

**SOVIET UNION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL :
THE GORBACHEV PERIOD.**

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
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to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before
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P R E F A C E

Throughout history nations have sought to ensure or improve their security through armaments. That they have failed in this quest is evidenced by the periodic wars affecting the mankind. The two global wars within a generation and the potentialities of nuclear warfare with the advancement of science and technology, have made the establishment of International Order and preservation of international peace the paramount concern of human civilisation. The devastation caused by Atom bomb in Hiroshima still lurks in the memories of the people of the world. The nuclear weapons of today have assumed such a proportion that if a nuclear war breaks out, it will lead to the total annihilation of human race. A scientist goes to the extent of saying that there are no sanctuaries after a nuclear holocaust and the ashes of Communism and Capitalism will be indistinguishable. So disarmament or arms control is desirable and necessary goal of the world to have any assurance of peace and security.

After the second world war, the Soviet arms control strategy took a new qualitative dimension. The advent of nuclear weapons has changed the commonly accepted ideas on what is possible and admissible in International affairs.

It played an important role in the formation of its disarmament policy. Change of leadership in Soviet Union also facilitated the modification of Soviet strategy doctrines and revision of the doctrine of the 'inevitability of war' in particular.

Soviet attitude towards arms control took a new turn with the coming of Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov to power. Soon after his election to the coveted post of General Secretary of CPSU, he took whole world by storms by his radical rethinking on domestic and international matters. He emerged as a political dynamo, a policy innovator of a sort not seen in Soviet Union. He considered evidently fresh policy initiatives and tactical flexibility to the more effective strategy for attainment of Soviet objectives than an offensive, ideologically rigid approach as practised in the past. Arms control and disarmament, therefore, ranked high in priority in his scheme of things. A series of proposals put forward by him not only reflects a new approach but has also put the US on the defensive.

The Soviet arms control policy under Gorbachov is not only a means for preventing the proliferation of lethal weapons, but also a sure way leading to:

- a) An improvement of world political climate.
- b) Consolidation of international security.
- c) Development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In fact, the Gorbachov period from 1985 till now has been the meaningful period of arms control. He championed the cause of global arms control in a period plagued with mutual distrust and suspicion between the big two. He heralds a new epoch in arms control negotiations.

The study which will adopt a historico-analytical and deductive method seeks to verify the following broad hypotheses:

1. Soviet initiative towards arms control and disarmament first arose out of the genuine fear of the strategic encirclement of the Soviet Union during US monopoly period.
2. Soviet campaign for arms control is viewed as a part of the Soviet nuclear diplomacy to avoid nuclear confrontation, to reduce East-West tension and if possible to build confidence in each other.
3. Whether Soviet arms control policy is the reflection of her dynamic foreign policy task to avert the threat of nuclear war or a tactical move out of domestic compulsion due to the difficulties in the field of its economy.

How a technical bureaucratic affair like arms control was set in the context of long term political-economic-strategic interests? Why did Soviet Union embark on the path of arms control? What were the

interrelationships between Soviet strategic doctrines, the flow of technological development, domestic and international economic pressures, the attitudes and capabilities of individual leaders, the quality of Soviet bureaucracy and diplomacy on the one hand and Soviet arms control policy on the other? What were the Soviet Union's gains and losses etc. are some of the questions to which my study proposes to seek answers.

The first chapter deals with Marxism-Leninism as the basis of Soviet military strategy and Soviet perceptions of nuclear war and arms control. The second chapter deals with the various Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States. The third one deals with the evolution of Soviet policy towards disarmament and arms control. The fourth chapter deals with Mikhail Gorbachov's arms control initiatives since his coming to power in 1985. It also analysis his the step by step, consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years before the end of this century, various recent peace offensives in his meetings with different leaders of the West and his sincere efforts for an East-West rapproachment.

Every research activity involves a collective process. Mine is no exception. It is in this process that I gratefully acknowledge the intimate prompting

and sagacious advice of my guide Prof. T.T.Poulose which helps me in reaching my goal. Really I owe a lot to his profound erudition and scholarly sophistication.

It is my great pleasure to say thanks to my friends - Susan (endearingly called Ajja), Avay, Subhas, Manoj, Prasanna, Nana, Haque, Aswini, Rajesh, Sarat, Sanjay, Avin, Aurobind, Bisu and other friends for their valuable suggestions. Last but not the least I would like to thank Sharmaji for taking pains in typing this dissertation.


(MANORANJAN PANIGRAHY)

C H A P T E R - I

MARXISM-LENINISM: BASIS OF SOVIET MILITARY
STRATEGY AND SOVIET PERCEPTION OF NUCLEAR
WAR AND ARMS CONTROL

The Soviet thinking about the use of military power is rooted in the official Marxist-Leninist ideology of the State. This dogma asserts that the World is moving from capitalism to socialism and that this transition began with the October Revolution. The Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party have built a socialist society and are now engaged in constructing a Communist one. Between the two World Wars the Soviet Union stood alone against hostile capitalist powers. Victory over Germany laid the foundation on which a socialist camp could be built. More recently the socialist camp has grown in size and has been joined by countries of 'socialist orientation' such as Angola and Ethiopia. In Soviet eyes these changes signify that since 1917 the 'correlation of forces' in the world has been moving in the direction of socialism.

The correlation of forces is the term used in the Soviet Union to describe the power relationship between capitalism and socialism. It is a broader concept than the 'balance of power', for it embraces not only military but also political, economic and moral elements. The Soviet concept differs also

from the 'balance of power' idea in that it does not imply that equilibrium is a good thing or that efforts should be made to correct imbalances. The objective of Soviet policy is to further the movement of the correlation of forces towards socialism, not to maintain a balance of power between socialism and capitalism.

In Soviet theory it is not Soviet actions that move the world from capitalism to socialism, but the contradictions inherent in capitalism itself. These contradictions give rise to revolutionary and national liberation movements which struggle to overthrow the capitalist States and destroy their net work of imperialist domination. Armed struggle may be necessary in some cases if the forces of reaction use the repressive agencies of the State to resist change. The functions of military power are presented in Soviet writings, in this context. The main function is to prevent a world war by deterring a nuclear attack through the threat of certain retaliation. The second is to defend the socialist community and its individual member States. The third is to aid national liberation movements and newly independent States to resist the forces of imperialism.¹

1. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms race, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p.82.

The growth of Soviet military power is seen to contribute to all these purposes by weakening the ability of the imperialist States to use their military power to stop the movement of the correlation of forces towards socialism. Similarly also Kremlin's arms control and limitation strategies are determined after an objective assessment of the correlation of forces in the camp of the adversary² - particularly western capitalist block headed by United States.

The policy of war and peace in Soviet Union, is based on Marxist - Leninist ideology, which considers war as a socio-political phenomenon arising at a definite stage in the course of social development. War promotes political ends of certain classes in an exploitative society. When war took place, it brought along with it, a cruel method of resolving social antagonism and helped the dominant classes to pursue their economic and political aims. Thus, war is considered by Marxists as a continuation of the policies of certain classes or States by forcible means and these classes with the possession of the private property play an important role in the outbreak of war.³

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2. T.T.Poalose, (Ed) The Future of Nuclear Arms Control (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987), p.67.
 3. Yassilei Mamantov, Disarmament - The Command of the Times (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1979), p.15.

According to Marxism - Leninism, private property and ownership of the means of production are responsible for the outbreak of war. War will be banished only with the fall of private property and classes based on antagonistic social relations. This in turn will eliminate the need to maintain armies and armaments.⁴

Lenin in his analysis of war was influenced by the German military theoretician Clausewitz. He gave a picture of the relationship between war and politics. War he said, "is only a part of political intercourse, therefore, by no means an independent thing in itself".⁵

Marx, Engels and Lenin evolved their theories of the true nature of War by empirical analysis of wars in the condition of capitalism and imperialism. They regarded politics not as an expression of abstract interest of society as a whole but as an expression of definite class interests.⁶ By doing so their main aim

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4. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German ideology (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1972) p.14.
 5. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), Vol.3, p.121.
 6. T.Borodulina, Karl Marx, F.Engels, V.I.Lenin on Historical Materialism; A Collection, (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1972), p.521.

was to reveal the political content of war and the connection between its aims and the material interests of a particular class.

Lenin was of the opinion that war and politics were not to be contrasted to one another because according to him war represented the continuation and consumation of the policy of a particular class. Politics on its part embodies the relations between large masses of people and reflect their conflicting interests and aspirations. Thus Lenin considered that all wars are inseparable from political systems that endangered them.⁷

While supporting the famous dictum of Clausewitz on War, Lenin added to it the phrase 'Violent means' which in Marxist-Leninist military vocabulary means- Weapons the armed forces and the entire military organisation or instrument of warfare. Lenin, does not see anything wrong in war and violence. He said: "much has been left in the world that must be destroyed by fire and iron".⁸ Hence Marxism-Leninism defines war

7. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), Vol.29, p.400.

8. V.I. Lenin, No.7, p.400

as an armed violence or organized armed conflict between different Social classes, States, groups of States and nations in order to achieve definite economic and political goals.

It must however, be pointed out that Marxism-Leninism does believe in an era of lasting peace. But this according to them, would be possible only when the proletariat have captured political power and when all exploitation has come to an end. And when the ideas of universal communism achieved, there would be no need of armies because there class antagonism would cease to exist. Thus according to Lenin "a World proletarian revolution is the only escape from the horrors of a world war".⁹

War in the correct sense of Marxism-Leninism, "inevitably means an interruption of the peaceful constructive activity of people, which diverts enormous material value to unproductive purposes and is attended by destruction of what has already been built. This is still more true of a thermonuclear

9. K.S. Murty and A.C. Boquet, Studies in Problems of Peace (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), P.256.

war, which could throw the socialist countries back from the levels they have attained in economic and cultural developments".¹⁰ Lenin advocated in 1915 pacific means, instead of resorting to war.

Marxism-Leninism advocates the theory of peace as the direct opposite of the theory of war as a continuation of politics by other violent means. "War is synonymous with politics in general but comprises only part of it that politics in addition to war commands a large portion of various non-violent means, which it can enlist to attain its goals without resorting to war."¹¹ To achieve its goal by peaceful means is one of the most important aims of the Soviet foreign policy. Hence the Soviet Union appeals to the Western powers, especially to its partner in the arms race to solve all international disputes by negotiations and not by war. Moreover, peace is necessary and essential to ensure peaceful conditions for construction of Socialism and Communism in the Soviet Union.

10. V.I.Lenin, No.7, p.469.

11. V.D.Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, (London: Rand Corporation, 1963) pp.271-272.

In pursuit of its goal to build Socialism and Communism in the USSR, it has accepted disarmament as a strategy of peace and today it has become the most important Soviet foreign policy objective. Its acceptance of disarmament is not new. Long before Lenin's support to it, Marx and Engels viewed disarmament favourably.

Marx and Engels discussed about the concept of disarmament in their work on European security. They both agreed that disarmament was necessary and urgent to bring about peace and security in Europe. Their views on disarmament were evolved at a time when militarism was tightening its grip over Europe and devouring her.¹² In the catastrophic atmosphere, Marx and Engels realised that disarmament was the only solution for peace in Europe.

Later, Engels formulated a systematic disarmament plan, which was meant for a step by step and proportional reduction of military force of regular armies of all countries. Thus, it was basically Engel's plan on disarmament that laid the basic foundation of the Marxist-Leninist concept of disarmament.

12. Igor, Vsachev, A World without Arms (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984).

Lenin gave a scientific interpretation of the Marxist concept of disarmament. In the beginning of his writings, he did not accept disarmament as an alternative to war. He bitterly opposed it, calling it "bourgeois - pacifism", which serves to distract the worker from the revolutionary struggle. Lenin's ideas on disarmament were evolved at a time when he was struggling to dislodge the Czar and bring socialism in his country.

Disarmament was unacceptable to Lenin because according to him, it was impossible to attain it in a bourgeois society, where there was exploitation and oppression of individual by individual. In such a type of society he believed in arming of the proletariat for the purpose of disarming the bourgeoisie. But he maintained that "only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie, will it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scarp heap, the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before"¹³.

Hence, when the bourgeois classes are completely eliminated the State becomes unnecessary and in the

13. V.I.Lenin, n.7,p.316.

absence of any class antagonism it slowly withers away, as a result of which a classless society is formed and as Lenin says, "disarmament becomes the ideal of socialism". There will be no war in a socialist society. Consequently disarmament will be achieved without any difficulties.¹⁴

The October Revolution brought about in Bolshevik eyes, a fundamental change in the class character of the Russian State and its military forces. In the early years after the revolution intense arguments erupted about the practical implications of this political transformation. Among the issues involved was the military doctrine. In 1921 Frunze stressed the importance of a doctrine, arguing that it was essential to have a set of aggrieved views on the nature of a future war, since this alone could give direction to the development and training of the Red Army.¹⁵ Trotsky opposed this argument on the grounds that military doctrine had been appreciated for the States of the old regime when a stable international system had existed, in a revolutionary period. He warned, however, that a doctrine with its implications of set and fixed views was inappropriate and might degenerate into doctrinairism.

14. Ibid.

15. Frunze, M.V. Yedinaya Voenaya doktrinia Krasnaya in Izbrannaya Proizvedeniya (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977) pp.29-46.

Frunze won the argument and the definition he gave to military doctrine is now the accepted one in USSR. In the Soviet definition military doctrine has two closely connected aspects: the political (which is supposed to be dominant) and the military-technical. The former sets out the political purposes and character of war and the way in which these affect the development of the armed forces and the preparation of the country for war. The military-technical aspect deals with the methods of waging war, the organisation of the armed forces, their technical equipment and combat readiness. In practice these two aspects are not only connected, but overlapping and in the formulation of policy the relationship between political and military responsibilities has often been contentious. Yet, the analytical distinction should be borne in mind, because it is important for an understanding of the Soviet thinking about nuclear war.

The Soviet concept of its military doctrine can not be properly understood without reference to the concepts of military science and military art. Military science is defined as the system of knowledge about the character and laws of war, the preparation of the

armed forces and the country for war and the methods of waging it; the significance of military science is clearer if we call it the science of war, Kriegswissenschaft. Military art is the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations and this embraces strategy, operational art and tactics. But the theory of military art and hence strategic and tactical theory form part of military science.

In the Soviet view, military doctrine embodies the agreed views of the State on questions of war and military policy. It is defined by the Party leadership who have to take account of economic and political circumstances in formulating the doctrine. The military doctrine expresses the political character and purposes of the State, but draws on military science in the formulation of its military technical aspect.¹⁶

1953 marked a major turning point in the Soviet military. That year Stalin died thus making it possible to move away from the rigid orthodoxies of 'Stalinist military science'. In the same year the

16. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms race, (New Haven and London, 1983) p.30

Soviet armed forces first received nuclear weapons, thus making it imperative to reassess the Soviet thinking about war. There are some indication that the reassessment began in Stalin's life time, for in 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR' published in September, 1952, Stalin wrote that "it is said that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today in defence of peace and against another world war". That is not true. To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.¹⁷

In 1953 and 1954 several articles were published implying that the 'law of the inevitability of war' could be rendered inoperative. In March, 1954 one of the Party leaders, Mikoyan argued that the danger of war had receded now that the Soviet Union possessed both the atomic and the hydrogen bomb. On the same day Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers declared that World War in the nuclear age would mean the 'destruction of world civilisation'.¹⁸

17. Ibid. p.31

18. H.S.Dinerstein, 'War and the Soviet Union', (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp.28-63.

At the Party Congress in February, 1956 Khrushchev announced that war was no longer to be considered 'fatalistically inevitable'. He noted the Marxist-Leninist thesis that 'Wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists', but claimed that the situation had changed. There existed a world socialist camp and in the camp the forces of peace found the moral and the material means to prevent aggression.¹⁹ The labour movement in the capitalist countries was also a major force for peace. In these circumstances he said, "certainly the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars will also be preserved, remains in force. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance. As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive towards military gambles and aggression and may try to unleash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent imperialists from unleashing war and if they

19. Lincoln, P. Bloomfield, 'Khrushchev and the Arms Race', (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966) pp.60-63.

actually lay to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans!"²⁰

This was an important new position and it remained central to Soviet thinking ever since War was less likely because the Soviet Union was increasingly able to prevent an attack on itself and its allies. This ability did not rest in the Soviet eyes, on Soviet military power alone, but Khrushchev's reference to the 'formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war and to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors suggests that besides the new political relationships he had military power including nuclear weapons, in mind when he stated that war was no longer 'fatalistically inevitable'.

The thesis has remained a key element of Soviet military doctrine. The political aspect of the doctrine stresses the possibility and the importance of preventing a world war between capitalism and socialism. The military technical aspect of the

20. N.S.Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the both Congress of the CPSU, (London:Soviet News Booklet, 1956), p.28.

doctrine attends to the question of fighting such a war if the imperialists should unleash it. In the Soviet thinking, deterrence is a political rather than a military concept and has received relatively little attention in military writings which are concerned primarily with the preparation for war and the conduct of war, there is no Soviet equivalent to the theory deterrence developed in the USA in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Soviet leaders have seen the prevention of war as something to be achieved by means of a 'peace policy' - a foreign policy that seeks to reduce the risk of war-backed by military might. According to Marshall Ustinov, the basis of the Soviet military doctrine lies in the 'unity of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet State and its readiness to give the necessary rebuff to an aggressor'.²¹ No contradiction is seen between the prevention of war and the preparation of war; war can be prevented only if the Soviet Union prepares to wage it.

Soviet military theorists divide the history of their military doctrine into several periods. They identify 1929 as the first major turning point

21. David Holloway, *op.cit.* p.32-33.

after the **Revolution** and date the transformation of the Red Army into a mechanised force from that year. The war with Germany had a profound influence on the Soviet strategic and tactical thought but it did not bring major changes in the military doctrine, in the Soviet sense of that term. 1953 saw the beginning of the next major period, in which military thought began to confront the problems raised by nuclear weapons. In January, 1960 Khrushchev announced the outlines of a new doctrine for the nuclear age.²²

Between 1953 and 1960 the Soviet Union began to acquire a stockpile of nuclear weapons, along with the inter-continental, medium range and battlefield systems to deliver them. Conventional forces were reduced as the nuclear arsenal grew naval ship building programmes were cut in the mid 1950s and the number of men under arms fell from 5,763,000 in 1953 to 3,623,000 in 1958. This shift of emphasis made it necessary to rethink the military doctrine. Colonel-General Povaly, Chief of the Operations, Directorate of the General Staff in 1960s, wrote that the new weapons 'persistently demanded a fundamental reexamination of all fundamental principles of

22. Ibid. p.35

military doctrine and all military art, primarily strategy.²³ In 1953 the central focus of the Soviet military thought was a conventional war in Europe. In December, 1959, the strategic Rocket Forces were established as a separate service and in January, 1960 Khrushchev declared that a future world war would inevitably be a nuclear rocket war.

This change of emphasis was not determined solely by the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet policy had to take account of the heavy American reliance on nuclear forces. American defence policy during the period rested on the doctrine of 'massive retaliation', which envisaged massive and immediate use of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression. The American nuclear stockpile was larger than the Soviet and the American ability to launch nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union remained far greater than the Soviet ability to strike the United States. Moreover, in 1954 the United States introduced tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, thus changing the character of ground operations in the continent.²⁴

23. Col.Gen. M.Povaliy, "The Development of Soviet Military Strategy", Voennaya Mysh, 1967, no.2, p.64.

24. George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First twenty-five years, (New York: Dunellan, 1970), pp.89.

At the end of 1953, the Ministry of Defence ordered that nuclear weapons and the particular features of preparing, conducting and securing an operation and combat in conditions of the use of such weapons should be studied. This caused the general staff Academy to revise its research and teaching programme radically. At the beginning of 1954, Red Star, the newspaper of the Ministry of Defence, published a series of articles on nuclear weapons, thus breaking a seven year silence on the subject. In September of the same year the first large scale troop exercise was held in which an atomic bomb was exploded; the results were studied carefully to gain information for anti-nuclear defence.

The effect was seen first in the discussions of the role of surprise in war. Stalin has described surprise as a "fortuitous and transitory factor in dividing the outcome of war, which would depend, he said, on the permanently operating factors: stability of the home front, morale of the army, quantity and quality of divisions, equipment of the army, the organising ability of the commanding personnel of the army".

Stalin had first used this formula in November, 1941 when he claimed that the advantages the Germans had gained from surprise had evaporated. At the time it was sensible to assess that the gains of surprise were transitory and it helped to sustain Soviet morale. But after the war the formula of the 'permanently operating factors' became enshrined as part of the orthodoxy of Stalinist military science. Discussion of strategic surprise was inhibited by Stalin's view that it was not a decisive factor and this judgement was closely linked with post-war historiography which played down the disasters of 1941 and portrayed the Soviet retreat as part of preplanned strategy.²⁵

Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Armed Forces had already gone over, to a considerable degree, to rocket nuclear weapons and that these weapons were being improved and would continue to be improved until they were banned. The Soviet Union did not regard war as inevitable, but if a world war were to take place it would begin with missile strikes deep into the enemy's interior. It was possible that a surprise attack would be launched against the Soviet

25. Mathew P. Gallagher, 'The Soviet History of World War II. Myths, Memories and Realities, (New York:Frederick A.Praeger, 1963), pp.167-74.

Union, but the Soviet Union would be able to retaliate. In saying this, Khrushchev implied that both the United States and the Soviet Union could retaliate against the attacker and inflict massive damage to him; in other words, that a relationship of mutual assured destruction existed.²⁶

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
Khrushchev's speech was the first public statement of the new doctrine, and the characterization he gave of a future world war remained central to Soviet thinking ever since. In a world war between socialist and capitalist States, the chief means of destruction would be the nuclear armed rocket. Because of the profound social nature of the conflict and the power of thermonuclear weapons, such a war would be bitter and destructive to an unprecedented degree. Khrushchev was expressing a view held by the Party and military leaders alike when he declared that a future war would be a rocket-nuclear war. The Soviet Union had tested the world's first ICBM in 1957 and had begun to deploy the SS-4 MRBM in 1959. A decision had already been taken to adopt the rocket rather than the bomber as the main delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. Although military doctrine

26. David Hollway, op.cit., p.38.

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had been reoriented to focus on thermonuclear war, no consensus existed on what forces were needed to fight such a war. **Differences** existed on questions of strategy and force structure: would a rocket nuclear war be long or short. Whatever the disagreements about force structure, the different schools of thought in the Armed forces agreed that the problem they had to solve was how and when to wage a nuclear war.

Khrushchev emphasised on the principle of peaceful co-existence between capitalism and communist nations. This stress on peaceful co-existence was born of necessity, a necessity he **recognised** in 1960, when he said in a speech that nuclear weapons could not make any distinction between communists and non-Communists, between atheists and believers, between Catholics and Protestants.²⁷

Sokolovskii Chief of General Staff recognised as had Khrushchev in his 1960 speech, that general nuclear war would be immensely destructive: hundreds of millions of people would perish, not only in the West, but also in the Soviet Union and throughout the

27. Chalmers M. Roberts, The Nuclear Year: The Arms race and Arms Control, 1945-70, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.29.

world. The main aim of preparing for a general nuclear war was to prevent it. Prevention was seen to be a function of preparation for war. Indeed, at the very time that the first two editions of Sokolovskii's book appeared, the Soviet Union was engaged in a bitter dispute with the Chinese leadership in which the issue of nuclear war played a key role. In this exchange with the Chinese, the Soviet leaders also said that if the imperialist madmen do unleash a war, the Soviet people will wipe out and bury capitalism. Marxist-Leninist theory holds that the world is now in transition from capitalism to socialism and world nuclear war is viewed in line with Clausewitz's definition of war as a continuation of policy by other means, in terms of the historic struggle between capitalism and socialism. The Soviet leaders have not allowed that world nuclear war might reverse the course of history and have claimed that such a war would mean the end of capitalism. The Soviet theorists, however, have been careful to distinguish between the essence of a world nuclear war and its utility as an instrument of policy.²⁸

28. Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Attitude towards Nuclear war: Do they really think they can win?" Journal of Strategic Studies, September, 1979, pp.173-175.

In January 1960, Khrushchev declared that the United States would try to catch up with the Soviet Union in the production of missiles by 1965. But the Soviet Union, he said, would use the time it had gained to develop rocket weapons and occupy a leading position in this field until an international agreement on the question of disarmament is reached. The build up of Soviet intercontinental forces proceeded at a rapid rate in the late 1960s: between 1966 and 1969 the Soviet ICBM force grew by about 300 new silo launches a year and in 1969 surpassed the number of ICBM launchers in the American force.

The ICBM deployment soon made it clear that the Soviet leaders would not accept a position inferior to that of the United States. They evidently did not regard the possession of an assured destruction capability - the ability to retaliate against the USA in the event of an American first strike - as an adequate guarantee of Soviet Security. The ICBM programme made it clear that the Soviet Union was intent, at the very least, a matching American strategic power. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union was close to attaining strategic parity with the United States.²⁹

29. David Holloway, op. cit. p.48.

In the decade before the SALT Agreements in 1972, the Soviet strategic policy was dominated by the drive to catch up with the United States. In the ten years since 1972, the competition in offensive strategic weapons has not stopped and although each side has committed itself publicly to parity, each has been accused by the other of striving for superiority. The continuing development and deployment of strategic missiles as well as the stress laid in military writings on preparing to wage and win a nuclear war, have been taken as evidence of the Soviet determination to move beyond parity. Soviet writers, for their part, have argued, that the American military industrial complex finds parity unpalatable and that the policy of the United States is to try to regain superiority and thus to restore American strategic power. It lost the political and military utility as a result of the Soviet build up of the 1960s and 1970s.³⁰

The Soviet leaders evidently believe that attaining parity has brought them important advantages and while not entirely happy with the relationship (because it does not entirely preclude nuclear war)

30. Ibid. p.52.

they apparently believe that there is at present no alternative to the relationship of mutual vulnerability with the United States. The Soviet Union has nevertheless, tried to reduce vulnerability to a nuclear attack by maintaining an extensive civil defence programme. Its chief missions are to protect the population, to ensure the viability of the economy, and to secure the survival of the State in the event of war.³¹

It appears that the Soviet Union applies two different principles to its strategic weapons policy. The first elaborated by Brezhnev, is that parity should be the goal of the Soviet policy because the pursuit of superiority would provoke a reaction which would prove self-defeating. The second to be found more frequently in the military press is that the Soviet Union should prepare for a nuclear war.

Two themes have been stressed in this survey of Soviet thinking about nuclear war: the prevention of such a war and preparation to wage it. In the Soviet thinking, these two aspects are not conflicting but complementary. The primary goal of the Soviet

31. David, R. Jones, "Civil Defence", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Vol. 2. (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1978), pp. 289-293.

military preparations is to prevent world nuclear war. At the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to prepare to wage such a war has been a distinctive feature of the Soviet military thinking in the nuclear age.³²

There are several reasons for this. Perhaps the most important has been the nuclear relationship with the United States. Soviet writers have stressed that the US made preparations for waging a nuclear war and put its strategic forces on alert during crisis in order to put pressure on the Soviet Union. They have claimed that American policy towards the Soviet Union aimed more at intimidation than at deterrence. In the 1970s the Soviet leaders evinced greater faith in the deterrent power of their military build up had caused the danger of nuclear war to recede. Since the mid-1970s the Party leaders have laid greater stress on the political side of the military doctrine apparently to adapt doctrine to the relationship of strategic parity with the United States.

Secondly, it has been difficult for the party to accept that nuclear war could permanently reverse the course of history and lead to the defeat of

32. David Holloway, *op.cit.* p.55

socialism. The military stress on preparing to fight and win a nuclear war has been reinforced by the ideological belief that, if world nuclear war did take place, it would be the decisive contest between Socialism and capitalism and that Socialism would emerge victorious.³³

Finally, the memory of 1942 had a profound effect on Soviet thinking about nuclear war and in particular about surprise attack.

When the issue was raised in mid-1950s, Soviet military theorists concluded that while surprise would bring major advantages, it could not be decisive in a war with a country that possessed a strong social and State order - just as it had not been decisive in 1941. Two consequences followed from this. The first was that Soviet forces should be able to retaliate in the event of a surprise attack and that the country should be prepared to survive a nuclear war.

The recent statements of Soviet leaders have evidently been intended to assuage Western fears about Soviet policy. They may also reflect the evolution

33. David Holloway, op. cit. p.57

of military doctrine and its adaptation to the relationship of parity with the United States. Parity is given concrete definition through arms control negotiations which have now become an important instrument of Soviet policy for regulating and managing the strategic relationship with the United States.

All these factors point towards the conclusion that defining parity in specific terms is not a technical, but a political problem. Where there are so many disagreements and no agreed technique for resolving them, the only solution is a political one. Only negotiation whether formal or informal can provide an agreed definition of parity in terms of the numbers of arms on either side.³⁴

Arms control is not isolated from politics but is deeply rooted in the East-West political relationship. It is at once an arrangement for pursuing the cooperative objective of regulating the competition in arms and an arena in which the two sides try to further their competing interests.

34. David Holloway, *op. cit.* p.80

In the prelude to the Geneva negotiations both the Soviet Union and United States declared their interest in controlling the arms race and tried to present themselves as more armed against than arming. It is not clear whether in view of the great differences that divide them, they can translate their professions of interest in arms limitation into an effective agreement.

C H A P T E R - I I

SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Historically mankind has taken many forms of efforts to prevent or limit war by establishing religious and ethical codes and barriers against war, by trying to outlaw it, by creating tribunals for peaceful arbitration and settlement of conflicts, by organising collective security measures (such as League of Nations and the United Nations), by forming military blocks, by spreading a world wide movement for non-alignment. Even in the prenuclear ages, efforts to control and limit weapons were hardly successful. With the maturing of the nuclear age, the radical new dimensions of destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the inter dependence or linkage of conflicts with self-righteous ideology, the hegemonism of the super powers and the varied sources of weapons and the technological imperatives of weaponry, the difficulties of arms control are even more vast.

The relentless march of technology now threatens the stability inherent in the doctrine of 'mutual assured destruction'. Without new arms treaties that can at least halt and then build down the arms race, the two super powers will find themselves trapped in a potentially destabilising race to develop defensive weapons like 'star wars' and even more potent offensive weapons to overwhelm them.

There are simply many dimensions to be negotiated on arms control between the two super powers: throw weight, number of warheads and missiles, land vs. air/sea bed missiles, high accuracy US low accuracy, tactical, US strategic nuclear weapons, definition of theatre nuclear force, deployment of missiles (such as forward based system), counting of British and French missiles, nuclear weapon as a factor in balancing the combined overall conventional and nuclear military strengths of the East-West camps etc. The following are brief views of important disarmament negotiations and agreements since world war II!

The Baruch Plan:-

On August 6, 1945 the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and three days later a second bomb was exploded over Nagasaki. In January 1946 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a proposal to establish an Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC was to submit to the Security Council plans for eliminating all atomic weapons, formulating regulations and safeguards and ensuring the peaceful use

1. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, (Washington D.C: The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982) P.3.

of atomic energy.² When the AEC of United Nations met on June 14, 1946 two proposals were presented to it. The US proposal was presented by Bernard M. Baruch and Soviet Union's proposal presented by Andrei Gromyko.

The first phase of the Baruch Plan called for the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority which would exercise a monopoly over the ownership, production and research for peaceful purposes of all atomic materials and which would operate all nuclear energy from mine to finished product. After an inspection and control system was adequately established, the second phase of the Baruch Plan was to be implemented which called for the cessation of all production of atomic weapons, the destruction of the American stock pile of atomic weapons and the transfer of its scientific information on atomic processes to the International Atomic Development Authority.

The Soviet Union denounced the Baruch Plan insisting that the existing atomic weapons first be destroyed before discussion of controls, that atomic facilities be owned by individual states, that a nationally operated inspection system be

established and that the veto power be retained in the Security Council.²

Although in Dec., 1946 the AEC approved, with the Soviet and Polish members abstaining, the so called first report based on a series of proposals submitted by Mr. Baruch, the American Soviet difference over the control and disarmament of nuclear weapons remained as a basic problem throughout all ensuing negotiations between the two super powers.³

Multilateral Negotiations
through the United Nations:

With heightening of concern for the spread of nuclear technology, the continuing of nuclear weapon tests and the implication of nuclear war, the UN increased its attention to disarmament issues. In 1952 the UN Disarmament Commission (DC) was created. The DC operated chiefly through the sub-committee of five (US, UK, France, USSR & China). As talks were endlessly dragging without results, membership in the DC was enlarged to moderate the acute East-West division by including non-aligned and non-nuclear nations.⁴

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2. William Epstien, Disarmament: Twenty Five Years of Efforts, (Canada: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971) p.5.
 3. Ibid. p.6
 4. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Texts and Histories of Negotiations, op. cit. p.6

Replacing DC, the Eight Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) began to operate in 1962. The ENDC was transferred in 1969 into the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (COD) to accommodate more members into disarmament talks. In 1978 the Committee on Disarmament (CD), a still larger forum of 40 member states, was established in Geneva and began its functions from 1979. The CD in recent years has become less effective body because it has devoted most of its meetings to drafting a comprehensive programme of disarmament which only has proved to be a labour in vain.⁵

Antarctic Treaty signed at Washington on Dec.1, 1959 and entered into force on June 23,1961.

It is a multilateral agreement initially signed by 12 nations. The treaty declares that Antarctica state be used exclusively for peaceful purposes only. It specifically prohibits "any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military manoeuvres as well as the testing of any type of weapons. It prohibits also any nuclear explosion in Antarctica and disposal of radio-active waste material.

5. Juzef Goldblat, Arms race and Arms Control, (Arms Control efforts in the UN and Commission on Disarmament, 1983) p.227.

Hotline Agreement signed at Geneva on June 20, 1963 and entered into force on the same date:

This was introduced as one measure to help reduce the risks of nuclear war. The need had arisen for assessing quick and reliable communication directly between the heads of the two super powers in order to prevent war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. It was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 that compellingly underscored the importance of a prompt, direct and reliable communication link between the heads of the nuclear weapon states in times of crisis.⁶ On June 20, 1963, the US and Soviet representatives to the ENDC in Geneva signed the so called 'The Hot Line Agreement! It was the first bilateral agreement between USA and USSR that recognised the perils implicit in the nuclear weapons systems and was a limited but practical step to minimise the risks of war. The hotline has proved its worth during the Arab-Israel wars in 1967 and 1973.

Treaty banning Nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in, outer space and under water (The Partial Test Ban Treaty) signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963 and entered into force on Oct. 10, 1963.

6. Lincoln, P. Bloomfield, Khrushchev and Arms race. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p.196.

The PTBT of 1963 prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere or in outer space or under water including territorial or high seas. While not banning underground test, the treaty does prohibit nuclear explosion in this environment if they cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosions were conducted.

In concluding the multilateral treaty, the nuclear weapon states showed their willingness to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substance. The Soviet Union had difference of opinion with USA on the following matters:

1. The Soviet Union initially sought to have the veto power against all substantive operations of the control system, while the USA wanted operations of the system free from the Soviet veto.
2. The Soviet Union insisted on a limit on the number of permitted on site inspections in its territory - refusing to allow more than three per year while the West held that the number must be determined by scientific fact and detection capability.

3. The Soviet Union insisted that the control posts should be nationally owned and operated with international monitoring and supervision while the West proposed that the control posts should be internationally owned and operated.
4. The Soviet Union proposed to replace the single administrator of the proposed control commission with a 'troika', a tripartite administrative council consisting of one neutral, one western and one communist member. By June, 1963 the Soviet Union shifted its interest to ban that did not deal with 'underground tests' even though they had rejected such a ban first the year before.

Outer Space Treaty signed at London, Moscow and Washington on January 27, 1967 and entered into force on October 10, 1967.

It sought to prevent a new form of colonial competition and the possible damage that self seeking exploitation might cause. President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be applied to outer space and Celestial bodies. Meanwhile the Soviet Union also proposed similar plans. However, the Soviet Union's plans did not separate out-space from other disarmament issues. The main obstacle was the Soviet Union's position that it would accept the restriction of the use of

outer space for military purposes if the USA's foreign bases, where short range and medium range missiles were targeting the Soviet Union were eliminated. The linkage was not acceptable to the USA because the elimination of American bases in the allied countries would drastically weaken the security of the West.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (The NPT) signed at London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970:

The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was quite evident from the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The purpose of the NPT of 1968 is thus to oblige non-nuclear weapon states to forgo rights for nuclear arsenal, in return for their right to the fullest development of peaceful nuclear activities in cooperation with nuclear weapon states as well as the advanced nuclear states which have no nuclear weapons. It is in short an attempt to freeze the number of nuclear weapon states at the existing five.

The first initiative to prevent 'horizontal proliferation' was the proposal of the Western powers in Aug. 1957 which included a commitment not to

transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons except for self defence. Although the Soviet Union was for non-proliferation it rejected western power's proposal because it wanted to couple non-proliferation with prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries which threatened the Soviet Union.

The principal stumbling block to a non-proliferation agreement for the next three years was the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MNF) and alternative British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) which were then under discussion by the USA and its NATO allies as measures for collective defence arrangement⁷. The Soviet Union strongly maintained that no non-proliferation agreement could be reached if MLF or ANF - a nuclear weapon sharing arrangement is instituted in the NATO. The Soviet Union contended that MLF or ANF would constitute in reality proliferation and that they were in particular, devices for giving West Germany access to our control of nuclear weapons. The Soviet

7. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, (Washington D.C.:The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982), p.83.

position contained in its draft treaty submitted to UN General Assembly on Sept.24, 1965 was to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly, through third states or group of states not possessing nuclear weapons and to bar nuclear weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use to military units of non-nuclear allies even if these were placed under joint command.⁸

Seabed Treaty Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on February 11, 1971 and entered into force on May 18, 1972.

The Seabed treaty is the fourth of the so called 'non-armament multilateral treaty like the Antarctic Treaty, the outer-space Treaty and the Treaty of Tlateloco. The treaty seeks to prevent the introduction of international conflict and nuclear weapons into an area hitherto free of them. It calls upon all states to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the seabed and the Ocean floor. Advances in the technology of Oceanography, greatly increasing interest of nations in the vast and virtually untapped resources of the Ocean floor that might lead to international strife

8. Ibid. p.84

and fears that nations might use the seabed as a new environment for military purposes including emplacement of nuclear weapons necessitated the establishment of rules concerning the seabed and the Ocean floor.⁹

On March 18, 1969 the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty to the ENDC that provided for the complete demilitarisation of the sea-bed beyond a 12 mile limit and for making all sea-bed installations open to parties of the treaty on the basis of reciprocity. In countering the Soviet proposal, the USA presented on May 22 a draft treaty which prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond a 3 mile zone. While the Soviet Union insisted on the banning of all military uses of the sea-bed, the United States was to allow some defensive military installations such as submarine surveillance systems. After the two drafts were extensively discussed at the ENDC, the United States and the Soviet Union framed a joint draft on October 7, 1969. The joint draft was revised three

9. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov, The USSR Proposes Disarmament, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p.145.

times by the CCD and the United Nations. On Dec. 7, 1970 the final draft was approved by the UN General Assembly.¹⁰

Interim Agreement between USA and the USSR on certain measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT) signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 and entered into force on October 3, 1972:

The SALT-1 was the first bilateral step the United States and the Soviet Union took to end the rivalry in their most potent strategic offensive weapons - land based inter continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) strategic nuclear weapons were included in the earlier US and Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament, but these earlier efforts were not successful and the strategic arms race was left unchecked.

The foremost difficulty in the negotiations was the asymmetrical structures of the US and strategic weapons system. The Soviet Union's strategic forces had concentrated in development of heavy ballistic missiles and had overtaken the US lead in land based ICBMs.¹¹ During SALT I years alone the number of the

10. Ibid. 147

11. Ibid. 149

Soviet ICBM's increased from about 1,000 to about 1500. During the same period the number of the Soviet SLBMs had quadrupled. The huge payload capacity (throw weight) of some Soviet missiles was regarded by the United States a serious threat to the US land based ICBMs even in hardened sites. The USA had not increased its deployment of Strategic missiles since 1967. At the time of SALT negotiations, the United States had 1054 operational land based ICBMs and 656 sea-based SLBMs. But the United States was arming missiles with Multiple Independently Targeted Recently Vehicles (MIRV).¹²

The main disagreement in the negotiations was the definition of 'strategic' weapons. The Soviet Union sought to define as strategic any weapon system capable of reaching the territory of the other side. If the Soviet definition had been accepted, the strategic weapons would have included US forward based systems (FBS), mainly short range or medium range bombers based in Western Europe or on aircraft carriers while excluding for example, Soviet intermediate range missiles targetted at the US allies in

12. Philip Noel - Baker, 'The Arms Race' (London: Sterns and Sons Ltd., 1958), p.227

Western Europe. The United State's position was that weapons to be negotiated in the SALT 1 were only the 'inter-continental systems of the two countries, not the US 'forward based systems' which served to counter the Soviet medium range missiles and aircraft armed at the US allies.¹³

An understanding was made by exchanges at the highest levels of both governments to break a long deadlock between the two super powers. On May 20, 1971, both the USA & USSR announced that an understanding had been reached to concentrate on a permanent treaty to limit ABM systems and at the same time to work out certain limitations on strategic offensive weapons. Ensuring this understanding in the summit meeting of President Nixon and Brezhnev the two leaders brought a conclusion to the first round of the SALT and signed two agreements - the Interim agreement on strategic offensive arms (SALT 1 agreement) and Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles systems (ABM Treaty).

The SALT 1 agreement was essentially a holding action designed to complement the ABM Treaty by

13. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, op.cit.p.132.

limiting offensive strategic arms race and to provide time for further negotiations. The agreement provided for a freeze, for a five year span, at existing levels of the aggregate number of fixed land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles launchers operational or under construction and permitted an increase in submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers upto an agreed level for each party only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. The parties were free to choose the mix, except that conversion of land based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs for older types into land based launchers for modern heavy ICBM is prohibited.

Land mobile ICBMs were not dealt in the SALT 1 agreement because the Soviet Union held that since neither side had such weapon systems a freeze would not apply to them now and in the future.

Article III of the SALT I agreement and protocol limited SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines. The United States was permitted to reach a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on 44

submarines from its base level of 656 SLBM launchers on 41 ballistic missile submarines, by replacing 54 older ICBM launchers. The Soviet Union beyond the level of 740 SLBM launchers on modern nuclear powered submarines, was permitted to increase to 950 SLBM launchers on 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.¹⁴

In a unilateral statement, the Soviet Union asserted that if the US allies in the NATO increased the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines operational or under construction on the date of signature of the agreement, the Soviet Union would have a right to increase the number of its submarines correspondingly. The United States replied that it did not accept the Soviet assertion.

In order to assure compliance with the provisions of the agreement, each party agreed to use national technical means of verification at its disposal, not to interfere with the national technical means of

14. See text of the SALT 1 agreement, Protocol to the SALT I and Agreed Statements, common understandings and Unilateral statements regarding the SALT 1, in pp.150-153 and 154-57.

verification of the other party and not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede verification by the other party.¹⁵

The ABM Treaty is one of twin agreements resulted from the SALT 1 negotiations. The treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM systems or their components for the defence of the whole territory of the United States and the Soviet Union or of individual regions except as expressly permitted. Permitted ABM deployments are limited to two areas in each country. The treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM defence system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM complex. The two deployments in each country must be at least 1300 Km. apart in order to prevent the creations of any effective regional defence zone or the beginnings of a nationwide defence system.

Precise quantitative and qualitative limitations are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. At each ABM site no more than 100 ABM

15. Richard Bust, Arms Control: Why SALT was not enough and a freeze is unfair, The Times, September 6, 1982.

launchers and 100 interceptors missiles may be deployed.¹⁶ The treaty also provides that ABM radars should not exceed specified numbers and are subject to qualitative restrictions. In particular it is forbidden to deploy radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, including large phased array radars, except at locations along the territorial boundaries of each country and on condition that they be oriented outward so that they did not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

At the Moscow Summit meeting of President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in July, 1974 the two super powers signed a protocol to the ABM Treaty that further limited deployment of ABM defence system. The 1974 protocol limits each side to a single site for deployment of ABM systems or their components instead of two such sites as allowed by the 1972 treaty. The Soviet Union had chosen to maintain in ABM system around Moscow and the United States chose to maintain defence of its ICBMs.¹⁷

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16. Christoph Bertram, "Rethinking Arms Control" Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980-81, pp.354-55.
 17. York and Wiesner, "National Security and the Nuclear Test Ban", Scientific America, October, 1984.

SALT II Treaty signed at Vienna on June 18, 1979
and not entered into force due to the US refusal
to ratify it.

The start of the SALT was coterminous with the introduction of MIRVed missiles and Cruise missiles and with the ever improving accuracy of all strategic missiles. The SALT II treaty was to last only until 1985. The treaty provides for the following ceilings on strategic offensive missiles and bombers.

- 1) An equal limitation on the aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles - ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, air to surface ballistic missiles is imposed on both sides not to exceed 2400. The initial ceiling was to be lowered to 2250 at the end of 1981 by dismantling or destroying the SNDVs in excess of that number.
- 2) Within the aggregate number allowed each side had the right to determine the composition of the SNDVs.
- 3) Within the aggregate number (1320) of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long range Cruise missiles, each party is limited to a total of 1200 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.
- 4) Furthermore, within the aggregate number (1200) of MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs & ASBMs each party is limited to no more than 820 MIRVed ICBMs.

Together with the Treaty, both parties also signed a protocol as an integral part of the treaty which bans until December 31, 1981, the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers. The protocol additionally bans the deployment of long range Cruise missiles on sea-bed or land based launchers, the flight testing of long range cruise missiles with multiple warheads from sea-bed or land based launchers and the flight testing or deployment of ASBMs.¹⁸

The SALT II Treaty is not in force although both countries stated that they would abide by the treaty. The main reason for its failure is the non approval by the US Senate.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

The Reagan administration came to office in January, 1981 with determination to correct an essential imbalance in the strategic offensive forces between the USA and the Soviet Union. Speaking at

18. "Keeping everybody Honest", 'Newsweek', January, 11, 1985, p.12

Eureka College on May 9, 1982, President Reagan introduced a concept of the START. By giving the US - Soviet strategic arms negotiations a new name, he hoped to signify a break with the SALT II which was not, then nor ever likely to be in force. The START proposal also called for more effective verification measures. In addition to conventional 'national technical means' of both sides to verify compliance, the United States proposed cooperative measures, data exchanges and collateral restraints, including perhaps intensive measures such as on site inspection.

The acceptability of the US START proposal to the Soviet Union rested on the credibility of the US argument that the growing vulnerability of land based ICBMs of both countries, to a pre-emptive first strike was the greatest threat to the stability of the strategic balance and that, therefore, ICBM should be substantially reduced to equal levels for both sides. The Soviet Union was not persuaded by the US argument. A Task comment of June 4, 1982 criticised the US

contention that ICBMs are more destabilising than SLBMs and rejected the notion that the United States can change the Soviet force structure. On January 2, 1983 Soviet Union made a counter proposal in a 'Pravda' articles. The main points of Soviet proposal were:

- 1) A phased reduction of heavy bombers, land-based and sea-based long range missiles to a total of 1800 delivery vehicles on each side, accompanied by a freeze on new production of strategic weapons.
- 2) Reduction of warheads to an equal level;
- 3) A freeze on further deployment of US forward based systems within range of the Soviet territory.
- 4) The prohibition of all Cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km.
- 5) A ban on heavy bombers and aircraft carriers in agreed zones adjoining the territories of the two countries.
- 6) Safe zones for submarines, in which anti-submarine warfare activities would be prohibited and

7) Prior notification of large scale exercises
of heavy bombers and FBs aircraft.

The Soviet Union's major objection to the US proposal is that the Soviet Union would have to eliminate significantly more of its large, land based missiles than the USA which has a superior strength in SLBM, bombers and cruise missiles. The Soviet Union's cuts of some of the weapons systems were unacceptable to the United States. If the Soviet proposal would be accepted the United States also would not have B-1 bombers or Mx missiles.¹⁹

The World today hangs on the edge of a nuclear precipice. With ever increasing nuclear arsenal the World is slowly cruising towards doom. Arms control is the only feasible answer to the problem. With more than three fourths of destructive weapons at the possession of super powers, the onus of arms control lies with them.²⁰ The importance and urgency of the talk demands that they be tackled at the highest level

19. The USSR proposes Disarmament, op.cit.157.

20. Ibid. p.159.

of decision-making. Arms control has all along been the focal point of super power summits. In fact, in all the sixteen super power summits held so far, the summit agenda had addressed primarily to the problem of arms build down. Both Soviet Union and the US might have irreconcilable ideological and geopolitical interests. But they have one goal in common survival. In these circumstances, summit meetings between the super powers have become essential. Summits serve the purpose of developing rules of engagement that could prevent their differences from bringing them into armed conflicts that could destroy them both.²¹

21. Richard Nixon, "Super power summitry", Foreign Affairs, Fall, 1985, p.1.

GENERAL SUMMIT

In the 1970s, the United States developed the picture of the Soviet Union as an aggressive power. The Soviet Union was seen as having taken the advantage of detente in the early seventies, steadily building its forces across the board, deploying SS-20 intermediate range missiles in the Eastern Europe in 1976, intervening in the Angolan Civil War in 1974-75 and in thereafter and finally intervening in Afghanistan. This image created a suspicion of Soviet behaviour that characterised the policies of the Carter administration and the subsequent Reagan administration.

In most of Reagan's first four years in office there was no "Soviet policy" only "an attitude. It was an attitude that sprang deep from his hatred of Communism. All his policies and pronouncements showed that he was prepared to repudiate totally the orientations that had dominated the post world war American foreign policy.²²

22. Lawrence A.C. & Caldwell, D. "United States and Soviet Union Relations and Arms Control", Current History, October, 1987. p.306.

The Soviet Union was viewed as an 'evil empire' and Reagan called upon the free world to mount a Crusade to Cast communism to the ash heap of history. He firmly held that arms control negotiations should not be resumed until Soviet behaviour in the world's trouble spots improved.²³

The Reagan administration was the first ever US administration to make a negative net assessment of the overall military balance as the starting point of its approach to arms control policies. Reagan had the grand design to make the US a super power by ending the strategic parity conceded by the US in the SALT treaty and making the US invulnerable while leaving the rest of the world exposed to American power. So USA went ahead with the task of rearming itself. In 1983 US decided to deploy Pershing and Cruise medium range missiles in Western Europe in response to earlier Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe. The deployment of medium range missiles in Western Europe was strategically much

23. Charles William Maynes, "Lost Opportunities", Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1985-86, p.413.

too important for the United States. For, by doing so it would not only have a chance to counter the Soviet SS-20 and SS-13 missiles positioned in Eastern Europe but also it was necessary to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.²⁴

Soviet Strategy against the INF deployment

The US alliance partners quite predictably were under a 'feeling of insecurity' due to the scale of arms build up and the prospect of using their territory for missile installation. Anti nuclear sentiment was growing up in those countries. Seizing the mood of public protest and the "feeling of insecurity" on the part of the US allies, Soviet Union started a "propaganda campaign" directed against the US military build up in general and forestalling the deployment in particular. A dual track strategy was adopted in the European countries. The first one was the "campaign from above" strategy i.e. to reverse the decision by influencing the decision-making elites in those countries. The campaign was pursued in three ways:

1. The Soviet Union tried to drive a wedge between

24. Smith A. "Cold war: "An aberration or the Normality of Contemporary International Politics", Journal of Peace Research, Vol.22, No.2, 1985, p.179.

USA and its NATO partners by presenting the INF deployment as a part of Washington's nefarious and aggressive purpose which is likely to endanger those countries.

2. It launched a peace offensive to portray itself as willing to compromise and negotiate.
3. It used implicit threat in case the deployment was not stopped. The campaign from below was a paralld effort to exploit popular fears, pacifism and misgivings about nuclear arms and to create sufficient mass opposition to prevent the deployment.²⁵

The Summit Agenda - with the Summit in the offing both the US and the Soviet Union adopted different conceptions of what the summit would chiefly deal with. In the Soviet view it was imperative that the Summit would have to make a break through in the allegedly most pressing danger : the incipient militarisation of space. By contrast, the US stressed that the Summit would have to be an 'across the board'

25. Allen R. Allenier, "The Soviet Campaign against INF : 'Strategy and Means', ORBIS, Summer, 1985 p.323.

survey of all issues troubling their relationship, from nuclear weapons to human rights to Soviet conduct in the third world.²⁶

In the months preceding the Summit, both sides manoeuvred to gain acceptance of their respective views. Finally the Summit agenda included twenty-six issues ranging from nuclear weapons to maritime boundaries to cultural cooperation between both the countries.²⁷

Summit Proposals

Before the Summit both the USA and the Soviet Union had agreed on the basic framework of the arms talks, namely the 'Strategic Arms Reduction Talks' (START), the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF), and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

START

On strategic weapons, the US position was that the number of long range missiles be limited to 6000 war heads a top submarine and land based ballistic

26. The Observer, 22 Nov.1985.

27. Time, 18 November, 1985, p.12.

missiles and air launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union proposed a limited of 6000 warheads including those weapons where US has the advantage i.e. the air borne cruise missiles gravity bombs and short range attack missiles launched from planes.²⁸

INF

On the issue of INF US wanted a freeze on all medium range weapons in Europe at the end of the year, limiting each side to about 140 launchers excluding the British and French forces. The Soviet Union wanted a ban on all but 120 US cruise missiles in Europe. It agreed to limit the number of its missiles to match the US deployments plus those of Britain and France.²⁹

However for the Soviet Union the agreements on START and INF were not 'self contained packages', i.e. agreements on these weapons were not to be achieved separately. Moreover, Soviet concessions in those arms were linked with the renunciation of the SDI programme.

28. Ibid., p.11

29. The Statesman (Calcutta), 24 November, 1985.

SDI

On 'star wars' the US position was as before i.e. research and testing of the SDI technology would be held within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet position was diametrically opposed to that of the US - no research testing or development of the SDI technology would be attended at any cost.

Soviet Union & SDI

Gorbachev did not subscribe to Reagan's views on the SDI. The SDI, he argued was a clear violation of the Anti Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABM) of 1972. Hence no research and testing would be permitted. He was sceptical of Reagan's claim of not using the SDI for offensive purposes. The SDI, he argued would create an impenetrable shield which might be used for the purpose of gaining strategic superiority and a 'first strike capability'. Moreover, he apprehended that the SDI technologies could be used against Soviet satellites and targets on Earth.³⁰

30. Hamington George H. "Geneva : First step down, a long road", US News World, 25 March, 1985.

The SDI remained the key to the solution of other arms control matters as START and the INF. Negotiations on these matters could not be continued as both leaders failed to agree on the future of the SDI. The Summit failed as both the leaders were unmoved over their respective stands.

Soviet Strategies in the Summit

Arms control agreements for Gorbachev are part of a "general political offensive". It is an instrument to achieve larger objective of Soviet foreign policy i.e. 'equal security'. With the US Soviet negotiating behaviour centred around the fact that Soviet Union had acquired acknowledged 'nuclear parity' with the US after two decades of intense competition, an achievement that was acquired at considerable cost transferring vast resources from development to defence. The maintenance of this parity was therefore the most cherished goal of Soviet arms control strategies at the Geneva negotiations. The purpose of the Soviet strategy was not to allow the

US a free hand that would upset the balance.³¹ The Soviet tactics for negotiating talks in Geneva were:

- 1) Gorbachev used the Summit as a 'propaganda platform' from which he could project the image of soviet initiatives while highlighting American intransigence. A Summit, after a gap of six years was bound to generate public enthusiasm and media publicity, Gorbachev therefore, wanted to derive maximum mileage out of it. His announcement of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and development a 50% reduction in strategic weapons and his assault on SDI was to show the world that the Soviet Union can go to any extent of compromise.

- 2) The unexpected Soviet offer to slash strategic nuclear arsenals by half was aimed at generating public pressure (both within US and outside it) on Reagan to apply brakes on his 'star wars' programme. At a time when the American Congress was coming down heavily on the SDI, the scientific world remained divided over the feasibility of the programme

31. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Soviet Position on Nuclear Arms Control and Limitation", Strategic Analysis, March, 1986. p.1287.

and some of the European allies remained opposed to it, the SDI was made more vulnerable by the frontal attack launched by Gorbachev. By using the SDI as the key to other arms control agreements he succeeded in making the SDI appear as the role obstacle to a rare opportunity of curbing the arms race.³²

Reykjavik Summit

The Geneva Summit, despite its failure, considerably narrowed down the differences between the super powers in specific arms control issues. It showed among other things that 'personal diplomacy' in the form of summits can lead to a better understanding of the problem and also to an effort to curtail the arms race, provided there is the political will to do so. Even after the summit failed, Gorbachev continued his 'peace offensive'. Despite mounting opposition from conservative quarters in the polit-bureau and the military, he pursued measures that not only addressed to the US and its Western allies but also restrained Soviet conduct in arms build up.³³

32. Aswini Kumar Mishra, Summit Diplomacy and Super Power Arms Control Negotiations : Case Studies of Geneva, (1985), Reykjavik (1986) and Washington (1987) Summits, (SIS, J.N.U. New Delhi 1988.)

33. G.P.Despande, 'The Reykjavik Retreat', 'Economic and Political Weekly, October 25, 1986, p.1877.

The measures outlined by him in various proposals were:

- 1) He extended the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the Soviet Union till January, 1987 despite Reagan's repeated refusal to reciprocate.
- 2) He gave the grandiose call for elimination of all nuclear arms by 2000 A.D.
- 3) He suggested a 25 per cent reduction in the NATO and WARSAW pact troops.
- 4) He called for the abolition of the two military blocks in Europe.
- 5) He agreed to the on site verification of arms control agreements as demanded by the US before.

Gorbachev's initiatives were part of his policies directed towards the US, West European Countries and Soviet Union's East European allies. His comprehensive proposals, skillfully blended with propaganda and substance were designed to promote detente in Europe. The move to solve European security problems within a 'pan European framework' was designed to strengthen the West European voice vis-a-vis the US and the US allies draw them closer to Soviet Union.³⁴ To allay

34. Larabee C. Stephen, Lynck, Allen, "Gorbachev : The Road to Reykjavik" 'Foreign Policy', Winter, 1986-87, p.10

the European fear of Soviet conventional arms superiority in June, 1986 he called for a wider negotiating zone' on conventional arms (from the Atlantic to the Urals) that would also include the European part of the Soviet Union.³⁵

Moscow's walk out over the Geneva Summit in 1983 and its hardening attitude towards the west had troubled its allies in Eastern Europe especially, East Germany, Hungary and Rumania. Discord within the Warsaw pact was beginning to grow as all of them pursued a policy of 'damage limitation'.³⁶ So Gorbachev's proposals and initiatives were part of an effort to soothe the nerves of the Soviet allies by showing them that the Soviet Union is not interested in an unbridled arms race with the US.

Even after the Geneva Summit failed, both Reagan and Gorbachev had kept their options open regarding another meeting between them. Both of these were exchanging communications and each of them despatched delegations of arms control experts to each other's capital.³⁷

35. Ibid.p.9

36. English Robert, "Eastern European Doves" 'Foreign Policy', Fall, 1984, p.44.

37. Abha Dixit, "Reykjavik : The Great Fiagco", Strategic Analysis, February, 1987, p.1317.

On October 11, and 12, 1986 Gorbachev and Reagan for the second time in their career, met at Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland. The USA had expected the INF to be the main issue of the summit, where it expected that Gorbachev would probably link to an INF agreement to a US pkdge to observe for another two or three years the strategic limits envisaged by the SALT II Treaty. Beside, it expected the summit to deal with other proposals such as ban on nuclear testing.³⁸ But Gorbachev belied the US expectation by insisting on a greater range of proposals. So the summit came to include comprehensive disarmament proposals including the INF, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the SDI another issues as nuclear testing. During the summit both leaders engaged each other on the biggest and most difficult issue dividing them how to structure and limit their huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and then proceeded to improvise most practical measures that could become part of achievable and verifiable agreements.³⁹

38. Nandelbaum, Michael, Talbott, Stobe, "Reykjavik and Beyond", Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1986-87, p.219.

39. International Herald Tribune, 13 October 1986.

The Proposals

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF)

On INF, Gorbachev suggested that the American and Soviet missiles should be withdrawn from Europe. He agreed to a scale down of the Asia based SS-20 INF Warheads from 513 to 100 which was to be equally matched by US based missiles. He consented to freeze the SS-21 and SS-23 shorter range nuclear missiles in Europe and to negotiate their reduction.⁴⁰

Reagan agreed to both the proposals. Besides, he proposed on site verification measures and the destruction of the missiles and their factories. Gorbachev agreed to the verification proposals.

THE START

In his START proposal Reagan called for the elimination of all ballistic missiles within ten years. In their place, both sides were to adopt defensive system like the SDI. The proposal, in effect, would have deprived the Soviet Union of its most formidable

40. Reykjavik Negotiations, Department of State Bulletin, November, 1986, pp.4-8.

strategic missiles while leaving the US with an advantage in nuclear armed bombers and cruise missiles. Gorbachev, on the other hand, gave a counter proposal for elimination of all nuclear weapons. The proposal if accepted, would liquidate the American advantage in medium range missile without affecting the Soviet edge in conventional arms. Still Reagan agreed to it.⁴¹

On long range missiles Reagan proposed a stunning 50% cut to six thousand warheads and sixteen hundred delivery vehicles of each side. Gorbachev agreed to the proposal but linked it to restrictions in the research and testing of the SDI to laboratory.

Nuclear Testing

An agreement on principle was reached in the banning of nuclear testing which would have provided the foundation for complete disarmament. But nothing concrete emerged out of the discussions.

THE SDI

Since Geneva Summit, there had been a small but significant shift in the Soviet position vis-a-vis the SDI. While it still opposed deployment of any

41. The Observer (London), October 9, 1986.

space based anti-missile system, in its June, 1986 proposal it accepted 'laboratory research' of the anti-missile system. This change in stance was reflected in the Reykjavik Summit where Gorbachev was willing to accept significant cuts in Soviet missile forces in return for a US agreement to confine the SDI to laboratory research and to abide by the anti-ballistic treaty for the next 10 years.⁴²

Gorbachev repeated his proposal that both sides should abide by the ABM Treaty for 10 years. Initially he proposed its extension for 15 years and Reagan proposed for 7 1/2 years. A compromise was struck at 10 years. The ABM Treaty Gorbachev proposed, should be so modified that the testing of all space elements of the anti-ballistic missile defence will be prohibited, except for research and testing in laboratories and it is not to be extended to field testing.⁴³

The Summit which was almost on the way of producing the most comprehensive disarmament agreements ever, failed over a single word 'laboratory'.

42. Halley, P. Edward, "You could have said yes: Lessons from Reykjavik", ORBIS Spring, 1987, p.80.

43. Time, October 20, 1986, p.12.

The Summit showed that the SDI plays a crucial role in Soviet thinking and rightly so far.

1. The SDI would plunge the Soviet Union into a race which it is decided by way behind the US i.e. in areas of high technology. The SDI would widen the East-West technology gap.
2. After two decades of neck-to-neck competition at the cost of domestic development, the Soviet Union had achieved a rough parity with the US. The SDI emerged as a challenge threatening to nullify many of these strategic gains.
3. Lastly, the Soviet Union feared that the spill over of the scientific by-product of the SDI research will upgrade NATO's conventional forces in West Europe which will liquidate Soviet superiority in conventional forces.⁴⁴

In terms of outcome, the Reykjavik Summit, turned out to be a great retreat from the expectations of the world. The summit represented, simultaneously the culmination and collapse of realistic hopes for arms control. The Summit failed because both leaders were

44. Time, October 13, 1986.

engaged in about of feverish one-upmanship, with each trying to out do the other in demonstrating his devotion to the dream of a nuclear free world. The Summit under lined the fact that much can be achieved if there is enough political will on both sides.

Washington Summit - 1987

Till the end of 1986 and beginning of 1987, it appeared that an ice-age has set in Soviet-American arms talks. It appeared almost impossible to bridge their divergent positions on nuclear and space arms limitation. The impromptu Reykjavik summit came so near to an agreement, yet was so far from it. The big question mark came in the aftermath of the Summit. Did the super powers really want to disarm and maintain military parity? 2) Did they really want to cut off most of the nuclear dimensions from their continued rivalry?

The answer came from Gorbachev again the Reykjavik efforts were beginning to be dismissed as a flash in the pan when Gorbachev in a bold gesture gave a barrage of further proposals. On Feb.28, 1987 Soviet Union declared that it would accept a separate agreement on the medium range missiles.⁴⁵

45. Michael, R.Garden, "INF: A Hollow Victory", Foreign Policy, Fall 1987, p.167.

Delivering the INF issue from the 'Star Wars' and START Gorbachev proposed that both side should remove intermediate range missiles from Europe. with each retaining 100 missile committed to eliminate medium r m the European part of the Soviet Union; agreed to exclude France & British nuclear force from the talks,⁴⁶ and finally declared his intention to destroy the remaining 100 INFs based in the Asian part of Soviet territory without a parallel US commitment.

A New Soviet Philosophy

Continuity, caution and consensus had hitherto characterised a system which is revolutionary in doctrine but deeply conservative in practice. Gorbachev's outlook was a marked departure from the earlier Soviet World view. The basis of his 'new thinking' was the belief that situation created by nuclear confrontation call for new approaches, methods and forms of relationships between the two different social systems that the two super powers represent.⁴⁷

46. Bruce D.Borkewitz, "An INF Treaty discredits Arms", promotes conflict", ORBIS, Winter, 1988, p.119.

47. The Times of India, 21 & 22 December 1987.

At the root of his new thinking and moves a new philosophy of 'peace and security' based on several important formulations.⁴⁸

1. Nuclear wars can never be won and hence should never be fought; a conclusion that naturally leads to emphasis on nuclear disarmament.
2. A realisation that the traditional Soviet pursuit of 'equal security' has led to ever higher levels of arms and continuous competition calls for new priorities. The goals should be 'reasonable security'.
3. The concept of glass fust can be extended to military spheres without endangering Soviet national security.
4. Finally, the emphasis should be on primacy of political means as opposed to military means in ensuring national security.

INF Agreement

The basis of the INF agreement was the Zero option proposed first by Reagan in 1981. Washington offered to cancel its planned deployment of the Pershing

48. The Hindu, 20 September, 1987.

II and Cruise missiles in Europe if Moscow eliminates its already deployed SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. But the proposal was largely for show and no one seriously expected the Soviet Union to accept it. The Soviet Union predictably, rejected the proposal. Brezhnev called it an absurd demand that would require the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally.⁴⁹

The dramatic moves by Gorbachev since February, 1987 converted the original 'zero option' for INF in Europe into a 'Zero_Zero option' which was to include both short-range weapons and the INF. What is more, his proposal envisaged a 'global-zero-zero option' (scrapping all such weapons world over), thus going one step ahead of Reagan. An agreement in principle was announced in September, 1987 to eliminate all land based intermediate range and short-range missiles. The treaty was to be drafted and signed at the Washington Summit.⁵⁰

After the stage was set and the main agenda finalised, the two leaders met from Dec.7-10, 1987 in a three day ~~tete-e-tete~~ tete-a-tete. The Washington Summit was

49. Time, March 16, 1987.

50. C.Rajamohan, "Peace and Security: The changing world Scenario", Mainstream, 5 Dec. 1987.

the sixteenth between the USSR, and USA since F.D. Roosevelt and Stalin first met in the throes of the second world war.

Under the treaty the USA over the next three years has to dismantle 436 nuclear missiles out of which 108 are Pershing II, 72 Pershing 1A and 256, Cruise missiles stationed in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium. The Soviet Union would scrap 703 nuclear missiles out of which 441 are SS-20, 130 SS-12 and 12 SS-4 and 20 SS-23 missiles positioned in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.⁵¹

START

The main goal of the super powers has been to achieve an agreement on 50% reductions in long range weapons. The US has at present 7900 nuclear Warheads on nuclear missiles while the Soviet Union has 10,056. During the negotiations, the US proposed a limit of 4800 missiles while the Soviet Union proposed a limit of 5100. A compromise was struck. Both sides agreed in principle to limit their strategic missiles to 4900 each.

51. "Super Power Nuclear Pact : Implication for others", Day After, Jan, 1988, p.9.

The US for its part, agreed that there would be limits to a number of Sea-launched Cruise missiles as the Soviet Union had insisted. But, the limits and procedures have to be made by a separate agreement. The Soviet Union acceded to the US demand that there should be a ban on the encoding of the electronic signals during the missiles tests. Some progress was achieved as to how to verify a new treaty on long range nuclear weapons and the 'counting rules' to determine how many warheads to be carried on their missiles.⁵²

For the Soviet Union the critical issue remained stopping the 'Star Wars'. In fact, one of the main reasons of Gorbachev to make concessions to secure the INF agreement was to give the necessary momentum to the arms control process, that might lead to cuts in the strategic arms and delays in the SDI.

During the summit there was an important shift in the Soviet Union's position on the SDI. Gorbachev's demand at Reykjavik to make any arms control agreement conditional on stopping the SDI research was modified. The new Soviet stance was that the SDI need not prevent

52. Editorial on file, 1987, p.1391.

an agreement on strategic arms, provided, the SDI research and testing programmes correspond to the original interpretation of the ABM Treaty which permits certain types of testing of the star wars technology. Reagan on the other hand continued to insist that his new and loose interpretation of the ABM treaty permits an unhindered pursuit of his star wars dream.⁵³

The INF agreement contains the most stringent verification measures in the history. It includes a 13 years verification programme including provisions for inspection teams actually residing in each other's territory, challenge inspections and several other forms of onsite verification.

The accord symbolises the feasibility of 'disarmament approach' hitherto written off as utopian.⁵⁴ Till now, the dominant philosophy of nuclear strategy was 'arms control' which seems to manage the arms race than to eliminate it. The result of this approach has been the institutionalisation of the arms race. The INF accord goes up on this approach and totally eliminates a particular class of weapons. It sets

53. n.6 p.1376

54. C.Raja Mohan, "The Washington Summit", Strategic Analysis, Feb 1988, p.1267.

a new standard of openness on arms limitation agreements. It has helped in generating trust and confidence between the super powers which is so essential to the progress in nuclear disarmament. What is more, the agreement removes the main issue of East-West military confrontation spanning over four decades. It dramatically lowers, if not dismantles entirely, the structure of the cold war.

Moscow Summit - In accordance with the understanding reached during the Soviet - US Summit in Dec. 1987. Gorbachev and Reagan met in Moscow in May 29 - June 1, 1988. The talks took place in a constructive atmosphere which provided ample opportunity for candid exchange. The two leaders have expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps in a wide range of issues in this area. The two leaders signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty between the USSR and USA on the elimination of their intermediate range and short range missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of Soviet and US nuclear arms and which sets new standards for arms control.

Taking into account a Treaty on strategic offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiation to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington summit. Progress was noted in preparing the joint draft text of an associated protocol. In connection with their obligations under the protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the nuclear risk reduction centres for transmission of relevant information.

The joint draft treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6000 warheads as well as agreement on sub ceilings of 4900 in the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The draft treaty also records the sides' agreements that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50% below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

The delegations have also prepared joint draft texts of an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol and a memorandum of understanding on data, which are integral parts of the treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF treaty extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The sides also discussed the question of limiting long range nuclear armed SLCMs.

The agreement between the USSR and the US on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles signed during the Moscow Summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. The leaders affirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single form full scale, stage by stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the USSR-US threshold test ban treaty of 1974 and peaceful nuclear explosions treaty of 1976 and proceed to negotiating further intermediate

limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process.

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th anniversary of the NPT, one of the most important international arms control agreements. The two leaders confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the nuclear risk reduction centres in Moscow and Washington established in accordance with the Soviet-US agreement of September 15, 1987.

The leaders reviewed the status of an on-going multilateral negotiations and bilateral Soviet-US consultations towards a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and timely global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem

of chemical weapons proliferation and use. Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol.

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They also discussed the situation in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna. The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

CHAPTER - III

EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS
DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

After the Russian Revolution in 1917, Lenin's aim of overthrowing the Bourgeois class in his country was successfully achieved, while that of establishing a classless society and withering away of the state were yet to come. In order to achieve these two goals, Lenin refused to compromise and accept disarmament as an alternative to war. But due to certain compelling factors, he was forced by the circumstances, to accept disarmament and initiate massive campaign for its success.

When the Bolshevik Communists led by Lenin to power in Russia, the first world war was still raging. The country was tired of fighting. The existing conditions at that time forced the Bolshevik to conclude a Peace Treaty with its adversaries. Hence to Soviet Russia, the need of the hour at that time was to establish peace with its neighbour in order to survive. This realistic understanding led the Bolsheviks to adopt the 'Decree on Peace' on 8 November, 1917.

Due to these developments, Lenin, spoke on the need for "reviewing old treaties between Tsarist Russia and other countries and for rejecting all clauses which provided for plundering and violence against other nations But all clauses where good neighbourly conditions and

economic agreement are provided we shall welcome, we can reject them.¹ The founder of Soviet State saw nothing incompatible in its existing side by side with capitalist powers. The 'Decree on Peace' itself proposed to all warring peoples and their governments to begin immediately negotiations for a just and democratic peace.

Also during this time Germany posed a threat to the Security of Russia. It rejected all proposals for a just peace with Russia and ordered her troops to march deep into the Russian Territory. In a dangerous situation like this Lenin took two steps backward and signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans. The treaty was a national humiliation to the Russians, as they were pushed back from the black sea.

Added to this tragedy, civil war broke out in Russia, which lasted almost for three years. The intervention by Western countries in the civil war further complicated the situation. Ultimately, Soviet Russia was victorious. The victory demonstrated to the world that newly formed communist state had the will and the strength to survive any onslaught from out-siders.

1. Andrew Rothstein, Peaceful Co-existence, (London: Penguin Books, 1955) p.28

In short critically analysing the consequences of the war in Russia, it can be said that war hit it hard, it disrupted its economy, there was a serious decline in grain production, several rural areas suffered near famine. On the industrial production sunk to one seventh of the pre-war regime.² Further, the sudden stoppage of Russian land trade with the West plus the sea blockade which shut off the Baltic Black sea proved to be disastrous for Russia. The latter's railway, also suffered severely from the strains of war most of it led towards the most highly industrialised regions and those had passed out of Russian hands by Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Taking into consideration the prevailing atmosphere in Soviet Union, it can be said that it urgently needed peace in which to rebuild its revaged economy. It needed not only respite from war, but economic assistance from the capitalist countries, without modifying its belief in the inevitability of war and the necessity of world revolution, the Soviet leaders resolved to take some steps backward, in order to consolidate and strengthen the forces at home and abroad that would enable the revolution to march forward at a later date.

2. Donald Treadgold, 20 Century Russia (Chicago: Rand Menally and Company, 1959), p.200

Lenin, therefore, accepted disarmament as a means to avoid any future war with the West and to create peaceful conditions for all round development. More or less similar consideration influenced Lenin's foreign policy, when he sought to establish diplomatic and economic relation with the imperialist countries of the West.

During the twenties Soviet foreign policy characterised by "breathing space" was intended to pursue the following objectives:

- i) to strengthen as much as possible the alliance between the proletariat of the USSR and the Western European proletariat and the oppressed people aiming at the developments and victory of the international proletarian revolution;
- ii) to carry on the policy of peace, which must be the core of the government's entire foreign policy and which must guide the government's basic actions and statements;
- iii) to carry on economic reconstruction with a view to transforming the USSR from an importer of machinery and equipment into a producer of machinery and equipment in order to reduce her dependence on the capitalist countries. This was intended to ensure an independent role for the newly born socialist country in international politics for carrying the revolutionary

message and to provide leadership to all the workers of the world and particularly to extend support to the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial peoples;

- iv) so far as possible, to prepare economic reserve that will insure the country against all eventualities in both domestic and foreign markets, and lastly to take every possible measures to consolidate the defence of the country and to increase the power of the Red Army, the Red Navy and the Air fleet.³

On the whole, the main aim of Soviet foreign policy during this time, was to lengthen the 'breathing space' to gain time to build the policy of the national economy and at the same time consolidate Socialist position both within and outside the country. In keeping with this policy, Lenin's tactical position on disarmament shifted sharply in 1921. He gave importance to disarmament and made every effort to achieve it, though till the end of his death he could not see it. The Western countries rejection of his disarmament plans made him confirm his earlier views that disarmament is possible only after the fall on capitalism.⁴

The recovery from the economic depression and rebuilding of its military forces, influenced the

3. V.I.Lenin, On Peaceful Co-existence: Articles and Speeches (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p.7

4. Ibid.

Soviet disarmament policy during Lenin's time. The proposals which Soviet Russia made on disarmament during this time laid stress on general disarmament. Guided by the Marxist-Leninist concept of disarmament, the Soviet general disarmament plan stood for the limitation of armaments.

Lenin's approach to disarmament was reflected in the number of proposals that his representatives submitted to the disarmament conference. The first conference which Soviet Russia attended under his guidance was the Geneva Conference for the Economic and Financial Reconstruction of Europe on 10th April, 1922. At that forum, the issue of disarmament was for the first time placed on a business like footing by the Soviet representatives, George V. Chicherin, the people's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated on behalf of the Soviet government that his "delegation intend to propose, in the course of the conference, the general limitation of armaments, and to support all proposals tending to lighten the weight of Militarism.⁵ At the same time, he proposed to ban the most barbaric forms of Warfare, such as poisonous gas, air warfare, etc., and the means of destruction aimed against civilian

5. Ye Potyarkin and S. Kortunov, The USSR proposes Disarmament, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p.23

populations. The most important part of the proposal was the guarantee, Soviet Russia was willing to give, to carry out limitations of its armaments on condition of complete reciprocity with necessary guarantee against any sort of attack upon or interference in its internal affairs.

At the Moscow Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, held in December, 1922 the Russian delegation proposed mutual and proportional reduction of armaments, that is, to reduce the army to one quarter within a period of eighteen months to two years. A suggestion was also made to dissolve all irregular military units, to limit military expenditure by imposing a limit on spending on servicemen and to establish neutral zones along the border.⁶

Similar disarmament proposals were made by Soviet Union at the Lausanne Conference in 1924. At all these Conferences the Soviet delegates pressed for reduction of armaments. To Soviet Russia disarmament from 1921 to 1924, meant the reduction of armaments.

6. Zenia Joukoff Eudin and Others, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (California: Stanford University Press, 1957), p.315.

When Joseph Stalin assumed power after the death of Lenin, he continued to be guided by Lenin's precepts on the subordination of world revolution to the goals of disarmament. This was mainly because his country had not yet fully recovered economically and militarily to face any military challenge from the capitalist countries. It was weaker than the great powers of that time. The prevailing International situation was of deep concern to Stalin, who viewed it as a serious threat to his country. Speaking at the plenary session of the central committee of the party on 19 January, 1925, he said, "In the event of complication arising in the countries around us, we must be prepared for all contingencies".⁷

Stalin adopted a more flexible policy on disarmament than Lenin, especially after 1926. In September 1927, answering a question put by an American Labour delegation, he said, "I think that the existence of two opposite system, the capitalist system and the socialist systems, does not exclude the possibility of agreements. I think that such agreement are possible and expedient in condition of peaceful developments", again he said the same thing may be proposed in regard

7. J.V.Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1954), Vol. 7, p.14.

to the diplomatic field. We are pursuing a policy of peace, and we are prepared to sign a pact of non-aggression with bourgeois states. We are pursuing a policy of peace, and we are prepared to come to an agreement concerning disarmament, including complete abolition of standing armies, which we declared to the whole world as far back as the time of Geneva Conference.⁸

Thus, with utmost care, Stalin made peace with the Western countries and allowed his country to actively participate in the League of Nation's Disarmament Conference. In the beginning of his regime, Soviet delegates at the League of Nations Preparatory Commission on Disarmament stood firmly for the limitation of armaments. Stalin also favoured general and complete disarmament in view of the prevailing militarization and growing threat of capitalist intervention. Moreover, as the economic pressure was increasing at home, in order to solve it speedily, he was for strengthening his country's relations with the Western powers by adopting a flexible approach towards disarmament. As a result of which at the Fifteen Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in December, 1927, Stalin declared "The

8. Andrew Rothstein, No.1 p.39

maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the co-existence of two opposite systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this.⁹

Stalin's flexible approach to Disarmament was reflected in the general and complete disarmament proposals of 1927 presented by the Chief Soviet delegates, Maxim Litvinov, at the League of Nations Preparatory Commission on Disarmament. The proposal envisaged the disbandment of all armed forces, the destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means of chemical warfare and other means of annihilation, the dismantling of fortresses and naval and air bases, the abolition of war ministers, the dissolution of general staffs, the prohibition of military training and other measures to ensure complete disarmament. However, the countries rejected the proposals.¹⁰

The non-cooperation by the Western countries did not discourage the Soviets from campaigning for disarmament. In fact, when the Western powers rejected the Soviet proposals on total disarmament, the Soviet Union proposed partial disarmament in 1928, with more broad

9. Ibid.

10. A. Beryozkin and others, History of Soviet Foreign Policy: 1917-1945 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p.267.

based terms to the West. But unfortunately, the plan was not responded favourably by the Western countries, though it stood for the reduction of armaments. The most important feature of this proposal was that it provided for an 'inspection system'.¹¹

In 1929, when Soviet Union's proposal for partial disarmament could not meet with any success. The Soviet Union again revived their proposals for general and complete disarmament. The Japanese and German military build up and Japanese aggression against China were mainly responsible for the Soviet support for disarmament. During this time Germany was also rearming herself under the leadership of Hitler. Alarmed by these significant developments, which posed threat to its own security, and the risk of war breaking out, Soviet Russia advocated total disarmament.

Almost all Soviet proposals on disarmament, presented to the League of Nations under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin were rejected by the West. The Soviet too did not agree with any of the Western proposals on disarmament. They considered them as

11. Ibid., p.268.

"nothing but a propaganda smoke screen for the continuing arms race".¹² This mutual rejection was mainly due to the basic differences about verification and control.

In regard to verification and control, in the beginning, the US did not favour the principle of supervising and controlling disarmament measures on the spot in national territories. At the League Preparatory Disarmament Commission the US delegates stated on 27 September, 1926, that the proposition to establish supervision and control of national armaments by an International agency must rest primarily on international good faith and respect for treaties.¹³

The Soviet disarmament proposals submitted to the League of Nations from 1928 to 1933, on the other hand, contained elaborate machinery for international inspection. The partial disarmament proposal of 1928, provided for effective inspection and the setting up for this purpose a standing International Inspection Commission consisting of representatives of all the

12. A. Beryozkin and others, No.10, p.291.

13. Allen Dulles, "Disarmament in the Atomic Age". Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.25, p.209.

countries participating in the convention. Interestingly the Soviet Union was favouring arms control on the spot, while the United States was opposed to it.

In 1932, the Soviet Union pointed out that it was premature to discuss the question of control before real disarmament had started. The Soviet delegation during this time insisted that first agreement had to be reached on what to control that is, the extent of armament reduction and then it would be possible to agree on how to implement control.¹⁴

In 1933, the US modified its stand on disarmament by accepting the principle of effective supervision of arms limitation. In doing so, it was influenced by the German rearmament policy, which it considered as a threat to the security of its European allies. In order to check this trend it accepted effective supervision of arms limitation. Announcing his country's decision at the Disarmament Conference on May 22, 1933, the US representatives Norman Davis's speech focussed on the importance of the effective supervision of arms limitations, and

14. Izvestia (Moscow), 25 September, 1932.

indicated the American willingness to participate in the supervision in order to faithfully implemented the disarmament proposals.¹⁵

Towards the end of the League period, the Soviet Union and the United States accepted the principle of effective supervision of arms limitation and worked for its success. Their joint collaboration on this particular aspect was to expose Germany military build up, which they both feared. To the Russians, German militarism posed an immediate danger to its security. Whereas to the American it constituted a threat to the security of its European allies. Adolf Hitler, who understood the motives of the communist as well as the Western powers, refused to yield to their pressure to accept the principles of effective supervision of arms limitation. As a protest, Hitler withdrew from the League of Nations. Unfortunately, even the joint collaboration between the Soviet Russia and the United States failed to check the danger from German Government.

15. John, W. Wheller (ed), International Affairs 1933, (London: Oxford University Press), p.211.

Despite the failure of Disarmament during the inter war period (1921-1938), it brought peace and helped Soviet Russia to consolidate economically and militarily, in order to face new military challenge from the West. It also reinforced the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist view that disarmament was possible only after the fall of capitalism. So strong was their belief in this, that the sixth Congress of the Communist International, which met in Moscow from 17th July to 1st September, 1928 said, "the aim of the Soviet proposals was not to spread pacifist illusions, but to destroy them; not to support capitalism by ignoring or toning down its shady sides, but to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulates; that disarmament and elimination of war were possible only after the overthrow of capitalism.¹⁶ The belief remained in force till the death of Stalin in 1953.

In view of this ideological lines, the Soviet Union still consider disarmament as a strategy essential to bring peace and security to its country and creates conditions for preventing future wars against the Soviet Union.

16. James Degras, (ed) The Communist International: 1919-1943: (London; Oxford University Press, 1960) Vol.2, p.450.

Notwithstanding the failure of the League of Nations, disarmament continued to gain considerable importance in International affairs, as a step towards restoring peace and security in the world. To the Soviet Union, it is particularly significant to achieve its goal of creating peaceful condition for building socialism and communism.

However, in the nuclear age, the changes of achieving disarmament have become far too complicated. This is mainly because of the introduction of the most destructive weapons systems. Hence, after second world war, the issue of curbing and halting arms race took a new qualitative dimension. Nuclear weapons threaten to destroy mankind, and has changed commonly accepted ideas on what is possible and admissible in International affairs.

When the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan, the military effect of these new weapons escaped no one but their impact on future strategy was only dimly understood, and a subject of controversy. The consensus of the scientific community, which had designed the new weapons held that by virtue of their unprecedented destructiveness as well their imperviousness to defences, they had

fundamentally and permanently altered the nature of warfare. Once other countries had acquired the ability to manufacture similar weapons, they would become unusable. With more than one power disposing of nuclear weapons, they could not be employed with impunity, as they had been by the US against Japan. Hence they would have only one conceivable function and that would be to deter others. Since victory in nuclear war was out of the question, nuclear weapons could not be rationally put to offensive purposes.¹⁷

This outlook did not gain immediate ascendancy, President Truman and Eisenhower, confronting communist aggression in Europe and Asia and unable to stop Soviet expansion with conventional forces, had no choice but to rely on the threat of nuclear response. That this threat could be effectively used, Eisenhower demonstrated in 1953, when he compelled North Koreans to accept an armistice. Later he and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, coined the slogan "massive retaliation", with which they hoped to contain the Soviet Union and its clients at minimum cost and without resort to unpopular military draft.

17. Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth", Commentary (New York: Published by American Jewish Committee Oct.1986) Vol.82, No.4, p.25

Such nuclear blackmail, of course, was possible only as long as the United States retained a monopoly on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the vehicles able to deliver them to other continents. This monopoly eroded faster than expected. The Soviet explosion of fission bomb in 1949 and fusion (hydrogen) bomb four years later shocked the United States. This shock contributed to the decision announced by President Truman on 31 January, 1950 to speed up work on thermo nuclear weapons. Such bombs have a yield many times greater than the atomic bomb used in Japan and the decision to develop them marked arms race. In spite of Soviet breakthrough in nuclear technology, United States did not abandon the strategy of "massive retaliation" because the Russian lacked adequate means of delivering these explosive device against the United States. These means they acquired in 1957 when Spujnik demonstrated their ability to launch intercontinental missiles. Since there existed at the time no effective means of intercepting such missiles, certain to be armed with nuclear charges, the United States faced for the first time in its history, a direct threat to its national survival.

With the launching of Sputnik, the world entered the age of balance of terror. Untill then, while the Soviet Union had been vulnerable to US nuclear strikes capable of being carried out by the strategic Air command from the American bases all around USSR, the US had been immune from Soviet strikes against its homeland. The inter continental ballistic missiles ended the United States invulnerability once and for all. At the same time, the powerful rockets of the ballistic missiles enabled each of the two super powers to launch satellites of various categories to keep the adversary under continuous surveillances.

The decade of the 1960s saw the beginning of the greatest over arms race. Such a massive build up of arsenals by both Soviet Union and United States, with an overkill capability to destroy the world many times over was based on the accepted strategic doctrine called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Under this doctrine each side must have adequate capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side with each sub-arsenal strategic triad (land-based, and sea based missiles and bombers) after absorbing a first strike by the adversary.

The assumptions regarding the adversary's future build-up, the extent of survivability of own's arsenal in a first strike, the survival arsenal required to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary and the operationality factor, each calculated on a conservative basis, boosted the arsenal considered to be necessary to such overkill levels.

There was yet another aspect of the action reaction phenomenon that fuelled the arms race. The Soviet Union was attempting to establish a capability to defend itself against nuclear attacks by intercepting the incoming nuclear war heads and destroying them in space by exploding a nuclear warhead on the path of the incoming one. The United States on its part was developing a force multiplier capability by putting into each missiles a multiple number of warheads each of which was programmed to hit a separate target. This was possible with miniaturisation of electronics and improving the 'yield-to-weight' ratios of warhead.¹⁸

18. K.Subrahmanyam, "The Struggle for Nuclear Disarmament" Strategic Analysis(New Delhi) April, 1985, p.50.

These developments led to the debate on anti-ballistic missile systems. The Soviet Union justified its erection of the ABM system on the ground that they were purely defensive and morally it was preferable to defend its population than acquiring additional capacity to inflict increased damage on the adversary. It was further argued that the capability to intercept nuclear warheads would enable a country more time to carefully assess the adversary's attack and respond in measure and secondly it was a shield against the attack of smaller nuclear powers. Initially these arguments prevailed and the United States too launched on a programme of erection of a light ABM shield which was further modified to one to protect the missiles fields only. At the same time it was urged by sections of the US Strategic Community that the ABM with the then prevalent technology was technologically far from effective and adversely affected the stability of deterrence based on the mutually assured destruction. The doctrine of MAD was based on the preceived capability to inflict assured destruction by each side on the other, and any injection of uncertainty by the introduction of a filtering system such as the ABM, was considered as affecting adversely the basic stability of

deterrence. All these arguments have now revived with the current debate on President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). While in the 1960s the Soviet argued in favour of defensive systems, currently it is the American, doing so, while the Soviets are arguing along the lines the American then did.¹⁹

Thus a state which increases its arms supply defends it on grounds of security. Others follow suit and an arms race begins. Tensions increases and each 'competitor' suspects the other to be the first potential aggressor. Mutual apprehension aggravate the arms race. Psychological tension invest even ordinary events with extraordinary implications. Minor incidents are interpreted as causing incalculable damage to national prestige or national security. The governments which are already psychologically on the brink of war, easily plunge into full scale hostilities at the slightest provocation.²⁰

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19. Phil Williams, "Soviet American Relations" Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (New York) Vol. 36, No.4, 1987, p.65.
 20. Rajvir Singh, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New Delhi: International Publishing House, 1987) p.1-15.

It is argued that armaments remain the fundamental cause of war. But, on a closer analysis, "arms are caused by the danger of war for more than war is caused by the presence of arms". A desperate competition in arms may surely lead to war, but what is more important to note is the combination of factors leading to an arms race. Arms are the product of insecurity, and a preparation of war. So long as war remains the final instrument of protecting or promoting national interest, arms will be stocked. This is a wrong notion, for an arms race once begun never stops, and gathers its own momentum. It certainly does not ensure security.

However, inspite of the American cry against Soviet 'adventurism' due to its involvement in Hungary (1956), Poland (1980), Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977-78), Afganistan (1979) etc., it gave the call for peaceful co-existence without war and for general and complete disarmament, from the very beginning of its formation. Peaceful co-existence has greater relevance in the age of overkill. Apart from capitalist and Socialist Coexistence it implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes between

states. Though, the Soviet Union due to the threat of annihilation and to lessen the tension from the world, accepted the theory of arms control for the time being, its main goals are general and complete disarmament, that is a world free of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union, also proposed general and complete disarmament, due to the pressure in its economy. During 1960s there was failure of the agricultural programme in Soviet Union. The Soviet Union decided to improve its relations with US, in order to ease the strains of a massive build up. It could then concentrate on economic development by diverting the resources towards solving the agricultural as well as other economic problems at home.

For the USSR, the benefits society would receive if the resources used in military activities were applied for other purposes have been extremely high. For several decades, defence has taken a large share of at least one-tenth of Soviet gross national product (GNP).²¹ Defence has competed with civilian heavy industry, receiving a substantial share of metallurgical products and much larger share of machinery.

21. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, (ed) Soviet Politics in the 1980s (Boulder: West View Press, 1985), p.131.

Manpower allocated to defence industry and the armed forces has limited the growth of the civilian labour force, which has suffered from the near and long term consequences of war time casualties.

The Soviet system of priorities strongly favours military activities, so that the civilian economy suffers disproportionately from the shortage of materials and services that are an essential feature of the Soviet Planning system. This massive commitment of resources and the ever-riding priority that favours defence activities have resulted in substantially slowed growth of the Soviet economy. In the early 1970s the continuing decline of capital productivity and the impending reduction in the growth rate of the labour force but in question, the USSR's capacity to continue meeting its priority objectives. At that time, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev strongly stated the problem. He said that "only by raising the economy's efficiency is it possible to find assets and resources sufficient to ensure simultaneously significant growth in the worker's well being, resources for the economy's rapid development

in the future and the requirements for maintaining at the necessary level of country's capability.²²

If Soviet policies continue on their present course, the USSR seems headed for a crisis in the next decade. What it faces is not a purely economic crisis, but an economic-political crisis brought on by the failure of the economy to provide the resources required to sustain at once the welfare state and the Soviet empire in its competition with the West. Thus economic constraints are exerting pressure on Soviet policy towards strategies of accommodation in the field of arms control and disarmament. Continuity, caution and consensus had characterised Soviet system which is revolutionary in doctrine but deeply conservative in practice. Gorbachev who came to the political scene of Russia after Chermanko's death marked a departure from the earliest Soviet world view. Like Kruschev Gorbachev evidently considers aggressive policy initiatives and tactical flexibility to be a more effective strategy for attainment of Soviet objectives than a defensive ideologically rigid approach as practised in the past. Arms control

22. L.I. Brezhnev, "On the fifteenth anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", Pravda, December 22, 1972.

therefore ranked high in priority in his scheme of things. His policies as reflected in his initiatives addressed to the problem of scaling down of the Soviet arms build up. He placed Soviet economic interests at the centre of his foreign policy. He is the representative of a system that prides itself on discerning the 'objective reality'. The reality were that Soviet economy has been bogged down under heavy military expenditures. He was important of the sluggish pace of the Soviet economic development. The Soviet economy had dwindled down to an all time low, from 1981-85 there was practically no economic growth; per capita income had declined; and the Soviet Union had a debt burden of a billion pounds in 1983 that has gone up one and half time; since then it was spending at least twice as much of its gross domestic product on arms as the USA. His proposed economic reconstruction programmes have been crippled by a heavy resource crunch, a situation that can be avoided if money is diverted from defence to development. Gorbachev therefore, restored the traditional primacy of economic over foreign policy, a priority reversed by Brezhnev.

The new thinking by Gorbachev extends to the sphere of ideology also. Socialism, the very basis of Soviet political and social system, came under a new relationalisation. Gorbachev called into question 'peaceful co-existence' by definition 'counter revolutionary'. He accepted realistically that socialism can be built if a nuclear war can be avoided and if the drift towards an Armageddon is reversed. The whole destruction - oriented thinking implied in the policies of his predecessors has come to be viewed as anti-humanistic and nihilistic and therefore, incompatible with the construction of socialism.

A successful process of democratisation and modernisation, Gorbachev believed will help Soviet Union gain more political and ideological terrain for socialist advances in other parts of the world than a Soviet Union engaged in a deadly arms race. His disarmament policies therefore create space for 'political and ideological offensives' with much better perspectives of success.

Hence the concept of Marxism and Leninism played a significant role in the formulation of Soviet policy of disarmament. Marx, Engels and Lenin developed the theories of war by empirical analysis, in the condition

of capitalism and imperialism. They considered politics not as an expression of abstract interest of society as a whole but as an expression of definite class interests. Lenin supported the Clausewitz's view on war and added to it his own concept of 'violent means'. Hence Marxism-Leninism defines war as an armed conflict between different social classes, state and nations in order to achieve definite economic and political goals. On the other hand Marxism-Leninism also believes in the concept of peace. Due to the realisation of the destructive quality of war Lenin advocated pacific means and accepted disarmament as an alternative to war. After Lenin, Stalin adopted a more flexible policy on disarmament. However, in the nuclear age, due to the introduction of most destructive weapon systems, disarmament became a complicated issue. In spite of complication Soviet Union has always favoured complete disarmament as it would help the USSR divert its resources for economic development. Thus the General and Complete disarmament had an important place in the Soviet policy of disarmament and for the Russians it would mean not only the end of the institution war but also a fundamental requirement for the continued development of Soviet economy and society.

CHAPTER - IV

SOVIET ARMS CONTROL

INITIATIVES UNDER GORBACHEV

Both super powers are believed to be under a moral obligation to control the nuclear arms race. It is however, not necessary that the leadership of the two powers sincerely believes in a new arms control agreement or compliance with the existing agreements. While the Soviet leadership has never missed an opportunity to offer new proposals for arms control, the US leadership has generally been hesitant to offer one in the recent past. Whether this policy of the US should be considered as representing lesser interest in the arms control regime than that of the Soviets or the resistance to offer a new proposal until achieving unchallengable military superiority over the rival power or a policy not to put forth a proposal only, is a part of public diplomacy rhetoric.

President Ronald Reagan assumed the leadership of the US with a firm conviction that the arms control agreements with the Soviet Union were always against security interests of the United States because the Soviets violated the treaties and acquired military superiority over his country. He therefore, displayed less interest in the arms control regime than his predecessors and decided to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. It is widely believed that he

has already achieved this objective. Finally the US leadership has always been critical of the Soviet arms control policy which concentrates more on public diplomacy than on serious efforts to achieve some concrete agreement.¹

During the period of detente hopes were raised about achieving the objective of nuclear and conventional arms control. But as the 8 point of detente started evaporating, the commitment to arms control began to decline. Though both super powers signed SALT II in 1979, the United States failed to ratify the treaty. Nevertheless both decided to comply with the provisions of the treaty. However, SALT II and the ABM treaty are likely to be abandoned in the not too distant future. By the end of this year (1986) the US will have reached the position of violation of a key provision of the SALT II, which limits each side to have no more than 1320 missiles warheads and bombers with cruise missile capability. The ABM treaty will also be violated if the space-based defence system of the United States, officially called 'Strategic Defence Initiative' continues to be developed as planned.

1. O.N.Mehrotra, 'Gorbachev's Arms Control Initiatives, Strategic Analysis, January, 1987, Vol.XI, No.10, p.171.

While President Reagan has not displayed keenness to achieve some arms control agreements, the Soviet leadership has offered many proposals to resolve some contentious issues of arms control. Perhaps Reagan could afford the luxury of not being serious about arms control issues in his first term because he decided to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union when the Soviet leadership was in the transitory period.²

In about 28 months, the Soviet leadership changed three times because three leaders died successively. While the Breznev era lasted for 17 years, and came to an end in November, 1982, his successor Yuri Andropov lasted for merely 15 months, Andropov's successor constantive Cherneko survived just for thirteen months. In the last two years of the Breznev regime and the short tenures of Andropov and Chernenko, Soviet industrial and agricultural performance deteriorated. In such a situation Reagan challenged the Soviet leaders to enter into an arms race which requires sophisticated modern technology lacking in the Soviet Union. During that period, the Soviet Union put forward many proposals to contain the nuclear arms race but they

2. Ibid. p.172.

were rejected by the United States. At times the Reagan administration appeared to have rejected the proposals under the influence of arrogance of power of its high technology and industrial pre-eminence.

The Soviet Union walked out from the Geneva arms control talks because of deployment of new American missiles in Europe in November, 1983. The Soviet walk out can be justified because the negotiations were on not deploying or reducing the number of scheduled deployment of new American missiles in Europe and reduction or elimination of the Soviet SS-20s. Since the US started deploying the missiles the Soviet leadership decided not to negotiate as the situation was changed. The nuclear arms control negotiation again started in March, 1985.³

It was a coincidence that these nuclear arms control negotiations began almost at the same time Gorbachev assumed the Soviet leadership. Since then and until the summit in Reykjavik in October, 1986, Gorbachev took at least five major initiatives to resolve the arms control issues. The first initiative was a self imposed unilateral moratorium on under-

3. Ibid., p.174

ground nuclear tests for five months, beginning on August 6, 1985, the 40th anniversary of US atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Since then he extended the moratorium until the end of 1986. He invited the United States to follow his example, leading to a negotiated ban on such tests. The Reagan administration rejected the moratorium on underground nuclear tests, saying that tests were needed to perfect American weapons.

Though the United States refused to follow the Soviet initiative regarding moratorium on underground nuclear tests, it has assailed the Soviet Union for its propaganda tactics. It argues that the Soviet move were taken after completion of its scheduled nuclear test programmes. Another US argument that the Soviet Union imposed the moratorium after completion of its scheduled nuclear test programme might have been accepted if the Soviet Union resumed tests after expiry of the moratorium which was initially for only five months. But since the Soviet Union has extended it until the end of 1986, this argument lacks substance. Moreover, many American experts have questioned the US argument about the Soviet scheduled nuclear test programme. Despite arguments in favour or against nuclear test moratorium, Gorbachev's initiative on the moratorium was genuine one.

The second initiative was taken by Gorbachev when in October, 1985 during his visit to France, he proposed 50% reduction in Soviet and US strategic nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory, a total ban on the 'development, production deployment of offensive space weapons of both countries and the uncoupling of British and French nuclear weapons from US-Soviet negotiations and called for direct Soviet talks with Britain and France on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Soviet proposal for a 50% cut in Soviet and US strategic weapons could have been attractive to the Europeans if Gorbachev had not included among strategic weapons American medium-range nuclear missiles placed in Europe. While the Soviet Union maintained that those missiles were strategic because they could reach Soviet territory, West Europeans refused to accept proposal which could disturb the military balance of the super powers in Europe. At the same time, the Soviet offer to trade the Soviet SS-20s for reduction in the French and British independent nuclear forces was rejected by both the countries.⁴

4. O.N.Mehrotra, 'Gorbachev's arms control initiatives' Strategic Analysis, January, 1987, pp. 174-75.

Gorbachev appeared to have taken the initiative by proposing some arms control measures in Paris because he wanted to probe the American's stand on some issues at the forthcoming summit meetings with Reagan in Geneva November. He perhaps wanted to test the cohesiveness of NATO and unity among the allies to face the Soviet peace offensive. His immediate aim might have been to influence the Dutch who were to decide on the deployment of Cruise missiles in their territory. While Gorbachev was perhaps successful in probing the US position on various arms control issues, he failed to create a wedge between the US and its European allies dispute playing up the 'Star Wars'.


Throughout the late spring and summer of 1985, Soviet authorities attempted to increase pressure on the Reagan administration to back off its support of the strategic defence initiative. The attack came on two fronts, the first charging the White House with abandoning its commitment to the linkage among strategic, intermediate-range, and space weapons talk in Geneva, and the second offering a series of positive incentives for agreement, including an end to Soviet counter-measures against American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, a nuclear test moratorium, and the prospect

for radical reduction, upto fifty per cent, of offensive weapons in exchange for a prohibition on the development of a protective umbrella. Charges that the Americans sought first strike capability through the deployment of a protective missiles shield alternated with vague Soviet threats about potential counter measures and a resumption of an unbridled high technology arms race in the space.⁵ Particularly, Soviet concern centered on continuing de facto adherence to the provision of the unratified SALT-II treaty and on seeking a US reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty, which has limited each side to one defensive system and ostensibly prescribed research and development efforts, although the US side held that initial research on the star wars system was permitted. For its part, the Reagan administration countered the Soviet initiatives with mixed and frequently conflicting voices, some advocating serious exploration of Moscow's offer to consider deep cuts in strategic weapons and others arguing for rapid development of SDI.

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With all his initiatives and an open mind it was natural that Gorbachev would be looking forward to a summit meeting with Reagan. A summit would give practical shape to his proposals. At the same time

5. Pravda, May 6, 1985.



he was quite circumspect about the outcome of the summit - it ought to produce practical results in key areas of limiting and reducing armaments and understanding should be reached on cessation of nuclear tests and abolition of intermediate range missiles in European zone; there is no sense in holding empty talks.⁶

Gorbachev had serious reasons for desiring a moderation of both the dangers and expense of the weapons race. His central purpose is to overcome the backwardness that had hampered the Soviet system since Stalin's day and has damaged the Soviet prestige in the worlds. This task would demand concentration on domestic affairs and a significant shift in the allotment of Soviet Union's limited natural resources - a shift away from international political and military involvement and into internal investments. A better atmosphere would serve to free restrictions on East-West trade, encourage the US allies to explore their own rapprochement with Moscow.⁷

6. Girish Mathur, "The Summit: Muted Expectations," World Focus, January 1986, p.22.

7. James Petras, "Talking Peace, preparing war", Economic and Political Weekly, January 25, 1986, p.156.

Although late in the spring of 1985 Moscow pronounced the first round of Geneva talks as the ending on 'unsatisfactory' note, it was soon drawn into both the realities and the atmospherics that surround super powers summitry.⁸ Early in July, both capitals announced that Reagan and Gorbachev would meet for a two day summit in Geneva on November 19th and 20th. While both leaders sought the meeting for domestic as well as foreign policy reasons it was the first opportunity for the new Soviet leader to occupy the world stage and test his mettle against the Reagan, and the President would find the trip to Geneva helpful in quieting his critics on the left and each also ~~hoped~~ that the meeting would emphasize his own version of strategic security in a world of increasingly complex and costly weapons systems. Gorbachev's goal was to convince the US President of his serious intent to reduce overall strategic weapons, including intermediate range systems in Europe in exchange for a suspension of SDI, and Reagan hoped to assure the Russians of the essentially defensive nature of his proposals for a nuclear umbrella.⁹

8. Pravada, May 27, 1985.

9. R.E. Miller and others, Gorbachev at the Helm: A new Era in Soviet Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 1987) p.192.

It was against this backdrop that Gorbachev pointed a more pessimistic picture of summit prospects in an interview he gave to the Time magazine early in September, although he yielded slightly on the question of star war research.¹⁰ Describing himself as taking "a more cautious look at the prospects for the Geneva meeting than I did at the time we gave our agreement," he pictured Soviet-US relations as 'continuing to deteriorate' because of the US rejection of Soviet proposals for a nuclear test ban and other symbolic steps toward agreement. Gorbachev yielded only slightly on the issue of star wars research, arguing that purely laboratory bound activities were permissible under the Soviet interpretation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, a position that he also expressed to visiting US senator.¹¹ Much of his spontaneous response after the formal question period was devoted to his professed bewilderment and anger at the Reagan administration's tone of hostility towards the USSR despite the President's proffered desire to build better relations. Pointing out that Washington

10. Pravda, September 2, 1985.

11. Zores Medvedev, Gorbachev (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.230.

still seemed to be a house divided on the issue of improved relations with Moscow, Gorbachev pictured certain circles in the administration as attempting to sabotage the upcoming talks.¹²

A month before the summit, the Soviets tabled a comprehensive disarmament plan at the Geneva forum. The proposal called for the complete prohibition of space strike arms for both sides and a radical reduction by 50 per cent in nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. Departing from their initial insistence about the coupling of all three aspects of the talks, Moscow now offered to reach a separate accord on intermediate-range systems in Europe and to open bilateral talks with Britain and France on their independent nuclear forces, an offer that was quickly rejected in London and Paris.¹³

With the summit in the offing, both the US and Soviet Union adopted different conception of what the summit would chiefly deal with. In the Soviet view it was imperative that the summit would have to make a breakthrough on the allegedly most pressing

12. Pravda, October 4, 1985.

13. Pravda, October 5, 1985.

danger, that is the incipient militarization of the space. By contrast, the US stressed that the summit would have to be an 'across the board' survey of all issues troubling their relationship from nuclear weapons to human rights and to Soviet conduct in the third world.¹⁴ And in the month proceeding, both parties manoeuvred to gain acceptance of their conflicting views. Finally the summit agenda included 26 issues ranging from nuclear weapons to maritime boundaries to cultural cooperation.¹⁵

Before the Summit, both the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the basic framework of the arms control talks. They had outlined their proposals on the broad issues of the arms talks - START, INF and SDI.

On strategic weapons, the US position was that the number of long range missiles be limited to 5000 war heads atop submarine and land-based ballistic missiles and air launched Cruise missiles. The Soviet

14. Jeremy, R. Azfael, and others, "Super Power Balancing Act" Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1985-86, p.481.

15. Time, November 18, 1985, p.12.

Union proposed a limit of 6000 warheads including weapons where the US has an edge, i.e. air borne Cruise missiles, gravity bombs and short range attack missiles launched from planes.¹⁶

On INF, the US wanted a freeze on weapons in Europe at the end of the year limiting each side to about 140 launchers, excluding the British and French forces. The Soviet Union wanted a ban on all US missiles in Europe except 120 Cruise missiles. The Soviet Forces would be reduced to match the US deployment plus those of UK and France.¹⁷

However, for Soviet Union the agreement on START and INF were not self-contained packages, that is agreements on these weapons were not to be achieved separately. A Soviet concession in those arms were to be linked with renunciation of the SDI.

On 'Star War' the US position was as before that is research and testing would be held within the

16. Ibid., p.11

17. Ibid.

bounds of the ABM treaty. The Soviet position was diametrically opposed to that of the US. No research or testing or development of technology will be allowed at any cost.

After six years of suspicion, hostility and rhetoric from both sides that evoked the coldest days of the cold war, Gorbachev and Reagan finally broke the ice. On November 19th and 20th, they met in Geneva for the first time.

The negotiations, as they turned out included lot of tough talking on both sides, particularly by Gorbachev. Each leader was trying to probe the mind of the other and convince the utility of the stance they had taken. Unfortunately the summit was destined to be a failure from the very beginning as the US had little interest in giving away anything of substance.¹⁸ An indication of the US approach was earlier hinted as the Weinberger memorandum to Reagan was leaked. The note urged the President not to reach any agreement on strategic arms limitation or anti-ballistic systems, nor affirm earlier treaties on the subject.¹⁹ This

18. M.O.Haque, Soviet Union and Nuclear Arms race, (1982-87), free zone, J.N.U. New Delhi, 1988.

19. Girish Mathur, op. cit. p.22.

attitude was confirmed when Reagan shifted away the focus from arms control to other peripheral issues like human rights and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Gorbachev tried with limited success, to make arms control the center of the talks.

The SDI remained the key to the solution of other arms matters as START and INFP. Negotiations on these matters could not be continued as both leaders failed to agree on the SDI. The summit failed to produce any agreement as both Reagan and Gorbachev remained firm over their respective stands.²⁰

The Soviet strategies for the negotiating talks as that Gorbachev used the summit as a 'propaganda platform' from which he could project the image of Soviet initiatives while highlighting American intrasiegence. A summit, after a gap of six years in the midst of the cold war was bound to generate public enthusiasm and media publicity, Gorbachev wanted to have the maximum mileage out of it.²¹ His announcement of unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and deployment, fifty per cent reduction in

20. News Week, December 2, 1985, p.14.

21. The Times of India, November 21, 1985.

strategic weapons and his assault on the SDI were to show to the world that the Soviet Union can go any extent of compromise. But Reagan's intransigence remains the only major obstacles to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals.²²

Also, the unexpected Soviet offer to slash strategic nuclear arsenals by half was bound to generate pressure on Reagan to apply breaks on the 'star war' programme, both within the US and outside. At time when the American Congress was coming down heavily on the SDI, the Scientific World remained divided over its feasibility and the European allies opposition to it, the SDI was made more vulnerable by the frontal attack launched on it by Gorbachev.²³

The Geneva Summit, despite its failure, considerably narrowed down the differences between the super powers on specific arms control issues. It showed among other things that 'personal diplomacy' in the form of summits can lead to a better understanding of the problem and an effort to curtail the arms race,

22. Azarel and others, No.14, p.493.

23. Strobe Talbott, "Build up and build down", Foreign Affairs, 1983, p.590.

provided there is the political will do do so. Even after the summit failed, Gorbachev continued his 'peace offensive'. Despite mounting opposition from conservative quarters in the politburo and the military he pursued measures that not only addressed to the US and its Western allies but also that restrained Soviet conduct in arms build up. These measures outlined by him in various proposals were:²⁴

- 1) Extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the Soviet Union till January 1, 1987.
- 2) Call for elimination of all nuclear arms by 2000 A.D.
- 3) A 25 per cent reduction in the NATO and Warsaw pact-troops.
- 4) Abolition of the two military blocks in Europe.
- 5) On site verification of arms control agreements as demanded by the US before.

Gorbachev's initiatives were part of his policies directed towards the US-West European countries and the Soviet Union's East European allies. His comprehensive proposals skillfully blended with propaganda and substance were designed to promote detente in Europe. A conductive atmosphere, he hoped, would make the US

24. Economic and Political Weekly,
October 25, 1986, p.1977.

allies to increase pressure on Reagan to be more forthcoming on issues such as nuclear testing and the SDI, taking into account the reservation of some European countries on the SDI. The move to solve European Security problems within a "Pan-European Framework" was designed to strengthen the Western-European Voice vis-a-vis the US and to draw them closer to Soviet Union.²⁵ To lessen the European fear of Soviet conventional arms superiority in June, 1986 he called for a "Wider negotiating Zone" on conventional arms (from the Atlantic to the Urals) that would also include the European part of the Soviet Union.²⁶

Even after the Geneva Summit failed, both Reagan and Gorbachev had kept their options open regarding another meeting between them. While the momentum seemed to be growing towards the Summit, at the end of the year a mini crisis broke out over the arrest of a Soviet diplomat at the UN and the retaliatory arrest of Nicholas Danilof.²⁷ The momentum towards the summit

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25. F. Stephen Larabee and Allen Lynch, "Gorbachev: The Road to Reykjavik", Foreign Policy, Winter, 1986-87, p.10.
26. Ibid. p.9.
27. Gerhard Wetting, "Gorbachev's strategy for Disarmament and Security", Aussen Politik, Vol.38, 1987, p.9.

slowed down and Soviet-American diplomatic relations nose-dived. Despite the crisis however, both the leaders were firm in their decision to have a summit.

On September 19, 1986 Gorbachev wrote to Reagan on the need of the two leaders to involve themselves personally in another arms control talk so as to impart an impulse to the stalled diplomatic process.²⁸

On October 11 and 12, 1986 Gorbachev and Reagan for the second time in their career met at Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland. At the Reykjavik summit meeting Gorbachev took his forth major initiative on arms control in just about the first 19 months of his assuming the mantle of Soviet leadership. He proposed that Soviet Union was ready to cut strategic weapons by 50 per cent during the first five years. This involved the halving of strategic arms on land, at sea and in the air. According to Alexander Bessmartnych, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, President Reagan had agreed to the elimination of all nuclear weapons and not just ballistic missiles by 1986. He said Gorbachev had insisted and Reagan had

28. Michael Mandelbaum and others, "Reykjavik and Beyond", Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1986-87, p.219

finally agreed that all nuclear weapons 'including bombs, battle-field weapons, Cruise missiles, submarines carried and medium range weapons be abolished. While not denying that the two leaders did discuss the abolition of all nuclear weapons, the White House insisted that the US made no formal offer along these lines. In fact, the Reagan administration did not take the summit meeting as seriously as Gorbachev did on the issue of arms control. According to Moscow radio (October 14 and 15), even Reagan's National Security Advisor John Pointdextor said he was surprised by the depth of the Soviet interest in detailed arms negotiations.

The second proposal of Gorbachev at the Reykjavik Summit meeting was dealt with medium range nuclear missiles. He suggested to Reagan the complete elimination of Soviet and US missiles of this class in Europe. Since Britain and France oppose inclusion of their nuclear weapons in the general count during the negotiations between the two super powers, Gorbachev accepted this position at Reykjavik. The other condition on which West Germany in particular had insisted, was that reduction and the elimination of medium range nuclear missiles was not to be discussed

without taking into account lesser range missiles in the face of which, it was said, Western Europe would be disarmed. Gorbachev reportedly agreed with Reagan to freeze missiles with a range of less than 2000 Km. and to start talks immediately about their fate.²⁹

The other proposal offered by Gorbachev in Reykjavik was of mutual obligations to be undertaken on the part of the United States and Soviet Union not to exercise the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for atleast ten years and over that period to put on end to strategic nuclear weapons. According to the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons in the next ten years, therefore, they should also agree to observe the provisions of the ABM treaty, for the same period. As a matter of fact, both super powers twice considered the ABM treaty jointly in 1977 and in 1982 and reportedly agreed that it continued to be in account with their interests.

They also confirmed during the deliberations that the connection between the offensive and defensive

29. Abha, Dixit, 'Reykjavik, The Great Fiasco', Strategic Analysis, February, 1987, p.317.

arms is of everlasting nature, irrespective of what technical level the development has attained.

The Soviet insistence on US commitment to the ABM treaty for the next ten years and the US refusal to do so are in conformity with their respective positions on the issue. While the United States does not want to limit its SDI programme because of its commitment to the ABM, the Soviet Union wants the star wars programme of US to somehow not to be allowed to proceed as planned. Whatever the objective of the two powers to check or advance the development of defence/offence system, Gorbachev advanced some proposals which were positive and need serious consideration. The Reagan administration was not well prepared to accept the Soviet peace proposals. Its reaction after the summit was also dismal. While the Soviet leaders did not call the meeting a failure, the immediate reaction of the US was that the summit could not produce any result. However, late the Reagan administration tried to retrieve its position.

Washington

After Reykjavik Soviet Union wanted to held separate talks on short range missiles. This was

firmly rejected by the United States since it left the possibility that the short-range weapons (with a range of 500-1000 kms) will remain unconstrained after an agreement on medium range weapons took effect. From the beginning, the American position was that an INF accord should also set limits on short range missiles. The purpose was to prevent the Soviet Union from circumventing a treaty by moving further short range weapons into Europe. A treaty on short range missiles will also neutralise the Soviet advantage in Europe³⁰ (the Soviet Union has 130 such missiles in Europe while the US had none) Soviet Union displayed further accommodating spirit by agreeing to remove all short-range missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia which had been installed in response to development of US inter-range missiles in Western Europe.³¹

The new approach gave a push to the arms reduction talks, culminating into Washington Summit on INF. The basis of the INF agreement was the 'zero option' proposed first by Reagan in 1981. Washington

30. Michael, R. Gordon, "INF: A hallow victory", Foreign Policy, Fall 87, p.167.

31. O.N.Mehrotra, "The INF Treaty: A step towards Nuclear Arms Reduction", Strategic Analysis, March, 1988, Vol.XI, No.2, p.1371.

offered to cancel its planned development of Pershing-II and Cruise missiles in Europe, if Moscow eliminated its already deployed SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5, missiles. But the proposal was largely for show and no one seriously expected Soviet Union to accept it.³² The Soviet Union predictably, rejected the proposal. Brezhnev called it an absurd demand that would require the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally.³³

The dramatic moves by Gorbachev since February, 1987 converted the original 'zero-option' for INF in Europe into 'zero-zero option', which was to include both short range weapons and the INF. His proposal also envisaged a global 'zero-zero option' which means scraping all such weapons throughout the world, thus gaining one step beyond Reyknavik.

After the stage was set and the main agenda finalised, the two leaders met December 7-10, 1987, in a three day talks. If not anything else, the summit represented an urgency involved in the issues of arms control. It showed that the Soviet-

32. Time, March 16, 1987.

33. Michael, R. Gordon, INF: A hollow victory, Foreign Policy, No.30, p.165.

American negotiations and the summit process in particular was not dead as yet. The two leaders got around to the business of finishing the unfinished business of Reykjavik. Under the treaty the USA over the next three years has to dismantle 436 nuclear missiles out of which 108 were Pershing-II missiles, 72 Pershing-IA, and 256 Cruise Missiles, stationed in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium. The Soviet Union would scrap 703 nuclear missiles out of which 441 were SS-20, 130 SS-4, and 20 SS-23 in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.³⁴

The main goal of the super powers had been to achieve an agreement of fifty per cent reduction in long range weapons. The US has at present 7,900 nuclear war heads on nuclear missiles, while the Soviet Union has 10,057.³⁵ During the negotiations the US proposed a limit of 5,100. A compromise was struck. Both sides agreed in principle to limit their strategic missiles to 4,900 each.

The US for its part agreed that there could be limits on a number of sea-launched Cruise missiles as the Soviet Union had insisted. But the limits and

34. Ibid.

35. Editorials on File (Denver Post)
December 9, 1987.

procedures has to be made by separate agreement. The Soviet Union acceded to the US demand that there should be a ban on the encoding of the electronic signals during the missile tests. Some progress was achieved as to how to verify a new treaty on long range nuclear weapons and the 'counting rules' to determine how many war heads are carried on their missiles.³⁶

The INF accord would create an atmosphere that would encourage the denuclearisation of Europe and the institutionalisation of the arms control process. By paying a disproportionate cost in weapons destroyed Soviet Union will achieve its principal military objectives - the elimination from Europe of Pershing-II missiles, a highly accurate and powerful one. Further a ban on US missiles fits the evolution of Soviet military doctrine which now stresses the importance of trying to limit any conflict in Europe to the use of conventional forces.³⁷

The accord symbolises the feasibility of disarmament approach, hitherto written off as

36. O.N.Mehrotra, op. cit., p.1376.

37. Michael R.Gordon, No.30, p.167.

Utopian. Till now the dominant philosophy of nuclear strategy was 'arms control; which seeks to manage the arms race than to eliminate it. The result of this approach has been the institutionalisation of the arms race. The INF accord goes one up on this approach and totally eliminate a particular class of weapons. It sets a new standard of openness of arms limitation agreements. It helped create trust and confidence, so vital to the progress on nuclear disarmament.

The fourth summit of the big two, US President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev held in Moscow from May 29 to June 1, ended tamely, the **only** achievement and that too a formal one, being the ratification of the INF treaty marked by an exchange of documents. The two leaders pledged to strive for a treaty on strategic arms reduction (START).

Mr. Reagan expressed satisfaction over the summit talks and said he wanted a good treaty even if it took some more time. He felt pleased that his relations with Mr. Gorbachev had deepened. Mr. Gorbachev admitted that the summit was one of missed opportunities. But everything had not been lost yet in agreeing on START; the exchange of documents meant that the era of nuclear disarmament had begun.

The Summit had facilitated constant official and also day-to-day management of US-Soviet affairs. Each such meeting, according to Mr. Gorbachev dealt a blow at the foundations of the cold war and made huge breaches in that fortress. It also stressed the idea of a continuity of dialogue, at the highest level.

The joint working groups made some progress in tackling technical points about limiting air launched Cruise missiles known as 'Alcums' but failed to reach any understanding on 'slocums' or sea-launched Cruise missiles. The Soviet could not agree to exclude 'slocums' from START as it would let the parties circumvent the treaty.

On May 31, the third day of the Summit the Soviet Union and the USA signed several agreements on other issues.

- a) they agreed to give advance notice about the launching of inter continental range sea and ground missiles tests. They will give at least 24 hrs. notice of the time, place and intended target of the inter-continental ballistic missiles and SLBM tests. Soviet Foreign Minister & US Secretary of State signed an agreement providing for joint verification testing of nuclear weapons at Nevada and at Semipalafisk.

In keeping with the past practice, Gorbachev presented his new nuclear disarmament proposal with the objective of "a step by step and consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons, to be implemented and completed within the next 15 years, before the end of this century. The objective is well oriented but may be difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons. It is doubtful that the United States will accept the objective in its totality. Though President Reagan told reporters 'we are very grateful for the offer, he added, 'it is just about the first time that anyone has ever proposed actually eliminating nuclear weapons. Since arms control is not in his priority, he must have forgotten that he himself made statements identifying that as an ultimate goal. Moreover, many similar proposals were offered in the last four decades.

In his proposal Gorbachev stressed that since 1986 has been proclaimed by the United Nations as the International Year of peace, the process of elimination of nuclear weapons ought to begin right now. He recalled that it was the Soviet Union which, as early as 1946 was the first to raise the question of prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons

and to make energy serve peaceful purposes for the benefit of man-kind. At that time, the USA proposed creating an international agency that would take control of all nuclear weapons and material, after which the US would relinquish its arsenal under the famous Baruch Plan. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union because the plan would have provided the US monopoly of nuclear knowhow. On the other hand, the Soviet Plan was devoid of provisions for inspection or enforcement. Since then both countries put forward numerous arms control or disarmament proposals which were largely rejected because they failed to provide a complete full-proof plan.

Gorbachev's present nuclear disarmament proposal is divided in three stages to be implemented in the next 15 years. According to the proposal the first stage will be implemented within the next 5-8 years beginning from 1986. During this period, the two super powers will set an example for the other nuclear powers to follow. They will reduce by one half the nuclear arms that can reach the other's territory. On the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind, each side will retain no more than 6000 warheads. In fact, both super powers agreed at the

Geneva summit on the goal of 50 per cent reductions, but they differed on the types of strategic weapons. While the United States insisted that the limit would apply only to inter-continental missiles, the Soviet Union had proposed to include American intermediate range weapons that can reach the USSR from Western Europe. In this respect there is a change in the new Soviet position - Gorbachev has dropped this condition.³⁸

The main condition to accept the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent rests on renouncing the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons, a Soviet term that would cover many aspects of the Strategic Defence initiative, President Reagan's plan for space based missile defence.. The condition may be unacceptable to Mr. Reagan - he has already committed himself to the SDI programme. He has invested the prestige of President and the country for pursuing the programme and will not abandon it at any cost. If the Euro missile crisis was the most complicated problem to be resolved

39. O.N.Mehrotra, Gorbachev's Nuclear Disarmament Dream, Strategic Analysis, April, 1986, Vol.X, No.1, p.32.

in 1981-83, the 'Star War' has assumed prominence now. Perhaps the Soviet Union is right in insisting that the US space based missile defence programme not be pursued; because once feasible, it would be difficult to give it up. In such a situation it can be countered by the Soviet Union either by its own similar programme or an enlarged strategic nuclear to saturate the defences. In both cases, the two super powers will enter another exorbitantly costly arms race. Reagan has however, assured Gorbachev and the world that he has no plan to deploy SDI and that when the technology is developed he fully intends to share it with the Soviet Union - an ideal assurance but difficult to believe and unlikely to be implemented.³⁹

Since President Reagan's commitment to develop a space based missile defence appears to be non-negotiable it is unlikely that he will accept the Gorbachev proposal if it prohibits the development of his programme. A compromise may be negotiated on continuation of laboratory research on a space-based system as seems implied in the proposal. The linkage between a space-based missile defence system

39. Ibid., p.33.

and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons by both the super powers under the first stage of a nuclear disarmament programme will not be acceptable to the US. Had the Soviet Union insisted in the proposal, the agreement would not have been possible. The other issue of proposal is the elimination of intermediate range missiles in the final communique of this summit meeting in November, 1985. Gorbachev appears to have offered the West some significant concessions in his plan in regard to medium range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. He has proposed "The first stage will include the adoption and implementation of the decision on the complete elimination of intermediate range missiles of USSR and the USA in the European zone, both ballistic and cruise missiles as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons.

The proposal is similar to the 'zero option' offered by Reagan in 1981. At that time Soviet Union rejected the offer because of a variety of reasons. It argued that Reagan was demanding removal of already deployed Soviet SS-20s for not stationing controversial American missiles to be deployed at the end of 1983. The Soviet leadership started a

large scale propaganda strategy and addressed its proposals to West Europeans who were protesting against the deployment of American missiles. They were even warned by the Kremlin that the deployment of missiles would lead to their territory being made a target of Soviet nuclear missiles. But the leaders of NATO did not succumb to it.

The first basic assumption of NATO and most European leaders is that nuclear weapons have preserved peace in Europe for more than four decades. It is King Atom who has ensured that the horrific experiences of the two world wars in Europe would not be repeated according to their perceptions. It is the nuclear deterrence of the Soviet threat of aggression either conventional or nuclear which has presented the outbreak of a third war in Europe.

The second assumption is that American nuclear weapons are needed to preserve peace in Europe. The NATO strategy is based on the logic that the security of the United States and that of the Western Europe in any likely conflict with the Soviet Union.

The scenario is that if the Soviet Union breaks through the conventional defences of West Europe, NATO

will resort to the first use of technical nuclear weapons in Europe and would be prepared to escalate it to the use of American strategic nuclear weapons in defence of European interests.⁴⁰ And it is this threat of American nuclear weapons, it is believed that automatically deters a Soviet attack and hence ensures peace. But the nuclearisation of Europe runs counter to the basic philosophy of the nuclear coupling between the US and Western Europe and perception of a Soviet threat and the need to deter it though nuclear means.

The critical question then is why did the West propose zero option if the Pershing-II and Cruise missile deployment was a response to perceived political and strategic need rather than that of the SS-20 threat? The NATO leadership did it anticipate the enormous political reaction that deployment decision would cause in West Europe. With the rise of peace movements and sharp focus on the Euro missiles at a time of increased fears over survival in the nuclear age, the NATO decision proved to be politically divisive. To blunt the offensive of

40. C.Raja Mohan, 'Gorbachev & Disarmament' The Deliverence of Europe, Strategic Analysis, May, 1987, Vol.XII, No.2, p.152.

the peace movement and prevent any agreement with USSR that would cut into the deployment of the Pershing-IIS and Cruise missiles, the Reagan administration came up with the proposal of the zero option.⁴¹

The zero option called for removal of all existing Soviet missiles in return for non-deployment of new American missiles leaving the nuclear balance very much in favour of NATO. The zero option also demanded not just European limits but also global ceilings on Soviet missiles. The Soviets were willing to reduce their medium-range missiles, but wanted compensation to offset the French and British nuclear forces which were obviously targetted on the USSR and which were to be modernised and numerically increased. The US said that the deal was purely bilateral and the British and French governments declined to bring in their weapons into any Euro missile deal between the US and USSR. Towards the end of 1983, as the American missiles arrives in Europe the Soviet Union broke the talk on Euro missiles.⁴²

Over the last two years Gorbachev has conceded to most of the unreasonable demand of the West - on

41. Ibid. p.153.

42. Ibid., p.154

French and British nuclear forces and on global ceilings. And now, by finally embracing the zero option itself, he has challenged the commitment of the West to the zero option. By unravelling the Reykjavik package, he has also exposed the basic NATO reliance on nuclear weapons and its cult of nuclear deterrence. In doing so he has thrown the Atlantic alliance out of gear.

Despite the public statements of welcoming the Soviet acceptance of the zero option, the Western alliance is in for deep trouble on the issue. Why did Gorbachev agree to the zero option which was earlier rejected by the Soviets? It would appear this is related to the change in the Soviet perception on the feasibility of fighting a nuclear war. So long as they held the view that a nuclear war could be fought and won they demanded parity in arms with Western alliance in every category of weapons. But once they realised that a nuclear war could not be fought and won, the number game became meaningless and it became logical to agree to a zero-option though it would leave the West in a numerically advantageous position in nuclear weapons in Europe.

It is clear that Gorbachev is determined not to leave any escape route for the West to get out of their own proposal of zero option. Gorbachev's move on the Euro missiles is not just tactical brilliance. It represents radical new thinking on the issue of arms, their limitation and on peace in our time. First what he is suggesting is one of those agreements which seek to ban irrelevant weapons. It is a proposal which seeks to eliminate some of the most modern weapons from the nuclear inventory. Second Gorbachev proposal is of significance not just to Europe but to the entire world.

Thirdly Gorbachev's package stems from an understanding that the time is now to put an end to the arms race and turn resources from arms building to disarmament.

Gorbachev's Euro missile initiative is certain to transform the security debate in Europe. His move on Euro missiles ensures that Gorbachev retains the initiative on European security issues and allows him to continue the pressure against the US to come to terms with him on 'Star Wars' and strategic arms limitation. Within Europe the initiative should strengthen the voices of all those elements of sanity

who have sought a more cooperative attitude towards the Soviet Union. It should also encourage the peace movements to strive harder for a nuclear free Europe and for a Europe at peace with itself. That in the long run, could be the most significant outcome of the Gorbachev initiative on Euro missiles.

Second Stage:

Gorbachev proposes that in the second stage which should start no later than 1990 and last for 5-7 years the other nuclear powers would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. The first major step will be to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them in the territories of other countries. It has been argued widely that the first step towards nuclear arms control will be freezing nuclear weapons at the present level before agreeing to further reduction. While the Soviet Union has shown its keenness to agree to such an agreement, the United States has not welcomed the move. The radical proposal in the second stage is that all nuclear powers eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, namely the weapons having a range of upto 1000 Km.⁴³ This would require

43. T.T.Poulese. The future of Nuclear Arms Control, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987) p.148.

Britain France and China to scrap their battlefield nuclear weapons. In the other words, all the nuclear weapon countries will have to negotiate and agree on elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

The NATO countries will demand that the Soviet Union should reduce its conventional arms, in which it has a big advantage. Though there have been protracted negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe under the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks for the last many years an agreement has eluded the negotiations on the question of the present number of Soviet forces and verification procedure. By and large, the Soviet Union has agreed to verification measures but has refused to accept the Western figures of its conventional forces stationed in Central Europe.⁴⁴

From the statement of Gorbachev, it is not clear whether tactical weapons will be eliminated totally or merely freezed under the second stage. The second paragraph of the second stage envisages freezing of tactical nuclear systems by both super powers but the next paragraph proposes that 'all

44. Jyotsna Saksena, 'Calling the Bluff: Gorbachev's comprehensive Disarmament Scheme and NATO's Dilemma, Strategic Analysis, July, 1987, Vol. XI, No.4, p.432.

nuclear powers eliminate their tactical nuclear arms'. Hence according to the second proposal, both super powers will eliminate their medium-range as well as tactical nuclear systems from the European theatre.

The other conditions of the second stage are stopping of nuclear weapons tests by all countries and a "ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction. Since the proposal envisages nuclear disarmament in the next 15 years, banning of nuclear weapons tested by all is an essential part of the proposal.

If all countries agree on nuclear disarmament, there should be no difficulty in enhancing the existing partial nuclear test ban treaty to a comprehensive test ban treaty, notwithstanding French and Chinese non-compliance of PTBT. China and France will have to adhere to the agreement as well as South Africa and Israel. Moreover, control of the production of new non-nuclear weapons, which are popularly known emerging technology weapons, will require a large scale effective international machinery to guarantee the implementation of the agreement.

Third Stage

State three of the Gorbachev plan will begin no later than 1996. According to the plan, at this stage "the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed. By the end of 1999, there will be no nuclear weapons on Earth. A universal accord will be drawn up that such weapons should never again come into being.

The ideal of achieving nuclear disarmament may be commendable but is beset with a number of problems. The Gorbachev proposal envisages on-site inspection, national technical means and any other additional verification measures to reach an agreement.

The proposal also points out that 'special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as the dismantling reequipment or destruction of delivery vehicles. In the process an agreement will be reached on the number of weapons to be destroyed in each stage, the site of their destruction and so on.

Summarising nuclear disarmament, Gorbachev again stressed on abandoning the space-based missile defence programme. He noted, instead of wasting the next 10-15 years by developing new, extremely dangerous weapons in space, allegedly designed to make nuclear arms useless, would it not be more sensible to start eliminating those arms and finally bringing them down to zero.

Gorbachev has also proposed the complete elimination of chemical weapons. "We are in favour of intensifying the talks in order to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention prohibiting chemical weapons" and destroying the existing stockpiles of those weapons as agreed with President Reagan at Geneva. In principle both super powers have expressed their willingness to eliminate chemical weapons but translating the principle into practice is based with more problems than elimination of nuclear weapons.

In fact Gorbachev has rescued the Soviet arms control policy from the rigidity of the Brezhnev-Gromyko framework. In the West he has successfully concluded one confidence building agreement, initiated a major movement in arms control in the new INF

proposals and offered serious proposals to cut back conventional forces in Europe. He has given a new dimension to the Soviet foreign policy by focussing increased attention on the arms control negotiations with the United States and other Western powers.⁴⁵

Gorbachev stresses the significance of a pledge by nuclear weapon countries on no first use of nuclear weapons. He recalls such a pledge made by his own country and China and expects that other countries will follow suit. He believes that a no-first use pledge as well as nuclear arms control agreement between the two super powers and NPT help strengthen international security.

He expresses his concern about "dozens of regional wars and calls for curbing a non-nuclear aggression. He feels that an effective guarantee against such wars may be provided by a system proposed by him, that "presupposes definiteness of measures which would enable the UNO, the main universal security body, to ensure its maintenance at a level of reliability. This could be possible by 'unconditional observance'

45. O.N.Mehrotra, 'Gorbachev's foreign policy' Strategic Analysis, April, 1987, Vol. XXI, No.1, p.37

of the charter and sovereign right of people to choose the roads and firms of their development, revolutionary or evolutionary.⁴⁶ In this respect Gorbachev supports the proposal made by the UN Secretary General to set up under the UNO a multilateral centre for lessening the danger of war. Gorbachev proposes to consider the feasibility of setting up a direct communication line between the UN Headquarters and the capitals of countries that are permanent members of the Security Council.

In the recent past, Gorbachev has expressed his faith in the United Nations. Moscow declared in October that it would pay all its over-due UN bills, including \$ 197 m. for peace-keeping operation it had opposed for a long time. This was a break through in the long entrenched Soviet position of ignoring contributions owed by Moscow to peace keeping operations which the Soviet Union did not fully approve.⁴⁷

He suggests increasing the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors the safety of atomic plants and attempts to discourage

46. O.N.Mehrotra, 'Gorbachev's proposal for a secure world', Strategic Analysis, January 1988, Vol.XI, No.10, P.1143.

47. Ibid., p.1144.

the spread of nuclear weapons. He also feels the need for establishing a world space organisation which could work in the future in close contact with the UN as an autonomous part of its system. Perhaps he wants to bring the space based missile defence programme of the United States under the purview of an international organisation.

Gorbachev believes that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. He advocates disarmament and the money saved from it to be invested in the development of poor countries. However, the USA has by and large not favoured this concept and refused to participate in the UN sponsored preparatory conference on disarmament and development in 1987. Gorbachev requests that Security Council member states, represented by their top officials may jointly discuss the problem and work out a coordinated approach.

A large part of Gorbachev's article is devoted to the concept of nuclear disarmament and arms control. He apparently wants to tell the world that his policy of glasnost or openness is not mere rhetoric but a genuine effort to share information about each other's

military installations and armament factories. But the Soviet acceptance of international inspection has sent a shock wave in the United States. It used to be said that an arms control treaty was not easy to implement because its adherence could not be verified. But now many American defence analysts oppose inspection of US military establishments by Soviet experts, avoidedly because the Soviets would acquire information about advanced American technology in the course of inspection.⁴⁸

Gorbachev began a three day visit to France and had a series of meetings with French President Mr. Mitterand over the issue of building a common European home. The two Presidents held almost 15 hrs. of talk on East-West relations, disarmament and expansion of bilateral trade. Besides, European security, the Vienna talks on reducing conventional troops and armaments in Europe and the progress in Soviet-US dialogue on a treaty having their strategic weapons (START) figured during the discussion. Mr. Gorbachev's speech is believed to contain new initiatives on building the 'common European home' which France and several other Western countries have

48. Ibid., p.1142.

welcomed as a great but still a vague concept. The Soviet leader is expected to present the concept in a more concrete form at Strassburg.⁴⁹

Mr. Gorbachev on his visit to France said Moscow would cut its arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe provided the NATO is ready to start negotiations on reducing these arms.

The Soviet leader in his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also announced that Moscow was ready to sign a number of Council of Europe conventions, especially in the fields of environment, culture etc. 'It is high time to enter into talks on tactical nuclear arms systems with all countries concerned' he said. The Soviet Union could immediately start to reduce its short range arms if NATO was ready to start talks on the elimination of such weapons and Mr. Gorbachev expected a 'substantial cut in conventional arms and troops could be reached in two to three years at the present conventional forces in Europe (CFE) reduction talks in Vienna. The subject of short-range nuclear weapons those with a range of less than 300 miles (600 Kms.) caused a deep rift in the Western alliance that appeared to have been smoothed over at NATO Summit in May.⁵⁰

49. Times of India, Wednesday, July 5, 1989.

50. Times of India, Friday, July 7, 1989.

The United States and Great Britain favoured modernising the weapons, while West Germany, whose most of the short-range weapons are based and other countries wanted them removed. Under NATO compromise bargaining with the Soviets on tactical weapons would begin only after reductions in Conventional or non-nuclear forces had started - 1992 at the earliest. Only Europeans who have no intention of waging a war against one another are threatened by those weapons, Mr. Gorbachev said in a 45 minutes speech to the Council of Europe.

CONCLUSION:

Thus, Gorbachev's radical approach provided a breakthrough to international peace and a new beginning to the process of nuclear disarmament. His initiatives reflects an innovation, not seen in Soviet Union since Khrushchev. He has displayed greater willingness to agree on arms control agreement than his predecessor.

C O N C L U S I O N

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The second world war ended with the United States as the world's only nuclear weapons power. The two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 proclaimed the sole US nuclear regime. It tilted the balance of power in favour of the US and posed nuclear threat to the security of the Soviet Union which was a non-nuclear weapon state then. Ever since, the nuclear weapons have dominated the life and thoughts of the people of this planet confronted with this threat to their very right to existence. The destroyer of the world as Robert Oppenheimer who produced the bomb called it quoting from 'The Gita' as he watched the first test, was now at the command of man, beset with all his human weaknesses.

Despite the nuclear challenge, Stalin's declared Marxist-Leninist theory of the 'inevitability of war' remained in force. In order to reduce the risk to the Soviet security, Stalin adopted a two-fold strategy to develop a Soviet nuclear strike capacity on the one hand and to pursue a policy of nuclear arms control. Hence the Soviet arms control policy laid stress on the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously it also appealed to the UN to set up an Atomic Energy Commission. The Soviet Union also rejected the Baruch Plan outrightly. It offered proposals in a Commission for conventional armaments of the United Nations, to

limit non-atomic arms and manpower. This was proposed alongwith its efforts to ban nuclear weapons and establish a machinery for international control of atomic energy as a general disarmament plan of Soviet Union. The main Soviet suggestion was a reduction of all armed forces by one-third, to take effect simultaneously with the ban on atomic weapons. It also felt the necessity of a peace pact to be signed between the US, UK, France, China and USSR.

Soviet attitude towards arms control took a new turn with the coming of Gorbachev to power. Arms control and disarmament ranked high in priority in his scheme of things. A series of proposals put forward by him not only reflects a new approach but has also put the US on the defensive. Nuclear arms control is the name of the game super powers play for stalling nuclear disarmament. The Soviet nuclear position vis-a-vis American is four fold.

- 1) In nuclear arms, or atleast in strategic nuclear arms, the Soviet Union continues to be the defensive, revisionist super power; its goal is to deny the United States strategic superiority and it has by and large achieved that goal.
- 2) Soviet nuclear arms policies have been generally reactive to American achievements in the realm of nuclear weapons and weapons technologies, and the almost endless crafting of American doctrines of nuclear offence and defence.

- 3) Unlike in the United States, Soviet nuclear arms control and limitation policies have not been buffeted by domestic political convulsions, nor altered to suit the preferences and predilections of individual presidents and their respective strategic counsellors.
- 4) And finally like Soviet foreign policy itself, the Kremlin's nuclear arms control and limitation strategies have enjoyed remarkable continuity.
- 5) The Soviets always try to play upon and if possible widen the contradictions between Western Europe and USA and this is the major thrust of the Soviet nuclear arms control strategy.
- 6) They have made extensive use of United Nations to build a nuclear arms control and limitation regime including nuclear weapon free zones.
- 7) The Soviets brought McNamara doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as the most and dependable means of avoiding and preventing nuclear war.
- 8) The Soviets regard peace as a continuing struggle against war mongers of the capitalist - imperialist countries notably the United States.

The latest nuclear peace initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev fall in the same category of mobilisation of world opinion in support of nuclear arms limitation and control. Indeed he waged a veritable nuclear peace blitzkrieg before sitting down with Ronald Reagan at various summits.

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