

# **NATIONAL SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD**

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
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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled "**National Security Perceptions And Indo-Sri Lanka Accord**", submitted by Mr. Sunil Dutt Nautiyal, is in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this and other university. This is entirely his own work to the best of my knowledge and belief.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
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(SUNIL DUTT NAUTIYAL)

## P R E F A C E

National Security is a basic concern of any country's foreign policy which is largely shaped by its geopolitical and geostrategic environment, by its domestic milieu and by the dynamics of the international system. Added to this, the leaders in the formulation of the foreign policy of their countries, are often affected by their perceptions caused by the historical, cultural and ethnic factors. This is perhaps more true in developing countries like India, where public policy institutions do not exist, or have very little to say in policy formulation or objective analysis. In the present study, an effort is sought to be made to examine India's security perceptions vis-a-vis its neighbouring states, in particular Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

The analysis of this study adopts the methods of description and explanation. It relies on both secondary and primary source materials. Newspaper and Magazine reports have been widely consulted to examine the situation currently at play.

Many things have been written on national security perceptions and Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and much more has to come in the future. However, all of them need an extensive and upto-date analysis. This work endeavours to fill this gap.

The present work has been divided into five parts. The Introductory Chapter addresses the problems of defining the National Security Concept; the various approaches to it; the complexities in threat perceptions and the security problems of the big and small states and the Third World.

Chapter II deals with the problems and prospects of India's security perceptions regarding its neighbouring states with particular emphasis on Pakistan, China and Sri Lanka.

Chapter III seeks to examine India's security perceptions and role vis-a-vis ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Chapter IV analyses the various aspects of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 29, 1987, with a brief summary of new developments. And lastly, the concluding part summarises analytically the problems of Indian security and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

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## CHAPTER - I

### NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT

#### INTRODUCTION

Concern for the security of a nation is as old as the nation-state itself. The term national security has long been used by politicians as a rhetorical phrase and by military officials to describe a policy objective. More recently, it has also been adopted by social scientists to refer to both an analytical concept and a field of study. However, a serious attempt to study the security problems of nation-state began only after the World War-II. Decolonisation process resulting in the emergence of the independence of many Afro-Asian and Latin American colonies also underlined the need for an awareness of the security problems of these nation-states. Moreover, the cold war, that followed the World War-II also threw further light on this concept. As the Big Powers got interested in the regional conflicts, viz., Korea, Vietnam, Congo, Afghanistan etc. in their quest for dominating the World system, they also desired to maintain their economic system and spread their socio-political value systems outside their respective homes. Furthermore, in the present day nuclear age, the growing futility of the use of force as an instrument of solving the security problems, coupled with the reduced prospects of nuclear war because of the fear of mass annihilation of mankind, thanks to the balance of terror and deterrence capability of nations, have resulted in a situation where foreign policy and diplomatic methods, that is, non-military

methods of dealing with national security have gained increasing validity.

### **Development of National Security Studies**

The development of the national security as a distinct academic field can be traced to the political and administrative changes in the United States, followed by the Second World War. It has been pointed out that the war brought to light the glaring deficiencies in the administrative machinery which was entrusted with the task of co-ordinating the war effort and to provide long-range plans for the future. Moreover, the technological booms particularly the emergence of atomic weapons, demonstrated clearly that military matters could no longer be dealt within a vacuum but had to be studied in the context of political and economic considerations, both foreign and domestic. As a result, the US Congress in 1947 passed the National Security Act to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and the functions of the Government relating to the national security. Academic interest and systematic study of national security emerged only after the establishment of the government institutions. Michael Louw has listed, among others, W.W. Kaufmann, Robert Osgood, Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Bernard Brodie, Samuel Huntington, Glen Snyder, Hermann Kahn, Klaus Knorr, A. Wolstettes and Martin Halperin, Andre Beaufre, Alastair Buchan, Hedley Bull, L.W. Martin



and Reymond Aron as pioneers in the field.<sup>1</sup>

### **National Security Definitions**

The origin of the concept of national security is said to be found in the different historical formulations of the concept of national interest propounded by some of its authors like James Madison, Charles Beard, Hans Morgenthau etc. However, it was only with the post-war trends of Behaviouralism and Systems Analysis that the attempts were made at conceptual clarification and specification. Morton Kaplan's work published in 1957, for instance, reflects the trends to study all aspects of societal behaviour as part of the total pattern which constitutes a behavioural system. National interest and the national security interest, therefore, are treated as simply one aspect, although an important one, of the problem of system maintenance. Furthermore, the security of the national system is closely linked to the security of the subsystems which make up the national system.

It may be pertinent here to look at some of the important definitions of national security. At an elementary level, the word 'secure' as the American Heritage Dictionary (1971) defines, it means, "to be free from risk or danger, from doubt, or fear";

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1. Michael Louw ed., National Security: A Modern Approach (Pretoria, S.A. 1978), p.12.

and "security" means "anything that gives or assures safety". In other words, security as per conventional usage appears to be almost synonymous with survival, and national security, as pointed out by Stanley Hoffmann, means in its narrow sense "the protection of the nation... from physical attack and the safeguarding of its economic activities from devastating outside blows". As against this, Hoffman refers to the broader definition where national security is equated with national interests, but these, he says, could be both excessive and dangerous, especially if the concomitant expansion of power threatens other states. He goes on to add that the scope of a major actor's definition of national security therefore depends on two factors i.e. its power and the external threats and that with the increase in either of these, the notion of national security "tends to become more expansive".<sup>2</sup> Robert Jervis similarly argues that the greater the range of interests that have to be protected, the higher is the potential for the conflict, and for the exacerbation of what he calls the "security dilemma", which he defines: "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others". He, thus, concludes that the behaviour resulting from such a concept of security which "almost automatically has a competitive connotation" will "almost surely clash with that of others who define their security in the same

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2. Stanley Hoffman, "Security in an Age of Turbulence: Means of Response", in Third World Conflict and International Security; (Part II), Adelphi Papers, no. 167 (Summer, 1981), pp. 4-5.

way".<sup>3</sup>

There are other writers as well as who have taken similar view of national security. Bernard Brodie, for instance, defines vital interests as those which affect the survival or security of the nation, with the latter concept implying survival or protection against military attack. He takes a broader view of security, in the context of the United States, which he says stretches beyond mere self-defence".<sup>4</sup> Arnold Wolfers too distinguishes between "minimal" security and its "maximization", i.e. seeking it in the "absolute" sense.

According to broader definitions of national security, Berkowitz and Bock say that national security implies, "the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats".<sup>5</sup> Or as Walter Lippmann put it; "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able if challenged to maintain them by war."<sup>6</sup> To Michael Louw, national security is "the condition of freedom from threat."<sup>7</sup> Accord-

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3. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 30, no.2 (January 1978) pp.169-185.

4. Bernard Brodie, "War and Politics", (New York, 1973), pp. 344-45.

5. Merton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, "National Security" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), p.40.

6. Walter Lippmann, "US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic" (Boston, Mass, 1943), p.5.

7. Louw, No.1, p.10.

ing to Louw, although moral and ideological threats should be included it is really physical violence which is generally perceived as the ultimate leverage against a state and therefore as the real and tangible danger to its survival. Certain scholars, while defining national security, emphasise the role of national governments, to create an environment whereby the nation would be able to maintain and promote its cherished values. Thus, Frank Traeger and Frank Simonie define national security as "that part of government policy having as its objectives the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries".<sup>8</sup>

National security in its broadest sense then imply the preservation of national core values or even defence of the entire ideology and way of life of a nation, whereas ideology may be taken to represent a "body of integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a socio-political programmes".<sup>9</sup> Such a definition is thus likely to have connotations that would far transcend the territorial dimension of this concept, and it would be the ruling elites of nations then who would determine precisely what these national core values are that need to be preserved. For example,

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8. Frank N. Traeger and Frank T. Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security" in Frank N. Traeger and P.S. Kronenberg, eds, National Security and American Security: Theory, Process and Policy, p.6.

9. This is the meaning of ideology, as given in Webster's seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, (1971).

in the case of Western democracies, individual liberty and freedom may constitute such core values whereas in the context of the Communist states it may involve the defence of the socialist system.

Robert Mc Namara's definition appears more appropriate in the context of present day world. As he put it :

Security is not military hardware though it may include it, Security is not military force though it may encompass it, Security is development and without development there is no security".<sup>10</sup>

This developmentalist perspective on national security was given recognition by the United Nations which in its twenty-fifth session in 1970 accepted a recommendation of the First Committee of the General Assembly and passed a resolution which among other things, called for "eliminating as far as possible the economic gap between developed and developing countries, which is closely and essentially co-related to the strengthening of the security of all nations and the establishing of lasting international peace".<sup>11</sup> K Subramaniam, Indian specialist on security and defence studies takes the same

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10. See Robert Mc Namara, The Essence of Security (London, 1968).

11. Cited in K.P. Mishra, "The concept of Security", India International Centre, Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 3, no.2, January 1976, p.88.

view. According to him,

"National security does not merely mean safe-guarding territorial integrity. It means also ensuring that the country is industrialised rapidly and has a cohesive egalitarian and technological society. Anything which comes in the way of this development internally or externally is a threat to (India's) national security".<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, a nation's security is inextricably linked up, among other things, with the resources position and the ecological balance, "Dwindling reserves of the strategic resources and ecological imbalances threaten the security of nations everywhere. National security cannot be maintained unless national economies can be sustained. The purpose of national security deliberations, says the author, should not be to maximise military strength but to maximise national security".<sup>13</sup>

The concept of national security is thus complex and comprehensive due to the ambiguities involved in the interpretations given to this concept. Much of this stems from the fact that the term security covers such a wide range of goals that, as pointed

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12. K. Subrahmanyam, "Our National Security" (Delhi, 1972), p.VII.

13. Lester Brown, Re-Defining National Security (Washington, 1977), pp. 37-38.

out by Arnold Wolfers, "highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security".<sup>14</sup> It is on account of this ambiguity that W.B. Gallie calls it an "essentially contested concept". Barry Buzon refers to the contradictions between individual, national and international security which he says "bedevil both the definition and the making of security policy".<sup>15</sup>

### **Approaches to study the National Security**

The traditional approach to national security has been divided along two lines, which have been viewed as being diametrically opposed to each other. The first line of approach is the Realist view of E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau, which concentrates on the level of the state and addresses the question of security exclusively in terms of power. Focus on the state results from the broad assumption that security is divisible. In contrast to this, the idealists approach security through peace. They adopt a holistic perspective in which security is viewed as being indivisible. In both these approaches, the concept of security is

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14. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, 1962). For Wolfers's views, see his essay on "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" in this book p.150.
  15. W.B. Gallie's views are quoted by Barry Buzan in "Regional Security as a Policy Objective" in A.Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia (New York, 1983), p.240. See p.241, for Buzon's view, Also see his book "Peoples, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in International Relations (Brighton, England, 1983).

assigned only a subsidiary role. It is seen either as a derivative of power (the Realist Approach), or as a consequence of peace (the Idealist Approach), whereas the Realists concentrate on the need to arm the state, Idealism is chiefly concerned with disarmament and arms control. The key point to be emphasised is that both the above approaches are based on a military orientation to the question of security. It is argued that neither view is wholly adequate in itself. "An excessively military approach to security is misleading in both its Realist as well as Idealist manifestations".<sup>16</sup> On practical grounds, there is no choice because neither by itself can achieve its security objectives. On conceptual grounds also, there is no choice because the two levels, that is, state and international systems cannot be delinked from each other in relation to the question of security. Barry Buzan, thus, argues that the concept of security deserves a higher status than it has been accorded hitherto. It should be "elevated to the same level as the currently dominant concepts of "Power" and "Peace".<sup>17</sup> His view is that international relations must move away from the twin extremes of "power" on the one hand and "peace" on the other, to an increased emphasis on "security" and security not as a mere adjunct of either power or peace.

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16. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Brighton, 1983), p.253.

17. Ibid., p.2.



A systemic security approach would move away from an excessive emphasis on the military element of security, which results from an exclusive orientation of security towards the state level. A systemic perspective attempts a broader view of the whole dynamic of vulnerabilities and threats. It encourages a longer-term outlook. More concern is devoted to the sources of threats than merely to measures to combat them. Security is viewed here not only in military but equally in social, economic and political terms. With regards to security planning, therefore, in place of an excessive dependence on one of these levels (individual, state and international) a multilayered approach would be more realistic. "This could begin with territorial defence strategies which would ensure individual and local participation in national security. On top of this would come national security policy based on self-help solutions to vulnerabilities in the social, political, economic and military sectors of the state. Beyond this could be created security arrangements among groups of states. These could include alliances and defence communities, formalised security communities, zones of peace and arms control agreements. The topmost layer, at the global level, could be centred on an organisation like the UN. This would provide a permanent forum for discussion and negotiations, a mechanism for the operation of international law, dispute settlement machinery and monitoring services to back up national facilities."<sup>18</sup>

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18. Ibid., pp. 253-54.

Such an approach, apart from distributing power and responsibility for security through all levels, would also lead to greater consistency of policy throughout the system, as single actors would not have the means to make big changes by themselves. This would result in a more reliable atmosphere, and a corresponding overall increase in security. On the whole, such a system would help in solving the key problem of how to reduce the parochial distortions injected into security policy by the domestic policy-making process.

The main components of the national security, thus, would include: a) to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country against external threat or attack; b) to preserve and perpetuate the kind of constitutional and political order that a country has given to itself; c) to maintain and further the economic system in operation followed by an all-round development of the country in science and technology; and d) to promote values that a country cherishes and professes like universal disarmament, world government and so on, they are referred to as "internal values" or 'legitimate interests'.<sup>19</sup>

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19. P.S. Jayaramu: India's National Security and Foreign Policy, New Delhi 1987 p.4.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS

National security is inextricably linked with threat perception. Perceptions are a mix of psycho-abstract constituents and abstract-concrete constituents interacting with multiple forces operating in the milieu of world politics. They are not static because of the fluctuations in the cluster of variables that tend to bring changes in national as well as international situations. They form an integral component of the on-going process of socialisation. They have direct co-relationship with psychological notions of individual policy actors or a group of participants in a given situation. To clarify it, we may say that psychological notion is based on past experience, historico-cultural background, personal biases, predilections, attitude and impulses of an individual actor."<sup>20</sup>

On the question of what determines and shapes security policies, Wolfer emphasises that the assessment of the "objective conditions and the milieu in which security policies take shape" is a significant first step in the overall process of its evaluations."<sup>21</sup> And this brings us to the question of the external

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20. B.M. Jain: South Asia, India and United States (Jaipur), 1987, P.1

21. Arhold Wolfer, op. Cit., pp. 164-165.

environment and the threats emanating therefrom in determining the national security policies. But here too one is confronted with the problems of the element of subjectivity involved in the assessment of threats, and of the gap between reality and perceptions. This is further compounded by the fact that such perceived threats could be both "actual" or "potential" a distinction referred to by Klaus Knorr in his cognitive study on threat perceptions.<sup>22</sup> Besides, assessments of the Character and intensity of threats could vary with the changed perceptions of security needs, which in turn could be purely a function of the changing power and capabilities of either of the two sides; as such that which appeared as threatening earlier could appear less threatening later or vice versa. In contrast to Knorr's approach is the precise, semi-mathematical formula for determining threat perceptions outlined by David Singer in his highly theoretical treatment of this topic where he states that Threat Perception = Estimated capability x

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22. Klaus Knorr, Threat Perceptions in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed., Klaus Knorr (Lawrence Kansas, 1976), p. 78-79. This book in Knorr's words serves to demonstrate the significance of "historical experience" in the study of national security problems (p.1). His own essay includes two case studies from World War II, wherein he deals with the concept of threat perception as a cognitive construct, focussing mainly on the attendant problems and difficulties associated with the perceptual process.

Estimated Intent."<sup>23</sup>

In his work, Robert Cohen focuses mainly on studying the phenomenon and conditions under which threat perceptions occur, and in providing explanations for its occurrence. His three-stage, step-level model for investigation includes 1) an examination of those aspects of the geopolitical environment, as defined by the decision-maker, which were important conditions for the perception of threat; 2) analysis of the domestic environment, which also affected the receptivity to threat; 3) examination of the cognitive process of evaluation by which information was defined as threatening".<sup>24</sup>

The linkage between the national security and the threat perception could be better understood in relation to the question, "security for whom?" for which the obvious answer would be, the security of the country as a whole. However, such an answer would be acceptable if the threat faced by a particular nation coalasced with the manner in which it is perceived by the decision-makers.

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23. J.D. Singer, "Threat Perception and the Armament Tension Dilemma", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. II, No.1 (1958), quoted in Robert Cohen, Threat Perceptions in International Crisis (Madison, 1975), p.5

24. Robert Cohen, "Threat Perception...", pp.4, 86-87.

but this does not always happen. The divergence in threat perception is acute in political systems where the ruling elites lack popular legitimacy and have come to power through non-democratic means like coups d'etat, or are imposed on the people by an external power; a situation which is characteristic of many weak, politically instable and fragile nation-states of the Third World. There a threat to the security of the ruling elites gets invariably mixed up with the security of the country as a whole, whereas the country may not be facing any actual threat to its security at all.

Secondly, even where the ruling elites perceive an external threat to the country, which could be territorial and/or threat to the country's power and influence position. The threat may not infact, exist. In such cases the threat is apparently determined not on the basis of its actuality but on the perception of the people in power. Sometimes, the opposite is also true, i.e. there might be an actual territorial threat from an outside power, especially an adversary neighbour, but the decisions-makers may not perceive its dimensions, they would wake up to it only when the actual war is upon them.

Finally, the role of the external powers in the internal affairs of a nation through control, domination and/or interference, is significant in this context. This generally depends on the nature of the relationship between the external power and the nation

concerned. If a nation is a party to a military or friendship treaty and particularly if the parties involved are a big power and a small state, then the control of the former over the latter is visibly high.

### **National Security and Problems of Big and Small Powers**

Although national survival is the prime concern of nations, big or small, their national security problems are certainly not similar. Big powers, particularly nuclear powers, seldom face the danger of their territories being annexed, except in the advent of a nuclear war. Their security problems are generally as follows:

- a) threats to the position of domination and hegemony they enjoy in the international system;
- b) threats to the control and influence they wield over the decision-making processes of regional powers and small powers;
- c) threats to the ideology/value systems they believe in and want to spread among nations in the international domain,
- d) threats to their technological affluence and standards of living;
- e) the security problems of their allies and alliance partners are also taken as threats to their own

security. For instance, the United States and the Soviet Union normally consider any threats to the security of their allies in NATO and the WARSAW PACT respectively as threats to their own national security."<sup>25</sup> In this context, the concept of national security has dimensions other than the one where it is equated with national interest, or the maximization of one's own national power. Wolfers, for instance, refers to the "expansive" definition of security where nations tend to equate their own national security, with that of close allies, whose physical and economic survival is considered indispensable to their own."<sup>26</sup> The systems Analysis approach too presupposes that the security of the national system is closely connected with that of its component sub-systems. Carried a step further, some states would argue that their national security is closely linked with the security of their regional allies, or those states which are sub-systems. Carried a step further, some states would argue that their national security is closely linked with the security of their regional allies, or those states which

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25. P.S. Jayaramu, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

26. Wolfer, quoted in Hoffmann, p.4.



are sub-systems of a regional collective security system. This is partly what Henry Kissinger implies when he says that "a more significant definition of security policy ... the way in which the term is used within the United States Government ... also involves the attempt to influence the actions of other countries by organizing them in efforts of collective defence or by creating an environment in which neutrality is possible."<sup>27</sup>

The small states most of which belong to the Third World, on the other hand, generally face threats to their very survival as independent entities in the international system. In the initial years, the primary concern of the newly independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America was to preserve their independence in the wake of East-West confrontation. Hence, the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Thus, to the East-West polarisation of international politics, a new North-South orientation was added. Over the years, the Third World nations have been increasingly preoccupied with social and economic development, and as a result, the North-South orientation of global society have achieved an ever increasing importance. Thus, whereas in the early years of independence, the perceived threat to Third World interests

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27. Henry Kissinger, ed., Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings (New York, 1970), p.7.

was from the fallout of the East-West conflict, now, however, "the security situation for the Third World has increasingly acquired a North-South orientation."<sup>28</sup> The security situation for the Third World has to be viewed in the context of an interdependent global economic system dominated by the industrialised nations and operating in their favour against the interests of the Third World states. In this interdependent system, the issue of social and economic development in the developing nations is closely linked to threats to their independence posed by the economies of aid and multinationals and more blatantly, by the growing threat of great power interventionism to safeguard access to raw materials and fuel resources. Moreover, the issue of development in the Third World is closely associated with the task of nation-building, which involves combating secessionist and divisive forces and the consolidation of national unity. Third World security is thus seen to comprise the three interacting elements of independence, development and national unity.

The above argument may be further elaborated to indicate that "in the Third World, threats to internal security equal or outweigh external treaties".<sup>29</sup> Further, the perceived acuteness

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28. S.D. Muni, "Non-Alignment and the security parameter", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.20, Nos.1-2, January-June, 1981, p.169.

29. Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildseth, Modern Weapons and Third World Powers (Boulder, 1984), pp. 1-2.

of external threats which usually emanate from the surrounding region, is usually bound up with domestic vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities tend to be a combination of regime instability, social divisiveness along traditional group lines, for example, religious, ethno-linguistic and tribal, or the potential for revolutionary political change. As a result, the military capabilities of Third World States are directed primarily towards the maintenance of domestic order and secondary to external defence."<sup>30</sup>

In his brilliant analysis Sveices lists a variety of other threats faced by small states from the international system as follows:-

- a) outright incorporation of a state into another state;
- b) turning a small nation into a colony or satellite;
- c) imposition of an unpopular regime;
- d) subversion;
- e) Undue influence over a small nation's internal policy; and
- f) Undue influence over a small nation's external policy.<sup>31</sup>

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30. Ibid, p.2.

31. V.V. Sveices, Small Nation survival: Political Defence in unequal conflicts (New York, N.Y., 1970), p.26. See also David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict (London, 1971).

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Therefore, a fundamental difference between the strategic security concerns of the big states and the small states needs to be taken into account while formulating the national defence policies. This difference pertains to the specificity and urgency of their respective threat perceptions. The mutual threat perceptions in the East-West confrontation reflect security concerns about avoiding or fighting a war which has hitherto never been fought. Further, such a war is highly unlikely in the future. On the other hand, the threat perceptions of the Third World emanate from specific security crises actually experienced or witnessed. Almost all wars since World War II have occurred in the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It seems clear, therefore, "that the strategic doctrines, accompanying the no-war situation in Europe cannot fruitfully be applied to bring about a no-war situation in the Third World."<sup>32</sup> Also, most of the military strategists of the Third World draw inspiration from the strategic environment approach of the US foreign policy in the early Cold War period, which envisaged a policy of the global military containment of Communism. The irrelevance of such a doctrine in the Third World contest has become increasingly apparent. Thus, for any underdeveloped post-colonial society, the concept of national security has to have a built-in predominance of its social and economic components; any temptation to opt for the soft option of a purely military-strategic perception

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32. Pradeep Ghosh, Disarmament and Development (Westport, 1984), pp. 52-53.

of the national security, involving heavy defence outlays, is fraught with positive hazards. In such societies, actually faced with external threat, the military strategic could only be an option under duress, and not of preference.<sup>33</sup> Hence, the contextual differences in the emergence of nation-states are vital in comprehending, examining and analysing a nation's security. The colonial legacy, the mass-elite gaps, the burden of socio-economic and political developmental tasks and institution building - all provide a different context to the analysis of national security of the developing countries.

#### **National Security And Rationale of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)**

The major challenge to the Third World security, which have been just mentioned above, came from the politics of Cold War following the Second World War. The emergence of two ideologically opposed Super-Powers and the building up of military blocks around them in Europe made it look as if the world was going to be divided into two armed camps. For those countries of Afro-Asia and Latin America which had just begun to attain independence, it was very essential to preserve this independence. The Cold War with its bloc politics threatened to take away that independence. The choice before these newly emergent countries was either to accept a policy

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33. Aswani K. Ray, "The 'Islamic Bomb' and India's National Security", India Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII, No.3, July-September 1981, p. 351.

of alignment, join one of the power blocs and thus be under its protective umbrella or adopt an independent non-aligned foreign policy and thus stay away from the bloc politics. Freedom to these countries could only be meaningful if it was based on true political independence and this, they felt, could only be achieved through the pursuit of a policy of non-alignment. Therefore, the primary basis of non-alignment was the opposition to the military alliances and the desire to remain out of the ambit of Cold War politics. Secondly, the non-aligned countries wanted to shape their economic, political and societal set-ups in such a way that they would suit the realities which existed within their respective countries. This, they believed, could not be possible if they aligned themselves with one bloc. Further, many newly independent countries did not want to lose their new found freedom by joining a power bloc and toeing the line laid by the dominant partner in the alliance. Thirdly, the economic considerations also played a very significant role for pursuing a non-aligned policy. The overwhelming majority of the newly independent nations were poor and underdeveloped and, therefore, they wanted to seek external assistance for their socio-economic development. In this case, a policy of non-alignment was considered useful since it allowed a nation to get aid from both blocs. Joining one bloc, they believed, would not only lead to less economic aid but also leave a country vulnerable to economic blackmail for cold war purposes. Thus, the economic basis of non-alignment aimed at securing "aid without strings". This also arose because of the desire of the newly independent countries to have

an independent foreign policy. The emerging nationalist leadership in the countries of Asia and Africa (statesmen like Nehru, Nasser, Tito, Sukarno) had a very clear world-view. They had dreams of establishing new types of global and regional order. Nasser, for example, wanted to develop Pan-Arabic unity and the resurgence of the Arab People and Nehru had a goal of Asian solidarity in his mind. Such visions could not be fulfilled within the confines of an alliance or through becoming enmeshed in super power rivalries. Therefore, the pursuit of a policy of non-alignment seemed better alternative to achieve the necessary freedom and security to pursue their respective World views. Despite its many shortcomings, the Non-Aligned Movement has retained its basic thrust in favour of peace, disarmament, development and independence. In the Indian context, the policy of non-alignment also was in fact a great harmonizer of conflicting domestic interests and effectively promoted the national political integration of India during the Nehru era.

### **National Security and International Cooperation**

Lastly, the discussion of the concept of national security would not be complete without a reference to the themes of collaboration and cooperation as opposed to those of discord and conflict. The underlying assumption of the themes of international cooperation, interdependence, arms reduction and disarmament is that the national security of states is inextricably linked with the security of

of the international system; There is in fact a whole body of literature that has developed around these themes. The areas of common interest in this field mainly include: regional integration, international cooperation in limited economic and technical areas, long-term fundamental trends towards international economic integration, the unilateral peaceful actions by one great power designed to evoke similar responses from other nations and thus reduce the level of international tensions. For instance, of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union under the leadership of President Mikhail Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement of unilateral arms reduction at the UN General Assembly at New York on 7 December, 1988 in order to evoke similar response from the United States of America is a case in point. Furthermore, some attention has been devoted to the permanent institutions and processes of international cooperation and integration. In this category, we find many of the works dealing with the international organization such as UN and international law.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, many agreements including the latest Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement have been concluded between the two super powers, the US and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, in particular under the leadership of Gorbachev has been emphasising on building a "comprehensive system of International security". This system is based on the



premise , that the problem of security as such is not a military-technological but a political problem and therefore, it can be solved by political means without adversely affecting the interest of any of the states. It argues that not even the best weapons systems can guarantee security either at the national or international level against the nuclear weapons. Thus, the requirement of a comprehensive approach encompassing military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres of international relations as well as all regional security systems. However, despite all the diplomatic negotiations, agreements and academic discussions, the goals of disarmament and path of cooperation remain a difficult one, ridden with the "security dilemma". Studies have analysed the technical problems at successive stages in the disarmament process, the role that detrence can play, the implications of the spread of nuclear weapons; the predictions of the social and economic effects of disarmament on different national societies and the problem of weighing the gains from cooperation and the cost of a breakdown.

## CHAPTER - II

### INDIAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS : PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The study of India's security perceptions should take a note of India's emergence as an independent nation, its outlook on world order and its geopolitical dimensions. This becomes necessary as the legacy of the past history influences shape and substance of the perception of the leaders of a nation. These perceptions are, broadly speaking, function of its ruling leaders belief systems, their self-images, their national as well as international images. The resultant images play a decisive role in the formulation of security considerations of a nation".<sup>1</sup>

Colonial legacy is a dominant factor in affecting the security perceptions of India. India, being a British colony for more than two centuries, could not easily get away from the resultant legacy.

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1. For an analysis of the influence of "Image Perceptions" On National security, See Robert Jervis, Perception and Mis-Perception in International Politics (Princeton, 1966); K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Delhi, 1978), PP. 366-83.

It is important that the entire South Asian region in which India occupies a dominant position, had been under the yoke of colonialism for a long time."<sup>2</sup> India acquired an inbuilt structure of security and threat perceptions from the British rule."<sup>3</sup> The British strategy of India's defence was based on geopolitical importance of India. The Indian peninsula was considered as the fulcrum of British rule from Hong Kong and Singapore in the East to the Suez Canal in the West. Their security perceptions was dominantly land based as their naval supremacy implied the Indian ocean as a "British Lake".

Lord Curzon succinctly illustrated the security perception regarding the strategic importance of both the Indian Ocean and the Himalayan Kingdom when he observed.

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2. For a study on Colonial legacy, see Hugh Tinker, "South-Asia. The Colonial Backlash", in Roger Morgan, ed. The Study of International Affairs (London, 1972), PP. 249 & 270.
  3. For an excellent study on British influence on India's Security Perception, see Lorne J. Kevic, India's quest for security: Defence Policies, 1945-65 (Berkeley, 1967) PP. 1-21, N.D. Palmer "The Defence of South Asia" in K.K. Sinha, ed. Problems of Defence of South and South East Asia (Bombay) 1969), PP. 95-129.

"India is like a fortress, with the vast coast of the Sea on two of her faces and with mountains for her walls on the remainder beyond these walls which are by no means of inseparable height and admit of being easily penetrated, extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimensions. We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends, but if rival and unfriendly influences creep upto it and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene because a danger would thereby grow up that could one day menace our security. He would be a short-sighted commander who merely manned ramparts of India and did not look beyond."<sup>4</sup>

#### INDIA'S SECURITY PERCEPTION AND POLICY EVOLUTION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

India's foreign policy perceptions form an integral part of the on-going process of socialization. Obviously when we deal with the leaders' perceptions like Jawaharlal Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai or Rajiv Gandhi, we can ill-afford to study about that part of their political socialization, their individual

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4. Cited by J.C. Kundra, India's Foreign Policy 1947-50 (Djakarta, 1955), pp. 32-33.

and borrowed experiences which help determine their perceptions about global, regional, and national issues. It is worth noting that political socialization of these leaders took place in a different intellectual and cultural milieu and in a different political circumstances. Consequently, their perceptions are also bound to differ from one another.

Secondly, South Asia's geopolitical and strategic significance has been of pivotal concern to India's foreign policy toward the entire region. The fact that the sub-continent constitutes the southern flank of the two powerful Communist nations - the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and that the Himalayan states are highly vulnerable to the deep penetration of Communist China is important. On the other hand, Sri Lanka and Maldives have high strategic value for Delhi, especially in the context of superpower contest in the Indian Ocean. Bangladesh, a 'window' to South East Asia, and Pakistan's geographical and ethnic proximity with the Gulf states have vital consequences for India's defence and security. As such India's priority in her foreign policy calculus is to see the region free from tensions and turmoil - internal as well as external".<sup>5</sup> It is also shaped

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5. See B.M. Jain, South-Asian Security: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi, 1985).

by her consideration of extra-regional power motivations, intentions and interests in the region.

Thirdly, it is also essential to understand the link between the perception and the concrete reality in a given situation. As we find that the apprehensions and fear of smaller countries of the sub-continent about India are based on the concrete notion that India's overwhelming military, industrial, economic and nuclear preponderance over them might jeopardise their security, weaken their political base and undermine their autonomy. It is a concrete reality that India's size, population and resources cannot be matched by any other country of the region. Hence, the smaller countries, mistrust and fear of India flow from their perceptions of existing realities in India."<sup>6</sup> Though it is not necessary that a pre-dominant country will always resort to act of aggression against a comparatively weak state; it is the perception of mistrust of a small nation about a strong nation that hangs heavily in its thinking. For instance, in the context of Pakistan, we may observe that Islamabad's hectic quest for military hardwares and its diversification of military and nuclear cooperation with the outside world are probably the based on hard core reality of India's pre-eminent position in South Asia.

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6. Shelton Kodikara, Strategic Factor in Inter-state Relations in South Asia (Canberra 1979).

Therefore, the leaders' perceptions stem from a cluster of variables including historical experiences, present asymmetrical relations between India and its immediate neighbours as well immediate interests of the ruling sections of the societies.

### **Nehru's Approach to Security**

There is perhaps no better way to begin than by understanding the views of Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, on India's position in the international system, his threat perception, his approach to national security, and finally, his concern for international peace and understanding. It may be mentioned that before independence for twenty years. Nehru had been the main thinker on foreign affairs in the Indian National Congress. The participation by Nehru as a representative of the Indian National Congress in the International Congress against Imperialism held in February 1927 at Brussels was a landmark in the evolution of Indian outlook on foreign affairs. The Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March-April 1947 was another landmark in the evolution of foreign policy in which Nehru's strategic perception is reflected. He called for reassertion of Asia's role in world politics and economy. In this connection, he reiterated India's pivotal position as "the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia, Nehru firmly believed that India's size, geostrategic location and historical

traditions entitled her to a leading role in Asia and world affairs. He said:

India is curiously placed in Asia and her history has been governed a great deal by the geographical factor plus other factors. Whichever problem in Asia you may take up, somehow or the other India comes into the picture. Whether you think in terms of China or Middle East or South East Asia. India immediately comes into the picture. It is so situated that because of past history, traditions etc. in regard to any major problems of a country or group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered whether it is a problem of defence or trade or economic policy, India cannot be ignored."<sup>7</sup>

Nehru believed that a world dominated by rival military blocs, India could play a meaningful role in the cause of peace, not by aligning with an either of the power blocs, but by following an independent, non-aligned policy, of judging every issue on the merit of the case. His speech before the Constituent Assembly on March 1948 is pointed to this:

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7. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches Vol. I, September, 1946 to May 1949, (New Delhi, Government of India, Publications Division, 1958), edn.2, p. 253.



If by any chance we align ourselves with one Power group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I have not the shadow of doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess (and that influence is growing from year to year ) in the cause of peace."<sup>8</sup>

Nehru went on to say:

"I feel that India can play a big part and perhaps an effective part in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined with any group of powers. This is the main approach of our foreign policy."<sup>9</sup>

It may be mentioned in this regard that Nehru's general desire and efforts for establishing world peace, his opposition to the bipolarisation of international relations, the cold war and military alliances, and the great stress laid down by him on the avoidance of war by all possible means were equally prompted by India's primary interest in peaceful economic development.

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8. Ibid., p. 247.

9. Ibid., P. 249.

For Nehru, national security meant not only physical security but socio-economic progress and political independence as well. India's economic needs also dictated a policy of friendship with all the countries, including major powers. Hence, his strategic posture was based on peace and pacific settlement of disputes, i.e., negotiations, mediation and even friendly compromises and not on deterrence through defence preparedness. The offer of a No-War pact to Pakistan in 1949 and its renewal in subsequent years, another offer again to accept a division of Kashmir on the basis of existing cease-fire line in the interest of Indo-Pak peace, the Agreement with China on basis of Panch Sheel in 1954, the premium on diplomatic negotiations for settlement of the border dispute with China even after the situation had worsened in 1959 and finally the acceptance of Colombo proposals after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 - as the basis for the resolution of the boundary dispute all these can be looked upon as evidences of the importance Nehru attached to diplomacy as a means of settling disputes and promoting national security.<sup>10</sup>

Nehru was aware that "the diplomacy of the big powers, the logic of nuclear weapons, the United Nations, the emergence of Asia and Africa, and the rise of Pakistan and Communist China,

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10. P.S. Jayaramu: India's National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 14-15.

all combined to make it imperative for India to play an independent role in international relations for promoting a better world order".<sup>11</sup> India's role had the basic objective of promoting the country's security by insulating its strategic environment from interference by the Soviet Union and the United States, the avoidance of war and nuclear annihilation, strengthening the United Nations, promoting the solidarity of the Afro-Asian countries and the opening up of a third area and dimension of world affairs for safeguarding India's national interest against the actual and potential threat from Pakistan and China, and for the assumption by India of a leading role in world affairs in spite of her being a new state without much economic and military strength.

#### SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA AND NEIGHBOURING STATES

Security concern of the South Asian nations, as we understand today, goes back to the last four decades. After the second world war, the withdrawal of the British from the sub-continent not only left a power vacuum but also created a yawning gap in the conceptual framework of security requirements for the actors in the region. Foreign policy orientation for some countries and reassessment for others were thus made as a response to the evolving power equation in the sub-continent.

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11. J. Bandopadhyaya: The Making of India's Foreign Policy, (1984), p. 316.

Broadly speaking, there were two components around which the articulation of foreign policies by the regional countries were based. Firstly, in the absence of Britain whose regional power in the sub-continent was only an appendage to a wider global role, the South Asian nations for example devised strategies which would help procure the political and economic benefits of relations with a major power and at the same time also secure the territorial integrity of their respective nations. Moreover, the menacing international environment at the time accentuated by the cold war politics between the superpowers and the emergence of Communist China as a major force in the region also brought varying types of reactions from the regional states. And secondly, the smaller powers have tried to define their policies from the perspective of their relationship with the strongest power in the region i.e. India, though strategies which have ranged from diplomacy to war, India has continued to remain central in its search for security and projection of its broader foreign policy interests.

Similarly, with the exception of India's relations with a powerful nation - China, South Asia has also remained the core area of India's security interest even though at times it has rhetorically emphasised a broader role in international affairs. Within this milieu, the search for a role by the South-Asian

nations has not been uniform and consistent. Different notions of what actually constitute their respective national interests and perceptions of their own limits and capabilities have to a large degree defined the parameters of their relations with one another and the outside world. The various stages of development in the foreign policies of these countries - which have been largely shaped by personalities, events and aspirations have given different colours to the strategies adopted by them. Moreover, perceptions by leaders of available options open to their respective countries in their maneuvering capacity has also determined the foreign policy trend of these countries.

Therefore, it has been argued that a dual pattern of interaction appears to predominate the relationship between the states of the subcontinent. On the one hand, the existence of smaller powers relative to India has led to the enunciation of a revisionist policy by the neighbouring states of India in the hope of maximizing their opportunities from the fluctuating regional and international environment. On the other hand, the disparity in power due to size and resources of India."<sup>12</sup> Vis-a-vis its neighbouring states has given a status quo-orientation to Indian policies

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12. For details see M.L. Qureshi, Survey of Economic Resources and Prospects of South Asia, (Colombo : Lotus Process Ltd., 1981) p. 13.

towards the region. As a defender of the system in which Indian influence should remain predominant, India's strategy has inevitably come in direct conflict with the revisionist policies of its neighbouring states. The origin of this revisionist trend in the foreign policies of the smaller countries of South Asia can be traced back to the state of relations between these countries and India in the immediate years after its independence. A common element which surfaces in their approach is the fact that at different times and in different ways they have tried to preserve their security by reducing the impact of the perceived Indian threat."<sup>13</sup> This policy has manifested itself among the small countries of the region in three ways:

- 1) Through efforts to broaden the base of interaction with foreign powers at both the bilateral and multilateral levels;
- 2) By development of relations with strong powers which can act as a counter weight to the influence of the regional dominant power at particularly propitious circumstances; and

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13. Sridhar K. Khatri : Foreign Policy and Security Perceptions of South Asian Nations (ed) Sridhar K. Khatri (ed) Regional Security in South Asia Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies. Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 1987) pp. 197-8.

- 3) Through efforts to internationalise issues which would help reduce the chances of the dominating power to exercise its authority arbitrarily"<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, India's strategy for regional security has been based on two basic principles:

- 1) Like the small powers of the region it has depended on the support of extra-regional powers to augment power position within the subcontinent;
- 2) Unlike the small powers, it has tried to consolidate its hold in the region by trying to limit the role of the extra-regional powers in their dealings with the smaller nations."<sup>15</sup>

#### INDIA AND PAKISTAN: SECURITY AND MUTUAL THREAT PERCEPTIONS:

Conflictual relationships is a fact in international relations . Existing or perceived incompatibilities can lead

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14. Ibid., pp. 200-201

15. Ibid., p.213.

to the formation of actors and to conflict behaviour. Conflict can become armed and thus, social relations become militarised."<sup>16</sup> Wars have their origin in such a state of affairs. They arise out of disputed or undermarked territories (geopolitik), differing ethnic, communal or sectarian compositions, or out of political or ideological differences (ideal politik)."<sup>17</sup>

The roots of Indo-Pak conflictual situation can be traced to the bitter and bloody environment in which the two South Asian Nations started their independent careers. It was a case of the conflict of images, status and identity between the two states. A series of factors have contributed to the substenance of this conflictual relationships between the two countries. Foremost in the Pakistani mind has been the fear that India has not yet reconciled to the idea of the existence of Pakistan as an independent state. In addition, the method in handling some of the

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16. Peter Wallensteen, "Incompability, Militarisation and conflict Resolution", in Alger and Balazs (eds.) Conflict and Crisis of International Order; New tasks of Peace Research, (Budapest, 1985) P. 228.
17. For a description of personal predilections as a factor in military wars, see John, G. Stoessinger, Why Nations go to War (New York, 1974), especially pp. 207-230.



important disputes between the two countries by India also reinforced the original suspicion. For instance, the long drawn out negotiations over the sharing of the financial assets between the two nations in the post-independence phase, disputes over the sharing of the waters of the Indus and Ganga rivers, the problem of a bifurcated Kashmir have come to underline the conflictual nature of the relationship. The birth of the two nations in the subcontinent was marked by the communal bloodshed and war and they launched their new careers as independent nations, not surprisingly, in an atmosphere of strained relations. Like India, Pakistan also inherited the British imperialist legacy in defence and security matters, but without the size and resources to go with it. Pakistan's strategies have basically evolved a response to the predominant Indian position in the sub-continent.

Kashmir still occupies a prime place in any discussion of Indo-Pak relations not only because of the religious factor, but because of the strategic stakes - geographic, security, economic and political - that both countries have in it. Kashmir's strategic location flanked by China, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan speaks volumes about its importance to India's as well as Pakistan's security. The contending claims of India and Pakistan over Kashmir resulted in a situation where Kashmir came to occupy a unique position in the sub-continental balance of power. Indians argued that the accession of Kashmir to India made by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947 was irrevocable, and that the status quo

therefore should continue. Pakistan, on the other hand, has tried to alter the status quo by reiterating its argument for self determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The sporadic incident in the Siachin glacier, reports of which have been coming since April 1984, are grim reminders at the present moment of the existence of the unresolved issue of Kashmir. The Kashmir issue still looms large in the threat perceptions of both countries. Pakistan, on its part, has sought to internationalise the Kashmir issue by keeping it alive within the UN forums in order to deter India politically from using its power arbitrarily in the region.

The arms acquisition by the two countries and the modernisation of their armed forces flowed out of a sense of insecurity emanating from each other's threat perceptions. Both fear repetition of the armed conflicts any time and want to remain prepared. This results in a huge spending on defence. A regional arms race is exacerbated by the interest shown by the external powers with ulterior motives. Pakistan has been very adept in exploiting such a situation to its advantage. Pakistan launched itself on a foreign policy strategy of forging politico military linkages with external powers to attain artificial parity in the capabilities of the armed forces by the inclusion of sophisticated military hardware in the region, despite being physically handicapped due to disparity in size and resources as compared to India.

It has been pointed out that Pakistan's purpose in joining the Western alliance systems like SEATO in 1954 and the Bagdad Pact in 1955, which was later renamed CENTO in 1958, had little to do with the US objectives. Because it was only marginally interested in containing Communism, it used the alliance systems as a pretext in acquiring substantial aid as a defence against the imminent threat from India. As a result, between 1954-1965, Pakistan became the recipient of a major aid programme from the United States. Thus, the identity crisis, the Small power psyche and the threat it perceived to its security from India were some of the major considerations in Pakistan's quest for parity with India.

One of the significant developments in the international strategic horizon in the early seventies impinging on India's security was the Sino-American normalisation initiated by Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in the summer of 1971 and the consequent emergence of a strategic axis comprising of China, Pakistan and the United States. This coincided with deteriorating in India's security ambience at the contiguous level brought about by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan to India and the belligerency of the Government of Pakistan and finally the outbreak of war in December 1971.

Evidences are now available as to the manner in which the Chinese and the American supported Pakistan vis-a-vis India in the winter of 1971.

India's response to the Sino-American strategic challenge came in the form of a strengthening of its relationship with the Soviet Union. The Indian decision-makers felt that an optimum response to the complex challenges to the country's security resulting from the coming together of China, Pakistan and the United States, required not only adequate defence preparedness, but more importantly, strengthening non-alignment by forging a strategic relationship with an external power friendly to India. The Soviet union which also felt encircled by the Sino-American strategic understanding turned out to be the ideal choice - convergence of threat perception between two countries and the already prevalent cordiality in Indo-Soviet relations were however important considerations - to enter into such a relationship. The result was signing the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1971. The Treaty not only constituted a countervailing force to the Sino-American strategic designs, but also ably served India's security interests, without compromising on non-alignment by acting as a deterrent against Chinese and/or American interference in the December 1971 war."<sup>18</sup>

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18. P.S. Jayaramu., O.P. Cit., PP.31.

Thus, if the sixties was a decade of insecurity for India, the events of 1971 brought about a marked improvement in India's security environment."<sup>19</sup> India's security position improved considerably after 1971 following the establishment and recognition of its pre-eminent position in the sub-continent, the Simla Agreement with Pakistan, the Indo-Bangladesh Pakistan Tripartite Agreement, the attainment of the nuclear status resulting from the peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974, the Kashmir Accord with Sheikh Abdullah, the integration of Sikkim with the Indian Union, and finally, the resumption of ambassadorial relations with China in 1976."<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war was an exception to Pakistani diplomacy. The war resulted not only in the military defeat of Pakistan, but also proved to be a political and diplomatic debacle for the country. On the one hand, Pakistan lost its eastern wing, constituting sixty per cent of its population and one sixth of its territory; and, on the other, it was one major conflict from which Pakistan could not benefit diplomatically from the external powers. Until the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, Pakistan's ability to acquire military hardware

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19. Ibid., P. 170.

20. Ibid., PP 31-32

from abroad, with the exception of China, was severely constrained especially with the United States particularly putting pressure on the country to deter it from going nuclear. But with the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan Pakistan again acquired a strategic importance which not only made the flow of assistance easy, but also helped maintain the pre-requisite balance considered by the Pakistan Policy towards India."<sup>21</sup> The emergence of the Afghanistan problem and the consequent elevation of Pakistan as a front-line state of the United States has helped Pakistan in getting an unprecedented flow of arms on concessional terms.

However, what is of concern to India from the security point of view is the Pakistani sophisticated arms acquisition such as AWACS, F-16s, the Harpoon missiles etc. The Indian decision-makers apprehend these arms likely to be used against India in the event of a conflict between the two countries. India cannot be caught unawares there to repeat a 1962 as long as the territorial disputes with China remain unresolved. It is all the more relevant in view of the close friendship and military co-operation that exists between China and Pakistan.

A common concern which has been talked about is the nuclear issue. This, perhaps, constitutes the biggest element in the

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21. Sridhar K. Khatri, op. Cit., PP 202-203.

two countries threat perception at the moment, overriding the concern for conventional arsenals. The possession of bomb by Pakistan would certainly bring in sense of psychological insecurity to Indian decision-making elite.

The coming to power of a democratic regime in Islamabad under Benazir Bhutto seemed to have brought in fresh wind of change to a relationship that had for long been characterised by bitterness and mutual suspicion. The Islamabad Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) provided the opportunity for Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi to give substance to the expectations of improved ties between their countries. Three agreements were signed - on avoidance of double taxation of income from international air transport, on cultural exchanges, and on not attacking each other nuclear installations. The stage, it would seem, was set for "a process that could gradually replace suspicion and hostility with trust and goodwill"<sup>22</sup>

The relaxation of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union and China and the Soviet Union removes one kind of stress effect for the sub-continent. It also ensures that Indo-Pakistan

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22. "A promising start", The Times of India, 3-1-89 P. 12.

relations is likely to improve significantly in near future. It is worth noting in this context that the politics of the cold war invariably contributed to the heightening of tensions between India and Pakistan. The US willingness to supply sophisticated arms to Pakistan in periods of Cold War tension aggravated the uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan. From this standpoint it appears that a major obstacle to amity on the subcontinent has been removed. A similar effect may be inferred from China's keenness to improve relations with all its neighbours, including India, since a major security concern over the past two decades and more has been the Sino-Pakistan military nexus.

However, it would be erroneous to conclude from this that it would lead to improvement towards Indo-Pakistan relations. The Indo-Pakistan relations have a history and dynamics of its own, encompassing, among other things, the bitterness of partition and its continuing relevance today in the form of the Kashmir issue, three wars, one of them contributing to the break-up of Pakistan, an incipient nuclear arms race and above all Pakistan's fear of Indian hegemony over South Asia. These factors cannot be discounted. It may be recalled that the onset of detente in the late 1960s and early 1970s certainly did not diminish the level of tension in the subcontinent."<sup>23</sup>

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23. Rajesh M. Bastur, "Prospects for India - Pakistan Relations: A Realistic Assessment, Strategic Analysis, Vol. XII, No.12, March, 1989 P. 1365.



Secondly, it is widely perceived that as long as the army held the power in Islamabad, there was a built-in tendency towards conflict, but there are now signs of change because of the establishment of a democratic regime in Pakistan. However, the argument is often advanced that the military generals have by no means been eliminated, and that so long as they remain a powerful factor in Pakistani politics, India cannot take a rapprochement for granted. Underlying this argument is the implicit assumption that democratic governments are basically conflict-avoiding in nature while non-democratic ones are fundamentally conflict-oriented ones. Such an assumption is also questionable. In this context, it would be worth-while recalling that there was no significant decline in tensions between India and Pakistan. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the Prime Minister of an elected democratic government. It was the same Bhutto who signed the Simla Agreement in 1972, which stressed the bilateralism in Indo-Pak relations and renunciation of the use of force but soon proceeded to flout it. It becomes thus, all the more important to study various pronouncements of Benazir Bhutto, including her faith the Simla Agreement in all its ramifications before reaching any valid conclusion.

#### CHINA AND SECURITY OF INDIA

Though much has been written about the Sino-Indian relations specially the border conflict of 1962, here an attempt has been made to analyse the manner in which the Chinese threat was perceived

and responded to by the Indian policy makers.

In the early phase after independence Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, sympathetic to China's revolutionary upsurge and national liberation, and conscious of the strategic problems it posed following the end of the buffer status of Tibet, had sought to built close and friendly ties with Beijing. Panchsheel Agreement was the major result of this effort. The five principles of Peaceful Co-existence, however, were by themselves not adequate in containing an expansionist and irredentist China. Beijing's single-minded search for great power status, its militant and often narrow nationalism than the internationalism of Marxism-Leninism, its skill in unabashed practice of realpolitick, and the continuous shifts in its political and strategic positions makes China a potent fatcor not only in India's security scenario but in Asia, as a whole.

Nehru was aware of this nationalistic arrogance and the inherent expansionist tendencies of the Chinese people and its possible impact on India's security. Articulating this perception, he told the Lok Sabha:

Even since the Chinese Revolution, we naturally had to think of what the new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution was going to be a very big factor in Asia, in

the world and in regard to us. We realised - We knew that amount of history - that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout that had been the case -----Taken also with the fact of China's somewhat inherent tendency to be expansive when she is strong, we realised the danger to India ----- As the years have gone by, this fear has become more and more apparent and obvious. If any person imagines that we have followed our policy without realising the consequences, he is mistaken.<sup>24</sup>

Despite such a clear understanding of the Chinese mind and behaviour, Nehru failed to perceive the possibilities of the Chinese threat manifesting itself in the form of a military confrontation between the two countries in October 1962. This was undoubtedly a great error in Nehru's threat perception.

So far the implications of the Chinese action on India's security in the Himalayan region were concerned, India's strategy was to insulate them by consolidating the relationship with Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal through a net-work of diplomatic/security agreements. The Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1950 made the defence of Sikkim, a responsibility of the Indian government; the Indo

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24. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Select Speeches September 1946 - April 1961 (New Delhi; Government of India, Publication Division, 1961) p. 369.

Bhutanese friendship Treaty of 1949 provided for consultations between India and Bhutan on matters involving Bhutan's external relations. As for Nepal, the two countries undertook bilateral negotiations on issues affecting mutual security. The result of all this was the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal in July 1950, providing for mutual consultations and devising of effective counter measures to deal with threats to their security.

The decade of sixties has often been considered as a period of insecurity to India, because of the developments such as the heightening of Chinese threat to India, leading to the increases in the conventional military capacity of China, the building up of a network of roads and communication system in the strategically important Tibet-Zinkiang region and the acquisition of nuclear capability by China in 1964. The perception of the Indian decision makers was that China might use nuclear weapons or resort to nuclear blackmail in the event of a future conflict. Thus, India's rejection of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was not just due to Treaty's unequal and discriminatory character, but a response to the security challenge posed by the Chinese bomb, the nuclear option strategy implied clearly India's right to make bomb in the event of a grave nuclear threat at that point of time from China.

The political and strategic perceptions of China changed again in the 1980's. In the past six years, China has taken significant steps in opening up its economy, forging peaceful ties with many states with which it was previously on a collision course, dismantled much of its ultra-leftist policies and engaged in active diplomacy, with the end of isolationism, ultra-nationalism too has significantly dwindled. Relations have improved with the East European socialist countries and the rapprochement with the Soviet Union is developing. Changes have also occurred in China's strategic thinking in keeping with the new situation. China has joined disarmament conferences and has on several issues such as Palestine, Central America, the Gulf, South Africa and general developing world issues, adopted positions akin to the non-aligned movement and India's policies.

With Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit in December 1988, a new era in Sino-Indian Relations may be said to have begun. This visit amply demonstrated India's determination to start afresh and create of amity and friendship with its neighbours in the north. The border question appears to be central to the whole issue, and the setting up of a Joint Working Group, possibly with a time-bound programme, may well introduce an element of urgency that was lacking in the past. However there is no scope for complacency unless concrete progress is made in the meetings

of the Joint Working Group, one cannot be certain that this will be an improvement on the official level of talks, eight rounds of which have already taken place since 1982. Therefore, while every effort must be made to settle the border question and normalise relations through commercial and cultural interactions, India can ill afford to drop its guard given the fact of geography and a history of conflict.

While China perceives herself to be a global power capable of influencing events in regions that are as distant as the Persian Gulf at one end, to the South Pacific on the other. India's myopic vision in the past has constrained her strategic perspective to be confined to the South Asian Region. It is conceivable, however, that with the procurement of submarines, both conventional and nuclear, as well as the development of Integrated Guided Missile Programme, by India that never perspective may emerge.

As India and China approach substantive discussion to improve mutual relations, Chinese nuclear weapons capability and other military modernisation developments will have to be taken into account. Merely agreeing to delineate a border may at best reduce tension but cannot bring lasting peace. In order to achieve that, it is essential to incorporate wide areas in

this resolution. Till then, it will be wise to take into account not only China's wider military capabilities but also its growing nuclear ambitions by the Indian decision-makers.

### **Indian Security Perception and Sri Lanka**

India and Sri Lanka are socially, culturally and politically linked. Both were the British colonies and attained freedom almost at the same time. Indo-Sri Lanka relations began under a cloud of some misplaced fears. The India was suspicious of Sri Lanka's close ties with Britain, particularly its Defence Agreement with that country and its economic ties, which were controlled largely by British commercial interests. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, could draw comfort from its ties with Britain, by which association, it believed, its interests, both security and economic, could be protected.

The bilateral relationship is unique from India's point of view, in the context of her protracted problem of adjustment with Pakistan, her uneasy relationship with China and the ambivalence of India's other small neighbours, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan towards her. The incorporation of Sikkim into the Indian Union in 1975 led to qualms in the other Himalayan states, but appeared to be hardly noticed in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, being an island

state, enjoys considerable advantages over India's other smaller neighbours in being more accessible by air and sea; but by the same token, Sri Lanka's geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean area has always remained a significant parameter relevant not only to the problems of India's own security but also to the general question of power rivalry in the whole Indian Ocean area.

From a geopolitical point of view, two influences in the Indo-Lanka relationship stand out as important i.e. the locational factor; and disparity in size, population and power between the two countries. Sri Lanka's location at the southern tip of the Indian peninsula, separated from India by a narrow stretch of water, the Palk Strait, which is no wider than twenty miles in certain places, has continued from historical times, to exert a determining influence on the course of the island's history. The majority of the Sri Lanka people, be they Sinhala, Tamils or Muslims, belong to the same ethnic stock as India's population, and cultural affinities extend not only to religion (Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam), but also to the language, Tamil being common to Tamil Nadu as well as North Sri Lanka, and Sinhala being related to the North Indian vernaculars such as Hindustani, Marathi, Gujarathi and Bengali.

The existence of a strategic harbour at Trincomalee, facing the Bay of Bengal on the island's east coast is also important



from the locational point of view. In about 16th century, Western imperialists had made sea-power the basis of their expansion in Asia and Africa. A concept of the strategic unity of India and Sri Lanka had emerged during this period and especially after the British came to be regarded as a pre-requisite to the defence and security of India. The British, therefore, made Trincomalee an important bastion in their defence network in the East. Although Trincomalee no longer plays a role as a naval base, its strategic location makes it a matter of much international concern, and India, which has no comparable natural harbour on its east coast, is most concerned about its potential status and uses. Writing in the mid-forties, K.M. Panikkar, the well-known Indian scholar-diplomat, had averred that the strategic unity of India, Burma and Sri Lanka was so obvious that one of the pre-requisites to a "realistic policy of Indian defence" was the "internal organisation of India on a firm and stable basis with Burma and Ceylon."<sup>25</sup> Similarly, another writer on Indian naval defence said:

The first and primary consideration is that both Burma and Ceylon must form with India the basic federation for mutual defence Whether they will it or not. It is necessary for their own security.<sup>26</sup>

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25. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London, 1945), p. 95.

26. K.B. Vaidya, The Naval Defence of India, (Bombay, 1949), p. 30. Emphasis added.

In 1925 Nehru himself had pointed to the ethnic, linguistic and cultural unity of India and Sri Lanka to support the view that the latter would inevitably be drawn into a closer union with India, "presumably as an autonomous unit of Indian federation."<sup>27</sup>

These were not just chauvinist effusions of responsible Indian spokesmen on the eve, and in the euphoria, of Indian independence. Many of them sincerely believed that the British withdrawal had thrust the responsibility of the defence of the South Asian region on Indian hands and that India was the natural successor to Britain as the guardian of the Indian Ocean. However, this kind of federated defence structure was never clearly enunciated. Nevertheless, Burma and Sri Lanka harboured the suspicion against Indian interventionism or expansionism. Burma underlined her independence and separateness from India by keeping out of the Commonwealth. But oddly enough for the same reasons Sri Lanka opted for the Commonwealth and sought, the commonwealth connection to redress the balance against India. Though India assured Sri Lanka that the former had no such designs to interfere in the latter's sovereignty, yet the perception of threat from India was a very real element in the foreign policy decision-making in Sri Lanka, more specially during the period 1948-56, but to

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27. Quoted in W.H. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 399.

a lesser extent even after. India's own strategic concerns regarding Sri Lanka's foreign policy posture and alignments have been continuing. A former Commander of the Indian Navy wrote as late as 1974 that:

Sri Lanka is an important strategically to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China...As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral, India has nothing to worry about but if there be any danger of the island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India, India cannot tolerate<sup>28</sup> such a situation endangering her territorial integrity".

It is not an unnatural concomitant of India's own perception of her regional security interests that she should evince interest and concern over Sri Lanka's international relations. But it is also inherent in the geopolitical situation,

, in the locational determinism of Indo-Sri Lanka relations, that a fear psychosis of India persists in Sri Lanka to a greater or lesser degree, depending on variables such as the international situation, issues of domestic politics etc. Moreover, implicit in the disparity in terms of size and population, are the tendencies on the part of Sri Lanka's decision-makers to seek diplomatic reinsurance in various forms against any attempt by India to dominate her and, on India's own part, a tendency

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28. Ravi Kaul, "The Indian Ocean: A Strategic Posture for India", in T.T. Poulouse, Indian Ocean Power Rivalry (New Delhi, 1974) p.66

to regard Sri Lanka, alongwith other small neighbours, as a legitimate object of India's interest and concern as a country lying within its security sphere and concomitantly, a tendency also to assume that Sri Lanka's policies must be prescribed by the demands of Indian national interests.

Sri Lanka and India have been members of Commonwealth since independence as well as the active members of the non-aligned movement since its inception in 1961. Even before this date, during the fifties, both of them espoused a common approach to important international issues, e.g., Indonesian independence in 1949. Suez and Hungarian crisis in 1956, the issue of national liberation generally, disarmament and resistance to military pacts. Both Indian and Sri Lanka were among the five states which met from time to time in the mid-fifties, known as Colombo Powers, which met at Prime Ministerial level in 1954 to consider the situation in Indo-China, and which sponsored the Bandung Conference in 1955. There was also community of outlook on the proposal on Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. However, this is not to say that the two countries do not have divergent views on specific issues of international politics. The current examples include those relating to recognition of Kampuchea (now Cambodia), the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the attitudes to the US and USSR generally. While India is an ally of the Soviet Union under a friendship Treaty and leans heavily towards that country

Sri Lanka is heavily dependent on western economic aid for her survival. However, what is of greater relevance for India's security perceptual point of view is Sri Lanka's attitude, past and present, to Indo-Pakistani relations and to the question of India-China relations.

It is to be noted in this connection that Sri Lanka kept aloof on the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and observed neutrality in the wars fought between these two countries in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. It also did not accord recognition to Bangladesh until March 1972, in order not to offend Pakistani susceptibilities. The grant by Sri Lanka during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 of air transit facilities through Colombo from West to East Pakistan after overflights by Pakistani aircrafts caused considerable misgivings in Indian circles. Similarly, when the Sino-Indian war broke out in 1962, the Sri Lankan government instead of branding China as an aggressor, took the initiative in summoning the Colombo Conference of six non-aligned Nations with the object of exploring ways and means of bringing India and China to the Conference table with a view to settling the boundary dispute. Also, when in July 1963, Sri Lanka and China entered into a Maritime Agreement giving most favoured nation status to the contracting parties in respect of commercial vessels engaged in Cargo and passenger services to and from the two countries or from a third country, the nature of the agreement became a subject of great concern in India.

To sum up, it can be said that Indo-Lanka relations over the years since independence stand out as a unique example of the manner in which two neighbouring states in South Asia have succeeded in resolving the disputes and problems, some of which appeared at times to be intractable, by recourse to political co-operation - discussion, negotiated settlement and continued diplomatic effort-carried out in a mutually cooperative spirit of give and take. At the time of independence Sri Lanka had an unresolved maritime boundary problem with India involving disputed possession of a small island called Kachcha Thivu in Palk Strait, and a protracted dispute regarding the citizenship status of persons of Indian origin resident in Sri Lanka. The citizenship issue, on which agreement was reached in 1964 and 1974, still awaits finalisation in the context of changing circumstances, but the maritime boundary has now been demarcated, and threat perceptions though intrinsic to a Small-Power Big-Power relationship, are now more imagined and less real than they used to be in the early years after independence. However, the current ethnic problem in Sri Lanka did cause a considerable concern to India, in recent times. This has been dealt in detail in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER - III

### ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA & INDIA'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

#### I

India since her independence and even before that has been an active participant in her external affairs. It has been watchful enough to the international events and more particularly to the events occurring in the neighbouring countries. Keeping national interest in sight and pursuing the policy of non-alignment and Panchsheel, India has always held the noble ideals of democracy, world peace, opposition to colonialism, imperialism, racialism and promotion of international cooperation and peace etc. The main instrument of achieving these objectives has been diplomacy based upon economic cooperation and political understanding. A much less known, though very important, aspect of India's diplomacy was her "military help" in support of her foreign relations with her immediate neighbours, viz. Burma (1948), Nepal (1951-53), Bangladesh (1971), Sri Lanka (1971 & 1987) & Maldives (1988).

The common feature of these crises had been their very serious nature which threatened stability of the government in power and the government found itself totally incapable of handling the situation and therefore asked India for help. India's action

of rendering military help has been motivated by certain objectives which have been almost common in every case. The foremost reason behind the help rendered seems to be security. Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, all of them, are important to India's security in their own way, the reasons for being so have already been clearly explained in the foregoing chapter. Moreover, importance of a friendly government in the neighbouring countries is obvious and may not need any emphasis in respect of security, political and economic interests. Not to have a friendly government in the neighbouring countries is a direct threat to one's security. Here Lord Curzon's theory though propounded in a different context remains important that though it is not desirable to occupy the neighbouring countries but its occupation by the foes also cannot be tolerated.

Another reason to render military help to these governments has been to strengthen the democratic institutions and forces therein. India has made it clear on several occasions that she is not merely a verbal spokesman for democracy but can go to the extent of action if needed to save the democracy. If the neighbouring countries are weak economically and politically, India's security is threatened. So, friendly, stable and strong government in neighbouring states is in India's national interest and obviously the national interest is supreme objective of India's



foreign policy. However, it has not been made clear by the Indian foreign policy-makers that what type of democracy India wants in the neighbouring countries.

There have been doubts in some quarters as to whether the military help rendered to these countries' was against the principle of non-interference in other's internal affairs. In this context, it needs be stated that whenever the Government of India rendered military help, she did so only when she was asked for it. Nehru himself clarified this when he said:

"It is not our purpose to enter into other peoples' quarrels ... the less we interfere in international conflicts, the better unless our own interest is involved ... Either we should be strong enough to produce some effects or we should not interfere at all".<sup>1</sup>

Nehru's stand over international conflicts had twin objects first that if national interests are involved, India cannot remain an indifferent spectator, and secondly, that India interferes only when she makes sure that her action will make a difference in the given situation. Against this backdrop, we

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1. See Indian Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, Vol.III, No.2, March 8, 1948, p. 1757

will examine the Government of India's attitude towards the ethnic conflict and its settlement in Sri Lanka.

## II

The question of according citizenship to stateless persons of Indian origin is an important issue in national politics of Sri Lanka. The citizenship issue, on which two agreements were signed between the two countries in 1964 and 1974, still awaits finalisation in changing circumstances beset with numerous political and administrative difficulties.

Another question equally important from the point of view of national integration of Sri Lanka is the role of Tamil dissident politics their demand for a separate state (Eelam) and Indian response to these issues. The ethnic tensions in any part of South Asia have always been viewed with concern by India. Religion, language ethnicity and, of course, a common colonial experience are the major forces that transcend the territorial boundaries of South Asian nations and strongly influence intra-regional relations. As an Indo-Centric region, serious ethnic or racial upheavals in any country that is part of South Asia are bound to have a spill-over effect in India. Thus, Tamils of India, who sympathise with the Tamils of Sri Lanka, reacted emotionally

when the island was rocked by violent Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic riots in July, 1983. Historically and culturally, the Tamils of India and Tamils of Sri Lanka have felt close to each other and the Tamils of Tamil Nadu state become agitated over any events in Sri Lanka that affects the interests of their cousins across the Palk Straits.

It may be mentioned that the most troubled country due to the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka is India. Its vital interest has been affected due to the influx of refugees into Tamil Nadu since 1983 violence. This is one of the reasons for India to recognise the Tamil problem as a bilateral issue. The reaction in India, and particularly in Tamil Nadu, naturally caused deep concern not only from human rights angle but also from obvious socio-political repercussions. Having an inextricable ethnic linkage with its brethren across the Palk Straits, Tamil Nadu, a state of 50 million Tamils, has been determining the shape of India's relations with Sri Lanka in a wider context. India often feels that any ignorance of Tamil sentiments over the Tamils problem in Sri Lanka would jeopardise India's national interest as has been the case when the D.M.K. Dravida Munetra Kazhagam party once gave a call for separatist movement on the issue of anti-Hindi and anti-north attitude to all Tamilians for an inde-

pendent Dravidastan consisting of the all Dravidian states of south India. Hence, Tamil Nadu state assumes significance in conducting Indo-Lanka relations. In fact, whenever any communal riot between the Sinhalese and the Tamils breaks out, the Tamils of Tamil Nadu, apart from other political and interest groups would press the Government of India to take up the matter with Sri Lanka and do something to redress the wrongs done to their brethren in that country. Sometimes, their statements and comments on the Tamils problem in Sri Lanka cause embarrassment to New Delhi. Sri Lanka Government then blames the Govt. of India for its inability to restrain the Tamil Leaders for going against the wishes of the federal government. It need to be stated that one Mr. Y. Gopalswamy, DMK M.P., visited Sri Lanka in March 1989 to meet Mr. Prabhakaran, the LTTE Chief, in his hideout. Later on, Mr. Gopalswamy expressed the view that the LTTE's fight for Tamil Eelam had widespread public support.<sup>2</sup>

But the Indian government could ill afford to restrict Tamil Nadu state mainly on political ground as any party would lose votes in an election if it ignores the feelings of the people.

Hence, the suspicion and the repurcussion of Tamil Nadu to the occasional disturbances and eruption of violence

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2. The Times of India, (New Delhi) March 6, 1989.

in Sri Lanka, have created impelled misgiving in Colombo's mind. Tamil Nadu's sympathy for the Tamil cause and their insistence on the Indian government to intervene in Sri Lanka to help the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka have caused a great resentment in that island country. Moreover, India's mighty position in South Asia and its Indo-centric nature developed a suspicion in the minds of Sri Lanka ever since its independence.<sup>3</sup> This was expressed openly by the Lankan Prime Ministers. As Bandaranaike himself said as early as 1947: "India must remember that it is the duty of the great and mighty to be just and even generous to the small and weak and to remove from their minds not only the substance, but even the shadow of suspicion and apprehension."<sup>4</sup> The citizenship question gained a new dimension in the bilateral relations which instigated Sri Lanka to have a military agreement with Britain mainly to safeguard her interest from any attempt by the mighty India.

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3. It means India is central to the whole region, not only in terms of geographical location and contiguous boundaries with neighbours but with respect of socio-cultural identities and experiences of historical and political evolution, (S.D. Munni and Anuradha Muni; Regional Co-operation in South Asia (New Delhi, 1984) pp. 56-57.

4. S.W.R.D., Bandarnaike, Speeches and Writings p. 351.

Despite these threat perceptions on the part of Sri Lanka, "India reiterated its stand of non-commitment in Tamil problem and viewed it as the internal affair of Sri Lanka"<sup>5</sup>. Even under the Janata Government, India's neighbourhood diplomacy aimed at "generally creating a peaceful, friendly and productive relations with neighbouring countries."<sup>6</sup> In this wider context, New Delhi's stand on the Tamil problem was appreciated by the United National Party (UNP) government. Thus, when anti-Indian disturbances occurred in Sri Lanka towards the last week of August 1977 which led to widespread anxiety in Tamil Nadu, the Government of India refrained itself from making any hasty observation or reaction to the development.<sup>7</sup>

After the Janata rule, the mutual understanding between two countries deteriorated with Mrs. Indira Gandhi coming to power since then the Tamil Eelam Movement became a discrete factor in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. A wide spectrum of India's attention was captured in the wake of 1981 holocaust when Sinhalese Chauvinism

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5. Urmila Phadnis, "Keeping the Tamil Internal," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 76, March 25, 1972, pp. 21-22.
  6. India, Ministry of External Affairs Report, 1977-78 (New Delhi, 1978) p.1
  7. S.C. Gangal, "Trends in India's Foreign Policy, in K.P. Misra (ed) Janatha's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1979), p.44

attained a new height which annihilated mercilessly enormous Tamil lives. The reaction of their Tamil brethren in Tamil Nadu made the Indian government to express its displeasure over the developments. The Indian government was worried over these developments since they affected a large number of persons of Indian origin and possibly some Indian citizens. But India restricted its limit not beyond expressing concern as it stated rightly that India had no desire whatsoever to interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

However, the eruption of communal violence in July 1983 put India into an extremely delicate position. Widespread attacks on Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian nationals including members of the diplomatic mission and damage to Indian properties had not only threatened to vitiate the atmosphere of regional cordiality but also resulted in a strong protest from India. Mrs. Gandhi faced the two distinct problems simultaneously due to the ethnic violence to safeguard India's historical ties with Sri Lanka and to ensure the unity and integrity of India by satisfying the aspiration of favoured Tamil Nadu. She had to take a "balanced path" so as to satisfy both the parties concerned. In her distress over the events in Sri Lanka, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated India's stand: "We are against secessionist movements in sovereign states, nor do we condone terrorism. In dealing with their particular people, we hope Sri Lanka will respond with

the same spirit and bear in mind the sentiments of the Indian people".<sup>8</sup> This was indeed a fairly carefully worded statement which showed India's neutrality and at the same time to respect the nation's wide sentiment regarding Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka. What influenced India's move in keeping the Tamil problem as an internal was perhaps the existence of and experience of similar secessionist movements in India and its commitment to the principles of NAM.

Despite Mrs. Gandhi's repeated assurance to Sri Lanka that "India does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka nor does it want to interfere in their internal affairs,"<sup>9</sup> the Jayewardene government suffered from an illusion of threat perception. Sri Lanka's threat perception from India was totally served by India's leniency towards the militants in allowing them to settle in Tamil Nadu. The sheltering and alleged existence of guerrilla-training centres in Tamil Nadu became the most controversial since 1983 which generated friction between the two governments and raised widespread fears in Colombo.

A Report appearing in India Today<sup>10</sup> about the presence of the Tigers training base in Tamil Nadu confirmed Sri Lanka's

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8. S.D. Muni, "India and Emerging Trends in South Asia, in Satish Kumar (ed) Year Book on India's Foreign Policy 1982-83 (New Delhi, 1985) p. 82.
  9. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XXXIX, No.6, July 1983, Col.518
  10. Sehgar Gupta "Sri Lanka Rebels in Tamil Nadu, India Today" (New Delhi, march 1984)



suspensions & fears. The article had created an unprecedented uproar in the Sri Lankan Parliament. The Prime Minister Premadasa (now President) himself took the lead in reacting to this report by asking a pertinent question: "What would be the position of India if we allowed the Sikhs to come here and train themselves to fight the government of India."<sup>11</sup> Despite the Indian government denial to the contrary Sri Lanka, in the meantime, tried to internationalise the issue by sending the copies of the report to the capitals of many countries with a view to exposing Indian connections with Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) even suggested that the "UNP Government should take the matter in other forums such as NAM... and also try India for its accommodation of Tigers before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the same way as Nicaragua sued the USA and won eventually."<sup>12</sup>

According to Time Magazine, "New Delhi's sponsorship of the separatists had its origins in Jayewardene's 1977 election victory, which drove PM Sirimao Bandarnaike, a friend and an ally of the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, from power. Jayewardene soon angered Mrs Gandhi by adopting pro-Western foreign and economic policies that New Delhi interpreted as a rejection

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11. The Hindustan Times, August 9, 1983.

12. Sri Lanka Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 28, No.7, Col. 565.

of its leadership in South Asia. Jayewardene also applied for membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations, Indian officials suspected that he might even be on the verge of offering military bases and listening posts to the United States... In 1982, agents of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India's foreign intelligence agency, recruited one of those groups, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and brought them to India for training in espionage and sabotage." It further states that "soon after the July 1983 ethnic violence, shocking India's own Tamil population of 50 million, the RAW began to recruit at least five Tamil separatist groups. Much of the training took place at the Indian army's Dehra Dun complex in the Himalayan foothills, where the recruits were taught how to handle small arms and how to make land mines using gelignite, which was to become the explosive of the choice for one of the groups, the LTTE.<sup>13</sup>

### III

#### INDIA'S MEDIATORY DIPLOMACY

Though the mystery about the guerrillas' training in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere remained an irritant in the bilateral

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13. Sri Lanka: Case Study of a Disaster; Time, Vol 133, No.14, April 3, 1989.

relations between India and Sri Lanka, Mrs. Gandhi deputed G. Parthasarathi to visit Sri Lanka and to offer India's "good offices" in seeking a solution to the problem. However, these efforts ultimately couldn't succeed because it did not help convince Sri Lanka of India's sincerity as an honest broker. In the absence of an Indian government effort to restrain the militant activity, anti-Tamil and anti-India feelings became almost synonymous in the Sinhalese psyche. And it was this psyche that determined the responses of the Jayewardene government to India's mediatory diplomacy. Hence, the stalemate of the All Party Conference (APC) over the decentralisation of powers.

In the post-Indira Gandhi era, a perceptible change came over the Indian government Sri Lankan policy. The new government led by Rajiv Gandhi made a sincere efforts to gain the Sri Lankan government trust by restraining the militant Tamil activity in India. This policy was a part of the new leadership's overall effort to promote greater understanding between India and its neighbours. India always ruled out the possibility of military solution to the Tamil problem. Neither did India endorse the Tigers' demand for an independent state of Eelam. Instead, promising India's support for Sri Lanka's unity and integrity, Rajiv Gandhi viewed the problem in Sri Lanka "as problem of equal civil and political rights for all citizens and adequate measures of

autonomy for the Tamils."<sup>14</sup> He emphasised that the issue was internal problem of Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the President Jayewardene and so he did not want India to be involved in the matter.<sup>15</sup> But India is affected as a result of its backlash on us in the refugees coming to India and problems arising in Tamil Nadu including adverse effects on the Indian fishermen."<sup>16</sup> This policy was not a new one as such. Mrs. Gandhi had also asserted that India could not be a silent observer to the happenings in Sri Lanka. She did not support the separatist demand but remained aware of the humanitarian considerations of the problem. However, India's commitment for a peaceful political solution made Colombo to accept the mediation of New Delhi in bringing Tamils and the Sri Lankan government to negotiating table. India's indepth understanding of the problem by now changed its approach and it felt the necessity of negotiation with the Tamil militants.

A meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and the then Sri Lankan Minister for Internal Security Lalit Athulathumudali in February 1985 was described as "most constructive" and the Indian government took two important steps that seemed to convince Sri Lanka of Rajiv's earnestness and sincerity of purpose in solving the ethnic problem. Later Romesh Bhandari replaced G. Parthasarathy

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14. The Times of India, December 4, 1984.

15. Ibid., June 5, 1985

16. Ibid., June 1, 1985

as the Prime Minister's special envoy dealing with the Lankan problem. A second and more important step was to curb Tamil militant activity in India. In fact, Indira Gandhi's reluctance to discourage the Tamil militants had been a major irritant in Indo-Sri Lanka relations, and curbing Tamil separatist activity was an important pre-requisite to convincing Sri Lanka of India's sincerity in serving as an honest broker. Having won the Parliamentary election with a thumping majority, Rajiv Gandhi was less constrained in moving against the Tamil militants."<sup>17</sup> Thus, on March 29, 1985, the Indian coast guard intercepted a boat carrying guns and explosives to Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, and in less than a week later Indian custom officials in Madras port seized container loaded with arms and ammunition bound for Sri Lanka. Action was also taken to remove Tamil militants from their bases.

Thus, New Delhi was able to create a better climate by clamping down on militants and bringing immense pressure on them to give up violence and to negotiate. New Delhi also made it abundantly clear to the militants that it was opposed to an independent Tamil state and that a political solution should be sought within the framework of a United Sri Lanka. India further impressed upon the Sri Lankan government the need to grant greater regional autonomy to the Tamils. It is significant to note here

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17. P. Venkateshwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception, Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No.4, April 1988, p. 426.

that India played a dual role as it not only cleared India's dubious perception but also showed to the Tamil community about India's undoubted spirit of commitment for their cause. The leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) were often consulted to ascertain their views on all aspects of the problem before taking any initiative by India.

#### THIMPU TALKS

The new round of talks began on July 8, 1985 in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan. The talks were held from July 8-13 and August 12-17, with all the Tamil groups moderate and militants represented."<sup>18</sup> The Indian delegation was present but did not participate. This was a welcome move because the major Tamil militants for the first time expressed their readiness to consider that given a fair deal, it would be worth giving up the path of armed struggle. It is also essential to explain the role of India in the settlement talks. New Delhi restrained to the limit of bringing both the Lankan government and the Tamils together so that they could come to a positive solution. The Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself explained India's role in his context. He said: "We will not like to be told that this or that should be

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18. In all, the six Tamil groups represented include - the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the militant, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE); Eelam Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF); Eelam Revolutionary Organization of students (EROS), and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)

done, New Delhi always wants to keep off its hands in the crisis as India feels that Sri Lankans should themselves decide their fate in the present day crisis. India understands that imposition or expression of New Delhi's views would be connoted by Sri Lankan Government as an indirect political interference."<sup>19</sup>

However, despite India's diplomatic efforts to bring the concerned parties (both state and non-state actors) to the negotiating table, the two rounds of the Thimpu talks failed in the wake of the rejection by the Tamil representatives of the government proposal for the devolution of power. The talks were adjourned on August 18 after the Tamils walked out alleging that the Sri Lankan security forces had killed about 400 Tamil civilians. Moreover, Sri Lanka's behaviour during the talks indicated that it is in no mood to conclude a political settlement with the Tamils and it was preparing for a military offensive against the militants. Even as the talks were going on, there were speculations around that the Jayewardene government was busy procuring the arms from foreign sources.

#### INDIAN INITIATIVES AFTERMATH OF THIMPU

India's attempt for political solution continued even after the collapse of the second Thimpu talks. The Indian delega-

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19. Indian Express (Madras), July 16, 1985

tion led by the then Minister for Internal security, P. Chidambaram, succeeded in committing the Sri Lankan government to the principle of a provincial councils in the north and east of Sri Lanka - as the basic unit of devolution of powers. New Delhi was convinced that the provincial council offer could serve as the basis for negotiations and persuaded the TULF to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government. The other Tamil groups were not involved this time. However, the Sri Lankan government remained as firmly opposed as ever to a single Tamil linguistic unit. The militants were also assured that no final settlement would be reached without consulting them. When the Colombo proposals on provincial councils were presented to the militant leaders in October that year, all were rejected as "inadequate". The LTTE insisted that "for any meaningful political settlement, the acceptance by the Sri Lankan government of an indivisible single region as the homeland of Tamils is basic."<sup>20</sup> The outright rejection of the Colombo proposals by the Tamil militants annoyed Indian government which in a co-ordinated move with Tamil Nadu got attested known militants & their leaders and confiscated their arms and ammunition in a statewide crackdown on November 8, 1986. However, those arrested were subsequently released in order to create a better climate for the following. Rajiv-Jaye-

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20. See Frontline, 3 November, 1986



wardene meeting at the SAARC Summit meeting to be held in Bangalore a week later.

The major objective in India's mediation efforts in the aftermath of SAARC Summit, was to seek a middle path between the Tamil insistence on the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces and the Sinhalese opposition to it. This was to some extent achieved on the consensus that emerged between the Sri Lankan and Indian government on the "December 19th proposals". However, by the dawn of 1987, Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict had deteriorated into a dangerous situation. Any prospect of further negotiations with the Tamil representatives was now seriously curtailed as the Jayewardene government once again pursued its military option against the Tamil community. The provocation for such action came only from the LTTE. On 1 January\_ 1987, the LTTE started carrying out its plan to take over the civil administration in the north, which already was under its military control. Its plan to register motor vehicles, organise traffic police, and open a secretariat was seen by Colombo as a "unilateral declaration of independence". The Sri Lankan authorities imposed a ban on the supply of fuel and other essential commodities to the Jaffna Peninsula, and the government simultaneously stepped up military action both in the north and east. In the east, about 200 Tamil civilians were killed in the Batticaloa district alone towards the end of January, followed by more killings in Mannar and other northern towns.

INDIAN DILEMMA

The worsening situation compelled India to express its concern and even issue a warning note to Sri Lanka. In a message delivered to Jayewardene on February 10, 1987, the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that India was suspending its good offices and demanded that Colombo lift the economic blockade of Jaffna and affirm its commitment to the December 19th proposals. If these steps were not taken and the military option was continued, Gandhi concluded that the fighting would "be prolonged and the situation will escalate."<sup>21</sup> However, Sri Lanka's refusal to stop the military campaign against the Tamils and lift the economic blockage of Jaffna left India in dilemma. It either had to bring military pressure on a reluctant Sri Lanka to open peace talks with the Tamils or ask the LTTE to renounce violence and negotiate with the Sri Lankan government. When New Delhi attempted to pursue the LTTE to give up violence and resume the peace process, the latter replied firmly that "a correct atmosphere and mood" should be created for the resumption of negotiations. New Delhi conveyed Colombo the LTTE position and appealed once again for an immediate lifting of the Jaffna blockade. Jayewardene responded on April 10 by declaring a ten-day unilateral ceasefire. But lifting of the economic blockade and resumption of negotiations were conditional upon observance of ceasefire, and when it was violated

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21. Ibid., 12 February 1987.

by the militants, a full-scale military campaign was launched by Sri Lanka on the Jaffna Peninsula. Jayewardene warned : "Jaffna must be recaptured and any civilian casualties in the process cannot be helped."<sup>22</sup> Ignoring India's concern that continued aerial attacks on Jaffna would have serious consequences for the peace process, Jayewardene was determined to pursue the campaign and said that his government had decided to fight the militants until "either they win or we win."

Towards the end of May the Sri Lankan army and militants were engaged in fierce fighting in the Jaffna area. While both sides suffered heavy casualties, Sri Lanka was severely condemned by India on May 28 for causing civilian casualties. Following reports that about 500 Tamils were killed in the Jaffna offensive, the Indian Prime Minister warned Colombo once again that "the time to desist from a military occupation of Jaffna is now. Later may be too late."<sup>23</sup> Sri Lanka, however, went ahead of its military campaign.

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22. In an interview with the Associated Press, Jayewardene said his government would accept help from the devil himself, if necessary to fight terrorism." by Tamil militants. He also said that the December 19 proposals "still stand, if they (militants) are prepared to give up terrorism and accept all proposals upto that date." Indian Express, 3 May, 1987.

23. For the full text of the PM's statement on the Sri Lanka situation, see The Hindu, 29 May, 1987.

The Government of India was under attack for its "in - decisiveness" and "inept" handling of the Lankan situation. An Indian effort on June 3, 1987 to send an unarmed and unescorted flotilla of boats carrying food and medicines for the beleaguered Tamils was thwarted by the Sri Lankan navy. It was a soft option attempted by India only to be snubbed and blocked. Condemning Colombo's act, India once again warned that it would not remain an indifferent spectator to the plight of the Tamils in Jaffna. In a drastic move on June 4, 1987, five Indian Air Force planes escorted by Mirage 2000 fighter jets entered Sri Lanka's airspace and dropped relief supplies to the people of Jaffna, under the operation code-named "Eagle". It was a mission done on the "humanitarian grounds". It was condemned by the Sri Lankan government as a "naked violation of our independence" and an "unwarranted assault on our sovereignty and territorial integrity." However, Colombo lifted the six-month old embargo on Jaffna and ceased military operations.

Despite official condemnation of the Indian action and the Sinhalese reaction to it, Sri Lanka acted with restraint. Colombo did not demand a security council meeting, nor did it boycott the SAARC Foreign Ministers Conference in New Delhi in July at which no attempt was made to rake up the issue. Perhaps in a true assessment of the political reality - the politico-military strength of India and the refusal of any major power

to come to its rescue - Sri Lanka offered to negotiate a political settlement to the Tamil problem on the basis of the December 19 proposals. Following renewed diplomatic activity between India and Sri Lanka, Gandhi and Jayewardene signed an agreement on July 29, 1987 in Colombo, about which a detailed reference will appear in the next chapter. However, it should be noted that the July Agreement is only a bilateral one between India and Sri Lanka. The other Tamil groups did not sign it. The agreement not only made India a formal party to the Lankan tangle but also placed on it the onus of obliging the Tamil groups to respect the Agreement in its letter and spirit.

#### IV

#### FOREIGN POWERS INVOLVEMENT IN SRI LANKA

The Tamil sentiment and the geo-strategic importance of Sri Lanka to India's security compel her interest in Sri Lanka's major political developments. The Indian security perspective does not brook external involvement in the affairs of the region. As the predominant power of the region, India regards South Asia as her security zone and conceives herself as the security manager of the region. In the wake of the July riots and amidst speculation that Jayewardene was seeking foreign military assistance, Mrs Gandhi pronounced a security doctrine for the region. It

inter alia said :

India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside power; if external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help."<sup>24</sup>

In the spirit of the above doctrine, the Indian government strongly reacted to Colombo's appeal to Western powers, the US and Britain, to give arms aid to quell the ethnic riots. Sri Lanka also made appeals to her neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Much to the chagrin of India, Sri Lanka did encourage external involvement in its ethnic crisis. A militarily ill-equipped country, Sri Lanka made serious efforts to get arms aid from Western and non-Western countries to meet the Tamil violence.

Following the July riots, it was strongly suspected that the US was planning to become seriously involved in Sri Lanka's ethnic situation, not because of its own self-initiative but because of the initiative on the part of Sri Lanka who was obsessed with its fear of India. The United States instead of

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24. Strategic Survey 1983-84, IISS, London, p.90.

providing for direct military assistance as requested by Jayewardene during his US visit in June, 1984, it allocated \$160,000 for military training under the U.S. aid programme in fiscal 1985, as an instigation to buy arms from other countries by using the U.S. aid.<sup>25</sup> The Sri Lankan Union of the U.S., a body consisting of Sri Lankan expatriates, had asked the Reagan administration for counter-insurgency military equipment, stationing of U.S. military advisers in Sri Lanka and a long-term pact involving economic and military aid.<sup>26</sup> There was always a mystery of report of naval base facilities to the U.S. at Trincomalee, despite repeated denial by the U.S. government. It was reported that Sri Lanka had decided to give facilities to the U.S. navy at the Trincomalee harbour. The result was that Sri Lanka acquired American-built Bell military helicopters (Bell-212) to supplement its only other fleet helicopters. It was believed that these were strong ground for the U.S. to extend its assistance to Sri Lanka in the present day ethnic crisis.<sup>27</sup>

Trincomalee, a natural harbour in the Indian Ocean, plays a strategic role in relation to Sri Lankan foreign policy. The issue of converting Trincomalee as a US Naval base attained

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25. S.D.Muni, "Sri Lanka: The August outrage," Strategic Analysis, Vol.VIII, No.6 September, 1984, p.502.

26. The Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 March, 1984.

27. The Statesman (New Delhi) 11 March, 1984.

a new dimension in the wake of ethnic violence as it was understood that Sri Lanka might conclude a military agreement with US and thus provide facilities at Trincomalee for the U.S. naval activities in the Indian Ocean to safeguard integrity of Sri Lanka in the wake of an Indian invasion: A first step in this direction was to allow the U.S. military personnel in the Indian Ocean region to come to Trincomalee for "rest and recreation". Trincomalee would, of course, not be called as a U.S. base but it will provide the necessary facilities to the U.S. navy."<sup>28</sup> The frequent visits of Sri Lankan President and its Ministers to the U.S. in 1984 and consequently the visit of the U.S. Defence Secretary and diplomats to Sri Lanka had strengthened this suspicion.

Moreover, the U.S. interest had further been augmented in Sri Lanka when the government of Sri Lanka negotiated with a U.S. giant company, Bermuda-based oil company Oreleum, to lease the oil storage tanks at Trincomalee harbour in December 1983. The Indian tender for the same was rejected. The Sri Lankan government further offered facility to the U.S. for the establishment of six Voice of America (VOA) transmitters with a total capacity of 2500 MW. Under the agreement, the Sri Lankan government would have no operational control over the VOA broadcasts. The

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28. New Perspectives, "United States Enclave in Sri Lanka," Vol. 15, February, 1985, Helsinki, p.24.



installation of VOA in Sri Lanka was a part of U.S. strategy for militarization of Indian Ocean as it was believed that the VOA station in Sri Lanka will be a perfect cover for a planned secret communication centre and an electronic listening post for the U.S. navy.

New Delhi made allegations that Sri Lanka's agreements with the United States posed threats to the Indian security as Washington had succeeded in establishing the military relationship with Colombo. Mrs Gandhi perceived India as being encircled by military thrusts of the Reagan administration's foreign policy. In her statement at Geneva she stated that "Israeli presence in Sri Lanka will be used by USA to encircle, confront and destabilise India."<sup>29</sup> Questions were also raised in the Indian Parliament about the Sri Lanka's intentions with regard to the strategic Trincomalee post and VOA agreements. It was described that the VOA transmitter in Sri Lanka was not for broadcast but part of American intervention in this region.<sup>30</sup> It was argued by many that it was not only posing formidable challenge to the India's foreign policy but also pushing the Tamil question away from an amicable solution.

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29. M.G.Gupta, "Indian Foreign Policy : Theory and Practice (Agra, 1985), p.323.

30. The Times of India, 5 August, 1985.

Britain appeared to be most responsive to the arms acquisition by Sri Lanka. Both colonial past and present Commonwealth links might have impelled a British initiative to find a political solution to the ethnic crisis in her former colony. A small quantity of arms including Congar Patrol boats, rifles, ammunition and armoured cars was flown into Sri Lanka. A former SAS personnel servicing the Jersey based private security organisation, Keeney Meeney Services (KMS), had been involved since 1984 in training the Sri Lankan security forces in counterinsurgency tactics. Britain admitted that about 20-ex-servicemen were engaged in Sri Lanka but claimed that she had no control over them.<sup>31</sup> During her visit to his country in April 1985, Jayewardene urged Mrs Thatcher to station British troops in Sri Lanka or loan them as Britain had been doing in some parts of Central America. However, the British Prime Minister avoided any commitment to Jayewardene's plea. Jayewardene also tried to revive the much-forgotten Anglo-Ceylon Defence Agreement signed in 1948 to obtain British support. However, it should be noted in this context that the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked Sri Lanka to settle the ethnic problem at a regional level without either British or Commonwealth involvement. The Commonwealth Summit held at Vancouver in October 1987, nevertheless, fully endorsed the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement.

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31. The Hindu, 6 March 1987.

It should be noted here that during the period of Thimpu talks, Sri Lankan government was busy procuring arms from the foreign sources particularly from Pakistan and China. Sri Lanka purchased four helicopter gunships from Pakistan and eighteen gunboats from China. Following a Pakistan military mission's visit to Sri Lanka in late July, 200 young men and thirty 'group leaders' left for training in Pakistan.<sup>32</sup> In April 1984, Jayewardene visited Pakistan, ostensibly to seek more arms. About a month later his visit to Pakistan, Sri Lanka received from that country a small quantity of arms and ammunition including AJ-47 and M-16 rifles. Late General Zia-ul Haq paid a five day visit to Sri Lanka the same year in December. Expressing total solidarity with the UNP government in its conflict with the Tamils, the visiting President called upon all the friends and neighbours of Sri Lanka to extend moral, political and economic support to Colombo. Promising Pakistan's fullest support to combat Tamil terrorism, President Zia said : "We cannot allow states to be wrecked from within, what is happening to Sri Lanka today can happen to Pakistan tomorrow."<sup>33</sup> Islamabad continued to supply arms and train Sri Lanka's security forces until the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed. The Pak-Lanka relations were commonly determined by the need to counter Indian domination in the region.

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32. India Today, 31 August, 1985.

33. The Hindu, 16 December, 1985.

China was one of the important extra-regional powers which supplied arms to Sri Lanka in considerable quantity. China was believed to have supplied mainly patrol boats T-56 assault rifles to Colombo. During the visit of Jayewardene in 1985, China agreed to provide "Shanghai" class patrol boats to strengthen the Lankan navy. During the visit of Chinese Air Force Chief to Sri Lanka, arrangements for Chinese training and supply of military equipments, including the sophisticated night surveillance items were finalised.<sup>34</sup> However, the Chinese arms supply to Sri Lanka need not necessarily imply a commitment to Jayewardene's fight against Tamils, but may be a part of her export drive in promoting arms sales abroad.<sup>35</sup>

The involvement of Israel raised a bitter controversy within and outside Sri Lanka among the foreign powers which assisted Sri Lanka. Israel supplied arms to Sri Lanka and her intelligence agency, Mossad, for internal security and counter-insurgency purposes was involved. It should be noted that Sri Lanka had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1970 and in the absence of official relations between the two countries an 'Israeli Interest Section' was opened within the U.S. Embassy with the USA acting as a protecting power. As already mentioned

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34. S.D. Muni, op.cit., p.502.

35. P. Venkateshwar Rao, op.cit., p.96.

Jayewardene stated that the refusal of Western countries to come to his aid in fighting Tamil terrorism had forced him to seek Israeli help. The secret meeting in Paris between Jayewardene and the Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in October 1985, the arrival of an Israeli trade delegation in May 1986 in Colombo and the visit by the Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Sri Lanka in November 1986 - all without diplomatic relations - confirmed the Israeli aim. Apart from training the security forces in counter-insurgency, Mossad agents were also known to operate in the guise of businessmen, agriculturalists, consultants and water management experts. The Mahaweli Development scheme in Eastern Lanka employed Israeli experts who were engaged in evicting Tamils from their lands and colonizing the Sinhalese there.<sup>36</sup>

Apart from the above-mentioned foreign powers, South Africa, Singapore and Malaysia were the other countries which were believed to have supplied arms to Sri Lanka. Thus, while the reluctance of the United States and Britain to get involved in Sri Lanka's conflict was a positive gain for Indian diplomacy, the interference of other powers, Pakistan and Israel in particular, caused some security concerns in India. It may be pointed out in this respect that India's strict policy of "non-interference" and commitment for a "political consensus" was misunderstood

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36. Indian Express, 6 March, 1987.

by Jayewardene who interpreted it as a green signal for going ahead with his military-oriented approach. Thus, soon after the Thimpu talks were adjourned the President Jayewardene asserted that the "Tamil problem is more a military problem and any military problem has to be tackled militarily."<sup>37</sup> In his interview to India Today in December 1985, Jayewardene answered in the affirmative when asked if the ceasefire reached in June 1985 was only an attempt to buy time by the Sri Lankan government. He continued: "Now we are acquiring arms and getting our soldiers trained. We are getting ready for a decisive military action."<sup>38</sup>

The Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi realised the danger of Indian interest in the Indian Ocean region later in the wake of Colombo's massive armament built-up and an unprecedented strong establishment of military nexus with the UK, USA, Pakistan, China and Israel, the failure of all India Peace initiatives and occasional pronouncements in military solution to the ethnic crisis by Jayewardene made New Delhi to understand the forces working behind Colombo and its consequent impact. The Annual Report of the External Affairs Ministry in India accused Pakistan and

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37. India Today, September 1985.

38. Ibid., 15 December, 1985

Sri Lanka of forging a military nexus and noted increase in the Sri Lanka's defence expenditure."<sup>39</sup> It also expressed concern over the activities of foreign security agencies such as Israeli intelligence organization and British Military experts operating in the Island Republic.

However, it is to be noted here that while exporting arms to the Sri Lanka, the US and UK equally supported a political settlement to the Tamil problem through conciliation and peaceful negotiation. Robert Peek, the then US deputy assistant secretary of the state said; "We have long felt that a dialogue between India and Sri Lanka was an absolutely essential ingredient in a search for a political settlement in Sri Lanka".<sup>40</sup> Despite their occasional expression, the US and UK never stopped exporting arms to Sri Lanka. These Western powers failed to understand the role of Sri Lankan force and the government in escalating violence and merciless onslaughting of 'Tamils'. This biased, politically motivated altitude of these powers, increased Jayewardene's advocacy to find a military solution to the ethnic problem.

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39. The Times of India, 19th March, 1986

40. Ibid., June 6, 1985.

## CHAPTER - IV

### ASSESSMENT OF INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD

Prior to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, the political price of conducting the war by the Sri Lankan government had caused a grievous effects on its democracy. The state emergency renewed time and again, had restricted all civil liberties. On social side, the human cost had become heavier and brutal. Some 600 Sinhalese civilians and 500 military and police deaths were recorded, and many more were wounded and rendered handicapped for the rest of their lives. Thousands of Sinhalese had become refugees in their own country, driven out by Tamil militants from numerous settlements, especially in the East. The Tamils also paid a heavier price, with at least 5,000 killed and many more injured, losing thousands as political prisoners and displacing more than 150,000 as refugees in India and elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> The rift between the two communities: Tamils and Sinhals - grew wider daily; insecurity and fear had gradually been incorporated into life's routine as normal. Out of the political factors, the President Jayewardene's ruling United National Party (UNP) was scheduled to face the two consecutive elections for the Presidency and Parliament in 1988-1989 respectively. The deteriorating state of the war-weary Sri Lankan economy had cast a dark shadow over the electoral prospects of

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1. These figures relate to the years 1983-1987 i.e. prior to signing the Accord.



the UNP, and the main opposition party. the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) alongwith several other smaller parties had seized the popular initiative. Moreover, the President had also to face the intensified violence and terrorism by the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). The JVP, emerged as the unpredicable element in any political equation in Sri Lanka, with an aggressively Chauvinistic organization having a sizeable following among younger Buddhist clergy. It has spread its tentacles deep in the South and has reportedly infiltrated into the rank and file of the army, as also the lower echelons of bureaucracy.

On the economic front, the diversion of scarce resources for military expenditure and the loss of the tourist income radically rearranged the country's development priorities. The Sri Lankan economy became dramatically militarised with 17% of the national budget allocated to defence by 1986 compared to 4% a decade earlier.<sup>2</sup> Foreign aid which brought in US\$ 625 million from the Aid Consortium was likely to be curtailed by the donor countries in the wake of continuing ethnic strife. The currency was devalued from 21.32 rupees per US\$ 1 in 1979 to 29.90 rupees in September 1987. Unemployment was on the increase and the number of jobless reached one million by mid-1987."<sup>3</sup>

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2. For details see Central Bank of Ceylon, Review of the Economy (Annual) Colombo, 1988).
  3. R.B. Korale, A Statistical Overview of Employment & Unemployment Trends (mimeo) (Colombo: Min. of Finance, and Planning) 1988.

In effect, internally, increasing violence, Wanton killings, arson, vandalism, unimaginable brutality, loss of tourism, fall in exports, vast increases in defence expenditure, inflation, intense political problems, augmentation of Sinhalese Chauvinism, *alienation* of virtually the entire Tamil population, and a dangerous proximity to a division of the country, had together posed great difficulties to the Jayewardene government.

Externally, the Sri Lankan government attempted to move closer to the West for seeking weapons and training for the security forces, while damaging its non-aligned credentials; seriously strained its traditionally friendly relations with India. Moreover, the reluctance on the part of both USA and UK to get involved in the ethnic crisis, further disappointed the President Jayewardene, as noted earlier. The government was clearly unable to put down the terrorists largely because of the popular support the Tamil militants enjoyed in the Northern Tamil area of the island. The sancturies the militants had in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere and the backing they enjoyed from the Indian government and a sizeable section of the population of Tamil Nadu greatly worried Jayewardene government. Hence, the termination of war with India's assistance appeared as a possible solution to reverse the sagging popularity of the government as well as the revival of the economy. The Accord was expected to set the stage for a return to economic and political normalcy, an environment in

which the UNP felt it could maximise its electoral prospects-

#### **Domestic Compulsions of Indian Government:**

On the Indian side, apart from the pressure of the State of 'Tamil Nadu on the central government as well as the threat to the country's security concerns on its southern flank, (these have already been explained in the foregoing chapter), Rajiv Gandhi's political calculations also figured in the Accord. It may be mentioned that at the time of signing the Accord, Rajiv Gandhi's popularity was on the decline. His party had suffered several electoral setbacks in state assembly elections. The party was beset with internal crises with several key figures either having resigned or been expelled. One of Gandhi's last remaining electoral strongholds was the state of Tamil Nadu. Here, nearly 150,000 refugees had come from Sri Lanka. Although sympathetic and supportive of the militants' cause, the Tamils in South India were becoming disturbed both by the cost of the refugees and their periodic skirmishes that often disrupted public peace. Rajiv Gandhi's settling of the dispute served to put an end to these problems and as a consequence, he was praised for his performance. The Accord was hailed in Tamil Nadu. Under the Agreement, the Tamil refugees would be received back in the Northern & Eastern Provinces and offered assistance for resettlement.

The Accord, therefore, served Rajiv Gandhi's internal political needs in another respect. Besieged by internal crises instigated by Sikh separatism, electoral defeats and bribery scandals, Gandhi's international peace-making role served to distract attention from his domestic difficulties.

### Major Political Aspects of the Accord

The political gains were obtained by incurring certain commitments reaffirmed. Paragraph 1.2 of the Accord states that "Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers." and that "(1.3) -- each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured."<sup>4</sup> Moreover\_ under the Accord, the Northern and Eastern provinces are provisionally united for approximately a year at the end of which a referendum in the Eastern Province would determine whether it would remain in the merged unit. Elections would be held before December 1987, under Indian observation, to the Northern and Eastern provincial council. However, the merger posed a hurdle in past because of the ethnic mix in the Eastern province. The 1981 census showed that Tamils constituted 42% Muslims 32%, and Sinhalese 25% of the province's population.

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4. See the text of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, July 29, 1987. (New Delhi: Publications Division, Govt. of India, 1987).

Despite this relatively balanced tripartite mixture, the Tamil militants claimed this region as well as the Northern Province as their traditional homeland in Sri Lanka. In the Accord, this Tamil argument was conceded temporarily and provisionally by the Sri Lankan government. Thus, the Agreement itself fulfilled most of the Tamil aspirations, the real and imagined fears of the Tamil community are addressed. Tamils as well as other minorities, are explicitly recognised as an integral and legal part of Sri Lankan society, & further their distinct cultural identity are to be nurtured by the state. It went far beyond what most had thought that they would get from the Sri Lankan Government. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution enabled the setting up of the Provincial Councils, changing the character of Sri Lanka's polity from unitary to quasi-federal, devolution of powers to the Provincial Councils, end to the discrimination of Tamils in education, employment, Tamil restored as the official language and an opportunity to merge the north and east if the majority of these areas agreed. While most of the areas contested by the militants were acknowledged as "traditional Tamil homelands", the Agreement scotched the most extreme demand of an Eelam. The Eelam demand went against the Indian policy and the terms of the Agreement which called for the maintenance of Sri Lanka's territorial integrity.

### Military Aspects

It may be mentioned that inability on the part of Jayewardene government to militarily finish the militant opposition during "Operation Liberation", and the fact that India was playing a more assertive role in ethnic crisis, made the Sri Lankan government conclude that negotiation and compromise were the only way to stop the disintegration of the country. What further reinforced this perception was the lukewarm support it received from those countries which had supported the Jayewardene government, when it came to the crunch during the airdrop by the Indian Air Force in June, 1987. Hence, the Sri Lankan government, however grudgingly, agreed to a compromise and acknowledged the Indian role in ending the conflict.

Out of the Accord, the Sri Lankan government secured the cessation of hostilities, bringing the promise of peace to a war-weary population. It was stipulated that both sides would desist from military activities within 48 hours of the signing of the Accord, and within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities. The Tamil militants were to turn their weapons over to Sri Lankan authorities at designated points. India undertook to prevent the continued use of its territory as a base from which to launch military operations into Sri Lanka, and it agreed to patrol the Palk Straits jointly with the Sri Lankan navy to intercept the

flow of weapons from South India to the Jaffna Peninsula. To end hostilities, Sri Lanka made several military concessions i) troops in the North and East were confined to their barracks; ii) the new bases built in the Vadamanachchi sector of the Jaffna peninsula, deep in Tiger territory and posing a direct threat to Jaffna city, were to be closed; iii) the 'homeguards' viz, the villagers trained and armed by the government for self-defence, were to be disarmed; and finally over 5000 Tamil detainees were to be released.

India also undertook a major role in the military exchange. It agreed to provide troops on request by the Sri Lankan government to enforce the Agreement. The Accord underscored India's responsibilities stating that India agreed to "underwrite" and guarantee the resolutions, cooperate in the implementation of these proposals" (para.2.14), and to offer troops as well as arms and military training to Sri Lanka. Simultaneously, the Sri Lankan government announced the entry of some 6000 to 7000 Indian troops into the Northern and later the Eastern province to assist in implementation of the military aspects of the Accord. By early 1988, over 60,000 Indian troops were in Sri Lanka to collect arms from the militants and to enforce general law and order. The most significant military undertaking by the Indian army was to ensure "the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and the

Eastern provinces" (paragraph 2.16 (e)). While signing the Accord in Colombo the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi explained that it was security fears that caused the LITE to be reluctant to cooperate. India undertook to provide that security substituting itself for the Tamil militants. To have Indian troops on its soil meant that Sri Lanka made a major foreign policy concessions to India, and this aroused the fears of many Sinhalese that their ancient anxieties over Indian invasion had become a reality through the ineptness or complicity of their own government.

It was also clear that a mediating Indian military was indispensable for the surrender of Tamil arms and the cessation of hostilities. While President Jaywardene stated that Indian troops in Sri Lanka were ultimately under his direction, the fact remained that they had considerable autonomy. Indian troops, it seemed, would not leave willingly if their withdrawal meant a threat to Tamils by Sinhalese forces. In India, underwriting the Accord and guaranteeing the physical security of the Tamils gave the impression that an Indian presence in the dispute had become entrenched. Even though the Accord called for the eventual installation of normal civil and law enforcement administration in the north and the east, the writ of the Indian government would always be qualified by the Accord's guarantee of Tamil security by Indian military might.



It should be noted again that the July Agreement is only a bilateral one between India and Sri Lanka; the Tamils did not sign it. The Accord not only made India a formal party to the Lankan issue, but it also placed on it the onus of obliging the Tamil groups to respect the Agreement in its letter and spirit. While the Indian government did succeed in bringing the various Tamil militant groups around to accepting the Agreement, the LTTE were most reluctant to relinquish control over their weapons. The LTTE approved the Accord reluctantly under New Delhi's heavy pressure. The LTTE supremo, Velupillai Prabhakaran openly argued that the loss of their weapons invited "genocide" of the Tamil people who would be left at the mercy of Sinhalese administration. He continued to talk about Tamil Eelam and complained that the July Agreement fell far short of his political objectives. He argued that India was keen on striking an Accord with Sri Lanka to protect its regional interests and that the Tamil issue was not central to it. Since the Tamils were consulted ex-post facto, the LTTE leader maintained that they were not bound by the Agreement. It thus became increasingly obvious that the LTTE was bent on flouting the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement on the slightest pretext. However, the Accord was to be executed with or without the Tigers' cooperation. India explicitly undertook to disarm the Tamil militants if they refused to surrender their weapons. It made a very poor surrender of arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF),

well beyond the initial 72-hour deadline. The cautious optimism of the Indian authorities that the Tigers would comply with the terms of the Accord soon proved to be wrong. It killed members of the rival Tamil groups, and refused to join the proposed Interim Administrative Council (IAC) for the Northern and Eastern Provinces, on which Sri Lanka was willing to give the LTTE maximum representation. Finally, it declared a war on the IPKF in October, stating that it had failed to protect Tamil lives from Sinhalese attacks. The Indian army and the LTTE engaged in fierce fighting throughout October and November when the IPKF gained full control over Jaffna, the LTTE stronghold, the battle scene shifted to the East. During the internecine fighting both sides suffered heavy casualties. Civilian losses were even more severe and extensive damage was caused to property and infrastructure. The Indian operation in the peninsula was a turning point in the war, not only because the Tigers lost their stronghold but also because the Indians, the manner in which they conducted the military campaign, lost much of the goodwill they had with the Tamils, in Jaffna. There is still no convincing evidence to suggest that the LTTE was ready to meet the two conditions put forth by India: unconditional surrender of arms and unequivocal acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. As long as the LTTE refused to fulfil these two basic conditions, prospects for implementing the Agreement remain quite poor.

### Diplomatic Aspects of the Accord

From its role in terminating hostilities, India extracted broad undertakings from Sri Lanka to desist from entering into any military relations with India's adversaries. Sri Lanka, in frustration with India's role in arming and harbouring the Tamil militants, had entered into counter-vailing security and military arrangements with Pakistan, China, Israel, the UK and the USA. Sri Lanka's countervailing relations with those countries had exposed India's southern flank. Already heavily preoccupied with security threats in its northeast and northwest from the Chinese and Pakistanis, respectively, and internally destabilised by the sikh and other secessionist movements, India was wary of opening yet another front to hostile penetration. India's security needs as well as its internal threats to its unity and solidarity also compelled it to seek the Accord with Sri Lanka. At least on the surface, Sri Lanka reaffirmed its commitment to a foreign policy of non-alignment and agreed not to permit the use of its territory by foreign military and intelligence agencies against Indian interests. The relevant part of the Accord - an annexed letter from Rajiv Gandhi to Jayewardene - can be cited in full:

"Conscious of the freindship between our two countries stretching over two millennia and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow

our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:

- 1) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
- 2) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.
- 3) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tanks farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
- 4) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or

intelligence purposes".<sup>5</sup>

Overall, the foreign policy concessions that Sri Lanka made to India served India's security interests. Sri Lanka was willing to reduce, if not eliminate, its security-military connections, in particular with Pakistan and China, to accommodate India's quest for security on its southern flank. It could also be argued that Sri Lanka had decided to accept modification of its freedom to choose its friends in exchange for India's guarantee not to invade, not to sponsor anti-Sri Lankan terrorism, and not to permit the use of its territory by forces inimical to Sri Lankan territorial integrity. In effect, it meant that Sri Lanka in accepting India's terms of friendship, signalled willingness to live under the canopy of Indian foreign policy dominance.

The military and diplomatic propositions together stress a key aspect of India's long standing security thrust in the sub-continent, namely that it is willing to be an ally of a neighbouring regime in its internal troubles if that regime is prepared to meet India's regional security concerns. Similar situations had developed in the past also in India's regional relations in South Asia in which linkages between India's security interests

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5. See the "Letters exchanged between P.M. of India and President of Sri Lanka, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, July 29, 1987.

and internal stability in a given neighbouring country were focussed. Such situations were clearly evident in Nepal (1950-53); East Pakistan (emergence of Bangladesh, 1971); Sri Lanka (1971); & Sikkim (1974-75). In all these examples India's perception of its regional security interests conditioned its approach to the internal developments in the neighbourhood.

### **Regional Implications**

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord seemed to have struck a severe blow to the Chinese and Pakistani strategic moves towards India in the regional South Asian Context. It may be noted that those two countries, in particular, had been utilizing Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and resulting tensions to consolidate their own strategic presence in the island republic through the establishment of military training and weapon supplies ties. The Agreement created hurdles in this respects. The stopping of the training of Sri Lankan military officers in Pakistan had clearly been announced under the provisions of the Agreement. India had also agreed to "provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security force".<sup>6</sup> It may be recalled in this context that before the signing of the Agreement and at the time of India's

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6. See the text of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, July 29, 1989.

airdropping of relief supplies to the beleaguered Jaffna Tamils, both China and Pakistan had come with the strongest criticisms of the Indian action.

Moreover, this Accord anticipated welcome implications for the functioning of the South Asian Association for Regional cooperation (SAARC) also. It may be recalled that on the question of Tamil issue, Sri Lanka had been trying to make use of the SAARC to focus attention on its problems with India. This was evident on various occasions; at the time of the first Ministerial Meeting in New Delhi in August, 1983; at Thimpu in July 1985 and also at the time of the second summit in November 1986 in India. The most vigorous attempt was made in the June Ministerial Meeting of the SAARC in New Delhi, where with the help of Pakistan and other members, Sri Lanka wanted to extend the SAARC forum for discussing the bilateral and contentious issues, even though it was not compatible with the SAARC Charter. The signing of the Accord should discharge such attempts in future.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the reiteration of India's desired security framework under the Agreement seemed to have been endorsed by the two super powers, the US and the Soviet Union, since both of them hailed the Agreement as a very welcome regional develop-

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7. S.D. Muni, "Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement: Regional Implications" in Mainstream, vol. XXV No.48, August 15, 1987, p.21.

ment. the US response has indeed been more pronounced and outspoken. It is to be noted that the US refrained from criticising the Indian aerial action in Jaffna in June 1987, in violation of Sri Lanka's air space. The US on the other hand, appreciated India's mediatory role in Sri Lanka. The July Accord received the US enthusiastic support. The State Department called it a "bold step" and expressed the administration's readiness to assist Sri Lanka in her reconstruction effort.

However, the enthusiastic support from the US needs a closer examination because the provisions of the Accord do not seem to be compatible with the known US strategic interests in Sri Lanka. For instance, the Accord has forbidden Sri Lanka from extending to any third party precisely those strategic facilities which were either already given or suspected of being offered to the US. Similarly, no broadcasting facilities are allowed on Sri Lankan soil for purposes other than public broadcasting. The VOA deal between the Sri Lanka and US was to be disallowed from being used for military or intelligence purposes. The US reluctance to back Sri Lanka has to be understood in the overall context of US Indian Ocean strategy and her policy objectives in South Asia. In the New Cold War period the major focus of US Indian Ocean strategy has centred on South West Asia and the Persian Gulf. For US, India and Sri Lanka are not the constituent



parts of "the arc of Crisis" but Pakistan is. The ports of Karachi and Gwadar might well serve the strategic needs of Central Command (CENTCOM) better than the Sri Lankan posts of Colombo and Trincomalee.

Another factor which weighed against US involvement in Sri Lanka was the Reagan administration's attempts to improve relations with India especially after Rajiv Gandhi's success in establishing a good relationship with Regan during his visit to the US in June 1985. Rajiv Gandhi's new policy of modernisation and economic liberalisation at home led to greater understanding and cooperation between the two countries especially in the fields of transfer of technology, trade and defence sales.

However, it needs to be pointed out in this respect that the above mentioned various aspects of the Accord along with India's gains in its regional security depend a great deal on the success of the complete implementation of the Agreement. It is in this context, that we will discuss several imponderables in the implementation of the Peace Accord in the following pages.

### **Impediments in the Implementation of the Accord**

Though the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was publicised as a proof of our assertive diplomacy to resolve the outstanding

issues free from outside inter-ference, the Accord has run into several major problems in its implementation and the peace has yet not returned to the Emerald Island. Let us examine those situations which proved as impediments after the Accord was signed.

As explained earlier, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) failed to disarm the LTTE within a stipulated period of time. The LTTE eventually refused to join the interim administration. That it was not serious about entering the mainstream democratic traditions in Sri Lankan politics is clear from the constant reneging on agreements that it resorted to. The selection of the Chief Administrator of the Interim Council is a case in point. The LTTE, as per the agreement, was to give President Jayewardane a list of the names from amongst whom he would select one nominee for the post. President Jayewardane chose Mr. Sivagyanam for the post, while the LTTE preferred Mr. Padmanabhan. The President refused to oblige on two grounds - that it would undermine his authority if he bowed to the LTTE's pressure and secondly, Mr. Padmanabhan, who had earlier worked as the Assistant Government Political Agent in the East, was involved in a massive jailbreak. Secondly, the LTTE struck at Indian army posts in Northern Sri Lanka in the first phase of a new insurgency, when New Delhi decided to hand over 17 hardcore militants to the Sri Lankan authorities in Colombo. The suicide by fourteen LTTE prisoners

also added to this new problem. After its defeat in Jaffna in October 1987, the LTTE shifted its operations to the Eastern province, which is a more sensitive area because it is inhabited in a significant members by all three communities - Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese. Since October 1987, the LTTE has conducted a concerted campaign in the province, using terror tactics to destabilise the region, including the murders of Sinhalese and Muslim civilians. For propaganda against the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), the LTTE has also exploited acts of violence and indiscipline committed by some Indian soldiers on Tamil civilians.

The unsatisfactory military situation prevented the holding of provincial council elections scheduled to be held in mid-March, 1988, and even the conduct of normal civil administration in the Eastern Province. However, the former Sri Lankan President Jayewardene issued a proclamation on 8th September, 1988 for the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, despite the die-hard Sinhala opposition to such merger. Then he directed the Election Commissioner of Sri Lanka to gazette the elections. Jayewardene also agreed to release 500 to 600 Tamil political prisoners granting them amnesty as per the Agreement. Meanwhile, the Election Commission of Sri Lanka called for nominations to the 71-member Provincial Council which has 36 seats from the North and 35 from the East. Later, it was announced that elections

would be held on November 19, 1988.

Since the successful conduct of the elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council in Sri Lanka would constitute as the first concrete step towards ensuring the safety and security of the Tamils in island, in accordance with the implementation of the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The LTTE did not only participate in these elections, but also tried to disrupt the electoral process by issuing death-threats to those who would go for polling. It tried a number of attacks to disrupt the elections and in a number of cases, there were clashes with the IPKF. Besides, the strategy of the Sinhala elements, who were opposed to the merger of Northern and Eastern Provinces, was to spread the propaganda that the security in the North and East was not good enough to hold elections. By insisting that the situation was not ripe enough for elections, the plan of the Sinhala elements was to get them postponed till the presidential election on December 19, 1988. The reasoning was that neither the SLFP candidate Sirimavo Bandarnaike nor the ruling UNP contender Ranasinghe Premadasa would have the same dedication as Jayewardane in implementing the provisions of the Agreement. Besides, if the Provincial council elections were not held, the Tamils would veer around the view that they would gain nothing from the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. thus, it became imperative that elections must be announced and held and also Tamil government in the North-Eastern

Province should be firmly established. The Jayewardene's proclamation on the merger, followed by the notification of elections to hold the elections as scheduled on November 19, 1988 and the release of Tamil detainees, provided a fillip.

However, the elections to the North Eastern Provincial Council were conducted successfully as scheduled, under the protective security of the IPKF against great odds. The combined alliance of Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) government with Varadharaja-Perumal as Chief Minister was established. The successful conduct of elections not only proved the Tamil's desire for peace and democracy but also their faith in Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement and the Indian-Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). According to Lt. Gen. A.S. Kalkat, General Officer Commanding, Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), The three principal factors which contributed to the successful conduct of the elections were : 1) the determination indicated by both the government of India and the Sri Lankan government to implement the agreement in full and the unmistakable signals sent in this regard which permeated down to the population in the North-Eastern Province; 2) the faith and confidence of the majority of the Tamils in Sri Lanka in the agreement and their intensive desire for the path of peace and democracy as against the LTTE's option of the gun and the

bombs; the success of the IPKF operations in creating the necessary environment by the courage, dedication and determination of the Indian soldier against the most difficult odds.<sup>8</sup>

The second impediment which has been disturbing for the survival of the Accord is the anti-Accord and anti-Indian militancy led by the JVP in the South. The South which is the heartland of the JVP, comprises mainly of the Sinhala Budhists, and the people of the area known as Ruhunu, believe that historically it is from their region that defending armies have repulsed attacks on the Sinhala nation. It is from here that kings have marched forth to repel invading Chola armies, and people believe that the accord and the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) are the latest in a series of invasions from India. They feel that once again it is the people of the South who have to rise and repel this threat. It was only after the Accord that the JVP managed to mobilise people in the region with its call to all "patriotic people" to oppose the Accord and the "traitorous government which had invited Indian forces into Sri Lanka."<sup>9</sup> It may be noted that this symptom of the Sinhalese reaction to the Agreement was exhibited when one of the white-uniformed men of

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8. See Frontline, December 10-23, 1988.

9. Ibid., (Madras) 10-23 December, 1988.

Sri Lankan naval honour guard, made an attempt on Rajiv Gandhi's life at the farewell guard of honour presented to him after signing of the Agreement with J.R. Jayewardene. It is a well-known fact that the JVP element has been strong in the various universities and it is reported to have infiltrated at the lower level of army as well as bureaucratic sectors. Moreover, a spate of politically motivated killings generally attributed to the JVP have occurred since August 1987, with most of the victims either members of the ruling party or of the left political parties that support the Accord. This situation forced the then President Jayewardene to postpone a bye-election scheduled for mid-March 1988, as well as elections to some of the provincial councils in the South originally scheduled for April 1988.

It may be noted again that on June 20, 1989 the Premadasa government reimposed emergency in Sri Lanka following the transport strike spearheaded by the JVP. It may be recalled that Mr. Premadasa had been critical of the Jayewardene administration for imposing the emergency. Therefore, one of President Premadasa's first acts on assuming office had been to lift the five-and-a-half year old emergency on January 11, 1989. Mr. Ranjan Wijeratne, defence minister, said that "1,705 people had been killed in cold blood since January 11, 1989". He pointed out that the public services, including transport, had been paralysed, forcing workers



to keep away from work under death threats".<sup>10</sup>

A new element was added to the boycott campaign of the JVP against Indian goods from June 14 in order to force the withdrawal of Indian troops. The JVP leader, Mr. Rohana Wijewardena, demanded that "businessmen of Indian origin wind up their operations and leave Sri Lanka by June 14, according to a report published in a Sinhalese daily "Dirayana".<sup>11</sup> While the foreign minister, Mr. Rajan Wijeratne, assured that full protection would be given to all businessmen of Indian origin, the boycott move has already created panic among the Indian business community, hence, an attempt to force its members to leave could lead to serious consequences for Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

The third problem is related to the President Ranasinghe Premadasa himself. It may be recalled that when he was the Prime Minister, he refused to attend the Accord's signing ceremony and actively spoke against it. During one of his presidential campaign speeches at the party special session in Colombo, he stated: "I (as Prime Minister of Sri Lanka) had reservations on

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10. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 21 June, 1989.

11. Ibid, 12 June 1989.



the Accord not because I did not like strengthening of friendship between Sri Lanka and India. The timing of the Accord was inopportune in my view".<sup>12</sup>

With regard to the presence of IPKF in the North-Eastern Provinces, he said, "The presence of a foreign force in any country is an irritant...This is one issue on which all are in agreement unreservedly and unconditionally. If by the time I am elected President the Indian Forces have not left, I shall ensure that they are withdrawn".<sup>13</sup> He further announced that, "there is no sense in my becoming President if I am to surrender the Independence of my motherland or if I am to allow it to be divided into pieces. For the sake of remaining as President or for the sake of personal gain I shall not betray my motherland. I have not inherited such treacherous qualities. I have no intention of passing down such a shameful reputation to my descendents either... I hope to replace the Accord with a Friendship Treaty, having greater reciprocity and in keeping with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unitary character of our motherland".<sup>14</sup>

The reasoning behind the election manifesto as well, as the statements of the UNP President Premadasa might be that

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12. Sri Lanka Today: No signs of Peace, "World Focus", Vol. 103, July 1988, page 23.

13. Ibid., p. 24.

14. Ibid., p.24

"while harnessing the Sinhalese susceptibilities on the issue, he was not only trying to take the political wind out of the sails of his major political rivals Mrs. Bandarnaike, but also of the JVP which rebuilt itself on its denunciation of the Indian presence and of projecting it as the thrust of Indian hegemony and expansionism. In the process he succeeded in effectively evoking the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist collective with the IPKF presence as an universal focus".<sup>15</sup>

### **New Developments**

Each passing day, the emerging scenario in Sri Lanka brings in its wake developments which drag India further down in the quicksands of the Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic conflict. The latest in the series of crises is the President Premadasa's unilateral decision calling on India to withdraw the IPKF before the end of July, stating that "the last Indian soldier would leave the Sri Lankan soil by July 29, coinciding with the second anniversary of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord". He further added that "they (IPKF) came on our invitation and helped us. Now they must go and help us by going".<sup>16</sup>

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15. Mainstream, Vol. XXVII, No.40, July 1, 1989, p.6

16. The Times of India, 2 June 1989.

In the light of this public statement by President Premadasa with regard to the IPKF withdrawal, New Delhi was dismayed at the manner in which the President Premadasa chose to make such an important pronouncement. It maintained that even if Premadasa wanted the withdrawal of the IPKF from the island by a particular date he could have conveyed the same through a more appropriate diplomatic channel.

It may be noted that the President's marching orders came in the culmination of a series of developments of unease for New Delhi. In his determination of ensuring the peace on the Emerald Island, Premadasa had offered a general amnesty, release of all political prisoners, nomination of JVP and LTTE to Parliament, an open discussion of all their problems and even a withdrawal of the army to pre-1983 positions. The offer found acceptance from LTTE, but the JVP, which had many preconditions including withdrawal of IPKF, abrogation of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and fresh elections etc. rejected the offer.

The President Premadasa has blamed the IPKF for its role on a host of issues: The IPKF failure to disarm the Tamil militants, its role in the ethnic clashes between Tamils and Muslims in the east. It has been argued that the factors that prompted Premadasa to ask the IPKF to clear out from the Island were:

- 1) A strident demand within and outside Lankan Parliament for an end to the IPKF's presence which was articulated even by the members of the ruling UNP who were unsparing in their attacks on it for its failures, atrocities and politicking;
- 2) The possibility of breaking a propaganda handle of the JVP and preventing a possible bloodbath of Indians and Sri Lankans of Indian origin;
- 3) His own election pledge that he would not keep the IPKF for long;
- 4) The talks with LTTE, which reportedly offered a ceasefire in the northern province, provided that the President ordered troop pullout before the second round of talks began. This would also give a respite to the overstretched Sri Lankan army;
- 5) Hope of bringing JVP to talks, which could be followed by a recognition of JVP as a political party and amnesty to all terrorist outfits;
- 6) The possibility of winning over the Tamil-speaking Muslims, whose vote is crucial in the postponed referen-

dum in which people of the eastern province have to decide on merger with the northern province. The Muslims have become restive after a spate of killings and abductions attributed to Sri Lankans as well as the ruling Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front and the IPKF, and finally

- 7) Intelligence reports that the IPKF is arming the EPRLF cadres."<sup>17</sup>

It may be further noted in this context that despite giving extra-ordinary powers to the security forces to arrest chaos, Mr. Premadasa has acknowledged the futility of his vaunted policy of reconciliation to the JVP. Neither the release of 1,800 political prisoners nor Mr. Premadasa's "Jansaviya" programme of generous doles to poor families helped wean the JVP away from murderous rampage. The transport strike was the last straw.

Thus, the President Premadasa's new deal to the JVP included a sharp anti-Indian stance. His opposition to the Peace Accord signed by his predecessor, Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi and in particular, the involvement of the IPKF in the predominantly

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17. See The Week (Cochin) 11 June, 1989.

Tamil provinces in the north and east, was well known. Even so, his resort to diplomatic adventurism reflected in his dramatic demand for the withdrawal of the IPKF by July 29 and reported move to take up the issue in the UN and the International Court could only be seen as a desperate bid to appease the JVP. Added to this, Sri Lanka has further regionalised the IPKF withdrawal by its decision to boycott SAARC ministerial meeting scheduled to be held on July 1, at Islamabad, thereby bringing in bilateral matters to the SAARC forum which explicitly precludes such matters.

The Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw Indian troops from Sri Lanka in the face of a clear demand for their withdrawal from the President Premadasa of Sri Lanka. The reasons for the refusal which Rajiv Gandhi cited in his speeches on June 14 and 15 are:

"We are joint guarantors to the agreement with Sri Lanka and until the agreement is completed in full we will have a responsibility to the security of Tamils and the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka".<sup>18</sup> Withdrawal must be "joint parallel exercise linked with the devolution process".<sup>19</sup>

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18. Indian Express, (New Delhi) 22 June, 1989.

19. Ibid., 22 June, 1989.

The Indian policy makers have few illusions about the viability of the provincial Tamil government led by nominated Chief Minister Annamalai Vardaraja Perumal of the rebidly anti LTTE, Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The provincial council elections, were in the first place, successful in the East; polling in the Tamil dominated north had to be postponed and even then voter turn-out was just 20 per cent. The EPRLF & ENDLF, the two main groups which participated in the election process, continue to have only a tenuous hold over the local Tamil population and would probably not survive a single day without IPKF support. Hence, the EPRLF and ENDLF have opposed to the President Premadasa's unilateral decision for the IPKF withdrawal, Moreover, the Sri Lankan government seems in no mood to give the North-Eastern Council all it requires. Not only has the Council not been given the powers promised in the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, but also its proposal to raise an armed police force - the citizens' Volunteer Force - has elicited only a lukewarm response from Colombo.

Matters have been further complicated by the Premadasa government's success in getting the LTTE to the negotiating table. The Indian foreign policy-makers suspect this to be an LTTE ploy to gain tactical advantage and perhaps gain a foothold in the local Tamil government of the North Eastern Province. The LTTE's

re-emergence in Tamil politics could have two implications: i) it could mark the beginning of a murderous campaign against the groups propped up by India, and secondly, it could provide a powerful rationale to compel India to stop meddling in Sri Lanka. Premadasa could perhaps gain considerable political mileage by getting rid of Indians. The LTTE's talks with the Sri Lankan government at Colombo regarding "the cessation of hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces" have been viewed by New Delhi as "India-baiting". For India, the withdrawal would mean leaving its task unfinished and jeopardising the gains achieved at a tremendous cost of life and money. Asking the IPKF back in such a situation would be a resounding slap on its own face. In the process, India has lost, 1,000 soldiers and spent over Rs.500 crores.<sup>20</sup> The Indian army believes that a likelier further scenario for Sri Lanka is intensified bloodletting. In the Sinhala dominated South, the violent JVP is likely to keep the Sri Lankan Security forces engaged in interminable combat and in the north-east, the LTTE if allowed to surface, is certain to precipitate internecine killings among the Tamils. While the Indian foreign policy-makers view such a future with dismay, the army regards it as inevitable: Remarked an IPKF staff officer: "In Sri Lanka, every group is going to try and wipe out the other. This is inevitable and nothing we do can stop it".<sup>21</sup> Hence, the Indian govern-

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20. The Times of India, 3 June, 1989.

21. Sunday (Calcutta), 14-20 May, 1989.



ment is reported to have sought an assurance from the Sri Lankan government that the LTTE's latest offer to cease hostilities against the Sri Lankan forces be accompanied by a pledge to end violence against other Tamil groups in the north-east province of the island. Also, India wanted to know whether the LTTE has given up its commitment to Eelam and one-party rule in the north-east. The Indian agencies are being reported to have been assisting the EPRLF's move to declare an Eelam, a separate Tamil State, if the government in Sri Lanka's north-east is dismissed by President Premadasa. As the Sri Lankan government-LTTE talks proceed and Premadasa's line on the IPKF's withdrawal becomes stronger, the EPRLF has stepped up recruitment for the citizens' Volunteer Force (CVF), which is its own political militia, in a big way. Both the EPRLF and senior level IPKF officials maintain that the creation of such a force is necessary, if not for anything else, to enable the ruling EPRLF to resist the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army in the future. Diplomatic moves between the two countries have got bogged down in the public airing of their differing perceptions on the Accord and the IPKF for which President Premadasa is partly faulted for the manner in which he asked for the IPKF's return. The question could have been raised by him either at a face-to-face meeting with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi or via a high-level emissary. But he chose to hurl the demand first via the Press, for Mr. Premadasa abetting the anti-Indian sentiment unleashed by the JVP might appear to be the earliest diversionary

tactic available to him for the time being in the totality of the emerging political scenario. Nonetheless, the friends or allies do not talk to each other from the platforms of public meetings. The Indian government is entitled to a genuine grievance on this score, but its reaction has to be cool and collected based on India's interests long-term and short-term. Under these circumstances both Gandhi and Premadasa require to adopt a more constructive and positive approach on issues pertaining to the withdrawal of Indian troops before it is too late."<sup>22</sup>

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22. Urmila Phadnis, "IPKF PULLOUT: Tact is needed, in, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 3 July, 1989.

## CONCLUSIONS

The term security has a wide connotation which is often ignored by the analysts. It is not merely concerned with defending the territorial integrity of a nation but is also concerned with political and economic stability, ethno-centric harmony and societal integration. In a broader sense of the term, security relates to all aspects of nationalism, regionalism and internationalism. Security is viewed here not only in military but equally in social, economic and political terms. And there is also an interaction between different aspects of the security at the individual, state and international levels. Hence, it requires an "eclectic" approach to understand the nuances of the different dimensions of security.

The foreign policy of any country, especially its security and strategic dimensions, is largely conditioned by its geopolitical and geo-strategic environment, by its domestic milieu and by the dynamics of the international system. Policies are conceived in the minds of the leaders, who are affected by their perceptions caused by historic-cultural and ethnic factors. This is perhaps more evident in developing societies like India, where think-tanks and public policy institutions do not exist, or have very little say in policy formulation or objective analysis. While studying India's national security perceptions vis-a-vis

its neighbouring states, we should note the context of India's emergence as an independent nation, its outlook on world order and its geopolitical dimensions. India being a British colony for more than two centuries could not easily get away from the colonial legacy. India acquired an inbuilt structure of security and threat perceptions from the British rule in the entire South Asian region in which it occupies a dominating position. After independence, South Asia's geopolitical and strategic significance has been of pivotal concern to India's foreign policy, with the exception of China even-though India has been rhetorically emphasising a broader role under the leadership of Nehru in the international affairs. The fact is that the sub-continent constitutes the Southern flank of the two powerful communist nations - Soviet Union and China. That the Himalayan states, viz, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh being highly vulnerable to the threat from China, has been fully recognised by the Indian security policy-makers in various annual reports of Ministeries of External Affairs and Defence. Hence, India's policy towards the Himalayan states is primarily determined by the historical, geographical, strategic and security factors espicially in the context of China's South Asian policy. The rise of the communists to power in China in 1949 and its rapid expansionist moves, more alarmingly in Tibet, posed a far greater threat to the Himalayan States ~~than~~ any other extra-regional powers in New Delhi's security perceptions. Thus, ~~the~~ Government of India signed Treaties of peace and Friendship with Nepal in 1950 and with Bhutan in 1949 respectively in order

to wean away of both of them from the Chinese influence, while at the same time maintaining good neighbourly relations with China itself. On the other hand, the strategic value of Sri Lanka and Maldives is important for India, especially in the context of the super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Maldives' location on the central ridge of the Indian Ocean is tempted to external powers seeking to play a dominant role in this maritime theatre. An unfriendly presence in the Maldives could lead to various kinds of intrusions into India's adjacent maritime Zones. India can ill afford instability being created in its immediate neighbourhood or military facilities being developed there by a foreign power. Indian army action in early November 1988 in Maldives to foil an attempt by a band of mercenaries to overthrow the Gayoom regime needs to be understood on these perceptual thinking. Sri Lanka's location at the Southern tip of the Indian peninsula, separated from India by a narrow stretch of water, the Palk-Strait, which is no wider than twenty miles in certain places, has continued to exert a determining influence on the foreign policy perceptions of India. The existence of a strategic harbour at Trincomalce, facing the Bay of Bengal on the island's east coast is also important from the locational point of view. Though Trincomalee no longer plays a role as a naval base, its strategic location, its potential status and uses by external powers, makes a matter of much concern to India. The reported involvement of foreign powers in Sri Lanka was partly responsible for determining India's security perceptions on the ethnic issue

in Sri Lanka, Similarly, Bangladesh's geographical proximity to Southeast Asia and Pakistan's geographical and ethnic proximity with the gulf states have vital consequences for India's defence and security. As such India's priority in her foreign policy calculus is to see the region free from tension and turmoil-internal as well as external.

Given the differentiation in domestic structures, institutional incompatibilities, the wide divergence in the perceptions of the ruling elites, differing political and economic systems, the ethnic rivalries, communal tensions and tribal subversive activities on the transborders of the states of South Asian region, the intra-regional disharmony is bound to create the problems for the functionality of the region's sub-system of security, because the latter at the minimum requires some degree of consensus among the key decision-makers. As we find that the apprehensions and fears of smaller countries of the sub-continent about India are based on the concrete notion that India's overwhelming military industrial economic, scientific and nuclear preponderance over them might jeopardise their security. A common element which surfaces in their perception and approach is the fact that at different times and in different ways, they have tried to preserve their security by reducing the impact of the perceived Indian threat. For instance, Pakistan's hectic quest for military

hardwares and its diversification of military and nuclear cooperation with outside powers, viz, USA & China, is probably based on the perceived Indian threat. Needless to say, Pakistan is not prepared to accept the role of India in the security management affairs of the region. Similarly, Smaller nations such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives do not share strategic and security perceptions of India. As a result, the conflicting postures and perceptions on the security aspect in fact, become the core security problems for India vis-a-vis its neighbouring states.

Moreover, these contradictions and imbalances in the military and economic capabilities of South Asian nations, intra-regional rivalries and dissensions have further been accentuated by the interventionist role of extra-regional powers, viz, USA, USSR and China. The destabilization has been accentuated due to the Superpowers' globalist interpretation of local disputes within the sub-continent. However, it may be noted that though the degree of involvement of the extra-regional powers have varied from time to time depending on their broader global commitments, China more than any other has emerged as the principal actor favoured by the smaller nations in their maneuvering capacity against India. Whereas, the superpowers have been reluctant to be involved in the contentious issues between India and its neighbours, China has usually come out strongly

in support of smaller powers' disputes against India. In other words just as what the Soviet Union is to India, China is to the small powers of South Asia today. Having to prepare for a two front war with adequate resources and technologies to match those of Pakistan and China, India embarked on a modernisation programme to meet the likely threats from both the sectors. While after the 1960s India only gave a side glance to Pakistan, India's basic strategies have become conditioned with the Chinese threat in mind.

In the overall analysis, it needs to be mentioned that the better option for India is to strive to dispel mutual distrust, misconceptions and suspicions, forge closer ties and promote good neighbourly relations with these countries, keeping in view the strategic calculations of outside powers and the emerging threat perceptions. India's approach to neighbours, however, has to be different to ensure peace and stability in the region and keep it secure from intrusions from extra-regional forces. As we have noted, that most of India's neighbours are mainly interested in taking advantage of their mighty neighbour's magnanimity. India has declared time and again that the unity, interest, integrity and strength of its neighbours are in its national interests. However, most of the neighbours have not been reciprocating this sentiment with equal warmth. Moreover India has viewed with concern attempts by



some of its neighbours to establish security relationship with the US and political relationship with China, not against a hypothetical Indian threat or so-called hegemonic behaviour, but to ensure their own survival. As noted earlier, Chinese influence on some of these countries arises mostly out of their perception of China as a superior power in comparison to India. China's political role in Islamabad, Colombo, Dhaka and Kathmandu has made India suspicious about the moves given the propensity of their regimes to play the China card vis-a-vis India.

Nonetheless, India is endeavouring to create an atmosphere of mutual trust free from misperceptions, prejudices or predilections. This is evident from India's assuming low profiles in the SAARC summits, meetings and conferences with a view to assuring a greater say to other south Asian nations in promoting regional co-operation. India's diplomacy in avoiding giving the impression that it is a "Big Brother" is considered a laudable move while supporting the strengthening of such regional groups. Moreover, India believes in solving regional problems through bilateral regional initiatives. The move should be towards greater understanding and cohesion within the region-reducing the role of external powers. India with its superior stature should take the unilateral initiatives in order to create a regional climate conducive to mutual cooperation. The Indian

government under the leadership of PM Rajiv Gandhi is trying to build climate of trust for a productive phase in her relations with our neighbours including China.

A much less known, though very important aspect of India's diplomacy has been her "military assistance" in support of her foreign policy objectives. This was particularly evident in her relations with neighbouring states such as Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives, primarily to safeguard her regional security interests therein. It is in this context that this study has sought to examine analytically India's perception and role in ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka.

India's efforts to find a political solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic issue have led to more than four-year old conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils into a dangerous impasse. Sri Lanka's acceptance of India's "good offices" which in practical terms meant active mediation, was a half-hearted one right from the beginning. Mrs Gandhi's doctrine of regional security and New Delhi's inability to discourage organised militant activity conducted from its soil against Sri Lanka did not help convince it of India's sincerity as an honest broker. The pro-Tamil thrust of India's Lankan policy has tended to make the Lankan majority and the Lankan authorities anti-Indian and more suspicious of their Tamils. The help (largely covert

but in some cases overt also) that was given by the Indian and Tamil Nadu Governments to the militant groups, was an aspect of this pro-Tamil thrust, which of course, is as much an offshoot of Indian politics as of Indian sentiments. Thus, in the absence of an Indian government effort to restrain such military activity, anti-Tamil and anti-India feelings became almost synonymous in the Sinhalese psyche. And it was this psyche that determined the responses and the perceptions of the Jayewardene government to India's mediatory diplomacy. For India, the Tamil sentiments as well as the geo-strategic importance of Sri Lanka to India's security compel her interest in the Sri Lanka's major ethnic conflict as the Indian security perspective does not brook external involvement in the affairs of the region. As the predominant power of the region, India regards south Asia as her security zone and conceives herself as the security manager of the region. In the wake of the July riots and amidst speculation that Jayewardene was seeking foreign military assistance, the Indian government strongly reacted to Colombo's appeal to Western powers, the US and Britain to give arms aid to quell ethnic riots. The interference by other powers, Pakistan and Israel in particular, caused some genuine security concerns in India.

However, a perceptible change came to be noticed in Indian government's Sri Lankan policy with the assumption of

power by Rajiv Gandhi. The new government's overall policy of promoting a greater understanding between India and its neighbours led it to make a sincere effort to gain the Sri Lankan government's trust by restraining the militant Tamil activity in India.

The Indian diplomatic efforts succeeded in bringing the militant Tamil leaders into directly negotiating with the Sri Lankan government at Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan. However a major weakness of the Indian diplomacy was its lack of enough leverage with rival parties in the ethnic conflict. Despite making vigorous diplomatic efforts, India could not succeed in persuading the Tamil groups, except the TULF, either to accept any of the proposals offered by Sri Lanka or come forward with concrete counter proposals of their own. Every plan that came from Sri Lanka or jointly worked out by Indian and Sri Lankan governments was rejected out of hand by the militants, who insisted on the ideas that "for any meaningful political settlement, the acceptance by Sri Lankan government of an indivisible single region (integration of Northern and Eastern provinces) as the homeland of Tamils is basic." In the meantime, the TULF also lost its clout with the emergence of the LTTE as the decisive force in the ethnic conflict. Finally, the Indian government was not able to restrain the resolute pursuit of a military campaign and the bombing and shelling of civilian populations

by Sri Lanka's armed forces.

On the Lankan side, the Jayewardene government cannot be absolved of all responsibility for aggravation of the conflict. Sharply divided between moderates and hardliners over the Tamil issue, it could never keep faith with its negotiators. It kept on changing its position from time to time, partly to yield to the hardliners and partly to gain time for a military offensive. The Sri Lankan perception of India's inability to get the Tamil define their final position for a political solution might have been partly responsible for driving Colombo towards a determined pursuit of a military solution. More importantly, India's strict policy of "non-interference" and a commitment for a "political consensus" was misunderstood by Jayewardene who interpreted it as a green signal for going ahead with his military-oriented approach. Thus, it may be recalled that soon after the Thimpu talks were adjourned, the President Jayewardene asserted that the "Tamil problem is more a military problem and any military problem has to be tackled militarily".

Hence, in the wake of Colombo's massive armament build-up and an unprecedented strong establishment of military nexus with the US, UK, Pakistan China and Israel, the failure of all Indian peace initiatives and occasional pronouncements

of military solution to the ethnic crisis by Jayewardene government made New Delhi to understand the forces working behind Colombo and its consequent impact on Indian security concerns on its southern flank. Ultimately in the context of Colombo's economic blockade of Jaffna and its stalemated military offensive and the Tamil militants' demand for Eelam, all necessiated the direct Indian action in Jaffna on humanitarian ground in order to change the ground realities, since India could not remain a silent spectator to the persecution of Tamils in Sri Lanka and their increasing influx into Tamil Nadu. However, following renewed diplomatic activity between India and Sri Lanka, the PM Rajiv Gandhi and the President Jayewardene signed an agreement on July 29, 1987 in Colombo "to establish Peace and Normalacy in Sri Lanka" The Agreement attempted to balance the demands of the Tamils for autonomy with the imperatives of retaining the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka. The Agreement provided for the creation of Provincial Councils for the Eastern and Northern regions with the options to join into the administrative unit through a referendum; and the Indian government would guarantee and underwrite the resolutions and cooperate in their implementation; and an Indian peace keeping contingent may be invited by the Sri Lankan President to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities. It was under this Agreement that the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)

landed in Sri Lanka to see through the implementation of the Accord.

The July Agreement is only a bilateral one between India and Sri Lanka, the other Tamil groups did not sign it. The Agreement, thus, not only made India a formal party to the Sri Lankan problem but it also placed on it the responsibility of obliging the Tamil groups to respect the Accord in its letter and spirit. Many critics of the Accord at that time felt that India should not have been a party to the Accord. It should have been above the dispute, helping the contending parties as a friendly, non-partisan and influential neighbour. India's clout and diplomacy should have been used in an attempt to bring the Lankan government and the LTTE to an agreement. Again, it could have underwritten any accord between disputing parties and offered to help enforce it, if both sides wanted for help. The critics maintain that under the Accord, India seemed to guarantee a peace and an order that was beyond her capacity to ensure. Indeed, India seemed to guarantee the LTTE's Cooperation on the LTTE's behalf but without the LTTE's consent. But somewhere in the bureaucratic labyrinth, the LTTE obduracy and bull-headedness and "intransigence" on the part of Jayewardene government were fully recognised and therefore not to allow this unique opportunity to go abegging, India had to force the pace in

the larger interests of peace, tranquility and stability in the region. The Accord reflected the right impulses towards settling this vexed question.

Strategically, politically and diplomatically, the Accord was a gain for India. The ubiquitous foreign hand would be removed from Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu Politics, emotionally surcharged as a result of the ethnic strife, would calm down; and diplomatically India's stature would go up. Moreover, India once again reaffirmed its role as the manager of south Asian crises.

While the Accord was itself an achievement, merely signing it could not wish away the decades of animosity between Sinhalese and Tamils. Resolute and firm action was needed to fulfil the terms of the Accord. It is here that India made its first but clearly avoidable mistake. The Indian government's handling of the Tamil militants has left a lot to be desired. The Indian government probably overestimated its influence with the LTTE, and underestimated the fighting capability of the Tigers and their commitment to a separate Tamil state of Eelam. It vacillated and was not firm enough to keep them under check, especially when India had been giving it support - moral and otherwise. The government policy from the very beginning should have been made clear to the parties to the Accord, especially the Tamil



militant groups, that any deviation from the Agreement would mean that India would come down on it heavily. But these appeared to be a shocking lack of a coherent policy within the Indian policy making structure on how to handle the events in the post-Agreement phase. The IPKF was sent in without a clear-cut mandate of disarming the militants. They were the "guardians of the Tamil populace" one day, and the next day they were hunting down the militants only half-heartedly because no clear-cut instructions were given to them. The intelligence, the army, navy, airforce and the bureaucrats all seemed to be working at cross purposes with each other. As a result the IPKF is involved in a costly war both in terms of casualties and material.

On the other hand, the internal politics of Sri Lanka has been a disturbing factor for the survival of the Accord. Following the signing of the Accord in July 1987, the anti-Accord and anti-Indian militancy launched by the JVP in the South has led to a spate of politically motivated killings, with most of the victims being those who support the Accord. Moreover, it may be noted that President Premadasa's opposition to the Peace Agreement and in particular the involvement of the IPKF in the predominantly Tamil provinces in the North and East was well known. In his determination to ensure peace in the island country, President Premadasa after assuming office made

a number of concessions to both the JVP and the LTTE. While the offer of holding negotiations with the Sri Lankan government found acceptance from the LTTE, the JVP rejected the same. Even so, President Premadasa's resort to diplomatic adventurism—reflected in his recent dramatic unilateral demand to Indian government for the withdrawal of the IPKF by July 29 and the reported move to take up the issue in the UN and International Court and the boycott of the SAARC Ministerial meeting to be held in Islamabad on 1st July, could only be seen as a desperate bid to appease the JVP. However, despite giving emergency powers to the security forces and his policy of reconciliation to the JVP, President Premadasa has not been able to contain the chaos created by the JVP which has only heightened agitation against him and his party.

In response to President Premadasa's unilateral call for the IPKF pullout, India feels that it would mean leaving its task unfinished and jeopardising the gains achieved at tremendous cost of life and money. Asking the IPKF back in such a situation would be a resounding slap on its face. Indian foreign policy decision makers have few illusions that the provincial Tamil government led by Chief Minister Varadaraja Perumal of the EPRLF would not survive even a single day without the IPKF support. Moreover, the negotiations between Sri Lankan government and the LTTE has been viewed by Indian government

as "India-baiting". India suspects that the LTTE's reemergence could mark the beginning of a murderous campaign against the Tamil groups propped up by India. That is why the Indian government has maintained that the troop withdrawal must be a "joint parallel exercise linked with the devolution process" alongwith the safety and security of the Tamil community of the North-Eastern provinces. Against the backdrop of this confused political scenario that obtains in Island country today, the diplomatic moves between the governments of India and Sri Lanka have got bogged down in the public airing of their differing perceptions on the Accord and the IPKF withdrawal.

To sum up, the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord should be viewed as a first step in a general direction towards a more durable peace in the Emerald Island. It has addressed only to a certain significant short-term issues, leaving on the agenda many of the underlying long term problems for future resolution. The terms of the Accord project both solutions as well as problems. In this sense, it has to be viewed as a dynamic instrument, clearing away some issues and creating others, a living document always available for amendments and adjustments, and not a final static writ unrealistically addressing a fluid situation that obtains in the island country today. It, therefore, entrusts responsibility on both Indian and Sri Lankan governments not only to monitor the implementation of

the Accord, but also the recommend changes leading to the larger objectives of institutionalising the peace in the Emerald Island, the protection of the rights of the Tamil minority and the safeguarding of India's larger security interests. It is in this contest that the positive and constructive approach is required on the part of both India and Sri Lanka regarding the issues of the withdrawal of peace keeping troops from Sri Lanka, because a prolonged military presence in a neighbouring country, whatever the good intentions may be, is not also a healthy development for the genuine non-alignment and regional cooperation.

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TEXT OF INDO-SRI LANKAN ACCORD

The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.

Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka,

Have this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil this objective.

In this context,

- 1.1 desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;
- 1.2 acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors), and Burghers;
- 1.3 recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;
- 1.4 also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;
- 1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations;
2. Resolve that:
  - 2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining Provinces to join to form one

administrative unit and also by a Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

- 2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period, (i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.
- 2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31 December, 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:
- (a) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2, or
  - (b) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.
- The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.
- 2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.
- 2.5 The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice; a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka; and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.
- 2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.

- 2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum.
- 2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the North and East.
- 2.9 The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka.
- Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in campus as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
- 2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of Government as are used in the rest of the country.
- 2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the process.
- 2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.
- 2.13 If the framework for the resolution is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.

- 2.14 The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.
- 2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this Agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.
- 2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,
- (a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
  - (b) The Indian Navy/Coast Guard will co-operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
  - (c) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will co-operate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
  - (d) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident there, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
  - (e) The Governments of India and Sri Lanka will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
- 2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this Agreement. The Government of India will extend full co-operation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.



- 2.18 The Official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.
3. This Agreement and the Annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have set our hands and seals hereunto.

DONE IN COLOMBO, SRI LANKA, on this the Twenty Ninth day of July of the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty Seven in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

Rajiv Gandhi  
Prime Minister of the  
Republic of India

Junius Richard Jayewardene  
President of the  
Democratic Socialist Republic of  
Sri Lanka

ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT

1. His Excellency the Prime Minister of India and His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Government of India to be invited by the President of Sri Lanka.
3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home Guards would be disbanded and all para-military personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.

The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such para-military forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.

4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.
5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that a Joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July, 1987.
6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.

Excellency,

Please refer to your letter dated the 29th July, 1987 which reads as follows:-

Excellency,

Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millenia and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:-

- (i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
- (ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.
- (iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
- (vi) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

3. In the same spirit, India will:

- (i) deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

- (ii) provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/-

( Rajiv Gandhi )

His Excellency  
Mr. J.R. Jayewardene,  
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic  
of Sri Lanka,  
Colombo

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This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(J.R. Jayewardene)

His Excellency  
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi,  
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,  
New Delhi.

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