

**PARLIAMENT AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION DEBATE IN INDIA:
1974 – 1987**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
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the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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
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
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"PARLIAMENT AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION DEBATE IN
INDIA: 1974-1987" submitted by MIHIR RANJAN SETHI
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for the award of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE of
this University. This dissertation has not been
previously submitted for any other degree of this
University or any other University. To the best
of our knowledge, this is a bona-fide work.

We recommend that this dissertation be
placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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PREFACE

No nation can ignore the threat to its national security. The nuclear option debate in India first started after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and the Chinese nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964. It was also discussed when the issue of Non-Proliferation Treaty came up in mid-1960s. India refused to sign NPT since it was discriminatory and did not provide adequate security guarantee against nuclear attack by the nuclear weapon powers. After the Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, it was again discussed in a different context relating to the reactions of the United States and Canada. At present, Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapon capability as reported by international press and the U.S. supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan have generated much debate in India since the early 1980s. These issues have repeatedly been discussed in both Houses of the Indian Parliament.

Hence, the present study is an attempt to examine the role of Parliament in the debate on the nuclear option and its influence in the formulation of the nuclear policy of India. It also discusses the changes, if any, made in India's nuclear policy by the successive Governments since 1974.

I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Professor M. Zuberi for his inspiring guidance, encouragement and his constructive criticisms without which it would have been very much difficult on my part to complete this work.

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I am also grateful to the Library staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), and Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (ICPS) in New Delhi for their help.

Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents for their inspiration and encouragement. I am thankful to Mr. Lamba for completely typing this dissertation.

However, I am totally responsible for any mistake that might have crept into this dissertation.


MIHIR RANJAN SETHI

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CHRONOLOGY

CHRONOLOGYImportant Landmarks in the Development
of Atomic Energy in India

- 1945 : India's atomic energy programme began with the establishment of Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay by the late Dr. Homi J. Bhabha. The Institute is the national centre of the Government of India for nuclear science and mathematics.
- 1948 : In August 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission was constituted.
- 1949 : The Rare Minerals Survey Unit was set up. It later evolved into the present Atomic Minerals Division of the Department of Atomic Energy. It has located substantial deposits of uranium in Bihar apart from thorium in the well-known beach sands of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. India has the largest thorium reserves in the world. The long term atomic power programme is based on its use in future reactors.
- 1950 : Indian Rare Earths was Registered as a limited company.

- 1954 : The Atomic Energy Commission decided to set up the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay, Bombay with Dr. Bhabha as its first Director, to centralise and coordinate various activities. The Department of Atomic Energy was also created and a Heavy Water Plant set up at Nangal.
- 1956 : The first reactor, Apsara, at Trombay, became critical on August 4, 1956. Apsara, a swimming-pool-type reactor, was designed and constructed entirely with Indian effort, except for the fuel elements.
- 1959 : Uranium Metal Plant at Trombay produced the first ingot of nuclear pure Uranium Metal.
- 1960 : For large scale production of radioisotopes, and also for building up a cadre of technical personnel in reactor technology, a high flux research reactor was considered necessary. With the offer of Canadian collaboration under the Colombo Plan, the construction of the 40 MW research reactor, now known as CIRCUS, was started early in 1956. The reactor attained criticality on July 10, 1960. Site for the country's first Atomic Power Station (Tarapur) was announced.

- 1961 : Another indigenously designed reactor Zerlina attained criticality on January 4, 1961.
- Heavy Water Plant of 14.1 tonnes capacity at Nangal went into production in August 1962. A facility for upgrading the diluted heavy water from CIRUS was simultaneously set up at Trombay. Decision was also taken to build the second and third power stations at Rana Pratap Sagar and Kalpakkam respectively.
- 1964 : In 1964 a Plutonium Plant went into operation at Trombay to extract Plutonium 239. The Plant was entirely designed, engineered and built by Indian engineers.
- 1965 : Decision to set up the Nuclear Fuel Complex at Hyderabad was taken.
- 1967 : The Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay was renamed Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in memory of the great Scientist who died in air crash over Alps in January 1966 while enroute to an international atomic energy meeting. Electronics Corporation of India was established at Hyderabad.

- 1969 : An Atomic Power Station of 380 MWe was commissioned at Tarapur, Maharashtra. Three more atomic power stations are under construction at Kalapakkam near Madras, at Ram Pratap Sagar in Rajasthan and at Narora in Uttar Pradesh. Variable Energy Cyclotron project at Calcutta was started and agreement with French Consortium for building a Heavy Water Plant at Baroda was finalised.
- 1970 : Work on the Kota Heavy Water Project was started with completely Indian technology developed at BARC. Uranium - 233 was successfully separated from Thorium at Trombay.
- 1971 : Contact with a French Consortium was concluded for starting the third Heavy Water Plant at Tuticorin.
- 1972 : Decision to set up the fifth Heavy Water Plant at Talcher in Orissa in collaboration with the German firm of M/s UFDE was taken.
- Indigenously designed and executed experimental reactor Purnima became critical in May 1972. The first reactor of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project attained criticality in August.

1974 : Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi laid the foundation stone for the fourth Atomic Power Station at Narora.

The A.E.C. conducted the first underground nuclear experiment for peaceful purposes in the Rajasthan desert.

[Source: Balwant Desai (ed.), Atom For Peace : An Exposition of India's Nuclear Policy, New Delhi: A.I.C.C., 1975, pp. 51-53].

CHAPTER - 1
INTRODUCTION

A fairly prolonged debate on India's nuclear option has been going on in the country for almost two decades. Before the debate began in 1960s, India's nuclear policy was marked by a great degree of stability and coherence, as was a by-product of Indian tradition of non-violence. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who was a great exponent of nuclear disarmament, test ban and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons once declared on 20 January 1957 while inaugurating the Apsara reactor :

"... No man can prophesy the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my Government - and I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future Government of India - that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance, because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far."¹

Mr. Nehru repeated this assurance on subsequent occasions. In 1961 he said that "under no circumstances shall we manufacture atomic weapons"². Again in 1963 : "we have often said, from the very first day we started

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1. Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, 1953-57
(New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958), p.507.
 2. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 15, 1961.

the reactor in Bombay, that we on no account would manufacture nuclear weapons ... I hold to that".³ But soon after Nehru's death, the first debate in India on going nuclear was triggered off after the nuclear explosion by China in October 1964.

Fresh from the memories of the treacherous Chinese attack in 1962, the pro-bomb lobby both in the opposition and within the ruling party became vocal in demanding production of the bomb by India to counter the Chinese nuclear threat. While Lal Bahadur Shastri steadfastly refused to depart from the Nehruvian path of abjuring nuclear weapons, he also refused to commit future governments to this policy. He said while addressing a worried Parliament, "I cannot say that the present policy (of nuclear-pacifism) is deep rooted; that it cannot be set aside; that it can never be changed... an individual may have certain static policy. But in the political field we cannot. Here situations alter, changes take place, and we have to change our policy accordingly".⁴

3. Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, (Delhi, 1979), p.11.

4. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 November 1964, Cols. 1570-71.

Shastri reiterated this during his party conference in Durgapur in January 1965: " I cannot say anything about the future, but our present policy is not to manufacture the atom bomb, but to develop nuclear energy for constructive purposes".⁵ Thus, Shastri had to adjust India's nuclear policy to the changed situation.

It was partly the changed geo-strategic environment and the strong parliamentary criticism which led Shastri to search for a guarantee by the three major nuclear powers - the US, the USSR and Britain against the Chinese nuclear threat to India. Since Shastri could not get any assurance of the guarantee, he permitted the scientists to go ahead with the design of an explosive system.⁶ Thus India's policy veered around the idea of peaceful nuclear explosions and at the same time an unexpected but implied option to go nuclear.

The intervening period between the Chinese explosion and the Indian PNE in 1974 saw the assumption of Mrs Indira Gandhi to power, the negotiations leading

5. Bhatia, n.3, p.121.

6. R. Wohlstetter, The Budha Smiles: Absentminded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb(ERDA), Monograph 3:2, 1977.

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the launching of the first Chinese Statellite in 1970, the Indian victory in the Bangladesh war of 1971, and the adoption of the ambitious nuclear power programme embodied in the Sarabhai Profile of 1970.

Although Mrs. Gandhi reiterated the peaceful purposes of India's nuclear energy programme, she assured the Parliament that the policy was "being kept under constant review"⁷ in view of the explosion of a Hydrogen bomb by China. India also did not sign NPT on three grounds : imbalance of obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, inadequate security guarantees, and discrimination regarding the development of peaceful nuclear explosives. However, the lukewarm response of the nuclear powers to India's search for a guarantee against the Chinese nuclear threat was the most overriding factor which prevented India from signing the NPT.⁸

7. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, 1966-69, (New Delhi, Government of India, 1971), p. 372.

8. Ibid., pp. 342-43,
Lok Sabha Debates, March 27, 1967, Cols. 27-28.
Lok Sabha Debates, June 21, 1967, Col. 112.
Lok Sabha Debates, March 14, 1968, Col. 190.
Lok Sabha Debates, April 5, 1968, Col. 211-12.

The launching of the first Chinese satellite generated more debates on India going nuclear both inside and outside the Parliament in the country.

The post-1974 period has been chosen for this study as the Pokhran explosion triggered a series of events which have to be analysed. The United States and Canada applied sanctions against India - Canada stopped all nuclear collaboration in the construction of the Rajasthan nuclear power plant while the United States went to the extent of getting a new legislative measure passed by Congress to prevent supply of enriched uranium to the Tarapur nuclear station. There have been attempts to pressurise India to sign the NPT and bring its nuclear plants under fullscope safeguards. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's vow to develop a matching Pakistani nuclear posture even if "Pakistanis had to eat grass", the ambivalent nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme (proclaiming that it is for peaceful uses of nuclear energy while its senior scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan, boasts about Pakistan's capability in the field of uranium enrichment) and the Indian response to these developments are some of the major factors which have now generated an intense debate whether India should go for a nuclear bomb or not. The four leadership changes in India at the Centre since 1974 with different nuances on this question have given added importance to this debate.

The Parliament while occasionally debating on India's nuclear option has been expressing its concern over the threat to India's security due to the acquiring of nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan. However, the members of Parliament have been taking more interest in the nuclear option debate, especially after the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion(PNE) by India because of its impact on India's foreign policy.

Does parliamentary scrutiny come after or before the event? What has been the degree of closeness/openness of the system? How mysterious/opaque has been the cloak of the concept of national interest in hiding the facts? What has been the degree of technical competence and issue-awareness displayed by the members of Parliament while participating in the nuclear option debate? Have the four Prime Ministers - Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Rajiv Gandhi displayed continuity and coherence in their approach towards India's nuclear option? This dissertation, which adopts a historical-analytical method, makes a modest attempt to seek answers to these questions.

CHAPTER - II

PARLIAMENT AND NUCLEAR POLICY

Since the nuclear policy of India is one of the aspects of its foreign policy, the Parliament's role in the formulation of foreign policy would be discussed first before studying the nuclear policy.

In a parliamentary system, the majority party forms the government. It functions as the executive and is individually and collectively responsible to Parliament for the management of domestic and foreign policies. However, it is difficult to distinguish between the executive as the government and the legislature as the Parliament since this system operates on the basis of the majority party domination. The executive takes the initiative in the formulation and implementation of policy as it enjoys the confidence of a majority in Parliament. Thus, foreign policy decisions in India are essentially a function of the Cabinet, which in turn is responsive as well as responsible to the opinions expressed in the Lok Sabha. The decisions taken by the Cabinet and their execution must be such as are acceptable to the majority of the members of the Lok Sabha, since it can continue in office as long as it enjoys the confidence of the Lower House.

Theoretically, in a parliamentary system of government, Parliament has two-fold role in its control

over foreign policy. In the first place, Parliament has the power to approve, modify, or reject foreign policy as framed by the executive. Secondly, it has general supervisory powers over the conduct of foreign affairs.¹ It may cover both preliminary intervention - before a policy is adopted - and after that policy has been implemented which involves the detailed examination of government activities.² To enable the Parliament to play this role, the executive has to place all the relevant information before it and keep it informed of the government's various programmes, negotiations treaties, agreements, and other activities in its relations with other states. Though these powers with respect to foreign policy and foreign affairs are vested in the Parliament, their actual control varies from country to country depending upon constitutional provisions, established precedents and the strength of the parliamentary system.

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1. Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge University Press, 1961), 3rd edn., pp. 279-89.
 2. "The Role of Parliament in Foreign Policy Affairs", Inter Parliamentary Conference, Vol. 1, XLII, Geneva, 1954, p. 19.

Article 246 of the Indian Constitution empowers Parliament to legislate on all aspects of foreign affairs which is defined as "all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country". Article 253 also deals with ratification of treaties with foreign countries. Article 51 pertaining to the Directive Principles of State Policy says that the state shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.

Both the Houses of the Indian Parliament have equal powers of control over foreign relations except with regard to the moving of no-confidence motions which can be done only by the Lok Sabha and the discussion on Demands for Grants which is also the exclusive preserve of the Lower House. The conduct of external affairs is subjected to parliamentary scrutiny in both the Houses through Debates on the President's Address, General Budget, Discussions on Demands for Grants and Annual Reports of the Ministries of External Affairs, Defence and Department of Atomic Energy, Reports of the

Estimates and Public Accounts Committees, Question Hour, Half-an-Hour Discussions, Calling Attention Motions and Resolutions. Of these methods, debates and questions in the House are the most effective; the others have particular and more specific functions.

The discussion during the voting on Demands for Grants of the Ministry of External Affairs, Defence and Department of Atomic Energy (and on their Annual Reports) and also the debates on the President's address provide opportunity to members of both the Houses to review the foreign policy and foreign affairs. The debates generally take place after the 15th of February or at the beginning of March. During such debates on External Affairs opportunity is taken to relate them particularly to India's defence needs.

The Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee indirectly influence the conduct of foreign relations. The Public Accounts Committee's purpose is to ensure that money is spent as the Parliament intended it to be, to ensure the exercise of due economy, and to maintain high standards of public morality in financial matters.³ The purpose of the Estimates Committee's work

3. B.B. Jena, Parliamentary Committees in India, (Calcutta, Scientific Book Agency, 1966), pp. 168-80.

is to keep economy consistent with efficiency.⁴ In discussing the usefulness of the Estimates Committee, professor Morris-Jones points out that it performs three important functions. Firstly, together with the PAC, it constitutes an important component of constructive opposition (the Committee assumes "a special political significance as a substitute for an effective opposition"). Secondly, it acts as the most valuable training ground for Members of the House. And thirdly, the reports of the Committee have a great educative value.⁵

The role of these Committees in the domain of foreign policy lies in the fact that their recommendations are considered to be very important and they have access to government records and statements of expenditure and their recommendations, though not binding legally have the weight of convention and tradition behind them.⁶ If the government decides to ignore their

4. Ibid., pp. 138-42.

5. W.H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, (Philadelphia, 1957), pp. 307-308.

6. Judith M. Brown, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making and The Indian Parliament", Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (New Delhi), April-June, 1969, p.41.

recommendations, it must provide sufficient reasons to the Parliament or to be subjected to continued investigation and parliamentary criticism.

Resolutions are an important means by which the Members of Parliament express their opinion on international affairs and thereby lend the weight of national consensus to the governmental decisions.⁷ Members adopt another method - motions to influence the conduct of foreign affairs. These motions are generally moved either to discuss a report or a statement of policy or a situation of national importance which may have occurred recently. The motions and resolutions give rise to free exchange of views between the opposition and the ruling party members and thereby the public is informed of the major trends in foreign affairs. The executive has the power to control members of the ruling party on significant international events by using the party whip. Members also move adjournment motions⁸ which are considered as a form of censure of the government and indicate the

7. M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdhar, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, Delhi, 1977), p.514.

8. Ibid., p.376.

seriousness with which Parliament views a particular event.

A Member of Parliament may, with the permission of the Presiding Officer, call the attention of a Minister to an urgent and important situation and to request him to make a statement on the matter. The Minister makes a statement of the facts of the case and no questions are asked. The calling attention motion⁹ does not have the authority of a formal vote in Parliament and it does not offer an opportunity to extensively debate an international events. But it does permit Parliament to force the government to take note of the situation and to explain its policy.

Under Rule 55,¹⁰ the Presiding Officer can allow a notice for half-an-hour discussion on a matter of sufficient public importance which has been the subject of recent questions and to which the answer needs more explanation. No formal motion or vote is taken.

9. Ibid., pp. 367-72.

10. Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1985), Rule 55(1) (5).

Members of Parliament take substantial interest in foreign affairs by asking questions relating to the conduct of foreign policy. Both the opposition and the ruling party members may ask questions on points of facts relating to India's response to certain events. When a question is admitted, the Minister either replies orally or in a written form on the floor of the House depending on the starred or unstarred type of questions. Supplementary questions can be asked on verbal answers. The questions by the members on foreign affairs especially centre round two overriding needs - national security and national interest.

Under Rule 372,¹¹ Ministers can make statements on matters of public importance either to keep the House informed or to state the Government's policy with regard to a certain matter without having to answer questions or to engage in debate. These statements provide factual information and identify the position of the government on policy matters.

Besides these above-mentioned constitutional arrangements there are certain extra-parliamentary forums which play

11. Ibid., Rule 372.

a very important role in influencing the executive decisions on India's foreign policy. These are discussed below:

The most important institutional link between Parliament and foreign policy is the Consultative Committee attached to the Ministry of External Affairs. Before the formation of an informal Consultative Committee in 1954, Nehru used to meet a group of 25 members regularly, to consult and discuss such matters which were not discussed in the House.¹² Later in 1969, the word "informal" was dropped. This committee normally meets once every session and once in between the sessions to seek information on external affairs. However, the effectiveness of the Committee was limited due to guidelines prescribed for its working. Despite the changes effected in 1969, the guidelines maintain that the Committee would remain informal in its working. Secondly, no reference to discussions in the Committee was to be made in Parliament. Thirdly, the Committee could not summon witnesses, send for files or examine records.¹³

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12. S.R. Maheshwari, "Informal Consultative Committees of Parliament", Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. II(1), January-March, 1968, p. 35.
 13. K.P. Mishra (ed), Foreign Policy of India: A Book of Readings, (New Delhi, 1977), pp. 86-87.

Late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri started the practice of extra-parliamentary consultations with the opposition leaders on defence and foreign policy matters. Such informal consultations give an opportunity to the Prime Minister to place the views of the government before the members more persuasively, and to the opposition leaders to present an integrated view of the entire opposition. As Winston Churchill once remarked, "matters of national defence and foreign policy ought to be considered upon a plane above party and apart from natural antagonisms which separate a government and an opposition. They affect the life of the nation. They influence the fortunes of the world".¹⁴

The party in power has to support the government when the parliamentary opinion on foreign affairs divides itself on party or political lines. But sometimes the ruling party members also become sensitive to public opinion and to the reasonable demands of the opposition. But the ruling party members usually do not use the floor of the House on such occasions; they ventilate their views in the internal meetings of the

14. Winston Churchill, The War Speeches, Vol. 1, quoted in B. Madhok "Parliament's Influence on the Conduct of Foreign Policy", Journal of Parliamentary Information, October, 1969, p. 71.

party or its executive. The Congress party in this respect is flexible enough in accommodating different viewpoints. Discussions within the ruling party influence the government more in shaping policies or responding to public opinion on foreign and defence matters.

Opposition parties also express their opinion on matters relating to foreign policy in their executive meetings. They criticise the government's failure in its foreign policy on a particular issue and pass resolutions thereon which are also sometimes mentioned on the floor of the House.

Through the press, public meetings and demonstrations the members effectively utilize their extra-parliamentary activities by arousing public opinion on government policy failures and thereby influence the government's decisions.

The press is rightly called an extension of Parliament. It is through the press that the Parliament is able to control the executive effectively. The press acts as a great check on administrative lapses, bungling and lethargy. It is used by the members frequently to draw attention to government's alleged policy failures and to create public opinion in favour of the opposition parties.

perspective on foreign policy. Press conferences and public demonstrations organized by opposition parties further promote the role of the press as an important link between the public and Parliament.

The Parliament can be effective in its control over the executive only in proportion to the strength of the opposition which expects to form the government at some future date. In the Indian parliamentary system, if the opposition has been deprived of this expectation, this is because of its weak and fragmented character¹⁵ and also partly due to the domination of the Congress party in Parliament except for a brief period between 1977 and 1979. The ruling party maintains the dominance of the executive through the party whip and the threat of the dissolution of the House. Secondly, Parliament can effectively exercise its control over the executive when it is backed by strong public opinion. Thirdly, the effectiveness of parliamentary control over

15. L.M. Singhvi(ed.), Parliament and Administration in India(Delhi, 1972), p.30.

the executive depends upon the devices and procedures instituted by Parliament in carrying out its functions to meet the changing needs of society.

The Indian Parliament has not succeeded in establishing its dominance over the executive in terms of influencing foreign policy-making due to certain factors. Members of Parliament show marginal interest in the field of foreign affairs. More concerned about the pressing problems of development, they naturally tend to concentrate on issues which have a direct impact on their constituencies. Their focus on foreign policy remains confined to matters which touch on national security.

The personality factor plays a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy. Nehru's position as the principal architect of foreign policy set the trend of executive dominance. This virtually took foreign affairs out of the purview of Parliament for two reasons. In the first place, there was no significant opposition presence in Parliament. Secondly, in the Congress party, it was Nehru who had bestowed serious thought to questions of foreign policy before freedom. Nehru tended to treat Parliament as a forum to explain

his ideas and policies. However, Nehru's death created a situation in which no single individual could control the foreign policy decision-making process. For the first time, Lal Bahadur Shastri appointed a Foreign Minister.

All the successive Prime Ministers after Shastri have been following the same practice. Since Shastri's control over his party was not so strong, his decisions on foreign policy were based on consensus. Mrs. Gandhi had the same problem at the beginning. She became more assertive in taking decisions on foreign policy after her massive victory in the 1972 election. Due to the coalition nature of the Janata party, Mr. Desai had to rely on the Foreign Minister while taking decisions. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi initially gave more freedom to the Ministers due to his lack of experience in foreign affairs but it is reported that the Prime Minister's Secretariat has acquired greater hold over the conduct of foreign policy.

Although, the Cabinet is vested with making foreign policy decisions, these are generally initiated and taken solely by the Prime Minister in consultation with


the Foreign Minister. Sometimes Cabinet colleagues and party members are consulted if it is considered necessary to do so. Formulation of foreign policy by the Prime Minister is accepted as a practical necessity. It is recognised that formulation and conduct of foreign policy especially in modern times require centralised authority, chain of command, specialised knowledge, access to diverse and systematic sources of information, security, efficiency and often times speed. These characteristics are conspicuously lacking in the Parliament which discharges several other responsibilities as its authority is widely dispersed.

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There are certain structural hurdles as well which inhibit Parliament from taking initiative on foreign affairs. The executive is the creature of the legislature and denies the existence of competing centres of power unlike the presidential model. The Consultative Committee as well as the Parliament reflects the structure of Indian politics which represents the wide spectrum of political ideologies and strategies. The different ideological positions and strategies are too divergent and rigid to permit any meaningful dialogue, not to speak of a workable consensus.

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Secondly, public attitudes adopted by political leaders, particularly those of opposition parties, often vary from the private attitudes expressed by them in informal meetings. Many opposition leaders regularly express sympathy and support for the government's policy at the consultative committee meetings, but express quite different views on the floor of the Parliament.

Thirdly, political leaders in India are not used to keeping secrets. Hence, the government is usually reluctant to trust the members of the Consultative Committee with confidential information at its disposal, for fear that such information may find its way into the press. And in the absence of confidential information, the discussions in the Consultative Committee are hardly fruitful.

Foreign policy is considered a specialized subject with many complexities and technicalities. Therefore it is the constitutional practice in every country of the world to give considerable freedom to the executive in this field. But its jurisdiction of action is restricted through constitutional means i.e. consultation, scrutiny or authorisation and ratification of the treaties

by Parliament.¹⁶ As Ameller says, "in a foreign policy the role of Parliament is to approve and conform rather than direct the action of the government".¹⁷

Since foreign policy is a matter of negotiation rather than legislation, international law is more relevant than a nation's domestic law. It is also a fact that the legislative process and statutory law is less well suited to the detailed supervision and conduct of diplomacy. Legal prescriptions by their very nature lose sight of the sense of nuance and the feeling of inter-relationship of issues on which the success or failure of foreign policy so often depends.

Moreover, international developments not being wholly under any government's exclusive control, Parliament's influence and authority over foreign policy in general is inevitably weak. While taking into account the views expressed in Parliament, the decision makers in

16. Michael Ammeller(ed.), Inter-Parliamentary Union, (London, 1954), pp. 258-316.

17. Ibid., p.280.

the field of foreign policy have also to take into account number of other factors completely out of control of the Parliament. These are the policies of other governments, the strategic environment, the evaluation of a given situation by the officials of the foreign office and by the diplomats accredited to other countries. Thus the parliamentary opinion can only be one of the factors, and not always the most important, influencing decision-making in foreign policy.

In spite of these limitations, the Parliament can play very important role in influencing the foreign policy decision-making process. No government can ignore parliamentary pressure which reflects the public opinion while deciding policies, although it can get the sanction of the Parliament by its sheer majority. In fact, the hub of parliamentary control over the executive lies in the pressures of the public opinion which in turn is moulded in no small extent by the opposition parties. Parliament plays a significant role in educating public opinion which is generally ill-informed and unconcerned about foreign policy issues. By utilizing parliamentary debates, both the opposition parties and the government explain their point of view and strengthen their own position with the electorates.

India's nuclear policy as it came to be formulated revolved around two features: that of research and development for harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes and that of self-sufficiency in the nuclear programme.¹⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply convinced that science and technology were the keys to economic emancipation of millions of his countrymen. He was helped by Dr. Homi Bhabha who pioneered India's nuclear energy programme.

Atomic energy was initially used to kill thousands of innocent people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the popular mind, therefore, atomic energy is associated with war and destruction. This has clouded the manifold advantages it offers to the development and progress of mankind. Jawaharlal Nehru, more than any other world leader of modern times, visualised the tremendous potentialities of atomic energy for future progress of India and the world at large. As early as 1948, he moved a Bill in the Constituent Assembly for development and control of atomic energy and for setting up an Atomic Energy Commission.¹⁹

18. Speech in Lok Sabha, 10 May 1954, in Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1961), p.191.

19. Balwant Desai (ed.), Atom for Peace : An Exposition of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi, A.I.C.C., 1975), p.5.

While emphasising the role of nuclear energy in the country's development and progress and suggesting its uses for peaceful purposes, Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly on April 4, 1948:

"... atomic energy is a vast source of power that is coming to the world... if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war- indeed, I think, we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes".²⁰

The Atomic Energy Act of 1948 entrusted the control of atomic energy exclusively to the Central Government and provided a legislative framework for the initiation of India's nuclear programme. It sought to formulate policy guidelines and enable the executive to adopt measures for the promotion of the nuclear energy programme. It also provided a legislative sanction indispensable in a parliamentary democracy. The Act, therefore is an important legislative measure in the

20. Constituent Assembly Debates (Legislature),
April 6, 1948, pp. 3333-34.

evolution of the nuclear policy of India. It served its purpose for fourteen years after which it was replaced by the Atomic Energy Act of 1962.²¹

Nehru explained that "... our research work cannot be as public as normal scientific research or scientific work ought to be. First, because if we did that, any advantage of our research would go to others before even we reaped it, and secondly it would become impossible for us to cooperate with any other country which is prepared to cooperate with us in this matter, because it will not be prepared for the results of their research to become public. Therefore this Bill lays down that this work should be done in privacy and in secrecy".²²

The Atomic Energy Act, 1948 paved the way for the creation of an institutional framework to pursue the nuclear programme with vigour. On 10th August, 1948, an

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21. K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali, 1980), p. 3.
22. Nehru's speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) in July 1948 cited in Balwant Desai, (ed.), Atom for Peace: An Exposition of India's Nuclear Policy (Delhi: AICC, 1975), p.9.

Atomic Energy Commission was constituted to launch a full-fledged atomic energy programme. But in 1958, as a result of past experience and developments, the Government of India after careful consideration decided to reconstitute the AEC, investing it with full executive and financial powers and replacing the commission set up in 1948.

The Commission was entrusted with the following functions

- i. to formulate the policy of the Department of Atomic Energy for the consideration and approval of the Prime Minister;
- ii. to prepare the budget of the Department of Atomic Energy for each financial year and get it approved by the Government; and
- iii. to implement the policy of the Government in all matters concerning atomic energy.²³

On August 3, 1954 a separate Department for Atomic Energy was established under the charge of the Prime Minister with Dr. Homi Bhabha as Secretary with

23. Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, Annual Report, 1957-58, p.25.

headquarter at Bombay. On 3 January 1954 a separate institution called the Atomic Energy Establishment of Trombay near Bombay for research and development of atomic energy came into being. It is a national centre for research and development of nuclear energy and other related disciplines.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 passed by the Parliament was a more comprehensive measure and it sought "to provide for the development and control of atomic energy for the welfare of the country".²⁴ It empowered the Central Government to produce, develop, use and dispose of atomic energy and carry out research into any matter connected therewith; notwithstanding anything contained in the Electricity Boards constituted under Sections 3 and 5 respectively of that Act and other similar statutory corporations concerned with the control and utilisation of other power resources; to implement schemes for the generation of electricity in pursuance of such policy and to operate atomic power stations in

24. Lok Sabha Debates, 20 August 1962, Col. 2885

the manner determined by it in consultation with the Boards or Corporations concerned, with whom it shall enter into agreements regarding the supply of electricity so produced; to fix rates for and regulate the supply of electricity from atomic power stations with the concurrence of the Central Electricity Authority; and to enter into arrangements with the Electricity Board of the State in which an atomic power station is situated for the transmission of electricity to any other state.²⁵

Thus India's nuclear policy from the time of Nehru was based on the commitment to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to acquire technology from abroad without compromising its basic principles. That is why India from the early opposed any international control of nuclear technology. Jawaharlal Nehru warned against such "atomic colonialism" and declared that India was prepared to accept such measures" provided we are assured that it is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way and not dominated over by certain countries, however good their motives".²⁶ As early as 1948, the Indian representative

25. Acts of Parliament , 1963, pp. 1750-90, cited in Pathak, n.21, pp. 30-31.

26. Nehru in the Indian Parliament, in J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, Vol. II(Delhi, 1974), p.192.

at the UN, Mrs. Vijay Laxmi Pandit opposed the Baruch plan for international control of fissile materials. She stated that India would agree to the plan only if "all nations agree to the full and free inspection" of their territories.

Thus India's nuclear policy is based on (a) not to manufacture nuclear weapons; (b) to work for and support nuclear disarmament and arms control measures (c) to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and (d) not to accept discriminatory international inspection and safeguards in respect of nuclear facilities.

CHAPTER - III
PARLIAMENT AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION
DEBATE SINCE 1974

The Chinese nuclear explosion of October, 1964 created a security threat to India and the Government was pressurised to reconsider its policy of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Hukum Chand Kachhavaia of Jana Sangh moved a resolution demanding the production of nuclear weapons in India. He was of the opinion that only nuclear assurances would prove inadequate to meet India's security requirements. The Government of India's response was calm and calculated. It assured the House that India was in a position to meet the Chinese threat at the conventional level.¹ Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri assured the Parliament that Indian scientists were doing their job and were conscious of their duty to the nation. India's determination to pursue its own course was influenced by the inability of the international community to reach disarmament measures and its failure to provide any measure of security to the non-nuclear powers.

Another factor which had to be taken into account was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which was

1. G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi, 1968), p.23.

discriminatory in nature. Explaining the Government of India's views, Foreign Minister, M.C. Chagla, said that the NPT only prevented the horizontal proliferation without preventing the vertical proliferation; and the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear powers were to be subjected to inspection.²

Earlier also Mr. P. Ramamurti, M.P. had criticised this treaty on 27 November 1964 by saying that the nuclear weapons powers had the monopoly over the weapons and nuclear research which prevented other nations from conducting experiments even for peaceful purposes. The nuclear research would be playing dominant part in development as the other sources of energy would be inadequate in future.³

Although India opposed the discriminatory NPT, her policy focused on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. India had also foreseen that nuclear energy was an important tool to catch up with the technological revolution ushered in by the splitting of the atom.⁴

2. Cited in K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi, 1980), pp.129-30.

3. Ibid., p.129.

4. Ibid., p.128.

The highly ambitious programme known as the Sarabhai profile⁵ for the decade 1970-80 which was brought out by the Atomic Energy Commission in May 1970 emphasized self-reliance. The main objective of the profile was to give the country a balanced nuclear infrastructure for energy development wedded to a modest space programme.

At the third non-aligned conference at Lusaka in September 1970, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stressed the importance of science and technology in the development of the member countries. Its resolution on disarmament stated: "The conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which technology has made in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including peaceful nuclear explosions".⁶

On November 26, 1970, Mrs. Gandhi made a statement in the Parliament on government's desire to exploit nuclear energy for economic development. She told the Parliamentary Consultative Committee for Atomic Energy

5. Atomic Energy and Space Research: A Profile for the Decade 1970-80, AEC-901, 1970.

6. Foreign Affairs Report(New Delhi), Vol. 19, Nos. 9,10,11 September, October and November 1970, p.108.

in July 1971 that the Government would experiment with nuclear explosion for engineering purposes. In November, 1971, Mr. K.C. Pant, Minister of State for Home Affairs, declared:

"Our scientists are today engaged in gathering all relevant information in order that peaceful uses of nuclear explosive devices, when the technology is developed, can be available for the economic benefit of this country.⁷

Thus inspite of the opposition of the super powers to the development of nuclear capacity and peaceful nuclear explosions, India exploded her first ever nuclear device on 18 May 1974 in accordance with its self-reliant nuclear policy for peaceful purposes.

Reactions to the 1974 PNE in India and Abroad

The 1974 PNE proved that the Indian scientists had mastered the technology and India was the first country to explode the nuclear device underground in its inaugural detonation.

7. Lok Sabha Debates, Cited in Pathak, n.2., p.131.

Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh said that "it represented our resolve to develop our indigenous resources of energy for the benefit of our people through our own effort"⁸ It was a feat of a great scientific achievement. Dr. Raja Ramanna, Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, stated that "it was one of the most cheaply fabricated device. It proved that even at a low cost one can carry out a peaceful nuclear experiment which is fully contained".⁹

Despite the economic hardship of the common man aggravated by the railway strike which had entered its 12th day, it was an event of national rejoicing to the Indians. The national mood was one of spontaneous rejoicing unequalled since the Indian victory over Pakistan in Bangladesh war two and half years ago.¹⁰ The opposition parties arraigned

8. Hindustan Times, May 22, 1974.

9. Raja Ramanna, "Development of Nuclear Energy in India", Weekly Round Table, Vol. III, Nos 28, 24, 24, 1974, p.21.

10. Guardian(London), 20 May 1974.

against Mrs Gandhi over the railway strike were unanimous in their admiration for the Indian scientists as well as the Prime Minister personally though Mrs Gandhi had told the people that there was nothing to get excited. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Homi Sethna, urged the newsmen not to gloat over the experiment and make it to look bigger than what it was - an experiment to study catering effect, rock diagnosis, possibilities of stimulation of oil and gas and effects on soil and energy.¹¹ He also said that the experiment was carried out not to make some kind of demonstration but to explore if it could be utilised in the production of gas or crude oil.¹²

Reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna confirmed that India had not violated any agreement or convention.¹³ The Christian Science Monitor asked : "How any one could really object if

11. Times of India, 21 May 1974.

12. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 21 May 1974.

13. See Motherland, 30 May 1974.

the achievement speeds India's industrialization. India is the first country to have nuclear energy but to forswear nuclear weapons.¹⁴ The Chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission congratulated the Indian scientists on their successful test. The United States and Canada viewed the explosion from the non-proliferation point of view and were generally critical although they admitted that India did not violate any treaty stipulation on supply of fuel.

However, the test was not without its amusing sidelights; one was provided by the U.S. Secretary of Defence when he 'withdrew' the American nuclear umbrella which Washington had been allegedly holding over India even though none in India had noticed it before.¹⁵ Another was the peremptory summons which the Canadian Foreign Minister reportedly issued asking for an emissary to Ottawa to explain the Indian conduct. It was suggested that the Canadian Foreign Minister

14. Quoted in N. Seshagiri, The Bomb : Fallout of India's Nuclear Explosion(Delhi, 1975), p.11.

15. Free Press Journal; 25 May 1974, edit. "Pakistan's Explosion".

should be told to mind his business as India was under no obligation to explain its decisions to anybody.¹⁶ There were more ominous decisions to follow. Canada stopped supplying nuclear fuel to the Rajasthan Nuclear Power Station and the United States deliberately delayed the supply of uranium to the Tarapur power plant.

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, called the Indian nuclear explosion a "fateful development" and a "threat" to Pakistan's security. He warned that if Pakistan failed to get "sufficient conventional weapons" to act as a "deterrent" against India's "nuclear blackmail", Pakistan would forego spending on conventional weapons and "make a big jump forward concentrating all its energy on acquiring nuclear capability."¹⁷ Pakistan blamed India for creating a new situation in the sub-continent. It further stated that the Indian explosion was a blow to the non-proliferation treaty. Mr. Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, said that "the barriers have been breached. The efforts of the international community to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons have received a crippling blow".¹⁸

16. Patriot, May 25, 1974.

17. P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan : Atomic Threat to South Asia, (Delhi, 1980).

18. C.C.D/FV 638, 23rd May, 1974, p.11.

However, India's other neighbours refused to buy the scare Islamabad tried to spread in the region. Sri Lanka accepted the Indian Government's statement that the test was for advancement of nuclear technology for peaceful uses of atomic energy.¹⁹ The press in Bangladesh praised India's glorious "feat" and "gigantic strike", Nepal said that there was no reason to disbelieve Mrs. Gandhi's statement that India was committed to using atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The developing countries like Argentina and Senegal welcomed the test and expressed their jubilation over the technological feat of a developing nation.²⁰

In an interview to the correspondent of Newsweek a few weeks later, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi restated India's position: "There is a difference between a nuclear country and a nuclear weapons country; we are not a nuclear weapons country; we don't have

19. Pathak, n.2, p.172.

20. Pathak, n.2, p.135.

any nuclear bombs. We don't intend to use this knowledge or this power for any other than peaceful purposes. Our neighbours need not have to fear. Quite honestly, we view the explosion as an extension of our work of research for keeping abreast of developments in science and technology. No new budgetary provision was made for it. There was no foreign exchange expenditure. And there was no dependence on any other country".²¹

Unsolicited advice was offered by foreign powers. It was suggested that a poor nation could not afford the luxury of a peaceful nuclear experiment. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that the same argument was advanced when India sought to build steel mills and machine-building plants for its economic development. It was also necessary that India should acquire higher technology in order to overcome poverty and economic backwardness. "Is it the contention that it is all right for the rich to use nuclear energy for destructive purposes but not right for a poor country to find out whether it can

21. See Balwant Desai(ed.), Atom for Peace: An Exposition of India's Nuclear Policy, (New Delhi: AICC, May 1975), p.45.

be used for construction"? Mrs. Gandhi asked,²² In reply to another suggestion that if the money earmarked for atomic research was spent on food production there would be no food shortage, an Indian spokesman said: "Our priorities are our own business. They are not determined in Washington and Moscow. We wish your people would stop telling us what our priorities should be. Did you tell the Chinese what their priorities should be when they exploded their bomb in 1964?"²³

Spelling out India's peaceful intentions behind the underground nuclear test, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh rebutted overt and covert charges of India becoming a nuclear-weapon state in the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1974. He clarified that: "Our underground peaceful nuclear explosion must be seen in the context of our endeavour at the national level, to develop our resources and capacities to the fullest extent for the

22. Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi, 1972-77, Vol III (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1980), pp. 684-85.

23. International Herald Tribune, 27 May 1974.

benefit of our people... The non-aligned countries had also stressed this in their declaration at Lusaka Conference in 1970. We have no intention of making nuclear weapons".²⁴

The Jana Sangh was the most vocal among all the political parties in its campaign for a nuclear bomb after the Chinese attack on India in 1962 and Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. It passed a resolution on June 2, 1974 stating that May 18, 1974 was "a red letter day in Indian history". It was also consistent in its stand that India should manufacture nuclear weapons "to protect our independence". Mr. L.K. Advani, President of the party, expressed his views in a newspaper article 12 days after the Pokharan explosion. He said "the demand for an atom bomb is no longer confined to a section or sections which can be termed as a lobby. It is nation's demand".²⁵ He said, in making the assessment of the nuclear policies of the earlier Prime Ministers "Nehru's 'No Bomb Ever' was modified by Shastri as 'No Bomb Now'. The

24. Deccan Herald(Bangalore), 27 September, 1974.

25. Indian Express, 31 May 1974.

same policy has continued under Mrs. Gandhi also. I think that it is time even this stand is re-examined and modified".²⁶ Although he was not opposed to India using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, there should be some nuclear dimension in our defence arrangements.

On 23rd March, 1975 Mr. Advani said in his Presidential address to the Annual Session of his party that China had got a voice in global matters due to her nuclear power. India should not mind the annoyance of the superpowers and pleaded for giving a nuclear dimension to India's defence preparedness.²⁷ Mr. A.B. Vajpayee, another vocal member who had said in 1964 that 'an Indian bomb was the only answer to the Chinese bomb' cautioned the government against making a commitment for all times to come that nuclear energy should not be used for defence purposes.²⁸ He made this point in view of the Chinese nuclear threat.

26. Ibid.

27. Indian Express, 24 March 1975.

28. Times of India, 25 March, 1975.

The leader of the Bharatiya Lok Dal, Mr. Charan Singh, described the explosion as a good development. However, the notable exception was Mr. Morarji Desai who opposed the PNE. He doubted the government's intentions saying that the explosion would encourage those who favoured a nuclear weapons programme for the country.

The Indian Institute of Public Opinion, Delhi, in a report on Indian public reactions to the explosion published on July 27, 1974 said that its metropolitan poll of adult literates showed that 90% were proud of the explosion. In Delhi, 99 percent were "exuberant". Roughly the same percentage felt that the test had raised India's stature in the international community.

When the Pokhran Explosion took place on May 18, 1974 the Parliament was not in session. It had closed its Budget Session a few days before this major event. The timing of the explosion might have been deliberately chosen in order to avoid instant parliamentary reaction. Mrs. Gandhi perhaps wanted to know the reactions of the domestic public opinion and also of the other countries before she could face the Monsoon Session of Parliament in July 1974.

On July 22, 1974, Mrs. Indira Gandhi made a statement in the Lok Sabha²⁹ which asserted that India's nuclear explosion experiment carried out underground in the desert of Rajasthan was essentially a part of the research and development work which our Atomic Energy Commission had been carrying on in pursuance of our national objective of harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

She referred to her statements in the Lok Sabha on November 15, 1972 that the Atomic Energy Commission was studying the conditions under which peaceful nuclear explosions carried out underground could bring economic benefit to India without causing environmental hazards and to another statement on November 15, 1973 that on the basis of the above study, the question of going for underground peaceful nuclear explosions would be considered.

She further stated that: (i) she had written to the Prime Minister of Pakistan that India was willing

29. Lok Sabha Debates, 22 July 1974, Cols. 264-69

to share her nuclear technology with other countries provided proper conditions for understanding and trusts were created; (ii) unlike the advanced countries it was by and large welcomed by the developing non-aligned countries that the Indian PNE was a step in the research and development work in the atomic energy field; (iii) the US expressed satisfaction that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system had worked and the material used for the PNE was not from the US; the US government reiterated its stand that it was against nuclear proliferation; (iv) the Soviet Union noted that India carried out a research programme striving to keep level with the world technology in peaceful uses of nuclear technology; the French had congratulated India while the Japanese had expressed regrets; China had simply noted the event without any comment; (v) the Canadian reaction had been sharp; Canada was satisfied that India had not violated any bilateral agreement; but Canada maintained that the experiment represented a severe setback to the efforts being made in the international community to prevent all nuclear testing and to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear explosion technology.

The Indian Government disagreed with the

Canadian view and hoped that the differences of interpretation could be sorted out in bilateral talks. Mrs. Gandhi maintained that the peaceful nature and the economic purposes of the PNE were explained to Pakistan's Prime Minister and therefore India could not understand the talk of blackmail made by Pakistan; (vii) she failed to understand why India was being criticised on the ground that the technology necessary for peaceful nuclear explosions was not different from that necessary for a weapons programme since it was emphasised in the IAEA panel discussions on PNE in 1971, 1972 and 1973 that activities in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions were essentially research and development programmes; (viii) "After all", Mrs. Gandhi observed "no technology is evil in itself; it is the use that nations make of technology which determines its character. India does not accept the principle of apartheid in any matter and technology is no exception".

The members asked the Prime Minister whether the US government had suspended the shipment of uranium to India pending clarification regarding India's nuclear policy. She replied that the Tarapur plant was

under IAEA safeguards and the question of clarification did not arise.³⁰

Members in the Lok Sabha asked the Prime Minister about the continuance of Indo-Canadian cooperation in the nuclear field.³¹ Indo-Canadian nuclear cooperation goes back to the 1950s. But the relation between these two became strained since the emergence of NPT. In 1971, Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada had unsuccessfully tried to get assurance from the Indian Government not to develop nuclear device.³²

The Members were interested to know about the countries which were critical of India's nuclear policy.³³ The Minister of External Affairs replied that India's nuclear explosion was for peaceful purposes and also for economic development. It was appreciated by the USSR and other developing countries except Pakistan. Some countries subscribing to NPT had expressed concern about proliferation. He explained that India's experiment had no military implication and the US had also appreciated our test. He replied negatively when he was asked by

31. Lok Sabha Debates, 20 November 1974, Col. 91, 19 March 1975, Col.68.

32. Peter Lyon "The Indian Bomb", Round Table, No. 256; October 1974, p.40.

33. Lok Sabha Debates, 21 November 1974, Col. 68.

some members whether the government was contemplating any shift in India's nuclear policy in the wake of opposition by some countries.³⁴ When some members suggested India using nuclear capability to strengthen its defence against the Pakistan's aggressive defence policy,³⁵ the Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram replied that our policy was to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and India's border could be protected by conventional weapons.

When members asked questions about Pakistan's intention of producing nuclear bomb and whether India should do the same,³⁶ the replies given by the government were that it had no information about the former and India did not believe in making nuclear weapons since its policy was to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

On Pakistan's proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in South Asia,³⁷ the government maintained that Pakistan did not have any genuine interest in nuclear disarmament. It should have included the Asia-Pacific region in its proposal. It should have entered into prior consultations with India before introducing this proposal.

34. Lok Sabha Debates, 5 December 1975, Cols. 151-52.

35. Lok Sabha Debates, 13 March 1975, Col. 156.

36. Lok Sabha Debates, 25 July 1974, Cols. 41-42.

37. Lok Sabha Debates, 12 December 1974, Col. 29.

However, Pakistan started its nuclear programme not after India's PNE. It could be traced back from the statement of Mr. Bhutto who was a Minister incharge of nuclear programme when he told the Guardian newspaper in 1965 that Pakistan would make nuclear bomb even if Pakistanis "had to eat grass". In 1972, he decided to go for nuclear weapons and pleaded for an "Islamic Bomb". Pakistan's reaction after India's PNE was a cover up for its own ambition of going nuclear militarily. When China exploded its first atom bomb in October 1964, Mr. Bhutto was quick to declare about the dominant position of China in Asia.

As regards the introduction of Pakistani proposal for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in South Asia at the UN General Assembly after India's PNE it was politically motivated. India pointed out that Pakistan could have introduced the proposal after consultation with the other countries of the region. Besides, the situation in the region was not conducive to establishing such a zone. India pointed out that South Asia is an integral part of Asia and the Pacific. In both these regions, nuclear weapons have been stationed and foreign military bases established. Pakistan wanted to bring India's

nuclear programme under NPT through back door. A NWFZ in South Asia would automatically exclude nuclear China which has good relationship with Pakistan.

Thus India's peaceful Nuclear Explosion of 1974 was a challenge to the nuclear weapon powers in the field of nuclear research. It opened the ways for other developing countries in the field of nuclear energy programme and it was a strong signal to these nuclear weapon powers that India could not remain unconcerned about the global nuclearisation under the cover of NPT. It was not true that India's PNE was made secretly as alleged by some people.

There was nothing secret about India's PNE in 1974. Before the explosion took place, Prime Minister Mrs Gandhi, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Minister of State for Home Affairs K.C. Pant had made several statements about India's interest in PNE. India did not violate any international treaty to which it was a party.

After the 1974 PNE India made it clear that it would cooperate with the developing countries in the field of nuclear energy. This policy was

perceived by the nuclear weapon powers as a threat to their monopoly over nuclear technology. The U.S. and Canada put pressure on India to bring its nuclear installations under fullscope safeguards. However, India withstood the pressure by restating its nuclear policy of self-reliance. The U.S. did not insist on applying fullscope safeguards to South Africa and Israel but was discriminating against India because of its refusal to accept the American perceptions of the international system.³⁸

II

The nuclear option debate became subdued when the Janata party came into power because almost all the erstwhile vocal pro-bomb elements were either members of Morarji Desai's Cabinet or were among influential members of the Janata party. Since these elements were now in positions of power, their old demand for nuclear weapons was no longer a matter of mere polemics, a stick with which to beat the ruling Congress

38. K.K. Pathak "Nuclear Policy of India Restated", in Surendra Chopra(ed), Studies in India's Foreign Policy (Amritsar, 1983), p. 386.

government. Considerations of cost and national priorities and the compulsions of international relations perhaps injected realism into their thinking. Thus when China carried out her twenty-second nuclear explosion in the third week of September, 1977 there was not a ripple on the surface in India. This was a marked departure on the part of the constituents especially the Jana Sangh party which had been vociferously clamouring for a weapons programme during the last two decades. Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the Jana Sangh leader who had become the External Affairs Minister stuck to the official brief while speaking several times on the subject.

Prime Minister Morarji Desai had opposed the 1974 PNE and made statements saying that India would not go for further PNE. His stance was perhaps due to the Janata Party's penchant for policies different from the ones adopted by Mrs. Gandhi. Therefore, the Janata government wanted to review India's nuclear policy in the name of "genuine non-alignment" which was nothing but a rhetoric. Mr. Morarji Desai made several statements in Parliament and to the press explaining the Janata government's nuclear policy.

The main areas covered by these statements of were as follows:³⁹

- (i) India was using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and would not manufacture nuclear weapons.
- (ii) He questioned the need for conducting PNE for the purpose of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- (iii) He regarded the results of the PNE as inadequate compensation for the jolt to international public opinion and the consequences it had on India's peaceful pursuit of nuclear knowledge;
- (iv) India would not undertake any more nuclear explosion while maintaining India's option to conduct experimental explosion and he again qualified it by saying that if needed, it would be done in consultation with "other people". But he did not identify the "other people".
- (v) Mr. Desai denied any pressure from outside powers not to conduct any further PNE
- (vi) He denied that he agreed to any inspection of the India's atomic power plants. His condition was that "untill they allow us to inspect their plants, we will not allow ours to be inspected by them"

39. . Asian Recorder, Vol. XXIV, No. 28, 9-15 July 1978; pp. 14397-399.

. UN monthly Chronicle, Vol. XV(7), July 1978, pp. 67-68.

. Lok Sabha Debates, July 13, 1977, 13 December 1977, Cols 22-25.

(vii) India will not sign the NPT, "whatever may be the consequences"; (viii) He also insisted on reducing nuclear weapons, destroying existing stock - piles and concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Mr. Desai's statements were discussed in Parliament. They were mainly in the context of issues regarding conduct of peaceful nuclear explosion, fuel supply by the US and Canada, and pressures on India to accept fullscope safeguards and production of nuclear weapons by India. The members were interested to know whether the government was changing its policy regarding carrying out peaceful nuclear explosion.⁴⁰ The Prime Minister replied that the government still adhered to the policy that atomic energy should be utilized for peaceful purposes only.

On further conduct of nuclear explosions, Mr. Desai said that if any nuclear explosions were necessary for peaceful purposes, these would be conducted publicly. There would be "no hide and seek" in the matter and the results of such development would be open to others. He declared in the Lok Sabha that his government did not consider any more nuclear explosions necessary for peaceful purposes but added that he was not making

40. Lok Sabha Debates, 6 July 1977, Col. 142.

any commitment for all times to come.⁴¹

Mr. Desai told a questioner that it was true that the 1974 explosion which the previous government had claimed for peaceful purposes had created difficulties for India. "I have come to conclusion that no nuclear explosion is necessary for peaceful purposes. This has been made clear in the talks with America",⁴² Desai added. When asked if the US was pressurising India to sign NPT, the Prime Minister categorically stated that "unless those who possess atomic weapons and conduct explosions give them up we cannot sign the treaty".⁴³ In a televised interview with NBC in New York on June 11, 1978 he admitted that the 1974 PNE by Mrs. Gandhi's government was for peaceful purposes. While replying to questions he said: "when the explosion was made three years ago by my predecessor, I have no doubt that she did not do it for any purposes or weapons."

41. Times of India, 14 July 1977.

42. Lok Sabha Debates, 13 July 1977, Col. 189.

43. Lok Sabha Debates, 23 February, 1978, Col 99-100, 1 March 1978, Col. 35-36.

She did it only to make use (of it) for peaceful purposes".⁴⁴ He further said: " I personally think that it was not necessary to have explosions even for peaceful purposes".

Desai's strong disapproval of nuclear blasts and arms immediately won him accolades from the United States. Mr. Warren Christopher, US Deputy Secretary of State said during a one-day stop over in New Delhi on July 23, 1978 that "we accept it at face value and fully trust".⁴⁵ Mr. Desai's statement that India would detonate no more atomic devices without consultation and inspection.

During his 1978 visit to the United States, Mr. Desai regretted the 1974 PNE and declared that India would never conduct another test. On his return Mr. Desai was cornered by the Members of Parliament who were furious that he should have committed India perpetually not to undertake another test. During the Half-an-Hour discussion on 26 July 1978,⁴⁶ Mr. Samar Guha said that the statement

44. K.S. Chavda (Comp), Morarji Desai on Disarmament, Peace and Prosperity (Dhinoj, 1988), p.53-54, emphasis added.

45. Hindu, 12 June 1978.

46. Times of India, 25 July 1978.

made by the Prime Minister in the course of his visit to USA that India would not undertake any nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes had created much concern" in the minds of the people like me, a humble student of science". He further asked, "I want to know from my government: What stands in the way of utilization of this blast technology for developing nuclear engineering for constructive and developmental purposes".⁴⁷ Mr. K.P. Unnikrishnan while taking part in the discussion made reference to Prime Minister Desai's statement in the U.N. abjuring explosions even for peaceful purposes. He said, that Mr. Desai had possibly taken a moral posture as he used to do before.⁴⁸

Mr. Desai clarified that he had only pledged to abjure nuclear "explosion", but would have no hesitation to have a "blast" which presumably was a peaceful exercise. The Prime Minister made three statements in Parliament in July 1978. On 26 July, Desai made an apparent retreat from his earlier assurances that India would undertake no more nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes. Answering questions, he said, he was

47. Lok Sabha Debates, 26 July 1978, Col. 360-61.

48. Ibid., Cols 367-369.

not ruling out atomic blasts for engineering purposes such as mining, oil prospecting or earthmoving. The Prime Minister indicated that the kind of nuclear explosion he opposed was carried out at Pokhran.

"Pokhran created all the troubles without our gaining anything", he said, adding that it really was staged by Mrs. Gandhi "for political purposes"⁴⁹ He said, "economic and technical studies were under way to find a substitute fuel for Tarapur". On 31 July, he told the Rajya Sabha that the 1974 blast had made India suspicious in some foreign eyes and this India had to live down. "From my knowledge of result of the Pokhran explosion" he found that, "the experiment, if it can be called, merely confirmed certain theoretical knowledge and gave some information on the behaviour of radio activities on neighbouring rocks and shell".⁵⁰

Discussing the cost of the explosion, he said, "India experienced the consequences of Pokhran everytime we entered into any cooperation and collaboration

49. Lok Sabha Debates, 26 July 1978, Statesman, 27 July 1978.

50. Selected Speeches of Morarji Desai, 1977-79, (New Delhi: Publication Division, Govt of India, 1986), pp. 95-96.

arrangement for the fulfillment of our need of the fuel and equipment for the conduct of research and development". Stating that the question of PNE had become an international issue, the Prime Minister said, there was no alternative" for us but to stand for exorcising the demon of the use of nuclear power for non-peaceful purposes"⁵¹. He regarded the results of the PNE as inadequate compensation for the jolt to international public opinion and the consequences it had on India's peaceful pursuit of nuclear knowledge.

The Prime Minister confirmed a press report that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were barred under an agreement India signed with IAEA at Soviet instance for the supply of heavy water by the Soviet Union to RAPS-I & II. He said: "The agreement applies to use the materials produced at the plant. The condition was there before when I took the charge. There is no secret about it".⁵²

Mr. Nye, Assistant Administrator of Energy and Research Development Agency of the USA came to New Delhi on January 8, 1977. He had a discussion with Prime Minister Desai regarding possible resumption of

51. Ibid.

52. Hindustan Times, 18 June 1978.

nuclear fuel for the Tarapur plant and ways to prevent production of nuclear weapons. When a reporter asked him about his talk with Mr. Desai he replied "they were very bright".⁵³

The opposition Congress Party Members in the Parliament charged five days after Mr. Nye's departure that there was an apparent US-inspired "subtle" deviation in India's nuclear policy.⁵⁴ Foreign Minister Vajpayee refuted the accusation by saying that India would not change its policy under any kind of pressure from any country. He said: "India shall not allow inspection of any of its atomic plants built with its own genius by any country under any circumstances."⁵⁵

On December 27, 1977 three days before President Carter's visit to India, the government leaked to the press through UNI a report that it had decided to set up a Joint Committee of Indian and US nuclear scientists to ensure that "fullscope safeguards proposed by Washington do not affect nuclear research and

53. Indian Express, 5 August 1977.

54. Lok Sabha Debates, 8 August 1977; Times of India, 9 August 1977.

55. Rajya Sabha Debates, 7 August 1977; Hindu, 9 August 1977.

development of not only India but also of other developing countries".⁵⁶ During his visit to India, Mr. Carter criticised India's position on fullscope safeguards and asked his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance to send a "cold and very blunt" letter to India on the issue. Mr. Desai reportedly told Carter that India's price for fullscope safeguards was that Washington and Moscow should stop all atomic test explosions and agree to gradually dismantle their nuclear arsenals.⁵⁷

In the last week of January, the Prime Minister wrote a letter to President Carter restating India's case on NPT and "fullscope" safeguards. On February 21, he told the Lok Sabha that India would be free to make its own arrangements to fuel Tarapur if the US did not provide enriched uranium within a reasonable time.⁵⁸

Dr. Subramanyam Swamy asked whether the government had spelt out the minimum pre-condition for

56. UNI Report, 27 December 1977.

57. Indian Express, 3 August 1978.

58. Lok Sabha Debates, 21 February 1978, Col. 79.

being signatories to the NPT and to the fullscope safeguards of the IAEA. Foreign Minister Vajpayee replied that there had been no change in India's policy of not signing NPT since it was discriminatory. As regards safeguards, they should be applicable to all the nations including the USA and the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

Mr. H.V. Kamath made a statement in the House under Rule 377 regarding inordinate delay on the part of the US government in arranging of the shipment of uranium needed for Tarapur and two statements made by the Foreign Minister in the Lok Sabha on February 23, 1978 regarding President Carter's communication to the Prime Minister Desai to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all of our nuclear activities and on March 2, 1978 the statement made by the Minister of State for External Affairs that the government was studying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Bill passed by the US Senate and its implications on Indo-US nuclear cooperation.⁶⁰

59. Lok Sabha Debates, 23 February, 1978, Col. 99-100.

60. Lok Sabha Debates, 18 April 1978, Col. 245-46.

Mr. K.P. Unnikrishnan, asked whether there was pressure from the US for fullscope safeguards and whether India had given any such assurance and whether it was a fact that the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act would cover India's all nuclear installations whereas the Soviet Agreement dated November 17, 1977 was confined to one nuclear station - RAPP I & II.⁶¹

On November 22, 1978 speaking on a call-attention motion under Rule 377, Mr. G.M. Banatwala said that it was most unfortunate that the government policy regarding nuclear installations was falling a prey to the US pressure. The Prime Minister had reportedly assured the Lok Sabha and the entire nation that India's nuclear installations would not be thrown open to international inspection. This assurance, even in the face of the US interrupting fuel supply for Tarapur, won wide public approval. The Prime Minister had also assured the nation that if the US did not honour its obligation with respect to fuel supply, India would look to alternative sources of supply. The wide public

61. Lok Sabha Debates, 26 July 1978, Cola. 367 -69.

approbation of policy had made it clear that it was a national policy beyond all controversies. But reports had appeared that an international panel of scientists chosen by India and USA would examine all types of safeguards on atomic energy establishments. This was a shocking development which signified a reversal of policies and surrender to the US pressure. The government should make a detailed statement to the Lok Sabha and through it to the entire nation.⁶²

Members of Parliament expressed concern that the Desai government was succumbing to the American pressure to put India's nuclear installations under fullscope safeguards. Mr. Madhu Limaye, an important leader of the Janata party, in a press conference said that Indian foreign policies were made in the US and transmitted to India.⁶³ The Janata government yielded to the Canadian and American pressure who linked supply of nuclear fuel with signing of NPT since they had been clamouring against India's 1974 PNE.⁶⁴

62. Lok Sabha Debates, 22 November 1978, Col.264.

63. Times of India, 26 February, 1979.

64. K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective(New Delhi, 1980), p.196.

The concern of Members of Parliament was also due to the fact that Mr. Desai had supported the American position on the 1974 PNE. He had publicly declared during President Carter's visit that India would not accept fullscope safeguards as a price for supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur plants and his statements were widely acclaimed by the press and the public. But actually Mr. Desai's government had accepted the safeguards for supply of Soviet heavy water to RAPP- I & II. This led the US government to conclude that Mr. Desai could be induced to accept fullscope safeguards for all Indian nuclear plants for the supply of nuclear fuel.⁶⁵

Mr. Desai had expressed his government's views not to go for nuclear weapons and considered peaceful explosions unnecessary. On June 29, 1977, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram was asked by a member about the Prime Minister's categorical statement that India would not manufacture nuclear weapons for defence although China possessed them and Pakistan was trying to get them and whether the statement of the Prime Minister and change

65. Ashok Kapur, "India's Nuclear Politics and Policy: Janata Party's Evolving Stand", in T.T. Poullose (ed.) Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy, (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 178-79.

in attitude of the Janata government would weaken our defence.⁶⁶

The Defence Minister replied that India would not manufacture nuclear weapons irrespective of what other countries did. He further said that there was no change in government's policy. India had declared many a times that she had no intention of making nuclear weapons and that nuclear energy should be used for peaceful purposes. He also said that the government was aware of the development of nuclear capability in neighbouring countries. The government did not visualize a nuclear threat at the moment. The government continued to hold that the Defence of India could be ensured by adequate military preparedness based on conventional weapons.

External Affairs Minister Vajpayee had declared at the UN General Assembly on October 4, 1977, that India had been consistently opposed to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons and that it would not go in for them even if all other countries in the world did so.⁶⁷ Earlier, on September 30, 1977, he

66. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 June 1977, Col. 166-67.

67. Times of India, 6 October 1977.

assured the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, "it is our solemn resolve that whatever the rest of the world may do, we will never use atomic energy for military purposes".⁶⁸ With reference to the above-mentioned speech of Mr. Vajpayee, a Member asked whether the Foreign Minister had made a statement that India would never make nuclear arms; and what were the policy decisions made thereon and its salient feature. Mr. Vajpayee reiterated the consistent policy of the Government of India not to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The salient feature of government policy on the subject were: (a) India was not only against the proliferation of nuclear weapons but was against nuclear weapons themselves; (b) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be confused with non-dissemination of nuclear technology; (c) India would always oppose any means or measures which stood in the way of peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy; (d) India would be prepared to cooperate wholeheartedly with other countries in discussing ways and means of putting

68. Sunday Standard, 3 October 1977.

an end to the danger of nuclear weapons.⁶⁹

On reports regarding the Pakistani nuclear programme, the Prime Minister replied that the government had no knowledge about Pakistan's intentions to produce nuclear weapons and the government adhered to the policy that atomic energy should be used for peaceful purposes.⁷⁰

The Parliamentary Consultative Committee on atomic energy which met on May 7, 1979 informed Prime Minister Desai about the recent American discovery that Pakistan had embarked on a programme to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Therefore, the government should reconsider its policy in view of the new situation. Mr. Krishna Kant, an influential member of the Janata party who has publicly advocated a weapons programme, noted that India was under US pressure to submit fullscope safeguards. He also reminded Mr. Desai of reports that

69. Lok Sabha Debates, 17 November 1977, Cols 118-19.

70. Lok Sabha Debates, 30 November 1977, Cols. 66-67.

weapons grade uranium had been illicitly diverted to Pakistan from the United States. Prime Minister Desai, however, felt that it would be "suicidal" for India to abandon its renunciation of nuclear weapons. He reaffirmed his government's declared policy against making nuclear weapons.⁷¹

Janata party's policy under Morarji Desai was described as "a nuclear Munich"⁷² hinting at the alleged intention of the policy to appease the Western countries. One interesting point to note here is that the statement regarding India's unilateral adherence to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was coming from an erstwhile Jana Sangh leader who in his Jan Sangh days used to be an advocate of the bomb. His anti-bomb stance had, probably, something to do with the principle of collective responsibility. It also meant that power was a great modifier of position.

When asked about Pakistan's proposal for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in South Asia, the government replied that it opposed because it should be applicable to the other regions of the world including the Asia - Pacific region.⁷³

71. Statesman, 8 May 1979.

72. R. Rama Rao, "A Nuclear Munich?" in T.T. Pulouse (ed.), Perspective of India's Nuclear Policy, (New Delhi, Young Asia Publishers, 1978), pp.240-46.

73. Lok Sabha Debates, 9 March 1978, Col. 107.

However, one notable departure by the Janata Government was not to vote against the proposal of Pakistan at the UN General Assembly in 1977 and 1978 which reversed the stand taken by the earlier government. The government of Mrs. Gandhi had been opposing the proposal from its very inception. This reversal by the Janata Government created the impression in the United States that Mr. Desai could be persuaded to have a regional non-proliferation pact which was against the well-established nuclear policy of India.

Although Mr. Desai claimed that the Janata government was continuing the nuclear policy of India being pursued from the time of Nehru, his statements that India would not conduct PNEs and were a departure from the past if needed, would do so in the presence of 'others'. It had been the policy of the earlier governments that India would develop her own PNE technology since the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions were useful and belonged to the realm of futuristic technology. It may be mentioned here that even Jawaharlal Nehru did not foreclose India's option of going for PNE and was opposed to make nuclear programmes of India open to inspection by the nuclear weapon powers. Therefore, the Janata Government's nuclear policy was a departure from the policies pursued by

the earlier governments in the context of India's world view since it failed to project an alternative world view.⁷⁴ Nehru, Shastri and Mrs. Gandhi had resisted the pressure by the nuclear weapons powers to change India's nuclear policy of self-reliance.

Commenting on Prime Minister Desai's stand on PNE, Mr. T.N. Kaul the present Indian Ambassador to USSR said that the Prime Minister need not have given expression to his "personal" views and unilaterally renounce India's sovereign rights to conduct PNE.⁷⁵

III

In Mid-1979, the Desai government resigned. The interim government headed by Mr. Charan Singh had a brief

74. B.M. Kaushik, "Nuclear Policy for India," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1977, pp. 17-18.

75. T.N. Kaul, Ambassadors Need Not Lie (New Delhi, 1988) pp. 152-53.

existence after the collapse of the Janata coalition. During this time, Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme came to light. It was feared that Pakistan was about to explode a nuclear device.⁷⁶ Mr. Charan Singh said in his Independence Day speech that "Pakistan whose people were our brothers till yesterday was attempting to make bomb".⁷⁷ He feared that Pakistan would use this bomb against India. He further added that "India does not want to join the race to make the bomb, but if Pakistan goes ahead with its plan to make a bomb then India will also have to reconsider the entire question."⁷⁸ Former Foreign Minister Vajpayee immediately attacked his statement and predicted it would 'harden' the attitude of the US on supply of uranium to Tarapur. He told reporters that Mr. Charan Singh had no right to make any sweeping policy changes because his administration was only a caretaker government.⁷⁹

76. See, Major General D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb, (Delhi, 1979).

77. Tribune, 16 August 1979.

78. Ibid.

79. Statesman, 16 August, 1979.

C. Subramaniam, the Defence Minister supported the Prime Minister's stand telling the National Defence College in October 1979 that all future governments and generations were not bound by the pledge that India would not make nuclear weapons.

The statement made by Prime Minister Charan Singh should be viewed in the context of threat to India's security from Pakistan's clandestine nuclear activities. His statement was due to the changed geostrategic environment in the sub-continent. It assured the armed forces that the political leadership was not unaware of the strategic implications of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Mr. Charan Singh, by making this statement, was even prepared to face the consequences of non-supply of nuclear fuel by the USA. His statement imparted a direction to India's nuclear policy which had been distorted by the Janata Government.

IV

In January, 1980 Mrs. Gandhi returned to power. During the Budget Session of the Parliament, she expressed her grave concern over Pakistan's efforts to

acquire nuclear capability. Replying to the debate on the Motion of Thanks to the President Address in the Lok Sabha on January 30, 1980, she said: "The production of nuclear bombs by any country in our region is bound to create reaction in others, which will increase the suspicion and fears of the intentions of the bomb producer. We have made it clear that India has no intention of producing nuclear weapons, but at the same time we do not give up our right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and development purposes".⁸⁰ In her first major nuclear policy statement on 12th March, 1980, Mrs. Gandhi reaffirmed India's commitment to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. She told the Parliament that although her government was committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy it would not hesitate from carrying out "nuclear explosion or implosion, whatever is necessary, in the national interest."⁸¹ Mrs. Gandhi said, it was necessary

80. Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi, 1980-81, Vol IV (New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1985), p.17.

81. Tribune, March 14, 1980.

to study the issue closely because of Pakistan's ongoing nuclear programme which would have a serious impact on the security environment of the region. She said: "we must have our eyes and ears open and be in touch with latest technology. We should not be caught napping".⁸² The issue should be viewed in the perspective of whether "our energy (nuclear) race will safeguard our interest or endanger it".

Thus Mrs. Gandhi restated with clarity the earlier nuclear policy of India on PNE which had been distorted by the Desai Government. Mrs. Gandhi, unlike Mr. Desai, pronounced herself only against nuclear weapons and not against PNE which had the sanction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. India's nuclear policy was thus back to square one: Opposition to nuclear weapons anywhere and at anytime but PNE when required. Mrs. Gandhi's statements were hailed unaminously by the Indian press and restored clarity and purpose to India's nuclear policy.⁸³ The Tribune editorially

82. Hindustan Times, 14 March, 1980.

83. R.R. Subramanian, "India and the PNE's : The Changed Mood in 1980", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1980, p.30.

commented that the Prime Minister's statement "reflects basically what has always been regarded as India's traditional policy on the subject barring Mr. Desai's brief digression during his period in office as Prime Minister".⁸⁴ Thus, while restating India's nuclear policy, Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that national security could not be compromised at any cost.

Mr. V.N. Gadgil, Congress(I) Member of the Lok Sabha expressed his concern in a call-attention motion regarding China's decision to help Pakistan in developing nuclear tests for its first nuclear device. Top Chinese nuclear scientists were visiting Islamabad for preliminary discussions to be followed by an inspection of Pakistani nuclear project. Since it was a serious development which would alter basically the security environment of India, Mr. Gadgil requested the government to make fundamental changes in India's defence policy and defence strategy.⁸⁵

During the debate on Demand for Grants for the Ministry of Defence on July 19, 1980, Mr. A.E. Vajpayee (BJP) and Dr. Subramanyam Swamy (Janata) asked the government to

84. Tribune, 13 March 1980.

85. Lok Sabha Debates, 30 July 1980, Col. 196-97.

make nuclear bomb in view of Pakistan's reported efforts to acquire nuclear capability. However, Mrs. Gandhi ruled out making any bomb. Explaining the nuclear policy of India, she said: "Our own view on atomic energy has been quite clearly explained in this House in reply to questions. But I shall reiterate it just in case any misunderstanding remains. We are committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, we must do everything possible to enable our scientists to gather knowledge and experience. Also I should ask: can one really maintain that the possession of one or a few bombs would be deterrent to a conflict?"⁸⁶

At a press conference, on 10th July 1981, clarifying India's nuclear intentions, Mrs. Gandhi said "we do not believe in deterrent theory and that India would not make nuclear weapons even if Pakistan did so".⁸⁷ Replying to a question proposing a revision of India's nuclear policy in view of moves by Pakistan to manufacture

86. Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi, n.80, p.106.

87. Statesman, 11 July 1981.

nuclear weapons, the Prime Minister said that government policy was to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁸⁸ In an interview in July 1984, several months after Pakistan announced that it was capable of enriching uranium, a key step toward developing nuclear arms, Mrs. Gandhi said "I don't think we can do anything about it except to try to talk to people out of stockpiling or making nuclear weapons".⁸⁹ Similarly in a statement to Parliament on 22 August 1984, she declared that India did not intend to alter its commitment to a peaceful nuclear policy despite reports of Pakistan's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. The government "did not think it necessary to revise the nuclear policy because of Pakistan's acquiring the bomb. China too had the nuclear weapon. Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapon did not make any difference".⁹⁰

88. Rajya Sabha Debates, 8 March 1984, Col. 194.

89. Caren Elliott House and Peter R. Kann, "Amid a Host of Problems, Indira Gandhi Remains Serene About the State of India", Wall Street Journal, 5 July 1984, p.E-3.

90. Lok Sabha Debates, 22 August 1984, Col. 112.

On 2 August 1984, the Foreign Minister replied to a question on sensational disclosures by US Senator Cranston. He said that government's attention had been drawn to the reports on Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration that Pakistan might acquire the capability of producing at least a dozen nuclear weapons during next 3 to 5 years. The possibility of Pakistan's nuclear programme having a military dimension would naturally be a matter of great concern for India and the Government kept a close watch on these developments.⁹¹

But the Indo-Pak nuclear relations worsened as a result of an American report that Mrs. Gandhi was urged by her military advisers to launch a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear installations at Kahuta and the plan was abandoned due to the fear of counter-attack by Pakistan.⁹² In mid-October, 1984, Mrs. Gandhi, addressing a group of Army Commanders, said that Pakistan's nuclear programme was "a qualitative new phenomenon in our security environment", which must add a "new dimension to India's defence planning".⁹³

91. Rajya Sabha Debates, 2 August, 1984, Cols. 57, 66-67.

92. Washington Post, 15 September 1984.

93. Indian Express, 15 October 1984.

The talks on US supply of enriched uranium to the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant were delayed till Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the US in July-August 1982. She skillfully brushed aside the American pressure to link the delivery of fuel for TAPS to the acceptance by India of fullscope safeguards and attempts to cause a change in India's foreign policy.⁹⁴ The CPI(M) leader Mr. E.M.S. Namboodiripad congratulated Mrs. Gandhi for not compromising on the basics of Indian foreign policy during her visit to the United States.⁹⁵

India refused to be browbeaten and preferred to retain its nuclear equanimity. Consequently, the US seems to have grudgingly recognised India's determination to pursue its nuclear and foreign policy goals and its place in regional and global politics as an actor of the non-aligned movement. The U.S. passed on the responsibility to France for supply of enriched uranium to India. An agreement was reached between India and the US on fuel supply to TAPPS on 29 July 1982. It provided that India would use French nuclear fuel for Tarapur. The

94. Times of India, 10 August 1982.

95. Ibid.

international safeguards that apply to Tarapur would continue to apply under the new arrangement but there would be no fullscope safeguards.⁹⁶

However, India is dismayed at the attitude of the U.S. towards Pakistan's nuclear programme. It does not insist on applying fullscope safeguards to Pakistan's nuclear enrichment and reprocessing plants which have been acquired from countries adhering to the international safeguard regime and has been providing arms and economic aid as well. This is a case of double standards. If the legislative history of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 is analysed, one will find that India was the main target when the Act was being hammered out.⁹⁷

Thus under Mrs. Gandhi, India stuck to nuclear policy of self-reliance in the field of futuristic technology although U.S. deliberately delayed supply of uranium to TAPS and Canada suspended cooperation in the RAPP.⁹⁸

96. Christopher S. Raj, "Tarapur: A Test Case for the US Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978?" Foreign Affairs Report, Vol. 30, No. 12, 1981, p.274 and see Times of India, 30 July 1982.

97. M.Zuberi, "Self-Reliance and India's Defence Policy", Mainstream, Vol. XXVI. No. 6, 21 November 1987, p.37.

98. Krishan Kant, "Arms Twisting on Tarapur", Mainstream Vol.21, No.1, 1982, p.29.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi became Prime on October 31, 1984 after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination. On 29 January 1985 in an interview with the CBS of the U.S. at the time of the Six-Nation Appeal on Nuclear Disarmament, Mr. Gandhi said "Yes, we (guarantee that we won't use nuclear capability in a regional conflict), because we don't have a nuclear weapon. We have had that (nuclear capability) for 11 years now and we have not transformed that capability into weapons. We are worried that Pakistan is going ahead in developing a nuclear weapon... But we are committed not to make a nuclear bomb and we are not going to do it".⁹⁹ But in another interview with reporters of India Today on 31 June, 1985, Mr. Gandhi said that "it will be a point of no return on the subcontinent if someone has nuclear weapons. We will have to review our policy to see how we are going to counter that imbalance."¹⁰⁰

During the first session of the Parliament in 1985, Members expressed their concern over Pakistan's nuclear

99. Quoted in Susan Ram "Pak Bomb: Confused Indian Response", Mainstream, 18 January, 1986, p.6.

100. India Today, 15 February 1985, p.78.

capability. Members of the Rajya Sabha brought to notice of the government the reports about Pakistan being capable of exploding a nuclear device. The Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Baliram Bhagat said that the government were monitoring with utmost vigil all the developments.¹⁰¹ Replying to questions on Pakistan's nuclear capability put to the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha, the Minister of State for Science and Technology, Shivraj Patil said that Pakistan was one of the several countries which had claimed to have acquired nuclear capability to produce enriched uranium. Any country with a capability to produce enriched uranium could in principle produce nuclear weapon, if it so desired. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre continued to keep abreast of all relevant developments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The government would continue to maintain utmost vigil and would take all necessary measures to safeguard the country's interests.¹⁰²

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi criticised the United States for failing to check Pakistan's nuclear capability before his visit to the United States. In an interview to Financial Times on April 4, 1985, Mr. Gandhi said:

101. Rajya Sabha Debates, 14 March 1985, Cols 55-56.

102. Lok Sabha Debates, 27 March 1985, Cols. 63-64.

"I think, (the Americans) must make their policy with regard to Pakistan very clear. Are they going to let Pakistan make a nuclear bomb for example: every indication today is that they are".¹⁰³ He further said, "the Pakistanis are very close to one if they have not got one and nothing is being done to stop it. And once, it is there it will be a fait accompli. We will be landed with a bomb in the subcontinent".¹⁰⁴

The Defence Ministry's Annual Report on 16 April, 1985 also stated that "Pakistan's relentless pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has added a new dimension to India's security environment" and described Pakistan as India's "principal security concern".¹⁰⁵ The nuclear option had become so crucial to India as to be raised in Parliament because of the reported Pakistani bid to acquire nuclear weapons. Defence Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao made a pointed remark in the Lok Sabha on April 25, 1985 that "it was time for us to elicit the opinion of Parliament on the question whether India should go nuclear". On the

103. John Elliot, "We have Got Five Years", Financial Times, 4 April 1985.

104. Ibid.

105. Ministry of Defence Annual Report, 1984-85.

ground that a situation of nuclear power asymmetry in the sub-continent was totally unacceptable, the plea in the Parliament was to "keep our option open".¹⁰⁶ Thus a classic case of "Parliamentary scrutiny before the event" was demonstrated and unwittingly or otherwise, the Parliament was accorded a pride of place by the political executive for the initiation of major policy change.

On 3 May 1985, Mr. Gandhi said in the Rajya Sabha that induction of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan would pose a grave security threat to India which would be compelled to divert its resources for defence. However, he made it clear that there would be no compromise on India's security. He expressed his displeasure at the waiving of the Symington Amendment by USA which amounted to an indirect help in Pakistan's nuclear programme.¹⁰⁷ The growing clandestine activities of Pakistan created alarm in India. Mr. Gandhi, speaking at the AICC meeting on 4 May 1985, said that "we feel that they (Pakistani) are developing a nuclear weapon... We are looking into various aspects of this question to see what action we should take... We are not convinced that all powers which can do so are trying to stop them".¹⁰⁸

106. Lok Sabha Debates, 25 April 1985, Col. 27.

107. Selected Speeches and Writings of Rajiv Gandhi, 1984-85 (New Delhi, Publication Division, 1986), p.299.

108. Indian Express, 5 May 1985.

However, Mr. Gandhi denied that he was considering nuclear arming of India.¹⁰⁹

During his Moscow visit, Mr. Gandhi said at a press conference on May 22, 1985 that "we are extremely worried about Pakistan's nuclear programme. We feel that they are very close to developing a nuclear weapon. It did come up in our discussion (with Mr. Gorbachev) and this is also being debated in India. We are especially worried about the programme because we feel that the US could do more to stop them developing a nuclear weapon and they are not doing so".¹¹⁰

In an interview with a Newsweek correspondent on May 25, 1985, Mr. Gandhi said that US arms supplies were upsetting the balance in our region but that is a balance we can restore by conventional means. Nuclear weapons in the region, however, change the ball-game completely. "We believe that Pakistan is close to making a nuclear bomb. And we also feel that the US is not doing all it could to stop them".¹¹¹

109. Ibid.

110. Susan Ram, n.99, p.6.

111. Ibid., n.99, p.6.

While giving interview to Le-Monde on June 4, 1985 he was asked whether Pakistan possessed a bomb? If so, what would his response? He replied:

"Yes, we think that they are very close to having one or that they already have one. In fact, more than one... We, for our part, have not yet taken any decision. But we are thinking about it, you must understand for India it is very worrying that Pakistan should have a nuclear weapon. Islamabad has already attacked us three times. The fact that they had the bomb would therefore change all the rules of the game. We must therefore think about this seriously. In principle, we are opposed to the idea of becoming a nuclear power. We could have done so far the past 10 or 11 years, but we have not. If we decided to become a nuclear power, it would take a few weeks or a few months".¹¹²

He was further asked , Q : "Are you contemplating this?" A : "Not yet..." Q : "Will you or will you not take the decision to produce nuclear weapons". A : " We have not yet reached a decision, but we have already worked on it".¹¹³

112. "Le Monde Interview, Le Monde, June 4, 1985, Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)/South Asia (Joint Publications Research Services, Virginia), June 5, 1985, p.E-1.

113. Ibid.

In a subsequent interview to Le Figaro on June 5, 1985, Mr. Gandhi said that "even if Pakistan does get the bomb I don't think we should do likewise. It is a question which will be discussed in the country so that a decision can be made". When asked "Will not Pakistan's getting the bomb force India to review its nuclear policy? Willingly or unwillingly?" He replied "Not necessarily. I am not saying no categorically, but let us say we would prefer not to have to change our policy."¹¹⁴

In Pakistan, there was criticism on Mr. Gandhi's statements. In an article in Muslim on 15 June 1985, Mr. Zulquarnain Haider stated that "the boast about becoming a nuclear power in several weeks gives the lie to Mr. Gandhi's pious peaceful pretensions. India obviously has a ready-to-assemble arsenal, not just a bomb or two in the basement".¹¹⁵

While replying to questions on 14 June 1985 during his visit to the United States, Mr. Gandhi said that India opposed NPT due to its discriminatory nature which

114. "Le Figaro Interview", 4 June 1985, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service/South Asia, 5 June 1985, p.E-6.

115. Zulquarnain Haider, "India's Nuclear Ambitions", The Muslim (Islamabad), 18 June 1985.

tried to prevent only horizontal proliferation. About Pakistan's proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, he said India was in favour of a zone of peace in the whole area including the Indian Ocean.¹¹⁶

However, Mr. Gandhi expressed serious reservations about Pakistan's production of enriched uranium since its power programme was based on natural uranium reactions. Mr. Gandhi conveyed to President Reagan India's concern on Pakistan's nuclear intentions. On his return to New Delhi Mr. Gandhi said that "I am fairly satisfied that the United States will do everything it can" to keep Pakistan from becoming a nuclear power.¹¹⁷

But soon the US assurances proved ineffective when the ABC report stated that Pakistan had successfully detonated the non-nuclear portion of an atomic bomb i.e. a high-speed electronic switch, known as a kryton to trigger the device, illegally obtained from the U.S. Another report which created misgivings in India was the joint interview given by President Zia to London-based

116. Selected Speeches of Rajiv Gandhi, n.143, p.412.

117. Ibid.

Saudi Gazette and Magazine of Arabia on 15 July 1985

that Pakistan had the right to manufacture nuclear weapons and would not bow to US pressure to abandon this option (quoted by the Statesman Weekly)¹¹⁸

President Zia later said that he had been misquoted.¹¹⁹

These developments intensified the debate in India.

Mr. Gandhi, expressing concern over Pakistani nuclear programme, said in an interview on July 17 that "a Pakistan bomb will be a weapon of blackmail" and that while India opposed nuclear arms, "national security cannot be compromised".¹²⁰

Expressing concern over the growing evidence on Pakistan's nuclear programme for bomb, the Bhartiya Janata Party demanded that India must make the bomb. The National Executive Committee of the BJP which concluded its three-day meeting at Bhopal on July 21, 1985, adopted a resolution calling upon the government to take

118. Statesman Weekly, (New Delhi), 20 July 1985 (datelined 15 July 1985).

119. Saudi Gazette, (London), 23 July 1985.

120. Foreign Broadcast Information Service/South Asia, 17 July 1985, p.E-1.

immediate steps to develop "our own nuclear bomb" in view of reports that "the threat of a Pakistan's nuclear bomb is real". It further expressed concern that Pakistan was continuing to proceed with its programme of making a nuclear bomb. The BJP on its part felt it necessary to declare that it could not even conceive the idea of countering Pakistan's threat by willy-nilly pushing India into the umbrella of any superpower. The resolution stated that the diplomatic initiatives taken by the government to deter Pakistan from going nuclear appeared to have completely failed. The BJP had no doubt that, in spite of Pakistan's protestations, the acquisition of such nuclear weapons could only be intended to intimidate India and pose a serious threat to its security and integrity. The only alternative as perceived by the BJP was to develop our own nuclear bomb.¹²¹

On 25 July 1985, responding to questions in an agitated Parliament, Mr. Gandhi replied that India was "preparing to meet the nuclear threat from Pakistan".¹²²

121. Narendra Sharma, "BJP's Turn About" Mainstream, 27 July 1985, p. 34; see Hindu, 22 July 1985.

122. Lok Sabha Debates, 25 July 1985, Cols. 184-85.

Dr. Raja Ramanna, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission speaking to a group of reporters on 25 July 1985 declared that India could develop a "suitable nuclear weapons delivery system", and that the country's growing nuclear self-sufficiency meant that "if anyone tried to twist our hand, we could flex our muscles too".¹²³

In the Lok Sabha, Members expressed their concern over Pakistan becoming a nuclear power, thereby urging the government to review India's defence preparedness. In a Calling Attention Motion under Rule 377 in the Lok Sabha, Mr. Somnath Rath (Congress-I) said it was a matter of great concern that Pakistani scientists had successfully tested the firing mechanism known as kryton switches producing a non-nuclear explosion. If Pakistan acquired nuclear capability, it would change the entire situation in the sub-continent. In view of these developments, he urged the government to review our defence preparedness and initiate necessary action.¹²⁴

123. Statesman Weekly, 26 July 1985.

124. Lok Sabha Debates, 25 July 1985, Cols. 184-85.

The reports on Pakistan's successful testing of kryton switches which were obtained illegally from the US and General Zia's assertion regarding Pakistan's nuclear capability created so much concern for India's security that Members from the ruling party and the opposition parties called for a firm decision to be made on India's response to Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Replying to points raised during a three-hour discussion on a Calling Attention Motion on the threat faced by India in view of the Pakistani move to acquire nuclear weapons, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Khursheed Alam Khan, told the Rajya Sabha on August 7, 1985 that if Pakistan made the bomb it would have a profound impact on the region and the option for other countries would also be "open". Mr. Khan hoped that better sense would prevail in Islamabad. At the same time, he asked the Members not to underestimate the capability of our own country. India did not want to brag about its own scientific and technological prowess as was being done across the border. ¹²⁵

Mr. Khan said Pakistan was receiving financial and technical aid from other countries for its nuclear programme. As for India "we stand by our policy, but no country can close all its options". In this context he also expressed concern over the massive supply of sophisticated arms by the USA to Pakistan which the latter did not require. He assured the Members that there was no question of complacency. Whatever was necessary was being done and "will be done". The government had confidence in its preparedness and in its defence forces. Security of the country "will be given the foremost priority in all our action", he pointed out. He rejected a Member's suggestion for an Israeli type pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear complex.¹²⁶

Speaking in a discussion on the situation arising out of Pakistan's attempt to develop a nuclear bomb and the supply of kryton electronics triggers by the USA, Mr. Khan made it clear that India would never agree to being under any big power's nuclear umbrella. "We don't need it, we have our own capacity, and Members should not underestimate that capacity",¹²⁷ he said.

126. Ibid.

127. Lok Sabha Debates, 8 August 1985, Statesman, August 9, 1985.

The Minister also reiterated that with Pakistan's nuclear intention clearly not being peaceful, "Our options will be such that this country's security and integrity remain safe". He, however, would not spell out the options as "it would be not in the interest of the country to do so." He could not disclose India's capability in this matter but then he added that "our capability was demonstrated in 1974" and that India had not the least "inferiority complex" in respect of its nuclear capability. He told the Lok Sabha that if Pakistan was under any illusion that its nuclear capability was higher than that of India, particularly in enrichment of uranium, "it was welcome to that illusion". It "would come to senses if it had an opportunity of knowing what we possessed."¹²⁸

The principal sponsor of the Call-Attention Motion, Mr. S.M. Bhattam (Telgu Desam) pleaded that any decision the government took in this matter should be evolved

128. Ibid.

through national consensus. The other speaker in the discussion Mr. P.L. Kurien (Congress-I) asked whether India could afford not to go nuclear in the present situation "not for the pleasure of it, but as a deterrent". Mr. Khan assured the Members that the government gave utmost regard and consideration to the views of the Members in deciding on the policy to be pursued in this matter.¹²⁹

Addressing the Army Commanders, Mr. Gandhi said on October 3, 1985, that Pakistan seemed all set for detonating a nuclear bomb and the threat to India's security was very immediate. "Pakistan's nuclear programme is building up in a very negative direction... We don't want to build a bomb. I hope we won't have to",¹³⁰ the Prime Minister said in an interview with Newsweek on October 7, 1985.

129. Ibid.

130. Newsweek, 15 October, 1985.

Addressing the National Defence College, Mr Gandhi on October 9, 1985, said a nuclear weapon was a very dangerous tool in the hands of countries where violent changes occurred and where there was no established system of command and control. He said, India had firm evidence that Pakistan's nuclear bomb was being financed not solely by that country but other nations as well. Would this mean that the bomb would be made available to these countries also? he asked. The impact of a Pakistani bomb on South Asian security as well as on the global balance of powers had to be considered.¹³¹

Mr. Gandhi added that "Pakistan must desist from making such a weapon. If they do we can build detente and go on further down the road". He said India had the capability of manufacturing a nuclear bomb 11 years ago but had refrained from going ahead. "We have demonstrated to the world that we have the will not to proliferate".¹³²

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi reemphasised India's concern over Pakistan's continuing development of a nuclear bomb and stated that the threat to India was immediate.

131. Selected Speeches of Rajiv Gandhi, n.107, p.54-55.

132. Ibid.

He said "we think it(the threat) is very immediate. We are talking about months(not years). We feel that they are either on the verge of getting the bomb or they already have one. They may not need to test it".¹³³

While answering questions put by the Guardian correspondent on India's rejection of a recent American proposal for a South Asian nuclear pact, he explained that "it would not help. The Pakistanis already have enriched uranium. It would be a good cover up for them". On a query about India's stand on NPT, he repeated that the treaty was "blatantly unfair. You have one set of rules for the nuclear powers and a totally different set for the non-nuclear powers. It must be equal for all".¹³⁴

Replying to question at a press conference on October 11, 1985 he said that Pakistan was fairly advanced in its nuclear programme. Mr. Gandhi made it clear that India's security could not be compromised in any way. There would be no question of allowing New Delhi or

133. Hindustan Times, 10 October, 1985.

134. Ibid.

other cities to be flattened out. However, he said that there are certain measures apart from making nuclear weapons to protect India's security.¹³⁵ On Jack Anderson's report about India making a hydrogen bomb he replied, "we are not making, we are not producing a hydrogen bomb. We do not have any such programme". He further said "our entire nuclear programme is in civilian area. There is no military nuclear programme. It is open to questions in Parliament, it is open to discussion in the press. Basically, it is visible to everyone".¹³⁶

Mr. Gandhi explained India's reluctance to any pact with Pakistan on mutual inspection of nuclear installations. Due to no fool proof arrangement, their nuclear installations which had military dimension would not be open to inspection. Enriched uranium could be stored in out-of-bound places. About NPT he said, India would not sign NPT which was discriminatory. Besides, there could be no question of equating India with Pakistan for India had "no weapons programme" and all efforts were devoted to civilian purposes.¹³⁷

135. Selected Speeches of Rajiv Gandhi, n.107, pp. 441-42.

136. Ibid.

137. Times of India, 12 October 1985.

Some members of opposition parties became more assertive urging the government to exercise the nuclear option to meet the Pakistani nuclear threat. The Bhartiya Janata Party President, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee told newsmen that India should produce the bomb and the Prime Minister should declare it openly instead of dilly-dallying on the issue so that it might deter Pakistan from going nuclear. "Then the Centre has to take clear cut stand as its pronouncements about a nuclear threat from Pakistan were creating confusion within the country", he said. Asked how an open declaration by the Prime Minister would help the country, he said "ours is a democratic nation unlike Pakistan and the people have the right to know whether such an option is desirable."¹³⁸ It may be recalled here that Mr. Vajpayee, when he was Foreign Minister during Janata government, always stuck to the official stand that India would not produce nuclear weapons and its nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes. It would strengthen its conventional defence to meet Pakistani nuclear threat.

Even the Janata Party members also favoured a bolder nuclear policy. At its Annual National Convention

138. Times of India, 18 November 1985.

a resolution was passed stating that "being a sovereign nation India has the right to exercise its nuclear option in full freedom". On 5 October 1985, Mr. Ram Krishna Hedge, who headed the Janata Government in Karnataka, had told the newsmen at Varanasi that India should opt for nuclear weapons if that worked out cheaper than importing conventional and advanced weapons. He appreciated Mr. Rajiv Ganhi's stand that "India's decision not to build nuclear bomb was not irrevokable".¹³⁹

On November 1, 1985, replying to foreign correspondents, Mr. Gandhi said that President Reagan had advised him that India and Pakistan should sort out the nuclear issue before Pakistan went beyond a point of no return. But Mr. Gandhi felt that if the United States were really interested for stopping proliferation they should withdraw the exemption of the Symington Amendment. He said that India did not have any nuclear programme at present. When asked about keeping of India's option, he replied: "I am not closing the option".¹⁴⁰

139. Times of India, October 6, 1985.

140. Selected Speeches of Rajiv Gandhi, n.107, p.461.

Mr. Natwar Singh, Minister of External Affairs rejected the US suggestion that India have a dialogue with Pakistan on the question of arms parity and the nuclear issue. He told the Lok Sabha on November 6, 1986 that Pakistan's nuclear capability was not "simply a bilateral matter". It was "irrelevant to say, 'talk with Pakistan'" because "it is a global problem and Pakistan has a role to play as a proxy of the US that is why it is not bilateral"¹⁴¹. This could either mean that India might, in global interests, not follow Pakistan in going nuclear or that India's policy was bound by what Pakistan did. India had a nuclear China to contend with, right at its doorstep. Mr. Natwar Singh repeated his statement in the Rajya Sabha: "India will not sit across the table with Pakistan to discuss the issue".

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi accused Pakistan of secretly developing nuclear weapons, thus preventing normalisation of relation between the two countries. He made this statement in Parliament a day after the press report quoted Dr. A.Q.Khan, Pakistani nuclear scientist, as saying his country would use the bomb as a "last resort".

141. Lok Sabha Debates, 6 November 1986, Statesman, November 7, 1986.

He told an Indian journalist Mr. Kuldip Nayar, that "the USA knows it, what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of certain foreign newspapers".¹⁴² "They told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but now they know, we have done it", said Dr. Khan. Subsequently, he denied that he had given the interview and said the article which appeared in the Observer was "mystery , false, concocted, an attempt to malign Pakistan".¹⁴³

General Zia-ul Haq also appeared to have mastered the strategy of ambiguity to create confusion about the actual status of Pakistani capability. In his interview to Time Magazine, President Zia said:¹⁴⁴ "You can use it (the atomic device) for military purposes also. We have never said we are incapable of this, we have said we have neither the intention nor the desire... You can virtually write today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes. What is difficult about a bomb? Once you have

142. Tribune(Chandigarh), 1 March, 1987; The Observer(London) March 1, 1987.

143. The Muslim(Islamabad), 2 March 1987.

acquired the technology, which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you like".¹⁴⁴ He subsequently said that Pakistan has not made a bomb, is not working on it, nor has intention to build it".¹⁴⁵ This denial may have been prompted by the desire not to jeopardise the 4.2 billion dollar aid proposal then before Congress which was partly contingent upon Pakistan's not possessing a nuclear bomb.

Mr. Eduardo Falerio, Minister of State for External Affairs, while replying to a question of Mr. Dinesh Goswamy in the Lok Sabha, said that India did not believe that the United States had used all leverage possible to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear programme non-peaceful dimensions.¹⁴⁶ Answering Mr. H.N. Nange Gowde's question whether India would manufacture an atomic bomb in view of reports that Pakistan already possessed one, the Minister replied: "At this point of time, we don't intend to make the bomb".

144. Time(Chicago), 30 March 1987, pp. 4-6.

145. Nuclenics Week, 12 April 1987.

146. Lok Sabha Debates, 14 March 1987, Tribune, 15 Mar 1987.

On Pakistan's possession of the bomb, Defence Minister V.P. Singh was reported to have said, "you cannot fight a nuclear war with conventional weapons, just as you cannot fight against gunpowder with bows and arrows".¹⁴⁷ He added that "certainly if someone in a neighbouring country acquires a technology that is way ahead of yours, you have to replan everything to catch up". As part of a newly announced defence strategy until the year 2000, Mr. Singh recommended a "strategy planning group" consisting of the Prime Minister and the Home, Finance, External Affairs and Defence Ministers. He also suggested that the group should meet regularly.

Mr. K.C. Pant who succeeded Mr. Singh as Defence Minister said in Parliament that India was considering a change in its non-military nuclear policy because of an emerging nuclear threat from Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ Besides the Defence Minister, the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and External Affairs Minister Narain Dutt Tiwari also made

147. Defence and Foreign Affairs(Alexandria, Va)
Weekly 13-19 April 1987.

148. Lok Sabha Debates, 27 March 1987

statements portraying India as a country being forced to increase its military preparedness. Mr. Pant told the Lok Sabha that the emerging Pakistani nuclear programme and its sophisticated arms build-up were forcing India to review its nuclear options. He, however, did not spell out what these options were while winding up the two-day debate on the demands of his Ministry.¹⁴⁹

Mr. G.G. Swell (Congress-I) forcefully urged the government in a debate on Indo-US relations to exercise the nuclear option to counter the Pakistani threat. The United States which was supplying all the arms to Pakistan "will understand only that kind of language", he said. The suggestion was reflected also in the speech of the former Minister for External Affairs Mr. B.R. Bhagat. Of course he did not quite say that India should go nuclear but asserted that the United States having failed in stopping the Pakistan's weapons programme was trying to compel India to sign NPT.¹⁵⁰

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi conveyed to President Reagan India's concern over US arms supplies to Pakistan and Islamabad's clandestine and determined efforts to acquire nuclear weapons during his wide ranging talks at the White House on October 20, 1987. He asked the

149. Lok Sabha Debates, 27 April, 1987, Hindustan Times, April 28, 1987.

150. Statesman, May 6, 1987.

Reagan administration to stop Pakistan's drive for a bomb in the interest of peace and security in South Asia.

Pakistan's acquiring of nuclear capability would change the geo-strategic environment in the sub-continent. Therefore, the statements made by the Prime Minister should be viewed in the context of a deterioration of India's security environment. These statements did not signify any significant departure from India's traditional approach to the nuclear issue. Mr. Gandhi followed the old policy of opposing NPT because of its discriminatory nature which prevented only horizontal proliferations. As regards a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia he said that it should include the Indian Ocean area. However, Mr. Gandhi did not agree with Pakistan's proposal for mutual inspection of nuclear installations since there were no fool proof arrangements. India also turned down the US proposal for regional talks between India and Pakistan on arms parity and the nuclear issue because Pakistan's nuclear capability had global implications.

The state of the nuclear debate in the country is now the most active and intense. Those who oppose India

going nuclear state the following reasons; (i) India's extremely constrained capability to sustain a credible and comprehensive nuclear programme; (ii) the alleged irrelevance of nuclear weapons in the context of India's security and geopolitical interests; (iii) no serious threat from Chinese side in view of their "no first use" promise; (iv) reliance on Soviet nuclear umbrella in the worst case; (v) non-use of nuclear weapons after the Second World War; (vi) protection of India's security by conventional arms; (vii) ineffectiveness of an Indian deterrent system in the absence of a second-strike capability and a high level of managerial ability ; (viii) the continuing escalation which the nuclear plunge will entail; (ix) the cost factor involved in a comprehensive nuclear programme; and (x) the diminution in India's standing as a peace-loving country which India's nuclear power status will bring about.

On the other hand, the reasons advanced by those who support India going nuclear are: (i) the Chinese nuclear threat; (ii) possibilities of a Beijing-Islamabad collusion in nuclear weaponry; (iii) fear of blackmail by a nuclearised Pakistan; (iv) militarization of the Indian Ocean by the big powers beyond acceptable limits;

(v) an unjust repressive and exploitative international nuclear proliferations regime and ;(vi) the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan; (vii) qualitative development needed for keeping up with modern technology by the Indian scientists; and defence modernisation boosting the morale of the soldiers.

Mr. K. Subramaniam, the former Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis who has been in favour of India going nuclear made the following points:¹⁵¹

1. Nuclear capability would help India to make peace with China and sort out its border problems. The Chinese would pay more attention to the sensibilities of a nuclear India. The Americans ignored a non-nuclear China for 20 years ,but responded positively to it when it became nuclear; (ii) A nuclear India would get a better political deal from the US and would end the India-Pakistan parity syndrome. It would equip India better to deal with a possible repetitive of the event in 1971 when the US Enterprise was brought out into the Indian Ocean;

151. K. Subramanyam, Nuclear Myths and Realities: India's Dilemma (New Delhi, 1981).

iii) It would make India less dependent on the Soviet for security, a fact, he thinks, would be perceived by Americans as a positive development, on similar lines as Chinese capability is viewed today; (iv) India is in strategic competition with China in the region. It is the nuclear capabilities, not the intentions, which should shape Indian policy; (v) the Chinese "no first-use" declaration was made when China was weaker.

He also argued that since China deployed recently 90 missiles outside Lhasa which were aimed at India, India should go nuclear to counter the Chinese threat. He said that the cost of nuclear bomb would be less than the cost of one tank. The nuclear option could reduce our defence expenditure and added that the Chinese "know that with nuclear weapons in their hands nobody will invade their territory".¹⁵²

Mr. T.N. Kaul, Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union, also supports India going nuclear.¹⁵³ He stated that India should make another peaceful explosion from the

152. Telegraph, 15 July 1987.

153. T.N. Kaul, Ambassadors Need Not Lie (New Delhi, 1988), pp. 155-62.

point of view of national interest and peace and security. Another underground nuclear blast by India would not bring the heavens down on us. India refrained from further nuclear tests but did not produce any change of attitude in the West or China. He further mentioned that since Pakistan had been making effort to develop nuclear capability it became must for India. His suggestion did not mean that India should squander its resources in a nuclear armament races. Nuclear technology must be developed for peaceful purposes. Mr. Kaul held the view that when India did not have nuclear capability its pleas for nuclear disarmament did not have the same effect as they have today when it has the capability. He said "The more we develop our capability, the greater will be our credibility. We have ferried too long. We must not delay anymore, but go ahead with our plans not so much for weaponry as for development".

Mr. Krishan Kant, ex M.P. and member of the National Executive Committee of the Janata party has been consistently asserting the need for India to exercise the nuclear option. He opposed the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement in Parliament in 1984

that Pakistan having a nuclear bomb would not make much differences since India had been living with Chinese bomb. His main arguments for India going nuclear are as follows: i) the Indian army would be demoralised to fight a conventional war with Pakistan; (ii) An unstable military dictatorship in Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to avenge the humiliation of its defeat in the 1965 and 1971 wars; (iii) with a weak political leadership in India not able to exercise its nuclear option, Pakistan would take a pre-emptive action to occupy the muslim-populated Kashmir valley to implement its two-nation theory ; (iv) China got international recognition and prestige in the world due to its nuclear weapons. It had also secured itself from the blackmail of the US and the highly modernised army of Soviet Union;¹⁵⁴ (v) There was growing evidence on Pakistan's acquiring of nuclear capability as mentioned in the Defence Ministry's Annual Report, 1984-85. Indian government should develop a strategy how to counter it instead of debating to go nuclear or not. The decision should be based on a national

154. Krishan Kant, "Indian Response: The Prime Minister is Wrong", World Focus, July 1984, pp. 25-29.

consensus since this consensus was available in Pakistan.¹⁵⁵

Mr. L.K. Advani, Member of Rajya Sabha and President of Bhartiya Janata Party also favours India going nuclear. He demanded a "white paper" from the Union Government on nuclear strategy against the background of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear capability. Mr. Advani reiterated his party's stand that India "should go nuclear" since possession of nuclear potential accorded the desired leverage in international relations. He recalled that Rajiv Gandhi had said that India would revise her nuclear options if Pakistan acquired a nuclear potential.¹⁵⁶

One interesting development in the current debate is that the Army Officers for the first time supported India going nuclear. Traditionally, the Indian Army was opposed to India going nuclear since the Navy and Air Force would get upperhand in the operation of a nuclear war. Even Field Marshall Manekshaw openly opposed a nuclear weapons programme in March 1973 pointing out that its cost would be very high and India could not afford it due to her poverty.¹⁵⁷ In 1981, the Army College of Combat

156. Indian Express, 16 January 1988.

157. Times of India, 23 March, 1973.

Mhow published a number of papers written by military officers supporting the nuclear option for India. In March 1982, the military officers participating in a seminar expressed their opinion in support of India making a nuclear weapons in view of Pakistani nuclear threat. They suggested two options for India. These were: (i) India should remain one step ahead of Pakistan in nuclear weapons programme so that it would not be at a disadvantage; or ii) it should keep its nuclear capability in complete readiness.¹⁵⁸

158. U.S. Bajpayee(ed), India's security: The Politico-Strategic Environment(New Delhi: 1982), p.136.

CHAPTER - IV

CONCLUSION

The influence of Parliament on foreign policy began to be felt for the first time when it pressurised Nehru's government to place before it correspondence with China on the border problem. Defence Minister Krishna Menon had to resign due to the parliamentary pressure. The intimate relationship between the foreign and defence policies came to be realised for the first time.

The nuclear option debate in India started for the first time in the wake of the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964, which posed a security threat to India. The Jana Sangh party members were the first to press for a nuclear weapons programme. Even some Congress party members were of the same view. Lal Bahadur Shastri adopted a cautious policy on this sensitive issue. While ruling out nuclear bomb for India, Mrs. Gandhi assured the House that the country's defence and security would be her "paramount consideration" and India would "keep her option open".

When the issue of the Non-proliferation Treaty came up before the Parliament in 1968, almost all the members of Parliament opposed it. On this issue, Mrs. Gandhi sought the collective support of the

Parliament not to sign NPT due to its discriminatory nature.¹ Thus, the parliamentary support for the first time was sought by the executive on this issue and the decision was based on a national consensus.

Until 1970, debates on India's nuclear option were minimal and mainly concentrated on the Chinese nuclear threat to India and India's opposition to NPT. However, from 1970 upto 1974 the discussion² took place occasionally regarding the benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. Mrs. Gandhi and her Cabinet colleagues repeatedly clarified that underground explosions were necessary for India's economic and scientific development. So there was nothing secret about the 1974 PNE as alleged by some people.

Parliamentary discussions on India's nuclear option took a new turn after 1974. Almost all the

1. Lok Sabha Debates, April 5, 1968 cited in R.L.M. Patil, India - Nuclear Weapons and International Politics, (New Delhi, 1969), Document: 53(4) iii.

political parties supported the government on this issue. They made demand that India should go nuclear. However, the government ruled out the possibility of making nuclear bomb to meet the Pakistani threat. It was stated that India would use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and security of the country would be protected by conventional arms. The government also opposed Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia proposed by Pakistan at the United Nations. Thus, under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership India could demonstrate its nuclear capability without actually going for nuclear weapons.

Prime Minister Morarji Desai ruled out further conduct of PNE by India. If his government decided to go in for PNE, essentially for peaceful purposes, it would be done in the presence of "others". Mr. Desai reversed the well-established nuclear policy of the earlier governments. His statements gave the impressions to the US that India would be amenable to sign NPT. He had made the statement in the US that India would never conduct PNE. But when he returned to India, he was cornered by the agitated Members of the Parliament. He then made an apparent retreat from

his earlier statement by saying that he did not rule out peaceful nuclear "blasts" for engineering purposes but had opposed the kind of explosion that took place in 1974. Thus, it could be said that due to the strong parliamentary criticism, Mr. Desai was forced to change his stand.

Mr. Vajpayee, Minister of External Affairs ruled out the demand for India making nuclear bomb in view of Pakistan's acquiring of nuclear device saying that India's security could be defended by conventional arms. This view was totally contrary to the earlier views of Mr. Vajpayee who had always been demanding that India should go nuclear after Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 and 1974 PNE by India.

Prime Minister Charan Singh's Independence Day speech in 1979 suggesting possibility of a review of India's nuclear policy in view of Pakistani nuclear threat indicated a shift from the position of the Morarji government.

When Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in 1980 she restated her earlier policy by saying that India

would conduct peaceful nuclear explosions "in the national interest". Because of her tough stand she could arrange the fuel supply for the Tarapur plant from France. The United States failed in its attempt to pressurise India to accept fullscope safeguards. Although, Mrs. Gandhi ruled out India producing nuclear weapons to counter the Pakistani threat, she insisted that India's security would not be compromised in any way and India's nuclear option was kept open. It could not be bartered away.

By the time, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi took over the Prime Ministership, there had been considerable deterioration in the security environment of the subcontinent. Pakistan's clandestine nuclear activities had been splashed in the world press. The bombastic interviews of Dr. A.C. Khan and the ambiguous statements of Pakistan's prominent spokesman coupled with authoritative reports of clandestine activities revealed in the western media had alerted the Indian public opinion on this vital issue. Mr. Gandhi's repeated statements on the nuclear questions were in response to this public anxiety and were part of



an Indian diplomatic effort to pressurise the Reagan administration to exert some pressure on Pakistan. He rejected the subtle suggestion for bilateral talks with Pakistan on the nuclear issue. Parliamentary opinion cutting across the party directives reflected the general sense of anxiety in the country regarding the security and territorial integrity of India.

As far as India's nuclear option is concerned, Parliament can only reflect the public mood but has little role in influencing the government's decision-making. Since it is a strategic matter, secret decisions will have to be taken by the government. Parliamentary control over the general policy matters pertaining to foreign relations and national security is exercised through scrutiny over expenditures and through the vigilance and expertise of Members and the manner in which they perform their parliamentary duties. A parliamentary system of government has to be responsive to public opinion as reflected by Members in both Houses of Parliament.

Recent changes in the international security environment - the ratification of the INF Treaty, the

impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the recent visit of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to China, the improvement in Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relations — signify a general relaxation of international tensions. The sudden death of General Zia and the accession to power of Ms. Benazir Bhutto through democratically held elections opens a new chapter in the politics of South Asia.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX - IPRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI'S STATEMENT IN LOK
SABHA REGARDING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
EXPERIMENT [JULY 22, 1974]

Honourable Members are aware that at 08-05 hours on May 18, 1974 our Atomic Energy Commission successfully carried out an underground nuclear explosion experiment at a depth of more than 100 metres in the Rajasthan desert. This experiment was part of the research and development work which the Atomic Energy Commission has been carrying on in pursuance of our national objective of harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Honourable Members may recall that on November 15, 1972, I had stated in the Lok Sabha that "The Atomic Energy Commission is studying conditions under which peaceful nuclear explosions carried out underground could be economic benefit to India without causing environmental hazards". Exactly one year later, on November 15, 1973, I informed Honourable Members of the Rajya Sabha of the continuing interest of the Atomic Energy Commission in this field and also stated that after satisfactory answers to the problems of the possible effects on environmental and ecological conditions are available, the question of

actual underground tests for peaceful purposes could be considered.

I am glad to inform Honourable Members that this successful experiment on May 18 has not resulted in any way in radio-active contamination of the atmosphere. The radio-activity was so well contained that a party of scientists was able to fly 30 metres above the site and reach upto 250 metres on the ground within an hour of the experiment without encountering any radioactive contamination. The Atomic Energy Commission is at present engaged in studying the result of the experiment. It is expected that this process will take about six months. In keeping with scientific tradition, the Atomic Energy Commission proposes to publish papers giving the results of the experiment for the benefit of the scientific world.

All the material, equipment and the personnel in this project were totally Indian. India has not violated any international law or obligation or any commitment in this regard with any country.

This experiment has evoked mixed response from various countries. While developing nations have, by and large, welcomed the experiment as a step in the research and development work carried on by India in the field of

atomic energy for peaceful purposes, advanced nations with some exceptions, have not shown equal understanding . The United States of America, while expressing satisfaction that the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has worked in regard to agreements with India and that the material used has not come from the United States, have reiterated that the policy of that Government is against nuclear proliferation. The USSR have noted that India has carried out a research programme striving to keep level with the world technology in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosion. The Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission has received a congratulatory message from the French Atomic Energy Commission on the success of the experiment. China officially reported the event without commenting on the explosion. The reaction of the Government of Japan has been to express regret for the experiment.

Reactions from Canada and our neighbour, Pakistan, have been sharp. While Canada is satisfied that India has not violated any agreement between the two countries, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs has stated that the experiment represented a severe set-back to efforts being made in the international community to prevent all nuclear testing and to inhibit the proliferation

of nuclear explosion technology.

The Government of India is unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the representatives of the Canadian Government in this regard. I have repeatedly reaffirmed our policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have specifically stated that we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons. The Government of India sincerely hopes that the Government of Canada will appreciate and understand the background of this experiment. I have already mentioned in the earlier part of this statement the fact that our Atomic Energy Commission has been reviewing the progress in this technology from the theoretical and experimental angles. This intention was not kept secret and was made known to the world. If differences of interpretation have arisen between the Government of Canada and the Government of India, it is the Government of India's hope that they will be satisfactorily resolved in the discussions which are under way between the representatives of the two countries.

The Government of India is unable to comprehend the repeated talk of nuclear blackmail indulged in by the representatives of the Government of Pakistan. I have explained in my letter to Prime Minister Bhutto the

peaceful nature and the economic purposes of this experiment and have also stated that India is willing to share her nuclear technology with Pakistan in the same way as she is willing to share it with other countries provided proper conditions for understanding and trust are created. I once again repeat this assurance and hope that the Government of Pakistan will accept India's position in this regard.

The Government of Pakistan has also made allegations about radio-activity having been carried to that country. I should like to take this opportunity of stating that this was impossible as there was no venting of radioactivity to the atmosphere and no formation of a radioactive cloud. Moreover, the wind was blowing in the opposite direction as it normally does at this time of the year and even in theory, any hypothetical radioactivity could never have gone to Pakistan. The wind pattern on May 18, 1974 was from, repeat from, the south-west.

There are several published reports by scientists from advanced countries on the potential utilisation of peaceful nuclear experiments. In 1970, 1971 and 1972, the International^{at} Atomic Energy Agency Organized Panel Meetings on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions and

India attended all these meetings as a Panel Member. In the Foreword to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Phenomenology and Status Report, 1970 an indication has been given of the projects for which peaceful nuclear explosions could be used. The following quotation will be adequate in this regard :-

"Fully contained nuclear explosions (those not breaking through to the ground surface) could be used for many projects. On an industrial level pilot-scale experiments have already been made on gas and oil stimulation, with encouraging results. In addition, the use of cavities created by such explosions appeared to have an economically attractive future for projects such as underground gas and oil storage, and the storage of radioactive wastes from nuclear power stations and chemical plant, for in situ ret^rot_xing of oil from shale oil deposits, and for in situ leaching of low-grade ores broken up by the explosion. The latter application is of particular interest to one Member State, India, who could by this means use her very large low-grade non-ferrous metal ore deposits, thus making her more independent of imports of these metals and furthering the national economy".

In view of the fact that we have just now carried out the experiment and the results will be available to us after six months, it is considered premature to talk of any particular technological application at a selected site. For any project of this nature to be considered economical and feasible, more experimental data must be available.

Honourable Members will notice that in the Panel discussions to which I have referred and in which most of the advanced countries have participated, it was emphasised that activities in the field of peaceful nuclear explosion are essentially research and development programmes. Against this background, the Government of India fails to understand why India is being criticised on the ground that the technology necessary for the peaceful nuclear exploding is no different from that necessary for a weapons programme.

No technology is evil in itself; it is the use that nations make of technology which determines its character. India does not accept the principal of apartheid in any matter and technology is no exception.

[Source: Lok Sabha Debates, July 22, 1974, Cols. 266-269]

APPENDIX - II

PRIME MINISTER MORARJI DESAI'S STAND ON
INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY REGARDING
NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY [EXCEPT FROM HIS INTERVIEW WITH
NBC T.V. IN NEW YORK ON JUNE 11, 1978]

MR. SHANNON : Mr. Prime Minister, ever since independence ,
India has taken a moral position in the world, speaking
out for peace, and it was quite a shock, I think, to the
world when India exploded a nuclear device.

If your speech to the United Nations Special Assembly
on Disarmament this week you said that India has pledged
that it will never develop a nuclear weapon. At the same
time, however, you said that India can't sign the non-
proliferation treaty as long as other people have weapons.

If someone like yourself, if a country like India doesn't
take this chance and step forward and say, "We are doing
something," how do you expect other people to follow

MR. DESAI: I have just spoken to the United Nations. The
attitude of India is very clear. Ever since the atomic bomb
was devised, India opposed it. And we have consistently
tried to see that atomic weapons disappear. And therefore
when the explosion was made three years ago in my country
by my predecessor, I have no doubt that she did not do

it for any purpose of weapons. She did it only to make use(of it) for peaceful purposes. But then she did it in a very secretive manner which gave a feeling to other countries - which is natural; I don't find fault with them - that India might go that way, and therefore, trouble arose.

But I do not believe she did it for any purpose of that kind. But she was not wise in my view.

I personally do not think it is necessary at all to have explosions for peaceful purposes. We have therefore said that we do not make any atomic weapons in the future even if the whole world make them.

We will stand out against that and we will not make any explosions. And this is what we want the world to do, and unless the whole world does it, well, it cannot come about. And yet people like us who profess it, we have got to set an example by ourselves. Whether others may do (it) or not, one may be confident that others also will take it up. The holding of this view has surprised people that we are not signing the nonproliferation treaty. Now who are asking for a nonproliferation treaty? Those who have ample arsenals those who are making explosions, and explosions at any odd time and adding new weaponry ;

and they say that those who don't do it must give a pledge. Let them give a pledge and I will be there. But if they don't do it, is it right that they should ask another who doesn't do it? It is discriminative, it is against our self-respect. Our independence is not less than theirs and it is only to assert that right that we are saying that it is not fair.

MR. SHANNON: Well, the point of the treaty would be that you would accept inspection, and would you be willing to do that so that people know it isn't just your saying?

MR. DESAI: If all of them fall in line, and they are also liable to be inspected, I am certainly bound to be inspected. The whole world can be inspected. But will they allow me to inspect their arsenals, which are the most dangerous thing?

[Source : K.S. Chavda(Comp), Morarji Desai on Disarmament, Peace and Prosperity, Dhinoj: Abhuday Prakashan, 1988, pp. 53-54]

APPENDIX - III

PRIME MINISTER MORARJI DESAI'S REPLY
TO THE HALF-AN-HOUR DISCUSSION IN
LOK SABHA REGARDING BAR ON NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS BY INDIA [EXCERPTS FROM THE
DEBATE , JULY 26, 1978]

SHRI SAMAR GUHA : Madam Chairman, the statement made by the Prime Minister in the course of his visit to USA that India will not undertake nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes has created much concern in the minds of people like me, a humble student of science.

THE PRIME MINISTER (SHRI MORARJI DESAI): May I correct the hon. Member? I made the statement first here and not outside.

SHRI SAMAR GUHA: But it has received quite a lot of publicity all over the world.

SHRI C.M. STEPHEN : In our country also.

SHRI SAMAR GUHA: In our country also, or wherever it may be . It has created some concern, I should say great concern, in the minds of people like us, humble students of science, as to why and what stands in the way of not having nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes...

When our first nuclear device was exploded in Rajasthan it was categorically mentioned that the whole object of this explosion was for the utilization or for

developing blast technology of nuclear engineering for peaceful purposes. It was made very categorically clear to the world, but here was a hue and cry all over the world against this kind of nuclear blast...

I want to know from my Government: what stands in the way of utilization of this blast technology for developing nuclear engineering for constructive and developmental purposes.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I think you have made your point.

SHRI SAMAR GUPTA : They are trying to monopolise all the nuclear technology , nuclear power and nuclear energy, brow-beating all the other States, as if it is their right only to have a monopoly of having nuclear engineering or other use of nuclear energy also.

I want to conclude by making a request to the hon. Prime Minister. Let us not take a moral posture in regard to the development of nuclear technology for peaceful explosion.

It can be used for peaceful purposes, constructive purposes, developmental purposes. An under-developed country like India requires it.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Shri Unnikrishnan, Question, not a speech.

SHRI K.P. UNNIKRISHNAN : I will introduce my question. Self-reliant development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has been our aim, as also the aim and goal of our scientific community. We have withstood pressures from all the nuclear Powers in the past and we undertook the Pokharan explosion. I recall Dr. Homi Sethna's speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I do not take your time. You are taking the time of the House. Kindly be brief.

SHRI K.P. UNNIKRISHNAN: Now, I find that the Prime Minister in his speech to the United Nations had said that 'in fact, we have gone further and abjured nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes'. Possibly he has taken a moral posture as he used to do before and said this. We would like to know whether he has said this in reference to the advice tendered by the scientists community.

What I want to know in relation to this agreement about which this Half-an-hour discussion has been raised here is: is it a fact that there is a pressure from the United States for full-scope safeguards and whether he has given any such assurance and whether this speech reflects this pressure?

Prof. Samar Guha who has raised this discussion has also posed a question. Whether it is a fact that the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, had stopped all peaceful nuclear explosions. The House would like to know whether it is as a result of any pressure from the United States or the Soviet Union or any other country.

Apart from what is raised, here, is there a pressure on full-scope safeguards? Is it a fact that the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act will cover all our nuclear installations whereas the Soviet Agreement dated 17-11-77 is confined only to one plant? That is the difference. We want to be enlightened on this. Whether it is a fact that we have agreed to this and whether we have agreed to full-scope safeguards.

PROF. P.G. MAVALANKAR : This is a very important subject affecting our vital interests and involving our honour and self-respect and, of course, our security and strength.

May I respectfully ask the Prime Minister these questions:

(a) Is the policy of not having nuclear explosion even for peaceful purposes taken under any kind of pressure brought to bear on us of either USA or Russia?

(b) Is this decision, that we will not have nuclear explosion even for peaceful purposes, taken because of our helplessness regarding some vital ingredients we need to import from USA/USSR?

(c) Why do we go to the extreme position and adhere to this extreme stance at a comparatively early stage of our negotiations?

(d) What, if any, are the political gains accruing to us because of this particular policy?

(e) What about our efforts at self-reliance?

(f) What about the attitude of the scientific community involved in nuclear research? The Prime Minister knows about it, more than all of us naturally. What is the attitude of that community to this new decision taken by the Government?

These are my questions to the Prime Minister and I would like to have answers from him.

SHRI SAMAR GUHA: This was the subject I had to teach in the university. I know where I am.

PRIME MINISTER: That is an impression on me. I may be wrong, but I must speak it. By saying humble, one does not become humble. Now the question is whether we

are stopping our nuclear research. There is no question of not using nuclear research. There is no question of not using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We are going at it fully. And is any explosion necessary for it? That is the question.

SHRI SAMAR GUHA: Yes

PRIME MINISTER : It is not necessary. I will say why. After all, there must be a distinction between blasting for purposes of mining or water purposes or oil purposes. That is different. That is not nuclear explosion. That is a limited purpose of blasting only for that purpose. I have not debarred that.

That is a different thing altogether. But that is not like this explosion which took place at Pokhran. That was quite different. No research is necessary for peaceful purposes by explosions. Enough research is there; enough knowledge is there and we can utilise all of that and therefore it is not necessary in that way.

[Source: Lok Sabha Debates, 26 July, 1978, Cols. 359-79.]

APPENDIX - IV

PRIME MINISTER CHARAN SINGH'S INDEPENDENCE DAY
SPEECH ON AUGUST 15, 1979 [EXCERPT FROM HIS SPEECH]

Pakistan "whose people were our brothers till yesterday", was attempting to make an atomic bomb. Pakistan had friendly relations with China. It had no quarrel with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, a small neighbour of Pakistan, did not have to have an atomic weapon aimed against it. If, under the circumstances, he and his colleagues concluded that Pakistan's bomb was directed against India, it would not be far from the truth." We do not want to join the race to make a nuclear bomb. But if Pakistan goes ahead with its plans to make the bomb we will perhaps have to reconsider the entire question.

[Source: The Tribune (Chandigarh), August 16, 1979;
Asian Recorder vol. XXV no. 37.p. 15067.]

APPENDIX - V

PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI ON NUCLEAR ISSUES

[EXCERPT FROM HIS INTERVIEW TO NBC'S
TOM BROKAW ON JULY 24, 1985]

Q: Prime Minister, thank you very much for agreeing to give this interview for us all. May I ask you this provocative question? Do you believe the Pakistan has a nuclear bomb?

PM: It is very difficult to say whether we have a nuclear bomb but we feel that they are on their way to getting a nuclear bomb.

Q: You have said that so many people in your country have urged you to build a nuclear bomb for India if, in fact, you determined that Pakistan does have a nuclear weapons. Why don't you wisely go the other way to try to reach out to Pakistan to negotiate between the two countries so neither one of you would find it necessary to have a nuclear weapon?

PM: Well, we are reaching out to Pakistan. We have had a joint meeting just recently which has made some headway. We were willing to go much further but we found that they wanted to go a little slower.

We have no programme for making a bomb and we don't want to make a bomb but if Pakistan did get a bomb it would , most certainly, change the perspectives in our region.

Q : What are some of the objections that the Pakistanis have in your plan for negotiating the elimination of nuclear weapons in that part of the world?

PM: Well, we don't think that they are fully sincere in what they are offering and the type of inspection that is being talked about will be sufficient to guarantee that nuclear weapons are not made.

Q : Would you prefer an outside independent agency of some kind -- a neutral country for example -- to become the inspectors?

PM: It is difficult to say what would work because, as most people are aware, most of the technology has come from the US and Western Europe and in spite of your very rigid control, you have not been able to stop it leaking.

Q: Has India at any time considered a tactical air strike of some kind against the plant of Pakistan which is called computer?

PM: No, we haven't.

Q : Is that an option that you must keep open, however?

PM: No, we don't intend such strike.

Q: Do you blame the United States, Prime Minister, for the development of a nuclear bomb in Pakistan?

PM: No, I don't think we blame the United States, but we feel that all the western countries could have been tougher and could have prevented this development.

Q: Is it time, do you think, on the part of India and Pakistan, United States and the Soviet Union, and all the nuclear powers in the world and those who have the potential to have nuclear bomb, to convene some kind of an extraordinary meeting-of all the leaders-to discuss this..?

Well, there are many ways that it can be done and I think we will have to try in more directions that one to get an effective answer. One of the first steps must be to prevent further escalation. And we must all work towards that end as well.

Q: And how would you recommend that first step be taken?

PM: Well, we have raised the issue. Public opinion is very important part of this. We have been talking about it. Other

nations have raised it. We have had a Six-Nation Summit in Delhi. Last year, in May, we had a Six Nation Appeal which the leaders of our six nations did simultaneously through a satellite link. These are first steps. But what is really needed is for major powers to come forward and want to disarm. It is very easy to spread the problem to countries that don't have weapons to nuclear weapons countries which are much smaller. But the initiative must start with the super powers.

Q: ... With all due respect, your country has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Why not?

PM: Because we feel it is unfair. It is not equal, it treats nuclear weapon countries differently from non-nuclear countries. It tries to stop horizontal proliferation but it doesn't stop vertical proliferation.

Q: Mr. Prime Minister, you have been critical in this interview and in other times of the super powers. You already have nuclear capability. A lot of people ask why India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, with all their economic problems and pressing social needs, are investing their precious resources on something like a nuclear weapon?

PM: But we haven't invested our precious resources on a nuclear weapon. And we have been using nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes, for generating energy, in other areas of agriculture, food preservation, industry. We are not wasting our money on weapons.

Q: In 1974 you did want to demonstrate to the world that in your country you have nuclear capability by conducting a nuclear explosion for test purposes.

PM: Well, we did have a very small peaceful nuclear explosion which is not the same as a bomb. And there are many uses in peacetime for nuclear explosions. Other countries are using this but we have not developed that further.

Q.... from the point of view of Pakistan, it has got three wars with you since 1947...

PM:... they attacked us three times since 1947...

A: And they have lost each time.

PM: Yes, but they started it.

Q: But the fact of the matter is that there is constant tension between India and Pakistan and to Pakistan's west, a country, Afghanistan, is now occupied by the Soviet Union. Pakistan is very well aware of the fact that you have cordial relations with the Soviet Union-between Delhi and Moscow. Why wouldn't Pakistan feel, as it might, as an island surrounded by altogether not friendly forces, and want to develop all the nuclear capabilities they require?

PM : Because we are offering them friendship. We have shown friendship with the other countries in our region and it has changed the atmosphere in South Asia. We offered the same friendship to Pakistan and we expect an outstretched hand in return.

Q: As you know, President Reagan has this week agreed to renew a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. Does that concern you at all, given the friendly relations between Pakistan and China?

PM: It does concern us because we are not totally convinced that technology... well, nuclear weapon technology is not leaking from that route.

Q: You are persuaded that China may be helping Pakistan in the development of nuclear bomb?

PM: It is a possibility.

Q: And apart from that, the new agreement between the United States and China may heighten the possibility that Pakistan can get a bomb?

PM: Well, unless there are sufficient controls. And we have seen that controls are not foolproof.

Q: In your best judgement and based on Indian intelligence, how long will it be before Pakistan gets a bomb?

PM: That is very difficult to say. But we feel that they are very close to developing a weapon.

[Source: Strategic Digest, September, 1985, pp. 1091-93.]

APPENDIX - VIPAKISTANI NUCLEAR SCIENTIST, DR.A.Q.KHAN's
INTERVIEW WITH KULDIP NAYAR.

PAKISTAN HAS THE BOMB.

KULDIP NAYAR

NEW DELHI, Feb. 28 - Pakistan has the bomb. Mr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, father of the "Islamic bomb", would not actually say that. But what he told me should be enough testi-mony. "The U.S.A. knows it, what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of certain foreign newspapers", he said.

The 51-year old Mr. Khan is hard to reach at his distant "two-bungalow" house, located in idyllic surroundings in Islamabad. He is fond of birds, which abound at his residence. Strict security arrangements shield him and from nowhere guards and bulldogs appeared when I was still yards from his house.

"They told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities. But they know we have done it", said Mr. Khan, who is hailed as only next to Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founder, in public esteem. During an hour-long interview with me, the first to a foreign journalist, he referred

specifically to an observation of Dr. H.N. Sethna, when he was Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission three years ago, that Pakistan had neither the capability nor the means to manufacture the bomb.

"Indeed, it was difficult , particularly when the U.S.A and other Western countries had stopped selling anything which could be used in manufacturing the bomb", he said. An embargo was put on such small things as magnets and maraging steel. "But we purchased whatever we wanted to before the Western countries got the wind of it".

Mr. Khan is tacit but by no means modest. He is proud of what he has done in proving sceptics like Dr. Sethna wrong. And he is so sure of himself that he does not better to back off-repeated Pakistani denials on the bomb. But he would not allow me to tape-record the interview.

"Why don't you announce that you have the bomb," I asked him pointblank, "Is it necessary? The U.S.A. has threatened to cut off all its aid".

But you have not tested it yet? "The testing does not have to be on the ground. It can be done in a laboratory through a simulator. Planes are flown after testing their capability in simulators".

Mr. Khan said India had a bomb bigger than the one it exploded in Rajasthan on May 18, 1974. "You have not tested it on the ground but you have tested its capabilities otherwise", he said.

Mr. Khan did not say when Pakistan actually came to possess the bomb. He mentioned that India took 12 years to make the bomb while he took only seven years. He returned to Pakistan from Holland in December, 1975, and the Kahuta plant took three years to complete; that means that by December, 1978, or the beginning of 1979, it was operational. If one were to add seven years, Pakistan could be said to have acquired the bomb either towards the end of 1985 or the beginning of 1986.

Making no pretence that Pakistan's nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes, Mr. Khan said: "The word 'peaceful' associated with the nuclear programme is humbug. There is no 'peaceful' bomb. After all, there is only a weak, transparent screen between the two. Once you know how to make reactors, how to produce plutonium — all that Pakistan has mastered as well — it becomes a rather easy task to produce nuclear weapons".

India's nuclear programme, according to Mr. Khan, was not for peaceful purposes. In fact, he was very

critical of India. "It is you who have forced us to go nuclear. The super powers had to because of mutual fear, China being a big country had to make the bomb because both the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. had it. Why should you have done it? India had no such serious security problems. It had a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. This was meant to threaten us, to establish its hegemony in the region. We were left with no alternative. In fact, it was as a result of the Indian betrayal of trust that the Canadians abruptly cut off all nuclear cooperation with us", he said.

Mr. Khan, who by this time had given up the stance of talking in general terms, said that "Pakistan will not use it(the bomb). But if it is driven to the wall there will be no option left in that eventuality. Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are there to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened".

Mr. Khan talked bitterly of Canada and France which, according to him, went back on "solemn agreements", the first cutting off all nuclear cooperation and refusing heavy water and the second backing off from the project for a processing plant, even though it was to be set up under international safeguards. "The U.S.A. twisted France's arms", he said.

Was Kahuta the right site to choose for putting up the nuclear plant? Mr. Khan got rather excited on the subject. "While outsiders would always think in terms of their convenience, I had two prime factors in mind. The site should be out of normal traffic for security reasons and it should be near the capital for support and quick decisions. More important than all these factors was the consideration of the facilities for my scientists and engineers. We never repented our decision and it is solely due to the selection of this site and my presence in the capital that we managed to rush through our programme for more than three years before the Western countries came to know of it and embarked upon concerned and coordinated, but unsuccessful efforts to kill our infant programme".

Mr. Khan ruled out the possibility of any attack on the plant. "Israel is not interested because we never come in its way, nor have we antagonised it one way or another. India is the only other country but it knows what price it would have to pay for attacking Kahuta. In any case, the plant is well protected and we have not put all our eggs in one basket."

"I personally think that the only way to stop nuclear warfare between India and Pakistan is to come to an agreement. You do not want us to throw them open to you. Whatever arrangements you suggest we are willing to suggest provided it is applicable to both countries equally," he said.

Mr. Khan said that Pakistan had been criticised for "stealing" things from abroad for its programme. "First let me make it clear we shall do anything in the national interest". He sounded angry when he recalled his trial in Holland for "stealing" information from there.

(A case was initiated against him in Holland for writing two letters from Pakistan to two of his former colleagues. But he fought the case from Islamabad and prepared a brief for the lawyer).

Mr. Khan studied in Bhopal, where he was born, till 1952. Only then did his parents emigrate to Pakistan. He earned a B.Sc. degree from Karachi University and went first to West Germany and then Holland to specialise both in metallurgy and physics. He is married to a Dutch, Mrs. Henny Khan, and has two children both girls. Mr. Khan has very few friends, mostly those working with him.

[Source: The Tribune (Chandigarh), March 1, 1987]

APPENDIX - VII

GEN. ZIA-UL HAQ'S INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE ,
JUNE 30, 1987

THE CAT IN THE BAG

The evidence has been there for some time, supported by occasional hints from government officials, but Pakistan has steadfastly refused to admit that its scientists were at work on a nuclear weapon. Though that basic premise did not waver, the general perception changed last week, and with less subtlety than might have been expected. In an exclusive interview with TIME, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's President, set the record straight, and in the process seemed to be heralding the arrival of country as a closet nuclear power.

As he sat flanked by two aides in his office at Islamabad's Aiwan-e-Sadar, the House of the Presidency, Zia was asked by TIME New Delhi Bureau Chief Ross H. Munro about persistent reports that Pakistan could build a nuclear weapon in less than a month. The President's blunt answer "You can virtually write today that Pakistan can build a (nuclear) bomb whenever it wishes. What is difficult about a bomb? Once you have acquired the technology, which Pakistan has you can do whatever you like".

Did that mean Pakistan had actually built the bomb, or intended to? On both questions, Zia answered no, even as he maintained a studied ambiguity that mirrored in some respects that of India, which also says it can produce nuclear weapons, while insisting that it has not taken that step. Said Zia: "You can use (the atomic device) for peaceful purposes only. You can also utilize it for military purposes. We have never said that we are incapable of doing this. We have said that we have neither the intention nor the desire".

Zia's clarification came in the wake of a widely circulated interview last January with Abdul Qadeer Khan, the head of Pakistan's nuclear research program, in which the scientist reportedly told an Indian journalist that Pakistan had reached the nuclear threshold. Khan subsequently denied having said any such thing, and just two weeks ago, Prime Minister M.K. Junejo told TIME, "Pakistan can set at rest any doubts which may exist regarding our peaceful nuclear program."

In last week's interview, however, Zia seemed to be creating a fresh aura of uncertainty surrounding Pakistan's nuclear plants. When asked by Munro if he could visit Kahuta, Pakistan's main nuclear research facility, Zia grew evasive.

Question: Can we visit Kahuta?

Zia: Unfortunately not yet.

Question: Why not?

Zia: There is nothing in Kahuta.

Question: So why can't we visit?

Zia : There is a certain facility but no atom bombs.

Question: So why can't we go see for ourselves?

Zia: Because once the cat is out of the bag, what will be left that is controversial?

Question: We know that Kahuta is the bag, but what is the cat?

Zia(laughing heartily): The cat is lying in Kahuta.

Question: Define the cat.

Zia: The cat is Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program.

Question: You just laid it on the table. The cat is the uncertainty. The uncertainty about what is going on at Kahuta is your great asset, isn't it?

Zia: Uncertainty created for specific reasons. Once that uncertainty goes, you will never talk with me.

While uncertainty remains as to Pakistan's intentions, little doubt lingers about its capabilities. That fact, now in the open, could have widespread repercussions among

Pakistan's friends, neighbors and enemies. In Washington Congress is considering a \$ 4.02 billion military and economic aid bill for Pakistan that may face tougher going in the wake of Zia's revelation. In Delhi the Khan interview earlier this year triggered appeals by hawks that India build a nuclear arsenal, calls that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has thus far resisted. Though Zia did not rule out the possibility of a future confrontation, border tensions between Pakistan and India are easing as both countries continue to pull back troops from sensitive frontier areas.

[Source: Time, March 30, 1987, p.4.]

APPENDIX - VIII

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

International tensions continued to be high in the year under review, with consequent repercussions on India's security environment.

In Pakistan, it is now almost certain, on the basis of public evidence, including the disclosures made recently by the leading Pakistani nuclear scientist that it is on the brink of acquiring, nuclear weapons capability. This development, which has the most serious consequences for India's security, has been compounded by Pakistan's continuing acquisition of weaponry which go well beyond its security needs. The US Administration has let it be known that it will provide another large arms package to Pakistan on concessional terms. Particularly disturbing is the Administration's willingness to consider transferring to Pakistan sophisticated airborne early warning systems, which would have a minimal impact on dealing with alleged air intrusions from Afghanistan, but a substantial force multiplier effect against India.

The Government of India remains committed to improving and normalising its relations with Pakistan on the basis of the Simla Agreement. However, the development of economic, commercial and cultural ties between the

two countries as envisaged in the Simla Agreement, has not made much headway. Pakistan continues to acquire sophisticated weapons systems plainly intended for use against India. Discussions on Siachen remain abortive. We appreciate Pakistan's recent undertaking not to encourage terrorist activities directed against India. During this year, a dialogue with Pakistan was carried on at various levels and on different security-related issues. However, it cannot be said that these talks have led to any perceptible improvement in the atmosphere.

This became evident from the recent escalation of tensions during Operation BRASS TACKS. We had informed Pakistan of the timing, location and level of troops to be deployed in the exercise. The force dispositions adopted by Pakistan, ostensibly to strengthen its defences, and counter India's force deployments as a precautionary measure could, in fact, have been the prelude for an incursion in the Jammu and Punjab sectors. The move of its armoured divisions into the Shakargarh bulge and opposite Fazilka - Ferozepur, along with other operational measures, had no relation to our exercise. They could only be construed as provocative and compelled us to take requisite defensive measures, involving the deployment of our armed forces along the international

border, which had previously been manned by the Border Security Force. Nevertheless, we took the initiative thereafter, to defuse tensions by offering to hold official level talks between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries. These talks have succeeded in lowering the temperature along the Indo-Pakistan border. The understanding reached during the two rounds of discussions held so far included a number of confidence - building measures and an agreement for a pull-out of troops on a sector by sector basis, beginning with the Ravi-Chenab corridor.

This overview would delineate the sharp deterioration that has occurred in India's national security environment over the last year. Considering the global and regional developments that have a bearing upon it, India has entered a complex phase in its growth, with external and internal factors interacting to create a new security milieu. It would require a determined national effort therefore in the foreign policy and security areas to meet these new challenges.

- Extract from the Chapter - I , National Security Environment.

[Source: Ministry of Defence, Annual Reports, 1986-87, pp.1-3.]

APPENDIX - IX

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Three areas on India's security perimeter where global rivalry is of great concern to us are the Gulf Region, the Indian Ocean and Pakistan.

In our immediate neighbourhood, Pakistan's weapons - oriented nuclear programme and its quest for sophisticated weapons like an AEW system, which go far beyond her genuine defence requirements are a matter of great concern for us. Not only have these developments led to a serious deterioration of our security environment but they have also tended to prompt the diversion of scarce resources from development to defence. Along with a sizable quantitative increase in its Armed Forces, Pakistan has been seeking to gain a technological edge over India by acquiring sophisticated weapon systems. For instance precision strike capability and electronic counter measures of the Pakistan Air Force have been significantly enhanced. Recently, the USA has decided to provide to Pakistan a large economic and military aid package, valued at \$4.02 billion for the period 1987-1993, despite further period becoming available of Pakistan's single-minded quest for nuclear weapons. It is indeed surprising that the USA should have decided to give a 30-month waiver to Pakistan from the application of its non-proliferation legislation

notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan is without doubt, engaged in a vigorous clandestine weapons-oriented nuclear programme. Quite apparently, the USA's non-proliferation concerns have yielded place to the need for ensuring Pakistan's continuing as its strategic ally.

It bears recollection that a dangerous escalation of tension occurred last year along the Indo-Pak border which was defused through official level talks by measures to restore confidence on both sides and graduated troop pull back from the Indo-Pak border. The deescalation of border tension, however, did not lead to any significant progress towards normalisation of relations due to negative actions on the part of Pakistan, such as its weapons-oriented nuclear policy, its quest for sophisticated weapons, like AWACS, far beyond its genuine defence requirements, its hostile posture in the Siachen area, its involvement with terrorist activities directed against India, etc. Government have also seen with concern reports about growing security linkages between Pakistan and the US CENTCOM Forces.


There is some improvement in Sino-Indian relations. The 8th Round of Official-level talks was held between India and China in a cordial and constructive atmosphere. Both delegations were agreed on the need for avoiding confrontation and conflict on the border between the two countries and the need to continue serious efforts to seek a settlement of the border problem in mutual interest. China, no doubt, continues to upgrade its logistics and communication network and improvement of military airfields in Tibet, apart from maintaining significantly higher force levels, compared to the past.

This brief over-view would reveal that the international security system is equipoised. It would show an improvement in the near term future and, hopefully, provide greater stability to regions neighbouring India, that impinge on its security environment. There has traditionally been a broad national consensus on India's foreign and security policy. It is important that this consensus be strengthened to cope with and influence the emerging trends.


— Extract from the Chapter-I, National Security Environment.

[Source: Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1987-88, pp.1-3.]

APPENDIX - X



[Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Annual Report 1987-88]

APPENDIX - XI

■ SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL ■ AUXILIARY & ADMINISTRATIVE



GROWTH OF MANPOWER

* Does not include staff transferred to NPC


[Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Annual Report 1987-88]

GROWTH IN NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

From: 1959-70 to 1987-88




ORGANISATIONAL CHART



[Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Annual Report 1986-87]


APPENDIX - XIV

ORGANISATIONAL CHART



[Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Annual Report 1987-88]

Atomic Energy Establishments in India




[Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Annual Report 1987-88]

APPENDIX - XVI


DEFENCE EXPENDITURE FOR THE SERVICES AND FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF
DEFENCE PRODUCTION & SUPPLIES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Chart I

[Source; Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 1987-88]

APPEDIX - XVII

Budget Allocation between Defence Services and Departments of Defence Production and Supplies and Research and Development



NOTE :- * Since April 1, 1987 a separate Demand for Ordnance Factories has been opened for better budgetary control. The amounts indicated against Army in 1987-88(RE) and 1988-89(BE) include Rs. 1150 crores and Rs. 1250 crores respectively, which has to be transferred to DGOF on account of DGOF supplies.

[Source: Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 1987-88]

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