NINETEEN FORTY-SEVEN

MAPPING HISTORIES OF PARTITION IN KASHMIR

Dissertation Submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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For Abu, Mamma, Nanu and Daddy, in love and reverence

&

Fayaz Uncle, in memory

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DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "*NINETEEN FORTY-SEVEN: MAPPING HISTORIES OF PARTITION IN KASHMIR*" submitted by **Miss Iffat Rashid** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this university has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this or any other university and is my own work.

Iffat Rashid

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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List of Abbreviations

NAI	National Archives of India, New Delhi.
JSA	Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu Repository.
SSA	Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar Repository.
TOP	*Constitutional Relations between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power, 1942-7* ed. Nicholas Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1970-83)
MOS	Ministry of States.
KRO	Kashmir Residency Office.
EA	External Affairs.
MEA & Cr.	Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
TOI	Times of India.
RSS	Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh.
NWFP	North West Frontier Province.

Glossary

Jirga	A council of elders appointed to dispense civil cases.
Sabhas	Unions.
Azadi	Freedom. The meaning of the word varied in the 1940s.
Millat	Community/nation
Millat-e-Islam	A community/nation based on idea of Islamic brotherhood
Wattaniyat	Nationalism.
Firqa warana	Communal.
Firqa parast	Sectarian.
Qaum parast	Nationalist.
Gadaar-e-Millat	A person perfidious to the cause of nation.
Mulk	Country.
Akhand Bharat	United India.
Sher-i-Kashmir	Lion of Kashmir (Usually referred to Sheikh Abdullah).
Mujahid-e-Islam	Warriors of Islam.
Inquilab	Revolution.
Roos	Russia.

National Conference murdabad	Death to National Conference.
Qaid-e-Azam zindabad	Long Live Qaid-e-Azam.
Sher-i-Kashmir zindabad	Long Live Sher-i-Kashmir.
Mahatma Gandhi ki jai	Long Live Gandhi.
Idgah	A place, usually an open ground, for offering congregational prayers by Muslims on Id.
Kashmir Chod dou	Quit Kashmir.
Amritsar beynama todh dou	Break the Amritsar Treaty.
Durbaris	Courtiers.
Hamlavar	Attacker/Raider.



1. Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, c 1846-1947

2. A Territorial Map of Jammu and Kashmir, delineating boundaries (colored) of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the British Empire.



3. Map of Northern Areas of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Introduction

The partition of 1947 is an inchoate story in the historical literature on Kashmir. Unlike Punjab and Bengal, which have been the focus of partition studies, the story of partition in Kashmir remains unclear and lost. The problem in writing the history of partition in Kashmir stems from its location in a larger frame of India's partition. The mainstream partition frame does not explore different kinds of local histories following the 1947 partition. Chronologically, the partition in Kashmir took place after the moment of independence. It transcended the moment of partition as an event, taking place at a particular historical juncture. This work is an attempt to locate Kashmir's partition and explore the long history of partition in a post-partition and post-independence context. By examining the long history of partition in Kashmir, this thesis explores the partition of Kashmir as a defining, cataclysmic event, and also probes the forces that shaped the history of partition in Kashmir. This work thus connects the history of 1947 in Kashmir with different kinds of local histories. And, yet Kashmir's narrative became intricately connected with the project of nation-state building in the South Asian context. What happened in Kashmir in 1947 cannot be seen in isolation from the political developments at the all-India level and has to be connected with the formation of nation-states. In addition, the political landscape of Kashmir was rapidly changing in the decade preceding partition. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to locate the Kashmir story within the larger frame of politics of the nation-states and decolonization, and situate it specifically in the decade of the 1940s in Kashmir.

An enormous amount of literature has been written focusing on the causes and origins of partition and growth of Muslim nationalism and 'separatism'. Scholars have widely focussed on varied themes explaining the partition as an event taking place at a particular historical juncture. The following survey of the vast literature on partition has been done by charting out broader themes in the historiography. The prevailing historiography has focussed on a number of significant themes, including the domain of 'high politics', the subjective experiences of violence, the nature of partition violence and the questions of nation-making, and partition as a process rather than being frozen in historical time.

'The Great Partition'

The partition of the subcontinent is a momentous and equally catastrophic event in the history of the subcontinent, owing to the scale of violence that engulfed the subcontinent in its process. Despite the vast historical and non-historical literature on the partition of the subcontinent, it remains, according to Dipesh Chakrabarty, a 'fundamentally inexplicable event'[1] in South Asian history. The focus of the partition studies has changed over the years. Within the wide ranging perspectives of 'nationalists', 'secularists' and 'subalternists' and works which cannot be easily bracketed into these categories, a shift is evident in historical literature signifying difference in approaches and perspectives.

The historiography on partition in the 1970s emphasized on 'valorising' the great men who were represented as those who made history, who made possible a separate nation for the Muslims of India. Such historiography placed regions like the United Provinces at the centre of their project of history writing. The growth of Muslim nationalist sentiments of separatism was seen as an outgrowth of the 'past glories and culture' of upper and middle class conservative Muslims in the United Provinces where they were in a minority. Holding onto some kind of nostalgia, now

[1] Quoted in Ritu Menon, 'Cartographies of Nations and Identities: A Post-Partition Predicament', *Interventions*, Vol 1 (2), 1999, p. 158.

fearful of losing power to the 'Hindu majority', the local politics in these regions created conditions for emergence of Pakistan.[2]

The 1980s began to analyze 'high politics' within the partition story. In her own words, Ayesha Jalal was set to question 'ruling orthodoxies about historical processes that led to the partition of India'.[3] At the centre of Jalal's work was the question, 'How did a Pakistan come about which fitted the interests of most of Muslims so poorly?'[4] According to Jalal, the Lahore Resolution of 1940, therefore, did not mean a 'Pakistan demand'. She notes, it should be seen as a 'bargaining counter'.[5] The Lahore Resolution, Jalal argues, 'provided the best insurance that the League would not be given what it now apparently was asking for, but which Jinnah in fact did not really want'.[6] There is, however, a sense of disconnect in Jalal's argument between 'high politics' and how people perceived the Lahore Resolution. As the thesis will show, in the 1940s the state of Jammu and Kashmir was enthused with ideals of an imagined community of Pakistan. However, what Pakistan meant or how it was to be attained remained unclear.

David Gilmartin notes that in Jalal's rendering, 'the idea of Pakistan, a Muslim state, provided Jinnah symbolic capital as he sought to identify himself with an image of a Muslim unity'. In Jalal's work, Gilmartin argues, Pakistan movement was not to create a territorial homeland for India's Muslims, but to form a 'political community', 'to give a moral and political meaning to a United Muslim Community'.[7] Gilmartin argues, 'Ironically, it was the fact that Muslims were in reality divided…that made the image of Pakistan as a symbol of moral unity, and of Jinnah as "sole spokesman" so widely compelling'.[8] Gilmartin, however, does not subscribe to the idea that the same disunity could undo the very idea of Pakistan. As

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[2] For varied essays on this, see C H Phillips & M.D. Wainwright (eds.), *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives*, 1935-47 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 27.

[3] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. xv.

[4] Ibid, p. 4.

[5] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, p. 57.

[6] Ibid.

[7] David Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative', *The Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. 57, No. 4 (Nov., 1998), p.1071.

[8] Ibid, p. 1080.

in the case of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the divisions, disunity among the Muslims of the state did not give Pakistan any moral authority; rather the adoption of Lahore Resolution further fractured the already divided political/ideological fabric of the Kashmiri society.

To understand who was responsible for the partition, the 'revisionist'[9] and the 'orthodox'[10] trends in the partition historiography have been caught in the binaries of 'hagiology' and 'demonology' of Jinnah.[11] While the former represented 'the teeming millions of adoring believers whom Jinnah led to the 'promised land',' to the latter he emerged as 'diabolic' and 'sinister' entailing 'the vivisection of Mother India'.[12] Asim Roy notes that the revisionist historiography questioned the myth of partition, the myth of 'Congress for unity' and 'Muslim League for partition'.[13] Roy argues that 'Congress continued to present the façade of the ideal of unity, while it steadily and deliberately worked itself up to a position where Jinnah was forced to take his 'Pakistan' and leave the scene for good'.[14] The Lahore Resolution of 1940 was seen as an answer to the 'Muslim Question' without making any 'demands on Congress's 'sacred cow', that is, the strong centre'.[15]

The emphasis in partition studies has shifted from an understanding of 'origins-causes' to people's subjective experience of the violence during the partition.[16] A turn to oral history became relevant in the deeply engaging work of Urvashi Butalia who focussed on both silences and memories. Questioning the premise of the official archive, Butalia turned to memories and unpacked the complexities of the actual experience of partition across age, gender, class, and caste. Butalia raised an important question in terms of writing the history of partition. She noted that 'the

[9] Ayesha Jalal, *Jinnah: The Sole Spokesman.*
[10] F Robinson, 'Review of Jalal's Jinnah', *Modern Asian Studies* XX, 3 (July 1986); Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).
[11] Asim Roy, 'The High Politics of India's Partition: The Revisionist Perspective', *Modern South Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 1990), p. 391.
[12] Roy, 'High Politics', p. 391.
[13] Ibid., p. 400.
[14] Ibid., p. 402.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (Haryana: Penguin Random House, 1998).

generality of Partition' was to be found everywhere in the history books but the 'particular' was harder to discover, which was only told and retold in the form of stories in the households.[17] The path breaking work of Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin has explored the role gender played not only in defining the character of partition violence, but also in the reconstruction of subsequent national authority. Focussing on the issue of recovery of women, these works revealed the tension between the statist narratives and personal experiences. Crucial to their project was to show the ways in which the intersections between the two shaped the post-partition world.[18]

Locating partition historiography within the larger framework of colonialist and nationalist historical writings, Gyanendra Pandey in his analysis attempted to place the spotlight on the consciousness and experience of the subordinated classes, the 'subalterns'. Pandey emphasized on foregrounding the 'fragment' in historiography which according to him resists the homogenization of a unified entity called 'India' and allow to take note of the deeply contested nature of the 'territory of nationalism'.[19] He notes that such histories are often written as 'the biography of the emerging nation state' adopting the "official" archive as the primary source to write state-centered histories. The history of partition according to Pandey, in the history of India 'is given short shrift'.[20] Pandey studies partition from a different vantage point. Certainly, he does not see the partition in terms of the origins of the modern nation-state. However, he has attempted to recover the history of partition as a process of 'renegotiation and a reordering', 'resolution of the old oppositions and constructing the new ones'. He sought to trace not just the large historical processes, but also 'a history of the everyday in the extraordinary'.[21] Rather than to focus only on the causes of violence, Pandey brought to centre stage the experiences of people who lived through the partition and the meanings they attached to it.

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[17] Butalia, *Other Side of Silence*, p. 4.

[18] Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin, *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition* (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998).

[19] Gyanendra Pandey, 'In Defense of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today', *Representations*, No. 37 (Winter, 1992), p. 28.

[20] Pandey, 'In Defense of Fragment', p. 29.

[21] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 17-18.

On the theme of violence, Paul Brass has examined the content and character of violence that unfolded during the partition. In his attempt to define the forms of collective violence, Brass delineates categories like 'riots', 'pogroms', 'massacres' and 'genocides' as overlapping categories that 'masquerade for each other, hide behind each other'.[22] Importantly, Brass explains that there were multiple reasons for the outbreak of violence, which was not generally executed with the motive of carrying a genocide and "ethnic cleansing".[23] Brass emphasizes that violence in Punjab was not spontaneous but organized. Yet, he reflects on the idea of the state as a benign source of order, which did not orchestrate these genocidal massacres in Punjab.[24] The role of the state and its forces cannot be ruled out in the case of partition violence. Indivar Kamtekar has shown that in Punjab the military, more precisely the ex-soldiers, played a pivotal part in the violence that engulfed the area.[25]

Subsequently, partition studies have moved forward in seeking answers to multiple questions.[26] The issue of addressing people's experiences during the moment and beyond this cataclysmic event has received increasing attention. Works of Vazira Zamindar and Yasmin Khan treat partition not as an event, which took place at a particular historical moment, but delve into the long history of partition, transcending the moment of independence and the creation of Pakistan. For Zamindar, the partition as a period of transformation emerges as a 'rite of passage', which people experienced. It was in this process, Zamindar argues, that the 'stable state' was culturally recognized as a 'naturalized nation'.[27] Zamindar refuses to give a 'closure' to partition, which nationalist histories tend to do. It is a 'long partition', a process of state building and bureaucratic consolidation through which the nation-states actually came into being in 1947.[28] The question of genocidal violence and mass displacement,

[22] Paul Brass, 'The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: Means, Methods, and Purposes', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 5: 1, 2003, p. 72.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Brass, Partition of India and Retributive Genocide, p. 72.
[25] Indivar Kamtekar, 'The Military Ingredient of Communal Violence in Punjab, 1947', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 56 (1995), p. 569, 571.
[26] David Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History'.
[27] Zamindar, 'A Rite of Passage', *Interventions*, 1: 2, 1999, p. 187.
[28] Zamindar, Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 7.

refugee rehabilitation and resettlement, the making of citizenship are some of her principal concerns, which portray the partition not as a single event, but as a long-term process.[29] Yasmin Khan, in a similar vein, questions the nationalist history writing on partition, which has treated it as 'an end point, or the apex of a great national struggle', and acknowledged 1947 as a starting point for the creation of new nation-states.[30] Khan notes that both the nation-states were in a transitional phase following the moment of partition signifying 'a transition between empire and nationhood'.[31] Both the scholars situate the partition within the broader context of the formation of the two nation-states.

Though new themes and trends have shaped the partition historiography in recent decades, there are still some gaps in partition studies in the light of their principal focus on the regions of Punjab and Bengal. The partition of the subcontinent had far-reaching consequences for those 'regions' as well which have not been fully acknowledged in the prevailing historiography. Generally speaking, the princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, were drawn into long and heated debates and discussions on the future of an 'independent and free nation'. Yet, historiographically, there is little recognition of the impact of partition on these princely states. They appear suddenly on the edifice of the nation at the time of independence. It is, therefore, important to widen the scope of partition studies to understand the implications of 'The Great Partition' on regions hitherto neglected in the existing historical writing.

A 'ghost' of Kashmir's partition

Strikingly, Kashmir hardly appears in the historical analysis of partition. There is a conspicuous erasure of the Kashmir narrative from the historiography of partition. Barring a few works like Urvashi Butalia's edited volume,[32] Nisid Hajari's,[33] Ritu

[29] Zamindar, *The Long Partition*, p. 4.
[30] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (Delhi: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 205.
[31] Khan, *Great Partition*, p. 206.
[32] Urvashi Butalia (ed.), *Partition: The Long Shadow* (Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2015).

Menon and Kamala Bhasin's,[34] which have sought to incorporate Kashmir's case into the broader frame of partition studies, Kashmir's long history remains absent in the history of partition. The 'subalternity' of Kashmir's partition narrative is evident in the mainstream literature. The historical literature on 1947 in Kashmir conflates Kashmir Valley with the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir when discussing the nature of violence in the region. This has given rise to the idea of 'Kashmiri exceptionalism', a proposition that Kashmir moved to a different rhythm in comparison to the rest of South Asia. It is assumed, therefore, that there was a non-communal character to the crisis that gripped Kashmir in 1947 and, if at all violence took place, it involved external forces, which pursued the conflict at the behest of the two nation-states.

Soon after the partition of the state, the earliest writings on Kashmir were written from a nationalist point of view, beginning with V P Menon's voluminous work on the integration of the princely states into the Union of India. At the centre of Menon's text is the question of Kashmir's much disputed accession to the Dominion of India. The image of 'India' in the text emerges as a 'benevolent' nation, where the Indian nation had no territorial ambitions in Kashmir. It came to the aid of Kashmir at a crucial time to help the Maharaja get rid of the tribal invaders. What gives legitimacy to the Indian nationalist claim, according to Menon, was that the accession of the Maharaja was supported by the 'premier political organization' of the state, the National Conference.[35] Since the 1950s, the question of Kashmir's accession has been the dominant trope in the writings on Kashmir. The scholarly interests in the 1960s were marked by their continued interest in understanding Kashmir's partition through the lens of India-Pakistan relations. Sisir Gupta tracing the origins of the dispute of

[33] Nisid Hajari, *Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition* (Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2015).
[34] Menon and Bhasin, *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition* (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998).
[35] V P Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1956), p. 283.

1947 stressed that Kashmir was an upshot of the Congress-League confabulations, and consequently an outcome of India-Pakistan schism.[36]

The 1970s saw a renewed interest in 'reclaiming' the history of Kashmir's accession to India through an emphasis on the 'high politics' of the summer of 1947. Much of the literature on Kashmir, predominantly written by political scientists and journalists, has overwhelmingly focussed on explaining the roots of the Kashmir dispute. Sumit Ganguly has traced the origins of the Kashmir dispute to the process of British withdrawal, 'the differing ideological commitments' of the two principal nationalist parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, and also to Pakistan's 'irredentist claim on Kashmir'.[37] The Kashmiri people and Kashmir's internal dynamics remain absent from such writings on Kashmir. Such writings have reduced the partition history predominantly to the question of Indian-Pakistani nationalist claims and counterclaims. The pre-partition political developments in the decade preceding partition are left out of these narratives. The history of [partition] of Jammu and Kashmir, as Vernon Hewitt argues, 'has long been a political prisoner to the wider processes of Indian and Pakistani state formation and their official nationalist discourses'.[38]

With the availability of the new sources, especially the *Transfer of Power* volumes, the episode of Kashmir's accession was re-enacted during the 1990s in scholarly debates on Kashmir as 'a disputed legacy'. Alastair Lamb made a departure from earlier works by going back into the colonial past to see how the state of Jammu and Kashmir came into being in the first place as a unified political entity, the role of the British policy, and the 'internal processes of political evolution which [was] one of the key components of the dispute which erupted in 1947'.[39] According to Lamb, 'at the very heart of the matter is the decision made by the Maharaja of Jammu and

[36] Sisir Gupta, *A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1966).
[37] Sumit Ganguly. *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), p. xii.
[38] Vernon Hewitt, 'Never Ending Stories: Recent Trends in the Historiography of Jammu and Kashmir', *History Compass*, 5/2 (2007), p. 288.
[39] Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire: 1991), p. 2.

Kashmir in October 1947 to accede to India'.[40] For Lamb, the year 1947 marked a rupture in the political fabric of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The year 1947 is treated as a metaphor for the 'birth of a tragedy'; the extent of which Lamb argues is 'still being revealed'.[41] Lamb's work has mainly been a critique of the ideological position of the Indian nationalist narratives at the turn of events during 1947. Victoria Schofield, in tandem with Lamb's questioning of the ideological standpoint of the Indian nationalist discourse, has sought to understand the complexities of Kashmir. Using ethnography as her research methodology, she has sought to explain both the Indian and Pakistani dimensions of the conflict as well as place the Kashmiris' diverse viewpoints, otherwise obscured in the nationalist narratives, at the centre of her political history.[42] However, the conflict is seen as a postcolonial development, therefore, erasing the colonial context, which was crucial in shaping the history of partition in the state in 1947.

Other important works like Prem Shankar Jha's seek to weigh the two nationalist versions; Indian and Pakistani, of history of 1947, against each other, losing sight of people's perceptions and experiences of violence in the state of Kashmir.[43] Jha's work engages with the same old framework of explaining the partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of how trouble originated with the entering of the tribal invaders which resulted in Maharaja's accession to India. The fundamental question for Jha was to de-legitimize Alastair Lamb's suppositions on the disputed nature of the accession. Jha argues that the dispute has its origins neither in the 'unfinished business of partition', nor in the 'vicillation [sic] of a weak, indolent and despotic' Maharaja. On the contrary, the Kashmir dispute is a product of 'power politics'. He believes that the British interests in the Middle East and South East Asia played a crucial role in British policy in 1947 and therefore in origins of the dispute as well.[44] Jha claims to have adopted a 'historian's approach on the subject', but his

[40] Ibid, p. 2.
[41] Alastair Lamb, *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* (Hertfordshire: 1994), p. 3.
[42] Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I. B Tauris, 2003).
[43] Prem Shankar Jha, *The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[44] Jha, *Origins of Dsipute*, pp. vi-vii.

understanding of the events of 1947 reduces the narrative to a kind of a 'biography' of the nation-state itself. The most problematic theme is his denial of any communal violence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. He argues that 'there was next to no animosity between Hindus and Muslims, and no communal violence inside the state, except for a few sporadic incidents in the Jammu region'.[45] The third chapter of my thesis closely studies the political situation in Kashmir during 1947 and reveals the close proximity of Jammu region with Punjab. Jammu was also engulfed in communal violence, as was the case with Punjab. Jha's work does not seem to rise above the conventional paradigm of the nationalist discourse on Kashmir.

Besides the theme of India-Pakistan claims on Kashmir, the idea of *Kashmiriyat*, Kashmir's unique identity, its distinct culture and history, has been a major trope in the writings on Kashmir. This 'uniqueness', which is translated into a 'Kashmiri secular identity', has been treated as the root cause why Kashmir, and more specifically why Sheikh Abdullah chose to side with India, the 'secular' nation, over Pakistan as a co-religious country, on the accession issue.[46] Balraj Puri argues that it was because of the 'uniqueness' of Kashmir that Kashmiri people and the leaders took a different trajectory on the question of accession. This 'uniqueness' according to Puri is peculiar to 'Kashmir's personality', which was moulded by historical, cultural, geographical and political factors. This 'uniqueness' 'goes back five thousand years to pre-Vedic times'.[47] Predominant in such works is the image of the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah as the fountainhead of secular politics within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Such writings evidently erase that while Sheikh Abdullah and National Conference did enjoy great levels of popularity within the Valley, the position of the party and Sheikh Abdullah was not the same in other areas of the state. Sheikh Abdullah never shied away from drawing upon religious rhetoric to mobilize the Kashmiris majority of who were Muslims.

Prem Nath Bazaz, a historian and a participant in the Kashmiri politics through the 1930s and 1940s, explained the factors responsible for the partition of the state.

[45] Ibid., p. 10.
[46] Balraj Puri, *Kashmir Towards Insurgency* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), pp. 8-9.
[47] Puri, *Kashmir Towards Insurgency*, p. 8-9.

Bazaz, who emerged as a vociferous critic of the National Conference party throughout the 1940s, argued that it was the 'hunger for power of National Conference leaders, the warlike designs of communalist sections among the Muslims, the ardent desire of the Congress leaders to give another fight to the two-nation theory, and worst of all the stupidity of the Pakistan leaders dispatching the unruly tribesmen to invade Kashmir', which resulted in the partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.[48] Bazaz was one of the earliest proponents of Kashmir's peculiarity in terms of the secularization of politics. He noted that 'outside Muslims' who were ignorant of Kashmir's history and its culture were 'baffled by the liberal views and tolerant behavior of the Kashmiris'. According to Bazaz, the people of Kashmir had developed a secular outlook over the centuries.[49]

M J Akbar, a prominent Indian journalist, showcases Kashmir as an integral part of India's secular project. Akbar has traced the history of Kashmir going back four centuries which according to him has made Kashmir a part of the subcontinent's secularism ideals, as reflected in Sheikh's decision in 1947 in the midst of the communal violence which engulfed the adjoining Punjab, and Bengal regions. Akbar argues that Sheikh Abdullah expressed 'strong commitment to Indian nationalism, secularism and democracy'.[50] Akbar writes that Abdullah believed, 'If Muslim Kashmir could live and prosper in secular, socialist India, then there could be no finer argument against the theory which divided this country and created Pakistan'.[51] Subscribing to the similar ideal of Kashmir's uniqueness due to a 'variety of historical reasons', Amitabh Mattoo also felt that the significance of Kashmir lies in the 'very idea of India'. Mattoo argues that 'As a Muslim majority state that voluntarily acceded to India, Kashmir lent tremendous strength to the construction of India as a vibrant, secular, and pluralistic state'.[52]

[48] Prem Nath Bazaz, *Kashmir in Crucible* (New Delhi: Pamposh Publications, 1967), p. ix-x.
[49] Bazaz, *Kashmir in Crucible*, p. 134.
[50] M. J. Akbar, *India: The Siege Within* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 215.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Amitabh Mattoo, 'India's "Potential" Endgame in Kashmir' in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), *The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect* (New York: Frank Cass , 2003), p. 16.

Vernon Hewitt argues, 'Indian accounts overlook the evident popularity of many Muslim Conference politicians as late as 1947, even within the Valley…and Abdullah's use of Muslim imagery and language in his political rhetoric'.[53] Scholars like T.N Madan have shown that this cultural identity was only limited to the Valley and it did not necessarily overcome the separate religious identities of the communities.[54] Mohammad Ishaq Khan argues that the term *Kashmiriyat* had social roots in Islamic egalitarianism. He argues that 'Being part of the nationalist project…official harping only blurs its true religious, human, and historically problematic perspective'.[55] Keeping identity politics at the centre of her work, Rekha Chowdhary argues that the origins of the Kashmir conflict could be traced to the 'Indian project of nationalism'. While she notes that Pakistan's claim to Kashmir was an external factor that shaped the accession, there was an internal dimension to it as well. She argues that despite the Muslim-majority leadership of Kashmir, they 'inevitably rejected the two-nation theory and joining Pakistan'.[56] Further connecting it to the present Kashmir crisis, she argues, 'It is the failure of the Indian nationalist project to nurture Kashmiri ethno-nationalist identity which has resulted in alienation of Kashmiris and shaped the Kashmiri ethno-nationalist identity in a 'direction that is incongruous with Indian nationalism'.[57]

Chitralekha Zutshi, in her profound historical work, *Languages of Belonging*, has questioned this Kashmiri 'uniqueness' encapsulated in the term *Kashmiriyat* through which Kashmir is represented in the nationalist discourses as a region where 'religious communities lived in harmony since time immemorial and differences in religion did not translate into acrimonious conflict until external intervention.'[58] Tracing the origins of the term, she argues that the term has a historically contingent nature. The

[53] Hewitt, 'Never Ending Stories', p. 291.
[54] T.N Madan, 'Kashmir, Kashmiris and Kashmiriyat-An Introductory Essay', in Aparna Rao (ed.), *The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture* (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), pp. 1-28.
[55] Mohammad Ishaq Khan, 'Evolution of My Identity Vis-à-vis Islam and Kashmir', in Nyla Ali Khan (ed.), *The Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 24.
[56] Ibid., Rekha Chowdhary, ' Kashmir in the Indian Project of Nationalism', p. 154.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), p. 2.

Kashmiri regional identities are more complex than what is captured by the term. Seeking to bring Kashmir within the larger South Asian historiography, Zutshi 'dispels' the idea that colonialism marked a rupture in terms of the emergence of 'politicized religious and regional identities in late nineteenth century Kashmir'.[59] More importantly, she 'transcends the trend to analyze the period [1940-1953] solely in terms of the de facto partition of Kashmir in 1948'.[60] Questioning the premise of the scholarship on the 1940s Kashmir, Zutshi shows how the political culture was 'ambiguous and complex'. She argues this was the result of a 'dialogue between religious identities, community definitions, and a deep longing for a homeland with just rulers'.[61] The outcome of 1947, according to Zutshi, was not just shaped by the complex negotiation between religious and regional identities, but also due to the failure of the major political organizations of the state to translate the ideas of national identity and citizenship rights into practice within the political fabric of the Kashmir Valley.

Focusing on the role religious sensitivities played in the political mobilization in Kashmir, Sumantra Bose has argued that the 'National Conference's ideology and its mobilization strategies were from its inception and during the dynamic 1940s, steeped in a distinctly Muslim ethos, shaped above all by the Valley's history, culture, and traditions'.[62] For Bose, the origins of the Kashmir crisis is embedded in the partition of 1947. However, according to Bose, the cause of continuation of such crisis is rooted in the failure of democratic institutions to emerge in Kashmir. He argues, 'Kashmir was intended to be the centerpiece of India's bouquet of democratic diversity. Instead, it became the thorn in the bouquet'.[63] Mridu Rai has argued that 'in the resistance against the Hindu rulers by the Muslim subjects in Kashmir [as contended by Bose], what was new was not the discovery of religious identities but the transformation, in the period of colonialism, of the political space in which these

[59] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*, p. 5.
[60] Ibid., p. 14.
[61] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*, p. 322.
[62] Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 24.
[63] Ibid., p. 44.

affinities came to be articulated'.[64] Rai argues the Dogra period entailed not just the rule by Hindus, but that the Dogra state had become a 'Hindu state'.[65] That the Dogra state had turned into a 'Hindu state' becomes a crucial point in explaining why and how religion became 'intertwined in defining and expressing the protest of Kashmiri Muslims against their rulers, whether Dogra or, after 1947, Indian'.[66]

Within the historiography on Kashmir, the recent trend of bringing 'people back into history' has opened up new possibilities of history writing. Such a framework lies at the core of Andrew Whitehead's work on 1947 Kashmir.[67] Whitehead has focussed on the 'human dimension' of the partition of the state in 1947 and the nature of the violence perpetrated by the 'tribal invaders' has been at the centre of his work based on oral history. He has sought to explore the 'lived experience of a period of political turbulence and military conflict'. Whitehead has questioned the conventional historiography which has represented Kashmir as an, 'exceptional' case where the violence had external dimensions rather than a communal character. Whitehead argues, that Kashmir's case emerges less exceptional than what was perceived by earlier scholars. According to Whitehead, Kashmir's partition narrative therefore needs to be incorporated into the mainstream partition accounts rather than reduce it to the margins of that historiography. Discussing the abduction of women and sexual violence in the Valley after 'tribal invasion', he argues that a number of non-Muslim women were abducted locally. The 'tribal invasion', Whitehead notes, was triggered by partition of the subcontinent itself and it did not simply set out to forestall Kashmir's accession to India. The 'tribal invaders' were guided by religious and communal grievances against the 'Hindu prince' ruling over a vast majority of Muslim masses. [68]

Recently, Christopher Snedden shifted attention once again to the question of who after all started the crisis in 1947 Kashmir. The 'syndrome' of discussing the

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[64] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2004), p. 7.
[65] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects*, p. 7.
[66] Ibid., p. 17.
[67] Andrew Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir* (Delhi: Penguin Global, 2008), p. 8.
[68] Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*.

India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir in 1947, Snedden argues 'makes Kashmir dispute appear a little bit like a rabbit pulled out of a hat: it is a huge thing that suddenly, magically, and mysteriously materializes from a small headpiece with seemingly very few, if any, antecedents'.[69] In his earlier work, Snedden had contended that it was an uprising in the Poonch region, west of Jammu, by the locals against Maharaja, which predated any tribal invasion and encouraged the 'tribal invasion'.[70] One of the significant contributions to partition historiography by Snedden has been his attempt to write the history of 'Jammu massacre' which otherwise remains obscure in much of the historiography on Kashmir's partition. Snedden has argued that it was actually the 'Jammu massacre' in the Jammu province that 'caused a chain of events which produced the Kashmir dispute'. He argues that by mid-1947, the Maharaja's forces had armed the non-Muslim population as a result of which the Muslims in Poonch jagir, and Mirpur both located in Western Jammu, obtained arms from North Western Frontier.[71] Zafar Choudhary has also tried to fill the gap in Kashmir's history of partition by focussing on communal violence that engulfed the Jammu province. His main focus has been on the trauma that Muslims of Jammu had to undergo during the partition.[72]

Cabeiri deBergh Robinson's work on 'Kashmiri refugees' has brought the focus in partition historiography on Kashmir, on the long term process of making of the 'Kashmiri refugee' between 1947-74. Robinson's work stands alone in its engagement with the question of constituting the category of the 'Kashmiri refugee', who fell outside the purview of the two nation-states' rehabilitation processes. She argues, 'that the international representatives and humanitarian relief workers contributed to the emergence of a consensus in South Asia that Kashmiri refugees were not like other Partition refugees'.[73] According to Robinson, the 'Kashmiri

[69] Christopher Snedden, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris* (London: Hurst & Company, 2015).
[70] Christopher Snedden, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir* (London: Hurst, 2012).
[71] Christopher Snedden, 'What Happened to Jammu Muslims? Local identity, "the massacre" of 1947' and the roots of the Kashmir 'Problem'', *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 24: 2, 2001, pp. 113-114.
[72] Zafar Choudhary, *Kashmir Conflict and the Muslims of Jammu* (Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 2015); 'Being a Muslim in Jammu', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 43, Issue No. 34, 23 Aug, 2008.
[73] Cabeiri deBergh Robinson, 'Too Much Nationality: Kashmiri Refugees, the South Asian Refugee Regime, and a Refugee State, 1947-74', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 25 (3), 2012, p. 348.

refugee' became the object, which defined the limits of Indian and Pakistani nationality. It appears as if the 'Kashmiri refugee' occupied a liminal position or themselves became liminal subjects –'Pakistani-Indian and not Pakistani-not Indian' who according to Vazira Zamindar could challenge and threaten the 'stable state or national order'.[74] More recently, Zutshi has argued that the partition of Kashmir 'far from being a settled historical fact that occurred in the past, partition(s) continue to inform the politics of the region as well as the lives of those who inhabit it'.[75]

The thesis mainly explores two key issues. The first is to bring into focus the time period between the years 1935 and 1955 to locate Kashmir's partition story within a spectrum of broader changes happening in and outside Kashmir. The second is to highlight the multiple experiences of people and evoke the 'small voice of history'[76] as well as to unsettle, using Emma Tarlo's expression, 'paper-truths'[77] of partition in Kashmir. In the official narratives, territorial contestations over Kashmir continue to be the main theme in the partition story. The official accounts focus on the 'tribal invasion' of 1947 and hardly explore the subjective experiences of violence and displacement that engulfed the state. These narratives do not acknowledge the nature and extent of communal violence, which resulted in mass displacement of people from regions like Jammu, Poonch and Gilgit. This thesis questions the official narratives in which the story of partition has been confined to the event of 'tribal invasion' at the expense of the larger and horrific communal violence following the partitioning of the subcontinent.

The first chapter locates the history of partition in the 1940s, which helps in understanding the factors and discourses that shaped the partitioning of Kashmir in 1947. The colonial construct of Kashmir's geo-politically strategic location, a space

[74] Vazira Zamindar, 'A Rite of Passage', p. 183.
[75] Chitralekha Zutshi, 'An Ongoing Partition: Histories, Borders, and the Politics of Vivisection in Jammu and Kashmir', *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2015, p. 266.
[76] Ranajit Guha, in *The Small Voice of History* ed., Partha Chatterjee (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2009).
[77] Emma Tarlo, 'Paper Truths: The Emergency and Slum Clearance Through Forgotten Files', in C J Fuller and Veronique Benei (eds.), *The Everyday State and Society in Modern India* (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2010).

'where three empires meet',[78] allowed for it to become a 'space of desire' in the cartographic anxieties and imaginations of the post-colonial nation states, much in line with earlier constructions, thereby leading to no major rupture. The chapter introduces geo-politics as an instrument of colonialism. It explores, through the notion of 'dual sovereignty', how the Raj as a territorial sovereign together with the Maharaja's sovereignty functioned in the state in the decade preceding the partition. This point is illustrated through a case study of the Gilgit region. Gilgit, a region within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, became a microcosm of the Raj's territorial sovereignty over the state. Through the case study of Gilgit, I will try to explore the ways in which British colonialism operated and shaped the geopolitics in this part of the subcontinent. Mridu Rai has argued that the Dogra rule inaugurated a 'personalized form of sovereignty, erasing earlier traditions of layered authority shared at various levels in the Kashmiri society'.[79] If one is to limit the focus to the Valley, then perhaps the Dogra rule removed multiple layers of sovereignty in that region. However, I seek to move away from such a viewpoint as the chapter highlights that there was an existence of a devolved kind of Dogra sovereignty over the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir and not merely a centralized or a 'personalized' form of rule.

The chapter traces how the discourse of Kashmir's strategic position goes back to the time of its creation as a modern State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. Within the British imperial discourse, this part of the Kashmir state (the Gilgit sub-division) was represented as a strategically located area. The British obsession with cartography led to a conflict between the Kashmir Government and the British over the demarcation of the boundary between them. The situation became grave when the British decided to "retrocede" the area to the Maharaja of Kashmir in 1947. Instead of keeping with the principles of partition of the subcontinent, the British decided to hand over this area back to the Maharaja of Kashmir. The chapter brings into focus

[78] 'Where Three Empires Meet' is the title of a travelogue written by E.F.Knight in 1893. The title was used to describe that part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Gilgit) where three empires; Great Britain, Russia and the China all meet. See E.F Knight, *Where Three Empires Meet: A Narrative of Recent Travel in Kashmir, Western Tibet, Gilgit, and the Adjoining Countries* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1893), p. viii.

[79] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects*, p. 4.

the northern areas, which otherwise remain marginalized in the historiography on Kashmir, to explore how the colonial governing practices transformed the 'unknown land' into a territory---- a controllable territory.

The second chapter explores the changing discourse on the nature of Kashmiri politics in the context of the transformation of the party from the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference to the National Conference in 1939. The chapter examines the struggle of various groups in the political spaces and spheres in the 1940s. The idea of space used in the chapter draws on Henri Lefebvre's conceptual framework of space as a dynamic social product and as a constitutive element of social relations. Instead of using the concept of space as pre-given container or physical geographical location of social relations, Lefebvre considers 'social space as at once the locus, medium and outcome of complex, superimposed social relations that are always also temporal'.[80]

The idea of Kashmir as '*Mulk*', '*Country*', '*Homeland*', '*and Wattan'* had become the dominant tropes in the nationalist discourse of the 1940s. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference throughout the 1940s used the trope of '*wattan'* interchangeably with the word '*mulk*' to lay the foundation for its ideal '*Naya Kashmir*'. The idea of Kashmir as envisaged by the National Conference was one in which men and women, dwarfed by centuries of servitude, would be free from Dogra autocracy. The chapter explores the multiple meanings people attached to these terms.

The process of negotiating multiple political spaces was instrumental in creating complex tensions between various communities, and between different communities and the Kashmir State. The struggles in Kashmir in the 1940s seem to have borrowed ideas, garnered support both material and symbolic, from the Indian nationalist movement, yet the relation was fraught with tensions and ambiguities. What can these 'regional' struggles tell us about the politics and narratives of 'national' movements, which tend to celebrate a 'unified' struggle of the masses against the British? How do these 'regional' movements relate to these nationalist ideas? Do these 'regional' struggles disturb the grand narrative of a 'unified' struggle against the colonial rule?

[80] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

Did the demand for 'a separate Muslim nation-state' bring any changes in the discourse on Kashmiri political discourses? If, as Venkat Dulipala has argued, the demand for Pakistan essentially created a new Medina for the Muslims, why does Kashmir, a Muslim majority State, then remain peripheral in the discourse of the Muslim League?[81] Was there an alternative idea of Kashmir's future in the discourse of both the parties, the Muslim Conference and National Conference? These are some of the questions, which I attempt to raise in the chapter.

Ian Copland has argued:

> Muslim Conference was communalist, almost rabidly pro-Pakistan, and cultivated close ties with the League, the National Conference was officially secularist and as the presence of Jawaharlal Nehru and Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the Party's annual meeting testified-well disposed, at least at the top level, towards the Indian National Congress.[82]

Ian Copland has not been alone in understanding the two parties in clear binaries of communal/secular. In P.N.K Bamzai's analysis, while the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi had gained popular support against British imperialism, Jinnah had set himself on the path to divide the country on the basis of religion. The Lahore Resolution of 1940, as Bamzai argues, demanded an independent state for Muslims in India on the ground that the two communities essentially formed two different nations. Bamzai argues that Congress did not accept the 'two nation theory' as it was against the best traditions of the country. The non-acceptance of Jinnah's 'two-nation' theory by the Kashmiris, Bamzai notes, was because the people in Kashmir 'through centuries of their history had developed a tolerant and peaceful outlook on religious beliefs. Hatred between one religious community against another was abhorrent to them, and having lived in perfect harmony throughout the course of their chequered history, the Muslim League

[81] Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating A New Medina: State, Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[82] Ian Copland, 'The Princely States, the Muslim League and the Partition of India in 1947', *The International History Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), p. 54.

ideology was foreign to their best traditions and did not, therefore, find favour with them'.[83]

The second chapter seeks to move away from the clear binaries drawn between the Muslim Conference as a 'communal' party and the National Conference as 'secular'. In writing about the political discourses of both the Muslim Conference and the National Conference, the chapter brings to centre stage the notions of '*millat*' and '*wattaniyat*' to talk about the differential ideas of the party on nationalism. Rather than study the difference between the National Conference and the Muslim Conference through the lens of communalism/secularism binary, I seek to argue that within Kashmir's political spaces, no clear demarcation between the two emerged throughout the period under study. It appears futile an exercise to present the differences between National Conference and the Muslim Conference as a 'simple battle between the noble ideal of 'secularism' and the nefarious construct of 'communalism'.' As Ayesha Jalal has argued, one needs to investigate the extent to which 'Muslim 'communalism' was an ideological construction of the politics of secular nationalism'.[84]

The third chapter focusses on some of the key moments and events of violence in the Kashmir narrative and will specifically refer to the Poonch uprising, Azad Kashmir movement, the Jammu massacre and the tribal invasion. The dominant/official narrative of partition in Kashmir has been shaped around the 'tribal invasion'. Soon after partition in 1947, the 'tribal invasion' became the dominant trope in the nationalist tellings and retellings of the partition narrative. The chapter engages with the subjective experiences of violence in writing the histories of partition in Kashmir, and shows that they were not just related to the 'tribal invasion', but were also shaped by internal disturbances. Such forms of violence would tell us about the differences created between what has been called 'general' (tribal invasion) which is 'historical' and the 'particular' (Jammu massacre, and other moments of violence), which have been rendered 'unhistorical'. Since the violence perpetrated by

[83] P.N.K Bamzai, *Culture and Political History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: M D Publications, 1994), *Vol 3*, p. 741-742.
[84] Ayesha Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of Communalism: Partition Historiography Revisited', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), p. 683.

the ‘tribal invaders’ was considered in the nationalist discourses as being meted out by the Pakistani State, it is therefore important to study the violence perpetrated by the Pakistani State. The partition violence, which engulfed the Jammu province, has largely been overlooked in the writings on the history of 1947, which feature more as ‘histories of the states’ than as ‘histories of people’.

Outside the domain of the dominant/official narratives lies the realm of local memory. This domain bears testimony to the presence of contesting memories of 1947 often omitted from the dominant discourses. Through the memoir written by Mehmood Hashmi,[85] which demonstrates the interaction between ‘unofficial’ memory and history, I will explore the meanings that the narrator attributes to the partition of Kashmir. Hashmi does not treat 1947 as a singular event. His narration of 1947 is that of a series of incidents occupying different temporal moments. The remembrances within the text happen at different moments and dates. Such conceptualization allows him to repudiate the singularity of 1947 as an event.

The official narratives are often silent on the deep scars left on the population of Jammu and Kashmir as a result of a continuous cycle of communal violence. The displacement of the Muslim population from Jammu province created a category of a ‘Muslim refugee’ which remained outside of the nation, and therefore, outside of history too. How did the body of a ‘Muslim refugee’ pose a threat to the newly formed nation-state? How did the ‘refugee crisis’ and the efforts to ‘repatriate/rehabilitate’ get entangled with the India-Pakistani politics over the question of Kashmir’s accession to India?

The third chapter seeks to answer questions of how are populations formed into a national body? How is the ‘national body’ constituted through a silencing of a particular kind of violence perpetrated on a particular group of people and what are the possible ways which in turn constitute these populations as ‘non-national’

[85] Mehmood Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai* (Rawalpindi: Qaumi Kutb Khane, 1950). Mehmood Hashmi was born in pre-partition Kashmir. At the time of Kashmir’s partition he worked as an Urdu professor at Amar Singh College in Srinagar. He was part of a peace brigade formed in Srinagar in 1947 to defend Kashmir against the ‘tribal invasion’. In January 1948 Hashmi crossed over to, what was called ‘Azad Kashmir’ and served ‘Azad Kashmir’ government as Chief Publicity Officer till 1953. Later he went to London and in 1961 launched *Mashriq,* the first regular Urdu weekly newspaper in Britain.

entities? Was silencing of the communal violence in the nationalist discourses then necessarily tied with the idea of Kashmir serving as a testing ground for India's projection as a secular nation-state? What can the region and the fragment tell us about the nature of the nation and its relation to the nation-state? The study of violence raises questions as to how are communities defined and placed in their relation to the nation-state, and in what circumstances are they officially construed as 'enemy' of the nation a term routinely used in the official records.

The 'Missing' Archive

Retrieving the history of Partition in Kashmir posed many archival challenges. The 'death of the archive' as demonstrated in the untraced files, the 'NT; non-transferable' files made it difficult to write an alternate account of Kashmir's Partition. The process of 'silences in the archive' and 'silencing of the archive' reflects the political anxieties of the postcolonial nation-state. It is important to acknowledge, as Gyanendra Pandey argues, 'that silence in the archives is not an absence', and that we must strive to listen to these silences and 'trace as far as possible the itinerary of a suppression'. The archive, as Pandey notes is, 'a site of remembrance, doing the work of remembering, is also at the same time a project of forgetting'.[86] The power entailed by the postcolonial state renders possible not just the silencing of the archive, which is embedded in regulating the practices of knowledge production (rooted in the governance of modern state), but it also exerts a control over different forms of memory. Pandey asks, 'Should we try to recover the meaning of all the blanks, fill all the silences?...is not silence itself sometimes a strategy, a refusal of inclusion (which, we know, always means inclusion on given terms)'.[87] So the question is, are we then to read the archive 'against the grain', or as Ann Stoler would note, 'along the archival grain'?[88] This has remained the most difficult exercise throughout the process of collecting archival material and in writing the thesis. In seeking to write an

[86] Gyanendra Pandey, 'Un-archived Histories: The 'Mad and the 'Trifling'', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, January 7, 2012, p. 38.
[87] Ibid, p. 41.
[88] Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

alternate account of partition, the real challenge has been in seeping through the archival gaps and silences to write an alternate account of the partition of the state.

The archive that I have tapped into is mostly the official archive, i.e. the government records. But I have tried to move beyond the 'archival hegemony' to push the boundaries of the already defined archive for the discipline of history. The newspapers which remain untapped in the works on Kashmir, especially the Urdu newspapers, have remained a very important archival source, both for the facts as well as to see how the memorialization of certain events takes place, how a collective history and memory is created through this medium. Of peculiar importance have been the memoirs/autobiographies, especially the memoir written by Mehmood Hashmi in attempting to write an alternate account of the event, or how those who lived through it have perceived the partition. The memoir has been an essential source not for its facticity, but for its representation of the partition episode itself. It has allowed me to question the dominant discourses, which have reduced the partition narrative into a linear narrative, often at the expense of the people's experiences of partition. Using memoirs/oral histories have often created anxieties for historians, which according to Tina Campt tells more about 'canonical disciplinary notions than about the legitimacy of memory work as an archive especially when that evidence is not facticity per se'.[89]

Using the memoir to 'denaturalize the presumptive boundaries of official archive space'[90] was taken up for another reason, which emerged from the control the nation-state continues to exert on the official archive. The political anxieties of the postcolonial nation-state are best reflected through the control it exercises on the archive as a site of knowledge production, especially when writing the history of a period, which for the nation-state has remained since 1947 a very sensitive issue. Through the Foucauldian framework, it has become possible to understand that archives as "documents of exclusion", as "monuments to particular configurations of

[89] Quoted in Antoinette Burton (ed.), *Archive Stories: Facts, Fiction and the Writing of History* (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2005), p. 5.
[90] Ibid., p. 6.

power" and 'technologies of power'.[91] In writing a history of the partition in spaces like Kashmir where political anxieties are immense and statist control over the archive is, inescapable, it becomes necessary to push the boundaries of the 'archival space'.

[91] Ibid, pp. 6-7.

Chapter 1
Reconfiguring 'Dual Sovereignty': The Raj and the Maharaja

The British colonial state was not monolithic in character, nor was it a unified entity. British colonialism in the Indian subcontinent unfolded in multiple forms. In certain parts of the subcontinent, economics of direct rule shaped the colonial state's policy. However, in some areas, especially those which formed the northern 'frontiers' of the British empire, the perceived threat of foreign invasions, especially the threat of Russia's increasing influence, framed much of the British state's policy. The paternalistic ideal of the colonial state became the dominant trope in the colonial state's discourse on Jammu and Kashmir's strategic location. Especially, the Gilgit region of the state was crucial in constituting this paternalistic ideal of the 'solicited', the 'benevolent empire' on the northern 'frontier'. Much of the colonial discourse on the Kashmir State[1] was construed around Gilgit, a region 'where three empires meet'[2], as a strategically located region. It occupied an important position in the construction of the colonial narrative of the colonial state as a paternalistic ruler on the 'frontier' 'who stood as a stern policemen'[3] guarding the frontiers not just of the Maharaja's 'empire' but, also, more importantly, the Indian Empire, against any foreign threat.

The chapter explores how colonial discourses of Kashmir's strategic location continuously fed into the secular nationalist imaginations throughout the 1940s. It maps how the trope of Kashmir as a strategically located region shaped the discourse on territorial contestations over the region on the partitioning of the state in 1947. The state of Jammu and Kashmir on several occasions during the years 1935-1947 became a site of political and cartographic anxieties for the British colonial state. The chapter explores how this trope, along with the colonial images of Kashmir as the 'most

[1] The term 'Kashmir State' had by now become the most commonly used term in the official discourse of the British colonial state encompassing the whole of the State which included disparate regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit; in short the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.
[2] E. F. Knight, *Where Three Empires Meet: A Narrative of Recent Travel in Kashmir, Western Tibet, Gilgit, and the Adjoining Countries* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1893), p. viii.
[3] 'Retrocession of Gilgit Sub-division to the Kashmir State', Political Department, 1947, File No. 29-R (S)/47, National Archives of India (hereafter, NAI).

romantic region of the mysterious East'[4] shaped the cartographic anxieties of the colonial state. The chapter maps the underpinnings of the 'dual sovereignty' of the *Raj* and the Maharaja in the state from the year 1935 when the British took direct control over the Gilgit sub-division, formerly a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Continuously, since its partition in 1947, Kashmir has been central to the territorial contestations between the two independent nation-states--- India and Pakistan.

In historical writing, a binary has been drawn on the relationship between the British and the Princely States. The framework of 'indirect rule' over the princely states and a 'direct rule' in British India guides much of the historiography on the relationship between the princely states and the British colonial state.[5] The simple binary of direct/indirect rule leaves little room to understand the relation between the British and the Kashmir State in terms of 'overlapping sovereignty and territoriality'.[6] The chapter attempts to deconstruct the neatly drawn binary of 'direct rule' and 'indirect rule', and argues that what formed the 'frontiers' of the British-Indian Empire and the Maharaja's empire, the notion of 'dual sovereignty' exemplified by two sovereigns the *Raj* and the Maharaja*,* was at play. The British took direct control over some parts of the state of Jammu and Kashmir on the northern 'frontiers', which the British did not recognize as part of the State. What was the nature of the Dogra 'sovereignty' in those areas, which the Kashmir State claimed to be a part of Jammu and Kashmir, but were governed directly by the British? There was a far greater interaction between the two sovereigns in these areas, which makes the binary of direct/indirect rule a problematic approach in the historiography on the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly for the northern areas of the state.

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[4] P. Pirie, *Kashmir: The Land of Streams and Solitudes* (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1909), p.35.

[5] Robin Jeffrey (ed.), *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978). The volume is one such example of the historical literature on the Princely States. Though the volume covers a whole range of articles cutting across various social and political phenomenon in the Princely States, more or less, the work is set within the same framework of 'direct'/'indirect' binary.

[6] Sanghamitra Misra, *Becoming a Borderland: The Politics of Space and Identity in Colonial Northeastern India* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011). I am borrowing the term, 'overlapping sovereignties', which Sanghamitra Mishra has used in her analysis of the northeastern borderlands, to understand the relations between the colonial state and the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

When one is dealing with the ideal of Dogra sovereignty are we to understand the 'Maharaja of Kashmir' as the centre through which all power emanated? Or are we dealing with what Michel Foucault has delineated as the 'modern forms of power that constituted, circulated and normalized without the central coordination of an ultimate sovereign'.[7] When we move away from the centre towards the periphery of the state, multiple relations of power become visible. The presence of the Maharaja's sovereign power somehow fades as the power of the local chiefs became more palpable in the 'frontier' zones, which were under the direct control of the British Political Agents. The co-existence of the two sovereigns in the 'frontier' regions often resulted in contestations over the limits of sovereignty of the two competing rivals.

In 1947, the Government of India decided to 'retrocede' the Gilgit sub-division to the Kashmir State with the lapse of paramountcy. The 'retrocession' of the area on the lapse of paramountcy in 1947 created further anxieties both for the departing colonial state as well as the nation-state(s), which was replacing it. This chapter seeks to explore how, against the backdrop of these anxieties and contestations, certain parts of the northern areas which were not a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir became entangled in the territorial contestations on Kashmir between the two independent nation-states. These areas have since then been claimed to be a part of Kashmir's disputed territory. The chapter charts how in these conditions of competing claims between the *Raj* and the Maharaja, the ideal of Dogra sovereignty unfolded in the state.

In his reply to Prem Nath Bazaz's letters, Mahatma Gandhi had replied:

> I have gone through your paper, we are sowing as we have reaped. Seeing that Kashmir is predominantly Mussalman, it is bound one day to become a Mussalman State. A Hindu Prince can therefore rule by not ruling i,e by allowing the Mussalmans to do as they like and by abdicating when they are manifestly going wrong. This is the ideal. What is expedient is more than I can judge.[8]

[7] Quoted in Stephen Legg, *Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p. 3.

[8] Quoted in *Wattan,* 21 September 1936, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1936, File No. 176/321/N-204, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu Repository (hereafter, JSA).

Gandhi's remarks seem to have not gone well with some of the contemporary 'political activists', including Prem Nath Bazaz himself. However, Gandhi's remarks are important to understand in the light of the changing perceptions of sovereignty of princes over the princely states both in the nationalist discourses[9] as well as the local perceptions, particularly the ideal of the Dogra sovereignty in the decade preceding the partition of the State in 1947. A redefinition of the idea of Dogra sovereignty had become a dominant trope in the discourse on Kashmir's politics through the late 1930s and the 1940s. The Maharaja could no longer act as an ultimate 'autocrat' and overlook the demands of his subjects, but had to reign in compliance with the wishes of the people. Gandhi emphasized that "A Hindu Prince can only rule by not ruling", which according to him meant that the state should be run on the principles of democracy rather than an autocracy. Gandhi reiterated that the Maharaja should reign and not rule.[10]

In the decade before the final demise of the princely order in Jammu and Kashmir, the contestations over a greater share in the political spaces[11] and reorientation of political subjectivity proved instrumental in creating complex tensions between various communities and the state apparatus. Against the backdrop of the emerging complex relationship between the subjects and the state, the chapter explores how Dogra sovereignty worked within a larger Imperial setting in post-1935 scenario. It was around the same time that the negotiations for the formulation of a constitution for India became intense and fraught. With the rising tide of Indian nationalist movement in British India, increasing pressure came to be built on the princely states to 'modernize' their states and take their due position in the future constitution of India. The negotiations throughout the 1940s reflected the shifting power balances between the princely states and the British Crown, and between the princes and the two Dominions on decolonization.

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[9] Here I am using the term 'nationalist' as a general category. However, even within the Indian nationalist position there were multiple strands of opinion on the continuation or discontinuation of the princely political order in independent India. To give an example, Nehru insisted on the complete erasure of the feudal elements, while Gandhi accepted that princes could continue but as limited monarchies.

[10] *Wattan*, 21 September 1936, Publicity Department, 1936, File No. 176/321/N-204, JSA.

[11] The idea of space is used in the chapter not as some geographical marker, but as a counter-space to the Dogra 'governmentalities', the creation of which was possible by the varying degrees of resistance to Dogra sovereignty and its 'governmentalities' during much of the 1930s and 1940s.

The Colonial Constructions: 'Where Three Empires Meet'

The *Times of India* in its 30 June 1947 issue reported that Kashmir was to regain Gilgit, a 'strategic territory'. The report maintained, 'Gilgit Agency, a part of Kashmir State [sic], which has common frontiers with Russia is going to be returned to Kashmir State. Of considerable strategic importance, Gilgit, which is now administered by the Political Department, was taken over from Kashmir State on lease.'[12] One thing had become clear that by 1947, the popular as well as official discourses were convinced that Kashmir occupied a strategic position in the Indian subcontinent. Two, the 'Gilgit Agency' was claimed by the Kashmir State in its entirety; however, the British had denied the state's position throughout the twentieth century and even more intensely post-1935. Third, it was only the Gilgit sub-division, the Gilgit Wazarat that was leased to the British in 1935, and much of the Gilgit Agency had been already brought under British control. These complex and contested claims over the territory form one of the crucial colonial legacies, as this region continues to be at the centre of territorial contestations between the surrounding three nation-states: India, Pakistan and China. But how was the image of Kashmir as a strategically located region constituted?

The discourse of Kashmir State's strategic position goes back to the time of its creation as a modern state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. By the time of the second Dogra ruler, Maharaja Ranbir Singh (1856-1885), the idea of Kashmir's strategic position in the imperial setting had begun to materialize. Maharaja Ranbir Singh in 1876 reportedly told Mr Edward Meakin:

> I am a buffer; on one side of me there is the big train of British possessions, and whenever they push northward, they will tilt up against me: then on the other side is the shaky concern Afghanistan and on the other side of it is the ponderous train and engine called Roos. Every now and then there is a tilting of Roos towards Afghanistan and simultaneously there is a tilting upwards of the great engine in Calcutta, and I am the poor little button between them. Someday, perhaps not far distant, there will be tilting from the north and Afghanistan will

[12] *Times of India (*hereafter, *TOI)*, 30 June 1947, p. 11.

> smash up. Then there will be a tremendous tilt from the south and I shall be buried in the wreck and lost.[13]

The idea of Kashmir being strategically located had become dominant in Kashmir state's official as well as British colonial state's discourse. But how did the region become so intrinsic to the colonial imagination of the region as a 'strategic location'? What were the processes that transformed these unfamiliar zones into 'controllable territories'?

In her analysis on how the Kashmir Valley came to be seen as a 'desired space' both in colonial and postcolonial imagination, Ananya Jahanara Kabir argues :

> The quality of desire that South Asia associates with the Valley, and which has resulted in "the lure of the land(scape)" and its complicated geopolitics, can be traced to the ill-defined relationship between the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and the British Empire, to the libidinal colonial economy of power, knowledge and control of which it was indirectly part, and to the camera's gaze that made the economy manifest.[14]

Jahanara Kabir's focus lies on the constitution of the Valley as the 'Territory of Desire'[15] when the 'lens of the camera was trained on it'[16], shaping the colonial and post-colonial imagination. However, I am here primarily concerned with how the northern 'frontiers' of the British Empire were central to the colonial discourse on the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a strategically located zone. It is these areas which figured in the colonial discourse as the strategic zones, 'where three empires meet', and the Valley came to be represented as the 'most romantic region of the mysterious east'[17] or simply as the 'Happy Valley'.[18]

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[13] Quoted in Prem Nath Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir* (Srinagar: Kashmir Publishing Company, 1941), p. 395.
[14] Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), p. 14.
[15] Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire*, p. 1.
[16] Ibid., p. 14.
[17] P. Pirie, *Kashmir: The Land of Streams and Solitudes*, p. 35.
[18] W. Wakefield, *The Happy Valley: Sketches of Kashmir and Kashmiris* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1879), is an example of the usage of trope of 'Happy Valley' for describing the Kashmir Valley, which was often repeated in other European travelogues.

The British colonial encounters with the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the areas around it intensified during the 1870s. The British personnel who came in various capacities either as geographers, surveyors, adventurers, to the region converted the unfamiliar landscape into a familiar territory. The post-1870s period was marked by an intense usage of technologies of power. These technologies of power essentially the trigonometrical surveys on the Himalayas and the imperial mapping techniques, opened up a channel of communication between the colonial *sahibs*[19] and the region in a multifaceted manner.

H. H. Austen who went to the Kashmir State as a Topographical Assistant, Government Trigonometrical Survey, Punjab, during the 1860s, regretfully wrote of Kashmir as:

> This country is not ours, and it is perhaps unfortunate for it as well as for us that it was handed over to the MahaRajah Goolab Singh. Much has been said of late respecting the colonisation of the East. The whole of this district is admirably suited for the European occupation, and no part of India assimilated more to a European climate. Had we kept the country, and had British colonies been formed in these hills (a very easy matter), they would have been the means of establishing with greater firmness our supremacy over the north-west of India and in the Punjab.[20]

The British discourse on the Kashmir State constantly drew on the trope of 'melancholia' over the issue of the transfer of Kashmir to the Maharaja. Some of the British officials and visitors believed that Kashmir was best suited to the European taste and should not have been transfered to the Dogra Maharaja. At the same time, increasing explorations began into the northern areas especially Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar and Yasin. Such explorations took the British colonial 'adventurer-cum-official' deep into this unfamiliar landscape. This initiated a process of defining the inhabitants of these regions as the 'Other' and representing them as untouched by colonial modernity, in contrast to the colonial self. The interaction between the colonial

[19] The word is often used in the British travelogues, reports, and memoirs written on these areas. But one needs to bear in mind that much of the usage appears to be shaped by imperial repertoire and techniques and it is difficult to know how the locals actually perceived the British colonial officers/travellers/tourists.

[20] H. H. Austen, 'Notes on the Valley of Kashmir', *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol. 31 (1861), p. 32.

'adventurer-cum-official' and the inhabitants of these areas appeared to the British as some kind of a discovery 'self' made of the 'other'.[21] Francis Younghusband, who held the post of Assistant Resident in Kashmir for three months in 1892, in his tale of how these 'primitive, picturesque hill-men had their first touch with the outside world' in 1895 observed:

> To such [a reference to the scientific society] the Hindu Kush affords the highest interest; for we have here mountain ranges of colossal height and only of the recent years explored, and races of people of a very primitive type, who, shut up for centuries in their mountain fastnesses, have preserved intact much of their original type of manners and customs.[22]

Such interactions and engagements with this region increased the cartographic anxieties of the British. G. W. Hayward who went on exploration in Gilgit and Yasin noted in 1870 that : 'Our maps must be very faulty in their delineations of the country [here country is a reference to Yasin] about the Pamir and the junction of the Hindu-Kush and Karakoram chains'. [23] These technologies of power for knowledge production, especially mapping, served multiple purposes for the British colonial state. The conversion of the unfamiliar landscape into a familiar and controllable territory through these technologies of power meant an epistemological control over vast areas of the State.

It was during the reign of the Maharaja Pratap Singh (1885-1925), the third Dogra Ruler, that the British Resident (Mr Plowden) boldly proposed that the British government set the *Maharaja* aside and rule the country themselves. However, H. H. Durand, the then Foreign Secretary, in his minute wrote:

> I do not agree with Mr Plowden, the Resident in Kashmir, in this matter. He is too much inclined to set Kashmir aside in all ways, and to assume that if we want a thing done we must do it ourselves…that we should limit our overt interference as far as possible to the organisation of a responsible military force in Gilgit. If we annex Gilgit or put an end to the suzerainty of Kashmir over the petty

[21] For further on similar kind of interactions see Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, Trans. Richard Howard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 3.
[22] F.E. Younghusband, 'Chitral, Hunza, and the Hindu Kush', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May, 1895), p. 410.
[23] G. W. Hayward, 'Letters from Mr. G W Hayward on His Explorations in Gilgit and Yassin', *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol. 41 (1871), p. 2.

> principalities of the neighbourhood, we shall run the risk of turning the Durbar against us and thereby increase the difficulty of the position.…No doubt we must have practically the control of Kashmir relations with those principalities, but this we have already. Indeed, the Durbar has now…asked Mr Plowden [Resident] to advise the Gilgit authorities direct without reference to them. If we have a quiet and judicious Officer at Gilgit, who will get the Kashmir force into thorough order and abstain from unnecessary exercise of his influence, we shall…in a short time, have the whole thing in our hand without hurting any one's feelings. [24]

But significantly the British turned to a 'pacification' policy in these areas around the 1890s. Younghusband noted that there were many crucial reasons of interest in these regions. According to him, 'these are political and military reasons. Here is the point where, as the title of Mr. Knight's remarkably interesting book runs, 'Three Empires Meet.' The Indian, the Russian, and the Chinese empires all meet here, and where three such empires meet the eyes of the people who inhabit them must naturally be turned'.[25] According to the British logic, it was the 'imperial game', which was a guiding force for such intervention in those regions.[26] As these areas, Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Gilgit and adjoining areas were embedded in the colonial knowledge production practices, the possibility of finding direct land routes to Yarkand drew increasing colonial attention. Hayward, who was awarded the Geographical Society's Gold medal for his Yarkand trip, noted, 'I have always been of the opinion that the true road from India to Yarkand is from Peshawar via the Chitral Valley, or from Kashmir via the Yassin and Gilgit valleys and not over Karakoram range'.[27]

The trope of the region 'where three Empires met', the possibility of trade routes to China, the image of warring chieftains and the internal disorder in these regions attracting Russian or Chinese intrusion into the territory, created conditions for British intervention in the area. By 1892, the 'Gilgit Agency' was firmly established in the area.[28] It comprised of Gilgit, independent states: Hunza and Nagar,

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[24] Quoted in Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir*, pp. 48-49.
[25] Younghusband, 'Chitral, Hunza, and the Hindu Kush', p. 410.
[26] For more on the developments in China and Russia which shaped the British policy in these regions, see Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir A Disputed Legacy* (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991), pp. 17-43.
[27] Hayward, 'Letters from Hayward', p. 8.
[28] 'Retrocession of the Gilgit sub-division to Kashmir', Political Department,1947, File No. 29-R (S)/47, NAI.

political districts comprising of Yasin, Koh-Ghizar, Ishkoman and Punial and 'tribal areas' which included Chilas. The Mirs of Hunza and Nagar governed the independent states, while political districts were governed by local governors who were directly under the control of the British Political Agent at Gilgit and Assistant Political Agent at Gupis.[29]

During much of the twentieth century, these tracts were governed by both British and the Maharaja (though his role had been turned into a nominal one). However, the task left unaccomplished during Pratap Singh's rule materialized during the reign of Maharaja Hari Singh (1925-1947), the fourth and the last Dogra Maharaja of Kashmir. It was during the tenure of Captain Colonel Colvin as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir state that Maharaja Hari Singh agreed to the transfer of Gilgit (sub-division). The agreement was signed and exchanged at Jammu on 26 March 1935. The Gilgit wazarat or sub-division was leased to the British for sixty years and the agreement was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on 3 April 1935. Accordingly, the state troops and the officers had to be called back from Gilgit.[30] This ended the dual control over these regions and the British control over these tracts increased considerably.

By this time the threat to British Indian possessions may have appeared alarming to the British. The British intervention true to the spirit of paramountcy seemed to be based on the principle of the right to intervention vested in a sovereign state for the preservation of its independence and security. Prem Nath Bazaz noted, 'If the dread of the Czarist Russia descending upon India through Kashmir was great in the past, the possibility of an invasion of Red Russia, whose boundaries after the inclusion of Tajdikistan and Uzbekistan in the U.S.S.R have come very near to Gilgit, are much greater'.[31]

Gilgit had dawned on the British imagination as a place 'Where Three Empires Meet'. The British in the true sense of being a territorial sovereign exercised

[29] 'Gilgit Agency and Leh Treaty Road, Administrative Report for the year 1943', External Affairs (hereafter, EA), 1944, File No. 584-X/44, NAI.
[30] *Wattan*, 21 September 1936, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1936, File No. 176/321/N-204, JSA.
[31] Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir,* pp. 394-98.

tremendous control over the region to safeguard their Empire. In 1947, when the British decide to 'retrocede' the area back to the Kashmir State, it once again became a site of immense political anxieties for the colonial state. Within the British imperial discourse, the Gilgit area had come to occupy a significant position, as noted by H. Weightman:

> The Gilgit area in the past and still does constitute a most glorious area for a "free-for-all" where the enterprising adventurer can give full rein to his ambitions unless he knows that there is a stern policeman behind his shoulder.[32]

And no doubt this policeman was personified by the British Raj itself.

Cartographic Anxieties: Mapping Territories, Overlapping Sovereignties

Maps are often used as a technology of governance. Often used to extend control of the states or the empires, maps have the power to 'transform the land into territory'.[33] In this section, I argue that the imperial mapping practices connected with the colonial state's 'governmentality' and techniques of governance. Such practices resulted in the transformation of 'Gilgit Agency' areas into a familiar territory of accountability in governance which resulted in an increasing control over these areas. The colonial mapping practices and the categories that it produced proved crucial in the governing practices of the colonial state in these areas.

The section brings centre stage one episode of British colonial state's cartographic anxiety to see how 'imperial mapping' practices exercized control over the 'Gilgit Agency'. The 'imperial mapping' of the 'Gilgit Agency' ensured that once these areas were mapped, and therefore controlled, contested claims of sovereignty over these areas were established. Were they to be included within the British Empire or part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir? Here, the matters which needed settlement did not appear to be between a paramount power and a subordinate one, i.e.

[32] 'Retrocession of Gilgit Sub-Division to the Kashmir State', Political Department, 1947, File No. 29-R (S)/47, NAI.
[33] Mathew Edney, 'The Irony of Imperial Mapping' in James R Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire* (London and Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009), p. 11.

an 'indirectly' ruled princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. But the matter proved to be more a case of 'overlapping sovereignties'. The claims of the local rulers, especially the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar, added further to the complexity of the problem of determining who ultimately was the sovereign power in the Agency. This confirms that the question of territory was intrinsic to the ideal of sovereignty in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during much of the period under study.

The British obsession with cartography brought the Kashmir State and the British at loggerheads with each other over the demarcation of the boundary between them in the northern areas in early 1940s. The reference to such a dispute arose from the criticism over the manner in which the boundaries had been demarcated in the political map of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The administrative report for the State of Jammu and Kashmir (October 1941-April 1943) had delineated boundaries and the whole of 'Gilgit Agency' (sub-division, tribal areas, political districts and Hunza and Nagar states) had been included within the State of Jammu and Kashmir (map. 2). This map, according to J S H Shattock, was very important because it was in frequent use in Kashmir.[34]

The British took cognizance of the fact and the clarification of the Kashmir map on the insistence of the Political Department led them to review the question of India's map generally. But why did the production of the map cause such anxieties to the colonial state? The map not only brought the question of status of Hunza and Nagir states centre stage to British colonial discourse around this time, but it also brought into question the limits of the Kashmir State defined by the Treaty of Amritsar, as well as the limits of the British Empire, the 'frontiers' of the Empire.The Prime Minister of Kashmir, in 1938, asserted that the territories, Hunza, Nagir, Chilas, Koh-Ghizar, Ishkoman and Yasin were a part and parcel of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.[35] Such a position created anxieties in the British political circles, owing to the importance that had been attached to the region over time. At the same time, the colonial state found itself in a dilemma. While it was hesitant to communicate the

[34] Political Department, 1944, File No. 17(27)-P/44, NAI; 'Undemarcated external frontier of India in Baltistan in Kashmir and Nagir-Gilgit Agency', EA, 1945, File No. 317.C.A (Secret), NAI.

[35] 'Status of Hunza and Nagir and Political Districts of Chilas, Koh-Ghizar, Ishkoman and Yasin vis-à-vis Kashmir State', Political Department, 1941, File No. 112-P (Secret)/41, NAI.

decision to the Kashmir State about the status of these territories, which was bound to have a discouraging effect on the war efforts of the Kashmir State, it was unable to accept the latter's contention that these territories belonged to the State.

The British government responded thus:

> Chitral was not recognised as a part of the Kashmir State but was a separate Indian State, that the northern part of the Gilgit Wazarat (and ofcourse the southern part which is not in issue) and Punial, a jagir of Kashmir State, were recognized as part of Kashmir, and Darel and Tangir were not. Of the territories in issue remain Hunza, Nagar, Chilas, Koh-Ghizar, Ishkuman and Yasin. We do not regard these territories as part of Kashmir…These under Kashmir's suzerainty and not a part of Kashmir.[36]

Mathew Edney argues that maps and mapping technologies have 'played crucial roles in the constitution of modern states and empires, not only as instruments of knowledge through which to regulate and control spatial activities but also as devices to constitute the state's territorial coherency.'[37] Edney postulates that, 'Imperial mapping is an ironical act: the population in the mapped territories remains ignorant while another population is actively enabled and empowered to know the mapped territories'.[38] The irony of the 'imperial mapping' for the state of Jammu and Kashmir was such that the mapping techniques had threatened the territorial coherency that the state of Jammu and Kashmir had claimed for so long. The imperial mapping, in fact, could challenge the territorial fixity of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The excision of these areas, the British believed, was of 'peculiar sentimental importance' to the Kashmir state, as it would deprive the state of its 'proud position' of being the largest State of India.[39]

Simultaneous to the mapping practices, the British colonial state through law began to tighten its grip over the areas by removing any possible challenge to the

[36] Demi-Official Letter from L C L Griffin, Additional Secretary, Political Department to Lieutenant Colonel D M S Fraser No. D. 1324-Fed.I/38, 21 November 1938, Political Department, 1941, File No. 112-P (Secret)/41, NAI.
[37] Mathew H Edney, 'Mapping Empires, Mapping Bodies: Reflections on the Use and Abuse of Cartography', *Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia*, 63, 2007, p. 84.
[38] Edney, 'The Irony of Imperial Mapping', p. 13.
[39] 'Status of Hunza and Nagir', Political Department, 1941, File No. 112-P (Secret)/41, NAI.

exercise of British sovereignty in these areas. The post-1935 period was marked by increasing efforts of the British colonial state to actively intervene in the 'Gilgit Agency' matters. The colonial law practised in the 'Gilgit Agency' was based on the principle of a separation between the civil and criminal cases. The officials in political districts and the 'tribal areas' were put in charge to dispose the civil cases arising in the areas. They were to deal with cases according to the local custom and could appoint *Jirgas*[40] to investigate the cases. The criminal cases were to be disposed by the British appointed Political Agents and the Assistant Political Agents. While the colonial state separated the law into civil and criminal branches in its categorization, it was deeply ambiguous in terms of defining which cases would fall within each category which left the British Agents in a dominant position. The political officers were conferred with power under the Frontier Crimes Regulation which was to be used in criminal cases.[41] In fact, the main forces in the area known as Gilgit Scouts[42] were put under direct control and supervision of the Resident in Kashmir directly under the orders of Crown Representative.[43]

How were these cartographic anxieties and the nature of power relations that had developed in 'Gilgit Agency' to shape the political developments in the State on the eve of independence? Or let us pose a different question and ask how did the developments in the Kashmir State affect the nature of sovereignty over this region on partition? The territorial claims of the Kashmir State on the partitioning of the state in 1947 had far greater implications than one would have imagined. The 'Gilgit Agency' became a site of territorial contestations once again when the British decided to 'retrocede' the Gilgit sub-division to the Kashmir State, owing to the principle of lapse of Paramountcy, with the termination of the 1935 agreement with effect from 1

[40] *Jirga* is a word, which connotes some kind of a council of elders that Governors of these areas could appoint to hear the civil cases.

[41] 'Exercise by the Political Officers of the Jurisdiction over the Political Districts in the Gilgit Agency', EA, 1940, File No. 724-X/40, NAI; 'Gilgit Diaries', EA, 1940, File No. 63-X/40, NAI; 'Gilgit Agency Political Diaries for the year 1944', EA, 1944, File No. 319-C.A/44, NAI.

[42] Gilgit Scouts was the main body of forces in Gilgit Agency enlisted from the local population but restricted to the areas under Gilgit Agency. The Commandant of forces who was required to address the Mirs of the independent states or Governors of Political Districts for the required number did the enlistment. In Gilgit sub-division, the Commandant was to ascertain the suitability of a person from the Assistant Political Agent for recruitment.

[43] 'Amendment to Gilgit Scouts Law vesting in general powers of supervision and control over the Gilgit Scouts in the Resident in Kashmir', EA, 1944, File No. 330-C.A (Secret), NAI.

August 1947.[44] It is difficult to ascertain, due to paucity of archival material, the real intentions of the British for transferring the control of 'Gilgit Agency' over to the Kashmir State when throughout the 1930s and 1940s they ascertained that no area of Gilgit Agency, except Punial and Gilgit wazarat, was part of the State.

Alastair Lamb argues, 'there was no legal or constitutional reason why the lease should inevitably end with the departure of the British since it did not, in itself, involve the doctrine of Paramountcy. It could have perfectly been transferred to one of the successor states to the Indian Empire, which is practice would almost certainly have meant Pakistan.' [45] Lamb saw the transfer as a British attempt during Mounbatten's Viceroyalty, though an unsuccessful one, to ensure that the 'guardianship of this strategic region be entrusted to the bigger, stronger, and apparently more reliable of the two successors to the British Raj, India'.[46] However, one must bear in mind the fact that the question of transferring the control of 'Gilgit Agency' to the Kashmir State had begun to make rounds as early as March 1947 in the official policy, way before the partition plan was accepted. No doubt Indian leaders especially Nehru were not incognizant of its strategic location. As late as July 1947, Nehru maintained :

> In regard to the major matter of handing over Gilgit, I would suggest that no immediate steps should be taken...Plans are being made for Standstill agreements and other arrangements with the States and any premature steps taken now might have consequences which do not fit in with the future arrangements. It is probable that some decision might be made by the Kashmir government in regard to future association with the Dominion in the course of the next two or three weeks.[47]

The 'retrocession' of 'Gilgit Agency' to the Kashmir State was bound to affect a far wider field. The Agency had primarily been a conglomerate of tribal areas, political districts and some small independent states. By 1947 it was almost treated as independent of the Kashmir State. Major G. C. L. Crichton wrote on 27 March 1947:

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[44] 'Retrocession of Gilgit Sub-Division to the Kashmir State', Political Department, 1947, File No 29-R (S)/47, NAI.
[45] Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, p. 75.
[46] Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy*, p. 74.
[47] 'Retrocession of Gilgit sub-Division to the Kashmir State', File No. 29-R (S)/47, NAI.

> It will affect the independent states of Hunza and Nagar, the Governorships of Punial, Kuh-Ghizar, Yasin and Ishkoman, the "republic" of Chilas (administered as a frontier tract) and, though less directly, the Tribal territories of Darel and Tangir. Although these areas acknowledge the suzerainty of Kashmir (except I think Tangir) none of them is a part of Kashmir State and their relations with the Government of India have been hitherto (even before 1935) conducted directly by the Political Agent at Gilgit who also supervised their relation with the Kashmir Darbar.[48]

Since the late 19th century the region's strategic location had remained a central trope in the colonial state's official discourse. As soon as the question of the transfer of the 'Gilgit Agency' was raised in 1947, certain colonial officials felt that it was likely to prejudice Indian nationalist interests in the spheres of external relations and defence. It was perceived by the colonial officials that if Kashmir chose to remain outside of the new Constitution, which is if it chose to remain independent of both the nation-states, or if the Maharaja tried to link the State to a form of 'regional government which was not acceptable to Muslims', it will create trouble in the State.[49]

The political developments in British India shaped the political anxieties of the colonial state while the question of transfer was being discussed. It was believed by certain British officials that 'there was a possibility that retrocession of a Muslim area to a Hindu State being taken as a pretext by fanatical leaders to incite Muslims in North West Frontier and Northern Punjab to embarrass the Government [British]'. The different polities that inhabited this region from the late 19th Century had shown tendencies of a 'dislike of direct Kashmir rule'. Against this background, Major Crichton maintained that 'it would be unwise to assume that the Chiefs and peoples of 'Gilgit Agency' would acquiesce in being handed over to the direct administration of the Kashmir Government'.[50]

Martin Sokefeld argues,

[48] Ibid.
[49] 'Retrocession of the Gilgit Sub-Division to the Kashmir State', Political Department, 1947, File No. 29-R (S)/47, NAI.
[50] Ibid.

> The British gave control of the Gilgit Agency to the maharaja of Kashmir….A Kashmiri governor, Brigadier Ghansar Singh, was sent to Gilgit but was unable to establish power. He lacked both the consent and the force to do so. The Gilgit Scouts, who before had been a crucial instrument in the British continuation of power, became now a power in themselves-a power aiming with increasing determination to the establishment of a Pakistani administration in Gilgit.[51]

Sokefeld further argues that the people of Gilgit had favoured joining Pakistan as they were all Muslims, with the exception of a small section of Kashmiri Hindus.[52] Since the region had been controlled by the British and over the years had drawn distant from Kashmir, it seems most likely that Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference, which the nationalist history claims to be the representative of the majority of Muslims of the state, held no ground in these areas. The British colonial rule had closer association with these areas than the Kashmir Valley or Jammu, and their decision to transfer the control to Kashmir Durbar manifested fissures within the political fabric of State of Jammu and Kashmir. The closing of the 'Gilgit Agency' had opened up multitude of possibilities in these conglomerated polities. G. C. L. Crichton wrote:

> Hunza might seek to renew its associations with China or conceivably, with an independent communist republic of Sianking which might be Chinese or Soviet in complexion; Chitral might seek to recover the lost Khushwakt "dominions" of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman and brinfg them with itself into the Pakistan fold; and the Raja of Punial might throw off the Kashmir yoke (he holds his jagir from the Maharaja) and seek, like his ancestors to carve out an independent kingdom embracing Darel, Tangir and Chilas, again for the benefit of Pakistan.[53]

Much to the apprehension of Major Crichton, the presence of the 'overlapping sovereignties' complicated the partition story of the State. Soon after the accession of Maharaja to the Dominion of India, the Gilgit Scouts rose in a rebellion against the Maharaja. On the night of 31 October 1947, Ghansar Singh was put under arrest by

[51] Martin Sokefeld, 'From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism: Changing Modes of Domination in the Northern Areas of Pakistan', *The Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), p. 957.
[52] Sokefeld, 'Changing Modes of Domination', p. 957.
[53] 'Retrocession of Gilgit Sub-Division to the Kashmir State', Political Department, 1947, File No. 29-R (S)/47, NAI.

the Scouts and a provisional government was formed. On 4 November 1947, Major Brown, who commanded the Gilgit Scouts, hoisted the Pakistani flag in the area.[54]

But what was the trajectory that the independent states of Hunza and Nagir followed during Kashmir's partition 'imbroglio'? While the most of these areas joined Pakistan, a question on the constitutional status of Hunza and Nagir began to draw the attention of the Ministry of States in India. There was a consensus within the Ministry that they were separate entities. It was maintained:

> So far therefore as the present decision goes, Hunza and Nagir are separate from Kashmir and are technically entitled to accede to either of the Dominion though in view of their close association with Kashmir in the past they should do so in consultation with the Maharaja of Kashmir…Hunza's status was also held to resemble closely that of Chitral which according to the newspaper reports has acceded to Pakistan. Hunza will, therefore, appear to have full discretion to opt in favour of either Dominion, but there is no doubt that the Mir and the Muslim population will only vote for Pakistan, which has already been done.[55]

In 1948, the Government of India recognized these states as independent states. But why do these independent states then continue to be treated as part of Kashmir's disputed territory? In fact, Pakistan has also been reluctant in accepting the region as part of Pakistan. As Yakub Khan Bangash argues:

> The status, and hence the accession, of Hunza and Nagar is still held hostage to Pakistan's preoccupation with the Kashmir dispute, where it does not want to jeopardise its position by incorporating states over which Kashmir had a claim. This is because if and when a plebiscite, as demanded by UN resolutions, or negotiations concerning the final status of Jammu and Kashmir take place, these wholly Muslim territories will play a crucial role in the bolstering Pakistan's case in terms of both votes and the strength of the religious argument in favour of the state forming a part of Pakistan owing to its Muslim majority.[56]

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[54] P N K Bamzai, *Cultural and Political History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: M D Publications, 1994), Vol 3, p. 766.

[55] 'Constitutional Position of Hunza, Nagir', Ministry of States (hereafter, MOS), 1948, File No. 1-K/48, NAI.

[56] Yakub Khan Bangash, 'Three Forgotten Accessions: Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 139-40.

In fact, India's acceptance of their independent status in 1948 was closely tied with the question of the plebiscite in the state. The position was:

> In case of [Junagadh] we have maintained that the will of the people as to the future of the State, shall prevail and consequently held a referendum…which was overwhelmingly favourable to Dominion of India. If such a referendum is held in Hunza and Nagir, it is not known whether they will be in our favour in view of the fact that most of the subjects who are illiterates are tribesmen and are likely to be carried away by Pakistan's cry of "Islam in Danger".[57]

Most of the histories written on Kashmir's partition are focused around the political developments unfolding in the Kashmir Valley. While both the nation-states got involved in the contestations over the Valley, these areas were relegated to the margins. This has resulted in the marginalization of other narratives, especially the complicated background of the Gilgit story. The partition of Kashmir in 1947 was in fact a much more complicated process than the otherwise claimed 'tribal invasion' story.

The discourse on these regions centre around the issue of cartographic as well as political anxieties for both the colonial state as well as the Kashmir state, and was further inherited by the post-partition successor states. The political anxieties of the Raj spilled over into the sphere of the archival content too during the war period. The British set up a censorship bureau in the Residency Office in July 1941 as a conscious attempt to keep a closer watch over the events in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The intelligence authorities in British India began forwarding to the First Assistant of Kashmir Resident extracts of the correspondence by the leaders of both National and the Muslim Conference which was deemed necessary to comprehend the political and other movements in Kashmir in critical times such as the war. As Ann Laura Stoler notes, it is important to tend to 'colonialism's archival content which may help one attain insights into the social imaginaries of colonial rule'.[58] The British proscribed books like Prem Nath Bazaz's *Inside Kashmir* under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, (1931), in 1942, on the grounds that in addition to 'attacking His

[57] 'Constitutional Position of Hunza and Nagar', MOS, 1948, File No. 1-K/48, NAI.
[58] Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 20.

Highness and his government and certain sections of his subjects', the book contained passages that tended to bring the 'Paramount Power into contempt'.

'Departing' British, 'Devolving' Princely Order

Within the imperial discourse of ruling over the subcontinent, the princes and states appeared to be an asset both in times of peace and war. The relationship between the British and the princely states as reiterated by Lord Canning in 1860 was that of the princes serving as backwaters to the storm and serving their own interests when times were quiet. He stated:

> Should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States. But to make them so, we must treat their Chiefs…with consideration and generosity, teaching them that in spite of all suspicions to the contrary their independence is safe.[59]

The princes, as Barbara Ramusack argues, 'represented a continuity in the traditional state formation'. The princes remained autonomous rulers, exercised authority and power within their own states. According to Ramusack, the devolution of the princely political order took place in 1948 when almost all the princely states were more or less integrated with either of the two independent dominions. She notes, 'the British had not reduced the native states into some theatre states where ritual was dominant and governmental functions relegated to imperial surrogates'. The Raj, according to her, as the sovereign restrained its sovereignty to only three matters i.e., defence, external affairs and communications.[60] Such an arrangement had to be struck with the princely states on the eve of partition unless new negotiations would finalise the nature of relationship between the former princely states and the Independent Dominions. Throughout the 1940s, within the discourse of handing power over to the people the princely states had been given a fair space to negotiate their position. With

[59] Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power, 1942-47* (hereafter, TOP), Volume II, p.16; EA, 1943, File No. 22 (3)-G, NAI.
[60] Barbara Ramusack, *The New Cambridge History of India: The Indian Princes and their States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 2.

respect to the making of the future constitution of an independent dominion/dominions, they could negotiate the terms on which they would want their relationship with them.

It has been argued that the fate of the princely states was 'doomed even before the Government of India Act of 1935 opened the way for the transfer of major powers to democratically elected politicians in British India'.[61] In fact, as late as 1946, Gandhi was perceived to be a well-wisher of the princely order. Gandhi in his conversation with Ramchandra Kak, Kashmir's Premier, had insisted that princes may be retained provided they acted as 'trustees for the people and agreed to the conversion of their states into limited monarchies'.[62] In almost all constitutional negotiations, the princely states made every effort to limit the intrusion into their powers and resented any proposal of imposing a constitutional framework which was unacceptable to them. The Chamber of Princes in 1940 while acknowledging the place India would attain in the British Commonwealth made it clear that they were seeking a parity with the proposed 'Dominion'. The princes were powerful enough to restrict any movement for the devolution of their powers and 'empires'. The demise of the princely order had not yet become the order of the day, which it was to become later upon independence. However, a shift in the power balances became much more visible throughout the 1940s. The Chamber of Princes in March 1940 passed a resolution which showed that the princes were unwilling to make any compromise on the sovereignty that they enjoyed in their respective states. One of the resolutions said:

> In any future constitution for India the essential guarantees and safeguards for the preservation of the sovereignty and autonomy of the States and for the protection of their rights arising from treaties, sanads, engagements or otherwise should be effectively provided and that any unit should not be placed in a position to dominate the others or to interfere with the rights and safeguards guaranteed to them and that all parties must be ensured their due share and fair-play.[63]

[61] Jefferey (ed.), *People, Princes and Paramount Power*, p.11.
[62] 'Disturbances in Srinagar', Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[63] 'Proceedings of the Meeting of the Chamber of Princes (Narendra Mandal) held at New Delhi on the 11th and 12th March 1940', EA, 1940, File No 103-G, NAI.

The Chamber of Princes further notified:

> Any constitutional scheme which may involve the transference of the relationship of the States with the Crown to any other authority without their free and voluntary agreement or which may permit of alterations affecting the rights and interests of the States without their consent cannot be acceptable to them.[64]

The British as the paramount power did not reduce these states into 'hollow crowns'[65] as fair amount of independence was enjoyed by them in their internal matters. At the peak of the Indian nationalist movement and the rising demands for self-government, the British colonial state as a sovereign restrained itself by not forcing the princely states to introduce democratic institutions in their states. It was left to the rulers of the states to introduce any constitutional changes in their respective states. The British in this sense were not a sovereign power in the absolute sense. This became much more obvious in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where the British colonial state's sovereignty was just limited to maintaining the defence on what formed the northern 'frontiers' of both the Empire and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Maharaja enjoyed enormous freedom to maintain the internal affairs.

A rift seems to have developed in the relationship between the Crown and the Princes with the omission of the reference to Crown's Treaty obligations to the States in the new Draft Declaration relating to the constitutional advance in India brought by Sir Strafford Cripps.[66] The treaties and the engagements with the princes had shaped and formed the 'ceremonial power' of the Empire within the South Asian context. Against the background of the unconditional war efforts undertaken by the princely states, such an omission indeed caused misgivings in the minds of the Princes and their loyal subjects. Digvijaysingh, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, in 1943 maintained:

> The Indian Princes have no desire to raise any controversial issues in the duration of the War…Nevertheless, certain recent happenings, arising out of the Cripps Mission, have caused, and are bound to accentuate, grave anxiety to the

[64] Ibid.
[65] Nicholas Dirks, *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[66] *TOP*, Vol II, p. 168.

> Princes and their loyal subjects, and have occasioned intense feeling of profound disappointment in the States. These developments, must state in all the frankness, have been a particular shock to the Indian Princes who feel special personal attachment to His Majesty the King Emperor.[67]

Such an occasion gave Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and others a reason to claim that the Treaties (between the British Crown and the Indian Princes) must be scrapped. He, in fact, declared 'that those who talk of the Treaties with Indian States were "lunatics, knaves or fools".'[68] Not long after Nehru's declaration, Sheikh Abdullah, the President of the National Conference and Vice President of the All States People's Conference during the Quit Kashmir Movement in 1946, declared that the treaty between the Crown and the Maharaja should be revoked. The British Resident in Kashmir reported that, 'He [Sheikh Abdullah] encouraged his adherents by urging them "to break the Treaty of Amritsar" and adopted a new slogan for the party, 'Quit Kashmir''.[69]

The princes' decision to rally around the British Crown in war efforts resulted in characterising them as the 'bulwarks of the British rule' in India. The princes in the meeting of the Chamber of Princes in 1940 said:

> The Indian Princes have been described, by certain interested critics, as obstacles in the path of the ordered progress of India and the States. We have been accused glibly of conspiring with the British Government against the political evolution of our motherland. These are baseless insinuations, which we emphatically repudiate. Our traditions and our actions belie all such charges. We stand for India attaining its full stature, wherein all components[sic] parts and interests and classes may be assured the fullest scope of their moral, material and cultural development.[70]

The Cripps Mission caused anxieties and deep disappointment among the princes. The Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes took cognizance of the Cripps Mission and

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[67] 'Copy of a letter from H. H. Jam Sahib, Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and a copy of the reply to it regarding the clarification of the position of the Indian States in views of Cripps Mission', EA, 1943, File No. 22 (3)-G, NAI.

[68] *TOP*, Vol II, p. 168.

[69] 'Muslim Grievances in Kashmir and Disturbances in the State', Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P(S)/46, NAI.

[70] 'Proceedings of the Meeting of the Chamber of Princes (Narendra Mandal) held at New Delhi on the 11th and 12th March 1940', EA, 1940, File No 103-G, NAI.

complained to the Viceroy's Political Adviser about 'the failure of the Draft Declaration of March 1942 to include an assurance that the British Government stands by its treaty obligations to the States, and of the apparent intention to impose a revision of these treaties on the Ruler'.[71] However, soon thereafter, the British sincerity to the princes had to be proved. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the war efforts of the larger states had been reassuring. Against this background, the British could do nothing but reassure the states of their sovereign powers and their independence and of the unflagging protection by the Paramount Power. Referring to the ruling princes, Lord Halifax, former Viceroy of India in a speech at New York Town Hall, said:

> They and their States do not fit easily into the picture of India as the Congress Party would like to draw it. Yet the independence of the Princes is enshrined in solemn treaties with the King Emperor and such are only alterable by negotiation. To scrap these or any treaties unilaterally would be to scrap one of the principles for which we went to war with Germany.[72]

The attitude of the princes and the Congress party came in conflict with the position the states were likely to take in the constitutional framework. The growing intervention of the Congress leaders in the states created enormous anxieties among the princes. While the Congress party especially leaders like Nehru stood for the dissolution of the princely political order, the princes were eager to join the Federation but only as independent units and autonomous bodies safeguarding their internal sovereignty. The Chamber of Princes in 1940 maintained:

> We feel that it would be a sad tradition if people from one unit, be it a State or a Province, are permitted to march in to the territory of the other unit in order to coerce its duly constituted authority to take matters within its competence. Such tendencies, which have lately exhibited themselves, if not arrested in time would be an invitation to civil war in the country which all patriotic Indians must join their hands to avert.[73]

The Declaration of the 12 May 1946 made it clear that the colonial state's policy towards the states remained unchanged. It was decided that by the time of the transfer

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[71] *TOP,* Volume II, p. 894.
[72] *TOI*, 9 April 1942, p. 4; EA, 1943, File No. 22 (3)-G, NAI.
[73] 'Proceedings of the Chamber of Princes', EA , File No. 103-G, NAI.

of power, the rights which the states had surrendered to the 'Paramount Power' will be returned back to them. The States would then be free to enter either the Constituent Assembly or make any other arrangements which they may deem necessary.[74] However, after the Mountbatten Plan of 2 June 1947, the Congress became anxious to gain some kind of paramountcy rights over the states. In a letter to Mountbatten, Nehru was worried over the prospect of some of the states declaring independent status. He wrote:

> The States are so situated if they are independent entities they can create very great difficulties in the administration of even the rest of India. It is impossible for us to admit the right of any of these States to independence and to do just what they will. That affects the whole of India's administration, defence and other problems. We are prepared to deal with them in as friendly as manner as possible, but we cannot admit the right of a declaration of independence by a State such as Bhopal intends to do. It must be remembered that the protection which the States possess will also go with paramountcy.[75]

Even before the Mountbatten Plan, was accepted the Congress had adopted a policy of rigorous intervention in the states and had given both symbolic and material support to political struggles for responsible government in the princely states. The *Maharaja* of Kashmir believed that such an intervention was unfortunate and likely to harm their interests. Jawaharlal Nehru's demand to enter Kashmir during the year 1946 was viewed by the Kashmir government as a way to bring pressure on the State, despite the states having appointed a Negotiating Committee. The committee was to negotiate a framework for the future constitution of the whole of India, and for the possible formation of a strong and representative Interim Central Government.[76]

In his unflinching determination and support for the people's struggles, Nehru declared the Treaty Rights as "dead as doornail",[77] which was considered as a threat to the internal sovereignty by the Maharaja of Kashmir. For many in Kashmir, as well

[74] *TOP*, Volume XI, p.
[75] *TOP*, Volume XI, p.129.
[76] 'Disturbances in Srinagar, Kashmir State', Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P(S)/46, NAI.
[77] 'Treaty Rights As Dead as Doornail', *The Statesman*, 24 June 1946, Press Cutting, Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.

as in British India, Nehru had chosen to go off at a tangent, and his provocative mission to Kashmir was seen as an unnecessary venture.

The Maharaja, in his speech to the Durbar, came heavily on such an intervention which according to him could pose a threat to the internal peace and order of the State. Addressing the Durbar about his policies, the Maharaja reiterated:

> The second principle which guides our policy is that so far as our domestic affairs are concerned we must work out our own destiny without dictation from any quarter which is not a part and parcel of the state. There are many organisations in the state representing different interests and opinions of State subjects. These organisations are free to operate within the law and to express their views in constitutional manner. These views are already represented in the state legislative assembly which has an elected majority. Freedom of association as assured, and all such views are given and will continue to be given their due weight. But the balance must be maintained, and no single interest can be allowed to dictate even within the State, unless constitutional government becomes a mockery.[78]

Such a policy towards the states was bound to create a great deal of friction between the states and the two Dominions. It would create a tense situation in states where the issue of accession to either of the Dominions was complicated by the fact of states being inhabited by diverse population, who were divided in their political leanings. The State of Jammu and Kashmir eventually came to exemplify this complexity.

With the lapse of British paramountcy over the Indian States, in fact an opinion was garnered for pushing forward the idea that Indian Union should claim the paramountcy rights over the states. As independence drew closer, the princely states found their sovereignty under constant threat. On 20 August 1947, V. K. John, a barrister, wrote to Sardar Patel:

> Now that Hyderabad and Bhopal have not acceded to the Indian Union, you may not give up the right of the Indian Union to exercise paramountcy over the Indian States but must assert the right and get it recognised by other Nations. There is not the slightest doubt that under the principles of International law the Indian Union being the Paramount Power within a well defined geographical area has a right to exercise paramountcy over smaller powers (the Indian States) within that

[78] 'Draft of the Speech of His Highness for the Darbar on 15th July 1946', Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.

> geographical area… Paramountcy has to be exercised for the self preservation and security of the Indian Union….Pandit Nehru has rightly said that recognition of independence of any Indian States will be considered as an unfriendly act against the Indian Union. This must be repeated.[79]

C. C. Desai, the additional Secretary to the States Department, responding to John's letter saying, 'We entirely agree with your conclusions and suggestions and hope to act accordingly as opportunities present themselves'.[80]

Even as late as 3 June 1947, on the question of a direct contact between the Centre and the States the British policy was that care should be 'taken to avoid any impression that there is a change in the relationship of States with the Central Government.'[81] Was the approach of the Indian Dominion towards the princely states, which did not accede to the Dominion, guided by the proposed policy of inheritance of paramountcy over the smaller powers?

The Maharaja: 'Reigning or 'Ruling'

Kashmir's political landscape had been dotted with the political struggles over time which became more strident in the post-1931 period, a period which is most often referred to as the beginning of the history of Kashmir's Freedom Struggle.[82] By the first decade of the twentieth century, Mridu Rai argues that 'the religious nature of the Dogra-Hindu state of Jammu and Kashmir had set into motion a competition channelled along religious lines for the symbolic, political and economic resources of the state among communities also defined religiously'.[83]

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[79] 'Exercising Paramountcy over Indian States, Press article by Dr. V. K. John on the theory of Paramountcy', MOS, 1947, File No. 41-PR/47, NAI.
[80] Ibid.
[81] 'Indian States Negotiations with Crown Representative in regard to matters relating to the lapse of Paramountcy', Political Department, 1947, File No. 35-R (S)/47, NAI.
[82] Works like F. M Hassnain, *Freedom Struggle in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Rima Publishing House, 1988), U.K Zutshi, *Emergence of Political Awakening in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1986), A.H Suhrawardy, *Tragedy in Kashmir* (Lahore: Wajidalis Limited, 1983) have dealt with the period in detail and more or less see this period as the beginning of Kashmir's freedom struggle
[83] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and The History of Kashmir* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2004), p. 224.

Throughout the decade of the 1930s, the political mobilization had largely taken place along similar lines. The common perception of discrimination was based on the question of religion among the majority of State's subjects. Ironically, this ensured that the political discourse throughout the 1940s would extract the language of a political community based on religious affiliations even when the trend was set for a more inclusive kind of politics with the changing of the Muslim Conference into All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. In fact, as Mridu Rai argues, 'the political rhetoric of 'secular' Sheikh Abdullah, National Conference President, was based not on the refusal of distinction between religion and rights. Rather the denial of the rights to majority of the subjects was rooted in the religious nature of the state'.[84]

It is crucial to understand the construction of subjecthood more so in constituting the category of a 'Muslim subject' and also to understand the Dogra 'governmentalities', which established the relationships of power. In his message to the Praja Sabha, Maharaja Hari Singh declared:

> Deeply pained to hear about the regrettable happenings in Srinagar city and Jammu Province as a result of an alleged insult to the 'Founder of Great Religion' and a supposed danger to the Hindu dharma, *further* causing considerable tension of feeling between the communities…let me assure all my beloved subjects that, in the Jammu and Kashmir State, there is not, there can never be, the slightest risk or danger to the peaceful profession or practice of any faith. [85]

When the 'Muslim subjects' of the State demanded economic or political rights, which according to the State were couched in a religious idiom, they came in conflict with the Dogra State's image of a 'secular' state. In these sites of contestations with the Dogra State, the demand for a reconfiguration of Dogra sovereignty and political subjectivity of Muslims was dubbed simply as 'communal'.

The constitution of 'Muslim subject' exposes the hollowness of the category of an inclusive subject and freedom of religion as represented in the political

[84] Rai, *Hindu Rulers*, p. 274.
[85] 'Message from His Highness Bahadur to the Praja Sabha', Publicity Department, 1939, File No. 495/P.N-11, JSA.

discourse of the Dogra State. Maharaja Hari Singh had made it clear to his subjects that he stood by, what he had proclaimed six years ago, the ban on cow-slaughter which had led to agitation of 1938. Maharaja maintained:

> I particularly wish to refer in this connection to a malicious rumour now being spread that cow killing is shortly going to be permitted. This malicious rumour has no foundation whatever…There is no question whatever of making any change in the matter. To that declaration I adhere.[86]

The Maharaja ensured his subjects that he had read the judgement of the High Court on the law regarding cow-slaughter. He reiterated:

> In fact, the High Court is not competent to alter the Law. As the members of Praja Sabha you know that no law of the kind can, in the normal course, be changed unless it is passed by the Sabha and assented to by me.[87]

Ironically, the paradox of sovereignty came to the fore. The paradox itself was reflected in a society in which the rule of law prevailed and was guaranteed by a sovereign who was above the law.

The language of the state would often attempt to universalize the notion of freedom of religion, but the concept of the freedom as a normative relation in the society needs to be questioned. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault writes:

> Freedom is never anything other than an actual relation between the governors and the governed, a relation in which the measure the "too little" existing freedom is given by the "even more" freedom demanded…The new governmental reason needs freedom therefore, the new art of government consumes freedom. It consumes freedom which means that it must produce it, it must organize it…it is clear that at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different and mobile problematic relationship between the production of freedom and that which in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it.[88]

[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Michel Foucault, *The Birth Of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979,* Trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 63-64.

The Muslims of Srinagar City during the 1938 agitation had drawn on the trope of oppression faced by the heroes of Islam during its early phase to make parallels with the ongoing oppression of the Dogra State on the Muslims of the State.[89] One of the articles maintained:

> What injustice that so much care is paid to the religious feelings of less than 2 percent of the population, and on occasion of every Id hundreds of Muslims who owing to their poverty cannot afford to sacrifice a lamb (and kill a cow) are involved into trouble for a period of ten years. A whole village is put under detention and imprisoned for the sake of a single cow. Cow slaughter has been considered to be such a grave offence that it has been made cognizable.[90]

The ban on the cow-killing issue remained crucial to certain political groups in Kashmir, especially the Muslim Conference and formed an important site on which the Muslims could possibly seek a negotiation with the Kashmir Government. During the 1946 agitation, Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah and several other leaders condemned the alleged 'military and police excesses' and reiterated the view of their party (the Muslim Conference) that the Muslims should be given various concessions such as the right to kill cows and that they should be granted a more responsible government under His Highness.[91] In the political discourses of Kashmir, the perception of the state, as negotiating through the principle of religious difference among the subjects, had by now become firm.

The category of the 'Muslim subject' was not a homogenous one and would often be defined differently on the basis of regional identities: the Jammu Muslim versus the Kashmiri Muslim. The Muslim subject as the 'other' had been constituted through Dogra 'governmentalities'.[92] At the Jammu session of the Muslim Conference held on 26 and 27 of March 1938, several resolutions were passed including a resolution to the effect that the government should grant representation in

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[89] *Islam,* Srinagar, 29 June 1937, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, File No.62/N-157, JSA. The same newspaper continued to publish similar stories in its other issues.

[90] Ibid.

[91] 'Fortnightly reports on the political situations in Kashmir Residency for the year 1946 (ending 15th June 1946)', Political Department, 1947, File No.5 (5)-P (S)/47, NAI.

[92] Here I am using the notion of 'governmentalities' not just as a tool to think about government and governing, but also how people think about the way they are being governed.

the public services to Muslims in proportion to their population in the State. In the same session, another resolution was passed asking for retrocession of the rights of the Muslims who were Hindu converts.[93]

The 'Muslim subjects' of the state perceived these measures as contradictions in the government's discourse of a 'constitutional' monarchy. The people launched a scathing criticism of the governmental practices, suggesting the government to 'better take off the "constitutional veil", and openly resort to personal rule'.[94]

The disinheritance of Hindu converts had been fully dealt with in the Glancy Commission Report of 1931, and it was recognised that it was no legitimate grievance on account of the Muslim subjects. The report maintained that, under the 'Hindu Law' a convert loses his share in ancestral property, while under the 'Muslim Law' a convert is liable to death and is certainly excluded from inheritance. A meeting held by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, on the pretext of observing 18 September 1942 as "Religious Liberty Day", insisted that the 32 lakh Muslims of the State had no religious liberty, and the Hindu Rajputs could openly make a display of arms. Among the many resolutions that the Conference passed was against the law pertaining to the confiscation of property on change of religion, which they believed was a 'black spot on the fair name of humanity in the 20th Century'.[95]

The Political Advisor Corfield in his Minute on Kashmir on 1 June 1946 noted that there was no case for unilateral action in favour of Muslims and any legislation in line with the British Indian Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, would conflict with both Hindu and Muslim religions and have undesirable reactions.[96] This reflects the political anxieties of the colonial state to interfere in matters of religion in the princely states which was usually the case of those provinces under the direct control of the colonial state.

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[93] *Annual Administrative Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State* for the Samvat 1994-95 (15th October, 1937- 16th October, 1938), p. 37.
[94] *Wattan,* dated 9 September 1935, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, File No. 176/321/N-204, JSA.
[95] 'Posters issued by the Publicity Secretary Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference', Publicity Department, 1942, File No. PR/M-313/B (A), JSA.
[96] 'Political Advisor's (Sd.Corfield) Minute on Kashmir of 1 June 1946', Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.

The nature of the State Forces became one of the major factors that conflicted with the interests of Muslims. The total expulsion of the Kashmiri Muslims from the State Forces underlines the fissures within society. Mridu Rai argues that no commonality of interests had emerged between the Muslims of the Valley and those of Jammu. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the political leadership of both the regions struck alliances with each other and such an uneasy relationship was almost always liable to break under any possible strain. [97] Prem Nath Bazaz sees this regional disparity in terms of some sort of a 'provincial prejudice', the Muslims of Jammu being different from those of Kashmiri Muslims in terms of race, language and culture.[98] These differences between the two regions were relegated to the margins when political agitations were launched for the rights of the Muslim subjects. The 'intra-community' fissures would often blur and 'inter-community' boundaries appeared to be reinforced. Never was one totally subsumed by the other within the socio-political fabric of the state during late 1930s and much of the 1940s.

After the careful examination of the Educational Reorganisation Committee in 1938, it was decided that 'simple Urdu' should be the medium of instruction with the optional use of Roman and Devanagari script. The Muslims maintained that only 'pure Urdu' with the Persian script should be obligatory.[99] Chitralekha Zutshi remarks:

> The National Conference's stance on the medium of instruction was double-edged, and again illuminated the inability of its leadership to reconcile the "religious" and "regional" aspects of its ideology. While Abdullah made public speeches exhorting his followers to fight until the government's order was rescinded since it was a move to foist Hindu culture on Muslims.[100]

Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah as a representative of the Muslim Conference registered a complex response, stating that Kashmir Government's attempt at introducing

[97] Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects*, p. 266.
[98] Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir*, pp. 262-3.
[99] Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.
[100] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), p. 269.

Devanagari script was actually an attempt to spread Hindi in the name of Hindustani [*simple Urdu*].[101]The differences were bridged but never completely erased.

The adoption of the Pakistan Plan by the Muslim League in British India began to have repercussions on the politics of Kashmir. The introduction of Hindi in the State against this background meant that the State ingratiated itself as a way to govern this crucial element associated with its subjects. One of the newspapers reported that after the issue of Pakistan came up in British India, the Kashmir Government began to promulgate such policies sternly. It maintained that the State was not just engaged in the discriminatory practices like the disinheritance of property on conversion or the cow-protection, but the Arms Act added fuel to the already precarious situation in the State. In addition, the introduction of Hindi would be disastrous for the social fabric of Kashmir and would create more antagonism between communities.[102]

Ironically, the 'national leadership' drew on the rhetoric of Urdu as binding Muslims together and as a marker of a 'Muslim identity'. In fact, the languages that were spoken in the region included Kashmiri, spoken by 14 lakh subjects, Dogri, Punjabi and Lahnde by 9 lakh subjects, Pahari, Gujari by 9 lakh, Balti, Ladakhi Shina by 3 lakh subjects.[103] And the national leadership did not find it necessary to claim a space for the language most spoken within the political discourse of the 'national movement'.

At another level, the state had created a rift in the social fabric of Kashmir through enactment of The Jammu and Kashmir Arms Act, 1997 (1941) with the exception that only the Hindu-Rajputs (Dogras) were allowed to keep one firearm per family. The enforcement of the Arms Law raised a furore, and 'much propaganda was carried by interested persons both in the Press and on the platform to mislead the public as to the intentions of the Government in introducing this legislation'.[104] It created a deep sense of suspicion among several communities who were barred from

[101] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*, p. 270.
[102] *Javeed*, Jammu, 15 November 1945.
[103] Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.
[104] *Administrative Report of the Police Department for the last 6 months of S.1998 and S.1999* (1942, 1943).

keeping the arms. His Highness' Government had claimed to have kept in mind all reasonable facilities given to the subjects of the State in matter of obtaining licences for the possession of arms and ammunition. Yet, there were elements of discrimination and exclusion. Not just were Hindu-Rajputs permitted to keep firearms, severe restrictions were placed on their possession by other communities. Even zamindars who lived in the wild illaqas of Kashmir hills were barred from keeping firearms even though they faced danger from wild animals.

The fears had increased in the wake of an open display of arms by Rajputs in the capital city of Jammu, when a new convert Ghulam Sakina was abducted by few armed Rajputs in the presence of the Government Offices in 1943.[105] Ghulam Sakina was a Hindu who had converted to Islam and married a Muslim. The Hindu Rajputs of Jammu objected to the claims of the woman and believed it was a case of forceful conversion.[106] The arming of one segment of the population, in times when different communities looked upon each other with suspicion, was perceived by many as an act of political dishonesty. This represented the sharpening of religious identities already visible in the political fabric of Jammu.

A pamphlet issued by the Muslim Conference in 1943 shows how the community which was denied the benefits of this law had begun to speculate why the other community was being armed. It averred:

> We should admit this truth (regretfully though) that this partial law has been greatly felt by the Muslims. They think that it has not only created a communal gulf, but has endangered the security of Muslims. And experience has shown that their suspicions cannot be dismissed as unfounded.[107]

The open display of arms in the capital of the State exposes the hollowness of the Maharaja's rule over the vast majority of his subjects.

The transformation of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference in 1939 marked a shift in the language used by various political actors on ideals of rights, subjectivity and nationhood. The discourse surrounding political parties, particularly the National Conference and the Muslim Conference and their claims,

[105] Publicity Department, 1943, File No. PR/M-313/B (A), JSA.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Publicity Department, 1943, File No. M/15/43/N, JSA.

whether economic or political, were recast in the political struggle in Kashmir's political spaces. This struggle in the political landscape of Kashmir refers to a battle for space and recognition in the evolving power structures.

When dealing with the question of the nature of the Dogra State and the history of Kashmir under the Dogras, most of the works focus on the idea of one monolithic Dogra state. The Dogra sovereignty, as we have studied in the chapter, functioned in multiple forms within the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Moving away from Agamben's idea of sovereignty, in which all power emanated from the sovereign who is above the law, the chapter illustrates that multiple relations of power were evident within the State. The Foucauldian approach helps us deconstruct the idea of a monolithic Dogra state and unfold the nature and process of devolution of the Dogra sovereignty in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The chapter has also tried to explore the many ways in which the political and cartographic anxieties of the colonial state continued to shape the discourses of nation-states in post-colonial era. The chapter shows that the category of 'indirect rule' is insufficient to understand the multiple dynamics of colonialism in the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Chapter 2
The Changing Political Landscape: Negotiating Varied Political Spaces

In the 1940s, the political culture in the State of Jammu and Kashmir underwent remarkable transformation. A reconfiguration of political spaces resulted in contestations among various communities for asserting their political rights in the late 1930s and the 1940s. Contestations among various communities created internal differentiation within the Muslim majority community.

The Muslim Conference, formed in 1932, emerged as a leading political force in the State. It dominated the Kashmiri politics throughout the 1930s. The Muslim Conference was transformed into the National Conference in 1939. This transformation marked a shift in the prevailing discourse on Kashmir's politics. This is particularly evident in the changing use of the term from 'communal' to 'national' in the political language of the National Conference. The party's discourse began to emphasize on a national collectivity moving away from its earlier emphasis on communitarian identities. However, when some of the members of the National Conference severed ties with Sheikh Abdullah, the leading figure of the party, they 'renewed' the former Muslim Conference in 1941 and retained the old name for their party. The 'renewed' Muslim Conference's language continued to draw on the earlier trope of religiously defined communtarian identities.

The nationalist histories unquestionably accept that the National Conference was the most popular party in the Kashmiri landscape throughout the 1940s. The chapter maps how the renewed Muslim Conference was not just able to rise in popularity by the mid-1940s, it was also able to challenge the dominant position the National Conference once enjoyed in State politics.

The transformed National Conference claimed to be the most popular party in the State during the 1940s. However, contestations were apparent from varied political voices as early as the 1940. The 1940s saw the resurgence of the Muslim Conference, Prem Nath Bazaz's Young Men's Socialist Party, and various student unions and *sabhas*. These parties, unions and *sabhas,* interacted with each other, but

continuously opposed each other's political discourses. They changed the nature of Kashmir's political landscape in the decade before the partition. Such changes had far greater consequences on the subsequent partitioning of the state in 1947 than what has been acknowledged in the existing scholarship on Kashmir's partition. It was through the intense efforts at the reorganisation of political spaces and contestations among various political agents often with no desire to share power with each other throughout the 1940s which created a fertile ground for the partitioning of the State in 1947.

The British creation of the modern State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846 and their handing over the State to Maharaja Gulab Singh resulted in the creation of the category of a 'Kashmiri subject', who experienced the subjection (though it was experienced differently across classes and communities), rose to challenge the Dogra 'governmentalities'[1], which had created hierarchies within the state bureaucracy based on religious affiliations, caste and kinship ties. A study of the Dogra 'governmentalities' in this period would allow one to understand the shift in the balance of power and the role played by personal and political resentment in shaping the new contours of Kashmir's political order. A critique of Kashmiri subjection by the Dogras and negotiation for re-defining the political subjectivity intensified during the 1940s which meant a reconstitution of Kashmiri subjects as 'sovereigns' in their own right. This chapter traces these changing political discourses on Kashmiri politics and shifts in the political languages of multiple political players in the State.

From the 1930s, the idea of 'responsible Government' became the dominant theme in Kashmir's political discourse on democratic rights. The chapter maps the discourse of the National Conference and attempts to show how it vehemently drew on the trope of subjecthood to challenge the Dogra legitimacy to rule over the Kashmiris. This political discourse was centered largely around the issue of overthrowing the Dogra Sovereignty and autocracy from early 1946. In 1944, the National Conference had framed the programme of 'Naya Kashmir', an idea of a new Kashmir. It was followed by a campaign of 'Quit Kashmir' led by Sheikh Abdullah which intensified the national movement for '*azadi*' in the state of Jammu and

[1] Stephen Legg, *Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

Kashmir and questioned the legitimacy of Dogra sovereignty. The chapter will focus on what '*azadi*' meant in the Kashmiri context of the 1940s and show how often its meanings were at variance with the freedom struggle in the British Indian context.

While the National Conference's discourse drew heavily on the ideas of '*wattaniyat*' in the decade before the partition, the renewed Muslim Conference's political language drew on the tropes of '*millat*', '*millat-e-Islam*' in support of the Muslim League's demand for 'Pakistan'. The political landscape changed rapidly and was entangled with the political developments at the all-India level. The 1940s were marked by intense efforts to 'nationalize' the 'princely spaces' and the State of Jammu and Kashmir entered into the Indian nationalist imaginations as a fountainhead of secular politics. Since 'integration' of the princely states in an all-India federation acquired far greater significance as late as 1946, it resulted in the marginalization of narratives of partition in princely states. The chapter shows how the efforts to bring the 'regions' closer to the 'national' were marked by tensions and the transition from the 'princely space' to the 'national space', as represented by India, was not a smooth process.

Negotiating Political Subjectivity: The Muslim Conference and the National Conference

Albion Banerji, who served Kashmir as its Foreign and Political Minister, remarked in 1929 that the Kashmiri people, 'absolutely illiterate', largely 'Mohammedan', 'labouring under poverty', were governed like 'dumb-driven cattle'.[2] Banerji's observation about the people of Kashmir offers a striking example of the ways in which Kashmiri subjects were conceptualised in certain political narratives. The Kashmiri subject may not have been unaware of his political subjectivity[3], contrary to what Banerji seemed to have suggested in his harrowing observation on the condition of the Kashmiri people. Years of 'Dogra Imperialism', Bazaz claimed, had reduced

[2] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet published by General Secretary All India States' People's Conference, Bombay, Publicity Department, 1939, File No. BK-11, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu Repository (hereafter JSA).

[3] Subjectivity in the chapter refers to the consciousness of understanding the self, the lived experience and the world that the self inhabits. It denotes the formation of a Kashmiri subject in the political act of resisting and questioning their subjection by the Dogra State.

other non-Dogra communities to 'humble places of inferiors' in the state machinery. The Valley of Kashmir, according to him, had to face the Dogras and their 'imperialism' who in turn were 'vassals to the British super-imperialism'.[4] The people of Kashmir soon after Banerji's statement rose against the government in its functioning and its treatment towards communities, especially the Muslims during the 'agitation' of the 1930s.

Banerji was perhaps unaware of the various agitations led by the shawl weavers from late nineteenth century onwards when he made his observations about the lack of initiative[5] and organized political activity or existence of political oganizations among the Kashmiris. This led Banerji to conclude that the people lacked any sense of political subjectivity and were driven like 'dumb cattle'.

According to Prem Nath Bazaz, during the years 1925-31, efforts were made [mostly by the Kashmiri Pandits] to resist the domination of the non-state subjects[6] in the state bureaucracy. Against the backdrop of the growing resentment against the 'foreign'[7] elements in the state machinery, changes in Kashmir's political landscape became visible. While anti-'foreign' elements of the movement, "Kashmir for Kashmiris"[8], was led mostly by Pandits, the political fabric began to show clear signs of transformation. The term 'state-subjects' only served the interests of a handful of the middle class, the vast peasantry remained almost untouched by it. The dissatisfaction grew especially among the educated young Muslims who found it difficult to secure employment in the state services. The peasant masses subjected to abject poverty, burdened by a load of taxes, added to their woes. According to the

[4] Prem Nath Bazaz, *The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, Cultural and Political, From the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (New Delhi: Kashmir Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 127-128.
[5] For more on the earlier agitations see, P N K Bamzai, *Culture and Political History of Kashmir*, *Vol. 3* (New Delhi: MD Publications, 1994); Mohammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom*, *Vol. 1* (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd, 1977).
[6] As a part of the several changes resulting due to the efforts from the various sections, a law was passed in 1927, which codified the definition of the hereditary state-subjects restricting the employment of the non-state subjects in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The 'state-subjects' were those who were permanently residing in Kashmir since Maharaja Gulab Singh's time.
[7] In many sources, the term 'foreign' refers to the non-state subjects who had secured important positions in the state machinery at the cost of state-subjects of Kashmir State.
[8] Bazaz, *History of Freedom Struggle*, p. 145.

pamphlet, *Kashmir*, dissatisfaction among the people 'remained a smouldering fire'.[9] This cycle of public resentment against the 'foreign' elements, against an almost total absence of any administrative restructuring, inability to secure employment, gave way to a popular movement and 'gigantic' movement of 1931.[10]

In the turn of events, Kashmir was abuzz with agitations which drew on the religious rhetoric of "Islam in Danger".[11] A few incidents followed such as the alleged mishandling of the Quran by a 'Hindu' police constable, an interference in the deliverance of the religious sermon on Id in 1931, and denial of permission to the Muslims of Digore village to offer Id prayers the same year, on some piece of land co-shared by Hindus and Muslims, stirred the political climate. Around this time, the political language merged with religious language in the discourses on Kashmiri politics in the 1930s. These events were followed by gatherings in the charged political atmosphere. One such gathering was held at *Khanqah-i-Maula*, Srinagar, on 21 June 1931. The aim of the gathering was to elect representatives, who would present the grievances of the Muslim community to the Maharaja at the insistence of G. E. C Wakefield, the Political Minister of Kashmir. In Jammu, Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas and others were elected. The gathering at *Khanqah* ended in a virulent speech by a Punjabi Muslim Abdul Qadir, which resulted in his arrest. It was during his trial that Muslims forced themselves into the prison compound and were fired upon, resulting in the death of twenty-one persons on 13 July 1931.[12] This incident became the pretext of the 'continual spell of agitational politics'[13] in the 1930s and 40s. The Muslim Conference, the first major political organization in the State, established in 1932, needs to be located in the context of turbulent years and in the face of continuous denial of a political voice by the Kashmir government.

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[9] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet, p. 4.
[10] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet p. 7.
[11] Bazaz, *History of Freedom Struggle*, p. 152.
[12] For detailed firsthand account of the incidents, see Prem Nath Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir* (New Delhi: Kashmir Publishing House, 1941*)*, *and Struggle for Freedom*. Other important works which deal with the events of 1930s are Bamzai, *Culture and Political History*; Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom*, and G M D Sufi, *Kashir: Being A History of Kashmir, from Earliest Times to our Own, Vol. II* (Lahore*:* University of Punjab, 1948). For historical literature on the nature of 1931 movement see U K Zutshi, *Emergence of Political Awakening in Kashmir* (Delhi: Manohar, 1986). For politics of Identity and Political Mobilization during the 1930s, see Zutshi, *The Languages of Belonging*, Rai, *Hindu rulers, Muslim Subjects*.
[13] U K Zutshi, *Emergence of Political Awakening*, p. ix.

Chitralekha Zutshi argues that the year 1931 stood for an inauguration of the dreaded term "communalism" in the otherwise non-communal political atmosphere of Kashmir. She believes that it is an overstatement to say that 1931 marked the beginning of anti-Dogra political activity. She further notes, 'what one cannot ignore is that the course of Kashmiri politics steered towards the anti-colonial politics of British India from 1931'.[14] It is true that political movements in Kashmir were far more influenced by political developments in British India around this time and were removed from any opposition to Dogra polity. However, it was from the early 1940s that the National Conference, though not in an organised form, began to register its opposition to British policies. In Kashmir's political discourse, the anti-colonial or anti-British rhetoric became intense only from the early 1940s. During this decade the struggles in Kashmir came to be seen as deeply entangled with freedom struggle in British India, and not in the 1930s as Chitralekha Zutshi has argued.

Not only did the contemporaries like Bazaz define the movement of 1931 in 'communal' terms, for instance, the 'Muslims rising against the Hindu government and Hindus', but later writings about the movement maintained that the reaction of the Hindus was laden with communal overtones. Saraf wrote, 'The wave of the political awakening which had thus begun to blow was construed as a danger by the State Hindus because of their obstinate unwillingness to share power with the majority.'[15] There is a sense of surprise in U. K. Zutshi's writing while raising the question of how the 1931 movement was marked by 'communal discord', a feature that is claimed to be antithetical to the traditions of Kashmir?[16] The traditions that U. K. Zutshi sought to invoke are necessarily tied with the idea of different religious communities of Kashmir Valley living amicably with each other since time immemorial.[17]

[14] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*, p. 211.
[15] Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom*, pp. 333-39.
[16] U K Zutshi, *Political Awakening*, p. 5.
[17] The term, '*Kashmiriyat'* is loosely used to refer to such uniqueness of Kashmir, where the communities are believed to have lived amicably since times immemorial. I am consciously avoiding the usage of the term as it is not found mentioned in any of the archival documents nor is the term used in any of the political discourses on Kashmir during the period under study. Mridu Rai also believes that no such term is present in any of the archival sources that she has looked at through the course of her study in the book, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*.

The communitarian overtones of the 1931 movement are considered by the nationalist histories as an aberration in the unique character of Kashmir's landscape and amicable relations among different communities [and here Kashmir means the Valley]. That is probably why the communitarian nature of the movement was brushed aside in the pamphlet and 'communal tendencies' were ascribed to the outside factor---the Punjabi Muslim press. The pamphlet maintained that the Kashmiri Pandits, the most educated and 'intelligent people' in the State, were at the forefront in demanding the constitutional reforms along with the Kashmiri Muslims. The Kashmiri Pandits were as "anxious as any other community for the introduction of reforms, and equally anxious that the body-politic be not corrupted by the canker of communalism".[18]

Often in the nationalist history writing, the term 'communal' is used retrospectively, imbued with the meanings that the term acquired on the partition of the subcontinent to create a binary of 'communalism' and 'secularism'. In the political discourse of the 1930s in Kashmir, it became apparent that the term 'communal' narrowly defined the interests based on one's community identity. The word 'nationalist' during the 1930s was often pitched against 'communal' to mean that the movements were not confined to one community, but were inclusive. In fact, the word nationalist did not carry the same connotations which it was to acquire on partition. For a more nuanced understanding of the usage of the term in the political discourse, one has to pay close attention to Urdu words: '*firqa warana'* (communal), *'firqa parast'* (sectarian), '*qaum parast'* (nationalist) which were interchangeably used by the Muslim Conference and National Conference. While the binary of 'communal' and 'national' was only introduced in Kashmiri political discourse in the 1930s, distinct boundaries could not be easily created between 'secular' and 'religious' languages and trends in a political setting like Kashmir. Even Sheikh Abdullah, believed to be a votary of secular politics in Kashmir, continued to use religious idioms in his political discourse.

The political movements in the 1930s drew on the language of religion and community. Some form of political activity was possible as the State opened up

[18] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet, p 5.

political spaces for asserting political rights and making religious claims, a significant departure from earlier times when such spaces were not allowed by state structures. To claim a space in the changed political order meant an assertion of the power of one's community, which was primarily defined in religious terms in the official narrative. The Muslims' political assertion was interpreted by non-Muslim communities as a threat to their position and their subsequent displacement from the state machinery. These non-Muslim communities labelled Muslims as 'communal', which not only served them, but served the state also. By claiming a space for themselves in the state machinery, the Muslims attempted to negotiate power within the larger context of Kashmir and thereby challenged their 'communal identity' as defined by the other communities.

This restructuring of the power balance in the state machinery opened a conversation on the issue of 'majority' and 'minority' in the Muslim Conference discourse in the 1930s. In his appeals to woo the minorities in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah in 1934 issued a statement which read:

> Let me hasten to say a few words to my non-Muslim countrymen. The poor Kashmiri Muslim has since the commencement of this battle of liberation of motherland fallen a prey to a vicious propaganda…we should shed all fears and distrust of each other and bridge the gap….Muslim demands are legitimate…rising tide of democracy…speaking for myself this is an appeal that I would make to you…as a well wisher of your country and community as well as mine. Speaking for the Muslims I may assure you that they are prepared to give you the same safeguards, weightages, and all that is necessary in the constitution for the minorities, that the Indian National Congress is prepared to give to Muslims of British India and other minority communities. Perhaps we would be more liberal.[19]

Sheikh Abdullah conscious of his identity as a Kashmiri Muslim called upon his 'non-Muslim countrymen', and not 'Kashmiri countrymen' to allay the fears of each other's communities and bridge the gap between the two. This shows that a 'Kashmiri National identity' was not being forged by the Muslim Conference leader at this stage. At the same time, he introduced the scheme of minority/majority in the Muslim Conference discourse. Contrary to Abdullah's rhetoric, this generated fears

[19] *Kashmir,* Pamphlet, p. 14.

among sections of non-Muslims, who perceived that Muslims being the majority community in a restructured political order or in the devised scheme of constitutional reforms would inevitably place the numerically larger community in a position of power and the displace the minority community, which till then held most of the state positions. The condition of the Muslims in British India was the total opposite of that of Muslims in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In the former, they were placed as a minority in relation to the numerically stronger 'Hindu community', but in the latter they were a majority community with little access to state structures and privileges.

In response to the Muslim Conference's discourse, some Pandits opposed the Responsible Assembly movement and asserted that the restructuring of political power ought not to be based on religious affiliations of communities alone. The newspaper *Wattan* reported:

> It is the economic problems which give rise to political parties and not the religious differences. No distribution of political rights and privileges can take place on the basis of religious belief. If any community is in minority from "religious considerations" it can demand a safeguard for the maintenance of its religion and culture, but not for its economic security.[20]

The Kashmir Government subsequently bent to the amounted pressure from various groups across religious affiliations, inaugurated the Legislative Assembly on 22 April 1934 which consisted of 75 members out of which 12 were government officials, 16 state councillors, 14 nominated and 33 elected members.[21] The Muslim Conference party achieved a splendid success at the polls in 1934 and formed an opposition in the Assembly. This initiated a process to further the constitutional reforms through the efforts of many Muslims and non-Muslims. These groups came together to steer the Kashmiri politics towards inclusionary ideals. In this context, inclusion meant an acceptance of differences between the communities, while not necessarily blurring the community identities, but coming together in the fight for democratic rights for the people and for *azadi*.

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[20] *Wattan,* 20 May 1936, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1935-36, File No. 176/321/N-204, JSA.
[21] 'Constitutional Note on J & K Constitution (Act No. XIV of Samvat 1996)', Publicity Department, 1939, File No. PR/R-14, JSA.

Despite the constitution of the Assembly, people of the State did not give up their fight for a responsible government. Soon people were disgruntled with the functioning of the Assembly which had given powers to the council of ministers, who were seen as constitutionally irresponsible to the people. A newspaper report criticizing the government maintained that 'the government should better take off the "constitutional veil" and resort to personal rule.[22] In opposition to the political discourse of the rising demand for the emancipation of Kashmiris striving to asunder the "fetters of slavery", there was another dominant political discourse which valourized the idea of the Maharaja as the fulcrum through which all power emanated.[23]

Foucault argued in, '*Space, Knowledge, and Power*', that the governance of state had to adapt to the idea of governing the society. It involved not only regulating the place and people but an interaction between the two. He noted how space is allocated, defined and distributed is a foundational and prescriptive element in the ordering of the society. Those spaces once allocated are then the sources of competition between people.[24] Once the Dogra State allowed the constitution of political spaces, intra and intercommunity struggles began to intensify.

Soon after the creation of the Muslim Conference in 1932 with Sheikh Abdullah as its President, Chaudhri Ghulam Abbass its General Secretary, a rift occurred in the newly formed party. Victoria Schofield argues that Sheikh Abdullah's insistence on 'secularism' was the prime factor for the breakaway of prominent Muslim leaders like Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah from the party.[25] It is true that Yusuf Shah's exit from the organisation was due to the foundational religious differences[26] as

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[22] *Wattan*, 6 July 1935, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1935-36, File No. 176/321/N-204, JSA.
[23] *Wattan,* 14 June 1935, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1935-36, File No. 176/321/N-204, JSA.
[24]Michel Foucault, 'Space, Knowledge and Power'. While Foucault has used the idea of space in terms of guiding the spatial alignments of populations, I seek to use it in the sense how spaces are allotted and competed for in a political set up. http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1412058.files/Week%207/Foucault.SKP.pdf. (Accessed on 14 December 2016).
[25] Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I.B Taurus, 2000), p. 18.
[26] The Muslims of the Valley were divided into two groups; one group, which led the prayers from Jama Masjid Srinagar and from late 19th Century was influenced by Wahabi ideals, and the other Khanqah-i-Maula, which followed more localized Sufi practices within Islam. Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah

Schofield points out. However, to reduce the factors of dissension to the simple binaries of 'secular' and 'communal' seems flawed as there was no clear separation between the two in Kashmir during this period. At this stage, different parties continued to use religious rhetoric while voicing their concerns about economic and political issues. The reason for split may be found in Sheikh Abdullah's address to the gathering on 17 October 1936: 'split between the Conference and M. Yusuf Shah's parties…on the question of sending up members for ensuing Municipal elections. Municipal nominees should be elected only by the Conference which was the only representative body of all Muslims'.[27]

Meanwhile, the Government of India Act of 1935 was passed which formulated an All-India Federation. A central government was to be formed which would represent both the provinces of British India as well as the princely states. While the Act was believed to be a step closer to the constitutional development in India, ironically, the same year the British colonial state sensing danger on the northern frontier from the 'red bear'[28] took direct control over Gilgit Sub-division, a part of the Jammu and Kashmir State. This demonstrated the power of the imperial project of the British colonial state. The provisions in the Act of 1935 brought the 'regions' closer to the 'national' which affected the nature of the politics at regional level in ways unknown earlier.

The All-India Federation Plan opened up new possibilities to bring Kashmir's struggles closer to those in British India. On 29 October 1936, some Hindus and Muslims formed a League named 'Federation Reform League Srinagar'. Jia Lal Kilam was its President, Sheikh Abdullah, G.M Sadiq, M Moh'd Sayeed, M Ahmad Yar, Gobind Ram Kabu and others were chosen as its members. The aim of the group was to ascertain that efforts be made to convene a Conference in India which was to be attended by workers from all 'Indian States'. They sought to secure the

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belonged to the Jama Masjid group, while Sheikh Abdullah had grown closer to the Khanqah-i-Maula group led by Mirwaiz Hamadan. For a detailed account on this, see Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects*, pp. 258-274.

[27] 'C.I.D Dairy for the 18 and 19 October 1936', District Magistrate Office Records, 1936, File No. I, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar Repository (hereafter, SSA).

[28] 'Red Bear' is a term that was used by Prem Nath Bazaz for Soviet Union in several of his books he wrote on Kashmir's history during and after the period under study.

representation of all Indian States' people in the All India Federation.[29] The Rajput Sabha in its meeting on 28 October 1936 had already passed a resolution urging that the post of the Federation Secretary was to be given to a Rajput candidate.[30]

Increasing efforts were made during these years to bring about communal unity. Sheikh Abdullah in collaboration with Prem Nath Bazaz started an Urdu weekly called *Hamdard*. In a joint effort, the elected members of the Legislative Assembly [the Praja Sabha] who believed the Praja Sabha had become a 'mock show' staged a walk out in 1936 in opposition to the Budget. [31] The Muslim Conference party members offered their resignations. This move was hailed as an attempt to shun the differences between the communities. Prem Nath Bazaz, in a gathering in 1936, expressed joy at the cooperation with which both Muslim conference members and S.Budh Singh, a non-Muslim member resigned from the Assembly and 'had shown to the world how the oppressed should be treated'.[32] In the same gathering, Sheikh Abdullah 'expressed his loyalty to His Highness and added that there was a force in the voice of thirty-six lacs of people which will surely bring forth its fruits'.[33] The politics had not yet taken the course which it was to take exactly ten years later when Sheikh Abdullah was no longer willing to declare himself or the Kashmiris, the loyal subjects of his Maharaja. It was in 1946 that the Sheikh vociferously sought to delegitimize the assertion of Dogra sovereignty over Kashmiri subjects through his campaign of 'Quit Kashmir'.

The years 1935-37 marked a decisive change. Efforts to promote politics based on the narrow definitions of communities took a backstage. However, soon Srinagar was affected by 'disturbances'. Other regions, especially Jammu and Poonch, were affected too. The Maharaja in his message to the Praja Sabha wrote, 'An Alleged Insult to the Founder of Great Religion and a supposed danger to the Hindu dharma', were the 'excuses' for the 'regrettable happenings' in Srinagar and in

[29] 'C.I.D Diary for the 29th October and 30th October1936', District Magistrate Office, SSA.
[30] Ibid, 'C.I.D Diary for the 3 November 1936'.
[31] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet, p. 12.
[32] 'C.I.D Dairy for 4 November 1936', District Magistrate Office, SSA.
[33] Ibid.

Jammu during the 1937 summer.[34] In this period, the political discourse of Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah group was constituted essentially on the issue of the Hindu minority versus the Muslim majority. Shifts in the language used by various political actors reveal the subtle structures of power that shaped the State. The Muslims of the State had begun to vehemently draw on the tropes of 'minority' and 'majority' to assert their claims for political and religious freedoms. One of the reports of the newspaper *Islam* maintained,

> It [the government] may understand that we were fighting for the political rights then [1931], but today we are fighting for the respect of our the religion and revera[e]nce for the prophet. The religious sentiments are more sacred than the political sentiments….what injustice that so much care is paid to the religious feeling of less than 2 percent of the population, and on the occasion of Id hundreds of Muslims who owing to their poverty cannot afford to sacrifice a lamb (and kill a cow) are involved into[sic] trouble for ten years. A whole village is put under detention…cow slaughter grave offence…made cognizable.[35]

The issues of economic status (Muslims being poor), religious identities, and struggle for political rights shaped the language of the discourse focusing on the dichotomies between 'majority' and 'minority'; the poor Muslim who formed the 'majority' oppressed by the 'Other', who formed a mere two percent minority.

The 'disturbances' in the State were followed by the imposition of the Section 144 in Srinagar city. Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah's group which had severed ties with Sheikh Abdullah and the Muslim Conference in defiance of the order took out a procession on 26 June 1937 which resulted in the clashes between the 'mob' and the police as a result of which one 'rioter' was killed. While the official archive preferred to define the protesters as 'rioters' and 'mob',[36] the local daily newspaper depicted the procession as a 'peaceful procession' which was lathi charged and arrests made. 300 women had also participated in the procession from Jama Masjid. [37] Not only did the relations between the two communities once again become volatile, the 'disturbances'

[34] 'Message from His Highness Bahadur to the Praja Sabha', Publicity Department, 1937, File No. 495/P.N-11, JSA.
[35] *Islam*, 29 June 1937, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, File No. 62/N-157, JSA.
[36] 'Communal Trouble in Poonch', Political Department, 1937, File No. 347-P (S)/37,National Archives of India (hereafter NAI).
[37] Ibid.

shook the State. The State resorted to violent measures to curb the 'disturbances' and 'mobs'. This was for the first time that various political groups, Sheikh Abdullah's group and Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah's group, used violent methods against each other, inaugurating a dissonant political culture in Kashmir's political spaces, which was to continue during much of the 1940s.

At Poonch, the prisoners went on a hunger strike against the alleged insult to Quran by a jail staff member on 8 June 1937. As a result, the people of the town gathered outside the jail premises and demonstrated against the authorities. The Raja of Poonch suspended the jail Superintendent. The Hindus and the Sikhs of the town protested against his suspension. It was only after the intervention of Sheikh Abdullah and two Hindu leaders that the situation in Poonch was brought under control.[38]

The pamphlet *Kashmir* discussed the nature of politics in British India, and their influence on the political movements in Kashmir. It noted that the Civil Disobedience Movement had 'far-reaching repercussions on the popular struggle of 1931' and later, the Gandhi-Bazaz-Nehru correspondence of 1937 had made a great impact on the political thinking of minorities in Kashmir. The Congress Movement was believed to have filtered down from the educated classes to the masses, some of whom had attended the All-India Congress Session of 1929 held in Lahore.[39]

The pamphlet represented the Kashmiri 'subjects' as lacking in political consciousness, who needed to be woken up by the clarion call of the Congress Movement in British India. The pamphlet maintained silence on the fact that some of these educated men had also been present at the Allahabad Muslim League Session in 1930 where Mohammad Iqbal in his Presidential address had propounded his political ideas clearly. Bazaz gave importance to the influence of Iqbal's conception of pan-Islamism and his political ideology on the young educated men of Kashmir, who returned home in early 1931 from various parts of British India, where they had gone to receive higher education and shaped the future course of Kashmiri politics, Sheikh Abdullah being one of them.[40]

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[38] Communal Trouble in Poonch', Political Department, 1937, File No. 347-P (S)/37, NAI.
[39] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet, p. 7.
[40] Bazaz, *Freedom Struggle*, p. 147.

In January 1938, Sheikh Abdullah met Jawaharlal Nehru and accompanied him on his frontier tour. He was advised by Nehru about the future course of action in Kashmir.[41] Soon thereafter the Jammu Session of the Muslim Conference was held on 27 and 28 March 1938, under the Presidentship of Sheikh Abdullah. In the session a



Frontier Gandhi and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in a village near Achhabal 50 miles from Sirinagar. The above photograph depicts the distressed condition of the village life in Kashmir.

Source: *Kashmir*, Pamphlet published by All-India States' People's Conference Bombay. Date: January 1939, Lahore.

[41] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet, p. 19.

resolution was moved to change the name of the party from Muslim Conference to National Conference. However, the resolution was not passed this time. [42] The States' People's Conference in its pamphlet *Kashmir* would note that it was under the influence of Nehru that Sheikh Abdullah had decided to change the name of the party to National Conference. Prem Nath Bazaz did not give any credit to the Congress and argued that it was the result of the sincere efforts of the Muslim members to nationalise the party. He noted that the Muslim Conference adopted the following resolution:

> In the opinion of the Working Committee the time has now come when all the progressive forces in the country should be rallied under one banner to fight for the achievement of responsible government, the Working Committee recommends to the General Council that in the forthcoming session the name and constitution of the organization be so altered and amended that all such who desire to participate in this political struggle may easily become members of the Conference irrespective of their caste, creed or religion.[43]

The political discourse surrounding the Muslim Conference and other parties underwent a transformation and was transmuted into a struggle for a greater space within Kashmir's larger political collective. Bazaz noted that the Muslim members of the party had initially feared that the party would become a 'hand maid' of the Indian National Congress. It was only after the assurance of Sheikh Abdullah that the party would remain aloof from the Indian National Congress as well as the Muslim League that the Muslim members of the party gave their full support in 1939. Chaudhri Abbas supported the resolution and said, 'Now we are in need of a nationalist guise. The time has come when we should discard the old and decayed mantle and tear it to pieces'.[44]

A further break within the party ranks took place when the National Conference at the Anantnag Session on 1 October 1939 'eulogized Congress and condemned the Muslim League'. This, according to Bazaz, had a disastrous impact on the public opinion. The break within the party did not simply signal a break between

[42] *Annual Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir state for the Samvat 1994-95 (15th Oct. 1937-16th Oct. 1938),* p. 37.
[43] Quoted in Bazaz, *Freedom Struggle*, p. 169.
[44] Bazaz, *Freedom Struggle*, p.171.

the 'secular' and 'communal' forces, as argued by scholars like Schofield. The break occurred owing to Sheikh Abdullah's and other party member's insistence on bringing the party closer to the Indian National Congress which led to the secession of some members. Prominent Muslim leaders, especially from Jammu, Allah Rakha Sagar, and Chaudhri Abbas resigned from the party.[45] This break set in motion another kind of struggle among various parties. The changes became more prominent with the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 by the Muslim League. Kashmir's political landscape from the 1940s became a microcosm of the larger political battles fought in British India. It was as if Kashmir had become a smaller battlefield for fighting the political battles of British India, especially those between the Muslim League and Indian National Congress. However, in certain respects, the political discourses continued to draw on the local struggles in Kashmir which were mostly defined by local specificities and were in tension with larger political struggles in British India.

The former Muslim Conference workers and its votaries, as well as the 'progressive Hindus', were quick to realize the shortcomings of the political movement of the 1930s for a responsible government. The political spaces had to be reordered and made inclusive in order to redefine political subjectivity within Kashmir's newly emerged political spaces. In the emerging political discourse on the nature of politics, a shift became apparent from late 1930s. This was a shift from politics which was narrowly based on communitarian interests to a more inclusive 'national' struggle for the rights of the people. From this period onwards, a binary was created between the terms 'national' and 'communal' in the political discourse. Yet, the political rhetoric was based on the idea that 'Hindus', 'Muslims', and 'Sikhs' came together as 'different communities' to join in the fight for democratic rights and a 'responsible government', and not as one 'Nationality'. The shift in the political discourse did not necessarily mean the blurring of community identities, defined on the basis of religious affiliations, but was an acceptance to make the movement more inclusive, more 'national' and not 'communal'.[46] The community identities continued

[45] Bazaz, *Freedom Struggle,* p.171.

[46] One has to be very careful about the usage of the term 'communal' in our historical discourses. When the term 'communal' was used in the political spaces of Kashmir during the 1930s, it did not carry the connotations that the term acquired on partition and the subsequent partition-related violence.

to shape the political sensibilities of various political workers. In 1944 it was in the National Conference's programme of 'Naya Kashmir' that Sheikh Abdullah introduced the idea of a national identity.

Competing Political Discourses: '*Wattaniyat*' and '*Millat*'

In the year 1939, All-India States' People's Conference was held in Ludhiana under the Presidency of Nehru. While the political activists in Kashmir had formed a federation group in 1936, it was the platform of the All-India States' People's Conference which brought the political struggles in the State of Jammu and Kashmir closer to those in British India. The Conference in 1939 passed a resolution in solidarity with the struggle of Kashmiri people in their fight for a responsible government. The Conference condemned the Notification No. 19L, which normalised the application of Martial Law in the State.[47] While the movements in states had been closely watched earlier, it was during this period that Kashmir began to enter the 'secular nationalist' imagination of Nehru. The front page of the pamphlet issued by the States' People's Conference contained some of the lines penned by Nehru on Kashmir, 'The Glorious Valley darkened by ordinances which are monstrous in their severity'.[48] This demonstrates the closer connection that Nehru began to forge with the 'secular nationalist' forces in Kashmir.

In 1940, Kashmir's political scene became a site of competition among different political outfits, i.e. the National Conference, local branches of the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, and the Sanatan Dharma Young Men's association. As soon as the National Conference came closer to the Congress, Nehru accompanied by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan paid a visit to the State in May 1940. The

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The term 'communal' meant defining the interests of a community in relation to and in opposition to the other community/communities. It meant prioritizing one's own 'communitarian interests' in relation to others.

[47] 'All-India States' People's Conference Resolutions', Publicity Department, 1939, File No. BK-11, JSA.

[48] *Kashmir*, Pamphlet, front page.

Muslim Leaguers greeted them with black flags which created an 'atmosphere of unpleasantness' in the State.[49]

The decade of the 1940s opened into an 'inter-party war of recriminations' between the two leaders, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and Sheikh Abdullah and their followers.[50] Originally, Muslim Conference was formed as a single anti-government party. But overtime its members were involved in many of the internecine fights resulting in emergence of breakaway parties which adopted violent measures during several of the intra-community clashes. Both the parties tried to secure outside support and sought affiliations with bodies from outside the State 'for the sake of prestige and dignity, and help for the sake of actual power'.[51] While Sheikh became closer to Congress ideology, the members prominent in the former Muslim Conference in Jammu took upon themselves to renew the party using its previous name, the Muslim Conference, in 1941. The Jammu leaders, Chaudhri Abbas and Allah Rakha Sagar, persuaded Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah to join the 'renewed' Muslim Conference. They were believed to have 'completely accepted the programme of the Muslim League and adopted the Pakistan cry'.[52]

The demand for Pakistan has been studied from different vantage points. The historical studies have largely focussed on what the demand meant in the Muslim majority provinces in British India and how it was different in provinces where Muslims were in a minority.[53] The demand for 'Pakistan' was, according to Christophe Jaffrelot, a 'nationalism without a nation'.[54] Ayesha Jalal argues that the Lahore Resolution of 1940, usually seen as the clarion call for the creation of 'Pakistan' as a separate state by historians, was a 'bargaining point of Jinnah and the League.'[55] More recently, Venkat Dhulipala has argued that the idea of Pakistan developed and was hugely discussed in the public sphere in the United Provinces, in

[49] *Annual Administration Report of the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the Samvat 1996-97 (17th Oct. 1939-15th Oct. 1940),* p. 68.
[50] 'Political Situation in Kashmir', Publicity Department, 1942, File No. PR 200-I-42, JSA.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850* (London: Routledge, 2000).
[54] Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience* (New Delhi: Random House India, 2015).
[55] Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty,* p. 57.

the last decade of British rule in India. He argues, 'it was the popular enthusiasm with which the idea of Pakistan was discussed and debated, which resulted in the final achievement of Pakistan as a nation for the Indian Muslims'.[56]

Seldom has the response from the Princely States to the demand for creation of 'Pakistan' been the focus of historiography on South Asia. There is a complete historiographical lacunae on how the princely states interpreted and responded to the demand for 'Pakistan'. In the northern most and largest of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, what were the meanings attached to the demand for Pakistan?. This section brings into focus how the demand in turn affected internal politics and shaped different competing political spaces in Kashmir.

Even before the creation of the 'Pakistani' nation, maps of 'Pakistan' were drawn. A cartographic imagination of the 'imagined nation' and a 'distinct nation' for Muslims had taken shape. Chaudhry Rahmat Ali propounded the creation of a Muslim majority state in his pamphlet "Now or Never" using the name 'PAKSTAN' for the first time in 1934. Rahmat Ali wrote,

> I am enclosing herewith an appeal on behalf of the thirty million Muslims of PAKISTAN, who live in the five Northern Units of India--Punjab, North-West Frontier (Afghan) Province, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. It embodies their demand for the recognition of their national status, as distinct from the other inhabitants of India, by the grant to Pakistan of a separate Federal Constitution on religious, social and historical grounds.[57]

It is most unlikely that Rahmat Ali's discourse created any impact on the political discourses in Kashmir. But by the time of the Lahore Resolution in 1940, the idea of a nation seemed to have taken roots within Kashmir's political discourse especially among the revived Muslim Conference group and its supporters. Dhulipala argues Pakistan was not formed accidently. The idea of Pakistan had become well entrenched in the popular discourses in the 1940s. It is true that the idea of 'Pakistan' had become popular within the public sphere in Kashmir as well. The case of Kashmir, a Muslim

[56] Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015) p. 4.
[57] http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_rahmatali_1933.html. (Accessed 15 April 2017)

majority state, which was to share a large portion of its boundary with the State of Pakistan after its creation in 1947, shows multiple responses to the demand of 'Pakistan'. The reactions of the people to the 'Pakistan' demand became one of the major points of difference in the political discourses of the National Conference and the Muslim Conference in the 1940s. The 'Pakistan' demand garnered support from the Muslim Conference and its supporters in the State through the idea of '*millat*' and '*millat-e-Islam*', but a tension was apparent in the Muslim Conference's discourse about the positionality of the state vis-a-vis 'Pakistan'.

It was Mohammad Iqbal who had espoused the idea of '*millat'* for the first time in his Allahabad Presidential address in 1930 and advocated a consolidated state for Muslims of India. Iqbal said:

> I would like to see the Punjab, north-western frontier, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within British empire or without the British empire…The formation of a consolidated north-western Indian State appears to me be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of the north-west Indian Muslim state appears to me the final destiny of the Muslims at least of the north-west India.[58]

What is striking in Iqbal's idea of a consolidated state is that Kashmir did not figure as one of the 'regions' which would constitute the state, despite his close connection with Kashmir and some of the organizations in Punjab which played an important role in shaping the politics in Kashmir during much of the 1930s.

V. N. Datta argues that the Islamic idiom was a powerful medium in Iqbal's thought which inspired the Muslim communities to forge a Muslim identity. Iqbal believed in the idea that 'Islam was a 'single unanalysable reality' and its separation from politics was unjustified'.[59] It was this idea of '*millat*' which shaped the Muslim Conference discourse during the decade before the partition. Like Iqbal, the Muslim Conference too rejected Maulana Azad's 'notion of a composite culture and religious pluralism'. Azad was referred to as '*gadaar-e-millat*' in several issues of the

[58] Quoted in V N Datta, 'Iqbal, Jinnah and India's Partition: An Intimate Relationship', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 50 (Dec. 14-20, 2002), p. 5036.
[59] Ibid, p. 5035.

newspaper *Javeed,* edited by Allah Rakha Sagar, one of the prominent members of the Muslim Conference.[60] He was subsequently also referred to as '*millat farosh*'. The notion of '*millat*' became the central trope of the Muslim Conference's discourse on nationalism. It is striking to note that Iqbal continued to influence not just the Muslim Conference discourse, but also the National Conference's. One of the leading newspapers, *Khalid-e Kashmir*, whose editor was a prominent member of the National Conference, and which was closer to the Congress ideology continued to carry some of the verses from Iqbal's poetry on its front page. As Chitralekha Zutshi argues, it was a common sight for Kashmiris, both the National Conference and the Muslim Conference supporters, to hang the portraits of Jinnah, Iqbal and Sheikh Abdullah side by side.[61]

Christophe Jaffrelot has pointed out that 'Pakistan' was 'insufficiently imagined'. [62] Pakistan was not 'insufficiently imagined', but in the state of Jammu and Kashmir it was imagined differently. The Muslim Conference's support for 'Pakistan' demand in the State of Jammu and Kashmir often implied that the Muslims would rule in the provinces where they were in majority. The physical division, the finality of territorial boundaries of the imagined nation, remained unclear. One of the issues of the newspaper *Javeed* carried an editorial piece called 'The Fifth Pakistan' which maintained:

> Pakistan is also of varied kinds. One 'Pakistan' is that demanded by the ten crore Muslims spearheaded by All India Muslim League which means that the Muslims in majority areas shall have the right to form self-governing states. The second is the Pakistan envisaged by Rajgopal Acharya and supported by Gandhi with an ideal of reserving seats for the Muslims and where non-Muslims would also have a say in the governance. The third Pakistan is one envisaged by the Ahrars. The fourth by the Communists which is even more dangerous to 'Pakistan' than these. The communist party hails the principle of self-determination which does not recognize the self- determination principle on the basis of religion, but wants it for all the ethnic groups, for Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis, Bengalis and for Kashmiris. Finally is the fifth Pakistan envisaged by the Nationalists of Kashmir. The foundation for this idea has been laid by one Communist named Mr Bedi. The idea is to give the right to form their own

[60] *Javeed*, Jammu, 26 July 1945, p. 2 and 9 August 1945, p. 1.
[61] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging* p. 303.
[62]Quoted in Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, p. 3.

governments to Dogras, Jats, Kashmiris, Ladakhis. This 'Naya Kashmir' will then join the Hindustan.[63]

The discourse of the Muslim Conference supporting the Pakistan demand would often be based on the idea of 'Muslims forming sovereign states in those areas where they were in majority in India and not as a separate entity'. This idea, as Ayesha Jalal has argued, in case of Iqbal's demand for a separate state or conglomeration of the north-western states, was not at odds with an all-India federation. She argues, 'The claim that Muslims constituted a 'nation' was not incompatible with a federal or confederal state structure covering the whole of India.'[64] Sheikh Abdullah, at the All-India Student's People's Conference in Udaipur, stated that the 'Pakistan' demand was a mere 'stunt' of the British colonial state to divide the people and to maintain their rule over India. Speaking in a meeting with students in Udaipur after the conference was held in January 1946, Sheikh Abdullah laid stress on the 'Indian social code', unity and the 'unflinching determination' needed for freedom. He insisted on the need for a mutual trust between Muslims and Hindus and if distrust was removed, 'thousands of Jinnahs would not be successful in carving out Pakistan'.[65]

While in U.P, as Dhulipala points out, the idea of Pakistan was envisaged as a sovereign Islamic State, a New Medina,[66] the Muslim Conference did not envisage the idea as a 'New Medina' but as a symbolic community, a '*millat*' for the Muslims. The rights of the Muslims in the State of Jammu and Kashmir would only be attained and secured through the establishment of Pakistan. There was a tension in the Muslim Conference's discourse in terms of whether the state would be a constituent element of the imagined 'nation' or remain outside of it. The Muslim Conference discourse was clear on the fact that Muslims of Kashmir were an important element of the symbolic community, the '*millat*', but it continued to imagine Jammu and Kashmir as a separate entity, a '*mulk*', a country in itself. The creation of 'Pakistan', it was believed, would create a state with the largest Muslim population in the world and

[63] *Javeed*, Jammu, 23 August 1945, p. 3.
[64] Ayesha Jalal, 'Nation, Reason and Religion: Punjab's Role in the Partition of India', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 33, No. 32 (Aug. 8-14, 1998), p. 2185.
[65] 'C.I.D Diary for the month of January 1946', General Records, File No. Nil, SSA.
[66] Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*, p. 4.

would open the doors of freedom for other Muslim nations which are fighting for their independence. 'The Muslims of Kashmir, even after remaining outside of 'Pakistan' would remain content and happy, because if you are surrounded by an ocean, it is definite the cool winds will reach you as well.'[67]

The Muslim press in the state especially in Jammu laid emphasis on religiously defined cultural differences among various communities. Muslims were called upon to give pre-eminence to Islamic ethics, to lay stress on the 'Muslim dress code' which would mark them different from the rest of the communities. The '*topi'* essentially became the object of differentiation between the communities. It was emphasized that the Muslims should start wearing the '*Jinnah cap'* as a marker of difference in dress codes between the two communities.[68]

Strikingly, a state like Kashmir which, according to the National Conference and the Muslim Conference discourses, fighting against the oppression of hundreds years' of Dogra rule had not become a fertile ground for garnering support for 'Pakistan' in the initial years when the demand was being made. It was only towards the middle of the 1940s that the support for the 'Pakistan' demand became vocal in some political spaces, especially through the Muslim Conference platforms, which were renewed within the state politics. The National Conference and other political outfits, especially the 'Hindus' unanimously continued to oppose the 'Pakistan' demand throughout the 1940s and stood for the ideal of undivided India, referred to as '*akhand bharat',* or as *'Hindustan'*.

The resurgence of the Muslim Conference in political spaces of Kashmir was facilitated by a decline in popularity of the National Conference in the middle of the decade. Jinnah's visit to the State in 1944 proved significant for the Muslim Conference party and its supporters. Jinnah during his month long stay had interacted with various political groups in the State. According to *Javeed*, Jinnah asserted that Muslims of the State were best represented by the Muslim Conference.[69] Jinnah's remark proved to be critical to the interests of the Muslim League in British India and

[67] *Javeed*, Jammu, 23 August 1945.
[68] *Javeed*, Jammu, 12 April 1945.
[69] *Javeed,* Jammu, 13 September 1945.

the Muslim Conference in Kashmir which was set out to counter the claims of Sheikh Abdullah, who over the years had drawn closer to the socialist ideas of the Indian National Congress.

The 'Local' and the 'National': 'Region', 'Territory', 'Country'

The section is a critique of the nationalist history writing, which clubbed different popular struggles in the princely states (Kashmir being the case study here) into the straitjacketed category of 'a seamless [Indian] nationalism'.[70] It draws on Gyandendra Pandey's idea on 'how local comes to be folded into the national in new kinds of ways and the national into the local'[71] in Kashmir and the tensions and contradictions that marked the process in the 1940s. Some of these tensions persisted even in the post-independence scenario and manifested in Kashmir in the form of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953. The nationalist history writing, however, has conveniently appropriated the local popular struggles, guided largely by internal dynamics, in princely states within the broader ambit of 'Indian nationalism'. The Quit India movement in the nationalist history writing becomes a major breakthrough when the people of the states 'formally joined the struggle for Indian independence'.[72] In the nationalist histories, the states not only demanded a responsible government but 'asked the British to quit India and demanded that the states become integral parts of the Indian nation'.[73]

The beginning of the 1940s marked a shift in the political language of the National Conference, from its emphasis on communitarian interests to a national movement for rights of all communities. In addition, the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 marked crucial changes in Kashmir's political culture. The 'region' emphatically came to be connected with the broader idea of 'India' as a

[70] Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).
[71] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 1.
[72] Bipan Chandra, Et al (ed.,), *India's Struggle for Independence* (Delhi: Penguin India, 1989), p. 359.
[73] Ibid, p. 359.

'National Space'[74] in the Congress nationalist discourses. Parallel to such changes was the production of a 'National Space', a 'national collectivity', represented by 'India', which in itself was not a smooth process but a fractured one. The process of transition from the colonial space to the national space resulted in categorizing some places/ spaces, as 'regional', 'local' previously imagined as a '*mulk'*, a 'country'. The intensification of the anti-colonial struggles in the 1940s led to characterizing the differently imagined spaces as 'regional spaces', as 'integral' units of the larger national collectivity of India. The appropriation of 'local' struggles in the nationalist discourse constituted, reconstituted or even produced the categories like 'regional', 'national' which resulted in the categorization of some spaces as 'regional'.[75]

The nationalist discourse of the Congress throughout the 1940s began to draw on the cartographic imaginations of the 'Indian Nation', with princely states as its integral parts. This acquired the most crystallized form in Jawaharlal Nehru's declaration at the All India States' People's Conference held at Udaipur in 1946. Commenting on the efforts made to seek responsible governments in the princely states, Nehru said, 'Their[Congress] basic policy was that there should be full responsible Government in the States as integral parts of a free India'.[76]

However, the political struggles in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir continued to be largely driven by the demand for a responsible government, and the 'freedom for India from the foreign yoke' never became instrumental in the political mobilization of the Kashmiri people. These dissonances reflect the tensions between the Congress nationalist discourses and the popular struggles within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The struggles in Kashmir had their own 'local' specificities, and were largely guided by a zeal to reconfigure the ideal of Dogra sovereignty, represented in the demand for a responsible government and not motivated by anti-British sentiments.

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[74] See Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). Though her work deals with the transition in British India, I draw on her work to use the idea of transition from colonial space to a national space in the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir through the changing nature of political spaces in the State.

[75] Such a categorization essentially placed those spaces categorized as 'regional' in a subservient position to the 'national space'. The 'region' was subsumed to form the 'national', which meant a position of power, a power of the 'national space' over the 'regional space'.

[76] 'C.I.D Diary for the month of January 1946', SSA.

Sheikh Abdullah, in his political language especially during the years 1942-43, employed the anti-British rhetoric. The beginning of the Second World War in 1939 provided Sheikh Abdullah an occasion to forge a closer connection between the popular struggles in the State and the struggles in British India. The War scenario not only allowed the political language of the National Conference to critique the British policy (mostly restrained to the years 1942-43) towards British India's demand for freedom and more specifically of the Indian National Congress, but allowed Sheikh Abdullah to broaden the scope of his political forays through the platform of All India States' People's Conference. The National Conference discourse entrenched a close connection between what were otherwise the 'local' struggles to a larger and broader based 'All India struggles'. The political language of the party emphasized on the idea of 'India' as a 'motherland' for all, including the Muslims of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah in the Annual Session of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference held at Mirpur in 1943 reiterated:

> Every Muslim should regard India as his home…Our heritage is spread out from Kashmir to Cape Comorin and from the Khybar to Nepal. India is our Motherland and will continue to be so. It is, therefore, our duty to be foremost in freeing it from the foreign yoke.[77]

Ironically, the cartographic imagination of India, in Sheikh Abdullah's discourse, would later be 'uncompromisingly represented as 'Pakistani Empire'' during the propaganda for Muslim League elections in 1946.[78] In the same session, Sheikh Abdullah made clear the goals of the National Conference party. The demand for a responsible government, Sheikh Abdullah believed, had become 'national' as there was hardly any association in the State which opposed the demand. Sheikh Abdullah declared, 'Our goal is the responsible Government, the panacea for all our ills'.[79] Despite an overture to 'India' being the 'motherland' of all the Muslims, including the Muslims of the State, in the National Conference's discourse, Kashmir continued to be addressed as a separate entity. It was continuously referred to as 'country', a

[77] 'Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's Presidential Address at the Annual Session of All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference held at Mirpur', Publicity Department, 1943, File No. M/8/43/N, JSA.
[78] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 44.
[79] 'Sheikh Abdullah Speech', Publicity Department, 1943, File No. M/8/43/N, JSA.

'*mulk'*, '*wattan'*. This represented a tendency towards 'regional' patriotism in the political language of both the National Conference and the Muslim Conference. At the sixth Annual Session of the National Conference held at Sopore in 1945, Sheikh Abdullah said:

> I am only convinced that only when we have a full and direct voice in the management of our affairs and the shaping of our destinies can we breathe as human beings and live as free citizens worthy of our beautiful homeland.[80]

Sumantra Bose has argued that despite a certain ideological affinity that the National Conference had forged with the Congress, it was not reduced to a 'surrogate of India's Congress movement'.[81] In fact, the dispensation of the National Conference was based on a strong 'regional patriotism centered on Valley'. In this conception, Bose argues, 'Kashmir and India were fraternal but ultimately separate entities, whose relation ought to be governed by equality and mutual respect'.[82]

Examining the various slogans raised by the National Conference adherents, it becomes clear that the anti-British slogan never became crucial in the political language of the party or even in Kashmir's political culture. The slogans varied from 'upholders of democracy', '*inquilab*', 'National Conference', '*Sher-i-Kashmir*', '*Mujahid-i-Islam*', '*Wattan ko azad karo (liberate the homeland) Kashmir ko azad karo*'.[83] Strikingly, the adherents of the National Conference, the 'secular' party, consistently used religious imagery in their political language. Important to note is that the meaning of '*azadi*' in Kashmir continued to be different from the British Indian context or was at variance with what it meant in the British Indian context. In fact, in British India too, multiple vocabularies of freedom were in circulation in the late 1940s, and it is the 'post-dated histories', which have retrospectively ascribed meanings to notions like '*swaraj'*, 'Pakistan', otherwise differently understood.[84]

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[80] *Hindustan Times*, 4-8-45, Press Cutting, Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.
[81] Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 23.
[82] Bose, *Roots of Conflict*, p.23.
[83] Publicity Department, 1942, File No.PR/M-329, JSA.
[84] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, p. 5.

In the Kashmir government's discourse, steering the politics towards anti-British during the years 1942-43 was a political manoeuvre by Sheikh Abdullah for political reasons. In a self-congratulatory tone, the Kashmir government boasted their ability to maintain peace in 1942.[85] There was apparently no organized anti-British movement and propaganda in the State. The anti-British rhetoric was largely confined to mere outbursts in Sheikh Abdullah's political language and were merely reduced to anti-imperialistic posters and paintings of "Quit India" inscriptions during much of 1942.[86] Besides the National Conference which had forged a close connection with Congress and the British India's struggles, many other political voices remained immune from the nationalist or anti-colonial sentiments represented by the Indian National Congress. The newspaper, *Hamdard*, criticised the Congress policy in the war against fascism. It maintained, 'had the Congress which claimed to be the only representative voice of India supported the British scheme, they would have opened new avenues for a self-government initiation in 1942 itself.'[87]

The Muslim Conference adherents led by Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah in the Valley and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas in Jammu too were critical of nationalistic ideas represented by the Congress. Though a small section, The Dogra Ruler and the ruling class formed another section, which were immune from the ideas of nationalism. One must ask the question then, what does it tell us about the people's imagination of the political future of the State? What does this tell us about the nature of the nationalist claims of a 'seamless nationalism'? Nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments at least failed to capture the imagination of the Dogra ruling class.The Maharaja of Kashmir, even as late as 1946, in a bid to maintain power and peace and order in the state disallowed nationalist leaders including Jawarhalal Nehru from entering Kashmir. The Maharaja was against any outside interference in the internal affairs of the State. The Maharaja declared:

> Naturally we are interested in the progress of India as a whole…we look forward to taking our due position in the new constitutional structures of India, whereby we hope that India will be able to take its proper place as a great nation…But our acceptance of India's progress does not imply acceptance by us of dictation in

[85] Publicity Department, 1942-43, File No. PR 200-9-42, JSA.
[86] Publicity Department, 1942-43, File No. PR 200-9-42, JSA.
[87] Publicity Department, 1943, File No. PR 222-7-43, JSA.

> our internal affairs, particularly when such a course entails interference with the lull and free operation of the law, and thereby endangers the security and orderly course of life to which every peaceful and law-abiding citizen is entitled. [88]

Though largely guided by the interests of maintaining their independent kingdoms, the princes till as late as 1947 were reluctant to 'integrate' their independent kingdoms into the newly formed dominions. The nationalist histories would often gloss over the facts, which do not fit their conveniently drawn narratives of an Indian nationalism encompassing all of India. How far had the nationalistic sentiment seeped into the popular imagination is difficult to ascertain in the case of Kashmir. Nonetheless, what does this 'fragment' tell us about the seamless Indian nationalism? In 1945, during the Congress leaders visit to Kashmir, *Hamdard* noted that many of the delegates that had come to attend the National Conference session held at Sopore, where Indian National leaders were also present, 'did not know the actual name of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad'. More interestingly, *Hamdard* noted,

> More surprising is the ignorance of another delegate who during the speech of Nehru [in the Annual Session of National Conference] in a fit of enthusiasm raised the slogan *Sher-e-Punjab Jawaharlal Nehru Zindabad*.[89]

The political situation in British India made it difficult to perceive the events in princely states as isolated events from an all-India situation. The first major clash between various political actors in Kashmir, shaped by the nature of British Indian political scene, took place in 1940 when Nehru and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited Kashmir.[90] This made evident that the political landscape in the State was marked by discordant political ideologies and the resultant attitude towards the dominant British Indian political parties: the Congress and the Muslim League. Both the National Conference and the 'renewed' Muslim Conference sought support from the parties outside the state.

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[88] 'Muslim grievances in Kashmir', Political department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.
[89] Quoted in *Javeed* dated 9 August 1945.
[90] *Annual Administration Report of the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the Samvat 1996-97 (17th Oct, 1939-15th Oct, 1940)*, JSA.

By 1942, the National Conference was the most organized and popular party to enjoy the support of 75 per cent of Srinagar's Muslims (in the Kashmir Valley).[91] However, outside the Valley and especially in the Jammu Province, the National Conference was not able to attain the same level of popularity even as late as 1946. In fact, varied and contested perceptions of the National Conference had begun to circulate among different constituencies of the State. The Kashmir State continued to perceive it as a Muslim party so did the colonial state. However, in some sections there was no doubt that the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference was the only '*qaum parast'* (nationalist) party in the State. It was also believed that the very few workers of the party in the Jammu province were communists who had no attachment to the cause of nationalism or any love for the nationalists, "their only deity was 'Roos' [Russia]".[92] The Muslim Conference was not able to command such popularity in the Valley, but things had begun to change by middle of the decade. The Muslim Conference, which according to P. N. K Bamzai led a 'tottering existence', received a new lease of life when Jinnah came to Kashmir in 1944.[93]

Sheikh Abdullah had invited Jinnah, the President of Muslim League, to Kashmir in 1944 so that he could offer his suggestions regarding Kashmir's politics. Jinnah came to Kashmir on May 8 , and stayed in Kashmir for a month and at the Annual Session of the Muslim Conference in the same year stated that the Muslim Conference was the true representative of the Kashmiri Muslims. Sheikh Abdullah and his party had reservations about Jinnah's statement and soon Sheikh Abdullah began to question Jinnah's right to interfere in Kashmir's internal affairs.[94] Abdullah reiterated that it was the National Conference which was a truly national organisation not just because it was open to all communities, but it had envisaged a truly national programme and a national vision. Sheikh while 'disavowing communal separatism' said:

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[91] Rai, *Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects*, p. 279.
[92] *Javeed*, Jammu, 10 May 1945; *Ranbir,* Jammu, 5 December 1946, p.3.
[93] Bamzai, *Culture and Political History*, p. 740.
[94] *Javeed*, Jammu, 16 August 1945, p. 2. This newspaper article seems to have been published in *Hamdard*, and it is the rendering of the same newspaper article, which *Javeed* has published in its 16 August 1945 issue. Though I could not find the dates when it was published in *Hamdard*.

> The programme of the National Conference envisages free and full development of cultural units and the principle of self-determination on[sic] the basis of nationality as a solution of the problems which are not only our own but those of India as a whole.[95]

Ian Copland argues that Jinnah's visit to Kashmir, the Muslim Conference's association with the Muslim League, and the 'vote-catching scheme of Pakistan' were the prime reasons for the revival of the Muslim Conference in Kashmir.[96] The Kashmir State also acknowledged that the Muslim Conference received impetus from Jinnah's visit, but Jinnah failed to bring the leaders of the National Conference to the side of the Muslim Conference.[97]

It became evident that the Muslim Conference was gaining ground by 1944 in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah and his party were co-opted by the Kashmir government during the War in the imposition of ration.[98] The public opinion was increasingly being shaped by the opposition forces in Kashmir regarding the National Conference's association with the Kashmir government. The Kashmir government was believed to have certain elements which were labelled as pro-Congress.[99] Such tendencies were used by the Muslim Conference to shape the public opinion during Jinnah's visit.

On 1 August 1945, the "Big Three" of the Indian National Congress: Nehru, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Maulana Azad visited Kashmir.[100] There were apprehensions of a protest against the Congress leaders' visit even before they arrived

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[95] *TOI*, Bombay, 29 June 1944, p. 8.
[96] Ian Copland, 'The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the Crisis of 1947', in D.A Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 230.
[97] *Annual Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Samvat Year 2001 (13th April 1944-12th March 1945*).
[98] Publicity Department, 1942, File No. PR/M-329, JSA; *Kashmir Times* dated 24-4-1943, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1943, File No. M/88/43/N, JSA.
[99] *Annual Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Samvat Year 2000 (13th April 1943 to 12th April 1944*), SSA; 'Political Situation in Srinagar', File No. 200-9-42, JSA; *Shahbaz,* 26 October 1943, Press Cutting, File No. PR 222-7-43, JSA.
[100] *Tribune* dated 3-8-45, Press Cutting, Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.

in Srinagar.[101] A sense of deep resentment developed among various political actors before their arrival. Prem Nath Bazaz in his pamphlet noted,

> The news about protests [against the Congress leaders] had been circulating in the press for many days before the 1st August [when the leaders were supposed to come]. The National Conference leaders were averse to any protests being held against the arrival of Congress leaders. On the other hand, the opposition [Muslim Conference adherents] opined that should the Congress leaders receive public welcome, the protests become imperative to put across the message that Kashmiris did not subscribe to the Gandhian nationalism. This set off the National Conference which organized many rallies [before 1st August] across Srinagar. In one such rally Sheikh Abdullah had vehemently stated that they would give a befitting reply to the opposition and make it loose face [if they chose to go ahead with the protest demonstrations].[102]

The students' wing of the Muslim Conference party had warned the Kashmir government of dire consequences if Nehru on his tour to Kashmir opposed 'Pakistan' from any of the political platforms. Nehru, as the Muslim Students averred, should not intervene in Kashmir's political struggles and 'advised him to see the beautiful mountains of the Valley' and return without intervening in the politics of the State. The students' wing made it clear that 'they do not subscribe to the Congress ideology and were with *Qaid-e-Azam* Jinnah and championed the cause of Pakistan'.[103] The Muslim Conference and its student wing were not alone in their opposition to the National Conference's decision to give a public welcome to the Congress leaders. Prem Nath Bazaz in *Hamdard*'s issue dated 21 July 1945 had stated,

> People should not be willy-nilly a party to the prospective welcome afforded by National Conference to the leaders of Congress. We [Bazaz] would not oppose any protests by which ever faction(s) provided they are peaceful and democratically organized.[104]

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[101] In the press statement by the Muslim Conference's President Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, issued in newspapers like *Dawn* dated 6-8-45; *Tribune* dated 18-8-45, he had stated that the protest demonstrations were only meant for Maulana Azad as the Muslim opinion had turned against him after the Simla Conference of June 25, 1945. Abbas stated that they would join the National Conference in welcoming Nehru as a guest and as a great 'Hindu' leader from Indian National Congress.

[102] Prem Nath Bazaz, Pamphlet '*The Reality of 'New Kashmir': Alliance Between National Conference and Kak Ministry',* Political Department, 1945-46, File No. B/707/45/P.B, SSA, p. 8.

[103] *Javeed*, Jammu, 26 July 1945.

[104] Bazaz, Pamphlet *Reality of 'New Kashmir'*, p. 8.

On 1 August 1945, when the Congress leaders were taken out in a boat procession, hundreds and thousands of people were believed to have registered their protest by wearing black bands and waving black flags.[105] In order to express the contesting claims of who best represented the Muslims of the State, both the Muslim Conference and the National Conference got involved in violent acts against each other. The Kashmir Residency Staff recounted the occasion as follows:

> As soon as the procession had moved a little the Muslim Conferencites burst out with the slogans of "*National Conference Murdabad*", "*Qaid-e-Azam Zindabad*" and freely displayed black flags, interrupted only by showers of stones and shoes… From Maharaj Gunj [one of the localities in Srinagar city] onwards the tone of the procession changed which now began to move more leisurely greeted by shouts of "*Abdul [sic] Kalam Zindabad*", "*Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru Zindabad*", "*Sher-i-Kashmir Zindabad*", and "*Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai*" etc.[106]

The clash between the two oppositional parties indicated the significant ideological differences that had evolved in Kashmir's political spaces. The August 1 episode further sharpened the ideological blocks represented by the Muslim Conference with pro-League sentiments and the National Conference with pro-Congress ideological affiliations. Despite the open display of support the Congress lent to Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference, Sheikh was still reconciling with the fact that the people of the states and the people of British India were together in their struggles, even though they formed separate entities. In his Presidential Address at the Sopore Session ,Sheikh Abdullah stated,

> We, the Indian States subjects have no right to comment or directly interfere in the politics of the British India, or take sides in it, but, collectively speaking, our destinies and our final liberation are bound up with the freedom of British India itself. Therefore, it is our natural wish that the controversies of India may find speedy solution. My earnest appeal to the leaders is that when they know that the obstacle which stand in their way to progress can be got [sic] over through

[105] Ibid, p. 9; *Javeed*, Jammu, 9 August 1945 and 16 August 1945, p. 3; *Hindustan Times,* 3 August 1945, *Dawn*, 6 August 1945 and 19 November 1945, *Tribune* dated 18 August 1945, Press Cuttings, Political Department, File No 177-P (S)/45, NAI. Though all these newspaper reports give a detailed account of what transpired on 1 August 1945, the narrative differs in each of the newspaper cuttings.

[106] D.O. No. D 860-C/45, Account of the Residency Staff on the disturbances in Srinagar, Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.

> mutual agreement alone[,] why should they not do it immediately and win for the 40 crores of people blessings of freedom.[107]

The Congress intervention in Kashmir and the close connection that Congress forged with the National Conference during these years began to shape the public opinion in British India. This connection helped the Congress in effectively questioning the Muslim League's demand for a 'separate nation-state' for the Muslims of India. [It is important to raise a question. A branch of the Congress party and a Congress Committee existed in the state. But why does the branch of Congress in the state not figure in Congress Party's discourse on struggles in the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir? Perhaps, the Congress party within the State did not perform the same function as the association of Sheikh Abdullah with the National Conference did.[108] After his tour of the Valley in 1945, Jawaharlal Nehru said that the people of Kashmir were averse to the idea of Pakistan. "*Qaid-e-millat*" Chaudhri Abbas condemned Nehru's speech, which he had given on 26 September 1945. Abbas believed that Nehru gave this speech for a small 'sensationalist group' [a reference to National Conference and its adherents]. The people of the state, Abbas stated, supported the Muslim League and 'Pakistan'.[109]

The Resident in Kashmir was apprehensive that there would be Muslim interference from outside the State in Kashmir affairs after the visit of the Congress leaders. The Resident reported:

> There may shortly be Muslim interference from outside in State politics, partly in retaliation for the recent Indian National Congress interference in them, and partly to offset the capital being made by the Congress leaders in the eyes of public outside Kashmir of the fact that in spite of its large majority of Mohammedan members, the Kashmir National Conference Party supports Congress.[110]

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[107] Ibid, *Hindustan Times,* 4 August 1945, Press Cutting.

[108] Throughout the 1940s, the annual administration reports mention that the party was a nominal one, and barely made any influence in the political discourses. The main activities that the party participated in was the celebration of independence day on 26th January, the celebration of the Azad Hind Fauj and its ideals as well as the celebration of the birthday of Subhash Chandra Bose.

[109] *Javeed*, Jammu, 11 October 1945.

[110] Extract of the Fortnightly report, Political Department, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.

By this time it becomes clear that the frictions in Kashmiri politics were used symbolically to counter the Muslim League demand for a separate Muslim state by the Indian National Congress. The National Conference was not only a party that had majority of its members as Muslims, but Sheikh Abdullah came from a Muslim majority state, which was one of the largest princely states. The alliance of interests became clearer in 1946 when, at the States Peoples Conference in Udaipur, it was agreed that Sheikh Abdullah be offered financial support for his tour to Punjab States. Sheikh Abdullah was to accompany Nehru who had proposed to visit Travancore, Madras and Hyderabad where the Muslim League had massive support. Sheikh Abdullah was to visit all these important states 'to counteract the propaganda of the Muslim League'.[111]

By 1944, Jinnah had begun to take increasing interest in Kashmir affairs. As a response to the turn of events in Kashmir after the Congress leaders visit, Jinnah sought Viceroy's intervention in Kashmir affairs. Jinnah, in his telegram dated 22 August 1945, to Lord Wavell wrote

> Situation Kashmir from all accounts pouring in from reliable sources even non-Muslim source very grave. Your immediate intervention requested…Prime Minister Kak determined to crush Muslims. I therefore appeal to you as Crown Representative and Paramount Power please intervene at once. Strong Muslim Prime Minister with strong authority or failing the Britisher essential…Hope you will take immediate action as from all accounts Raj of Goondaism prevails and very grave situation has arisen there.[112]

The National Conference set out to work hand in glove with the Kashmir government. It was hell bent by this time to defeat any opposition to the party. By now the Kashmir government had also begun to curb press liberties, and pre-censoring the newspapers, especially *Hamdard*, *Vitasta* and *Millat.* Bazaz wrote:

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[111] 'C.I.D Diary for the month of January 1946', General Records, File No. Nil, SSA.

[112] Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI; *Dawn* dated 12 September 1945, 13 September 1945, 15 November 1945, and 16 November 1945, *Tribune* dated 2 October 1945, *Eastern Times* dated 13 November 1945, Press Cuttings, Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.

> People had been aware and had no qualms about the fact that National Conference was hand in glove with the government. Sheikh Abdullah had allied with Rai Bahadur Pandit Ramchandra Kak who sought each other's refuge. On the contrary, this alliance had only damaged the credibility of National Conference among Muslims. It might just be that Sheikh pointedly criticized Ramchander Kak in his speech to suggest that he was not working in concert with the government and be able to earn trust of Muslims.[113]

Jinnah made an intervention on the pretext that liberties were being curbed in the State and the Muslim Conference was being targeted by the National Conference and the Kashmir government. This intervention was bound to have repercussions in British India. Soon representations from the All India Hindu Mahasabha were made to the Viceroy of the dire consequences if any such intervention was granted in case of Kashmir, which according to them was a 'Hindu State'.[114] The Punjab Hindu Press was especially believed to malign the public opinion against Jinnah, and his intervention in Kashmir was represented as guided by his 'communalism'.[115]

In fact, Muslim Conference and its adherents were not alone in seeking and justifying Jinnah's intervention in Kashmir affairs. By the mid-1940s, Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmiri Pandit and once an ardent supporter of Sheikh Abdullah, had become a significant oppositional element to Sheikh Abdullah's politics as well as to Gandhian nationalism and the Congress. The Resident in Kashmir reported that Bazaz, who had formed the Socialist Party and edited *Hamdard* and *Vitasta*, was in touch with Jinnah. The anxious Resident in Kashmir wrote:

> Trouble in Kashmir if it came, though it might be temporarily directed from outside into communal channels, would fundamentally be socialist and economic, a revolt of the masses, mainly Mohemmadan, but containing Sikh and Hindu elements… The mutual interest of the leaders of the Kashmir Socialists and that the Muslim League is therefore understandable, in spite of the fact that the former is a Hindu (a Kashmiri Pandit). It is more difficult to forecast what form an understanding between this somewhat ill-assorted pair might take.[116]

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[113] Bazaz, '*The Reality of Kashmir'*, p. 20.
[114] Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.
[115] Ibid., *Dawn*, 15 November 1945, Press Cutting.
[116] Ibid, Extract from the Fortnightly report of the Kashmir Residency for the fortnight ending the 31 August 1945.

The association of the socialist forces of the state with Jinnah meant that the binaries between Jinnah and Muslim League as representing 'communalism' and the Congress representing secular Indian nationalism are deeply problematic.

The year 1945 also brought an end to the World War. The War ended but not the political anxieties of the British colonial state. The colonial state by mid-1940s consciously continued to maintain the non-interference policy in the internal affairs of the princely states. Despite Jinnah's increasing insistence on Viceroy's intervention in Kashmir affairs, post the 1 August 1945 disturbances, the British policy remained that it was His Highness and the Kashmir government which were responsible for Kashmir affairs. The colonial state was aware of the repercussions of any interference in Kashmir affairs and the undesirable reactions elsewhere [Hyderabad] arising from such intervention.[117]

The political developments in British India by middle of the decade had begun to have far greater impact on princely states. The closer connection forged between the Congress and Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference made Kashmir the 'test case' for other princely states in terms of the constitutional relationship with an All India Federation.

Delegitimizing Dogra Sovereignty: '*Naya Kashmir*' and 'Quit Kashmir'

The movement of 1946 initiated by the National Conference was an important phase in the opposition to Dogra sovereignty. The same year saw considerable tensions in the process of bringing princely states closer to British India. The political discourse on Kashmir's future relationship with India was further complicated with the increasing intervention from British Indian political parties. For most of the 1940s the discourses of the two main political parties differed on the issue of supporting the demand for 'Pakistan' or supporting the idea of a United India. The tensions in the Indian nationalist discourse on the position of the states and their likely relation to India and the discourses of both the National Conference and the Muslim Conference on the future of the State became more pronounced. Both the parties in the State remained ambiguous on the position the State was to acquire in free India. The

[117] 'Muslim grievances against the Kashmir government', Political Department, 1945, File No. 177-P (S)/45, NAI.

Maharaja of Kashmir began to show tendencies for an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir right from 1946, which explains Maharaja's reluctance in acceding to one of the Dominions on partition.

In January 1946, Sheikh Abdullah was elected as the Vice President of All India States Peoples Conference. The ties with Nehru allowed Sheikh Abdullah to make forays into a wider arena beyond Kashmir's politics and emerge as the leading figure of struggles in princely states. However, affiliations with the Congress cost Sheikh Abdullah and his party popularity and influence they had once enjoyed in the Kashmiri imagination in the late 1930s and early 1940s. There was a definite decline in their popularity by middle of the decade, ascertained by Bazaz as:

> National Conference had been fast losing its base which seemed to be quite evident. Jammu province had completely drifted away from National Conference. In Poonch jagir, Baderwah, Doda and Kishtwar National Conference has lost its credibility while in Kashmir, Muslim Conference had started to overtake National Conference. This became apparent when the National Conference sought help from Muslim Conference leaders in grain distribution in Kashmir. Barring a handful of Kashmiri Pandits, the community as a whole had largely kept distance from National Conference. Apparently National Conference had seemed to be representing Kashmir or for that matter Kashmiri Muslims. This is far from truth...Violence was perpetrated on common people by the "Storm Troopers" [volunteers] for eschewing the ideology of National Conference.[118]

The Resident in Kashmir was also well aware of this shift in the public perception in Kashmir. He wrote in January 1946, 'Sheikh was well aware of his declining popularity in Kashmir and of the gradual drift of members of his party towards Muslim Conference'.[119] The Resident believed that desertions of the National Conference by the Muslim members 'may accelerate the communal feelings and eventually result in the National Conference developing into a Hindu organization with only a few Muslim supporters such as Sheikh Abdullah and his more intimate friends'.[120]

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[118] Bazaz, '*The Reality of Kashmir'*, p. 15. Emphasis added.
[119] 'Disturbances in Kashmir', Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[120] Ibid.

At a meeting held on 28 March 1946, secret negotiations opened between the National Conference and the Muslim Conference for an amalgamation between the two parties. Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, the president of the Muslim Conference, Afzal Beg, G M Sadiq, Maulana Sayed, and Sheikh Abdullah of the National Conference were present at the meeting. The Resident in Kashmir reported that the 'proposed new party which if formed is expected to ally with the Muslim League rather than Congress party'.[121] Perhaps the National Conference would not have made this move had Sheikh Abdullah and the party been able to maintain the support they once enjoyed in the early 1940s. The Resident noted that such an amalgamation was attempted to increase the popularity of Sheikh Abdullah as the most prominent political leader. It was also aimed at combining the forces of 'Mohemeddan' parties to oppose the Prime Minister, Ramchandra Kak. Despite various attempts to coalesce the two warring parties, a clash over the leadership of the new party and in fact the rivalry between Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah were the factors for the failure.[122]

By March 1946, the National Conference lost the support it once enjoyed from Kak ministry. The National Conference's "popular" minister Afzal Beg resigned from the Praja Sabha which made it evident that relations between Kak and National Conference had reached a breaking point. Sheikh Abdullah believed that Afzal Beg's resignation would give a moral victory to his party, and a bargaining position to push the Prime Minister for some radical measures towards seeking the goal of responsible government.[123] However, Prime Minister Kak 'turned the tables on them'[124] and secured Mian Ahmad Yar Khan, a senior National Conference member as a successor to Afzal Beg. Sheikh Abdullah did not take well to the opposition at the hands of Kak and also the deflection of Mian Ahmad to Kak's side. On several occasions Sheikh exhorted people to show displeasure at Mian Ahmad's appointment and said, "You should tear him (Yar Khan) wherever you see him. If he is given shelter in the royal

[121] Ibid.
[122] 'Muslim grievances in Kashmir and the disturbances in the State', Political Department, 1946, File No 182-P (S)/46, NAI.
[123] Political department, 1946, File no. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[124] 'Muslim grievances', 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.

palace we will pull the palace to the ground. Although he is being put in the Council to please the Maharaja, His Highness will have to drown with him".[125]

By this time Sheikh Abdullah no longer agreed that the Dogra rulers had moral authority to rule over the Kashmiris. The discourse of the party from now onwards drew heavily on the anti-Prime Minister and anti-Dogra tropes. In April 1946 the party began to collect funds for widespread agitation against the Kak Ministry. People were urged to be ready for "great sacrifices" in a final bid to overthrow the "irresponsible government".[126] In fact, in the month of May, Sheikh Abdullah devised an entirely 'new line of attack' on the Kashmir government. The shift in Sheikh Abdullah's discourse from being loyal subjects of His Highness to delegitimizing Dogra sovereignty over Kashmiris became evident with his declaration on 10 May at "Palestine Day" meeting in Srinagar. The Resident in Kashmir reported :

> At several meetings he [Sheikh Abdullah] revealed to the people that they had been sold by the Treaty of Amritsar to Maharaja Gulab Singh for the paltry sum of rupees 75 lakhs or, as he [Sheikh Abdullah] put it, 7 pice a head….He encouraged his adherents by urging them to "to break the Treaty of Amritsar" and adopted a new slogan for the party, i.e. "Quit Kashmir". This slogan was addressed to the Maharaja and the Kashmir government, both of whom he referred to in extremely objectionable terms. This was the first time that Sheikh had dared to attack His Highness.[127]

The 'Quit Kashmir' movement, though different in ideology, turned on the lines of 'Quit India',[128] declared in the nationalist history writing as the 'last battle of the Indian nationalism'.[129] While Sheikh Abdullah had made it clear through many of his declarations that the 'Quit Kashmir' movement aimed at 'evicting the princes' from the State, Acharya Kriplani, the Congress President declared in May 1947 that such a

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[125] Ibid.

[126] Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI; Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI; Political Department, 1946, File No. 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.

[127] 'Muslim grievances', File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI; *Khalid-e-Kashmir,* Srinagar, 10 May 1946, p. 1.

[128] Both Quit India and Quit Kashmir movement differed in their ideologies. While the former was essentially aimed at evicting the British according to the nationalist histories from India, the latter was aimed at the overthrow of the Dogra aristocracy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Quit Kashmir movement however did follow the same line of action in Kashmir, in the sense that sabotage took more or less the same form; damaging bridges, cutting telegram wires and telephone lines, etc.

[129] Indivar Kamtekar, 'The Fables of Nationalism', *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Monsoon 1999), p. 48.

demand was "unreasonable". He noted the analogy the National Conference made between 'Quit India' and 'Quit Kashmir' was 'untenable' as Maharaja was the 'son of the soil' and had every right to live in Kashmir .[130]

In early 1940s, Sheikh Abdullah and his party had not questioned the legitimacy of the Dogra Sovereignty over Kashmiris. In 1942 during the public meeting held by the National Conference at *Idgah* on the occasion of Id, Sheikh Abdullah had stated:

> If there is any party which is loyal to His Highness, it is the National Conference. The only difference with the Maharaja Bahadur is that people here, no matter whether Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs should run the government…This is our domestic quarrel. He is our King, and we are his subjects…At this time the country and the Crown and the throne of the Maharaja Bahadur are in danger. When our country and our Ruler emerges safe from this danger, we shall pass our demands before our Highness.[131]

Even when the National Conference party adopted the 'Naya Kashmir' programme in 1944, the National Conference sought a socially equitable society, a responsible government which would be headed by the Maharaja. By mid-1940s, however, Sheikh Abdullah's position on the Dogra autocracy had changed. In 1946, Sheikh Abdullah was no longer willing to negotiate the idea of Dogra legitimacy and their right to rule over the Kashmiri people. The anti-autocracy and anti-feudalism element within the National Conference had become strong. Speaking at the Udaipur Conference in January 1946, Sheikh Abdullah had stated that 'Time was fast approaching when the people would ask the Princes to quit and leave their States….Time was approaching when they would destroy big Rajas and Nawabs'.[132]

The newspaper reports maintain that from 15 May 1946, rumours started spreading across Srinagar about the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and his close aides.[133] However, it was on 20 May 1946 that the Kashmir government informed the Resident in Kashmir about its decision to arrest Sheikh Abdullah and Sheikh Abdullah was

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[130] *TOI*, Bombay, 26 May 1947, p. 8.
[131] 'Id ul Fitr celebration and Clashes between the Muslim Parties', Publicity Department, 1942, File No. PR/M-329, JSA.
[132] 'C.I.D Diary for the month of January 1946', General Records, File No. Nil, SSA.
[133] *Khalid-e-Kashmir,* Srinagar, 18 May 1946, p.1.

arrested on 20 May at Uri on his way to meet Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi.[134] On 21 May 1946 began the 'disorders' in Srinagar as a result of which five persons were killed the same day.[135] Until June 1, according to the government figures, 400 people were arrested and the total number of causalities throughout the State was 8 dead and 17 injured.[136]

The response to the 'Quit Kashmir' movement from various communities varied. The Resident in Kashmir reported that the National Conference adherents readily supported and responded to Sheikh Abdullah's call. The Kashmiri Pandits and other loyal elements to the Maharaja showed considerable resentment towards the 'Quit Kashmir' slogan, especially response to the references made to the Maharaja. Even the Muslim Conference supporters distanced themselves from the 'Quit Kashmir' movement. Not only did the response to Sheikh Abdullah's slogan vary across communities, but the impact of the movement was also not felt equally across the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Resident reported that while the National Conference was the largest political party in the State, it represented a small portion of the population. This according to the Resident was proved by the very small number of places i.e. Anantnag, Pampur, Sopore and Srinagar where the incidents related to 'Quit Kashmir' took place. Jammu remained calm and to the Resident's surprise nothing significant happened in Poonch and in towns like Baramulla.[137]

Why did Sheikh Abdullah launch an agitation against the Dogra ruler and ruling house at this particular juncture? What did the slogan '*Kashmir Chodh dou*' (Quit Kashmir) and '*Amritsar beynama todh dou'* (Break the Amritsar Treaty) meant? Was it aimed at evicting the Dogra ruler from the State?

Against the backdrop of Cabinet Mission's visit to India, Sheikh Abdullah sought a change in the relationship between the Ruler and the ruled in the State by launching the 'Quit Kashmir' movement. In his telegram to the Cabinet Mission dated 22 April 1946, Sheikh wrote:

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[134] *Khalid-e-Kashmir*, Srinagar, 31 May 1946, p. 1.
[135] Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[136] Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.
[137] Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.

> As President All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference representative all communities and classes people inhabiting Jammu and Kashmir State I welcome your visit to our State and hope that it will usher in new era of freedom both political and economic for four million States people. As the mission is reviving relationship of princes with paramount power with reference to treaty rights we wish submit that for us Kashmir re-examination of this relationship is vital matter because hundred years ago in 1846 land and people of Kashmir were sold away to the servitude of Dogra house by British….This sale deed of 1846 misnamed Treaty of Amritsar sealed fate of Kashmir masses….people of Kashmir press on Mission their unchallengeable claim to freedom on withdrawal of British from India. We wish to declare that no sale deed however sacrosanct can condemn more than four million men and women to servitude of an autocrat when will to live under this rule is no longer there. People of Kashmir are determined to mould their own destiny.[138]

The 'Quit Kashmir' movement became one of the important sites around which Nehru could rally the support of the Congress in Kashmir affairs. Kashmir was made a testing ground for All India States' relations with the proposed all India federation. As Nehru evinced keen interest in the Kashmir affairs, the Kashmir State came under heavy criticism from various corners. Initially, in one of his statements to *The Statesman* dated 28 May, Nehru stated that Sheikh Abdullah by launching the movement had embarrassed both the National Conference and Nehru. The Resident reported that the movement had no formal sanction from the party nor was it approved by the Congress high command for the reason that they wanted a peaceful atmosphere during the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, and Sheikh had started a full-fledged agitation across the State.[139]

From May 27 Nehru showed keen interest in Kashmir affairs. Prime Minister Kak, initially had no objection to Nehru's visit to the State. However, the Kashmir government's position changed in the light of what was viewed as Nehru's interference in the domestic affairs of the State after he had started a propaganda against the Kashmir government. Several telegrams were exchanged between Nehru and the Maharaja in the month of June 1946. The Maharaja insisted that Nehru's visit would create further problems in the already complicated political setting of Kashmir. Nehru's insistence to visit Kashmir gave enough reasons to cause political anxieties to

[138] Ibid.
[139] Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.

both the Kashmir State and the Government of India. While the Viceroy had 'no wish to fetter the Kashmir government's reasonable discretion and no intention to withhold the support, it would be highly embarrassing for all India reasons if any untoward incident occurred in respect of Nehru.'[140] What can one deduce from the position the British took on the nature of the 'colonial state' in the last phase of British rule in India? Did colonial state consciously choose to remain a mere spectator to the ensuing power play?

Meanwhile, the Maharaja of Kashmir had expressed his discomfort at Nehru's entry into the state. The Resident reported:

> If Kashmir government are under pressure of Government of India, compelled to allow Nehru to enter the State [,] Prime Minister has this evening said he will immediately resign and His Highness has this evening said that he may as well abdicate if his hands are forced...It was pointed to them that Government of India had not intended that such pressure would be brought to bear on Kashmir government.[141]

Nehru accompanied by Chaman Lal and Asaf Ali arrived at Kohala on June 19, where they were stopped at the border. The next morning Nehru sought to move forward to Srinagar and the Kashmir government arrested him at Domel, after which he was taken to Uri.[142] Nehru's arrest had created a difficult situation for the Kashmir government. Rumours spread both in Srinagar as well as in British India that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had arrived at Domel with 200 red shirts from the North-Western frontier in support of Nehru's "invasion".[143]

It was only at the insistence of Maulana Azad that Nehru decided to return to Delhi, with the hope that once freed from the Congress Working Committee's work he would return to Kashmir. Nehru's arrest created a precarious situation for Kashmir.

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[140] 'Disturbances in Srinagar', Political Department, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[141] Telegram No. 70 dated 19th June from Resident to Political Department, New Delhi, 'Disturbances in Srinagar', File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[142] *Khalid-e-Kashmir*, Srinagar, 22 June 1946, p. 1.
[143] Telegram No. 74 from Resident to Political Department, New Delhi dated 20th June 1946; Telegram No. 75 from Resident to Political Department, New Delhi dated 21 June 1946, Political Department, File No 167-P (S)/46, NAI.

The Congress Working Committee began to closely view the Kashmir situation. Griffin wrote to Abell that Nehru would visit Kashmir again as Congress leaders may well consider that Pandit Nehru's "honour" can be restored by the abandonment of case against Abdullah and that 'unless Nehru's face is saved he will certainly visit Kashmir again and make a general solution impracticable'.[144]

For a viable solution, and to end the complications caused by Nehru's entry, Kak met Gandhi and Patel in the first week of July in Bombay. Gandhi noted that 'Kashmir Government was within its rights to arrest Sheikh Abdullah and prevent Nehru's entrance but suggested that the action was impolitic as Kashmir government is now likely to be out of frying pan into fire'.[145] He further suggested that ban on Nehru's entry should be removed, case against Abdullah be dropped and a committee including Nehru be appointed to frame constitution for Kashmir which would be implemented by the Maharaja. [146] Gandhi's discourse on the princely order seemed to have been different from other Indian nationalists. Gandhi had intended that the princes 'may remain provided they undertook to be trustees for the people and agreed to the conversion of their States into limited monarchies'.[147]

The deadlock did not end here. Nehru returned to Kashmir on July 24 accompanied by Shah Nawaz (INA), Habib-ur-Rehman (INA), and P N Bajpai (Free Press Correspondent). The Maharaja had insisted that he remained confined to activities related to Sheikh Abdullah's defence. However, this time when Nehru visited, Resident Webb reported that people on the whole 'showed complete indifference to his activities especially in Srinagar'. [148] The Resident's reports maintained, 'the general impression is that Nehru is disappointed with his reception in the State and that all sections of the public, with the exception of the more vehement supporters of National Conference, consider that his stock is markedly lower than it was two months ago'.[149] Nehru appointed Shah Nawaz to control the

[144] Ibid., D.O No. 4475-P/46 dated July 1, 1946.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Note on the Prime Minister's (Kak) discussion with Congress leaders in Bombay during July 1946, Political Department, 1946, File No. 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid., Fortnightly reports for the State of Jammu and Kashmir ending 31 July 1946.

National Conference. It was rumoured that Nehru wanted the *Shahi Masjid* and *Mujahid Manzil* to be handed over to the Congress and to replace the National Conference flag by the Congress flag. But soon Shah Nawaz returned to British India and his return was hastened by the idea that the National Conference could not be transformed into a definite branch of the All India Congress Party.[150]

The Congress intervention did not stop at Nehru's visit. The Working Committee appointed Patel and Azad to take matter in their hands. A heated exchange soon followed between Kak and Patel. Kak in his telegram to Patel dated 25 August 1946 insisted that Patel visit the state as a guest and see things for himself. Patel was adamant to go on, what he termed as an offer for a 'pleasure trip'. In one of his telegrams to Patel, Kak wrote:

> The analogy that you draw between the British government and the interim government on the one side and this government on the other is misleading. This government is fundamentally of this country. Its history is our history, its hills and valleys were traversed and occupied by our forebears countless centuries ago. The government is indigenous and broad based and its members are not drawn from any single section, class or community. It contains a substantial popular element. From the ruler downwards we have the advantage of generations of local associations and knowledge behind us.[151]

Despite the immense pressure that was being built on the Kashmir government, Kak displayed enormous power to limit the intervention from the political parties of British India. At this time when the demise of the princely political order seemed to have become a reality, the Kashmir State asserted its power. Kak during his Bombay visit had in fact mentioned to the Congress leaders that although "paramountcy" might cease, but "independence" of the State would still remain. This policy of the Kashmir State in fact remained intact right until October 1947. Such tendencies

[150] Ibid, Fortnightly reports for the State of Jammu and Kashmir ending 31 August 1946.
[151] Telegram dated 12 September 1946 from Kak to Patel, Political Department, 1946, File No. 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.

The above cartoon appeared in National Conference newspaper, *Khidmat* in 1947. The National Conference had criticised the policy of the States to declare their independence, as according to the party discourse such declaration would have meant a continuation of the princely political order which wasn't any more acceptable to the National Conference. The above cartoon depicts the figure of the Nawab/Maharaja riding his horse (as horse had become the symbol of royality) and the horse is in turn riding on the backs of the people of the States. This depicts how the National Conference discourse drew on this trope of exploitation of the people by the Maharajas and the Nawabs. The Urdu text reads '*Riyasti hakumranu ka ailaan azadi*' (Declaration of Independence by the Princely State Rulers)

Source: *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 8 July 1947. Reference Section, Directorate of Information, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir.

towards the independence of the states may have caused greater anxiety to Nehru and Congress.[152]

How did the Muslim Conference respond and adapt to the changing political scenario in Kashmir? What was the response of Jinnah to the increasing interference of the Congress in Kashmir? In June 1946, the Muslim Conference members met Jinnah in Delhi. Jinnah was believed not to have committed anything openly to the Muslim Conference leaders. But he advised them to make most of the situation created as a result of Sheikh Abdullah's failure to topple the Kashmir government. Soon the Muslim Conference leaders passed resolutions criticizing the Kak ministry. Chaudhri Abbas was chosen as the new President of the party replacing Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah. In August 1946, the Muslim Conference made efforts to observe a *hartal* on 16 August as "Azad Kashmir Day".[153]

In the month of August internal differences broke out in the Muslim Conference between Salam Dalal, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, whose followers were mostly in Srinagar city and Chaudhri Abbas followed mostly by the Muslims of Jammu. Agha Shaukat Ali, who was a *tehsildar* in the state, joined the Muslim Conference and was appointed the General Secretary of the party. Agha Shaukat Ali and Chaudhri Abbas succeeded in awakening a great deal of interest among their supporters. They opposed the Congress decision to send a delegation to Kashmir and labelled the Congress as a 'Hindu party'. The Resident reported that the Muslim Conference in the first week of September passed resolutions in favour of the "Direct Action Day". The party had decided to prepare for a "final struggle against the combined forces of British and the Brahmins". [154]

In September 1946, the Muslim Conference was encouraged by the visit of the Muslim League members and by the organization of the Muslim National Guards Training Centres in Kashmir province. As the party began to show signs of great activity, the Kashmir government clamped down on the Muslim Conference members. On 21 October at the Annual Session of the party, Chaudhri Abbas, Moulvi

[152] Political Department, 1946, File No. 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.
[153] Political Department, File No. 167-P (S)/46, NAI.
[154] Political Department, File No 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.

Noorudin, Shaukat Ali and Allah Rakha Sagar made incriminating speeches and were arrested. The 'route rivalry' between the 'Jammu and Kashmir groups' had further weakened the party.[155] With the arrest of the important figures of the Muslim Conference, a void was created in Kashmir's political spaces. A deputation of the Muslim Conference members met Jinnah. Jinnah in a press statement on November 2, 1946 appealed to the Maharaja of Kashmir to intervene, as Kak, according to him, pursued a policy of suppression in Kashmir. In the same press statement, he exhorted the people of Kashmir to be guided by Chaudhri Abbas, who was in jail and, in his absence, Chaudhri Hamidullah Khan as the Acting President of the Muslim Conference.[156] This further fractured the Muslim community within the state along the lines of regional differences between Jammu and the Kashmir Valley. Even within the same state the partition of 1947 followed different trajectories.

The 1940s saw an intense struggle for negotiating varied political spaces in the State. In his political discourse Sheikh Abdullah, the leading Kashmiri political figure, struck a complicated relationship between religious identities and the 'national movement' for '*azadi*' from Dogra rule. From communitarian identities to attempting to forge a national identity, a significant shift became visible in Sheikh Abdullah's discourse in the late 1930s. However, a clear separation between religious and the profane could not be achieved in a political setting like Kashmir. The other significant party, the Muslim Conference, continued to emphasize on communitarian identities and religious nationalism. Even when criticizing Jinnah, which was often done from the pulpits of *Khanqah-i-Maula*, a Muslim shrine, Sheikh Abdullah heavily drew on the religious rhetoric. Jinnah, Sheikh Abdullah stated once, 'was not a true Muslim and that he had little or no knowledge of Qoran'.

The nationalist histories have conveniently glossed over these dissonances within the National Conference discourse. There is almost an absolute silence in the nationalist histories on the forms of religious nationalism within Kashmir's political spaces. These silences are essentially due to the fact that Kashmir consciously entered the Indian nationalist imagination as the fountainhead of secularism. Not to forget, the

[155] Political Department, File No 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.
[156] Ibid.

alliance which the Congress and more specifically Nehru forged with the National Conference was to counter the Muslim League's demand for 'Pakistan'.

Through these shifting discourses and political languages of the National Conference, a shift in the political position of the party on Dogra sovereignty became evident with the launching of the 'Quit Kashmir' movement. The 'Quit Kashmir' movement marked a rupture in the party's discourse on the moral authority of the Dogras to rule over Kashmir. When changes of magnificent scale were taking place in political spaces of Kashmir, the transition from a 'princely space' to a national collectivity opened a pandora's box for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. As the efforts to bring princely states closer to British India were made, Kashmir State came under heavy pressure from various political parties of British India. The Maharaja was opposed to any intrusion into the domestic affairs of the state.

These intense negotiations and contesting claims to political spaces gave rise to a distinctive political culture in Kashmir. The two warring parties would often utilise violent methods to browbeat each other. The clashes between the parties became an important factor for the Kashmir government to exert its control over people. Curfews would be enforced. Collective fines were imposed in the localities where the conflicts between the parties took place. In times of clashes and crisis, both the Jammu city and Srinagar city would be handed over to the military control. Press censorship became another feature throughout the 1940s. Against the backdrop of such intense contestations, Kashmir entered into a phase of competing territorial claims between the two newly independent nation-states in 1947.

Chapter 3
1947: Theatrics of a 'Violent State' or 'State of Violence'

Nineteen Forty-Seven remains the most intensely discussed and hotly debated year in the modern history of Kashmir. Over the years, multiple meanings have been attached to 1947 as the most crucial 'Event' of Kashmir's history. The chapter explores the intense political maneuverings among various political parties; the Muslim League, the Indian National Congress and the parties within the state of Jammu and Kashmir over Kashmir's future relationship with the Dominions of India and Pakistan. The political discourses of the National Conference and the Muslim Conference, the two major parties in the state, continued to be influenced by the broader political changes in the subcontinent in 1947. The chapter examines the political discourses of the National Conference and Muslim Conference over the question of state's relationship with the two Dominions. Though the British had left the Maharajas at the helm of deciding the future of 'their' states after the lapse of paramountcy, the issue of accession of the state became a complicated affair. The complication was not just a result of the difference in religion followed by the ruler and the ruled, but also because of the complex nature of local politics in Kashmir. The two parties showed divergent attitudes towards the question of Kashmir's future. Their contrasting views fractured the majority Muslim community along ideological lines.

The chapter brings centre stage the question of violence as a cataclysmic event in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. Violence became a site which marked the transfer of the Dogra sovereignty over the state to the newly independent Indian nation-state. Violence shaped the course of state's history in 1947 and post-partition identities. It manifested variously as communal violence or that perpetrated by the tribal invaders.[1] While the 'tribal invasion' has become the nationalist trope in writing histories of violence of 1947, the 'communal violence' which engulfed the Jammu province has been treated as 'someone else's history- or even, not history at all'.[2] The

[1] For a detailed account of the nature of violence perpetrated by the 'tribal invaders', see Andrew Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir* (Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2007), p. 2. The violence carried out by the 'tribal invaders' had primarily shown the characteristics of 'communal violence'.

[2] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 6.

politics of silencing the narrative of communal violence in the Jammu province, I argue, was tied to the idea of Kashmir becoming a metaphor for a 'secular national community'.

Anthropologist Bruce Jackson notes, 'stories generate their own boundaries of acceptable reality: nothing worth mentioning happens before the stories begin and nothing happens after they end'.[3] Such is the nationalist story of Nineteen Forty-Seven, told and retold over the years, with 'tribal invasion' being 'The Event', with almost a complete erasure of what happened earlier and what followed next. Nineteen Forty-Seven has become both an event and a metaphor in the history of the state. As an event it took place at a particular historical juncture which is intensely remembered and conflictually narrated. The chapter attempts to free the history of Nineteen Forty-Seven from the framework of the 'tribal invasion' story and question the dominant discourses which silence alternate accounts of partition of the state. The Jammu case becomes an alternate site to explore the history and memory as an alternative to the master/official narratives. Shahid Amin notes:

> The master saga of nationalist struggles is built around the retelling of certain well-known and memorable events. There is very often an exasperating and chronicle-like quality about such celebratory accounts, but the significance of the nationalist narratives lies in their elaborate and heroic setting down, or 'figurating', the triumph of good over evil…The triumph of such histories lies not in making people remember events from a shared past: the nationalist master narrative also induces a selective national amnesia in relation to specified events which would fit awkwardly, even seriously inconvenience, the neatly woven pattern.[4]

The official/dominant narrative of Nineteen Forty-Seven in the state has been able to successfully induce a similar kind of selective amnesia. The chapter seeks to question the perpetuation of one version of history, and to un-familiarize the familiar history of partition and to familiarize the unfamiliar. The chapter explores a text called, *Kashmir*

[3] Quoted in, Alessandro Portelli, *The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory and Meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 12.
[4] Shahid Amin, *Event Metaphor Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922-1992* (Haryana: Penguin Random House, 2006), pp. xix-xx.

Udaas Hai, which unfolds the unofficial memory/history of Nineteen Forty-Seven I will explore the multiple meanings the author has assigned to Nineteen Forty-Seven.

Temporally, the partition of the subcontinent and partition of the state were separated by a period of few months. The chapter seeks to address how the partition of the subcontinent had an impact on the subsequent partitioning of the state and how far did the movement of refugees from both East Punjab and West Punjab affect the communitarian relations, especially in the Jammu province. The chapter also seeks to explore how the body of the 'refugee', rather the body of the 'abducted woman', became a threat to the political fabric of the nation-state and a cause of immense political anxiety. The 'refugee' in case of Kashmir emerged as a highly politicized being and posed a threat to the moral legitimacy of the new nation-state. It was a politically charged body which owed its character to the question of holding a plebiscite in the state.

The history of partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been written in the frame of 'the origins-outcomes arrangement', which Pandey argues 'is a trademark of the history writing on many of the major events of recent centuries'.[5] The focus is on the 'origins' of the 'Kashmir dispute' starting with the Pakistan backed 'tribal invasion', and the 'outcome' being the contested territorial claims between the two nation-states.[6] This chapter attempts to move beyond this teleological framing of the history of Kashmir.

The Eventualities of Nineteen Forty-Seven

The political fabric of Kashmir was marked by considerable tensions between the Muslim Conference and the National Conference party in 1947. The differential attitude of the two parties to various political struggles throughout the 1940s reflected the internal differentiation among the Muslim community. Perhaps, this remained the case during much of the tumultuous year of 1947. One of the important sites of

[5] Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, p. 49.

[6] Prem Shankar Jha, *The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). Jha's narrative exemplifies the theme of 'origin-outcome' of histories written on the partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

difference between the parties was their attitude towards the demand for the creation of 'Pakistan' in the 1940s. This resulted in the partition of 'mentalities' even before the actual partition of the state took place in late 1947. The Muslim Conference garnered support for the 'Pakistan' demand through the idea of '*millat*', a religious community. In the Muslim Conference's discourse, even as late as 1946, 'Pakistan' was not perceived as an alternate political realm for the Muslims of the state. The Muslim Conference in late 1946 adopted the slogan of '*Azad* Kashmir' as a future constitutional position for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The '*Azad* Kashmir' in the Muslim Conference discourse meant a democratic form of government, with the Maharaja as its constitutional head. The Muslim Conference discourse maintained that such a government will work for the amelioration of the masses. It also argued that the minorities had nothing to fear from such a government.[7] While the Muslim Conference's discourse allowed a space for retaining Maharaja's sovereignty over the state, the National Conference's position on princely order had sharpened by this time. It advocated a complete devolution of the feudal aristocracy in the state.

In May 1947, Chaudhri Hamidullah, the acting President of the Muslim Conference outlined what the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be like. Commenting on Acharya J B Kripalani's visit to the state, Hamidullah stated:

> He is trying to influence the Maharaja to side with 'Hindu Congress' and enter the Constituent Assembly. If the Government decided to join the Constituent Assembly we will take steps against it. On no ocassion will we accept to side with 'Hindu Congress'. It is incumbent on the Maharaja that he declares Kashmir as an independent state and allow Kashmiris to frame their own constitution, which will preserve both our culture and religion. We have warned time and again the Kashmir Government against joining the Constituent Assembly. We will have friendly relations with 'Hindu Hindustan' and 'Muslim Pakistan'. After we frame our constitution we shall decide which party we would join. We won't force our Maharaja who is a born Hindu to join Pakistan.[8]

[7] 'Kashmir Muslims Passing Through a Severe Ordeal', *Dawn*, 31 January 1947, Press Cutting, Political Department, 1946, File No. 167-P (S)/46, National Archives of India (hereafter, NAI).

[8] 'Sovereign State for Kashmir: Muslim Demand', *Times of India* (hereafter, *TOI*), Bombay, 22 May, 1947, p. 5; 'If Pakistan intervenes in our internal matters we would resist such intervention, Maharaja should allow us to make our own Constitution: Chaudhri Hamidullah's speech', *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 24 May 1947, p. 4.

Hamidullah's declaration of an independent Kashmir was seen among some circles as a political tactic of his party, perceivably hoping to eventually absorb the state into Pakistan.[9] By 1947 the association of Muslims with Pakistan was so ingrained in the common psyche of 'Hindus' of the state that any 'Muslim' force which deemed to take a different course for the future of Kashmir was suspected.[10] Hamidullah was aware of the mistrust that National Conference supporters and 'Hindus' had for his principle of an '*Azad* Kashmir'. He declared in the conference that some mischievous elements in the society had misinterpreted the Muslim Conference's demand for an independent Kashmir 'as a ruse to trap the Maharaja and finally absorb this state into Pakistan'. Clarifying on this issue, Hamidullah said, 'I take this opportunity to repudiate this allegation, and I reiterate that we shall stand by His Highness if he chooses to become a constitutional monarch with full responsible government'.[11]

The Muslim Conference group was not alone in embarking such a course for Kashmir's future. The *Hamdard*'s editor Prem Nath Bazaz also advised the Maharaja to declare independence and join the British Commonwealth. *Noor,* another newspaper, in its issue of 31 May 1947 reported that, 'Moulvi Yusuf Shah in alliance with the official organisations, State People's Conference and the 'Government-paid Bazaz Party' (Prem Nath Bazaz who was dubbed as a staunch enemy of the freedom struggle by National Conference workers) sent telegrams to His Highness and urged him not to participate in the Constituent Assembly'.[12]

The Muslim Conference's discourse on the future of the state at this point represented a decision to safeguard the state's distinctive identity. Perhaps within the Muslim Conference discourse, the support for Pakistan appeared to have been based on the idea of *millat*. This meant that the Muslim Conference discourse on Pakistan was not at odds with the language of belonging drawn on the ideal of an attachment to the 'place'. At the same time, Hamidullah's declaration of Kashmir's independent

[9] 'Chaudhri Hamidullah's New Stunt', *Ranbir*, Jammu, 28 May 1947, p.4.
[10] *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 29 May 1947. Lala Shiv Nath Nanda, the Hindu Sabha President, represented one such voice that deemed Chaudhri Hamidullah's statement was a political forgery. He stated that seeking Pakistan while being in Hindustan was like adding fuel to fire and hurting the 'Hindu' sentiments. The ideal was for 'Hindustan' to remain 'akhand' (united).
[11] *TOI*, Bombay, 22 May 1947, p. 5.
[12] *Noor*, 31 May 1947, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1946-48, File No. PR/ NK-6, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu Repository (hereafter JSA).

status reflected a tension in the process of searching a 'collective Kashmiri Muslim identity'. The 'collective Muslim identity' seems to have been caught between the two forces of an 'Islamic identity' which had extra-territorial implications and entrenched 'Kashmiri' identity based on local social and cultural traditions. This was a dilemma in the Muslim Conference's discourse which lent support to Pakistan, representing a kind of 'supra-nationalism', while at the same time grappled with the idea of attachment to Kashmir as a 'homeland' for Muslims of the state.

Chitralekha Zutshi notes that the Muslim Conference, the pro-Muslim League party of the state, 'did not want the state to join Pakistan, but remain independent'.[13] It is true that the Muslim Conference in early 1947 was keen to see Kashmir as an independent state. However, the party's position by July 1947 had undergone a massive transformation.

By 1946, the idea of Pakistan as a territorially demarcated entity had taken deep roots within the people's psyche. David Gilmartin argues:

> The 1946 Cabinet Mission represented the last serious attempt to reconcile the notion of Pakistan as territory with the notion of Pakistan as a symbolic marker of the larger community's sovereignty over Muslim's embedded communal lives. With its failure, Pakistan's realization as a territorial state became inescapable. And with that the disjuncture between place and territory began to take its violent toll.[14]

Once the territorial fixity of the new nation became somewhat clear, the Muslim Conference's position also changed drastically. The Muslim Conference party held a convention on 19 July 1947 in Srinagar to discuss the future plan of their party. The convention was attended by Muslim Conference workers from Poonch, Jammu and Kashmir. One of the resolutions passed in this convention was:

> The Maharaja of Kashmir should be appeased and convinced to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Without losing any time, the Maharaja should declare the

[13] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), p. 303.
[14] David Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative', *The Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 57, No.4 (Nov., 1998), p. 1084.

> accession of the state to Pakistan. If the resolution was not accepted, the Muslim Conference would launch the "Direct Action" against the present Kashmir Government. The Muslim Conference is of the opinion that because of the geographical factors, 85 percent Muslim majority of the state, commercial ties with Pakistan, cultural affinities and shared boundaries with Pakistan it would be most beneficial for the state to join Pakistan.[15]

The political discourse of the Muslim Conference stood in clear opposition to its counterpart, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. Since the 1940s Sheikh Abdullah had vehemently opposed the 'Pakistan' demand and the 'two-nation' theory. While Sheikh Abdullah remained jailed till September 1947, the vacuum in Kashmir's political spaces was filled by his wife, Begum Akhtar Jehan. In the National Conference's discourse the issue of accession was not of prime importance. As late as September, Ghulam Ahmad Bakshi maintained that the goal of 'azadi' was of key importance. Once that goal was achieved, Bakshi argued, the people of the state would have the right to decide if they wanted to accede to Pakistan or 'Hindustan'.[16] In the National Conference discourse, the question of freedom from Dogra aristocracy had taken pre-eminence. It reiterated the slogan of 'Azadi before Accession'.

How did the Maharaja of Kashmir respond to such political maneuvrings and competing discourses on Kashmir's future? Did the political differences within the state have any impact on Maharaja's decision on accession? Maharaja Hari Singh was known for his 'delusions of grandeur', 'his taste for independence', his 'tendency towards extravagance'.[17] The British empire, Kwasi Kwarteng argues, 'produced proud and difficult maharajas, who stood on ceremony and were punctilious about their dignity and honours'.[18] In the light of the Muslim Conference's declaration in May 1947 that the Muslims who formed the majority of the state subjects would support the Maharaja in his declaration of an independent sovereign state, it would not be wrong to assume that the ideal situation for Maharaja himself would have been independence. Kwarteng argues that towards the end of the

[15] 'Who will decide the future of the state?' *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 23 July 1947, p. 2.
[16] *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 11 September 1947, p. 1.
[17] Kwasi Kwarteng *Ghosts of Empire: Britain's Legacies in the Modern World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 110.
[18] Ibid., p.112.

British Raj, the Maharaja had turned to mysticism under the influence of Swami Sant Dev. The Maharaja had begun to believe that he could build a 'fantastical kingdom' for himself which some called the 'Dogistan'.[19]

In a bid to influence the Maharaja, the Congress President, Acharya Kripalani paid a visit to the state in May 1947. Kripalani had advised the National Conference supporters to give up the 'Quit Kashmir' slogan, which he believed was 'unreasonable' and 'unjust'. He believed that there was no parallel between the Congress slogan of 'Quit India', and the National Conference slogan of 'Quit Kashmir', since Congress was fighting the British who were foreigners to the country. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Kripalani believed, was the 'son of the soil'.[20] Despite the Congress President's call for abandoning the slogan of 'Quit Kashmir', the slogan remained crucial to the National Conference party.[21] `

Maharaja's indecision over the accession to either of the Dominion was perceived by many as reason enough to create a rift between the two independent nation-states. The possibility of Kashmir remaining an independent state was ousted by Lord Mountbatten during his visit to the state in June 1947. Mountbatten had advised the Maharaja that his 'state was a landlocked country, an over-sized and under-populated country, and that he must decide on acceding to either of the dominions keeping in mind the geographical contiguity, political position and composition of the State'. However, the Maharaja was undecided even after Mountbatten's intervention. The fact that the state was not only predominantly a Muslim majority state, ruled by a Hindu Ruler, the political loyalties of the Muslims across the state were divided between Muslim Conference and the National Conference. The Muslims in the Valley were as divided as their leaders in terms of their discourse on the future of Kashmir. In Jammu, Sheikh Abdullah did not gain the same level of popularity, as he had among the Muslims of the Valley. The people of the state were as diversified as the regions they inhabited within the territorially bounded state. It appears that the Maharaja was sure about the consequences of his

[19] Ibid, p.121.
[20] *TOI*, Bombay, 26 May 1947, p. 8; Noor, Press Cutting, Publicity Department, 1946-8, File No. PR/NK-6, JSA.
[21] *TOI*, Bombay, 3 June 1947, p. 9.

decision. His decision may have resulted in 'communal violence' across the state. He was also sure that his own position vis-a-vis the new nation-states would also change after the accession. He was bound to lose the sovereign rights over the state.

There were clear differences in the discourses of the Congress and the Muslim League over the position of the states after the lapse of Paramountcy. While Congress vociferously made it clear that the declaration of independence by the states would be treated as a threat to the Union of India,[22] Jinnah conceded the states' right to independence. Jinnah in a statement issued on 17 June 1947 declared that the end of paramountcy would give the states sovereign status. He further said:

> Constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent sovereign states on the termination of Paramountcy, and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like: it is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent. In the last case, they can enter into such arrangements or relationship with Hindustan or Pakistan as they may choose.[23]

In his interview with Chaudhri Hamidullah on 11 July in Delhi, Jinnah reiterated that Kashmir was free to join either of the Dominions or remain independent. He was hopeful that the Maharaja and the Kashmir Government would give 'close attention and consideration to the interests not only of the ruler but also the people, eighty percent of whom were Muslims'. [24] The stakes of the Union of India were far greater in terms of defence had the states been allowed to remain independent. Some of these smaller states were located deep within the Union of India and it would have been technically impossible to govern an internally diversified political entity.

As all the efforts to persuade the Maharaja to accede to either of the dominions continuously failed, the task was left to Gandhi. Gandhi arrived in Srinagar on 1 August 1947 to address the National Conference volunteers at its headquarters, Mujahid Manzil. Known for their "goondaism" throughout the 1940s the National

[22] Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power*, 1942-47, (hereafter, *TOP*), Volume XI, p. 129.
[23] *TOI*, Bombay, 18 June 1947, p. 1.
[24] *TOI*, Bombay, 12 July 1942, p. 7.

Conference volunteers may have appeared to Gandhi the '*peasant otiyars of Chauri Chaura*'[25], an undisciplined motley of volunteers. The National Conference volunteers may not have been acquainted with Gandhi's ideal of a disciplined volunteer. The audience in their 'enthusiasm to have his *Darshan'* made it impossible for Mahatma to reach the stage to address the National Conference volunteers. Gandhi returned without addressing them. The exuberant audience kept raising the slogans '*Mahatma-Gandhi-ki-Jai*' and '*Sheikh Abdullah Zindabad'* which made it difficult for Gandhi to speak at Mujahid Manzil. The audience of around 20,000 people had collected inside the Manzil compound. Gandhi had to return disappointed, and 'left the meeting visibly angry'.[26] Gandhi, however, did address the conference volunteers later in the afternoon, inside the Manzil where he held his prayers. This meeting was intended for a private address to the National Conference volunteers where Gandhi addressed a more 'disciplined' crowd.[27]

Gandhi met the Maharaja of Kashmir at his palace on the same day. Ramachandra Kak, the Prime Minister, reportedly had a meeting with Gandhi lasting nearly an hour. It was generally assumed that the matter of discussion was the question of the future of Kashmir. Kak on being questioned had said, 'We are and we want to be friendly with everybody'.[28]

An editorial of the local newspaper, *Millat,* which had appeared after Kripalani's visit to the state, stated that Gandhi is believed to have come to Kashmir to get Sheikh Abdullah released. Gandhi's purpose of visiting the State, the editorial maintained:

> To mend where Pt. Nehru and Acharya Kriplani have failed. The eyes of the Congress have always been on Kashmir. Acharya Kriplani had come here to persuade the Kashmir Government to join the Indian Union. But the Muslim Conference and other democratic organisations warned the Government not to participate in the Constituent Assembly….We hope that the Kashmir Government will have regard for the political tendencies of the people and

[25] Shahid Amin, *Event Metaphor Memory*, p. 130.
[26] *TOI*, Bombay, 5 August 1947, p. 8.
[27] Ibid.
[28] *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 2 August 1947, p.2; *TOI*, Bombay, 4 August 1947, p. 9.

accord the same treatment to Mr Gandhi which has been meted out to Nehru and Acharya Kripalani.[29]

After his three day visit to Kashmir ended, Gandhi arrived in Lahore. At Rawalpindi, Gandhi made a reference to Kashmir and stated that after 15 August the state would legally become independent. He was sure that the state would not be able to remain independent for long and had to join either of the two dominions. Gandhi said, 'He had no hesitation in saying that the will of the people of Kashmiris was supreme, that commonsense dictated that the will of the Kashmiris should decide the fate of Kashmir and Jammu'. According to Gandhi, the sooner the Maharaja of Kashmir and the people of Kashmir decided the better it would have been. Gandhi was of the opinion that if 'four dominions', the Maharaja, Kashmiris, Pakistan and India could come to a joint decision much of the trouble would be saved. After all, 'Kashmir was a big State and had the greatest strategic value perhaps in the whole of India'.[30]

The deadlock over Kashmir's future course had not ended and it seemed most unlikely that Maharaja would come to any conclusion. The Crown Representative began to negotiate with Kashmir Government on the object of standstill agreements.[31] The British believed that the object of the standstill agreement was 'that existing arrangements between the State and what is now British India will continue to remain in force and would not prejudice the rights, privileges, and immunities of the State and its Ruler'. The Political Department was hopeful that R C Kak would be deputed by the Maharaja for the proposed discussions.[32] The agenda of the discussions was the immediate accession of the states to Dominions on three subjects, foreign affairs, defence and communications. R C Kak was to attend the meeting of 25 July between State representatives and the States Department. In the subsequent communication with the Political Department through the Resident, Kak had notified he would be in Delhi

[29] Publicity Department, 1946-8, File No. PR/NK-6, JSA.
[30] *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 8 August 1947, p. 1; *TOI*, Bombay, 7 August 1947, p. 5.
[31] The standstill agreements were treated to be provisional agreements between the states which were undecided about their joining either of the dominions and the dominions. Under the agreement, the control over three departments viz. foreign affairs, defence, and communications were to be handed over to either of the dominions.
[32] 'Formula for Standstill Agreement', Letter No. F.34 (1)- C/47, dated 8th July 1947, Kashmir Residency Office (hereafter KRO), 1947, File No. 34 (1)-C/46, NAI.

on 23 July for the discussions. In the chain of telegrams exchanged between Colonel Webb, the Resident and Political Department, New Delhi, a telegram from Webb notified, much to their surprise, that 'Kak had resigned and His Highness had appointed Major General Janak Singh in his place'.[33]

The British saw Kak's resignation as a likely pretext to Kashmir joining either of the Dominions. Resident Webb, wrote to the Political Department that:

> Kak asked for permission to retire as he felt that he had lost confidence of the Ruler who he found had been corresponding with Congress through other channels. I believe the break came because of indecision of His Highness to make up his mind either to join one of the other dominion or in peculiar circumstances of Kashmir come into open and ask for agreements with both.[34]

Webb, shedding light on the complex nature of the Kashmir situation at this critical juncture, further wrote:

> His Highness, Dogras and Hindu communities incline towards India but the bulk of population are Muslim and if consulted would probably favour Pakistan especially the Mirpur, Poonch and Muzaffarabad areas. Kak although a Hindu clearly saw implications and felt that if Kashmir joined either dominion especially India it would mean serious trouble…His Highness's letter accepting his [Kak's] request for retirement stated that he had lost the confidence of the people.[35]

The Resident in Kashmir, Webb noted that Thakur Janak Singh, the new Prime Minister of Kashmir, was aware of the situation in the state and '[he] although inclining towards India as a Hindu realises bulk of Muslims will not accept decision [to accede to India]'.[36] He therefore wished for agreements with both the dominions. 'The Kashmir Government were in a great dilemma as a decision to join either dominion will result in serious trouble that might also have repercussions outside

[33] Ibid, Telegram No. 85 dated 11 August 1947 from Resident in Kashmir, Colonel Webb to P.S.V, New Delhi.
[34] Telegram No. 86 dated 13 August 1947, from Resident in Kashmir Colonel Webb to P.S.V New Delhi, KRO, 1947, File No. 34 (1)-C/46, NAI.
[35] 'Formula for Standstill Agreement', KRO, 1947, File No. 34 (1)-C/46, NAI.
[36] Ibid.

State,'[37] Once again it became apparent that Kashmir was not likely to join either dominion. By now it had become clear that it was next to impossible to retain the state in its entirety and accede to either of the two dominions. There were certain groups within the state which favoured accession to Pakistan. While the 'Hindus' (with some exceptions like Bazaz, Kak etc) and ruling classes were opposed to it.

Following Kak's 'resignation', the National Conference workers celebrated the day of his dismissal as a 'Deliverance Day' to mark his removal from the Prime Ministership of the State. They lit their homes and fired hundreds of crackers. Processions were reported to have been taken out in the entire city shouting pro-nationalist slogans.[38] On 17 June 1947, Nehru had written to Mountbatten before he came to Kashmir:

> From Maharaja's point of view this [joining the Constituent Assembly of India] is obviously desirable and preferable to joining the other Assembly. Mr. Kak, however, comes in the way and it has been reported that he has told Maharaja that the Viceroy favours Kashmir joining the Pakistan Assembly because of the geographical situation of the State. Mr Kak has also tried to convince the Maharaja that as soon as he joins the Indian Union, there will be communal riots in the State and that possibly hostile people from the surrounding territory of Pakistan might enter Kashmir and give trouble…Immediate steps that appear to be essential are the removal of Mr Kak from the Prime Ministership.[39]

It is not clear, however, if Kashmir Government bent to any pressure from Nehru or Mountbatten over the issue of Kak's dismissal on 11 August 1947. It appears from Nehru's letter to Mountbatten that serious differences between the Maharaja of Kashmir and Kak had developed by middle of the year 1947. As early as May, *Hamdard* reportedly referred to the growing differences between the two which National Conference supporters dubbed as 'baseless allegations'.[40] However, Kak's dismissal started a new phase in Kashmiri politics in 1947. It opened up possibilities of striking alliances among parties which may have otherwise been difficult to sustain.

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[37] Ibid.
[38] *TOI*, Bombay, 13 August 1947, p. 5.
[39] *TOP*, 'Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, dated 17th June 1947', Vol XI, pp. 446-48.
[40] *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 25 May 1947.

Khidmat, the official mouth piece of the National Conference party, reported that a secret meeting was held soon after the dismissal of Kak which was attended by his 'agents' Maulvi Yusuf Shah, Salam Dalal, Prem Nath Kuna, Prem Nath Bazaz and Amar Nath Kak. It maintained:

> In the meeting it was decided that they [the above mentioned people] make sure Agha Shaukat [Muslim Conference Secretary who was arrested in 1946 by the Kashmir Government] be out of jail on parole and propagate that "Prime Minister Kak wanted the state of Jammu and Kashmir to join Pakistan Union and not Indian Union, and on the basis of which he was dismissed from his office".[41]

[41] 'Kak met Muslim Conference Agha Shaukat in Srinagar Central Jail, Is Kak aiming to incite communal riots: A New ploy?', *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 14 August 1947, p. 1.

The illustration is from National Conference party's official mouthpiece, *Khidmat*. Right from 1946 the National Conference vehemently opposed Prime Minister Kak. The above picture is from August 1947, when Kak was replaced by Major Janak Singh as the Prime Minister of the State. The Urdu text in the picture reads, '*Qabristan Mai Kak Shahi'* (Kak Ministry buried in the graveyard).

Source: *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 21 August 1947, p. 3. Reference Section, Directorate of Information, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir.

In the month of August, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and Chaudhri Hamidullah launched a movement called, '*Pakistan mai shamil hojao'* (Accede to Pakistan).[42] On 26 August 1947, Kashmir Government finally entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan for the continuance of all administrative arrangements and agreements previously in force between Kashmir and the British.[43] It was on the same day, the Muslim Conference workers spread a rumour in the Srinagar city that Kashmir has finally acceded to Pakistan. [44] With the signing of the standstill agreement with Pakistan, the Muslim Conference workers believed that there was no need to continue emphasizing on 'Direct Action'.

The nationalist histories tend to generalize that no organised body advocated accession to Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.[45] While it is not sure how organised the Muslim Conference's movement of 'Accession to Pakistan' was, there were certain elements even within the Valley that sought accession to Pakistan. In fact, Sheikh Abdullah, who was released by the Kashmir Government on 28 September 1947, too recognised that there was a group of people within the Valley who wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan.[46]

For some time the high drama of Maharaja's undecidedness had subsided into the background. In this state an agitation erupted in Poonch bordering West Punjab. The Poonch *illaqa* had been a fruitful ground for recruitment into the British Army during the Second World War period. In the year 1945, 7503 recruits had joined the army bringing the total to 33,815 since the commencement of War.[47] The post-war period had witnessed an increase in prices. Prices rose higher than what they had been in the year 1945. Price rise combined with food shortage in the post-war period made the situation precarious. The disturbances in Kashmir during the year 1946 had seen a

[42] 'Agha Shaukat Ali on Ramchandra Kak's advice brought Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and Chaudhri Hamidullah group together: Self-motivated movement named Accede to Pakistan movement', *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 28 August 1947.
[43] *TOI*, Bombay, 27 August 1947, p. 1.
[44] 'Why did Muslim Conference spread the rumor that Kashmir has acceded to Pakistan?', *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 29 August 1947.
[45] Jha, *Origins of a Dispute*, p. 33.
[46] *Khidmat*, Srinagar, 19 October 1947, p.1.
[47] *Administrative Report of the Poonch Jagir for S. 2001 (May 1944-April 1945*), JSA.

'falling off' in the tourist trade, and Kashmir province especially had begun to "feel the pinch".[48]

According to the Resident in Kashmir, the most dangerous trend was the large number of demobilized servicemen returning to their homes in increasing numbers in the year 1946. The majority of these men lived in Poonch and Mirpur where, to the Resident's surprise, Sheikh Abdullah's and Nehru's agitation of 1946 left no visible impact. Webb wrote to Griffin that this peaceful atmosphere may not continue for long. It was essential for them to do something to give the returning servicemen full opportunity of employment and improved economic conditions. He emphasized that 'Post war Reconstruction Funds' need to be utilised as soon as possible to avoid any untoward situation.[49]

As early as August 1947 trouble started to brew in Poonch. The Kashmir Government released a 'communique' in September which gave the official version of the happenings in Poonch. The 'communique' stated:

> Early in August in the Bagh tehsil and northern parts of Sudh, Nuttul tehsil of Poonch Jagir evil disposed persons instituted a violent agitation against the administration of the jagir and in favour of civil-disobedience and no-tax campaign…On August 24, large and excited mobs collected to the west of Bagh tehsil and on August 25 they marched on Bagh town-a mob of 5000 which considerably swelled during the next two days. The mobs were armed with firearms of various patterns-axes, spears and other weapons…mob entry into Bagh town mainly inhabited by Hindus and Sikhs…burnt Hindu and Sikh houses.. mobs warned that troops in garrison would enforce order by force.[50]

While the turn of events in the state became worrisome for the state, following the agitation in Poonch jagir, Mehr Chand Mahajan, (who had replaced Thakur Janak Singh as the Prime Minister of Kashmir) at a press conference in Srinagar on 15 October 1947, reiterated Kashmir Government's stand that they would remain on

[48] 'Muslim Grievances in Kashmir and disturbances in the state', Political Department, 1946, File No. 182-P (S)/46, NAI.
[49] Ibid.
[50] *TOI*, Bombay, 15 September 1947, p. 7.

friendly terms with both the dominions irrespective of which dominion the State eventually decided to accede to. He stated:

> People who wish to sabotage the existing Government and substitute a parallel Government of their own, will undoubtedly be treated as rebels and if caught will share the same fate that meets all the rebels. Those who wish to carve a communal State in the Dominion of the Maharaja will find no quarter with me.[51]

Who were the 'rebels' the Prime Minister Mahajan was referring to? It is clear that prior to the 'tribal invasion', the Maharaja sensed that there was trouble in the state and his authority as a sovereign of the state was being challenged. The 'rebels' were the 'Kashmiri rebels', who rose in a rebellion against the Maharaja from within the State itself.

The nationalist history writing, as Shahid Amin argues, is often marked by 'a selective amnesia'[52]. Prem Shankar Jha argues that what happened in Poonch in August and early September 'was carefully instigated by Pakistan'.[53] In his speech of 21 October 1947 in Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah stated:

> The Poonch area is a jagir of the Kashmir state. The people have started an agitation against the Kashmir state which is not communal in nature. The Kashmir government sent state forces to that area which created panic among the people. Poonch locals who formed an important element in state forces evacuated their families to Jhelum and Rawalpindi areas where they have familial ties.[54]

Not only are certain events erased from the dominant historiography, but the events are cast in altogether different terminologies. The popular struggles are often delegitimized, camouflaging the role of the actual 'actors' while highlighting the role of the 'instigators'.

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[51] *TOI*, Bombay, 21 October 1947, p. 3.
[52] Amin, *Event Metaphor Memory*, p. xx.
[53] Jha, *The Origins of a Dispute*, p. 10.
[54] *Ranbir*, Jammu, 25 October 1947, p. 1.

While Mehr Chand Mahajan, the new Prime Minister of the state and Maharaja of Kashmir were still living in their ideal of Kashmir being the 'Switzerland of East',[55] serious trouble had already erupted within the state. The insurrection in Poonch preceded any tribal incursions into the state territory. Since the region was a recruitment ground for the army, the military ingredient became crucial in the uprsing against the Maharaja. These 'Kashmiri rebels' 'insurgents' had succeeded in overwhelming the Government forces. As a result, 'the Kashmiri rebels' established a 'Provisional Azad Kashmir Government' with its seat in Poonch. This was not all. In the meantime trouble also broke out in the northern district of Gilgit too.[56]

In a situation of chaos due to the various locally organized agitations, the state faced a 'tribal invasion' from the North-Western Frontier hastening what may have been the choice of Maharaja, if independence was ruled out. The Maharaja of Kashmir sought help from the Union of India to repel the 'tribal invasion', which was extended only on the condition that Maharaja acceded his state to the Union of India. The accession was accepted on 27 October 1947. Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General of India, had accepted the accession on the condition that once peace and order was restored, wishes of the people would be taken into account to settle the final accession.[57]

The partition of the state demonstrated a certain kind of a pattern. The areas, which the Resident in Kashmir, Colonel Webb, had noted earlier in 1947 – the people of Poonch, Muzaffarabad, Mirpur – where pro-Pakistan sentiment was visibly stronger, were engaged in an uprising against the Maharaja. The partition more than the physical division of the state reflected a partition of the state in terms of the ideological differences. All those areas where Muslim Conference was able to secure its foothold throughout the 1940s were left on the Pakistani side of the ceasefire line. Was then the partition of the state a result of the long-drawn ideological differences between the Muslim Conference and National Conference rather than just an outcome of hostility between the two nation-states?

[55] *Ranbir*, Jammu, 17 October 1947, p. 1.
[56] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*, pp. 305-306.
[57] *TOI*, Bombay, 28 October 1947; 29 October 1947.

Narrating Nineteen Forty-Seven: The Nationalist Trope

The nationalist narratives of Nineteen Forty-Seven reiterate certain types of tensions in reconciling the sharply different accounts of the 'event'. The contestations over the past and the representations of Nineteen Forty-Seven in these master narratives speak volumes about buttressing their claims to Kashmir. *Defending Kashmir* constructed the image of Srinagar for the tribal invaders as that of a 'coveted objective'. The narrative used the trope of 'rape of Baramulla' to construct the images of sacrilege, atrocity, and rapacious looting so as to damn the 'tribal invaders' from Pakistan. Baramula became emblematic of the rapaciousness of Pakistan's desire for Kashmir. [58]

Such narratives have shaped a certain kind of history and memory of Forty-Seven. The narration of Nineteen Forty-Seven takes place in this particular frame feeding on images of destruction, marauding and loot. The narrative describes the invasion as:

> They were a motley crowd composed of frontier tribesmen attracted by the promise of rich loot, ex-soldiers from Punch and Pakistan, some regular soldiers from Pakistan Army on leave and deserters from the Kashmir State Forces….The tribesmen amongst them busied themselves with looting and pillaging while the going was good, and forgot the holy war and its military objective.[59]

If it was a holy war for the tribal invaders, Free India's first military campaign was to be guided by 'the code of "dharma" that the Lord preached to the warrior Arjuna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra'.[60]

What is intrinsic to the master narratives is the construction of an image of the tribal as 'indisciplined motley', 'hordes of hostiles', 'wild forces let loose on the state'. The newspaper reports too constructed such images of the 'invaders' and the 'invasion', creating a memory bound up with the rituals of national identification, a

[58] *Defending Kashmir*, (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1949), p. 17. https://archive.org/details/DefendingKashmir. (Accessed on 16 June 2016).
[59] Ministry of Information, *Defending Kashmir*, p. 16.
[60] Ibid, p. 4.

symbolic repertoire for binding people into a collective national identity. The *Times of India* reported Nehru saying:

> Our complaints against Pakistan was that it incited and aided the tribesmen from outside…Incursions by the raiders into the State territory, involving murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women were continuing. The booty was being collected and carried to the Tribal Areas to serve as an inducement to tribesmen to swell the ranks of the raiders.[61]

In these narratives perhaps the fear of the tribal people, the danger of an unstable frontier, was in some way or the other shaped by the earlier colonial constructions of the tribal people, designated as 'wild', 'plundering' or 'predatory'. In the colonial constructions, Ajay Skaria notes the tribes were considered as 'primitives outside of the civilization or more precisely before the civilisation and therefore their acts of violence are seen as not barbaric but savage.'[62] Such images fed into the dominant narratives and produced a memory of the tribal invasion of a particular kind. Sheikh Abdullah in his autobiography, *Atish-e-Chinar*, reiterated similar images of the 'tribal invasion'. The tribals, according to Abdullah were 'lawless people, asked to proceed to Kashmir, having been assured of their bounty through plunder of the countryside'.[63]

What was the character of the violence that engulfed the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the pretext of 'tribal invasion'? The official narratives maintained that the violence perpetrated by the 'tribal invaders' made no difference in terms of race and religion. The Muslims suffered as much as non-Muslims at their hands.[64] Andrew Whitehead argues, 'The Kashmir Valley did not initially endure communal carnage. But it witnessed an invasion, and violence that was political, religious and communal in nature, starting just as the Partition killings in Punjab were beginning to subside.'[65]

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[61] 'Kashmiri Muslims Support Indian Government-Pandit Nehru's Reply to Critics and Opponents', *TOI,* Bombay, 6 March 1948, p. 9.
[62] Ajay Skaria, 'Shades of Wildness: Tribe, Caste, and Gender in Western India', *The Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), p. 726.
[63] Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, *Flames of Chinar: An Autobiography* (New Delhi: Viking, 1993), p.89.
[64] Ministry of Information*, Defending Kashmir*, p. 28.
[65] Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*, p. 2.

While the dominant/official discourses represented this violence as 'political violence' with no 'communal' overtones, the individual testimonies suggest otherwise. From these testimonies, the narrative of violence indicates its 'communal' character. Forceful conversions, abduction of women from a religious group other than one's community, self-inflicted death by women to save the honour of the families, all point towards the 'communal' nature of violence.[66]

In the official discourses, the violence which erupted in the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a result of external factors. Whitehead argues that many of the local Muslims at Baramula looked upon the invaders as their 'liberators', 'as delivering them from their unpopular maharaja'.[67] One of the testimonies mentions that the local population at Baramula and Muzafarabad offered support to the 'tribal invaders'.[68] It noted, 'such attitude of the local people who are wolves with a veneer of nationalism have created a havoc…Not a single Muslim in these areas has been killed or looted except those who were of course exceedingly rich and didn't entertain the raiders on dinners and parties.'[69] Frantic telegrams were sent to Patel and Nehru about the local population aiding 'qabaili raiders'.[70]

The official/dominant discourses silenced the episodes of local connivance to the 'tribal invaders'. The official narratives homogenized the events and constructed a 'collective memory' of Nineteen Hundred Forty-Seven in a particular way. Forty-Seven was equated with the 'tribal invasion', reducing other happenings to nothingness. What becomes evident is that these narratives are powerfully inclined to silence the alternative historical and memory discourses; they tend to define what is to be remembered and what is to be forgotten about the past. Dipesh Chakrabarty argues, 'Some constructions and experiences of the past stay "minor" in the sense that their very incorporation into historical narratives converts them into pasts of "lesser importance" vis-à-vis dominant understandings of what constitutes fact and evidence

[66] D. 1170-P/48 from Ram Prakash to Patel dated 1-1-1948, File No. 2 (13)-E (S)/47, Ministry of States (hereafter MOS), 1947, NAI; 'Enquiry about non-Muslims in Gilgit', MOS, 1948, File No. 7 (4)-K/48, NAI.
[67] Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*, p. 10.
[68] 'Kashmir Affairs-Offer of Help from Provinces', MOS, 1947, File No. 118 (1)-PR/47 Vol II, NAI.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Telegram No. D. 2687-PS (III)/47 dated 13-12-1947 to Nehru, MOS, 1947, File No. 118 (3)-PR/47, NAI.

(and hence vis-à-vis the underlying principality of rationality) in the practices of professional history.'[71] Is then the past that does not figure in the master narratives essentially 'minority history'? Isn't it more likely that these master narratives tend to normalise and naturalize what they construct as the most genuine picture of the past pushing the other 'minor histories' and memories into obscurity?

[71] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 100.



Source:http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00routesdata/1900_1999/partition/refugees/refugees.html (Accessed 7 June 2016)

Of Silenced Histories: The 'Jammu Massacre'

The dominant/official/nationalist narrative of partition in Kashmir has been shaped around the 'tribal invasion' story. Soon after partition in 1947, the 'tribal invasion' became the dominant trope in the nationalist tellings and retellings of the partition narrative. However, violence which engulfed the state was not just related to the 'tribal invasion', but was also shaped by internal disturbances. It was also closely connected to the partition violence and partition related 'migrations' and dislocations in the subcontinent.

Ian Stephens in his book *Pakistan* has noted:

> In the Jammu Province things went very differently. There, unlike every other part of the State, Hindus and Sikhs slightly outnumbered Muslims; and within a period of eleven weeks starting in August, systematic savageries, similar to those already launched in East Punjab and in Patiala and Kapurthala, practically eliminated the entire Muslim element in population, amounting to 500,000 people. About 200,000 just disappeared remaining untraceable, having presumably been butchered, or died from epidemics or exposure. The rest fled destitute to West Punjab.[72]

If one is to believe the estimations made by Stephens, then the 'Jammu massacre' remains the least known episodes of the state's partition history. The 'Jammu massacre' remains a marginalized episode in the history of partition of the state in 1947. This marginalization is a direct result of the construction of nationalist narratives, which reflect a tendency to narrate the happenings of Forty-Seven in the language of 'action', 'reaction', actions of Muslims in Punjab resulting in the 'over-reaction' in the border belts of Jammu province.[73] There is an uneasy acceptance in the nationalist narratives of 'mere sporadic incidents of communal violence' in the Jammu region.[74] The politics of silencing shapes the making of a linear narrative of partition in Kashmir The convergence of the two diverging points; one the outright dismissal of communal violence in the state, and other an uneasy acceptance of

[72] Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (New York, 1963), p.200.
[73] Jha, *The Origins of a Dispute*, p. 10-11.
[74] Ibid.

sporadic episodes of communal violence make the nationalist/dominant narratives somewhat disturbing. They reduce the partition to a single and self-enclosed event. The nationalist narratives maintain that the Muslims in the border belt of Jammu must have faced some of the atrocities committed by bands of Sikhs and some State troops in the first week of October. Prem Shankar Jha notes, these were caused by an 'overspill into the State of the communal carnage that was going on all along its borders in east and West Punjab. The atrocities may have been an over-reaction to the atrocities committed by Muslims in the same area and in the adjoining areas of West Punjab where they were in a minority.'[75]

Such narratives fail to locate the Jammu violence of 1947 within the frame of partition violence. The official/dominant/nationalist narratives maintain that there was no communal violence inside the state. No animosity existed between the two communities. Such narrative construction is not limited to writing a history of partition-related violence in Kashmir. It is also evident in the narratives written on partition violence in the subcontinent in general. Gyanendra Pandey notes that partition violence is treated as an aberration from the norm of inter-communal co-existence. Such violence is seen as 'against the fundamentals of Indian or (Pakistani) tradition and history'.[76] In the case of Kashmir, underplaying such form of violence was deeply connected with centerstaging Kashmir as the fountainhead of secularism in the nationalist imagination. The official narratives of 1947 which were written as 'triumphal history', the triumph of good over evil,[77] soon after the partition of 1947 celebrated Kashmir as a metaphor for the new nation-state encompassing a national community of secularism and democracy. Mahatma Gandhi in his post- prayer speech on 29 October 1947 said, 'He would not shed a tear if the little Union force was wiped out like the Spartans in defending Kashmir [against the tribal invasion]. Nor would he shed tears if Sheikh Abdullah and his Hindu and Muslim comrades were wiped out in defending Kashmir'.[78] This, according to Gandhi, served a 'timely reminder to the rest of India, and that they would forget that Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were

[75] Jha, *Origins of Dispute*, p. 10-11.
[76] Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, p. 3.
[77] Ministry of Information, *Defending Kashmir*, p.17; *Twelve Months of War in Kashmir* (Washington: Government of India Information Services, 1948),https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89100129055. (Accessed on 16 June 2016).
[78] 'Kashmir Trouble: Mahatma's Views on Invasion', *TOI*, 30 October 1947.

enemies'.[79] Kashmir became the populist metaphor for the new nation-state as a community of secularism and democracy. Srinath Raghavan argues, 'In the stygian darkness after Partition Gandhi and Nehru regarded Kashmir's accession as a powerful affirmation that India would not become a Hindu Pakistan.'[80] It was to secure the image of the new national enterprise as a community of secularism that much of the communal violence in Jammu province slipped through the pages of history.

Even before the partition of the subcontinent was announced people from North-Western Frontier entered the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Resident in Kashmir, Colonel Webb reported that by 15 December 1946 approximately 'Hindu refugees' arrived in Muzzafarabad. He noted that there has been no communal tension until this time in the area. Further he reported, 'The only result of the arrival of the refugees has been the slight resentment on part of the local inhabitants who fear that foodstuffs may run short'.[81] As the partition of the subcontinent was announced, the state of Jammu and Kashmir became a passageway between those areas which were considered to be parts of India and Pakistan. When the territorial boundaries of the two nation-states especially with regard to the disputed districts of Kangra state, Gurdaspur and Sialkot was announced, two days after declaration of Independence, the migrations from East Punjab and West Punjab via the state of Jammu and Kashmir became much more intense.[82] As the movement of people from East Punjab to West Punjab and vice versa took place, via the territories of the state, reports of looting, murder and arson in neighbouring Punjab districts began pouring and became a cause of anxiety to the state of Jammu and Kashmir.[83]

The movement of refugees from East Punjab and the West Punjab, through the state of Jammu and Kashmir had politically charged the 'communal' atmosphere within the

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 101.

[81] 'Fortnightly reports on the Political Situation in Kashmir Residency ending 15 December 1946', Political Department, 1946, File No. 5 (5)-P (S)/46, NAI.

[82] 'Apprehensions about possible disturbances', Political Department, 1947, File No. A-113/47-PB, Part ii, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar Repository (hereafter, SSA).

[83] Ibid.'Report regarding border disturbances in Kathua District'. Though it is very difficult to comprehend when exactly this happened because of the dates are not mentioned in the file.

state. As the news of the atrocities on refugees on each side of the border spread, it ignited communal tensions in the state. The report on Kathua maintained:

> No doubt our Muslim State people are going to Pakistan and Govt. is affording facilities to these people for crossing the border of the state to Pakistan, but Pakistan people have continued scondal [sic] of panitration [sic] looting, killing, burning of our border villages…This has resulted [in] retaliation of [sic] attacking by non-Muslims people to Muslims. The incidents in our district more especially [sic] in Poonch, Mirpur and Jammu had added fuel to the fire with the result that the state people [on] seeing and hearing their atrocities of Pakistan people have begun [sic] looting, burning and killing of the Muslim refugees going to Pakistan.[84]

The Jammu province did witness violence and dislocation especially experienced by Muslim communities which was deeply tied to the partition of the subcontinent. Andrew Whitehead notes:

> By October, the killings in Punjab had subsided, but the population movement was getting into stride. Some Partition refugees, a small proportion but sufficient to infuse Kashmir with some of the tension of the time, used Kashmir as a corridor to pass between the dominions. Thousands of sikhs from Peshawar and elsewhere in the Frontier travelled through Kashmir, and there were suggestions that these refugees had deposited arms in gurdwaras, Sikh temples, in towns such as Muzaffarabad and Baramulla. Muslim refugees tended not to travel through the Kashmir Valley, but enormous numbers passed through Jammu district on their way to West Punjab. Indeed, many Jammu muslims were among the refugees.[85]

The nationalist retellings of Nineteen Forty-Seven emphasised that all was calm within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But according to the individual testimonies, panic had gripped the Muslim residents in the Muslim *mohallas* of Jammu from August itself. Muslims from Jammu city began sending telegraphs to Chief Military Staff (H L Scott), Srinagar. One of the telegraphs sent from Muslim Residents of Jammu city on 22 August 1947 stated:

[84] 'Apprehensions', Political Department, 1947, File No. A-113/47-PB, Part ii, SSA.
[85] Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*, p. 33.

> musalmans jammu request muslim military staff for muslim mohallas =Residents mohalla panchbaktar.[86]

The text of the telegraph shows the panic created among the Muslims of Jammu city. Another telegraph from Akhnoor to Maharaja Bahadur maintained:

> Refugees arrived relating exciting tales hindu furiated situation tense purely local partial hindu military pretend pray save our life sending muslim or impartial military.[87]

By September the question of 'refugees' who found their way into the state created immense anxieties and shaped the political opinion in some circles much before the state faced a 'tribal invasion'. Khwaja Ghulam Ahmad, Muslim Conference Assembly party's deputy leader in a speech in September, stated that the spilling over of the refugees into the state territory is liable to create tensions between the two communities and worsen the already existing food crisis in the state. He maintained, 'The Muslims in the state are already facing troubles and they want to live by the principle of "*Live and Let Live"* and any attempt to make them slaves would be met with a strong resistance'.[88]

Historical writing shows that in Kashmir Valley violence did not take a communal form. However, in Jammu province and its adjacent areas, it manifested itself in the 'liquidation movement of Muslims'.[89] In fact, Jammu was closer to Punjab which created apprehensions about the communal carnage spilling into the region. In September, the socialist leader in Jammu, Balraj Puri, insisted that the government should raise the 'Home Guards' in the city to prevent any untoward

[86] Telegraph No. BDN 94, 22 August 1947, Political Department, File No. A-113/47-PB Part iii, SSA.
[87] Telegraph No. 3 BDN 94, 8 Sep 1947, File No. A-113/47-PB Part iii, SSA.
[88] *Ranbir*, Jammu, 24 September 1947, p.2.
[89] 'Extermination from Jammu of Prof. Bal Raj a zealous worker of the R.S.S', Political Department, 1949, File No. 6-PP/50, SSA.

incidents.[90] The memorandum submitted by the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer stated:

> The partition of India in August 1947, resulted in an unprecedented exodus of refugees-Muslims and non-Muslims from the East and West Punjabs and their mass movement through the territories of the Jammu and Kashmir State…Incursions from Pakistan started all along the border in October 1947, which resulted in the displacement of the inhabitants of the State in large numbers, completely shattering normal life in these areas. This tragic state of affairs brought in its train the commotion, which ultimately developed into internal communal disturbances almost all over the province of Jammu.[91]

By November, official reports underlined the madness engendered by the persistent attacks by the 'Pakistan army and raiders all along the border'. These resulted in 'cases of private retaliation between the two communities and in losses of the respective communities where they were in minority'.[92] A Special Correspondent to *The Times* reported from Srinagar:

> While the military situation in the Vale of Kashmir, and as far west as Uri, in the western hill, remains under control by the Indian army, it is reported from southern Province of Jammu that communal feelings are running high and clashes are occurring between Muslim villagers and Hindu and Sikh refugees from western Pakistan. In villages adjacent to the Pakistan border across from Sialkot, Hindu and Sikh refugees, reinforced by others from Poonch and Mirpur districts in West Kashmir have attacked local Muslims and burned villages, with consequent retaliation.[93]

The Times correspondent reported that the partition of the state resulted in the 'elimination of two-thirds of the Muslims last autumn which entirely changed the

[90] *Ranbir*, Jammu, 24 September 1947.
[91] 'Progress of Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons in the Jammu and Kashmir State', Political Department, Year Nil, File No. Nil, SSA.
[92] 'Report from Office of the Governor of Jammu Province to Wazir- Wazarat, No. 301 dated Jammu, 17 November 1947', Political Department, 1947, File No. A-113/47-PB Part iii, SSA.
[93] 'Abdullah Flies to Jammu', *The Times* (London, England), Monday, 17 November 1947, pg. 4, Issue 50920.

present composition of eastern Jammu Province'.[94] The 'Jammu massacre' has been pushed into obscurity by the silences maintained in the master narratives of Nineteen Forty-Seven. In fact, the national leadership including Sheikh Abdullah himself remained silent on the communal violence that engulfed the state, especially the Jammu province. However, he did hesitantly accept in his exchange of letters with Shyama Prasad Mukherji that Jammu was racked by communal violence during the partition period.[95] Jawaharlal Nehru, free India's first Prime Minister, said on 27 November 1947:

> I regret deeply that in parts of Jammu Province Muslims were killed and driven out. This, ofcourse, has had nothing to do with our Government or our forces. But this mutual killing has been a very tragic feature during these past months in the Punjab and Jammu was powerfully affected by this.[96]

But what seems to have happened is almost contrary to what Nehru insisted upon. Sardar Dalip Singh, Agent General to the Government of India in his exchange of letters with Jawaharlal Nehru, reported from Jammu, that 'it was difficult to stop the Sanghis entering the State'.[97] He added that 'almost every official is secretly in sympathy with them and they probably turn a blind eye on their entry. The Sanghis enter the State with the help of the military lorry drivers'.[98] He further informed him that as soon as evacuees started out from Jammu, 300 of them were killed. About 660 were brought back to Jammu and 300 reached Pakistan. Dalip Singh stated, 'I have strong reason to believe that State troops did not act properly'.[99] The official connivance and the military element of communal carnage was not only a distinctive

[94] 'Elimination of Muslims from Jammu', *The Times* (London, England), Tuesday, 10 August 1948, pg. 5, Issue 51146

[95] 'Letter from Sheikh Abdullah to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee dated 4 February 1953', Nehru-Mookerjee-Abdullah Correspondence, *Private Collection of Peerzada Mohammad Ashraf*, Srinagar, p. 55.

[96] 'Army's Behaviour Good and Worthy of our Traditions', *TOI*, Bombay, 26 November, 1947.

[97] Letter No. I-16/AGI/47 from Sir Dalip Singh, Agent to the Government of India in Kashmir, to Jawaharlal Nehru, dated 18 November 1947, MOS, 1948, File No. 178-P/48, NAI.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Letter No. I-16/AGI/47 from Sir Dalip Singh, Agent to the Government of India in Kashmir, to Jawaharlal Nehru, dated 18 November 1947, MOS, 1948, File No. 178-P/48, NAI.

feature in the partition related violence in Jammu, but had already played a crucial role in the partition related violence in Punjab. Dalip Singh noted:

> I have little doubt that once the refugees are evacuated and the people have realised that it is not His Highness's wish to massacre the Muslimsans [sic]- the fact which is commonly believed both by Muslims and Hindus…things will improve and normal relations may possibly be restored.[100]

Dalip Singh further reported that Sheikh Abdullah had informed him of 1½ lakhs Muslims massacred in Riasi (a district in Jammu province).[101] The communal violence continued in Jammu unabated even as late as November 1947. The violence in Jammu was instrumental in constituting what would be defined as the national community within the state boundaries. The violence in Jammu cannot, therefore, be separated from the story of nation-making. It was intricately connected to the question of final accession of the state to either of the nation-states. Dalip Singh reported:

> There [in Jammu] is the Dogra party who consider themselves the clansmen of His Highness and consider they have a right to rule in the land…They consider that Kashmir will probably anyhow remain Muslim largely and inevitably go off to Pakistan. They wish to retain Jammu as Hindu province or State…It is useless to point out that Kashmir is far more important than Jammu and that Jammu is only important as the link between the Indian Union and Kashmir. They would reply that even if this is so, Jammu at any rate should remain Hindu because a Muslim Jammu, and Muslims are in a majority here, implies accession to Pakistan and Kashmiris will have to accede to Pakistan if the route to the Indian Union is cut off.[102]

Together with the valley, there is an almost complete erasure of communal violence in other parts of the State in the nationalist narratives. While the communal character of the partition violence is highlighted elsewhere for example, in Punjab and Bengal, it is usually downplayed in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The partition of the subcontinent, a territorial partition, was limited to Punjab and Bengal, but the consequences of partition were far-reaching. The official narratives gloss over the

[100] Ibid.
[101] Letter No. I-19/AGI/47 from Dalip Singh to Nehru dated 20 November 1947, MOS, 1948, File No. 178-P/48, NAI.
[102] Ibid. Letter No. I-16/AGI/47 from Dalip Singh to Nehru dated 18 November 1947.

deep scars left on the population of Jammu and Kashmir as a result of a continuous cycle of communal violence. The displacement of the Muslim population from Jammu province created a category of a 'Muslim refugee' which remains outside of the nation, therefore, outside of history too.

The Refugees In 'No Man's Land'

As partition of the state in 1947 happened in the aftermath of the making of the two nation-states, the violence which erupted in the state is often treated as outside partition frame. The hostilities between the two nation-states have rendered the experience of dislocation and displacement peripheral in the historiography on the partition of the state. Such marginalization in case of partition of the subcontinent, as Vazira Zamindar argues, is because 'in the region's [south-Asia] nation-bound historiographies these refugees have been presumed to have seamlessly folded into new nations'.[103] The figure of the refugee Zamindar argues, 'through the discursive and institutional regimes of rehabilitation, was made into a citizen of the nation'.[104]

In case of the state of Jammu and Kashmir due to the ensuing dispute between the two nation-states there was no inter-dominion agreement either on evacuation or refugee rehabilitation. Robinson argues that during partition 'Kashmiri refugee' emerged as a distinct political subject within the South Asian refugee regime.[105] When Indian citizenship was extended to Jammu and Kashmir state subjects in 1952, it did not 'negate their claims to subject status or property status in any part of the former princely state unlike the rest of India'.[106] Robinson argues:

[103] Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 6.
[104] Ibid, p. 9.
[105] Cabeiri deBergh Robinson, 'Too Much Nationality: Kashmiri Refugees, the South Asian Refugee Regime, and a Refugee State, 1947-1974', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 344.
[106] Ibid, p. 355.

> The South Asian refugee regime's paradigmatic resolution of refugee-into-citizens was inverted; people displaced from the state of Jammu and Kashmir territories had to remain categorically refugees in order to maintain their historical rights in the princely state, which in turn gave them rights to be resettled as refugees; they were citizens because they were refugees.[107]

While it is true that the 'refugee regime'[108] in the case of Kashmir was different than the rest of India, I argue that the 'refugee regimes' actually did not recognise those who were displaced from and within the state as 'refugees', but categorised them as 'displaced persons'. Logically the Kashmiris were citizens based on their hereditary claims to the former princely state, not because they were refugees. In the first place they were not recognised as 'refugees' at all.[109] The rehabilitation officers in the state did not use the word 'refugee' to define the state subjects displaced from and within the state. The 'refugee' was a non-state subject who was displaced from West Punjab. The displaced persons were further categorized into three categories, 'displaced persons' due to internal disturbances, 'displaced persons' due to 'enemy' action from areas which had been 'liberated', and 'displaced persons' from those areas, which were still under the 'enemy occupation'.[110] The nation-states extended the citizenship rights to the people of Kashmir, but the people of the state could retain their state-subject status and property claims. The annulment of the property rights of the 'displaced persons' would have meant an acceptance of the finality of partition of the state, as was the case with the rest of India.

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[107] Ibid.

[108] Post-partition, both the nation-states made attempts to recover, rehabilitate and resettle people who were found on the 'wrong' side of the newly formed borders between the nation-states. This process has been defined through the term 'refugee regime' by scholars like Vazira Zamindar, Yasmin Khan in case of India and Pakistan, and Cabeiri Robinson in case of Jammu and Kashmir.

[109] This explains why the West Punjab refugees do not hold any permanent citizenship in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The West Punjab refugees in the state are entitled to vote in the Lok Sabha but they are barred from voting to the State Assembly. They are considered as Indian citizens but non-state subjects. The issue of granting them permanent resident status still continues to become a bone of contention in the political circles of the state. For recent controversy on their status see, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/west-pakistan-refugee-vs-rohingya-muslim-refugee-turns-into-kashmir-vs-jammu-identity-certificates-spark-protests-and-violence-4446449/. (Accessed on 9 July 2017).

[110] 'Progress of Rehabilitation of Displaced persons in the Jammu and Kashmir State', General Records, Year Nil, File No. Nil, SSA.

Due to the centrality of property in the rehabilitation schemes, the process was more complicated in the state. The Central Refugee Committee formed in November 1947 in order to avoid double allotment of land to the refugees of West Punjab refused any allotment of land to them in the state. In one of the representations before the Committee, it was maintained:

> The displaced persons from outside who have received allotments in the State should be ejected so that the land under occupation may be available for the displaced persons of the State…In the ordinary course of things no land should have been allotted to a displaced person from outside the State nor he should have been permitted to occupy any land on his own.[111]

In fact, the state rehabilitation schemes made sure that the 'evacuee property' is only allotted to the displaced persons. In cases when the evacuee returned to the state, the displaced person continued to retain the rights on the land, until a new land was made available to the displaced persons.

The non-applicability of the term 'refugee' becomes more evident in the efforts to 'recover the Kashmiri abducted women' from the two Dominions in post-ceasefire phase. While both the nation-states treated 'Kashmiri abducted woman' as a distinct legal category for the purposes of their repatriation programme,[112] the failure to reach an agreement over the recovery of Kashmiri women stalled the efforts to 'recover' them. The efforts at defining the category of Kashmiri abducted women were marked by ambiguities. Till early 1949 all non-Muslim women recovered in Pakistan were handed over to the camp managed by Indian Social Worker at Lahore, without defining the place where from they were recovered. By mid-1949, however, the legal category of 'abducted woman' began to be classified on the basis of the place from where these women were recovered. In the absence of an Inter-Dominion agreement on Kashmiri

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[111] Progress of Rehabilitation of Displaced persons in the Jammu and Kashmir State', General Records, Year Nil, File No. Nil, SSA. p. 9.

[112] 'Demi-Official Letter No. 1912 SHW, Office of the Commissioner Jhullundur Division, Jhullundur City, dated 13 October 1948', Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (hereafter, MEA & Cr.), 1948, File No. 64-CAP (AP)/48, NAI. For a discussion on the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act of 1949 in the Indian Constituent Assembly, see Veena Das, 'The Figure of the Abducted Woman', in Veena Das, *Life and Words: Violence And The Descent Into the Ordinary* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007), p. 25.

abducted women, it became difficult to recover those non-state subject women from Pakistan, who ironically happened to be in Kashmir when they were abducted during the disturbances, but did not belong to Kashmir.[113]

In the official category of 'Kashmiri abducted women', recovery of 'unattached women and children' was not possible as the 'refugee regimes' emphasized the 'morality of patriarchal and familial authority'.[114] The recovery policies due to the hostilities between the two nation-states followed a de-humanizing principle of 'quid pro quo'. In this trade-off, an equal number of Kashmiri abducted Muslim women were to be exchanged for an equal number of Non-Muslim Kashmiri abducted women.[115] The figure of the 'Kashmiri abducted woman' became the 'object of political struggles to define the limits of Indian and Pakistani post-colonial nationality'.[116] As a political charged subject, the 'Kashmiri abducted woman' became a trope and site of immense political anxiety to the nation-states. Through the principle of 'recovering' them and sending them back to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, these women, as per Indian official discourse, had the potential to 'play a very dangerous part in the political, social and economic life of Kashmir.'[117]

[113] No. C.R/HPO/27 July 1949, Central Recovery Office, 'Agreement on the rescue of Kashmiri girls', Ministry of External Affairs (hereafter, MEA), 1950, File No. 64 A-CAB (AP)/50 Part 1, NAI.
[114] Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan, Historiography', p. 1090.
[115] 'Agreement on the rescue of Kashmiri girls', MEA, 1950, File No. 64 A-CAB (AP)/50 Part 1, NAI.
[116] Robinson, 'Too Much Nationality', p. 347.
[117] 'Camp, Residence of the Deputy High Commissioner for India in Pakistan, Lahore, 28 April 1949', MEA & Cr., 1948, File No. 64-CAP (AP)/48, NAI.



Source:http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00routesdata/1900_1999/partition/refugees/kashmiris2.jpg (Accessed 15 April 2017).

Of Memories and Metaphors: Memorializing 1947

Outside the domain of the dominant/official narratives lies the realm of local memory. This domain bears testimony to the presence of contesting memories of 1947 often erased from the dominant discourses. The memories of the 'Jammu massacre' constitute one of the alternate sites of contestations between the history of Nineteen Forty-Seven as a 'history of triumphal events' and the silenced memory of traumatic

events. The 'massacre', which was a direct consequence of the partition of the subcontinent, has been obliterated as an event from the dominant history of the state. Christopher Snedden argues, 'The massacre appears to have slipped through the cracks of subcontinental history, overshadowed by the communal slaughter in the neighbouring Punjab around the same time'.[118]

In contrast, memories of the 'Jammu massacre' are shaped by popular beliefs which shift responsibility to multiple stakeholders; the 'sanghis', the Dogra army, the Maharaja Hari Singh, and also Sheikh Abdullah for his inability as an emergency administrator to stop such actions against the Muslim community in Jammu. The massacre became etched as a traumatic event in the collective memory of Muslims.

Memoir as History:

The last section of the Chapter deals meanings of silence and denial of alternate histories and memories of partition in the state. It focuses on a memoir entitled *Memory Lane to Jammu,* which recounts the memories of the massacre and represents trauma and nostalgia of varied notions of home and forced migration.[119] Through the memoir written by Mehmood Hashmi,[120] which demonstrates the interaction between 'unofficial' history and memory, I will explore the meanings that the narrator attributes to the partition of Kashmir. Hashmi does not treat 1947 as a self- enclosed event. His narration of 1947 incorporates a series of incidents and moments. Such remembrances within the text happen at different forms of temporalities at different moments .

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[118] Christopher Snedden, 'What happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local identity, "The Massacre" of 1947' and The roots of the 'Kashmir problem'', *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 24:2, p. 111.

[119] Rehmat Ullah Rad and Khalid Hasan (ed.), *Memory Lane to Jammu*, trans., Khalid Hasan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004).

[120] Mehmood Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai* (Rawalpindi: Qaumi Kutb Khane, 1950). Mehmood Hashmi was born in pre-partition Kashmir. At the time of Kashmir partition, he worked as an Urdu professor at Amar Singh College in Srinagar. He was part of a peace brigade formed in Srinagar in 1947 to defend Kashmir against the 'tribal invasion'. In January 1948, Hashmi crossed over to what was called 'Azad Kashmir' and served the 'Azad Kashmir' government as Chief Publicity Officer till 1953. Later, he went to London and in 1961 launched *Mashriq,* the first regular Urdu weekly newspaper in Britain.

In his path-breaking study of the Nazi massacre in Rome, Alessandro Portelli writes, 'These stories [stories of Fosse Ardeatine] function as the tool that allows us to reconstruct the struggle over memory, to explore the relation between material facts and personal subjectivity, and to perceive the multiple, mutable ways of elaborating on and facing death.'[121] Recollecting the partition period, Rehmatullah Rad narrates, 'the Muslims of Jammu were annihilated and the few who survived found themselves turned into refugees without home or hearth in Pakistan'.[122] Rad's imaginings of the loss of place (Jammu) are incorporated as a set of symbolic signifiers and images. The images of a lost place and space symbolize the process of annihilation that Rad is invoking in his narration. The narrator, Sorayya Khurshid, talks of annihilation through allusions to various characters that vanished during the partition. 'Ikramullah Khan had been killed during the bloody 1947 upheaval. Sher Mohammad Shera, another of the Jammu characters had married a blind woman Zulekha. Both were killed in 1947. One of the wonders of the school was Abdul Rashid Butt…he was a very delightful and a funny fellow. Tragically, he was killed in the 1947 riots. One of my friends, Khwaja Anwar…In 1947, he was killed in Kathua town'.[123]

The narrative is framed around the list of the names that repeatedly figure in the stories of the 'massacre'. These names symbolise the collective as well as the individual identity of people who disappeared in 1947. The stories of migration, communal violence, and the 'massacre' in Jammu act as a catalyst for memories of a lost community . The 'event' signifying the hostility between India and Pakistan is relegated to the margins. The key metaphor in these stories is the loss of homeland. The metaphoric projection of this loss of 'homeland' is narrated via the narrative of displacement from Jammu and a settlement in a new place altogether. The memories of 1947 within these stories, essentially those of escape, separation, uncertainty and fear are also marked by certain dissonances and contradictions. While the memory of 1947 mainly focuses on tropes of 'forced migration', 'of atrocities perpetrated by Dogra military', and 'RSS warriors', the narrative of certain 'Hindus' acting differently in the atmosphere of chaos also frames a part of remembrance and memory. Yusuf Saraf recollects how some 'good natured Hindus like Bankay Behari,

[121] Portelli, *The Order Has Been Carried Out*, p. 16.
[122] Rehmat Ullah Rad, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, p. 53.
[123] Sorayya Khurshid, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, p. 75.

Nand Lal Pawa and Dr Sethi cautioned their Muslim friends of the grim shape of things to come'.[124]

James Young notes, 'I treat all memory sites as memorials, plastic objects within these sites as monuments. A memorial may be a day, a conference, or space, but it need not be a monument'.[125] In Mehmood Hashmi's memoir, *Kashmir Udaas Hai,* memories recur not through the sites of memorials and other designated places of recollection, but are situated in everyday spaces of everyday life. He seeks to retrieve different types of individual and collective memory which have been systematically erased from the official narratives.

Hashmi addressed and underscored the year of 1947 as an era of political upheavals through the deployment of vivid metaphors and dates. The metaphors such as 'burning chirags', or 'Chinaru ki aag', 'the night of 24 October 1947', '25 October 1947'[126] were crafted into the narrative to represent a personal memory of place and the year 1947. The significant aspect to which such images allude is the reality of the internal political situation of the society and the autocratic form of authority. This is represented through the enactment of the Durbar scene between the Maharaja and his *Durbaris* on the night of 24 October 1947. Hashmi wrote:

> The *Durbaris* will have to bow before an individual who is exactly like them, just because he is a Maharaja and they are not…In Maharaja's palace the courtiers are the 'naked' selves, without any basic human values, the basic tenets of honor, of pride and dignity.[127]

The memory of the Durbar scene creates a space for remembrance of Maharaja's lineage. In this process, Hashmi actively inscribed the history of the Dogra lineage and the experiences of living under the Dogra aristocracy on the Durbar scene of 1947. He wrote:

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[124] Yusuf Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, pp. 161-162.
[125] James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 4.
[126] '*Chinaru ki Aag*-The burning Chinars, the Night of 24 October 1947, 25 October 1947, and after till 20 November 1947' is the title of the opening theme of the memoir.
[127] Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai*, p. 60.

> A century ago, Maharaja Gulab Singh bought 40 lakh people for the paltry sum of rupees 75 lakhs. This empire which he created has passed from him to his sons and then his grandsons. They have over the time maintained the control over the empire and created a feudal structure by incorporating people as *sardars*, *wazirs* and gazetted officers.[128]

The end of the Durbar scene in the text is symbolic of the end of 'Dogras autocratic rule'. Hashmi created the image of Maharaja who has fallen silent and all errors of the courtiers go unnoticed as his mind is preoccupied with the thoughts of 'where would those people be who attacked Rawalpindi after Mirpur and Poonch and were in Uri now?'[129]

Remembering Sheikh Abdullah's speech of 22 October 1947 in Delhi about the people of Poonch, Hashmi wrote:

> Two days earlier the Nationalist leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah said that the people of Poonch have started an agitation against the Kashmir Government which is not communal in character. The Poonch people have been oppressed by the Kashmir government. To make themselves heard the people rose in a rebellion against the Maharaja. The Poonch people evacuated their families and sought arms from outside and began to fight.[130]

Such flashback memories are invoked to legitimize the action of the people of Poonch while delegitimizing the 'autocratic rule' of Maharaja Hari Singh, the last Dogra ruler. With the flight of the Maharaja from Srinagar, the capital city of the Maharaja, on 25 October, the Valley was plunged into chaos and depths of despair as conveyed graphically through the movements of people. The people of Ram Munshi Bagh were fleeing to Amira Kadal, and people of Amira Kadal to Ram Munshi Bagh.[131] Through the interlocking of historical and personal time, Hashmi has questioned the linear conception of time via the narrative of circularity and non-linearity of time. Hashmi's text contests the prevailing linear historical narratives of partition of the state. Through the interlocking of two notions of time Hashmi, projected memories of time

[128] Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai*, pp. 65-66.
[129] Here it is a reference to 'tribal invaders'.
[130] Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai*, p. 67.
[131] Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai*, p. 69.

and space as embedded in the city space of Srinagar, which serves as a blueprint for broader political struggles. The city becomes a powerful 'memoryscape'[132] and forges an enduring relationship between memory and place in the text.

The narrative through the confluence of place and memory opens up the possibility of a multiplicity of different forms of remembering. Hashmi wrote:

> Aren't they the ones about which President of the National Conference, couple of days back in Delhi, stated that they are oppressed by the Kashmir Government. Why is the National Conference then calling them '*hamlavar*'?[attackers]...One resident of the city sitting on the window of his house is thinking, last year in the atmosphere of political upheavals, the National Conference raised the slogan of 'Quit Kashmir'. In those times of repression they raised the slogan of '*Hari Singh murdabad',* and Sheikh Abdullah was arrested. The whole year people then raised the slogans of '*Bhagi Abdullah zindabad'*...But now if someone reminds them of the 'Quit Kashmir' slogan they don't like it. Perhaps, this is the reason why they don't like those people who are marching towards Srinagar raising the slogan 'Azad Kashmir zindabad'. The National Conference thinks of them as '*hamlavar*'.[133]

For Edward Casey, the idea of a place is that of a 'holder of memories', negotiating a plurality of spatial memories. In a similar vein, Srinagar as a 'holder of memories' becomes a metaphor for the narration of competing memories. This points to what Whitehead has noted about the memory of the 'tribal invaders' as liberators rather than as attackers.[134] Casey's reflections on 'place memory' render places as 'congealed scenes' for memory. Casey notes, 'A given place or set of plaes acts as a grid onto which image of items to be remembered are placed in a certain order'.[135]

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[132] The 'memoryscape' connotes a form of remembering represented through the surge of memorial sites, which are often in the form of memorials, monuments and museums that shape the collective memory. These sites, transform the public spaces into sites for remembering the past. Here I am using the idea of Srinagar city as a 'memoryscape' not necessarily transformed as a public site of remembering, but as a space for recollecting the alternate memories of 1947.

[133] Ibid, p. 73.

[134] Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*, p. 10.

[135] Edward Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 184.

Central to Casey's work is the notion that the particularity of place is instrumental in developing points of attachment that allow memory to be contained and retrieved.[136]

Hashmi captures the changing political scenario in the state by tracing the shifting meanings in the language of political slogans of the time. For instance, the slogans of National Conference, 'Quit Kashmir', 'This is our *mulk* (Motherland), We will protect it, We will rule it', 'Attackers Beware, National Conference is Ready' and the Muslim Conference slogans 'Pakistan *zindabad*, Kashmir will become Pakistan'[137] represent the forms of contestations in the memory of 1947. Through these competing slogans, Hashmi introduced the figure of the National Conference volunteer—the Homeguard. The Homeguard becomes an embodiment of contested memories of 1947. The use of the slogan, "*Allah Is Great*" reflected the irony of the image of the National Conference volunteer as adhering to the ideals of 'secularism' and the rhetoric of 'Hindu-Muslim-Sikh unity'. It marks a rupture in the rhetoric of the National Conference and disturbs the party volunteer's secular identity. The memories of 1947 in the text emerge both from Hashmi's lived experiences as well as from his narration of those lived experiences. The account complicates the image of 1947 as one 'uniform category' and marks how Srinagar city became a critical site of contested memories of 1947.

Exploring the subjective experiences of Hashmi as a narrator allows one to move beyond the official frame of narrating 1947. In all these alternate sites of memory, the master narrative of hostility between the two nation-states over Kashmir is questioned via the subjective experiences of people. It allows one to understand people's perceptions of 1947. The official memory of Nineteen Forty-Seven has been one in which the wrongs of one nation-state needed to be undone by the other. It was narrated in a way as if 'the order has been carried out'.[138] The 'wrongs' perpetrated by the Pakistani state were undone and the order had been restored by the Indian nation. The histories and memories of the local political maneuvrings and regional struggles are wiped out in the nationalist narratives at the cost of the biographies of the nation-states. The nationalist histories emphasise that the partition is also a moment of

[136] Ibid, p. 186.
[137] Hashmi, *Kashmir Udaas Hai*, p. 73.
[138] The phrase is the title of Portelli's book, references to which are cited earlier in the chapter.

exclusion and that certain narratives do not count as histories. The histories and memories of 'communal violence' in the state are marginalized. So are the subjective experiences of displacement. While the British technically left Maharajas in control of deciding the future of their states on the lapse of paramountcy, the issue of accession was entwined with the local processes and struggles against those sovereigns. The interplay between high politics and local histories reflects that the partition of the state was deeply embedded in ongoing local political struggles. The partition moment signifies a crisis of sovereignty. In a place like Kashmir where overlapping sovereignties co-existed, attempts to impose a single and homogenized sovereignty were bound to create deep fissures and disputed identities.

Conclusion

Rupture or Continuity: Post-Partition Kashmir

The river of politics was on the rise,

With Indians and Pakistanis hunting

Indians trapped the big fish,

Hurting Pakistan deep enough

Pakistani's could get Chitral[1] only

That too after betting with their Life![2]

(Trans. Amit Kumar)

The poem was written by Shad Kashmiri, the cartoonist of the National Conference's mouthpiece *Khidmat*, representing the politics over the partition of Kashmir. The big fish that Shad Kashmiri was referring to was Kashmir (the Valley), which remained the focus of both the nation-states' policy towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir. As the poem depicts, the irony is that in the story of the 'great partition' of Kashmir, the Kashmiris have been conspicuous by their absence. The partition of Kashmir in 1947 demonstrated the affirmation of the 'bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty'[3], which was a crucial element in the establishment of the states as sovereign modern states. The territorial contestations over Kashmir between the two newly independent nations reflected how quick the process of transformation was

[1] Chitral was one of the small independent states bordering the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir that recognized the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. However, Chitral being an independent state acceded to Pakistan in 1947.

[2] *Khidma*t, Srinagar, 19 December 1947.

[3] Willem van Schendel, *The Bengal Borderlands: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia* (London: Anthem Press, 2005), p. 370.

from "people-nation" to "state-nation".[4] Both the nation-states maintained their national unity and territorial integrity, and Kashmir became one of the sites, which reflected their ongoing political interests. Subsequently, the nationalist histories that came to be written about the partition relegated the Kashmiris to the margins, focusing on the 'wrongs' committed by the Pakistani nation and the 'rights' of the Indian nation. The peculiarity of nationalist discourses is such that they tend to highlight the events in one particular part of the state. As a matter of fact, one knows more about the events that took place in the Valley than in other areas of the state.

The partition in Kashmir became a site of exclusion as well. The Kashmir Valley was elided into the entire state in the nationalist narratives on partition, which silenced the narratives on areas like Gilgit, Jammu, and Poonch. In these spatial geographies, which remained at the margins of the British Empire as well as the Dogra State, the principle of 'dual sovereignty' continued to be challenged by the local 'chiefs'. These spatial geographies claimed the power to define the limits of the State, at the same time could subvert the very idea on which the British Empire was built. The idea of territory had been integral to the working of both the Dogra and British sovereignty over these areas during much of the 1930s and 1940s. The 'indirect' British rule over the entire princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and the direct rule in those areas, which formed the northern frontiers of the British Empire, allowed the co-existence of multiple layers of sovereignty especially in the northern areas. On independence, when the territorial integrity of the two nation-states became crucial, the idea of the Kashmir state as a strategic location and a colonial legacy became a dominant trope in the nationalist imaginations of the two countries. The idea of a new nation-state was constitutive of political and cartographic anxieties, and Kashmir as a 'space of desire' best reflected those anxieties. The accession of the state to India implied an imposition of a new order and a new national identity on these spatial geographies, where multiple layers of sovereignty had co-existed. The partition of 1947 triggered the crisis of sovereignty reflected in the internal uprisings against the Dogra State, a rebellion in Gilgit towards the end of October 1947, a

[4] Gyanendra Pandey, 'India and Pakistan, 1947-2002', *Economic and Political Weekly,* Vol. 37, No. 11 (Mar. 16-22, 2002), p. 1028.

rebellion by the Poonch people in early August, which continued till the formation of 'Azad Kashmir Government' in late October.

A synthesis of territory, politics and violence shaped the partition of the state. By bringing the notions of '*wattaniyat'* and '*millat*' to centerstage in the analysis of Kashmiri politics throughout the 1940s, one can begin to understand the competing political discourses of the National Conference and the Muslim Conference, and their contesting claims to political spaces during much of the 1940s. The thesis has attempted to question the idea that these claims were necessarily based on the divergent ideas of 'secularism' versus 'communalism'. This argument therefore challenges the prevailing point of view that the National Conference's discourse was based on the idea of a national identity defined in relation to a territorially characterized citizenship and rights, the Muslim Conference gave importance to 'communitarian identities', deriving its political language mainly from a religious rhetoric. The 'Muslim' identity played an altogether different role in shaping the politics of both the parties in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike the Muslim League in British India, the Muslim Conference could not rely on the rhetoric of Muslim minorities seeking the right to rule over Muslim majority provinces. Rather, its discourse constantly imagined the Muslims of the State as a '*millat-e-Islam*', a 'Kashmiri Muslim nation'. The predominance of a secular form of nationalism has marginalized the critical narrative of religious nationalism, which needs to be analyzed in the languages of nationalism.

The National Conference while labelling the politics of the Muslim Conference as '*firqa warana*' (communal) drew support from various religious groups especially the *Anjumans* set up in Mirpur or the Jama'it-ul-Ulema established in various places in the state especially in Poonch. The representaton of Muslim Conference as a 'communal' party was the creation of the National Conference discourse, which considered the party politics of the National Conference as 'secular', a counterpoint to the 'communal' politics of the Muslim Conference. For the National Conference and for Sheikh Abdullah, 'secularism' did not mean the rejection of religion as a way of life, but rejection of Islam as a polity. The National Conference had to operate within a larger Muslim context, since religion had become increasingly crucial in the construction of identities of various communities, and therefore

divorcing religion completely from the political life had its own repercussions. In fact, after the accession to India in October 1947, the opening of *madinat-ul-ulum*, an institute at Hazratbal which was to impart religious instruction to students further added to Sheikh Abdullah's 'secular' popularity, and 'helped to solace those who dubbed him as a mere stooge of the "Hindu Congress".'[5]

Some of the publicity programmes that ran on Radio Kashmir to counter the Azad Kashmir propaganda against the accession to India included *Sacha Mujahid Koun* (Who is the true Crusader?), *Shariat ki Kasauti* (The touchstone of true religion). The Azad Kashmir ideology was not to be condemned by the Kashmir State as a struggle between communalism and secularism; rather the difference was articulated via the tropes drawn on Islam. The Kashmir Government had to counter the rhetoric of holy war, '*Jehad'* used by the Azad Kashmiris and the 'tribal invaders' against the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah's endorsement of accession to India. The programmes that ran on Radio Kashmir were to make people understand what was the true meaning of *Jehad* (Crusade) and *Mujahid* (Crusader) in the light of teachings of Quran, and not what secularism meant. Those who were represented by Azad Kashmir and Pakistan as "*Mujahideen*" (Crusaders), Kashmir Government believed stood self-condemned in the eyes of Islam.[6] Above all, the publicity propaganda of the Azad Kashmir which had passed into the hands of M.D Taseer, a Punjabi Marxist and the former principal of one of Kashmir's prominent colleges and closer to the communist circle in Kashmir during the 1940s, had to be countered by such propaganda.

As the Indian nation-state, on account of the alleged Pakistani aggression, took over the role of the sovereign over the State, the post-partition/post-colonial sovereignty worked much in continuation with earlier notions of Dogra sovereignty through the principle of 'exclusion'. The violence, which marked the partition period in Kashmir, was not just about the physical acts of violence perpetrated by the 'tribal invaders' or the communal violence in Jammu province. The history of violence must also be understood in the way communities/groups were positioned in relation to the

[5] Report on Publicity Arrangements in Jammu and Kashmir State, Ministry of States, 1948, File No. 10 (2)-K/48, NAI.
[6] Ibid, Fortnightly Intelligence reports on Kashmir.

State. The nation-state defined the subject worthy of inclusion within the 'national community' in the context of violence. During the time of Sheikh Abdullah, an ordinance was passed called the 'Enemy Agents Ordinance' in 1948 to provide for the punishment of 'enemy' or 'enemy agents'. The enemy or enemy agents were those who provided any kind of help to the raiders. The ordinance was applicable to the entire state and to all state subjects domiciled in either India or Pakistan. It made anyone participating or assisting the raiders directly or indirectly punishable with death.[7] All those who had been vociferous in their criticism of National Conference like Prem Nath Bazaz were externed from the state. All those who supported the state's accession to Pakistan were either detained or their properties confiscated under the Enemy Agents Act. The properties of the Muslim Conference leaders especially Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and Chaudhri Hamidullah were seized.[8]

A sense of impermanency of partition resonated among people due to the reference of plebiscite to determine the final status of the state. Many people would cross the borders and settle back in areas where they originally belonged and migrate to Pakistan during the violent upheavals. The government of Kashmir made efforts and initiated a programme of 'repatriation' to repatriate Kashmiris from Pakistan to Kashmir and vice versa. At the same time, a legal category of 'illegal infiltrator' was created without defining who is liable for repatriation and worthy of resettlement and what qualified one as an illegal infiltrator. Both these categories were in a continuous flux till mid-1953 when the Government of India initiated a passport system and filing for visa that would allow people movement across the new set of boundaries, reinforcing in the process a rigid sense of place and identity. The constitution of the 'national community' was deeply tied with the project of constructing categories of 'infiltrator', 'enemy of the state', 'illegal trespasser'. These categories defined the limits of the 'national community'. It is this process of constituting the 'national community' and imposing a uniform kind of post-partition identity on people, which needs further interrogation.

[7] *The Jammu and Kashmir State Gazette*, Jammu, the 23 March 1948, Part III, Jammu and Kasmir State Archives, Jammu Repository.

[8] Confiscation of property of Enemy Agents, Home Department, 1950, File No. 21-Confis/50, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Srinagar Repository (hereafter, SSA).

While after the partition of the subcontinent people 'felt compelled to decide upon the unalloyed national attachments'[9], the 'Kashmiri National' stood at the margins of the process of ascribing definite identities. While Sheikh Abdullah had hoped that the autonomous position of the state of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian Union would safeguard and preserve Kashmiri identity, immense pressure was retained on Sheikh Abdullah's government through the Praja Parishad movement in early 1950s in Jammu to fully integrate the State with Indian Union. As Sheikh Abdullah began to vacillate and talk of Kashmir's independence from both the nation-states by 1953, a role reversal took place within the nationalist discourses. The nationalist discourses which had once represented Sheikh Abdullah as the secular democrat who led the States' People's Conference now condemned him as a 'religious zealot', a fanatic who conspired with Pakistan to subvert the accession of the State to Indian Union.[10] It is these post-partition continuities, which reflect how identities could be fluid and contingent. It is this question of fluidity of the identities, which needs to be further examined.

The parody of partition and the plebiscite was particularly reflected in one instance when a group of three Europeans came to Pattan (Baramulla) and enquired from the villagers about the plebiscite in 1948. The European woman from the group asked the villagers, who were collected in the police *thana* for enquiry, if a plebiscite should take place? The villagers responded that it should take place and settle the matters once for all. On asking what they meant by plebiscite, the villagers were unable to answer. The European woman asked one of the villagers what he meant by Pakistan? The villager responded, 'Jinnah's country was known as Pakistan'. She again asked, what did he understand by Hindustan? The villager responded, 'Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's country was known as Hindustan'.[11] Which country was theirs? The villagers remained clueless.

[9] Yasmin Khan, 'The Ending of an Empire: From Imagined Communties to Nation States in India and Pakistan', *The Round Table*, 97:398, 2008, p. 701.
[10] *TOI*, Bombay, 29 April, 1964, p. 1.
[11] Extract from the Confidential reports from the Head Constable Police State Pattan, Home Secretariat, 1948, File No. I.S-121/48, SSA.

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