THE BUREAUCRATIC QUESTION
A SOCIO-HISTORICAL DIAGNOSIS

Dissertation Submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI
1988

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July 21, 1988

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to my supervisor Dr. M.N. Panini, without whose guidance this dissertation would have been a dilettante's handiwork. I am also grateful to Prof. R.K.Jain, for his timely help during crucial phases of my M.Phil career. Thanks and love to Karen Gabriel for her severe but constructive criticism and editing. Mr. Tulsidharan also deserves a word of praise for his meticulous typing.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The growing complexity of social life and the multiplying effect of the extension of the state's regulative functions have made the 'bureaucracy', an epitome of institutionalized social power. Be it a liberal democracy or a totalitarian State, bureaucracy in some form exists and governs primarily because of its farflung system of professionalized administration and its hierarchy of appointed officials upon whom society is thoroughly dependent. Its importance has led it to be one of the most examined concepts in academic social science where it has been studied, individually and comparatively, within the structure of the government and outside it by sociologists, political scientists and psychologists. The vast outpouring of books, monographs, research reports and journal articles serve as able indices to guage its significance in social research. However, the increase in the quantity of literature associated with bureaucracy, its personnel and their role, has led to a concomittant increase in the perspectives reflected in these works. On the one hand the institution has fanatic defenders who back its growth to the hilt and justify its existence in their works. On the other, it faces scathing criticism from philosophers who foresee within the growth of bureaucracy

a corresponding growth of dehumanization. The most severe of its critics is the Marxist school which characterizes it as an instrument of the dominating class. The liberal school based on the theory of free market economy criticizes the bureaucracy for its interventionist attitude. Both these schools of thought have a wide array of prolific and vocal philosophers who have contributed to the ambivalence with which the concept bureaucracy has now become loaded with.

The coining and the subsequent acceptance of a term in social science theory is a sure guide to the importance or level of concern about a phenomena. Bureaucracy as a term has been fortunate enough to have an extraordinary reception, though it has been almost from the start, a vessel into which many different meanings have been poured.

Etymologically it represents an addition to the Greak classification of governments monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, suggesting government by a new group of rulers -- officials. The term was used with a pejorative bias during the struggle against absolutism by liberal critics of the years preceeding the French revolution.

The neologism is attributed to Vincent de Gournay, who is alleged to have also coined the term'laissez-faire', which implies minimum interference of the State in the economy especially in the industrial and commercial sector. It is quite possible that both attributions are accurate because the chief vice of which bureaucracy was initially accused, was an inability to leave anything alone.

Thus bureaucracy was initially conceptualized as a perversion and carried only negative connotations. In modern times, the term has been defined variously,depending on the interests and focus of particular writers. Martin Albrow perceives this situation rather well and suggests that instead of investing time and energy to precisely define bureaucracy one should treat the term as a kind of sign post concept. In order to assist conceptual clarity and facilitate greater accuracy and detail, it is important to analyse the breadth of implications the term bureaucracy is laden with.

Bureaucracy as a Political System

In this usage bureaucracy is interpreted as a form of government, government by officials characterized by its tendency to meddle, to exceed its proper functions. Baron de Grimm writing on the French bureaucracy remarks - "...Not to over govern is one of the greatest principle to govern, which has never been known in France. The true spirit of the laws of France is that bureaucracy of which the late V. de Gournay used to complain so much; here the bureax secretaries and inspectors are not established to benefit the public interest, indeed the public interest appears to have been established so that there might be bureax."[1] In Prussia, Christian Krauss wrote "The Prussian State far from being an unlimited monarchy ... is but a thinly veiled aristocracy which blatantly rules the country as a bureaucracy."[2] John Stuart Mill followed this tradition when in 1861 he wrote: "The work of government has been in the hands of 'governors by profession', which is

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1 Baron de Grimm and Diderot - Correspondence, Cf. Martin Kriyger, 'State and Bureaucracy in Europe : The Growth of a Concept', in E. Kamenka ed., Bureaucracy, (London, 1979), p.22.

2 Ibid., p.23.

the essence and meaning of bureaucracy".[3] Mill did not use the concept simply as a blanket characterization of continental overgovernment but as a specific almost technical description of one way of governing. In 1930, Harold Laski reiterated Mill's view point. For him, the word bureaucracy is usually used "for a system of government the control of which is so completely in the hands of the officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens."[4]

Bureaucracy as a Class of Officials

This usage of bureaucracy does not confine its meaning to a certain kind of government but is characterized to a group of people or a life style.[5] Reflection is more on the nature and working style of bureaucrats. Emphasizing the increasing unpopularity of the Prussian government

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3 Ref. J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, (London,1905), p.113.

4 H.J. Laski, Bureaucracy, in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, (New York), p.70.

5 Drawing parallels with the shifting meaning of Aristocracy, from a political system, to an elite class as power-holders.

Gillis writes, "...the target of political agitation in the decade before 1848 was not the monarchy itself but the form that monarchy had assumed since the late 18th century. Bureaucratic absolutism and not royal despotism was the issue."[6] In 1844 an anonymous pamphlet, Bureaucracy and officialdom in Germany appeared in Hamburg. The author was of the opinion that bureaucrats formed a caste with purposes of its own 'a people within the people, a State within the State. Bureaucracy, for him, was of no productive use, but on the contrary, was a powerful cancer which feasts' voraciously, insatiably and lives off the marrow and blood of people.[7] From this dramatic characterization one can shift the emphasis to a more academic one, the characterization of Mosca. In the 'Ruling Class', Mosca postulated a fundamental structural distinction between the feudal and bureaucratic ruling class. His conclusion was that in a modern State the ruling class is necessarily the bureaucracy.[8] Robert Michels expanded

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6 J.R. Gillis, The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis - 1840-1860, (Stanford,1971), p.15.

7 Quoted from Herman Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern Government, (London,1961), p.738.

8 Ref. Gaetano Mesca, Ruling Class, Tr. by Hannah Khan, (New York,1939).

the scope of Mosca's conception of bureaucracy to include salaried professionals in non-governmental voluntary organizations especially political parties.[9]

Bureaucracy as an Apparatus

This conception transfers attention from officials as a group to the organizations in which they serve. This use of 'bureaucracy' is important as a forerunner of the widespread 20th century habit of applying term 'bureaucracy' to organizations rather than to the officials employed in them. Emphasis is therefore more on the administrative and less on the political aspect of it. A familiar parallel distinction is made between an 'army' as an organization and the 'official' who serve in it. F.M. Marx viewed bureaucracy from this perspective, when he defined it as a type of organization used by modern government for the conduct of various specialized functions embodied in the administrative system."[10] For John Dorsey, bureaucracy is

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9 Refer Robert Michels, Political Parties, a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, (Glencoe,1948).

10 Freitz Morstein Marx, Administrative State, (Chicago, 1957), p.20.

the civil governmental administriative components of political systems.[11] Parsons more or less adheres to this view point when while characterizing modern society, he says, "one of the salient structures characteristics of such a society is the prominence in it of relatively large-scale organizations with specialized functions, what rather loosely tend to be called bureaucracies."[12]

Bureaucracy as a Manifestation of bad Administration

From this perspective bureaucracy is viewed largely as a mal-construct. The sickness is attributed both to the organization as well as the individuals comprising it. Richard Bendix, highlights some of these negative features of the bureaucratic organization - empire building, conflicting directives, rigid rules and routines leading to red tapism, slow operation and the like.[13] One of the most beligerent attacks on bureacracy has come from Balzac in his novel 'Lesemployes'. He sees it as "a giant power

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11 . John Dorsey, Bureaucracy and Development , ed., Joseph Lapalombora, (Princeton, 1963), p.322.

12 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (Glencoe,1960), p.2.

13 Richard Bendix, Bureaucracy in Intemation , Encylopedia of Social Sciences, 1968, p.206.

wielded by pygimes... a natural kindness for mediocity, a prediliction for categorical statements and reports..."[14] Michel Crozier in his Bureaucratic phenomenon defined bureaucracy as the maladaptations, the inadequacies or the dysfunctions which necessarily develop with human organizations.[15]

Bureaucracy as a Type of Society

An extension of the earlier definition of bureaucracy as a political system of rule is the characteristics that now seems to be more relevant - bureaucracy as a society. The underlying assumption is that if a polity is dominated by bureaucracy, then all social relations are marked by the bureaucratic style. Tendencies towards bureaucratization even in the less political, state-free sections of the society like the industry, churches, and the legal circles have been studied by Gouldner, Troeltsch and Olszewski respectively.[16] James Burnham pointed out that

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14 Krygier, op.cit., p.23.

15 Michel Crozier, Bureaucratic Phenomenon, (Chicago, 1973), p.5.

16 Refer, Article on Bureaucracy in the Encyclopedia of Marxism, Capitalism and Socialism.

a bureaucratic class now dominates not only the polity but all of society, through private corporations as well as big governments.[17] Brunno Rizzi thinks in similar terms when he holds bureaucracy responsible for having created a bureaucratic society.[18]

As far as the sociology of bureaucracy is concerned, it would be definitely ambitious to claim that, it originated and developed as an independent branch of study. For from it, sociologists studying bureaucracy have been influenced by other more traditional streams in the discipline. For example, the sociology of organizations provokes interest in the public sector, in difference between public and private organizations, in change in public bureaucracies. Those interested in the study of social stratification have found a rich field in bureaucracy for both their general studies on the social and educational background of the elite and for their focus on social class and power issues. Social psychology is called upon implicitly and explicitly in a variety of studies of values, attitudes, job satisfaction

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17 James Burnham, Managerial Revolution, (London, 1943), p.157.

18 Brunno Rizzi, Bureaucratization of the World, Tr. by Adam Westoby, (London,1985).

and the norms of civil servants and in studies of attitudes towards the bureaucracy. The sociology of development drawing on studies of the power of civil service, finds a wide range of queries pertaining to the role of public bureaucracies.

However, very few sociologists and especially not the recent ones have approached the subject in totality, from all its dimensions. It is extremely important for a sociologist to try and examine the relationship of the administrative apparatus to the specific social context in which it arose and to define that relationship in terms of a larger conceptual framework. This will help to recognize and comprehend the implications of the bureaucratic structure both from an individual as well as from a societal perspective.

This dissertation attempts to be a modest effort in this direction. Efforts have been directed at analyzing the socio-economic conditions which gave rise to the modern bureaucratic structure. The first chapter deals with the evolution and growth of bureaucracy under absolutism. The second chapter attempts to link industrialization,

bureaucracy and social class by analysing the theories of Hegel, Marx and Weber. The third chapter attempts to link socialism with bureaucracy. Lenin's theory of bureaucracy and Mao's model have been compared. The post-revolutionary exercise of restructuring the bureaucracy is extensively dealt with. The final chapter is devoted to the analysis of the nature of the Indian bureaucracy, its genesis and development.

RISE OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE WEST
ITS REFLECTION OF SOCIO-POLITICAL THOUGHT

Chapter-I

A crucially important element formed in the development of the absolute monarchies of 17th and 18th century Europe was the growth of powerful, centralized, hierarchical administrative institutions. A powerful centre gave birth to huge centralized administrative structures. Conversely the centre relied heavily on its daughter structures for the subdueing of provincial powerholders and for tax collection. The consequence was an increasing concentration of military and administrative power in centrally directed institutions at the expense of churches, estates, local aristocrats and provincial centres.[1]

The emergence of the bureaucratic structure has been associated with the separation of functionaries from the king's household necessiated by the growing size and complexity of governmental affairs. The corps of officials earlier managing the kings task from within the royal household came to live in households of their own and to be

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1 Refer, Ernest Barker, Development of Public Services in Western Europe 1660-1930, (London,1945).

paid for their service in money rather than in kind. Service to a ruler in the capacity of both, a household functionary and person of official responsibility soon resulted in the conferring of honour and social standing for the incumbent. High royal officials used their advancing position to gain more independence from the ruler in the conduct of governmental affairs as well as for their own advancement. This form of struggle between the growing independence of groups of officials and the consequent renewed endeavour by the ruler to butress his authority led to myraid bureaucratic formations in the European continent.

In France, effective and centrally controlled administrative institutions began to develop in the second quarter of the 17th century primarily because of the need for effective collection of taxes. Bureaucracy however did exist before but was not all that effective. The earlier bureaucrats were appointed for a temporary, specific purposes; they were not administrators but inspectors of the activities of the local independent officers. However in the 1630s the role of French bureaucrats known as the

'provincial intendant' underwent a transformation from an inspector - reformer to administrator.[2] By 1650s the intendants supervised the assessment and collection of royal taxes, the organization of local police, the preservation of order and the conduct of the courts. The institution of provincial intendants was vehemently opposed by local officers but got established firmly around 1660. The king's insistence on full and accurate reports had the effect of extending the intendants function as information officers and led to the development of a hierarchy of subordinate officials. Meanwhile at the Centre, administrative apparatus was reorganized into functional ministries with staffs of assistants and secretaries, linked to the intendants and local officers in the provinces. By the end of Louis XIV's reign a system of administration had been established which was clearly under the direction of the central authority, and extended virtually over the whole territory of France.[3]

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2 Martin Krygier, "State and Bureaucracy in Europe : The Growth of a Concept"in E. Kamenba ed., Bureaucracy: The Career of A Concept", (London,1979), p.4.

3 Ibid., p.5.

It is important not to exaggerate the efficiency of this burgeoning administrative machine. The intendants constantly vied with independent officers, local notables and local traditions. Moreover the intendants themselves were not always easy to control. In the years before the French Revolution, central direction of intendants became far less effective then under Louis XIV and there was a great deal of confusion and turn over among certain officials.[4]

The French Revolution changed this situation dramatically, French officials began to form a bureaucracy in a modern sense : they became public servants (no longer the kings servants) who were paid regular salaries by and were answerable to the State.

The Prussian Bureaucratic structure of the 17th and 18th century serves as a better model of analysis. Development here has been a lot more neat as compared to the French bureaucracy. In fact most classical philosophers including Hegel and Marx have formed their

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4 For an interesting analysis on the confusion prevailing in French Bureaucracy, refer, F.L. Ford, Robe and Sword , (New York,1965), pp.35-6.

theories by using the Prussian bureaucracy as an empirical model. A detailed analysis follows.

The rise and the subsequent evolution of the Prussian bureaucratic structure started in 1722 when Fredrick William I introduced a centralized supervisory body called the 'general directory' and provincial domains boards as a result of which local associations, estates, municipal corporations and provincial courts were subordinated to central direction.[5]

It was under Fredrick II (1740-86), that Prussia became a major European power and the outlook role and organisation of its administrators changed remarkably.

Bureaucrats started functioning in an enormously increased scale large scale institution of specialized training and regularlized recruitment of civil servants started; a merit system applied to all posts, a degree

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5 For details on the administrative reforms of Fredrick I, refer, Hans Rosenbergs, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy : The Prussian Experience 1660-1815, (Boston,1960).

in Cameralistics was required for higher posts followed by a period of practical training and a further oral and written examination.

An important innovation in this period was the mode of organization of administrative structures. The 18th century. Prussian monarchies had 'collegial' organizations.[6] The colleges or boards were organized on territorial rather than on functional basis. Under Fredrick II, new specialist functionally based ministries were established which surrounded the collegial bodies and made them almost impotent. A gradual'disengagement' of public officialdom from the king or dynasty occured. As a result the bureaucracy "... derived great advantage from the impersonal basis of its strength; from its huge size as an organization, from its permanence, functional indispensability and monopoly of expert knowledge; from its self-consciousness ... as a power elite..."[7]

The ever increasing power of the bureaucracy resulted in the drafting of "The Prussian General Legal Code of 1794"

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6 Colleges in Prussia comprised of a body or community of persons having certain rights and privileges. All affairs were discussed here collectively and all members were responsible for the actions of the majority.

7 Rosenberg, op.cit., p.176.

which subjected the monarch to binding rules in matters of personal administraton, curbed his power and placed him under the law and generally 'depersonalized' government.[8] However, the decisive change in the form and role of bureaucracy came after Prussia's defeat by France in 1806. Ministries were reorganized; the jumbled, overlapping collection of central agencies was rationalized, and the connections between these ministries and the administrative agencies were clarified and organized in a hierarchical and relatively efficient manner.

The success of the French and the Prussian bureaucratic structures in administration led to quick diffusion of structure throughout the continent. The successful diffusion was primarily because of the common socio-political and economic changes the European states faced; a steady growth in population and the industrial revolution. The former required great expansion in the number of officials to perform traditional tasks whereas the latter led the states to perform functions hitherto not performed at all. Continental administrative organizations grew enormously during this period and were constantly reorganized and reformed during the 19th century.

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8 John R. Gillis, op.cit., pp.22-24.

The analysis of both the French and the Prussian model have in a way helped to discover the common denominator of bureaucratization. In other words, "the earlier involvement of public employment with family prerogative and the identification of office with property have been superseded in the course of long and diverse developments, by the emergence of the nation-state in which public officials administer a service-rendering organization for the protection of rights and the enforcement of duties of a national citizenry."[9]

The profound changes in the nature, size, organization and role of the state and its administrative structures was reflected in the prevalent socio-political thought of the 17th and 18th century. Thomas Hobbes, perhaps the first philosopher to assert that the political institution which mattered most was the central sovereign power, was bolstered by Saint Simon's conviction that administrators would inherit the earth.[10] By the end of the 18th century a substantial

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9 Barker, op.cit., p.6.

10 Saint Simon's views on the dynamics of society has been discussed by Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, (Boston,1960), p.412ff.

body of ideas about the executive had emerged from the focussed discussion on the 'administration' that began early in the century.

An extremely popular view that emerged was one of government as a service-rendering institution that ought not to be preempted by either individuals or groups contending in the political arena. Rulers were expected to hold power in 'trust' for their people and had to exercise their power in accordance with the terms of that trust. Locke's doctrine, that the supreme legislative authority had no right to breach the terms of his trust and Rousseau's distinction between "sovereign people and mere government" are persuasive examples of this school of thought.[11] With this dynamic conception of states responsibility, the quality of administration became a matter of public concern, and the purposes which officials served became public purposes.

The conception of government as a public trust is important for our theme, for the governments of European

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11 Edmund Burke was an exponent of this school. Refer in his Selected Writings and Speeches, ed., Peter Stanlis, (New York,1963), pp.370-71.

states were beginning to be assessed in terms of success in achieving public goals rather than simply in terms of the geneological or divine claims. This criterion of assessment placed demands on and turned attention to their executing machinery i.e., the bureaucracy for achieving these goals.[12] The study of politics thus warranted how given ends of government could be attained with the utmost economy of effort, the end being the welfare prosperity and happiness of citizens. Proposals for governmental reform came increasingly to focus not merely on legislative institutions and reforms, but also on specifically administrative ones. The theorists of "enlightened government" regarded themselves as scientists of administration entering on a new way in the study of politics ignored hitherto by scholars.[13]

With this shift in emphasis from the functional goal orientation of the state to the more specific 'means' required to achieve these goals bureaucracy assumed a more or less independent status in socio-political writings. Efforts were directed at studying various aspects of its

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12 Leonard Krieger, An Essay on the Theory of Enlightened Despotism, (Chicago,1975), p.52.

13 Ibid., p.56.

efficiency and achievement. The result was that, the structure of bureaucracy became increasingly analogous, during the process of examination, to a 'machine'. "... By the end of the 18th century the machine had become an obsessive image. Anson used it to describe the projected ministry of the interior, Camus to describe the entire administration and Marat to represent municipal administration. The writings of many others seem to show that this generation thought of administrative agencies as analogous to machines."[14]

The conceptualization of administrative institutions as machines was particularly suited to rationalist reformers in the enlightened state for it legitimized both their role and that of their ruler. An administrative machinery needs to be looked after by qualified mechanics and it can be designed, redesigned and manipulated according to the technical knowledge these mechanies monopolize.[15] Viewing administrative institutions and machinery allowed many of

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14 J.F. Bosher, French Finances, 1770-1795 : From Business to Bureaucracy, (Cambridge, 1970), p.296.

15 J.H.G. Von Justi used this mechanistic model in his writings. Refer his quotations in Geraint Parry, "Enlightened Government and Its Critics in 18th Century Germany", Historical Journal, vol.6, 1963, p.182.

these thinkers to distinguish and stress the central guiding role of the ruler, who did not function as part of the machine but was required to run and oversee its workings. Moreover, alongside there was also a concomitant increase in attention given to its parts - the officials - and a heightened perception of the importance of their role within it to ensure that they were good parts suited to the task they had to perform. The latter notion found reflections in administrative theory which now dealt extensively on the importance of recruiting competent officials. Models of education and recruitment practices were designed, altered and improved.

Along with the increased attention to the official went a much more definite attention to 'function' well conveyed in the mechanistic terms that prevailed towards the end of the 18th century. This preoccupation with function was at the root of the discussion on the collegial versus individual responsibility and the debate on territorial vis-a-vis functional based administrative units. The shift in emphasis was quite apparent. Bosher writes, "whereas the posts of officials during the ancient regime had been offices or places, they now began to be called functions and the officials themselves were for the first

time described as functionaries. This utilitarian vocabulary was used to describe organizations with quasi-mechanical virtues, ... the idea of function became a principle of quasi mechanical organizations."[16]

Perhaps it is these mechanical analogies which led to the birth of a rational-legal approach to bureaucratic structure. Legal, because legislation was treated as one of the most important means of implementing administrative reforms; rational, because of the concern to establish streamlined, simplified, harmonious administrative structures in which all parts fitted and worked smoothly. Within these broader functional concerns specific suggestions and practical measures like rules specifying a department's function, payment by salary, use of records, inspection and reporting were almost universally recommend. These schemes and proposals contain a great deal which anticipates Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy.

In conclusion, it can be said that the general character of these writings was that of technical advocacy, not of social theory and certainly not of revolutionary ideology. An indepth discussion on social theory of bureaucracy has therefore been attempted in the following chapters.

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16 Bosher, op.cit., p.297.

CAPITALISM AND BUREAUCRACY
REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHIES OF HEGEL, MARX AND WEBER

Chapter-II

Important for the rise and growth of capitalism was the dual revolution in Western Europe - i.e., political events between 1789 and 1815 in France and industrial revolution in England.[1] This dual revolution was therefore the cause of rapid transformation in 19th century Western European society. The French Revolution with its violent and creative changes made men realize that they could substantially alter their institutions if they wished.

The new individual of liberal theory was the master, not merely of nature but of his own economic and social destiny, and he was deemed capable of looking after himself in equal competetion with others who were conceived as rivals rather than fellows. The rich, supportive network of social relationships associated with traditional life and the laws, conventions and habits which helped protect it were denounced as impediments to the free, productive individual.

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1 Graeme Duncan, Marx and Mill : Two Views of Social Conflict and Social Harmony (Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.19.

However, it became more and more obvious during the 19th century that the free status and equality of men were matters of theory rather than reality, as inequality and power of an extremely damaging kind emerged. The issue was whether society itself should become a market place subject only to economic laws and criteria and driven forward by an endless thirst for gain.[2]

Outraged by what seemed to them large scale social devastation, forward looking socialists alongwith conservatives complained of the costs of progress, and contrasted present decomposition with warm human communities, which they sometimes located in the actual past. They were appalled by many aspects of the fragmented, differentiated, contractual and individualistic society which was emerging. It was the market place writ large - divided, abstracted, cold and pervaded by a selfish and calculating utilitarian morality.

There were thus some common elements in conservative and radical denunciations of the 19th century capitalist

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2 Ibid., p.22.

world. But there were substantial differences over the conceptions of history within which changes were perceived. Most social critics preferred community and closeness to division and anomic, but some looked back to an harmonious, patriarchial and unequal system while others looked forward to a cooperative egalitarian social order, marked by widespread and diverse individual achievement.[3] It was this latter school which aimed to control and civilize capitalism thereby sowing the seeds of an alternative political philosophy. The thrust was towards a democratic community in which industrial growth was to be regulated according to ethical priorities and the pursuit of profit be subordinated to human needs.

I

One of the earliest critics of the modern industrial system was G.W.F. Hegel. His work assumes importance as it was one of the very first attempts to establish a necessary link between the emergence of machinery and the intensification of alienation of man.[4] Hegel's position is between

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3 Ibid., pp.24-25.

4 Refer, Raymond Plant, Hegel : An Introduction, (London, 1983), pp.207-10.

the idealizers of machine and the machine-smashers : while recognising the alienation caused by the introduction of the machine, he sees it as a necessary element in the anthropological determination of modern society based on increasing production.

For Hegel, the ultimate power in the commodity - producing society is the power of the market. The power of the market is connected with the transformation of the use value of objects into the exchange values of commodities. Thus man's labour which had been aimed at achieving power over objects thus ultimately places man in a diametrically opposed condition of utter dependence and total impotence vis-a-vis the powers which were created by him - over which he now lost all control.

Hegel's account of commodity - producing society abounds with explicit references to the sociological structure of this society. The basis of this society is the system of needs; yet human needs are not raw natural needs, rather they are mediated through man's labour : 'Through labour the raw material directly supplied by

nature is specifically adapted to the numerous ends by all sorts of different processes'.[5] Labour is thus the mediator between man and nature and therefore in labour there always exists an intrinsic moment of liberation, since labour enables man to transcend the physical limits set upon him by nature.

For Hegel, it is precisely this liberating aspect of man as not being limited in his needs by his natural determination which also drives human society to the endless pursuit of commodities. The power driving men to act in the market thus becomes infinite. The rapid expansion of the market necessiates ever expanding and continually-changing needs. For Hegel, it is this economic expansion of civil society which brings about social polarization and intensifies it. "The wealth of nations can be built only at the expense of the poverty of classes. Factories and manufacturers base their existence on the misery of class".[6]

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5 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (1821) Tr. by T.M. Knox, (London,1942), para-196.

6 Shbomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, (Cambridge,1972), p.96.

The condition of poverty, in which this mass finds itself is endemic to commodity-producing society. Modern poverty is accompanied by industrial overproduction which cannot find enough consumers who have sufficient purchasing power to buy the products offered in the market. It is not the malfunctioning but the smooth-functioning of the powers of the market which creates poverty.[7] The ultimate consequence of this condition then pushes the helpless mass of the poor into personal dependence upon the wealthy who are their employers. Economic inequality calls for a situation of domination, and out of economic relations there emerge a dangerous pattern of inequality and power.

Hegel thus points an astonishing picture of civil society. At this point one would expect Hegel to argue for a radical transformation of this society. But at the height of this critical awareness of the horrors of industrial society. Hegel, ultimately remains quietistic, searching for a solution that would incorporate this horrifying

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7 Refer, David MacGregor, The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, (London,1984), pp.223-35.

reality into a system that would integrate and accommodate it. For him, philosophy can only integrate the world and not change it.[8]

It is in this context that Hegel looks at the political structure proper and introduces the state as a system of integration aimed at overcoming the atomistic individualism of the economic sphere. The State is shown as a force regulating and integrating economic activity, transcending by its very universality the centrifugal forces of the market. "It becomes necessary at the moment when society seems to be heading for disruption and chaos : it is the re-integration of the self into itself as an universal being after economic life has particularized and atomished it."[9]

In developing his theory, Hegel endows the state with a dual quality which accentuates the dialectical nature of his whole attitude. On the purely subjective level, the State is merely instrumental; people view it as

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8 Shlomo Avineri, op.cit., pp.98-99.

9 Ibid., p.99.

a convenient device to secure their ends, to smoothen and polish the functioning of economic institutions. But on a higher plane, the State embodies mans' basic universal nature, the immanent necessity of man to transcend individualistic interests.[10]

However the State, while incorporating the individual in a universal unity, doesn't subsume his activities under its existence. This ambivalence is represented in the individual in his dual role as a particular as well as universal being. Hegel says that man is both a member of the civil society and a citizen of the State and therefore has to strike a balance between these two aspects of his existence.[11]

These two aspects of human activity lead to Hegel's discussion of social classes. The crucial point here is that Hegel doesn't see the contradiction between man as a member of the civil society and as a citizen as something to be overcome in a total, new entity; it is part of the dialectical progress of man towards his self-recognition.

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10 Ibid., p.101.

11 Ibid., p.104.

For Hegel, the institutionalization of class relationships into the political structure is the way through which the atomism of civil society becomes integrated into a comprehensive totality. Each class is in itself an expression of universality, since it is based on what is common to its members. It is through belonging to a class that a person achieves his ties with other persons. "Every individual, by virtue of his belonging to a class is an universal and thus a true individual, a person."[12]

The main function of the classes for Hegel is to mediate the physical dependence, inherent in the relationship of the civil society, into an ethical relationship of mutual interdependence, in which the brute force of physical and economic power is sublimated into political organization. Belonging to a class links a person to a universal and hence classes mediate between man's purely individual existence and the wider context of his life.[13]

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12 Ibid., p.105.
Slaves, who cannot constitute a universal are not a class, the Slave relates to his master as a particular.

13 G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., para-207.

It is also important to note that class divisions, for Hegel, determine not only a person's purely economic mode of life but are a totality which impinges on the whole of his life. A person's consciousness is moulded in accordance with his membership of a particular class. The three classes - the agricultural class, the business class and the bureaucracy, thus reflect three modes of consciousness, conservations, individualism and universality.

The agricultural class is inclined to subservience, it has little occasion to think of itself. What it primarily obtains is the gift of a stranger, of nature. Therefore, the feeling of dependence is fundamental to it and with this feeling there is readily associated a willingness to submit to whatever may befall it at other mens' hands. It is a class of immediate trust, of unreflective consciousness.[14]

The business class is more inclined to freedom. Craftmanship, mass production and exchange are the three main modes through which this class establishes itself. A higher level of consciousness can be felt in this class

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14 Ibid., para 203-4

as natural products are treated only as raw materials.[15]

The business class expresses already a sort of universality - the universality of the market - but it is still abstract. Universality becomes concrete only in the class of public servants who represent 'the intervention of the universal into all particularity'.[16] Bureaucracy thus becomes a crucial link between the particularism of civil society and the universality of the state. On the one hand, it is one class among the classes of civil society; on the other, it does not have its own interests as the goal of its activities but is motivated by the interests of the society as a whole.

Hegel defines the universal class as follows:

> "The class of civil servants has for its task the universal interests of the community. It must therefore be relieved from direct labour to supply its needs, either by having private means or by receiving an allowance from the State which claims its industry, with the results that private interest finds its satisfaction in the work of the universal."[17]

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15 Ibid., para 204.

16 Shlomo Avineri, op.cit., p.108.

17 G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., pa205.

The Fredrikian idea of a meritocracy is strongly echoed in Hegel's insistence that:

> "individuals are not appointed to office on account of their birth or native personal gifts. The objective factor in their appointment is knowledge and proof of ability. Such proof guarantees that the State will get what it requires; since it is the sole condition for appointment, it also guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the civil service."[18]

Universalistic, achievement oriented criteria imbue the whole structure of civil service, and a place in civil service should never be construed as constituting a claim to something resembling private property. According to Hegel, the property-oriented criteria of civil society are totally out of place in the public realm of the civil service and he sees the institution of a modern, rationally organized bureaucracy as one of the characteristics of the new State. "The individual functionaries and agents are attached to their office not on the strength of their immediate personality,

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18 Ibid., para 291.

but only on the strength of their universal and objective qualities.... The functions and powers of the State can never be a form of private property."[19]

Civil servants should also have tenure and be thus independent of immediate political pressure :

> "Once an individual has been appointed to his official position by the sovereign's act, the tenure of his post is conditional to his fulfilling his duties. Such fulfilment is the very essence of his appointment, and it is only consequential that he finds in his office his livelihood and the assured satisfaction of his particular interests, and further that his external circumstances and his official work are freed from other kinds of subjective dependence and influence. What the service of the State really requires is that men shall forgo the selfish and capricious satisfaction of their subjective ends; by this very sacrifice they acquire the right to find their satisfaction in - and only in - the dutiful discharge of their public functions."[20]

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19 Ibid., para 277.

20 Ibid., para 294.

According to Hegel the modern State needs a tenured bureaucracy with an ethos of service, to the commonwealth, recruited according to its merit and compensated according to its performance. In its autonomy and independence from the economic powers of civil society, this bureaucracy acts as a brake on civil society itself and ensures that public policy shouldn't be an immediate reflection of the interests of the civil society.

Hegel is aware of the danger that members of such a bureaucracy may tend to view themselves as owing the State. He therefore envisages a series of educational mechanisms as effective checks and balances on the power of the civil service. The first in the series is the factor of socialization itself. In Hegel's view, bureaucrats are recruited from among the middle class which is characterized by a combination of cultural sensitivity and sense of law and order. This class consciousness acts as a backdrop to educate them regarding the will and knowledge of the universal interest. Among the more concrete educational mechanisms are the control exercised from above by the constitution and from below in the form of grievances, petitions from corporations, press and

public opinion. Educational mechanisms operate also from within bureaucracy also. The State machinery operates according to what Hegel considers to be rational rules of division of labour - i.e., hierarchy, specialization and coordination, where the view of the whole is combined with the familiarity with details.[21] This creates a type of bureaucratic ethos which polishes the universal insight and universal will of the bureaucrats. Because Hegel was aware of the immense power of civil society he saw as the utmost necessity the development within the social structure of focii of power that would be relatively independent of it.

An important question to be raised is - what are the effects of functions of the bureaucracy on the larger social order? Some of these effects have been mentioned in passing. But in order to review Hegel's position in a proper perspective, we have to come to terms with the general problem of the relationship between the State and the civil society.[22]

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21 Victor M. Perez-Diaz, State, Bureaucracy and Civil Society, (London, 1978), pp.12-3.

22 Refer, G.W.F. Hegel, Political Writings, Tr. by T.M. Knox, (London, 1964), pp.56-68.

Hegel's position, as we shall see, is an ambiguous one. The main line of reasoning is as follows: civil society is an order of universality in-itself, While the State is an order of universality of an higher degree - i.e., the State represents the development and actualization of these universal aspects of civil society.

In order to understand Hegel's view of this harmonious relationship between civil society and the political state in modern times, we may compare this model with that of civil society and the political machinery in the framework of a society, which is not an ethical community. Such was the case of the Roman world. There we have - (a) a civil society composed by self-seeking individual atoms, by masters and slaves who have no bond of moral reciprocity, by antagonistic social classes; and (b) a machinery of the State that is external to and oppressive of that civil society.[23]

The bourgeois society, or the civil society of modern times, is far from being such an atomistic and conflictual

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23 Refer, G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, Tr. by J. Sibree, (New York,1955), pp.278-318.

world: To begin with, the system of needs (or market system) contains a set of self-regulatory mechanisms - which in Hegel's opinion replace the chaotic regulations of the ancient regime's economic interventionism, with much better results. Besides this system combines within the 'corporations' - a term that denotes associations of a local and professional character-that-defend and educate their individual members and help them to acquire a quasi-public disposition.[24]

At the same time, Hegel's discussion of the State includes frequent and crucial statements with quite a different message : notably that civil society is a very unstable social equilibrium eroded by self-seeking and conflicting individual strategies as well as by insoluable problems (such as the accumulation of wealth and poverty) - and that, as a consequence, civil society is not to be trusted by the political State and has to be checked by and subjected to it.

As a result, we are confronted with a set of contradictory 'functions' or effects of the bureaucracy on civil society. The bureaucracy is supposed to make

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24 Victor M. Perez Diaz, op.cit., p.14.

explicit the latent universality of civil society - while at the same time it has to check its (basic) particularism. It has to increase civil society's public disposition - and it has to deactivate it.[25]

What ever may be the ambivalence, one function of the bureaucracy is crystal clear. It expresses and reinforces the differentiation between political State and civil society. In his earlier writings Hegel makes the universal class occupied with defending the State and latter on there is a shift from mere defence to administration; this occurs parallel to his own growing awareness of the power of the civil society. Hegel's theory of bureaucracy is thus not only a reflection of the functional needs of a complex and differentiated society, but also represents a critique of the claims of the civil society to absolute power.[26]

It is important to understand the distinction Hegel draws between the rational state and the existing political states, the former involving a just and ethical relationship

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25 Ibid., pp.14-15.

26 Shlomo Avineri, op.cit., p.160.

of harmony among the elements of society, an ideal against which existing political states are to be measured. The extent to which it really is a state depends on this closeness to the ideal. The 'present situation' Hegel refers to is one in which the Western European States present all the necessary elements for a potentially rational order - an efficient and stable government, a system of representates, a free press and an increasingly educated public opinion, a market system checked by some public regulations, laws which have been publicly discussed and enacted, equality before the law, liberal principles and basic individual liberties (of conscience, academic freedom, private property, choice of profession, etc.). However this is not to say that the concept of State is fully realized in all and each of these nations. But the closeness to the rational State cannot be denied either.[27]

The essence of the State is then, for Hegel, internal not historical. For him, its aim is the realization of rational freedom, as an association of free men mutually

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27 Victor M. Perez Diaz, op.cit., p.16.

educating each other. It is the great organism in which judicial ethical and political freedom have to achieve realization. The frame of reference for Hegel is then, not necessarily anything that actually exists but rather what should exist. Further the 'state of reason' doesn't refer merely to the political institutions of society, but all public affairs and life in a broad sense. It embraces the totality or collectivity of humanity's communal concerns; it is the institutionalization of communality in society.

II

Following Hegel, the young hegelian movement held that errors committed by the constitutional monarchical State could be eliminated or corrected through rational argument. Using the 'Prussian State' as a model of analysis, the young Hegelians maintained that it could eventually develop into the 'State of reason'. They continued to adhere to their belief that everything bad and 'irrational' in the State could be corrected through the use of reason.[28]

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28 A. Hagedus, Socialism and Bureaucracy, (London, 1976), p.12.

Karl Marx was the first to lift the last veil of this illusion. He established that the State is not some incorporeal - it is people, certain individuals, involved in a particular set of social relationship. He says:

> "The affairs and operations of the State are bound up with individuals (the state operates only through individuals) ... Hegel forgets that the State affairs and operations are human functions ... that the State affairs etc., are nothing but modes of existence and operation of the social qualities of human beings."[29]

It is interesting to note that like Hegel, the young Marx believed that the rational State must represent the universal interests of the community, but he insisted that the existing State did not do so, and the prominence of the bureaucracy within it was one of the major reasons why it could not do so. He rejects Hegel's claim that the bureaucracy is an impartial and thus 'universal' class.[30] Reversing the Hegelian dialectic, he asserts that, though

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29 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol.3, (Moscow,1975), pp.21-2.

30 Ibid., p.45.

the function of the bureaucracy is in principle a universal one, the bureaucrats have in practice ended by turning it into their own private affair. Certainly in the past the bureaucracy fought on the side of the monarch against the corporations and against separatism :

> "When bureaucracy is a new principle, when the universal interest of the State starts to become something 'apart' by itself and thereby an 'actual' interest, bureaucracy conflicts with the corporations just as any consequence conflicts with the existence of its presuppositions."[31]

But once the victory had been won, the bureaucracy needed constantly to maintain the appearance of the separation in order to justify its own existence. For,

> "the same spirit that creates the corporation in society creates bureaucracy in the State. The spirit of bureaucracy is attacked alongwith the spirit of the corporation. If bureaucracy earlier attacked the existence of corporations to make room for its own existence, it now attempts to sustain forcefully the existence of the corporations so as to preserve the corporations' spirit, which is its own spirit."[32]

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31 Ibid., p.45.

32 Ibid.

In other words, on the one hand, the bureaucracy considered other corporations as rivals and fought against them. On the other hand, it presupposed the existence of corporations, or atleast the 'spirit of corporations', for like them it sought simply to serve its particular interests : it tried therefore to defeat them but could not do without them.

Thus bureaucracy allocated to itself a particular, closed society within the State, the consciousness, will and power of the State. In the battle against the corporations, the bureaucracy was necessarily victorious as each corporation needed it to combat other corporations, whereas the bureaucracy was self-sufficient. In short: 'The corporation is the attempt of civil society to become the State; but bureaucracy is the State which in actuality has become civil society.'[33] Thus bureaucracy, which came into existence to solve problems, . . . in order to continue existing, turned into an end in itself and achieved nothing. It was this

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33 Ibid., p.46.

process that accounted for all the characteristics of bureaucracy : the formalism, the hierarchy, the mystique, the identification of its own end with the end of the State. Marx sums up these characteristics in a passage whose insight merit a lengthy quotation.

> "Bureaucracy considers itself the ultimate finite purpose of the State. Since bureaucracy converts its formal 'purposes' into its content, it everywhere comes into conflict with 'real' purposes. It therefore, changes the purposes of the State into the purposes of bureaus and vice versa. Bureaucracy is a circle that no one can leave. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of information. The top entrusts the lower circles with an insight into details, while the lower circles entrust the top with an insight into what is universal, and thus they mutually deceive each other. The universal spirit of bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery sustained within bureaucracy itself by hierarchy and maintained on the outside as a closed corporation. The open spirit and sentiment of patriotism hence appear to bureaucracy as a betrayal of this mystery. Finally, the bureaucracy holds the essence of the State in its possession; it is its private property - that is for the bureaucracy State power plays the same role,

> in terms of the material basis of its assendency as private property does for the property ownership classes. For the individual bureaucrat the State's purposes become his private purpose of hunting for higher positions and making a career for himself."[34]

Marx's fundamental criticism of Hegel hinges around the fact that the attributes of humanity as a whole had been transferred to a particular class, which thus represented the illusory universality of modern political life. The bureaucracy was just another class with particular interests like the others, peculiar only in that its particular interest base was the State. It too was based on a sort of 'property', but its private property consists of the State itself - the political power. It was this peculiarity that created the illusion of universality. But it is all based on a lie — "the lie that the State is the people's interest or that the people is the State's interest."[35]

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34 Ibid., p.47.

35 Refer, Ibid., pp.28-33.

It is important to note that the foregoing analysis is based on the writings of the young Marx of 1843. With his historical materialism not yet fully developed, Marx allowed the bureaucracy more autonomy than he was later prepared to concede. For, while the bureaucracy discussed in 1843 can be said to be serving the corporations in a weak sense, by preserving their existence, Marx doesn't make the stronger claim that it merely serves their interests. The objection to its control over the State is not that other estates thereby control the bureaucracy, but that bureaucracy is itself a particular interest and that no particular interest should have such control over a State supposed to represent the whole of society, the universal interest.

By 1845, however, the doctrine usually taken to characterize 'classical' Marxism had been developed. Thereafter Marx insisted that productive economic activity is fundamental in human affairs, that the 'bearers' of relations of production are social classes and that their conflicts are the motor of historical change. Within each "mode of production" a fundamentally important distinction exists between that class which owns the means of production and that which doesnot; these two classes are the fundamental actors in each society, and their relationship and

conflict are at the root of the definition and capacity for change of the society. In this theoretical context, neither bureaucratic activity nor bureaucrats were needed to be central foci of attention. In class societies, bureaucracy was not a class but the servant of classes; not basic, but ultimately subordinate to the ruling class. In capitalist society, that class is the bourgeoisie. In the German Ideology of 1845-46, Marx and Engels claim that the State in bourgeois society is simply "the form of organisation which the bourgeoisie are compelled to adopt ... for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests."[36] The independent State, they insist, is an anomalous and pre-bourgeois phenomenon which only remains where estates have declined but classes are still not fully developed and where no group has the power to overcome the rest. The State in this situation is relatively autonomous, free from control by any of the contending classes but not from society as such. The historical moorings of Germany was a case in point as distinct from the more advanced

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36 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, German Ideology, (Moscow, 1976), p.99.

countries of that time, England and France. Engels hints at this relative autonomy in an article on the Prussian Constitution:

> "Thus the king, representing the central power of the State, and supported by the numerous class of government officers, civil and military was enabled to keep down the middle class by the nobility and the nobility by the middle classes, by flattering now the interests of the one and then those of the other; and balancing as much as possible, the influence of both. This stage of absolute monarchy has been gone through by almost all the civilized countries of Europe, an in those most advanced it has now given place to the government of the middle class. This is because the nobility and middle classes are placed in such a situation that by natural progress of industry and civilization the latter must increase in wealth and influence while the former must decrease and impoverish."[37]

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37 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol.6, (Moscow, 1984), p.65.

Further for Engels,

> "a constitution, in the pre-bourgeoisie set up gives an appearance of guarantee to the aristocracy and middle classes; for the reminder there was everywhere a bureaucratic government whose proceedings are shut up as much as possible from the public eye."[38]

Engels tries to find out the root of the situation and in a brilliant article on the 'constitutional question in Germany' written in 1947 he refers to the formation of bureaucracy as a result of the resigning of power by the nobility and the petty bourgeoisie. Both contending classes however contribute to the formation of this third class, with the nobility reserving the higher positions and the petty bourgeoisie content with the lower positions in administration. For Engels this regime represented by the bureaucracy is the political summing up of the general importance and contemptibility of the dull boredom and sordidness of German society. The reason for this situation of status quo according to Engels is the lack of

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38 Ibid., p.30.

capital in the hands of one class. He argues that it is only the bourgeoisie class which overthrows the compromise established between nobility and petty bourgeoisie in the bureaucratic monarchy.[39]

Marx realized the difficulty involved in bringing about this change. He says,

> "the absolute bureaucratic monarchy will not itself be amicably changed into a bourgeois monarchy. It will not abdicate amicably. The princes' hands are tied both by their personal prejudices and by a whole bureaucracy of officials who are far from willing to exchange their ruling position for a subservient one in respect of the bourgeoisie. Then the feudal estates also hold back; for them it is a question of life and death."[40]

Therefore bureaucracy which was a necessity for the petty bourgeoisie very soon becomes an unbearable fetter for the bourgeoisie. Already at the stage of manufacture

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39 Ibid., p.79.

40 Ibid., p.333.

official supervision and interference become very burdensome. The bourgeoisie resorts to bribing the bureaucracy for which Marx says they can't be blamed. However it is impossible to bribe all officials with whom a factory owner comes into contact - "bribery doesn't free him from perquisites, honoriums to jurists, architects, mechanics, nor from other expenses caused by the system of suspervision."[41] The more industry develops, the greater the pestering becomes.

The bouregoisie, therefore, is compelled to break the power of this indolent and pettifogging bureaucracy. From the moment the State administration and legislature fall under the control of the bourgeoisie, the independence of the bureaucracy ceases to exist. For the bourgeoisie, to make itself dominant is a compulsion. Engels says:

> "the bourgeoisie must develop itself to the full, daily expand its capital, daily reduce the production costs of its commodities, daily expand its trade connections and markets, in order not to be ruined. And to be able to develop freely and to the full, what is requires is precisely

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41 Ibid., p.88.

political dominance, the subordination of all other interests to its own."[42]

Engels latter on refering to Prussia as a specific historical model makes clear the growing power of the bourgeoisie and the shift from absolute bureaucratic monarchy towards a bourgeoisie monarchy. The Prussian bourgeoisie after the formation of the new Constitution under Fredrick William IV in 1947 refused to finance the State. The king was in despair and for the first few days Prussia was almost without a king. The country was in the throes of revolution without knowing it. It was only after receiving aid from Russia that the monarchy stabilized a bit. The Prussian bourgeoisie was for the time being defeated. But it made a great step forward, had won for itself a forum, had given the king a proof of its power and had worked the country up into a great stage of agitation.[43] The State bureaucracy is seen here as the main political obstacle to social progress at the given point in history. Once the bourgeoisie gains power, social and political thereby taking over in its own name the direct command of the State,

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42 Ibid., p.90.

43 Ibid., p.522.

the bureaucracy gets reduced more and more to the status of a social stratum acting merely as the agent of the ruling class. This is the status it tends to be restricted to, as a rule, wherever the ruling class of a given society is robust enough to exercise unchallenged socio-economic and political sway. Perhaps this suggests why the class status of the bureaucracy has again become a moot question in the contemporary world, which sees the down phase of bourgeois society and the increasing prevalence of autonomized State phenomena.[44] In the United States, which had started on a more or less bourgeois basis without evolving through feudalism, Marx noted that the 'State' in contradistinction from all earlier rational formation was subordinated from the first to the bourgeoisie society and production and could therefore never make the claim of being an end in itself.[45]

This tidy and uncomplicated formula dominated Marx's writing about the modern State until 1851 — Napoleon's coup detat of 2nd December. Marx recognized that the

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44 Refer Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, vol.II, (New York,1977), p.497.

45 Ibid., p.497.

result of the coup appeared to be triumph of Napolean and the bureaucracy over society, a triumph of the executive over social classes. In the 18th Brumaire he complained of:

> "this executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its ingenious State machinery, with a host of officials numbering half a million ... Every common interest was straightaway severed from society, counterposed to it as a higher, general interest, snatched from the activity of society's members themselves and made an object of government activity."[46]

More important was the fact that the French bourgeoisies' economic interests depended directly on a huge bureaucracy, for it offloaded its surplus population and received in salaries 'what it cannot pocket in the form of profit, interest and rents'.[47] Politically, the bourgeoisie was compelled to build up the power of the State, in order to defeat the classes which it oppressed economically.

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46 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol.II, (Moscow, 1979), p.185.

47 Ibid., p.139.

Marx writes,

> "the bourgeoisie confesses that ... in order to preserve its social power, its political power must be broken, that the private bourgeoisie can continue to exploit the other classes and enjoy undisturbed property, on condition that their class be condemned alongwith other classes to political nullity; that in order to save its purse, it must forfeit the crown..."[48]

In the Bonapartist state, then, a class may rule economically without ruling politically; indeed, its lack of political power is, in these circumstances, a condition of its economic dominance. French Bonapartism in other words is a regime which in times of bourgeois weakness and fierce struggle within and between classes, serves the bourgeoisie's economic interests without being in their control. It is not an example of a truely autonomous State or bureaucracy but a response to the special nature of its class base.

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48 Ibid., p.143.

The sociological significance of Marx's analysis of bureaucracy lies in his insistence that bureaucratic structures donot automatically reflect prevailing social power relations but pervert and disfigure them. Bureaucracy is thus the image of prevailing social power distorted by its claim to universality. This insight may perhaps serve as a clue to Marx's reluctance to systematize his views on the modern State. Though he never conceived the State, or the bureaucratic structure, as a mere reflection of socio-economic forces, he still considered it as a projection, even if a distorted one of those forces. The basic contradiction in which the modern State finds itself reveals that, to attain its expectations and standards it must appear different from what it really is — its alienation lies in its very essence. Like religion which projects on to God what is lacking in this vale of tears, the State ascribes to itself and to bureaucracy those attributes which should have been part of every person as a subject.[49]

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49 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge, 1968), p.51.

If so, why waste time in studying the distorted looking glass instead of looking through it at the reality hidden behind it? Instead of discussing the imaginary arrangements of the State, why not analyse the reality of civil society and its economic forms? This is the way Marx summed up his own programmatic position in 1859 in the Preface to 'A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy'.[50]

Marx thus viewed bureaucracy within the context of the class struggle; it represents the tool of the ruling classes, an instrument by which the latter exercises its domination over the other classes. Its only with the establishment of classless society will result the gradual absorption of bureaucracy into the society as a whole.

> "Thus instead of having an oppressive structure which is separated from and antagonistic to the rest of society, in the communist State those functions of bureaucracy which are not parasitic will be performed by all social members. The administrative tasks, losing their

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50 Ibid., p.52

> exploitative character will consist in the administration of things and not of people, as was the case with the bureaucracy."[51]

In his manuscript for the fourth volume of Capital Marx had approached the role of bureaucracy from the economic side. He was concerned with the State officialdom as one of those social strata that consist of people who do unproductive labour but are nevertheless useful to the ruling class in some way. The bourgeoisie although initially had a critical and severe attitude towards the State machinery soon discovered and learned by experience that it was out of its own organization that the necessity arose for this class which was quite unproductive. Having realized this the bourgeoisie gradually began to justify the demands of its defender. The dependence of the bureaucracy on the capitalism was thus proclaimed.[52]

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51 Cf. Nicos P. Mouzelis, Organizations and Bureaucracy : An Analysis of Modern Theories, (London,1967) , p.11.

52 Ref., Victor M. Perez Diaz, op.cit., p.50. For the political rationale for bourgeoisie justifying bureaucracy.

III

For Marx, the relationship between bureaucracy and capitalism was established in stages; at loggerheads at first and then discovering that one was beneficial for the other. The second stage can be seen as a voluntary ceasefire from both sides. Marx Weber had a different story to tell in this regard. He viewed the relationship from a much more rigid perspective, which led him to conclude that bureaucracy is indispensible to modern economic organization; among the many preconditions necessary for it to develop in its purest form is the rational economic base of capitalism.

Like Marx, Weber regarded the developed capitalist order as a system with imperatives, with rules of actions which the individual capitalist had to obey to survive. In this system, the imperatives of mechanized production and incessant competition force enterprises continuously to maximize profit and therefore to operate in the most efficient way possible. For this, bureaucracies are essential in two areas. Internally, large scale capitalist

enterprises are 'unequalled models of strict bureaucratic organization',[53] simply because bureaucracies get things done better than any other form of organization. Externally, the capitalist enterprise is equally dependent on the predictability and calculability provided by a rational legal order and state administration staffed bureaucratically and working according to strict formal rules.[54]

The framework of Weber's conception of bureaucracy is to be sought in his ideas on power, domination and authority. For Weber, power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance. Domination is power in a hierarchy; it is the probability that a command will be obeyed by a given group of person. Authority exists whenever obedience is based on a belief in the command's legitimacy. The habit of obedience which is essential to domination, however, cannot be maintained over time without a continually functioning administrative staff which enforces the order.[55] Organized domination

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53 Max Weber, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretitive Sociology, vol.III, (New York,1978), p.974.

54 Ibid., p.1394.

55 Ibid., p.946.

therefore is always associated with and vitally dependent upon administration. Such structures of domination become politically crucial and attain some stability in form and structure as soon as the group in which they exist becomes at all large and often as a result of increase in size, administration increases in complexity. Administration can be said to occur in a wide variety of forms and contexts. The bureaucracy is the most important administrative apparatus, and according to Weber, it is specifically the most rational form of administration.

For Weber, bureaucracy referred to a quite specific kind of administrative organization. Although he never defined bureaucracy in the explicit way in which he defined 'class'. But on a number of occasions he outlined in some detail the characteristics of bureaucracy. Specifically they are:

(i) There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.

(a) The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties.

(b) The authority to give commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of the officials.

(c) Methodical provision is made for the continuous and regular fulfillment of these duties and for the executive of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed.

(ii) The principles of office hierarchy and the levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super ordination and subordination, in which there is a supervision of the lower office by the higher ones.

(iii) The management of the modern office is based on written documents.

(iv) Office management, at least all specialized office management... usually presupposes thorough and expert training.

(v) When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official.

(vi) The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable.[56]

Central to the bureaucrats way of working is the separation of his official from his private life, work-place, activity and equipment; Finally his professional obligations are based not on loyalty to person superiors in or above the bureaucracy, but rather to the organization's impersonal purposes.

Because of these features, Weber claims bureaucracy is, from a purely technical view point capable of attaining the highest degree of rationality. From this viewpoint the fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical means of production. This is so, since the division of labour minimizes duplication of tasks as well as friction. Hierarchy facilitates central planning and coordination as well as control and discipline. Employment on the basis of qualifications makes for a

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56 H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (Tr. & Ed.), From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology, (London, 1958), pp.196-98.

higher level of knowledge and more competent work. Rules save effort by standardization; they obviate the need to find a new solution fromeach individual problem, therefore they also spell calculability of results. Impersonal detachment promotes objectivity and prevents irrational action as well as such inequitable treatment as favouritism on the one hand or discrimination on the other.[57]

Two things should be noted about this conception. First, it must be remembered that this is the ideal type of bureaucracy, a theoretical construct, combining several features of bureaucracy in its purest and most extreme form. This pure unmixed form is never found in reality. Weber never claimed that all modern organizations display all the afore mentioned features. He merely claimed that there is a general tendency in this direction and that the closer an organization comes to displaying these features, the more rational and effective it is likely to be Weber thus refered to actual administrations as bureaucracies even when they displayed only in parts the characteristics of his ideal type.

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57 Ibid., p.337.

Second, since Weber was interested in the form of organization rather than to the uses to which it was put, he was not limited to talking of government. He recognized that the State's monopoly of legitimate force puts its bureaucracy in a unique position, and in his political writings he usually referred specifically to state bureaucracy when he used the word, but he repeatedly stressed that bureaucracies were found in all kind of enterprise. The causes for this kind of a development are several according to Weber three of which however need special mention:

(i) - creation of money economy - Bureaucracies based on compensation of kind had existed for instance in Egypt, Rome and China. But payment in kind could not ensure dependable revenues for bureaucrats. Hence the practice was to reward them by grants of land or the collection of tax revenues from given territories. This lead to the disintegration of bureaucracies into feudal or semi-feudal domains. A money economy on the other hand permits payment of secure, regular salaries, which in turn creates dependable organizations.

(ii) the emergence of capitalist economy proper - Two important elements of modern capitalism are the rational estimation of risks and the systematic calculation of profits. This requires regular and stable market processes. Capitalism thus encourages strong and orderly governments based on bureaucratic organizations. Moreover, the requirements of rationality and calculability have led capitalist enterprises themselves to follow bureaucratic principles of organization. This has already been mentioned before. Strange as it seems, it is thus the system of free enterprise that has fostered bureaucracy.

(iii) the more encompasing trend towards rationalist, in Western Society - This trend found expression in a general 'disenchantment' or demystification of the world, in a more effective adaptation of means to ends and a more systematic organization of reality. For Weber, the protestant ethic was the basic of the spirit of capitalism which called for the rational investment of time and effort so as to maximize profits and achievements. The general trend towards rationality is also evident in the development of modern science with its

> combination of rational theory, mathematical calculation and systematic empirical observation. Protestantism, capitalism, science and bureaucracy are thus all part of one cluster of developments - the process of rationalization.[58]

The pivotal political fact of the modern age was the indispensability factor of bureaucracy with its expertise born of long and specialized training. But Weber was deeply concerned about its effects both on the individual and society at large. The individual bureaucrat reduces himself to a powerless cog'in a ceaselessly moving machine which prescribes to him, an essentially fixed route of march'.[59] Bureaucracy holds equally grave dangers for society as a whole. In the past, bureaucratization of society, as part of a growing rationality had for Weber a liberating effect on society by destroying oppressive traditions. But Weber saw further bureaucratization as leading to the permeation of bureaucratic values and ways

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58 Ibid., pp.204-10.

59 Max Weber, op.cit., p.958.

of thought throughout the population, a prospect he didnot find heartening. While at the first sight bureaucracy brought liberation, it is now apt to bring about the opposite - overorganization. Weber sounds quite radical when he says:

> "it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up and the great question is therefore not how we can promote but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parceling out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of this bureaucratic way of life." [60]

If one follows the political writings of Weber a little more closely one will discover that there are two principal foci of Weber's uneasiness regarding bureaucracy. The first as mentioned before is the bureaucratization of the whole of society in the sense of the percoalation of bureaucratic values, ways of through and behaviour throughout a population. It is important to note that although Weber drew attention to

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60 Cf. Martin Kriger, "Weber, Lenin and Reality of Socialism", in E. Kamenka ed., Bureaucracy, (London,1979), p.67.

the 'socially levelling' effects of bureaucracy on status structure, he was more aware and disturbed about the kind of status hierarchy which bureaucracy itself encouraged - a hierarchy based on the 'patent of education' and on education of a uniquely important kind in specialized functional skills.[61]

His second concern was more directly political in focus. It was the fear that those who man the bureaucratic organization might come to be the actual rulers of a State. It was less a fear that we would all become bureaucrats, than we would all come to be ruled by bureaucrats. In one sense Weber believed that this was already the case in every modern society because all domination was exercised through bureaucratic agencies. But 'rule' in the sense of ultimate directive power, did not inevitably lie in the hands of officials for there was a fundamental difference between the functional indispensability of bureaucratic forms of organization and of bodies of trained officials and the 'power' of those officials. Weber's stand in this regard is a little ambiguous for

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61 Max Weber, op.cit., pp.998-1002.

he says -

> "It must ... remain an open question whether the 'power' of bureaucracy is increasing in the modern states in which it is spreading. The fact that bureaucratic organization is technically the most highly developed power instruments in the hands of its control doesn't determine the height that bureaucracy as such is capable of procuring for its own opinions in a particular social structure."[62]

But Weber aruged that while the power position of the bureaucrats could not be predicted in general terms, it was always great, under normal conditions. He realized that the bureaucrats had enormous power resources at their disposal which might enable them to rule unless they were kept under political control. Unlike Hegel, who argued that officialdom represented the general common interests of the society; Weber insisted that bureaucrats far from constituting a 'universal class' fostered quite particular sectional interests. For example in Prussia, they were recruited predominantly from one class - the economically

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62 Ibid., p.991.

declining 'junkers' - and therefore they over emphasized the latters' conservative interests. For Weber, officialdom generated its own values and a consciousness of its own special interests, which it was uniquely placed to promote.

What Weber feared most was that modern society might have to be dominated by the bureaucrats who controlled an incomparably effective and inescapable administrative machinery and that throughout society only those attitudes and values would be generated which were appropriate to this machine. Weber concluded that it is only the non-bureaucratic political head who could put a check to such a move, and this is precisely why Weber is at to mention dearth of people who have taken "politics as their vocation". For Weber, the relationship of the official vis-a-vis the political master is the relationship between an expert and a dilletante. Generally speaking, the trained permanent official is more likely to get his way in the long run than his nominal superior, the minister who is not a specialist. Thus the power of bureaucrat tends to increase with respect to his political superior. Weber attributes this progressively increasing power to

(i) practical effectiveness and increasing indispensability of bureaucratic organizations; (ii) expert technical knowledge; (iii) administrative secrecy. The first two points have been dealt in the paper. The codes of bureaucratic secrecy assumes significance because of the fact that most important spheres of bureaucratic action are withdrawn from public scrutiny. Weber says, "The concept of the 'official secret' is the special invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude...."[63] If it chooses to overrule its master, there is nothing to prevent it from doing so; "against the bureaucracy, the ruler remains powerless."[64]

Weber fears that if the top administration of State is in the hands of the bureaucrats, then there will be a strong tendency for - (i) the political direction of the bureaucracy to be irresponsible and ineffective, especially in times of crisis; and (ii) the behind-the-scenes

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63 Gerth and Mills, op.cit., p.233.

64 Ibid.

influence of big capitalists in the running of the State.[65] For Weber, 'the essence of politics is struggle over ends and the power to accomplish ends. Effective and responsible political leadership consists in knowing how to weigh competing and conflicting ends, how to negotiate compromises, sacrificing the less important with the more important..."[66] The entire structure and ethos of bureaucracy makes the professional bureaucrat unsuited for such a political directorate. As regards to the second point Weber was aware of the covert influence of big capitalists interest in state administration especially in its monocratic form. Monocratic chief is more open to personal influence. Although the influence of the big capitalist exists even when there are strong political institutions yet it assumes unrestricted form when bureaucracy is least controlled.

Weber was of the opinion that only a working parliament could provide the institutional means for effectively controlling the unrestrained power of bureaucracy. He also saw it as a breeding ground which would

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65 Eric Wolin Wright, Class, Crisis and State, (London,1979), p.186.

66 Ibid., p.187.

generate the talented political leadership necessary for responsibly directing bureaucratic activity. This analysis is quite significant because towards the end, Weber was arguing for a charismatic leader who would appeal directly to the masses and would thereby acquire the independence necessary for controlling and setting the goals for bureaucrats.[67]

This solution propounded by Weber was in sharp opposition to the Marxist solution of the withering away of the State and bureaucracy under communism. Further unlike Marx, for Weber the real danger of capitalism was the rise of more and more almighty bureaucracies, and not simply the private ownership of the means of production and the relative or absolute exploitation of the working classes to the advantage of their masters. He pointed out that the nationalization of the means of production would not substantially alter the situation under socialism. 'Any socialist economy organized on rational lines ... would retain the expropriation of all the workers and merely bring it to completion by the expropriation of the private owners.'[68] A socialist revolution according to Weber

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67 Ibid., pp.188-89.

68 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol.I, p.139.

cannot result in a dictatorship of the proletariat. In modern mass society it can only result in a consolidated dictatorship of the bureaucrats. In economic enterprises bureaucrats would now be in the highest positions, formerly held by private enterpreneurs; strikes would be more difficult than ever before, and the possibility of appeal or support from one enterprise against another would be gone. If private capitalism were destroyed -

> " What would be the practical result? The destruction of the steel frame of modern industrial work? No! The abolition of private capitalism would simply mean that the top management of the nationalized or socialized enterprises would become bureaucratic... There is even less freedom, since every power struggle with a State bureaucracy is hopless and since there is no appeal to an agency which as a matter of principle would be interested in limiting the employer's power, as there is in the case of a private enterprise. That would be the whole difference. State bureaucracy would rule alone if private capitalism were eliminated. The private and public bureaucracies, which now work next to and potentially against, each

> other and hence check one another to a degree, would be merged into a single hierarchy."[69]

Weber's case against socialism was good : first, in so far as he argued that it was not the ownership of property as such, but rather the control of the entrepreneurial positions which matters; secondly, when he pointed out that the real cause of the 'alienation' not only of the working classes, but of the great majority of the population in modern socialism, lay in the emerging bureaucratic structures and not so much in the particular modes of the distribution of wealth.

Weber was not a champion of capitalism either although he was an enthusiastic admirer of the capitalist system. Weber clearly perceived that capitalism creates social trends which are detrimental to a humane social order. No doubt, he pointed out time and again that it is only the "market economy" which is capable of attaining a maximum degree of formal rationality, particularly regarding the exact rational calculation of all economic

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69 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol.III, pp.1401-02.

operations. Any socialist economy, for Weber, especially if it goes so far as to abandon a market-oriented system of prices, would have to cope with a substantial diminution of 'formal calculating rationality'. On numerous occasions Weber strongly emphasized that capitalism is infinitely superior to all other known forms of economic organization precisely because it alone is capable of organizing all its activities on a purely formal-rational basis.[70]

But Weber, himself pointed out on various occasions that 'formal rationality' and 'substantive rationality' are by no means identical and as a rule not compatible with one another. The concept of 'formal rationality' is identical with the principle of maximization of efficiency, whereas, 'substantial rationality' in Weberian terms refers to social systems or social institutions or even to forms of social conduct that are rationally oriented towards the realization of certain fundamental ideas as for example, the principle of social justice.. On one occasion Weber

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70 Wolfgang, J.Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy, (Oxford, 1974) , p.65.

declared explicitly:

> "The fact that the maximum of formal rationality in capital accounting is possible only provided that the workers are subjected to domination by the entrepreneurs is a further specific case of the substantive irrationality of the capitalist economic system." [71]

That is to say that an economic system which in economic terms is rationally organized throughout can well be and is extremely irrational, when analyzed from the angle of particular value positions. Weber was also convinced that all socialist economies had to face serious problems which resulted from the fundamental contradictions between formal and substantive rationality. Although he did not state this explicitly, it was in his eyes a key argument against the feasibility of socialist systems.[72]

All the three philosophers Hegel, Marx and Weber are aware of the inhuman consequences of modern industrial capitalism. For Hegel, it stems out from the chaotic

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71 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol.I, p.138.

72 Mammsen, op.cit., p.69.

conditions prevailing in the civil society. Marx attributes it to the close exploitative nexus between bourgeois society, state and bureaucracy, whereas for Weber the in-human consequences are a result of bureaucratic domination. For Hegel, bureaucracy, the universal class has a positive role in resolving the crisis in the civil society. For Marx bureaucracy is the lesser villian, characteristically impotent, serving the greater villian, the capitalist ruling class. Conversly for Weber bureaucracy is a necessary evil. The way out therefore, for Marx is a socialist revolution and the subsequent establishment of communist society whereas Weber feels the necessity of a strong working parliament to counter bureaucratic domination. Hegel envisages a positive relationship between the state and bureaucracy, and stresses on their crisis solving capabilities. Marx also sees the close link between the two but attributes a very negative role to them. Arguing from a more humane perspective he denounces the state, the bureaucracy and the capitalist system. Whereas Weber, while making bureaucracy the target of his attack, reserves a lot of admiration for the capitalist setup and pins lot of hope especially on the political/governmental role of the state.

IV

It is important to note that the relevance of these theories in analysing the industrialized capitalist societies of today have become a hot point of debate specially in the light of the growing power of the state. The issue for Marxists has been to account for the prominence of the modern state while at the same time remaining faithful to traditional Marxist assumption that the political realm is ultimately a consequence of the interaction of economic forces. The solution that has proven most popular has been to turn to extend Marx's analysis of Bonapartism in French politics, into the theory of relative autonomy. Thus relative autonomy would mean, an autonomy from particular capitalist interests, so that the state can represent the long term needs of the capital as a whole. The concept of relative autonomy accommodates the growth of the modern welfare state and also helps account for frequent conflicts between state agents and capitalists, a tension hard to explain in Marxism which treat the state as the captive of the ruling class. The relative autonomy theory allows us to understand better some of the structural constraints upon direct exercise of

power by the capitalist class, but it still sustains the traditional Marxist practice of dismissing the possibility of bureaucrats being an independent force in political struggle. Poulantzas arguing in this line says:

> "the bureaucracy cannot constitute a particular class nor even a fraction of a class and thus it cannot have its own political power. The socalled 'bureaucratic power' is infact the mere exercise of the state's functions, functions exercised on behalf of the hegemonic class. To exercise power on behalf of another class is not to have power by itself."[73]

A more realistic analysis is by Fred Block who refers to the dynamics of the modern state, derived from the conflict between bureaucrats pursuit of separate class interests and the necessity for capitalists to heep bureaucratic in their place.

Although Marxists have resisted recognizing the power of bureaucrats in contemporary capitalism, the neo-conservative stand within the liberal tradition of analysis

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73 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class, Tr. by Timothy Hagan, (London, 1978).

have made bureaucrats power their target of attack. These neo-conservatives would have us interpret government regulations and welfare expansion as the growth of the new bureaucratic elite imposing its interests, against the public good. To establish that the growth of the welfare state primarily reflects increased bureaucratic power, it is necessary to show that the welfare state grows at the expense of the interests of the dominant capitalist class. Capitalists are somehow missing from the neo-conservative analysis; anti-bureaucratic tracts ignore an entire liberature and perspective showing that precisely these extensions of state power are a necessary and an integral part of the development of monopoly capitalism .

In summary, the sociological analysis of the power of bureaucracy in advanced capitalism has been distorted by strong political feelings. Liftists have been unwilling to confront the independent power of state officials, thereby clouding the understanding of the State's relative autonomy within a capitalist class system. At the same time neo-conservative analysis have attributed unreal qualities to State officials directing attention away from the ongoing class conflicts in which bureaucrats play a significant but limited role.

SOCIALIST BUREAUCRACY ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES OF LENIN AND MAO

Chapter-III

Weber's model of bureaucratic development centres on the need for rational, predictable administration for capitalist enterprise to be able to make efficient calculations in their production decision. Thus given the conditions of modern technology and production, bureaucracies are inevitable and necessary. However, Weber seems concerned about the uncontrolled bureaucratic domination and its tendency to serve the capitalist class. Sensing the fact that bureaucracies cannot be eliminated, Weber feels the necessity to create and develop institutional guarantees, like a strong working parliament, that will control and politically direct the bureaucracy.

Like Weber, Lenin argued that the real centre of State power is located in the bureaucracy which serves the interest of the capitalist class. But bureaucracy, for Lenin, was not a technological imperative necessiated by modern technology and mass administration but as a specifically political imperative for stability of capitalism and the domination of the bourgeoisie.

Especially in the age of imperialism, when the working class political parties become potentially strong, the bourgeoisie cannot rely on representative institutions to guarantee its rule and will tend to move increasingly to the executive as the primary structure of class domination.

For Weber, State is a compulsory political organization with continuous operations. It is not possible to define the State in terms of the end to which its action is devoted as it corporates all inclusive ends, starting from the provision for subsistence to the patronage of art. The State for Lenin is conceived more as a structure than as an organization. It is assumed to have a specific function, the suppression of the class struggle and the maintenance of the domination of the ruling class.

Both, for Weber and for Lenin, bureaucratic power feeds on the political incapacity of the nonbureaucrats and reinforces that incapacity. However, in Weber's analysis, the pivotal category of nonbureaucrats was the parliamentary elite and thus he was preoccupied with the problem of developing their political capacity. Whereas

Lenin's theory, true to the Marxist tradition, made the working class the critical category of non-bureaucrats, therefore the decisive factor, for him, was to develop and strengthen the political capacity of this class.

The comparison between Weber and Lenin raises three important questions regarding Lenin's theory of bureaucracy, the answers to which shall be sort by analysing his work:

(i) To what kind of a structure is bureaucracy?

(ii) To what extent can the bettle be fought against it?

(iii) Is it possible to achieve victory over it?

I

Before the Russian Revolution, European Marxists had not made much attempt to predict institutional arrangements of a post-revolutionary phase. Even where it was attempted it was not the central preoccupation because of the problems associated with effecting

revolution. However most Marxists including Lenin agreed with Karl Kautsky that the proletariat should take over and use the existing State apparatus rather than smash it.[1] The odd man out among the Marxist theoriticians was Bukharin, who propagated the theory of smashing the State. Dubbing Bukharin as an anarchist Lenin stated that the "socialists are in favour of utilising the present State and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, maintaining also that the State should be used for specific form of transition from capitalism to socialism. This traditional form is the dictatorship of the proletariat which is also a State."[2] However after undertaking a systematic research on the works of Marx and Engels on the State in the early months of 1917 Lenin abandoned the views of Kautsky and adopted a theory of smashing the 'State machinery'. This view is different from Bukharin's version of smashing the 'State' and has been elaborately dealt with in this chapter.

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1 Unlike Kautsky, Lenin did not believe that the State should be taken over peacefully.

2 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.23, (Moscow,1965), p.165.

The State, for Lenin, is a product and manifestation of the irreconciliability of class antagonism. "The State arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And conversely the existence of the State proves that class antagonisms are irreconcilable."[3] Following Marx, Lenin believed that "the State is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another. The State is a special organization of force; it is the organisation of violence for the suppression of some class."[4] This is the chief function of all states including the socialist state where the proletariat rules and the capitalist is suppressed. "A State would be required to suppress counter-revolutionaries and it would also be required to suppress counter-revolutionaries and it would also be required in the first stage of socialism to administer."[5]

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3 V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution, (Moscow, 1979), pp.10-11.

4 Ibid., p.11.

5 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.25, (Moscow, 1965), p.425.

The bureaucracy is the basic structure through which the capitalist class rules. Furthermore, bureaucratic organization is suited only for capitalist domination. Lenin attributed the growth, perfection and strengthening of bureaucracy to the fall of feudalism and the growth of capitalism. As class struggle intensified with the development of capitalism, the progressive expansion and centralization of the bureaucratic apparatus became necessary.[6] Further the era of imperialism has clearly shown an extraordinary strengthening of the State machine and an unprecedented growth in its bureaucratic apparatus.[7] Bureaucrats for Lenin are "the most faithful servants of the bourgeoisie[8] connected to the latter 'by thousand of threads'."[9] Bureaucrats could not be neutral, let alone amiable to the proletariat; as a result of their social position, connections and conditioning, they would necessarily take the side of the bourgeoisie. They would simply be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletariat State.[10]

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6 Eric Olin Wright, Class,Crisis and the State, (London,1979) , pp.197-98.

7 Ibid., p.198.

8 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.24, (Moscow,1965), p.181.

9 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.25, (Moscow,1965), p.407.

10 Ibid., p.434.

But Lenin was not arguing that the proletariat dictatorship could do without a State. To him the existing State rested in effect on two separate apparatus; one - police, bureaucracy and army - was highly oppressive and had to be smashed; the other apparatus however had 'extremely close connections with the banks and syndicates. It is an apparatus which performs an enormous amount of accounting and registration work ... This apparatus must not be smashed. It must be wrested from the control of the capitalists...[11] 'one should not invest the organizational form of the work but take it readymade from capitalism'.[12]

The image which emerges is less that of a monolith which must be razed to the ground to be replaced by something totally new and different, than that of a growing and potentially healthy organism afflicted by a harmful parasite. Harsh treatment must be administered to destroy the parasite and certain precautions must be

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11 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.26, p.106.

12 Ibid., p.110.

followed to keep it at bay. I quote Lenin to strengthen my argument:

> "Once we have overthrown the capitalists, crushed the resistance of these exploiters with the iron hand of the armed workers and smashed the bureaucratic machine of the modern State, we shall have a splendidly equipped mechanism, free from the 'parasite', a mechanism which can very well be set going by the united workers themselves, who will hire technicians, foreman and accountants and pay workmens' wages."[13]

Lenin had clearly visualized the limited amount of smashing the State had to undergo. Before revolution, in one of his articles, he wrote: "in all probability we shall introduce complete wage equality only gradually and shall pay these specialists higher salaries during the transition period."[14] And after the revolution Lenin made it clear in his writings that the average Russian workers did not know how to administer the State. The reason for Lenin was that, there was no canonical guide

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13 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.25, pp.426-27.

14 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.26, p.110.

to show them the way: "We know about socialism but knowledge of organization on a scale of millions, knowledge of organization and distribution of goods - this we donot have ... The Bolshevik Party cannot boast of this in its history."[15] Lenin therefore insisted that lessons had to be taken from the bourgeoisie, in techniques of management, industrial production and trade. He exhorted communists to bear in mind that 'the engineers way to communism is different from that of the underground propagandist and writer'.[16] Further, he fought for better treatment and higher wages for bourgeoisie specialists higher indeed than those of workers and even of party leaders.[17] He argued that "unless our leading bodies ... guard as the apple of their eye every specialist who does his work conscientiously and knows and loves it - even if the ideas of communism are alien to him - it will be useless to expect any serious progress in socialist construction."[18] He called for German and American literature

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15 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.27, pp.296-97.

16 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.32, p.144.

17 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.33, p.193, also Selected Works, vol.II, pp.368-69, 472-73, 642-44, 660-62.

18 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.33, p.194.

to be obtained: "everything more or less valuable should be collected, especially as regards normalizing bureaucratic work - procedure for despatch, control, business forms, typing of copies, inquires and replies, etc."[19]

Lenin was fascinated by any technique which promised to increase industrial production - piece work, adjusting wages to productivity and in particular the Taljlor system. Lenin reviewed the book 'Taylor System and the Scientific Organization of Labour' by O.A. Yermansky and recommended it as a standard text book for the trade union schools. In this review article Lenin writes:

> "To learn how to work is now the main, the truely national task of the Soviet Republic. Our primary and most important task is to attain universal literacy, but we should in no circumstances limit ourselves to this target. We must at all costs go beyond it and adopt everything that is truely valuable in European and American science."[20]

It is further important to note that Lenin fought for single as opposed to collegial authority in industry by

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19 Ibid., p.581.

20 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.33, p.368; and Selected Works, vol.II, p.603.

advocating that the latter be restricted to discussions of questions preliminary to execution. Although he agreed with his opponents that one-man management was dictatorial, yet he considered dictatorship of the competent, necessary. His resolution of introducing the man management inspite of strong opposition passed at the 9th Party Congress in 1920.[21]

Lenin's views exhibit many tensions and strains: He emphasized the primacy of politics in a revolutionary state, yet decried the excessively 'political' orientation for communist administrators;[22] he emphasized the need for bourgeois specialists yet continually blamed them for their 'bureaucratism'; he insisted that they be treated well yet ordered that they in particular should be harshly scrutinized.[23] But it seems clear that he sought

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21 J.R. Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics, (Cambridge,Mass., 1966), p.46.

22 At the Eight Congress of Soviets in December 1920 Lenin applauded "the beginning of that very happy time when politics will recede into the background, when politics will be discussed less often and at shorter length ... Henceforth less politics will be the best politics." (Collected Works, vol.31, pp.513-14).

23 A. Ulam, "Lenin and the Bolsheviks", Cf. "Martin Krygier, Weber, Lenin and Reality of Socialism", in E. Kamnenker ed., Bureaucracy, (London,1979), pp.82-83.

an efficient bureaucracy staffed increasingly by workers. His attack on bureaucracy in the post-revolution phase was centred around abuses, excesses and inefficiency. The flaws which Lenin most often identified with bureaucratic methods were of three general kinds. The first kind is a predilliction for authoritarian dictation from above, for 'bossing' and 'ordering'. A second flaw, related to the first is the making of plans without any kind of test, or realistic assessment of their effects. Finally he referred to the inefficiency and red-tape by bracketing them with the sin of bureaucratism. His fury with inefficiency, his tendency to view 'bureaucratism' as a moral fault led him to encourage punishment of anyone found guilty of redtapism by peoples court. But he did realize that the cure for bureaucratism was not possible only by throwing inefficient people out, but by recruiting a new type of persons into it. A way out for him was "to pour as many workers and peasants as possible into this apparatus."[24] In 1919 the Workers and Peasants Inspection also called Rabkrin was setup under Stalin as a means of drawing the masses into supervising the

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24 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.33, p.351.

bureaucracy and training them in State administration. But in no time 'Rabkrin' grew to some 12,000 officials, very few of them were workers and it became 'one of the most bureaucratic - ridden agencies in the whole government'.[25]

How did 'bureaucratism' become such a widely prevalent a malaise of the Soviet State? To Lenin the answer was simple.

> "The Czarist bureaucrats began to join the Soviet institutions and practice their bureaucratic methods, they began to assume the colouring of the Communists, to procure membership card of the Russian Communist Party to succeed better in their careers. And so, they have been thrown out of the door but they creep back in through the window."[26]

The answer perhaps can be categorized as vulgar Marxism at its best for Lenin himself wrote extensively on the skills of the old officials' and communists' and workers'

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25 M.C. Morgan, Lenin, (London,1971), p.205.

26 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.29, p.183.

lack of skill. Thus since many of the former had never been thrown'out of the door', there was no need for them to return through the window.

The fundamental problem with Lenin's formulation is that it confines workers' control to the administrative sphere of bureaucratic organization. Bureaucratic functions of control and accounting Lenin claims, "have become so simplified...that they can be easily performed by every literate persons ... for ordinary 'workmen's wages'..."[27] The technical services and operations, which Lenin regards as non-bureaucratic and hence not a possible source of elitist structures, are not subject to political control. "The question of control and accounting", Lenin states, "should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers..."[28] The first question is concerned with political necessity, the second with technical necessity. Control and accounting functions comprise the power dimension of bureaucracy and to the extent they are democratized, bureaucratic domination is precluded. Technical functions

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27 Lenin, 'State and Revolution', in Collected Works, vol.25, p.421.

28 Ibid., p.473.

are independent of this political dimension, and therefore technically determined subordination is not open to political challenge. The technique of modern, industrial enterprise, Lenin comments, "makes absolutely imperative the strictest discipline, the utmost precision on the part of everyone carrying out his alloted task, for otherwise the whole enterprise may come to a stop..."[29]

It was therefore natural that technical necessity came to dominate more and more spheres of activity in the bureaucracy and beyond. Concurrently there was a narrowing of those areas of concern subject to political control. This is evident in a series of proposals Lenin offered in 1918 which as summarized by Bendix, proclaim that:

> "The masses of the people must participate actively in planning the policies which should govern production and distribution, but during the work day they must observe iron discipline and subordinate themselves unconditionally to the dictatorial will of one man, the Soviet Manager ... Towards this end the courts must be used to inculcate labour discipline. Anyone who

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29 Lenin, Collected Works, vol.27, p.317.

> violated the demands of labour discipline must be discovered, brought before the courts and punished..."[30]

Technically necessary subordination, required for the development of the 'higher' phases of communism, underlie the progressive depoliticization of socialist Russia, not with the abolition of private property but with the emergence of a technically expert bureaucracy. Detached from the political will of the masses by 'technical necessity' the experts in industry and in the party successfully and efficiently supervised the modernization of the Russian society. But they did so, as Weber predicted, by establishing a highly repressive and an immensely powerful bureaucratic organization. This is not to suggest either that the bureaucracy became independent of political controls or that the technicians and managers came to assume central positions within the party. What happened was that the Party increasingly justified its demands for unity and obedience with reference to technical necessity, thus placing these demands outside of the realm of political or collective discourse

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30 Ibid., p.317. See also Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, (New York, 1956), p.193.

and debate. Party officials in this context are viewed as social technicians and experts and ofcourse this view doesnot diverge significantly from Lenin's conception of the Party as the vanguard of the proletariat, a vanguard comprised of professional revolutionaries, scientific socialists wity an expert knowledge of the laws of socio-historical development. Compliance with Party commands, then was seen as a matter of 'technically necessary' subordination, since these commands were based on specialized scientific knowledge which like the knowledge of the engineers was not yet widely diffused, and since such compliance would contribute to the material advancement required for the full development of consciousness. In short, the bureaucratic technicians did not become Party officials, rather, the Party officials became political technicians and as such they were beyond challenge and criticism.

It will perhaps be fruitful here to recall Weber's distinction between formal and substantive rationality and compare it with Lenin's 'rationality of technique' and rationality of 'consciousness'.[31] Weber says - 'the fact

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31 By distinguishing the two aspects of rationality Lenin's theory envisages the possibility of a society where the application of instrumental rationality and technical reason is confined to

that the maximum of formal rationality in capital accounting is possible only provided that the workers are subjected to domination by the entrepreneurs is a further specific case of the substantive irrationality of the capitalist economic system'.[32] From the Leninist viewpoint, the class structure of capitalism impedes the rationalization of consciousness. As a result, the rationalization of technique, although furthered by the development of capitalism, defies rational control and strengthens the irrational domination of social life. Thus the central problem concerns the eradication of class restrictions. But the rationalization of technique is also simultaneously seen to establish the material conditions necessary for the rationalization of consciousness. In more familiar terms, ideological changes are dependent on substructural changes, the realm of freedom is contingent upon the realm of necessity. Technically determined subordination, so long as it occurs within an organization stripped of its class, functions and establishes the material conditions of classlessness which permits the acquisition of rational understanding and consciousness.

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the material world and critical rationality or political consciousness permeates every other sphere of life to the degree that domination becomes virtually impossible.

32 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol.I, (New York, 1978), p.138.

What Lenin fails to realize, however, is that 'it is not only class power but any source of societal domination that inhibits dialogue and undermines rationality'.[33] Domination and unfreedom, whether technically or politically determined, inhibits dialogue, understanding and consciousness, and this inhibition allows the rationalization of technique to penetrate unchallenged throughout society. In this way technological rationality ' protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination, and the instrumentalist horizon of reasons open on a rationally totalitarian society'.[34] The extension of technology and technocratic bureaucracy severely delimits the space where communication free from domination is possible and thus deteriorates the ideological and political discourse that preceeds rational understanding.[35] Political goals are transformed into technical problems whose solution require not public discussion, but subordination to the technically necessary.[36]

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33 Alvin Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, (New York, 1976), p.98.

34 Herbert Maxuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston, 1964), p.159.

35 Refer Jurgen Habemas, Knowledge and Human Interest, (Boston,1971), pp.25-42.

36 For details, refer Jurgen Habemas, Towards a Rational Society, (Boston,1970),

II

The Maoist model of bureaucracy can be seen as an attempt to reconcile the limits of rationality of consciousness and rationality of technique, to strike a balance between 'the reds and the experts', the social and the technological revolution. The emphasis on the critical and politically pivotal role of consciousness which shapes this effort is accompanied by the recognition that changes in superstructure - ideology, culture and consciousness - don't automatically or mechanistically follow changes in the technical-material base.[37] According to this view, it is necessary that 'politics take command', that is, the rationalization of consciousness be actively pursued, and this requires the politicization of all spheres of decision making and the expansion of areas hospitable to critical discourse. Reliance on technique and organizational efficiency is by no means surrendered, but the development of each is circumscribed by the development of political consciousness. Modernization

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37 James Peck, "Revolution versus Modernization and Revisionism", in V. Nee and J. Peaks eds., China's Uninterupted Revolution, (New York, 1975), p. 117.

entails an increase in the level of productivity and of equal importance, an increase in rational understanding, and the former must not be permitted to happen at the expense of the latter. In short, "while a principal aim... should be to raise the level of material welfare of the population, this should be done only within the context of the development of human beings and of encouraging them to realize fully their manifold creative powers."[38] Thus rationality of technique and the rationality of consciousness is placed in "a dialectical relationship of growth of production, institutional change, developing socio-political consciousness and cultural advance. Each element feeds the other... in a sense that is literally dialectical - it is dialogue, its motive force depends on the community's discussion of past experience in relation to present choices."[39] Consciousness is rescued from the epiphenomenal level of superstructure and made an integral part of the

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38 John Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development", in E. Friedman and M. Selden eds., America's Asia, (New York,1971), p.332.

39 For details refer Jack Gray, "Politics in Command; the Maoist Theory of Social Change and Economic Growth", Political Quarterly, vol.45, 1974, pp.26-48.

dialectic of development. Accordingly, the socialist route to modernization must steadfastly avoid those developments such as technical specialization and bureaucratic elitism and centralization which inhibit critical discourse. A program of combined development in which consciousness and technique (as well as manual and mental labour the city and the country, industry and agriculture) develop together is the Moaist alternative to the position of Weber and Lenin.

In the 1950s, attracted by short cuts to rapid industrialization promised by the Soviet model, the Chinese socialists led by Liu-Shao-Chi reduced the emphasis on consciousness, initiative and participation.[40] 'One-man management' replaced dialogue and the industrial sector increasingly exhibited an unresponsive bureaucratic structure.[41] The focus of this model was on specialization,

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40 Since Liu was discredited in the G.P.C.R., it is difficult to ascertain whether the implementation of the Soviet model was due entirely to him. It could perhaps be correct to say that routinizing behaviour in the fifties may have had tacit approval from Mao and that the "Maoist vision of modernization" as an alternative to the Soviet model relied on ideological work of Liu as well as that of Mao.

41 Stephen Andors, "Revolution and Modernization : Man and Machine in Industrializing Society, the Chinese Case", in E. Friedland and M. Selden eds., America's Asia, (New York,1971), p.399.

hierarchy and an elite corps of cadres and professionals. China's break with Russia at the close of the 1950s fostered a rejection of the Soviet model and a return to the principles of dialectical development. Affirmation of these principles appeared in the Great Leap forward which was launched to bring about a shift "from centralized to decentralized decision-making, from one-man factory management to greater roles for the party committees and greater initiative by the workers, from the extensive use of material incentives to increased reliance on social responsibility."[42] Essentially a reaction against elitism, the Great Leap Forward sought to politicize bureaucracy by incorporating innovations such as the "triple combination" in terms of which technical decisions were made at all levels of the organization by committees comprised of workers, administrators and technicians. Despite these developments, strong tendencies toward, hierarchial control, restricted participated, and the use of material incentives remained in industry and in the Party. Instead of the anticipated balance

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42 James Peck and J. Peak, "Why Uninterrupted Revolution", in V. Nee and J. Peak eds., China's Uninterrupted Revolution, p.50.

between red and expert, revolution and modernization, China was experiencing an intense struggle between the 'two lines'. In describing the situation of through the early sixties, Vogel states that "in a very fundamental sense, what has happened to the organization of cadres since 1949 corresponds more closely to the vision of Max Weber than to those of Mao."[43]

The rift between supporters of the Soviet model of industrialization and the Maoist model finally culminated in the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution which began in 1966. According to Macciochi, "cultural revolution, (as that aspect of modernization which concerns the rationalization of consciousness) is above all a maturing process that involves discussion, mass criticism and public debate at all levels."[44] The considerable force of the G.P.C.R. was directed towards reversing the growth of a bureaucratic and technical elite which sought to

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43 Ezra Vogel, "From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat : The Regularization of Cadres", China Quarterly, vol.29, p.38.

44 Maria Macciochi, Daily Life in Revolutionary China, K. Brown (trans.) (New York,1972), p.485.

depoliticize and to diminish extensive participation in the decision-making process. An ideological struggle, the Cultural Revolution sought, first, to eradicate the elitist tendencies sustained in consciousness and second to infuse this now politically purified consciousness into the administrative apparatus. And this transformation of consciousness, this cultural revolution, would further the technological revolution by creating a highly motivated, knowledgable and conscientious labour force.[45] In short, the cultural revolution demanded the extensive application of the Maoist directive to combine revolution and production.

The re-examination of the possibility of a socialist bureaucracy prompted by the cultural revolution ultimately led Chinese socialism to its first serious consideration of the Paris Commune. The Chinese interpretation of the Commune, like Lenin's was indebted to Marx's assessment, and shared his emphasis on those provisions such as election, recall and equal wages which discouraged the formation of an unresponsive elite.

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45 Chumg-Wu Kung, "Cultural Revolution in Modern Chinese History", in Nee and Peck eds., op.cit., p.292.

The Chinese go beyond Marx and beyond Lenin in particular to find the fundamental significance of the Commune in the fact that:

> "The masses were the real masters of the Paris Commune. While the Commune was in being, the masses were organized on a wide scale and they discussed important state matters within their respective organizations ... they made proposals or advanced critical opinions on social and political matters great and small ... This revolutionary, enthusiasm and initiative was the source of the Commune's strength."[46]

Applied to the present situation, this lesson meant that the masses have the right to criticize leading cadres at all levels no matter how meritorious their service how high their position or how senior their qualifications.

The Maoist ideal type of bureaucracy, very much unlike Weber's is presented as a moral and evaluative

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46 Chih-Szu Cheng, "The Great Lessons of the Paris Commune", Peking Review, April, vol.15, 1966, p.24.

ideal, one which can and ought to be realized in society. The ideal typical features constituting this model of bureaucracy are designed to achieve three interrelated goals: (i) the rationalization of consciousness; (ii) the prevention of elitism, and (iii) the formation of people and organizations strongly committed to the material development os socialist society. The injection of cultural revolution into bureaucratic structures entails a significant reduction of the degree of both centralization and bureaucratic autonomy and neutrality. With 'politics in command', all bureaucratic problems, even relatively minor ones such as accident proneness, waste and absentecism, and made the object of political dialogue.[47] All organizational decisions and actions "are seen as having political implications ... and this means that every action is supposed to be based not only on the desire to maximize internal efficiency, but on its effect on the pursuit of revolutionary social goals. When the two are in conflict, the latter should take precedence.

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47 Ezra Vogel, "Politicized Bureaucracy : Communist China", in L. Cohen and J. Shapiro eds., Communist Systems in Comparative Perspectives, (New York, 1974), p.167.

Placing 'politics in command' is a way of rem oving or at least diminishing the constraints which inhibit the development of consciousness. The weakening of constraints expands the opportunities for, but does not assure the rationalization of, consciousness. The incorporation of the 'massline' into bureaucratic sometimes is guided by a concern to insure the actual use of these opportunities.[48] The 'massline' consists of the organization of study and discussion groups generally comprised of eight to fifteen members representative of the various organizational levels which are linked by frequent consultation.[49] The mass line stresses the necessity for organizational members to be both 'red and expert'.[50] Expertise in a particular task area is not the only intension for organizational membership. On must also show commitment to continuing social change. To assure this commitment higher-level personnel, administrators and technicians regularly one placed in manual positions, sent down to supplement their technical knowledge with revolutionary

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48 Martin K. Whyte, "Bureaucracy and Modernization in China : The Maoist Critique", American Sociological Review, 1973, vol.38, p.153.

49 Victor Nee, "Revolution and Bureaucracy", in E. Nee and J. Peak eds., op.cit., p.394.

50 Stuart R. Schram, "The Marxist", in Dick Wilson ed., Mao Tse Tung in the Scales of History, (Cambridge, 1977) , p.59.

politics.[51] With the 'mass line' then, "subordinate participation is not just to be solicited but guaranteed".[52]

Together, 'politics in command' and the 'mass line' serve as an institutionalized checks against the emergence of elitist and oligarchical structures. Technical necessity thus assumes a subsidiary role to political necessity. However, technology and technical knowledge is not deprecated. Rather the aim is to have those who are reliable politically become experts at their work and to have those who are experts become politically reliable, i. e., to prevent a sharp differentiation of political form rational-bureaucratic.[53] Seen in this hight, "the Maoist model of bureaucracy is an effort to establish a strengthened bargaining position for the working class in its inevitable forthcoming negotiations with the technocracy". In so far as Maoism accomplishes that,

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51 For details refer Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse Tung, (Harmondsworth, 1969), pp. 316-17.

52 Martin K. White, op.cit., p.153.

53 Ezra Vogel, op.cit., (1974) , p.165.

rather than fostering contempt for the technocracy and the technical intelligentsia, then, Maoism is a profoundly progressive force".[54]

It is important to highlight two important organizational forms that developed from the conflict in the Great Cultural Proletariat Revolution. They were oriented towards promoting egalitarianism and participatory decision-making. The first of these new forms consists of open-door rectification and criticism. These processes take place at basic levels - in schools, factories, hospitals, communes and neighbourhood groups. Open door rectification refers to open criticism of Party cadres and leaders by the masses. Criticism is directed at an individual or the group in a small group setting.[55] This form therefore gives the masses an opportunity for and a sense of meaningful participation. Further evaluation of leaders by the masses makes the former more sensitive to the

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54 Alvin Gouldner, op.cit., p.268.

55 For a brilliant analysis of post-GPCR institutions, see E. Freidman's article in Dick Wilson, op.cit., pp.309ff.

latter's needs.[56] On similar lines the 'May 7 cadre schools' were setup to rectify administrative cadres' bureaucratic working style and triple isolation from the process of production, from the masses and from class struggle.[57] It involves a system where cadres are sent to rural areas or factories to live with the peasants and do the work they do. The cadres experience the life of a peasant, getting themselves engaged in manual labour, eating and dressing up as the peasants or the workers. All cadres above the production level are required to spend six months every few years at a May 7 school. In the early seventies, visitors to China reported that most cadres do indeed mingle well with both workers and peasants after attending May 7 schools.[58]

There is no doubt that the forces of production are underdeveloped in China and as a consequence, socially necessary labour time for the production of necessary subsistence is great. Yet, if elitism is to be

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56 R.M. Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution", China Quarterly, vol.52, 1972, pp.620-53.

57 Ibid., p.630.

58 Ibid., p.632.

combated effectively, time for spontancity, mass criticism, political discussion and debate - surplus time - must be created. The problem of surplus time has been combated at the level of Communes and factories by politicizing organizational decision-making in such a way that time for work is frequently also time for politics. This union of production and mass-line decision-making has proved more difficult to secure at the national level. The fundamental questions therefore are whether or not, and to what extent, dialogue, discussion and discourse as the major vehicles of the rationalization of consciouness are free from constraint. In fact critics of present day Chinese bureaucracy have asserted that both open-door rectification and criticism are now merely rituals and examples of 'controlled spontancity'. Indeed 'rectification is no more than a show in that initially people are told to say all that you know 'without reserve' but that it criticism is directed at high level officials the critic is accused of holding a 'bourgeois ideology'.[59] Zagoria notes that study groups, neighbourhood associations and rectification campaigns are merely "institutionalizing

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59 Simon Leys, "Broken Images : Conversation in Hongkong", Dissent vol.23, 1976, p.361.

the practice of poking into one's neighbours business".[60] In addition, the eight grades salary system, the thirty levels of civil servants and the perquisites of party membership are evidence of routinization of both gods and authority decision-making structures. It may be therefore said that the conditions of free public discourse necessary for the 'full' development of consciousness and understanding do not prevail in China today. However, it should be mentioned that many of these conditions are approximated within established socio-cultural limitations. Given these limitations, "the rationalization of consciousness is expressed historically and concretely both as a resistance to any regressive restoration of censorship and in the development of social movements and popular attitudes oriented towards exposing and criticizing pressure by Party officials, bureaucrats and technicians to impose elitist control and structures".[61] Infact Schram suggests the durable presence of this historically concrete rationality of consciousness by observing present-day China's readiness to criticize authority and

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60 Donald S. Zagoria, "China by Daylight", Dissent, vol.22, 1975, p.146.

61 Alvin Gouldner, op.cit., pp.158-59.

an absence of awe of hierarchical superiors. This is not to suggest that organizational democracy has been established, but that Mao's model has been able to avoid the unaccountable, highly regimented organizational forms that emerged in Russia during a comparable period of development.

The Weberian position that socialism necessarily entails the penetration of formal rationality into all areas of social life rests on a conception of rationality that relates, the rationalization of human conduct with the extension of hierarchical, specialized, impersonal i.e., bureaucratic, organization. The Marxist theory in general and the Leninist theory in particular gains an analytical advantage over the Weberian perspective by distinguishing between the rationality of consciousness and the rationality of technique. But this advantage is quickly lost as the two aspects of rationality coverage in the assumption that the elimination of class constraints necessary for the development of consciousness presupposes a certain level technical material advancement. The rationalization of consciousness (in the realm of freedom) is regarded as contingent upon the rationalization of

technique (in the realm of necessity). This convergence of the two aspects of rationality shapes Lenin's treatment of the political and technical functions of bureaucracy. By assigning special importance to technical necessity, the Soviet model of bureaucracy, consistent with Weber's claim, brought about a technical elite and the application of technical reason to social life.

The Maoist model of bureaucracy is premised upon a clarification and a restatement of the relationship between the two aspects of rationality. Abolishing the primacy of the technical, the Maoist conception places the two aspects of rationality in a dialectical relationship such that each reciprocally contributes to the development of other. This requires that all constraints on consciousness be eliminated, that the technical realm be politicized and technicians be brought into interaction with workers. Anticipated is a social bureaucracy which "in order to work, must rest on the workers' consent, initiative and sense of responsibility; relations of cooperation and mutual trust between work teams and technicians or engineers become indispensable : the latter can no longer give order and demand, obedience;

they must seek the workers' consent and therefore have to explain and discuss each other their concerns."[62] Given such conditions we may expect on the organizational level highly innovative, creative, adaptive and accurate responses to a given situation, and on the level of the individual the development of commitment and sense of efficiency. Thus the social revolution can be carried on, not in opposition to, but in support of, the rationalization of technique.

In fundamental respects, the Maoist model of bureaucracy constitutes a valuable addition to Marxist social theory. It takes Marxist theory beyond both the critique of the bourgeois bureaucratic state and the technically necessary structures of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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62 Andre Gorz, Technical Intelligence and the Capitalist Division of Labour, Telos, vol.12, p.33.

THE INDIAN BUREAUCRACTIC TRADITION - GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE MOGHUL, THE COMPANY, THE CROWN AND THE SOVEREIGN INDIAN STATE

Chapter-IV

The theoretical analysis in the preceeding two chapters helps one to comprehend the various dimensions of bureaucracy, its evolution, composition, structure and role, its relationship with the State and social classes, its ethos and doctrine, its power and responsiveness, its maliability and its contribution towards social stability and social change. True, that the conclusions drawn have been different for different philosophers, but then one has to consider the fact that each philosopher had studied the situation within a particular socio-economic civilizational setup. Further one does find a linear development of the bureaucratic theory from Hegel to Mao Tse Tung. The exercise in the earlier chapters was to establish a theoretical link between these philosophies through the concept of rationality, a phenomena that lay dormant in the works of Hegel and Marx but which served as an important tool to evaluate the works of Lenin, Weber and Mao. None of the five theories can, on their own, serve to analyse a bureaucratic structure in all its dimensions. However, they can help one to identify, to locate significant elements, be they events, patterns or

relations, in a bureaucratic structure. And this is a crucial lesson to be learnt before attempting to study a particular bureaucratic system, and its ramifications.

This chapter is devoted to comprehend the critical issues associated with Indian bureaucracy. The evolution of the Indian system right from the Moghul period to the present day has been traced so as to have an intellectual grip over the nature and characteristics of the bureaucratic setup in the different periods of Indian history. The rationale behind analyzing the Mughul bureaucracy is to familiarize one self with the bureaucratic tradition that has prevailed in this country for centuries. Further there exists a functional continuity between the bureaucratic structure of the Moghuls and the British model; it was this bureaucratic apparatus that provided social and political unity to imperial territory and developed a uniformity in administrative procedures. The bureaucratic form existing under the 'company' have been extensively referred to. The gradual rationalization that the bureaucracy underwent before and after the industrial revolution in England has also been closely studied. The position and power it enjoyed before and immediately after

the independence of the subcontinent have also been spelt out. Special emphasis has been given to phases where the bureaucracy seemed to undergo a crisis.

I

The hall mark of the Moghul administrative system was the absolute sovereignty of the Emperor. The centralization was to great that many a matter of detail was referred to him for orders. Delegation of authority was rare as the monarch did not possess any equivalent of a cabinet; the highest incumbents .. under him were heads of departments. They were often consulted if the monarch so desired, but they had no right to tender advice, nor were there any institutions, the membership of which could entitle them to express views.[1] Only the higher officers of the department of Finance were called Ministers; the others were considered to be just high dignitaries and servants of the State. The question of mutual consultation or joint responsibility simply did not

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1 Ishtiaq Quarishi, The Administration of the Moghul Empire, (Patna,), p.71.

arise. Each one was responsible to the monarch.[2] The head of the administration was the 'Wakil', considered to be the emperors' chief advisor and responsible for all appointments, dismissals, promotions and demotions. However, he could not exercise the final authority because of the monarch's interest in detail of administrative matter.[3]

The 'Wazir' was the head of the fiscal administration of the empire. His authority stemmed out of his expert knowledge. In theory he was subordinate to the Wakil; however in practice he had independent authority.[4] Practically all fiscal posts were under his patronage. He kept a strict control over the provincial diwans and their offices and recieved for scrutiny detailed statements about the income and the expenditure continuously from the provinces. The imperial treasury was also under his control.

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2 Ibid., p.71.

3 Ibid., p.72.

4 Ibid.

The 'wazir' was assisted by three officials who held almost independent charges and were directly responsible to the monarch. These officers were the 'diwan-i-khalisah', 'diwan-i-tan' and the 'mustafi'. The first was in charge of all the revenues which the State received into its treasury, the second was responsible for the payment of salaries to the servants of the State whether in cash or in the form of assignments upon the revenues of certain areas called 'jagirs'. The third was the auditor-general of the empire.[5]

Yet another important office was that of the 'Mir-Saman', who only in a matter of precedence and formality was considered subordinate to the diwan. He was dependent upon the Wazir in only financial matters; all other matters were taken up with the monarch directly. This official appointed the superintendents, accountants, cashiers of various karkhanas (factories) and departments of the palace. The menial staff of the place and such other household officers not on the State payroll received their monthly or annual salaries on his certification.

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5 Ibid., p.75.

He drew up statements about the income from royal gardens, shops and houses and was responsible for the realization of all dues from those who had leased such property.[6]

The reason for such detailed description of offices is that, these offices were only theoretically hierarchical. In practice each individual officer was directly accountable to the monarch, thus making the position of the latter absolute. The system also helped the king to maintain a balance of power amongst the top [illegible] echelon of the bureaucracy.[7]

The Mughul bureaucracy followed a lengthy method of transacting business which involved endless paper work and filing. Writers were employed by the court whose duty was to record all that was reported to the monarch, all that was said or done by him. Even the arrivals and departures of important officers were put down. All such reports after having been corrected by a senior official

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6 Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, (New Delhi, 1970), pp.234-35.

7 Querishi, op.cit., p.80.

was presented to the emperor for his final approval.

The bureaucrats received their salaries through various methods. A fair number of disbursements were made in cash. A proper pay order was made out and the treasurer concerned made the payment on obtaining a receipt.[8] The other method was of paying salaries through assignment of the revenue of a particular area. The categories of revenue were specifically mentioned in the order giving the assignment. Usually all the sources of revenue of an area were assigned, making it easier for the assignee to administer the area. The assignment was called jagir and the asignee, jagirdar.[9]

Those who received their salaries in cash were better off because they were saved of the botheration to administer an area, along with their normal duties. It was like a civil or military officer of the government simultaneously trying to discharge his duties and being

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8 B.N. Puri, History of Indian Administration, vol.II, (Bombay,1975), p.221.

9 Querishi, op.cit., p.107.

bothered with the administration of a large personal estate for maintaining himself. A man may mismanage his personal property with only financial loss to himself, but a jagirdar had to be vigilant over his agents as he was primarily held responsible for their shortcomings. Besides it was financially a poor bargain, because the administration of the area cost roughly $\frac{1}{10}$ of the income which came out of the assignment, though the assignment was only for the amount of salary.[10]

The Moghul bureaucracy was also perfectly designed for cogent provincial administration. The empire was divided into provinces called 'subahs'. The progressively subdivided provinces were 'sarkars', 'parganas', 'mawda' and the village respectively. A province was under a governor who was the head of the civil as well as military administration. Apart from his military duties of maintaining law and order and defending the area, he was experted to encourage and expand cultivation. He was required to extend all help to the peasants including large scale irrigation works. It was in his office that all the returns of

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10 Puri, op.cit., p.218.

assessment and realization from the 'parganas' were audited and then consolidated into abstracts for transmission to the central ministry of finance.[11]

The 'fawjdar' was the head of a Sarkar and although he was subordinate to the Governor, he could write directly to the Imperial Court. The 'amil' headed the pargana. He maintained an assessment staff who measured the land, assessed the yield and kept a record of the figures.[12]

When an area was assigned as a jagir, there was no change in its administrative organization. The officials were appointed by the jagirdar , but he contended himself by posting his nominees to one or two key positions. The rest of the staff was permitted to continue functioning, because this was in the interest of the jagirdar as the local officials were conversant with the conditions in the area. If the central government found any deterioration in the administration, it cancelled the assignment.[13]

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11 Querishi, op.cit., p.230.

12 Ibid., p.234.

13 Ibid., p.238.

It is important to note the difference between the office of the jagirdar and the zamindar. The former was only the representative of the government; he only realized the prescribed state demand. Certain areas were however unadministered. These were the territories of tributary chiefs, called zamindars, who administered their territories themselves and whose agrarian administration was not under the supervision of the central government. The government however did try to bring them into its fold by enrolling them as mansabdars and giving them their hereditary territories as jagirs.[14] Succession to the position of zamindars as well as right to sell the zamindari could only be done with the permission of the imperial court.[15]

The State tried to protect the peasant from the exactions of its officers as well as from local authorities. Each peasant entered into an agreement with the State. The agreement drawn up by the officers representing the State or the mansabdar mentioned the area under cultivation, the crops and the amount of the demand. The

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14 Ibid., p.172.

15 Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Moghul India, (London, 1963), p.115.

peasants acceptance of the assessment was also denoted. This agreement was handed over to the peasant concerned and a copy of its was deposited in the local revenue office.[16]

The Mughal government was thus a complicated bureaucracy which needed a large number of public servants. The middle class was a chief source of bureaucrat recruitment. A Persian manuscript of the Bangash Nawabs of Faruhabad accounts for a well defined system of recruitment. The provincial governors usually recruited one hundred trainee apprentices in the age group of 7-13 years. It was from this group that permanent officials of the bureaucracy were selected.[17]

It has been seen that the Moghul bureaucracy with its proto-rational structure was entrusted with vast power and authority by the Moghul Emperors. But the latter had also very carefully designed institutional methods of checks and balances to keep this apparatus under control

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16 I. Querishi, op.cit., p.173.

17 B.K. Gupta, "Some Aspects of Indian Bureaucracy", Journal of National Academy of Administration, July 1961, p.70.

and make it responsive to the needs of the State. Moreland characterized this situation brilliantly:

> "We have officers posted to their charges by the king and transferred, removed or punished at his pleasure, administering their charges under his orders and subjected to the strict financial control of the revenue ministry. None of these features has any counterpart in the feudal system of Europe ... The use of feudal terminology was presumably inspired by the fact that some of the nobles of the Delhi kingdom occasionally behaved like feudal barons, that is to say they rebelled or took sides in disputed successions to the throne; but in Asia atleast, bureaucrats can rebel as well as barons and the analogy is much too slight and superficial to justify the importation of the feudal terms and all misleading ideas which they connote. The kingdom was not a mixture of bureaucracy with feudalism; its administration was bureaucratic throughout."[18]

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18 W.H. Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India, (Cambridge, 1929), pp.218-19.

The bureaucratic structure underwent a significant change after the death of Aurangzeb in 1706 A.D., with the bureaucratic nobility breaking away from the central authority and declaring themselves independent. Since time immemorial the right to demand and collect revenue, had been in the minds of the Indian rural population, regarded as an attribute of sovereignty. The prebendal nobility, as Weber would call it, made use of this popular idea and began to exercise not only rights of ownership of land but also magestrial and administrative powers. This transformation in character assume(special significance because, while in France and England the 'sale of office' was gradually being replaced by pure bureaucracy, in India, the bureaucrats were transforming their office prebendals into hereditary estates. This phase, however had a very short history because of the rise of a prosperous merchant class that came into existence in the 17th and 18th century as a result of the opening of trade with the West. This trading class was largely responsible for undermining the authority of the States and the power of the office prebend holders, metamorphosed into landlords. All the big landowners as well as the rulers of the various

independent stands that had sprung up on the ruins of the Moghul empire were heavily indebted to this class.[19] But before this class could dominate the State affairs, the internecine warfare among the feudal lords and the subsequent decline of the central authority created a power vaccuum into which the British stepped in.

II

The Britishers who came into India with the first fleet of the London Company in 1601, during the reign of Akbar, represented the growing trading class back at home. They started their work with small commercial establishments and had to employ their own agents to collect different articles of export. For arranging and stocking these goods as well as those arriving in India in ships from abroad, special warehouses were erected. A warehouse together with the office of the agent and the apartments for local business, constituted what was called a 'factory', and

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19 M.N. Roy, Indian in Transition, (Bombay, 1971), pp.96-97.

those merchants persoming them were called 'factors'.[20] In 1606 factors were engaged on contractual basis for five years and that became the normal period of appointment.[21] The head of a small factory was designated as 'Agent' and that of a large factory as 'President'. All the servants of the company including the President and members of the respective presidential council were responsible to the Court of Directors at home.[22] In the initial stages, the Company made appointments and fixed wages without having regular cadres. Though it had in its service various categories of employees - apprentices, writers, factors, junior merchants, and senior merchants - they were appointed and paid not according to service rules but on the basis of individual merit.[23]

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20 Edward Blunt, The ICS, (London, 1937), p.12.

21 L.S.S. O'Malley, Indian Civil Service 1621-1930, (London, 1931), p.2.

22 A.K. Ghosal, Civil Service in India Under the East India Company, (Calcutta, 1944), p.19.

23 B.B. Mishra, The Administrative History of India, 1834-1947, (London, 1970), p.329.

In December 1674, however the Company introduced "something like a regular service",[24] with a regular gradation of posts.[25] A young man was usually recruited first as 'Apprentice' for seven years on an annual salary of £ 5 for the first five and £ 10 for the last two years.[26] When he served out his term, he could obtain preferment to the next grade, that of 'writer', subject to giving a security of £ 500.[27] The writers were required to serve a 'convenated'' term of five years.[28] The convenants practically embodied their conditions of service, rights and obligations.[29] The qualifications for a writer's post were generally limited in the beginning to good pen-manship and willingness to serve upon all occasions without murmuring. Later, from 1682, a general education and knowledge of commercial accounts were required. The other three superior grades of Factor, Junior Merchant and Senior Merchant and their respective rates of pay during

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24 Ibid.

25 O'Malley, op.cit., p.3.

26 Ibid.

27 Ghosal, op.cit., p.23.

28 O'Malley, op.cit., p.3.

29 Ghosal, op.cit., p.23.

the first five years of their service were £ 20, £ 30 and £ 40 respectively.[30] These officials performed varied functions. Apart from routine work which included imposing taxation, minting currencies and settling immigrants on the islands, these bureaucrats were sent out on various missions - discover trade prospects in some new place, a mission to the court of some prince or governor, to collect an important debt or in-charge of a caravan of goods. These officials were occassionally called on to read prayers when no chaplin was available and thus received an extra allowances of £ 50 per year.

The turn of the 18th century witnessed the decline of the Mughal empire. The governors of Hyderabad, Bengal and Avadh established independent kingdoms. Existing offices and jagirs were transferred into hereditary ones. In order to stabilize the financial crisis, the new emperors auctioned land to the highest bidder and collected revenue from him. The zamindars too became rebellious and withheld revenue. Meanwhile the Franco-British war spilt over to India in the 1740s. The Carnatic wars 1750s,

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30 Mishra, op.cit., p.379.

the Battle of Plassey 1757, the Battle of Wandiwash 1760 and the Battle of Buxar 1764 lead to the suzerinity of the British in India.

In 1765, the Company obtained the 'Diwani' of three Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the Mughal Emperor. The grant of Diwani included the administration of revenue and civil justice. But the Company's senior servants had no acquiantance with public administration. Hence for four years administration was left to the established native agencies. Clive justified this position: "in the infancy of the acquisition of the diwani we are under the necessity of confiding in the old officers of the Government from whom we were to derive our knowledge, and whom we therefore endeavoured, to attract to our service by the ties of interest until experience render their assistance less necessary."[31]

A system of dual government thus evolved with the revenues being extracted by the Company and the territorial jurisdiction remaining in the hands of the Nawabs or his ministers. This period is characterized to be

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31 Ibid., p.109.

one of misrule and oppression. The recruitment procedure of the Company's civil servants underwent a change as the Court of Directors started recommending candidates for the various posts in the bureaucracy. "They saw no reasons why they should not push a young friend or dependent into a service which within an incredibly brief period would bring him back enormously enriched."[32] Junior and senior civil servants, because of the uncertainty and insecurity of tenure resorted to questionable practices carrying on private trades.

This sordid state of affairs led to the appointment of supervisors, in all districts in 1769 with powers to superintend the collection of revenue and the administration of justice. However the heavy and miscellaneous duties backed by inadequate training led to the complete breakdown of supervisor's office. Supervisors themselves got involved in the generally corrupt system prevailing in this district. The practice of private trade in which the supervisors got involved did not leave them much time to devote for the Company.[33]

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32 G.T. Garrat and E. Thomson, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India, (London,1934), p.98.

33 Ramsay Muir, Making of British India, (London), p.81.

In 1772 Warren Hastings abolished the dual system and the Company stood forth as 'Dewan' and the administration of the country was placed in the hands of the British officers. Supervisors turned collectors were recalled from the districts at the instance of the Court of Directors and Provincial Councils were established. True to the spirit of merchantile capitalism the company felt alarmed at the expenses on civil charges amounting to £ 300,598 in 1770, which was cutting its profits and dividends.[34] The withdrawal of the collector created a state of confusion in district administration. A monotonous list of large deficits, defaulting zamindars, absconding farmers led to the reappointment of collectors, independent of provincial councils, to realise outstanding balances and to restore normalcy. Offices of revenue and justice were united under the collector. This was followed by a large scale Europeanization of the office, with the district administration vested only on the convenanted servants of the Company.[35]

From 1786 to 1813 a policy of systematic exclusion of the natives of the country from all share in the

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34 B.B. Mishra, op.cit., p.119.

35 Ibid., p.133

administration continued under Cornwallis and Wellesley. Civil and Criminal Courts were personed by a Governor General and Members of the Supreme Council instead of a 'quazi'. In 1792 zamindars were deprived of police powers. Police jurisdictions were brought under the authority of European magistrates. This attitude involving the removal of Indians from positions of authority and rejection of traditional administrative forms was grounded fundamentally in a sense of racial superiority and its corollary contempt for others.[36] Politically, also, elimination of Indians from the ranks of officers was considered expedient in the sense a big force of European officers was a necessity to maintain British rule in the country.

The claims of Indians were entirely lost sight of and their door to responsible public employment banged and barred. During the twenty years, Indians were practically nowhere in the public services and continued in a state of dreamy stagnation.[37] There was no awakening

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36 Michael Edwards, British India, 1772-1947, (London, 1967), p.52.

37 J.W. Kaye, Administration of East India Company (London, 1853).

of facilities, no sign of progress within or without, for the intelligence of the people was held in small esteem by their rulers.[38]

Further the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793 introduced by Cornwallis bred a new class of landlords with hereditary and transferrable rights to the land. A system similar to this was already prevalent during the last days of Mughal rule. The new class of zamindars were required to give $\frac{10}{11}$ of the rental they got from the peasantry to the State within a specified time. Thus exploitation reached new heights as cultivators were reduced to tenants being deprived of long standing rights to the soil.

The system of Government established by Cornwallis proved unsuccessful in all its aspect. Wellesley himself pointed to the radical imperfection where no system was adopted with a view either to conciliate the good will or to control the disaffection of the people.[39] But owing to his other involvements, little advancement was made in reforming the administrative system.

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38 Ibid.

39 P.N. Mathur, The Civil Service of India, 1731-1894, (Jodhpur, 1977), p.39.

III

Until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England, the main interest of the East India Company was to monopolize exports. According to a report of the Company's Governor, Verelest, during the three years 1766-68, India's exports amounted to £ 6,311,250, while her imports amount to only £ 624,375.[40] Thus, ten times as much was taken out of the country as was sent into it. The deficit in the balance of trade was paid from revenues collected in India, which was termed the company's 'investment'. The House of Commons Select Committee report, in 1783:

> A certain portion of the revenues of Bengal has been for many years set apart in the purchase of goods for exportation to England, and this is called the investment ... (Therefore), the whole exported produce of the country, so far as the company is concerned, is not exchanged in the course of the barter, but is taken away without any return or payment whatever.[41]

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40 R.P. Dutt, India Today, (Calcutta,1970),p.105.
41 A. Sen, The State, Industrialization and Class Formations in India, (London,1982), p.52.

The whole situation was stated more clearly by Burke:

> In all other countries, the revenue, following the natural course and order of things, arises out of their commerce. Here, by a mischievous inversion of that order, the whole foreign maritime trade, whether English, French, Dutch or Danish, arises from the revenues; these are carried out of the country without producing anything to compensate so heavy a loss. This new system of trade must have unquestionably thrown the merchantile system of the country into the greatest confusion.[42]

As a result of this unprecedented organized economic drain from India, the rising merchant and artisan classes were completely wiped out.[43] The destruction of this class eased the way for the emergence of the industrial revolution in England, which was mainly agricultural until the middle of the 18th century.[44] The revenue transfer from India was one of the primary hidden 'sources of capital accumulation' which ushered the industrial revolution ... With the rise of

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42 Ibid.

43 For details refer, R.P. Dutt, op.cit., p.103.

44 E. Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire, (Harmondsworth, 1969), p.36.

a powerful industrial bourgeoisie, policy changes related to trade and commerce occured in quick succession. The export of Indian textiles and silk to England was prohibited, to protect the interest of Lanchashire and Manchester manufacturers. With the rise of the power of the British bourgeoisie in parliament came the first parliamentary interference in the Company's affairs, in 1769. It was decided that the Company should, during each year of the term, export British merchandise to the amount of £ 380,837.[45] British manufactured goods were forced into India through the agency of the Company's Governor General and its commercial residents. Manufacture of raw silk was encouraged in Bengal whereas silk fabrics were discouraged. Silk winders were allowed to work only in the Comapny's factory.[46]

Simultaneously an ideological offensive was launched against the East India Company's administration in India by Adam Smith, the theoretical mentor of the rising industrial bourgeoisie of England in 1784. He demanded

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45 R.K. Mukherjee, Rise and Fall of the East India Company, (Berlin,1958), p.400.

46 R.C. Dutta, The Economic History of India, vol.I, (London,1956), p.256.

that the opportunities to trade in India should be open to all.[47] These growing pressures from the industrial bourgeoisie resulted in the Charter Act of 1813 which ended the trade monopoly of the Company in India.

The irony of this situation is that, while British political economists propounded the principles of free trade in the latter half of the 18th and early 19th centuries; they were not ready to apply them in the case of India. As E.J. Hobsbawm points out:

> The one exception was India. Its abnormality leaps to the eye. It was for one thing the only part of the British Empire to which laissez faire never applied. Its most enthusiastic champions in Britain became bureaucratic planners when they went there, and the most committed opponents of political colonization rarely and then much seriously, suggested the liquidation of British rule. [48]

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47 For details refer, Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations, (London,1950), especially p.593.

48 E. Hobsbawn, op.cit., p.148.

IV

The Company did lose its trading monopoly in 1813. But the government and the revenue continued to be in their hands. Further trade in tea and trade with China remained exclusively with the Company.

The investigation preceding the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1813 had exposed defects in the established judicial and revenue systems. In 1813 the Court of Directors circulated queries regarding the working of the judicial system in India to several of their 'distinguished' servants, then in England. Bureaucrats like Sir Henry Strachey, Colonel Thomas Munro and Colonel Walker boldly proclaimed that India couldnot be governed except through the cooperation of the people themselves. Strachey wrote: "although their education is most defective ... they are nevertheless found to acquire easily the requisite qualifications for the duties, which we are pleased to entrust to them. From temper, habit and peculiar circumstances, they are in many respects fitter for the office of a judge than ourselves.[49] As a result of these views, the

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49 R.P. Sikka, The Civil Service in India, (New Delhi,1984), p.32.

November 1814 Despatch of the Company emphasised the judicial functions of the Indian Munsifs. It also raised the power and status of 'sadār-āmins' whose office had been reconstituted in 1803.[50]

But the recruitment procedure of the European bureaucrats was still the privileges of the Court of Directors. In a statistical analysis, Bernard Cohn shows a director's possible reason for giving an appointment. Among these admitted to the East India Company's Training College at Haileybury (setup in 1806) between 1809 and 1850, business relationships accounted for 1.6 per cent company service for 4.69 per cent, political recommendation for 0.70 per cent, recommendation of the Board of Control 6.57 per cent, kinship connection 23 per cent and friendship connections 54.7 per cent.[51] Haileybury soon began to be referred as 'that sacred college of sons and nephews'.[52] This establishment was however the only source of supply of civil servant for the Company. Though

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50 Mishra, op.cit., pp.274-75.

51 Bernard Cohn, The Development and Impact of British Administration in India, (New Delhi, 1961), p.105.

52 N.C. Roy, The Civil Service in India, (Calcutta, 1960), p.61.

nominations for admission to it were made by the directors, to undergo a probationary period and complete with success a prescribed course of study at this college was regular condition for appointment to the service. It was specially laid down that those who did not pass with credit the final examination shall not be appointed to the civil service of the Company.[53]

Owing to the expansion of territories and in the administrative machinery of the Company, an acute shortage of men in the covenanted service was faced by the authorities in India the late 1820s. This undoubtedly gave an impetus to an increased employment of Indians but only in the subordinate and unconvenanted service. Acute shortage of the covenant level however was handled by the Court of Directors conducting special examinations under the newly formed London Board of Examinations. This practice however ceased to operate by 1832 when the deficiency in the supply of civil servants ceased to exist and thus Haileybury once again became the only source of supply of civil servants to the company.

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53 Sikka, op.cit., p.138.

The company by the 1830s had consolidated itself as a stable ruling organization in India. The question of a proper selection of its civil servants was therefore bound to be raised sooner or later. Back at home, in England, the industrial bourgeoisie through its parliamentary representatives put pressure on the Company for a more rational structure of the bureaucracy, which sparked a debate between the system of recruitment through competetive examination and the system of patronage recruitment. The case for competition was strongly advocated by many witnesses before the Select Committee of Parliament on the Affairs of the East India Company in 1931-32.[54] The reaction of the Court to this proposal was, as expected, unfavourable. The proposal materially affected their power of patronage. Thus they proposed the abolition of the Haileybury College altogether and revived the idea of a public examination of candidates nominated by themselves after an education at the existing institutions in the country. In other words, they were ready to sacrifice the symbol of patronage, the Haileybury College, if patronage itself could be retained by the sacrifice. The board however overruled the dissent of the Directors and incorporated the principle of limited competetion in the Charter Act of 1833.

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54 Ibid., p.143.

Also important is the fact that the Act of 1833 made exclusion of any citizen from the public service in India on grounds of colour or religion positively illegal.[55] Several factors could be traced for this deliberate policy of Indianization of the bureaucracy : the inadequacy of the covenanted service to cope with the increasing volume of work, the growth in the complexity of administration in the fast expanding territorial possessions, the costliness of the European agency, the cheapness of the Indian element, the expediency of winning the sympathy of the newly educated classes to the British cause, the change in the vision of the authorities towards their obligations in India and finally the rise of liberalism in England.

Thus there was a conscious effort to breed a local class elite class, 'a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.[56] The rationale was expressed by Macaulay thus: "we must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern.[57] Thus, when in 1835, English was made

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55 N.C. Roy, op.cit., p.99.

56 B.B. Mishra, The Indian Middle Class, (London, 1961), p.154.

57 Ibid.

the medium of instruction of higher learning and the official language, it was not out of any intention of making education universal, but for perpetuation of imperial rule.

The Charter Act of 1833, however made no provisions to secure the nomination of Indians to the convenanted service of the Company. Indians remained excluded from any but minor posts. However the Act, and specifically the clause pertaining to the Indianization of bureaucracy, became the sheet anchor of political agitation in India towards the end of the century. Almost all the political activities in the early year of the national awakening turned on this clause, which came very handy when demands were being made for giving Indians equal opportunity in administration.

V

The failure to Indianize the high echeleon of the bureaucracy on the part of the British even after a parliamentary act provides for an interesting analysis. The nomination cum selection pattern reduced the role of the Directors in relation to appointments to a very insignificant portion, confined only to a fourfold nomination of candidates for admission to the Haileybury college,

giving all other powers to the Board of Control. The average number of writers appointed in each year was 40 and it was obviously difficult for the directors to provide 160 candidates a year. The Act also provided that if the directors failed to produce the required number the nominations would lapse to the Board.

Having failed to prevent its incorporation, the directors defied it by lobbying and finally succeeded in amending it after four years in 1839. What finally emerged was only the control of the Board over a proposed preliminary qualifying test for admission to Haileybury College, and its hold over the administration of the college and its final examination. Nominations continued to be made by directors.

The crux of the whole problem was the patronage system which circumscribed the civil service to a few families, friends and favourities. After 1833 with its commercial monopoly gone, the company had been reduced a mere patronage concern. Since this very basis had changed, there could be no basis for its unfettered patronage. Therefore twenty years later in 1952-53 a twin attack on the system of patronage and the exclusion

of Indians from the higher offices was launched with much more vigour. The Charter Bill of 1853 was well debated. It provided for an open competetion in place of nomination for admission to the Haileybury College. The hither-to existing setup was severely criticised by Macaulay, as the 'most monstrous, the most extensive and the most perilous system of abuse in the distribution of patronage ever witnessed.'[58]

Therefore with a view to give effect to the provisions of the Act of 1853 regarding open competetion a Committee was appointed in 1854 to advise on measures and detailed regulations for selection and appointment of candidates. Popularly known as the Macaulay Committee it submitted its report in November 1854 which marks an important epoch in the history of the civil service in India. The following are the recommendations jotted in brief.[59]

1. No person under 17 or over 21 could be admitted to the college.

2. The competetive examination should embrace only European Sciences, Arts, Languages, Literatures and History. Subjects and Italian language, literature and history; Mathematics, Pure and Mixed; Natural Sciences

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58 R.P. Sikha, op.cit., p.161.

59 The full text of the Report has been reproduced in Appendices to the Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87, (Calcutta, 1888), Appendix-F, pp.35-42.

including Chemistry, Geology, Minerology, Botany, Zoology; Moral Sciences including moral and political philosophy, the science of logic and the inductive method.

3. Examination should be carried on by means of written papers, whose objects was to train the mind for the highest purposes of active life.

4. Successful candidates should undergo a period of probation more than one but less than 2 years.

5. In order of their ranking they should opt for the presidency or alternatively the allotment should be done at random.

6. Probationers had to devote themselves to four studies — (i) Indian History which included geography of the country, national products, manufactures, qualities of different races, doctrines and rites of important religions; (ii) Commercial and Financial Science including mode of keeping and checking accounts, principle of banking, the laws which regulate exchanges, nature of public debts, effects of different system of taxation; **(iii) the science of jurisprudence; (iv) the oriental tonges.**

7. There should be periodical exams at which a probation must pass, on pain of forfeiting his appointment.

The Maculauy Committee recommendations were accepted almost in toto. Since the Committee had not deliberated on the continuance or otherwise of the Haileybury College the Board of Control decided to close it down in 1958.

The first competetive examination was thus held in 1855 in London. Theoretically the Act of 1853 did not exclude Indians from open competetion but in practice its Indianizing capability was very little. Till 1868 the total number of Indian candidates was just 12 out of whom only one succeeded as compared to 2,376 Europeans out of whom 659 were successful. It is important to add here that one of the first and most vocal demand of the Indian National Congress formed in 1885 was for simultaneous competetive examinations to be held in India as in London.

VI

With the rationalization of the bureaucratic structure at the turn of this century the entire system underwent a metamorphosis. Efficiency improved alongwith stability. The new Indian Civil Service was entrusted

upon the task of maintaining 'Pax Britanica'. Although the overall size of the civil service was minute in relation to the State structure in which it was located yet it was truely an all India service. Officials were located at all levels - in the districts as collectors or subdivisional officers, in each provincial headquarters, in the Secretariat or in some other leading capacity at the Centre. A system of elitist administration thus came into vogue, with the recruitment of a few young men each year to a separate service and then giving them and only them,a clear run to the top, commanding handsome salaries. This meant that other administrators who did not, or could not, get into that service were for ever denied access to the top positions, however able they might subsequently become. Colonial administration was thus in consequence highly stratified, with little movement up and hence therewere few rewards or incentives on offer for ambitious civil servants at lower levels.

The characteristic patterns of the ICS administrators during this period was clearly political even if persons involved rarely levelled them as such. This was true of the work they did both in the district and the Secretariat.

Certainly they were involved in overseering and organizing the implementation of the decisions made by political leaders. They also as leaders of the State structure, made authoritative decisions themselves. Most importantly, they were centrally involved in pursuing partisan objective by mobilizing groups in society to support and work for these objectives, usually in opposition to those groups who had different political orientation.

The relative autonomy for the ICS was very pronounced as the leadership of the State was for away in London. Alongwith the autonomy, the trust that went alongwith it was also large. The salary and career opportunities, the security of tenure and provision for retirement were extra-ordinarily advantageous. These characteristics combined to place the ICS at the very top of the service class. Any youngman, shaped to the ICS in course of time, to take for granted his very elevated position as a servant of the imperial State par excellence in India. Given this elevated position, the ICS men were powerfully motivated to use their considerable authority and knowledge to preserve their advantaged position and the special privileges that went with it, inclining them to a conservative disposition with a substantial stake in the status

quo. However this conservatism did not imply any intrinsic commitment to the continuation of British rule in India as most ICS official were able to make the adjustments to changing constitutional arrangements imposed in India by the British Parliament during the 20th century.[60] But this does not mean that ICS men had no political views, nor that they always agreed with the government policy. There is extensive evidence to show that a wide range of views on the constitutional reforms emanating from London were held by ICS men and that these views changed over time.

The hegemony of the civil servants was first shaken by the Montague Chelmsford Reforms embodied in the Government of India Act 1919.[61] According to these reforms the Central Legislative Council came to have two houses - the Legislative Council and Council of State, with a majority of elected members, whereas the provincial councils were to have for the first time ministers with the then

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60 See H.M.L. Alexander, "Discarding the 'State Frame' Changing Images Among Indian Civil Servants in the Early 20th Century", South Asia, New Series,V, (1982) , pp.1-12.

61 T. Beaglehole, "From Rulers to Servants : The Indian Civil Service and the British Dimension of Power in India", Modern Asian Studies, 11:2 (1977), pp.237-38.

minor portfolios of education, public health and local self-government. Hubback, a civil servant then of Orissa, remembers in 1918 opening the Montague Chelmsford Reform development 'one morning at breakfast and finding the words 'Ministers' which seemed to me rather alarming at first sight.' The Act of 1919 clearly mentioned that the bureaucracy will not only provide the executive machinery of Government, it will be their part to assist, as only they can do, inthe training of the rural classes for self-government; their help will be greatly needed to explain the new principles of government to many who will find them strange.

The first world war led to a general disinclination to make a career service overseas and a more cynical view about taking up the white man's burden. Failure to attract new recruits also stemmed from the material conditions of services as much as the constitutional and political changes. The result was that Allahabad was made the first Indian centre in 1922 for the Civil Service examination.

The Lee Commission Recommendations quickly followed in 1925. The Report called for largescale financial reforms which led to a dramatic rise in candidates from

the London centre. The Commission also recommended stepping up the rate of Indianization. It urged the government that 20 per cent of the superior posts should be filled by Indians promoted from the provincial services - the listed posts. The rest 80 per cent direct recruitment should have a 50:50 ratio between the Europeans and Indians. This according to the Commission would equalize the ratio of Indian and European bureaucrats 15 years hence. It is interesting to note that inspite of periodical fluctuation of recruitment by the end of 1940 there were 597 Indian and 588 European ICS officers.[62] Although a generalized and strong sense of racial superiority prevailed among the ICS Europeans vis-a-vis the Indian society and culture yet relations within the ICS was quite cordial. The ICS Europeans had frequently a high regard for ICS Indians, and why not? After all it was an exclusive fraternity group with a common socio-economic background, consciously alienated from the society to rule it.

The recruits whether Indian or European were made to identify the fact that the ICS was a separate, closed institution. Care was taken to ensure as far as possible

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62 R.B. Jain, Contemporary Issues in Indian Administration, (Delhi,1976), p.39.

that those entering into that process were likely to be receptive to the specific norms and values being transmitted. After the appointment early postings and district training reinforced the transmission of behaviour patterns, norms and values. Gentlemanly norms and values however were hardly unknown to youngmen coming from such socio-economic background. But the Indian recruits were expected to spend two years of their probation in London, in order to be familiar with the European life style, so that they could come back as Brown sahibs . It is true that Indians who entered the service did it not out of patriotic motives but with an eye to the emoluments, security and enormous power that were attached to the job. But these recruits did not lose their traditional identity. Religious and caste affiliations were quite consistent with the modern administrative setting. Though the Indian recruits were primarily Brahmins and Kayasthas by caste, they handled their traditional and administrative roles quite effectively.[63] Indians and Europeans could work together within the shared ICS administrative tradition, and then retire at the end of the day into separate social settings.

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63 Refer . R.S. Khare, The Changing Brahmans, (Chicago, 1970).

VII

When war came in 1939, the ICS, and the colonial bureaucracy more generally, were still basically loyal to the British Government. The main opposition to the raj and to the ICS as its agent came from the Indian National Congress. Certainly there was no position for a highly paid administrative elite in Gandhian ideology. However Gandhian ethics in the late 30s was on its way out and the right wing gained strength in the Congress. It underwent a transformation from a forum dedicated to social upliftment to an organization contesting elections. The suspension of the Civil Disobedience Movement and the creation of the All India Congress Parliamentary Board are indices to this metamorphosis. The change in the ideology of the Congress was largely because of the infilteration of the big bourgeoisie at the national level and of the merchants and traders at the provinces. The main orientation of the Party therefore was towards, unity, strength, order and a political posture not unfriendly to the capitalist enterprise. This position went in a long way to continue the ICS tradition in India after independence. Retaining the ICS framework and the colonial bureaucracy

reassured the capitalists leading to an increasingly favourable attitude of Indian business man towards political leadership. For the most active element of the big bourgeoisie, State capitalism was the only answer if India was to shake off foreign capitals hold on the economy and to speed up development while increasing profits. It should also be said that once these goals are approached the big bourgeoisie demands a reduction of the State's economic action. Rest of the bourgeoisie also for some kind of State capitalism because it offered quicker industrialization.[64] Thus the bourgeoisie and the Congress Party wanted freedom yet not a Gandhian India. While the capitalist wanted freedom for a grip over the domestic economy, the Party wanted freedom so as to be the natural successor. It was the young Indian bureaucrat who was torn between the national movement and career and job. Most of the fresh recruits before independence were nationalists. Even the British recruits were influenced by the mildly left-wing views prevelant in the British University in the 30s. Being a nationalist, the Indian bureaucrats perhaps made a subconscious

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64 Refer C. Bettelheim, India Independent, (New York, 1968),

distinction between the government as the instrument of a foreign power and in its purely administrative, capacity, as the established government of the country.

The continuation of the ICS did not pose any threat to dominant classes or to the Party. But what it required was a political support for its existence. The necessary support came and came in a big way immediately after independence. Jawaharlal Nehru's speech to the Constituent Assembly clearly conveyed the message that first things to be looked after was the stability and security of India, and thus there was no time to start tampering with the bureaucracy.[65] But is was only the rigid support of the Iron Man extended to the ICS which proved to be decisive. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly, Sardar Patel in 1949 echoed, 'I have worked into them during this difficult period', they are patriotic loyal, sincere and able, remove them and I see nothing but a picture of chaos all over the country.[66]

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65 India, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debates, vol.I, 1947, pp.793-95.

66 Ibid., vol.X, 1949, pp.48-52.

With the political support strongly behind the ICS took the shock of disintegration easily. A brief period of crisis did occur with most Europeans and Muslim ICS officers leaving the service. But then the IAS succeeded the ICS frame. Emergency recruitments were done to fill in the necessary posts and the additional ones vacant because of the integration of the princely States. The annual examinations also began in 1948. These brought in 30-40 IAS recruits each year until 1954 after which the numbers increased.[67] Thus the IAS tradition got fairly entrenched with very little damage done to it. It also made its way through to the Constitution of India. The proposals of the Constituent Assembly later numbered Articles 308-14 provide that, central and all-India services would hold office during the pleasure of the President of India and those in the States during the pleasure of the Governor - this was intended to make clear that civil servants were not the employees of a particular minister; that a civil servant could not be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself;

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67 David C. Potter, India's Political Administrators, (Oxford,1986), p.145.

that a civil servant could not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one which appointed him - this was meant to provide protection against victimization by a minister and also central government protection for all-India civil servants serving in the States; and that Parliament be authorized to create additional all-India services and expressly specified that the new IAS and IPS were already deemed to be services created by Parliament.

VIII

The survival of the ICS and the creation of an IAS successor required initially in the late 1940s an act political will from the Centre. Once secured, however the ICS/IAS then required continuing political support in order to survive mounting opposition to it. Three factors are required to be analyzed to show this situation clearly.

The first was the formal provision for a parliamentary system of democratic government and the consequent spread of democratic politics, with politicians increasingly involved in administration at central, state and

district levels. The relationships between these new democratic politicians and political administrators were bound to be uneasy. The previously colonial administrative machinery on the one hand and the democratic governments became the principal contradiction in the Indian situation. From the first day of independence the administration was indeed in politics, for politics influenced the administration and administrators learnt to be sensitive to politics.[68] This preoccupation with the political and comparative neglect of professional problems of administration has perhaps been the greatest single failure of civil service in India. L.K. Jha points out that the declining standards of administrative performance is the deterioration in work relations between bureaucrats and ministers.[69] This unhealthy relationship to my mind was produced in part by having retained an ICS tradition of administration in a changed political context.

The second main feature to challenge the ICS tradition was the ideal of planned development for the

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68 E.N. Mangat Rai, "Patterns of Administrative Development in Independent India", Common Wealth Paper 19, (London, 1976), p.52.

69 L.K. Jha, "The Role of Bureaucracy in a Developing Democracy", Training Abstract no.2, (Government of India, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, 1983).

welfare of the people. Implementing the Five Year Plans for economic and social development affected the whole posture of the state, shifting it from an essentially laissez faire holding operation towards a much more interventionist role. This obviously began to affect the administration. New ministries and departments in development fields emerged in the 1950s, each with their own separate hierarchies reaching down to the districts. Many of them were set up to implement specialist programmes, each having their own technical requirements. They tended to resent having to go through an ICS or IAS political administrator in the secretariat in order to get ministerial approval for skills. At the district level they were unhappy about being subject to the supervision and control of a generalist Collector, the principal representative of the State government. These developments led to increasing dissatisfaction with IAS generalists being on 'top' and technical experts only on 'tap'. Inequality, amateurism, dilettantism were two of many changes levelled increasingly from the 1960s against the ICS tradition. These criticisms were taken up by the Administrative Reforms Commission and later in government

reports and academic writings. Here again one can see the origins of these conflicts in the contradictions between the need for specialist expertise and the generalist tradition.

The third feature was the federal structure of government which was hardly new, but in combination with the democratic feature did set in motion forces opposed to an all-India service. The IAS official was governed by service rules made by the Central government and these could,under great difficulty,be altered or interpreted to his disadvantage. Such an arrangement largely undermined the position of the State ministers whose choice of selecting officials for implementing their policies was severely restricted. The issue became more serious when political parties other than the Congress came into power in the various states. Thus such an all-India service, controlled from the centre, restricted the States' right, as they saw it,to recruit and control their own civil servants needed to implement the tasks allocated to them under the federal constitution. The point, I wanted to make here is that the institutional fit was poor between

the administration and polity. The IAS as an institution within a democratic federal Constitution committed to development set up contradictions that had unfortunate administrative consequences. Despite these tensions the IAS reigns and rules supreme in this country today.

The reason why the IAS survived, indeed prospered despite increasingly hostility needs explanation. The first important reason was that the IAS people themselves had a major say in all attempts at administrative reforms till date. The second reason is that there was never sufficient political clout from the political leadership at the centre for radical reform of the existing administrative reform. Even Prime Minister Nehru during the 1950s and early 1960s, a man who had formerly been such a critic of the ICS offered only mild criticisms of their 'colonial mentality' while stressing their values in the maintenance of unity. The rationality of technique was recognized and lauded. Perhaps the lack of rationality of consciousness was recognized but only no efforts were made to shake the institution of its colonial legacy. Reports on aspects of central administration by Gorwala in 1951,

Appleby in 1953 and 1956, Chanda in 1958 and Krishnamachari 1962, each contained a number of proposals for reform but altering the IAS institution was not one of them.[70] In 1961 when a high-powered Committee on Administration was setup within the Government of India to consider administrative reforms as many as six members including the Chairman were from the service itself. Thus apart from meek efforts being made, it can be also said that the bureaucracy is quite energetic in working to preserve their position within existing structures.

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70 David C. Potter, op.cit., p.167.

C O N C L U S I O N S

CONCLUSION

The reason why an analysis of continuity and change of the Indian bureaucratic tradition has not been attempted before is because the subject falls between the dominant concerns of the principal theories of State both pluralist and Marxist. These theories have tended to direct the attention of scholars interested in the Indian State to areas of research other than one explored here. Pluralist theory tended to concentrate either on the political inputs, plurality of groups, voters and political parties as the motor of the political system, while seeing the output of the State bureaucracy as largely derivative, or to treat the State bureaucracy rather separately in fairly conventional public administration terms, while seeing socio-political forces as vague environmental factors. No such bifurcation of politics and State bureaucracy was evident in Marxist research on the nature of the State. Their work was also fundamentally historical in conception. At the same time the principal Marxist preoccupation was to try to discern the dominant mode of production and the class character of the State. The State was not seen as merely an

instrument of the ruling class rule, but it did tend to be viewed as a single entity (with little in the way of internal contradiction or conflicts) and as essentially determined by the logic of its location within the class structure. This partial emphasis of scholars both pluralist and Marxist was one the reasons which provoked me to go back to the classical philosophers. These philosophers manage to maintain an institutional fit between State, political organizations, classes - dominant and dominated, bureaucracy and the socio-political ecology irrespective of the emphasis they attach to one or more of these elements. This was the crucial lesson I learnt while analysing the origin, development of and the crisis in the Indian Bureaucracy.

Hegel's theory was analysed in great detail to get a grip over the latter theories of Marx and Weber, both of whom derive their basic premises from Hegel. However the contradictory functions he attributes to the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the civil society is quite relevant in the Indian context. Let us take the situation that existed immediately after independence. On the one hand the Indian bureaucracy was expected to provide the ground

work for the capitalist class. This is evident from the fact that as an institution with experts it was expected to sow the seeds of industrial infrastructure in this country. The Industrial Policy Resolutions reserving the basic, strategic and capital goods industry for the public sector seem to endorse this fact. Yet at the same time the bureaucracy was to check the basic particulartism inherent in the business class. And hence the doctrine of socialism adopted and reflected in the Indian Constitution, and the Five Year Plans. Hegel highlights this dualism quite clearly; the bureaucracy is supposed to make explicit the latent universality of civil society - while at the same time it has to check its basic particularism. It has to increase civil society's public disposition and it has to deactivate it.

As far as Marx is concerned, his theory of relative autonomy of the State, a situation in which estates decline but classes are still to develop fully, seems to be a competent conceptual tool to analyse the Indian situation. The Moghul kingship representing the central power of the State and supported by the numerous class of government officials was relatively autonomous from

any kind of domination and could establish its hegemony over society at large. Later on as Marx predicted a powerful merchant class did grow with the growing trade with the West and East Indies and threatened to overthrow both the metamorphosed landed aristocracy and the weak Moghul State. But it could not develop any further because of the advent of the colonial rule. In order not to be ruined, the bourgeoisie must develop itself to the full, daily expand its capital, daily reduce the production cost, daily expand its trade connections and market. However, the local Indian bourgeoisie did get ruined as it was overthrown by the developed British bourgeoisie. The latter, survived as it expanded its capital and trade through colonialism. The end of the autonomy of the State was clear when efforts were made by the East India Company to keep even their own bureaucrats underpaid. Thus the colonial bureaucracy was only a social stratum acting merely as the agent of first the merchantile bourgeoisie and then the industrial bourgeoisie of Britain. Whenever the ruling class of a given society is robust enough to exercise unchallenged socio-economic and political sway, the bureaucracy is reduced to such a status. The 'transfer of power' to India however led to

the triumph of the executive over the social classes, a situation contrary to the colonial era. The successful maintenance of the ICS tradition even after independence was precisely because of the fact that the indigenous national bourgeoisie was weak enough to enforce any kind of hegemony on its own. Thus a form of State capitalism emerged; the bureaucracy maintained an autonomy in the absence of any class domination. Marx's view that the State is the form of organization which the bourgeoisie are compelled to adopt for the mutual guarantee of their property and interest seems to me applicable, given the relative weakness of the Indian bourgeoisie after independence. Because of the uncertainity of the situation the Indian bourgeoisie was prepared to give the State a leading role to play in the country's economy. The Bombay Plan drafted by a few leading industrialists in the closing years of the Second World War accepted State control, not because of any other reason but keeping in view their brotherhood's own incapability of investing in sectors that required long gestation period. The infilteration of the bourgeoisie into the Congress Party was also a strategy to keep their property and interest intact. And the support extended to the civil

service, which under the circumstances was the only institution capable of maintaining a stable united India and thus a stable market was yet another example, which made the bourgeoisie's intention quite clear.

Throughout Indian history, right from the period of the Moghuls a powerful bureaucratic structure existed and proved to be indispensable. For Weber this indispensability factory of bureaucracy arises because of its expertise born out of long and specialized training. Judging the Indian bureaucratic tradition one finds that the recruitment policy advocating an early age for entering the bureaucracy, the period of probation, and the kind of training did make the bureaucrat an expert in his field and hence indispensable to the political system. Further very much like Hegel, Weber drew attention to the contradictory effects of bureaucracy on society - the first being a social levelling effect on status structure and contradictory, second being the kind of status hierarchy which bureaucracy itself encouraged - a hierarchy based on the 'patent of education'. The progressive taxation, the abolition of zamindari system, the protective discremination polity and the slogan of socialism were all

infact social levelling ideas - The very idea of developmental administration emanated from the anticipation of a more active role to be played by the civil service in various socially progressive institutions and programmes, be it the Panchayati Raj or the Integrated Rural Development Programmes. But Weber was more worried about the second effect than the first. He therefore, warned that the inherent nature of bureaucracy would itself encourage hierarchy. The power and privileges which the bureaucrats enjoy *vis-a-vis* the society let Weber's fear come true. It is equally interesting to observe that while analysing the Prussian bureaucracy Weber found out that its officials were recruited predominantly from one class - the economically declining 'junkers' - who overemphasized the latter's conservative interests. Taking lead from Weber and applying it to the colonial period in India one discovers that the recruitment to the civil service was preimarily from the middle class intelligentia. But unlike the intelligentia in the West whose growth was rooted in the freedom of opportunity and in the concept of *laissez faire*, its Indian counterpart had an imitative character with a desire to simply substitute itself in the place of colonial rulers. Perhaps the urge to imitate so as to rule, came

naturally to the middle class intelligentia who belonged to the upper level of the caste hierarchy - a hierarchy rooted for centuries inthe Indian social structure. Unlike the Prussian junkers,this class was economically strong. But what is important is the fact that a conservative ethics emanated from this class as it did in Prussia. Further the Weberian doctrine that, from a technical power of view,the bureaucracy is capable of attaining the highest degree of formal rationality, is followed in most third world countries which the task of all round socio-economic development to this institution. But Weber also warned about the substantive irrationality inherent in it. Perhaps in India, the Nehru family realized this when one after the other, the man, his daughter and more recently his grandson were quite vocal in criticizing the bureaucracy. Nehru is on record having said that his greatest failure as India's Prime Minister was his inability to change the character of Indian administration.

The Leninist philosophy and practice makes us realize that to do away with this institution is extremely difficult perhaps impossible. The post revolution situation in Russia

and the shift in Lenin's position vis-a-vis the bureaucracy is quite an indication of the powerful, sprawling tentacles of the bureaucracy. However important lessons are to be learnt from Lenin. He differentiated between bureaucrats and technicians and argued for a better position for the latter. The generalist/specialist debate in India follows a similiar perspective. Nehru realizing the importance of specialists in an underdeveloped economy and argued for them and even recommended State governments to encourage this section to actively participate in administration. The similarity in perspective in both leaders emanates from the identical environment in the two countries - in Russia, after the revolution and in India after independence. Restructuring the economy had to be undertaken in a large scale and thus both the countries adopted the technique of 'planning' which automatically brought the specialist into the forefront. Yet in both situations the leaders inspite of their charisma failed to push through their ideas. Lenin once said after the revolution, that the bureaucrats kept coming through the window after having been thrown out of door. The Indian situation is a little different. Try showing them the way out very politely, (and mind you donot

have any choice but to be polite) and you will find walking straight upto your chair to sit and relax. Form an Administrative Reforms Commission to make the bureaucracy responsible and you will find a senior civil servant appointed as its chairman!

If anything decisive and enduring has to be done to change the power position and substantively irrational structure of bureaucracy, lessons have to be learnt from Mao Tse Tung. Through out my chapter on Indian bureaucracy I have extensively dealt with the shock absorbing capability of the bureaucracy the most important among which was the crisis in the recruitment procedure throughout the history which the bureaucracy withstood. Add to this the elitist tradition - the emoluments, the facilities, the positions, the examination procedure and the training. All these put together make the bureaucracy a body powerful enough to rule and to rule decisively. Mao's practice seems competent to break this hegemony but tobe in such a position requires strong political will and the right situation. Mao could successfully implement his model because of the strong political consciousness that prevailed in China after the revolution. In India the right time should have the period immediately after independence, but the leadership

lacked the political will. Perhaps the commitment of the Communist Party of China during that phase and that of the Indian National Congress during independence were a little too different. The question is what does not do now. Given the state of affairs with the political leaders in this country, Weber's model of a strong working Parliament doesn't seem to me applicable. The possibility of a revolution which could atleast serve as a starting point for sobering the bureaucracy,is also remote. Perhaps one has to sit back and wait till the bourgeoisie becomes strong enough to match the bureaucratic power. I do realise that there is every possibility of a symbiotic relationship developing between the two. But then Marx once said, given the choice between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, the proletariat would prefer the former. So let all eyes be on the Indian bourgeoisie.

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