

**NATO'S EXPANSION TO RUSSIA'S BORDER AND  
SECURITY OF THE BALTIC STATES**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
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**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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## DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **NATO's Expansion to Russia's Border and Security of the Baltic States** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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## CERTIFICATE

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**KARAN KUMAR**

## **Abbreviations**

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BALTBAT	Baltic Battalion
BALTDEFCOL	The Baltic Defense College
BALTNET	Baltic Air surveillance Network
BALTRON	The Baltic Naval Squadron
CEF	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IW	Information War
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MNC	Multi National Companies
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PARP	Planning and Review Process
PFP	Partnership for Peace
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SFOR	The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UNCTAD	United Nation Conference on Trade and Development

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## Chapter 1

### **Introduction: Literature Review and Research Design**

The eastward expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become an important geopolitical trend after disintegration of former Soviet Union and the so-called end of cold war aiming at establishing western control over post-Soviet space. The Soviet disintegration and emergence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania commonly known as Baltic states newly independent states led to profound transformation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). Baltic states took steps for advancing regional cooperation and established relation with Euro-Atlantic institutions by joining NATO and European Union (EU) in 2004. NATO's expansion towards Russia's border poses challenges to regional security, and has security challenges for Baltic states as NATO members. The Baltic states are located in the region which is circumvented by central geopolitical collisions. Since the Baltic states came under the Euro-Atlantic framework, they view Russia's influence a potential threat for them in the Baltic region. The latest growing confrontation between NATO and Russia in the context of Ukraine crisis makes these states more relevant where a major battle between global powers is feasible. The post-Soviet security environment and the policies of Baltic states based on identity and integration approaches generates multiple dilemmas for them. NATO's expansion into Russia's border creates vulnerability and security dilemma for Baltic states in the region.

#### **Profile of the Problem**

With the dismantling of Berlin Wall, the wheels of the history started rolling in a new direction. The sphere of influence of Soviet Union collapsed and was dissolved into 15 different states. Some of them stayed allied in a confederation, while other quickly established themselves as independent states and reoriented towards the west. Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian republic

recognised the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) independence and signed bilateral treaties with them.

With the independence, Baltic states have become a densely interwoven network of political, social, legal, economic, environmental and cultural relations between the littoral states and outside participants. Moreover, in order to guarantee national security for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a successful foreign and defence policy is of course vital (Braun 2008: 1). Additionally, these small independent countries need to learn to manage their affairs successfully to secure development and a higher level of stability. The Baltic states are positioned at an area of importance to both actors, being the homeland of cold war enemy Russia, which still retains nuclear weapon capability and significant oil reserves. To fill the security vacuum which emerged after Baltic independence, leaders called for NATO enlargement because NATO with its Article 5 can deal with 'hard' security matter of Baltic states (Corum 2013: 37-38).

The expansion of NATO towards eastward and the inclusion of the Baltic states into the NATO alliance generated a resilient reaction in Moscow. It creates security dilemma for Russia and vice-versa for the Baltic states due to Moscow's response to change its policy of unilaterally demilitarising the zone around the Baltic states. This research is carried out because of recent growing tension between Russia and the West due to membership of Baltic states in NATO which undermine Russia's position in the Baltic states as well as in the post-soviet space. Moreover, the reemergence of Russia in world politics, Russia-Georgia war, Russia's compatriot policy, use of soft power in Baltic states, and the recent Ukraine crisis has once again raised the security concern of the Baltic states (Grigas 2014).

For several years after independence, the relationship between Russia and the Baltic states was defined by two major issues- first, the Baltic treatment of their Russian minority and second, the large contingent of Russian troops on the Baltic territory. Another bigger issue which also plays a major source of conflict between Russia and

the Baltic states is a territorial dispute. However, after years of discussion, the Estonian-Russian border dispute was resolved for status quo in a 1996 border protocol; yet, a formal treaty has not been signed and ratified (Connor 2003: 188).

Because of historical and political reasons, the policy priority of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) since independence became rapid integration into European institutions, global organisations, and NATO. There is a strong desire among the Baltic States to see themselves included in the European political as well as natural map of West's policy planners. Baltic people even believe that they are not a part of Russia's area of authority. Moreover, the Baltic leaders have always maintained that NATO is the only guarantor of security in Europe and also for Baltic states. However, Russia opposes membership of NATO for the Baltic countries and has put pressure on the West to keep NATO's door shut to them for several years. On March 29, 2004, seven new states including the Baltic states delivered their accession letter to US secretary of state Colin Powell to Washington and became NATO member (Gidadhubli 2004: 1885).

The position or geopolitics of the Baltic States could be viewed as an indicator of relations between Russia and Western countries. The Baltic region also has been seen as a political litmus test for affairs between the West and Russia. The former Sweden's PM Carl Bildtsaid, that the policies taken up by Russia with regard to Baltic states shall determine both its current outlook and the real attitude of Russian obligation towards the international law and principles (Zajedova 2000: 79). The Baltic states being a small neighbour state with the positive number of Russian minority, by seeking NATO's membership provided direct access to NATO forces into the doorstep of Russia's border. On the other hand, Russia considered all the three Baltic states to be part of the two lost empire- the Soviet Union and Russia. Moreover, the Baltic countries serve as a littoral output for Russian landlocked economy (Rouseck 1949: 171).

There are three possible reasons for the Baltic states to join NATO: First, economic benefit emanating from membership. Second, they see NATO membership as part of an opportunity to re-linking with Europe after 50 years of involuntary absence. And Third, to receive the security guarantees under Article V (any armed aggression on a NATO member would be considered an attack on each and every member of NATO) to deal with Russian threat. However, the problem arises because Russia has warned NATO from granting membership to Latvia and Estonia due to the fact that the two country hold a considerable number of Russian minority respectively 27% and 24% and thus, poses a threat to Russia's security interest (Solovjova 2016). It is a classical instance of the security dilemma, whereby when one state improves its security, it is seen by the neighbouring country as a threat to its security. It is implied vice-versa on the Baltic states as well as on Russia. In John H. Herz's(1950: 157) words "security dilemma of one group or individual is living in such a constellation must be, and usually are concerned about their security from being attacked, subjugated, dominated or annihilated by other groups or individual." Herz went further and said, striving to attain security from such attack they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others" (Herz 1950: 157).

Russia's conduct of war over Ukraine, the rise of Russian military movement in the Baltic Sea region together with Putin's emphasis of ethnic Russians on foreign land are an indication of imminent danger to the Baltic states as well as their allies. An event like the attack on cyberspace in Estonia during 2007, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 created apprehension among the Baltic countries as such happening raised concerns of a possible threat. A strategic document published during 2010-2012, mentions about danger arising from a threat to national security, and the threat emanating from intelligence and cyberspace of another state, in the light of Russian arm stretching to recapture its position as a superpower and also due to increased hostility among NATO and Russia (Coffey 2015).

Being a small state that shares border with a former superpower, along with the fact that it has a Russian minority population, including energy and trade dependency on Russia makes the Baltic states security more vulnerable. Annexation of Crimea during March 2014 generated security concern of modern warfare including cyber-attack, incitement of minority revolts and direct military threat, in addition to creating economic pressure and use of strategic nuclear armaments (Berzins 2016).

In present scenario Russia and U.S are both playing a shadow game over Baltic states. Moreover, growing confrontation between Russia and U.S over the crisis in Syria has increased worry for Baltic states because any confrontation between two major power directly affects the Baltic region. Due to their geography and historical experience as a land where many wars fought, Baltic leaders want to prevent Russian aggression. That is the reason, Baltic states as a reaction to Russian offenses, have raised its military power and has asked NATO members to deploy NATO forces on Baltic soil and Baltic Sea region (Batchelor 2017). In recent times, the number of military exercises has been increasing over the Baltic region. Anaconda-2016 that took place in Poland that was participated by 24 NATO members, and about 31,000 armed forces were involved from 24 countries, the biggest military drilling ever since the end of Cold War (Smith 2016). The study discusses the security implications of NATO's expansion and military buildup in Baltic Sea within a broader theoretical framework of geopolitics, new regionalism, and security.

### **Theoretical Framework**

In this study, two important variables- regionalism and regional security- are used to analyze the security situation of Baltic states in the Baltic Sea region. Regionalism assumes that the participatory state share proximity and a degree of mutual interdependence which is based on natural, essential core of economic, security, religious or cultural links between states and peoples. In this research, regional security is defined as an ideal type of order where members of a region attain a

political stability by finding solutions to a regional problem or sweeping them so firmly under the carpet that they do not re-emerge.

The three small Baltic states in the struggle for power between two dominant powers of the world desire to bandwagon with one powerful alliance to ensure their security. The security dilemma is one of the major concepts that helps understand Baltic states' efforts to move closer to the west on the one hand, and their approach to Russia's response, on the other. The Baltic states' desire and security dilemma developed for two reasons; first, its geopolitical location and second, the small size of the states. Therefore, the theoretical study of geopolitics and small states theory becomes essential. The last argument which tends to examine the Baltic states' regional integration in Europe and the West is because Baltic states believe that they were cut off from Europe during the first and second World War by Russia and identify themselves more closely to the western identity and culture that led them to integrate into the Western regional structure.

Alex Warleigh Lack (2016) identifies genesis, functionality, socialization and impact as major principles of regionalization. Genesis helps to seek answers why the regionalization process is initiated. Functionality investigates to find answers of the regionalization process at large. Socialization focuses on the domestic development within the region and moreover, it helps to measure the widespread awareness and support for the region. Impact, pays final attention on the impact of regionalization measured by the outcome of the region and impact on global structure that help to measure the successful regionalization.

On the other hand Barry Buzan (2008) explains Regional Security Complex (RSC) as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely, so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan 2008: 190). The relations within RSC are resolute not only by the geographic proximity of the states involved, but also by the anarchic nature of international political structure (McSweeney 1999: 63). As far as Baltic states' RSC

concern, it cannot be viewed separately. All three Baltic states form a geographical linked group that is uniform in their strategic and political links. They have similar history and bound by close economic links, their ethnic nations can be considered as rather similar. The security concern of all Baltic states and interaction of great power has a significant impact on the situation in this sub region as it emerges from the interaction of the EU, NATO, United states and Russia. Buzan and Weaver in 2003 saw the Baltic states as part of the Post-Soviet regional security complex and the Russia was the main security problem of the Baltic states.

The theory of geopolitics has evolved gradually, and some prominent scholars have contributed to expanding the area of geopolitical theory. A scholar like Friedrich Ratzel has worked extensively on political geography (Hegan 1942, 478-479). The other names who have extended the idea of geopolitics are H.J. Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman, Haushofer, Brzezinski, etc.

The father of geopolitics, H.J Mackinder introduced the theory of heartland. Mackinder's theory is based on the opposition between land power and sea power. This Heartland theory covered the region of Eurasia and said that any state is able to control the heartland would rule the whole world and pose a potential threat to a global regime (H. Mackinder 1904). According to Mackinder, as Hagan explained, "the universal land should be divided into islands. The land mass including Asia, Africa, and Europe will be called World Island. The other continents would be considered as islands and satellites of this great land mass" (Hegan 1942, 480). The heartland comes under the World Island:

The Heartland, for the purpose of strategic thinking, includes the Baltic Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia. Within it, therefore, were Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria-Hungary, as well as Russia- a vast triple base of manpower, which was lacking to the horse-riders of history. The Heartland is the region to which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be refused access, though the western part of it lies without the region of Arctic and Continental Drainage(Mackinder 1919: 135-136).



One more prominent scholar of geopolitics Nicholas J. Spykman has propounded the theory of 'Rimland' where he argued that 'the "rimland" region of Eurasia is which that semi-circles from Europe to East Asia. This Rimland has a natural disposition to move in the hands of one dominant power who control it could rule the whole world. Spykman's idea of Rimland as Kaplan explained "covered the Europe, Middle East, Indian subcontinent and the Far East. The area together controls the zone where the land and sea meet around Eurasia, built up by a significant number of population, economic growth, and availability of hydrocarbon resources (Kaplan 2013: 99-102).

The last significant geopolitical theory on Eurasia was given by Zbigniew Brzezinski as he called Eurasian chessboard. Brzezinski has argued in his book *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (1997) that the Eurasian chessboard engages in several players and each one is having a different amount of power. Brzezinski identifies key players of Eurasian chessboard which is located in West, East, Center, and South (Brzezinski 1997: 34).

Now, it is easy to understand the geographical importance of Baltic states. In the light of 'Heartland (Pivot area), 'Rimland' and 'Eurasian chessboard' idea, Baltic states come under the Rimland and part of the Eurasian chessboard and touches the border of the Heartland. The geostrategic position of Baltic states get the attention of biggest powers like- Russia, the U.S, EU and NATO and all try to control these three states. As far as from Russian point of view is concerned, Baltic states is a region that gives access to Baltic Sea and opens a door towards Europe. For the West, it is important because it provides access to the heartland and open NATO's door towards middle space and southern part of the Eurasian chessboard of Brzezinski.

With the independence of Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have moved closer to the idea of Western democratic institution and integrated themselves in European regional institutions and global organisation for economic and security purpose. The successful regional integration is based on three underlying conditions as Young Jong Choi and Nae Young Lee listed out as, 'Practical demand, the

leadership to supply public goods and internal mutual crisis or external dangers' (Choi and Lee 2002, 8). However, before going into the discussion of Baltic states' regional integration and developing a regional cooperation with the Nordic and regional organisation, it is empirically relevant to discuss the idea of the region and the concept of regionalism.

A region can be a combination of physical functional dimension. The physical region often is defined by territorial, military and economic contents regulated primarily by states, and the functional region is defined by culture and economic features that are generally the cognizance of non-state actors (Vayrynen 2003: 27). Calleya argues that regions are empirically determined by the social and cultural entity or flow (Calleya 1997: 34). There can be different types of the region; it can be beyond one state's border (Transnational), led by the government (intergovernmental), and can be a combination of state and non-state actors (Calleya 1997: 38).

With the emergence of multidimensional structures and non-state actors, the concept of regionalism has extended. Previously, regionalism was mainly defined by geographical, military and economic activities and states were the prominent players. Whereas, new regionalism consist of both actors: - state and non-state. Many scholars have differentiated new regionalism from regionalism by various means. Andrew Hurrell has pointed out four major difference between regionalism and new regionalism and said, 'new regionalism has a variety of structure; it can establish a partnership with North and South and is multi-dimensional as well as develop a sense of regional identity (Hurrell 1995, 332).

In the case of Baltic states, they have broader historical, political, cultural and developmental link Lithuania with Poland, Finland with Sweden, and Latvia with Estonia. The definitions of Baltic Sea Region are project as the best one in cooperative projects. The Helsinki's Commission's (HELCOM) definition- the Baltic Sea including all sub basin with their drainage basins, and councils of the

Baltic Sea States definition-9 coastal and all Nordic states including Norway and Iceland (Pistohlkors 1987: 126). As soon as they gained independence, instead of relying on international help to solve their issues of transition, Baltic states set up a regional cooperation agreement as this was a natural association due to their shared past. They founded the Baltic Cooperation Council (BCC) in 1990 in Latvia as part of an economic agreement between the three republics (Jurkynas 2004, 9).

Baltic states also founded a regional organization called an organisation of Baltic states in 1993. The economic interest of all three Baltic Countries directly affected the regional cooperation among themselves. Under the financial stress, Baltic states agreed to set up a common market and decision-making power given to the Baltic Cooperation Council. Within the structure of free trade framework, the Customs Union and Resources Union were introduced to provide equal right to the Baltic administrator and free movement within Baltic states. Also, to expand its economic relations, Baltic states have signed a free trade agreement with Nordic Countries. The financial support between the Baltic republics and Nordic states was evolved around Baltic Sea and the environmental issues. The establishment of Conference for the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation NEFCO is an example of Baltic-Nordic cooperation (Santangelo 1997).

The relationship between Baltic states and EU was started in 1992. The EU was interested in all three republics because EU wants to develop its market in Eastern Europe on the idea of Western economic institutions and necessity. Also, EU considered Baltic Sea region as a large market for the economic activities of EU. All three Baltic states have shown their interest for integration into the European Union. Baltic states have taken various steps to integrate into the European Union from liberalisation of the market to opening its border to strengthen its economic structure and following the norms and values of Western principles. Baltic states have also become members of various regional organisations such as to show unity in Baltic Sea region. Indeed, the Baltic countries showed their desire for full membership by calling European Union's members.

## **Review of the Literature**

A large body of available literature on Baltic state, NATO expansion, and security of the Baltic states. There have been many historical and regional studies done by different scholars on NATO's expansion and Baltic states security. The present study is related to NATO expansion to Russia's border and its security implication on the Baltic states. As such various studies have been reviewed which are important, relevant and concerned with the intention of the study of NATO's expansion to the Russia's border and security for the Baltic states. On the basis of the available literature this literature review has been divided into four themes:

1. Post-soviet geopolitical context and Baltic security challenges;
2. Security perceptions and NATO's membership of Baltic states;
3. NATO expansion to post-soviet space and Russia's response and
4. Security implication of NATO expansion for the Baltic states.

With the collapse of USSR, the whole geopolitics of Baltic states has changed as Janina Sleivyte (2010) said 'Russian access over Baltic Sea region was limited to in an around Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. The neo-geopolitical situation posed not only economic and security but also political, military and even psychological challenges to Russia and the Baltic states, both. However, at the same time author failed to understand the security problem for the Baltic states due to Russia's leverage. Search for security became prominent issues for Baltic states among Post-Soviet states. From the time when security concern for Baltic states emerged, these states moved close to Europe and considered Russia as a huge threat. Clive Archer (2007), Barry Buzan (2008), Joseph S. Roucek (1949), Peter Van Ham (1978) have pointed out certain threat that the Baltic states face due to their geographical proximity.

After independence, all three Baltic states have tried to reinforce its security interest through its application of acquiring NATO membership. As Iivi Zajedova (1999-2000), Mark Kramer (2002), Matt Rojansky (1999), A. Thomas Lane (1997),

Stephen J. Blank (1997), Zivile Marija Vaicekauskaite (2015) argues that ‘ it is easy to understand why Baltic states are interested in joining NATO. The author argues on the basis of historical remark that Baltic states have a feeling of historical connection and their roots to Europe, and see their future with Europe. They certainly do not consider themselves to be part of the Orthodox Slavic world. The author also successfully draws three major reasons why Baltic states want to be a member of NATO: first, to get economic benefits; second, to reunite with Europe after 50 years; and third, due to a possible threat from Russia. The author also gives an emphasis on hard power security needed for Baltic states and argued that ‘Baltic region soft power cannot be considered sufficient. Only NATO with its article 5 can consider dealing with the matter of hard security needs of Baltic peoples. However, the author failed to identify the security implication on the Baltic states as a result of acquiring membership of NATO and Russia’s response.

J. L. Black (1999), Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998), Anatol Lieven (1995), Alex Pravda (1995), Dmitry Shlapentokh (1999), Yaroslav Bilinsky (2006), Kenneth N. Waltz (2000), Fred Coleman (1997), has analysed NATO’s expansion in Post-Soviet space and Russia’s stand on NATO expansion in the Baltic states and why Russia considered Baltic states incorporation with NATO as a threat to their influential status in the Post-Soviet Sphere that may undermine the Russian dominance in the Baltic region. As the author mentioned Russia has only two bases in the Baltic Sea: Kronstadt near St. Petersburg and Baltiisk in Kaliningrad and because of that over the course of time Russia have always been against the Baltic states membership in NATO. Even communist paper *Zavtra* accused the Baltic leadership of engaging itself in rising game of restructuring Northern Europe and cutting Russian presence from the Baltic Sea. Mikhail Margelov Committee, the chairman of the Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee, made a critical observation of NATO expansion to the Baltic states. This committee has opined that NATO expansion was proceeding according to a “geopolitical map” dating back to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the committee’s opinion, the objective was to drive Russia into the

Eurasian heartland towards North-eastern part of the continent to weaken Russian significance. The committee also observes Russia's outplay in the southeast of Central Asia as NATO revamped its Partnership for Peace (PFP) program as a military project. NATO made progress in its relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and also had a particular bond with Ukraine. Hence, according to the committee, accession of Baltic states to NATO would further strengthen anti-Russian makeup of the NATO alliance.

R. G. Gidadhubi (2004), John H. Herz (1950), Robert Jervis (1978), Barry R. Posen (2006) explained the security dilemma of Russia due to the expansion of NATO to the Baltic states. The author explains how the expansion of NATO generated a strong reaction in Moscow. Russia felt that the enlargement of NATO, especially the inclusion of Baltic states could fetch NATO military and armed forces right on the Russian boundary. One of the major fear of Russia was that Baltic states inclusion in NATO facilitates Brussels to use Soviet and Russian military infrastructure in Baltic. Even Russian foreign minister Aleksandr Yakoventako said, the decision to expand NATO near Russia's border would be a threat to the national security of Russia, and also the enlargement indeed threatened the political and economic interest of Russia. Therefore, Russia might have to review its policy of unilateral demilitarisation in the region around the Baltic Sea.

Agnia Grigas (2014), Robert Nalbandov (2010), Michael Birnbaum (2015), Greg Simons (2014) has explained, Russia-Baltic relation after Soviet dissolution and the reason for concern of the Baltic states was primarily because the Baltic states possess ice-free ports and provide a window to the west. Also what is more threatening to Baltic states is Russia's compatriot policies. As this policy calls for the political, economic and indirect military protection of the right and concern of Russian populations and ethnic Russian living abroad announced in the year 2000 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, and now charted in Russia's National Security Strategy of 2020. The author analysed that the Baltic states have a significant number of reasons

that would help Russia's policy of 'compatriot protection' as Estonia and Latvia have a particularly large number of ethnic Russian minorities, with about 24 percent and 27 percent of the total population respectively. Since the percentage of Russian speakers as a national minority is higher, the nationalist majority Baltic people keep a sceptical attitude towards them.

### **Focus of the Study**

The main focus of the study is to examine the implications of NATO's expansion to the Russia's border and security challenges to the Baltic states. The study makes an attempt to understand the security complexities in this region especially when the Baltic states is close to a former superpower's territory. The study situates the security of Baltic states within the geopolitical and strategic context of Baltic States security.

It also tries to examine the Baltic states integration process into the Western structures and its contribution in the region building. This study will also investigate the role of the Baltic states to NATO's expansion and current Baltic and Russia's relation when NATO military facilities and armed forces have brought been right on the Russian border. Attention is given to the Baltic security dilemma due to NATO expansion. The emphasis of the study is the post-Soviet period, and particular attention is given to Baltic states regional security complexity and needs. The study analyse the regional security implications of NATO expansion for the Baltic States.

### **Research Questions**

The study tries to answer the following research questions.

- Why have Baltic states become members of NATO and consider Russia as a potential threat?
- How geopolitics and NATO Expansion to the Russia's border contributed to the security dilemma of the Baltic States?

- How Russia views NATO's expansion to its border and role of Baltic states in it?
- What would be the possible security implications of NATO's expansion to the Russia's border for the Baltic state?

### **Hypotheses**

- Security perception of Baltic states based on identity and integration approach led them to become a member of NATO and support NATO's eastward expansion.
- NATO expansion to Russia's border and Baltic states demand of military buildup in the Baltic Sea can create security dilemma for the Baltic states.

### **Research Methodology**

This study is quantitative, descriptive and analytical in nature. The study used primary and secondary data to analyse the issue of NATO expansion to the Russia's border which creates a security and as well as a dilemma for the Baltic states. The primary resources like raw data given by the international organisation and data on ethnography is used. The data of GDP growth rate of Baltic states and Post-Soviet countries has been taken from the World Bank data. The data of foreign direct investment, flow, and the stock has been taken from United Nation Conference on Trade and Development. The data of Human Development Index has been from Human Development Report of United Nations Development Programme, and military expenditure has been taken from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). The energy dependence of Baltic states from Eurostat and ethnic composition of the Baltic population has been collected from the Baltic states central static bureau. The secondary data include books, articles, scholarly journals, various newspaper, and internet sources.



## **The Scheme of Chapters**

This study consists of five chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the whole research and briefly analyse the different theories in the context of Baltic states and this study. This chapter also discusses the whole research framework that helps to design the research and it also highlight the objective, research question and the hypothesis of the study. The second chapter discuss about NATO's role and effort to expand North Atlantic Alliance toward the east Europe. NATO's attempt to expand Russia's near abroad makes Russia uncomfortable, and Russia responded that the Baltic states inclusion into the NATO alliance wouldbe considered a red line. Russia has taken various measures to prevent NATO expansion near its border by diplomatically and via bilateral talk with the leader of Baltic states. Thus, this chapter also discusses Russia's effort to prevent NATO's acquirement of the Baltic states.

The third chapter deals with the role of Baltic states in NATO expansion and Baltic states effort and preparedness to get into the alliance. It also gives an analysis of the intention behind the idea of the desire of Baltic states to be a member of NATO and what attempt they have made in order to become a member of NATO. The fourth chapter is an analysis on security, security dilemma of Baltic states. It also analyse s the security challenges for the Baltic states after joining NATO. Furthermore, it discusses the various security concerns of Baltic states despite being a member of NATO and EU. This chapter also discusses the debate of new cold war and try to analyse that how the current situation in Baltic Sea region can lead to the confrontation between two powerful sovereign states and will affect the world order. The final and concluding chapter summarise the main finding of the research and states the validity of the hypothesis proposed at the beginning of the study.

## Chapter 2

### **NATO's Expansion to Post-Soviet Space: Geopolitical Dynamics and Russia's Response**

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic states-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became independent and went back to Europe from where they were regained by Russia in 1941 under the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. For Russia, independent Baltic states simply the loss of strategic region. However, Russian policy of foreign and security was being made to maintain some influence over the Baltic states. On the other hand, Baltic states feeling of historical roots and future in Europe as well as to include themselves both on the political map of the Europe and on the mental map of Western policy maker led them close to Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Since 1991, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enthusiastically pursued a strategy intended at the establishment of political, economic and social ties with the International and European organisations. An expanded global presence both in Europe and in the world is in the interest of the Baltic States. They have striven to develop an extensive network of international and regional relations, and have tried to become an active partner or member of all the relevant economic, political and security organisations.

In 1994, with the decision of Baltic states joining the PFP (partnership for peace) programme confirmed their desire for the full-fledged membership in North Atlantic alliance and the European Union. Moreover, Members of North Atlantic Alliance, especially the United States have also initiated several Programme like NACC, PFP and MAP to assist and guide these Post-Soviet small states to construct the political, economic and legal structure and modernise their military. On the other hand, Russia has been taking preventive measures to counter the NATO's enlargement to near its border. Though Russia failed to prevent the NATO's expansion near its sphere of influence and finally, in 2004, all three Baltic countries became a member of NATO as well as the European Union.

## **Historical Background of the Baltic States**

Before the period of Russia's domination began in the original 18<sup>th</sup> century, Baltic states Estonia, Latvia were more influenced by Germany, Sweden, and Denmark while Lithuanian, due to its strong relation with Poland was more influenced by Central Europe. Lithuania's statehood started back in 13<sup>th</sup> century when Lithuania elite ruled over most of Eastern Slavic Orthodox population, while Estonia and Latvia's statehood began in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The history of Baltic states is full of war. Due to their geographical position this states were battleground on which larger states like Germany, Russia, Poland and Sweden fought their many wars (O'Connor 2006: 4). Lithuanians were engaged in constant conflicts with Poland.

By 1917, during the Russian revolution, Baltic states became independent and started to practice the parliamentary form of a democratic system but very soon Lithuania following the example of General Pilsudski's successful coup in Poland turned it into an authoritarian regime. Later on, Estonia and Latvia also capitulates to dictatorship in 1934 due to economic decline. By the Second World War, the fate of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania decided by a secret protocol between Nazi and Soviet to divide Eastern Europe into the German and Soviet sphere of influence. However, the pact failed, and all Baltic states were driven into a war against the Soviet by Germany from 1942. In the course of the Soviet invasion of the Baltic in September 1944, Red Army overran nearly all of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Following these incident Baltic states re-emerged with Soviet Republics. They were isolated from the West and included within the Soviet Socialist Republic (O'Connor 2003). All three Baltic countries have lost large number of its populations and experienced physical destruction during the two world wars.

With the occurrence of the Soviet civil war in 1960, the Soviet Union pulled out from the Baltic state, allowing these states to join the European confederation as full member states in 1962 on the condition of their permanent non-involvement. Soon the Baltic states came to enjoy a tremendous economic growth in the course of the

1960 and 1970s. As a result of this productivity Estonia and Latvia's wages and income far exceeded the Soviet average (Kundu 2003: 60-61).

In the Baltic states, there was always a resistance against the assimilation into the USSR and Sovietisation of Baltic states. During the 1980s most of the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were resigned to economic stagnation and shortage, left to the mounting pressure of Russification, leave for the foreseeable future. Later Gorbachev forms a policy called *Glasnost* (openness or publicity) and *perestroika* (restructuring)<sup>1</sup>. Baltic states used this opportunity and ultimately became an independent nation (O'Connor 2006: 29).

After getting independence, the Baltic countries have moved much closer to the western idea of political system and have set up a parliamentary form of democratic government. One of the primary goals of Baltic states was to maintain a close political, economic, and military relation with their western neighbor. In an effort to increase their security ties and integrates on Western culture, all three Baltic countries Joined North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union in 2004 (O'Connor 2006: 4). However, the Baltics states also maintained good relations with Russia and sorted out their border disputes. Nevertheless, their fear of continued political and economic dependence on Russia and military stationing of Russian soldier near their border still exist.

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<sup>1</sup>In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has initiated a program called 'perestroika' (reconstructing) and 'Glasnost' (openness). These programs were introduced in order to reconstruct the Soviet economic structure and give Soviet people more freedom in political process. Glasnost (openness) refers to the social and political freedom, to give more space to freedom of expression. That means, the newspaper and media will get more power and freedom that will allow exposing the political corruption and addressing the grievances of common Soviet people. It also allowed, the Soviet people to criticize the government policy and give social freedom which freedom had already exist in western societies. 'Perestroika' was introduced with the aim to reconstruct the economic structure of Soviet Union. Perestroika emphasized on semi-private business. It also ends the control of state to control the price and promote semi market economic system in order to encourage the capitalist mode of economy as Japan, Germany and United States has capitalist economic structure.

## **Post-Bipolar Geopolitical Dynamics in the Baltic Sea Region and Baltic States**

Brzezinski stated referring to Napoleon Once said “to know a nation’s geography was to know its foreign policy” (Brzezinski 1997: 37). For most of the history of international relations, influence over the territory was the focus of political/power struggle. According to Brzezinski, “Self- gratification over the acquisition of larger territory or sense of national deprivation once the loss of sacred land has been the cause of most of the bloody wars fought since the rise of nationalism” (Brzezinski 1997: 37). Geopolitics what Morgenthau calls is a “pseudoscience” because it establish “the factor of geography into an absolute”, writing soon after the world war II, as Brzezinski said “he had in mind the great British geographer Halford Mackinder, whose turn-of-the-twentieth-century theories were revived in the midst of the Second World War and misused by the Nazis to justify their idea of *Lebensraum* or German living space” (Kaplan 2012).<sup>2</sup>

In the context of the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which shares border with Mackinder’s Eurasian Heartland Map, Eurasia is the globe’s largest area and is geopolitically axial. A power that ruled Eurasia would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive region. Nearly 75 percent of the world’s population comprises in Eurasia and most of the world’s human resources are there as well. Eurasia accounts for 60 percent of world’s GNP and about 3/4<sup>th</sup> of the world’s energy resources. One of the most prominent geopolitical scientist Harold Mackinder pioneered the concept of the Eurasian “pivot area” (which was said to include all of Siberia and much of Central Asia) and later of the Central East-European “heartland” as the essential springboard for the attainment of continental domination. Geographical Pivot term is usually used for those states whose strategic

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<sup>2</sup> *Lebensraum*: a German geographer, Friedrich Ratzel was the one who first used the term lebensraum. Ratzel developed lebensraum theory on the basis of his study on human development which fundamentally determined by geographical position or situation. In Germany itself, after getting power Hitler introduced the lebensraum or living space in order to survive. The belief that the living space could be concurred only in the east Europe especially from Russia constitutes the key idea and formed Hitler’s policy.

position is not to recognise from their size, power, and high morale but rather from their sensitive location and the consequence that they have to face due to their exposed condition for the behavior of the geostrategic player. Mackinder popularised his heartland concept by the grand and simplistic dictum:

Who rules East Europe Commands the Heartland:

Who rules the Heartland commands the world-Island:

Who rules the World-Island commands the World. (Kaplan 2012).

When we talk about the Baltic states, the first question that arises is what the geopolitical significance of these small Baltic states have? Historically, Baltic provinces were a battlefield over which significant power struggled; a good deal what Joseph S. Roucek called the ‘dominium maris Baltici’ depend on the possession of these small but strategically located territories. The southeastern shores of the Baltic have been linked up with the sea, with the Vistula and the Daugava (Dvina), with the trade route going up these rivers and continuing southeastward down the Dniester and the Dnieper. The Baltic states thus connect the northern channel for the Ukraine and Asia ahead, linking them up with the Baltic sea, the Scandinavian countries, Britain, the wide open oceans. Moreover, the Baltic region is also economically important to the coastal outlet for landlocked Russia (Roucek 1949: 171-172).

For the West, the geographical location of the Baltic states reinforce NATO’s position in Eastern Europe and effectively rendering the Baltic Sea an allied lake. Predominantly in a political context, the Baltic countries have acknowledged and signified everything the West believe, support and promote in the political order. The Baltic states have established functionary parliamentary democracies. It should be clear that despite Russia’s security concern in the Baltic region, Baltic states find themselves more close to Europeans. Moreover, the Baltic states political stability contribute sustainability to the Baltic Sea and the North European region as a whole. They are a member of regional organisations as well as international organisations and constitute a major gateway to commerce with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine for

the West and for Russia, the gateway of a gas pipeline which go to the European countries through these Baltic states. Geopolitically, they contribute to the security of their region and the whole Europe by becoming a member of NATO and creating an air surveillance system. Geostrategically, they may help to secure the Eastern flank of Baltic Sea region, on the other hand, the Baltic states can contribute by encouraging Russia to have an enhanced feeling of stability and security at the Western border. (Zajedova 1999, 2000)

### **Geopolitical Significance of Kaliningrad for the Baltic States, West and Russia**

Since the downfall of Soviet Bloc, Russian Federation has lost its control of Baltic Sea, when comparing the Russian Federation's current Baltic area possessions and what Moscow-controlled during the USSR period. However, Russia possesses small territory "Kaliningrad" located between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea. The Russian enclave Surrounded by North Atlantic Alliance which serves as a Russia's warm water port in Baltic sea as well as a forward base of the sort for the country's military in Northern Europe, similarly to the Russian 14<sup>th</sup> army's presence in the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova.

**Fig. 2.1 Map of Kaliningrad**



*Source:* [www.Shoebat.com](http://www.Shoebat.com)

Kaliningrad is now a militarised Russian region packed between two members of an organisation: economic and military organisation namely NATO and EU members. Baltic states and Kaliningrad became part of balancing the military buildup of NATO and Russia respectively in the Baltic region. Due to tension between Moscow, Warsaw, and Vilnius, there are reservations regarding the opening the border to connect the oblast to Belarus, and hence the rest of the Russia. After the 2008 summer war, three questions were raised and answered by “W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto” regarding the geopolitical importance of Kaliningrad, how does Kaliningrad fit into a Russian-Georgian war? Have the Baltic countries perceptions of Russia changed after the summer war? And how do they relate to Kaliningrad? (Nieto 2011, 469).

Meanwhile, regarding the Baltic Roucek stated that ‘the essential Baltic problem is the struggle for dominance, latent or active, between Russia and Germany. The destiny of the three small nations edged about in the corner between two great nations (Roucek 1949: 171). Also, Rojansky argues that ‘the prospect of NATO expansion into the Baltic states possess not only a military threat to Russia but also the ultimate failure of Slavic unity and the degradation of Russian cultural dominance in the post-Soviet space (Rojansky 1999: 25). In recent times, after the annexation of Crimea, It has created a tensed situation between Russia and the West. Since the emergence of the Ukraine crisis and the imposition of a sanction against Russia by EU and U.S, Moscow accelerated the military modernization effort (Ramani 2016).

Furthermore, US Special Forces have been deployed near the border with Russia as part of a “persistent” presence of American troops in the Baltics. Dozens of special operation forces are being stationed along Europe’s eastern flank to reassure NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The move will also allow the US to monitor Russian maneuvers amid fears of further destabilisation following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Batchelor 2017). Lithuanian defense ministry spokeswoman Asta Galdikaite confirmed the US had offered “additional safety assurance measures to



the Baltic countries following the deterioration of the security situation in the region” (Adl 2017). To counter the NATO military presence in the Baltic state, Russia is assembling military forces in Eastern Europe as it draws closer to a potential Cold War-style standoff with NATO in the Baltic countries (Samuels 2016). According to Reuters news agency, the Russian military has been mobilising troops, trucks, and equipment to various bases around Kaliningrad. Russia’s clarification on a military buildup in Kaliningrad is that they believe its borders are under threat as NATO forces are getting closer to Russia’s border (Waller 2016).

### **Ukraine Crisis and Vulnerability of Baltic States**

The end of Cold War saw relatively improved US-Russia relations in the 1990s which dramatically reduced the security threat to Baltic states coming from the Russian Federation. Moreover, Baltic states worked closely with Russia to resolve the border dispute and also convince Russia to remove their forces from the territory of Baltic countries. International terrorism became a new threat which increased after 9/11, the 2004 Madrid train bombing, and the July 2005 blast in the London metro is an example of increasing number of terrorist activity. To counter the international terrorism Russia and US has worked together and Moscow has also provided its military bases for US security forces to conduct anti-terror operations in Afghanistan (Tretler 2002).

However, the 2008 summer war between Russian and Georgia had a significant implication on security relations between Russia and the United States. At the time of Russia-Georgia war and even afterward, both Europe and USA remained neutral regarding the conflict. The unspoken message turned out to be that Washington and Brussels were not willing to go to war with Russia over Georgia. The stand of Western power had prompted the Eastern European NATO member to wonder whether NATO would protect them from a Russian offensive. Many Eastern European NATO members and Baltic states as well as Poland have asked for a stronger NATO military presence within their borders, including from the American military, to serve as a deterrent against any potential Russian aggressive intention.

However, Kremlin has denied the accusation and asserted that Russia has no intent to outbreak war with any of NATO member state. In June 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin in an interview with the Italian newspaper has said “I think that only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO ( Barnes 2015).

In the transition process of Baltic states, the issue of realisation of the problems for security has played a significant role as such to tackle the security question like what are the primary objective for security? And how security conceptions are related to the security process? Moreover, all three states have adopted a document which defines and identify the security distress of Baltic states. Lithuania was the first to recognise the security concern due to its location. In the world map, Lithuania is situated between two undemocratic countries: Kaliningrad, district of Russia and Belarus that poses a threat to their national security. Kaliningrad, located just downward of the Lithuania and controlled by Russia, is one of the most militarised region and Russian ally Belarus give access for Russia to Kaliningrad and make Lithuania security vulnerable.

**Fig.2.2 Political Map of Lithuania**



**Source:** The World Factbook, (2017), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lh.html>

Latvia feels more threaten among all three Baltic states due to its location in the middle of Lithuania and Estonia. Latvia shares a long border with Russia but has no border with any western countries. Geographical location of Latvia makes Riga economically more dependent on Russia, in particular for its energy need. Also, Latvia has a significant number of Russian speaking minority near the Russia's border and in some major city which caused an alarming situation for Latvia. On many occasion, Moscow has raised the issue of violation of Russian-speaking minority in Latvia.

**Fig. 2.3 Political Map of Latvia**



**Source:** The World Factbook, (2017), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lg.html>

The location of Estonia is in the northern part of the Baltic states shared a border with Latvia and Russia. Estonia's dependence on Russia for energy resources and having a large number of Russian minority makes Estonia position Vulnerable. In late 20<sup>th</sup> century, Estonia's Riigikogu (Parliament) approved the recommendation of the National Defence Policy of Estonia. The document identified the primary source of security concern for Estonia as the imperialist aspiration of Russia and the political and military volatility of the region

**Map. 2.4 Political Map of Estonia**



**Source:** The World Factbook (2017), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html>

In the light of Baltic states security threat, Russia's annexation of Crimea which created tension between USA and Russia (termed as the illegitimate annexation of Crimea by force by the West and Russia claimed it as a referendum that made that made it a part of Russia) has grown the security concern of much of NATO's eastern flank as well as for the Baltic states. The geostrategic importance of Baltic states, given their geopolitical position, makes it the 'pivot' to any western effort to defeat Eastern Europe. Due to their geographical locality of Baltic states, threat of Russia as much strongly felt because Baltic states are smaller and exposed (Simon 2014). Even under the NATO's bombardment, Russian troops could cross the border and be in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia within 36 hours (Withnall 2016).

The Baltic states, as Roucek said "has been the buffer between East and West, Slavs, and Germans, Communism and Fascism" and played a prominent role to form the northern outlet for Ukraine and Asia beyond, linking them up with the Baltic sea, the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain, and the wide open Ocean (Roucek 1950, 12). However, on the other hand, the re-emergence of Russia in the world order, the growing Russian military activity in Baltic Sea region, and Vladimir Putin's insistence on protecting Russian 'Compatriot'<sup>3</sup> abroad are all reasonable concern for the Baltic states and their allies.

### **NATO's Expansion to the Post-Soviet Space**

The NATO stands for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation were founded after Second World War. It is a group of 28 countries which carry out military operation around the world. NATO's purpose was as Hasting Ismay, NATO's first secretary general said, "to keep Russians out, the American in, and keep the Germans down." With the

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<sup>3</sup> Compatriot is a policy of Russia's president Putin officially meant to safeguard ethnic Russians living in near abroad. These policy was initiated in 2000 now interpreted in Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020. Compatriot policy not only include ethnic Russian minority even Russian speaker and those who is sympathizer of Russian culture will come under the compatriot policy. Furthermore, article 61 of the Russian Constitution states that "the Russian federation shall guarantee its citizens defense and patronage beyond its boundaries." That means Moscow will protect Russian civilian outside of Russian territory. In practice though, Russian policies include not only Russian citizens, but also ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and sometimes even simply Russian sympathizer.

dissolution of Soviet, the NATO has achieved its all purposes. But still, the existence of NATO has raised some serious questions like Rober W. Rauchhaus raised such as, “Why NATO still exists? Why is NATO interested in giving membership to its former cold war rivals? Is it due to the contemporary international distribution of power and an effort made by the United States or the West to spread out its influence beyond their first members or Eastern Europe? Did some sort of ideology, such as Wilsonian Liberalism, drive expansion?” (Rauchhaus 2007, 174).

Two types of counter argument possibly hold true: first, NATO’s expansion was inevitable, as realist thought of school said “the NATO’s expansion was inevitable because, after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the world order became unipolar, there was no significant power to counter the American supremacy. America saw NATO as the instrument for maintaining the American hegemony over the foreign and military policy of Europe (Waltz 2000). Second, NATO has been expanding after the collapse of USSR, because of the lobbying of Eastern European states as well as their clever use of PFP (Partnership for Peace)<sup>4</sup> to gain full-fledged membership of NATO.

Advocates of NATO’s Expansion said that NATO’s opening to the East is not directed against Russia. It aims at rather managing conflict, democratise and integrate all Europeans, and fill a power vacuum in the East Central Europe.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, scholars like Walter C. Clemens Jr. question, the necessity of NATO’s Expansion and says “NATO enlargement is the wrong answer to the problem, its purposes is to solve. Taking new member into NATO is not necessary for managing ethnic conflicts, democratising east central Europe or uniting all Europeans. Without

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<sup>4</sup> Partnership for Peace program was introduced by NATO in 1994 in order to provide a secure environment to establish peace on democratic principles and also establish a close relation between NATO and other Euro-Atlantic partner. It also established a very close relations with post-soviet states and provide idea condition to especially Baltic states in order to prepare for the inclusion into the North Atlantic Alliance.

<sup>5</sup> East central Europe here refers to Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. If the Balkans stabilizes, the neutralized zone could include Albania and the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

getting a membership of NATO's ranks, the existing Partnership for Peace facilitates closer cooperation among NATO members, Russia and the non-aligned countries of Europe (Jr. 1997, 344-345). Nor is NATO expansion necessary for democracy in the former Soviet space as democratisation depends in the first place upon internal conditions- development of political and economic prerequisites for a civil society". However, a clear-cut answer emerges: the main reason for NATO enlargement is that the United States wanted the alliance to expand eastward. (Jr. 1997)

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO settles its position in Post-Soviet space which was part of the Communist Block. Due to NATO's expansion, Russia's threat concern was that the Western power might push their agenda and sphere of influence to the border of the Russian Federation. Recently the United States have started to move their artillery and military to the Baltic states and Poland. In response, It is evident any government would worry if its historic enemy were to multiply its allies and edge closer and which is why Russia starts to threaten a variety of countermeasures if NATO expands eastward and has threatened to move the Nuclear capable missile near the Baltic border.

Earlier to 1998, NATO added new members in three stages- in 1952 Greece and Turkey, in 1955 West Germany, and in 1982 Spain. The first former Warsaw member countries that became a member of NATO in 1999 that is The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO which was followed by Albania and Croatia in 2009. For Central Europe and the Baltic states, becoming a member of NATO has been the center of their post-Communist security policies. The analyst contends, the expansion of NATO and adding new membership after the collapse of Soviet Union, first became an issue for the American administration at the time of President Clinton tenure when the President of the Czech Republic and Poland, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa respectively visited the United States in 1993. In their meeting with the American President Clinton, they lobbied to consider their membership into the alliance which very soon got attention and support of National

Security Advisor, Anthony Lake. By 1994, NATO's meeting held in Brussels and the expansion of NATO was placed on the agenda through the establishment of a NATO commission to study about the NATO expansion (Hendrickson 1999: 87)..

In 1994 itself, Partnership for Peace came into existence and started to operate under the principle to prepare states for future entry into the alliance. In mid-1994, the American President, Clinton expressed his desire and saw NATO expansion in the national interest of United States. The desire of Clinton became more expressive when the enlargement study was released in 1994, and the American administration has expressed their desire on many occasion that the expansion of NATO is centre of the United States of America foreign policy and NATO's future (Hendrickson 1999: 87). The standards established by NATO for admitting new members require political and military conditions. On the political ground, the state should have a democratic government with free and open market practices, resolution of ethnic conflict and the state should not have any border dispute with the neighboring country, and apart from the fact that the military of the state should be democratic and under civilian control. On the military ground, all new members should standardise their armies to allow for interoperable machinery among all allies and also share the cost of NATO's military equally (Hendrickson 1999: 87-88).

NATO's policy towards the former Communist Bloc, especially in Baltic states has developed as Paul Latawaski asks mentioned by three principal components since early 1994. These are expansion policy, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, and the effort to address Russia's concern and develop a mutual understanding with the Russian Federation. The formation of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in late 1991 enabled the former communist states to pursue much closer relations with the alliance (Kramer 2002: 736).

The establishment of NACC was followed by the formation of NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994. The intention behind the formulation of PFP was to help the Post-Soviet states to develop professional military under a democratic and civilian control



and possibly to prepare these countries in another way for future membership of NATO. Under the PFP, the Alliance has set up a Planning and Review Process (PARP) that helped desire NATO members to achieve modern and finest force level and better information ability. Since the Soviet dissolution, in order to become NATO member, the Baltic states have also followed a consistent policy.

As a result of their broad and intensive reform programs, Baltic states have full-filled all the requirement to be a part of internationally recognised liberal democratic states as well as developing their economy as an open market economy. Since the independence, Baltic states have become member of various international as well as regional organisations to transform their political and economic condition such as Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the organisation of Baltic states, and the Council of Europe. Moreover, earlier before getting a membership of EU and NATO, Baltic states have signed and later granted association agreement with the European Union (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007: 324-325).

During the Madrid Summit in the summer of 1997, NATO members adopted resolutions which may help to continue the process of Alliance enlargement into the Baltic states. Even though these states were not accepted during the first phase of NATO expansion, their aspiration was recognised by West as an 'open door' policy. Such recognition was not enough to satisfy the Baltic leaders. Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs said he wants to hear something more concrete at the next NATO meeting. He added that all Baltic states are concerned that their opinions and views will be listened too and that they will be told when they are invited to join. The Baltic state has gone further with American Charter of Partnership of 1998, which promises crisis consultation, military assistance and a possible backing for NATO membership of the Baltic states that will result in closer relations (Zajedova 1999, 2000: 11).

Since 2004, the air space over the Baltic has been patrolled by four aircraft from various NATO member states. At the same time, up to 30 military sites have reportedly been constructed with financial assistance from the United States, and a system of electronic reconnaissance is being created in the Baltic States (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007: 316).

A critic of this strategy believes that possibly confrontation between West and Russia will increase the danger of a conflict between the two dominant power of the world. NATO wants to strengthen its military presence on its eastern border and to position foreign troops battalions in Poland and the Baltic states. Poland and Baltic countries want to push NATO to be even more aggressively. They demanded for increased air surveillance by fighter jet of the alliance partner near the Baltic region and also permanent stationing of NATO combat troops which would clearly violate the NATO-Russia Founding Act, 1997 (Zuesse 2016).

### **Russia's Responses towards NATO's Expansion**

Russia's view towards NATO's expansion was very much evident. Privately and publically on many occasion, the Russian government official expressed their opinion against NATO's expansion to the states of the eastern part of Europe. Many of the states were part of Soviet Bloc who openly showed their desire to be a part of Atlantic alliance. The Russian opposition to NATO's expansion is very much understandable because Russians see NATO's expansion as a threat that will undermine the Russian sphere of influence in the Post-Soviet space which Moscow consider as 'near abroad',<sup>6</sup> especially near the Russian border. Russia also sees NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe or in its heartland as a potential threat due to NATO's military advantage over Russia and with adding a new member from Central and East Europe near Russia's border will make Moscow's position in the

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<sup>6</sup> Near Abroad are basically those state which emerged after the collapse of Soviet Union. Russia refers these states as a priority for Kremlin's foreign policy. These states also what Russia called come under the sphere of influence.

region vulnerable. In 1992, Russia recorded NATO as a cause of military threat in her new military policy (Toppo 2016).

There are some major concerns of Russia which emerged due to the NATO's expansion near to its border. The following are some of such concerns.

1. Russia feared that Baltic membership in NATO is a threat that will raise a concern for security of Moscow. It is because Russia believes that NATO's expansion will not stop after one or two rounds, it will go further to penetrate towards eastward, and the accession of East and Central Europe will make Russia's national security more vulnerable. This fear became real when Georgia and Ukraine have also shown their desire to get a membership of NATO.
2. Russia was also concerned about its role in the European security structure. Moscow believes that the expansion of NATO would make North Atlantic Alliance a prominent guarantor of European hard security needs which will curtail Russia's opportunity to participate in decision-making process.
3. The primary concern for Russia was the consequence of NATO expansion for Kaliningrad. The membership of Baltic states in NATO could disrupt the transit route to Kaliningrad through Lithuania.
4. One of the primary concerns for Russia was the use of Baltic territory against Moscow. Kremlin believes that the inclusion of Baltic states into NATO will give access to use Soviet and Russian military infrastructure and bases against Moscow which was abandoned by Russia.

In 1992 when it became vibrant that NATO is likely to add new members in the alliance, in response Russia started to regain its position in Post-Soviet states whom many of the states are the member of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These CIS countries were considered as a group of countries which is essential for Russia's security and stability. In 1993, to protect Moscow's interest in the region and prevent NATO's expansion, Russian President Yeltsin signed a document

entitled 'the conceptualisation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The document refers Russia as a security guarantor to CIS countries. Russian President Yeltsin also invites Baltic states under the Russian security structure and in exchange, Baltic states have to forge their NATO aspirations. Furthermore, Russia's President Yeltsin ordered to modernise and test of new arms and establish military bases by allegedly need to protect 25 million ethnic Russians who are living outside Russia. (Toppo 2016)

Defending the NATO's expansion in former Warsaw Pact members, Atlantic alliance response was not adequately addressing the concern of Russia. However, the members of NATO assures Russia that "the accession of Baltic states and other former Warsaw members is in the interest of overall European integration and it would not undermine the Russian interest in the region. As Martin A. Smith quoted what is said on "Segodnya in early September 1993, foreign official Vyacheslav Yelagin set out the basic ministry line. This was, first, one opposing the rapid enlargement of NATO membership, while recognising the former Warsaw Pact states had the right to join if they so chose. Second, according to Yelagin, the foreign ministry's preference was for 'Strengthening and improving such structures as CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council'; that is, institution and structures within which Russia has a seat" (Smith 2006: 54).

Russia worked against NATO's eastward expansion at the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Lisbon Summit 1992, and Moscow also insisted on reviewing the Conventional Forces in Europe Pact. Russian strategy was to prevent the meeting that increases the number of members of NATO by unconditionally approving the admission of Central and East European countries, and on the other side, trying to make OSCE into a one-in-all European organisation with its own conditions and interest. (Toppo 2016)

In 1994 NATO initiated a programme called 'Partnership for Peace,' which include all the former members of the old Communist Bloc. With getting a membership of

PFP, not only European countries even former Soviet states can conduct a military exercise with NATO. As expected, Moscow did not see such development in favour of Moscow's position in the region and it would also upsurge the hostility between the West and Russia. The formation of PFP may also be considered as a setback to the Russian-directed Collective Security Organisation. Russia maintains the expansion of NATO as a threat to its national security, but due to the weaker economic and military condition, Russia could not succeed in preventing the proposal of US expansion of NATO. Russia opposes to the deployment of any nuclear weapon on the area of any former Warsaw members. However, Russia assured it would not prevent the expansion of NATO only on the condition that the development was slow and no nuclear weapon were installed on the land of the new NATO allies (Toppo 2016).

In Paris on May 27, 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and leaders of the 16 NATO countries signed a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. The founding Act provided for a Russia-NATO Permanent Council for Consultations where both groups can discuss issues of common security interests, such as terrorism, nuclear safety and a conventional military doctrine and peacekeeping operations. NATO enlargement to the Baltic states notably was proclaimed to constitute a 'red line' in Russia's relations with the West, which later was strongly warned not to cross. Russia threatens the West that the inclusion of Baltic states in NATO will be considered as a 'red line'. Russia have also many times attempted to block the expansion of NATO near its border. Moscow portrays Estonia and Latvia as a country which is struggling with national integration. Russia also emphasised that the border with all three countries were undefined by creating an unstable situation in the region. Although, Russia had sort out border disputes with Baltic states, it refused to sign them. Russia signed a border agreement with Lithuania in 1997 but did not ratify it from Duma. Moreover, Russia also sees that the NATO expansion cannot stop because the US interest is widening its presence in

the heartland of Eurasia to obtain access to strategic energy resources and control over transportation route. (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007).

With the hope to build cooperative relations between Russia and US, NATO-Russia Council (NRC) were founded in 2002. However, Russia was recovering from the trauma of collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Russia still raises and remind the commitment of U.S.A which was given by the Washington at the time of German Unification in 1990, that NATO would not expand and station its forces towards eastward.

Despite Russia's concern and preventive majors NATO has expanded, first it includes three former members of the Warsaw Pact and then East-Central and South-Central European states also with three former Soviet states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In December 2006, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a meeting with students of the faculty of world politics at the Moscow State University mentioned some of the unhappiness in his speech when he said that "As a part of NATO-Russia Council we are accumulating the potential for practical cooperation in countering common threats and security challenges. At the same time, firmly put the questions that cause the transformation of NATO, the alliance's expansion plans, the reconfiguration of the US military presence in Europe, the placement of US missile defense elements here, the refusal NATO members to ratify the CFE Treaty and we would like to see how Brussels will react to our Proposal on logical engagement with the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) in regard to the threats emanating front the territory of Afghanistan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2015).

The Russia-Georgian war and Ukraine crisis is a result of the NATO's eastward expansion policy and Russia's fear of losing its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The Ukrainian, Georgian and Moldova cases are unquestionably different from the Baltic ones. Russian interest in Ukraine, in particular, is much broader and stronger than Baltic states due to the fact that an important Russian naval base is situated in Sevastopol which gives access to the warm water. As Yevgeny Primakov,

the Russian Foreign Minister has argued, expansion of NATO would create a worsened geopolitical position for Russia. It would extend the West's strategic reach into an area of traditional Russian power and influence, a move not dissimilar to the positioning of the Soviet missile in Cuba in 1962. The expansion would thus create "a bridgehead rather than bridge" between Russia and West (Lane 2007).

To sum up, with the collapse of USSR, the relations between Russia and Baltic states followed many ups and downs. There are some cooperative elements like to solve the dispute over boundaries and withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states, as well as disputed element like Baltic states curiosity to get membership of NATO and EU. the Baltics states culturally find themselves very close to Europe and due to their historical experience with Russia they want a military alliance with NATO to secure its border from Russians. Despite having cultural and identity alignment with West, the geopolitical proximity of Baltic states is one of the major factors that leads them to look towards west.

Baltic states location between Western and Eastern Europe surrounded by two undemocratic nation, in southward a heavily militarise enclave and Baltic states position near the Mackinder's Heartland provide one of the primary reason make these states a pivot states. West see Baltic states inclusion into NATO as an opportunity to hold its control in Eurasian Heartland. Therefore, NATO has initiated various programme like NACC, PFP and MAP to assist and guide aspiring Post-Soviet states.

On the other hand, Russia sees the NATO enlargement near its border as a threat for its sphere of influence in post-soviet space. Russia's concern was also that the PFP could be conceived as a counterweight to Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that would encourage the post-Soviet states to look westward rather than eastward for their security needs. However, Russia and U.S maintained a cooperative relationship on the conditions that both countries will not cross the red line. Moreover, both countries have agreed to form a joint platform like

NATO-Russia Founding Act where both actors will discuss their primary concern. Especially after 9/11 terrorist attack U.S.A and Russia work closely to counter the global terrorism.

To get into a western economic and security structure of EU and NATO, Baltic states has set up parliamentary democracies. Moreover, they have developed an open economic market, spent billions of dollar to improve the military standard and mechanism, and became a member of various regional and international organisations. Moscow has strongly opposed NATO enlargement into the Baltic states. Russia on many occasions made clear that NATO expansion to the Baltics states might lead to deteriorating relations with the West. Russia followed a strategic and military tactic to prevent the NATO's expansion near its border, and they have signed a Founding Pact 1997 with the USA to discuss its concern. However, by 2002 it became apparent that Baltic states will be a part of NATO security alliance and finally it became one of the NATO's members in 2004.



## Chapter 3

### **Role of the Baltic States in NATO's Eastward Expansion**

Since the collapse of Soviet Union, the whole world started to operate in a different political, economic and security environment. The world became bipolar to unipolar. Baltic states took western orientation in their perceptions of security and development. With the downfall of Communist bloc, Baltic states regained the status of independent state. However, the bigger questions that arose in front of Baltic states was how long the Baltic countries are going to maintain their status of a sovereign state? Due to the vicious experience with USSR and cultural affiliation with the West, Baltic states went much closer to the Western institutional structure. The Baltic states moved from communist political system to liberal democratic institution, from state-controlled economy to open market economy. On the other hand, Russia still wants to maintain its sphere of influence in the Post-Soviet space. The small size of Baltic states and the security dilemma also directed them to look towards the North Atlantic security structure.

From the beginning of its independence, Baltic states had a high aspiration to integrate on the political, economic, and security map of the West. The fear of Russian aggression forced Baltic leaders to come under the NATO structure so they can defend their sovereign status. Also as small states, Baltic states have two options either align with small states or with the large states. However, Baltic states have chosen the large states and acted as a bandwagon to uphold the norms and values of large states. Baltic countries have reformed its political, economic and security structure according to the NATO's Membership Action Plan to get membership of NATO. Baltic states have not only improved their economic growth, but they have also set up a more democratic institutional structure. On the matter of defence structure, Baltic states committed to spending 2% of their total GDP. Also, they have taken several measures to develop cordial relationships among themselves through the collective defence forces and also established mutual defence educational institutions in order to enhance its defence

capability. This chapter is an attempt to find out the answer to some of the questions such as: why Baltic states eagerly wanted to become a member of NATO? What is the role of Baltic states in NATO's expansion? And what have Baltic states done in order to get membership of North Atlantic Alliance? Further, this chapter will also analyse the cooperation of the Baltic states among themselves and support that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania got from Northern and Central European countries to prepare themselves to get into the European political, economic and security structure.

### **Baltic States as “Small-States” and Search for Security**

Since the disintegration of the USSR, the relationship between Baltic states and Russia has been tensed especially on politics, economic and military ground. The hostile relations between Baltic states and Russia not only have an effect on whole Eastern Europe but also more or less impact on the Western economic and military alliances. Baltic states' brutal historical experience with the Soviet rule and a feeling of culturally being more closer to Europe propelled Baltic leaders to develop closer ties with the West. Also, the fear of Russian imperialist nature pushes Baltic states to look westward under the security of NATO structure. In many ways, the geographical vulnerability and size of this small Baltic nation have driven the Baltic countries to look toward European-Atlantic alliance.

All three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are small states. These Baltic countries are like other small countries of Europe, as Jeremy W. Lamoreaux said “faces potential disciplinary challenges. Lamoreaux has described two primary reasons for that:

“First, there is a great geographical diversity (a major of the states in Europe fits into the “small states” category) providing plenty of fodder for research; the conclusion is increasingly repetitious. Second, small states theory, which can fit within the broader realism, liberalism and constructivism genres of theories. It is a bit of misnomer. That is because the expectations ascribed to small states (and which comprise “small state” theory) thereby no means limited to the small states” (J. W. Lamoreaux 2014, 566).

According to small states theory, the small states aspiration is not different from large states desire. Many scholars identify four primary expectations which can fit for the small states to join the larger Alliance and other international institution.

1. Sovereignty is one of the chief objectives of any small state. That is because of their size, small states feel more threatened than large states (Cooper and Shaw 2009).
2. The small state chose to join alliances with large states via bandwagoning because that allows them to act effectively as well as, due to the reason that small state believe that aligning with the larger states will help them to secure their sovereignty (Krause and Singer 2001; Bjerga and Haaland 2010).
3. For the large state, the small state can be less and more important for military and economic reason.
4. The small state also acts like an upholder of norms and values of large state and institution (Jacobsen 2009; Nasra 2011).

In the case of Baltic states, it has become vital to analyse where these small states:- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania stands. As a small state, it is critical to answer the intention of Baltic states to get a larger alliance membership in NATO and EU. It reflects that the small state's theory is more applicable to the Baltic states due to their size, security, values, and geographical locality. Therefore, size is one of the major factor that driven Baltic states closer to West. There are some questions which needs to be answer such as: why Baltic states want to join the North Atlantic forces? What role has been played by the Baltic states to get membership of NATO? Do they want to secure their sovereignty or want to ally with NATO as an upholder of Western norms and believe or both?

Size as a concept to measure state is problematic because various authors provide a different component of size whether it is the size of the population, geographic location, and size of the economy, etc. Traditional criteria that are used to define the size of states is of four variables or categories as of population, territory, gross domestic product (GDP) and military capacity. Colin Clarke and Anthony Payne identified the size of the population, geographical location and economic condition as a major component (Clarke and Payne 1987). On the other hand, Michael Handel highlighted that “small states could have a significant population (e.g. Bangladesh)

and a large state can have a small population (e.g. Russia). Only smallness and largeness cannot determine the size of any country as it is also based on the strength and weakness of a state since that can also depend on the particular objective and morale of the state (Handel 1981, 31).

**Table 3.1 Comparison between Russia and Baltic States of Population, Economy, Landmass and Military Expenditure**

	<b>Population</b>	<b>Landmass (km square)</b>	<b>GDP at Purchasing Power Parity in USD</b>	<b>Military spending (m)</b>
Russia	142,355,415	17,098,242	3.751 trillion \$	66421
Estonia	1,258,545	45,228	38.93 billion \$	457
Latvia	1,965,686	64,589	50.65 billion \$	286
Lithuania	2,854,235	65,300	85.62 billion \$	471

**Source:** Data for Population, Landmass, and GDP at Purchasing Power Parity collected from The World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>), and Military Expenditure collected from SIPRI (<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>).

Moving on, Thorhallsson argued that the traditional technique to measure state size and power cannot just depend on their population size, territory size, economic and military size. It is also based on their cultural unity, leadership and domestic politics (Thorhallsson 2006). Thorhallsson described “six major components by which we can measure the size of the state that may affect the state action:

1. Fixed size (Population and Territory).
2. Sovereignty size (whether the state can maintain its sovereignty efficiently and minimum state structure and presence at international level).
3. Political size (military and administrative capabilities and the degree of domestic cohesion).
4. Economic size (GDP, Market Size, and development).

5. Perceptual size (how local and international structure regard the states).
6. Preference size (the view of governing elite regarding the possibilities and preference of the states internationally and its idea about the international system) (Thorhallsson 2006: 7-8).

Furthermore, Thorhallsson has given two more component to measure how influential a state should be, both internally and internationally: these are action competence and vulnerability. An action capability refers to state ability to formulate and implement domestically and ability to exercise influence on the international stage. The Vulnerability perhaps described as a tool to measure a national and international weakness of states and potential subjugation of the regime (Thorhallsson 2006).

While analyzing the case of Baltic states through the lenses of Thorhallsson's structure, the Baltic states can be considered as a vulnerable on both grounds, domestic and international capacity. However, by getting membership of EU and NATO, Baltic states will be regarded as less sensitive. They will get the support of the third party and would be in a position to influence the international agenda of NATO and EU, thereby, helping the Baltic countries to prevent their traditional security threats.

As a small state how Baltic states behave in the international arena? And how much these states will be influential in international structure? These questions need to answer. Also, it is important to address the problem of Baltic states security. Lamoreaux and Galbreath has examined the ability of small states to influence the agenda of international institutions as well as highlighting the vulnerability of its sovereignty by three frameworks: small states theory of David vital, Stephen Walt's study of alliances, and Buzan and Waever's concept of regional security complex theory (RSCT) (Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008, 4). Vital's small state theory is majorly constructed on realist thought, which believes the international system is anarchical, states are the central actor and nature of the state is egoist and coherent. The primary objective of all state is to secure or maintain their sovereignty by acquiring more power or military force (Kolodziej 2005, 109). For small states, from Vital's point of view, should be neutral to remain entirely sovereign but also expect

that no other, larger state develops hateful design towards it (Vital 1971, 12). But if any challenge towards its sovereignty occurs, small states have the option to contend with this all alone and face the defeat and lose its sovereignty, or else ally with the large states to secure its sovereignty. Therefore, the only way to regain and maintain its independence is to ally with large states (Vital 1971, 123-24).

On the other side, S. M. Walt argued in his alliance theory that “state have only two option when forming an alliance: balancing and bandwagoning (Walt 1985). Balancing means to ally with the weaker side of the coalition, for preventing the stronger side from domination over the world order. The state chooses balance for two reasons. First, to inhibit the hegemon power and second, joining the weaker side give more importance to the new members. Bandwagoning means a state ally with larger or stronger state with the notion it has of choosing the winning team. According to Walt “the weaker state, more likely is to bandwagon because it is not possible for the more fragile state to retain or secure their sovereignty by themselves” (Walt 2007).

### **Baltic States Integration into NATO**

Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after getting independence have a lot to think about its security. Baltic states worry, as one of the prominent principles of realist thought pointed out is ‘Survival of state.’ Even small states theory recognise that the first thing which small states want to retain is independence or maintain its sovereignty and also act as an actor to uphold the norms and values of the larger states. Besides, Baltic states due to their historical experience with USSR, geographical locality, and a valuable number of ethnic Russian minority feel more threatened. The security vulnerability and incapability of confrontation with the larger states which is just near its border made Baltic states to act as bandwagon and join European security structure. As Lamoreaux and Galbreath explained that Baltic states as small states are trying to negotiate with the East by engaging the West (Lamoreaux and Galbreath 2008).

Since the independence, Baltic states have been trying to transform in every aspect: political, economic and social. Baltic states have practiced what Silova has mentioned 'Four-d' transition: de-militarisation, de-Russification, de-Sovietisation, and de-socialisation (Silova 2006). Moreover, Baltic states have expressed their willingness on many occasion to be a part of NATO but due to the lack of preparedness Baltic states had not been included in Northern Atlantic alliance in the first phase of expansion. After the first phase of NATO expansion Baltic states have taken several measures to fulfil the criteria set by NATO to be a part of North Atlantic security structure. The Baltic states has accomplished a series of political, economic, military, and legal criteria that have been drawn in membership action plans or MAPs<sup>1</sup> to be a part of NATO's security structure.

Baltic states which were a part of the Soviet republic, since independence moved far away from Russia and more closer to Washington and Brussels. With the collapse of Soviet rule Baltic states got the opportunity to return to Europe which has many prospects and challenges. The Baltic states security concern and the reaction, from 1989 to the Madrid summit in 1997 has been explained by Clive Archer and said that "the Baltic security history can be divided into three phases. First, from 1989- 1991 when the Baltic states' movement for decentralisation of power to the institution started; second, from 1991 to 1993/4 when the dominant political groups begun to revisit their security concern; in third and final phase, the Baltic states' government specified to look forward their long-term security need and decided that the sovereignty and security need could only fulfil under the Western security structure " (Archer 1998, 44-46). The period between Baltic states independence to NATO's second round of enlargement, especially the security dilemma and securing their independent status has driven Baltic states toward western European security structure.

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<sup>1</sup> Membership of Action Plan was started by NATO in 1999. MAP program consist five chapters that guide aspiring states to reform their political, economic and military and legal structure. The Membership of Action Plan was initiated with the focus of Post-Soviet aspiring states in order to get the membership of NATO. It helped to prepare the seven countries which later joined in 2004 including Baltic states. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro are current participants of NATO's Membership of Action Plan.

Acquiring membership of the European Union and NATO, and developing regional cooperation were two pillars of Baltic states' security and defence policy (Ham 1998, 50). Immediately after gaining independence in 1991 Baltic states announced a collaboration with NATO.

In 1991 NATO founded North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to provide an ideal situation to follow cordial relations with Post-Communist States (Kramer 2002). In 1991 itself Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Furthermore, Baltic states participated in NACC Foundation meeting and became Member State of the forum. The formation of NACC was followed by the creation of Partnership for Peace in 1994, and during the same year, Baltic states joined the PFP programme. By joining PFP programme, Baltic states were trying to validate their NATO membership credentials and also trying to demonstrate that they are not only consumer of security, but are and will be, a valuable asset for the alliance as whole (Ham 1998, 50). As mentioned on Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia "joining Partnership for Peace gave the possibility to take benefit from NATO to enhance support and practice assistance in the development of the defence system and also facilitate an ideal ground to get a membership of NATO (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, 2008).

By the time of the first NATO expansion after the dismantling of Communist Bloc, all three Baltic states- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were hoping that they would be considered as potential future members of NATO. NATO also did identify Baltic states' progress towards security and stability. And on April 1999 in Washington summit, the development of Baltic states as an aspirant for NATO membership was recognised. In 2000, while addressing to the Foreign Defence Attache Association, Lithuania's Vice Minister of National Defence Dr. P. Malakauskas said, "Development of the National self-defence capabilities and interoperability with NATO are parallel and mutually complementary. As we gain credibility as potential NATO allies, while increasing interoperability with NATO enables us to further strengthen national self-defence capabilities. The priority areas of defence co-



operation are those which allow us to pursue both tasks at the same time” (Malakauskas 2000, 136).

NATO leaders established the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to assist and give practical support according to needs of aspiring Baltic states. The MAP (Membership Action Plan) consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with political and economic issue; means aspiring nation should have stable democratic institutions, settle the territorial and ethnic disputes, formed civilian control armed forces, and have an open market economy. The second chapter deals with defence and military issue; means aspiring state should reform their armed forces and contribute to the collective security forces. The resource section deals with the allocation of fund on armed forces. The remaining section deals with the security and legal issue; means aspiring nation has to ensure affirmative security of sensitive data (Bigg 2008).

It is vital to analyse the effort of Baltic states to get membership of NATO, especially with the attainment of independence, Baltic states faced security complex issue, and they also had to build a political structure based on democratic principles and values, moving from state-controlled economy to market economy, and evolved its military structure to manage the internal and external security issue (Archer 1998).

**Figure 3.1 The Shift from Communist Idea of State and Economy to Democracy and Capitalism.**



*Source:* Yaroslav Bilinsky (2006).

With the downfall of the Soviet regime, Baltic states not only got political independence but they also got transformed from a state-controlled economic system and moved towards a more open and liberal economy. All three Baltic countries have adopted liberal democratic policies with a free and periodic election that respects the civil liberty and human rights. They also widely got engaged and integrated with EU, and NATO led structures. From independence to acquiring membership in NATO, the economy of Baltic states was one of the fastest growing economies among the post-soviet states. Especially, in the case of Estonian economy, the GDP increased nearly 10 percent a year. By the time of 1996, the Baltic states had opened their economy and had moved ahead of Russia and was little behind Poland and other central European countries. (Table No 3.2).

**Table No. 3.2 Gross Domestic Product rate of Baltic and other post-Warsa states**

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Russia	-4.1	-3.6	1.4	-5.3	6.4	10.0	5.1	4.7	7.3	7.2
Poland	7.0	6.1	6.5	4.6	4.6	4.6	1.2	2.0	3.6	5.1
Czech Rep.	6.2	4.3	-0.7	-0.3	1.4	4.3	3.1	1.6	3.6	4.9
Hungary	1.5	0.0	3.3	4.2	3.2	4.2	3.8	4.5	3.8	5.0
Georgia	2.6	11.2	10.5	3.1	2.9	1.8	4.8	5.5	11.1	5.9
Belarus	-10.4	2.8	11.4	8.4	3.4	5.8	4.7	5.0	7.0	11.4
Estonia	-	5.3	11.8	4.1	-0.9	10.6	6.3	6.1	7.4	6.3
Latvia	-	2.4	9.0	6.5	2.6	5.4	6.5	7.1	8.4	8.3
Lithuania	-	5.1	8.3	7.5	-1.1	3.8	6.5	6.8	10.5	6.6

**\*Source:** The World Bank Data (2016).

To identify and measure the economy of states as Peter Murrell said “De Melo and Denizer and Gelb (1995) have identified three major scales. First, charting the

liberalisation of the internal market; second, foreign trade and investment and lastly private sector entry” (Murrell 1996, 31).

Among the Baltic states, Estonia radically liberalised its economy and opened its door to the liberal market economy. Table No 3.3 shows the Baltic states extent of economic reform between 1996 to 2004. The Czech Republic and Estonia were on the top of the list, whereas Ukraine and Belarus were on the bottom. The data released by the Heritage Foundation shows that the degree of economic freedom among all the transitional economy of post-soviet states and former Warsaw members. The Czech Republic has given a free hand to the degree of economic freedom (67.8), Ukraine (39.9) and Belarus (40.4) has the smallest. Among the Baltic states, Estonia has been given a free hand (65.2) whereas Latvia and Lithuania were in middle of the reforming process (www.Heritage.org).

**Table No 3.3 Economic Liberalisation 1996-2004**

<b>Degree of Economic Freedom</b>										
<b>Country</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
Estonia	65.2	65.4	69.1	72.5	73.8	69.9	76.1	77.6	77.7	77.4
Latvia	-	55.0	62.4	63.4	64.2	63.4	66.4	65.0	66.0	67.4
Lithuania	-	49.7	57.3	59.4	61.5	61.9	65.5	66.1	69.7	72.4
C. Rep.	67.8	68.1	68.8	68.4	69.7	68.6	70.2	66.5	67.5	67.0
Hungary	55.2	56.8	55.3	56.9	59.6	64.4	65.6	64.5	63.0	62.7
Poland	50.7	57.8	56.8	59.2	59.6	60.0	61.8	65.0	61.8	58.7
Russia	51.1	51.6	48.6	52.8	54.5	51.8	49.8	48.7	50.8	52.8
Belarus	40.4	38.7	39.8	38.0	35.4	41.3	38.0	39.0	39.7	43.1
Ukraine	39.9	40.6	43.5	40.4	43.7	47.8	48.5	48.2	51.1	53.7
Georgia	-	44.1	46.5	47.9	52.5	54.3	58.3	56.7	58.6	58.9

*Source:* <http://www.heritage.org/index/>

Foreign Direct Investment in Baltic states is also an indicator of economic reform in the Baltic countries (Grennes 1997). Table 3.4 shows that Baltic states has done reasonably well compare to other Post-Soviet states like Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Among the Baltic countries Estonia was the favourite destination for the MNC's and Lithuania was the least favourite states for foreign direct investment. Moreover, Table 3.5 also indicates that Estonia is far ahead from Latvia and Lithuania in the matter of stock of FDI. Thus, it is a clear indication that all three Baltic states have reformed its economy to make more favorable for foreign investor to move close to the European Structure.

**Table No. 3.4 FDI Flow in the Baltic States and the other Post-Soviet States**

<b>Country</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
Estonia	4.37	3.11	5.28	10.30	5.28	6.88	8.64	3.94	9.44	7.94
Latvia	3.30	6.41	8.01	4.96	4.60	4.14	1.26	2.20	2.38	4.23
Lithuania	1.08	1.82	3.50	8.23	4.43	3.28	3.64	5.08	0.96	3.42
Czech Rep.	4.30	2.14	2.11	5.60	9.72	8.11	8.37	10.38	2.12	4.18
Poland	2.57	2.81	3.09	3.67	4.28	5.50	2.93	2.03	1.83	4.79
Hungry	11.04	7.10	8.84	6.86	6.75	5.86	7.34	4.43	2.51	4.12
Russian Federation	0.52	0.66	1.20	1.02	1.69	1.02	0.92	0.99	1.80	2.59
Belarus	0.11	0.72	2.49	1.25	3.66	1.14	0.78	1.69	0.96	0.71
Georgia	-	-	6.91	7.34	2.94	4.29	3.41	4.72	8.38	9.60
Ukraine	0.53	1.13	1.20	1.71	1.52	1.84	2.01	1.58	2.74	2.55

*\*Source:* UNCTAD (United Nation Conference on Trade and Development 2017)


**Table No. 3.5 FDI Stock in the Baltic States and other Post-Soviet states**

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Estonia	15.24	17.32	22.92	32.45	43.00	46.49	50.42	57.78	71.32	83.29
Latvia	11.39	15.69	19.49	21.71	23.85	21.31	22.31	25.57	27.15	31.54
Lithuania	5.25	8.35	10.28	14.46	18.80	20.23	21.75	27.89	26.38	28.21
Czech Rep.	12.35	12.84	14.98	21.66	27.12	35.21	40.21	47.33	45.61	48.13
Poland	5.52	7.17	9.17	12.88	15.36	19.48	21.20	23.80	25.80	33.17
Hungry	24.46	28.57	38.12	42.65	47.44	48.48	51.08	53.66	56.87	59.40
Russian Federation	1.40	2.08	3.36	4.77	9.34	11.45	16.48	19.93	21.96	20.34
Belarus	0.36	1.06	3.59	8.67	9.52	12.53	11.31	11.28	10.65	8.89
Georgia	1.19	2.21	7.02	14.16	22.54	24.92	27.29	30.90	34.96	37.23
Ukraine	1.78	3.12	3.97	6.46	9.93	11.97	12.21	13.48	14.55	14.29

*\*Source:* UNCTAD (United Nation Conference on Trade and Development 2017).

Furthermore, Baltic states after getting independence, perform better than the Russian Federation in HDI (Human Development Index). Among the Baltic states, Estonia performs very well in human development index, and Latvia and Lithuania maintained the same share of index by the time of NATO integration.

**Figure 3.2 Growth rate of Human Development Index, 1992-2004**



*\*Source:* Human Development Data of United Nations Development Programme, 2017  
(<http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>)

There is sufficient indication that proved the economic reform in Baltic states is more aggressive than other post-soviet state but less than in Central European Countries. Among the Baltic, Estonia has reformed its economic structure more radically, and Lithuania was the least reformer. Baltic leaders hail the economic investment of western MNC's for the benefit of the Baltic economy and also to counter Russia's economic influence in the region.

Furthermore, since the collapse of the communist bloc, Baltic states have tried to sort out the border dispute with Russia as well as the issue of the Russian minority in order to get into the Atlantic structure. As mentioned in MAP's chapter, the aspiring member should settle their territorial and ethnic dispute. In the matter of border dispute, Lithuania signed a border treaty with Poland and Russia in the 1990s and fulfilled NATO's criteria. Estonia and Latvia were not able to settle down its border

dispute with Russia due to the alleged discrimination against the ethnic Russian minority and human right violation of Russian minority. Even Russia knows that by not solving the territorial dispute with Estonia and Latvia it will prevent their membership in Atlantic alliance. However, the first steps were taken in 1993 between Russia, Latvia, and Estonia to regulate cross-border movement. In the case of minority issue, Latvia and Estonia adopted citizen act, according to the citizen act all native who had been a resident on 16 June 1940 and their descendants will get the citizen's right. Means all post 1940s settler will not be considered as citizens of Latvia and Estonia (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds and Birka 2013). In 1998 Latvia held a referendum and amended the citizenship act with the standard set by OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). In Estonia, to settle their ethnic dispute has taken a little longer to resolve (Kramer 2002).

Thus, regarding political and economic readiness, the Baltic states executed what has been mentioned in Membership Action Plan. Baltic states reform-inclined towards a liberal open market economic system and also set up a liberal democratic regime where public control was given over armed forces. In terms of political readiness, Baltic states has adopted Western parliamentary form of democracy. Furthermore, Baltic states tried to solve their long-pending border dispute with neighbouring countries especially with Poland, and to some extent, it was successful in signing an agreement with Russia. Baltic states also recognise the Russian ethnic minority rights and made amendments in its citizenship act to resolve the long pending ethnic tension.

According to the Membership Action Plan, aspiring members have to reform and reconstruct their defence structure. The aspirant member also has to spend a minimum amount of their GDP on defence expenditure. All three countries maintained the commitment to spend 2% of their total GDP on defence though Latvia and Lithuania found it difficult to attain. As shown in Table 3.6, Estonia (1.7%) and Latvia (1.6%) has doubled its GDP spending on military expenditure from 1995 to 2004 and was at the top among all Baltics states in the expenditure on defence structure. However, Lithuania (1.2%) lagged behind Estonia and Latvia. Nevertheless, when we compare

the defence expenditure in terms of US\$, Estonia’s military spending was the lowest by 2003. All three Baltic Countries, having a small number of military personnel as well as financial limitation, cannot build a large security structure that can counter the Russia’s aggression. So, they have developed as F. Stephen Larrabee mention in his testimony “their functional capability in real areas. Baltic states have established its mine sweeping units and chemical defence unit” (Larrabee 2003).

**Table No 3.6 Military Expenditure by the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1993-2004**

<b>Country</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
Estonia*	78.4	76.3	102	108	134	158	184	220	254	268
% of GDP	1.0%	0.9%	1.0%	1.1%	1.3%	1.4%	1.5%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%
Latvia*	92.4	71.9	69.6	75.0	97	122	153	250	288	311
% of GDP	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	0.9%	1.0%	1.5%	1.6%	1.6%
Lithuania*	82.1	91	150	261	200	261	306	305	298	344
% of GDP	0.5%	0.5%	0.7%	1.2%	1.0%	1.2%	1.4%	1.3%	1.1%	1.2%

\*In US\$ million

*Source:* (SIPRI 2017).

Not only Baltic states spend a valuable amount of their GDP on military expenditure they also work on regional defence cooperation. All three Baltic countries have taken up various steps to build up a stronger defence structure and regional co-operation in the Baltic region. Baltic militaries have an advantage in getting membership of NATO. Unlike Poland or other countries, they did not have massive large armies, equipped with old weapons and arms. This mean, Baltic states do not require to reduce



their military size as Poland have done. Also, all three states initiated to train their military personnel according to NATO standards that helped to develop a new organisational structure to having a recognised excellence of NATO. Even though Baltic states perform relatively well in the state of groundwork but still due to their small Population (Combined 6.14 million) and economy, Baltic states have relatively small military forces compared to Central and Northern European countries. Due to the fact that Baltic states do not have any small and medium military threat in their region that's the reason why they spend limited resources on military capacity. Baltic states regard Russia, the only threat in the long term that can be prohibited by NATO (Gorenburg et al. 2001).

In 2002 NATO Prague summit, when it became apparent that the Baltic states inclusion in NATO will become a reality as NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced: "This has been a hugely significant decision, for NATO, for these seven countries including Baltic states to start enlargement talks, and for the Euro-Atlantic Community (NATO 2002)." The Baltic countries have gone for extensive reform to get membership of NATO. It is further supported by a significant power like U.S and other Nordic countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.

U.S supported the Baltic inclusion on the ground of economic, political and military progress. In economy, the growth of all three states is steady. Moreover, Baltic states have taken several measures to control corruption and instituted the legal framework to form its economy- a liberal open market economy that will tie them with the Northern European states and other members of EU. All three states also committed to resolving the issue of ethnic minority. Baltics states have taken various steps to meet NATO and OSCE criteria to settle the minority issue, especially with the Russian-speaking population. Finally, each Baltic countries have pledged to spend 2% of their GDP on defence expenditure. Sweden has firmly supported NATO and EU enlargement in all three Baltic countries hoping that expansion will increase the United States commitment in the Baltic Sea region. It has taken numerous steps to prepare the Baltic forces to NATO standard. Sweden contributed almost 40%, a large

part of western aid. It also has exported arms and ammunition, given comprehensive training and maintenance, education in western military structure and education on civil-military relations.

From the beginning of the independence of Baltic states, Denmark has supported the NATO's enlargement to the Baltic states with the hope that Baltic states inclusion will stabilise the region. Denmark has been the prominent defender of Baltic states' integration into NATO and the EU. Denmark also sees that the more small countries in NATO and EU will diminish the dominance of Germany and France. Denmark supported the Baltic states to reform their economic, political and defence structure. Especially in defence ability, it was Denmark's effort to build cooperation among the Baltic countries that lead to the creation of Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) and Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).

Although Germany supported the NATO's Expansion into the Baltic states, it was also vocal to pursue cordial and cooperative relations with Russia. For a long time, Finland followed the policy of neutrality. However, since Putin's statement came after 9/11 attack that "it was up to the Baltic states to choose whether it wants to be included in the alliance", there was a change in Finland's policy too. Thus, many of the Nordic countries have supported the Baltic states inclusion in the NATO, including military superpower U.S and European economic power Germany has supported the Baltic states integration. On the other hand, Russia has also drawn a red line which is not to cross. However, since the Baltic states became a NATO as well as EU member, it has become important to find answers and analyse questions such as: what will be the security implication of NATO's expansion to Russia's 'near abroad'? Have Russian and Baltic states foreign policy changed after NATO's enlargement? Will the inclusion of Baltic states in North Atlantic alliance be able to solve their security concern? Will NATO's expansion stabilise the Baltic region or will it escalate the security dilemma between Baltic states and Russia?

## **Defence Cooperation among Baltic Countries**

From the very beginning, the Baltic countries have understood that cooperation among the Baltic nation is essential to get into the North Atlantic security structure. Since 1993, all three Baltic states have taken numerous steps to develop an active regional defence cooperation. The creation of Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) is a landmark to the growth of Baltic military cooperation. All three defence minister of the Baltic states signed an agreement in Tallinn on 1993 that led to the creation of BALTBAT (Zájedová 1999, 2000: 84-85). Later BALTBAT got widespread support from Scandinavian countries; especially from Denmark and Sweden, and other NATO members. They provided a large amount of guns, mortars, and vehicles (Kramer 2002: 744). The BALTBAT has participated in the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR).

In 1997, all three Baltic states created a joint standardisation group for the purpose of coordinating and to increase national defence planning among themselves. Through the regular meeting and consultations, Baltic countries initiated some Tri-national collaborative military project that includes:

- A collective Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), with the goal to develop air surveillance and air proficiency in the Baltic region and is interoperable with NATO's integrated air defence and early warning system.
- A collective Naval Squad (BALTRON), with bases at Riga, Liepaja, and Ventspils (in Latvia), Tallinn (in Estonia) and Klaipeda (in Lithuania). BALTRON was created to reduce the mine menace, increase the security of the Baltic states provincial water and help to improve the environmental damage in the provincial waters and industrial areas of Baltic states (Miinisadam 2015).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For detailed background and latest information on The Baltic Naval Squadron, check Estonia Defence forces official website (<http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces/international-co-operation>).

- In 1998 defence minister of all three Baltic states signed an agreement to establish The Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. Under the command of Danish General, BALTDEFCOL started to train officers for service in their respective defence ministries as well as for common military units. The training emphasises NATO's standard and procedure. Most importantly the working language at the defence college which was chosen to be English helped Baltic officers to coordinate with NATO forces (Miinisadam 2015).<sup>3</sup>

Thus, Baltic states not only developed cordial relations among themselves also take widespread support of Central and Nordic European countries as well as composite measures to counter common threat because all three countries are facing a similar kind of dangers.

To sum up, Baltic states due to their size and security needs, not only considered NATO as a hard security guarantor but it also played a major role in NATO's expansion towards Eastern part of Europe. To acquire membership of NATO Baltic states have worked as a bandwagon with NATO and spreading the Western idea of democracy and institutions in other Post-Soviet countries as well as they helped in NATO's peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Bosnia that shows nature of Baltic states to uphold the Western norms and values. By getting membership of NATO, all three Baltic countries filled their hard as well as soft security vacuum. They became a member of the Western idea of democratic institutions and formed a parliamentary form of democracy, open market economy and gave civil control of their armed forces. However, bandwagoning with larger states is not always fruitful, because it increases the resources available to a threatening power as well as need placing trust in its continued tolerance. Because perceptions can change and intention will not be

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<sup>3</sup> To know more about BALTDEFCOL and get latest and updated information on the Baltic Defence College, see the college official website (<http://www.baltdefcol.org/>)

similar, it is better to balance against possible threats rather rely on the hope that larger states will always protect.

## Chapter 4

### **NATO Expansion to Russia's Border and Security Challenges to the Baltic States**

Baltic states preparedness to get into Euro-Atlantic security structure became a reality in 2004 when Baltic states with other four countries became official members of NATO. With the inclusion into NATO alliance, Baltic states felt more secure and acquired a hard power guarantee against Russian threats. The security dilemma between the states, when one country feels threatened that another country will attack their security and sovereignty was the primary force behind the Baltic states inclusion into NATO. Baltic states wanted to secure their sovereign and independent status from Russia which is not possible to obtain without getting a firm security guarantee and in that circumstances, NATO was a desirable choice for Baltic states which would secure its territory from Russia's traditional military aggression. On the other hand, Russia was also driven by security dilemma that expansion of NATO towards eastward will minimise Moscow's area of influence in Post-Soviet space and also Baltic inclusion into the NATO will be a loss for Russia's access to the Warm water of Baltic Sea region. Moreover, Russia feels that the cordial relations between Baltic states, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova will encourage the other countries like Georgia and Ukraine to apply for membership of Atlantic-European Security structure.

After the inclusion into NATO, now it becomes necessary to find answers to the questions such as, has the security concern of direct military threat from Russia to the Baltic states been resolved on a permanent basis? Or what would be the security implication of NATO expansion to Russia's border for the Baltic countries? This chapter is an attempt to find out the above-raised questions. This section will briefly discuss the idea of security dilemma in the international world order, and it will go

further and analyse the security dilemma of Russia and Baltic states. It will also try to examine the recent and new security concern of Baltic states.

The Recent Crisis in Ukraine, and Russia and NATO military drilling in the Baltic region again has raised concern for the Baltic states. With having a large number of Russian minority, the influence of Russian language and culture and there is a potential that Russia might use the same tactic which Moscow used in Ukraine to destabilise and has resurfaced security concern for all three Baltic countries as well as the region. The deployment of military and weapons also raised the situation as many experts say, like a Cold War. So, the last section of this chapter will try to evaluate whether recent hostility between NATO and Russia has any similarity with Cold War phenomena or is it only to maintain their supremacy in Europe.

### **Russia's Approach to NATO Expansion and Security Dilemma Baltic States**

On 29 March 2004, seven countries including three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) were formally included as NATO members. The Baltic state's officials were excited and announced: "It is a most awaited juncture and achievement of a pending desire" (Gidathubali 2004). However, the inclusion of Baltic states into the NATO brought out a strong reaction in Kremlin. Russia started to believe that the NATO expansion close to its border will practically facilitate NATO armed forces direct access near the Russian border. The Russian foreign ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko expressed that "the NATO decision was a threat to Russia's national security" (Gidathubali 2004, 1885). Russia has maintained that there is no need of military base in Baltic states and Poland, especially to counter the anti-terror operation in West Asia. This behavior of Russia shows that Moscow feels threatened by NATO enlargement and this action is due to their security dilemma.

In this section, researcher will evaluate how security dilemma works between both states vice-versa. It will also discuss, how the improvement of one's security status makes another state more threatened. But before going into Russia and Baltic states concern, it is important to discuss the concept of the security dilemma. Insecurity

mostly directs security dilemma between any states. As one side starts to put effort to strengthen itself militarily and diplomatically as a defensive action, the other end begins to feel uncomfortable and threatened. As John H Herz explained security dilemma and said “Security dilemma prevail in an anarchic structure, as groups or individual living in such circumstances are generally concerned about their sovereignty being attacked, enthralled or subjugated, dominated and annihilated by other groups or persons; to prevent such condition, they are forced to acquire more and more power” (Herz 1950, 157). Even Butterfield explained, “security dilemma as a major component that has driven the states to war even though they may not want” (Butterfield 1951, 19-20). Indeed, Jervis defined security dilemma as, “meant to be defensive, many times by various ways, states try to increase their security to seek control or at least negate others and one state’s security improvement recklessly threaten other states” (Jervis 1978, 169-170).

Because of the anarchic nature of the International system, it imposes pressure on states’ behavior. “Even if they can be confident that the current intentions of other states are compassionate, they can neither neglect the probability that the others will become hostile in the future, nor there is credible assurance that they themselves will remain peaceful” (Jervis 2001, 36). Charles Glaser has defined security dilemma as a situation that determines the security seeking motives of the states (Glaser 1992) and taken forward by Jeffrey W. Taliaferro who said “the security dilemma applies where the intention of the state is to look for security because states’ behavior is determined by security interest (Taliaferro 2000-2001).

On the conceptual analysis of the various idea of security dilemma Shiping Tang defined security dilemma as follows:

“Under a condition of anarchy, two states are defensive realist states- that is, they do not intend to threaten each other’s security. The two states, however, cannot be sure of each other’s current or future intentions. As a result, each tends to fear that the other may be or may become a predator. Because both believe that power is a means towards security, both seek to accumulate more and more power. Because even primarily defensive capability will inevitably contain some offensive ability, many of the measures adopted by one side for its own security can often threaten, or be



perceived as threatening, the security of the other side even if both sides merely want to defend their security” (Tang 2009, 594).

On the basis of the different definitions of the security dilemma, it can be said that security dilemma can only prevail in anarchical circumstances where two states are guided by defensive realism and won't want to intimidate each other's security, but they are not certain of their intention in the current scenario or future. Therefore, there is always a mutual suspicion among states that the other state might launch an attack, as both states consider power as a measure of security. Hence, both states are engaged in accruing power to a greater extent. As a result, any country drive for necessary defence capacity will involve a bit of offensive power. A part of the measures taken up usually threatens the security of another state. Even though both states are only safeguarding their own security

The situation between Russia, Baltic states, and NATO is deep rooted in their historical background; Baltic states cannot trust Russia due to their experience with Russia and Moscow cannot trust NATO due to their Cold War rivalry. Though Brussels claimed that the role of NATO after the collapse of Soviet Union has changed. However, Russia still considers NATO as a military alliance, and the expansion of NATO will only decrease the Russian Security.

NATO's expansion towards eastward is seen by Kremlin as tearing the promise given by James Baker U.S Secretary of State to Mikhail Gorbachev at the time of German unification that “ No new military structure would be in the eastern part; no permanent military base will be placed; no weapon of mass destruction would be positioned near Russia's border” (Pifer 2014, Laguerre 2016). After the first round of NATO enlargement, Antony Kvashnin, the leading member of the General Staff of the Russian Army expressed his view and said “further practical NATO step towards eastwards expansion and the accession of Central and East European countries will be considered a challenge to our national security” (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007, 314-315).

Russia also fears the possible positioning of NATO forces in the Baltic states:

The geostrategic location of Baltic states, which in case of accession to NATO would be linked with the North Atlantic Alliance exclusively by a narrow strip, from the very beginning challenged the credibility of NATO security guarantees to the Baltic states and Brussels assurance that NATO troops would not be deployed permanently on the territory of these new states (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007: 315).

This fear became real for Russia when it was announced that NATO forces might use the military bases abandoned by Soviet-Russia security forces in 1993-94. Moscow's another fear was after NATO's expansion to Russia's border it will make NATO a primary collective security organisation. Since, the crumbling of Soviet Union, Russia always wanted OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) to be recognised as a fundamental security guarantor in Europe. However, NATO enlargement will prevent the Russian desire. That means Russians do not have any role in constructing and decision-making policy on European security matter.

A primary concern for Russia is also the Kaliningrad enclave. Russia fears that the inclusion of Baltic states in NATO will prevent its accessibility to the Kaliningrad oblast. Moreover, NATO's expansion will have an effect on the transit route of oil and gas. The primary concern which Russian realists argued was that the inclusion of Baltic states into the Atlantic alliance would encourage other countries like Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine to come out from the Russian sphere of influence. And with the Rose Revolution in Georgia and Ukraine crisis clear the shadow of speculation. Russia cannot afford to lose these two strategic areas because for Russians loss of Georgia and Ukraine will cost Moscow's regional hegemony and power status.

After getting independence, Baltic states had only three options to form their security policy. First, neutrality; second, establish cooperative relations and form an alliance with other small states; and lastly, to get membership in a larger political, economic and military alliance. From the very beginning of their independence, Baltic states expressed their desire to become a member of EU and NATO; meaning Baltic states

wanted to return to the western structure. In various articles, many scholars have highlighted that two possible reasons majorly determine the Baltic states security policy: the geostrategic location, between the West and East Europe and historical familiarity (Kojala and Kersanskas 2014-2015: 172-173).

With the inclusion of Baltic states into the North Atlantic security structure, NATO has become the key security guarantor of the Baltic region. Baltic states believe that accession into NATO will also eliminate security concern and dilemma of Baltic states. But it is important to answer and analyse whether the Baltic states membership into NATO have resolved all their security concern or are they still in a security dilemma.

### **Security Challenges for the Baltic States after NATO Membership**

Despite getting a membership of NATO, Baltic states still considered Russia as a plausible threat to their peace and security and stability for the region. Even Rod Thornton and Manos Karagiannis has explained the Russian strategies in Ukraine and warned the Baltic states that the very same element could be used by Russia against Baltic countries to destabilise and put into a ‘permanent war’ what can be called ‘hybrid warfare’<sup>1</sup> (Thornton and Karagiannis 2016). In the context of Baltic states, Russia can use ‘hybrid warfare’ as Janis Berzins of the Latvian Defence Academy understands a “state of superficial war to a total war, the state of permanent war. Where the state of permanent war becomes the ‘normal situation in national life” (Berzins 2014). Now the NATO is near Russia’s border which is a major concern for Russia and to secure its border, Moscow can give the excuse that Kremlin is concern about its ‘strategic depth.’ As Russian newspaper explained it, ‘The US uses the organisation to continually push against the strategic depth that Russia retained after 1991’ (Korybko 2015).

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<sup>1</sup> Hybrid warfare is a form of war which is not only based on physical and psychological, the kinetic and non-kinetic, but also involved different variant of human actor. An important objective of a state following ‘hybrid warfare’ is to develop confusion and mistrust in its opponent thereby destructing its managerial capability (Hoffman 2007, 31-33).

After getting NATO membership, it was unimaginable for Baltic states that Russia will uphold its influence in the Baltic region. However, Russia-Georgian war (2008) and recent Ukraine Crisis (2014) have raised a potential threat to territorial integrity of the Baltic states. Moreover, Moscow's military exercise in Baltic coast after Russia's intervention in Ukraine threatened the Baltic security (Demianchuk 2014). Like Ukraine, all three Baltic states have strategic importance for Russia. Russia has limited accessibility to the warm water, and also Baltics states like Crimea give access to the warm water of the Baltic Sea and also to the west. Furthermore, Baltic states believe that the large number of Russian ethnic minorities which reside there also give Russia a reason for intervention. Especially, after the introduction of Russia's 'compatriot' policy what happened in Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Ukraine's Crimea also spread fear among Baltic states.

Estonia and Latvia have a significant number of ethnic Russian minority, respectively about 25.10 percent in Estonia and 25.50 percent in Latvia, while in Lithuania ethnic Russian population just fall under the 6 percent (5.88%) (as mentioned in Table no. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Since the compatriot policy has included the Russian speaker and sympathiser, the number has increased even higher because other Baltic minorities usually adopt Russia as their primary language. Russian speaker in Latvia is nearly about 34% of the total population, Lithuania has the least number of Russia speaker among the Baltic states almost about 15%, and Estonia's Russian speaker is approximately about 30% of all the people. However, Estonia does not report such statistics (Grigas 2014, 63).<sup>2</sup>

Russian minorities majorly in Estonia and Latvia concentrated near the Russian border, and some major cities included Tallinn and Riga. Riga has a significant number of ethnic Russian Population (243,546), approximately 38% of total population. The number of Russian speakers even goes higher. The second largest

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<sup>2</sup> Estonia's exact figure of Russian Speakers is difficult to find as the Estonian census statics does not report such information.

concentration of ethnic Russian in Latvia's city is Daugavpils city, located near the Belarus border, nearly 50% (42,634) of total city population (see the table No. 4.4).

**Table no 4.1 Ethnic Composition of Latvia**

<b>Ethnic Composition of Latvia</b>					
	<b>Indigenous Ethnic</b>	<b>Russian</b>	<b>Polish</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Total</b>
Interwar Period 1935	77.00% (1,467,035)	8.80% (168,266)	2.50% (48,637)	11.70% (221,998)	100% (1,905,936)
1989	52.00% (1,387,757)	34.00% (905,515)	2.30% (60,416)	11.70% (312,879)	100% (2,666,567)
2012	61.00% (1,245,246)	26.80% (541,840)	2.20% (45,634)	10.00% (212,093)	100% (2,044,813)
2016	61.80% (1,216,443)	25.60% (504,370)	2.10% (41,528)	10.50% (206,616)	100% (1,968,957)

*\*Source:* Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2017.

**Table no 4.2 Ethnic Composition of Estonia**

<b>Ethnic Composition of Estonia</b>					
	<b>Indigenous Ethnic</b>	<b>Russian</b>	<b>Polish</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Total</b>
Interwar Period (1934)	88.2%	8.5%	0.1%	3.2%	100%

1989	61.50%	30.30%	0.20%	8.00%	100%
2012	69.20% (917,075)	25.30% (335,268)	0.13% (1,738)	5.37% (71,136)	100% (1,325,217)
2016	68.83% (905,805)	25.10% (330,263)	0.13% (1,747)	5.94% (78,129)	100% (1,315,944)

**Source:** For the interwar years and 1989, Nils Muiznieks, Juris Rozenvalds & Leva Birka, Ethnicity and Social Cohesion in the Post-Soviet Baltic States (Pattern of Prejudice 2013), 290; for 2012 and 2016, Statistics Estonia 2017 (<http://www.stat.ee/en>).

**Table no 4.3 Ethnic Composition of Lithuania**

Ethnic Composition of Lithuania					
	Indigenous Ethnic	Russian	Polish	Other	Total
Interwar Period (1923)	83.90%	2.70%	3.20%	10.20%	100%
1989	79.60%	9.40%	7.0%	4.0%	100%
2011	83.90%	5.40%	6.60%	4.10%	100%
2016	85.08%	5.88%	6.65%	2.39%	100%

**Source:** For the interwar years, 1989 and 2011, Nils Muiznieks, Juris Rozenvalds & Leva Birka, Ethnicity and Social Cohesion in the Post-Soviet Baltic States (Pattern of Prejudice 2013), 290; for 2016, TrueLithuania.com (<http://www.truelithuania.com/topics/culture-of-Lithuania/ethnicities-of-Lithuania>).

**Table No 4.4 Latvia's City which has Significant Number of Ethnic Russian Minorities**

<b>Latvia's City which has significant number of ethnic Russian Minorities</b>				
<b>Latvia's City</b>	<b>2015</b>		<b>2016</b>	
	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>
Riga city	243,546	38.0	241,307	37.7
Daugavpils city	43,211	50.0	42,634	49.7
Jurmala city	16,845	33.9	16,613	33.8
Ventspils city	9,891	27.3	9,709	27.0
Jelgava city	15,239	26.6	14,982	26.3
Jekabpils city	6,151	26.7	6,017	26.4
Liepaja City	21,091	29.7	20,731	29.4
Rezekne City	13,027	44.4	12,675	44.2
Ventspils City	9,891	27.3	9,709	27.0

**Source:** Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2017, Resident population by ethnicity and by statistical region and city at the beginning of the year (Code: ISG191).

Since the NATO enlargement to Russia's border, Moscow has intensified its efforts to maintain social, political and economic bonds with ethnic Russian and Russian speaker in Baltic states. Russia has set up a number of Cultural Organisations, Unions, and associations in Baltic states which are focused on the ethnic Russian population and Russian speaker group. Moscow is also encouraging Russian as a second language in the region among the Russian minority in Baltics states and addressing the Russian minority anxiety like educational issues. As Igor Zevelev

explained, “ the Russian speaker have become the tool of propaganda crusade and found themselves under the suspicion of various intelligence agencies” (Zevelev 2016). Moscow also criticised Estonia’s and Latvia’s Citizenship Act which discriminate the Russian minority. Thus, Baltic states still fear that Russia can use its ‘compatriot policy’ to propagate against states as Moscow did in Ukraine to destabilise the internal security of Baltic states and put it into a permanent state of war.

Baltic states which are dependent on Russia for energy resources see Russia as a potential threat. Therefore, one of the major worries of Baltic states is energy security. The Baltic energy sector is mostly dependent on Russian giant company Gazprom. Even, after liberalization of their economy Baltic states require additional energy for their infrastructural growth that leads to an upsurge of the Russian Energy supremacy in the Baltic energy field. The Baltic countries are almost dependent on Russian gas and oil and the Russian pipeline structure for the supply of gas and oil. Baltic states dependency on Russian international gas company Gazprom also make the situation of Baltic states more vulnerable. Lithuania imports all gas from Gazprom, the Russian giant Gazprom has also owned a significant share of Latvia’s national gas company, and the entry of Gazprom in Latvia have affected Estonia because it receives gas from underground storage facility during winters. By acquiring a larger share of companies operating in the prominent area of the Baltic energy field, leader of Baltic states have shown their concern over dependence on Russian energy that could compromise their independence (Janeliunas 2009: 191).


Lithuania has been majorly dependent on the only refinery in Baltic states ‘Mazeikiu nafta’. Lithuania’s Mazeikiu nafta is the biggest company and has a tremendous impact on Lithuanian economy. As shown in chart No. 4.1 and 4.2, Lithuania’s energy dependence on gas is almost 100%, and Russia also supplies the consumption of oil. Thus, Russia’s intention to disrupt Mazeikiu nafta refinery will have a direct impact on Lithuania’s energy need and economy (Janeliunas 2009: 191). Latvia’s energy requirement has been influenced by the economic development and condition



in the country. Since its independence, Latvia has established gas supply construction on the domestic and interstate level, an extensive underground storage capacity, a limited scope of alternative internal resources, and own infrastructure. However, oil and gas are one of the most prominent factors that fulfil Latvia's energy need. Russia supplies 100% of Latvia's gas requirement which accounts 33% of Latvia's energy needs. Even Russia has been dominating the supplies of heavyweight fuel oil. Latvia does not have a refinery that is the reason why most of the vehicle petrol and diesel fuel purchases are made from Belarus and Lithuania. Russia was also transporting oil to Europe via Latvian port in Ventspils. It became the second major port in Russia in terms of shipping bulk of crude oil and oil item for consumption after the Novorossiysk (Spruds 2009).

Estonia has enough oil shale to fulfil it's almost 90% of electricity energy for domestic needs. However, the part of gas in primary energy resources is 15% till 2007, and it imports all of its gas energy resources from Russia (Mae 2009). Despite Baltic states vulnerability on Energy and dependency for gas on Russia, Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius have done very less to diversify their reliance on oil and natural gas. Russian giant gas company Gazprom has share and investment in all three states' national gas company: 37% investment in Estonia's gas company Eesti Gaas, 34% investment in Latvia's gas company Latvijas Gaze, and 37% stake in Lithuania's gas company Lietuvos Dujos. It is also evident that growing Baltic economy requires more and more energy resources and any disruption will have a direct impact on Baltic states economy (Grigas 2012).


**Figure No 4.1 Energy Dependence Percent of Total in EU 28, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania**



**\*Source:** Data from Eurostat 2017

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc310>


**Figure No 4.2 Energy Dependence Percent of Natural Gas in EU 28, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania**



**\*Source:** Data from Eurostat 2017

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsdcc310&language=en>

**Figure No 4.3 Gross Inland Energy Consumption in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania**



\*Source: Data from Eurostat

<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>

The Baltic states are also threatened by Russia’s use of ‘soft power’. As Joseph Nye explained, “the soft power is an ability to frame the choices of others”. At an individual level just as we are aware of the human nature that is driven by the power of attraction and seduction, in politics too politicians make use of it as a part of political tool, creating an agenda and deciding the structure of a debate according to what they want. The ability to mold the choices are related to qualities such as bold leadership, culture, political values and institutions” (Nye 2008, 95). Moscow’s uses of Soft Power as Agnia Grigas puts it “Russia use soft power by maintaining and supporting and influencing in the economic, political and cultural fields. Russia’s soft power has been constructed on the demand of Soviet and Russian culture, and

due to the economic and institutional backing. Still, Russian culture is regarded as an elite culture among the Baltic population. Russia penetrates its culture through various means like Russian cultural events, sports, Soviet films, Russian arts and Russian music. Russia carries this links through its compatriot policy which include the person who speaks Russian language and has the influence of Russian culture” (Grigas 2014, 73). The Russian speaker often trusts the Russian media, and through media channels, Russia propagates its point of view in the mind of Russian speaker community. Even through the various institutions, academics, culture, organisations, NGO’s and union which have Russia’s viewpoint try to influence the Baltic states social and political sphere. Moreover, the Mayor of Tallin Edgar Savisaar was accused of getting fund from the NGO which has ties with Russia (Simons 2015).

Thus, Baltic states fear that Russia’s influence of soft power through the various means will directly affect its internal security. What happened in Ukraine also alarmed Baltic states to think about Russia influence in Baltic states that could lead to the internal turbulence and will give an excuse to Russia to involve in Baltic states based on the western idea of humanitarian concerns or to protect the right of ethnic Russian minority in the near future.

The biggest threat that Baltic states are facing despite getting a membership of NATO is a threat of hybrid warfare. As Thornton & Karagiannis has explained, “ the United States of America and its allies have become so powerful that any capable opponent in order to recapture its influence will develop a new kind of warfare” (Thornton and Karagiannis 2016: 332). Hoffman by defining modern warfare said “ the warfare tactics have changed, warfare is no longer limited to the traditional war dependent on military or battlefield. The new warfare now has many components like; economic, political, cultural, moral and psychological and all are determinant factors into the behavior of new warfare” (Hoffman 2007: 23).

Since the inclusion of Baltic states into NATO, it was evident that Russia would respond. Russia knows that it is not possible to confront with NATO directly, so

Russia developed a new warfare method. Baltic states are so vulnerable that they can not handle Russia's hybrid warfare in their countries. As mentioned earlier how Baltic states are dependent on Russia for energy need and also how Russia using its soft power to influence the economic, social, and political structure of Baltic states. Baltic states leaders also accused Moscow of cyber attacks which aimed for political spying and financial crime in all three Baltic states, has developed an ideal scenario for Russia to use hybrid warfare against Baltic Countries (Sytas 2016). The government of Lithuania has gone ahead and printed a manual objective to prepare people of Lithuania for worse calamity (Kuncina 2015).

UK defence secretary Michael Fallon said " there is an actual and existing threat of Russia trying to destabilise the Baltic countries (BBC 2015). In response, Baltic states have restricted local Russian language program and banned some channels for given period for showing information against Baltic states. In 2012 Lithuania changed its national security strategy with an aim to pay more attention to the national security interest of Lithuania by strengthening NATO and developed the capacity of response to internal threats such as Cybersecurity, energy security and information security (Kojala and Kersanskas 2014-2015: 175-176).

Thus, the real danger for Baltic states and security dilemma still exist, despite having a security assurance of Article V of NATO. The states size, limited resources and unpreparedness to block Russia's aggression make Baltic states security more vulnerable. Despite having a small economy, all three Baltic states have increased its defence budget, and lately conducted military exercise in Baltic region with NATO members and called for more NATO troops on their territory. However, Russia's use of soft power, information war, and hybrid warfare has once again upsurge the Baltic states security dilemma. Though, Russia does not want any confrontation with NATO members, but Russia will try to put pressure on Baltic states and put in a permanent state of war, so that Baltic states are not able to act as an active NATO member and act as buffer states between central NATO members and Russia territory (Berzins 2014: 1).

After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the current military exercise by Russia and NATO, and the subsequent military buildup in Baltic Sea region triggered the debate of a new cold war. It became necessary to answer the questions like; whether the recent hostility between NATO and Russia has any cold war phenomena? What would be the implication on Baltic states due to NATO-Russia's confrontation in Russia's sphere of influence? And most importantly whether it would lead towards any direct military confrontation between two powerful states.

If we carefully study the cold war history between the US and the Soviet Union, it is easy to explain that Cold War had numerous precise features like the world was divided between two superpower that means the world order was bipolar, there were two blocks which were divided on the basis of ideology (Capitalist and communist) and Military security organisation (NATO and Warsaw Pact), unmatched arms race, and superpower involvement in regional conflict (Arbatov 2017). The current stiffness between Russia on the one side and NATO and EU on the other side have none of the common features of the Cold War. Additionally, the current dispute lack one of the major components of Cold War, that is bipolarity. Even, the world is witnessing global and trans-regional centers of economic and military forces, like the United States, Russia, China, the European Union and Japan, and also the growth of regional leaders, such as India, members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Brazil, South Africa, etc.


Also, Russia and the United States of America is no longer the two decisive poles of the world politics. In contemporary situation, Russia may have a lot of differences with USA and NATO. However, they have worked together to solve the continuing global conflict. For example, after 9/11 attack, Russia and USA worked together to combat global terrorism, in the nuclear issue of Iran and North Korea they are working and trying to resolve these matter by multidimensional discussions. Regarding the arms race, in spite of the current increment of their defence budget, it cannot match the race of arms during the Cold War time. On the subject of ideological differences, it is more or less divided between, as Arbotova and Dynik

explained: “liberal capitalism and capitalism without democracy, global North, and South and between globalisation and anti-globalisation” (Arbatova and Dynkin 2016).

The recent crisis in Ukraine and Syria escalated tension between the U.S and Russia. And as a result of the military buildup near the Baltic territory, it again raises concern of security vulnerability of Baltic states. Despite a member of NATO and the European Union, the threat from Russia is still a primary concern for Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius because all three Baltic states share a border with Russia, and it is visible that any of these countries’ clash with Russia possibly will lead to a straight confrontation with Russia and the West. In reply to the Ukraine crisis and addressing Baltic states concern, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO said “ in response to the Ukraine crisis and providing the NATO’s eastern member more security; NATO will station its military forces at new stations in Eastern Europe” (Traynor 2014).

In the aftermath, statement of Secretary General of NATO, on 4<sup>th</sup> May 2016, Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu announced that Moscow would form three new military division to counter NATO’s mounting influence in Eastern Europe. These new military unit have 10,000 soldiers positioned on the southern and western border of Russia (Ramani 2016). In response, in the NATO summit in Warsaw, member states have decided to deploy the military personnel of NATO members to the Baltic countries and Poland in order to reinforce the deterrent capability and firmness in the field of security policy in the Baltic Sea region (Blomberg 2016). In addition, NATO has deployed thousands of troops near Russia’s sphere of influence that is its largest military build-up since the end of Cold War. Across the NATO’s 28 members states, more than 7000 military personnel have been deployed in bordering countries of Russia. In Baltic states, approximately 1,200 soldiers from Canada and Germany are deployed (Batchelor 2017).

Figure No 4.4 Escalation of Regional Confrontation in Baltic region



Source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3876672/Nato-squares-Putin-Russia-beefs-military-Europe-s-border-West-responds-biggest-force-Cold-War.html>.

Even, Estonian officials have raised concern over Russia's deployment of nuclear-capable missile 'Iskander' into Kaliningrad which has a range of 450 km and might touch Poland's capital, Warsaw (Coffey and Kochis 2015). The Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas said: " the deployment of nuclear-capable missile system into Kaliningrad is undoubtedly frightening and show yet again Russia's efforts to pressure the West by using different tools" (Wintour 2016). In reply to the Estonian Minister concern, Russian Defence Ministry said: " the deployment of Iskander missile system was part of the military exercise and Russia had done it before.



Thus, the recent crisis in Ukraine has raised some considerable worries for Baltic states. The hostile relations between NATO and Russia have mounted pressure on the Baltic region, and with the deployment of thousands of troops, tanks, and missile, the region became most militarised region after the end of the Cold War. However, despite the growing budget on defence expenditure of Russia and NATO members, it is too early to call the present situation as similar to Cold War. Rather, it is a battle between two largest military power of the world, one, of which is superior and trying to maintain its security guarantor status in Europe and expand in the Eurasian heartland and the other is trying to maintain and protect its sphere of influence in near abroad.

To sum up, after a study of security implication of NATO expansion to Russia's border for the Baltic states, we can say that the security issue of Baltic states after inclusion into the North Atlantic structure remains a major concern and the dilemma between Russia and Baltic states still exist. Russia's dilemma is that NATO's eastward expansion would curtail its dominant position in the post-soviet states and also isolate Russia from the European security matter. On the other hand, Baltic states still have a fear of Russia imperialist nature due to their experience. Despite getting membership of NATO and EU and having political, economic and military cooperation with Nordic states, the Baltic state is still struggling to cope with their security issue. Baltic states were optimistic that the inclusion of Baltic states into the North Atlantic Alliance would resolve their security concern or threat.

However, Baltic states due to their small size and having a significant number of ethnic Russians not only face an external threat, but it also faces an internal security threat. Also, Russia and the United States of America is trying to play Zero sum game in the region. Russia's ability to play soft power is due to its cultural, linguistic and political legacy in the Baltic states and a significant number of ethnic Russian minority makes the presence of Russia's influence in Baltic states visible. The emergence of modern warfare and lack of preparedness to cope with the problem also a concern for Baltic security. Moreover, dependency on Russia for energy

resources has also played a significant role in influencing the economy of Baltic states because Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius are still dependent on Russia's gas as well as the fact that Russian gas company have adequate percent of share in national gas company of Baltic states, and through these company Russia can easily influence the Baltic state's economy. After getting separated from USSR, the economic growth of Baltic states was nearly 10% of annual GDP that helped Baltic states to build their economic and military infrastructure. With the growing economy, the consumption of oil and gas has also increased. That means the Russian influence in the energy sector also has grown. Russia has many times used energy as a tool to leverage the economy of Baltic states.

The Russo-Georgian war and recent Ukraine crisis, have once again raised the Baltic states security concern over territorial threats. The Traditional military threat postured by Russia is still a major worry for Baltic states. The recent Ukraine crisis has exaggerated military buildup by Russia and NATO in Baltic Sea region that has straight implication on Baltic states. The deployment of Russian military and weapons near the border of Baltic states and increment of Russian military aircraft movement near the airspace of Baltic countries has also escalated the hostility between Russia and NATO, EU and Baltic states.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusion**

The study titled “ NATO’s Expansion to Russia’s Border and security for the Baltic states” have tried to answer to four pertinent questions; first, why have Baltic states become members of NATO and consider Russia as a potential threat? Second, How geopolitics and NATO’s expansion to Russia’s border contributed to security dilemma of the Baltic states? Three, How Russia views NATO’s expansion to Russia’s border and role of the Baltic states in it? And fourth, what would be possible security implication of NATO’s expansion to Russia’s border for the Baltic states. After studying various scholarly argument and analysis of data, first question (Why have Baltic states become a member of NATO and consider Russia as a potential threat?), it is correct to say that Baltic states moved closer to the west and acquired NATO membership possible for four reasons.

First, Baltic states vicious historical experience with Russia and their belief that culturally they belong to the West, not East. Baltic states found themselves much closer to the West and wanted to include themselves on economic, security and political map to Europe. Baltic states know that the membership of NATO will facilitate Baltic states an ideal ground to re-link with Europe after 50 years of Russian occupation.

Second, Baltic states Due to their location feel more threatened. Baltic leaders know that they are not capable enough to counter Russian influence in the Baltic region as well as possible Russian aggression. Also Baltic states, due to their shared past have always been suspicious about Russia’s intention that Moscow will again capture and subjugate their sovereignty. So, Baltic states, to protect their sovereign status and prevent possible Russian aggression want NATO membership. Furthermore, Baltic leaders know that by getting membership of NATO, Baltic states will receive firm security guarantees under Article V (Any armed aggression on a NATO member

would be considered an attack on each and every member of NATO) to deal with Russian threats.

Third, by getting membership of NATO will help to get the economic benefit. Four, the Baltic states have acquired membership of NATO is due to their size. As an alliance theory, any states have two options to align themselves with other states 'balancing or Bandwagoning' and often small states choose later option. So, Baltic states as small states act as a bandwagon to secure its sovereignty as well as uphold the norms and values of larger states which in U.S. and its alliance NATO.

The fifth and final reason of why have Baltic states became member of NATO is possible because Western countries wanted to include Baltic states. Western countries have helped Baltic Counties to develop their political, economic and military structure according to the Western norms and values. Through various programmes such as NACC, PFP and MAPs they have assisted Baltic states to establish their democratic institutions. Moreover, European countries especially Nordic states and Poland helped all three Baltic countries to developed cordial relations among themselves.

Since independence, Baltic states are more concerned about their security and sovereign status and considered Russia as the biggest threat and termed Soviet Union period as a foreign occupation. Why they view Russia as a threat, not an ally that is because of three reasons. First, due to their geographical position. Baltic states share their long border with Russia. Baltic countries, surrounded by Russia, Russian ally Belarus and in south, Russian enclave Kaliningrad that is one of the militarised areas. Second, the size of Baltic states by territory, economy and military is not enough to counter the Russia's influence in the Baltic region. Third, Baltic states shared past with the Soviet Union that make them uncertain about Russian imperialist nature. Fourth and final reason of concern for the Baltic states is having a significant number of ethnic Russian minority, especially in Estonia and Latvia. Russia's ability to conduct hybrid warfare in all three Baltic countries and put Baltic states in a

permanent state of war is also a possible reason that Baltic leaders consider Russia as the potential threat.

The answer to the second question (How geopolitics and NATO's expansion to Russia's border contributed to security dilemma of the Baltic states?), could be true to say that geopolitics of Baltic states has contributed to security dilemma of the Baltic states. Through the study of Mackinder's Heartland, Spykman's Rimland and Brzezinski Eurasian Chessboard, it can say that Baltic states acquire a geostrategic location and due to their location both West and Russia want to take control over these territories. For Russia, Baltic states can provide an ice free port that gives access to the Baltic Sea region as well as it opens economic door towards West. For U.S concern these small pivot states important to take control over heartland and also it gives access near to the other Post-Soviet states where it can export its democratic institutions and ideas. Because of their geography, Baltic states were a battleground for many states, and they fear that again any confrontation in the region among major power will directly led towards the traditional war. Since Russia-Georgia war and Ukraine crisis Baltic states again started to believe that Russia will expand and play the same trick which Kremlin has played in Ukraine.

Answer to the third question (How Russia views NATO's expansion to its border and role of Baltic states in it?), reflects that Russia sees NATO's expansion as a threat to its national interest as well as for its area of influence in the Post-Soviet states because Russia believes that expansion of NATO will not stop after first and second round, it will continue further to expand eastward and inclusion of Eastern and Central European states will have direct effect on Russia's national security. Moreover, Russia also concerns about its role in European security structure because NATO's expansion as a hard security guarantor will entirely minimise the role of Russia's decision-making process in Europe. Indeed, Russia sees NATO's expansion near its border will effect the Russian transit route to Kaliningrad enclave which is through Lithuania. The Baltic states have played an important role in NATO expansion near Russia's border. Since independence, Baltic states have shown their

desire to acquire membership of NATO and became member of various regional and International Organisations. Furthermore, they have actively participated in various programme which was initiated by NATO. To become a member of NATO, Baltic states have transformed their political, economic and military structure and adopted Western idea of the liberal democratic system. Moreover, they are contributing to NATO's peacekeeping operations and upholding the Western norms and values.

Giving an answer to the fourth and final question of research (What would be the possible security implications of NATO's expansion to the Russia's border for the Baltic states), it can say that NATO's expansion near Russia's border will have direct impact on Russia's national interest as well as on Baltic states. It is obvious that Russia's national interest will threaten if its cold war rivalry and its ally states expand near its border and to counter NATO's expansion or minimise its effect, Russia will flex its muscles. Baltic states know that any reaction from Russia will have direct impact on Baltic states security. Since Baltic states inclusion, Baltic states leader believed that it would fill the vacuum of Baltic states security need.

However, Russia's compatriot policy, and ability to use its soft power in Baltic states and other Post-Soviet states are again threatening the Baltic states security. Due to the fact that Baltic states have significant number of ethnic Russian population, dependency on Russian energy Resources, and sharing border with Russia is a major concern for Baltic states. Since Georgia-Russian war and Ukraine crisis, Baltic leaders believe that Russia can use its soft power ability over Baltic states and destabilise the whole Baltic region.

After Ukraine crisis, military buildup in Baltic sea region has increased, and Baltic states have requested to the West to raise the number of armed forces and weapons in the Baltic Sea area. The recent military buildup and Russia's deployment of the nuclear capable missile in Kaliningrad can lead two major powers towards direct military confrontation or Nuclear War that is possibly more threatening for the Baltic state because whoever wins or lose ultimately it will be a loss of Baltic states.

The study intend to test two hypotheses.

- the security perception of Baltic states based on identity and integration approach led them to become a member of the NATO and Support NATO eastward.
- NATO's expansion to Russia's border and Baltic states demand of military buildup in Baltic Sea region can create security dilemma for the Baltic states.

The hypotheses are relatively tested positive. it is not incorrect to argue that the identity and integration approach of Baltic states led them to become member of NATO and support NATO's eastward expansion. There is no question about it that the Baltic states feel they are culturally and by identity much closer to the Europe. Baltic states still consider that the Soviet Union forcefully occupied them and also imposed the idea of Russification. With the independence of Baltic states and other central European countries, they have shown their intensive desire to integrate themselves into the political, economic and security map of Europe and the West. As constructivist viewpoint says "the 'return to Europe' result from a robust recognition of Western norms and values as well as with the Western international section from which these states were alienated under the Soviet regime".

However, the Baltic state's inclination towards Western norms, ethics, and identity is one of the reasons to integrate into the North Atlantic Alliance but not essential reason to join NATO. It is one of the reason because all Baltic countries since their independence from Russia, have shown their desire to get membership of NATO and therefore have identified themselves based on western norms and values. For Baltic states establish an identity with Western means and ethics which was a long process, as the Baltic countries had taken some significant commitment by adopting various Western established rules and practices. All three states have executed necessary reforms which moved them to set up liberal democratic institutions, democratic governance, recognise the human rights, given civil control of the military and liberalised their market economy.

Baltic states as small states are bandwagoning with NATO and working as a upholder of the Western norms, values, ethics, and idea of democracy. Baltic states in order to democratise and identify with the Western idea have developed cooperative relations with the Nordic states and other European countries that helped to build their political, economic and security structure. Furthermore, Baltic states by spreading the western idea of democracy in other post-soviet states helped NATO to expand eastward and the near abroad of Russia. By engaging with Post-Soviet states and maintaining close relations with Georgia and Ukraine it has shown their desire to join NATO; Baltic republics are upholding the idea of western norms and values in these countries. On the other hand, Russia saw these acts as a threat for their sphere of influence and warned West to do not cross the red line. Russia as an energy and military power in the region do not want to lose its control over Post-Soviet republics and perceive that NATO's expansion towards East will encircle Russia and threaten their national interest.

The security perception to view Russia as a threat to their sovereignty is due to their past with Moscow and size and geography is one of the primary reasons that has driven Baltic states toward western security structure. The security concern of Baltic states, especially hard security after getting into NATO alliance has been addressed not entirely but partially. However, with the changing nature of war and security, and Russia's ability which Moscow has shown in Georgia and Ukraine again, raised some major concern for the Baltic states.

Despite getting membership into NATO and assurance of Article V of the alliance, the question remains same: Has NATO been able to address the security concern of Baltic states? Has the security dilemma of Baltic states vanished? After examining the progress which has taken place near Russia's border and Baltic Sea region since the end of the Cold War and NATO's expansion, it can be said that, the Baltic states and other Central-eastern European countries got assurance under the nuclear structure, and military support from the other members that was not possible for these small countries to build up such a larger security structure by their own.



However, this progress is widening the gap between West and Russia and creating a volatile situation in the Baltic Sea region.

NATO's expansion to Russia's border and Baltic states demand of military buildup in the Baltic sea can create security dilemma for Baltic states, it is fair to say that NATO's eastward expansion since the end of Cold War has been extensively discussed among NATO members. Some voices came in support of enlargement, and some came in contradiction of NATO's expansion. Critics have an opinion that NATO should not enlarge, rather choose other alternative. The critic of NATO expansion argued that NATO enlargement will reinforce Russia's opposition to further nuclear demobilisation. It will also deteriorate NATO by adding more members that will create more expenses than security paybacks. NATO members neglected the voices which were not in support of NATO's enlargement and did not address the Russian concerns.

Russia and the West both are playing a blame game and blaming each other for the military build up in the Baltic region and termed that the recent development is part of a military exercise, nothing more than that. Moreover, the West and Russia both are playing the soft power game in the region to influence the region and maintain their influential position. The West by their liberal democratic values and open market economy penetrating the western identity in the newly emerged post-soviet states. On the other hand, Russia by supporting its ethnic Russian minority, culture, unions, television channels, and Russian language is trying to maintain its supremacy and influence the social and political structure in the Post-Soviet Republics.

With the enlargement of NATO, Russia's fear became real that NATO's eastward expansion would curtail its dominant position in the post-soviet states and also isolate Russia from the European security matter. On the other hand, Baltic states still have a fear of Russia imperialist nature due to their experience. Despite getting membership of NATO and EU and having political, economic and military cooperation with Nordic states, the Baltic state is still struggling to cope with their

security issue. Baltic states were optimistic that the inclusion of Baltic states into the North Atlantic Alliance would resolve their security concern or threat. However, Baltic states as small states and having a significant number of ethnic Russia not only face an external threat, it also faces an internal security threat. Also, Russia and the United States of America is trying to play zero sum game in the region. Russia's ability to play soft power is due to its cultural, linguistic and political legacy in the Baltic states and a significant number of ethnic Russian minority makes the presence of Russia's influence in Baltic states visible. The emergence of modern warfare and lack of preparedness of Baltic states have given a primary concern for Baltic security.

Moreover, dependency on Russia for energy resources has also played a significant role in influencing the Baltic state's economy because Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius are still dependent on Russia's gas as well as Russian gas company have adequate percent of share in national gas company of Baltic states, and through these company Russia can easily influence the Baltic state's economy. After getting separated from USSR, the economic growth of Baltic states reached nearly 10% of annual GDP that helped Baltic states to build their economic and military infrastructure. With the growing economy, the consumption of oil and gas has also increased. That means Russia's influence in the energy sector has also increased. Russia has many times used energy as a tool to leverage the economy of Baltic states.

The Georgia-Russia war and recent Ukraine crisis again raises the Baltic states security concern over their national threats. The Traditional military threat postured by Russia is still a major worry for Baltic states. The recent Ukraine crisis has exaggerated military buildup by Russia and NATO in Baltic Sea region that has straight implication on Baltic states. The deployment of Russian military and weapons near the border of Baltic states and increment of Russian aircraft flying near the airspace of Baltic countries has also escalated the hostility between Russia and NATO, EU and Baltic states.

From securing their independent status by achieving NATO membership, acting like a bandwagon with NATO and following some aggressive policy with former superpower failed miserably in achieving a balance of power and almost resulted in bringing two powerful countries into a direct confrontation with each other. Russia considers its national interest at stake in the Post-Soviet space with the engagement of Baltic states with the West and serving as a stage for western military and strategic design to counter the Russian supremacy in the region, it is a possibility that Russia can resort to other means apart from military to secure its national interest and maintain its sphere of influence in the region. Russia's ability to play hybrid war and, in particular with the adaptation of compatriot policy it also becomes a major concern for Baltic states.

To conclude, arguably Russia and the West would not be benefited from the zero-sum game in the region. The region can turn more and more unstable if the direct confrontation between Russia and West continue. If we take the example of any war which happened throughout the world, even the war that had not been fought but only mutual suspicion cost a significant amount. The total cost of 45 years of Cold War was itself 18.45 trillion (2014 dollar). So, the recent military build-up in Baltic region will economically paralyse the region. Any form of confrontation between the West and Russia will have a direct effect on small states like Estonia, Latvia and Riga. The recent events like the cyber war in Estonia, Russia-Georgia war, Ukraine crisis, and even Syrian crisis have widened the gap between the West and Russia and create distrust among the U.S and Russia. Even confrontation is likely possible, and it will directly affect the economy and the geography of all three small Baltic states. Moreover, the escalating tension between West and Russia will not only be limited to Europe; it would likely enter into the danger of nuclear war. The way the both sides increasing their forces in the Baltic region that will only destabilise the region, and it mostly affects the small states.

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## **Appendix 1**

### **The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)**

**Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949**

*The Parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all people and all governments.*

*They are determined to safeguard the freedom of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.*

*They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to their North Atlantic Treaty:*

#### **Article 1**

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

#### **Article 2**

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.



### **Article 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

### **Article 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

### **Article 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-dependence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

### **Article 6 (1)**

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- On the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Island under

the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force of the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

#### **Article 7**

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### **Article 8**

Each Party declares that none of the international engagement now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

#### **Article 9**

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Article 3 and 5.

#### **Article 10**

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a Party

to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

#### **Article 11**

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherland, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (3)

#### **Article 12**

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### **Article 13**

After the Treaty has been in force in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of United States of America, which will inform the Government of the other Parties of the deposits of each notice of denunciation.

#### **Article 14**

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government of other signatories.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applied was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1993, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

(Source: NATO 2017)

## **Appendix 2**

### **Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Estonia**

The Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Republic of Estonia to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

#### **Article 1**

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Republic of Estonia an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Republic of Estonia shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

#### **Article 2**

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

#### **Article 3**

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Government of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(Source: NATO 2017)

### **Appendix 3**

## **Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Latvia**

The Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Republic of Latvia to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

### **Article 1**

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Republic of Latvia an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Republic of Latvia shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

### **Article 2**

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

### **Article 3**

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Government of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(Source: NATO 2017)

## **Appendix 4**

### **Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Lithuania**

The Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Republic of Lithuania to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

#### **Article 1**

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Republic of Lithuania shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

#### **Article 2**

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

#### **Article 3**

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Government of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(Source: NATO 2017)