

**NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AND DECISION MAKING :  
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA**

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Dedicated to  
the loving memory of my brother-in-law  
late Sri Parsuram Samal



CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,  
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled  
"NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AND DECISION MAKING : A CASE STUDY OF INDIA"  
submitted by Avaya Kumar Nayak in fulfilment of nine credits  
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in his original work according to the best of my Knowledge  
and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This  
dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any  
other degree of this University or of any other University.

Prof. S.C. Gangal  
Chairman

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## P R E F A C E

This research work is an attempt to unravel the nuclear debate in India. ( It examines the politics of nuclear behaviour since independence. In this changing world, where the fate of a country changes without any time interval, it is very difficult on the part of India to sit idle. It has to examine and re-examine various political socio-economic, military developments both inside and outside the country. The greatest dichotomy of the present day is that on the one side there is accumulation of nuclear armaments and on the other side there is call for disarmament. The countries which are unable to eradicate rampant poverty are spending a lion's share of their budget towards defence purposes.) This is why it has created enthusiasm in us to work on the nuclear diplomacy of India.

Here we base our hypothesis on the following four pillars:

- (i) ✓ India's arms control and disarmament proposal is the direct product of the economic compulsions of the country.
- (ii) ✓ India's campaign for arms control is viewed as a part of its nuclear diplomacy to avoid nuclear confrontation and to establish preponderance in the South Asian region.
- (iii) ✓ The ingredients of India's foreign policy such as non-alignment and peaceful co-existence has paved the way for a matured defence decision making.
- (iv) ✓ The nuclear dilemma confronted by threats from the neighbouring countries and other international forums have compelled India to keep its option open.

Here this research work has been divided broadly into four chapters. In the first chapter with the general introduction, some concepts and challenges to India's nuclear diplomacy has been highlighted. In the second chapter, defence strategy of India has been vividly narrated. The focus has been given on the evolution of India's nuclear programme since independence. The major wars and incidents with its neighbours and its impact on India has been analysed. In the third chapter the present Socio-economic, political, military position of the world has been studied. The very nuclear debate in the country has been rigorously debated. In the fourth chapter the role of decision making has been discussed. It has shown that the political leaders have an edge over the professionals in the nuclear decision making. Anyway we hope that we have been successful in analysing the real nuclear diplomacy in India, which will inspire the future researchers to go deep into the matter and make a more anatomical study of the problems and prospects of nuclear weapons.

On this occasion I owe a personal debt to my supervisor professor T.T. Poullose, without whose help writing this dissertation would have been a dream to me. I am extremely fortunate to have benefited from his valuable suggestions and constructive criticisms. I am very much grateful to my parents for their love, affection and continued support althrough my academic career.

I take this opportunity to acknowledge my deep regards to my brother-in-law late Sri Parsuram Samal, who was always

somebody special to me. for his constant inspiration and keen interest in my educational pursuits.

I should not fail to mention the encouragement and enthusiasm rendered by my brothers for the completion of this dissertation.

My thanks are due to friends like Ajja, Manoranjan, Prasanna, Arvind, Nana, Babuly & Mina, Bisu, Sujata, Nandita, Manoj, Dwibedi, Biswajit, Ashok, Avin, Hague, Sarat, Sridhar, Abhiram Vai, Lalit Vai, Anant, Akshaya Vai, Sunil, Sukhwant, Chand, Tewary, Ambika, Pratap, Maheswar, Lenin, Mahesh, saroj, Sanjaya, Sahul, Anjani, Amit, Rajesh and many others for their help and co-operation.

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A. K. NAYAK

( AVAYA KUMAR NAYAK )

CHAPTER - I  
INTRODUCTION



The nuclear policy debate in India is not the product of the present environment, rather it traces its origin to the past two decades. Before the debate began in the sixties, India had a coherent nuclear policy for nearly fifteen years. Its origin lies in the Gandhian tradition and the concept of non-violence, which was also part of the heritage of the Indian freedom struggle. Nehru had a genuine horror of the nuclear menace and he believed that India while developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must never go in for nuclear weapons.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her statement in the U.N. General Assembly said that nuclear weapons represented the ultimate in force. Thus, any attempt to eliminate force as the determining factor in international relations must begin with practical steps towards disarmament. But the nuclear menace has become an accepted fact of life and the world has developed a certain insensitivity to the nature of the threat. Despite every solemn resolution adopted by the General Assembly, States continue to enlarge their capacity for nuclear war. The arms race and the search for more sophisticated weapons have rendered meaningless the concept of balance of power, yet every advance in military technology is accompanied by an effort to maintain a balance of terror. This encourages local wars and undermines the established political authority in States,

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1. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Nuclear Weapons? Policy Option for India ( New Delhi: Sage, 1983), P. 1.

which are struggling to protect their freedom.

Indians in general find it even more difficult to grasp the impact of nuclear weapons, the ultimate instrument in the projection of absolute power. The extremely limited indigenous geo-strategic and geo-political literature in India has concentrated primarily on a non-nuclear environment, dealing with security issues in terms of conventional threats to our territorial integrity and sovereignty and as responses to them. The challenges of and responses to proliferating nuclear weapons around india thus present a totally different paradigm and pose a new predicament.<sup>3</sup>

A firm believer in the creed of non-violence, Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation preached all his life that should abjure war as a means of attaining national objectives and become a firm upholder of this principle as a means of solving all international disputes while keeping a small army, adequate to the needs of self-defence. India, should never go for the manufacture atomic weapons, as an aid to the conduct of foreign policy or for national prestige, as some nations are said to be doing at present. It looks upon the great scientific discovery of nuclear fission as a blessing to mankind, chiefly because, it promises to solve the world's most pressing problem, viz, the generation of power for industrial development and it may create a new heaven and a new earth.<sup>4</sup>

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2. Statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the U.N. General Assembly (14 October, 1968), (Extract).

3. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and the Nuclear Challenge (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986 ), p. 17.

4. ' Atomic Development in India', Economist, (15th october, 1960), p. 300-315.

But building up the armed forces, either as an expression of national independence or to support foreign policy, was never one of Nehru's objectives for independent India. The reasons can be divided into two: In the first place, building up the armed forces would have meant diverting resources from economic development which India considered extremely important. Secondly, Nehru's faith in the efficacy of his own foreign policy seemed to obviate the need for developing the armed forces as a defence requirement. His foreign policy was aimed at keeping India out of all military alliances, so as to avoid involvement in international military conflicts.<sup>5</sup>

The outlines of independent India's defence policies were laid long before independence. But the Congress party, which assumed office in 1947, brought with it a long tradition of hostility to British defence policies, including the belief that many of the so-called threats to Indian security, whether from Afghanistan or the Soviet Union, were illusory and largely the product of British expansionist urges.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly there was a marked tendency, particularly after 1931, to see independent India as relatively secure from external attack. Nehru said in 1931: "India in the future would be protected by a balance of power created by a mutual jealousies and

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5. Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1979), p.26.
  6. Lorne J. Kavic, India's quest for security (Berkeley and Los Angeles University Press, 1967), p. 21.

rivalries of the great powers"<sup>7</sup>. In keeping with this background, Nehru in 1946 as the head of the interim government, recalled all Indian forces from abroad and expressed his desire to keep away from all alignments, while at the same time maintaining friendly relations with all countries. Thus, a tentative plan drawn up by the interim government in March, 1947 envisaged a small, mobile and well equipped army of 200,000 men, a 20 squadron air force and a small naval force built around three light Cruisers and two air craft carriers.<sup>8</sup>

The great plan of 1947 was all of a sudden abandoned, due to the new developments in India's strategic scenario. The Creation of Pakistan and its boundaries posed a new threat to India. The Kashmir dispute and other differences with Pakistan made it impossible to implement the plan under a joint defence agreement between the two countries. From 1949 onwards, Indian defence strategy took into account the possibility of another attack by Pakistan through Kashmir, but the theoretical basis underlying defence policy towards the major communist powers remained fundamentally unchanged.<sup>9</sup> However, the communist threat to India's borders, from being a distant and theoretical possibility in 1947, acquired new menacing proportions in 1949 with the Chinese invasion of Tibet that year. India adjoins

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7. Ibid, p. 23.

8. Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, (Sahibabad : Vikas, 1979), p. 28.

9. Ibid., p. 28.

the Sino-Soviet borders in three main sectors: Ladakh in North East Kashmir, the States of Himachal and Uttar Pradesh and the North-East frontier agency (NEFA), situated between Bengal and Assam, all bordering Tibet. The successful Chinese invasion of Tibet made all three sectors vulnerable to armed attack for the first time in this century.<sup>10</sup>

In Nehru's vision this attack on Tibet was perceived mainly as a political and diplomatic one, rather than military. Any approach of expanding the armed forces to counter a possible Chinese attack in future would have been very expensive. As a result diplomatically Nehru acquiesced in the take over of Tibet and he followed this up by signing the 1954 agreement on Tibet by which India surrendered all its rights and privileges in the area. At the same time, Indian government supported peking wherever possible in international forums, for example on the issue of its right of admission to the United Nations organisation. Between 1950 and 1952 new agreements were signed with Nepal and its semi-independent neighbours, Bhutan and Sikkim, to strengthen their political and defence links with India.<sup>11</sup>

The prospect meanwhile of india being involved in a war with either China or the Soviet Union was dismissed as unlikely because as Nehru reasoned, it would cause a much larger

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10. Ibid., p. 29.

11. Ibid., p.29.

conflagration as a result of the Western powers coming to India's aid. Significantly defence expenditure during the period actually declined as a proportion of the national annual budget. In 1950 annual defence cost of Rs. 170.06 crores represented 50.33 percent of the budget. In 1960 defence costs rose to Rs. 272.26 crores but this represented only 20.77 percent of the budget.<sup>12</sup> Since then it has become a general question before the decision Makers whether to increase or decrease the defence budget keeping in view the economic under development, malnutrition and poverty of the country.

It is widely recognised that the conditions under which scientists feel motivated are some what different from those who work in trades or bureancratic and industrial enterprises. That scientists require freedom from the bureaucratic constraints in order to demonstrate their scientific research potentials prompted Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, the founder of India's nuclear energy programme, to seek total autonomy for himself and for his trusted followers. He laid the foundation of nuclear India: from policy formulation to decision making, from executive to scientific engineering, from building construction to designing gardens of his nuclear estate.<sup>13</sup>

When Nehru perceived that Bhabha was the only one to shoulder different responsibilities, he assigned him various

12. Based on The Hindu, (1 March 1950 and 1 March, 1960).

13. Dharendra Sharma, India's Nuclear Estate, (New Delhi: Lancers, 1983), p. 16.

roles including that of a grassroots scientific researcher, policy maker, organiser and administrator of a new scientific and engineering organisation in which knowledge of many inter-related disciplines was essential. In the nuclear development particularly at that stage, it was important to be involved closely in research laboratories development besides maintaining high efficiency in administrative services which required direct contact with the scientific and professional workers.<sup>14</sup> As long as Bhabha was alive, all nuclear policy decisions were taken by him which were routinely approved by Nehru. This implied that the chairman of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) with such responsibilities also carried with him full accountability. But this was an enormous burden placed upon Bhabha by the nation.

It is however not to deny that India could have had an atomic energy programme even if there had been no Bhabha-Nehru connections. It is also accepted that the mode of its policy formulation during the first phase (1948-1966) notwithstanding, the broad policy perspectives were directed towards two main identifiable national goals: attainment of an allegedly lower cost technology for electric power generation system which could be largely independent of locational constraints and secondly to be prepared for weapons options as and when occasion necessitated.<sup>15</sup>

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14. Ibid., p. 17.

15. Ibid., p. 18.

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Homi J. Bhabha stated at the conference on the IAEA Statute on 27th November 1956 that India is well endowed by nature with atomic raw materials. India has the largest known deposits of thorium in the world. More over, the monazite sands of India contain some 0.4 percent uranium, their total uranium content amounting to several thousand tons of uranium. In order to alleviate the long-range power problem, we have not only to burn the uranium-235 contained in the natural uranium, but we have to utilise all the uranium and thorium as is possible through the breeding process.<sup>16</sup> It is, therefore, essential that the long range atomic power programme be based on the atomic power plants which breed new fissionable material from the source material. He also observed that in future States might deposit their stockpiles of fissionable material with an international agency, though, it is too early to say whether such a step will be necessary in the interest of mutual security, but if this is to be done it must be done on a universal basis by mutual agreement and not be imposed only on a group of States, namely those receiving aid from the agency.<sup>17</sup>

Conceptually, the framework of India's security requires it to be structured on two fundamental criteria: that of optimum freedom of action to protect and advance national interests, and secondly, that of a paradigm of national power. It is

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16. Statement by Homi J. Bhabha at the conference on the IAEA statute (27 September, 1956).

17. J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, Vol. II, (New Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1974), p.44.



also apparent that these two are deeply interlinked and inter-related. The problem perhaps lies in the fact that the first, having been practised as an article of faith in dealing with international issues, it is better understood by most in terms of non-alignment in a world of alliance systems and bipolar power blocs.<sup>18</sup>

Freedom of action to select policy options is not only necessary to safeguard national interests, but in a bipolar world order which is inherently unstable, it becomes an essential catalyst to help move the international world order towards a stable multipolar or balance of power system. Attempts to achieve this so far have been based more on reactive responses rather than on a coherent concept of national power.

The anatomy of national power must be seen in its totality, not as an absolute and redundant concept in relation to military power only and the relational aspects of power. Power has been defined in international relations as "the capacity of a nation, to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations,"<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the developing countries essentially need to increase their relative power to obtain a tilt in favour of the developed countries. National power must be seen not from the antiquated concept of power in the 19th century, but in its perspective in the closing years of 20th century.<sup>20</sup>

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18. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and the Nuclear Challenge, (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986), pp. 39-40.

19. Stanley L Falk, "The Environment of National Security," Industrial colluge of the armed forces (Washington D.C., 1968), p.25.

20. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and the Nuclear Challenge, (New Delhi : Lancer International, 1986), p.44.

The military power however is an important aspect of a nation's capabilities to pursue its policy options. It is no longer the only or even the main element among the many constituents of national power. Japan today is in a position to exercise tremendous influence on the international order on the basis of its economic and technological rather than the military element of the power of nations. Second by relational aspects of power is crucial especially since it rests on the intangibles<sup>21</sup> of perceptions.

It is obvious that a modest nuclear capability has led to changes in the relative power by other States thus leading to changes in the relative power of nations. The United States took unprecedented initiatives and started serious search for rapprochement with communist China after the latter acquired even a modestly credible nuclear capability, which was in no position to pose a direct threat to U.S.A. The camp David peace agreements and the longest stretch of peace between the Arab countries and Israel, even to the degree of isolation of the palestine Liberation organisation (PLO) by the Arabs may be due in no small measure to the knowledge of nuclear weapons capability of Israel . What two thousand years of struggle and three decades of almost constant active fighting could not achieve, a few nuclear weapons did-recognition of the State of Israel.<sup>22</sup>

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21. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and Nuclear challenge (New Delhi : Lancer International, 1986), p.44.

22. Ibid, p. 48.

India is already surrounded on all sides by nuclear weapons powers engaged in continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons. To the north, the Soviet Union and people's Republic of China possess a variety of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems. China at present has an impressive nuclear weapons capability. The U.S. base in Diego Garcia in the Indian ocean is capable of launching B.52 strategic bombers equipped for nuclear and conventional weapon delivery, besides being able to support large-sized U.S. combat forces in the region.

Since the establishment of the bipolar world order backed by nuclear weapon stockpiles, the United States and Soviet Union have been restrained from direct conflict by the fear of mutual assured destruction. They have concentrated their competition in 'third areas' in the developing world. With its political instabilities and localised wars, the developing world has provided a fertile, alternative battle ground where the great powers could wage a proxy war where each could seek to spread its own influence and deny or disrupt its opponent's ambitions.

This essential frame work permeated Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of India and the direction he provided to the nation.

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23. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.) India and the nuclear challenge (New Delhi : Lancer International, 1986), p.62.
24. Richard E. Feinberg, The Interperate Zone: Third world Challenges to U.S. foreign policy (New-York, W. Norton & Co., 1983), p. 15.

He led the nation to keep the tryst with destiny: it is for the nation to fulfil the promises made in the yester years and cover the miles into the deep and dark woods of tomorrow: and for the leadership and the people of today to make a tryst with India's destiny ahead, so that we can meet the future challenges.<sup>25</sup>

The big question before Indians is not whether nuclear weapons can be used to defend Indian frontiers from external attack or prevent external powers from making war on India. International experience shows that, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have not been used in war either for defensive or offensive purposes.<sup>26</sup>

Nehru's wide vision for utilising nuclear energy for peaceful purposes received a different dimension at the outbreak of the first Chinese explosion in 1964. Lal Bahadur Shastri diluted the commitment by saying that 'I can't say that the present policy of nuclear pacifism is deep rooted, that it can't be set aside and that it would not be changed. In fact the first debate in India on going nuclear was triggered off by the Chinese bomb. The response to this pressure produced an ambivalent nuclear policy: an unexpressed but implied option to go nuclear with only an insipid political will to do so.<sup>27</sup>

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25. K. Subrahmanyam, India and the Nuclear Challenges, p. 49.

26. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear Weapons? Policy Options for India (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p.29.

27. Ibid., p.2.

CHAPTER - II  
INDIA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY

The threat to nation's security arises from the desires of zealous men and nations and their ability to satisfy those desires. A nation's defensive capacity depends upon its ability to anticipate such threats and to wrest the enemy. In contemporary times with the development of inter-continental missiles and electronic surveillance, the capacity of both offensive and defensive strategies have increased greatly.<sup>1</sup> This inherited incapacity is provided by two recent events. The last Soviet Defence minister, Marshal Grechko on his visit to India in March, 1975 was flabbergasted by an Indian Air Force request for a strategic bomber to replace its aging canberras. But Grechko emphasised the need to replace bomber with missiles. Clearly, the Indian government's emphasis on combat air craft in an age of man carried anti-aircraft missiles shows that India's appraisal of its defence needs is based on the estimate that its enemies fall within the range of, and could be deterred by,<sup>2</sup> a manned bomber.

The two conflicts- the Chinese aggression of 1962 and the Pakistan aggression of 1965- in the early years of our independent existence brought home to us the urgency of security. The strategic new developments of China is attaining a nuclear

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1. Rohet Handa , Policy for India's defence (New Delhi : publications, 1976), p. 18.
  2. Ibid., p. 18.

status and China's intentions to test its nuclear missiles system across Indian territory into the Indian Ocean,<sup>3</sup> and India's response to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, must have shaken many Indians from an idealistic to the realistic outlook.

There is no doubt about China's single most important threat to India's national security and territorial integrity. The threats of nuclear China and Pakistan to India may develop separately, or could combine in a single dangerous threat, in which case India would find itself in a crucial position.

China's Military posture towards India and the world is a matter of every day comment in news papers. Its moves in Asia and else where are routinely watched by the intelligence and diplomatic staff of any country of consequence. By ignoring the China's cloud of military power or by deliberately not facing up to that threat, in the hope that the cloud will pass without causing harm.<sup>4</sup>

The chinese regime is currently characterised by an intensely ethnocentric and expansionist nationalism. Being a totalitarian regime it is not restrained by free public debate or the wishes of its people.<sup>5</sup> In its dealings with its neighbours,

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3. Parris H. Chang, "China's Scientists in Cultural Revolution," Bulletin of the atomic scientists, vol. 25, 1969, p.20.
  4. Rohit Handa, Policy for India's defence, (New Delhi :Chetana publications, 1976) pp. 19-20.
  5. Sampooran Singh, India and the nuclear bomb, (New Delhi: S Chand & Co., 1971) p. 75.

the regime furnished unmistakable evidence of its hegemonistic designs. In the Chinese Revolutionaries and the communist party of China (1939), Mao wrote that the seizure by the imperialists of many states situated round China and enjoying China's protection was a tragic loss for China.<sup>6</sup>

So far as India is concerned, China has laid claim to well over 50,000 square meter of Indian territory. It launched a massive attack in Ladakh and N.E.F.A. in 1962 and occupied 15,000 square meter of our territory. China will operate largely through a strategy which ensures maximal pay off at the lowest possible risk and minimal cost. It is quite possible that China will take advantage of the comparatively unstable socio-economic and political setting in Asia,<sup>7</sup> Indian defence planners take into account the possibility that the Chinese could, in the event of serious threat, move down in force either via the old Ledo-Yunnan road going through North-Burma, or via the North-South road system of Nepal running from the Indian border to Tibet. It is also reported that the Chinese are digging trenches and making air-raid shelters in Lhasa and its surrounding areas.<sup>8</sup>

When China for the first time exploded its nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964, Mao Tse Tung qualified to join, what he had

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6. Ibid., p. 76.

7. Ibid., p. 77.

8. Ibid., p. 77.



till then called, ' the club of paper tigers.' Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri described the Chinese explosion as a danger to the maintenance of peace and called upon peace loving people in all the countries to raise their voice and awaken the world conscience to fight this aggression on peace and security. Defence minister Y.B. Chavan declared that the atomic bomb would not add to China's military strength and that the short term threat from across India's northern borders continued to be from conventional weapons. He had the belief that china would use this explosion to exert political pressure, specially in Asian and African countries. Chavan said:"we will not be deceived by such hypocrisy." Similarly also the then Education minister M.C. Chagla declared that India could not trust the protestations of the Chinese that their atom bombs were for peace. He added by saying " I do not think the explosion of the bomb increases the Chinese menace. If China ever dares to use it against India, it will mean a world war, a nuclear holocaust."

Various Comments and commentaries on China's nuclear plan gave different meanings to its nuclear break-through. Some were of the opinion that the bomb was of no military significance,

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9. G.G. Mirchandani, India's nuclear dilemma (New Delhi : popular Book services, 1968), p. 26.

10. Ibid., p. 26.

While some opined that it is only to provide psychological and political pressure upon India. A New Delhi news paper conceded that the Chinese explosion was a grave provocation to India but counselled that India's response should be sober and realistic. A leading news paper from South India counselled that China had still a long way to go from the nuclear device to actual nuclear weapon capability and a matching delivery system.<sup>11</sup>

This nuclear scene in China created havoc in different society. The General Secretary of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, demanded that India should produce her atom bomb, called upon the government to change its nuclear weapons policy. The communist party of India (Marxist) at a session held three weeks after the Chinese explosion passed a resolution urging the government to take the initiative in breaking the deadlock in the border dispute with China, but made no comment on the latest development in China. The General Secretary of the rightist swatantra party, M.R. Masani urged the government to rely on the deterrent provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella rather than itself enter a nuclear race. "A nuclear force in order to act as a deterrent, must be vastly superior to that of the enemy. It is highly problematic whether India would never be capable of achieving superiority over communist China"<sup>12</sup>

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11. Ibid., p. 26.

12. Ibid., p. 26.

The All India congress committee called for a hot discussion on the foreign policy and consequently several amendments were moved concerning the government's nuclear policy. As a result a member of the congress parliamentary committee strongly pleaded that India should produce atom bomb. In the parliamentary debate on the defence budget for 1975.76, the former defence minister Swaran Singh maintained that China's on its armed forces was ten times as great as India's. But China's expenditure must be evaluated in the context of its own defence aims, which includes defence against the Soviet Union, the U.S. and India.

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The foundation of China's stature is not the bomb, but its size, discipline, the advantages of population and geography, the upsurge in its economy despite a variety of handicaps. These enable China just to sit back and frighten the whole world. V.C. Trivedi, India's former ambassador to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament conferenced (ENDC), has written that China would like to weaken India's power and prestige in Asia and perhaps to topple the Indian government by maintaining a military threat which cause India to slow its economic development as defence spending increased. Some scholars on the other hand believe that the security threat which China

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13. Rohit Handa, Policy for India's defence 'New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1976), p. 49.
14. V.C. Trivedi, The defence of India China and the peace of Asia (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), p. 131.

poses to India is basically political. There are two distinct aspect of this political threat-subversion like arms aid to Nagas, Mizos and Naxalites and development of an operational nuclear weapons capability. Peking is equally determined to prevent India from developing as a countervailing force jointly assisted by Moscow and Washington.<sup>15</sup> With the possession of nuclear weapons, peking may be expected to exercise a freer and stronger hand in South and South-East Asia. The possession of nuclear bombs not only enables peking to win the psycho-political game, but also gives it an option to precipitate a crisis in which India could be blackmailed into paralysis.<sup>16</sup>

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
But on the other hand if it is vividly observed, it would be clarified that China has apparently a strong commitment to an indigenous weapons production base, unlike India, where designs, systems and components are freely imported. For this reason China is less well equipped than India. But as the Chinese economy grows and if china imports military technology from the U.S., its conventional military capability will increase. As China's infrastructure improves, especially its proposed rail network in its south west which is under construction, its capability to reinforce Tibet will improve greatly.<sup>17</sup>

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15. Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971) p. 79.

16. Ibid., p. 80.

17. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? Policy Option for India (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p. 36.



Of late the new developments in both the countries has changed the post environment. The signing of a cultural agreement between India and China described by a Chinese dignitary as a "pioneering pact" is doubtless an advance on the road to rapprochement between the two countries. Nothing like this accord existed even in the hey day of the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai era. It is against this backdrop that the focus in both this Country and China has shifted to Rajiv Gandhi's forth coming visit to Beijing, the first by a Indian Prime Minister since 1954 when Jawaharlar Nehru went there. Mr. Gandhi's encounter with the chinese leaders was entirely different from his encounters with Soviet and American leaders. The agreement which would be automatically renewed every five years was signed for India by M. Vardarajan, secretary, department of culture and for China by vice minister of culture, Liu Deyou in the presence of Chinese culture minister, wang Meng on 28 May, 1988.

A meaningful development of Sino-Indian Relations, which have remained frozen because of the crucial border dispute, seems to be in the offing with the decision in February 1988 to reopen consulates of either country in Bombay and Sanghai which were closed down following the chinese attack on India's border in october, 1962.

The Sino-Indian border dispute, which burst into an open war in 1962, has remained in cold storage for close to two

decades. Before the official level talks on the boundary dispute began in December, 1981, China had been dropping hints and showing interest in a solution of the issue based more on concessions and a package deal than on principles and respect for historical records.

The solution of the border dispute hinges on the acceptance of the McMahon line. China has althrough opposed it. In contrast, China settled the border question with Burma on the bases of the McMahon line and Burma was a part of India till and mid-30's. However China does not make a mention of it. When it comes to the question of 'Historical background: China says the document relating to the McMahon line is fake.

The border issue has been discussed threadbare over eight rounds of official level talks in the past six years. It has become complicated because of the construction of the 'silk road' by China over the Karakoram range through Aksai Chin and pak-occupied Kashmir. Inevitably, the solution of the border dispute is linked to regional perception and stratigic interest.

On the other hand the official position is that India can defend itself against a chinese attack. One war and one incident have occured between the two countries. The chinses responded to Indian attempts to force recognition of its claims regarding the international boundary by means of active

paramilitary patrolling, by launching a full scale attack against North-West and North-East India in 1962. In 1967, the Nathulal incident took place when china attempted to test India's will. In 1965, though no incident occurred, China unsuccessfully attempted to coerce India by implying the use of military force unless India broke off its war with Pakistan. In 1971, though Pakistan's need for chinese intervention was greater than in 1965, China made no attempt to coerce India.<sup>18</sup>

Another strategic problem that confronts India on the issue of nuclear bomb, is the threat from Pakistan. After being an independent state on August 15, 1947 Pakistan, in October, 1947 invaded the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Bloody fighting continued till United Nations declared a ceasefire in 1948. Pakistan again launched an offensive in April, 1965 when a complete infantry brigade supported by tanks and heavy artillery attacked the Kutch area. Again on september 1, 1965 a whole infantry brigade and 70 tanks of the Pakistan army crossed the International border into Indian territory.<sup>19</sup>

Some people opined that the main cause of this war is the dispute over the state of Kashmir. The more generally accepted view is that the conflict with Pakistan is fundamental and arises from the pre-independence struggle between the rival concepts of secular nationalism and communalism.<sup>20</sup> Most Indians

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18. Bhabani Sengupta Nuclear weapons? policy option for India, (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p. 32.

19. Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971), p.82.

20. Ibid., p. 82.

are equally convinced that Pakistan born in strife, needs to maintain a climate of confrontation to hold its desperate people together.<sup>21</sup> China's support for Pakistan's claims against India, is no doubt the direct product of sino-Indian hostility, which constitutes an unhelpful external factor in the dispute between the two neighbours. Two significant developments in Sino-Pakistan relations during 1969 were: (i) the re-opening of the 669 kilo meter road Kashgar in Sinkiang with Gilgit in pak occupied Kashmir through the mintake pass, and (ii) the construction of a new 112-kilometer lateral road connecting morkhun in pak occupied Kashmir with 4,880-metre high Khunjerab<sup>22</sup> pass on the kashmir-Sinkiang border. Some 12,000 Chinese PLA men were reported to have been inducted into Kashmir to sontruct the latter road, which links the two strategic roads-the Aksai<sup>23</sup> Chin and the gilgit-Kashgar roads.

Ultimately in the two wars with Pakistan, India successfully proved its potentiality and Pakistan was shown its own place. These two incidents in the life of Pakistan as nation prompted it to tilt more towards the United States of America to get both technological and military help. As a result there existed a security relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. The

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21. Dillip Mukherjee, "India's defence perspectives," Survival, 1969, vol. XI, No.1, p.2.

22. Sampooran Singh, India and the nuclear bomb (New Delhi : S. Chand & Co., 1971), p. 82

23. "India in world strategic Environment", Annual Review, (New Delhi : Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1970), vol.2, No.3. p. 263.



emerging relationship includes American Support for Afghan rebels operating from Pakistan, U.S. arms for Pakistan, use of Pakistani naval facilities by American warships and probable exchange of information regarding the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup>

To the extent Pakistan has become a frontline state for the US in its new drive to reforge the ring of encirclement against the Soviets, the US may be expected to react adversely, if Pakistan is seen to be threatened by India. At the same time the US is most unlikely to instigate Pakistan to attack India. It is entirely in American interests that Pakistan and India do not fight another war.<sup>25</sup>

If a comparative approach is taken between India and Pakistan, so far the commitment to the atomic energy is concerned, different meanings strike to our mind. For India peaceful uses of atomic energy, a willingness to acquire technology from abroad without compromising its basic principles and a total application to military applications of the atom marked the nuclear technology development of India.<sup>26</sup> But it is too difficult for Pakistani leaders to take a similar step as the Nehru-Bhabha team had foreseen in the use of atomic energy. Zulfikar Ali

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24. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? Policy option for India (New Delhi: Sage publications, 1983), p.33.

25. Ibid., p. 33.

26. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and the Nuclear Challenge (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986), p. 198.

Bhuto was the acknowledged architect of Pakistan's foreign and nuclear policies. For him, non-alignment was "ambiguous" because the "neutral" had no "positive mission" and they were "divided among themselves."<sup>27</sup> Even if it was a remote possibility for them to collectively play a decisive role Bhuto's this conception of 1962 changed automatically by 1976, when he said "on the whole, non-alignment has been a balancing force. As practised by the majority of Asian-African States, it has gained the recognition, which it had merited from the beginning of being morally the only valid and practically the only effective policy available to them in the face of the rivalry of the great powers."<sup>28</sup> He went on to compliment Jawaharlal Nehru for his "historic contribution" to the evolution of the world affairs by articulating the principle of non-alignment.<sup>29</sup>

In recent years that country has become a victim of what are called the 'technological fixes. General Zia-ul-Haq himself asserted that Pakistan would not give up its right to acquire nuclear technology irrespective of the hurdles. In 1979, he went to the extent of saying that if he had to choose between holding general elections and the acquisition of nuclear technology, he would prefer the latter.<sup>30</sup> Abdul Qadir Khan, who

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27. Ibid., p. 198.

28. Ibid., p. 198.

29. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Third World: New Directions, (London, 1977), pp. 36-37.

30. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, September 12, 1979.

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27. Ibid., p. 198.

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30. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, September 12, 1979.

reduced the tension in India.

Under this strategic point, if Pakistan were to begin manufacturing nuclear bombs that will be the point of no return for India. K. Subrahmanyam asks the question: why would Pakistan want a nuclear bomb? As an instrument of blackmail against India in Kashmir? or as a deterrent to India's invasion of Pakistan in a renewed conflict on Kashmir? or for pressurisation of India for other reasons? one threat must beget another of the same kind to deter of.<sup>31</sup> If Pakistan is going to make its nuclear bombs, the present policy of India will come under intolerable pressures for revision from the public, the press<sup>32</sup> and the parliament.

Non-aggression and no-war pacts are all very well between states that have no unresolved disputes, but they would be meaningless in the Indo-Pakistan context as long as Pakistan excludes Jammu and Kashmir from their scope. Such exclusion is implicit in Pakistan's position, which reserves for Pakistan freedom to intervene in Jammu and Kashmir at any time of its choice.<sup>33</sup>

It has become a fact that in India and Pakistan, the weapon

31. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and the nuclear challenge (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986), P.189.

32. Ibid., pp. 189-90.

33. Ibid., p. 190.

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options have been a crucial aspect of their policies and that their civilian nuclear efforts have, by and large, been meant to develop such an option. Another important thing that strikes us is that both India and Pakistan have reached a limit of nuclear capability whereby they can unfold this option and launch on a nuclear arms race. Also it is a fact that the nuclear situation in the sub-continent is largely independent of the global nuclear situation and therefore it can be tackled by regional bilateral arms control measures.<sup>34</sup>

Another important measure that strikes at the very root of our nuclear policy is the commitment for non-alignment. Non-alignment is often defined as an independent foreign policy. It is an expression, in the international field, of the independent spirit and the independent judgment of a nation. It is looking at the world, as Jawaharlal Nehru used to say, through one's own eyes and not through the eyes of others.<sup>35</sup>

Non-alignment is simply an expression of the desire to attain maximum independence in national decision making on all issues domestic as well as foreign. V.K. Krishna Menon said: "Non-alignment is the policy of independence." It reserves and stoutly maintains that India will take its own decisions in her national interests and in conformity with her ideas of what is good in world interests. A policy of alignment with foreign

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34. Ibid., p. 191.

35. K.R. Narayanan and K.P. Misra (eds.), Non-alignment in contemporary International Politics (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 94.

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34. Ibid., p. 191.

35. K.R. Narayanan and K.P. Misra (eds.), Non-alignment in contemporary International Politics (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 94.

states on the other hand, especially when the partner to the alignment is economically and militarily much weaker, places the decision in foreign hands. It is also a policy based on self-reliance and national dignity.<sup>36</sup>

However non-alignment did not mean neutrality. In the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, Nehru said: we have proclaimed that during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else.....we are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are not going to join the side which is to our interest, when the time comes to make the choice.<sup>37</sup> Nehru insisted that non-alignment was a positive and dynamic policy, not a negative or unchanging one. It was not just an idealistic or utopian policy either, but realistic and practical one, meant to promote the national interest of a country, consistently with progressive advancement of individual nations within their self-chosen different ways, as much as the collective good of the community of nations.<sup>38</sup>

In 1954, Nehru initiated the policy of co-existence (panchsheel) with communist China. The Chinese aggression of 1962 was an eye opener to India and Nehru approached to United

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36. Paul power (ed.), India's non-alignment policy: strengths and weaknesses (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1967), p. 79.
37. "Nehru's speeches-september, 1946-may 1949," vol.1 (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and broadcasting 1949), p.24.
38. Sita Gopalan, India and Non-alignment: A study of 1962 Sino-Indian conflict (New Delhi: Spick and Span, 1984), p.9.



States, United Kingdom and other democracies for assistance to stop the attack. Nehru did not see any conflict with his basic policies in asking for conventional weapons for the defence of the nation. After the conflict, Nehru stated that there could be no non-alignment with regard to China, and that India had failed to understand and grasp "Neutralist Realism" and has been pursuing "Neutralist Idealism. The chinese aggression also ignited a spirited debate in parliament and the popular press on the relevance on non-alignment.<sup>39</sup>

During 1949-50, neutrality had no meaning in the chinese eyes and the emergence of free countries in South and South-East Asia as sovereign states was not recognised by the Chinese leaders. In October-November 1950 China charged that India was being influenced by foreign powers which were hostile to China. Moreover in April 1955, at the bandung conference where India and china met as co-participants to discuss issues of peace and co-operation among Afro-Asians, the Chinese Prime Minister told that nations could hold different view -points and yet seek common ground.<sup>40</sup>

India's foreign and military policies indicate elements of continuity and change. The continuity refers to the constant

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39. Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971)p.83.

40. Quoted in Sita Gopalan, India and non-alignment: A study of 1962 Sino India conflict(New Delhi: spick and span, 1984), pp.19-20.

at tention that Indian elites have given to foreign developments, if these appear to effect India's political, economic and security environment. India has also given considerable at tention to the behaviour of the industrialised nations, the super powers, and international organisations, all of whom are in a position to aid its development.<sup>41</sup> The involvement of foreign powers was recognised as a "foreign interference" in India's developmental and security processes if it seemed contrary to India's interest.<sup>42</sup>

Though it is an observed fact that there is continued utility of non-alignment, still the relationship between military policy and diplomacy has been changing all the time. If we cite the examples, then it will be clear that in 1950's the Indian defence mechanism was modest in scope and geared to the threat from Pakistan and the danger of communist subversion within India. India's poor military performance during the 1962 crisis with China revealed serious deficiencies in the quality of entelligence, training and equipment of the India's defence services.<sup>43</sup> Subsequently, India embarked on an intensive plan to modernise its defence machinery. Even though the Indian Air Force failed to achieve air superiority over Pakistan during the 1965 war. In the aftermath of the 1962 crisis, two serious changes in India's

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41. R. Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 385-88.

42. Quoted in Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and decesion Making (New York: Praeger, 1976), p.7.

43. Ibid., p. 8.

security behaviour were observed:(1) although the idea of peace and non-alignment in the Indian foreign policy rhetoric was not moderated, the theory of peaceful co-existence came to be applied primarily to India's Soviet policy and to India's China policy (2) while the idea of peace as the ultimate goal of Indian policy remained constant, in practice India's foreign policy establishment recognised that available military force<sup>44</sup> was a vital pre-condition for the achievement of peace.

The nuclear diplomacy in 1950's and 60's is of greater significance in the nuclear history of India. The U.S. policy of keeping India off balance through a strategy of supplying military equipment on a grant or concessional basis to Pakistan evoked strong Indian protests. In addition to the great problem that India faced in the Kashmir area, the U.S. strategy from the Indian perspective appeared to have broader implication. It had a contextual feature in the arms-control and disarmament negotiations; for example India's attitude against president Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for peace" proposal of 1953-54 appeared to be shaped by general Indian perceptions about the nature of US foreign policy in the Indian sub-continent.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the shifts in India's relations with the United states, the Soviet Union and China, India's nuclear policy

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44. Ibid., p. 8.

45. Ibid., p.9.

remained constant from the 1950's to may 1974. In the 1950's and the 1960's Canada was the principal supplier of atomic fuel and reactor technology to India. At this time, India's opposition to controls over the peaceful use of atomic energy applied principally and publicly to US proposals to have rigid controls and, to a lesser extent to the Canadian suggestions to strengthen safeguards in Indo-Canadian atomic energy agreements.<sup>46</sup>

Nehru stated that India would develop atomic power for peaceful uses but warned that, so long as the world was constituted as it was, every country would have to develop and use the latest scientific devices for its protection.<sup>47</sup> India ultimately viewed that peaceful rather than military uses should be safeguarded.

On 4th November, 1948, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, India's ambassador Vijay Laxmi Pandit had stated, "India like so many other countries of the world is an under developed and under powered country in whose future economy, atomic energy shall play an important role. India's policy has been to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and it has worked for nuclear disarmament."<sup>48</sup>

Since independence, the development of nuclear technology

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46. Ibid., p. 10.

47. See L.J. Kavil, India's quest for security (Berkley and los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967),p.28.

48. J.P. Jain,Nuclear India,vol.II(New Delhi: Radiant,1974)pp.3-4.

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has been under five phases. In the preliminary phase from 1946 to 1956, India has set-up scientific and industrial laboratories to train Indian scientists and to identify areas which might help in the country's progress. The next phase lasted from 1956 to 1966, when India established power reactors and full processing plants. Indian engineers also designed a research reactors and joined experience of working and maintenance of nuclear power system. This phase met an abrupt end with the sudden death of Dr. Bhabha in January 1966. Also this tragedy was followed by the demise of prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri at Tashkent.

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The third phase in the development of the nuclear technology in India was from 1970 to 1974, when India conducted an underground test in Pokharan. It clearly demonstrated that Indian scientists could design instruments, fabricate nuclear material and develop technology which was equalled to the European countries. The fourth phase of the nuclear technology development began after the pokharan explosion on 18th May, 1974. After this explosion however, the American and Canadian help was terminated, with the presumption that India has violated an

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49. S.S. Sisodia, Foreign Policy of India: Indira Gandhi Era (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications 1985), p.104.

50. Ibid., p.104.

51. R. Rama Rao, "India's nuclear progress-A balance sheet" India Quarterly (October-December, 1974).

52. S.S. Sisodia, Foreign policy of India: Indira Gandhi Era (New Dehhi : Inter-India, 1985), p. 105.

agreement of peaceful use of nuclear power. In the United States it was increasingly felt that India was a key country whose going nuclear would set in motion an ambitious programme in Pakistan to go in for the bomb. Secondly, the U.S. wished India to remain weak in the nuclear field so that the balance in the Indian sub-continent between India and Pakistan could be maintained.<sup>53</sup>

However this implosion has created misgivings not only in the minds of the decision makers of non-nuclear powers but also in the minds of those powers who possess it and use it to manipulate the power balance of the world. To the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India in fact is in the primitive stage of nuclear development.<sup>54</sup> Mrs Gandhi approached the formidable problem which requires reconciling between universal demand for banning the nuclear options and the national demand to produce more and more nuclear energy. In other cases Mrs. Gandhi chose the middle path and, in that she partially criticised the provisions of the partial Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, endorsed by Jawaharlal Nehru. The treaty appeared to be partial to those who were not having the bombs. But it has little to say substantially for those who can<sup>55</sup> manufacture, process and produce gigantic stockpiles.

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53. Ibid., p. 106.

54. G.P. Ojha, India's Foreign Policy (Meerut: G.T. printers, 1986), p. 132.

55. Ibid., p. 132.

India subscribed to the treaty with the hope and enthusiasm that it would lead to total and comprehensive disarmament. The reception of the treaty was universal and it raised optimism among the peace loving people of the world. India at this juncture could not realise that the contracting parties to the treaty had an agreement for a partial treaty and refrained themselves from a comprehensive one. More over this treaty permitted underground tests, and that is way china and France opposed the treaty and refused to sign it. Finally China<sup>56</sup> announced that the treaty was an attempt by the U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to consolidate their position and deprive the non-nuclear powers from further developing nuclear technology. Similarly president De-Gaulle declared that unless the nuclear powers surrendered or destroyed their nuclear weapons, France would not sign the treaty.

In another side also, the main interest of India was that all nuclear weapons, being weapons of mass destructon should be completely eliminated. But India was critical of the Non-Proliferatian treaty of 1968, on the following grounds.

(i) The NPT was very much discriminatory and it ignored equal and mutual obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear state.

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56. S.S. Sisodia, Foreign policy of India: Indira Gandhi Era  
(New Delhi : inter-India Publication, 1985), p.107.

(ii) The treaty ran contrary to the General Assembly Resolution, 2028 (XX), as there was no linkage between the treaty and other measures of disarmament.<sup>57</sup>

(iii) All the nuclear powers were not consulted in the forming of the treaty. As China was absent, so why the treaty will be binding on her?

(iv) on the question of control and safeguards, the treaty was not very much clear. Safeguards should be universal in nature and not discriminatory. The safeguards here were only for non-nuclear powers.<sup>58</sup>

India objected that restrictions have been put on 'nuclear have nots' but not on 'nuclear haves' and it is designed to protect the status quo and to check the aspirations of the developing countries. The Indian objection was mainly against the unequal nature of the treaty and misuse of International Public opinion to subvert a policy of vertical proliferation by a few powers. In India's view this was not a non-proliferation treaty but a measure designed to disarm the unarmed.<sup>59</sup>

#### THE POKHARAN EXPLOSION-

Nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes have been conducted in both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. for the exploration of natural

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57. Ibid., p. 110.

58. Ibid., p. 110.

59. K. Subrahmanyam, Indian attitude towards the NPT: nuclear Proliferation Problems (stockholm, 1974), p. 267.



resources, for raising mountains and irrigating deserts.

The peaceful uses of atomic energy has been generally welcomed in the United Nations Conference on peaceful uses of Atomic energy.<sup>60</sup> India's interest in the peaceful nuclear explosions dates back to the 8th general conference of the international Atomic Energy Agency on 17th September, 1964, where Dr. Bhabha emphasised India's determination to use this source of energy in the field of civil engineering and explosion of resources for economic benefits.<sup>61</sup>

One of the reasons for opposition to the non-proliferation treaty by developing countries was the hope raised by the potential of new technology of peaceful nuclear explosions. The government of India came under heavy pressure to abandon its policy of peaceful uses of atomic energy and to immediately start a nuclear weapons programme. On 27th November 1964 Hukum Chand Kachhava<sup>62</sup> of Bharatiya Janasangha moved a resolution in the Lok Sabha urging the government to manufacture nuclear weapons. He referred to the threat from China arising out of the Sino-Indian dispute and her nuclear explosion and argued that peace could be maintained only by those who had power.

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60. S.S. Sisodia, Foreign policy of India: Indira Gandhi Era (New Delhi : inter-India Publications, 1985), P.111.
61. J.P. Jain, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Radiant, 1974),p. 159.
62. K.K.Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A third world perspective, (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashana, 1980), p. 125.

According to him India must go nuclear and warned that government should not rely on outside nuclear assistance. participating in the discussions on the resolution, Kapur Singh (M.P.) pleaded for seeking and accepting umbrella protection which had been volutarily and suo motu offered by the United States.

But government of India's reaction to these demand was something different, when it argued that the Secutiry of India was conventional and would be met at that level. Prime Minister Shastri's disclosure that Indian scientists were experimenting with peaceful nuclear explosions technology was in reply to the demand of the members that the government should go for nuclear weapons.<sup>63</sup>

In non-aligned conference at Lusaka in 1970, Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi said: "The conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, can make to the economy of the developing world. It is of the opinion that the benefits of this technology should be available to all States without any discrimination."<sup>64</sup> As a whole these guided the development and gorwth of India's nuclear efforts to employ nuclear energy for achieving economic self reliance. India could foresee that nuclear energy was an important tool to catch up with the

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63. Ibid., p. 126.

64. Ibid., p. pp. 127-28.

technological revolution ushered in by the splitting of the atom.

Participating in a discussion in the parliament P. Rammurthy (M.P.) on Non-proliferation Treaty, said, " The question is that these powers which have already got the monopoly of those weapons and nuclear research, seek not only to continue but also want to prevent other nations from conducting experiments even for peaceful purposes of nuclear energy. After all, we know that in future nuclear research is going to play a dominant part in the development.<sup>65</sup> Also he added by saying that it is an accepted fact that the acceptance of this treaty would mean that we will have to agree not to proceed with our own atomic research and to utilise energy for our own purposes. They will have the power of veto.<sup>66</sup>

Mentioning the problems connected with the development of this technology, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi said that before going in for peaceful nuclear explosions, the effect on the environment, the contamination and the actual usefulness of exploiting ores of indigenous origin by creating cavities through blasts and reaching the ores, needed to be examined and we should resist the pressure to go into it immediately.<sup>67</sup>

K.C. Pant declared that our scientists are to-day engaged in gathering all relevant information in order that peaceful

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65. India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 4, vol.3. No. 7, (31 May 1967), col. 2156.

66. Ibid.

67. India, Lok Sabha Debates, vol.39, No. 40, (20 April, 1970), Col. 392.

uses of nuclear explosive devices, when the technology is developed can be available for the economic benefit of this country.<sup>68</sup>

After a great debate India decided to explode an under ground nuclear test device on 18 May, 1974. In accordance with the rationale of its nuclear policy, India decided to go ahead with nuclear test experiments to develop and refine the developing technology. She therefore, chose to ignore the pressure of the super power and also of Canada, and resisted their efforts to compel India to subscribe to the non-proliferation treaty.<sup>69</sup>

Despite all the pressures from the super powers, enunciate in the non-proliferation treaty, India successfully achieved a breakthrough in her endeavours when she successfully conducted her first nuclear experiment at Pokharan in Rajsthan on 18 May, 1974. It was conducted under ground in a geological suitable medium to gather information on its usefulness for several peaceful applications. A notable feature of the explosion was that India was the first country to explode a nuclear device under ground in its inaugural detonation.<sup>70</sup>

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68. Ibid., series 4, vol. 4, No. 30, (2 July 1971), Cols. 295-9.

69. K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A third world perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashana, 1980), pp. 131-32.

70. Ibid., p. 133.

However Canada took this step in a different look, when Prime Minister Trudeau in 1971 attempted to dissuade the Indian government from developing peaceful nuclear devices, with a warning that Canada would have to reassess its relationship with India. Ashok Kapur has pointed out that "as a matter of fact, before the Indians tested, the conadians had already started to be tough because the zengler committee had recommended that even industrial items be denied to India because of their possible in India's peaceful atomic energy programme.<sup>71</sup>

Indian explosion is treated as if it was a bolt from the blue.<sup>72</sup> It is though a small step in the nuclear history of the world but a giant step for the whole human Kind.

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71. Indian Express, New Delhi, (27June, 1974).

72. K.K. Pathak, Nuclear policy of India: A third world perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashana, 1980),p. 154.

CHAPTER - III

WEAPON OPTION AND INDIA: A REVIEW

The situation in which we pass through is a very complicated one. It is too difficult to see the whole world system in one direction. Hence the vital question before us is the anatomical study of the situation and an analysis of both domestic and foreign environment of a nation as well as the socio-economic condition of that particular country.

The understanding of the economic role of the atomic energy and the awareness of the developments abroad in this field were helpful in defining the objectives of India's nuclear policy. India could hopefully aspire to employ this new source of power along with conventional sources to solve its problem of backwardness and poverty,<sup>1</sup> In the international forum India had all along advocated the elimination and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and emphasised the need for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.<sup>2</sup>

(A close study of the post partition economy reveals that there is bare necessity of using modern scientific and technological tools to reconstruct the shattered Indian economy. It stands as a big question before every human being

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1. K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India, (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), p. 10.
  2. Ibid., p. 10.

in this Sub-continent that the basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter should be provided to the vast population. It was in this context Mr. Bhabha, realising the inadequacy of hydro-electric power and conventional fuels, stressed the need for developing the atom for this purpose.

Nehru made the position of the Government of India clear when he spoke in the inauguration ceremony of India's first nuclear reactor 'Apsara' at Trombay on January 20, 1957 that no man can prophesy the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my government and I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future government of India that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use the atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance, because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far.<sup>3</sup>

In a television interview screened in New York on May 18, 1964 he declared "we are determined not to use weapons for war purposes. We do not make atom bombs. I do not think we will."<sup>4</sup> This is perhaps the last word of Nehru on this subject, which till now also has become a big question before us that whether we should go nuclear or not?

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3. T.T. Poullose (ed.), Perspectives of India's nuclear policy, (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), p. 54.

4. Ibid., p. 54.



To make the bomb or not to make it this is the cruel choice that faces India. Nehru's implacable opposition to India going nuclear, whatever the circumstances, remains fresh in the memory. Cost is the major prohibitive factor, because enlightened opinion now realises that there is no half way house in a realistic nuclear programme.<sup>5</sup> Disarmament remains the long term aim of all civilised governments and people's of the world. This is the ultimate solution of world's and India's nuclear dilemma.<sup>6</sup>

It is no doubt a fact that Nehru committed all future governments of India to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. But soon after his death and just five weeks after the first Chinese explosion (1964) his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri, diluted the commitment. 'I can not say that the present policy is deep rooted, that it can't be set aside and that it would not be changed. In fact the first debate in India on going nuclear was triggered off by the chinese bomb.'<sup>7</sup>

Krishna Menon said that the making of bomb is very much harmful, because it creates the feeling in the minds of other people that we did not mean it when we said that we wanted the

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5. G.G. Mirchandani, India's nuclear dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 173.
  6. Ibid., p. 173.
  7. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? Policy options for India (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p.2.

total prohibition of nuclear weapons, tests and stockpiles. The debate whether we should build the bomb or not is in itself a departure from policy.....what is the use of having a couple of bombs or a greater number of small sized bombs unless you have enough to annihilate China. The bomb has no value, it has not even a deterrent value.<sup>8</sup>

Already humiliated by the perfidious Chinese war on India in 1962, there was a ground swell of concern in India about a possible Chinese nuclear threat to her national security. But according to the Chinese, their nuclear weapons were to defend the third world. Yet these were no consolation for a non nuclear nation like India with whom the Chinese had an armed conflict just two years before the nuclear test.<sup>9</sup>

During the first years of Indira Gandhi's Prime Ministership, India took a hard line at meetings of the eighteen-nation Disarmament committee in Geneva and tried to ensure a Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that would safeguard its security from the Chinese bomb. However India wanted the nuclear powers to commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapon technology to others, not to use nuclear weapon against a country that did not possess them and safeguard

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8. Dharendra Sharma (ed.), The Indian Atom (New Delhi : Philosophy & Social Action, 1986), p.27.
  9. T.T. Poulouse (ed.) Perspectives of India's nuclear Policy, (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), p. 104.

the security of the countries threatened by a power having nuclear weapons capability or about to acquire such capability.<sup>10</sup>

In all the five nuclear weapon powers and two clandestine nuclear weapon powers the decision to go nuclear was taken in secret without any public debate. However, in France though the decision was taken in great secrecy by M. Felix Gaillard heading an interim cabinet, yet there was considerable debate at that time. There is impression among many in this country that having conducted a nuclear test India has already become a nuclear weapon power with a few bombs in its arsenal,<sup>11</sup> which is totally incorrect.

Right upto the early 1960's, Indian comment on hazards of nuclear warfare had assumed no direct threat to India when the news first broke that Mao-Tse Tung's China might, in the not too distant future possess the atom bomb, the nuclear threat assumed a new dimension in Indian eyes.<sup>12</sup> The Chinese armed attack on Indian border changed the image of a friendly neighbour and the nuclear debate in India began to be more sharp.

Various estimates have been made of India's nuclear capabilities. Leonard Beaton in his book 'Must the bomb spread'

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10. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? policy option for India, (New Delhi : Sage, 1983), p.2.
  11. K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives(New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), p. 198,
  12. T.T. Poullose (ed.), Perspectives of India's nuclear policy (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), p.55.

stated that Indian government does not possess substantial reactor facilities free of international commitments. The Canadian reactor, which was built under the Colombo plan with Canadian help, is not subject to formal safeguards-It is governed merely by the Indian government's undertaking<sup>13</sup> that it would be used only for peaceful purposes. However, the atomic plant built at Kalpakkam, near Madras, would be free from such restrictions as it is being designed and built completely by Indian scientists.

Beaton explained at a news conference in London in 1965 that for on average atom bomb it had been calculated that five kilograms plutonium were needed, and that four thermal megawatts had the capacity to yield one kilogram of plutonium. It was on the basis of such calculations it has been estimated that Canada-India reactor, with a power rating of 40 thermal megawatts, if it was switched over to production of nuclear weapons, could produce at the rate of two atom bombs a year. Tarapore, with an estimated power rating of 380 electrical megawatts can produce 76 possible bombs per year, Rajasthan, with a rating of 400 electrical megawatts, 80 possible bombs<sup>14</sup> per year.

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13. G.G. Mirchandani, India's nuclear dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 174.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

A pro-bomb lobby started coming into the open even during Nehru's life time. Less than six weeks after the ceasefire in the 1962 armed conflict with china, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh demanded in a formal resolution the production of nuclear weapons by India as part of the country's long term defence effort against China.<sup>15</sup> On october 22, 1964 Indira Gandhi who was then India's minister of information and Broadcasting, said in an interview on French Television that "India is in a position to produce the bomb within 18 months. But I think we should not deviate from our stand and should use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."<sup>16</sup>

Nehru's successor as Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, reiterated his government's decision not to produce the atom bomb for moral and practical considerations. In January, 1965, speaking at the 69th annual session of the Indian National congress, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri declared, "our policy is not to manufacture the atom bomb at present....I can't say any thing as to what might happen in the distant future. So long as we are here, our policy is clear that we do not want that atom bombs should be manufactured in India."<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, at the armed conflict with Pakistan in 1965,

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15. T.T. Poulouse (ed), Perspectives of India's nuclear policy, (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), pp. 55-56.

16. Ibid., p. 56.

17. Ibid., p. 57.

the pro-bomb lobby became very strong. A day before the 22 day Indo -Pakistan war ended, about hundred members of parliament belonging to all parties addressed a letter to the prime-minister demanding an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.<sup>18</sup>

After the death of Shastri, Mrs Gandhi took the charge of the Prime Minister, in 1966. At the same time China exploded her third bomb in may, 9, 1966. As a result of which heavy pressures came from all the members of parliament irrespective of the party distinctions to go for the bomb. However Mrs. Gandhi did not concede to their pressures. N.G. Goray, the then chairman of the Praja Socialist party of India said that India should manufacture bomb at all costs and called upon the people to cheerfully bear any additional tax burden as a result of India going in for nuclear weapons.<sup>19</sup>

Prime minister Morarji Desai who for decades opposed the idea of India going for nuclear said, " our people will die of poverty and get destroyed even before any destruction can take place by a bomb thrown by China. Also he goes nuclear, no body in future would believe in her professions of morality.

The whole world knows that Pakistan is engaged in a relentless drive to acquire nuclear weapons. Its clandestine nuclear activity over the past few years is now the stuff of

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18. Ibid., p. 57.

19. Ibid., p. 59.

20. Ibid., p. 60.

legend. In contrast, the Indian nuclear programme has been open and public. Despite demonstrated nuclear weapon capability 11 years ago, no one has accused India of building a nuclear arsenal. Yet General Zia-ul Haq has successfully projected himself as a champion of peace seeking to rid South Asia of nuclear weapons.

The five nuclear proposals of General Zia are that India and Pakistan could (i) jointly sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) (ii) agree to mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities, (iii) together submit all their facilities to international safeguards, (iv) convert South Asia as a nuclear free zone (v) agree to a mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons.<sup>21</sup>

A closer and informed look at General Zia's Package, however reveals that the offer is neither sincere nor serious. The only common thing in the Indian and Pakistani attitude to the NPT is that both have refused to sign it. But the underlying motivations and philosophies of India and Pakistan are poles apart, and hold the key to the understanding of Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy.<sup>22</sup>

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21. C. Raja Mohan, "India's nuclear Diplomacy: The need for clarify" Strategic Analysis, vol. IX, No. 11,

22. Ibid., p. 1077.

The Pakistani proposal on mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons is yet another way of imposing NPT on India. India's refusal to submit to the NPT regime and renounce its nuclear option has nothing to do with Pakistan's nuclear policy. It has always been based on global consideration, particularly as part of its quest for genuine nuclear disarmament at the global level. India refuses, rightly, to give up nuclear option so long as nuclear weapons remain the currency of global power and their build continues. Pakistan has never shown serious concern for global nuclear disarmament. Its only concern has been to bring India into the net of the NPT either directly or indirectly and close India's nuclear option. It is however very much clear that all the five nuclear proposals of Pakistan are totally incompatible with the basic thrust of India's nuclear policy, founded by Bhabha and Nehru and pursued by the later leaders.

Pakistan's offers on mutual inspection and international safeguards administered by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) reveal the same pattern of divergence between India's globalism and Pakistan's bilateralism on the nuclear question. The objective of mutual inspection or IAEA safeguards is to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from civil facilities to weapon development. In their essence, the IAEA safeguards are only measures to account for nuclear materials within the

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23. Ibid., p. 1085.



nuclear fuel cycle of the country. If there is a large amount of nuclear material unaccounted for (MUF), then the inspecting agency could conclude that there has been a diversion. Because of a number of inherent limitations, the real utility of <sup>24</sup> safeguards or inspection in confidence building is marginal.

A close research on this policy reveals that India was not against the principle of safeguards but against their irrational application "only to the developing countries," where the chances of their misuse were the least. According to the opinion of the Indian leaders safeguards and nuclear disarmament should go together. It pointed out that if only the world's uranium enrichment and plutonium separation plants - the sources for weapon material were put under international control, safeguards on other material equipment and reactors would be unnecessary. <sup>25</sup> The Pakistani proposal on the nuclear free zone for South Asia would involve renunciation of nuclear weapons by the countries of the region and opening up all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. Under the free zone concept, the nuclear weapon States agree not to deploy nuclear weapons <sup>26</sup> against the countries of the region.

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24. Ibid. p. 1079.

25. Ibid., p. 1081.

26. Ibid., p. 1082.

However nuclear weapon free zones are based on two principles, First no country on the zone should have crossed the threshold or be on the point of doing so and all countries of the area should be subject to either International or mutual inspection. In this situation, neither Pakistan can be sure that India, with its demonstrated capability to produce nuclear weapons, has not tucked away a few weapons somewhere, nor can India be sure that Pakistan has not done the same thing.

Secondly, the facilities to be inspected by the two sides are very asymmetrical while in the case of Pakistan, it will cover only the reprocessing cell and the centrifuge facility, in case of India it will include the fast breeder reactor, the madras reactor, the Dhruv reactor, Trombay and other reprocessing plants, This would show how the mutual inspection will be totally asymmetric bargain from the Indian point of view.

Thirdly, so far no operational inspection procedures have been developed for facilities like fast breeder reactors or uranium centrifuge enrichment, These activities have hitherto been undertaken only by the nuclear weapon powers and they have exempted such installations from the inspection procedures of the international atomic Energy Agency.

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27. K. Subrahmanyam, "Pakistan and the nuclear issue," Strategic Analysis, vol. IX, No.6 (September, 1985), p.550.

28. Ibid., p. 550-51.

29. Ibid., p. 551.

General Zia-ul Haq asserted in his interview to the Arabia magazine that his country will change its position on acquiring nuclear weapon capability only if the non-proliferation treaty is made universal, covering Israel too. However is thesedays, thre is much talk noth in India and Pakistan about avoiding a nuclear confrontation between the two countries. Pakistan authorities and makia claim the credit for putting forward ideas such as a South Asian nuclear weapon free zone and mutual inspection of nuclear facilities.

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It is an abserved fact that threats are not posed by weapons alone. Threats arise out of weapons enveloped in adversarial political relations. The British and French nuclear weapons do not pose threats to other west European countires or each other. The US nuclear weapons are not seen a posing threats to Canada or Mexico but do pose a threat to Cuba. The Chinese nuclear weapons were seen as a threat by Japan before normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. so, any proposal to avert nuclear confrontation should address itself to improving the political relations between India and Pakistan.

The nuclear threat to India arises from three quarters: the super powers, great powers like China, the nuclear threat from super powers is not taken seriously by Indian strategists. The Chinese nuclear-weapons capability was taken seriously

in the sixties but there is no evidence that India is contemplating steps to match the Chinese nuclear weapons capability.<sup>31</sup> India has through out opposed the South Asian nuclear weapons free Zone proposal on two grounds. First, China impinging on South Asia (many Pakistanis argue that China is a South Asian Power) there can be no South Asian nuclear weapon free zone without china being brought in.<sup>32</sup> There are a plenty of reasons to be more concerned with China, than with Pakistan.

There is also a continuing debate in India about Pakistan's intensions and capability, especially in terms of time frame, there is little debate on Pakistan's intention to use nuclear blackmail to coerce India if and when possible. It is also said that the acquisition of a few nuclear weapons would provide Pakistan with a parity with India which it had always sought.<sup>33</sup>

Indian decision makers will have to base their calculations on old military, political and economic realities as well as international experience when deciding whether and to what

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31. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? policy options for India (New Delhi : Sage, 1983), p.40.
  32. K. Suprahmanyam, "Pakistan and the nuclear issue", Strategic Analysis, vol.ix No.6, (September, 1985), p.554.
  33. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear seapon? Policy Options for India, (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p.40.

extent nuclear weapons would enable India to deter a nuclear Pakistan, a nuclear China and also the nuclear superpowers. It is an observed fact that no nuclear power has so far used nuclear weapons against India in a conflict over Kashmir or in a general war is to put Pakistan in an entirely different category of nations that is in the company of Israel and South Africa.<sup>34</sup>

There is a great deal of logic in the argument that a nuclear Pakistan would neutralise India's nuclear strength. Though a local war has taken place between two nuclear powers in which nuclear weapons have not been used the Sino-Soviet border war in the Ussuri river region the assumption in India seems to be that possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan or by both Pakistan and India would rule out conventional war between the two countries. It seems to be widely believed in India that a nuclear Pakistan would acquire military parity with India whether or not India is armed with nuclear weapons.<sup>35</sup>

The dilemma facing the nation is: can India remain non-aligned and non-nuclear and still cope with the security threat?<sup>36</sup> India's stand on the nuclear weapons programme .

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34. Ibid., p. 41.

35. Ibid., p. 42.

36. Samporn Singh, India and the nuclear bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971), p. 130.

some thing ambiguous and hence India is trying to develop its agriculture, industry etc. There is considerable uncertainty concerning the future prolicies of China, the Soviet Union and the United States. If the security threat from China remained high and the support of super powers to India diminishes, there will be no choic for it but to go in for a  
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 crash nuclear programme.

The nuclear debate in the country at present reminds one of the debate we used to have in the late fifties on our defence preparedness. There are some who argue that we can afford to live with the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear weapons programme and that a nuclear weapon programme will ruin us economically, there were people three decades ago who used to assemt that socialist states did not lunch attacks and hence socialist China would not luch aggressions, and that in any case India could not step up its defence expenditure without ruining its development  
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 plans. Another school of thought is of the opinion that if the chinses were to attack India, the Americans and Russions would come to our assistance.

Another thing is obvious that though India's defence burden was doubled in 1963-64, it was found that our saving and investment did not need to be adversely affected. Sociatist China could not attack only India but other  
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 socialist countries.

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37. Ibid., p. 130.

38. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), India and the nuclear challenge, (New Delhi: Lancer international, 1986), p.289.

39. Ibid., p. 289.

In 1971, though the finale turned out to be different and in India's favour at least in the first few months the reactions of sections of Indian elite were on a pattern with their behaviour prior to 1962. Some even argued that India can't afford a war with a Pakistan backed by the U.S. and China. Much of our public debate on the nuclear issue today is being conducted as unrealistically and as vociferously as the debates in 1962 and 1971 and with as little background knowledge.<sup>40</sup>

Preparation for war have run up against the absolute limits for the economy. Research on the frontiers of knowledge is not only a socially comprehensive activity; it also reaches further into future the impressions of high technology have produced complicated weapons systems which are expensive and difficult to operate. The F<sup>2</sup>-4 predecessor of f-16 required 70,000 spare parts. Norman Augustine has pointed out that "if the existing trend continues, the entire defence budget in the year 2054 will purchase just one tactical fighter plane which will be shared 3½ days a week by the Air Force and the navy and made available to the marines for one day each leap year."<sup>41</sup>

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40. Ibid., p. 290.

41. M. Zuberi, "Disarmament and Development," World Focus (New Delhi, August 1988), vol.9, No.8, pp. 1-3.

The most important role played by India in the recent UN conference on the relationship between Disarmament and development was held in the context of changes in the international politics and in the world economy. The election of Mr. Natwar Singh as the president of the conference is a tribute to the crucial rôle played by India in the preparation of the conference. India whole heartedly opposed any sort of unnecessary expenditure on nuclear armaments. It reiterated its faith on non-violence, disarmament, non-alignment and other Panchsheela principles. Also Pakistani delegate raised the issue of South Asia to be declared as a nuclear free zone and emphasised the importance of regional and sub-regional security arrangements. However this role of India projected its image outside this region as an epitome of peace. And also this conference provided impetus to different countries to study their weapon options.

In the struggle against nuclear hegemony, keeping the nuclear option open is a crucial strategy. So long as the nuclear weapon powers use nuclear weapons as the currency of International power, a number of consequences follow. Those who do not have the nuclear weapons attempt to use nuclear technology and the option to go nuclear as leverages in a world, where nuclear weapons have been made the currency of power. Those who do not have the technology or option to go nuclear try to use their raw material resources, their base



facilities, which can provide infrastructure for nuclear war fighting and command, control, communication and intelligence facilities for bargain. Among the developing countries only Brazil, Argentina, India and Pakistan are in a position to exercise the nuclear option.<sup>42</sup>

More over nuclear weapons are not relevant in the context of India's security and Geo-political interests. India's Primacy in the South Asian region can be ensured by conventional armaments and by diplomacy based on good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence with as many countries as possible. As a non-nuclear power, India is not likely to be attacked by a nuclear power; there is overwhelming international sentiment and some commitments from the nuclear powers against a nuclear power attacking a non-nuclear power with nuclear weapons.<sup>43</sup>

It is an observed fact that nuclear weapons create a special kind of insecurity and invariably call for a continuing escalation in nuclear armaments. Without ensuring insecurity. There are however four types of weapons of mass destruction- biological, radiological, chemical and nuclear. Biological and chemical weapons can be made by any country, which has a

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42. K. Subrahmanyam, "Our nuclear predicament". Strategic Analysis, vol. ix No. 7 (October, 1985), p. 654.

43. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? Policy Options for India, (New Delhi, Sage, 1983), p. 18.

minimal industrial infrastructure. So a poor developing country like India should not dare to utilise much of its resources on nuclear weapons.

Another important factor that hints in the minds of all the nuclear strategist is the nuclear deterrence . Maintaining a nuclear deterrent requires a very high level of managerial capability. Simultaneously it comes to maintain the necessary high level of conventional military preparedness, an early warning system, to maintain security of launchers /Warheads/Communications and to maintain a national command authority.<sup>45</sup>

Also some argue that once India becomes a nuclear power, it may develop a vested interest in maintaining a severely restricted and monolithic international nuclear arms control and disarmament as evident among existing nuclear powers. India will be joining the nuclear club as a very junior member, way behind China and may be equal in some respect with Pakistan, which will ultimately diminish India's stature as a leading member of the International community.

India charted its own long range and independent path to nuclear self sufficiency. It did not follow the beaten track of others. Similarly, in the case of the nuclear weapon

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44. K. Subrahmanyam, "Our nuclear Predicament" Strategic Analysis, vol. ix, no. 7. (October, 1985), p. 664

45. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear weapons? Policy Options for India, (New Delhi, 1983), p. 19

option also its status is unique, It is the only country which after having achieved a capability nearly two decades ago and even after having demonstrated that capability nearly two decades ago in 1974, still has restrained itself from converting it to a weapon programme. The restraint held in the face of a growing nuclear challenge from China, an emerging one from Pakistan and increasing nuclearisation of the seas around the subcontinent. It did not break-down even when a nuclear blackmail was attempted against the country in 1971 when the USS Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal.

Jawaharlal Nehru said, "we will not make these bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so, and that in no event we will use atomic energy for those most destructive purposes.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile India took a major decision in 1963 by signing the partial test ban treaty and thereby renouncing the option to conduct nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. It was the first country to sign the treaty after the depository powers. Since 1959, India had been demanding a total prohibition of all nuclear explosions, for all states, nuclear as well as non-nuclear.

It is unforgettable in the memories of a treacherous military attack and forcible occupation of large chunks

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46. P.K.S. Namboodire, "The bomb and the Option," Strategic Analysis, vol. ix, no. 9 (December, 1985), p. 844.

of Indian territory, by the Chinese invaders, the nuclear teeth of China cause grave concern about the security of the country among various sections of the Indian Public. After Nehru when Shastri came as Prime minister, he opined that "Jawaharlal Nehru made India a leader by calling for disarmament and peaceful co-existence. We should stick to these policies..... we have certain global policy to encourage the forces of peace." He reaffirmed that as a government policy India would not want to manufacture atom bomb and reiterated in the parliament that his government had "no intention of changing the nuclear policy." His government would adhere to the decision "Not to go in for nuclear weapons, but to work for their elimination instead."<sup>47</sup>

Indira Gandhi after coming to power said, "we are anxious not to do anything which will precipitate the crisis and lead to the development of nuclear weapons in many more countries. The policy of restraint which we have adopted must therefore, continue. It is not because we believe that certain big powers should have a monopoly of these destructive weapons, but because we are genuinely interested to see total nuclear disarmament."<sup>48</sup>

However the policy of keeping the option open while continuing the restraint, was carried on by the two non-congress governments which came to power in 1977-79. Even while

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47. Ibid., p. 846.

48. Ibid., 846.

declaring before the United Nations that India would not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons "even if the rest of the world did so", Prime Minister Morarji Desai dismissed the Pakistani proposal for a nuclear free zone as "idle talk." He rejected the US president Jimmy Carter's insistence on 'full-scope safeguards " even at the risk of shutting down the Tarapur station due to lack of full availability from the United States.

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Pro-Bomb Argument:

The Indian government and people are currently reassessing India's security needs and its cardinal principles of non-alignment and nuclear weapons abstinence are coming under close scrutiny, The Institute of Public opinion, New Delhi, estimates that in 1968, over 75 percent of the Indian people from all walks of life favoured India's taking the decisions to produce nuclear weapons. Some of the recent pro-bomb writers are: Subramaniam Swamy, K. Subrahmanyam Col. R. Ramarao, Sisir Gupta, M.L. Sondhi, Ashok Kapur, Samar Guha and others.

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Non-alignment can't stand as a potent weapon which can combat an aggressor and this meet the security threats from the country. To these pro-bomb writers to do nothing and wait for

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49. See P.K.S. Namboodiri, "The Bomb and the option", Strategic Analysis, vol.ix, No.9.(December, 1985), PP.846-847.

50. Subramaniam Swamy, "India's nuclear strategy in the nineteen Seventies", "vol.vi, no.3,(June-September,1969), p. 18.

something to happen and then react by improvisation is the very opposite of rational policy, it is tantamount to its<sup>51</sup>abdication.

A paper issued in 1968 by the institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi gave certain suggestions:-

First, the basic Chinese motivations in developing a strategic nuclear capability has been treced by these (American) authorities as an attempt to provide a basis for threatening her neighbours. If the US with her own overwhelming capability to devastate China, does not feel safe with that alone and needs further measures to protect herself, the Indian population or Government is not likely to feel safe with guarantees from other nations to protect them.<sup>52</sup>

Secondly, so long as the use of nuclear weapons is deemed legetimate in war, a nation which is in a position to have them and which faces a possible threat of use of weapons against her, will be taking undue risks if she does not acquire them and relies as a permanant measure on tenuous and incredible guarantees of nations which insist on the legitimacy of use of such weapons.

Thirdly, India should make an effort to develop the nuclear option further and to close the gap between the current state of knowledge and that required to become a balanced nuclear power.

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51. Sampooran Singh, India and the nuclear bomb, (New Delhi: S. Chand & co., 1971), p.95

52. Ibid., p. 96.

The supporters of the bomb argue that nuclear weapons are the supreme symbol of national self-reliance. They treat the development of national nuclear forces as the mark of national greatness, and political power and importance.<sup>53</sup>

It is an observed fact that the states without nuclear weapons tend to be ignored by those which have them. Also some Indians believe that India's development of nuclear weapons would create a credible counterpoise to China. Gopal maintains that the United States in Asia must be reduced and eventually replaced by an Asian power capable of thwarting the Chinese.

Professor M.L. Sondhi has summarised the opinion of some intellectuals and stated that "if India decided to make the bomb, it would not merely heighten the morale of the nation but also transform the attitude of its hostile neighbours. Som Dutt advocated that India should go nuclear and that time waits for no man and in this case, time is the essence. They also suggested that India's opposition to the development of nuclear weapons would keep it perpetually on the defensive as a relatively powerless entity among the world's nations."<sup>54</sup>

The final report of the International Assembly of nuclear weapons, held on 23.26 June, 1966, stated that there were three basic reasons that might prompt some countries to embark upon a nuclear weapon programme.

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53. B.W. Augenstein, "The Chinese and French Programs for the Development of National Nuclear Forces, ORBIS, vol.xi, no.3, 1967.
54. Sampooran Singh, India and the nuclear bomb, (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971), p.97.

These are anxiety for their own security and the wish to introduce a stronger element of deterrence in to their systems of national defence, A desire to share in the position of prestige and influence and the possession of nuclear weapons is a drive for greater autonomy.

The Indian defence programme is aimed at deterring China and the defence spending is aimed at providing security without disrupting the economy. Even from the strictly economic development angle, it is clear that India is faced with small wars on its borders with periodic regularity and it will mean serious dislocation of the economy and serious strain on planned progress: nevertheless a low level of defence expenditure is a sure invitation to such small wars, It is certainly better to build up deliberately a strong, efficient<sup>55</sup> defence force which will deter the enemies of India.

K. Subrahmanyam Stated that India's military strength did not command the credibility it deserved both within the country and abroad. He also pointed out that as our Credibility goes down, our problems with our neighbours will increase. He listed seven factors which he believed would have a bearing<sup>56</sup> on the Indian decision.

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55. Ibid., p. 101.

56. Bhabani Sengupta Nuclear Weapons? Policy options for India, (New Delhi, 1983), p.15



- (a) Whether Pakistan goes nuclear;
- (b) Whether two super Powers continue with their unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- (c) Whether the other three nuclear weapons powers continue with their own programmes;
- (d) Whether Israel is deprived of its nuclear weapons and whether further clandestine proliferation takes place in countries like South Africa and Taiwan;
- (e) Whether the arsenals of crypto nuclear weapons nations increase or become more lethal;
- (f) Whether the interventionist tendencies of nuclear weapons powers get strengthened further; and lastly;
- (g) Whether nuclear weapons get increasingly legitimised or delegitimised.

He correctly identified Pakistan's aspirations and efforts as the most important provocation for India to go nuclear. Of course Subrahmanyam argued in favour of India adopting a nuclear weapons policy at a more sophisticated level, relating the issue to the unjust, repressive and exploitive international nuclear regime. Military officers at a seminar held in New Delhi in March, 1982 referring to the Pakistani nuclear issue suggested that "with regard to a possible Pakistan nuclear threat, India has two options: Either it remains one step ahead of Pakistan in nuclear weapons programme, so that it is not caught in a disadvantageous position or it keeps its nuclear

weapons capability in complete readiness. Either way India<sup>57</sup> will have to perform a delicate balancing act.

Two American Strategic specialists, Lewis A Dunn and Herman Kahn identified eight types of events which pressurises a country to go nuclear. These are: (a) Involvement in foreign crisis; (b) reduction in alliance credibility; (c) nuclearisation of other countries; (d) Weakening or breakdown of International constraints; (e) domestic crises; (f) government or leadership change; (g) increased availability of necessary resources and inputs; and (h) changed perception and utility<sup>58</sup> of nuclear weapons.

Pandit Nehru's vision of India as a great power along with the USA, USSR and China is also taken into account. South Asia, it was asserted, could not be defended without nuclear weapons; how could India then shirk its role as a regional power; We must go nuclear from the global as much as from the moral and nationalistic point of view. The costs involved were roughly estimated at an additional Rs. 3,600 crores per annum, as the probable requirement of a modest nuclear programme for the next ten to fifteen years roughly doubling the present defence budget to about six percent of the GNP. It was opined that this<sup>59</sup> order of expenditure need not deter us from making nuclear weapons.

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57. U.S. Bajpai (ed) India's Security: the politico-strategic Environment, (New Delhi: Lancer 1982), p.136.

58. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear options? Policy options for India, (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p.17.

59. Ibid., pp.110-11.

One participant presented a set of four circumstances in which India might go nuclear:

- (i) By acquiring nuclear Weapons in open defiance of the NPT regime;
- (ii) In order to gatecrash into the nuclear hierarchy in the highly stratified international system;
- (iii) In response to a successful nuclear explosion by Pakistan or to a nuclear bomb manufactured by that country;
- (iv) In anticipation of Pakistan going nuclear, thereby maintaining a lead over it as an emergent nuclear power. <sup>60</sup>

Some also argue that the option of relying on a nuclear umbrella could be ruled out as it would reduce us to the status of client state. So we have to become a nuclear power in our own right—there is nothing immoral in it as the stark choice is between kill or get killed. Going nuclear would win us international respect and would also remove the psychological disadvantage from which our armed forces suffer due to non-possession of nuclear weapons. Going nuclear is the only option and this option is open to us because our consistent refusal to sign the NPT. <sup>61</sup>

Also the school of thought which support India to go nuclear, put forth the following points. <sup>62</sup>

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60. Ibid., p.111.

61. Ibid., p. 112.

62. Sampooran Singh, India and the nuclear bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971), p. 101.

- (i) A nuclear bomb project was technically feasible, politically highly desirable, strategically highly inescapable and economically not only sustainable but actually advantageous;
- (ii) the cost of nuclear bomb programme would, instead of crushing the economy, accelerate growth of industry and technology.
- (iii) the nuclear programme had a definite advantage as it would provide 50,000 jobs for engineers, scientists and technicians;
- (iv) if national survival and existence were objectives, the cost of the bomb should not stand in the way of its Production.

Anti Bomb Arguments:-

Those who oppose the bomb, they say that to achieve a strategic second-strike capability vis-a-vis China, India would need a relatively sophisticated system. The Chinese have built many air fields in Tibet from which their air craft are within, 1300 Kilometers of Delhi, Calcutta and Jamsedpur. China can deliver nuclear bombs by air craft or IRBMs from their bases on Tibet against Indian cities. On the other hand, the approximate ranges from the northern most air fields in India to the nearest important targets are Ashan,

3520kilometers; Mukden, 4,000 kilometers, and chungking 2080 kilometers, Sanghai.3,440 kilometers and Hangkow, 2,800 kilometres. The talk of covering such distances, penetrating into air defences, refuelling in flight and returning to base is a formidable one.<sup>63</sup>

The antibomb lobbies invoke the names of Mahatma Gandhi and pundit Nehru in support of arguments, "India going nuclear." According to Mahatma Gandhi if there were threats to national security and sovereignty, then evil must be resisted. The Indian armed forces moved into defending the state of Jammu and Kashmir in october, 1947 with the blessings of Gandhi. If India develops nuclear capability mainly with a view to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by its adversaries, that by itself can't be unGandhian.

Nehru was advised by Dr. Bhabha that the country should close the option to produce a nuclear device in 1963 in case this should become politically or militarily necessary. However India took major initiatives in regard to the test Ban treaty and in promoting discussions on disarmament.

If India decides to go nuclear, it seems that U.S. will discontinue its aid, may even withdraw from the area and give additional aid to India's adversaries. This would increase

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63. Ibid., p. 103.

security threats from either the aided Pakistan or the unrestrained China. The effort to build the bomb in India would thus be more frantic and less tailored to economic needs.

It has also been suggested that India will be playing straight into the hands of China, if because of emotional reaction or prestige considerations, it enters into a nuclear race with China. The enormous diversion of resources and talents required will retard India's economic and social development programmes indefinitely and by creating scarcity and economic dislocation and social discontent not only weaken India internally but eliminate as a political factor in Asia and Africa.

This school of thought also opine that our International role and prestige hardly depend on having nuclear weapons. In fact it was the fifties and sixties when we vehemently opposed nuclearisation that our role in world affairs was regarded as most effective. As for prestige, there are several non-nuclear nations notably Japan and West Germany which enjoy a great deal of prestige. On the question of costs, the estimate of Rs. 3,600 crores per annum challenged. Reference was made to the figure of US 75 billion spread over fifteen years which one of the background papers had mentioned, based on

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64. Bhabani Sengupta, Nuclear Weapons? Policy Options for India (New Delhi: Sage, 1983), p. 113.

the French experience in acquiring a limited nuclear capability.

Besides, apart from the costs of making nuclear weapons, other related costs like those of delivery and command and control systems had to be taken into account. Defence expenditure was already consuming 30 percent of the non-plan budget and forms 17 percent of total government spending and we could hardly afford to double this level which would be necessary even if the expenditure was going to be only Rs. 3,600 crores per year.<sup>65</sup>

Not only going nuclear will incur Socio-economic loss but also diplomatically we would be thrown into a strange foreign policy league after losing our ability to sustain a non-aligned stance. The adversary relationship with Pakistan would get permanently perpetuated with no hope of any improvement. USA would certainly resist our going nuclear and even the USSR will not be in favour of us, if we become nuclear power. Moreover in this situation nuclear weapons are not of much use militarily; what is of more immediate relevance are stronger conventional forces backed by aggressive diplomacy.

The following four points, are strictly opined by the antibomb school.

- (i) Improvement of relations with Pakistan, accompanied by a mutual reduction of forces.
- (ii) work towards creating a nuclear free zone in south Asia.

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65. Ibid., p. 113.

(iii) Make common cause with popular peace movements in the West.

(iv) Plead for a new political order objuring the use of mass destruction weapons: not only nuclear but also bacterial, chemical binary gas etc.

India's defence policy must not seek to win wars, it must seek to make war impossible to contemplate, so far as its neighbours are concerned. <sup>66</sup> However deterrence does not mean the use of one's most developed weapons and escalate the war level, the moment the enemy launches such a war; it means acquiring an option in this regard.

Taking to the present conditions of India, any impartial man can suggest one's own view point. A country where 36 percent people still live below poverty line and 36 percent people are literate, why should we go for a bomb? Our developing economy can't bear such a big burden with increasing population in this sub-continent. Still a nation has to live like a nation, it should be capable enough to preserve, protect and defend, its Sovereignty, integrity and nationality as a whole. Under this circumstance, what some academicians, researchers, strategists and political decision makers say for keeping the nuclear option open, should be strictly adhered to.

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66. Sampoorn Singh, India and the Nuclear bomb, (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971), p. 109.



CHAPTER - IV

INDIA'S RESPONSE - THE ROLE OF DECISION  
MAKING

Decision making has become an important instrument in the policy making of a nation. It is no doubt a fact that the post second world war period has seen rapid development of new strategic doctrines, the rapid break through in the weapon systems, transport and communication capabilities. It has profound impact on the decision making processes, command and control apparatus and civil-military relationships in different countries which maintain sizeable military establishments.

Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India's first prime Minister, was the principal architect in the India's foreign policy and the sole voice in the making of defence policy. During 17 year from 1947 until his death in May 1964, he was also the country's minister of External Affairs and thus directly responsible for the active <sup>1</sup> interpretation and administration of that policy. So in order to clearly understand the nuclear policy of India, we have to sufficiently rely on Nehru's ideas, his philosophy and vision and the broad national purpose seen by him.

In the present International environment, the difference between peace and war has been considerably narrowed down. The process which used to make the immediate period before

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1. S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem (New Delhi: Orient Langman, 1968), p. 299.

hostilities, continuous production of war material, deployment of troops on the frontiers, keeping them continuously combat ready are today normal peace time aspects of defence management. Any country which goes in for elaborate measures<sup>2</sup> of mobilisation will invite a preemptive attack on itself.

Conceptualising the role of Indian political personalities in the nuclear policy process, is a hard but not an impossible task. The original framework as defined by Nehru was to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to leave the open for possible use for India's protection.<sup>3</sup> In this regard the role of the Indian scientists in shaping the policy process is not less significant. Nehru always spoke about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. But the shift in Nehru's thinking occurred after the 1962 crisis in response to Bhabha's position on the diplomatic strategic uses of nuclear energy.

Bhabha conceived the India's atomic programme under the 'Atoms for peace' concept, but his commitment to peaceful uses was limited. He never lost sight of the military use of atomic energy.<sup>4</sup> Because of his real politik approach, he did not show much enthusiasm for disarmament beyond the 1960s. Nehru of course was committed to disarmament completely, and he talked publicly

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2. K. Subrahmanyam, Perspectives in Defence Planning (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1972), p. 115.
  3. Ashok Kapur, India's nuclear option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision making, (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 192.
  4. Ibid., p. 192.

Primarily about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.<sup>5</sup>

Speaking at the fourth International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) General conference, on 22nd September, 1960, H.J. Bhabha said that India was not and never had been against the principle of safeguards, It insisted that any system of safeguards adopted by the agency should conform to certain basic principles. The states most advanced in the atomic energy and therefore the main contributors to nuclear weapons production would not be affected by any safeguards the agency could impose.<sup>6</sup>

In the present international environment the difference between peace and war has been considerably narrowed down, wars are more likely today among industrialising nations than among industrial nations since the risk of escalation to nuclear levels in these cases is very much less as the stake the industrialising areas represent to the nuclear powers is less than what the industrial nations constitute.<sup>7</sup> The industrialising countries will have to get part or most of the armament requirements from industrial powers. The industrial powers keep only limited stockpiles of conventional arms as they act on the assumption that a conventional war fought in the industrial areas will escalate into nuclear war in a short period.<sup>8</sup>

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5. Ibid., p. 193

6. J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol.II (New Delhi: Radiant publishers, 1974), p. 104.

7. K. Subrahmanyam, Perspectives in Defence Planning (New Delhi: 1972), p. 116.

8. Ibid., p. 117.

But Nehru's policy was based neither on an abstract moral or other conceptual monism, nor entirely on the existing circumstances, but a curious mixture of both the two principles. It is no doubt a fact that he was influenced by the Gandhian doctrine of non-violence, which seemed to gain emphasis and strength from the violence of world war II. In his report to the all India congress Committee in the January 1955, session, Jawaharlal Nehru emphasised Gandhiji's basic lesson that, means govern ends, so that the adoption of the right means is as important as the ends themselves.

Continuing his report to the AICC, Jawaharlal Nehru said "India is finding herself again. She is learning a great deal from others.... we have, therefore, encouraged in every way our family contracts with other countries, but we realise that, if India is to advance, she must be true to herself and not be a pale copy of some other country.

Nehru in his speeches in parliament on February 18, 1953, said, the United Nations organisation which is built for peace is itself engaged in sponsoring war today. Is it possible that the world has not grown up and is incapable of having an international organisation for peace?

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9. S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem, (New Delhi: orient Langman, 1968), p. 302.
  10. K.T. Narasimhachar, The Quintessence of Nehru (London: George Allen & Unwip, 1961), p. 91.

No doubt Nehru's commitment for the principle of non-alignment, panchsheel, Disarmament have kept India in the safest side. The personality of his stature was very difficult to be swayed away by the ordinary happenings in the land. No doubt his death in 1964, is a terrible shock not only to the decision makers of the country, but also to the humankind as a whole. Nehru's successor as Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, continued the policy of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and friendship with all nations<sup>11</sup>. He also made a special endeavour to improve or strengthen India's relationship with her Neighbours. At that time the relationship with ceylon and Burma was not good, and with the appointment of Sardar Swarana Singh as Minister of External Affairs, he went to ceylon, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan and some other countries of Asia.

In the non-aligned summit at Cairo in october, 1964 Shastri made an impulsive impression to send a peace mission to china so as to persuade the communist China leaders to stop their nuclear programme, however met with a dead end. Shastri visited Russia in may, 1965 and reiterated India's faith in peaceful co-existence, stressed the need for the improvement of the international situation then undergoing one of the more serious strains of the cold war, for the achievement of general nuclear disarmament, and the settlement of all international

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11. S.S. Khara, India's Defence Problem, (New Delhi: Orient Langman, 1968), p. 303

disputes through peaceful and friendly negotiations.

The brief period of Shastri's term as Prime Minister also saw the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan and ultimately in September, 1965, there was a full fledged war between the two countries resulting in a good deal of damage to both the countries.

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After the death of Shastri in 1966 the country vested all the responsibilities on the shoulder of Indira Gandhi. She reaffirmed the nation's policy as 'Socialism and democracy at home and non-alignment and peaceful co-existence abroad. The Chinese attack of 1962 and the continuing threat from China across India's northern borders, has caused many people to express a strong view that non-alignment as a policy has failed. In fact however, the policy of non-alignment has not only become unsuccessful but has been instrumental in saving India from involvements of the kind, which even Pakistan has recently found to be of little use for her particular purposes.

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The death of Nehru no doubt provided a different direction to the nuclear policy of India. The focus of nuclear decision making centred on the relationship between Bhabha, Shastri and L.K. Jha, Shastri's principal secretary. In RAPP II negotiations with Canada, Bhabha wanted the Indo-Canadian agreement to be even

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12. Ibid., p.304.

13. Ibid., p. 304.

14. Ibid., p. 306.

freer than the RAPP I agreement. But in the Glassboro conference between president Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin, the NPT discussion got seriously under way and the Canadian stance towards India stiffened. L.K. Jha<sup>15</sup> supported the Canadian and American view on NPT. At this juncture Shastri approached Bhabha to negotiate with Canada on this issue, to which he declined.

Consequently Bhabha's opposition won over L.K. Jha's views. In November 1965, Bhabha put forward a note for a subterranean nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP)<sup>16</sup>. This project's aim was to produce an underground explosion. In December, Shastri gave his approval to the proposal. After Bhabha's death, the SNEP story took a new direction, with the appointment of Vikram Sarabhai as the Chairman of the Atomic Energy commission. Then Sarabhai called off SNEP and accepted tougher safeguards on RAPP II.<sup>17</sup>

On 5th March, 1970, Prime minister Indira Gandhi told the Rajya Sabha that Government believe that the present policy of developing our scientific and technological capability in expanding our programme for the peaceful uses of Atomic energy and space research is in the best overall interest of the nation. On 1st June 1974, Prime Minister of India wrote to the Canadian Prime minister stating, "India remains firmly committed to

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15. Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision making, (New York: 1976) p. 194

16. Ibid., p. 194.

17. Ibid., p. 195.



a policy of producing weapons. India has opposed and will continue to oppose military use of nuclear energy as a threat to humanity.<sup>18</sup>

Prime Minister Desai in the Lok Sabha on the 23rd March, 1978 made a statement in response to a calling attention notice regarding the reported decision of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to put off the release of enriched uranium for Tarapur Atomic power station and the consequence arising out of it. He said the bilateral agreement for co-operation between the government of the United States and the government of India provides that all requirements of enriched uranium for use as fuel at Tarapur shall be made available by the USA and that India shall not obtain these from any other sources. Accordingly enriched uranium is being imported from USA.<sup>19</sup>

Government have constantly been impressing upon the U.S. authorities the necessity of maintaining continued supplies of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic power station in accordance with the inter governmental agreement and the subsequent sale contract between the two countries.

The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre officer's Association (BARCOA) in a memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister on January 29, 1980, mentioned that the performance of the working

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18. Dhirendra Sharma (ed.) The Indian Atom: Power and Proliferation, (New Delhi: Philosophy & Social Action, 1986), p. 79.

19. Ibid., p. 81.

scientists have had little effective say in decision making in scientific or personal matters. They mentioned that "Too many important facts like those concerning health hazards, progress of important projects and service conditions of individual scientists have been unnecessarily kept secret not only from the public but also from the majority of the scientists.<sup>20</sup> As a result of which the working scientists do not want to accept the responsibility for any failure, for they have no right to participate in decision making. And due to this serious alienation of the working scientists and the management, India's nuclear programme has failed to contribute seriously to the national development.

In the light of Mrs. Gandhi's pre-occupation with domestic concerns, India came very close to signing the NPT. Mrs Gandhi's final decision was to reject the NPT after the issue was debated in the Indian cabinet. Morarji Desai and Y.B. Chavan were the principal cabinet members, who agreed against the nuclear treaty.<sup>21</sup>

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20. Ibid., p. 93

21. Ashok Kapur, India's nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision making, (New York: 1976), p. 196.

It may be made clear that the decision not to sign was not based on any conviction in principle against the NPT. Rather it was based on the careful reading of Indian public opinion polls.<sup>22</sup> The poll ultimately showed that a majority rejected the NPT and favoured an Indian decision toward nuclear weapons.

In this regard heavy attention should be given to the rate and scope at which civil servants and scientists are able to educate a political leader about the intricacies of nuclear policy. No doubt there is a positive link between the 1962 India-China crisis and the shift in Nehru's thinking. In assessing interaction between (i) Bhabha and Nehru (ii) Bhabha and Shastri (iii) Bhabha and Indira Gandhi, it becomes obvious that the Prime Ministers were more attentive to Bhabha's security concerns in India's nuclear and disarmament policies.<sup>23</sup>

On the one hand, there were Mrs. Gandhi's perceptions of the implications of super power parallelism in Tashkent agreement (1966) and the NPT agreement (1968), the implications of the U.S. tilt against India during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis and the problems India had in securing Soviet support during the 1971 crisis. On the other hand, there was her decision in late 1971 and her final decision on or around February 15, 1974 to explode a peaceful nuclear device on or around May 16-21, 1974.<sup>24</sup> Mrs Gandhi however Cancelled the decision of her predecessor, Shastri to have an underground exposition,

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22. Ibid., p. 196.

23. Ibid., p. 197.

24. Ibid., 198.

this should be seen as a temporary delay in the evolution toward nuclear weapons, for India in the late 1970s and 1980s.<sup>25</sup> The India's decision for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy does not necessarily mean that India will not opt for weapons, rather it is a slow movement, a gradual march toward the weapon. It has become a fact that India's nuclear behaviour is a mere reflection of its nationalistic reaction against super powers, Pakistan and China. Of course the recent developments in sino-Indian relations, new disarmament package of Benazir Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the settlement of Afghan crisis, the success of super power's disarmament talks have given a new direction to policy makers in the sub-continent.

The Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in an interview with the Japan Economic Journal, November 9, 1985 said that we are against atomic bomb on principle we have fought for disarmament, for doing away with nuclear weapons in this part of the region.<sup>26</sup> Also he said in another interview "we do not have a bomb. I do not know if Pakistan has one. Though we have the full capacity to make a nuclear bomb, I do not see the need to make one at present. When it is necessary to go in for one we will inform the people".<sup>27</sup>

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25. Ibid., p. 200.

26. Dharendra Sharma (ed.), The Indian Atom: Power and proliferation, (New Delhi: philosophy & Social Action, 1986), p. 152.

27. Ibid., p. 152.

At the inaugural ceremony of India's Fast Breeder Test Reactor at Kalpakam on December 16, 1985, Rajiv Gandhi said that India shall never make nuclear weapons. We shall not sign the non-proliferation treaty because of its discriminatory character. But India is committed to peaceful purpose of atomic energy. Also on December 17, 1985 president Zia of Pakistan visited New Delhi for a meeting with the Prime Minister of India. They both however signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Both of them declared that their nuclear programmes were "for peaceful purposes" and that they intend to work for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia.

India's nuclear energy programme was of a very modest size in comparison to the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at the inauguration of the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay had emphatically declared in 1957, that "whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use atomic energy for evil purposes."

India's confidence in the U.N. guarantees is shaken, which is evident from Swaran Singh's speech in the floor of the parliament that he strongly deprecated any tendency to think

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28. Dhiraendra Sharma (ed.) The Indian Atom, (New Delhi: philosophy & Social Action, 1986), p. 152.

29. *Ibid.*, 152.

30. Dhirendra Sharma, India's Nuclear Estate, (New Delhi: Lancers, 1983), p. 82.

that at a time of crisis other countries would under write India's safety and independence. It is time to realise that there is no option for this country but to stand on its feet. We must remember that the best of umbrellas do not open when you need them and also that when it rains every body uses his own umbrella.<sup>31</sup>

Hans vohra has neatly summed up India's policy in three negatives like (1) we will not sign the NPT (2) we will make no atomic weapon and (3) we will accept no guarantees.<sup>32</sup> According to him these three nuclear negatives is very much harmful to Indias interests. The main reason behind it is the gap btween India's nuclear potential and the Chinese nuclear strenght widens with the change of time and India's secret dream of matching the chinese effort would evaporate. The second reason is the security council's resolution, which promises secutity to those countries which sign the NPT. Also each nuclear powers like UK, USA, USSR have proclaimed that they will provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty on the non-proliferations of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, it is doubtful, as time passes and the number of non-signatories diminishes, whether it will be able to obtain the co-operation of nuclear powers even in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.<sup>33</sup>

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31. Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear bomb, (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. 1971), pp. 90-91.
  32. Hans R. Vohra, "India's Nuclear policy of three negatives" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. xxvi, No. 4. (April, 1970), p. 25.
  33. Sampooran Singh India and the nuclear bomb, (New Delhi : S. Chand & Co., 1971), p. 92.

It we come to the case of Pakistan, it is evident that there is no way of making Pakistan give up its quest for nuclear capability. Those who urge India to accept Pakistan's proposals for mutual inspection or its invitation to India to give up policies of not acceding to the so-called non-proliferation treaty or the nuclear weapon free zone do not distinguish between mutual inspection and verification.<sup>34</sup> Verification is central to any arms-control measure. With its current capabilities India is not in a position to satisfy itself that Pakistan does not have weapons. It is not however meaningful retort that neither can Pakistan satisfy itself about India's nuclear-free status.<sup>35</sup> Therefore it is obvious that such an arms control measure is not feasible between India and Pakistan.

There are some people, who argue that India should join Pakistan in a mutual verification agreement, so as to wipe out the fear of insecurity in the minds of both these countries. At the same time we do not have to forget the threat from China.

Moreover the sub-continent is surrounded on all sides with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and the China in the north, the US central command encompasses the north-west quadrant of

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34. K. Subrahmanyam (ed.) India and the Nuclear Challenge, (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986) p. 284.

35. Ibid., p. 285.

the Indianocean. A U.S. naval taskforce with nuclear weapons is on permanent station in the aranian Sea. Diego Garcia handles the B-52 bombers. Sixty five nations on the globe have either nuclear weapons stationed on their soil or have command, control, communication and intelligence facilities related to nuclear war-fighting. In addition to this all industrialised nations of the world barring Sweden, Finland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Greece and New Zeland subscribe to war doctrines, as the basis of their security. So taking into account all the world nuclear scenorio, it is seer foolishness on our part to think anymore that nuclear issue is merely an Indo-Pakistan issue, Many Indians in this regards believe that India's development of nuclear weapon would create a credible political counterpoise to China. The presence of United States in Asia must be reduced and eventually replaced by an Asian power capable of thwarting the chinese.

Professor M.L. Sondhi has summarised the opinion of some entellectuals, who attended the Seminar and stated "it was felt that if India decided to make the bomb, it would not heighten the morale of the nation but also transform the attitude of its hostile neighbours. It has been suggested that India's opposition to the development of the nuclear weapons would keep it perpetually on the defensive as a relatively powerless entity among the world's nations.

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36. Ibid., p. 285

37. S. Gupal, The choice, Seminar, (August, 1967), p. 158.

38. M.L. Sondhi, "Notes and memoranda," Seminar. (August, 1967) p. 158

39. Sampooran Singh India the nuclear bomb, (New Delhi: 1971) p. 97



K Subrahmanyam on the other hand points out that as our credibility goes down, our problems with neighbours will increase. Any nation that does not develop national power, commensurate with its size and population, is not likely to be permitted to continue that way for long. It will be reduced in size and population commensurate with its power. The only way of increasing our credibility is to develop our own nuclear weapons.<sup>40</sup>

Also Subrahmanyam in another book suggests that if a nuclear war were to take place in Europe, India would not be spared. The recent study of the scientific committee for the preservation of the Environment (SCOPE), has highlighted that even if a single nuclear warhead is not exploded over India in a nuclear war confined to Europe, the casualties in India caused by the adverse climatic consequences following that nuclear war will far exceed those in Europe, the main battlefield itself.<sup>41</sup> So, at this juncture India's response to the nuclear world should be based on numerous presumptions. The roles of decision makers have turned high. It should not be the problem of only the nuclear strategists, rather all the academicians, bureaucrats, politicians have to contribute a lot for the policy

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40. Ibid., p. 101.

41. K. Subrahmanyam (ed), India and the nuclear Challenge, (New Delhi : Lancer International, 1986), p. 286

formulation of the country. We should not forget our commitment to nationalism and urge for national survival among the population. No doubt Pakistan is likely to knock into India some sound nuclear strategic sense, just as the Chinese taught this country some lessons on national security management in 1962.<sup>42</sup>

For the first time in independent India's history, the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his presidential address to the congress centennial celebrations concluded that "we must commit ourselves to the demanding task of making India a mighty power in the world with all the strength and compassion of her great culture. To this cause I pledge myself, Jai Hind." Only the future can tell whether this vision of a mighty but compassionate India will be translated into reality and the present political leadership will be able to refashion our industrial, agrarian, economic, Scientific, Technological, military and bureaucratic infrastructures to contribute effectively towards this goal.<sup>43</sup>

India's response to nuclear Challenge must have two components. The first one is to acquire the nuclear capability to shield India from coercive diplomacy and possible nuclear blackmail and the second is a sustained crusade to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons and make such use and threat of use, crimes against humanity.<sup>44</sup> So taking into account the time and circumstance the decision makers should take a proper decision about the nuclear scenes of India.

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42. Ibid., p. 292.

43. Ibid., p. 294.

44. Ibid., p. 294.

C O N C L U S I O N  
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The arms race is increasingly a world wide phenomenon, and although its intensity varies markedly between regions, few countries and no major regions has stayed out of it. The competition in armaments between the largest military powers is by far the most important. It involves the greatest diversion of resources, the greatest inherent dangers and constitutes the principal driving force of the world-wide arms race. This competition is even more intense than is suggested by the immense size and the rapid expansion of their arsenals, because it takes place primarily in a qualitative, rather than a quantitative dimension, each new generation of weapons being more complex and more destructive than the systems it replaces. In some parts of the world the term 'arms race' is less appropriate, but in every major region and in the majority of countries the process of expanding and improving military force appears to be gathering momentum.

The drain on resources involved in the arms race has already been commented upon in global terms. On average, countries are devoting 5 to 6 percent of their output to military ends. One aspect of the economic and social impact of the arms race is the constraining effect on consumption, private and public, and on growth. High military expenditure, on the other hand, seems to have contributed to the growth difficulties of some industrialised countries, not only by diverting capital and skilled personnel from productive

employment, but also because a secure and profitable domestic market for arms production reduced the need for and the efforts of firms to compete on world markets. The arms race not only entails heavy economic sacrifices. It also threatens and perverts democratic processes, and weakens those processes of Social evolution which provide the only real hope for the future of mankind.

Nuclear disarmament must be given the highest priority both because of the intolerable threat posed by nuclear weapons, and because current and foreseeable developments in their means of delivery and the doctrines governing their use, and the proliferation to new states will enhance this threat and could make disarmament vastly more difficult in the future. As regards nuclear weapons proliferation, regional limitation and restraints, such as the establishment of nuclear free zones, would constitute important steps. The high level of military spending in the world not only diverts resources from civilian purposes but also it accelerates various problems. In this way they have contributed the economic disruption and political instability in some countries.

The economic cost of constructing nuclear bombs and a delivery system was a separate issue altogether. A UN study in 1968, quoted by the Institute for Defence Studies and analyses, New Delhi, estimated that a small but significant nuclear force, comprising from 30 to 50 jet bombers, 50 medium range missiles and 100 plutonium warheads would cost at least \$ 1,700 m if spread over a period of ten years. This represent a vast sum

for the government of a poor country like India.<sup>1</sup>

Indian policy makers would further need to consider how a decision in favour of nuclear weapons was likely to affect foreign perceptions of regional and international stability. Also there are divergent views on the nature of the role that nuclear weapons could play for the developing world. A particular school of thought are of the opinion that the possession of nuclear weapons by developing countries would provide greater stability and deterrence against war. It was therefore desirable that as many as possible of the developing countries should acquire nuclear capability. Also some argue that the possession of nuclear weapons by developing countries would not enhance their security, particularly in a situation of technological and economic dependence when they were not self reliant even with regard to conventional weapons.<sup>2</sup>

Another school of thought who oppose the bomb issue regard that once a nuclear weapons capability was acquired, full nuclearisation would inevitably follow over a period of time; all the economic, political and social consequences of doing so would have to be accepted. India's strategic environment is not that much vulnerable. An overview of the strategic pattern was provided by a military expert who pointed

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1. Shyam Bhatia, India's nuclear bomb (Sahibabad; Vikas, 1979), p. 128.
  2. Bhabani Sengupta and Centre for policy Research, Nuclear Weapons? Policy options for India (New Delhi; Sage, 1983), p. 105.

out that: (a) India had successfully met external aggression more than once but sizeable chunks of Indian territory continued to be occupied by China and Pakistan; (b) the problem of insurgency in the north east had been tackled successfully through a mixture of military force and political tolerance; (c) While the threat from China has lessened, new threats had arisen<sup>3</sup> to our coastal areas. Moreover Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and U.S.A. arms supply to Pakistan give different dimensions to the security threats in the Sub-Continent.

One thing should be clear that we need not have a guilt complex about the Pakharan explosion since Pakistan's nuclear programme had in fact started long before Pakharan and was in no way triggered off by it. It may be an important possibility that Pakistan's nuclear programme was not necessarily directed against India, it is because some say that any bomb which will be dropped in New Delhi, will have the same repercussion in Islamabad. Therefore it will be sheer foolishness on the part of Pakistan to use it against India.

Recently Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi has expressed concern at Pakistan's continuing nuclear programme. He said, "If we push the button for a nuclear programme of course we can produce a nuclear weapon. But we are the only country which has shown that it has the capability to produce a bomb. I do not think there are any other country which have given such example."<sup>4</sup>

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3. Ibid., p. 106.

4. The Times of India, (New Delhi: July 14, 1989).

Anyway India can't be condemned on the ground it does not have nuclear capability. Its commitment for non-alignment, disarmament, the principle of panchsheela has obstructed India to go nuclear. Its effort in making Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace and to build the South Asian region on peaceful foundation has become sole goal of India. The entire world should learn a big thing from the very freedom movement of India, its culture and commitment. The first step the poor countries have to do is to non-co-operate with the nuclear hegemonists. India has accepted this strategy by refusing to accede to the so called Non-proliferation treaty which proclaims the nuclear imperial order. As a corollary India refuses to enter into arrangements establishing the nuclear imperial protectorates in terms of so called nuclear weapon-free zones. India joins hands with peace movements in the Industrialised world which are struggling to mould the public opinion against the nuclear weapons cult. India exercising nuclear Option correspond to the Quit-India movement, the formation of the Indian National Army and Royal Indian Navy revolt serving notice on the nuclear imperialist that the days of nuclear imperialism are over and nuclear coercive diplomacy is becoming non-viable.<sup>5</sup>

In these circumstances nuclear disarmament has posed a very important question to all the sovereign nationstate. It is the academicians, the strategists, political leaders,

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5. K. Subrahmanyam (Ed.), India and the nuclear Challenge (New Delhi: Lancer International 1986), p. 297.



who are at the apex of the decision making process, should think a while. A question may arise can India sacrifice its security, integrity and sovereignty at the cost of its moralistic ideology? Can India remain silent when its neighbour attacks India? There fore we have to think and rethink while going to clarify its nuclear option. We have to be strong enough to defend ourselves, hence we should not close our nuclear option, rather we have to be vigilant enough to see the world in our own eyes, making our nuclear option open.

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