

Working of United Arab Emirates As A Federation : A Systems Analysis

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY



BHARATHI N.


CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI
1 9 8 9

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Mehrauli Road,
New Delhi-110067

5 January 1989

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
"WORKING OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AS A FEDERATION:
A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS", submitted by Bharathi. N. in
fulfilment of six credits out of total requirement
of twenty-four credits for the Degree of Master
of Philosophy (M.Phil) of the University, is her
original work according to the best of my knowledge
and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


(Dr. P.C. Jain)
Supervisor

TO MY BAPU JI
LAXMAN SINGH CHACHA JI
&
LOKESH BHAI SAHIB

WORKING OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
AS A FEDERATION :
A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

C O N T E N T S

Page No.

	PREFACE	i - iii
CHAPTERS		
I	INTRODUCTION	1 - 32
II	EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERATION	33 - 66
III	DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERATION	67 - 102
IV	INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERATION	103 - 133
V	CONCLUSIONS	134 - 139
	SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	140 - 145

PREFACE

PREFACE

Britain's 1968 decision to terminate its official colonial presence east of Suez as of 1971 prompted the small emirates on the coast of Oman in the oil-rich Arabian-Persian Gulf to start to search for a viable political structure that would enable them to cope with the challenges posed by the postcolonial era. Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quiwan, and Fujairah established the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a federal entity on December 2, 1971 after three years of genuine and arduous negotiations. The seventh emirate Ras al Khaimah joined the federation two months later.

This study is an attempt to analyse the working of United Arab Emirates as a federation from a systems analysis perspective. It is argued that the UAE as a federal system has been able to withstand the stresses put on it by the environment not only during its evolutionary stage but also in its persistence. Systems analysis gives a more scientific analysis of political and social systems which earlier

(ii)

traditional approaches were not capable of doing.

The introductory chapter deals with the conceptual framework of systems analyses as propounded by David Easton. In the second Chapter the evolution of the federal structure has been dealt in the context of the British withdrawal from the gulf, threats of encroachment from the neighbouring countries need for a viable political unit etc. The domestic environment and the functioning of the federation in terms of the 'demand' and 'supports' entering the system, the 'outputs' obtained and 'feed backs' gained by the system has been analysed in the third chapter. The fourth one examines the demand and support stresses arising from the international environment and their impact on the functioning of the federation of the UAE. The last chapter summarizes the major findings of the dissertation and the future trends of the functioning of the federation has been assessed empirically.

In consideration of the relatively short time since the federation came into being, conclusions

(iii)

reached in this study may be tentative. Time and further research are needed in order to attest their final validity. This is only an humble beginning. This work is mainly based on secondary sources i.e. newspapers journals and books.

I express my sincere gratitude to my guide Dr. P.C. Jain, who supervised this work with great zeal and interest. I am also thankful to Professor K.R. Singh Professor M. Sadik and Professor Abidi for their kind and worthy advices. I am grateful to my friends who rendered me substantial assistance in completing my dissertation. I also thank the various members of the staff of the libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Council of World Affairs and other libraries in Delhi.

Finally, I acknowledge the responsibility for all errors and omission, if any.

January, 1989


BHARATHI N.

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to analyse the working of United Arab Emirates as a federation from a systems analysis perspective. Systems analysis provides a more scientific analysis of political and social systems which the earlier traditional approaches were not capable of doing. It is argued that the federation (as a political system) has been able to withstand various constraints both internal and external not only during its evolutionary stage but also in its functioning for nearly two decades. As such we would attempt to show that the federation has been successful in adopting itself to the changed circumstances which were brought about by the rapid socio-economic developments accruing to oil wealth on the one hand and the revival of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran on the other. Additionally, superpower rivalry was also intensified in the area which threatened the littoral states in the Gulf.

In the process of analysing the functioning of the federation, my emphasis would also be on the development of the organisational framework for the smooth functioning of the federation. As in all other federations in the world, in the UAE also there

is a tendency of the centre becoming more stronger vis-a-vis the member emirates. Herein this study would deal with this question as to how far it is true in the case of the UAE and whether there is any scope of the federal units finally mearging to form a unitary system.

I Literature Survey:

The internal characteristics of the Gulf states, their history, economic and social patterns have only recently become of academic interest to Indian scholars. The reasons for this are two-fold: firstly, none of the shaykhdoms have been large enough to support an extensive vernacular literature on the history, politics, sociology, Islamic sciences or belle lettres. Only the Sultanate of Oman has had a strong literary tradition but one which only recently has become accessible to scholars. Faced with paucity of sources, the scholars have no option left but to turn to richer and easier fields to explore. Secondly, even the theme of the impact of modernity on traditional societies, which has dominated much of the Western academic writings on the Third World, is scarcely relevant to the Gulf societies before

the late 1960's.

The Western writings on the lower Gulf countries have been scarce. It may be due to this fact that these countries attracted only a small number of Westerners as permanent or temporary residents. None of the Gulf states was ever a colony or even officially a protectorate of imperial powers. Also, very few Westerners had the cause to reside there for administrative purposes. Exclusive treaties and small populations prevented the need for large naval or military contingents. Until the oil was discovered in large quantities in the early sixties, few outsiders were attracted to this area. The harsh climatic conditions and lack of a rich historical past with lavish monuments made the place generally unattractive to outsiders.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the Gulf has inspired few scholars or academicians to put pen to paper. However, whatever has been written since Captain Taylor's report of 1818¹, imperial

1 Arabian Gulf Intelligence (Oleander, Cambridge, 1983) Reprint of selection from the Record of the Bombay Government, new series, no. XXIV: Historical and other Information connected with the Province of Oman, Muscat, Bahrain and other places in the Persian Gulf, Compiled and ed. by. R.H. Thomas, (Bombay Education Society Press, Bombay 1856).

factors dominated the writings on the area for more than a century. Thus the British account of this area, even though quite rich in valuable data on trade, religion, customs and intertribal relations, and historical and topographical information, is said to have the disadvantage of always and exclusively representing the imperial point of view. They have been criticised by J.B. Kelly and others as being inaccurate and deficient.²

J.B. Kelly's books are the first major academic works done on the Gulf.³ These works show Kelly's scholarship and his ability to clarify complex issues of international diplomacy. Kelly bases himself mainly on British archival documents and provides enormous amount of factual details. But his third book on the Gulf, however, does not disguise his disgust at the British withdrawal of troops from the Gulf in 1971 and his distaste for the states which subsequently obtained independence.⁴

2 J.B. Kelly, British and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1881, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968). p.860.

3 J.B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (Faber, London, 1964). British and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968).

4 Arabia, the Gulf and the West (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1980).

B.C. Busch⁵ is the first American scholar to have written on the Gulf. Despite a considerable use of British archives, Busch's emphasis on the area is different from Kelly's. Instead of seeing it as merely an unruly area for Britain to pacify and administer, he focuses on the Gulf as an area of international rivalry. Apart from the opening chapter, in the rest of the book the Gulf states play the role of back drops to the imperial players, that is the French Ottoman, German and Russian challenges to British supremacy in the area. Thus the book is one sided.

R.M. Burrell's⁶ brief monograph is significant in many ways. It is the first book by a political scientist on the Gulf to discuss its security problems and is also first to have made predictions as to the future course of events there. The book surveys the economic and political situation in the Gulf States concentrating on aspects likely to bring instability to the region.

5 B.C. Busch, Britian & the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967).

6 R.M. Burrell, The Persian Gulf (Liberary Press, New York 1971).

J.D. Anthony⁷ was the first to examine the Gulf states on the basis of class and to study the Shaykhdoms as independent states. Working in terms of elites, bourgeoisie, and the political dynamics, the author examines the structure of government, the conflict between ethnic elements, and foreign affairs. Although constantly stressing the transition from protectorate to independent state, Anthony does not really analyse major changes in the social fabric, like the impact of urbanisation on a basically bedouin people, or the development of the economy.

David Long's⁸ book devoted much space to economic and political organisation and to foreign policy formulation. Although, a useful handbook full of facts and figures, the author does not appear to have a deep understanding of the region.

John Bulloch's⁹ book is a work of serious journalism. Although there are few facts and figures

7 John Duke Anthony, The Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics and Petroleum (Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C. 1975).

8 David Long, The Persian Gulf: An Introduction to People, Politics and Economics, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976).

9 John Bulloch, The Gulf: A portrait of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE. (London: Century Publishing, 1984).

and a lack of organisation, the author has a sound grasp of Arab society, Islamic religion and Middle Eastern history.

Malcolm. C. Peck's The United Arab Emirates : A Venture in Unity (1986) is the latest arrival and gives an overview of UAE with an extensive geographic and demographic description of the country. The author examines UAE's historical legacy, the socio-cultural values of the people, economic development and prospects, its domestic, regional and international affairs. But this work too is only informative and does not seek to analyse the working of the political system of the United Arab Emirates.

However, a very valuable study on the federation of UAE has been done by the Mohammed Khalifa¹⁰. This is the first comprehensive book on the UAE. It discusses the background, emergence and development of the UAE as an integrative venture. Dr. Khalifa asserts that the UAE came into existence due to the efforts of the pertinent political elites of the Trucial Shakydoms. They perceived that the emirates

10 A.M. Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates : Unity in Fragmentation, (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

as individual entities were unable to assume the responsibilities of statehood in a highly complex world, weakened as they were by the dependence on a foreign power for nearly a century. He is very much influenced by the western writing on the area and concludes that UAE as a federation can persist as long as major regional powers judge such an union to be in their respective national interests, that is to say, atleast not incompatible to their national interests.

We have already seen that the previous studies on the Gulf states generally deal with the historical and socio-cultural aspects. Such studies on the UAE are even less in numbers. There have been no analytical studies of the political systems of the UAE as well as other countries. Therefore, in the present study an humble attempt has been made to analyse the working of the federation of United Arab Emirates from the systems analysis perspective.

II Conceptual framework of Systems Analysis:

Over the past three decades or so, the study of the discipline of political science has tended to move towards formal analysis and methodology in

the hope of finding some framework, theory, paradigm or whatever it may be called that would enable scholars of political science to prove the phenomena of particular nation states individually. It also enabled the scholars to undertake meaningful comparative studies on a more systematic basis. In this atmosphere of retrenchment the concept of 'system', 'political system' or 'international system' has arrived almost as a panacea. These concepts helped the area researchers in meeting the need of having sharp analytical tools.

Systems Analysis is a new recent approach in Political Science. It emerged as a tool of analysis only after the Second World War as a part of the post-behavioural revolution (or movement) that swept the United States of America. It is primarily due to the contribution of American scholars especially David Easton, Almond and Mitchell.

Systems Analysis was first developed by biologists, physical theorists and engineers before it could attract the attention of the political scientists. As early as 1932, Cannon developed the concept of 'homoeostasis', which is a vital property of the biological system. Bertalanffy, the famous

biologist, developed the general systems analysis. The political scientists were directly influenced by sociologists like Talcott Parsons, Homans, Roethlisberger, and Dickson. They have also been influenced by public administration scholars like Chester I. Bernard and Herbert A. Simon.

What is distinctive about the systems perspective is not the use of the term 'system', but the way in which it is used. Without ignoring the niceties of the intellectual historiography, it seems clear that only in the past few decades has there been a rigorous attempt to conceptualise not only the state/nation as a system but also the global society. Thus attempts have been made to work out, in appropriately coherent theoretical terms, the implications of this conceptualisation.

Systems analysis owes much to the traditional concepts of equilibrium, and integration which are widely employed in the legal, philosophical and sociological studies. In the case of systems theory, however, the differences from traditional concepts and theories are rather more significant than the continuities. The systems perspective is interdisci-

plinary; its principal inspiration comes from biological or cybernetic analogies rather than (as in power theory) from mechanistic ones; and it combines a technique of analysis with a set of theoretical propositions.

Systems analysis is merely the more formalised version of clear thinking about complicated problems which education teaches us to use daily. We divide a large problem into sections, concentrate our attention separately and singly on each section in turn or on a group of sections, and as we explain each part to ourselves, rebuild the whole piece by piece in order to reconstruct the phenomenon mentally in a form in which we feel we can understand it. If initially the problem cannot fully be understood, we can still achieve some understanding either by "black-boxing" for the time being the most difficult sections, or by exploring one coherent aspect of the whole, or say by choosing to think of the problem only on one "level", in the full awareness that other levels exist and that some of these might ultimately be more revealing. In this perspective, the "final truth" or total knowledge of a problem may not even

be fully attainable. But that does not matter since one specifies the type of enquiry (level, number of subsystems, areas to be black-boxed) in terms of some particular purpose. "An ordinary car driver knows quite a lot about the behaviour of an automobile, but for his purpose it does not matter if the engine is to him an incomprehensive "black-Box". For a mechanic on the other hand, the engine has to be an operationally explained system even if the principles of physics on which it is in turn based are for him a "black-box". Designers of engines, however, need to know some physics and so on".¹¹

The systems theory derived from the general systems theory has as its building blocks, the various concepts such as political system, in-put, feed-back, environment, etc. When this systems theory is applied to a specific situation, it becomes systems analysis. Systems analysis is thus, system theory in action in a specific setting.

11 Charles A. Mc Clelland, Theory and the International System. (New York : Collier Macmillan, 1966) p. 15. He gives perhaps the clearest of the many expositions of systems analysis.

In systems analysis the key term is 'system'. A system means "complex whole, set of connected things or parts, organised body of material or immaterial things...."¹² A system is thus an organised whole. This is the central feature of a system. Ludwig Bertalanffy refers to it when he writes, "Every organism represents a system by which term we mean a complex of elements in mutual interaction"¹³. A system is thus a whole consisting of parts or elements which have some characteristic relationship with one another and which interact with one another. Implicit in the foregoing are three properties of a system. First, a system, as already explained, is a set of interactions taking place within itself. What this means is that a change in one part generates changes elsewhere, and the whole system gets subjected to the impact. Secondly, these inter-related parts or elements have a boundary set upon them. The very concept of a system implies that it has a boundary, it ends at some point from where other systems or subsystems

12 Concise Oxford Dictionary, (Bombay : Oxford University Press, 1985) p.1085.

13 Bertalanffy, L., Problems of Life (New York London, 1952) p.17.

begin. But these other systems are included in environment; and it is within an environment that a system operates. This constitutes the third property of a system. A system is said to exist in a state of equilibrium, which means that it has a tendency to maintain itself through various processes whenever it meets with some disturbance. Kaplan says, "A brief and nontechnical description of the objective of systems analysis would include: the study of a set of inter-related variables, as distinguished from the environment of the set, and of the ways, in which this set is maintained under the impact of environmental disturbances".¹⁴

Systems analysis is an approach which considers politics as a set of interactions which takes place within an environment, but the system is analytically distinct from the latter (ie, environment). It is a particular method of describing and analysing political behaviour, and while doing so it has evolved a number of concepts like system, sub-system, boundary,

14 Kaplan, Morton A, 'Systems Theory', in Charlesworth, James C. (ed.). Contemporary Political Analysis, (New York, The Free Press, 1967, p.150

environment, input, output, conversion process, feedback, etc. These concepts would be explained later. Systems analysis is thus an approach to the study of political structures, institutions and processes.

III David Easton and the System Analysis:

David Easton's set of propositions derived from general systems thinking for the use of political scientists is useful for our study. A brief review here of his theory will serve to introduce some of his more important concepts of systems analysis. It would illustrate the ways in which the use of these concepts would enable this study to be made both theoretically coherent and systematic. First we would deal with what 'system' is, what it consists of, and then step by step develop the whole approach.

For Easton, the political system is the basic unit of analysis.¹⁵ In any society it is through a political system that binding or authoritative

15 David Easton, The Political System, (N.Y: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).
A Framework of Political Analysis, (N.J: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1965)
A systems Analysis of Political Life (N.Y: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1965).

allocations are made and implemented.¹⁶

According to Easton, all political systems are both open and adaptive systems. Easton aims at the study of nature of exchanges and transactions that occur between a political system and its environment. The political system is constantly receiving from other systems, to which it exposes a stream of events and influences that shapes the conditions under which its members act. Political systems accumulate large repertoires of mechanisms, by which they try to cope with their environment and respond to disturbances, thereby, to regulate their own behaviour and adapt their internal structures and even basic goals.

According to Easton, a system need not react to disturbances just by oscillating in the neighbourhood of a prior point of equilibrium or by shifting to a new one. It may cope with the disturbances by seeking to change its environment so that the exchanges between its environment and itself are no longer

stressful. It may seek to insulate itself against any further influences from the environment. The members of the system may even fundamentally transform their own relationships and modify their own goals and practices so as to improve their chance of handling the inputs from the environment. In these and other ways, a system has the capacity of creative and constructive regulation of disturbance.¹⁷

A political scientist aims at understanding the processing and converting of a variety of influences flowing from the environment into the political system. We concentrate on the way in which systems would respond to these influences. These fundamental functions, without which no systems could endure, together with the typical notes of response through which systems manage to sustain them, are called 'the life processes of political systems.'

Despite criticisms of the equilibrium approach,¹⁸

17 David Easton, "Systems Analysis: An example of functionalism", in James A. Gould & V.V. Thursby, ed., Contemporary Political Thought: (New York, Holt, and Winston, Inc., 1969) p.20.

18 Easton, A Framework of Political Analysis. (cited opp.) pp.123-130.

Easton gives systemic persistence the central place in his analysis. He emphasises the sources of stress along with modes of regulating stress. These are the essential variables without which a political system could not exist. They define the critical range within which the variables can fluctuate. If the essential variables were pushed beyond the critical range, one can conclude that the system is under stress. In this way the researcher ought to concentrate on the developments that would threaten to drive the essential variables of a political system beyond the "critical range". Also one can study the various responses to these developments.

Political system receives demands and supports from the society in the form of inputs through a conversion process within the system. Once converted the inputs assume the form of outputs. The outputs act in the environment. The effect and consequences of the outcomes of the outputs in the environment are put back into the political system as inputs. This entire process gives a feed-back to the system. The system behaves according to the feed-back it receives, which in turn affects the conversion of the new round of inputs. Thus a feed-back loop is

formed. Any political system, therefore, is a complex cyclical operation with a dynamism of its own.

According to Easton inputs include both demands and supports which are received by the system from the society. A demand is an expression of opinion: whether an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so.¹⁹ A demand involves a four fold process or growth. To begin with it is a mass of conscious but undifferentiated wants then it grows into the articulation of recognizable demands. Later it develops into the formulations of specific issues. Finally, it reaches the output stage of binding decisions.

Besides the concept of demands, which are either excessive or few in quantity, time factor is important in the sense that a political system can handle a wide range of demands in course of time. But on a short range, the over-load problem becomes acute and the quantitative level of current demands demands also shoot high.

19 Ibid, p. 38.

A political system has regulatory mechanism of its own. Through this it can either push the demands or allow them to creep within its boundaries. This is accomplished through channels and processes which can retard both its velocity and volume. Easton enumerates four types of regulatory mechanisms in a political system. First is a set of gate-keeping at the boundary of the political system. It is designed to regulate flow of wants from entering the system and becoming articulated demands. Secondly, there are certain cultural mechanisms and socio-cultural norms, which are in the nature of influential criteria of appropriation or the articulation of political demands. Thirdly, the political system can develop a network of communication channels. Demands are persuaded or pressurised to flow through these channels extensively so as to get considerably diluted in the process. Finally, the political system consists of a number of reduction processes by which demands are forced to convert themselves into specific issues. Without them the demands cannot be properly fed into the conversion process.

Along with demands there are also 'supports'. A political system receives considerable 'supports'

from the environment. Without this support, a political system cannot survive. The support may be overt, in the form of clearly and manifestly supportive actions. It may also be covert in the form of supportive attitudes and sentiments.

According to Easton, the system persistence depends upon the maintenance of a minimal level of attachment for each of the three identified political objects (political authority, political community and political regime). When the inputs of support falls below this minimal level the persistence of any kind of system is endangered.²⁰



TH-2719

Support can be to a specified political object or it can be an all out support to a political community. Members of a political system are seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour. This implies the existence of the regime, certain basic values, political structures and norms. The political authorities include those in control of power at any given time. If the substantial majority of the members of the political system remain dissatis-

20 Ibid, pp. 157-167.

DISS

321.02095357

B4694 Wo



TH2719

fied for long with the achievements of the political system in terms of their wants and demands, they can challenge the system by withdrawing from the political system their partial or complete support.

The political system can accommodate the support-stress in several ways. The change of its structural elements, representational system, party system, etc. are some of the means of achieving this end. The lack of specified support in a political system can be counter-balanced by generating diffuse support. It creates a sense of legitimacy and feeling that the persistence of the political system promote some common public interests.

Different political systems follow different imperatives for creating and promoting a sense of community among its members. The efficacy of the political system consists in what it accomplishes for society. Easton develops the concept of out-put in this context. The 'out-puts' of a political system are the decisions and actions of the authorities. They help in organising the consequences flowing from the behaviour of the members of the system from its environment. According to Easton, out-put only

help to influence events in the broader society of which the system is a part, but in doing so, they help to determine each succeeding round of in-puts that finds its way in to the political system. This process is termed as feedback loop. It is an important type of response to cope with stress in a political system.

The feed-back is a dynamic process. Information about the performance of the system is communicated back to it in such a way as to influence the behaviour of the system. This is, therefore, a cyclic process known as flow-model of the political system. Here the political processes involve a continuous and interlinked flow of behaviour. In short, out-puts are not the terminal points. In fact, they are feed back into the system and thereby shape its subsequent behaviour.

Not that David Easton's Systems analysis is perfect in every respect. It undermines the patterns of control, power and influence. The phenomena of decline, disruption and break-down in political system, or the analysis of mass political phenomena are also

ignored.²¹ His concept of system persistence and maintenance has been widely criticized, to which he has answered that "In systems analysis, the idea of persistence is only a theoretical tool and explicitly not a value."²²

We have seen that System analysis as Easton has conceived it is built upon the following premises with 'system' as a primary axis.

System

It is useful to view political life as a 'system of behaviour'.

Environment

A system is distinguishable from the environment in which it exists and is open to its influences. The environment also consists of other systems such as physical system, psychological system, social system, economic system etc.

21 S.P. Verma, Modern Political Theory (Delhi; Vikas Publishing House, 1975) p.202

22 Easton, "System Analysis and its Classical Critics," Political Science Review, 1973, Vol. 3, p. 282.

Responses

Variations in the structures and processes within a system can be usefully interpreted as the efforts by members of a system to regulate or cope with stresses. Stresses flow from the environment as well as from the political system itself.

Feed-back

The capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence and nature of the information and other influences that are returned to its actors and decision makers.²³

Finally, political system is an open system in that it has to cope with the problems generated by its exposure to influences from other systems in the environment. In order to persist through time, a political system has to obtain adequate feed-back about its past performances. The feedback thus received helps the political system to regulate its future behaviour. Regulation is simply adaptation

23 Easton : A framework of Political Analysis.
(New York: 1956) pp. 24-26.

to the ever changing setting in the light of fixed goals. A political system in the course of time, if the need arises, can also modify its old goals to transform them entirely. Thus sometimes in order to persist, it may be necessary for the political system to have the capacity to transform its own internal structures and processes.

Thus systems analysis seeks to unravel the processes through which a political system is able to cope with the various stresses imposed upon it. The aim of this analysis is to enable the investigator to understand fully the way in which the political system in a particular society manages to persist in the face of stresses that might have been expected to lead to its destruction.

IV Operationalization of Systems Analysis in the case of UAE:


This study is an humble attempt at analysing the functioning of United Arab Emirates as a federation. Our aim would be to investigate the manner in which the political system of United Arab Emirates has managed to persist, in spite of stresses flowing

from its domestic as well as international environment. As said earlier, I would argue that as the federation has been successful in persisting through the turbulent periods (cold war of the '70s and the Iran-Iraq war in the Gulf, etc.) due to the mutual efforts of the federation units, that is due to support the federal polity got from its internal environment as well international environment, which has helped it to face the input-overload that had once threatened the very survival of the federation of UAE.

The conceptual schema of the federal political system of the UAE is depicted in the diagram (in page no. 28). In terms of the UAE's functioning, 'structures' here refers to three major federal political bodies - the Supreme Federal Council (SFC), the council of ministers, and the Federal National Council (FNC). The SFC comprises of the rulers of the seven emirates. The council of ministers include all the heads of the federal departments and is presided over by a Prime Minister. The FNC is an advisory body whose members are appointed by the rulers. The judicial branch of the federal government is represented by a Supreme Court and several courts of First Instance.

ENVIRONMENT
DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL

Political System of UAE



DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

To run the government there is a federal civil service, based mainly in Abu Dhabi.

The political culture of a nation refers to the basic value orientations of its people towards the political system. As such it conditions and shapes the in-puts in a political system. Arab identity and Islam influence and shape the norms, values and attitudes of the people of UAE. These norms, values and attitudes of the people determine the political culture of the system. The tribal past of the Trucial States also play an important part in shaping the political culture of the UAE.

The environmental factor can be considered in terms of its domestic and international components. The domestic environment includes the political systems of the seven emirates and other systems, i.e. economic system, cultural system, etc. The international environment comprises the neighbouring nation states as well as the super powers. Thus the in-puts - demands and supports - arise from both the domestic and international environment.

The 'out-puts' in the case of UAE would be the authoritative decision taken by its political

system. The out-puts would effect the environment both domestic and international.

The 'feedback' is supposed to be operative in a political system through mass media, public opinion, etc. In the case of UAE the nature and functioning of the feedback mechanisms is an empirical question.

V A Methodological Note:

This dissertation is as much a methodological exercise in the application of systems analysis as a substantive analysis of the functioning of a federal political system. The dissertation will be based on secondary sources - periodicals, books, newspapers, government reports, etc. It must be pointed out here that a major limitation of this study is the unavailability of adequate material on such a subject. The paucity of academic works on the subject has already been noted earlier. Other secondary sources such as newspapers are no better. The newspapers in India give very limited coverage to the news from the UAE. Even the three English dailies from the UAE - The Emirate News, Khaleej Times and The Gulf News, do

not give enough and accurate coverage to the political news from the UAE. Moreover, these newspapers being government owned, provide only official version of the news. The translated works from Arabic to English too are rarely available. In spite of these limitations we have tried to do our best in terms of collecting the material as well as analysing it objectively.

Having already discussed the aims and objectives as well as the proposed conceptual framework of this study in this chapter, the rest of the dissertation is organized as follows :

The second chapter deals with the evolution of the federation. This is done in terms of such factors as the creation of political vacuum due to the British withdrawal, threats of encroachment from the neighbouring countries, need for a viable political system, etc.

The third chapter analyses the functioning of the federation of the UAE in terms of the 'domestic environment' i.e., the demands made and stresses put on the political system, the out-puts obtained and feed-back gained and rechannelized as demands and supports, etc.

'International environment and the functioning of the federation' is the theme of the fourth chapter. The demand and support stresses arising from the international environment (ie, the regional and global) have been studied and the working of the federation has been analysed accordingly.

The concluding chapter summerizes the major findings of this dissertation. Also an attempt has been made to asses the future trends of the functioning of the federation. Theoretically, the efficacy of the systems analysis approach in the third world situation is also assessed.

Chapter II
EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERATION

CHAPTER - II

EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERATION

The very concept of a federation was not alien to the lower gulf tribal shaikhdoms. In the early part of the nineteenth century the Quasimi federation was consolidated along the Arab Gulf Coast, north and east of Dubai and into the Musaudam Peninsula. The Quasimi ships dominated the waters of the lower gulf and came increasingly into hostile contact with the British merchant and navy ships. The Quasimi federation also challenged Oman's maritime supremacy and the expansion of Saudi political and religious influence into the south east quadrant of the Arabian Peninsula.¹

But these federations did not have the modern structures for their functioning, rather they were

1 Muhammad M. Abdullah, United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 90-95. The British expedition of 1819 weakened this tribal federation. Moreover the Bani Yas tribal Federation too was a comparatively strong federation. It comprised of nearly 20 tribes. By the seventeenth century this federation occupied the most of what is now Abu Dhabi with Liwa Oasis as their centre.

and the political community as a whole. Through years of genuine and arduous negotiations, they come together to put up a united front because individually they know they cannot cope with the challenges put forward by the environment. Thus the persistence and maintenance of the system is assured in the unstable environment.

A factor common with other British Colonies which later formed a federation and that of the United Arab Emirates is that the British had the legitimate political authority (who controlled the decision making and implementing process) to perform the output functions, of the system.²

The British presence in the Arabian Gulf was the outcome of the private mercantile interests

2 The assertion that Britain had maintained a total aloofness vis-a-vis matters of domestic concern during the earlier period may be misleading. British authorities had often made sure that domestic behaviour on the part of a local ruler was not incompatible with British interests. Hence, the gunboat diplomacy was a familiar feature in Gulf waters and on its shores. Those who see 'foreign affairs only' aspect of British control seem to have in mind the absence of a colonial government in the Gulf and the fact that the British Colonial office at no time took charge of the Emirates. See for details Zahlan, The Origin of United Arab Emirates, 1978, pp. 55-71.

different from modern federations. In this chapter we will trace the evolution of the modern federal political structures in the United Arab Emirates. To do so we would deal with the history of British occupation in this area very briefly especially in terms of the disturbances in the international environment of the Trucial states in the last phase of the British Colonialism. The role of British as the protector will be discussed from the point of view of the structures they developed in the Trucial states. How these structures enabled the political system of the Trucial states to cope with the different types of stresses coming from their domestic and international environment, would be discussed.

The creation of a political vacuum in the area, was due to the sudden decision of British withdrawal from the Gulf by 1971, the threats of encroachment from the neighbouring political systems (regional international environment) and the need for a viable political system would also be highlighted.

No federation can emerge spontaneously. There is always in the background antecedent efforts at co-operation by the political authorities, regimes

(demands) since the opening decades of the seventeenth century. The consolidation of British hegemony over India late in the eighteenth century resulted in the rise of the strategic value of the sea approaches leading to the newly established empire in the East. Among such routes was the Gulf.

The piracy on this route done by the littoral shaikhdoms came as a direct threat to the British mercantile interests. Thus the demand for a safe passage through the Gulf made the British enter into a number of treaties and engagements with the local shaikhs, starting with the General Treaty of 1820 and ending with the Exclusive Agreement for oil prospecting and exploration a century later (whose acceptance by local shaikhs had not always been voluntary).³ The British were thus able to establish legally a monopoly of control in the area for one and a half century, to the disappointment of the other competing powers like the Germans, Russians and the French.⁴

3 For complete details of the British Treaty relations with the tribal shaikhdoms see H.M. Albaharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A study of their Treaty Relations and their International Problems (N.Y: Oceana Publications, 1968).

4 M.M. Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London : Croom Helm, 1975), pp. 22-71.

The British kept their involvement in the domestic affairs, at least officially, to a minimum and were concerned with the maintenance of the status quo. The outcome of the maintenance of such a status quo had cases of protracted tribal conflicts on land and on the sea.⁵

With the fall of British Empire in India in 1947, the strategic importance of the Gulf route to the British decreased. But two other developments, one in the international environment and the other in the domestic environment of the Trucial states were incentives enough for an extended and consolidated British presence in the area despite the rising fervor of Arab nationalism. In the international environment it was the onset of the cold war, and the perception of a communist challenge to the western interests in the Gulf. In the domestic environment it was the discovery of huge petroleum resources and the equally

5 Behind these persisting skirmishes were, inter alia, tribal rivalries, family feuds, and later, territorial disputes. At the base of all this conflict, in the words of one analyst, a genuine effort "to rise above a bare subsistence level of life." See Robert G. Landen "The Modernization of the Persian Gulf," in T.C. Young (ed.) Middle East Focus: The Persian Gulf (Princeton N.J. Princeton University, 1968), p.3.

huge investment by the British and the other western nations. These environmental changes created a need for a greater degree of involvement in the domestic affairs of the Trucial states, particularly in the administrative sphere. These administrative innovations can be looked at as the prelude to the ensuing federation of the Trucial states when the British declared in 1968 its intention to withdraw from east of Suez in 1971.⁶ Hence a brief discussion of such developments is warranted.

I **PROTOTYPE OF THE FEDERATION: ADMINISTRATIVE VENTURES IN CO-OPERATION**

Inter-shaykhdom co-operation was the direct outcome of the shift in the British Gulf Policy from

6 The British had reinforced their military units in Bahrain and Sharigah following their withdrawal from Aden in 1967 to compensate for the strategic loss of the latter. This move may have contributed to the bewilderment of local rulers who were duly taken by surprise as a result of the British announcement. On the circumstances surrounding that announcement see, The Gulf: Implications of British withdrawal (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, SRS: No.8, 1969), Chapter 5 and 6; Neville Brown, 'Britain and the Gulf-The Wisdom of Withdrawal Reconsidered', New Middle East No.24 (Sep 1970); pp 14-21; David Holden "The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj, "Foreign Affairs 49, No.4(1971) pp. 721-735; Jan Nasmyth, "If the British Leaves the Gulf...", World Today 28, No:2 (Feb 1972)pp. 75-81 and D.C. Watt, "The Decision to withdraw from the Gulf,"Political Quarterly 39, No.3 (July-Sept 1968), pp 310-321.

an exclusive emphasis on the conduct of the Trucial States foreign and defence relations to greater involvement in the domestic politics of the tribal Shaykhdoms. Despite a long history of tribal rivalry⁷ two important institutions emerged in the early 1950s under British initiative and supervision, namely Trucial States Council and Trucial Oman Levies. These were the first structural changes that the tribal shaykhdoms (the tribal political systems) had to undergo in order to process the new kind of input of demand for proper socio-economic development due to the changed economic conditions (affluence of oil).

(a) The Trucial States Council (TSC):

The major administrative venture towards the formation of a federation of seven emirates was the establishment of Trucial States Council (TSC) in 1952 under colonial guidance. The British political agent presided over the Council which was composed of the rulers of the seven Trucial States. It was

⁷ The latest wars in the long chain of violence, which the British tried unsuccessfully to mediate, were those between Dubai and Sharjah in 1940 and Abu Dhabi during 1945-48.

a consultative body, and not a decision making authority that could convert demands of the fast changing political systems of the Trucial States. Nevertheless, it was the only colonial institutional structure which fostered the idea of co-operation, allowing the political authorities to come out of their tribal niche to meet his counterpart on an equal basis.

The council met twice in a year and the common issues discussed were economic development; abolition of slavery; traffic regulations; citizenship and jurisdictional matters; travel documents; locust control; education and public health and the administration of these programmes by the regional states, etc. Thus in 1958, the first step was taken towards the formation of specialized structures which could process the various kinds of wants i.e., committee for agriculture, education and public health etc. In the mid-60s the chairmanship of the council was transferred to an elected ruler⁸ from the British political agent. This was followed by the establishment of Development

8 The first elected chairman was Sagr bin Muhammad al-Gasimi ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah from May 1966 to 1968 followed by Khalid bin Muhammed, ruler of Sharjah.

office⁹ and Development Fund¹⁰ which affected certain infrastructural facilities in the area.

Here it is important to mention a few changes brought about by the Development Office of the Trucial States Council. Long term influence on the environment of the coming federation as a whole, the practical achievements of the Development Office, may be less significant than the seed which were shown in the minds of the coming generation¹¹, when they

9 By 1972, Development Office had undertaken many projects like, road construction, telecommunication development, technical education, public health, housing, urban infrastructure etc.

10 Development Fund dealt with issues of economic development and welfare. For this purpose the British granted £1000000. Qatar contribution for the same was £250,000 and Bahrain contributed £40,000. In 1970, Abu Dhabi contributed £ 7 million i.e. 80% of Development Funds revenues. M.T. Sadik and W.P. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath & Co. 1972). pp. 188-89.

11 On the manifestations of a craving for modern education which beset many families on the Trucial Coast particularly in Sharjah, Dubai and Ra's al-Khaimah, see A.M. Morsy, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (1978), pp. 143-152.

were made aware by their Arab teachers of the cohesion of the Arab culture and of the trends in Arab nationalism. Medical and educational facilities were improved.¹² The Trucial States Council gave priority to the improvement of communication.¹³

(b) The Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS):

TOS (initially known as Trucial Oman Levies), a land force, was the outcome of the British decision to give more weight to decisions taken by the political agent in internal matters especially concerning protection of oil survey parties and oil field and intra and interstate peace and security.¹⁴ With its headquarters in Sharjah, TOS had 1,700 well trained scouts by the time it was turned over to the federal authorities in early 1972, providing the cornerstone for a union

12 Kuwait & Saudi Arabia opened offices in Dubai in 1963, 1968 respectively through which generous assistance was allotted. D. Hawley, Trucial States pp. 227ff.

13 See Fenelon, K.G. The Trucial States - A Brief Economic Survey (Beirut, 2nd edn. 1969) p. 17 and p. 136.

14 K.G. Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey (London: Longman, 1976), p.21.

army (UDF) that subsequently integrated the otherwise disparate defense forces of the member states by mid 1970s.

The Trucial Oman Levies was initially formed to safeguard the oil exploring units from the tribal attacks due to the inter-tribal rivalry. Its duty included the maintenance of peace and good order in any part of Trucial States and provide an escort for the British representatives. The first major encounter of the TOL took place when the border issues concerning parts of the Buraini area and the southern desert of Abu Dhabi became acute. The TOS (then TOL) successfully participated in evicting the Saudi force from the disputed area.¹⁵

The TOS was largely made up of Omanis from the tribes living on the fringes of Oman because the nationals of Trucial states had more job opportunities in the growing oil industry. Despite this the British decision to send the TOS to Oman to assist the Sultan's forces on their assault against the rebelli-

15

F.Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates (London: Croom Helm, 1982) pp.304-305.

ous Sulaiman bin Himyar of the Bani Riyam and the other supporters of the Imam, was successful. The force fought in Oman from November 1957 until January 1959. That was the only time the TOS was required to deal with the stresses emanating from the regional international environment.

To sum up, the establishment of TSC and TOS was the first step towards the formation of a federal political structure for the entire coast of Oman. These structures created communication channel on both administrative and social levels. These structures were further strengthened, despite of the centrifugal tendencies of the emirates, by the support from the regional international environment i.e. from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain (its system of jurisdiction and control) and the UNO (development programmes).

II DEMAND FOR A FEDERATION

The demand for a federation arose not due to the rising tide of nationalism as in the case of India or Malaysia. The British announcement in 1968 of the termination of treaty obligations with the gulf littoral states created the demand for co-operation due to possibility of the breakdown of the

Trucial states system in the wake of various territorial claims¹⁶ from the regional international environment. The support to steer the emergent political structure discussed above towards political stability, maintenance of the status quo in the individual emirate and also the security of the gulf region came both from its domestic¹⁷ and international environment. The feed-back from the international environment about the turbulent background of many small states due to the failure of the federal experiments in central Africa, the caribbean, and South Arabia following the demise of Pax Britannica further helped to create covert support for the formation of a federal political system.

The outputs took the shape of an agreement on Feb 18, 1968 between Shaikh Zayed, ruler of Abu

16 The claim of Iran over Bahrain, Sandi over the Buraimi Oasis, etc see - MEE'S Vol: XIII No.27, 1 May 1970 and No. 32, 1 June 1970.

17 In this connection see the following statement by Shaykh Zayid - "Abu Dhabi's oil and all its resources and potentialities are at the service of all the Amirates". This encouraged the poorer emirates to join the federation for they knew that such words were often followed by generous deeds. See Arab Report and Record (ARR) London issue 21, 1-15 Nov 1968.

Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid, ruler of Dubai, to establish a federation of two emirates encompassing vital areas like defence, foreign affairs, internal security, etc. Article 4 of this agreement extended an invitation to "discuss and participate in this agreement" to the other members of the Trucial States, Qatar and Bahrain.¹⁸

The outcome of the invitation put forward by the federal authorities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi was the signing in of yet another Federation Agreement by nine heads of the Trucial States (alongwith Bahrain and Qatar), "The Union of Arab Emirates" in 1968.

III POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNION OF ARAB EMIRATES

The highest authority of the Union of Arab Emirates was to reside in the Supreme Council (SC) of the nine rulers with a unanimously elected

18

See in ARR, issue 4, 16-29 Feb 1968 and the complete text of the agreement issue 3, 1-15 March 1968. However this Agreement became possible only after the dispute regarding off shore boundary between the two shaikhdoms (Dubai & Abu Dhabi) was settled to Dubai's advantage. Dubai obtained full sovereignty over the whole of the off-shore Fath oil-field.

head. SC was to draft a "complete and permanent" constitution for the Union and was to enact laws regarding foreign and defence affairs, economic & cultural matters and approving of federal budget. The executive authority was to be vested in a Federal Council. The adjudication in the matters on the federal level was to be done by Federal Supreme Court. But in a political culture where patterns of rivalry, underlaid by historical, tribal, dynastic and personality factors still had the upper-hand, a stress over load was created which for once threatened the survival of this emerging federation.

The issue of constitution first came in the form of drafting a constitution. Bahrain and Qatar had their own nominees and wanted them to take up the assignment but this stress was normalized by choosing a third candidate. On the question of the presidency of a temporary federal council Bahrain threatened to with-draw support for Qatar's deputy ruler Shaikh Kalifa Bin Hamad al-Thani.

The other issues which could not be processed and converted initially by the then temporary federal system were the site of the federal capital and the

nature of representation in the Federal Council.

However by 1969 after three meetings the decision was taken on the site of location of the federal capital and representation in the Federal Council along with others. Thus Shaikh Zayed was appointed the first chairman and Shaikh Rashid as his deputy for two years. Abu Dhabi Town was to become the temporary capital. It was decided to have equal representation in the Federal Council (four from each emirates). But the last moment British note to the Shaikhs which urged them to launch the proposed Union soon was seen as unwarranted interference in the council's affair by rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Qatar.¹⁹

Again in Oct 1970 in the two meetings of deputy rulers the provisional constitution was discussed. But here too the issues of contention were the site of the capital, representation in the Federal Council, voting in the Supreme Council and contribution of each emirate to the federal budget.²⁰ As a delegate

19 The rulers suspected the British interference in the affairs and so left the council in the middle of the meeting.

20 Qatar and Bahrain disagreed on all these issues for details see A.M. Khalifa. The United Arab Emirates, 1978 p.32.

had summarized the situation at the last meeting of the council -

".....some rulers have more or less convinced themselves that a federation is unworkable. Others have rounded on the British and complained that they should never have set a dead line.....remainder with minimal bargaining power, appear to be delaying any co-operation until as near the deadline as possible in the hope of stampeding more powerful partners into making maximum last-minute concessions"²¹

Two developments in the international environment had direct bearings on the gulf federation. First, the Iranian territorial claim on Bahrain was settled through UN good offices.²² Second, following the coming of the Conservatives to power in Britain there was a possibility of the British non-withdrawal. But, at last when it was confirmed that the British would withdraw, the federation was seen as the only alternative for survival.

The rift between Bahrain and Qatar could not be patched up. Both of them opted to remain out

21 Ralph Izzard, "The Fight for Federation," Middle East International, (April 1971), pp. 33 - 35.

22 Hooshang Moghtader, "The settlement of the Bahrain Question: A Study in Anglo-Iranian-United Nations Diplomacy", Pakistan Horizon. 26, no.2(1973)..pp 16-29.

of the federation. In July 1971 it was agreed to form a federation of six Trucial states known as United Arab Emirates (UAE)²³. The UAE was declared a sovereign entity on December 2, 1971. This Federation may be looked at as the outcome of three years of negotiations, ensuring some kind of a political system in the Coast of Oman. The Trucial State System was transformed into a federation which could now work on its own without any external interference before we go further a discussion of the political structures of this incipient entity is in order.

IV THE FEDERATION : STRUCTURAL SETTING

(a) Traditional Structural Elements

In the emirates prior to the formation of the federation the basis of political rule were derived essentially from Islamic law and tribal customs, principles such as Shura, majlis and baiah²⁴. These

23 Shaikh Zayed announced publicly to form a federation of any number of states. See A.M. Khalifa. The United Arab Emirates (1979) cited opp.p.34. Ra's al Khaimaf joined the federation later.

24 Shura: Consultation with tribal notables and elders; Majlis: a tribal rulers daily audience through which his accessibility to his subjects is assured. baiah: an approval of and promise of allegiance to an ascending ruler or an heir apparent by those over whom he rules. See, J.E. Peterson, "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia" Middle East Journal, 31, no.3 (summer 1977) pp. 297-312.

were the most salient traits on which the tribal political culture of Arabia was hinged. In a sense some principles and mechanisms of democracy were known and practiced by the people of East Arabia. A brief discussion of these follows.

In this context one can mention the Wali system²⁵ of Trucial Shaykhdoms was decentralised. The Walies who represented the political authority in far flung, scattered areas of the Shaykhdoms, (usually from among Rulers relatives). In the case of Abu Dhabi, the muzakki used to collect the taxes and customs duties. Also there were the mutarziyah (or fidawiyah) who had political authority and were sent on special missions of all kinds. The tribal security set-up comprised the 'askars (who were salaried but untrained armed tribal men); the haras (the guards for the fort)

25

At a time when communication was slow between the scattered settlement of the Shaikhdoms, each Ruler maintained permanent representatives, usually called wali, in the more important population centres of his Shaikhdom. The fact that his representative was in control in that place meant that the Ruler's authority was at least de jure recognised by the population of that remote area and by the neighbouring Shaikhs.

and a camel guard (in the Liwa)²⁶. Generally an educated man from Iran was appointed as the secretary in the Wali system. The 'arif was paid by the community of people who used the aftaj (the underground water channel). A person was appointed to supervise the suq (market). Finally, the qadi was the most important in many respect because he had knowledge of Quran, urf²⁷ and shariah²⁸.

Adapting these traditional patterns of system maintenance to a modern form the provisionial Constitution in its preamble envisions " a complete representative democratic rule" as the systems long-range -objective. Constitution provides for Western model of political structures with legislative, executive and judicial functions, even though in this particular case the balance among the structures performing such functions is less emphasised.

The Provisional Constitution is based on the voluntary acceptance by political authorities

26 Franke Heard-Bey, "Development Anomalies in the Beduin Oases of al-Liwa" Asian Affairs 61 pt. 3 Oct 1974, pp.-272-86.'

27 urf : customary or tribal law.

28 Shariah: Islamic Law.

of the seven member units of the federation. Thus it can be viewed as both an expression of the status quo and a perpetuator of it as far as the traditional authority's adaptation to the changing times and circumstances are considered. It also provides the basis for political action by the federal authorities and the emiral authorities. A brief description of a structural functional aspect of the federation as given in the Constitution is important before we go into the dynamics of the working of the federation.

(b) Federal Constitution and two levels of Political Authority

In the opening the Constitution stipulates that the member emirates shall "exercise sovereignty on their respective territories and territorial waters in all matters that do not fall within the domain of the union in accordance with this Constitution." The Constitution views the federation as "one people" (one nationality) one official language (Arabic), and one official religion (Islam). Abu Dhabi town was agreed upon to be the temporary seat of the federation till a permanent capital for the federation on the Abu Dhabi - Dubai joint border becomes operative

operative (within seven years). On the economic system the Constitution specifies that the member emirates "shall form one single economic and customs unit" with "free movements of capital goods.....only to be restricted by a Federal law."²⁹

The Constitution spells out certain aims for the federal undertaking. There are three sets of aims. the federation has the avowed purpose of realising "a better life, a more solid stability and a higher international status for the emirates..."³⁰ These general goals aim firstly, at the preservation of the federation's independence, sovereignty, security, and stability; the repulsion of an aggression against its member secondly safeguarding the rights and liberties of the people; seeking co-operation among the member states in matters relating to domestic affairs, and the realization of a better life for all citizens of the federation.³¹ The third relates to the ends

29 "The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates": Middle East Journal 26 No. 3 (1972) pp. 307-25, Art.II.

30 Ibid, Preamble of the Provisional Constitution.

31 Ibid, Art.10

towards which the foreign policy is to be geared i.e., the support to Islamic and Arab issues and interests.³²

The UAE Constitution delegates specific powers to the federation leaving the unmentioned ones to the member states. Thus the delegation of authority to the upper layer of the union by the states would enhance the overall position of the federation. In regard to the lower layer of the federal structure, the emirates, the constitution states clearly that all matters not specifically stipulated as falling within federal jurisdiction are to be considered within the domain of the member emirates.³³ But the Constitution also hastens to ascertain its supremacy and the supremacy of the federal law, decree, or decision that may be based on its overall local legislation in case of contravention.³⁴

The federation is responsible for the legislative and executive steps required for a "sound, efficient and cohesive foreign policy".³⁵ The monopoly

32 Ibid, Art. 12

33 Ibid, Arts. 116-122

34 Ibid Art. 151

35 Ibid, Art.12, 47(1), 120(1)

over treaties and international agreements;³⁶ appointment of diplomatic and consular representative and receiving credentials of their counterparts;³⁷ the declaration of war and the protection of the federation's nationals abroad;³⁸ and finally, defining its own territorial waters along with the regulation of navigation on the high sea.³⁹

In the domestic context, the Constitution delegates the federation all legislative and executive functions pertaining to⁴⁰:

- (1) federal armed forces, defence and security of the union
- (2) Security and order in the permanent capital of the union
- (3) affairs of federal employees and the judiciary
- (4) Union finances, taxes, fees, royalties and general loans

36 Ibid, Art. 47 (4)

37 Ibid, Art. 54 (6) (7)

38 Ibid, Art. 140, 8 respectively

39 Ibid, Art. 121

40 Ibid, Art 120; Art. 121

- (5) post, telegraph, telephone and electric services;
- (6) education and public health
- (7) money and currency
- (8) measures and weights
- (9) Construction and maintenance of highways and regulation of traffic on them
- (10) air traffic control
- (11) federal nationality, passports, residence and immigration
- (12) federal property
- (13) Census and statistics connected to federal purposes
- (14) federal information, etc.

Thus the member emirates have sovereignty over their territories and territorial waters, including control of natural wealth and resources within its borders. They could maintain their own armed forces and flags (for local display).⁴¹ On foreign affairs, the emirates could, with SCU's permission, conclude limited agreements of local administrative nature

with neighbouring states and retain membership of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries and or Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.⁴²

This far the emirates look like structural units charged with the execution of federal policy in their respective territories. But actually the emirates have leverage in the federal working through its chief executive in the Supreme Council of the Union.

(c) The Present Federal Structure

There are five major structures on the federal level: the Supreme Council of the Union (SCU), the president and his deputy, the Union's Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council (FNC) and the federal judiciary.⁴³

(i) The Supreme Council of the Union:

The Supreme Council of the Union is the highest authority in UAE; its members are the Rulers of the seven emirates. It holds closed sessions often

42 Ibid, Art. 123

43 Ibid, Art. 45

in the federal Capital. It is vested with rule-making and rule-implementing authority. SCU has "supreme control over the affairs of the Union in general."⁴⁴ Each emirate has one vote in the council, but a majority of five votes is required including the votes of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, to ratify international treaties, agreements, draft laws, declaration of war and the like. In case of procedural issues, simple majority rule applies.

The responsibilities delegated to SCU by the Constitution, makes it autocratic in a collective form. The SCU plans the general policy to pursue the goals and objectives set by the Constitution. It elects among its members, the president and vice-president for a term of five years. It can admit new members to the union.⁴⁵ It ratifies the annual budget and closing account.⁴⁶ It supervises all federal affairs, internal and external. Thus the prime minister

44 Ibid, Art. 47, para 7.

45 The member should be an independent Arab country.

46 Constitution Art. 47

and his cabinet
president and the
used by the em
SCU.

(ii) The Presi

As a
president are e
the SCU members.
the president rep
and international
over its meetin
of its sessions.
of Defence (SC
armed forces,⁴⁸
medals.⁴⁹

The president signs all federal laws,
decisions including treaties and international agree-
ments, declaration of war and martial law. He appoints

47 Ibid, Arts. 47 & 64.

48 Ibid, Art. 141. The title was assigned
in accordance with Federal Law 19(1972).

49 Ibid, Art. 54.

the prime minister, accepts his resignation, terminates him, appoints the president and judges of the Supreme Court.⁵⁰ The president exercises his prerogatives through the Council of Ministers (Cabinet).⁵¹

(iii) Council of Ministers:

The third federal authority the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) consists of a prime minister, deputy prime minister and a number of ministers. Initially twelve ministerial portfolios were specified, the prime minister, his deputy, ministers for foreign affairs, interior, defence, education, public health, public works and agriculture, communication, post, telegraph and telephone, labour and social welfare, information and planning (Art. 58). The prime minister presides over the cabinet meetings, supervises his ministers, along with the co-ordination of work among various ministries and all federal executive departments.

50 The SCU's approval is mandatory in the exercise of the last two functions, as stated in Art. 47, 140, 146, 95, 115.

51 Accordingly he supervises execution of federal laws, decrees and decisions, appoints the senior federal officials (civil & military) except the president and judges of high courts. He appoints the deputy prime minister and cabinet members with the advise of the prime minister. Art. 54, 60, 64-65.

Cabinet deliberations are closed to the public and decisions are taken by majority votes.

The important functions of the cabinet are initiation of federal draft laws, regulation and implementation of federal laws, preparation of the federal budget and the closing account, appointment and termination of civil servants.

The cabinet supervises the execution of federal laws, decisions, Supreme Court decisions, international treaties, etc. The federal organ acts as the receiver of feed-back from the system and communicating it to the president, thus at the beginning of each fiscal year it has to submit "to the President a detailed report of internal achievements, union's relations with other states and international organizations " (Art. 60, 65).

(iv) Federal National Council (FNC):

The FNC consists of forty seats of which Abu Dhabi and Dubai have eight each, Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah have six each and Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Quiwan have four each. The population of the member states but according to the affluence and influence each commands. FNC members are elected by each emirate

by appointment or election. The member is elected for two years and the member is not allowed to hold any other federal post because he represents the people of the emirates and also the whole federation. The FNC enjoys parliamentary immunities against the censorship of ideas and opinions expressed in the line of work.⁵² The FNC has an annual term of six months starting the first week of November. The FNC is neither the exclusive nor the most important legislative authority but has a consultative character. Its "observations and aspirations" in regard to the working of the federation are presented to the SCU. This thus again acts as a structure which receives the feed-back from the environment and passes it to the out-put producing authorities. Hence the Council of Ministers has a tremendous leverage over the FNC because it determines the issues to be debated by this body. In other words, one can say that the cabinet here acts as the regulator of demands, entering the federal system.

(v) The Judiciary:

The fifth and the last federal structure is the Judiciary. Art. 94 to 109 of the Constitution

52

See A.M. Khalifa, (1979) cited opp., for details of the FNC powers. pp. 47-48.

provide for a hierarchy of courts which culminates in the Union Supreme Court (USC). The Supreme Court adjudicates disputes between the central and emiral authorities. It sees to it that the Constitution is adhered to and reigns supreme. It is the highest court of appeal.

Below the Supreme Court of the UAE one or more primary Tribunals are established which have jurisdiction pertaining to the permanent capital along with the civil, commercial and administrative matters (Art. 102).

In an analysis of the Constitution, the president emerges as the central authority. The tribal political culture is left to counter balance excessive authoritarian tendencies of this central figure. The federation is thus constitutionally oriented towards more unification and centralization.⁵³

In this chapter we have dealt with the evolution of the political structures of the federation of UAE. The announcement of British withdrawal from

53

Franke Heard - Bey, From Trucial States of United Arab Emirates, (1982), pp. 375-378.

the Coast of Oman resulted in the renewal of territorial claims by some neighbouring states. For example, the claim of Iran over Bahrain and the Abu Musa and the Tumb islands, the threat of encroachment of the vital oil producing areas of Abu Dhabi's border by Saudi Arabia (Buriami Oasis), etc. These environmental factors created an atmosphere wherein the rulers of the Trucial States were forced to shed their differences and work for a viable political unit which could enable the tribal systems' survival. This took the shape of the federation of United Arab Emirates after considerably long negotiations lasting nearly for three years.

If one compares the environment, both material and socio-political, of the Trucial States with that of the United Arab Emirates now, it may seem as though one is comparing two entirely different worlds. Yet the Society has itself changed remarkably little. Attitudes, values, behaviour and customs which were formed under quite different circumstances continue to be the essential ingredients in the interactions of the today's multinational society and the newly created political system.

The political life of the federation of UAE continues to be largely traditional even after

its adaptation to the modern political institutions. The tribal character of the society still continues in the form of informal structures which influence the functioning of the system. The essence of the tribal traditional system is the majlis, which enables the ruler's and his subjects to discuss issues of concern to them. Thus the mechanism of the operation of the system is very simple and most of the demands are processed in such a way that the system gets enough support in the time of crisis. The role of Islam in the tribal system is that of helping in levelling many of the differences inherent in the societal system. Islam has been moulded and grafted in such a way that it has enabled the tribal system to withstand adversities of wars and economic crisis. As for the political aspects, the Shaikhs are expected to be leaders and exemplars in religious matters. Islam gave the tribal system a law which has been retained in the present Constitution of the UAE.

With this background of the evolution of the federation of UAE and its political structures we proceed to the analysis of actual working of the federation in its domestic environment.

Chapter III

DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE
FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERATION

C H A P T E R - III

DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERATION

Every system functions in an environment. For the purpose of our analysis we have divided the environmental system in which the federation of United Arab Emirates is embedded into the domestic and international environment. In this chapter we would analyse the functioning of the federation of UAE in its domestic environment. To do so it is important to state the ingredients of the domestic environment of the federation of UAE.

The domestic environment of the federation of UAE would consist of the seven member emirates, their cultural, social and economic systems. The 'wants' formed in the domestic environment are converted into demands which further takes the shape of specific issues. There is no organised political parties to process the demands arising in the domestic environment of the UAE and so the political authorities or the influential political elites themselves process the wants and demands arising from their systemic environment and form the issues. These elites or

authorities form the communication channels through which the federal system is informed of developments taking place in the environment. In other words, they constitute a part of the 'feed-back loop' of the system.

The federal political structures along with the role - incumbents convert the demands and issues into out-puts. Authoritative decisions and actions are taken by the role incumbents to fulfil the demands entering into the federal system. These out-puts act in the environment and create new sets of demands and supports. The support is required by the political regime to continue making authoritative decisions for the system (in the case of UAE to maintain their status-quo). Each successive round of out-puts acts in the environment which brings about changes. These changes are reflected in the form of new demands and supports to be fed as in-puts into the system. Not all demands or issues threaten the persistence of the system. But certain issues on which decisions cannot be taken due to differences of opinion among the political authorities can create a 'stress overload' which may threaten the survival of the system. Sometimes the decisions taken by the authorities

are unacceptable to the system in general, then too the system is put under stress.

Here our concern will not be on the day-to-day working of the federal system. We would concentrate on some specific issues that sometime or the other threatened the survival of the federal system by creating so called stress-overloads. In doing so, we would see what came out of the system which for the time being reduced the stress-overload and enabled the system to persist and continue to make 'authoritative allocation' for the whole system.

Before proceeding further, it is important to note that inputs are not only created in the environment of the political system but also within the political system itself. These are known as 'with-inputs'. In the case of the working of the federation of UAE these 'with-inputs' are created by the political authorities or the political community of the federation.

The various issues which created stress on the federation from time to time can be broadly catagorised as pertaining to boundary disputes, the issue of the unified Federal Army, dynastic feuds

and the struggle for succession, socio-cultural order and financial matters. Obviously these issues are overlapping. Nonetheless, such a categorisation is useful for analytical purpose. The working of the federation will be analysed in terms of how the federation copes with the demand and support stresses caused by the above mentioned issues.

i. **The Boundary Disputes:**

A peculiarity of the geopolitical nature of the tribal society in the lower part of the Gulf is the vagueness of territory occupied by the different shaikhdoms. Traditionally, the concept of territorial sovereignty did not exist in Arabia¹. As soon as the federation of UAE was formed the issue of the boundary line between different shaikhdoms was raised by the respective rulers.

The first incident that posed threat to the survival of the newly formed federation came from

1 See J.B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, (N.Y: Praeger, 1964) p. 18.

Fujairah. The ruler of Fujairah in 1972 motivated by economic and political considerations, announced his decision to present Shaykh Zayed, the President of the federation and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, an orchard in his territory as gift. But the well that watered that garden was used for years by both Sharjah and Fujairan tribesmen. So the Sharijan tribesmen felt that they should have been consulted before making such decision. Consequently, fight broke out until order was restored by the stationing of federal and Abu Dhabian troops. The federation, eventually coped with the issue purchasing the title to the orchard and allowing equal utilization of its well by both sides².

In 1975 the issue of Dubai-Sharjah border was raised between the two emirates because Sharjah wanted to build a major shopping complex there. The site of the planned structure claimed by Dubai lay astride the border between the two. The issue

2 See J.D. Anthony, Arabian States of the Lower Gulf : People, Politics, Petroleum (Washington D.C. : The Middle East Institute, 1975) pp.214-15.

was later settled by the mediation of France³ because the federal authorities including the President, could not bring the sides to a compromise⁴.

Besides these, disputes have arisen between Sharjah, Ajman and Umm al Quiwan over offshore jurisdictions and rights of granting oil concessions and between Umm at Quiwan and Ras al-Khaimah over land and sea borders.

These territorial disputes among the member emirates have created hostile and non-conducive atmosphere to sociopolitical and economic development and stability and survival of the system.

The frustration of the federal authorities over these issues was expressed by Shaikh Zayed in the following words:

I spent nearly a week in the northern emirates in an attempt to settle some border disputes

-
3. For relations with France see, Pradip Sarbadhikari, "The United Arab Emirates in International Relations", Indian Journal of Political Science 38(2); April-June 77 pp 143-152.
 4. A.M. Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, : London 1979 P. 102

of minor consequence, yet they are source of conflict among the member-states..... their disputes often involve a few tens of meters, and do you believe that we have not been able to build a hospital on a piece of real estate because two emirates claim sovereignty over it?⁵

The Federation have tried to resolve the internal territorial problem by publishing official maps without boundary lines. But this is no solution to these perennial issues which create a perpetual stress on the federation. Till boundary issues are settled through compromise understanding, flexibility and discussions, they will continue to be a source of stress on the federation.

ii Issue of the Unified Federal Army.

Under article 120 of the Provisional constitution the federation was given exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the matter of defence and Union Armed Forces . But till 1975 no member emirate co-operated towards this end. So by the end of 1975, the federalist (Abu Dhabi along with Shahjah, Fujayrah and Umm al Quiwan) demanded the

5. Quoted in M.R. al-Fil "Boundary Problems among Emirates of the Arabian gulf," Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, 2 No. 8, Oct. 1976 p.36./

establishment of a federal Army. This issue (along with other issues) created a demand-overload when President Zayed (ruler of Abu Dhabi) refused to put forward his candidacy for re-election to the SCU at the end of its first terms in 1976 until the issue was resolved.

To cope with stress, the federal authorities amended Art. 142 of the constitution to place the unified federal army under the control of the federation (and a federal budget) and to forbid individual arms purchases by the emiral rulers or to raise troops. Accordingly, the federal army (in which various local armies were incorporated) as well as the unified police force and the border guard which were successfully established in the beginning of 1976 were to be placed under the control of the federal authorities. Thus for the time being the demand stress on the federation was reduced.⁶ Later Shaikh Zayed was unanimously appointed the President of the Federation for another five years.

6. See MEED (Middle East Economic Digest) 5 August 1977 and MECS (Middle East contemporary survey) vol:1976-77 p.361. The UDF and the UAE armed forces (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah) were formally merged in 1976. The Military Balance 1977-78 (London; International Institute of Strategic Studies).

Towards the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978 the efforts to achieve a merger of the armed forces had failed and it became clear that the existence of three regional commands had perpetuated the divisions, in particular between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.⁷ The crisis was precipitated when President Zayid as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, on 31st January 1978 issued two decrees. By the first decree, Shaykh Zayed's son, Sultan Ibn Zayid was appointed as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The second decree aimed at completing the unification and reorganization of the armed forces by completely merging land and naval forces at all levels and by abolishing the commands in the western, central and northern military regions. The President acted in accordance with the constitutional amendment, approved by the SCU in 1976 which provided that the state alone had the right to establish land, naval and air forces.⁸

7 Emirate News, Abu Dhabi, Oct. 28, 1977.

8 MECS 1976-77, p.359.

However the decrees were issued by the President while on vacation in Pakistan and without consulting the Vice-President Shaykh Rashid (the ruler of Dubai) or the Defence Minister. The Vice-President, Shaykh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum, was the acting Head of the State at the time, and any such decree should have come from him. Moreover, the new appointment upset the delicate balance between Shaykh Zayid and Shaykh Rashid and once again brought to the surface the controversy between them over the powers of the federal government.⁹

The immediate reaction of Shaykh Rashid and his son Defence Minister Shaykh Muhammed bin Rashid was to put Dubai's forces on alert. Later developments only confirmed that the Dubai units in the central region were not under the complete control of the federal command. Another opponent of Shaykh Zayed, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah also opposed the new decrees.

9. Ibid, p.358.

The withdrawal of support for the smooth functioning of the federation by Shaykh Rashid was demonstrated by his staying away from the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Union¹⁰. The cabinet meeting used to take place irregularly and several urgent items of legislation continued to be postponed. Thus the federal governmental structures were paralysed and the continued existence of the UAE seemed to hang in the balance. The withdrawal of withinputs of support by the ruling elites (of Ras-al-khaimah and Dubai-the autonomist) threatened the persistence of the federal system.

In March 1979, the UAE Supreme Council (the highest federal legislative structure) held a series of meetings. The support in favour of an integrated federal system and increased federal unity came

10 Shaykh Rashid was supposed to have gone on hunting in Pakistan, MECS, vol: III, 1978-790, p.477

in the form of demonstration (mainly in Abu Dhabi) held by the UAE nationals¹¹. In a systemic effort to normalize the situation, the FNC along with other federal institutions submitted a memorandum¹² to the SUC.

The memorandum was opposed by the rulers of Dubai and Ras-al-Khaimah jointly¹³. This federal crisis was averted by the input of support emanating from the regional international environment¹⁴. The ruler of Kuwait became the mediator between Shaykh Rashid of Dubai and Shaykh Zayed of Abu Dhabi. Consequently certain political changes were brought

11. Emirate News, March 20, 1979.

12. The memorandum prepared measures to consolidate federal authority including complete integration of military units, in a single federal force; new rules for assessing share of each emirate in the federal budget accountability for the use of federal funds and steps to draft a permanent constitution. MECS, Vol. III 1978-79 p.477.

13. In a Nine-Point Memorandum Shaykh Rashid opposed the federal memorandum. Objections were raised on the granting of exclusive arms purchase to the federal authorities, the unification of import regulation and greater federal supervision over the entry on aliens into UAE. Reported in a Kuwait Newspaper Al-Siyash, 22 March, 1979.

14. Also discussed in the next chapter.

in which dampened the demand overload on the system¹⁵.

Although the appointment of the Commander-in-chief was still a major issue in¹⁶ the dispute between Shaykh Zayed and Shaykh Rashid, the enactment of a law in May 1978 providing for compulsory military service of nine years between the age of 16 and 36 made various military schools and training courses the agencies of political socialisation for the younger generation from which the support needed for the federation was to emanate.

15 In negotiations to avert the federal crisis, a proposal was put forward to bring in a few cabinet changes. Accordingly, Shaikh Rashid, the Vice-President of the Union, was also made the federal Prime Minister in place of his son, Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid al-Maktum who resigned on 25 April, 1979. The combination of the premiership and the Vice-Presidency gave Shaykh Rashid prestige but Dubai had to agree to place half its revenue at the disposal of the federal budget. Consequently, a new federal cabinet was made by him under the changed circumstances. The composition of the Cabinet offered Dubai compensation for consenting to a stronger federal authority. Shaykh Rashid's son Muktum was given one of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and the other went to a relative of Shaykh Zayed, Hamdanibn Muhammad al-Nuhayan. See for details MECS, vol. III 1978-79

16. Dubai ordered for British layland Scorpion tanks in April, 1978, Moreover there was no indication of the decision to cancel the military regions and merge units was being carried out.

No progress has been made in implementing the full merger of the emiral forces into a federal armed force except that Ras al-khaimah agreed to make its second brigade part of the Federal forces under the command of Col. Shaykh Sultan ibn Saqr al-Qasim.¹⁷ But the fact that Saykh Sultan Hamid Ibn Ahmad al Mu'alla, the commander of Police in the Emirate of Ummal-Qaiwan declined to take up the post of Minister of Planning in 1982 is evidence enough to show how insecure the ruler feel when they are asked to relinquish their post of power in their emirate to serve the federation.¹⁸

Thus the question of unified Federal Army still remains and became an issue of contention between the member emirates.

17 Qatar News Agency, 24 Oct. 1979

18. Summary of World Broadcast (SWB) 12, July, 1983.

III Dynastic Feuds and Struggle for Succession.

One of the destabilizing factor in the domestic environment of the federation, which from time to time threatens the federal system's existence is the pattern of dynastic quarrels for usurping power. The coup attempt in the ruling family of Sharjah in 1974 was one such incident.

In 1972, Shaykh Sagr bin Sultan, the deposed ex-ruler of Sharjah, returned from Egypt with his eighteen followers to Sharjah.¹⁹ Taking advantage of the weak position of the ruler Shaykh Khalid, in the wake of the annexation of Abu Musa island by Iran, Shaykh Sagr attempted a palace coup against the incumbent ruler. Even though Shaykh Khalid was killed in the struggle, due to a combined response of the Union Defence Forces and Abu Dhabi Defence force the coup was averted. Later Shaykh Sultan, the younger brother of the assassinated ruler, was chosen by the federal authorities to succeed to the rulership²⁰

19 Shaykh Sagr was deposed by the British in 1965 because of his criticism of their policies in the area and his pro-Egyptian orientation.

20 For details on this incident, see Michael Tomkinson, The United Arab Emirates (London: Micheal Tomkinson Publishing, 1975) p. 150 and J.D. Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, (1975) pp. 117-119, 174-176.

The coup attempt represented the first real challenge to the federal system since it was forged. It also prompted co-operation on the part of the federal authorities, Shaykh Zayid and Shaykh Rashid in the forms of despatching the UDF and the appointment of Shaykh Sultan as the new ruler. Thus the federation was to receive ample support for its maintenance from the new incumbent ruler, Shaykh Sultan, who became a stern supporter of the federation (and an ally of Shaikh Zayed). Moreover, the fact that Shaykh Sagr was kept under house arrest, instead of being tried and convicted, shows that both Shaykh Zayid (the ruler of Abu Dhabi) and Shaikh Rashid (the ruler of Dubai) were keen to keep the matter under control and thus averting the simmering historical Tribal enmities between al - Qawasim and Bani Yas, from taking a disastrous turn.

The resignation of the Commander-in-Chief Brig. General Shaykh Sultan Ibn Zayed, (in 1982) son of Shaykh Zayid, the ruler of Abu Dhabi who was appointed in 1979 can be seen as another dimension of the dynastic struggle for succession. The resignation was apparently provoked by the rift between him and his elder brother, the heir apparent, Shaykh

Khalifa Ibn Zayid. One account alleged that four people from Khalifa's entourage had been killed in an exchange of fire with Sultan's men which took place at the beginning of Feb. 1982²¹

The problem of succession also exists in Dubai where in the wake of the continue illness of Shaykh Rashid his two sons might each claim the rulership. However, if and when this succession is effected the status quo in the federation is likely to get disrupted because the new generation may not be as accommodative as the present ruler. At the moment however, this is merely a conjecture.

The exception to the dynastic quarrel for succession was the peaceful succession to power in Umm al-Qaiwan of Shaykh Rashid ibn Ahmad al-Mu'alla (when his father, Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Rasid al-Mu'alla died on 21 Feb 1988) and the succession of Shaykh

21. Daily Report, 23 February, 1982.

al Humayd Ibn Rashid al-Nu'aymi in Ajman on 6 September²²

In the patriarchal ^{societies} of West Asia dynastic feuds are an extremely serious matter.

IV Socio-Cultural order

A. Impact of Immigrants:

The scarcity of indigenous population in an area of remarkable oil-based affluence have the statistical advantage of boosting per capita GNP in the small emirates on the shores of the Arabian Gulf, but it has also invoked an immigrant imperative of such a magnitude that the immigrants now pose a problem not only to the political system but also to the entire socio-cultural order. A UAE newspaper has described migrant workers as a "fifth column"²³. Such fears are natural in a country like UAE where foreigners outnumber natives by at least four times. (See the accompanying tables).

22 The Guardian, 23 Feb. 1981 and Daily Report, 8 Sept. 1981.

23. Khaleej Times, (Sharjah) March 24, 1982.

TABLE: The 1980 Population Census

	Nationals	Non-Nationals
Abu Dhabi	69,000	380,000
Dubai	42,000	236,000
Sharjah	48,000	111,000
Ajman	11,100	25,000
Ra's al Khaymah	39,700	34,000
Fujayra	23,200	9,000
Umm al-Quiwan	7,200	13,000
	240,200	808,100

Source: Financial Times, 26 October, 1982.

The census only related to legal alien resident. Illegal residents were supposed to be more than 200,000. The causes of this situation lay in the small number of nationals and their low level of educational and vocational training which made the presence of foreign workers and employees indispensable.

An attempted coup in Bahrain in December 1981, by native Bahraini and few other Gulf Arab Shia aided by Iran - has exacerbated those fears. However, the possible socio-cultural consequences of the increasing immigrant population represent the greatest danger. An erosion of traditional values by the physical presence of the immigrants, and their alien tastes and ideas constitute a major disruptive social force in UAE.

Thus the emiral system faces a considerable dilemma: on the one hand, they are in great need of the foreign labour force, otherwise no development can be carried out and no modern administration, army or trade established.²⁴ On the other hand, with such an overwhelming majority, the aliens (especially the illegal immigrants) were a constant threat to stability and internal security.

24 Abu Dhabi and Dubai, because of their large development plans need increasing numbers of skilled and unskilled labour. The nationals themselves have little stimulus to work because they have easy access to comfortable incomes, if not wealth. Various estimates suggest that aliens comprise between 65% and 75% of the 656,000 population. Immigrants from India Pakistan, Baluchistan and Afghanistan come to work in construction, the public service and commerce. The Omanis, Arabs and Pakistanis are employed in the Army. There are large number of Palestinians, Egyptians, Iraqis in the administration, Iranians are in commerce.

Emirians are increasingly becoming apprehensive of the impact of Asian nannies in terms of the basic social values and patterns of behaviour of the upcoming generation. According to Peck,

....an intellectual....lamented that his brother's children, looked after by a Filipino nanny, were being raised to speak English (and fragmentary Tagalog), but were unacquainted with their native Arabic....The man was deeply troubled by the prospect of an eventual cultural deracination of the country's young people.²⁵

Besides socio-cultural problems, threat to the political system is an important consideration regarding the immigrant population in the UAE. Even though the foreign workforce was politically passive on the whole; their low salaries, poor living conditions have caused a number of strikes and demonstrations. In October, 1976, for example, a strike in Dubai developed into a riot. The police intervened arrested most of the strikers and were ready to deport them. But due to the pressure from the companies, the police deported only the ringleaders.

25. See Malcolm Peck, The United Arab Emirates 1986 cit.opp. p.71

To regulate the stress caused by immigrants the federal authorities issued new rules and regulation strengthened the Border Guard by special naval and motorized units. Under the regulation the companies were required to report to the authorities regarding the number and conditions of their foreign workers. They were also to get the foreign workers registered. As a reaction to these measures the federal ministry of Social Affairs and Labour was attacked by armed men, reportedly immigrants²⁶.

In another incidents a group of Palestinians attempt on the life of the Syrian Foreign Minister at the Abu Dhabi airport in Oct 1977 which resulted in the death of the UAE minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Later, a group of native people, who reacted to this incident by holding a demonstration in Ras al - Khayamah demanding the deportation of the Palestinians, was shot by the Palestinians.²⁷

26. Emirates New, August 5, 1977.

27. MECS, vol. I 1976-77 p. 363

These incidents made the federal authorities take stern steps to establish full control over the foreigners. But Dubai took a different attitude by declaring the Jabal' Ali area - a huge industrial complex - a free zone where Arab and Asian workers needed no visa or work contract. Dubai's decision was a great surprise for the federal authorities.

The spurt of armed riots created insecurity in the UAE and SO in Feb.1978 the authorities banned the trading of arms and ammunitions and the possession of firearms by foreigners. Moreover the rumours of a Palestinian group threatening to blow up oil and port installations had created a demand ("within-put") to transfer the PLO representative in the UAE, who was later replaced.²⁸

The outcome of the strict control on immigration was a 65% drop in the illegal infiltration. The authorities even tried to tighten control over infiltration through sea and air by abolishing transit visa arrangements in December 1977. But the authorities had to reverse to the previous transit visa

28. SWB, March 4, 1977

arrangement due to the demands of the business elite, especially from Dubai who found the decision detrimental to their interests.

In addition to immigration measures attempts were also made to revise Islamic Law and Practices in 1977. The UAE Minister of Planning claimed that bringing the Sharia back into the nation's daily life was a progressive attempt to combat, with social weapons, the grave social dislocation of the past years.

"Genuine and pressing social problems have sprung from the sudden swamping of the UAE by foreign habits, and the state is trying to minimize disruptive influences".

These measures were followed by strict censorship on the mass media. A commission on alcoholism was appointed to draft a prohibition bill. But the ruler of Dubai opposed such a bill, because accommodation and entertainment services are an important source of revenue for Dubai. This added yet another grievance to Shaykh Rashid's dispute with the President Zayed in 1977.

29. Emirate News, Jan. 8 1975.

Immigrant population still continue to be a stress on the system in the UAE. But it is a necessary evil and so the system has adapted in its own peculiar way to the challenges posed by it.

B. Generational Gap

The exposure of the younger generations to the liberal ideas gained from the Western education³⁰ created discontent because the youth felt that they were denied opportunities to find a place in the narrow, closely knit world of their country's politics. One expression of this discontent was the demand by the students in 1981 at al'-Ayn University for permission to form a student union³¹

The authorities dealt with student's discontent by providing material benefits for university graduates. The authorities also took precautionary measures by dismissing a number of professors for expressing liberal ideas.

30 Foreign Arabs have filled most teaching positions at all levels, only recently have they been displaced significantly by native Emirians. As elsewhere in Arabian Peninsula Egyptians have played a particularly important role in supplying faculty and administrators.

31 The Guardian, 25 Feb 1981.

A number of bomb throwing incidents occurred in the UAE in 1981. The incidents were said to be the consequence of the transfer of the Bathist ideological factional differences between Syrians and Iraqis, to UAE

The effect of the immigrant populations on the socio-cultural order may not be significant enough to challenge the conservative, religiously grounded values of UAE society, because of the efficient communication network (feed-back-loop).

It can also be due to the timely decisions taken by the authorities to convert the withinputs of demands emanating from the political system itself. In the UAE this is possible because of the small population which share more or less common cultural and social values and norms. Even the economic interest of the seven emirate do not vary much. Moreover, the basic elements of its traditional society — Islam, tribe and the family still continue to shape the socio-political order.

V **Financial Matters:**

Besides the question of immigration and social unrest issues of finance and budget contribution pose problems for the functioning of the federation. In fact, these are so closely interrelated that it is reasonable to say that budget issue is not separate at all but is merely a restatement of the other issues in different terms.

As already mentioned, financial contribution of each emirate became an issue of contention in 1976 when President Shaykh Zayed refused to put forward his candidacy for re-election. Until 1976, Abu Dhabi had paid 98% of the budget and Sharjah, Fujairah and Ajman the rest. Dubai, the second richest emirate, as well as Ras al-Khaimah and Umm al-Gauwan refused to contribute claiming that to do so would diminish their autonomous status by strengthening the centre and giving it the opportunity to interfere in their own financial affairs.

It is a fact that the income of the emirates other than Abu Dhabi and Dubai is so small as to make very little real difference to federal revenues.

But the stress put on the system in 1976 was for the time being averted when it was resolved that each emirate would contribute 20% of its revenues to the federal budget. This was supposed to reduce the burden on Abu Dhabi. But in 1977 the issue of contribution to the budget again became a stress on the system when Rashid still refused to contribute all to the federal budget. The cancellation of the transit visa (discussed above) in December, 1977 further worsened the crises and for the first time it became clear that the very cohesion of the UAE was in danger because political alternatives to the UAE were being actively discussed. But Shaikh Rashid of Dubai later announced that he did not intend leaving the Union when Dubai threatened to impose an economic blockade.³³ Thus the stress over the system for the time being was reduced.

33 Gulf Weekly Mirror (Manamma) 6-22 Feb. 1980. and also see Naomi Sakr, "Federalism in United Arab Emirates Prospects and Regional Implications" In Tim Niblock (Ed.) Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf. (London, Croom Helm, 1980). page pp170-186

The issue of budget was resolved in 1979 in the wake of the new arrangement of power sharing, when Shaykh Rashid was made the Prime Minister of the federation. Prior to this he was only the Vice-President of the Union. Thus in 1979, Dubai agreed to contribute \$1,750 million to the federal budget.

In addition to the above the demand overload came from another issue emanating from the domestic environment. On 10 Feb., 1980, high-school students staged street demonstrations in UAE's northern Emirate to protest against a rise of petrol prices. The demonstration spread to other parts of the UAE.

Taxi drivers protested by raising fares; fishermen threatened to stop fishing unless fuel prices were brought down; supermarkets and food vendors raised prices by 40%. There was also a false threat to blow off Sharja's petroleum storage and distribution terminals.³⁴ The rulers of the emirates of Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Rasal-Kharymah, 'Ajman and Umm al-Quwain met the students and promised to convey their demands to the President.³⁵

34 Gulf New Agency, Manama, 13, Feb. 1990
35 SWB, 11 Feb. 1980.

The federal authorities acted swiftly. FNC appointed a special 10-member committee and the Minister for Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Dr. Mani Saidal-Utayba was instructed to investigate the cause for the increase in the price rise and study the way to end the crisis. Two days later Shaykh Zayed allocated \$50 million to subsidize the prices of petroleum in northern Emirates.³⁵

The demonstration was interpreted as an indirect expression of dissatisfaction with the pace of "federalism". FNC Deputy Speaker³⁷ complained that he had advised the government two years back to form a national fuel distribution company to replace the foreign firms, but the federal authorities had done nothing. The Minister of Petroleum Complained that his Ministry had no control over petrol distribution. Under the provisional constitution, each Emirate had its own separate fuel policy. A need for a permanent constitution was again repeated by the head of the 10-member committee appointed by FNC to investigate the cause of the students demonstration. "We will never solve our problems unless we became truly unified", Tiryam said³⁸

36. Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 Feb. 1980.

37. Hamad Bushabab was the Deputy Speaker.

38. Middle East Newsletter, London, 25 Feb. 1980.

The unequal distribution of wealth among the other emirates has increased the frustration of the masses. Moreover, according to the constitution, each emirate had complete ownership of its own natural resources. This made it impossible for the federal government to implement equal rules for the consumption of the natural resources. Thus as we already saw the overt demand for curtailment of Oil prices had also created a withinput of demand in the political system that is a demand for a permanent constitution.

Moreover, the issue of finance is closely related to the question of unchecked industrialization policy adopted by Dubai and other emirates,³⁹ Shaykh Zayed 's complaint about unequitable contribution to the federal budget lies in the enormous debt incurred by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah for their industrialization. On unplanned/ such occasion Abu Dhabi had to allocate funds to these emirates to repay their debts.⁴⁰

39. MECS, Vol. II 1977-78 p. 458

40 Noami Sakr, Opp. Cited, pp 184-185

The demand for the sharing of the federal budget had have the potential of creating stress on the system, especially when there is a fall in oil prices, and it becomes difficult for the Abu Dhabi to contribute the larger share of the budget.,

Besides the above mentioned issues, other important issue that have created and can create stress overload on the system are (a) the issue of democratization of the polity and (b) the issue to ministerial appointments by the two powerfvul emirate Abu Dhabi and Dubai and (c) the issue of the permanent capital and a permanent constitution.

The issue of ministerial appointment, especially in the cabinet, has resulted in stress on the system on more than one occasion. In 1979 after Shaykh Rashid become the Prime Minister there were a few changes in the cabinet the appointment of the Foreign Minister Ahmed Khalifa al Suwaydi and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Rashid Ahmad was considered by the President Shaykh Zayed, as dangerous because they were supposed to be 'Nasserist' sympathizers. Shaykh Zayed, however had to compromise.

The demand that competence should be the criteria of the selection of ministers was raised by Shaykh Zayed in 1976 at the end of his first five year term as the President of the UAE. But the Ministerial posts continued and still continue⁴⁰ to be distributed according to the interests of the Emirates especially that of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

The increasing political awareness among the masses in the wake of the Iranian revolution led to a demonstration of students and young people for a more centralized or strong federation. The demand for a stronger federation was time and again put forward by the Federal National Council. In 1976 after the new cabinet was formed the FNC was successful in pressuring the government to raise the pay scale of the employees, thereby checking the growing unrest among employees. It was also thought that such a measure would lead to reducing the correction.

40. Summary of World Braodcast, 8th April, 1980-
Later Ahmad Khalifa al-Suwaydi resigned in 1980 because there was a conflict between him and Shaykh Rashid over the decision to grant the USA certain naval facilities.

After 1976, in 1979 there was again a discussion in the Supreme Council to draft the permanent constitution. But every time the autonomist led by Eubai group had widespread support for their proposal that the provisional constitution be extended for another five years.

The need for the expansion of the base of the FNC was felt. The mere consultory role of the FNC was regretted by its members and so in 1979 they had demanded for a permanent constitution that would confer full legislative power on the (FNC) itself. This demand was not met. However, FNC's recommendations to set up the general Petroleum Corporation to enforce uniform marketing practices and to double the fuel subsidies were accepted by the SC.⁴¹

The fact that such important recommendations were at all accepted by the SC is in itself a significant step towards decentralization as well as legitimisation of FNC as a desirable political institution.

41. See MECS, 1979-80 Vol. IV and 1980-81 vol. V
p. 502 pp. 429-430

To sum up, one can say that the spring 1979 crisis was an attempt to edge the constitution towards a centralised state, because so far the federal system had not attained the necessary balance between the input by the member states and the output by the centre. A federation requires that the member states give up some of their sovereignty in exchange for greater security, economic equality and better public services, while they may retain some autonomy.

The FNC has periodically reminded the Supreme Council of the inadequacy of the federal institutions to cope with the 'wants' of the country. The student demonstrations in 1980 in the northern emirates, against the petroleum price hike and for more subsidies from the centre also make it clear that the federal government did not have enough control over the member emirates. The students demonstration in al'Ain University supported the FNC's demands addressed to the SCU to take up again the discussion of the 1979 memorandum.⁴² The issue of democratization in fact formed part of the call for improvement of the structure and function of the federal system.

42 See MECS Vol: IV 1979-80 p. 453.

Since the extension of the Provisional Constitution on 29th Oct 1981 for another five years nothing much has changed may be due to the system's preoccupation to deal with the serious challenges posed by the international environment. On the whole, one can say that the system has been functioning satisfactorily and have been able to withstand the stresses put upon it by the domestic environment. In other words, the stress overload was not too heavy to breakdown the consolidating federal system.

Chapter IV
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERATION

CHAPTER - IV

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FEDERATION

In the previous chapter we have analysed the functioning of the federation of United Arab Emirates in its domestic environment. This chapter deals with the functioning of the federation in the international environment. Here it would be more convenient for the purpose of our analysis to divide the international environment into its regional and global components.

The demands and supports emanating from the international environment enter the political system. But, not all the demands and supports get converted into 'outputs'. The most devastating ones are 'regulated' by the political system. In other words such demands are either not converted into output or they are relegated to a minor order of importance. Here our emphasis would be on those 'demands' and 'supports' that created stress on the federal system, either due to their nature, or due to the inability of the system to convert them into 'out-puts', or to execute the authoritative decisions made by the

system. (Border disputes, Iran-Iraq war, etc.)

I. Iran's Occupation of Islands

Right from the time of the inception of the federation UAE has faced severe (distressing) challenges flowing from its international environment. In 1968, when the Union of Arab Emirates, (the prototype of the federation) was formally announced, by the nine shaykhdoms of the lower gulf, Iran again claimed Bahrain.¹

The Iranian claim had prompted Bahrain to join the Union of Arab Emirates in 1968. However, when the Iranian claim was finally dropped in May 1970, Bahrain, whose social structure, system of administration and services were far more advanced than those of its proposed federal partners, lost all interest in the proposed federation and opted

1 Iran stating that it "reserves all its rights in the Persian Gulf and will never tolerate this historic inequity and injustice ... The British Government cannot relinquish and give away land which according to history was taken from Iran by force." Arab Report and Record, London issue 7, 1-15 April, 1968.

2
for complete independence. Later, Qatar followed suite. Thus the emerging federal system could not cope with the stress-overload following from its regional environment and an attempt to form a larger federation was nipped in the bud.

It must be pointed out here that the federation of the Union of Arab Emirates derived the needed support from the neighbouring countries like Kuwait who had previously helped the Trucial States to lay the foundation for an effective educational system. Since 1954 the Ruler of Kuwait had paid for the construction and running of schools in the Trucial States.³ Qatar and Saudi Arabia had also contributed financially to education projects, while Bahrain had helped by providing some of the teachers who were paid for by the other states.

2 For details of the ultimate Iranian decision to relinquish the claim over Bahrain see R.K. Ramazani "The settlement of the Bahrain Questions" Indian Journal of International Law 12, No.1 (January, 1972) pp 1-14.


3 The finance was channeled through the Development funds for details see Franke Heard Bey. From the Trucial States to United Arab Emirates 1982, pp., 331-332.

But such kind of support was not enough to ward away the Iranian claim over the islands Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. In fact Iran had given up its claim on Bahrain to avoid a possible showdown with the Arab World at a time of uncertainty regarding British provisions of security in the Gulf. Iran was determined to play its new role as self-appointed protector of the gulf and so these islands with their strategic position near the entrance of the Persian Gulf were important to Iran⁴ (see figures) but, as one student of Gulf politics puts it, control over these islands is "neither essential to block sea traffic in the Gulf, nor sufficient in itself to frustrate a determined naval power from pursuing that objectives".⁵

4 See also for the following, ARR issue 13, 16-30 June 1971 on 28 Sept. 1971, Shah said "We need them (the islands) ... no power on earth shall stop us ... If Abu Musa and the Tunbs fell into the wrong hands they could be a great nuisance value ... my country has no territorial ambitions. The Islands are a different matter".

5 M.M. Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentations, (London: Croom Helm, 1979) p. 152.

THE GULF PROPER-DISPUTES AND DEMARCATATIONS



The Tunb⁶ belong to Ras-al-Khaimah and Abu Musa was claimed by Sharjah.⁷ However, due to British intervention, the Ruler of Sharjah, the late Shaykh Khalid-bin-Muhammed, in the interest of the stability in the gulf agreed to set up a joint committee which was rejected by Iran; the only positive aspect of the deal was Irans offer of economic aid to Sharjah. But this negotiation resulted in withdrawal of support for Shaykh Khalid vis-a-vis Shaykh Sakr (the deposed ruler of Sharjah) whose coup attempts was throttled by the Union Defence Force (UDF) and Abu Dhabi Defence Force (ADDF) in 1972. The system was thus relieved of the stress temporarily.

6 The largest Tunb has a population of about 100 people, while the small Tunb is normally uninhabited; they both lie near to the Iranian Coast than to Ras-al-Khaimah, but historically belonged to the Qawasim Rulers, See Franke Heard-Bey. 1982, cited opp. p. 364.

7 The island of Abu Musa lies some 35 miles off the Sharjah Coast and about 43 miles off the opposite coast of Iran. It had been permanently inhabited by a few subjects of the Ruler of Sharjah. The ruler of Sharjah have granted concession to various foreign companies (British & German) to mine the red oxide, the revenue from such concessions was at one stage important for Sharjah. MEES Vol. XV No. 6,3, Dec. 1971 pp.4-8 and M.M. Abdullah, The United Arab Emirate, 1979, p.233.

The issue of these islands was again raised in 1979 when Khomeini came to power in Iran. While the issue of Abu Musa was concluded, the dispute over the two Ras-al-Khaimah islands was not resolved. Iranian troops forcibly occupied the islands. The Ruler's police force were killed on the Greater Tunb. The Ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah became the nationalist hero. The outcome of this exercise resulted in Iraq severing diplomatic relations with Iran and Britain and Libya, nationalising the British petroleum interests.⁸

Iran-Iraq war and the issue of the three Islands

The issue of these islands are still the roots of strained relations between the 'core unit' of the federation (Dubai and Abu Dhabi) and the concerned emirates. Just after the Iranian occupation in November 1971, the President of the newly formed UAE is reported to have said, "We protest against

8 See MEES Vol. XV No. 7, 10 December, 1971.

Iranian aggression on her neighbours and her occupation of the islands, and are awaiting Arab States to help the ... UAE to regain our rights".⁹ This demand which was fed into the regional environmental system had re-emerged in the wake of the Iranian revolution (when Ayatollah Khomeini who took over Iran had intended to undo Shah's policy). This demand became an issue during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 when Iraq had made the restoration of the sovereignty of the island to their Arab owners one of its declared objectives in the war.

During the first few months of the war, the UAE kept silent on the islands issue. To take up the Iraqi demand would have earned it Iranian hostility; to disclaim it would have antagonised Iraq. However, Iraq exerted pressure on the UAE to become a party to its demands. The UAE political system was not immune to Arab public opinion which generally took the view that any indifference by the UAE over the islands issue would show a lack of proper Arab patriotism.

9 Quoted in Ray E. Thoman, "Iraq and the Persian Gulf," Current History, 64, Jan 1973, p.25.

In the first week of October 1980, the Ruler of Ras-al-khaimah, paid a visit to Iraq, ostensibly for the sole purpose of discussing economic issues. Kuwaiti sources, however, reported an agreement between the two sides concerning the future restoration of the islands Ra's al khaimah had been prompted by its owner-interests rather than by those of the Federation. President Zayid was known to oppose the restoration of the islands by force.¹⁰

The UAE authority's silence triggered a campaign against it during November 1980 in the Lebanese daily, al-Bayraq, which often took up Iraqi causes. The paper sought to embarrass the UAE by reference to the length of reporting that Ra's al Khaimah had threatened to secede from the federation unless the Federal Government took a decisive stand on the issue of the islands.¹¹

The Arab public opinion literally forced the UAE to fall in line with Iraq. In systemic

10 MECS, Vol. V 1980-81, p.506.

11 Ibid.

language, it can be said that the latent demand for the islands from the respective shaikhdoms along with the demand made by Iraq were converted into 'output', ie, the UAE informed the UN Secretary General of its insistence that the islands be restored to full UAE sovereignty, and expressed its readiness to negotiate the issue with Iran. This outcome was infact partly influenced by an Iranian statement suggesting that the Shah had in the past paid money to some UAE shaikhs to keep them silent on the issue.¹² Even though the UAE's acting Foreign Minister had said that the UAE supported Iraq's policy of not ending the war unless the three islands were restored, the UAE authorities hoped to solve the differences with Iran "with understanding and (by a) dialogue on logic"¹³... However, the issue of the islands and stress caused by it within the federation continue to exist although the Iran-Iraq war seems to have ended.

12 SWB, 13 December, 1980.

13 SWB, 23 May, 1981.

II Saudi-UAE relations

In 1968 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had expressed unconditional support for the proposed federation, and so in collaboration with Kuwait invested a great deal of effort to bring the federation of nine shaykhdoms to fruition. The fact that both Bahrain and Qatar (who had intimate relations with Saudi Arabia) opted for independence in 1970 had disappointed the Saudi authorities and so when the federation of the seven was forged, Saudi Arabia withheld formal recognition to it until its territorial claim of the Buraimi Oasis (a part of Abu Dhabi) was amicably settled in 1974.¹⁴

The Saudi-UAE agreement in 1974 on the Buraimi Oasis was formalised in an international treaty in 1976. According to the agreement (a) Saudi renounced its claim of the Buraimi Oasis (b) in return the Saudis got an outlet to the sea 15 to 20 miles in width encompassing Kaur-al-Odaid at the base of the Qatari Peninsula and (c) the Saudi-UAE border underwent minor adjustment in favour of Saudi

14 See MECS 1976-77, Vol. 1, p.363.

Arabia who got sovereignty over the Zarrarah oil field.¹⁵

It is typical of the UAE decision making authorities (role incumbents) to settle disputes through negotiations, thereby dampening this long term demand-stress which historically had and co

in the future have created stress on the policy. Here the stress could have taken the shape of security threat to the unity of the federation.

In 1979, in the quarrel between the federalist and autonomist emirates (discussed in chapter 3) the Shah of Iran had supported Shaykh Rasid of Dubai (the autonomist), and Saudi Arabia, by contrast, had sided with Shaykh Zayid (the federalist).¹⁶ The over throw of the Shah removed Rashid's principal

15 For more details on the background and events of this territorial dispute, see George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1960) pp.141-152; J.B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (N.Y.: Praeger, 1964) and Husain M. Albaharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States, (England: Manchester University Press, 1968).

16 MECS Vol. IV 1979-80 p.432.

external support. Thus Shaykh Zayid with Saudi backing emerged stronger, a fact reflected in the solution to the federal crisis in 1979.

Since the resolution of the Buraimi Oasis dispute in 1974, the federation of UAE has relied on Saudi Arabia for policy guidance, especially to improve its relations with Iraq and to foster its ties with neighbouring and other Islamic countries, both Arab and non-Arab. Obviously, Saudi Arabia has also its support to the UAE in the time of crisis.

III Oman-UAE Dispute over Ras-al-Khaimah Seashore

A stress similar to the one mentioned above was created in 1977 when oil deposits were discovered in the offshore zone of the disputed coastline between Ra's al khaimah and Oman. The dispute over a stretch of coastline 16 km long, between Ra's al Khaimah and Oman's detached territory on Ra's Musadan was first raised in 1974. In 1977 Oman sent troops to its border with the UAE and a warship in the disputed area demanding suspension of oil exploration and developments in the Sa'm and Dawrah regions

along the disputed seashore. The issue was dealt initially by the federal government of the UAE, but later the issue was settled between Shaykh Zayed and Omani Foreign Minister with the mediation of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Thus in 1979 the dispute which had temporarily created stress on the federation was resolved "in principle". However, this stressful situation was overshadowed by the deteriorating situation in Iran (eg., Iranian revolution) and by the tensions within the federation between the president Shaykh Zayed and his deputy Shaykh Rashid.¹⁷

IV Gulf Co-operation Council and the UAE :

A Demand for Security

The outcome of the decisions (outputs) taken by the UAE authorities to settle few debated boundary disputes (demand-stress) with Saudi Arabia and Oman resulted in good neighbourly relations. This process was further enhanced with the formation of the Gulf

17 Discussed in the third chapter of the dissertation.

Co-operation Council in 1980 by the six lower Gulf states i.e., Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the UAE.

Efforts to promote cooperation and unity among the countries of the Gulf antedate the GCC. In 1975 the Shah of Iran had put forward a proposal for a Gulf states security pact. The Saudi's and the other littoral states of the Gulf did not then see sufficient threat to warrant such a pact and feared Iranian hegemonic ambitions in the region and so the Iranian initiative came to nothing.

With the fall of the Shah in 1979, despite his long military and security relationship with the United States, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that same year, the Gulf Arab states intensified their consultations on possible joint security measures. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 proved the final impetus for a new initiative for co-operation among the Arab Gulf states. Conflict between Iran and Iraq raised the stress-overload due to the possibility of the overt military or subversive actions by either combatant against the

Gulf Arab States. It also raised the possibility that outside powers might intervene to preserve access to the Gulf's oil resources, adding to the fear of Soviet-U.S. rivalry intruding into the Gulf in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the establishment of a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force to counter any further Soviet military move in the early eighties.

In order to dilute the stress overload caused by this disturbance in its international environment, which to some extent had threatened the very survival of the federation of the UAE, (and other neighbouring states), the UAE joined its neighbours (at Saudi initiative) to consider increased co-operation among themselves. A series of meetings in early 1981 gave rise to the Gulf Co-operation Council,¹⁸ Though the GCC members are closely bound by shared cultures and political interests, there are still frictions and difference among them.¹⁹ The UAE is

18 For details of these meeting see, MECS Vol. No V 1980-81, pp.458-466.

19 Malcolm Peck, opp. cited p. 139

closest to Kuwait in opposing Oman for extending the military facilities to the United States.²⁰ It also considers the super power rivalry in the Gulf as detrimental to regional peace and security. This internal threat such as the attempted coup in Bahrain by its Shia dissidents supported and trained in Iran was also considered a possibility within the federation. To deal with such external as well as internal threats, in February 1982 the UAE following Bahrain signed a security cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, which called for regular meetings between border security officials, regular exchanges of information, and new procedures for extradition of criminals.²¹

By 1983 the external threats posed by the Iran-Iraq war led the GCC states to set up a joint Rapid Development Force.²²

&

20. Oman has allowed the U.S. to build some facilities at Masirah island located in its waters in the Arabian Sea The Hindu, June 13, 1983.

21. See, Malcolm Peck, P. 140

22 THE HINDU, June 13, 1983.

In October 1983 its first exercise, code named Peninsula Shield, was held in the Western desert region of Abu Dhabi. The deputy supreme commander of the UAE's armed forces, declared on that occasion that the GCC states were "fully committed to defend their integrity, sovereignty and natural resources." (Thus the creation of GCC helped in lessening the stress-overload on the political system of the UAE to a large extent) Later on, in 1984 the GCC states initiated a series of aerial exercises engaging the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

But still the UAE could not achieve enough military strength due to the continued internal political differences on many issues discussed in Chapter 3. Additionally, it also lacked skilled manpower²³. Despite vast sums of money spent on modern weapons systems, the UAE and its neighbours remain

23 The bulk of the army's manpower and cadre of non-commissioned officers is provided by Oman's and Baluchis and, although capable UAE officers have entered military services there is continued reliance on Jordanians, Pakistan's and Britain in senior and technical staff positions. For details see Anthony H. Cordeman, The Gulf and the Search for strategic stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab Israel Military Balance (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1984) p. 597.

highly vulnerable to external threats. However the creation of GCC and the UAE's membership in it has helped it least for the time being in dampening the stress-overload caused by the Iran-Iraq War.

V. The Iran-Iraq War and the UAE

Until the mid-1970's the UAE-Iraq relationships were strained because Baghdad's radical Bathist Arab nationalism had lent support to groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) that sought to overthrow the conservative Gulf Arab regimes. Viewing itself as the bulwark of Arab Nationalism against a tide of Iranian nationalism and U.S.-European "Colonialism" in the Gulf region, Iraq aimed to assert itself as a Gulf state.²⁴ Thus the UAE perceived Iraq as a politically destabilizing influence and a potential hegemonic power in the Gulf. But in 1975, the Algier's Agreement between Iran and Iraq in which the UAE played a mediating role) which aimed at settling many

24 Jasin M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The years of Crisis (Baltimore Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) p. 78-79.

outstanding disagreements like, Shatt al-Arab boundry crisis, Kurds problems etc., changed the whole situation. Iraq then withdrew its support for the PFLOAG and the Ba'thist cells that had been active in the UAE. Nevertheless, suspiou among the small Gulf States still lingered about ultimate Iraqi regional aims. The Islamic revolution under Khameni in Iran posed a threat to both Iraq and the UAE and so at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, UAE had no alternative but to support Iraq (diplomatically and financially).

The UAE also provided financial assistance,



The UAE's relation with Iran under the Shah were strained as a result of the seizure of the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands. Still, the UAE and Iran shared broadly the economic, political security interests of the conservative Gulf States, and lucrative trade between the two helped boost the UAE's economic presperity - especially that of Dubai. But with the advent of a revolutionary government in Iran, because of Iran's Islamic fundamentalism the UAE political

system was put under 'stress'. However, this stress did not cross the limit so as to destroy the system, because the UAE kept a low profile,^{i.e.} maintained a low-key dialogue with Iran, mainly through Dubai and Sharjah, who transhipped much needed commodities across the Gulf to Iran. In response Iran on several occasions praised the UAE. The UAE under the auspices of GCC and in tandem with Kuwait, also unsuccessfully tried to paly the role of a mediator in the War, especially in 1983.²⁶

Iraq on many occasions had shown its displeasurer with the UAE's failure to provide greater support it needed (i.e., diplomatic and political support). But Iraq regards continued economic and communication links between UAE and Iran as "disgraceful" to the Arab Unity. The UAE however rationalizes its position by saying that "We stand with the Arabs, but this does not mean that we want to commit suicide."²⁷

26 David B. Ottaway, "Iran Accepts Gulf state mediation in war and Iraq, Washington Post, May 21, 1983, p. A 18.

27 See Malcolm Peck, P. 145.

During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War, (if it has really come to an end) though the UAE had to bear with various kinds of accidental attacks on its oil offshore facilities (e.g., Mubarak Oil fields, Sharjah), the UAE-Iran relations remained functional.

In 1984 and 1985 the tanker war (in which Iran and Iraq sank tankers of the third-party) represented a spillover of the war into the Gulf, but did not actually have a direct impact on the littoral states including UAE. There was a possibility of Iran lashing out in frustration on the UAE because of latter's apparent support to Iraq (financial aid). But due to UAE's diplomatic and commercial relations and Iran's weak economic position caused by the war, enabled the UA to remained secure.

There have been a series of terrorists incidents and riots carried out by Shia extremist in the Gulf, ^{states, including UAE} which undoubtedly had the support of Iran. The , of the Mecca Mosque in 1979 by Shia followers, the highjacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Iran, the May 1985 bombing

incidents in Saudi Arabia and the narrow escape of the Kuwaiti ruler on the May 25th bombing incident, etc. are some other examples of terrorism. However inspite of these and other provocations the UAE was successful in maintaining its distance from the war front because of ^{its own protective measures.} One the whole, the political system of UAE did not allow the "stress" to cross its limit, that is the federation has managed to persist or survive in the wake of all such potential threats.

VI UAE and the Wider Arab World

From the very inception of the federation, the UAE have pursued an active Arab policy through maintaining good relations in the Arab World. Although according to the constitution, the UAE aims to maintain good relations with all Arab Countries in practice, it is closest only to the moderate states. That is especially the case of Jordan which has provided the UAE with military and security personnel who have played an important role in strengthening both defence and internal security.

In return, the UAE have also extended diplomatic and financial support to Jordan in Arab affairs vis-a-vis Israel. Even when Jordan restored diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1984, the UAE did not criticize that move, although it represented a break in Arab ranks.

The UAE relations with Egypt since the Camp David agreement were strained. Previously, the UAE along with the other Arab states had invested heavily in the Arab Military Industrial Organisation, which was to produce weapons for its donors. Moreover, Egypt sustained its links with the federation through the presence of its educators, office workers and government employees who helped in establishing and functioning of the new administrative system. But signing of the Camp David accord by Egypt led to a break in ties between UAE and Egypt. Al-Ittihad, the UAE newspaper closest to the federal government position declared the signing of the Camp David accord as "something ominous and treacherous"²⁸ yet, a year and a half later, that is in mid 1987

28 Malcolm Peck, 1986, opp. cited p. 146.

an Egyptian delegation visited the UAE and the military cooperation was restored between the two countries.²⁹ Such an output was the result of the demand for security by the moderate countries like UAE in the wake of Iran-Iraq war and the radical threats put forward by the Iranian revolution.

UAE have diplomatically and financially supported most of the Arab Countries like Sudan, Morocco and Algeria. As stated in the previous chapter, it has emphasized on the intake of more Arab than the Asian and African manpower. But UAE's relations with the Arab radical states like South Yeman and Syria are not very warm. Although it had previously supported Syria for its pro-Arab role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its radical Bathist ideology was not acceptable to the UAE. The UAE had also unsuccessfully tried to nudge Syrian policies towards moderate direction.³⁰

29. Washington Post, December 5, 1982

30. Daily Report, July 6, 1984.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is perceived as the greatest long-term threat to the stability of the UAE. After the fourth Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, the UAE (along with other oil producing states) played an important role in using oil as a political weapon. However considering the UAE's geographical situation (the oil embargo) Arab-Israeli problem generally has only emotive appeal to the UAE.

The UAE and other Arab countries would like the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in such a way that would enable full Palestinian self-determination.

VII UAE and the Third World Countries

The UAE plays an important role in providing significant aid to various non-Arab Third World countries, especially those within the Islamic sphere in return it gets political and diplomatic support. Ties with Pakistan are close and diverse, encompassing significant aid massive labour migration to the UAE and services of Pakistani officers in the UAE's armed forces UAE's relation with India too

is important due to the large number of emigrant Indian workers there. Moreover, the UAE is planning to invest in India in some major petroleum industries.³¹ As far as Afganistan is concerned, The UAE has supported the Afghan resistance fighters with weapons and money.

VIII Japan and Western Europe's Relation with the UAE.

The UAE's relations with Great Britain remain quite close especially in regard to economic and security matters. Britain is a major trading partner, and a source of weapons. British personnel play a significant role in the armed forces for its internal as well as external security. French and Italy have become additional sources of modern weapons systems to the UAE as relations with the USA were strained in the mid-eighties. France has supplied the UAE with Mirage-2000, one of the most advanced aircraft which is the backbone of the UAE's airforce. However, UAE has time and again criticized the pro-Israeli stand of France.

31 The Times of India, Nov 4th 1988.

Japan is an important UAE trading partner and source of advanced civilian technology.³² Politically Japan like other European countries has now and again expressed the need for an evenhanded approach to the solution of Arab-Israeli problem. Indirectly, Japan had attempted to play a diplomatic role of potentially great importance to the stability and security of the UAE and the other Gulf states by mediating in the Iran-Iraq war as it is an important economic partner of each belligerent. However, these efforts did not yield fruit immediately.

IX Relations with the USSR and China

Compared to the US and Western Europe the communist states occupy less significant place in the UAE's (support) no international relations. Although the UAE and the Gulf states did not perceive a direct Soviet military threat in the Gulf that the US has, they were concerned about Soviet intentions in the Gulf following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The UAE, however, regard the various Soviet

32 Malcolm Peck, 1986, cited opp. pp. 114-115.

statements and actions on the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian question as positive support for the Arabs. The UAE has grown more disenchanted with the US role in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis and so it has now turned to the Soviets to do the needful. Although, previously the UAE had opposed the 1983 Brezhnev Gulf security initiative that would have given the USSR more say in the Gulf affairs³³ it has now allowed the Soviet and several Eastern Block countries to establish trade offices, commercial air links and have also exchanged official visits.³⁴ In November, 1985 UAE established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.³⁵

In 1984 the UAE extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC). In Feb 1985 a Chinese delegation visited the UAE to promote cooperation in the field of Urban and rural construction. Thus a modest economic relationship has been established between the two.

33 Malcolm Peck, 1986, P. 151

34 Khaleej Times (Dubai) Sept 3, 1984

35 Ibid, Nov 20, 1985.

X. **The UAE and the United States**

The United States has important economic relations with the UAE. In 1983 the US was the second largest exporter to the UAE and its major oil importer.³⁶ The United States is the prime source of current technology and of external security assistance. However, the political relationship between the UAE and the US have been strained since the Iran-Iraq War. The US policy failure in the Gulf, that is the fall of the Shah of Iran, the US inability to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-81) for more than an year; the US inability to resolve the Iran-Iraq crisis, the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force in the Gulf (to check the Soviet invasion of Afganistan) etc., have all tended to shake the UAE's confidence in the US pledges of support.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has caused strains on the US-UAE relations because the UAE considers the US economic and military support for Israel,

36 Malcolm Peck, 1986, p. 153.

the failure of the US to restrain Israeli "aggression" against Lebanon in 1978 and 1981 and the bombing of the nuclear reactor of Iraq in 1981, etc., as USA's one-sided approach to most of the (Middle East) problems. Infact the US is seen as the initiator of some of these threats faced by UAE.

Prospects of the Working of UAE in the International Environment

As already seen, the federation has received the needed support for its functioning from the international environment, especially its regional environment in the form of the GCC. The Gulf Cooperation Council will in the long run help the UAE to meet the major challenges posed by its volatile domestic environment (especially through the mediation efforts, of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). The peaceful settlement of the boundary problems with Saudi Arabia and Oman has boosted the image of the UAE both nationally and internationally.

The unsettled Arab-Israel crisis and the rise of radicals in the Arab world and other developments in the international environment can once again force the Arab oil producing states like UAE

to use oil as a weapon, if the US and other European countries do not find any other alternative to their fast declining oil reserves³⁷. It is likely that the next generation leadership may not be as accommodative as the present one and the federal system because of its weaknesses might find it too difficult to cope with the new challenges. Thus the uncertainty still lingers on in regard to the capacity of the federal system to cope with a stress-overload both from its internal and external environment at the same time.

Finally, one can say that unless the islands issue with Iran is not settled, the federation will time and again face "stress-overload" which may also lead to secession as was evident during 1987 in yet another attempted coup in Sharjah³⁸.

37 The 1973 oil embargo was the outcome of the rise of Arab radical in the OPEC who wanted to force the US to negotiate a favourable settlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis. But this embargo failed to produce results due to the splits in the Arab camp.

38 The Hindu (Madras) 23 June 1987.

Chapter V
CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

No federation can work smoothly. Sooner or later every federation has to face challenges posed by a number of external and internal factors. The persistence of the federation of impact depends on the manner in which the federation itself copes with the different types of stresses (demand stress and support stress) it faces, and how it maintains the delicate balance between the functions of the centre and its constituent units.

The UAE as a federation as we have seen has been able to function relatively satisfactorially. The major drawbacks of the working of this federation in its domestic environment is that it has not yet been able to frame a permanent constitution and therefore the polity is subjected to stress whenever the federal authorities try to execute their decisions which may be detrimental or disadvantageous to the interest of the member units (the emirates). Every time the polity was subjected to stress the FNC (Federal National Council) came up with the need

for a permanent constitution. But due to the opposition of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, who fear the dominance of Abu Dhabi, the provincial constitution is amended and/or extended at the end of its five years term.

The other area of stress in the federation of the UAE has been the internal boundary problems unlike in India, where the boundaries had been drawn and redrawn on the linguistic bases, in the UAE the boundary disputes between the different federal units remain due to the fact that the emirates have been accorded autonomous status in the constitution. At the same time the unwillingness of the different emirates to part with the land which might become an additional source of revenue in the case of the poorer emirates further complicates the problem. The relative affluence of Abu Dhabi and Dubai have led them to solve their boundary disputes amicably. But such disputes occur in the case of Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Quwain.

Another source of stress which hampers the functioning of the UAE as a federation is the dynastic feuds for coming to power in the member emirates.

Although in Dubai and Abu Dhabi this problem is not serious, Sharjah has been prone to coup attempts. The latest in line was the one that took place in mid-1987 when Shaikh Sultan abdicated in favour of his brother Sheikh Abdul Aziz, the Commander of the Sharjah National Guard.¹ But the abdication was totally unaccepted by the ruler of Dubai and other rulers. The very fact that this coup attempt was broadcasted and debated in the national dailies of the countries meant that Abu Dhabi, the most powerful emirate was in favour of the removal of Sheikh Sultan due to the large scale international debts incurred by Sharjah on account of its reckless developmental schemes. Finally, Shaikh Rashid's the prime minister call for an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council and the external support for the deposed ruler by other GCC countries resulted in a negotiated settlement whereby the perpetrator of the coup was declared the crown prince. Moreover, this coup points out that the emirates are volunerable to the wishes of the de-facto commandor of the armed forces.

1. The Times of India, 18 June, 1987

Fiscal matters tend to be another source of stress in most of the federations of the third world countries. One or other level of government do not command sufficient funds to carry out its due obligations. In the economic sense it would imply that the federal system was unable to work at the full potential efficiency. In the political sense it can give rise to a feeling of injustice on the part of states that feel discriminated against in the process. In certain circumstances this discontent might become serious enough to create a demand for withdrawal of certain members from the Federation (as Jamaica withdrew from the Federation of the West Indies). In the case of the UAE the raising federal funds as well as allocating budget expenditures have been a major issue; between Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah. In the wake of oil recession in the world market, Abu Dhabi found the federal budget expenditure too much for it to bear and so it called on Dubai to share a part of it. But Dubai with its too autonomous stand feared the domination of Abu Dhabi in the economic field and so till 1980 did not actually share the budget expenditure.

The federation of the UAE has been a reality for about two decades. During these years most of the major issues that created "stress-overload" were averted due to the support extended to the federation by its regional international environment. To the federation of the UAE with such a small population and the enormous wealth at display, the other third world countries both Arabs and non-Arabs, have also extended their indirect support in the form of supplying skilled manpower especially for the defence forces and developmental planning.

For smaller states federation is a viable mode of survival in the world without being swallowed by bigger states the large number of immigrant populations pose a great danger to the culture, norms and values of the society of the UAE and the gulf at large. Although so far the problem has not assumed serious dimensions it still remains a major source of threat to the nature of the political system in the UAE.

Finally, we can say that the application of D. Eastons system analysis as an approach to study the working of the political system of the

third world countries is not very useful because it does not take into consideration the patterns of control, power and influence. Moreover the approach talks only of survival of persistence of a political system but not its decline or disruption, nor does it enable us to closely analyse the mass political phenomena except in the form of overt demands put forward by them by means of demonstrations, etc., Of course, one of the major drawback of this approach is that it embraces a large canvas and so one ends up in confusion unless and until every fine detail is considered.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary Sources

Books

- Abdulghani, Josin M., : Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis
(Baltimore Md: John Hopkins University Press, 1984.).
- Albaharna, Husain ., The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States:
(England: Manchester University Press, 1968)
- Bertallanfy, Ludwig Problems of Life (N.Y: 1952)
- Cordeman, Antony H., The Gulf and the Search for Strategic stability: Saudi Arabia, The Military Balance in the Gulf, the Trends in the Arab Israel Military Balance (Boulder; Colo: Westview Press, 1984).
- Bulloh, John, The Gulf: A portrait a Kuwait Qatar, Bahrain and UAE
(London: Century Publishing, 1984)
- Burell, R.M. The Persian Gulf
(N.Y: Liberty Press, 1971)
- Busch, B.C., Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967)

Eastern David

The Political System,
(N.Y: Afrred A Knof,
1953)

A Framework of Pol:
Analysis
N.J. Prentic Hall, Inc.,
1965)

A systems Analysis of
Political Life
(N.Y. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1965)

Fenelan, K.G.

The Trucial States -
A Brief Economic Survey
(Beirut, 1969)

The United Arab Emirates:
An Economic and Social
Survey (London: Longman,
1976)

Heard-Bey, Franke

From the Trucial States
to the United Arab Emirates
(London: Longman 1982)

Kaplan, Morton A.

Contempory Political
Analysis
(N.Y. The Free Press,
1967)

Kelly, J.B.

British and the Persian
Gulf
(Oxford: Clarendon Pres,
1968)

Khalifa, Ali Mohammad

The United Arab Emirates:
Unity in Fragmentation
(London: Croom Helm,
1980)

- Lenczavski, George, Oil and State in the Middle East
(Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1960)
- Long, David, The Persian Gulf: An introduction to People, Politics and Economics,
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976)
- Moghtader, Hooshang "The settlement of the Bahrain Question: A study in Anglo-Iranian-United Nation Diplomacy" Pakistan Horizon, 26 no.2(1973) pp. 16-29
- Mc Clelland, Charles A Theory and International System
(New York: Collier Macmillan, 1986)
- Morcy, Abdullah Muhammed The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History
(London: Croom Helm, 1978)
- Morris, Cland The Desert Falcon
(London: Croom Helm, 1985)
- Niblock, Tim Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf
London, Croom Helm, 1986
- Shavely W.P., Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE
(Lexington, Mass: D.C. Health & Co. 1972)

- Tomkinson, Micheal The United Arab Emirates
(London: Micheal Tomkinson
Publishing, 1975)
- Verma, S.P., Modern Political Theory
(Delhi: Vikas Publishing
House, 1975)
- Young, T.C. (ed) Middle East Focus: The
Persian Gulf
(Princeton, N.J. Princeton
University, 1968) p.3
- Zahlan, Rosmerei Said The Origin of United
Arab Emirates
(London: Macmillan,
1978)
- Articles
- al-Fil, M.R., "Boundary Problems among
Emirates of the Arabian
Gulf", Journal of the
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
Studies, 2 No.8, Oct.
1976
- Eastern, D, "Systems Analysis &
its classical Critics",
Political Science Review
1973, Vol.3. P. 282
- Heard-Bey Franke, "Development Anomalies
in the Beduin Oases
in al-Liwa." Asian Affairs
61, Oct 1974 pp. 272-86
- Nasmyth, Jan. "If the British Leaves
the Gulf".. World Today
28, No.2 (Feb. 1972)
Ap. 75-81
- Peterson, J.E. "Tribes and Politics
in Eastern Arabia" Middle
East Journal 31, no.3,
(Summer 1977)

- Ramazani, R.K. "The Settlement of the Bahrain Question", Indian Journal of International Law. 12, No.1 January, 1972, pp 1-14)
- Thamman, Ray, E., "Iraq and the Persian Gulf" (Current History, 64 January 1973 p. 25-32.
- Sarbadhikari, Pradip "The United Arab Emirates in International Relations" Indian Journal of Political Science 38(2), April-June 77, pp. 143-152.
- Watt, P.C. "The Decision to Withdraw from the gulf", Political Quarterly 39, No.3, July-Sept, 1968 pp. 310-321.

Newspapers and other references

Emirates News, Abu Dhabi

Khaleej Times (Dubai)

The Hindu (Madras)

The Times of India

Washington Post

Arab Report and Record, London

Daily Report

Gulf Weekly Mirror (Manama)

Middle East Economic Digest

Middle East Economic Survey

: 145 :

Middle East Contemporary Survey
Summary of World Broadcasts
The Guardian (London)

