

AUSTRALIAN MARITIME STRATEGY, 1991-2016

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled *AUSTRALIAN MARITIME STRATEGY, SINCE 1991-2016* submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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Dedicated
To
My Graduation class
friends

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Triloki Nath Singh

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAT	Australian Antarctic Territory
ACPB	Armidale Class Patrol Boats
ADF	Australian Defence Force
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AEW&C	Airborne Early Warning and Control
AFMA	Australian Fisheries Management Authority
AFZ	Australian Fishing Zone
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ANZUS	Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1951
ARE	Amphibious Ready Element
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
ASSP	ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
AWD	Air Warfare Destroyer
BPC	Border Protection Command
CCAMLR	Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources
CIWS	Close-in Weapons Systems
CDT	Clearance Diving Teams
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CTF	Combined Task Force
CTI	Coral Triangle Initiative
DCP	Defence Capability Plan
EEZ	Economic Exclusive Zone
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
EPBC Act	Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act - 1999

FFA	Forum Fisheries Agency
FFG	Guided Missile Frigates
FFH	Frigate Helicopter
FPDA‘	Five Power Defence Agreement
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HIMI	Heard Island and McDonald Island
HMAS	His/Her Majesty’s Australian Ship/Submarine
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IUU	Illegal, unregulated and unreported (Fishing)
LHD	Landing Helicopter Dock
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LPH	Landing platform helicopters
LTTE	Liberation of Tamil Tiger Eelam
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCS	Naval Control of Shipping
PACIOSWG	Pacific and Indian Oceans Shipping Working Group
PICs	Pacific Island Countries
PIF	Pacific Island Forum
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Island
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific [exercise]
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
ROPA	Regional Plan of Action
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communications
SSG	Guided-Missile-Submarine
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicles
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
UNMAET	United Nation Mission in East Timor
USA	United States of America
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USSR	Union Soviet Socialist Russia
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPNS	Western Pacific Naval Symposium

LIST OF MAPS, TABLES AND IMAGES

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1.1: Australian Maritime Zones

Map 3.1: Strategic Chokepoints: Strait of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok and SLOCs Passing Through the Spratly Islands

Map 3.2: Fishing Zone in the Coral Triangle

Map 3.3: Heard and McDonald Region

Map 4.1: Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific Region

Map.4.2: Location of Major Defence Facilities across Australia

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: The Key Elements of Maritime Strategy

Table 2.2: Royal Australian Navy's Current and Projected Fleet

Table 2.3: Defence Capability Plan

Table 2.4: Australian Defence Strategic Interests and Objectives

Table 3.1: Maritime Piracy Incidents on the Global Level

Table 4.1: State Security Eras of Pacific Island Regionalism

Table 4.2: Countries in and adjacent to the Pacific Arc- Land Area and Size of EEZ

Table 4.3: Australian Arrests of Foreign Fishing Vessels within the Heard and McDonald Islands Fishing Zone

LIST OF IMAGE

Image 4.1: Different Modules of Amphibious Ship

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
Acknowledgements:	iv
List of Abbreviations:	v-vii
List of Maps, Tables and Image:	viii
Chapter I: Introduction: Australian Maritime Strategy: 1991-2016	1-13
Chapter II: Australian Defence White Papers: Its Implications in Australian Maritime strategy	14-38
Chapter III: Challenges of Australian Maritime Strategy	39-68
Chapter IV: Role of Australian Navy within Indo-Pacific Region	69-98
Chapter V: Conclusion	99-106
Bibliography:	107-121

Chapter: 1

Introduction

The proposed study intends to examine the Australian maritime strategy in the post-Cold War. Australia is an island continent which even preceding turning into a free state as federation in 1901 had a rich history in oceanic undertakings. Since that time, Australia has maintained an expanding centre around maritime security, especially expanding in recent years in response to contemporary events. Maritime strategy changes with the specific circumstance, structure, national purposes, technologies, and equipment accessible. Surprisingly, after the Guam doctrine and failure of ANZUS Treaty Australian government became serious in transforming the maritime strategy. Therefore, in the end of 1980s Australia came with new maritime strategy with evolving new equations. As an island continent with vast ocean spaces to the east, west, and south, Australia had a nearly unfettered capacity to proclaim a continental shelf, a fisheries zone, and then eventually an EEZ. The development within Australian trade into the Asia-Pacific, particularly Japan and China, where there is significant demand for Australian crude metallic and non-metallic minerals, implies that Australia has solid interests in regional maritime security. Since, end of the Cold War, for Australia and every other person, the idea of security has broadened massively. The real concentration of post-Cold War Australian sea technique incorporates guaranteeing the flexibility of route, the stream of business and the insurance of sea assets, and in addition securing ‘the oceanic space from non-state dangers, fear based oppression, human trafficking and different types of transnational wrongdoing, robbery, ecological obliteration and illicit seaborne migration’. Maritime security, based on the “provision of good order at sea” is a prerequisite for wider security and prosperity, especially for oceanic trading states like Australia. It has an exceptionally specific oceanic security enthusiasm for Southeast Asia, as Indonesia is Australia’s biggest sea neighbour. This proximity not only raises issues with respect to the security of maritime zones and associated interests; additionally there has been expanded sea communication in recent decades between the two nations, ranging from fishing interests to asylum seekers. Australia’s growing economic relationship with India has additionally advanced more enthusiastic for the Indian Sea.

The 1987 Australian Defence White Paper emphasised on the importance of self-reliance within the framework of alliances and agreements. The report expressed that the “first aim for self-reliance in defence is to give Australia the military capability to deter an aggressor attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of our territory, or extracting concessions from Australia through the use or threat of military force”. Therefore, with a specific end goal to comprehend the full range of security mechanism maritime domain has critical place in nation security and stability. One’s own historical experience needs to be augmented by an understanding of other nation’s experiences, in various times and in differing situations. The experience of the 20th century vindicates one maritime strategy is not legitimate for all circumstances.


A maritime strategy facilitates Australian navy to contribute in a meaningful tactic of obstructing adversaries from accessing the mainland of the country. It empowers the maritime forces against the illegal fishing, smuggling, illegal immigration, piracy and any security concerns related to the mainland and offshore island. Therefore, keep adversaries away from the Australian water, there must be ‘rule of law’ in the immediate neighbourhood. Any conflicts or crisis within immediate neighbourhood region will affect the stability of whole region and Australian interest also. The 1994 White Paper Points that Australia’s security concern is intertwined with regional security. In this situation, Australia cannot be secure in an unstable region. This security approach has the best opportunity to assimilate the distinctive capabilities of all three services in a well-organized manner; it is multifaceted approach of maritime strategy. The military concept of maritime strategy encompasses diplomatic, constabulary and warfighting elements and in broad sphere, it encompasses nation’s economic, political, societal, and environmental security.

The defence policy is a dynamic concept. It always implores changes regularly in accordance with the national interest. Therefore, to maintain equilibrium with the current and forthcoming circumstances, it is necessitated to publish official document wherein the government can fix the comprehensive landscape for that services, which is directly related to the nation security. Australian government has published still five Defence White Papers (DWPs) in the post-Cold War period. Moreover, these DWPs explain the policy related to maritime strategy and regular update about the acquisition of naval vessels and equipment. In the absence of these machinery, no one naval force can maintain their minimum standard operating procedure in peace time

and cannot achieve effective outcome in the war time. Thus, it is known process to reformulate its interest, objective, and policy setting.

Approximately 70 per cent of the world's population reside within 150 kilometres of a coastline. In Australian context, this figure is near about 95 per cent and the figure is even higher for most of Southeast Asia. These statistics clearly point out the greater influence of maritime environment on human activities like social, economies, and strategic aspects. The 21st century is a maritime century; substantially it is an Asian century correspondingly. In fact, an Asian century will be maritime in nature by virtue of the region's geography, Asia's intra-regional trades and linkages are maritime in nature than either Europe or North America, and of course, the region has more maritime boundary disputes than in any other region of the world. Australia's maritime zones are one of the largest in the world, larger in area than continental area.

Map: 1
Australian Maritime Zones



Sources: <http://www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/marine/jurisdiction/maritime-boundary>

The Australian maritime zones have 60,000km of coastline and 12,000 islands, with a multitude of riches from the point of blue economy (off shore oil and gas fields, fisheries, coral reefs, aquaculture etc.) Australia's exclusive economic zone around its coastline and those of its offshore islands is the third largest in the world, extending to more than 8.1 million km. Some Australian islands like McDonald, Cocos, Christmas, Norfolk, and Macquarie islands are more dispersed and which lies nearly 4000km from Australian mainland. This creates an immense ocean space that not only needs to be monitored but also crossed in order for Australia to maintain its sovereign rights throughout its waters. The 1987 White Paper clearly identified major eight national defence interests wherein "the protection of Australian interests in the surrounding maritime areas, our island territories, and our proximate ocean areas are major focal points."

Meanwhile, its involvement during peacetime within maritime patrol and cooperative security building measures becomes helpful to dissuade arising conflict. Australian strategic interest is affiliated with the maritime domain therefore; the protection from the adversaries or any potential threats is the prime concern for Canberra. The Australian DWP 2000 clearly illustrated about the protection of Australian water and its offshore island. Subsequently, DWP 2016 also clearly elucidates the strategic defence interest wherein secure, protection of Australian water and offshore territory are the prime concerns and secure the immediate neighbourhood islands, and sea line of communication are significant. DWP 2016 also points out three strategic defence interests and strategic defence objectives. These spectrums clearly envisage about the Australian objectives and level of priorities. These priorities clearly give the outline for the ADF, as usual to deter and defeat the unseen threatened, participate in the security and stability in the South Pacific and Timor, and play a crucial role in the stable Indo-Pacific and rules based global order within U.S or U.N.

Nowadays, natures of threats are more volatile, dynamic, and disruptive than traditional threats such as the coercive act between two nations. On the other side, emergence of non- state actors as major security threats during this time have created stiff situation in this maritime domain. Albeit, the transnational behaviour of these challenges conveys enormous structural changing consequences as collapsed democratic states and political system, economic instability and environmental stressed conditions. Recent known scenarios are indicating the instability within these Pacific Island Countries. Undemocratic structure may create a lacuna in this region and the cascading effect of this circumstance will be more malicious and challenging for the

Australian navy. Therefore, to curb these challenges the 2016 DWP clearly emphasises, as ‘it is the sole responsibility of the ADF to foster Stability and Security within the South Pacific and East Timor’.

Australian interest directly is tangled with the ‘rules based global order’. The 2000 DWP clearly depicts and consider about the Australian forces contribution would not be limited until the Asia-Pacific region. The Australian forces would facilitate their presence in any US or UN led coalition. Hence, after the Cold War period Australia achieved its global strategic objectives within its comfort level. Australian forces participated in the most of operation like as Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraq Freedom (2003). Australia sent three warships and navy clearance divers to ‘Operation Desert Storm’ in 2003 Special Forces, F-18s, warships and other elements had shown their participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These presences are clearly showing the resemblance with its global strategic objectives. Here is no concern with the number of the warships and forces. Significant fact is herein, they have conceived Canberra’s objective as facilitate in the rules based order.

Freedom of navigation, protection of major sea line of communications, good order at maritime domain, as well as rules based global order is the major strategic interest of Australia. Actually, all these concerns are related with the Australian economy. New economic order after Cold War affected Australian economy in the positive sense. This growth gives at least limited free hand for the expenditure in different sectors like defence, health etc. therefore, it is become necessary for the Australian maritime forces to protect these interest actively. Naval power works as the major deterrent projection against the opponent and symbolically assurances of allies’ security. The widespread maritime zone of Australia inherently implores an efficient and capable maritime force. Nowadays, unconventional security threats are the concerned subject for the nation’s security. Interdependence within this non-traditional security threats and its cascading effects directly suffer the human security related issue. The degradation within human values will be black spot on the civilised human society. Australia is Human Development Index (HDI) ranking country; on the flip side, Southwest Pacific Islands Countries are suffering from the ‘Pacific paradox’ (under developing situation). This flaw can easily affect the region’s stability. Therefore, it is also one of the Australian strategic interest to maintain ‘rules based order’ under the democratic norms and ethos.

Prime Minister Paul Keating's Labour Party Government issued the Australian Defence White Paper 1994 in November 1994. This document clearly expressed that security is a global phenomenon. Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007), his government published the Australian Strategic Review in 1997. Highlights of this document discussed about the global nature of Australian strategic interests and emphasizing the importance of basing security on conditions in contiguous countries. An illegal migration from the Southeast Asian region is one of the major concerns. Further terrorist activities and illegal migration became a major concern for the Australian security as the result of Australian government came with "maritime information zone" policy in 2004. Policy mentioned that "upon entering the zone all ships intending to travel to Australia would need to provide information about its identity, crew, cargo, location, and destination". Moreover, RAN (Royal Australian Navy) and Australian coast guard comprehensively have been working for check of illegal migrants. During this period, Australian government has released Defence White Paper consequently in 2009, 2013 and 2016. All these documents emphasis on maritime vision and established "global rule based order." Apart from all these issues, Australia's naval force shares world's major naval fora like IONS, WPNS, ReCAAP, and various naval exercises like RIMPAC. These Naval exercises are the preparation of future challenges and complexities. So far these Naval exercises approach is multi-faceted like Naval war, Naval interdiction, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), guard the maritime boundary, information sharing. All these cooperation become goal setter for making a comprehensive maritime strategy.

Review of the Literature

Understanding Australian Maritime Strategy

The practice and the theory of naval and maritime strategy have been metamorphosed with changing world. Australian maritime strategy evolved under the guidance of British culture (Anglosphere legacy). Sea denial policy became major part of Australian maritime strategy. **Dupont (2003)** mentioned that it was about stopping the bad guys getting here, and anyone who got here onto Australia would be mopped up by the Army. During Cold War period, Australia followed the sea denial policy and tried to protect the interest of US and his allies. This policy kept away USSR from this southwest pacific region. After the end of Cold War, globalisation evolved with new mechanism wherein economy, trade, and commerce are more significant. Until now, Australia was evolving as middle power nation and its trade and commerce was growing gradually with Asia-Pacific countries. Moreover, new challenges

evolved like as maritime piracy, terrorism, transnational crime, and fragile democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. These all issues were affecting the Australian's interest and security. Therefore, especially Australia came with first Australian maritime doctrine in 2000 thus it was the first comprehensive plan which convinced about the Australian sea power policy.

Australia is known as the continental maritime nation. Furthermore, **Frank Broeze (1998)** highlighted the way Australia's states have captivated to a 'regional littoralism', which has restricted the evolution of a national maritime outlook. While New South Wales and Queensland look out onto the Pacific, South Australia adjoins the Southern Ocean and Western Australia overlooks the Indian Ocean. The nation's maritime diversity between east and west is further compounded by the fact that the Northern Territory's seaward focus is on the Timor Sea and into Southeast Asia through the Indonesian archipelago. Therefore, this phenomenon obviously illustrates the absence of far reaching maritime strategy and the sentiment this air-ocean crevice. Without a doubt, it was just in 2000 that an Australian Defence White Paper really utilized the term 'maritime strategy'. Surprisingly, it is the greatest paradox of modern Australian history that an island continent is deprived of a maritime culture, either in practice or in theory.

Peter Cozens (2000) argued, "Australia has perceived that an administration particularly custom fitted to Australia's oceanic domain is a vital instrument of national administration. After wide open discussion Australia has now characterized an Oceans Policy, it most likely has a few imperfections however these will be uncovered and can be tended to." Australia's Oceans Policy is presently a perspective, giving direction and standards of bearing, to national and local policymakers wherein incorporate all concerned divisions and individuals from society. Their direction related to huge seas will be helpful for strategically managed and governed. Most of scholar mainly emphasise on the military led concern within the maritime strategy whereas the human security led concern is also inherent part. Present vibrant domain as global warming and huge economic led activities are influenced this maritime domain.

Challenges for the Australian Maritime Security

The new millennium incepted with two faceted horizon wherein one face is dealing with new opportunities and scientific development but other sphere has come with the new complexities like terrorism, maritime piracy, human trafficking, trans-national crime, population explosion, and global warming also. Nowadays, all these unconventional challenges are evolving as the

major constraints for the nation security and stability. This fact was clearly highlighted by one of Australia's leading strategic thinker, **T. B. Millar (1965)** argued that the geographical proximity of Australia to Asia. It is just reverse position for the Australian culture and belief like 'Australia belongs to Anglosphere'. This situation has become major guiding force for the Australian foreign policy and security engagement. The nearest neighbour of Australia is Indonesia, with a population of about two hundred million and the accumulated population of Southeast Asia and south Asia are approximately 2 billion. On the other side, Australia has less population base and concentrated mainly in the eastern coastal region (Pacific coast). This feature and its porous oceanic boundary always attract the illegal migrants. Thus, it is challenging situation for the Australian navy and coastguard to curb all these illicit migration.

The recurrence of piracy acts has made gigantic difficulties immense for the global shipping industry. As Professor **Geoffrey Till (2013)** has noted, universal transportation, in a globalised world, is more delicate and less resilient than it used to be. In present era, piracy can disrupt the operations of a framework supported by a 'simply enough, just in time' operating procedure, along these triggering a cascade of financial impacts. Article 105 of UNCLOS mentions that on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, any state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. Maritime piracy is major concern for the every nation because it is impeding the constraint in the world trade and it is against the concept of 'freedom of navigation'. These maritime piracies are a part of global terrorism channel like as Somalian pirates, Jemaah-Islamiyah, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu- Sayyaf group of Philippines. It supports terrorism in both visible and invisible way. Hence, curb all these illegal activities in maritime domain are major one of the objective of Australian maritime strategy. There is distinguish fine line related to 'modus operandi' within the piracy and maritime terrorism act and transnational behaviour makes it more challenging for 'good order at sea'.

According to **Clive Schofield, Martin Tsamenyi & Mary Ann Palma (2008)** the Australian case delineates a large number of the oceanic security challenges confronting coastal states, and various innovative ways to address those difficulties. In any case, for all the upgraded maritime surveillance and enforcement capabilities, supported by noteworthy insights statistics, considerable issues remain. The sheer enormities of Australia's maritime jurisdiction, the intensity of maritime activities that should be tended to, and the inescapable human and

operational limitations imposed by Australia's moderately little population, represent a huge challenge. While noteworthy improvements have been accomplished and facilitate positive strides are being implemented, much remains to be done to guarantee that maritime Australia is secure. It remains to be perceived how the government of new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (elected in November 2007) will expand on the advancements delineated above , for instance through the establishment of an Australian Coast Guard as guaranteed preceding the election, with a specific end goal to address the critical difficulties confronting Australia.

Australian Maritime Policy in Indo-Pacific Region

The fundamental policy that Australia follows is to avoid the use of force and find resolving mechanism with dialogue and accommodation at multilateral fora like UN. Towards this end Australia has always supported, to the extent that its limited resources permit, all UN initiatives aimed at peacekeeping and stabilisation of volatile regions. **Bateman and Bergin (2011)** observed that the events of 1999 in East Timor and Australia's subsequent leadership of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) once again highlighted the importance of sea power to an island continent. Without sea power, INTERFET's operations in East Timor would have been vastly more difficult and complex, especially in such key areas as force protection, mobility, and logistics. An amphibious capability was the major cause behind the successful mission in East Timor the presence of sea power, provided INTERFET with force protection, mobility, and significant sustainment capabilities. Maritime issues offer abundant opportunities for fostering good relations between Australia and Timor-Leste. Common interests in the maritime domain assimilate security, resource development, and marine environmental protection related concern. Moreover, Australian navy has cooperated with Pacific Island Countries to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security or stabilisation operations in the immediate region as it has acted successfully in Solomon Islands and in Bougainville and regarding to the devastation of Tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in March 2015. The active presence of Australian maritime forces within most of the stifle situation is picturing a forward defence approach. However, limited presence within the Indian Ocean based operation is creating apprehensive landscape.

Katherine M Anderson and Rob McCusker (2005) argue about the challenges of illegal fishing and its deterrent effect. Australia has played as a big brother role in this region and tried to curb all illegal activities in this region. Operation Solania is the Australian Defence Force (ADF) led maritime surveillance programme within the Southwest Pacific Region. The

major objective is to monitor the Economic Exclusive Zones of Pacific Island Countries. This operation started under the Niue Treaty, which was established in July 1992 to enable cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement amongst Forum Fisheries Agency member nations. Thus, this policing mechanism supports the economic development of Pacific island countries through the protection of their marine bio-product. In spite of, ADF also provides assistance for the 'Operations Kuru Kuru, Big Eye, Island Chief, Tui Moana and Rai Balang', which are coordinated maritime surveillance and patrol operations run by the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), to detect and deter Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing activity. The southern ocean near to Heard and McDonald island region, Australia is also facing IUUs. Comparatively, the IUUs challenges are not identical within the Australian northern and Southern water mass. Hence, threats are identical but mechanism and dynamics are heterogeneous.

Rory Medcalf (2011) argues that the Indo-Pacific region is becoming widely recognised as the global centre of gravity, whether in terms of economic interaction, demographics, transnational security challenges or the strategic balance. All these specialities and its geographical proximity near to major SLOCs (sea line of communications) make this region more vibrant. The interests of major, middle, and minor powers are entangled with this region. Interestingly after the establishment of ARF (ASEAN Regional forum) and ADMM Plus (ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting), it has availed the opportunities to share concern on single platform and tackled the trans-national issue with cooperation. Despite all these, Australia has a long tradition to work and set up security agreement with regional partners bilaterally and through regional agreements such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements and Regional Maritime Security Initiative. It has defence cooperation programs with regional partners, especially in Southeast Asia, that comprised training, joint exercises, specialised exchanges and shared professional perspectives on defence doctrine. Despite, all this assimilation, there is discrepancies related to the maritime surveillance within the Southeast Asian water to dissuade maritime piracy in this region. Until, Australia is not Part of indigenous regional mechanism 'ReCAAP'. This flaw within Australian maritime strategy is accommodating scope of study.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

The proposed study on Australian maritime strategy after the Cold War period is an under researched area. Existing study mainly focuses on perspective of Australian maritime strategy

within 1991-2016 timeline. This study also explains the major challenges for Australian maritime strategy such as traditional and non-traditional security threats. Australian maritime zone is one of largest in the world, larger in area than continental area and its geographical proximity to Asia is availing the new challenges. Maritime terrorism and illegal migration are major concerns for the Australian security. Australian trade is growing within the Asia-Pacific region; especially expanding nature of Japanese and Chinese's industry, where there are considerable demand for Australian natural resources, meant that Australia has strong interests in regional maritime security. The major focus of post-Cold War Australian maritime strategy includes ensuring the freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce and the protection of ocean resources, as well as securing the maritime domain from non-state threats, terrorism, and drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. Therefore, it is significant to explore Australian maritime strategy in the holistic way.

Aims and Objective

- To assess the Australian maritime strategy during the 25 years period.
- Find out the gap between Australian maritime strategy and its manifestation.
- To evaluate the Australian maritime policy towards the challenges like security and non-security threats.
- To assess the impact of maritime policy on Australia and its neighbouring countries relation.

Research Questions

- 1) What is the major focus of Australian maritime strategy in the post-Cold War?
- 2) Why is the maritime strategy significant for the Australian perspectives?
- 3) What are the major comprehensive challenges for Australian maritime strategy?
- 4) What is the Australian view towards the "Indo-Pacific" region?
- 5) How has the post-Cold War era taken new challenges to Australian naval policy?
- 6) What are the initiatives taken by Australia to cooperate with Southeast Asian neighbours?
- 7) What is the 'Look-West' strategy of Australia?
- 8) Are Australian naval policy and capabilities transforming in real sense?

Research Hypothesis

- The consecutive Defence White Papers have been showing the Australian maritime strategy is more submissive towards the ‘immediate neighbourhood countries’ than ‘Indo-Pacific region’
- Australia’s emphasis on maritime strategy has become more prominent and pronounced due to ‘US Pivot of Asia’.

Research Methodology

The proposed research follows the qualitative, descriptive, and analytical method. To accomplish the set objectives, the study examines the Australia’s maritime strategy in Indo-Pacific region in post-Cold War timeframe. This study is based on primary and secondary sources of reading. The study of various documents, government pronouncement, government records, Defence White Papers, interviews of scholar, as well as reports from international organizations and Australian parliamentary library have contributed as the primary sources for this analysis. The secondary sources are included with various books, articles, journals that exist in this area studies and related issues.

Structure of the Study

The study is structured in five chapters. The first chapter discusses about the background of contemporary maritime strategy of Australia and how does it become different from the ‘Naval strategy’. It explains the major concerning issues related to Australian maritime strategy. It covers a comprehensive discourse related to the proposal.

This chapter two examines the all released DWPs in this last 25 years span and points out the application of Defence White Paper. This chapter focuses on the major implications of DWP in Australian maritime strategy. It provides the real scenario of capabilities, strength, challenges, and future visions for Australian naval force.

The third chapter explains about the challenges of Australian maritime strategy. As it is an island state and due to its colossal maritime jurisdictions conveys new opportunity and without orderly approach, it is transformed into complexities and challenges. Henceforth, this chapter minuscule analyses forthcoming challenges within the current perspective of major conventional security and unconventional security challenges.

The fourth chapter is focused on the role of Australian maritime forces, towards the Indo-Pacific region. This chapter acknowledges in detail on the development of convergence of

views and shared interest in the transforming geo-strategic and geo-economic environment in Indo-Pacific region.

The last conclusion chapter briefly summarises the main findings of this study and the validity of hypotheses.

The study proceeds to the next chapter that explains about the Australian Defence White Papers and its implication on the Australian maritime strategy.

Chapter: 2

Defence White Papers: Implication on Australian Maritime Strategy

Introduction

Human civilisation is a continuous growing phenomenon. This phenomenon demarcated world land into different nation-states. At the early stage, some communities developed as producer group and other as huntsman. Both communities specialisation provided a mutual understanding for the development of nation-state and protection from the external incongruities. Therefore, this defence is the fundamental feature of nation-state. Kautilya mentioned “*Saptang theory*”¹. It is related to the state major seven basic part in which ‘forces and foes’ (*Sena aur Shatru*) are integral part. Time keeps changing from the ancient time to the present time but defence has been always being a determining part of world system. Nowadays, world order is full with complexities and national interest is the top most priority of any nation. Government as protector of national interest, it applies different mechanism like economic, political and defence related policies. Therefore, the prime objective of Defence policies has to fulfil the national interest during wartime and peacetime, as well as protection from the external threats and securing border. So far, Defence White Papers are regularly produced by numerous countries like USA, China, Japan, Australia etc.

Defence White Paper (DWP)

Defence White Paper is a part of government defence related policy planning which has the potential to protect national interest from future unseen circumstances. It acts as lighthouse for the government for future defence planning, defence related material acquisitions and growth for the defence related industry. Thus, it is the holistic view of government related to the defence mechanism. The Fraser Government released the first official Australian Defence White Paper in 1976². Subsequent defence White Papers were released in 1987 (Hawke), 1994 (Paul Keating), 2000 (John Howard) (with biennial updates in 2003, 2005 and 2007), 2009 (Kevin Rudd), 2013 (Julia Gillard) and 2016 (Malcolm Turnbull).

¹Chakrabarty, B. (2015). Indian Political Thought. *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*.

²Cheeseman, G. (1990). Australia’s Defence: White paper in the red. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 44(2), 101-118.

Australian defence structure is developed under the shadow of 'British guardianship' so Australia's Defence White Paper is replica of the Westminster model wherein government strategic policies are vocalized publicly through White Papers.³ According to the United Kingdom (UK) Parliament's website, White Papers contain "government policy initiatives and proposals for legislation".⁴ There is no formal definition of what constitutes a White Paper but it is commonly accepted as a statement of government policy. Because of this speciality, the White Paper is known as a "command paper".⁵ The first Australian White Paper was tabled in Parliament in the mid-1940s under the Curtin Government but it was related to the post World War reconstruction and employment⁶. Later on the first Australian defence White Paper was issued during Prime Minister Malcom Fraser government tenure in 1976. But now its total count is seven wherein four Defence White Papers released in the 20th century time frame consequently 1976, 1987, 1994 and 2000 whereas remaining three (2009, 2013 and 2016) share the vision of the first quarter of 21st century. The DWP 40 year time span convinces about the temporal and sectoral interest of Australian defence policy as relation with Indonesia, USSR, and Indo-pacific region etc.⁷ Apart from this, stressing the importance of the alliance with the United States is being as a perpetual notion. Each of the Defence White Papers were related to make Australia deal with and defend the continent from potential threats of war, aggression, Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) without outside assistance and the principle of self-reliance has been having the central thrust. Therefore, this official document is full with responsibilities and foresightedness due to this DWP has been proving beneficial for the defence mechanism.

The Purpose of Australian Defence White Papers

Since the first Defence White Paper was released in 1976 and a discussion started in the scholar club about its purpose and usefulness. Hugh White pointed out that the purpose of a White Paper is to avail "a detailed statement describing a new policy direction' that is supported by credible arguments and evidence"⁸. Similarly, John Hartley (National President of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia (RUSI Australia)) argued that White Papers "are useful because they force a government to consider its policy priorities in a disciplined and structured

³Evans, M. (2016). Look seaward, Australia: Maritime strategy for the Asia-Pacific century. *Quadrant*, 60(6), 9.

⁴Flynn, D. (2005). New borders, new management: the dilemmas of modern immigration policies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(3), 463-490.

⁵Young, S. E. (2000). By Command of Her Majesty: An Introduction to the Command Papers of the United Kingdom. *Law Libr. J.*, 92, 81.

⁶Furphy, S. (2015). *The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins: Australian Government Administration in the Post-War Reconstruction Era* (p. 246). ANU Press.

⁷Wiseman, G. (1992). Common security in the Asia-Pacific region. *The Pacific Review*, 5(1), 42-59.

⁸White, H. (2008). The new Defence White Paper: why we need it and what it needs to do. *Perspectives*.

way and also provide the electorate, and indeed the international community, with a statement of policy direction”.⁹ Mainly, DWP becomes the reflection of government’s broad strategic objectives and the capabilities whichever to be achieved within the fiscal responsibility and realistic boundaries. It must be vague about the Government’s site on the composition of military forces and other factors that support the defence of the country.

Peter Jennings (Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)) asserted in 2005 that a Defence White Paper should “do some hard thinking about the impact of strategic change on defence policy. A clear statement of Australia’s strategic outlook would help to order our thinking about how we should set priorities between traditional ‘defences of Australia’, regional and global tasks. A new White Paper also provides an opportunity to develop some disciplined language explaining Australia’s policies. This would be helpful in building relations with our closer neighbours.”¹⁰ Generally, the government set up review committees time to time to make his policy up-to-date. It fixes a holistic and envisioned planning associated within the categorisation of national interest; operational point of view, it urges about the acquisition and upgradation of military equipment. Rod Lyon acknowledges as “the implications of a defence White Paper as an official document, which to answering about the Australian defence strategy in the public sphere”. Actually, it is one of the mediums to convince people their taxes money is worthwhile for the nation security.¹¹

The natural phenomenon of DWP is to talk about that Australia must be self-reliance in military power to deter any adversary against the mainland. With the demise of the Cold War, the concept of ‘self-reliance’ transformed into ‘forward defence’. Meanwhile, this strategic priority again shifted and more focusing towards global order and outward looking circumstances. The transformation is a continuous process wherein interest of nation varies within the time and space. Moreover, Australian governments have not followed a systematic and specified timeframe to release DWP in these 40 years. Actually, politics is the major factor for the decision and development of DWP so the outcome of policy is totally depending on the government motives. Historically, Australia’s Defence White Papers have not been released within any specified timeframe. Politics plays a key role in the decision to develop a Defence

⁹Hartley, J (National President).(2008). *The defence white paper-balancing competitive demands*, Royal United Services Institute of Australia, speech, p. 5.

¹⁰Jennings, P. (2012). *Ken Henry's Asian Century*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

¹¹Lyon, R. (2007). *Australia's strategic fundamentals*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

White Paper so its outcome is tangled with the successive government's policies and willingness.

Maritime Strategy

Initially, the maritime strategy was renounced as a naval strategy in wartime. However, in the dynamic horizon, the practice and the theory of naval and maritime strategy has been enhanced in broad theoretical understanding that builds, expands, and modifies these earlier ideas for wartime strategy. A contemporary development of new circumstances, technology, and new experiences came with wider practice and encouraged further development of theory. The Maritime strategy is the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation's interests at sea. Accordance with nation's interest, there are two aspects of it. One is related with military and another one is civilian preserve. The navy serves for the military aspect.¹² The basic focus of the military element in maritime strategy centres on the control of human activity at sea with armed force. There are two parts to this: establishing as deterrence against opposition or coercion and using this warfare domain astutely.¹³ The Maritime strategy involves the other functions of state power that include protection of offshore islands, the national maritime border, the safety and security of commercial trade at Sea, securing biological and non-biological marine resources from illegal thefts and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Nonetheless, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mentioned that the high sea is part of global territory so it is a responsibility of every nation to take active participation for global maritime order¹⁴ In contemporary period Maritime strategies involve air, sea and land forces operating jointly. There are three classic elements of maritime strategy.¹⁵

Sea Denial - the core concept of this dynamics is to “deny any adversaries or another force to use their maritime territory” against the national interest in given timeframe. It is a passive posture of maritime defence.

Sea Control - this phenomenon is more active than sea denial, wherein “maritime force uses its maritime domain more actively and enthusiastically in given time”.

¹²Hattendorf, J. B. (1997). What is a Maritime Strategy?. *CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY AND DEFENCE*, 119, 5-18.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Goldfarb, D. (2003). NEPA: Application in the Territorial Seas, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Global Commons, and beyond. *Sw. UL Rev.*, 32, 735.

¹⁵Corbett, J. S. (2012). *Principles of maritime strategy*. Courier Corporation.

Power Projection - this is the most aggressive maritime strategic posture wherein any country uses its “power projection within territorial sea to high sea in any circumstance” and period. This posture is also an indication of the maritime-related technological advancements. Some of the modern technologies that underpin each of the key maritime strategy elements are shown in Table below.

**Table: 1
The Key Elements of Maritime Strategy**

Maritime Strategy Element	Technology
Sea Denial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mines, moored and bottom mines • submarines using mines, torpedoes or anti-ship missiles • Captor, a homing torpedo encapsulated in a moored mine case • fast patrol boat (PTFG) armed with anti-ship missiles (SSM) • a surface ship armed with anti-ship missiles, gunfire and torpedoes • a surface ship armed with ship-launched homing torpedoes including • long range delivery by Ikara and Subroc • aircraft carriers with fixed and rotary wing aircraft • land based aircraft with bombs and anti-ship missiles
Sea Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • aircraft carriers with Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft and fighters armed with air to air missiles (e.g. Phoenix, AAMRAM, Sidewinder), and guns • surface ships armed with area surface to air missiles (e.g. standard) • guns, Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS), electronic warfare, and point defence missiles • surface ships for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) using sonar, depth charges and homing torpedoes • submarines to provide intelligence of enemy air, launched from land bases, and as SSK (Hunter-Killer submarines) to provide ASW defence

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ship-borne ASW aircraft, both rotary and fixed wingland-based aircraft - long range maritime patrol aircraft, maritime strike aircraft and a land-based fighter if within a range • minesweeping, mine hunters and clearance divers
Power projection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • aircraft carriers with ground attack aircraft and fighters • surface ships for naval gunfire support (NGFS) • amphibious warfare ships such as landing platform helicopters (LPH), assault ships • landing craft • the ship launched land attack cruise missiles

Source: Robertson, A. (2001). *Centre of the Ocean World: Australia and Maritime Strategy*. Seaview Press.

Brief History of Australian Defence Policy since Second World War

Australia took active participation under the USA; Britain led the group in 2nd World War. Australian forces played a crucial role in Oceania region to protect the interest of their group. After the war, Australian government came with defence policy in 1947 wherein it was clearly mentioned about the strengthening of Australian military forces and especially emphasised on an expansion of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).¹⁶ Australia's identical dualism (proximity to Asia and its 'Anglosphere notion') accommodated a narrow landscape within foreign relations with this Asian country. This flaw inculcated a determining role for the Australian defence policy. The similar culture, governance model and its war experience in the Pacific Ocean during Second World War accommodated a stringent reason for building a stronger relationship with the USA and emphasised on significance of grouping for regional security. Meanwhile, Australia signed ANZUS Treaty with the USA in 1951. Australian perspective was against communism and participated within various wars to deter the 'Domino effect. This endeavour cemented the relationship with the USA¹⁷. Moreover, Australia followed 'forward defence' mechanism to control spreading Communism in this period mid-1950 to until the end of 'Vietnam War'. With the end of Vietnam War, Australian defence policy shifted towards

¹⁶Hasluck, P. (1980). *Diplomatic witness: Australian foreign affairs, 1941-1947*. Melbourne University.

¹⁷Brands Jr, H. W. (1987). From ANZUS to SEATO: United States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954. *The International History Review*, 9(2), 250-270.

the concepts of ‘Self-reliance’ which is also called as ‘continental defence’¹⁸. US government propagated ‘Guam doctrine’ (Nixon doctrine) in December 1969 wherein US government clearly announced its limited role in the security of allies. Therefore, it was high time for the Australian defence strategist to emphasise on approach that was more self-reliant. Furthermore, British government announced to complete withdrawal of its military forces from Malaysia and Singapore by the end of 1971.¹⁹ To fill these vacuum, five nations (Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore) signed security agreement ‘Five Power Defence Agreement’ (FPDA). Further, in the decade of 1970s, Australian government first time came with Defence White Paper (1976) and set up a specialised force like Australian Defence Force (ADF). As well as, an ADF designed, developed, and operated as an integrated, joint force across sea, land, and air domains. ADF is the structured mechanism wherein three major military bodies like land, air force, and navy work on the same platform with integrated management and shared responsibilities.²⁰ Another factor affecting Australia’s defence policy in 1980s was reversal of New Zealand from ANZUS, prompting a rift between NZ and US. Furthermore, Hawke government came with the new DWP in 1987 wherein Paul Dibb’s review on Australia Defence Capabilities (1986) promoted a debate about the defence force’s structure.²¹ ‘Self-reliance’ was the major manifestation of the recommendation and acknowledged about stronger continental defence capabilities, more strike capacity for air force and naval forces. Further, this review first time asserted ‘Two Ocean policy’.²² Consequently, a new paradigm established for the Australian maritime strategy. With this Australian government, first time asserted as a major player in the Indian Ocean region. It proved as a ‘watershed event’ for the RAN. Expanding naval surface combat ships from twelve to sixteen or seventeen and developing a new warship class with range and armament to operate in areas beyond Australia’s geographic contiguousness acquiring six new submarines and establishing the RAN as a two-ocean fleet with major portions being based in Western Australia (Perth naval base). Below table is propagating the naval power of RAN.

¹⁸Millar, T. B. (1971). Trends in Australian Defence Policy. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 2(1), 49-55.

¹⁹Kimball, J. (2006). The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36(1), 59-74.

²⁰White, H. (2006). beyond the defence of australia. *Finding a new balance in Australian strategic policy*. Lowy Institute Paper, (16).

²¹Dibb, Paul. *Review of Australia's defence capabilities: report to the Minister for Defence*. Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986.

²²Ibid.

Table: 2
Royal Australian Navy's current and projected fleet

Groups	2003	2015	2025
Surface Combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 Adelaide Class • FFG • 5 Anzac Class 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Air Warfare Destroyers (1 building) • 3 Upgraded FFG • 8 Upgraded FFH 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Air Warfare Destroyers • 8 upgraded FFH transitioning to next generation surface combatant
Naval Aviation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16 Seahawk • 11 Super Seasprite in a course of delivery • Sea King • 12 Squirrel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16 Seahawk • 11 Super Seasprite • Utility Helicopter possibly UAVs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common type warfare/utility helicopter • UAVs
Patrol Boats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 Fremantle Class 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 Armidale Class 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Next generation patrol capability
Submarines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 Collins Class SSG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 Upgraded Collins class SSG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 SSG transitioning to next generation submarine capability
Mine Warfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 Huon class Coastal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 MHC • 2 CDT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 upgraded Huon class MHC

	<p>Minehunters (MHC)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Auxiliary Minesweepers • 2 Clearance Teams(CDT) 		<p>transitioning to next generation mine warfare capability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 CDT
Amphibious Lift	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Landing Ship Heavy (LSH) • 2 Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) • 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 large amphibious ships • 1 LPA • ADF Watercraft replacement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 large amphibious ships • Strategic Sealift capability • ADF Watercraft
Hydrographic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Leeuwin class Hydrographic Ships (HS) • 4 Paluma class Survey Motor Launches (SML) • 1 Laser Airborne Depth Sounder (LADS) • 1 Hydrographic Office Deployable Survey Unit (HODSU) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 HS • 4 SML next generation • LADS capability • 1HODSU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Leeuwin class HS transitioning to next generation Hydrographic capability • next generation airborne system • 1 HODSU

Source: Composite table of ADF Capability Fact book 2003, RAN Plan Blue 2001 and Defence Capability Plan 2004-2014.

Thus, the major components of Australian defence policy were ‘self-defence’ and regional alliances since post-World War to till the end of Cold War. This span was full with up and down as per the security reason later on it affected the security concern and policy. Especially ‘Two Ocean policy’ epitomised as a crucial instance for the Australian maritime strategy²³. This watershed event put a pillar for the paradigm shift of ‘Australian sea control to sea denial policy’. The advent of decade 90s prompted with new challenges and opportunities, which have been mentioned in the subsequent Defence White Papers.

1994 Defence White Paper

The Keating Government tabled the 1994 DWP, entitled ‘Defending Australia’ in parliament on 30 November 1994. It again emphasised on Australian defence policy of self-reliance within strategic engagement with regional neighbours and USA.²⁴ DWP 1994 was the first DWP, which published in the post-Cold War era, in the changed strategic scenario within the region. It clearly recognised that Australia’s future security was completely based upon the stability in Asia-Pacific region²⁵. Despite all these circumstances, the legacy of ‘self-reliance’ was prevailed because its security environment and national interest were very dependent on strong and capable forces²⁶. The White Paper’s outlook covered the next 15 years and its title substantially focused about the security of Australia.

Paul Dibb mentioned in the ‘Australia’s defence capabilities’ (1986) related review; in present situation, Australia no requisite to huge shuffle in the defence policy. Canberra is already an alliance partner of USA and ANZUS pact reconciles the U.S. intelligence, surveillance, defence science, weapons, and logistics support to Australia.²⁷ Paul Dibb was also be in favour of enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities to protect critical areas in Southern waters including the Bass strait, Freemantle, Sydney and Cape Leeuwin that ground forces should protect military and infrastructure assets supporting air and maritime power projection²⁸. Prior to publishing this DWP, Australian government commissioned a ‘Force structure review’, ‘Australian strategic planning’ and ‘Strategic review’ respectively in 1990 and 1993. Surprisingly these review committees provided an enduring and focused vision for the DWP.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Australia, D. (1994). Defence White Paper 1994. *Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service*, 93.

²⁵Ibid., p. 3.

²⁶Ibid., p. 3.

²⁷Dibb, Paul. *Review of Australia’s defence capabilities: report to the Minister for Defence*. Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986.

²⁸ Jones, J. (2012). *A maritime school of strategic thought for Australia: perspectives* (pp. 10-19).

The Strategic Review 1993 urged about the active role of Australia in the 'Asia-Pacific' region. This concept was shown in the 1994 Defence White Paper.

The prior Defence White Papers classified Canberra's role in this region separately as Southeast Asia and Pacific region but the 1994 Defence White Paper stressed on the broader Asia-Pacific region as a whole.²⁹ Subsequent, Defence White Papers sustained this trend. This view mentioned in the 1994 DWP. Meanwhile 'Force Structure Review' came with a report on the ADF (Australian Defence Force) wherein the major fodder materials were related to the setup equilibrium within changing scenario and capabilities of ADF. That's why, its recommendations were correlated with the rampant acquisition of new naval boats, platforms, naval related aviation and equipment on the place of obsolete equipment. There is huge variations in the naval equipment and there working pattern is also specific based. This DWP mainly emphasised on the 'sealift related and amphibious related and maritime patrolling related equipment'. Old operational experience works as major guiding force behind this rampant acquisition. Interestingly, Australian naval forces started 'Operation Morris Dance' in 1987 to convey Australian citizen from the conflict led Fiji. In the absence of proper Sealift and amphibious capabilities, the operation outcome was not up to the mark³⁰. Therefore, acquisition of helicopters for the ANZAC Class Frigates (FFHs) (this became the ill-fated Super Seasprite project that was eventually cancelled in 2008 after \$1.4 billion had been expended)³¹ and technological upgradation of the RAN's Sea King helicopters and the P3-C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft were major naval aviation related. The acquisition of two heavy landing ships (LHDs) amphibious ship (HMAS Kanimbla and HMAS Manoora) was also vital capability enhancement for the Australian navy³². Actually, this equipment is significant to maintain the minimum warfare standard, patrolling, and surveillance of the maritime zone. Australian widespread maritime zone implores a capable patrolling boat fleet. Therefore, this DWP considered about the old Fremantle class Patrol boats were replaced by the Armidale Class Patrol Boats.³³ Thus, these all acquisitions were related to the RAN's past operational experience and tried to fill the gap with new acquiring.

²⁹ Australia, D. (1994). Defence White Paper 1994. *Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service*, iii-iv.

³⁰ Blaxland, J. (2013). Game-changer in the Pacific: Surprising Options Open Up with the New Multi-purpose Maritime Capability.

³¹ The Super Seasprite project: Department of Defence, audit report, 41, 2008-09, ANAO, Barton, ACT, 2009, pp. 13-14.

³² <http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-manoora-ii>.

³³ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/pb>.

2000 Defence White Paper

The Howard Government came with DWP 2000: Our Future Defence Force (2000 Defence White Paper) in Parliament on 6 December 2000. The timeframe facilitated for this Defence White Paper was a ten-year. Aforementioned title is clearly envisioning about the 'the present and future role of forces'.³⁴ The 2000 DWP emphasised about the domestic capability to defend itself; simultaneously emphasised on the significant role within wider Asia-Pacific region to global peace and security.

In the accordance of priority, it was essential for the Australian government to transform his maritime strategy from 'sea denial policy to sea control'. Sea Denial has the major objectives to prevent use of their contiguous maritime region by opponent against us whereas sea power is 'that condition which exists when one has freedom of action to use an area for one's own purposes for a period of time and, if required, to deny its use to an opponent'. In fact, Australia followed the sea denial policy until end of the Cold War and prime concern were related to abstain the USSR from this region and this sceptic shadow was blown with the disintegration of the USSR. Later on, new unconventional challenges were taking shape, which had the potency to affect the strategic interest of this region. DWP 2000 considered that "the key to defending Australia is to control the air and sea approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile ships and aircraft and provide maximum freedom of action for our forces. That means Canberra needs a fundamentally maritime strategy."³⁵ Australia portrayed the 'concentric circle' perspective wherein it classified as inner, middle, and outer concentric circle. By this means, Australia recognised that it had 'strategic interests and objectives at the global and regional levels'. When, this DWP released on that time new situation were evolving in the neighbourhood that's why this DWP mentioned about the closed neighbourhood countries (Southeast Asian and South Pacific). Indeed, after the Cold War, there was less possibility for conventional war but internal dispute and strife (Bougainville, FIJI Coup) were a major concern. These disputes had accounted for the vast majority of armed conflicts, rebellion, and terrorism underpinned by historical grievances. Nowadays factional and territorial disputes, resource competition, and economic friction are enraging this chaotic situation. On the flip side, climate change has engraved the severity of natural calamities, so humanitarian relief, evacuations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are also salient features Australian maritime

³⁴Woodman, S. (2001). Not quite the full Monty?: analysing Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 55(1), 29-35.

³⁵ 2000 Defence White Paper, p 47.

strategy. Therefore, it envisaged new working field for the ADF and RAN. Furthermore, the 2000 Defence White Paper acknowledged that there were fewer possibilities for the conventional war but non-conventional threats were acquiring huge threatening space. The geo-economic significance (sea line of communications) fortified this region viable for every adjacent country to this Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, in the changing situation RAN and ADF have to play a crucial role in changing dynamics. These changing dynamics demand a pro-active strategy to galvanise freedom of manoeuvre in the air and sea approaches against a potential adversary like as piracy, transnational crimes. Despite these facts, this DWP set out three major guiding principles for the ADF's priority task as a defending Australia:

- Firstly, self-reliance was the major thrust; Australia must be reliant to defend itself from direct military attack “without relying on the combat forces of other countries”.
- Secondly, a maritime strategy “to control the air and sea approaches to our continent”.
- Thirdly, proactive operations is an essential area, however, Australia's strategic posture is defensive, and “it would seek to attack hostile forces as far from its shores as possible”.³⁶

Moreover, John Howard clearly mentioned that ‘Australia belongs to the Anglosphere culture’ so this legacy always prevailed in the defence policy of Australia. Grown terrorist activities like as 9/11 and Bali terrorist attack (December 2002) had already shown the severity of violence and its effect came as new challenges for the ADF. Meanwhile USA took a more proactive approach to deal with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation; both issues were related to wider security interest of Canberra. These congruence interests reinvigorated the Australian role in the war against global terrorism and strengthening the global security order’. As well as, The 2005 Defence Update specified that terrorism had been countered through the ADF's presence in Afghanistan and Iraq so to confront this transnational incident Australia needed to work more closely with national and international organisations. Hence, the amendment was done in the Defence Act 1903 ‘to ensure that the ADF could be deployed effectively and easily to support law enforcement agencies in responding to terrorist incidents’.³⁷ After the fulfilling overseas goal, this specialised force started operations in

³⁶ 2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. xi.

³⁷ Moore, Cameron. "To Execute and Maintain the Laws of the Commonwealth' the ADF and Internal Security-Some Old Issues with New Relevance." *UNSWLJ* 28 (2005): 523.

northern Australia and its northern approaches, and patrolling in the Bass Strait and the Southern Ocean. As well as, Surveillance in the Southwest Pacific had been re-activated. Three previously separate patrol operations in the Indian Ocean, Coral Sea, and Torres Strait had been merged into one operation in June 2004³⁸. A Joint Offshore Protection Command was set up in March 2005.³⁹ These three seas belong to the Australian northern approach and this water stretch is near to the Indonesian provinces. Meanwhile, terrorist acts were increased in this region under the different terrorist group like Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf group and these groups clearly announced the connection with Al-Qaeda. Retrospectively, Canberra was also providing military and logistic assistance in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda (Operation enduring freedom). Hence, it was necessary to guard its northern approach from potential adversaries.

Moreover, this DWP came with the substantial approach about the operational part of maritime strategy. It clearly reflected in the defence capability programme. New equipment and new technology led vessels become an essential component of the maritime strategy and are key driving force behind the operational activities to maintain the number of submarines, frigates, destroyers, surveillance aircrafts are significant for power projection and operation. The 2000 Defence White Paper introduced the inaugural Defence Capability Plan: 2001–2010 (2001 DCP) to replace the “Defence New Major Capital Equipment Proposals”.⁴⁰ The 2001 DCP accommodated a 10 years framework (as opposed to its predecessor’s five-year framework) to better assist industry with future workforce and structural planning. The 2000 Defence White Paper considered Australia’s defence capabilities under five groupings-Land Forces, Air Combat, Maritime Forces, Strike, and Information Capability.⁴¹ The maritime forces element proposals included the weapon upgradation of the ANZAC Class frigates wherein anti-ship missile defences and Harpoon anti-ship missiles assimilation process commenced in 2001.⁴² Again, 1999 INTERFET operational experience proved valuable for the new amphibious ship acquisition plan. In this operation, the Australian navy used successfully the amphibious vessel HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora. This operation proved as theatrical test for this vessel. This experience cherished the futuristic ‘Canberra class’ amphibious vessel acquisition programme and the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer program was initially approved in May 2005 (first

³⁸DOD (Department of Defence). (2005). Australia’s national security: A defence update 2005. p.10-11.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Department of Defence, *Defence New Major Capital Equipment Proposal 1995-1995*, Defence, Canberra, 1995

⁴¹Cook, S., & Mun, R. (2006). Australian approaches to capability engineering.

⁴²2000 Defence White Paper. P.89.

pass approval) but was placed on the Projects of Concern list in June 2014 due to program delays and cost increases.⁴³

Substantially, from operational point of view frigates, destroyer, submarines, and naval aviation have specific role in warfare. These naval equipment’s cost become multi-million dollar; to protect all these equipment they have to upgrade with lethal weapon like harpoon, long distance missile, machine gun etc. This upgradation work fortifies the capability and endurance of all these vessels in the sea.

Cost of Capability

The inaugural Defence Capability Plan (DCP), containing unapproved major capital projects over the next ten years, accompanied it. In practical terms, the 2000 Defence White Paper identified more than two dozen capability enhancements, which were expected to cost \$13.7 billion in capital expenditure over ten years within a total defence expenditure of \$141 billion for that period. In facts, this amount will take an infrastructural change in this period. It is approximately 9% of the total spending. When we categorise this data merely for naval force then a value is coming nearby 1.4% of total expenditure on capability enhancement. Whereas maritime forces have to spend 35 \$ billion to maintain their current capabilities in this ten years period which is around 25% of total allocated money. The 2000 Defence White Paper took into account through-life costing estimates for the components of capability.

**Table: 3
Defence Capability Plan**

Table 1: Total expected costs for decade 2001–02 to 2010–11 Capability			Total for decade (year 2000 \$ billion)			
Expenditure item	Land forces	Air combat	Maritime forces	Strike	Information capability	Total
Maintenance of current capabilities	59.0	13.0	35.0	5.0	13.0	125.0
Capital expenditure required for capability enhancements	3.9	5.3	1.8	0.8	1.9	13.7

⁴³Watt, D. (2014). The Air Warfare Destroyer program.

Additional personnel & operating costs due to enhanced capability	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.6	2.3
TOTAL (\$ billion)	64.0	18.6	37.1	5.8	15.5	141.0

Source: Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, December 2000, pp. 84-97.

Increasingly allocation of funds in the defence sector shows the reflection of future preparedness. Actually, this allocation is essential for the operational cost, investment in new capabilities (upgradation and acquisition) and quick responses to any odd situation like incursion, peacekeeping or disaster relief. By this mean, forces always ready to handle any odd situation.

2009 Defence White Paper

The Rudd Government released its ‘Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030 (2009 Defence White Paper)’ in May 2009 with a 20-year vision.⁴⁴ The 2009 Defence White Paper was released into a strategic environment that had changed significantly since the 2000 Defence White Paper such as sub-prime crisis had grappled the whole world economy. Nonetheless, non-traditional security threats evolved as major challenges. On the contrary, cyber and space warfare had come on the security related dais in a structured form with technological enhancements.

The Kevin Rudd led government considered in the changing scenarios like globalisation and non-traditional security threats were a significant factor for the security related concern, which exponentially multiplied the ADF’s work to maintain freedom of navigation, protect shipping line of communications, support land forces, and provide a floating base in the open sea area.⁴⁵ Asian scenario was more vibrant during this decade. The sub-prime crisis created havoc situation on the front of trade and commerce and non-traditional security threats just put fuel to fire in this situation. ADF was playing active role in the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, while also intervening in the Solomon Islands to prevent internal strife

⁴⁴Australia. Department of Defence. (2009). *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: force 2030*. Commonwealth of Australia.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp.60-64.

in that Pacific Island country from causing the collapse of governmental authority. This document also pointed about the challenges of the Southwest Pacific and East Timor stemming from economic stagnation, political and social instability, weak governance, and crime. China assertive behaviour towards the South China Sea and continuous opposition by major stakeholders like Vietnam and Philippines were directing a meddling situation for the stability of this region. Therefore, it was the prime concern for Canberra to restrain any direct-armed attack and to ensure security and stability in its neighbourhood.

A submarine fleet become helpful to maintain an effectiveness during operation, at long range, as well as protect other key ADF assets; hence, the expanded submarine fleet conveys a potential edge. Moreover, the expanded submarine force would be used as a strategic deterrent.⁴⁶ This deterrence proves as game changer against the adversary. In this emerging situation, Rudd's Government decided to acquire 12 new submarines to be built in South Australia. These Future Submarines having greater range longer patrol endurance, and capabilities beyond those of the current Collins class submarines. Examples of these expanded capabilities include strategic strike; mine detection and mine laying operations, intelligence collection. This document also committed to enhancing Australia's surface fleet by acquiring three air warfare destroyers and a fleet of eight Future Frigates. DWP 2009 clearly emphasised on the enhancement of Anti-submarine warfare capabilities, offshore maritime warfare, mine countermeasures, and border protection capabilities⁴⁷. Specifically, the 2009 Defence White Paper in the accordance of theme 'Force 2030' announced new acquisition proposals for the future perspectives. One of the major announcement was related to the 24 new naval combat helicopters (MH-60R Seahawk helicopters). Actually, the 1994 DWP mentioned about the acquisition of 'Super Seasprite helicopter' but due to technical fault and unbearable delay, this acquisition was cancelled. Besides it, the 2009 DWP not only started new acquisition plan, also reaffirmed the naval capability enhancement programme of 2000 DWP related three Air Warfare Destroyers (Hobart class AWDs), Five Canberra class amphibious ship and weapons upgradation for the Anzac Class frigates.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Australia. Department of Defence. (2009). *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: force 2030*. Commonwealth of Australia.,p.64.

⁴⁷Ibid., p.64 and 72.

⁴⁸Ibid.

2013 Defence White Paper

2013 DWP released in the volatile horizons like Australia's economic realities (raw material export oriented), global financial crisis, strategic changes in the region, U.S pivot, and emergence of china as a major superpower. The 2013 DWP was released with no defined timeframe on 3 May 2013 under Julia Gillard government.⁴⁹ This DWP emphasised on the 'ADF's operational commitment in overseas' and 'force structure review'. The major essence of the force structure review was related to maintaining status-quo within ADF and adjusting themselves as per the current and future challenges. This White Paper also stressed on the capability, lethality, vitality against unseen circumstances of ADF personnel in overseas operations. Over the same period, the ADF involved in restoring stability in our near neighbourhood, in Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), while supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations both overseas and at home.⁵⁰

Australian DWP argues about the main functionalities of maritime strategy wherein "denies and deter any incursion against Australia, protect sea line of communication and project power by deploying joint task forces in the Indo-Pacific region and support the operations of regional partners when required". ADF's naval-based services participated as an active player in joint task force such as 'Operation SLIPPER'.⁵¹ Apart from this 'Operation Anode, RAMSI and Operation RESOLUTE' (border protection) were a substantial instance of power projection. Operation SLIPPER was Australia's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism, maritime security in the Middle East Area of Operations and countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden⁵².

The 2013 DWP 'Australia in the Asian Century' distinctly prompted the increasing weight of the Asia-Pacific region in Australian foreign and national security policy and it replaced 'Asia-Pacific' term as a 'Indo-Pacific' term. National security topics stressed in this document that the future Australian prosperity is critically linked to the development of this region. The region's security environment is affecting to the regional economic growth, an emergence of new middle and minor power, and the behaviour of non- state actors. In fact, This DWP clearly emphasised on the cooperative arrangements within regional nations on the point of the

⁴⁹ 2013 Defence White Paper, p. 1

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.35.

⁵¹ Ibid, p.29.

⁵² Ibid, p.36.

economic and strategic horizon. Moreover, Australia supported China's participation in regional peaceful economic, political, and strategic development. On the contrary, it reaffirmed the closer relationship with the US and supported the notion of US strong and active regional presence in Asia-Pacific region. It praised the U.S. Marine Corps rotation through Darwin and indicated that the U.S. alliance may become more important in the future; approved 'Plan Beersheba' which seeks to structure the Army into three multi-role combat brigades; and implicitly recognizing the need for Australia to have a maritime capability to protect trade and essential materials from being attacked at sea.

The Review noted that the ADF is requisite to continue within 'the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia, and in relation to its unique strategic interests and neighbourhood'. This meant a greater focus on northern Australia, but the more controversial recommendation was for Defence to 'upgrade the Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield facilities to support unrestricted P-8 (maritime patrol aircraft) and UAV operations'⁵³. Hugely spread maritime area demands a potent active surveillance system. For this context, DWP prompted about the ageing 'AP-3C Orion fleet'. Therefore, it mentioned the replacement with P-8A Poseidon aircraft. This aircraft would be helpful for the long-range maritime surveillance and information collecting.⁵⁴

There was comparatively few additional capability decisions marked in the 2013 Defence White Paper, especially when compared with its 2009 predecessor. This was largely owing to a lack of available funding and affected by the economic downturn in the wake of the global financial crisis. However, while there was nominal new spending in the 2013 Defence White Paper, many previously mentioned acquisitions, such as the 12 future Submarines⁵⁵. Actually, budgetary deficit was in between 2009 to 2012. Generally, it becomes the brain storming time for any government to control the expenditure. That is why it distinctly visible in the Australian defence spending, which remained below of 2% of GDP. This deficit was approximate \$20.741 billion. This deficit affected the expansion of RAN. The priorities of 2009 Defence White Paper were to expand and modernise the RAN capabilities. Therefore, 2013 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the predecessor DWP major commitment. Simultaneously, it argued about

⁵³Hawke, A., & Smith, R. (2011). *Australian Defence Force Posture Review*. Department of Defence.

⁵⁴ 2013 Defence White Paper., p.88.

⁵⁵Australia. Department of Defence. (2009). *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: force 2030*. Commonwealth of Australia.,p.70 and 78.

amphibious capabilities, surface combatant, naval aviation, and maritime surveillance so this is the hindsight of Australian maritime power projection.

2016 Defence White Paper

The 2016 DWP was released on February 25, 2016, by Malcom Turnbull led government; perceived as the Government's commitment to a safe and secure Australia not only in current situation but in future time equally. It has been prophesied about the need of Australian defence until 2035 wherein future unseen threats and examining defence capabilities by the ADF. The 2016 Defence White Paper considered that Australia is the 12th largest economy of the world. Its strategic and economic interest is keep growing and making more ambitious. Simultaneously, this economic growth also affected positively other nation of this Asia- Pacific region like China, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam etc. whilst, this region has already been filled with superpowers (USA, China, and Japan) and middle power (India, Australia, and Indonesia). All these players are protecting and prioritising their national interest alone. Meanwhile, a strong presence of USA in Asia-Pacific is a need of its alliance countries and for its hegemony. However, the peaceful emergence of China as a major superpower and its assertive behaviour in 'The South China Sea and the East China Sea' is originating sceptic environment in this region. As well as, it is the open challenge for the legacy of USA centric mechanism. The roles of the United States and China within region and relationship amid them will endure to be the most strategically vital factors for the security and economic development of the Indo-Pacific until 2035⁵⁶.

Australia's security and prosperity depends on a 'stable, rules-based global order', which supports the peaceful settlement of disputes, facilitates free and open trade, and enables unfettered access to the global commons to support economic development⁵⁷. Meanwhile, this document reaffirmed 'rule-based global order' as prime objective under the guidance of US-led leadership. Australia welcomes and supports the active role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region⁵⁸. The United States is showing its commitment to propagate 'rebalance policy' wherein the USA vows to long-term security of the Indo-Pacific region⁵⁹. Under this circumstance, 2016 DWP is giving clear indication that its strategic planning will not be confined until Australian mainland defence. Consequently, DWP argues about three key

⁵⁶2016 Defence White Paper, p. 41.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 121.

⁵⁹ Ibid, pp. 41-42.

strategic terms ‘deterring, denying, and defeating to any incursions or coerce by hostile countries and non-state actors’. Therefore, it emphasised on securing adjacent area encompassing maritime Southeast Asia, South Pacific, and building a stable Indo-Pacific region. To achieve this, the Australian government has stressed on capabilities enhancement of RAN and ADF.

Table: 4

Australian strategic defence interests and objectives

Strategic defence interests		
A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication.	A secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.	A stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.
Strategic defence objectives		
Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests and northern approaches.	Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security	Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a Rules-based global order.

Source: Australian Defence White Paper, 2016

Maritime strategy acknowledges that RAN has the sole responsibility for safeguarding the security of its maritime borders with other agencies, particularly the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. As well as, it is to be prepared to help protect Australia's

offshore resource extraction activities, maintain Australia's sovereignty over its offshore territories and Exclusive Economic Zone, fulfil its global search, and rescue obligations. So, in this context, a new large-hulled multi-purpose patrol vessel 'Ocean Protector' has been acquired by the RAN to provide further capability to safeguard the security of the maritime borders⁶⁰. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities are the benign face of this maritime strategy. Hence, it is become essential for ADF to facilitate assistance during any calamities. The successful humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation was conducted by the ADF in Solomon Islands and in quick response to the devastation of "Tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in March 2015". These exclusive experiences in this sector gave an edge to widening and deepening the relationship with neighbourhood countries. That is why the DWP 2016 emphasises on the enhancement of ADF related maritime forces and amphibious capability; means the ADF will be more capable and responsive in assisting its inherent neighbours⁶¹.

Technology and new equipment are an efficiency multiplier so nowadays, a nation spending on defence equipment provides a deterrent effect against the enemy and adversary. To achieve this edge, handsome investments requisite for modernising and enhancing the potency, range and capacity of maritime capabilities is required. Next generation submarines, destroyers, frigates, aircraft carriers, amphibious vessels, and surveillance aircraft are the major pertinent components. Therefore, previous DWP emphasised on the buying of the capacity of the P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft and the high altitude MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft⁶². Surprisingly, Australia's EEZ is one of the largest in the world, so to keep hawkish eye on this sea area, it is essential to maintain surveillance and UAV. Actually, Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs) is the vital arteries of World Sea borne trade and commerce. Any disruptions may convey virulent effect on this global economy. Therefore, most of the nations do maritime surveillance to safeguard their maritime domain from any unwanted threats.

Anti-submarine warfare is essential for maritime domain, since it gives strategic edge during wartime and surveillance capacity in peaceful time. Hence, the number of submarines is trying to promote from six to twelve. The doubling in size of the submarine fleet recognises that

⁶⁰ Ibid.,p. 73.

⁶¹ Ibid.,p. 74.

⁶² Ibid., p. 87.

Australia is restructuring according to coming challenging maritime environment in the decades ahead⁶³. By 2035, around half of the world's submarines will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region where Australia's interests are most engaged. Submarines are a powerful instrument for deterring conflict. The acquisition of the 12 future submarines commenced in 2016 and since 2030, first new submarine will be inducted in the Australian navy while overall, Construction of all 12 new submarines will extend until the late 2040s to 2050 timeframe⁶⁴. The Government has decided to implement a rolling acquisition program for Australia's submarine fleet. A rolling acquisition program will ensure that Australia is able to maintain a fleet of 12 regionally superior submarines as a submarine and anti-submarine technologies develop over the coming decades⁶⁵.

Nevertheless, amphibious capability is also a significant part of the maritime domain. Hence, this capability makes land forces more effective and capable. This amphibious ship administers a logistic support like weapons, vehicles, helicopter, etc. so it is the connotation of ADF effectiveness in operations and humanitarian assistance. The Canberra Class provides capability to the ADF to undertake a range of operations, including supporting the security of maritime Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries and addressing emergent threats in the broader Indo-Pacific region⁶⁶.

Australian identity is related to his maritime domain so secure maritime domains are the prime objective of this document. In achieving this self-proclaimed result, DWP clearly mentions about the defence spending to be at least 2% of GDP whereby Australia can defend its air and sea space. The military's primary role is warfighting; therefore, trio of warfighting mechanism must be capable in their domain. Further, DWP considers on the enhancement of RAN surface and subsurface combat capabilities and that naval bases at Broome, Cairns, and Darwin be enhanced. Actually, shortfalls in capability will be as malaise for the security concern and extensive border protection operations. DWP mentions about the Garden Island's (New South Wales) upgradation plan by which it will be helpful to enable expanded fleet and accommodate larger platforms such as the 'Canberra Class amphibious ships and Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer'⁶⁷. Garden Island is situated in the South Pacific coast and eastern side of Australia

⁶³ Ibid., p. 90.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.91.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.99.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 101.

near to Sydney. Aforementioned all naval base will be supportive in any adverse situation for immediate Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific neighbourhood countries. Actually, this naval infrastructure becomes benefactor for the smooth operation of navy vessels. Hence, these naval bases are significant to achieve the ‘strategic defence objectives’.

The dynamic scenario has been evolved in the Asia-Pacific region in the last 25 years. This, in turn Canberra’s significantly vibrant strategic environment has been reflected in the each of the DWP onward 1991, whether, it is related to either naval equipment purchasing or the role of Australian naval force in the establishment of rule-based global order.

Conclusion

A maritime strategy facilitates Australian navy to contribute in a meaningful tactic to ward away any adversaries from the mainland of country. It empowers the maritime forces against the illegal fishing, smuggling, illegal immigration, piracy and any security concerns related to the mainland and offshore island. Therefore, to enforce ‘rule of law’ within immediate neighbourhood islands is a precautionary measure to away adversaries from the Australian water. Any conflicts or crisis within immediate neighbourhood region will affect the stability of whole region and Australian interest equally. The 1994 White Paper pointed that Australia’s security concern is intertwined with regional security, due to regional cohesiveness and same maritime attribute. In this situation, Australia cannot be secure in an unstable region. To dissuade instability in this widespread maritime domain, it is necessitated to adopt a multidimensional maritime led strategy. This security approach has the best opportunity to assimilate the distinctive capabilities of all three services in a well-organized manner. The military concept of maritime strategy encompasses diplomatic, constabulary and warfighting elements and in broad sphere, it encompasses nation’s economic, political, societal, and environmental security.

Australia’s maritime strategy is not pronounced and vocal compared to other countries such as China, Japan, and USA. Actually, Australian governments follow the self-reliant policy for the national security, means to be capable for the self-security without any outside assistance. Australian has no any severe personal conflict with its neighbourhood countries and other Indo-Pacific countries and until, Australia is sole resident power in the Southwest Pacific region. On the other side, in this post-Cold War period, until now there is no power projection perspective of Canberra. These all circumstances give a conducive opportunity to get financial stability and

development within domestic issues. Moreover, in this 25 year time span Australian government released five DWPs. One common features within all DWPs, there is no aggression or assertive behaviour towards any region or countries. As a middle power nation, Canberra has always supported the UN led dispute redressal mechanism. Simultaneously, it emphasises on the US based 'rules based global order'. Australian navy has shown her presence in various mission under the UN and USA led mission. Australian DWP 2000 also considers about a holistic maritime strategy and further the 2009 DWP emphasises to protect its mainland and maritime water from any hostile adversaries. Therefore, it considers about the active presence of ADF led all three services to deter, deny, and defeat any hostile threats. The theme of 2009 DWP 'Force 2030' envisions about the modernisation of all military forces. Herein, acquisition of twelve submarines and induction of Canberra class amphibious ship are inculcating about the forthcoming time is about to more challenging; is not to remain like present scenario. Further, 2013 DWP replaced the term 'Asia-Pacific into Indo-Pacific'. This transformation is showing the growing interest of Canberra within the two huge ocean areas of Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean.

An inherent philosophy within any strategy generally becomes soul of that strategy and that abstract philosophy inculcates the ownership of that strategy. In fact, this naval strategy or any other military strategy is known for the deterrent effect against the opponent. It is the fact; its major concern is assimilated with the 'security of the nation'. However, in present scenario, every concept is restructuring in this time and space. In this context, naval strategy has transformed into maritime strategy with broader sense. Due to this transformation, a deterrent force is metamorphosing into benign force. The 1994 Australian DWP clearly indicates about the Australian navy role in the HADR mission, especially for the areas in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia(13.8, 1994 DWP). These regions are vulnerable to tropical cyclone and earthquake. Simultaneously, 2016 DWP reaffirms this commitment clearly and during this time, span Australian Naval vessels and personnel actively participated in the different HADR and SAR mission. Thus, these DWPs have defined and reformulated Australian maritime strategy in the accordance of strategic interest and futuristic visualisation.

Chapter: 3

Challenges for the Australian Maritime Strategy

Introduction

Australia is an island country with continental attribute. Its geographical proximity is near to world's one of the largest archipelagic country Indonesia and group of various island nations. These groups of islands nations are known as "Pacific Arc."⁶⁸ This Pacific Arc is stretched in the direction of Northern, Northeastern, and Eastern of Australia. This specification avails 'some opportunities and some hindrance' for the security issues. In fact, geographical location and neighbour is the key determining factor to develop ones defence policy. Hence, Australian geographical maritime position demands a vibrant maritime strategy, to face known concerns and new evolving challenges. One of the central obligations of a State is to secure its territorial sovereignty in all relevant range of contention. As Australian foreign policy is based on balance of power considerations and defence policy is principally concerned about the maintenance of territorial integrity, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been structured for defeating attacks on Australia and operating at the higher levels of the conflict spectrum. However, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also operates at the lower end of the conflict spectrum when it is embraced constabulary operations in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)⁶⁹. The issue of protecting maritime resources is significant concern for both the RAN and other maritime regulating agencies whoever is involved to maintain status-quo in this maritime domain. The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) came into force on 16 November 1994, owing to this international law; all responsible states got opportunities and responsibilities to maintain the good order at sea⁷⁰. Apparently, the vastness and interconnectivity are the salient features of maritime region. It is beyond the capacity of individual nation to protect its maritime interests in this broad maritime global trading system. Certainly, it can be done some of the time and in some specific locations, but just as certainly not everywhere and not all of the time. Maintaining good order at sea is fundamentally a collective and cooperative activity. Without such

⁶⁸ Schultz, J. (2014). Theorising Australia–Pacific island relations. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(5), 548-568.

⁶⁹ Klein, N., Mossop, J., & Rothwell, D. R. (Eds.). (2009). *Maritime security: international law and policy perspectives from Australia and New Zealand*. Routledge.

⁷⁰ Rothwell, D. R., & Stephens, T. (2016). *The international law of the sea*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

collective cooperation may not be gained effective outcome. Therefore, a comprehensive maritime strategy may set up good order at sea.

Globalization and liberal economic policies came as new opportunities for this Asia-Pacific region and with this changing paradigm; this region has been evolved as major economic powerhouse. This changing is occurred as benefactor for the Australian economy and it has been increased since 1991 to 2015 approximately four times (\$325.57billion to \$1.33 trillion)⁷¹. Simultaneously, new economic policies like Free trade, Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) are continuously giving momentum in the trade and commerce. Therefore, Canberra's huge interest is entwined with this region's peaceful stability; Interestingly, Australia is very much dependent on seaborne trade. Therefore, growing trade pattern between Australia and Asia-Pacific countries will sustain within the hassle free environment. Pointedly, the 2016 Defence White Paper considers about three pairs of strategic defence interests and strategic defence objectives. In the first of these pairs, the interest is acknowledging as "a secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication"⁷² and the corresponding objective is to "deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests, and northern approach"⁷³. Aforementioned, objectives and interests clearly depict about the extensive maritime interests that Canberra shares with his neighbours.

Traditional Security Threats

Traditional security threats are conventional security issues for every countries. These include aggression or war by the other countries or particular alliance against each other. However, such concepts of security played a significant role during the World Wars and Cold War. In general term, we can mention as these are related to military power and protection from external threats like war and coercion.⁷⁴ Apparently, the prime concern of any government is to make sure security from the armed attacks by any other states or non-state actors. The tyranny of sea-air gap has not been effective with technological development like 'Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Weapon of Mass Destruction'. Simultaneously, floating naval bases (Aircraft carrier) and other naval vessels (especially Submarine) have made the security concerns convoluted. This floating naval vessel provides a strategic tactical ground in the mid of ocean

⁷¹ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=AU>.

⁷² 2016 Defence White Paper, pp. no. 68-69.

⁷³ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 71.

⁷⁴ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

or sea. Henceforth, it became conducive to use its Airforce and Land force during wartime. This vibrant warfare domain demands a futuristic and comprehensive security mechanism within the strategic interest of that nation. Therefore, any war or military action occurs within the Australian territory or outside of territory may affect the Australian strategic interest because as a middle power Australian strategic interest has been entwined within the ‘immediate neighbourhood to rules based global order’.

Immediate Neighbourhood Challenges

Australian Defence White Paper (DWP) gives portrayal about the ‘concentric circle’⁷⁵. In fact, the concentric circle portrays the inner, mid and outer circle wherein each circle denotes region and Australian strategic interest. Inner circle denotes about the Australian interest in immediate neighbourhood whereas the other two mid and outer circles are reflecting the Australian strategic interest in the stability within ‘Asia-Pacific region’ and ‘rule based global order’ respectively⁷⁶. The inner concentric circle is also known as the “Pacific Arc.” The propinquity accommodates a significant dimension for the Australian security and maritime strategy. However, the similar maritime culture within the point of economic activities and security led concerns makes this region homogeneous. This homogeneity provides a common type of challenges and opportunities. Australia is an island continent nation whereas the immediate neighbourhood countries are fragmented into group of islands (Archipelago) wherein these islands countries share widespread Exclusive Economic Zone. Lesser economic and security related development may transform this region as ‘Pandora box’. In this situation, Canberra has to rely on heavily on the ability to control its air and sea approaches. Therefore, the sound naval and air capabilities are essentials for Australian securities purpose. On the other side, the presence of Australia and its huge strategic interests tangled with this region claim Canberra’s active and supportive role for the peaceful synergy in this region.

Most of the Southwest Pacific states are archipelagic States. Most of the nations are in growing state and underdeveloped, in this situation no one countries have to willingness to play as a dominant player. Retrospectively, these regional countries are suffering from the internal disturbances and military coups intermittently. This situation is one of the major challenges for Canberra to protect democratic norms and ethos within this region. Interestingly, this salient

⁷⁵ https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/assessing-the-defence-update-2007-by-rod-lyon/2_16_31_PM_Policy_analysis12.pdf.

⁷⁶ Menhinick, R. T. (2003). Sea control & maritime power projection for Australia: maritime air power and air warfare.

feature is one of Canberra strategic interest. Meanwhile, Australia played an active role in the mitigation of these internal disturbances within the region like Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Island (RAMSI), Fiji coup. The most important strategic objective is here to foster the stability, integrity, and cohesion within immediate neighbourhood. Australia's intervention in East Timor in 1999 (it is largest overseas military operation since the Vietnam War) and its peacekeeping operation in the Solomon Island 2003 ensures 'stability within arc' has a prominent objective in Canberra's defence policy planning⁷⁷. These Pacific countries demarcate a transition boundary for the Australian water. Absence of democratic government and its related governing institution may perturb the strategic interest of Australia; it may foster the severity of non-traditional security threats. Henceforth, it is significant for Australia to apply forward defence policy in this Southwest Pacific islands region.

The Southwest Pacific Islands' feature is prominent for the Australian geostrategic perspective therefore, it acquires a centre stage within the formulation of Australian foreign and defence policies. The 2013 Defence White Paper pointed 'a secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste' as the second of four strategic interests⁷⁸ (after 'secure Australia') and asserted that the accompanying principal task is to 'contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste'. Moreover, all consecutive Defence White Papers have been highlighting about the importance of regions that incorporate approaches to Australia's territory and need to interdict any adversary prior to reaching Australia.

Australia and Indonesia share the geographical neighbourhood; both countries have a huge Maritime border. The common Maritime trade is significant for both nation. That is why; Canberra's economic and maritime interest is closely intertwined with its neighbours. Indonesia also occupies a geo-strategically pivotal location between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, forming a bridge between Asia and Australia and controlling strategic Sea-Lanes of Communications, which is prominent to military and commercial activities between the Pacific Basin, Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia⁷⁹. Paul Dibb considered that "an archipelago state, especially Indonesia has of great strategic significance for Australian and therefore Australia feels a stable Indonesia as an important factor in its security. Indonesia

⁷⁷ Dibb, P. (2012). The importance of the Inner Arc to Australian defence policy and planning. *Security Challenges*, 8(4), 13-31.

⁷⁸ 2013 Defence White Paper, p. 24.

⁷⁹ Rahman, C. (2013). 'The Geopolitical Context'.

forms a protective barrier to Australia's northern approaches and it possesses the largest military capability among the ASEAN nations."⁸⁰

Present Indonesian president Joko Widodo has shown the assertive behaviour towards the transformation of Indonesian maritime culture in his presidential election speech. Aftermath, elected as a president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo led government clearly enunciated about the five pillars of maritime policy in the East Asia summit in Naypyidaw, in November 2014 in which first three are related to the domestic policy, and last two are related with international maritime cooperation⁸¹. Remarkd as, this maritime domain works as cohesive force within this countries and by the cooperative mechanism all regional stakeholder may eliminate the source of conflict at sea such as illegal fishing, violations of sovereignty, territorial disputes, and marine pollution. Otherwise, he reconsidered the obligation due to as the fulcrum of the two oceans, to establish a maritime defence force. It is necessary "not only to guard our sovereignty and maritime wealth, but also as a form of taking responsibility to guard the safety of shipping and maritime security."⁸² Indonesia proximity to the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's busiest waterways gives the sovereign right to secure the Sea Line of Communications. Hence, a well-armed friendly Indonesia would be a security asset for Australia and the region equally.

Global Challenges

During Cold War period, world order was bifurcated under the major great powers USA and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Meanwhile, the world confronted the heat of this Cold War. Eventually, after the disintegration of USSR, the bipolar world transformed into unipolar under the USA led order. This situation minimised the threats of conventional war in the Asia-Pacific region. The opted deeds by the great power during Cold War reflected as an armed conflicts, rebellion, and global terrorism in the early period of 21st century⁸³. These are the major challenges for the world order now. These challenges are overlapping the Australian strategic interest therefore; it is essential for Canberra to handle the challenges for the protection of own and their allies' interest. Australian DWP 2016 also considers this new growing equations (like Russia-China), territorial disputes, state fragility, and violation of

⁸⁰ Dobb, P. (2012). The importance of the Inner Arc to Australian defence policy and planning. *Security Challenges*, 8(4), 13-31.

⁸¹ Connelly, A. L. (2015). Sovereignty and the sea: President Joko Widodo's foreign policy challenges. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 37(1), 1-28.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Mamdani, M. (2005). *Good Muslim, bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the roots of terror*. Harmony.

international law would be major challenges for the ‘rules based order’ in forthcoming 20 years⁸⁴. Australian geo-strategic location near Southwest Pacific will plead a massive role for the established US based legacy and aforementioned all these factors will be the major key drivers behind the shaping of Australian security environment⁸⁵.

Australian DWPs always contemplate about the ‘rules based global orders’⁸⁶ (62 times pointed in the 2016 DWP). Australian strategic interest is colloquially entangled with it. Australia is a middle power Nation. In this context, it becomes tangible to Australia to play active role in world order, usually middle power countries urges about the ‘rule-based global order’, security alliances, active participation in multilateral organisation and effective role of UN in redressal of any bilateral and multilateral dispute⁸⁷. Contrarily, Australian DWP 2016 also mentions about the US-Australia mutual relation wherein clearly supporting the role of Canberra under the US led Global Security⁸⁸. Since last two decades, USA stiff position against the global terrorism and proliferation against Weapon of Mass Destruction⁸⁹ (WMD) devices brings both nation on same dais. Australia participation in ‘Operation Enduring freedom and Iraq war’ is a clear-cut example of Australian-U.S comprehensive defence policy and Canberra’s strategic interest.

Nowadays, great powers belong to the Asia Pacific region. According to the realist behaviour, great power believes in the use of military power or coercive act. Interestingly, emergence of China as a great power in this region is transforming the unipolar world into multipolar world with Russia, India. The ‘China peaceful emergence’ is now transmigrating into the ‘powerful China policy’. The marvellous growth in Economics sector is availing the huge dimension for the military modernization. Substantially, China assertive behaviour towards naval expansion is showing willingness to transfer the ‘Pacific Ocean as a Chinese lake’. China is spending alone 41% of all Asia-Oceania defence expenditure and approximately \$155 billion. In a vibrant international relation scenario is reflecting the Chinese sphere of influences on Russia, Pakistan, North Korea, the Central Asian States, and Myanmar etc. The China-Russia bonding repercussion may be to create a stifle situation for the US led grouping. USA has individual

⁸⁴2016 Defence White Paper, p. 30.

⁸⁵ Ibid, pp. no. 40-41.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. no. 33.

⁸⁷ Jones, B. D., Pascual, C., & Stedman, S. J. (2009). *Power and responsibility: building international order in an era of transnational threats*. Brookings Institution Press.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. no. 65.

defence agreement with the Asia-Pacific nation such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and Singapore etc. this policy is remarked as 'Hub and Spokes policy' wherein the position of US as 'hub or core' and all these allies nation are situated on the periphery as 'spokes'. Therefore, any disruptions in the USA's strategic interest would self-mobilize these natural allies. Silently, this multipolar world order is again being transformed into two rival leading group. The Malabar naval exercise is an outstanding showcase. This naval exercise started as bilateral naval exercise between India and USA but in 2015 Japan joined this grouping as permanent member⁹⁰. As well as, Australia and Singapore are as non-permanent member of this naval exercise. This naval exercise is known for the huge naval warfare domain and adequate number of high technological naval vessels. It is one of the largest naval exercise with non-NATO countries. Conversely, China started 'Peace Mission exercises in 2005' and now its prominent members are Russia and the Central Asian Countries. 'Newsweek International' mentioned this silent competition has a potential dangerous reality. Apparently, this competition sole purpose is to expand the influence of individual group with potential members. This is depicting the emergence of two competing security camps in Asia. As the competition accelerates, more and more states will have to choose sides themselves either intentionally or unintentionally.⁹¹

One leading contemporary strain is related to the rise, decline, and disappointment of great powers in the system. In reality, past always decides the future. A period of Cold War ended with the rise of USA as superpower and disintegration of USSR. Suddenly, this bi-polar world seemed as unipolar world wherein USA led group evolved as invincible. The hegemony of US sprawled in each domain like economic, multilateral organisations, global order control (Iraq war 1992). Ironically, time and space does not remain always same for any one. New economic order brought a new influential growth in the Indo-Pacific regional countries. This region is full with great powers (USA, China, Russia, and Japan) and some are dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction seems more prudent with decline of US hegemony in world order and Australia's interest is inevitably tied with as usual international power system. Retrospective side, China is continuously growing its naval power and constructing artificial bases in South China Sea region. On the other side, Russia has the probable capability to challenge US hegemony. During the Cold War Russia has already shown its technological skill, arsenal,

⁹⁰ Ma, T., Wills, M., Medcalf, R., Singh, A., Supriyanto, R. A., Koda, Y., ... & Fargo, T. B. (2016). Non-claimant Perspectives on the South China Sea Disputes. *Asia Policy*, 21, 1.

⁹¹ Christian Caryl, "Asia's Dangerous Divide; Beijing and Washington are building new alliances throughout the continent", *Newsweek International*, 10 September 2007 at <<http://www.mywire.com/pubs/Newsweek/2007/09/10/4400075>>. Accessed 23 April, 2017.

military related equipment, and commitment to lead the world system. Nowadays, Russia has second biggest military capabilities (Military Strength Index based on the Credit Suisse report in September 2015). The last decade of 20th century is known for the economic liberalization. Economic liberalization created a new mechanism in world order wherein economic interest is played a significant role in the setting up relationship with other countries. This changing paradigm multiplied the Russian economy and its huge petroleum and natural gas resource base, less domestic consumption gave extra positive propulsion in its trade book. In the mid of all win-win situation, the role of Russia in Ukraine and Syrian crisis is creating apprehensive sphere. Vibrant domain of international diplomacy always comes with new paradigm. Recently the Russia-China bonding on International dais is well known. Both nation share different multilateral organisations like UN Security Council, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and G-20 etc. Actually, this bonding has a huge potential in the sense of economy and defence; wherein China is well known for the huge economy and trade surplus and Russia is known for the new technological innovation. According to the 'Realist theory', that two displeased great powers' bonding would be challenged for settled and pronounced legacy. The US led legacy is pronounced and prevailed in this time. The world order is running under its hegemony and his natural allies are assisting in this known global order. During the Cold War, Australian maritime strategy mainly focused on the how to kept away USSR to Southwest Pacific region to pacify the interest of US in this region. RAN followed the 'Sea denial policy' until demise of Cold War. World overcame to this sceptic situation with the disintegration of USSR and end of Cold War. Now in changing horizon, it is essential to shift their strategic interest with contemporary challenges.

Southeast Asian region has a significant space in the Australian defence policy. Its geographical proximity and historical defence cooperation (FPDA) along these countries corroborates the significance for Canberra's point of view. In 1991, Southeast Asia was regarded as a relatively stable region wherein the maturity of Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) had made significant contributions to management of disputes between member states. All the Southeast Asian countries came on the common dais of ASEAN in 1995. All the Southeast Asian countries under one dialogue platform and the self-developed indigenous peaceful mechanism "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation" (originally concluded in 1976 for the peaceful settlement of intraregional disputes in a framework of absolute respect for state sovereignty) cemented the relation among all states and transformed into as the

ASEAN community⁹². This approach cherished the stability and prosperity within the region. However, the rift with China on the South China Sea issue is promoting the apprehensive situation. This multi-party led (Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Indonesia) dispute has the potential to disrupt the status-quo of the region. Simultaneously, the growing strategic rivalry across the Indo-Pacific can be analysed from basic arms acquisition statistics. In 2012, it was reported that the period from 2007-11 saw a 200 per cent higher volume of arms transfers into Southeast Asia than there had been over the period 2002-06. This volume of imports was the highest since the end of the Vietnam War. Naval weapons formed the bulk of these purchases, with ships and maritime weapons accounting for 52 per cent of the total, and another 37 percent accounting for weapons with a possible maritime role.⁹³ A similar level and profile of weapon is evident for weapons acquisition intentions.

One major determining factor for the ‘rules based global order’ belongs to the stability of the South Asian region equally. This location works as a bridge between the Middle East and the Southeast Asian. Nowadays, Middle East is grappled under the regime change, civil war, and Shia-Sunni conflict and terrorist activities led by such Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Al Qaeda group. The gravity of these challenges is enhanced with the India-Pakistan tussle on Kashmir dispute and both nation have encountered four time catastrophic consequences of war in the last six decades. In forthcoming time future, any coercive act might be more grievous for the both nation due to the nuclear power. As well as, both nation share security engagement with major great power, in that situation there is possibility to war may take a global shape. India’s ambition and geographical location perceives a significant regional power within Indian Ocean. India’s maritime military strategy is underpinned on “freedom to use the seas for our national purposes, under all circumstances and to ensure good order at sea”. Understandably, India asserts that ‘whatever happens in the IOR can affect its national security and is of interest to us’.⁹⁴ As well as, India’s Act East policy is considering the strategic interest within this Indo-Pacific region. However, the huge maritime boundary, the protection of Indian strategic islands and coastal assets claim enrich maritime strategy and naval infrastructure. India continuously expanding the naval infrastructure such as enjoining the aircraft carrier ‘INS Vikramaditya’ and set up new air naval base ‘INS Baaz’ in Andaman-Nicobar islands are reflecting the motive.

⁹² Caballero-Anthony, M. (1998). Mechanisms of dispute settlement: the ASEAN experience. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38-66.

⁹³ Siemon T Wezeman, ‘The Maritime Dimension of Arms Transfers to South East Asia, 2007-11’ in *SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.

⁹⁴ Corder, L. (2010). Maritime security in the Indian Ocean region: Compelling and convergent agendas. *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs*, 2(1), 16-27.

On the other front, the expansionist behaviour of Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean is creating the rift between both nations. India's relation with China is noted to be 'cooperative at present but there is a competitive rivalry in trade and power projection'⁹⁵. China is trying to develop deep water port Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Mauritius and Sittwe (Myanmar); Chinese argument in favour of this development as to protect their sea trade route or energy route is not substantial satisfactory for the Indian concern. India's notion about these port developments as strategically encircling the Indian maritime region and during any coercive situation, China can be used these ports against Indian naval power. Meanwhile, the China-Pakistan axis always has been apprehensive for the Indian concerns. This contradiction questions the stability of the IOR.

Canberra clearly understands that its stakes in the maintenance of a liberal world system. It is essentially entangled to its security and national interests. There is no viable alternative to the existing order. The most likely actual alternative would be a system, which is far less orderly, and thus less economically prosperous and inherently more dangerous. Surprisingly, one of the most delicate geopolitical challenges for the United States of America's leadership is being given by the dual aggression of Russia in Europe and China in Asia. The repercussion of this dual aggression may be against the interest of U.S and the global order as a whole. Australian 2009 DWP considers about the Chinese intensive military modernisation programme wherein the Chinese navy is expanding his capabilities on level of naval power projection; becoming a blue water force. The new aircraft carrier, nuclear powered submarines and other naval vessels give a strategic position in Asia-Pacific region along with Indian Ocean rim also. This forward defence capability is giving concern to its neighbour and stakeholder.⁹⁶ The problem of violent Islamist extremism is serious, albeit one which is of lesser consequence than great power challenges discussed above. The crisis within Islam arguably has been fermenting for a century but evolution of ISIS as Caliphate has given the extra edge than other terrorist organisation like Al-Qaeda. The establishment of government in the Iraq and following the religious text as governing principles are a new panorama for the other terrorist organizations and it may be taken other secular Islamic countries to religious based (Sharia Based) governance model. This alarming situation may be a threshold position for the global rules based order. Therefore, it is

⁹⁵ Cordner, L. (2010). Rethinking maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 6(1), 67-85.

⁹⁶ Australia. Department of Defence. (2009). *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: force 2030*. Commonwealth of Australia. p.34.

the modest ADF commitments to make coalition campaigns to combat a near-term threat to national or alliance interests, or to regional order in different parts of the world.

Simultaneously, USA came with the rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in Obama administration wherein US is trying to set up again stronghold naval position in the Asia-Pacific maritime region. The United States' rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has been most prominent in Australia in the form of plans to expand defence cooperation between the two countries under an already close alliance relationship. The details of this closer engagement were jointly announced by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Julia Gillard on November 16, 2011, and included the deployment of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines to Darwin and northern Australia and planned for closer cooperation (Force Posture Initiative or Agreement⁹⁷) between the Australian and U.S. air forces⁹⁸. The geographical position of Darwin naval base is near to Southeast Asian water; due to proximity US navy can do training exercises with Southeast Asian countries led naval forces as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Further, DWP 2016 clearly supports the US's strategic rebalance for long duration stability within the Indo-Pacific region⁹⁹.

Non-traditional Security Threats

Non-traditional security threats having a few common characteristics generally non-military in nature, transnational in scope-neither very domestic nor purely inter-state and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution. This implies that these non-customary dangers are substantially more threatening than the conventional ones as they require the national leadership to look not only outwards to cultivate international cooperation, but also inwards, with an open viewpoint to execute internal socioeconomic and political reforms. The revolutionary structural changes are outcomes of the Cold War. These ramifications benefitted a supplement regional dynamics to enhancements in household security, rapid economic development, and the maturing of regional identity to produce a conducive environment for economic cooperation and revamping of security needs in Asia-Pacific region. The maritime dimension is a remarkable speciality of this region. Most of the countries belong directly to this maritime domain. Their development and culture are totally

⁹⁷ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 123.

⁹⁸ "Australia–United States Force Posture Initiatives," Prime Minister of Australia, Press Release, November 16, 2011 u <http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/Australia-united-states-force-posture-initiatives>.

⁹⁹ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 123.

based upon this domain. Hence, any disruption in this sphere may be affect the strategic interest of the Canberra and other related countries. In this context, maritime security is as a major concern. “Non-traditional” maritime concern is related to maritime terrorism, transnational crime, ocean resource management against environmental pollution, and climate change. Australian DWP 2009 pointed out non-state actors as security threatening elements¹⁰⁰, which mobilize unconventional threats against state security.

Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terrorism is one of the major marked hassle in the maritime security. It emerged as the most widely recognizable and visible threats to a nation’s security, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Sometime, the concept of maritime terrorism and piracy become hazy and congruent; actually similar modus operandi creates this suspicion. However, the distinction is clearly visible on the ground of motive. The private end (ransom) becomes the prime motive behind the piracy whereas terrorism has political motives, to contemplate a ruckus in good order at sea. The most important and fundamental difference is in their objectives: while drug cartels and arms smuggling networks primarily operate to increase their wealth, terrorist and insurgency networks always have a political goal. Hoffman (2013) defines terrorism as the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence in pursuit of political change.”¹⁰¹ Therefore, there is fine line between both of them but in changing situation, it has potential to assist terrorist led group. Nowadays terrorist groups like as Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Northern Sumatra and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Southern Philippines have carried out attacks using this piracy act for the ransom and raising fund. In March 2004, Philippine military sources were quoted as saying that “the ASG was conducting training with Jemaah-Islamiyah (JI) to prepare for possible seaborne and underwater attacks outside from Philippines”¹⁰². Australian Defence Force was also part of the U.S led operation ‘Enduring freedom’. Due to this synergetic gesture, Australian people already suffered in the Bali bomb incident in 2002 therefore Australian tanker and cargo ships are under the threats. This vulnerability has been enhanced with the ISIS defeat in the Iraq. Further one of the side effects of the likely military defeat of Islamic State will be the dispersal of its members. This vulnerable situation may affect the Canberra’s interest.

¹⁰⁰ 2009 Defence White Paper. p. 23.

¹⁰¹ Hoffman, Bruce. 2013. “What is Terrorism?” In *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 11th Edition, edited by Robert Art and Robert Jervis, New York: Pearson

¹⁰² Bateman, S. (2006). *Assessing the threat of maritime terrorism: issues for the Asia-Pacific region*.

The huge technicalities and gloomy regulatory mechanisms with lesser accountabilities make this shipping industry sometime fraudulent and illegal. This fraudulent behaviour may avail the perfect opportunity for the maritime related terrorist act such as attack on shipping, port or naval establishment. Due to this act, it may originate economic disruption and security concern. After the 9/11 incident, this Southeast Asian water region is full with sceptic environment. After the 9/11 terrorist act, this Indo- Pacific water has confronted the terrorist acts. The ‘USS Cole’ in Aden in October 2000 and the ‘French tanker Limburg’ off Yemen in 2004 came under attack. The sinking of ‘Superferry 14’ in February 2004 near Manila in the Philippines was the most grieved act of maritime terrorism, in terms of loss of life with 116 people killed¹⁰³. Despite these examples, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used these mechanisms several time against the both merchant and Sri Lankan naval ship¹⁰⁴. More recently, India faced the land based terrorist act (26/11 incident) in 2008 but its origin was related to maritime and terrorist used this porous maritime regime for this gruesome massacre act. Therefore, these limitations of maritime boundary may be encouraged for the illegal intrusion and terrorist act in adjacent sea region.

The port area or naval base face threats from the both side landside and seaside (small boats, underwater swimmers). Waterside security will generally be more difficult and costly than landside security. While tight physical security might be possible on the entry points to a port from the landside, it is extremely difficult to secure a port and the ships in it from attacks launched from the seaward, particularly if there is a high level of small craft activity in the port. This vulnerability demands huge surveillance and security mechanism. This has led to the US navy and other Western navies much greater attention to the force protection of their ships during port calls. Whenever, this naval ship remains in the seawater on that time, they are self-sufficient to handle any terrorist act. Nevertheless, port call time their security mechanism is not like within sea. On the contrary, security of big commercial tanker is always under suspicion due to less security system. Usually these commercial tanker floats with crude oil, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and chemicals (Ammonium Nitrate etc.). The inflammable property of all these products pronounces as ‘floating bomb’ in the sea. This hazardous specification is a potent method to disrupt or damage navigation channel. Interestingly, sea routes become narrow at some places so these are known as ‘choke points’. These points are

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Rohan Gunaratna ‘Terrorist threat to shipping is ‘imminent and growing’ *Lloyd’s List*, Wednesday 29 September 2004.

very important for the freedom of navigation and smooth movement of any type of ships. The Navy Strategic Plan, 2008 (NSP) identifies three 'maritime focus areas' that correlate directly to the priority regions in the global campaign against Islamist extremism the Western Pacific, especially Southeast Asia; the Middle East and Southwest Asia; and the Mediterranean. These regions also include the world's most important, and vulnerable, maritime choke points. The NSP notes the Al Qaeda links with regional organisations such as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group¹⁰⁵. Ironically, the dominance of these terrorist organizations does overlap within the Australian water. Within any disruption in this region may affect especially Southeast Asian water and the semi-enclosed seas of Western Pacific.

Seaborne trade has a great importance in the global trade, especially Asia-Pacific region; new economic policy and globalization came with huge economic transformation in this region-based country. This transformation has assisted to economic boom, whereby trade and commerce within region and intra region has been increased. Maritime behaviour of this region emphasises on the seaborne trade. Seaborne trade gains additional importance in the Western Pacific and East Asia because of the archipelagic nature of this part of the world. This economic vibrancy also affected Australian economic in positively way. As well as Canberra signed, free trade agreement with China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Besides, this economic point of view, strategic causes are also significant for Canberra. Inherently, Southeast Asian water is the connecting point for the Indian and the Pacific Ocean water. USA naval Pacific command and Indian Ocean command usually use this sea channel for navigation. Hence, it is essential for Australia, this maritime region should be hassle free.

Piracy

Piracy is also one of the major non-traditional security threats. It is a type of robbery, which occurs at sea. Interestingly, piracy is the oldest non-traditional security threats and but the mechanism has been transforming; motives always remain private end or ransom. Approximately 70-80% of Global trades are happen by the sea routes¹⁰⁶. It is the cheapest and bulkiest mode of transportation than any other transportation modes such as air and land. These salient features make a significant position in the international trade and commerce. A pirate generally uses high sea for this robbery act. Apparently, it does not come under any state

¹⁰⁵ On the maritime activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group, see Rommel C Banlaoi, 'The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism', in Lehr, *Violence at Sea*, pp. 121-137.

¹⁰⁶ Jacks, D. S., & Pendakur, K. (2010). Global trade and the maritime transport revolution. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(4), 745-755.

territory that is why it is known as the ‘common global human heritage’. International Law mentions Pirates as-Hostis Humani Generis or Enemies of all humanity¹⁰⁷. That piracy is a technical legal term referring to ‘particular acts of violence committed on the high seas or in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)’. It can be used broadly to cover all forms of sea robbery and violence at sea. The strict legal definition of piracy is provided in “Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982”. Key words in this definition are ‘high seas’ and ‘for private ends’. An incident that does not occur on the high seas (and in the EEZ) is not piracy. Piracy under international law cannot occur within the territorial sea or internal waters of a state that is waters under the full sovereignty of that state. The significance of ‘for private ends’ is that it distinguishes acts of terrorism from piracy, as terrorism is not normally conducted for private end.

The naval constabulary work is suitable and logical response to set up good order at sea. The vast maritime domain and porous behaviour demand a collective security measure (in June 2008 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1816, which directly sought to address the threat posed by Somali piracy¹⁰⁸) to check this sea piracy. Southeast Asian water is one of the most piracy prone water in the world. Apparently, Australia’s shares the same sea-lanes for the export and imports Simultaneously USA, Japan, China, and South Korea. The value of Australian trade by sea was \$ 424.9 billion in 2014-15 whereas this value was \$365.8 billion and \$320.5 billion respectively in 2009-10 and 2005-06¹⁰⁹. The new economic order brought huge economic prosperity and trade opportunities within this region. Australia is known for huge metallic and non- metallic minerals ores and Asian region is known as huge market. This symbiotic relation is a win-win situation for the both parties. Any erratic action may create disturbances in this equilibrium. Mistakenly, piracy has the same potential to disrupt this order.


¹⁰⁷ Burgess Jr, D. R. (2005). Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New International Law. *U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.*, 13, 293

¹⁰⁸ Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). The global maritime partnership and Somali piracy. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 25(3), 223-234.

¹⁰⁹ https://bitre.gov.au/publications/2017/files/asf_2014_15.pdf, p. no 3.

Map: 1

Strategic chokepoints: Strait of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok and SLOCs passing through the Spratly island



Source: <http://www.eaglespeak.us/2014/11/>

Southeast Asian waters were suffered from the perennial maritime piracy concern from the early 2000s, but after 9/11 incident its dubious role in the global terrorism as fundraiser, make quite burning issues for the security of land and maritime domain both. In December 2003 Singapore's home affairs minister Wong Kan Sen made the first explicit link between piracy and terrorism when he referred to "terrorism camouflaged as piracy."¹¹⁰ This sea pirate is demanding million-dollar money as ransom; crude oil tanker is facing the problem as million-dollar crude oil theft ¹¹¹(the Singaporean oil tanker "Joaquim"). Nonetheless, hijacking of crewmember, torturing, and putting under the inhumane situation is against the norm of human


¹¹⁰ "Piracy Equals Terrorism on Troubled Waters: Minister," Agence France Presse, December 21, 2003.

¹¹¹ The Singaporean oil tanker "Joaquim" is on its way from the Indonesian port city of Tanjung Pinang to the small Malaysian island Langkawi, bearing 3,500 metric tons of fuel oil. The shipment never reaches its destination. The ship is found the next day, 3,000 metric tons of oil gone, the navigation system and communication equipment smashed, and the crew beaten but alive. <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/forget-somalia-this-the-new-sea-piracy-hot-spot-2015-10-07>.

ethos and good order at sea. To curb this challenging situation, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) played a significant role. On time, information sharing and collective maritime surveillance within waters are giving better output. Despite the better situation, southeast water is until now facing the piracy problem. The following data is showing.

Table: 1

Maritime Piracy Incidents on the Global Level



Source: <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/forget-somalia-this-the-new-sea-piracy-hot-spot-2015-10-07>

Australian strategic interest is also enshrined with the Southeast Asian water and with the peaceful Indian Ocean also. Data is showing the most of the piracy act has happened in these waters. 104,128 and 141 piracy related incidents have been noticed respectively 2012, 2013, and 2014. The collective measures have been taken by the under UN security led council resolution 1816 in 2008 and keep collective maritime surveillance near to the East African coast is reflecting better result¹¹². However, this surveillance mechanism avails the temporary willing result. The mainly attributed causes behind this illicit act are Poverty, lack of economic opportunity, unemployment, unstable government, and civil war. In this gloomy situation, it accommodates an alternative source of income. Therefore, political insecurity and Economic problems are the major cause for resurgence of internal security problems leading to a higher risk of illegal activity, including at sea. The Sulu Archipelago (comprising the islands of

¹¹² Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). The pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The coalition is the strategy.

Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi) and the Mindanao and Sulawesi islands all have been neglected by the central governments in Manila and Jakarta for decades, as the result of poor governance, corruption, and stubbornly high levels of poverty and unemployment are known prevailing features. Mindanao has been suffered by insurgency and separatist conflict for over three decades. Resulting in, the Sulu and Celebes Seas have been become notorious for illegal maritime activities such as smuggling of illegal narcotics, guns, piracy, and human trafficking. The sea is become an ungoverned maritime space due to the lackadaisical behaviour of offshore or onshore policy and then there will not be effective law enforcement at sea. The proximity with politically unstable nations or territories brings conducive circumstances for the armed robbery or piracy at sea.

Transnational Crimes

Transnational crime is one of the major non-traditional security threats for the Australian maritime strategy. Mainly, it affects the human security related perspective of the maritime strategy. Major components of these concerned issues are drug trafficking, illegal arms supply, human trafficking, illegal products dumping and quarantine breaches¹¹³. Current globalized world serves the new- new economic opportunities and sometime lacks of regulations create a nexus among the government officials and peddlers. This nexus not only affects the security and economic well-being of all states. Simultaneously, this practice is against the humanistic values. Insofar, illegal drugs affect the health and productivity of young generation people. Other side, women, and children are the most suffered group in human trafficking. These all-inhumane activities make the civilised society as vulnerable and violence led.

Australia is concerned about arising issues due to its geographical proximity to neighbouring states.¹¹⁴ The geographical position of Australian neighbours mainly in the northern and eastern direction of Australia. These groups of islands are known as “Pacific-Arc”. These groups of islands belong to different island countries like Indonesia, East Timor, Vanuatu, and Fiji etc. These island countries have huge maritime region. This hugeness in the absence of effective regulatory mechanism transforms as challenges. Most of these Pacific-arc countries are known for weak government institutions and under develop economic situation. This horizon makes a fragile situation for the Australian security; in fact, this region (Torres Strait) provides a good

¹¹³ 2009 Defence White Paper, p. 24.

¹¹⁴ R. Cornall, ‘Australia’s Response to Transnational Crime in the Region’, *Public Administration Today* v4, July–October 2005, pp. 61–5.

transit point for the illegal entry of people, drugs, and other contraband in Australia¹¹⁵. Transnational organized crime has always remained alert to take advantage of flaws and vulnerabilities that exist within certain states due to the huge length of their coastlines. Retrospectively, inadequate monitoring mechanism of maritime activities, lack of maritime enforcement capability and poor legal frameworks proves as boon for these illicit activities.

Australian proximity to Southeast Asian water and “Golden crescent” position is in this region (Myanmar) avails the alarming situation for this Southeast Asian region and contiguous region equally. The huge per capita income of the Australian people makes it as cynosure for the illicit drug peddlers to sell their narcotics drugs and psychopathic products. This illegal process starts the illegal vicious circle of money wherein it encourages the other illegal activities such as arms trafficking, sea robbery etc. Simultaneously, in 2008 the United Nations Secretary-General pointed the links that existed between drug trafficking and related organized criminal activities, such as trafficking in illegal firearms and terrorism¹¹⁶. Hence, to curb this organized transnational crime is a one of the major challenges for the good order at sea.

The World Bank (2013) defines- an organized crime network as one that uses force and coercion for pursuit of wealth by criminal means. Thus, going by this definition, international drug cartels, arms smuggling groups and maritime piracy networks can be classified as some of the major organized crime networks¹¹⁷. Organized crime networks usually mushroom and thrive in “weak” or “failed” states (mostly underdeveloped and developing countries), which are characterized by ineffective government control, poor law and order control situation, weak regulatory framework for protecting business activities and a corrupt judiciary.

Illegal Immigration

Australia is facing drastic contrast owing to proximity with the Asia continent and Asian values. The legacies of Australian political, social, and cultural norm are congruent to the western or Anglosphere ethos. This divergent situation created a speculative aura in the Australian foreign policy and domestic policy. The 1901 Immigration Restriction Act,

¹¹⁵ M. Moriarty, ‘Border Management in the Pacific’ in A. Bisley (ed.), *Pacific Interactions: Pasifika in New Zealand, New Zealand in Pasifika*, Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2008, available online at <http://ips.ac.nz/publications/publications/show/248>, pp. 245, 257.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, note 4, para. 102.

¹¹⁷ The World Bank. 2013. “Shape of Violence Today.” In *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 11th Edition, edited by Robert Art and Robert Jervis, New York: Pearson.

tantamount as the 'White Australia Policy', its objective was to allow merely that immigrants who were young, white, British migrants, and impede all those viewed as "Other" to this racialized cultural identity. This policy prevailed until the late of 60s¹¹⁸. Later on Canberra also opted the policies of multiculturalism. This opted policy enhanced the number of migrants from the Southeast Asian region due to civil war and instability. Moreover, in the late of 20th century non-traditional security threats and the interconnectivity among the variable of this non-traditional security threats have spin a broad web of security threats. In this situation, it is essential for Canberra to check this illegal immigration.

As Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering argue: "The Australian Government refused to allow docking of the 'MV Tampa on Christmas Island' in August 2001. It was a defining moment in the evolution of Australian border control".¹¹⁹ After this incident 9/11 incident, happen in USA. These two sequential incidents conveyed security concern. Australian government took step to check this incident. As a result, 'Operation Relax One, Relax Two, and Operation Resolute' were started by ADF. Subsequently, Canberra government passed a legislation to set up detention centre on foreign soil like Nauru, which came to be known as "Pacific Solution".¹²⁰ The main objective of this policy is to prohibit asylum seekers to reach Australian territory directly. The Australian political party such as Liberal party has taken staunch stand against the asylum seekers. In 2013 general election, Tony Abbott led liberal party conveyed this issue at the centre stage and he gave slogan "Stop the boats".¹²¹ He emphasised on border protection and immigration policy after the winning in election. As the result of, the Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) was started in September 2013 under the ADF. Australian northern water has come under the surveillance of ADF and the main purpose of this surveillance is to deter or shift all immigrants to foreign soil based detention centre (Nauru and Papua New Guinea)¹²².

The problem becomes more grievous when the number of asylum seekers mismatch with the Canberra policy related to immigrants. The forthcoming time is also full with this challenge, due to global warming, terrorism, ethnic problem (Rohingya). Australia's humanitarian intake policy has been usually accepted 12000-13000 asylum seekers since last 20 years. It has

¹¹⁸ Jupp, J. (2002). *From white Australia to Woomera: The story of Australian immigration*. Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁹ Weber, L., & Pickering, S. (2011). The Ambiguous Architecture of Risk. In *Globalization and Borders* (pp. 163-196). Palgrave Macmillan UK.

¹²⁰ Gordon, M. (2011). The Boat That Changed it All. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20.

¹²¹ Luke Mogelson, 'The Dream Boat', The New York Times Magazine, 17 November 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/magazine/the-impossible-refugee-boat-lift-to-christmas-island.html?ref=magazine&_r=0

¹²² van Berlo, P. (2015). Australia's Operation Sovereign Borders: Discourse, power, and policy from a crimmigration perspective. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 34(4), 75-104.

committed to accept additional 12000 refugees from Iraq and Syria in 2015-16¹²³. Therefore, aforementioned these challenges may create divergent situation in this dimension. To check Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) is about to one of the major challenges for the managing authority.

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

Waterbodies are one of major source of substantial food supplies from the centuries. While, we mention maritime identity on that time seafood is already significant variable there. Sea is known for their abundant biomass reserve and non-biomass. This abundant reserve is under stressed in current over exhaustive consumption. This unchecked exploitation has been emerged as existence problem for the some marine species. Therefore, this situation reinvigorates every maritime nation to take a constabulary and cautious measure against this over exploitation of biological resources.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a serious challenge that threatens the conservation of fisheries resources, as well as livelihoods of fisheries-dependent communities. Due to this illegal practice, it originates the strain situation in front of Australian fishing economy and marine environment equally. This practice creates an existence challenge for the rare, threatened and protected species. As per the gravity of this illegal practice, 2016 DWP considers major maritime challenges as safeguarding Australia's maritime approaches, offshore territories and borders are essential for Australia's national security. Over the next 20 years, technology will be threats multiplier to maritime resources and borders to grow in sophistication and scale. Australian fisheries remain relatively abundant, particularly in the Southern Ocean. This abundant availability will attract for long-range illegal fishing fleets¹²⁴. Interestingly, Australian maritime zone sprawls in a widespread area approximately 16 million square km of ocean, an area that is twice the size of the continent's land mass. Australia's Fishing Zone (AFZ) is 8.94 million km² in area and includes the waters surrounding the offshore territories of the Cocos, Christmas, Norfolk, Macquarie, Heard and McDonald Islands. Legal fishing activities are monitored by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). Due to the vastness of the fishing zone and the highly priced fish (Tuna) stocks within maritime region are increasing the

¹²³http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/RefugeeResettlement.

¹²⁴ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 53.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. Simultaneously, some destructive fishing practices as ‘dynamite and cyanide fishing’ method gives a very harmful effect on the marine ecosystem. Due to these practices, other fishing species are become vulnerable. This extensive zone is full with biological and non-biological resources like polymetallic nodules. Now less technological advancement and more operational cost put all resources as a preserving mode for coming generation. Australia’s geographical proximity is quite near to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is also known for the maritime culture. This part of Asia is known for huge population base so, genuinely it increases burden on natural resources.

Australian northern approach is full with several of small coral islands. These Coral reefs are the health indicator of ocean and seas. Coastal and marine ecosystem in the Coral Triangle and Australian Great Barrier Reef (GBF) are already under stressed due to declining water quality, resource extraction, destructive fishing practices and over-fishing (Ainsworth et al. 2008: 361)¹²⁵. It will be harmful for the multi-billion dollar economic activities associated with the tuna, tourism and coral reef ecosystems. These unsustainable fishing practices can lead to fishery depletions and eventually conflicts, which are often due to competition among various groups for access fisheries.

¹²⁵ Ainsworth, C. H., Varkey, D. A., & Pitcher, T. J. (2008). Ecosystem simulations supporting ecosystem-based fisheries management in the Coral Triangle, Indonesia. *Ecological Modelling*, 214(2), 361-374.

Map: 2
Fishing Zone in the Coral Triangle




<http://www.zmescience.com/research/discoveries/cave-dwelling-coral-pacific-11102012/>

Depletion of fish stocks is likely to increase competition, which could lead to potential conflicts among these triangle countries. Therefore, to mitigate this challenge, the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food security organisation (CTI-CFF) is major organisation in this region. The deterioration in the economic condition brings human security on the brink position. Hence, to manage the livelihood, people start to choose different economic activities. Sometime, this economic activity is related to piracy and transnational crime. Apparently, these fishing communities have sound knowledge about the maritime region so this knowledge becomes helpful in these criminal activities. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime clearly pointed out the some fishing vessels are often involved in criminal activities like as smuggling of migrants, drugs and weapon also¹²⁶.

¹²⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry—Focus on: Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Weapons, Illicit Drug Trafficking* (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), p. 2.

Australian Southern water near to the Heard and McDonald Islands is also dealing with an IUU fishing. This region is different from the Australian northern approach. Huge distance from the Australian mainland (approx. 2500 nautical mile) and near to Antarctica continent demands the active maritime surveillance act against this IUU. The marine biodiversity is quite indigenous here. Continuously, illegal fishing in this region is evolving challenges for the environment.

Map: 3
Heard and MacDonalD Island Region



Source: <http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp06-1.gif>

The Australian fisheries management authority (AFMA) is the managing authority. This authority decides the fishing season and quota system. Fishing season is quite significant factor for the fishing activities. Actually, some season or month belongs to the fishing reproduction time. Hence, this time fishes are under growing stage that's why that period does not become high time for the fishing activities and it becomes the against the norms of aquaculture. Simultaneously, the quota system is a process by which this authority manages the quantity of fishing practices and makes this primary economic activity as sustainable and lifelong. The

annual quota manages the quantity of ‘Patagonian Tooth fish and Mackerel Ice fish’ fishing¹²⁷. This quota system acknowledges about the limitation of one fishing trawler and countries. Problem originates when these fishing trawlers encroach their quota limitations and they start catching growing ‘Patagonian Tooth fish’. The high demand and economic value of these fishes in international market encourage for the encroachment of quota system. However, sometimes these vessels are involved in whale poaching and restricted indigenous animals. Environmental protection and Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) clearly mentions that any whaling activity within the declared Australian Whale Sanctuary is prohibited and illegal¹²⁸. These provisions are applicable for the Australian nationals and vessels equally to foreign nationals and vessels, and extend to waters offshore the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) in the Southern Ocean. The least responsible behaviour of licensed vessel towards fishing practices is the major concern for this maritime region. The financial gain always encourages to these vessels to do this illegal work.

The management and conservation of living resources are important not only for Australia’s domestic fisheries but also for the long-term preservation of a healthy ecology. Australia’s commercial interest in stocks managed by Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR) includes a substantial Patagonian Toothfish fishery within Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone around the Heard Island and McDonald Islands; a sub Antarctic island group which is an Australian external territory. Australia’s major priority within CCAMLR is to pursue stronger measures for effectively combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing, which is occurring in the CCAMLR area of Competence, including in the Australian Fishing Zone around the Heard Island and McDonald Island; as well as protecting our commercial fisheries interests.

Australia is committed to CCAMLR as an effective international mechanism for the conservation and rational use of Antarctic and Southern Ocean marine living resources. Australia continues to work with CCAMLR’s members for the development of conservation and management measures to realise the objectives of the Commission.¹²⁹ Fishing activities in the Australian Fishing Zone around Heard Island and McDonald Islands are

¹²⁷ McPhee, D. (2008). *Fisheries management in Australia*. Federation Press.

¹²⁸ Anton, D. K. (2009). Antarctic whaling: Australia’s attempt to protect whales in the Southern Ocean. *BC Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.*, 36, 319.

¹²⁹ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 54.

required to be conducted in an ecologically sustainable manner and consistent with domestic and international obligations.

Environmental Threats

Environmental issues within the EEZ of the coastal state become a significant factor in national security, particularly with the implementation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)¹³⁰. Activities that might impact on the environment are increasingly seeming as a possible threat to a nation's wellbeing and thus to its national security such as a state with poor environmental behaviour may lead to resource depletion and lead to possible conflicts for the ocean based resources. Therefore, the Royal Australian navy may take defensive or pre-emptive actions to gain or maintain control over these scarce resources. Australian mainland geographical location shares the tropical and temperate region and its Christmas and Coco Island situated in the equatorial maritime water region. Contrarily, some island like Heard and McDonald Island's location is near to Antarctica. In this situation Australian mainland and islands sprawls in different climatic zone, this climatic zone becomes the determining factor for their different and indigenous biodiversity.

Australian northern and eastern coast is well known for the huge coral reef such as Great Barrier Reef and Ningaloo Reef¹³¹. These regions are known for marine species diversity. Surprisingly, blue economy facilitates a good stake in the every countries economy and tourism is one of the major stakeholder of this economic activities. Best part of this tourism sector is long supply chain activities, thereby; it generates huge interconnected work culture. The sound environmental condition is directly entangled with the prosperity of tourism sectors. The best part of the natural environment has own recreational and aesthetic cost. That is why this cost management reinvigorates about the protection of pristine environment and the poor environmental behaviour may lead to resource depletion. The primary environmental legislation, the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) establishes a robust legal framework to provide protection for the environment while at the same time allowing sustainable economic development. However, the Great Barrier Reef outlook report 2014 mentions the reef is under pressure from the severe effect of climate change, illegal

¹³⁰ Charney, J. I. (1994). The Marine Environment and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. *The International Lawyer*, 879-901.

¹³¹ Wilkinson, C. C. (2004). *Status of coral reefs of the world: 2004*. Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS).

fishing, and coastal development¹³². The deterioration within this marine park may affect the billion dollar blue economic system. The Australian and Queensland government contemplated a GBF sustainability plan 2015- 2050¹³³. Within this time span, it will be challenge for the Australian environment led and maritime security led organisations as Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) to get the proposed results.

Moreover, the Australian southern water marine ecosystem is unchecked due to no presence of any other countries. In this geographical paradox, Australian navy and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) have the sole responsibilities for the protection and conservation of this region marine ecosystem. Simultaneously, The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR) announced the 1.5 million square km area as marine protected zone in 2016¹³⁴. Australian government is the active member of this convention and always supported this initiative. Australian offshore island Heard and McDonald also part of this protected zone. Ironically, this region is affected to IUU by national or foreign vessels without the permission of the nationals of that State. Moreover, this region demands well-equipped mechanized boat for the fishing but sometime these boats are below the standards whereas this maritime region is known for the high-speed sea wind and disastrous sea wave. Therefore fishing boat or trawler should be up to the standard, if any ship wreckage in this pristine environment can become cause of the marine pollution. One example Amur named the vessel sank in this water in 2000 and Insung named vessel in the Ross Sea in 2010¹³⁵.

This situation demands the two precautionary measures for the protection of marine environment- one is stringent environmental protection law which is already here as EPCB 1999, Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act 1981 and Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 etc. and second is related to the effective surveillance and monitoring mechanism therefore, it is the challenge for Australian maritime strategy to protect their indigenous marine environment and biological resources.

¹³² Assessment, G. B. R. R. S. (2014). Great Barrier Reef Region Strategic Assessment.

¹³³ <http://www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/long-term-sustainability-plan>.

¹³⁴ <https://www.ccamlr.org/en/news/2016/ccamlr-create-worlds-largest-marine-protected-area>.

¹³⁵ <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/animals/ocean-pursuit-leaves-toothfish-pirates-with-nowhere-to-run-20130503-2iy11.html>.

Climate Change

Climate change is a multifaceted, multi-dimensional global challenge. It is a significant threat to both Australia and Southwest islands countries. This challenging situation will evolve a fragile situation in the immediate neighbourhood 'Pacific-arc'. Strategic defence interest (2016 DWP) clearly highlights about the stability in immediate neighbourhood; means any fragility may be affected the Australian interest. ADF already played a constructive role for manage the order within the region, substantially, in 2004 Tsunami and Tropical cyclone Pam, Vanuatu in March 2015¹³⁶.

Australia's climate threat environment is the largely defensive neorealist perspectives that shape Australian national strategic culture. Thus, due to global warming in coming decades, the potent geopolitical and international security repercussions such as existence challenge for the Pacific Island countries will meddle. Sea level rises may to be a reason for significantly increase refugee flow to Australia from Pacific Island states. The Pacific Island nation, Kiribati is already exploring about mass migration policies as their atolls become increasingly vulnerable¹³⁷. On the other side, change in weather pattern will affect the water discharge capacity of multi nation flowing river like Indus, Brahmaputra, and Mekong etc. It may instigate the water conflict or the notion of 'water nationalism' in this region. The geopolitical implications of reduced river flows in India and Pakistan might create conflict between these two nuclear-armed states. Dwindling fresh water resources has led to many scholars predicting inter-state "water wars" in the future. Interestingly, Dupont (2013) points out that China has resorted to diverting fresh water resources from Tibet to the water-scarce Northern China region, thereby affecting millions of livelihoods in the riparian regions from which the water was redirected¹³⁸. Such endeavours may not only affect the environment but also lead to deteriorating relations with the neighbouring countries that would be adversely affected by one state's quest for fresh water resources. Thus, water scarcity is a critical national security issue for states. Apparently, climate change intensifies the acidification of waterbodies; the malicious effect of this natural process lies on the coral reef and fish production. The depletion in the biotic reserves may start conflict in the region. Noticeably, Fishes are the plentiful source of nutritional values, which strengthen the human security. A 2009 report entitled "The Coral

¹³⁶ <https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/resources/Documents/SC%2012-1%20FullwithFC.pdf>.

¹³⁷ Smith, R., & McNamara, K. E. (2015). Future migrations from Tuvalu and Kiribati: exploring government, civil society and donor perceptions. *Climate and Development*, 7(1), 47-59.

¹³⁸ Srikanth, D. (2014). Non-traditional security threats in the 21st century: A review. *International Journal of Development and Conflict*, 4(1), 60-68.

Triangle and Climate Change: Ecosystems, People and Societies at Risk” states that if the world does not take effective action on climate change, coral reefs would disappear from the CT by the end of the century. The ability of the region’s coastal environments to feed people would decline by 80 percent, and the livelihoods of around 100 million people would be lost or severely impacted¹³⁹.

Climate change has assumed critical importance to world security in the last few decades. It has the huge cascading affect, wherein the increasing temperatures will facilitate condition for frequent formation of tropical cyclones and thunderstorms in the tropical regions. Actually, it is natural phenomenon but in recent time the severity and intensity of cyclone is too high with increasing temperature. This temperature becomes the main energy for the cyclone; due to this, it is fortified with more catastrophic effect, which may affect the human lives and establishments (urban infrastructure, agro-forestry, plantation etc.). In this fragile situation, Environmental refugees may soon become a reality, as environmental degradation, food, and water scarcity may lead to mass migration of populations from the affected regions¹⁴⁰, contributing to the instability of the host states. On the other side, this devastation will originate the question mark on human security like child and women trafficking, forced illegal migration and poverty. Transnational organized criminals’ works are escalated with gruesome natural calamities. They use this grim situation for humans trafficking especially Childs and women and illegal activities. Thus, environment protection and nurturing is a demand of time, as a destabilized environment can lead a threshold position. Catastrophic and irreversible consequences, such as increase in the number of natural disasters may threaten the survival of the state and its population.

Conclusion

The challenges are the place where we can reform and make a thing perfect according to their practicality and these are the parameter, which give the abstract pictorial aura of any nation strategic interest. Erstwhile, some people take these challenges as negative aspects but in pragmatic sense it gives the chance to formulate own planning according to the futuristic sight. Australian huge maritime sphere brings huge challenges. These challenges are the major concern for the security and interest of Canberra.

¹³⁹ Hoegh-Guldberg, O., Hoegh-Guldberg, H., Veron, J. E. N., LOUGH, J., KING, M., AMBARIYANTO, H. L. & PEÑAFLOR, E. (2009). The Coral Triangle and Climate Change: Ecosystems. *People and Societies at Risk*.

¹⁴⁰ 2013 Defence White Paper, p. 18.

Demise of Cold War came with new enthusiastic aura wherein economic interdependence, trade, and commerce expanded. This economic interdependence came as paradigm shift. Economic development is accommodating as major catalyst in foreign relation. Any disruptive behaviour can affect the equilibrium. The non-traditional security threats are one of the major challenges; the globalization and new technological enhancements are also supporting these threats. Actually, these non-traditional security threats are more volatile than traditional security threats. Its easily transformation and adaptation according to the situation makes it malicious lethal disruptive source. On the other side, the traditional security threats are related to war, coercion so its severity is higher than non-conventional threats. However, in present time, world is full with several number of multilateral organisation and dispute redressal mechanism which work as 'safety valve' in any adverse situation. Therefore, in present domain non-traditional security threats are the more challenging for the world order and good order at sea. The maritime piracy, terrorism, transnational maritime crime, and IUU are the major face of these threats. The intertwined relationship within these challenges behaves as 'Spaghetti Bowl'. In this situation, it is essential for Australia to opt an effective and enhanced maritime surveillance mechanism.

The dimension of global warming is also major challenging factor for the Australian maritime strategy. The Australian DWP contemplates about the role of ADF and RAN in the Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Relief (4.65, 2009). The cascading effect of this global warming directly affects the aspects of human security. Due to this threshold position, again it is become excellent opportunities for these illegal non-state actors to flourish their illegal practices. This perspective clearly claims the effective and constructive Australian navy role within this region maritime sphere. The unwilling desire against these challenges will affect not only national interest but also common people ethos. Christopher Columbus mentioned, "The Sea will grant each man new hope as sleep brings dreams of home". This hope is completely based upon the 'good order at sea' and in the absence of this, it will be like graveyard of dreams.

Chapter: 4

Role of Australian Navy in the Indo-Pacific Region

Introduction

Navy is an inherently flexible instrument of national power. The most significant salient feature is its combination of mobility and persistence. Naval forces offer persistent occurrence in a region without the need to acquire basing rights¹⁴¹. Simultaneously, no need to acquire basing right or territory during naval operation time, it makes different from other forces. In fact, other forces like Airforce should be ground station for its operation. However, naval floating landing platform and other vessels like helicopter frigate work as ground base station in the sea, therefore no need to take basing right; naval forces operate their mission from the high sea. Thus, these marine forces are also beneficial to mitigate the scenario of conflict. In peacetime, they are capable of demonstrating presence, shaping the behaviour of other actors, reassuring allies, and peace mission. They are also useful instruments of peacetime competition.¹⁴² Apparently, navy turns out to be significant during both war and peaceful time. The oblate shape of earth and its landmasses is enclosed by the water masses. These waterbodies work as connecting point for the globe's landmasses and behave like sea highway. Spykman denoted this salient feature in his 'Rimland theory' and highlighted that the ocean provides a close passage for military. Australia's geostrategic position is as island country, adjacent to the 'rimland region'. This proximity will conceive to control this region and subsequently 'Heartland region'.¹⁴³ According to Spykman, the Rimland countries (mainly Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asian and China) have both continental and maritime attribute. In this situation, Rimland countries have better communication advantage than 'Heartland region'. Hence, any great power can handle this Heartland region with the help of Rimland countries. Australia geographical position as world island, which is contiguous to the Rimland region; herein it can provide a good military base. In such extent, Australia's maritime attribute claims the efficient and empowered navy, which has the capability to handle any adversaries during conflicts. The lethal power of naval force makes as deterrent power. The naval forward

¹⁴¹ Mahnken, T. G. (2014). 38| Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection Navies and the Flexible Application of Power| 39. *Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection*, 38.

¹⁴² Thomas G Mahnken (2012) (ed), *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto.

¹⁴³ Katzenstein, P. J. (2015). *A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium*. Cornell University Press.

deployment during the World Wars, Cold War, and present conflict is clearly showing its deterring aggression. The US naval force has used its naval capabilities as deterrence and reassuring his allies to defend from any threats such as in Korean War, Iraq War, Taiwan crisis etc. simultaneously, the US navy offered assistance during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and Fukushima disaster¹⁴⁴. Therefore, the effective sea capability hosts nation's strategic interest and nurturing good order at sea.

The context of 'Indo-Pacific' region within the Australian maritime strategy is a continuous gradual process. Australia inherently situated in the midst of the two great ocean Pacific and Indian Ocean. This coherent feature has remained disappear until the 'Two Ocean policy'. This paradigm shift embraced in 1987 with the 'Paul Dibb report'¹⁴⁵. Despite this phenomenon acceptance, all consecutive DWPs until 2009 emphasised on 'Asia-Pacific' as a major priority. 2013 DWP came as watershed event wherein first time 'Asia-Pacific' term was replaced by 'Indo-Pacific'; considered stability within this region as major strategic interest¹⁴⁶. In fact, the first hindsight of this paradigm shift was visible in the 2009 DWP wherein it indicated that Australian enduring strategic interest is overlapping with wider Asia-Pacific region concern¹⁴⁷. On the different side, Australia shares indigenous multilateral platform as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA, year 1997) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). The continuous growing interest within the economic, security and SLOCs are the major circumstance behind this paradigm shift.


¹⁴⁴ Bradford, J. (2013). Waves of Change: Evolution in the US Navy's Strategic Approach to Disaster Relief Operations between the 2004 and 2011 Asian Tsunamis. *Asian Security*, 9(1), 19-37.

¹⁴⁵ Dibb, Paul. *Review of Australia's defence capabilities: report to the Minister for Defence*. Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986.

¹⁴⁶2013 Defence White Paper, p.25.

¹⁴⁷2013 Defence White Paper, p. 7.

Map: 1 The Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific Regions



Source: <https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20dossiers/issues/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2015-4c79/rsa15-03-chapter-1-dff2>

Usually, major causes of disagreement within the countries belong to land related border dispute. In such extent, most of the nation concentrated the capacity building of military forces (land forces); however, for successful forward deployment or power projection naval power is supreme. Antecedent air force, navy and military worked separately, means interoperability within these forces were limited but with the technological enhancements and the vibrant modern domain of warfare has demanded interoperability and unified mechanism within the trio of forces in this time and space. This interoperability within the forces makes it more efficient and effective to cope with the issue in astute way. Sea power has an enormous dimension, compared to the concept of land force or airpower, neither of which incorporates the geo-economic dimensions of human activity to the magnitude that sea power does. An author, Alam has interestingly remarked; “unlike the army and the air force, whose size and firepower have to be related to that of potential adversaries, the size of the navy is determined

by the quantum of maritime assets and interests that you have to safeguard”¹⁴⁸. International conventions and UNCLOS have shown a constructive role to establish the order in the sea. Substantially, these norms serve responsibilities to the nation to make good order at sea. Therefore, this maritime Magancarta derives the norm and regulation of sea and codify the role of enforcing agency against the new evolving non- traditional challenges.

Human’s interest is continuously growing with the ocean resources and in present scenario; the recreational and aesthetic value is one of the major concern. In accordance with, the Australian perspective, it becomes more valuable and laudable owing to huge exclusive economic zone. So in this context, the prime objective of naval forces are not limited to combat or coercive act. Contemporary strategic thinkers, notably Ken Booth, have suggested that “the roles of maritime forces in this context fall into one of three categories: military (or combat related), diplomatic (or foreign policy related) and policing (or constabulary)”¹⁴⁹. The military and the policing role are the known behaviour of maritime forces but this diplomatic role is evolving within the benign transformation of naval power; actually, the use of naval power in the peacekeeping role, assistance during the disaster, search and rescue operation making as an effective mechanism to strengthen the relationship with neighbourhood countries or any one. Logistic shipment for the reconstruction of any conflict led region or state is also one of the significant peace building mechanisms. Actually, this happens in two particular ways; one is related to the clearance of underwater mines, and another one belongs to the opening of port and ordnance disposal. Owing to this, sea communication runs smoothly. Australian maritime forces have exhaustive experience since 1945 to clear underwater mines and other dangerous ordnance from not only national territory and waters, but from Southwest Pacific islands, Southeast Asian water and Papua New Guinea¹⁵⁰. The RAN contributed significant role in strike, interdiction and fire support to land forces in Korea and Vietnam War; availed the logistic support in the (1990 and 2003) Gulf war and East Timor crisis in 1999.

RAN Bases and Naval Capabilities

Navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can secure coastal region, where people lives. Some of the activities during maritime coercion do not belong merely to adjacent shore security but disguisedly it affects the whole war perspective.¹⁵¹ Battle of Normandy, Iwo-jima

¹⁴⁸ Till, G. (2013). *Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century*. Routledge, pp.no.16.

¹⁴⁹ Booth, K. (2014). *Navies and Foreign Policy (Routledge Revivals)*. Routledge.

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA16.pdf>, page no-59.


¹⁵¹ Professor Colin Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War*, New York, 1992, p. 1.

and Okinawa are the major instances wherein these shore areas changed the whole scenario of Second World War thus this combat behaviour is sea based but affects the security of continent also. The delivery of force from the sea is defined as 'Maritime power projection'. Within this power projection sea borne covert and non-covert vessels like submarines, amphibious landing ships, aircraft carrier etc. play decisive roles in combat time. On the other side these amphibious, patrolling and minehunter ships work in the peaceful time also as maritime border protection and relief assistance. These naval equipment and vessels bring the tactical edge during the operational time.

Australia's is situated on the crossroad of Pacific and Indian Ocean; despite, Canberra's self-proclaimed responsibilities in the Southern Ocean necessitate active, capable, and efficient naval forces. The RAN (Royal Australian Navy) has mainly two naval bases, Fleet Base East (HMAS Kuttabul situated in Sydney) and Fleet Base West (HMAS Stirling situated in Perth) respectively on the coast of the Pacific and Indian Ocean¹⁵². In 1987, the RAN affiliated the "Two Ocean" naval policy wherein first time Canberra recognised the prominence of Indian Ocean. This paradigm shift implored the bifurcation of Australian naval vessels between both commands. However, until now the lion's share of naval vessels and equipment belongs to the Eastern fleet base. The strategic interest of Australia is more entwined with the Southwest Pacific island region therefore; Canberra opts forward defence policy for this region. The Australian DWPs also contemplate about the security of this region whereas the North-Eastern Indian Ocean water near to Indonesia is apprehensive in the sense of illegal migrants and transnational crimes. To curb this problematic situation the HMAS Coonawarra or Darwin naval base is there with the patrolling naval vessels to guard the northern Australian maritime boundary and offshore territory. Retrospectively, the South Eastern Indian Ocean is like non-acumen region, no country is there. The huge hostile sea-air gap serves a little bit conducive assertion behind the lesser number of naval vessel in the western naval fleet (Perth). Besides these two major naval fleets, there are a number of other bases and support facilities.

¹⁵² <https://southfront.org/military-analysis-the-royal-australian-navy-assets-and-capabilities/>

Map: 1
Location of Major Defence Facilities across Australia



Sources: <http://www.budget.gov.au/2012>

13/content/ministerial_statements/rural_and_regional/html/rural_and_regional-07.htm

Fleet Base East/HMAS Kuttabul: Main Fleet Base located in Perth¹⁵³.

Fleet Base West/HMAS Stirling: Main Fleet Base located in Sydney¹⁵⁴.

HMAS Albatross: It is known for merely RAN's Naval Air Station that operates three squadrons of aircraft.

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

HMAS Cairns: It is situated in Cairns on the North-eastern Pacific Coast of Australia. This base is homeport for 14 RAN vessels mainly Armidale Class Patrol Boats, four Balikpapan Class Landing Craft Heavy (LCH), four Paluma Class Survey Motor Launches (SML) and two Leeuwin Class Hydrographic Survey Ships (HS)¹⁵⁵.

HMAS Coonawarra: It is situated in Darwin Northern part of Australia. It is the centre of “Border Integrity Operations” and operates patrol craft repair facilities.¹⁵⁶

HMAS Creswell: It is situated in Jervis Bay south of Sydney on the East Coast of Australia. It is known for RAN College and training facilities that emphasis on ship safety and survivability, damage control, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, and naval gunnery and anti-aircraft gunnery ranges.

HMAS Penguin: Located in Sydney, the base is home to the RAN Diving School, Hydrographic School and Medical School.

HMAS Waterhen: It is situated near to Sydney, specialised for RAN Mine Countermeasures Force and homeport to six Huon class vessels.

“The Royal Australian Navy comprises of approximately 50 commissioned vessels and over 16,000 personnel”¹⁵⁷. Australian navy is the largest and most sophisticated naval forces in the Southwest Pacific region. The region in which naval forces can operate range from the open oceans, or it is known as ‘blue water’, over the continental shelves, archipelagos and coasts in ‘green water’ and into inshore areas and estuaries in ‘brown water’ conditions. Littoral operations are characterised as those influenced by the interface amongst land and sea. The physical contrasts between these circumstances can pose altogether different challenges, since submarines, ships, aircraft and systems that are configured for one condition may not be appropriate for another.¹⁵⁸ This circumstance demands an overall or comprehensive commissioned naval vessel fleet.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet>

¹⁵⁸ <http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf>, p. 19.

Major Combatants

Surface Combatants

Surface combatants are the major naval vessels for any naval establishment; it is mainly beneficial during the combat time. The RAN is using mainly the ANZAC Class Helicopter frigate (FFH) and Adelaide class FFG (Guided Missile Frigate). The ANZAC class frigate having the capabilities to long- range escorts with roles including air defence, anti-submarine warfare, surveillance, reconnaissance and interdiction. Its operational range is more than 6000 nautical miles and in one day it can travel around 1200 km (1 knot=1.85km,so 27 knot x 24 =648 mile/day)¹⁵⁹. On the other side, the Adelaide class FFG is also having the same capabilities but its guided surface-to-air missiles (SM-2) makes more capable to handle airborne threats. However, it was inducted in the RAN in 1980s, now these all FFG will be decommissioned in upcoming time¹⁶⁰. Resulting in, Australian navy inducted a new modernisation programme “Next Generation Navy” wherein Australian navy is trying to induct three new Hobart class air warfare destroyer (AWD) and five HMAS Canberra Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), or Amphibious Assault Ship¹⁶¹.

Amphibious and Afloat Support

Amphibious Lift

The amphibious ship can be operated along the full spectrum of operations, from disaster relief and search and rescue through to the more traditional roles of amphibious assaults, raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals. These operational postures are pivotal for ‘conflict prevention and crisis mitigation’. During the INTERFET mission two Kanimbla Class Landing Platforms Amphibious (LPA), HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla played a crucial role in logistic support¹⁶². This amphibious ship is constructed under the modular approach wherein ship is divided into modules. Every module fits to the specific purpose, as transporting tank, marines and land-based equipment and its amphibious behaviour make more significant¹⁶³.

¹⁵⁹ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/ffh>


¹⁶⁰ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/ffg>

¹⁶¹ <https://southfront.org/military-analysis-the-royal-australian-navy-assets-and-capabilities/>

¹⁶² Paget, S. (2017). The Renaissance of Anzac Amphibiosity. *Naval War College Review*, 70(2), 113.

¹⁶³ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd>

Figure: 1
Different Modules of the Amphibious Ship



Source: <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd>

The maintenance and decommissioning are also major concerning issue with these vessels. Australian navy has decommissioned in HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla in 2011¹⁶⁴. Whereas, it necessitates maintaining at least some vessels, therefore Australian government acquired second hand vessel (HMAS Choules) from the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, two new large amphibious (Landing Helicopter Dock) vessels have been purchased, the first, HMAS Canberra, has been commissioned in 2014¹⁶⁵. These 27,000 tonne ships are able to land a force of over 1,000 personnel by helicopter and watercraft, along with

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd>

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

all their weapons. The LHD has been designed with the shallowest possible draft to enable her to work in optional ports and harbours and move strategically in the shallow waters regular in the littoral regions¹⁶⁶.

Afloat Support

The afloat support force refuels and re-supplies naval vessels and embarked helicopters at sea and provides logistics support to land operations. The fleet comprises two vessels: HMAS Sirius, which was refitted according to naval specifications as an Auxiliary Tanker (AO) and HMAS Success.

Submarines

Submarine is the covert sea based vessel that runs mainly under the sea surface. This speciality brings the tactical edge than other naval ships. The attacking capabilities on enemy ship and counter the threat of adversary submarines makes it a more lethal vessel. Simultaneously, it can collect intelligence about the position of enemy ships. The RAN is operating six Collins class Diesel electric submarines. It is mainly Guided Missiles Submarine (SSG). This six SSG fleet inducted during the years 1996 and 2003¹⁶⁷. The underwater operability make it more sophisticated and maintenance led vessel. Resulting in, an optimum number of this vessel should be in the force. Australian defence ministry consented about the acquisition of 12 new-advanced SSGs in 2009 DWP. Nowadays, non-traditional threats are the major security concern for Canberra. In this situation, effective maritime surveillance and patrolling boat is fixing Canberra's strategic concerns.

Minor Combatants

Patrol Boats

The Navy has thirteen Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPB). These vessels are mainly tasked to support civil surveillance program within Border Protection Command. They can also be used for the insertion and extraction of army patrols on the coast, including Special Forces. All PBs are based at either HMAS Cairns or HMAS Coonawarra¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/submarines/ssg>

¹⁶⁸ <https://southfront.org/military-analysis-the-royal-australian-navy-assets-and-capabilities/>

Mine Warfare Vessels

RAN currently uses the Huon Class MHC (coastal Mine hunters)¹⁶⁹. The Huon Class feature a unique hull design, outstanding shock resistance and an inherently low magnetic signature, allowing the ships to operate in hostile mine environments. This ship employs sonar to search mines, which can be destroyed by using a remote-controlled mine disposal vehicle.

Naval Aviation

Aviation related vehicle moves faster than any other land based or marine based vehicle. This speed brings a tactical advantage during the combat time. They are configured for anti-submarine and surfaces search/targeting. The RAN has sixteen US-designed Seahawk helicopters, which mainly based on the FFH and FFG class frigates. New acquisition of Seahawk 24 MH-60R aircraft and Six MRH-90 are replacing the old Seahawk and UK based Sea king harrier¹⁷⁰.

Surveillance and Response Group

Surveillance and patrolling of maritime boundary is one major task for the maritime force. The Australian maritime domain is broadly extended. Therefore, to guard and patrolling it is necessary to maintain the surveillance related maritime patrol aircraft. Its multiple behaviour is beneficial for the both combat and non-combat situation. The RAN is using AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, which undertake maritime patrol, maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, offensive air support, surface & sub-surface strike, and search and survivor supply¹⁷¹. RAN has upgraded this patrol aircraft on time but in forthcoming time the P-8A Poseidon will replace it¹⁷².

Australian navy is not deploying the Aircraft carrier in the present time. This floating base becomes the major hindsight of the maritime power projection. The liberalist view related to Australian defence, self- defence notion and strategic interest are major determining factor for the expansion of naval fleet. Several vessels are necessary to maintain the standard operating procedure (SOP). These entire naval vessels implore the huge maintenance costs and resting periods. As well as, decommissioning and technological upgradation of naval vessels are also parts of this mechanism. The 2009 Australian Defence White Paper announced to acquire 12

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.navy.gov.au/aircraft/mrh-90-taipan>

¹⁷¹ 2013 Defence White Paper, p.88.

¹⁷² Ibid.

new submarines and presently six commissioned Collins class submarines are already the part of RAN. For the effective and smooth operation, it is necessitated to acquire naval vessels and other related equipment for future course of action whereby, present and future will be secured.

Role of Australian Navy in the Southwest Pacific Island Region

In the South Pacific, Australia is the resident power. It holds 94.5 percent of the GDP of Oceania and its defence spending is 98 per cent of the region's defence and security spending; Australian population shares 60 per cent of the region's population; and contributes 60 per cent of all development assistance to the region¹⁷³. The common maritime identity is the salient feature of PICs. In this situation, the collaborative measures are the suitable mechanism to address the concerning challenges such as the Illegal Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, transnational crime, maritime surveillance. The region’s security architecture has been strengthened within several regional organisation as “Pacific Islands Forum, the Forum Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting”¹⁷⁴.

The Australian immediate Southwest Pacific Island Countries got independence in the second half of the 20th century. 20th century and is still strife-redden with internal disputes and political instability until Cold War period, Australia tried to curb the influence of the USSR navy. Any USSR related naval establishment might have affected the interest of the US led groups. Strikingly, after the ‘Guam doctrine’ Australia inculcated self-defence, self-reliance and continentalism for securing its interest and the security of the nation¹⁷⁵. Simultaneously, Canberra followed different security mechanism in the Southwest Pacific Islands region.

Table: 1
State Security Eras of Pacific Island Regionalism

Era	External view of Pacific Islands	Perceived nature of risk	Regionalist response
1944-1976	Security risk	Invasion route through Islands	ANZAC Pact / ANZUS
1976-1989	Security liability	Fear of Soviet “breakout”	“Strategic Denial”

¹⁷³ Wallis, J., & Wesley, M. (2016). Unipolar Anxieties: Australia's Melanesia Policy after the Age of Intervention. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 3(1), 26-37.

¹⁷⁴ 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 55.

¹⁷⁵ Beazley, K. (2008). Operation Sandglass: Old history, contemporary lessons. *Security Challenges*, 4(3), 22-43.

1990-2001	Financial liability	“Pacific Paradox”	“Constructive Commitment”
2001-2011	Failed state incubator	Threat from non-state actors	Biketawa/RAMSI/“Pacific Plan”
2011-Present	Arena for geo-political rivalry	Political realignment	PIDF/ “New Framework for the Region”

Source: Regionalism, security and cooperation in Oceania, page no: 21

Demise of the Cold war facilitated a broad and Australian led security mechanism wherein the self-security led concern is the paramount purpose. Therefore, Australian comprehensive defence policy is based on the self-defence in the post-Cold War age. On the other side, Australia followed the forward defence policy for Southwest Pacific region.¹⁷⁶ In fact, the presence of Australia as the largest island countries within this region with biggest military expenditure (defence expenditure) is notifying its responsibilities to secure this region. Apparently, the Australian active presence is in this region distinctly seeming such as the making the Pacific Island Countries led common platform like Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Canberra decided that its national interests overlap with its sense of regional responsibility, which required it to take a leading role in assistance to address instability problems among smaller neighbours. Hence, within this expectation, it became necessary to ADF would play a central part in that. The past few years have provided many examples of this-in PNG, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

These island countries are intermittently engulfed in civil unrest, and peacekeeping is the prime concern for Australia. The Solomon island grappled under the civil unrest (between the leading dissident factions in the Solomon: the Malaita Eagle Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement) in June 2000 and it became grievous with the resignation of Prime Minister Bart Ulufa'alu¹⁷⁷. The RAN started ‘Operation Plumbob’ with the deployment of HMAS Manoora and Tobruk. Tobruk evacuated 480 Australian civilians and ‘Approved Foreign Nationals’ from Honiara, the Solomon Island capital, and conveyed them to Australia¹⁷⁸. During this strife

¹⁷⁶ White, H. (2007). Four decades of the defence of Australia: reflections on Australian defence policy over the past 40 years. *CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY AND DEFENCE*, 167, 163.

¹⁷⁷ Moore, C. (2007). The misappropriation of Malaitan labour: historical origins of the recent Solomon Islands crisis. *Journal of Pacific History*, 42(2), 211-232.

¹⁷⁸ Hill, R. (2014). 102| Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection Navies, Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection: 1996-2007| 103. *Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection*, 102.

period , to support of the Peace Monitoring Council and the International Peace Monitoring Team (IMPT) the RAN ships like as New Castle, Tobruk, Darwin , Kanimbla, Manoora and Melbourne were deployed under the ‘Operation Trek’ to prevent further any violence acts¹⁷⁹. However, the ethnic violence, civil unrest prevailed throughout 2002. To curb this gruesome situation, Solomon Island’s government requested the adjacent neighbourhood countries in June 2003 and in such extent Australia led military and police peacekeeping force started Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Island (RAMSI) with other nations personnel like New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji¹⁸⁰. Later on, Pacific Islands Forum also contemplated the Australia’s plan at a meeting held in Sydney on 21 July 2003. This Australia led assistance mission was depicting the firm commitment of Canberra for the stability of the region. The RAN ships HMAS Manoora, patrol boat Whyalla, the coastal minehunter Hawkesbury and the RAN’s HS 817 Squadron at HMAS Albatross actively participated in the peacekeeping mission¹⁸¹. Moreover, during the Fiji crisis, the RAN deployed HMAS Ships Newcastle, Kanimbla (II) and Success (II) to the waters off Fiji in November 2006 to evacuate the Australian citizen with the outbreak of any violent incident¹⁸². Nevertheless, situation did not get worst and this precautionary naval deployment returned back in late December. Moreover, it executed a crucial role in the Bougainville crisis also. The RAN’s role not only limited until the pacifying mechanism of civil unrest. The ‘Operation Render Safe 2014’ is the ADF’s commitment to removal of unexploded bomb and remnants of bombs, which may be fatal for the life beings, in district of Tokorina on the West coast of Bougainville. In this annual series, near about 16 tonnes of ordnance was disposed of. Actually, it is ADF-led mission wherein ‘Explosive Ordinance Disposal’(EOD) team involved from Australia, US, UK ,New Zealand ,Canada and Solomon Islands and major technological assets, platforms and Operational Amphibious ship HMAS Choules assigned in this mission¹⁸³.

Australia has implemented the policy of active engagement in its neighbourhood Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The fostering of peace, stability and democratic norm will transform this region as ‘arc of opportunity’ otherwise in the absence of this democratic norms and stability may transform this region as the hub of the non- traditional security threats and illicit non-state

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Hutcheson, J. (2007). The lessons of 2006: army operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands. *Australian Army Journal*, 4(2), 93.

¹⁸¹ <http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-august-2005>

¹⁸² Breen, B. (2016). *The Good Neighbour: Volume 5, The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations: Australian Peace Support Operations in the Pacific Islands 1980–2006*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸³ <http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Oct2014/Operations/1527/Australia-lends-a-hand-in-Bougainville-with-Operation-RENDER-SAFE.htm#.WUGapPmGPIU>

actors. Therefore, Stability and security in the South Pacific remains second merely after the defence of Australia in the ADF's principal tasks and priorities. Henceforth, to achieve deterrent and coercive effect in this maritime region, the Australian naval force had better prepare for any situation.

Pacific Boat Program

Australia maintains a robust system of regional engagement and capacity building for maritime security, including via the Defence Cooperation Program. Within this cooperation program 'the Pacific Patrol Boat project' is the most extensive program, wherein Canberra accommodates financial assistance for building 22 patrol boats for 12 Pacific island nations. The RAN accommodates as 'maritime surveillance advisors and technical advisors'. As well as, it immensely supports for further maintenance of boat. Australia, along with France and New Zealand, also provides aerial surveillance to support patrol boat activities and signed a trilateral declaration related to maritime surveillance to check IUU fishing in this region in 2006. Current Pacific Maritime Security Program partners include Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Samoa, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tuvalu, Tonga, Cook Islands and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Table: 2
Countries in and adjacent to the pacific arc- Land area and size of EEZ

Country	Land area(sq km)	Size of EEZ (Sq km)	Approx. ratio (land/water)
Australia	7690,000	10,710,000	1:1.4
Cook island	240	1,989,000	1:8,300
Fiji	18,272	1,338,000	1:73
FSM	701	2,900,000	1:4,150
Indonesia	1,904,569	5,409,981	1:3
Kiribati	684	3,540,000	1:5,175
Marshall islands	181	2,131,000	1:11,735
Nauru	21	320,000	1:15,238
Niue	258	390,000	1:1,512
Palau	508	629,000	1:1,238
Papua New Guinea	162,243	3,120,000	1:19

Philippines	300,000	1,891,247	1:6
Samoa	2,935	131,000	1:45
Solomon islands	28,530	1,340,000	1:47
Timor-leste	14,874	101,259	1:7
Tonga	699	720,000	1:1,030
Tuvalu	26	725,000	1:27,885
Vanuatu	11,880	680,000	1:57

Notes: 1. Size of EEZ includes territorial sea, archipelagic waters and continental shelves where appropriate. 2. Figure for Australia excludes the EEZ and its adjacent EEZ

Source: Hanns J. Buchholz, *Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987) and CIA World Fact Book

The problem of slow regional growth in the per capita incomes, despite generally favourable natural and human resources grants, high levels of external assistance and proximity to the world's most economically dynamic countries has become known as the 'Pacific Paradox'.¹⁸⁴ In spite of, pacific patrol boat program, Australian government signed the Niue treaty bilaterally to check illegal fishing and law enforcement. Australia also provides funding assistance and Defence assets for a range of exercises and combined operations in the South Pacific such as "Operations ISLAND CHIEF, Operation SOLANIA, and KURUKURU". Its main concern has to enforce the good order at sea not only limited until IUU fishing. Moreover, "Operation KURUKURU 2006 involved operations in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu against IUU fishing, as well as smuggling, people trafficking and other illegal activities". It was Hosted by Tonga and funded by Australia, France and New Zealand contributing aerial surveillance and the 'Forum Fisheries Agency' (FFA) providing technical support. Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Parramatta served in a three-day visit in Solomon Islands, to continue a maritime patrol that assists South Pacific Island states to protect their own fisheries and natural resources¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸⁴ Evans.G(1995) 'Australia's foreign relations in the world of 1990s' page no.193, Melbourne University Press.

¹⁸⁵ <http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Jul2014/Operations/1221/HMAS-Parramatta-departs-Honiara.htm#.WUGbCvmGPIU>.

Role of Australian navy in the Southeast Asian water or North East Indian Ocean

The North East Indian ocean region (NEIO) is known for the dispersed islands and world's major choke point (Strait of Malacca); its geographical position near to Pacific Ocean makes as connecting passage between both oceans. This Southeast Asian region and the northern approach of Australia are directly intertwined with this Indian Ocean part. Australian DWPs clearly manifest the significance of this region, whilst the concern is related to the security and stability of East Timor is one of the major strategic interest. In 1999, ADF played a major role to get independence of Timor from Indonesia¹⁸⁶. Therefore, it is a moral responsibility to see Timor Leste's independence survive. The Australian offshore island like Cocos and Keeling Islands is 2700 km far from the Australian western naval fleet (Perth) whilst the distance between Christmas Island and Java is mere 400 km¹⁸⁷ and Australia's most significant offshore gas fields are situated near to North west shelf (Timor sea gap). Simultaneously this water is also essential for the maritime patrol, submarine operations, freedom of navigation, SLOCs, to deter IUUs and potential illegal immigrants (PIIs) threats. Despite all these factors, this water should be free from the turbulent situation because of this is the known channel of the movement of US naval ship of Pacific Command (7th fleet) and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM or 5th fleet). On the other side, phenomenal growth of the non-traditional security threats may meddle this security equilibrium. Therefore, stability and good order at sea is essential for the Australian strategic interest.

Over the next few years, small contingents of specialist RAN personnel were involved in a series of peace missions. 'Operation Gemini' was the UN led peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1992; prime concern was related to implement the 'Paris Accord' and establishment of lawful government. Therefore, UN set up a governing body, which called as United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was the post-War reconstruction process therefore herein; the Australian navy's role was mainly related to logistic supply and communication establishment.¹⁸⁸ The major concern evolved in the last year to the 20th century with growing demand of independence in East Timor in 1999. UN Security Council took initiative to resolve the East Timor crisis and unanimously passed a resolution (1236, 1246, 1264 and 1272) to create a multinational force to restore peace and

¹⁸⁶ McDougall, D. (2002). Australia's peacekeeping role in the post-cold war era. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 590-608.

¹⁸⁷ Babbage, R. (1988). *Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands?* (No. 45). Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University.

¹⁸⁸ <https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp14.pdf>.

security in East Timor on 15 September 1999¹⁸⁹. An Australian-led multinational force INTERFET (International Force East Timor, resolution no1264) arrived in Dili on 20 September. More than five thousand Australian defence personnel from all defence services actively involved in this stabilisation operation. Fifteen RAN personnel were deployed to Dili to form the Naval Component Command (NCC) under Commodore J.R. Stapleton. (Commodore B.D. Robertson succeeded him on 21 November 1999.) The NCC was the controlling and coordinating authority of a 35 ships fleet, in which the activity of eight ships operating purely in support of INTERFET, assisted in the management of more than 30 merchant ships, and acted as the harbour authority for all East Timorese ports from 20 September. This INTERFET prime concern was to restore peace in this island whereby UN led independence related referendum could happen. The Australian navy played a major role to accommodate logistic facility for the UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) and to conduct this referendum peacefully a temporary group UNAMET (United Nation Mission in East Timor) established wherein police and military led personnel were included from many countries like Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, New Zealand, Japan, Russia etc. Australian logistic and personnel were vital for this group.¹⁹⁰ Australian Amphibious ship played an effective role in this logistic supply for conducting peaceful referendum. The geographical entity as island and segregated features of this island make a better landscape for the land forces (personnel-intensive) to do stabilisation operations within this region. Therefore, naval vessels facilitated logistic support for the land forces. The nature of civil unrest is quite different from the usual two-nation confrontation. Herein, the operational uses of naval vessels are limited and sectoral based under the local administration.

After the four years of independence, East Timor again grappled in the civil unrest. Since May 2006, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) sustained troops in Timor-Leste (East Timor) under ‘Operation Astute’, Australian and New Zealand personnel deployed as an ANZAC Battle group¹⁹¹. In fact, ‘Operation Astute’ is the ADF led stabilisation operations to assist the government of East Timor wherein all three services of ADF participated actively. The stabilisation operations were multi-faceted wherein amphibious landing ship accommodated medical, communication and various other facilities and other ground troops were actively

¹⁸⁹ Lloyd, G. J. (2003). The diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the international community. *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, ANU E-Press, Canberra, 74-98.

¹⁹⁰ http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib9900/2000CI B03

¹⁹¹ Waddell, J., Laughlin, R., & Moore, C. (2008). Australian Defense Force Operations. *NZ Armed FL Rev.*, 8, 147.

engaged in the security operations like as suppression of communal and gang violence in Dili (capital of East Timor). During this operation, the ADF's Amphibious Ready Group was deployed first time in operation, comprising the amphibious transports HMA Ships *Kanimbla* (II) and *Manoora* (II), and heavy landing ship HMAS *Tobruk* (II). East Timorese President Horta was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt on 11 February 2008. The ADF deployed HMAS *Perth* and a response force of around 200 ADF personnel plus Australian Federal Police personnel by Air Force C-17 *Globemaster III* and C-130 *Hercules* aircraft to provide additional support to Timorese and international efforts to stabilise the country.

The Australia has defence cooperation program with especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines and the Australian's commitments under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which has role on improving maritime security capacities. Apparently, this region is known for the strong and active organisation as ASEAN its related subsidiary body (ADMM, ReCAAP), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CACSP) etc. Resulting in; these multilateral intuitions share the responsibility of common concern and accommodate a common platform for that regional issues and global issues. Therefore, the role of RAN is limited and mostly related to the protection of its maritime zone from the SIEVs (Suspected Illegal Entry vessels) and PIIs (Potential Illegal Immigrants). The HMAS *Coonawara's* (Darwin) location is near to the northern water and the border protection command continuously facilitates security for the offshore oilfield near to the East Timor gap. The Border Protection Command also is pursuing regional engagement; Philippines has been especially attentive to the Border Protection Command model in establishing its Coast Watch South project, and Australia has actively been providing assistance via a number of Australian government agencies.

The Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) also have vital role to play in unconventional warfare and security operations in Australia's near region and beyond. The threat from terrorists or other non-state actors has led to amphibious forces across the globe being deployed to support a range of operations, including assaults, raids, withdrawals, and demonstrations. Amphibious craft has been used extensively in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and against radical groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf in the Sulu archipelago.¹⁹² The

¹⁹² Friedman, B. (2012). Blood and Water: The Present and Future of Amphibious Operations. *Military Operations*, 12.

ongoing threat from radical Islamist groups operating throughout the Indo-Pacific region, in such a possible situation, it is essential to continue maritime constabulary in maritime borders, to provide security within maritime waterways and to protect offshore islands and economic infrastructure.

IUUs

Australian northern water is facing the challenges of cross-border illegal fishing. Interestingly, Southeast Asian water is facing similar type of problem. To curb this problem, three multilateral arrangements RPOA (IUU), ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership (ASSP) and (CTI) Coral Triangle Initiative are working in this region¹⁹³. These agreements have different regional players. The Australia is also part of the Regional Plan of Action (ROPA) (IUU) multilateral agreement wherein all ASEAN member states with Papua New Guinea are the major stakeholders except Myanmar and all the member states EEZ coincided with one to another state. Indonesian fishing trawler have been the major concern for the illegal fishing in Australian water. The illegal incursion number was growing continuously. Hence, Australian maritime forces started “Operation Clearwater” in 2005 to culminate this illegal act¹⁹⁴. Owing to this operation, Australian naval forces detained many fishermen and seized illegal mechanised boats, in this anomaly the relation between the Indonesia and Australia became tensed. To smoothening relation and curb this problem, initially Australian and Indonesian government signed bilateral agreement and later on, other major nine regional parties signed the agreement against the IUU problem.

‘AUSINDO CORPAT’ is the joint Australia and Indonesia maritime patrol operation, started in 2010. Its prime objective is to target illegal fishing boat in the both countries’ maritime zones and improve the coordinated maritime security.¹⁹⁵ As far as The Australian Fisheries Management Authority and the Royal Australian Navy conducted a joint operation ‘Operation GRAB III’ to target foreign fishing in Australian waters with two navy’s Armidale class patrol boats and officials of Fisheries Management Authority¹⁹⁶. Thus, to protect Australian water

¹⁹³ Williams, M. J. (2013). Will new multilateral arrangements help Southeast Asian states solve illegal fishing?. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 35(2), 258-283.

¹⁹⁴ Cribb, R. B., & Ford, M. (Eds.). (2009). *Indonesia Beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 214

¹⁹⁵ Supriyanto, R. A. (2014). Waves of opportunity. *Enhancing Australia-Indonesia maritime security cooperation. Strategic Insight. Australian Strategic Policy Institute*.

¹⁹⁶ http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Oct2015/Operations/2424/Policing-foreign-fishing-in-Australian-waters.htm#.WV1PM_mGPIU

from illegal fishing, ADF personnel work whole year with their colleagues in Australian Border Force and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority.

Role of Australian Navy in the Western Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean western part is surrounded by Africa continent and its Northwestern part is encompassed by the Middle East countries. The stability within this region is vital for countries like India, Japan, and China etc. because their energy security may be affected with region instability. Apart from this, major choke point near to the Red sea may affect the Sea Line of Communications and disrupt the navigation channel through the Mediterranean Sea. This geo-strategic significance makes this part of Indian Ocean significant for the US led groupings. Australian geographical position only offers as part of Indian Ocean rim country but the vast huge sea gap with this region country facilitates less traditional security concern. Henceforth, it is clearly visible in the defence cooperation also but Australian strategic interest is also intertwined with the 'rule based global order' therefore Australia emphatically contemplates about the US and UN led global order.

The authoritarian rule, boundary conflicts, and Shia-Sunni dispute make this region more vibrant, volatile, and porous for the great power to play their hegemony game. The invasion of Iraqi army on the Kuwait originated a flash point in this region. Simultaneously the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661 on 6 August 1990, which imposed trade sanctions on Iraq. The Australian government gave consent to this proposal and announced active participation of two RAN frigates (Darwin and Adelaide) and a replenishment ship (the tanker Success) to enforce the trade restriction measures. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 665 authorising member states to deploy maritime forces to enforce the trade blockade by whatever measures were necessary to halt and inspect all inbound and outbound shipping. By the end of 1990, all three Australian ship (Brisbane, Sydney and Success) joined 'Battle Force Zulu' as part of the Multi Nation Force (MNF). The Australian ships were readily integrated into the air surveillance program being conducted by the MNF. The MNF was an imposing armada. With six aircraft carriers, two battleships, fifteen cruisers, 67 destroyers and frigates, and over 100 amphibious, auxiliary and support vessels. RAN specialist personnel also participated in the UN's weapons inspection teams in Iraq (UNSCOM) in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War and amphibious ship Tobruk transported the contingent of helicopter and essential logistics to the Sinai. After the end of Gulf War, Australian navy supported the two UN mission, UNITAF and UNOSOM 1 in Somalia during 1993 under the name of

‘Operation Solace’¹⁹⁷. Tobruk and Jervis Bay were tasked with transporting troops, armoured personnel carriers, heavy equipment, and vehicles from Townsville to Mogadishu.

9/11 incident came as shocking event and it affected the completely global order massively and simultaneously it grappled Iraq again on the issue of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) devices. US led forces started ‘Operation Enduring freedom’ against the terrorism and fake allegations of WMD against the Saddam Hussain led government in 2003. Prime Minister John Howard led government criticised this terrorist act vehemently and supported the US led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ overwhelmingly. RAN supported this mission logistically and with personnel. The RAN deployed the Two AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in the Persian Gulf¹⁹⁸. Furthermore, Canberra announced its active participation in the war against WMD devices (Iraq war or Operation FALCONER) on 18 march 2003. ADF and the Australian naval ship (Amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla and surface ships HMAS ANZAC and HMAS Darwin) contributed actively in different maritime operations like as clearance of the ‘Khawr Abd Allah waterway’ and ‘Al Faw peninsular’. HMAS ANZAC’s highly effective naval gunfire support to UK Royal Marine Forces attacking an Iraqi coastal defence site helped ensure victory in this engagement and HMAS Kanimbla intercepted an Iraqi vessel loaded with sea mines etc. Australian Clearance Diving Team Three’s operations in the ports of Umm Qasr and Al Zubayr, and on the Al Faw peninsular were a critical element in the coalition strategy for supporting and sustaining operations in Iraq. The opponent group uses this underwater sea mines war mechanism. The sole purpose is to create constraint to the naval base or port area against the opponent naval vessels. So, it is become vital during coercion time to clear all this underwater mine for effective naval presence. Hence, the RAN contributed in this operation on both side, logistic and operational.¹⁹⁹

During the Operation Enduring Freedom, US led forces took all the measure to tackle the terrorism activities. To check the effectivity, severity and expanding behaviour of terrorism, finance is one of the major factor. Actually, in the absence of money, these terrorist led organisation become toothless. Therefore, cutting the financial channels is a significant and effective measure. Drugs and narcotics, illegal arms trade are the major sources for the terror financing. This circumstance implores the effective land border checking system and effective

¹⁹⁷ Breen, B. (1998). *A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force Somalia, November 1992-May 1993*. Allen & Unwin.

¹⁹⁸ <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/lessons.pdf>, p.18.

¹⁹⁹ <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/Docs/DefenceWinningPeaceWar2004.pdf>, p. 6-7.

surveillance mechanism in the maritime trade. For this purpose, ‘Operation MANITOU’ started in the Middle East related water. Australia’s amphibious ships participated in maritime security operations as a part of ‘Operations SLIPPER (2003) and MANITOU (US- led Multi-National Combined Maritime Forces)’. Australian warships and aircraft involved in the Middle East counter-piracy operations and maritime interdiction off the Horn of Africa as part of Combined Task Force 151 in 2009, in which US amphibious ships played a critical role. The RAN guided missile frigate (HMAS Newcastle) and HMAS Canberra were deployed as part of ‘Operation MANITOU’ wherein HMAS Newcastle seized consignment of 1,525 kg of narcotics worth approximately Australian Dollar 1.222 billion²⁰⁰. On the other side, HMAS Canberra during her deployment seized 427 kg of Heroine in the fishing boat in October, 2015 which estimated worth is also at least AUD\$126 million²⁰¹. High demand of narcotics and drugs in black market make it more common and easy source for terror organisation to mint money for their terror led activities.

Role of Australian Navy in the Southern Ocean

the Australian 2016 DWP elaborates about the concerning risk related to the Australian Antarctic territory wherein it clearly mentions about the Australian government having a strong belief on the Antarctic Treaty System, which expressly prohibits any mining in Antarctica. Australia also strongly supports the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which regulates fishing activity in Antarctic waters²⁰². Resulting in, the biological resources protection particularly in the Heard and McDonald Islands Exclusive Economic Zone is the prime concern for the maritime forces.

The Australian southern water near to the Heard and Macdonald island attribute is distinctly different from the other surrounding water like northern, eastern and western water. It belongs to the Antarctica ecology. The ecosystem of this region is colder therefore; the marine bio diversity is according to the surrounding environment. The distant location and less affected by the human activities make this region environment pristine. The CCLMR is the major group, which is managing this region. Australia is also one of the major member and its geographical proximity despite other member states gives large responsibilities and authority to manage this

²⁰⁰ <http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Sep2015/Operations/2287/HMAS-Newcastle-heads-home-after-Middle-East-success.htm#.WUGX6vmGPIU>

²⁰¹ <http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Oct2015/Operations/2368/HMAS-Melbourne-intercepts-427kg-heroin-haul.htm#.WUGV5vmGPIU>

²⁰² 2016 Defence White Paper, p.54.

region. Nowadays, this region is also facing the challenges like IUU and environmental degradation. AFMA works as major governing body that decides the fishing season and quota (fishing quantity).

These are the part of blue economy. Extensive exhausting economical activities may create challenge for that assigned Australian company (Austral Fisheries), earning is based on this region related fishing activity. Therefore, this activity must be sustainable and free from the illegal catching and poacher's community. Fisheries protection is one of the oldest constabulary roles of maritime forces and remains an important activity in an era of extending jurisdiction with increasing technological exploitation of stressed and non-grown fish stocks in both coastal and oceanic waters. The majority of the RAN's fisheries work has been conducted in its northern waters by patrol boats. However, the demands of Australia's vast EEZ were graphically demonstrated in 1997 and 1998 during operations in the Southern Ocean during which the frigates Anzac (III) and Newcastle, which was supported by the tanker Westralia (II), successfully seized vessels illegally fishing for Patagonian Toothfish²⁰³. These operations, which involved a high degree of joint co-operation with RAAF maritime patrol aircraft and other agencies, demonstrated the requirement for reach in the Australian environment. The 12-mile territorial sea near to Heard and Macdonald Island (HIMI) were proclaimed as a natural marine reserve with a number of activities including fishing and mining prohibited in 1987 and the same area was included on the World Heritage List in 1997²⁰⁴. This portion of the AFZ is now managed pursuant to the Heard and McDonald Islands Fishery Management Plan 2002. In 1997, estimates placed as many as 70 illegal fishing vessels operating near the Heard and McDonald Islands²⁰⁵. The first foreign fishing vessel was arrested by Australia in October 1997. This figure seems very low (an average of one arrest per year) particularly in comparison to the hundreds of arrests of foreign fishing vessels in Australia's northern waters.²⁰⁶ The interception of suspected illegal fishing vessels in the far Southern Ocean between 1997 and 2004 various operations were started (Operations DIRK, MISTRAL, TEEBONE, SUTTON, and CELESTA).

²⁰³ Klein, N., Mossop, J., & Rothwell, D. R. (Eds.). (2009). *Maritime security: international law and policy perspectives from Australia and New Zealand*. Routledge.

²⁰⁴ *Heard and McDonald Islands Environment Protection and Management Ordinance* 1987. Section 14 prohibits fishing. <http://www.whc.unesco.org/heritage.htm>

²⁰⁵ 'Fishing Piracy around Antarctica shadows Treaty Meeting' AFP Christchurch, New Zealand. 12 May 1997.

²⁰⁶ 144 vessels were apprehended in 2002. See the Australian Fisheries Management Authority Annual Report 2002-2003, XI. In 2003, 138 vessels were arrested in the northern AFZ. See, Media Release, Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, 'First illegal fishers caught for 2004' 7 January 2004, DAFF04/001M.

Table: 3

Australian arrests of foreign fishing vessels within the Heard and Macdonald islands fishing zone

Vessel name	Flag state	Date of arrest
Salvora	Belize	16 October 1997
Aliza Glacial	Panama	17 October 1997
Big Star	Seychelles	21 February 1998
South Tomi	Togo	12 April 2001
Lena	Russia	6 February 2002
Volga	Russia	7 February 2002
Visara	Uruguay	28 August 2003
Maya V	Uruguay	22 January 2004

Source: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/deakin9&div=9&g_sent=1&collection=journals

Globally, illegal fishing is a highly profitable enterprise. The Patagonian Toothfish is a valuable fish; its high demands in international market to encourage poachers to encroach the barrier of the legal quota, it has been noted that the illegal trade has “probably become more profitable than running drugs or smuggling people”.²⁰⁷ Therefore, it is become essential to check this IUU fishing activities in this HIMI Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Resulting in, the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) assigned accountability to different civilian body to maintain regulation in this zone. Vis-à-vis, Customs Australia (Customs is responsible for the operation of the Oceanic Viking armed patrol vessel), AFMA and the National Oceans Office (a branch of the Marine Division within the Department of the Environment and Heritage responsible for development of overall oceans policy) are working to maintain order in this EEZ.

Role in the HADR Mission

No one country is completely secure from the natural and manufactured disasters. The sophistication and intensity of natural disaster is enhancing with the population expansion and global warming. The effective inherent capabilities of naval forces during the disaster are one of the major hindsight of the maritime strategy. Meanwhile, horizon of natural disaster is broad

²⁰⁷ Bruce Montgomery, ‘A Fishy business’, *The Weekend Australian*, 26-27 October 2002

and unpredictable; these natural calamities are belong to the Earth's inside mechanism (Earthquake and volcano) and outside weather (Tropical cyclone and flood) based dynamics. In this situation, it is one of the part of earth mechanism to set up status-quo in its system therefore government or concerned authority can demean the severity of its catastrophic effect by effective disaster management structure. Australian naval forces have already proved their vitality in so many Human Assistance in Disaster Relief (HADR) operations such as 'Sumatra Assist'. The different naval ships assist as logistic support base, hospitals, special amphibious vessels to rehabilitations and repair work and as command station during this period. Its self-supporting behaviour and quick endeavour to fix the damaged infrastructure make more effective and less chaotic during these calamities. Whilst the aviation wings of naval forces provide assistance in the distribution of life saving products and evacuate affected people from the hinterland area. This positive approach avails a game changer edge during the disaster time. In fact, quick and effective responding behaviour brings the paradigm shift in the relationship of both donor and recipient countries equally.

Southwest pacific region is one of the major tropical cyclone induced region. Recent technological enhancement and weather related satellite acknowledges about the origin of any cyclone in this region. simultaneously the earthquake, volcano and tsunami are less predictable nature and the Australian immediate neighbourhood (Indonesia) and other interested region have been affected to this geological disaster (2004 Tsunami, Fukushima disaster) on time to time. The Australian naval forces played a crucial role in relief work after the Indian Ocean tsunami, which came on 26 December 2004; it swayed the whole "Northeast Indian Ocean coastal country wherein more than 130,000 Indonesians died and displaced half a million people in Aceh and North Sumatra"²⁰⁸. In this havoc situation, The Australian government took quick initiative as 'Operation Sumatra Assist' wherein the ADF provided humanitarian support including emergency relief, engineering and aeromedical evacuation. Moreover, the Indonesian Padang Island and Samoa (Pacific Island country) affected by the earthquake in October 2009²⁰⁹. ADF started humanitarian mission under the name of 'Operations Padang Assist' and 'Samoa Assist'. In Indonesia alone, 1.3 million litres of water were produced, 1300 medical patients were treated and over 500 tonnes of aid delivered²¹⁰. A similar amount of aid was delivered to Samoa and Tonga in November. The 'Operation Pacific Partnership' was

²⁰⁸ Prothero, D. R. (2011). *Catastrophes!: Earthquakes, Tsunamis, Tornadoes, and Other Earth-shattering Disasters*. JHU Press.

²⁰⁹ <http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/SP10.pdf>. p.14

²¹⁰ Ibid.

started in July,2009 wherein “the heavy landing craft HMA Ships Betano and Wewak participated with USNS Richard E Byrd and delivered engineering, medical and dental aid to Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands”²¹¹. Strikingly, Australia is as resident power in this region and its positive affirmation towards the immediate neighbourhood to global issues brings Australian navy into the centre stage of disaster relief and backhand support.

Nowadays, the domain of HADR is dynamic and vibrant. Search and Rescue (SAR) operation and evacuation of the people from the conflict region are also part of this assistance work. By August, the ADF was back in Tonga, this time to assist with the location and recovery of bodies from the sunken ferry ‘Princess Ashika’²¹². Moreover, it assisted to the PNG authorities to recover the victims’ body of the ‘Kokoda air crash’ in August 2009²¹³ and conducted a search operation for the disappeared ‘Malaysia Airlines Flight 370’²¹⁴. However, the Australian navy played a vital role within the domestic front also. ADF personnel took part with civilian authority in relief work in ‘January 2009 against the overwhelming bushfires in Victoria and surges in Queensland’. In March, ‘Cyclone Hamish’ washed thirty-one containers off the deck of the cargo ship MV Pacific Adventurer representing a considerable risk to shipping in the area. Over a two-week period, the coastal minehunters ‘HMA Ships Yarra and Norman’ located and marked the position of all the containers²¹⁵. The effective delivering capabilities totally depend on the naval vessels. The amphibious naval ship usually becomes suitable for this HADR related mission. Hence, these technological advancements work as efficiency multiplier in the adverse condition.

The requisite for the ADF to deliver capabilities for home and worldwide HADR is incrementing and the occurrence of more extreme weather events and the impact of climate change may demand higher operational rhythm for HADR missions in the immediate region and across the Indo-Pacific. Apparently, “the Cyclones Wilma (2011), Jasmine (2012), Sandra (2013) and Pam (2015) in the South Pacific and Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines in November 2013”, have been acknowledging a similar catastrophic trend wherein naval non-combatant HADR mission provided better output with its assistance work and vessels. Cyclone

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/australia%E2%80%99s-search-mh370-regional-leadership-through-hadr-and-search-and-rescue>.

²¹⁵ <http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/SP10.pdf>, p.14.

Pam devastated Vanuatu Island in 2015, on that time HMAS Torbuk offered a vital lifesaving role in the relief mission (Pacific Assist)²¹⁶. Recently, in 2016 Fiji is also affected by ‘Tropical Cyclone Winston’, the RAN deployed HMAS Albatross and Canberra under the ‘Fiji Assist’ mission²¹⁷. Better part of all these assistance missions, the naval forces work as per the local government regulation therefore there is no any fiasco related to the encroachment of any sovereign power of that nation. Simultaneously, it canvasses a colourful benign memory among the regional people within suffering situation.

Australian Naval Exercise with Other Nation’s Naval Forces

Naval exercise is a sophisticated and pragmatic mechanism wherein sometime one nation naval force do exercise within their mechanism or with other services like air force, coast guard and usually this joint endeavour is held like as bilateral, trilateral and multilateral. Substantially, Joint exercises create stability and understanding between nations, build personal and institutional links between the countries' military forces, defence related industries, reinvigorate political, commercial, and defence related linkages between the participating countries. The mechanism of coalition building for multilateral and joint operations is not essentially standardised. Generally, each nation navy has its self- developed command structure and its staff and commanding procedure varies with other nation. Some time, it depends on the evolution such as the RAN evolved under the British navy. In such extent, ‘joint or multilateral naval exercises strengthen their efficiency in operation, interoperability and commanding position within other nation’s plans and order’. The joint endeavour eliminates the apprehension due to unexpected rift or weaknesses and it creates a supportive mechanism for the aid, naval vessel’s lease and acquisition and technological upgradation. Simultaneously, it is also helpful in maritime patrol, counter piracy mechanism, raids, naval interdiction and disaster relief mission. During the exercise, “participating personnel and assets will conduct gunnery, missile, anti-submarine, and air-defence exercises, as well as maritime interdiction and vessel boarding, explosive ordnance disposal, diving and salvage operations, mine clearance operations and an amphibious landing”.

In post-Cold War era, traditional security threats is the least concerned issue for the RAN and expansion of Non-traditional security threats is challenging the notion of ‘rules based good

²¹⁶ http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Apr2015/Operations/1963/HMAS-Tobruk-completes-life-saving-mission-to-Vanuatu.htm#.WUGZw_mGPIU

²¹⁷ <http://news.navy.gov.au/en/Apr2016/Operations/2837/808-Squadron-return-from-Operation-FIJI-ASSIST.htm#.WUGSBPmGPIU>

order in maritime domain'. Therefore, to maintain rules based order in maritime domain UN has been supporting the interstate cooperation, multination security mechanism to curb Somalia piracy issues. US navy centric '1000 navy ship plan' (2005) is also based on the global cooperation concept within the shared responsibilities²¹⁸. Actually, in this global and trade and commerce oriented world, every nation is administering more value to this trade relation. These vibrant situations are cherishing new paradigm in the relationship amongst the nations (chequebook, railway, pipeline diplomacy). In this situation, navy is also playing a determining role on the multilateral platform like international naval symposium. The RAN is the significant member of the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)²¹⁹. Usually, this symposium decision and initiative are taken on the consensus basis and not binding for any member countries. Despite these naval symposium, Australian navy takes actively participation in the multilateral exercises like as RIMPAC, KAKADU, BERSAMA SHIELD, MILAN, AMAN and on the bilateral level Australian navy participates with the other nation naval forces like as Indonesia(Exercise Crossway²²⁰), Singapore(SINGAROO), India(AUSINDEX), US, and PNG Defence Force(Exercise Paradise) etc. Running exercises with foreign nations signals that at some level, there is a hypothetical possibility that the countries involved may actually end up on the same side of a conflict. Exemplary "Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a major United States Pacific Fleet biennial combined exercise involving forces from 26 countries including mainly share Asia-Pacific region and some exception is also here like India, Denmark, France and UK" . Any future combat situation, these countries may serve against to each other. Despite, this speculative situation most of the countries naval forces are organizing this exercises either annually or biennially. These naval exercises are organised regarding multiple forms like as interdiction, Passex, coercive act, HADR exercise and port visit etc. The Pacific and Indian Oceans Shipping Working Group (PACIOSWG) is an arrangement to promote common doctrine and procedures for the naval control of shipping (NCS) in the Pacific and Indian Oceans²²¹. Within the NCS doctrine and procedure, an annual Exercise BELL BUOY is organised, by each PACIOSWG member on a rotating basis; Australian navy organised this exercise in 2000²²². The PACIOSWG core membership is comprised of the allied nations of Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., and subsequently, the membership has been

²¹⁸ Ratcliff, R. E. (2007). BUILDING PARTNERS'CAPACITY: The Thousand-Ship Navy. *Naval War College Review*, 60(4), 44.

²¹⁹ Mukherjee, A., & Mohan, C. R. (Eds.). (2015). *India's Naval Strategy and Asian Security*. Routledge.

²²⁰ <http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/SP10.pdf>, p. 96-97

²²¹ Johnston, P. (2012). Security of maritime trade: a cooperative and coordinated approach for the Indo-Pacific region. *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs*, 4(1), 1-10.

²²² Johnston, P. (2013). Exercise BELL BUOY and naval control of shipping. *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs*, 5(2), 41-50.

extended to include other U.S. allies and coalition partners. In an increasingly globalised world, the vulnerability and consequences of disruptions to seaborne trade have increased. Within the Pacific and Indian oceans, various navies work together to demean disruptions in the international sea borne trades. Apparently, this concept evolved during Second World War period to protect naval shipping line, reinforcement convoys that flourished until demise of Cold War. In post-Cold War period, it has been metamorphosed as a long-range detection asset for merchant ship movement, as a mechanism to identify legitimate, and suspects vessels. The objective of this comprehensive cooperation within the countries is to conceive a good order at maritime domain.

Conclusion

The Royal Australian navy has a dynamic role within this Indo-Pacific region. The role of Australian navy is full of variations; strategic interests are the significant factor behind this variation. This variation is related to the conventional and non- conventional challenges. Huge maritime zone, unstable immediate neighbourhood and continuously growing interest in global order brought a roller coaster type pathway for the Australian navy during this 25 years' time span. Hereby, Gulf war, War against terrorism, democracy stabilisation process in the Pacific Island Countries and participation in the different HADR mission make the Australian navy's understanding multidimensional. In this period, Australian navy is facing mainly the non-conventional challenges like illegal immigrations, IUUs, and transnational crimes. Therefore, to curb all these illicit acts and maintain order in the maritime domain, the Australian navy served in the various operations like 'Operation Relax to operation Sovereign Border and Operation Resolute'. Eventually, the Australian maritime strategy is more or less based on the concern of self-reliance herein the prime concern is to secure the Australian mainland and country's interest. Continuously growing the number of Australian naval fleet is reflecting the 'sea control' capability of Australian navy within growing interest from neighbourhood to Indo-Pacific region. Apparently, this interest is the major catalyst to expand presence of any nation in world's political, economic and in security led issues.

Chapter: 5

Conclusion

World's most old human civilisations evolved in the cradle of rivers' vales. This location accommodated most of conducive circumstances for the growth of human beings. However, seas or oceans have been one instrument for detaching regions from each other. Further, with technological advancement the detaching feature of the Oceans had changed into connectivity. Now in present world 'land lock' feature seems as hindrance. Interstate trade and commerce is the significant feature to set up relationship with other countries in this globalised world. Seas evolved as vital trade route in the world's economy. Bulk amount of the products with cheap transportation cost makes it the most viable transportation medium. Apparently, cost-effectiveness is the major factor for industrial competitiveness and industrial growth. Therefore, maritime domain should be hassle free. It should be governed under the mechanics of 'rules based order'. The hassle free 'freedom of navigation' (1st Barbary war, year 1801) originated naval supremacy the projection of naval power started by USA. The grown naval capabilities had inflicted their geo-economic significance during the colonization period. Erstwhile, the government of Portugal, Spain, and Britain had implied their naval forces to colonise the country of Africa, Asia, and America. The reflection of all these incidents helped to imbibe a holistic maritime strategy whereby a multidimensional approach evolved within this maritime domain. The mechanics of this approach is mainly based on the wartime capabilities and peaceful time regulation. The wartime capability makes it as major deterrent force against the enemy and its capability during peacetime cultivates an assurance for human security. New forthcoming challenges as global warming, marine pollution, and illegal marine resource's extraction are broadening and deepening the landscape of this maritime strategy.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) evolved under the great naval power i.e., the British Royal Navy. History is full with the anecdote of British navy's valour and sea controlling instinct. However, the limited strategic interest, identical dualism, and British naval hegemony are the major inherent determinants of the Australian maritime strategy. During the Cold War, Australian navy joined the Anti-Communism led force in which it contributed actively in the Korean War, Vietnam War and promptly followed the 'Sea denial policy' within the Southwest

Pacific region. During Cold War, Australian maritime strategy was guided by the great powers (British and United States of America) hence; the historical influence conveyed a limited space for self-induced maritime strategy. Meanwhile, termination of Cold War and new liberal economic order came as new dynamics wherein the new economic opportunities and interdependency shattered the shackle of pre conceived norms. This new dynamics set up a status quo within the Australian interest and its viability with liberal trade regulations provided a huge Asian market for the Australian surplus metallic and non-metallic raw materials. This win-win situation affected whole Asia-Pacific region positively. This peaceful rise is encouraging to reformulate its strategic interest and objective in the dint of transforming paradigm.

In the post-Cold War era, Australian government consequently has published five Defence White Papers (DWP) in 1994, 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2016. These DWP explicitly have depicted about the Australian strategic interests, objectives, relationship with alliance countries and adjacent neighbourhood countries, global responsibilities, future defence expenditures, and defence related equipment's acquisition plans. The 2000 DWP was the watershed event for the Australian maritime strategy. This DWP promptly supported the concept of self-reliance strategy within the maritime domain. Especially, self-reliance led concern was an underpinning point for active and self-sustained maritime strategy wherein it considered Australian navy as sole managing body for the 'good order at the Australian maritime water' and RAN would be handled maritime security led concerns without external assistance. Australian security policy concentrated on credible lower-level contingencies and acknowledged that the nation would need to plan for a range of operations without direct support from its superpower ally. Correspondingly, it also mentioned that Australian interest is directly intertwined with the 'Freedom of Navigation (FoN) and United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)'. Ironically, the exponential growths of non-conventional security threats have created stifling position against 'good order at maritime domain'. The interconnecting behaviour within the various non-traditional security threats accompanies most of the Southwest Pacific Island countries under the circumference of fragile situation. The 2009 DWP and Kevin Rudd led government also considered these non-conventional threats against the interest of Canberra. In such situation, the DWP emphasised on the security concern of immediate neighbourhood; an establishment of 'rule of law' has been one of the primary strategic interest of Australia. Any fragile situation within the immediate neighbourhood (Inner Arc countries) may modify whole Oceania region's stability. Biketawa declaration (years 2000) is equally showing congruency

with Australian DWP on the subject of regional Southwest Pacific Islands security (5.38. 2016 DWP). Substantially, Australian maritime forces actively participated within the internal crisis (Timor issue and RAMSI) and disaster assistance mission. ADF actively has shown its presence in the INTERFET mission (East Timor crisis, 1999), it was the largest mission inducted by the ADF after the end of Vietnam War. When the Kevin Rudd elected as the Prime Minister (December 2007) on that time he criticised prior John Howard led government for ignoring the security of 'Pacific arc' rather than controversial engagement in Iraq War. This active willingness is showing similarity to mention first hypothesis statement; Australian maritime strategy is more submissive towards 'Southwest Pacific' than 'Indo-Pacific' region. Apparently, Australian maritime force accommodated his role in the Western Indian Ocean region but it was under the notion of 'shared responsibility within global order'. Simultaneously, the Asia-Pacific region also got significant place in the strategic area and further it transformed as Indo-Pacific region (particularly Southeast Asia and the maritime environment) in the 2013 DWP. The contextualisation of this transformation is elucidating, it will be crucial for the Australian maritime strategy in forthcoming decade.

Hugeness and volatility is the major feature of sea. Its various mood and merciless behaviour against the human weakness requisites skilled personnel, equipment, and holistic policy to harness this domain in accordance of wishes whatever for the war-fighting capabilities or peaceful use. Therefore, in the DWP, Australian government has been publishing the future defence equipment related acquisition and capability plan. Actually, this equipment works as efficiency multiplier against the adversaries. The 1994 DWP mainly focused on the enhancement of sealift capability, acquisition of helicopters (Super Seasprite project) for the ANZAC Class Frigates (FFH) and upgradation of the RAN'S Sea King helicopters. The 2009 DWP theme is related to 'force structure of 2030' henceforth Kevin Rudd government focused on the huge defence spending on the equipment acquisition. The 2009 DWP has a 20 years outlook and contained around \$43 billion worth of new initiatives for the coming decade and around \$ 146 billion in additional funding over the life of the White Paper. It emphasised on the acquisition of 12 new non-nuclear submarines (4.26, 2016), eight new larger frigates (replace the eight Anzac frigates), 24 naval combat helicopters (due to failure of Super Seasprite project) etc. Additionally, 2009 DWP reinvigorated erstwhile intensive acquisition plan of three Air warfare Destroyer and two landing helicopter dock amphibious ship (Canberra and Adelaide) etc. which were mentioned in the 2000 DWP. Due to slowdown in world economy, Australian economy also influenced negatively thereby to maintain budget deficit

was prime objective; the acquisition and upgradation work affected equally. The worst part of economic slowdown has been over and Australian economy is showing some positive vibes. Hence, the 2016 DWP has shown integrity with erstwhile-prescribed defence acquisition plan and emphasising to achieve two percent share of Australian GDP share until 2020-21(8.2, 2016).

Australia is the largest economy in the Oceania region. Subsequently, maritime capabilities and military power of Australia is increasing but as a unilateral force, it is still far behind which hinders its global security interest. Therefore, it is necessitated for Canberra to set an equilibrium with its natural alliance partner like United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)(5.77,2016) and other multilateral organisation like United Nations(5.78,2016) and ASEAN(5.52,2016). Australian identical dualism is also a major concern in the foreign and defence related subjects. The present situation, the South China Sea issue is the major cause of disagreement among the directly stakeholder countries like Vietnam, Taiwan, China, Philippines and Brunei; US is also opposing the Chinese construction development in this region and asserting as against of the notion of 'freedom of navigation'. whilst, Chinese assertive behaviour towards the South China Sea is meddling the situation and considers the US's rebalancing policy as containment of Chinese interest is depicting the conjecture environment in both side. On the other side, 2013 DWP applauds the Chinese economic and social growth and contemplates that this economic growth positively affected the regional economic activities. Within this contextualisation, this Australian document has not recognised peaceful rise of china as threat to Australia. The Defence White Paper 2016 states that Australia's security depends in part, on how China and the US resolve their disagreements because the notion of 'freedom of navigation' is the paramount factor of the evolution of the US navy. Any disruptions within the notion of 'freedom to use the sea' would be disastrous for the 'rules based order' and in that circumstances, Australian navy will have to play their role actively not symbolically.

The Asia-Pacific region is obtaining the centre stage within changing paradigm 'Rebalance of US'. This transformation is vital for the natural allies of US. Meanwhile, 2013 and 2016 DWP mention, this paradigm shift would be supportive for the enduring stability within the 'Indo-Pacific' region in swiftly changing strategic environment (6.10, 2013). Within the dynamics of 'Two Force Posture Initiatives' in November, 2011 announced the deployment of US marine personnel to the Australian northern territory on rotational basis (2.24,2013). Moreover, 2016 DWP supported this US initiative. However, both DWP do not explain any specific role of

RAN within the 'Rebalance led perspective'. There is no much transformation in the Australian maritime strategy; all strategic interests are as usual. Therefore, the contextualisation of Australian Maritime strategy within 'the rebalance' is showing a distinguish finding which is not identical to the second hypothesis. The Australian maritime strategy in post-Cold War period is reformulating within the priority index wherein the security of Australian territory and immediate neighbourhood is most crucial.

Challenges are the significant limitation against any perfection. Perfection is the utopian concept in the present world but it gives the positive vibes and encouragement for achieving the betterment from past to future. Major challenges of conventional and non-conventional threats are intertwined with Australian strategic interest. Usually, nation's strategic interest shows the nature of that nation's commitment and role in the world's major concern, for example terrorism. Apparently, Australian strategic interest spread from adjacent neighbourhood to the 'rules based global order'. In such situation, Australian government has codified its commitment astutely in the certain circumstances whereby the Australian navy's practices are diversified or distinguished maritime strategy, such as Australian navy followed forward defence strategy within the immediate neighbourhood countries. Otherwise, for 'rules based global order', it showed its commitments within certain parameters of shared responsibilities.

Demise of Cold War and new World Order incepted with the new colourful situations wherein economic perspectives held a strong position in every country's foreign policy. Therefore, to protect economic interests has been the major concern for all states. Non-traditional security threats' frequency and intensity have the potential to disrupt order within maritime domain and its transnational and interconnected behaviour gives a web type of structure. Henceforth, the consequences of this structure start a chain reaction with multiple disorder as transnational crime is assisting directly or indirectly maritime terrorism, piracy and IUUs and human trafficking. The complexities of this Pandora's Box escalated with the fluid and widespread maritime region. Oceans are broad and porous but with the technicalities of cooperation and shared responsibilities as 'Operation Atlanta' (curb Somalian piracy) obtained effective outcome against these piracy acts. The Southeast Asian water is also facing similar piracy related challenge. ASEAN led 'ReCAAP' organisation is working in this region to control this piracy led issues. Until now, Australian navy is not member of this multilateral mechanism. This Australian dilemma is questioning to the role of Australian navy against the anti-piracy role in this Southeast Asian water. The tantrum of South China Sea and East China Sea dispute

may originate a grievous scenario for the world order. Apparently, Canberra is not directly related with this conundrum but is obliged towards US since Chinese aggressiveness is challenging the US hegemony (Pacific lake or Monroe doctrine). DWP 2016 clearly depicts China led infrastructural construction as against the rules based order. This endeavour is acknowledging the belief of Canberra under the US led world order or legacy wherein Australia is trying to safeguard its strategic interest astutely.

Time is perpetual but not constant and so the interests and objectives always reformulate and reorganise according to the circumstances. Meanwhile, technological upgradation and economic interdependence are elaborating as new paradigm shift. The new extended version of blue economy (tourism, nature aesthetic value) is significant for the Australian GDP, as well as, vital for the 'Pacific Arc' countries and the incidence of its cascading effect surely will affect the situation of 'human security'. Apparently, current global warming and its cascading effects is creating a question mark on the existence of these small island countries (2.35, 2016). As the result, in forthcoming decade the challenges for the Australian navy are about to become multidimensional and more challenging.

Navy has a significant deterring power within the military and its manoeuvrability gives a tactical or strategic edge than other military services like Airforce and land forces. The huge operational capabilities during war and peacetime provide an assurance to the allies' security. In the post-Cold War period, Australian navy played a significant role in the U.N led operation, US led mission against terrorism and Iraq and individually in an active stabilisation mechanism within the unstable South Pacific island countries. Australian domestic front is also challenging with broad maritime zone. Therefore, maintain a 'rules based order' in the Australian maritime water, the Australian navy has been playing an effective role within the offshore territory protection, maritime surveillance and patrolling, checking illegal vessel laden with Potential Illegal Immigrants(PIIs) and IUUs fishing in Australian water especially Heard and McDonald water region. The reflection of Australian maritime strategy mainly based on the crux of strategic interests. The guiding principles like humanitarian aid, UN missions, and UNCLOS are proving like a lighthouse for highlighting presence in the emerging World Order.

Australia; as a resident power within the Pacific region claims a great responsibility under the 'Biketawa Declaration 2000' and as major stakeholder of Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). To maintain status quo, Australian navy has been showing her representation according to gravity of instances. Australian navy commenced several operation like 'Operation Morris Dance',

‘Operation Fiji Assist’, and ‘Operation Anode’. Meanwhile, the non-traditional security threats have evolved as major challenges in the post-Cold War period. These unconventional threats requisite a capable maritime force to protect seaborne trade routes and marine resources, means efficiently handle all odd and even situations. This part of maritime domain is severely affected with these unconventional threats. The broad and hostile Indian and Pacific Ocean with less human habitation serves as a challenge for maritime patrolling and surveillance. Therefore, Australian navy has been accommodating her experience and technical assistance in the ‘Pacific Boat Programme’. Ultimately, these self-sustainment maritime surveillance acts happen like burden sharing for the RAN. Furthermore, to deter the potential illegal migrants and illegal vessels in Australian water, Australian maritime forces started ‘Operation Relax’ and consequently it transformed as an ‘Operation Sovereign Border’ in 2014. The RAN has limited role in the anti-piracy efforts in the Southeast Asian water. The absence of US led effort or UN based mission is the major condition behind this lackadaisical behaviour. Nevertheless, in the present interconnected world, sectoral interest may become an opportunity for the other nation. The expectation of ‘peaceful rise of China’ has actually transformed into ‘assertive and aggressive rise of China’. The manifestation of this process is also distinctly visible in the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s (PLA-N) maritime power projection. The continuous growth in the number of Chinese naval fleets are depicting the futuristic perceptive of its role in global order. DWP 2016 indicates about the Chinese military modernisation and until 2020, 70 submarines of Chinese navy will float in this region. The Chinese naval continuous presence in the Southwest Pacific island region (launched its first modern hospital ship, the Peace Ark, in 2007) and its chequebook diplomacy may replace the leverage of Australian navy.

SAR (Search and Rescue), HADR (Human Assistance in Disaster Relief) (2.34, 2009), and the protection of maritime environment are the substantial significant landscape for the Australian navy. The active presence of Australian navy in various HADR missions (Sumatra Assist, Fukushima disaster, Tropical cyclone Pam in Vanuatu) is indicating the vitality of this mission. This HADR operation is not merely to fulfil the diplomatic virtue; it accompanies soft power and benign appearance. During this period, contextualisation of the HADR within the maritime strategy caricatures a dynamic matching ‘white colour in the blue-based canvases’.

The traditional concept of naval force or other defence forces are to deter and defeat adversaries primarily associated to military nature and nurture national interest within the time and space (air, land, water, cyber, and space). In ‘Some Principles of Maritime Strategy’, wherein Sir Julian Corbett pointed out naval conflict is fundamentally about ‘the control of

communications'. Subsequently, the concept of 'command of the sea', transformed as 'sea control'. Although the early maritime theorists concentrated on the wartime role of navies, the ability to ensure sea control has been most likely necessary across the entire spectrum of operations. This entire spectrum manifested as key theme for the modern maritime strategist to reshuffle the role of navy in the changing paradigm. Sea control measures are essential deterrent mechanism counter to prevent pirates or terrorists from meddling the flow of merchant shipping, to enforce economic sanctions, or to establish a suitable condition for the attachment of a peacekeeping force. Therefore, this sea control capability is helpful to handle the adverse situation within the traditional and non-traditional threats situation. Australian maritime attribute is the most identified features. However, the rift in the maritime capabilities is generating apprehension in the maritime identity. Some scholars (Frank Broeze, John Bach, and Kim Beazley) clearly consider that "Australia is maritime country by geographical point of view but by nature, it is continental country." The relaxed behaviour towards a pronounced maritime strategy was a concern compared to the rising maritime strategy of China, Japan, India, and USA. However, in the changing paradigm, it is necessitated for the Australian navy should adopt 'sea control' strategy because Australian interest is growing within the changing paradigm of geopolitics and geo-economics, Indo-Pacific region as centre of gravity. Apparently, 'Knowledge without action is meaningless' as stated by the Indian philosophical school '*Mimansa*' as without strategic interest and knowledge; huge expenditure on the defence is pointless. This quotes matches with the Australian circumstances and Australia's Anglosphere allies bestow some liberty from security related concern.

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