

**US RECONSTRUCTION POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ,
2003-2011**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the
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To My Beloved Parents and Brothers



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DATE:21 July 2017

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “US Reconstruction Policy Towards Iraq, 2003-2011” submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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List of Abbreviations

AFCAP	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
AUSA	Association of the US Army
BASIC	British-American Security Information Council
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Command
CORs	Contracting Officer Representatives
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPA-IG	Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DFI	Development Fund for Iraq
DoD	Department of Defense
EIPG	Energy Infrastructure Planning Group
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EPRT	Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRD	Gulf Region Division (also Gulf Region District)
HR	House Resolution
IG	Inspector General
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCLEA	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Account (INL)
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State)
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

IRPO	Iraq Reconstruction Procurement Office
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISFF	Iraq Security Forces Fund
ISG	Iraq Study Group
ITAM	Iraq Training and Advisory Mission
JCC-I	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq
KBR	Kellogg Brown & Root
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MNF-I	Multi-National Force-Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OCRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSC-I	Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
OSP	Office of Special Plans
PL	Public Law
PCO	Project and Contracting Office
PCR	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project
PDP	Police Development Program
PNAC	Project for the New American Century

PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Professional Services Council
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreements
TAL	Transitional Administrative Law
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destructions
WW II	World War II

PREFACE

Post-war reconstruction is indispensable for war-torn or damaged societies for the restoration of their pre-conflict situation. It has been an important part of the US foreign policy since the end of World War II. Post-war reconstruction is imperative for all those countries emerging out of war ravages.

The US reconstruction policy in Iraq has enormous significance and policy implications for US foreign policy. The reconstruction policy towards a significant country in the Middle East is of immense importance for the whole Middle-East region. It is very interesting to understand the genesis and evolution and the length and depth of this policy and the developments that surrounded it. The following research work would focus on the genesis, evolution, and development of the US reconstruction policy towards war-torn Iraq (2003). This research work would attempt to analyse the extension of political strategies of President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama, as their reconstruction policy towards Iraq.

The dissertation takes into account a comprehensive understanding of Washington's interpersonal and bureaucratic infighting and how it impinged on reconstruction policy towards Iraq. It studied the ideological and political context of planning reconstruction after the US invasion in 2003. As an aftereffect of the US invasion in 2003, Iraq was devastated. Reconstructing was imperative to recover the widespread damage in the country. Regime change was carried out and bestowing democracy to Iraq as well extend it to other countries of the Middle-East region was expected as an important outcome. The following research takes into account a comprehensive understanding of all the major developments around it. The study would help to examine constraints faced by US policy makers while framing and implementing reconstruction policy. A thorough analysis of the circumstances that compelled them to continue their endeavour in Iraq for more than nine years is also pertinent to this study.

The following research takes into account the US policy miscalculations for a complex and miscellaneous country like Iraq. This study critically examines the implications of policy miscalculations for the existing problems in Iraq, which drove it further away from peace and stability. The dissertation has attempted to analyse why reconstruction policy in the duration of 2003-2011, did not show the promised result as claimed by the President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama. A thorough study would assess why reconstruction policy in the

duration of 2003-2011, did not show the promised result as claimed by the President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama.

The dissertation would also aim to investigate the challenges posed by political, social and economic dynamics of Iraq. It would focus on ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq following the U.S. led military operation, which hampered the US-led reconstruction. The violence stemming from brutal and internal Iraqi conflicts between Arabs and Kurds and between Sunnis and Shi'ites and its repercussions for US reconstruction efforts would also be assessed.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The US reconstruction policy, in general, encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, and humanitarian programs and mechanisms. Reconstruction policy, itself is not new to the US foreign policy. It has been a part of the political activities for the US since the end of Second World War. The US reconstruction programs in Europe and Japan after the Second World War was a historical success. After this, the US has been frequently engaged in the reconstruction efforts in many countries including Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq among others.

As far as the reconstruction of Iraq is concerned, it was initiated by George W. Bush administration after the US-led military operation in Iraq (2003) was over. The post-war reconstruction policy of president Bush Jr. incorporated a large spectrum of activities including emergency relief, infrastructure building, political development, urban planning, economic and social rehabilitation, the return of the refugees, and reintegration of soldiers. Americans expected that the success story of the US reconstruction program in Europe and Japan would be repeated in Iraq too. However, according to several sources, including the official ones, it seemed that despite earlier successful experiences of execution of reconstruction programs in Europe and Japan, the US-led Coalition did not show the same great skills while executing the reconstruction works in Iraq. Such assessments raise important questions about such a policy and its implications for US foreign policy as a whole. In particular, the study of US reconstruction policy towards Iraq would provide the causal factors that led to the making of such a policy and attempt to explain the outcomes by examining a variety of reasons. This policy would also help in testing the contention that argues reconstruction is tied to discernible political priorities. At the same time, critical literature on the subject has also made it relevant and necessary to explore the reasons behind the limited success of the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq.

RECONSTRUCTION

According to noted Arab-Israeli scholar Jabareen (2013), the concept of post-war reconstruction in Iraq includes four interrelated basic components. These are political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, social reconstruction and the provision of general security (Jabareen: 2013). Other experts like, Barakat (2005) insightfully posit five key areas of reconstruction which includes governance, security, participation, economic opportunity, and provision of basic services. Reconstruction in the most basic sense entails the replacement of infrastructure that existed prior to the event that destroyed or disabled that

infrastructure. The event could be man-made or natural, with reconstruction bringing a return to the pre-event infrastructure status quo (McKechnie 2002).

Francis Fukuyama (2006) gave a rich and detailed definition of three separate but linked terms nation building, state building, and reconstruction. According to him, reconstruction refers to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre-conflict situation (Fukuyama: 2006). Development, as he writes, refers to the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth. Development transforms the society into something that it has not been previously. He differentiates between development and reconstruction. He writes that reconstruction is the more attainable task in comparison to the development and the outside powers have often shown their ability to accomplish the reconstruction work abroad, historically. Development is a comparatively more difficult task because it demands creation of new institutions and dismantling or at least weakening of the existing official and unofficial institutions. Fukuyama argues that reconstruction is more successful in developed states because of presence of strong government institutions. In Fukuyama's view, the term nation building is American specific. He writes that nation-building is state-building coupled with economic development.

Fukuyama argues that the US initiated a great task by adding development to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. According to him, Iraq does not fit perfectly into his restricted framework of reconstruction but encompasses both, reconstruction and development. Before the 2003 war, Iraq possessed established institutions and some of them even, highly rated in terms of social services in the Middle East before the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The US led Coalition Provisional Authority dismantled many of the existing institutions of Iraq, including the Iraqi Army, intelligence services amongst others. In his view, the removal of the Ba'athist regime and the endeavour to establish a democratic regime expanded the scope of the US mission in Iraq to such an extent that the US risked failure. Yet another critical perspective noted that it was essential that the United States recognize that it was perilously close to reaching the point of no return in Iraq and that it had little time to turn things around (Pollack 2006).

US RECONSTRUCTION POLICY: IDEATIONAL ROOTS

The stated goals of the reconstruction policy in Iraq were democratization, free market and development. The US-led military operation in Iraq in March-April 2003 ousted Saddam

government from power. The U.S. president George W. Bush and the Neoconservative ideologues of his administration asserted that intervention and regime change was necessary to forcibly disarm Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, President Bush Jr. argued that if setting up democracy in Japan and Germany after WW II was successful, then it should also be successful in Iraq. He said that the US would help to rebuild a prosperous, peaceful and free Iraq.

US the reconstruction policy in Iraq apparently reflected the political agenda of George W. Bush. On October 27, 2003, the President in his Oval office directed Ambassador Bremer to rebuild Iraq as a free, secure and peaceful country for long-term peace in the world. He evinced that a democratic and revitalised Iraq is very important for US national interest. To achieve this goal he looked forward to a sustained US commitment for reconstruction of Iraq. He anticipated that rise of a peaceful and democratic Iraq in the Middle East would promote reform and security in the world.

While asking for supplemental funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, President George Bush Jr. proposed a general strategy for the Middle East region in the Congress in 2003 (Jabareen 2013:113). He explained that the United States and its allies would bring liberty and democracy to the troubled Middle East region. Ostensibly, the US reconstruction policy was aimed at developing Iraq as a reliable strategic partner in counter-terrorism initiatives of the US. The US policy makers perhaps expected that a new and revitalized Iraq would not sponsor terrorist organizations believed to have flourished under Saddam Husain.

President George W. Bush released the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, in November 2005. This important strategy document stated that the victory would be accomplished when Iraq would emerge as a peaceful, stable, united, and secure as well as integrated into the rest of international community. It was expected that Iraq would be a reliable partner of the US, in its global war on terror. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the US, stated that the war in Iraq would be won by only through unified efforts of the U.S., Iraq and the international community. He expected that all of them would work together to meet various needs of Iraqi people, including the political, economic, security, and other needs. (US GAO: 2006).

Carol Pascual (2004), the head of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (OCRS) under the Department of State, explicitly mentioned that the ultimate goal of reconstruction was to facilitate the benefits of peace, democracy and free market to the citizens of restructured nations (Etzioni 2007:114). On May 9, 2003, in an address to the

University of South Carolina, President Bush Jr. intimated that a new and prosperous Iraq would emerge as an outcome of reconstruction (Bush 2003). The reconstructed Iraq would be enough capable of offering a better quality of life, improved services, and new institutions to its citizens.

Stuart J. Bowen (2008) writes that relief and reconstruction in Iraq was an extension of the political, economic, and military strategy of the president George W. Bush. The US led coalition started the humanitarian relief and reconstruction of Iraq. However, the US also perceived the need for international support for reconstruction efforts as it was seen to be substantially important for the global fight against terror. According to the Department of State preparation for the multilateral donor's conference for reconstruction began in June 2003 under the auspices of the United Nations. The UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund agreed to conduct a needs assessment for reconstruction of Iraq. In October 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1511 that called on the international community to support the Iraqi people at this time of need and opportunity (UNSC 2003:992).

Thus an "International donor's conference for Iraqi reconstruction" was held in Madrid in October 2003. The purpose of this conference was to secure international cooperation and adequate funding for reconstruction aid. In the conference, the US and the international community agreed to make sincere efforts to rebuild economic infrastructure and introduce democratic government in Iraq. To achieve this goal the international donors and partners pledged \$33 billion for reconstruction of Iraq, in a period of four years (2004-2007). The United States as the leading contributor pledged \$20 billion. The US reconstruction aid was intended to create a foundation for a strong and secure U.S.-Iraqi alliance.

According to a Council on Foreign relations report, some important countries including France, Germany, and Russia promised to share the burden with the US by reducing the huge debt burden of Iraq. They did not pledge any new fund for reconstruction, yet cooperated to the US led reconstruction efforts. Some countries also committed to provide products or services as an alternative of monetary help. Iran offered to donate electricity and facilitated gas and oil export. Bulgaria and Egypt offered technical assistance. Some countries offered food supply like Vietnam donated rice and Sri Lanka gave 100 tons of tea to Iraq (Pan 2005)

INFLUENCE OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATURE AND BUREAUCRACY ON RECONSTRUCTION POLICY

The US reconstruction policy in Iraq (2003) was shaped by the interplay of various personalities and processes at the top echelons of the US government. As the records reveal, then President George W. Bush prominently influenced the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. Though, he was strongly opposed to the US involvement in nation building in any country during the presidential election (2000). He argued that US-led reconstruction and “armed social work” in the 1990s was an inappropriate use of the military as well as taxpayers money. However, the event of September 11, 2001, had significantly influenced his reconstruction policy.

In September 2002, George Bush Jr. proclaimed the National Security Strategy in which he emphasized that the United States would progressively make efforts to spread the optimism of democracy, development, free markets and free trade in every part of the world. The US reconstruction policy in Iraq can be perceived as an extension of US National Security Strategy, as it echoed these aspects. On October 25, 2003, President Bush Jr. in his radio address to the nation clearly spelt out the purpose and goal of US reconstruction policy. In his speech he illustrated his latest address to the UN members where he clearly mentioned that peace and security of Iraq would ensure peace and security of every free nation across the world (Bush 2003). He encouraged the UN member countries to support reconstruction efforts of the US led coalition to bring hope, freedom and stability in Iraq. He pitched for international support for the Iraqi reconstruction. In response, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1511. The resolution 1511 endorsed the presence of a multinational force in Iraq under the US command and also urged for larger international support for reconstruction of Iraq (UNSC 2003:992).

In his radio address, dated October 25, 2003, he mentioned the details of Madrid Conference, in which more than 70 nations and many international bodies including the World Bank and UNICEF were represented. They pledged billions of dollars to aid the US led reconstruction. George W. Bush accepted it as a welcome step, as well as, a supportive move for the success of the US led military coalition working to improve the life of the common Iraqi people (Bush 2003). In addition, he also spoke about the progress that coalition was making in Iraq like rebuilding schools, power plants, health clinics and signs of recovery in the economic life of cities. The Iraqi people started taking incipient steps steadily, towards a democratic and

free society. He hoped that the process of drafting a new constitution would be followed by free elections very soon (Bush 2003).

In order to facilitate the Iraqi reconstruction, President Bush removed sanctions imposed on Iraq earlier. On May 7, 2003, with President Aznar of Spain, in a joint press address on removing the sanctions on Iraq, he said that the US sanctions enforced on Iraq's old government were no more relevant, hence removed, to facilitate the Iraqi reconstruction. He directed Treasury Secretary Snow to make necessary changes for facilitating access of American companies and citizens to Iraq so that the essential commodities and necessary equipment for reconstruction could be exported to Iraq (Bush 2003).

In his remarks at Signing of HR 3289, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan he went further:

Our investment in the future of Afghanistan and Iraq is the greatest commitment of its kind since the Marshall Plan. By this action, we show the generous spirit of our country, and we serve the interest of our country, because our security is at stake. I appreciate the solid bipartisan support for this bill in the House and the Senate. I also appreciate that reconstruction funds for Iraq have been provided in the form of grants so that this struggling nation is not burdened with new debt at a moment of new hope. (Bush 2003)

The legislative branch of the US government played a tremendously important role by not only providing funds for reconstruction work but also set the framework for US policy towards Iraq. The Congress kept a close oversight on executive performance in order to minimise waste and fraud. In April 2003, the Congress provided \$2.5 billion for facilitating immediate humanitarian relief in post-war Iraq through 'Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund'. In November 2003, the President signed and the Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defence and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (<https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/3289>). Through this act \$18.45 billion was added in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund for security, relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pcaac210.pdf). Furthermore, the Congress, by an amendment to Public Law 108-106 in October 2004, created Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) helped the Congress in the oversight of the huge amount of taxpayer dollars appropriated for the reconstruction funds for Iraq.

In the financial year 2005, the Congress had authorized a very important fund named the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). It funded the training, life support, equipping and sustainment

of Iraqi security forces. This fund channeled \$18 billion for support to Iraqi security forces. The ownership of the security assistance account was given to the Department of Defense rather than the State Department. This marked a sharp departure from the historic practice of giving this responsibility to the Department of State, which needs elucidation. A total of \$60 billion was allocated by the Congress for reconstruction from April 2003 to September 2012 (Bowen 2013:9). These funds came mainly through the Department of Defence and partially through the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development. The Department of Defense directed the expenditure of more than 75% of the funds allocated for Iraqi reconstruction. USAID spent almost 15% of money while Department of State had the responsibility of less than 10% of the total obligations (SIGIR 2013). It is worth to note that the Department of State carried the responsibility for direction of the reconstruction program since May 2004, still it had small amount of fund placed under it.

The formulation of reconstruction policy was an inter-agency process in which Department of Defense, Department of State, US Central Command (CENTCOM), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), National Security Council Principal Committees, National Security Council Deputies Committees, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) etc. played a very crucial role. It is important to note that there was no specific department or institution which had specialization in dealing post-war reconstruction work. Hence a leading agency was to be selected to integrate the valuable inputs provided by various departments and agencies. For this purpose, the White House decided to rely on the Department of Defense and assigned it the lead role in order to bring unity of effort in planning and managing the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq.

Changing military leadership in Iraq deeply influenced the US reconstruction policy. The retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed to the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on April 21, 2003. He had the responsibility to restore normalcy and retrieve the situation of intensifying conflict quickly. He failed to implement it due to intense violence, insurgency, loot and criminal activities. The Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III replaced Garner in May 2003. He was the head of newly created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer's arrival in Baghdad symbolised a major shift in U.S. reconstruction policy towards Iraq as he adopted a maximalist approach of reconstruction which was aimed at nation-building on a grand scale. The CPA's reconstruction plan was intended to transform almost every aspect of Iraqi political system, economy, and society. It

made a strategic decision to disallow the former Baath Party members from participating in the new Iraqi government. The CPA also took the decision to disband the military and security forces of Saddam regime. He delayed the return of sovereignty to Iraqi people. Bremer's decisions changed the role of the United States in Iraq from that of liberator to that of occupier with significant, long-term, costly implications (Caldwell 2011:183). Caldwell (2011) criticized the Bremer's decision to disband the Iraqi military and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's decision not to send enough American troops to Iraq. According to him, it worsened the security situation in Iraq and created a security vacuum in post-war Iraq. L. Paul Bremer III is of contrary view on the same. He writes that by the time of US victory of Baghdad (9 April 2003), no organized Iraqi military units existed. In reality, there was no need to dissolve the Iraqi army (Bremer et al: 2008:36).

The Neoconservatives also influenced the US reconstruction policy in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹ They argued that democracies rarely fight one another or experience internal conflict. So the US should make sincere efforts to build a democratic political structure in Iraq and Afghanistan. They expected that US-led political reconstruction of Iraq would make it a stable and democratic country, which would promote peace and security in the world. When the Bush administration launched a massive reconstruction programme for Iraq in order to restore peace, stability, and prosperity in Iraq, many rightly pointed to the influence of the neoconservatives. For instance, Kenneth Pollack argued that some important Bush administration officials influenced by neoconservatives believed that Saddam was the source of all evils in the Middle East. Once he had gone out of power, the region would progress towards prosperity and progress. They did not feel any major necessity to plan for long term reconstruction for Iraq (Pollack: 2006). Their hopes and predictions did not prove authentic. The ground realities of Iraq were very different and often hostile for US-led Coalition.

While the reconstruction plans were being finalized and implemented, the situation in Iraq was rapidly deteriorating. In the three years period, starting from 2003, when the reconstruction program commenced, some harsh developments took place in Iraq. Many in

¹ Neo-conservatism was a prominent political movement which originated in the US in 1960s. Neo-conservatives, also known as neocons strongly believe in promotion of democracy abroad, even by use of military force, as a means to enhance US national interest. The US reconstruction policy in Iraq was very much influenced by the neoconservatives. The influence of neoconservatives on foreign policy achieved its culmination during President George W. Bush administration.

the US described it as an avoidable mistake engendered by discoordinated US planners. As a White House Fact Sheet in 2005 acknowledged that over the course of this war, the Coalition learnt that winning the battle for Iraqi cities was just a primary step. The Coalition had to adjust itself to win the "battle after the battle" by helping Iraqis consolidate their gains and keep the terrorists from returning (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/57735.htm>).

Since its inception of US led reconstruction in Iraq in 2003, violence stemmed out of the struggle between the Coalition forces and the loyalists of Saddam regime (Cordesman 2007:2). Soon, the vacuum generated by the dissolved military and police forces and de-Baathification substantiated this conflict (Jarrar 2006:1). The new political order engineered by the US intensified the already existing divisions between Iraqis. Shia, Kurds and some Sunnis joined the government but, for different reasons. The marriage of convenience for entering in political order was not based on fair political processes and competition for power, hence converted into chaos and violence.

INSTABILITY AND VIOLENCE

By the end of 2006, Iraq had descended into a full-blown sectarian civil war. The noted author Linda Robinson wrote that

“By the summer of 2006, Baghdad was on fire. Sectarian violence was spilling over into all-out war, and it swept up hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.” (Robinson 2008:14)

The violence stemmed from brutal and internal conflicts between Kurds and Arabs and between Sunnis and Shiites took the form of a civil war. The Sunnis fought for recovering power and the Shiites for keeping it with them. The Kurds also adopted violent means for autonomy in their territory. The end result was civil war conditions in Iraq in 2006. The bombing of the Golden Mosque on February 22, 2006 exposed the deadly Sunni-Shi'ite clashes that originated in 2003.

By 2006, Americans well understood that President Bush had misled the US into an unnecessary war causing immeasurable pain for young American sacrificing their lives and draining the US treasury as well. The majority of US citizens were not in favour of wars at the expense of the lives of their young countrymen. The changing mood of the common public also reflected in the mid-term Congressional elections of 2006. Though many factors including both the national and the local, affected the election results, the statistics shows a defeat of President Bush's foreign policy. A pre- poll nationwide survey of October 5, 2006,

by the Pew Research Center, found 58% of the public saying that the U.S. military effort in Iraq was not going well and a 47% of the people believed that the war in Iraq was not helping, but hurting the war on terrorism (<http://www.people-press.org/2006/10/05/iraq-looms-large-in-nationalized-election/>). An anti-Bush and anti-war voting in the mid-term Congressional elections of 2006 led a higher turnout for the Democrats (Domhoff: 2006). It is important to note that the Democrats gained the control of the House of Representative and the Senate, for the first time since 1994. The deteriorating Iraqi security and stability and defeat in the mid-term Congressional elections of 2006, compelled President Bush Jr. to accept the poor outcome of reconstruction policy towards Iraq, in public. In December 2006, for the first time, President Bush accepted that the US was not winning the war in Iraq. He also acknowledged the grave situation of Iraq in a key point,

“In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States” (Bush 2007).

The President stated that aftereffect of failure in Iraq would result in an expansion of Islamic extremism, the creation of a safe haven for terrorists and progress in Iran’s nuclear program. He announced changes in military and diplomatic command. President accepted the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld and appointed General David Petraeus as the new commander of all U.S. forces in Iraq. The change of leadership was also followed by major changes in US reconstruction strategy.

The President committed additional US funds for reconstruction and the expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. In January 2007, the President announced another important decision to send about 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Iraq to support the new American strategy known as the “surge” (Katzman 2015:7). The surge of troops was accompanied by increased civilian efforts and revised counterinsurgency strategy designed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General David Petraeus, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. It ushered in a new era of reconstruction and soon it began to pay dividends also (Sky 2011). By the end of 2008, the surge had seemingly desired effect on security and reconstruction work.

In the 2008 presidential election campaign, Barack Obama promised to end the war in Iraq within sixteen months of taking the office. On the end of the war in Iraq, President Obama in

his remark at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, proclaimed that the US left behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq" for the common Iraqi people (Obama 2011). In contrast, the Secretary of Defence Robert Gates cautioned against the premature victory parades or self-congratulation by President Obama.

The US reconstruction policy in Iraq from 2003 had enormous significance and policy implications for US foreign policy. While it was supported by an international coalition, the bulk of the money came from the US. The reconstruction policy started by Bush Jr. administration continued and evolved during Obama administration though not on such a scale. The role of the Congress was important in both funding and approving the interagency process that would carry on the policy. Thus, given the length and depth of this policy towards a significant country in the Middle East, it is necessary to understand the genesis, evolution, and developments that surrounded it. Further, the brief account of the two administrative approaches reveals the sharp differences that need to be probed so as to establish causal linkages. The Iraqi reconstruction policy is also an interesting case study that reveals how the decision making in US foreign policy process is multifaceted and complex. Thus this study would look at why reconstruction announced and promoted by Bush lost support and esteem by 2008. The proposed study will examine the factors that brought changes in Obama's approach of Iraqi reconstruction. It is important to draw lessons from nation-building efforts in Iraq for which the US struggled for almost a decade to make it successful. At the same time, it is equally important to learn from the experiences of Iraqi reconstruction and take necessary initiatives.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE:

Andrew Rathmell in the article "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" (Oct. 2005), published in *International Affairs* writes that the post-war reconstruction of fragile and failing states has emerged as a primary concern for the international community in last few years. The author argues that post-conflict reconstruction policy has a leaning tendency to draw from the study of various disciplines ranging from political science, health economics, urban planning and project management and thus making it multidisciplinary. This article used the case-study of Iraqi reconstruction under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The case study focused on the planning aspect, institutions required and management processes for effectiveness and efficiency in the use of resources for reconstruction.

Yosef Jabareen, in the article "Conceptualizing "Post-Conflict Reconstruction" and "Ongoing Conflict Reconstruction" of Failed States" (2013), argued that there is a need to develop theoretical and practical knowledge of reconstruction for a complex and miscellaneous country like Iraq. The persistence of violence, political conflict and security problems shows a profound lack of study of reconstruction in such circumstances. His proposed concept of Post-war reconstruction in Iraq includes four interrelated basic components. These are political reconstruction, social reconstruction, economic reconstruction, and general security. Political reconstruction is crucial for building a legitimate, stable and capable state. It is equally important to establish democratic governance and pluralistic national institutions having the capability to safeguard the common interests of its people.

Social reconstruction promotes stability and security in the country by reconstructing and strengthening the local communities with the help of their own leaders. It also incorporates the creation or nurturing of civil societies to make it more vibrant. It also supports inculcation of voluntary cooperation to promote the type of political culture that can limit state power. Economic reconstruction incorporates rebuilding of the country's physical infrastructure, promotion of self-sustainable economy and creation of rules, supporting legislations and institutions that enable a functional market economy. It also develops institutional capacity, so that it becomes easy to join the international economic community. Yosef Jabareen pointed towards the contrast of the prevalent paradigm of post-conflict reconstruction and the reconstruction mission in Iraq which took place amidst deep on-going conflict. On this basis of security problems, he favours a change in the concept for post-war reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan from that of Germany or Japan.

Roger Mac Ginty in the article "The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq" (Aug., 2003) published in *Third world quarterly* gives an outline of the development of post-war reconstruction as a specific area of focus for humanitarian organizations and academia. The article conveys that the post-war reconstruction includes a large spectrum of activities like emergency relief, political restructuring infrastructure building, urban planning, economic and social rehabilitation, the return of the refugees, and reintegration of soldiers. Meanwhile, the author also examines the plans for the US reconstruction plan for post-war Iraq. He criticized the reconstruction plan conceived in Washington for a democratic deficit.

James Dobbins, et. al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2005) present a policy analysis of USA-led democratization in different countries. The book studies seven such cases in a comparative way which includes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The author supports the Bush administration's approach of democracy promotion in non-Western societies. Based on this study, policy recommendations are derived for various issues like holding of elections, the building of civil society, humanitarian help, economic reconstruction, military and police presence, and more, in order to maximize the success of democratization. The book overlooks the importance of cultural factors in influencing the outcome of nation building efforts and seems over-optimistic in respect to making the world democratic. The author failed to foresee the persistent and increasingly dangerous armed resistance against the democratisers like the US and other Western countries.

Caldwell Dan in his book *Vortex of Conflict: US Policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq* (2011) outlines and analyses US policy in three conflict-torn countries. The book explains how Washington's interpersonal and bureaucratic infighting shapes policymaking. The book also describes the Bush administration's assumptions regarding al Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq; war planning and post-war reconstruction policy. It provides a deep insight into inter-agency policymaking making processes. This book helps to understand the US policy miscalculations in Iraq which led to an escalation of the problem and drove Iraq further away from peace and stability. It helps in understanding the socio-political context of today's conflict in Iraq. Dan also discusses US policy initiatives linked to the war on terror and comes out with a precise analysis of the reasons of the US military operation in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also studied the ideological, political, cultural, historical, and military context of these two wars. Caldwell concluded the book by compiling the cardinal lessons from the wars which can find applications in the future conflicts.

David L. Phillips book titled *Losing Iraq: Inside the Post-war Reconstruction Fiasco*(2005) describes various planning proposition by various executive agencies and departments. He argues that there was no absence of a good plan for the reconstruction of Iraq. According to him, a very important document titled "Future of Iraq" was prepared by the State Department. Many Middle East experts and Iraqi exiles were consulted while preparing the document titled "Future of Iraq". It was Pentagon political appointees who decided to subsidize the efforts of the Department of State for Iraq war and reconstruction.

David Phillips was a part of the group preparing “Future of Iraq”. The “Future of Iraq” document figured out various situations very carefully and extensively and suggested policy alternatives to cope up with the every issue that the Coalition Authority encountered later. This rich document which could have helped in the reconstruction of Iraq, was undermined and ignored by the Bush Jr. administration. Phillips put forth the argument that the Future of Iraq Project represented a blueprint for success, which may be an exaggeration to some extent. This is worth to note that the Iraqis, involved in preparing the Future of Iraq Project, were absent from their country for decades and had little knowledge about the contemporary ground realities. Therefore, the plan prepared by them may not be very suitable and realistic as explained by the author.

Phillips’s book covers the bureaucratic struggle between the State Department and Defence Departments for different course of actions in Iraq. The author put blame on Bremer for the deadly violence, looting, organized crime and chaos which led to civil war in 2006. Decisions made by Bremer, in the beginning of his tenure as the head of the CPA made a major shift in the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. The author explains the policy mistakes made by the US policy makers and the CPA in detail. The book documents the process of returning sovereignty to the common Iraqi people.

Leffler, Melvyn P. (2004), in the article titled “*Bush's Foreign Policy*” explain the goals of disseminating America's core values including democracy and freedom. The article explains the democratic peace theory and its implications for the Middle East. The author opines that democratizing the Middle East would perpetuate America's core values. He argues that unilateral initiatives or preventive alone can not democratize the Middle East. He further elaborates that democratization requires much more patience, huge resources, imagination, and commitment than the Bush administration or possibly any U.S. administration could willing devote. He says that Bush's foreign policy should not be criticized for a radical departure from previous administrations, rather it shows continuity by propagating the spirit of freedom and democracy. However, it may be criticized for its meager success.

Mark P. Lagon, (2011) in the article “Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community” explain the Bush’s approach to military action as a means to facilitate or restore democracy. After 9/11, President George W. Bush gave a strategic priority to the democratization of Middle East. However, he disagreed with military intervention in Iraq as a strategy of democracy promotion. The author also highlights

the bipartisan consensus on democracy promotion as a supportive factor for with President George W. Bush.

David B. Magleby (Edt.) (2008), in the book titled *The Battle for Congress: Iraq, Scandal, and Campaign Finance in the 2006 Election* argues that the war in Iraq was a significant factor in the 2006 mid-term elections of Congress. The author also opines that the 2008 Presidential elections might be influenced by the war on terror and reconstruction policy of president Bush Jr. It provides an in-depth examination of the ways in which campaign resources are allocated among candidates, interest groups, and parties during the midterm elections. This book looks at the changes in the Congress in 2006 and possibility of changes in the White House in 2008.

Dulio, David A., and Trumbore, Peter F. (2009) in the article "Running on Iraq or Running from Iraq?: Conditional Issue Ownership in the 2006 Midterm Elections" published in *Political Research Quarterly* examines the role of Iraq as a campaign issue in the 2006 midterm elections. The authors found that the issue of Iraq was one of the central issues which impacted the midterm Congressional election of 2006. They reach to the conclusion that it was not the factor but a strong one in the midterm elections of 2006.

James Dobbins, et. al. "America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq" (2005) present a policy analysis of USA-led democratization in different countries. The book studies seven such cases in a comparative way which includes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan. Based on this study policy recommendations are derived for various issues like holding of elections, economic reconstruction, humanitarian help, the building of civil society, military and police presence, and more, in order to maximize the success of democratization. The book overlooks the importance of cultural factors in influencing the outcome of nation building efforts and seems over-optimistic with respect to making the world more democratic. The opinion "democracy is transferable to non-Western societies", without any reservations appears paradigmatic. The definite statements like "there is no reason why Iraq cannot be democratized and establish democratic institutions and a pluralist polity" reflects a way of thinking, which may not be applied to Iraq. The noble idea of democratization of the Middle East and persistent armed resistance against the US and other Western "democratisers" tells a different story. The conclusions of the book are noteworthy. It concludes that time, manpower, money and security are important factors. The political reform will not be effective until it is accompanied by economic growth.

Efraim Karsh in the commentary “Making Iraq Safe for Democracy” (2003) analyses the preparedness of Iraq's society for democratization. It describes the Violence among various ethnic groups in Iraq which may hinder the US reconstruction efforts. It also explains the role of the U.S. and Great Britain in post-war reconstruction.

Richard H. Brown in the article, “Reconstruction of Infrastructure in Iraq: end to a means or means to an end?” (2005) explores the enigma of reconstruction with short-term goals in the circumstances characterized by violence with the possibility of maintaining a long-term vision. The author argues that the reconstruction of Iraq was not post-conflict reconstruction in real terms. The conflict and the day by day increasing insurgency endured for a long term. It retarded the reconstruction. The slowed pace of reconstruction also deepens the violence as Coalition Provisional Authority failed to fulfill the expectations of common people. This article is written by the author on the basis of his own working experiences, as an engineer in Iraq. He worked for Coalition Forces in Basrah and in Baghdad for one year (2003-2004). The author criticizes the top-down approach of imposed reconstruction. As well as, he pointed towards the exclusion or little participation of local Iraqi population resulted in the limited outcome.

Anthony H. Cordesman of CSIS in his commentary “Iraq: Security and the Challenges of Lasting “victory” (Oct. 2009)” points out that the dire challenges causing security threats were ethnic and sectarian divisions as well as the deep political divisions among Iraqis. So he stressed for a reliable and permanent solution of the Arab-Kurdish conflict and the deteriorating Shia-Sunni relations. He has noted that no Sunni political party has demonstrated the capability to speak for Sunni and represent them in the national politics. He also counts the problem of security maintenance in a large and diverse country like Iraq. Protecting government and civil centers proved a daunting task for them. He opines that the fair struggle for political accommodation of Sunni and Shi'ite, Arabs, Kurds, and other minorities would bring final peace and stability into relations. He prefers to solve the existing problem by finding the civil side solution rather than just having a narrow look at the challenges of insurgent and terrorist violence.

Larry Diamond in his book, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* (2005) describe the situation of Iraq under Bremer's leadership. Larry Diamond came to Baghdad on the initiatives of Condoleezza Rice to help Iraqis in preparing a draft of the constitution and planning their first democratic elections. He

explains how the plan of a quick exit from Iraq within few months collapsed when it collided with Iraqi realities. Then he describes the worsening situation in Iraq under Bremer's leadership. Then he discussed Bremer's seven-step path to restore Iraqi sovereignty. He explains the process of nomination for the committee appointed for preparing the draft of a new Iraqi constitution, which was mandated to be ratified by a nationwide referendum. After this, the national elections took place for final transition of power in the hands of a new Iraqi government.

Ryder, Gustavo D., in *"Iraq: Final Assessments of the Special Inspector General and Post-U.S. Withdrawal Developments, Politics and Economics of the Middle East reviews (2013)"*, analyses the deficiencies as noted by SIGIR's audit work on Iraqi reconstruction. The author stressed on the requirement of a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the lack of deteriorating security on reconstruction. It also asserts that an integrated management structure which incorporates interagency coordination, defined authority and program accountability might improve the results. The need to attract qualified program and contract-management personnel is equally important. It is equally important to work closely with host-country government officials and common people, for the success of reconstruction programs.

DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND RATIONALE:

Reconstruction encompasses a wide range of humanitarian, developmental, political, and human rights programmes and mechanisms. The study of post-war reconstruction has a multidisciplinary inclination as it draws from various disciplines, including political science, health economics, security studies, urban planning and project management. The concept of Post-war reconstruction in Iraq includes four interrelated basic components, which are economic reconstruction, political reconstruction, social reconstruction and general security. It also includes emergency relief, repair of roads and infrastructure and economic and social rehabilitation, reintegration of soldiers, the return of the refugees, de-mining, and removal of other war debris.

This proposed research work would focus on the genesis, evolution, and development of the US reconstruction policy towards war-torn Iraq (2003). This research work would examine the extension of political strategies of president Bush and President Obama as their

reconstruction policy towards Iraq. As an aftereffect of the US invasion in 2003, Iraq was devastated. Reconstructing was imperative for all Iraqis who suffered from the widespread damage of the war. Regime change was carried out and political security was expected as an important outcome.

It would aim at finding the reasons of huge budgetary support by the Congress for reconstruction of Iraq. It would also examine how the huge wastage, fraud, and corruption of reconstruction funds had eroded the Congressional support to reconstruction policy of President Bush Jr. It will also explore how U.S. policymakers planned and articulated the reconstruction of Iraq. The impact of planning for post-conflict stability and support operations done by the US government would be explored. The proposed study would explore the important factors that caused very limited success of US-led reconstruction of Iraq.

The study would critically examine the challenges posed by political, social and economic dynamics of Iraq. The ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq following the U.S. led military operation hampered the US-led reconstruction. The violence stemming from brutal and internal Iraqi conflicts between Kurds and Arabs and between Sunnis and Shi'ites and its repercussions for the reconstruction efforts would also be assessed. This study would attempt to analyse why reconstruction policy in the duration of 2003-2011, did not show the promised result as claimed by the President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

- What are the key features of US reconstruction plan (2003) for post-war Iraq?
- How have various executive and independent agencies influenced the formulation and implementation of US reconstruction plan?
- How has the Congressional control over purse, policy making and oversight shaped the reconstruction policy in Iraq?
- What role had Coalition Provisional Authority played in the reconstruction of Iraq?
- How have the domestic factors of Iraq moulded the US reconstruction strategy?
- What are the major challenges faced by the US in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq?

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES:

On the basis of survey of the existing literature and the objectives of this study as outlined above, the research work proposes to test the following hypotheses:

- US reconstruction policy towards Iraq was guided by George W. Bush's political agenda of building democracy, free market and development rather than the rising criticism on the failure to find WMDs.
- Despite supportive congressional funding, reconstruction in Iraq was relatively unsuccessful as a result of poor interagency coordination in the US and persistent conflict in Iraq.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The proposed research work is based on descriptive and analytical method. Both primary and secondary sources are consulted. Primary sources include Congressional debates, Congressional hearings, US Government publications and reports of various other International Agencies, Presidential papers and other government records. The major secondary sources like books written by experts, journal articles, media reports, Research reports, newspaper articles, working papers and internet sources are used for this research. The present study also captures the indicators, observations and other quantitative and qualitative information provided by various reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and the United States Agency for International Development.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN OF RECONSTRUCTION PLAN AND THE POLICY PROCESS

Post-war stability and reconstruction is not a new Part of the US foreign policy. During the twentieth century, the United States gained substantial experience in helping many countries in post-war stabilisation and reconstruction. After the conclusion of World War II, the principal reconstruction efforts of the US were in Western Europe and Japan. The US reconstruction plan for Western Europe, named as the Marshall Plan was one of the great successes of American foreign policy. As far as US reconstruction policy towards Iraq is concerned, George W. Bush's commencement address at West Point in June 2002 and the release of the National Security Strategy in September 2002 set up a strong ideological background for it. It also laid down the foundation of Bush doctrine, which favoured the case for war against Iraq.

The origin of US reconstruction plan for Iraq can be traced in the preparation of war plan for Iraq. Debates and discussions about a possible invasion and reconstruction of Iraq began simultaneously. The debates and discussions inside the Bush administration and the various Congressional committees on the Iraq reconstruction plan began almost fifteen months before the beginning of war continued after the end of the war (Bowen 2009:2). The course of reconstruction plan appears to be shifting in new directions over a period of nine and half years i.e. 2003 to 2011. This is important so as to capture the dramatic and frequently reactive course changes in reconstruction strategy at different points of time.

The US had a leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq. It took the responsibility of reconstruction of Iraq after the end of the military operation in 2003. Ostensibly, in the pursuit of creating a just and peaceful world which would be beyond the "war on terror", the US spent more than sixty billion dollars for the reconstruction of Iraq. The policymaking within the executive branch in the US is often a contentious process as it reflects the divisions, differences and conflicting opinions within the executive branch.

BACKGROUND

The US military occupation and reconstruction of Iraq is closely linked to a series of events which began nearly a decade ago. The seeds of the US military operation (2003) and reconstruction policy can be seen as an extension of unfinished nature of the 1991 gulf war. In January 1991 gulf war, the United States and thirty-eight other countries attacked Iraqi forces to compel them to withdraw from Kuwait. The US military successfully ousted Iraq from Kuwait. This action was supported by UN resolutions. These resolutions did not support

the overthrow of Saddam Hussein or the taking of Baghdad. George H. W. Bush was unwilling to go beyond the mandate provided by the United Nations but he anticipated that the fall of Saddam Hussein as inevitable after this war. It was assumed that the gulf war of 1991 would provide the death knell for the Saddam regime. The regime of Saddam would fall without any use of force.

In February 1991, President George H. W. Bush, through his speeches, encouraged the Iraqis to compel Saddam Hussein to step down and take the power into their own hands. He encouraged the Shiites and Kurds to rebel against Saddam and the Baathist controlled government but could not provide the required support to them. Saddam Hussein reacted immediately and brutally and repressed the revolt successfully within few weeks. President George Bush Senior's failure to support the rebels haunted the reconstruction of Iraq twelve years later, as it created distrust among the Shiites and Kurds about the intentions of the US (Ricks: 2006:6). The US military did not get a cordial welcome by a large section of the Iraqi population when they entered Iraq in 2003 as a so-called liberator. They were seen with deep distrust, especially in southern Iraq. According to analysts, the roots of their attitude were to be taken from the past. To illustrate, during and at the end of the 1991 Iraq War, leading members of the coalition openly expressed their hope for a new Iraqi leader in January 1991 and not one chosen by the US.

President Bill Clinton's policy towards Iraq was of containment, largely based on the maintenance of a multilateral sanctions regime by the United Nations. The aim of the sanctions was to destroy the capacity of the Iraqi regime to make weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regime change. The Clinton's official position was that the sanctions would be lifted from Iraq as Saddam is ousted from power. In September 2000, a neoconservative think tank named Project for the New American Century (PNAC), having strong linkages to the incoming Bush administration advocated for a permanent presence of the US in the Gulf region in order to solve the unresolved conflict with Iraq. One of the important missions of the think tank was to secure and expand zones of democratic peace (Anderson and Stansfield 2004:3). However, Iraq was not a priority and also not an important issue till 9/11.

ORIGIN OF RECONSTRUCTION PLAN

Presidential leadership is preponderant in determining the configuration of the reconstruction plan for Iraq. The US reconstruction plan towards Iraq reflects ideological preferences and

style of working of President George W. Bush. The origin of US reconstruction policy towards Iraq can be traced in his political agenda and ideological assumptions. At the time of presidential election of the US (2000), the issue of Iraq seldom registered any appearance on the political screen. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney did not believe in too much military uses and indicated towards the selective use of the military in their foreign policy. Bush argued against the use of the military in non-combat operations like nation-building. In a debate with Al Gore on October 3, 2000, Bush stated-

I would be very careful about using troops as nation builders, I believe the role of the military is to fight and win the war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place... If we are the strongest if we don't do something, if we don't have a clear vision of the military, if we don't stop extending our troops all around the world and nation building missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road, and I'm going to prevent that. I'm going to rebuild our military power. It's one of the major priorities of my administration. (Bush 2003)

From the above statements, it is evident that Bush was not interested in engaging military for nation building missions. It appears that Bush wanted to continue the policy of containment towards Iraq in future. The Vice Presidential candidate Dick Cheney also endorsed the similar stand during the campaign when he said that he wanted to continue the same posture vis-a-vis Iraq (Ricks 2006:25).

The political and military outcome of the events of Sept. 11, 2001, was very important for the US foreign policy in general, and for Iraq in particular. The event altered the US policy towards Iraq from containment to pre-emptive strike. On January 29, 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush, declared Iraq along with Iran and North Korea as a part of "axis of evil". Bush located Iraq firmly at the centre of the newly identified "Axis of Evil." He, very adamantly maintained that Iraq was engaged in developing the weapons of mass destruction, which included nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Bush administration justified the military operation and regime change as a certain means to disarm Iraq of its WMDs (Bush 2002).

In June 2002 in his West Point speech, Bush provided the doctrinal rationale for moulding US policy towards Iraq in a new direction. He made pre-emption his national strategy which inclined to attack Iraq before it could become a full-fledged threat to the US national security. He stated that

Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the words of tyrant, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialise we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge (Bush 2002).

On March 20, 2003, the US attacked Iraq with an explicit aim to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. It was claimed to be a war against all evil-doers and barbaric people who attacked America and also against those who harboured or encouraged them (Bush 2003). On April 9, 2003, the American forces reached Baghdad and tumbled the iconic statue of Saddam Hussein at Firdos Square. On May 1, 2003, President Bush, from the flight deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, displayed the “Mission Accomplished” banner visible in the background. From there he declared an official end to major combats in Iraq. With this, the third phase of the war plan was over.

The US attack on Iraq itself was the very first step towards the moral reconstruction of the Middle East (Anderson and Stansfield 2004:185). It freed the nation from the grip of the so-called repressive regime of Saddam Hussein and paved the way for democracy and freedom (Anderson 2003:15). However, the full-fledged implementation of reconstruction plan began after the completion of the third phase. It was the longest and most difficult phase of US military operations in Iraq. To rebuild a nation which was most probably devastated on large scale by decades of sanctions and multiple wars was a very challenging task. The US and its coalition partners and many international organizations undertook this ambitious and expansive effort to rebuild Iraq.

The Iraq war and its reconstruction were placed in the soul of Bush doctrine. President Bush believed in the export of liberal democratic market capitalism as a model of governance for enhancing the security of the world. It is clearly manifested in the National Security Strategy 2002. It put forward the idea of a single sustainable and successful model for success i.e. *democracy, freedom, and free trade*. Bush explicitly stated that moral truth is same for every culture, in every time, in every place (Bush 2002). This statement reflects his strong belief in the successful ideological export of democracy, freedom, and free trade. The broad outline plan for the political reconstruction of Iraq was seems prepared in these documents and

speeches of President Bush. It was intended to remove Saddam Hussein from power and introduction of democracy to Iraq.

President Bush in an address, at Washington Hilton Hotel expressed his strong belief in the democratic domino theory. He said that-

“The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region” (Bush 2003).

Bush expected that a stable functioning democracy in Iraq would become a beacon of light amid the darkness of repression in the Middle East. It was expected that it would lead to the creation of a zone of “democratic peace” in the centre of the Arab World (Anderson and Stansfield 2004:186). The final outcome of this would be the creation of a region which would be safer for the US and the world as well.

The goals of U.S. reconstruction policy towards Iraq can be traced in various speeches of the President George W Bush. In a speech delivered in March 2003, he stated that “In the longer term, the US would assist Iraqis in emerging as a new, prosperous and free nation (Bush 2003).” The reconstructed nation would be free from war, or aggression against another country. We believe Iraqi people deserve liberty. It would enhance peace in the Middle East. He expected that sustained commitment is required to help the Iraqis to achieve the status of the united, stable and free country.

On April 28, 2003, while giving his Remarks on Operation Iraqi Freedom at Ford Community and Performing Arts Centre (Michigan) he stated -

I have confidence in the future of a free Iraq. The Iraqi people are fully capable of self-government. Every day, Iraqis are moving toward democracy and embracing the responsibilities of active citizenship. Every day, life in Iraq improves as coalition troops work to secure unsafe areas and bring food and medical care to those in need. America pledged to rid Iraq of an oppressive regime, and we kept our word. America now pledges to help Iraqis build a prosperous and peaceful nation, and we will keep our word again (Bush 2003).

A report issued entitled “Results in Iraq: 100 Days towards security and freedom” to proclaim the successes of the U.S.-led occupation was issued by the White House. Among the notable achievements report optimistically counted the institutionalisation of democracy, universal access to health care, the restoration of water supplies to pre-conflict levels among the major successes in Iraq.

Often, it has been argued that the failure to find out WMD turned the attention of Bush administration towards a robust reconstruction program. One of the stated goals of the Iraq war (2003) was to get rid of WMD present in Iraq. During his January 2002 State of the Union address, Bush claimed that Iraq was taking serious initiatives for the procurement of high-strength aluminium tubes and Uranium for developing nuclear weapons. When debate began on whether the events of 9/11 demanded any US-led military operation in Iraq or not, the linkages of 9/11, the threat presented by Iraq's WMD and suspected links among Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and Saddam Hussein was cited as the major reason. After some time, these linkages proved an unconvincing justification for targeting Iraq. So, in order to divert the attention of common people from WMDs, Bush administration shifted to focus on the long-term reconstruction of Iraq. If the political, economic and social reconstruction of Iraq enjoyed popularity among the Iraqi people, no one would criticise the intentions of military operation and occupation of Iraq by the US. In the long run, the US would convince the Middle East region of its benign intentions. It is also important to note that, in case the U.S. could not succeed in its stated intention it might create chaos in Iraq. The repercussions of chaos in Iraq would jeopardise the US strategic interests in the whole Middle East region. This justification for reconstruction of Iraq does not appear strong when seen in the context various speeches and statements of President Bush Jr. as discussed above.

NEOCONSERVATISM, LIBERALISM AND RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

The US reconstruction policy was deeply influenced by the neoconservative and neoliberal ideologies. In fact, ideas impact policy making significantly. The US intervention in Iraq is seen as the culmination of post-cold war liberal intervention (Dodge 2009) in other countries. The dominant ideological explanation of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq was premised on neo-conservatism. Neoconservatives encourage the promotion of democracy and national interest abroad even by means of military force in international affairs. By 2001, the neocons developed powerful think tanks, organisations, and media groups for the purpose of influencing US foreign policy. Vice President Dick Cheney had significant connections to the neocons. He played an important role in bringing them into the new George W. Bush administration. Donald Rumsfeld, the head of Defense Department was also surrounded by many prominent neoconservatives like Deputy Paul Wolfowitz.

The neoconservative, however, did not gain considerable space in formulating foreign policy until the 9/11 terror attacks. The deeply disturbing shock of 9/11 pushed President Bush to look for a plan to deal with terrorism and the neoconservative had an existing one to offer

him. The neoconservative militaristic agenda matched with the requirement of traumatised disorder created in the US by the 9/11 terror attack. The neoconservative provided a simple paradigm which Bush found attractive to implement.

The neoconservative policy of Security and proselytization of national greatness was at the core of Bush doctrine (Dodge 2009). The reconstruction policy was shaped by the US's historic mission to replicate its own success based on democracy and the free market. As illuminated in the SIGIR Report of 2013, the president's agenda was clearly discernable in the policy. However, the neoconservative undoubtedly influenced the planning of the military operation and the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. A closer analysis of President Bush's speeches reflects his commitment to deliver liberty, free market and democracy. They helped in planning military operation and post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

RECONSTRUCTION PLANS PREPARED BY DIFFERENT AGENCIES

The official US plan for Iraq war was prepared on the directions of President George W. Bush. The war plan was divided into four important phases. These were- (1) preparation for a possible invasion, (2) designing the battle space (3) major combat operations, including regime removal and (4) post-war stabilisation and reconstruction. It is all-important to note that, reconstruction was not regarded as an after- thought but it was integrated into the military operation plan itself. Post -war stabilisation and reconstruction was last and proved the longest phase of the execution of military campaign in Iraq. If one looks closely, the origin of US reconstruction policy towards Iraq can be traced in the first phase of the war plan itself when debates and discussions about a possible invasion of Iraq began. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting deliberated the possibility of war in Iraq in August 2002. In the meeting, the committee paid substantial attention to the costs of the reconstruction.

Thoughtful discussions on pre-war planning for Iraq originated about fifteen months before the March 2003 invasion (Bowen 2009:1). The competing planning visions from various departments and individual experts from within and outside the governments influenced the pre-war planning process. The disagreements and differences in the plans prepared by various departments could not be sorted out and remained unresolved. The weak inter-agency cooperation resulted in poor planning, as the efforts of some important departments were totally sidelined.

The formulation of reconstruction plan was a multi-layered inter-agency process in which the White House, core government agencies and departments and the military were involved. Actually, the planning for post-war relief and reconstruction policy was based on the competing visions of the important agencies and departments including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget, National Security Council, US Central Command (CENTCOM), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) etc. It was also influenced by the inputs provide by various think tanks and NGOs involved in multilateral and bilateral discussions on various occasions.

The US policymakers had to incorporate the key issues like how to promote U.S. national interests while planning relief and reconstruction plan for Iraq. They also had to secure public order in Iraq in order to promote long-term economic and political stability in the region. The US reconstruction program included a very wide range of initiatives which covered many important dimensions. It incorporated diverse initiatives like democracy-building efforts, elections, training Iraq's police and army, restoring old water and electricity projects, building large electrical, water and oil projects, strengthening provincial council, reforming rule of law. At the same time, they tried to ensure that Iraq develops the capability to sustains what the US reconstruction program had built and provided to Iraq.

Ideally, an in-field needs assessment helps in preparing a realistic outline plan for reconstruction. Many times, it may not be possible practically. As far as the outline plan for the reconstruction of Iraq was concerned, it was also based on presumed rather than assessed needs. It was due to limited access to the information about the political, economic and social conditions of Iraq before the war. There are different viewpoints on the need of reconstruction in Iraq. Paul Bremer III (2006) argues that the involvement of Iraq in multiple wars since 1979, thirteen years of international sanctions, and decades of neglect by the Saddam regime left the country physically ravaged, socially fragmented with a devastated economy. Iraq under the so called, dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, had combined features of Soviet-style command economy characterised by economic mismanagement and an oil-rich rentier state. This bleak picture was not exposed to the world due to limited access to Iraq. Many scholars recognised the big challenge of reconstructing before the US, as the deteriorated situation due to two decades of the tightly controlled regime, crippling UN

sanctions and a constant fear of sectarian violence made Iraq more vulnerable. The US military operation in Iraq in 2003 further ruined the already deteriorated socio-economic and political conditions. Hence a deeper involvement of the US was required for reconstruction after the end of 2003 war.

There is another point of view on the same issue. It believes that Iraq, though not prosperous yet in a stable situation before the US military operation in 2003. The toppling of Saddam regime followed by chaos and looting caused destruction and deterioration of Iraq at large scale. The statement of the Secretary of State Colin Powell can also be seen in this perspective. He told the President Bush Jr. that when you hit (Iraq), it would act like a crystal glass. There would be no government and civil disorder. It might take many years in restructuring the nation (Bowen 2009:1). He believed that invasion of Iraq, followed by regime change demands enormous efforts on the part of the coalition.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense of the US government dominated the preparation of reconstruction plan for Iraq for a considerable period of time. The Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expected that the forces of U.S. would be received in Iraq as a liberator. The post-war plan prepared by the Department of Defense, in the beginning, was a simple one- i.e. to “get in and get out” of Iraq quickly (Caldwell 2011:175). Rumsfeld predicted that the US would comfortably transfer power to an interim Iraqi government within few months of Saddam’s removal. He expected that the U.S. would hand over power in the hands of the local Iraqi population would be hassle free. The initial plan was to restore the basic services to pre-war level. This plan was approved by the President Bush Jr. also. Rumsfeld expected the prevalence of a welcoming, cooperative and violence-free environment for the successful transition of power from a so-called autocratic regime to a new democratic set-up. The intention to establish a functioning democratic system with full sovereignty in the hands a democratically elected government could not be realised as violence and insurgency continued (Anderson and Stansfield 2004:191).

The Department of Defense, no doubt, played a very crucial role in turning the direction of reconstruction policy in order to make it suitable for the new environment. In August 2002, the Office of Special Plans (OSP) of the DoD issued a range of guidelines on various issues related to the reconstruction ranging from the creation of the Iraqi army to de-Ba'athification.

The restoration of oil sector of Iraq was cardinal for funding the reconstruction projects of Iraq. The Department of Defense was given the charge of the restoration of Iraq's oil sector. On September 20, 2002, Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG) was established within the Department of Defense. The EIPG was led by Michael Mobbs. Mobbs handed over the planning contract for restoration of the oil sector to Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) a Houston-based firm. A conflict of interest is apparently visible, as Vice President Cheney was served in the past as CEO of Halliburton, the parent company of KBR. Just after three months after KBR had received the planning contract on March 8, 2003, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) had signed a \$7 billion contract with KBR for repair work in the oil sector of Iraq. This contract was the single largest reconstruction contract signed not only in Iraq but also the largest known single source contract in the history of the US. KBR was authorised to do this work without any competition. The argument given in the favour was that it was done in order to save time. Though Feith, the then Under Secretary, raised this matter at a Deputies Committee meeting, no action could be taken for competitive bidding (Bowen 2009:38).

On January 20, 2003, President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive number 24(NSPD-24). NSPD-24 gave complete control to the Department of Defense over post-war planning and operations in Iraq. The argument put forward in favour of giving the command in the hands of Department of Defense was that it would prevent the separation stabilisation and war fighting operations activities as experienced in Kosovo and Bosnia. Rumsfeld also argued that Department of Defense would ensure a smooth transition towards reconstruction from combat operations. The President by issuing National Security Presidential Directive 24 superseded on the existing system of interagency post-war planning within the National Security Council. This move, in principle, was a sensible one to ensure the unity of command. The decision to run post-war operations in Iraq by the Department of Defense was very significant because, for the first time since World War II, the Department of State had not made responsible to and given the charge of post-war reconstruction.

NSPD-24 also gave the responsibility for managing post-war Iraq to a newly created organisation named the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). ORHA was housed within Pentagon. Jay Garner, having the experience of leading the "Operation Provide Comfort"- a humanitarian mission started post-1991 Gulf War in Northern Iraq was appointed to the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). He was a

retired Army Lieutenant General. On April 21, 2003, Jay Garner reached Baghdad and took the charge of ORHA. He had the responsibility to restore normalcy and implement the U.S. reconstruction plan for Iraq. His plan was to retrieve quickly and give power in the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible. Their strategy was based on the assumption there would be a permissive environment free from violence. What most of the US policy makers anticipated for post-war Iraq, remained miles away from ground realities. The violence and insurgency created a situation of “war after the war” (Cordesman 2007:54). The country was descended into full-scale civil conflict triggered by sectarian and ethnic violence.

Jay Garner failed to control violence that followed the war. General Garner and Zalmay Khalilzad wanted to hold a nationwide meeting of influential Iraqis in May 2003 in order to smoothen the process of transfer of power to the local leaders. He was sacked and the plan of a quick transfer of power was also dropped. President Bush terminated the Khalilzad’s status of the presidential envoy, thus ending his involvement with post-war planning for Iraq. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III reached Baghdad on May 11, 2003. He was sent to lead the newly established Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which replaced the ORHA. Bremer, just after his arrival took many important decisions to make big changes in the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. He expanded the scope of reconstruction programme to introduce changes in almost every sphere of Iraqi political life, the economy as well as society. He issued an order to exclude former the Baath Party members from any active participation in the new Iraqi government. The decision of de-Ba’athification deprived the government ministries of their topmost officials and manager. The CPA also disbanded Iraqi security forces and military officials and delayed in giving sovereign decision-making power to people of Iraq. These decisions of Bremer had changed the role of the U. S. in Iraq from that of liberator to that of occupier with substantial, costly and long-term implications (Caldwell 2011:119). The CPA could not mobilise competent manpower to effectively implement the grand reconstruction program. Soon, the common Iraqi people fed up with inadequate basic services and deteriorating security started looking at the US as an occupier rather than a liberator. The CPA had given power to a sovereign interim Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. Then it was officially disbanded and transitional period Iraq began.

While discussing the various plan outlays of different departments it is worthwhile to note that there was no specific department or institution which had specialisation in dealing post-war reconstruction work. Hence a leading agency was to be selected to integrate the valuable

inputs provided by various departments and agencies. For this purpose, the White House decided to rely on the Department of Defense and assigned it the lead role to bring unity of effort in planning and managing the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq. The unity of effort was not the only important cause of this decision. This decision of the president should also be seen in the light of divergent views within the cabinet of President Bush, between the Vice-President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. All these resulted into side-lining the efforts of State Department and centralising the authority in the hands of Department of Defense. The decision of Bush administration in January 2003 to vest authority for Iraq in the Department of Defense was, in principle, a reasonable decision. It ensured the unity of command as well as accountability which was much desirable.

It also had to coordinate with other agencies, like the Departments of Treasury, Justice and State that were not under Department of Defense's command. For this purpose in February 2003, the first conference on interagency planning was organised by the ORHA in Washington, followed by a post-conflict plans review by the various civilian and military actors in Kuwait in March 2003. A draft was prepared by ORHA planners named Unified Mission Plan, compiling the various post-conflict plans in one place. Unfortunately, the ORHA had not adopted the Unified Mission Plan as a strategic and operational plan. Although various planning guidance and documents were inherited by CPA, including a wide range of reports from the Future of Iraq project to the CENTCOM Phase IV planning, to Unified Mission Plan, it neither deployed any integrated planning process or any set of strategic and operational plans. The planning processes of the CPA, also, evolved routinely according to the demand of the circumstances. During the spring of 2004, a massive bureaucratic transition towards the Department of State from the CPA was started, which intended to assume the responsibility for planning the post-war reconstruction of Iraq in June 2004.

In practice, though, the Department of Defense had negligible experiences of post-war reconstruction. It did not take the charge of nation building and reconstruction effort post World War II and the Vietnam War. It was a limitation because the department lacked any recent experience of the civilian character in post-conflict reconstruction. It also lacked the internal capability and expertise of staff in the civilian nation-building operations which were required for Iraq. It took many steps to develop this capacity quickly, through the ORHA and the CPA.

As far as military planning is concerned it began in December 2001, when General Tommy Franks, Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM) presented an introductory draft of post-war operations to Secretary Rumsfeld on December 7, 2001. CENTCOM's Oplan Ioo3V consisted of four-phase operation. In the last phase i.e. Phase IV, in which the 'post-hostility operations' was covered, the US government was expected to introduce representative democratic government in Iraq. The CENTCOM commander General Franks mentioned that Phase IV might take many years. From January 2002 onwards, the Third Army had undertaken planning processes for Phase IV, which was designated as the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). During 2002 and 2003 detailed operational plans were developed by CFLCC which included Phase IV operations. The first program was called as COBRA II. However, when the program was operationalized in 2003 many problems cropped up and then it was realised that sufficient account of the risks had not been taken into consideration once the regime of Saddam would collapse. In fact, the pre-war planning premises were proved badly flawed. It may not be taken as a sign of the systemic problem or the problem of the planning. It might be a case of the incompetency of the systems in Iraqi state that surprised many US policy makers. A sequel plan of COBRA II, named ECLIPSE II, was therefore developed (Timothy 2014:33). This plan took more account of the risk of collapse of the regime and the need for coalition forces to carry on the rapid transition towards reconstruction and peacekeeping tasks.

In February 2003, a further approval of the U.S. military's allegiance to reconstruction could be seen when Pentagon appointed Lieutenant General Jay Gamer as Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Planners in the military had a firm belief that military operations would have a decisive and clear and task to accomplish. They had not expected any post-war resistance by Iraqis in general. The military was prepared to carry out severe humanitarian crises, including internally displaced people and flows of refugees. They expected that most people of Iraq would happily accept the political transition towards new democratic Iraq and would actively participate in the process of democratisation of the Iraqi political system. The coalition forces planners tried to work within the conditions set by both the geostrategic conditions of the conflict and the civilian leadership of the country.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The State Department had a different vision of reconstruction in Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell believed that occupying Iraq and substituting its authoritarian regime would

necessitate a mission of tremendous scope. In order to access the post-war requirements of Iraq, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs under the Department of State launched the “Future of Iraq Project” in April 2002. Tom Warrick, a veteran State Department official headed this project. In this project, he included many Iraqi exiles that could help in preparing a more realistic report. Hence this Future of Iraq programme was particularly remarkable in the aspect of bringing together a large number of opposition figures of Iraq during 2002 and early 2003 to examine how Iraqi society, government institutions and politics could be improved after replacing the totalitarian regime of Saddam. Warrick himself was an expert on various aspects of Iraq. Six days after the President’s January 29, 2002, State of the Union address naming Iraq as part of the “axis of evil”, Thomas Warrick put forward an abstract on subjects to the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Though report of Warrick had not proposed any operational strategy in post-war Iraq, yet it did address many issues of importance that could confront the US authorities engaged in post-war reconstruction (Caldwell 2011:225).

The Department of State, which allegedly had knowledgeable experts of post-war reconstruction and more familiarity with the ground realities of Iraq, was largely sidelined in the initial phase. Tom Warrick, notable figure of Department of State also one of the most knowledgeable person about post-war Iraq was not allowed to work on the subject on which he had an expertise. He worked for a very short time with Garner and then fired, allegedly on the direction from Cheney and Rumsfeld. Ambassador James Dobbins noted that “The decision to transfer civilian aspects of reconstruction from the State Department to the Pentagon imposed immense costs as Defense had not handled anything like it [Iraqi reconstruction] for at least 50 years, while State garnered considerable experience over the previous decade (Caldwell 2011:175)”. The efforts of the Department of State were sidelined and power was centralised in the hands of Defense Department.

In July 2004 the U.S. Embassy in Iraq inherited the reconstruction program of CPA. The reconstruction strategy shows changes and evolution during the tenure of various US Ambassadors to Iraq. The U.S. ambassador John Negroponte realised the imperative of security for smooth reconstruction work. It was one of the most important reason because of which the rebuilding efforts proved more time consuming and expensive than the US planners anticipated. One of the important initiatives adopted was the upgradation of U.S. military from a three to a four-star command. Zalmay Khalilzad took the charge of US embassy in Iraq in June 2005. He started a new initiative known as Clear-Hold-Build which

integrated civilian and military efforts for a better outcome. He also deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (E-PRTS) for reconstruction work. Though many new initiatives were taken, but these could not ensure smooth implementation of US reconstruction policy (Bowen 2007:1). Some major hindrances which impeded the implementation were Shia- Sunni conflict, Arab-Kurds violence, disputed internal borders, corruption, institutional development, friction between federal, regional, and local administrations, challenges from neighbours etc.

While the US took various initiatives to curtail violence, train Iraqi security forces, and cultivate public faith in political institutions, the ethnic and sectarian tensions continued. The US efforts, as well as sectarian and ethnic conflict for control of political and economic space, continued. The complex patterns of conflict pushed the country deeper into civil war by the end of 2006. It appeared that President Bush was about to face defeat in Iraq. In order to control the highly deteriorated situation, the President Bush Jr. announced to send an additional 30,000 US troops in January 2007. The surge of troops accompanied by increased civilian efforts like the formation of PRTs proved beneficial. This counterinsurgency strategy involving both military and civilian efforts designed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General David Petraeus, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, began to show positive results. By the end of 2008, insurgency and violence reduced and security improved. The task to reshape Iraq as a modern democratic state was not an easy one. It elongated the US involvement in Iraq for almost a decade.

USAID

In October 2002, USAID came out with a draft titled “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq”. It stated that the main aim of reconstruction was to bring back Iraqi facilities to a modestly improved pre-conflict level. The U.S. reconstruction strategy came out with a two-stage approach of reconstruction. In the first stage, USAID would engage in water and sanitation, emergency electricity, public health, food distribution and critical transportation routes necessary to open supply routes. The success of the first phase would be based on in part upon coordinating relief efforts with getting hold through military operations. In the second stage, i.e. after stabilisation, the focus of USAID would expand to improve the basic infrastructure, like hospitals, irrigation, electricity, sanitation, roads and markets. The overwhelming focus was to improve infrastructure and return to pre-conflict service delivery levels (Bowen 2009:29).

It is important to note that USAID also recognised that the major challenge for the US in Iraq was to establish democratic governance based on the rule of law. It is worthy to note that the U.S. government had prepared itself for the worst case in planning humanitarian relief program at the same time it also planned for the best case of reconstruction work. The planning for Humanitarian relief went forward smoothly as the humanitarian eventualities involved were straightforward, and had the backing of the President from the beginning. Restitution of damages due to war were ultimately adopted as the policy goals, but the link between how the reconstruction would facilitate a democratic transition was very little. Soon the Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was given the full responsibility for administering post-invasion Iraq.

THINK TANKS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

Many important think tanks and NGOs influenced the reconstruction plan by suggesting inputs through various reports, policy suggestions, recommendations, data analysis, opinion polls and articles. Council on Foreign Relations, Center for International and Strategic Studies, RAND Corporation, National Defense University, Army War College, US Institute of Peace, Atlantic Council of the US and Washington Institute for Near East Policy, all produced voluminous studies of what was needed in post-war Iraq (Caldwell 2011). All of them played a role in shaping the plan for the reconstruction of Iraq in their various capacities. For example, a committee sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by James R. Schlesinger and Thomas R. Pickering suggested that the president should ask for \$3 billion from the Congress which should be spent within one-year. The committee also recommended that additional contributions might be required in the future, for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq. It further recommended that out of \$3 billion, \$2.5 billion should be used for reconstruction and rest \$500 million for humanitarian relief. However, in the case of major interruptions in the availability of revenues from the Iraqi oil, the monetary aid for humanitarian assistance might be considerably higher (CFR 2003:2). It also suggested that involvement of international organisations and other governments in the post-conflict transition and reconstruction process would offset the load on U.S. military personnel and make the task easier. So, Bush administration should take initiatives for the same. This move was pertinent to show the world that the US alone did not want to control the transition of Iraq.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the US Army (AUSA) jointly started Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project (PCR) for Iraq. This project provided enriching information and useful recommendations for post-conflict reconstruction on the basis of the collection of data (<http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/index.htm>). They used diverse source for collection of data including polling, news sources and interviews and provides the inputs of the Iraqi opinions about the reconstruction effort. Through interviews and polling, they helped to gain an insight of the US reconstruction effort and Iraqi opinions on the same. For example the CSIS published ‘Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction- A Field Review and Recommendations’ in 2003, ‘Winning the Peace - An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction’ in 2004 and many others.

The RAND Corporation, a non-profit institution, dedicated to impacting policy making and decision-making through intense research and analysis came out with useful reports and useful suggestions for post-war reconstruction of Iraq. The U.S. Army had a contract with the RAND to prepare reports of reconstruction operations. The RAND Corporation analysed and compiled lessons learned reports on Iraq stability and reconstruction operations. Their reports included interviews of many important ORHA and CPA officials. The British-American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organization having expertise in analysing the issues of international security. It fostered a very informed debate on the assessment of Private Military Companies working in Iraq. The Professional Services Council (PSC) includes a number of commercial firms providing professional and technical services to the government. Many members of the PSC had presence in Iraq and they provided a number of services to the CPA for reconstruction of Iraq. The PSC, working with the Department of the Army, compiled a lessons-learned briefing which was premised on the inputs from 40 different member companies engaged in Iraq on contract basis (<http://www.pscouncil.org>).

LOCAL IRAQI POPULATION

The reconstruction plan was drawn up in Washington; it denied the involvement of local people of Iraq. There was a fear that post-war reconstruction would be treated as something done to them rather than a process in which they could participate. Just as the totalitarian government in Iraq had disempowered the people of Iraq, the reconstruction program at least in initial phases seemingly had a democratic deficit.

INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

The policy process reveals that the White House provided the ideological backing for the formation of reconstruction policy towards Iraq. Bush Jr. was not directly involved in many important decisions. He brought situations in which Rumsfeld became the significant person to determine the strategy processes as he preferred a delegatory approach rather than getting directly involved in the decision making. He also did not issue detailed guidelines to resolve the interagency disputes in the policy processes. According to some analyst, one reason behind this was the very little experiences of the president in foreign policy. He knows very little in the field of foreign policy, and had experienced figures around him like Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, who had experience of decades in the same area. They had broad knowledge about the issues than the President did. The President himself informed after taking office to Condoleezza Rice, "I don't have any idea about foreign affairs. This isn't what I do". James Fallows while interviewing on Iraq for several months written that, he never encounter anyone who said, "We took this step because the president indicated..." or "the president really wanted..." Instead, Fallow heard 'Powell thought', 'Bremer asked', 'Rumsfeld wanted', 'The Vice President pushed' and so on (Fallows 2006:96). It was true that it never was a big problem. The problems started when bureaucratic fighting began and the President failed to take appropriate action to resolve it.

Obert Blackwell, the Deputy National Security Advisor for planning on strategic issues, who was involved in on the process of interagency noted that he found

Estrangement, very serious estrangement, between the Pentagon, the State Department...It was very longstanding. It was much more broader than only Iraq. Therefore the level of cooperation between those two agencies was rarely quite minimal. So the inter-agency process was essentially not working (Dyson 2009).

The problems of infighting of bureaucracy could have been managed and the possible chaos could have been mitigated by a regularised and thorough process of National Security Council. The National Security Council could provide a venue for the transmission of information, the airing of disagreements, and the distillation of options for decision making. It was sidelined by the president. In some ways, the credit of failure also goes to Condoleezza Rice. John Burke (2005) opines that Condoleezza Rice the National Security Advisor of the US failed to assert her role. Due to lack of assertion of the prerogatives of her office by Rice, the Defense Department and the Vice President Office became the main sources of post-war operations in Iraq. Condoleezza Rice never provided an opportunity to analyse fully the cost/benefit analysis of decisions on Iraq (Burke 2005:558). She was not able to assure that

the Defense and State departments cooperated and coordinated on policies on Iraq. Particularly she had not very cordial relation with Rumsfeld, who in general was dismissive of National Security Council and in particular of Rice. Rice did not tackle him effectively and never took initiatives to discipline him and allowed herself to be outmanoeuvred.

CONCLUSION

The policy process of preparing reconstruction plan for Iraq reflects the political agenda and priorities of the president. The President selected the department of his choice for planning and coordination process. He relied on formal and even informal meetings, policy papers, and bureaucratic structures of his liking. He relied on Department of Defense for preparation and implementation of reconstruction plan. Various departments came out with their plans for reconstructing a nation which was thousands of miles away from the US. The existing interagency structure did not prove sufficient to solve the interdepartmental coordination problems.

The lack of coordination among various executive agencies and inevitable bureaucratic differences plagued the reconstruction process. The formal coordination process failed to make any settlement between the Department of State and Department of Defense, in particular. The lack of coherent approach for aggregating the expertise of various agencies and departments of the US administration remained lacking. The US government had desired expertise on many aspects of reconstruction of a nation after the war. There was no shortage of ground knowledge and plans about post-war Iraq. A great deal of thinking existed in various executive agencies and departments of the Bush administration about the issues. What was lacking was to reach conclusions using the existing plans and come out with consensus. Lack of consistent approach to reconciling the differences and come out with an aggregate plan for the reconstruction of Iraq proved a major hindrance.

CHAPTER III

CONGRESSIONAL ROLE: BUDGETING, OVERSIGHT AND REGULATORY ACTIONS

The role of Congress in foreign policy making is a prominent feature of the American political system. The influence of Congress on the reconstruction of Iraq is closely linked to its foreign policy powers. In order to obviate the exercise of arbitrary powers, the framers of the US Constitution created a government of “separated institutions sharing powers” (Neustadt, 1960:33). The US Constitution is the main source of foreign relations powers of both, the legislature and the executive. Within the constitutional framework, both the Congress and the President are given foreign policy powers. Some of these powers are shared by them, while others are exercised by each of them, exclusively. The Article I of the US Constitution enumerates important Congress’s foreign affairs powers, which includes the power of purse, the power to declare war, power to raise armies, maintain navy, power to make laws, frame rules and regulations. Congress has the power to collect and lay taxes and also draw money from the treasury.

This chapter highlights the role of Congress in designing the reconstruction policy towards Iraq during President George W. Bush and President Obama, in a broad and comprehensive context. It elaborates the Congressional budgetary support for reconstruction by ensuring huge funding and deep oversight on the executive through reporting, auditing, accounting for taxpayer’s value and hearings by various committees. The chapter explains when and why Congress played different roles in shaping the reconstruction policy towards Iraq. It also elaborates the electoral factors and role of individual policymakers to interpret the role of Congress.

Various scholars share different viewpoints about the role of Congress in US foreign policy making. Olson (1991) is of the view that foreign affairs, in general, are a prerogative of the executive, exception being the power to make treaties, impose tariffs and episodic declaration of war. Stevenson is of the view that

Congress is rarely in the driver’s seat for U.S. foreign policy, but it fuels the car, sometimes tries to navigate from the front seat, and often complains from the backseat. It also has its own hand brake to use in emergencies. Needless to say, the vehicle goes farthest and fastest when Congress and the president agree on the route forward. (Stevenson 2013:86)

Henehan (2000) is of the view that the U.S. Congress receives a great deal of attention because of the important role it plays in foreign policy-making. He writes that the Congress can influence foreign policy making through several means which includes power to

appropriate money, oversight, the passing of legislation, and rejecting or delaying the treaties and nominations.

Congress can declare any policy or hold an oversight hearing to collaborate on policy in order to support the administration. It can include oversight tools, such as reporting requirements, in its policy direction legislation. The fuel for the US reconstruction program in Iraq i.e. billions dollars taxpayer money came from the deliberations followed by votes cast and decisions U.S. Congress chambers. Senate and House committee rooms provided the venue for overseeing the expenditure of billions and the way it was used. The US Congress remained very supportive of the cause of reconstruction of Iraq. The US reconstruction policy was a part of US engagement abroad, thus a very crucial part of US foreign policy.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

US Congress played a very significant role by providing enormous funds for the stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq since April 2003. Budgetary support is a very basic foreign policy function of Congress. It has the obligation to pay all the bills for the US foreign involvements (Olson, 1991). The article I (Clause 7, Section 9) of the US Constitution states that money shall be drawn from the treasury only through legal appropriations. The clause also states that regular statement of the account of expenditures and receipts of every dollar withdrawn from public purse mandatorily published. The whole process is lengthy, in which the Senate and the House, both are involved. The power of the purse, which includes the power to tax and spend public money, is a major power assigned to the House of Representatives. An elaborate committee structure in the Senate and the House and floor debate in each body is also a significant part of the process. The Congress first authorizes the expenditure of funds for a specific programme, purpose or department and then allows appropriation of money to implement it.

The US Congress played a very constructive and supportive role by providing huge sum for the reconstruction of Iraq. As far as the reconstruction of Iraq is concerned, the Congress authorized approximately \$60.64 b for the relief and reconstruction in nine and half years (from April 2003 to September 2012). The details of the funds provided by the Congress is summarised in the following table:-

US Funding for Iraq Reconstruction, as of 9/30/2012 (In \$ millions)

	Appropriated	Obligated	Expended
Major Funds			
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1 and IRRF 2)	20,864	20,343	20,076
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)	20,194	19,569	18,762
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	5,134	4,578	4,199
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	4,119	3,728	3,728
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1,313	1,155	989
Subtotal	51,624	49,373	47,754
Other Assistance Programs			
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)	1,501	1,494	1,339
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	850		
Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF)	801	801	801
Iraq Freedom Fund (Other Reconstruction Activities)	700	680	654
P.L. 480 Food Aid (Title II and Non-Title II)	395	395	395
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA)	272	261	261
Democracy Fund (DF) and Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF)	266	266	262
U.S. Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)	179		
Iraq Freedom Fund (TFBSO)	174	86	65
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)	163	62	62
Department of Justice (DoJ)	133	121	119
Child Survival and Health Programs Fund (CSH)	90	90	90
Education and Cultural Exchange Programs	46		
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)	27	27	10
International Affairs Technical Assistance	16	16	14
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	11	9	6
U.S. Marshals Service	9	9	9
Alhurra-Iraq Broadcasting	5	5	5
Subtotal	5,638	4,323	4,093
Reconstruction-related Operating Expenses	2,937	1,152	1,085
Reconstruction Oversight	445	340	333
Total	60,644	55,187	53,265

(Source- Bowen 2013:56)

The obligations of the US were \$55.19 billion out of \$60.64 billion till September 2012. Out of \$55.19 billion they actually used \$53.26 billion, till September 2012 (Bowen: 2013:55). The Congress allocated largest chunk of reconstruction funds into five important funds which include the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF, \$20.86 billion), the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF, \$20.19 billion), the Economic Support Fund (ESF, \$5.13 billion), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP, \$4.12 billion) and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Account (INCLEA, \$1.31 billion).

In the fiscal year 2003, the emergency supplemental appropriation authorized \$2.48 billion for relief, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq. On April 12, 2003, Congress approved this amount for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). On April 16, 2003, the Congress through, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003(P.L. 108-11), directed that

“IRRF 1 to be used to pay for “necessary expenses for humanitarian assistance” and for “rehabilitation and reconstruction in Iraq,” identifying twelve humanitarian and reconstruction sectors for fund use.”

The Office of Management and Budget divided up the money among following five implementing agencies:

P.L. 108-11/ IRRF1as on September 30, 2004 (in million \$)

Agency	Apportioned
USAID	\$1,820.3
Department of Defense	\$518.3
Department of State	\$125.4
Department of Treasury	\$6.0
US trade and Development Agency	\$5.0
Total	\$2,475.0

(Source- Bowen 2004:55)

The USAID was bestowed with more than 70 percent share of the of the IRRF1 money. The money helped the USAID in carrying out multiple tasks in various sectors, which included education, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, health care, economic growth, airport and seaport management, local governance, community development, along with the other initiatives of transition. The IRRF 1 proved inadequate to fulfill the reconstruction needs of Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority required more money for its broad reconstruction plan.

The debate on supplemental request by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Congress started in October 2003. On November 6, 2003, the Congress passed the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004”. The act facilitated \$18.4 billion in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2) which was to be used in next two years. Although the CPA’s funding request was approved by the Congress with insignificant changes, the legislators decided to put stiff control and deep oversight on the IRRF 2. Besides CPA, the legislation authorised five more agencies to use the funds for reconstruction programs. The fund use was restricted to the Department of State, Department of Defence the Department of Health and Human Services, the Treasury Department, and USAID. The details of apportioned fund was done by Office of Management and Budgeting three years by these five departments are summarised in the following table-

OMB Apportions of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2 in FYs 2004, 2005 and 2006
(\$ in millions)

Organization	Amounts Apportioned			
	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	Total
DoD/U.S. Army	\$10,201.36	\$2,866.54	\$453.16	\$13,521.06
USAID	2,361.23	666.05	16.29	3,043.57
DoS	1,132.44	231.90	118.97	1,483.31
U.S. Treasury	40.00	351.38	0	391.38
U.S. Institute of Peace	10.00	0	0	10.00
Total	\$13,745.03	\$4,115.87	\$588.43	\$18,449.32^a

(SOURCE- Bowen: 2010:6)

Congress divided the funds available in IRRF2 into ten sectors and the President was authorised to use limited discretion to hatch adjustment of funds among these sectors. More than twenty percent of the IRRF2 money could not be shifted from one sector to another, by the CPA without congressional approval. The following provision of the Public Law 108-106 (108th Congress) makes it very clear-

the President may reallocate up to 10 percent of any of the preceding allocations, except that the total for the allocation receiving such funds may not be increased by more than 20 percent: Provided further, That the President may increase one such allocation only by up to an additional 20 percent in the event of unforeseen or emergency circumstances: Provided further, That such reallocations shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. (P.L. 108-106 2003)

The sectorwise fund obligations and expenditure shows that the executive adhered to the limited discretion given by the Congress on spending money in every sector. The data of the following table reflects and confirm the same.

Sectorwise Obligations and Expenditures from IRRF Sector as on September 2012

Appropriation	IRRF Sector	Obligated	Expended
IRRF 1	Subtotal	2,227.7	2,227.7
IRRF 2	Security & Law Enforcement	4,918.4	4,892.3
	Electric Sector	4,125.5	4,089.1
	Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, & Civil Society	2,310.0	2,218.3
	Water Resources & Sanitation	1,965.0	1,961.4
	Oil Infrastructure	1,596.8	1,593.4
	Private Sector Development	860.0	830.0
	Health Care	808.6	805.4
	Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy, & Governance	515.9	447.7
	Transportation & Telecommunications Projects	469.8	469.8
	Roads, Bridges, & Construction	280.9	280.7
	Administrative Expenses	219.5	217.9
	ISPO Capacity Development	44.9	42.3
		Subtotal	18,115.3
Total		20,343.0	20,076.0

(Source- Bowen 2013:58)

The public law 108-106 also had a very important provision to monitor the funds of the IRRF2. It facilitated the creation of an important office named Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG). The CPA-IG had the duty to provide objective and oversight of the programs of reconstruction of Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA-IG was obliged to provide quarterly reports to the Congress to keep it informed about the progress made by the CPA in the reconstruction of Iraq.

For the purpose of facilitating training and equipping the security forces of Iraq, a supplemental appropriations request of \$5.7 billion was sent by the President George W Bush, to the Congress on February 14, 2005. In response to his demand, the Congress passed the Public Law 109–13 on May 11, 2005 and created the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The Public Law 109–13 apportioned \$5.7 billion for the ISSF which was to be used for the operation and maintenance, military personnel, overseas humanitarian, civic aid procurement

disaster, research and development, along with the test and evaluation of the defense working capital funds(P.L.109-13 2005).

The Iraq Security Forces Fund was placed under the discretion of Secretary of Defense. The ISFF helped the U.S. Forces-Iraq and the Multi-national force-Iraq. By September 2012, out of \$20.19 billion, \$18.71 billion (93%) of the total money was spent by the Department of Defense. About 93 percent of the ISFF was obligated to support the activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and rest to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The fund was spent on four important sub-activities including equipment and transportation, sustainment, infrastructure, and training. Almost \$12.02 billion of the ISFF was spent by the Ministry of Defense. Out of \$12.02 billion \$5,327 billion i.e. about 44% share was spent for the equipment and transportation. The investment on infrastructure and expenditure to make it sustainable was the second largest expenditure from this account. The details of the funds obligated and expended under ISFF is represented in the following table-


Obligations and Expenditures under ISFF, by MOD and MOI in September 2012(In \$ Millions) from IRRF Sector as on September 2012

		Obligated	Expended
MOD	Equipment and Transportation	5,327	5,227
	Infrastructure	3,075	2,972
	Sustainment	2,894	2,620
	Training and Operations	723	698
	Subtotal	12,018	11,518
MOI	Equipment and Transportation	2,026	1,945
	Infrastructure	1,347	1,260
	Sustainment	663	623
	Training and Operations	2,656	2,592
	Subtotal	6,692	6,420
Related Activities	859	825	
Total	19,569	18,762	

(SOURCE- Bowen 2013:60)

With the passage of time the size of ISFF competed with IRRF in magnitude. From the year 2005 to the year 2011, Congress allocated an amount of \$20.19 billion to ISFF which almost competed with the size of IRRF (\$20.86 billion).

Cumulative obligations from major funds apportioned by the US (2004–2012)




(Source- Bowen 2013:57)

The Congress allocated \$5.13 billion in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) to enable the Department of State and The United States Agency for International Development to improve the Iraqi infrastructure, building democracy, supporting civil societies, capacity building, enhancing security and economic development. ESF remained the main funding source for programs that are non-military during the rebuilding efforts of latter. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was initiated by the CPA on November 6, 2003. Initially, the CPA transferred \$177 million in the CERP from the Development Fund for Iraq (Bowen 2013:64). CERP facilitated quick response to the local needs of humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. This fund gave flexibility to the U.S. military commanders to take an immediate action in the case of urgency. The Congress enriched the CERP by \$3.98 billion by eleven more appropriations in next seven years. The military commanders in Iraq could use this fund for relief and reconstruction in exigency cases. The use of the fund varied from restoring water supply, disposal of wastewater, rule of law, security, education, electricity, and also the measures that were protective with the Sons of Iraq program as well. Another important fund, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) was one of the largest expenditures for Police Development Program

in. INCLE had a corpus of \$1.31 billion. The fund of the INCLE was allocated in four areas by the Congress. These four areas are counter-narcotics, criminal justice, corrections, development and support program. Out of four, the criminal justice sector received the largest chunk. Despite small corpus, the INCLE became the largest reconstruction fund after the financial year 2009. It is worthy to note that the percentage is eighty of the total money allocation to the above discussed 5 funds that was made available by the supplemental appropriations which was different from the perennial budgeting process (SIGIR 2013:56).

The Obama administration asked Congress for funds through supplemental appropriations for last time, in order to complete its military responsibility in Iraq. He promised that his demand for money be Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 would be the last of its kind. He said that since the beginning in fiscal year 2010, war funding would be a part of regular budget bills. The Obama administration urged the Congress to approve funds to help people of Iraq. The funds of Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 were meant to help Iraqis for taking the responsibility of their own future and work to dismantle, disrupt, and defeat the al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As he promised during the election campaign to reduce expenditure of US military missions abroad, he realised it in Iraq.

Daily Expenditure (Average) of US Funds from 2003 to 2012(\$ Millions)



SOURCE- Bowen 2013:55

The expenditure rate of reconstruction which peaked at \$25 million per day in 2005, reduced to \$7 million per day by 2012. The US expenditure averaged around \$15 million per day from 2003 to 2012. It reduced to less than half in 2012, i.e. around \$7 million per day by 2012.

In October 2011, Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) transferred the overall responsibility for training police to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State) (INL). It prepared a plan for Police Development Program (PDP) which was to be implemented in next five years. However this multibillion-dollar training program was scaled back only after one year due to considerable slash of fund. An internal assessment of the INL and SIGIR audit findings shown huge embezzlement of fund. It resulted in a big slash in the number of police advisors, about one tenth of the originally decided strength. The USACE's Iraq Area Office subsumed the Gulf Region Division in March 2011, and the PRT program also winded up in the summer of 2011. The number of personnel dropped significantly by the end of 2011. Though the number of personnel rose

slightly in at some of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) hubs, some embassy satellite locations, , and training sites in early 2012. The USAID programs were also closed down and it narrowed the scope of reconstruction works in Iraq by the end of 2012. Overall, the number of civilian and contractor personnel declined considerably. The largest chunk of reconstruction funds were obligated by the end of 2012. Out of 60.64 billion, \$55.19 billion was obligated and at least \$53.26 billion was expended. The U.S. military withdrawal was almost complete within 15 months. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) was wound up in September 2011. Almost all money of the ISFF(\$20 billion) was also obligated by the end of 2011. At the end of the year 2012, the US personnel were reduced to about 10,000 and they continued to work for the rest of the ongoing US programs in Iraq.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ

Congress can influence foreign policy making through several means. Oversight duties are one of the important means to exercise control over the foreign policy. Oversight is of the fire-alarm type, responding to crises and scandals, rather than the regular police-patrol variety (Stevenson 2013:97).The oversight duties of Congress include formal hearings, investigations as well as informal staff inquiries. It helped in ensuring better results and effective use of American taxpayers dollars invested in the reconstruction of Iraq. Congressional oversight essentially helped in improving efficiency apropos of reconstruction of Iraq.

A small number of congressional committees are charged with recommending, monitoring and in general judgements about the overall foreign policy of the US the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House, the two Armed Services committees, the two Subcommittees on Foreign Operations of the Appropriations committees, and the two Intelligence committees. Members of Congress used legislative oversight to review and monitor the reconstruction funds, to make sure that the money was spent in accordance of the laws passed by the Congress. It is worthy to note that the Congressional oversight is not above political biases. Party loyalties can make investigative tendencies speechless.

Charles A. Stevenson writes that

Oversight is a political act. Lack of oversight is also a political act. Everything Congress does or chooses not to do is suffused with political considerations and pregnant with political consequences. Studies have found that congressional

oversight, especially measured in terms of frequency of hearings is most active when the congressional body differs politically with the president (Stevenson 2013:97).

For example, Senator John McCain III(R-Arizona), criticised the Congress for intentionally adopting an attitude of towards the U.S. taxpayer's expenditure money in Iraq in initial phase (Bowen 2013:31) A lively debate started for a stringent audit of the fund allocated for the purpose of reconstruction of Iraq when the IRRF 2 legislation was proposed in the Congress. Senator Feingold (D-Wisconsin), Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine) and some others, in the Congress, put the demand of creation of a separate office for an audit of reconstruction funds allocated for Iraq. While some of the senators were of the view that the Government Accountability Office, the default oversight agency would be sufficient for the stated purpose, many others demanded a separate agency or The Special Inspector General for stringent oversight over funds of reconstruction.

The Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin), proposed an amendment for keeping aside \$10 million for the commencement of the Office of Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (Bowen 2009:8). Finally, *the* Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General (CPA-IG) came into existence through the Public Law 108-106 (108th Congress) passed in November 2003. The Public Law 108-106 (P.L. 108-106 2003) provisioned the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG) to report the Congress on all major federal contracts worth more than \$5 million (Bowen 2013). On October 9, 2004, Congress passed H.R. 4200, which amended the P.L. 108-106 to re-designate the CPA-IG as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (*SIGIR*), successor to the CPA-IG. The amendment allowed *SIGIR* to continue the oversight that CPA-IG had established for stabilisation and operations for reconstructions in Iraq. The CPA-IG was specially mandated with the obligations that are oversight of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and other revenues and expenditure associated with rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Iraq. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. occupied the office of CPA-IG on January 20, 2004. He was mandated to submit his reports to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and Congress directly. In the capacity of *SIGIR*, he issued several important reports to the Congress, which helped in reducing waste and corruption. The performance of *SIGIR* can be summed up as follows:-

Summary of Performance of the SIGIR (March 2013)

Audits	Cumulative
Reports Issued	220
Recommendations Issued	487
Potential Savings if Agencies Implement SIGIR Recommendations to:	
Put Funds to Better Use (\$ Millions)	\$973.62
Disallow Costs SIGIR Questioned (\$ Millions)	\$640.68
Inspections	
Project Assessments Issued	170
Limited On-site Assessments Issued	96
Aerial Assessments	923
Investigations	
Investigations Initiated	637
Investigations Closed or Referred	562
Open (Active) Investigations	75
Arrests	41
Indictments	104
Convictions	82
Sentencings	68
Monetary Results (\$ Millions)	\$191.2
Hotline Contacts	
Email	413
Fax	19
Mail	30
Referrals	26
SIGIR Website	200
Telephone	84
Walk-in	112
Total Hotline Contacts	884
Other Products	
Congressional Testimony	35
Lessons Learned Reports	9
Special Reports	3
Evaluation Reports	1
Quarterly Reports	35

(Source- Bowen 2013:2)

The SIGIR served until October 2013 and came out with an estimate that at least \$8 billion of the reconstruction fund was wasted. His investigations also led to the recovery of \$191.2 million in court-ordered monetary penalties, produced 104 indictments and 82 convictions. For example SIGIR brought the Cockerham conspiracy case in limelight. The Cockerham conspiracy case was one of the most shaking criminal conspiracy case exposed during Iraqi

reconstruction by the SIGIR, Defense Criminal Investigative Service and many others. Cockerham, a contracting officer, had the responsibility of bottled-water contracts and some other programs for Iraqi reconstruction. He received about \$9 million for contract awards from companies or individuals as hush money. Cockerham was ordered to pay \$9.6 million as fine and a punishment of 17.5 years in prison. The investigation in this case exposed a big fraud. The investigation in the case resulted in recovery of \$67.7 million, conviction of 22 persons, and the debarment or suspension of 57 companies. (Bowen 2013:52)

Congressional oversight was a way to monitor the reconstruction work. It was a way to ensure that reconstruction efforts were proceeding in the desired directions to extract maximum output and maximise efficiency in the use of taxpayer's dollars. The oversight functions of Congress also ascertained that checks and balances were adequate as the founders of the US constitution aspired. The deep oversight through multiple reports and findings of misuse of reconstruction funds also influenced public opinion against the long-term US involvement in Iraq. It helped in the victory of Democrats in the elections.

A very popular oversight tool for Congress is the periodic reports from the executive on foreign policy issues and programs. Reporting helped Congress to review the implementation of reconstruction policy by the executive. Often, it is observed that reports help to maintain some issues on the agenda of the administration, while many others were side-lined without significant attention by members of Congress. Reports are also used to compel the administration to acknowledge certain facts or defend its position on certain issues (US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Required Reports to Congress in the Field Committee on Foreign Affairs 1973:5). For example, the SIGIR presented 35 detailed Quarterly Reports to the U.S. Congress to keep it informed about the US reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Besides the reporting requirement, Congress used hearings to review and monitor the administration's policy, to make sure that the administration carried out laws, passed by Congress, in accordance of law. As former Congressman Lee Hamilton has said, "Congressional oversight helps keep federal bureaucracies on their toes" (Stevenson 2013:97). Congressional hearings not only helped to examine the administration past conduct but also helped in shaping the on-going plans.

Many reviews by Government Accountability Office and other organizations persistently found deficiencies in oversight of the contractors working under the Department of Defense.

In a testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations in 2008, David M. Walker pointed towards the problems of the contingency contracting procedures, in particular which was to be addressed. It was mainly due to inadequately trained military personnel as well as civilian employees to carry out these duties. (Walker 2008) For example, the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, reported that in 2004, DOD never had a contract oversight personnel, who could be able to manage and also oversee its logistical support contracts such as LOGCAP and the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP).

The lawmakers had many tools at their disposal for conducting oversight and one of the important among them is committee hearings by the regular committees and special committees. Investigations carried on in the committees helped in reducing waste, fraud, corruption, and abuse of taxpayer's money while executing reconstruction program. Useful suggestions come from the reports of these committees. For example- Rend Rahim Francke, an Iraqi exile clearly told that the system of public security would collapse because there would be no functioning police force, no justice system and no civil services in Iraq after regime change (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002:179). Later, Rend Rahim Francke became first post-Saddam Iraq's ambassador to Washington. Phebe Marr, an observer of Iraq in both the academic and government affairs told in a hearing that the removal of the current regime in Baghdad, under certain circumstances, could result in collapse of the central government and its inability to exercise control over the country (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 107th Congress 2002:171).

Rep. John Tierney (D-Massachusetts) , the ranking Member pointed out in the committee hearing that in the absence of a comprehensive plan for how and to what extent to use contractors and as a result, ad-hoc basis contracting was done without any important consideration for foreign policy implications and without putting necessary oversight systems. Insufficient resources were dedicated to oversight that resulted in poor performance where billions of dollars were wasted, and thus failing to achieve the mission goals.(U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2011:58).

Military commanders and service members indicated that Department of Defense did not provide enough training and was not equipped to support the contractors in Iraq (GAO 2008:74).

The Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) was responsible for management of contractors that are generally drawn from combat units and receiving little training like on how to work with contractors. The analysts and officials further believed that the military did not have with them enough trained oversight personnel or also infrastructure that was adequate for effectively executing and managing contracts in Iraq (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012: 6).

In January 2009, in a testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (110th Congress) about the challenges faced by the Department of Defense, the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged DOD's failure to adequately prepare for the use of contractors. He said “We have not thought holistically or coherently about our use of contractors, particularly when it comes to combat environments or combat training (GAO 2009)”

On Nov 30, 2011, the Congressman Steve Chabot (R-OH first district), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on the Middle-East and South Asia, expressed his strong disapproval for the US Withdrawal from Iraq. He expressed fear before the committee by saying so, that Iraq is secure, stable, and self-reliant, did not make it the same in reality. He said that our objective to make sure that Iraq becomes stable within the political timeline was not realised in practice (US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Middle-East and South Asia 2011:25).

CONGRESSIONAL MEMBER'S IMPACT ON RECONSTRUCTION POLICY

Congress, at its disposal, has several means to influence foreign policy making. Members of Congress, in their individual capacity, influenced the reconstruction policy process by declaring their views on foreign policy issues without compelling the administration to take specific actions. Congress has exercised this role through the adoption of simple and concurrent resolutions or sense-of-Congress declarations. Though these resolutions do not have the force of law, they remain good indicators of congressional views and intentions. These resolutions can also influence foreign policy in various ways; they may voice support or opposition to a certain policy, launch a new idea, or promote a new policy. Members of Congress also use congressional hearings, floor speeches, letters written to the executive, press releases, op-ed pieces for newspapers, or interviews for radio and television to declare their views on foreign policy issues.

Henry A. Kissinger in the Committee on Foreign Relations had argued that before initiating any military action it is important to address the issues of reconstruction and the future of the region (US Senate Committee of foreign relations 107th Congress 2002:138). Senator John McCain III (R-Arizona), a member who remained a member of very important Congress committees including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee influenced the reconstruction policy in his various capacities. He consistently supported the U.S. military mission in Iraq, strongly backed the decision of troop surge in 2007. Senator McCain shares his experiences of poor project oversight during his Iraq visit. During his field visits to Iraq, he was told by a general that the project oversight was conducted by a drone aircraft where no one was appointed to oversee the performance of the aircraft (Bowen 2013:31). Senator McCain pointed the major shortcomings that undercut the U.S. program of reconstruction. It included the program that was in adequate and also the project oversight along with the security which was insufficient. He is of the view that if these two challenges were initially resolved, the efforts of reconstruction could make progress on a different scale. In a debate in October 2003, Senator Obama criticised Bush administration for funding the reconstruction projects of Iraq rather spending money at home to generate employment for the unemployed young US citizens (Obama 2003). Representative Stephen Lynch from Massachusetts highlighted the lack of oversight in the beginning of a stabilization and reconstruction operation. He argued about in the outflow of huge sum of money before SIGIR could take charge in Iraq in the year 2004. Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) proposed a legislation that was co-sponsored for a bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting. Her proposal bought about a series of recommendations for reforming the contingency operations that was overseas, so that the wasteful expenditure can be stopped in future.

ELECTORAL FACTORS AND RECONSTRUCTION

By 2006, Americans fully comprehended that the US was into an unnecessarily involved in war and reconstruction of Iraq. The day by day growing casualties of American lives in Iraq raised the eyebrows of common public on the loss of life and growing expenditure on Iraqi reconstruction. The young American sacrificing their lives and drain of the US treasury as well as civil war like situation in Iraq impacted public opinion and in turn the forthcoming elections. The majority of US citizens were not in favour to approve further US involvement in Iraq at the expense of the lives of their young countrymen. The changing mood of the common public reflected in their voting for mid-term Congressional elections of 2006.

President Bush's foreign policy towards Iraq was not only issue, which influenced the mid-term Congressional elections, though it remained a polarising issue, as the statistics shows. A pre-poll nationwide survey of October 5, 2006, by the Pew Research Center, shows that 58% of the public said that the U.S. military effort in Iraq was not going well. About 47% of the voters believed that the war in Iraq was not helping, instead it was hurting the war on terrorism (<http://www.people-press.org/2006/10/05/iraq-looms-large-in-nationalized-election/>). Domhoff is of the view that an anti-war voting in the mid-term Congressional elections of 2006 had an impact on causing higher turnout for the Democrats (Domhoff: 2006). It is important to note that the Democrats gained the control of the House of Representative and the Senate, for the first time since 1994. The deteriorating Iraqi security and stability, and defeat in the mid-term Congressional elections of 2006, compelled President Bush Jr. to accept it publicly that reconstruction policy towards Iraq was not working. In December 2006, for the first time, President Bush accepted that the US was not winning the war in Iraq.

The continued involvement of President Bush, in military occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan and a continuing war on terror were important foreign policy issues for the mid-term Congressional election and the American presidential election of 2008. The new president-elect, to which party he belonged to, had no option to simply wish away the important foreign policy decisions of President Bush administration. Therefore the foreign policy credentials of 2008 presidential candidates drew substantial attention of the common people. Specially, the US continued involvement in Iraq emerged as one of the very important polarizing issue in the upcoming American presidential election of 2008.

A large number of the Democrats, including the Presidential candidate Barack Obama, demanded early troop cuts in Iraq. In general, Republicans, including their Presidential candidate John McCain, wanted U.S. troops to stay until Iraq's stability was guaranteed. Jacobson opines that George W. Bush's involvement in Iraq war paved the way for victory of Barack Obama in the presidential election of 2008. The popular disillusion with the Iraq war affected the popularity of George W. Bush as well as Republicans overall. Public opinion on the war influenced the voting in Democratic primaries as well as general elections. A Cooperative Congressional Election Study and the American National Election Study data reflect that Barack Obama was benefitted from the unpopularity of Bush's involvement in Iraq (Jacobson 2010).

Public approval for the high expenditure of taxpayer's money on Iraqi reconstruction was shrinking. In the face of impending recession, majority of people objected US military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. At that juncture, the public needed a president who could demonstrate strong international leadership and re-establish the diminishing popularity of the US because of prolonged conflicts with limited outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq.

During the Democratic primaries, many among the Obama's critics, pointed their fingers on Obama's little experience on foreign policy issues. McCain criticised Obama for not having real understanding of actual problems of the US in Iraq. He said that Obama had not been back to Iraq since 2006. Thus he had little idea about the progress made by the US in the country (Zeleny 2008). In light of these political criticisms, it became important for Obama to come out with appropriate answers for his critics. Soon, he decided to travel abroad to strengthen his credibility.

After wrapping up the nomination for presidential candidature, Obama proceeded for an international tour in June 2008. During his trip, Obama focused his efforts on the Middle East and Europe. He visited eight countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Germany, France, and the UK. Though it was insisted by his supporters that his trip was not a part of his campaign, many political spectators saw it as a move to strengthen his foreign policy credentials. Dan Balz of the Washington post also made such a claim. Balz is of the view that in order to successfully confront the questions about his readiness to become next commander in chief, Obama made an international tour of many important countries. Most probably his tour signalled the possibility to give a new dimension to the US relations to the rest of the world (Balz 2008). After spending one day in Afghanistan, the Obama delegation went to Iraq. Obama met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security Adviser to discuss the future course of Iraq. These meetings were very productive, as all of them reached consensus for US withdrawal from Iraq within 16 months' time limit (Oppel and Zeleny 2008). Some military officials were had doubts about the realising a specific timetable of withdrawal, in general, they reached general consensus on US withdrawal discussed in the meeting.

Obama's visit helped him significantly in improving the common perception and credibility about his understanding of the nuances of US foreign policy towards Iraq, and it demonstrated an initial transformation in Obama's perceived credibility. This changing

perception about Obama's foreign policy expertise was also noticed the media and the Bush administration. As one of the Time Magazine article reported that Obama's visit wasn't only about when the U.S. forces should leave the Iraq. It was also about McCain was undermined in Washington DC. McCain's claim of his outstanding overseas expertise for the US presidency appeared squandered (Klein 2008). Obama's positions on withdrawal from Iraq and his insistence on diplomatic relation with Iran gave teeth to his foreign policy credential, despite some big concerns about the US withdrawal from Iraq.

McManus, in his article in The Los Angeles Times, pointed towards the balanced approach of Obama in the forthcoming elections. He writes that Obama had to strike a balance between fighting terrorism, with one eye on the balance sheet and another on supporting democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan (McManus 2010:23). Obama had the challenge of reducing the expenditure of on US foreign policy engagements, specially the military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reconstruction of Iraq had been draining the domestic economy of the US. It was the need of the hour for President Obama to strike a balance between the war on terror and financial burden on the treasury. The deteriorated situation of Iraq and exposure of Abu Ghraib to the world had put a question mark on the trust of the world on the purposes and democratic principles of the US. After sacrificing American lives in thousands and spending billions dollars money in Iraq, many Americans were losing the faith in American leadership in the world affairs. Obama, in his article in Foreign Affairs put forward his views on ending the US engagement in Iraq. He mentioned that-

To renew American leadership in the world, we must first bring the Iraq war to a responsible end and refocus our attention on the broader Middle East. Iraq was a diversion from the fight against the terrorists who struck us on 9/11, and incompetent prosecution of the war by America's civilian leaders compounded the strategic blunder of choosing to wage it in the first place. The best chance we have to leave Iraq a better place is to pressure these warring parties to find a lasting political solution. (Obama 2007)

And the only way for applying the pressure was beginning of a phased withdrawal of forces of U.S., with a goal of removing all the combat brigades from Iraq by the date March 31, 2008-a date consistent with goal setting of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group. This redeployment can be temporarily suspended if the government of Iraq meets the political, security, and economic benchmarks to which it has been always committed. But we must recognize that, in the end, only the leaders of Iraq can the real stability and peace to the country.

CONCLUSION

The Congress remained supportive for the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. The U.S.-led reconstruction efforts became easier for the executive due to continuous support of the Congress in various capacities. Otherwise, it would have been very difficult to carry out reconstruction for more than nine years in extraordinarily difficult circumstances in Iraq. The Congress remained supportive of the president's political ambitions of introducing democracy, freedom and free market in Iraq. It used the power of the purse to help the executive to achieve the goals of reconstruction policy. The Congress provided enormous wealth for the stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. It also politically legitimized the policies of the executive by passing favourable legislation and helped the executive in carrying out long-term decisions. At the same time, it tightened the monitoring and supervision when wastage and misuse of fund revealed. The Congress framed supportive laws which were necessary to provide adequate support to the executive.

In the initial years, President George W. Bush accumulated more powers, at the expense of Congress to make decisions. Congress gave almost free hand to him in designing and implementing the reconstruction policy in the beginning. This laissez-faire attitude of Congress changed when the executive could not ensure expected outcome from the taxpayer's dollars appropriated for the purpose stated in the laws framed by the Congress.

CHAPTER IV

***US RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND THE
MAJOR ROADBLOCKS***

In the aftermath of US military operation, the reconstruction of Iraq began in April 2003. With the help of the international community, the path to rebuilding Iraq as a stable, democratic, and prosperous country was paved by the US. The strategic objectives of the reconstruction program were to make Iraq a partner in the warfare against terrorism which would be at peace with itself and its neighbours. One of the stated goals was to provide the people of Iraq an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of a free society and a market economy (Christoff 2006:1). It was expected that the newly established Iraq would become a source to be emulated in the Middle East region. It would serve as a successful model in democracy promotion, economic development and social change for its neighbours.

This chapter describes the evolution of US reconstruction policy towards Iraq (2003-2011). It examines the significant changes made in the reconstruction policy by the CPA. It also elaborates the different approaches of President George W. Bush and President Obama towards Iraq. A broad analysis of the major obstacles faced during the implementation of reconstruction policy with special focus on security aspect is also explained. The causes of the limited positive outcome of the US reconstruction efforts and the major reasons for reconstruction gap are properly examined. The US Reconstruction programs included a wide spectrum of initiatives. It included the strengthening of Iraqi forces through equipment and training, construction of infrastructures such as electric power, roads, sanitation and oil production. Expert advice offered to the government on a wide range of programs; civil society promotion, business centres establishment, providing books for schools and vaccinations, financing development projects for villages etc.

US INITIATIVES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION


On October 15, 2003, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1511. It recognised the importance of global support for the restoration of security and stability for Iraqi people and their well-being. It called on the global community to support the people of Iraq in the time of distress that arose following the U.S. led pre-emptive military action in Iraq in 2003. The resolution also stressed that U.S. occupation of Iraq was temporary and encouraged the US to let Iraqis govern themselves as soon as practicable. In this context, the Coalition Provisional Authority was recognised as a temporary entity with specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations. It emphasised that the Coalition Provisional Authority would cease to exist once an internationally recognised government sworn in

representing the people of Iraq, takes the responsibilities (UNSC resolution, 2003). It deeply emphasised the rights of the people of Iraq in deciding their political future and how to use their natural resources.

Adding to this endeavour, the U.N. Resolution 1483 passed on May 22, 2003. It brought sanctions to an end and allowed the occupying coalition group to use the reserves of oil for the long-term program of reconstruction. The resolution transferred responsibility of oil profits and the disbursement of the profit to the US and its allies from the U.N. by creating a Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) under the Central Bank of Iraq. This resolution also paved the way for increased international financial aid to Iraq.

The preparations for the multilateral donor's conference also began under the aegis of the U. N. In June 2003 the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund consented to carry on a needs assessment for reconstruction of Iraq. In October 2003, the "International donor's conference for Iraqi reconstruction" was organised in Madrid. President George W. Bush commended the 20 international organisations and 73 nations that were ready to encounter the challenge for a better future of Iraqi people who were recovering from the decades of suffering and oppression (Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs 2003). Besides this, 13 non-governmental organisations also shown their interest and participated in the event. Representatives from various countries gathered in Madrid for the two-day conference, in order to raise adequate money for funding the reconstruction of Iraq. The purpose of this conference was also to secure international cooperation as well as funding for reconstruction aid. In the conference, the USA and the international community agreed to make sincere efforts to rebuild economic infrastructure and to introduce democratic government in Iraq. To achieve this goal the international donors and partners pledged \$33 billion for Iraqi reconstruction in four years (2004-2007). The United States as the leading contributor pledged substantial amount of \$20 billion for reconstruction. Other participating countries and international organisations pledged \$13 billion for the same purpose. Rather than financial assistance, some countries also offered technical and other kinds of support to the Iraqi people. The largest share of fund for reconstruction was shared by Iraq. The following bar chart presents the share of fund apportioned by the US, Iraq and non-US international community for reconstruction of war-torn Iraq. The overall expenditure for reconstruction was about \$220 billion.

US, Iraqi, and Non-US International money spent on Reconstruction of Iraq (2003–2012)



(Source- Bowen 2013:56)

The then Secretary of the Treasury John Snow and the then Secretary of State Colin Powell led the delegation of the U.S. to the Madrid Donors Conference (2003). They presented their vision for a new Iraq which would be prosperous and peaceful. It was expected that the world community’s financial assistance from would provide people of Iraq with more schools, telecommunications, hospitals, bridges, and roads. They argued that it would also help in strengthening security apparatus, improving power and oil infrastructure and putting Iraq again towards a path of economic stability and prosperity (Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs 2003). The Iraqi delegation presented by the Head of the Iraqi Governing Council Ayad Allawi. He told all the participants of the conference that the Iraqi Governing Council intended to pursue open markets, democratic development, physical reconstruction and joining of Iraq to the global community of nations.

RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ UNDER GEORGE W. BUSH

The US-led interventions into Iraq and the subsequent programmes of reconstruction, democratisation, and nation building were indicative of a more proactive and pre-emptive approach adopted by the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks for international peace and security. The US-led military combat in Iraq was over by the first week of May 2003. President J. W. Bush on May 1, 2003, stood on the USS Abraham Lincoln flight deck with a “mission accomplished” flag clearly visible behind him, to announce officially the end of Iraqi’s major combat operations (Liam and Gareth 2004:52). During the combat phase itself, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was appointed to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the common Iraqi people. President Bush on 20 January 2003, signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24 and authorised the Department of Defense to establish a civilian-led office named Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (The White House 2003). When the major combat operation ended, the ORHA took the responsibility of reconstruction of Iraq along with the responsibility of creation of an interim government by the Iraqis. It was set up by the US Defense Department in March 2003 and at that time, emerged as the single agency in charge of the post-war administration of post-Saddam Iraq.

ORHA took the responsibility of planned development and administration in the post-war Iraq and implementation of the plans after the war ended. The man in charge of ORHA was a retired General named Jay Garner who was a close associate of the Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. This new civilian organisation, in its early days, ironically staffed primarily by serving military personnel instead of civilians as the civilian authorities, in general, took a very long time in sending their personnel. The major reason behind this was that the civilians were not readily given the job to go in an area having the potential of being a war zone. The civilian agencies did not regularly redeploy and reassign their employees in the way military authorities used to do, due to this they had to search for the volunteers (Bensahel 2006:458).

Lt. Gen. Garner considered the war-related damage and the effects of the use of biological nuclear or chemical weapons as the main challenges required to be dealt with. He made a list of eleven important goals to be accomplished in Iraq. These goals were security, salaries to be paid nationwide, to return police to work and train them, prevent a fuel crisis, return ministries to a functional level, purchase crops, restore basic services to Baghdad, solve food

distribution challenges, install town councils nationwide, deploy and integrate government support teams with local government and to prevent cholera and dysentery (Bowen 2009:90).

When ORHA started its work in Iraq it thought that the administrative system of Iraq would remain there and American occupation would not be very long (Dobbins 2009:133). The reconstruction on a large-scale would not be necessary as the new Iraqi leadership would receive a capable and well-functioning governance structure. During the transition of power, the United States had to assist the ministries so that they continue their work for the transition period (Bensahel 2006:457). Jay Garner was of the view that he had to stay there in Iraq only until June 2003 and anticipated a permanent government, elected by Iraqi people would be there by August 2003 (Caldwell 2011:149).

When Garner entered in Baghdad, the circumstances were totally different from his expectations. The first logistical challenge that hampered the plans of ORHA was badly disrupted communications network. Garner had to work in an environment characterised by extreme violence, looting, and unrest that exploded after the war. Criminal anarchy, a protracted insurgency and the problems of deep divisions within the society along ethnic and sectarian lines hampered all the plans prepared by the ORHA. The insurgents destabilised the country and organised crime found its golden opportunity in post-war Iraq (Bowen 2009:86). The looting had three major effects on US reconstruction efforts. First, it greatly increased the costs of reconstruction and relief work. Estimates may vary, but the total plundering during the period was clearly to the tune of billions of dollars (Bremer et al, 2008:42). Garner admitted that after he began an attempt to reoccupy government buildings in the city, they were set on fire. The Ministry of Oil remained the only ministry to evade any major damage because it was guarded by Coalition troops the moment they entered into Baghdad city. The second major problem was the looting of the conventional arms depots. It had terrible long-term effect for the U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. As providing internal security became a big challenging task across the country. The third effect was the lost chances to restore normalcy of government services as soon as possible which was very crucial for securing local support for the US efforts. All these problems added to the responsibilities of ORHA as it had to restart all essential services and rebuild it from scratch (Caldwell 2011:177).

The unexpected extent of the destruction that followed the war, gave a severe blow to the administrative plans for the rapid transfer of power. General Garner wanted to hold a

nationwide meeting of influential Iraqis in May 2003 for transfer of political power but failed to implement it. The plan had to be dropped when it faced the ground realities in Iraq. The ORHA also faced a deficiency of qualified personnel throughout its existence who could be deployed overseas. The coordination civil and military was also missing because ORHA and the army command plans had not been synchronised and their differences were not reconciled before the beginning of combat operations (Bensahel 2006:471).

ORHA remained a temporary organisation and worked for less than two months, a very short period of transition. Soon, Garner was sacked and Paul Bremer was appointed as the head of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and sent to Iraq. The White House on May 6, 2003, formally announced Bremer's appointment and on 12 May 2006, he arrived in Baghdad, with an authorization to replace ORHA with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA appears as a superseding authority having stiff control on the Iraqi government. Seemingly, it also admitted that the Iraqi reconstruction was not that easy. It would take a longer time than anticipated by the ORHA and was a more complicated endeavour.

THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

The Coalition Provisional Authority symbolise a basic shift in the US policy towards post-war Iraq (Bensahel, 2006). It inherited the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in May 2003. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1483 (2003) recognised the Coalition Provisional Authority as a temporary body having specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under the international law. The resolution accepted the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and underscored that the CPA would cease to exist on the day when a representative government, recognised globally, established by the Iraqi people had taken the oath and assumed responsibilities.

L. Paul Bremer III reached Baghdad on May 12, 2003, as the chief administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The appointment of Bremer as the head of the CPA raised many eyebrows due to various reasons. Most probably his ideological proximity to neoconservative faction of Defense Department and great energy to grasp complex issues ensured his selection for leading the CPA. He shared same views about the sources of terror and regional security as neo conservatives had (Dobbins 2009:158). In past, he served as the head of the US State Department's counter-terrorism effort. The critiques point out that he

was not the right person to lead the CPA, as he had no experience of work in the Middle East. Neither, he had any background in Foreign Service nor any work experience in private-sector in post-conflict contingency operations, peacekeeping, or reconstruction. He never took part in any joint civilian-military operation and had not much experience in international development. He did not speak Arabic, which could have helped him in grasping the local circumstances, in order to make more practical decisions (Bowen 2009:96).

The President George W. Bush authorised Ambassador Bremer to oversee reconstruction efforts of Coalition and the procedures by which the people of Iraq build their governing structures and institutions. Subsequently, in a memo dated May 13, 2003, Bremer addressed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that he, as CPA administrator, had the responsibility for the temporary governance of Iraq. Rumsfeld's memo also directed Bremer to coordinate, oversee and direct all legislative, executive, and judicial functions necessary to accomplish his responsibilities, including reconstruction humanitarian relief and assisting in the making of an interim Iraqi authority. Rumsfeld stated that Bremer had to work in a tough environment and had to take a lot of decisions which was a difficult job (Woodward, 2006:274). Hence he gave extraordinary freedom of action to him in order to take independent and timely decisions. Bremer "only technically, but not really" worked under Rumsfeld (Dyson, 2009). Rumsfeld figured it out when he stated- "The cow was out of the barn. So my attitude was, fine, let him report to the president or Condi or Colin. Doesn't bother me" (Graham 2009:438)

The arrival of the CPA in Baghdad, under L. Paul Bremer III, pronounced a major change in U.S. reconstruction policy towards Iraq. The CPA assumed a very ambitious responsibility of creating durable peace, providing effective and representative government and building a market economy. Immediately upon his arrival in Baghdad, it took three fatal strategic decisions which were: (1) to prohibit former members of the Baath Party from participating in the new Iraqi government, (2) to disband Iraqi military and security forces, and (3) to delay the return of sovereignty to Iraqi officials. Bremer's these three decisions altered the very role of the US in Iraq from a liberator to that of an occupier with substantial, long-term and costly implications. Garner and other members of the ORHA team advised him against these measures but Bremer decided not to reconsider any of his decisions (Caldwell 2011:183).

Dan Caldwell (2011) opines that there were many negative consequences of Bremer's decisions of de-Ba'athification and disbanding the army. These decisions Bremer continued

to haunt reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq since De-Ba'athification led to the purging of all the top layer of management in government ministries. Additionally, it made lakhs of people unemployed abruptly. At that time it was very urgent to restore government services to win Iraqi support but, a sudden increase in unemployment further added to the existing problems of the Iraqi people and the CPA too. Many scholars and diplomats share a different point of view on the same issue.

Many of them believe that when Baghdad fell (9 April 2003), the Iraqi army stayed simply dissolved. On April 17, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and General John Abizaid through a video conference reported that there were no organised Iraqi military units left (Bremer et al: 2008:26). So, the decision of disbanding the army was a mistake which no longer existed in reality. Moreover, the military establishments required de-politicization because it crushed Shia and Kurds uprising during Saddam regime. Shi'ites and Kurds together constituted over 80% of the total population of Iraq's and did not want the Saddam's army to be restored. Kurdish leaders even threaten to secede or participate in civil war if Saddam's army was recalled due to their painful experiences with the Iraqi army in past. On 9 May 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld circulated a memo entitled 'Principles for Iraq-Policy Guidelines' to the National Security Council members. The coalition mentioned it explicitly that it would actively and continuously oppose Saddam Hussein's old guard like the Fedayeen Saddam, Baath Party, etc. and the coalition would eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime (Bremer 2006:39).

For political reconstruction, Bremer had to make a transition towards establishing an infant democracy from the collapsed dictatorship. This transition in political sphere included the creation of Governing Council, the appointment of interim ministers, the formation of provincial councils, concluding the long-running debate over national elections, and in June 2004 the eventual formation of the interim Iraqi government (Rathmell 2005:1016). For this purpose, Bremer publicised a seven-step path in September 2003, to restore Iraqi sovereignty. In accordance with this seven-point strategy, a governing council was to be chosen. This governing council had to nominate a committee for the preparation of a draft of the new Iraqi constitution. The draft prepared was to be ratified through a national referendum and a national election for the formation of a new government was scheduled to be held. After that, the CPA was to be dissolved. This plan of drafting and then ratifying of the constitution of the country and holding of national level elections for the formation of a representative Iraqi

government would take some time and be supposed to take a couple of years (Dobbins 2009:141).

The CPA took the charge of Iraq amid deep political crisis and to some extent economic crisis too. In Iraq, the CPA confronted a situation similar to the defeated Germany in 1945 after Second World War and a failed USSR in 1989 (Bremer et al: 2008:46). There was no government, meagre electricity supply, poor water supply and no functioning security forces. Bremer and his staff worked hard to restart almost every aspect of life in Iraq, from paying government salaries to reopening ministries, from restoring the essential medical services to providing health care, from cleaning sewage to collecting garbage from the streets.

There were many practical problems affiliated with the transfer of power in the Iraqi hands. At first, the legal and political vacuum of Iraq was to be filled. There is a constitutional prerequisite before sovereignty could responsibly and effectively be returned to them by the coalition. The CPA on 13 July 2003 had set up a broadly representative 25-member, Governing Council of Iraq. The council had all the authority to appoint ministers for the smooth running of the government. It also encouraged responsibility of these ministers for their performance. In effect, the government of Iraq never managed achieved or install a system of accountability in the political leaders (Bremer et al: 2008:29). Many have pointed out that this was a major faultline in US plans and policy.

On 15 November 2003, Bremer managed to secure Governing Council assent for an expedited schedule that requested for negotiation on an interim constitution, acknowledged as the transitional administrative law (TAL). On 28 June 2004, Bremer formally transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people and their interim government. The CPA attached greater urgency to the formation of a central government than establishing the authorities of the local governments. The reason given was the danger of serious centrifugal forces in the post-conflict societies. A weak central government and empowered local governments might cause more political chaos.

The reconstruction program was not only aimed at fixing the issues what the incursion had broken. It was a large programme which also created new infrastructure.

The CPA, by 1 October 2003, had brought the power generation and electricity to a new height than seen before the start of the war. It had committed to provide more than \$5 billion

to enhance the electric power production to a level over and above the pre-war levels. Spending on public health under the CPA increased significantly i.e. to the tune of 3,200%. There were renovation and rewriting of school text books in thousands to reduce the influence of Ba'athist. The courts were reopened and the process of creating an independent judicial structure started. The CPA, by September 2003, claimed that 90% or more of courthouses in Iraq were reopened, although a fully functional justice system was not in place until that. In June 2003 a Central Criminal Court was started by the CPA to handle the major cases of criminal nature which have national importance in Baghdad. Independent inspectors-general were appointed in each ministry as practised in the Commission on Public Integrity based on the model US in order to reduce the incidences of corruption. In security aspect, the performance of Iraq was very poor and it was at the lowest in any ranking during reconstruction efforts of post-war. It had not deployed sufficient troops to dissuade the growth of insurgency and violent resistance but were sufficient to topple the old regime (Dobbins 2009:148).

Various scholars, bureaucrats, and diplomats differ in their opinion about the achievements of the CPA. L. Paul Bremer III (Bremer III, 2006: 395) claimed that “I leave behind a country very different from what it was a year ago. Iraq today is a very much better country, though much work remains to be done to bring about a future of hope for all Iraqis. The day of the tyrant is over. Justice will prevail- the justice you have prized in the land between two rivers since the time of Hammurabi...Today Iraq is united, not by forced loyalty to a tyrant, but by a shared vision of freedom for every single Iraqi- man or women, Arab, Turkman or Kurd, Sunni or Shia, Christian or Muslim.”

James Dobbins (2009) also appreciates the achievements of the CPA. According to him “the CPA had restored Iraq’s essential public services to near or beyond pre-war levels, instituted reforms in the Iraqi judiciary and penal systems, dramatically reduced inflation, promoted rapid economic growth, put in place barriers to corruption, begun reform of the civil service, promoted the development of the most liberal constitution in the Middle East, and set the stage for a series of free elections”(Dobblin 2009).

Dan Caldwell (2011) is of contrary view about the achievements of the CPA. He opines that the CPA failed miserably in restoring even basic services to Iraq’s cities. The coalition forces faced increasing global censure for not able to establish law and order situation. It was also

criticised for its failure to maintain the Geneva Conventions' provisions under which, after the end of major combat, an occupying force had to establish law and order.

The CPA remained confined to the Green Zone most of the time. It had a minimum presence outside Iraq for several months. When the CPA was formed, the armed forces commanders were informed that it would take the responsibility of almost all of the reconstruction works very soon. The military commanders kept waiting but very few officials reached out of Baghdad due to security related issues. They soon began to make a joke of the CPA by calling CPA stands for- "can't provide anything" (Bensahel 2006:472). The inexperience, incompetence, and resulting ineffectiveness of some Coalition Provisional Authority officials led some in the military to make a joke that the CPA means "Can't Provide Anything" (Caldwell 2011:181).

RECONSTRUCTION: MAJOR OBSTACLES

The task of transformation of Iraq was designed properly but could not be executed smoothly due to various reasons. One major reason was continuous violence and unrest in Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq. Noticeably, the closing months of CPA's were dominated by a growing war on primarily two fronts, with both Shia militias and Sunni insurgents. The monumental task of rebuilding and even performing the core functions of Iraq proved a big challenge in these tough circumstances. In addition to this, the CPA faced many problems like problems of staffing, lack of required expertise with Defense Department, bureaucratic problems, weak coordination, little civilian presence outside Iraq etc. (Dobbins, 2009). Bremer personally appointed a number of highly skilled and experienced at the level of the senior position to serve and accomplish the goals of reconstruction. Many of them arrived late and some served for the tenure he desired. They were often good, and sometimes even better but frequent and rapid turnover of staff had not any good effect on the continuity of work.

Even more enervating was the persistent inability of Washington to employ more than half of the junior positions and mid-level in the CPA. Due to this, though it was intended it would be a broadly civilian organisation, the CPA remained to a great extent staffed by the armed forces personnel.

In the administrative structure, there was an acute shortage of middle-level skilled and experienced managers. In particular, there was a dearth of regional experts who speak Arabic and had working experience in previous post-conflict stabilisation operations. Bremer tried hard but failed to find out the civil servants who had the skill and genuine interest in working in Iraq. Many CPA personnel was often young and being in their 20s and 30s having not much experience in the fields or in the region they were working (Caldwell, 2011:182).

In the highly insecure environment, the CPA staffs could not reach many areas. At these places, the military commanders themselves initiated a broad chain of reconstruction works, but they were not acquainted with different skill sets required- like how to build city councils, justice procedure, local procedure, setting priorities for allocation of resources etc. Due to lack of centralising command for reconstruction, different regions adopted different policies which in turn created confusion and resentment among common Iraqi people. It also defeated the purpose of unity of command. The military commanders reported to CENTCOM, while CPA officers reported to President Bush through Rumsfeld. Another limitation was Bremer's inability to mobilise available local expertise effectively for reconstruction efforts. These limitations also hampered the outcome of reconstruction work during the occupation period.

CHANGING DYNAMICS: ELEVEATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE

President Bush on May 11, 2003, brought out National Security Presidential Directive 36 to formalise the key features of transition plan of the U.S. The NSPD-36 had given the State Department full responsibility for managing the reconstruction between the U.S and Iraq. It also facilitated the establishment of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. In between, on June 28, 2004, the CPA had prepared itself for departure from the Green Zone, in a hurriedly-arranged ceremony, by recognising the full sovereignty of Iraq and passed the task of reconstruction in new hands. The State Department had been given the charge of all activities U.S. in Iraq except few. The Defense Department retained the charge of development and military operations of the security forces of Iraq. While the CPA largely focused on big infrastructure projects for reconstruction, the embassy had shifted its priorities to security, governance, and economic development. The NSPD-36 also established new organisations named Iraq Reconstruction Procurement Office (IRPO) and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to manage security and reconstruction. On October 14, 2006, Project and Contracting Office was merged with Gulf Region Division (GRD). The GRD took the sole responsibility of

supervision and conclusion of the Department of Defense IRRF 2 reconstruction program. The Joint Contracting Command- Iraq (JCC-I) was established in November 2004 to support the military contracting and reconstruction in Iraq. The U.S. government repeatedly reorganised and reformed the offices in Iraq in order to make the management better in the area of the reconstruction and relief program of Iraq. Efforts were put to improve coordination and cooperation within a particular agency and also among various other agencies. Some changes like the establishment of the IRMO and PCO, with the overlap in their authority, had not solved the problem rather continued it while other organisations, for example, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I), helped incrementally (Bowen, 2009:328).

SECURITY: THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE FOR RECONSTRUCTION

No facet of the U.S. program in 2004 and 2005 for the rebuilding of Iraq was left untouched by the growing violence. By the end of 2005, the entire rebuilding effort was threatened due to deteriorating security and slowing down the work. It led to increase in cost in every sector of reconstruction. The military mission of U.S. in Iraq did not include giving security protection for contractors and civilian government agencies of the U.S. Therefore, the organisations working in Iraq had to rely on and hire security personnel from private security companies for the protection of their employees. SIGIR review in 2008 had found that a total obligation of around \$5.3 billion was given for providing physical security services to 77 private security contractors for contracts for all U.S.-funded programs and projects since 2003. Key projects audit by SIGIR in the electricity, health, water/sewerage, and oil, disclosed that between June 2004 and July 2005, there was little progress made by U.S. in this insecure environment in the infrastructure sectors.

Various policy analysts put forth different reasons of the tragic level of instability and violence in Iraq which increased continuously following the 2003 war. Some analysts consider instability and violence as a legacy of the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein. Some others consider it a natural outcome of the process of democratic transformation of Iraq (Diamond, 2005). Many of them acknowledged a different reason. Kuoti (2016) argue that the US had not handled properly the process democratic transition after the Iraq War of 2003. Policies like De-bathification and very limited representation of Sunni in the Committee on the Writing of the Constitution and National Assembly excluded and sidelined Sunni. In this context, the use of violence could be understood as an expression of a power struggle

between the declining domination of the Sunni minority and the rising dominance of the Shiite majority.

Out of 270 seats in the National Assembly, Sunnis who were about 20 percent of the total population received only 20 seats. Out of 55 experts and officials of the Committee on the Writing of the Constitution, there was only one Sunni member. The Constitution was adopted on 15 October 2005 by a popular referendum which was mostly rejected by Sunnis. Constitutional provisions like Article 109 and Article 110 talks about the division of resources among regions allotted the extra revenues coming from gas and oil sales to regions which were underprivileged under Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi president. These provisions also caused dissatisfaction among the Sunni population. Kurds also used violent methods for autonomy and guaranteed protection in the Constitution. They also wanted a fair share in the recruitment of Iraqi security forces in order to ensure that Kurdish officers occupy proportionate share in commanding positions.

Cordesman (2009) argues that the major reasons of Iraqi security related problems were closely linked to Iraq's political divisions, ethnic divisions, and sectarian tensions. The violence stemmed from brutal and internal conflicts between Kurds and Arabs, and between Shiites and Sunnis. The Sunnis fought for recovering power and the Shiites for keeping it with them. The Kurds also adopted violent means for autonomy in their territory. In nutshell the core grievances which caused full blown violence were linked to minority rights, the sharing of oil revenues and federal-regional relations. Criminal gangs, Insurgent groups, and militias of different political parties had employed violence to accomplish their specific objectives. Neighbouring countries backed them with weapons, paramilitary training, and funding, further fomenting instability (Cordesman 2009:27).

In the year 2006, a number of significant events took place. In February 2006, a major terrorist attack was done on the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra by al Qaeda terrorists. In March 2006, the polls in the US indicated that a majority of Americans no longer favoured the U.S. presence in Iraq. The public support for the US involvement in Iraq was waning. In the congressional elections of 2006, in both the Senate and the House of Representative, Democrats got a comfortable majority for the first time since 1994 (Caldwell, 2011). Most worrisome among all was the warning of the possibility of a civil war in Iraq by an eminent person like General John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. The noted journalist Linda Robinson (2008) also reported that Baghdad was on fire by the

summer of 2006. Sectarian violence spread out in the form of an all-out war and affected hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. By the end of 2006, the full-blown civil war on sectarian basis was descended into Iraq.

To find out a way out, a bipartisan group named “Iraq Study Group” was formed. The co-chair of Iraq Study Group was prominent Americans Lee H. Hamilton (D- Indiana) and James A. Baker (Republican). It was formed to make policy recommendations after assessment of the situation in Iraq. The report of Iraq Study Group (ISG) started with a knockout punch on talk of victory by Bush administration. It clearly stated that “the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success.” The findings of Baker-Hamilton report influenced the future course of action of the US in Iraq.

Senator Joseph Biden, the former Head of the Council on Foreign Relations Dr Leslie Gelbraith, diplomat Peter Galbraith, and some Kurd leaders favoured partition or decentralisation of Iraq into Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish states or regions. Biden and Galbraith suggested a division of Iraq into three “autonomous regions” with a central government in Baghdad. The central government should be responsible for border defence, foreign policy, and oil revenues. This idea was rejected by President Bush as Baghdad had a mixed population of all ethnic groups. Many Sunnis and Shia leaders also dismissed the idea of partition believing that they might get less than they deserve.

Broadly President Bush had three options to handle the worsened security situation in Iraq. These were- (1) withdraw from Iraq and accept failure, (2) increase the number of American forces, (3) adopt a significantly different strategy (Caldwell 2011:237). Joe Biden, Senator of U.S. stubbornly opposed any further increase in the number troops, contending that surge of American troops could not make any permanent positive effect except some temporary positive impact. U.S. Senator John McCain(R-Arizona), President Bush and many others were proponents of the surge. In September 2006, Rumsfeld met with a retired general, Jack Keane, who also recommended an increase in forces in Iraq. They were of the view that surge of troops could provide sufficient security and protect people against sectarian violence. They were very much convinced and had firm belief that under such violent circumstances any withdrawal of forces in Iraq could affect neighbouring countries which might lead to jeopardise exports of oil across the region. Those advocating surge also believed that leaving Iraq without stabilising it would seriously harm the reputation of the US globally. It would be

a morale booster for terrorist groups like Islamic extremists and in turn, the morale of the U.S. military might be crushed. That's why President Bush opted for increment in the number of troops to control the insurgent and sectarian violence which appeared to be growing up continuously.

The "new way forward", named as "surge" was formally announced in January 2007, by the White House. It emphasised on counterinsurgency strategy under the supervision of General David Petraeus, the commander of all U.S. forces in Iraq. It was designed in such a way to supplement the Iraqi efforts to appease the violence on sectarian basis and make favourable conditions to start the process of national reconciliation by giving the time and space to Iraqi government required to sort out and address diverging views among various sections of Iraqi society (GAO Report 2007:4). President Bush expected that the deteriorating situation would be turned around soon. The Bush administration started a "surge" of additional U.S. forces of about 30,000, increasing troops level to a high of about 170,000 from their 2004-2006 levels of 138,000. The surge of troops was accompanied by increased civilian efforts and revised counterinsurgency strategy designed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General David Petraeus, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Surge of troops was accompanied by increasing civilian effort by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Katzman 2015:36).


Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the formation of the first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for Iraq on November 11, 2005. PRTs were intended to achieve various political objectives, counterterrorism and socio-economic development. These teams helped the local communities of Iraq to strengthen the moderates, pursue reconciliation, and accelerate the transition process towards self-reliance. The PRTs, representing U.S. interests, worked as the 'eyes and ears' of the U.S. government in every part of Iraq. It reported to State embassy about the local conditions and political developments in different corners of Iraq. The account of Economic Support Fund (ESF) which substituted the IRRF being the main channel of the economic assistance of U.S. in 2006 funded the Surge and the PRTs. The key component of the surge initiative and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) programs implementation was ESF. The Iraqi PRTs differed significantly from that of Afghanistan. In Iraq, a State Department official was in charge of the PRT and they were staffed mostly by the civilians. In Afghanistan military officer headed the same. By the end

of 2006, there were 10 PRT s in Iraq, followed by 25 in 2007, and 31 in 2008. There were some problems in timely deploying of these teams. The Department of State wanted assurance from the Defense Department that their personnel would be provided adequate security. But Rumsfeld was not enthusiastic in providing security to these State Department personnel by deploying military forces.

The PRTs and Surge appear to have facilitated a new era of reconstruction. Soon these new initiatives began to pay dividends, at least in short term. President George W Bush also signed the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with Iraq's government by 2008. It was an agreement between the US and Iraq in which the US agreed to withdraw its combat forces by June 30, 2009, from Iraqi cities and all combat forces of the U.S. would be completely out by December 31, 2011, from Iraq. Along with the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), a strategic framework agreement was also signed. A possible glimpse future relationship between U.S. and Iraq could be anticipated by the strategic framework agreement. It avowed the desire to establish a long-term relationship between the US and Iraq for friendship and cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including trade, culture, energy, health, communications, diplomacy and security. The United States promised under the framework of the Strategic Framework Agreement, to continue to help and build professional civil service, encourage reconciliation, establish a nonsectarian institutions, promote and encourage a system of checks and balances between the executive branch and parliament of the country, and support the reintegration and assimilation of refugees and displaced persons. SOFA and the Strategic Framework Agreement, seemingly, indicated the changing dynamism in the relationship between the US and Iraq towards partnership from one of patronship.

The impact of the “New Way Forward in Iraq” was felt after few months. The enemy-initiated number of attacks on Iraqi Security Forces, coalition forces and civilians, which was increased strikingly with the Samarra Golden Mosque bombing (February 2006), shows some sign of decline. There was a continuous increase, in general, in the number of attacks on a monthly basis through June 2007. After June 2007 the number of attacks declined. The Statistics can be observed in the following figure:

Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians, May 2003 through September 2007



Source: GAO Report September 2007

By the end of 2008, the surge had a much-desired effect on security and reconstruction work. U.S. President George W. Bush in July 2008 had announced that there was a decreasing trend in the violence cases in Iraq and reached "to its lowest level since the spring of 2004". The major reason for this sustained progress towards declining trends in violence was "the success of the surge" (Sky, 2011). Multi-National Force-Iraq's top commander Odierno had a different point to make. He stated that the root causes of conflict in Iraq were not eliminated by surge as the Iraqis were unable to develop the systems and institutions which were necessary for peaceful management of competition among different groups for resources and power. Although there was a great improvement in security situation in Iraq, for outside world the status as a country had moved only a bit up to a fragile state from a failed state (Caldwell 2011:240). In Iraq, the public services were still very poor and had a large influence of foreign powers and armed groups. For instance, in September 2008, tensions sprang up between Kurds and Arabs in Diyala, the northern Iraqi region, and within few months spread in Ninewa and Kirkuk.

BARAK OBAMA AND RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

The issue of Iraq figured out prominently during the campaign for the US presidential election of 2008. During the Presidential election campaign, Barack Obama promised to stop the war in Iraq within a stipulated time period of sixteen months from the date he took the office. During his campaign, he described the request of Prime Minister Iraq Nouri al-Maliki, for a schedule of U.S. troop's withdrawal from his country as "an enormous opportunity" that would raise the possibility of successes for "long-term success in Iraq and the security interests of the United States" (Stern 2015). Obama, with a mandate to end the war in Iraq, was successfully elected as the President of US to bring back the American forces home.

In his inaugural presidential address in January 2009, he pledged to leave a peaceful Iraq to its people. He also reflected honour for the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) signed between the government Iraq and George W Bush in 2008. In 2009 just over a month after taking charge of the White House office, Barak Obama delivered his very important speech at Camp Lejeune reiterating his poll campaign promise to conclude the U.S. war in Iraq by putting a schedule of withdrawal to pull all military forces of US out of Iraq in consistent with the agreement by Bush Administration by the end of 2011. On February 27, 2009, he stated that

The strategy in Iraq is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists. Through the period of transition, we will carry out further redeployments. And under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.

Barak Obama chose the middle ground, by making a mini-surge of troops to end the combat operations and then by August 2010 a reducing the number of troops to 50,000. General Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq enforced a plan of Obama by shifting the attention of mission from counterinsurgency to stability operations with the help of remaining U.S. forces. The reconstruction efforts were oriented towards bolstering the capacity of ISF's to protect the people of Iraq on their own. Obama made it clear in his statement that the future of Iraq should be left in the hands of people of Iraq, once the US laid the foundation of a stable Iraq. In the Camp Lejeune speech in 2009, he stated that

“We will complete the transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home with the honour that they have earned. The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility. However, a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security.”

By late 2009, General Raymond Odierno resolved that the aim of U.S. policy towards Iraq could not be completed by the end of 2011. The elites of the Iraqi political spectrum were also of the same views. Many of them felt that the administration under Obama leadership focused more on vacating Iraq rather supporting the country's effort to build a system of government on democratic lines. Tamara Coffman, who served from 2009 to 2012 as the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, stated that

“Our policy rhetoric regularly acknowledges that extremists thrive on grievances and disorder driven by failures of governance, but our policy practice avoids addressing governance for fear of disrupting short-term security goals” (Stern 2015).

The withdrawal from Iraq was a priority for President Obama since the beginning of his tenure. Marc Lynch (2015) is of the view that since Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continuously pursuing personal power at the cost of the national good, in such a scenario whatever be the number of U.S. troops, it could not make a lasting difference in Iraq. Maliki’s sectarian and corrupt rule over the Iraq brought subsequent failure, the growth of the Islamic State and renewed kind of civil war situation. According to him, the U.S. withdrawal was not the major reason and it was well timed also. Another critical point of view says that continued engagement by the US could have helped Iraq in such a way that it could come closer to the vision of a nation like the US that is at peace with itself, an ally against violent extremists and an active participant in the global market. Still, Iraq had a long way to go with continued US assistance to become a self-reliant, sovereign and stable country.

Simon (2008) predicted that When the US withdraw from Iraq, it would leave a country more divided than the one it had invaded. He said that it might happen that Iraq would remain essentially unreconstructed. The US strategy in Iraq systematically nourished domestic rivalries in order to maintain an illusory short-term stability. Aware of the U.S. forces final withdrawal in near future, a new round of in fighting was going to start in different Iraqi factions for which preparation was started.

Sky (2011) also pointed out the risk of reverting to violence among different groups Iraq to accomplish their goals when the US withdrew completely. He had the view that the Communal struggles continued to exist between Kurds and Arabs and Sunnis and Shiites and institutional structure of the state remained too weak to control it. Rather showing a peaceful and smooth transition of unity and power, the political process in Iraq uncovered the lingering distrust among different sections of Iraqi society, especially among the ruling elites, who looks ready to promote their own interests over and above the cause of national good. The Iraqis were also not very enthusiastic about the Maliki's coalition assembled, which enjoyed some points of agreement on important national issues. Nouri al-Maliki could not facilitate consensus on many issues being politically sensitive such as the sharing of oil revenues, federalism and the internal borders demarcation.

Some major obstacles were hindering the path of a definitive success. The most prominent among them was the division of society on sectarian lines. Maliki was unable to take any strong steps leading toward genuine reconciliation between Shiite and Sunnis. Instead, he grabbed the opportunity achieved by the success of the surge and solidified his power in Baghdad and also enjoying the firm support of Washington. Maliki also allowed Iran to utilise the territory of Iraqi to equip, train and arm hard-line militias of Iraqi Shiite. Many foreign powers, especially Iran, Turkey, and Syria continued their intervention in Iraqi politics and influenced the power-sharing negotiations and arrangements. The remnants of Shiite militias and al Qaeda also kept on fomenting troubles. Iran trained and armed Shiite forces while Gulf countries financed the opposing faction of Sunnis. All these developments set the platform for the rapid advancement of ISIS and set the stage for country's potential disintegration. Dodge(2012) is of the view that the government of Iraq rather than becoming democratic, it might become increasingly authoritarian. He believed that there was a big possibility of undermining the enormous US investment of blood and treasure in Iraq.

Uncertainties in the policies of Obama administration's desire to keep a residual force in Iraq, the troubled political system, and the issue quite sensitive of legal immunity for service members of the US personnel acted as stumbling blocks between two counties in developing a longer-term arrangement. The Pentagon officials told military leaders of U.S in Iraq that the president would consider the idea of keeping troops in Iraq beyond 2011 for the purposes other than the combat missions if it helps and preserve the gains obtained to secure the peace in recent years (Stern, 2015). A major hurdle was a denial of immunity by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki for the U.S. troops staying in Iraq beyond the termination of the agreement

on status-of-forces that Maliki and Bush had agreed to in 2008. President Obama and his national security team's senior members failed to reach a consensus with the Iraqi government that would have permitted the residual military force of U.S. to be there temporarily. In January 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, and the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Lloyd Austin. As Gates recollects through his memoir, Austin urged that for a transitional period that might last between three and five years, he would need at least 20,000 troops to be there in Iraq post-2011 (Brennan, 2014). But, they failed to work out a plan for how to depart from Iraq in a way that would preserve and secure the gains achieved during last few years.

CONCLUSION

The rights and wrongs of Iraq war and the reconstruction policy will continue to be debated in coming years. The Iraqi people had expected the excellent outcome of the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. They expected that the liberating coalition that conquered their nation in less than two months had high capability to bring prosperity to their nation in very short term. The reality appeared very different. The limited visible progress and little improvement in the basic services frustrated the highly aspirant Iraqis.

Another important point which can be noted is that the US could not democratise Iraq and the Middle East at the point of a gun. At the same time, it is equally important to note that apparently, it is very difficult to engineer democracy than the Bush and Obama administration had thought. The very basic is that democracy cannot be enforced upon an unwilling population. A functional democracy requires the consent of the governed. The "anyone can do it" approach of democratisation and liberalisation could not be realised in Iraq. This concept had limited success in Iraq as the ground realities of Iraq also influenced the outcome. It is broadly acknowledged that the political agenda of Bush administration of introducing a successful democracy to Iraq had severe limitations. It was very difficult to impose democratic order in Iraq at the point of a gun. War. The celebrated formulations of John Quincy to use military force to champion democracy and liberty could not be realised in Iraq.

The reconstruction of Iraq appears an expensive and difficult undertaking for the US since the beginning. The US paid an undeniably high price for reconstruction of Iraq. Around some

thirty-two thousand wounded, forty-four hundred US lives lost, and hundreds of billions of dollars spent in Iraq. The efforts of US had only limited outcome. According to the Office of the SIGIR, reconstruction efforts were continuously plagued by pathetic management, inadequate coordination with Iraqis, reconstruction funds mishandling and large scale attacks on contractors and construction sites. The reconstruction might have been less expensive and much more efficient if contracts were given to local firms of Iraq. Many local firms could not participate in the process simply because they were state-owned due to the flawed contracting strategy.

It is important to note that the countries should get involved in armed conflicts only when immediate national interests are at stake. It is equally important for the leaders to develop a strategy for the exit before they began fighting. As in March 2003, Major General David Petraeus famously put it, as armed forces of U.S. battled their way to Baghdad “Tell me how this ends.” American forces had achieved all their combat objectives within 42 days of US invasion in Iraq but concluding an exit took almost nine years.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The nine years long US reconstruction program in Iraq was one of the largest stabilisation and reconstruction program initiated by the US. Though the US had taken part in post-conflict reconstruction of several countries across the world, the case of Iraq was different from many other earlier initiatives. The US-led military occupation of Iraq in 2003, followed by the post-war reconstruction, was provoked by the country's plausible possession of weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles and Saddam's alleged association with terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda. This study examines that in addition to the elimination of the alleged WMDs and eroding terrorist bases, bringing liberal democracy, freedom and free market to Iraq were the principal objectives of the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. This study's research aims are as follows:-

- To understand the genesis and ideological roots of the US reconstruction policy towards war-torn Iraq with a special focus on the role of President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama.
- to examine the involvement of various executive bureaucracy agencies and other independent agencies in articulation, formulation and implementation of US reconstruction policy towards Iraq
- To examine the role of Congress in shaping the reconstruction policy towards Iraq.
- To understand the evolution, development and contraction of the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq and to find out major obstacles in its implementation with a special focus on the security problems.

The research work begins with a focus on ideological background of US presidents and its impact on policy making. The research work highlighted how the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq was guided by the political agenda of President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama. George W. Bush's decision to involve in the gigantic task of reconstruction of Iraq was supported by his strong conviction on making the world democratic and peaceful. For instance, in September 2002, President George W. Bush proclaimed *The National Security Strategy* of the US, wherein he emphasised that the US would endeavour to spread optimism of democracy, freedom, and free markets to every corner of the world. On February 26, 2003, while discussing the future of Iraq in Washington Hilton Hotel in Washington D.C., he stated that democratic, stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. He manifested his belief in the dissemination of democratic values in the world. For this purpose, he spent billions of dollars and sent a large number of troops to Iraq.

The evidences show that it created the ideological background for President George W. Bush's reconstruction policy towards Iraq. Thus, the second chapter found that US reconstruction policy toward Iraq was guided by his firm belief in the elimination of terrorism through democracy, peace and prosperity in Iraq.

President George W. Bush projected that the political reconstruction of Iraq would bring the hope of democracy and peace for Iraq, as well as for other authoritarian regimes of the World. He considered regime change in Iraq as an important means to enhance American security as well as to secure the interest of the Middle-East region as a whole. The democratic transition of Iraq was projected as an essential part of the war on terrorism. Political reconstruction of Iraq was portrayed as the first step towards the democratic transition of the whole Middle -East region. President George W. Bush expected that a new democratic regime in Iraq would serve as an inspiring example, a beacon of light of freedom for other despotic nations in the region. The idea of the US as 'shining city on a hill' always remained a source of inspiration for the spread of democracy across the world. Many Presidents including George W. Bush, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan took initiatives for democracy promotion as an important aim of US foreign policy. President George W. Bush's decision to start political reconstruction after the war in 2003 was also inspired by the centuries old cultural tradition of the US. The economic reconstruction policy, approved by the President George W. Bush administration was aimed at introducing free market and free trade. The designed changes in the economy were expected to raise the standard of living of the common Iraqi people and bring prosperity to the nation.

The chapter two of the dissertation examined the Presidential dominance in decision making on Iraqi reconstruction policy. An important assertion of the study is the dominance of Presidential leadership in determining the nitty-gritty of the reconstruction plan. The evidences show that President George W. Bush took important decisions and selected the department of his liking for planning and coordination process for reconstruction of Iraq. He selected the Department of Defense for preparation and implementation of reconstruction plan. He relied on formal and even informal meetings, policy papers, and bureaucratic structures of his choice to come out with a suitable reconstruction policy. President George W. Bush delegated the implementation of US reconstruction plan without having personal cognizance of its details, as he had little knowledge of foreign affairs.

The evidences show that the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq was influenced by a number of prominent neo-conservatives from within and outside of President George W. Bush's administration. The President, Vice-president and many top administrative officials set the rationale for US engagement in Iraq for the sake of bringing democracy, freedom and prosperity. The Vice President Dick Cheney and the head of Department of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were closely associated with some outstanding neo-conservatives like Paul Wolfowitz, Paul Bremer and Elliot Abrams. The Department of Defense, which was put in charge to spending more than seventy percent of the reconstruction funds, was deeply influenced by the neoconservatives. The neo-conservatives strongly supported the beneficial effects of democratic regime in the Middle East region. In an address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville (Tennessee), on August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney put emphasis on WMD threat to go for a war against Iraq. Besides this, he explicitly mentioned that the goal of the US was to form a pluralistic democratic government in Iraq. He stated that the people of Middle East would be exposed to a life of freedom and dignity. The US would ensure that terror and tyranny, poverty and oppression find no place in the new Iraq emerging out of the war. He projected the US led military operation in Iraq, as a ray of hope for the young people of Iraq. He expected to bring them out of despair, hatred and violence. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, one of the prominent neoconservatives and also one of the few persons who strongly pitched for US invasion of Iraq, just after 9/11, was a big champion of democracy promotion in the world.

In further examination of presidential dominance in decision making on Iraq reconstruction policy, the study also examined the nuances and policy goals of President Barak Obama. As many studies revealed, President Barak Obama had deep faith in the spread of democratic values to different corners of the world, though his approach of democratisation varied from President George W. Bush significantly. He also believed in democratic values and promoting it in the different parts of the world like many other US Presidents including Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan but he did not believe in elaborate and expensive reconstruction policy which put heavy burden on the US exchequer. He favoured spending money at home rather than spending it on the reconstruction of Iraq, which posed no immediate threat to the US security. He was opposed to the so called oppressive and despotic regime of Saddam Hussein and wanted to remove him through multilateral sanctions and other initiatives taken under the aegis of the United Nations. In the capacity of a State Senator from Illinois, he criticised President George W. Bush's

preemptive strike on Iraq and the burden of reconstruction funds, which was depleting the US economy. In the beginning of his tenure, he continued the reconstruction policy of President Bush because he had little choice to pull out from Iraq suddenly, as the prestige of the US as a global power was also at stake. Soon, he started the process of withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq. As the study clearly indicates that the US reconstruction policy towards Iraq was an extension of the political strategies of President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama.

The chapter two of the dissertation also put a deep glance on the involvement of various executive bureaucracy agencies in formulation of reconstruction plan. As far as, the origin of US reconstruction plan for post-war Iraq is concerned, a humble beginning is traced in the early debates and discussions of the possible invasion on Iraq. The discussions in the study illustrate that competing visions of important executive agencies and departments shaped the reconstruction plan to varying extent at different point of time. The intensity of departmental influences depended on many factors. For example, the Department of Defense dominated the planning process and other important departments were completely sidelined by the president in the initial years. The President George W. Bush, through NSPD-24, gave the Department of Defense complete control over post-war planning and reconstruction operations in Iraq. The argument put forward in favour of giving the command to the Department of Defense was that it would bring war fighting and stability operations under a single chain of command.

The chapter two of the dissertation highlighted that the US government never lacked the ability to prepare a good plan. Knowledge and brainy ideas to handle the post-war reconstruction were scattered in various departments but the lack of sufficient initiatives to tackle their differences and to reach a concluding plan was really lacking. When the plan started showing poor performance upon implementation, the Department of Defense took few initiatives to incorporate policy inputs from other agencies. It accommodated the policy inputs from the Department of State to some extent to get desirable outcome. The formal institutions and mechanisms like National Security Council meetings or inputs from inter-agency conferences largely remained neglected or dormant. The problem of lack of coordination among various executive agencies persisted since the beginning. The bureaucratic fights on various issues seem inevitable but could have been handled if initiatives were taken on time to settle the differences. The inter-agency cooperation

remained weak and no doubt, it hampered the reconstruction efforts. Lack of consistent attempt to reconcile the differences and bring about an aggregate plan for the reconstruction of Iraq proved a major hindrance. The study found that weak inter-agency cooperation regularly plagued the reconstruction efforts and certainly hampered the outcome.

The third chapter dwelled into providing a detailed account of the nature and scope of Congressional support for the Presidential initiatives, in particular Presidential initiatives in Iraq. The chapter third has focused on the role of Congress in the reconstruction plan from the perspective of budgeting, oversight and role of individual members. The study found that the US Congress played a very significant role by providing enormous funds for the stabilisation and reconstruction operations in Iraq since April 2003. As the study reveals, the President George W. Bush had full bipartisan support in the Congress for his reconstruction efforts, at least in the initial few years. While supporting the executive by providing huge funds, Congress also tightened the supervision on the executive, when misuse of funds came in limelight. It appointed the SIGIR for an audit of the money apportioned for reconstruction in Iraq. The output of spending billions of dollars and losing thousands of lives from both the sides brought no big relief for Iraq. The loss of lives and drain from the treasury raised the eyebrows of the public towards long term US occupation of Iraq.

The study also included the play of electoral politics in capturing both, the role of Congress as well as the policy itself, as the public opinion kept shifting. In this regard it was found that after the 2006 mid-term Congressional election the support for the long term involvement in Iraq appears diluted. The limited success of reconstruction and civil war kind of situation in Iraq intensified the unpopularity of President Bush and helped the Democrats in winning the Congressional mid-term election of 2006 as well as the presidential election of 2008. Barak Obama, with a mandate to end the war in Iraq, was successfully elected as the President of the US in 2008, to bring back the American forces home.

The study analysed the process of funding by the Congress on the executive requests for Iraqi reconstruction. In 2009, President Barak Obama asked the Congress for funding the US efforts in Iraq through Supplemental Appropriations Act for the last time. The Congress apportioned the money asked by President Barak Obama for a respectful exit from Iraq, as the image of the US as a global power had to be maintained. The Congressional funding for reconstruction shrunk during President Obama, as the global recession of 2008 also necessitated the Congress to cut expenditure in Iraq. The Congress could not allocate more money in Iraq when it was required to spend more at home. By the end of 2012, the funds

allocated for reconstruction reduced to almost one fourth of what President George W. Bush spent in 2005. The Congressmen, in general, were in favour of ending the US involvement in Iraq within the time limit agreed by President Barak Obama and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. However, many scholars and Congressmen criticised Obama for US withdrawal from Iraq with compromising the security of Iraq. The main focus of this chapter remained the funding, oversight and electoral politics influencing the reconstruction of Iraq. The chapter three concluded that the Congress remained supportive for the reconstruction of Iraq during the tenure of President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama.

The chapter four dwelled into the influence of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority on reconstruction of Iraq. It is clear that while, with the aim of searching WMDs and cruise missiles US led forces successfully occupied Baghdad and reconstruction began in April 2003. All available evidences indicate that early reconstruction efforts of the US were based on the premise of smooth transfer of power in the hands of Iraqis within few months of occupation. It was hoped that the US, UK and other coalition partners would facilitate the transfer of power to a democratically elected government after immediate humanitarian relief and few months of reconstruction aimed at restoring the war damaged infrastructure. The US had expected to restore basic services, which were necessary for the Iraqis to start a peaceful life. It was hoped that Iraq would resume a peaceful life with the help of the US within few months. With this limited aim, the US-led reconstruction of Iraq began. The ORHA began the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in April 2003 with the aims to restore basic services, facilitate humanitarian relief and transfer the power to the Iraqis. As the US forces successfully captured Baghdad, the government structure collapsed and the Iraqi military crumbled within few weeks of the US occupation. The circumstances in Iraq proved too difficult for the ORHA to realise the plan of transfer of power to the Iraqi people. The ORHA was replaced by the CPA in May 2003. The evidences indicated that after entering Iraq, the Coalition failed to get any trace of WMDs. As well as Saddam's affiliation with Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organisation could not be confirmed. It is evident in chapter four that the issue of the WMDs which became a major justification for US military operation in Iraq, soon became an ancillary issue.

As pointed out by several scholars, the arrival of the CPA in Iraq broadened the scope of reconstruction. Reconstruction policy of the CPA and afterwards were aimed at bringing all-encompassing changes in the political, economic and social life of the Iraqi people. The

maximalist approach of reconstruction of the CPA was premised on peaceful environment for implementation. The Iraqi army was dissolved and the Baathist party members were barred from any participation in the new government. As the implementation of reconstruction programme begun at full pace, the major aim of the Operation Iraqi Freedom remained spread of democracy, peace and stability in Iraq as well as in the Middle-East region. It was expected that the new security forces would have enough capability to protect the newly formed political and economic order, emerging from the endeavour of the coalition of the willing. All these hopes soon shattered, peace and stability in Iraq remained a distant dream. In between this chaos, Bremer III the head of the CPA formally transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people and their interim government, on 28 June 2004. All the goals of reconstruction could not be realised and the CPA departed from Iraq with some achievements. The expectation of the final exit by the US, by the end of CPA's occupation could not be realised. At the same time a massive bureaucratic transition towards the Department of State from the CPA started. The Department of State assumed the responsibility of the post-war reconstruction of Iraq in June 2004.

In chapter four, the political developments in Iraq have also been studied, as they are significant in the evolution of US reconstruction policy towards Iraq. The elections for national assembly of Iraq held successfully in January 2005 and the Iraqis also adopted a new Constitution on 15 October 2005 by a popular referendum. By 2005, a leap towards introducing full democracy in Iraq was taken with the help of US. It was expected that the constitutional democracy would help Iraq to emerge as a unified and stable Iraq which would have space to accommodate pluralism of Iraqi society. It would have tolerance to embrace diversity, respect for minority rights, as well as an urge to promote human rights. With these aims, the Constitution was adopted on 15 October 2005 by a popular referendum and election for national assembly of Iraq held successfully. It was expected that the constitutional democracy would help Iraq to emerge as a unified and stable Iraq which would have space to accommodate pluralism of Iraqi society. It would have tolerance to embrace diversity, respect for minority rights, as well as an urge to promote human rights. The study found that all these could not be realised in practice, as reality differed from the expectations. It became a very difficult task to see functional democracy in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic mosaic country, Iraq. The Sunnis, in general, did not participate in the elections. The elections in Iraq produced a mix of success as well as failure. The election offered an incentive to the progressive people to participate in elections and in the political processes through various

means. The regressive elements offered resistance to the changes and caused instability in the country. Iraq's political divisions, ethnic divisions, and sectarian tensions uncovered its ugly face through violence. The internal discord between Kurds and Arabs, and between Shiites and Sunnis and their struggle for power resulted in dysfunctional as well as paralysed politics in Iraq. While, Reconciliation required all of them to make unpleasant and painful compromises, neither group was ready to put efforts for the same. The study shows that despite successful democratic transition, the growing violence, insurgency and organised crime necessitated the presence of the US in Iraq for a longer time than the Bush administration originally anticipated. As a result civil war kind of situation broke in Iraq in 2006.

The chapter four of the dissertation sought to look into major obstacles faced while implementing the reconstruction policy. The study finds out the major hindrances in implementation of reconstruction policy with a special focus on security problems, resulting in to limited success. The rampant aggression and chronic violence by the non-state actors including the terrorists, militias and the insurgents severally affected the US led reconstruction efforts. The study found that sectarian and ethnic tensions continued to put an obstacle on the path of reconstruction and undermined the outcome of reconstruction efforts. It also caused a substantial hike in the budget required to build, sustain and operate various reconstruction projects including construction of power plants, schools, water plants, oil pipelines etc. There is evident in the study that the initial military phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom achieved an easy and spectacular success. Very soon, the easy success paved the way for a consistent and chronic security problem which proved a big obstacle for the reconstruction of Iraq.

The evidences revealed that the surge of troops and additional funding along with many other initiatives like Sunni awakening and formation of PRTs put Iraq back on the track of peace to a large extent, if compared to its situation in 2006. By the time President George W. Bush left office, Iraq, from the brink of disintegration, started moving on the path of survival. President Bush was in the favour of democratisation by force and wanted to sustain the US-led efforts of political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. In these circumstances, President Obama began his campaign with a promise to bring the American boys back home within the stipulated time limit.

President Obama was of the view that once Iraq stabilised, the task of reconstruction would be transferred in the hands of Iraqis with little US commitment for future reconstruction of the nation. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki did not make serious efforts to bridge the Arab-Kurdish divide and bring about genuine Shiite-Sunni reconciliation. The Iraqi parliament also refused the request for legal immunity to the US service members, though it agreed to extended U.S. military presence beyond 2011. President Barak Obama could not resolve the very sensitive issue of legal immunity which was to be imparted to the US service members after US withdrawal from Iraq. By December 2011, the US withdrew from Iraq. The gains made by President Bush and Obama still remained fragile. All these stumbling blocks remained and hampered the future course of peace in the coming time, as the situation in Iraq remained fragile. The study shows that the reconstruction policy initiated by President George W. Bush largely continued under President Barak Obama also, though diminished in its scope with the passage of time. Obama's reconstruction policy was aimed at wrapping the US led efforts in a responsible manner so that Iraq could emerge as a democratic and stable country of the Middle East. He put his efforts to leave Iraq as a sovereign, democratic and prosperous country while reducing the financial burden for the US. Though, in the process, many are of the view that he compromised with the long term security of the Middle-East. Some critics viewed the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy, freedom, peace and prosperity in the Middle East in the posthoc pretext of Iraq war (2003) and not as the main goal. According to them, the main aim of US led intervention was the elimination of WMDs and terrorist bases in Iraq. The Bush's political agenda of democracy and freedom was meant to divert the attention of the world from the US intelligence failures on Iraq's WMDs. The study found that there is no doubt about WMD-terrorism connection making a strong premise to target Iraq in the immediate context. Alleged presence Weapons of mass destruction emerged as a firm reason which ensured overwhelming support for President George W. Bush's decision of overthrowing Saddam Hussein from power. Otherwise, it would have been difficult for the US to take such an action for the sake of democracy promotion. In the ultimate analysis, the research establishes that once Saddam was thrown out of power, US administration officials put much more emphasis on the importance of democratic transformation and economic transformation of Iraq, as the major goal of US reconstruction policy. To them, post-war reconstruction of Iraq was not meant to cover the absence of WMDs or US intelligence failure. The ideological goals of Iraqi reconstruction to bring democracy, freedom and free market capitalism to Iraq, was important. It would be

interesting to see whether more realistic goal setting, better coordination and sharp focus on ground realities will animate future US policy towards Iraq.

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