

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS THE WHITE MINORITY REGIME IN RHODESIA 1964-73 ,

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PREFACE

Americans have always prided themselves in being a democratic country, where the government is based on the consent of the governed. Even when the US Government has not often found it feasible to intervene on behalf of movements for the attainment of democratic rights, due to pragmatic constraints, American foreign policy is presumed to be sympathetic towards them. Since the beginning of the sixties, with several African Countries becoming independent and movements for freedom and democratic governments becoming strong, the US was forced to face up to the problem of minority rule in Africa. The US found it extremely difficult to reconcile its value preference for freedom and democracy and its political, economic and security interests in supporting the Western Colonial Powers.

In Southern Africa, there were several countries where minority white regimes ruled. These white minorities in order to retain their minority character and continue their oppression of the majority had sought and often enjoyed American support. Even if the support was not very active, American apathy towards the problem of majority rule in Africa favoured these minority regimes. An effort has been made here to analyse how the United States reacted to the

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issue of White minority rule in Rhodesia.

I owe my deep sense of gratitude to my Supervisor, Professor B.K. Shrivastava, without whose guidance, patience and help, this work would not have seen the light of the day. I express sincere thanks to Professor M.S. Venkataramani who helped me in choosing the topic and has remained a constant source of encouragement.

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CHAPTER - I

UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

C H A P T E R - I

UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, United States foreign policy was by and large guided by the principle that George Washington had expounded in his Farewell Address of 17 September 1796.¹ He had pleaded that the United States should be free from "permanent alliances" but it could, if the situation so demanded, enter into "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." He regarded this as the only satisfactory basis for American foreign policy. Five years later on 4 March 1801, the newly elected President Thomas Jefferson, in his inaugural address also defined American foreign policy in similar terms and warned the nation against what he called "entangling alliances."²

Such a policy had its rationale in the conditions that prevailed then. The United States had just achieved independence, and existing social, political and economic conditions in the world did not warrant any alliance. But the international environment in which the United States found itself after the Second World War was markedly different. The international system which emerged was bipolar. The United States decided to lead the alliance of

1. Robert Birley (ed.), Speeches and Documents in American History, Vol. I: 1776-1815 (London, 1944), p.219.

2. Ibid., p.251.

of the "Free World" against the alliance of communist countries led by the Soviet Union. Among the alliances which the United States entered with the countries of the "Free World", the North Atlantic Treaty was the first and for that reason most significant. It involved the countries in Western Europe in which the United States had vital interests. The United States was not only interested in preventing these countries from falling into the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union but was also interested in maintaining the access of the world to the vast resources of the West European countries and their colonial possessions in Africa and Asia.³

The economic and strategic interests which the United States had come to acquire in many countries, forced her to dilute considerably, if not sacrifice them altogether, certain principles for which the nation had stood. In principle, the United States supported and stood for political self-determination. As a noted commentator has observed: "From the time President Woodrow Wilson transformed World War I by the publication of his Fourteen Points -- American Statesmen have elevated national self-determination

3. For a detailed study on the subject see, Report of a study group sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and The National Planning Association, The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy: Its Concepts, Strategy and Limits (New York, 1955).

to the status of a doctrine."⁴ This right of national self-determination is a vital one to the American world view; in the same way as class struggle is to the Communist Countries. But in certain countries -- particularly in Southern Africa -- where the people have struggled for national self-determination, the United States failed to provide adequate support for such movements, because Southern Africa offered certain advantages to the United States both economically and strategically. It is contended here that American trade and investments in the region were an important factor in the maintenance of the Southern African systems.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: A PROFILE

It has been estimated that Southern Africa has roughly an area which is 1/6th of the area of the entire continent of Africa. Before the end of the Salazar regime in 1974, the area comprised of the Portuguese Colonies of Angola and Mozambique, independent Zambia, the British territories of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland; the British colony of Rhodesia which unilaterally declared independence in 1965 and the Republic of South Africa. During the period of this study, Southern Africa thus consisted of territories which greatly varied in their constitutional status. Some were colonies of Western European nations. Some had achieved

4. Donald Rothchild, "Engagement Vs Disengagement in Africa: The Choices for America", in Alan M. Jones (ed.), United States Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York, 1973), p.222.

a measure of self-government, and South Africa was independent but was ruled by a white minority regime. With the sole exception of Zambia, all nations of the region shared a common feature in as much as they were all ruled by a white minority, indigenous or imposed from outside. Furthermore all these white minority regimes were under pressure from black nationalist movements. Angola and Mozambique struggled against the Portuguese Colonialism. But in South Africa and Rhodesia, an indigenous white minority, hardly one-third of the total population, continued to resist majority rule. These minority regimes had adopted oppressive racial policies.

Given the size of the black population and its determination to overthrow the white minority rule, it is indeed surprising that the white regimes in Southern Africa were able to survive. While it cannot be doubted that in many instances the black movements were divided and weak and were not in a position to generate enough force which could bring about the collapse of white minority regimes, it is equally true that these minority regimes derived considerable support and sustenance from Western Powers. They were strengthened in their intransigence and opposition to giving legitimate share to blacks in power.

It should be noted that prior to the World War II, the interest of the United States in Southern Africa, was minimal.

The war made the United States aware of the strategic importance and rich resources of the continent. In the post-war era these resources of the African continent were exploited mostly by Western nations, particularly by Britain and France, for the reconstruction of their war ravaged economy. The United States also gradually entered the field and began to use the mineral resources.

The sixties proved to be a turning point in the political evolution of Africa. Almost 28 African countries became independent, and many were on their road to Independence. The voice of these independent nations could no longer be considered insignificant in such international forums like the United Nations. The East and the West were now vying with each other to win the favour of the newly independent African countries. In its competition and confrontation with its principal adversary the Soviet Union, the United States deeply felt the need of Africa on its side and to keep it away, from Communist influence. But to accomplish this in Africa as well as to contend with the Soviet Union globally the United States also needed the support of its Western allies. Therefore, the policy of winning Africa to its side could not be at the cost of friendship of Western countries. United States foreign policy towards Africa during the sixties, was guided by the policies

of Western European nations, who had been the colonial masters. It did not have a policy of its own.

The Africa League of America, an organisation of those liberals who were interested in America's friendly relationship with Africa, in its statement before the House Sub-Committee on Africa, rightly pointed out that the United States had

responded only to immediate crisis which could not be ignored. In these responses our policy has been determined in the first instance not by African consideration at all, but by non-African ones. These stem from our official interpretation of the cold war, which has dictated the terms of our alliance in NATO with the colonial nations of Western Europe.⁵

Apart from these factors, the United States policy in general towards Africa was to a great extent constrained by one important domestic limitation -- the question of civil rights for its own Black population. Not until the mid sixties did the Blacks in America obtain Civil Liberties on par with the rest of the population. Hence during the period proceeding this (Civil Rights Bill was passed in 1965) the United States could not possibly vigorously advocate a policy of racial equality and granting of voting right on one man one vote basis for the people of Southern Africa who were ruled by and segregated from the Whites.

5. U.S. House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Sub-Committee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings, Briefing on Africa (Washington, D.C., 1960), p.129.

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The issue of self-rule was one of the vital and critical issues which had a tremendous impact on United States policy in Southern Africa. But it was by no means the only factor. United States policy was aimed at securing its economic and strategic interests in the region. The Western powers, especially the United States derive huge economic benefits from Southern Africa. It gets its supply of several important raw materials from the region. The region produces and exports a large percentage of the world supply of important minerals, that are essential for modern industry. The bulk of Southern African production is shipped to the United States, Western Europe and Japan.⁶ The economic resources of southern Africa on which the Western nations are chiefly dependent, include natural resources like gold, diamonds, uranium and other minerals like chrome, vanadium, manganese, fluorspar and asbestos. Oil is also a chief source particularly in the Cabinda region of Angola. The United States awareness of these rich mineral resources, came after

6. Gilda Loewenstein and Sean Gervasi, "Southern Africa in the World Economy", in U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Special Study Mission to Africa, The Faces of Africa: Diversity and Progress, Repression and Struggle (Washington, D.C., 1972), p.465.

the second world war, which had forced it (U.S.) to pay attention to a part of the world it had hitherto ignored. America had discovered that its own resources in raw materials are not inexhaustible, and this had forced reliance on other parts of the world. If the First World War changed the United States from a debtor to a creditor country, the Second World War changed the United States from being a large net exporter of raw materials to a large net importer. Southern Africa had come to occupy a new place in American calculation for both agricultural and mineral resources. This had resulted in the flow of American trade, investment and aid programmes to Southern Africa, which have been growing at an enormous rate since the later half of the fifties.

During the period 1 July 1945 to 31 December 1955 the United States loaned \$ 16,140,524,000 to all countries of which Africa received \$ 342,713,000 or 2.12 per cent. It should be noted that of this amount, South Africa received \$ 151,714,000 and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland received \$ 60,686,000 both areas of white settlement in Southern Africa, already substantially developed.⁷ Since the Second World War and upto the beginning of the sixties,

7. Walter Goloschmidt (ed.), The United States and Africa (New York, 1963), pp.24-25.

the bulk of foreign capital in Rhodesia has been from Britain and the United States, though British investment far outweighs that of the United States. According to the figures available for that period, approximately £ 50 million of private American capital was invested in Rhodesia. Virtually all in copper, chrome, manganese and lithium mines. The United States Government had put £ 56 million into Rhodesia to develop copper and cobalt mining and to improve road and railway transport.⁸ The World Bank had loaned £ 122 million for the construction of the Kariba dam in the Zambesi river.⁹

The United States assistance to Southern Rhodesia through the programmes of the Agency for International Development totalled about £ 7 million for the period 1954-64.¹⁰ Southern Africa has been the base for operations of large multinational companies of the Western nations, specially the United States. The Diamond and Gold Mining Industries attracted a large number of these firms to invest in the region. The largest single employer of labour

8. The American Assembly, The United States and Africa (New York, 1958), p.130. Collection of background papers prepared for the use of participants, and the Final Report of the Thirteenth American Assembly. A revised edition of the same was published later in 1963, Goldschmidt, n.7.

9. Ibid., p.131.

10. U.S. Economic Assistance programmes, Administered by the Agency for International Development, April 3, 1948-June 30, 1967 (AID, 1968), p.53.

in Southern Africa apart from the government of South Africa, is the Anglo-American Corporation, whose Chairman is Harry Oppenheimer. This company controls 40% of the gold production.¹¹ As for diamonds, about 95% of the world diamond output in the early sixties was handled by the Diamond Corporation, a subsidiary of De Beers Consolidated mines of South Africa - again a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation. The Tsumeb Corporation of the United States, which is located in Namibia (South-West Africa), controlled the production of copper, zinc, and lead. Apart from this, the huge deposits of chrome in Rhodesia are controlled by United States firms like Union Carbide and Fecite Mineral Company.¹²

Southern Africa also contains rich deposits of Uranium. Uranium was discovered in South Africa during scientific surveys conducted in 1944-1945. Following the Second World War, the United States joined Great Britain in a mission to South Africa to arrange the details for the production of Uranium oxide.¹³ The Uranium needed for much of the United States post-war military developments came from South Africa.¹⁴ A considerable sum has been invested by private U.S. firms

11. ? , Southern Africa (New York, 1961), p.42. A publication of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

12. New York Times, 11 January 1966, p.1.

13. Encyclopedia of Southern Africa (London, 1961), p.549.

14. Goldschmidt, n.7, p.166.

in the extraction and exploration of oil in Southern Africa. The region thus becomes more important to the United States, since the Gulf Oil Corporation, the fourth largest oil company in the United States, has exclusive rights over oil in the Cabinda. It has been estimated that Gulf Oil investments in oil in the region is over 200 million.

The huge volume of trade that takes place between the United States and Southern African countries facilitates a great deal of foreign exchange earnings of these countries. The crucial importance of Southern Africa to the United States was clearly revealed in a State Department study in 1969. According to the figures presented by the State Department, "the region as a whole had provided 69% of the world's gold production, 64% of its gem and diamonds, 57% of its cobalt, 32% of its chromite, 29% of its vanadium, 28% of its platinum, 31% of vermiculite, 28% of its antimony, 22% of its copper, 14% of its manganese, 10% of its beryllium and 17% of "free world" uranium." 15

U. S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Apart from being a region rich in vital mineral resources, Southern Africa is also of considerable importance to the

15. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive? (London, 1971) p. 57.

United States from the strategic point of view. The United States has an important military base in the Portuguese held island Azores-located in the mid Atlantic. This base was important for atleast three reasons; (a) it provided a staging base for air transport (b) it had been a refueling base for the United States strategic air power and (c) the naval mission there served both as a communications center and as the hub of submarine operations in the eastern Atlantic".¹⁶ United States policy towards the Portuguese territories in Africa have been influenced by the former's obligations towards NATO and the United States' security interests in the military base in Azores.

The Union of South Africa also provides over-flight and landing facilities apart from the naval bases in Cape Town and Simonstown. The United States also maintains a NASA tracking station to track unmanned space-craft; and an installation to track guided missiles.

Oil from the Persian Gulf, and other important goods to the United States are shipped along the Indian Ocean through the Cape Route in Southern Africa. The United States imports about 100 strategic minerals, of which 16 items are imported in amounts exceeding 100,000 tons annually. Forty

16. Alexander A. Hielson, African Battle line: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa (New York, 1965), p.31.

of these minerals are required for normal peacetime use in the United States industry and about 50% of these are shipped along the Cape route.¹⁷ Testifying before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 24 March 1970, Admiral G.V. Anderson (Retd) of the U.S. Navy stressed the need for control of the Cape region in Southern Africa. What he said then is also relevant for the period of the present study. "It may be very very important", he said, "to the free world at some time to have the facilities there and the people of the area on our side in order that we can control these lines of communication".¹⁸

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The above mentioned economic and strategic interests of the United States in Southern Africa, though significant in themselves, have also to be viewed in the light of Soviet activity in that part of the continent. Unlike most West European nations, the Communist countries never held colonies in Africa, nor did they have any significant trade

17. Southern Africa, n.11, p.52.

18. U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, Second Session, Sub Committee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Policy Towards Africa for the Seventies (Washington, D.C., 1970), p.121.

relations with the continent. Following the Second World War, the United States had launched a program to contain communism. With the process of decolonisation set in motion, following the war, the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to keep the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa out of the camp of the other. The United States policy of containment when applied to Africa, meant denial of Africa to the Soviet Union.¹⁹ American policy towards Africa was framed in a manner that its specific interests in the continent were protected, whether they were military, economic or of a political nature.

It is here that the problems in Southern Africa become more important. Portugal and Britain were the colonial masters, and members of the NATO. Except South Africa, the United States had no direct access to the other countries of Southern Africa and approached them only through Britain and Portugal. Though the countries in Southern Africa were of relatively minor importance, compared to United States interests in Western European countries, viz., Germany, Britain, France etc., the United States could not follow an independent policy, in Southern

19. Hans J. Morgenthau, 'United States Policy Toward Africa,' in Calvin W. Stillman (ed.), Africa in the Modern World (Chicago, 1955), p.317.

Africa for fear of alienating its own allies in the NATO. Soviet influence in the region was also increasing.²⁰ The White-minority governments have always tended to justify their staying in power by pointing to this fact. The United States accepted this logic and felt impelled to support the policies of Portugal and Britain, while at the same time maintaining public opposition to colonialism in the United Nations.

The case of Rhodesia is a case apart in Southern Africa. In economic and strategic terms Rhodesia offers practically nothing to any country, much less to the United States. The only material it has is chrome. But the United States, as will be seen in the following chapters, decided merely to follow Britain's lead in solving the problem created by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. It was not the loss of Rhodesia that mattered to the United States. However, if Rhodesia was to come under the Soviet influence, the dependence of the United States on the Soviet Union for its chrome supply would have increased. Furthermore Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique which had acted as buffer states to South Africa would come under increased pressure. Once these three countries fell into hostile hands, South

20. William A Hance (ed.), Southern Africa and the United States (New York, 1968), p.27.

Africa probably would become the immediate target. It is important to note here that, the Soviet Union has the World's second largest reserves of important minerals, next to South Africa. If the resources from South Africa are lost, the West will have to depend on the Soviet Union for the same.

Reserves and Output²¹

	South Africa		USSR	
	Percentage of World Reserves	Percentage of World Production	Percentage of World Reserves	Percentage of World Production
Platinum Group	86	55	13	31
Chrom	83	30	1	32
Vanadium	64	46	33	20
Manganese	48	24	45	35
Gold	49	59	19	19
Fluorapur	46	5	4	11
Asbestos	10	10	25	36
Uranium	17	13	13	28

21. Hong Kong Standard, 7 January 1979, p.9.

Thus, US policy in Rhodesia, needs to be analysed in the context of the entire region as well as its domestic environment. Effort will be made here to emphasize the role of US private investment and interest groups in the evolution of policy towards Africa. Before that we will briefly examine the historical antecedents of this policy.

THE LEGACY OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

Before the Kennedy Administration, the US interest in Africa, except Southern Africa, had only been minimal. Only a few steps were taken at irregular intervals to show American interest in the vast continent. In March 1957, Vice-President Richard Nixon undertook a three-week tour of the African continent. He visited Morocco, Liberia, Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. By sending one of such a high political figure, the United States evinced its growing interest in Africa *afaire*. Before his departure for Africa, the Vice-President said that Africa, "a continent of 200 million people with tremendous natural resources, can be decisive in the conflict between slavery and freedom going on in the world today."²² Following his visit, Nixon made certain significant recommendations for United States policy in Africa. He

22. Zander Hollander, "Nixon Trip Stresses U.S. Friendship for Africa", Africa Special Report (Washington, D.C.), Vol.2, March 1957, p.2.

suggested increased American diplomatic and consular representation in Africa, and creation of a new Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department. Following Nixon's advice, the State Department for the first time set up a separate office to deal with African affairs in 1957, which came to be known as the Bureau of African Affairs.

With this modest gesture the Eisenhower Administration had recognized the emerging importance of African nations in the world and their potential in furthering U.S. interests in the continent. During his tenure, President Eisenhower worked to increase aid to African countries. He formulated a five-point programme for Africa. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 1960, the President said that the programme was based on the assumption that the emerging nations in Africa would not align themselves with any military block but would seek the help of the United Nations to protect and maintain their national independence and security.²³ The five main ingredients of his programme for Africa were as follows:-

- Non-interference in the African countries internal affairs.
- Help in assuring their security with wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments.

23. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), Vol 43, 10 October 1960, p.553.

- Emergency aid to the Congo
- International assistance in shaping long term African development programme and
- United Nations aid for education.²⁴

Keeping his own recommendations in mind, in his Mutual Security message for 1960-61 to the Congress on 16 February 1960, President Eisenhower declared to step up technical assistance to Africa and proposed to allocate / 20 million to initiate educational and training programmes in Africa, South of the Sahara.²⁵

Washington's growing interest in African Affairs found its most explicit expression in the forum of the United Nations. By 1960, almost 28 African nations became independent, and were admitted into the United Nations. Their voices in the international forum could no more be ignored. The United States stand on African issues in the United Nations was carefully watched by these new nations. The previous voting record of the United States in the United Nations had been marked by continuous abstention on colonial issues and where it had cast its vote, it was always in favour of its European allies.

24. Ibid.

25. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 16 February 1960, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1960-61 (Washington, D.C., 1961), p.185.

The year 1960 saw the first departure of the United States from this traditional policy. An incident took place in Sharpeville, a small town in South Africa, on 21 March 1960, which resulted in the killing of many blacks who were unarmed and had gathered to demonstrate against the government's rigid apartheid laws. The State Department which had until then followed a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa, for the first time issued a statement regretting the massacre.²⁶

In the United Nations twenty-nine African and Asian states requested the Security Council to examine the causes that led to the firing.²⁷ The resolution that was adopted by the Council, recognized that the situation in South Africa had caused international friction, which if prolonged would threaten international peace and security. The Council's resolution requested South Africa to abandon its policies

26. On 22 March 1960, in response to a query from a news correspondent, Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, made the following statement:

"The United States deploras violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means. While the United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa." Department of State Bulletin, Vol.42, 11 April 1960, p.551.

27. United Nations, G.A.O.R., document A/4390 (1 July 1960), p.19.

of apartheid and racial discrimination.²⁸

On the Security Council resolution, the United States expressed its view that it was a "constructive step" to call upon the South African Government to initiate policies with the aim of achieving racial harmony based on equality and to abandon the policy of apartheid. The United States voted in favour of the resolution.²⁹ Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge who supported a request for a debate, forcefully condemned the South African Government and its politics.³⁰ America's attempt at establishing closer relationship with Africa, keeping in mind the views of indigenous African people was clearly revealed in Lodge's United Nation speech. The very fact that the US Government had taken a stand at the risk of alienating a friendly government - though this did not happen -- like South Africa, with whom it had important strategic and trade links, proved that Africa had become a factor to be reckoned with.


It should also be noted that US policy of friendship with the African countries did not result in anything more than verbal condemnation. The departure in the policy lay in the fact that whereas Washington had hitherto tacitly

28. Ibid., pp.19-20.

29. UN, SCOR, 15th Year, 855th Meeting (1 April 1960), p.4.

30. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.43, 25 April 1960, pp.668-669.

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supported the Western Colonial powers, it had ventured at least to verbally condemn colonial and racial policies. This is borne out by the voting record of the United States on issues concerning the Portuguese Southern African territories of Angola and Mozambique. On a resolution concerning the Portuguese Southern African territories,³¹ the United States did concede that Portugal had a legal obligation to report on its dependencies, but abstained when voting took place. The United States delegate declared that the General Assembly was legally incompetent to remind particular countries of their obligations.³² The United States further tarnished its image when it supported Portugal's candidature for election to the non-permanent membership of the Security Council. According to the critics of the policy, the United States was motivated by its strategic considerations in the Portuguese Azores, apart from the fact that Portugal was an ally and member of the NATO. However, once Portugal withdrew its nomination, the United States did vote for Liberia.

In general the United States voting record in the

31. General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV) 15 December, 1960.

32. T.C. Baker, The United States and Africa in the United Nations: A Case study in American Foreign Policy (Washington, 1968), p.75.

15th plenary session of the General Assembly showed that the United States had voted with the European countries on all but one issue; and voted with the Africans on only five issues including one to end racial discrimination. It was a unanimous vote. It is, however, significant that of the five issues on which the United States voted in favour, four of the resolutions had a favourable vote from the European countries also. The United States was thus saved from the embarrassment of choosing sides.³³

Thus until the 1960s even in the United Nations the United States - 1) Abstained on an Algerian resolution to avoid displeasing France, which might have affected the European defense system. 2) The strategic importance of the Azores forced it to abstain on resolution concerning Portugal an important NATO ally and 3) abstained on the colonial resolution to support Britain, which was a colonial power. Although the Eisenhower Administration did not bring about any significant departure in United States policy towards Africa, the attempt that it had made to improve US

33. For details of the United States voting in the United Nations in the 15th plenary session of the General Assembly, see: G.M. Houser, "Cause for Concern", Africa Today (Denver, Colorado), Vol. 8, January 1961, pp. 5-11.

image in the area, was further accelerated when the Kennedy Administration took office in 1961.

KENNEDY AND AFRICA

In his inaugural address, President Kennedy said that,

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. 34

Referring to the newly independent countries, the President further added,

..... We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom. To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required..... not because the Communist may do it, not because we seek their vote, but because it is right. 35

The fact that the "torch" of leadership had been passed on to a younger generation of leaders, was clearly visible in his address. Referring to the swift political changes occurring in Asia and Africa as the greatest in

34. Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, 20 January 1961, Department of State Bulletin, Vol.64, 6 February 1961, p.175.

35. Ibid.

human history, the President in his special message to the Congress said that the United States "would support (them) regardless of the Cold War and regardless of which political or economic route they choose to freedom." ³⁶

Kennedy's interest in African Affairs did not begin with his assuming the office of the President, but it goes back to his early Senate days. In 1957, on the Algerian problem, Senator Kennedy scored Washington's stand on the issue. According to him Algeria was "no longer a French problem alone." Therefore, he asked the United States to use its influence to work out a solution based on "a recognition of the independent personality of Algeria."³⁷ His views were seriously assailed on the ground that he was advocating a policy which might jeopardize United States interests vis-a-vis France, one of its most important allies. But this statement had brought to light Kennedy's deep sympathy for freedom movements in the third world. He continued to express this interest while a member and Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

36. United States Congress, House Document 174, 87th Congress, 1st Session; in Richard Stebbins, Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1961 (New York, 1961), pp.70-71.

37. A. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (London, 1965) p.482.

Before he became President, Kennedy had attacked United States neglect of Africa and had criticised the Eisenhower Administration for having followed the lead of cold war allies. Kennedy's recommendations by no means can be regarded as something radical. They were in line with the current liberal thinking. This becomes evident from the recommendations of a Congressional delegation which visited sixteen African countries in the later part of 1960.³⁸

The Committee was of the view that the United States stance on African issues in the United Nations during the Eisenhower Administration had cost the U.S. dearly.³⁹ The Visiting Group stressed the need for the U.S. to support self-determination and self-government for all nations, stepping up of U.S. technical assistance to countries in Africa, and also felt the necessity for the strengthening of the United Nations to control any local war.⁴⁰

Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign

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38. Senators Frank Church (., Ida.), Gale McGee (., Wyo.) and Frank Moss (., Utah.) visited sixteen African countries during November - December 1960. They submitted a report of the tour to the Senate on 12 February 1961. Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.), Vol.107, 29 June 1961, p.11759.
39. The New York Times, 17 December 1960, p.2.
40. Congressional Record, Vol.107, 3 March 1961, p.3241.

Relations, Senator Wayne Morse (D., Ore.), condemned US policy on Africa at the U.S.⁴¹ He also regretted that on all issues involving colonialism in the General Assembly, the US State Department had directed the representative not to take any position that might jeopardise American interests vis-a-vis the colonial powers. The Senator attributed this posture in the UN, to pressures exerted by the Pentagon as well as the constraint imposed on the U because of its leadership in the NATO alliance. Morse criticised the extent to which the US was guided by Great Britain on colonial issues. Similar views were voiced by the foreign critics of US foreign policy.⁴²

When Kennedy came to the White House, it was not very difficult for him to make some modification in US foreign policy in Africa. Indeed, the critics of Eisenhower - Dulles had prepared the ground for change. In just three weeks after assuming office, on 15 February 1961, G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was dispatched on a tour of the African continent. A Department of State Press Release on 10 February 1961 said that Williams visit to African

41. Ibid., Vol.107, 20 February 1961, p.2401.

42. The New York Times, 1 March 1961, p.5.

countries was a good will mission. Its principal concern was with political and economic relations between the US and the countries of Africa and with US assistance programs especially in the field of education. It was remarkable however, that South Africa was omitted from the Secretary's itinerary while in Africa. Williams reiterated the new Administration's stand in favour of anti-colonialism and determined efforts by the US to help the liberation movements of Southern Africa towards independence. His speech was high lighted by the statement "Africa for Africans" which sparked off bitter criticism and some within the State Department even demanded his resignation. But Kennedy had said, "I don't know who else should Africa be for?"⁴³

That the new Administration attached more importance to Africa became more evident when the US Congress decided to celebrate "Africa Freedom Day" on 15 April 1961. Favouring the celebrations, Senator Humphrey declared in the Senate that,

recently the United States has demonstrated by its vote in the United Nations and by statements of its officials that it will effectively back anti-colonialism despite any hurt feelings of its allies. Under these circumstances it seems particularly appropriate that the United States

43. Mennon Williams, Africa for the Africans (Michigan, 1969), p.159.

Senate should support a resolution marking the celebrations of 'Africa Freedom Day'. 44

Senator Humphrey also referred to Adlai Stevenson's performance in the United Nations supporting the African countries.

In 1969, the Economic Commission for Africa held its third session in Addis Ababa. President Kennedy for the first time sent a special message, in which he said that the nations of Africa should be their own masters and expressed his desire that they should grow in vigor and prosperity.⁴⁵

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Apart from his personal commitment to freedom and racial equality, Kennedy was concerned with the domestic criticism from the Black Caucus and various African organizations, to which the previous Administration's policy in Southern Africa had been subjected to. This did not imply that the Administration had gone to the extent of supporting nationalist forces in Southern Africa. Kennedy was quite aware of the significance that South Africa had both strategically and economically to the United States.

44. Congressional Record, Vol.107, 3 April 1961, p.5430.

45. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.64, 13 March 1961, p.374.

In the United Nations, the United States voted in favour of all those resolutions which condemned South Africa for its racial policies. On many occasions the United States had rejected South African contention that since anything occurring within the territory of the country, comes under its domestic jurisdiction (Article 2, Para 7 of the UN Charter), the United Nations was not competent enough to intervene. When in the General Assembly a resolution was proposed calling all members to cut off diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa the United States opposed such a resolution. The State Department itself expressed disapproval of the resolutions.⁴⁶ Kennedy did not want a UN embargo on South Africa. The reason was that it was the fear of losing a vital region for United States security. Instead the US proposed only an embargo on the shipments of all arms and ammunitions to South Africa until the policy of apartheid is completely removed.

When the UN General Assembly established a Committee to review the situation in South Africa, the Committee reported that South Africa had intensified her racial policies and the existing situation constituted a "threat to international peace and security." The Committee

46. Schlesinger, n.37., p.507.

recommended sanctions against South Africa. Also by now most African states were demanding the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. The United States response to these demands was never precise and clear. On the one hand, the Administration disapproved of the racial policies and on the other expressed its doubt as to whether the situation could be alleviated by depriving it of United Nations membership. In a press Conference, President Kennedy said that,

We've condemned the racial policies of South Africa which is inimical. I think, to the future of South Africa, as well as repugnant to us. But to begin expelling members of the UN would be to start a process that might not be easy to halt. 47

As for the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, the United States was in an even greater dilemma. The situation in Angola was becoming worse as each day passed. Clashes between Angolan nationalists and Portuguese forces resulting in heavy loss of life and property was reported. The position of the United States was rather precarious in that Portugal was accused of using NATO weapons supplied to it by the United States to suppress the nationalist movement. In the United Nations

47. President Kennedy's Press Conference as cited in: Richard P. Stebbins, The US in World Affairs: 1963 (New York, 1964), p.248.

Security Council, a resolution was passed on 15 March 1961, condemning Portugal, and the United States for the first time voted in favour of the resolution.⁴⁸ The very fact that the United States had voted in favour of the Security Council resolution to include the Angolan question on the agenda indicated two things. On the one hand, by voting for the inclusion of the item the United States wanted to appear to be sympathetic to the African sentiment and by saying during the debate that the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace, it wanted to appease Portugal. This dualism was characteristic of its entire policy in Southern Africa.

The US posture should also be viewed in the context of the fact that the agreement with Portugal on base rights in the Azores was due to expire in 1962. The United States Security interests required the base to be retained. Kennedy had also to prevent a Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for which he was forced to take into account the impact which the possibilities of the loss of Azores might have on the treaty itself. He did not want to be accused of neglect of vital national security interests. He explicitly remarked

48. Baker, n.31, p.95.

in a Cabinet Meeting that, "We could not afford to loose the Azores with the test ban coming up."⁴⁹

As far as South Africa and the Portuguese territories were concerned, the Kennedy Administration, therefore could not take a decisive stand and much of what it did was only a window dressing.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The Central African Federation, or the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was essentially formed as part of an attempt to solve problems created due to lack of man-power and resources. The Federation had come into existence in 1953 over the objection and opposition of African nationalist leaders, who termed it as a subterfuge for white domination. Opposition to the policies set by the white minority regime in Salisbury was more pronounced in Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). In order to pacify the blacks by appearing to concede their demands, the Whites in the Federation proposed a constitution with non-racial franchise. The Constitution was supposed to eventually establish black majority rule in the 65 seat Parliament. But in the transitory phase it had blatant racial discriminatory features. The worst of these was the condition

49. Schelesinger, n.37, p.507.

that blacks elevate their individual economic and educational level. There were two rolls, 'A' roll all white with fifty seats in the Parliament had separate qualifications and 'B' roll all Blacks with fifteen seats had different qualifications. This discriminatory constitution was opposed by the blacks and African nationalists led by Joshua Nkomo and Ndabangi Sithole staged a political boycott of the constitution, refusing either to contest for seats in the Parliament or even to register themselves. They demanded that the stringent economic and educational qualifications be removed and be replaced with one-man one-vote.

The United States had never intervened in the affairs of the territories of British possession. Britain being the sovereign ruler of these territories, the United States recognised the fact that anything occurring within these areas was primarily British concern. Therefore it was believed that interference might probably damage relations with Britain. However, the United States did express its reservations and displeasures over the 1961 constitution because Washington felt that the Constitution lacked provisions for "responsible progress toward self-government."⁵⁰

50. Williams, n.43, p.111.

Nor did the United States entirely favour the position that the black African nationalists had taken by boycotting the Constitution. The United States wanted them to change their position and fight for greater representation.

In the United Nations, most African members were pressuring Britain not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia, until its internal political situation changed with a policy of one-man one-vote. The members termed the situation in the colony as an 'explosive' one and a 'threat to international peace and security.' They insisted that Britain should pay heed to UN recommendations on the problem. The United States position on Southern Rhodesian issues in the UN appeared very defensive. It refused to look into the Rhodesian problem as a serious one and recommended measures which would alleviate the situation through constitutional means. It did not however agree that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security. Even at a time when most Afro-Asian States wanted the Rhodesian problem on the Security Council agenda, the British representative Sir Patrick Dean protected against it and said that ^{no} one was "proposing to unleash the white Southern Rhodesian against the Africans." ⁵¹ U.K. believed that putting the Rhodesian

51. Stebbins, n.47, p.258.

problem on the Security Council agenda was an act of abuse of power by the Security Council. The United States Ambassador Adlai Stevenson towed the British line and suggested that Security Council action on the issue was not necessary. When the General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security and called on Britain to take appropriate measures to give expression to the "Legitimate Aspirations" of the Rhodesian people, the United States abstained on the voting. But it stated that it would continue to exert a constructive influence on London to improve the situation.⁵²

SUMMARY

The Kennedy Administration made a very slight change in US Policy vis-a-vis Southern Africa. Until 1960, the United States had moved with great caution in supporting nationalist aspirations for self-determination in Southern Africa. It had seldom taken a clear cut stand on any issue involving colonialism and self-determination. Its position was guided solely by European interests. However, in 1961 on the Angolan problem the United States for the first time departed from its traditional policy and voted against,

52. Ibid., p.259.

Portugal. But the speech delivered by the US Representative was very mild. As far as South Africa was concerned, US opposed UN sanctions but agreed to place a ban on shipment of arms and ammunitions. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Administration supported the process of self-determination but here again it was constrained by its close relations with Britain.

The United States policy towards the three countries of Southern Africa was different in details but there has a certain underlying unity beneath the surface. Although the US championed the cause of self rule everywhere, it had not articulated that policy in relation to Southern Africa. As it entered the sixties, it found that the situation was rapidly changing and the policy of offering tacit support to White minority rule could no longer be followed without showing atleast some concern for the demands of the Black Africans. However, it was the assessment of the US policy makers that they still required the support of White minority regimes. This brought a contradictions in the US policy. Now the US made an effort to resolve this contradiction in relation to the problem of Southern Rhodesia has been discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER - II

UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE U.D.I.

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UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE U.D.I.

The Central African Federation formed in 1953, collapsed after ten years in 1963. This resulted in the liberation of Northern Rhodesia which came to be called Zambia and Nyasaland which was renamed Malawi. Britain however, refused to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia on the ground that the White minority government there should first pave the way for majority rule. The collapse of the Federation strengthened the resolve of the Rhodesian Whites to secure their independence from Britain before the introduction of majority rule. For almost three years, until the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith refused to join in any talks with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, that did not relate to independence before majority rule. In 1964, when Britain tried to bring about a negotiated settlement, Smith threatened to unilaterally declare independence if negotiations failed. When Smith refused to accept an invitation to come to London for negotiations, British and African apprehensions about Rhodesian intentions increased.

(As a pre-requisite for independence, Britain demanded that Rhodesia repeal the land apportionment act of

1939¹. Other conditions which Britain laid down for granting of independence to Rhodesia may be summed up as follows:-

1. There must be unimpeded progress towards majority rule.
2. Firm provisions against any retrogression by the Southern Rhodesian government on constitutional guarantees for majority rule.
3. Immediate constitutional advance for black Africans.
4. Progress in reducing racial discrimination including repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.
5. Satisfactory evidence that the majority of the Southern Rhodesian population - not merely a majority of whites or a majority of the government salaried chiefs - accept the 1961 constitution as basis for independence.
6. The need to ensure that regardless of race there is no oppression of the majority by

1. This act set apart areas for separate occupation by white and black men respectively. But the subsequent amendments to the act resulted in the establishment of separate townships meant solely for blacks.

minority or the vice-versa.²

Britain also warned Rhodesia of the serious consequences that it would have to face if it decided to make a UDI. As early as 27 October 1964, Harold Wilson had indicated that if Rhodesia declared independence unilaterally, the relationship between the two countries would end, and the former would be isolated from the Commonwealth and consequently suffer heavy political and economic damage.³

The following day, the US government issued a statement supporting Wilson's stand. The statement said,

We have on frequent occasions expressed our hope that a solution would be found to the Rhodesian problem acceptable to the majority of the people. We continue to hope that Rhodesia will gain independence as a United nation with a government based upon the consent of the governed. We have been encouraged by the British government in insisting that it would not sanction independence for Rhodesia until satisfied that the people have been allowed the full exercise of self-determination.....

..... Prime Minister Wilson's message to the Rhodesian Prime Minister, makes clear some of the serious consequences which could befall all Rhodesians should their government continue to follow its present course. 4

2. Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.), Vol.112, 7 April 1966, p.8023

3. G.M. Williams, Africa for the Africans (Michigan, 1969), p.111.

4. Ibid., p.112.

The United States Charge d' affaires in Rhodesia, Philip M. Kaiser, also informed Smith about the United States government's policy supporting that of Britain. He strongly upheld the right of the African majority to rule and also conveyed that the "United States would not recognise a government that denied the right."⁵

On 12 October 1965, in the United Nations General Assembly, the United States permanent representative Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg pledged that the United States would take the "necessary and concrete steps"⁶ to halt any defiant action against Britain by Rhodesia. However, he did not specify the measures the United States would take. The Assembly then adopted a resolution calling upon Britain to take all necessary steps to prevent or end if need be, a threatened rebellion by the Rhodesian White minority. By voting for the resolution the United States for the first time supported a statement condemning the plans of the government of Ian Smith. But when the Trusteeship Committee recommended that Britain suspend the Rhodesian constitution and draft a new one, providing universal adult suffrage for an independent Rhodesia and

5. New York Times, 8 October 1965, p.1.

6. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), Vol.53, 8 November, 1965. p.762.

also requested Britain to military intervene if necessary to prevent a UDI, the United States voted against it. The reason for this was that the US regarded the resolution as "untimely while delicate negotiations were in progress."⁷

The warnings of Britain, America and the United Nations did not deter the Salisbury Government which continued through 1964 and 1965, to further consolidate its position and taking advantage of loopholes implemented the 1961 constitution. During the last week of February 1965, the then Commonwealth Secretary Arthur Bottomley and Lord Chancellor Gardiner, visited Rhodesia on a ten-day fact finding mission.⁸ Their attempt to dissuade Smith from declaring unilateral independence failed. In the elections that followed in May 1965, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front won an overwhelming vote of confidence from the white electorate. Smith captured all the 50 seats in the 'A' Roll and was now in a better bargaining position vis-a-vis Britain. The negotiations that continued all through 1965 proved fruitless despite the personal efforts of Harold Wilson. Finally on 11 November 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence. Britain refused to recognise the illegal seizure of power

7. New York Times, 2 November 1965, p.14.

8. Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London, 1967), p.187.

and initiated a program of sanctions against Rhodesia.

AMERICAN REACTION TO RHODESIA'S UDI

The US had only limited interest in Rhodesia. It was estimated that in 1965 American investment in Rhodesia was only £ 56 million.⁹ This was mainly in the sphere of mining and agriculture sectors. In contrast British trade was nearly six times than that of the United States. In the year 1964, Southern Rhodesia's exports to the United States were valued at £ 11 million, while imports from the United States to Rhodesia was £ 21 million. (The corresponding British figures being £ 93 million and £ 95 million respectively.)¹⁰

The following table indicates the volume of U.S. trade with Rhodesia.

9. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.53, 12 July 1965, p.71.

10. Ibid.

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Rhodesia's Major Trading Partners - 1965¹¹

(in millions of £ (£ 1 = \$ 2.80)

	<u>Exports To</u>	<u>Imports From</u>
Zambia	£ 45.9	£ 4.3
Britain	31.4	36.4
South Africa	14.4	27.5
West Germany	12.9	4.9
Malawi	9.5	1.4
Japan	7.4	6.6
USA	3.5	8.2

The American population in Rhodesia at the time of UDI was nearly 2000, half of whom were missionaries. Diplomatic ties with Salisbury was maintained by the American Consulate General, which dealt with the Government of Southern Rhodesia as a "British Colony accorded internal autonomy by the United Kingdom."¹² Nor was the United States engaged in supplying military arms and equipment to Rhodesia. The Agency for International Development's (AID) operations were also terminated completely on 30 June 1964.¹³

11. Source: Africa Report (Washington, D.C.), Vol.12, February 1967, p.8.

12. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.53, 12 July 1965, p.75.

13. Ibid.

Important American multinational firms operating in Rhodesia were Union Carbide and Foote Mineral Company which were engaged in mining of Chrome. Mobil and Caltex had more than 15% share of the market each before UJI.¹⁴

Prior to the Rhodesian UJI, the Johnson Administration had clearly indicated that in the even of such an eventuality the Administration would support Britain. President Johnson had himself conveyed this to Smith in a letter.¹⁵ The United States felt that the Rhodesian problem was primarily an internal British matter, but that an act of secession by the white minority government would have repercussions throughout Africa, possibly upsetting the white-black political balance that had been achieved in many African states. In his letter Johnson made it clear that the United States would support a boycott in a decisive way, even to the extent of reducing the impact of such a measure on the British economy.

The Administration clearly understood that if sanctions were implemented against Rhodesia, the United States would suffer much less than Britain. This was due to the fact

14. New York Times, 26 February 1966, p.39.

15. Ibid., 4 November 1965, p.1.

that if Britain were to cut off all imports from Rhodesia, it would be difficult for it to find an alternate market for imports. Britain was the chief importer of Rhodesian tobacco. Johnson's letter to Smith was probably written to deter Smith from the unilateral declaration of independence which would have affected the British economy, in whose strength Washington had prime interest. This was explicit in the Administration's attitude when it stated that it would make American tobacco available to Britain under long-term credit. It thus assured the latter of a supply without a strain on its dollar reserves.¹⁶ The United States also offered to reinforce any British move to cut off financial credits to Rhodesia by preventing the latter from obtaining American credits. While it showed solidarity with Britain by these assurances, it was hopeful that a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of self-government would be reached in Rhodesia with the participation of the African nationalists. A New York Times editorial on 12 November 1965, reflected the same view. It had stated that in the UDI there was no moral or political choice for the United States, and that it should support Britain in full.

16. Ibid.

The editorial also stressed that Washington should try to dissuade South Africa and Portugal from forming an alliance with the Smith regime. It suggested that the United States could help to keep Zambia and Malawi afloat and ease Britain's economic burden.

The first statement from the American government on Rhodesia's UDI came from Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In a news conference on 11 November 1965 in Austin, Texas, the Secretary echoed the President's words that "the United States in no way recognises the rebel regime and continues strongly to support a solution in Rhodesia that will be just and acceptable to the population as a whole."¹⁷ On the following day the Administration instituted the following measures against the rebel regime in Salisbury.¹⁸

----- The United States Consul General in Salisbury was called back and the consulate staff was reduced.

----- Diplomatic status was withdrawn from the Southern Rhodesian Affairs Minister in the British Embassy in Washington and from his staff.

17. Williams, n.3, p.114.

18. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.56, 6 March 1967, p.370.

----- American citizens were told that the government would no longer encourage private travel to Southern Rhodesia and if they did, they would not be assured of normal protective services and that they must have British and not Southern Rhodesian Visas.

----- The U. S. Government also suspended action on all application for U. S. government loans and credit and investment guarantees to Southern Rhodesia.

Once Rhodesia made U.I, the British government suspended the board of directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in London and in its place instituted a new board. The United States government recognized the new board as the legal authority over official Southern Rhodesian accounts in the United States. The government also asked American importers of Southern Rhodesian asbestos and lithium to find alternative sources. American companies were also informed that the United States recognized the legal authority of the British Order-in-Council prohibiting the export of tobacco and chromite from Southern Rhodesia and were requested to comply. Controls were instituted on exports to Southern Rhodesia cutting off all exports of significance to its

economy and with the co-operation of the American oil Companies a total embargo was placed on shipments of all US petroleum and its products to Southern Rhodesia.¹⁹

The suspension of the United States sugar-quota for 1965-66 along with an embargo on oil was made in accordance with the Security Council resolution tabled by Britain on 20 November 1965 and approved by a vote of 10 - 0, with France abstaining. The resolution demanded that all United Nations members should do their utmost to cut off all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. After the vote US Ambassador Arthur Goldberg announced that the entire 1965 Southern Rhodesian sugar quota for the United States, then on its way to Yonker's Port and scheduled to reach by 12 December, would be suspended. Earlier, the sugar imports were suspended by Presidential action. If admitted the sugar quota of 9500 tons would have been sold at 6.85 cents a pound and would have fetched the US \$ 1.3 million. (As per the then existing world market the shipment would have earned the US some / 318,000).²⁰

On 26 February 1966, the Commerce Department issued an order to virtually halt all United States exports to Rhodesia.²¹ The order had the approval of the President.

19. Ibid.

20. New York Times, 1 December 1965, p.92.

21. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.54, 21 March 1966, p.466.

It however faced opposition in the Congress. Many Senators and Representatives assailed the Administration's policy on Rhodesia.

Senator Jones O. Eastland (D., Miss.) and Congressman John M. Ashbrook among others were critical of the Administration's measures. According to them the measures which United States had taken against Rhodesia - "a friendly, peaceful, non-Communist country" - was not justified. Senator Eastland also drew attention to what he called the "similarities" between the American and Rhodesian declaration of independence.²² Congressman Ashbrook who headed a fact finding mission to Rhodesia in January 1966, said in his report that the American policy in Rhodesia represented the "triumph of ideology over actuality."²³

These members of the Congress in an attempt to defeat the Administration's policy, challenged the legality of the Commerce Department order. Quoting Article 1, Section 8 and Para 3 of the American Constitution they said that it was only the Congress that had the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes. They further

22. Congressional Record, Vol.112, 22 March 1966, p.6501.

23. Ibid., Vol.112, 8 March 1966, p.5340.

pointed that the 1949 Export Control Act as amended said:

The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States (a) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States and (b) to encourage and request domestic concerns to refuse to take any action which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by and foreign country against another country friendly to the United States. 24

The Congressional critics of the Administration's policy argued that when Britain did not help the United States in Vietnam, why should now the United States help Britain. Smith on the other hand offered "tangible help". Britain had also refused to abide by the sanctions imposed on trade with Communist Cuba. Many Senators and Congressmen were of the view that Johnson's instant support of the British boycott against Rhodesia was in contrast to the British refusal to support US boycott of trade with Cuba and North Vietnam. Representative Ashbrook suggested that the House of Representatives should authorize a special sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to visit Southern Rhodesia and that Congress should take a hard look at the

24. Ibid., Vol. 112, 22 March 1966, p. 6514.

State Department's policy in Rhodesia.²⁵ He wanted the House to consider a Congressional resolution which would urge the State Department and the Administration to withhold any cooperation in the British sanctions and boycott, until that nation ceases to trade with North Vietnam and Cuba, two of America's adversaries. But the Administration could not think of any measure that could be taken without hurting Britain.

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had formulated a three point plan to end the Rhodesian rebellion and bring about eventual majority rule. These proposals were presented at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference that was held in Lagos, Nigeria during 10-12 January 1966. They were, tighter sanctions against Rhodesia, more Commonwealth aid to Zambia and a program of training the black Rhodesians to govern once the White Government's rebellion was crushed. It should be noted here that the US Administration's order to manufacturers to discontinue imports of asbestos and lithium from Rhodesia was timed precisely to coincide with Wilson's departure for the Conference.

25. Ibid., Vol.112, 10 February 1966, p.830.

By the end of January 1966, the State Department had included chrome to the list of items in the sanctions against Rhodesia. Chrome was classified as a strategic item and its imports into the United States in 1964 were valued at \$ 4,648,000 which was about 36% of the total US import.²⁶ The major importers in America of Rhodesian chrome were Union Carbide and American Vanadium. The State Department in its Communique of 28 January 1966 said that this new measure was "based on a recognition of the legal authority of the British government to prohibit the export of chromite from Rhodesia."²⁷

Apart from these measures to pressurize the Rhodesian economy, the United States also planned to limit Rhodesia's political activities abroad. As a step towards this end, the State Department withdrew the diplomatic status from John Michael Hooper, Head of the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington.

IMPOSITION OF PARLATORY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Despite such extreme steps, the Smith regime did not

26. New York Times, 11 January 1966, p.1.

27. Ibid., 29 January 1966, p.31.

collapse. Britain's initial hopes of bringing about a "Quick Kill" proved to be illusory. One important reason for the failure of economic sanctions, was the refusal by South Africa to participate in any program of economic embargo against Rhodesia. South Africa carried on normal trade with Rhodesia which helped the latter to withstand the pressure generated by economic sanctions. South Africa feared that any change in government in Salisbury which might bring about majority rule, would have tremendous impact on its own political system. A few days after the U.I, the Johannesburg Sunday Times warned that South Africa could not stand by and see Rhodesia collapse, implying thereby that black supremacy in Rhodesia would endanger peace and harmony of all Southern African States.²⁸ Similarly, Portuguese help to Rhodesia was also significant. During the years following the U.I, Portugal was guided by its own interest to see that Southern Africa remains stable under favourable control. Only then could guerilla pressures on its own territory of Mozambique could be checked. Therefore, instead of offering unilateral help to Rhodesian whites alone, Portugal also

28. Robert C. Good, U.I: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London, 1973), p.129.

extended its support to Zambia.²⁹

South Africa and Portugal were not the only countries that helped Rhodesia. As early as February 1966, US companies complained that while they had complied with British requests to stop trading with Rhodesia, and were losing their trade, British trade with Rhodesia was increasing. These U. firms complained that since the ban on Rhodesia was enforced (particularly on chrome ore and tobacco which were brought under the terms of the order) the British Government had by special authorization exempted both the Rhodesian exporters and British importers from the order. They alleged that 9000 tons of high grade metallurgical chrome had been shipped to Britain since the embargo order was issued. This was enough to maintain the supply of Britain's ferro-alloy industry for six months.³⁰ American oil companies operating in Rhodesia - Mobil Oil and Caltex -- also stated that their business was dwindling while British oil firms brought oil clandestinely into Rhodesia.³¹

29. Tad Szulc, 'Portugal Offers Assistance to Both Rhodesia and its enemies,' New York Times, 27 February 1966, p.2.

30. New York Times, 26 February 1966, p. 9.

31. Recently it was found that British Oil firms like Shell and British Petroleum, were in fact supplying Rhodesia with oil during the period of the embargo. For details see: New York Times, 1 February 1976, Section IV, p.12.

The truth in these complaints could not be ascertained but it was true that oil was coming into Rhodesia and the sanction was not effective. Therefore, 9 April 1966 the Security Council passed a resolution which authorized Britain to use force -- if need be, to prevent oil from entering the Mozambican part of Beira from where it could be pumped into Rhodesia.³² Speaking on the resolution, the United States representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg said that his country was convinced that Britain sincerely wanted to meet its obligations and responsibilities to the black Africans in Rhodesia. He said: "We are asked in the Security Council and it should be a matter of great deep consideration and concern for all of us, to put our sanction upon what will be a rule of international law when this council acts."³³

The Security Council resolution authorized the United Kingdom to use force to stop vessels at high seas with oil

32. By the end of March 1966, an oil tanker had anchored off Beira, with oil supposed to be pumped through the pipeline into Rhodesia. On 10 April 1966, the New York Times disclosed a South African connection to the oil tanker. It mentioned a wealthy South African businessman Rudolph Raphsely as having had discussions with Mozambique Investments, the Company that had erected new oil storage tanks at Beira to receive oil for Rhodesia.

33. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.54, 2 May 1966, p.715.

to Rhodesia. It was a strong measure but was less than what the African States had wanted. Most African nations demanded that Britain should use force to bring down the white regime in Rhodesia -- an act which Wilson had refused to take. Viewed from another angle the resolution was the first deviation from the British policy of avoiding the use of force. The United States supported the British because it felt that failure to do so would adversely affect its standing among the Africans.

Secondly, though the invocation of the use of force was only indirect - Britain was authorized and not ordered to use force -- Britain and the United States had for the first time since the beginning of the Rhodesian problem, conceded that the situation constituted a threat to peace. It also opened the possibility of remedies under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Remedies beginning with mandatory sanctions failing which the use of force against Rhodesia could be resorted to.³⁴ But a United Nations authorization of the use of force against Rhodesia could have serious implications for both the United States and Britain. Given South Africa's refusal to participate in any

34. New York Times, 12 April 1966, p.15.

measure instituted by the United Nations, stronger economic action or even the use of force would have involved the stopping of the flow of oil from South Africa to Rhodesia. With British investments in South Africa amounting to more than £ 2.8 billion³⁵, it could not possibly engage in such an operation. Also a healthy British economy was of such importance to the United States, that it was doubted as to how far Washington would have supported such an action.³⁶

This plea for inaction was based on an incorrect assessment. The fact remained that if the UK and US needed South Africa, the latter also needed them. Pressure could operate both ways. Knowing full well that economic sanctions were not succeeding because of South Africa, these two powers did nothing to bring South Africa to the book. This raised some doubt about the sincerity of the UK as well as the United States.

If sanctions against Rhodesia failed, the danger of it being extended to other parts of Southern Africa, including Portuguese Africa and South Africa, also existed. Criticising US Policy on Rhodesia, Senator Paul J. Pannin,

35. Ibid., 17 April 1966, Section IV, p.1.

36. Ibid.

(R., Ariz.) expressed grave concern over such an eventuality.³⁷ He wanted to know as to what would be the U.S. position be if such a thing happened. The Senator quoted President Johnson, who had expressed doubts about the success of total sanctions against Southern Africa. Such a total blockade, the President felt could be enforced only by means of blockade. The President also felt that this would only "redouble their (the whites) determination to resist."³⁸ Senator Pannin further quoted the President who said that:

at this point, question of prestige will become paramount. To admit defeat and call off sanctions, it will be argued will mean the end of the U.N. "Save the UN" will become the battle cry of those who call for a military attack against all of Southern Africa. Obviously only the United States will have the power to carry out such an attack so the United States will be asked to lead the United Nations into war. 39

The Senator was of course opposed to such a policy. But so was the President. There is no evidence to suggest that he was contemplating to involve the United States in any such wider conflicts. Britain, in line with the

37. Congressional Record, Vol.13, 12 January 1967, p.396.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

Security Council resolution, put its navy afloat and prevented oil from entering Rhodesia. Despite the blockade, flow of oil into Rhodesia, through South Africa, could not be plugged. According to an estimate in mid 1966 the South African government supplied Rhodesia at the rate of 50,000 gallons a day, a quantity which was about one-third of Rhodesia's minimum needs.⁴⁰ African countries expressed great resentment at the British failure to solve the problem. By April 1966, Britain realised that her attempt to bring down the Smith regime with the help of the United States through the United Nations had failed. Since Wilson was opposed to the use of force, he then attempted to bring about a solution by means of a dialogue with the White-regime. On 27 April 1966, he announced his intention to hold informal talks at official level with Rhodesia. The talks were adjourned on 5 July. By then atleast nine African nations had broken off relations with Britain because of its handling of the Rhodesian issue. Other African members of the United Nations - Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, Uganda - were insisting upon the use of military force. Britain refused to take such action on the ground that it might impede the progress of talks that were taking place between Britain

40. New York Times, 17 April 1966, Section IV, p.1.

and Rhodesia.

Washington had played a very significant role in keeping African states from forcing Britain to use force against Rhodesia. President Johnson tried to assure the African states that the United States was seriously interested in bringing to an end the white-minority rule in all three areas of Southern Africa. In a speech on 26 May 1966 on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity, President Johnson said:

the foreign policy of the United States is rooted in its life at home. We will not permit human rights to be restricted in our own country and we will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited. 41

This statement was intended to assist Wilson in his negotiations with Smith and to pacify the new African countries that were opposed to any settlement without the removal of the Smith regime or any other white minority regime in Rhodesia.

The British - Rhodesian talks that began in May 1966 continued for six months without any settlement in sight. Meanwhile on 14 September 1966 in the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London, Britain was forced to

41. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.54, 13 June 1966, p.915.

take more drastic measures to resolve the Rhodesian Stalemate. Zambia had earlier threatened to walk-out of the Conference if Britain did not take military action.⁴² The Conference ended with Britain being given one final chance to settle the issue, failing which most African members threatened to withdraw their membership from the Commonwealth. In December a working document was prepared by Britain which Rhodesia rejected.⁴³

The failure to reach a settlement forced Britain to propose a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council for applying mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. The items covered twelve key exports from the rebel territory. These included asbestos, iron-ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skin and leather. The value of these commodities at 1965 levels were £ 235,200,000 a year.⁴⁴ Oil was not

42. New York Times, 7 September 1966, p.1.

43. Britain demanded that the rebel regime resign and institute an interim government until such time a government formed by majority rule was instituted. Rhodesia demanded that the legality of the existing regime be first affirmed, which would then pave the way for majority rule. Robert O. Good, n.28, p.165.

44. New York Times, 9 December 1966, p.1.

included to the list. It appears that Britain tactically avoided the inclusion of oil, since a ban on the export of that item, would mean a direct confrontation with South Africa, which had been the chief supplier of oil to Rhodesia. Britain wanted to avoid this.

Supporting the draft resolution, United States Ambassador Arthur Goldberg said that "the Administration has recognised from the outset Britain's responsibility to seek a solution by all appropriate peaceful means."⁴⁵ The Ambassador failed to mention oil in his remarks. Even within the United States various groups demanded that oil be included to the list of Contraband items. The American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa - in a telegram to President Johnson said, that "realistic sanctions must include oil embargo of Rhodesia, vigorously supported by the United States."⁴⁶

On 16 December 1966, the Security Council voted for Mandatory Economic Curbs on Rhodesia. The decision was taken by a vote of 11 - 0 with 4 abstentions viz:

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 10 December 1966, p.1.

Bulgaria, Franco, Mali and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ This was the first time in the history of the United Nations that the Security Council had voted for mandatory economic sanctions. The resolution also contained oil in the list of item banned for trade with Rhodesia. But it did not contain the amendment introduced by the African bloc, which asked Britain to prevent by all means. the transport of oil to Rhodesia. The U.S. view was that the sanctions programme was fully justified under the charter and might help to convince the Rhodesian regime that it had no future.⁴⁸

The Security Council resolution met with considerable opposition in the United States. People like the former Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that the Security Council decision was an irresponsible act against a territory which had not transgressed any international law or obligation. He said:

International Law does not proclaim the sanctity of British dominion over palm and pine. Certainly we Americans are in no position to declare it - we who conspired to instigate French aggression against British power in

47. Ibid., 17 December 1966, p.1.

48. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.56, 9 January 1967, p.73.

America and not only threatened but shattered international peace to achieve our independence. 49

The former Secretary pointed out that Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence from Britain was more justified when compared to the American attempts at achieving independence. According to him, the United Nations had violated the charter by interfering into the domestic affairs of a state. For him it did not matter whether there was a majority rule or a minority rule in Rhodesia.

Ambassador Goldberg made the following points in support of the Security Council resolution while replying to Acheson:

----- Rhodesia was not a state and had not been recognised as such by a single government or international organisation.

----- The situation in Rhodesia was not domestic since it involved the international responsibilities of the United Kingdom under the United Nations Charter relating to non-self governing territories.

49. "The Acheson-Goldberg Correspondence on Rhodesia," reprinted from the Washington Post, in Africa Report (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 12, January 1967, p. 56.

- The action of the Security Council did not constitute intervention since the Council action was at the instance of and concurrence with the legitimate sovereign - the United Kingdom and
- Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter (relating to domestic jurisdiction) by its own terms, did not apply to application of enforcement measures such as mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council.⁵⁰

On 19 January 1967, a resolution was moved in the U.S. Senate by Senators James O. Eastland (D., Miss.) and Paul J. Fannin (R., Ariz.). The resolution had the concurrence of the House read as follows:

It is the sense of the Congress of the United States, that the United States government immediately cease its inhumane, illegal, arbitrary, unfair, harmful and costly policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, take necessary steps to compensate United States citizens for any financial loss incurred as a result of said policy, and resume Nations' former policy of honourable self interest towards this friendly country. 51

50. Ibid.

51. Congressional Record, Vol.113, 19 January 1967, p.965. The resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. It was not reported out.

The Johnson Administration felt that the Security Council resolution was the only feasible alternative that could force Smith to restore constitutional rule and prepare the black majority for eventual rule. In order to implement the Council's resolution, President Johnson signed an Executive Order Number 11322, on 5 January 1967, which virtually cut off all trade between the United States and Rhodesia.⁵² This was the first time that the United States had invoked Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended. This act empowered the President to apply appropriate measures to enforce Security Council decisions made under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter covering threat to peace. According to an estimate American imports from Rhodesia would have been reduced from \$ 10 million to \$ 2 million as a result of the imposition of mandatory sanction. It would have also resulted in completely stopping the exports, which had already dropped from \$ 23 million in 1965 to about \$ 6 million in the first ten months of 1966.⁵³ It was estimated that the Rhodesian economy would

52. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.56, 23 January 1971, p.146.

53. New York Times, 6 January 1967, p.1.

have a drain of £ 100 million in the year 1967 as a result of the sanctions.

IMPACT OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS

Britain was able to avert a strong resolution as demanded by the African states i.e. to use force to prevent oil from entering Rhodesia. But the mandatory economic sanctions favoured by it and imposed by the Council were not effective. In fact it strengthened the White Rhodesian's determination to resist any pressure that might lead to their own down fall. The Security Council had no means by which it could enforce its decision. Member states were only morally bound to abide by the decision. South Africa and Portugal always resisted any United Nations measure against Rhodesia. Portugal had gone to the extent of demanding a £ 28 million indemnity for losses resulting from the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, which it said had gravely affected the economy of its province Mozambique.⁵⁴ West Germany announced that it would allow the then existing contracts with Rhodesia to continue despite the Security Council resolution.⁵⁵ Switzerland rejected

54. New York Times, 2 February 1967, p.11.

55. Ibid., 14 February 1967, p.3.

United Nations Secretary General U Thant's plea to comply with the Security Council resolution.⁵⁶

In his New Year's message on 1 January 1968, Ian Smith claimed that Rhodesia was strengthening its economic position despite the U.N. sanctions.⁵⁷ Its mineral exports had been significantly strong to countries like Japan, United States, West Germany and other industrialised nations. Some British economists estimated that "sanctions would cut Rhodesian exports by 25% - from about £ 80,000,000 in 1966 to £ 60,000,000 in 1967."⁵⁸ But they warned that this would not bring Rhodesia to its knees. Zambia had been a major trading partner of Rhodesia, it was forced to buy goods and services from its neighbour despite the UN sanctions. Even as early as 1966, Rhodesia had reduced its imports by one-third and with South Africa honouring the Rhodesian pound, Rhodesia had no need to dig into its foreign exchange reserves at all.⁵⁹

The New York Times cited Mr. Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, as having told the House of Commons that at least nine nations including the United States had

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., 1 January 1968, p.7.

58. Larry W. Bowmann, "Rhodesia 'since U.N.'", Africa Report, Vol.12, February 1967, p.8.

59. Ibid.

increased their trade with Rhodesia despite the United Nations sanctions.⁶⁰ He however, did not mention the volume of trade or the commodities that were being traded, nor did he mention the names of firms that were involved.

The failure of the United Nations sanctions was made explicit, when many individual groups in the United States called upon the government to adopt more measures against Rhodesia. A resolution adopted by the Negro Leadership Conference, an organisation of blacks to fight for civil rights, labour and religious groups - called upon Britain to use force to topple the Smith regime, failing which they proposed that the United States should force the United Nations to take military action to solve the problem, and thereafter place Rhodesia under appropriate United Nations supervision "with a view to establish a government freely elected by Rhodesians, 'black and white.'⁶¹

The United Nations however, gave a different and optimistic picture. The Security Council had authorised the Secretary General to report on the Implementation of the sanctions programme on the basis of reports submitted his report. It stated that the limited sanctions imposed

60. New York Times, 21 July 1967, p.8.

61. Ibid., 5 April 1967, p.94.

on Rhodesia caused a drop of more than 87% in imports and more than 71% in exports by that country's major trading partner's in 1967 compared to 1965 figures.⁶² One wonders why this steep decline in trade of more than 80% did not cause any serious economic impact on Rhodesia. The validity of the Secretary General's report remains doubtful because late in October 1967, the Trusteeship Committee of the General Assembly called on Britain to use "any force" necessary to overthrow the regime in Rhodesia. The resolution asserted that the economic sanctions applied had failed to bring down the illegal minority regime.⁶³

On 29 May 1968, when the Security Council voted for a resolution extending the earlier prohibition on imports and exports to cover all commodities and products, the United States voted in favour of the resolution.⁶⁴ The resolution also obligated the United Nations members to prohibit the transfer to Rhodesia of funds and other economic resources and to prevent their air carriers and aircrafts from operating to Rhodesia. It also asked the members to discourage travel by persons holding Rhodesian passports. The United States agreed to implement this resolution when President Johnson signed an executive order number 11419

62. Ibid., 20 June 1968, p.6.

63. Ibid., 28 October 1967, p.10.

64. Ibid., 30 May 1968, p.2.

on 29 July 1968.⁶⁵ During the second half of 1968, the US policy towards Rhodesia did not witness any significant change. But the US did not commit itself to withdraw its consulate from Rhodesia in compliance with the resolution. Ambassador Goldberg told the Security Council that the United States would give it careful consideration. "In so doing", he added, "we will have to take into account our profound belief in the free flow of information and communication through out the world, which we feel should apply to Rhodesia also."⁶⁶

U.S. ZAMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Zambia, an independent Southern African state to the north of Rhodesia, is a land-locked country. It achieved its independence in 1964 after the collapse of the Central African Federation. Since then, though politically independent, Zambia was economically dependent on Rhodesia for its essential supplies, technical services, transport facilities and communications. In 1965, when Rhodesia declared independence, the Rhodesian railways carried nearly all of Zambia's exports and imports across 1500 miles from the Copper belt, to the ports of Beira and

65. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.59, 19 August 1968, pp.199-200.

66. Ibid., Vol.58, 24 June 1968, p.847.

Laurence Marques in Mozambique. Zambia also imported 90% of her supplies of petrol, oil and lubricants via Rhodesia.⁶⁷ Her exports to South Africa and Rhodesia (mainly copper) were worth over £ 17,000,000 in 1964, as against imports from these countries valued at £ 47,000,000. Purchase from Rhodesia and South Africa ran through out 1965 at a level of nearly £ 1,000,000 a month above the level in 1964. (£ 1 = \$ 2.80). Also, in 1964, Zambia's purchases from Rhodesia alone added up to £ 30,800,000 or almost 40% of its total imports.⁶⁸ Further, the Kariba Dam which was the chief supplier of hydro-electric power both to Rhodesia and Zambia was situated in the former's territory.

Zambia was thus vulnerable and President Kaunda had

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67. Richard L. Sklar, "Zambia's Response to Rhodesian UDI" in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester, 1974), p.327.
68. Richard Hall, "Zambia and Rhodesia: Links and Fetters", *Africa Report*, (Washington D.C.), Vol.11, January 1966, p.12.
- Break-up of materials imported by Zambia from Rhodesia and those that were banned by the Security Council in December 1966.

a) Chrome	- nil	g) Iron and	
b) Hides	- nil	Steel	- £ 2,500,000
c) Leather	- nil	goods	
d) Asbestos		h) Meat and	
goods	- £ 353,000	Meat	- £ 608,000
e) Asbestos		Products	
Crude	- £ 55,000	i) Tobacco	- £ 668,000
f) Pig Iron	- £ 91,000	j) Sugar	- £ 1,238,000

Source: John de St. Jorre, "Zambia's Economy: Progress and Perils," *Africa Report*, Vol.12, December 1967, p.37.

good reasons for feeling anxious about the incipient dangers of racialism on the Copperbelt⁶⁹ in the event of a UDI in Rhodesia followed by British Sanctions.⁶⁹ At the insistence of both Britain and Zambia, a working group on contingency planning was formed in Washington in March 1965. The British and American planning teams met and compared notes in May and they agreed that in the event of the UDI by Rhodesia, Zambia would face a very difficult economic situation. They prepared a plan to help Zambia if such a situation materialised. It was decided that if Rhodesia closed its railroad to Zambia, preventing it (Zambia) from exporting its copper, the United States would release refined copper from its strategic stockpile to meet Zambia's requirement. The idea was to eliminate the problem of transporting Zambia's production during the emergency.⁷⁰ The United States and Britain realised that in view of the enormous volume of trade and Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia for other things, its economy could not be maintained if a complete rupture with Rhodesia resulted.

The transportation problem was really a very critical problem. Furthermore, the United Kingdom imported nearly 300,000 tons of copper per annum, and a good part of it came from Zambia. As early as May 1965, President Kaunda went to Washington to request help in the construction of an alternate rail-link through Tanzania to Dar-Es-Salaam.

69. Colin Legum (ed.), Zambia: Independence and Beyond (Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda) (London, 1965), p.235.

70. Good, n.28, p.89.

President Johnson had then refused to support such a costly venture. The Administration was also conscious that the proposal would force considerable Congressional opposition. During the mid sixties, foreign aid was increasingly assailed, and due to the frequent crisis in the Congo, interest in Africa in general had reached a low-ebb. The Administration viewed the Rhodesian problem primarily as a British concern. Thus, Johnson decided against any direct American assistance for what was to become one of Africa's largest and politically most important aid projects. Instead the American Government offered to conduct an economic survey of the road-link to Dar-Es-Salaam, while the British agreed to finance yet another project of a similar kind.⁷¹

Following Rhodesia's UDI, Prime Minister Wilson met President Johnson for the implementation of the oil embargo against the colony. At that meeting, Wilson requested for American support to keep Zambia afloat with its normal supplies of oil. Britain benefited in two ways by seeking American help. Firstly, with American assistance, the cost of the operation would be considerably reduced, and secondly, it could also convince Zambia as regards Britain's

71. Ibid., p.93.

sincere interest in solving the problem. Assisting Britain in helping Zambia was to the advantage of the United States. The Johnson Administration could demonstrate its interest in Anglo-American Cooperation. It then could ask Wilson to curb the extreme demands of Labour Party members, who were opposed to United States policy in Vietnam. The United States government also took this as an opportunity to demonstrate American sympathy to Zambia and erase Zambian disillusionment with the United States policy resulting from its refusal to assist in the construction of the Ton-Zam rail-link. Talking to the Ministerial mission from Zambia, which visited Washington between 22 - 27 December 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured the Zambians of US help.⁷² He promised US to help in minimizing the effects of the Rhodesian crisis on Zambia's economy.

On 29 December 1965, the Agency for International Development concluded an agreement with the Pan American World Airways to begin an airlift of gasoline and oil into Zambia.⁷³

When the sanctions programme failed to bring about

72. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.54, 17 January 1966, p.65.

73. Ibid., Vol.54, 31 January 1966, p.157.

the desired effect, Zambia demanded that Britain and the United States use force to topple the Smith regime. The Zambian President asked the United States government for political and economic support. He suggested that the United States should request for the application of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia under the United Nations Charter. This he said would range the whole world against Rhodesia and warn South Africa that it could not violate the sanctions without risking the condemnation of the world.⁷⁴

When such an initiative did not come from the United States, Zambia threatened to walkout of the Commonwealth, and also to sever all economic relations with Rhodesia. But the United States played a very effective role in dissuading Zambia from taking any extreme step. To reduce the impact of the UJI on its economy, the world Bank offered Zambia \$ 175 million in aid to improve its highways.⁷⁵

By the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey paid a visit to eight African countries. The trip gained added significance because Zambia was also included in his itinerary. The visit to

74. New York Times, 20 March 1966, p.27.

75. Ibid., 20 September 1966, p.65.

Zambia was to assure it of United States support and assistance to resist the pressure that it had had to face because of the Rhodesian UJI, an assurance which had been earlier given to Kaunda by Johnson himself. In Lusaka, Humphrey promised Zambia US assistance in paving 300 miles of strategic Great North Road which runs for 800 miles from Ndolu in Northern Zambia to Dar-Es-Salaam. African economists attributed immense Political significance to this road, because it had become the symbol of Zambia's -- indeed of entire Africa -- economic independence from whites.⁷⁶

76. New York Times, 6 January 1968, p.11.

CHAPTER - III

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION: REVER AL OF POSITION ON EMBARGO

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THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION: REVERSAL OF POSITION ON EMBARGO

Among the many complex problems which Richard Nixon inherited from his Democratic predecessors in 1969, was the problem of Rhodesia. Although neither in priority nor in complexity it came anywhere near the Vietnam problem, it was sufficiently important. The crux of the problem was whether to follow the British lead as President Johnson had done or to evolve an independent policy. Primarily, President Richard M. Nixon's election had played a crucial role in influencing his foreign policy decisions. He entered office on a minority vote, and "was quite crucially indebted to Southern Conservatives, most notably Strom Thurmond of South Carolina."¹ This resulted in Nixon adopting a "Southern Strategy" and from the beginning he worked to consolidate his position among Southern Conservatives, which would have helped him in his re-election in 1972. It should be noted here that majority of the supporters of the Rhodesian cause in the Congress were conservatives from the South.²

1. R.W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive? (London, 1977), p.56.

2. Southern Solidarity on the Rhodesian issue is reflected by the fact that in 1967 of the 58 formal resolutions introduced in the House supporting economic sanctions against Rhodesia, not one was sponsored by a Southern representative. Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.), Vol.113, 24 July 1967, p.19903.

Within three months of assuming office, on 10 April 1969, Nixon ordered the National Security Council to study the problems in Southern Africa and make recommendations. Under Henry Kissinger, then President Nixon's National Security Adviser, the National Security Council submitted its report -- National Security Study Memorandum-39 on Southern Africa -- in December 1969. It was classified as Secret. In the fall of 1974, two reporters of the Washington Post, Tad Szulc and Jack Anderson had access to it and the report became public. The importance of the document lay in the fact that for the first time a detailed analysis of American policy and interest was made in respect of each country in Southern Africa. The study had been carried on not by the National Security Council alone. It was prepared by the NSC's Inter-departmental Group for Africa, which consisted of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State and the Department of Defense. Facts and figures relating to American activities in Southern Africa, as well as those relating to the countries of the region were provided by various US departments that were in charge of such functions. This included various other agencies and departments like the Treasury Department, Department of Commerce, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for International Development and the National Aeronautical

and Space Administration.³

The memorandum outlined five policy options for the United States.⁴ Option one, called the "Dean Acheson" Option (because the former Secretary of State had been its most vocal exponent) proposed treating the white regimes in Southern Africa as any friendly sovereign nation without regard to its internal policies. Option two or the "Tarbaby Option" (so dubbed by its critics in the State Department who feared that once it was adopted, Washington would find it impossible to abandon it even if the policy proved a failure)⁵ recommended increased communication and selective involvement with the white Governments. The option was based on the premise that friendly persuasion rather than constant condemnation was more likely to make these countries modify their racial policies. Option three, the "more of the same" policy called for the continuation of the Kennedy-Johnson policy of vigorous verbal attacks on apartheid. It also favored an arms embargo and advocated limited official involvement. Option four, advocated a policy of dissociation from the white regimes

3. Mohammed A. El Khawas and Barry Cohen (eds.) The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum-39 (SECRET) (Connecticut, 1976), p.22. Hereafter this source has been cited as NSM-39.

4. Ibid., p.102.

5. New York Times, 2 April 1972, p.1.

and for the establishment of closer relations with black African states to improve US standing on the racial issue in Africa and in the world. Lastly, Option five recommended dissociation from both black and white states in an effort to limit US involvement in the problem of Southern Africa.

African experts within the State Department and officials in the Administration favoured Option three, while officials in the Department of Defense favoured Option one.⁶ However, the option that Nixon chose at the instance of Henry Kissinger was Option two. The decision was influenced by the view held by the President and the National Security Adviser that the "theroy moral and political problems of Southern Africa are basically beyond the control of the United States",⁷ which had only marginal interests in the area. They also agreed that due to the problems in Indo-China, the United States could not undertake the resolution of the problem of Southern Africa. American investments in Southern Africa, particularly South Africa, were also an important factor in the President's choice of

6. Terence Smith, "US Widens Ties to African Whites," New York Times, 2 April 1972, p.14.

7. NSSA-39, a.3, p.29.

Option two.⁸ This option was based on the premise that Whites in Rhodesia were there to stay and the only way that constructive change could be brought about was through them.⁹ Based on this premise, the United States policy towards Rhodesia from the beginning of 1970 was one of gradually increasing support to the white minority regime.

Within six months of assuming office, Nixon was faced with the Rhodesian problem. In June 1969, Rhodesia conducted a referendum in which only the whites voted and approved a formal break with London. They also voted for the establishment of a republic and adoption of a new constitution providing for virtually permanent white supremacy. As a reaction to the referendum, Britain severed its last remaining ties with Rhodesia and withdrew her consulate. British and Afro-Asian pressure began to mount on Washington to withdraw its consulate from Salisbury. But the State Department withstood the pressure. Britain was interested in the withdrawal of American mission in Rhodesia, primarily

8. Some 300 American Companies, including 12 of the 20 largest, have investments in South Africa valued between \$ 750 million and / 1 billion. The average yearly return is about 17% per year, and contribute handsomely to the plus column of US balance of payments. Some of the Companies such as the Union Carbide and the Foote Mineral have openly advocated a more business like relationship with Southern Africa. Terence Smith, n.6, p.14.

9. NSOM-39, n.3, p.105.

because it wanted to demonstrate that its policy had the backing of the United States.

As the Johnson Administration in the past had followed almost immediately any British move, the new Administration's delay caused anxiety in London. In the Commonwealth Conference during 10-15 January 1969 in London, Wilson was assailed for his policies in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister had gone to the extent of confessing to the members in the Conference that there had been a contradiction in British policy towards Rhodesia.¹⁰ The new British policy made a radical departure. heretofore, Wilson had earlier pursued a policy of "no independence before majority rule", his new policy envisioned progress towards majority rule after independence. African members in the Conference demanded, as they had done before, that Britain should use force. This was ruled out by Wilson. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Wilson settled the Rhodesian problem on the basis of the proposals he had made in 1968 - suggesting constitutional provisions for eventual majority rule and for a right of judicial appeal to London on the question. Britain needed U.S. support in the face of these difficulties.

10. New York Times, 11 January 1969, p.11.

On 18 January 1969, Smith announced that his government would withhold money due to the United States government on investments in retaliation for economic sanctions against Rhodesia. The United States government could also have retaliated by closing its consulate in Salisbury. But although the Administration threatened to close the consulate, it did not actually do so. Instead, the United States Consul General to Rhodesia, returned to Salisbury in September 1969. This made it look as though the United States had decided to follow its own course in Rhodesia. The unusual delay in closing the consulate gave the impression of a tacit approval of the Smith regime. That the United States was so reluctant to take such a small step was a clear indication that its opposition to the Smith regime was only rhetorical. As far as the Black African States were concerned, this was meaningless. They began to doubt whether the United States was really opposed to the racist White minority regime at all.

At this juncture, the United States decided to send Secretary of State William Rogers on a tour of the African countries. In order to create a favourable atmosphere for Roger's visit, President Nixon in his report to the Congress and the nation on American foreign policy referred to the problem in Rhodesia in the following words:

Clearly there is no question of the United States condoning or acquiescing in the racial policies of the White rebel regimes. For moral as well as political reasons, the United States stands firmly for the principle of racial equality and self-determination. 11

But Black Africa was no longer willing to be appeased by words. Therefore, when Rogers arrived on his visit between 7-23 February 1970, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia conveyed to the Secretary of State, Africa's mood of disappointment and disillusionment. He told Rogers that the United States should bear the main responsibility among the great powers for helping Africans to end White minority rule in Southern Africa.¹² He pointedly asked the United States to close its consulate in Salisbury because it gave political solace to the White minority government. According to the New York Times, the essence of Kaunda's talks with Rogers was that when such states like Zambia and Tanzania took reasonable positions on the problem and Western powers did not respond, a stance of continued reasonableness was made difficult for the Africans.

11. United States Foreign Policy for the Seventies: A New Strategy for Peace: President Nixon's report to the Congress and Nation on American Foreign Policy, 18 February 1970 (New York, 1970), p.69.

12. New York Times, 27 February 1970, p.3.

Specially, Kaunda asked the United States to influence Portugal to respond positively to the Lusaka Manifesto issued by the Central and East African nations in April 1969. The Lusaka Manifesto had called for the independence of Portuguese territories in Africa - Angola and Mozambique - and for racial equality in Rhodesia and South Africa. This statement of Kaunda was aimed primarily at weaning away Portugal from South Africa and Rhodesia with American help. Though Secretary Rogers did not promise any immediate action, he did inform Kaunda that Washington would seriously consider his proposals. He said that the presence of the American Consulate in Salisbury did not imply recognition of the Smith regime. The United States thus was not willing to support the moderate Black states even by making a small gesture of closing its consulate. It was Rhodesia which forced the United States to take the step by proclaiming itself a Republic on 1 March 1970. Secretary Rogers ordered the Consulate closed on 9 March 1970.¹³

In a statement, the Secretary said that the action was taken because the United States continued to regard Britain as the lawful sovereign in Rhodesia despite the

13. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), Vol.62, 30 March 1970, p.412.

declaration of a Republic by the Smith regime. Apart from denying formal recognition to the regime, the decision represented a significant gesture towards Black Africa and a condemnation of the Smith regime. The Administration's decision was greatly appreciated by many groups in the United States, which had been critical of U.S. policy towards Rhodesia. Representative Ogden R. Reid, Chairman of the Africa Group which included among others Senators Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) and George McGovern (D., S.D.), in a statement said that the decision by the Secretary was a significant step to reassure the Black African nations that the United States will back up with concrete action the commitment made in the President's state of the world message.¹⁴

Following Rhodesia's proclamation of a Republic and implementation of a new constitution, the Afro-Asian countries sponsored a resolution in the Security Council condemning Britain for not having used force to overthrow the white minority government. The United States along with Britain vetoed the resolution when it was put to vote on 17 March 1970. This was the first veto cast on any resolution by the United States during its membership in the

14. New York Times, 10 March 1970, p.1.

United Nations.¹⁵ The Security Council then adopted a compromise resolution which strengthened the earlier sanctions against the Smith regime and demanded that all members terminate diplomatic, consular, trade, military and other relations with the regime in Salisbury. A demand for the interception of mails and other communications with Rhodesia was opposed by the United States and the U.K.

The United States' veto of the resolution was totally unwarranted. Even before the vote, the U.K. had announced that it would veto the resolution. As a mark of disapproval the United States could have obtained from voting. But, according to U.S. Ambassador Charles W. Yost, "only the most serious consideration would bring the United States to take such a step as voting against a resolution that had so much support."¹⁶ In choosing to cast the veto, the United States attempted doing three things at once. Firstly, it forthrightly opposed what it considered to be an unfair, unrealistic and unworkable resolution. Secondly, it asserted that it will not hesitate to use the veto in future and thirdly, it demonstrated its support for a valued ally, Britain.

15. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.62, 13 April 1970, p.501.

16. *Ibid.*, p.506.

The United States veto caused great resentment among the Afro-Asian bloc, wiping out what little good will had been created as a result of the withdrawal of its consulate. The Third World countries felt that the United States valued British support more than theirs. To appease these countries, President Nixon approved a policy statement on Africa which was presented to him by Secretary Rogers on 26 March 1970.¹⁷ The new policy stated that the Administration would work to bring about a change in the direction of its policy towards Africa where racial oppression and colonial remnants still prevailed. It said that US policy towards Africa was a policy related to African countries and was not based upon relations with non-African countries -- meaning former and present colonial powers like Britain, Portugal, France and others. More significant was the domestic political implication that the statement had in describing America's ties with Africa. It said that, "we are linked by the cultural fact that one out of every ten American has his origins in Africa."¹⁸ However, the statement went on to point out that "easy solutions" for the problems facing Africa were not available. It promised that the United States would

17. Department of State News Letter, no.108, April 1970, pp.6-11.

18. New York Times, 29 March 1970, p.19.

stand on the side of these forces of fundamental human rights.

REVERSAL OF THE UN EMBARGO ON TRADE WITH RHODESIA

On 17 November 1970, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously for strong and urgent action against the White regime in Rhodesia. The resolution called upon Britain to take urgent and effective measures to end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁹ The resolution implicitly conceded that the sanctions programme had been a total failure. Moreover, the period of the British adherence to the sanctions programmes was to expire by the end of 1971. Washington wondered whether Britain would extend the boycott or terminate it. What would the United States do, if Britain decided to resume its trade with Rhodesia? The latter had been an important source for chrome, a strategically vital metal for the United States. And since the ban, the United States had been forced to buy Russian chrome. Despite this inconvenience, the United States had supported Britain, in the hope that in exchange Washington would get British support for its policy in Vietnam. It also had to bear in mind, that almost all the African countries supported any move against Smith. But with a new government under Edward Heath in office in

19. Ibid., 18 November 1970, p.13.

London, Washington was keeping its fingers crossed.

Within the United States, the Administration had to contend with a Congress which was gradually becoming more seriously concerned with U.S. policy in Rhodesia. Thus far it had played a relatively minor role in the affairs of Rhodesia leaving it to the Administration to handle the problem. This had been facilitated by the fact that Britain had taken the problem to the United Nations and the implementation of any Security Council resolution was done only by the President under the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 as amended. President Johnson had participated in the voluntary economic sanctions against Rhodesia on Britain's request in December 1965. Later, when the Security Council of the United Nations imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia late in 1966. President Johnson supported the programme by means of an Executive Order. Again in 1968, when the Security Council extended the sanctions to cover more items not covered by the previous resolution, it was the President who issued another Executive Order committing the United States to abide by the resolution. Hence, the Rhodesian issue as such had remained one of Executive concern.²⁰ With the growing interest in Congress,

20. R. Sean Randolph, "The Byrd Amendment - A Post - Mortem", World Affairs (Washington), Vol. 141, Summer 1978, p. 58.

this was bound to change.

The United States entanglement in Vietnam brought the Administration under heavy attack. Congress wanted to know as to what exactly the United States was doing in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Information Office in Washington carried on lobbying efforts to arouse this Congressional interest. It convinced a good many Senators and Congressmen that the US Policy in Rhodesia needed a drastic overhauling. Southern Conservatives like Senator Strom Thurmond (D., S.C.) had frequently expressed their deep dislike of US policy in Southern Africa. For them Rhodesia and South Africa were stout hearted allies in the world wide struggle against communism.²¹ They felt that the participation of the United States in the operation of sanctions and an arms embargo against these bastions of the "Free World" was against national interest.

Many in Congress were agitated over the issue of importing Rhodesian chrome. Senators like Strom Thurmond, Harry F. Byrd (Ind., Va.) and Barry Goldwater (D., Ariz) were in favour of lifting the ban on US imports of

21. Johnson, n.l, p.56.

Rhodesian chrome. The issue had cropped up in the Congress as early as 1967 following the refusal by the Treasury Department to issue the Poote Mineral Company a special license to import chrome from the Rhodesian mines, the cost of which it had paid prior to the imposition of sanctions.²² Reacting to the Treasury Department's order, Sen. Thurmond speaking at a banquet in Washington on 17 May 1967, referred to the grand absurdity of forcing the United States, suppliers to become dependent upon an enemy (Russia) who was intent upon destroying the United States.²³ By the end of 1969, Congressmen especially from the South, had begun to question the constitutional validity of Presidential executive orders which imposed UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Sen. Sam Ervin (D., N.C.) charged President Johnson with usurpation and exercise of a power which he did not possess under the Constitution.²⁴ Defense of White Rhodesians was equated with defense of Congressional authority, a cause which gained more support than either racism or anti-communism.²⁵

22. Raymond Arsenault, "White on Chrome: Southern Congressmen and Rhodesia," Issue (Massachusetts), Vol.2, Winter 1972, p.49.

23. Congressional Record, Vol.113, 10 August 1967, p.22346.

24. Ibid., Vol.115, 12 December 1969, p.38638.

25. Arsenault, n.22, p.51.

Another Senator who was actively working on behalf of the Rhodesian government was Sen. Harry F. Byrd. Having secured an invitation for Smith from the University of Virginia, he then demanded from the State Department that Smith be permitted to enter the United States to address the University. The State Department however, refused to grant the Rhodesian Prime Minister, a visa to enter the United States.²⁶ Senator Byrd was the chief architect behind the amendment that lifted the ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome. He was also the most vocal opponent of the Administration's decision to close its consulate in Salisbury. Byrd demanded that Great Britain take immediate action to close its consulate in Hanoi.²⁷

THE BYRD AMENDMENT

Though the Byrd amendment did not mention chrome by name, it was evident that it was chrome that the backers of the amendment had in mind. The amendment also did not relate to any previous export import law. It was primarily an amendment to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, which empowered the President to commit the United States to obey any Security Council resolution by unilateral

26. New York Times, 5 March 1968, p.1.

27. Congressional Record, Vol.116, 10 March 1970, p.6669.

Executive action. It was by the powers given to him under this act that President Johnson committed the United States to participate in the United Nations Security Council sanctions programmes, of 1966 and 1968. The amendment sought to amend this Presidential prerogative. It was aimed at preventing the prohibition on imports "of any strategic material into the United States from a non-communist country unless that material were also prohibited from importation from a Communist Country".²⁸

The Byrd proposal was introduced in the Senate on 27 March 1971 as S.1404 and simultaneously in the House by Representative James M. Collins (R., Tex.) with 24 cosponsors.²⁹ In the House it was referred to the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of

28. U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, First Session, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: UN Sanctions Against Rhodesia-Chrome (Washington, D.C., 1971), p.1.

The main producers of chrome ore are the Soviet Union, Rhodesia, South Africa, Turkey and the Philippines. Of this group Rhodesia has an estimated two-thirds of the world supplies of high grade chromite ore. Russia while being the largest supplier has less than one-tenth the reserves of Rhodesia. Congressional Record, Vol.117, 23 September 1971, p.33251.

29. Congressional Digest, Vol.52, February 1973, p.42.

the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings were held on 17 and 22 June 1971, but the Sub-Committee did not report the bill out. In the Senate, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations before which hearings were held on 7 and 8 July 1971. While defending his amendment Senator Byrd argued that chromium ore was a strategic mineral which was used in steel alloys, needed for aircraft, missiles and other military purposes. After the Rhodesian supply of chrome to the United States ceased, it heavily depended on the Soviet Union which became America's major supplier. The Soviet Union could however cut off the supply at any time.³⁰ He also contended that the Russian's had tripled their price for chrome and that he found no reason as to why the United States should not be free to buy chrome from Rhodesia. Byrd also said that since the Senate had not been consulted when President Johnson issued the Executive Order halting trade with Rhodesia, it was a unilateral action. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on 7 July 1971, Sen. Byrd said,

30. The New Republic (Washington), Vol.165, 27 November 1971, p.7.

I say again this action of putting an embargo on was taken unilaterally by the President. I think the Congress has given up too much power and I think the Chief Executives have assumed too much power. I think the one reason we are in a mess we are in throughout the world today is because Congress has turned over to the Chief Executive and turned over to some extent, I will include the United Nations into it, too much power. 31.

The Senator further contended that the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia was not serious enough to destroy the Rhodesian economy. On the contrary, despite sanctions Rhodesia's Gross National Product had increased from \$ 727 million in 1965 to \$ 1027 million in 1970, an increase of 41%³². This according to him was a clear indication that Rhodesia had carried on trade successfully with other countries. When the United States had adhered to the sanctions programme much to its own inconvenience, other countries had been trading with the White regime. Senator Byrd felt that the United States should also resume its trade with Rhodesia.

Others who supported Byrd's proposal were Senator Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) and the former Secretary of State Jean Acheson. Acheson almost repeated Byrd's

31. Hearings, n.28, p.36.

32. Ibid., p.6.

arguments that Rhodesian chromite was essential to American Security and it was dangerous to depend on the Soviet Union for it. He pointed out that this was a matter of the free versus the Communist world. The former Secretary of State used the occasion to launch an attack on United States policy towards the United Nations. He accused the US government of being subservient to an undemocratic United Nations.³³ He also said that the embargo was illegal because the Senate was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order by President Johnson.

Senator Gale W. McGee (D., Wyo.) who opposed Byrd's move in the Senate, argued that chrome was not in short supply in the United States. In fact it had enough in its reserve stockpile.³⁴ Senator McGee contended that,

.....at the end of January 1971 the Executive branch of the US Government submitted draft legislation introduced as Senate Bill 773, to authorize release of roughly 1.3 million short dry tons of high grade chromite from the national strategic stockpile, as being in excess to stockpile needs. The Office of Emergency Preparedness, with the concurrence of all interested agencies and especially the Department of Defense, had determined that 3.1 million tons of metallurgical grade

33. W.S.A. Skurnik, "Recent US Policy in Africa", Current History (Philadelphia), Vol.64, March 1973, pp.99-100.

34. Congressional Record, Vol.117, 16 September 1971, p.32153.

chromite were sufficient for stockpile requirements out of an inventory of about 5,350,000 tons which could be released. 35

In a fact-sheet which Senator McGee presented to all the Senators, he stated that there was no current shortage of chrome ore for defense purposes. He mentioned that the United Steel workers upheld the sanctions policy.³⁶ The Senator pointed out, that the United States imported about one-third of its chromite from the Soviet Union for several years before the sanctions and no Rhodesian chromite entered the United States indirectly. He stressed that by passing the Byrd Amendment, the United States would defy the United Nations Security Council which would affect United States relations with United Nations and Africa. McGee felt that to deprive the President of the limited power would go contrary to Congressional approval of United States adherence to the United Nations Charter.³⁷ Others who opposed the Byrd Amendment were Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs H. J. Newson and Chairman of the House sub-Committee on African Affairs Charles C. Diggs.

35. Gale W. McGee, "The US Congress and the Rhodesian Chrome Issue", Issue (Massachusetts), Vol.2, Summer 1972, p.3.

36. Congressional Record, Vol. 117, 29 September 1971, p.33939.

37. McGee, n.35, p.5.

On 5 August 1971, the full Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered the Byrd amendment (S.1404) in its Executive Session and without a single dissenting vote decided to postpone indefinitely any action on the bill.³⁸ The inaction of the Committees in both the Senate and the House made Senator Byrd refer his amendment to the Committee on Armed Services of which he himself was a member. This Committee was considering a House passed Bill HR 8687, authorizing military procurement appropriation for fiscal 1972. In referring his amendment to the Committee on Armed Services Senator Byrd had certain advantages. Firstly, being a member of the Committee, he could influence other members to consider the Bill favourably. Secondly, the Senator while introducing his amendment, tactfully, worded it to reflect the United States national security interests and the importance of chrome for defense production. The Byrd Amendment was included in the HR 8687, as Section 503. The Armed Services Committee reported out the amended version of HR 8687, the House passed military procurement appropriation Bill, along with Section 503 which contained the language of the Byrd amendment.³⁹

38. Ibid., p.4.

39. Congressional Digest, n.29, p.42.

In the Senate Section 503 faced stiff opposition. Senator McGee offered an amendment which would have struck down Section 503 from the military procurement bill. On 23 September 1971 the McGee amendment was defeated by a 46 - 36 roll-call vote.⁴⁰ After the rejection of the McGee amendment, Senator J.W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced an amendment on 27 September 1971, seeking to make the Byrd proposal subject to the President's right to over-ride it, if he (the President) determined that the national interest or a treaty obligation of the United States so required and he informs the Congress of his determination.⁴¹ Debate on the Fulbright amendment took place on 30 September 1971, and was passed the same day by a vote of 45 - 43. After the vote as the Senators drifted away from the Chamber during the evening to fulfill other engagements, the proponents of the Byrd proposal took advantage of the situation and proposed a motion to reconsider the Bill. The motion was passed by a vote of 39 - 38.⁴² The Fulbright amendment was again put to vote on 6 October 1971. This time it was

40. Congressional Record, Vol.117, 23 September 1971, p.33086

41. Ibid., Vol.117, 27 September 1971, p.33463.

42. New York Times, 1 October 1971, p.44.

rejected by a vote of 44 - 38.⁴³ It should be noted that the Fulbright amendment had the support of the Congressional Black Caucus.⁴⁴

The Military Procurement Bill was finally passed on the same day with one modification to the Byrd Amendment. A proposal was introduced by Senator Williams Brock (R., Tenn), to delay the effective date of the Byrd proposal until 1 January 1972 -- a provision which was intended to give more time to Britain which was at that time engaged in talks with the Smith regime. In the Senate the Bill was passed by a vote of 82-4.⁴⁵ The House passed the Military Procurement Bill by a vote of 252-101 along with the Byrd amendment on 10 November 1971.⁴⁶ The President signed the Bill on 17 November 1971.⁴⁷

43. Congressional Record, Vol.117, 6 October 1971, Opp.35254-55.

The Fulbright Amendment was defeated due to absenteeism in and lack of White House support. Twenty-two Republicans voted against the Amendment. Among those absent were four Senators seeking the Democratic Presidential nomination. They were Fred R. Harris (Okla.), Henry M. Jackson (Wash.), George McGovern (S.D.), and Edmund S. Muskie (Pa). New York Times, 7 October 1971, p.8.

44. Congressional Record, Vol.117, 29 September 1971, p.34063.

45. Ibid., Vol.117, 6 October 1971, p.35282.

46. New York Times, 11 November 1971, p.1.

47. Ibid., 18 November 1971, p.13.

Senator McGee made yet another effort in May 1972 to get the Byrd Amendment repealed by the Congress. But it failed just by four votes. By a vote of 40 - 36 the Senate reaffirmed its support for the continued importation into the United States of Rhodesian chrome despite United Nations sanctions.⁴⁸

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE BYRD AMENDMENT

That the Nixon Administration was following a policy as outlined in Option two of the National Security Study Memorandum-39, was clearly evident from its attitude towards the Byrd Amendment. As early as July 1971, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, D.D. Newsom, testifying before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, unambiguously stated the Administration's views on the Byrd Amendment. He conceded that it would invalidate the existing United Nations embargo on chrome and went on to add:

We are not unmindful of the national interest which concerns those who propose this legislation. Were the chrome situation indeed critical, we, too, would seek measures of relief. We do not, however, consider it such; for us the over-riding

48. Ibid., 1 June 1972, p.7.

consideration are our international obligations and our desire to do nothing which would undermine movement towards an acceptable solution to the Rhodesian problem. 49

Newsom also stressed that the United States had adequate stockpile of chrome ore, essential for industrial purposes. Indeed, the stockpile position was so satisfactory that just before the United Nations Security Council imposed its sanctions, the United States government had commenced the disposal of surplus chrome ore. The Congress authorized the disposal of 885,000 short tons by means of an enactment PL 89 - 415 on 11 May 1966.⁵⁰ This testimony would indicate that the White House was opposed to the Byrd Amendment, but it did not vigorously push for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. President Nixon did not send enough of White House personnel to lobby for the defeat of the Amendment in the Congress. Had he made an effort to line up Representatives behind the McGee Amendment, it certainly would have passed. This inclines one to believe that the Administration was not seriously interested in the continuation of American policy towards Rhodesia.

49. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.65, 26 July 1971, p.113.

50. Ibid.

Once the Byrd Amendment came up for discussions in the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Committee withheld approval of S.773 which it was then considering (to release 1.3 million short dry tons of high grade chromite from the nation's strategic stockpile). In fact, Senator McGee even accused the Committee of holding S.773 as a hostage to action on Byrd's proposal.⁵¹ The Byrd Amendment had a smooth passage due to lack of White House opposition to it.

It is significant that the State Department was opposed to the Byrd Amendment. In fact, it was at the instance of the State Department, that Senator McGee made a second attempt to repeal the Byrd Amendment in May 1972. The Senator received a letter from the Acting Secretary of State John Irvin, 2nd saying that the importation of Rhodesian chrome "put the United States in violation of its international legal obligations and had resulted in adverse international reaction among Black African states."⁵² The acting Secretary also revealed that the United States had a surplus of 2.2 million tons of chrome ore in its strategic stockpile and

51. McGee, n.35, p.3.

52. Ibid., p.6.

argued that on strategic grounds there was no need to import the material from Rhodesia. When in May 1972 the McGee Amendment was defeated Senator McGee criticised the White House for "lying down on the job" and paying only lip service to the Rhodesian issue. He said that the White House from which a telephone call to few Senators would have gathered enough supporters for him, refused to call anyone.⁵³ The White House authorized Senator Hugh Scott to announce the support of the President for the defeat of the Byrd Amendment, but the support did not go beyond this.⁵⁴ A frustrated McGee said that "on such critical issues, Congress looks to the Secretary of State and the White House for guidance and support."⁵⁵ But no such guidance and support came through. Nixon also remained silent when the Congressional Black Caucus wrote him a letter asking him not to support the Byrd Amendment.⁵⁶

In late March 1973, Nixon decided to sell chrome from the Nation's strategic stockpile in an effort to bring down prices. This provided him with an opportunity to remove the

53. Skurnik, n.33, p.101.

54. R.K. Baker, "Towards a New Constituency for a more active foreign policy for Africa," Issue, Vol.3, Spring 1973, p.5.

55. McGee, n.35, p.4.

56. Congressional Record, Vol.117, 29 September 1971, p.34063.

United States from the ranks of International Law breakers. Earlier, in a Supreme Court debate on a petition of Certiorari in January 1973, the government had conceded that if the President determined that metallurgical chromite was not a strategic and critical item to the national security of the United States, then he could prohibit its import. As mentioned earlier, with the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Department of Defense such a determination could have been grounded in fact.⁵⁷ One suspects that the reason for the President's refusal to take such action which he was empowered to take under the Constitution, and his failure to actively seek the defeat of the Byrd Amendment was because he was under pressure from business interests, as well as other lobbying groups.

Lobbying for Southern African interests is done through "the indirect though highly efficient contacts established and maintained by the South African Foundation and the Rhodesian Information Office",⁵⁸ in Washington. The Rhodesian Information Office was constantly lobbying on the point of unreliability of Soviet chrome for military purpose -- a point which Senator Byrd also stressed while speaking

57. New York Times, 30 March 1973, p.38.

58. Robert J. Janosik and Barbara B. Lawrence, "Southern African Pressure Politics in the United States", Issue, Vol.4, Fall 1974, p.76.

for his amendment. But more significant is the lobbying done by the Union Carbide and the Peete Mineral Company, who had mining interests in Rhodesia and who would have benefitted a great deal if the embargo ended. The Union Carbide Corporation's mines produced about 78% of the 625,000 tons of metallurgical grade chrome mined in Rhodesia in 1965, and the Peete Mineral Company accounted for another 7% or so.⁵⁹ Since then the United States mines had sold their output to a trading corporation set up by the Rhodesian government. At the time the ban was instituted, despite the government's policy disposal of excess stocks these American Companies made sizeable purchases of Rhodesian chrome. The two Companies asked for permission from the United States government to allow them to import the ore for which they had already paid. While the Johnson Administration declined to permit the companies to import the chrome, the Nixon Administration did in the early months of 1971.⁶⁰

59. Business Week (New York), 27 November 1971, p.23.

60. R.K. Baker, n.54, p.17.

It was significant that President Nixon named Kenneth Rush as Under Secretary of State. Rush was the President of Union Carbide until 1969, after which he joined the Nixon team. According to a very well placed State Department Official, Rush "personally raised with the President, the matter of Union Carbides' request to import chrome from its Rhodesian subsidiary after he was sworn in as Ambassador to Bonn". Bruce Oudes, "Clark McGregors' vacation: 'different' might be an understatement", Africa Report, Vol.18 (January-February, 1973), p.10.

Whatever be the reason that may be cited to justify United States action of lifting the embargo, there was no doubt that it was viewed by others as a violation of international law. It made the United States appear as supporting the racist regime in Rhodesia. In February 1972, when Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the African National Council visited Washington, he gave expression to the African feeling. The Bishop said,

In my opinion the purchase of chrome by the United States had no motives other than encouraging and boosting the morals of the racist regime in order to make it defy the world. It is time someone brought the United States before the International Court of Justice. 61

On 28 July 1972, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that condemned all acts violating its economic embargo against Rhodesia. The United States Representative George Bush said before the vote that since the resolution condemned acts rather than countries committing such acts he would probably abstain from voting.⁶² The General Assembly condemned the U.S. for importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of the United Nations embargo of 1968.⁶³

61. Nancy McKeon, "Rhodesia's Fighting Bishop", Africa Report, Vol.17, March 1972, p.9.

62. New York Times, 29 July 1972, p.5.

63. Ibid., 8 December 1972, p.5.

Once again on 22 May 1973, the Security Council attempted to pass a draft resolution, that extended the trade sanctions against Rhodesia to include South Africa and the Portuguese territories in Africa. The United States and Great Britain vetoed the resolution. United States delegate John Scali said that it was unrealistic to call for broader sanctions until all governments showed that they were taking more seriously the existing sanctions against Rhodesia.⁶⁴

On the same day, 24 Senators joined together in introducing a measure to restore United States observance of economic sanctions on Rhodesia. The Chief Architect of the resolution was Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.) Response of the Administration to the new repeal measure was more favourable than in the previous year. Top aides of the Nixon Administration favoured the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. The Administration sent John A. Scali and J. J. Newson to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Africa headed by Senator Humphrey himself. Other witnesses who testified before the Committee were Senator Edward Kennedy, Gale W. McGee and John L. Sheehan, Lobbyist for the United steel workers.⁶⁵ They did not subscribe to the view that

64. Ibid., 23 May 1973, p.3.

65. Ibid., 19 December 1973, p.3.

denial of Rhodesian chrome would impair United States security interests, and said that the fear had been proved baseless.

Testifying in favour of retaining the Amendment were the representatives of the Union Carbide, the Foste Mineral and the Alleghney Ludlum Industries. The Committee approved the bill and in the Senate, despite efforts by Senator Byrd to filibuster it, the Senate voted 54 - 37 to restore the United States boycott on chrome from Rhodesia after a lapse of two years. Voting in the House did not take place until late 1974, by which time Nixon had left the Office.

CHAPTER - IV

CONCLUSION

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United States policy towards the minority White regime of Rhodesia can be understood only in the context of its broad interest in Southern Africa. With a large number of African States becoming independent and acquiring membership in the United Nations, the United States could not possibly pursue a policy which these states vehemently opposed. It could not hope to gain access to the vast resources of Africa by flouting their sentiments and feelings. All these Black states were agreed on one thing that they would no longer tolerate white minority regimes in Rhodesia as well as South Africa in their midst. At the same time the United States realized that it had vital economic, strategic and political interests in South Africa and in Portugal, the country which ruled over Angola and Mozambique. The case of Rhodesia was somewhat different in as much as it was a former British colony and the United States considered it primarily a British responsibility. Its interests there were minimal and certainly not as vital as in South Africa. Yet, it could not take a position towards the problem created by the unilateral declaration of

independence by Rhodesia, which would have conveyed to the African States that it was indifferent to their sentiments. Therefore, it adopted a policy which would indicate support for African States at the same time would not hurt its vital interests in Southern Africa.

The policy of supporting Britain was the easiest thing for the United States to do and that is what it precisely did. Britain was not willing to topple the white minority regime by the use of force. It wanted to apply economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the hope that it would be enough to force Salisbury to its knee. However, there was one snag, imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia would cause unbearable hardships to Zambia which was dependent on Rhodesia for oil and transit facilities. Britain requested and the United States stepped in to relieve the economic distress of Zambia. By supporting Britain, the United States hoped that Britain would support its policy in Vietnam. A hope which turned out to be false.

The policy of "support Britain on Rhodesia", operated under one severe constraint. The United States during this period was deeply involved in Vietnam War, and there was growing opinion against the involvement. Certainly, further involvement in an African War could not be conceived. Furthermore,

despite stirring of interest in Africa as the establishment of the Africa Bureau, during the Johnson and Nixon Administration Africa was accorded a very low priority.

The United States supported mandatory economic sanctions. But these failed to put adequate pressure on Rhodesia as South Africa continued to support Rhodesia. The failure of sanctions had President Johnson worried. He was concerned that there might be a move to extend sanctions to other countries of the region, particularly to South Africa. Any extension of sanctions against South Africa would have posed a real problem for the United States as it had vital interests in that country.

By the time President Richard Nixon assumed Office in January 1969, the American position in Vietnam had further deteriorated. As some writer has noted:

The heavy US involvement in Vietnam had profound influence on Nixon's response to Southern Africa. The enormous outlays of money equipment and personnel for the Indo-China War left little time, energy or money for other problems, further when other issues did demand attention, militaristic or strategic considerations predominated. 1

1. Mohammed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, The Kissinger study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum-39 (SECRET) (Connecticut, 1976), p.29.

The issue in Rhodesia was that of White Minority imposing its rule on the majority of Blacks. It did not involve the problem of Communism. But a section of American Conservatives from the South, in the habit of seeing every conceivable issue from that angle, insisted that as Rhodesia and South Africa had been loyal supports in the cause of anti-Communism, nothing should be done by the U. S. which would hurt them. Some of these members of the Congress had connections with important business interests in Southern Africa. They prevailed upon Nixon to relax U.S. policy towards Rhodesia and South Africa to protect their business interests. It has been suggested that Nixon ordered the review of US policy in Southern Africa within three months of assuming Office, because he was under pressure from Southern Conservatives.² Senator Gale McGee confirms this while expressing his views on the passage of the Byrd Amendment through the Senate Armed Services Committee. He stated:

While it may be doubted whether all members of the Armed Services Committee were aware of the full implications of the action being taken - owing in part to the speed with which the decision was made - the composition of that Committee almost assured a sympathetic response. For, the seats

2. R.C. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive? (London, 1977), p.56.

on the Committee are held preponderantly by Conservative, Southerners and representatives of the two states - Pennsylvania and Ohio - possibly most effected by the Commercial factors at stake. 3

The policy that the Nixon Administration adopted towards Southern Africa was given a formal structure by the NSC Memorandum-39; but it was not something startlingly new. The Nixon Administration started putting Option two of the NSSE-39 into practice since its second year. For instance, Assistant Secretary of State, D.J. Newsom, stated in Chicago on 17 September 1970, that the United States was constantly encouraging trends that will lead to peaceful Change in Southern Africa.⁴ A year later he declared, "isolation can breed resistance to change. Open doors can accelerate it."⁵

The Nixon Administration under Option two did the following: 1) delayed the closing of the consulate, 2) granted license to Union Carbide to import chrome ore from Rhodesia, 3) refused to actively lobby for the defeat of the Byrd Amendment.

3. Gale W. McGee, "The US Congress and the Rhodesian Chrome Issue," Issue (Massachusetts), Vol.2, Summer 1972, p.4.

4. Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), Vol.64, 12 October 1970, p.420.

5. Terence Smith, "US Widens Ties to African Whites", New York Times, 2 April 1972, p.14.

Except supporting Britain, the United States did nothing during the Johnson Administration. At best it was a passive policy. But during the Nixon Administration, even this passive policy was reversed when the US Congress lifted the ban against import of chrome from Rhodesia, despite a UN Security Council resolution to the contrary. Apart from supporting Salisbury this act resulted in totally wiping out the very modest gain the US policy had won among the black African States. The lifting of the ban, as shown in this study, was the work of Southern Conservatives and the Corporations who gained from such an act. Given the characteristics of the American political system, the President could have easily defeated these elements, had he decided to do so. But he did not and the ban was repealed.

When the US Congress lifted the ban on US imports of Rhodesian Chrome in violation of the UN Security Council sanctions, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution by a Vote of 93 - 8 "condemning" the United States for this act.⁶ This was the first time that the word "condemn" had been

6. New York Times, 8 December 1972, p.5.

used against the United States. The voting pattern clearly showed the international communities' intense disapproval of US policy in Rhodesia.

The State Department woke up. With its active support and that of the White House the ban against the import of chrome from Rhodesia was approved by the Senate. But it did not pass the test in the House. The battle continued through the Ford Administration. It was only after Jimmy Carter became President that the ban was reimposed in 1977. By that time enough damage had done. It had been shown that US opposition to minority rule and support for majority rule and self-determination was only rhetorical.

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