AFRICAN UNION'S PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE OPERATION IN SOMALIA

Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"AFRICAN UNION'S PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE OPERATION IN SOMALIA"** submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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List of Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUPF	African Union Peace Fund
CEWS	The Continental Early Warning System
DDDC	Darfur- Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
DPAIT	DPA Implementation Team
DPKO	Department of peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
ICU	Islamic Court of Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD peace Support Mission in Somalia
NGO	Non- Governmental Organizations

NIF	Neutral International Force
NMGO	Neutral Military Observe Group
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	Party of HUTU Emancipation Movement
PoW	Panel of Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace support operations
PSOD	The peace support operations Division
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRDM	Somali Redmption Democratic Movement.
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations
UNANIMID	African Union- United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNOSOM I/II	United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia I/II
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress

Chapter 1

The purpose of this study is to examine the working of the Institutional mechanisms of peace and security of the African Union and the pattern of its involvement in peacekeeping operations, highlighting the challenges it faced in the process. A case study of Somalia would be taken to add an empirical element to the study.

Background

The United Nations has the primarly accountability of mainating peace and security Since its establishment in 1945, "With the failure of the collective security system, the peacekeeping operation became the most visible mechanism of the United Nations to manage conflicts in the world"(Latif 2000: 24). "Chapter VIII of the UN Charter contains provision for the role of regional organizations to complement the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security"(Amoo 1992: 2). Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in May 1963 as a regional organization of Africa with following objectives:to endorse the harmony and unity of the African States, to manage and and strengethern their different and numrous efforts, so as to have the peoples of Africa attain a healthier life, and defend the autonomy, "territorial truthfulness and freedom of its members; to work to eliminate colonization from Africa and finally, to uphold due respect to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To achieve these goals, OAU members pledged to harmonize their policies regarding political, economic, diplomatic, educational, cultural, scientific, defense and safety, and healthiness, sanitation, and beneficial cooperation" (OAU Charter 1963). "The OAU also stated to respect the sovereignty and independence of its members; agreed to non-interference in respects to members' interior affairs; prohibited political homicide and political rebellion; supported the peaceful settlement of clashes through arbitration, reconciliation, and mediation; supported the total liberation of African states that continue to be reliant on and finally, avowed a policy of nonalignment"(OAU Charter 1963).

During Cold War period, OAU played a mediating role in conflicts between the states in accordance to its principles. “However, the Commission seemed to have been doomed from the start, as it did not address the practical realities of the region. Moreover,it'slengthy, and costly judicial process made the Commission unattractive to many member states. The Commission dissolved in 1977, with the OAU opting for other means of conflict managing, such as the use of good offices” (Tekeste 2000). OAU mediated three years of the border conflict between Morocco and Algeria in 1963. The main reason of this war was the nonappearance of a detaileddescription of the border between Algeria and Morocco,and another reason was the discovery of mineral resources in disputed area. The conflict between Algeria and Morocco provided OAU with the first test of its peacekeeping and peaceful settlement of the dispute. In the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict, OAU came up with a peace plan, but Eritrea rejected the peace process saying that it only dealt with Badme region as the only source of border tension with Ethiopia, living other hotspot areas like Adi Murg (Tekeste 2000). Eritrea criticized Ethiopia for using OAU to get a favourable deal.Eritrea and Ethiopia signed Algiers peace process and ceasefire agreement between these states. During the Cold War, the vacious competition between the superpower was the significant factor for the conflict in Africa.

However, in the Post -Cold War, outside powers were no more interested in government stability in Africa. This resulted in series of rebellions against the authoritarian nature of governance in many African countries. Military insurrection and civilian-led armed revolts became an interactive feature of the conflicts in Africa.The OAU faced with increased challenge of dealing with internal crises of the African countries.At the 1993 OAU Meeting in Cairo, the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution were set up.This mechanism was needed to respond to conflicts in Africa. This had three goals: first to anticipate and prevent situation of potential conflict, “second to undertake peace making and peace building efforts, if full blown conflicts should arise the third goal was to carry out peace making and peace building activities in post-conflict situations” (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000:1).“Although the OAU principle of non-interference in internal affairs is reaffirmed, the mechanism was also charged with the mission of dealing with internal conflicts in the region” (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000:1).“Overall, there was optimism that the mechanism would fare much better than the OAU Commission of Mediation, Reconciliation, and Arbitration, which established in the 1960s and was expected to be the organization’s core instrument for conflict management.Certainly, the

establishment of the mechanism in 1993 was an effort by the OAU to shift from an ad hoc to a methodical approach to conflict resolution" (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000:1).This was a vibrantwarning of the organization's efforts to make itself pertinent to the post-Cold War realities on the African continent. Evidence of this hasfound in the events in Chad.

OAU intervention in the Chadian civil war of the 1980s was the first interventionin a domestic matter of a country. Its strong commitment to the principle of non-intervention prevented itfrom effectiveintervention in thecivil war in Chad. In Rwanda, "the OAU played a protruding role in exertions to reach a settlement between the government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. It was firstly done through mediation efforts between 1990 and 1992, of which the outcome was the establishment of an OAU observer mission to observe the cease-fire"(Nhara 1998)." It was also active in 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement. The OAU force grudgingly evacuated in 1994 when the much greater UN force left the scene revealing one of the central weaknesses of theorganization: that even when it is eager, it may not have the capability to act. In Burundi in 1994 the OAUalso deployed an observer mission and appointed a special envoy to the country. The mission terminated, following the coup of July 1996"(Nhara, 1998). "The following institution of sanctions against Buyoya's military regime was a clear indication that the OAU had twisted a corner in its method of crisis management on the continent"(Nhara, 1998). "The OAU, however, overwhelmed by old problems, some of which relate to the interests of its leaders, and others that are the natural consequences of managing an organization of this magnitude"(Nhara, 1998). "Although the idea that the organization is a club of corrupt and autocratic leaders is gradually dissipating, given the appearance of more democratically inclined states, it is still probable for the personal benefits of some leaders to affect their retort to some conflict circumstances"(Nhara, 1998). It was often thought that non-democratic leaders would find it difficult to oppose the private conduct of another state whose rulers disrupt the human rights of the citizens. OAU was strongly abided by its norm of non-intervention. It could also not intervene in member countries where military coups overthrew civilian governments. The economic commission of OAU did not have resources or capability to facilitate cooperation to address Africa's economic problem. Similarly, it had no legal mechanism to settle a legal dispute between the member states. Another problem was heads of state avoided criticizing of each other and, therefore, the assembly became heads of state club. The OAU "had come to be known as the Dictators' Club reflecting the presence of various authoritarian heads of state who had failed to relinquish power

in their individual countries" (Feldman, 2008:267).The OAU came under increasing criticism for its inability to proffer transformative changes that desperately needed in post-independence Africa. But it was organization's institutional and normative weakness in confronting armed conflicts that attracted most condemnation.The sense of apathy and ineptitude caused widespread humanity misery in many parts of Africa. The failing prospects of the organi**z**ation led many to conclude that if active steps were not taken to renew and revamp its conflict management frameworks,it was hard to see an **a**ctive future for the OAU(Jeng, 2012: 130).

The Sirte Declaration which adopted on 9 september 1999 by OAU,represents a significant step in the march towards the renewal, consolidation, and repositioning of the OAU. "It was inborn out of the perceived need to strengthen the continental organization and to rekindle the aspiration of the African people for new unity, solidarity and cohesion in a larger community transcending, linguistic, ideological ethnic and national differences in adopting the Declaration" (T. Maluwa, 2002: 37). "The final transition and transformation of the OAU completed with the adoption in 2001. "the Constitutive Act of the AU and the launch of African Union in July 2002"(Jeng, 2012: 161).

Literature review

OAU; involvement in conflict management

The scholars like Carvenka (1974), Sheehan (1990), Naldi (1985), Prem Chand (2005), Rajan Harshe (1988) have given a comprehensive understanding of how and why the OAUcame into being, its t purpose, and objective: why and how OAU get involved in peacekeeping operations. These authors are on the view that the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security is of UN Security Council but because of its ignorance of African problem the OAU head attempted to come up with their own solution. They are on the view of that the founding fathers of OAU had dreamt for a united progressive and develop Africa, which should be free from hunger disease and debt. It was also expected that the OAU would "influence event in the world

and defend with sureness the cause of the world peace and international cooperation" (Prem Cand, 2005). "They have also highlighted that member state of OAU agreed to non-interference with regards to members internal affairs, forbade political assassination and political supervision, supported the peaceful settlement of the dispute through mediation, and arbitration conciliation supported the total emancipation of African states that continued to be dependent and finally affirmed a policy of non- alignment" (Harshe, 1988: 377). "The OAU evolved one of its primary roles on the African continent as peacekeepers over the decade, the OAU mediated conflicts in Chad, Rwanda, Burundi Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan, many of this conflict have been territorial and boundary disputes that reflected artificial border created by colonial powers" (Harshe, 1988: 377).

Scholars like Nahara (1998), Munya (1999) Olonisakin (2000) have looked into OAU's involvement in conflict management at the initial period. Peace and stability have elusive in pre-colonial and colonial Africa. "During Cold War the conflicts were motivated by ideology between capitalism and socialism" (Nhara, 1998), these scholars also argued that during Cold War OAU became one of the objects of its leaders although the idea that the organization is a club of corrupt and autocratic leaders is gradually dissipating. In cases of conflicts in South Africa Namibia, Mozambique and Angola no resolution could be passed because of the superpowers Rivalry during the Cold War. The withdrawal of superpower rivalry from these areas created an atmosphere conducive to resolution efforts.

Scholars like Hollick (1982), Joffe (1982) Naldi (1985) Sesay (1989), Berman(2008) McClellan(2003) have discussed about the conflict in Chad and peacekeeping effort by the OAU in the 15 years old civil war in Chad between two ethnic group. In 1980 Libya invaded in Chad in order to influence Arab culture and it also had strategic interest.The search for solution to the protracted conflicts in Chad led OAU to exercise its peacekeeping efforts the OAU Assembly approved peacekeeping forces in Chad "in spite of high hopes and expectation the OAU peacekeeping operation was the total failure"(Sesay,1989:191), and also OAU did not intervene initially for the fear of contravening Article 111 which proscribes interfering in the internal matter of any country but when in 1980 full scale of civil war broke out between the faction of Weddeye and Hebre then it intervene.Finally, Libya removed its forces from Chad.

The scholars like Williams (2009), L. Feldman (2008), Naldi (1985), Amoo (1992) have discussed the peacekeeping operations experience by OAU. They have argued that the peacekeeping activities by OAU have received little attention. Although the organization took the initiative to deal with conflicts, it could not make success into the process. Scholars like Andersen (2000) Murrey (2001) Sakrin (2001) have discussed the Rwanda crisis and role of the OAU. They had given the comprehensive understanding that Rwanda crisis. When Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated, OAU was strictly following its norm of non-intervention and left the situation as it was. However it got involved later but despite numerous meetings, consultation, and summits OAU failed to stop the genocide. Besides, the famous 1992 Arusha cease-fire agreement (1), an arrangement to discontinue the conflict and open a political dialogue, an attempt which employed the wisdom of main African players failed to materialise. Due to the difficulty of the problem in the region and disharmony among regional actors, even the conflict machinery the OAU had instigated in 1993 was not adequate to stop the bloodshed in Rwanda. (Dawit 2012)

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communist supremacy in Eastern and Central Europe, states were rushed into tribal and ethnic conflagrations hitherto prevented by Communist socio-political order. This indicates that ethnonationalism has re-emerged in the Western Hemisphere as well. Africa was not spared the adverse impacts in the post- Cold War either. The post-Cold War internal wars in Africa have been marked by the unparalleled rapidity and devastating consequences. (Munya 1999: 538). "A distinction must be made between those battles that became deceptive as a result of post-Cold War changes, and those that had existed before these modifications and, in some cases, had been driven by the Cold War. (Munya 1999: 538). "In cases of pre-existing clashes in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola (initially) the withdrawal of superpower contention from these areas created an atmosphere conducive to resolution efforts" (Munya 1999: 538). "The UN in Mozambique and Angola, and the Commonwealth in the case of Namibia where peace efforts had slowly started before the fall of the Berlin Wall tat played dynamic roles in the resolution of these conflicts. Angola would later agonize a reversal as the election results were refused by one of the belligerent parties. Many of these conflicts were simply amenable to traditional

forms of conflict resolution diplomacy supported by traditional peacekeeping operations, where necessary. Regarding emerging conflicts" (Munya 1999: 538).

OAU tried conflict management by carrying out the peacekeeping operation in Chad but soon realized that it was "ill-suited for conducting peacekeeping operations. Not only was it tough to reach consensus within the OAU on particular course of action"(L fieldman, 2008: 47). Its "members did not provide the organization with a reasonable budget or applicable assets. As a result, the OAU was forced to operate without sizable bureaucracy operative management structures or standing forces"(Fieldman, 2008: 47). "Given these structural problems, it would be surprising that OAU was able to undertake any peace operations at all. Nor was there much indication that African states were ill-fated with this situation" (Williams 2009:98) "Even in the aftermath of Rwanda's 1994 genocide, when the United States, France, and the United Kingdom all supported the creation of an African force to undertake crisis management operations, African governments greeted their proposals with almost universal skepticism. Instead, the few large peace operations those African states conducted during"(Fieldman, 2008: 47). The "1990s were under the auspices of the continent's sub-regional arrangements, notably the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau" (Williams 2009:98)

Scholars likeNaldi (1985), Feldman (2008), Amoo (1992) have discussed the problems of peacekeeping operations in Africa for instance in Chad they are on the view of the establishment of peacekeeping operation was a costly venture that achieved little merit that gave rise to disappointment. "The real danger may lie in the probability that the OAU will be unwilling or unable to dispatch another peace-keeping force if the occasion demands. This might constitute another blow to the already imperiled concept of African unity" (Naldi 1985:595).

The heads of states also did not make an effort to deal with effective peacekeeping operation. OAU considered as dictators club due to "The OAU's peacekeeping not only failed to have any positive impact on the conflict; it also resulted in institutional frustration and regional disillusion"(Amoo 1992: 22). They have also argued that the goals were both unclear and insufficient, and the organization was also abodedwith its principle of non-intervention. Therefore, the peacekeeping operation could not play an effective role.

African Union: Intuitional Structures for Peace and Security

Scholars like Rukare (2002), Williams (2009), K.Holt and K.Shanahan (2005), Prem Chand (2005) have explained why there was need of creation of the entirely new organization and much more powerful organization. They are of the view of "that it marked the turning point in the history of the African continent. The constitutive act of the African Union entered into force representing the start of a new political and judicial organization for Africa which is simply called the African Union" (Rukare 2002), The scholars like Murithi (2007), Williams (2011), Sesay (2011) Tiruneh (2010) have given a comprehensive understanding of institutional structures of African Union and also its role in conflict management. They have explained the establishment of Peace and Security Council Protocol mark the peace and security architecture in Africa. The PSC Protocol delivers for a continental architecture for peace and safety grounded on five structures: Continental Early Warning System the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, the Peace Fund and the Panel of the Wise These scholars have also discussed their role. (Trinuneh, 2010: 5) The scholars like, Murthi (2014), Abdelaziz (2010) are on the view of that that "Peace and Security Council is the most visible component of African Peace and Security Architecture, and it is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient response to both existing and emerging conflict and crisis in Africa (Trinuneh, 2010: 5). "The PSC has arisen as the most observable constituent of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) it has held more meetings and briefing sessions than was firstly anticipated demonstrating two things first the growing commitment of AU members states to tackle clashes on the continent, second the regularity with which it has met establishes the fragility of the security situation of some of its members" (Murthi 2014:45). In the realm of peace and security the "greatest progress was the foundation of the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC). Since 2004, it has represented the support for the continent's conflict managing activities" (Murthi 2014:45). The AU has also evolved an African Standby Force (ASF) of about 20,000 armed forces trained to deportment a variety of military tasks from observation to humanitarian intervention.

Scholars like Cillier (2005), Theo (2005) Franke (2010), have discussed the African Standby Force. In 2004 African ministers of defense and security conference of AU in the headquarters in Addis Ababa agreed on the "Draft Agenda for shared African Defense and Security Policy. The ministers revised growth made in developing an African Standby Force and an Early Warning System to distinguish and avert possible battels and guarantee rapid humanitarian releif during catastorophes. In July 2004, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State or government, meeting in Addis Ababa, officialy accepted the defense and security policy as Africa's design in the search for peace, security and stability on the continent" (Theo 2005). They are on the view that ASF based on five regionally administered standby brigades. It further contends that even though the African Standby Force is theoretically closer to the Standby Arrangement of the United Nations than to a Pan-African army as intended by chief Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah. It nevertheless marks a considerable expansion in Africa's continental self-emancipation which should be hailed and maintained by Africans and the international community alike (Franke 2010).

The history of constructing institutes in Africa has been disappointing. In designing the African Union and building theinducedorganizations, it is necessary to review the record of structure and to sustainthe necessary ascendancy dimensions. The faintness of institutions has been a chief disablement to the private zone and democracy. An overall African standard for institution building has been lacking. (Symposium AU: 5)

Scholars like Gumedze (2011) Trinueh (2010) have discussed the challenges of this PSC architecture they are on the view of these body have faced and have been facing challenges, for instance, lack of adequate funding. AU has dependent more on international communities and other organizations like EU, which is still insufficient. It also lacks the capacity for humanitarian relief.

The African Union's experience of peacekeeping operations

Scholars like Anne (2011), Sevonsson(2008), Murithi(2008), Boshoff (2010) have discussed the Burundi crisis. They argued "the AU's promising approach to peacekeeping and to investigate the relationship between the Union's aspiration, experience and a prospect to provide African

solutions to African problems' in the security dominion (Anne 2011). "The AMIB case study recommends that both the capabilities of the intervener and the clashes context in which it intervenes affect a mission's probabilities of success. Not only the mixture of the two but also how they relate to each other matters. Different actors move the appropriate conditions for mission success."(Marie 2011:1) "More support from one actor can to some extent recompense for less support from another and this was the case with African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in which South African commitment and aptitudes made up of limited resources on the part of the AU" (Sevonsson2008). There was reallyinsufficient interest from the international donor community.

These scholars have explained that Despite AU's initiatives to resolve African crisis, it could not bring any effective changes in terms of maintaining peace and security In the region there are many factors that avert the African Union to carry out an effective peacekeeping operation, for instance, it is very much dependent on international community and United nation most of the time it urges UN to take over operation, lack of resources equipment's, funding problems and not supporting by member countries.

Scholars like Uchenna (2011), Akuffo (2010), Waldemar and Rauntenbach (2010) have brought light on a number of the violent conflict situation in Africa and core challenges facing the African Union. They are on the view of that creation of the African Union and establishment of Peace and Security Council organ have marked changes in terms of peace and security matter. They have explained that from "2003 and 2008 the AU deployed peace operations involving around 15,000 armed forces to four states: Burundi, Sudan, Somalia and the Comoros (Uchenna 2011).They raises crucial questions that how fruitful "these operations have been, what challenges they rise for the union's peacekeepers, and whether this tempo of actions is sustainable While the new African Union still grieves from some of the similar mechanical weaknesses, for example" (Akuffo 2010), "reliance on external finance and a lack of administrators, and standing forces, it has approved a very several position on peace operations.This has been the amount of a wider continental exertion to grow a new peace and security manner in Africa" (waldemar and rauntenbach 2010). "Between 2003 and 2008, the AU deployed six peace operations involving approximately 15,000 soldiers in four states: Burundi,

Sudan, the Comoros (three operations), and Somalia. This representsan enormous change of tempo from the OAU days" (Webersik 2004).

Scholars like Omorogbe (2011) Diehl (2006) Oluwadare have discussed the African Unions Peacekeeping Operation they have argued whether the role of "regional organization have increased compared to the Cold War era? If so, this expansion is result of a shift in security responsibility from the UN to regional organization" (Diehl 2006: 191). These authors are also on the view of that the rise of the globalization has had effect international relation, and it has made the expansion of regionalization certainly in the security realm. They are of the view that the regional organization is mediating the conflicts through peacekeeping activities but in reality the regionalization itself diverse, this regionalization is not uniform.

African Union's peacekeeping operation in Somalia

Scholars like D. Williams (2009), Forchamer (2013), are of the view that Somalia has been without a central government since the Siyad Barre regime collapsed in 1991. They have also discussed that failed state resulted ininternal, external displacement of people and also burden on neighboring countries when people cross borders into safety.

Scholars like Freer and Conning (2013) Webersik Christian (2004) are on the view of, the Somali conflict was the result of "the modernization process that played a significant role in shaping the violence. The country went through a dramatic change from pre-capitalist to a capitalist society where the mode of production got changed" Conning (2013. They have also argued that in "many African states ethnicity has been measured as a major hindrance to modern state-building causing political instability and violent conflict. In Somalia, political observers and analysts were more hopeful" (Webrsik 2004:516). "the collapse of the Somali regime can be explained by the unjust circulation of new sources of wealth in post-colonial Somalia rather than by present internal divisions based on the ideology of kinship" (Webrsik 2004:516)

Scholars like Paul D. Williams (2013), Freer and Connind de (2013), Williams (2009) have discussed challenges by the AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Initial international political context in which mission deployed, problems of internal coordination between the missions component parts, the lack of reliable local partner with which to wage a counter insurgency campaign, problems of strategic matching among external companions , the nature of the enemy forces. Some authors are of the view that *"*AMISOM's lack of relevant capabilities and assets to perform its mandated tasks; and the challenges of facilitating legitimate and effective governance structures, especially as AMISOM began to deploy outsideMogadishu Irotn late 2011"(Williams,2013:222) These authors highlighted how AMISOM's relevant documents contained a variety of mixed messages on peacekeeping operation issues. They are on the view of "some of the ways in which the African Union was hardly an ideal actor to instrument a civilian protection agenda because of its limited previous experience with these issues.Moreover, analyzes the ways in which AMISOM was itself sometimes a source of civilian harm in Mogadishu"(Williams, 2009:515) "AMISOM was an ill-conceived mission deployed to the wrong place at the wrong time by an institution incapable of meeting its grandiose statement of intent the predictable. Result was that it attracted few serious political victors and hence its personnel were left dangerously under- resourced this amounted placing numerous thousand Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers in harm's way for morally and politically dubious reason"(Williams, 2009:515)

Scholars like freer and Conning(2013) are of the view that the African Union mission and Somalia government forces have made considerable advances against Al-Shabaab the military group, particularly over the 18 months. A military campaign that bought sudden and unexpected progress in August 2011 has provided space for the conclusion of the political change and the establishment of the new federal government.Similarly, they have also explained incapability and problems in Mogadishu (freer and Conning, 2013:1)

There is literature on the origin of OAU and AU and how they deal with the crises and challenges they faced. There are literature assessing the individual cases of AU's peacekeeping operations and general discussions on AU's peace and security architecture . However, there is a lack of comprehensive research on how AU's peace and safety architecture worked in actual

conflict situations and how they evolved and challenges that AU peackeeping operations. This research attempts to address this aspect of AU's experience.

Definition, Rationale, and Scope

Paul.E Diehl has defined peacekeeping as a preventive diplomacy that is primarily alternative in settling international disputes.

Saira Mohamed has looked into the difference between peace operations and peacekeeping operation the peace operation is the traditional concept of maintaining peace this notion is old. Now since the war has changed from interstate to internal crisis, the perception of peace has also changed peace act now incorporate post -conflict peacebuilding, performance that seeks to rebuild failed states and prevent the resurgence of conflict (Mohammed Saira 2005:808)

RichardCaplan (2012)hasexplained that the "Peacekeeping refers to the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the resolving and helping to control and determination a real or probable armed conflict between or within states. Most peacekeeping operations are underway with the approval of and are often led by, the United Nations (UN) but regional organizations has also undertaken peacekeeping operations"(Caplan (2012).Peacekeeping forces regularly installed with the consent of the parties to a conflict and in support of" a cessation of hostilities or other agreed upon peace measures. Peacekeeping forces are therefore frequently defenseless or only informally armed and use the smallest of force necessary only exceptionally basesPeacekeeping"(Caplan (2012)

This paper has taken Richard Caplan's definition of peacekeeping as he has explained the peacekeeping operation by regional organizations.

Most of the conflict in the post-Cold War, mainly the intrastate conflicts, occurs in Africa and most of the literature highlights the resources lacuna of the UN peacekeeping operation and the major powers neglected of the conflicts in Africa. This study attempts to find out what compelled the African Union to take on the responsibility of maintaining peace and security in Africa; how the other actors assisted AU and what challenges it faced in its peacekeeping operations. In that context, it is significant to know how the institutional mechanisms of peace and security of AU

functioned and how AU tries to manage conflicts in its continent, despite lacuna in the institutional structure. It also attempts to examine whether the relationship between the UN and AU is of burden-sharing or burden shifting.

Although OAU is dealing with the crisis in Africa from 1980's the scope of this study is focused on peacekeeping operation under the African Union since 2002 up to the present.

Research Questions

The Research Questions for the study would broadly be

1. How did the OAU deal with the conflicts between the states in Africa?
2. Why and how the OAU started dealing with the internal crisis of the member states?
3. What are the factors that made African countries replace Organization of African Unity with the African Union?
4. Why is the AU regarded as more capable of dealing with the crisis in Africa than OAU?
5. How effective are the working of institutional structure for peace e under the AU?
6. Why some of the institutional elements could not function effectively?
7. How did the external actorsassist the AU in peacekeeping operations?
8. What are the key challenges that AU faced in carrying out its peacekeeping operations?
9. Why did the AU delayed intervention in Somalia? Why was the AU's involvement in Somalia not forceful and decisive?

Hypotheses

1. The lack of political will and capacity among the countries of African prevented operationalization of the institutional mechanism of peace and security of the African Union.
2. Lack of effective burden sharing between the AU and external actors has been the major stumbling block in active intervention by the AU in the crises in Africa.
3. The resource lacuna is the major factor which prevents prompt and effective AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia.

Research Methods

This paper has mostly based on qualitative technique as it is descriptive and analytical. It has also used data to show participation in peacekeeping operations. Data have beenalso used to indicate the estimate of expenditure of the operations and contribution by various actors. This study has used both secondary and primary literature. The primary sources are thedeclaration and the Charter of both OAU and AU and other official documents of these two organizations as well as the United Nations. The secondary source has included books and articles in academic journals, relevant internet sources, and reports.

Outline of Chapterization

to understand the African Unions Peace keeping Operations; A case study of Somalia The dissertation dedicates four chapters to the first chapter focuses upon Evolution andTransformation from Organization of African Unity to the African Union.This chapter discusses the main objective of the OAU and analysis why and how it got involved in peacekeeping operations and crisis management. The primary focus of this chapter is why it became necessary to replaced OAU by AU and how AU is different fromOAU in the constitutional provision of managing conflicts. Second Chapter looks on the African Union's Institutional Structures of Peace and Security**.** This chapter discusses in detail the institutional mechanism for peace and security of AU such asthe Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Peace Fund and the Panel of the Wise and how they functioned in reality.

The Third chapter examines the African Union's Engagement in Peacekeeping Operations**.** This section gives an overview of AU's engagement in peacekeeping operations and tries to find out the pattern of its involvement in the operations. It also highlights the working of the AU's institutional structures and interaction with other actors In the process of carrying out the peacekeeping operations in various conflict areas. The Fourth chapter looks into African Union Peacekeeping Operation: Case Study of Somalia.This chapter discusses in detail the origin of the crisis, why and how AU responded to the Somalia crisis, and how it interacted with external actors and how the institutional structure operated in addressing this crisis. It ends with highlighting the challenges the AU encountered in this operation.

Chapter 2

Transformation from Organization of African Unity to the African Union

The anti-colonial movements in Africa enabled the birth of new states claiming a place in international society. Independence brought a sense of identity, positivity, and desire for greater cooperation amongst the new states that was largely influenced by the Pan-African ideals(Jeng 2012: 120). It is an ideology and movements that inspire the coordination of African worldwide. It is based on the belief of Africa for Africans and the values of unity and solidarity a standard narrative developed that saw promise in an African project of institution-building by 1962. "several African leaders got tired of the divisions within the African continent and so jettisoned bloc politics. It was this development that eventually led to the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963" (Edo and Olanrewaju 2012: 42)

During Cold War period, OAU played a mediating role in conflicts between the states. However, the Commissionof mediation, conciliation, and arbitration "seemed to have been doomed from the start as it did not address the practical realities of the region. Moreover,it waslengthy, and costly judicial process made the Commission unattractive to many member states. The Commission dissolved in 1977, with the OAU opting for other means of conflict management, such as the use of good offices" (Jeng 2012: 124)OAU mediated three years of the border conflict between Morocco and Algeria in 1963. The main reason for this war was the absence of a precise delineation of the border between the two countries, and another reason was the discovery of mineral resources in disputed area. This conflict provided OAU with the first test of its capability in peacekeeping and peaceful settlement of the dispute (Welz 2012: 74). In the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict, OAU came up with a peace plan, but Eritrea rejected the peace process saying that it only dealt with Badme region, leaving out other conflict areas (Tekeste 2000: 45). Apart from conflicts among the African states, "the vicious competition between the superpowers during the Cold War era of influence over African states was the significant factor for the wars between African states"(Olonisakin 2000: 21).

However, in the Post -Cold War, outside powers were less interested in African states and withdrew their protection of some of the regimes.This resulted in series of rebellions against the authoritarian regimes. Military insurrection and civilian-led armed revolts became an interactive feature of the conflicts in Africa.OAU eastablished mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1993 becuause it had faced nomrous challenges dealing with the conflicts in Africa.This mechanism became necessary to deal with conflicts in Africa and it" had three goals to anticipate and prevent potential conflict, to carry out peacemaking and peace building efforts where full blown conflict occur and to take care post-conflict situations. Its key structures included: the Central Organ and the Conflict Management Centre (CMC)"(Jeng 2012: 124) In order the deal with issues affecting the African states, there was need of appropriate economic conditions political and social reforms to bring Africa on the path of recovery from its condition. the dire need for sound economic, social and political reforms to put Africa on the path of recovery.

This chapter starts with a focus on the origin of OAU, examining the factors that shaped the birth of OAU, discussing the principle and objectives of OAU. This chapter specifically focus on OAU dealing with conflicts. It examines hllow the OAU dealt with the conflicts and what challenges OAU confronted while handling the conflict in Africa. Finally, the chapter examines the circumstances that lead the transformation of OAU to the African Union (AU).

Origin of OAU

The daunting challenges of consolidation of society and rapid economic development followed the newly achieved political independence for African states. To realize such formidable responsibilities, the African states felt the need for cooperation and collective action. The institutionalization of OAU in 1963 marked a milestone in the promotion of unity among those member states which had suffered fragmentation due to their long subjugation by colonial powers. Both economic and political reasons gave a push to the need for integration during the immediate period of independence. The realization in the beginning of 1990s about the drawbacks of the import substitution model of development and growth was a major economic reason which forced to look for better alternatives. Moreover, the artificially drawn borders of states led to the growth of unsustainable national economies in the sense they lack structural

complementarities on a large range of similar primary commodities for export along with the necessary minerals. This led to limiting the development of economics of sale. The imports of intermediate and final goods was also effected by the consumption patterns of the state's leading them further into dependence on the industrially developed countries.

United Nation Development Indexes specifies that in the past decades, the share of continent's trade globally had continent's share of global trade had stagnated for an long period soaring around a meager 1-2 per cent which led to legitimate concerns in policy circles in Africa "In the political realm, the ideas of the Pan-African movement for continental unity, collective identity and coherence also acted as catalysts for integration on the Continent" (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000:2).

There was some unity of purpose amongst African political elites, and they felt that solidarity and cooperation were vital in the accomplishment of security and economic progress (Jeng 2012: 120). Pan-African ideology also influenced not only evolution against exploitation and dominance but also of framing the ideological basis for the proposition of an African institutional legal order.The lack of consensus as to the direction and essence of the anticipated continental institution culminated in competing for regional and ideological groupings. By early 1960 the ideological divide had given birth to four major groupings of the Brazzaville group, Casablanca Group, Monrovia Group, and pan freedom movement of Eastern Central and Southern Africa(Jeng 2012: 121). However, after a series of meetings and consultation a consensus was reached that paved the way for a moderate organization.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was finally inaugurated in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963. The charter of the organization signed on that day by Heads of State and Government of independent 32 African states. The purpose of the OAU was set out in Article 2 of its charter. This included the promotion of unity and solidarity, cooperation for the realization of better condition of life for Africa, to defend Africa's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, eradicate colonialism and promote international cooperation with due regard to the UN charter and UDHR n pursuance of these purposes, Article 3 of the charter outlined a number of principles that were to govern OAU membership. These were "sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal matter of and state, respect for sovereign equality and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of the dispute by negotiation, conciliation, mediation

and condemnation of political assassination as well as dedication to the emancipation of Africa and an affirmation of a policy of non-alignment. It is worth noting that these principles clearly reflected the history, structure, and intersection of the prevailing international order and precepts of international law. Since its birth, OAU has asserted to the world its assurance and competency as the prime agency to intervene in African conflicts. Indeed, an essential component of the Charter of the OAU is member-states commitment to the principle of "peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration" (Amoo 1992: 5). It is also imperative to note OAU as a premier continental institution was itself a progeny of pan-Africanism, whose primary objectives had been the propagation of a certain ideology that galvanizes a sense of African unity. It was the manner in which unity was to be conceptualized, negotiated and achieved that gave rise to political compromises. For the new post-colonial African states, the burden of inheritance condition by encounters with international law played some part in limiting prospects for reinvention. Over an extended period, most of the African colonial states had not experimented a culture outside of that framework. This burden of cooperation made it possible for the concept of sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality of states and non-interference to shape the international legal operating at the time of the founding of the OAU. The organization and indeed its membership could not realistically arrogate exception to the structure of the prevailing international order, nor was the OAU capable of reinventing inherited notion of statehood. "The international rules and statehood systems under which the OAU operated were already in place at the dawn of post-colonial statehood. From this perspective, the international order functioned as post-imperial ordering devices"(Edo and Olanrewaju 2007: 42)

The OAU was a multipurpose organization whose role characterized by numerous"inter-state activities in multiple spheres such as security and economic co-operation, a political interface for accumulating and enunciating common interests, and promoting social cohesion and unity among member states and peoples of the organization"(Marzui 1967: 19). The establishment of OAU was an effort to move ahead of the remnants of the colonial subjugation and also to encourage institutionalised behaviour among its members. The reason was that any ordinary voice can be secured on the issues of challenges which are global, international politics and also to initiate a collective act for the removal of the leftovers of colonialism. The most important goals among all in the Charter which occupied much amount of focus are the goals of unity,

development and the issues of security. However in the developing years the organisation was incapable to foster any of these goals, like "it had been abandoned by the end of the first decade of its formation only to be taken over by the UN Economic Commission for Africa"(Elias 1972: 127)." The goal of 'unity' became a mere rhetoric due to the unawareness of Africa's immeasurable and rich diversity. Burdened with the great power rivalries, the zero commitment, internal political squabbles deep-rooted external loyalties, fear, distrust, "among member states, and security matters affecting the continent also remained a simple protocolCivil conflicts and the enduring African refugee crisis are as old as the regional body itself"(Mayaall 1991: 25).

OAU and African Interstate Crises

In link with its charter's Article 2, paragraph (d), the OAU dedicated itself to the annihilation of different forms of colonialism in the African continent. Article 3, para. 6 strengthens this commitment by seriously urging the members to adhere to the principles of complete commitment to the over-all emancipation of the African Territories which are still dependent. "With these regard, OAU has In this direction the organization directed a significant proportion of amount of its inter-African and international diplomatic moral, resources, military,and financial support to carry forward the aims of bringing an end to the practice of apartheid in South Africa, decolonization in different states, namely, Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola, French Somalia Spanish Sahara, the Comoro Islands, the Canary Islands, the Seychelles, and a plethora of Islands surrounding the African continent"(Jeng 2014: 126). The Liberation Committee was established to help its organizational and diplomatic activities and it's headquarter which was established in Dar-es-Salaam which was supposed to cooperate its mobilization and tacticalefforts. However, the headquarter continued under the limits of the Council of Ministers which made endorsements to the Assembly of Heads of States. The assembly was composed of leaders and government and their appointed representatives. Its primary function was to provide leadership in the formulation of the political and ideological direction of the organization (Jeng 2014: 126). Since its commencement in 1963, the OAUhad always been cognizant of the necessity to deliver a regional agenda for United Regional action and tactical preparation in the areas of regional security, peace and stability, as well as the encouragement of economic

development through economic cooperation and integration. It is to the everlasting credit of the visionary creation fathers of the OAU that such a framework or principles were resolutely entrenched in the Charter of the OAU. “It is signifying the inspired and joint determination of our leaders to promote understanding among the African people and Cooperation among the African States.”(Jeng 2014: 127).

The early attempts by OAU to confront violence and conflicts were embedded in the commission of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. Thecommissionmandated function and composition was outlined in the separate protocol that came into effect after the creation of OAU. In the absence of a mechanism, the many conflicts that affected most parts of Africa continued with little or no meaningful efforts by the OAU to address them. Where attempts were made, these involved the largesse of ad hoc committees and diplomatic endeavors fronted by some political leaders. The Commission has remained largely dormant because of the “narrow interpretation of sovereignty and created difficulties throughout past efforts to formulate procedures for the resolution of conflicts between the OAU Member States”(Munya 1999: 536). “These difficulties notwithstanding, there were innovations in the measures and instruments for conflict resolution introduced by the OAU”(Munya 1999: 536).“Such innovations have comprised the creation of Ad-Hoc Committees of wise men to handle particular problems, like the case of Western Sahara, Chad/Libya, and the Senegal/Mauritania conflicts”(Munya 1999: 536). “The success of the OAU intervention in the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia and Somalia and Kenya achieved by the collective authority of Africa's Foreign Ministers meeting in an extraordinary session convened to Dar-es-Salaam in February 1964”(Munya 1999: 537). “When the dispute flared up again at the 1973 OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, the authority of five Heads of State composing the OAU ad hoc mediation committee (Nigeria, Senegal, Liberia, Guinea, and Mali) persuaded President Barre of Somalia to co-operate with the Committee in search for a compromise”(Munya 1999: 537). “It was the ad hoc committee consisting of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Presidents William Tubman of Liberia, Modibo Keita of Mali, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Gamel Abdul Nasser of Egypt which in 1966 resolved a dispute between Ghana and Guinea.”(Amoo 1992: 10). Four Presidents of Central African States (Presidents Tombalbaye of Chad, Bokassa of the Central African Republic, Bango of Gabon and Ahidjo of Cameroon) initiated reconciliation between President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and President Ngouabi of the Congo, which led to the signing of the Manifesto of Reconciliation on

June 16, 1970In 1970 Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was “instrumental in bringing about reconciliation between Nigeria on one hand and Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia on the other on the issue of Biafra“ (Karvenka 1974: 132). “Gabon was the only one of the four African States which recognized Biafra and refused to normalize relations with Nigeria after the war ended in January 1970“ (Karvenka 1974: 132). “Libreville was used as a staging post for arms supplies to Biafra, and some Nigerian war orphans were shipped to Gabon and then returned to Nigeria by relief organizations. Eventually, in 1971, Gabon was reconciled with Nigeria through the good offices of Presidents Eyadema of Togo and Ahidjo of Cameroon“ (Karvenka 1974: 132). “President Diori of Niger acted as a mediator between Chad and Libya which decided to re-establish diplomatic relations thatwere broken in August 1971 after Chad accused Libya of interfering in its internal affairs“ (Karvenka 1974: 132). “The ad hoc Special Mediation Commission of the OAU presided by Emperor Haile Selassie achieved in 1972 reconciliation between Senegal and Guinea. The Authority of the Heads of State was also sought by the“ (Karvenka 1974: 132).“OAU Liberation Committee trying in vain to reconcile the rival liberation movements in Angola. President Mobutu of Zaire and President Ngouabi of the Congo held series of meetings with the representations of the two Angolan liberation movements, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLLA) and the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA), which eventually led to the reconciliation announced at the 1972 OAU Summit in Rabat“(Karvenka 1974: 132). Sub-regional organizations, “such as the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in Sudan and Somalia and the Southern African Development Community in Lesotho, have also used to promote the defrayal of tangible and localized conflicts. Also, the silent but active role of the Secretary - General of the OAU has undergone a qualitative change thereby” (Ibok 2000: 4). “demonstrating him with an agenda to take ingenuities to interfere personally or, through Special Envoys, to promote the peaceful settlement of conflicts” (Ibok 2000: 4). This alternative was mostly favored by African states that ignored the commission of the basis perchance that less formal measures are more agreed to the defy overly legalistic and time-consumingconventional solutions. This traditional dispute resolution could not work longer because traditional African system to settle dispute did not include resolution of intertribal dispute except for the few Ad hoc measures or attempt at diplomacy. “These heads of states may have come to OAU with their traditional experiences of human interaction, hence the preference for collective action but

lacking exposure to the skills necessary for the interstate interaction"(Langholtz and Stout 2004:135). The weak capability of the OAU as a peacemaker is further established by the constrained authority for conflict management controlled in the protocols of mediation. Although member states are obliged by the Charter to submit all disputes to the process of peaceful settlement, the jurisdiction of the Commission (and hence the OAU) is optional and not compulsory. Organizational intervention was in disputes between member states and it was constitutionally constrainted to deal with internal conflict due to the provision of the principle of noninterference in internal matters of member states. The OAU cannot even bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on an intractable party since the Commission's report could be published only with the consensus of the parties. There was no substantive provision to link the intent and the act of intervention in the disputes among the states. "In the absence of the commission of mediation, the Assembly has adopted the rehearsal of intervening in conflicts with ad hoc committees from among its membership, as allowed by Rule 37 of the Assembly's rules of procedure"(Burtom 1990: 2). "Since its first use in 1963 to interfere in the Algeria, Morocco dispute, the ad hoc committee had become the primary instrument of conflict management for the OAU"(Burtom 1990: 2). "The establishment of ad hoc mediatory bodies habitually follows and accompaniments two principal types of mediatory roles of the Assembly: official and catalytic"(Burtom 1990: 2)."The Assembly's formal role usually begins at its summits where an aggrieved state, party or an ally would lodge a complaint against a member state and lobby for its enclosure in the summit's agenda by consistently pronouncing and upholding the regional consent on functioning principles in numerous types of conflicts, the Assembly offers a representative yet effective legitimization of specific positions in conflicts which inspirations both the conflict and mediation procedure. At its Khartoum summit in 1978"(Burtom 1990: 2). for example, "the Assembly accepted a resolution which defined the Western Sahara conflict as a process of decolonization and self-determination. To the chagrin of Morocco, which captured the territory following a decolonization pact with Spain, this resolution amounted to an approval of the position of Algeria and the Polisario, which wanted the territory to be an independent state"(Burtom 1990: 2). The Assembly ruled on the matter of illegitimate and legitimate. The norms and the organizational principles had three distinguishable results. This also had a positive impact on regional stability. They are: "(1) it narrows the area of uncertainty in disputes which may hurry conflicts; (2) it may influence, in a predictable and positive manner, the comportment

of the parties in the conflict environment; and (3) it helps in illustrative the bargaining setting by delineating the stakes in dispute, by identifying (often by implication) the aggressor and the defender, and by articulating the legitimacy of the status quo or the demand to change it"(Alger 1961: 128).

The weak ability of The OAU was weak and its lack of capability was additionally confirmed by instances. The jurisdiction of the Commission was largely optional and not mandatory. This became a reason for member states to submit all disputes to the process of peaceful settlement.

OAU intervention in the Chadian civil war the first instance when the African regional institutional infrastructure intervened in the domestic matter of a state. Previously the OAU stood firmly to the accepted principal and firm commitment of non-intervention. Some regard that the 1990 Declaration as a pivotal turning point for Africa because for the first time OAU documented the varying nature of conflicts from inter-State to intra-State that called for a more lively approach. "Given the African pre-occupations with concepts such as Dominion and noninterference in the domestic affairs of Member States, as preserved in the OAU Charter" (Richard 1981: 30)

OAU in African internal conflict situations

The OAU did not initially intervene in the conflict for fear of contravening Article 3 of the Charter, which proscribes interference in the internal affairs of members. In 1977, the OAU to reach a peaceful solution to the Chad conflict leaded a mediation. For a long five years from around 1977-1982 Chad was largely the only active conflict in Africa. It saw some serious peacekeeping from OAU. It was even inconsistent with the universal norms and organizational principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.

Chad

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The first major peacekeeping operation taken by OAU was the Chadian crisis. The reason of the crisis was the failure to realize the goal of nation building due to rival factions at the local level. These were a product of colonialism and the ethnic loyalties and parochial nationalism. The Cold

war added fuel to this already ignited fire. The two superpowers and the system of alliance were very strong. France for instance was a colonial master but it also somehow was exerting a neo-colonial hegemony. In Libya the Soviet backing was strong. The complicated character of the Chad conflict was also due to the ongoing Cold War and proxy wars.

The period of 1970-1975 witnessed a variety of crises in Chad. There was economic crisis and political power struggle among elites. The agriculture in these five years also suffered due to unexpected change in weather resulted in crop failure. The prevalent fear in the regime had resulted in major reshuffling of high officials and defense forces commanders. Among many bad decisions of the regime one having long lasting negative impact was to imposing punitive physical and psychosomatic yondoinitiation, especially for the male population living in South of Chad. Many scholars have also raised the condition of non-Muslims. The population between sixteen and fifty years were not allowed to join any position of power in the government neither the defence.

The Tombalbaye government disconnected its formal connections with Libya. It blamed it for assisting insurgency against Chad. At this time the Libyan leader recognized FROLINAT. The final blow was that with the synthesis of all the factors led to mass discontent. The junior rank officers in the military and a majority of the people living in South Cahd became dejected as they were facing socio-economic and political crisis. At this time Tombalbaye got assasinated. However by this time a majority of Chad population had realized that even without Tombalbaye the overall culture of dictatorship and totalitarianism would not end in Africa and particularly in Chad. There was mass dissatisfaction within Chad and the guerrilla campaigns from Libya continued.

“Libya intervention in Chad resulted in de facto control over northern part of the country” (Joaquim 1998). As the OAU Charter remained silent of how to deal with the internal crisis and its principle of non-intervention in internal affairs prevented its mechanisms such as peace-making, the Mediation Commission and its affiliate committees from dealing with the challenges posed by the conflict in Chad. The OAU's silence and inaction on the Chadian conflict were broken by approving series of agreements reached in Nigeria. By this agreement, OAU authorized peacekeeping operation. The mandate of OAU mission was to anticipate, contain and temper hostilities in Chad, to put an end to them and to safeguard the security of the Chad state.

In short, the force would: "(i) keep the peace in Chad, (ii) supervise elections to be held at a date to be agreed upon by all factions in the country, and (iii) assist in the integration of the Chadian army" (Sessay 1989: 194). The organisation was unable financially to support the crisis laden members. Constitutionally and financially beleaguered, the OAU turned to UN for rescue. The deteriorating security situation in N'Djamena coupled with the favourable response of some western powers (U.K., France and U.S.) to meet all or most of the cost of the peace force were some of the factors that eventually led to the creation of peacekeeping operation in November, 1981. "The total number of troops in the Force was to be streamlined. Nigeria, which was to provide 8000, would now send only 2000 men. The remaining five contributing states were to contribute 600 men each, making a total of 5000 men. Adopting the UN tradition, the force was to be under the authority of the Secretary-General who in turn appointed the Ethiopian, Gerbre Egziaber Dawitt, "as his personal representative in N'Djamen"(Sesay 1989:192) "Mr. Dawitt was also to head a committee made up of representatives from Benin, Congo, Guinea and Kenya to oversee the action cities of the Force"(Sesay 1989:192). Chad was divided into six zones each of which was to be occupied by troops from one of the contributing states.

"The OAU had resisted any attempt to give the external powers and actors, including Western powers and even the rich Arab countries, the chance for undertaking any concrete actions on Chad" (Laure and Anyedoho 1992: 817). As a regional organization, it crushed diplomatic activities of searching sturdy political solutions to the conflict when peace was needed the most. Also the organization's Pan-African ideals like unity, security, and development took a back-seat in the face of the crisis in Chad which led to the organization's compromising its prestige and credibility not only at the Pan African level but also outside Africa. Critics of the ill-prepared intervention set their arguments from a defective conceptual clarity by pointing out that for the OAU to have tailored its force and the chain of command along the patterns of the UN was in itself a disaster. Due to the stiff nature of the military, politico-cultural and religious postures of the warring factions, there was no peace which was to be kept in Chad. "Hence, the whole project was bound to be a failure. Also, the factions and the frontlines were not easily identifiable for demarcations needed for an obstruction force" (Bostan 1992: 24). What was worse was that the duplication of the UN command structure requires a high coordination and administration skills which were absent in OAU, thus making it incapable for the task. The OAU lacked the constitutional basics for a project like peacekeeping. The vision of an African High

Command to foresee possible future crisis and challenges associated with the fragile post-colonial state took a backseat by external loyalties which were structured and deepened along the Francophone-Anglophone divide. The less economically privilegedmember states which already promised to support by contributing troops for the want of liquid cash were unable to standby their promises as long as the money was not coming from OAU. Togo and Guinea were sufferers of the OAU's financial difficulty as they could not obtain the cash for financing troops deployment, thus risking the first ever attempt by the organization to find regional solutions to African problems which was then an emerging concept. These recurrent problems apart, the organization also lacked an accredited political and military bureau with expert manpower to deal with the Chad crisis and the planned peacekeeping scheme. The essential problems concerning logistics could not give the organization any free hand for maneuver also. The African armies have very limited supply of equipment's like the transport planes, personnel carriers and up-to-date telecommunication gadgets which are essential for such operations. Thus, the reliance upon France and US. Still the question can be asked on the pace of the delivery of those facilitates by the western powers, provided the problems of bureaucracy and distance. It had been accepted that the Zairean contingent had to be on the waiting for over one month just to be transported to their selected zone of operation in northern Chad. OAU also lacked the ability to grapple with problems of technical nature like issuing a clear mandate, convincing the factions for a inclusive cease-fire agreement, and demilitarizing the various frontlines with swift and efficacy created room for the factions to reorganize for the final onslaught.. "That the forces of Habre, for example, managed to make military gains under the nose of the Inter-African Force on 15 March 1982 by taking over Oum Hadjer in the midst of intervention is a clear evidence of the OAU's incompetence to the task it had taken upon itself" (Jeng 2012: 202)".

Rwanda

Rwanda is the first major internal conflict that OAU was called upon to deal with in the post-Cold War era. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda was not something new in the post-Cold War. Since colonial period, there is disagreement between majority Hutus and minority Tutsis.Without a doubt, the transition process to an independent state was stained by colonial racial ideologies

with Tutsis claiming political control because of the racial blessing that had been bestowedduring the colonial rule. Hutus opposed the dominance of Tutsis. With the end of monarchy system in October 1962 along with the success in elections of the Hutus under the banner of the PARMEHUTU brought Kayibanda to the presidency under a first republican constitution. The Kayibanda's rule rule ended in July 1973, "in a bloodless coup led by Major General Juvenile Habyarimana. Brutal military dictatorship exhibited Habyarimana's long rule in the second republican government (1973-1994)"(Malvern 2000: 5). Tutsis framed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Mr. Kagame. In August 1993 after numerous attacks, a peace accord signed between Habyarimana and the RPF. However, it did little to stop the continued unrest. When the Habyarimana plane was shot down at the beginning of April 1994, it was the final nail in the coffin. Finally, RPF captured Kigali, the government collapsed, numerous attack between the two group started, and major genocide took place.

The international panel of Distinguished characters to inspect the 1994 genocide in Rwanda andcontiguousacts were created.The panel had given the task of enquiry about the Arusha peace Agreement and the killing of Rwanda president. It was also asked to enquiry about the genocide that followed number of refugee crisis that led the overthrow of Mobuto regime in Zaire. It was alsothasked to investigate the role of UN and its agencies before, during and after the genocide. It was supposed to investigate the OAU outdoor and indoor forces and non government organisations .role. apart from these it was also mandate to inquiry what African and non-African leaders, government, role individually and collectively.

Being a regional body, the OAU also monitored Rawandian crisis right from its beginning in the early 1990s. OAU through its mediating efforts between 1990 and 1992, managed to established of an observer mission to obeserve cease-fire which resulted the settlement between the government and Rwandan Patriotic Front.OAU Secretray General Salim Ahmed Salim and both government of Rwanda and RPF came up with an agreement where military observer group would resolve the conflicts which emerged in October even before the 15 members military observer team from Burundi Uganda and Zaire deployed in April 1991. It was cleared from the very beginning itself that size of force agreed to deploy very less and inappropriate. In March 1991, a second agreement provided that the original observer team would be replaced by a larger

group of the military observer from other parts of the region. To be known as the Neutral Military Observer group (NMOG), fifth months later NMOG was enlarged and renamed NMOG2. "Although NMOG first and second were modest size, the OAU had difficult time fielding the forces by September 1991. Six months after NMOG one was authorised, only 15 OAU military observers were in the country.Tthe mission never reached its expected strengthen of 50 military observers" (Murray 2001: 125)

The OAU's involvement was crucial at this stage assuming that the international measurements had given task to international force to replace NMOG. The Secretary General being a representative figure for collective African platform, requested for UN support in Rwanda based on the resolution 812. The Secretary General of the UN restated his apprehensions about seeing the issue while not looking the considerable peace agreement between the opposinggroups. It was then obligatory upon the OAU to advance action on the Arusha accords which would facilitate the formation of the Neutral International Force (NIF). Due absence of on time deployment of the NIF, the Secretary-General appealed to the Central Organ to support the mandate of the Neutral Military Observe Group (NMOG), which stressed by the scarcity of resources. This delay also impeded a proper formation of the provisional institutions. Also, there was also an increasing sense of anxiety in the form of summarily executions, manslaughters of political leaders, and massacre of innocent civilians. "It was the deplorable situation in Rwanda that compelled the President of Tanzania to convene a regional summit of the leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda in Dar-es- Salaam on 6 April 1994 to address the security situation in Rwanda in particular" (Murray 2001: 126)

"The OAU force grudgingly evacuated in 1994 when the much greater UN force left the scene revealing one of the central weaknesses of the organization: that even when it is eager, it may not have the capability to act" (Murray 2001: 126)

Burundi

Before the colonialism,like its neighbour Rwanda, Burundi also headed by Tutsi monarchy Burundi was led by a Tutsi monarchy like its neighbor Rwanda. Under ongoing power structure made circumstances easy fro German and Belgian to rule as Tutsi were already dominating there over Hutu. "They, therefore, perpetuated Tutsi domination. After the independence, a federation

with Rwanda rejected and Michael Micombero led a successful coup in 1960 and replaced the monarchy with the presidential republic" (Nyangoni 1985: 134). Under the micambro regime, the minority Tutsi-dominated governance in 1972. "Hutu's organizations organized and carried out systemic attacks on ethnic Tutsi with the declared intent of annihilation the whole group" (Nyangoni 1985: 134). The military regime resorted with large-scale reprisals targeting Hutus.. The coup in 1987 installed Tutsi officer, Pierre buyoya, as Preisent of the country. "He tried to bring some changes to ease state control over media and attempted to facilitate a national dialogue. Instead of reducinh the problem, this reform served to inflame ethnic tension as hope grew among the Hutu population that the Tutsi control was at an end" (Nyangoni 1985: 134). "Local revolt subsequent took place by Hutus peasants against several Tutsis leaders in northern Burundi there. Hutu's militants killed hundreds of Tutsis" (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 442). When in 1993 Burundi's president Malchior Nddaye was assassinated by Tutsi extremist. "As a result of the murder, violence took between the two groups and acts of genocide started against Tutsi minority in 1993 Acts of genocide was organised by the state and by arm militia group" (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 442). They were followed by a long civil war that kills both Hutus and Tutsis.In 1994 Ndayaye's successor Cyprien Nitayamira was assassinated with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. This act marked Rwanda genocide and in Burundi there were general massacre.

The assasination of Melchior Ndadaye who was the first democratically elected President made conflict situation in Burundi. according to Hutu's Tutsi's killed the President and their anger drived the conflict The OAU intervened in Burundi in October 1993 to restore the democratic political process and stop the violence."The 1993 crisis coincided OAU to prepare its framework for peacekeeping effort to enable the Pan African Organisation to play a central role in promoting democracy and conflict resolution in Africa" (AU & HD Reports 2011: 249). After the very disastrous development in Rwanda in 1994, the challenge to the OAU in Burundi was how to help efficiently, not only to resolve the tension but also to exertion with international community.to avert a replication of the shocking events of Rwanda.

The OAU established peacekeeping mission in the form of African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). AMIB's mandate "involved establishing a liaison between the parties, and monitoring

and verifying the ceasefire… "AMIB also facilitated a specialized commission looking at the reform of defense and police forces, securing assembly and demobilization camps, facilitating and supporting the DDR process, facilitating humanitarian assistance (including to IDPs and refugees), providing VIP and mission protection, and co-ordinating with the UN and other international actors on the ground"(Harsch 1998: 4).

OAU slected a special envoy to the country and deployed a observer mission. The mission completed, following the coup of July 1996. The coup d'etat of 25 July 1996 provisionally reversed the little progress that was achieved in that country. There was the annihilation of the country's substructure, a low-intensity guerilla warfare by rebels and adversaries of the Government, a sluggish motion genocide which claims hundreds of lives every month, foremost population shifts and worst of all, the ill-starrednonappearance of political consent on the part of the military and political elite. Jointdoubts and allegations, have nurtured on the fears of both sides of the political division. "The significance has been the emergence and consolidation of the forces of extremism while the voices of moderation have all but been descended"(Samuel 2006: 12)

Limitations of the OAU

OAU while dealing with conflicts faced major problems. Following are the highlight of the challenges:

Structural inadequacies of OAU

The absence of enforcement and capacity in the life of the organization made it more of a loose association, and it was conservative, unable and unwilling to cultivate a proactive normative blueprint relevant to Africa. Bureaucratic formalism was deeply protected which amounted to demonstration protective preference for inaction and delay over decisive movement (Foltz 1994: 282). Likewise, the original focus of OAU was fundamentally a political organization which

sought to hasten decolonization struggles and also salvages what little was left of the African Unity project. In other words, it was only a platform to provide harmony and sense of identity amongst states, and therefore, it was not set out to functional institutional machinery that could actively generate norms and enforce policies. Moreover absence of enforcement and capacity made this organization a loose association, of sovereign states "which design to promote international relation without offending the tenet of sovereign equality" (Munya 1997: 583).

Normative inadequacies of OAU

The OAU was structured along four fundamental principles: Sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity and African solution of African problem. The exclusion of internal conflicts was a major flaw' given that a substantial number of conflicts in most of the Africa are post-independence have been in the form of civil war. This narrow conception not only advises that there was little interest for the commissions proactive involvement in internal conflicts but also that the sanctity of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal matters were the more than just a guiding principle "they were just central of OAU's existence" (Ibok 2000: 7). Moreover, balancing act embedded the OAU charter transformed it into a curious mismanagement of principles and purposes which combined rather "conservative statements designed to preserve the status qua in inter-African relation with radical commitments towards the outside world" (C. Hoskyns 1984: 278). It was the OAU's dogmatic resolve to fulfill this bestow equation with an unwieldy institutional structure that made its impact in confronting Africa's post-colonial peace and human security dilemmas negligible and largely submissive.

The OAU came under the increasing criticism in the 1980s for its inability to proffer transformative changes that were desperately needed in post-independence Africa. However, it was the organization's institutional and normative weakness in confronting armed conflict that concerned most condemnation. "The OAU, however, overwhelmed by old problems, some of which relate to the interests of its leaders, and others that are the natural consequences of managing an organization of this magnitude" (Zartman 1984: 41). Although the "idea that the organization was a club of corrupt and autocratic leaders was gradually dissipating, given the appearance of more democratically inclined states, it is still probable for the personal benefits of

some leaders to affect their retort to some conflict circumstances" (Zartman 1984: 41). "It was often thought that non-democratic leaders would find it difficult to oppose the private conduct of another state whose rulers disrupt the human rights of the citizens" (Zartman 1984: 41). OAU was strongly abided by its norm of non-intervention. It could also not intervene in member countries where military coups overthrew civilian governments. The economic commission of OAU did not have resources or capability to facilitate cooperation to address Africa's economic problem. Similarly, it had no legal mechanism to settle a legal dispute between the member states. Another problem was heads of state avoided criticizing of each other and. Therefore, the assembly became heads of state club. The OAU "had come to be known as the Dictators' Club reflecting the presence of various authoritarian skulls of state who had failed to renounce power in their individual countries" (Feldman, 2008: 267).The sense of apathy and ineptitude caused widespread humanity misery in many parts of Africa. The failing prospects of the organi**z**ation led many to conclude that if **ac**tive steps were not taken to renew and revamp its conflict management frameworks,it was hard to see a positive future for the OAU(Jeng, 2012: 130). Due to these limitations of OAU made the African leaders think of reforming the organization. Finally, they arived at the decision that instead of just a reform, they decided to replace OAU with African Union.

Conclusion

This study focused on transformation of Organisation of African Unity to African Union. OAU which estabished in 1963 under the circumastances where the post war anti colonial movements enable the birth of new states. The idea of an organisation was based on the ideal pan African which is on the bases emancipation, Africa for Africans and values of unity and solidarity these activities developed the sence of building an institution based on larger cooperation apart from cooperation other factors which shaped the ideas of an organisation was internal clashesh, diversities, political uncertanity and rivalry between eliets, yet amongts the tension that arose from these waves of social upheavels, still there was some scanario of unity amongts the elites were available, that was the reason they came up with an organisation in 1963, which was Organisation of African Unity, iniatialy it was based on the perspective of unityfying Africa.

(Jeng 2012: 120). Therefore OAU inograted in 1963. Its principle which incorporated in Article 2 was soverighnty, teritorial integrity, equlity of states and non-interefarence to shape the international legal order operating at time of the founding of the OAU. The organisation, indeed its membership could not realistically arrogate excpetion to the structure of the prevelling international order, nor was OAU capable of reinventing inheritated naotion of statehood. The principle and objective of OAU correspondent to similar provision in the UN charte both UN and OAU charter provides for non-interference in the domestic affairs of states. The peacefull settlement of dispute throgh mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

In the absence of the operation of the commission the many conflicts that affiliated most parts of the Africa continued with little or no meaningful attempts by the OAU to confront them

Chapter 3

African Union's Institutional Structures for Peace and Security

The African countries continue to experience human misery on a scale unmatched in the history of humanity, despite all hard work made by all type of organizations. The continuing interstate and intra-state conflicts proved the failure to find a solution. As discussed in the earlier chapter, the OAU was besieged withsome limitations because of which it could not tackle the conflicts in the region. Further, it was inhibited by thelack of constitutional authorization to address the internal conflicts.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the OAU had become so disconnected from the reality and the challenges of the post-cold war Africa that it was acknowledged, and even echoed by some of Africa's most ardent apologists, that the institution needed a major or complete overhaul. Although it is hard to determine the specific defining epoch that triggered the need for normative and institutional transformation, it is plausible to suggest that the inability of OAU to confront violence and conflicts and the broader challenges of an increasingly globalized world were the major factors. Pan-Africanism provided the rallying baton and battle-cry for the acceleration of reforms. The urge for transformation was, therefore, inevitable than accidental. However, in therun-up to the transition process from the OAU to the African Union, other factors were also at play that helped provide the essential narrative and political synergy to translate ambitious into practical outcomes. This was manifestedthrough a battle for ideas fronted by leading personality from three majorcountries.

The competiting dynamics were spearheadedby the political leadership of Nigeria, Libya and South Africa accentuated by their desire to shape the ethos and trajectory of continental institution building. The initiatives were framed around specific domestic circumstances of the three countries. Thomas Kwasi Tieku has identified "key factors that propelled Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa to the forefront of Africa's institutional reform"(Tieku 2004: 251). In the case of Nigeria, process began in the late 1990s when the country emerged from military interregnum,

steering it onto a pathway to bolster its democratic credentials in a bid to recapture lost glory in Africa's geopolitics. Coinciding with general disaffection with the OAU, the country's leadership saw an opening through which Nigeria foreign policy influence could be exerted to shape the direction of continental institutional reform. Like Nigeria South Africa had also emerged from a difficult period- apartheid and international isolationism. It embodied South Africa's readmission to international diplomacy and provided it with a platform to formulate a foreign policy framework that could promote stability and democratic culture across Africa. ForLibya, its poor international image following prolonged isolation generated considerable political desperation in the context of widespread disenchantment with its domestic constituents. International transformation in the aftermath of cold war brought an opportunity for Ghaddaffi to attempt an exercise in image building. "The specific circumstances of the three countries and the desire of their respective political leadership to influence Africa's future found an appropriate interface in dysfunctional OAU and a continent very much in need of an organized narrative in a period of rising frustration" (Jeng 2012: 164).

cusse the,The launch of AU was seen by rapturous affirmation of the potential attributes of the new organization and the satisfaction that Africa has taken significant leaps towards mapping a progressive future capable of shaping identities, protecting the interest and granting agency to its people. This sense of optimism was in part predicated on a popular belief that the institutional and normative settings upon which a troubled past and usher in an era that promised a different future where the. "The launch was therefore seen as symbolic to the extent that it signaled an end, at least in theory to the old institution embodied by OAU" (Jeng 2012: 136). "The objectives of the African Union have a wider scope than those of OAU"(Jeng 2012: 169). There is a number of possible reasons for this. First, the OAU was established in shadows of persuasions compromises which ultimately scaled down the prospects for an institution capable of arrogating broad functions and objectives. Second most of the OAU existence coincided with a critical period shaped by the challenges of post- independence political struggle in Africa. The overriding concern at the time was to create a semblance of functionality and survival of newly independent states. A value such as human rights, good governance and social justice were hardly agenda of the African leaders. "The African Union, on the other hand,, emerged at a critical juncture of Africa's quest for political renew accelerated by transformation in international society" (Jeng 2012: 169).

The philosophy of the African Union and the structures it formulates hinge on kind of narrative that taps into the promises of a united, integrated and peaceful Africa. Although the inspirations for the paradigmatic shift embodied by the new normative and institutional architecture come from some dimensions, they nonetheless signify an admission that the realization came in the wake of an apparent institutional paralysis, and normative faultlines of the former OAU The emerging African Union's framework is meant to be a conscious representation of a leap into the future and an attempted departure from the misuse of past failings.While this leaps and what it attempts to achieve could be attributed to a conflation of factors; the perceived departure seeks to ascribe a sense of reorientation of Africa's institutions and norm creation mechanism. "Although the significant of this shift straddles many areas, its resonance with the search for alternative approaches to the conflict and peace problematic in Africa is profound" (Jeng 2012: 138) In the context of peace building, the reorientation may potentially constitute parameters of what could be termed and African- induced recharacterisation of approaches to internal conflicts.

The AU established with the objectives of promotion of peace and security and apply principle of non-indifference unlike the non-intervention principle folllowed by OAU. The. "To achieve this objective and to strengthen the competence of the AU in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the Protocol recitation to the formation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) were accepted in Durban in July 2002 and came into force in December 2003" (Jeng 2012: 138).Therefore, the Peace and Security Council was shaped as a collective security and early-warning grounding to enable timely and effectual responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.In order to achieve its objectives, the subsequent organs were established: "the African Standby Force (ASF), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (POW) and the Peace Fund. Collectively, these organs fall under the authority of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)" (Jeng 2012: 138).

This chapter attempts to gauge not only the extent to which the AU provides viable processes and mechanisms in confronting violence and internal conflicts in Africa, but it also emphasises the change in normative principles that underlie the constitutive Act's Peace and Security Architecture. It first discusses the guiding principles of the AU and how they differ from that of

the OAU, and then it discusses the composition, role and functions, achievements and challenges of each of the structures such as Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise (POW), The AU Peace Fund (AUPF), The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Military Staff Committee (MSC).

Guiding Principles

"The preamble to the constitutive Act provide a documentary expression of resolve of African leaders to what they view as the multifaceted challenges facing Africa" (Constitative Act 2002: para 5). These are partially situated in the context of the political economic and social transformation around the world, the preamble also acknowledge the pervasive nature of scourge of armed conflicts of as a major impediment to the socio-economic development in Africa.These also includes an undertaking to achieve greater unity and enhance solidarity in Africa" (Constitutive Act 2002: Art 3(a)).

"In relative terms the AU is undoubtedly a step forward African Governments have moved away from the rigid stance from sovereigntytrumps everything and now recognize the right of the AU to intervene in member states if war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity are occurring" (Taylor 2013). The AU has become involved in peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Somal. AU came up with principle of non-indifference, because OAU could not take suitable action in African conflict because it was strongly bounded by its principle of non- intervention

Peace and Security Council

AU established the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSCAU) with the accountability to endorse peace, security, and solidity on the continent. It was imagined that this responsibility would be fulfilled in collaboration with other organs and institutions. The equivalent of this body in OAU was known as Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution.

The Peace and Security Council is a somewhat promising continental institution that is increasingly determining current Africa's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Recognized through the Protocol Concerning to the Formation of the Peace and Security Council of the

African Union (PSCAU Protocol), the Council is to some degree modeled on the UN Security Council. The PSCAU Protocol reached into force on 26 December 2003 replacing the Declaration on the Establishment within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cairo Declaration), which was set up in 1993. The Peace and Security Council, formally established in 2004. This Council is one among several other AU organs (or clusters of organs) described in Article 5 of the AU Constitutive Act. These are: "the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the AU Commission, the Permanent Representative Committee, the specialized technical committees, the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and the financial institutions. Provision is also made for any additional organs that the AU may decide to establish."(Constitutive Act 2002: Art. 5 (2)).

Composition

The PSC has 15 members they all are elected by the AU excutive council and endorsed by the assembly at its next session. Five members are elected for three years term and ten for two years term usually to take up office on the first day of April following endorsement by the Assembly. Retiring members are eligible for immediate re-election. "Members are elected according to the principle of equitable regional representation and national rotation. National rotation is agreed within the regional groups. Regional representation is usually: Central Africa: three seats, Eastern Africa: three seats, Northern Africa: two seats, Southern Africa: three seats, Western Africa: four seats"(AUPAS 2014)."Council on the principle of equitable regional representation rotation using the criteria like, commitment to, authorize the values of the Union, contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, such as experience in peace support operations either locally or under the banner of the United Nations, capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership" (AUPAS 2014).

At another level, "there is a possible separation between the AU and the regions when it comes to selecting members of the PSC, as, despite the laid down criteria, the election of members rests with the regions" (AUPAS 2014). "The regions have adopted their own formula for proposing members to the PSC. For example, some areas have agreed to have one of their members inhabit the three-year seat virtually on a permanent basis, thus creating a pseudo-

permanent member, but without any veto powers" (AUPAS 2014). "The gap between the AU and the regions on the criteria for electing members creates a dilemma and raises profound questions" (Cilliers and Sturman 2004: 103). Due to the gigantic resource differences among the AU member states, it became impracticable to enforce all the laid down criteria. In the meantime, there was proof that numerous member states have supported the staff in their missions to the AU following their appointment to the PSC. "The cases of Ghana and Uganda are glaring examples in this respect. Before their membership of the PSC, both countries had no defense attaches. However, they have since deployed these officials in their embassies in Addis Ababa; a practice that should be encouraged" (Fisher et al. 2010: 27). Those regions which who have adopted their own method for electing members some instances, "appear to be driven more by political bargaining than complying with the criteria in the Protocol; a situation that exposes gaps in the application of the subsidiarity principle" (Fisher et al. 2010: 27).

However, the one principle that the PSC seems to have reliablycompulsory is the one that bars its members from participating in decision making in situations where they have a direct participation. The Protocol specifies that PSC members that are party to a conflict or a situation that is under contemplation by the PSC should recuse themselves from the discussion and decision-making procedure on the specific case. This principle has been widely adhered to, with some few exceptions. For instance, "when Sudan was a member of the PSC it was allowed to make presentations on the crisis in Darfur, it was not permitted to participate in the decision-making process" (Fisher et al. 2010: 28). The AU requirements to elucidate what establishes a party to the conflict. Given the cross-border nature of most conflicts, there have been circumstances where some members of the PSC, "who were deemed to be party to a conflict insisted on participating in PSC meetings on the basis that from their standpoint they are not directly involved in the given conflict situation" (Fisher et al. 2010: 28). If it would not clarify, this issue would in the long run undermine the integrity of the PSC as an unbiased actor in conflict situations.

The PSC Chairperson, who is elected by the assembly of heads of state for a one-year term, alternates amongst the continental's five regions. The Chairperson may bring to the PSC's attention any substance that may threaten peace, security, and constancy in the continent, and may demand meetings with PSC committees and other AU organs and institutions. The agenda is

designed on proposals submitted by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and by the Member States. A Member State may not oppose the insertion of any item on the provisional agenda. The Commission plays a role in almost all the relationships between the Council and the organs and institutions. ‘’However, the relationship between the PSC and the AU Commission is not formalized”(Gumedze 2011: 271). Put otherwise; there is no explained provision in the PSCAU Protocol for the affiliation between these organs. The role of the chairperson of the AU Commission, whose accountabilities comprise of guaranteeing the application and totaling of decisions of the Peace and Security Council. Such decisions of the Council also include those connecting to its relationship with the organs and institutions. From the evolution of the role of the AU Commission and its chairperson, it may be clinched that the Peace and Security Council cannot function efficiently without the chairperson of the AU Commission. “This is predominantly the case because the chairperson is, in fact, central to the implementation of the decisions of both the Peace and Security Council and the AU Assembly as they relate to peace and security in Africa. This is evidently meant out in Article 10 of the PSCAU Protocol” (Gumedze 2011: 271).

Role and functions

The PSC was established to be a collective security and early warning procedure with the ability to enable timely and actualresponses to conflict and crisis state of affairs. While the managing peace and security, per se, is not a new spectacle within Africa, the creation of the Peace and Security Council escorted in a new era in the way in which peace, security, and constancy challenges were to be addressed in Africa. “In terms of article 6 of the PSCAU Protocol, the areas in which the Peace and Security Council shall function are: the elevation of peace, security and constancy in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making, as well as the use of good offices; mediation, conciliation and enquiry; peace provision operations and intervention pursuant to Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act” (Fisher et al. 2010: 29). It is exepcted to perform “peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management; and any other function as may be decided by the Assembly” (Fisher et al. 2010: 29). The functions of the Council as enumerated above embrace the notions of conflict

prevention,management, and resolution, which are essential for peace maintenance on the continent.

"The PSC is expected to anticipate and prevent conflicts, and it shall have the responsibility to commence peace-making and peacebuilding functions" (AU 2002: Article 3b). "The African Security Council is also to promote and appliance peace building and post-conflict restoration activities to combine peace and prevent the renaissance of violence" (AU 2002: Article 3c) and finally, it shall "promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of

law, protect human rights and essential freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for averting conflict in Africa" (AU 2002: Article 3f).The PSC's core functions are early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace-support operations and, in certain conditions, command intervention in the Member States to promote peace, security, and stability. The PSC also works in support of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction as well as humanitarian action and disaster managing. "While the functions of the Council are significant, neither the Constitutive Act nor the PSCAU Protocol defines what the terms provided for in article 6 of the PSCAU Protocol mean from an operational or policy standpoint" (Levitt 2010: 118).

The Peace and Security Council is the importantactor in the promotion of peace and security in Africa is not in conflict. "Comparison to the OAU's method in addressing peace and security in Africa, the PSCAU signifies a more robust system for the early detection of crises or conflicts and is sanctioned to take steps to prevent these problems"(Sarkin 2010: 381). The Council's role in the promotion of peace and security is complemented by the roles of the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force, and a Special Fund. "Peace and Security Council forms a vigorous part of the African regional human rights system."(PSCAU Protocol 2002: Art 2(2)). "It is for this reason that it is obliged to seek close cooperation with the African Commission, among other institutions" (Levitt 2010: 110).

The role of PSC has been quite evident in the development of the Peace and Security architecture. It held several meeting on large range of issues which represented two things- one the growing commitment to confront the conflicts and secondly the regularity of its meetings

epresents the delicate nature of the security situations of the members. The PSC called three retreats on some key issues in Dakar, Senegal in 2007, in Livingstone, Zambia in December 2008 and in Ezulwini, Swaziland in September 2009. In these meeetings, the PSC adopted its functional approaches, the Livingstone Formulation defining its relationship with civil society organizations and how to improve the application of authorizations in situations involving an unauthorized change of government.

Challenges and Constrains

It seems that the PSCAU Protocol provide only for the structures without giving an indication of how these are to operate in practice. The PSC has authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM)"(Cilliers and Sturman 2004: 101). The deployment of peacekeepers in these theaters has exposed a major gap between the PSC's willingness to authorize such missions and the AU's ability to carry them out. Shortage of resources, human and material, has emerged as a major shortfall. How the AU deals with this mandate-resource gap would determine the continued credibility of the PSC since decisions that are not backed by resources would, in the long run, erode its credibility. Another major challenge is that the role and functions of PSC are seen not only as complementary to the other mechanisms of AU but also as contradicting them (Levitt 2003: 117).Institutionally, the PSC is mandated to work with the Chairperson of the Commission, who will back it in carrying out its mandate. Though the Commission has been providing the PSC with consistent reports on growth and challenges on anxieties of peace and security on the continent, what has been absent is the link between the Panel of the Wise and the Peace and Security Council. The chair has played more of a simplification role in its place of driving the procedure by providing clear direction and input to PSC meetings. The net result has been a giant encumbrance on the PSC Secretariat, which has had the additional accountability of secondary PSC chairs with limited staff. In the long-run, the rather symbolic role of the chair, he could raid the PSC of the possession of its programs and activities. While the AU Commission appears to have bursting the gap by providing administrative and other types of support to PSC meetings, a development that could be sustainable in the short-term, it is not bearable in the long-term given that the Secretariat is understrength as well. That the AU's PSC has appeared as the most noticeable component of the APSA is not in doubt. However, the interface between the PSC and similar

organs in the RECs has been limited to date. Furthermore, the interface between the PSC and other APSA mechanisms has not been optimum, primarily due to the fact some of the components are still being operationalized. Institutional support to the PSC, whose agenda of activities has grown exponentially, is limited. The Secretariat is overstrained in the face of growing demands on it to support PSC.

Panel of Wise (PoW)

The African Union has inducted a panel of eminent citizens to endorse efforts to avert conflict on a continent that has seen more than its share of wars.Drawing on Africa's rich tradition of conferring peacemaking efforts on the elders because of their astuteness, the African Union formed the Panel of the Wise (PoW) as one of the important body of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and, at its core, a conflict prevention mechanism. The Panel of the Wise is an important element for any effective initiativeexpected at determining peace and security issues ascending in our continent, and also an significant step for the indispensable work of reconciliation, be it at the national level or between countries in disagreement (Murithi and Mwaura 2010:81). In statutory terms, Article 11 of the PSC Protocol calls for the creation of a panel of the wise "to support the endeavor of the Peace and Security Council and those of the chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflicts prevention"(Porto Ngandu 2015: 11). "It has, since its launch at the end of 2007, become a key instrument of the African Union (AU), supporting the African Union Commission (AUC) and Peace and Security Council (PSC) in the prevention, management andresolution of violent conflicts in Africa"(Porto and Ngandu 2015: 11). . The Panel of the Wise is one of the five pillars of the APSA. "This is an essential element for any effective enterprise aimed at resolving peace and security issues arising in our continent, and also an important step for the essential work of reconciliation, be it at the national level or between countries in disagreement"(Murithi & Mwaura 2010: 81).

Composition

Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC sets up a five-person panel of "highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions

to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent with a task to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention"(PSC Report 2011: 7).

Panel of Wise reports to the PSC and as per its suggestion assembly member selected by the chairperson of AU commission and appointed by the decision of the assembly for three years renewable terms. according to the protocol the panel of the request of PSC or its own initiatives shall undertake such action which is suitable and appropriate to support the efforts of PSC and those of the chairperson of the commission for the prevention of conflicts.

"The first Panel was appointed in December 2007 and collected of Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, who attended as chair, Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, Elisabeth K. Pognon of Benin, Miguel Trovoada of Sao Tome and Principe, and Brigalia Bam of South Africa" (AUPAS 2016). "At the July 2010, Summit in Kampala, Ben Bella and Ahmed Salim were reappointed for another term ending in December 2013 and three new members were appointed: Mary Chinery Hesse of Ghana; Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; and Marie-Madeleine Kalala-Ngoy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (AUPAS 2016).

It has held several seminars and undertaken some missions aimed at developing confidence-building measures. "It has also been helping the AU Commission in mapping out threats to peace and security by providing regular advice and analysis and requesting the Commission to deploy fact-finding or mediation teams to specific countries"(PSC Report 2011: 7) It has also created some thematic reports on subjects pertinent to peace and security such as non-impunity, women, and children in equipped conflicts and balloting disputes.Nevertheless, its role in assisting to handle evolving threats or recitation crises on the continent has so far been fairly limited.

The wise are selected for the north, east, south, west, and central regions of the continent. The first panel was established in December 2007, and its mandate expired in 2010. At July 2010, Summit in Kampala, Ben Bella, and Ahmed Salim were reappointed for another term ending in December 2013 and three new members were appointed: Mary Chinery Hesse of Ghana; Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; and Marie-Madeleine Kalala-Ngoy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The PoW reports to the PSC and through it, to the Assembly.

Functions of PoW

The Protocol says that the Panel, "at the demand of the PSC or its own initiative, shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the prevention of conflicts"(Portu and& Nagandu 2015: 25). The Panel meets, at least, three times annually to deliberate on its work program and identify regions or countries to visit. It also organizes annual workshops on issues related to conflict prevention and management, helping to harvest a particular report to be submitted to the Assembly of African Heads of State and Governments for authorization. The PoW acts on appeal as well as on own initiative. "It takes the actions it deems suitable to provision the exertions of the Peace and Security Council and also give advice to the PSC and the chairperson of AU on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa"(Karock 2014: 5).It has held several seminars and undertaken some missions aimed at developing confidence-building measures. "It has also been helping the AU Commission in mapping out threats to peace and security by providing regular advice and analysis and requesting the Commission to deploy fact-finding or mediation teams to specific countries"(PSC Report 2011: 7). It has also produced some thematic reports on issues relevant to peace and security such as non-impunity, women, and children in armed conflicts and electoral disputes.

Since its inauguration in December 2007, the PoW become a key component of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Indeed, "it is remarkable that in a mere eight years, the Panel has considered into a key conflict prevention and resolution instrument, contributing, through the sheer will and fortitude of its members, to strengthening the Union's ability to better address the infliction of violence wherever it occurs on our continent"(Porto &Ngandu 2015: 19).It has held several seminars and undertaken some missions aimed at developing confidence-building measures. "It has also been helping the AU Commission in mapping out threats to peace and security by providing regular advice and analysis and requesting the Commission to deploy fact-finding or mediation teams to specific countries"(PSC Report 2011: 7). It has also produced some thematic reports on issues relevant to peace and security such as non-impunity, women and children in armed conflicts and electoral disputes.

The PoW primary function relates to conflict prevention and mediation is a complementary one to support efforts of the PSC and those of the chairperson of the AUC in the area of conflict

prevention, and to advise both. The PoW could, at its own initiative, undertake actions deemed appropriate to contribute to the efforts of the PSC and those of the chairperson of the AUC in the prevention of conflict. In practice, this is done through good offices and fact-finding, conciliation, and the facilitation of communication, among others. Indeed, in its supportive and at times independent/interdependent role with other AU institutions, the PoW has revealed a number of key advantages: "its ability to act in confidence, away from media attention; and the experience, age and prestige that allows members of the Panel to intervene in conflicts to promote dialogue, confidence building, and communication" (Jegede 2009: 424). Undeniably, members play a key role in the AU's efforts to interact with multiple decision-making levels in affected countries to optimize the impact of those interventions. "The Panel members can support mediation teams, but this does not automatically be understood to mean that it should focus its efforts on becoming a body that undertakes structured mediation"(Jegede 2009: 426).

However, it plays important role to handle emerging threats on the continent has so far been quite limited Part of the clarification may be that while its presence is encompassed in the PSC Protocol, its funding at this stage is not part of the regular budget. "Its members are based in their respective countries, and some of them have other jobs and commitments" (AUPAS 2016).

AU Peace Fund (AUPF)

In terms of carriying out Peace and Security ouncil's functions effectively APSA established a special fund known asPeace Fund. "Which is governed by the relevant financial rules and regulations of the AU" (PSCAU Protocol 2002: Art 7(1) (e)). The Peace Fund was formed in June 1993 as one of the operational tools to finance peace and security actions of the African Union. The Peace Fund supports five peace and security programs; African Stand by Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise (PoW), Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), Capacity Building and Conflict Prevention. "It was borne out of the realization that contributions by the Member States alone were not sufficient for the OAU to undertake its various responsibilities" (AUBP 2012: 8).

Source of the Fund

The Peace Fund which was established in June 1993 as one of the functioning instrument to finance the peace and security actions of the African Union. The Fund provides fund to five peace and security programs; Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), Panel of the Wise (PoW), African Stand by Force (ASF), Capacity Building and Conflict Prevention. It was emeged out of the realization that contributions by the Member States alone were not adequate for the OAU to undertake its various errands. "The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular AU budget, as well as arrears of contributions, charitable contributions from member states and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society, and entities as well as through suitable fundraising activities" (AUBP 2012: 8). "The member states contributions are critical to building up and maintaining this fund" (PSCAU Protocol 2002: Art. 21(1)). The AU Peace Fund (AUPF) is envisioned to finance AU-led peace maintenance operations.. "During the Special Summit held in Tripoli in August 2009, AU Member States decided to increase contribution to the Peace Fund from 6% to 12% of the AU regular budget. However, throughout the 16th ordinary session of the Executive Council held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2010, it was agreed that the contribution would be augmented from 6% to 12% over a period of three (3) years starting from 2011" (AUBP 2012: 8).

Use of the Peace Fund

The PSC is important in terms of maintaining peace and security and other operational activities. "Both the peace and security architecture and the ongoing, AU peace support operations were being funded almost entirely through donor assistance, in particular through the European Union's African Peace Facility (APF)" (Engel and Porto 2010: 4). "The APF was financed by the European Union (EU) to the tune of EUR 250 million for the period covering 2003 and 2007" (Engel and Porto 2010: 4). EU and other countries mostly do not fund through AU Peace Fund.

The Peace Fund is incompetently financed, and African states conveyed only 2 % of the budget for it from 2008 to 2011. With international donors finance most of the AUPF, the Fund seems

not to signify an effective African solution to African problems. Furthermore, questions have been elevated about its economic governance framework and the need for clear modalities and effective monitoring to ensure adequate accountability. “The AU needs to establish modalities on what and how resources from the Peace Fund can be used for there were no modalities in place on the use of the fund, this is a gap needs to be addressed” (Fisher et al 2010: 78). “The AU should establish strong resource mobilization strategies and mechanisms for the Peace Fund. Such structures would ensure that resource mobilization is undertakenon a more structured and consistent manner” (Fisher et al 2010: 78). “A successful approach to energizing the AU's Peace Fund should increase not only revenue but also improve economic governance” (Gilpin 2013). “Trust funds, which are characteristically governed by an independent administrator and a managerial Council, are an increasingly important part of the international aid architecture, currently constituting 11 percent of all Overseas Development Assistance” (Gilpin 2013).“Their mounting admiration can be accredited to the benefits they provide, namely: cumulative donor funds, improving coordination and allowing for better and suppler resource allocation. Managing the Peace Fund as a trust fund could be a significant stage in refining economic governance and complete success of the Fund” (Gilpin 2013). “This method is not without its challenges, but together with a concentrated political will, the involvement of an extensive display of stakeholders, and long-term and creative funding arrangements, it could effectively address current shortages in peace and security and lay the basis for organic growth and sustainability” (Gilpin 2013). “The frequency, persistence, complexity and unpredictability of security challenges crossways the continent underscore the urgent need for funding mechanisms that are adequate, easily accessed and well-managed” (Gilpin 2013). “Most of the costly delays and inefficiencies associated with the ill-fated AU response to the African crisis could be traced to problems with funding and resourcing” (Gilpin 2013). Addressing this gap requires creativity and organization by all stakeholders’ not only African countries.

Security challenges on the continent have global insinuations. Some lessons could be haggard from financing mechanisms intended to provision the delivery of debt relief to heavily-indebtedpoor countries, most of which are on the African continent. For example, the International Monetary Fund used off-market gold sales to finance its contribution in a multi-million dollar debt relief arrangement for poor countries, while other multilateral institutions

have used a combination of payments on concessional lending and allocations from their profit-making gadgets. Bilateral creditors also established extraordinary flexibility. The Peace Fund is one of the six parts that make up the African Peace and Security Architecture(APSA). "It is partly financed from the AU's budget and partly by voluntary contributions from AU member states and fundraising efforts" (Gilpin 2013). "At a time when the AU is seeking to assert its independence and autonomy, African states provided only 2 percent of the budget for the African Union's Peace Fund between 2008-2011" (Gilpin 2013). "This means that international donors provided 98 percent of the funding, making it difficult to institute African solutions to African problems. "Recent pledges include $2 million from Russia likely to be spent on Somalia and West African states" (Gilpin 2013). Maintainable revenue raising is clearly a challenge for the AU and its member states. At the May 2013 summit of the African Union the High–Level Panel on Substitute Sources of Funding the African Union, led by Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo submitted their report which comprised two groundbreaking fundraising measures: a $10 levy on air travel and a $2 levy on hotel accommodations. Though the suggestions have received criticism from several African leaders for the potential negative impact on the tourism industry, the report was approved by the heads of state and was sent to finance ministers for response at the January 2014 meetings. Even if these proposals are ultimately adopted, they are unlikely to resolve larger fund-raising challenges.

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is one of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). "The CEWS is accountable for data collection and analysis and is mandated to cooperate with the UN, its activities, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs" (AUPAS 2012). The Chairperson of the commission advise the PSC on possible conflicts to resolve on its best way by collecting information from CES

Composition

The CEWS is comprised of observation and monitoring center which had large coverage, with the opinion and surveillance unitsof the regional mechanisms. The centeris situatedin the

'Conflict Management Directorate of the AU', "The Situation Room' and is responsible for collecting data and analyzing it by an appropriate early warning indicators module" (AUPAS 2012). "The CEWS was formed under the 2002 protocol, which created the Peace and Security Council, to provide timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to empower thedevelopment of proper response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts in Africa" (AUPAS 2012). "The observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms are set to be connected directly, through appropriate means of communication, to the Situation Room" (AUPAS 2012). "The responsibility of these units is to collect and process data at the regional level and transmit it to the Situation Room" (AUPAS 2012). Under Article 12 (2), the chairperson of the commission is required to use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions falling under his/her domain regarding the PSCAU Protocol.

Functions

Since the adoption of the Framework for the Operationalization of CEWS in December 2006, important progress have been achieved. The system is able enough to provide reliable and up-to-date data on actual and post-conflict situations. The CEWS have had significant achievements which includes: development of data collection and analysis tools and the elaboration of a software grant agreement between CEWS, successful development of the CEWS methodology through a counseling procedure with all involved stakeholders; and the early warning systems of the RECs; supported harmonization between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs; "refurbishment of the Situation Room; infrastructure upgrade and installment of the necessary equipment, including the live monitoring software; increased expertise and investigative skills of the CEWS and the early warning systems of most RECs" (Tiruneh 2010: 3). "This includes putting in place some Early Warning Officers, Forecasters and Situation Room staff Information collection and monitoring tools and data can be accessed through a specifically developed CEWS information portal" (Tiruneh 2010: 3)."Full operationalization of CEWS is essential so that it efficiently supports conflict prevention, mediation, and preventive diplomacy. Moreover, uneven development and in some cases slow development of early warning systems in RECs ultimately hinders higher level operation" (Tiruneh 2010: 3).

"Continuous news monitoring, summarized in the Africa News Brief and Daily News Highlights, are circulated by the AUC to a wider network of subscribers including all RECs by Email. A collection of data from stakeholders is progressing but still needs substantial efforts to be completed" (Tiruneh 2010: 6)The CEWS analytical agenda also covers three key rudiments. "The first is the collection and intensive care of information on probable conflicts through alerts that contemplate context, actors, and events to prepare profiles and starting position for evaluating vulnerability"(IPI 2012: 2). "Following the development of gender-based indicators by the CEWS and the AU Women, Gender and Development Directorate, the collection of conflict information also reflects a gender viewpoint" (Tiruneh 2010: 3). "The second component deals with early warnings that include analyses ofconflict relevant structures, actors, and dynamics and that identify trends and conditions conducive to conflict". "The third element relates to the formulation of recommendations, through scenario building, development of response options, and their validation and verification"(IPI 2012: 3). "In general, the analytical framework is perfected by the response, which materializes in the action taken and applied by the applicable decision makers"(IPI 2012: 3)."In practice, the Situation Room in Addis Ababa presently comprises thirteen staff members and attempts to operate on a twenty-four-hour basis. The Situation Room, since its establishment as part of the Conflict Management Division of the Organization of African Unity in the early 1990s, is in progression"(IPI 2012: 3). "The CEWS relies on analytical and news sources such as Oxford Analytica and BBC Monitoring, as well as online news sites such as the Africa Media Monitor (AMM). The AMM is a data-gathering tool that eases the collection of info from a large variety of sources in real time and all four AU working languages" (Tiruneh 2010: 8). "The software can read 40,000 articles simultaneously and is rationalized every ten minutes" (Tiruneh 2010: 8). "Another tool tailored to the CEWS pointers and patterns is the Africa Reporter, which enables monitoring and information gathering primarily from the AU field missions and liaison offices" (Tiruneh 2010: 8). In accumulation, the CEWS uses Live-Mon, a tool that achieves an automatic geo-localization of news items so that events can be exhibited on a map. Apart from information on events, incidents, and situations, data on actors and mechanical factors are unruffled and analyzed to (or "intending to") reinforcingconflict prevention efforts by identifying trends. "The functioning of the CEWS was strengthened by a January 2008 Memorandum of Understanding, which increases the AU's cooperation with other regional early-warning and response mechanisms"(IPI 2012: 3).

Consistent meetings bring together continental and regional early-warning experts for training and to share experiences and technical support. Also, the AU and the RECs early-warning and response mechanisms use common tools and authorization agreements, and they have started publishing a joint newsletter.

Challenges

Moving from early warning to a response that concretely averts conflict that is, making a situation on the ground stimulate action is particularly difficult in the context of limited financial, human, and material resources. Unlike at the local level, where both early warning and response can be instigated by national and community-based peace initiatives, it is the political organs of the RECs, the AU, or the UN that have the accountability to respond to conflicts at the regional and international levels. It is also important to identify the mechanism that is most adequate for addressing a specific conflict. The reaction can come from the UN Security Council at the global level or from the AU Peace and Security Council at the regional level. "Despite noticeable progress in operationalizing the CEWS, the limited capacity of the AU Situation Room regarding staff expertise, material, and technical equipment continues to hinder the effectiveness of the system"(IPI 2012: 4). "The AU situation room employments five early-warning professionals amongst its thirteen staff paralleled to eleven experts at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) observation and monitoring units"(IPI 2012: 4). "Such inadequate capability negatively impacts the analysis of collected data. It also affects the drafting of concrete recommendations for action"(IPI 2012: 4). To address these challenges and complete the operationalization of the CEWS, there is need for a more effectual info and communication system that takes into account the advancement of new technologies; "better communication between the AU Situation Room and the regional observation and monitoring units; additional training and capacity building for staff members; and stronger cooperation with other AU conflict prevention bodies, the RECs, civil society, and think tanks"(IPI 2012: 4). "There is also the need for relevant AU organs to strengthen the political will to act on early warnings, not least by improving the implementation of continental and regional normative frameworks" (Tiruneh 2010: 8).

The CEWS could advantage from stratagemsadvanced by the UN in its national conflict-prevention work precisely concerning building local actors' capability in this area and addressing the root causes of conflict and not only its symptoms. As such, "the formation of national peace structures and the involvement of civil society and women have confirmed critical to preventing and speedily addressing potential crises" (Tiruneh 2010: 18)

African Standby Force (ASF)

Under the grave situation Article 4(h) of AU Constitutive Act ASF was established so that PSC'S performance can be facilitated further.

Composition

Article 13 of the Protocol stipulates such force "shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. For that tenacity, the Member States shall take steps to found standby legations for participation in peace provisionmission"(AUPSC protocol 2002: Art 13). ASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents along with civilian and military component. "Upon request by the AU Commission following authorization by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly the troop contributing states are required to release the standby contingents with the necessary equipment for operations" (AUPSC protocol 2002: Art 13). The PSCAU Protocol provides for the "training of the Standby Force in both International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, the most vulnerable groups in conflict situations" (AUPSC protocol 2002: Art 13). "The PSCAU Protocol has been hailed for its inclusion of women in a few places" (Wing and Smith 2003: 77). This recognizes the significance of women rights."The training involves the humanitarian and human rights law accompaniments the force's specific training program, both at the operational and tactical level" (Levitt 2003: 46)."The training of the ASF in international human rights law, in particular, is crucial because more often than not there are disturbing reports of peace mission personnel committing egregious human rights violations in conflict situations, especially against civilian populations" (Levitt 2003: 46)."An understanding

of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights standards is equally important for members of the ASF: both sets of law are aimed at protecting the human being" (Levitt 2003: 46)."The ASF must also appreciate the fact that violations of human rights and humanitarian law are both consequences of and contributing factors to instability and further conflict in Africa" (Levitt 2003: 46). "Conflict management as a process that is 'most integral to the physical and legal protection of displaced people works to prevent the escalation of refugee flows and IDPs" (Levitt 2003: 46).

Functions

ASF is tasked to observe and moniter missions, support peace missions and intervene in a member state under Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act. From an operational viewpoint, conflict management should be aimed at establishing order through "intense preventive diplomacy, coercive sanctions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement or humanitarian intervention"(Kithure 2001: 16). Humanitarian intervention entails a response to human rights violations that are a threat to peace and security, and such a response may consist of the use of force to bring the violations to a stop"(Kithure 2001: 16). "Along with article 6 of the PSCAU, article 15 of the same provides for humanitarian action" (Kioko 2003: 808). The ASF is responsible for such humanitarian action while the Peace and Security Council is responsible for its coordination"(PSCAU Protocol 2002: Art. 7(1)(b)). The ASF is mandated under Article 13(f) of the PSCAU Protocol to render humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas, among other things. "The ASF is adequately equipped to undertake humanitarian activities under the control of the chairperson of the AU Commission and is also responsible for facilitating the activities of the humanitarian agencies in the mission areas" (PSCAU Protocol 2002: Art 15(3) & (4)). Briefly ASF functions are "Observation and monitoring missions; Other types of peace support operations and intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state to restore peace and security by Article 4(h) and 4(J) of the AU Constitutive Act; Preventive deployment to prevent a dispute or a conflict from escalating, an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or states and the resurgence of violence after parties to conflict have reached an agreement" (Williams 2011: 9). "The ASF also works in the area of peacebuilding, including post-conflict

disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in zones of conflict and support efforts to address major natural disasters"(Williams 2011: 9). Any further functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly of Heads of State.

In May 2003, the "AU developed a background for the ASF based on five regional brigades, each with approximately 4,300 troops and some 500 light vehicles" (Willliams 2011: 10). The ASF functions on three interconnected levels: "the continental level (the AU Commission's planning element), the sub-regional level (the five brigades), and the state level (the contributing countries). With sub-regional organizations playing a crucial intermediary role, harmonizing overlapping memberships and sub -regional decision-making structures present a particular challenge" (Willliams 2011: 10). "In light of the developments above, and in the context of the need for speedy operationalization of all APSA components, with a particular focus on the ASF and its rapid deployment capability (RDC)" (Porto & Ngandu 2015: 110). "On 30 April 2013, the AUC recommended the establishment of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), a temporary multinational African interventionist standby force, to the meeting of defense ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia" (Williams 2011: 10). Yet, the PSC conceded that, "despite the progress achieved so far, the APSA has not yet been fully operationalized" (Porto & Ngandu 2015: 113). "Delegates called for the deployment of renewed efforts in the operationalization of the ASF and establishment of the ACIRC" (Porto & Ngandu 2015: 113). "Originally the ASF was to achieve full operational capacity by June 30, 2010, but this goal was not met. Today, the ASF still may not be able to respond to scenario five or six on anything but the smallest scale" (Williams 2011: 10).

Conclusion

To fulfill AU's purpose and objective in delivering peace and security in African continent the African Peace and Security Architecture and its subsidiary bodies are the important component. PSC is the main pillar of APSA. These entire component CEWS, ASF, AUPF, PoW supports PSC. These components are mandated by PSC protocol under guidance of APSA. Essentially, the AU can only eradicate the worst armed conflict but critical test of the ASPA is whether AU can resolve the cause of the violence that has disrupted the growth of African states.

The PSC's approach to peacemaking reflects its members"preference for consensual decision making both within the PSC and between militant factions conducted out of the public spotlight. For much of the post–Cold War period, conflict mitigation initiatives revolved around a search for workable elite bargains in the form of power-sharing agreements" (Eriksson 2011: 127). "Confronted with repeated cases of recalcitrant behavior, the PSC adopted more coercive mechanisms to secure compliance with its stated objectives namely sanctions regimes" (Eriksson 2011: 127). AU inclined to suspend the membership of the disobedient regime without putting sanctions. AU then gives the time of six months to conform to its consttitution if changes not occure according to the AU instructions then it applies targeted sanctions these procedures include travel bans It then gives the country roughly six months to conform to its constitution. If no positive change occurs, the AU may apply targeted sanctions, usually travel bans on select individuals and measures designed to freeze regime assets. The PSC has taken the encouraging step of determining that leading figures in military juntas be ineligible to contest any subsequent elections. However, the PSC may encounter cases where a military coup can spur democratization by removing an authoritarian regime. "Since Africa still has its fair share of tyrants, the AU should consider granting temporary recognition to military juntas that overthrow anti-democratic despots, as President Tandja did in Niger" (Omorogobe 2011: 154). "Moreover, the PSC's new approach to unconstitutional changes of government places it in a difficult position when confronted with the question of whether to recognize new authorities which topple the incumbent regime through popular protest or armed insurrection" (Omorogobe 2011: 154). The PSC has also been far less than forthright in cases where African presidents have effectively abolished presidential term limits or held onto power through fraudulent elections. This is a hugely thorny issue given that some of the most blatant offenders are insignificant African states,

including Algeria and Uganda. Ultimately, the PSC lacks the relevant capabilities to administer and enforce targeted sanctions regimes. To address this gap, the PSC is establishing a sanctions committee to monitor situations, gather and interpret information, identify and review individuals and entities to be sanctioned, consider exemptions, and report back at least once in a month to the PSC. In so doing, the PSC seems to be explicitly copying many EU procedures onsanctions.

Transition from OAU to AU was characterized by disagreement and accommodation of competing political, ideological and individual strategic interest. This mainly revolved around personalities and countries who intended to arrogate dominant roles in Africa's post-Cold War reformation agenda. The competing interest w at times tense, reminiscent perhaps of the tempestuous ideological groupings that preceding the founding of the OAU in the early 1060s. The competing dynamics were spearheaded by the political leaderships of Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa, accentuated by their desire to shape the ethos and trajectory of the continental institutional building.

As Murithi rightly pointed out the transformation from the OAU to the AU is indeed a major development in the evolution towards accomplishing the ideas of Pan- Africanism. "AU was supposed to attendant Africa into a new era of continental integration, leading to a more profound unity and a resolution of its problems" (Murithi 2007). The transformation of OAU to AU involved both normative and institutional changes. When it comes to normative level changes under the constitutive act of the AU, the AU separate itself form OAU in two major ways. Firstly it redefined the concept of sovereignty. In OAU the OAU the principle of non-intervention was replaced by a solidarity principle of non-indifference under Article 4(h) of the constitutive act. Secondly, a major shift from AU to OAU was that it brought the process of decision making and implementation structures, representatives and judicial institutions. Apart from this it also incorporated a continental development taking the form of the New Partnership for Africa's Development with its governance monitoring and assessment procedure which was called the African Peer Review Mechanism. Compared to the OAU years, Africa indubitably itemized some praiseworthy progress under the AU. This is predominantly true in the context of peace and security in particular. However, the potential is unfulfilled and remains far lesser than

anticipated/expected. Though there are quite some limits that have been witnessed in the past decade on this particular front. The most notable and extensively recognized restriction of the AU system is its, substantial dependence on donor fundings for its activities. For example, close to 90% of the funding for AU peace and security activities comes from donor fundings. Furthermore, most AU member states do not suffice the needed diplomatic and military aid as required for efficient application of the decisions they made. For example, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contained troops from Uganda and Burundi alone for far too long, though all PSC members were involved in the decision to deploy AMISOM. Major contributions regarding both troops and other resources for peace operations are borne by fewer than a dozen countries on the continent.

Chapter 4

African Union's Engagement in Peacekeeping Operations

Contemporary armed conflicts in Africa can be explained by the involvement of numerous "national and international state and non-state actors, insurrectionary, terrorists, numerous belligerents and warlords, illegal arms merchants, criminal drug cartels, and international criminals" (Anag 2007: 6). "The actors above participate in violent armed conflicts that are more often characterized as intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts. Their violent activities habitually have a spill-over effect, with regional ramifications" (Anag 2007: 6). Moreover, "regional instability entices the unintentional or purposeful involvement of neighboring states that host or support certain of these actors" (Anag 2007: 6). The players and the atmospherein which they deportment their unwanted behavior illustrate theinterconnectedness and complexities associated with resolving armed conflicts in Africa. The conflicts have culminated in deaths of millions of people, large-scale destructions of property and considerable disruption to economic and political spheres.

As discussed in the earlier chapters, the OAU did not have the capability to deal with these conflicts nor did it have a constitutional mandate to address internal conflicts of the African states. It has also been discussed in the earlier chapters that Africa lost its strategic significance for the great powers in the post-Cold War. So the great powers in the UN Security Council have no interest in authorizing UN peacekeeping operations to address conflicts in Africa. In this situation of chaos and neglect, AU has been established with the effective mandate and institutional architecture to deal with African conflicts by the Africans, as discussed in the previous chapter. "This strategic environment and the actors above require AU peacekeepers to

be both diplomats and peacekeepers or peace enforcers in an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), where there is no peace to keep" (Tisdall 2009: 2).

This chapter focus on AU's operations in Burundi and Darfur to delineate how the AU deal with the conflicts in Africa, how the AU's institutional architecture of peace and security operated to address the conflicts, how effective have been the AU's peacekeeping operations in dealing with these conflicts, what challenges it faced in the process of conducting these operations, what kind of relations the AU has with the United Nations in resolving these conflicts. These and related questions will be the subject matter of this chapter.

Burundi Crisis

The Civil war which arose in Burundi had three cause: first is the social composition which had four ethnic group, second is the monarchy rule which later became a reason for the war, third was the decentralisation of the political system of Burundi. These were the three most important factors which cause the civil war in Burundi. "Burundi is the oldest nation-state of Africa. It is one of only a few countries in Africa whose geographic layout has remained virtually unchanged"(Lemarchand 1994: 1). In Burundi Four types of social group that continues to inhabit its postcolonial nationhood.These are the Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, and gunwa. Gunwa was a kind of group that is associated with Burundi's royalty but has ceased to exist following the abolition of the monarchy since 1966. Among these groups, "The sense of commonality could be seen in what they shared the same language, culture, and customs, traditional, political, institutions and spiritual beliefs"(Lemarchand 1994: 1). In addition to these common traits, the social groups had maintained, prior to Burundi's post-colonial cycle of violence, what has been described as "a life rich in intergroup relation mark by a keen sense of solidarity"(Gahama 1999: 81).

Precolonial Burundi was governed by a monarchy system, a rule by Mwami (king), who was perceived as a father figure and held in considerable reverence, possessing in effect "near divine power a symbol of nation unity"(Kay 1995: 3). The Mwami's role was primary to ensure stability and social cohesion, promote prosperity and provide a conducive environment for the harnessing of individual aspirations. "In achieving those goals, the mwami delegated authority to

the Ganwa administration chief and Bashiningantahe (council of elders)"(Lemarchand 1970: 24). This had the benefit of promoting individual and collective worth, facilitating interpersonal interaction, harmony and consultative decision making in the interest of the common interest. The strength in the monarchy's distribution of authority and maintenance of peaceful coexistence could be located in "subtle interplay of alliances"(Gahama 1999: 81). "The system showed a sensible amount of legitimacy was capable of addressing social conflicts"(Uvin 2009: 9). Burundi had relatively orderly precolonial political structure which enabled it to prevent intergroup armed conflict. It is worth noting that even where conflicts were apparent, "they arose from power struggles within the royal household motivated by factors that transcended identity"(Prunier 1995: 17). The political structure also reveals the level of decentralization that characterized precolonial Burundi. Integral to this was the influence of two distinct determinants: "chiefdom and clientage"(Eller 2002: 203). Burundi's highly driven decentralized political system remained in place until the nineteenth century. However, by 1889 Burundi internal cohesion has been disrupted by a series of natural and social episodes. "A draught devasted its flora and fauna followed by an outbreak of disease that killed two third of the population"(Eller 2002: 210). Food insecurity and the grief that followed the deaths dampened the communal spirits of people whose unity was dependent on this social resource. King Mwami Mwezi Gisabo, had seen his leadership challenged by sustained and sometimes violent opposition to his power and ambitious. Old age coupled with an inability to contain recurrent resistance from an aggrieved social group such as the Gnawa weakened and eroded trust in the Mwami's capacity to assert authority or reclaim glories of the monarchy. The internal chaos was perhaps the final straw in the monarchy's attempts to salvage a crumbling dynasty. It changed Burundi forever.

The problem among ethnic groups started when, under Belgian rule, minority Tutsi population roughly 14% were favored and given enormous privileges allowing them to regulate of the military, government and most importantly land since 1923 when Burundi came under Belgian rule. This continued even after Burundi got independent in July 1962. Burundi transition from colony to self-rule was anything but smooth. In 1961, just a year away of independence, parliamentary elections were held as a part of the political transition process. "UPRONA emerged with 84 percent of overall votes its leader, Prince Rwagasore was sworn in as a prime minister" (Lemarchand 1989: 22). Two weekes later he was assassinated in what was deemed a politically motivated act. "Reaction to his murder was swift, and bloody opponents from the

PDC party were identified for blame and dozen of its senior hierarchy executed"(Jeng 2012: 210). These situations further ensued with the manslaughter in 1965 of a Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendume. "A gunwa replacement appointed by the mwami was interpreted as an act of royal nepotism, intensitive to, the unmoved by prvious disenchantments" (Jeng 2012: 210). Hutu army officers attempted an abortive coup to rectify the unfolding political crisis. The Tutsi-dominated army reacted with brutal reprisals summarily executing the coupists and nearly purging the military of Hutus. Hutu army officer tried to rectify the political crisis and Tutsi led army answered in the same manner. "The mwami fled, and the line of succession fell to his nineteen-year-old nephew whose inexperienced made it possible for Michel Micombero to stage a coup in 1966"(Krueger 2007: 28). "If the transition to independence epitomised chaos, the second period in the gradation of violence was monumental and tragic in this scale and effects. Micombero oversaw massive breaches of fundamental freedoms. The excluded Hutu majority were severely prejudiced" (Lemarchand 1994: 3). "In many ways his regime was a symphony of disorder with rumors plots and counterplots, often culminating in violent state reprisal" (Lemarchand 1994: 3). The last fire in the conflict was rising of Hutu militant group in south againts Tutsi's monopoly as their rights were not given. Tutsi minority group continued to build their hagemoney in government and military, tension arose in 1972, when a small rebellion group of Hutu operating from Tanzania started were in order to regain power from Tutsi's. in the process of gaining power hundereds of civilian killed in a matter of days. Then President Micombero deployed a military and carried out attacks on Hutus. of Hutus and started killing hundred and thousand across Burundi. The incursion was met by a vicious reprisal from the Burundian army, which did not distinguish between Hutu insurgents and noncombatants. "Around 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus were murderedMany fled the country to neighboring Rwanda and Tanzania and the violence and oppression were described as genocide" (Svensson 2008: 8).

The events, "which may have activated the actual crisis in Burundi can be located in the brutal political and social transformation introduced by the 1991 democratic procedure" (Ndayizigiye 2005: 2), which include the inconsistency in leadership vision: the Tutsi fight to maintain the status quo while the Hutu increasingly demand for democratic elections; a precipitate and ill prepared democratic procedure (the former unique Uprona party accomplishes

the process, drafts the new constitution and the electoral law, has the power to admit or refuse other emergent political parties); a very short crusade period (two weeks) and the success of the opposition; the assassination of the democratically elected President; the anarchism characterized by the nonappearance of authority and the lack of a strong government for decision making. In summer 1993, the country held its first presidential and legislative elections. For the first time in history, a member of the Hutu ethnic group, President Ndadaye Melchior, became Burundi's supreme executive officer. He incarnated the ambitions and hopes of the Hutu ethnic groups to sought the management of the state affairs from which they had been excluded for centuries. The new power undertook democratic reforms;"edification of a state of law to curb impunity, fight corruption, and misappropriation, and many other administrative reforms including the security services" (Hatungimana 2011: 5).

In nut shell, the assassination of Hutu political leaders (1962 -1965), military coups d'etat (1965, 1966, 1969, 1971, 1976, 1987, 1993), the different Hutu uprisings followed by brutal repression of the civilian population (1965, 1972, 1988, 1990) and most of all, the fear engendered by many refugees in the neighboring countries "created a climate of insecurity and eroded the Hutu-Tutsi trust and mutual respect"(Hatungimana 2011: 15). Besides the loss of countless human lives; they have produced many refugees and internally displaced. They have demolished the social fabric and natural resources.These activities produced many refugee and internally displaced people and destroyed the natural resources. Apart from the loss of countless human lives.

Early Interventions

When Tanzanian President Nyerere called the meeting between the two groups Hutu and Tutsi then regional attempts to regain peace started."Nyerere projected a summit in Arusha for the regional Heads of State to converse the condition in Burundi"(Rodt 2011: 7). FRODEBU and UPRONA and other smaller parties were invited to the Summit in June 1996. "Julius Nyerere and presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania tried to convince President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya to accept the intervention of a regional peacekeeping force at the summit" (Rodt 2011: 7).However, the Burundi army resistedTutsi Major Pierre Buyoya

domesticated power in a coup d'état supported by the army. In reaction, the regional powers imposed a hurdle on Burundi. "This, in turn, triggered Burundi's withdrawal from the Arusha peace process and persuade many Tutsi that Nyerere, who led the progression, was partial to the Hutu cause" (Boshoff and Rautenbachet al. 2010: 30). "The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Settlement for Burundiwere signed in August 2000" (Boshoff and Rautenbachet al. 2010: 30). "The agreement was assumed to join to amalgamate the peace procedure. Nevertheless, the armed wings of CNDD and PALIPEHUTU, Forces of Democracy (FDD) and National Forces of Liberation (FNL), correspondingly, had broken away from the negotiations. Unable to disruption the deadlock, deliberations continual with the political leadership, leaving out the military factions"(Boshoff& Rautenbach et al. 2010: 30)."In effect, these armed groups were not parties to the peace agreement. "Continued negotiations ultimately led to ceasefire agreements between these groups and the Burundi government, but they were not all combined into the peace progression until 2006" (Boshoff& Rautenbach et al. 2010: 30).

"The Arusha Agreement consisted of a number of aprovision that reflected the fluidity of Burundi crisis and the need to advance durable peace through transformative approaches" (Jeng 2012: 220).

Clearly, the Arusha Agreement had a broad provision which in many respects tried to proffer an alternative approach to conventional approaches. First, it is plausible to suggest that the Arusha Peace process was the most appropriate peace agreement in African internal conflicts. Though the dynamism of reverence for, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and South Africa's Nelson Mandela were key influencing factors, the timing of the peacebuilding process was also crucial. Secondly it helped in peace process which was aimed to deal with conflict by using constitutional instruments. it seemed in this phenomena that peace agreement involved to the level where it reflected a break from the past. When AU replaced the OAU it sought to engage in the Burundi crisis to resolve the conflict in best manner. It was also sought to implementing the Arusha and Reconciliation Agreements and also in the light of Constitutive Act and peace and security initiatives that resulted formation of AMIB.

African Union's Response

The Arusha Agreement made the procedure for an international peacekeeping force in Burundi. "The October 2002 ceasefire covenant amongst the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Armed Political Parties and Activities (APPMs) stressed that the truce should be indicated and overseen by a peacekeeping mission, either mandated by the UN or the AU" (Agoagye 2004: 11). "The ceasefire agreement signed in December 2002 accepted that the formal agreement and control of that agreement should be held by the African Union" (Agoagye 2004: 11).

On the 2 December 2002, The ceasefire agreement specified that an AU force would be deployed in Burundi by 31 December 2002. "However, there were early postponements in the placement and AMIB was not hurled until April 2003" (Agoagye 2004: 12). "Meanwhile, there were daily ruptures of the ceasefire. President Buyoya and FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza both permitted for the position of an African peacekeeping force to perceive and monitor the ceasefire, emphasizing that deprived of international subsistence the truce was likely to collapse" (Agoagye 2004: 12). "South African Vice-President Jacob Zuma, who enabled the talks between the two, specified that the troops could be prepared to deploy within a week" (Agoagye 2004: 12). "Burundi was the first country where in 2003 the African Union invoked provisions of its constitutive act's peacebuilding framework**"** (Rodt 2011: 7)."The aim was to utilise the restorative and stabilisation mechanism under Article 4 with the view of halting the cycle of violence so as to facilitate the implementation of the other components of African Unions's peace and security framework**"** (Rodt 2011: 7). "The invocation of Article 4 (h) came in the wake of continuous dithering and abdication of international responsibility, particularly from a United Nations that showed limited interest in providing leadership, in confronting the Burundi crisis"(Jeng 2012: 203). What this situation did, in fact, was to provide space for the African Union to assert its presence by attempting to invoke peacebuilding framework in Burundi, through the African Mission in Burundi(AMIB). It is imperative therefore is to examine AMIB, under whose auspice approach to the Burundi e conflict had been conceptualized.

African Mission in Burundi(AMIB)

AMIB, which was established in 2003, was the first operation solely commenced, planned and executed by AU members. "It represents a milestone for the AU regarding self-reliance in operationalizing and implementing peacekeeping and peacebuilding" (Boshoff and Francis 2003: 42).AMIB's four main objectives were to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; "to support disarmament and demobilization creativities and advise on the reintegration of combatants; to create favourable circumstances for the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission, and to back to political and economic stability in Burundi " (Boshoff and Francis 2003: 42).These objectives interpreted into a number of operational tasks, namely: to establish and maintain connection between the parties; to monitor and authenticate implementation of the ceasefire agreements; to ease the actions of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the technical commissions for the formation of national defence and police militaries; these objectives incorporated involved a number of operational task; maintain link between the parties monitering cesefire agreements and to ease the action of Join ceasefire Commission. "to protected identified assemblage and disconnection areas; to provide safe passageway for the parties during planned activities to designated assembly areas; to assist with and offer technical support to the DDR process; to help with the delivery of humanitarian aid" (Boshoff & Francis 2003: 43). Plus "aid to refugees and internally displaced persons; "to organized mission accomplishments with those of the UN in the country; and to offer fortification for designated leaders returning to Burundi" (Boshoff and Francis 2003: 43).AMIB was mandated to operate for one year with the possibilities of extension by the central organ of MCPMR, pending the deployment of UN peacekeeping force.

Composition of AMIB and Operational Activities:

Under the coposition "AMIB was primarily envisioned at a total strength of 3,500 people, including 120 Military observers. In reality, it counted a total of 3,335 staff of which 43 were observers"(Svensson 2008: 12). Regarding its "manpower AMIB did, more or less have the resources it was assured. This was in huge part attributable to its prime nation" (Svensson 2008: 12). South Africa is providing the mainstream of workforces both in the arena and in headquarters. It also upheld the Force Commander and one of the two Deputy Heads of Operation. "It deployed the first and the largest military constituent of the mission and

functioned on its own till the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents were equipped to deploy" (Svensson 2008: 12). South Africa's bilateral military operations and diplomatic efforts in Burundi before, during and after AMIB helped to chain its success. "The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had soldiers organized in the country both before and after AMIB and South African politicians like Nelson Mandela, and Jacob Zuma contributed a vital support in the peace procedure" (Svensson 2008: 13). South Africa's strong pledge to the mission could to some degree make up for the inadequate help from other AU members. "Ethiopia and Mozambique did ultimately provide troops and other personnel to the mission, though their deployments were delayed and reliant on US and UK support, correspondingly. Other AU member states did petite to actively sustenance the mission"(Svensson 2008: 13).

Similar to UN peace operation, AMIB was a mixed mission, comprising a civilian component and military legations. The Head of Mission and Special depictive of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Ambassador Mamadou Bah (Guinea), was helped by two deputies from South Africa and Tanzania AMIB was mixure of civilian component and military delegations the Head of mission and special depivtive of the chairperson. "The Force Commander of AMIB's military group of follower was Major General Sipho Binda (South Africa), whereas his deputy, Brigadier-General G. Ayele, was from Ethiopia" (Agoagye 2011: 11). A third deputy from Uganda did not position. Altogether, "AMIB had a total force of up to about 3 335 with the probable military, from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858) and Mozambique (228), as well as the AU spectator ingredient (43) strained from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia" (Svensson 2008: 14).

AMIB's deployment began the formulation of its headquarters on 27 April 2003, superseded by the changeover of SAPSD, which was deployed already in Burundi. However, it was not until the arrival of the essential bodies of Ethiopia and Mozambique from 27 September to 17 October 2003 that the force converted fully operational. Conceptually, the strength was concerned in Bujumbura. From this stranglehold, the South African and Ethiopian contingents correspondingly were to launch two demobilization centers at Muyange and Bubinga. "The formation of a third demobilization center was contingent upon the mission and operational exigencies. Overall, AMIB was predictable to Canton and disarm an assessed total of 20 000 ex-combatants which meant 300 people a day" (Agogye 2011: 11). Also, the Mozambican

contingent was to provide escorts for sustainment groups and all other movements, including those of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while the special Security and Reaction Unit (South Africa) provided protection to the returned leaders. In respect of the cantonment exercise, AMIB established Cantonment Site 1 (Bubanza) on 25 May 2003. With effect from 26 June 2003, "it was able to district up to 200 ex-combatants at this site; encompassing elements from the CNDD-FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the PalipehutuFNL of Alain Mugabarabona" (Agoagye 2011: 12). "Except this undertaking, AMIB was unable to proceed with the DDR. The maintenance of Cantonment Site 1 entailed the sustainment of the ex-combatants. To be capable of doing this, AMIB's Head of Mission used his good offices tomobilizeassets mainly from the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), European Union (EU), United Nations Children'sFund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO)" (Agoagye 2011: 12).By far the most perceptible mission task of AMIB was its safety of the returned leaders by the Special Protection Unit (SPU). The SPU take on this work with about "260 special forces troops within the framework of a provisional service level agreement that is providing for the scope, privileges, and responsibilities of the parties and AMIB. Upon the termination of AMIB's mandate, this mission task fell into abeyance" (Rodt 2011: 12).

AMIB also proficient its objectives by forming and maintaining liaison between local parties and monitored the application of the peace and ceasefire agreementsIt started to secure the recognized assembly and disconnection areas and providing safe passageway for the pertinent parties to these areas and provided VIP safety for selected leaders in Burundi. "It also helped with the conveyance of humanitarian assistance and harmonized its movements with those of the UN, and other international factors players included in the peace process." (Rodt 2011: 12).

AMIB's mandate restricted its use of force. It was permitted to use force in self-defence, to ensure its freedom of movement and protect its troops and apparatus as well as civilians under imminent threat. Svensson (2008) has argued that this mandate is too preventive. However, it constituted a clear mandate in harmony with UN principles and values, international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. Furthermore, it was a sufficient forceful mandate for the AU troops to complete their mission to the degree that its resources are allowed. Concerning its use of force, AMIB successfully defended the Muyange cantonment area when it

came under attack in July 2003. “Seeing the danger that this fear posed and the method in which the AU replied, this was a suitable use of force”(Svensson 2008: 14) 12 fatalities were reported, and eight enemy fatalities have been validated, none of which were civilian. The AU did not lose any soldiers during the attack and no further violent extortions on AMIB occurred. Relating to funding, “the applicable MOUs required TCC self-sustainability for up to 60 days, in complete compensation by the AU Commission, and the possibility of in-mission supply of water and fuel”(Sevensson 2008: 16). “The budget for the operation and sustainment of AMIB was projected at the US $110 million for the first year; at the end of its 14-month mandate, the entire budget of AMIB pronounced to the US $134 million” (Agoagye 2011: 13), covering the real costs of troop and device deployments, reimbursement for specialised equipment at suitable devaluation rates and common mission costs for items such as vehicle designs, insignia, and medical health amenities. It also comprised the budget for the combined mission headquarters and the military observer element. The applicable rates of reimbursement that were accepted by the Central Organ were: US $1.28 as individual troop grant; US $10 per forces for food; and US $500 per troop as operative costs (Agoagye 2011: 13).Without available funds in its Peace Fund, the AU hoped to fund AMIB’s budget from redeemed pledges and contributions from its traditional partners, who had given indications of sufficient goodwill towards the peace efforts of the AU. “Parenthsetically, the pledges from the partners, amounting to some US $50 million, fell far short of the budget” (Sevensson 2008: 16). Even worse, “actual donation into the trust fund amounted to just US $10 million, even though this excluded in-kind and from the US (US $6.1 million) and the UK (US $6 million) to backing the deployment of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents respectively” (Sevensson 2008: 16). Although the mission eventually reached its anticipated number of personnel, it remained under-equipped in other ways. Throughout the mission, AMIB suffered from serious funding problems. Throughout the mission AMIB faced problem of lack of funding and other equpments though the mission had reached to the expected number of personnels. “The AU, its member states, and the international community demonstrated a shared unwillingness and inability to fund the mission sufficiently for it to perform all its tasks properly” (Sevensson 2008: 16). “Based on what it called the concept of self-sustainment The AU ruled that the troop-contributing countries would pay for the first two months of their deployments. This decision was taken despite the fact that this would be an impossible requirement to meet for many of the Union’s member states” (Sevensson 2008: 16).

Ethiopia expressed concerns with regards to its ability to fund its share of the mission from the beginning. Ultimately, the United States financed the Ethiopian deployment, and the United Kingdom paid for the deployment of the Mozambican component. Despite this external support, the Mozambican and Ethiopian deployments were significantly delayed. The AU set up a special fund to pay for the rest of the mission, but this too was dependent on external donor support. This is an example of how limited capabilities in one area, i.e. funding, can to some extent be compensated for by stronger capabilities in another area, namely: cooperation and coordination. This also demonstrates how a concerted effort by the Head of Mission and the Force Commander can positively affect what a mission can achieve. Likewise, the lead nation playeits promisen important role in persuading donors to support AMIB. Though Ethiopian promised to contribute but did not fulfill its promise finally United States financed the Ethiopian deployment and Untedt Kingdom paid for Mozambian component despite the support from outside these two country delayed contributing any help Au set up a special peace fund which was dependent on external partners.

Coordination and cooperation

AMIB Without the cooperation of other actors could not manage peace operation it twas essential to the mission's success. "AMIB did not have sufficient resource capacity to carry out its mandate" (Rodt 2011: 20). However, through the strong-minded efforts of the mission's guidance, AMIB was able to organize its efforts with other actors complicated in the peace process. "Throughout the mission, AMIB worked closely both with partners within and beyond the African Union. In effect, it achieved to raise adequate support from international donors, local and regional parties to fulfill most of its mandate" (Rodt 2011: 20).

A number of AU member states, amongst them South Africa and Tanzania in precise, have long been convoluted in the directive of the conflict. These efforts were channelled through the Regional Peace Inventiveness on Burundi. AMIB synchronized its activities well with other ingenuities undertaken by AU member states and institutions before, throughout and after its deployment. By way of example, AU military eyewitnesses, and South African troops were deployed in the country before AMIB. "Upon its arrival, these essentials were combined into the African mission" (Agoagye 1994: 11). "South Africa played an important role in making AMIB

a reality and comparative success. It prepared for the AU mission discreetly and militarily" (Svensson, 2008: 16). "It provided vital resources such as funding, troops, equipment and logistics and made arrangements for procurement, preservation, working out and service of equipment" (Svensson, 2008: 16). It.it was alone during operation when AU there was delay in contribution from AU member states, other institutions and donor."Before the AMIB deployment, the CNDD–FDD had threatened that they would attack the mission if it intruded on their range of operations, had the ferocious conflict continual, this would have threatened the peace process as well as AMIB's role within it coordination and collaboration with outside parties were essential" (Boshoff & Francis 2003: 43). after the launch of AMIB observes gave importance to faciliate peace process it was also important to bring bring other parties on the paltform. "AMIB established a Civil Military Coordination Centre. It also arrived the joint planning group set up by the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme" (Boshoff & Francis 2003: 43).

The AU also made a concerted effort to coordinate its activities with the different UN agencies involved in Burundi. It formed strategic-level AU–UN rendezvous to mobilize resources for both organizations. In theatre, it got conventional administrative and logistical help from the UN system. Among other things, AMIB got technical support from the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. AMIB benefited from MONUC's involvement with regard to public info campaigns, headquarters organization, and DDR. "Likewise, the evolution from AMIB to United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was facilitated by the re-hatting of a number of staff. 2,612 AMIB troops shaped the first contingent of the UN force" (Rodt 2011: 12). ONUB was envisioned to number 5,650 armed personnel, including 200 military observers, 120 police and up to 1,000 national and international civilian staff. "Though, the force cohort procedure was overdue by slow replies from the member states, the AU mission's extraction and the UN mission's launch were become possible and conceivable because of collaboration between thetwo organizations" (Svensson 2008: 15). It also guaranteed a degree of continuity and institutional memory on the ground.

Achievements and Challenges

AMIB mandate was not backed with a strong enough to use forse though, “the rules of engagement was based of self-defense and the use of force in other circumstances was only allowed to secure the freedom of movement of its own personnel and to protect civilian under imminent threat of violence” (Svensson 2008: 12). Further, the mission suffered from mismatch between mandate and resource capacity in terms of finance, political and other material capacities. Despite the weakness of mandate the rules of engagement,the code of conduct and lack of material capapcities, the mission was atleast in “accordance with International Humanitarian Law, the laws of armed conflict and UN principles and standards”(Agoagye 2004: 12).Three criteria can measure the success of the AU's involvement in Burundi: the fulfillment of the mandate of the PKO as set by the AU; the resolution of the fundamental disputes precipitating the conflict, and the involvement of the PKO to the “maintenance of peace and security by reducing or eliminating conflict in the area of operation (basically conflict containment and the limitation of casualties)” (Mark 1993: 34). Despite financial, logistical, and planning difficulties, AMIB can be credited with stabilizing about 95 percent of Burundi, with facilitating the delivery of humanitarian support and with providing adequate protection to the designated returning exile leaders. Throughout its period of operation, AMIB was successful in de-escalating a possibly volatile situation. In the absence of the AU mission, Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of the violent conflict. When measuring the success through the identified three criteria, it can be concluded that AMIB had fulfilled its mission; “contributing to the resolution of the dispute by addressing its underlying causes and contributed to peace and stability in Burundi even in the face of the serious policy, institutional and theoretical limitations” (Sharamo 2009: 51).The AU presence prevented violence against women, abridged the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted displaced persons and endangered humanitarian corridors and convoys. AMIB demonstrated the AU’s commitment to PKOs and took the necessary steps to prevent a security vacuum in Burundi, which then enabled the UN to intervene.

On the other hand, the mission in Burundi was well-defined; it relished a clear mandate and had the political support of most of the belligerents.“The Rules of Engagement gave the AU troops no mandate to intervene in the conflict between the rebel groups and the Burundi security forces” (Boshoff and Francis, 2003: 42). AMIB was, therefore, dependent on the cooperation of those

involved in the conflict. This meant need of cooperation of the "Their cooperation was enabled through the Arusha peace procedure and the subsequent ceasefire agreements" (Svensson, 2008: 14). For AMIB to be able to complete its mission positively, it was dependent on these delicate institutional arrangements to hold water.

Regardingthe DDR procedure, the mission's attainments were more modest. "AMIB did not have sufficient resources to form and precaution all the planned cantonment areas or to sustain the predictable number of ex-combatants" (Svensson 2008: 15). "It has generally been beer perceived that the financial and logistical constrictions, under which AMIB is operating, avert the force from fully applying its mandate" (Svensson 2008: 16). Nevertheless, the mission did remarkably well with the little resource capacity. One could argue that despite its comparative success, AMIB did not bode well for AU peace and security delivery on the landmass, because of South Africa's overriding role in the mission. However, the Union is made up of its member states, and if they are dedicated to its endeavors and willing to devote the vital abilities tohelp them, a mission of this nature is more likely to prosper. The positive interventions of neighboring states and regional powers like South Africa and Tanzania facilitated the coordination at the state and sub-state levels, which was required for AMIB to prosper. Thus, the coordination and cooperation of various regional and external actors greatly contributed to the achievement of the AMIB. Also this is the first AU peacekeeping operation which was taken over by the UN operation. In most of the other cases, despite repeated plea by the African Union, the United Nations did not take over, which led many to accuse the relationship between the two organizations as "burden-shifting" rather than "burden-sharing".

The dissection of responsibilities between regional forces and UN presence should be formalized. This could be facilitated by UN involvement in the planning of regional mission and ensure a gradual and smooth changeover to UN peace operation. In that transition, the UN should thoroughly consult with the AU and regional peace creativities, not only troop-contributing countries."The implementing institutions at the operational level, such as the IMC and JCC, should endeavour to ensure the implementation of key requirements of the apparatuses of peace; " (Rodt 2011: 14).

Another lesson from Burundi experience is that the integrity of the regional force and its

mandate should not be compromised by unwarranted reliance on the transitional government, whose efforts will be contested by members of its own coalition or by the opposing APPMs. The civilian constituent of the leadership of regional forces should be capable of the essential capacity for the organizational and technical management of the regional peace operation and mandates for regional missions should aim at addressing essential issues in ceasefire and peace agreements. The UN and the international community may well learn the hard lesson that they required assisting the AU in its critical areas of need, beyond the limited soft support towards training. The UN and the international community should see themselves as partners in arms with the AU. They ought to help Africa build real capacity for African regional peace operations, to plug the gap in the global security architecture arising from the hesitance of UN interference and the abdication of the West from UN-mandated peace processes in Africa.

Darfur

Darfur, an arid region in western Sudan, has become synonymous with genocide though many have been reluctant to define the condition there in such term, not least the African Union (AU). As the conflict between Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, fumed on for over two decades, long-lasting tensions in Darfur were neglected. Meanwhile, negotiations led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) concluded in the Inclusive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, coloration the end of Africa's longest-running civil war in Sudan. However, the marginalization of Darfur meant that the celebrations marking the end of the North-South clash were short-lived, as news of mass murder including government soldiers and their ill-fated militia allies, the Janjaweed, eclipsed the much-celebrated deal. "In Darfur, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had taken up arms against the Government early 2003" (Keith 2007: 152). Sudan's national government, intensely concerned about the threat to its endurance posed by these groups, used its military force as well as militia group is known as Janjaweed to crush the rebellion and eradicate these civilian base of support. "Four years since the conflict began, the threat of this uprising and other apparent existential dangers endure to drive Sudan's central government to block all actual efforts by external actors to stop its deadly campaign" (Keith

2007: 152).

The ferocity in Darfur is part of a complex history. The Arab-dominated central government in Khartoum fought a long civil war in contradiction of rebels in Sudan's mainly black South between 1983 and 2005. Throughout this war, the government, shored up its western flank, the underdeveloped and relegated shires of Darfur, "by arming Arab militias recognized as the Janjaweed to addition its regular army and inauguration raids on the non-Arab population base of possible rebel factions" (ICG 2004: 5). "Khartoum further serious prevailing tensions by redrawing Darfur's administrative boundaries in a way that divided major non-Arab ethnic groups and further reduced their influence in the regional government" (ICG 2004: 6). The present crisis arose in early 2003 "when non-Arab rebels from Darfur, fed up with attacks on their land and persuaded that their interests were not being embodied in the ongoing peace talks between Khartoum and the southern rebels, hurled a guerrilla war on government forces" (Waal 2007: 17). "The government responded by launching a ruthless counterinsurgency "completely disproportionate to the targeted guerrilla warfare of the two Darfur insurgent groups" (Slim 2004: 814). "Khartoum again supplemented its forces with substitution Janjaweed militias, who have committed numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes to kill and displace the ethnic groups tied to the rebel forces" (Udombana 2005: 115). The slaughters that characterize this counterinsurgency have been genocidal in scale. "Approximations of the number of Darfurians to die as a result of the campaign vary widely: one U.S. government study clinched that an approximation of 170,000 dead by mid-2005 was the most credible, though other approximations have placed casualty figures as high as 400,000" (GAO 2006: 21). "More than two million Darfurians have been expatriate or driven into neighboring Chad, and many thousands have been raped" (Udombana 2005: 115). The violence has been brought out with such harmonization, intensity, and focus on specific ethnic groups that the U.S. government, though unenthusiastic to commit itself to action, declared in 2004 that "slaughter has been committed in Darfur and may still be happening" (Powell 2004: 35). The level of violence has receded and dashed over in the following years, but lawlessness continues to prevail as of early 2007, "creating a particularly dangerous environment for displaced civilians and the aid workers that deliver their philanthropic lifeline" (Waal 2007: 18) Khartoum has indisputably played a central role in these human rights violations. To some amount, the counterinsurgency may have gotten "out of

control, running wild beyond the designs of its sponsors" (Slim 2004: 814). However, extensive reports of jointly coordinated attacks by the militias and government forces make it highly uncertain that the "Janjaweed are truly independent as Khartoum officials have claimed, and even more unsure that the government is vigorously seeking to disarm them as it has frequentlycommitted to doing" (Keith 2012: 151). "The U.S. government decided from refugee interviews that Khartoum and the Janjaweed bore joint responsibility for the initial upsurge of attacks" (Powell 2004). Khartoum has become more discreet in its provision for the Janjaweed since Darfur came to worldwide attention, but it has continued arming and supporting the militias and, in some cases, absorbing their members into the national army. Khartoum sees Darfur's rebellions as an existential threat. Its desire to crush the rebellion as thoroughly as possible explains many of its subsequent actions, with its efforts to delay the onset of serious pressure from outside actors. "Regime officials dreaded early on that if the uprising were to spread beyond Darfur and evolve into"…a widespread northern crusade for regime change" (Keith 2012: 153).

Fortunately for Khartoum, the Darfur crisis arisen as the international community was brokering what would become the Naivasha peace consensus between Khartoum and the southern rebels. Correctly manipulative that the international community would not criticize its behavior in Darfur with the southern peace procedures close to resolution, Khartoum first hauled its feet at the Naivasha consultations to buy time for a chief offensive in Darfur, then switched its stance and focused on concluding the Naivasha process "in part to distract international attention from the crisis in Darfur" (Keith 2012: 154). "Khartoum signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with one section of a major Darfur rebellious movement on May 5, 2006, and agreed to disarm the Janjaweed but did little to stop them well after the settlement was signed" (ICG 2006: 4). "It rejected to sign any agreement that called for replacing the African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur with a more efficient UN" (Keith 2012: 156). "Finally, the ICC's prosecutor has issued an accusation for a senior Sudanese official concerned in war crimes and crimes against humanity, giving the administration still another excuse not to allow into the country UN forces that it fears would pursue to arrest its top personnel" (ICG 2006: 1).

African Union's Response

"The lack of an immediate UN response to the Darfur crisis AU took the prime opportunity to assert the legitimacy and of the PSC in Africa. It was an opportunity to the AU to enforce its principle of not-indifference to violence in member states" (Akuffo 2010: 80) "The initial AU response was the appointment of Chadian mediation team led by President Ldriss Deby to find a political settlement in Darfur" (AU Report 2004). It resulted in the signing of the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004. "In this agreement, the government of Sudan SPLA/M and JEM agreed to cease a hostilities and proclaim a ceasefire for a period of 45 days that could be automatically renewable if no one opposed" (Akuffo 2010: 80). By one of the party establish a join commission and a ceasefire commission with the participation of the international community including the AU; "free all prisoners of war and all other persons detained because of the armed conflict in Darfur, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the creation of condition conductive to the delivery of emergency relief to the displaced person and other civilian victims of war" (HCA 2004).

The AU's members are less than fully devoted to making the most of the limited tools at their disposal to change Khartoum's actions. "The AU's habits of operating by comission and shunning hostility are similarly compelling. Though the AU and its Peace and Security Council is empowered to make decisions by a two-thirds majority; their Charter also encourage them to make decisions by consensus" (PSC Protocol 2002: Art 8(13))". The AU also demonstrated a deep disinclination to criticize fellow member states. The PSC established the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks as part of the diplomatic peace efforts to prevent conflict and for a political settlement in Darfur. Further, the PSC established a Ceasefire Commission and authorized the establishment of AMIS as the operational arm of the commission" (PSC 2005: 10th Meeting).

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

The in April 2004 The AU involvement in Darfur started with sending of 80 military observers. “Itwas collaborated by the Darfur Integrated Task Force based at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and had an operational base in El Fasher, Darfur” (Prunier 2006: 88). However, “the AU’s monitoring mission left much to be desired, and a more vigorous peacekeeping force was required to dissuade effectively the silent genocide that was unfolding in Darfur” (Prunier 2006: 88). This mission ultimately developed into the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which remains the only external peacekeeping force providing security in Darfur. “The initial mandate of AMIS was to assist the parties in conflict to reach a political settlement” (Keith 2007: 153). It was tasked with monitoring and observing compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; undertake confidence building; enable the supply of humanitarian ad; assist internally displaced personsin their camps and eventually facilitate their deportation; and promote complete security in Darfur.

It started with AMIS I was situated with the support of the UN; European Union (EU); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); “as well as on a bilateral level by the Government of Japan and South Korea. The initial Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) included Gambia; Kenya; Nigeria; Rwanda; South Africa; and Senegal” (Prunier 2006: 88). The Civilian Police Contributing Countries were Cameroon; “Gambia; Ghana; Mauritania; Nigeria; South Africa; and, Zambia” (Prunier 2006: 88). While AMIS presence sporadically deterred violence against civilians, it did not eliminateacross the Darfur region. Indeed, it was incapacitated of achieving such a feat largely due to its limited mandate and also due to its lack of capacity and adequate resources. “Therefore, the AU’s monitoring mission left much to be desired, and a more vigorous peacekeeping force was required to dissuade effectively the silent genocide that was unfolding in Darfur” (Prunier 2006: 88).

Though less funded and understrength, “AMIS has acknowledged some admiration for enlightening a grim security condition and accepted credit in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 for “plummeting large-scale organized violence” (GAO 2006: 45). However, AMIS’s efforts have fallen far short of ending the human rights violations in Darfur, and its contributions have been recognized as inadequate. “The force has been incapable of playing the protecting role that the Darfur Peace Agreement allocates it largely because it is too small, frequently operative

below an approved capacity that, even if fulfilled, would still be insufficient to protect enough of Darfur's vast territory" (GAO 2006: 62).

Beyond peacekeeping efforts, the AU's members were seem to be unenthusiastic to aaply internal concentration even had appeared highly unenthusiastic to apply diplomatic density on Khartoum, even when President al-Bashirwanted to grabmanagement places within the AU while the Darfur conflict stank. "The AU's member states sent an ill-fated signal when they allowable Khartoum to host the group's annual summit in early 2006, although the AU's rules of process unambiguously necessitate that the summit takes place in a "conducive political atmosphere" (Udombana 2005: 118). "Subsequently President also wanted to win the rotation term of chairmanship… Al-Bashir subsequently sought to win the institution's rotating chairmanship as well" (Udombana 2005: 118). Fearful of the stain that would do to the AU's trustworthiness if they allow Al-Bashir to become the chairman, the AU's member states came to a demanded (private) agreement to deny al-Bashir's bid and recurrent their stand in 2007, supporting John Kufuor of Ghana after the circumstances in Darfur had worsened. However, "AU members specifically declined to frame their action as a statement on Khartoum's behavior. South Africa's representative insisted that the 2007 decision be made to commemorate the historic independence of Ghana in 1957 had nothing to do with humiliating or rejecting Sudan" (Gruzd 2007). The fact that the AU and its member states have spent financial, diplomatic, and military resources engaging in the Darfur conflict suggests that the principles of the AU's Charter have been at least partly translated into action.

However, chronic obstacles to more efficient measures remain. Most obviously, the African Union's financial and military resources are harshly limited. AMIS has been short of adequate soldiers from the beginning of its operation and has remained incapable to accomplish even the authorized level of 7,000 (ICG 2005: 4). A handful of Africa's rich states is left to bear the burden of paying for the AU's regular and peacekeeping budgets, accompanied by often generous but ultimately inadequate foreign funding that makes planning difficult (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004: 142). The European Union African Peace Facility, for example, provided 250 million euros of help for African peacekeeping efforts for 2004 and 2007, but the fund was exhausted by mid-2005.

AU's efficiancy could be position a serious coercet by its internal political influences. The priority of African people and states can make AU peacekeeping efforts, the rich states of Africa can contribute in AU peacekeeping iniatives "South Africa's government has confronted a public reaction over its high foreign peacekeeping expenditures during a significant crime wave at home" (Gottschalk andSchmidt 2004 145). "while Rwanda's government recently cautioned that its mounting peacekeeping budget was likely to make it miss expenditure targets it had settled with the International Monetary Fund" (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004 145). For similar reasons, the "AU seems improbable to follow Desmond Tutu's request to apply for approvals regarding Sudan, given the high political costs that any African government, especially an important Sudanese trading partner, would face in forcing domestic businesses to cut off trade with Sudan."(Keith 2007: 155)

"The AU's habits of operating by comission and shunning hostility are similarly compelling. Though the AU and its Peace and Security Council is empowered to make decisions by a two-thirds majority; their charters also encourage them to make decisions by consensus" (PSC Protocol 2002: Art 8(13))". "The cautious way in which the decision to refuse Sudan the AU chairmanship showed a deep disinclination to criticize fellow member states" (Gottschalk & Schmidt 2004: 146). The PSC established the Abuja Inter Sudanese Peace Talks as part of the diplomatic peace efforts to prevent conflict and for a political settlement in Darfur. "Further the PSC established a Ceasefire Commission and authorized the establishment of AMIS as the operational arm of the commission" (PSC 2005: 10th Meeting). "In April 2004 the AU deployed 162 military and civilian AMIS personnel and 24 support staff to Darfur on a US$26 million budget" (Akuffo 2010: 80). The bulk of the funding came from the European Union, United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Canada. "Although AMIS was expanded with a protection force of about 7,700 personnel comprising 6 171 military personnel and 1 560 civilian police personnel" (Akuffo 2010: 80. "inadequate troops on the ground, lack of logistics and equipment and the bad state of infrastructure in Darfur posed serious challenges to the peacekeeping efforts"(PSC 2004: 17 Meeting). "As a result, international humanitarian law was frequently violated and serious human rights abuses were committed especially by the Janjaweed militias, with the tacit support of the Sudanese government" (Williams 2006: 168-183) The breach of the Humanitarian Ceasefi re Agreement created massive refugee flows and internally

displaced persons. “As then AU Commissioner, Alpha Oumar Konaré, described it in several reports, the humanitarian situation in Darfur was precarious, grave and a matter for serious concern”(Akuffo 2010: 80). “The Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, suggested in 2008 that the death toll of the conflict had risen to 300 000 people” (CBC News 2005). It is estimated that “2,3 million of the six million inhabitants in the Darfur region have become internally displaced persons who are supported by an equally vulnerable population of conflict-affected residents of about 390 000 people” (PSC Report 2005: CoC)

Finally, protective human rights are only one of many priorities within the African Union itself. “The AU’s members are supervised to consider a government’s respect for constitutional control as well as the norms and law and human rights. However, no mechanism gives this principle any protuberant place among the many other principles” (AU PSC Protocol 2002: Article 5(2))”.“The presence of Libya, Algeria, Cameroon, Togo, and Sudan among the Council’s first members in 2004 recommends that material and geopolitical factors be likely to trump the most humane criteria in influential PSC membership and other decisions” (Freedom House 2006). The continuous conflict in Khartum expends the African Union’s inadequencieswhich also making its insufficient military resources eneffectve The active confrontation of Khartoum magnifies the African Union’s inadequacies, making its inadequate military resources less pertinent and intensifying its inclination to accede to the autonomy of associated states.Though African Union were a stronger organization and acted its best way its activeness in the case of Darfur would still be sharply constrained.

Afrter the Darfur Peace Agreement an rebel group conflict incresed which led emergence of many other armed groups without any political motive which led to complicated the further situations. The inplementation of DPA became the challenge for AU when non-signatories believed the organisation was not neutral in the negotialtion of the agreement. Level of hostility action increased for AMIS but failling of commmand and control from rebelian groups causedattacks on peacekeeper groups. The new clash worsened the humanitarian condition terribly. Inn spite of these circumstances AU scucsessfuly formed the DPA Implementation Team (DPAIT) with a mandate to spearhead implementation of the agreement.

The DPAIT were suppose to work with the coordination of the chairperson of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). The DDDC showed in Afghanisthan were ment to be address the issues like “security, entitlements of demotion and exclusion and socio-economic

development to reconciliation. It was envisioned as a bottom-up approach to remedy some of the anomalies that resulted from the top-down method of the Abuja peace process" (Bah 2010: 9). Its main objective was to increase the sense of possession of local population "But, since the vast majority of the people had already disallowed the DPA, efforts to convene the DDDC were obstructed, undercutting the bottom-up peacemaking approach that had been envisaged" (Bah 2010: 9).

These faction failed to complete, forcing the PSC to execute beleaguered sanctions included the travelling ban and asset freeze of leadership of the group who were showed as spoiler. However when AU could not influence mechanism to administer them. Furthermore it took AU at loggerheads with the pretentious groups, who were doubtful about its role. These differences of DPA weekend the AU's capability of mediation efforts plummeting the entire peace process into dismay.

Meanwhile, "the inter-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja that terminated in the DPA were plagued by differences between the AU and UN, the other partner in the peace process"(Nathan 2007: 253)."While the UN favored a step-by-step approach, the AU aimed for an inclusive agreement because the parties had signed earlier agreements, which in its view, was already the basis for a final settlement" (Nathan 2007: 253).While these alterations were minor, the conciliation efforts hesitated due to what some have described as deadline diplomacy and a lack of commitment from the parties."There was an undue emphasis throughout the talks in concluding negotiations even after the parties had repeatedly demonstrated an unenthusiastic commitment to the peace process and the will to appliance any subsequent agreement " (Nathan 2007: 253).This situation was summed up by the head of the AU mediation team Sam Ibok when he stated that "our experience over the past sixteen months has led us to conclude that there is neither good reliance nor commitment on the part of any of the parties"(Nathan 2007: 254).

UN Involvement in Darfur

Since September 2005, the Government of Sudan was composed of nine members of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and 16 members of the government that is why the this

government of Sudan also known as government of unity. SPLM was quite adept at directional against the establishment of a UN-peacekeepingforce. The Khartoum regime determinedly forbids the obtainability of a UN force in Darfur and instead perferred AU operation in Darfur. in Darfur AU intervene and during dealing with conflict it faced the probblem of less equpment and resources Unfortunately, while the AU's peacemaking efforts are to be applauded, its peacekeeping operation floundered, allowing

In this state of inability to handle the situation, the AU repeatedly requested the United Nations to take over its operation. As usual, the major powers in the UN Security Council had no interest in authorizing UN operation. Instead, "On 31 July 2007, the Security Council passed Resolution 1769 authorizing the joint AU-UN peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to deal with the deteriorating situation in Darufr. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with the Sudanese regime in Khartoum several times in 2007 to pursued it to allow UN peacekeepers to access Darfur region"(Akuffo 2010: 81). "But the regime persisted with its intransigent position of not allowing theoperationalization of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur"(Akuffo 2010: 81). Finally in 2008 AMIS was replaced by the unprecedented joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur(UNAMID).

Challenges

The engagement of the AU in Sudan AMIS represents one of the most critical tests of the role of AU in African PKOs. "The instability in Darfur has assumed regional and international dimensions, evolving into a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming over 200,000 lives, displacing over 2 million people, and poses security threats to neighboring countries" (Murithi 2008: 78). "The AU intervened with the deployment of a peacekeeping force and by initiating peace talks seeking an agreement, to disarm the Janjaweed, to rebuild Darfur, and the integration of various armed groups into the national army" (Murithi 2008: 78).

"The underlying reasons for the conflict were not successfully addressed due to the limited and inadequate mandate of the initial AU deployment in Sudan" (Murithi 2008: 78). The

earlypurpose of the operation was monitoring, not peacekeeping, evocative of the incompetence of OAU deployments. Furthermore, the influence of the AU PKO in the resolution of the underlying disputes generating the conflict and the maintenance of peace and security has been very limited. Institutionally, this situation was caused by a lack of sufficient manpower and essential equipment, such as armored personnel carriers and helicopters, to carry out even the most elementary of peacekeeping tasks. "However, the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the AU PKOs is political in nature, particularly due to the indifference and polarization of the international community over the resolution of the Darfur crisis, coupled with the obstructive behavior of the Sudanese government" (Murithi 2008: 78). "The involvement of the AU in Burundi can be regarded as a success while the PKO in Sudan achieved only limited results because the AU force was not large enough" (Murithi 2008: 80).Moreover, the mandate was too weak. The lack of resources further weakened the mission. AMIS lacked a well-defined mission, lacked a clear mandate, and a plan for reaching peace. "It also lacked funding and manpower throughout the mission" (Murithi 2008: 80).Finally, "there was no obligation to complete the mission. The UN eventually managed to convince the Khartoum government to accept a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping force, UNAMID, in response to the deteriorating humanitarian and security conditions in Sudan. In short, AMIS was not able to contain this crisis due to its limited mandate, manpower, and equipment" (Murithi 2008: 80).

Challenges of AU in Dealing with the Crises

During the peace eastablishment in Africa by AU, it faced many challenges in spite of various efforts to mainetain peace and security it faced problem."Despite the glimmers of hope and promise, the challenges faced by the African Union in dealing with the peace and security matters are numerous, complex and desperate" (Kobbie 2009: 18). To tackle them would require to considerable resilience and political will from member countries. The diversities of Africa and its intricate socio-political configuration means that AU will continue to be confronted with challenges to overcome. "AMIB and AMIS proved that the greatest constraints and challenges to the readiness of the AU in African PKOswerepolitical, institutional, and conceptual in nature" (Kobbie 2009: 18). Both peacekeeping operations by the AU proved that it lacked to respond to the challenges in Africa regarding peace and security. Thse conceptual and institutional

challenges limits the effiectveness of African Union."Politically the AU is, in some cases, captive to the internal politics or interests of member states, foreign powers, and host governments" (Sharamo 2006: 53). "These circumstances prevent it from acting effectively with governments such as Sudan, out of fear of reaction from key African member states or foreign powers" (Sharamo 2006: 53). These condition of insecurity reminds the ineffectiveness of OAU and shows that affects AU's credibilites as a manager of peace and security in Africa. The lack of political power members states weekened to the AU in deployment of peacekeeing mission. "Furthermore, both African and non-African leaders are not willing to risk the loss of soldiers in poorly assumed countries where there may be no deceptive strategic nationwide interests at stake" (Sharamo 2006: 53). "As a result, African peacekeeping requirements are being addressed in an ad hoc manner, with states acting independently, reflecting the same inabilities and weaknesses that characterized the OAU" (Sharamo 2006: 53). The major powers have in some way or other wanted to deal with individual states with which they have had a favourable bond instead of going in a manner that acknowledges regional organizations. The AU for instance has been also selectively funded. The capacity enhancements of the African Union reveals that there was a great power, especially international actor's vested interest.

Through the example of Sudan the AU realized that there its very crucial to distinguish between state sovereignty and the need for intervention. An analysis of the AMIS stands for a brave step by the AU to intervene in Darfur. The experience of PKOs in Sudan told the AU that sometimes being rigid on the principal of sovereignty can lead to horrendous results. Grave humanitarian crisis and violations in human rights becomes a fertile possibility then. The elites in the war torn countries often have a vested interst and the cardinal principal of respect for sovereignty become s counter productive for the mandate of AU.

Although the AU PKOs continue to be tied into these rigid proinciples. In many ways it is different from other simiilar IO's as "its interventionist and activist stance towards peacekeeping remains paralyzed by host country demands for restrictive mandates " (Akuffo 2010: 83). .

Some scholars have argued that the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has a weak capability to conduct ASF placements. Especailly strategically these largely lack due to improper articulation on this matter. The particular AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has said to highlight the loopholes in strategic planning. There has been recorded difficulties in regular logistics and

structural organizational levels. They fail in leading together some divergent sub-institutions like police, military, political, and humanitarian organizations etc... “These AU problems were painfully uncovered in the Sudan PKOs. Further, there is an insufficient linkage between the PKO Division and other departments of the AU Commission or the Peace and Security Council (PSC)” (Feldman 2008: 274).

. “These AU problems were painfully uncovered in the Sudan PKOs. Further, there is an insufficient linkage between the PKO Division and other departments of the AU Commission or the Peace and Security Council (PSC)” (Feldman 2008: 274).

Though AU has gained appropriate experience but it has weakened to implement its own decisions. AU experiences of these two operations suggested that AU need to advance its capability to deal with the issue and to maintain peace and security in Africa. “The AU will need to orient the political leadership of the continent seriously and take decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met.The African Union has been operative in growing cooperation and unity within Africa, putting its efforts towards diminishing conflict and boosting democrac” (Feldman 2008: 274). “Lastly, one can say that there just are not enough trained troops, money, and political willpower among the nations that comprise the AU to intervene effectively in all of Africa’s conflicts. The probability that all three of these factors will change in the immediate future is quite small” (Feldman 2008: 274). “Even when force can be assembled, additional problems limit their functioning as a unified entity with effective command and control. Language, religion, and other factors frequently divide them” (Feldman 2008: 275). “Geopolitics dictates which nations may contribute soldiers to which missions. Mandates that impede rather than facilitate peacekeeping minimize the forces’ impact. Despite all of these obstacles, the AU is expected to make and/or keep the peace” (Feldman 2008: 275).Soldiers who have involved in the operation specify their lives and served their duty honestly with honor. In these regard troops deserve respect and appreciations. “Far too often they are asked to do too much with too little. With so many shortages properly trained troops, funds, modern equipment, intelligence capabilities the AU frequently places its soldiers in harm’s way, accepting risks that other multinational forces, such as NATO, might not find acceptable” (Williams 2011: 19).

Capability Gaps of the African Union

Effective capabilities to manage armed conflict require more than just the technical assets associated with peacekeeping operations and sanctions regimes. "It also involves other important political, bureaucratic, and infrastructural dimensions. These gaps will be looked into different dimensions which follow" (Williams 2011: 19). "Arguably the most important dimension of conflict management is the political piece. As the UN secretary-general correctly concluded, the African Union's effectiveness results from the sum of its members" (UN Sec Gen Report: para59). "Major political enablers that affect the AU's conflict management capabilities include: "widespread agreement on what AU peacekeeping operations can (and cannot) be expected to achieve; unity within the PSC in support of those objectives … sustained high-level political engagement to support AU special envoys, committees, and panels as well as peacekeepers in the field… and genuine cooperation from host state authorities.Unfortunately, the AU has not performed well in these areas" (Williams 2011: 19-20) "When confronting armed conflict, it is particularly important that there be strong and united PSC support for a viable peace process, the force generation phase of the peacekeeping operation, the conduct of the operation, as well as an exit strategy. During the crucial startup/planning phase, powerful African leaders, and not merely Commission officials, must champion the mission and play a proactive role in generating the vital forces" (Williams 2011: 21) "Early and sustained high-level political engagement makes it more likely that the required technical capabilities will be allocated and maintained during the mission's lifecycle" (Williams 2011: 21)

Peace keeping process required effective management and bureaucratic structures in the field to provide support to the mission. At present it lacks effective institutional ability and human resources to conduct effective peacemaking initiatives for peace. "According to its own internal assessment, the AU Commission suffers from weak bureaucratic processes and management systems; poor information technologies; inadequate physical infrastructure; a lack of professional and motivated personnel; poor reputation, presence, and reach; and inadequate sources of funds"(AU Commission Strategic Plan 2009-12: 17). At the Peace and Security Council, the Secretariat remains severely under-resourced, with just four professional staff, one secretary, and

an administrative assistant. “Proposals are underway to increase the number of professional posts to thirteen, but this figure is still far too small” … The PSC Secretariat also lacks a dedicated legal expert and translators” (Williams 2011: 21).

Peacekeeping stances particular institutional challenges to the AU at each stage of a mission’s lifecycle“In the field, teams of qualified senior leaders, including the special representative, force commander, police commissioner, chief administrator, etc., are difficult to assemble and retain” (Williams 2011: 21) “Back at the AU’s headquarters, capacity for planning, force generation, and logistical support remains very small, especially when compared to that of national militaries and other international organizations attempting to conduct similar types of operations. For example” (Williams 2011: 21) “while a policy unit was finally established in the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division in June 2011, it currently consists of just two people” (Williams 2011: 22). Finally, high staff turnover and the absence of a lessons learned unit means that the AU has little institutional memory regarding conflict management.

The AU consistently struggles to marshal the requisite military personnel and range of military assets needed for complex peace operations. Perhaps the most blatant example of military unpreparedness noticed in all the AU peacekeeping operations till now. Among the assets in highest demand in difficult African theaters such as armored personnel carriers, communications and intelligence equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and night vision goggles. “As for military personnel, the AU’s greatest deficits are specialists with niche skills including medicine, engineering, and intelligence gathering” (Nathan 2009: 14-15) “To fill these gaps, AU missions rely on external donors to provide funding, training, and equipment directly to troop-contributing countries hence bypassing AU systems” (Nathan 2009: 14-15)

While military assets are critical, multidimensional peace operations also require civilian capabilities. Multidimensional peace operation required civilian capabilities when military assets are critical. “Here the AU suffers from a shortage of experts in the rule of law and security institutions such as police, justice, and corrections officers as well as expert trainers to build local capacity in these areas” (Nathan 2009: 14-15) “However, the AU’s biggest civilian deficit in conflict management is its lack of mediation capacity. Rather than developing a systematic

approach to mediation, the AU has preceded on an ad hoc basis, largely dictated by the personalities of the senior figures involved" (Nathan 2009: 13). "It has often deployed high-level candidates who lack the relevant expertise and experience, while investing meager effort in evaluating what went right or wrong in its previous mediation initiatives" (Nathan 2009: 13). The AU's conflict management initiatives critically need adequate facilities, systems, and infrastructure to sustain peacekeeping missions and mediation efforts in the field" (Nathan 2009: 13). "For peacekeeping operations, for example, safe and secure accommodation facilities are crucial as are the provision of Level II/Level III hospitals"(UN Sec Gen Report: para 24). "Similarly, no mission can operate effectively without logistics chains to facilitate the deployment (and sustainment) of military and civilian capabilities into the theater of operations. The AU has conducted its peace operations without an equivalent of the UN's Department of Field Support"(UN Sec Gen Report: para 24).. "This leaves the AU's Peace Support Operations Division without the capability to effectively manage planning processes in relation to movement control, logistics, human resources, finance, provisions, fuel, maintenance, troop rotations, stores management, and other elements crucial to mission support" (Williams 2011: 22). "To the extent that any of these gaps were ever plugged, it was by Western donor states and various UN agencies. Not only has the UN given the AU practical tools such as pre-deployment checklists and planning tools, but it has also brought AU officials to its logistics bases in Brindisi, Italy, and Entebbe, Uganda, to help the AU establish a logistics base in Africa" (Williams 2011: 22).

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the African Unions involvement in African crisis and peacekeeping operation held by AU, particularly in Burundi and Darfur. It also focused on origin of the crisis causes of the crisis and how did AU involved in the crisis before involvement of AU, which initiatives were takento resolve the crisis while dealing with the conflict. What challenges did AU face while dealing with the conflict and how far its been successful in conflict management of these respective countries. It also focused on how AU and its mechanism has helped to resolve African crisis so far and what challenges they have faced.

The AU Peacekeeping Operation in Burundi and Darfur was AU's first peacekeeping initiative

which was entirely initiated, planned and executed by AU members. “This PKO represents a milestone for the AU regardingoperationalisingpeacekeeping. Both AMIB and AMIS challenged the traditional concepts related to peacekeeping” (Kobbie 2009: 13). AU leaders did not seek the consensus of all the conflicting parties to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of the respective countries armed conflicts, nor was a formal cease-fire agreement in place prior to the interventions. “However both operations required the consent of the ruling government to enter the country, and AU peacekeepers operated under a limited mandate” (Kobbie 2009: 13).”In Sudan, AU peacekeeping troops did not have the authority or manpower to disarm the Janjaweed and other paramilitary forces, since the mandate stipulated only the PKO authority to monitor the peace agreement, but not to enforce the peace” (Kobbie 2009: 13).

“The AU has begun to take a stronger stand on conflicts and peace initiatives in Burundi, and Darfur. The relatively early stage of the African Union’s development means that we cannot pass a definitive judgment on the organization” (Murithi 2007: 81). It is evident that specifically with regards to peace operations the AU has already acquired substantial experience, but it has faltered in its ability to monitor and implement its decisions. “The AU’s experience in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia suggests that the organisation has much to do to improve its ability to deliver peace and security to African citizens” (Murithi 2007: 81). However, it goes without saying that the AU’s peace and security architecture will be a vital component of Africa’s strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent. “The AU will need seriously to orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met.The AU also needs to further enhance the level of efficiency and eradicate the administrative bottlenecks that hinder the rapid deployment of its peace operations” (Murithi 2009: 16). In this regard, the AU will need to establish a permanent institutional framework for training its civilian and military personnel to function more efficiently in a peacekeeping operation.

Chapter 5: Case Study of Somalia

Introduction

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa. It has been beset by violence and conflicts for the most part of its post-independence existences, culminating in the collapsed state in 1991. With the overthrowing of Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia had been inflicted with prolong civil war. Clan loyalties continued and, clan amalgamation became an important sanctuary for individuals against violence. After overthrown of Barre regime the country entered into internal conflicts and lawlessness that disrupted economic, political and social condition in Somalia. "The governmental vacuum created anarchy for the country of Somalia living Somalia for warlords, Pirates, and the Islamic militia (Al-shabab)" (Aden et al. 2012: 7). In the process of restoring peace for the Somalia people, the regional and international community made their efforts. Despite efforts by various actors, including the United Nations, solution to the civil war remained elusive. This situation proved to be a fertile breeding ground for Islamic radical groups. The latest round of a major crisis started when Ethiopia launched an incursion into Somalia in July 2006, with US backing, to rout the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Although this intervention could dislodge the UIC, the TFG was confined to Mogadishu and was under siege by Al Shabaab, a well-armed and well-trained elite force of the UIC. Al Shabaab was an Al Qaeda aligned jihadi group that resorted to insurgency operations to resist foreign intervention and imposed its own regime. When the presence of Ethiopian forces further radicalized Somali society, an effort was geared towards the deployment of an AU peacekeeping mission to replace Ethiopian troops. African Union invoked Article 4 of the Constitutive Article and sent African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) following the endorsement from UN Security Council.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed in 19January 2007 with initial mandate to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid." (Aden et al. 2012: 7). This operation is the largest, most complex and long lasting peacekeeping mission in Africa. The It was created with an initial mandate of six months and it has been extended every six months after review of its performance by the UN Security Council (Aden et al. 2012: 7).

This chapter first undertakes the historical overview of Somalia's social structures and then discusses the development of Somalia as a state and tense within the society, especially since its independence in 1960. It highlights the internal conflict in the post-Cold War and how the UN and US failed to bring the situation under control. Then it discusses the renewed conflict in terms of US supported Ethiopeian intervention in Somalia to confront Islamic radical groups and support Transitional government. These provide background to study why and how AU mission in Somalia carry out the operation. It discusses how the AMISOM expanded over the period of time and challenges it encountered in carrying out its mandated tasks, specifically of constraints of resource capacity. It also discusses how AU interacted with other external actors in the process of carrying out its mission in Somalia and the assistance it acquired from the other actors. It ends with highlighting the achievement and challenges of the AMISOM.

Background

Somalia is based on the culture of clan groups since history. "Pre-colonial Somalia was constituted of nomadic groups structured along kinship lines" (Brons 2001: 115). A family clan structure existed mainly composed of the Isaaq, Dir, Hawiye, Darod social groups. The internal composition was a mixture of settled and nomadic community conditioning a social order that has been labeled as "pastoral democracy" (Lewis 1961: 2). Demographically, the civil war has altered the clan settlement patterns. Strong clans have captured valuable urban and agricultural real estate by force. The patterns of clan settlements have changed mainly in the urban and arable areas such as Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, and Mogadishu. These areas have undergone

considerable changes due to heavy brews of non-resident clans supported by their militias.The displaced are forced to move out of traditional lands into new areas, thus changing demographic constitutions.

Three European countries Great Britain, France, and Italy have each individually colonized Somalia. The two most influential colonial powers being Italy, who occupied the South of Somalia from 1889, and Great Britain, who controlled the North of Somalia from 1886. In 1950, Italy gained a trusteeship of South Somalia and agreed with the British, who controlled the North (also known as British Somaliland) that the Somali people would gain their independence ten years later. "Both countries kept their promise and in 1960 British Somaliland and South Somalia were successfully transferred to the Somali Republic under a then well-developed Somali political elite" (Lewis 2008: 5).In 1960 British and Italian colonial territories were united to become independent Somalia. Even though by this move Somali were under one flag, it was seen as decolonization without due esteem to the wishes of the Somali people who were against the union.Such irredentist political ideology created unfriendly relations with its immediate neighboring states particularly Ethiopia. It then concluded into one of Africa's catastrophic inter-state conflicts when Somalia aggressed against Ethiopia to regain its 'lost' territory of Ogaden from Ethiopia in 1977/78. Unfortunately, it was a military failure for Somalia while leaving the scar for future latent wars between the two states and a threat to security in the Horn of Africa. "In October 1969, the Somalia Army, led by a USSR trained General Mohammed Siad Barre, seized power in Somalia" (Dualeh 1994: 15). Siad Barre's government received military aid from the US and with fundings from international partners built up one of the major standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1977 and 1991, the country suffered three major armed conflicts. "The first was the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in1977–78, in which Somali forces interfered in support of Somali rebel battalions in a bid to liberate the Somali-occupied region of the Ogaden. Somalia was defeated in the war and suffered around 25,000 casualties" (Samatar 1998: 137). Those fatalities propagated the seeds of future internal conflict, prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements intent on confronting the government of Siyad Barre, whom they held answerable for the debacle.

Another major conflict was the war between the Somali military and Somali National Movement (SNM) to control north west Somalia. SNM was created by some members of the Isaaq clan. This movement was result of the act of Barre regime which placed northwest under

militart control and used military management to control the area. This kind of governance had worsened condition of Isaaq and deprive them of their business. The civil war by SNM started in 1988.

The third armed conflict was between the government militants and growing number of clan base liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. It comprised Hawiye clan (United Somali Congress), Ogaden clan (Somali National Movement) and the Somali Redmption Democratic Movement. This multi-front war forehold made situation disruptive, lowlessness and looting in Somalia. These wars weakened the Barre regime. The state of Somalia under Barrer regime was opressive, based on inequility and used by some political leaders to control others, and use state resources and land assests. "This resulted reconciliation and power sharing discussions under suspicion and leading to a zero-sum game approach toward political power and the state"(Menkhaus 2004: 359). Second, "the leadership skillfully wrought and politicized clan distinctiveness over two decades of divide-and-rule politics, leaving a legacy of deep clan separations and complaints" (Simons 1995: 4). The period of cold war coincided with internal conflict in African region. Therefore, the Barre regime of SDR also attracted military as well as economic aid. Further, with the end of cold war in 1969, retaining bureaucracy became an arduous task due to the financial shortage in the region which further led to the decline of the regime. With the dwindling of the Cold War, the western interest towards Somalia too declined. Also the promise made by the donors like EU and UN remained unfulfilled, making the situation and condition of Somalia from bad to worst.

The toppling of Said Barre in 1991 marked the fall of the Somali state with the termination of government services and an extended catalog of chaos and human suffering. "The ensuing intolerable humanitarian conditions included famine, disease, and endless civil wars" (CRD 2004).The wars, which began as a struggle for control of the government, rapidly deteriorated into predatory looting, banditry, and occupation of the valuable real plantation by victorious clan militiaman (Lewis 1993: 2). The debacle of the Somalia's war against Ethiopia however created a fertile ground for further political instability which since then has become the usual phenomenon in Somalia. It has culminated into civil strife and given rise to the collapse of central authority with the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of President Siyad Barre in January 1991. The two dominant faction leaders namely, Ali Mahadi and Farah Aideed failed to come

into terms on a national political formula. As a result, the country entered into a period of intensive civil war and statelessness that disrupted the social, political and economic fabric of the Somali Republic. Civilians who formed organized and freelance militias acquired a large number of small arms and heavy artillery enabling them to replace the national defence and police forces. Atrocities committed include human rights abuse, indiscriminate killing of civilians, widespread rape and violence against women and children, arbitrary detention, forced recruitment and use of child soldiers among others (Chesterman, 2001: 140).

Since the beginning of the Somalia conflict in the early 1990s, "the UN embarked on two unsuccessful operations called UNOSOM- I and- II between1992 and1995" (Amadi 2014: 57). When UN interfere into Somalia its earlier intention was to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of famine. In May 1993, United Nation got the invitation to do the operation in this region. "The U.N. mandate was much more expensive to assist Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy" (Williams 1996: 316). When the United Nations could not bring the situation under control, "US administration authorized the deployment of US forces to support the beleaguered UN mission in Somalia in 1992" (Bradbury & Healy 2010: 12). However, U.S. forces refuse to embark on a campaign of disarmament of the Somali faction and later US handed the operation back to the United Nations, leading to creation of UNSOM II. However, both the US and UN failed to bring the situation in Somalia under control and left to the country to its fate.

Somalia since mid-1990s

The strength and vibrancy of the lineage system is perhaps best exemplified byits ability to survive despite the constantly changing nature of the political landscape in Somalia. Since 1990 there has not been an effective formal government in Somalia and conditioned have worsened over the years. But amidst the scale of Somalia postcolonial chaos, kinship lineage has retained its primacy and continues to offer, for good or bad, an alternative to the absence of state institutions.

In its precolonial and postcolonial dispositions, lineage perfoms certain social security functions that begin with the empowerment of the individual. "Empoewerment confers a feeling

of certainty and psychological comfort of belonging and identity"(Brons 2001: 122). "Through its subsidiary networks, a support base emergs whose focus is to strengthen solidarity as well as ensure the material and social survival of people"(Ibid). "This was secured through the sustenance of what the philosopher Kwame A. Appiah describes in a different context as a social structure with 'a sense of family and tribe that wasmultiple and overlapping'" (Appiah 2006). In Somalis region the conflict was imminent at the domestic level, clan elders constituted an ad hoc committee known as the *shir* council, whose task was to adjudicate between individual disputants. And in the event of armed conflict involving rival social groups, the *shir* performed duties of a generally peacebuilding nature. As Amina Mahamoud Warsame notes,

> "a large percentage of conflicts never passed the local police station ans were never reffered to courts. When cases ended up in the courts, it was common for these cases to be 'taken out' of the cout by elders of the two conflicting parties and solved according to tradition. In fact, in some instances, like family cases, Somalis prefer to settle them through traditional methods. It can embarrassment to the 'elders' and the other famiy members when such cases are taken to law courts"(Warsame 1997: 48)

Ultimately, its territory was subject to foreign dominance on a large scale. By the middle half of the 19th century, Somalia was rapidly drawn into the political interplay of colonial rivalry between Britain, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Egypt and Ethiopia (Lewis 2002: 40). Before long its predictable kinship culture witnessed some structural and normative transformations. It was this fixation on the protection of individual interest that made imperial rivalry also brought distinct approaches, interpretations and understandings of Somali society. The disparity in vision and identity was to play a significant role in the formation and eventual disintegration of the modern Somali state. After the World War II, period saw a wave of Somali nationalism whose underlying aim was to foster the unification of captured Somali territories.

In 1949, the former Italian Somalia was placed under and international trusteeship system by a United Nations General Assembly Resolution for a period of ten years under the Italian Trust Administration (UNGA Resolution 1949)

On 26 June 1960 the British colony of Somaliland gained its independence. At independence Somalia was faced with significant challenges. Its encounters with colonialism had

introduced a particular mindset, culture and social pattern alien to its people and the social lineage that had defined their existence. The demonstration process and its representations had turned sour giving rise to a constituency of discontents (Mansur). A series of events unfolded that had severe impact on Somali order. First, national disaffection cascaded into wider grievances and sporadic and organized violence, the culmination of which was the killing of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmake in 1969.During the period of Siad Barre, ruled Somalia from 1969 until its disintegration in 1991 endured fear within the peoples, chaos and anarchy. Barre ruled with ruthlessness, continued the divisiveness of clan politics and exploited Cold War superpower rivalry, the proceeds of which he utilized to prosecute the Ogaden War with Ethiopia and subsequent terror campaigns against those who defied him (Samatar 1998). By 1991 Somalia was in total disarray. State institutions had completely collapsed. Opinions as to the reasons for the collapse of the Somali state are diverse. At the core of the arguments is what is seen as the final triumph of primordial lineage segmentation. This theory points to the status of clanship as framing the bedrock of the Somali social order. The clan identity was set against symbols of state and nationhood, often resulting in violence and social division. The implication, then, for Somalia has been a kind of persistent struggle between state survival and clan supremacy.

As a people scattered across four main international boundaries- the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Dijibouti, Chad and Kenya- post independence Somali national politics leans on a near obsession with the ultimate unification of its people. Somalia had always contested the principle of retaining inherited colonial boundaries. Its leadership had always argued that political boundaries were artificial and arbitrary, and so were determined to promote the self-determination of Soamli ethnic ancestry scattered across international territories. In 1978, after constant threats by Somalia to annex the Somali-speaking Ogaden region of Ethiopia in pursuance of its irredentist policies, Somalia and Ethopia entered into a war lasting longer than both countries could afford. Since then, Somalia has not been able to fully recover from the Trauma and destruction of that war. This national political obsession with unification wa given constitutional legality. Article 6(4) of the first republican constitution of Somalia provides that: ‘the Somali Republic shall promote, by legal and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories’.

“In fact throughout its colonial and postcolonial and postcolonial history, as Alice Hashim notes, Somalia has found itself to be a pawn in the hands of more powerful states and

their allies" (Hashim 1997 : 219). Its strategic position lends in to the competing politics of superpower rivalry, played out in the form of a regular supply of external support, military hardware and technical and financial assistance. Though conceding that 'it may be an exaggeration to claim that the Somali state is a creation of external assistance', Ken Menkhaus emphasizes nonetheless that it is almost a given that "the state has never been remotely sustainable by domestic sources of revenue" (Menkhaus 1997: 124). Colonial policies that shaped modern Somali statehood created circumstances that thrived on the politicization of lineage structures and institutionalization of collective clan acquiescence. These turned out to be avenues of contestation to be survival of the postcolonial state.

Genesis of violence and conflict

The Horn of Africa- a geographical appellation that straddles the peninsula in East Africa and constitutes four territories, namely Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritera and Djibouti- has been almost continuously afflicted with violence and armed conflicts since the 1960s. Reasons for the Horn's volatility are diverse and are exacerbated by internal and external factors (Clapham 1995). Somalia's turbulent political history accounts for a considerable portion of this regional profile. Its struggles since independence have been characterized by violence, hardship, disorder and a crisis of identity (Dualeh 1994). Hundreds of thousands of people, civilians and combatants, have been killed and a lot more internally displaced in what is one of the most enduring humanitarian catastrophes. The condition of the internally displaced and refugees in the Horn of Africa are considered by the United Nation as some of the most desperate in the world. Similarly, the United States Committee for refugees has reported an estimate of over 4.5 million internally displaced people in four of the region's most unstable countries: Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritera. The situation has been further aggravated by the 2011-12 Somali famine. The violence in Somalia has occurred in four main periods: the Ogaden war, battles for the control of the northwest, the chaos and lawlessness of the 1990s and the anarchy that pervaded efforts at state reconstitution at the turn of the millennium. The 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia was the first of the sequence of conflicts that challenged the capacity of the state to cope with conflict induced disorder. The conflict was caused by state ambitions of complementing

efforts of rebel groups attempting to liberate the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden from Ethiopian control. Ogaden was ceded to Ethiopia was never settled.

The second period pertains to an uprising in northern Somalia in May and June 1988. The conflict pitted the Somali military against the Somali National Movement, a splinter group that was created in 1981 by members of the Issaq clan who harbored grievances in the wake of the Ogaden war (Brons 2001: 157). It was also fuelled by clan rivalry aggravated by wide spread social injustice. Once their region was placed under military administration, the Isaaq clan became targets for persecution from the Barre regime.

The third episode, in the 1990s, saw Somali society's divisive politics becoming particularly self-destructive. Between 1989 and 1990, Barre's embattled government was further weakened by attacks from multiple armed groups. State institutions had then virtually collapsed with the government unable to extend its jurisdictional competence beyond the fringes of Mogadishu. Increasingly, from 1990 and 1991, violence intensified to the point of general lawlessness; targeted killings escalated, looting and vandalism became commonplace.

Fourth, since 2000 both organized and gurerrila- style fighting has been prevalent. In 2004 international re-engagement with the Somali crisis was reactivated after the fiasco that characterized previous UN missions. Diplomatic endeavors through trans-state initiatives spearheaded by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) resulted in the creation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Its institutions were anticipated at the time to revive the Somali state and chart a way for a peaceful order.

To help consolidate its faltering grip, the TFG tried to make on the Islamists with military support from Ethiopia. From 2006 until the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in December 2008, tales of atrocities re-emerged. Renewed hostilities led to an escalation of the humanitarian catasteophe. An African Union peacekeeping force was then dispatched with a mandate to restore order and formulate peacebuilding initiatives. Violence has occasionally intensified, and although progress has been intermittently registered, conditions in southern Somalia are far from orderly, aggravated by a devastating famine which not only claimed thousands of lives, but also overstretched what was already a fragile political and social structure.

The United Nations, on the other hand, did not exhibit palpable interest in Somalia conflict particularly given the views of the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in 2007 that "deploying

UN peacekeepers to Somalia was neither realistic nor practical" (Darya 2006: 135).

The latest round of a major crisis in Somalia started when Ethiopia launched an incursion into Somalia in July 2006, with US backing, to confront the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. It was after the engagements of different actors particularly the US that Ethiopian military victory became inevitable at least in the beginning. The ICU militias could not withstand the mighty Ethiopian army. Within a short period of time, forces of the weak TFG backed by the Ethiopian troops ousted most of the ICU militias. After the defeat of the ICU. This resulted fighters joining the clan groups again. Ethiopian troops faced guerrilla attacks by the ICU militants until they withdrew from Somalia. Meanwhile international community started pressurizing Ethiopian troops to withdraw. "But it also recognized the fact that Somalia will relapse into a state of anarchy without a strong force replacing the Ethiopians to assist the TFG consolidate its position" (Aden and Tesfaye2012: 21). Although Ethiopian could dislodge the UIC, the TFG was confined to Mogadishu and was under siege by Al Shabaab, a well-armed and well-trained elite force of the UIC. Al Shabaab was an Al Qaeda aligned jihadi group that resorted to insurgency operations to resist foreign intervention and imposed its own regime (Anderson 2014: 938). The TFG's reliance on the Ethiopian forces enabled Al Shabaab to project it as an illegitimate regime and mobilized the civilian population against it. Realizing the presence of Ethiopian forces was radicalizing Somali society, need was felt to deploy an AU peacekeeping mission as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military. In official terms, Ethiopia is no more in Somalia since January 2008. It has left the AMISOM as well as the weak but the new TFG of President Sheikh Sherif Ahmed under serious security challenges and a further deteriorating humanitarian crisis. And the whole country has been de facto controlled by the reviving Islamist elements, particularly the militant wing of the ARS-A faction, the Al-Shabaab except few places in the capital, Somaliland and Punt land (Solomon, 2009).

African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

For the first time in many years the African Union has sent into Somalia under its own

leadership, its soldiers for a Peace Operation, the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). By 2007 only Uganda and Burundi had come forward to contribute in total 2710 troops to AMISOM. Other countries had promised to contribute troops to AMISOM these included Nigeria and Malawi, Hitherto, Nigeria did not carry its promise according to AU official. "Nigeria was reluctant to send troops because it believed that nigeria soldiers would not be paid equal to the level of UN soldiers" (Hesse 2011: 20). Malawi also promised to send troops but domestic politics complicated President Bingu Wa Mutharika's decision to send troops. During this time Mutharika lost election it resulted losing majority in parliament. "Thus when he promised troops to the AMISOM operation he did not have majority support in parliament which resulted decline his proposal of contributing troops therefor Malawi could not send its support to Somalia operation" (Hesse 2011: 20). AMISOM force was mandated to deploy up to 12,000 troops with Uganda having deployed 4500 and a pledge of more 3000 to deploy when Partner states and UN provide requisite logistical and financial support services. AMISOM was also mandated by the African Union in January 2007 and it was endorsed shortlyafterward by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Intially AMISOM was mandated to take all necessary measures, as suitable, and in harmonization with the Somalia National Defence and Public Protection Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. It was mandated to conduct military enforcement against anti-government actors, principally al- shabaab, and facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil-military operation (Amadi 2014: 46).Later on, AMISOM expanded its mandate which comprises to assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the Somalia government over its national territory. "The mission's small police component was mandated to help train, mentor and advise the Somali police force, although very few of them deployed to Mogadishu before 2011 because of the dire security situation on the ground"(Amadi 2014: 46). It was also mandated to providetechnical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, predominantly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions. AMISOM Was also mandated to help government in providing the key institution and making the situation where free and fair election can take place. Faciliate humanitarian support to Somalia under its capability and also focus on IDP,s and refugee to come back at their places."The mandate also comprises to enable harmonize support by pertinent AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and provide safety to AU

and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence" (Williams 2009: 515).

AMISOM,s initial deployed force was consisted around 1,600 Ugandan soldiers who later joined from December 2007 by a battalion of Burundi troopsThe mission grew in its strength cumulative and expanded.AMISOM supported TFG troops in a bid to oust Al-Shabaab and other opposition groups which are an offshoot of the ICU which splintered into several smaller groups after its defeat by Ethiopian forces in 2006. Al Shabab, the main extremist opposition group, controls most of the southern and central parts of Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu. It imposes a harsh form of Sharia law in areas under its control (Aden and Tesfaye2012: 32). AMISOM was trying to stabilize parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa and had a role to play in creating the security conditions required to enable the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. AMISOM was also supporting dialogue and reconciliation.

Untill the Ethiopian forces withdrew, AMISOM protect key members of the TFG and a number of strategic location in the city from the armed opposition in 2009. These included the sea and air ports, the presidential place at Villa Somalia. In order to defend and prevent the TFG from inundate al-shabaab fighters the Ugandan and Burundian troops played the important role. Neither AMISOM nor al-shabaab could defeat each other. In an attempt to weaken Uganda's resolve, al-shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala in July 2010. In respond Uganda deployed additional troops to Mogodishu. "Faced with a growing enemy, *al-Shabaab* launched a major offensive against the TFG and AMISOM during Ramadan of 2010, but the insurgents were repelled and sustained heavy losses"(Amadi 2014: 47). "AMISOM then went on the offensive and engaged in many months of bloody street fighting across Mogadishu in order to expand its areas of control"(Amadi 2014: 47). Though the fight was continued in the suburbs and outskirts these actions of AMISOM consequences was the withdrawal of al-shabaab's core fighters from the center of the city in early August 2011.

When al-shabaabattacked Kenyan territory Kenyan forces launched a unilateral military intervention into southern Somalia in October 2011, but also reflecting parochial Kenyan politics and interest"(Amadi 2014: 48). Ethiopian forces again entered in Somalia across Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions. In December 2011 the African Union, UN, and their other partners developed the new strategic concept of operations for AMISOM to take account of these major

developments. “The new concept of operations outlined a larger AMISOM force of nearly 18,000 uniformed personnel and hugely expanded its theater of operations across four land sectors covering south-central Somalia” (Amadi 2014: 48). Though AMISOM lacked maritime assets itincludes maritime sector. This new form of AMISOM peace keeping management was endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of AU and UN Security Council in January and February 2012 respectively. (AUPSC 2014: Res 2036).

In 2012 itself Kenya, Djibouti and Sierra Leone all signed a memorandum of understanding pledging to join AMISOM. During this time AMISOM also tried to capture the remaining suburbs and outskirts of Mogadishu through conducting the operation. Al-Shabaab has used the presence of non-Somali troops in Somalia to create disaffection among Somali population and in effect gain support as well as recruit followers among sections of the population. “For the moment, AMISOM police component continues to support the reform, restructuring, reorganization and professionalization of the SPF through various programs and activities” (Naduwimana 2013: 14). AMISOM police, including the Formed Police Units (FPUs), worked closely with the SPF at numerous police establishments in Mogadishu to mentor, train and counsel Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, comprising human rights and the managing of crime. It has the strength of 1, 680 and currently has 362 deployed personnel consisting of two FPUs of 140 personnel each, 76 individual police officers and a senior leadership team of 6 officers” (Naduwimana 2013: 14). “The civilian component has political, humanitarian and public information units. The political unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing advice on political processes. It is responsible for the application of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation’s public service”(Naduwimana 2013: 15).“The Civilian Component is committed to encouraging the launch of civil reconciliation initiatives with a view to seeking political inclusiveness and representation”(Naduwimana 2013: 15). The humanitarian unit works in close collaboration with the Office for the Harmonization of Humanitarian Assistance, the UN Children’s Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and other UN organs as well as Somali and international NGOs to establish coordination instruments and the sharing of Information. It also collaborates closely with the relevant Somali government agencies and

ministries."AMISOM's exit strategy is closely tied to the development of the institutional capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia"(Naduwimana 2013: 15). There is a need to ensure that all the key state institutions, and especially those charged with providing security, are established and well-functioning to ensure maintenance of the rule of law, effective governance and provision of essential public services. In these, the AMISOM has and can play a critical role"(Neos 2013: 32). On 20 August 2012, the first federal Parliament since 1991 was instated leading to the adoption of a new constitution on 10 September. The Somalia parliament chose Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the new president of the Federal Government of Somalia (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:42

AU's Interaction with other Actors

Some of the major powers supported AU in carryout its operation in Somalia. "Since 2007, the United States has provided $340 million in assistance to AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and provided approximately $150 million for its share of assessed costs for UNSOA" (Swan 2012).

AU interaction with UN

African Union's interaction with United Nations the AMISOM was deployed on the approval of UN Security Council. "Two years later, in response to the growing logistical requirements of the mission, UNSC passed a resolution creating a secure environment for the deleivery of humanitarian aid" (Bwomezi). In line with the recommendations of the 2013 benchmarking, UNSOA continues to emphasize and increase measures to assist the African Union in bringing AMISOM in line with UN peacekeeping standards and towards the future transition of AU troops into a UN peacekeeping mission. The UN peacekeeping was suppose to take over AMISOM this did not happen for a variety of reasons. "Instead, AMISOM was supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and from2009, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provided a logistical support package to AMISOM forces in Mogadishu" (Amadi 2014: 47).

UNSC resolution 2182 of 4 October 2014 extended the mandate of AMISOM, included that

UNSOA will continue to provide logistical support of AMISOM, troops and they in turn work closely with federal Government of Somalia to delivergovernance and services to the people of Somalia

AU interaction with IGAD

In the course of sending a mission to Somalia, the AU has always been in collaboration with RECs particularly the IGAD. The latter has been on the side of the so-called the Somali government partly because Ethiopia has a large say in the organization. As a result IGAD has become the first start and inclined favorably towards the TFG‘s request of armed protection, as well as the relaxation of the arms embargo on Somalia so as to help it build-up of the armed forces. Nonetheless due to its weakness, IGAD‘s practical role has more or less remained in putting pressure on the AU.(Aden and Tesfaye2012: 33 2012: 28)

AU’s Interaction EU

“The European Union’s engagement in Somalia has political, diplomatic, civilian, military, Humanitarian and developmental dimensions” (Amadi 2012: 60).. The EU Training Mission also trains Somali Security Forces. “In early 2013 the training mission’s mandate was extended until March 2015” (Amadi 2012: 61). The European Union was supporting the deployment of AMISOM with €15 million. In June 2005, the UK pledged to finance AMISOM with €1,3 million.

AU’s Interaction with other countries

The UK also provided planning assistance to several potential troop-contributing countries and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa. The AU had requested NATO to provide air transportation in support of AMISOM troops (2012: 33)

Achievements

Undoubtedly, the security situation in Somalia has significantly changed since the inception of AMISOM. AMISOM has begun to lay strong foundations for the restoration of peace and security. For example, the improved security situation has enabled the country to engage in democratic governance. A first step has been the move from a transitional government to an elected central government. The first election conducted in the country in (write here the year of election), after nearly 21 years. Also, local administration structures in parts of the country, particularly in areas liberated from Al - Shabaab, by the Somalia National Security Forces with the sustenance of AMISOM, have been established. AMISOM has helped implement peace and security by setting up provisions and services like AMISOM health hospital for attending to injured and sick civilians and also injured AMISOM fighters. It has brought about security in some areas by crushing and pushing the al-shabab insurgents and ensuring to keep a strong hold on captured areas. Hence provision of peace and tranquility for some Somali people gave space for recovery and development" (Aden and Tesfaye 2012: 40)

AMISOM has effectively been able to defeat and drive the alshabab out of Mogadishu the capital to its outskirts. Alshababs militants in Afgooye have been defeated.

International Aid offering organizations like UN programs have been finding it difficult to reach people who needed aid but now the situation has been calmed down with thanks to AMISOM and Somali National forces for defeating alshabab in the areas of Mogadishu and now Afgooye an outskirt of the capital. So far it's a positive response with AMISOM implementing peace and security as one of its mandates. Mogadishu is now considerably peaceful that people are back to usual activities like business in areas of the bakara market with a reduced number of sucide bombings. Alshabab pushed to the outskirts of Mogadishu by 2013 is a positive sign of the AMISOM mission. (Wiklund 2013: 43)

Challenges

Neo-liberal international peace approaches have been perceived to have complicated and prolongrd the conflict in southern Somalia. Such concerns constitute to grow and successive UN

failure has served as a reference point for factional groups and their sympathizers. In fact on a number of occasssions with bore the brunt of this local hostility with targeted attacks on its forces which bought about their deaths of many of its peacekeepers. The presence of international military forces, therefore, has always had critical consequences in Somalia. This legacy of discontent not only prejudices the average Somalia's receptiveness to the idea and actually of international engagement, But also influences the trajectory of externally perceived initiatives in Somalia.

During the period of multilateral engagement, approaches to the Somali conflict were theorized from a mindset that ignored the capability and relevance of indigenous social structure. Clan and sub-clan entities were perceived by the UN and sections of the international communities as fundamentally violent and disorderly. It was believed that recognizing and incorporating them into peace building initiatives would inadvertently amount to grating legitimacy to a whole network of social undesirables.

AMISOM found southern Somalia in a messy state, still nursing the failure of multilateral engagement conceptualized through international law approaches. The legacy and public disillusionment they generated were inherited by AMISOM. The Somali challenge is that unlike in Burundi, where the African Union attempted to invoke the Constitutive act's transformation initiative before a UN mission, AMISOM enter the freay long after international neo-liberal engagement. Challenges for the mission also resulted from circumstances that were self-made. From the beginning, the mission was beset with uncertainty and lack of clarity as regards its mandate and modus operandi. "This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the few skilled and specialized police trainers like all other police officers, are deployed on a rotational basis and so, have to leave at the end of their mission cycle" (Amadi 2014: 70). This negatively affects both the internal and external training cells in AMISOM. The training of AU Peace Support Operations remains a significant challenge because of the low level of experience and language problems. Especially since its further expansion, "AMISOM is hampered by a lack of Somali speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population and the National Security Force"(Kimani 2013: 24).

Similar to the Military and Police components, the Civilian component is understaffed and, therefore, faces difficulties in achieving its stated objectives. This makes it difficult to organise in-mission training as each unit needs specific training in addition to the generic peace support

operations knowledge that is applicable to all the units in the component. The most significant purpose of training in a peace support operation is to enhance the capabilities of mission staff to perform efficiently the mandated tasks needed for the efficient execution of the mission mandate.In the early stages of the mission, the international community prioritized strengthening the Federal Government and mitigating the threat posed by the al-Shabaab. "This in effect resulted in the neglect of recruitment and training of a capable civil component" (PSC Report 2013).

Increasingly, AMISOM is being called upon to deal with emerging security challenges, for example, those about maritime security including piracy, dumping of toxic wastes, over-fishing among others along the coast of Somalia. However, AMISOM do not have capacity to tackle these issues effectively. There are two categories of detached fighters: those who have been arrested or captured in combat and those who have voluntary surrendered themselves to AMISOM or the Somalia National Forces. On its part, AMISOM continues to receive disengaged al-Shabaab fighters, but the mission has limited resources to cater for them. The role of AMISOM is to obtain and manage turncoats at designated response centers for 48 hours and then hand them over to the Somalian government for further management as of mid-January 2013, "the federal government was holding approximately 1,500 disengaged fighters"(AUPSC 2007)). Like AMISOM, the Somalian Government does not have the necessary capacity to help facilitate the transition of such a large number of disengaged combatants. **"**The lack of sustainable funding poses a serious challenge for AMISOM regarding continuity of its operations, the provision of the required capabilities and logistical support" (Amadi 2014: 70).

While there are several co-existing support models including the UN Trust Fund, the EU African Peace Facility, direct donor support and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), AMISOM is a heavy burden for the AU. To its credit, UNSOA and the support from the EU have made a big difference but is still far from meeting most of the needs of the mission. For example, the necessary additional deployment of troops to the area where they are most needed has been hampered by the lack of resources to airlift and sustain the troops in the mission.

Conclusion

Somalia has been in constant turmoil since 1991. The complexity of the political and social situation has led to around fifteen failed peace keeping processes. Both the UN as well as the regional institutional infrastructure on peacekeeping has attempted finding solutions to the Somalia's problem but the conflict has remained largely intractable. The African Union has been actively engaged with the Somali conflict since it deployed peacekeeping troops in 2007. The mission has been challenged by the lack of sufficient staff as well as on the front of financial and logistics. The international community though committed its support yet failed in solving the Somalia's problems. Despite various efforts made by regional and international organizations, the situation in Somalia remains precarious. Somalia still lacks a well-functioning government with the sufficient capacity to provide security and basic services to the people. The radical Islamic groups Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam continue to threaten the very existence of an internationally backed government by waging a series of attacks and controlling some of the territories of Somalia. The situation in Somalia, therefore, has reached a critical stage, requiring coordinated and long-term engagement and commitment of regional and international organizations.

On the African Union front the AMISOM has clearly displayed support to the African PSOs. It has been plagued not only by a failure to obtain pledges of participation from member states, but also by an inability to swiftly deploy the troops available. As a result AMISOM has remained far too small to actually accomplish its task or have a real effect on the security situation in Somalia. Most of the challenges facing AMISOM have been present in the AU's previous peacekeeping experience as well. Lack of resources capacity and funding leading to poor mission and institutional capacity to manage operation have prevented AMISOM, just as AMIB and AMIS, from fully implementing its mandate. The balance between tasks and resources mandated to AMISOM might have been reasonable had all resources been accessible and the missions relived by a UN operation within the recommended time period. The experience tells that structural weakness has remained throughout the first three missions conducted by the AU. It is noted that one of the biggest issues is the inability of the AU to sustain troops participating in its mission; as a result it has struggled with obtaining pledges. Lesson learnt from AMISOM within the AU is that AU institutional capacity needs to improve quicker or a future PSOs undertaken by the union risks merely being repeats of AMISOM.

The chapter looked into the changing situation in Somalia. The establishment of changed drastically from what it was when the TFG was formed. Alongside the TFG, the Islamic Courts emerged as a major factor in Somali politics. ICU began to establish itself as the new reality that controlled Mogadishu and advanced its sphere of influence to other areas. It could manage to effectively besiege the TFG inside Baidoa. Though the ICU did not agree with the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter, it opted to create a political authority based on the Shari‘ a law. In the start, both the TFG and the ICU expressed their commitment to dialogue and reconciliation, and even declared their readiness to participate in peace talks. They expressed their readiness to discuss all political and security issues, including the new situation in Mogadishu, and called for the full support of all stakeholders to ensure the success of the talks. Two rounds of peace talks which took place in Sudan, under the auspices of the Arab League failed however to bring about the expected results while the third round too never succeeded to take off due to their uncompromising positions (Anon, 2008: 18).

The specific reasons for the failure to field the peacekeeping operation were a disjointed political approach; the lack of funding; and theexistence of a UN arms embargo on Somalia. Until the African Union expected its direct responsibility to involve in the crisis, IGAD continued its engagement in the crisis to pursue solution of the problem. The United Nations, on the other hand, did not exhibit palpable interest in Somalia conflict particularly given the views of the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in 2007 that “deploying UN peacekeepers to Somalia was neither realistic nor practical” (Darya 2006: 135).

The latest round of a major crisis in Somalia started when Ethiopia launched an incursion into Somalia in July 2006, with US backing, to confront the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. It was after the engagements of different actors particularly the US that Ethiopian military victory became inevitable at least in the beginning. The ICU militias could not withstand the mighty Ethiopian army. Within a short period of time, forces of the weak TFG backed by the Ethiopian troops ousted most of the ICU militias. Although Ethiopian could dislodge the UIC, the TFG was confined to Mogadishu and was under siege by Al Shabaab, a well-armed and well-trained elite force of the UIC. Al Shabaab was an Al Qaeda aligned jihadi group that resorted to insurgency operations to resist foreign intervention and imposed its own regime (Anderson 2014: 938). The TFG’s reliance on the

Ethiopian forces enabled Al Shabaab to project it as an illegitimate regime and mobilized the civilian population against it. Realizing the presence of Ethiopian forces was radicalizing Somali society, need was felt to deploy an AU peacekeeping mission as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military. In official terms, Ethiopia is no more in Somalia since January 2008. It has left the AMISOM as well as the weak but the new TFG of President Sheikh Sherif Ahmed under serious security challenges and a further deteriorating humanitarian crisis. And the whole country has been de facto controlled by the reviving Islamist elements, particularly the militant wing of the ARS-A faction, the Al-Shabaab except few places in the capital, Somaliland and Punt land (Solomon, 2009).

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Though the significance of United Nations and other international organizations is increasing but there are remarkable rise of regional organizations in process in the past twenty years if UN has the responsibility to maintain peace and security then why Regional Organization's (ROs) is need? According to the UN secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali RO's are the connection that is important to International Organizations itself. According to this argument "International Organization focus on ability of RO's to handle rising, ongoing conflicts" (UN Sec Gen1992). The anti-colonial movements in Africa had impacts beyond accelerating independence campaigns. These movements brought the birth of new states claiming a place in international society. The pan-African ideals influenced the sense of greater cooperation amongst the new states and Africans started realizing the need for unity and cooperation. The newly decolonized states were greater concerned about the belief of Africa for Africans with minimal foreign intervention in the internal matters. By 1962 as a collective effort of several African leaders led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). All through the Cold War OAU played a mediating role in various conflicts between African states but somewhere the institution lacked acknowledging the practical realities of the region.

The creation of OAU represented the social and political aspiration of post-colonial Africa. purpose of OAU, which was incorporated in Article 2 of the Charter of OAU promotion of unity and solidarity, cooperation for the realization of better conditions life for Africa. to defend African's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, eradicate colonialism and promote international cooperation.

OAU's purpose which incorporated in ariticle 2 of its charter the incorporation of non-

intervention, soveregnity equality and territorial integrity in the charter of OAU attracted various and and variying interpretation. Taslim Elias situates it in the context of the complementary of soverighnty equlity with non-interference equlity with non- interefarence in the domestic affairs of soverign states he argues OAU's purpose is to help protect the inviobility of the territory of the state from external affairs by so doing enhances continuty and the exercise of prerogative rights (Elias 1972: 127). James Mayall locates the rationale for the incorporation of these principles from the perspective of the psycology of fear as the radical pan- Africanism propounded by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana sought to creat continental union government (Mayall 1991: 25). Throgh these perspective it could be said that soveregnty was seen by new state as denoting equality, and that Narumah's government proposal scarely found favour.

According to the charter of OAU, it was strongly bounded by the principle of non-interference and in the absence of any interference and operation many conflicts that affiliated most parts of the Africa continued but only little or no meaningful attempt made by the OAU to confront them where attempts were made that included the munificence of ad hoc commitees and diplomatic endeavors fronted by some political leaders. In the early 1980's civil war erupted in Chad which triggered the involvement in of the OAU. Unlike the earlier conflicts the OAU despatched a peacekeeping mission, but like thee report of the organisation in other peacekeeping initiatives the Chadian mission failed and OAU withdrew.

The OAU ad hoc committees and diplomatic peace efforts showed that their effectiveness tended to have little impact on internal conflicts. Despite these attempts, the ad hoc committees were far from ideal. Many African leaders had established groups of friends and sympathizers amongst the peers and some of the close relations meant that where conflicts erupted, ad hoc committees were more inclined towards preserving and protecting incumbents than working for swift and effective settlement through neutrality and fair play. Moreover, the ad hoc committees of by their very nature lacked coherence and clear direction in achieving durable peace.

no other continent has been as troubled and politically disturbed as has been Africa. Several debates have suggested for an African answer to the African problems in case of peacekeeping. Not just involvements in Africa has proved to be unacceptably costly for the UN but there has also been a record of foreign countries taking undue advantage of the African situation and resources in the guise of UN peacekeeping. During Cold War period, the OAU had played a

mediating role in conflicts between the states in accordance with its principles. But overall analysis suggests that there have been numerous loopholes in its approach which has led to a failure of OAU in peacekeeping. It failed to address the practical realities of the region. Moreover,it'slengthy, and costly ways and judicial processes made the Commission overall unattractive to many member states. The rise of AU was actually an improvement on the OAU.

However, in the Post-Cold War period the outside powers became less interested in the African states and withdrew their protection and support to several of the regimes. Intra-state wars, civilian-led armed revolts and civil wars are magnified. Though OAU established Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution but the OAU became largely helpless in the overall situation. There were a variety of cases in Africa which simultaneously demanded assistance from the institution, Rwanda, Chad, Burundi, etc. There was a dire need for economic, social and political reforms in the continent. All these reasons and shortcomings of the OAU-led to a universal aspiration of the member states to move towards a new institution which would be better equipped to deal with the emerging challenges. This marked urgency and requirement of transformation from OAU to African Unity. The study reveals the major limitations of the OAU. These were (a) structural inadequacies like the absence of enforcement and capacity, and (b) normative inadequacies of the institution like the exclusion of internal conflicts from the mandate. In short, as suggested by the several study inadequacies of the OAU in catering the demands of the African continent led to the need for transformation from OAU to the African Unity.

By 1990,s it was becoming incresingly obivous that the OAU's normative and institutional setting wre insufficient to confront violence and conflicts in Africa. at least for a while that the realism provoked debate on the need of reconceptualise and reinterpret some of the principles that anchored the OAU Charter. As these principle were averse to advancing transformative approches to conflicts, the organisation's then Secretray General, Salim Ahmed Salim, to the need to maintain a balance between national sovereignty and international responsibility (Obasanjo and Mosha 1993: 343). Salim questioned the relevance underlying the OAU Charter, nothing in perticular that the doctrinee of non-intervention precludes the possiblity of accountability on the part of the states (Obasanjo and Mosha 1993: 343). The Seretray General

pronouncement however persuasive, could not induce the OAU into the kind of changes that were required at the time. A significant development, however, was the creation of Mechanism for conflict prevention mangaement and resolution following the decision by the Assembly in June 1993 (AHG 1993: Session 29th). The OAU declaration introduced the Mechanism for Conflict prevention Managemeent and Resolution (MCPMR). As an organ that was needed as so as to bring to the processes of the dealing with conflicts in the continent a new institutional dynamism enabling speedy action to prevent or or manage and ulmately resolve conflicts when and where it occure. A year later, the Rwandan genocide occurred, and by that time OAU and its charter were disbanded and a new organisation, the African Union was created. The MCPMR was subsequently drafted into the peace and security council of the African Union.

The OAU came under increasing criticism in the 1980's for its insabilty to proffer transformative changes that were desperately needed in the post independence Africa. but it was the organisation's institutional and normative weakness in confronting armed conflicts that attracted most condemnation (Achuku 1977: 371).

The chapter also looked into the transformation of Africa from Organization of African Unity to the African Union. The insufficiency of OAU made African leaders to come up with a new organization which would be stronger and sufficient for African continent in terms of every aspect. Therefore African Union established in 2002. This organization had incorporated with many different approach and established supportive components for maintaining peace and security in the continent. In the context of peace building, the institution whose functions are critical to tackling violence and conflict in Africa is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). he African Union set forward an institutional structure whose core purpose was promoting peace, security, and strength for the continent. To accomplish these objective and to reinforce the capability of the AU in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, a Protocol related to the creation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was adopted in 2002. It formed as a collective security and early-warning preparation system. The following organs were established: the African Standby Force (ASF), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (POW) and the Peace Fund. Collectively, these organs fall under the authority of the African Peace and Security Architecture

(APSA).

On the lines of Africa's rich tradition of resecting to elders, the African Union formed the Panel of the Wise (PoW) as a body of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Also for functioning smoothly, the APSA instituted a special fund, known as the Peace Fund. Its aim was to finance peace and security actions of the African Union. Under the broad structure of the AU peacekeeping, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was established. It is counted amongst one of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This institution was accountable for data collection. It also cooperated with the UN and other NGOs and related institutions. Under the structure, the Chairperson of the Commission was expected to utilize the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on possible conflicts and intimidations to peace and security in Africa and endorse the best course of action.

Created by a separate protocol, the PSC is an amalgamation of some of the conflict resolution and management structures that existed under the OAU, aspirational values of the treaty relating to the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) and the integrated normative principles underlying the Constitutive Act. Article 2 of its protocol states that the PSC is the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and therefore perceived as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Protocol further stipulates that the PSC shall be supported by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, An African Standby Force and a Special Fund for peace. Article 11 of the PSC Protocol provides that the panel of the Wise shall be selected by the Chairperson of the African Union commission and be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society.

In determining the members of the Panel, regard must be had to their outstanding contribution to the cause of the peace, security and development. The panel's main function is to advise the PSC and the African Union Commission on matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security and stability in Africa. The standby Force is created to assist the PSC in its conflict transformation functions, such as peace support deployments and intervention missions pursuant to Article 4(h) and (j), and is anticipated to serve as a rapid deployment unit in

situations of emergency (Africa Security Review, 15:4, 2006). In this sense, the Standby Force constitutes an important part of the emergency dimension of the Constitutive Act's peace and security architecture

Overall, an analysis of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) suggests that it is an umbrella term for the key AU mechanisms for endorsing peace, security, and stability in the whole of the African continent.

The chapter three looked into the African Union's engagement in the peacekeeping operations in Africa and showed how the institutional structures operated. The contemporary armed conflicts in Africa are an amalgamation of a number of actors involved. These are states, international actors, non-state actors, insurrectionary, terrorists, numerous belligerents and warlords, illegal arms merchants, criminal drug cartels, and international criminals. Scholars argue that the spill-over effects of violent activities in a state are very high in Africa. Thus the task confronting the African Union as a dedicated institution on the matter becomes greater and harder. The study reveals that these continued conflicts have resulted in deaths of millions of people and a large-scale destruction of property. The society and the economy are the worst affected.

As Africa lost its strategic significance for the great powers in the post-cold war, the UN has also largely shrunk its resources and interest in authorizing UN peacekeeping operations to address conflicts in Africa even in the turn of 21st Century. The Au has to take on the responsibility of handling the crises on the principle of sharing the burden with the United Nations. Under this principle, the United Nations was expected to support the AU in this endeavor By examining the AU's operations in Burundi and Darfur, the third chapter tries tried to delineate the way in which the AU deals with the conflicts in Africa

Like in most of Africa, the impact of colonialism on Burundi has been profound, ranging from exploitation and the reconstitution of social relationships to the certain of new forms of structures and ethnic stratification. These imbalances conditioned the direction of Burundi's post-independence politics, mostly manifested in violence and a recurrent civil war. During this time, violence intensified with virtually no significant response from both the OAU and the United Nations Security Council. The former's passivity was conditioned by the restrictive nature of its Character, whilst the latter suffered from a historical conditioned reluctance to extend its

jurisdiction to internal violence. But even where international law engages the fissures of postcolonial violence, the approaches often adopted do little to advance durable conflict-transformation and peace-cultivation initiatives. Their limited success often displays an inability to institution or articulates a typology of conflict transformation that is capable of engaging the social system from which violence emanates. Neo-liberal peace building often focuses on the agency of the state as the medium through which advances to peace and security are conceived. In the process, social institutions and traditional structures from which individuals and communities seek sanctuary when faced with conditions of violence are preety much consigned to irrelevance.

As the first mission to be set up under an Article 4 mandate, AMIB was faced with challenges and logistical difficulties. But through a collective will to engage and actualise African solutions to African problems, the mission generally averted further escalation of large-scale violence. To this end, it played a crucial role in helping in the transformation of the agencies of violence and overseeing sufficient stability for the advancement of durable peace. In part the transformation in Burundi took shape in the form of the Restorative, Corrective and Preventive subsets to transformative peace building. It is from this perspective that the innovation of the Constitutive Act in Burundi, notwithstanding its related challenges, shows patterns of hope and promise in the African Union interfaces with internal conflicts in Africa.

In the case of Burundi, the AU established the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003. As a first operation solely commenced, planned and executed by AU members it well represented self-reliance and capability of the organization. The task upon AU was to establish and maintain liaison between the parties; to monitor and authenticate implementation of the ceasefire agreements; to ease the actions of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the technical commissions for the formation of national defence and police militaries. According to Boshoff and Francis the AU to protected identified assemblage and disconnection areas; to provide safe passageway for the parties during planned activities to designated assembly areas; to assist with and offer technical support to the DDR process; to help with the delivery of humanitarian aidThe AU also made a concerted effort to coordinate its activities with the different UN agencies involved in Burundi. On the basis of the study of the AU's peacekeeping in the case study of Burundi it appears that the AMIB mandate lacked a strong backing to use force as the rules of engagement were based of self-defense. According to Svensson the AU were only allowed to secure the

freedom of movement of its own personnel and to protect civilian if any under imminent threat of violence Analyzing the case of Burundi also reveals that the AU mission also suffered from a mismatch between mandate and resource capacity (finance, political and other material). However the mission was at leastin accordance with International Humanitarian Law. The AU was largely successful as they succeeded in stabilizing about 95 percent of Burundi and provided adequate protection to the returning exile leaders. According to Sharamo, it can be concluded that AMIB had fulfilled its mission as it has contributed to the resolution of the dispute by addressing its underlying causes and contributed to peace and stability in Burundi even in the face of the serious policy, institutional and theoretical limitations. The AU presence prevented violence against women, abridged the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted displaced persons and endangered humanitarian corridors and convoys. AMIB demonstrated the AU's commitment to PKOs and took the necessary steps to prevent a security vacuum in Burundi, which then enabled the UN to intervene.

In the case of Darfur due to the failure of immediate response from the UN, the AU took the prime opportunity and responsibility itself. The initial AU response was through the appointment of Chadian mediation team to look into ways of possible political settlement in Darfur. The overall transition from OAU to AU was was led by the political leaderships of Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa, accentuated by their desire to shape the ethos and trajectory of the continental institutional building. In both the above cases, there has been were some positive interventions of neighboring states and regional powers like South Africa and Tanzania, who facilitated the coordination of AU at various levels. Many scholars argue that the relationship between the UN and AU was less of "burden-sharing" and more of "burden-shifting". However as pointed out by Murithi the transformation from the OAU to the AU is indeed a major development in the evolution towards accomplishing the ideas of Pan- Africanism. A major and notable change between the OAU and AU was that the latter redefined the concept of sovereignty. Adding to that the age-old principle of non-intervention was replaced by a solidarity principle of non-indifference under Article 4(h) of the constitutive act. Major changes were brought to the process of decision making and implementation structures, representatives and judicial institutions.

The fourth chapter examines the case study of Somalia to deal in depth the how the AU carry out the peacekeeping operations and kind of challenges it faces in the process, as a typical example

of the way AU handles the internal crisis in Africa. The experience of southern Somalia since the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991 has shown that successive neo-liberal approaches conceptualised through the frame of international law have failed. More than once, the rebuilding of state institutions has been interpreted as a prerequisite condition for the consolidation of peace. And more than 0nce, these state centric perceptions have appeared to provide no meaningful solution to a conflict whose multitudinous actors and complex outlook continue to challenge some of the foundational ethos of contemporary international law. The reason relate not only to the absence of collective political will, logistical support and leadership assiduity, but also to a context in which approaches have been conceptualised, defined and enforced by a certain framework and mind set rooted primarily in an international law that displaces, contradicts and expurgates indigenous social institutions and the philosophies that underpin their modes of existence. It has also been established that the desire for the indigenisation of transformative peace building led to the invocation in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act and the deployment of AMISOM in southern Somalia. Achieving only a modest impact, the mission has been dogged by challenges, most of which are a culmination of the legacy of successive international failures. It has been argued that this lingering legacy has constrained AMISOM's ability to chart its own path. However, a gradual departure from this legacy in the northwestern region of Somaliland appears to temper violence and offer valuable insights into the mechanics and potentials of transformative peacebuilding. Somaliland's success lies in its exploitation of peacebuilding strengths of local structures to restore order and embark on installing social institutions in the shadows of the ruins of the postcolonial state. There are three lessons from these experiences.

The first is that the continued dysfunctional state of Southern Somalia in the face of international engagement and the triumph of Somaliland under indigenous initiatives show quite clearly that confronting internal violence in Africa requires a strong engagement with traditional social structures and institutions. Social institutes are the conduits of communities and the entities from which individuals source sanctuary in times of need. Second, the success of transformative peace building approaches is not entirely dependent on the primacy of the modern state. The state as an entity for the organisation of social life is merely one of several possible options. The Somaliland model amply demonstrates that for Somalis- and indeed African postcolonial societies in general- the state is nothing more than an organised expression of the

people's aspirations and way of life. This is partly driven by a community's shared values, commonality of interests and desire to create conditions that have the potential of fostering mutual coexistence, peace and social justice. Third, Somaliland's integration of modern institutions with traditional social structures appears to drift away from the strict Westphalia model to one that moves towards a people-centred interpretation of security. This may well represent a kind of postmodern re-characterization of the structures and normative composition of the postcolonial African state and its perception of peace and security. But considering the depth of disintegration propelled by the sequence of violence and the history of contestation between modernity and Somali lineage structures, it would be remiss to definitively conclude that armed conflict on a grand scale will be less probable in Somaliland. Construction of frameworks for peace is a continuously evolving process with its every stage critical. As Farah notes, in the medium and long term, the most that can be hoped for is that [social] institutions capable of resolving conflict should be in place and functioning. This is not to say that Africa is better off without the state. The state and international law will still remain important elements of international society. What is needed, however, is a certain conceptualisation that incorporates the intricate nature of the social dynamics of indigenous structures into the functions of the state and outlay of international law. At least for now, transformative peace building framed around normative values, social integration and interdependence provides grounds for hope.

The AMISOM or the African Union was mandated to take all necessary measures, as suitable. This marks a departure from the previous institution of OAU which largely had a very limited mandate. In the particular case of AMISOM, it was in harmonization with the Somalia National Defence and Public Protection Institutions to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups present and active in Somalia. The AU mission in Somalia was mandated to conduct military enforcement against anti-government actors, principally Al-Shabaab, and also to facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations (Amadi 2014: 46). In the case of Somalia, we witness that the AU conducted a huge endeavor including almost every aspect of modern peacekeeping.Later the AMISOM even expanded its mandate to assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the Somalia government over its national territory.

This study revealed that undoubtedly the security situation in Somalia significantly changed

since the inception of AMISOM under the African Union. AMISOM has laid strong foundation for the restoration of peace and security. This has enabled the country to engage in democratic governance. Although despite these successes, there has remained concerns among the government of Somalia and the humanitarian agencies over the prevailing insecurity in the country. A key challenge which the study has highlighted is regarding the Military component of AMISOM. There have been insufficient numbers of troops needed to guarantee the stabilization of areas liberated from al-Shabaab and to curb insurgency and drain out the violent elements out of the country. Apart from these challenges the AMISOM has been in the recent also expected to deal with emerging security challenges including maritime security including piracy, dumping of toxic wastes, over-fishing among others along the coast of Somalia.

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