

# **NATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT :** **A STUDY OF INDIAN POLICY, 1947-1964**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**SOMANATH BIRADAR**

**CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI - 110067**

**1989**

C E R T I F I C A T E


Certified that the dissertation entitled "NATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT : A STUDY OF INDIAN POLICY, 1947 - 1964" submitted by MR. SOMANATH BIRADAR in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. With best of our knowledge, it is his bonafide work.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.



PROF. S.C. GANGAL  
CHAIRMAN  
**Professor S. C. GANGAL**  
Chairperson

**Centre for International Politics**  
**Organization and Disarmament**  
**School of International Studies**  
**Jawaharlal Nehru University**  
**NEW DELHI-110067.**



PROF. T.T. POULOSE  
**Professor** SUPERVISOR  
**Centre for International Politics,**  
**Organization and Disarmament**  
**School of International Studies**  
**Jawaharlal Nehru University**  
**New Delhi-110067**

## A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T


In the preparation of this study I owe my sincere thanks to many.

First, I am grateful to Prof. T.T. Poulouse, my supervisor, for giving me a proper insight into the topic and encouraging me always.

I am thankful to the Library staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Nehru Museum and Library, Indian Council of World Affairs and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Library for providing me the necessary information. I am also sincerely thankful to all my friends for their help and cooperation.

Last but not the least, I am most grateful to my parents whose love and affection has always been a source of inspiration for completing this study.

New Delhi  
21 July 1989.

  
SOMANATH BIRADAR

## C O N T E N T S

		Page
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</b>		i
<b>CHAPTER I</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	1
1.1	Statement of the Problem	3
1.2	Objectives	5
1.3	Scope and Limitations	6
1.4	Methodology	6
<b>CHAPTER II</b>	<b>THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY</b>	
2.1	<b>Def</b> initions of National Security	8
2.2	Different Concepts of Security	14
2.3	National Security vis-a-vis National Interests	22
2.4	The Relationship Between National and International Security	25
2.5	Instruments of National Security	26
<b>CHAPTER III</b>	<b>INDIA'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY DURING THE NEHRU ERA</b>	
3.1	Nature of Threat Perceptions	29
3.2	Evolution of National Security During the Nehru Era	34
3.3	Pakistani Threat and India's Security	43
3.4	The Chinese Challenge and India's Security Policy	47

CHAPTER IV	INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT	51
4.1	Concept of Disarmament	52
4.2	Origin and Development of Disarmament	55
4.3	Disarmament and Development	64
4.4	Disarmament and India's Role	65
CHAPTER V	CONCLUSION	78
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY		82

CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION

Independent India inherited the legacy of Gandhiji's non-violence and satyagraha. Hence, India's role in the initial years of the independence, under Jawaharlal Nehru, was in promoting a climate of peace and friendship in the world. Jawaharlal nehru put into practice the principles enunciated by Gandhiji, in international relations through the doctrine of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. This is evident from a statement made by him :

"All the peoples of the world have a right to life and progress and the fulfilment of their destiny. They have the right to peace and security. They can only preserve these rights now by living peacefully together and by solving their problems by peaceful methods. They cannot convert each other by force or threats of force, for any such attempt will lead to catastrophe for all. The only way is to exist peacefully together in spite of differences, and to give up the policy of hatred and violence."<sup>1</sup>

In order to develop or to sustain its development a nation needs security, both external and internal. While external security is largely military-related, internal security problems arise mostly out of non-military causes. Foreign policy of a country is derived from the interpretation of its historical background, its geographic location, its national objectives and the perception of its national interests by the people exercising political power.

---

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi, 1961), p. 202.

The goal of a sound foreign policy is to insure national security. National security, in Nehru's thinking, could be safeguarded not merely by military preparedness but also by an effective foreign policy. His strategic posture was based on peace and pacific settlement of disputes, i.e., negotiation, mediation and not on deterrence through defence preparedness. Witness his statement:

"Security can be obtained in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is equally true that security is protected by policies."<sup>2</sup>

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru considered disarmament as the most important question facing mankind. Nations possessed such terrible weapons of mass destruction that the whole creation faced the danger of complete annihilation. The most important factor in India's disarmament policy had been her national interests. As Nehru put it :

"Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress."<sup>3</sup>

By making the Gandhian ethics of purity of means and non-violence as cornerstone of India's disarmament policy, Nehru sought to project the disarmament problem essentially as a moral one.

---

2. Jawaharlal nehru, n.1, p.79

3. Ibid, p. 79



In formulating India's disarmament policy, Nehru appears to have been governed by Emperor Ashok's philosophy of moral conquest.

The genesis of India's present day national security and disarmament policy under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi may be traced back to the days of his grandfather and the country's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In short, the tactics have changed but the strategy remains the same. And the strategy as envisioned by Nehru was that in terms of nuclear matters India should strive for and be treated as equal by the great powers even if it did not merit such equality in terms of its economic and military achievements. Nehru had painfully concluded that India's defeat and subjugation at the hands of foreigners in the past was due to its scientific and technological backwardness.

Nehru was an idealist and a realist. As an idealist he had a dream to wipe out centuries of humiliation of the past and revive memories of the golden age. As a realist he set out a goal to move towards his dream to usher India into the modern age through science and technology, especially nuclear technology. He saw science and technology as indispensable tools for realising his dreams of a strong and sturdy modern India.

### 1.1 Statement of the Problem

By the time India became independent, the Cold War dominated the world scene - the European powers under the leadership of U.S.A. forming the military alliance of the NATO, on the one hand, while the Soviet Union and Socialist countries of Eastern Europe

forming the counter-bloc of Warsaw Pact on the other. Having liberated itself from the hegemony of the British imperial system, it was but natural for Nehru to assert that independent India refused to belong to either of the military alliances of the Cold War. Thus, appeared on the world scene what has come to be known as non-alignment. Nehru made it clear that India would decide its foreign policy on the basis of its own understanding of India's national interest which is to protect its national security. Nehru claimed that India's policy was rooted in a line of thinking which was wholly opposed to the purely military thinking. Non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes were put forward as the Indian formula for world peace.

Nehru tirelessly denounced the trend towards nuclear arms race. It became a passion for him to plead for disarmament. It was on India's initiative that the U.N. undertook a study of the economic consequences of disarmament. It was the same Nehruite legacy that was carried forward by Indira Gandhi in her crusade against nuclear war threat, culminating in the emergence of six-nation-five continent initiative for nuclear disarmament. Rajiv Gandhi has not deviated from this path.

The actual military threats that India faces are those from Pakistan and China. Pakistan and its policies hold great significance for India. In fact, the history of these two nations is one. India and Pakistan were one before 1947. The bitter experience of the blood-soaked partition left its deep marks on

the national psyche of both the countries. This was accentuated in India by Pakistan's attack on Kashmir. The U.S. military alliance with Pakistan has grievously vitiated Indo-Pak relationship. The continuous supply of U.S. arms to Pakistan has led to certain pernicious developments which impinge on India's security policy.

Next, that is China, which has often been a 'snake in the monkey's shadow'. India, under the leadership of Nehru signed the Panch Sheel Agreement with China in 1954, and tried to follow a policy of friendship and close cooperation. The defeat and loss of territory to the Chinese in 1962 war also has contributed in a very big way to a change in perception of the makers of India's security policy.

The topic of national security and disarmament deserves to be reviewed again and again because of the fast changing circumstances and the new developments in the field of nuclear technology which have threatened the very survival of mankind.

This study is an attempt to establish the linkage between national security and disarmament without compromising India's national interest or its foreign policy.

## 1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are the following :

1. To examine the concept of national security and its importance in international relations as applicable to India;

2. to assess how far the foreign policy of India as laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru could safeguard the national security of the country.
3. to determine whether India, during the Nehru period from 1947-1964, was able to face the various threats from Pakistan and China; and
4. to what extent the global efforts for disarmament have succeeded and what contribution towards disarmament has been made by India during the Nehru era, consistent with India's national security.

### 1.3 Scope and Limitations

This study covers the Nehru era of seventeen years focussing on areas like national security and disarmament. This period has been taken up with the idea that this study would give a comprehensive understanding about the nature of the national security and disarmament policy after the attainment of India's independence. It forms the base for the construction and strengthening of India's foreign policy under the dynamic leadership of Nehru.

### 1.4 Methodology

The study has adopted historical and analytical method of research. It is historical in the sense that it is covering a period of 17 years and the important developments are studied in historical perspective. For the collection of relevant data, the information sources like classified documents, publications

of the government of India and memoirs, are utilized.

The study consists of five chapters with an 'Introduction' as the first chapter. Chapter-II deals with the concept of National Security, chapter-III discusses the Threat Perceptions and the Evolution of National Security during Nehru era, chapter-IV is about India's Contribution to Disarmament and chapter-V are the conclusions.

CHAPTER - II  
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Mankind has always been concerned about security or safety - whether it is the security of the individual, family, clan, tribe, nation, region or the globe. People did feel insecure whether it was the state of nature as depicted by Hobbes in his Leviathan or the civil society as portrayed by Locke in his Treatise on Civil Society or of Rousseau's general will in his Social Contract. However, nations started realising the gravity of the security problems and the issue came to be debated freely in the academic circles only in the period following the Second World War. Moreover, the process of decolonisation which led to the freeing of several nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America from the clutches of serfdom, also pinpointed the need for an ever-growing concern of the security problems on the part of modern nation States. Several of them, America being the pioneer, recognised the development of national security as a separate academic discipline.<sup>1</sup> To achieve this end the US Congress passed in 1947 the National Security Act.

### 2.1 Definitions of National Security

Different writers have defined national security differently. Broadly speaking there are two definitions - conventional and modern. In conventional terminology, national security means the protection of territorial integrity.<sup>2</sup> Micheal Louw also defines

- 
1. Micheal Louw, National Security : A Modern Approach (Pretoria, 1978), p.12.
  2. P.S. Jayaramu, India's National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1987), p.2.

national security as the condition of freedom from external physical threat<sup>3</sup>. Thus conceived, it is the function of the defence policy of the country to promote national security by acquiring military hardware and building up the defence forces of the country.

According to Walter Lippman, "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able if challenged to maintain them by war".<sup>4</sup> The definitions of Micheal Louw and Walter Lippman treat the use of physical violence or force from outside as the real and potential danger to the survival of the state. Because of the vast vicissitudes and complexities in the arena of international politics in the twentieth century nations no longer fear or have to make use of the physical force. In the presence of the nuclear weapons and missiles the use of physical force has become irrelevant and meaningless. Therefore, these definitions are considered to be outdated and narrow.

The implications of security today have changed. It implies not only the preservation of the prevailing political and economic systems but also the maintaining of position of dominance and superiority that a nation has come to occupy among the community

---

3. Micheal Louw, n.1, p.12.

4. Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy : Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943), p.5.



of nations and the advancement of its cherished values and traditions. For instance, the United States gave up its traditional policy of isolationism, and joined the camp of the Allied Powers not to defend its territorial integrity but to guard the western political institutions and economic set-up and the values of democracy and freedom which were under fierce attack by the Axis powers. As Orvik has pointed out, "if there were no threats to national values and institutions, security would be a matter of course".<sup>5</sup>

While defining national security certain writers have stressed the part played by the national governments in creating an environment instrumental in maintaining and promoting its cherished values. They are of the opinion that the national governments are solely responsible for this. Thus, Frank Traeger and Frank Simonie have defined national security as "that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries".<sup>6</sup>

All the above definitions, however, are based upon the assumption that threats to a nation's security emerge only from

- 
5. Nils Orvik, "Threat : Problems of Analysis", International Journal (Toronto), Vol. 26, No.4, Autumn 1971, p.675.
  6. Frank N. Traeger and Frank T. Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security", (quoted by P.S. Jayaramu in his India's National Security and Foreign Policy, p.5).

the external environment. But what about threats that emanate from within? The scourge of modern-day politics has led to political instability, gaping economic disparities, regional imbalances in development and cultural, linguistic and ethnic conflicts on a vast scale. A nation, therefore, is said to enjoy security only when economically and technologically it is on sound footing, politically stable and socially and culturally a cohesive unit.

While World War-II was responsible for streamlining the concept of national security, the Cold War that followed threw further light on it. The big powers got entangled in the regional conflicts of Korea and Vietnam far away from home in order to maintain their dominance over the world system, which also meant their desire to protect their economic system and spread their social and political value systems. In the contemporary nuclear age, force as an instrument of solving the security problems has become futile and the chances of nuclear war have receded. The importance of non-military and diplomatic methods in tackling security problems has increased a great deal.

According to Robert McNamara "Security is not military hardware though it may include it, security is not military force though it may encompass it, security is development and without development there is no security."<sup>7</sup> This developmentalist aspect

---

7. Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security (London, 1968) quoted by P.S. Jayaramu, no.2, p.5

of national security was recognised by the United Nations in its twenty fifth session of the General Assembly in 1970, which also passed a resolution calling for "eliminating as far as possible the economic gap between developed and developing countries, which is closely and essentially co-related to the strengthening of the security of all nations and the establishing of lasting international peace".<sup>8</sup> A group of government experts appointed by the General Secretary of UNO in 1983 for a comprehensive study of the concepts of security has also given a similar definition: "Security is a condition in which states consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressures or economic coercion so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress".<sup>9</sup>

K. Subrahmanyam who was the Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, further clarifies : "National Security does not merely mean safeguarding territorial integrity. It means also ensuring that the country is industrialised rapidly and has a cohesive, egalitarian and technological society. Anything which comes in the way of this development internally or externally

---

8. K.P. Misra, "The Concept of Security", India International Centre Quarterly, (New Delhi), vol.3, No.2, January 1976, p. 88.

9. U.N. Publication, No.14, on Disarmament, Study Series, Concepts of Security, p.2

is a threat to (India's) national security".<sup>10</sup>

The above definition, though made with reference to India, holds true of the conditions prevailing in a very large number of the Third World countries.

National security depends upon several factors such as the resource position in oil, coal, iron, military strength, nuclear power and the ecological imbalances. It is also significantly affected by the natural threats such as floods, earthquakes, lack of rainfall, diseases etc.

The concept of national security is a complex and comprehensive one. That is the reason Arnold Wolfers has described the concept as an "ambiguous symbol".<sup>11</sup>

#### Components of National Security

In the end we can sum up as to what national security comprises of. It has the following components :-

- (a) Preserving the territorial integrity of the country against external threat or attack;

---

10. K. Subrahmanyam, Our National Security (Delhi, 1972), p.vii, See also Rajendra Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age (Bareilly, 1988), p.1. "National Security encompasses questions like protection of the perennial values of a nation, and of advancing them, if possible, besides the physical security of her citizens; and securing economic and technological progress in a stable socio-political milieu".

11. Arnold Wolfers, National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol in his ed., Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962).

- (b) preservation and perpetuation of the kind of constitutional and political order that a country has given to itself;
- (c) maintenance and furtherance of the economic system in operation followed by an all-round development of the country in Science and technology; and
- (d) promotion of values that a country cherishes and professes like universal disarmament, world government and so on.<sup>12</sup>

## 2.2 Different Concepts of Security

The study of security whether national, regional or global will be incomplete unless we try to clearly understand the different circumstances or factors that have led to its evolution. International security which is the sum total of the security of all nations is only a matter of degree. In fact, the security of a nation also implies security or insecurity of some other nation or nations.

Several major developments in the field of international relations have contributed to the evolution of the concept of security. Besides the traditional use of force developments in science and technology and military strategy have vastly increased the dangers of nuclear warfare. New weapons system and technologies such as anti-satellite systems, laser and particle-beam weapons and large range cruise missiles have significantly changed the military relations among major powers. Moreover, the international diffusion of advanced military technologies and military capabilities has enhanced the dangers of war all the more.

---

12. See P.S. Jayaramu, n.2 p.4.

In addition to the above deteriorating military developments, there are serious new challenges to global, political and economic problems. The emergence of new centres of political and economic power, resource scarcities, trade deficits, financial debts, over-population and threats posed by natural calamities and environmental degradation have combined to create hitherto unforeseen problems in the period following the Second World War. As said by the Secretary General they have placed the world on the thin margin between catastrophe and survival.<sup>13</sup> The shadow of nuclear war has given a historically unprecedented and urgent dimension to the concerns for security, national or global.

At the same time when the consequences of nuclear war and the dangers of instability are greater than ever, so also are the potential rewards of cooperation and mutual understanding. Thus, the conditions that pose new threats also provide the incentive to search for new means of attaining security, new efforts to build a more stable world capable of accommodating global change peacefully, achieving arms reduction and disarmament, enhancing respect for sovereignty and human rights, and solving economic problems.

The different security concepts which have evolved over a period of time are dealt with hereunder one by one.

---

13. "Disarmament : SSOD II, a Review", Fact Sheet No.26, (New York, 1982), p.1.

A. Concept of Balance of Power

In the field of international relations Balance of Power may be described as a system or an arrangement among states whereby they, in the absence of a higher authority regulating relations among them, seek to protect themselves from the possible risk of an attack upon them. It has often tended to produce offsetting coalitions against emerging concentrations of power anywhere in the world. Security is sought to be maintained by achieving equivalence of power among rival states or group of rival nations or by avoiding preponderance of power by any nation or group of nations.

The concept of Balance of Power had its heyday in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is, however, based on the use of force to be displayed through military alliances among different states. It encouraged territorial annexations in Europe and imperial expansion in the regions of the developing countries. The post-war alliance system has failed to eliminate the essential dilemma of security in the nuclear age dominated by two super powers.<sup>14</sup>

B. Concept of Deterrence

Deterrence is a security concept whose objective is to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating war, by threatening the use of force in order to either to deny an adversary from gaining his objectives by military means or to punish the adversary

---

14. Hans J. Morgenthau, Plitics Among Nations, 4th edn., (Calcutta, 1969) pp. 161-211.

should he seek to do so. In effect it seeks to persuade an adversary that the risks and costs of acts of aggression will exceed any gains that might be obtained from such acts. If war is not avoided, deterrence has failed.<sup>15</sup>

Although deterrence has been practised since earliest times and not recognised now by all the major powers yet it remains an important concept in the pursuit of national policies because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the growth in the size and destructive capacities of arsenals of conventional weapons. However, a distinction between conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence is made.<sup>16</sup>

C. Equal Security

Equal security is not a security concept but a principle for bilateral arms negotiations that parties may agree upon. For example, in a joint communique issued on 29 May 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union declared their intentions to limit strategic offensive arms "and to conduct their negotiations in a spirit of goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security". Critics, however, maintain that this principle does not apply to the security of medium-sized and small states because of wide disparities in their military capabilities.<sup>17</sup>

---

15. U.N. Publication, n.9, p.6.

16. Ibid, pp.6-8.

17. Ibid, pp.8-9.



D. Concept of Collective Security

The concept of collective security is based on a global commitment to international peace and security undertaken as a legal obligation of all nations. It is the first attempt to institutionalise and enforce the rule of international law to enhance the security of all nations. The international community, acting together, is committed to move promptly to encounter any act of aggression by one nation against another. However, the guarantee to collective security is subject to the veto power of all the five permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>18</sup>

E. Neutrality

Another method of promoting national security has been the pursuance of policies of staying outside military alliances. In strict usage, the term neutrality is applicable only in times of war, indicating the legal status of a state that has declared itself neutral in relation to the belligerents during armed hostilities. The rights and obligations of neutrals in times of war are laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and 1912. As long as a state acts in accordance with the international rules on neutrality, international law safeguards the status of neutrality. Switzerland, Norway and Sweden are neutral states.

---

18. Hans J. Morgenthau, n. 14, pp.397-409.

The pursuit of a policy of neutrality aims at ensuring the security of neutral countries in accordance with their national interests. One basic feature of a security based on neutrality is that it is not offensive. The military forces of neutral countries are meant for keeping the commitment to uphold their neutral status in war. The neutral states have substantially contributed to easing international tensions and antagonisms in their regions and on a larger scale.<sup>19</sup>

F. Non-Alignment

Non-alignment is not merely a policy of governments but also a movement of the peoples of non-aligned countries. A number of newly independent nations emerged in the post-war era. During the same period the power and rivalry of military alliances also increased. In this climate of the Cold War, it was only natural that non-aligned nations should get together to protect themselves from its consequences. They did not wish to take sides in a conflict from which they had little to gain and much to lose. The realisation of this common danger persuaded them to co-ordinate their perceptions and policies on a more regular basis. Non-alignment may be seen as a response not only to the Cold War that characterised the period after the second World War but also to the challenges of the process of decolonisation, particularly in Africa.

---

19. Bauripada Bhattacharya, Pursuit of National Interests through Neutralism : India's Foreign Policy in the Nehru Era (Calcutta, 1978), p.34-69.

In addition to the political aspect of non-alignment, the economic factor constituted one of the main motive forces and later became the strongest motive that impelled the non-aligned countries to co-operation and joint action. More recently, the movement has become a forum for promotion the new international order based on equality, co-operation and independence. It has thus made several contributions to the cause of international security.<sup>20</sup>

#### G. Peaceful Co-existence

Since the first world, the concept of peaceful existence has been put forth as a fundamental norm in international relations. In the light of the complexity of the contemporary world, with some 160 independent countries of different peoples, language, culture, customs, ideology, political institutions and socio-economic systems, the idea of peaceful co-existence is designed to accommodate the perceivable conflicts and contending interests among states. Peaceful co-existence is not intended to mean just passive co-existence, but also active cooperation and understanding among all states on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.<sup>21</sup>

---

20. U.N. Publication, n.9, pp.10-12. For details see Mishra, K.P., India's Policy of Non-alignment.

21. U.N. Publication, n.9, p.13.

H. Common Security

The idea of common security was put forward in the report of the independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (A/C N.10/38 and Corr.1). The Commission stated that "a doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction".

The commission began with the premise that threats to security - the conventional and nuclear arms races, resources shortages, environmental degradation, underdevelopment - are threats that nations increasingly have in common, and that solution should therefore be sought in common. As the commission reported, the key to security lies in the willingness of nations to organise their security policies in co-operation with each other.

The commission recommended that the process of co-operation begin with relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and their alliance systems, in particular, with negotiations over conventional and nuclear arms limitation and with policies to encourage rapprochement and normalisation of relations between the Super - Powers.<sup>22</sup>

22. Ibid., pp.13-14.

DISS  
355.033054  
B53 Na



TH3099



TH-3099

### 2.3 National Security vis-a-vis National Interests

The main objective of the foreign policy of a country is to articulate the national interests. Since Jawaharlal Nehru was the chief architect of the foreign policy of India let us see as to how he conceived of the national interests of India. Even before independence it was Nehru as the unofficial spokesman of the Congress who made his colleagues "to realize that the Indian struggle for freedom was actually a part of a global struggle and that it could be made to succeed only if geared into the context of international developments."<sup>23</sup> According to Michael Brecher, a famous Nehru biographer, Nehru prevented the movement from becoming narrowly egocentric.<sup>24</sup> Nehru as the first prime minister of India was assisted by a few able men, particularly Krishna Menon, who formulated essential ideas about India's national interests.<sup>25</sup> Brecher described Menon as "the adjunct Minister of External Affairs" and Nehru's deputy for all purposes. The National Interests of India as conceived by Nehru in his speeches can broadly be classified as specific interests and general interests. They can be clubbed together as below :-

1. A certain dilution of nationalism with internationalism or rational nationalism;

---

23. Willard Range, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), p.42.

24. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London, 1969) p.616.

25. Ibid., pp.569-77.

2. peace and prevention of war;
3. disarmament;
4. economic development;
5. racial equality;
6. anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism;
7. Preservation of peace;
8. independence of thought, policy and action, and
9. non-aggression.<sup>26</sup>

It seems rather surprising that national security as a national interest never figures in the speeches of Nehru. It is only in the context of certain geographical territories that India's policy makers did think seriously about national security. The joint proclamation of Panch Sheel (Five Principles of peaceful co-existence) by India and People's Republic of China in April 1954 over Tibet was a proof of India's preoccupation with the problem of national security. But why this discrepancy between articulation and action? This may be due to the realization on the part of Nehru and his advisers that national security was a problem too concrete and specific to be talked in terms of more abstraction. Also, although it may be traditional for most of the nations especially of the west, to think that the road to peace may lie through security. But in the Indian case

---

26. Sauripada Bhattacharya, n.19, pp.34-69.

with a world radically, transformed with her particular brand of nationalism influenced by Gandhian pacifism and Tagorean internationalism, the road to security lies through peace (the doctrine of security through peace).<sup>27</sup>

It will, however, be interesting to note that Guy Wint, one of Britain's most perceptive students of the area, said as early as 1947 that independent India's principal foreign policy interests as determined by her geography would be :

1. The integrity, neutrality and possibly, alliance of all the border states from which India might be attacked - Persia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indo-China, Siam, Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia);
2. access to the oil of the Middle East, Burma at the Netherlands East Indies;
3. welfare of the Indian communities in these border countries and the promotion of Indian states;
4. safety of sea and air-routes in the Indian Ocean on which the security and commerce of India depend;

---

27. Ibid., pp.48-49.

5. the desire to play a great part in the external world in the affairs of the family of sovereign powers which is fitting to its own status, culture and past history.<sup>28</sup>

Guy Wint made the above prognosis when Great Britain was still in control of India, and the partition had not taken place.

#### 2.4 The Relationship Between National and International Security

The nexus between national and international security has become very close. The notion that security is primarily a function of national power or military and economic strength stands challenged. While seeking for solutions to the problem of insecurity, many nations find themselves confronted with situations beyond their direct control, such as a structural economic crisis and global economic, population, environmental and resource trends. All nations face universal threats posed by the nuclear arms race. Global interdependence has created a situation in which actions not only by major powers but also by other nations can have major regional or even international repercussions.

It is only by realising that security is not divisible, either in its military, economic, social and political dimensions

---

28. Guy Wint, The British in Asia (London, 1947), pp.108-09 as quoted by Sauripada Bhattacharya, n.19, pp.123-24.



or as between its national and international aspects. This calls for a comprehensive and cooperative approach to international security. The unchecked pursuit of national security interests at the cost of other nations is not conducive to international security and may even cause a havoc. With the existence of highly explosive armagadon of nuclear weapons such policies constitute a potential threat to the survival of mankind. It is therefore, an imperative necessity that nations take timely action to reconcile the contradictions between individual national security interests and the overall interest of international security and peace.

## 2.5 Instruments of National Security

National security ultimately depends upon national power. The factors that lead to the stren hening of national power also lead to the strengthening of national security. Another fact that is to be borne in mind is that security is no longer a purely military phenomenon. It is a comprehensive concept and has grown in its dimensions, entailing also political and economic aspects. Again national security can't be attained in isolation from the regional and global security. The vast change in our circumstances and the fast development of the nuclear weapons are responsible for this eventual inevitability. The nexus between national and international security has become

so close as to practically blot out the distinction between the two. Since it will neither be feasible nor advisable to go in for all the detailed of instruments of national security they will be alluded to briefly to serve our purpose. The elements of national power ensuring national security<sup>29</sup> :

1. Geography;
2. natural resources such as food, raw materials, such as minerals, oil, energy, neutrons, protons etc.;
3. industrial capacity;
4. military preparedness accompanied by quality and quantity of armed forces;
5. technology;
6. leadership;
7. population and its distribution;
8. national character and national morale;
9. quality of government; and
10. quality of diplomacy.

The above mentioned factors though briefly mentioned emphasise not only the military aspect of national security but

---

29. Hans J. Morgenthau, n.14, pp.97-139.

also underline the significance of economic as well as social and political elements of national security.<sup>30</sup>

---

30. Rajendra Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age (Bareilly, 1988), pp.194-214. See for details, see also Gordon, B. Turner and Richard D. Challener, editors, National Security in the Nuclear Age (London, 1960), pp.227-78 regarding Military Instruments of Security.

CHAPTER - III

INDIA'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF  
NATIONAL SECURITY DURING THE NEHRU ERA

### 3.1 Nature of Threat Perceptions

Since independence in 1947, Indian defence policy has pivoted around the prevailing security relationships within the important regional strategic triangle of India, Pakistan and China.<sup>1</sup> This regional strategic triangle continues to be linked to the global strategic relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The regional and global strategic relationships appear to conform to the Kautilyan Principle, "an enemy of my enemy is my friend". India's principal neighbours - Pakistan and China proved to be enemy states, while some of the neighbours of these neighbours - Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and Vietnam turned out to be friendly states whose policies against China or Pakistan were useful in drawing the Chinese or Pakistani threat away from India.

National security is inextricably linked with threat perception. The threat is determined not on the basis of the actuality but on the perception of the people in power. There might be an actual territorial threat from an outside power, specially an adversary neighbour. There is also the role of external powers in the affairs of a nation, through control, domination or interference. This generally depends on the nature of the relationship

---

1. Raju G.C. Thomas (Ed.) India: Balance Great Power Intrusion and Regional Security Interests (Lexington, 1983), pp.65-81.

between the external power and the nation concerned. According to K. Subramanyam, a specialist on security problems, anything that stands in the way of development internally or externally if constitutes a threat to (India's) national security.<sup>2</sup> The threats are so great or devastating that they might mean the end of the human race.

As against the present, the wars in the past were not so destructive and seldom took a very heavy toll of human life. The weapons used were primitive or less destructive and a smaller portion of a nation's human and material resources was mobilised for war. Technological changes were very few. But all this has changed vastly in the present situation. Armed conflicts in the different parts of the world, the use of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their proliferation threaten people everywhere, indiscriminately. Moreover, we are passing through an age of indispensable and complex interdependence in most of the areas. The mind of the modern man is wavering between peaceful accommodation and confrontation and seeking mutual survival. "The contemporary mind", says, Dr. S. Radha Krishnan, "is vacillating between vague apocalyptic fears and deep mystical yearnings".<sup>3</sup> We have grown in knowledge and intelligence but not in wisdom and virtue.

---

2. K. Subramanyam, Our National Security, (Delhi 1972), p.vii.

3. S.Radha Krishnan, Recovery of Faith, (Delhi, 1967), p.9.

For lack of the latter, all the powers we have developed are inter-locked in perpetual struggle. "There has never been", says Gen. J..C. Fuller, "a period in human history altogether free from war, and seldom one or more than a generation which has not witnessed a major conflict; great war flow and ebb almost as regularly as the tides".<sup>4</sup> Rajendra Prasad,<sup>5</sup> a reader in the Department of Defence Studies in the University of Gorakhpur (India) has identified the following threats :

1. The continuous growth in the potency and destructive power of weapons. This growth has caused uncontrolled arms race;
2. the development of two power blocs in which the United States and the Soviet Union each headed two separate blocs;
3. the growing tendency that there is no any distinction between military and civilian or between war and the home front;
4. the concotions prevailing between war and peace. Peace is now considered a concocted word in some

---

4. J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western world Vol.1, (London, 1954), p.xi.

5. Rajendra Prasad, India Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age (Bareilly, 1988), pp.25-26.

great countries. One's loyalty is suspected if one is so much as mentions peace. On the other hand there are other countries where peace is talked of so aggressively and in such defeating tones that it almost sounds like war. Peace is now spelt war. It combines too much importance to the power of arms and threats of war for the solution of international problems;

5. those who don't want to align themselves with either of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. blocs are constantly under pressure from the two blocs - each bloc wanting them at least to be sympathetic to it;
6. the transformation of the international system from bipolarity to some form of emerging multipolarity; and
7. international terrorism - a new mode of conflict.

In fact, the increased potency and destructiveness of war weapons in the possession of both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. have led some exponents to confess that a war would mean mutual suicide.<sup>6</sup> The deterrence of mutual annihilation acts as a grave

---

6. H.Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New York, 1969) p.9.



warning for both the Super Powers. But deterrence may also fail due to the danger of miscalculation, human irrationality and immature political leadership. According to Quincy Wright "Peace is an equilibrium among many forces. Change in any particular force, movement, or policy may at one time may create conditions of war, but under different circumstances a similar change may introduce conditions for peace."<sup>7</sup>

Although national survival is the prime concern of nations, big or small, their national powers, security problems are generally as follows :

1. Threats to the position of domination and hegemony they enjoy in the international system;
2. threats to the control and influence they wield over the decision-making process of regional powers and small powers;
3. threats to the ideology/value system they believe in and want to spread among nations in the international domain;
4. threats to their technological affluence and standards of living; and

---

7. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1969), p.351.

5. the security problems of their allies and alliance partners are also taken as threats to their own security.<sup>8</sup>

However, the arms race continues. The presence of political and ideological differences, economic interests, mutual fear and distrust etc. will ultimately lead to war. "History has a habit", says H. Kahn, of being richer and more ingenious than the limited imaginations of most scholars or laymen."<sup>9</sup> It may also be added that the fallacious theory of deterrence advocated by the suppliers of arms for peace has led to several wars due to the stock piling of lethal arms by nations confronting each other.

### 3.2 The Evolution of National Security During the Nehru Era

India occupies a strategic position in Central Asia lying on the periphery of the vast Pacific Ocean in the east fringed by the Persian Gulf and Muslim Powers in the West and Communist China on its north. In the Far East lies Japan which is doing magnificently well. There are 30 major nations and territories lying on the periphery of the Pacific - nine are located in North America, four in South America, twelve in Asia and twelve are major island nations which include Japan, Australia, Indonesia,

---

8. P.S. Jayaramu, India's National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1987), p.78.

9. Quincy Weight, n.7, p.137.

Newzealand and Phillipines. They include the world's three largest industrial countries, three nuclear powers, two of the richest nations and the third and fourth ranking countries in population. In fact, the Pacific nations, although occupy less than one fourth of the world's space, yet they contain more than half of the world's population. The Secretary of State in USA, John Hay, wrote in 1900, "The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic Ocean of the present and Pacific is the ocean of the future." Similarly, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk predicted in 1966 that future wars would be fought between Asians and not against or between Europeans.

The Indian ocean has started playing an important role in international trade, economy and cultural ties. The American and Western activities have increased. This is mirrored by the burgeoning expansions of naval installations by a number of countries of the CENTO and ANZUS having direct access to the Indian Ocean. Typical examples of such bases are the Chah Bahar and Bandar Abbas in South Iran and the Cockburn Sound base on the west coast of Australia. The United States is establishing a multipurpose cum multi-strategic complex in Diego Garcia, a British Island in the midst of the Indian Ocean. Besides electronic communications, aerodromes for strategic 525 bombers equipped with nuclear weapons and stations for nuclear powered aircraft-carriers and outmarine harbours have been established. The purpose behind

such constructions is to cover the Indian Ocean. And besides major naval exercises have been held by these countries in the Indian Ocean.<sup>10</sup>

There is a further reason for the existence of tension in Asia. The colossal poverty, illiteracy and backwardness of the mass vis-a-vis the more fortunate people of Europe and America are factors which make Asia a focal point of danger. The annual per capital income of East and South Asia barring Japan is as low as 19 dollars against the world's average of 540 dollars.

The leaders of South and South-East Asian countries, which emerged from colonialism, in the forties of the present century mirrored emotionalism in their foreign policies. President Sukarno of Indonesia and U. Nu of Burma often voiced their sentiments in their speeches. Prime Minister Nehru was one of the Asian leaders who had maintained contacts with international affairs during the country's freedom struggle. His approach to global problems at anti-colonial meets was realistic at times and admitted in a speech, "There is a great deal of talk of Asia being a unit. Asia is in a sense a geographical unit, has been unit in many other ways but in the main it was a unit in a negative sense; that is to say, practically all of Asia became the colonial dominion

---

10. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, India's Security in Resurgent Asia, (New Delhi, 1969), pp.236-42.

of various European powers. It was a unit in that sense; a colonial dominion where people were struggling for freedom against European imperialism; it was a unit because of these struggles and a certain commonness of purpose. But there is, at the same time, a great deal of diversity. It is not generally correct to think of Asia as a compact unit." He, however, emotionally interpreted India's role in world affairs by stating: "The emergence of India in world affairs is something of major consequence in world history; India is going a great giant again..." He stated in his speech in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1949: "India is so situated as to be the pivot of Asia" and asserted "when we talk of Asia, remember that India, not because of any ambition of her, because of force of circumstances, because of geographical use of history and because of many other things, inevitably has to play a very important part in Asia." Brecher in his political biography has correctly assessed Nehru's role in India's foreign affairs. He stated "In no other state does one man dominate foreign policy as he does in India. Indeed so overwhelming is his influence that India's policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of Pt. Nehru. And justifiably so, for Nehru is the philosopher, architect, the engineer and voice of his country's foreign policies towards outside world."<sup>11</sup>

The basic objective of the foreign policy of each country

---

11. Ibid., pp.243-44.

is the preservation of its territorial integrity, maintenance of its political independence and attainment of a reasonable standard of living for its people. The national security must be assured either through peaceful means or by resorting to war if necessary. We must observe how far the Indian leadership during the Nehru era from 1947 or even earlier to 1964 when Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, left us for the heavenly abode, succeeded in guarding the security of the nation.

#### India and South-East Asia

The Indian leadership during the Nehru era viewed foreign policy through the global periscope rather than following a more realistic or practical regional approach to make it safe from foreign interference. The assigning of low priority to its immediate neighbours in South and South-East Asia led to the neglect of far reaching economic and political changes. The security of the countries in South and South-East Asia to India is no less important than her own. The geographical situation demands that India should be more interested in her neighbours, particularly because of her economic stakes, being herself a major economic power in the region. Nehru realised this fact much later that her economic, cultural and political cohesion with her neighbours was more important than serving grandiloquent sermons on global matters. This he admitted in a letter to the Chief Ministers on 30 December 1955 when he wrote that "a country like Nepal,

although weak is most important to us in the long run than some distant country, however, big or powerful it might be." He added, "geography leads to closer contact with neighbouring countries, unless there are very significant reasons to the contrary.."

Although culturally, socially and economically India and Sri Lanka had most intimate contacts yet Nehru made no attempt to fill the power vacuum by backing Sri Lanka when the British granted independence to that country. Similarly, India turned a blind eye on Burma despite its strategic location in South-East Asia. India did not provide economic or political aid during its crucial post-independent era. When Burma became the victim of Chinese aggression in its post-independent era, India did not lift its finger to render assistance. This also holds true of the rest of South-East Asia which is of immense strategic importance to India. This region is a major producer of rice, rubber, tin ore, sugar, copra, coconut oil etc. India left the region in the cold despite several opportunities. Nehru was, however, forced to take up the Indonesian cause against Dutch colonialism. Despite his espousal for the Asian cause Nehru did not lay stress on the creation of a "Peace or Security Zone" in the region around India.

Nehru even did not intervene in Indo-China despite the persuasion of the delegation of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

to accord recognition to the government by sponsoring Indo-China issue at the United Nations. India's posture towards Indo-China was possibly hinged on her 1954 policy to extend non-alignment and peace in South East Asia in cooperation with China. India's diplomatic intervention in 1954 for evolving a settlement in Indo-China was sound, but her expectations that the Geneva settlement would bring lasting peace in Indo-China was believed due to expansionist designs of China. India's ineptitude to have acted more dynamically in the fluid situation prevailing in Indo-China was heart rendering as she could have easily contributed towards consolidation of the independence, solidarity and neutrality of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and the two parts of Vietnam. India was the Chairman of the International Supervisory Commission in each of the three states of Indo-China.

The policy adopted by Nehru was only beneficial to China. Brecher aptly comments on Nehru's latent policy when he writes, "this striving lacuna was evident in Nehru's view of the world as well. It was reflected in India's policy of inaction and indifference in the region during the fifteen years following her initiative in the Dutch-Indonesia colonial struggle at the Delhi Conference of 1949. No efforts for regional integration worthy of the name were made by India. In short, Southern Asia was a backwater for India's foreign policy. And the key to that policy vacuum was precisely the vacuum in Nehru's and Menon's image of



the region as part of India's external environment.<sup>12</sup>

Nehru firmly believed that India's size, geostrategic location and historical traditions entitled her to a leading role in Asian and world affairs. As Nehru said :

"India is curiously placed in Asia and her history has been governed a great deal by the geographical factor plus other factors. Whichever problem in Asia you may take up, some how or the other India comes into the picture. Whether you think in terms of China or Middle East or South East Asia, india immediately comes into the picture. It is so situated that because of past history, traditions etc. in regard to any major problems of a country or groups of countries of Asia, India has to be considered whether it is a problem of defence or trade or economic policy. India cannot be ignored".<sup>13</sup>

India's policy during the early years of the cold war in essence that India was trying to act as a balance in world affairs. The offer of a no-war agreement to Pakistan in 1949 and its renewal in subsequent years, the offer again to accept a division

---

12. Michael Brecher, India and world politics : Krishna Menon's view of the world, (London, 1968), p.325.

13. Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Speeches, Vol.1, September, 1946 to May 1949, (New Delhi, 1958), Edn.2, p.253.

of Kashmir on the basis of the existing cease-fire line the interest of Indo-Pak, the Panchsheel agreement with China in 1954, the premium on diplomatic negotiations for settlement of the border dispute with China even after the situation had worsened in 1959 and finally the acceptance of Colombo proposals after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 - as the basis of the resolution of the importance Nehru attached to diplomacy as a means of settling disputes and promoting national security.

#### Doctrine of Non-Alignment

The major challenge to Indian security during the Nehru era came from the politics of cold war. For a country which has just then attained nationhood, preservation of Independence and its use both in thought and behaviour was the most natural and cardinal objective. The cold war with its bloc politics threatened to take away that India was either to accept a policy of alignment, join one of the power blocs and thus be under its protective umbrella or adopt an independent non-aligned foreign policy and stay away from bloc politics. The former i.e. the policy of alignment was ruled out because that would lead India giving up its identity and the right to judge issues of international politics on the merits of the case and more so within the framework of India's own national interests.

Non-alignment above was therefore the viable foreign policy strategy for India. In his broadcast to the nation on 7 September

1946, Nehru laid down the fundamentals of India's foreign policy.

"We propose as far as possible to keep away from the politics of groups, aligned against one another which have led in the past to disasters. We shall take part in international conferences as free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation".<sup>14</sup>

Thus, India gained a certain position and acceptability from the role it played as a mediator channel of communication and peace keeper in crises, without in any way compromising on its non-aligned position.

### 3.3 Pakistani Threat and India's Security

The more specific and serious threat comes from the immediate neighbour Pakistan. With regard to Pakistan there has always been an ingrained hostility mutual suspicion and distrust. The Pakistani threat during the Nehru era was multi-dimensional nature i.e. territorial, ideological and politico-strategic.

It is noteworthy though not unexpected that Indian and Pakistani defence programmes have tended to be mirror images of each other. This results in part from the traditional Indian

---

14. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 April 1961 (New Delhi, 1946), p.2.

response to the Pakistani threat, which was based on the principle of "matching capabilities" through the 1950s and much of the 1960s.<sup>15</sup> Both the Indian and Pakistani armies improved the teeth-to-tail ratio of their infantry divisions and reconstituted them in smaller numbers. There are other factors contributing to the threats and counter threats perceived by two sub-continental neighbours. External arms races have become interlocked with the Indo-Pakistani arms race. The politics of cold war and the attendant arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the later concurrent Sino-Soviet struggle for security, have produced efforts by the United States, the Soviet Union and China to draw India and Pakistan into their security plans.

Pakistan's persistent efforts to alter the balance of power in the sub-continent also refused to by some writers as altering the status quo.<sup>16</sup> By attaining parity with India and measure of success it achieved after joining the U.S. sponsored alliance system led to a heightening of the Pakistani threat to India. Also by joining the alliances system, Pakistan brought the Cold War to the sub-continent an eventuality Nehru tried hard to avert. Geoffrey Hudson, an eminent analyst of foreign policies, wrote, "antipathy to Pakistan is the pivot of India's foreign

---

15. Babani Sen Gupta, Nuclear Weapons? (New Delhi, 1983), pp.31-32.

16. Sisir Gupta, "India's Policy Towards Pakistan", International Studies, Vol.8 nos.1-2, July-October, 1966.

policy. India would be genuinely neutral in the Cold War as long as Pakistan was also unattached by any alignment of Pakistan with either bloc was likely to push India in the opposite direction. Had Pakistan turned towards Russia - as a faction in Karachi advocated - India would have moved to the side of the West. But as it was Pakistan which became a recipient of American military aid and signatory of the Manila Treaty. India became responsible to Moscow's approach."

#### Kashmir Issue

India and Pakistan were locked in a conflict resulting from an invasion of the Kashmir valley, on 22 October 1947, by armed tribesmen from the North-West of Pakistan. That the government of Pakistan was behind the invasion has been substantiated by the official sources in the government of India and corroborated by Western observers.<sup>17</sup> Kashmir became a nexus in India's security is evident from what Nehru told constituent Assembly. We have only two objectives in the Jammu Kashmir state: to ensure the freedom and progress of the people there and to prevent anything happening that might endanger the security of India. If these two objectives are assured to us, we are content.<sup>18</sup>

---

17. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi, 1966), p.116.

18. P.S. Jayaramu, n.8, p.20.

Finally when the crisis ended, Pakistan was in possession of about 5,000 sq. miles of Indian territory is what has come to be known as "Azad Kashmir". Since then Pakistan has not only consolidated its position in the region but brought in China into the picture by entering into a boundary agreement with that country (1963) Pakistani's rejection of the No-War Agreement (December 1949) and the blatantly pro-Pakistani stance of the Western Powers, specially Britain and the United States, led to a heightening of India's security concerns. The perception that Pakistan buttressed by Western military aid was a great threat to India's security was succinctly summed up by Krishna Menon when he said: "There is no Pakistan plus the United States so far as the Indo-Pakistan issue is concerned".<sup>19</sup> Nehru also told the Parliament: "All this arming of Pakistan is a matter of concern to us because the quint-essence of hatred for India plus accumulation of arms may lead to bad results."<sup>20</sup>

India oriented its foreign policy towards seeking friendship with the communist countries, the signing of Panchsheel Agreement with China in 1954 and the strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era stand out in this regard and succeeded in preserving the status quo in Kashmir speaks over

---

19. Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishan Menon's View of World Politics (London, 1968), p.201.

20. Jawaharlal Nehru, n.25, p.96.

all success of its foreign policy strategy in meeting the Pakistani threat.

### 3.4 The Chinese Challenge and India's Security Policy

Here we only attempt to analyse the manner in which the Chinese threat was perceived and responded to by the Indian policy makers. It needs to be emphasised that while the broader and general nature of the Chinese challenge was very well perceived by Nehru. Although he failed to perceive a military confrontation between India and China. While briefing D.R. Mankekar before his visit to China in 1954, Nehru said:

"Someday or the other, these two Asian giants are bound to tread on each other's corns and come into conflict and that would be a calamity for Asia. This is an eventuality we should all strive hard to avert."<sup>21</sup>

Nehru was aware of the nationalistic arrogance and the inherent expansionist tendencies of the Chinese people and the possible impact on India's Security; Articulating this perception, he told the Lok Sabha: "Ever since the Chinese Revolution we naturally had to think of what the new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution was going to be a very big factor

---

21. D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay, 1968), p. 110.

in Asia, in the world and in regard to us. We realised that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout the history that had been the case...We realised the danger to India... As the years have gone by, this fear has become more and more apparent and obvious. If any person imagines that we have followed our policy without realising the consequences, he is mistaken."<sup>22</sup> Such was also the perception of Krishna Menon, Defence Minister and an important participant in the Indian Security decision-making group. Menon told Micheal Brecher once that "at no time there was an indication that China would wage war against India."

In spite of such a clear understanding of the Chinese mind and behaviour, Nehru failed to perceive the possibilities of the Chinese threat manifesting itself in the form of a military confrontation between the two countries. This was undoubtedly a great error in Nehru's threat perception.

It is clear that the foremost objective of India's China policy was to have a friendly and peaceful relationship with that country. The imperatives of such a policy were :

1. Nehru's admiration of the Chinese people and their achievements;
2. the place that China occupied in Nehru's worldview;

---

22. Jawaharlal Nehru, n; 25. p.369.



3. the need for Chinese support in building an area of peace and Asian solidarity; and

4. finally, its security rationale, i.e. Nehru thought that a militarily weak India was not in a position to protect and preserve its security if it had to face two enemies on its borders - Pakistan and China.<sup>23</sup> It is in this light that we have to understand Nehru's policy reactions to the Chinese takeover of Tibet, his decision to sign the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, his approach to the border dispute, and finally his decision not to re-occupy Longju after the Chinese took over and vacated it in 1959. Nehru's soft policy of not seeking the occupation of Longju by the Indian forces, Krishna Menon's revelations to Brecher that "even at that time we did not think China would invade us" point to the serious weakness in India's military policy towards China, leave alone the failures in threat perception. This was because Nehru continued to treat - even as late as 1959 - the security issue within the broader framework of Sino Indian friendship. This is clear from one of his policy statements made after the Tibetan uprising of March 1959, to quote him:

"We have to keep various factors in view, the major factor being, of course, our own security. After all every Government's duty is to protect its country in every way. The second factor is our desire to have and continue to have friendly relations with China. The third factor is our

---

23. P.S. Jayaraman, n.8, p. 25.

strong feeling about development in Tibet. Now and sometimes there is a contradiction in these. That is inevitable. One has, therefore, insofar as one can, to balance, adjust and sometimes make difficult choices."<sup>24</sup>

It was only the border war of 1962 that awakened Nehru to the errors in his perception of threat from china. The defeat that the Indian armed forces suffered in the hands of the Chinese led him to realise the limitations of an approach that laid stress on diplomacy per se in managing threats to national security, the setting up of a MIG-factory in 1963, the inauguration of the defence plan in 1964, the adoption of a nuclear option strategy. At the sametime, India continued its diplomatic efforts to ease security tension in the sub-continent.

To sum up, India's attitude in terms of her national security - the main threat was mainly from Pakistan. There could have been no solution on Kashmir. It had reached a stage of status-quo. With regard to China, it was seen as a problem but not an immediate one, till 1962.

---

24. Girilal Jain, Panchasheel and After (Bombay, 1960), p.127.

CHAPTER - IV

INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT

One of the important means of ensuring world peace and security of nations is Disarmament. Disarmament is a moral one and traced back India's attitudes towards the Emperor Ashoka's philosophy of peace and morality as described in Rock Edict XIII.

"King Priyadarshi considers moral conquest, that is conquest by Dharma, the most important conquest, This edict on Dharma has been inscribed so that my sons and grandsons, who may come after me, should not think new conquests worth achieving. Let them consider moral conquest as the only true conquest".<sup>1</sup>

The Supreme need of the hour is to banish war and preserve peace and the philosophy of moral conquest governed India's attitude towards the problem of disarmament. The pursuit of peaceful co-existence was possible not by waging war but by taking steps that would lessen the chances of war and lead to mutual trust and confidence.

The horrors of war and the destructive capability of modern weapons after the Hiroshima (on 6 August 1945) tragedy made the people of the World to think in terms of disarmament the Government of India also adopted a well defined and systematic policy towards disarmament and attached the highest importance to it. This is evident from the following statement by Prime Minister Nehru, speaking to the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) he said:

---

1. Ashwani Kumar Chopra. India's Policy on Disarmament (New Delhi, 1984), p.7.

"In regard to foreign affairs, the most important thing today is disarmament, looking at it from the world point of view because, if there is no disarmament, the world will naturally drift more and more towards conflict, towards war, and undoubtedly if there is war, it will be a nuclear war, and a possible war like that brought on without even a declaration of war"<sup>2</sup>

A nuclear war did not present the possibility of either a victory or a defeat. It only present the possibility of complete destruction. Nehru also was quite categorical about the importance of disarmament for saving humanity from total destruction. As he put it:

"The question of disarmament is more important than any other problem, internal and external, national or international, because it is a national problem, apart from being an international one. The whole future survival of India and every Indian depends upon it"<sup>3</sup>

#### 4.1 Concept of Disarmament

The Soviet Union and the United States have created samantic confusion by using the words "disarmament" and "arms control"

- 
2. Eithteen Nation Committee on Disarmament ENDC/PV5, 20 March 1962, p.34.
  3. A.K. Chopra, n.2, p.14.

interchangeably. The UN charter also talks more in terms of limitation or regulation of armaments. Article 47 of the charter qualifies its use of the term "disarmament" by adding the "possible".<sup>4</sup> Disarmament should be general, that is, it should include all states. It should also be complete, that is, it should cover all weapons and systems. Speaking before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, India's Krishna Menon said:-

"Today, disarmament has become not a question of reducing armaments by 10%, 15%, 20% or 25%. If this basic fear remains it does not matter how much you reduce it because it does not require, as figures are given, the thousand of nuclear bombs possessed by nuclear powers a quarter of them are enough to wipe off the world or the other country. So the only answer to armament and menace of war is total disarmament. there is no way of mending this situation but only of ending"<sup>5</sup>

Speaking before the first committee of the General Assembly on 2 November 1959, India's representative, Krishna Menon, strongly supported the Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament and said:

---

4. ENDC/PV5, 20 March, 1962 p.26.

5. India Lok Sabha Debates, 23 Nov 1960, pp.1937-40

"The only choice was between general and complete disarmament, which would free from the world from the fear of war and limited disarmament which would inevitably lead to the kind of re-armament which the world had experienced after the World War".<sup>6</sup>

So far as India is concerned, disarmament meant elimination of all national military forces, leaving each country with nothing more than the domestic police or militia. "Disarmament" is a comprehensive and universal term. It applied to conventional, nuclear, and other weapons of war-fare, it included all kinds of armed forces and all nations. It called for elimination of the war making capacity of all nations on earth. Disarmament meant an entirely new situation, i.e. a world without war where armament could be abandoned altogether<sup>7</sup>.

Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of certain or all armaments for the purpose of ending the arms race. For a clear understanding of the term disarmament, according to Morgenthau three basic distinctions must be kept in mind. The distinction between disarmament and arms control, the distinction between general and local disarmament and the distinction between quantitative and qualitative disarmament. While disarmament is the reduc-

---

6. ENDC/PV 30, 3 May 1962, p.27

7. A.K. Chopra, n.1, p.15.

tion or elimination of armaments, arms control is concerned with regulating the armaments race for the purpose of creating a measure of military stability.<sup>8</sup> When we speak of general disarmament, we refer to a kind of disarmament in which all the nations concerned participate. For example, the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments of 1922, signed by all major naval powers and the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, at which practically all the members of the community of nations were represented. We speak of local disarmament when only a limited number of nations are involved. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 between the United States and Canada is an example of this type. Quantitative disarmament aims at an overall reduction of armaments of most or all types. This was the goal of most nations represented at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932. Qualitative disarmament envisages the reduction or abolition of only certain special types of armaments, such as the aggressive weapons. Great Britain tried to have outlawed by the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, or atomic weapons, the suppression of which was discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations.

#### 4.2 Origin and Development of Disarmament

The history of the origin of disarmament, though very old, yet the first practical step in favour of disarmament to

---

8. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Calcutta, 1969), p.375.



ensure international peace and order, which was taken up by world statesman coincided with the beginning of the era of international relations. In 1816, the Czar of Russia proposed to the British government the "the simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of every kind". The British monarch replied by suggesting the implementation of the Russian proposal in the form of an international conference where the military representatives of all powers should determine the respective strength of the armies of each power. Austria and France expressed their sympathies, with the proposal, which, however, was not given serious thought by any one of the governments, and did not produce any practical results.

In 1831, the French government made similar proposals to the representatives of the great powers. These proposals were favourably received, but nothing more was heard of them. The same must be said of the proposals Napoleon III made in 1863, 1867, and 1869 for a general reduction of armaments. In 1870, immediately before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, Great Britain, on the instigation of France, twice approached the Prussian governments on the question of the reduction of armaments, but without success. Another such approach, this time undertaken by Italy in 1877, was similarly rejected by Germany. The first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 had as one of its main purposes the limitation of armaments and of military budgets. It was attended by

the representatives of twenty eight nations, among them all the major powers. The results of the deliberations of the Conference with regard to disarmament are embodied in two resolutions that speak for themselves. The Committee in which deliberations took place declared that it was 'of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.'<sup>9</sup> The full Conference is adopting this resolution expressed "the wish that the governments taking into consideration the proposals made at the Conference may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets".

The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, attended by forty-four nations, confirmed "the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure, and in as much as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the governments should resume the serious examination of this question"<sup>10</sup>. The President of the Conference, the Russian delegate, summed up the efforts of both conferences with regard to disarmament by thus commenting on this resolution: "If the question was not in 1899, it is not

---

9. James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Conference: The Conference of 1899 (New York, 1920), p.390.

10. Ibid., The Conference of 1907, Vol.1, pp.89-90.

been possible to do anything on these lines, and the Conference to-day finds itself as little prepared to enter upon them as in 1899".<sup>11</sup>

The treaty of Versailles took another step towards disarmament as a means of general pacification by stipulating a drastic limitation of the armaments of all nations. Articles of the covenant of the League of Nations more specifically declared "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations". It charged the Council of the League of Nations with the formulation of plans for such reduction. In pursuance of these stipulations, the council established in 1925 a Preparatory commission plans were submitted to a World Disarmament Conference. Its tentative and incomplete conclusions were submitted to a World Disarmament Conference, which was convened at Geneva in 1932. With the withdrawal of Germany in October 1933, the Conference virtually died. Its general commission met for the last time in 1934. The World Disarmament Conference was an unmitigated failure, unable to reach formal agreements of any kind.

These efforts at general disarmament were interrupted by the second world war. The Charter of the United Nations took

---

11. Ibid., p.92

up where the covenant of the League of Nations had left off. According to Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter, "The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both." Article 26 of the Charter provides that "in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

In pursuance of these provisions of the Charter, the General Assembly created, through its resolution of January 24, 1946 an Atomic Energy Commission to make specific proposals "for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purpose; for the major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."<sup>12</sup> With regard to so-called "Conventional" armaments, the General Assembly passed on December 14, 1946, a resolution on "Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments."<sup>13</sup> In it the General Assembly recognised "the

---

12. Resolution of the General Assembly, Atomic Energy Commission Official Records, Supplement No.1, also U.N.Doc.A/64, p.9.

13. Journal of the United Nations, no.75, Supp A/64, add1, p.827.

necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces", and called upon the Security Council to consider promptly the practical means necessary to that effect. Consequently, on February 13, 1947, the Security Council passed a resolution establishing a Commission for conventional armaments. The purpose of this Commission was the preparation of "proposals:-

- (a) for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and
- (b) for practical and effective safeguards in connection with the general regulation and reduction of armaments."<sup>14</sup>

In making this distinction between atomic and conventional weapons, the United Nations was moved by the hope that progress on atomic disarmament, separately achieved, would stimulate progress with regard to disarmament in Conventional Weapons. Neither the Commission for conventional armaments nor the Atomic Energy Commission succeeded in reaching agreement of any kind on the substantive problems before them. Thus the General Assembly resolved on January 11, 1952, to combine the work of the two Commissions and establish a new Disarmament Commission, composed of the members of the Security Council and Canada. Unable to reach agreement, it was replaced by a Sub Committee composed of China, France,

---

14. U.N. Doc. S/P.V.105.

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States in pursuance of a General Assembly Resolution of November 28, 1953, calling for negotiations by "the powers principally involved." This Sub Committee, with the Soviet Union opposed, submitted on August 29, 1957, a draft for a disarmament agreement, which the General Assembly accepted on November 14, 1957. The Soviet Union refused to participate in any further negotiations of the disarmament Commission or its sub-committee and called for a disarmament commission composed of all the members of the United Nations. As a compromise move, the General Assembly expanded on November 19, 1957, the membership of the commission to 25. The new commission remained inoperative, and since the beginning of 1958, disarmament negotiations - dealing primarily with the suspension of nuclear tests and the prevention of surprise attacks - were carried on outside the United Nations by Albania, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1959, these same Nations established a disarmament commission outside the United Nations to consider the overall problem of disarmament and, with Bulgaria replacing Albania, met in Conference in March, 1960. After continuing deadlock, the Soviet bloc withdrew from the conference in June of that year. In March 1962, a general disarmament conference with a membership of eighteen nations was convoked under the auspices of the United Nations. It was from the outset boycotted by France and has met periodically without achieving any results. In fact, the

history of disarmament is a history of several failures and fewer successes. The successes will be taken up below.

### The Successes

The only successful disarmament provisions of the nineteenth century are found in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 concerning the frontier between the United States and Canada. It limited the naval forces on the Great Lakes to three vessels of equal tonnage and armaments for each nation. Revised early in the Second World War in order to allow Canada to construct vessels on the Great Lakes for use against the Axis, it has remained in force to this day.<sup>15</sup>

The outstanding example of a venture in disarmament compounded of success and failure is the Washington Treaty of 1922 or the Limitation of Naval Armaments. This Treaty established approximate equality in capital ships between the United States and the British empire, the United States and Japan, scrapped about 40 per cent of their strength in capital ships. Furthermore, it was stipulated that replacements, to begin in 1931, should establish by 1942 a 5:5:3:1.67 ratio for the capital ships of the British Empire, the United States, Japan, France and Italy. The Washington Conference, however, failed to produce agreement

---

15. James E Ayrs, "Arms Control on the Great Lakes", Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol.II, no.4 (Autumn 1964), p.372-

with regard to any naval craft other than capital ships, such as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, attended only by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, likewise failed to reach agreement on this issue. Finally, at the London Conference of 1930, the United States, Great Britain, Japan agreed upon parity between the United States and Great Britain for cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, with Japan limited to approximately two thirds of the American and British strength in these categories. France and Italy did not accede to the Treaty, since Italy demanded parity with France, which France refused to concede.

In December 1934, Japan served formal notice of its intention to terminate the Washington Treaty of 1922. It submitted to the London Naval Conference of 1935-36 a demand for parity in all categories of naval armaments. This demand was rejected by the United States and Great Britain. In consequence Japan resumed its freedom of action. The only result of the conference which had any bearing upon the size of naval armaments was an agreement among the United States, Great Britain and France, adhered to by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1937, which limited the maximum size of naval vessels, provided that no other nation exceeded that maximum. A separate Anglo-German agreement, concluded in



1935, limited German total naval strength to 35 per cent of the British and allowed Germany a strength in submarines equal to that of the British empire, provided that the total submarine tonnage of Germany remained within the 35 per cent limit.

#### 4.3 Disarmament and Development

India did not consider the achievement of general and complete disarmament (GCD) as an end in itself. It was means to an end. The goal sought for was peace and equality economic progress and development. To reach that goal, disarmament was an inescapable means. India's efforts in the direction of achieving disarmament was motivated, inter alia by the desire to give meaning to its political freedom by ushering in an era of economic prosperity. Economic prosperity could be achieved more expeditiously by doing away with or at least by reducing unproductive military expenditure. Ambassador R.K. Nehru emphasized the close relation between disarmament and development in the following words :

Disarmament and cuts in military expenditure would help to release resources which should be utilised to the maximum extent for the purpose of development. That would help to reduce the dangerous tension which are being created by a growing disparity between the rich and the poor nations. Thus disarmament and development are closely inter-

related and both are essential for strengthening of peace."<sup>16</sup>

India's keen interest in disarmament is natural in view of its declaration of war against poverty and economic backwardness, the menace posed by poverty, ignorance and disease was no less threatening than the nuclear menace. Disarmament could release the necessary funds for development purposes. Peace and progress are entirely dependent on disarmament. International opinion, therefore, must be mobilized in support of concrete measures of disarmament and the consequent diversion of savings from the arms race to the cause of much awaited and much needed worldwide economic development.

To sum up, in India's opinion, peace and progress depended on the achievement of disarmament. The Indian approach to 'disarmament for development' was motivated solely by its self-interest. India was genuinely interested in the betterment of the entire humanity, the emphasis on 'World Wide Economic Development' is significant. It indicates that India stood for sharing the fruits of disarmament with all.

#### 4.4 Disarmament and India's Role

As a leader of the third world India has played a significant role in propagating the cause of disarmament. India has

---

16. ENDC/PV 170, 27 February, 1964, p.30.

always stood for total disarmament.<sup>17</sup> When the history of nuclear disarmament negotiations comes to be written, the names of India and Jawaharlal Nehru are bound to find in it places of the highest honour.<sup>18</sup> Nuclear disarmament despite its risks and hazards of annihilation to the whole world has reached a stage where even a small part of its weaponry can destroy the whole planet. Conventional arms and armed forces of the world have witnessed during the last war what a scale of destruction in the clash of these arms and forces can bring about.

Since the very inception of the U.N. India has worked hard and consistently in advancing the objective of peace through disarmament. In historic statement, Jawaharlal Nehru proposed in Lok Sabha (Indian House of People) on April 2, 1954, that pending progress towards full or partial prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, there should be a standstill agreement in respect of nuclear test exposing full publicity in the extent of destructive power and known effects, of these weapons, immediate and continuing private meeting to consider the standstill agreement and active states by people of the world to add their voice and influence in as effective manner as possible to arrest

- 
17. Darshan Singh, (Ed.), India Supports Disarmament Rejects Neutron Bomb (India, 1979), p.30.
18. G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (India, 1968), p.112.

the progress of his destructive potential. He pledges that "the government of India will use its best efforts in pursuit of these objectives."<sup>19</sup>

Indian aspiration for an autonomous role in world affairs and for a dominant role in South Asia, ran counter to the U.S. interests of establishing global hegemony. If India were to be an independent centre of power, the United States would have to concede South Asia as India's sphere of influence. This could be acceptable if India agreed to be a client or collaborative regional power. This was, however, not the case. By articulating a policy of non-alignment, India offered a third option to newly emergent states. They did not need to join any of the two power blocs. The global power normally seeks clientization of regional power by offers to aid, trade, arms, and diplomatic support. If the regional power resists clientization, the global power seeks to contain the regional rival through a regional military balance by strengthening smaller states in the region. When containment fails, the global powers seek accommodation with the regional power by accepting the legitimate sphere of influence of the regional rival.<sup>20</sup>

But India hurt American in Asia and beyond by refusing

---

19. Ibid., p.112.

20. B.R. Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (India: 1976), pp.5-25.

to fall into U.S. orbit, and by adopting independent policies on issues of the cold war.

The first proposals regarding the spread of nuclear weapons were put forth by the Soviet Union<sup>21</sup> and the United States<sup>22</sup> in the sub-committee of Disarmament Commission in 1956-57. The Soviet proposal was regarding the creation of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in central Europe. The zone was to be free from atomic and hydrogen weapons. The proposal was motivated by the Soviet concern about the possible stationing of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany. The second proposal by U.S. envisaged agreement or treaty which would specifically ban the dissemination by the nuclear power and acquisition of nuclear weapons by the nuclear power and acquisition weapons by states not possessing them. In 1957 the U.S. again tabled a package of partial disarmament proposals. It was, however, during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly in 1958 that the Assembly's concern about the possible spread of nuclear weapons through dissemination and acquisition took concrete shape.<sup>23</sup> A draft resolution submitted by Ireland on the subject, though not pressed to a vote, prepared the way for future United Nations

- 
21. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for Jan.-Dec., 1956, Document DC/83 annex 5.
  22. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for Jan.-Dec., 1957, Document DC/113 annex, DC/SCI/41, DC/SCI/60.
  23. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-46.

decisions. On 20th November 1959 the General Assembly adopted an Irish resolution by a roll call vote of 68 to 0, with 12 abstention; India voted in favour of the resolution. By this resolution the danger of dissemination of nuclear weapons, and suggested that Ten Nations Disarmament Committee should consider appropriate means of averting the danger including the possibility of an international agreement subject to inspection and control, whereby the powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them, and the powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them.<sup>24</sup>

The problem of proliferation was not considered at the Geneva Conference of Ten Nations Disarmament Committee as requested by the Assembly resolution 1380 (XIV). It again came up by before the General Assembly during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Session on the initiative of Ireland. An Irish draft resolution which was subsequently revised and co-sponsored by Ghana, Japan, Mexico and Morocco called upon all the governments :

- (a) To make every effort to achieve permanent agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons;

---

24. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Document A/4286/Para.5.

- (b) called upon powers producing such weapons, as a temporary and voluntary measure pending the negotiation of such a permanent agreement to refrain from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them, and from transmitting to it the information necessary for their manufacture; and
- (c) called upon powers not possessing such weapons. On a similar temporary and voluntary basis, to refrain from manufacturing these weapons and from otherwise attempting to acquire them.<sup>25</sup>

The Indian government in its reply<sup>26</sup> to the enquiry laid the basis of India's policy towards non-proliferation which are still valid. India felt that the elimination of nuclear weapons was imperative and urgent as an initial step towards disarmament. She pointed out that the greatest responsibility rested on those who already possessed and manufactured these weapons. The fact that some other states had the potentiality to manufacture nuclear bombs and that more nations were likely to achieve this capacity with the advancement of scientific knowledge and development of

---

25. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Document A/4640/Para 10.

26. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-65 (New York), P.189.

technology coupled with the spread of nuclear weapons to more areas under military pacts, made non-proliferation an urgent task. She, therefore, suggested that:

1. All these states, not yet manufacturing these weapons or permitting them on their territory, should undertake not to do so;
2. the weapons already in existence should be confined to her territory of the states which manufactured them;
3. the latter, as required by the General Assembly Resolution 1948 (XVI) should bind themselves by a treaty banning nuclear test under appropriate control, and pending such a treaty, they should refrain from such tests.

Since with these measures there would still be sufficient nuclear capacity to destroy vast areas of the world, India emphasized the necessity to undertake immediately a programme for the dismantlement or conversion to useful uses of all nuclear weapons that were in existence. The Government of India reiterated its policy of non-manufacturing itself or accepting nuclear weapons in its territory. It also expressed its willingness to enter into any general agreement or specific undertaking in this regard in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations.

Although the United Nations failed to take any "measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons" the world community



had a breakthrough on 5 August 1963 when United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom concluded the Moscow Test Ban Treaty which was later on subscribed to by an overwhelming majority of states. Each of the parties understood to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control, in the atmosphere, beyond its limits including outer space, or underwater, including territorial water or high seas; or any other environment if such explosion caused radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion was conducted.<sup>27</sup>

The refusal of two nuclear powers France and China, to subscribe to the Moscow Treaty, has added urgency to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear-weapons. China denounced the treaty as a "dirty fraud".<sup>28</sup> The Chinese government described the Treaty as an "attempt to consolidate their (U.K., USSR, and USA) nuclear monopoly and bind the hands of all the peace loving countries subject to the nuclear threat. It urged that the Treaty completely divorced the cessation of nuclear test from the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, legalises the continued manufacture, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons by the three nuclear powers and runs

---

27. Official Records of Disarmament Commission Supplement for Jan. to Dec. 1963, Document DC/208.

28. Statement of Chinese Govt., "The Test Ban Debate", (India, 1963), pp. 15-20.

counter to disarmament. The treaty was advantageous for advanced nuclear powers because it did not cover underground nuclear tests and the Chinese urged it, had no restraining effect on the policies of the United States and the Soviet revisionists for "war preparation and nuclear blackmail". It in a way hindered them from proliferating nuclear weapons and expanding nuclear armaments. The Chinese read the Moscow Treaty a "imperialist" plan to deny the "peace-loving" nations like Communist China, the right to increase their defence capability so that they are continuously kept exposed to "threats and blackmail". The Chinese, therefore, refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty. The shortcomings in Moscow Test Ban Treaty, were therefore fully exploited by Communist China and no wonder, the Afro-Asian nations did not condemn China and later many of them particularly African countries applauded China's rapid development of military nuclear capacity. India condemned China but it was almost alone voice and went unheard in Africa and Asia.

France refused to sign the treaty. Since De Gaulle's return to power on 7 June 1958, it has been pursuing policies aimed at promoting her independent role in world politics. De Gaulle made it clear that he intended to raise France to the rank of nuclear powers. And before the test ban treaty was mooted, France had exploded the atom bomb. To develop an independent nuclear force

it had to continue with atomic tests, obviously, therefore, France was not willing to surrender her option. Apart President De Gaulle pointed out the defects in the treaty<sup>29</sup> and declared "that until the nuclear powers forswore nuclear war and destroy their nuclear weapons, France would continue with her nuclear policy."<sup>30</sup> The refusal of China and France to sign Moscow treaty frame a serious impact on the peace, security and stability of the international community.

The Moscow Treaty was signed by a bulk of nations with a certain amount of enthusiasm and optimism. It was hoped that the treaty would pave the way for further agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ultimately to the much cherished aim of disarmament. Though agreements followed on other measures intending to reduce the risk of nuclear war e.g., the establishment of the hot line between Washington and Moscow and the agreements not to orbit weapons of mass destruction in space, if failed to achieve either a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or a Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The disillusionment with the Moscow Treaty, was expressed in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee. India pointed out that "the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, was hailed by the peace-loving peace

---

29. The Hindu (Madras), 1 August 1963.

30. Christian Science Monitor (London), 1 August 1963.

of the world as a significant first step in the march of humanity towards sanity and international security. There was general hope then that this first step would be followed by other steps in the field of both nuclear weapons tests and of the other measures of disarmaments". However, the hopes and optimism with which the world hailed the Moscow Treaty did not materialise. The treaty was partial in more than one manner. Its prohibition does not extend to underground tests and no progress has been achieved in that direction despite the pleas of non-aligned countries and the resolution of the United Nations.<sup>31</sup> As India pointed out, the Moscow Test Ban Treaty was not only partial because it was partial in its prohibited environment and left out underground nuclear weapons tests; it was much more regrettably partial in that it had been adhered to only partially by the international community.<sup>32</sup> India, therefore, pleaded to make the Moscow Test Ban Treaty universally binding and called this task urgent and vital for the international community.

However, soon after China entered into the nuclear club, thereby making it all the more urgent that step should be taken to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first thorough discussion on nuclear non-proliferation weapons, took place in the

---

31. ENDC/PV240, p.89.

32. U.N. Document DC/PV 75, P.16.

Disarmament commission which met for several weeks from April to June 1965. During the deliberation of the commission, India pleaded that a more equitable and practical basis of agreement would consist of a package or integrated approach consist of a non-proliferation agreement and some other measures affecting directly the nuclear weapons capability of nuclear powers. India maintained that an integrated proposal containing the following elements would afford the only actual solution to the problem:

1. An undertaking by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon technology to others.
2. An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against countries which did not possess them.
3. An undertaking through the United Nations to safeguard the security of countries which might be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons capability or embarking on nuclear weapons capability.
4. Tangible progress towards disarmament including a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, as well as a substantial reduction in the existing stocks and
5. An undertaking by non-nuclear powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.<sup>33</sup>

---

33. Ibid., p.16.

The enunciation of the Indian approach to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was an improvement on the reply of the government of India to the enquiry of Secretary General under the General Assembly's resolution 1664 (XVI) referred to earlier. In the Disarmament Commission, India raised the question of security. India stressed that it was unrealistic to ask countries to forswear for ever a programme of nuclear weapons production, when the existing nuclear powers continue on their awesome arsenals and when new countries embarked on nuclear programme.<sup>34</sup> The United States while agreeing that each component of a sound programme to halt nuclear proliferation should be pressed nevertheless, that a stalemate might result from the theory that unless various countries were met or various prior measures implemented, non-nuclear powers had to consider acquiring nuclear weapons.<sup>35</sup>

---

34. Ibid., p.43.

35. ENDC/52/Add.1.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The World War II brought heavy loss to mankind. The World organisation namely UNO came into existence for the establishment of peace and security. Most of the countries of the World, particularly Afro-Asian countries have got their independence recently. They have formulated their own foreign policy according to their needs and necessity. Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and protecting its own progress. The goal of a sound foreign policy is to ensure national security. National security aims at the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat. Every nation, big or small, works for its progress and development. National security, in Nehru's thinking, could be safeguarded not merely by military preparedness but also by an effective foreign policy. His strategic posture was based on peace and pacific settlement of disputes i.e. negotiation, mediation and not on deterrence through defence preparedness.

National security is the security of a nation which protects its internal values from external threats. On the basis of this study it can be inferred that national security becomes a part and parcel of a nation and which helps the nation;

1. to be independent and safe from the external threat;
2. to formulate its own foreign policy ;
3. to protect its national interests;



4. to protect its internal values;
5. to lead the nation towards progress in science and technology;

Each and every country is depending on others, one way or the other. The Nehru era was full of conflicts and contradictions. There was a constant threat from within and without. The external threats that India faces are mainly those from Pakistan and China. Pakistan and its policies hold great significance for India. The bitter experience of the blood-soaked partition left its deep marks on the national psyche of both the countries. The Pakistani threat during the Nehru era was of a multi-dimensional nature i.e. territorial, ideological and politico-strategic. This was accentuated in India by Pakistan's attack on Kashmir. The U.S. military alliance with Pakistan has grievously vitiated Indo-Pak relationship. The continuous flow of U.S. arms to Pakistan has led to certain pernicious developments which impinge on India's security policy.

The second country which is of great importance to our national security is China. India, under the leadership of Nehru signed the Panchsheel Agreement with China in 1954, and tried to follow a policy of friendship and close cooperation. The defeat and loss of territory to the Chinese in 1962 war also has contributed in a very big way to change in perception of the makers of India's defense policy.

India's concept of disarmament meant an entirely new situation i.e. a World without war where armament would be abandoned altogether. As a developing country India's choice of peace through disarmament is understandable. The diversion of funds from militarization could speed up process of economic development. Prime Minister Nehru considered disarmament as the most important question facing mankind. Nations possessed such terrible weapons of mass destruction that the whole creation faced the danger of complete annihilation.

In the disarmament negotiations, India's role was in conformity with the principles of non-alignment. Disarmament primarily affected the major powers, particularly the USA and the USSR. It meant a reduction in their armed strength. An agreement among the powers concerned was essential for the success of any arms control or disarmament measures. India had all along emphasized that disarmament could only be brought about by an agreement among the powers principally concerned.

Nehru tirelessly denounced the trend towards nuclear arms race. It became a passion for him to plead for disarmament. It was on India's initiative that the U.N. undertook a study of the economic consequences of disarmament. Nehru claimed that India's policy of non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes were put forward as the Indian

formula for world peace. It was the Nehruite legacy that was carried forward by Indira Gandhi in her crusade against nuclear war threat, culminating in the emergence of six-nation-five continent initiative for nuclear disarmament, that Rajiv Gandhi has taken up since then.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi; The publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India).

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Speeches, Vol. 1, September 1946-May 1949 (New Delhi; publications Division, Govt. of India, 1949).

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Speeches, Vol.2, 1949-1953 (New Delhi; Publication Division, Govt. of India, 1954).

\_\_\_\_\_, Speeches, Vol.3, March 1953 - August 1957  
(New Delhi; Publications Division, Govt. of India, 1958).

\_\_\_\_\_, Speeches, Vol.4, September 1957 - April 1963  
(New Delhi; publications Division, Govt. of India, 1964).

\_\_\_\_\_, Speeches, Vol.5, March 1963 - May 1964 (New Delhi; publications Division, Govt. of India, 1968).

India, Lok Sabha, Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1958 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1958).

India, Lok Sabha Debates, 23rd Nov. 1960 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1960).

India, Lok Sabha Debates, 3rd Series, Vol.46, September 14-25 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1965).

SECONDARY SOURCESBOOKS

- Andrew, W.P. India and her neighbours, (New Delhi, Inter-India, 1987).
- Appadorai, A. Contemporary India-Essays in Domestic and Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, South Asian Pub., 1987).
- Bajpai, U.S.(éd.) India's Security: The Politico - strategic Environment (New Delhi, Lancers, 1983).
- Bhatia, S. India's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing, 1979).
- Bimal, P.(ed.) Continuity and change in India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, Vikas, 1979).
- Bhattacharaya, S. Pursuit of National Interests through neutralism (Calcutta, Firma KLM, 1978).
- Chandhari, J.N. India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies (New Delhi, 1973).
- Chawla, S. and Sardesai, D.R. Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1980).

- Chopra, A.K. India's Policy on Disarmament (New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1984).
- Chopra, M.K. India and the Indian Ocean (New Delhi, Sterling).
- Das, S.T. National Security Perspective (Delhi, Gian, 1987).
- Jain, J.P. India and Disarmament: Nehru Era, Vol. I (Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1974).
- Jayaramu, P.S. India's National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, ABC, 1987).
- Jha, C.S. From Bandung to Tashkent: Glimpses of Indian Foreign Policy (Madras, 1983).
- Kapur, Ashok India's Nuclear Option : Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New Delhi, Prager Publishers, 1976).
- Kathapalai, P.N. National Security Perspective (New Delhi, Lancer, 1986).
- Kaul, T.N. Indian Ocean : A Strategic Dimensions (Sahibabad, Vikas, 1983).
- Kaushik, Devendra Perspective on Security in Indian Ocean Region. (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1986).



- Kothari, D.S. Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects (Delhi, Govt. of India, 1968).
- Mirachandhani G.G. India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi, Popular Book Service, 1968).
- Mirchandhani, G.G. and Namboodiri, P.K.S. Nuclear India (New Delhi, Vision, 1981)
- Misra, Rajnarain Indian Ocean and India's Security (Sethi, Mittal Publishers, 1986).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations (Calcutta, Scientific Book Agency, 1969).
- Nath, Trilok National Security (New Delhi, B.R. Pub.)
- Pandey, B.N. South and South-East Asia 1945-1979: Problems and Policies (Delhi, McMillan, Press Ltd., 1980).
- Paniker, K.M. Problems of Indian Defence (Bombay, Asian Publishing House, 1960).
- Patel R.L.M. India: Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (Delhi, National Publishing House, 1969).
- Pathak, K.K. Nuclear Policy of India (New Delhi, Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980).
- Patil, V.T. Studies on Nehru (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1987).

- Poolose, T.T.(ed.) Perspectives of Indian Nuclear Policy (New Delhi Young Asia, 1978).
- Poullose, T.T.(ed.) Indian Ocean Power Rivalary (New Delhi, 1974)
- Prasad, B. Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs (Calcutta, Bookland, 1962).
- Prasad, B. India's Foreign Policy: The Nehru Legacy, in Rajan M.S. and Ganguli, S(eds.) Great Power Relations World Order and Third World (New Delhi, Vikas 1981.
- Rajkumar, N.V. (ed.) The Background of India's Foreign Policy (Delhi, Navin Press, 1952).
- Ray, J.K. Security in the Missile Age (Bombay, Allied Publisher, 1967).
- Ravi Nanda Evolution of National Strategy of India (New Delhi, Lancers Books, 1987).
- Sarhadi, Ajit Singh India's Security in Resurgent Asia (New Delhi, Atlantic Pubs., 1986).
- Sarvepalli, G. (Ed.) Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983).
- Sawhney T.G Zia's Pakistan: Implications for India's Security (New Delhi, ABC, 1985).

- Sen.Gautam.(Ed.) India's Security Considerations in Nuclear Age (New Delhi, Atlantic Pubs., 1986).
- Sengupta, B. Nehru and Disarmament in Nanda, B.R. (Ed.) Indian Foreign Policy: Nehru Years (Delhi, Vikas Publishers 1976).
- Sengupta, B. Nuclear Weapons? Policy Option for India (New Delhi, Sage, 1983)
- Sharma and Nagar, K.S. Indian Northern Security (New Delhi, Reliance, 1986).
- Singh, Ashok Kumar Disarmament and World Peace (Bareilly, Prakash Book Depot, 1985).
- Subra . Indian Security Perspectives (New Delhi, ABC, 1982)
- Thomas, R.G.C. Indian Security Policy (New Jercey, Princeton University Press, 1986).

#### ARTICLES

- Appadorai,A. "An Understanding of Indian Foreign Policy", International Relations, Vol.2, No.2, (Oct.,1963), pp.66-79.
- Brockway, F. "The Gandhi and Nehru", Gandhi Marg, Vol.3, No.3, (March, 1964), pp.195-97).
- Chari, R.R. "Non-Alignment and National Security", Man and Development, (Jan.,1981), pp.162-67.

- Damodara A.K. "Nehru and Non-Alignment," Mainstream Vol.21, No.39 (1983), pp.13-17.
- Dhirendra, Sharma "India's Nuclear Policy", Mainstream, Vol.25, No.30, (April, 1987), pp.31-33.
- Diwakar, R.R. "The Gandhi and Nehru Era", Gandhi Marg, Vol.8, No.3, (March, 1964), pp.177-80.
- Gupta. A. "Pakistan Acquisition of Arms: Rationale, Quest and Implications for India", IDSA, Vol.14, No.3, (Jan-Mar., 1982), pp. 422-443.
- Haskar. P.N. "National Security: Aspects and Dimensions", Secular Democracy, (1982).
- Husain. N.A. "Indian Regional Foreign Policy: Strategic and Security Dimensions", Strategic Studies Vol.8, No.1, (Autumn, 1984), pp.31-56.
- Kaniyalal, J. "India and Pakistan Mutual Threat Perceptions". Strategic Analysis, Vol.12, No.4, (1988), pp.359-370
- Kant. K. "Should India Go Nuclear, IDSA, Vol.14, No.3, (1982), pp.307-328.
- Kaushik, B.M. "Nuclear Policy for India": The Pakistan connection", Strategic Analysis, Vol.8, no.5, (Aug.1985),pp.390-94
- Kaushik, B.M. "India's Nuclear Policy", International Studies, Vol.17, No.3-4, (July-Dec., 1978),pp.779-88.
- Kember, J. "India and International Affairs 1944-47: The Prelude to Independence". International Studies, Vol.15, No.3, (1974) pp.364-91.
- Komorov, E.N. "Evolution of Nehru's World out look", Link, Vol.7, No.14, (1964), pp.61-62

- Leintenberg, M. "Disarmament and Arms Control Since 1945: A Brief Survey", Review of International Affairs, Vol.30, No.5, (March, 1979), pp.18-21.
- Majumdar, L. "The Road to Disarmament", Strategic Analysis, Vol.8, No.7, (October 1984).
- Naik, V.P. "The Architect of Modern India," Link, Vol.7, No.14 (1964), pp.36-
- Namboodiri, P.K.S. "Non-Alignment and Disarmament", Strategic Analysis Vol.6, No.11, (March, 1983).
- Palme, O.T. "Disarmament and Development", Review of International Affairs, Vol.29, (Sept-20, 1978).
- Pasricha, P.M. "Is there an Indo-Pakistan Arms Race", Strategic Analysis, Vol.8, No.8, (Nov., 1984), pp.71-73.
- Poulouse, T.T. "Survey of Research in India on Disarmament: An overview", International Studies, Vol.18, No.3, (July-Sept. 1979).
- Poulouse, T.T. "India and Disarmament", International Studies, Vol.19, No.2, (1980), pp.7-11.
- Raja Mohan, C. "India's Nuclear Diplomacy": The Need for clarity, Strategic Analysis , Vol.9, No.11, (Feb.1986).
- \_\_\_\_\_, "India and the Asian Security concept", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.21, No.47, (Nov., 1986), pp. 2037-39.
- Rai, S.M. "Disarmament Negotiations upto date", Afro-Asian and World Affairs, Vol. 1, No.4, (1964), pp.276-87.

- Rana, A.P. "Strategic considerations in India's Foreign Policy" Political Sciences Review, vol.21 No.1, (Jan-March, 1982), pp. 35-36.
- Sengupta, B. "Third World Perceptions on Arms Control and Disarmament," Man and Development, Vol.4, No.2, (July, 1982).
- Shahabuddin, S. "National Security: A sub-continental Approach", Mainstream, Vol.21, No.11, (Nov., 1982), pp.25-27.
- Sheth, V.S. "Changing Security Environment of India", Janata, Vol. 37, No.42, (Dec., 1982).
- Singh, J. "Indian Security: A Frame Work for National Strategy" Strategic Analysis, Vol.12, No.8, (Nov. 1987). pp.885-900.
- Subramanian, R.R. "India's Nuclear Policy", Mainstream, Vol.21, No.8, (Oct., 1982).
- Subramanian, R.R. "Changes in India's Security Environment", Link, Vol.25, No.24, (January, 1983), pp.71
- Subrahmanyam.K. "Indian Security Perspectives", Strategic Analysis Vol.21, No.5, (Aug., 1987), pp.511-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "India's Security Challenges and Responses: Evolving a Security Doctrine", Strategic Analysis, Vol.11, No.1, (April, 1987), pp.1-12.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Security Issues in South Asia, Strategic Analysis, Vol.9, No.9, (Dec., 1985), pp. 827-39.

Subrahmanyam, K. "India's Security in the Eighties, Combat, Vol.11, No.1, (Apr., 1984), pp. 15-25.

Subrahmanyam, K. "India's Security present and Future", Strategic Analysis, Vol.8, No.7, (Oct., 1984), pp.634-639.

PRESS CLIPPINGS

1. Aquarian, National Security must come first, (Tribune, Chandigarh, 3 May 1987).
2. Bhargava, G.S. Defence Spending and Security (Financial Express, Bombay, 6 May, 1982.)
3. Chintan, Devendra, Right time mend fences: India's Security Environment (Tribune Chandigarh) 11 Dec. 1986.
4. Chopra, V.D., India's Security Environment in the Nineties. (Patriot, New Delhi, 1 Jun. 1987).
5. Gupta, Rakesh, India's Security Concerns (Patriot, New Delhi, 25 Jun 1987).
6. Malhotra, Inder, The Real Security Issues, (Times of India, New Delhi, 9 Feb. 1984).
7. Misra, K.P., National Security in Third World (Patriot, New Delhi, 9 May, 1988).
8. Rama Rao, R. Threats to India's Security (Patriot, New Delhi, 9 May 1984).
9. Sen, Gautam, New Security dimensions, (Indian Express New Delhi) 26 March, 1984.
10. Singh, Jaswant, M.P. Looking for a foreign policy National Security concept (Indian Express New Delhi, 30 Oct. 1985.)
11. Subrahmanyam, K., Changed Indian Security framework (Times of India, New Delhi, 15 Aug. 1987).
12. Subrahmayam, K., Reassessing India's Security (Times of India, New Delhi, 3 Jan. 1987).

