

**REFLECTION ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
SIR ISAIAH BERLIN**

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DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "Reflection on Political Philosophy of Sir Isaiah Berlin" submitted by Rajiv Kumar for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) is his original work to the best of our knowledge and has not been previously submitted for any other Degree of this or any other university.

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation,



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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

The Relationship between a tradition and individual contributions to it is important to the understanding of both. Each may be seen as exercising a formative influence on the understanding of the other, although the two are distinct. To talk about one liberal writer is to say something about liberalism as a whole, and the talk about liberalism should inform us about some characteristics common to individual writers in this class. To illuminate the liberal version of society it is necessary to demonstrate its many manifestations that are related to a common framework of thought which does not support contributions to other tradition of ideological writing. "The intellectual ancestors of Liberalism did not belong to a school. Their political opinions were various, and the subject and occasion of their writing disparate."¹ A tradition of ideological writing, of the kind of which Liberalism is an example, can not be said to have a particular point of origin in time, or to culminate in a single work. Liberalism was, in its various aspects, an attitude of mind before it became a self conscious theore-

1. Manning, D.D. Liberalism J.M. Dent and Sons Limited; London 1976 P.10.

tical exposition. Seen in totality its history reveals many deviations and transitions. "To define an 'ism' through intellectual spokesmen, as is usually done, provides topics for learned discussion : in the case of liberalism on (among others, and at random) William Von Humboldt, Germaine de Stael, John Stuart Mill, and Benedetto Croce. If they had lived at the same time and found themselves in the same room, these four thinkers would have quarrelled.....".²

Variations and differences are there between and among the various spokesmen of Liberalism but there are some under currents which unite these varying views in a broader paradigm. Despite the assertion that "a tradition of ideological writing does not possess, and is not in need of, the kind of Coherence which an academic explanation requires"³ it may be said that Coherence of an ideological tradition is not the same thing as to holding some fundamental principles in common for from these fundamental principles different and sometime opposing inferences may be drawn, or differing arguments forwarded to support these fundamental principles. For example when Liberal democrats asserted that man is not

2. Salnadori, Massimo; The Liberal Heresy: Origins and Historical Development; The MacMillan Press Limited, London and Basingstoke, 1977 P.20.

3. Manning, D.J.: Liberalism, J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, London, 1976 P.140.

simply a 'bundle of appetite' but a 'bundle of conscious energies seeking to be exerted' there obviously is no Coherence but beneath these two non-Coherent assertions-
 lied the unifying principle of seeing Man as an individual-
 an isolated individual-upon whom environment does not
 have an effect of much consequence. Similarly, meaning-
 less is the assertion, "...as a tradition of ideological
 writing, liberalism cannot be presented as a set
 of claims about what qualities and skills are involved
 in the successful pursuit of good government, or what
 good government is like, some of which are true and others
 false",⁴ for we are not even the least interested in what,
 according to liberalism, is a good government we are
 interested in the principles upon which the theory of
 government or the relationship between individual and
 society is determined.

"That it is impossible to define Liberalism or
 any 'ism' is a common place which seems appropriate in
 face of the array of meanings and experience....."⁵. In
 actual fact, the definition presents no difficulty it
 is preceded by, and derived from, analysis of what
 has been and what is not of what should be, according to

4. Manning, D.J.; Liberalism, J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, London
 1976 P.141.

5. Salvadori, Massimo; The Liberal Heresy Origins and Historical
 Development", The MacMillan Press Limited
 London and Basingstoke, 1977 P.19

any single thinker or school of thought, Let us therefore try to look into the characteristics of Liberalism.

The metaphysical and ontological Core of Liberalism is individualism. It is from this point that commitments to familiar liberal values derives. Though Liberals don't have a monopoly, neither these values belong exclusively to the tradition of modern Liberalism Bhikhu Parekh has pointed out that as with any body of beliefs, many of its basic values preceded its birth but what distinguishes liberalism and makes it a unique historical individual is not its belief in these values but the way it redefines and rearranges them within the bourgeois individualistic conception of man".* Liberal individualism is both ontological and ethical. It sees individual as more concrete and Primary than society and social institutions and structures. It also attaches higher moral value to individual than to society or any collective group individual comes before the society. He is more real than society. His rights and demands come morally before those of the society. While characterizing the Liberal tradition as a whole D.J. Manning proposes that three principles serve the purpose one of them being

*Parekh, Bhikhu; "Liberalism and Morality" in Bhikhu Parekh and R.N. Benki (eds) the Morality of Politics, Allen and unwin 1972 P.83.

'The Principle of spontaneous generation and circulation' (the other two being the Principle of Balance, and the principle of uniformity). Explaining this Manning writes 'For liberals compulsion is undesirable because the motive force of society and the energy for social reform originate in the spontaneity of the independent mind and the power of the liberated will. In the liberal tradition a parallel relationship exists between motivation and stability in Economics."⁶

By and large liberalism emphasized reason instead of tradition. Contract rather than status, the present and future rather than the past, the value and rights of the individual instead of existing power-holders, whose claim based on the superiority of caste or creed it challenged. "Basically liberalism has been an attitude in defence of individual man and citizen in defiance of the arbitrary acts of government."⁷ Whereas the classical liberalism undertook to protect the individual from arbitrary actions of the government and its agencies, later liberalism developed a broader concept of the individual.

6. Manning, D.J.; Liberalism, J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, London, 1976 P.13.

7. Bramsted, E.K. and Melhuish, K.J.; Western Liberalism: A history in documents from Locke to Croce Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1978, P.XVII.

On this ontological base the value-definition approach of liberalism, as has been done by Richard Wollheim, can be elaborated in the form that whereas socialism is about equality liberalism interpreted rather narrowly can be described as "the belief in the value of the liberty of the individual".⁸

The value definition approach poses some problems. First, it is not based on any wider view of man and society which every tradition of the stature of liberalism should be. It is this failure that results in the vagueness and abstractness of its definition. Secondly, if a political doctrine is defined in terms of values "it can set no realistic historical limits to the doctrine in question".⁹ Thus we can discover its traces in most unlikely places which leads to an-achronism. Therefore we will look into the conception of Man and society in the liberal tradition to avoid the deficiencies of the value-oriented approach to liberalism.

What is important in the scientific outlook for the individualistic theory of Morality is the stress on

8. Wollheim, Richard; "The justification of liberalism" The Listener, 21 June 1956.

9. Arblaster, Anthony; The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1984, PP.12+13.

the moral neutrality of the world of Scientific facts, as well the concept of person as the detached observer of those facts. Thus the liberal moral theory would say that the question of morality is the question of individual choice and commitment. Thus Iris Murdoch would say that the idea of good remains indefinable and empty so that human choice may fill it. But the rise of modern science was paralleled by the development of Religious individualism.

Liberal moral theory can coexist with science and Positivism and that individual is morally autonomous are the two conclusions that follow from the above distinctions.

The second fundamental assumption of liberalism is that each individual is different and hence separate from other as reflected in the assertion of Forster that each of us is ultimately alone above all before the fearful fact of death. This tendency is further manifested in the writings of Novelist like Ayn Rand¹⁰ where Howard Roark epitomizes extreme of individualism to the extent

10. Clinton Rossiter in his book conservatism in American terms such writers as traditionalists while classifying the American People. He says although most inhabitants of the contemporary rights are committed to individualism, only a few are consistent thoroughgoing individualists, men who seem entirely willing to drive this doctrine

that any one who talks of society becomes his enemy. In her writings society form the setting and the individual the theme. Thus the individual is abstracted from the society. Individual becomes prior to the society, a matter of study in isolation with any social or historical context. It is thus that Man becomes individual. Whereas Man was individual naturally at least before the fearful fact of death now in the hands of such writers it will also be ideal if he is left alone.

What is it that enables individual to achieve autonomy and self sufficiency which is ascribed to the individual within liberalism. "The answer falls within two parts (1) The liberal conception of human nature sees human beings as driven actively from within by the natural energy of innate desire and appetites; and (2) the individual is guided in the pursuit of the gratification of these desires and appetites by the crucial faculty of reason, which is in some degree the universal possession of human beings".¹¹

straight through its logical conclusion: Philosophical Anarchy'. Further he says that 'the best known contemporary exponents of Pure individualism are..... Ayn Rand whose novel 'The Fountain head is a great favourite among young men who seek to so as on pinions free (clinton Rossiter, Kalayni Publishers New Delhi - Luddiana, 1962 P.169).

11. Arblaster, Anthony; The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, P.28.

Since desires are essentially given and therefore unalterable therefore they enjoy a kind of sovereign independence which places the desires outside the realm of morality, therefore, morality must accommodate itself to desires. Those who advocate law so that no one pursues ones own interest at the cost of others (e.g. Hobbes) do so keeping in view the principle of equality of rights of individuals. They don't imply any criticism of the desires as such.

In liberal economics it finds expression in the principle where revealed preferences as expressed in the market in terms of what people buy and what they will pay and it is taken as given and beyond discussion. The function of market is simply to minister to these preferences.

Therefore, the desires and hence values (for desires derive from the system of values which an individual holds) are absolute and should not be questioned. They can not be determined by one person or a group of persons who claim to be enlightened.

One of the characteristic of contemporary political thinking has been its being overwhelmingly dependent upon general philosophical trend. Therefore, some of the basic assumptions which we find in political philosophy are

expression of similar philosophical trend. Thus the separation of 'facts' from 'values' and of 'is' from 'ought' finds its expression in political philosophy in the form of separation of man from nature. Likewise the experience as the ultimate touchstone of truth finds its expression in the form of separateness of human being from each other.

There are other characteristic free market etc. but either we won't find them in Berlin or are not very explicit in his philosophy.

Now we shall turn to Sir Isaiah Berlin's theory and will try to see if we find these characteristics in his theory.

According to Berlin man is superior to and distinct from animal because man is able to choose and will and since upon this criterion alone we can distinguish man from non-man so this becomes the essence of man. Now whatever a man chooses or wills, he does it on his own and therefore bears its responsibility for it is something natural, eternal and universal in man and is hence immune to any effect of outer environment and is also distinct

Berlin, Isaiah; Four essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, London, 1969 P.XXXII.

from it. Thus man becomes an abstracted entity stripped of all social and economic circumstantial effects. Berlin would not ask where these desires come from or how they may have been formed. The complex processes of and experiences through which a child is adapted and adopts itself to the demands and limitations of a particular culture and society the whole process of socialization is generally ignored by liberal theory. Since these are ignored man becomes isolated individual separated from nature.

Since the essence of man is to choose freely hence whatever a man chooses is right and there can not be anything, if chosen by a man, which will be either immoral or considered wrong. Thus, there can not be any value which can be said to be superior to other for while one value might be chosen by one person the other value will be chosen by other person. Since values don't exist by themselves but they come into existence because men choose them hence there can't be existence of any value by itself and therefore can not be said to be an absolute value.

Since values don't exist and whatever a man chooses becomes value of itself therefore if a man chooses to kill someone or say rope someone it will not be condemnable or an offence for one has chosen it to do so. But obviously

this can not be allowed to happen in human society and certainly should not be allowed to happen where the individual comes first. This means that these type of acts i.e. murdering and raping can not be said to be values even if they are chosen by some one.

Why this can not be said to be value or say, may be a value but an underireable one and hence not to be practiced. The answer may be becuase it interrupts the smooth functioning of the society and hence underireable. This means that the values prevailing in a society can be hierarchically arranged. If they are hierarchically arranged this must have been done in relation to a standard which can be said to be an absolute value or a value which must be given precedence if some other value comes in conflict with it. Therefore, as Berlin asserts, there are plurality of values but unlike Berlin's assertion they are not equally important.

This all is true if we say that whatever a man chooses is value including mrdering and raping. But this can equally be asserted that they are not values at all for they don't facilitate the smooth functioning of society neither do they help men in fulfilling their attributes. If so then murdering and raping are something outside the group the elements of which are said to be values.

Inference thereby is that values don't come into existence because men choose them to be so but they exist independent of human choice.

There is no denying the fact that there exist a Plurality of values but this also can not be denied that they are independent at least of human choice i.e. they are values not because men have chosen them. Also, that values, as they are independent of human choice, is a definite set but their position changes with the changing historical conjectures and are also dependent upon the prevailing objective condition including socio-economic condition of a particular society. Thus Liberty and equality both are values but their ranking in societies with different economic conditions will differ. The people of the third world will prefer equality over liberty not only in relation to the people of their own nation but also in international field for what is most urgent to them is their survival and not their enjoying a beautiful painting. The preference will differ where people are free from such mundane tension; they will talk of beauty and aesthetic for equality for them is not a goal to be achieved.

Whatever we have said about Berlin shows that there are differences in approaching the problem that he tackles and one may not be in sympathy with him. One such approach

can be based on the writings of Karl Marx. This approach is "an intellectual attitude, or a way of thought, a philosophical position the fundamental principle of which is continuous, systematic and comprehensive confrontation of reality with reason".¹²

To know the truth which is the whole, one must study the given objective reality in all its ramifications. The method of dialectic with its emphasis on contradiction, interconnection, reciprocal effect, movement and transformation helps in differentiating appearances from reality and brings us closer to truth. It should be noted, however, that dialectics provides an angle of vision, a lens through which to view the object of study but it does not predetermine what will be discovered there. Moreover, any theory which claims to be scientific must be able to go behind the appearances or form of things to their nature or their essential reality. Illuminating this very aspect, Marx aptly remarked that all science should be superfluous if the appearances, the form and the nature of things were wholly identical. Furthermore, in explaining the realities of the world the marxian approach which epitomises scientific, materialist rationalism goes much deeper for analysis. It is not only concerned with the tip of the ice-berg i.e.

12. Baran, Paul; The Longer view : Essays towards a critique of Political Economy, New York, Monthly Review Press 1969, P.32.

the surface phenomenon but also with the underlying large portion, i.e. the socio-economic categories life. Paul Baran has put this notion beautifully in the book 'The longer view' "For what is, in my opinion central to the Marxian Position is the capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediately observable facts and to see the free of future in the tiny shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combination of historical vision and the courage to be utopian with the vision sternly disciplined by an analysis of tendencies discernible at the present time, and with the utopia rendered concrete by the identification of the social forces that may be expected to further its realisation".

It should be noted that in the dialectical materialist approach the concept of 'totality' is very important. This totality is a structural interdependence of its parts which is loaded by the predominance in the long run of one part i.e. economic structure, and having contradiction that impel its development forward.

The theoretical foundations of Marx's attempt to construct a science of society lie in his original insight into the central role of historical and material condition in moulding human life. In the preface to the 'critique of political Economy' Marx explained the source of his break with Hegelian philosophy as follows "MY inquiry led

me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political terms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life".

Since the foundations of social life are to be discovered, according to Marx, not in the elevated spheres of speculative philosophy, but in earthly fact, he proposed that the study of human history be approached in a scientific manner that the study of history be transformed from metaphysics to science, and pass from the simple apparent ^sdescription of phenomena to their hidden laws of motion. This 'natural science about man', or science of man' would comprise both history and present day social science and would be subject to validation by historical and social evidence gathered through empirical study.

Thus Marx urged that human history is not an accidental aggregate of events but a unified realm of phenomena marked by regularity of occurrences like the regularity of occurrences in nature. There are ascertainable objective forces which govern civilization. In each of the historical epoche they play a major part in shaping man's motive,

Marx, Karl; Preface to the critique of political Economy
 quoted in Mcquarie, Donald; Marx: Sociology/Social
 charge/capitalism, quartet Boops Limited, 1978,
 P.9.

ideas and institutions, governing the relationship of man to man and directing the flow of events to predictable goals. These forces are to be investigated in a scientific manner and one to be discovered in the empirical study of history itself.

Thus we believe that to make the essence of man the starting point of one's philosophical construct one will have to be watchful against making him an abstract entity. The evolution of man is very much related to the evolution of the history. The argument that since man is man because of his ability to choose and that man's actions can not be explained as effects of some cause implies that man is able to will freely. This is evident from such arguments that when man chooses something to pursue it becomes value implying that something becomes value if and only if men choose it is be so , prior to this they are not values.

Similar kind of arguments are forwarded about the history. Berlin would not believe that events of history follows some law or there is some cause and effect relationship between the course of action and the social structure and social facts. Though Berlin would remind us again and again that whatever his line of argument may be he did not want to convey the ideal that causal relationship is necessarily false or that a regular pattern can

not be perceived in the history rather what he wanted to convey is that if we accept the truthfulness of this doctrine our language will have to do away with many a words and that it will have to become value neutral but, Berlin holds, this is not practicable.

The views of Berlin on question of free will and history seems to flow from his distinction of man from non-human on the capacity to choose. We will look into these questions later in the present work.

The present study is divided into four parts. The first part will deal with the conception of man. In this chapter we will look into the details, as provided by Berlin, of nature of man and will see the difficulties that will follow if we take this nature of man to be true. We will analyse a different alternative of the nature of the man namely the Marxist one and would examine if that would transcendent the problems faced by the former. We would try to show that the problem in the analysis of Berlin basically rises because of the abstraction of man from the social relationships.

In the second chapter we will look into the question of liberty. Here we will analyse the question whether Berlin's preference of Negative liberty would really be able to do good to the humanity. We will also see his

criticism of the positive liberty. In this chapter we would also compare the views of Berlin and Hayek on the question of liberty. We would compare the views of Berlin with that of Hayek to show that the kind of economic system that would be needed to realize Berlin's Negative freedom would be laissez faire economy.

In the third chapter we would look into the question of laws of history (Determinism) we would try to show that history is not the story of the whims and fancies of the great persons or for that matter any person as asserted by Berlin. We would also try to show that neither the society progress strictly in accordance with some impersonal law (e.g. Mode of Production) but rather the progress of the society takes place because of the continuous action and interaction between individuals and social structure. In this chapter we would also look into the allied questions viz, morality and free will.

In the last chapter we would conclude our study with a few observations. A few questions would also be raised answers to which have not been proposed and the views on these answers may vary.

CHAPTER-II

CONCEPTION OF MAN

What Berlin wants to say about human nature has a great bearing on his conception of the Philosophy of history. Therefore we will first examine his concept of man and then his ideas on Historical inevitability.

Berlin writes in an essay titled 'Political Ideas in the twentieth century' that "man is everywhere and in every condition able to discover and apply rational solution to his problems. And those solution, because they are rational, can not clash with one another and will ultimately form a harmonious system in which the truth will prevail, and freedom, happiness and unlimited opportunity for untrammled self-development will be open to all".

Further in the same essay elsewhere Berlin writes "but in the main all the Parties to the great Controversies accept the notion of man as resembling in varying degrees one or the other of two idealized types (1) either he is a creative free and naturally good but hemmed in and frustrated by obsolete or corrupt or sinister institutions masquerading as saviours and Protectors and repositories of sacred traditions or, (2) he is a being largely but not wholly free and to a high degree but not entirely good, and consequently unable to save himself

by his own wholly unaided efforts and therefore rightly seeking salvation within the great frameworks - state, churches units.

From the first quotation quoted above two principles are easily derivable (1) That man can discover and apply rational solutions and therefore man is not a subject to the historical laws but an agent of the historical laws. Thus the human being are responsible for their act of omission and commission. Therefore, there arises no contradiction in relation to morality and Historical laws*.

(2) That man can discover and apply rational solution to every problem the emphasis, this time, being upon rational. Since not only the solutions are rational but also their application therefore there arises no question of clash of the solution and hence ultimately they will form a harmonious whole.

Not only that Man is able to discover and apply rational solutions but these solutions will lead to a harmonious whole whereby opportunity for untrammelled self development will be open to all. Thus what Berlin states amounts to saying that human beings are not static entities but they develop and crucial to their development is the fulfilment of above mentioned condition.

In fact Berlin's version of human nature can be better understood if we view it against the background of



his critique of what he calls the deepest assumption of Western political thought. The first of these assumptions is a "great despotic vision"¹ of man and the world.

According to this assumption world is a rationally organised and intelligible whole which follows a law called by such names the Natural Law, Immutable Reason, Ideas etc. according to the particular view to which they subscribe. Berlin Rejects this assumption on two grounds (1) It is meaningless to say that every thing has a meaning and purpose since to say this would mean that there does not exist a thing which is non-purposive. Hence the concept itself is invalidated. Therefore neither we will have any category with which to contrast purposiveness nor will it be meaningful to distinguish the two.

The second assumption of the Western political thought which Berlin does not agree with is the assumption that good is and must be a coherent and frictionless whole. Thus they are not only compatible but they necessarily entail one another. This also implies that if two values contradict one of them is either ~~not~~ true or improperly defined. Berlin Rejects this assumption on the ground that conflict between values are inherent and fundamental and inescapable truth of human life. He cites Machiavelli approvingly and say that he distinguished between two sets of morality first the morality of the Pagan World Streessing

1. Berlin, Isaiah; Against the current, P.301.

such values as courage and second christian morality with its emphasis on such values as charity. He further says that if one chooses any one of the two, he will have to give-up all hope of living by the other.

The third assumption which is criticised by Berlin is the notion that it is possible to form, and even to realize, a conception of a perfect man and/or a perfect society. Berlin rejects this on the ground that since human capacities, aspiration and values conflict and that men can live morally in several different and incompatible ways therefore it is logically impossible to combine them all. Hence the concept of a perfect man is untrue. Similarly since different societies promote different human capacities therefore, conception of a perfect society is also untrue.

The fourth and final assumption of the Western political thought untenable to Berlin is moral monism i.e. that all values can be reduced to one and fundamental value. Even reason can not specify what kind of life one should lead.

Against this criticism of some of the assumption of Western political thought he defines man in terms of the characteristics which distinguished man from the non-human world. Berlin distinguishes man on his capacity for autonomy or self determinism, Man is able to choose and regulate

his life. "Man is most himself in choosing rather than being chosen for and realizes and develops himself in the course of making free choices"². For Berlin the capacity for self determination is somehow inherent in man. How this capacity comes is not elaborated in Berlin's argument. But then one thing can be assumed that since man chooses his values and the way he should live he must be doing so keeping in view his interests and his desires and beliefs. This entails that men do what they do because they wanted to do that. This question will be looked into in greater detail in the chapter on historical inevitability.

Now, let us have a look at what Robert A. Kocis has to say about Berlin's conception of human nature. But before we go into details it should be mentioned here that Mr. Kocis has analysed Berlin's theory from the point of view of Berlin's Aversion to Rationalism and his understanding of human being as capable of development.

Mr. Kocis writes "At the root of much of Berlin's Political and ethical philosophy including his theory of human nature - is a conviction that the Western tradition of rationalism is fundamentally mistaken"³. In Berlin's

2. Berlin, Isaiah; Four essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, London, 1969 P.137.

3. Kocis, Robert A. - "Towards A Coherent Theory of Human Moral Development : Beyond Sir Isaiah Berlin's vision of Human Nature" in Political Studies, 1983 Vol.XXXI P.371.

EYE THE Western Rationalist tradition is dominated by monism and its accepted assumption is that every real question about human existence and actions has one and only one true answer. Therefore Berlin sees us (and therefore for his conception of human nature is) as "self creative, as incomplete and incapable of completion, and as capable of living in a variety of different, contradictory, yet equally valid ways"⁴. Because we can not prove that any one way of life is the best, we must tolerate one another and respect others freedom to live as they see fit.

This vision of human nature which seems rather compelling turns out to be an incompatible blend of Kantian Individualism and Herdesian Pluralism. Where the first leads Berlin to a defence of negative liberty as a trues and more humane ideal the second element commits him to an ethical pluralism a claim that there are no rational ground for claiming an ethical hierarchy. It must be noted here that the French Liberals (e.g. Guizot)-who were concerned with the changing structure of society-found the empiricists concept of liberty what Isaiah Berlin has called negative liberty - inadequate. In their view the negative concept of liberty was not very helpful in a social context, that is, a context of Rule governed action.

4. Kocis, Robert A - Ibid P.370.

5. Berlin, Isaich; Four essays on Liberty Oxford University Press, London 1969, P.171.

It remained important as providing a final criterion for distinguishing between coerced and free action. But, apart from that, it did not help much to clarify the different types of liberty which might be available in a modern state. "It did not identify different forms of rule governed action, or make any use of the distinction between les lois and les moeurs - between political and social structure".⁶ In that way negative concept of liberty revealed its origin in early empiricism. It failed to establish that intentions and motives and also action itself are only conceivable within a framework of social rules. "For that reason it failed to distinguish between the absence of constraint and the absence of obligation".⁷ Therefore Mr. Kocis writes that "Although Kantian vision precludes any ethical relativism, Berlin's Pluralism may not provide a sufficiently solid foundation for our moral and political obligation".⁸ Continuing further he writes Thus we must consider the possibility that Berlin is wrong in his claim about human nature : first, that we are purposive agents, torn by an internal tension, and capable of living in a variety of ways; and second, that development

6. Sidentop, Larry; Two Liberal traditions in The Idea of Freedom:Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin edited by Alan Ryan, Oxford University Press, 1979 P.168.

7. Sidentop, Larry; Ibid P.168.

8. Kocis, Robert A.; Towards a Coherent Theory of Human Moral Development:Beyond Sir Isaiah Berlin's vision of Human Nature in Political Studies, 1983 Vol.XXXI P.371.

theories is misplaced i.e. the danger of monism and oppression lies not in lawful regularities but in an overly rigid teleology.

Thus what Berlin wants is fusing Romanticism and Rationalism and therefore his vision of human nature is subtle and complex. Robert A. Kocis has said that for the sake of simplicity. We might see his account of human nature as proceeding along three distinct levels. "the monistic, the dualistic, and the pluralistic".⁹ Berlin does so to show that (or at least he reaches on the conclusion that) negative liberty and therefore a liberal society is essential. Let us therefore look into a bit detail all the three levels at which he examines the human nature.

At first level the human being is seen as single, unified agents. Here purposiveness replaces rationality as essential, and universal characteristic of the species. Thus Berlin feels in an essay "Does Political Theory still exist?" that if someone totally lacks the basic moral intuitions of moral person, he would be said to be inhumane. Therefore here we are characterized by agency and creativity. Therefore we may conclude that at this level there is an eternal and universal essence of humanity which extends universality to some of our moral values, but does not entail that we must all live in one way. Now since we are purposive agent therefore we must have the freedom (and no

9. Kocis Robert A; Ibid P.372.

obstruction should be placed in the path of my Freedom) and rights to protect us in our purposes. Thus this directly leads us to a conception of negative liberty.

Berlin has written a book 'The Hedgehog and the Fox' the introduction of which is important in understanding the second level. At the second level Berlin sees us just in the opposite manner as compared to what he takes us to be at the first level. In the introduction of the book 'the Hedgehog and the Fox' Berlin's view of us is as torn from within so that the formal unity of agency is subjected to divisive forces. On the one hand, there is within us a need to attend to life in all its diversity and detail, a need simply to observe (i.e. a need to be like a fox). On the other hand there is also within us a strong drive to Coherence, a drive to find a pattern into which we can fit all of life's diversity (i.e. a need to be like a hedgehog). If, at the first level, Berlin's vision of humanity requires that our dignity be respected, the second level entails the possibility of human heroism and nobility, as well as the possibility of tragedy and depravity.

The above analysis shows that the emphasis at the second level or at the dualistic level of analysis is upon the proposition that we are torn by the internal conflict between universality and diversity. Robert Kocis writes that because of this it can happen that some of us are not

sufficiently mature and so too compulsive to recognize that other person need to choose their ends if they are to retain their dignity. Therefore if our purposiveness is to be protected then this analysis requires reinforcing the need for moral and political rights.

At the third level, the empirical diversity of human cultures suggests to Berlin that there are a number of different ways of life which seem to suit human nature. (This view has been expressed by Berlin in an article titled 'The Question of Machiavelli' in *The New York Reviews of Books*, Nov.1971, P.20-32) and no one of these ways is demonstrably superior to others. For Berlin, this means that our values are Pluralistic and that our cultures are only relatively good. Thus Berlin is convinced that any one of a number of ways of life is equally stable, equally viable and equally good for us as human beings.

This level of analysis is Pluralistic in the sense that it emphasises that human being can live in a variety of ways which accord equally well with human nature. Berlin believes that this entails some degree of liberty though not directly. Berlin opines that if human beings can live in a variety of ways which accord equally well with the human nature then it would not matter much if some were to impose their preferences upon others unless we were convinced that

purposiveness is a distinctively human characteristic whose loss entails the loss of our humanity.

If we review the above analysis, ^{we} would find that the first level of analysis emphasizes universality of human nature but at the second and third level the concern is with diversity, variety, creativity which are natural opponents of universalism. Therefore Robert A. Kocis writes "Thus Berlin's complex vision of humanity involves two contradictory strains: there is a monistic, formalistic strain (Kantian) emphasizing the universality of human purposiveness and requiring liberty; and there is a dualistic and pluralistic strain (Herderian), centring on the variety of arrangements suitable for us humans and which need not require that a way of life have any particular characteristic".¹⁰ Thus on the one hand Berlin concludes that liberty is of special value, on the other hand he concludes that there is a variety of goods to which human can subscribe. Therefore Robert Kocis opines that the conflicting intuitions are basically valid, then we must seek another account of human nature. Thus if we accept Berlin's Pluralism (i.e. men can ^{and} should live in a variety of ways) we fail to show the reason behind our moral obligation.

10. Kocis, Robert A; Ibid P.375.

Summing up the whole discussion we can say now that there is a contradiction between the various levels at which Berlin proposes to analyse us.

What we have been doing till now is that we have been looking into the coherence of the Berlin's conception of human nature. What we propose to do hereafter is that we will look into the argument put forward by Berlin based upon his conception of human nature and see what kind of society does this entail and if it is conducive to the realization of 'full man'. We will do this not exactly from the Marxist point of view but we will take help of the analysis provided by Macpherson mainly in his book 'The political Theory of Possessive Individualism'.

Macpherson writes in the concluding chapter of the above mentioned book we can identify some social assumptions common to the main 17th century Political theories and he proposes to show later as to how they are relevant to the problems of later liberal democratic society.

Macpherson identifies seven social assumptions of which we will consider the first two only for the other five are not directly relevant in the present context.*

*Macpherson enumerates the other five social assumptions as follows (1) The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for which he owes nothing to society. (2) Although the individual can not alienate the whole of his property in his own person, he may alienate his capacity to labour (3) Human society consists of a series of market relations (4) since freedom from the wills of others is what makes a man human, each individual's freedom can

The first one is the assumption that what makes a man human is freedom from the dependence on the wills of others, and the second that freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his own interest".¹¹

Macpherson opines that these assumption were peculiarly appropriate for the 17th century British society for these assumptions (which Macpherson call Possessive individualist assumptions) did correspond to the reality of 17th century market society".¹² In fact it were these assumptions, Macpherson further says, that provided the original theory its strength and the weakness of these theories to its having failed to deal with some of their implications.

We notice that Berlin has opined that man is a purposive agent and therefore is capable of living in a variety of ways. It is the assumption that man is a purposive agent

rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to secure the same freedom for others. (5) Political Society is a human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintainance of orderly relations of exchange between individuals regarded as proprietors of themselves (The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism by C.B. Macpherson, Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Orford, 1979, P.263-64).

11. Macpherson, C.B.; The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford University Press, London, 1979, P.263.

12. Macpherson, C.B.; Ibid P.270.

that logically demands that each man should be free from the dependence on the will of others for this will lead to one man serving the purpose of other. Thus for Berlin for man to be fully man he must be free to persue his purpose and should not be interfered with by any agency even in the interest of the Person concerned.

It has been seen in the chapter on Freedom that by Coereion-the opposite of Freedom - Berlin means the intentional interference by outside agency. Thus if an individual enter in some kind of relationship with others in his own interest, which accidently may be more advantageous relation for the other party - this will be as free as before.

Thus we see that the first two assumptions of the Possessive individualism as enumerated by Macpherson is implicit in the arguments of Berlin. What implication do they have on the idea of freedom and what kind of society will it be? For Sir Isaiah Berlin believes that Political theories "depend logically and directly on what man's nature is taken to be".¹³

13. Berlin, Isaiah; Does political theory still exist? In Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and society (Second Series); Basil Blackwell, 1962 PP 28-33.

As far as Freedom is concerned it has been dealt with in the chapter on Freedom still we must point out here that it leads Berlin to distinguish between Freedom and conditions of Freedom and he asks us not to confuse the two. Thus ones incapacity due to social arrangements will not be taken by Berlin to be loss of freedom for the person concerned.

As far as the type of society is concerned we only can visualize it for nothing has been said by Berlin on this. Still when we would distinguish between freedom and condition of freedom then it can be said that it lies very close to the tradition of linguistic analysis and therefore an attempt is implicit of evading the hard core realities prevalent in the society. The resultant society will be full of inequalities ^{nurtured} ~~metured~~ by the social institutions for no one would be under any obligation to minimise it as this would mean interfering with the life of individual and this is not in accordance with the proposition that men are capable of living in a variety of ways and that they should be allowed to live so.

If we follow the statement of Berlin quoted just above that the nature of political theories depend on the nature of man that we take to be then we can surely say that the whole deduction drawn above is because the nature of man that we take to be then we can surely say that the whole deduction drawn above is because the nature of man

that Berlin takes seem to be faulty. This is faulty at least in the sense that man is abstracted from his social reality and then is constructed in void. "This philosophical approach (where philosophical generally designated an investigative approach to the world that affirmed the dominance and efficacy of ideas, conception and phrases) was deemed inappropriate as an attempt to comprehend the world, at least in Part because the use of philosophical terminology itself actually tended to have a negative effect on the accurate understanding of real human life".¹⁴

Talking about ~~Feuerbach~~^{Feuerbach}, while working upon German Ideology, Marx said that although ~~Feuerbach~~^{Feuerbach} had made some progress in overlooming of the Hegelian Idealism, what this critical approach amounted to was the mere opposing of new philosophical category/conception to the old Hegelian ones and to commonly accepted religious doctrines leaving aside almost completely the needed criticism of the actual conditions of human social life. Subsequently, all demands for change in society also amounted to mere calls for a change in consciousness on the part of all individuals, leaving the objective structures and relations of society as they are.

14. Christensen, Kit R.; Marx, Human Nature and Fetishism of Concepts in Studies in Soviet Thought, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston; Volume 34 No.3 October 1987. P.138.

We, if now make a survey of what has been said about nature of man by Marx and/or Engles we would find that Marx's saying that philosophers have tried to understand the world while the real task is to change it finds its expression in it.

Let us now see what Marx has to say about it. But before we go into the details let us be very clear that there are scholars who opine that Marx never wrote about the nature of man. Their contention is that there is nothing universal about man. Man is the the evsemble of social relation-ships and the social relationship, keep changing. Further in pre socialist societies the social relationship is not between man and man but rather between an owner and a worker, a teacher and a student, a doctor and a patient etc. Therefore, these relationships can not be said to characterise man as such. Similar sentiments are expressed by Norman Geras in his book Marx's concept of Human Nature. Here he says that the relevant part of the 6th thesis is - The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each singal individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations. Geras separates out three possible interpretation of Marx's menaing; (1) that in its reality the nature of man is conditioned by the ensemble of social relations.(2) that in its reality human nature is manifested in the ensemble of social relations.

(3) that in its reality the nature of man is determined by, or human nature is dissolved in the ensemble of social relations.

There is another contention that different special science explores different aspect of man's activity; no aspect remain unexplored, and all special sciences together give a complete picture of man.

Man is not, however, the sum of his parts or aspects. but an integral being; and no special science does or can answer the question of what he is as an integral being, that is, what makes him man and each of his activities or aspects human. Although man is not always and every where the same, although he his-~~torically~~ changes, there is something that allows us to call a proletarian as well as capitalist, a landlord as well as a slaveowner a man. "If Marx had by passed these questions, they would still demand an answer. But nothing is more false than the assumption that Marx condemned discussion about man in general".¹⁵

What we have been trying to establish is that Marx did say something about human nature in general. Kit. R. Christensen in his article 'Marx, human nature and fetishism of concept' says "the causes why Marx is believed to have

15. Petrovic, Gajo; "Marx's concept of Man" in B. Ollman 'Social and Sexual Revolution' P.22

some conception of human 'essential nature' may be enumerated to be following".¹⁶

Firstly, Alten Wood says that when Marx speaks of dehumanization of people specially in capitalist society he must be having some general ideal of what more truly human state would be like.

Secondly, Marx's assertion in Sixth thesis that the ensemble of social relations (viewed always within the Context of World constituting human Praxis) is the real essence.

Thirdly, the perceived continuity in the works of early (Economic and Philologic Manuscript) and later Marx also demonstration the point.

Now we can proceed with the assumption that Marx indirectly should have said something on the subject, but is was not a philosophical approach like that of Feuerbach. The difference between Marx and Feuerbach has been very clearly brought out in the fourth of the thesis of Feuerbach wherein, Marx says in effect that Feuerbach has missed the point in his thought liberating anthropologizing inversion

16. Christensen, Kit R; Marx Human Nature and Fetishion of concepts in Studies in Soviet thought Vol.34 No.3 October, 1987 P.154.

of religious belief. As Feuerbach's philosophy of man ended up equating resolution of the philosophical problems with the resolution of the actual material and social problems with which the human beings are confronted, and because the phraseology that Feuerbach and other ideologists used seemed to facilitate this sort of misconstrual of the actual dynamics of human life, Marx and Engels concluded that the avoidance of as many philosophical concepts as possible would account for more fruitful accurate and less misleading account of circumstances within which people lived and hence Marx's emphasis to look at man from a social or communal point of view.

In the Dictionary of scientific communism Marx's concept of individual has been elaborated in following manner "The Marxist concept of individual, rooted in the materialist view of history, which considers material production relations as the definitive ones among the entire set of social relations, consists in seeing man as carrier, the subject of social relations. It organically combines with the view of ~~man~~^{man} as a product of his social environment and recognition of his active role in cognising and transforming this environment".¹⁷ Marx and Engels also wrote "Just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him"+

17. A Dictionary of scientific communism Published by Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, P.114.

18. Marx, Karl and Engels, F. Collected Works Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, Vol.3, P.298.

The emphasis in the above paragraph is that man is conditioned by his surroundings and he also is capable of moulding it. The first half of this assertion has been looked into by us above. The second half is to be examined. Gajo petrovic writing in his book 'Marx in the mid 20th century "Man is not a mechanical sum of his spheres (Economic political, moral, artistic etc.), and even in so far as it is possible to distinguish such spheres they do not maintain for eternity the same relationship. Therefore what makes a man is not his main shpere but his whole way of being the general structure of his relationship toward the world and toward himself. This way of Being, which is peculiar to man, Marx designates by the word Praxis, Man for Marx is the being of Praxis".¹⁹

When we define man as Praxis then we must know what is Praxis. In its simplest form Praxis is human activity, a certain kind of activity is common to all animals. Writting about the activity of a man and animal we read in Marx's Economical and philosophical manuscript of 1844.

"The animal is one with its life activity. It does not distinguish the activity from itself. It is its activity. But man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious life activity. It is

19. Petrovic, Gajo; "Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century"
Doubleday and company 1967, P.77-78.

not a determination with which he is completely identified. Conscious life activity distinguishes man from the life activity of animals".²⁰ Gajo Petrovic says that Praxis can be defined as a universal. Creative self creative activity, activity by which man transforms and creates his world and himself. To substantiate this he quotes from Economic and Philosophical Manuscript.

Thus we see that whereas man is conditioned by his surroundings he (because of man being defined as being of Praxis) also influences the environment surrounding him.

Marek Fritzhand in an article titled 'Marx'S Ideal of Man' says that "According to Marx, People should be Total, Personal and auto active".²¹ Total means that man should not be fragmented. By personal the author means that he should feel at home while working or is at leisure and By auto active he wants to say that the activities should be free conscious activity. These all three attributes can be realized in only socialist society.

20. Fromm, Erich; Marx's Concept of Man Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, New York, 1964, P.101.

21. Fritzhand, Marek; Marx's Ideal of Man in Fromm(Erich)(ed) Socialist Humanism, The Penguin Press,

Thus we see that whereas Berlin's conception of man is a bit philosophical and hence not realistic for the concept starts guiding the reality Marx's concept is more realistic and leaves the scope for man's striving towards a goal. Berlin's concept is also deficient in this sense for he argues that agreeing to the proposition that man advances towards a goal (which can be hierarchically ranked) implies teleology and hence leads to despotism.

CHAPTER - III

FREEDOM

The conception of liberty is at the heart of every well developed political theory in modern western liberal tradition. "The appeal of the Idea of liberty is so powerful in modern western tradition that even those who write as its critics or its enemies, who see it as an embodiment of social discipline and insubordination to established authority or as the superseded ideology of a bankrupt social order, unwittingly testify to its centrality". We also can perceive that it is the craving for liberty which has led Berlin to criticize a particular view of history of a particular conception of man. The name of one of the books - 'Four Essays On Liberty' - written by Isaiah Berlin also indicate towards the centrality of the concept of freedom in his system of thought.

On the surface Freedom is a strange and puzzling concept for it has application in radically different ways: Freedom in the slave society meant for the slave freedom from arbitrary will of the masters of taking lives of the slave; in the feudal system it was expressed by the demands of the serfs of right to ownership of the land on which they worked. In the capitalist system it means freedom to

contract and in the Marxist tradition-transcends it all - freedom means victory of men not only on the nature but also the victory of individuals over the reified social relations. It is not only that in different time period or in different theoretical tradition-viz, Liberalism, Marxism or Liberrarianism - the concept freedom has different meaning but that even within liberalism the concept freedom has changed its meaning for example whereas Hobbes defined freedom as the absence of external obstacles - physical or legal Green always advocated a kind of state interference. In fact the Idealist school as such emphasises the role of state.

Berlin's conception of freedom is reinforced by his conception of man. If the essence of man is to choose then it would be like treating him sub-human if we restricted his alternatives or prescribed for him a particular way of life. If there exists alternatives from choosing any one of which the individual is not theoretically prevented then this will not be a case of unfreedom even if the individuals are unable in practice to realize the alternatives provided. Their inability to realize the alternatives may arise out of their in-

capacity and not because of any kind of unfreedom. Thus if we take freedom to be absence of coercion then it accords well with Berlin's conception of man. ~~As we have seen in the previous chapter that Berlin's conception of man.~~ As we have seen in the previous chapter that Berlin's conception of man is not adequate therefore, with the help of logical reasoning, it can be said that his conception of freedom is also not adequate.

In the book 'Four Essays On Liberty' Isaiah Berlin proposes to examine what he finds to be two central senses of political liberty. (Since liberty is of many kind, economic political, social etc. and all of them can be put under one heading or the other, viz, Negative and positive, therefore Berlin finds it better to study liberty under these two headings) on the one hand, he finds that a significant group of political theorists hold a negative notion of freedom (e.g. Hobbes, Bentham etc.) A man can be said to be free if he is theoretically free to do whatever he wants to do. "I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others".² This implies that I must be free to do whatever I want to do and if I am

2. Berlin, Isaiah; Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969 P.122.

somehow unable to do what I wanted to do then I am unfree and hence coerced. But if every kind of inability amounts to coercion? Berlin does not think so. "Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of inability. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area within which I could otherwise act."³ Since it requires deliberate interference therefore the interference will be only by men and not by any inanimate thing for they can not do so deliberately.

Berlin says that what pricks the consciences of the western liberals is not the belief "that freedom that men seek differ according to their social or economic condition but that the minority who possess it have gained it by exploiting, or at least, averting their gaze from, the vast majority who do not."⁴ But for the liberals individual liberty is an ultimate end and therefore, no one should be deprived of it especially so at the cost of others. Some may argue, Berlin opines, that I don't want liberty for myself if my fellow human beings have not got it. But this will be surrendering liberty with no chance of increase in the total freedom. A sacrifice is not an

3. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P.122.

4. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P.125.

increase in what is being sacrificed. The sacrifice of freedom may increase say, equality or justice but not freedom. But Berlin opines that "it remains true that freedom of some must at times be curtailed to secure the freedom of others".⁵ Berlin says that we prescribe a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not to degrade or deny our nature. How large or wide this minimum area be may be debated but it will remain an area where individual will be absolute, however small this may be Liberty in this sence means liberty from.

Mill defended this liberal individual freedom because for the lack of it the civilization would not advance, the truth will not, for the lack of a free market in ideas come to light Society will be crushed by the weight of collective mediocrity. Berlin says that three facts about this proposition may be noted. Firstly that Mill confuses two notions. First is that all coercion is bad as such for it frustrates human desires while non-interference is good as such. And the second is that men should seek to discover the truth and that truth can be found only in condition of freedom. Berlin says that the first notion is the representative of negative liberty and a liberal view and that the second notion also is an liberal view but both are not identical. Berlin would believe that history tends to show that in-

5. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P.126.

tegrity, love of truth etc. grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities as in more tolerant society.

The second fact is that the doctrine is comparatively modern.

The third fact is that liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kind of autocracy. Liberty in this sense is concerned with the area of control not with its source. Thus liberty is not directly related to self government or democratic government for even in a democracy the area of control could be wide. "The answer to the question who governs me? Is logically distinct from the question How far does government interfere with me?"⁶ The positive sense of the liberty comes from the answer to the second question.

The positive concept of freedom "derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself not on external forces of whatever kind".⁷ Thus it is a desire not to be slave to anyone or thing. But the depravity in this thesis may ~~cause~~ be such arguments as I may become slave of my unbridled passion. To prevent

6. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P.130.

7. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P.131.

this I must know what is natural for me and if I am not competent enough to decide this let it be decided by others for me and this gives licences to paternalism.

We will now reflect over what Berlin has said.

Macpherson in his book 'Democratic Theory' has argued that Berlin's "Concept of Negative liberty is unworkably narrow" and that his "Concept of positive liberty is confusingly wide"⁸ Let us look into it in a little bit more detail.

Berlin defines liberty as absence of Coercion. We have seen that Coercion implies deliberate interference of other human beings in the area where the individual could otherwise have acted. A Man will be said to be coerced due to his natural inabilities. For example Berlin would say that it would be meaningless to say that one is unfree if one could not jump ten feet. He is not able but he is not unfree. Macpherson questions the validity of the stipulation deliberate interference as constituting Coercion. Macpherson says that this deliberate interference may be taken to be even this much broad as to include the relationship of dominance and subservience provided dependence of the subservient is

8. Macpherson, C.B.; Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval; Oxford University Press, Oxford; 1977 P.97.

ascribed to arrangements deliberately made and enforced for that purpose by the dominant. But it will not include any relationship of dominance and subservience which is not the intended but necessary result of social arrangements.* Macpherson says that it can be argued that Berlin was arguingⁱⁿ the classical liberal tradition where the capitalist property relation is not taken to be an infringement on the liberty of individuals. But Macpherson holds that "We may still ask whether a concept of liberty adequate for the twentieth century can afford to neglect all that classical English liberal tradition and Mill neglected?"⁹

The other argument given by Berlin that the question if dependence of a subordinate class is intended result of class arrangements is distinct from the assertion from the assertion that negative liberty is simply the absence of interference by other human beings. Berlin says

* Though in the Introduction of the book 'Four Essays on Liberty' Berlin has relaxed the hold of the condition 'deliberate interference' to read 'absence of freedom is due to the closing of such doors or failure to open them as a result, intended or unintended, of alterable human practices of the operation of human agencies; although only if such acts are deliberately intended will they be liable to called oppression (P.XI) though he says so in the introduction but the text of the eassay remains unchanged. Whcih we have quoted earlier while talking of his concept of negative liberty.

9. Macpherson, C.B; Ibid P.100.

that poverty and dependence may not generally be the result of other people's action or arrangements. He says that there is no such causal relationship. It is believed to be so only by those who believe in a particular social and political theory. Macpherson contends that to say so implies that there are equally credible theories which don't ascribe dependence and poverty of the subordinate class to the capitalist property relations. But Macpherson doubts this proposition. He says 'free enterprise theories of any standing from Adam Smith and Bentham to Mill and Green (with the possible exception of Malthus) have recognized that it is indeed arrangements made by other human beings that determine the distribution of wealth and poverty.

Apart from the above views it is a fact that the difference in income in the liberal individual capitalist can not be explained solely by reference to such factors as chance or industriousness or innate capabilities: For so long as there remains difference in access to the means of life and labour there will remain disparity in the income (Though it is not only the question of income but also the capability of doing or not being able to do is related to the factor of access to the means of labour. Thus it can be said, despite Berlin's insistence to the contrary, that unequal access to the means of life and labour inherent in capitalism is an impediment to the

negative liberty of the individuals.

Berlin has acknowledged this but he puts it aside on the ground that it is not freedom which is at stake but it is the condition of freedom which is at stake. But access to the means of life and labour can be called a condition of liberty if it is not considered to be a fetter in our way of doing what we want to do, i.e. negative liberty is narrowly defined. But we very well know that if there is a restriction on the access to the means of life and labour it reduces the area within which I could have otherwise acted freely.

The above argument bring Berlin closer to spencer and Friedman. But Berlin unlike them, criticizes laissez fair as having been destructive of conditions of liberty. "The case for social legislation or planning for the Welfare State and Socialism, can be constructed with as much validity from considerations of the claims of negative liberty as from those of its positive brother"¹⁰ But this contention is not self-consistent. It will be self-consistent only if one drops the distinction between liberty and the conditions of liberty. Macpherson holds that similarly a case could be made of socialism on ground of negative liberty provided we are ready to compute the nett, gain of liberty for the whole society but Berlin Rejects it as logically absurd.

10. Berlin, Isaiah; Op.Lit. P.XIV

Why is it that Berlin defines liberty so narrowly? Macpherson would say that it is because like spencer he is working with a concept of liberty which is mechanical and inertial.

Berlin holds that positive liberty derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. Macpherson compares it with his concept of developmental power for it gives the individual ability to develop all of his humanly attributes. Thus positive liberty requires not only the absence of the simple coercion but also it requires the absence of impediments. This leads to the denial of liberty in the hands of Idealist and extreme Rationalist for the Idealist hold men to be divided into two self-higher and lower and if some-one is not obeying his higher self and thereby is not free then he can be forced to be free. More or less the same logic hold good for extreme rationalists also. What Macpherson wants to convey is that this predicament (i.e. deriving such conclusions from the assumptions of positive liberty which leads to denial of liberty) is due to failure of liberal theory and that it is not due to the logic of positive liberty.

Macpherson says that Berlin mixes three assumption in the concept of positive liberty. (a) the desire of the individual to be his own master; (b) Idealist or Metaphysical

Rationalist transformation of self direction i.e. to take liberty as coercion by fully rational people and; (c) what or who is source of control or in other words it is the right to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled. The central problem, if we have to prove that denial of liberty is not immanent in positive liberty, the relation between (a) and (b) that is how a changes to b. For there is no proper distinction between Negative liberty and the assumption (a) i.e. the desire of the individual to be his own master. Since (b) is dangerous only when it becomes the ideology for justifying greater authoritarian structure therefore, the degeneration of (a) into (b) is not inherent in the logic of positive liberty (a) can degenerate into (b) through two ways (i) the degeneration is induced by (a) or (ii) it is immanent in (a) In case of (ii) the degeneration is attributed to the rationalist assumptions. Berlin writes.

First, that all men have one true purpose, and one only, that of rational self-direction, second, that the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single universal, harmonious pattern, which some men may be able to discern more clearly than others; third, that all conflict, and consequently all tragedy, is due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational or the insufficiently rational—the immature and underdeveloped elements in life—whether individual or communal, and that such clashes are, in principle, avoidable, and for wholly rational beings impossible, finally that when all men have been made rational, they will obey the

rational laws of their own natures, which are one and the same in them all, and so be at once wholly law-abiding and wholly free.¹¹

Thus Berlin proposes four assumptions of which the first is true, that is positive liberty involves the assumption of Rational self direction but not the other three. Macpherson says that if we say that if we remove all the impediments from the path of development of men all will be able to develop - we don't mean that they all will develop into one larger pattern (in fact Macpherson does not believe in such pattern) but that they will develop into different patterns which will not be prescribed nor will they conflict the requirement for which is ending of scarcity and of class conflict. But Berlin is emphatic in his contention that values will conflict in any society. If we have a look at the list of the values which conflict then we will find that it is always the negative liberty which is ⁱⁿ conflict with other values like equality, justice etc. - negative liberty defined in a narrow way so as to exclude the access to the means of life and labour. But if it is defined broadly it will not come in conflict with other values.

G.A. Cohen has argued that one can not be forced to do what one can not do, and one can not do what one is not free to do. Hence one is free to do what one is forced

11. Berlin, Isaiah; Op. Lit. P.154.

to do. So he says if marxists contend that in bourgeois society the labourer is not free not to sell their labour power it may be true but according to the logic explained above the labourers are yet free to sell their labour power which is always the contention of the liberal philosophers. Uptill now both are right but liberals would be wrong if they would presume that their contention refutes the Marxists contention. For in the words of Charles Taylor the freedom about which liberals talk is 'opportunity concept'* of liberty and not an 'exercise concept'*.

As we have seen above that positive liberty leads to paternalism if we assume the following three assumptions namely, (a) the desire to of the individual to be his own master (b) Idealist and/or Metaphysical Rationalist transformation of self direction (c) Right to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled. We have seen that Berlin has proved that it is the assumption (b) which leads to paternalism and that this assumption leads to paternalism because of the failure on the part of the people in political power to provide to all the access to the means of life and labour. Assumption (b) per-se does not lead to paternalism. What we now want to say is

* Opportunity concept means how for a being is free to do something or what options are open to do whether or not we do anything. Whereas the exercise concept involves essentially the exercising of control over one's life. One is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself.

that even if it is granted that positive liberty assumes the distinction between motives we will try to show that the concept of negative liberty also involves distinction of motives. What we want to say is that if we are not motivated by our real will or say higher self to do something we are not free in relation to positive liberty. It is this kind of distinction between motives which sometimes leads to the denial of liberty. We shall try to show that even the "concept of negative liberty requires some kind of background conception of what is significant"¹². For example if we say that absence of external obstacle is freedom then the traffic light restricts my freedom i.e. I become unfree because of traffic lights as they restrict my movement. Further if a legislation is passed by the state authorities prohibiting worship of a particular faith or, say, it prohibits the number of times we can worship then this also represents a case of unfreedom. But whereas for the holders of negative liberty also the second case is an example of unfreedom the first one is not. Why this is so? Because we don't think that the traffic lights restrict our important or significant action but the restriction on number of times we worship is on significant action. Thus we distinguish between important and not so important actions.

12. Taylor, Charles; 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty' in Ryan, Alan; The Idea of Freedom: Essays in honour of Sir Isaiah Berlin, Oxford University Press, London, 1979, P.183.

As far as the question of exercise concept Vs. opportunity concept is concerned, we can say that they can and necessarily should rely on the opportunity concept for will have to include in this group those theory of negative liberty also which have some notion of self realisation also.

As we have perceived that there is a close connection between upholding negative liberalism and laissez faire we propose now to analyse Berlin while comparing him with Hayek.

In the book 'Four essays on Liberty' Isaiah Berlin proposes to examine what he finds to be two Central senses of political liberty. On the one hand, he finds that a significant group of political theorist hold a negative notion of freedom. For them, a man is free to the extent that no other human being interferes with his activity. On the other hand, there is an equally significant group of writers who hold a positive notion of freedom. For them a man is free to the extent that he is master of himself.

What, in General outline, are the Central element in Berlin's famous distinction? At its simplest the distinction between negative and positive liberty is the distinction between non-interference and self government.

In the Negative conception a man is free if and only if no other human being stands in his way, Preventing him by force or coercion, by legal prohibition or private threat, from acting in a way he might otherwise act. On the positive view the lack of coercion or similar interference by other human agent is never a sufficient, and may not even be a necessary, condition of freedom: a man is free, rather, only when he is incharge of his life, master of his circumstances and able to do what he sets himself to do.

While at first it may seem that 'negative' and 'positive' freedom are but two ways of saying the same thing, Berlin notes that these notions of freedom historically developed in different directions until they came into direct conflict. For many of these who held the positive notion of freedom, it was a relatively easy step to distinguish within the individual a 'higher' self as opposed to a 'lower' self. A man's positive freedom came to be identified not with what the individual in fact wanted but with what he would want if he were under the control of his 'higher' self. With this conception of freedom, it then became possible to urge that some men have the right to interfere and direct the lives of other men with the aim of increasing their positive freedom by making them do what their 'higher' self would really want

to do if those individuals only knew better, from the standpoint of those committed to preserving man's freedom in the negative sense, such views merely provided an excuse for tyrants to create the very opposite of a free society while invoking the ideal of positive freedom to justify their dictates. Berlin concludes by observing that while tyranny may also be justified by those who hold the negative notion of freedom, the lesson on history is that tyranny is more likely to result when power is in the hands of those who would make men free in the positive sense. Thus it is the Negative freedom which is true freedom. Now we will see in brief Prof. Hayek's conception of freedom.

While Hayek's 'Road to serfdom' set out in a dramatic and popular way the social advantages that accrue, almost accidentally, from free and spontaneous action, and the harmful consequences that must follow from attempts to improve on a developing spontaneous order, a more philosophical position is contained in the essay 'Individualism: True and False'. It is here that Hayek first Systematically contrasts the rationalist tradition of liberty - unfavourably with the view that defines liberty as spontaneous action, i.e. action which is inherently unpredictable, within traditional rules (though the emergence of an order is predictable). Hayek equates freedom with action in the

context of those traditional rules; rules for which 'reason' is too fragile and weak an instrument to give an intellectual justification. Freedom entails a willingness to submit to rules"so long as one has no definite reason to the contrary¹³ because, "apparently, there is no alternative between accepting the blind forces of a tradition and the orders of a superior".¹⁴

Major systematic Analysis of Liberty and the elaboration of its connection with a more general philosophy is found in Hayek's constitution of Liberty. Here Freedom is defined as that "State in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another".¹⁵ Freedom is clearly an attribute of individual action best exemplified in the choosing and making of decision by persons according to their plans, rather than their being directed to particular ends by others. Elsewhere Hayek relates freedom more directly to human action in decentralized markets when he says it is a "state in which each can use his own knowledge for his own purposes". Liberty describes the relationship between an individual and his fellow citizens so that "the only infringement of it is coercion by other men".¹⁶ From this it follows that freedom

13. Hayek, F.A. 'Individualism and Economic Order' P.23.

14. Ibid. P.24.

15. Hayek, F.A. 'Constitution of Liberty' P.11.

16. Hayek, F.A. Ibid P.12.

is not a function of the range of choice open to the individual; a person is still free if laws forbid him from doing certain things, since unfreedom consists in actually being directed to do things, most obviously by political superiors. The Direction of labour and investment in a fully centralized command economy would be the clearest case of unfreedom for Hayek.

Thus we see that both advocate Negative Liberty. Berlin says that one is free till there is no deliberate interference of others human beings, Hayek would define freedom as that state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another.

Berlin opines that the positive Liberty - the legacy divided into two parts, the higher and the lower, the rational and the animal. "The real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term is normally understood), as a social 'whole' of which the individual is an element or aspect; a tribe, a race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and the dead and yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the 'true' self which, by imposing its collective or organic, single will upon its recalcitrant members, achieve its own and therefore their higher freedom".¹⁷ This renders

17. Berlin, Isaiah, "Two concepts of Liberty" in DEWEY, R.E. and Gould, J.A.(Eds.), Freedom: Its History, nature and Varieties; Macmilan Company, London, 1970, P.92.

it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know that they truly need better than they know it themselves. What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist me if they were rational and as wise as I and understood their interest as I do. Thus I may coerce others with a feeling in me that all I am doing is for the coerced benefit and not for mine. Apart from the fact that any such picture of man's divided self can be used to licence paternalism. Berlin thinks it embodies the immemorial fallacy of supposing that fundamental dilemmas of choices are liable to uniquely rational solutions. This he also explains by analysing the human nature. "We might see his account of human Nature as proceeding along three distinct levels: the monistic, the dualistic, and the pluralistic".¹⁸ At the first level Berlin sees human beings as single, unified agents. "In this Romanticized version of Kant Purposiveness replaces Rationality as the Central essential, and universal characteristic of the spectra".¹⁹ We are characterized by agency and creativity. Considering cases

18. Kocis, Robert A, 'Towards a Coherent Theory of Human Moral Development' in *Political Studies* (1983), XXXI, P.372.

19. *Ibid.* P.372-373.

which illustrates the universality of certain of our moral traits, Berlin writes that the truth of them lies" the basis of modern translation into empirical terms of the Kernal of truth in the old a priori Natural Law doctrines".²⁰ Thus at this level we may conclude that there is, for Berlin, an eternal and universal essence of humanity which extends universality to some of our moral values, but does not entail that we must all live in one way. The Path from the dualist and Pluralist level to liberty require detour through purposiveness but they do lead to the same point. Therefore he advocates Negative Liberty characterizing it as the area within which a man may act unobstructed by others. Berlin points out that coercion is not a term that covers every form of inability: "coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act".²¹ That is to say that coercion is distinguishable from other cognate concepts such as power force and violence, inthat every instance of coercion presupposes an Intention on the part of the coercer to secure the compliance of the coerced agent in a course of conduct which he would

20. Berlin Isaiah 'Does Political theory still exist?' in Laslett and Runciman (eds) Philosophy, Politics and Society, P.27.

21. Berlin, Isaiah, 'Four essays on Liberty' Oxford University Press, Oxford 1969, P.122.

not otherwise follow. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or can not read or can not read because I am blind, or can not understand the darker pages of Hegel it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. More incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom. This is brought out by the use of such modern expressions as economic freedom and its counterpart economic slavery.

Prof. Hayek also advocates Negative Liberty and defines freedom as that "State in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another".²² In other words freedom is a state in which each one can use his own knowledge for his own purposes. Thus for Hayek "coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve another man's will, not for his own but for the other's purpose".²³ Moreover "coercion implies both the threat of inflicting harm and the intention thereby to bring about certain conduct".²⁴ Though the coerced still chooses the alternatives are determined for him by the coercer so that he will choose what the coercer want.

22. Hayek, F.A.; 'The Constitution of Liberty', P.11.

23. Ibid. P.133.

He is not altogether deprived of the possibility of using his knowledge for his own aims.

It seems from what has been said above that coercion means choosing from among alternatives without external interference i.e. the case of limiting one's choice will be coercion, for Berlin, for Hayek it is not minimising one's option that is coercion rather, to be coerced, means to have one's choice determined by another with the intention of using coerced knowledge for the benefit of coercer. This means that a person is coerced not when he has his range of alternative narrowly reduced by government action, but only when he is actually told to do something not in his own interest, but, may be, in the interest of the society. For Berlin, both the cases will be condition of coercion.

Like Berlin Hayek also distinguishes between power and coercion. Power means, for Hayek, the capacity to achieve what one wants. Coercion is forcing others to serve one's will.

Concept of Freedom constitutes the core of Hayek's philosophy. In 'The Constitution of Liberty', he writes "For not only is liberty a system under which all Government action is guided by principles, but it is an ideal that will not be preserved unless it is itself accepted

as an overriding principle governing all particular acts of legislation. Where no such fundamental rule is stubbornly adhere to as an ultimate ideal about which there must be no compromise for the sake of material advantages - as an ideal which, even though it may have to be temporarily infringed during a passing emergency, must form the basis of all permanent arguments - freedom is almost certain to be destroyed by piecemeal encroachments. For in each particular instance it will be possible to promise concrete and tangible. For in each particular instance it will be possible to promise concrete and tangible advantages as the result of the curtailment of the freedom, while the benefits sacrificed will in their nature will always be unknown and uncertain. If freedom were not treated as supreme principle, the fact that the promises which a free society has to offer can always be only chances and not certainties, only opportunities and not definite gifts to particular individuals, would inevitably prove a total weakness and lead to its slow erosion."²⁵

The break with the Monist tradition in ethics and philosophy that inherit from the classical period of platonic and socratic Rationalism by the dependency of Berlin's account of freedom on the claim that some

25. Hayek, F.A.: The Constitution of Liberty Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1946, P.68.

moral and political values which are fundamental in our thought about human conduct e.g. justice are incommensurable with one another. Which motivates Berlin in assigning to liberty a privileged place among the political values he judges to be worthy of promotion. For, as Berlin sees it, it is an inexorable result of the truth that some basic moral and political goods are incommensurable, and that the central excellence of human life are competitive and may sometimes be uncombinable, that moral and political dilemmas are insusceptible of any definitively rational solution. The concept of perfect man, like that of a perfect society, has, accordingly no clear application and must be judged to be incoherent. The privileged status of freedom among the ends of political life derives for Berlin from the constitutive role he conceives moral conflicts to have in political life, and from the source of such conflicts in the ineradicable diversity of man's purpose. Berlin's advocacy of the priority of liberty is grounded, then in the doctrine of value pluralism which he has always promoted.

The claim that everything that deserves to be accounted free act must be expressive of a value in no way supports the very different claim that freedom can not embody values which are inescapably in conflict with

one another. This is evident from Berlin's reiterated emphasis that freedoms may have to be curtailed, either because their exercise conflicts with that of other, perhaps in commensurably valuable freedoms, or because they compete with other values that are largely distinct from those comprehended in typical judgments about freedom. An example of a conflict of the latter kind is suggested by F.A. Hayek. When he compares the situation of a conscripted soldier, well fed and comfortably housed, with that of wandering vagabond, dependent for his survival on his wits. Both Berlin and Hayek recognize that the vagabond's freedom may have little or no value to him, is not to deny that it is freedom that is lost when he is eventually conscripted. Such cases only point to the relevance of the distinction often made by writers in the liberal tradition between a man's having a freedom and his enjoying conditions in which its exercise is on balance valuable to him.

There is one more point regarding coercion on which Berlin and Hayek seem to be following two different paths. For Berlin Coercion is coercion whether a majority of the people are subjected to it or only one individual or whether it be predictive. But for Hayek the proper system of law, is not a infringement on the liberty of the people. This is because unlike the orthodox libertarian tradition,

he does not base his argument for a free society on a structure of Rights which forms a barrier against state coercion, but rather assesses the legitimacy of state action in accordance with whether such action satisfies certain formal requirements of legality. It is not therefore a political philosophy of liberty in which rights constrain government action but one in which the structure of law determines the rights themselves; therefore government action is to be evaluated for its lawfulness rather than its consistency with a substantive morality. Thus if some state action is consistent with Rule of law or that state enacts a law which is perfectly general, non-discriminatory and perfectly predictable it can not be said to be an infringement of liberty in Hayekian system. This is because such coercion can be avoided : "Provided that I know before hand that if I place myself in a particular position, I shall be coerced and provided that I can avoid putting myself in such a position, I need never be coerced".²⁶ If the coercive measures are trained in a manner consistent with the rule of law, so that no person is discriminated against, they function like 'natural obstacle', like my inability to run due to my lameness, to be planned for by each individual.

26. Hayek F.A.; The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976 P.142.

Since none of them base freedom on a system of rights both of them say that infringement by state or other agency upon the freedom of the Individual can be stopped by recognizing an individual 'private sphere' where for Berlin each individual will be able to pursue his own path as the distinctiveness and purposiveness of each individual requires. Hayek would say that this private sphere will give every individual an opportunity of trying those things which have not been in use i.e. decreasing the number of unused things not been in use i.e. decreasing the number of unused things and hence contributing to the progress of the society.

One of Berlin's most Controversial claims is that there is some special kinship between negative views of liberty and the intellectual traditions of classical liberalism. Much here depends on how widely we construe the negative conception. It may be true that thinkers such as Hobbes and Bentham embraced a severely negative view of Liberty, but neither of these is indisputably a liberal. No can J.S. Mill finally be characterized unequivocally as a negative liberarian. For, despite the classical-liberal subject matter of 'on Liberty' in the grounds and Limits of Political obligation, the conception of freedom at work there is one of which it is the notion of a free or autonomous man rather than that of free act

or a free or autonomous man rather than that of free act or a free society that is centrally constitutive.

Freedom can be said to mean conflict and competition among rival modes of thought and life resulting in the enlargement of the options, thus enlarging people's freedom. "Freedom-promoting policy is one which expands the options open to men, and this (on Berlin's own account) must include diminishing internal and subjective restrictions on the availability of options. Against those classical liberals who insist that their intellectual tradition is partly defined by advocacy of a narrowly negative view of liberty, John Gray would argue that the General commitment to freedom actually comprehends a commitment to an open society in which rival modes of thought and life conflict, indeed, that option become available to free men, and only thus that one dimension of their freedom can be enlarged. It is a disadvantage of the position of those who attach a stringent negative liberatianism so closely to classical liberalism, that the link between endorsing the priority of liberty and supporting cultural pluralism is severed. At this point we can contrast the views of Berlin with those of Hayek. While Hayek's conception of freedom has some strongly positive connotations, it is akin to Berlin's in rejecting any necessary connection with wealth or power. It differs

from Berlin's, however, in that Hayek sometimes writes as if the institution of predictable and uniform laws protecting the basic liberal freedom is a sufficient condition of social freedom. Hayek's view appears to be that a liberal social order may be, and perhaps must be a society in which a dominant moral and intellectual tradition drastically curtails the options open to its members (constitution of Liberty, Chapter-4) Berlin's view is surely more faithful to liberalism's classical concerns in recognizing that, though the institution of predictable and uniform laws is a necessary condition of the promotion of liberty through the enlargement of options, it is not sufficient to render a diversity of options and life styles subjectively accessible to men, without which they must fail to attain the status of free men."²⁷

Sir Isaiah Berlin distinguishes between Negative and positive liberty and points out that negative theories are concerned with the area in which the subject should be left without interference, whereas the positive doctrines are concerned with who or what controls. Charles Taylor makes the same point though in a slightly different way. "Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view

27. Gray, John : On Negative and Positive Liberty in Z. Pelczynski and John Gray (eds.): Conception of Liberty in Political Philosophy, The Athlone Press Limited, London, 1984.

of freedom which involves essentially the exercising of control over one's life. On this view, one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept."²⁸

By contrast, Negative theories can rely simply on an opportunity concept, "wherebeing free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise this options".²⁹

We can say here that whereas Berlin's account of freedom essentially entails the opportunity concept Hayek's may be said to be the exercise concept since using one's knowledge for one's own sake is defined as freedom.

These things apart it can be said that both Berlin and Hayek are interested in maintaining the present system. This can be drawn from many statements. For example "Hayek equates freedom with action in the context of those traditional rules; rules for which 'reason' is too fragile and weak an instrument to give an intellectual

28. Taylor, Charles; What's wrong with Negative Liberty in Ryan, Alan (Ed.) The Idea of Freedom:Essays in Honour of Sir Isaiah Berlin, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979 P.177.

29. Ibid. P.177.

justification".³⁰ Further Hayek seems to suggest is that those rules that have emerged to cope with man's necessary ignorance, to coordinate actions in a more effective way than deliberately designed ones could, must be preserved because it is only within the context of such an evolving system of rules that freedom and order are in harmony. Similarly the concept of Rule of law also will produce the same result.

Thus what we find from the analysis of Berlin's view as well as from the comparative study of Berlin's and Hayek's view on liberty that by and large the liberals are on the side of taking a negative view of liberty and thereby providing the individuals with just hypothetical opportunities for choosing from among the alternative. Those who, in the liberal tradition, took a positive sense of liberty e.g. Idealists or Rationalist ended up with the all powerful state. What we think it is due to is the faulty assumptions about human nature and the faulty method of providing the individual with liberty. If the negative concept of liberty in the liberal tradition provides liberty to the individual from reified social relation it does not provide him the liberty of the species being on the other hand if the positive liberty of the species being on the other hand if the positive

liberty treats it as species being then man lost his identity under the heavy shadow of community. In fact in the liberal tradition the opposite of freedom is not one's dependence on some necessity governing the world of things (e.g. the anonymous market mechanism) but one's dependence on the arbitrary will of another man. As opposed to this Marx saw both the mastery over the objects (i.e. world of things) and over the arbitrary will of others as the true freedom. "Hence freedom in this conception had two aspects: in the relation man-nature it meant the maximization of Power of the human species achieved through the development of productive forces; in the relation individual society it was understood as a conscious shaping by men of the social conditions of their existence, and thereby the liberation of individuals from the impersonal power of alienated, reified social forces. In the first case the subject of freedom was the collectivity (society or mankind); what was at stake here was the development of collective man, freeing himself from the power of nature at the expense of ever increasing enslavement of individual".³¹ Marx also sees a man as a continuous developer and freedom as an opportunity providing device whereby men will be able to develop and realize their full capacity. This will be possible only when the realm

31. Walicki, Andrzej; "Marx and Freedom" In The New York Review of Books, 24 Nov. 1983, p.283

of necessity ends. This is pretty close to what Macpherson contends but there is one difference whereas Macpherson feels that this could be done within the liberal society itself Marx did not believe so and therefore he said that man will be totally free only when the communism comes.

CHAPTER - IV

HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY ?

In the preface to A Contribution to the critique of Political Economy Marx wrote "in the Social Production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces..... with the change in Economic Foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed"¹.

The passage quoted above gives the impression that it is only the economic Foundation which creates history other things - as individual human beings, their motives and will etc - have no role to play in this regard. Thus to some it seems that men are only the cog in the wheel, they do what the mode of production wants them to do and hence there exists a relation of cause and effect. If there is a change in the mode of production corresponding changes will be discernable in the society. This implies certain kind of determinism. The determinism may also follow from

1. Marx, Karl "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in Marx and Engels Selected Works Vol.1 Progress Publisher Moscow 1977 P.503-504.

Hegelian interpretation of History where the driving force is not the Mode of Production but the 'Absolute Idea' or 'Absolute Spirit'.

It is precisely this kind of determinism against which Sir Isaiah Berlin wants to speak. But it is not only this proposition which is objectionable to him but also the results that will follow if we adopt this version of History.

In this chapter we will first see what Berlin has to say about Historiography, (which basically comprises critique of the deterministic theories of History) then we will see that if whatever he says about these theories communicates the full, clear and also the true picture of the concerned theory. We will then venture to look into the question of Methodological individualism vs. Methodological collectivism and finally we will look into the question of morality and the effects on our daily language if we adopt the so called deterministic theory of History. It is also pertinent to point out here that while looking into the question of Methodological individualism vs. Methodological collectivism we will also have a look on the question of free will.

Berlin says that in answering the questions like 'How did this or that situation arise? Who or What was or is (or will be, or could be) responsible for a war, a revolution, an economic collapse, a renaissance of arts and letters, a

discovery or an invention or a spiritual transformation altering the lives of men? We encounter broadly two types of theories. On the one hand there is 'Personal theory'* and on the other hand there is 'Impersonal theory'. Explaining the personal theory Berlin says ".....theories according to which the lives of entire peoples and societies have been decisively influenced by the exceptional individuals....."² Further more he writes in the same vein that if we adopt this view of the history ".....it becomes the business of historians to investigate who wanted what, and when, and where, in what way; how many men avoided or pursued this or that goal, and with what intensity....."³. Thus what is the characteristic of this theory is that we want to interpret history in terms of the purposes and characters of individuals.

Contrary to the above mentioned view is the Impersonal theory of History according to which "the behaviour of men

* This nomenclature has been used by Isaiah Berlin himself in the essay 'Historical Inevitability' in the book "Four essays on Liberty" Oxford University Press, London, 1969.

2. Berlin, Isaiah; "Four Essays on Liberty", Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p. 11.

is in fact made what it is by causes largely beyond the control of individuals; for instance by the influence of physical factors or of environment or of custom; or by the 'natural' growth of some larger unit - a race, a nation, a class, a biological species; or (according to some writers) by some entity conceived in even less empirical terms - a 'spiritual organism', a religion, a civilization, a Hegelian (or Buddhist) world spirit; entities whose careers or manifestations on earth are the object either of empirical or metaphysical inquiries....."⁴

Berlin feels that this tendency is because of two

- (1) Because of the belief that this possesses greater scientific value (i.e. enables them to predict the future or retrodict the past more successfully or precisely) or
- (2) Because of the belief that this approach embodies some crucial insight into the nature of the universe. These beliefs commit the believer to trace the ultimate responsibility for what happens to the acts or behaviour of impersonal or 'transpersonal' or 'super-personal' entities or 'forces' whose evolution is identified with human history.

Berlin opines that individual in such analysis remains abstract for he is taken to be a part of the whole, "mere elements or aspects, moments artificially abstracted for ad-hoc purposes and literally without reality apart

4. Berlin, 'Isaiah'; Ibid P. 45

from the wholes of which they form a part"⁵. He finds Marx and Marxists to be more ambiguous for they seek to explain history with the help of such ambiguous categories as class. Marxists deny interpretation in terms of individuals because true cause of human behaviour lies, what Berlin thinks Marxists believe in, not in the specific circumstances of an individual life or in individuals thoughts or volition but in the pervasive inter-relationship between a vast variety of such lives with their natures and man made environment. Men do as they do largely as a function of the inevitable evolution of the class as a whole. Berlin says that this theory may take different form but remains the same in its essence. Thus he says that be it benevolent internationalist like Herder or the ferocious champions of national or racial self assertion and war like Hitler or the upholders of Collectivist mystiques who appeal from individual to tradition, or to Collective Consciousness of a race like Carlyle but what all such views have in common is the fundamental distinction on which they rest, between , on the one hand, 'real' and 'objective', and, on the other, 'Subjective' or 'arbitrary' judgements based respectively on acceptance or rejection of this ultimately mystical act of self-identification with a reality which transcends empirical experience."⁶.

5. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P-46.

6. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P-47.

Thus this method, according to Berlin, gives more scientific outlook to the theory at least for those who believe in it. But Berlin believes that this is not scientific. Berlin says that ".....whatever version of the story is accepted..... it is never scientific, that is empirically testable theory, stated in quantitative terms, still less a description of what our eyes see and our ears hear....."⁷

Thus for Berlin scientific method means employing our sense organs and hence only that is true which we see or hear every thing else is wrong. We will look into the validity of this proposition later in this chapter when we shall take-up the job of evaluation of Berlin's views.

Let us switch back to the two beliefs that Berlin supposes to be the cause of rise of Impersonal view of the history. We have seen above that Berlin has refuted the first belief, that is, the belief that this possesses greater scientific value. We now will concentrate on the second belief.

Berlin first states that the proponents of the second belief, that is, the Impersonal view of history embodies some crucial insight into the nature of the universe, say that there is a nature of things and it has a pattern in

7. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P. 48-49.

time hence things are what they are. Berlin says that to avoid deception we must, at the very least-if we can not swallow the notion of super-personal 'Spirits' or 'forces' - admit that all events occur in discoverable, uniform, unaltering patterns. Our values are conditioned by the place we occupy in the pattern on the moving stair. Hence the only attitudes correctly described and rightly condemned, as relative, subjective and irrational are forms of failure to relate our judgment to our own truest interests.

This attitude, Berlin says, rests on the belief that everything is caused to occur as it does by the machinery of history itself-by the impersonal forces of class etc. Berlin opines that if our life is organised in this way then it is unjust to blame or praise an individual or group of individuals.

Notion that history obeys laws has deep metaphysical origin, so Berlin tells us. There are at least three identifiable sources:- firstly the Teleological outlook. Whereby all living and non living creatures are supposed to have function and pursue purposes. Thus every entity has a nature and the measure of its perfection is the degree to which it fulfills its nature. This attitude is anti-empirical and hence unscientific to Berlin for we attribute

purpose to everything despite we not having any evidence for it. This view also implies that individual responsibility is an illusion.

The second view which feels that history obeys laws, does so because it believes that there is a timeless, permanent, transcendent reality above which is in perfect, in-avoidable, self-explaining harmony. Therefore explanation is discovery of the underlying pattern. The distinction between reality and appearance plays the part here which purpose and function plays in teleology.

Thirdly, there is the influence of the natural science, "the notion that all that exists is necessarily an object in material nature, and the therefore susceptible to explanation by scientific laws."⁸ Common to all these concepts is the notion that to explain is to subsume under general formulae.

What implication does Berlin derive from this?

There are two; first that individual's freedom of choice is ultimately an illusion and secondly that we can not condemn or praise an individual for there is no free choice. Thus the moral judgment becomes groundless. Moral judgment

8. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P 56.

are groundless because of two streams of thought either we know too much or we know too little. Again among the former are those who are optimist and those who are pessimist. Thus for Hegel, and after him for Marx also, man is a part and parcel of wider nature. But they all agree in that world has a direction and is governed by laws and that these laws and direction can be discerned if proper tool is applied, that is, the whole process is analysed realizing that lives, characters and acts of individuals are governed by the larger wholes to which they belong (e.g. class for Marx and 'Spirit' for Hegel) and that the true scientific history is one which is in terms of these wholes. Berlin here also sees the abolition of individual responsibility which again creates problem for the concepts like deserts and condemnation etc.

At one place in his writings Berlin says that whatever his argument be he does not want to convey the idea that determinism is necessarily false. He wants to say that the truthfulness of this concept is not reflected in our process of daily thoughts and practices. "I don't here wish to say that determinism is necessarily false, only that we neither speak nor think as if it could be true, and that it is difficult, and perhaps beyond our normal powers, to conceive what our picture of the world would be if we seriously believed it....."⁹ so either we will have

9. Berlin, Isaiah; Ibid P.71.

to change our language and thought process entirely or determinism is false. He says that there is a class of expression which demand attaching some meaning to free choice. But Berlin submits that this is an horrible task.

The other stream why moral judgment is taken to be groundless is that we know too little and hence every thing is relative. Therefore we should attempt at greater understanding. This is also so because man is imperfect and also that so many minute forces are operating that it is impossible to comprehend them all. Berlin draws some conclusions from this argument. Firstly, we can not blame historians for maintaining objectivity as every thing is relative including the standards of objectivity. Secondly all attitudes become morally neutral in the absence of some super-standard. But even this, Berlin holds, can not be said for the contradictory of this position can not be refuted. Therefore there must be some fallacy in the argument of the anti-moralistic school. Thirdly, condemnation or praise in language should be done away with and Fourthly, that if the proposition that moral judgment is groundless is true then our language and distinction that we make of evaluative kind will be false-

Now Berlin gives some general remarks about what he has said in relation to determinism and relativism. Firstly since scienticism requires generalization and since

in history there can be no generalization for it requires evaluation, which is subjective, hence no scientific method is applicable to history.

About the proposition that we should not sit for judging for we know too little Berlin holds that in practice we often find the contrary to be true.

Another proposition that concepts are relative, that is, they change with time and surrounding atmosphere logically implies, Berlin holds, such standards which don't change with time by which the changes in such concepts is perceptible. But it can not be so according to relativists. Hence the fallacy.

Keeping in view, Berlin holds, that all the arguments which have been put forth for upholding Determinism or Relativism are untenable there must be some other reasons also and that may be to shift the burden of moral responsibility from the shoulder of human beings to such inanimate abstraction as 'class' and 'spirit' which ultimately might lead to prescription of a particular way of life and thereby lead to Paternalism.

Till now we had been looking into what Berlin had to say. We propose now to ponder over it.

At the very general level it can be said that Berlin's

main point of attack is Determinism of any variety be it that of Hegel or Marx. The fault being committed by him is that of not distinguishing between different kinds of Determinism. Though it is altogether a different question whether Marx was a determinist in the sense of not assigning any role to individuals and thus whether he gives a place to free will in his scheme or not. The similar type of fallacy is seen when we find him clubbing together Marx and Comte for both espoused scientific method. We will tackle these problems in due course. Let us begin in the same order as we have discussed Berlin earlier.

Berlin's conception of Scientific method is one where we apply our sense organ. Only that is true which we see with our eyes and which we hear with our ears. Every thing else is wrong. This conception of scientific method is more akin to empiricism which relies on pure observation only than to scientific method as we understand it in 20th century. For the scientific method not only prescribes observation and taking the observed phenomenon as true but it also takes true what has been arrived at by logical deductive reasoning from inductively reached factual generalization.¹⁰ Thus Berlin is wrong in emphasising that scientific

10. The steps in the scientific method enumerated by Arnold Brecht in his book political theory: The foundation of 20th century political thought as followings.

1. Observation 2. Description 3. Measurement. 4. Acceptance or non acceptance of result of observation 5. Inductive generalization.

method is only the one where only observation has been believed upon. He also is misleading when he believes, even if by implication, that whatever we observe is truth. We shall like to put an example here. We see the sun rising in the east daily. Since we see it therefore our assertion that sun rises in the east is not only scientific but also true. But only a naive person will take it as truth for sun does not rise at all. It is only because of the geoid shape of the earth that we feel that the sun is rising.

Hence rejecting the theories of Determinism and Relativism on the ground that they are not scientific seems to be unjustified. Also as we have tried to show empiricism can not be shown to be equivalent to scientific method. These observations are especially true for Marxism if not for all forms of determinism and Relativism. As far as the question of adoption of scientific method by Marx and

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6. Explanation of accepted facts 7. Logical deductive reasoning
 8. Testing by further observation 9. Correcting the tentative acceptance of observation etc. 10. Predicting events. 11. Nonacceptance of all statements not obtained in the manner here described.

Engles is concerned we can quote Arnold Brecht "Marx and Engles did indeed apply what we now call scientific method-empirical observation, description, hypothetical explanation, and so forth....."¹¹

Berlin's other assertion is that individual in such analysis remains abstract for he is taken to be a part of the whole. Further he finds Marx and Marxist mere ambiguous for they seek to explain history with such ambiguous category as class. Here we must emphasize that when man is taken to be a part of the whole what is meant thereby is that while explaining the individual we should take into consideration effect of all such factors. Charles E. Merriam while criticising the work of historians as irrelevant argued that modern historians had ignored the Psychological, Sociological and Economic factors in human affairs too much. Thus contrary to Berlin's emphasis it seems that if we take an individual to be a part of the whole we don't abstract him but rather concretize him more.

Berlin's assertion that since we don't use a separate language for narrating history which like language of physical sciences is value neutral and is also objective. If the only criteria for making a discipline nearer to science is having

11. Brecht, Arnold; Political Theory: The foundation of twentieth century Political thought", The Times of India Press, Bombay; 1965, P.187.

its own distinct language then surely history is not but is this criterion sufficient? Or even is this criterion important enough? Perhaps no, because when we talk of scientism in social science we don't mean to make it value free for it can not be by the very nature of its subject matter.

Berlin's assertion that the contention history that obeys laws is conditioned by three tendencies (a) Teleology (b) acceptance of supernatural reality and (c) effect of Natural science. Let us be very clear that though this assertion of Berlin may be said to be right in case of some variants of the contention that history obeys laws but certainly it does not seem to be perfectly correct in connexion with Marxian theory. How, let us see.

When we encounter such questions like can the order of cause and effect be reversed? Can the end effect its own cause? Or can the future shape the part to suit it? We come across two propositions. (1) future events often influence man's actions, and (2) the future seems to be incorporated in the very nature of many things. The first of these arguments presents no particular difficulty. Motivation of man's action by future events does not really affect the order of cause and effect, since in this case the fact that a person pursues certain purposes and harbours certain expectations is the cause of his action and antecedes it in time. But the second

argument confronts us with a great problem. "The order of cause and effect may appear reversed in a most Puzzling manner - with no human anticipation serving as a connecting link - on the ground that the seeds of plants, animals, and human beings seem to carry their own future in them, and every organ of living body seems to be the incarnation of a purpose, and to act for the purpose. Even some inanimate matter, like crystals, seems to develop towards a goal. This way of looking at things is called Teleological"¹².

If this is what is meant by Teleology then there is no teleology in Marxian theory for it does not say that man or the productive forces are some purposes in-nate in them in the pursuit of which they do or develop what and how they do and develop. In fact the contradiction in the forces of production and Relations of Production which make the history enter into a new era does not do so in accordance with some dirive plan or purpose. This much about Teleology.

Let us now see the question of belief in the concept of supernatural reality. Since Marx or Marxist can not decisively be shown to believe in teleology they don't need to creat a supernatural power either to impute motive in every one or to see to it that all things follow a dirine and

12. Brecht, Arnold; Igid P.83.

universal plan. Contrary to this the development in the society is caused by the Material forces very much present in the world itself. Though Berlin's contention will be of no problem if seen in relation to the determinism, led to believe in the presence of spiril or Absolute Idea - a supernatural entity.

As far as the question of effect of Natural Science is concerned let us quote Sir Berlin himself "I should like to reiterate some common-places from which I don't depart: that causal law are application to human history (a proposition which, pace Mr. Carr, I should consider it insave to deny, that history is not mainly dramatic conflict between individual wills"¹³.

Let us close this issue here and switch over to the new issue that is of the question of Methodological individualism Vs Methodological collectivism. We relate this question to the system of Berlin's thought through his assertion that there can be no cause and effect phenomenon for if it is so then there shall be no question of condemning a person for his wrongs or praising one for his good deeds. Thus what Berlin, by implication wants to say is that every phenomenon is unique and so should be analyzed in its own right. Methodological individualism also entails a particular version of ontology.

13. Berlin, Isaiah; Four Essays on Liberty Oxford University Press, London, 1969 P.XXXIV.

The broad outlines of the argument for methodological individualism have changed little since Weber's time. Elster writes "intentional explanation is the feature that distinguishes social sciences from the natural sciences"¹⁴. To explain an action intentionally is to ascribe to the agent beliefs and desires which caused him so to act. This presupposes some account of the distinct properties of human agents. Daniel Dennett specifies six necessary condition of personhood.

- "(i) Persons are rational being
- (ii) Persons are beings to which---Intentional predicts (i.e. belief and desires) are ascribed.
- (iii) Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to ti.
- (iv) The object towards which this stance is taken must be capable of reciprocating in some way.
- (v) Persons must be capable of verbal communication.
- (vi) (Person are) conscious in some special way (namely they are aware of having engaged in actions and therefore can be held responsible for them"¹⁵

This conception of Agent which assigns belief and desire to men is an explanatory concept. Predictions about people's conduct can be derived from it by means of explana-

14. Elster, Jon; Explaining Technical Change Cambridge 1983
P.69.

15. Dennett, Daniel; Brainstorms Brighton, 1981 quoted in Callinicos, Alex Making History: Agency Structure and Change in Social theory polity Press, Cambridge 1987, P.12.

tion on the following form. If some one desires something and believes that by doing A he can best get it, and other things are equal, then he does A. Macdonald and Pettit have argued the orthodox conception of Agent (Characteristics of which have been enumerated above in words of D. Dennett) implies the truth of methodological individualism. Since as we have seen in the chapter on conception of man that Agents can be ascribed with beliefs and desires it implies that we should adopt Methodological individualism for explaining phenomenon.

Macdonald and Pettit hold that accepting the orthodox conception of agents means rejecting the claim that institutions have explanatory autonomy.* The methodological collectivists hold that action can not be explained solely in terms of individual's properties, beliefs, desires etc., but that these explanations must also make irreducible references to institutions or more generally to structures. Attempted proof of this doctrine's falsehood by Macdonald and Pettit involves two main premises (as explained in 'Semantics')

(1) If the explanatory collectivist say that there are some events which can be explained by reference to institutions,

* Explanatory autonomy has been defined by Macdonald and Pettit in the following way "One sort of entity X exists over and beyond another sort Y if and only if the following condition is met: that the addition of terms by means of which we refer to X-type things enables us to give explanations of events, taken under certain descriptions, that we can not account for in a language with terms for referring to Y-type items.

but not by reference to individuals, then he is denying the truth of the orthodox conception of agents. At least with respect to the behaviour involved in those events he is saying that it is not the rational outcome of the agents' beliefs and desires (2) The claim of this conception is undeniable.

Alex Callinicos, however, opines that "the orthodox conception of agents' belong to a historically specific intellectual context, one that involves the combination of an essentially Platonic notion of theoretical understanding with the more modern idea that it is legitimate to interfere in nature in order to know it".¹⁶

The above arguments may lead one to the conclusion that the orthodox conception of Agent is false and is implicit in the post structuralists thought. But again as Alex Callinicos says "The orthodox conception is best seen as part of a broader account of human nature"¹⁷ Norman Geras explain this account of human nature thus one which treats human beings as "like all other species, material and natural beings, irredeemably rooted in a given biological constitution,

16. Callinicos, Alex; Making History: Agency Structure and Change in Social theory", Polity Press Cambridge, 1987 P.21.

17. Callinicos, Alex; Ibid P.25.

absolutely continuous with the rest of the natural world"¹⁸.

The answer to the question whether or not the orthodox conception Woven into account of human nature requires methodological individualism i.e. the claim that the explanation of social events can only be in terms of individual, their states and properties. Macdonald and Pettit argue that orthodox conception does involve Methodological individualism since to suppose the contradictory true, will amount to suggesting that at least there are some phenomena which can be explained without taking into consideration the desires and beliefs of the agents and thus deny the truthfulness of orthodox conception. But we will argue here that despite the belief in the orthodox conception which ascribes desires and belief to the agent we need not necessarily adopt Methodological individualism. Thus while accepting that in some conditions the agents do have free will we will try to show that it does not involve methodological individualism.

Let us consider the form of action explanation:

- (1) A desires p
- (2) A believes that q, namely that doing x will bring it about p.
- (3) Therefore A does x.

18. Geras, Norman; "Marx and Human Nature" London NLB 1982
PP 21-22.

But there are various ways whereby this reasoning may be shown to be defeasible. This is the case what Aristotle called Akrasia where despite the belief that doing x will bring p the agent does not do x because of the weakness of the will. Another way is that A will not do x if he is prevented from doing x. So what we will have instead of proposition 3 is that

3' A tries to do x.

Let us take an example. A slave who has a love for freedom and other human dignity (despite the fact of his being a slave and society accepting this system as true) will want to be free from the predicament of being a slave. He will know that eloping from his owner's place will bring him relief from those predicaments but his attempts will be frustrated by the guards employed there. (or perhaps they might themselves be owned by the master) therefore the other alternative is to bring about consciousness among the fellow slaves and stage a general coup. But when this happens the state comes in with its organised force to crush it (as is shown by G.E.M. de Ste Croix in the class struggle in the Ancient Greek world, London, 1981). So to explain why 3' happened instead of 3 we have to make reference to the social structure. Thus we see that inspite of ascribing desires and beliefs to the agent we give the social structure an explanatory autonomy. This

does not also imply the untruthfulness of orthodox conception of agent because for an action-explanation to be validly inferred we require one more preposition i.e. (4) A has the power to do x and is not prevented from doing it.[†] Thus "Action consists in the exercise of powers, and the powers agent have depend on and are determined in part by social structures".¹⁹

Thus what we have been trying to show is that what an agent wants to do is not entirely determined rather that they (The agents) may form their own plan but executing this depends upon the power they have which in their turn depends upon the Social structure. Thus agents may and do have free will.

Tamas Foldesi has opined in his book 'The problem of Free will' that the problem of free will is related to the question of necessity and chance. "Whatsoever follows from the essence, the intrinsicity of things and unavoidably takes place is necessary"²⁰ Whereas "chance is variable, not

* This whole argument is based on the analysis given in. 'The Problem of Free will' by Tama's Foldesi and 'Making history' by Alex Callinicos.

19. Callinicos, Alex; Making History : Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory, Policy Press, 1987 P.38.

20. Foldesi, Tamas; The Problem of Free will Akademiai Kiado Budapest 1966 P.136.

immediately related to the essence of the process. Chance phenomenon may or may not occur, may take place in one way and in another, too"²¹. After defining the differences the two categories he opines that necessity and chance are at the same time related for chance phenomena are not entirely accidental since necessity assert itself through a group of chance phenomena.

After saying this much about the question of free will and the problem of Methodological individualism let us now turn to the problem of morality so vehemently raised by Berlin. He opines that moral theories which deny or limit the responsibility of individual are politically as well as logically objectionable. Politically for it may call for a particular way of living and thinking as prescribed by the minority ruling elite or to say in one word. Regimentation. It is contradictory to the basic human nature for then men will not be free to persue their carefully chosen values and hence logically also objectionable.

Let us see what do we mean by saying that human beings make history, we will thus be answering the question of responsibility and hence morality.

Perry Anderson suggests that we can distinguish three ways in which men can make history each involving a different

21. Foldesi, Tames; Ibid P.136.

sort of goal for their activity. The first and the most typical form of historical action is the pursuit of private goals e.g. cultivation of a land or say choice of a marriage. The second kind of agency operates, as the first one, within the framework of existing social relations, pertaining to the kind of ventures involving public goals e.g. political struggles or commercial explorations etc. and this is the subject matter of the conventional history. And lastly the third one involved in the collective pursuit of global social transformation, which first appeared in the American and French Revolutions but acquired full expression only with the emergence of the workers' movement and revolutionary Marxism. Here for the first time collective projects of social transformation were married to systematic efforts to understand the process of past and present, to produce a premeditated future. We think that this much will suffice the question of individual responsibility as with the above made distinction we can to a great degree overcome the abstract polarity between structure and Agency represented by Althusser and Thompson respectively.

As far as the question of value related morality is concerned Berlin says that we can not hierarchically arrange the values for none is absolute. This logically means that an individual should be free to rape a woman and strike a nail into a child's head if he consciously chooses to do so. But we very well know this can not be. In trying to replace

moral monistic absolutism Berlin does little more than replacing it with pluralist absolutism, so Bhikhu Parekh opines.²² At one place Berlin says that men choose, accept or commit themselves to certain values, implying that the value exists independently of human choice. On the other place he would convey the idea that no principle or value is higher than the ends of the individual and that all values are made so by the free acts of man. Both these views seem to be contradictory for if value exist prior to human choice then a thing can not become a value simply because ~~men~~ choose them. Thus Berlin seems to be oscillating between the extreme of objectivism and of subjectivism. It may make sense that men are the sole author of values, in the sense that system of values don't grow on trees but are product of human decision, it does not follow or philosophically false to say that every man is the sole author of his values for this will be sliding down from man in the collective Noun to the man in the proper Noun.

22. Parekh, Bhikhu; Contemporary Political Thinkers Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982, P.43.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

Berlin's over emphasis on the autonomy of men, Plurality of values and their absoluteness and 'personal' theory of history are in accordance with the British tradition. His powerful advocacy for Negative Liberty accords well with the system of his thought.

What one perceives as a whole after a bit close look at his writing is that he wants individual should be left alone and that there should be a minimum of interference from state. Although he has not explicitly expressed the idea that there should be a limited state but while discussing negative liberty **he** opines that there should be a sphere where there should not be interference by any agency, individual should be the master of this field. This Berlin has propounded against the back-ground of the criticism that he proposes of what he calls the deepest assumption of western political thought. First among these assumption is the 'great despotic vision of the man and the world' wherein he criticises the tendency of assuming the universe as a rational and intelligible whole which is informed by a single principle and is called by such names as Natural law, immutable reason, Ideas etc.

The second deepest assumption is that good is, and must be a coherent and frictionless whole. But Berlin holds the company to be true. For him the conflict between values, principles and human capacities are the fundamental and inescapable features of human life and can not in principle be eliminated.

The third fundamental assumption of the Western political thought which he takes to be wrong is the belief that it is possible to form and even to realize, a conception of a perfect man or a perfect society. But Berlin opines that since human values, capacity and aspirations conflict therefore men can live morally in several different and incompatible ways. It is logically impossible to combine them all into a harmonious whole, hence the concept of a perfect man is incoherent. Since different society develop different capacities therefore concept of a perfect society is equally incoherent.

Moral monism is yet another fundamental assumption of the Western thought. Berlin says that there is no value to which all other values can be reduced. Even such value like reason when required to make more specific need reference to other values.

Against all these he proposes that essence of man is his being autonomous being and freedom is the unique and

principle characteristic. "Man is most himself in choosing rather than being chosen for and realizes and develops himself in the course of making free choices"¹.

This all implies that man should be left free. In the field of liberal economics this takes the form of Market Society of perfect free Market i.e. Laissez Fairie. F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman can be taken as spokesman of this. We feel that Berlin supplies the Liberal political and philosophical version of this tendency. (That is why we have ventured into a comparative study of Berlin and Hayek in the chapter on Freedom).

Why is it that in the twentieth century when there is a tendency of gaining more and more influence by the positive liberalism Berlin has ventured into such an exercise?

All political theorising about society in the twentieth century shared a consensus that society is a thing, an object or entity that has little or no self sustaining and self connecting mechanism. In practical term, for those who believed in this doctrine, this means that every problem is a social problem requiring immediate attention through central action rather than an individual problem that can be settled by following decentralised rules.²

1. Berlin, Isaiah; Concepts And Categories, P.190.

2. For example such views have been expressed by David G. Green in his book 'The New Right', Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex, 1987 and Norman P. Bassy in 'The New Right' Croom Helm, New York, 1987.

All this implied a central role for politics. Those who are against assigning this central role to politics, like Berlin, have taken to classical Individualist Liberalism. That is why we see again the revival of the old contractarian formula espoused by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in the term of John Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice'.

Why do they decry politics? For they thought that they could legitimately complain that despite over arching power over the economy and society, the typical social democratic state was weak. This was so precisely because it could not resist the incessant demands of pressure groups.³ In Britain because of the distorted election results, they thought, individual was put not at the mercy of the majority but at the mercy of the majority in the House of Commons which invariably represented a minority. That is why we saw that an increase in the number of grievance being taken to the European court of Human Rights and this fact indicated towards nothing but the possibility that the inner constitutional devices were not proper.

If they did not believe in the Politics, the question is did they want to create a world without Politics. NO ! certainly No.!! for they themselves were engaged in a political exercise. Even laissez **faire** economists have to accept in

3. Such views have been expressed by Norman P. Bany in his book 'The New Right' in 3 different case studies of Britain, U.S.A., and West Germany.

some sense the primacy of the political, i.e., the theory that survival of an exchange process depends on a set of rules and political arrangements which are not derived from exchange itself and that is why we find Berlin also expressing the view that though the sphere of the individual's absolute freedom should be more and more but that it can never be unlimited implying that there should be a minimal state, for the necessity for such political arrangements does not entail that politics as a decision - making method should predominate over all other possible decision-making methods, such as market mechanism and voluntary actions outside the realm of price. Such ideas have also been expressed by Gordon Graham in his book 'Politics In Its Place' where he tries to demonstrate this through a study of six Ideologies.

True that most of the Western liberal democratic countries have not been able to solve the problems despite the adoption of many a social welfare measure like progressive taxation but we, nonetheless, find them beset even with a new kind of problem. The new Rightist are Right in diagnosing that 'Western democratic countries are sick company,' but like Rousseau, they are not trying to solve the problem by going still forward but that they want to solve it by retracing their own path: they want to give the state a minimal role which had gained ground because of the malfunctioning of these very societies. It was the great depression of 1929- which later on led to the Second World War (though not the sole cause of the 2nd World War) - which proved the necessity of giving the

state a supervisory role.

We don't, of course, want to convey the idea that the state can never be done away with. But certainly this can not be done in the presently obtainable circumstances in most of the countries. Even if we agree with the proposition of Berlin that man differs from other by his capacity to choose from among the many alternatives then let the situation come when he is not only really able to choose but also that there are really more than one alternatives available to him. We don't believe in hypothetical alternatives and men's hypothetical capacity to choose. But can this real capacity to choose and the real alternative would come by making adjustments here and there in the presently obtainable liberal democratic system? Would this be done by change-in-structure or structural change is a debatable question.

After the second world war USA and USSR emerged as the two super powers with entirely different political set-up, political culture and related ideology. Each one found the other's ideology hostile to its own ideology the spread of which could have questioned even the existence of the other. Therefore there was an attempt by the Western block of checking the sphere of influence in the World Polity. This tendency witnessed a simultaneous rise in a philosophical system which opposed the ideology and philosophical system of the eastern block at every level - philosophical, Market etc.

Thus if there was an assertion by the Marxist ideology that individual is largely a social construct rather than an abstraction the counter-ideology try to proved the individual's characteristic ~~in~~ such abstract quality as to choose, if, on the one hand the former ideology said that we can discern a pattern in the historical progress the counter assertion immediately came and stressed that no, history is the sum total of many unique phenomena and could only be analysed with reference to the great personalities of their times as it were they who chose what to do. If one ideology believed that men are men therefore every one should be given opportunity and means to realise himself the counter assertion was quick enough in coming forward and asserting that men should be left free and be allowed to choose freely - for this is what is the essence of the man - unfettered by any force ~~save~~ the market force which would award each individual according to his capacities and abilities. The philosophico-political counter part of this very assertion is what we find in Methodological individualism. This trend of countering the Marxist ideology with more vehemence - is what is called by Anthony Arblaster 'Cold War Liberalism'. We don't want to propose that Berlin wrote with the same intention, though true is it historically that he wrote after the second World War when the Cold War was at its peak. But we can very safely propose that his writings can be read in that light.

Marx said to the effect its not the consciousness that determines the being of an individual rather its the social being which determines ones consciousness. We don't want to assert the obvious truth for Berlin also. Bhikhu Parekh has said that the basic distinction between philosophical and non philosophical enquiry is that while the former" is a self conscious and rationally self critical form of enquiry non philosophical forms of enquiry rests on and are constituted by several basic assumptions which they don't and can not question"⁴. Does this mean that Berlin's enquiry can't even be called a proper philosophical enquiry? At this juncture only some questions can be raised for further investigation though it is difficult to characterise Berlin as unphilosophical because the very question of ontology is the subject matter of philosophy.

4. Parekh, Bhikhu: "Contemporary Political Thinkers Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982 P.186.

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