

**No - War Pact In Indo - Pak Diplomacy :
The Role Of The Indian Press**

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C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "NO-WAR PACT
IN INDO-PAK DIPLOMACY; THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN PRESS"
submitted by Shri SANGJA KHANDU in partial fulfilment
of the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil)
in Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a product of the student's
own work, carried out by him under my supervision and
guidance.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before
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DEDICATED TO
MY MOTHER

PREFACE

No study of the Indo-Pakistan problem is complete without the detailed study of a No-War, Pact proposal - a dominant theme in the 1980's. In this study, an effort has been made to analyse the origins of the No-War Pact proposal between the two countries. An attempt has also been made to find whether the response to a no-war pact from each country has reflected the situation in the sub-continent. It also examines both the internal and external factors, that had come to play a greater role in Indo-Pak negotiations on the No-War Pact proposal. The role of Indian press has attracted a special mention in chapter IV.

In the first chapter, the focus is on the analytical approach of conflict between India and Pakistan. Here an effort has been made a detailed study of areas of conflict between the two countries, such as political, economic, societal, religious and more importantly Pakistan's effort to attain parity with India in defence build up.

In the second chapter, an attempt has been made to discuss the genesis and evolution of a no-war pact proposal by India to Pakistan and then an intensive study of all counter-proposals. The study of negotiations is posited as an attempt at confidence-building in troubled sub-continent.

For the first time in their bilateral relationship, a strategic issue - the no-war pact proposal - emerged as the cornerstone of Indo-Pak diplomacy, this is discussed in the chapter three titled "No-War Pact As An Instrument in Indo-Pak Diplomacy".

In the fourth Chapter, the focus is on the role of Indian Press, ever since India made an offer of a No-War Pact proposal in 1949 to Pakistan. It concludes with the role of Indian press in conveying India's response to Pakistan's offer of a No-War Pact in 1981. This chapter also deals with the impact of press on the articulation of the Indian public opinion and on the foreign policy decision-making body.

Based on the facts and analysis presented in the chapters, the conclusions drawn are included in the fifth chapter.

I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Dr. K.D. Kapur whose patience and constant help were encouraging and helpful in completing this work. I also wish to extend my gratitude to the staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, Indian Council of World Affairs Library and Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis Library and last but not the least to my friend Vinayak and younger brother Tsering Wange who have provided me with all round support without which I would not have finished this work.

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CHAPTER - I

A Background Study of the
India-Pakistan Conflicts

Various problems have been responsible for strained relation between India and Pakistan were created by the way in which partition had taken place. The Mountbatten Plan was implemented in a hurry to meet the dead line. The problems of division of assets, demarcation of boundaries and the accession of princely states were not satisfactorily paid attention to. The consequence was that these issues became points of disputes between the two dominions. Pakistan has ever since been hursing the grudge, rightly or wrongly that injustice had been done to it. Where as some of the problems have been resolved, others still continue to be stumbling blocks in the normal relation between India and Pakistan.

Ever since the emergence of India and Pakistan as sovereign independent countries their relations are consistently unpleasant and, have over shadowed all aspects of our affairs internal and external, political and economic.¹ The trouble between India and Pakistan actually began even before they were established as free and independent nations.² It seems, the bases of modern nationalism, geography, historical heritage and language were less applicable in the division of the sub-continent.

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1. Hassan, K. Sarwar. "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan". Pakistan Horizon, Vol.IV, No. 4, December 1951, pp.4.
 2. Ibid, p. 192-93.

Historically, culturally and ethnically there is much in common between India and Pakistan. The partition was thus an inevitable consequence of the colonial policy of playing of different religions and castes against each other, of dividing entire people and of destroying their historically moulded economic political and cultural integrity.³

A number of areas in the interaction of the two countries can be easily identified where both the countries clashed and crisis arose. Broadly the conflicts between India and Pakistan can be classified in to the following categories:

1. Political Conflicts :

Disagreement between India and Pakistan have culminated into two types of political disputes: a) Demarcation disputes b) Accession disputes. After independence all states except Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, acceded either to India or Pakistan following the principle on which partition had resulted. But regarding Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, there was bitter controversy between India and Pakistan, of the subsequent years despite long and protracted

3. Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan (Moscow, 1964), p. 96.

verbal attacks by Pakistan Junagadh and Hyderabad disputes were solved. Realistically speaking now there is only one accession disputes between the two countries and that is the Kashmir dispute.

The Kashmir issue was the product of the partition plan and has been lingering on for the honourable solution acceptable to both the parties since 1947. So far, two undeclared wars have been fought by the two countries but there is no change. In the situation, no doubt some times it becomes very hot and creates explosive situation. The policy of Pakistan towards India usually revolves around this issue and the Government of Pakistan has complicated it by involving the superpowers rivalry in it.⁴

It has kept India and Pakistan divided and has also largely influenced the international outlook of the two countries. Many a times it has caused embarrassing situations for the friends and allies of the two countries.⁵

Pakistani leaders contend that Pakistan came into being on the basis of religious majority areas and, Kashmir being contiguous to West Pakistan was claimed by it on the

4. Bindra, S.S. India and her Neighbours, (Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1987), p.41.
5. Choudhry, G.W., Pakistan's Relation with India 1947-66, (Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1977), p.54.

basis of religion. Pakistan, thus had put political and economic pressure on Kashmiris to opt in favour of merger with it. Apparently, for ethnological, economic and strategic reasons, Pakistan could not possible allow hostile or potentially hostile country to hold Kashmir.

India's attitude was different. Indian leaders had accepted partition, but not the two-nation theory. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the leader of the Kashmir people had been close to the Indian National Congress and its ideology. Therefore, India accepted the accession of Kashmir and helped Sheik Abdullah's government militarily. However, a large number of Pathan and regular Pakistani armed personnel disguised as tribesmen crossed the border into Kashmir to was a jihad (holy war) and on 24 October 1948 the tribesmen set up its own government in the areas which they captured and assured the name Azad Kashmir.⁶

At first, Pakistan disowned the responsibility of the invasion of Kashmir. Instead it blamed the state's Dogra ruler, Hari Singh, whose repressive measures against the people of Kashmir had driven the Muslim subjects who favoured accession to Pakistan to revolt against him. However, in May 1948, as admitted by Pakistan, regular

6. Burke, S.M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy; An Historical Analysis (London, Oxford Press, 1973), p.28.

Pakistani forces joined the Azad Kashmir troops.⁷

It was in January 1948, that Indian Government took the Kashmir question to the United Nations by evoking article 35 of the Charter.⁸ In January 1949, a ceasefire was accepted.⁹ Pakistan responded by denying that she was assisting the raiders, and in turn, accused India of genocide of Muslims and forcible possession of Junagadh, whose ruler had acceded to Pakistan.¹⁰

For the Government of Pakistan the Kashmir is not merely a struggle for territory but something more, that is, struggle for her ideology.¹¹ Mohammad Ayub Khan in his autobiography has emphasised that security of Pakistan is closely linked with the solution of Kashmir issue. When he met Nehru in New Delhi on 1 September 1959, and the second time when the latter visited Pakistan to sign the Indus water Treaty in December 1960 both the leaders discussed the issue at some length and Ayub Khan felt that only the people of Kashmir were the supreme authority.¹²

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7. Arif Hussain, Pakistan : Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London, 1966), p.68.
 8. Burke, no. 6, p.28.
 9. Ibid., p.34.
 10. Ibid., p.28.
 11. Hussain, no.7, p.76.
 12. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London, 1967), p.123.

On 16 September, 1976, Bhutto said in Muzaffarbad that there was only one dispute between India and Pakistan and that was Kashmir. He stressed that this was the basic issue and Pakistan would never go back on its commitment. Nor will it bargain on the fundamental principle of the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris.¹³ However on 4 October 1976 India reaffirmed in the UN General Assembly that Kashmir was an integral part of India,¹⁴ as it had done earlier also on a number of occasions.

Nehru replied that Kashmir problem had become very complicated with the passage of time. Two elections had already been held in Pakistan and a third was in the offing. India had spent an enormous amount of money, apart from military expenditure, on development work in Kashmir. He further stated that Muslims of India which are in minority have entered in the integration process and only hasty action on this issue would not only disturb them but also create obstacles in the way of national integration.¹⁵

From 1966 onwards, the issue was not as much alive as it was from 1947 to 1965. But the ruling as well the opposition of Pakistan has always tried to keep the issue of Kashmir alive and are using it occasionally to win the

13. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speech of Muzaffarbad on 16 September 1976 Quoted in Asian Recorder, Vol. 22, (1976), pp.13515.

14. Ibid., p.13515-16.

15. Choudhry, G.W., no. 5, p.58.

sympathies of the people of Pakistan. The issue has not been debated in the Security Council after 1965 because of the Tashkent Declaration in which both India and Pakistan agreed to settle their issues peacefully and friendly, but Pakistan has not missed any opportunity whenever and wherever she got the opportunity and has raised the issue in international forums including the United Nations.

2. Economic Disputes :

An analysis of the course of Indo-Pakistan relations since their inception indicate that they had conflictual economic relations in the following areas:

- (a) Sharing of cash balance and exchange of currency.
- (b) Sharing of army and bureaucratic personnel.
- (c) Distribution of military equipments.
- (d) Evacuee property settlement.
- (e) Indus-Water disputes etc. etc.

Serious disputes occurred between India and Pakistan, after their independence over the division of financial assets, particularly the cash balance of the former government of undivided India. The cash balance of undivided India on August 14, 1947; was 4,000 million rupees. Pakistan demanded 1,000 million rupees as her share of the cash balance, but India did not agree. The matter therefore was referred to

the Arbitration Tribunal, which had been set up to decide such cases of differences. In December 1947, however, the two governments arrived at a financial agreement under which Pakistan's share was fixed at 750 million rupees. Earlier as an interim measure 200 million had been awarded to Pakistan.¹⁶ But at the subsequent stage the payment of cash balance to Pakistan got linked with the Kashmir issue, which led to a further deterioration in relations. Finally at Gandhiji's intervention the disputes was settled and India agreed to pay Pakistan her cash balance, after deducting 50 million rupees as advance adjustment of certain claims against Pakistan.¹⁷

Distribution of army and bureaucracy was one of the controversial factors between India and Pakistan, as during the British regime very few Indian civil servants were trained. A similar condition prevailed in the army. Of these few officers, the Muslims were even fewer in number and a small number of them desired to remain in India, which again created misunderstanding between them.

In 1947, there was bitter controversy between India and Pakistan regarding the distribution of military stores and equipments of the former Government of India. To resolve

16. Choudhury, G.W. Pakistan's Relation with India, 1947-66 (Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1977), p.26.

17. Ibid, p. 28.

this dispute a joint defence council under the chairman of Lord Mountbatten was set up to supervise the division of armed forces and military stores and equipments. But the council failed to perform its duties impartially. This failure embittered relations between India and Pakistan.

The difficult problem before India and Pakistan in 1947, was the rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their properties, as a million of people in haste crossed the new international border in search of a new homeland. They left behind all their urban and agricultural property and carried only such movable belongings which the circumstances had permitted. Hence, there was a vast property movable and immovable in India which belonged to Muslims, and in Pakistan belonging to Hindus and Sikhs, left by them.¹⁸

On 9 October 1954, the displaced persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Bill was passed by the Indian Parliament. It empowered the Government of India to acquire the evacuee property and utilise the same for relief and rehabilitation of the displaced person and also had a provision for payment in Pakistan.¹⁹ In April, 1955, an agreement was signed at

18. Chaudhri, M.A. "Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. X, No. 2, June 1957, pp.96.

19. J.B. DasGupta, Indo-Pak Relations 1947-55 (Amesterdam, 1958), p.204.

Karachi by India and Pakistan and the disputes relating to the movable property were solved.²⁰ But the issues had lost much of its importance in the public mind since the decisions of India and Pakistan to acquire unilaterally has rights, title and interests of evacuee owners and to utilise them to pay compensation to refugees. Its explosive image slowly and gradually vanished from the minds of the people of both the countries.²¹

The Indus-water disputes had existed in pre-partition days, but was then a domestic matter mainly between Punjab and Sind, the two provinces of undivided India. The head works of the Upper Bari Doab canal which irrigates both Indian and Pakistani soil are with India at Madhopur on the river Ravi.²² The dispute over the distribution of water arose when after the partition India desired that the Government of Pakistan should replace the supplies she was receiving from the eastern rivers by building link canals from the Western rivers. Pakistan did not like the suggestion of India and was not prepared to agree to any diminution of supplies from these rivers, as she not only needed them out but also considered them to be her right as the lower riparian under international law. An agreement was reached

20. J.B. Dasgupta, no.19, p.81.

21. Sisir Gupta, India's Relation with Pakistan, 1954-57 (New Delhi, 1958), p.50.

22. Hafez-ur-Rehman Khan, "Indo-Pakistan Water Dispute", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XII, No. 4, December, p.323-24.

between India and Pakistan in May 1948 under which in due course Pakistan was to tap alternative source for the waters of the eastern rivers.²³ The boundary as drawn under the Radcliffe Award put India in a position to deprive Punjab of the waters of the rivers on which it is dependent for its economic prosperity if not the whole existence of West Punjab.²⁴

3. Societal Conflicts :

It is a significant characteristics of Indian history that the two major communities of the India sub-continent, Hindus and Muslims had friendly and brotherly relations. But after the downfall of the Mughal empire their relation deteriorated and in subsequent years the Government of British-India further strengthened their differences for promoting a policy of divide and rule. The ultimate outcome was the partition of the country and creation of complicated problems connected with :

- (a) The rehabilitation of refugees.
- (b) The communal riots.
- (c) Minority protection etc. etc.

23. D.C. Jha, "The Basic Foundations and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol. VI, No. 1 January - June 1982, pp.3.

24. Choudhury, G.W., Pakistan's Relation with India 1947-66, (Meenakshi Prakasan, Meerut, 1971), p.120.

The early phase of their separation into two countries were marked by mass killing and destruction. In East Punjab the communal roites were so horrible that lakhs of Muslims were massacred and their property destroyed. But the position in East Bengal was quite different as the majority of those massacred were Hindu Bengalis.

In 1950, the Government of India and Pakistan had signed a treaty called the Nehru - Liaquat Pact for the minority protection. But this treaty failed to create any positive and lasting results. The Government of India was extremely worried. Nehru described the problems as more acute and complex than the Kashmir. Earlier the Indian Government requested Pakistan to take necessary steps to check the migrants and also remove the difficulties which the minorities were facing.²⁵

The minority problem has created a feeling of hatred in the minds of the people of both the countries and intensified the differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, the dominating communities of India and Pakistan respectively.

4. Religious Conflicts :

India is a holy land of many religion such as Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, Islam and Christainity. Islam entered

25. Hindustan Times, 3 December 1956.

India in the seventh century and was accepted as a mass religion by the eleventh century. The partition of India on the basis of religion further embittered the rivalry between the Hindus and the Muslims.²⁶ It was commonly remarked that the Muslims owed the creation of Pakistan to the Congress in the sense that, had the leaders of the Congress party treated the Muslims at par with the Hindus, there would have been no Muslim separatism and therefore no Pakistan. The Congress it is argued never made a serious attempt to understand the problems of Muslims. It had no definite policy on the matter and always tried to meet the crisis as it arose.²⁷ Mohammad Ali Jinnah felt that the Hindus and the Muslims differed in ideas and outlooks, beliefs and habits and conducts and modes of behaviour,²⁸ and he demanded that the division of country on these points. The creation of Pakistan gave Hindu-Muslim rivalry a permanent constitutional form.²⁹

26. Ibid., 21 March 1956.

27. K.K.Aziz. "The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism" (London, 1967), p.184.

28. Bindra, S.S., India and her Neighbours (Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1987), p.18.

29. Hamayun Kabir, "Muslim Policies (1942-47)," In C.D. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (ed.) Partition of India Policies and Perspectives 1937-47 (London, 1970), p.404.

5. Conflict of Image :

The leaders and leading spokesman of India and Pakistan have also carried perverse impression of each other. To Nehru, "the Muslim League, under M.A. Jinnah leadership, was aggressively anti nationalist and narrow minded and had "no constructive suggestion", and had a negative programme of hatred and violence, reminiscent of Nazi methods and contained "reactionary and feudal elements."³⁰ A similar view was taken by other Indian spokesman.³¹

On the other hand President Ayub Khan held that "Indian leaders have a deep hatred for the Muslims and... India was determined to make things difficult for us." He alleged that the main aim of India is to make Pakistan a satellite. Under India's neutralism he saw expansionist influence.³² Mohammed Ali, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan viewed that Pakistan's "Safety and security have been under constant threat," by Indian forces, talked of numerous Indian aggression", including the one in Goa.³³

30. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, (Bombay, 1962), p.605.

31. V.K. Menon, "What is at stake, " Seminar, 5 February 1964, p. 39.

32. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Master: A Political Autobiography, (London, 1967), p.115.

33. D.C. Jha, Indo-Pakistan Relations 1960-65, (Patna, 1972), p.21.

Bhutto called India a "suspect nation in the Asian - African world and compared with Portugal as the only colonial power³⁴, and Indian democracy with "false teeth" of a senile person who often demonstrates it. Such types of adverse images of each other can not lead to any understanding between India and Pakistan. Pakistan tried forcibly to bring about Kashmir accession to Pakistan in September 1947 with impurity. Actually the preparation for this started much before the partition of the country. Pakistan has all along clamoured for a implementation of the UN resolutions which stipulated a plabiscite in Kashmir which India had earlier accepted.

Initially lack of agreement between the two countries on the quantum of troops to be maintained both sides of the cease-fire line and latter India withdrawal of the plebiscite offer on the ground that the political, economic and strategic factors sorrounding the whole of the Kashmir question had undergone a change has widen the perceptual distance.³⁵

Pakistan decided to occupy the Kashmir with the help of thousands of infiltrators, sent by her to disrupt communication system and for formenting trouble. The whole plan which was named as "Operation Gibraltar" by the Pakistani

34. D.C. Jha, no. 3. p.21.

35. Surendra Chopra, UN Mediation in Kashmir; A Study in Power Politics, (Kurukshetra, 1971).

Government collapsed because the people of Kashmir refused to co-operate. When India resorted to counter offensive and sealed the borders of Kashmir, in 1965 undeclared war broke out.

A full fledged war between India and Pakistan started on 3 December, 1971 when Pakistan troops launched a massive attack on the western front stretching from Kashmir to Rajasthan. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war fought not due to any bilateral problem between the two countries, in fact, it was imposed on India and it gave a new dimension to India-Pakistan relations. The Simla Pact of 1972 marked a major break through in Indo-Pakistan relations. The most important outcome of the accord had, however, been the expression of desire of both India and Pakistan to eschew the use of force. there is no denying the fact that there was mutual suspicion between them. Indeed 'real co-operation between India and Pakistan based on good intentions to bring peace and harmony'.

Just after partition, India was trying to dissuade Pakistan from joining a military bloc for security reason and not to internationalize the Kashmir issue. Actually, India was trying to promote friendship and goodwill between the two countries, which have many common ties and condemned resort to war for the settlement of any existing or future disputes.

India was well aware of the threat and insecurity to it in which Pakistan has been the recipient of US arms since 1948, which India led to the offer of a no-war pact to Pakistan. Currently Pakistan is getting arms worth 3.3 billion dollars which include highly sophisticated missiles. Pakistan which had already provided US with an airbase at Peshwar is now providing bases on its soil. Pakistan will also be the headquarters for the US central command for this region which include as many as 19 countries.³⁶

Pakistan's former Defence Minister A.A. Talpur had also openly declared Pakistan's intention to create a new military - political bloc which is to play, in an expanded form, the role played since became the king-pin of U.S. strategy for this region and the spearhead of animosity against Afghanistan and India. What makes the arms supply to Pakistan so dangerous for India is that bulk of them can be used only against India.³⁷ India clarified the principles which would guide the dialogue between the two countries. Mainly India wished to see an immediate impact of the no-war talks on the quantum of sophisticated weapons which Pakistan had obtained from the West. In fact, India considered the non-promotion of an arms race in sub-continent not only for

36. "India's Unity and Security : Challenges" - Paper presented at the National Convention on Defence of India's Unity and Freedom. Nov 1984, p.96.

37. Ibid., p.28.

its own sake but also for keeping the big powers out of the region. With Pakistan giving up the option of using force to come to a settlement about the outstanding problem between the two countries, it was expected that the overall situation would improve. So, India's offer of a no-war pact proposal to Pakistan in November 1949 was aimed to bring peace and resolving their differences through bilateral negotiations without recourse to war and third party.

C H A P T E R - I I

THE GENESIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE

NO-WAR PACT PROPOSAL: INDIA AND PAKISTANS' RESPONSE

No study of the Indo-Pakistan problem is complete without a reference to the much talked of No-War part between India and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the Tashkent as well as Simla accords had expressed the desire of both India and Pakistan to eschew the use of force in the resolution of disputes and put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation. Both are a kind of no-war declaration and are in consonance with the declared policy objectives assiduously laid down by Nehru and faithfully followed by his successors.

The main reason to discuss the no-war part proposal was to remove a minimise the tension that prevailed in the two countries and to bring about a climate favourable to the settlement of major disputes.

Since independence, both India and Pakistan have kept armed which stand facing each other, eyeball to eyeball, heightening trans-frontier tensions. There is every effort to show Pakistan as Eastern end of the Middle East rather than as the Western part of the Indian Sub-continent.

During the Second World War, many non-aggression part and frontier of mutual assistance were concluded. These non-aggression pacts around great interests in the inter-war period, in which they condemned war. Geneva

Protocol and Kellogg-Briand Pacts and in later years, with the formation of the United Nations Charters, named the way for the renunciation of war and to agreed to settle all sorts of mutual differences by peaceful mean. Quite recently, initiatives have been made to conclude agreements that would outlamed the wars a first use of force.

So, those non-aggression pacts were the main reason that Nehru understood well the results of war between India and Pakistan. As a logical Corollary to the proposition that Pakistan needs to improve its relations with India, there was widespread support for the non-war pact proposals between India and Pakistan.

In the world history there was never an age of incessant peace a incessant war. Peace and war had followed each other in the by-gone ages and the same is true in the present century as well. Some firms men have desised peace for the solution of the terrible honours and miseries that war bequeathed. And again some time they have desired war for the settlement of international disputes. ¹

1. A.C. Roy, International Relations Since 1919 (The world Press Private Ltd, Calcutta, 1983), p.61

(a) attempt should be made to ensure world security of regional security.

(b) during the time of deliberation of the arbitrators the contending states would not mobilise troops.

(c) any state refusing to accept a peaceful settlement or declining to accept the decision of the arbitrators would be adjudged as "aggressor".

Although the Geneva Protocol was rejected, some of its merits cannot be overlooked. The Geneva Protocol passed the way for the future No-war pacts and international security.

Firstly, the signatory states were forbidden to enter in to any kind of hostility excepting under "certain special conditions" as stated in the Protocol.

Secondly, acceptance of arbitration was made compulsory on the part of the belligerent states for the settlement of all political and legal disputes.

Thirdly, it was the first occasion when war was declared illegal by the signatories to the Protocol.

Fourthly, it was not always possible for the League council to take proper and timely measures against any state involved in aggression activities. In that case the Geneva Protocol proposed for armistice.

An entirely different and perhaps more visionary approach to the problem of war was to be found in Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, Known more formally as the Geneva Treaty for the renunciation of war (also as the Pact of Paris). According to the Pact Singnatory States.:

(a) agreed not to resort to war as a national policy and also agreed to renounce war in the interest of national progress.

(b) agreed to settle all sorts of mutual differences by peaceful means and,

(c) consented to keep this Pact open for adhesion by all the other powers of the world.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact received almost universal approbalish and a large number of states of the world took the pledge of refraining from war. For the first time since the world wars, the United States of America entered into treaty relation with the Soviet Union and came closen to each other in international politics.³

Anxiety of the people of the world for worl peace and security was fully manifested in this pact. So, its importance from this point of view was enormous.

3. Roy, h.1, p.74

Following this Pact, many non-aggression treaties and treaties of mutual assistance between the two a more states were concluded in later years. For example, Molotov - Ribbertrop Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, Molotov - Matsuoka Non-Aggression Pact of 1940 and the famous Panch Sheel Agreement between India and China in 1954.

Together with the concept of collective Security, bileteral non-aggression pacts aroused great interests in the in the inter-was period. They did not, as such, out lowed military forces as a means of solving international conflicts. The contracting party simply committed themselves not to be the first to use force against each other.

Since World War II, and also quite recently initiatives have been made to include agreements that world ban first use of forces. In particular, there have been efforts to apply the no first use to the most destructive, i.e. Nuclear Weapons.

Article 2 (3) and (4) of the United Nations Charter imposes on obligations on all members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. And all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations, respectively.

These Articles, relating to non-use of force, is generally accepted as a major force for international peace and security of all the members of United Nations.

No-first use pledge do not necessarily have a direct effect on other area of security policy. The parties concerned can, even after having undertaken such a commitment, continue to arm to avoid themselves as they see fit, provided that they avoid first recourse to force or specific weapons.

No - War or non - use of force is a concept that is more encompassing and pervasive than no first use initiatives. The crucial difference between the no-first use principle and non-use of force/non-aggression is that the later outlaws the use of arms forces together. It follows from the comprehensive nature of concept of non-use of force that the agreements and norms in question also exert influence on other areas of security policy. In practical politics, however, they constitute an important instrument of peace.

India and Pakistan's Response:

Barring only a few intervals of detente, India and Pakistan have had one long spell of bad relations ever since the sub-continent was partitioned over four

decades ago. India had all along been offering to sign a no-war declaration with Pakistan but it is the latter who always thought advisable to reject it. India Pakistan relationship has been hitting head lines since Pakistan challenged the UN Collective Security System in 1947 to 1948 with impunity and relatively unexciting long term co-operative process.⁴

The talks on no-war pact have an interesting background for the normalisation of relation between the two countries. The core and essence of no-war pact is mutual confidence building to enable specific issues to be tackled and to assuage distrust, mutual fear and suspicions which have been prevalent over the last forty years between India and Pakistan.⁵

India's offer of a no-war pact have always had a certain background to them. In Delhi, on 2nd November 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru offered a no-war pact in order to assure, Pakistan in regard to its security concerned (or rather obsession) and to dissuade it from joining a military bloc, internationalising the problems between the two countries and inviting foreign intervention

4. Charles P. Schlicher, International Relations: Cooperation and conflict. (New Delhi, 1963), p.332

5. R.G.Sawhney, Zia's Pakistan (ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985), p. 97

in the region and to allay Pakistani anxieties of any aggression by India especially as the constant refrain of Pakistani propaganda was that India was not reconciled to partition and was bent upon destroying Pakistan. Pakistan rejected the offer in 1949, in order to retain its freedom to go to war in Kashmir or elsewhere. Perhaps the more plausible reason was that Pakistani leaders at that time badly needed to bugey of ever present aggressive design by India to consolidate an authoritarian regime in Pakistan, to bar contracts between millions of people having friends and relations across the borders and to suppress any demand by East Pakistan for a greater share in economic decision and plitical power.⁶

In June 1963, Bhutto had said that "Let India arrive at an equitable and honourable settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir... we can then have not one but a thousand no-war pacts... While the Kashmir dispute exists, it is in conceivable that we should accept India's offer of a no-war pacts."⁷

The offer of 1964 which was made by Lal Bahadur Shastri was also rejected by the Government of Pakistan.

6. Hindustan Times, 12 April 1982.

7. Dawn, 26 July 1963.

Bhutto not only ridiculed the offer but said, "an aggressor state always creates a false sense of security and to cover its aggressive interests make such offer."⁸

India showed keen anxiety to fulfil the promise of Tashkent Declaration of 1965. India's observation of the declaration included

- (a) the withdrawal of the troops to their positions as before the September 1965 conflict
- (b) return of Pakistani prisoners of war.
- (c) Unilateral removal of the ban on trade with Pakistan.
- (d) stopping all propaganda against Pakistan both on the Radio and in press.

These were by no means minor gesture. They were in fact a serious efforts, to bring about normalisation of relations in the spirit of Tashkent Declaration.

On 11 January 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai reiterated India's desire for further implementation of Tashkent Agreement in the interest of India and Pakistan. They observed that the solution of all the outstanding problems between the two countries was possible only on conference

8. Pakistan Times, 30 August 1964

Table.⁹ The Indian Prime Minister apprised the Soviet Premier, during her visit to the Soviet Union on 25 January 1968, of the fact that Government of India earnestly wanted to follow the path shown by Tashkent Declaration and to establish good relations with Pakistan but it required co-operation of the Government of Pakistan as well.¹⁰

But the Government of Pakistan did not extend its hand of friendship, it rejected the Indian moves for resumption of trade and commerce with India.¹¹ On 15 August 1968, from the rampart of Red Fort in Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi said, "I again repeat to Pakistan today to recognise this (no-war) proposal as this is the only way in which lies the good of both India and Pakistan."¹² But Ayub Khan's response was that there could not be a better pact than just settlement of this basic disputes of Kashmir. He added that to talk of a 'no-war' pact without settling the Kashmir dispute was only an attempt to mislead and hoodwink the world.¹³

Elaborating his views further, he said on 26 October 1968, that he was ready to sign such a pact

9. Times of India, 12 January 1968

10. Ibid., 26 January 1968

11. Safi Qureshi, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 4, Vol.12, 13 February 1968, Col. 121

12. The Statesman, 17 August 1968

13. Pakistan Times, 2 September, 1968

with India provided the latter agreed to sign "another pact, which would define how India and Pakistan can resolve problems that exist at present or may arise in future."¹⁴ But Ayub Khan's conditional acceptance of the 'no-war' pact of India was soon viewed as a trap in India to reopen the Kashmir dispute.¹⁵ It may be added that this conditional acceptance by Ayub Khan to 'no-war' pact was not the least different from the previous Pakistani reaction to a no-war pact offer by India.

On 4 December 1968, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated in Lok Sabha that many a times Government of India had asked the Government of Pakistan to solve Indo-Pakistani problems without any preconditions but every time it was rejected by Pakistan.¹⁶ On 12 December speaking in Rajya Sabha she said that the conditions which the President Ayub Khan had added to sign a no-war pact with India had made it rather "difficult for India to consider it" and added "normally a pact is signed first and issues are settled later through peaceful negotiations."¹⁷

14. Ibid, 27 October, 1968

15. The Times, 30 October, 1968

16. Lok Sabha Debates, Series 4, Vol 22, 4 December 1968, Co. 92

17. The Hindu, 13 December 1968

On the eve of the third Anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration, a note containing the clarification on Mrs Gandhi's statement was also handed over to Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi which indicated the proposal for setting up the bilateral machinery contingents upon Pakistan agreeing to the no-war pact.¹⁸ On, 30 January 1969, a spokesman of Pakistan Foreign Ministry said that Mrs Gandhi's proposal signified no change in India's stand on basic issues like Kashmir and Farraka barrage and emphasised Ayub Khan's proposal for a "self - executing machinery" to provide for the settlement of basic disputes and normalisation of relations including provision for mediation and arbitration if negotiations failed.¹⁹

Yahya Khan assumed the charge from the outgoing President Ayub Khan on the evening of 25 March 1969. On 19 May, 1969 Yahya Khan said in Peshawar that Kashmir problem was under "constant review" of the Government of Pakistan and would be referred to back to United Nations at the right time if required.²⁰ On May 23, he also said that there would be no change in the foreign policy of Pakistan because it was based on certain geo-political factors.²¹

18. The Statesman, 17 January 1969

19. Pakistan Times, 13 January 1969.

20. Dawn, 14 May 1969.

21. Ibid., 24 May, 1969

The Government of India on its part once again tried to initiate the move of no-war pact to Pakistan. Mrs Gandhi sent a personal letter on 22 June 1969, to President Yahya Khan through Kewal Singh, the Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, to this effect.²² In her letter, Mrs. Gandhi renewed the proposal for 'No-war' pact and a joint machinery to examine comprehensively all aspects of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. She disclosed in Parliament that joint-measures would cover fields such as commercial, economic and cultural.²³

On 28 July 1969, a letter from Yahya Khan (in reply to Mrs. Gandhi's Letter) was delivered to her by acting High Commissioner of Pakistan to India.²⁴ Yahya Khan accepted the proposal of Mrs Gandhi provided the machinery of Indo-Pakistan's body should discuss all issues between the two countries including Kashmir and Farraka barrage.

But after the exchange of letters between the Governments, no followup action was taken by either of the Governments. Mrs Gandhi in her letter on 22 June 1969 to Yahya Khan had also described that, "there is almost a total lack of contract between the peoples

22. Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 14 July 1969

23. Hindustan Times, 24 July 1969

24. Ibid, 29 July 1969

of two countries", and that commercial, economic and cultural relations are completely cut off.²⁵ The word Tashkent had also disappeared from all official communique.²⁶

However, Gen. Zia wanted to keep alive anti-India feeling within Pakistan and sow seed of discord amongst the political and intellectual community in India. His latest efforts for the good relation were only part of his gimmicks to betray India. What is objectives behind the Zia's no-war pact offer? Does he wanted to restor peace between the two countries? Or is it a measure only to foster a false sense of security in India, on the other hand and to legitimise his position as a supporter of American global strategy on the other. It can be interpreted as a gesture to create more favourable pro-Pakistani climate in the United States of America (USA) and in rest of the world.

Zia also desired to derive political advantages out of such proposals - firstly by diluting the previously agreed of accord and thus keeping up a status of hostility with an apparent posture of feeling peace and friendship; secondly, perpetuating his rule in the country; thirdly creating an image of his being a very "reasonable and national leaders" in Pakistan. At the same time Zia

25. The Statesman (Calcutta) 1 August 1969

26. J.D.Sethi, Negotiating with Pakistan, Journal of Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, Vol.2 3 January 1970 pp. 309-322

was able to derive propaganda advantage for Pakistan both at home and abroad, while showing up India in a bad light.

There would be two explanation why the 'No-war pact' offer was made -

(a) The first is that, it was only a casual gimmick aimed at the US Congress when it had under consideration the arms transfer to Pakistan, made to assuage the hostility to the arms sales amongh large number of Senators and Congressman. But the public relation exercised undertaken by the Pakistanis and the US media gave an offer an independent life to its own section of the Indian media too helped the process. The Pakistan administration was itself unwillingly compelled to pursue the proposal. Now that they have achieved their objectives of getting the arms through they would like to get the proposal scuttled in such a way that the blame would largely rest on India.

(b) The second explanation could be that there was three lines in the Pakistan ^{Ministry} ~~Ministry~~ Janta that time, one in favour of the no war pact proposal, ~~one~~ ^{one} against it and third somewhat ambivalent which would look at the pact particular reference to Pakistan's domestic and international compulsion and none of them being in a clear majority. This was result in and ziz-zaz

policy depending upon how the balance view the situation at any particular time.

Much steam has been generated over the issues of No-War Pact offered by Pakistan in September 1981. The issue of No-War Pact has become a focal issue in the recent time. It was an offer made by Pakistan in a most of sudden and casual manner and under unusual circumstances. Initially it was made as footnote to a statement while accepting US\$ 3.2 billion economic and military aid package on 15 September 1981. When Pakistan floated the 'No-War' idea, the Indian officials - as also a large section of non-officials - opinion tended to look at it as a political ploy designed, as it by single diplomatic stroke to achieve three Pakistani objectives:²⁷

First, Zia wanted to project himself as a dove-eyed statesman and a peace seeker at a time when the US arms package (to Pakistan) was being critically examined by the appropriate Congressional Committees in the United States of America - where several democratic leaders and noted columnist Selig Harrison argued that the offered US arms aid might be used by Pakistan for mounting a military misadventure against India.

27. Link, Vol.24 No. 24, 26 January 1982.

Secondly, Pakistan manifestly wanted to impress and with the sympathy and support of India's friends in Muslim world, who generally share Pakistani's threat - perception arising from the Soviet Military presence in Afghanistan, and to evoke the sympathy of those sections of the Indian public who generally stand for a gentler or (as Mrs Gandhi has characterised it) a 'soft' approach towards Pakistan.

Thirdly, Zia was aiming at diverting public attention away from the increasingly intolerable domestic situation by rivetting it upon an Indo-Pakistan question - an area of traditional interests and concern for Pakistan public.

In this context, two questions are important. Firstly, could a no-war pact by itself provide significance confidence building measures. Secondly, could it be used to any advantage in furthering mutual confidence between the two countries. The motivation behind the issuance of No-war pact proposal however was quite understandable. Firstly, Pakistan wanted to allay the fears of Congressmen while inducting sophisticated weapons in the Indian sub-continent. It is noted that the offer of 15 September 1981, was made undoubtedly clumsily and in a manner calculated to gain the maximum propaganda.

In fact, this offer was not made directly to India but came as a kind of 'footnote to a memorandum

about the arms, acquisition. This figured at the end of the public statement announcing formal acceptance of the US package deal and not in a formal proposal made through diplomatic channels. Islamabad issued a long explanation on Pakistan's need for US arms and acceptance of aid package put out in mid-September 1981. The last sentence of the statement read : "On our part we are prepared to enter in to immediate consultation with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of Simla Agreement."²⁸

Secondly, Pakistan used it as a ploy to appease the Indian as well as world public. It is very clear in the words of Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, "that the offer of no-war pact has been made precisely in order to allay India's disquiet over the massive dose of arms from US, if they still think that it is a threat to their security, we are ready to enter into non-aggression pact with India."²⁹

Immediate response of India to Zia's no-war pact proposal was that:

(a) India has suggested steps which would in effect, mean that Pakistan put brake on the arms race and does

28. A.G.Noorani, India: The Superpowers and the neighbours, (New Delhi, 1985), p. 171

29. Dawn, 9 March 1982

not raise bilateral issues, such as Kashmir at international forum.

(b) India had an open mind on the issues much would depend on Pakistan's response and its sincerity and seriousness.

(c) India had suggested that neither country should indulge in an arms race through the acquisition of sophisticated weapons disproportionate to their legitimate defence needs.

It is to be recalled that ever since the Indian Government decided to call off the Secretariate level talks scheduled for early March 1982, an impasse marked the relation between the two countries. It was not simply the Indian Government's decision to deter the talks which had created strains between India and Pakistan. What had directed impact on the relations was the controversy over Kashmir which assumed her dimensions.

When Agha Hilaly, Pakistan's representative at the UN Human Rights Commission, made a reference to the Jammu and Kashmir in February 1982, Mrs. Gandhi's Government over reacted and therefore, called, off the talks. Narasimha Rao, the Indian External Affairs Minister took the position that under the Simla Agreement, India and Pakistan had undertaken to settle their disputes and difference bilaterally and through peaceful measures,

he insisted that his commitment was equally applicable to Kashmir.

Zia in an interview to the press had shown willingness to discuss the Kashmir question with India. "If the opportunity arise, " he observe.³⁰ Zia said that apart from the proposal he had in mind Pakistan still "stuck" to the UN formula of plebiscite for Kashmir. In an earlier interview, Zia had said that the conversion of the actual line of control into the international border was unacceptable to Pakistan. Thus the Indian Government believed that by reserving the right to internationalise the Kashmir issue an part of his no-war pact proposal, Zia was trying to exclude Kashmir from its application.

However India's reaction, to the Pakistan's proposal of no-war pact is quite realistic and based on actual facts of the situation. The reluctance of the Pakistan government to subscribe specifically to settle all disputes bilaterally, without any outside interference has given rise to same fresh apprehensions about its interntions. Similarly, the refusal to accept openly its obligations as a non-aligned country not to encourage great power rivalries in the region has made India more cautious in its responses to the no-war propostions.

30. Telegraph (Calcutta), 31 October 1962

The factor of unreliability is very relevant in assessing the success of any prospective understanding between the two countries. Pakistan has diowned the Simla Agreement. Even when the possibilities of the prospective dialogue were being proposed its representative raised the Kashmir issue at Geneva.³¹ However, India responded positively Mrs. Gandhi on 24 November 1981, replied by saying that India was willing to talk about a no-war pact, if Pakistan was serious about it. She pointed out that the context and the manner in which the proposal was mooted by Pakistan made the Government of India doubtful about the Pakistan's positive genuiness.³²

Subsequently, on 25 November 1981, the Government of India responded to Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact treaty by reffering to India's offer first made in 1949 and repeated since then. In Indian Parliament, Narasimha Rao, recalled chronologically, the repeated offer made by India have invariably and all long drawn a negative response from Pakistan.³³

Pakistan made a proposal for mutual reduction of forces. Gen. Zia made this proposal during the visit of the speical emissary of Prime Minister of India,

31. Ibid, 2 November 1982

32. Times of India, 25 November 1981

33. Ibid., 26 November 1981

Ram Sathe to Islamabad in April 1980, to explore the possibility of evolving close perception of the geo-strategic imperatives. During this visit, Zia articulated the need for credible forces for Pakistan for its defence and even expressed his willingness to consider India's suggestion as to the size of a credible force for Pakistan and India. Gen. Zia further suggested that this matter of mutual reduction of forces could be delegated to the military commanders. The two sides agreed to continue the dialogue during Agha Shahi's visit to Delhi at a mutually convenient time.

Subsequently, on 10 July 1980, Major General Rao Farman Ali, a defence commentator, described Pakistan's offer to India for a joint venture of their defence requirements as "most appropriate and timely".³⁴ and added that the geo-political development in the region should impal the two Governemnts to understand such review to protect their long term interests.

India took a clear cut stand which is worth' to be noticed. The External Affairs Minister, Narasimha Rao, told the Parliament on 18 July 1980, that India had rejected Pakistans suggestion for a meeting of military commandars to consider mutual reduction of forces. Any such talks, he said should be proceeded with the requisite amount of mutual trust and confidence.³⁵

34. The Patriot, 11 July 1980

35. The Statesman, 19 July 1980

When this issue was raised by Agha Shahi during his discussion in New Delhi, Narasimha Rao, told him that the question of forces reduction could not be treated as a pure exercise since it should reflect a "shared political perception and understanding of each other's security needs by the others."³⁶ However, Gen. Zia undoubtedly realised the futility of his own proposal unless it was aimed at driving a wedge between the political and military leadership in India.³⁷

It is quite true that the reduction of forces is a very desirable objective and it must be clearly understood that the force level actual flow out of threat perceptions. Therefore, if there is any genuine desire for mutual reduction of forces, what need is to be reduced first is mutual suspicion. Any reduction in mutual suspicion and hostility will automatically generate pressure for force reduction. Hence more viable and effective paths towards mutual forces reduction should start from confidence building and exploiting the areas of agreement. It is in this spirit, that the Simla Agreement should become the basic foundation on which a structure of reducing peace can be built.

36. Times of India, 31 January 1982

37. Deccan Chronicle, 6 August 1984

Pakistan has always shown scant respect for the agreement on various issues between the two countries for normalising the existing relations where India as suspicious about its intentions of peaceful response from Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand told the Pakistan journalist, covering the Indo-Pakistani Ministerial level talks here "that (no-war pact) or no pact India would never attack."³⁸ Mrs Gandhi further stressed that India regarded stability and strength of its neighbours as part of its own strength.³⁹ At every step made by India to restructure normalisation between the two countries on the principle of peaceful co-existence, American and Chinese leaders hastened to pull strings from behind the scenes to thwart any possible easing, of relations between the countries, the ruling circles of Pakistan have assumed altogether different role in the political system of Pakistan.⁴⁰

The elite play an important role in a political system. In a dictatorial regimes where there are no organised political parties, the role of the elites is obviously of greater importance. In her meeting with Agha Shahi on 30 January 1982, Mrs Gandhi offered to sign a treaty of peace and friendship with the Pakistan as a more

38. Times of India, 31 January 1982

39. Indian Express, 1 February 1982

40. V.D. Chopra, ed., Pakistan and Asian Peace - (New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1984), p.186.

positive step than a mere no-war pact.⁴¹ Islamabad replied that it would wish to consider the offer carefully before formulating a response. Mrs. Gandhi also suggested to Agha Shahi, the setting up of a Joint Commission to resolve bilateral issues which according to the communique was accepted immediately by Pakistan Foreign Minister, with details to be worked out by the officials of the two countries. With the installation of a democratically elected Government, Pakistan's new Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, had strongly apposed the idea of no-war pact with India. " We don't believe in a no-war pact, we believe in the Simla Agreement between the two democratic Governments (in 1972)," She observed, she stressed that the Simla pact brought the longest - ever peace on the sub-continent. The fact that no-war had taken place between India and Pakistan since 1972 was greatest of the agreement signed by the late Z.A. Bhutto and late Mrs. Gandhi" she added.⁴²

Pakistan's world view is conditioned by a deep sense of insecurity dating back to 1947, when it came into existense as an independent state. One may talk about the discreptancies between the reality and the perceptions of the ruling elites.

41. Times of India, 31 January 1982

42. Ibid., 3 December 1988

Most of the writers believed that the ruling elite exaggerated the security threats to the state in order to consolidate their position vis-a-vis counter elite in the Domestic political system. The fact remains that the sense of insecurity was the single major factors that shaped Pakistan's defence and security policies over the last thirty six years. The hostile circumstances under Pakistan came into being, a series of disputes with India as matters relating to the partition of the sub-continent, and the first armed conflict between the two countries on Kashmir. (1947-1948) all created a strong impression in Pakistan that India either wanted to ruin Pakistan or turn it into a client state. This set in motion a process whereby India and Pakistan veiwed each other as major adversaries.

C H A P T E R - I I I

N O - W A R P A C T A S A N I N S T R U M E N T I N

I N D O - P A K D I P L O M A C Y

India - Pakistan interaction on the no-war pact has sparked a good deal of debate on the policies and intentions of the two countries of the sub-continent. At an apparent level the no-war pact is a plain non-aggression agreement which would entail both the countries to desist from committing an aggression against another. This was the gist of most of the communications of the various Indian Prime Minister's to Pakistan.¹

But at a deeper and more significant level the treaty attempts to build up certain basic principle which would govern the overall pattern of interaction between India and Pakistan.

The Indian position has been that no time recourse be made either to superpower intervention or to go in for purchase of arms in such a manner as would disturb the power balance. The perception of a no-war pact by India and Pakistan differed widely. Whereas India required that violence should be abjured no matter what the prevailing atmosphere was or what the compulsions of the situations were. Pakistan's perception was different Pakistan felt that before a non-war pact was signed, there should be a movement towards it in the shape of an agreement over outstanding disputes.

1. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, Series 7, Session 7, VI.XXI

Pakistan wished this to be a pre-conditioned to the signing of a no-war pact whereas India desired this to be a blanket declaration and a total commitment not to resort to force under any circumstances.

Pakistan had preferred to link the agreement for non-recourse to war with an understanding on the procedure to be adopted for resolving outstanding disputes between the two countries chief among them being Kashmir. In 1959, Ayub Khan formally proposed to Nehru that the two countries enter into a joint defense treaty, under which India and Pakistan would cooperate in protecting the region against external threats. Nehru dismissed the proposal as inappropriate since India and Pakistan did not share a common perception of external threats. Moreover, Nehru's embrace of non-alignment prevented India from coordinating defense arrangements with a rival tied by treaty obligations to the United Nations.²

Another proposal that has periodically surfaced in South Asia is a bilateral mutual reduction - of - forces agreement. Up until India's decision in 1971, Pakistan had refused to enter into mutual reduction talks with India as long as Kashmir remained in dispute.

2. the Statesman, May 5, 1959

India showed no inclination to make concession, and Pakistan had lost all hope of inresting control of the stock by force of arms. Because of the new geo-political realities that emerged after 1971. Pakistan began to reassess its position on the mutual - reduction proposal.

Neither Government has publicity put forward a formula for maintaining a fixed ratio of forces along the India-Pakistan border though diplomatic overforces have been made in this direction.

Since the offering to sign a no-war pact with Indian in 1981, Gen. Zia strategy of waging a 'peace offensive' has put India in the uncustomed position of responding to the barrage of Pakistani proposal. While a section of informed Indian opinion views this diplomatic offensive as little more than propaganda, India has nontheless matched Gen. Zia's offers with its own proposals.

While agreeing that geo-political realities make Pakistan a South Asian power, Pakistan argues that their country is also bound by history, geography and religion to the States of West Asia and Middle East. Pakistan's chafe at the notion that the component part of South Asia form an integral Security System, in which India plays the lead role because of its size, resources

and potential. Just as India tends to discount the Soviet threat to the region, Pakistan tends to discount the Chinese threat.³

The Chinese incursion into India in 1962 and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 did not fundamentally alter the perceptions of threat on either side. Indeed, each side was convinced that its adversary adhered to the Kautilyan dictum that "my enemy's enemy is my friend." Though Indian routinely condemns the superpower's pursuit of balance-of-power diplomacy in South Asia, its reliance on Soviet backing in its disputes with Pakistan parallels Pakistan's reliance on United States and Chinese support.⁴

Again, according to Ayub Khan, "India is planning to raise two armies, one with which to face China and other to use against Pakistan and her smaller neighbour's in pursuance of her expansionist objectives."⁵

3. Douglas C. Makeig, "War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process".

Pacific Affairs, Vol.60(2) Summer 1987,p.282

4. Ibid, p.282

5. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography (London, 1967), p. 136

Indian professions of support for a stable western neighbour that can serve as an Indian Security buffer are dismissed by most Pakistani analysis, "We do not need India to defend us, and in view of our past relations, it is most unlikely that we would leave our own defences in Indian hands" , writers A.I. Akram.⁶ Whereas Indian defense policy rests on the doctrine of regional preponderance Pakistani defense policy stresses the deployment of counter-vailing forces to check what Islamabad sees as India's hegemonic impulses.⁷

Pakistan has historically diplomatic and military succour from abroad in order to improve its negotiating position in dealing with India.

For examples of this outward-looking posture are Pakistan's search for defense ties with the United States in 1950, with China after the 1965 war, with the Gulf states after the 1971 war, and again with the United States after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Coversely, whenever Pakistan has not felt threatened by India, it has looked inward and attempted to normalise relation with India.

6. The Muslim, 2 April 1983.

7. Douglas C. Makeign, op. cit, p.283

Examples of Pakistan's conciliatory posture towards India include Ayub Khan's 1959 joint defense proposal, the 1972 Simla Accord, and Gen. Zia's 1981 offer of a no-war pact. "The empirical evidence, that militarily the more threatening India becomes, the more determined is Pakistan's attempts to countervail it, should guide Indian policy, only when Pakistan feels safe enough --- does it look inward and feel in a position to establish cordial relations with India."⁸

Pakistan has always been suspicious of Indian proposal which offer rapprochement without addressing outstanding disputes, such as Kashmir. Ayub Khan summarised the Indian position as follows:

"Let things becomes normal and we will deal with the problem; and that things are normal, why raise the problem?"⁹

Consequently Indian proposal such as no-war pact are interpreted by Pakistan to mean capitulation by instalment. Two notable exceptions to rule were Ayub Khan's 1959 joint defense proposal and Gen. Zia's 1981 offer of a no-war pact with India. India immediately questioned Pakistan's intensions on both occasions.

8. Imtiaz H.Bokhari, "soth Asian Regional Co-operation: Progress, Problems, Potentials and Prospects", Asian Survey Vol.25, No.4, 1985. p. 381

9. Ayub Khan, n.4 p.123

since each of the proposals ran counter to Pakistan's cautious, step-by-step approach to negotiations with.

Despite indications that the detente process is moving ahead, numerous obstacles remain. The joint commission is a fragile edifice of co-operation, subject to the ebb and flow of Indo-Pakistan relations at any given moment.

When Pakistan's delegates to the United Nations Human Right commission raised the Kashmir issue in February 1982, India accused Pakistan of violating the Simla Accord by raising bilateral disputes in a multilateral forum.

India then cancelled negotiations of the no-war pact. Similarly, Pakistan suspended negotiation in 1983 when Mrs. Gandhi expressed sympathy for domestic opposition to Zia in the Sind.¹⁰

India's position has remained consistent in all the negotiation to date. India insists on direct bilateral negotiations of all outstanding disputes, a reaffirmation of the Simla Accord, Pakistan restraint in the Punjab and pledge by both sides not to grant base right to any foreign power. Although Gen. Zia unwilling

10. India Today (New Delhi), 30 June 1982

to allow US or Chinese assess to Pakistan's bases unless faced with the imminent disintegration of the nation, India does not rule out this scenario.

Pakistan rejects the no-base pledge by arguing that its membership in Non-aligned Movement preclude the option. Pakistan's instence that such a pledge would infringe on the nation's sovereign right to determine its own defense arrangement ignores the fact that a no-war pact would also forfeit Pakistan's sovereign right to wage a jihad (holy war) against India.¹¹

The impasse could be overcome, however either by issuing a joint reaffirmation of the Non-Aligned Movement stand against foreign bases, or by incorporating a no-base pledge under the freamework of South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) a newly formed multilateral body which incorporates all seven states of South Asia."¹²

Pakistan has also indicated a willingness to enter into a binding agreement whereby each country pledges not to use its territory for hostile action against the other. India, however, has stuck to its

11. Douglas C. Makeig, op. cit. p. 289

12. Indian Express, 8 March 1984

instance on obtaining iron clad guarantee that U.S. forces will not be granted base rights in Pakistan, as was the case in the 1950's when Pakistan participated in U.S. sponsored Security pacts.¹³

Nuclear proliferation is probably the most critical subject in Indo-Pakistan diplomacy. Although both sides publicly deny any interest in developing, testing or deploying nuclear weapons, there is overwhelming evidence that Pakistani nuclear programme is geared to military as well as civilian applications and also that India's broadbased nuclear energy programmes could be quickly converted into a weapons programme, given the political will to do it.¹⁴

India has rejected all but one of the proposals arguing, that an agreement to forego the nuclear option against Pakistan would weaken India's long term security against nuclear-armed China. Consequently, Pakistani proposals for a South Asia nuclear free-zone, joint-inspection of nuclear facilities, and simultaneously entry into the non-Proliferation treaty have been repeatedly rejected by India. Clearly without improved understating

13. The Hindu, 2 June 1986

14. Richard P. Cronin, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia," "Middle East Journal" Vol.37, No.4 (Autumn 1984) p. 594

over regional security on the part of Pakistan and India, there is little reason to believe that international efforts to discourage nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent will succeed.

Some general observation on the no-war pact as a instrument in Indo-Pakistan diplomacy are brought in order.

First, the atmosphere surrounding Indo-Pakistan relations is rarely conducive to a healthy give-and-take at the meaningful, no-war negotiations. The rivalry is visceral and it is unlikely to change dramatically for the better, irrespective of the government in power. Both sides tend to attribute the worst possible motives to their adversary while assuming for themselves the role of the innocent victim of other sides deceitful and aggressive intentions. If any thing, the records of Indo-Pakistan negotiations illustrate that occasional goodwill gestures or confidence building measures rarely have a positive, lasting impact on the perceptions of either side.

To make matter worse, Indian and Pakistani public opinion is highly volatile whenever bilateral relations take a turn for the worse, or whenever one or both governments play to their domestic galleries

by harping on the threat from next door.¹⁵

Second, both sides adhere to the dictum that war (or the threat of war) is an instrument of diplomacy between India and Pakistan in managing bilateral relations. In South Asian experience, war has provided a powerful, though highly destructive, impetus for negotiations. The most notable gains at the negotiating table occurred in the aftermath of the three Indo-Pakistan conflicts. The price of this progress, however, was a sharp increase in mutual suspicion which poisoned the climate for future negotiations.

Third, the India-Pakistan rivalry continues to be an unequal match. Whether potential, or sheer firepower India has always maintained a margin of security over Pakistan in most categories of defense preparedness. This disparity in power has important implications on the way each side negotiates. While justifiably demanding diplomatic equality in any negotiations with India.

Pakistan routinely assumes that a larger and more powerful India can afford to make concession without jeopardising its own security interest. India, on the other hand, has strong psychological reservations against

15. Douglas C. Makeig, op. cit. p. 291

deferring to its historic adversary, given the existing imbalance of forces.

Fourth, the United States and Soviet Unions have historically played an influential role in Indo-Pakistan negotiation. Super powers leverage has been manifested by the more subtle mechanism of arms sale and maintaining military presence in the South Asian region. The tendency of both parties to defer action over bilateral disputes is exceedingly complex.

Pakistan's nuclear programme has been significantly influenced by competition with India. India and Pakistan had fought three wars since India gained its independence. Pakistan suffered a major defeat in the 1971 war, resulting in the creation of the separate nation of Bangladesh, in territory that had been east Pakistan. When India began a nuclear programme in the late 1950's some Pakistani leaders said that Pakistan should match India's efforts.

One reason Pakistan may want to remain close to a nuclear weapon capability is to provide a ledge against Indian production of nuclear weapons. A widely held view in Islamabad is that it would be better if both Pakistan and India had nuclear weapons than if only India had them.

While competition with India may give Pakistan an incentive to strive for a nuclear weapon capability, it may also give Pakistan reason not to test a perhaps even assemblage of weapon. Since India has a more advanced nuclear industrial base, it is doubtful that Pakistan could hold its own in a nuclear arms race with India. For this reason, it seems likely that Pakistan would prefer an ambiguous position regarding its nuclear programme and intentions. In order to allay the Pakistani fear, both imaginary and real, Mrs Gandhi wrote to Bhutto:

"I am sorry that you should have assumed in spite of our categorical declaration that the nuclear test which our scientists have conducted entirely for developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and economic uses somehow poses threat to Pakistan's security."¹⁶

Pakistan's sense of weakness vis-a-vis India had always led it to seek balancing assistance from outside. The United States had greatly improved Pakistan's military capability in the mid-1950's, and perhaps it might be helpful again.¹⁷ Elements of the Pakistan military were enthusiastic about the possibility of renewing the American connection.

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16. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.20, No.6, June 1974 p.194

17. Lawrence Ziring, ed., Pakistan: The Long View (Duke University Press 1977) p. 301

India has considerably been opposing the US economic aid to Pakistan since mid fifties, on the ground that it leads to an arms race in the sub for a consequently. India has to direct her much needed economic resources towards the development of the Indian military. Experience has shown that Indian fears are well-founded. Pakistan Governemnt had arrested that it is seeking aid from the US because it needs to strengthened the country militarily and economically underlying the fact that its over immediate neighbours, India and Afghanistan, were getting direct Soviet military support.¹⁸ Only to legitimise the issues of no-war pact between India and Pakistan to gain economic aid from United States.

But India did not trust Pakistan it fears that America arms in the hands of Pakistan pose a direct danger to India and has therefore again raised objections to the F-16, Harpoons and the concomitant air to surface missile system for those plane sent by US to Pakistan, the AWACS which are likely to be piloted by the US personnel initially and the deadly anti-tank 'TOW' missiles which can nerve any tanks.¹⁹

18. POT, Vol. IX. 9 April 1981, p.830

19. Indian Express 3 July 1987

Both the countries are busy in acquiring superiority in the sphere of military affairs. At a press conference at the National Press Club at Canberra on 4 October Mrs Gandhi held Pakistan responsible for making India embark on a huge defense expenditure to protect her security and integrity and India had to divert funds for defence which could be used for the benefit of the poor because of the new situation created by Pakistan's acquisition of sophisticated weapons from the US and other countries.²⁰

It is really interesting that on the other hand Gen. Zia had said that a number of times that Pakistan was serious about signing a no-war pact with India and is interested in maintaining friendly relations with India, on the other hand, Pakistan was legitimising the arms build up by collecting sophisticated weapons. It seems, the interests of Pakistan Government are not good and she would settle scores with India.

Pakistan attempt would encourage advanced weapon technology in the region and would also disturb the existing military balance in South Asia.²¹

20. Indian Express, 5 October 1981

21. P.B. Sinha, "US-Pak Military Tie-up and India's Response" Strategic Analysis, Vol. V., No.7, October 1981, p.277

The result of United States Presidential election of November 1981 eased Gen.Zia's problems considerably. The newly elected Reagan administration was clearly less concerned than its predecessors about the character of Pakistan's domestic politics and nuclear non-proliferation was considerably lower. On the new administrations priorities than was the bolstering of Pakistan's military capability.²²

But in April 1981, the renewed offer by the Reagan administration of 3.2 billion in military and economic aid spread over six years was accepted. It has so far worked smoothly enough. Although the American ambassador talked of certain continuing vulnerabilities of Pakistani-American relationship, the visit by the US Secretary of state George Shultz and the Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger, show the relationship to be reasonably trouble-free.²³

Since the Reagan Administration's economic aid package for Pakistan, in response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the US has become actively involved in Indo-Pakistan negotiation particularly in the area of nuclear non-proliferation.²⁴ Kashmir and

22. Stephen P. Cohen, ed. Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspective. (Vistaar Publication, New Delhi, 1987) p.71

23. M.B.Naqvi "The other Detente: Can it Survive" Pakistan Horizon. Vol. 36, 1983 p.26

24. Douglas C. Makeig, op. cit. p.276

Pakistan's military ties with the United States remained to highly visible hurdles in Indo-Pakistan relations. There was no sign that the Pakistan would give up what it considered its right to raise Kashmir in international forums for the sake of Simla bilateralism and what Indian's called climate of mutual trust and confidence. It is not a departure from such orientations that Pakistan is turning to US for economic and military help. It would be equally wrong to view this attempt as prelude to another venture on the sub-continent with India as its target as in the pas.²⁵ Ofcourse no one can ever say with confidence that Pakistan has ruled out armed conflict with India as an instrument of its foreign policy. States do engage in wars with others even when they do not have the means or the strength to do so.²⁶ Henry Kissinger maintains that for weak states the act of war itself rather than victory in it, sometimes becomes the best way of gaining self-respect.²⁷

On the eve of Gen. Zia's visit to US atleast partly to balance the earlier Indian summit as well

25. Pran Chopra, ed. Contemporary Pakistan: New Aims and Images (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi 1983)p.38

26. C. Ibid., p. 38

27. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. (Little Brown Co.) Excerpted in Time, 1 March 1982. p.27

as urge speedier delivery of electronic gear for the F-16s, he reiterated on December 3, that his Government's stand that the Kashmir remained the chief obstacles to a meaningful no-war dialogue with India. Pakistan continues its attempt to shift attention from the Simla Agreement by focusing on the United Nations Charter as the basis for future Indo-Pakistan relations, but India reportedly upheld the former document, this meant India stuck to Simla bilateralism with respect to the Kashmir issue. Mrs. Gandhi told Gen. Zia on November 2, that raising the latter in international forums would be "counter-productive."²⁸ With China Pakistan's relation had enjoyed profitable relations since the mid-1960's. Not only had the Pakistanis benefited from China's diplomatic support at the United Nations and elsewhere, but Islamabad believed that its ties to Beijing served to deter possible pressure from India. China withheld its recognition of Bangladesh until India released the Pakistanis being held as POW's, and a modest flow of Chinese military assistance helped slow Pakistan's gradual decline in comparison to India's growing capability. During Bhutto's year, the "China connection" was carefully nursed.²⁸

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 28. The Statesman, 4 November 1982

29. Y. Vertzberger, The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960-1980 the Washington papers, No.95 (Praeger, New York, 1983)

From the time of Ayub's overtures to China, China had supplemented Pakistan's American equipments in the late 60s and as the American arms embargo persisted, it became an increasingly important arms supplier.³⁰

During Gen. Zia's visit to China, he stressed the need to strengthened peace everywhere, Gen. Zia said. "Pakistan looked with understanding at China's effort to improve relation with India", Pakistan too, on its part, was trying to establish a 'tension-free relationship with India. In this respect, Pakistan had taken initiative by offering a 'no-war pact' to India, that was in order to improve mutual confidence, he added.³¹

Indian and Pakistan had already had two round talks on no-war pacts, while commenting on above talks, Gen. Zia said, "we are determined to take this process ahead, so that no-war pact is signed and improve the bilateral relations and the force of peace in the region be strengthened". Pakistan also supported the proposal for regional co-operation that would particularly help the countries of South Asia, he added.³²

30. Stephen P Cohen, n.15, p.7C

31. Pakistan Times, 18 October, 1982

32. Ibid., 19 October 1982

Addressing a news conference, Gen. Zia said, "China appreciated Pakistan's offer to India for signing a non-aggression pact." 'India', he said "was trying to put a proposal for much larger arrangement, while Pakistan wanted to proceed step by step."³³

About China, Gen. Zia said, "although the Asian neighbour often viewed with a wary eye, it has been a model neighbour". In this context, he also cited Chinese friendship and "support of Pakistan's legitimate objectives of safeguarding its independence and sovereignty and developing its economy."³⁴

In the Islamic world of the Gulf, Gen. Zia had sources of support that had not been available to his predecessors. After 1973, the states of Gulf-particularly Saudi-Arabia and the United Arab Emirate (UAE) were able to provide a level of financial as well as diplomatic assistance hiterhto unimaginable. Pakistan has some major assets in the Middle East. A number of senior officials have served in Gulf region (Zia himself was stationed in Jordan at the time of the expulsion of th PLO in 1970 and was staunch supporter of Kindg Hussein).

33. POT, Pakistan Series, September - October, 1982, p. 2836.

34. Pakistan Times, 12 January 1983

More than one million Pakistan citizens have laboured in the Gulf region and sent home over 2 billion in remittances annually - which has for several years constituted Pakistan's largest single source of foreign exchange.³⁵

Pakistan since its inception in all set to maintain friendly and brotherly relations with these countries. But the real efforts in this direction were made by Z.A. Bhutto when he came to power in 1972 and his successor gen. Zia had also a firm faith in the policy followed by his predecessors.

Further the strengthening of the unity of the Muslim world, inter-state co-operation in gaining economic and political supports, in which Pakistan had initiated from the beginning. Jinnah, stated stressing the need for cohesion among Muslim states over the world and was keen to a see the political and economic support from these world.

To maintain close relation with the Muslim world was always the desire of the political elites of Pakistan. The Muslim world supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and 1971 and in return Pakistan always sided with the Muslim world for its economic supports. These countries helped Pakistan in strong

35. Stephen P. Cohen, n. 15, p.68

strengthening its economy and industrial development. by providing economic aid liberally.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have stood by each other in times of stress and strain Pakistan was successful in gaining support on the issue of no-war pact proposal, in which Saudi leaders had shown and expressed thier solidarity with Pakistan.

The role of the Muslim world, particularly played by Saudi Arabia in solving the economic problem is commendable. There was no direct financial assistance to Pakistan to Islamic countries prior to 1973-1974. By 1976 the Arab world has given loans and credits worth 993 million, or almost one-third of all the financial aid from foreign sources over the previous three years.³⁶

The political military and economic prouds between Pakistan and the Muslim world took shape it seemed, because of the super power involvement in it. But one thing is clear that friendship of Pakistan with these countries world be further cemented in the years to som in dealing the with no-war pact proposal of in which India put forward a new versis i.e. treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

36. Eric Gustafson, "Economic Problems of Pakistan under Bhutto." Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No.4 April 1976 p. 364

New Delhi had no objection to a secondary role of Pakistan in the sub-continent and to its increased activities in the Middle East.³⁷

Pakistan knows that India imports 50% of its oil from Saudi Arabia at a concessional price and India is multi-religious society in which Indian Muslim constitute a considerable portion of its population specially Sunnis - have a special regard for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia have been very keen to see the detente establish in the sub-continent. So Pakistan seeks diplomatic support from Saudi Arabia in respect of no-war pact proposal to India.

Pakistan needs both economic aid and military hardware so that it has the required, where with all to exercise such options when they mature. In addition to doing so, Pakistan takes every opportunity provided by friendly Soviet moves to applaud the Russians. It could well be that Pakistan is working silently for an eventual rapprochement with the Soviet Union which might then be followed by Soviet willingness to look the other way when the time comes for Pakistan to play the part it desires to in the West Asian region.

As with any future scenario, unanticipated development and a variety of imponderables may well

37. S.M. Ali Shah, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: Prospects for Normalisation." Pakistan Horizon Vol.36, 1983,p.55.

operated in upsetting Pakistani expectations. But the West Asia arena is at the moment the only arena in which Pakistan can hope for affirmation and self-respect without stopping to ride the high horse it wants to be on.³⁸

(India was well aware of the Pakistan's economic and political support from the Islamic world, for normalisation of relation with India, in relation to a no-war pact proposal. But on the other hand, Indian Government had gave a new version to the no-war pact, i.e. Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, in which again Pakistan was reluctant to give any attention. India claimed that no-war pacts have little practical in preventing wars between adversaries and that it is mutual trust which prevents wars and promotes cooperation between two countries. However, no one can deny that the establishment of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission provided a useful machinery for promoting bilateral co-operation and paved the way for the establishment of cordial relations.) From the view of many Gulf States, a stable Pakistan is in itself a valuable asset. compared to the seven million citizens in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan looms as a major regional power. So long as it copes with its own domestic and security problems, Pakistan

38. Pran Chopra, ed., Contemporary Pakistan: New Aims and Images. (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983), p.40

can be a reliable and predictable force in the eastern matches of the Gulf.³⁹

For Pakistan, of course, the Islamic Middle East comprises more than Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; Iran is also important. Pakistan sought to cultivate the friendship of these Muslim neighbours in order to strengthen itself against India and gain diplomatic support over various issues of no-war pact proposal with India. In the late forties and fifties Iran was not hostile to India, but it was clearly more friendly towards Pakistan, it was the first Muslim country to recognise Pakistan.⁴⁰ When India showed here resentment over the mention of Kashmir issue in the Baghdad Pact ministerial communiques of 1956, Iran did not pay any heed to India's protestations.⁴¹ The real test of Iran - Pakistan friendships, however, came during the two Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971,⁴² in which Iran called India an aggressor." Zia sought to mediate an end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was splitting the oil

39. Stephen P. Cohen ed., Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspective (Vistaar Publication, New Delhi 1987), p. 69

40. Dawn 1 November 1956

41. Asian Recorder, Vol. 2, 1956, p.847

42. For detail see, H.R. Gupta, India-Pakistan War, Vol. I & II, (New Delhi, 1969)

producers and threatening the peace in the Gulf, only to gain and strengthen itself against India. Moreover, Pakistan sought diplomatic support over the various issue, including Kashmir in the United Nations and in all Islamic Conferences.

In the context of South Asia, Gen. Zia said that he was very happy that seven countries of the region had systematically embarked, it is our hope that the South Asian Regional co-operation will flourish in a atmosphere of mutual confidence, which can only be generated by strict respect for each other's sovereignty and independence and non-interference in the internal affairs, "he added.⁴³

Gen. Zia, with his usual flair for glib talk, also suggested that a 'break through' in the Indo-Pakistani talks could lead to the formation of a South Asian organisation somewhat like ASEAN. He stressed his keenness to remove the longstanding source of irritation in Indo-Pakistanrelations and suggested that the Indians might call the no-war pact by any name they like so long as the hurdles were eliminated.

Gen. Zia, said that there is growing realisation in all countries of the South Asian region that their

43. Pakistan Times, 5 October 1983

destinies are interlinked and they can attain their national goals of progress and development only in the tension-free and peaceful environment.⁴⁴ In a message to the South Asian Regional Conference of the Rotary International, which began at New Delhi on December 12, 1981, Gen. Zia said, "Pakistan had taken initiative by offering a No-war pact to India, that was in order to improve mutual confidence and hope that the countries of South Asia could forge enduring ties of friendship and co-operation on the foundation of mutual trust, confidence and sovereign equality. Since this conference was taken place at New Delhi, he had re-emphasised the deep commitment of the people and Government of Pakistan to the consolidation of peaceful and amicable relation with India, mutual self-interest demanded that the two neighbouring countries should turn their back on conflict and confrontation and begin an era of durable peace." he added.⁴⁵

44. Baluchistan Times, 13 December 1981

45. POT, Pakistan Series, Vol.9, October-December 1981
p.2950

CHAPTER IV.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN PRESS

The news of the invasion by Pathan tribesman from the North Western Frontiers, supported by Pakistan on 20, October 1947 stunned the country. The Indian newspapers generally called for direct military action to force Pakistani troops out of Kashmir and to annex Kashmir to the Indian Union. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Sir, Hari Singh, requested military aid from India and signed an Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union. Nehru rushed in airborne troops into Kashmir but in the meantime the Pakistani troops had already occupied one-half of the Kashmir and could not be pushed out without a bloodbath. Nehru turn to the United Nations and in January 1949, the U.N. Security Council voted cease-fire in the region.¹ The Kashmir problem had occupied a prominent place in Indian newspapers. The vernacular press had generally been emotional whereas the tone of English press had been generally restrained.²

In 1966, when the Tashkent Declaration was signed by India and Pakistan, after a three weeks war between the two, one of the point that preoccupied the negotiators was that both the countries put an end to the tension building or provocative role the mass media

1. Alastair Lamb, The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey. (New York, Praeger 1966) p. 163

2. S. Karkhanis. Indian Politics and the Role of Indian Press. (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi 1981), p. 81

of their respective countries was playing in Indo-Pakistan relations. Within one year after the declaration was signed, there were accusation and counter - accusation between the two countries each charging the other with starting the so-called 'have campaign' all over again through their media.³ Under these circumstances decision makers of a country engaged in a conflict taken into account, what the mass media of its adversary had been saying and consider it as one to be controlled or negotiated in order to successfully managed the tension or crises situation, short and long term variations in crises and non-crises themes in the mass media should had studied for an understanding of the inter-state conflict and co-operative process.⁴

In editorial Times of India wrote, "... for the Government and people of India to take up the position that Kashmir is like any other part of India..." To say that Kashmir is a part of India is in effect to argue the case for the aggressor... this is what the Pakistan propaganda machine wants the world to believe.⁵

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3. M.S. Rajan, "The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect". International Studies, 8 (1-2) July October, 1966 p.11
 4. James W. Markhan, Communication Research in International Conflict and Co-operation: Towards Pretheory (Iowa City : School of Journalism, 1967) p. 26
 5. Times of India, 1 October 1964

The first phase of the political war over Kashmir lasted roughly until the end of 1953. It was a period when Nehru talked most rigorously of permitting plebiscite and when he made a number of persuasive gestures towards preparing for one. From Indian point of view these efforts were nullified by Pakistan's refusal to evacuate Azad Kashmir in advance of vote.⁶ In late 1953 the political development within Kashmir led to a greater control from New Delhi. Simultaneously, an atmosphere of hope that the Kashmir problem could be settled through bilateral Indo-Pakistan negotiations was dispelled by the reports of military pacts between United States and Pakistan. The Tribune carried to "690 square Miles in Our Control Fighting a Real Success"⁷ and Indian Express published that "Defence Preparedness Must Continue" "Country Warned of Dangers"⁸ and Times of India attempted to find weakness in Pakistan. It wrote, "Pakistan was not keen to expediate a settlement..." Pakistan's case in the Rann of Kutch is so weak that it can hardly stand scrutiny by an impartial tribunal.⁹

Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri warned the nation in winding up the day long debate in the Lok Sabha on the UN Security Council resolution of the dangers ahead even after the cease fire that

6. Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict (Pall Mall London, 1968), p.86

7. Tribune, 26 September 1965

8. Indian Express, 24 September 1965

9. Times of India, 7 June 1965

had just ended the armed hostilities between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pakistan conflict were covered extensively by the Indian media specially the press. Some sections of the Indian newspapers had supported India during the conflict and attached Pakistan's principle of self determination cannot be applied in jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir is not negotiable.¹⁰ Beginning in 1962, Ayub Khan turned his country with increasing vigour towards fierce internal jingoism and an active search for international freedom of action. The Pakistani press launched a hate campaign which was pursued daily, relentlessly and vehemently for the last two years before 1965. It featured, among other elements, the constant cry that Pakistan was threatened by India aggression, continued demand for Pakistan control over Kashmir and periodic reports of revolt against Indian rulers in Kashmir.

Pakistan leaders themselves matched the vehemence of the strongly controlled press, by contrast, Indian officials were reasonably restrained if cold defiant on Kashmir and the press was moderate.¹¹ The Indian press was deluged by political and conflictual news. The pages of Indian newspapers were filled with the reports on Indo-Pakistan conflict as "Pakistan is an aggressors"¹² "War between the two is one of religions;

10. Ibid., 9 June 1965

11. Russel Brines, No.6 p.226

12. Times of India, 11 February 1966

Kashmir is merely a symptom", "Kashmir is not basic issues."¹³ The Statesman, went further in its attack against Pakistan. It accused Pakistan was using US arms against India.¹⁴ The aspects of trust-suspicion between India and Pakistan, as indicated by the orientation of the particular newspapers editorials, which serves the parties to an inter-state conflict in the mutual assessment in public of each others intentions. The press may also be employed in countless other ways to support particular policies or lines of policy, ways that are neither declratory nor propagandists.¹⁵ Press and other mars media in third world naturally reflects the difficulties with which they have to contend and the press particularly has to face thorney problems.

Concepts have increasingly become the major foci of international debate and negotiations, for instance the example of New International Information Order (NIIO). The redressing of global inequalities and injustice requires information which will flight preconcieved ideas, ignorance and aleinations and facilitate the conscientisation of citizens and ensure the control over decision making.

As such the role of Indian press in Indo-Pakistan negotiation had been very much public oriented and major

13. Ibid., 10 June 1966

14. Bernard C. Cohen. The Press and and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N. Jersey 1963), p. 202. Perhaps Cohen is the first who has systematically examined the relationship between the press and foreign policy.

functions of the press had to structure people's view, direct attention, create ideas of which is important and that is not between the two countries.

Almost all the political activities involves communication of some sort.¹⁵ The Times of India gave extensive coverage of the Indo-Pakistan negotiations after the 1965 war, as "No-war pact standstill" and supported the Government decision making policies as India is a peace loving country.¹⁶ Press doesn't set national political agenda or establishes the parameters of civil debate, its role is affirmation rather than confirming.¹⁷ Most of the Indian news papers played an important role in informing the public and foreign policy decision makers about the development and different perspective in Indo-Pakistan bilateral negotiations. It was, Bharat Jyoti however placed blame and warned policy makers with a head line, "Heed to Alarm" it wrote, "The alarm signal has been hoisted, there is a real danger to our motherland, other two unscrupulous and unprincipled countries hostile to us are closely united, the gravity

15. Richard N. Fagen, Politics and Communication. (Little Brown, Boston, 1966), p.64

16. Times of India, 10 July 1966

17. Edwin Diamond. Good News: Bad News (Cambridge MIT Press, 1978)

of the new danger needs to particular emphasis.... this is nation to indulge in the luxury of ideological controversies and conflicts.... for of what avail are these when our very existence is menaced.¹⁸ Since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the relation between the two countries deteriorated further. The Patriot, which had supported the Indian stand as the friendship between the people of India and Pakistan cannot be made firm by appearing Pakistan's jingoist and chauvnist.... it can be strengthened on the basis of democracy in the two countries. Instead of hoping to short circuit the working and the middle class in to the two countries whose awareness of common problems alone will bring permanent peace in the two countries.¹⁹ and the Pakistan Government was shock on the India's offer of negotiation "or all outstanding disputes with Pakistan is once again spurned by Pakistan."²⁰

There was a great deal of evidence, the role of the mars media as the mirror of the public and also to some extent as the agenda setter of national policies. Given the nature of foreign policy, the role of the mars media specially the press in a democratic set up becomes crucial and significant with regard to the reporting

18. Bharat Jyoti (Bombay), 29 October 1967

19. Patriot, 8 January 1968

20. Indian Express, 13 February 1968

and evaluation of foreign policy. The reaction of the Indian press was in favour of the Simla agreement between India and Pakistan. The Statesman in its editorial "Waiting and Seeing" said that "the Agreements emphasis an bilateral negotiations was more encouraging because Bhutto was critical about biloterolism"²¹ The Hindustan Times described it as it represented a victory for the 700 million people of the sub-continent and it created new hopes fo India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.²² In another evidential it pointed out that it "postulates a momentous terms formation of relationship on the sub-continent from confrontation to Co-operation"²³ On the other hand, Indian Express was somewhat critical about the signing of Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan. But it wrote that it "Does not signify a breakthrough but a beginning. A beginning has its users for both sides. Lets keep the door open."²⁴

21. Statesman. A July 1972

22. Hindustan Times, (ed) "An Historict Accord" 3 July 1972.

23. Ibid., (ed) "To win Peace" 4 July 1972

24. Indian Express (ed), "A New Beginning" 4 July 1972. See also The Tribune (ed), "Tashkent to Simla", 4 July 1972. Free Press Journal (ed) "Towards the Light", 4 July 1972. Times of India (ed) "A Thaw" 4 July 1972.

Blizt wrote, it thus set an example to other Asian and African countries involved in mutual conflicts.²⁵ The Hindu in its editorial advised the Pakistan "to respond correctly to what is undoubtedly a major gesture of goodwill on the part of India."²⁶ The major news papers sustained their attack against Governments stand, as a sample of editorials will illustrate: "Change Time of said, " Pakistan's tardy responses to India's offer of talks betrays lack of enthusiasm in Islamabad for normalisation of relations between the two countries."²⁷ and "A Big Step" it wrote, "the Delhi accord is expected to clear the way to durable peace in this sub-continent provided it is implemented, unlike the two Indo-Pakistan agreement in the spirit that prompted the parties to finally shed their initially unavoidable bargaining stance."²⁸

In 1975, during emergency Government controlled of the press prevented many of the decision being published relating to the negotiation between India and Pakistan. With the press censorship and the Government's repression the press nearly resorted to underground activities.²⁹

25. Blizt (Bombay) (ed) "Blessed Peace" 8 July 1972.

26. The Hindu (ed) "A Gesture of Goodwill" 4 July 1972.

27. Indian Express, 25 January 1974.

28. Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 11 April, 1974

29. Sharad Karkhanis, n.2 p.148

After the Simla agreement between India and Pakistan all the major newspapers welcomed the accord as a positive step towards normalisation and paved the way for the no-war pact negotiations. As Amrita Bazaar Patrika, in its editorial "offer to Pakistan", wrote "Despite the unhappy experience of the years following partition, Nehru believed that the stable peace between India and Pakistan was possible... A no-war would form, he hoped a practical basis for a construction readjustment of mutual relations."³⁰ Actually, the Indian press was trying to present the situation where the foreign policy decision making; the international observers and the general public was trying to define the situation as it was developing between India and Pakistan during a no-war pact proposal. Generally it assumed the role of the press is to keep the people informed of national and international situations and provide them with well argued position. As Times of India in its editorial, "Positive Gain" wrote, "the agreement on the Salal Dam between India and Pakistan is yet another step forward in the slow but steady process of normalisation of relations between the two countries... this is a triumph for the spirit of give and take that has characterised Indo-Pakistani discussion on recent years leading earlier to resumption of communication and full diplomatic ties between the two countries."³¹

30. Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 7 April 1977

31. Times of India, 15 April 1978

Whenever Pakistani Government gets military aid from the United States, the leading newspaper in India tended to take a pro-Government stand and warned the policy makers and parties that Pakistan might use her military power against India to rectise her goal of liberating Kashmir from India. Indian press had been busy offering arguments in an effort to project Pakistani no-war pact proposal as "doubt" and "suspicious".

The Hindu, in its editorial "Building Friendly Ties with Pakistan" wrote "that a period of law key diplomacy and a policy of rebuilding - quietly and brick by brick-the lost amity between the two countries produced results... a way of building up friendship between the people of India and Pakistan that should not be underestimated is represented by hockey and cricket diplomacy."³²

Indo-pakistan negotiations on no-war pact proposal were widely covered as Nagpur Times in its editorial "No-war Pact" what for wrote, "No-war pact between India and Pakistan is a relevent concept at this juncture but Pakistan is not disposed to accept it for obvious reasons."³³ In India, the newspaper have to be practically alert because they alone get through the people.³⁴

32. Hindu, 11 January 1978

33. Nagpur Times, 2 January 1980

34. Chanchal Sarkar, The Changing Press (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1967), p.88

In a democratic countries like India, public opinion plays an important part in influencing the major policy decisions. The role of the Indian press however has to be an efficient means of opinion mobilisation. The Indian press reflected the mood of a newly independent India; supportive of leaders who helped consackles the nation from foreign domination; concerned with the security of its national borders being encroached by hostile neighbours and enthusiastic about the role played by its leaders in Indo-Pakistan relations the days immediately after the Pakistanis offer of a no-war pact proposal to India in September 1981., the national press of the country, almost in the manner of foreign press, speculated that foreign policy of Indian Government would clean the paths towards the bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. Most of the Indian press has been rousing public opinion to the Government policies in dealing with the neighboring countries, especially Pakistan on no-war pact proposal.

But Indian press had hardly succeeded in acquiring to change the attitude of India's stand an Pakistan offer a no-war pact in September 1981. As Hindustan Times wrote, "It seems to us that those minor negotiation elements can be removed without a great deal of spadeswork.. all that is needed is a political will on both sides, in itself make for better climate in which the major

issues become more amenable to a solution.³⁵

The Indian press has succeeded in increasing public's understanding regarding the Indo-Pakistan relations and no-war pact proposal, but failed to change the attitude of the Government's policy, in which Government took independent decision in Dealing with Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact proposal.

In democratic as well as authoritarian system, Public opinion is often "used as an active and manipulative resource"³⁶ However in general, the role of the press as the watchdog on policy makers and as manipulation of the public opinion is established beyond doubt. In the context of India, situation of parliamentary democracy and the dimension of relationship is evident in the fact that the press, if not influencing the decision making directly, nevertheless exercises a measure of influence over the parliament. The relationship between the press and the parliament is not a phenomenon merely of post-independence period. In a simpler but crucial way the press is indispensable to the opposition as a source of information - both as it reflects the public opinion and suggestion on the matters on which to challenge

35. Hindustan Times, 24 December 1982.

36. Kelman Herbert, ed. , International Behaviour (Holt Rinehart, New York, 1965), p. 279

the Government, or take up a position.³⁷ Furthermore, to the opposition the press is especially important, for policy making and debate alike, because it lacks the help of the bureaucracy. Thus, of all major political institutions in the country, Parliament in general and opposition in particular has most to gain from a diverse national press. In the eyes of the Government, the press becomes dangerous at times when it assumes the role of oppositon in the absence of an effective efficient and strong opposition in Parliament.³⁸

A press opposition alliance, therefore, can be a very powerful weapon to have strong check over the autocratic moves of the authority. But regarding the foreign policy making of a country, both have certain limitation.³⁹ It is more so with the simple fact that the press, whenever making an observation of the foreign relations, cares to be objective and tries to avoid any of the distortion.

37. R.M. Punnet, Front Bench Opposition (London, 1937) p.196

38. Herbert Morrison, Government and Parliament (London, 1959).

39. James Beston, The Artillery of the Press: Its Influence on Foreign Policy (Harper and Row; N.York, 1966.)

The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution attached great importance to the freedom of speech.⁴⁰ Although in their hearts and minds was imprinted the message of fathers of the nations, that evolution of democracy is not possible, if one is not prepared to hear the other side and zealously guard individual freedom of opinion, speech or expression. Under his inspiration the Indian press played a significant role doing the freedom movement. Undoubtedly Jawaharlal Nehru was a great mass-communicator of his time. According to him the objectives of the press should be "... to understand the public feeling and give expression to it... to arouse among the people certain desirable sentiments... to expose popular defects. Perhaps keeping these objectives in mind the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said. "I would rather have a completely free press with all the dangers involved in the wrong use of that freedom than a suppressed a regulated press."⁴¹

40. Though Article 19(1)(a) does not specifically mention freedom of the press, it has been settled by judicial decision that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of press (the text is : Article 19(1). All citizens shall have the right (a) a freedom of expression).

41. Jawaharlal Nehru's speech at All India Newspapers Conference in 1961 in Chanchal Sarkars, Changing Press, Popular Prakashan, 1967), p.4

There have been only a few occasions since the country attained independence in 1947, when the government policy regarding foreign relations has been subjected to intensive criticism.⁴² In general, the authorities have been able to use strained relations with foreign states to distract public attentions from more serious failures in their domestic policies." This is unusual behaviour for beleaguered governments, of course but India has been exceptional in the extent to which the government rather than the opposition has used foreign policy for political purpose.

At the time of external threat and danger to national integrity, the press of country stands unified in their support of the government. Also when there is a major national crisis, the press often comes forward to suggest to the government about the ways and methods to rescue the nation from crisis through its editorial notes. After attaining independence in 1947, the Government of India was compelled to focus its attention almost exclusively on domestic problem Foreign policy also became the subject of immediate concern. The only

42. F.Warren Ilchman, "Political Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of India, Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies. Vol.4, 1966, p.216

43. Leo E. Rose, "The Foreign Policy of India" in N. Rosenau, WorldPolitics: An Introduction (Free Press N.York, 1976) P. 205 Also see K. Balaraman, "The Indian Press and Foreign Policy".Journal of International Affairs No.10. 1956, p.176

critical international problem, the country faced in that period was the relationship with Pakistan.

The news stories relating to the neighbouring countries are usually long and prominent in Indian newspapers. This is quite understandable in the context of historical links and geographical proximity with these countries. The political and other developments in these countries are of interest to Indian people, both bilateral relations and politics within these states are of concern in India. Indo Pakistan negotiations on no war pact issue were covered extensively by the Indian media specially the press. Internal political developments often make good story for Indian press. The movement against the army rule and for restoration of democracy in Pakistan were widely reported in Indian Press.

Journalistic reports were important indicators of the role played by the newspapers in informing the public and the policy makers about the development and different perspective in the Indo Pakistan relations and conflict as seen by person close to the political decision makers. However, the journalists, who pursue the sources close to the policy makers, especially in Pakistan, had to face reluctance and sometimes avoidance on the part of the national leaders to communicate their views and stands unambiguously regarding the way they were approaching the problems and issues in Indi-Pakistan relations.⁴⁴.

44. Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake, ed. The news media in National and International Conflicts (East West Centre, Hawaii, 1984p. 125.

In dealing with the issues relating to the Indo-Pakistan conflict situation was the high degree of initiative taken by press in India about the issues that had important bearing on the political tensions between the two countries.

Some Indian newspapers were critical of Indian Government for its 'ad hocism' on the crucial question of national security when the United States was arming Pakistan. The Patriot in its editorial 'Quibble' characterised that 'Gen Zia wants to use the no-war clamour to distract attention from his growing military collaboration with the US which is causing new tension in the region.'⁴⁵ Commenting on renewal of arms package to Pakistan, Kailm Bahadur says, 'there is no chance of Pakistan fighting a war against any other country except India.'⁴⁶ The Indian press was out to support the Indian responses to the Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact proposal. The Hindi in its editorial 'Responding to the call from Pakistan' that India had made it clear to Pakistan that no-war between them would be in continuation and recognition of the Simla Agreement,⁴⁷ and Indian Express the 'early solution' relating to the issues of no-war pact between India and Pakistan. The Times of India, however, viewed 'both side have accepted the need views for a no-war pact and declared that it would make a positive contribution to peace and stability in the region.

⁴⁵.Patriot, 15 March 1981.

⁴⁶.Link Vol.23 18 June, 1981 P.13.

⁴⁷.Hindu 26 December 1981.

They have also recorded a measure of mutual understanding on a number of elements of such an accord and agreed to continue their discussion on points on which difference and disagreements persist'⁴⁸. In the flow of events which captures the attention of the press a common incident is the presentation of a political decision : an election of the President or Prime Minister based on their stand on India-Pakistani relations, pro-or anti no -war pact between India and Pakistan or some kind of defence are some example of the kind of decision involved which an editorial would either support a refute⁴⁹. Since the editorials have been used as indicators of interaction between India and Pakistan, the frequency of editorials in one country about its relation with other, provides an indication whether when and how often the selected newspapers for a country saw fit to discuss the tense relation between India and Pakistan indicating their concerns over the no war- pact issues.

Some Indian newspapers which until recently had been emphasising the need to remove misunderstanding between the two countries, are now supporting the government policies. Such as the Patriot went further in its attacks that 'Pakistan was seeking a no war pact as a mere 'Propagandist' strategoy to delude international public and securing certain political advantages.⁵⁰.

48.Times of India, 2nd February, 1982.

49.N.Bhaskara Rao, Controlled Mass Communication (S.Chand and Chand (Pvt.) Ltd. 1971) p.83.

50.Patriot, 8 March, 1982.

The Indian Express sounds an optimistic note while saying 'Hopefully the meeting (Indira - Zia) will clear the way (the) cabwebs and enable the two leaders to talk to another with complete candour and sincerity (th two) could cut through a great deal of bureaucratic red tape and obfuscating mumbo-jumbo and draw up a framework for the non aggression pact and treaty of peace and friendship that have been under discussion... Both countries need peace and friendship to serve their own best internal and international interests. More reason, therefore, for a both initiatives rather than let yet another opportunity slip.⁵¹ Some of the press have been critical of Indias hostile relation and suspicious attitude towards Pakistan and had call for a positive support for Pakistan as it faced problems created by the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan.

Actually the role of the news media was aimed at facilitating the understanding between the two countries and stressing the need for cordial relation. The Indian Express expressed almost similar ideas when it wrote that 'Peaceful, friendly co existance is what India seeks, there are no two option in this country ⁵². and even the pro-government, the Partiot went all out in support of the government, and it made the Indian Government response to a no-war pact as 'right decision' and asserted that 'If they wanted to rid the world of war they would

51. Indian Express 2 September 1982.

52. Ibid, 30 January, 1982.

sign no war pacts and then go about merrily providing bombs and missiles and all the destructive weapons to keep the war industry going protected from war by no-war pacts.⁵³ The Indian Express, in the editorial 'manmade jinx' drew attention of the public that 'the Government of India has done well to let Islamabad know what it thinks of its conduct (Pakistan reference to Kashmir in UN Human Right Commission), however there is no need to disengage ourselves from the no-war pact negotiation process altogether.⁵⁴ During the first part of 1982 and 1983 the following trends or patterns can be discerned in the attitude of the press.

- a) A major section of the national press stood by the Government's decision on no-war pact-news coverage as well as in content⁵⁵.
- b) Again only the Statesman and Patriot tended to present a picture which was sympathetic towards no-war pact issues⁵⁶.
- c) Some newspapers grew highly critical of the policies adopted by Pakistan by issuing the offer of a no-war pact to India. 'A two track policy' 'Ineptitude', 'The Tilt Again', 'No war' were the titles of editorials indicative of attitude of the press⁵⁷.

53. Patriot 14 february, 1982.

54. Indian Express, 26 February, 1982.

55. All the Delhi based papers Editorials and commentaries.

56. See all the editorials, Statesman and Patriot, 1982.

Criticism and advocacy as the participants role of the press, are so intimately related that differentiating them is some times arbitrary, for criticism of a particular policy may be merely as preliminary to the recommendation of an alternative course of action. In either case, they are concrete expression of press, as representative of the public to interpret the public interest in foreign policy as it sees fit.⁵⁸ Since the press speaks for the public and is even recognised as an expression of the public in its own right, than, thus 'Where the people are sovereign, the press is King'.⁵⁹ With this role constraints and all other limitation, the Indian press is dealing with Indo Pakistan relations adopted overall sympathetic attitude to India's policy towards Pakistan. though with the breathing space of criticism and doubts. Undoubtedly, the suggestions and criticisms made by the Indian press influenced the decision making process though not overtly and directly.

Also, the press contributed to some extent in shaping and formulating the foreign policy through the parliament and other platforms of public opinion, at the significant turn of events when country's image and the national interest was jeopardised. It also led the decision makers to review the foreign policy at critical moments. Reviewing the failures of Governments policies and its innovation the press of the country caution the Indian leaders from time to time that something

~~58. Bernard C. Cohen n.13. p. 36.~~

59. Ibid p.33

led them to seek face saving device and sometime to make clarification by giving interviews and public statement regarding foreign policy issues.

Thus, the overall attitude of the Indian press towards Pakistan was one of the critical evaluation and definitive towards can be discerned. Despite various constraints and limitations, the Indian press undoubtedly has acquired a character of its own. So, the Indian press have a vital role to play in allotting the national public opinion for generating the will to solve such problems between India and Pakistan and making an ordinary people put pressure on the authorities to implement appropriate solutions.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The adversary relations between India and Pakistan have mainly resulted from the various factors like historical legacies, the difference in religion, conflicting national interest and ideology, divergent perceptions of each other and of themselves and various bilateral disputes including Kashmir.

Every Pakistan action was inspired by fear of India - founded or unfounded. "The principal objectives of Pakistan foreign policy", wrote Ayub, "are security and development."¹ Its security concern, however, has been Indo-centric althrough. Indeed it is unfortunate that the two closest neighbours, had to exchange hostilities on the question of Kashmir, an issue around which Pakistan formulated all her defence and security requirements.

For political decision - makers in both the countries, the Simla Agreements serves as an index of the peace-building capacity of the two states. It has been a help to give a sense of direction to Pakistan's search for peace and it has given an opportunity to India to show its sense of responsibility as a power which seeks a viable peace-maker with its neighbours. A thaw in the Indo-Pakistan relations largely depends upon the adaptation of confidence-building measures particularly the solution of political disputes. If political relations shows a marked improved and the areas of conflict are minimized meaningful regional

1. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography
(London: 1967) P.114.

co-operation based on mutuality of interest can be forged. The security of Indian sub-continent is best promoted through a joint regional responses to the problems. Pakistan must appreciate that India is equally concerned about the security threat to the sub-continent. While each country, has a right to protect its security from all possible threats, Pakistan's acquisition of arms from the United States appear disproportionate to its requirements.

This is a matter of great concern for India. No-War or non-use of force is a concept that is more encompassing and pervasive than no first use principle. The non-use of force/non-aggression outlaws the use of arms forces altogether in practical politics, they constitute an important instrument of peace as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 and the United Nations Charter of 1945. On 2 November, 1949, Jawharlal Nehru offered a no-war pact to Pakistan in regard to its security and to dissuade it from joining a military bloc and internationalise the Kashmir issue. But Pakistan rejected the offer in 1949, in order to retain its freedom to go through war in Kashmir or elsewhere. In June 1983, Z.A. Bhutto had said that "Let India arrive at an tangible and honourable settlement with Pakistan any Kashmir.....we can then have not one but a thousand no-war pacts... while Kashmir Dispute exists, it is inconceivable that we should accept India's offer of a no-war pacts.² The offer of 1964 which was made by Lal Bahadur Shastri was also rejected by Pakistan. Bhutto not only ridiculed the offer but said, " an aggressor state always creates a false sense of security and

2. Dawn, 26 July 1963.

to cover its aggressive interests make such offer.³ On 15 August 1968, from the ramparts of Red Forts in Delhi Mrs. Gandhi said, "I again repeat to Pakistan today to recognise this (NO-War) proposal as this is the only way in which lies the good of both India and Pakistan."⁴ But Ayub Khan's response was that there would not be a better pact than just settlement this basic dispute of Kashmir. He added that to talk of a No-War Pact without settling the Kashmir disputes was only an attempt to mislead and hood wink the world.⁵ Yahya Khan assumed the charge from the outgoing President Ayub Khan on the evening of 25th March 1969. On 19 May 1969, Yahya Khan said in Peshawar that Kashmir problem was under "constant review" of the government of Pakistan and would be referred back to United Nations at the right time if required. In her letter, Mrs. Gandhi renewed the proposal for no-war pact and a joint machinery to examine comprehensively all aspects of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. She disclosed in Parliament that joint measures would cover fields such as commercial, economic and cultural. Yahya accepted the proposal of Mrs. Gandhi provided the machinery of Indo-Pakistani body should discuss all issues between the two countries including Kashmir and Farraka barrage. Morarjee Desai, offered a no-war pact in 1977, Mrs. Gandhi offered a no war pact in 1980 and in 1982 she however modified a no-war pact into a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation which has always been rejected by Pakistan. Much

3. Pakistan Times, 30 Aug. 1964.

4. The Statesman, 17 August 1968.

5. Pakistan Times, 2 September 1968.

steam has been generated only the issues of a No_War Pact offered by Pakistan in September 1981. Firstly Zia wanted to project himself as a dove-eyed statesman and a peace searcher at a time when Pakistan should stop getting arms aid from United states and China, there is no generation that these arms from these countries will not be used against India in any armed confrontation in near future. Where future appears to be secure that Pakistan would not engage in armed hostilities against India as it is doing at the moment by training the Punjabi and Kashmiri terrorists and sending them to destabilised the political situation in the country. Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact proposal is only related to no-war pact in which there is no agreement in other aspects of bilateral relations to the friendly development of relations between the two countries in all its manifestation. On the other hand India's Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation has a larger scope of covering a relations between the two countries like exchange of culture and social delegates, give and take of education facilities, launching of joint economic development project and signing a trade agreements which will improve the relations between the two countries. Now Pakistan seems unwilling to accept the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, of India, because among other things, India seeks guarantee that Pakistan would not give bases to any foreign powers, which is not acceptable to Pakistan. This demonstrates Pakistan real intention behind a no-war pact proposal.

India and Pakistan conflict were covered extensively by the Indian media, especially the press. Some sections of Indian newspapers had supported India during the conflict and attacked Pakistan's principle of self-determination cannot be applied in Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir is not negotiable and Pakistan is an aggressor. As such the role of the Indian press in Indo-Pakistan negotiation had been very much public oriented and major functions of the press had to structure people's view, direct attentions create ideas which is important and what is not between the two countries.

The reaction of the Indian press was in favour of the Simla agreement between India and Pakistan . The statesman in its editorial "waiting and seeing", said that the agreement emphasis on bilateral negotiations was more encouraging because Bhutto was critical about bilateralism". Some Indian newspapers were out to support the Indian responses to the Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact proposal. In rational terms both India and Pakistan need to set their own houses in order. Indo-pakistan relations can be stabilised if an honest endeavour is made to involve the people of both countries and minimising bureaucratic hurdles in the way of accomplishing mutual co-operation. With Simla accord, on the basis, relations can be developed on the basis of sovereign equality, no interference in each others internal affairs and commitment to the non-use of force.

If the pillars of Indo-Pakistan co-operation are built on insecure foundation they might easily collapse and lead the two countries once again into a conflict. There are still major differences over Kashmir

and on the question of arms acquisitions. There are also divergent perceptions regarding the role of two super powers in South Asia, and the interpretation of non alignment bilateralism and no-war pact proposal. However, sentiments in Pakistan and India is now opposed to war and public opinion positively favours detente and co-operation. There are two major hurdles to the establishment of friendly Indo-Pakistan relations.

Firstly, India wants Pakistan to guarantee that she will not provide naval military basis to any foreign powers. Secondly, India feels that Kashmir disputes should never be internationalised, but should be solved according to mutual understanding and bilaterlly.

A sense of insecurity would continue to prevail until both states are in a position to formulate their internal and external policies independently and without the slightest threat or coercion. India and Pakistan will have to rid themselves of the war psychosis. The interest of the two countries call for the adoption common security approach particularly against external threats. The two states have to go a long way in enlarging the areas of co-operation and minimising the clash of interest in the various fields. For the purpose, the people of India and Pakistan should discount historical legacies and find new basis for the promotion of amity between India and Pakistan.

APPENDIX I.

Appendix - I

NEHRU - LIAQUAT CORRESPONDENCE ON ' NO WATERPACT 1950.PRIME MINISTER INDIANew Delhi
January 18, 1950.

My Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you about the proposed joint declaration by the Governments of India and Pakistan for the avoidance of war.

2. On the 16th January we received a copy of a statement which you were to make in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in reply to a question regarding this proposed joint declaration by the Government of India and Pakistan for the avoidance of war in the settlement of disputes. In this statement it is said that, in the view of the Government of Pakistan, the only way to promote peace is to resolve major disputes. Even if these disputes cannot themselves be settled before the declaration is made, at least the procedure for settling them can be laid down by agreement in precise terms in the declaration. Further, that your Government urge the Government of India to agree to the concrete and precise suggestions of the Government of Pakistan already made regarding the procedure to be followed in the settlement of disputes.

3. I was not aware of any concrete and precise suggestions of the Government of Pakistan or its High Commissioner in Delhi in this respect. All that had happened previously was that your High Commissioner had mentioned various matters in dispute and referred to possible methods of settling them. No concrete or precise procedure had been suggested. We had dealt with the points raised by your

High Commissioner, whereupon it was agreed that a tentative draft of a declaration might be prepared. This draft was handed to your High Commissioner on the 22nd December, 1949. The first reply to it that we received is the copy of your statement which reached us on the 16th January. We were surprised to find in this a reference to certain concrete and precise suggestions, which we had not thus far received.

4. I have now seen newspaper reports of the full statement made by you before the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on January 17th. You refer in this to be various matters which are, according to you, in dispute. As you know, the Kashmir issue is before the United Nations and has therefore to be considered separately. As regards Junagadh, I am surprised at your reference to it, as this is not a live issue.

5. The canal water issue has been the subject of correspondence between the two Governments and both are practically agreed that a joint technical commission should be set up for making a factual investigation. On the basis of the report of the commission, the two Governments will confer with a view to arriving at a settlement. If it is not found possible to reach a settlement, we are quite prepared to refer the matter to reach a settlement, we are quite prepared to refer the matter to arbitration or some tribunal approved of by both Governments. You will appreciate that the manner of subsequent procedure as well as the form can hardly be decided satisfactorily before we know what the results of the technical commission are and what the remaining points for decision are.

6. We are prepared that the evacuee property dispute should be settled by arbitration, if negotiations and mediation fail.

7. So far as the division of the Reserve Bank's assets is concerned the major portion of the assets claimed by Pakistan has already been transferred to the State Bank and in regard to the remaining claims, disagreement has arisen on the question of the mode of payment. The question thus is one of the manner in which the claims have to be settled. This matter has already been discussed informally between the two Governments, and Pakistan themselves have suggested a conference to discuss it further. There are a number of other issues connected with this matter, all of which would have to be considered in arriving at a settlement.

8. The question of payment of sterling depends upon the amount that is due and of which type it is, that is, whether current or blocked. Both these matters are eminently fit for settlement by negotiation and indeed, as I have mentioned above, a conference is envisaged.

9. As you know, the Government of India have large claims of financial nature on the Pakistan Government. These have been pending for a long time without any satisfactory settlement. This again should be dealt with by negotiation and in the absence of any settlement, by other peaceful methods.

10. The whole object of the proposed joint declaration was to remove or lessen the unfortunate tension that exist between out two Governments and to produce an atmosphere which is more favourable to the consideration and settlement of particular disputes. If these disputes are satisfactorily of particular disputes. If these disputes are satisfactorily settled seperately, we would welcome it. But obviously there has been difficulty and delay in doing this. A joint declaration would, no doubt, be helpful in bringing us nearer to a settlement of all outstanding disputes between the two Governments, which the Government of India earnestly desire.

11. The procedure for settling disputes cannot be uniform in all cases. It is possible that one method may be appropriate for one dispute and another method for another dispute. Apart from negotiation and mediation, the only remaining peaceful methods are arbitration and reference to some international authority or tribunal. That is precise enough.

12. The proposal to make a joint declaration was made by the Government of India in all earnestness, so that we might take one effective step forward towards the resolution of existing disputes between the two Governments. Not to take this first step, because the other steps are not simultaneously taken, is to avoid taking any steps ar all for the present at least. That is not a very helpful way of proceeding in this matter. For us to say that in no event are we going to war for a settlement of disputes in an important and significant contribution to peace between the two countries. The Government of India are prepared to say that, if

the Government of Pakistan is also agreeable. Owing to geography and for many other reasons, it is inevitable that many issues arise between the two countries which require settlement. A firm declaration that we will in any event settle them by peaceful methods will itself be a great service to our two countries and the world, because it will remove fear of war from the minds of our peoples.

13. Any joint declaration that we might make must necessarily be in general terms to cover all cases that may arise now or hereafter. Apart from this joint declaration, and in pursuance of it, we can at once begin to consider specific matters separately. I shall be glad to have an early reply from you.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The Honourable Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Karachi.

PRIME MINISTER
PAKISTAN

KARACHI
Date 14th February, 1950.

My dear Prime Minister,

As promised in my letter of January 25, I (acknowledging letter of 18 January ; not reproduced here), write in reply to your letter of January 18, to give you the views of the Government of Pakistan.

2. At the outset, I should to emphasis the principles which guide Pakistan's approach to this question. As a Member of the United Nations, Pakistan has firm faith in the principles of the Charter and is prepared always to abide by them. This membership in itself constitutes a declaration of Pakistan's renunciation of warlike means of settling disputes. With her neighbour, India, in particular, Pakistan desires most sincerely to remove all cause of friction, and to promote friendly relations without which it is impossible for either country to achieve the full measure of its potential development. As I have repeatedly reaffirmed, Pakistan is convinced that war between India and Pakistan would bring utter ruin on both. The common good of both countries lies in the peaceful settlement of all disputes between them.

3. Pakistan therefore welcomes the proposal to issue a joint declaration the primary object of which must be to carry conviction to the people of India and Pakistan and of the whole world as to the sincerity of both Governments in renouncing war as a method of settling their disputes. To attain this object, it is essential that there should be tangible action to match the spirit of the declaration, since peoples and Governments are judged by their actions rather than by their words. This action

should, in the view of my Government, be the laying down of a clear cut procedure with an agreed time table, which would make it binding on both Governments to carry through the settlement of their disputes to its final peaceful conclusion. For example, we could lay down that, from the date of the declaration, two months would be allowed for negotiations. The next two months would then be allowed for settlement by mediation of those matters which negotiation had failed to resolve. If, at the end of this second period of two months, any matters remained over they should all stand automatically referred to arbitration by a method agreed upon in advance. A last period of two months should suffice for this process, though its duration would of course depend on the arbitration or arbitrators.

4. I am sorry, if, as paragraph 3 of your letter suggests, there has been any misunderstanding regarding the view which we have consistently held that a concrete and precise procedure should be followed. When towards the end of November 1949, your Secretary General orally suggested to our High Commissioner that a joint "no-war declaration" should be made and that, if no agreement were reached the dispute should be referred to a third party for settlement, we directed our High Commissioner to reply as in the annexure to this letter. Our High Commissions reported that he read out his reply word by word to your Secretary General on December 3. You will, I think, agree that the reply makes concrete and precise suggestions ; and the statement which

I made in the Assembly on January 17 did no more than reiterate the suggestions made to your Government on December 3. However, it seems that there was some misunderstanding and that our precise proposals were not placed before you when you prepared the draft of the joint declaration which reached us on January 9. I would most earnestly request you to reconsider your view that an agreement in general terms is alone required, and to consider further the advantages of the more precise course suggested by me.

5. The procedure for setting disputes which we suggest is fundamentally a very simple one, and is flexible enough to cover all cases which may arise now in future. As you observe, 'apart from negotiation and mediation, the only remaining peaceful methods are arbitration and reference to some international authority or tribunal. "If, therefore, a dispute cannot be settled by negotiation and mediation, it must be referred to arbitration. Whether arbitration is by a special agency set up by mutual agreement for the purpose, or by an international authority, its essential feature is that an independent authority gives an award which is binding on both parties. Resort to arbitration would of course be had only when negotiation and mediation had failed to bring agreement and would in each case cover differences over procedure as well. In all disputes there is a danger that the party which is in possession of and wishes to withhold the rightful dues of the other may so conduct itself as either to prevent a fair settlement or to cause such delay in settlement as to give the same result. Either course produces a sense of injustice, frustration and despair of securing a remedy by peaceful means which is one of the most frequent causes

of conflict. The procedure which my Government propose is designed to obviate any such contingency.

6. In no spirit of controversy, but as an illustration of the considerations set out above, the Kashmir dispute which holds the key to Indo-Pakistan relations may be cited. This dispute was referred to the Security Council, and after a year's effort the settlement embodied in the U.N.C.I.P.s Resolutions of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January 1949, was reached, with the agreement of both India and Pakistan and the approval of the Security Council. This settlement provided for cease-fire and demilitarisation leading to a free and impartial plebiscite. Differences having arisen over the programme of demilitarisation and the Commissioner's mediation having failed to resolve them, the Commission suggested arbitration of the points of difference. Pakistan accepted, but India refused, with the result that the matter was referred back to the Security Council after the lapse of another year. The Security Council then asked its President, General McNaughton, to mediate.

The proposals which General McNaughton put forward have again been accepted by Pakistan but not by India. In a situation of this kind, when reference to an international body like the security council and negotiation and mediation carried out under its authority have failed, no negotiation other than arbitration of points of difference in implementation of the settlement already reached can lead to a resolution of the dispute.

7. Again the canal water, dispute is a justiciable issue which should be referred to the International Court of Justice if no agreement by negotiations can be reached, and yet India has so far refused to agree to this course. It is true that both Governments have practically agreed that a joint Commission should be set up, although Pakistan believes that the common objective will be better-served if the commission consists of non technical statesmen who will enlist services of technical experts, than by appointing a technical commission. On the basis of the Commission's report, the two Governments will confer with a view to arriving at a settlement, but if an agreement is not reached, the proper way of resolving differences in a matter of this kind would be a reference to the International Court of Justice. What is most urgently needed is to set at rest the fear operating on the mind of the people likely to be affected that the dispute may drag on indefinitely while their welfare and prosperity are progressively put in jeopardy. They must be assured that, in the event of the dispute not being resolved by the method now being pursued, it will be settled by adjudication of the Tribunal best fitted to resolve it. Since you are prepared to accept arbitration, there should be no objection to designating the International Court of Justice as the arbitral authority.

8. It will thus be seen that the considerations which have impelled the Government of Pakistan to their proposal for a precise procedure are derived from their past experience of these disputes. Other issues need not be dwelt upon in detail, but it is necessary to state that Junagadh is on the agenda of the Security Council to be dealt with after the Kashmir dispute has been settled, and cannot be regarded as a deal issue.

9. I feel that you will agree that if the principle of arbitration and a timetable leading up to it is accepted, the exact disputes to be handled under this procedure should be a matter for settlement in advance.

10. As regards the exact forum, mediation or arbitration could be undertaken by a special agency set up by mutual agreement for the purpose, or by agreed reference to some appropriate international body recognised by both parties. I will gladly consider any suggestion made by you to this end, but I suggest that it is desirable that the name of the arbitrator or arbitral agency be decided before the issue of the declaration and included in it ; I have accordingly left a blank in the draft below for inclusion of names or description of the arbitrators. If the Government of India agree, the Government of Pakistan would be prepared to accept the majority decisions of an arbitral Tribunal of three persons ; and I suggest for your consideration that the Governments of three friendly countries, whom we should now select, should be asked to nominate one member each.

11. In the light of these considerations, my Government suggest that the following should be the terms of the joint declaration ; The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, their being desirous of promoting friendship and goodwill between peoples, hereby declare that they will not resort to war for settlement of any existing or future disputes between them. They

further agree that settlement of such disputes shall always be sought through peaceful methods of negotiation and mediation and if these should fail to bring settlement, by resort to arbitration of all points of difference including those relating to the procedure for arbitration. They undertake that they will abide by the award of an arbitral Tribunal which shall consist of for all the settlement of all existing disputes. In the event of their not being unanimous, the decision of the majority shall be binding. Negotiations, for the settlement of all such disputes shall begin as early as practicable and such of them as are not settled by negotiation within two months, from the date of this declaration shall be referred to mediation, for which a further period of two months shall be allowed, Any matters remaining unsettled at the expiry of this period shall be referred to arbitration.

In pursuance of this declaration, both Governments hereby agree to refer to this arbitral Tribunal, differences which have arisen or may arise in implementation of U.N.C.I.P.'s Resolution of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January, 1949 which both Governments have accepted for settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Both Governments also agree that the canal water dispute shall, if no agreement is reached by negotiation or mediation, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. In other disputes outstanding them such as Junagadh and neighbouring States, evacuee property, boundary disputes and claims relating to assets,

both, Governments agree that if no settlement is reached by negotiation or mediation, the matter shall be referred to the arbitral tribunal. It is their earnest hope as well as their firm conviction that implementation of which declaration and the spirit which lies behind it will serve to promote friendly relations between the two countries and advance the cause of International peace.

Yours sincerely,
Liaquat Ali Khan.

The Honourable Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi.

ANNEXURE AIDE MEMOIRE 3 DECEMBER 1949.

The Pakistan Government welcomes the proposal that all outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan should be settled by peaceful means and not by war. This has been their stand all along. They are convinced that just and peaceful settlement of outstanding question would remove both the cause and the fear of war between the two countries.

2. The main disputes between India and Pakistan relate to :
- (i) Jammu and Kashmir
 - (ii) Junagadh and neighbouring States that have acceded to Pakistan.
 - (iii) Canal Waters
 - (iv) Evacuee Property
 - (v) Assets of Pakistan withheld by India.
- (i) Jammu and Kashmir

The points at issue relate to the implementation of the U.N. Commission's Resolution of 1st August, 1948 and 5th January 1949. These Resolutions have been accepted by both Governments and have the character of an International Agreement. Negotiation between the two Governments and mediation by the U.N. Commission have failed to resolve the differences between the two Governments in the implementation of Part II of the Commissioner's Resolution of 13th August, 1948. The only course left is to refer the points

of difference to arbitration. In short, both Governments should reaffirm their desire to implement at the earliest possible date the Commissioner's Resolution of 13th August 1948, and 5th January 1949, by having a free and impartial plebiscite in the spring 1950 and should agree in advance to refer to arbitration any points of difference that have arisen or may arise in the implementation of these Resolutions.

In view of the Pakistan Government, the Kashmir dispute has an absolute priority over other disputes. Without a just and peaceful solution of the Kashmir question it is impossible to create that atmosphere of goodwill which is essential to the solution of the dispute.

(ii) Junagadh

The dispute relates to the occupation by India's armed forces of Junagadh and neighbouring states which had acceded to Pakistan. The U.N. Commission has been entrusted with the task of mediation in this case also and if its efforts at mediation do not succeed, both the Government should agree to abide by arbitration.

(iii) Canal Waters

The issue is a juridical one and if negotiating between the two Governments do not succeed, both Governments should agree in advance to refer the matter to decision by the International Court of Justice.

(iv) Evacuee Property

The Evacuee property disputes can only be settled after the canal waters dispute has been settled since a decision on the canal water dispute has a vital bearing on the question of evacuee property. A settlement of the canal waters dispute is, therefore, an essential preliminary to a settlement of the evacuee property. After the canal waters dispute has been settled, the evacuee property disputes should be settled by negotiation aided, if necessary by mediation and if that does not prove successfully by a resort to arbitration.

(v) Assets of Pakistan withheld by India.

For example, the assets of the State Bank withheld by the Reserve Bank, the sterling due to Pakistan under the Payments Agreement. In this case too if negotiations do not succeed, both Governments should agree in advance to refer the matter to arbitration.

3. In all cases where a matter is to be referred to arbitration it should be agreed that all points of difference including those relating to procedures should, if necessary, be referred to arbitration so that it should not be possible for either party to hope up or obstruct a settlement. And both Government should agree to abide by the award of the arbitrator.

4. If the Government of India is prepared to accept a solution on the above lines, further negotiations can be undertaken to settle the details and the procedure of mediation and arbitration. As soon as agreement has been reached a joint declaration will be made that the two Governments will in no case in got to war.

PRIME MINIATER
INDIA

No.1236-P.M.
NEW DELHI
29th August,1950.

My dear Nawabzada,

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter of the 14th February regarding the issue of a joint declaration by the Government of India and Pakistan that they will settle all outstanding disputes between the two countries, by peaceful methods. After our talks on Kashmir last month, I had to cope with an important session of Parliament and, since the session concluded, I had a number of most pressing matters to attend to.

I have in conclusion with my colleagues, given the most careful consideration to our correspondence on the subject in particular to the views expressed in your letter of the 14th February. We are glad to note that Pakistan desires most sincerely to remove all causes of friction with her neighbour, India and to promote friendly relations without which it is impossible for either country to achieve the full measure of its potential development. May I say that we fully

reciprocate these sentiments. I am also happy to note that Pakistan welcomes the proposal to issue a joint declaration, the primary object of which must be to carry conviction to the people of India and Pakistan, and of the whole world, as to the sincerity of both Governments in renouncing war as a method of settling their disputes. 'To attain this object', you say, 'it is essential that there should be tangible action to match the spirit of the declaration, since peoples and Governments are judged by their actions, rather than by their words', I may assure you that in suggesting that we should make the declaration first, and immediately afterward, consider ways and means of settling outstanding disputes between our two countries; it was not my intention that action should not be prompt and in conformity with spirit of the declaration. To mention the three more important disputes.

- (i) We have had personal discussions about Jammu and Kashmir and the matter should soon come up before the Security Council.
- (ii) As regards evacuee property also, there have been discussions, since the conclusion of the Delhi Pact, between our two Governments, and my colleagues, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, hopes to renew these in Karachi in the near future with a view to an early settlement.

(iii) The letter that you have sent me recently regarding the dispute over canal water is receiving attention now and I hope to be able to address you shortly on the subject.

These instance support my contention that individual disputes have to be and can be dealt with most satisfactorily be seperate consideration. What is, in our view, psychologically important is that this seperate consideration of individual disputes should take place in an atmosphere of friendly understanding. For this purpose, a short but comprehensive declaration to the effect that, whatever the differences between out two Governments, they will be settled peacefully and that both countries would be spared the horrors of a fratricidal war is desirable and should be adequate. I would, therefore in all earnestness, again commend to you, for favourable consideration, the draft declaration that we sent you thtough our High Commissioner last December.

For convenient reference, I am enclosing a copy of the draft declaration proposed by us.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The Honourable
Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,
Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Karanchi.

There was further exchange of letters without any results, the arguments on either side being repetitive.

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