent leaders of the league in the meanwhile joined the Congress. It is these leaders who made valuable contribution to bring the League and the Congress even more closed resulting in the Congress-League Pact in 1916. In May 1913, Mazharul Haq addressed the UP Congress Committee on the possibility of a joint Hindu-Muslim Conference. He brought the League behind the Congress in an agitation over the conditions of Indians in South Africa. In 1914, he declared that there was no political question in which the interest of both the communities were not equally involved or with regard to they differed.⁷

The Congress too reciprocated the League resolve. In its Karachi Session in 1913 the Congress resolves: "This Congress most hastily welcomes the hope expressed by the League, that the leaders of different communities will make every endeavour to find modus-operandi for joint and concerted action on all questions of national good and earnestly appeals to all communities to help the object we all have at heart.

The outbreak of the world war I added a new chapter in the growing Hindu-Muslim amity. Though the Indian Muslims and various of that organisations declared their loyalty to Britain in its war efforts, but they were greatly pained at British attack on Turkey. Many of the prominent Muslim leaders were in jails

and their publications banned by the British government. India came under severe repression during the war years.

It is during the war that efforts were made by the leaders of both the congress and the league to come together. In 1915, the league and congress held their sessions in Bombay simultaneously. It was so arranged that the leaders of the league attended also the congress session. The soul of this movement was Maulana Mazharul Haq, a Bihar leader. At Bombay, the leaders of both the bodies were in one mind regarding the need of co-operation between the two organisations. Lastly a joint dinner was organised which symbolized the unity of two great communities. Both the bodies stressed the unity in constitutional demands. The congress and the league both formed separate committees to draw up a scheme of reforms in consultation with each other.

The natural corollary of these developments was the Lucknow Pact between the congress and the league at Lucknow in 1916. Now, the congress accepted in principle the separate electorate to Muslims which it had been opposing since 1909, the year of its introduction. It even acquired in their introduction in the Punjab and the central provinces where it did not exist before. All these were done for the sake of unified front against the British. The Muslim League on its part agreed to fight unitedly for the goal of self-rule which had been set by the congress. Thus will simultaneous assertion of both the bodies for self-rule became a formidable challenge to the British. Now onwards, both co-operated each other till the Khilafat Movement. At every stage the league remained a formidable ally of the congress.

Thus when Home Rule Movement gained momentum the League did not lag behind. A number of prominent league members became active advocate and participant in the Home Rule Movement. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Omar Subhani were the prominent Home Rule League leader of the Bombay presidency. Similarly in the UP and Bihar, the league members played significant role in the Home Rule Movement. A fortnightly report from Punjab said, "A report has been received that Raja of Mahmoodabad (a prominent league leader of UP) intends to finance some newspapers in this province on behalf of All India Muslim League to champion the Home Rule cause."⁸ Meston, the Lieutenant Governor of the UP reporting on the political developments in his province wrote:

"Extremists and Moderates have united after years of misunderstanding, and the greatest marvel of all, the Mohammadans also have come into the fold".⁹

The general tone of communal environment also improved. Hindus and Muslims of Allahabad embraced each other during the Dussehra and Muharam festival.¹⁰ There are similar other examples, whenever riots occurred it was condemned by both the leadership. For example, when serious riot occurred in Bihar in 1917, it greatly worried the promoters of Hindu-Muslim unity. All efforts were made to educate the masses of both the community against religious animosity and remove all the obstacles that came in the way of league congress rapprochement. Hakim Ajmal Khan at the Amritsar session of the league advised Muslims not to slaughter cows with a view to respectfully the sentiments of Hindus.

The Montagu Chelmsford Reforms which for the first time declared the goal of reforms as progressive realization of

responsible government in India, were rejected both by the congress and the league as it fell short of their expectations at their Bombay and Delhi sessions respectively.

Similarly on the introduction of Rowlatt Bill which mean to curb the civil rights of Indian and gave extra-ordinary powers to the police, the response was similar. Following the call of Gandhi to protest against the Rowlatt Bill, the Hindus and Muslims responded spontaneously. Mahatma Gandhi writes in his autobiography about the protest in Delhi.

But in the meanwhile Delhi had already observed Hartal on 30th March. The word of Swami Shradhanand ji and Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahab was law there.....Delhi had never witnessed a hartal like this. Hindus and Muslims seemed united like one Man, Swami Shradhanand ji was invited to deliver a lecture from Jama Masjid. All this was more than the authorities could bear." ¹¹

Similarly in Bihar Hasam Imam and Maulvi Mazharul Haq were Gandhi's Chief Lientenants. They mobilized thousands of Muslims attend a public meeting in Patna in protest against the Rowlatt Bill.¹² In Bengal, the Hindus gathered at the Nakhoda Mosque to protest against the Rowlatt Bill.¹³ In UP, Maulana Abdul Bari strongly supported the movement against the Rowlatt Bill.¹⁴

Thus the Young Turks helped both the great communities of India to come on a common platform and fight unitedly against the British. The Lucknow Pact, the Home Rule League and the Rowlatt agitation were the fine examples of this rapproachment. This rapproachment

continued till the non-co-operation and Khilafat Movement of 1920-22 and provided a common front to the British in India.

To sum up, the Young Turks period is very significant from the point of view of the evolution of nationalism both in Turkey and India. It was the culmination of the process which had started in the 19th century. The anti-colonial feeling of the 19th century acquired clearer shape with the coming of the Young Turks to power in the Ottoman Empire since these groups had better understanding of the situation.

In Turkey, the Young Turks ushered in a new era of nationalism. They ultimately came to the conclusion that better way of preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire was to cultivate the idea of nationalism among the Turks. Though initially they did not resort to it in the belief that ^{their} cosmopolitan approach would wean away the non-Turkish sections of the Empire from anti-national activities. But in it they failed miserably. Hence they stressed the need for the development of the idea of nationalism in the Empire. Thus they became in one way instrumental for the establishment of republic in Turkey. At the same time, their anti-colonialism had many similarities with that of nationalists in India. They too, ultimately singled out Britain as the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire and successfully uncovered the mask of dualism which Britain had been wearing since long. They made the true nature of British colonialism clear.

In India, the development of nationalism got a definite direction. The process of alienations of Indians which had started

in the 19th century, now became complete. During the Young Turks period, particularly Indian Muslims found no justification of further spoliation of Turkey since it was rapidly assimilating western methods of government and institutions. But with the imperialist spoliation of Turkey, unabatted, the Indian Muslims began to suspect British in all these developments. By 1913, the alienation of the Indian Muslim from the British government was complete.

At the same time, the Hindus too responded to the perils of Turkey though on different grounds. But the response of Hindus was complete. They readily co-operated with their Muslim brethren in support of Turkey. This won over many of the conservative Muslims who had till then been opposed to co-operate with Hindus in demanding freedom from Britain.

The result of this rapprochement between the Hindus and Muslims was the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the congress and the Muslim league which subsequently offered united opposition to the British till the Khilafat Movement. All along these years, both the bodies co-operated each other and it seemed that the co-operation between them was complete. The rapprochement was total, so much so that it alarmed the British.

Thus, the Young Turks helped to bring the two great communities of India on one platform, thus frustrating the game of divide and rule played by the British for many years. It became very significant for the development of nationalism in India. Moreover, the developments in Turkey aroused the common Muslims which till then been untouched by the ideal of nationalism and

anti-colonialism. They came on the forefront of national movement in subsequent years.

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