# Discourse, Power and Truth in Foucault's Analysis of the History of Systems of Thought

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of*

## MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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# CERTIFICATE

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This thesis titled **"Discourse, Power and Truth in Foucault's Analysis of the History of Systems of Thought"** submitted by **Mr. Prashant Kumar Gaurav**, Centre for Linguistics, School of Language, Literature and Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is an original work and has not been submitted so far in part or in full, for any other degree or diploma of any University or Institution.

This may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

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Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi - 110067

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# DECLARATION

Dated 25th July 2016

This thesis titled "Discourse, Power and Truth in Foucault's Analysis of the History of Systems of Thought" submitted by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is an original work and has not been submitted so far in part or in full, for any other degree or diploma of any University or Institute.

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# Introduction

There have been traditional approaches to the history of thought and these approaches are based on certain philosophical accounts of the human subject. But these attempts can at best serve as rutted cul-de-sac. First the major philosophical attempts to study human beings could not offer credible and lasting explanation. Second the traditional approaches to the history of thought fail to tackle the fundamental question of what makes possible the occurrence of certain kinds of discourses and its norms. This is what this thesis tries to say. Foucault's archeological work shatters the phenomenological bid which establishes the unhindered relation of the subject to truth as archeology puts the primacy on the archive. His genealogical approach, which is the hallmark of his work of 1970s, also serves to confute phenomenology, as it shows that there are no direct claims to truth rather they are ensconced in political relations.

Foucault's analysis of the history of systems of thought can be seen as part of his effort to formulate a credible and lasting alternative to traditional approaches to the history of thought and at the same time he also gives an alternative philosophical picture which corresponds to his new historiography, thus offering a method for the study of human beings.

There has been an effort in the thesis to juxtapose Foucault's major works in order to give a coherent picture of what is trying to say and do in these works. In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault says that modern medicine emerged in the form of a clinical science[1] which offered a plentitude of new experience of disease. This new experience of disease made it possible to have a historical and critical understanding of the old experience. It made possible to have a new and different understanding of the mad in the light of new experience, helping remove the Classical treatment of mad people and thus the rational methods to which the mad people were subjected in the Classical age. Thus the medical rationality has now the access to the copious amount of perception, which enabled one to get to

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[1] Foucault, 1963/2003: xvii.

the very grain of things offering the first glimpse of truth. So now to perceive is no longer just the matter of just seeing. This inseparability or the oneness of to see and to perceive was what was preached by rationalist philosopher like Descartes and Maleranche.

Foucault says that modern age is an age of criticism. We now have the reign of criticism because now only criticism matters and it also indicates its fatality as is subjects everything to criticism. The heralding of the age of criticism found growing acceptance among positivists and also exhorted them as it supplied appropriate conditions for the nurturing of their practices. Nietzsche has also already emphasized the importance of criticism in modern time. He calls even philosophy criticism[2] and critical science. He says it is critics who do a tremendous job to mankind as they take everything that has happened till now and render it distinct, intelligible and manageable and subdue the whole past. The philosophical labourers and men of science have to do the formal assessments of value which over a period of time establishes itself as truths. Even actual philosopher himself has to first don the task of critics as they are used as instruments by them before becoming a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and the promoters of mankind. They reach for the future with creative hands and their knowing is their will to truth[3].

So criticism and positivism came on the scene in the modern age as the age of representation declined. At the same time there is the metaphysics of the object. This is the metaphysics of non-objectifiable depth of objects. It is from here objects rise up towards human's superficial knowledge. Foucault in *The Order of the Things* says that criticism, positivism and metaphysics formed the triangle. They formed the triangle of the object. This criticism-positivism-metaphysics triangle constituted modern European thought from the beginning of the nineteenth century, marking the break from the Classical thought.

Chapter one will talk about this radical break between Classical and modern thought which occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century. In the

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[2] Nietzsche, 1886/2003: 141.
[3] ibid., p. 143.

Classical thought, the problem consisted in discovering a nomenclature that would be a taxonomy. The Classical thought's major problem to lay bare the relations between name and order arise from Classical age ontological standing that being is offered to representation without interruption. But as the new thought emerged in the modern age, it now became evident that it is possible to know only phenomena and its laws and not substances and essences. So it not the ideal essences that determine the order of concrete things but rather the hidden historical forces inside it determine the order of things. A new concept of the sign emerged under the new conception of order.

As now human delved the depths of life, critical thinking made the way for the phenomenal realm to take the centre stage. The phenomenal realm now became the only area of concern for the human's epistemological endeavor, which led to the synthetic notion of life. It helped give rise to the modern conception of knowledge, which created the conditions of possibility of modern discourses of biology, philology, and economics. The positivism, which indicates a reversion to the classical thought, owes its genesis to the importance which now gets attached to the phenomenal world. Man now emerges as a strange empirico-transcendental doublet[4] as the empirical contents of man served to reveal the conditions of knowledge.

In *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault describes discourses such as biology, medicine, psychiatry as discursive formation. He sees discursive formation as a system of dispersion for the elements of discursive formation. It acts as the space in which various objects emerge and get continuously transformed. A discursive formation is a collection of statements which observes the rules of formation. He does not hold a discursive formation to be defined by any unity of objects, manner of statement, concepts, or method. Rather it functions as a system of dispersion for its elements. It is the rules of formation that govern the formation of statements that define the unity of a discursive formation.

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[4] Foucault, 1966/2002: 347.

Traditional historical inquiry and Foucault's archeology both need documents or the collections of statements to commence with. But the way they treat documents differs in a significant way. Conventional history of ideas uses documents to get to the intention, thoughts and beliefs of the author who produce it. Documents were used to understand the synthesizing operations of a psychological kind. They were seen as the language of a voice which is no longer present, thus document is just the way to reach that voice. The linguistic data of statements acts as an object to revive the inner life of constituting subjects in this case. Foucault's archeology on the contrary treats statements as objects of study in their own right, without paying any attention to what was the author's thought. For him, statements need to be treated as monuments. Thus he seeks to do away with the constituent subject[5].

Foucault says that archeology's concern lies in paying attention to discursive formation or positivity that makes possible the existence of disciplines and sciences. This will be discussed in the second Chapter, besides discussing how Foucault explain the changes in the discursive formation by looking at the relations of thought and discourse to the factors that lie outside them.

He says that it is the episteme of the epoch that archeology seeks to reveal and it defines the conditions of possibility of all forms of knowledge. It is in this epistemic context all branches of knowledge become relevant and intelligible. Investigations and requisite examinations required by new disciplines were also structured in this epistemic matrix, which made possible the coexistence of dispersed and heterogeneous statements and concepts. Foucault cites the example of psychiatric discipline which differed radically in its content, internal organization, practical function, and methods from the corresponding traditional disciplines because this new discipline owes its emergence at the beginning of the nineteenth century to the contemporary discursive formation. Discursive formations may be mapped by scientific disciplines but they go way beyond the boundaries of any scientific disciplines and it were these discursive formations that archeology seeks to describe. These all diverse and dispersed elements need

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[5] Foucault, 1977: 117.

to figure in the genealogy of modern biology and not just natural history which is linked only to the theory of signs and to the project of a science of order. The autonomy and rigid enclosure of natural history excludes the elements which can legitimately contribute to the constitution of biology. The same can be said about other established sciences of classical period. It is also true that positivities and sciences not always exist in an exclusive relation and that there is always the possibility of a science where there is a positivity. This raises the question of the relation between the positivities and the sciences. This puzzle can be sorted out by drawing the distinction between what Foucault calls savoir and connaisance. Here we see Foucault's formulation of dynamic conception of knowledge. He calls epistemic knowledge savoir[6] and scientific knowledge or accumulated, refined, deepened, adjusted knowledge connaisance. The elements of a scientific discourse are made available by the savoir of a discursive formation. It is savoir that provides critical knowledge. Foucault sees objects which the discourses talks about as emerging in the space offered by savoir. It is in this space the subject speaks of the objects of his discourse. Thus the occurrence of discursive formations and the objects made possible by it is coeval. There is no one permanent, delimited object to refer to. This underpins the nominalist streak in Foucault's archeological approach.

Foucault says that connaisance remains in the clutches of subjectivity or connaissance is the subjective enterprise. So subject plays the key role in achieving the scientific knowledge and for this subject depends on savior. On the other hand, it is savoir that concerns archeology, so archeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge (savoir)/science axis. Foucault suggests that we should distinguish between scientific domains and archeological territories. Those texts or propositions that do not meet the accepted norms of the period are not seen as belonging to the scientific domain. Literary and philosophical texts are excluded from any domain of scientificity as they do not observe the established scientific norms of the period. But an archeological territory extends not only to

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[6] Foucault, 1969/2002: 200.

scientific texts but also to literary and philosophical texts that do not observe to a great deal the scientific norms of the period.

Foucault says that it is possible to isolate four distinct stages or thresholds that a discursive formation crosses. Threshold of positivity and threshold of epistemologization come prior to the threshold of scientificity and threshold of formalization. The first threshold is crossed by a discursive practice when it becomes an individual and autonomous system and start operating to govern the formation of statements. The second stage is reached when a group of statements is formed following the epistemic norms of verification and coherence through which to verify knowledge. The threshold of scientificity is crossed when the statements of the epistemological figure comply with archeological rules and certain laws.

Different thresholds and the attention to the threshold of interest make it possible to do different types of historical analysis. kind of history of science was practiced by G. Bachelard and G. Canguilhem, where they dealt only with connaissance or took only the current scientific disciplines and accepted these fully constituted sciences as the norm of its historical analysis to write the history of how the concepts and standards of these sciences developed freeing itself from pre-scientific stuffs. But the archeological history which Foucault practices does not accept norms of fully constituted sciences in an uncritical way and subject them to archeological analysis, which shows that their emergence is rooted in contingent historical processes and archeological or epistemological structures. The presence of the set of relations among different discursive practices is possible because this set of discursive practices is tethered to common non-discursive domains and its practices which make possible the occurrence of different discursive practices at a given period.

Foucault says that scientific norms originate at the interaction point of discursive practices and non-discursive systems, which has the effect of removing the role of subject in the formation of norms by showing that norms originate beyond the domain of subjectivity. The norms, which govern the formation of discourses, are essentially attached to the social practices with shows the nature of

our engagement with the word. The same message can be found in Habermas when he says that it is only the knowledge-constitutive interest or the cognitive interest[7] that lays down the conditions of the possible objectivity of knowledge. So the practical engagement of human with their world at a given period of time serves as the basis for the emergence of the norms of the sciences.

The norms of the sciences played a very critical role in the functioning of modern society. Medical discourse performed specific social functions as individuals were judged and categorized according to its scientific definitions. Administrative and judicial decision making took recourse to it and so it helped in running prisons. Scientific discourses now came to be used in disciplining individuals and thus in the exercise of power.

Third chapter will discuss how discipline as a modern technique of power emerged as the blueprint of a general method. Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* genealogically shows that emergence of this new form or method of punishment, that is, discipline cannot be attributed to just one grand process of incarceration but to different and dispersed minor processes with different origins. This method was in operation even in secondary education, in primary schools, in hospitals, in the restructuring of military organizations and other such places. These different disciplinary institutions with their own individual differences employed meticulous techniques that defined what Foucault calls a new micro-physics[8] of power.

Foucault says that this genealogical history of micro-physics of power would be the genealogy of the modern soul. The soul as a reality get produced by the functioning of power exercised over all those who are supervised, trained and corrected, over children at school and at home and also over madman and the colonized. This genealogy of the modern soul brings into light the historical reality of the soul which is brought into being by the methods of punishment, supervision and constraint.

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[7] Habermas, Jurgan, 1968/1972: 176.
[8] Foucault, 1975/1991: 26.

The modern techniques or methods of power have several new features. These methods or disciplines make possible the maximum control over the functioning of the body in order to keep its forces subjected and maintained a relation of docility-utility on it.

As new system of discourses of truth and technique of power arrives on the scene, the new scientific-juridical complex emerge which served as the basis to discipline body across the society. It can be said that it is the transformation in the way the power relations invests the body that serves as the basis for the scientific-juridical formation and thus for the transformation of punitive methods. A new reality in the form of a modern soul get produced in modern capitalism[9] as familiar institutions, objects and social roles get derealized.

The success of disciplinary power, as Foucault notes, can be attributed to the use of three simple but effective instruments, that is, hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance has great importance among the techniques of power. Disciplinary power becomes an integrated system through such surveillance and is linked to the economy from the inside and to the aims of the mechanism. This power is organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power as it functions as a network of relations from top to bottom and this network holds the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with the effects of power. Power should not be seen as a phenomenon where an individual homogeneously dominates over others. It is not localized in anybody's hand. On the contrary, power functions in the form of a chain or a network of relations from top to bottom and is employed and exercised though a net-like organization. Normalizing judgment is the other instrument which the disciplinary power uses. Any activity, any behavior, any gesture or any sexuality that departs from the rule or the norm is punishable. The punishment involves subtle procedures. The art of punishing in the regime of disciplinary power normalizes and gives the substantial knowledge of the individual, of us. We now know the nature and the abilities of individuals, we now can refer individual actions, and we now can differentiate individuals.

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[9] Lyotard, 1979/1984: 74.

Normal is institutionalized in the organization of a national medical profession and in a hospital system and gets established in the standardization of industrial process and products. Power of the Norm can be seen in the emergence of the modern disciplines.

The third instrument which the disciplinary power uses is the instrument of the examination. It is a normalizing gaze. It seeks to establish a visibility over individuals through which to differentiate and judge them. The hospital gets organized as an examination apparatus and the school also functions as an apparatus of uninterrupted examination. Now there is the practice of regular observation that placed the subject in a situation of perpetual examination. The examination also involves a mass of documents that captures and fix individuals. With all its documentary techniques, the examination makes each individual a case. With documents to refer to it can be said that that a given individual is a case of defaulter of debt and so a given set of techniques of power can be used against this given debt defaulter. Thus we clearly see that power and knowledge directly imply one another. This is what Foucault tries to convey when he speaks of power-knowledge. The combination of hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgement, that is, the examination assures the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory individuality. So we live in a disciplinary society or carceral archipelago[10] but Deleuze goes one step ahead and says that we no longer live in a disciplinary society and we now live in the societies of control[11] as the institutions of disciplinary society enters its fag end.

Foucault also talks about bio-power in The History of Sexuality, which is also discussed in the third chapter. He sees bio-power as supplementing disciplinary power as the techniques to control populations or species body to ensure the right of the social body to maintain and develop its life.

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[10] op.cit., p. 298
[11] Deleuze, 1992: 4

# Chapter 1

# Discourse and Discontinuity

## Introduction

In the early phase of his writing, a distinctive approach emerges in Foucault's dealing with the history of thought. The gradual development of archaeological approach in his initial works reaches sophistication in his pivotal work *The Archeology of Knowledge*. It can be said that this new and unique approach to the history of thought makes Foucault's this phase of writing a unified enterprise. The significance of archeological approach lies in its contribution to the debasement of the role of human subject or the 'constituent subject'[12].

## Archaeology and Contemporary Historiography

Foucault points out that traditional history and its practitioners have paid attention to the primacy of man. He says that traditional history has tried to study in depth the shifts and changes of political events. Traditional historians have preferred to lay emphasis on rapidly changing history of governments, wars, and famines where the human subject plays central role. Thus hackneyed history pays attention to short periods and the rapidly changing human centered events which have taken place during those short periods. Foucault underscores one of the major directions that historical approach and method of recent decades has taken. He says 'for many years now historians have preferred to turn their attention to long

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[12] Foucault, 1977: 117. Foucault says that it would not be enough to modify phenomenologists' stand say that now the subject have the access to truth historically and so the solution is to just historicize the subject. He says that what is needed is to do away altogether with the constituent subject itself and to have an analysis that would account for the constitution of the subject within a historical field.

periods, as if , beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force, and are then suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the  great silent, motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a thick layer of events.'[13] What Foucault seeks to underline is that as contemporary histological method has paid attention to long periods, it cannot be the focus of the doings of any individual subject. Thus any social subject or individual can no longer be the driving factor of any contemporary historical practice. This has been corroborated by what he has to say further 'beneath the rapidly changing history of governments, wars, and famines, there emerge other, apparently unmoving histories: the history of sea routes, the history of corn or of gold-mining, the history of drought, and of irrigation, the history of crop rotation, the history of the balance achieved by the human species between hunger and abundance.'[14] He talks of 'slow movements of material civilization'[15] The contemporary focus on the study of the history of sea routes, of corn or of gold-mining highlights that for current methodology of history human factors are not relevant, rather material conditions are the factors where the attention needs to be paid. Thus the material conditions such as geography and climate determine the deeper processes and silent, motionless bases of history such as the history of sea routes, of corn and the like. These material factors slowly alter the formation of history. He says 'it seemed to me that, for the moment, the essential task was to free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence.'[16] Also with the shift of emphasis on long periods in contemporary historiography, new questions have replaced the traditional ones about how to establish the causal connections between desperate events, about how to define totality. Now the questions being posed are of different nature: 'which strata should be isolated from others? What types of series should be

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[13] Foucault, 1969/2002: 3.
[14] ibid., p.4.
[15] ibid., p.3
[16] ibid., p.223.

established? What criteria of periodization should be adopted for each of them? What system of relations may be established between them? What series of series may be established? And in what large-scale chronological table may distinct series of events be determined?'[17]

Traditional methods of conventional history have also been eschewed in the other branch of contemporary historiography. In the history of though, the focus is no longer on long-term continuities or on periods of great lengths. The emphasis in contemporary historical method has rather shifted on the phenomena of rupture, on sharp discontinuities, on radical breaks. This shift from long-term continuities to sharp dislocations is also associated with the drifting away from the human subject, the constituting subject as in the other branch of historical method practiced in history itself. Foucault says 'at about the same time, in the disciplines that we call the history of ideas, the history of science, the history of philosophy, the history of thought, and the history of literature, in those disciplines which, despite their names, evade very largely the work and method of the historian, attention has been turned, on the contrary, away from vast unities like 'periods' or 'centuries' to the phenomena of rupture, of discontinuity.'[18] The drifting away from the constituting subject means the removal of principal of continuity as the subject has been the principal of continuity. He says 'rather than refer to the living force of change (as if it were its own principle), rather than seek its causes (as if it were no more than a mere effect), archeology tries to establish the system of transformations that constitute change; it tries to develop this empty, abstract notion, with a view to according it the analyzable status of transformation.'[19]    The subject transmitted ideas from one mind to another through different mechanisms down the ages, maintaining the continuities of thought. On the level of ideas, the constituting subject has strived to maintain an unbreakable chain of it. The traditional history has persistently sought to trace the origin of this continuous chain of thought. Foucault observes 'beneath the great

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[17] ibid., p.4
[18] ibid., p.4.
[19] ibid., pp. 190-191.

continuities of thought, beneath the solid, homogeneous manifestations of a single mind or of a collective mentality, beneath the stubborn development of a science striving to exist and to reach completion at the very outset, beneath the persistence of a particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical activity, one is trying to detect the incidence of interruptions. Interruptions whose status and nature vary considerably.'[20] Foucault mentions the analyses of Bachelard on the history of science. Bachelard gives description of epistemological acts and thresholds. He describes epistemological acts as suspending the continuous accumulation of knowledge, cutting it off from the its empirical origin and original motivations, directing historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings, and the never-ending tracing-back of the original precursors, towards the new search for a new type of rationality and its various effects. Fouacult also mentions the analyses of G. Conguilhem on the history of sciences as examples of the new approach which may serve as models. He also points out the work of M. Serres in the history of mathematics that explicates the phenomenon of discontinuity. He also mentions the work of M. Gueroult in the history of philosophy, which analyses the architectonic unities of systems which is not concerned with the description of cultural influences, traditions, and continuities, but with the internal coherences, axioms, deductive connections, compatibilities. Thus in line with the attempt of works of Bachelard, conguilhem, M. Serres, and M. Gueroult, Foucault's early works make bid to formulate a methodology in the history of thought that is free of constituting subject. The historical method adopted in the works of all of them does not seek to establish continuities or patterns or transitions. Foucault says that 'the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations, the rebuilding of foundations.'[21]

Thus, the adoption of the way to analyze the history of thought and the history proper is guided by the necessity to remove the centrality of the human subject and the requirement to focus on discontinuities, radical breaks in the

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[20] ibid., p.4
[21] ibid., p. 5.

analysis of history of thought and on the other hand the need to focus on periods of great lengths, brushing aside a thick layer of changes of political events.

Foucault cautions us against imagining that these two forms of contemporary historiography have crossed without acknowledging one another. He says that both the cases of contemporary historical analysis grapple with the same question, though they provoke opposite effects on the surface. Both approaches find the common ground in the questioning of documents. Tradition historiography has taken to documents in order to decide whether it is telling the truth or not, reconstituting the past from which they emanate and which has now disappeared far behind them, thus reconstituting what men have done and said, the events of which only the trace remains. Modern historiography seeks to treat documents in its own right. It works on history from within and develops it. Foucault says ' Now, through a mutation that is not of very recent origin,  but which still has not come to an end, history has altered its position in relation to the document: it has taken as its primary task, not the interpretation of the document, nor the attempt to decide whether it is telling the truth or what is its expressive value, but to work on it from within and to develop it: history now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unities, describes relations. The document, then, is no longer for history an inert material through which it tries to reconstitute what men have done or said, the events of which only the trace remains; history is now trying to define within the documentary material itself unities, totalities, series, relations.'[22] The document is no longer the convenient tool in the hands of historians, through which to memorize the human centric events and monuments of the past. History for a given society is just one way in which it recognizes and develops a mass of documentation. The writing of history depends on the material documentation of a given society, which includes not only books and accounts but also laws, institutions and customs of the society. He states that 'history is the work

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[22] ibid., p.7.

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expended on material documentation (books, texts, accounts, registers, acts, buildings, institutions, laws, techniques, objects, customs, etc.) that exists, in every time and place, in every society, either in a spontaneous or in a consciously organized form. The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily and fundamentally memory; history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked.'[23] In the traditional approach, history tried to transform memorized monuments of the past into documents. History now makes use of a tangled mass of diverse elements which need to be grouped and placed in relation to one another to form totalities. In the contemporary approach, history seeks to transform documents into monuments. Document now demands treatment in its own right, as if it is a kind of monument. Thus the importance which used to be assigned to monument in historical studies now in present times gets assigned to document. Foucault notes that 'in our time history aspires to the condition of archeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument.'[24] In the past, archeology which focused on silent monuments as a discipline was the mainstay for the writing of history. But in the contemporary time, history seeks to become archeological or seeks to go archeological way.

## Archaeology and Discursive Formation

The analysis of history of thought based on radical breaks or sharp discontinuities may seem improbable as it shrugs off coherency of thought. It seems bizarre to conceive of a history of thought that is not in essence a history of its thinkers. To undermine this age-old entrenched notion sustaining the mainstream history of ideas, Foucault examines or offers a critique of subjective unities. These subjective unities are the myriad products of the intellectual activities of human subjects and are the objects of the mainstream history. Foucault says that this mass of notions presents us with theoretical problems

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[23] ibid., p.7.
[24] ibid., p.7

which need to be done away with in order to make use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture, and transformation in the study of history of thought. He says 'The use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation present all historical analysis not only with questions of procedure, but with theoretical problems. It is these problems that will be studied here. These theoretical problems too will be examined only in a particular field: in those disciplines - so unsure of their frontiers, and so vague in content - that we call the history of ideas, or of thought, or of science, or of knowledge.'[25]

These unities can be arranged into a hierarchy according to their proximity to the immediate activity of the individual subject. At the most basic level is the particular book by a particular writer, and then there is the oeuvre or the collection of all the works of a given writer. Foucault says 'the unities that must be suspended above all are those that emerge in the most immediate way: those of the book and the oeuvre. At first sight, it would seem that one could not abandon these unities without extreme artificiality.'[26] The fundamental unities of book and oeuvre are taken as unproblematic starting points for history of thought. They are treated as if they possess self-evidence. A little probing reveals that it is very difficult to define the contours of either book or oeuvre. He points out that as soon as one looks at the matter a little more closely, it becomes clear that 'the frontier of a book are never clear-cut : beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences : it is a node within a network.'[27] A book constructs itself on the basis of a complex field of discourse only. He says 'as soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; it indicates itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse.'[28] Regarding oeuvre, Foucault notes that 'if one speaks, so undiscriminately and unreflectingly of an author's oeuvre, it is because one imagines it to be defined by a certain expressive function. One is admitting that there must be a level (as deep

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[25] ibid., p.23.
[26] ibid., p.25.
[27] ibid., pp.25-26.
[28] ibid. p.26.

as it is necessary to imagine it) at which the oeuvre emerges, in all its fragments, even the smallest, most inessential ones, as the expression of the thought, the experience, the imagination, or the unconscious of the author, or, indeed, of the historical determinations that operated upon him. But it is at once apparent that such a unity, far from being given immediately, is the result of an operation; that this operation is interpretative. ….The oeuvre can be regarded neither as an immediate unity, nor as a certain unity, nor as a homogeneous unity.'[29] At a level higher than book and oeuvre, there comes the notion of tradition. Tradition intends to give a 'special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical (or at least similar); it makes it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the form of the same; it allows a reduction of the difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue without discontinuity the endless search for the origin.'[30] Then finally come different disciplines or major types of discourse under subjective unities. Different types of discourses can be seen as divisions or groupings. Foucault observes that 'we are not even sure of ourselves when we use these distinctions in our world of discourse, … these division - whether our own, or those contemporary with the discourse under examination - are always themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, institutionalized types: they, in turn, are facts of discourse that deserve to be analyzed beside others; of course, they also have complex relations with each other, but they are not intrinsic, autochthonous, and universally recognizable characteristics.'[31] Thus principles of division and norm-setting rules dictate the ordering of discourse. These rules, principles need to be put under the scanner of analysis as they are not indigenous and intrinsic features. These subjective unities are related by different subjective means of transmission within the conventional history of thought. There exist the notion of development and evolution which 'make it possible to group a succession of dispersed events, to link them to one and the same organizing principle, …., to discover, already at work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future

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[29] ibid., p.27.
[30] ibid., p.23.
[31] ibid., p.24-25.

unity.'[32] Then there is the notion of influence, which 'provides a support …. for the facts of transmission and communication; which refers to an apparently causal process …. The phenomena of resemblance or repetition; which links, at a distance and through time …. Such defined unities as individuals, oeuvres, notions, or theories.'[33] Finally there is the notion of spirit 'which enables us to establish between the simultaneous or successive phenomena of a given period a community of meanings, symbolic links, an interplay of resemblance and reflexion, or which allows the sovereignty of collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation.' [34] Foucault also rakes up two vital themes within traditional history of thought, which were used to maintain the unquestioned continuity of discourse. One is of secret origin. This involves 'a wish that it should never be possible to assign, in the order of discourse, the irruption of a real event; that beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a secret origin – so secret and so fundamental that it can never be quite grasped in itself. Thus one is led …towards an ever receding point that is never itself present in any history. … the first theme sees historical analysis of discourse as the quest for and the repetition of an origin that eludes all historical determination.'[35] Thus 'discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs.'[36] The second theme, which can be called pre-linguistic thought, is connected to the first one. According to this theme, 'all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already-said'; and that this 'already-said' is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, but a 'never-said', an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath, a writing that is merely the hollow of its own mark. It is supposed therefore that everything that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in that semi-silence that precedes it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it covers and silences. The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this 'not-said' is a hollow that

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[32] ibid., p.24.
[33] ibid., p.24.
[34] ibid., p.24
[35] ibid., p.28.
[36] ibid., p.28.

undermines from within all that is said.[37] Foucault castigates traditional historians and commonplace research done in the history of ideas when he says that 'to seek in the great accumulation of the already-said the text that resembles 'in advance' a later text, to ransack history in order to rediscover the play of anticipations or echoes, to go right back to the first seeds or to go forward to the last traces, to reveal in a work its fidelity to tradition or its irreducible uniqueness, to raise or lower its stock of originality, to say that the Port Royal grammarians invented nothing, or to discover that Cuvier had more predecessors than one thought, these are harmless enough amusements for historians who refuse to grow up.'[38] This reminds one of G. Canguilhem's critique of original precursors in his analysis of the history of science. Foucault seeks to suspend these immediate forms of continuity and take to the project of a pure description of discursive events because this description reveals that the field of discursive events is a finite grouping of statements at any moment. This is not the case in a language (langue) which is a finite body of rules but it authorizes an infinite number of possible performances. Thus the new method in contemporary historiography strives to explain what is it that determines the appearance of one particular statement rather than other. Foucault tries to emphasize that the objective of any discourse analysis is to be sure that the occurrence of the statement/event is not linked with synthesizing operations of a purely psychological kind but rather to be able to be able to understand other forms of regularity and other types of relations. Thus every statement/event needs to be understood in terms of the 'relations between statements, relations between groups of statements, and relations between statements and groups of statements and events of a quite different kind (technical, economic, social, political)'[39]. The purpose of it is to explain 'the interplay of relations within it and outside it.'[40]

      The problems posed by Foucault may not show that the subjective unities and the subjective means of transmission are on shaky ground and incoherent, but

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[37] ibid., p.27-28.

[38] ibid., p.160.

[39] ibid., p.32

[40] ibid., p.32

these difficulties adequately questions their self-evident starting points and show that they are riddled with problems. Thus non-subject-centered categories can replace them as basic categories of the history of thought. It is here that Foucault presents his archeology of thought as doing this job.

Traditional historical inquiry and Foucault's archeology both need documents or collections of statements to begin with. But the way they treat documents differs in a significant way. Conventional history of ideas uses documents to get to the intention, thoughts and beliefs of the author who produce it. Documents were used to understand the synthesizing operations of a psychological kind. They were seen as the language of a voice which is no longer present, thus document is just the way to reach that voice. The linguistic data of statements acts as an object to revive the inner life of constituting subjects in this case. Foucault's archeology on the contrary treats statements as objects of study in their own right, without paying any attention to what was the author's thought. For him, statements need to be treated as monuments. Grammar and logic already treat statements in their own right. Grammar specifies the conditions which make a statement meaningful, while logic on the other hand determines what can be added to a given set of statements or what cannot be added to that set of statements. It is clear that is pretty much possible to make a multiplicity of statements which are grammatically and logically possible but cannot be supported by either strong or weak sense of verification or simply do not have basis in any experiences, beliefs, or intentions of subjects. Ancient people did not talk about optical fiber or star death because they had no experience of it; many social factors caused Victorians to suppress some aspects of sexuality. Thus it is clear that any domain or epoch only entertain the set of statements which is only a miniscule subset of grammatically and logically possible statements. Foucault says that there are the rules of formation to which statements are subjected, which explains such linguistic gaps in many basic cases. These further set of rules are neither grammatical nor logical and one observes these rules of formation whether one knows about it or not. He says that it is discursive formation to which such a set of statements belongs.

Foucault's emphasis on statements is in keeping with his attempt to avoid all subjective unities of discourse confronting him and to pay attention rather to all forms of discontinuity, break or threshold. He seeks to describe statements and the relations between them in the field of discourse itself. His first of all tries to understand how disciplines like political economy, grammar, biology, medicine or psychopathology are made up of particular set of statements. He attempts to understand these unities. He asks what makes the 'analysis of headaches carried out by Willis or Charcot belong to the same order of discourse? ....What sort of links can validly be recognized between all these statements that form, in such a familiar and insistent way, such an enigmatic mass?'[41]

Foucault says that it is convenient to say statements form a set if they refer to one and the same object. But he says that 'I soon realized that the unity of the object 'madness' does not enable one to individualize a group of statements, and to establish between them a relation that is both constant and describable.'[42] This is because it would be a wrong step to say anything of madness by just interrogating the being of madness, its secret content, and its self-enclosed truth. He says that in fact the object, for example mental illness, is constituted by 'all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own.'[43] Further the object or referent do not exist outside the discourse or precede it that tend to describe and name it. Also the give set of statements do not deal with just one object. He says that discourse on madness or  this 'group of statements is far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all, and to preserving it indefinitely as its horizon of inexhaustible ideality; the object presented as their correlative by medical statements of the seventeenth or eighteenth century is not identical with the object that emerges in legal sentences or police action; similarly, all the objects of psychopathological discourses were modified from Pinel or Esquirol to Bleuler: it is not the same illnesses that are at issue in each of these

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[41] ibid., p.34-35.
[42] ibid., p.35.
[43] ibid., p.35.

cases ; we are not dealing with the same madmen.'[44] Thus different discourses on say madness by different authors or of different domains constitute its own object and work it to the point of transforming it altogether. Attention should be focused on the space in which various objects take shape and get transformed incessantly rather than paying attention to the permanence of an object. He says that it the typical relations between the statements that is important and serve to segregate and individualize a set of statements. It is the interplay of rules that makes possible the emergence of different objects and define the transformations of these objects. He mentions that 'the typical relation that would enable us to individualize a group of statements concerning madness then (would) be: the rule of simultaneous or successive emergence of the various objects that are named, described, analysed, appreciated, or judged in that relation? The unity of discourses on madness would not be based upon the existence of the object ' madness', or the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time…. Moreover, the unity of the discourses on madness would be the interplay of the rules that define the transformations of these different objects, their non-identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence.'[45]

The second element that determined the relations between the statements is a certain style or a manner of statements. As opposed to content, a discourse is united by its form. The emergence of modern medical science can be attributed largely to a certain manner of statements. Foucault says that modern discourses on medicine consisted of 'corpus of knowledge that presupposed the same way of looking at things, the same division of the perceptual field, the same analysis of the pathological fact in accordance with the visible space of the body.'[46] Thus a series of descriptive statements determined the organization of medicine. He says that the unity of discourse or of a group of statement is not due to a determined form of statements. The unity is rather due to the 'group of rules,

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[44] ibid., p.35
[45] ibid., p.35
[46] ibid., p.36.

which, simultaneously or in turn, have made possible purely perceptual descriptions, together with observations mediated through instruments, the procedures used in laboratory experiments, statistical calculations, epidemiological or demographic observations, institutional regulations, and therapeutic practice.'[47] One must seek to 'characterize and individualize the coexistence of these dispersed and heterogeneous statements; the system that governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement, and replacement.'[48] Thus within given discourses there are myriad ways of describing the object of the discourse.

The third element that affects the grouping of statements is the concepts. Foucault says that one cannot group the statements just by determining the system of permanent and coherent concepts. Synchronic conceptual framework will not lead to a possible set of statements. New concepts keep appearing. One can find the unity of a discourse not in the 'coherence of concepts, but in their simultaneous or successive emergence, in the distance that separates them and even in their incompatibility.'[49] The endeavor should not be to discover an architecture of concepts sufficiently general and abstract to straddle all other concepts, rather one should make effort to analyze the interplay of their appearance and dispersion.

The fourth element which proves decisive in the formation of set of statements is the themes or theoretical viewpoints. Foucault says that one cannot achieve the unity of discourse based on the persistence of themes only. He says that it may seem tempting and convenient to root for one thematic in order to come up with a linking of a group of discourses in the face of many philosophical options and political influences. One should rather consider everything or every factor that constitute a particular theme which seeks to unite a discourse. The same thematic  can be articulated 'on the basis of two sets of concepts, two types

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[47] ibid., p.37.
[48] ibid., p.37.
[49] ibid., p.38.

of analysis, two perfectly different fields of objects: in its most general formulation, the evolutionist idea is perhaps the same in the work of Benoit de Maillet, Bordeu or Diderot, and in that of Darwin; but, in fact, what makes it possible and coherent is not at all the same thing in either case.'[50] Thus a single theme can be present or established in two types of discourses or different groups of statements. He also impress upon us to find various strategic possibilities that makes possible the activation of incompatible themes. He thus queries that 'rather than seeking the permanence of themes, images, and opinions through time, rather than retracing the dialectic of their conflicts in order to individualize groups of statements, could one not rather mark out the dispersion of the points of choice, and define prior to any option, to any thematic preference, a field of strategic possibilities?'[51]

Thus the unity of large group of statements like grammar, medicine, or economics, which we confront on a regular basis, is not based on continuous and defined field of objects or on a definite type of statements. Those discursive unities are neither based on a defined collection of notions nor on the permanence of a thematic. Therefore Foucault seeks to describe dispersions themselves. One should not try to discover between these elements a progressively deductive structure, nor a single huge book that is being gradually and continuously written, nor the oeuvre of a collective subject. He tries to describe these dispersions so as to discover 'whether, between these elements,… one cannot discern a regularity: an order in their successive appearance, correlations in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and hierarchized transformations.'[52] He puts emphasis on studying forms of divisions and on describing systems of dispersion. He says that 'such an analysis would not try to isolate small islands of coherence in order to describe their internal conflicts; it would study forms of division. Or again: instead of reconstituting *chains of inference* (as one does in the history of the sciences or of philosophy),

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[50] ibid., p.39-40.
[51] ibid., p.40.
[52] ibid., p.41.

instead of drawing up *tables of differences* (as the linguists do), it would describe *systems of dispersion.*'[53]

On the basis of all these considerations, Foucault puts forth the critical notion of discursive formation. In fact it can be said that the focus of AK is on discursive formations. The use of this notion helps one avoid hackneyed terms which come laden with conditions and consequences. These clichéd terms also falls short of designating what is now seen as dispersions like science, domain of objectivity, or ideology. He says that one deals with a discursive formation 'whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations).'[54] A discursive formation thus involves four basic elements: the objects its statements stand for, the kinds of statements or the cognitive status or authority they have, the concepts in terms of which they are formulated, and the themes they develop. However, a given discursive formation cannot be defined by a defined and packed field of objects, a definite type of statement, a distinctive conceptual framework, or the permanence of a thematic. The same discursive formation can serve as a vehicle for discourse about different fields of objects, categorized under different conceptual set-up, and its statements will have different styles and may develop many different theoretical stands.

Thus Foucault does not hold a discursive formation to be defined by any unity of objects, styles, concepts, or method give by its elements. On the contrary, a discursive formation acts as a system of dispersion for its elements. It defines regularity or a field within which a variety of different sets of elements can be deployed. Therefore the rules that govern the formation of statements define the unity of a discursive formation. Foucault calls it the rules of formation that determine the deployment of the elements of a discursive formation. He says that 'the conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statements, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we call the *rules of*

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[53] ibid., p.41.
[54] ibid., p. 41.

*formation*. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division.'[55] Thus it is the rules of formation that govern the formation of statements about different fields of objects, showing different manners of statements, using different conceptual frameworks, and giving voice to different themes.

## Discourse, Discontinuity and Modern Thought

The three Classical empirical sciences, general grammar, natural history, the science of wealth and the modern sciences of philology, biology, and economics are the examples of discursive formations in Foucault's historical studies. The nineteenth-century empirical sciences are each separate discursive formations and are also not part of the discursive formations of the corresponding Classical empirical sciences. Classical natural history, for example, was a codified and normative system of statements, while the modern medical discourse is a group of perceptual descriptions. This reflects the sharp break between Classical and modern thought. His major work *The Order of Things* discusses the radical discontinuities that occurred in the episteme of western world.[56] He notes that 'the last years of the eighteenth century are broken by a discontinuity similar to that which destroyed Renaissance thought at the beginning of the seventeenth; then, …. a discontinuity as enigmatic in its principle, in its original rupture, as that which separated the Paracelsian circles from the Cartesian order.'[57] Both the Classical age and the Modern age have different conceptions of knowledge. The conception of knowledge in a given epoch is grounded in its experience of order. The Classical age order was a matter of relations of identity and difference, whereas the Modern age order is grounded in organic structures, in internal

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[55] ibid., p. 42.

[56] Foucault's archaeological inquiry reveals two discontinuities in the *episteme* of Western culture. The first starts the Classical age and the second mark the beginning of the modern age.

[57] Foucault, 1966/1970: 235.

relations between elements. Foucault's archeology shows that in the modern episteme the 'general area of knowledge is no longer that of identities and differences, that of non-quantitative orders, that of a universal characterization, of a general *taxinomia*, of a non-measurable mathesis, but an area made up of organic structures, that is, of internal relations between elements whose totality performs a function; it will show that these organic structures are discontinuous, that they do not, therefore, form a table of unbroken simultaneities, but that certain of them are on the same level whereas others form series or linear sequences.'[58] In the Classical thought, the problem was of discovering a nomenclature that would be a taxonomy, because the 'essential problem of Classical thought lay in the relations between *name* and *order*: how to discover a *nomenclature* that would be a *taxonomy*, or again, how to establish a system of signs that would be transparent to the continuity of being.'[59] Thus the order of representative discourse was the order of things. This cornerstone problem of Classical thought to lay bare the relations between name and order stems from the Classical thought's ontological standing that being is offered to representation without interruption. The ontology characterizing the Classical thought effected the ordering of empiricity of Classical age as the 'ordering of empiricity is … linked to the ontology that characterizes Classical thought; indeed, from the very outset, this thought exists within an ontology rendered transparent by the fact that being is offered to representation without interruption; and within a representation illuminated by the fact that it releases the continuity of being.'[60] As the new form of thought emerged in the modern age, it became evident that it is possible to know only phenomena and laws and not substances and essences. Thus it is not the ideal essences that determine the order of concrete things but rather the hidden historical forces inside it determine the order of things, as 'European culture is inventing for itself a depth in which what matters is no longer identities, distinctive characters, permanent tables with all their possible paths and routes, but great hidden forces developed on the basis of their primitive and inaccessible

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[58] ibid., p. 236.
[59] ibid., p. 226.
[60] ibid., p. 224.

nucleus, origin, causality, and history.'[61] Under the new conception of order, a new conception of the sign took shape. This striped representation of the central role that Classical age gave it. Representation now came to be seen as grounded in terms of something other than itself, because 'representation has lost the power to provide a foundation – with its own being, its own deployment and its power of doubling over on itself – for the links that can join its various elements together. No composition, no decomposition, no analysis into identities and differences can now justify the connection of representations one to another.'[62] The condition of connections no longer reside inside representation, rather it lies 'outside representation, beyond its immediate visibility, in a sort of behind-the-scenes world even deeper and more dense than representation itself.' [63] This served to 'open up language to a whole new domain: that of a perpetual and objectively based correlation of the visible and the expressible.'[64]

As human plumbed the depths of life, critical thinking paved the way for the phenomenal realm to take the centre stage or to be the only area of concern for the human's epistemological endeavor, which led to the synthetic notion of life. It helped create the modern conception of knowledge, which created the conditions of possibility of modern discourses like of biology. Escaping from mechanistic confines of Classical age, notion of life now acquires new dimension, as 'from Cuvier onward, it is life in its non-perceptible, purely functional aspect that provides the basis for the exterior possibility of a classification. The classification of living beings is no longer to be found in the great expanse of order; the possibility of classification now arises from the depths of life, from those elements most hidden from view. Before, the living being was a locality of natural classification; now, the fact of being classifiable is a property of the living being. So the project of a general *taxinomia* disappears.'[65] Biological being now becomes regional and autonomous, which facilitated the 'transition from the taxonomic to the synthetic notion of life which is indicated, in the chronology of

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[61] ibid., p. 274.
[62] ibid., p. 259.
[63] ibid., p. 259.
[64] Foucault, 1963/2003: 242.
[65] op.cit. p. 292.

ideas and sciences, by the recrudescence, in the early nineteenth century, of vitalist themes. From the archaeological point of view, what is being established at this particular moment is the conditions of possibility of a *biology*.'[66] In the importance attached to the phenomenal world lies the genesis of positivism, which indicates a reversion to the Classical thought, as 'for classical thought, finitude had no other content than the negation of the infinite, while the thought that was formed at the end of the eighteenth century gave it the powers of the positive: the anthropological structure that then appeared played both the critical role of limit and the founding role of origin. It was this reversal that served as the philosophical condition for the organization of a positive medicine; inversely, this positive medicine marked, at the empirical level, the beginning of that fundamental relation that binds modern man to his original finitude.'[67]

Foucault is of the view that from the nineteenth century the most important development was the fragmentation of the epistemological field under the new conception of knowledge. The field of knowledge was perfectly homogeneous in the Classical period. All kinds of knowledge, be it mathematics, empirical sciences or philosophy, was just the part of homogeneous field of orderable representation. It was the matter of constructing an ordered table of identities and differences between representations in order to know. Under the Classical order with the vast plan of continuities, 'the field of knowledge, from the project of an analysis of representation to the theme of the *mathesis universalis*, was perfectly homogeneous: all knowledge, of whatever kind, proceeded to the ordering of its material by the establishment of differences and defined those differences by the establishment of an order; this was true for mathematics, true also for *taxonomies* (in the broad sense) and for the sciences of nature, …. it was true, finally, for philosophical thought.'[68] On the contrary, the archeological plunge makes it possible for the modern episteme to be seen as a volume of three-dimensional space. This splintering off of the epistemological field is the most ground-breaking development of the modern age. The modern

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[66] op.cit., p.293.
[67] op.cit., p 244.
[68] op.cit., p.377.

age no longer employed the same method in all the branches of knowledge and linear series and hierarchies counted for naught; instead 'from the nineteenth century, the epistemological field became fragmented, or rather exploded in different directions.'[69] The space of knowledge acquired three distinct dimensions. The modern knowledge is situated in the volume or space defined by three different dimensions. This is because when questioned at the archeological level, 'the field of the modern *episteme* is not ordered in accordance with the ideal of a perfect mathematicization, nor does it unfold, on the basis of a formal purity, a long, descending sequence of knowledge progressively more burdened with empiricity. The domain of the modern *episteme* should be represented rather as a volume of space open in three dimensions.'[70] The one of the dimensions of the epistemological trihedron is constituted by the mathematical and physical sciences, for which 'order is always a deductive and linear linking together of evident or verified propositions.'[71] Another dimension of this three-dimensional epistemological space is that of empirical sciences of biology, philology, and economics, which work up its way by relating discontinuous but analogical elements in order to be able to reveal causal relations and structural constants between them as Foucault says that 'in a second dimension there would be the sciences (such as those of language, life, and the production and distribution of wealth) that proceed by relating discontinuous but analogous elements in such a way that they are then able to establish causal relations and structural constants between them. These first two dimensions together define a common plane: that which can appear, according to the direction in which one traverses it, as a field of application of mathematics to these empirical sciences, or as the domain of the mathematicizable in linguistics, biology, and economics.[72] The last and third dimension of the epistemological space is that of philosophical reflection, which tries to achieve a unified understanding of the basis of knowledge and the order of reality. Here the philosophies of different domains such as of life, man, symbolic

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[69] op.cit., p.378.
[70] op.cit., p.378.
[71] op.cit., p.378.
[72] op.cit., p.378.

forms directly or indirectly rely on what the different empirical sciences has to offer in terms of its deeper findings, thus forming a common plane with the dimension of linguistics, biology, and economics. Further regional philosophical reflection when adopts the line of radical philosophical argument gives rise to the regional ontologies which define life, labour, and language in its own being. He says that the 'third dimension would be that of philosophical reflection, which develops as a thought of the Same; it forms a common plane with the dimension of linguistics, biology, and economics: it is here that we may meet, and indeed have met, the various philosophies of life, of alienated man, of symbolical forms (when concepts and problems that first arose in different empirical domains are transposed into the philosophical dimension); but we have also encountered here, if we question the foundation of these empiricities from a radically philosophical point of view, those regional ontologies which attempt to define what life, labour, and language are in their own being.'[73]

Thus with synthetic notion of life in place, a yawning divide was facilitated between the mathematical sciences and the empirical sciences, with only deductive sciences now possessing analytic knowledge. The decline of representation in the modern age also resulted in the separation of philosophy as a mode of inquiry, which is methodologically distinct.

At the same time there are the human sciences or the sciences of man, which have fuzzy distribution within the three-dimensional epistemological space, as they cannot be located along any of its dimension or on the surface of any of its plane. The human sciences can be found only in the volume defined by the three dimensions of the epistemological space, placing them in the complex relation to all the other forms of knowledge. These sciences speak of man. In other words, like philosophy man is the chief concern of the human sciences. These sciences seek to understand the metaphysical status of man, as their aim is to traverse all the empirical manifestations of mode of being of man. This shows their uncertainty as sciences and also their dangerous familiarity with philosophy. This complex position of human sciences is due to the intricate epistemological

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[73] op.cit., p.378.

configuration in which they are placed. 'What explains the difficulty of the 'human sciences', their precariousness, their uncertainty as sciences, their dangerous familiarity with philosophy, their ill-defined reliance upon other domains of knowledge, their perpetually secondary and derived character, and also their claim to universality, is not, as is often stated, the extreme density of their object; it is not the metaphysical status or the inerasable transcendence of this man they speak of, but rather the complexity of the epistemological configuration in which they find themselves placed, their constant relation to the three dimensions that give them their space.'[74] The human sciences sees man as a living being, who lives, speaks, and produces, because 'the human sciences are addressed to man in so far as he lives, speaks, and produces. It is as a living being that he grows, that he has functions and needs, that he sees opening up a space whose movable coordinates meet in him.'[75] The human sciences thus deal with man as a subject, who constitutes representations which constitute his word or by means of which he lives. These sciences deal with that man who provides himself with a representation of economics itself and also comes up with a representation of language itself. These sciences of man do not deal with that living being who possesses a very particular form or that man who is by nature bound to work or is just a speaking being because 'man for the human sciences is not that living being with a very particular form (a somewhat special physiology and an almost unique autonomy); he is that living being who, from within the life to which he entirely belongs and by which he is traversed in his whole being, constitutes representations by means of which he lives, and on the basis of which he possesses that strange capacity of being able to represent to himself precisely that life. … the object of the human sciences is not that man who, since the dawn of the world, or the first cry of his golden age, is doomed to work; it is that being who, from within the forms of production by which his whole existence is governed, forms the representation of those needs, of the society by which, with which, or against which he satisfies them, so that upon that basis he can finally

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[74] op.cit., p.380.
[75] op.cit., p.383.

provide himself with a representation of economics itself. …The object of the human sciences is not language (though it is spoken by men alone); it is that being which, from the interior of the language by which he is surrounded, represents to himself, by speaking, the sense of the words or propositions he utters, and finally provides himself with a representation of language itself.'[76] Thus the object of the human sciences differs from that of the empirical sciences like biology, philology, and economics. The empirical sciences on the contrary treat man as part of nature, as an empirical object whose representation faculties are the products of the external world. The sciences of man are an analysis that extends from man's nature as a living, speaking, laboring being to its transcendental realm as the human sciences 'are not … an analysis of what man is by nature; but rather an analysis that extends from what man is in his positivity (living, speaking, labouring being) to what enables this same being to know (or seek to know) what life is, in what the essence of labour and its laws consist, and in what way he is able to speak .'[77]

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[76] op.cit., p.384-385.
[77] op.cit., p.385.

# Chapter 2

# Discourse, Knowledge and Power

## Introduction

Foucault's archeological approach to the history of thought, as we saw, strives to 'establish the system of transformations that constitute change'[78]. Here the significant question of how to explain this change arises. As archeology pays little or no regard to the notion of tradition, of influence, of evolution, or of spirit, the concern for the causes that act as the driving forces of the history of thought assumes significance. In his sleek works of 1970s, he adopts genealogical approach to history which supplements archeological approach to address the vexed question of causality as he focuses largely on the essential connection of knowledge and power. His later works seek to establish a veritable symbiotic nexus between knowledge and power, leading to causal explanation of changes in discursive formation and establishing a vital connection between discursive and nondiscursive practices. The genealogical approach shows that a complex motley of microfactors effects changes in the nondiscursive practices. Genealogy is to discursive practices what archeology is to discursive practices because it also labors to remove the role of a central, constituting subject.

## Discourses and Knowledge

Foucault tries to explain the changes in the discursive formation by looking at the relations of thought and discourse to the factors that lie outside them. These

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[78] Op.cit., p. 191.

factors can be institutional structures, as he says that 'discontinuity – the fact that within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a new way – probably begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which it has never ceased to think from the very beginning. Ultimately, the problem that presents itself is that of the relations between thought and culture: how is it that thought has a place in the space of the world, that it has its origin there, and that it never ceases, in this place or that, to begin anew?'[79] It is important to first look at his initial formulation of dynamic conception of knowledge when he draws distinction between connaisance and savior. Foucault makes it clear that archeology's concern is not with the description of disciplines or sciences[80], as he says that 'archaeology does not describe disciplines. At most, such disciplines may, in their manifest deployment, serve as starting-points for the description of positivities; but they do not fix its limits: they do not impose defmitive divisions upon it; at the end of the analysis they do not re-emerge in the same state in which they entered it; one cannot establish a bi-univocal relation between established disciplines and discursive formations.[81] Archeology's concern lies in paying attention to discursive formation or positivity that makes possible the existence of disciplines and sciences. He says that it the episteme of the epoch that archeology seeks to reveal and which defines the conditions of possibility of all forms of knowledge as 'in any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one *episteme* that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice. The monetary reform prescribed by the States General of 1575, mercantilist measures, or Law's experiment and its liquidation, all have the same archaeological basis as the theories of Davanzatti, Bouteroue, Petty, or Cantillon. And it is these fundamental necessities of knowledge that we must give voice

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[79] op.cit., p. 56.
[80] Though, Foucault's archeological studies in his early phase of writing deals extensively with sciences, his archeological approach can be applied to discourses of any sort in equal measure as his archeology concerns the discursive formation.
[81] op.cit., p. 197.

to.'[82] It is in this epistemic context all branches of knowledge become relevant and intelligible. Investigations and requisite examinations required by new disciplines were also structured in this epistemic matrix, which made possible the coexistence of dispersed and heterogeneous statements and concepts. Sartre also attaches importance to the contemporary state of knowledge in determining the character of an experiment as he says that 'in the sciences of Nature we can have a general idea of the aim of an experiment (experience) and the conditions for it to be valid, without knowing what physical fact is to be investigated, what instruments it will employ, or what experimental system it will identify and construct. In other words, a scientific hypothesis includes its own experimental requirements; it indicates, in broad outline, the conditions that the proof must satisfy; but this initial schema can be distinguished only formally from the conjecture which is to be tested. This is why the hypothesis has sometimes been called an experimental idea. It is historical circumstances (the history of the instruments, the contemporary state of knowledge) which give the projected experiment its peculiar physiognomy.'[83] Foucault cites the example of psychiatric discipline which differed radically in its content, internal organization, practical function, and methods from the corresponding traditional disciplines because this new discipline owes its emergence at the beginning of the nineteenth century to the contemporary discursive formation. The examination of this new discipline reveals that 'a whole set of relations between hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the norms of industrial labour and bourgeois morality' makes it possible and this discursive practice is 'not only manifested in a discipline possessing a scientific status and scientific pretensions; it is also found in operation in legal texts, in literature, in philosophy, in political decisions, and in the statements made and the opinions expressed in daily life.'[84] Further, there was no single autonomous

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[82] op.cit., p. 183.

[83] Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1960/2004: 42. Sartre notes the importance of historical circumstances and the present state of knowledge in determining the conditions which the relevant investigation must meet while offering the critique of purportedly critical investigation and also says due to this Foucault, among others, does the same i.e. they construct their own system to get the requisite result.

[84] Op.cit., p.197.

discipline which preceded the establishment of psychiatry, but in the classical period 'there were a discursive formation and a positivity perfectly accessible to description, to which corresponded no definite discipline that could be compared with psychiatry.'[85] Thus, discursive formations may be mapped by scientific disciplines but they go way beyond the boundaries of any scientific disciplines and it were these discursive formations that archeology seeks to describe. He says that the elements of only natural history of classical period does not constitute the prototype of modern biology because it also uses 'the analysis of reflex movement (which was to have so much importance in the constitution of an anatomo-physiology of the nervous system), the theory of germs (which seems to anticipate the problems of evolution and genetics) , the explanation of animal or vegetal growth (which was to be one of the major questions of the physiology of organisms in general)'[86] of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, which were ignored by natural history. These all diverse and dispersed elements need to figure in the genealogy of modern biology and not just natural history which is linked only to the theory of signs and to the project of a science of order. The autonomy and rigid enclosure of natural history excludes the elements which can legitimately contribute to the constitution of biology. The same can be said about other established sciences of classical period. Thus it can be said that 'discursive formations are not future sciences at the stage at which, still unconscious of themselves, they are quietly being constituted: they are not, in fact, in a state of teleological subordination in relation to the orthogenesis of the sciences.'[87] It is also true that positivities and sciences not always exist in an exclusive relation and that there is always the possibility of a science where there is a positivity. Foucault cites the example of clinical medicine. In its early phase of development, clinical medicine cannot be considered a science but in the course of the nineteenth century it established definite relations between established sciences of physiology, chemistry, or microbiology and also brought into being other discourses such as morbid anatomy. All these considerations made Foucault to

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[85] op.cit., p. 198.
[86] op.cit., p. 199.
[87] op.cit., p. 199.

come to the conclusion that 'discursive formations can be identified, therefore, neither as sciences, nor as scarcely scientific disciplines, nor as distant prefigurations of the sciences to come, nor as forms that exclude any scientificity from the outset.'[88] This raises the question of the relation between the positivities and the sciences. This puzzle can be sorted out by drawing the distinction between what Foucault calls savoir and connaisance.

He calls 'epistemic knowledge' savoir and scientific knowledge or 'accumulated, refined, deepened, adjusted knowledge'[89] connaisance. To constitute a scientific discourse or a discipline containing scientific knowledge such as psychopathology or particle physics, a group of objects, enunciations, concepts, and theoretical choices need to be formed by a discursive practice. These elements are made available by the savoir of a discursive formation or what Foucault calls the knowledge of a discursive formation such as Natural History or political economy. Foucault says that to analyze positivities or discursive formation is to 'show in accordance with which rules a discursive practice may form groups of objects, enunciations, concepts, or theoretical choices' and these elements are that 'on the basis of which coherent (or incoherent) propositions are built up, more or less exact descriptions developed, verifications carried out, theories deployed. They form the precondition of what is later revealed and which later functions as an item of knowledge or an illusion, an accepted truth or an exposed error, a definitive acquisition or an obstacle surmounted. This precondition may not, of course, be analyzed as a donnee, a lived experience, still implicated in the imagination or in perception, which mankind in the course of its history took up again in the form of rationality, or which each individual must undergo on his own account if he wishes to rediscover the ideal meanings that are contained or concealed within it. It is not a pre-knowledge or an archaic stage in the movement that leads from immediate knowledge to apodicticity.'[90] It can then be noted that savoir cannot be seen as providing just uncritical knowledge from which to build scientific knowledge so as to reach apodictic certainty following

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[88] op.cit., pp. 199-200.
[89] op.cit., p. 169.
[90] op.cit., p. 200.

phenomenologist's path. We also should not see savoir as a donnee or a confirmed knowledge base which is given to the development of a science because science is not linked with 'that which must have been lived, or must be lived, if the intention of ideality proper to it is to be established; but with that which must have been said - or must be said - if a discourse is to exist that complies, if necessary, with the experimental or formal criteria of scicntificity.'[91] Thus we can say that the grouping of elements done in a regular manner is important as in Foucault's view 'this group of elements, formed in a regular manner by a discursive practice, and which are indispensable to the constitution of a science, although they are not necessarily destined to give rise to one, can be called knowledge. Knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice, and which is specified by that fact: the domain constituted by the different objects that will or will not acquire a scientific status; knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse; knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are defmed, applied and transformed; lastly, knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse.'[92] Foucault thus sees objects which the discourses talks about as emerging in the space offered by savoir. It is in this space the subject speaks of the objects of his discourse. Thus the occurrence of discursive formations and the objects made possible by it is coeval. There is no one permanent, delimited object to refer to. This underpins the nominalist streak in Foucault's archeological approach. This nonrealistic line is what is found even in two of the twentieth century's most towering physical theories, that is, the theory of general relativity and the quantum theory, as concepts in these fields of physics lacked real referents. Albert Einstein's positivist predisposition prompted him to adopt the nonrealist path to the special relativity and the quantum physics as Arthur Fine says that 'if we examine the two twentieth-century giants among physical theories, relativity and the quantum theory, we find a living refutation of

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[91] op.cit., p. 201.
[92] op.cit., p. 201.

the realist's claim that only his view of science explains its progress, and we find some curious twist and contrasts over realism as well. … A study of his tortured path to general relativity shows the repeated use of this Machist line, always used to deny that some concept has a real referent. Whatever other, competing strains there were in Einstein's philosophical orientation (and there certainly were others), it would be hard to deny the importance of this instrumetalist/positivist attitude in liberating Einstein from various realist commitments. Indeed, on another occasion, 1 would argue in detail that without the "freedom from reality" provided by his early reverence for Mach, a central tumbler necessary to unlock the secret of special relativity would never have fallen into place.'[93]

Foucault says that connaisance remains in the clutches of subjectivity or connaissance is the subjective enterprise. So subject plays the key role in achieving the scientific knowledge and for this subject depends on savior. On the other hand, it is savoir that concerns archeology, so archeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge (savoir)/science axis as Foucault says that 'instead of exploring the consciousness/knowledge (connaissance )/science axis (which cannot escape subjectivity), archaeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge (savoir)/science axis. And whereas the history of ideas finds the point of balance of its analysis in the element of connaissance (and is thus forced, against its will, to encounter the transcendental interrogation), archaeology finds the point of balance of its analysis in savoir - that is, in a domain in which the subject is necessarily situated and dependent, and can never figure as titular (either as a transcendental activity, or as empirical consciousness).'[94]

Under these considerations, Foucault suggests that we should distinguish between scientific domains and archeological territories. Those texts or propositions that do not meet the accepted norms of the period are not seen as

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[93] Fine, Arthur, 1986: 122-123.  Einstein's positivist predisposition can be attributed to his pursuance of Mach and Hume. Schrodinger is the other founder of quantum theory. Once he spotted the difficulties in the wavelike reality for his own equation, he abstained from making any reference to reality. The positivist approach was further given formidable push by Bohr's philosophy of complementarity. Most of the major breakthroughs in atomic, nuclear, and particle physics of the twentieth century came in the conceptual backdrop of quantum unrealism. The pursuance of nonrealist way by physicists has churned out immense success in the history of science.
[94] op.cit., pp.201-202.

belonging to the scientific domain. Literary and philosophical texts are excluded from any domain of scientificity as they do not observe the established scientific norms of the period. But an archeological territory extends not only to scientific texts but also to literary and philosophical texts that do not observe to a great deal the scientific norms of the period. 'Archaeological territories may extend to 'literary' or 'philosophical' texts, as well as scientific ones. Knowledge is to be found not only in demonstrations, it can also be found in fiction, reflexion, narrative accounts, institutional regulations, and political decisions' and thus 'the sciences appear in the element of a discursive formation and against the background of knowledge.'[95]

Knowledge (savoir), thus, acts as an epistemological site or the background in which the sciences emerge. This epistemological site contains everything that contributes to the formation of the sciences. Foucault is of the view that 'science is localized in a field of knowledge and plays a role in it'[96] and so knowledge (savoir) is distributed across the entire epistemological field and is not just contained in a science or a particular set of statements which gains intelligibility and legitimacy because of its background. Such understanding of the distinction between savoir and connaissance thus alludes to the Foucault's dynamic understanding of knowledge. The significance of the role a science plays in a field of knowledge changes as it undergoes sequential modifications over a period of time as 'what, in the Classical period, was offered as the medical knowledge of diseases of the mind occupied a very small place in the knowledge of madness: it constituted scarcely more than one of its many surfaces of contact (the others being jurisprudence, casuistics, police regulations, etc. ); on the other hand, the psychopathological analyses of the nineteenth century, which were also offered as scientific knowledge (connaissance) of mental diseases, played a very different, much more important role in the knowledge (savoir) of madness (the role of model, and decision-making authority).'[97] Because of a specific relation

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[95] op.cit., p. 202-203.
[96] op.cit., p. 203.
[97] op.cit., p. 203.

between science and knowledge, archeological relation show positively how a science functions in the element of knowledge.

## Norms and the Nondiscursive

Foucault talks of four distinct stages or thresholds that a discursive formation crosses. Threshold of positivity and threshold of epistemologization come prior to the threshold of scientificity and threshold of formalization. The first threshold is crossed by a discursive practice when it becomes an individual and autonomous system and start operating to govern the formation of statements. The second stage is reached when a group of statements is formed following the epistemic norms of verification and coherence through which to verify knowledge. The threshold of scientificity is crossed when the statements of the epistemological figure comply with archeological rules of formation and with certain laws for the construction of propositions under certain scientific methodology  as ' some epistemological figures whose outline, position, and function can be reconstituted in their positivity by means of an analysis of the archaeological type; and these, in turn, may obey two different organizations: some present characteristics of objectivity and systematicity which make it possible to define them as sciences; others do not answer to those criteria, that is, their form of coherence and their relation to their object are determined by their positivity alone.'[98] The final threshold of formalization is crossed when the scientific discourse is able to define the axioms necessary to it and to deploy the formal edifice that is constitutes. Archeology's one of the major concerns is to explore the distribution in time of these thresholds, there succession and the conditions in which they are established. Foucault says that a discursive formation do not cross different stages at regular intervals or at the same time and the occurrence of thresholds is not regular or homogeneous. This divides the history of human knowledge (connaicssances) into different ages. While many positivities reach the final threshold, others do not yet reach the threshold of scientificity. In the case of the

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[98] op.cit., pp. 398-399.

transition from Natural History to biology, the thresholds of scientificity are linked with the transition from one positivity to another. In some instances two stages are confused in time. In the case of the discursive practice of mathematics the distinction between different thresholds vanishes. It is the only science that crosses at the same time all the four thresholds.

Foucault says that different thresholds and the attention to the threshold of interest make it possible to do different types of historical analysis. He says that the analysis at the level of formalization is possible in the case of the historical analysis of mathematics. The second type of historical analysis is done at the threshold of scientificity. This analysis is directed at discovering how a concept freed itself from metaphor and imaginary content to function as a scientific concept and how a region of experience got rid of immediate practical uses or values related to those uses to constitute a scientific domain, thus discovering how a science got established over and against a pre-scientific level. This kind of history of science was practiced by G. Bachelard and G. Canguilhem, where they dealt only with connaissance or took only the current scientific disciplines and accepted these fully constituted sciences as the norm of its historical analysis to write the history of how the concepts and standards of these sciences developed freeing itself from pre-scientific stuffs as 'it shows what the science has freed itself from, everything that it has had to leave behind in its progress towards the threshold of scientificity. Consequently, this description takes as its norm the fully constituted science; the history that it recounts is necessarily concerned with the opposition of truth and error, the rational and the irrational, the obstacle and fecundity, purity and impurity, the scientific and the non-scientific. It is an epistemological history of the sciences.'[99] Thus this type of historical analysis, which deals with only savoir, uncritically accepts as norms the concepts and methods of current sciences, which are fully defined, in order to analyze past scientific discourses. On the contrary, the third type of historical analysis, which is done at the level of epistemologization, does not see scientificity as serving as a norm as it rather seeks to remove the wraps over

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[99] op.cit., p. 210.

different discursive practices to see how they brings forth a defined corpus of knowledge and how they assume the status and role of a science. Because this historical analysis deals with savoir that provides the conditions of possibility for a defined scientific knowledge, Foucault sees it as archeological history of science whose job is not just to uncritically describe discursive formations but to show how a science get established in a discursive formation, how processes of epistemologization get established to attain the norms of scientificity. Such an analysis thus tries to explicate the historical processes through which cognitive norms are formed, showing norms as the products of historical processes as 'such an analysis sets out, therefore, to outline the history of the sciences on the basis of a description of discursive practices; to define how, in accordance with which regularity, and as a result of which modifications, it was able to give rise to the processes of epistemologization, to attain the norms of scientificity, and, perhaps, to reach the threshold of formalization.'[100] Thus archeological history which Foucault practices does not accept norms of fully constituted sciences in an uncritical way and subject them to archeological analysis, which shows that their emergence is rooted in contingent historical processes and archeological or epistemological structures. Foucault says that the analysis of discursive formation, of positivities, and knowledge in their relations with epistemological figures is the analysis of episteme and the episteme is 'the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems.'[101] The presence of such set of relations among different discursive practices is possible because this set of discursive practices is tethered to common non-discursive domains and its practices which make possible the occurrence of different discursive practices at a given period. And as it is these discursive practices that go on to take the form of sciences, we can say that the norms appear at the interaction point of discursive practices and non-discursive domain and its practices. It can also be said that as 'archeology … reveals relations between discursive formations and non-

[100] op.cit., p. 210.
[101] op.cit., p. 211.

discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)'[102] and as archeological history, which does historical analysis at the level of epistemolization, uncover discursive practices in so far as they give rise to a corpus of knowledge, in so far as they assume the status and role of a science, so archeology seeks to reveal that scientific norms originate at the interaction point of discursive practices and non-discursive systems, thus removing the role of subject in the formation of norms by showing that norms originate beyond the domain of subjectivity. Though episteme as the set of relations between sciences, epistemological figures, positivities, and discursive practices imposes a set of constraints and limitations on discourse, but it makes possible in the positivity of discursive practices the existence of epistemological figures and sciences. At the centre of the analysis of the episteme is the very fact that scientific discourse exist and it relates this fact to the processes of a historical practice as he says that 'as a set of relations between sciences, epistemological figures, positivities, and discursive practices, the episteme makes it possible to grasp the set of constraints and limitations which, at a given moment, are imposed on discourse: but this limitation is not the negative limitation that opposes knowledge connaissance) to ignorance, reasoning to imagination, armed experience to fidelity to appearances, and fantasy to inferences and deductions; the episteme is not what may be known at a given period, due account taken of inadequate techniques, mental attitudes, or the limitations imposed by tradition; it is what, in the positivity of discursive practices, makes possible the existence of epistemological figures and sciences. …. In the enigma of scientific discourse, what the analysis of the episteme questions is not its right to be a science, but the fact that it exists. And the point at which it separates itself off from all the philosophies of knowledge (connaissance) is that it relates this fact not to the authority of an original act of giving, which establishes in a transcendental subject the fact and the right, but the processes of a historical practice.'[103] So the archeological analysis does not explain the link between discourse and the non-discursive domain through symbolic or causal

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[102] op.cit., pp. 179-180.
[103] op.cit., pp. 211-212.

analysis which other history of sciences does to explain that link. The symbolic analysis sees in the organization of discourses such as clinical medicine and in the concomitant historical processes two simultaneous expressions, which reflect and symbolize each other and which the form that they share. While the causal analysis tries to discover the extent to which the political changes or economic processes could determine the consciousness of scientists or in which direction or how far their interest would go and how they would perceive things. Thus the causal analysis would say that the industrial capitalist's manpower requirements caused the disease to take social dimension or medical profession explained diseases in social terms with the sate seeing it as the collective responsibility to maintain health, cure, and public assistance for the poor and sick and to search for pathological causes and sites. Archeological analysis on the other hand is done on another level as it 'wishes to show not how political practice has determined the meaning and form of medical discourse, but how and in what form it takes part in its conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning.'[104] This relation of political practice to discourse can be seen in operation at three different levels. At the fundamental level, non-discursive or social factors open up new fields for the mapping of scientific objects. Thus administratively compartmentalized population as per norms of life, the conscript armies of the revolutionary period, and the institutions of hospital assistance in relation to the economic needs of the time constituted new fields for the mapping of medical objects. Another level where this connection can be seen is the institutional relation of the doctor with the hospitalized patient or with his private practice. In this institutional relation the doctor enjoys the status of virtually the exclusive enunciator of medical discourse. Finally, this relation can also be seen in the social function of medical discourse in judging individuals, making administrative decisions, laying down the norms of the society. Medical discourse here as a practice concerns itself with 'a particular field of objects, finding itself in the hands of a certain number of statutorily designated individuals, and having certain functions to exercise in society, is articulated on practices that are external to it, and which are not

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[104] op.cit., p. 181.

themselves of a discursive order.'[105] Thus discourse and the non-discursive domains or social factors are connected in fundamental ways. This connection serves the basis for the origin of scientific norms as non-discursive practices take part in the conditions of emergence of discourses which observe those norms. These norms, which govern the formation of discourses, are essentially tethered to the social practices with shows the nature of our engagement with the word. Habermas also tries to highlight the similar thing when he talks of cognitive interests as he says that the hermeneutic sciences and the empirical-analytical sciences are 'governed by cognitive interests rooted in the life contexts of communicative and instrumental action.'[106] Habermas says that it is only the knowledge-constitutive interest that lays down the conditions of the possible objectivity of knowledge. As we saw Foucault also says that social practices with which we are engaged and which interest us take part in the conditions of emergence and function of discourses. Thus Foucault's archeology 'seeks to discover that whole domain of institutions, economic processes, and social relations on which a discursive formation can be articulated; it tries to show how the autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the status of pure ideality and total historical independence; what it wishes to uncover is the particular level in which history can give place to definite types of discourse, which have their own type of historicity, and which are related to a whole set of various historicities.'[107] Thus it is the practical engagement of human with their world at a given period of time that serves as the basis for the emergence of the norms of the sciences. Archeological analysis saw how medical discourse

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[105] op.cit., p. 182.

[106] Habermas, Jurgen, 1968/1972: 176. The empirical-analytic sciences are anchored in the behavioral system of instrumental action and the hermeneutic sciences in interactions mediated by ordinary language. Empirical-analytic methods seek to understand reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical control, whereas hermeneutic methods seek to maintain the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary-language communication and in action according to common norms. The cultural sciences' practical relation to life determines both their historical genesis as well as the factual context of their application. The practical cognitive interest defines the level of hermeneutics itself a priori like the technical cognitive interest defines the framework of the empirical-analytic sciences. This practical relation to life so does not undermine the objectivity of science as it is only the knowledge-constitutive interest that lays down the conditions of the possible objectivity of knowledge.

[107] op.cit., p. 182.

performed specific social functions as individuals were judged and categorized according to its scientific definitions. It facilitated in making administrative and judicial decisions and so in running prisons. Thus scientific discourses were used to discipline individuals or in the exercise of a technique of power. The archeological analysis of both discursive practices and non-discursive practices establish veritable symbiotic nexus between knowledge and power. This connection was explored in depth in Foucault's work of 1970s as he rolls out the dynamic conceptualization of power.

# Chapter 3

# Knowledge, Truth and Power

## Introduction

In *Disciplin and Punish* Foucault says that he seeks to write this book as an genealogical history of the modern soul. He shows that discipline as a modern technique of power emerged as the blueprint of a general method. With new system of discourses of truth and techniques of power in place, the new scientific-juridical complex served as the base to discipline body even at schools, hospitals, military camps, factories, producing the disciplinary society or what he calls 'carceral archipelago.'[108] The new knowledge about the subject produced by the different techniques of power as the body underwent the mechanism of objectification was used for the further exercise of power or in the further deployment of techniques of power. It is in this context he talks of power-knowledge. Finally in *The History of Sexuality* he talks about 'bio-power' which supplements disciplinary power as the techniques to control populations or species body to ensure the right of the social body to maintain and develop its life.

## Discipline, Power and Truth

Foucault begins *Discipline and Punish* by offering a detailed account of the public execution of Damiens, who committed regicide. His body was made to undergo immense torture in a hideous way in public on a scaffold before the main door of the Church of Paris in 1757. He then mentions a time-table for the House of young prisoners in Paris eighty years later, detailing meticulously when prisoners

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[108] Foucault, 1975/1991: 298.

must rise, dress, go down into courtyard, leave school, and get into bed. The purpose is to highlight a shift in the penal style as public execution gave way to a time-table towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. As old customs and traditional justice entered its twilight, modern penal codes were chalked out under the new moral or political justification of the right to punish and discipline.

Under the new theory of law and crime, body is no longer the locus of punishment. The body does not have to undergo the public torture any more. This reflected deeper changes and institutional transformations which was underway towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The disappearance of traditional punishment practice of subjecting body of the condemned to public torture for long hours coincided with the emergence of new thought which saw such practice of punishment as savage as the crime itself, executioner as a criminal and judges as murderers because the 'public execution is now seen as a hearth in which violence bursts again into flames.'[109] As punishment becomes the hidden part of the penal process, it entered the domain of abstract consciousness. Now punishment's inevitability and the certainty of being punished discourage crime rather than the horror of public execution as punishment changes its mechanisms of operation. In modern justice there is a growing shame in punishing which is reflected in the proliferation of the psychologists and the minor civil servants of moral orthopedics, whose job was to prevent the crime from being committed in the first place. The disappearance of public punishment or execution meant the disappearance of what is at the centre of such practice of public punishment, that is, the body. Punitive practices no longer confront the body physically as they try to reach something beyond the body itself. Though in modern penal systems some penalties such as incarceration, forced labor, penal servitude, deportation and the like are physical penalties,  but 'the punishment-body relation is not the same as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in

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[109] ibid., p. 9.

order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property. The body, according to this penalty, is caught up in a system of constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty.'[110] Any manipulation of body, if necessary, needed to observe strict rules and fulfill a much higher aim than just torturing body. With new technicalities and restraint in place, a whole new crop of technicians sprang up, such as doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists and the like. The very presence of these technicians near the inmates shapes their consciousness that the body and torture are not the ultimate objects of punitive practices; this is what the new law wanted to achieve. It can be said that the presence of the technicians near the prisoners did what the Panopticon did to its inmates, that is, to 'induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic function of power.'[111] Under the new morality concerning the act of punishment, the execution now affected life rather than the body. The execution was performed in a single moment and with a single blow, thus reducing thousand deaths to strict capital punishment. The new execution methods made criminals more frightful of the torture, fulfilling the intention of the new law. The new forms of punishment applied the law to a judicial subject and not to its body, that is, the new ways of punishing intended to deprive the subject of its right to live, or of its right to liberty, or its right to wealth as judicial reticence or sobriety began to be observed in punishment. Though minor elements of torture like solitary confinement, sexual deprivation, and rationing of food remains in the modern criminal justice, but this trace of torture is overshadowed increasing by the non-corporeal nature of the current penal system. What is significant amidst these changes is the change of objective of the penal practices. The very object of the penal rituals has changed

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[110] ibid., p. 11.

[111] ibid., p. 201. Foucault talks of Bentham's device, i.e., Panopticon, which is an architectural figure that is composed on the dualistic mechanisms of exclusion. At the centre is a tower with a supervisor and at the periphery an annular building which is divided into cells that contains a patient, a madman, and the like where they are perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The panopticon mechanism makes it possible to see constantly. Thus the inmates lived in the+ constant knowledge that they are being watched upon always.

or displaced. It is no longer the body but it is the soul as 'the expiation that once rained down upon the body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations.'[112] With the change in punishment practices and with the objective shifting to the soul, the object of the penal practice is now not only the judicial objects or the element of object of the judicial or penal discourses but also the soul which also is judged now. So the judgment is also passed on the criminal's passions, instincts, infirmities, effects of environment, perversions and desires for 'it is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and punished. They are judged indirectly as 'attenuating circumstances' that introduce into the verdict not only 'circumstantial' evidence, hut something quite different, which is not juridically codifiable: the knowledge of the criminal, one's estimation of him, what is known about the relations between him, his past and his crime, and what might be expected of him in the future.'[113] The interplay of notions of scientific fields was also used in judging those shadows, which served as ways to define an individual. The punishment measures now included security measures that accompanied the internal economy of a penalty in order to supervise the individual so that the individual can be assisted in liberating itself from the clutches of the shadows of criminal acts. The modern disciplines of psychiatry, criminal anthropology, and criminology helped cast criminal offences among the objects of scientific knowledge that provided the mechanisms of legal punishment, that is, the concrete steps of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, and normative judgments regarding the criminal, which ensured the legal system's hold on the soul of the criminal and so on the individual, thus determining what one is, will be, may be as 'discipline makes individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise.'[114] In the Middle Ages, knowledge of the offence, knowledge of the offender, and knowledge of the law served as the conditions for grounding a judgment in truth. Now a different set of questions of

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[112] ibid., p. 16.

[113] ibid., p. 17.

[114] ibid., p. 170. This disciplinary power makes use of three simple but effective instruments of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and the examination.

truth came up in the penal judgment. Assessment of the criminal act itself and the determination of its nature need to be done now. What is also sought to be established is its causal process, and its origin in the author. These questions were answered in the light of modern scientific disciplines of psychiatry, criminal anthropology, and criminology as we are 'judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.'[115] Thus the whole modern set of assertion, diagnostic, prognosis, and normative judgment became part of the penal judgment as it made it possible to ground the judgment in modern truth which entangled with the earlier truth. This entangling of one truth with another truth made the judgment a scientific-juridical complex as Foucault says 'another truth has penetrated the truth that was required by the legal machinery; a truth which, entangled with the first, has turned the assertion of guilt into a strange scientifico-juridical complex.'[116] As now the judge-magistrate does more than just passing the judgment of guilt, their sentence includes an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization and 'by assessing acts with precision, discipline judges individuals 'in truth'; the penality that it implements is integrated into the cycle of knowledge of individuals'[117] So the increasingly complicated penal machinery for the implementation of sentences and which also adjusted according to individuals led to a mushrooming of the authorities of judicial-making and extended its power of decision beyond sentence.

With new set of objects, new system of truth, and a raft of authorities with new roles in place, it can be said that 'beneath the increasing leniency of punishment, then, one may map a displacement of its point of application; and through this displacement, a whole field of recent objects, a whole new system of truth and a mass of roles hitherto unknown in the exercise of criminal justice. A corpus of knowledge, techniques, 'scientific' discourses is formed and becomes

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[115] Foucault, 1976: 94.
[116] op.cit., p. 19.
[117] op.cit., p. 181.

entangled with the practice of the power to punish.'[118] This new power[119] to judge and punish thus has its base in the current scientifico-juridical complex.

## Micro-physics of power and Discipline

It is the transformation in the way the power relations invests the body that serves as the basis for the scientific-juridical formation and thus for the transformation of punitive methods as Foucault says that 'the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain 'political economy' of the body: even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even when they use 'lenient' methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue - the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission'; so power relations 'invest it, mark it, train it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs' and this 'political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both productive body and a subjected body.'[120] The power relations wield direct control over the body so as to come up with a productive body. As a technique of power, discipline seeks to forge new kind of body, that is, docile bodies that can be subjected, transformed and improved as 'the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power', was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed

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[118] op.cit., pp. 22-23.

[119] This is the pure form of power as 'the pure form of power resides in the function of the legislator; and its mode of action .... Is of a juridico-discursive character' (Foucault, 1976/1998: 83).

[120] op.cit., pp. 25-26.

and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies.'[121]

The emergence of this new form or method of punishment, that is, discipline cannot be attributed to just one grand process of incarceration but to different and dispersed minor processes with different origins as 'the 'invention' of this new political anatomy must not be seen as a sudden discovery. It is rather a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method.'[122] This method was in operation even in secondary education, in primary schools, in hospitals, in the restructuring of military organizations, during the control of epidemic diseases, in the invention of the rifles and in the victories of Prussia. These different disciplinary institutions with their own individual differences employed meticulous techniques that defined a new micro-physics of power or a particular mode of detailed political investment of body. As the political technology of body is made up of bits and pieces and implements a disparate set of methods with not any particular institution or state apparatus as its point of location, the state apparatuses and different institutions operate a micro-physics of power whose field of validity lies between the functioning of these institutions and the bodies themselves with their materiality and forces as the 'overthrow of these 'micro-powers' does not, … obey the law of all or nothing; it is not acquired once and for all by a new control of the apparatuses nor by a new functioning or a destruction of the institutions; on the other hand, none of its localized episodes may be inscribed in history except by the effects that it induces on the entire network in which it is caught up'[123] and Foucault says that 'the history of this 'micro-physics' of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modem 'soul'. Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of

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[121] op.cit., p. 138.
[122] op.cit., p. 138
[123] op.cit., p. 27.

power over the body.'[124] The soul has a reality as it get produced permanently around, on, and within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised over all those who are supervised, trained and corrected, over children at school and at home and also over madman and the colonized. This genealogy of the modern soul brings into light the historical reality of the soul which is brought into being by the methods of punishment, supervision and constraint.

The modern techniques or methods of power have several new features. These methods or disciplines make possible the maximum control over the functioning of the body in order to keep its forces subjected and maintained a relation of docility-utility on it. The first of the features of new techniques of power is the scale of the control as 'it was a question not of treating the body, *en masse*, 'wholesale', as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it 'retail', individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself - movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body' and the object of the control is 'no longer the signifying elements of behaviour or the language or the body, but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization; constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the signs; the only truly important ceremony is that of exercise'[125], finally there is the element of modality of the control that 'implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement.'[126]

Discipline, as Foucault notes, proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space, to the control of activity, then to the organization of geneses, and finally to the composition of forces. This made possible the optimization of the functioning of the body and to rearrange it into a new body. To achieve the distribution of individuals, discipline employs several techniques. The technique of enclosure is sometimes required and it specifies a place which is heterogeneous to others. This enclosure acted as the protected place of disciplinary monotony.

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[124] op.cit., p. 29.
[125] op.cit., p. 136-137.
[126] op.cit., p. 137.

The disciplinary machinery employs the technique of portioning or elementary location which works space in a much more detailed and flexible way as 'disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. Its aim to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or its merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organizes an analytical space.'[127] The technique of functional site codes a space for different uses, which is seen in operation especially in the military and naval hospitals. The final technique in the art of distribution of individuals in space is of the rank or the place one occupies in a classification because 'discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations.'[128] The control of activity involves time-table for coordination among activities; it further involves the temporal elaboration of the acts which defines the anatomo-chronological schema of behavior, where the act gets broken down into its elements and the position of the body, limbs, articulations gets defined and so we have the correlation of body and the gesture as disciplinary control imposes the best relation between a gesture and the overall position of the body, which is its condition of speed and efficiency. Control of activity then involves body-body articulation where the relations that the body must have with the object that its manipulates get defined by discipline and finally it involves exhaustive use which is the principle of non-idleness. Now discipline comes to the organization of geneses where disciplines are understood as machinery for adding up and

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[127] op.cit., p. 143
[128] op.cit., p. 146

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capitalizing time in order to exercise power over men through the mediation of time. Finally discipline arrives at the composition of forces as 'a new demand to which discipline must respond: to construct a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, of extracting time from them and accumulating itt but of composing forces i n order to obtain an efficient machine.'[129]

As discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space to finally the composition of forces, it exercises four techniques, thus creating an individuality with four characteristics as Foucault says that 'discipline creates out of the bodies it controls four types of individuality, or rather an individuality that is endowed with four characteristics: it is cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities), It is genetic (by the accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the composition of forces). And, in doing so, it operates four great techniques: it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it imposes exercises; lastly in order to obtain the combination of forces, it arranges tactics·. Tactics, the art of constructing, with located bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination are no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice.[130] This serves the basis for the general foundation of all military practice. Our society also operates like the military as Foucault says that 'historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility.'[131]

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[129] op.cit., p. 164.
[130] op.cit., p. 167.
[131] op.cit., p. 169.

# Power and Knowledge

Foucault points out that to train is the key function of the disciplinary power. It seeks to multiply and use forces. It separates, analyses, and differentiates its subjects in order to get sufficient single unites as it ''trains' the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements - small, separate cells, organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments.'[132] The success of disciplinary power can be attributed to the use of three simple but effective instruments, that is, hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. The hierarchical observation adopts a mechanism that coerces by means of observation. It has the techniques to see the observed and to keep it clearly visible, which induces the effects of power. It employs the technique of eyes that sees without being seen. Though the emergence of the minor technique of these multiple and intersecting observations cannot be accounted for by the traditional history of sciences, they secretary gave a new knowledge of man. It came up with an architecture in order to 'permit an internal, articulated and detailed control - to render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms an architecture of power that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them. Stones can make people docile and knowable'[133], so there is 'no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze.'[134] Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance has great importance among the techniques of power. Disciplinary power becomes an integrated system through such surveillance and is linked to the economy from the inside and to the aims of the mechanism. This power is organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power as it functions as a network of relations from top to bottom and

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[132] op.cit., p. 170.

[133] op.cit., p. 172.

[134] Foucault, 1977: 155. Foucault points out that the system of surveillance incurs very little expense.  So power is continuously exercised at a minimal cost. Bentham called it the Colombus's egg of political thought when he realizes that he has discovered a superb formula in the form of Panopticon. This formula is the opposite of monarchical power.

this network holds the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with the effects of power but this 'power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is true that its pyradmidal organization gives it a 'head', it is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field. This enables the disciplinary power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone of shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with  the task of supervising; and absolutely "discreet', for it functions permanently and largely in silence. Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, for the spectacle of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes.[135] So it is futile to ask the question of who has the power, what is the aim of someone who possesses it or why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy, rather 'it is a case of studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices. What is needed is a study of power in its external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there - that is to say-where it installs itself and produces its real effects… Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other words, rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects.'[136] Power should not be seen as a phenomenon where an individual homogeneously

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[135] op.cit. p. 177.
[136] Foucault, 1976: 97.

dominates over others. It is not localized in anybody's hand. On the contrary, power functions in the form of a chain or a network of relations from top to bottom and is employed and exercised though a net-like organization as Foucault suggests that power should be analyzed 'as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application.'[137] The individual is not an inert material or point on which power is exercised rather it is one of the effects of the power.

Normalizing judgment is the other instrument which the disciplinary power uses. Any activity, any behavior, any gesture or any sexuality that departs from the rule or the norm is punishable. The punishment involves subtle procedures which ranges from light physical punishment to minor deprivation to petty humiliations. So the punishment involves a double juridico-natural reference in the disciplinary regime. In his disciplinary regime 'the workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole micro-penality of time (latenesses, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ('incorrect' attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency).'[138] So, everything, be it school or hospital or army or workshop, acquires the punitive function or can make normalizing judgment and can punish even the slightest deviations from the norm. This has the effect of putting every single citizen in the dock if they departed from the norm even slightly. Disciplinary punishment is also corrective as it subjects individuals to exercise, that is, intensified, multiple forms of training repeated several time if

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[137] ibid., p. 98.
[138] op.cit., p. 178.

one deviated from the norm in order to make them meet the norm. Discipline also involves the element of gratification. The disciplinary punishment of training and correction gave rise to the positive pole as the object of training is to get better behavior so that one can achieve better rank or position so 'through this micro-economy of a perpetual penality operates a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level or their values. By assessing acts with precision, discipline judges individuals 'in truth'; the penality that it implements is integrated into the cycle of knowledge of individuals.'[139]

The art of punishing in the regime of disciplinary power normalizes and it normalizes by five distinct operation of referring individual action to a whole, by differentiating individuals from one another, by measuring in quantitative terms and hierarchzing in terms of value the abilities, the level, the nature of the individual, by introducing the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved, and finally by tracing the limit that define differences in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal. Thus normalization in the regime of disciplinary power gives the substantial knowledge of the individual, of us. We now know the nature and the abilities of individuals, we now can refer individual actions, and we now can differentiate individuals.

The normalizing judgment is thus opposed to judicial penality 'whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals, but by specifying acts according to a number of general categories; not by hierarchizing, but quite simply by bringing into play the binary opposition of the permitted and the forbidden; not by homogenizing, but by operating the division, acquired once and for all, of condemnation' and this 'disciplinary mechanisms secreted a 'penality of the norm', which is irreducible in its principles and functioning to the traditional penality of the law.'[140] Normalization emerged as one of the great instruments of power at the start of the modern age. The

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[139] op.cit., p. 181.
[140] op.cit., p. 183.

Normal is institutionalized in the organization of a national medical profession and in a hospital system and get established in the standardization of industrial process and products. Power of the Norm can be seen in the emergence of the modern disciplines as Foucault says that 'the power of the norm appears through the disciplines. Is this the new law of modern society? Let us say rather that, since the eighteenth century, it has joined other powers - the Law, the Word (Parole) and the Text, Tradition - imposing new delimitations upon them. The Normal is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education and the establishment of the 'ecoltes normales (teachers' training colleges); it is established in the effort to organize a national medical profession and a hospital system capable of operating general norms of health; it is established in the standardization of industrial processes and products. Like surveillance and with it, normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age.'[141] The most recent incident of the Normal being established can be witnessed in the effort of the federal government to establish the first and only federal agency which is devoted to children's welfare and which seeks to enforce a national vision of a normal childhood as the historian Paula S. Fass in her latest book[142] says that ' by the end of the nineteenth century, saving children who needed care and providing advice to mothers about effective nurture became the central commitment of public life. These continued forcefully into the early twentieth century. Drawing on the prestige of science and the level of statistics, even the federal government became a critical actor in this realm, with the establishment of the first and only federal agency devoted to children's welfare. … this was underwritten by a new professionalism in the twentieth century that enlisted pediatricians, psychologists, childrearing advisors, and experts in juvenile delinquency. Together they reframed the parent-child relationship as mothers, in particular, were urged to look outside the home for

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[141] op.cit., p. 184.
[142] 'The end of American Childhood: A history of parenting from life on the frontier to the managed child' is Paula S. Pass's newest book published by Princeton University Press, 2016.

counsel. By the 1930s, this "expert" knowledge about children produced a national vision of a national childhood.'[143]

Besides the techniques of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement, there is the instrument of the examination which the disciplinary power uses. The examination is a normalizing gaze as it combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. It is the technique to establish a visibility over individuals through which to differentiate and judge them. The hospital gets organized as an examination apparatus and the school also functions as an apparatus of uninterrupted examination. Now there is the practice of regular observation that placed the subject in a situation of perpetual examination as this made possible the extraction 'from the pupil a knowledge destined and reserved for the teacher. The school became the place of elaboration for pedagogy. And just as the procedure of the hospital examination made possible the epistemological 'thaw' of medicine, the age of the 'examining' school marked the beginnings of a pedagogy that functions as a science. The age of inspections and endlessly repeated movements in the army also marked the development of an immense tactical knowledge that had its effect in the period of the Napoleonic wars.'[144] This newly furnished pedagogic, medical and military knowledge was put to use for the further exercise of power. The visibility that was established over individuals gets transformed into the exercise of power by the technique of examination as 'the examination introduced a whole mechanism that linked to a certain type of the formation of knowledge a certain form of the exercise of power' and this visibility of the individuals that assures the hold of the power over them is the 'the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. And the examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the

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[143] Fass, Paula S., 2016: 8.
[144] op.cit., p. 187.

ceremony of this objectification.'[145] The recent flourishing practice of parenting can be seen as doing the same thing as it sees child as its object. As a set of techniques, parenting aims to produce a particular kind of child and eventually happy and successful adults as Alison Gopnik says 'a strange thing happened to mothers and fathers and children at the end of the 20th century. It was called "parenting".... "parenting" means something that parents *should* do. "To parent" is a goal-directed verb; it describes a job, a kind of work. The goal is to somehow turn your child into a better or happier or more successful adult... The right kind of "parenting" will produce the right who in turn will become the right kind of adult. The idea that parents can learn special techniques that will make their children turn out better is ubiquitous.... The promise of "parenting is that there is some set of techniques, some particular expertise, that parents could acquire that would help them accomplish the goal of shaping their lives.'[146]

The examination also involves a mass of documents that captures and fix individuals. It came in handy in the army where the accumulated document made it possible to track down deserters, to know the services and the value of each individual. It also came in handy in the hospitals as it made possible to recognize patients, follow the evolution of diseases, study the effectiveness of treatments, and in the teaching establishments it made possible to define the aptitude of each individual, to situate their level and aptitude, to indicate their possible use, and to know the habits of the children and their progress. This led to the 'the formation of a whole series of codes of disciplinary individuality that made it possible to transcribe, by means of homogenization the individual features established by the examination: the physical code of signalling, the medical code of symptoms, the educational or military code of conduct or performance. These codes were still very crude, both in quality and quantity, but they a first stage in the 'formalization' of the individual within power relations.'[147] The disciplinary

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[145] op.cit., p. 187.

[146] Gopnik, Arthur (2016, July 16). A manifesto against parenting. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from www.wsj.com  Dr. Gopnik's "The Garden and the Carpenter: What the New Science of Child Development Tells Us About the Relationship Between Parents and Children," will be published in August by Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, from which this article has been adapted.

[147] op.cit., pp. 189-190.

writing also involved the correlation of these elements, the accumulation of documents, and the organization of comparative fields, which made it possible to classify, to form categories, and to fix norms. The hospitals used different documentary methods as 'among the fundamental conditions of a good medical 'discipline', in both senses of the word, one must include the procedures of writing that made it possible to integrate individual data into cumulative systems in such a way that they were not lost; so to arrange things that an individual could be located in the general register and that, conversely, each datum of the individual examination might affect overall calculations' and with this apparatus of writing, the  examination 'opened up two correlative possibilities: firstly, the constitution of the individual as a describable, analysable object, not in order to reduce him to 'specific' features, as did the naturalists in relation to living beings, but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly, the constitution of a comparative system that made possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given 'population'.'[148] Confession as the procedure for the production of truths was also established. One either confess or made to confess in a confessing society of ours as the confession 'plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relations, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confess one's crimes, one's sins, one's thought and desires, one's illness and troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in public and in private, to one's parents, one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves; … When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body.' [149] This

[148] op.cit. p.190.
[149] Foucault, 1976/1998: 59.

confession of truth got inscribed at the heart of the procedures of the individualization by power.

With all its documentary techniques, the examination makes each individual a case. With documents to refer to it can be said that that a given individual is a case of defaulter of debt and so a given set of techniques of power can be used against this given debt defaulter. So a case 'constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power' and 'it is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.'[150]

Here we clearly see that power and knowledge directly imply one another. This is what Foucault tries to convey when he speaks of power-knowledge. Once we know that the given individual is the defaulter of debt we also know what set of techniques of power has to be used against the given individual. Further we cannot use this set of technique of power against the given individual unless we know that he is the defaulter of debt. 'Power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations' and 'we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations ate suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests.'[151]

We also saw that the examination is a modality of power in which 'each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the 'marks' that characterize him and make him as a 'case'. So a technique of power produces the knowledge of a case. The combination of hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgement, that is, the examination assures the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory individuality as 'it is the examination which, by

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[150] op.cit., p. 191.
[151] op.cit., p. 27.

combining hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgement, assures the great disciplinary functions of distribution and classificarion, maximum extraction of forces and time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes and, thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality.' [152] That's why Foucault says that 'power produces, it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production' and so 'we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'.'[153] It can then also be said that ''power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. … it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.'[154]

## Bio-Power

Foucault says that power over life evolved in two basic forms. One of these forms is disciplinary power which focused on the individual body or body as the machine. While the other form focused on the species body. He calls this second form bio-power. These two forms constituted bipolar technology. As population increased exponentially, 'government perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a "population," with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and birth rates, life expectancy,

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[152] op.cit., p. 192.
[153] op.cit., p. 194.
[154] op.cit., p. 27-28.

fertility, state of health, frequency off illness, patterns of diet and habitation'[155] and so the 'existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population.'[156] As there occurred transformation in the mechanisms of power since the classical age, with power now focusing on generating, ordering and optimizing forces, a shift also occurred in the right of death. The sovereign no longer enjoyed the right to decide life and death as this 'death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reversal of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life' and 'wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire population are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity' because now 'power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomenon of population.'[157]

So, the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life became important and it led to the proliferation of many and diverse techniques. This marked the heralding of an era of 'bio-power'. As western man gradually learned what it meant to be a living species in a living world and to have a body, biological existence for the first time in history reflected in political existence. Foucault says that 'if one can apply the term *bio-history* to the pressures through which the movements of life and the procedures of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of *bio-power* to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformations of human life.'[158] This transformation of human life and the development of bio-power made possible to seek the answer to the question of man in the new mode of relation between history and life. Now the action of the norm assumes new importance. A technology of power centered on

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[155] op.cit., p. 25.
[156] op.cit. p. 137.
[157] op,cit. pp. 136-137.
[158] op.cit., p. 143.

life led to a normalized society as it does distributions around the norm. Now what man demand and has as its objective is life.

# Conclusion

There can be many interpretations of Foucault's work in terms of overall message. It may seem tempting and easy to see only one aspect of the modern medical sciences, that is, in subjecting individuals to it and its norms while judging and categorizing them and thus putting them to the mechanism of objectification. But the emergence of medicine in the form of a clinical science offered a plethora of new experience of disease. This new experience of disease rendered it possible to have a have a historical and critical understanding of the old experience. It made possible to have a new and different understanding of the mad in the light of new experience, helping remove the Classical treatment of mad people and thus the rational methods to which the mad people were subjected in the Classical age. So the medical rationality has now the access to the copious amount of perception, which enabled one to get to the very grain of things offering the first glimpse of truth. Thus modern medicine liberated human from uncritical methods, constrains and caprice of the Classical age.

We have also seen the appropriateness of archeology as a method of history in his work as it made possible to take us beyond the modern concept of man. The usefulness of archeology as a method for historiography cannot be denied. The philosophical theories, like the one of language, might be taken to be foundational but they serve only as attempts to show that the archeological method can be formulated in a coherent way without any reliance on the modern philosophical category of the constituent subject. It can be then said that Foucault's theoretical discussions in AK is not to establish archeology as the right method of human reality, neither to offer a final theory of human reality which may seem adequate. Rather archeology work as an appropriate instrument of Foucault's critical philosophical project.

With the decline of representation in the modern age, a raft of new possibilities of human thought and action emerged. It now became possible for the human to explore the depths of life, which the Classical age has kept out of its reach. This exploration of life in its empirical richness made it possible for

modern man to have a new knowledge of life. As the new form of thought emerged in the modern age, it became evident that it is possible to know only phenomena and laws and not substances and essences. Thus it is not the ideal essences that determine the order of concrete things but rather the hidden historical forces inside it determine the order of things.

Foucault's method of archeology which analyses the historical development of norms and his method of genealogy which shows how political relations invest the body according to these norms has more liberating effect on human than domination. Archeology provides a neutral historical account of norms of a society, revealing their historical character. One may say that Foucault undertakes his philosophical project of historical critique to show norms as unnecessary constrains on human freedom. One may also say that Foucault tries to show that political practices only determine the meaning and form of discourse. On the contrary, he is trying to highlight that haw and in what form political practices take part in the conditions of emergence of discourses an its norms which librates us from the mechanistic confines of the Classical age, helping us explore new and different aspects of life.

Foucault sees power not just as subjecting individual to the mechanism of objectification, but he also says that power takes part in the perpetual production of knowledge and truth, which can be productively used. He notes that we must not use negative terms for describing the effects of power and so we must not see it as excluding, concealing or repressing. On the contrary it does the production of reality and the rituals of truth, thus making possible the function of modern society. He also notes that we should not see bio-power as an excuse for the modern regimes to execute bloodshed on a massive scale. He says that it rater makes possible to control populations or species bodies and to ensure the right of the social body to maintain and develop its life. The development of bio-power also made possible to seek the answer to the question of man in the new mode of relation between history and life.

One may also say that Foucault is only doing intellectual history focusing on certain political and social goals and that he falls short of tackling the

grand question of human existence and does not talk about eternal truths. It is right to say that old philosophy has strived to gain the knowledge of ultimate truths, but the real purpose of traditional philosophy to seek ultimate truth has been to achieve the freedom of human beings and to bring happiness to them. Be it Plato's idea of the Good, or Aquinas's philosophical thinking of the divine essence, or Spinoza's Absolute as a substance, or Hegel's return to the Absolute as a subject, all tried to gain the knowledge of fundamental truth in order to liberate human beings. Foucault's effort, it can be rightly said, has been to arrive at a realistic way of realizing the conventional philosophical goals. Further, Foucault undertakes meticulous assessment of arguments and deep analysis of concepts to successfully do his own critical philosophy. These exercises of rigorously assessing arguments and deeply analyzing concepts are also performed by traditional philosophers. Generally contemporary philosophizing situates itself in the narrow space of its specialized problems, but Foucault seeks very broad cultural and historical awareness in order to undertake his archeological and genealogical project, which we also find in the enterprise of the towering philosophical figures.

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