

**Role of King Abdullah in the Emergence of Israel, 1947- 49**

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Degree of**

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**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Role of King Abdullah in the Emergence of Israel, 1947- 49**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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**Dedicated to My Mother, Father and Brother**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

DOI	Declaration of Independence
WZO	World Zionist Organization
BD	Balfour Declaration
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
AHC	Arab Higher Committee
APG	All Palestine Government
UN	United Nations
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization
ISA	Israel State Archives
AL	Arab League
CIE	Centre for Israeli Education
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PCC	Palestine Conciliation Commission
IAF	Israel Air Force

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

When the Jewish leadership in Mandate Palestine or Yishuv unilaterally declared the State of Israel through the “Declaration of Independence” (DoI) on the Sabbath eve of 14 May 1948, it ended their long suffering that began with the Roman conquest of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 AD. Since their dispersal, the Jews lived in various countries and endured suffering, subjugation and a treatment as second-class citizens. The emerging idea of nationalism as well as anti-Semitism resulted in Theodore Herzl visualizing a Jewish homeland and the formation of the World Zionist Organization in 1897 (Polley 2000: 165). A few years earlier, young Jewish pioneers from the Caucasus began to emigrate to Palestine, then a part of the Ottoman Empire. Herzl, considered as the architect of political Zionism, aspired for a Jewish homeland as the answer to the centuries-old Jewish problem. After lobbying with various powers of that time, in 1917 the Zionists were able to secure the support of the British through the Balfour Declaration that pledged the support for “a national home” for the Jews in Palestine (Lockman 1996: 57; Jones, 2012).

The Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate upon Palestine speeded the Jewish immigration to Palestine. When the Declaration was issued the Jewish population in Palestine was less than five per cent. Gradually a large number of Jews, mostly from Eastern Europe and Russia, immigrated to Palestine especially following the raise of Hitler in Germany and Mandate Palestine became the destination for a large number of Jews who were fleeing the Nazi rule (Halamish 2010: 122-125). Meanwhile, the Arabs of Palestine began opposing the Jewish immigration as well as homeland in Palestine. As part of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915-16 (Arnold and Roth 1995: 247), Britain carved out Transjordan from Palestine in 1921 and installed Abdullah, second son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca as the emir. He was a shrewd politician and ensured that the British promise to Zionists for a national home should not incorporate the land of Transjordan (Skutch and Ryle 2005: 121; Aruri 1975: 75).

Britain had vital interest in the West Asian region and the importance of this region was drastically enhanced by the construction of Suez Canal. This Canal reduced the distance between Europe and most part of Asia beyond one’s control (Dubey, 2001). Britain was determined to protect the passage of its ships from harm via Suez Canal and ensure access to its ships but the



bloody tribal wars which used to flare up with greater frequency made Britain carve Transjordan and end tribal warfare. The Emirate of Transjordan was supported by Britain, militarily, politically and economically and it paid monthly subsidy of £5000 (Reisman 1970: 45; Alon 2007: 40; Wilson 1987: 53). Through this move Britain tried to safeguard the lines of communications but these were affected by the tribal warfare in 1922 and the subsidy provided by Britain was not sufficient to meet the expanses of the Emirate. Therefore, Britain gave a nominal independence to Transjordan in 1923 and increased its monthly subsidy and the new Anglo-Transjordan agreement was signed and it formally recognised the independence of the Emirate of Transjordan (Bacik 2008: 77; Bidwell 2010: 4; Haddad and Kolayi 2014: 59).

But the Sharif Hussein decision of proclaiming himself as the Caliph in 1924 generated a rift in Emir Abdullah's relations with Britain. After this decision by Hussein and Ibn Saud campaign against this proclamation resulted in expulsion of Hussein from Mecca and he came to Amman and started living with his son. Britain brought down the hostility against Abdullah's kingdom by signing agreements with Ibn Saud in 1925 and 1927. Britain tried to contribute in the development of Transjordan. In the year 1928 Britain revived its Anglo-Transjordan agreement with Emir Abdullah and the organic law was instituted in the system (Knowles 2005: 23, 24; Bacik 2008: 78; Massad 2001: 46-47). This agreement brought nearly all the affairs of the kingdom of Transjordan in the hands of the British. Under this agreement consultative parliament and legislative assembly were created for the kingdom and were given the power and authority of enacting laws but all the laws created by them have to have the approval of British representative in the kingdom (Deardon 1958: 50). Through this law Britain governed almost all the aspect of kingdom of Transjordan with Abdullah as its head.

Britain created an armed force for the protection of Abdullah and his kingdom and brought Major John Bagot Glubb to Transjordan and made him the commander of the Arab Legion. With this move Britain tried to represent Arab Legion as an army with the purpose of maintaining law and order in the region. At the same time, Jewish immigration to Palestine rose and due to this the Arab opposition to Jewish immigration rose and periodically took instant shape and in the wake of the Arab Revolt of 1936, Britain appointed the Peel Commission in 1937 to find out the causes of the unrest. The commission conducted its search and came with a report and advocated partition as the solution to the Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine which only intensified the

internal communal tension (Barnidge 2016: 24-25; Young and Kent 2013: 74; Cesarani 2016: 131). In 1939 on the onslaught of the Second World War, British issued a White Paper by which the Mandate power abandoned the Balfour Declaration (Laqueur and Rubin 2008: 44-50). However, both Zionists and Arabs rejected the proposal; the former maintained that it contravened Mandate while the Arab states and Palestinians wanted immediate independence and a complete halt to Jewish immigration to Palestine. Amidst the Second World War, the Arab countries met in Alexandria and signed the Alexandria Pact in 1944 which led to the formation of the League of Arab States in 1945. From the beginning the League was committed to the Palestinians and sought to prevent the idea of establishing a Jewish homeland in the predominantly Arab Palestine. Britain on the other hand became weak due to the Second World War and decided to end its imperial hold in the region. Therefore, gave full independence to Transjordan in 1946 and Abdullah renamed his kingdom as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. Despite this independence did not reduce Abdullah's dependence on Britain, he got independence but Britain maintain a stringent control over its military and foreign affairs. Britain was aware of king Abdullah's Greater Syria plan because of this it did not wanted to seen as promoting his ambitions. Britain tried to satisfy both the conflicting parties the Arabs and Jews to settle their differences. But the both the parties blamed Britain for all the happenings in the region and became prime target for their attacks (Medoff and Waxman 2008: 108; Husain 2014: 48).

Unable to satisfy either of parties, in February 1947 Britain transferred the Palestine question to the newly established United Nations. The UN General Assembly's first special session met in April-May and appointed United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) an eleven-member to advice a solution to the dispute. The committee submitted two plans; the majority plan recommended partition of Palestine and the minority plan promoted a federal Palestine. At the UN most Arab countries rejected both the proposals and demanded an immediate end to Mandate rule and granting of independence to Palestine. On 29 November 1947, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved the partition plan through a vote of 33 in favour, 13 against with 10 abstentions (Bottaro 2012: 50).

Transjordan, however, took a position that was at variance with the rest of the Arab countries. Though not yet a member of the UN, Transjordan did not oppose the partition idea that was

wholeheartedly accepted by the yishuv. He saw partition plan as an opportunity to expand the territories of the Emirate of Transjordan. Towards this end, King Abdullah established contacts with the Zionist leadership and held a secret meeting with Golda Meir (then known as Golda Meyerson) in Amman days before the DoI. This meeting was seen by scholars as an important inducement for the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as the yishuv was confident of Abdullah not seeking any claims over territories that were given to the Jewish State by the UN partition plan (Meir, 1975; CIE, 2016).

British decision to end its Mandate and withdraw from Palestine by 15 May 1948 without trying to implement the partition plan accelerated the pace of developments. Arab countries neighbouring Palestine were determined to prevent the partition of Palestine but had to wait until the British departure scheduled for 15 May. Transjordan's Arab Legion was the most powerful army in the Arab world and was funded, trained, armed and at that time even commanded by the British (Karsh, 2014; Wilson, 1987). As Israel was formed on the eve of the British departure, armies of neighbouring Arab countries and Arab Volunteers entered Palestine on 15 May with the intention of preventing the formation of nascent state. Iraq and Saudi Arabia also sent armies for the campaign.

The first ceasefire took place on 11 June and lasted till 8 July 1948, an ammunition and arms ban was announced with the hope that not either side would secure a little gain but both side made direct violations and consequences of this was most of the people fled their homes and military tussle became more violent. By the time the second ceasefire came into force on 18 July 1948, the situation on the ground was militarily stabilised. The war exposed the military limitations of the Arab armies as well as their political divisions. Numerically superior Arab armies were unable to prevent the formation of Israel primarily due to lack of adequate military preparations and tactical coordination. While Syria made some territorial gains south of the Golan Heights, Egypt captured the Gaza Strip. Transjordan made the largest territorial gains in the form of the capture of the zone west of the River Jordan, subsequently well-known as the West Bank. The most significant military-political accomplishment of Abdullah and his Arab Legion was the capture of the East Jerusalem, including the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest location in Islam. Having lost Mecca and Medina to the al-Saud, the capture of Harem al-Sharif was also politically significant to the Hashemites.

The actions and policies of Abdullah both during and after the 1948 War highlight his differences and divergences with other Arab countries and shared approach vis-à-vis Israel. The Arab Legion was active only in areas that were allotted to the Arab state by the partition plan. With the only exclusion of East Jerusalem, its forces did not fight in areas that were to be portion of the Jewish state or of relevance to the Jewish forces. Furthermore, Abdullah adopted a position that was in variance with the Arab League over Palestinian independence. On 1 October 1948, the Arab Higher Committee under the chairmanship of Hajj Amin Al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, met in the Gaza city and declared the All Palestine Government (APG). This move was recognized by other Arab countries, except for Transjordan which controlled the larger territory of the West Bank because Abdullah had plans for unification of greater Syria. He always believed that Palestine was included in area over which British promised Arab independence. This led to the collapse of the APG. Moreover, unlike Egypt which kept military control over the Gaza Strip, and Transjordan was renamed as Jordan. Meanwhile, on 3 April 1949, Jordan became the third Arab nation to sign an armistice agreement with Israel after Egypt (24 February 1949) and Lebanon (23 March 1949) (Korani 2011: 12). And on 26 April 1949, three weeks after the signing of armistice agreement, King Abdullah annexed West Bank to Jordan. The armistice agreement also formalised the partition of the city of Jerusalem with the East Jerusalem coming under the Jordanian control. United Kingdom recognized newly christened Jordan in 1950 (Chatterjee 1973: 439; Blum 2016: 229).

Thus, King Abdullah played a very crucial role during the run-up to the DoI and the initial stage of the new state. He was in constant touch with the Zionists and did not oppose the formation of Israel. This is one of the reasons why he was killed by a Palestinian named Mustafa Ashu who thought among others that King Abdullah was collaborating with the Zionists and was going to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Because of these doubts he killed him while the king was visiting Al-Aqsa Mosque for the Friday prayers on 20 July 1951. On the other hand Abdullah's military aims were in congruence with that of the Jewish leaders. His plan to capture and annex East Jerusalem was aimed at securing legitimacy from Arab world. This understanding was cemented in subsequent years when both the countries maintained clandestine but close ties for decades. Despite aberrations like the 1967 June War, the tacit understanding between the two had major influence over the course of events in the region, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict.

## **Review of the literature**

The available literature on the proposed topic can be placed under three themes, namely, Declaration of Independence, Britain and King Abdullah-I and Arab League and Palestine.

### **Declaration of Independence (DoI):**

Thomas Jefferson, the founding father of the United States defines declaration of independence as “a devised, pregnant with our own and the destiny of the world” (Armitage 2007:1). According to him independence implies national distinctiveness and difference. According to Carl Becker, who defines DoI as an “event that is culmination of a series of revolutionary activities expressed in the document in which that event was proclaimed and justified to the world”. David Armitage believes that the DoI is an occasion, a certificate, and the beginning of a genre (Armitage 2007: 13). The 1776 American Declaration became model for the world and marks the beginning of new history separate from other national or imperial histories.

The American example of declaring independence was used by the yeshiva to proclaim their rights on the eve of the British departure. At four o'clock on the Sabbath eve of 14 May 1948 David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine by reading out the DoI in front of a vast number of notables in the Museum of Tel-Aviv (Shlaim 2000: 33). The yishuv leaders declared the state unilaterally because they wanted to get recognition from the world as Elihu Lauterpacht (1970) argued “in order to get recognition a state must exist, not every community claiming existence as a state exists as such” (Lauterpacht 1970: 308). The DoI rests its claims to the historic rights of the Jews and referred to the Balfour Declaration, Mandate and the UN Partition resolution of the UN (DoI, 1948).

Paul Eidelberg noted that the DoI was to justify Jewish possession of the land of Israel (Eidelberg 1987: 392) while Howard M. Sachar (1996) argued that the declaration announced the Eretz-Israel (historic land of Israel) as the place of origin of the Jews and the Zionist movement and displayed the persecution suffered by the Jews which in turn laid the legal and moral foundation for the new state. Avi Shlaim has argued that DoI pledged that Israel would be formed on the principles envisaged by the prophet (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses etc.) of Israel like justice, peace and liberty. The DoI promised equal rights to all its citizens including Arabs and pledged to trustworthily support the rules of the UN charter and stretched out the hand of peace (without exception) to all neighbouring Arab states (Avi Shlaim 2000: 33).

The leadership of the Yishuv faced various challenges while declaring state. The US Secretary of State George Marshall advised it to postpone the DoI and avoid a military showdown with the Arabs. He warned that chances of victory and defeat were equally balanced, especially in the face of larger Arab armies including Transjordan's Arab legion. Despite the risk, Ben-Gurion threw all his weight behind immediate proclamation of independence so as not to miss the historic opportunity. He strongly expressed preference of not defining the borders of the new state in the DoI in order to leave open the probability of enlargement beyond though permitted under the UN plan.

Elyakim Rubinstein (1998) noted that Ben-Gurion and his generation were occupied with national survival and rebirth and believed that the rights of the entire nation were the main focal point, not the rights of the individual. It is natural and proper in a pluralistic society like Israel to aspire liberty for the collective and the rights of the individual would come to fuller fruition with the maturing of the state.

In international law there are two theories on state recognition. According to the constitutive theory, a state exists via recognition by other states and the proponents of this theory believes that "a state is only a state when its existence gets acknowledge by recognition and other states have a substantial consideration to recognize or not". On the other hand, the Declaratory Theory assumes that the stature of statehood is based on actuality, not on individual deliberation. James R. Crawford (2007) argued that "The actuality of a State is a question of fact and not of law. The basis of statehood is not legitimacy but effectiveness" (Crawford 2007: 4). There are many examples for unilateral declaration of independence when a new political entity is formed through secession from the parent body or through the amalgamation of various smaller units. Since the American declaration of independence in 1776, many countries and political entities have pursued this path; these include, All Palestine Government (1948), Bangladesh (1971) Northern Cyprus (1983) State of Palestine (1988) and Kosovo (2008). Recognition by states formalises the UDI and their acceptance into the international comity of nations.

### **Britain and King Abdullah-I:**

Transjordan was carved out of Palestine by Great Britain in 1921 as a result of a bargain between Emir Abdullah-I son of Sharif Hussein and Winston Churchill. This arrangement was in continuation of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-16 whereby Britain promised to

create an independent Arab kingdom under Sharif Hussein of Mecca if the latter would lead the Arab rebellion against the Ottoman sultan. In the wake of expulsion of Faisal—Hussein's first son—from Damascus by the French, Churchill offered the emirate of Transjordan to Abdullah-I, Hussein's second son. Abdullah-I accepted Churchill's offer and was made Emir of Transjordan in April 1921. Article 25 of Mandate of the League of Nations over Palestine excluded "areas lying in the middle of the Jordan and the earlier frontiers of Palestine" from the area designated for the founding of a Jewish national home. On 26 May 1923 Emirate of Transjordan was announced an independent state from the authority of the Mandate and on 28 February 1928 through a treaty Britain recognized Transjordan's 'independence'. According to Avi Shlaim since British created Transjordan "Abdullah-I was tacitly endorsing his father's claim that Palestine was incorporated in the area over which Britain affirmed to back Arab Independence" (Shlaim 1988: 39). To realise this dream Abdullah-I needed the support of the British who had promised Abdullah-I Palestine, Syria and a larger United Arab Kingdom.

Britain and Transjordan shared a unique relation during this period. Abdullah-I became the King of Transjordan on 17 June 1946 and the country was named the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. This move did not reduce Abdullah's dependence on Britain and many saw him as a 'puppet' of the British Empire due to his military, political, and financial dependence upon Britain (Wilson 1987, Latey 1988).

Nashashibis were one of the powerful families in Palestine and they urged unification with Transjordan and were willing to accept Abdullah-I as the ruler of Palestine after the British departure they were opposed to Abdullah-I and regarded Hashemites as traitors. Another powerful family the Husseini's who controlled many Arab and Islamic institutions in Mandate Palestine were pitted against Nashashibis and Abdullah-I. They were committed to the independence of Palestine and rejected any compromise with British (Shlaim 1988: 40).

Avi Shlaim offers an impressive account of contacts between Britain and King Abdullah-I and his successors in his work *Collusion across the Jordan* (1988). According to him the common ground between these supposed adversaries was their shared opposition to the appearance of a self-sufficient Palestinian state, especially under the direction of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the erstwhile Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The British, Shlaim argued, helped to engineer the deal

whereby King Abdullah-I would seize the West Bank, while the nascent Israel would consolidate its hold elsewhere in the former mandate of Palestine (Shlaim, 1988; Quant, 1989).

Bruce Maddy Weitzman argued that the Zionist leadership and King Abdullah-I cooperated closely to prevent the emergence of an independent Arab state of Palestine as proposed by UN General Assembly (UNGA) voting of 29 November 1947. In this endeavour both these countries were obliquely encouraged and funded by Great Britain (Weitzman 1990: 261). *Wilson Quarterly* underlined that Britain collaborated with Abdullah-I and the Zionists to block the implementation of the partition resolution and thus made their contribution to the most enduring conflict in West Asia (*Wilson Quarterly* 1989: 124). There was a belief among some Arab states that Britain was manipulating international diplomacy for the benefit of Abdullah-I and robbed of the Arabs of Palestinians of the fruits of a possible Arab victory (Shlaim 1988: 260).

During the 1948 war, Britain maintained the Arab Legion at the annual cost £2.5 million per annum when the entire budget of Transjordan stood at £0.75 million per annum (Shlaim: 1988: 146). Abdullah-I was worried when the British announced its withdrawal from Palestine in the wake of the UN partition plan. The major concern for him was the financial viability of the Arab Legion after the British withdrawal from Palestine. When Britain abandoned Mandate in the wake of the UN plan, Abdullah-I was in a tacit understanding with the yishuv (Jewish community in Mandate Palestine) that the Arab Legion would occupy only those parts of Palestine that were awarded to the Arabs. Hence, the Arab Legion was not active in areas which were allotted to the Jews under the UN plan. Jordanian Prime Minister Abu Hude Tawfik Pasha went to London in February 1948 and secured the approval of the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin for this secret arrangement. The Arab Legion was the best skilled, capable and active Arab fighting force in the region and was supplied, trained and largely officered by the British. Indeed, Britain wanted to retain its influence in the Arab world through the Arab League which had rejected partition plan and went to war with Israel. Therefore, King Abdullah-I had to conceal his collaboration with Britain from the Arab League (Maurice Latey 1988: 164).

According to A.H.H. Abidi (1965) Abdullah-I was a shrewd politician who set out to tackle his problem from various directions. He knew that the implementation of partition was not easy and he cannot openly confide his desires with other Arab governments. British also could not openly support him. Only course left to him was to establish direct contact with the Jewish leadership.



His contacts with the *yishuv* were at various levels and manifested through his friendly disposition towards the Jews, disgruntlement with the Arab League and his anxiety to annex portions of Palestine. Abdullah-I and the *yishuv* shared a common view regarding the partition of Palestine but open negotiation was politically unacceptable, if not suicidal, for both.

Mary C. Wilson (1987) argues that Abdullah-I planned for “Unification of Greater Syria” under his rule and for which he was dependent on the British financial aid. According to her Abdullah-I was a ‘stooge’ or ‘puppet’ of Britain (Wilson 1987: 37). Partition of Palestine was an opportunity for Abdullah-I to increase his regional influence or to realise his dream of a Greater Syria and hence he favoured partition. Maurice Latey (1988) has stated that Abdullah-I was effectively conscious of the weakness of his a tiny kingdom that was dependent on economic, political and military support of the British and was disliked and suspected by his Arab neighbours. The British enticed the Hashemite ambitions by making contradictory promises. Hence, Abdullah-I combined his soaring ambitions with a cautious and pragmatic realism. He aspired to unite the whole of the Fertile Crescent through a Greater Syria under his rule and by recovering the Hejaz from al-Saud, the seat of his Hashemite dynasty, to achieve the leadership of the Arab world. Towards realising this dream Abdullah-I needed the support of the British and in the beginning British aided his desire to maintain a strangle hold over the West Asian region but when the situation became complex Britain stop its financial aid. Thus, Hashemites were let down by British and when Britain abandoned the Mandate and the UN proposed the partition of Palestine, a tacit understanding with the *yishuv* leadership became inevitable for Abdullah-I.

### **Arab League and Palestine**

The Arab League adopted a hard-line position on Palestine. Avi Shlaim has argued that since its establishment on 22 March 1945, "the Arab League visualized a progress of Arab unity through a regional devising program devised to provide a centre which would promote political participation in the Arab world" (Shlaim, 1988). However, when the struggle started over Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs were weak and this was shown in their reliance on Arab states and the League (Shlaim 1990: 37). The Arab Higher Committee (AHC) which was established in the 1930s was deeply divided with few political assets of its own. Due to internal divisions and British restrictions since the mid-1930s, the AHC was not able to pursue an autonomous policy.

Because of this Arab League turned into the principal forum for determining the Arab position on Palestine (Shlaim 1990: 38).

Inside the Arab League there was no amalgamation or agreement on the question of Palestine and proved fatal in 1948. Most members agreed on the rigid approach in the struggle against Zionism and criticised and rebuked the UN partition resolution as unlawful, illegitimate, impracticable, unfair and unjust (Shlaim 1990: 38). Since its founding in 1945 there was considerable support within the League for a unitary and independent Palestinian state. After the UN vote there were conflicting views regarding the future of Palestine. On the one hand, was Hajj Amin al-Husseini wanted an independent Palestinian state (Shlaim 1988) and on the other King Abdullah-I of Transjordan, sought to occupy the Arab proportions of Palestine to his domain (Wilson 1987). When British announced its withdrawal from Palestine, the AHC requested to the Arab League for backing in the creation of temporary government in Palestine to fill the space that would be generated following the British withdrawal. Mufti requested for the creation of a temporary government under the patronage of AHC, the Arab League not only rejected his demand for a Palestinian government-in-exile but declined to give loans to AHC to cover even administrative expenses (Shlaim 2000).

The AHC which represented the Palestinian Arabs denounced the UN partition plan as “impracticable and unjust” (Shlaim 1990: 38) and the Arab League announced the partition plan as felonious and “illegal.” The Palestinians called for a three-day strike on 1 December 1947 which resulted in violent attacks on Jews which hinted an devastating war amongst the two people in Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 27). When Israel proclaimed the DoI was none of members of AHC were in Palestine except for Ahmad Hilmi Abdul Bagi (Shlaim 1990).

Most of the scholars on the proposed topic has worked on the relationship between king Abdullah-I of Transjordan and great Britain and their contacts with the Zionist leadership like Avi Shlaim, Mary C. Wilson and A.H.H, Abidi, most have failed to capture the reason for the collaboration between and king Abdullah-I and the Zionist forces. King Abdullah-I played a very crucial role during this period. He was in constant touch with the Zionist and whatever policy Abdullah-I adopted during this period facilitated the Zionist forces in declaring independence. The proposed research will focus on the role Abdullah-I in the emergence of Israel, will also analyse his personality factor, his ambitions and his dream of unification with greater Syria.

This research will try to find the reasons that brought change in Abdullah-I's attitude towards the Zionist. While analysing this, the research will also try to find out the reason for Abdullah-I's disgruntlement towards the Arab League.

### **Definition, Rationale and scope of study:**

In February 1947 the British announced its withdrawal from Mandate Palestine and handover the problem to the newly created UN, which formed UNSCOP to propose a solution. The majority plan suggested partition of Palestine and was adopted by the UN General Assembly. This plan was rejected by Arabs but Jews accepted the resolution 181 and the yishuv unilaterally announced the state of Israel on the eve of the British withdrawal. However, the partition plan and its acceptance by the Jewish leadership alone did not make Israel a reality its establishment was consolidated during the 1948 war also known as the Arab-Israeli war which also exposed inter-Arab differences and rivalry. When the second ceasefire came into force in 18 July 1948, the territory of Israel expanded from 57 percent of the Mandate Palestine as allotted by the UN plan to 78 percent; correspondingly the Palestinian territory was cut down from 44 percent to 22 percent and was divided up between Egypt and Transjordan. Both the DoI and Israel's territorial consolidation were considerably helped by the policy choices of King Abdullah-I between early 1948 and April 1949 when the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement was signed.

### **Methodology**

The research will be deductive and try to explain and understand to what extent the yishuv/Israeli leadership and King Abdullah-I were negotiating the future of Palestine within the context of the interests of their own countries. While examining this, the role of Britain will also be examined because it had mandate over Palestine and was instrumental in the formation of Transjordan. The proposed research will be based on available primary resources in English as well as secondary sources. Primary sources will include memoirs of King Abdullah-I of Transjordan. Secondary sources will contain books, magazines, articles published in edited volumes, research journals and newspapers. Internet sources would also be used..

### **Research questions:**

1. To evaluate the role of King Abdullah-I of Transjordan in the emergence and consolidation of the State of Israel.

2. To examine the role of Britain in maintaining its stronghold over the West Asian region through king Abdullah-I and Transjordan.
3. To examine the interest convergence between Transjordan and the Jewish forces during the 1948 war.
4. To examine the tension between Transjordan and other Arab countries over Palestine in 1948.

### **Hypotheses:**

1. King Abdullah-I's territorial aspirations concerning Palestine facilitated the emergence of Israel. .
2. King Abdullah-I's complex relations with Britain and his interest convergence with the Zionist leadership led to the downfall of the Arab plan for Palestine.

### **Chapter Scheme**

The second chapter titled *Britain and Abdullah* discusses the role of Great Britain in the creation and consolidation of Emirate and later the state of Transjordan. The chapter briefly examines the promises made by Britain during the First World War to Sharif Hussein of Mecca and how these promises facilitated the creation of Emirate of Transjordan for Hussein's second son Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein. The chapter examines how the Emirate became important for maintaining Britain's interest in the West Asian region. And the relationship between Great Britain and later the King of Transjordan. It focuses extensively on the role of Britain in safeguarding the Emirate of the Transjordan and how it served as the major partner for Abdullah in bringing down the hostility towards him and his kingdom. The chapter also examines how the promises made by Great Britain to the Hashemites worked in expanding the territorial ambitions of Abdullah.

The third Chapter titled *Yishuv-Transjordan Contacts* highlights the contacts between the Hashemites and the Jewish community in Palestine. The chapter examines how the contacts and meetings between Abdullah and Gold Meir (then representative of the Jewish Agency) helped in bringing down the possibility of an aggression from the Arab side. The chapter briefly examines how these meetings between the two facilitated Israel's DoI. This chapter broadly covers the events that led to the military-political tussle between the Arabs and the newly created state of Israel. The chapter underlines how the British decision to withdraw from Palestine and the adoption of UNGA resolution 181 led to war between the two. The chapter also examines the

role of these events in reviving the Greater Syria plan of Abdullah that brought change in his behaviour towards the APG.

The fourth Chapter titled *Transjordan-Arab League Tensions Over Palestine Issue* examines the relationship between King Abdullah of Transjordan and the Arab League over the Palestinian issue. The chapter discusses how the Arab League as the spokesperson and representative of Arab people failed to have a unified strategy on the question of Palestine. This chapter investigates the contacts, exchanges and communications between Abdullah and Arab League over the Palestine issue, and how the suspicion and distrust between the two led to the down fall of Arab plan for Palestine during the 1948 war and its aftermath.

The fifth and the last chapter sum up the findings of the research and tests the proposed hypotheses.

## Chapter Two

### Britain and Abdullah

First the emirate and later the state of Transjordan was result of a partnership between Great Britain and Abdullah-I. As Britain developed vital interest in the West Asian region, its Imperial interests focused upon secure the Suez Canal (vital waterway) and sea and land communications to India (Simon, 1974: 321). The reason for British interest in Sharif Hussein of Mecca was that Hussein might excite an Arab revolt that at least could reroute the Ottoman troops from frightening the Suez Canal (Smith 2013: 56). British strategy planners began to recognize the requirement to construct a security belt in the West Asia near British interests and therefore it wanted the removal of potential challenger, the Ottoman Empire (Gilhar 1992: 374).

In February 1914, Sharif Hussein of Mecca dispatched his second son, Abdullah to Cairo to request British assistance against the Ottoman (Smith, 2013: 54). Hussein was a member of the Hashim clan to which the Prophet Muhammad had belonged, he was the thirty-seventh in the direct line of descent from Muhammad, this made Sharif an official guardian of the holy places of Mecca and Medina, He was an Ottoman official but he sought to retain greatest autonomy possible, There was a intense belief among the Hashemites that they were intended to rule over the whole of Arab world, in Hejaz he fostered the ambition for an independent Arab kingdom (Shlaim, 1988). Hussein Bin-Ali was alarmed by the Ottoman intention to extend the Hejaz railway to Mecca, therefore, he deputized his son Abdullah to seek British help in blocking the Ottoman plan, Abdullah was the most astute and politically ambitious, he was born in Mecca but received his education in Constantinople (Wilson 1987: 6-16). It was during this period he developed the desire for Arab nationalism, as was convince that it was necessary to break up the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand his father's idea of nationalism was based on tribal and family unity, for these ambitions Hejaz province had to have backing of the British Empire, being a guardian of holy shrines he could not embrace himself with power and made secret overtures to the British (Shlaim 1988: 22).

However, the imperial British response to Abdullah was negative. Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the consul general in Cairo, notified Abdullah that Great Britain would not provide and give arms to be used against a favourable and friendly entity namely Ottoman (Smith 2013: 55). Great Britain at this time was reluctant to supply arms to be used against

Turkey but the meeting opened the door for further negotiations and ten months later, when Britain declared war on Turkey after the onset of First World War, Britain brought a significant change in its behaviour and from 14 July 1915 to 10 March 1916 Sharif of Mecca and the British high commissioner in Cairo Sir Henry McMahon exchanged ten letters which came to be known as Hussein-McMahon correspondence (Armajani 1970: 226).

Under this exchange of letters Hussein demanded, that Great Britain accept the “freedom of the Arab Countries” whose frontiers surround all of Greater Syria, including Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula (Smith 2013: 57). British informed Hussein that in return for its support, the Arab nation might give support to the British and in return they would protect the Arabs against foreign invasion and would protect Hussein against in-house menacing and would also back the proposition that first the caliph, the high Sunni institution was held by the Ottoman Turks, an “Arab of authentic race” should become *caliph* of Mecca. This communication with exaggerations established the basis for an association that persisted throughout the World War I (Smith 2013: 55-57). Sir Henry promised Arab independence in large portions of West Asia. Hussein fell for the British, with a view that if British support rightly channelled it would end Ottoman rule over Arabs and he would become the ruler of the Kingdom of the Unified Arab Kingdom, stretching from Aleppo (Syria) to Aden (Yemen). But Arabs were betrayed in 1916, When the British and French quietly plunged into the Sykes-Picot agreement in which the Ottoman Empire in the West Asia was distributed into spheres of their influence (Hasan 2010: 27).

Britain and France divided the whole Fertile Crescent into the spheres of influence, the draft agreement of 15-16 May 1916 about the post-war division of West Asia, was approved in principal by the Tsarist Russia (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 13). French got Syria and Lebanon and, Britain got Iraq, Palestine and Jordan. And it was accordingly understood between the two that in matter area, they shall alone provide consulate or external administrator at the appeal of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states. That in blue zone France and in red zone great Britain shall be permitted to formulate or indirect authority or command as they wish and as they may consider wise to organize with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 14).

This agreement also gave Great Britain a power to construct, conduct, operate, supervise and be the lone proprietor of a railway linking Haifa with area B, and shall have a permanent right to transfer and transport troops along such a line. This agreement made both the governments of Britain and France respectively, to promise that, as the defender of the Arab state they would not themselves take and would not assent a third power to obtain a territorial control in the Arabian Peninsula, nor they would assent a third power to establish a naval base neither on the east coast or nor on the island of the Red Sea. This agreement made to clear that the issue of dividing line e of the Arab State or confederation of Arab states should be continued through the similar channel on the behalf of the two powers and gave assurance on the importance of ammunition and arms into the Arab areas would only be pondered by the two governments (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 15).

Arab revolt led by Hussein's sons Abdullah and Faisal broke out on 5 June 1916 and Hashemites appealed to their supporters in Hejaz to rise against the Ottomans (Aruri 1972: 16). Britain not only financed this revolt but also supplied weaponry, arms, equipments, provisions, assistance, direct military support, professionals in desert warfare (T.E. Lawrence) (Smith 2013: 70). Within four months of the outbreak of the revolt, the Sharif, at the instigation of his enterprising second son, was proclaimed king of the Arab nation but British refused to recognize (Shlaim 1988: 25). It was the blunderbuss decision by the Arabs, led by Sharif Hussein, to revolt against the Ottoman Empire, relying on British promises of independence if they succeeded in breaking off from the Ottoman Empire. Turkish was no doubt the language of Ottoman Empire but it was very much a Muslim empire and the Ottoman sultan claimed to be the Khalifa of all Muslims. Sharif Hussein of Mecca was part of the Ottoman aristocracy. He lived for the most part in Istanbul and spoke better Turkish than Arabic (Hasan 2010: 27).

British diplomats knew about French aspiration in Palestine and Syria, and had explained this matter to their French counterparts in the spring of 1915, British officials knew about France demand for Mosul, and it was London which proposed to take forward the official talks on partition that made Paris to reformulate its territorial goals and move forward to claim the territory of Mosul. The Foreign Office had pursued these talks because it needed French consent for a future Arab State of Hussein, The French, although barely interested in Sir Edward Grey British Foreign Secretary's "Arab kingdom", believed that his reluctant acceptance would give



an opening to increase their territorial demands as compensation. London accepted France claim and Sykes was all set to agree because it was one of their traditional aim to maintain a buffer zone that separates territories of British and Russian influence in Asia and “French Mosul” did that nicely (Fitzgerald 1994: 707-723). Grey suggested to the French that they assign a representative to discuss the pros and cons of the prospective partition of Ottoman lands, He did so not out of concern about Britain’s potential obligation to the Arabs but because he believed that British troops were about to enter Baghdad, assuming that Iraq, considered vital to post war British interest, had been effectively secured (Smith 2013: 60).

British official viewed the Sykes-Picot agreement as a temporary wartime collusion, they wanted to take advantage of their remarkable military presence in the Arab West Asia at the end of the war to secure total control of the region, either through direct occupation or through sponsorship of an Arab state in Damascus (Smith 2013: 63). At this time commitments to Hussein became a reason of prevention of British obligation to the French under the Sykes-Picot and vice-versa (Smith 2013: 63). At the same time Jewish nationalism began to appear towards the end of the 1917, Jews who suffered injustice, faced rapid challenges in Europe, the ghettos of Russia and Eastern Europe where majority of the Jews lived became victim of Christian fanaticism, introduced reformed Judaism and Theodor Herzl a Jewish Intellectual launched a modern Zionism and propagated the idea of establishing a ‘Jewish State’ as the solution for their suffering (Armajani 1970: 229-330). The Zionist realised that their idea of state required the British presence in Palestine therefore they asserted that Zionist government in Palestine would always remain an ally of the British (Armajani 1970: 232). neither European power saw the two sets of promises compatible, the disparity between commitment and intentions expanded as the war continued and progressed, Great Britain and France promulgated more assurances of freedom and independence to the Arabs while Britain hand out Palestine to the Zionists as their national home (Smith 2013: 63). Great Britain took gratuitous, and even peculiar, step of issuing the Balfour Declaration, which pledged it to help in the establishment of “a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine” Herzl's founding Zionist dream of an independent Jewish state within fifty years was on the road to fulfilment (Brecher 1985: 179).

The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 was an encouragement to the establishment in Palestine of national home for the Jewish people. Britain announced that

“His majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and would use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist federation” (BD, 1917).

The Paris peace conference of 18 January 1919 continued till 21 January 1919 found Arabs free from the Ottoman rule, Abdullah brother Faisal succeeded in forming temporary administration in Syria and attended this conference as the envoy of King of Hejaz, He was sent to insist on nothing less than complete independence but he was out of his depth in the world of Great power diplomacy and left the conference empty handed (Shlaim 1988: 25). The Treaty of Versailles which was signed on 28 June 1919 redesigned the route of Arab nationalism. Britain and France, under a League of Nations mandate, governed the Levant and partitioned the territory of the region into five countries: Syria and Lebanon under French control in the north; and Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan under British control in the south (Drysdale and Blake 1985, 63-67).

Faisal was installed as the King of Syria by the Syrian congress, his administration in Damascus was short lived and he was evicted from Damascus in July 1920. His subsequent appointment in Baghdad as the head of a British-subsidized administration did not bring to an end his desire for his old capital in which he was first announced King and for governing over a greater Arab state which would include Iraq, Syria and perhaps other parts of the Fertile Crescent (Masalha 1991: 679). The eclipse of Faisal in Damascus gave Abdullah the opportunity to stage a comeback on the Arab stage after he had been soundly beaten on the battlefield by the forces led by Ibn Saud. He was denied admission to the peace conference by the allies, and experienced growing difficulties with his father which led his resignation as a foreign minister, when the Syrian congress elected Faisal to the throne of Syria, a group of Arab leader nominated Abdullah to the throne of Iraq but he received no encouragement from the British to seek that particular throne (Shlaim 1988: 26). Emir Abdullah was the elder brother of King Faisal ruler of Syria and he was constantly claiming that Faisal’s lineal heirs should succeed to the throne of Iraq, he believed that Faisal lost the Syrian Kingdom therefore he should revert it to himself. He worked

industriously and propagated this idea throughout geographical Syria, but did not succeed, since French were ruling over this territory therefore it was considered conspiracy to talk about Greater Syria (G.E.K 1948: 18).

British found themselves facing an armed resistance in the Arab West Asia. In May 1920 a rebellion broke out in Iraq and lasted through summer and had many casualties (Smith, 2007: 81). British officials wanted to stop these tribal revolts but did not know how but when Abdullah marched towards north and started its campaign towards Damascus there was an excitement in the Arab people. In order to stop the rebels from fighting the British Empire, Winston Churchill wanted to create a system of government. On 20 August, Sir Herbert Samuel, British high commissioner for Palestine made his first visit to the country, and announced that Great Britain favoured a system of local self-government. Six British were left at large as advisers and three fledging government set up one in Kerak, for south, another in Amman, for the Belka and a third in Ajlun for the north. But all inspiration had gone and no one knew how to govern. The bewildered administrations barely functioned and Transjordan remained in chaos until the appearance at Maan in 1920 of Abdullah (Deardon, 1958:43).

Abdullah was different from his father. He knew the importance of Britain. In order to make his own principality, he turned his attention to the mountainous territory lying east of the river Jordan which nominally formed part of British mandate but in practice had been left to its own and degenerated into brigandage and lawlessness (Shlaim, 1988; Patai, 1958; Wilson, 1987). No British troops were left by Britain to administer this barren territory; and had only had few political advisers like Alec Seath Kirkbride, Abdullah turned his attention towards the mountainous area lying east of the Jordan (Shlaim 1988: 26). It was to this territory he set off from Medina He appeared in Maan on 11 November 1920 (Aruri 1972: 19)

Amman until then was an insignificant town (Vatikiotis 1967: 41). The Area was small and insignificant, with a very less population. Amman was a Circassian village of no great importance, whose only claim to fame was that it was the site of Roman Philadelphia (Wilson 1987: 55, 56). Al Salt, on the road to Jerusalem, was the main economic and administrative centre in the time of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile Amman became the centre of Syrian Arab nationalists who had fled French repression. On his arrival in Maan on November 1920, Abdullah's intentions were to march to Damascus to drive out the French aggressors, and restore

his brother King Faisal to his rightful throne (Shlaim, 1988: 27). He was encouraged by local politicians in Amman, who requested his father, Hussein, to dispatch one of his sons to organise a movement against French in Syria (Vatikiotis 1967: 41). From Maan Abdullah moved northwards to Kerak where Capt. Alec Kirkbride was appointed by British. He had no instruction on how to deal with this unlikely contingency. As a result, he decided to welcome the prince in the name of the national government of Maab. This curious encounter between the Hashemite prince and the polite young Englishman marked the beginning of a warm personal friendship and close political association, severed only by the former's death thirty years later (Shlaim, 1988: 27).

Britain had no intention of forming an independent Arab state (McNabb 2017: 71). This welcome by the British and significant support was the single source available to Abdullah and allowed him to survive the tribal revolts and attacks of the 1920s (Wilson 1987: 3). But he left Maan on 28 February 1921 and arrived in Amman on 2 March 1921. Initial steps he took in Amman was to impose his authority over the various factions and localities, set up his headquarters, still with no intention of raising a larger force to mount an invasion of Syria from the south.

In the same month (March) he was invited to meet Churchill, then colonial secretary, in Jerusalem (Vatikiotis, 1967: 43). Churchill was persistent to support the British position in West Asia while exceedingly cutting spending and expenditures. Winston Churchill, Sir Herbert Samuel and T.E. Lawrence through their efforts arranged a meeting in Jerusalem on 24 March 1921. Many conditions were laid down and surprising of all these events was that Abdullah agreed to fulfil these conditions. In this meeting the goal of Churchill and his helper cum-advisers, which included Lawrence organised the Cairo conference in March 1921 to chase these goals. It was here that they admitted to appoint Faisal in Baghdad (the incomparable and inexpensive solution) and to give to his brother Abdullah eastern Palestine which became Transjordan (Smith 2013: 81). After his talks in Jerusalem with Winston Churchill, Abdullah decided in early April 1921 to remain in Amman as the destined ruler of Transjordan and restrain from pursuing his preliminary objective of attacking and challenging the French in Syria. Throughout the talks with Churchill before the territories of Transjordan had finally been drawn Abdullah again and again demanded Churchill to have Palestine incorporated in his realm but Churchill turned him down, but the person never gave up (Susser 2012: 8).

## **Great Britain and Abdullah**

In the year 1921 British pronounced that the land to the East Bank of the Jordan River, should become part of Palestine would become Transjordan, prosper and develop into an independent Abdullah's emirate. By doing this Britain wanted to restrict the Zionist project solely to West of the Jordan River, to Palestine . The emirate was placed in the hands of the Hashemite prince, who had begun the Arab revolt, in collaboration with the British, against Ottomans during First World War (Susser 2012: 7). Therefore, Britain installed Abdullah-I as the Emir of Transjordan. Abdullah bin al-Hussein was the first ruler of the area that was carved from the old Ottoman Empire known as Transjordan. He was born in Mecca, Hejaz in some of Hussein, Saudi Arabia. He was the second son of Hussein bin Ali. His father was Sharif Hussein of Mecca and later the King of Hejaz (Shiflett, 1957: 54). His arrival in summer 1921 declared in his own frustration and suffering, that he had 'had adequate of this wilderness of Transjordania' Abdullah sought expansion and Palestine was his option (Susser 2012: 9). It was jointly agreed that Abdullah would take command over Transjordan for a period of six months. He also guaranteed to curb both anti-French and anti-Zionist troubles to the best of his ability, and he was assured British financial support in return (Susser 2012: 8).

It was primarily the result of Churchill-Abdullah talks that permitted Abdullah to establish Transjordan and the British undertook to provide a financial aid to his administration, especially for the purpose of organising a security force capable of maintain law and order (Vatikiotis 1967: 43). Therefore, army was formed it was called *Al Jeish al Arab* or in English The Arab Legion and captain Peak of the Duke of Wellington's regiment was brought to serve as the commander of the Emirs army (Bagot 1957: 27). A government was established Emir Abdullah and was working for six months, during which Abdullah was to receive from Britain a financial subsidy of £5000 per month and Britain would work towards the improvement of relations between Abdullah and French authorities in Syria. Abdullah then appointed a government on 11 April 1921 and on 27 April an organic law of the executive was passed AL-Salt, Kerak, Irbid became the first three official provinces of the principality and first budget was introduced (Vatikiotis 1967 : 44).

In 1922 when Britain in the face of strong Zionist opposition, obtained the necessary approval from the League of Nation for excluding the territory of Transjordan from the prearrangements

of the Palestine mandate associating to the Jewish national home (Shlaim 1988: 29). The Emir administered the territory on the advice of the British High Commissioner at Jerusalem and the High Commissioners issued an elaborate statement on 15 May 1923 stating the course of British policy and recognised the actuality of an independent authority in Transjordan (Abidi 1965: 9). These new arrangements were formalised by the Anglo-Transjordan agreement signed in London in April 1923 and Britain formally recognised the autonomy of the emirate and British government granted Transjordan independence to some extent with Abdullah as the head of the Emirate, and with St John Philby as chief official to administer the country and Transjordan was given a grant of £150000 in aid (Vatikotis, 1967; Abidi, 1965; Shlaim 1988:).

The tribal community of Transjordan were the chief supporters of the Hashemite rule and they were the most passionate and keen supporters of the kingdom (Alon 2005: 213). When the emirate of Transjordan was formed its monarch faced a dangerous opposition because the residents were able to resist the state policy at will (Alon, 2005). The tribal community was structured along the lines of real or imagined kinship and the confederations could bring out its own leaders who were able, if necessary, to gather and organize their fellow tribesmen into a powerful fighting force and it was substantially correct in the desert and in the semi settled districts in central and southern Transjordan and villages of the north, and between towns people all over, tribal unanimity was still significant and could assist as the principal constituent for unified action (Alon 2005: 218). But Britain gave minor strategic relevance towards maintaining a distinct political establishment in Transjordan. It sought only minimal involvement in its functioning of the country and authorized Abdullah's free rein over domestic tribal matters and he governed Transjordan in a chieftaincy-like manner because he was not engrossed in the matters and affairs of Transjordan per se but saw Transjordan as a platform for expanding his rule into Syria, he took small interest in the every-day government and legislation of the country and left most of the matters to the discretion of his ministers (Alon 2005: 219).

The Transjordan administration experienced few troubles in exerting its command and control over the countryside, and this condition did not seriously improve until 1924, when the Colonial Office took more absolute control over Transjordan's domestic matters (Amadouy 1995: 536). Ibn Saud was demanding the incorporation of the entire Wadi Sirhan Valley into Nejd, these demands, if accepted; posed a challenge to British provincial progression and air route Britain

also did not want to indulge in the Arabian struggle but at the same time Hussein proclaimed himself as the caliph in April 1924, this act provided an excuse to Ibn Saud to launch a holy war against Hejaz (Abu-Lebdeh, 1997; Gilhar, 1992). In the same month Hussein did one more mistake and proclaimed the inception of the Maan Vilayet government, along with parts of Transjordan which the British considered as being constituted in Palestine Mandate (Gilhar 1992: 376).

The Emirate of Transjordan during this time was poor and wild and was barely established as a nation, so much was happening on its borders, its own government was riding the storm and its independence was proving a failure (Deardon, 1958). Much of the British money was spent in payments to too many Syrian officials, who were funding the Syrian rebels and due to this France was protesting at these anti-French activities by the Emir government. He tried to suppress these activities but could not wholly control (Deardon 1958: 49). At the same time British government did not agree with Sharif Hussein of Mecca pronouncement and British Cabinet pronounced that Hussein had no authority to control any part of Transjordan but they did nothing in the area (Gilhar 1992: 376). By 1924 the country was merely bankrupt and a savage because of the savage raids into Syria by Emir patriots and brought French complaints. As a result the British government cracked down and Emir was obliged to accept full financial control by Britain and to depose more violent members of his nationalist club. The country was made to run on the lines of a crown with its new British resident in Colonel Sir Henry Cox as its chief instructor. With this move Britain brought its own officials to the key posts in administration of Transjordan (Deardon 1958: 49). Through this the Maan district was secured by the British from Hussein and the Transjordanian government reinstated in June 1925 without acceptance of Hussein and his sons. But the proclamation by Hussein gave rise to illegal acts by Ibn Saud in all the territory of Hejaz and after the reinsurance of Maan by British, Ibn Saud announced that he is prepared to settle the question of tribal raids with Great Britain (Gilhar 1992: 377).

As a result various agreements were signed between Britain and Ibn Saud in bringing down the hostile tribal raids in this regard the Bahra agreement was signed on 1 November 1925 by Sir Gilbert Clayton and Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud, whereby Iraq and Nejd recognized that invasions by tribes in order to resolve their differences and occupy the areas of other states would be considered as an aggression and necessitated serious actions and punishment to the executioner

of invasion by the administration to which the perpetrators belonged and that the head of the tribe doing such aggression was to be held answerable (Leatherdale 1983: 375).

This agreement was subsequently followed by the Hadda agreement which was signed on 2 November 1925 by the same parties. Under this agreement the Government of Nejd undertook not to establish any fortified post at Kafor in its neighbourhood as a military centre, and the parties agreed that if any time they considered necessary to take measures in the neighbourhood with the view of maintaining law and order, involving armed forces, they would first have to inform his Majesty's government without delay (Leatherdale 1983: 376). As a result of this agreement the government of Nejd undertook to avert by all methods at their disposition, whatever incursion by their army into the territory of Transjordan and British government succeeded in gaining their confidence. This ruled out that in case of any misunderstanding or any incident, the conflicting parties would not cross the common frontiers and before taking measure they would have to inform and take consent of the British Government's representative in Transjordan (Leatherdale 1983: 377, 378).

But the Jeddah agreement between Britain and King Ibn Saud of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its protectorates on 20 May 1927, whereby his Majesty government recognised the total, outright and absolute independence of the possessions of his King of the Hejaz and Najd and its dependencies (Leatherdale 1983: 380 ). These agreements by the British Government for settlement of relations and frontiers between Hejaz (Saudi Arabia) and Transjordan marked the special reference in Britain and Emir Abdullah and brought down the hostility of Ibn Saud towards the Hashemites (Gilhar 1992: 377).

In 1928 an agreement was penned between Great Britain and Transjordan, which recognised Transjordan's autonomy and independence, left finance and foreign affairs under the British control (Wilson, 1987). Britain undertook the defence of the emirates frontiers because of Ibn Saud's hatred towards the Hashemites (Deardon 1958: 50). Transjordan's Organic Law was established in April 1928 under the leadership of Emir Abdullah. It called for a consultative



parliament, provided for a legislative assembly to be elected and election and Transjordan's first elections were held in April 1929<sup>1</sup>.

Under this law, a body was elected for three years to serve a legislature council and legislative power was vested in the council and the prince. Legislature council had serious limitations; no law passed by council, could not be implemented without the Princes approval and the latter, in turn had to get the concurrence of the British resident in Amman under the mandate status (Abidi 1965: 48). A new force was brought to the scene namely, Major John Bagot Glubb He was born in England to a middle class English civil service and military family and his father Fredric Manley Glubb served in the royal engineers, and when the World War I ended he attained the rank of Major General Glubb. He volunteered for the service in Iraq, when he reached there it was the territory wracked by the tribal and religious conflict but there was a constant raiding from Saudi Arabia and occasional intervention by the royal air force with Glubb directing the aircraft to target (Morris 2003, 1, 2). Glubb describes his experience in Transjordan and argued that "in 1930, the Transjordan government decided to put an end to raiding and invited me to undertake the task; I arrived in Amman for this purpose in November 1930. By the simple device of employing the tribesmen themselves to police their own deserts, we succeeded in putting an end to raiding in Transjordan, almost without firing a shot or making arrest" (Glubb 1957: 26).

The Arab revolt broke out in Palestine in 1936 and local feeling ran dangerously high in Transjordan, it only needed a hot or ill-judged word to unleash a pack of sympathizers across the border or to turn public wrath on Amman's own British officials. In this Anglo-Arab crisis Abdullah had the key to peace (Deardon 1958: 55). In order to stop the revolt from spreading into Transjordan, Glubb agreed with Hajj Amin al-Husseini (the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) and his Palestinian supporters that the Zionist influx was unjust and be hated (Morris, 2003) Britain wanted to stop the killings as, British official were worried about Britain's position in this war (Morris 2003: 34) Emir Abdullah could have joined the revolt against the British Empire but he did not do because of his dependence on British that helped in crushing the Ibn Saud's aggression towards Transjordan. They also helped in creating an army and were also paying for

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<sup>1</sup> The Government of Jordan (1952), the Constitution, [Online: Web] URL: <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/government1.html> (accessed on 30 March 2017).

the army. Therefore Abdullah did not do anything. It was proof of his great authority; it was by mandate, that his royal command was universally obeyed. One or two demonstration did take place in Transjordan Iraq Petroleum Company's Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline which ran through Transjordan and was damaged thrice. During this Arab revolt of 1936 Transjordan was neutral because it was sympathetic towards the British Empire (Deardon, 1958). Britain completely subsidised Emir's government, which had no local sources of revenue, Glubb believed that the agitation would translate into rebellion only if townsmen joined the dissatisfied tribesmen but bulk of the population of Transjordan of about 350,000 strong at that time lacked any serious anti-Hashemite or anti-British grievances (Morris 2003: 37).

Emir Abdullah took and serious interest in matters related to Palestinian Arabs therefore met the British High Commissioner in Amman on 6 June and 7 August in effort to end the revolt organised by the Palestinian Arabs (Patai 1958: 42). The British government answered to the eruption of the Arab revolt by commissioning a royal commission in 1937 with Lord Peel as chairman, to inspect and examine the causes of the disturbance and to advocate a solution (Patai 1958: 43). The commission came up with a report saying that partition was the only solution to the Arab Zionist tensions in Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 19). The report of royal commission in neighbouring Palestine advocated partition and also advocated that Arab part should then come under Abdullah's command (Wilson 1987a: 39). Abdullah strived at this opportunity. He was the only Arab ruler to openly support the partition for which he was criticised throughout the Arab world (Ibid). Abdullah was distressfully informed of Transjordan's indebtedness and vulnerability of its substantial reliance on Britain and of its dependence on a British strategic motive for its distinct being in the area. Abdullah's eyes were not set on Palestine till 1937, when Britain advocated that Palestine might be partitioned between Arab and Jews and that Abdullah might govern the Arab areas (Ibid: 38).

But the revolt that started in 1936 and lasted till 1939 and it proved that there cannot be a bargain, adjustment, and arrangement between the two conflicting parties in Palestine only a war could resolve the issue (Shlaim 2009: 20). This changed the circumstances in Palestine to Emir Abdullah's favour and compelled Britain to review and re-evaluate its Palestine strategy. The outcome of this revolt was that Britain came to the decision that the provisions of the mandate could not be carried out inside a unitary Palestine state and it understood that it required to find a

new mediator in Palestine to change the nationalist establishment and in this research attention turned to Abdullah (Wilson 1987: 39).

Because of the Second World War and Germany's annexation of part of Czechoslovakia and Italy's attack on Albania and formal military alliance between Germany and Italy, Britain agreed to issue White Paper on 17 May 1939 (Smith 2013: 143). The papers declared that "His Majesty's government considers that the framers of the mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was incorporated could not have proposed that Palestine should be transformed into a Jewish state in opposition to the desires of the Arab people" (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 45). Under this White Paper the demands of the Arabs were broadly met but the Jewish exodus and immigration was to carry on for at a greatest annual rate of 15,000 for additional five years, the Jewish land purchases were prohibited in some areas and restricted in others. Therefore, the Jewish reaction to the White Paper was hostile but on the other hand Arab leaders also rejected it because of the continuation of immigration for five years (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 44).

Abdullah was characterized as an enthusiastic, determined and ambitious man, a man who was never happy with territory of Transjordan. Transjordan existed as a distinct entity different from Syria or Palestine or for that matter, from Iraq or Saudi Arabia because of British important strategic and political interest. Thus Abdullah in Transjordan become permanently recognized with Britain and British strategy in the country and outside (Wilson, 1987: ). Transjordan in formative years was dominated by Britain, the British government spent £50,000 between the period 1936 and 1945 and 250,000 individuals eventually obtained unchallengeable title to their land, each parcel being clearly demarcated and assessed for land tax (Deardon 1958: 53). Abdullah could not have gained power in Transjordan without Britain's approval and support, and had he tried to the defiance of Britain he would not have survived for very long. It was not the province of Hejaz which was the attraction for Ibn Saud but the arms supplied to him by the Britain that enabled him to conquer their country (Shlaim, 1988: 30). Ibn Saud had dreams just like the Hashemites and he also wanted to be the ruler of the Arab world, that dream was fulfilled by British who helped him defeating Sharif Hussein in Hejaz led to its dispersal from Hejaz and they did it by supplying arms to Ibn Saud. And this withdrawal British support paved the way to the decline of the Hashemite kingdom in the Hejaz so it was British protection, and only British protection, which could preserve the Hashemite Emirate in Transjordan (Ibid).

Previously the Emir agreed to be guided by British advice on vital matters like foreign affairs, budget, financial administration, exploitation of mineral resources and jurisdiction over foreign residents. He undertook not to increase, control or maintain in Transjordan or acquiesce nor allow any military forces to be raised or maintain without the consent of the British government. These restrictions greatly circumscribed the powers of the Emir (Abidi 1965: 10). Britain relaxed these restrictions in the wake of the Second World War and an agreement was signed on 19 July 1941 with a the British strategy of winning the Arab public opinion and retrieving her military position in the region in the face of the impending war in Europe (Abidi 1965: 11). Hitler's forces reached at al-Alamein on the border with Egypt on October 1942 and pro-Hashemite circle in Palestine realized that in case of German victory they would be suppressed and killed (Shlaim 1988: 71). British were aware of their greatly diminished power, prosperity and wealth and were ready not to renounce but to decrease their commitments in the West Asia region. There was an increasing unpopularity of imperialist rule and Arab nationalism and local hostility and rousing opposition to British rule made the British yoke more unbearable. The Nazis failed in exploiting the Arab discontent all this brought changes in British policy (Fitzsimona 1951: 22).

The British government also agreed to new talks for the formal ending of the mandate and the negotiation of a treaty for an independent state of Transjordan. Britain decided to reward Emir Abdullah for his wartime loyalty (Shlaim 1988: 72). This decision came to force in response to a Transjordanian memorandum in June 1945 requesting such talks. The British government invited Abdullah to London and in the spring of 1946 the Emir Abdullah visited England. In February 1946, a new treaty was negotiated with Britain as a result in March negotiations were completed for the termination of the mandate as a result of which the mandate of Transjordan was terminated and the signature on a new treaty was taken. This same treaty was ratified in June, and Abdullah became the King of Transjordan on 17 June 1946 and the country was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. This treaty recognised the independence of Transjordan. Transjordanians proclaimed their independent state but the British government retained the protection of their vital strategic-military interest in the country under this new treaty (Vatikiotis, 1967: 49).

On his return he was inaugurated as a king, and a ceremonial review of the Arab Legion was held. It was the climax of twenty five years of labour and as Glubb described it as

There can be no doubt that these twenty five happy years in Transjordan were principally due to the personality of King Abdullah. He alone was able to appreciate the need of his country for the assistance and advice of a great power, while at the same time he was firm enough to be able to hold his own terms of equality, there was never any British domination of Transjordan or of the Arab Legion. That country alone achieved this ideal state. There alone, energy and affection of the people of the country were reinforced by the technical and financial help of a great power, in cordial cooperation (Glubb 1957: 50).

This ceremonial review of the Legion did not reduce King Abdullah dependence on Britain as Transjordan remained financially and militarily depended on Britain for survival (Levenberg 1991: 26)

### **British Contribution to expanding Abdullah's Territorial Ambitions**

The 1946 treaty between Britain and king Abdullah activated Transjordanian interest in the affairs of Palestine and renewed his drive in the direction of Greater Syria (Shlaim 1988: 73). Abdullah was ambitious, and he was never well pleased with the territory of Transjordan. Through it Abdullah survived the tribal attacks and the territory continues to prevail distinct from Syria or Palestine for that matter distinct from Saudi Arabia or Iraq Abdullah never abandoned this dream. From the beginning he had planned for "Unification of Greater Syria" under his rule and for which he was dependent on the British financial aid in the process he became a 'stooge' or 'puppet' of Britain (Wilson, 1987: 37).

Subsequently, Britain lost its interest in Palestine, once it decided to leave India, the "Jewel in Crown" of the empire. The passage to India (Suez Canal) of which Palestine was an important link, had lost its fundamental and strategic usefulness (Hinchecliffe 2001: 17). In February 1947, the British declared that they were handing over the Palestine question to the UN General Assembly. On 28 April that body congregated for a special session to consider the matter and agreed to create a special committee, composed of the representatives from 11 member states, to enquiry in depth on the problem and submit suggestions to the regular session of the General

Assembly in September. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) organised its first meeting in New York on 26 May 1947 and on 15 June it appeared in Palestine to conduct its enquiry on the ground (Ben-Dror 2014: 19).

King Abdullah and Zionist movement dishonestly conspired to terminate the birth of a Palestinian Arab state as promised by the United Nations general assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 in this they were indirectly encouraged, aided and provoked by Great Britain (Weitzman 1990: 261). *Wilson Quarterly* underlines that in order to maintain its rule over the West Asian region, Britain collaborated with Abdullah and Zionists, to block the implementation of the UNGA resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 that termed for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish State. By helping to prevent creation of Jewish and Arab Palestinian state, British made their contribution to the west Asia's most enduring political conflict (*Wilson Quarterly* 1989: 124). There was a belief among the Arab states that Britain was manipulating international diplomacy for the benefit of Abdullah and if they succeed they would be robbed of the fruits of victory (Shlaim, 1988: 260).

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced on 14 February 1947, that His Majesty's Government had decided to hand over the Palestine question to the UN, and the UNSCOP submitted its report and recommendations on 31 August 1947. The tension in Palestine were high due to illegal immigration of Jews that continued and rose and due to this there was a growing restiveness in the Arab countries (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 65). Britain's attempt to find a solution for the peaceful resolution of the contesting claims of Arabs and Jews failed and on 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) accepted the resolution 181 that called for the partition and division of mandatory Palestine into two independent states, one Arab and one Jewish (Shlaim 2009: 21). Most Arab countries and Arabs of Palestine and The Arab League rejected the partition as the solution to Arab -Zionist tension in Palestine and Britain forbidden from accepting any responsibility for implementing and executing the partition and took a decision to end the mandate and withdrawal of its troops from Palestine on 14 May 1948 (Shlaim, 2009).

After the UNGA partition plan Britain preferred an enlarged Transjordan to the emergence of an Arab state in Palestine. Because of this the attention was thus turned mainly towards the strengthening of relation with Abdullah (Bialer 1992: 158). When Britain ended the Mandate on

15 May 1948, the British Officials of the Arab Legion of Transjordan led their forces, by all accounts the most law-abiding, well-trained, devoted disciplined and observant of any of the Arab states, into Palestine. Their aim was to annex and secure the territories given to the Palestinian Arabs under the United Nations partition plan passed by the General Assembly in November 1947. The Arab Legion 'had hard instructions on not to enter in any area allotted by the UN to the Jews. It was also prohibited from entering East Jerusalem which was suppose to be a United Nations enclave' (Jasse 1986: 505).

King Abdullah had a substantial following among the Arabs of Palestine, there were two powerful families one was the Nashashibis and the other one was the Husseinis (Shlaim 1988: 40). Nashashibis one of the powerful families in Palestine urged unification with Transjordan and were willing to accept Abdullah as King of Palestine under British auspices but Husseinis another powerful family who controlled many Arab and Islamic institutions in Mandate Palestine pitted against Nashashibis and were against Abdullah and regarded Hashemites as traitors (Anderson, 2016; Shlaim, 1988). They represented the radical nationalist trend in Palestinian politics and they were committed to the independence of whole of Palestine and rejected any compromise with British authorities. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was the most prominent figure like the King of Transjordan, and casted himself as of an Arab liberator, who would banish the British from Palestine and used it as a base of a great Pan-Arab and Islamic empire (Shlaim 1988: 40). The common ground between these supposed adversaries namely Abdullah and Amin as well as the Palestinians was their opposition to the emergence of an independent and unconstrained Palestinian state, especially one within the control of mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The British, helped to engineer the deal whereby King Abdullah would seize the West Bank, while Israel consolidated its hold elsewhere in the former mandate of Palestine (Quandt, 1989).

And when Britain declared its desire to withdraw from Palestine, Abdullah was aroused, afraid that it broadcast the prospective withdrawal of assistance, subsidies, funds from Transjordan itself, Although Britain went to great length to pursued him that after abandoning Palestine, Transjordan would be transformed into a major partner of Britain in the region (Wilson 1987a: 40). For Abdullah Britain's disengagement from Palestine lastly made expansion of Transjordan possible by creating a local, regional and territorial role for himself and Transjordan which

would outlast British aid. After partition would was passed by UN, Britain favoured the expansion of Abdullah's role to the designated Arab part of Palestine. He was to act as balancing force in the nonappearance of Palestinian leadership that might serve as British (Ibid). During this period Abdullah was considered so close with Britain inside of Transjordan. He was never a major figure outside of Transjordan in a period when Arab nationalism was the reigning ideology (Wilson, 1987a).

Partition of Palestine was an opportunity for Abdullah to increase his regional influence or to realise his dream of a Greater Syria and hence he favoured partition. Abdullah was well aware of the weakness of his a tiny kingdom that was dependent on economic, political and military support of the British and was disliked and suspected by his Arab neighbours. The British enticed the Hashemite ambitions by making contradictory promises. Hence, Abdullah combined his soaring ambitions with a cautious and pragmatic realism. He aspired to unite the whole of the Fertile Crescent through a Greater Syria under his rule and by recovering the Hejaz fro al-Saud, the seat of his Hashemite dynasty, to achieve the leadership of the Arab world. Towards realising this dream Abdullah needed the support of the British and in the beginning British aided his desire to maintain a strangle hold over the West Asian region but when the situation became complex Britain stop its financial aid (Latey 1988: 164). Thus, Hashemites were let down by British and when Britain abandoned the Mandate and the UN proposed the partition of Palestine, a tacit understanding with the yishuv (Israel) leadership became inevitable for Abdullah (Shlaim, 1988)

Abdullah was worried when the British announced its withdrawal from Palestine in the wake of the UN partition plan. He was worried that who would pay for the standing of the Arab legion as the financial viability of the Arab legion became a major concern after the British withdrawal from Palestine. When Britain abandoned Mandate in the wake of the UN plan, Abdullah was in a tacit understanding with the yishuv (Jewish community in Mandate Palestine) that the Arab Legion would occupy only those parts of Palestine that were awarded to the Arabs (Shlaim 1988: 146; Shlaim 1987: 55-57). Hence, the Arab Legion was not active in areas which were allotted to the Jews under the UN plan (Shlaim 2000: 37-38). Jordanian Prime Minister Abu Hude Tawfik Pasha went to London in February 1948 and secured the approval of the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin for this secret arrangement (Rogan 2009: 264). The Arab Legion was the most



efficient Arab armed force in the area and was supplied, trained and largely officered by the British. Indeed, Britain wanted to retain its influence in the Arab world through the Arab League which had rejected partition plan and went to war with Israel. Therefore, King Abdullah had to conceal his collaboration with Britain from the Arab League (Latey, 1988: 164).

Abdullah was a shrewd politician who set out to tackle his problem from various directions, through secret negotiation with the Zionist and by participating in war (Abidi 1965: 25). He knew that the implementation of partition was not easy and he cannot openly confide his desires with other Arab governments. British also could not openly support him. Only course left to him was to establish direct contact with the Jewish leadership. His contacts with the *yishuv* were at various levels and manifested through his friendly disposition towards the Jews, disgruntlement with the Arab League and his anxiety to annex portions of Palestine. Abdullah and the *yishuv* shared a common view regarding the partition of Palestine but open negotiation was politically unacceptable, if not suicidal, for both (Abidi, 1965). Britain believed that trouble in Palestine would be localised and a situation in which Britain would have to cast a veto at the Security Council would not arise and King Abdullah would take no step that might segregate him from the other Arab states (Morris 2003: 108). It believed that if King Abdullah annexed Arab area of Palestine and abstained from dispatching the Arab Legion into the area given to the Jewish state by the UN, this would anyhow not appease. Above all it is barely possible at current to think of any program of action which would appease all three requirement, these requirements were Britain believed that the troubles in Palestine would be localise and in this situation it would have to cast a veto and lastly it was convinced that Abdullah would not do anything that would give rise to accusation (Ibid). On 17 January 1948 Kirkbride delivered a verbal message from Bevin to Abdullah. Abdullah was pleased and began to concentrate on the fact that he had not been prohibited to move at the end of mandate into the Arab areas of Palestine (Ibid).

A, on a basis of co-operation and mutual assistance. On 15 March 1948 the Treaty of alliance was signed between United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern Ireland and his Majesty the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan in Amman, for the development of existing friendship between the two (Kirkbride 1948: 469). This treaty was to run for twenty years and a joint Anglo-Transjordan defence Board was created to coordinate defence matters, and on it the two powers were to be represented by an equal number of military experts (Wright 1951: 442).

King Abdullah was desirous to achieve a new Treaty of partnership with His Majesty's government to strengthen the partnership, co-operation and mutual assistance this according to him would able make and engender the international peace and security in conformity with the regulations and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) (Kirkbride 1948: 469). Under this agreement Britain agreed to provide, joint training, personnel services whenever they would be required, would make sure the efficiency of the military units of the army and agreed to give arms, weapons, ammunition, material, machinery and aircraft and other war substance for the army of the King of the "Hashemite kingdom of Transjordan" (Kirkbride 1948: 472). King Abdullah primarily was not interested to defeat Israel but to seize the hilly region between Jenin and Hebron (Sela 1992: 624). His plans to capture the East Jerusalem was move in by him in to get support and legitimacy from Arab world for his annexation of other populated areas of Palestine, he was motivated by political consideration therefore did not engage in war with Israel (Sela, 1992).

The normal Transjordan budget prior to 1948 was approximately £1 million per year, much less than the annual British grant for the maintenance of the Legion. Abdullah was not accustomed to economic issues of this magnitude, and he was, naturally enough, preoccupied with the political issues involved in the control of his new area (Wright 1951: 452). During the 1948 war, Britain maintained the Arab Legion at the annual cost £2.5 million per year on the other hand the entire budget of Transjordan was t £0.75 million per year (Shlaim, 1988: 146). Therefore, the loss and beating of Britain's partner namely King Abdullah was bad and unacceptable to British officials for strategic and political reasons because Transjordan's Arab Legion ensured the safety of Suez Canal ; flanked the British on the defensive position in respect to their interest in the region and across Palestine (Shlaim, 1987). The Arab Legion was the only well-equipped, organized, trained army in the West Asian region and it guaranteed the security of Suez Canal therefore it was important for Britain to bring Transjordan out the war Britain called for a cease-fire and was pressurising all the member of Arab League because at the end of the one week of fighting Britain's partner King Abdullah as the commander of all the invading forces achieved most of his goals by annexing the central part of Palestine, he strongly prevented the efforts made by his partner to invade the territory given to the Zionists (Dockrill and Young 1989: 80). The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) attempt to capture East Jerusalem, forced the Arab Legion to interfere and resulted in submission of Jewish Quarter inside East Jerusalem on 28 May 1948 (Ibid). Britain to

called for cease-fire and was pressurising almost all the members of Arab League to welcome it and on 29 May 1948 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a British-sponsored resolution that argued for a four-week of cease-fire. The risk of sanctions convinced the other Arab states to pursue Transjordan's plan in accepting the cease-fire. The first truce went into force on 11 June and was acknowledged by the Israelis like “dew from heaven.” Long before that date the British administration had started restraining arms supplies to Palestine (Shlaim 1987: 56).

In March 1949 Britain had increased its grant to the Legion from £2 million to £3.5 million. On his visit to Britain in August, Abdullah argued forcibly that this was inadequate. The League's soldiers needed to be doubled in numbers, its 9,000 men were now insufficient for their vastly increased duties and it needed re-equipping in the light of its Palestine experience (Wright 1951: 453). Training needed tanks rather than lightly armoured desert cars and it needed aircraft. This involved the enlarging of Mafraq air field which would in itself cost about £3 million and a scheme of air training (Ibid). King Abdullah could barely maintain his seat of power in Amman in the absence of British support, because his dependence on Britain was huge (Susser 2012: 8).

British administration opposed and criticised the creation of Jewish state in Palestine, and that after establishment of Israel in May 1948 declined to extend *de facto* recognition. But after eight months changed in position and London remain to have strong reservation about the growth and viability of Israel (Haron 1983: 217). It was manipulating the international diplomacy for the benefit of King Abdullah, it wanted United States of America to give recognition to Israel's neighbour Transjordan which had been given independence in the 1946. Secretary Marshall determined to work out an arrangement whereby London would give recognition to the government of Israel at the same time Washington would declare recognition of the government of Transjordan (Haron 1983: 217). And 11 May 1949, Israel was admitted to the United Nation. London at the end of 1949 started to consider *de jure* recognition of Israel. In March a Foreign Office official mentioned that Israel is a possible danger to our interests, and therefore must be handled appropriately (Haron 1983: 221). The British government desired and wished for Transjordan's King Abdullah to occupy Arab Palestine- what remained of the territory that the United Nations 1947 partition plan allocated for the creation of an independent Arab state. The Foreign Office advocated the government might make use of the promise of the *de jure*

recognition to acquire Israel's consent to union of Transjordan and Arab Palestine. Britain had hold back so long to give *de jure* recognition (Ibid), that it should have been given the previous May when Israel gained access to the United Nations. King Abdullah declared establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan- union of Transjordan and Arab Palestine and Britain gave *de jure* recognition to Israel. The Foreign Office was accustomed to the Jewish state, and through this Armistice agreements were concluded (Haron 1983: 221).

### **Conclusion**

Both Britain and Transjordan had relations, which were of mutual use for both the parties, with Emir and later King Abdullah's relations Britain was able to consolidate its hold over the West Asian region. Abdullah ambitious leader who studies in Constantinople, his ambitions for Arab nationalism and unity of Arab world under their (Hashemite) rule developed during his stay in Turkey. Abdullah- believed that since they are the direct descended from Prophet Muhammad's family, they should unite and rule over the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, he arranged and organised the Arab revolt in the opposition to Ottoman Empire on the promise of British to his father Sharif Hussein this is, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Britain betrayed the Arabs by promising the same territory to France in the Sykes-Picot agreement whereby, the region was divided into the sphere of influence, and the territory of the Fertile Crescent was shared between Britain and France. Britain did not only stop here. In order to make the Zionist enterprise into their side during the First World War British promised the same territory to the Zionists and issued Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917 that declared British backing for the establishment of "a national home" for the Jews in Palestine. By the time Ottoman Empire decline in 1918, Britain promised the same territory to the three different people, namely the Arabs, French and Jews.

The Paris Peace conference of 1919 found the Arabs liberated from the Ottomans but the territory of the Arab was divided between Britain and France and League of Nation brought out resolution for the mandatory rule of these territories by Britain and France. The post -war settlement by the League of Nations gave rise to new nation states in the West Asian region namely Transjordan, Iraq and Lebanon and . But Britain faced huge tribal opposition in the territories and the expulsion of Faisal, Abdullah's brother from Syria by the French, brought him to Maan. Abdullah came to Maan with the intention of launching his Greater Syria scheme but

British official welcomed his arrival and in the year 1921 in a meeting in Cairo, Abdullah was made Emir of the territory called Transjordan.

Britain's aim was stop his campaign against French but his arrival also provided a solution to tribal campaign against British, which miraculously stopped with arrival. Britain agreed to provide monthly subsidy to its ally Emir Abdullah, and in the year 1923 Transjordan was given nominal independence by the British and increased its subsidy but this financial aid was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the state as Transjordan poses no resources. The change in British policy towards Hashemite came in 1924 when Sharif Hussein announced himself as Caliph and this move provided an excuse to Ibn Saud to launch his against the Hashemite and he was thrown out of Hejaz by the Ibn Saud. British played a major role in Sharif's expulsion, his majesty's government provided arms and ammunition to Ibn Saud that assured his victory. Ibn Saud was the mortal enemy of Hashemites and was always hostile towards the Hashemite but the British through a series of agreement with him like Bahra, Hadda, Jeddah agreements brought down his hostility towards the Hashemites and secured Abdullah's kingdom.

But British failure in stopping the Arab revolt that lasted from 1936-1939, resulted in White Paper of 1939 and brought change in British attitude towards the Zionists. Through this paper Britain labelled the restriction to Jewish immigration to Palestine and reversed from its promise of support to Jewish state in Palestine. but both the Arabs and Zionist rejected these White Papers but resulted in invoking Abdullah's Greater Syria scheme and Britain gave full independence to Transjordan in the year 1946 but it did not reduce his dependence on the His Majesty's government. British decision to withdraw from Palestine in February 1947 spurred Abdullah to worry about who would pay for the standing of his army, Britain paid an annual subsidy for the maintenance of his Arab Legion. But the partition plan of UNGA on 29 November brought a new ray of hope for him and Abdullah decided to intervene in Palestine after British withdrawal on 14 May 1948 plan was not to fight the Zionists but was to capture the Arab parts of Palestine given to it under the UNGA resolution 181. Abdullah captured East Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

## Chapter Three

### *Yishuv-Transjordan Contacts*

The contacts of Transjordan with *Yishuv* were extensive and visible. . Long before the establishment of the kingdom of Transjordan, the political leadership of *Yishuv* had communication and hefty contacts with the Hashemite family (Shlaim, 1988). Emir Abdullah I was not the first from his family to establish contacts with *Yishuv* leaders (Shlaim 1988: 44). His brother Faisal was the first Hashemite to discuss with Zionist leaders on the possibility of cooperation between the Arab and Jewish national movements (Ibid: 43). He agreed to the idea of a Jewish National Home and was supportive to a Jewish Homeland from which he wished to receive assistance in establishing his future kingdom (Katz, 1973).

In June 1918, as the military commander of Arab revolt, he received a visit from Dr Chaim Weizmann, moderate Zionist leader, head of the World Zionist Organization and a key figure in the Balfour Declaration (Shlaim 1988: 43)., and their subsequent negotiation on this and subsequent occasions crystallized into the famous Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, which was signed on 3 January 1919 (The Syrian Times, 2014). The talks between the two got as far as they did. But this Faisal-Weizmann agreement had no practical results because under the Article IV of agreement Faisal accepted “the Jewish immigration and migration of Jews into Palestine on a massive scale and provided the Arabs agricultural worker residents, tenant, and poor farmer shall be protected in their rights” (Armajani 1986: 235). Article VII of the same agreement under which The Zionist Organization agreed that it would utilize its best attempt to help the Arab state in handing over the means for the expanding and flourishing the natural resources and economic prospects (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 18) This episode in Hashemite-Zionist relation illuminated important trends in the thinking, expectations, and strategies of the two sides. In this agreement both Weizmann and Faisal believed that national aspirations of Arabs and Zionist were possible through collaboration and in the development of Arab state and Palestine. To achieve desirous outcome both have to show good understanding that exist between the two from the ancient times. Hashemite rulers saw the Zionists of great help in maintaining their relations with British. Both sides based their strategy on an alliance with Britain, and it was the British who arranged the first meeting, in the hope for bringing an alliance between Sharifian doubts of Zionism (Shlaim 1988: 43).

Abdullah -I clandestinely maintained direct relations with the *Yishuv* and later Israel at nearly all levels. The aspiration for cooperation between Abdullah I and the Zionist movement was not produced by some natural understanding for each other. The heritage of cooperation between the two parties were political, economic and military goals that could have not been achieved without the joint effort and backing of Israel and Transjordan. The aims that Abdullah wished to achieve through his contacts with the Zionist movement were the formation of an ally to protect his position in the region as well as the establishment of an opportunity to increase the size of his territory. Nonetheless, the major driving force behind Abdullah's relationship with the Zionist Movement, and later Israel, was the likelihood of a viable and protected state from the territory given to him by the British (Kashgari 2011:1)

Avi Shlaim (1988) argued that soon after being made Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah began his efforts to come to terms with the desires of the Jewish people. The Emirate of Transjordan was an artificial creation to accommodate the interest of foreign powers and in order to maintain its hold over the emirate Abdullah had to compromise with Britain (Aruri 1972: 3-4). By establishing an emirate for Abdullah Britain secured the territory of Transjordan from the provisions of the Palestine mandate (Arurii, 1972). Article 25 was introduced that gave right to Britain to withhold the application of Balfour Declaration to east of the Jordan (Patai 1958: 35). It was the verdict of the British government to separate the administration of Palestine from the Transjordan which made the Jordan River the effective eastern boundary of Palestine (Biger 1981: 158). Therefore Abdullah made an offer made to Dr Weizmann in London in 1922, to support Zionist demands and implementing the Balfour Declaration if the Zionists would accept him as Emir of Palestine and use their influence with British Government to procure this appointment for him (Shlaim 1988: 45). The solution was a 'Semitic Kingdom' embracing both Palestine and Transjordan, in which Arabs and Jews could live as of rightful equals and with himself as their hereditary monarch (Ibid). But the leadership of *Yishuv*, stood for nothing less than an independent and autonomous Jewish state (Ibid). The offer of limited autonomy under the Arab rule fell short of their expectations and was incompatible with the aim of the Zionist movement. But in the Hashemite, the leadership of *Yishuv* discovered a foreign Arab dynasty which could be used to avoid the resistance of the local residents and to secure their toe hold in Palestine (Ibid). Confidant in their ability to attain full independence and statehood by their own exertions, they were reluctant to place themselves under the benevolent umbrella of the

Hashemites. They wanted good relation with Abdullah, but they had no wish to be his subject. They saw self-reliance as the only path to genuine independence and felt that riding to power on Abdullah esteemed coat-tails, would incur unacceptable obligations (Ibid). David Ben-Gurion defined the ultimate aim of the Zionist movement, that was the topmost aim as the independence of the Jewish community in Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan, not as an outnumbered group but as a society of several millions (Shlaim 1988: 46).

Transjordan was small and insignificant territory. It had no actual city, no natural and essential resources, and no importance to trade except as a desert highway. In short, it had no basis to be a state on its own rather than a part of Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, or of Iraq, except that it preferably fulfilled Britain's objective and interest (Wilson, 1987). Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb described Transjordan as "the state consisted of half of the Jordan valley east of the river, of the range of mountains, and finally of the Syrian desert, to an average distance of some 150 miles east of the Jordan river. The mountains of Transjordan were more than the barrier between the Jordan valley and the desert-they were the meeting place of the East and West" (Glubb 1957: 24).

Abdullah knew about the disadvantages that he had and therefore he looked for investment of capital for the development of his territory. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to interest non-Jewish capitalists, and it was only after the Emir had given up hope of finding any other source rumours about his intentions began to reach Jewish circles (Shlaim 1988: 50). Two members of the Jewish Agency Executive, Emanuel Neumann and Herschel Farbstein secretly went to see the Emir to find out his real intentions (Ibid). The Emir told them that he would welcome Jewish economic initiative because it would help the country to develop and that Jews and Arabs had much in common and should be friends. He believed that this project would promote the welfare of both (Ibid). Therefore, he allowed the Jewish business and entrepreneurs to contribute to the development of his Emirate, he allowed Moshe Novomeysky, a Jewish mining engineer to set up a chemical plant on the Dead Sea, Similarly, in 1927 Pinhas Rutenberg, another engineer from Russia, was granted the concession to set up a hydroelectric power plant in Naharayim, (Shlaim 1988: 46, 47,48).

But the eruption of violence in Palestine in 1929, which sabotaged the British rule and Jewish settlement, further boost Abdullah's interaction with Zionist leaders. These riots in 1929 took



everyone by surprise with a high number of casualties. Abdullah saw in this bloodshed as one more event to make the absolute commitment of his own political ambitions and Zionists wished to find a ground for their cooperation with Abdullah to display to Great Britain. By now Palestinian Arab resistance rose and was uncompromising and rigid (Divine2003: 23). Abdullah had a more realistic and practical appreciation of the strength of the forces behind the Zionist movement than most, if not all, of his Palestine opponent.

He never undervalued nor downgraded the commitment, skill and power which turned on the Jewish nationalism in Palestine (Shlaim 2007: 27). He realized that Zionism cannot be destroyed or ignored, and that the Arabs must one day compromise with it (Ibid) In his dealing with the Zionists, he was not hampered by any racist prejudice, intense dislike of the Jews did not burn in his heart and he stood above the extremist anti-Jewish enmity common among a few members of his race (Shlaim, 2007). After the death of his father Hussein Ibn Ali Hashimi in 1931 and his brother Ali in 1933, which made him head of his house, he realized that the power of Zionism cannot be ignored. If it was accurately channelled, could turn out be not a barrier but a support in accomplishing his desire of a Greater Transjordan. Jewish antipathy he believed could only decrease his chances of being confirmed by the world as the emperor of Palestine. On the other hand Jewish consent, especially if it could be procured at the price of self-government under his rule, might lay concrete on the way to a Greater Transjordan, incorporating part, or possibly all, of the Holy Land (Shlaim, 2007; Shlaim 1988: 41, 42).

Abdullah had ambition for the total control of Palestine and Zionists also had territorial ambitions, the desire to create settlement on both sides of river Jordan. The Palestinian represented different things at each time. For Abdullah Palestinian and their soil symbolized an elementary power and citizenry base that could be used to fuel prospective expansion (Kashgari 2011: 1). Therefore, in the year 1934, Abdullah sent, Muhammad al-Unsi, his trusted emissary, with four point proposal to the Jewish Agency, Palestine and Transjordan should be united under the throne of Abdullah; the Arabs should recognise the mandate, including the guarantee of Jewish rights; each state should have its own Legislative Council and government, but the two prime minister would act under Abdullah's direction; and, an agreement should be reached between Jews and Arabs on Jewish immigration and land purchase which would be outside the jurisdiction of either Legislative Council (Shlaim 1988: 53). Al-Unsi conveyed Abdullah's

proposal to Moshe Shertok (latter Sharett), the chief of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, together with an invitation to talks in Amman. The two delegations of Palestinian Arabs, one representing the Hussein's and the other the Nashashibis, were also invited to discuss Abdullah proposals.

The Hussein's rejected the plan as incompatible with their basic demands for the abrogation of the mandate and the Balfour Declaration and the granting of full independence to the Arab People (Ibid). Because of this Hajj Amin al-Husseini conflict with Abdullah intensified, and Hajj Amin, who had once served in Faisal's government in the Damascus and enjoyed Hussein's (Abdullah's father) patronage as the mufti of Jerusalem, shifted his loyalty to Ibn Saud-the most deadly rival of the Hashemite dynasty (Shlaim 1988: 54). It opened the gates for Zionist-Hashemite link up, Arab Palestinian community was enormously divided between the two conflicting camps namely Hajj Amin al-Husseini and his partners, the Husseinis and their opponents, the Nashashibis. Abdullah and Hussein became mortal enemies. Both had conflicting interest and wanted to be the ruler of Palestine, Hajj Amin had dislike for Abdullah and the Zionists (Susser 2012: 8).

Because of this it sensible think for Abdullah to establish close ties with the Zionist. The connections to the Jewish Agency that were established by Abdullah were, both financial and political. The Emir welcomed the money from the Zionists (Susser 2012: 11). The Zionist and Abdullah had innumerable authentic similar interests. The Jewish financial backing gave Abdullah a much required degree of freedom of action in his excessively depended association with his British friends and with a few additional methods to manipulate East Bank local politics. A good example of this is 1936, during the Arab revolt in Palestine, wealth and money was extensively distributed by the Zionist to the tribal commanders of Transjordan and they also spend money on the relief and appeasement work, as a way of keeping people in distressed and troubled areas quiet (Ibid). It was undisclosed that some of the Abdullah I gifts and largesse came from the Jewish Agency (Susser, 2012).

### **Leading to Israel's Declaration of Independence (DoI)**

Jews undergo an injustice, possibly the greatest injustice of the twentieth century the holocaust (Shlaim 2009: X). Jews lived in Palestine for centuries, but after the demolition of their Second

Temple in 70 AD, they left Palestine and lived in Diaspora for nearly two thousand years. Throughout their life Jews faced persecution, lived in exile. Throughout history wherever they went they became residents but never became citizens for example wherever they went were called by the country they resided they were called Jews from Germany, Jews from France, never attained respect as a citizen. This gave rise to Jewish national aspirations popularly known as Zionism, solidify and harden the desire inside the Jewish Diaspora for Jewish national homeland for the Jewish people (Milton and Hinchcliffe 2001: 22). Theodor Herzl, a European Jewish intellectual, the chief architect of Zionist movement, the founder of political Zionism and the idealistic and dreamer of the Jewish state, published a book in 1896 called *The Jewish State*, in which Herzl wrote:

The Jewish question still exists. It would be foolish to deny it. The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist, it is carried by Jews in the course of their migrations. We naturally move to those places where we are not persecuted, and there our presence produces persecution. This is the case in every country, and will remain so, even in those highly civilized. Until the Jewish question finds a solution on a political basis. I think the Jewish question is no more a social than a religious one, notwithstanding that it sometimes takes these and other forms. It is a national question. In countries where we have lived for centuries we are still cried down as strangers, and often by those whose ancestors were not yet domiciled in the land where Jews had already had experience of suffering. But I think we shall not be left in peace, oppression and persecution cannot exterminate us. No nation on earth has survived such struggles and sufferings as we have gone through. Jews must acquire economic power sufficiently great to overcome the old social prejudice against them. Where Jews now feel comfortable, it will probably be violently disputed by them. My happier co-religionists will not believe me till Jew-baiting teaches them the truth; for the longer Anti-Semitism lies in abeyance the more fiercely will it break out. The infiltration of immigrating Jews, attracted to a land by apparent security, and the ascent in the social scale of native Jews, combine powerfully to bring about a revolution, everything connected with rights of property very fully, the distinctive nationality of Jews neither can, will, nor must be destroyed. It cannot be destroyed, because external enemies consolidate it. It will not be

destroyed; this is shown during two thousand years of appalling suffering it must not be destroyed, and that, as a descendant of numberless Jews who refused to despair, I am trying once more to prove in this pamphlet. Whole branches of Judaism may wither and fall, but the trunk will remain. The movement towards the organization of the State I am proposing would, No human being is wealthy or powerful enough to transplant a nation from one habitation to another. An idea alone can achieve that and this idea of a State may have the requisite power to do so. The Jews have dreamt this kingly dream all through the long nights of their history. "Next year in Jerusalem" is our old phrase. It is now a question of showing that the dream can be converted into a living reality (Herzl 1896:28- 30).

Herzl advocated a solution to Jewish suffering, and argued that Jews would have to leave the life in the Diaspora and achieve a land over which they would exert sovereignty and create a state of their own. According to him Jews were not only a religious community but a true country waiting to come into existence (Shlaim 2000: 2). He further argued that assimilation of the Jews would not at all take place and Jews should construct their own state, willingly in Palestine the historic home of the Jewish people. The connection to Palestine were strong, the recollection of the former homeland and the hope to return there were long encouraged and nurtured by religion alone. 'Next year in Jerusalem' devotee prayed every year. The call of Zionism was the straight result of hundreds of years of European anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jewish people, including the Russian pogroms. Zionism was a doctrine of its time and place, a hard work of western political thought and intellectual tradition unfolding the national vision (Milton and Hinchcliffe 2001: 22).

At the First Zionist Congress convened in Basle, in 1897, the delegates argued that "the goal of Zionism is to make for the Jewish people a home in Palestine protected by public law". The Basel meeting voiced of a home relatively than a state for the Jewish community, but after the Basel Congress onwards the only and true goal of the Zionist movement was to establish a state for the Jewish community in Palestine. In his diary Herzl revealed that at Basel I discovered the Jewish state. If I said this out loud, I would be answered by universal laughter. May be s in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it. After the Basel Congress the rabbis of Vienna pronounced to examine Herzl's vision and sent two volunteers to Palestine. This evidence

finding mission brought in a cable from Palestine in which two rabbis (volunteers) wrote, ‘the bride is pretty, but she is married to somebody else’ (Shlaim 2000: 3). Zionism was an answer to two basic problems that Jews faced in Europe. The Jews were scattered in different countries throughout the world, and in every country they constitute a minority. The Zionist answer for the resolution was to end this bizarre existence and reliance on others, to return to Zion, and to gain majority status there and, finally, political independence and statehood (Shlaim 2000: 2).

From 1897 to till the Balfour Declaration of 1917 the Zionists promoted their perception and lobbied the great power’ USA, Britain, France and Russia for political backing (Milton and Hinchcliffe 2001: 22). The Zionists regarded both banks of river Jordan, including all of Transjordan, as part of the Jewish homeland (Susser 2012: xi). Chaim Weizmann forged an alliance between Great Britain and the Zionists. He secured the Balfour Declaration from the British in 1917 (Shlaim 2000: 6). Great Britain in November 1917 took the rather gratuitous, and even peculiar, step of issuing the Balfour Declaration, which devoted it to facilitating the establishment of "a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine "(Brecher 1985: 179). It also handed over a protective umbrella that empowered the Zionist to proceed slowly towards their final goal of establishing an independent Jewish state in Palestine (Shlaim 2009: 5). The Balfour declaration further provided recognition to what Zionists needed. It was a powerful endorsement of their cause and their claim to ancient home of the Jewish people in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration called for the development of a Jewish "state," as distinct from the more modest "national home’’ (Brecher 1985: 181). The Balfour Declaration, apart from all its uncertainty, ambiguities and restrictions, hand over the Jews a golden key to open the doors of Palestine and to make itself the masters of the country (Shlaim 2000: 7). After the World War I Jews were far from a negligible political presence in Palestine, and were given an inordinate amount of the area originally promised them. The British violated the terms of League of Nation mandate for Palestine by exempting Transjordan from the Jewish homeland provision, which, were suppose to have been applied to all of mandated Palestine, both east and west of the Jordan river (Brecher 1985: 182). British purpose in issuing the declaration was to bring the world Jewry more actively into to allied cause (Ibid: 183).

In the year 1933 a major development took place in Germany and Nazi party came to power and brought Hitler in power, and hatred against Jews was activated and the vicious anti-Semitism in

Poland and Europe, (Milton and Hinchcliffe: 18). The onslaught of anti-Semitism in Europe brought a new surge in Jewish immigration to Palestine, in light of the lack of havens elsewhere. The British were compelled to open the gates a little more widely. But Germany gained strength and momentum with the repudiation of world war one treaties, union with Austria, dismemberment to Czechoslovakia, and alliance with Italy. Britain came under heavy stress to strengthen its position in the Arab and broader Islamic worlds, defence of the Suez Canal, and of Britain's extensive interests in the West Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Its weighed more heavily leading to a waning commitment to a Jewish national home in Palestine (Dowty 2012: 84). Because of this there was a sudden rise in immigration to Palestine (Milton and Hinchcliffe 2001: 18). The rise of Nazi Germany and following the horrendous suffering that was imposed upon the Jews of Europe by Nazi Germany, it was an unavoidable reality that something on a large scale had to be fixed for them and there was nothing titanic enough except Palestine (Shlaim 2009: xi).

The influx of German Jews into Palestine after the rise of Nazi to power exasperated wide concerns between the Arabs (Shlaim, 2009: 19). The Jewish land purchases began to contribute to the evolution of an Arab landed class, the majority Arab population, nearly 90 percent of who lived as peasants and small land holders, were tense because of the mass influx of the Jews that deteriorated their economic condition and placed them into a disadvantageous situation. The *Histadrut*, the Trade Union was using only the non Arab labour, and this formed the basis for the Arab Revolt that erupted in 1936 (Smith 2007: 131,132). The Arab Higher Committee announced a general strike with the goal of stopping Jewish immigration, prohibiting the sale of the land to Jews, and creating an independent national government (Shlaim 2009: 19).

The ordinary strike took shape of a large scale rebellion that lasted three years, revolt of 1936 proved that there cannot be compromise between the two parties (Ibid: 19). This Arab revolt of April, 1936, was much more dangerous than the earlier demonstrations of the Palestinian Arabs in opposition to the British domination and Jewish immigration. This revolt had the ample and most effective support of the Arab community. At first the revolt was assumed the shape of a prolonged Arab strike, with periodic attacks on Jews. But revolt was arranged and structured by the Higher Arab Committee, which was an alliance of Arab states and groups under the leadership of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The committee requested the

discontinuance of Jewish immigration, prevention of land purchases by Jews and the replacement of the Mandatory Government by a responsible and answerable national government (Hirszowicz 1964: 43).

This revolt marked the turning point in Ben-Gurion's attitude towards the Arab problem. He notified the Jewish Agency Executive on 19 May 1936, 'we and they want the same thing: we both want Palestine'. He also admitted in the struggle for Palestine, they were the aggressor and Arabs were defending themselves. He was devoted to the adequate cognizance of the Zionism regardless of the scale and depth of Arab resistance. In a letter to the Jewish Agency executive of 9 June 1936, he asserted that peace with Arabs was the only a means to an end, it was to establish peace in the country for that they needed to have an agreement (Shlaim 2000: 18)

British government appointed the *Peel Commission* to investigate the motives for Arab resistance and to investigate the underlying causes of the unrest (Bard 1999: 117). The Peel Commission came up with its report and published its findings on 7 July 1937, it concluded that Palestine Mandate was not viable, and its terms were impossible to sustain and the Arab community was genuinely confused and upset by the hope of being destroyed by the Jewish majority. Because of this they started rebelling against the Jewish immigration to Palestine, The Commission also recommended partition as the solution to Arab Zionist tensions in Palestine (Smith 2007: 135). The commission suggested a very tiny Jewish state of some 5000 square kilometres, a broad Arab state, and an enclave from Jerusalem to Jaffa under a long-lasting British mandate (Shlaim 2009: 27).

The Peel Commission's partition proposal awarded the Jews less than 20 percent of Palestine, but the majority of people within the Zionist movement were in favour of the acceptance of partition. Because partition recognised the idea of Jewish statehood, and considered the great sense of necessity in respect to the trouble of the Jews in Europe, any autonomous and sovereign shelter was better than none. In 1937 the Jews accepted the partition but Arabs rejected it, so the dispute escalated and brutality and savagery continued (Shlaim 2009: 19).

The responses of the two people to the Peel Commissions partition scheme were in tuning with their fundamental policies: in the Arab case, rejectionist and in the Jewish case, gradualist. The Arab Higher Committee, chaired by Grand Mufti, rapidly and ferociously rejected the Peel

Commissions suggestions, demanding full independence for Palestine and an embargo on any further Jewish immigration and purchases of land by the Jews. It was immensely dangerous planning of all or nothing that left no room for an agreeable solution. The Jewish response was more measured. Weizmann argued that the Jews would be stupid not to accept it and that kingdom of David was smaller (Shlaim 2009: 27).

Though partition was welcomed by the Zionists, the verdict was finally made following the disagreeable internal debate (Milton and Hinchcliffe 2001: 18). For Ben-Gurion the Peel partition proposal signalled the beginning of the end of the British mandate in Palestine and the inception of a Jewish state as a practical political program. The Zionist movement was split up in its reply to the partition scheme, in particular because of the small size of the Jewish state and doubts concerning the activity, growth and viability. The twentieth Zionist Congress held in Zurich for the negotiation with the British government (Shlaim 2000: 19). Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann were vehement and passionate supporters of partition.

At the twentieth Zionist Congress convened in Zurich in August 1937, Ben-Gurion persuaded the majority by building the following main arguments; the fundamentals of partition ought to be accepted, the Peel Commission plan need not be endorsed as it endured, but comparatively should deliver as a fundamental basis for colloquy with the British to enhance and better their plan, a small Jewish state was superior than none and it would grant an essential shelter for the Jews who were in terribly horrific and appalling situation in Germany and Poland and this small state could be the starting point for expansion at some later stage in future (Milton and Hinchcliffe: 18). Abdullah's interaction with Zionists rose and he recommended the Peel Commission report, his plan was non approval of the partition of mandatory Palestine into independent Jewish and Palestinian states instead he wanted to incorporate these two communities into his kingdom (Karsh 2003: 4).

The Arab revolt lasted for three long years, under the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand mufti of Jerusalem, the Palestinian nationals showed their resistance to Zionism, the Mufti consistently refuse to agree and rejected all the concession plans put forward by the British, initiated lawlessness rampage and disturbances against the Jews (Shlaim 2000: 10). During the revolt frustration reached fever pitch as Palestinian community called for major common attack



and the country delegated into a rebellion that lasted for almost three years (Milton and Hinchcliffe: 23). The British positions were attacked during the summer of 1938 and railways and police station were the major targets of the rebels and resulted in disrupting government's capacity to provide service but the revolt was crushed by the imperial authority in the year 1939 by deploying over twenty thousand soldiers (Bunton, 2013). The stress of the World War Two and the adoption of brutal methods in crushing the revolt brought a major change in Britain's attitude towards Palestine (Shlaim, 2009; Bunton, 2013).

But the major blow to the Zionist aspirations came on 17 May 1939, when British issued White Paper, whereby, the British Government averted its support to Zionism and convicted the Jews status of long-lasting minority in a future independent Palestinian state. Because of this the Zionist movement was directed to advance its own military, to combat Arab resistance (Shlaim 2000: 22). The White Paper announced that "His Majesty's Government considers that the makers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was incorporated could not have proposed Palestine should be transformed into a Jewish State against the desires of the Arab Population of the Country" (Liqueur and Rubin 2008: 45). Both Arab and Jews rejected these Paper, the Jewish Agency considered it as violation of a promise that were made to them in and since the Balfour Declaration (Smith 2007: 144).

The White Paper rejected partition, and restricted Jewish immigration, and guaranteed independence to Palestine in ten years. But in reality these measures had temporary effects because it failed in stopping immigration of Jews fleeing the threat of Hitler's Pogroms. (Milton and Hinchcliffe 2001: 24). *Yishuv* learned lesson from these experience and formed its own resistance policy against the White Paper of 1939, which restricted the land purchases by the Jews and immigration of Jews to Palestine. The onslaught of World War Two in September 1939 put the *Yishuv* in a severe dilemma; it was behind Britain in the fight against Nazi Germany but at loggerheads with Britain in the fight for Palestine. The solution which they found against this dilemma was, rightly explained in the slogan given by Ben-Gurion "We will fight with the British against Hitler as if there were no white paper and we will fight the white paper as if there were no war" (Shlaim 2000: 23).

During the Second World War the realities in Palestine were obscured by the forced migration of Jews, and the devotion to Jewish statehood became profound and more eager in the obscurity of

the holocaust, the killing of one-third of the Jewish people, the largest mass murder in history (Dowty 2012: 85). Zionist Congress of August 1945 agreed on a strategy of active resistance to British rule. And the national military organization, the *Irgun*, of *Yishuv* prepare to direct its attacks against the British officials in Palestine as their opposition to the publication of the White Paper in 1939 (Shlaim 2000: 24). During this period had the British not interfere to restore and reinstate law and order, the *Yishuv* would had been defeated easily, but, Palestine was not the strategic asset for British, but a symbol of weakness, The logic of the position of Palestine became inevitable following India's independence, which was declared in 1947. Britain lost its interest in Palestine, India was the epitome of honour in crown of the British Rule and "Palestine was nothing more than a button in kings shirt" (Shlaim 2009: 20).

### **Abdullah and Zionist Contacts**

By 1946, independence was given to almost all the mandated countries apart from Palestine and Abdullah was nevertheless on its own in the unsettling worthwhile state of Transjordan but the pact of 22 March 1946, ended the Emirate and proclaimed Transjordan an independent kingdom (Abidi 1965: 11). This treaty ended the administrative relationship that existed before, between Britain and Transjordan, and kept attached Britain's military and financial support to King Abdullah (Wilson, 1987; Abidi, 1965; Shlaim, 1988). But the post-Second World War Britain was unable to maintain its West Asian interest on the similar level and in the similar fashion as previously (Wilson 1987: 38). Nazis unsuccessful attempt to exploit the Arab discontent with British during the battle finished with downfall of foreign threats for Britain but after the War British were careful of their seriously declining power, influence and wealth, and was ready, not to give up, but to decrease its engagement and commitments in the West Asia (Fitzsimons 1951: 22). Immediately upon Britain showed its desire to withdraw from Palestine Abdullah was aroused (Wilson, 1987; Cohen, 1982). On 18 February 1947, the Government of Britain declared its determination to hand over the question of Palestine to the United Nation (Porter and Stockwell 1987: 56) On 28 April 1947 a Special Session of the General Assembly met, the goal of which was to discuss Britain's appeal. It was agreed during the session to establish a special inquiry committee that would study the situation in Palestine. Suggestions regarding the political destiny of Palestine would then be given to the General Assembly that was due to gather in September (Ben-Dror 2007: 259). This investigation committee popular as the United Nations

Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). It consisted of 11 members and it worked from 26 May until 31 August. The major part of its investigation was conducted in Palestine (around 15 and 20 July) and the portion dealing with its conclusions took place in Geneva, on 1 September (Ibid). The UNSCOP gave its suggestions to the UN. All members of the committee joined together around the consortium that the British mandate should come to an end and that the people of Palestine were made entitled to freedom and independence (Ibid).

During this period Britain's financial and military support to Transjordan continued undisturbed and its troops remained stationed in Transjordan and could be deployed anywhere for the reason of defence (Abidi 1965: 12). But the political relations between two remain subtle and indirect (Ibid). When Abdullah sensed British intentions of withdrawing from Palestine, he was afraid, apprehensive that it indicated the prospective withdrawal of assistance for Transjordan itself (Wilson, 1987). He actualized that without British help, Transjordan could not survive politically, and it would not function financially and would torment its security (Shlaim 1988: 39). Transjordan had no industry, no large cities and King Abdullah was deeply conscious of its vulnerability of its substantial and earthly reliance on Britain (Wilson 1987: 38).

King Abdullah was a shrewd politician, he decided to tackle all these problems from various directions, for which he decided to have secret negotiation with the Zionists (Abidi 1965: 25). He secretly met Golda Meir, the acting head of Jewish Agency, on 17 November 1947, twelve days before the UN met to decide the fate of Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 30). The meeting happened at Naharayim near the River Jordan (Shlaim 2004: 539). In this gathering King Abdullah outlined his plan to pre-empt his enemy Hajj Amin al-Husseini the Grand *Mufti* of Jerusalem from capturing the Arab part of Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 30). He further stated his motive to occupy the Arab parts of Palestine and to attach it his kingdom (Morris 2003: 103). During this meeting Abdullah repeatedly and explicitly declared his interest in a Transjordanian takeover of the Arab parts of Palestine and committed himself to non-aggression against the Jewish areas and to non participation in any aggressively minded Arab coalition (Ibid). The *Yishuv* representatives shied away from explicitly endorsing a Transjordanian military takeover of the Arab parts of Palestine (Ibid). Meir's response in this meeting was that the Zionist leadership will not oppose this plan if it means that there would be no clashes between Jewish and Jordanian forces (Centre for Israeli Education, 2016).

Golda Meir herself written in her autobiography that

I met with King Abdullah of Transjordan, the first time I met Abdullah was early in November 1947. He had agreed to meet me, in my capacity as premier of the Political Department of Jewish Agency-in a house at Naharayim (on the Jordan), where the Palestine Electric Corporation ran a hydroelectric power station. I came to Naharayim with one of our Arab experts, Eliahu Sasson. We drank the usual ceremonial cups of coffee and then we began to talk. Abdullah was a small, very poised man with great charm. He quickly clarified his stand on the issue that he would not take part in any Arab attack on us. He would forever remain our friend, he said, and, like us, he desired peace other than anything else. After all, we had a same enemy, Hajj Amin al-Husseini the Mufti of Jerusalem. Not only that, but he suggested that we meet again, after the United Nations vote (Meir 1975: 175-6).

Before the UN could decide on the future of Palestine, Political leaders of *Yishuv* and King Abdullah of Transjordan met secretly and decided on what would be their response after a decision by the UN. The direct result of this meeting between King Abdullah and Gold Meir was that Yishuv leaders got assurance that Arab Legion would not attack on Jews and the land they would get under the UN plan. This assurance by Abdullah brought down the possibility of any hostile attack on Zionists forces, and also brought down the Zionist fear of Arab attack on Jews in Palestine after the UN decision. On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended the UNSCOP's majority committee's suggestion and voted for the Partition of Palestine into an Jewish and a Arab state by a vote of 13 against, 33 in favour with 10 abstentions (Cohen 1987: 295). The Arab leadership and people in Palestine became wholly unready to contend with the military and political threats that were posed by this decision (Nevo 1987: 3).

The result of this was the clashes between Arabs and Jews broke out in Tel-Aviv and Jaffa on 1 December 1947, and Jews opened 12 recruiting centres and posted mobilization notices. And on 2 December 1947; eight Jews and six Arabs were killed, and 32 Jews and 6 Arabs were wounded in the day's clashes. Sporadic fighting continued on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv boundary (The Middle East Journal 1948: 215). Attacks by Arabs on Jewish shops were reported in Jerusalem on the first day of a three- day Arab strike, minor skirmishes were reported at Ramleh and Safad (Ibid).

After the publication of the UNSCOP report, Britain delivered a verdict announcing its accord with the report's suggestions and that if the General Assembly recommends a strategy which would not be agreeable to the two Jews and Arabs, British Government would not perceive having the power to put into action the recommendations by it (Hammond, 2010). Britain followed with a statement declaring that His Majesty's Government would not be able to play an important part in the implementation of a plan that is not accepted by both Arabs and Jews, but affixing "that British government would, however, not desire to block the implementation and execution of a recommendation endorsed by the General Assembly (Ibid). On 8 December 1947, Britain recommended to the UN that it terminate its Palestine mandate on 15 May 1948 and that independent and autonomous Jewish and Arab countries come into formal existence two weeks later (The Middle East Journal 1948: 215). The policy adopted by UN aroused resistance among the Arabs and it became very difficult for Britain to maintain law and order situation and 338 British subjects were killed therefore withdrawal by 1 August 1948 became the major task for the British forces in Palestine (Loose, 2015).

Britain's departure from Palestine did lastly make the enlargement of Transjordan possible and created the vacuum where King Abdullah could play a role (Wilson 1987: 38). Abdullah I believed that since Britain was withdrawing from Palestine, the implementation of UN partition plan would not be easy; therefore he decided to have secret negotiations with the Zionists (Abidi 1965: 26). He could not open his mind to the Arab Governments, and he knew that Britain also could not openly support him and hence, the only course was left to him was, to get into direct contacts with the Jews (Ibid). Abdullah I was a skilful Arab Leader, he won his way by diplomacy by patience, by subtle balancing of forces of interest of foreign power with nationalist demands of his people (Wright 1951: 439). He knew when and where to act, Zionist were also aware of his intention, Ben-Gurion was notified that Abdullah wants to meet Zionist. Ben-Gurion "suggested that we arrange such a meeting quickly but that it be secret and unofficial, we sent Golda Meir from Jerusalem to Haifa to enable her to meet with the 'friend' our code name for Abdullah" (Ben-Gurion 1971: 89).

On 8 May 1948, grounds were prepared for a talk between Golda Meir and King Abdullah I. Unluckily, that same day David Ben-Gurion was to scrawl in his diary a new Zionist ruling: "We have agreed in the interim that there should either be an alliance on the basis of the United

Nations ruling or a collective rewriting of the border” (Jasse 1986: 516). On 11 May 1948, Golda Meir, disguised as an Arab woman, made the dangerous journey to Amman in a last-ditch effort to salvage the agreement she had reached with the King at their meeting six months earlier. The Zionist aim towards sending Golda Meir to Amman and the entire diplomatic efforts of the Jewish Agency were directed towards not to have a truce accompanying the Palestinians but at discouraging King Abdullah from participating in the Arab League proposal for attacking and encroaching Palestine upon expiration of the British mandate (Shlaim 2000: 32).

King Abdullah clandestinely and in hidden manner meet up with Golda Meir his at home. The Zionist at present had already programmed in advance to establish a Jewish state not beyond the territories pointed out by the Majority plan, irrespective of the judgement to be taken by the General Assembly hence this gathering with their most powerful, deadly and treacherous enemy was welcome. In the existence of both Glubb the British Commander of the Arab Legion and Kirkbride,, Abdullah propagated to the Zionist heads his intention to acquire and absorb Arab Palestine, nevertheless, he pledged not to attack the Jewish territories, which he was ready to recognize as state (Jasse 1986: 506) Golda Meir wrote in her autobiography that:

By the first week of May, there was no doubt that, for all of his assurances, Abdullah had, in fact, thrown his lot in with the Arab League. We debated the pros and cons of the requesting another meeting before it was too late. Perhaps he could be persuaded to change his mind at the last minute. If not, perhaps we could at least find out from him just how deeply he had committed himself and his British-trained and officered Arab Legion to the war against us. A great deal hung in the balance: not only the Legion by far the best Arab army in the area, but there was vital consideration that if by some miracle, Transjordan stayed out of the war, it would be much harder for the Iraqi army to cross over into Palestine and join in the attack on us. Ben-Gurion was of the opinion that we could lose nothing by trying again, so I requested a second meeting, and asked Ezra Danin to accompany me (Meir 1975: 176, 177).

Golda Meir described the meeting as:

I was too much concerned with the outcome of our mission to think about what would happen if, God forbid, were caught. Luckily, though we had to identify

ourselves several times, we got to our appointed meeting place on time and undetected. The man who was to take us to Abdullah was one of his most trusted associates, a Bedouin whom the king had adopted and raised since childhood and who was used to running perilous errands for his master. While we waited for Abdullah to appear, I talked to our guide's attractive and intelligent wife. Then Abdullah came into the room. He looked very unimpressive and appeared to be under great tension. Ezra translated for us and we talked for almost an hour. I initiated the talk by directly coming to the subject at once. 'Have you broken your commitment to me, after all?' I asked him. He didn't answer my question directly. Instead he said: when I made that commitment, I thought I was in control of my own future and could do what I believed right. But after then I have learned otherwise.' Then he went on to declare that before he had been alone, but now, 'I am of five,' the other four, we united, being Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Still, he thought war could be averted. 'Why are you in such a hurry to announce your state?' he asked me, 'what is the rush? You are so impatient! I told him that I did not think that a people who had remained quite 2,000 years should be portrayed as being 'in a hurry'. And he seemed to accept that. 'Don't you understand,' I said, 'that we are your only allies in this region? The others are all your enemies.' 'Yes,' he said, 'I know that. But what can I do? It is not up to me.' So then I said to him: 'you must know that if war is forced upon us, we will fight and we will win. He sighed and again said 'Yes. I know that. It is your duty to fight. But why don't you delay for some years? Let go your request for free and unrestrained immigration. I will occupy the entire country and you will be constituted and represented in my parliament. I will serve you very excellently and there will be no battle. I tried to explain to him that this plan was impossible. 'You know all that we have done and how hard we have worked,' I said, 'do you think we did all that just to be represented in a foreign parliament? You know what we want and to what we aspire. If you can offer us nothing more than you have just done, then there will be a war and we will win it. But perhaps we can meet again- after the war and after there is a Jewish state. 'You place much too much reliance on your tanks,' Danin said. 'You have no real friend in the Arab world, and we will smash your tanks as the Maginot Line was smashed.' They were very brave

words, particularly since Danin knew exactly what the state of our armour was. But Abdullah looked even graver and said again that he knew that we had to do our duty. He also added, unhappily I thought, that events would just have to run their course. All of us would know eventually what fate had in store for us. There was no doubt left in my mind that Abdullah would wage war against us. I knew that the Legion's tanks were no joke, and my hearts sank at the thought of the news I would have to bring back to Tel Aviv. From the windows of the car, we had seen the Iraqi forces massing at Camp Mafrak and had talked in whispers of what would happen on 14 May (Meir 1975: 178, 179, 180).

Abdullah's assurance was worthless, absurd and planned to safeguard himself against the Hagana's intrusion in his step-by-step plan to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine to his Kingdom (Levenberg 1991: 29). Abdullah had no force at his disposal at the moment because the Arab Legion was stationed in Palestine under the British rule securing essential installations and British life lines namely the supplies (Ibid). The British ruling prohibited and stopped the use of its units for whichever motive till the termination of the Mandate. The *Hagana*, in this front line, abstained from offensive action solely because it was outside scope of its power at this point of the battle (Ibid). On 11 May 1948 Golda Meir gave a briefing of her meeting with King Abdullah to David Ben-Gurion and said "I had a peaceful meeting (with Abdullah). He is very distressed, anxious, troubled and looks awful and horrific. He did not refuse that we had agreed on a jointly satisfying planning " (Ben-Gurion 1971: 91).

### **The Greater Syria Plan**

King Abdullah lastly notice the big chance offered by the departure of the British from Palestine and the eruption of Arab-Jewish fighting (Talhami 1993: 47). He worked industriously to propagate the idea of Greater Syria, always harking back to Faisal's lost kingdom which should revert to himself just as Faisal's lineal heirs succeeded to the throne of Iraq. He lost the Kingdom due to British and French politics, and he worked industriously to propagate that idea. But without a great deal of success, French made a rule in which it was conspiracy to talk about Greater Syria in their mandated territories. Abdullah did not receive support from the Syrian people; who condemn Abdullah as a puppet of the British (G.E.K 1948: 18).



The notion of great empire was cherished by his father, Hussein, but he failed in making it a reality so it became the duty of his son to realise this dream. Since he was the oldest member of the Hashemite family and the only surviving leader of the Arab Revolt and he considered that it was his duty to unite the Arabs under his rule (Shlaim 1988: 33).

British decision to surrender mandate paved the way for the partition (Jasse 1986: 506). This provided Abdullah an opportunity to make his dream a reality, hence he tacitly Abdullah supported partition, as it was a sensible thing for him in order to make his greater Syria plan a reality. Palestine was among the one of the four parts into which 'natural' Syria was divided. For Abdullah it had importance out of all proportion to its small size. Transjordan needed capital, the markets, the trained manpower, and an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea which only Palestine could provide (Shlaim 1988: 36). And UNGA passed a historic resolution 181, on 29 November 1947 which was in favour of division of Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 25). More than two third of the membership of United Nations voted in support of General Assembly Resolution 181. Whereby 56 percent of the territory of the mandate was given to the Jewish state and 43 percent was to Arab stat and Jerusalem was supposed to become international administration (Matthias 2014: 39). Britain denied to take any responsibility in executing the UN partition plan. It fixed an inflexible date for the termination of the mandate 14 May 1948 (Shlaim 2009: 21). However before the British withdrawal only a provincial state comes 14 May, a provisional State Council of Jewish premiers announced the independence and sovereignty of the Jewish state, to be called Israel (Dowty 2012: 93). They regarded that it is the fundamental right of the Jews to form an autonomous state for itself on their hereditary and familial shore in Palestine, and to live there in harmony, friendship, goodwill and peace with their surroundings (Shlaim 2009: 27).

This was an opportunity for Abdullah to make his Greater Syria a reality, and he worked hard to propagate the idea, and hacked back that Faisal's lost kingdom should revert to himself just as Faisal's lineal heirs succeeded to the throne of Iraq (Shlaim 1988: 34). The withdrawal from Palestine by Britain offered opportunity to him for annexing West Bank including the third holiest site in Islam the Haram al-Sharif (Simon 1974: 317). The incentives for war had impressive territorial gains for him, Abdullah knew he could not get to his ultimate destination within day, but the road to Damascus might go through Baghdad or Jerusalem (Hinchcliffé 2001: 11). To make his Greater Syria dream a reality King Abdullah, accepted the Jewish statehood in

other parts of Palestine and was accepting Arab Palestine as part of Transjordan. This was an unforgivable concession as this decision of Abdullah was completely at variance with the Arab consensus who, regarded it as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. King Abdullah had no desire of establishing a Palestinian Arab-run state, because he wished to occupy a substantial portion of the land of the British Mandate as he could. He was playing a double-game, while trying to be as close as possible with the Jewish authorities and forging contacts with them and was doing the same with the Arab League. He had super secret meetings with the Jewish Agency (Golda Meir) in all these gatherings they jointly assent with one another on the partition proposal of the United Nations in November 1947. One area of Palestine became the State of Israel and the other was captured by Transjordan (Katz, 1973).

### **Arab-Israeli War of 1948**

The situation in Palestine rapidly deteriorated after the UN vote on 29 November that favoured of partition. Because of this Arab guerrilla attacks began to be launched against Jewish targets, Ben-Gurion was convinced that these attacks were merely a prelude to a full scale military confrontation with the traditional infantry of the surrounding Arab states (Shlaim 2000: 28). The UNGA resolution 181 earned appreciation of, King Abdullah, as the single Arab state to welcome the division *de facto* plan, and his readiness to play by the western rules distinguished him from other Arab states (Talhmi 1993: 47).

After the vote in UN, situation in Palestine rapidly deteriorated in favour of partition. The Arab higher committee denounced the UN partition resolution as absurd, impracticable and unjust and endangered to block its enforcement by power (Glaus, 2007; Shlaim, 2000; Shlaim, 2009). It focused on full Arab control over the all of Palestine and declined to welcome a Jewish state of whichever size or shape. Because of this Arabs started launching guerrilla attacks against the Jews. (Shlaim 2009: 28) After the adoption of partition resolution, the withdrawal of British troops began and on May 14, 1948 the British Mandatory government of Palestine was formally abolished. At the similar day, the Jewish National Council, met in Tel Aviv, declared the foundation of the Independent State of Israel. The next day that is 15 May, the regular armies of the neighbouring countries namely Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt, and a token force from Saudi Arabia began penetrates through the borders of the Mandatory area and clashed with the Israeli forces which was already holding considerable parts of the country (Shlaim, 2000;

Dowty, 2012; Smith, 2013, Solingen, 2007; Harms and Ferry, 2012; Patai, 1958, Ashton, 2008, Maoz, 2002).

The battle among Jews and Arabs in Palestine started after acceptance of the partition plan (Dowty 2012: 92). The plan for a coordinated Arab attack was already made in April by the Arab league, but, there was no coordination among the military movements of the Arab armies because the participants were suspicious of one another's territorial ambitions (Smith 2013: 199). Abdullah was interested in Palestine and disinterested in Arab unity (Zamir 2015: 100). Everybody correctly and appropriately doubted King Abdullah's ambitions of having command over the areas given to the Palestinian Arabs in the partition plan, thereby enlarging his country and defeating the mufti (Smith, 2003). The Israeli were well aware of Abdullah's aspirations. The Zionist representatives had been in contact with him in 1947 and again in May 1948, when he assured them of his tacit acceptance of partition. Abdullah felt constrained to attack Israeli forces after independence when they took over areas within the Arab partition zone, but his Arab Legion, the best of the Arab forces, did not undertake sustained offensive, preferring to establish defensive perimeter around the Transjordan. The Israeli-Transjordanian aims generally were coincided with the exception of Jerusalem, where Transjordan after fierce fighting, was able to retain control of the East Jerusalem (Smith 2013: 199).

Fighting began when troops were still in nominal control it was largely guerrilla warfare between irregular Palestinian Arab forces and the military organizations of the Jewish Yishuv namely the mainstream Haganah and the more radical Irgun and Lehi movements of the revisionists. In the first few weeks of the fighting, the Arab attacks on convoys and settlements within territory given to the Jewish state (Dowty 2012: 92). At the time of the second cease fire in July 1948, Jewish army remained in charge and coped to maintain its hold on most of the area given to the Jewish state, and even to invade some Arab area, for example Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle (Morris, 2000; Glause, 2007. A large number of the Arab refugees had already fled the area of fighting, creating the beginning of the refugee issue Dowty 2012: 92)). Earlier in May itself, Israeli forces stopped the Egyptian forces at the coast which was twenty miles short of Tel-Aviv, reserved a corridor to Jerusalem which allowed access to it without being affected by annexation of the West Bank by the Arab Legion of Transjordan, and held Syrian to minimal gains in the north. This was followed by a month-long truce imposed by the UN, followed in turn by "The Ten

Days" of fighting 8 July to 18 July, during which Israeli forces took offensive and captured strategic areas beyond the partition lines. A second, unlimited truce as imposed on 18 July, it was punctuated by isolated outbreaks of hostilities on the Egyptian front in mid-October and late December, and with Palestinian forces, in Galilee in late October. These campaigns left all of *Galilee*, and most of the Negev region, in Israeli hands (Dowty 2012: 93).

The first phase, began from the mid-May to June 11, adage the Israeli finish the Arab invasion once Arab army infiltrated Israeli parts. The UN peacekeeping efforts then procured an agreement between enemies, which both side were glad to accept. In reality sanctions were put in place on the exportation of weapons and ammunitions, Britain, the United States of America and France were solely behind the imposition of sanctions on the blockade on the supply of arms to the Arabs. The Israeli's bought and brought most of their weapons from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet bloc country. The cease-fire ended on 6 July, the Israelis were in a better position militarily in comparison to the Arab, whether the unitary command structure or in terms of weaponry the Jews had upper hand. The situation of the Arabs in the battle was such that it blamed each other like Iraq's contingent who were just a show piece had no actual strength or power, on the hand Hashemite king blamed Egypt's ruler King Faruq for disrespecting and degrading him because the flag of Egypt was larger than the Iraqis who were in command of Abdullah. (Smith 2013: 199). The truce was eroded because Egypt and Syria were not eager to extend it, plagued, by internal troubles generated by the exaggerated stories and expectation of winning, made them chose battle. The second round of hostility persisted from 8 July to 10 July and led to a defeat of Arab forces on all fronts (Karsh, 2014; Smith, 2013). Israel gained control over most of western Galilee during this phase; this territory came into the zones of Arabs under the partition plan. This truce was imposed by UN and the Israeli incredibly extended their command and control over their areas The only area which was left did not came under the control of Israeli's subsequently was the Negev, it was allotted to the Israel by the partition scheme but in the aftermath of the war it was partially annexed by Egyptian army. In October Israel invaded the Negev and joined it into Israel at the end of 1948, they were driven to the eastern coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, expelled small regiment of Jordanian army and gained a channel to the Red Sea (Ibid: 199, 201).

This war claimed the lives of 6000 soldiers and civilians, or 1 percent of the entire Jewish population of around 650,000 (Gendzier 2015: 169). The war was composed of three circles of hostility punctuated by two UN-imposed truces. The first around lasted from 15 May until 11 June, the second during 8-18 July and the third from 15 October until 7 January 1949. The Arab forces raided Palestine after termination of the British mandate with only one goal in mind: to suppress the emergence of a Jewish state as soon as it comes into the existence. Jewish state battled a dangerous, heroic, daring and conclusively outstanding war for their survival and endurance against the powerful contingents (Shlaim 2000: 34). In mid-May 1948 the total strength of Arab army, both irregular and regular, movements in Palestinian drama was under 25,000, nevertheless the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) sent over 35,000 troops. By mid-July the IDF gathered 65,000 men under weaponry, and by December its strength reached a zenith of 96,441. The Arab countries also reinforced and increased their forces, but they could not compete with this sudden enlargement (Shlaim 2000: 35). The military specialists of the Arab League had brought out an allied strategy for the incursion, but King Abdullah who had supreme control over all the Arab armies in Palestine, demolished this plan by making forging sudden developments. His motive in dispatching his forces into Palestine was not to block the creation of a Jewish state but to make and embrace himself the monarch of Arab part of Palestine (Ibid).

Arabs called this war *al-Nakba* (catastrophe), the greater injustice which have been done to them (Shlaim 2009: 28). The Arab-Israeli War was long and bitter one between the forces of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq with some assistance from other official members of the Arab League and newly formed state of Israel (Reich 1991: 1467). Because of the stress of the war and pressure to safeguard Jerusalem (the third holiest site in Islam) from the clutches of Israel, Abdullah's pre-battle appreciation and understandings with leaders and representatives of the Jewish Agency (including Golda Meir, whom he met on several occasions like in November 1947 and May 1948) shied away and broke down (Ashton 2008: 17). Transjordan's Arab Legion, annexed the major areas including central parts that came to be known as West Bank. Syria universally pulled out from its holdings in Palestine in return for disarmament of that parts Lebanon on the other hand participated symbolically in this war (Dowty 2012: 95).

Abdullah's role in 1948 war for Palestine is hotly contested (Gatrel, 2013). Because of the previous understanding on the likelihood of partition, Abdullah was ready to counter the

establishment of a Jewish State by occupying the Arab parts of Palestine; despite the fact his real and actual preference was a confederation of the Jews and Arabs under his command. But, as chief of the most powerful force in the Arab world involved in the dispute and had control over all commanders of Arab armies, further more he also had to assist the wider Arab opposition to the establishment of any Jewish State or quarter. Abdullah had practical acclamation of the power and strength of the Jewish army and leadership, and an equivalent recognition of the fragility, division, disgruntlement and weakness visible t in the Arab grouping (Ashton 2008: 17).

Avi Shlaim (2000) argued that, there was no strong feeling of affection nor of lost between Abdullah and the several other Arab rulers, who disliked his enlarging intentions and suspected him of being someone who had partnership with the enemy. All the other Arab states ware also gathered and progressed and changed position for their dynastic or national interests that were largely hidden behind the larger cover of securing and protecting Palestine for the Palestinian. The failure of the Arabs to have coordination in their military, political and diplomatic schemes was in no way to be held accountable for the catastrophe that overloaded them. But the leadership of Israel was fully aware of these divisions and exploited them whenever they feel it necessary after the official eruption of warfare, they kept on exploited them as they did previously (Shlaim 2000: 36). The Israeli leader knew about the relations among Arab countries, on 6 October, Ben-Gurion presented to the cabinet his proposal for renewing the war against Egypt, without even mentioning Egypt peace feeler. He stated that relations between Transjordan and Egypt were so strained that the Arab Legion was unlikely to intervene if Israel renewed fighting against Egypt. On 15 October, Israeli's violated the cease-fire and began to strike one Egyptian army in the south. Throughout the battle between Israel and Egypt, the Arab Legion remained neutral (Shlaim 2000: 39). In the end Transjordan alone managed to save something from the dismal wreckage of Arab Palestine. Transjordan held on to the West Bank, and in 1950 incorporated it into what became the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. The Palestinians were left out in the cold (Shlaim 2009: 29).

As being one of among the several other armies which united to repel the proclamation by the Jews by initiating a strike in which Transjordan developed as having the physical control over eastern part of Palestine including the East Jerusalem (Talhmi 1993: 47). Abdullah explained

Transjordan's occupation of the West Bank as the opening move in uniting Greater Syria. It was without a doubt good for him to forecast his role in affairs of Palestine was actually a part of his propaganda in order to gather support for greater Syria. Arab unity was then a permit for his entry in the partition of Palestine, and he was very serious in giving special value on Greater Syria, all over his life the question Palestine played a secondary role in desire for Damascus, and there is no evidence that he gave up his lifelong phobia. Since Palestine was means to an end for Abdullah, there no doubt that he died a disappointed man (Wilson 1987: 40). King Abdullah continuously attempted to establish a relationship with Israel, which led to his assassination by a Palestinian nationalist on 20 July 1951; and Egypt's King Faruq was deposed in a bloodless coup in 1952 (Harms and Ferry 2012: 103).

### **King Abdullah I approach towards APG**

The All Palestine Government (APG) was anti-Hashemite effort, initiated by the enemies of King Abdullah that was intended to stop him from gaining control over Palestine. King Abdullah of Transjordan, the Mufti of Jerusalem and King Faruq of Egypt were the sole representative of the Palestinian cause but unity among them was weak and there was the belief among the Arab states that Britain was manipulating international diplomacy for the benefit of Abdullah (Khan 2016: 125). They believed if Abdullah would be involved militarily, it would rob them of the fruits of the victory. Therefore, each country involved in the war looked after its own interest (Shlaim 1988: 260). In public sphere all members of the Arab League revealed and showed solidarity and sympathy with the Palestine cause but in private, Arab leaders continue to advance and support an assortment of political solution to the dispute. Transjordan was in favour of military invasion in Palestine with a view that the Arab Legion's role in freeing the areas of the country from the Zionists clutches would pave for the occupation. Mufti refused Transjordanian project due of the horror of Abdullah's plans, and asked for the honest, moral, ethical, material and political backing for his campaign. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were antagonistic of the authorized military interference because it would raise Abdullah influence in the region and destroy their connection and relationships with the West (Mayer 1986: 343).

Palestinians were weak, divided, vulnerable and devoid of countrywide political leadership, this was reflected in their dependence on Arab states and Arab League (Ghanem, 2001; Shlaim, 1990). The league was internally and there was no consensus on what policy should be taken for

securing the future of Palestine. Most members including Husseini agreed to an unbending strategy in the struggle to counter Zionism (Shlaim 1990: 37, 38). There were two powerful families in Palestine, the Nashashibis and Husseinis, Nashashibis urged unification with Transjordan and were willing to accept Abdullah as the King of Palestine but Husseinis family, which was headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini the president of Supreme Muslim council and also the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, pitted against the Nashashibis and Abdullah (Thomas and Amelia, 2010; Shlaim, 1988). The Mufti and also the Field Commander of the Arab Liberation forces represented the radical nationalist trend in Palestine politics, organized nationwide boycott of Jews, pushed for the end of Jewish immigration and Land purchases, advocated for the establishment of Palestine government and was committed to the independence of Palestine (Matter, 2005; Shlaim, 1988; Parson, 2015). Therefore he rejected any compromise with British and Zionists (Jacobs 1998: 492). The Mufti himself like the King of Transjordan was an empire builder, casting himself in the role of an Arab liberator, who would banish the foreign powers from Palestine and use it as the base of a great Pan-Islamic empire (Shlaim 1988: 40). Inside the Arab League (AL) there was no general agreement nor a consensus on what needs to be done for the Palestinian and who should be appointed as the leader for commanding the forces in Palestine. On the one side it was Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who pursued a hostile program path for an autonomous, independent and sovereign Palestinian state consisting of all the territories of Palestine including the territories given to Jews. On the other side it was king Abdullah of Transjordan, whose unspoken goal was the division of Palestine between the Zionists and him whereby he was to annex the Arab areas to his kingdom (Shlaim 2009: 38).

After declaration of independence by the Israel, Abdullah was under constant stress of the war and pressure to safeguard Jerusalem; he was prepared for the countenance establishment of a Jewish State in part of Palestine, for this had to entertain the extensive Arab resentment to the establishment of Jewish State. He recognised the weakness and division that persisted in the Arab camp (Ashton 2008: 17). King Abdullah's forces were in physical control of the central as well East Jerusalem, the Hebron hills and Lydda and Ramle in the coastal plain part of Palestine. When the Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator, recommended the Arab areas of Palestine should be added with Transjordan, King Abdullah's enemies inside the Arab League proceeded to act. Within the Arab camp intense negotiations were taking place concerning what position to be adopted on the All Palestine Government (APG) (Shlaim 2009: 45).



The (APG) was established in Egyptian controlled Gaza on September 1948 (Matter 2005: 29). The Arab people were critical of the APG because it failed in protecting the Arab people, failed to garner support from other Arab countries and it also failed in safeguarding the sovereignty over the whole of Palestine (Filio 2014, Shlaim, 1988). It also failed in taking over Arab areas. The weakness and geographical isolation of the APG, was taken very serious by Abdullah, he took these challenges very seriously. When APG was proclaimed he refused to recognize it and announced that it should not be permitted to work in all the parts annexed by the Arab Legion. He also took steps to formalise his authority over these areas and systemized, arranged the army his own supporters in Palestine to oppose the government in Gaza, (Shlaim 1988: 297, 299).

British were committed to the King Abdullah's plan for Greater Syria because this held out the hopes of safeguarding their strategic interest after the termination of mandate (Knopf, 1999; Shlaim, 2009). In the British eyes Palestinian state meant Mufti's state, and would be mean hostility towards Jews, therefore, British applied hefty pressure on Arab states to halt the declaration of APG (Shlaim 2009: 41). On 22 September a communiqué about the formation of the APG was issued in the name of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), whereas Arab League turned the Palestinian civil and refined administration into a Palestinian government. The AHC undoubtedly declared that the residents of Palestine, by righteousness of their logical right to self determination and in agreement with the verdict of the AL, with strong-will of its own declares Palestine, as an independent and autonomous state within the auspices of a government known as the APG which is completely established on the basis of democratic principle, at the same time Egyptian soldiers were sent to Bethlehem to dispense small weapons to anti-Hashemite groups ( Shlaim 2009: 42).

In first week of in life the APG revived the wars, mobilised with their already announced desire of emancipation and liberation of Palestine, due to the ambiguous position of the Arab League, Abdullah declared that APG had been established against the wish of the Palestinian population. This new administration refuted Abdullah claims, because of this Abdullah launched his campaign against APG. He refused to recognise this new government in Palestine and wrote resentful telegram of disagreement and dissent to Ahmad Hilmi and Mahmud Nuqrashi, the Egyptian prime minister (Shlaim, 1990) Abdullah made his intention very clear that he had no desire of permitting a pro-Palestinian administration to take command of the Arab areas of

Palestine when it had no forces to secure it from Jewish forces and he further took practical actions to formalise Transjordan's control on the area it adhered to the West side of the Jordan river and tried to organise his personal resistance against the APG (Shlaim 1990: 43, 44). Abdullah used bribery to get some supporters of the Mufti government, to transfer their loyalty to him, on the other hand APG was largely unsuccessful in getting international recognition to their cause (Shlaim 2009: 45, 46).

After the war Palestinians disappeared as an independent actor; an APG was proclaimed in Gaza strip by the followers of the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the all Palestine government (AHC) established in Gaza in September 1948 was short lived and ill starred (Shlaim, 1990; Shlaim, 2009). The Egyptian kept it on a short leash. No recognized organization or spokesman represented all Palestinians, except for Transjordan; Arab governments had little or no reason to make peace with Israel (Dowty 2012: 96). After the strong opposition from Arab League to Abdullah's occupation of the West Bank area that was held by his army, the APG was doomed to be a failure. In September 1948 the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee tried to establish an Arab "Government of All-Palestine" with its seat at Gaza, under Egyptian occupation. Although most of the Arab states recognized this body, which elected the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, as the President of its Assembly, King Abdullah of course refused to recognize a political formation dominated by his old enemy, the Mufti. In December 1948 Abdullah was acclaimed His Majesty King of united Transjordan and Palestine and named as the kingdom of Jordan (Patai 1958: 48, 49). Abdullah did not try to move his capital from Amman to the Old City of Jerusalem. His weekly visits to Haram al-Sharif, his tour of Palestine, did little to placate Arab criticisms, but did serve one purpose, it helped to hinder the internationalization of Jerusalem, which his Arab neighbours were all too willing to support (Wright 1951: 456).

## **Conclusion**

The contacts of the Hashemite and Israel grew in the subsequent years and became very visible in the reign of King Abdullah I Bin al-Husseini, for whom the Zionist were of great help, for realising his dream of Greater Syria Plan. He found the political leadership of *Yishuv* very useful for making his dream a reality after the loss of Mecca and leadership of Arab world to Al-Saud. The contacts of Transjordan with the *Yishuv* were visible in the meetings that take place between the representative of the political and civil leadership of the *Yishuv* and Abdullah that gave

assurance to Zionist that in case of war, Abdullah would not attack the Jews and would not occupy whatever territory they will held as per the UN plan. The result of these meeting was, it (Zionists) brought down the level of hostility in the course of war.

The relations with Transjordan were of great help to them, this relation divided the Arab countries over the Palestine issue, because they all suspected Abdullah . He also did not undermine the force of Zionism, from the beginning and he I advocated that Palestine was the territory over which British promise the Arab Kingdom. In order to make his dream a reality, he contacted the *Yishuv* leadership and gave assurance that Arab Legion would not attack and kill Jews in case of war but when the Zionist paramilitary groups *Irgun* and *Lehi* attacked the Palestinian Arab village *Deir Yassin* on 9 April 1948 and massacred the Arab inhabitants of the village, Abdullah had to change its position and followed the Arab public opinion over the issue and joined hands with leaders of Arab counties and followed their orders in respect of what should be done for Palestinian issue. The Deir Yassin massacred by the Zionist forced Abdullah to join the war against the newly formed state of Israel (Thomas 1999: 95; Tucker 2008: 1149).

This incident and withdrawal of British made Abdullah helpless, and he had no friends in the Arab League. Most of the member's countries did want Abdullah Arab Legion to take part in the war, as they all believed that if Legion would be allowed to invade Palestine it would seize the country and increase his influence in the region. But the Arab Legion did took part in the war in order to safeguard East Jerusalem the third holiest site in Islam through which Abdullah tried to realise his plan of Greater Syria by annexing the Holy city. Throughout his life he did not gave up the idea of Arab Kingdom. Abdullah's strength increased over the years in a diplomatic, military, and prestige sense. The legion proved its military value and gave a new security to the eastern deserts. The dynastic links with Iraq were close. Merger of Palestine did not affect Abdullah and his state, His pleas for the unity of the Arab peoples reflected Hashemite ambitions, his statecraft reflected realism. On 20 July 1951, the King of Jordan, was murdered during his weekly visit to the Haram al- Sharif by Mustafa Shukri Ashu, a twenty one year old tailor in Jerusalem a supporter of the ex-Mufti. Abdullah effort to unite with the Zionist and bring about the constitutional government for the enlargement kingdom brought his own death.

The *Yishuv*-Transjordan contacts were not only inspired by the hope for increase in regional influence and beginning as British mandates became financially connected. The hostility of

countries surrounded them gave push to their economic cooperation, as both became economically reasonable choice for each other. The *Yishuv* administration and Abdullah had many of political aim regarding the viability of their own states that coexist. Both countries were seen as bogus and fake invention in the region and by backing each other they believed they would guarantee their own endurance and survival. Subsequently Palestinian nationalism grew and a major danger for two the *Yishuv* and Transjordan namely. Apart from the economic and political dependence between Transjordan and the Zionist movement, the military aspect was became major and brought them close to each other. The forces of the both recognised each other's potential as being the dominant fighting force that promoted good relations in order to avoid the possibility of direct confrontation with one another and thus protecting the alliance that was capable of providing assistance when the situation called for it. It was this union that brought convergence in political, economic and military concerns as well as the opposition of the neighbouring Arab states that brought the *Yishuv* and Abdullah together and it was not only the interest of the both that brought them closer as claimed by the nationalist Arabs. It was actually this convergence that brought change in the attitude of Abdullah who was the son Sharif Hussein, mastermind behind the Arab revolt, cooperated with the Zionists leadership in order to safeguard his own kingdom and make it a legitimate state.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Transjordan-Arab League Tensions over Palestine Issue**

The League of Arab Nations (Jami'at Al-Duwal Al-Arabiyyah) commonly recognized as the Arab League (AL) was founded on 22 March 1945 (Ireland 1945:797). The League was constructed as a reaction to interests regarding post-Second World War colonial distribution of territories in West Asia also heavy resistance to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Masters, 2014). The AL was result of the Alexandria Protocol which was signed on 7 October 1944, in which the representatives of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and Transjordan participated. From Yemen the Imam participated as an observer in the working committee and Saudi Arabia was represented by Shaikh Yussuf Yassin. From the Palestinian side Musa al-Alami was invited to attend as a representative of Palestine and six subcommittees were formed on political, social, economic, health, cultural, and communications questions, to work out the possibilities of cooperation between the Arab states. This action and other decisions of the Committee were embodied in a protocol and resulted in to emergence of AL in 1945 (Ireland 1945:798).

The AL was supposed to become an active regional organization in the West Asian region. It was consists of Transjordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It occur due to the result of many compromises and long historical developments that were welcomed at this stage. The aim of the AL was to strengthen cooperation among member nations furthermore was to coordinate their policies and was focused on safeguarding their independence and sovereignty. But this cooperation was effected by economic, financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, nationality problems, social affairs, and questions of health (Howard 1952: 102). The AL was symbol of disunity and poor governance as it became the work place of its many tyrannical governments than of Arab people.

Before the emergence of the AL, most of the Arab nations were busy fighting for independence and were at war. During the onslaught of the World War Two, most of the Arab countries were struggling to get independence; Iraq was the only country which got independence at early stage in 1932, compared to other countries in the region. But countries like Syria and Lebanon were suffering to get independence even after more than two decades of mandatory pedagogy (Khadduri, 1946). The situation in Palestine deteriorated because of the communal violence between Jews and the Arabs. After the one month and fifteen days of fighting that began on 10

May 1940 to 25 June 1940, Britain's ally France collapsed and changed the international situation. Rumours started spreading that naval headquarters in Lebanon and Syria may be used by Germany in opposition to Great Britain but the new government in France (Vichy Government) refused all possibilities of giving those headquarters to Germany but gradually the influence of Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) in West Asia rose and as a result the commission of Armistice was formed with Italy and Germany as member and was dispatched to Lebanon and Syria to assist the mandatory government. This event in global system was to favour the nationalist in the Arab countries namely Syria and Lebanon who believed that the victory of Germany would result in the emancipation of Palestinians and as well as the nations of Arabs from the western colonization (Khadduri 1946: 91).

The very influential chief of Arab Palestinians lived in Germany at the time of World War Two and met with Hitler and other Nazis such as Ribbentrop, he also met various Arab leaders in West Asia in order to find a solution for Palestine. He established contacts with the Nazis and had conversation with Hitler on 28 November 1941 and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem notified the Nazi's chief Hitler that many Arab nations believed that Germany would be victorious in these wars for the reason that the Reich had very strong forces which was consisted of very brave soldiers and military heads with lot of experience and this would then prosper the Arab cause. He believed that the Germans and Arabs had the same enemy the Jews, the communist and the English namely, therefore they were to be friends, and hence the Arabs were also ready to collaborate with Germans with all their support and were willing to take part in the war as Germany's ally. He also appealed to the Arab countries to send large numbers of volunteers who were keen on taking a part in the war for their struggle. At the same time some countries Arab countries namely Iraq and Palestine were making great effort in order to achieve freedom, independence and unity of Palestine. They had full belief in the forces of Hitler and hoped to achieve their goals through Hitler and his army as it was the only help available to them in their fight against the Jews (Laqueur and Rubin: 50, 51). The concept of "enemy's enemy is a friend" was greatly used by the Mufti.

Due to all this Syria, Palestine and Iraq became most active exponents of a grouping of Arab states. Since Iraq was one of the first countries to get independence it became the centre of all the political activities and on 30 March 1943 the government of Egypt announced its intentions

towards the Arab unity, Nahas Pasha (prime minister of Egypt) had a plan for Arab unity which he mentioned in his note titled *Arab Independence and Unity* and he began the process and contacted the Arab governments and asked them to dispatch their deputy's to Cairo to give their official opinion separately. In 1943 he submitted this scheme to R. G. Casey, then British Minister of State in Cairo and under this scheme he called for the unification of some Arab countries and argued that Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Palestine should be joined together into one nation and residents of that nation should determine the model of government either monarchical, autarchic, democratic or to be united as one (Khadduri 1946: 93, 94).

This gave a new ray of hope to King Abdullah-I, for realising his dream of Greater Syria. He was proud of his race and descent, and believed that the future of Arabs lies in the union under Hashemite control (Shlaim 1988: 32). His ambitions were channelled towards the realization of his Greater Syria Plan, a Syria in its historical or natural dimensions. This notion of great empire was cherished by his father who failed in making it a reality so it became the duty of his son to realise this dream. For him it was his family who sponsored the Arab revolt and that his brother Faisal was placed on the throne of Syria which purported to include Palestine, Transjordan, and Lebanon. The revolt was staged, as Abdullah-I recorded in his memoirs, with object of establishing unified Arab state (Ibid: 33). But after the war the Arab flags were hauled down in Damascus and Syria was trodden under foot and was dismembered and divided into four parts.

Abdullah-I therefore, hoped to achieve the dream of Greater Syria having its capital in Damascus, the ancient home of the Umayyad caliphate and casted himself in the role of commander. He was of the belief that Transjordan was the southern portion of Syria and his control over it was the beginning of towards achieving full Arab liberation in the pursuit of which his family has sacrificed the Hejaz. The motto he adopted was all Syria to come under the leadership of a scion of the house Hashemite and Transjordan was the first step. Abdullah nurtured this vision of a far-flung and powerful Arab kingdom united under his crown (Shlaim 1988: 33).

The Arab countries never wanted to make Palestine an independent nation (as noted in Nahas Pasha's earlier proposal) and they also did not had a proper plan for Palestine. At same time the Palestine question was the touchstone of patriotism in every Arab country and no Arab politician was dare to agree publicly to any concession (Morris 2003: 76). Therefore in its initial talks on

the plan of Arab unity, most Arab states agreed on the creation of the AL and were of the view that Iraq and Syria to remerged and become Greater Syria with an open invitation to other Arabs for joining it if they desire. Syria was in favour of the unification and wanted to have one central administration for ruling the entire Arab world. Under these circumstances most Arab nations were not ready to for this but Iraq and Transjordan on the other hand put forward the proposal for unification which was based primarily on the principle of sovereign equality of all the Arab nations. Lebanon and Syrian were in favour of the proposal put forward by Iraq and supported it and eventually Yemen and Saudi Arabia also agreed on this plan (Khadduri 1946: 94).

The Greater Syrian scheme was completely discussed, analysed, as a preliminary move to unite all the Arabs, both Transjordan and Syria supported the plan but latter welcomed the scheme on the consideration that the current monarch of Transjordan, Emir Abdullah should appointed as the king of the nation. At the same time Syria was not ready to give up its democratic government and was of the view that Transjordan was the former territory of Syria, under the Ottoman government therefore should be merged with Syrian republic. Thus in reality the Greater Syria scheme led to a disagreement between the leaders and, it became very clear that it was not sincere to include the territories of Palestine and Lebanon into the scheme, therefore, this scheme was completely discarded, and even disgraced by many Arab nationalists (Khadduri 1946: 96).

A Hashemite annexation or control of Syria and Iraq was completely unacceptable to King Ibn Saud and posed a great danger to his regime therefore all his life he fought against the Hashemites. He perceived the probable Hashemite control of Syria and possible takeover of the Fertile Crescent by the Hashemite was in opposition to his own desires. This should be accepted as the symbol of the aged old ancient rivalry and antagonism among the countries and cultural places, centres of the Nile Valley and Fertile Crescent, with Palestine and Syria forming the central spots for the struggle. Egypt was against the Hashemite desires pertaining to Syria in general and Iraq in particular, as the success of these ambitions posed a serious challenge to Ibn Saud and damaged his position; therefore it was the important ally in its opposition to the Hashemite (Eppel 1992: 111).

The aim of the Syrian and Lebanese administration for larger Arab backing for their freedom comes against the Egyptian Government's ambitions to "occupy" the AL plan for its own North



African scheme's and to prohibit its segregation and isolation from an Arab coalitions and bloc. There was a extensive feeling that larger Arab support was needed to confront the post-war political troubles, especially the Palestine issue, because of all this the ability of the AL was to be questioned (Seabury 1949: 636). Therefore the pact of AL of which Transjordan was a founding member contained Article eight whose sole purpose was to make the Arab states to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, The article made all member countries to honour and respect the system of administration set up in other member countries and they were also forced to undertake to refrain from all activities tending to diversify this system of administration.

Through this then Secretary-General of the AL, the Egyptian nationalist Azzam Pasha argued so the question of Greater Syria was permanently ended. But Emir Abdullah-I did not give up his dream, the Transjordanian propaganda continued till 1945. When Abdullah was concerned with securing his own kingdom Abdullah's propaganda continued and in November 1946 the Egyptian press published a report from Beirut that King Abdullah had stated privately in Amman that he had been formally promised the throne of Greater Syria and Abdullah officially denied these reports but added "I shall never cease my efforts to achieve unity with Syria" (G.E.K 1948: 19).

The Greater Syria scheme of King Abdullah became the major barrier to unification of Arab. This desire was supported by a powerful ally British, who also gave financial assistance to Arab Legion brought it under their control through British commanding officer Brigadier Glubb Pasha. The British help affected the loyalty of Abdullah to Arab cause secondary. If he had succeeded, it would have made the unification of Transjordan, Iraq and Syria possible under his command. For him this scheme brought the Arab parts of Palestine under Transjordan control. But the opposition of the Syrian, Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Syrian administrations to him generated severe division inside the AL even before to 1948. Transjordan rejections for support and suspicions of others made the Transjordan Government to engage in secret negotiations with Washington in February 1948 in order to acquire the backing of the US Government for its scheme's for Palestine (Seabury 1949: 639).

### **Relationship during 1948 War and aftermath**

The AL as the regional groupings and as a regional organization in West Asia did not include all the states in the region (Howard 1952: 107). The individual states of the AL were weak,

politically, economically, and militarily. The military weakness of the League led to a feeling of insecurity among all members of the League, which, in turn, added to various resentments against the West over the Palestine question, oil problems and the Suez Canal. Because of this some Arab leaders chose the path of "neutralism" in the struggle and the members of the AL were divided over disagreement, as it was visible in Hashemite-Saudi rivalry, with Syria, Transjordan and Iraq on one side and Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other. A controversy in which the project for unification of Transjordan, Iraq and Syria and their jealousy on the "leadership" of Egypt in AL played an important role (Howard 1952: 108).

But the question of Palestine had impact on Arab politics in general and was capable of producing reactions all over the Arab world and from governments of extensively distinct political organizations and dogmas (Brynen 1991: 595). Even the text of the pact of AL had special rules regarding Palestine and a separate annex regarding Palestine issue which said

Towards the end of the final Great War, Palestine along with the Arab nations was detached from Ottoman Empire. It (Palestine) became autonomous, not relating to all other nation. The pact of Lausanne announced that its destiny was to be decided by the countries involved in Palestine. Nevertheless Palestine was till now was not able to govern its personal matters, the pact of the League of Nations in 1919 carved out rules for an administration which were primarily based on the acceptance of its autonomy, freedom and independence. Its global, survival, existence and independence within the states system, as a result, would not be challenged, de jure, than can bring freedom of the several other Arab nations. Even though the outside manifestation of this independence was continued to be undetermined and causes for it were outside its control, it was not allowed to interfere in its participation in work of the League council. Due to this the signatory members of the covenant of the AL were of the opinion that, because of the extraordinary condition and circumstances of Palestine, till it effectively enjoys its freedom and autonomy, the AL Council would allow the representative from Palestine to take part in its working (American Society of International Law 1945: 271).

Therefore, Musa Beg al-Alami was allowed to represent Palestine and he tried to get the attention of the League over situation in Palestine, and stressed on the seriousness of Arab stand in Palestine. According to him Jewish migration and purchase of Arab lands by them were the major problem and therefore he request for the attention and examination of this crucial situation. But the League decided that his opinion will not be accepted due the circumstances, will also not be accepted in confederation and declared that the AL should be created and determined that it should be consist of sovereign Arab nations (Khadduri 1946: 97). The League's goal was the peaceful resolution of the conflict that could arise among the two or more member nations, with strict instruction for not resorting to violence but Palestine was neither an sovereign nation nor it had membership therefore League looked for outside support for settling the Palestine question.

The members of AL tried their best through there diplomatic effort in convincing western strategy planner to pay attention to problem in Palestine and suggest a solution in the wake of American efforts to ensure the entry of the displaced Jews from Europe into Palestine. Arabs agreed to the creation of Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry in November 1945, the committee was given the responsibility to suggest a solution to the dispute in Palestine. the committee had meeting with League's Secretary General Abd al-Rahman Azzam in the beginning of March 1946, the delegation of the Arabs notified the committee that Arabs should not be held responsible for the persecution of Jews in Europe, they were of the view that why should the Arabs of Palestine pay for the sins or something that they did not do and the also told the committee that they being forced by the west to accept hundreds and thousands of sufferers and victims of anti-Semitism in Europe (Mayer 1986: 338).

The Arab people unilaterally opposed the attempt to impose the Jewish immigration to Palestine with the dream for creating a Jewish nation, and believed that the Palestinians were the children's of the native citizens of the state who were living there from the time when there Jewish organization. They were of the view that they will not accept that it is the right of the immigrant population to impose their will on the existing majority of population, therefore, they can accept their demands which are primarily based on historical connection, which were completely halt long ago. That's why they decided that they will not submit to a strategy of the immigrants, which posed a direct challenge to their status as majority and were aware that if

pursued would turn them into minority from majority in a nation which they considered as alien. Because of this majority of them opposed the claims of Zionists and Palestine was not in position to create a state of its own like the other Arab countries (Laqueur and Rubin: 57, 58).

From the beginning the idea of collective Arab action in order to resolve the problem of Palestine dominated the psych and thinking of the Arabs, in this struggle they were led by Hajj Amin al-Husseini the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The leadership of the Palestinian Arabs believed that the Jews were making duplicitous and dangerous plans for capturing *Al-Buraq Al-Sharif* - the Western or Wailing Wall. The response of the other Arab countries to the appeal of Arab Palestinians for assistance and aid was very small because most leaders were busy in their own national struggles, therefore did not pay much attention to problems outside their purview and to the request of Palestinians in particular. As noted earlier (during the Arab Revolt) Saudi Arabia and Iraq gave a favourable response to the request of Arab Palestinians for aid and help, revealed their enthusiasm and interest in being a mediator in the Arab's conflict with British (Mayer 1986: 331).

At the same time Emir Abdullah was threatening the Arab rulers for realising his Greater Syria Plan, While addressing the AL Council the Prime Minister of Transjordan warned the Syrians and the Lebanese that if they did not join in a Greater Syria they would leave themselves exposed and could not avoid a return of foreign rule, Therefore, King Abdullah in the beginning of 1946 paid an official visit to Turkey, and tried to win Turks, as well as British, to support his Greater Syria plan. For this he was ready to abandon the Syrian claims to Hatay, which had been annexed by Turkey in 1939. The Cairo newspaper *Akhbar al-Yom* of 2 February announced that Transjordan troops were deployed along the Syrian border and awaiting a pretext to attack. But the British government was disinterested in the questions of Greater Syria, which it believed was to be decided by the people concerned (G.E.K 1948: 20).

Emir Abdullah visited Jerusalem on 17 November 1945 to mark his presence in the decisive discussions, but failed in stopping the Arabs from re-establishing the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), earlier also he failed like he did in this meeting, he never actually had success in enforcing his desires on the heads of other Arab governments and as a result after a several day of active work a new AHC was established on 22 November (Levenberg 1991: 24, 25). The possibility of direct military involvement of Arabs raised certain questions like, who would

assume the supreme command, what would be the role of each army and what responsibility will they assume after the onslaught of battle. An attempt was made to reconcile the rival Palestinian parties, because of the factional disputes, the AHC became politically ineffective and broke into two competing groups, one headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini and other Alami who was boycotting its meetings and was supporting King Abdullah.

From 8 June to 13 June 1946 an extraordinary session of AL was conducted in Syria (Bludan) and decided to form a new five-man AHC and dissolved these two groups and Hajj Amin al-Husseini was declared President and Jamal al-Husseini became deputy which it then recognized as the official representative organization of the Palestinians. The AHC members were recognized by British as the legitimate representative of the population of Arabs and it was the AHC with whom the matters were supposed to be discussed after the end of mandate. But at same time Britain declined to hand over the areas which were already evacuated to the Arab authority. The Committee was moved to Cairo, the Egyptian capital because Hajj Amin took refuge there so it became major point for of the AL (Mayer 1986: 334).

The Bludan council, created a special AL Committee consisting of all the members of the league and Palestine, but the higher Executive Committee came under the control of Jamal al-Husseini. These committees made provisions for raising funds and raised one million pound fund for recovering the land of Palestine from the Jews and recommended that any Arab Selling its land Jews or subsidising Jewish immigration will be held liable for harsh punishment by Arab nations. Demands were made for the demolition and demobilization of Zionist army, and secret provisions were made for arming the Arab of Palestine and they were of the view that Britain disarms the Jews they will continue their efforts for increasing the power of Palestine militarily, called for stopping the Jewish immigration. The council Session in Bludan, in addition to its plans for Palestine, guaranteed AL support for Egypt stand vis-à-vis Britain, and pledged to work for the freedom of Libya and other Arab nations (The University of Wisconsin Press 1947: 155).

During this Bludan meeting, a resolution was adopted that in situation of brutal and savage Arab-Jewish encounters, it was decided that Arab nations would not stop their residents from taking initiatives and providing assistance to their relatives in Palestine. the League's Political Committee after the Months, gathered in Aley (Lebanon) in October 1947, and ratified the Bludan provisions and determined the right course of action. And had discussion on whether the

General Assembly would adopt the suggestion for partition, it agreed to establish permanent Technical Committee to determine the exact needs of the Palestinians, to have coordination on the Arab aid, on supervising funding. And it also agreed to raise funds for the Palestinian cause. But during this meeting there was a dispute between AHC and AL over the issue of creating an army of volunteers for Arabs; the Palestinian representatives rejected this idea and AHC considered that the surrounding Arab nations would confine themselves only to the provisions of money and arms therefore the much importance was not given to the prospect of outside involvement (Nevo 1987: 20).

During AL council at Aley which focused Palestine, a delegation headed by Azzam Pasha visited Amman to satisfy itself of Abdullah's loyalty to the League's authority. When discussing the value of the meeting, the delegation and the Arab press expressed the customary unanimity. In fact, at a time when all the Arab leaders were vying with each other in bellicose declarations, Abdullah pleaded for the maintenance of order in Palestine and for a peaceful solution (Wright 1951: 444).

In the political committee meeting of AL in Aley, most of the Arab countries considered the steps to be taken in the light of UNSCOP report. Transjordan was represented by its prime minister who claimed that his country would oppose any form of partition and the meeting pledged its support for an independent Arab Palestine and its communiqué advised that any pursuit for establishing a Jewish nation will unavoidably give rise bloody war in the West Asian region. Most Arab states focused on the preparations for military action in Palestine to prevent the partition. It was resolved to implement the secret decisions of Bludan meeting for the provision of money, arms, and volunteers to the Palestinian Arab community in the event of a solution being adopted in violation Palestine's to right to become an independent Arab state (Shlaim, 1988).

Abdullah accepted the decision calling for military, economic, and moral support for the Palestine Arabs, but he strenuously opposed the proposal of the AHC for the immediate formation of a Palestine government headed by the Mufti. A small delegation led by Azzam Pasha was sent to Amman to try to get the King to withdraw his objection but their efforts only made him to reiterate his conviction that a Palestinian government would fail to obtain

international recognition and, would spur the Zionist to form a government, and would thus render permanent partition (Shlaim, 1988).

The decision in Aley meeting of the AL represented a fundamental shift in League's policy towards Palestine. Since its inception in 1945 and especially since the Bludan meeting of June 1946 the AL had supported the establishment of an sovereign Palestinian Arab nation. In keeping with this policy, it had submitted a comprehensive plan to the London conference in January 1947 for ending the mandate in stages and to ultimately giving complete independence to a state in Palestine whose regime would ensure an absolute majority of Arab inhabitants. Once the British announce their withdrawal from Palestine it transformed the idea of an independent state from a theoretical notion into a practical possibility. The Arab states began to renege on their commitments. At Aley they took decisive step, going beyond the pledge to support the Palestinian Arabs in their fight for independence and opened the doors for the direct intervention by the regular armies of the member states (Shlaim 1988: 98).

The establishment of an army was necessary and inevitable and Fawzi al-Quaqji's name was proposed as the commander in chief of army but both AHC and Hajj Amin al Hussein became on the most vehement opponents of the nomination. According to Hajj Amin, al-Quaqji was not good enough to handle such big position. But Fawzi al-Quaqji had very good relations with Mufti's enemies at home and outside namely King Abdullah and the Nashashibis respectively. During the late 1947, It was King Abdullah who was putting pressure on al-Qauqji's appointment. On the other hand Hajj Amin al-Husseini was fighting for Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini to be nominated as the commanding officer of all forces which were to operate in Palestine. his pressure was so much that the AL finally met with him, but did not cancelled al-Qauqji's nomination, and the Military Committee of the AL recognized the control and governing power of the local tribal leaders, Hassan Salama over southern Palestine and Abd al Qadir al-Husseini over central Palestine, while the control of the Army of Liberation was confined to the northern province alone. . But the AL council meeting of Aley in October 1947 proposed that its members should 'take military steps around the borders of Palestine', should the plan for partition to be approved. The Council also favoured the creation of a Military Committee by having the Iraqi national as its head and made it sure that it should have a Palestinian representative in its membership. It was also pronounced that if the situation appeared then Arab armies would be

allowed to operate near the border of Palestine, whereby the option of invasion was not mentioned clearly (Nevo 1987: 21).

There was fight between Abdullah and other Arab countries over the command of fighting army. King Abdullah maintained that command should be in the Transjordanian hands and with a headquarters in Amman but Azzam Pasha was in favour of continuing the current arrangements with headquarters in Damascus under Ismail Safwat or another Iraqi general but the Iraqis wanted an Iraqi in overall command wherever the headquarter might be situated. On the other hand Abul Huda argued that Transjordan would not place the Arab Legion under the existing command at Damascus and in order to break the deadlock it was agreed that each country would retain its independent command and be allocated an operational zone in Palestine (Shlaim 1988: 174). The diversity of assessment dubiously impacted military developments. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both were against the military invasion, replied very lately to the League's provisions for assisting the units of volunteers (Mayer 1986: 345). Palestinian Arab solution prevented Transjordanian and Iraqi plans for occupying Palestine, although the people in the states of the members of AL were voicing affinity, compassion, solidarity and affinity with struggle of the Palestinian Arabs for independence. Nevertheless in private sphere Arab leaders continue to back, and sometime advance, various political solutions to the issue. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were against the official military campaign due to the fear that it would raise Abdullah's influence in the region and severally damage their ties with the western countries. Yemen also followed the footsteps of Saudi Arabia largely because of fear of Ibn Saud's actions instead of the ideological faith (Mayer 1986: 343).

On 29 November 1947 the UNGA voted for resolution 181 that called for the division of mandatory Palestine into two sovereign nations, one Jewish and one Arab and internationalization of city of Jerusalem (O'Malley 2015: 15; Stein 1991: 57)). The Palestinian Arabs as well as the Arab nation along with AL, they all rejected partition and called it corrupt, immoral, shameful, illegitimate, unlawful, impossible, absurd, unwise, illegal, unworkable, useless, impractical (Al-Shuaibi, 1979; Shlaim, 1988; Shlaim, 2000; Shlaim, 2009). The Arab Higher Committee's delegation to the UN did request for the announcement of an sovereign Arab Palestinian nation after the termination of the mandate and advance of the armies of Arabs, just as Jews had done. But this demand fell on deaf ears, especially among the Arab states. Thanks to



their military presence in Palestine, they were now in a position to decide all Palestinian affairs, and none of them welcomed the establishment of a Palestinian state (Al-Shuaibi 1979: 69).

About a week after of UNGA partition resolution, the Arab and Palestinian Mufti had a meeting in Cairo to figure out their response to the resolution of the UN. The Arab leaders granted that the UN partition scheme should be crushed, and a sovereign Arab nation should be created all over of Palestine, but they pronounced to accept only few of Safwat's suggestions. The Military Committee of AL was supposed to get 10,000 rifles, together with some other small ammunition and arms. This commission was also held responsible for sending 3,000 volunteers to Palestine who will directly be appointed in the army and received an amount of one million (Mayer 1986: 340). The members of the AL were requested to send ammunitions which they promised to supply to the Military Committee.

The achievements of the Volunteer Army in January-February 1948 was to impact the Arab reply to the new political actions in order to solve the issue of Palestine. Therefore, in March 1948 the Political Committee of the AL dropped the proposal of Americans to UNSC for creating an international trusteeship in Palestine. This position of Arabs was changed after a month late, due to the few military disappointments, and the League Council determining to help in the sustainment of the mandate, it was of the view that it would support in maintaining the mandate if it was guaranteed that partition plan would be revoked and immigration of Jews would halted. The Council further debated the option of military action and supported General Safwat and his plan that recent military loss of Palestine required the interference from the regular armies of the Arabs (Mayer 1986: 341).

But all this brought King Abdullah's intervention in the Palestinian issue and provided an opportunity for annexing the Arab areas of Palestine. The Palestinian elites were of the view that it was impossible for them to achieve the national desires without the support of their Arab brothers, but the Arab governments from the period 1946 were of the view that military assistance would be needed in allowing the local residents to establish their own nation in all of Palestine and was prohibiting the Jews from doing something similar. But dispute between AHC and AL on how to help and assist the Palestinian in the time of crises continued and, both concentrated on the issue either their support should be physical, militant intervene by organising

an military attack through the regular armies of the Arabs by placing them in and along with Palestinian forces (Nevo, 1987).

The distrust towards Abdullah from the members of AL that undermined the cause of Palestinian,

Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb argued that “when the hostilities for Palestine became inevitable, I sent a personal signal to the Commander-in-Chief, West Asia, asking him to dispatch immediately to Aqaba, a ship containing certain specified types of ammunition. The Commander-in-Chief rose to the occasion and the ship was duly loaded and steamed out of Suez for Aqaba. But before it left the Gulf of Suez, an Egyptian launch overtook the vessel and brought it back to port. A convoy of Egyptian army trucks had already lined up on the quay. The ammunition was rapidly unloaded from the ship into the trucks, which drove off. I received a signal from the British Commander-in-Chief, informing me that our allies the Egyptian army had seized and confiscated our ammunition. I replied imploring him to send another ship and at the same time urged the Jordan government to protest, the British army duly loaded another ship, but before it sailed the UN had issued a prohibition against the state of warlike stores to either side. The British army consequently unloaded the ship once more. And when the fighting began, the Arab Legion had a reasonable stock of 303 ammunition for rifles and Bren guns (Glubb 1957: 90-92).

The reason for Egyptian confiscation of arms sailed for Aqaba was the fear that if these arms would reach Aqaba it would strengthen the position of King Abdullah vis-à-vis other Arab countries and enlarge his influence in the region, which was contrary to Egypt and its allies in the region namely Saudi Arabia.

But still Transjordan was also to adopt policies that segregated him from surrounding Arab nation and also made the Security Council monitor his behaviours (Jasse 1986: 508). Abdullah was to take action for which he knew that he would be hated by UN and he knew his actions would result in generating severe disorder and inconvenience in relations with member of the AL but Abdullah was very sure about the advantages which were to be produced solely due to his actions, he believed that If the Arab Legion succeeded in annexing the Arab parts of Palestine as

given to them by the UN, his entry into Jewish area would greatly affect the British subsidy to Transjordan and Arab Legion (Morris 2003: 112). Tawfiq Pasha notified British official Bevin regarding the plans of his administration for sending the Arab Legion beyond the borders of Transjordan after the termination of British Mandate it wished to annex the area of Palestine given to the Arabs, which they regarded were important and bordered with Transjordan. Bevin replied to him by saying that "It appeared as the apparent thing one would do", 'but do not go and attack the parts given to the Jews (Jasse 1986: 509).

Dispute between AL and AHC rose due to the failure of the Arab nation in fulfilling the aspirations of the Palestinians. Only a narrow part of the wealth and ammunition collected by the AL could reach to the soldiers who were fighting for Palestine; some of it was sent by the camps in local areas that were barely assisted and armed by the AL, very few sent directly to the leaders of the various provinces. Only 4,100 rifles were collected by February 1948, on the other hand Arab nations promised to assemble around 10,000 rifles out of which only four thousand could reach to its respective destination. Only one fourth of this amount was sent to AHC and allocated between its soldier, and were led by Abd-al Qadir al-Husseini who explicitly suffered from Military Committee's disinclination, after his constant efforts, the Committee gave him £ 370 to distributed between his group of 3,000 men. Whenever he requested for weapons, he was given a suggestion to purchase from the money that he was given to him. Abd al-Qadir accused the Military Committee of the AL for the defeat in Palestine; he made this accusation just two days before his death in a military strike of 6 April 1948 (Nevo 1987: 24).

Inside the AL there was no unity on the question of Palestine. Till the declaration of state by the Zionists most members of the League supported an inflexible strategy in their battle against Jews, and condemned the scheme of UN, the UN plan. They were fully behind the Palestinian in opposing partition. The Arab states, loosely organize since 1945, in addition declared that the UN scheme was unconstitutional and endangered to block its execution by violence (Shlaim, 2000). Until Britain confirmed its decision to withdraw from Palestine in the autumn of 1947, there was outstanding backing for establishment of a united and sovereign Palestinian nation. Hereafter, nevertheless, there were clashing believes on which strategy to be accepted on decessing the destiny of Palestine. There was Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, on one side, who opted an expansionist policy for an autonomous Palestinian nation on entire

territory of Palestine. On the other side, it was King Abdullah of Transjordan, whose unspoken ambitions was to divide Palestine with the Zionists to occupy the Arab areas to his state (Shlaim 2009: 38).

The AHC which presented the Palestinian, scolded the scheme as “ridiculous, unworkable, and biased”. On 1 December the AHC observed a three-day attack, which was supplemented by brutal strike on Jewish population. The voting at the UN in favour of partition, hence not only gave the international recognition to the aspiration of Jews for establishing a Arab and Jewish state inadvertently, hinted on the brutal war between the two people in Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 27). The Arab Higher Committee, headed, promptly and vehemently rejected partition as solution to Arab -Zionists tensions in Palestine and insisted on full autonomy of Arab Palestinians and an embargo on the Jewish migration and selling of land to the Jews. This plan was consisted of a larger risk. The Arab higher committee denounced the UN partition resolution as absurd, impracticable and unjust and endangered to block its execution by violence. It focused on total autonomy over all of Palestine and declined to agree on a Jewish nation in any area of Palestine. Through the call for voting on partition UN thus contributed, eventually, hinted towards a brutal battle in Palestine (Shlaim 2009: 27, 28).

In early December 1947 Abdullah told British official Kirkbride that he intended to tell the Arab League members that he planned to take over the Arab areas of Palestine when the British left. Kirkbride argued that the proposed step would be premature and harmful and he advised the King to play along with the other Arab states while concealing his own intentions for the time being. He further argued that Abdullah was delighted at the prospect of such guidance from London on the matter. Abdullah was unclear or shifting thinking and intentions, regarding the future deployment of the Arab Legion. The Legion’s units seconded to Mandate- on garrison and patrol duties in British bases and along roads in Palestine, would have to return to Transjordan as British rule wound down and British forces were withdrawn. But the British subsidy of the Legion was formally linked to the Legion’s services on behalf on behalf of the Mandate government. Once its units returned to Transjordan and Britain pulled out of Palestine, what would be the fate of the subsidy? Would the British continue to pay, with the Legion no longer directly serving British interests and authorities? (Morris 2003: 106).

Abdullah appealed to many of his foreign visitors to support him, in his scheme for the division of Palestine and was curious to know the views of others. Azzam Pasha was one of the visitors but Ibn Saud, President Quwatli of Syria and King Farouq ganged up against him but consequently everybody realized that he was powerful and his army was of some value. The AL council visited him in Amman, where Abdullah-I explained to them that he wanted peace, no war but all of them took the view that Palestine must take precedence over all other problems. Abdullah agreed but stressed that it did not mean that he was retreating from his Greater Syria plan, because of this Abdullah, turned towards the Zionist envoys and argued that the partition would not shame him before Arab world when he came to defend it, and stated that my wish to take this chance to advise you plan for deciding destiny of Arab Palestinians, therefore, believed that any idea for an autonomous Jewish nation in any area of Palestine or inside Transjordanian nation would make him the ruler of the e both banks of Jordan (Shlaim 1988: 112, 113).

The British official Kirkbride informed the foreign office of a series of talks he had held with Transjordan's new Prime Minister (February 1947-December 1947). According to Kirkbride, the armies of Transjordan and Iraq would have to bear the brunt of the fighting and that, it was only fair that all Palestine should be united to Transjordan if it could be saved. Kirkbride commented that he did not think the other Arab states, with possibly Lebanon and Iraq would be in favour of the union of Transjordan and Arab Palestine under Abdullah. King Abdullah was acquiescing to the establishment of nation for Jews in Palestine, and was certain that the Arab residue would come to Transjordan. He did not share the optimism of the others about ultimate military defeat of the Jews (Morris 2003: 96). On the other hand the leadership in Palestine and the was shared by the civilian population, Palestinians could hardly rely on their own leadership and they knew that their defence requires a large number of trained soldiers but this mission was very bulky for the provincial troops to confront with (Nevo 1987: 17).

From the period 24 December 1947 to 1 January 1948 only protective exercises were carried out by formulating escorts and vigilances in Jerusalem and neighbouring villages instead of carrying violent attacks by posting gunmen and sharp shooters near the settlements of the Jews. The defence of Jerusalem was main source of concern and the issues related to protection took major chunk of their attention and was reflected in the activities of the Palestinians and these specific situation repeated again and again in Palestine. As greater time expired and Jews began taking

more and more steps and initiative, and multiplied the efforts of Palestinian Arab military for protection (Nevo 1987: 18).

In December 1947, after the marvellous gathering of Foreign Ministers in Cairo, the AL energetically declared that "urgent steps" would be taken to prohibit the establishment of a Jewish nation. Under the leadership of Iraq in January 1948, a volunteer Arab Liberation Army was created and it also established the Military Committee of the AL, although secretariat of the AL declared that Saudi Arabia had sent a small group of fighters to Egypt for the unavoidable clash the members of the AL were requested to send ammunitions which they promised to supply. Lastly on 16 January 1948, the spokesperson of AL declared that the Arab Nation would "annex" whole of Palestine, whenever the British mandate would end in May (Seabury 1949: 638). As being confident of the success of the Arab forces, the speakers further announced that the AL was all set to battle with Jews till the end to reach its goals. The Jewish people were to be powerless and weak in the guerrilla warfare. The reasons for the defeat of the AL effort and show up in Palestine was better known, but the major among them was misjudgement and miscalculations in view to the tactics of the United States, the power of the Zionists army, and their capacity to match their military endeavour were noticeable. Not widely know, nevertheless, were the broaden gap inside the League itself, which were accelerated by the Palestine conflict and which stopped impressive military actions from being taken (Seabury 1949: 638).

Hajj Amin al-Husseini requested for a financial assistance for an Arab administration in Palestine and the creation of a provisional government there, soon after the British withdrawal from country he made all these demands at a gathering of Arab League Council in Cairo in February 1948. But the Council refused to fulfil all his demands and Hajj Amin al-Husseini tried get support of his enemy King Abdullah. He was o the view that a Palestinian government under his command would deliver ambitions because it would weaken Abdullah's desires and influence in the Arab world. A Palestinian administration was no doubt the top priority of Egypt, Syria or Saudi Arabia, at the same time for Transjordan it was a critical question. Abdullah so assuredly objected the creation of a Palestine administration, which was supported by other members of the AL; they were expecting a confrontation or sovereign reaction from Transjordan.

Despite having failure in gaining the support of the AL, the AHC aspired to set up its government in Palestine and to lay a ruling network to give the people essential assistance soon

after the British evacuation. Only few members of the AHC, who were living in Palestine, tried to convince the High Commissioner for transferring the power to rule primarily to the local Arabs in an proper and orderly manner. The ambitions of the AHC were that it expected the National Committee to take control in these parts, therefore were criticised not only by British, but also the AL. The AL council pledged on 12 May 1948 to formulate a body of government in Palestine soon after the end of the Mandate (which was expected in three days). Despite the fact the League tried to fulfil its commitments, situation in Palestine stopped its execution (Nevo 1987: 28)

The situation in Palestine became rigid at the same time the Political Committee met again in April to decide, discuss among the other things that whether King Abdullah of Transjordan would annex Palestine with the help of Arab Legion soon after the end of British mandate on 15 May. Rumours started spreading that Syria and Lebanon, sceptical of efforts made by Abdullah for attaching their areas into a "Greater Syria," were nervous that Transjordanian annexation of Palestine would be indestructible. Still, certain Arab nations appeared ready to back such an annexation it would accept League's instructions. The AL scheme of activity and operations in Palestine was reportedly such that comprised the annexation of the state by Arab Legion of Transjordan and establishment of a local administration with Mufti of Jerusalem as its Head. The scheme visualized prospective elections and the creation of a Legislative Assembly in which Jews would to be counted as a group of minority (University of Wisconsin Press 1948: 379).

Abdullah could not possibly agree to the Jewish nation having passage to the Gulf of Aqaba and cutting off Transjordan from Egypt. His efforts were positioned to try to find out from British officials like Kirkbride where British stood. Kirkbride was authorized to deliver an oral message stating that "the British realise that what Abdullah really wants to know was whether we think he should intervene in Palestine contrary to decisions of the Arab league and whether we would protect him at the UN by using the veto if the matter came before the Security Council. We do not consider we can provide him a bit of support in acting alone, I am afraid that is the best we can do" (Morris 2003: 108).

By March 1948 it was clear that the situation in Arab Palestine had turned in Abdullah's favour. The Arab League had denied the Palestinian Arab Higher Executive all the important military commands and blocked much of its political influence. The Arab Legion was in the country, and

as guardian of Palestine's frontiers, he had a better claim to the allegiance of the territory than any rivals. In Central Palestine, all who wished to preserve the semblance of order looked to Abdullah, such as, mayors, small traders, enemies of the Husseini's like the Nashashibis and the Tuqans. after the failure of the efforts of Brig. Clayton, the British Minister for Arab Affairs in Cairo, to maintain a unified Arab front at the Arab League Conference, Britain began to turn primarily to support of Abdullah-I. To Palestine Arabs, the Transjordan Treaty with Britain seemed to suggest London's endorsement of his policy. Historically, Northern Transjordan and Central Palestine had frequently been united and it was the separation which was unusual (Wright 1951: 445).

There was no affection or sense of liking for each other between Abdullah and other rulers of Arab countries, most of them disliked and suspected him for being a traitor by entering into partnership with the enemy. Almost all Arab nations took part in the battle for their own interests that were primarily national and dynastic, and secluded or concealed behind the aim of safeguarding Palestine for the Arab residents of the area. The failure of the Arabs in having coordination in their military and diplomatic scheme was in no way to be held accountable for the catastrophe that devastated them. The Jewish heads were aware of the these disunion and took advantage of it as much as they could following the official outbreak of hostilities, just as they have exploited them previously (Shlaim 2000: 36).

The Deir Yassin incident on 9 April 1948 by the military organization of Zionist led by *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (IZL) ( national military organization) and *Lehi*, was geared to clearing the length of the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem road. The conquest was accompanied and possibly followed by the killings, mutilation and rape of dozens of unarmed civilians and, about 110 villagers most of them women, children and elderly persons died. This contributed to the precipitation of Palestinian flight from neighbouring and distant villages and towns and sparked feelings of anti-Zionist militancy and vengefulness in the masses and in the political elites in the Arab states. The affect of the massacre to Transjordan was it created a good deal of indigenou and an equal amount of alarm. Transjordan came under pressure from their peoples to intervene to save the Palestinians, Abdullah was immediately pressed to do something using his fabled region and Palestinian urged him to despatch the Legion to Palestine, to take over and protect the Arab areas and also to conquer the Jewish areas of the country. Palestinian notables made tracks for Amman



to lobby the king to intervene and the King responded that the Arab Legion was too small to alone confront the Jews, but after the 15 May other Arab states would join the war and together the Arabs would beat the Zionist (Morris 2003: 127).

The schemes of an combined Arab operation in Palestine took actual form on 10 April when Abdullah sent an offer to the Political Committee of the AL which was in session that time, for saving Palestine with the help of Arab Legion. The AL, hesitated, despite being discussing 'for so long on the operations and their role in sending in the armies' (Jasse 1986: 511). As the ambitions of Abdullah were well known, his proposal for the rescue of Palestine was suspected by many, King Faruq of Egypt solved this dilemma by declaring that the Arab invasion of Palestine would not result in partitioning the country, hence it would lead to freedom of Palestinians (Ibid).

The Foreign Office sent a letter to Sir Alec Kirkbride on 13 April and asked whether King Abdullah still thinking about the annexation of Palestine after 15 May. . Kirkbride responded with confirmation that he still predetermined take in the Arab parts of Palestine bordering Transjordan. The general scheme in the beginning insisted on the placement of Arab Legion's unit to Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron, various plans were proposed and were to accepted in the 'light of events'. The Prime Minister of Transjordan Tawfiq Pasha after taking everything into consideration was of opinion that invites should be sent to all the Arab countries for participating in military activities after 15 May. Kirkbride stated that the AL knew about the plans Abdullah of Abdullah's, which were portrayed as 'forming a momentary military annexation to secure Arab parts, but till now nothing was done to establish an agreement between Amman and the AL. "He wind up with the statement that there were larger evidences that the habitation of regular Arab soldiers would be accepted by the Arabs of Palestine who [are] discovering Arab enthusiast groups now in that state widely considered as annoying guests" (Jasse 1986: 511).

The British decision was clear therefore "British official Bevin authorized Kirkbride to deliver a verbal message to Abdullah that it hoped that the troubles in Palestine would be restricted to particular areas and they would soon come to an end. That a condition in which Britain would have to cast a veto at the Security Council would not arise and he should refrain taking any actions that might disengage him from other Arab nations and which would give indication that Britain is planning its re-entry into the region. Therefore declared that if King Abdullah-I

succeeds in annexing Arab parts of Palestine, which it thought was possible, should refrain from dispatching the Arab Legion into the territories given to the Jewish nation by the UN, it knew that this would not appease him, and it is very difficult at current to think of any activities which satisfy these precondition, on 17 January 1948 Kirkbride gave this verbal notice Abdullah. The message concentrated on the fact that Abdullah had not been prohibited from invading the territories of Palestine after the end of mandate (Morris 2003: 108).

The army specialist of the AL brought out an undivided plan for their actions but King Abdullah, who was commanding the forces of the Arabs, ruined this plan by doing changes in the execution of these plans right before the official eruption of battle. His goal in dispatching his forces into Palestine was not to prohibit the creation of a Jewish state but to make himself the ruler of Arab areas of Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 35). The League's decision to invade Palestinian was to save Palestinian Arabs or attacks by the Jews. Abdullah came under growing, indeed intense, pressure to join-indeed to lead, the other Arab states in the attack on the Jews. It was the gradual collapse of Palestinian Arab society under the hammer blows of the civil war of November 1947 to May 1948 and more particularly the switch to the offensive by the Haganah in April to early May. This triggered the start of the Palestinian mass exodus that strained the Hashemite-Yishuv agreement. King Abdullah's "different understanding" with Jews made Transjordan partnership with AL very problematic (Seabury 1949: 637). Benny Morris has argued that "the pressure on Abdullah increased with each new Jewish success and each new episode of Palestinian collapse and flight. On 11 January 1948 Elias Sasson wrote to Abdullah regarding the cycle of slaughter and massacres that were plunging Palestine into chaos and which implicitly might affect the open and honourable agreement that had been reached two months before". Sasson expressed a worry that intrigues were afoot in the Arab world that pushes Abdullah and his government and army into the cauldron in order to turn him into the enemies of Jews (Morris 2003: 126).

### **Political and Military Differences**

On 9 May 1948 the Secretary-General of the AL, Abdur Rahman Azzam Pasha stated in Damascus that repeated and fully substantiated reports had reached there that the Zionists in Palestine were intensifying their campaign to terrorize the Arab inhabitants into abandoning certain districts of tactical importance. They were taking advantage of the inadequate protection afforded by the British forces and also of the earlier Arab declaration that the forces of Arabs

would refrain from entering Palestine prior to 15 May armies not . The Arab States were therefore faced with the urgent need to decide whether in spite of the unwelcome risk of a clash with the British they could resist the demand of public opinion for a movement into Palestine before 15 May in order to stop the massacres of Arabs. On 14 May small Military operations were launched by the Arab sides to protect the Arabs (Chatham House 1948: 314).

Azzam Pasha, spent 10-11 May in Amman, where he apparently proposed to the Arab Legion's commander in chief (Glubb Pasha) that he should replace Mahmud as pan-Arab commander in chief. Azzam acknowledged that among the armies of Arabs the Legion was most excellent and only one fully ready to push into Palestine and hence the offer. Glubb politely declined, perhaps sensing that Azzam was planning to make him the reason for downfall for the anticipated failure or to assure Transjordan's participation in the fight against Israel, while unable to assure him that any of the Arab armies apart from Transjordan's, would actually obey him (Morris, 2003).

Glubb wrote in his memoir that on the eve of the invasion, no information was available to the Arab Legion headquarters as to what the other armies proposed to do or the strengths which they had available, not the least attempt at liaison or cooperation was made and during the fighting (Morris 2003: 148) . Indeed, both were deep suspicious of each other's about the ' intentions and objectives both before and during the fighting. Most believed that King Abdullah had no real intention to fight Zionists. Underlying the lack of cooperation between the other Arab states was Abdullah's assessment that the Jews were too strong and that the pan-Arab attack on Israel would be fail. The Jews, as the Transjordanians understood, were well coordinated, and had many people with weapons, the forces of the Arab did not had arms for some of it soldiers and many others stayed in their home countries to protect their trembling governments. Hence, Abdullah- preferred and intended to occupy the West Bank without fighting the Jews, marching on Jerusalem was never part of his original intention or plan (Morris 2003: 148, 149)

Once the violence erupted, the AL strategist predicted that during this war the role of the Palestinians would be secondary in the battlefield. The irregular fighting transformed in a full-fledged war, the Arab rulers were willing accept Arab Palestinians as nothing more than a nuance. From 11-12 May 1948 the Political Committee of AL gathered in Damascus approved that the safety of the armies in the forth coming invasion should be secured. There were many confrontations among the citizens of the towns and troops of al-Qauqji, the latter looted, robbed

and insulted the people of Palestine. Palestinian argued that the forces of Arabs carried a strategy that was intended to remove the residents from the battleground. But the Arab legion of Transjordan stemmed from obvious political consideration, in order to weaken the Palestinian's power and decreased all hostility to king Abdullah-I ambitions to occupy; and for his part Al - Quaqji was forced to split authority with the supporters of Mufti (Nevo 1987: 22)

The regular forces of Transjordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia launched an attack on Palestine, the AL supported the irregular army of Palestine and it also sponsored the Arab Liberation Army (Shlaim 2000: 34). The actions of the Palestinian irregular forces were reduced due to this there was no coordination among the army of liberation and irregular Palestinian forces (Ibid). After the Arab intervention in Palestine, the attempts of the AHC to establish its national authority in the country turned into fight against Abdullah. This struggle continued for a short period of time. The AHC after its strike, told the Arab official to resume its daily work and continue its services to public. The heads of the departments were appointed and issued orders to the public. Abdullah gave a reply to al-Husseini and thanked him for his assistance to the Palestinian problem and revealed his intentions that the mufti would not let puzzling declaration to be issued. The military governors of the Transjordan did not let AHC to have any control over the territories that were annexed by the Arab Legion. All this narrowed the control of AHC even in the unoccupied areas of Palestine which were in absolute turmoil (Nevo 1987: 29). The defence specialist of AL penned a plan that call for the united action by Arabs, King Abdullah who had control over the army, ruined this plan by making changes in the plan right before the invasion. His aim behind sending his army into Palestine was not to prohibit the establishment of the Jewish nation but was aimed at appointing himself as the ruler of Palestine (Shlaim 2000: 35).

The regular army of Abdullah, the Arab Legion aspired to expel armies of the other Arabs from the front lines. Abdullah as the leader of the armies of Arabs announced on 12 May 1948 that the liberation army should be dissolved and this prepared the way for the rise of the regular armies. Because of this in the coming weeks the remaining forces of al-Qauqji withdrawn from the places, front-lines and the holding they had in central Palestine and Transjordanian army took over these places. Until the last month of 1948 they continue to have these places under their control but at the same time the regiments of al-Jihad al-Muqaddas forces continue to

fight even after 15 May 1948. After the demise of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, Hasan Salama became the prominent figure among the Palestinians. During the first stage of the invasion by Arabs, he tried to gain control over the important areas in Palestine soon after the British withdrawal, this important area where such as military camps of Sarafand and Tel-Litwinski, airport in Lydda but he had very little achievement. But Hasan Salma was murdered in Rosh Ha'ayin. The supporters of AHC had no control over armies in central Palestine because it did nominate anybody to his place (Nevo 1987: 25).

The war for Jerusalem was started by Jewish forces long before the withdrawal of British from Palestine because of this on 17 May Abdullah gave orders to Arab Legion for securing East Jerusalem from the hands of Jews who were resorting to violence in these area, (Shlaim 2000: 37). Jerusalem, the most explosive flashpoint along the entire eastern front, provided the starting point for talks between the two sides. Ben-Gurion was ready to offer a cease-fire in Jerusalem in order draw Abdullah into comprehensive peace negotiations (Shlaim 2000: 43). In a Press interview in Amman on 19 May, the Secretary General of AL Abdurrahman Azzam Pasha said that the Arabs were not just defending the Palestinian Arabs but were fighting Zionism, and that the purpose of the Arabs remained as it was before, the impediment of the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine (Chatham House 1948: 314).

Similarly, the approach of the Arabs concerning the Jews in Palestine was unchanged. The Zionists were looking to build a entirely Jewish State, but the Arabs were combating for a Palestinian State in which Jews would have full and equal citizenship, all facility to build up their Jewish life and all encouragement to play a full part in the building up of a united Palestine. There would be no favouritism and no difference concerning Arabs and Jewish citizens. The Arabs expected an extensive and tough struggle but were resolved to see it through. Since the recommendation of partition the Palestinian Arab struggle against the Zionists had been a failure, and the Arab Higher Executive had been unproductive and useless. But the circumstances had now transformed entirely and it was the Jews who had transformed it. When the Zionists decided to terrify the Palestinian Arabs into accepting partition they made a deadly mistake. They planted horror into the hearts of Palestinians, but they also planted antagonism into the hearts of the Arab countries and willpower to fight Zionism to the end (Ibid). At last it persuaded the Arab League that Zionism must be crushed (Ibid).

When the Syrian and Egyptian armies were moving inch by inch, aware of the problems in their paths, Azzam Pasha said, on the progress of the Arab armies that the Iraqi Army had unexpected delays, but the Arab Legion had moved rapidly into the area allotted to them (Chatham House 1948: 314). But the reason behind the delay was King Abdullah, who did not allow the Iraqi and Saudi Army to pass through Transjordan in order to station themselves at the border with Palestine (Shlaim, 1988; Bar-Zohar, 2005). The precarious and unfounded rumours began to spread that the Legion was being controlled by the British, that delay the arrival of Iraqi Army but Azzam Pasha could have stated categorically that no restrictions had been made by the British (Chatham House 1948: 314).

The Palestinian leadership at large miscalculated the capacity and quantity of army of Jews. They made no genuine effort in evaluating the actual army power of Zionists. The approach of Palestinian people towards the on it preparation for the coming confrontation was incomplete. The pioneers and the citizen of Arab countries were very much apprehensive of the consequences and meaning of army attack. Whatever arms that the AHC possessed or obtained did not reach Palestine when they were most needed, this was due to an absence of corporation. The lack of ammunition, arms and bombs blocked the implementation of Mufti's plan. The unavailability of weapons was the extremely dangerous difficulty in contrast to all various other difficulties that it faced, funds were also desperately needed by Palestinians (Nevo 1987: 19). When the war actually began no member of AHC stayed in Palestine except Ahmad Hilmi Abdul Bagi (Shlaim 2009:39).

Palestine was not a important resource; nor was the symbol of influence but of vulnerability. The logic of the position of Palestine suddenly became illogical soon after the announcement of independence by India IN 1947. India was a symbol of power and worked as Jewel in British crown, Palestine on the other was not more than a button in Kings shirt, the economic situation made evacuation option viable (Shlaim 2009: 20). The widely distributed British army in Palestine's 'Fortnight Intelligence Newsletter' thought that the defeat at Tirat Zvi of the Arab Liberation Army might persuade these noble strugglers to depart Palestine. The High Commissioner predicted that the Arab would be unable to prohibit the emergence of a Jewish nation (Morris 2003: 116).

The forces of Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Transjordan and Lebanon did not actually cross the outermost edge and attacked Palestine on 15 May 1948 despite having any unified, well designed strategy. During the February-April 1948 a number of staff officers, including a young Transjordanian captain Wasfi Tal, and General Ismail Safwat, the Iraqi ex-chief of staff and Arab League military committee chairman in Damascus, had, function on a incomplete strategy, with having an organized Iraqi-Transjordanian Lebanese-Syrian communications, along several north-south and east-west axes, towards Afula. The Arab Legion was supposed to advance into Samaria and then, veering north westwards, into the Jezreel Valley settlement from the main Jewish concentration of population along the coast (Morris 2003: 145).

A second stage push to Haifa- the country's main port was envisaged, while the Arab Legion simultaneously was to push towards the coast somewhere north of Tel Aviv. The Lebanese army was supposed to thrust down the coast road from Ras al-Naqura toward Haifa. With the other Arab armies engaged in north, the Egyptian army was to cross the border at Rafah and advance directly up the coast road towards Tel Aviv. The plan envisaged a dissection and isolation of the Jewish demographic concentrations and conquest parts of the Jewish designated state (Morris 2003: 145). Palestinian combatants sharply declined after 15 May 1948, the AL goal was not to formulate Palestinian nation, but wanted to decrease Abdullah's efforts for the occupation of Palestinian areas that came under his control (Nevo 1987: 29).

Abdullah growingly undisguised exercises of the Arab Legion to make himself the ruler of Arab Palestine and he desired that the Palestinian Arabs should be represented by the Transjordanian envoys inside the AL instead of being represented by the AHC. These ambitions antagonised other members of the League especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. This hatred of Abdullah was fuelled by Britain's support to the ambitions of Abdullah and raised anti-Abdullah force in the AL. Arab nation under Egypt began their operation for the establishment of the Arab government for Palestine. In the gathering of the Arab League's Political Committee which happened in Alexandria on 6 September, various proposal were made for the termination of existing civil administration that they already agreed on in July, called for its replacement by the Arab government for all Palestine became the top most topic for the this meeting. And it lasted for ten days. Jamal al-Husseini a permanent member of the AHC and the cousin of Mufti visited

several Arab capitals, including Amman, to mobilise support for this proposal (Shlaim, 1988; Shlaim, 2009; Shlaim, 2000).

The Political Committee after a series of meetings proclaimed the formulation of an Arab government for Palestine the official declaration of commitment was made on 20 September. To forestall Transjordanian rejection this decision compelled the Arabs to agree on partition and even to the Jewish state, this new organization was called the All Palestine Government (APG) (Shlaim 2009: 40). Abdullah's opposition did not prevent the Arab Higher Committee from persisting its attempts to establish the Palestinian entity and approved the formation of a Government of All Palestine composed of a Prime Minister and other ministers; and a National Council composed of "representatives" of the Palestinian people. The mufti became National Council's president, while Prime Minister's position was given to Ahmad Hilmi Abdul-Baqi. The full independence of Palestine was announced by the Council, it also declared the creation of a free and sovereign nation. Except for Transjordan, the other members of the AL recognized this government (Al-Shuaibi 1979: 70).

The ALs decision was antagonistic to Transjordan and was critical of APG for failing to protect the Palestinian. The verdict to create an government for Arab Palestinian was an effort to establish armed groups under the control of AL, was an strategy to acquire and equip the League with an armed forces for the defence purpose, these efforts gave an incentives to the members of the League for attaining direct responsibilities for the execution of its plan and withdrawn their forces from its holding in Palestine after the opposition by the local inhabitants. Avi Shlaim has argued that "in British eyes a Palestinian nation was supposed to mean mufti's nation, and the thinking towards the mufti nation was that it would be a breeding ground of ineffective Arab extremist who were soon to be bedevilled by the Jewish nation. The Foreign Office thus manifested greater pressure on the capitals of Arabs for prohibiting the declaration of the APG, stating that these efforts were inappropriate and aimed to fulfil the ambitions of the Mufti (Shlaim 2009: 41).

End of mandate the AHC came to know that its freedom of action was very small and, it barely had any official or envoys in Palestine. The AL avoided its jurisdiction army and Committees on Palestine. But the eminent danger to the AHC's freedom was King Abdullah-I. Once his plans in Palestine appeared achievable, he stopped hiding his aims from the AHC. Few days before the



evacuation of Britain, a statement was attributed to Abdullah which notified him that the AHC no more represents the Palestinian Arab, The statement further notified that the residents of Palestine were not satisfied with AHC's actions, so it believed that it no long had power for being a spokesperson for the Arab Palestinians. Amman denied of being involve in issuing such statement. Apart from being true or not, these statements undoubtedly emulated the beliefs, and the AHC member knew about these feelings (Nevo 1987: 29).

The mufti and AHC played crucial role in the establishment of the new administration. Major part in the formation of the new government. Ahmad Hilmi Abdul-Baqi became the head of this government, who until recently left the AHC and accepted King Abdullah's offer and became the governor of Jerusalem, but he was persuaded by the mufti and therefore he left Abdullah's camp and joined Egyptians camp. The Cabinet of Hilmi was composed of mufti's supporters but also had substantial numbers of people who directly belonged to the Palestinian ruling class and other well known Palestinians who until recently supported Abdullah (Shlaim 2000: 42). Plans by the AL officers to create an government for Arabs on the entire territories of Palestine reached its climax on 22 September 1948 by the proclamation of a government at Gaza, and was to be headed by the Military Governor of Jerusalem Ahmed Hilmi Pasha (Kumaraswamy, 2015).

Abdullah rapidly notified soon after the proclamation of AHC that he would prohibit it from East Jerusalem because it recognised the partition, while the others were opposing it. The Jericho meeting of the Palestinian Arabs on November 28 nominated King Abdullah of Transjordan as King of "all Palestine". The Transjordan's cabinet on December 7 gave its approval that King Abdullah gave his consent that he would accept the crown of a united Palestine and Transjordan. The Arabs of Palestine told the Arab League that they are ready to accept the decisions taken in meeting at Jericho besides the fact that the AL was trying the possible means of pressure to convince Abdullah for renouncing his plans and was considering on the option of expelling Transjordan from the AL (University of Wisconsin Press 1949: 165).

The efforts of the AL for creating an "independent" government in Palestine soon after the evacuation of Britain were postponed for four months, till September 1948, it was primarily because of the opposition by Transjordan. The government was lastly created in Gaza, Egyptian regiments provided security to this government, and it was recognized by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon, this establishment of government was a move to counter

the Arab Palestinian conference at Jericho, which called for the unification of Palestine with Transjordan with Abdullah as its head. The League Council's meeting in December saw a deadlock over the consideration on whether Gaza Government should be formally admitted to the AL. Due to this paramount difference, it was extensively accepted that the League would might crash because of its in-house tension (Seabury 1949: 639).

From Amman, Abdullah pursued his actions in his opposition to APG with refreshed robustness, at time of its declaration; he only declined to give recognition to it, but dispatched angry letters of objection to Ahmad Himli and Azzam Pasha. Very soon Abdullah began send warning notices that APG would not be given permission to function in any of the part annexed by the ARAB Legion, Abdullah told then Egyptian prime minister Mahmud Nuqrashi that he had no desire for granting a poor government of Palestinian a permission to rule, which has no army of its own to protect it from the attack of the Jews. Abdullah took important action to establish and determine Transjordan's administration over the part it occupied namely East Jerusalem, which was an well organize move to gather his own allies in Palestine to show their opposition to the government in Gaza (Shlaim 2000: 44).

Emil Lengyel has argued that "the AL failed the Arab hopes; it was lavish in demonstrations and words, but barren of results and deeds. The ordinary Arab did not experience its actuality as it has neither secured anything for him and has not achieved any goal" (Lengyel 1953: 152). On the other hand Harry N. Howard has stated that "the truth is that unity is not the natural condition of the Arabs, and has never existed. The picture afforded by the AL so far is one of dismal and often deliberate failure. It must be admitted that the League has gone through difficult years since its birth, and that Palestine was a terrible strain to put on the new organization. But an analysis shows that a primary defect falsified the politics of the Arab League from the outset" (Howard 1952: 108).

Inside the Arab clique strong conciliations were ongoing regarding what position to be adopted on APG. On the contrary, the Arab leaders roughly with no omission were willing to give up Arab interests in Palestine for local ends. The Arab unwillingness utterly to support the new body was enlarged by the progressing and wide-ranging dislike of the mufti; certainly, the importance of his appearance in influencing incidents in APG habituated other hopes relating to the entire process that led to the formation of APG, which was pre-planned to inspected the

intentions of King Abdullah's plan for the occupation of Arab areas of Palestine. As the situation changed they were worried did not wish to worsen the clash with Abdullah and the danger of the disintegration of the AL (Shlaim, 2009).

Avi Shlaim has argued that "the Arab regime measured the public opinion which was prevention of war. In the intervening time resistance to Abdullah was at peak, thwarting his intention for the occupation, was in par with opposition to partition, as one of the few goals behind which early all Arab states could rally" (Shlaim 2009: 46).

His faithfulness to Britain was progressively related to unfaithfulness with the cause of Arabs, requirement to defend their nationalist card combine with their antagonism to Abdullah eventually acquire preference in addition to their distrust concerning mufti; when APG was announced, the Arab nations actualize, nevertheless, without enthusiasm, to unite behind it. Unsurprisingly Egypt played a important part in exacting the Arab League's blessings to the APG and its new minister was also critical of king Abdullah (Shlaim 2009:46). The APG rejected to continue any financial support even to pass donations from Arab and Islamic countries and left the government in exile without funds to give salaries or cover its administrative expenses (Shlaim 2009: 49).

The mounting Jewish pressure and the lack of commander, arms and the poor communication with AHC made the actions of the forces of fighting in Palestine increasingly infrequent. The Arab Legion became bigger villain, right after the truce in June 1948, its troops partly deactivated the Palestinians, mainly in September-November 1948, Transjordanian administration in January 1949 gave an authoritative instruction for the total disintegration of the regiments functions in Palestine and its army, the Arab Legion took control over headquarters in al-Jihad al-Muqaddas and Bie-Zayt where it arrested various members and demilitarized them. Nevertheless few jihad forces who fought along the side of invading armies of Arabs, in Samaria with Iraq, in Bethlehem with Egyptian, in Faluja and Suwayden with Iraq and in Jerusalem with Arab Legion (Nevo 1987: 26).

The AHC wished to transform the forces of Palestinians, mainly the one which fought along with the Egyptian in forming the core of regular army of the APG was to set up in Gaza, Once APG failed in transforming itself into a sovereign body, the al-Jihadal -Muqadda forces were

instructed by AHC in May 1949 to disintegrate. The military efforts of the Palestinians were restricted to some villages which succeeded in securing themselves until July 1948 were the village of Tira, Ain Ghazal, Ijzim and Jaba, they were the once who succeeded in attacking the transport of the Jews in the area (Ibid). Abdullah's camps were abandoned by the APG and its national council. In Negev the Israeli's were very violent and the cut Gaza in mid-October 1948 from the rest of the Arab parts of Palestine. Because of this jurisdiction of APG on various parts was excessively shortened.

Furthermore, around one month after its establishment, Egypt called for the withdrawing and evacuated its member to Cairo. Likewise, Abdullah planned for the occupation of Palestinian areas which were already under the preview of Arab Legion and given to it by the Iraqi forces. The followers of Abdullah arranged a public gathering, please were signed and appeals were made to Amman requesting for merger of these territories to the kingdom of Transjordan. Congress of Palestinians was held in Jericho on 1 December 1948, which boycotted the APG and revealed their doubts on the working of AHC. This congress gave Abdullah a mandate over Palestine to find a solution and found the unification with Transjordan beneficial. All these resolution gave a valid support for the legitimate occupation of the East Jerusalem by King Abdullah (Nevo 1987: 31).

The 'Arab Unity' discussions among Arab rulers impel to the establishment of AL. In spite of that the League did not represent awareness to Arab desire for unification. Instead, it was a bargain among Arab leaders and numerous schemes. Instead of agreement and understanding, mutual suspicion, anxiety, panic and fear were the prevailing denomination of the members of the League. Due to this most members gave up their political ambitions soon after the creation of League (Mayer 1986: 342). The creation of AL and its policies throughout the early 1950s can be perceive as a manoeuvre by the Saudi Arabia and Egypt to establish an authorized congress by which they could destroy effectively King Abdullah and Iraq's union over of the territories northern side of the West Asia. Egypt was able to control the League and pull for the Syrian vote to its side whenever it was needed. The appointment of Hajj Amin al-Husseini as spokesman for the Palestinian cause rather than the more qualified Musa Bey al-Alami, and the refusal to give Abdullah command of the AL forces in 1948 were the results of the Egyptian policy to keep the Hashemites at bay (Simon 1974: 323).

## **Conclusion**

The AL was established to facilitate the cooperation among Arab states. Its Articles mainly focused on settling dispute between the member states of the AL and since its inception it always looked for outside support for solving the Palestinian issue. The League was a podium to facilitate the political cooperation among the member states but it did not had army therefore had to depend on member state. The lack of consensus over the question of Palestine, provided an upper hand to Emir and later King of Transjordan in reviving his "Greater Syria plan". Abdullah was ambitious and wanted to fulfil the family dream by getting hold over East Jerusalem after the lost of Mecca and Medina. The failure of AL in unifying a coordinated policy on Palestine issue and its rejection to UNGA partition plan paved the way for Abdullah's intervention in Palestine.

Abdullah was also aware of the situation, therefore he established contacts with the Zionist leaders and offered place under his rule after his annexation of the Palestine but his intentions brought suspicion of the Arab world because of his plan and contacts with the Zionist. But Abdullah knew that Arabs cannot alone defeat the Zionist force without his support. The British announcement for withdrawing from Palestine raised his worries, as his kingdom was sustained on the military aid provided by Britain. After their departure Abdullah was worried as to who would pay for the standing of his army. He looked towards the AL but because of the suspicion Arab leaders refuse to give him money and he was delivered by the politics of Arab states namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, which believed that if was he given and aid and allowed to intervene in Palestine, Abdullah would occupy the whole of Palestine and would result in increasing his influence in the region.

But the lack of forces for the campaign against the Zionist made the AL to allow Abdullah to intervene in the war for Palestine. During this time his rivals, Saudi Arabia and Egypt also realised that the military force of King Abdullah's army cannot be ignored. The lack of coordination and suspicion among the Arab states resulted in defeat of the AL efforts for denouncing the partition plan of 1947. The Israeli forces were far more powerful than the Arabs had expected and above all they had coordination in their campaign against the Arabs. The invasion of Arab liberation forces on 15 May 1948 was very easily tackled by the Zionists.

The Israeli army were able to take over more territory than originally given to them in the UNGA plan. Arabs lost most of their territory. There was no coordination between the Egyptian army and the Arab Legion, as Abdullah did not send his army to help the Egyptians army and he also did not allow the Iraqi army to pass through Transjordan in order to station themselves against the Zionists. Abdullah and AL shared a unique relation, AL was suspicious of King Abdullah's aim and the latter used the AL podium for realising his Greater Syria plan, but both at the same time were dependent on each other's support. The AL wanted to use the Arab Legion in its campaign against the UNGA partition resolution and Abdullah on the other hand wanted to be the ruler of Palestine with himself as its head. But time to time AL brought resolution against his plan; it re-established the AHC but still failed to stop him from acquiring his goals.

When it did not succeed, it decided to give the powers and control of Palestine to the Palestinian leadership namely Hajj Amin al-Husseini and an enemy of Hashemite in Palestine by creating an APG which was recognised by all the member countries of the AL except Transjordan. When the opposition of Abdullah became very weak he decided to send his Legion to Palestinian territory in order to capture East Jerusalem the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina with the strict instruction of not to intervene in the territories given to Zionists by the UN. By doing this East Jerusalem came into the hands of King Abdullah. The Egyptian army was successful in capturing Gaza Strip and it came under the control of Egypt in the same way East Jerusalem became part of Transjordan, King Abdullah-I renamed his kingdom as Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. So the Palestinian not only lost their territories to the Zionists but also to the Arab states namely Egypt and Jordan. Both these countries along with Lebanon and Syria fought for Palestine with the aim of establishing a state of Palestine, but in reality they confiscated the land and made it part of their territories.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion**

Abdullah I Bin Al-Hussein was a power-loving person. He was born in Mecca, Hejaz and did his primary and secondary education in Constantinople, Ottoman Empire. It was here he developed his believe in the greatness of Arabs and became eager for unification of Arabs under the Hashemite rule and strived for the creation of “Arab Kingdom”. He was aware of the disadvantages they had in making this dream a reality and therefore he was ready to take the help of external power in achieving this goal. He was sent was by his father Sharif Hussein of Mecca in February 1914 to Cairo, for the approval of Hussein’s plan against the Ottoman Empire but the response of the British representatives was negative. However, when the World War I broke out it brought a major change in the British attitude towards the Hashemite and letters were exchanged between Sharif Hussein and British representative in Cairo from July 1915 to March 1916 commonly known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence whereby British gave an assurance that it will support the independence of all the Arab and would create an Arab Kingdom for Sharif Hussein and would defend him in times of crises.

At the same time, the British promised the same territories to French under the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916 and this territory was divided under the sphere of influence. In 1917 British promised the same land to the Zionist under the Balfour Declaration where it promised to help in establishing a “national home” for the Zionists. And the fall of Ottoman Empire in 1918 saw the Arabs free from the Ottoman rule. The League of Nations created the system of mandate and France and Britain were installed as the mandatory powers to administer this region. It was during this period Abdullah’s brother Faisal was expelled from Syria in 1920 that began Abdullah’s campaign against the French. He reached Maan in 1921 and his aim was to re-install Faisal in the thrown of Syria. But the British representatives stopped him at Maan and he was welcomed by the British official Alex Kirkbride and in April he was invited to attend the conference in Cairo. There Winston Churchill (the British official) convinced him to abandon his campaign against its ally France and in return he was made the Emir of Transjordan and Abdullah agreed to this.

By appointing Abdullah as the Emir of Transjordan, the Britain brought the tribal warfare to an end. Because of the Zionist opposition, the Britain sought an approval of the League of Nations

and excluded this territory from its promise to Jews for “national home” and gave nominal independence to Transjordan in 1923 and increased the subsidy to Transjordan. This was not enough to meet the expenses of the Emirate and his father Sharif Hussein declaring himself as the Caliph in April 1924 brought a change in British attitude. Therefore, Britain gave military assistance and delivered arms and ammunition to Ibn Saud, that resulted in expulsion of Sharif from Hejaz.

However, this did not bring about any change in the British attitude towards Abdullah who was significant importance to the British. But Ibn Saud did not stop hostility even after the expulsion of Sharif and his campaign towards the Hashemite continued but British played a major role in bringing down this hostility. Britain signed Bahra (1 November 1925) Hadda (2 November 1925) and Jeddah (20 May 1927) agreements with Ibn Saud whereby the latter agreed to bring down hostilities outside Nejd and Hejaz and he also agreed along with his dependencies that if they feel to strike a tribal campaign outside their territory in order to maintain law and order, they would first take the permission from London. In the process, Britain brought down the hostility towards Abdullah to a large extent.

In order to maintain its strangling hold over Transjordan, Britain brought Organic Law in the year 1928 which recognised Transjordan’s independence. Under this law finance and foreign affairs were still under the British Empire. This law introduced the Transjordanians to the parliamentary system, legislative assembly was created but all laws enacted would have to have the approval of British representative in Transjordan. Through this system Britain controlled Transjordan and Abdullah worked as the puppet of His Majesty’s Government. Britain also created army for the Emirate of Transjordan and John Bagot Glubb was brought into Transjordan. He helped in making the Arab Legion a major fighting force in the West Asia region.

Abdullah remained largely intact with all these changes which were brought by the British for the elevation of his Emirate. He was not like his father. He supported these transitions and was aware of the importance of British, because it was British who brought him to power after he had been soundly beaten on the battlefield by the Wahhabi forces of Ibn Saud which led to denial of him in the peace conference by the allies. This led to growing difficulties with his father and led



to Abdullah's resignation as a foreign minister. Therefore, he never underestimated British potential for the betterment of his Emirate.

Abdullah gave an evidence of his loyalty to the British during the Arab revolt of 1936 which was primarily against the British and Jewish immigration to Palestine. During this revolt Abdullah remained silent and did everything possible in curbing this revolt. On the other hand, the British government was worried about what would happen to their rule if this revolt reaches Transjordan but because of the loyalty of Abdullah to his majesty Britain was able to fight this revolt, especially in stopping the killings of British officials in Palestine. British government responded to the revolt by appointing a Peel Commission 1937 which recommended partition as the solution to the Arab-Zionist tensions in Palestine. Due to revolt that lasted until 1939 and because of the opposition to their rule, British official agreed to the demands of Palestinian Arabs and Grand Mufti and issued a White Paper. This scrapped the Balfour Declaration and as recommended by the Peel Commission report, partition was seen by the British as the only solution to the Palestine question. But, these recommendations were rejected by Zionists as well as the Arabs.

The White Paper of 1939 revived Abdullah aspiration for "Greater Syria plan". From the very beginning he never abandoned his plan for the creation of an Arab Kingdom under his rule. He believed that as the descended of Prophet Muhammad, the Hashemites have been destined to rule over the Arab world and after the loss of Hejaz to Ibn Saud. His father died in 1931, and Brother Faisal in 1933. Abdullah was looking for a right opportunity for realizing his dream for bringing the holy places of Islam under his rule and the White Paper was an opportunity for him. After the issuance these white paper, Abdullah diverted all his attention for the realization of his dream of Greater Syria under his rule.

The outbreak of World War II brought the Zionist and Emir Abdullah closer to each other. During this war when the forces of Hitler stood at the border of Egypt, it caused panic among the establishment of Transjordan, most of their supporter realized that if Germans won this war it would result in the overthrow of their regime, as it was a British ally. It was during this war when the relations were established between Emir Abdullah and the Zionist leadership as they shared the same enemy. During this period he showed a keen interest in the issues pertaining to

the Zionist that resulted in diverting the attention of Zionists to Emir Abdullah, who they believed was of great importance to their plan in Palestine.

The Arab League was established in the 1945 as the Arab states decided to have a forum where they could coordinate their policies. The league was established but it was a divided house on the issue of Palestine, Arab states largely supported the cause of Palestine but failed to have a coordinated policy on the issue of Palestine. It was largely due to the disgruntlement and distrust between Abdullah and other Arab states. The League did not leave any space for Abdullah to open his mouth for his plan for Palestine. All the Arabs suspected him, in the beginning they were ready to appoint him as the ruler of whole of Palestine by unifying the area of Palestine, Iraq and Syria under his rule but because of the opposition from other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, the moral enemy of the Hashemite, the plan was abandoned by Nahas Pasha (Egyptian prime minister) who later joined the Saudi bloc to oppose Abdullah.

Britain was in favour of Abdullah, but it became very weak and poor due to the Second World War. Therefore, it decided to end mandate and Abdullah was made the King of Transjordan in 1946 and this was the gift of British Empire to Abdullah for his wartime loyalty. This decision of British government further revived Abdullah's plan for Greater Syria and activated his interest in the affairs of Palestine. At the same time Britain decided to part with India, which was a major reason that made Britain to take part in the affairs of West Asian countries as it provided a shortest route to India. This decision of Britain brought a major shift in its policy towards Palestine and Transjordan and British government took a bold decision in February 1947 whereby, it decided to give up its commitments to Palestine and took a decision to submit the issue of Palestine to UN.

This decision by British government raised the aspirations of King Abdullah towards Palestine. On the other hand through Transjordan, British government thought of maintaining its strangle hold in the West Asia region because it made Abdullah king of Transjordan and it changed its name and became Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. However, British government continue to have control over his Arab Legion which was the most powerful armed force in the West Asian region. British were paying an annual subsidy (£2.5 million) to King Abdullah for the maintenance of his army. This subsidy was more than the annual budget of Transjordan (£0.75 million).

The first hypothesis says that King Abdullah's territorial aspirations concerning Palestine facilitated the emergence of Israel. The UN General Assembly convened a special session in April 1947 and appointed an eleven member committee (UNSCOP) which submitted two plans, namely minority and Majority plans for Palestine. Since King Abdullah had the most powerful army in the Arab world, he decided to capture the Palestinian territory after partition vote. Therefore, before the UN could decide on the issue, twelve days before the voting on UNSCOP plan, he secretly met Golda Meir on 17 November 1947 at Naharayim on River Jordan. In this meeting King Abdullah outlined his plan to the acting head of the Jewish Agency that he wanted to prevent his enemy Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj-Amin al-Husseini from assuming power in Palestine. In this meeting he told the Zionist leader that he wanted to annex Arab parts of Palestine to his kingdom and assured that he would not take any aggressive action against Jewish areas and would not join aggressive minded Arab coalition against the *Yishuv*.

However, the Zionists did not agree with his plan of taking over the whole of Palestine but this meeting clarified the stand of Transjordan against the Zionist. This promise brought the possibility of any Arab attack on Zionist. Because of his strength of army the Zionists were worried of the consequences if his Arab Legion would take action against *Yishuv* after the UN plan. This gave a positive signal to the Zionists that in case of hostility King Abdullah would remain neutral and this was how they were able to bring down the major chunk of opposition against them.

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly voted in favour of majority plan and adopted resolution 181 that called for the creation of Arab and Jewish states in Palestine. There were clashes between Arab and Jews in Palestine soon after the UN partition plan. But, King Abdullah did not send his army to support the Palestinians because of his promise to Golda Meir. There were many attacks by the *Haganah* against the Palestinians but King Abdullah did not do anything. The British decision not to assume any responsibility for the implementation of this resolution and its decision to withdraw on 14 May 1948 resulted in raising the territorial aspiration of King Abdullah and therefore he met Golda Meir again on 11 May 1948.

The Zionists had decided to declare its state after the British withdrawal but through this meeting with King Abdullah the Zionist leaders wanted to get the assurance whether his still committed to the promises that he made earlier to Golda Meir. King Abdullah gave an assurances that his a

Bedouin first and he would never break promise that he made to women and further stated that when he made those promise he was alone, but now he was one of five (a formal coalition against the *Yishuv*). But all this promise by him were part of his strategy for securing himself against the Zionist aggression with this he wanted to assure non-intervention of Zionists in his plan of capturing the Arab part of Palestine, especially East Jerusalem. This was important for him after his family's lost of Mecca and Medina to the Ibn Saud. Zionists were aware of Abdullah's territorial ambitions and instead of curbing they took benefit of his rivalry with Hajj-Amin and the Arab world, the major opponents of Jewish state in Palestine.

Second hypothesis says that King Abdullah's complex relations with Britain and his interest convergence with the Zionist leadership led to the downfall of the Arab plan for Palestine. As discussed in the third and fourth chapters, following the 1948 war, the government of king Abdullah had a strict orders from his majesty's government for not to intervene in the areas given to the Jews in the UN partition plan of 29 November. Britain maintain and controlled the Legion through its annual subsidies and it was aware of his territorial plans. Time to time it threatened him by issuing orders that in case of violation of his majesty's government orders, it would cut its annual subsidy. King Abdullah had no other sources for revenue; its kingdom had no resources so it had to depend on British aid for survival. Therefore, he decided to have a secret deal with the Zionists for peacefully achieving his dream of capturing Arab parts of Palestine.

The Arabs since the 1936 revolt rejected all the solution that call for the partition of Palestine, whether it was the Peel Commission report that suggested partition of Palestine, White Paper of 1939, or the UN partition resolution of 29 November 1948. The Arab stand on the Palestine question was a strong opposition to Jewish immigration and they believe was why the Arabs should pay the price for the crime that they did not commit. Arabs did not consider Palestine to become a Jewish state, their believed that Arabs have lived in this land for more than two thousand years and Jews have no place to come and settle in this area. But there was no unity among the Arabs over the Palestine issue despite these believes.

Since the establishment of AL in 1945, it never had a universal plan for the Palestine but rather it was a divided house on the issue of plan. Since its establishment they never gave Palestine a status of an independent state and hence it was not represented in the AL. Instead, they agreed to

its representation by the Palestinian Arab as a non-member state. There was enormous rivalry among the Arab world over the representation of Palestine. In AL it was represented by Musa al-Alami but, on one hand there was Hajj Amin al-Husseini (the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) who was of the believe that Palestine should be represented by him. Above all, there was King Abdullah of Transjordan, whose plan was to capture Palestine and include it into his kingdom, as the first step towards realizing his Greater Syria plan. The Arab world was divided on the line of who should be given the authority to represent Palestinian Arabs and because of distrust towards King Abdullah and his plan, and his rivalry with Saudis it was finally decided that Hajj Amin should represent Palestine. The latter colluded with the Nazis to bring down the Zionist plan for Palestine but Hitler failed in using the Arab opposition towards the Zionists.

But the UN resolution of 29 November 1947 united the Arab world against the Zionists and because of the blind support for actions to be taken against the Zionists compelled the Arab world to take the actions against the Zionists. The AL along with AHC rejected this partition plan and called it inhuman. Further, decided to take military actions against Israel after the declaration of independence by them. In this plan most of the Arab countries came forward, major development after the partition resolution was King Abdullah also join this bloc of military actions against Israel. At the same time he gave assurance to Zionist that he would not attack the Jewish areas given to them by the UN partition plan. When Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948, hours before the British withdrawal, the Arab countries began their invasion of newly created state of Israel.

The armies of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia sent their armies to Israel and invasion began on 15 May. But because of the lack of coordination among the Arab armies it failed to have a desire outcome. The distrust of King Abdullah by the other Arab countries was to a level that they did not let him lead the campaign against the Zionists because of this King Abdullah did not allow the forces of Iraq to pass through Transjordan and position themselves on the border against the Zionists. King Abdullah had advantageous position in this war as he was in control of central Palestine and other Arab countries did not like him having advantageous positions. They were afraid that king Abdullah would confiscate this territory to his kingdom. Therefore, the Arab countries try to snatch the fruits of victory from his hands and declared All Palestine Government in September 1948 and appointed Hajj Amin al-Husseini as

its head. This government was recognised by all the Arab states, except Transjordan. King Abdullah refused to recognise the APG and this new government failed in protecting the Palestinian Arabs. Since King Abdullah had major positions in Palestine and his army succeeded in capturing East Jerusalem and this led to failure of Arab plan for Palestine, whose plan was aimed at making Palestine an independent state. King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farouk of Egypt along with the Zionists succeeded in confiscating Palestinian land, Transjordan captured the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Egypt captured Gaza Strip. After his annexation of the West Bank, King Abdullah changed the name of his country to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. King Abdullah was killed by Palestinian Arab Mustafa Ashu who believed that his going to sign a peace treaty with the Zionists, thus both of the hypothesis outlined for this research are validated.

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